MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

INTO THE COMING MILLENNIUM

Edited by

Stephen J. Blank

1999
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ii
Foreword..............................

1. Introduction

Stephen J. Blank .......................

2. Transnational Security Challenges

 in the Mediterranean

Alessandro Politi ......................

3. Regional Security Challenges

 in the Mediterranean

Stephen Calleya .......................

4. NATO in the Mediterranean

Mario Zucconi ........................

5. European Union Security Perceptions and Policies Towards

 the Mediterranean

Roberto Aliboni........................

6. Arab Perceptions of the European Union’s

 Euro-Mediterranean Projects

Mohammad El-Sayed Selim.................

7. The Security Challenge in Kosovo:

 Toward A Region-Stabilizing Solution

Steven L. Burg ........................

8. The Cultural Scope of Balkan Security

Stefano Bianchini ......................

9. South-Eastern Europe at the Brink of the New Century:

 The Security Aspect

Valeri Ratchev ........................

10. Turkish Challenge and European Opportunity:

 Greek Foreign Policy Priorities in a Post-Cold War Setting

Theodore A. Couloumbis ...................

11. Turkish Security Challenges in the 1990s

Duygu Bazoglu Sezer.....................

iii
 Dilemma

R. Craig Nation .......................

13. The Stalled Peace Process: Israeli-Syrian Track

Sami G. Hajjar ........................

14. Israeli Security in a Changing Environment:

 Challenges and Responses

Gerald M. Steinberg .....................

15. American Policy Toward the Middle East

 in Clinton’s Second Term

Robert O. Freedman .....................

16. Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East

Rodolfo Ragionieri ......................

17. The Spirit of Eternal Negation:

 Russia’s Hour in the Middle East

Stephen J. Blank .......................

About the Authors ........................

iv
As Kosovo demonstrates, the United States is an

continue to be deeply engaged in the security 

Mediterranean Basin. Moreover, we will participate in s

benevolent outcomes there with our allies and partners. I

the United States cannot do otherwise since the m

challenges to regional security in that area are so diver

numerous. For these reasons, we must engage our alli

partners in an ongoing dialogue over the nature of se

challenges, their perceptions of them, and the most effectiv

to address them.

The papers included in this volume represent just s

effort to lay a firmer foundation for this continuing dialog

to bring together different points of view. In October 19

Strategic Studies Institute, assisted by Pepperdine Univ

assembled a distinguished group of analysts from the 

States, Europe, and the Middle East, in Florence, Italy

conference titled “Mediterranean Security into the C

Millennium,” the task of the participants was to address c

regional security issues in the Balkans, Middle East, a

Aegean, as well as the perceptions of the individual stat

relevant security organizations, NATO and the European 

and the players and major external actors like the United 

and Russia. These papers cover the many areas discussed 

conference and should advance the debate on Mediterr

security both in the United States and abroad.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publis

compendium as a contribution to the international dialo

these issues.

LARRY M. WORTZEL

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute

v
INTRODUCTION

Stephen J. Blank

At present, U.S. air, naval, and ground forces 

guard across the Mediterranean and perform mu

missions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s K

operation is only the largest and most prominent of 

combat or combat-related missions. However, the sc

American civil and military engagement in 

Mediterranean basin is enormous and growing. And 

Kosovo operation increasingly appears to encomp

wholesale restructuring of the Balkan sub-regional se

system, that scope will only expand further. Ther

across the Mediterranean the number of troops on 

deployment and their missions will probably increas

This growth in U.S. engagement clearly pertains 

NATO allies as well, and not just in Kosovo. Even b

that operation, they had forces in Bosnia due to the D

treaty. Both NATO and the European Union (EU

begun systematic programs of security dialogues with 

Mediterranean states in North Africa and the Middle 

because of multiple challenges to the security of 

organizations’ member states. While those challeng

not strictly or even primarily military ones, many m

states regard them as the fundamental blocks to re

security. If a lasting structure of peace is to evolve 

Mediterranean basin as a whole, Europe must engage 

governments across a wide-ranging agenda of econ

social, political, military, and ecological issues. For 

reasons, Mediterranean missions play an enormous r

current U.S. defense and foreign policies and will con

to be essential for our armed forces for some time.

1
range and extent of the issues that we and our allie

partners must grapple with remain poorly understoo

little known. Second, it is clear that so extensive a se

agenda requires multilateral efforts and ther

continuing dialogue among all the players if cooperativ

mutually beneficial solutions are to emerge. Most, if n

security problems there, as Brigadier General John B

(USA) of AFSOUTH’s Policy and Plans Division obs

are not military ones but economic and political.

1

 C

and military professionals must also share their in

and experience through such dialogues to clarify 

publicize the issues and the interrelationships among 

Apart from “trans-Mediterranean” issues, e.g., eco

relations among Europe, the Middle East, and North A

we find many instances of intra-state security where 

are at risk, and far too many cases of sub-regiona

transnational challenges to security. For example

regional agenda goes from Algeria’s civil strife or Tu

Kurdish insurgency to include Lebanon, the peace pr

Israel’s overall relations with its Arab neighbors, the 

Balkan cauldron, pervasive economic backwar

throughout most of the former Ottoman empire, the 

the Middle East and Balkans as an area of gr

transnational crime including narcotics traffic

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and, of c

the activities of the great powers in areas of long-sta

rivalry and intervention.

For these reasons, the Strategic Studies Institut

Pepperdine University sponsored an internat

conference, “Mediterranean Security into the Co

Millennium,” attended by civilians and mil

professionals from the United States, Europe, an

Middle East and held in Florence, Italy, on October 

1998. Even before international violence erupted i

over Kosovo (i.e., the civil war between the Se

government and the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA

already in progress), it was clear that dialogue was urg

2
together to discuss many of these challenges to securit

papers that follow are some of those that were prese

but the conference agenda was even broader. Besid

papers that follow and a separate monograp

transnational threats such as drugs, terrorism

proliferation, by Anthony Cordesman, the partici

discussed the Arab side of the Israel-Arab relationshi

then recent Wye River Agreement between Israel an

Palestinian National Authority (PNA); and arms con

The discussions were lively, spirited, and probing. 

discussions and the papers provide a basis for fu

international dialogue and engagement across cont

and among civilians and military professionals. A s

purpose of the conference was to engage the U.S. Army 

regional institutions and experts in an ongoing dialog

these issues; without such a dialogue the Army’s an

West’s ability to forge appropriate responses to f

challenges will be undermined. That outcome would h

strongly negative impact upon Western security 

NATO and the other organizations that provide secu

and around Europe are already heavily engaged in the 

As General Klaus Naumann, Chairman of NATO’s M

Committee, has written,

It is in NATO and Europe’s interest to keep conflicts a

distance and to cope with new risks which may no longer be t

military risks we are accustomed to. It is for this very reas

that NATO focuses its attention on the security in t

Mediterranean and its periphery together with the Southe

Region, which is today NATO’s most endangered region.

3

The need for such dialogues will grow as the engage

of the United States, either alone or with its allie

partners, grows. Without a better insight into the n

interests, and views of our interlocutors, we are a

stumble into a morass based on excessive unilateralis

triumphalism. And once so trapped, as in Kosovo, ther

be no way out other than through a forceful mi

operation. This is not merely academic speculation.

3
Nimetz, who argue that a U.S.-led Pax NATO is ab

descend on the entire region. As Nimetz wrote, a clea

commitment to remaining a military power her

markedly enhance regional security. This is also true f

major NATO powers: France, Germany, Italy, 

Britain, Spain, Greece, and Turkey. 4 To maintain re

security, NATO must not only integrate the entire r

into the Western economy and foster the developm

“pluralistic institutions,” NATO must also gras

military nettle.

The Pax NATO is the only logical regime to maintain securit

the traditional sense. As NATO maintains its dominant rol

the Mediterranean, it must recognize a need for the expansio

its stabilizing influence in adjacent areas, particularly 

Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea region (in concert

course, with the regional powers, primarily Russia, Ukra

Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) and in the Arabian/Pers

Gulf. The United States must continue to play the major rol

this security system. The Sixth Fleet will be the vehicle 

implement this commitment for years to come, although th

something that might be reviewed some time down the roa

However, upon closer examination, the proble

Mediterranean security do not appear to point 

clear-cut a resolution of future issues. And, as Kosovo 

us, NATO was unready to assume this responsibil

shoulder the burden of adequately supervising a re

peace so that war would not again break out. In

challenges to the West as a whole and to the United S

in particular may rise in the future beyond our abi

deal with them comprehensively. Kosovo shows the 

problems that we now face in trying to execute Ni

mandate. And the fact that our engagement in Bosn

not end anytime soon also will undoubtedly test NA

staying power.

4
To discuss Mediterranean security is to en

conceptual minefield. Nor are these merely aca

disputes. Definitional issues are deeply relevant to 

because any definition of the terms “Mediterranean

“security” shapes the nature of our cognitive and 

responses to local challenges. Nor do these defini

issues pertain solely to U.S. forces. Precisely becaus

Mediterranean overlaps Asia, Africa, and Europe

commitments there are often multilateral ones that in

NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperat

Europe (OSCE), or bilateral partners like Morocco, E

and Israel.

Thus our Mediterranean policies and dom

discussions about them take place in a conte

multilateral and international debates and conte

approaches to the problems of Mediterranean sec

Without a shared understanding of the scope and nat

the issues we are facing, we will find ourselves unable 

alone or in concert with our allies and partners. 

United States or its armed forces disengages from re

concerted dialogues with its prospective regional par

it will lose much of its standing and ability to 

responses to local security challenges. In that 

dissension rather than consensus will be the order of th

among our allies and partners, not to mention 

interested parties. Instead of unity, challengers to 

security will find Western disunity and argum

Quarrels, not common undertakings, will reflect the n

of NATO, OSCE, and EU policy, as in the fiasco of Eu

and Washington’s Bosnia policies until 1995 and the D

Peace Process or, more recently, Kosovo.

The visible discord among our NATO allies in the K

crisis even after the operation began is very much due 

fact that their concepts of what must be done and wha

of outcomes are desirable diverge sharply from ours

divergence is one of the primary causes of the difficult

5
informed and continuing dialogue among NATO me

on Balkan issues in general and this one in particular 

have averted this sorry spectacle. Sadly, Kosovo is on

latest in a long list of Mediterranean and Middle Ea

crises where inter-allied discord has hamstrung 

policy.

7

Clearly this lesson must be constantly in our 

because it all too often is not one that sufficiently comm

our elite’s attention. Europe resents Ame

unilateralism, and the United States is quick t

Europe’s seeming paralysis.

8

 But Europe’s “para

stems as much from a growing perceptual gap betwee

allies and ourselves over the nature of security 

challenges to it, as from diverging responses to 

challenges. Therefore dialogue and discussion, n

arrogant know-it-all posture or self-righteous univers

and excessive faith in the use of long-distance, intens

short-term military power, is the preferred answ

challenges to international security.

At the conference it rapidly became clear that the 

terms “Mediterranean” and “security” are problemat

contentious in nature. When we say the 

“Mediterranean,” do we imply a strict geograp

construction to include only those countries whose s

comprise the Mediterranean Sea’s coastlines from Por

and Morocco to Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and E

Or do we include whole regions attached to those coast

the entire Balkan peninsula, the entire Middle East 

Gulf, and beyond that the Black Sea littoral? After 

Ambassador Luigi Ferraris observed in his keynote s

the latter was colonized to some degree by the Greek

Romans, and later the Venetians. None of these colo

peoples’ Mediterranean affiliations are open to ques

By this standard, and it seems to be materializing befo

eyes, Black Sea security issues must already pla

important role in any consideration of the Mediterran

security agenda. Thus definitions of the Mediterranea

6
as well as historical evolution. And even if w

satisfactorily provide a regional geographical definit

that all security providers agree on the territorial sc

their responsibility to provide security (whatever 

means), can we also agree then that there is 

overarching generic “Mediterranean” quality to the re

That is, can we conceptually and thus pract

organize our efforts and those of our alliances to cre

single regional security system or structure? Or is it r

the case that the diversity of challenges to security 

the entire space we have previously defined is so grea

any unifying or uniform regional approach is foredoom

failure and is inherently an absurd undertaking

instance, Mario Zucconi argues that the Mediterr

space is not a unitary geopolitical realm and that 

absence of the galvanizing Soviet threat, a

interventions throughout the area must now be ration

on a case-by-case basis.

10

 Accordingly, a sub-re

approach that sharply differentiates betwee

challenges to security in the Balkans and the Arab-I

peace process must be the order of the day. Thus the s

for a unifying and uniform strategic principle behin

operations in the Mediterranean is as elusive there a

elsewhere.

And if the heterogeneity of threats to security is 

distinguishes the region, can we deal with them th

some form of sub-regional organizations? What form 

those organizations take and what issues would 

address? Furthermore, by what principle would we 

the sub-regions and those states who can contribute 

region or sub-region’s greater security? Is there a bas

lumping together Israel and Mauritania in the EU

NATO’s ongoing Mediterranean dialogue? Does the lim

NATO-Mediterranean dialogue proceed on the same 

and should it do so? Does geography or some other att

qualify for membership in such debates and fora? And 

a satisfactory way of organizing the Mediterranean li

7
Israel, for example, finds such a structuring of the se

process to be deeply problematical.

11 And it probably 

alone in doing so although other states will have thei

reasons for such dissatisfaction with the Western app

And these questions are hardly the only such issu

conceptualization and practical organization to b

efforts to enhance security. Whether one looks at the 

Barcelona Initiative directed to the states upo

southern coast of the Mediterranean, or to NA

Mediterranean dialogue, one finds little progres

continuing mutual suspicion and mistrust between 

and South. Observers also discern within these pro

mutual mistrust among the southern states, 

strikingly, but not exclusively, in fora where Israel and 

states would logically participate together on an 

basis.

