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54–387 PDF 2009

THE V–22 OSPREY: COSTS, CAPABILITIES AND

CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 23, 2009

Serial No. 111–32

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

JACKIE SPEIER, California

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

——— ———

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois

——— ———

RON STROMAN, Staff Director

MICHAEL MCCARTHY, Deputy Staff Director

CARLA HULTBERG, Chief Clerk

LARRY BRADY, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on June 23, 2009 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management,

accompanied by Jerry Clark, Senior Analyst, Government Accountability Office; Dakota L. Wood, senior fellow, Center for Strategic and

Budgetary Assessments; Lieutenant General George J. Trautman III,

Deputy Commandant for Aviation, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel

Karsten Heckl, Commander, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 162

(VMM–162), U.S. Marine Corps; and Dr. Arthur Rex Rivolo, U.S.A.F.

(Ret.)/Aviation Expert ................................................................................... 16

Heckl, Lieutenant Colonel Karsten ......................................................... 60

Rivolo, Arthur Rex .................................................................................... 63

Sullivan, Michael J. .................................................................................. 16

Trautman, Lieutenant General George J., III, ....................................... 42

Wood, Dakota L. ........................................................................................ 34

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Heckl, Lieutenant Colonel Karsten, Commander, Marine Medium

Tiltrotor Squadron 162 (VMM–162), U.S. Marine Corps, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 61

Issa, Hon. Darrell E., a Representative in Congress from the State of

California, prepared statement of ................................................................ 8

Rivolo, Dr. Arthur Rex, U.S.A.F. (Ret.)/Aviation Expert, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 65

Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 18

Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts, prepared statement of ................................................... 12

Towns, Hon. Edolphus, a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York, prepared statement of ........................................................... 3

Trautman, Lieutenant General George J., III, Deputy Commandant for

Aviation, prepared statement of .................................................................. 44

Watson, Hon. Diane E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 95

Wood, Dakota L., senior fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, prepared statement of ............................................................... 36

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THE V–22 OSPREY: COSTS, CAPABILITIES AND

CHALLENGES

TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edolphus Towns (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Towns, Cummings, Kucinich, Tierney,

Clay, Connolly, Quigley, Van Hollen, Cuellar, and Issa.

Staff present: John Arlington, chief counsel—investigations; Lisa

Cody and Katherine Graham, investigators; Neema Guliani, investigative counsel; Adam Hodge, deputy press secretary; Carla

Hultberg, chief clerk; Mike McCarthy, deputy staff director; Jesse

McCollum, senior advisor; Steven Rangel, senior counsel; Ophelia

Rivas, assistant clerk; Jenny Rosenberg, director of communications; Christopher Sanders, professional staff member; Ron

Stroman, staff director; Laurence Brady, minority staff director;

Jennifer Safavian, minority chief counsel for oversight and investigations; Frederick Hill, minority director of communications; Dan

Blankenburg, minority director of outreach and senior advisor;

Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk and Member liaison; Stephen

Castor, minority senior counsel; Ashley Callen, minority counsel;

and Glena Sanders, minority Defense fellow.

Chairman TOWNS. The committee will come to order.

Today’s hearing is on the V–22 Osprey, an aircraft that has been

in development for about 25 years and has a very controversial

past. This hearing, however, looks beyond the checkered past and

focuses on the current issues raised in a new report by the Government Accountability Office.

According to the GAO, the V–22 has operational problems that

raise serious questions as to whether the aircraft can accomplish

the full range of its missions as a helicopter. It was intended to replace on the range of the mission provided by other modern helicopters. GAO found that the V–22 has problems with parts, maintenance, reliability, and availability. And I understand the reliability issue is one in which the Department of Defense concurs.

In addition, GAO found that the V–22 may not be operationally

effective in combating questions of the ability of the aircraft to operate in both extreme heat and extreme cold. In short, GAO found

that the Osprey has severe operational and suitability problems.

And these problems have not come cheap. Since 1983, more than

$27 billion has been appropriated for the V–22 program. The cost

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per aircraft has almost tripled since the Osprey’s inception to some

$120 million each. And the cost of the programs may rise even

higher given expected increases in operation and support costs.

Let me be clear. The value of just one American service member is priceless. And if a $120 million aircraft like the V–22 does the

best job of protecting our troops and helping them to accomplish

their mission, then it should be supported. But at $120 million per

aircraft, the Osprey had better work as advertised.

When we first convened this hearing a month ago, I decided,

with the support of the ranking member, Congressman Issa, to

postpone the hearing because the Department of Defense had failed

to produce certain key records pertaining to the Osprey. It took

them a few weeks to do it, but finally we obtained copies of the

after-action report and other data we had requested.

The additional documents raised even more serious questions

about the V–22. The Marine Corps’ own reports on the performance

of the Osprey in Iraq reveals that the Osprey was restricted to a

very limited role due to its vulnerability to hostile fire, its lack of

maneuverability, and its unreliability in the heat and sand in Iraq.

In the course of our investigation, we asked the Defense Department for an inventory of all their Ospreys and how many of those

were ready for combat. The answer was both surprising and appalling. Since 1988, the Marine Corps has bought 105 Ospreys; of this

number, only 47 are considered combat deployable. Worse, we

asked the Marine Corps how many of these are ready for combat

on any given day. On the day the Marine Corps picked, June 3rd

of this year, only 22 of these 47 Ospreys were ready for combat.

In other words, fewer than half would be used for combat on a good

day.

At this point, I have strong reservations about the future of this

aircraft. And let me say, I am anxious to hear from our witnesses

on this particular issue.

At this point, I yield 5 minutes to the ranking member of the

committee, Congressman Darrell Issa of California.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Edolphus Towns follows:]

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Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this

hearing today. And thank you again for postponing the original

hearing to give a better opportunity for the Department of Defense

to provide us with the information necessary to conduct our oversight.

As Chairman Towns said, the Osprey has certainly had a checkered past. Additionally, with the high cost of the Osprey and the

claimed unique mission, it is important that this committee be an

honest broker.

The V–22 clearly is a unique aircraft, a hybrid helicopter and airplane, it does enjoy an ability to fly faster and further than any

helicopter in the fleet. Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I am a

child of the 1960’s and I am a soldier of the 1970’s. I had an opportunity in the 1977–1978 timeframe to be part of a research project

dubbed TASFAL. TASFAL was a fly off between a great many aircraft designed to kill tanks.

Fortunately, I was not a tank platoon leader at the time, and as

we went through that, I became acutely aware that the Department of Defense and the U.S. Congress can, in fact, buy aircraft

for unique missions that let us down. In this case, the A–10 was

unable to perform as well as either attack helicopters, the Tow

Cobra or even an F–4, in killing tanks, Soviet-equivalent tanks,

and surviving. That has left me skeptical anytime someone tells me

that an aircraft uniquely does a job.

Like Ike Skelton from Missouri, I believe we have to make you

prove it.

Today, we are going to hear testimony that certainly surprised

us. It showed us that, in fact, although this aircraft is unique and

does meet certain specifications that may in the future be essential

to a vertical lift, long self-deployment and, in fact, a mission that

could happen again but happened during my military career. In the

1970’s, when our embassy was taken hostage in Iran, the absence

of an aircraft like the Osprey caused us to have to refuel and refit

in the desert. That mid-desert night led to the loss of both materiel

and men that left us embarrassed and unable to rescue our embassy personnel in Tehran, ultimately having to wait until they

were released at the whim of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Notwithstanding that great need and these many years later, we

certainly have to ask, where are we today? And, as the chairman

said, we are at 22 combat-ready aircraft on a given day. And if we

accept that the Osprey is worth further investment—and as a Congressman with 44,000 Marines at Camp Pendleton, I hope in fact

we will make that decision—then how do we go from a low readiness of an aircraft with great promise to one that, in fact, has higher readiness, better survivability and, in fact, is more prepared for

that day in the desert or night in the desert that may never come

again, but if it comes, we may need this aircraft?

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I look forward

to the testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much.

At this time, I yield 5 minutes to the chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tierney

of Massachusetts.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As you are well aware, the Subcommittee on National Security

and Foreign Affairs continues to focus extensively on wasteful defense programs. I can’t underscore enough the importance of oversight of programs that just don’t seem to measure up to our expectations even though we continue to throw money at them.

Annually, Congress gets a report on the health of the Department of Defense’s major weapons acquisitions portfolio from the

Government Accountability Office; and frankly, with $300 billion in

cost growth, that portfolio is anything but healthy. Swine flu is not

the only epidemic around here.

Defense cost overruns have waylaid budgetary flexibility at a

time when we face economic hardship at home and significant challenges abroad. It is time to take a hard look at programs that have

a history of procurement challenges and see where improvements,

if any, have been made to those programs to ensure a better return

on taxpayer investment. If problems continue, then it may be time

to reconsider more drastic action on the part of Congress.

Today, we have the case of the V–22, a program with quite a storied procurement history, involving almost every type of challenge

imaginable, resulting in cost overruns compounded over nearly a

quarter century. The aircraft was intended as a more capable replacement for an existing helicopter; however, in its report the

GAO expressed concerns about the ability of the V–22 to perform

a full range of missions that these helicopters could, including operating in harsh climates.

Now, the Department of Defense is going to procure fewer than

half of the originally planned 1,000 V–22s. How is that an original

plan calling for 1,000 of them that is now going to be fulfilled by

fewer than half of that number with fully less-capable aircraft?

What is equally concerning is that amongst this error-laden procurement process for the V–22, the program has been allowed to

survive without proper scrutiny for such a long time because political decisions have trumped technical and budgetary realities. The

elimination of such a program or even reducing orders for it can

have difficult consequences on employment in some Members’ districts. It is not a new strategy for large contractors to devise and

follow a strategy of spreading the work over several facilities and

subcontractors encompassing as many States and districts as possible in order to ensure protection of their profits. This is a legitimate and serious matter for all those rightfully concerned about

our economy and our work force.

Still, it would seem that a better course would be to develop a

policy for keeping those people at work in burgeoning innovative

industries and developing systems that help achieve our national

security priorities, but that don’t become antiquated before completion and that do so within planned budgets and planned schedules.

The alternative of continuing failed programs as jobs programs

that are rife with waste or abuse of the procurement system and,

in many instances, fail to produce the needed weapons systems to

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protect those who protect us is not the wisest course. In most instances, such a program probably would not be the most efficient

and cost-effective jobs program at any rate.

As we look at this out-of-control issue with defense contracts, we

ought also to look at our policies for protecting the financial security and employment prospects of those to be affected by cuts to

wasteful programs. We owe good workers that, given Congress and

the administration’s complicity in allowing such a problematic condition to develop.

Thank you for your time, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

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Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much.

Any other Members seeking recognition?

The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

associate myself with all the comments that have been made here

this afternoon. I want to thank you and the ranking member for

holding this hearing.

One of the things I think about as I sit here, Mr. Chairman, is

a matter that we are dealing with in my role as chairman on the

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime matters in the Transportation Committee, and that is our deepwater project. This reminds me so much of that. It is incredible, and we have been

straightening that out; but we started, Mr. Chairman, with three

things that I said to my committee, and I want to say that to these

wonderful gentlemen here this afternoon.

First, we must get what we bargain for, period. We must get

what we bargain for. You don’t buy a lawnmower that doesn’t cut

grass. It makes no sense.

No. 2, I said to my subcommittee, whatever we buy for the military, it must do no harm to them. We are out there, our young people—I also serve on the board of the Naval Academy, and I see a

lot of our young people go into the Marines and do wonderful

things. But the idea that we might be buying equipment with the

American people’s money that could actually do harm to those folks

makes no sense whatsoever.

