Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 145 / Tuesday, July 29, 1997 / Notices 40551

June 4, 1997, submittal, Great Bay

reported that underwriting

specifications had been prepared and

issued to the insurance market by AON

Risk Services. Subsequently, on July 7,

1997, Great Bay reported upon the

status of the efforts to locate a suitable

assurance arrangement. Great Bay

reported that a surety bond does not

appear to be available, and the only

insurance mechanism available to Great

Bay at the present time is for Great Bay

to prefund its entire outstanding

decommissioning obligation. Great Bay

asserts that because there is no pool of

similarly situated entities requiring

decommissioning funding assurance,

arrangements such as surety bonds for

such entities are unavailable. Great Bay

asserts further that prefunding the entire

obligation would put Great Bay at an

undue competitive disadvantage.

Great Bay appears to have made a

good faith effort to secure a surety bond

at reasonable cost but has been

unsuccessful in this effort so far, and it

does not appear that Great Bay feasibly

can meet the NRC’s requirement that

non-electric utility power reactor

licensees obtain a surety bond or some

other third-party guarantee mechanism

to provide decommissioning funding

assurance.

IV.

In consideration of the foregoing, the

Commission is granting an extension to

the temporary exemption issued to

Great Bay and North Atlantic on January

22, 1997. This extension to the

temporary exemption from the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.75(e)(2) is

granted to allow Great Bay more time in

which to obtain the additional

assurance for decommissioning funding

required by the regulation.

However, in view of revisions to 10

CFR 50.2 and 10 CFR 50.75 now being

considered by the Commission, this

exemption shall expire 90 days

following the date any revisions to 10

CFR 50.2 and 10 CFR 50.75 become

final agency action, or 1 year from the

date of issuance of this exemption,

whichever date is sooner.

The Commission has determined that

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1), this

exemption is authorized by law, will not

present an undue risk to the public

health and safety, and is consistent with

the common defense and security. The

Commission further has determined that

special circumstances as provided in 10

CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR

50.12(a)(2)(v) are present.

Under criterion (ii), special

circumstances exist in that application

of the regulation in this particular

circumstance is not necessary, for the

period of the exemption, to achieve the

underlying purpose of the rule, which is

to provide additional assurance that

funds will be available for

decommissioning at the end of the

license term or in the event of a

premature shutdown. In this instance,

Great Bay’s projected income and cash

flow indicate that Great Bay very likely

will be able to meet its operating costs

and monthly decommissioning fund

payments for Seabrook through 2001.

Furthermore, Great Bay’s past

contributions to the existing sinking

fund along with its present working

capital and its former corporate parent’s

guarantee, would currently cover nearly

three quarters of Great Bay’s

proportionate share of Seabrook

decommissioning costs.

Furthermore, application of the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.75(e)(2) at

this time would not serve the

underlying purpose of the rule. The

regulation would require Great Bay to

prefund the remaining $47.2 million

decommissioning obligation or to obtain

a surety bond or other third-party

guarantee mechanism for the unfunded

amount. No surety arrangement appears

to be available to Great Bay at this time

other than to fully fund or collateralize

the insurer for the entire obligation

which would make it difficult, if not

impossible, for Great Bay to meet its

day-to-day obligations. Thus, the

underlying purpose of the rule would

not be served by attempting to apply the

rule under these circumstances.

Under criterion (v), special

circumstances exist because the

exemption provides only temporary

relief from the applicable regulation(s),

and Great Bay has made a good faith

effort to comply with 10 CFR 50.75 by

continuing to make payments into an

external sinking fund while making

good faith efforts to locate a suitable

assurance mechanism.

Because this exemption is based on

financial circumstances and projections

that are subject to change and current

market conditions for obtaining surety

methods that are subject to change, this

exemption is subject to the following

conditions:

A. Great Bay is to continue efforts

with due diligence to obtain a suitable

decommissioning funding assurance

arrangement that will meet the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.75(e)(2) and

is to provide a written report 6 months

from the date of issuance of this

exemption to the Director, Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation, of the

efforts underway and the progress made

to obtain a suitable decommissioning

funding assurance arrangement.