12

At the same time the Greco-Turkish controve

heating up, with each side’s senior statesmen denou

the other in highly inflammatory terms as “outlaw sta

Professor Duygu Sezer’s paper stresses that Tu

policymakers and elites feel surrounded by threats, n

Europe’s rejection of Turkey’s claim to membership 

EU and thus to an identity as a fully European state

other analysts write about Turkish policy in ter

Turkish high-handedness and confidence in str

truculent poses.

15

 Who is right, and how do we squar

circle? This too is not an academic point. Getting T

right is crucial to consolidating security in many tro

areas of the post-Cold War world. For example, 10 

after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the barriers separ

north from south remain deeply entrenched, an

identity of what constitutes Europe remains a mat

intense contention and dispute. Turkey’s attempt to 

the EU is a powerful emblem of those barriers an

salience of disputes over Europe’s identity.

As Zucconi and many others have observed, NATO 

be adapting its military structures, but its governmen

8
intervene abroad. European governments are not rea

spend money for the proliferating new contingencies 

area that make up the bulk of current U.S. operations. 

even before Kosovo it was obvious that resources 

dwindling while operations tempo (OPTEMPO) an

number of contingencies were increasing.

16

 Kosovo’s r

to date only confirmed many of the problems tha

instantly arise due to the underfinancing 

overstretched NATO and U.S. military. Nor are the

only challenges to allied cohesion and comprehens

what must be done in the region. As Zucconi writes,

And possibly, the main problem is not so much the dwindl

budget and reduced force structure, as much as the lack 

overall, articulated strategies and of clear determination to 

engaged in upholding stability in this area. In fact, there 

much improvisation and, in large measure, inability to co

into the crisis before the issue becomes an intractable one. 

interviews with this author in Brussels in June, 1998, abo

what to do and when to act in regard to Kosovo, several sen

officials and military officers started by warning that t

arrival of Christiane Amanpour, the CNN reporter, 

Pristina, meant that NATO “had to do something”—needl

to say, an indication of [the] lack of overall policies, of strate

planning, and even of well-defined mandates.

17

And beyond the issues involved in defining 

conceptualizing the Mediterranean, we enco

arguments over what security should mean an

definition. And again this is not an academic issue sin

definition of security will furnish statesmen with 

intellectual guide to policymaking for achieving 

condition. Indeed, today the very notion of security it

deeply contested, and the divisions over its meaning 

cause and reflect the Alliance’s inner confusion and di

For NATO as an organization, as U.S. General Batiste 

clear, the main sources of challenges and threats to se

reside in economic-political structures and their def

Classical studies on security interpreted security stric

terms of the defense of the integrity, independence

9
applied almost exclusively to military security. That 

longer the case. Security as a concept and as the g

day-to-day policy is becoming ever more civilianized 

its practitioners. And NATO evidently accepts this tre

legitimate and as an accurate reflection of reality. Se

also is increasingly used as a comprehensive term den

policies across a broad range of governmenta

inter-governmental activity that can fairly be describ

being of unprecedented scope.

19

 In Europe those respo

for security policy and those who contribute to the 

discourse on it are increasingly disinclined to see the u

of military force as an answer to problems short of inv

or to fund it as we think they should. The term securit

applies to economics, environmental security, so

security (or social but not our old age program) a

forth.20 But in this context of an expanding definit

security that encompasses virtually all aspects of orga

social life, what becomes NATO’s role? After all, these 

of issues are not those for which NATO is most equip

deal with. But if NATO cannot effectively provide se

in these domains and must wait for an explosion 

acting, who then can and will provide security in any 

of the term? And can we find mechanisms by which to 

explosions or to anticipate crises? Here Zucconi and Ro

Aliboni seconded General Batiste by highlighting the 

for the effective deployment of economic power as a si

non of any effective Western response to Mediterra

security challenges.

21

 Yet at the same time, the EU’s 

inhibited dialogues with the Mediterranean cou

betrays hesitation, mutual incomprehension, and m

suspicion as both Aliboni and especially Prof

Mohammad El-Selim cogently argued.

22

Egypt is hardly the only country that has a grie

against the EU. Israel is certainly dissatisfied wit

progress of the EU’s Barcelona dialogue, and Tu

anger at its exclusion from the EU has been exten

displayed publicly.

23 Worse yet, as Sezer, The

10
entry into the EU is formally tied to progress 

relationship with Greece and the resolution of the C

issue.24 Thus the EU’s effectiveness as a vehic

integrating Turkey, and beyond that the Middle Ea

severely limited from the start. As Couloumbis state

Greece now openly declares its willingness to lift its objectio

(given its veto power in the EU) to the building of a cl

relationship between the EU and Turkey, provided the lat

abandons its threats of going to war over the Aegean quest

and contributes substantively toward a functional a

mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus questi

permitting the reunification of Cyprus as a federal, bizon

and bicommunal state that is also a member of the Europe

Union and NATO.25 

Since even this quite moderate presentation of Gr

position puts or appears to put the onus of action w

upon Turkey, it is unlikely to provide a satisfactory ba

resolving the issue. Thus the EU’s failures and the li

of Turkish entry to the bilateral political conflic

weaken NATO’s cohesion and open the way to mi

makers of all sorts in the area. As R. Craig Nation po

out, the Cyprus issue is thus tied to other, larger iss

both bilateral and regional security in the Ea

Mediterranean.26 Already, as Stephen Blank obs

Russia’s efforts to sell arms to both Greece and Cypr

clearly motivated, at least in part, by a desire to fa

conflict’s flames and weaken NATO by splitting it.

27

Thus it would seem from these papers, and fro

unhappy Bosnian and Kosovo experiences, that Europ

has not addressed with sufficient seriousness what it 

considers to be the root challenges of security throug

EU, the organization most suited to deal with eco

security issues. Kosovo may change that as the EU 

appears to be moving to create a more comprehe

program of socio-economic reconstruction for the B

regional economy which has been devastated by alm

years of constant warfare in and around the f

11
its responsibilities, how can NATO make up the se

deficit in places like the Balkans? Or should it even t

At the same time, the emphasis in Europe on th

stemming from underdeveloped Mediterranean econo

failure to modernize clashes with the U.S. tendency 

threats in more purely military terms and unilate

approaches. And as we have seen in Bosnia and K

these differing or clashing perspectives inhibit rapi

unified allied or European response. Those disputes 

our relations with our allies and possibilities for eff

coalition building and maintenance. Recently Italian 

Minister Massimo D’Alema wrote that Italy, by virtue 

threats it faced from uncontrolled migration, drug run

and so on, was a front-line state.

29

 While the humani

disaster in the wake of the Kosovo operation may inc

our understanding of this perspective, his remarks re

jarring or dissonant to American ears since the 

“front-line state” clearly denotes a state that is ac

threatened in its vital interests by an opposing mi

force, not migrants fleeing for their lives. And if his an

is true, NATO cannot do much to prevent these chall

to Italian security. 

Until now the EU has been unwilling to act on its o

sponsor the rapid economic integration of Eastern Eu

Southeastern Europe, or the Middle East with We

Europe. As Stephen Calleya warned, there is the d

that European dialogues with the South may come 

seen as an exercise in boundary maintenance—fenci

the South from the North—not integration.

30 B

accounts, the EU’s Barcelona process and the 

Mediterranean Dialogue appear to be marking time

NATO’s parallel dialogue with Mediterranean state

not appear to be flourishing either. As Alberto B

NATO’s Political Affairs Division and Secretary-Ge

Javier Solana have both stated, the success of this init

depends on developments in two other fora which are d

troubled or just marking time, the peace process be

12
Euro-Mediterranean Program.

31

Meanwhile, the two most acute crisis areas seem 

the Middle East and the Balkans. The Florence confe

took place immediately after the Wye River Agreem

Maryland between Israel and the Palestinian Author

October 1998. Just to get this agreement on paper req

a stupendous exertion of American diplomatic activit

appeals from the dying King Hussein of Jordan. Y

Robert Freedman and Gerald Steinberg both pointed 

was not likely that this accord would constitute the de

impetus to bring the two sides closer to peace. Dom

factors in Israel and the PNA, as well as the intense l

of suspicion built up over the years, would probably ob

much more progress. And the subsequent fall of the I

government of Prime Minister Netanyahu an

suspension of progress until elections in May 1999 vali

their insights.

32

 Failure to advance the peace proces

likely diminish the U.S. standing in the area, for s

stalemate as well as the depth of the U.S. involvement 

Israeli political process could lead Israel or other sta

look for alternatives to the stifling U.S. presence

surprisingly, a quite recent rapprochement bet

Jerusalem and Moscow seems to be emerging, in pa

this reason.

33

Neither do the difficulties of establishing peace 

Middle East end here. Sami Hajjar’s discussion o

Lebanon triangle illustrates that fact. As long a

Lebanon issue remains unresolved with Israeli and S

forces both exercising an occupation or hegemony ove

or all of the country and its government, terrorist attac

Hizballah against Israeli armed forces in the south 

Syrian and Iranian support will continue. But since 

has no incentive to negotiate Israel’s way out of thi

accommodate Israel that is taking heavy losses but c

find any satisfactory way to retreat without endanger

own territory, the conflict will go on. Under 

circumstances, it cannot be ruled out that the conf

13
1975-76, 1982, and 1996. As Hajjar observed, Israel i

bogged down and trapped in one of the many low inten

unconventional conflicts now taking place througho

world. If its leadership cannot find an alternative sol

it may have to withdraw unilaterally, but that ma

produce more security for itself or Lebanon either.

34 T

is entirely possible that war will go on here for a long 

and poison the security environment for all conce

including the United States. After all, our own 

memories of Lebanon are not happy ones, and it is un

we will intervene with force. But is it in American int

or within our capacity to remain aloof or disengaged 

this process? On the other hand, if we cannot dise

from the peace process without serious losses t

interests and regional standing, how far should 

engaged? The experience of Israel’s 1977 and 1996 ele

show that if the United States is perceived as too obv

supporting one Israeli leader or coalition against an

then the U.S.-backed faction is likely to lose.

Obviously the Lebanon war will not come to a

without progress in some fashion between Israe

Lebanon and Syria. Washington’s participation is 

obviously indispensable. But as no such vista is in sigh

Eastern Mediterranean may not know peace for quite 

time. And under such circumstances, as Stephen 

warned, outside parties with rather different agenda

Russia, could be tempted to intervene in the area

indeed Moscow has fished in the turbid Lebanese w

already in 1996 and again at present as its relations 

Syria and Israel now illustrate.

35

The United States and its allies in the Ea

Mediterranean, e.g., Turkey and Israel, face threats b

these unconventional ones of the Kurds and Lebano

renewed Intifada. In the United States the threa

revived Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pro

or Iran’s developing one has become one of the most v

contemporary defense issues. As missile defense ag

14
must also recognize that this is becoming the 

dangerous, if not vital, threat perceived by Israe

perhaps by Turkey as well.

36 As Steinberg and Seze

observed, these missile and WMD threats are also 

threats to Israeli and Turkish security and are forcing 

governments to contemplate and undertake fundam

changes in thinking about defense strategy, force plan

and overall security policy. In Israel’s case, this be

even more urgent since it is no longer certain that 

achieve conventional superiority and deterrence ov

Arab enemies.

37

The Middle East in general has long since become a 

of increased tendencies to long-distance missile wa

This threat did not begin with Saddam Hussein. 

under Nasser had numerous German scientists work

rockets against Israel and Israel’s atomic program beg

the 1950s. Nor is WMD use a new threat or one that 

with Iraq in its war with Iran in 1980-88. Nasser’s Egy

forces in Yemen, in the 1962-67 civil war, used che

warfare against their Yemeni and Saudi-backed oppo

But what is most dangerous is that Saddam Hussein 

chemical war as a strategic operation in the war ag

Iraq over a decade ago and paid no price for it then or 

The price he has paid is for attacking Kuwait in 1990 a

subsequent defiance of the United Nations Sou

Command (UNSCOM) and the United States. Thu

example is not likely to be the last one, for it succeeded 

operationally and politically.

38

 For the United S

Israel, and Turkey, proliferation and terrorism, two ty

unconventional warfare that are simultaneously arra

deployed against them, are real and major threat

example, Israeli Brigadier General (res.) Aharon Lev

senior intelligence officer, recently told an interviewer 

You don’t need heavy weapons to win. When you consider wh

has happened to us, the Palestinians have succeeded 

beating us with the lightest of weapons. Clausewitz defin

war as gaining one’s goals. And when you consider what t

15
gained— they truly have demonstrated that terror is not o

simply a nuisance—it is in and of itself a strategic thre

We have already seen how short range light weapons, w

used to carry out a campaign of terror, can be just as effectiv

achieving the Arabs’ goals as heavy weapons. After all, te

has achieved something which, traditionally, one side only lo

after a crushing defeat—territory.

39 (emphasis author)

However, this is not the case in Europe. Or at 

Europe and our major NATO allies do not uniformly se

such a threat.

40

 D’Alema omitted proliferation as a th

States that do not feel menaced by the same threats wi

it difficult to cooperate on the reply to those threats. T

only one source of the difficulties the United States had 

devising a new strategic concept for NATO. U.S. 

remain extremely skeptical of our argument that N

should have the explicit capability and intention to str

threats that may originate outside of Europe 

proliferation.

42 Therefore there is little European ur

about devising effective and unified counterprolife

policies or about arms control regimes in the Middle 

For instance, a recent article by Francois Gere 

Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique argued 

proliferation threat to Europe is highly doubtful as a t

requiring amendment of NATO’s new strategic co

that military ripostes to threats emanating from place

North Korea are taking over NATO’s political proces

that there is no reason to believe that NATO would lo

effective deterrent capability vis-à-vis Russia if it di

from Washington’s stance on proliferation.