And, three, I said we must make sure that whatever equipment

we buy, that it is the equipment that they need to carry out their

mission. End of game. That is it. If we can do those three things,

then we have done a lot.

Sadly, this Osprey appears to have failed all three of them—to

fail all three of them, then the question becomes, Mr. Chairman—

which I am interested to hear today—how did we get to this point?

I think Mr. Tierney was very clear, and I think he made a good

statement when he said a lot of times this is based on politics. And

I believe that is quite true.

And also, the other piece is, politics to what extent? To the extent of a plane costing this kind of money, unable to do what it is

supposed to do? Harming our people? We are not getting what we

bargained for.

And then you have to ask the question—the people who are in

charge, our acquisitions people, the people who are responsible—is

there incompetence? Are we stuck in a culture of mediocrity? Is

there no empathy for our military?

These are the questions that have to be raised, and I hope that

they are answered. And, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing

our witnesses. I thank you.

With that, I yield back.

Chairman TOWNS. I now yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chairman. And I want to thank you,

Chairman Towns, for convening this important hearing.

This committee has devoted substantial resources to investigating contracting practices, and appropriately so. With the dramatic

rise in volume and value of contracts, we must enhance our manVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:23 Feb 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\54387.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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agement and oversight capacity so we are maximizing return for

the taxpayer.

In previous hearings, this committee has discussed the shortage

of acquisition personnel, specifically in the Department of Defense.

During the Bush administration, the value of contracts doubled

with virtually no significant increase in procurement personnel. At

a Smart Contracting Caucus meeting just this past week, members

of this committee discussed how we need to increase the capacity

as well as the number of acquisition personnel.

As this committee’s work has demonstrated, our acquisition challenges are real. With these systemic challenges, it is not surprising

that we have not resolved problems exemplified by the V–22 Osprey. By most indications, this would seem to be a very expensive

piece of equipment that has not performed as promised. Despite its

failure to perform, Congress has spent more money on it, even as

it becomes apparent it will never perform as promised.

The Government Accountability Office has noted that the V–22

suffers from an unreliable supply chain and a frequent shortage of

parts. We should not need the GAO to identify this problem. If the

Department of Defense does not have the capacity to identify such

problems themselves, then we need to determine how to ensure

that it can in the future.

Similarly, we should not need the GAO to identify problems with

continual and unforeseen increases in cost. Our acquisition personnel need to be equipped and need to be there to be able to preempt

this kind of problem in the first place.

Mr. Chairman, we have chosen a very powerful example to demonstrate the need to reform our acquisition process in the Federal

Government. I hope that we can use the lessons from the V–22 to

identify steps that we can take to avoid repeating these mistakes

in the future, through enhancing the capacity of our acquisition

systems and personnel.

And I thank the chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much.

At this time we would like to swear in all our witnesses. Would

you please stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOWNS. Let the record reflect that all the witnesses

answered in the affirmative. You may be seated.

Let me begin by giving some background on our various witnesses.

Mr. Mike Sullivan is the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing

Management at the Government Accountability Office, who will

testify about GAO’s report entitled, ‘‘Assessments Needed to Address V–22 Aircraft Operational and Cost Concerns to Define Future Investments,’’ which is being released today, and identifies

operational suitability plus challenges concerning the V–22 Osprey.

Welcome.

Mr. Dakota L. Wood is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic

and Budgetary Assessments, an independent, nonpartisan policy

researcher, who will testify about the CSBA’s report, ‘‘Strategy for

the Long Haul, the U.S. Marine Corps: Fleet Marine Forces for the

21st Century.’’

Welcome.

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Lieutenant General George Trautman is the Deputy Commandant for Aviation for the U.S. Marine Corps. The General will

testify about operational and cost issues regarding the V–22 and

the current and future use of the aircraft.

Welcome.

Colonel Karsten Heckl is a Marine Corps pilot and the commander of a V–22 squadron. He will discuss his experience flying

a V–22. Welcome.

Dr. A.R. Rivolo is a retired Air Force pilot who flew combat operations during the Vietnam War, an aviation expert who worked on

operational testing and evaluation of the V–22 for the Institute for

Defense Analyses, which provides direct analysis and support to

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director of Operational Tests

and Evaluations. He will discuss inherent safety issues regarding

the V–22 and operation limitations.

Welcome.

I will ask the witnesses to summarize their testimony in 5 minutes. The yellow light means you have a minute left, and of course,

the red light means stop. Then, we will have time to raise some

questions and look forward to your answers.

So, Mr. Sullivan, why don’t we start with you?

STATEMENTS OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY

JERRY CLARK, SENIOR ANALYST, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; DAKOTA L. WOOD, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS; LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE J. TRAUTMAN III, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, ACCOMPANIED BY LIEUTENANT

COLONEL KARSTEN HECKL, COMMANDER, MARINE MEDIUM

TILTROTOR SQUADRON 162 (VMM–162), U.S. MARINE CORPS;

AND DR. ARTHUR REX RIVOLO, U.S.A.F. (Ret.)/AVIATION EXPERT

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I begin, let me

just for the record state that Mr. Jerry Clark is up here. He is a

Senior Analyst with the GAO, who headed up the work on this specific assignment and has significant institutional memory and

knowledge on the V–22. He is here to help with answering questions.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Issa, members of the committee, I

am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of the V–22. I

would like to make some brief points in my opening statement, and

ask that my written statement be submitted for the record.

Chairman TOWNS. Without objection.

Mr. SULLIVAN. We recently completed a review of the MV–22’s

operations in Iraq, recent testing and training results, and the program’s past, current, and future costs.

First, with regard to operations in Iraq, we found that the MV–

22 successfully completed all of the missions it was assigned in

low-threat operations and used its enhanced speed and range effectively to deliver personnel and cargo faster and farther than legacy

helicopters.

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Battlefield commanders indicated that they need more experience

with the aircraft to better understand the limits of its role in some

of the medium-lift missions because its speed cannot always be exploited and these missions may be better performed by legacy helicopters. The aircraft also had availability and reliability challenges

in Iraq, as you had alluded to, Mr. Chairman.

While the acquired availability rate is 82 percent, the 12 aircraft

with the three squadrons in Iraq were able on average 68, 61, and

57 percent of the time. In comparison, legacy helicopters were

available about 85 percent of the time or greater, on average.

Parts reliability was a major cause of the V–22’s availability.

Specifically, we found that 13 parts were in very high demand because they only lasted on average less than 30 percent of their expected life, forcing cannibalization of other V–22s and even from

the production line in the United States. V–22 engines also had

some problems; expected to last 500 to 700 hours, they lasted less

than 400 hours in Iraq.

Second, ongoing operational tasks and training have identified

other challenges to the V–22’s ability to conduct operations in highthreat environments, also while transporting personnel and cargo,

operating onboard ships and operating in extreme environments.

The program continues to work these challenges as it upgrades the

aircraft, and will have three different component upgrade; however,

this will be difficult since some of them arise from the inherent design of the V–22.

Third, the V–22 cost estimates have increased significantly from original baselines. Development cost has increased from $4.2 billion

to $12.7 billion, over 200 percent. Procurement cost has increased

about 24 percent, from $34.4 billion to $42.6 billion, even as the

number of V–22s to be procured was reduced from over 900 to less

than 500. It is also clear that operation and support cost through

the V–22’s life cycle will be much higher than originally anticipated. Moving forward, the program plans to spend nearly $25 billion

to buy 282 additional V–22s, and the cost to operate and support

the aircraft through its life cycle is now estimated at about $75 billion.

Given these figures and the availability challenges we have discussed, we believe this is a good time for the Department to stop

and once more consider the proper mix of transport capabilities as

it moves into the future. This is why we recommended in our report that the Secretary of Defense perform a new alternatives analysis to clarify the V–22’s role in transport operations, and require

the Marine Corps to prioritize necessary improvements to the V–

22 to improve its suitability and operational costs.

Thank you for your time, Mr. Chairman. I will answer any questions as they may come.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Sullivan.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. Mr. Wood.

STATEMENT OF DAKOTA L. WOOD

Mr. WOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Issa, and

distinguished members of the committee. It is my personal honor

to appear before you today to discuss the MV–22 Osprey.

I have been asked to elaborate on various issues related to the

Osprey originally outlined in the paper that you have already mentioned. The point of the larger project was to highlight a range of

defense issues to be addressed and considered during the 2009

Quadrennial Defense Review.

This particular monograph of the Marine Corps examined the

readiness of the service to do its part in meeting a set of emerging

challenges, namely, the rise of large, hostile powers, a greatly proliferated world, and Islamist radicalized elements. There were also

the ‘‘meat-and-potatoes’’ missions typically associated with Marine

Corps deployments, such as noncombatant evacuation operations,

mandatory assistance and disaster relief missions, and other various security cooperation initiatives that focused on working with

other countries.

Within the paper, we describe the current state of the Marine

Corps, discuss what the Corps must be able to accomplish in meeting these burgeoning challenges successfully, and briefly assess the

service’s program of record and related developments within the

service that would pertain to or be impacted by these challenges

and operational demands.

With specific reference to the MV–22 Osprey, we question the

current Marine Corps plan to replace all of its medium-lift helicopters with the MV–22, and suggest that the Corps revisit this

plan to see whether a mixed fleet of MV–22s and helicopters might

be better.

During the Ospreys long period of development, some 25 years

or more, changes in the operational and threat environments, increasing budgetary pressures, and the various implications arising

from the service’s own strategic and operational concepts suggest

that a mixed fleet would provide more options and increased flexibility for the services at less cost than a fleet composed only of

MV–22s.

As has already been mentioned, the Marine Corps is planning to acquire 345 of these aircraft at a total cost of $42 billion, or roughly $120 million each. Over the years, the aircraft has been the subject of controversy arising from engineering challenges and related

developmental delays, some highly publicized crashes, and many

funding debates; and certainly has strong supporters and equally

passionate critics, both sides claiming that it is either better or

worse than conventional helicopter alternatives.

Those favoring the program cited speed, range, and altitude advantages over helicopters, characteristics that make it possible for

Marine Corps forces to execute operations from increased distances.

Those against the program cite its troubled developmental history

and its high cost relative to helicopters, and argue that less-expensive helicopters can just as effectively support ship-to-shore movements, amphibious landing operations, and various amphibious assault missions without having to coordinate with aircraft of lesser

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capability. In other words, escort aircraft can’t keep pace with the

MV–22.

The argument between advocates and critics of the Osprey appears to rest on the fundamental question: Does the Marine Corps’

commitment to field the MV–22s sole medium-lift helicopter-like

capability help or hinder its ability to perform anticipated missions

at an acceptable cost, both in dollars and overall effectiveness, in

an operational environment? Or should the Corps pursue a much

less-expensive path that gives it the ability to effectively execute

the missions it will most likely encounter, even if this means it

would not have the ability to conduct missions at extreme range in

as timely a manner? Of course, not having the more advanced capability provided by the MV–22 precludes undertaking missions

that would require it.

Mr. Chairman, I had planned on 5 minutes. I can jump right to

the end and submit the rest of my comments for the record.

Chairman TOWNS. Without objection.

Mr. WOOD. In the end, the issue of the MV–22’s value must be

viewed within the context of the often competing demands and desired operational attributes, the nature of expected operational

threat environments, and our experiences of how our forces are actually employed to achieve their objectives. Achieving such a balance isn’t easy, and it inevitably requires compromises that would

properly and carefully weigh the costs and benefits of various alternatives.

The Osprey can certainly enable the Marine Corps to perform a

variety of missions far more effectively than has been possible in

the past and undertake missions it would not otherwise be able to

perform. But this capability also comes at a steep price both financially and in terms of the opportunity costs of absorbing a major

slice of the Corps’ modernization budget that may starve other

badly needed modernization programs.