B. Great Bay shall provide the

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, its next four unconsolidated

quarterly financial reports, including

statements of income and cash flow, and

balance sheets within 45 days of the

close of each calendar quarter.

C. In the event any circumstance or

condition develops that threatens Great

Bay’s present or future ability to meet its

decommissioning funding obligation, or

if Great Bay is in default of any monthly

payment to the Fund, Great Bay and

North Atlantic are to inform the

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, immediately in writing.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that

granting this Exemption will not have a

significant effect on the quality of the

human environment (62 FR 39285).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23rd day

of July 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–19930 Filed 7–28–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–272 and 50–311, etc.]

Public Service Electric & Gas Co., et al;

Environmental Assessment and

Finding of No Significant Impact

In the matter of: Public Service Electric &

Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric

Company, Delmarva Power and Light

Company, Atlantic City Electric Company,

Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos.

1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50–272 and 50–311; and

Public Service Electric & Gas Company,

Atlantic City Electric Company, Hope Creek

Generating Station; Docket No. 50–354;

Environmental assessment and finding of no

significant impact.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an exemption

from certain requirements of its

regulations for Facility Operating

License Nos. DPR–70, DPR–75, and

NPF–57, issued to Public Service

Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G, the

licensee), for operation of the Salem

Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and

2, and Hope Creek Generating Station

(Salem/Hope Creek), respectively.

The facilities consist of two

pressurized water reactors, Salem Units

1 and 2, and a boiling water reactor,

Hope Creek, at the licensee’s site located

in Salem County, New Jersey.
40552 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 145 / Tuesday, July 29, 1997 / Notices

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

The proposed action would allow

implementation of a hand geometry

biometric system of site access control

such that photograph identification

badges can be taken offsite.

The proposed action is in accordance

with the licensee’s application dated

January 17, 1997, for exemption from

certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55,

‘‘Requirements for physical protection

of licensed activities in nuclear power

reactors against radiological sabotage.’’

The Need for the Proposed Action

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, paragraph

(a), ‘‘General performance objective and

requirements,’’ the licensee shall

establish and maintain an onsite

physical protection system and security

organization.* * *’’

Paragraph (1) of 10 CFR 73.55(d),

‘‘Access Requirements,’’ specifies that

‘‘licensee shall control all points of

personnel and vehicle access into a

protected area.* * *’’ It is specified in

10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) that ‘‘A numbered

picture badge identification system shall

be used for all individuals who are

authorized access to protected areas

without escort.’’ It also states that an

individual not employed by the licensee

(i.e., contractors) may be authorized

access to protected areas without escort

provided the individual ‘‘receives a

picture badge upon entrance into the

protected area which must be returned

upon exit from the protected

area.* * *’’

Currently, unescorted access into

protected areas of the Salem/Hope Creek

site is controlled through the use of a

photograph on a combination badge and

keycard. (Hereafter, these are referred to

as a ‘‘badge’’). The security officers at

the entrance station use the photograph

on the badge to visually identify the

individual requesting access. The

badges for both licensee employees and

contractor personnel who have been

granted unescorted access are issued

upon entrance at the entrance/exit

location and are returned upon exit. The

badges are stored and are retrievable at

the entrance/exit location. In

accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5),

contractor individuals are not allowed

to take badges offsite. In accordance

with the plants’ physical security plans,

neither licensee employees nor

contractors are allowed to take badges

offsite.

The licensee proposes to implement

an alternative unescorted access control

system which would eliminate the need

to issue and retrieve badges at the

entrance/exit location and would allow

all individuals with unescorted access

to keep their badges with them when

departing the site.

An exemption from 10 CFR

73.55(d)(5) is required to permit

contractors to take their badges offsite

instead of returning them when exiting

the site.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed

Action

Under the proposed alternative

unescorted access control system, each

individual who is authorized for

unescorted entry into protected areas

would have the physical characteristics

of their hand (hand geometry) registered

with their badge number in the access

control system. When an individual

enters the badge into the card reader

and places the hand on the measuring

surface, the system would record the

individual’s hand image. The unique

characteristics of the extracted hand

image would be compared with the

previously stored template to verify

authorization for entry. Individuals,

including licensee employees and

contractors, would be allowed to keep

their badge with them when they depart

the site.