43 Like 

European elites, he opposes globalizing the Alliance 

lines suggested by the United States and stresses th

are overrating the military threat. Instead, for the Al

to move forward there must be a strategic converge

interests between Washington and Europe, and it m

confined to European issues, e.g., the Balkans an

Mediterranean. Therefore Europe must resist the eff

foist a global anti-proliferation posture upon it. 44

16
is clear that they are irrelevant at best and dangero

worst for the Middle East, including Turkey. Seze

pointed out that Turkey feels surrounded, not lea

proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD.

45 And 

such weapons have already been used with impunity 

Middle East, it is unlikely that further instances w

occur. Nor can pro-Western Middle Eastern s

necessarily rely on allies and the promises of coll

security for,

In true collective security it should make no difference w

commits aggression and who the victim is. But the princip

of collective security were ignored even during the Gulf W

[Henry] Kissinger, among others, observed that in its fin

hour, the Security Council closed its eyes to that princi

when Israel was attacked. . . Tactically the Council’s silen

made eminent sense, but the implications of this omission a

sobering, for they confirm yet again that the Council 

governed less by the commitment to respond to unprovok

aggression than by the politics of the situation.

46

Thus, for these states and for the United S

proliferation is seen as a growing menace. As St

Blank pointed out, Russia seems increasingly willi

supply Iran, Iraq, and even Syria with capabilities th

only enhance both their conventional and W

capabilities.

47

 Therefore the threat posed by prolifera

missiles with these capabilities and of conventional ba

missiles to U.S. allies in the Middle East is rising. Nor 

have effective counters to it. While Russia’s inter

obstructing U.S. initiatives is growing and adding an

page to the history of the Middle East and Ea

Mediterranean as an area that is constantly and thoro

penetrated by the great powers’ more general rivalr

Robert Freedman demonstrates, U.S. poli

floundering.

48

As Freedman shows, the United States has proven 

inconstant in the peace process and unable to forge an 

policy that commands international support. Wors

17
yet borne appreciable fruit, and we can expect little pro

here as a presidential election draws near. The U

States has not succeeded in persuading our all

invigorate their counterproliferation policies or to jo

against Tehran and Baghdad. Instead, we have ma

only to draw ourselves into a long-term, low-level w

attrition with Iraq and to commit ourselves to the over

of its government, policies and goals that is very un

ising.

49 Despite NATO’s rhetorical and organiza

commitment to a counterproliferation policy, it is clea

the allies’ misgivings about U.S. policy on this issu

frustrate efforts to realize a meaningful stra

commitment.

But this means that the Middle East will remai

just an arena of ethnic and religious conflict la

populated by authoritarian governments f

increasingly dire socio-economic challenges, but al

area of strategic dissension among our allies.

50 As be

European history, the inability of the powers to agree 

“Eastern Question” has allowed enterprising revis

powers, today, most notably Russia, to attempt to un

the entire status quo using this area’s inherent insta

as a political crowbar. And we can see similar e

underway in the Balkans. Russia seeks tactical al

with powers like France who resent American promi

so that they can both enhance their position at the ex

of the United States in Europe as well as in the M

East.

51 This trend will only further complicate effo

forge a strategic and operational consensus for NATO

strategic concept when it comes time to implement 

practice. Therefore in the Middle East, on top o

structural failings in economics and politics that ar

main sources of local challenges to internal and ex

security, we face the abiding tendency of the great pow

use the area as a battleground for their larger 

political rivalries.

18
tinderbox where consensus among the great powers 

less elusive today than in the past. In the Balkans, as 

Middle East, local intrastate conflicts and ethnic riv

easily spread across borders, threaten existing 

borders, and then often, as in the past, generate 

international crises. Frequently these crises are inten

because the great European powers approach them fro

vantage point of their own interactions. Thus the U

States did not intervene decisively in Bosnia until NA

own cohesion was at stake. So, too, in 1991-92 the A

Franco-German responses to the crackup of Yugo

were as much driven by their considerations of thei

bilateral and trilateral interactions as they were by e

to respond to local events and trends. 52 

NATO’s new Kosovo operation only confirms 

extends this depressing trend. NATO and the EU ar

committed to a fundamental and long-term reorganiz

of the regional status quo and by so doing have deci

worsened relations with Russia. Russian ties to NAT

probably not improve when this war is over, and it alre

talking ominously of revising its military doctrine to 

NATO’s challenge to its sense of itself as a great powe

to its regional security interests.

53

 And if NATO fa

achieve its goals, Russia’s interest in undermining 

cohesion and capability for doing so will dramatically g

While the Balkans may well produce too much h

for its own good, that history is inextricable from the 

issues of European security. While nobody writing abo

Balkans can just glide over the multiple challeng

security in maladapted political and economic struc

the siren song of exclusivist nationalism, contested bo

and so on, Europe’s responses to these problems has 

tepid or too little, too late, too often.

As Colonel Valeri Ratchev of Bulgaria makes 

Romania and Bulgaria are anxiously looking to the W

support and finding encouragement to be in short sup

19
European engagement. Romania’s ambassador t

United States recently complained that allied prevari

on the “open door” to NATO is inhibiting foreign inves

in her country.

55

 That produces a vicious cycle whic

impedes Romania’s efforts to catch up to NATO an

membership requirements. The destruction of a subst

part of the regional economy in the wake of the K

operation only adds to this structural problem. Bu

may not have made effective use of the first 7 ye

post-socialist rule, but it is now striving manfully to 

the needed reforms and likewise fears that the do

Europe will be shut in its face.

56

 Perhaps skepticism 

the depth of Sofia’s or Bucharest’s commitments to ref

not unmerited, but we should remember that these a

most pro-Western governments that we can expect in 

states. If they fail, what prospect is there for 

successors to launch the kind of reforms that will 

them more eligible for integration according to We

standards and more secure?

European engagement. Romania’s ambassador t

United States recently complained that allied prevari

on the “open door” to NATO is inhibiting foreign inves

in her country.

55

 That produces a vicious cycle whic

impedes Romania’s efforts to catch up to NATO an

membership requirements. The destruction of a subst

part of the regional economy in the wake of the K

operation only adds to this structural problem. Bu

may not have made effective use of the first 7 ye

post-socialist rule, but it is now striving manfully to 

the needed reforms and likewise fears that the do

Europe will be shut in its face.

56

 Perhaps skepticism 

the depth of Sofia’s or Bucharest’s commitments to ref

not unmerited, but we should remember that these a

most pro-Western governments that we can expect in 

states. If they fail, what prospect is there for 

successors to launch the kind of reforms that will 

them more eligible for integration according to We

standards and more secure?

However, the regional picture is not just one of ei

total lack of reform or of complaints about the We

February 1999, Bulgaria and Macedonia signed a tre

put an end to the “artificial problems between ou

countries,” namely whether they speak a separate lan

or not. The two governments renounced nationa

territorial claims upon each other and refused supp

groups who sought to use their territory for purposes h

the other. Both sides also claimed that they had “fo

way to speak in the language of a united Europe.” A

March 1999, Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria anno

plans for a free trade zone to begin in 2002. A Balkan 

force made up of local forces is also coming into be

While all these actions are not disinterested ones, the

and do contribute visibly to the possibility for bu

durable sub-regional or regional security structures 

Balkans that can help move that troubled area to a ne

more tranquil place in world politics. These are 

20
darkness in the Balkans. But too much still is darkn

Serbian policy daily shows us. The United State

NATO’s militaries now realize that the only effective 

for enduring long-term stability in the region is th

governments’ provision and management of long

prosperity. As Supreme Allied Commander E

(SACEUR) General Wesley Clark observed, military 

does not bring long-term stability, but prosperity does 

stability.

58 If we are to avoid more Kosovos and Bosnia

lesson and its implications must forcefully be imp

upon the official minds of governments who hav

capability to help and interests that would otherw

negatively affected by new conflicts. Therefore as N

confronts the challenge of restoring a lasting and legit

order in Kosovo and Bosnia, its challenges are as 

political and economic ones as they are military, pe

more so. And indeed, in 1998, NATO began to rise to th

as Secretary General Javier Solana launched a B

economic initiative.59 Now diplomats, expert analyst

generals must strive to grasp what policies best pr

attaining those goals in Kosovo, Bosnia, and acros

Balkans. 

Steven Burg provided a detailed and compa

typology of the kinds of solutions that have been 

elsewhere in Europe in analogous conflicts as wel

penetrating analysis of the actual operative facts o

ground in these countries. His conclusions pointed str

to the need to foster democracy in these areas an

outside democratic players to heavily engage themselv

the long-term in bringing about such a solution. 

Ratchev, Burg insisted that European attention to B

trouble spots cannot be intermittent and after the 

Europe must make its presence and interest

throughout the political process and not come in at th

with a heavy-handed force for lack of a better alternat

for want of more insight when the conflict could have 

prevented or arrested.

60 While preventive diploma

21
is not likely, Burg’s approach offers us a chance to 

from our past errors or sins of both omission 

commission and prevent the deployment of trained so

for long periods of time in roles that are ultim

uncongenial to them.

As Burg observed, NATO soldiers cannot be deplo

defend a status quo but rather must be instrume

progress towards a better peace. Examination of 

precedents, like the Basque one in Catalonia, suggest 

to overcome the conflict in Kosovo and find creative w

address bitterly contested issues of sovereignt

indispensable element of any viable solution, as S

Bianchini argued, is that the combatants have to get b

the political culture of nationalism which inflames 

passions and get to a new concept of the state which 

coterminous with that of ethnic groups.

61

 To the exten

new conceptions of sovereignty and of the state c

implemented in practice and agreed to thereafter, we 

be able to overcome the multiple crises, especially 

former Yugoslavia. Bianchini argues that all these 

are intertwined and require an overall solution that 

with neighbors and not against them as nation

demands. Thus he argues that if NATO alone oc

Kosovo and its autonomy or independence comes 

exclusively through the efforts of a military alliance, r

than an international organization like the UN, i

always be seen as an illegitimate outcome.

62 If that 

case, NATO will be trapped there in an increas

inhospitable and untenable situation. The Balkans, 

secure, must be integrated into the world curre

interdependence where alternatives to classical sovere

have been tried and succeeded.

This consideration returns us to NATO for it 

embodiment of that trend towards the creation 

pluralistic security community where war is unthin

and where aspects of traditional sovereignty, su

command over national armed forces, have been trade

22
this internal harmony of interests among its me

because it has formed a true security community, wher

among the members and purely unilateral national se

policies are inconceivable. 63 NATO’s integ

military-political structure subjects current and f

members to a rigorous international system of ci

democratic control over the use of armed forces at hom

abroad.

64

 NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement butt

this democratic form of control by demanding it 

precondition of membership, and the OSCE’s 1994 c

conduct also outlined a politically binding European a

for such control. NATO staked its claim here to democ

and internationalize controls over governments’ de

and security policies. 6 5 Everyone unde

democratization and mutual restraint, and becomes 

secure.

NATO justified its enlargement simply by req

democratic civilian control over the armed force

subjecting all its members to mutual discipline or rest

as well as internal constitutional restraints that go 

preventing renationalized security policies. 6 6 

generalized discipline makes NATO a uniq

self-restraining alliance whose inner constitution reas

Europe of peace. Even when Europeans complain 

Washington’s dictation, they acknowledge that it o

because Europe cannot overcome its divisions of advoc

collective European defense policies, while refusi

spend the money or take the necessary action.

67

 

works only when it acts in unison, when everyon

unilaterally, or tries to, the result is failure.

68

 When t

European unity, they all say, Washington then does i

listen to its allies and moderates its position in the int

of allied unity.69 Even at the height of the Cold 

Washington could not simply dictate to its allies, a

remained exquisitely attentive to their interest

concerns, often being forced to amend its policies to 

those concerns.

70

23
temptations to unilateralism in Europe. Those who w

use NATO assets for global crusades and world

intervention in the name of collective security or demo

may find this condition irksome. But it is the necessary 

we pay for leading this kind of multilateral alliance. W

now learning this lesson again the hard way in Kosov

it is essential that NATO again find its way to cons

because it remains the most effective and legit

security provider in Europe.

As Stephen Calleya pointed out, if NATO foste

kinds of consensus needed to respond to threats ru

from economics, through ethnic conflicts, to proliferat

can achieve a great deal of cohesion and rapproche

among the various conflict zones in the area.

71 The 

model of an authentic European community holds 

potential appeal for non-European and non-member s

and, if successfully developed, it can increase its a

through successful performance and meeting 

challenges to it. The converse is also true so NA

disarray could unravel some, if not all, of the progress 

since 1989. This does not mean NATO should substitu

the OSCE or EU in the Mediterranean, but it shou

what it can, if for no other reason than becau

abdication or failure will encourage those organizati

evade their responsibilities as well. For this kind of pa

to succeed in promoting peace in the area, NATO and 

key states must avoid the perception of or temptation 

according to a scheme which looks like tradit

hegemonic power plays. Overcoming security challen

the area must encompass attention to sub-reg

dynamics.

72

For instance, in the Greco-Turkish rivalry, the iss

EU membership for Cyprus and Turkey, dis

territories in the Aegean, military buildups, etc., mu

addressed together as Nation suggests. Nor should T

continue to act in a high-handed and threatening m

24
harboring Kurdish rebels or other sins.