Mr. Chairman, with these issues serving as points for further

discussion, I would be happy to respond to any questions this committee might have.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much for your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wood follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. General Trautman, first of all, let me thank

you for your many years of service.

General Trautman.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE J.

TRAUTMAN III

General TRAUTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Issa, distinguished Members, as the

current leader of Marine Corps Aviation, it is a privilege for me to

appear before you today to discuss the MV–22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, its performance in Iraq, and our plans for leveraging this capability in the future for the benefit of the men and women who

ably serve our Corps.

Last month, the Commandant outlined before this Congress his

vision of the Marine Corps of 2025. That vision portrays a fast, lethal, expeditionary force that is ready for the uncertainties of future combat operations, yet has the staying power of engagement

in the most austere conditions imaginable. At the center of this vision is the MV–22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft.

As always, your Marines are ready for full-scale theater war, we

are ready for irregular warfare and insurgency, and we are ready

for everything in between.

Today, we have a foot in two different streams. We are drawing

down our forces in Iraq while at the same time we are building up

forces in Afghanistan. This past year, your Marine Corps flew over

330,000 flight hours, with over 40,000 hours of these hours in combat zones in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. With last

month’s return of VMM–266 and its 12 Ospreys on board USS

Wasp, Osprey squadrons finished their third consecutive 6-month

deployment to Iraq. We will now turn the Osprey toward sustained

operations at sea, and later this year we will deploy to Afghanistan

and the challenges that await us there.

The Marine Corps is not interested in airplanes for their own

sake. We are interested in the capabilities that airplanes provide

to the aviation combat element in support of the Joint Force. With

that in mind, I want to give you an example of what this aircraft

can do.

In 1988, one of our former Commandants said, ‘‘If I am a commander operating off the coast of North Carolina, I want every bad

guy from New York to Miami to be nervous.’’ What he meant by

this statement was, he wanted to find a way to keep an enemy

force off balance by giving our Marines the kind of asymmetrical

advantage the Osprey brings to the battlefield.

Simply put, the V–22 has transformed the way we are fighting

in a manner akin to the introduction of the helicopter in the middle

of the last century. We can now project combat-loaded Marines, soldiers, or Special Operators from a sea base or any forward site

deep into the battlespace at the speed of a KC–130, and we can do

it at altitudes above the ground threat that has tragically brought

down so many conventional helicopters in Iraq, Afghanistan, and

elsewhere. And then we can land that payload anywhere it is needed, just like a helicopter. With its speed, range, and survivability,

the MV–22 is truly a game changer.

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For the past 20 months, the Osprey has been in the fight. Since

its introduction to the Iraq theater of war in October 2007, the Osprey has flown nearly 10,000 hours in combat, lifted over 45,000

passengers, and carried more than 2.2 million pounds of cargo,

while completing every assignment imaginable. And it has done so

flying faster, farther, and at more survivable flight profiles than

any other assault support aircraft in the history of military operations.

As we move into Afghanistan later this year and we are required

to cover a larger country than Iraq with Marines spread out even

further, cutoff from one another and on foot in the equivalent of the

Rocky Mountains, this aircraft will not be just a nice, new capability; it will be a crucial, critical necessity that saves lives and wins

battles.

I have sent my staff around the world to speak with infantry battalion and platoon commanders, and their message is remarkably

similar to that of our pilots: Get more of these assets into the fight.

Our logisticians, infantry officers, and our Marines have now

seen what the Osprey can do. They have flown in the back of it,

they have run down its ramp into landing zones in combat. They

know that this capability means that we can move three times as

many Marines five times farther and twice as fast as they could

move those same Marines even in the most advanced conventional

helicopters.

They know that as they transit to the objective, they are flying

as high as 13,000 feet, out of the range of rifle fire, heavy machine

gun fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and man-portable air-defense

systems that are the weapons of choice for both irregular insurgents and the conventional soldiers who intend to do us harm. The

infantrymen in the back of the aircraft, those 19-year-old riflemen

whose well-being is the focus of the Commandant’s vision and

mine, are getting where they need to go in half the time, and the

majority of the flight takes place in an altitude sanctuary well

above the prevalent ground threat.

Like other types of aircraft in the early operational phases of

their life cycle, the V–22 has experienced lower than desired reliability of some components. However, these challenges are not

unique to this program. Aircraft like the F–14, 53 Echo, H–60, and

F–18 have all had similar problems at this stage of their developmental process. The difference between the desired and observed

rates is typically the result that spares our purchase for a new program based upon predicted engineering analysis. And when that

analysis is informed by historical knowledge, improvement in availability and reliability occurs.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to speak with you

today. Colonel Heckl is with me. He is one of our combat veteran

V–22 squadron commanders.

I look forward to answering any questions that you may have. I

have provided a written statement, and I request that it be entered

into the record.

Chairman TOWNS. Without objection, the entire statement will be

included in the record.

[The prepared statement of General Trautman follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. Colonel Heckl.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KARSTEN HECKL

Colonel HECKL. Sir, good afternoon. I am just here to answer

questions. I have no opening statement, sir.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Heckl follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. Dr. Rivolo.

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR REX RIVOLO

Mr. RIVOLO. First, let me just say that I am not representing any

organization. I have terminated my relationship with the Institute

for Defense Analyses. I am here strictly as a private citizen.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good afternoon. The

V–22, conceived as a transformative technology 30 years ago, promised extensive new capabilities. Today, the aircraft, 30 years later,

is operational with both the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air

Force, but the promised capabilities have failed to materialize.

This much-awaited transformative aircraft has, in my opinion,

turned out to be a disappointment, falling well short of its design

goals. Additionally, two technical issues, order rotation and maneuverability in helicopter mode, make the V–22 problematic in a combat environment. I will address these issues one by one.

The design shortfall and load-carrying capacity has resulted in a

compromise in the configuration and the construction of the V–22.

As a result, the aircraft fails to meet the requirements for the critical ‘‘50 nautical mile, 10,000 external load’’ mission if all the safety

operational requirements are imposed. In operations at high-density altitude, both the MV and the CV–22 have little or no capability above 8,000 feet density altitude, and such density altitudes are

common and tactically relevant in the Afghanistan theater of operations.

In many operational situations today, the Marine Corps would

have to call on their few CH–53s or on the U.S. Army’s CH–47s

to meet mission requirements. Similarly, the CV–22 called upon to

conduct noncombat evacuation operation of an embassy in Kabul

on a hot day would have no more than about a 60-nautical-mile

range, once lifting out of the compound with a full complement of

24 evacuees. Any mitigation alternatives would include much-higher-risk operational options or the use of H–53s.

The inability of the V–22 to safely autorotate, now firmly established, has serious implications. The V–22 would fail to meet basic

air worthiness directives of the FAA if it were a civilian transport.

Despite this, the U.S. Marine Corps leadership has shown little

or no concern over this issue and has no problem requiring young

men and women to ride as passengers in the V–22 under combat

operations. I believe that this is reprehensible. It is a stand that

the Marine Corps leadership should never have taken. And, by passive consent, the acquisition executives of the Department of Defense and the Congress are essentially in that same category.

The V–22 is susceptible in a combat environment to autorotation

because of its design and because of its vulnerabilities. The conscious disregard of this substantial and unjustifiable risk qualifies

as reckless behavior, in my opinion in the legal sense, on the part

of these entities. The significant lack of maneuverability in turning

and change in altitudes while in helicopter or conversion mode

makes the V–22 susceptible to hostile fire while on approach to

landing.

All operational testing of V–22 conducted to date has been

scripted; that is, conducted without any opposing so-called ‘‘red

forces’’ to add the element of surprise—essentially, a nonthreat enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:23 Feb 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\54387.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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vironment. As a result, no data on the ability of V–22 to evade hostile fire while on approach to a landing zone are available.

Proponents argue that V–22 has been combat proven, given its

operational experience in Iraq. This, I believe, is either delusional

or disingenuous. The V–22 mission in Iraq was largely one of combat circulation. It is a euphemism for logistical support of carrying

passengers and cargo from base to base in bus route fashion. Combat assault, the mission for which the V–22 was designed, remains

unproven under realistic conditions.

Despite the rhetoric heard over the past 5 years about how V–

22 is the ideally suited aircraft for combat operations in Afghanistan, the aircraft has not been deployed into that theater to date.

One could speculate on the reasons for this, and I will not at this

point.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify. I am prepared to answer any questions. And, if I could, may I have my

written testimony placed into the record? Thank you.

Chairman TOWNS. Without objection, your written statement will

be included in the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rivolo follows:]

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Chairman TOWNS. Let me thank all of you for your testimony.

And let me begin with you, General Trautman.

I understand there are no Ospreys currently in Iraq. If this is an

aircraft that is so valuable, why isn’t it being used?

General TRAUTMAN. Sir, we had Ospreys in Iraq for three successive deployments. As you know, at this point, Marine Corps operations in Iraq are starting to draw down. The situation in Al Anbar

since October 2007 has been significantly changed, and the Marine

Corps is turning its attention to focus on Afghanistan.

But the small number of squadrons that we have, we have only

been able to have one squadron deployed at a time up until this

point. By the fall, we will be able to have two squadrons deployed

from North Carolina, and we look forward to having one squadron

onboard ship and one squadron in Afghanistan by the fall.

Chairman TOWNS. Is it the troops or is it the Osprey that has

the problem? You indicated you pulled them out, but the point is,

is it the problem with the troops or problems with the Osprey?

General TRAUTMAN. No, sir. It is a success of the mission. The

Al Anbar battlespace has successfully been transformed by the actions of multinational force west over the past 7 years. The Marine

Corps forces in Al Anbar are drawing down at this point and we

are reducing our force structure there commensurately, so we are

bringing out AV–8s, we are bringing out attack helicopters, we are

bringing out heavy-lift helicopters, and we brought out the V–22

Osprey.

So there is no problem. This is a success story, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. In your written testimony, you state that the

Marine Corps has accepted delivery of 91 Ospreys. On June 2,

2009, your boss, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, told the

House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense that the Marines

have 90 operational aircraft. However, we know that many of the

Ospreys are not ready for combat. We also know that the Marines

have had to cannibalize some of those Ospreys for spare parts.

Isn’t it true that only 47 Ospreys are even theoretically combat

deployable?

General TRAUTMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have a training squadron

composed of 20 Ospreys that we would not deploy. This is a place

where new pilots are shown how to fly the Osprey. We have four

Ospreys in HX–21. This is a test squadron. We have five Ospreys

in VMX–22, another operational test squadron. And so we have

stood up a total of four squadrons, and we are in the process of

standing up our fifth as airplanes are delivered.

Chairman TOWNS. So the answer is ‘‘yes?’’

General TRAUTMAN. I was trying to describe the situation with

regard to the Ospreys that are in the fleet. I am not sure what

question the chairman is——

Chairman TOWNS. Let me move on then. I think it was ‘‘yes’’ you

answered.

Isn’t it also true that of that number, on a good day fewer than

half of those are ready for combat?

General TRAUTMAN. No, sir. Typically, we have established about

63 percent operational readiness within the fleet by one measure,

which measures every second of a 24-hour period.

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Another measure, which is what we call ‘‘ready basic aircraft,’’

which is the number of aircraft that are ready for tasking on a day

when the air tasking order begins, we are actually in the low 70’s—

which is not acceptable, but it is not nearly as you describe, sir.

Chairman TOWNS. Let me go at this another way.

If the Commander in Chief, President Obama, asks the Marines

to deploy today for a new special combat mission at a high-threat

environment, how many Ospreys would be fully mission capable

and ready to deploy to combat?