Based on a Sandia report entitled ‘‘A

Performance Evaluation of Biometric

Identification Devices’’ (SAND91—0276

UC—906 Unlimited Release, Printed

June 1991), and on its experience with

the current photo-identification system,

the licensee stated that the false

acceptance rate of the proposed hand

geometry system is comparable to that

of the current system. The licensee

stated that the use of the badges with

the hand geometry system would

increase the overall level of access

control. Since both the badge and hand

geometry would be necessary for access

into the protected area, the proposed

system would provide for a positive

verification process. Potential loss of a

badge by an individual, as a result of

taking the badge offsite, would not

enable an unauthorized entry into

protected areas. The licensee will

implement a process for testing the

proposed system to ensure continued

overall level of performance equivalent

to that specified in the regulation. The

Physical Security Plan for the Salem/

Hope Creek site will be revised to

include implementation and testing of

the hand geometry access control

system and to allow licensee employees

and contractors to take their badges

offsite.

The access process will continue to be

under the observation of security

personnel. A numbered picture badge

identification system will continue to be

used for all individuals who are

authorized access to protected areas

without escorts. Badges will continue to

be displayed by all individuals while

inside the protected area.

The change will not increase the

probability or consequences of

accidents, no changes are being made in

the types of any effluent that may be

released offsite, and there is no

significant increase in the allowable

individual or cumulative occupational

radiation exposure. Accordingly, the

Commission concludes that there are no

significant radiological environmental

impacts associated with the proposed

action.

With regard to potential

nonradiological impacts, the proposed

action involves features located entirely

within the restricted area as defined in

10 CFR Part 20. It does not affect

nonradiological plant effluent and has

no other environmental impact.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes

that there are no significant

nonradiological environmental impacts

associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded

there is no measurable environmental

impact associated with the proposed

action, any alternatives with equal or

greater environmental impact need not

be evaluated. The principal alternative

to the action would be to deny the

request. Such action would not change

any current environmental impacts. The

environmental impacts of the proposed

action and the alternative action are

similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use

of any resources not previously

considered in the ‘‘Final Environmental

Statement related to the operation of

Hope Creek Generating Station,’’

NUREG–1074, dated December 1984 or

‘‘Final Environmental Statement related

to the operation of Salem Nuclear

Generating Station Units 1 and 2,’’ dated

April 1973.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy,

on February 19, 1997, the staff

consulted with the New Jersey State

Official, Mr. Dennis Zannoni, of the

New Jersey Department of

Environmental Protection and Energy,

regarding the environmental impact of

the proposed action. The State official

had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental

assessment, the Commission concludes

that the proposed action will not have
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 145 / Tuesday, July 29, 1997 / Notices 40553

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment. Accordingly, the

Commission has determined not to

prepare an environmental impact

statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the

proposed action, see the licensee’s letter

dated January 17, 1997, which is

available for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC and at the local

public document rooms located at the

Salem Free Public Library, 112 West

Broadway, Salem, New Jersey, for Salem

and at the Pennsville Public Library,

190 S. Broadway, Pennsville, New

Jersey, for Hope Creek.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23rd day

of July 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John F. Stolz,

Director Project Directorate, I–2, Division of

Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–19932 Filed 7–28–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–413 and 50–414]

Duke Power Company, et al.; Catawba

Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2;

Environmental Assessment and

Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an exemption

from certain requirements of its

regulations to Facility Operating License

Nos. NPF–35 and NPF–52, issued to

Duke Power Company, et al. (the

licensee), for operation of the Catawba

Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, located

in York County, South Carolina.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

The proposed action would exempt

the licensee from the requirements of 10

CFR 70.24, which requires a monitoring

system that will energize clear audible

alarms if accidental criticality occurs in

each area in which special nuclear

material is handled, used, or stored. The

proposed action would also exempt the

licensee from the requirements to

maintain emergency procedures for each

area in which this licensed special

nuclear material is handled, used, or

stored to ensure that all personnel

withdraw to an area of safety upon the

sounding of the alarm, to familiarize

personnel with the evacuation plan, and

to designate responsible individuals for

determining the cause of the alarm, and

to place radiation survey instruments in

accessible locations for use in such an

emergency.