73

Moreover, to the extent that NATO neglects regio

sub-regional concerns and issues, it will come to be se

an intrusive interloper that must be resisted or as a 

whose true intention is to maintain the boundary be

the East and the South. While the West would be a kin

of integration in this scheme, the East would be the re

fragmentation and crisis. If states that endeavor to cli

to European levels feel discriminated against or left 

the status quo, they will oppose it. And if NATO 

united, it will not be able to reach for solutions like 

called for by Burg in the former Yugoslavia or the ki

long-term engagement Ratchev and Bianchini urged. 

more unilateralist forces, whether in Greece, Tu

Russia, or the Middle East, will have their d

cooperative multilateralism will have been tried and 

wanting.

While there are no easy answers, there are some si

a rethinking of past postures. Italy’s new military polic

devote more attention to rapid reaction forces and to de

against proliferation threats.

74

 There are also sign

Germany understands that to safeguard security a

European role, it must move as well towards a br

southern engagement. The St. Malo Agreement be

Britain and France in December 1998 gave a new, 

vigorous impetus to a European Security and De

Identity.

75

 The aftermath of the Kosovo campaign ma

lead to more creative responses to the challenges now o

overall European security agenda. On the other 

NATO’s fractured process over Kosovo in 1998-9

Russia’s determination to frustrate U.S. efforts in E

and the Middle East, and its occasional success in fin

European partner are very disheartening signs. So 

fact that substantial economic pressures are building 

the United States to reduce its foreign military expos

the same time as its economic presence in 

Mediterranean as a whole is dropping relative to 

25
investments there as compared to other more c

strategic areas, the U.S. interest and military commi

in the Mediterranean may well decline over time. 76

Thus the current Mediterranean situation contain

frustrating and hopeful signs; it is neither sky-blu

black, but rather something in between, perhaps a 

typical, if not wholly satisfactory complexion. But sinc

governments that have the power to change the re

weather, they must first try to grasp in what directi

the region’s winds are blowing, even if they are seem

blowing in contradictory directions all at the same 

This may frustrate many, for complexity is not always 

accepted as today’s or tomorrow’s status quo.

Readers may therefore feel somewhat shortchange

we did not lay out here a blueprint of solutions or a 

from which to choose. However, the more one comes to 

with the entire range of security challenges i

Mediterranean, the more one comes to understan

enormous diversity of those challenges and of perspe

upon them. Hopefully this understanding should se

help us and governments clarify their thinking and se

a guide to action. Such clarification through dialogu

mutual engagement is essential. For, as many of the p

that follow imply or even state explicitly, if NATO an

United States fail to understand the dynamics o

challenges to which they are responding, they will 

extinguish them as sources of conflict. In that case, no

will the forces committed to existing crises and co

remain in place, but new forces for new crises will hav

found, and that is a most unappealing prospect.

26
1. Brigadier General John Batiste (USA), “Peacetime F

Engagement in [the] Southern Region,” briefing presented 

SSI-Pepperdine University Conference “Mediterranean Secur

the Coming Millennium,” Florence, Italy, October 26-27, 1998. 

2. Dr. Cordesman’s paper was published separately due to 

and comprehensiveness. Anthony Cordesman, Transnational 

from the Middle East: Crying Wolf or Crying Havoc?, Carlisle Ba

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999.

3. General Klaus Naumann, “The Reshaping of NATO 

Military Perspective,” Royal United Services Institute Journa

1997, p. 7.

4. Ambassador Matthew Nimetz, “Mediterranean Securit

the Cold War,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 2, Sprin

p. 29.

5. Ibid.

6. Fred Hiatt, “Without Muscle in Kosovo,” Washington Post

14, 1999, p. B7; Jonathan Landay, “Bigger NATO; But 

Divisions,” Christian Science Monitor, March 12, 1999, p. 2; Ro

Repubblica (Internet Version), in Italian, March 14, 1998 

Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe, (hen

FBIS-WEU), March 15, 1999, where Vuk Draskovic, Serbian 

Prime Minister, confided that a number of EU diplomats “

playing as a team with the United States.”

7. Wayne F. Lesperance, Jr. and Tom Lansford, “Dual Engag

France and the Persian Gulf,” European Security, Vol. VII, No. 4, 

1998, pp. 137-165. For an examination of the sources of inte

discord on issues in the Middle East, see Robert D. Blackw

Michael Stuermer, eds., Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies 

Greater Middle East, Cambridge MA: MIT University Press, 19

Anderson, “The European Union: Time for a Place at the T

Middle East Policy, Vol. VI, No. 3, February 1999, pp. 160-1

Christina Wood, “Chirac’s ‘New Arab Policy’ And Midd

Challenges: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Iraq, and Iran,” Midd

Journal, Vol. LII, No. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 563-580.

8. Michael Brenner, Terms of Engagement: The United Sta

the European Security Identity , Foreword by Jonathan 

Washington Papers, No. 176, Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher

27
Into the Coming Millennium,” paper presented to the SSI-Pep

University Conference “Challenges to Mediterranean Se

Florence, Italy, October 26-27, 1998.

10. Mario Zucconi, “NATO in the Mediterranean,” paper pr

to the SSI-Pepperdine University Conference; see also Naumann

11. Alfred Tovias, “Israel and the Barcelona Process;” El

“Israeli Views of the Role of NATO and the OSCE Security 

papers presented to the Conference on the Changing Struc

Euro-Atlantic Security and the Middle East, Begin-Sadat 

Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel, January 25-27, 1999.

12. The discontent with the EU’s role is pervasive. See 

Eberhard Kienle, “Destabilization Through partne

Euro-Mediterranean Relations After the Barcelona Decla

Mediterranean Politics, Vol. III, No. 2, Autumn 1998, pp. 1-20

Romero, “The European Union and North Africa: Keepi

Mediterranean Safe for Europe,” Ibid., pp. 21-38; Jorg 

“Institutional Constraints of the European Union’s Mediter

Policy,” Ibid., pp. 39-60; Stephen C. Calleya, “Preface,” Step

Calleya, ed., Economic Diplomacy in the Mediterranean, 

Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of 

1998; and Eberhard Rhein, “Globalisation of the Economy 

Meaning for the Mediterranean,” Ibid., pp. 27-45; Marc S

Poulsen, “The Barcelona Process,” Helsinki Monitor, Vol. IX

1998, pp. 55-62.

13. See the article by Ilnur Cevik in the Turkish Daily News 

Turkistan Newsletter, ISSN-1386-6265. March 9, 19

sota@EURONET.NL12.

14. Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, “Turkish Security Challenges 

1990s,” paper presented to the SSI-Pepperdine University Con

Idem., “Turkey’s New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapo

Proliferation, Comparative Strategy, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1995, pp. 1

see also Ilter Turan, ”Mediterranean Security in the Light of T

Concerns," Perspectives, Vol. III, No. 2, June-August 1998, pp. 

15. Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign 

SAIS Review, Vol. XIX, No. 1, Winter-Spring 1999, pp. 93-111.

16. James F. Miskel, “The Future of the US Military Presenc

Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Politics, III, No. 2, 1998, pp. 9

17. Zucconi.

28
Region.”

19. Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, Security: 

Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher

20. Ibid.

21. Zucconi; Roberto Aliboni, “European Union Security Po

Perceptions Toward the Mediterranean,” paper presented 

SSI-Pepperdine University Conference.

22. Ibid.; Mohammad El-Selim, “Arab Perceptions of the Eu

Union’s Euro-Mediterranean Projects,” paper presented 

SSI-Pepperdine University Conference.

23. Sezer; Turan, pp. 22-23.

24. Sezer; R.Craig Nation, “Greek-Turkish Rivalry a

Mediterranean Security Dilemma,” paper presented 

SSI-Pepperdine University Conference; Theodore Coulo

“Turkish Challenge and European Opportunity: Greek Foreign 

Priorities in a Post-Cold War Setting,” paper presented 

SSI-Pepperdine University Conference.

25. Couloumbis.

26. Nation.

27. Stephen Blank, “The Spirit of Eternal Negation: Russia

in the Middle East,” paper presented to the SSI-Pepperdine Un

Conference.

28. Breffni O’Rourke, “EU To Develop Ties with A

Macedonia,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Newsline, A

1999.

29. Massimo D’Alema, “Italy, Europe, and the New N

International Herald Tribune, January 22, 1999, p. 6.

30. Stephen Calleya, “Regional Security Challenges 

Mediterranean,” paper presented to the SSI-Pepperdine Un

Conference.

31. Alberto Bin, “Strengthening Cooperation in the Mediter

NATO’s Contribution,” NATO Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, Winter 

27. Secretary-General Solana similarly passed the buck to 

29
organization must take the lead in addressing them; Brussels

Internet, November 11, 1997, Foreign Broadcast Information 

Western Europe (henceforth FBIS-WEU), 97-316, November 13

32. Robert Freedman, “American Policy Toward the Middle 

Clinton’s Second Term,” paper presented to the SSI-Pep

University Conference; Gerald Steinberg, “Israeli Securi

Changing Environment: Challenges and Responses,” paper pr

to the SSI-Pepperdine University Conference.

33. Hillel Kutler and Danna Harman, “Sharon Scored for R

in Kosovo,” Jerusalem Post, North American Edition, April 16, 1

1-2.

34. Sami Hajjar, “The Stalled Peace Process: Israeli-Syrian 

paper presented to the SSI-Pepperdine University Conference.

35. Blank.

36. For a survey of the regional proliferation problems, see 

Lesser and Ashley Tellis, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation P

Around the Mediterranean Area, Santa Monica, CA: 

Corporation, 1996; and Cordesman.

37. Steinberg; Efraim Inbar, Israel’s National Security, 1

Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University

Gan, Israel, 1998; reprinted from The Annals of the American A

of Political and Social Science, Vol. 555, January 1998, pp. 72-74

38. Yiftah Shapir, “The Threat Posed by Proliferation of WM

Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East,” paper presented 

Conference on the Changing Structure of Euro-Atlantic Secur

the Middle East, Begin-Sadat Center, Bar-Ilan University, Ram

Israel, January 25-27, 1999; Timothy D. Hoyt, “Diffusion Fr

Periphery: The Impact of Technological and Conceptual Inno

paper presented to the 40th Annual Convention of the Intern

Studies Association, Washington, DC, February 18, 1999.

39. Interview of General Aharon Levran by Dr. Aaron 

Director, Independent Media Review and Analysis (IMRA), De

14, 1997, IMRA@netvision.net.il, December 15, 1997; see als

Castle, Transnational Organized Crime and International S

Working Paper no. 19, Institute of International Relations, Un

of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 1997, p. 10.

30
Study in Alliance Politics, Colorado Springs, CO: Institute for N

Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, Occasional Paper, 

1997.

41. D’Alema, p. 6.

42. For the most recent statement of the U.S. position, 

speech by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh 

to the NATO at 50 Conference sponsored by the Royal United S

Institute in London, March 9, 1999, “Shelton Remarks 

‘Transatlantic Commitment’,” U.S. Mission to NA

http://usa.grmbl.com/s19990309c.html; Clifford Beal, “NATO: 

We Stand?,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 3, 1999, pp. 22-23.

43. Francois Gere, “U.S. Hegemony and NATO,” Defense 

March 8-14, 1999, p. 25.

44. Ibid. 

45. Sezer.

46. Gidon Gottlieb, Nation Against State: A New Approach to 

Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty, New York: Council on 

Relations Press, 1993, p. 101.

47. Blank; and see more recently, Moscow, Segodnya, in R

February 17, 1999, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 

Eurasia, (Henceforth FBIS-SOV) February 17, 1999, and M

Izvestiya, in Russian, February 19, 1999,FBIS-SOV, February 1

48. Freedman.

49. Ibid; Paul Richter, “No End in Sight for U.S. Assault o

Los Angeles Times, March 3, 1999, p. 1.

50. Blackwill and Stuermer, passim.

51. Blank.

52. James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: Intern

Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, New York: Columbia Un

Press, 1997.

53. Colonel Valeri Ratchev, “South-Eastern Europe At the B

the New Century: The Security Aspect,” paper presented 

SSI-Pepperdine University Conference.

31
55. Jeffrey Simon, “Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years,” N

Defense University, Institute for National Security Studies, S

Forum, No. 142, 1998; Robert Lyle, “Bulgaria Receives Praise fr

Directors,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, March 1

Kevin Done, “Still hurdles to Overcome,” Financial Times, 

section on Bulgaria, March 8, 1999.

56. William Pfaff, “Good news From the Balkans: Bulga

Macedonia,” International Herald Tribune, March, 9, 

Turkistan-Economy Bulletin, ISSN-1386-6265, March 15

kryopak@WORLD.ATT.NET.

57. “Turkish Moves in the Caucasus, Balkans, Irk Rivals in R

Defense News, August 3-9, 1998, p. 12.

58. Luke Hill, “NATO Chief Embraces New Economic M

Balkans,” Defense News, March 15, 1999, p. 18.

59. Speech by Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana 

Royal United Services Institute, London, March 9, 

www.NATO.int.

60. Steven L. Burg, “The Security Challenge in Kosovo: To

Region-Stabilizing Solution,” paper presented to the SSI-Pep

University Conference.

61. Ibid.; Stefano Bianchini, “The Cultural Scope of 

Security,” paper presented to the SSI-Pepperdine Uni

Conference.

62. Ibid.

63. Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, et al., Political Community 

North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the L

Historical Experience, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pres

is the classic statement of this thesis. For a recent restatement o

Catherine McArdle Kelleher, The Future of European S

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995.

64. General Klaus Naumann, “NATO Is Changing,” 

European Issues: Romanian Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. III

1997, pp. 18-28.

65. NATO Study on Enlargement, NATO Internet, B

September 28, 1995.

32
the Working Group on NATO Enlargement, November 1994

Internet; David Carment, “NATO and the International Po

Ethnic Conflict: Perspectives on Theory and Policy,” Contem

Security Policy, Vol. XVI, No. 3, December 1995, pp. 364-365.