I am looking for the answer here. Go ahead.

General TRAUTMAN. In the mid-40’s, sir. There are four squadrons of 12, so four times 12 is the number, sir.

Chairman TOWNS. I didn’t hear you.

General TRAUTMAN. We have four operational squadrons of between 10 and 12 airplanes. So it is in the mid-40’s. Approximately

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Chairman TOWNS. Let me switch to you, Mr. Sullivan.

Isn’t it true that the Osprey is incapable of performing in the

way it was originally intended?

Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, we looked at how it performed in Iraq, first

of all. So it is true that it was not able to complete the full envelope, the performance envelope that it was intended to perform in.

However, it also wasn’t asked to do all that in Iraq, mostly because

there are things it can’t do yet that they know it can’t do.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me come back to you, General. Thank you,

Mr. Sullivan.

If it will not perform in hot areas, it will not perform in cold

areas, what do you need it for?

General TRAUTMAN. Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can have Colonel

Heckl. He commanded a squadron through the hottest environment

in the Middle East that I have ever encountered. He could probably

talk to that question.

Colonel HECKL. Sir, I deployed my unit over there in March 2008

and we departed in October 2008. Some of what I have heard here

today—I didn’t have any prepared statements, but what I have

heard here is kind of disturbing. Some of this is just blatantly inaccurate.

I don’t agree with a single thing that Mr. Rivolo said.

I was over there, sir. We had days every day over 120 degrees.

I don’t know how much hotter anybody would want it to get. We

had more dust storms. The wing, Third Marine Aircraft Wing, commanded by then-Brigadier General Alles, estimated they lost more

than 10,000 flight hours due to weather, it was so severe. So it has

operated in extreme heat. Extreme heat.

The hostile fire thing, you know, I assume everyone here is

aware that we classify zones based on color code—green, red, black,

yellow zones. We flew into black zones. As a matter of fact, the

squadron that I replaced flew Senator McCain into a black zone in

the middle of the day. That is as high a threat as it gets.

The maneuverability: This is an old discussion for Mr. Rivolo,

proven years ago to be wrong. The demonstration is not scripted.

And anybody that has flown into Baghdad International Airport

under night vision goggles, knows how maneuverable the airplane

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is. All you have to do is do a whiskey transition over to Liberty

Pad, and you know how maneuverable the airplane is. It is blatantly false.

And last, the ability to operate—well, we already talked about

the ability to operate in the heat. Again, I had the squadron over

there for the entire summer, and we had temperatures well in excess of 120 degrees every single day.

Chairman TOWNS. I think it is appropriate that I allow Dr.

Rivolo to respond, because I think you did call his name.

Dr. Rivolo.

Mr. RIVOLO. Everything the colonel said is correct. I mean, they

did operate in 120-degree weather constantly in a pretty much sealevel environment.

My criticism is that at high-density altitudes is when the problems will arise. And that is also having to do with maneuverability.

The problems only exist under certain conditions, but they happen

to be conditions that are tactically relevant certainly in Afghanistan. The aircraft performs brilliantly at sea level. No one doubts

that.

Chairman TOWNS. GAO, what did you find? Because there

seemed to be some questions in terms of its ability to perform. I

mean, did you find this as well?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I might let Mr. Clark fill in where I have gaps.

But I believe what we found is that it was—when it was over in

Iraq with the three squadrons, it was for the most part limited to

low-threat environment because of maneuverability problems or restrictions that they have that I believe they have in—even in the

flight manuals themselves, right?

And maybe Mr. Clark can fill in some of the gaps here.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, when we did our work, we looked at

the flight manual which is considered the NATOPS manual, and

according to that manual, the aircraft is prohibited from conducting

air combat maneuvering or defensive maneuvering issues. So if Mr.

Rivolo is saying that is an essential element in terms of survivability, according to that manual it’s something that the aircraft is,

they’re prohibited from doing.

In terms of operating in the environments that we were talking

about, we relied on the after-action reports that you, I believe, had

asked for, and of course, we interviewed the unit that had deployed, the first unit that deployed and interviewed personnel from

that unit. But those after-action reports of the first unit and of the

unit, the third unit that was in Iraq, talk to issues that they had

problems operating in the desert environment, talked to problems

that the aircraft had in operating in terms of the heat. And I think

the capability rates seem to reflect some of those problems if you

looked at it on the months, in terms of the hotter months, would

be a lower capability rates versus the cooler months. So there were

those issues there that we did identify.

Chairman TOWNS. My time has expired. I yield to the gentleman

from California, the ranking member.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I share the committee’s

entire concern that we want our Marines to have the best assets

for each and every mission. I would like to go through a couple of

quick questions, and I hope you’ll indulge me if I ask that they be

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as quick as possible. General Trautman, I understand that you’re

a Marine aviator, but isn’t it true that the reputation of the C–5

is any time it lands it doesn’t take off again for a long time? Just

reputation, just something you may have heard over your years.

General TRAUTMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. And isn’t it incredibly a cost overrun aircraft and expensive to maintain; and isn’t it true that it no longer does any

mission that is unique to the C–5, at least in the unclassified

world?

General TRAUTMAN. I’m not qualified to answer that, sir.

Mr. ISSA. But it’s a big airplane that only carries one tank, if you

remember that part of it.

General TRAUTMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. It happens. Now the AV–8B, the B implying that it

ain’t the first, it killed a lot of Marines and some British aviators

before they got it right, isn’t that true?

General TRAUTMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. And isn’t it true that as far as I know, we haven’t had

a single mission, as unique an aircraft as it is, that only that aircraft could do in a combat environment leading to a successful battle, in spite of the fact they worked the bugs, and it’s able to do

a mission that no other jet can do.

General TRAUTMAN. That’s right. It’s performing exceptionally

well in Afghanistan today.

Mr. ISSA. OK. So we can have a really great aircraft that meets

its requirement, and we may not have a war exactly suited to that

requirement at the time that it’s in the field; isn’t that true?

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps is worldwide deployable

and has to be ready across the full range of military operational

requirements.

Mr. ISSA. I’ll ask you the one softball. If, in 1979, when we were

trying to rescue our people in Tehran that had been taken hostage,

in violation of all international law, what would have been different

it that mission if the Osprey had been the primary aircraft?

General TRAUTMAN. It would have been a successful mission and

we probably wouldn’t be where we are with Iran today, Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Because it could have flown, self-deployed, flown nonstop and, in fact, been able to hit the target without the cluster

that occurred in the desert.

General TRAUTMAN. We would have gone directly to the stadium.

Delta Force would have come out in the stadium and carried out

the mission as described. It wouldn’t have been a 2- to 3-day evolution of landing in the desert and having the situation that occurred.

Mr. ISSA. Colonel Heckl, you’ve flown other rotor wing aircraft;

is that correct?

Colonel HECKL. Yes, sir. My background, about 3,000 hours in

CH–46s my whole career. And I flew in OIF 1 back in 2003 when

we went into Iraq in the beginning, I was a 46 pilot.

Mr. ISSA. Well, I’m not nearly as qualified a pilot as you are, but

isn’t it true that all aircraft lose lift at high density altitude, basically a hot day, hot, humid day, the higher you are and the hotter

it is, the more likely you are in a fixed wing to need a longer runway or a rotor wing to simply have to carry less on take off?

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Colonel HECKL. Absolutely, sir. And that’s one reason in Operation Tora Bora in the fall of 2001, 46s weren’t even taken ashore.

Mr. ISSA. Because in fact——

Colonel HECKL. It could not perform.

Mr. ISSA. The high altitude there is a challenge to almost any

helicopter made in the world.

Colonel HECKL. To every helicopter, sir.

Mr. ISSA. OK. And in your estimation, having flown the Osprey,

with further development over time, can we, in fact, increase the

at-altitude lift-off capability, just based on the record of rotor

wings?

Colonel HECKL. There’s no doubt about it, sir. Absolutely.

Mr. ISSA. So, in fact, even though a little bit like the AV–8 and

a little bit like most of our other helicopters, generation one usually

don’t do as well. I’m a guy who was one of a four pack in a Huey

every time it took off on a hot day at Ft. Riley. And by the way,

that’s close to sea level, but that was about all we could carry in

a UH 1.

Colonel HECKL. Yes, sir. And like you said, an AV–8B, when I

left the CH–46, we were on CH–46 Echo.

Mr. ISSA. OK. I’m going to ask you the tougher questions now,

and I am concentrating to a great extent on you two in uniform,

partially because some of the rest of you are more available to me

all the time. Isn’t it true though that in fact, many of the missions

that we’re doing in Iraq and Afghanistan we, in fact, can do with

other rotor wing aircraft?

Colonel HECKL. Sir, I’ll tell you, that you could do with other aircraft?

Mr. ISSA. Yeah. Many of them.

Colonel HECKL. Yes.

Mr. ISSA. So when the GAO talks about perhaps a smaller fleet

or a mixed fleet, that is something this committee should look at

tasking consideration of, just consideration of whether or not the

mix is right.

General.

General TRAUTMAN. Well, yes, sir. And the Commandant does

that routinely. Let me take you back 3 years when the decision was

made to increase the size of the Marine Corps from 175,000 to

202,000. We did a thorough analytical look at what the aviation

combat element of the Marine Corps should look like at the larger

size. We looked at the Osprey and we saw that it performed at four

times as well as the CH–46. But we also saw that we needed additional assault support assets. So what we did is we decided to grow

the size of our CH–53 fleet from six to nine active squadrons, and

the size of our light attack helicopter fleet, which includes the UH

1 Yankee, a middleweight lifter that will round out the B 22 perfectly in the context of the aviation combat element. And we increased our HMLA from six to nine.

Coming out of that deep dive, the Commandant and I are absolutely certain that we have it right today. But each and every year

I publish, under the Commandant’s name, an aviation plan, and we

do retrospective thinking, introspective thinking, pardon me, about

where we should go with our Marine Corps to provide the best

force for the Joint Force Commander in an every changing world.

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Mr. ISSA. In my opening statement I mentioned TASVAL back in

the 1970’s, and the recognition that at least at that time the systems aboard the A10 were not the best for killing tanks of the aviation assets we had in the field. There were changes made afterwards.

Do you welcome a similar test of all of the fixed and rotor wing

assets, periodically, by the military, by either joint or a particular

branch, in order to determine whether or not the mix is right and

the assets meet the requirement as offered in real instrumented

type combat situations where we can computerize and oversee, if

you will, whether pilots and assets do what they say they’ll do?

General TRAUTMAN. Sir, not only do we welcome it, we pursue it.

Twice a year, the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics squadron

based in Yuma, Arizona, performs a weapons and tactics instructor

course, where we bring the most capable aviators in the Corps and

other services, bring them together, do quite a bit of instrumented

training and testing, and that’s how we develop the ideas that enable us to go forward.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sullivan, according

to your report, this V–22 is still having problems with unreliability

on component parts?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That’s true, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Can you explain that a little bit for us.

Mr. SULLIVAN. What we’ve found over in Iraq was that, despite

the fact that they had taken more than the usual complement of

spare parts that they would usually take, they were running out

of parts, having to cannibalize other V–22s. And when we looked

at the parts specifically, we found that there were 13 critical parts

that were just not lasting long at all. In fact, as I stated in my

opening statement, about 30 percent, they’re getting about 30 percent of the usual time out of those. And in addition to that, the

supply chain, the vendor supplying the parts, that’s a very immature supply chain at that part, and they were having problems

with that as well.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. So General Trautman and Colonel

Heckl, you don’t dispute that, do you?