The proposed action is in response to

the licensee’s application dated

February 4, 1997, as supplemented by

letter on March 19, 1997.

The Need for the Proposed Action

The purpose of 10 CFR 70.24 is to

ensure that if a criticality were to occur

during the handling of special nuclear

material, personnel would be alerted to

that fact and would take appropriate

action. At a commercial nuclear power

plant the inadvertent criticality with

which 10 CFR 70.24 is concerned could

occur during fuel handling operations.

The special nuclear material that could

be assembled into a critical mass at a

commercial nuclear power plant is in

the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of

other forms of special nuclear material

that is stored on site is small enough to

preclude achieving a critical mass.

Because the fuel is not enriched beyond

5.0 weight percent Uranium-235 and

because commercial nuclear plant

licensees have procedures and features

designed to prevent inadvertent

criticality, the staff has determined that

it is unlikely that an inadvertent

criticality could occur due to the

handling of special nuclear material at

a commercial power reactor. The

requirements of 10 CFR 70.24, therefore,

are not necessary to ensure the safety of

personnel during the handling of special

nuclear materials at commercial power

reactors.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed

Action

The Commission has completed its

evaluation of the proposed action and

concludes that there is no significant

environmental impact if the exemption

is granted. Inadvertent or accidental

criticality will be precluded through

compliance with the Catawba Nuclear

Station Technical Specifications, the

design of the fuel storage racks

providing geometric spacing of fuel

assemblies in their storage locations,

and administrative controls imposed on

fuel handling procedures. Technical

Specifications requirements specify

reactivity limits for the fuel storage

racks and minimum spacing between

the fuel assemblies in the storage racks.

Appendix A of 10 CFR part 50,

‘‘General Design Criteria for Nuclear

Power Plants,’’ Criterion 62, requires the

criticality in the fuel storage and

handling system to be prevented by

physical systems or processes,

preferably by use of geometrically safe

configurations. This is met at Catawba,

as identified in the Technical

Specification Section 3.9 and in the

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

(UFSAR) Section 9.1, by detailed

procedures that must be available for

use by refueling personnel. Therefore, as

stated in the Technical Specifications,

these procedures, the Technical

Specifications requirements, and the

design of the fuel handling equipment

with built-in interlocks and safety

features, provide assurance that no

incident could occur during refueling

operations that would result in a hazard

to public health and safety. In addition,

the design of the facility does not

include provisions for storage of fuel in

a dry location.

UFSAR Section 9.1.1, New Fuel

Storage, states that new fuel will

normally be stored in the spent fuel

pool serving the respective unit and that

it may also be stored in the fuel transfer

canal. The fuel assemblies are stored in

five racks in a row having a nominal

center-to-center distance of 2 feet 13⁄4

inches. New fuel may also be stored in

shipping containers. (Note that in none

of these locations would criticality be

possible.)

The proposed exemption would not

result in any significant radiological

impacts. The proposed exemption

would not affect radiological plant

effluents nor cause any significant

occupational exposures since the

Technical Specifications, design

controls (including geometric spacing

and design of fuel assembly storage

spaces) and administrative controls

preclude inadvertent criticality. The

amount of radioactive waste would not

be changed by the proposed exemption.

The proposed exemption does not

result in any significant nonradiological

environmental impacts. The proposed

exemption involves features located

entirely within the restricted area as

defined in 10 CFR part 20. It does not

affect nonradiological plant effluents

and has no other environmental impact.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes

that there are no significant

nonradiological environmental impacts

associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded

there is no measurable environmental

impact associated with the proposed

action, any alternatives with equal or

greater environmental impact need not

be evaluated. As an alternative to the

proposed exemption, the staff

considered denial of the requested

exemption. Denial of the exemption

would result in no change in current

environmental impacts. The

environmental impacts of the proposed