67. Brussels, Knack, in Dutch, July 16-22, 1997,FBIS-WEU-

July 16, 1997; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Demo

the European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy, Princeton, NJ: Pr

University Press, 1995.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid. Vienna, Die Presse, in German, July 16

FBIS-WEU-97-197, July 16, 1997.

70. Ibid.; Risse-Kappen, passim.

71. Calleya.

72. Ibid.

73. Cevik; Makovsky, pp. 93-111.

74. Paolo Valpolicini and Richard Bassett, “Defined Lines,

Defence Weekly, March 3, 1999, pp. 25-26. 

75. Andreas Jacobs and Carlo Masala, “Germany’s Mediter

Challenge,” forthcoming in European Security; Joseph Fitchett

Joins London On A Push for Defense,” International Herald T

December 2, 1998, p. 1; Theresa Hitchens and Christina Mac

“Europe’s Big Three Drop Defense Bombshell,” Defense 

December 7-13, 1998, pp. 3, 40.

76. Miskel, pp. 93-103.

33
TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENG

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Alessandro Politi

Executive Summary.

The objectives of this paper are to define the bound

of the Mediterranean Region, to provide a definit

transnational security challenges, to offer a descript

the major risks and their effects on European security

to describe some policies to cope more effectively with t

A transnational security challenge is a phenomeno

threatens different areas irrespective of borde

distances. In this paper, we will consider as transna

security challenges mainly three phenomena: transna

organized crime, illegal drug trafficking, and interna

terrorism. The exclusion of other possible security con

stems from the observation that either they cannot be 

with forceful means or because they are not neces

transnational.

In describing a geopolitical map of these challenge

paper focuses on:

• three centers of gravity, concerning m

transnational organized criminal organiza

namely Italy, Russia, and Turkey;

• 21 regional gravitating support areas: Alb

Croatia, Bulgaria, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, F

FRY, FYROM, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jo

Lebanon, Morocco, Rumania, Slovenia, Som

Spain, Syria, Tunisia;

35
to states at soag (gea ad ussa

ten having experienced various degrees of f

(Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Eritrea

FYROM, Georgia, Lebanon, Slovenia, Somalia)

• four islands which have relevant grey zone

different degrees of organized crime co

connection (Corsica, Cyprus, Sardinia, and Sic

• two major (Morocco and Russia) and two mino

producers (Lebanon and former Yugoslavia);

• three major drug trafficking routes: Atlantic R

Balkan Corridor, and Russia;

• three major drug trafficking entry points: R

Spain, and Turkey;

• three major people-smuggling sea-r

(Morocco-Spain, Tunisia-Italy, and Albania-

and four land-routes (Sarajevo-Croatia-Slov

Italy/Austria; Istanbul-Ukraine- Poland-Germa

Istanbul-Romania-Hungary- Slovakia-C

Republic; Istanbul-Greece- FYROM-Italy/Au

Russia-Finland);

• three regional financial offshore centers, i.e., Cy

Malta, Monaco;

• the presence of Chinese, Colombian, and Jap

organized criminal groups and the relative abse

North American and Mexican ones;

• the prevalence of drugs such as cannabis, heroi

ATS, with cocaine increasing;

• 20 countries with internal/endemic/civi

terrorism, inspired by nationalist/ethnic motiv

(Spain, Israel, Greece, FRY, FYROM, Turkey, 

Iraq, Russia) or by political/religious motiv

36
Iraq, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain);

• three countries affected by international terr

(France, Saudi Arabia, Yemen);

• five countries designated as terrorism supp

states (Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Iran);

• nine countries seriously violating human rig

various degrees in their counterterrorist a

(Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, 

Iraq, Bahrain, Turkey, FRY).

With regard to the possible policies to be adopte

paper argues that, at an institutional level, the EU 

leading institution in the region. The possible four prio

should be to:

1) continue the gradual integration of the commo

enforcement and judicial spaces;

2) prepare to enlarge through policies that en

formally and informally the cooperation among 

interested in stability and economic development;

3) continue support to Russia; and,

4) devise appropriate policies for the assistance t

enforcement agencies of third countries.

The Boundaries of the Mediterranean Region.

The general use of the word “Mediterranean” may 

that it includes on one hand the countries of the old 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Southern Flan

on the other the dialogue partners of the Western Eur

Union (WEU) and of NAT0.

2

 Indeed, for traditional se

purposes, this definition would be a reasonable 

although for strategic and political reasons, it shou

regarded as a minimalist one.

37
European Union (EU)-sponsored Barcelona Pr

represents a large component (since it represen

countries), although not an all-inclusive one, for two 

reasons: methodological and political.

Firstly, transnational risks do not confor

international political constellations or mind sets 

somehow to slice a geopolitical area into nice subdivi

For analytical purposes, one has to see an area as w

using afterwards the existing political settings or de

new arrangements to implement an appropriate poli

Secondly, these risks are considered too often in a l

“us versus them” (i.e., thinking that they come fro

external perimeter of our Western “civilised” w

whereas they are as transnational as financial ma

with transactions and raids occurring in Lo

Barcelona, Istanbul, Berlin, Rome, or New York.

It should also be borne in mind that the widesprea

that the Mediterranean is nothing more than a geogr

expression, because it is impossible to reconcile 

different realities, may reveal three distinct and som

politically unhelpful mind sets.

The first one pretends that a region must be som

homogeneous in order to be considered as a whole. It i

similar to those favouring “unity and purity” within 

geopolitical area.

The second conception, much cherished by sim

and pragmatic-by-default people, tries to exclude as 

as possible every complexity, believing that outs

politically correct area the rest is an incoherent, fragm

chaos.

The third mind set derives from the rich, yet li

experience of the last two centuries (19th and 

centuries), whereby it is nearly impossible to under

realities lacking the relative coherence of nation-state

great alliances. The problem is that most events cha

38
complexity, and more or less substantial disorder.

Now, what will be called in this pape

Mediterranean Region can be subdivided into dif

subregions, but it is impossible to cut apart if one do

want to pay heavy economic, social, political, and str

prices. Seas create inevitably strong links and to try 

them as bulwarks is an illusion, as two world war

several migratory waves have demonstrated

Mediterranean Region is a geopolitical reality conn

willy-nilly the destinies of different countries.

According to these premises, we will consider a

Mediterranean Region the area included by the Stra

Gibraltar, Bosphorus, Kerch, Bab el Mandab, Hormu

by the Suez Canal. This means that the Black Sea w

considered as an extension of the Mediterranean, wh

Red Sea and the Persian Gulf are not only physicall

also historically and politically linked to the Me

ranean. This area can evidently be subdivided int

smaller subregions: West Europe, Balkan/Black 

Middle East/Red Sea, and Maghreb.

3

During each great historical period, the Mediterr

Region had to face as a whole the great security ques

even if these were considered from different angles in 

subregion.

During the Cold War, the subregions of West Europ

of the Balkan/Black Sea were characterised by h

armed peace, tinged with strong political tensions

Maghreb, instead, after post-colonial convulsion, w

secondary theatre of confrontation between the two b

while in the Middle East/Red Sea subregion war rag

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the great Arab-I

wars have been superseded by an extremely fragile 

more marked by internal conflicts (opposing terro

urban guerrillas, social inequalities) than by the 

armoured and air battles. Iraq is the only exception

39
problems of this part of the subregion remain the 

between armed bands and all types of illicit traffi

Similar plagues affect some Maghreb countries in a 

visible (Algeria) or less evident way (Libya).

In several countries of the Balkan/Black Sea subr

the armed peace has changed into a long civil war, feat

in most cases guerrilla and counterguerrilla opera

conducted by more or less heavily equipped troops. The 

of Yugoslav dissolution, ended in Slovenia, Cr

Bosnia-Herzegovina, are now continuing in the 

Albania, and Macedonia. Yet all the countries i

subregion are affected by the new transnational se

challenges (namely drug trafficking, organized crime

terrorism). In fact, most countries of the Mediterra

Region do not confront a single, classic military threa

are going back to a multidimensional security.

Defining Transnational Security Challenges.

There have been within the post-1989 Euro-Ame

strategic literature a number of studies trying to redef

various ways the nature and the scope of ch

concerning traditional security.

4

 Surely a first bo

contention can be the definition of traditional security 

If, by traditional security, we understand that po

concern and that politically oriented activity that E

was accustomed to seeing as relevant for the past 

centuries in the case of earlier centralised states an

some 150 years for younger states, then we risk mis

wider and much more complex picture. This is partic

true if Western strategic thinking may be still und

unconscious influence of the Cold War.

The fact is that all the security concerns that we pr

are new are stone-age old in other continents and rem

pretty much unchanged in other parts of the Mediterra

Region. A cursory glance at history books shows tha

strife and violence, population imbalances and migra

40
international terrorism, and transnational organized 

are in most cases common during the some four mill

that preceded our age (international terrorism beco

much more frequent in the 19th century due to the evo

of political movements and of technology).

5

 This is e

true for many areas that were not directly under the s

Cold War stabilization, the Middle East being one ev

example and the tragic events in Lebanon being alm

paradigm.

Thus, it would be more appropriate and simple to 

that we, in the Northern hemisphere, once dominated 

Cold War, are rediscovering traditional security, a se

by nature multidimensional, whose concerns might 

changed in object and scope when compared to the pa

This return, although justifiable with Vico’s theory 

corsi e ricorsi6 (occurrences and recurrences of histo

better explainable with the link that exists between 

and grand strategy. If we take into account 

definitions of grand strategy, we shall see that in this 

the old Cold War division between security proper 

external and military interstate security) and int

security or other newer concerns never applied.

7

An immediate political objection to a wider conc

security is the danger of putting very different thing

the same category of security, with the consequence th

policy approach will be less focused on political and 

solutions and more in favour of indiscriminately repre

quasi-military actions. In other words, if poten

everything concerns security, policy responses cou

implicitly more and more “militarised.” On a 

intellectual level, this objection is coupled with the r

“concept inflation,” whereby the progressive widen

security endangers its coherence.

The reply in favour of the return of a of conc

multidimensional security will combine diff

arguments.

41
st, te dea tat a boadecocept ose

should imply a more narrowly focused response 

warranted by itself. On the contrary, a br

concept should allow a flexible, tailored policy w

force is only one of the different means employ

• Secondly, as already shown, the concept of se

became singularly “deflated” during the 1948

period in a significant, but not all-encompassing 

of the globe. Conversely, it risks not being in

when security reacquires its original complexit

• Thirdly, security has become more vi

multidimensional because attacks on the sovere

of nation-states can now be carried out 

effectively by richer and more powerful non

actors, and because the complexity of m

societies offers multiple vulnerabilities. Go

mental resources, moreover, seem insufficie

control key autonomous components of sovere

(territorial integrity, strategic control of key ar

resources, financial flows, internal security).

• Finally, security is, and remains, a politically de

concept. One can discuss if the widening of se

might be a good or a bad political choice, but se

is not intrinsically a self-contained concept, nor 

be related to military affairs only. If the po

priorities change, the nature and the mea

multidimensional security will inevitably follow 

adapt to the different sectors of the political ac

How the political decision on including other con

within the perimeter of security will respect basi

democratic freedoms does not depend on the conc

security itself, but on the state of actual laws and pra

of a given government.

Once one agrees that multidimensional securit

matter of fact, politically and operationally accepta

42
really considered security challenges or not.

In principle, as stated above, once a political 

decides that a specific issue is relevant for security

should be more than enough, yet this arbitrary elem

compounded by some less subjective factors, both pra

and conceptual. From a practical point of view, the

some nontraditional concerns that clearly involve the 

violence, allowing easier links to traditional security

as civil violence and insurrection, international terro

transnational organized crime, and illegal drug traffic

Environmental degradation, resource sca

population growth and migration, all can affect na

and international security, but in general they tend 

managed more within higher policy and grand str

With regard to these problems, the use of means othe

force (economic, political, diplomatic, social, cultural 

appears to be, in first instance, more cost-effective, e

force may remain the last recourse, as always in polit

a certain sense, whereas the first four nontradi

security risks are, notwithstanding the causes, ma

tations of violence, the remaining ones may be, inste

violence, considered more likely to be stakes for an a

confrontation.

From a more conceptual point of view, grand str

does work as a bridge between politics and tradi

security in both senses. On one hand, as we have se

favours the enlargement of the old concept of security

on the other, it helps to shift some of the newer se

challenges to a domain that is more politically 

security-minded.

At this point one can define what a transna

security challenge should be. A security challenge 

phenomenon that threatens the security of a given ar

it defined by geographic, geopolitical, statehood, nat

sub-national, or supranational criteria. A transna

43
irrespective of borders or distances.

9

In this paper, we will consider as transnational se

challenges mainly three phenomena: transnat

organized crime, illegal drug trafficking, and interna

terrorism. The exclusion of other mentioned se

concerns stems from the fact that either they ca

considered more the resort in first place of means othe

force, as already argued, or because, as such, they a

necessarily transnational. Civil violence and insurre

for what these somewhat vague terms mean

characterised in the first place by their localised actio

immediate effects, although they sometimes may 

transnational aspects either in terms of log

(sanctuaries) or in terms of terrorist actions. If one 

Algeria as an example, civil violence and insurrectio

fairly localised, whereas terrorist actions and pol

logistic networks may be transnational.

10

The delimitation of the analysed transnational se

challenges does not exempt us from the equally compl

definition of the three risks themselves. Academics, ju

and police forces continue to disagree on the definit

transnational organized crime.

11 There are, howeve

elements defining organized crime on which a 

majority of authors agree: the existence of an organize

stable hierarchy; the acquisition of profits through c

the use of force and intimidation; and recourse to corru

in order to maintain impunity.