General TRAUTMAN. No, sir. I don’t dispute that all. In fact, it’s

quite typical of other platforms that have reached about the 50,000

to 55,000 hour mark. The F14.

Mr. TIERNEY. You already testified that you have low aircraft

availability, lower than you would like and lower than would be estimated as ideal.

General TRAUTMAN. Lower than ideal, yes, sir. That’s right.

Mr. TIERNEY. So we have a plane here that in 1986, when they

estimated at what would be 2009 dollars, we were going to get

1,000 of them over 10 years at $37.7 million each. Now we’re looking at some projections, we’re going to get less than 500 over 10

years, at about $93.4 million each, which is a pretty sizable thing.

What caused that overrun, General?

General TRAUTMAN. Well, sir, the actual non-recurring flyaway

cost of the Block B MV–22 in fiscal year 2009 is $64 million. Cost

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increases, yes, sir. The cost increases throughout the years have

been somewhat troubling. Projections in the 1980’s for this platform, as well as other platforms, as some of the Members have

pointed out, have not come to fruition. But $64 million a copy is

much less than things like a Super Hornet, which are in the mid

80’s.

Mr. TIERNEY. As my mother used to say, if everybody jumped off

the Brooklyn Bridge, would you? That other programs had a problem, I don’t think, diminishes the exact problem that we’re dealing

with on this one.

Let me ask you, have any of the contractors been fined, or at

least not given their bonus as a result of this?

General TRAUTMAN. They haven’t been fined, to my knowledge.

There are incentive fees that have been either given or withheld

throughout the years, and I’m not—I can get that for you in a follow-on.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Sullivan, do you have any information on that?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I don’t, but we’d be happy to look into that too.

Mr. TIERNEY. I’d very much appreciate if you do that; whether

somebody’s being held responsible for this. This is a 20—how many

years program are we talking about here? 1986 we were going to

get 1,000 at $37.7 million. We didn’t have them in 1996, we didn’t

have them in 2006, we still don’t have them today.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right.

Mr. TIERNEY. So the V–22 Rolls Royce engines, well, one-half to

two-thirds of their expected life span is all that we’re getting out

of them. Yet General, I understand that the Marine Corps has contracted to buy even more of the same engine. Negotiated a new engine sustainment with Rolls Royce that includes numerous exclusions. So who made that decision?

General TRAUTMAN. The decision is made by service acquisition

executives, and I contribute to that.

Mr. TIERNEY. It’s not just one person; it’s a whole bunch of them

that make that kind of decision?

General TRAUTMAN. No, the service acquisition executive in the

Department of the Navy makes the ultimate decision.

Mr. TIERNEY. Who would that have been that made that decision?

General TRAUTMAN. Research development acquisition, Assistant

Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. TIERNEY. So they apparently think if you’re getting half to

two-thirds of the expected life span of an engine is something that

they ought to reward with an additional contract.

General TRAUTMAN. I believe it’s a very wise decision with this

performance-based logistics contract that we have with Rolls, the

V–22 never goes without an engine. I wish I had a similar situation

in other type model series.

Mr. TIERNEY. Could you describe for me the exclusions that are

made in that contract for the additional engines and what the reasons are for those exclusions.

General TRAUTMAN. I’m not sure the contract has been negotiated. You’re talking about the performance-based logistics contracts that are being negotiated now? The negotiations are not complete.

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Mr. TIERNEY. The sustainment contracts that they’ve been negotiating with Rolls Royce.

General TRAUTMAN. One example would be if the engineer particle separator is not working adequately, I think that’s excluded.

As you said, we’re negotiating this year, and we don’t expect to

finish negotiations until December timeframe.

Mr. TIERNEY. Is it possible to have another supplier proceed an

engine that would require significant design changes and thus, I

suppose would cost more but at least might work better?

General TRAUTMAN. At a significantly increased cost and detriment to the program, there’s a possibility we could go in another

direction if the performance-based logistics negotiations don’t go

the way we desire, that’s something that’s on the table, of course.

Mr. TIERNEY. So, it just sounds to me, General, that we’re talking about having a choice. We can either pay for underperforming

engines, or start over again and pay even more for engines that are

designed properly.

General TRAUTMAN. Well, the engines are staying on about 600

hours, which is typical of other similar airplanes operating in that

austere, challenging environment.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Clark, is that the kind of response you’re getting, 600 hours?

Mr. CLARK. Sir, when we looked at the data from the Iraq experience, it was not. It was less than 400. Now, again, I’m not sure if

he’s looking at the other aircraft not deployed.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, General, let’s talk about deployed aircraft

then. Are you disputing Mr. Clark’s testimony that you get less

than 600 hours?

General TRAUTMAN. I’m not disputing. I’m saying that it’s about

687, as I recall, fleetwide, which means—and in Iraq I think it’s

approaching 500 hours. We’ve instituted changes that have enabled

us to get up to around the 500-hour mark.

Mr. TIERNEY. You can talk faster than I can, General, but I’ll

slow you down a little bit. The question was, in Iraq, where the examination was done, they’re not making even 500 miles, never

mind 600, right?

General TRAUTMAN. Approaching 500 hours in Iraq, that’s right.

Mr. TIERNEY. All right. Mr. Sullivan, what do we need to do?

What does the Department of Defense and Marine Corps need to

do to get this program back on track, or is there anything they can

do?

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, I think one of the problems with—most

of the problems with this program are probably, you know, it’s been

around a long time and has taken most of its hits. At this point,

it’s not meeting all of its requirements. But I would agree a little

bit with what the General says is that it’s still relatively new.

They’re still doing some operational testing on it. Some of these

things are growing pains that it will grow out of. However, I think

that there are some inherent design features on the V–22 that are

going to keep it from being the most optimal choice that the Marines are thinking they’re going to have, I guess is the best way

to say that. They’re having, you know, you’re looking at, first of all

they’ve taken a big hit on the unit cost. So there’s already, it’s

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going to cost a lot more than they thought to buy the remaining

280 aircraft.

Chairman TOWNS. The gentleman’s time has expired. I now yield

5 minutes to the gentleman from——

Mr. TIERNEY. Can he finish his answer, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman TOWNS. I thought he finished.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think what has to happen is, as we recommended, that they need to look at the proper role of the V–22

and a proper mix. There’s a lot of things that the CH–46 and the

53s can do as well as the V–22. And I think that we think that

the mix should be looked at again.

In addition, the Marines have to stay on top of these reliability

issues. You know, there’s obviously a problem with some of the specific parts on this, and the supply chain, and we recommended that

they take a good study of that as well.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Chairman TOWNS. And there’ll be a second round. Gentleman

from Maryland.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General

Trautman, I listened to your testimony very carefully. You know,

we had asked the Marine Corps to compile a list of incidents and

mishaps involving the MV–22 since the aircraft was approved for

full rate reduction in 2005. However, we discovered that many of

the incidents involving the V–22 since that time were not included

in the report by the Marine Corps. And General, I heard you say

all these wonderful things about this aircraft. Why did the Marine

Corps fail to include all of these incidents in their report to the

committee?

General TRAUTMAN. Sir, I’m not sure what you’re talking about.

I have a June 15, 2009 information paper that was provided to the

committee that, in my judgment, includes everything that has happened to the V–22 going back to 1992.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, when you presented that information, is

that only dealing with damage to the aircraft or personnel or other

mishaps included?

General TRAUTMAN. All mishaps. Category C, B and A. All mishaps are included in the documentation we provided on June 15th.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. And so do you consider the grounding

of all your combat aircraft a minor incident?

General TRAUTMAN. Grounding of aircraft is never a minor incident; of course not, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what about the forced landings in Iraq? Are

those a part of the incidents that you would have there?

General TRAUTMAN. Precautionary landings that take place, no,

sir. If a precautionary landing takes place, that’s actually a benefit

associated with the Osprey in that a conservative pilot can land

and determine what’s going on in his airplane in a way that regular airplanes cannot. So no, it did not include precautionary landings, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, our staff compared your report to the—we

did a search of the Osprey and found that there were many, many

more mishaps than we had reports on. So I’m sure that’s just—you

know, perhaps you can clear that up for us.

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General TRAUTMAN. Yes, sir. We will clear that up for you, and

I stand ready to do that with anybody at any time.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. As I sit here, I was just

thinking, there’s probably some things that you all agree on. But

there’s a cardinal question here, and that is, that Mr. Sullivan and

his group have made some recommendations, and there’s a question as to whether a country that is spending, is in deep economic

trouble, can wait for, to work out all the kinks, when perhaps we

could get something much more effective, even if it’s a mix with the

Osprey.

And I think what is bothering me as I sit here, just looking at

it from a very practical standpoint, I think we can get so hardened

in our positions that it’s hard for us to see anything else. And this

is just from sitting up here and observing. And this airplane, this

Osprey, obviously, has some major problems.

And if I had an employee who only showed up 30 percent of the

time, they could be the greatest employee in the world, but no job.

If I had somebody who I had certain expectations of that they

were going to work 600 hours so and so, over a certain period of

time, and they don’t show up, or they’re not available, what good

does it do me?

And so I’m just trying to figure out, where does the defense of

this airplane end and the beginning of getting what we bargained

for, making sure our people are not harmed by the very things the

taxpayers dollars are paying for, and getting our people, the equipment that they need?

When does that defense of the plane end and we say to the manufacturer: manufacturer, we know that you’re watching C-Span

right now, and we know that there are people that need jobs. Why

don’t you just correct and do the things that we need to be done

so that we can provide the very best for the men and women who

I know you love?

You’ve given your life for them, and I know you wouldn’t just put

somebody in a plane that perhaps would do them harm. I know you

wouldn’t.

But when you hear the testimony, it sounds like we don’t end the

defense and begin to say to the people who are creating this, come

on now. Guys, this is America. This is the greatest country in the

world. We can produce a plane that can get around the things that

you all talked about. Are we that far behind?

Do you follow me, General?

General TRAUTMAN. I do, sir. And I would submit that we’re

doing precisely what you recommend. You know, if you go back in

history and you look at the F–14 or you look at the CH–53 Echo

or you look at the F–18, you will see that about the 50,000 to

60,000 hour mark, which is exactly where the V–22 is, in every

case, readiness drops below anticipated predictive modeling. We

are exactly where those other type model series have been, and

now they’re considered successful legacy performers, extremely successful performers.

We are engaged with the Naval Air Systems Command, the rest

of the Naval air enterprise, and our industry partners to correct

these issues that are staring us in the face. The reason we’re defending the program is because this airplane will save lives. It has

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already demonstrated that it will save lives. It is a positive thing

for our Nation and that’s why we feel passionate about it.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much. I now yield to the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Quigley.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my colleague is

correct. Sometimes when we have these discussions, positions get

hardened and somewhat defensive. So I’d ask the General and the

Colonel, looking at the other way, despite the issues of reliability

and so forth, from a sheer flying point of view, what would you like

this to be able to do that it doesn’t do?

Colonel HECKL. Sir, to answer, I agree. I’m a 46 pilot. That’s

where I come from. But in reality, I’m an assault pilot. I carry Marines. I strap the airplane on, sir, and I can assure you that there’s

not a minute of the hundreds of hours I’ve accumulated in this airplane where I was concerned. Not one. As a matter of fact, when

Marines die in helicopter crashes, on a, I guess I would say a regular basis, this airplane was designed from the ground up to be

more survivable. There’s no damage-causing mechanism, no weight

over the cabin. There’s all kind of things that we could discuss offline that make it more survivable that a 53, or 46, or any other

traditional helicopter does not have.

All the weight is on the end of the wings. The auto rotation

thing, again, addressed years ago. But I’ll tell you, sir, it’s the platform, the airplane did every mission. And I don’t know where Mr.

Sullivan and Mr. Clark were. They weren’t at my deployment. I

was the middle guy, the guy that did it during the heat, March to

October. Didn’t have a problem. I operated for 7 months filling

combat line numbers and did not miss a mission.

I don’t know what else we want. Do we want them, the reliability

to improve? Yeah. I never want my car to break down. It still

breaks down. Do I think it’s going to get better? I do. But I’m going

to tell you right now, sir, from an operational standpoint, which is

my lane, this thing, I was 3 weeks in theater and we did a raid

with Alpha company second and 504, Army guys, out of a single

plane zone in Haditha, went and took down a zone that my 46

couldn’t have even done.

I don’t know what missions we’re talking about here that it’s not

doing. I’m missing something, and I must have been asleep in Iraq

for 7 months.

It does it all. We did cas evac, we did Medevac, we did raids.

What else do you want? We moved Senator Obama from Ramahdi

to Jordan, which would have taken me weeks in my 46.

So I just want to make sure you guys—because I agree with you.

Let’s go in to this thing eyes wide open and have an honest assessment. An irrational defense? No. But an irrational offense also.

I mean, in all honesty, the airplane performed very well. Were

their areas we want to improve? Absolutely. I have some ideas that

they have, about cleaning airplanes and stuff like that.

But let’s not go into this thing thinking the airplane couldn’t do

its mission. It’s not true.

Mr. QUIGLEY. I’m not trying to get you to think like that or to

suggest something that you don’t believe in. But on the other hand,

as I said, as these positions harden it’s just human nature. SomeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:23 Feb 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\54387.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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times it’s hard to let your defenses down. And that may be, you

know, taking it too far, but just telling us what you think.

I mean, for example, originally, I was told that this was supposed

to have a nose-mounted Gatling gun. Is that correct?

Colonel HECKL. Sir, I think maybe it may have.

General TRAUTMAN. Let me comment on that. That was an objective, anecdotal objective early in the program and it proved to be

not cost effective or technically feasible over 10 years ago.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Well, OK. With all due respect, the cost effective

horse has gotten out of the fence here and is running all over the

place. But for effectiveness, I guess I want to know from either one

of you gentlemen, whether or not it matters in those kind of situations that this might be in Afghanistan, having a front-mounted

machine gun.

General TRAUTMAN. It does matter, and so we’re doing two

things, sir. One is, we’re upgunning the ramp-mounted weapon system from a 7.62 to a 50 caliber, and when the squadron deploys

in the fall, it will have a 50 caliber weapons system.

The second thing we’ve done is we’ve partnered with the Air

Force to build a defensive weapon system that is mounted on the

belly of the aircraft, and it will be an all-aspect weapon system

that can shoot 360 degrees around the Osprey. We finished developmental test of that defensive weapon system, and I anticipate

operational tests being completed in August. And the squadron

that goes to Afghanistan will be, I’m confident, will be armed with

the all-aspect weapon system that we’ve been working on over the

last few months.

Mr. QUIGLEY. I’m sorry. Could you repeat that? When will this

be, this full system be implemented?

General TRAUTMAN. The developmental test is complete. We’re

doing some software changes, and we will do operational tests in

July and August, and by September we should have a full-up, allaspect weapons system, and we’ll deploy eight of these systems

with the squadron that deploys to Afghanistan in the fall.

Mr. QUIGLEY. I appreciate your candor gentleman. Thank you.

Chairman TOWNS. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chairman. Colonel, you clearly are an

enthusiast for the V–22. And I take your testimony very seriously,

having been in Iraq and in the combat zone.

I’m just curious. When I was in Iraq, we had a very big sand

storm back in February and all helicopters were grounded. Could

the V–22 have operated in a sand storm?

Colonel HECKL. Sir, I don’t know if that was a staged question,

because the airplane has a new capability called—it has an approach mode with a hover capability. And we actually had a case

where we had an emergency leave, trying to get a Marine out. His

wife had been in an accident back stateside. We had one of these

sand storms which, if you were there over the summer, we had a

lot of them. He was up in Wahlid, which is on the Syrian border.

We were actually able to use the airplane to shoot an approach in

less that a quarter mile visibility to a pad in Wahlid. The 46 would

have been struggling to even make the range, sir, much less the

ability to operate in that kind of limited visibility.

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Mr. CONNOLLY. OK. Were you aware of cannibalization for the

V–22s in Iraq?

Colonel HECKL. Sir, we cannibalized on frogs.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I cannot hear you.

Colonel HECKL. I’m sorry, sir. We cannibalized on CH–46s. We

did cannibalization. It’s something no commander ever wants to do

with his airplanes, but sometimes, if a part isn’t there and we have

a mission, we will cannibalize. We tried to avoid it because it’s double work on the Marines.

Mr. CONNOLLY. OK. Let me ask the General. What’s it cost per

copy for a V–22?

General TRAUTMAN. The non-recurring flyaway cost of a block B MV–22 in 2009 is $64 million.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Not the $90-something million Mr. Tierney referred to?

General TRAUTMAN. Well, sir, as you know, there’s many ways to

cut, to describe the cost of airplanes. I’m giving you a factual cost

defined as non-recurring flyaway cost. Program cost, larger program costs take a different cut at the issue.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Sullivan, would you agree with that cost estimate?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think probably what we have in our report is the $93.4 million, which represents, that’s strictly an average procurement unit cost. That’s basically the procurement dollars divided by

the number of——

Mr. CONNOLLY. By the way Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Quigley and I have

a little private bet. Where are you from, may I ask?

Mr. SULLIVAN. You’ll be wrong. Chicago.

Mr. CONNOLLY. We’re both right. Sorry. We heard those flat vowels. I had to ask.

Mr. SULLIVAN. But if I could just, because this is something that

comes up all the time, and I’m not sure what the General’s number

is referring to, but it sounds to me like it would be, if you took the

last, the one, the last one off the line right now, because the cost

tends to decrease as they learn more, you would get the flyaway

cost for the system. It sounds like that may be the number that

he’s quoting.

If you take the average from the first one you build to the last

one, that’s going to be less expensive. It would be about $93 million.

Mr. CONNOLLY. That’s the average.

Mr. SULLIVAN. That’s the average right now estimated, yes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, General, let’s just say, for the sake of argument, it’s somewhere between $64 and $93 million. When you cannibalize one of those things, that’s a pretty expensive cannibalization because of lack of spare parts, isn’t it?

General TRAUTMAN. Cannibalization is not something that we

like to do, but we do it in every type model series from time to

time.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, but in this particular case we have a report

from the GAO that says that in this, with respect to the V–22, this

is a chronic problem. It isn’t an ordinary problem only in the combat zone. It’s actually a chronic problem with this particular aircraft. Is that not true?

83

General TRAUTMAN. I don’t think so. I mean, I don’t think it’s

any more chronic or typical in this airplane than in other airplanes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. So you take issue with the GAO finding with respect to that issue?

General TRAUTMAN. No, I think the GAO probably found cannibalization and aptly criticized it.

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, no, no. With respect to the problem of reliable supply of spare parts.

General TRAUTMAN. Oh, we do. Absolutely. We do not have the

availability that we desire in the V–22 today. I already said that.

Mr. CONNOLLY. And to what do you attribute that problem?

General TRAUTMAN. I attribute it to several things. The first of

which is that some components are not meeting the predicted mean

time between failure that engineers several years ago said that

these parts should provide. And that’s probably the biggest issue.

The second biggest issue is supply, range, and depth of supply

and the immature nature of the platform which has just passed

material support date on October 1, 2008, 1 year after we deployed

it into combat. So we’ve ridden this airplane far harder than any

other airplane that I can describe in the last 30 years. And so the

combination of riding it hard, having some predictive modeling not

being as accurate as we would desire, has put us in a hole with

regard to availability and reliability.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I see my time is up. But if the Chair would just

indulge me with one last followup to that.

But General, given what you just said, would you not agree that

the cannibalization with respect to this aircraft is a little bit unusual because of just what you said; that it’s not your normal cannibalization, contributing to that cannibalization we’re experiencing

is this problem of supply chain for spare parts.

General TRAUTMAN. I’d have to do the analysis to make sure that

I was right with regard to my answer. But I would say that any

time you have an airplane that isn’t providing the kind of availability that you desire there have reasons for that, and I would say

there’s probably a connection to increased cannibalization associated with that particular problem. I think that’s probably accurate,

sir.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the Chair.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We’ve been

joined by the gentleman from Ohio. Yield 5 minutes to him for

questions at this time.

Mr. KUCINICH. General Trautman, would you be able to yield

most appropriately to questions about the falsifying of maintenance

records?

General TRAUTMAN. I’m not sure I understand, sir. Say that

again, please.

Mr. KUCINICH. The question that deals with falsifying of maintenance records, what was the reason? Does anyone here know what

the reasons were why people attempted to falsify maintenance

records? Why did they do that? I know there were convictions involved, but why was that done, do you know?

General TRAUTMAN. 10 years ago no, sir. I’m not qualified to respond to that.

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Mr. KUCINICH. But the culture has changed, I take it, about

maintenance records, is that right?

General TRAUTMAN. Absolutely.

Mr. KUCINICH. And what is that culture today?

General TRAUTMAN. I don’t think you’ll find an organization that

is more upstanding and forthright than the U.S. Marine Corps, sir.

That’s my opinion.

Mr. KUCINICH. And so the performance of the V–22s in Iraq,

what is it you’re feeling has been the overall record of their level

of performance?

General TRAUTMAN. Their performance has been outstanding. It’s

done things that no other airplanes in the history of mankind could

do. Its availability and reliability has fallen short of our desired

ideal, but producing up above 70 percent on a daily basis, adequately allowed to perform missions that were needed to be performed in al Anbar province.

Mr. KUCINICH. Is it your judgment that they would be operationally effective in high threat environments such as Afghanistan?

General TRAUTMAN. Well, Afghanistan is not what we would

characterize as a high threat environment, sir. A high threat environment in the military vernacular includes an integrated air defense system that typically includes radar directed missiles. The

Afghanistan environment will be, I anticipate, very similar to the

Iraq environment which we would characterize as low or medium

threat. A low- and medium-threat environment has conventional

weapons, small arms, rocket propelled grenades and surface to air

missiles, typically infrared surface to air missiles. So in that environment, I think the Osprey will be just as effective as it has been

in Iraq.

Mr. KUCINICH. Have you, yourself, had the opportunity to be in

one of those V–22s on any mission fights?

General TRAUTMAN. I haven’t been on any mission flights. I probably have a little over 10 hours at the controls of the airplane in

fairly sterile garrison operations.

Mr. KUCINICH. Colonel Heckl, have you been in a V–22 on a mission flight?

Colonel HECKL. Yes, sir. I had command of the second squadron

in Iraq for 7 months.

Mr. KUCINICH. And can you tell me what—have you ever had

any operational difficulties with that in high threat environments?

Colonel HECKL. Well again, sir, by the definition, not high for us,

but no, sir, I haven’t.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, in the Iraq environment, did you have any

operational difficulties with it?

Colonel HECKL. No, sir. And sir, I’ll just give you just a real

quick anecdote. I think everybody’s familiar about the CH–46 that

got shot down a few years ago, killed everybody on board. It was

by a surface to air missile, heat seeking missile.

One thing in this airplane, the speed, like when we would go into

Baghdad, sir, regularly, which is right on the edge of a black zone,

back in 2008, so there were potential for surface to air missiles.

The approach mode of this airplane, we call it thermally IR cooled

because you’ve got the power back. You’re coming down at a real

high rate of speed, and it’s very difficult and it’s proved in op eval,

85

very difficult for heat seeking missiles to track the airplane. And

you combine that with the aircraft survivability equipment on

board, and the aircraft is very survivable. Sir, I would fly the airplane into any threat environment.