This paper will use the definition adopted in 1993 

EU’s Ad Hoc Group on Organized Crime, then presen

the EU Council:

Organized crime is present whenever two or more persons 

involved in a common criminal project, for a prolonged 

unspecified period of time, in order to obtain power and pro

and where to the single associates are assigned tasks to ca

out within the organization: (1) through business or connec

business activities; (2) using violence or intimidation; 

44
judiciary, through the control of a determined territory

necessary, in order to commit the planned crimes that, from 

collective or individual point of view, must be consider

serious crimes.12

Appended to this definition, which is not a commo

definition but represents an important step, was a ta

eleven characteristics for use during the preparation 

reports on organized crime and in pinpointing more 

this phenomenon at international level. They ar

collaboration among more than two people; (2) among 

there is a distribution of tasks; (3) who operate for a l

unspecified time; (4) operate under a certain disciplin

control; (5) are suspected of serious crimes; (6) oper

international level; (7) use violence and other mea

intimidation; (8) use commercial or pseudocomm

structures; (9) launder money; (10) exercise their infl

on politics, media, public administration or in the eco

field; and (11) seek profit and power. If a criminal 

displays at least six of these characteristics, among whi

necessarily (1), (5) and (11), it can be considered 

involved in organized crime. 13

Concerning illegal drug trafficking, for the purposes 

paper it will be called simply drug trafficking. It will not 

upon the debate on what should be illegal drugs or 

what should be the best strategy to combat this probl

will consider illegal those drugs considered as such b

majority of EU governments, knowing that some n

exceptions in legal practice or in actual law enforc

priorities in some countries might create political pro

and difficulties in implementation, as the Dutch 

shows.14

International terrorism is no less controversial tha

previous two phenomena regarding definitions, des

marked increase in cooperation during the last 5 yea

Probably the best known definitions are those emp

by the U.S. Department of State:16

45
motivated violence perpetrated against noncomb

targets by subnational groups or clandestine ag

usually intended to influence an audience. 17

- The term “international terrorism” means terr

involving citizens or the territory of more than one cou

- The term “terrorist group” means any group pract

or that has significant subgroups that practice, 

national terrorism.

The definition adopted will be that proposed L. R. B

which uses the twin criteria of just cause and just me

distinguish between rightful recourse to insurgent forc

unlawful terrorism.

18

 As has happened also for the O

extradition case from Italy to Germany, the just ca

political violence can always be argued,

19

 but the just m

are quite clearly defined by international law bo

regular and irregular forces. Terrorism is unlawful be

the means used fail to satisfy the criterion of just m

(i.e., whenever the use of force is indiscrimi

disproportionate, and/or beyond the codified bounda

military necessity). The group that violates these n

would be guilty of war crimes and possibly even of c

against humanity.

20

Further clarification is needed for the term interna

terrorism. In the wider debate, it is often a fairly imp

expression that covers actions, differing in degre

political and moral unacceptability. This paper 

forward seven types of terrorist or terrorist-like situat

• domestic terrorism, endemic terrorism and civil 

• international implications of domestic/end

terrorism and civil war;

22

• international spillovers of domestic/end

terrorism/civil war;

23

46
teatoasuppot to doestc/edec teo

civil war;

24

• international state-sponsoring of domestic, en

terrorism or civil war;

25

• international terrorism proper. In this case citiz

one country are conducting attacks in countries 

than the theatre of civil confrontation and/or a

citizens who are neither within the mentioned th

nor in countries adjacent to it;

26

• covert operations. Under this denominatio

included state-sponsored assassinations of se

individuals whose political or military res

activities are considered dangerous or because 

are retaliatory targets.

27

In the international political debate, there is 

another category called ”state terrorism” and defined 

situation in which a state lends its legitimacy to terror

lends its own organs to indulge in acts of terroris

appears that this concept, although repeatedly employ

not particularly helpful in pinpointing the natu

international terrorism. In the case of legitimizat

terrorism per se, it may be a condemnable political po

but it is not a terrorist act. In the case of using state o

for terrorist operations, it falls mostly either in the cat

of state-sponsoring or in that of covert operations. It 

that only in the context of a situation of endemic terr

can one envisage state terrorism as the method by w

government (or a part of it) sets up clandestine g

whose selected or indiscriminate killings are off

disavowed. In all cases, state terrorism either weake

rule of law within a given country, or creates in the me

term heavy friction with the rest of the interna

community.

28

47
Mediterranean Region.

Transnational organized crime and drug traffi

The paper will analyse what it considers the two 

threats among the transnational security challe

transnational organized crime and drug trafficking. 

have to be considered together since the drug produ

and smuggling chain requires criminal organiza

While organized crime can exist without drug traffi

the reverse is not true. But drugs can be considered a 

and a crime multiplier not only for criminal groups, bu

for guerrilla and terrorist groups.

Transnational organized crime, and especial

association to drug trafficking, is an outright threat f

governments and societies in the Mediterranean regi

the following reasons:

1) The lives killed or maimed by drugs or during cri

confrontations are not only casualties, but repr

directly or indirectly an economic gain for dangerous a

that challenge across the border the authority of the 

and of law. Few governments or publics would a

similar levels of casualties in peacekeeping, external a

and terrorism (at least 16 dead per day in 1996 in Sch

countries, apparently one of the best protected areas).

politicians and citizens at large still entertain the ru

belief that it is an internal matter, to be fatalis

accepted as car accidents are. The human costs o

dangerous combination are, of course, not the same f

countries in the region, but experience shows that t

countries become in most cases also consumer coun

with all the attendant consequences.

2) The economic resources generated by organized 

and drug trafficking are directly and deliberately us

destabilising the society, the political system

administration and the economy of the country. Its fin

muscle, facilitating the accession to political influenc

48
multibillion transnational business: drug trafficking 

according to the UNDCP World Drug Report, yields a 

billion per year turnover, equal to 8 percent of total 

exports.30 The corresponding effects are: ”pax ma

destruction of democratic/liberal values, corruption, m

laundering, and business infiltration. Even if in a num

countries the political regimes are not democrati

undermining effects of parallel power structures shou

be underestimated. The case of the Soviet Union show

organized criminal structures were never fully integra

the system and that, even then, they produced m

inefficiencies, injustices, and illegal power struggles 

within the laws and the logic of the regime.

31 

circumstances could have potentially dangerous effe

the transitions that some regimes in the Balkan

Middle East, and some states adrift in the Horn of A

will face at the end of this century.

3) The transnational networks, created and sustain

this combination, attack the territorial integrity both 

borders and within a given country. Whenever orga

crime controls an area, transnational organized crim

free access, and law enforcement finds a no-go area 

anyhow ineffective. These areas, also called grey zone

practically out of state sovereignty. Grey zone

unfortunately also present in many countries o

Mediterranean Region.

32

4) In addition to the problems experienced by 

European countries, many countries in the remainder 

Region risk becoming less reliable international pa

because organized crime and drug trafficking unde

them, even if they consider themselves only drug t

countries. In this context, the stability of Russia 

Ukraine may be put significantly into question, 

evident repercussions at the political and economic 

not the least in the G8 forum, where important po

coordination takes place against these risks.

33

49
finished, and it could imply much bigger dangers. Som

analysts believe already that the latest evolution o

phenomena are going towards organized systemic 

(OSC), characterised by increasing alliances bet

Russian, Chinese, Italian, Japanese, and U.S. cri

organizations, and a fully-fledged narco-indus

Between 1991 and 1993 a number of criminal ”sum

have taken place, involving also Cosa Nostra and Ru

criminal organizations.

It may be easily overlooked that the Mediterr

region is home to five major transnational orga

criminal constellations:

- Italian Camorra, Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta

Nuova Sacra Corona Unita (SCU);

- Russian and Georgian organized criminal group

- Turkish and Kurdish maffia clans.

35

Moreover, minor, but not less dangerous and vi

organized criminal groups are very active in Alb

Bulgaria, France, Israel, Lebanon, Spain, and f

Yugoslavia. To these countries, one should naturall

Malta, Monaco, and Cyprus as centers providing of

banking facilities and fiscal incentives, a natural magn

money laundering schemes.

This listing of countries is just an indicator, an

should not concentrate attention only on those geogr

areas, because one would miss the formidable 

connections between those groups and the whole 

Mediterranean region, Europe, and the world.

As a first proof that the phenomenon of organized 

must be viewed at a strategic scale, one should tak

projected forgery and money laundering operations d

the switch to the Euro currency.

36

 Naturally, this will 

some Spectre-like secret operation; much worse, it w

the sum of flexible agreements between some sophist

50
opportunistically exploiting with regional/g

capabilities, this great occasion.

The potential damage of gigantic fraud on the pu

and market’s confidence could be very considerable

could just imagine if some powerful Russian orga

criminal group would have converging interests 

aggressive neo-nationalist Russian groups in ord

undermine the confidence in future European integrat

Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). N

integration would be lamed, proven substantially us

while politics, societies, and economies would be 

infiltrated by diverse criminal organizations. To thi

one could add risks of distortion of the gold trade, be

all major criminal organizations are starting to use g

traceless money laundering means.

The geography of criminal groups is bound of mod

inevitably current geopolitical maps, because in some 

transnational organized crime is capable of modifin

nature of the governmnent. According to the Observ

Geopolitique des Drogues (OGD), in the Mediterr

Region, Russia, the FSU republics (Georgia, Mo

Ukraine, in our case), and Turkey are the countries w

the dangers of connivance between state organ

criminal groups are greatest.

37

With the proviso that it is not our intention to subs

the old Soviet enemy with a new Russian one, since We

mafias are absolutely cooperative with Russian mafi

whenever they settle their power and money feuds, w

point out some relevant strategic implications of Ru

and Georgian organized crime before passing to other 

We will leave the Turkish-Kurdish until the end, wh

will treat the mixture of organized crime, drug traffi

and terrorism.

The end of the Soviet regime marked the mutatio

type of organized crime from the “totalitarian” v

towards a “free market” one. While during the Soviet r

51
the Western world, it was nonetheless so present t

undermined significant portions of the Soviet state

surprisingly, “mafya” problems already exist

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan 

1960s-1980s, prompting the Muscovite leadersh

replace corrupted and criminal top local party mem

who, in turn, complained (not without some reason) th

Moscow bosses led an unfair competition.

With the liberalization of the regime and its ult

fall, organized crime also became liberalized. The ju

quality of the first generation of former Soviet transna

organized crime is due to these factors:

- strong cohesiveness within the different lev

organized crime and the ethnic groups;

- a higher level of instruction (higher secondary 

and university degrees for many bosses);

- the hard training that the first post- perest

criminal generation received during the Soviet regim

- the arrival in criminal organizations of well-tr

senior military and intelligence officers;

- the long-standing collusions with corrupted sect

the ruling elite;

- the ongoing collapse of the old police and ju

system;

- the legal and criminal globalization of economy;

- the widespread poverty, hitting also relatively h

classes;

- the slow reconstruction of alternative moral and 

values after the vanishing of the old ideology;

- the persistent lack of a transparent and efficie

collecting, banking and customs system;

52
ment of the Russian economy without questioning too 

the destination of funds and the arrival of Ru

investments for many years.

38

This state of affairs has brought important consequ

for the stability of the Mediterranean Region and Eu

the existence of criminal regimes in Crimea, Transdne

and in other areas affected by civil strife and with 

illegal emigration rates (Georgia in our case); the r

criminal terrorism in Russia and Ukraine; drug produ

and trafficking in North Caucasus, Black Sea 

Ukraine, Moscow, St. Petersburg; major smug

operations in North Caucasus and Ukraine; massive 

frauds and money laundering in the major Russian 

and substantial economic penetration in the C

countries and sizeable investments in the legal econo

West European countries.39

Main illegal businesses of these groups are rackete

smuggling of Western wares and East Euro

antiquities, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, prostit

and gambling.

A recent disquieting dimension is the export o

proliferating technologies by criminal business 

quasi-government entities, which may be outside the 

control of the government, towards sensitive countrie

India, Iran, and Syria.

40

 This phenomenon is actually 

more credible than the dreaded possibility that Ru

organized criminal groups might export nuclear weap

components to proliferating countries. Althoug

situation does not leave room for complacency

proliferating pattern by these entities shows that 

prefer to do some illegal and lucrative business, inst

risking a dangerous sale with unforeseeable consequen

The diffusion of these groups is truly on a global 

since the countries most targeted are France, Ger

Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

4

said, all CEEC countries are affected at different leve

53
Spain, and Turkey.

42

 Connections with other 

worldwide organized criminal groups have since long 

place.

In this context, Israel is interesting as a country 

besides local criminal organizations that were active in 

trafficking since the 1980s, has particularly experienc

effects of criminal diasporas. The massive immigrat

Jewish people from former Soviet Union evidently cou

avoid the arrival of elements of the Soviet organized c

The activities of these groups is suspected of having ra

influenced the internal political game in the country.

Italy has long been a country synonymous 

organized crime, but the evolution in the last decade is 

different from that of FSU. Also, here the Cold War fav

collusions within a political system that could not enj

strategic reasons, normal competition between gove

parties and opposition. Corruption had penetra

significant number of governmental institutions bo

local and at central level, and in several regions orga

crime enjoyed substantial impunity.

The end of that period, both in political and ju

terms (generally called Mani Pulite—Clean Hands

opened different scenarios from the previous con

advance of organized crime in southern Italian re

supported by drug trafficking and white collar crime 

center and north of the peninsula.

43

 In this s

notwithstanding the judicial result, the trial of the f

Premier Giulio Andreotti has an enormous politica

psychological importance because it is the Nurember

of an era of political-Mafioso liaisons.