Mr. KUCINICH. Is there any problem with cabin visibility?

Colonel HECKL. Sir, that’s an old—the crew chief, the enlisted

guys in the back have difficulty, the windows are smaller. But I

will tell you, sir, to the pilots up front——

Mr. KUCINICH. What is that like, though when you’re in a vehicle

moving at such a high right of speed if there’s a problem with cabin

visibility? Does that cut down your possible response or your judgment in any way?

Colonel HECKL. No, sir. And the fact is, again, the aircraft survivability equipment on the aircraft is going to indicate any threat

coming at me probably quicker than anybody in the back trying to

look out of a window. It’s very similar to CH–53 echo, sir. The windows are smaller than normal and they’re a little bit higher, and

visibility’s a little more reduced.

Mr. KUCINICH. One final question, Mr. Chairman. I see my time’s

expired.

The V–22 was originally designed to have a gun mounted in its

chin. And I understand they changed the design to have a variant

mounted on the aircraft’s rear ramp. Now, if you take that into

consideration, what you just said about visibility, does that, in any

way, compromise the ability of the craft to defend its crew in a

combat situation?

Colonel HECKL. No, sir, because the nose-mounted weapon, if

we’d have ever gotten it, which there was a lot of discussion at the

tactical level about what good that would be on the nose of an aircraft that moves at 250 miles an hour—it would be controlled by

the pilots. So, the visibility—and the visibility up in the cockpit,

sir, is very, very good, particularly compared to my old C–46.

Mr. KUCINICH. And the rear quadrant of the craft is protected

then?

Colonel HECKL. We have the ramp-mounted weapon now, sir,

that I had in Iraq. And the crew chiefs man that off the ramp. And

sir, most ravine shots, assault aircraft were rear hemisphere shots,

and that’s why we did that.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. Let me begin with you, Mr. Sullivan. Your

GAO reports say the V–22 may have problems operating in extreme temperatures and even aboard ships. It is true that this complex revolutionary aircraft has problems in hot and cold weather

and operating on ships.

Now, Colonel Heckl says that’s not true. Where did you get the

information from?

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, my team went onboard the ship with

one of the Osprey squadrons. I spent 4 days with them, interviewing shipboard people and the Osprey squadron. And onboard ship,

the Osprey is a larger aircraft. It was intended to operate off of six

operational deck spots on the flight deck. That was the desire. But

two of those spots near, at the super structure, for various reasons,

are not cleared for it to operate off of, take off, or land vertically.

So that limits the aircraft. And also, because of its size, the squadVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:23 Feb 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\54387.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ron, the air combat element that would deploy on the ship in the

past with the CH–46s would have deployed with 12 CH–46s, and

the other elements of the air combat element, the CH–53s and the

AV–8s and such. But with the Osprey size, they are going only to

deploy with 10.

And we also found that the hanger deck, which is used to work

on the aircraft out of the elements, because of the aircraft’s size,

there were—it restricted movement of other aircraft potentially

around it if it was maintenance being conducted.

In addition, we found that the inventory of spare parts that the

aircraft would deploy with, called the AFCAL, that was significantly greater in volume than the CH–46s, to the point that not all

of the parts would be able to deploy with the ship, would have been

to be positioned somewhere else. And that was an issue.

In terms of operating in extreme environments, the full mission

capability rate, which is not a requirement, but is measured on the

aircraft, on the first squadron, it was, I believe, around 6 percent.

And the problem there is essentially, is the aircraft capable of

meeting all assigned missions?

The problem was the ice protection system with the aircraft. It

essentially has been a problem for some time. It doesn’t work. And

so in any situation where you might fly into icy conditions, that

would be a concern, so that hindered that also.

And we also looked at the issue of at altitude. According to a

NATOPS manual, there is a compromise between altitude and

weight; that the aircraft certainly can fly at altitude in airplane

mode, but in helicopter mode, landing, that there is a tradeoff between the aircrafts, the altitude and the weight of what it’s carrying, either fuel or troops or cargo.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much. Dr. Rivolo, in your testimony you indicate the V–22 has an inherent design flaw that affects the V–22 Osprey’s load-carrying capacity, indicating that the

problem is so complex that the aircraft designers don’t even understand it.

That is scary. Your chart is rather complicated, so please explain

further, if you can put it up there, in a sentence or two that——

Mr. RIVOLO. The intent of my testimony was to bring out the fact

that the original designers had great hope for this aircraft. The initial wind tunnel runs and calculation show that we would have a

truly spectacular aircraft. As a result of actually building the aircraft, the numbers fell well short. So as a result, the aircraft has

a lifting capacity which is about 6,000 pounds less than was expected. And we have lived with this because it still has considerable capability. But that difference, that lack of efficiency which

has materialized, has resulted in compromise after compromise and

the aircraft is not performing as it was designed to.

If you were listening to a briefing in 1988, the aircraft was spectacular in its anticipated performance. And I just wanted to bring

out the fact that, I realize that this is old news and there’s not a

lot of interest in it. But the aircraft is not as capable as it was designed to be, and we are living with that, obviously.

Chairman TOWNS. Your testimony indicates that the V–22 may

have problems conducting combat maneuvers. What do you mean

by that?

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Mr. RIVOLO. Yeah, that’s, again that apparently is very old news.

I have very serious concerns that, and we’re talking about rare occurrences. We’re not talking about day-to-day operations. If you are

making an approach to a high density altitude and you’re in helicopter mode with a full load of Marines and someone jumps out

with an RPG, you’re going to be very, very hard pressed to get out

of there. And that has been documented. It’s not a debatable thing.

The only option the airplane has, it can convert very rapidly

going forward. But forward is usually where the bullets are coming

from.

So my concern has been that in a real environment like Afghanistan, and I believe that once this aircraft deploys there—the reality

of what’s happening in Afghanistan, things are not getting better.

Things are getting very much worse in Afghanistan—that the aircraft will be asked to fly these missions, and it will run into some

of its idiosyncrasies. And until those happen, the discussions are

not going to take place because we have been raising those issues

now for at least 10 years.

And as I said, it’s not only the Marine Corps, but I think the

community at large sees it as passe’ information. We’re not interested in that; whereas, to me, the fact that the aircraft could not

be certified by the FAA, and we are asking Marines to—not pilots,

pilots know fully well what the risks are. They take them. But for

a Marine who’s told get into that airplane, when that airplane

could not be certified as airworthy, there’s a real problem there.

There’s a real, real problem with attitudes. And that’s the reason

why I’m here. I mean, I don’t like to come down and get beat up.

I get beat up all the time.

Chairman TOWNS. Let me ask you then, General Trautman, you

just heard Dr. Rivolo say that if the FAA examined the MV–22 it

would not certify as being flightworthy. He just said that. By Federal Aviation Administration standards, the MV–22 is not safe for

flight. Does the Marine Corp disagree with the FAA standards?

General TRAUTMAN. Absolutely, sir, or we wouldn’t put our Marines in the V–22. I can’t—I’m not an expert on the FAA. I have

no idea what this individual is saying. I know that most of the

other things that he says I don’t agree with and I find flaw with,

but I’m not sure about the FAA’s position.

Chairman TOWNS. Mr. Sullivan, the GAO report indicates that

the costs associated with the MV–22 are expected to rise significantly, due to operation and support. Why? I don’t understand why.

Mr. SULLIVAN. One of the things that we looked at is the costs

now are about $11,000 per flight hour, which is much higher than

they had originally estimated that and much higher than they expected. And with the problems that they’re having now with reliability, we think it’s prudent to expect that cost to operate and support that aircraft through its life cycle will probably go up some

more. It’s at, the total estimate now is at $75 billion for the 30 or

so year life cycle of the V–22.

Chairman TOWNS. I yield to the ranking member.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sullivan, following up on that, isn’t the single greatest overrun cost the fact that the engines are lasting dramatically less time

than originally planned?

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Mr. SULLIVAN. Could you repeat that? I’m sorry.

Mr. ISSA. Isn’t the greatest single upcost, the fact that the engines last roughly half what they were intended to last?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think that’s right now, yeah, that’s a huge cost

that they have.

Mr. ISSA. And following up on that, do you recall the first Gulf

war?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. I do. Do you remember that basically our helicopters

went into the first Gulf war, ingested and died like this, and they

didn’t last even a quarter what they were intended to, and we almost had to shut down in that relatively short time leading up to

the campaign while they were trying to figure out how to stop the

ingesting of dust from killing those aircraft engines almost overnight. Do you remember at least reading about that?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, I do.

Mr. ISSA. So, if, in fact, Boeing and its partners do their job, and

with the Marines, and increase the longevity of that and a few

other parts, isn’t it true that although that projection might be

right, it also could be reduced considerably by those parts coming

closer to their original intended life span?

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, I think that’s a possibility, yes. But it

is just that, a possibility. Right now it takes an awful lot to maintain those engines after they’ve been run through there.

Mr. ISSA. General, have you charged your partners in this to get

those times up on parts that are underperfoming the original

specs?

General TRAUTMAN. We have indeed, sir. We work very closely

together. If I could just give you a couple of examples and reasons

why I believe and our industry partners believe that these costs are

going to come down significantly, not go up. A flapper on. In the

beginning, we were removing and replacing flapper ons at a cost

of $280,000 per flapper on. We’ve now figured out a way to repair

these onsite for less than $10,000.

Another example are bleed air valves. They were a throwaway

item. $27,000 per. Now we’re repairing them at $5,000 per. I could

give you many examples, but I don’t want to eat up your time.

That’s the way that we’re working together with the OEM to improve the cost and reliability of this airplane.

Mr. ISSA. Colonel, before you flew the CH–46, what was your primary flight trainer? What did you learn to fly on?

Colonel HECKL. CH–46, sir. I learned to fly a TH–57 and then

a——

Mr. ISSA. OK. So you started with a light trainer.

Colonel HECKL. Yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. You weigh 200 pounds?

Colonel HECKL. Yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. How much could a light trainer carry on a hot day, just

you and the instructor?

Colonel HECKL. That was about it. On a hot day, we actually, a

couple of guys were large enough that we would exceed the CG

limit, so, yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. OK. I learned to fly on a 172. The reason I learned to

fly on a 172 is that my trainer was 220 pounds. I was 205 pounds,

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and on a hot day a Cessna 150 wouldn’t take off with full fuel, and

we weren’t allowed fuel management. Our rules for Army aviation

is we had to have full fuel on take off. I think they may have

changed it now.

So part of what you do, I’m assuming, on hot days is you manage

fuel so that you’re not always with full fuel, you’re with the amount

of fuel you need to help get those packs back up where they need

to be when you’re in high altitude on hot days.

Colonel HECKL. Absolutely, sir. Fuel management’s an issue in

any rotor craft.

Mr. ISSA. That was my next question you anticipated is that all

your aircraft you’re always dealing with, on hot days at least, in

high altitude, you’re dealing with tradeoffs between fuel and passengers.

Colonel HECKL. Absolutely, sir. In the Air Force with the CV variant actually trains to manage fuel to a point where they will dump

fuel if they need to make them——

Mr. ISSA. And you’re not a fixed wing pilot at all. But do you

know of any Air Force aircraft, any jet, any prop that doesn’t have

a fuel to pack to altitude limitation where there’s tradeoff?

Colonel HECKL. Not that I’m aware of, sir. I know certainly in

rotor wing.

Mr. ISSA. Well, that kind of brings me back, I think, to a couple

of questions on this. This aircraft is not a combat aircraft. It is an

aircraft that operates in combat, meaning it’s not an attack aircraft, it’s not designed to fly into bullets and RPGs deliberately,

right?

Colonel HECKL. No, sir. Actually the design was so that it would

avoid those things.

Mr. ISSA. So the little bit of chicken armor beneath your seat is

not intended for you to take RPGs regularly?

Colonel HECKL. I hope not, sir.

Mr. ISSA. And that’s true of the CH–46 and any other of that

type of transport aircraft.

Colonel HECKL. Yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. If you were flying any of the heavy lifts, but the CH–

46 and you were just at that critical time final, heavy, coming in

at altitude, and you suddenly started taking fire, how hard is it for

you to get up and move in the opposite direction quickly?

Colonel HECKL. Extremely difficult, sir. As a matter of fact, when

I went into OIF in March 2003, we had Marines that were loaded

because we thought, you know, we’re wearing all our gas gear and

everything else. My aircraft, even though I managed the fuel, I

barely had a minimal amount of power to conduct a wave off which

is a, you know, pretty standard procedure. So very difficult, sir.

Mr. ISSA. And Doctor, to be fair to you because we have been sort

of talking to the other side, isn’t it true that if you were to evaluate

any and all aircraft that the military operates, that they would all

have some of these tradeoffs? And last, are you familiar with the

DC–3, I guess it was CH–46?

Mr. RIVOLO. Yes.

Mr. ISSA. Are you aware that the FAA will not certify that aircraft today because it can’t come out of a flat stall? It is an unsafe

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aircraft even though it has the most amount of hours and the

safest record of any aircraft in aviation history?

Mr. RIVOLO. Yes, I’m aware of that.

Mr. ISSA. So the FAA certification you spoke to, although important, is not always the only telling factor.

Mr. RIVOLO. No, not at all. But if I might say, that, you know,

at some point we will be back to this committee with a different

issue because that rare event, you know, it is a rare event. It will

happen. And if you deliberately do not plan for that, then we will

be called to answer. That’s my only issue, sir.

Mr. ISSA. That’s a good one. And thank you. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I tell you, if I was sitting here as a judge, this is a, to me, this

is a continuation of this defense of mediocrity, and it bothers me

tremendously. We’ve got a spare parts problem. We’re

cannibalizing planes that some say cost $64 million, others say

more. And how many people have been, how many deaths have resulted from the use of the V–22, General?

General TRAUTMAN. There was a mishap in 1992. I believe four

people were there. Another mishap in 2000, 9 years ago, where 19

were killed and another in 2000, less than 9 years ago where I

think 4 were on board.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So more than 30.

General TRAUTMAN. Just under 30, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And there appears to be a design problem with

the V–22. It was designed with this forward fighting chin gun

which was never mounted because of a lack of accuracy; is that

right?

General TRAUTMAN. Not a lack of accuracy, no, sir. I think we

determined that the pilots had more important things to do than

be attack helicopter pilots operating a chin gun.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But the guns couldn’t be mounted on the side

since the rotors were in the way, and the windows were far too

small for observation or aiming; isn’t that right?

General TRAUTMAN. That’s why we’re excited about the defensive

weapon system, all aspect weapon that’s made it through developmental tests and that will soon do operational tests this summer.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Then we have an aircraft that can be docked,

take off and land from small decks and fly far inland to drop off

combat ready troops as the Osprey is supposed to do would be particularly attractive to troops that deploy aboard ships. However,

the V–22’s turbo jet engines blow hot exhaust directly on the deck

and burn away the no skid surface and warp and singe the metal

deck. As a result, flight operations have to be limited so that V–

22s never sit at one place with engines running for more than a

couple of minutes, an impossibility when launching over 30 aircraft. Does that——

General TRAUTMAN. That’s not accurate, Mr. Cummings. You

know, we have 5 weeks of sustained deployment operations now

from VMM–263, which was out on the USS Bataan. They are operating and doing a marvelous job. They’ve carried more passengers,

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more cargo, their readiness rates are higher than anyone else embarked with them.

What I think you’re referring to, sir, is when the necells are in

the perpendicular mode to the ship, you don’t want to leave them

in the perpendicular mode for more than a few minutes. You want

to adjust them, which is fine to do on the deck. You adjust them

after landing, and then you leave them pointed slightly aft, and

you can do that for long periods of time without having a problem.

Mr. CUMMINGS. How long can do you that?

General TRAUTMAN. Thirty to 40 minutes. And if you’re going to

stay more than 30 to 40 minutes with your engines turning on an

LSD or an LPD, we have a work around where we bring out essentially a hot plate that goes underneath the nasal and then they can

stay for an unlimited amount of time.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But other than that they could burn the no-skid

surface of the——

General TRAUTMAN. Well they could if you didn’t follow the techniques, tactics and procedures that we’ve developed to accommodate that problem, which we’ve done.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And General, you said that there were, you had

concerns about availability of spare parts.

Now I want to go to Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Sullivan, how significant

is that, and where is that controlled in the process, the acquisition

process?

It seems to me that, in the beginning of a process, you figure out

the spare parts that you might need. And the gentleman has talked

about how we’re going through this evolution. And it seems to me

that if we’re truly going through an evolution and we’re truly looking at the problems that are occurring, that are happening, that we

would prepare for the spare parts because cannibalization doesn’t

seem to be the best of alternatives. Where does it come in? Is that

an acquisitions problem or what?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think that is an acquisition program problem.

And generally speaking, in the best of circumstances, you would

have a design maturity curve, so to speak, where you figure out

your mean time between failure rates and your reliability rates before you get anywhere near producing aircraft, and then you work

down that curve.

I think it’s legitimate to say that, you know, this is a somewhat

immature supply chain. But they have parts that are lasting only

a third as long as they had predicted back when they had critical

design reviews, 10, 15 years ago. So that, to us, should be a major

concern. They should be further down a design growth curve then

they are today.

General TRAUTMAN. Sir, may I comment.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. If the chairman allows. Thank you Mr.

Chairman.

General TRAUTMAN. Sir, the issue is that you use engineer predictive analysis, so engineers predict how long parts will last. They

predict mean time between failure. Every type model series that

enters into service, at about the 50,000 to 60,000 hour mark, which

is exactly where the V–22 is, starts to develop an actual historical

track record. The actual historical track record when parts fail is

never the same as the engineering predictive analysis. And so

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when a part fails before it was predicted to fail, which several parts

on the V–22 have done, you are not spared properly to immediately

remove and replace those parts.

So there’s a lead time involved, and that’s what impacts all type

mode series as they go through this particular stage of their life

cycle. It’s not something that I enjoy or appreciate, but it’s typical

of the way engineering predictive analysis goes in 2009.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But I understand there’s a storage problem in

that you had three times the number of parts needed and went

through all of them. Is that true?

General TRAUTMAN. No, that’s not accurate at all sir. I’m not

sure who would say that.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWNS. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from

Virginia, Mr. Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Rivolo, you use some pretty strong language.

You used the word ‘‘reprehensible.’’ You used the word ‘‘disingenuous’’ to describe the Marine Corps management of this project and

this particular aircraft, in various context. You’ve heard both the

Colonel, who actually operationally has maintained and flown the

vehicle, and you’ve heard the General’s explanation for cost overruns, cannibalization, and operational capability. What’s your reaction to what you’ve heard, in light of the strong language you put

in front of this committee?

Mr. RIVOLO. The strong language is feelings that I’ve had for

many years, since 1999 when basically I discovered that the program was lying about the auto rotation results that we were getting. And these are official channels. When I discovered that, it

seemed to me that the whole program should have been reevaluated simply on the this air worthiness issue. And instead it was

very quickly dismissed by a bogus argument that the aircraft can

make engine outlanding as an airplane, which is true.

However, since the aircraft is both an airplane and a helicopter,

it must meet airworthiness directives as an airplane and as a helicopter.

So I have been very angry over this, because I have always

looked at my job as looking out for the welfare of the people that

ride in those airplanes. I lost that battle. I had some very, very vicious, vicious fights with the acquisition executives, with the Director of Operational Tests, and basically I lost the battle. And my job

is to bring it out.

We had some meetings. We had meetings with the Commandant,

we had meetings with the Secretaries of Navy. We had a horrible

meeting in Duncan Hunter, Sr.’s office.

All of that was hashed out and basically dismissed as irrelevant.

And I don’t believe that it is irrelevant to have an airplane that

when in helicopter or conversion mode, if there is a power interruption, everybody is guaranteed to die. And that is what we have in

V–22.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let me ask it. All right. We have an airplane

that costs almost three times what it was originally estimated to

cost. We have an airplane that had some bugs that had to be

worked out that cost some lives. Yeah, we had some falsified

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records, but we are over that now. And the airplane seems to be—

and we have scaled back our expectations of the airplane.

Maybe our expectations were too unrealistic. And now—now it is

performing well though we have to cannibalize it because we are

not quite satisfied with the supply chain of spare parts. But it

seems to be functioning and functioning well in a combat situation,

even under extreme situations, as the colonel indicated. What is

wrong with that? Maybe we just need to scale back our expectations and accept the fact that the good should not be the enemy of

the perfect.

Mr. RIVOLO. I think that is what we have been doing since the

year 2000.

Mr. CONNOLLY. But what is wrong with that? At least it is functioning and doing its job in Iraq.

Mr. RIVOLO. To different agendas it has different meanings. To

the operators, the V–22 is a phenomenal machine. It is an incredible machine. It has enormous capability, enormous flexibility. It is

just a dream machine.

But there are some idiosyncrasies that will come back to bite us

at some point. And, historically, we in the aviation community have

had rules, and we have abided by those rules.

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. Let me ask you a final question because I am about to run out of time, and I will ask Mr. Sullivan

to comment, if the Chair will indulge as well.

We had a question just a little while ago about maybe the contractors should have been fined. The assumption behind that question is, the only people responsible for the problems with the scope

of mission, design, and operational capability and costs were the

contractors somehow.

To what extent did the Marine Corps, did the Pentagon, did the

Federal Government—to what extent should we bear responsibility

for the acquisition process that turned out to be less than perfect?

I mean, to what extent are we also culpable at the Federal Government?

Mr. RIVOLO. We in the government? I think we are totally culpable. We are essentially saying, yes, your airplane is not airworthy, but we are going to put Marines in it. It is OK because

that rare event, it may happen, but it is not important, OK?

When it happens, we will talk about it, but it is not important,

because the overall capability that this aircraft gives us is so great

that we can do without that.

And I just think that is unconscionable. I am sorry, but that is

my position.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I wonder if the chairman would indulge Mr. Sullivan to simply respond to that question?

Chairman TOWNS. Thank you very much.

Let me begin by thanking the witnesses today. At the outset of

this hearing, I expressed strong reservations about the performance and costs of the V–22 Osprey, but I wanted to hear what our

witnesses had to say before reaching a conclusion.

What we have heard today convinces me that the dream of a viable, high-speed, long-range tiltrotor aircraft has not been realized.

Moreover, there is at least some evidence that the aircraft is inherently unsafe.

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To sum up, it can’t be used in hot weather, it can’t be used in

cold weather, it can’t be used in sand, it can’t be used in high-altitude locations; and it has restricted maneuverability. The lists of

what the Osprey cannot do is longer than the list that it can do.

Not only has the Osprey failed to live up to its initial billing, it

has failed expensively as well. Our investigation indicates that we

have gotten half the aircraft for three times the cost. That is not

a recipe for longevity.

I am looking to ask the staff—I am going to ask the staff to prepare a report on the findings of this investigation, which we will

forward to the Appropriations Committee with recommendations

for further action. It is time to put the Osprey out of its misery and

to put the taxpayers out of their misery.

And, without objection, the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Diane E. Watson follows:]

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