Italy, after having experienced an internationaliz

by the export and the international connections of its 

Nostra and Camorra, is now experiencing the globaliz

in the criminal domain. The most visible event 

eruption of Albanian, Kosovar, former Yugoslav, Tu

and Russian organized criminal groups in the I

54
prostitutes from Albania, CEEC, Kurdish areas, 

Africa, Nigeria, Philippines, and Turkey, and their 

effects have in the first 2 months of 1999 lead to h

political controversy. In the last 8 years the cri

geography of a big city like Milan changed from 

coexistence of the old Apulian, Calabrian, Neapolitan

Sicilian organized criminal groups to the forced entry 

main gangs—five Kosovars and one Croat.

44

The fight against national organized crime an

evolution continues. On one hand, Cosa Nostra has 

severely affected by aggressive investigation techn

but on the other, if the importance of the Corleonesi “

has been reduced, other families also have reduced 

profile in order to continue their business. Especia

what concerns racketeering, the hold of Cosa N

appears to be undiminished, and money laund

provides further relevant profits. The relative weaken

Cosa Nostra does favour a certain criminal anarchy w

in turn, creates further problems for law enforce

Between the cracks of Cosa Nostra’s power, orga

groups like the Stidda (Star) or smaller “angry young 

gangs have tried to establish with ruthless violence 

own influence.

A similar phenomenon of relative disintegration c

observed within the Camorra, which for the first tim

the use of car bombs and antitank rockets in intern

wars.

45

Much less penetrable is the Calabrian ‘Ndrang

whose control on the region is particularly strong and w

influence in the shady world of professional kidnapp

remarkable. Only a string of arrests by mid-Februa

connection with the Sgarella kidnapping has opened a 

in its criminal power.

46

Finally the Nuova SCU (New SCU) has lost the bos

the first generation, but has received further impulse 

connections across the Adriatic with Albanian and Ko

55
that this group is not alone in the region of Apulia; o

contrary less known, but even more dangerous “M

prosper in the Northern part of the region.

47

The problem of the deep infiltration of local orga

crime within the government and the economy of Tur

not new (in the 1960s the U.S. Government had pres

Ankara to destroy opium poppy cultivations), but 

acquired a newer international dimension with the 

the government guided by the premier Mesut Yilma

with the Ocalan case.

The fall of that political coalition has highlighte

danger that organized crime poses to the stabil

important allies. The warning signals go back t

November 1996 when a car accident in the villa

Susurluk revealed to the public that a Mafia boss (wo

for the Turkish intelligence service), a Kurdish polit

and high official of the police were travelling togethe

car full of arms and drugs. A further investigation or

by the then new premier, Mesut Yilmaz, concluded 

organized criminal groups, trafficking in drugs 

connected with certain sectors of the government, 

responsible for some 2,000 killings.

Revelations that the sale of a major state-owned Tu

bank and of two dailies were tainted by organized 

infiltration, and that both the premier and the minis

economy were aware of the circumstances and that 

nevertheless encouraged the deal were the direct ca

the government’s fall last November.

This discomforting state of affairs was confirm

month later by the explosive declarations of a successf

anti-drug police official that detailed how the chief 

Istanbul police, his deputy, and the chief of the Tu

police had been corrupted. In addition to the tradi

arms smuggling and drug trafficking businesses, Tu

Kurdish groups are very active in human traffi

Ironically, Albanian-Kosovar organized criminal g

56
of the drug trafficking market.

48

The Ocalan case adds a further dimension t

international importance of transnational organized c

but it will be considered further when the paper exa

the transformation of terrorism and its links with 

trafficking.

To recapitulate the strategic picture drawn until n

terms of major organized criminal constellations

Mediterranean Region is characterised by three cent

gravity located in Italy, Russia, and Turkey.

The fact that some of them are NATO members is 

irrelevant for the effects that this may have on the qua

governance and the prevention/repression of orga

crime. This point should be kept in mind, especiall

that NATO will enlarge and celebrate its 50th

anniversary: the argument made by CEEC politicia

favour of NATO membership as a means to ”Weste

their countries is purely political and is not valid b

that realm. EU enlargement might provide much mor

against these plagues, but, precisely because it has h

requirements and standards, it does not have for the 

being the needed political push.

All three centers of gravity have remar

transnational reach: Cosa Nostra for 70 years at 

Turkish-Kurdish groups at least for 30. The Ru

Georgian groups are younger on the international 

but displayed Blitzkrieg quality in their diffusion, tha

the active cooperation of other local organized cri

groups or gangs. The patterns of drug trafficking will 

the complexity of the web of opportunistic alliance

collaborations.

In the meantime, it is useful to recall briefly some 

international connections among major transna

organized criminal groups.

49

57
money laundering area, especially in the to

entertaininent, and gambling industries. Spain is use

main transit point towards Germany, Italy

Netherlands, and Russia. CEEC are used as t

countries towards Western Europe. All Italian 

organized criminal groups have relationships wit

cartels.

The Russian-organized criminal groups have tar

in Southern Europe, countries like France, Italy, and 

(in addition to Austria, Northern Ireland, Fin

Germany, Switzerland, and the UK).

The Chinese Triads, after having selecte

Netherlands as their first bridgehead, have expa

towards Italy and France in the area (and for the r

Europe, they are present in Belgium, Germany, and 

Looking from the side of Italian criminal organiza

we can find that groups from Brazil, Egypt, Tunisia

former Yugoslavia are in contact with Cosa N

Camorra, and ‘Ndrangheta. Cosa Nostra, in turn

specialized contacts with Argentinean, Chilean, Is

Jordanian, Moroccan, Polish, and Syrian organiza

Camorra has links with Argentinean, Colom

Jordanian, Somalian, and Uruguayan groups, whi

‘Ndrangheta finds support from allies in Chile, 

Republic, Dominican Republic, Israel, Poland, Rum

Slovakia, and Turkey.

50

The end of the Cold War worked differently on 

three centers of gravity. In Italy, it helped to brea

connivances and to weaken significantly older dom

groups and families. In Turkey, apparently it did not m

preexistent situations, although the increase in pu

and in pressure from allied countries might help in t

change things. In Russia and Georgia, it gave more o

free rein.

58
amount of criminal power, one should avoid jumping 

conclusion that the Eastern and Central Mediterr

basins are Mafia-ridden, while the rest is relatively 

Whenever there are drug trafficking and money laund

one can be assured that organized crime is at work an

its social and political nefarious effects are present.

A quick look to other relatively minor situations c

instructive. A first indicator are states that fail

different degrees within the past decade: Lebanon, Som

former Yugoslavia, and Albania. All these countries 

experienced or continue to experience governments th

be corrupted, and their law enforcement is questiona

best.

Lebanon was one of the first cases where drug traff

became a standard financial resource for several mi

while others preferred large-scale trafficking 

kidnapping. This has had a corrupting influence over 

whose military and intelligence forces were he

involved in the war and in the further pacification. Alth

drug production and trafficking have undergone signi

changes, they still remain an important factor in the 

and Syrian political life. Poppy cultivations 

disappeared, to be replaced by cannabis and h

refineries. Beirut retains a very marginal role, but the 

of Jieh, Damour, and Tripoli retain their role, whil

ports are developing near the Israeli border (B

Batroun, and Enn Naqoura). Lebanon is an impo

regional hub for deliveries towards Tel Aviv, Dam

(further on to Cyprus and Greece), Al Riyadh (via Am

and Istanbul.

51

Somalia, after the failure of the Western coa

policies governing U.N. missions, has become a major 

trafficking transit point. Allegedly most of the 

trafficking is controlled by the warlord Osman Atto, f

second in command of Aideed. Moreover, after a d

activity due to the death of the warlord Mohammed F

59
attacks where even mortar rounds and rocket-pro

antitank grenades are used to stop ships.

The whole war in former Yugoslavia cann

understood if one does not consider the level of 

corruption of most regimes in place, no matter if so

them are supported by Western countries. In many 

their most bloody militias had been recruited directly 

the underworld of organized crime, often disguis

football clubs or hooligan groups. The Neretva Valle

and remains a place where cannabis is grown, and the 

region is known to law enforcement agencies as the B

Corridor or Route (by 1995, 80 percent of all heroin sei

West Europe had passed through that corridor). Due 

war in former Yugoslavia, the tracing of this corrido

changed, but not its importance. The general rehear

the projected Euro mass forgery was the widespread fo

of the Deutschmark, the reference currency in the ar

order to finance the costs of the wars of Yugosl

dissolution.

52

It should be absolutely clear that the presence 

SFOR has only blocked open war and has forced 

militias take a relatively lower profile, but its presen

been negligible in severing the criminal liaisons a

political elites, armed militias and organized crime. 

U.N. and EU initiatives have started to tackle 

prudently the problem, but they are severely hamper

the diplomatic constraints placed upon them and 

general lack of cooperation among different entities.

Albania since 1997, when the Italians, lead

European coalition of “able and willing," intervened t

the local government restore law and order wit

operation Alba, is the classic example of how transna

organized crime is a real security threat. First, throu

bankruptcy of the “financial pyramids,” it has generat

nightmare of a criminal republic just across the Ad

Sea. Second, it has continued to exploit the desp

60
juvenile prostitution rings. Third, it has created 

maintained in the north and in the south of the countr

zones which are respectively responsible for nourishin

war in Kosovo and for keeping up a stream of drugs, s

war weapons (50 percent of all Italian confiscations 

Apulia, the region facing Albania) and cigarettes acro

Adriatic. The drugs, once imported, are starting 

produced locally. Mostly it is cannabis, whose qualit

lower prices are beginning to replace Lebanese ha

but, under the supervision of members of Cosa Nostra 

the Colombian cartels, experimental coca cultivations 

been started on the local, rugged mountains. Mor

there are several indications that the local groups 

started operating morphine refineries. The same cou

together with Montenegro, is the starting point for m

laundering operations carried out by the NSCU, 

ramifications towards Russia and Rumania.

A much less discussed, but no less important grey z

the island of Corsica, infested by a sort of Mafia a

forgotten by international analysts. The story of Cors

a base for transnational organized crime begins wit

gradual transformation, through a series of secession

terrorist nationalistic movement into a collecti

organized criminal groups, as French President Ja

Chirac defined them.

54

 He was the first French presid

admit the problem openly, until then mostly consider

internal affair, mostly buried under the silenc

successive governments of different political affiliatio

As it happens often with insular regions, Corsica w

decades one among the most economically depresse

socially backward regions of the centralized French 

After the end of World War II, national movements s

up, advocating more resources for the island an

secession from France, following traditions disp

during the upheaval of the French Revolution, where 

peripheral regions tried to oppose the dominance 

capital. The situation was worsened when the f

61
black-footed ones) were relocated after the end of the w

decolonization of that country. But by the end of the 1

the revolutionary fervour had given way to a diffuse

organized racketeering system, thinly disguising itsel

the old ideals. The French political elite thought it 

expedient to buy out the secessionist movement wit

cuts, privileges, contributions to its development, a

tolerating the creation of a parallel power structure

tacit pact was that France enjoyed a more or less no

sovereignty on the island, and that, in exchange, Cors

supported in various ways the party in power, promot

the same time their own lobbies.

Until the end of 1996, intimidating bomb attacks 

still conducted so as to minimize casualties, but by th

of 1997 some still unidentified “nationalist groups” 

parlance for organized crime groups) assassinate

prefect Jean-Claude Erignac, evidently throwin

gauntlet to the French state.

As with every country facing forms of organized 

capable of controlling the territory, France has its 

understandable difficulties restoring law and order o

island.

55 It must be clear, however, that Corsican orga

crime is not something that can be consider

circumscribed to the island alone. Corsican groups 

infiltrated various levels of the French law enforce

agencies, they have connections with the loca

transnational organized crime groups present in Sou

France, and, as other groups in other countries, the

responsible for serious frauds against Euro

Community structural aid and agricultural support f

Spain is also another interesting and not so 

mentioned base for transnational organized crime. Its 

organizations, although lacking the strong image of o

are very active in drug trafficking, systematic cig

smuggling, liaisons with trasnational prostitution 

and software piracy. Part of the problem comes fro

62
that were created by the terrorist and rackete

activities of ETA. Their liaisons include Braz

Bulgarian, French, Italian, Moroccan, Polish, Portug

and Russian organizations.

56

Drug production in the Mediterranean region o

according to the type of drug, among the follo

geographic areas:

57

• Cannabis: Morocco and Russia (major produ

Lebanon and former Yugoslavia (minor).

• ATS: Western Europe (group of the ecstasy d

and CIS (methamphethamine and ephedrone).

Drug trafficking, instead, reveals the following pat

• Heroin: Afghanistan58has replaced the G

Triangle as major producer, 40 percent of 

heroin seizures were made in Europe (Wester

Eastern alike). The drug followed three po

routes: 1. Central Asia, Russia; 2. Central 

Caucasus, Turkey Balkan Corridor; and 3. 

Turkey (much less used due to harsh Ir

anti-drug policies). Some 10-20 percent could com

Pakistan, Somalia, Nigeria, Netherlands, or S

Russia helped significantly to make the g

connection between two producing areas that 

before much more separated: Golden Crescen

Golden Triangle.

59

• Cocaine, largely produced by Colombia (Boliv

Peru have a lesser role), and Europe (Easter

Western) is a market with an upwards trend (ac

10 percent of all world seizures happen here). 

the Netherlands and Spain are the main Eur

entry points, the air and sea trafficking routes co

the producing countries either directly or vi

Brazil-West Africa or Southern Africa route. An

63
to Russia in order to reach European markets.

• Cannabis, produced by the mentioned coun

plus Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgy

(Colombia, Cambodia, and Thailand are mino

increasing in importance). Congo, Ghana, K

Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania (

together) are important transit points and prod

countries for European markets.

Summarizing at the end of this paragraph, we ca

that the organized criminal and drug trafficking geog

of the Mediterranean Region is marked by:

• three centers of gravity, concerning m

transnational criminal organizations, namely 

Russia, and Turkey;

• 21 regional gravitating support areas: Alb

Croatia, Bulgaria, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, F

FRY, FYROM, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jo

Lebanon, Morocco, Rumania, Slovenia, Som

Spain, Syria, and Tunisia;

• two states risking to become failed (Algeria 

Russia), 10 having experienced at various de

such a failure (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cr

Eritrea, FRY, FYROM, Georgia, Lebanon, Slo

and Somalia);

• four islands which have relevant grey zone

different degrees of organized crime co

connection (Corsica, Cyprus, Sardinia, and Sic

• two major (Morocco and Russia) and two mino

producers (Lebanon and former Yugoslavia);

• three major drug trafficking routes: Atlantic R

Balkan Corridor, Russia;

64
tee ajodug tacg ety pots

Spain and Turkey;

• three major people-smuggling sea-r

(Morocco-Spain, Tunisia/Albania-Italy), and 

land-routes (Sarajevo-Croatia-Slovenia-

Austria, Istanbul-Ukraine-Poland-Germa

Istanbul-Romania-Hungary-Slovakia-C

Republic, Istanbul-Greece-FYROM-Italy/Au

Russia-Finland);

60

• three regional financial offshore centers: Cy

Malta, Monaco;

• the presence of Chinese, Colombian, and Jap

organized criminal groups and the relative abse

North American and Mexican ones;

• dominant drugs are cannabis, heroin, and ATS

cocaine on the increase.

61

Transforming Terrorism. The end of governm

control and manipulation of guerrilla movements d

the Cold War has produced, as in other areas of politic

economy, deregulation and delocalization, only that he

see a deregulation of guerrillas and a delocalization o

logistics. The deregulation of terrorism includ

privatization, its links to criminal organizations

mainly at the local level, its extension as a pract

criminal organizations. The delocalization is synony

with globalization. These three relatively 

characteristics pose a direct problem to the states in 

of diffusion of power. The privatization of terrorism is 

epitomized by the figure of the millionaire Osam

Laden.

Instead of ideologies and political struggle

economics are increasingly a mainspring of these 

conflicts, leading to a “degeneration” of armed movem

more and more entangling them in the vicious cir

65
with criminal organizations, the most worrying feat

that armed movements acquire more and more ”M

characteristics precisely because they engage themsel

drug trafficking. The drawback for these movements is 

in the long run, their legitimacy will be increasingly e

in the eyes of dominated populations.

The dynamics of this involvement in crim

illustrated through three levels;

- local tax on illicit cultivations,

- involvement in commercial networks, and

- development of international networks.

62

Through the first system, it is possible to set up 

large private militias (brigade strength). The second 

follows the first, through a tax on drug trafficking. Th

level has been developed by the Lebanese Christian m

during the civil war, the TTLE (since the mid 1980s

Kosovo Albanian organizations, and the Kurdish mil

of the PKK.

The case of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan 

Avenger, nicknamed by his followers Apo—Uncle

striking illustration of the transformation of terroris

1978 he founded the PKK on a Marxist-Leninist ideol

basis and begun eliminating competing nationalist Ku

formations (KUK). In 1980 the coup of the Turkish gen

unleashed a systematic persecution of all pro-Ku

groups, moderate and extremist alike. Fleeing from Tu

he started training his fighters in 1982 in the midst 

Lebanese civil war. By 1984 he started an outright gue

campaign in South Eastern Turkey that cost unti

31,000 dead (17,878 rebels, 4,660 civilians, 3,835 so

247 policemen, and 1,218 rural self-defense militiam

Sanctuaries and help were provided by reg

neighbours (Iran, Iraq, Syria) interested in cre

problems for Turkey, by the USSR for politica

66
recently locked in the long running feud with Ankara

resulted in a very structured organization, 10,000-1

hard core militants (among which some German 

terrorists) capable of controlling actively non-negl

portions of the Kurdish diaspora in the world 

influencing several cultural associations, one isl

branch movement, a Kurdish parliament-in-exile, 

dailies, one TV chain, and one political wing (HADEP

While at the start the costs had been borne by fo

assistance, in time systematic racketeering and 

trafficking began increasingly to fill PKK’s war c

Ocalan not only resorted to all usual, bloody terrorist t

and suppressed even political dissenters ruthlessly at 

and abroad (the crime for which German judges w

him), but, unlike Arafat, Mandela, or the IRA, he us

position on the Turkish border to promote the pass

drugs towards Western European markets.

The war waged in Southeast Turkey would n

logistically understandable if one would not take 

account the drug trafficking dimension and the exte

complicities in that trade on both sides. This a

constitutes also the hidden political dimension on whi

future of hard liners in both camps is at stake

beginning of the end, prepared by terrible countergu

Turkish campaigns, started with the end of S

protection, an ambiguous sign of the remaining infl

that state sponsoring has on terrorism.

At a political level, only the imminent trial of Ocala

tell if there has been a backstage agreement betwee

and the Turkish generals towards some vaguely fede

political solution. Apparently one of the goals of the Ku

terrorist leader was to continue the political overtu

1993 in the direction of a cease-fire and the search for 

political solution, yet it remains to be seen if a

commanders of the PKK will exercise restraint or if 

parts of the PKK run amok.64

67
bin Laden. In the past bin Laden had actively collabo

with the CIA in Afghanistan, but he changed his mind 

the arrival in Saudi Arabia of American troops, felt b

as sacrilegious. His $300 million fortune has created se

terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Y

and Somalia, with a network of 3-5,000 affiliates und

name of Al Qaeda (the Base). He is suspected of bein

mastermind of the killing of 18 U.S. Rangers in Mogad

the Dahran bomb attack (June 25-26, 1996), and of 

involved in the twin attacks in Nairobi and Dar Es-Sa

(August 7, 1998).

65

A less spectacular, but no less important aspect 

transformation of terrorism is the network of priv

religious charities that are capable of supporting low

terrorist networks, who, in turn, may accept state su

but do not depend on it. 66 This independence 

governments is real, but it should not be exagge

Private initiative, despite having succeeded in p

together most of the means necessary for an interna

terrorist campaign, appears not to be capable of effec

mounting one like in the 1960s and 1970s. One could 

that only the systematic support capability provid

states allowed such campaigns during the Cold 

Several intelligence evaluations in 1998 indicated th

French terrorist Kelkal group was induced t

rudimentary means not only to avoid investig

detection, but also because it was very difficult 

sophisticated materiel. The same appears to happen e

Algeria, where GIA groups are forced to rudime

production instead of relying on effective logistic net

abroad. By the way, the case of the GIA also show

endemic terrorism can ”degenerate” into clanic gang

name itself does not stand for a rigidly organized grou

just a label, covering a terrorist nebula, whose 

(companies) are controlling each their own terr

managing their own racketeering and trafficking 

68
government forces.

The geography of terrorism in the Mediterra

Region can be summarized as follows:

• 20 countries with internal/endemic/civi

terrorism, inspired by nationalist/ethnic motiv

(Spain, Israel, Greece, FRY, FYROM, Turkey, 

Iraq, Russia) or by political/religious motiv

(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel

Iraq, Djibouti; Saudi Arabia, Bahrain);

• 3 countries affected by international terr

(France, Saudi Arabia, Yemen);

• 5 countries designated as terrorism supporting 

(Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Iran);

• 9 countries seriously violating human righ

various degrees in their counterterrorist a

(Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, 

Iraq, Bahrain, Turkey, FRY).

Regarding international terrorism as defined abov

Mediterranean Region is characterized by the appa

contradictory presence of a vast movement of isl

extremism, of a majority of U.S.-designated terr

supporting states, of some of the most important terr

and yet a very low number of casualties, compared 

potential targets in the whole area and in the We

European riverine countries.

The most striking contradiction is the recurring n

a great Iraqi terrorist offensive, possibly with the h

Abu Nidal or Osama bin Laden. It should be remem

that before the Gulf War, the alarm was launched 

Saddam’s supposed terrorist armada, but no

happened. Surely quiet preventive measures are h

their effect, but probably other factors also are playing 

role.

67

69
exploiting the Islamic religious renaissance 

particularly its integralist variants. Saudi Arabia 

promoted since at least 1980 its own wahabbite vari

fundamentalism, exporting it not only to Afghanista

also to Algeria, Tunisia, and other countries wh

succeeded in exercising influence. The presence of We

infidel soldiers on the holy land of Saudi Arabia, w

monarchy is legitimized precisely from its role as pro

of the holy Muslim places, weakened severely S

prestige. This circumstance was in some cases coupled 

a cut of funds towards extremist groups that had supp

the Iraqi cause in 1991. Moreover, the conservative isl

movement failed because it did not address revoluti

needs of the societies. Land reform was, for ins

conspicuously absent from their agenda, while 

believed that a Middle East “Marshall Plan” could 

furthered their goals.

On the other hand, secular forces started in a num

countries to break their ambiguous relationships 

integralist islamist groups. In fact, these groups had 

supported in order to fight against other political oppo

(in some states they were leftwing forces, in 

Palestinian groups). At the same time, the impetuous 

of religious streams in the political debate had forced 

secular parties on the defensive. Some analysts n

that, at a certain moment, two Middle Eastern le

started vigorously drawing the attention o

international community on the danger of isl

extremism, particularly the attention of the United S

Creating this new enemy, Hosni Mubarak and lzthak 

succeeded in getting international support or neut

regaining in importance vis-à-vis and liquidating w

too much international criticism their own a

opponents (al Jamaa al Islamiyya, Muslim Brothe

Hamas, al Jihad).

68

The second factor, already mentioned, is the les

support of certain states to terrorism, compared to the 

70
fear of the propagation of islamist extremism also br

several Arab states to underwrite same basic po

principles of the anti-terrorism fight, which, in turn

lead to a better cross border cooperation among Me

ranean region countries.

69

Finally, one should not forget that terrorism is 

winning option in several significant countries in the 

Through democratic or despotic means, the battle ag

terrorism is being won slowly but assuredly in Spain, E

and Turkey, and, in the supposedly much more f

petromonarchies, it appears to be a somewhat li

risk.

70

Another aspect of international terrorism is repres

by the future of its evolution, particularly regarding th

of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and of inform

warfare. The debate on the possibility of the use by ter

groups of biological or chemical weapons has gained 

profile through President Clinton’s declarations on 

risk.

Surely the chemical attack in Tokyo carried out b

Auni Shinrikyo sect has left a deep impression in the m

of decisionmakers and law enforcement agencies, an

should not be complacent about the failure of the sam

to procure biological weapons. Nuclear terrorism, espe

its variant featuring crude radiological dispersion d

(RDD), remains still a distinct possibility; therefo

preventive measures aimed at reducing the risks t

populations are something that should be considered 

European governments, too. 71

That said, one should acknowledge that most ter

groups do not need to face the risks and the possible s

backlash inherent to the use of WMDs because much c

methods are enough to attain their goals. Moreover, o

limited number of groups may present a profile of 

purification and isolationist mentalities, which, in 

71
consideration.

The so-called cyberterrorism is already a reality 

which open information societies must learn to live, 

until now no spectacular incident has reached the ef

traditional killings and bomb attacks.

On a less exotic note, a much more probable risk is 

by the links between terrorism and criminal groups. In 

this feature in not new, but the way these bond

presently fostered is different, as the French 

demonstrates. Since 1994 the frontier between isl

militants and criminals has become hazy, due 

increasing interpenetration of both environments

French anti-terrorist experts point out that the new g

emerging are bound by a more ”intellectual” membe

veteran from Afghan or Bosnia; already socially exc

they tend to create a sort of internationalist countercu

using islamism as an existing ideological anti-system 

offered by certain mosques, cultural associations

within prisons; and, finally, their social oppos

connecting internal and international terrorism is exp

to increase.72

The diffusion of terrorist methods to organized cri

groups is particularly well-known in Colombia, whe

Cali and Medellin drug cartels have employed car b

frequently in indiscriminate attacks. In Europ

phenomenon is still relatively limited: three Cosa N

attacks in Italy (1994) and one Russian organized 

attack in Moscow (November 11, 1996). In the ca

Corsica, we have instead the gradual transformatio

terrorist nationalistic movement into a collecti

organized criminal groups, as already mentioned.

An ominous sign of the lethal potential tha

manipulation of organized crime and terrorist techn

can develop in spillovers of endemic terrorism comes 

India. The March 12, 1993, multiple bomb attacks 

explosive cars, motorcycles, and suitcases left 320 dea

72
The perpetrators were not terrorists, but local crim

following the directives of an Indian ”godfather” liv

Dubai, apparently recruited by the Pakistani intellige

retaliate for the Indian killings of Muslims in Kashm

A possible variant of this deadly synergy is the cri

multiservice agency, making money through cri

activities organized in ”mafia”-like fashion and obta

money and political protection through customized ter

attacks. Although rare, there is the important preced

the Magliana gang (1983-93).

74

Concluding the analysis of the new risks in the are

should draw attention to the case of Aum Shinrikyo, 

has also highlighted the possibility that some sects 

represent a risk for democratic governments eith

violent actions (including mass suicides) or, worse, by 

political and economic infiltration, leading t

destabilization of the very foundations of democracy.

The problems are not only the undemocratic idea

the methods advocated by these groups, but also 

specific crimes against the human person (brainwa

battering, rape, and extreme physical and psychol

pressure) and at the economic level (extortion, tax 

money laundering, and corruption). Ironically, 

Southern Mediterranean countries have more pro

with religious extremism, Northern Mediterranean 

more affluent countries have more specific troubles 

sects.

75

Policies.

If one might believe that coordinated and coh

policies regarding these new risks are more easily fou

the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) domain than 

defence one, reality will delude him quickly. Already 

relatively homogeneous area of EU countries, this issu

taken several years to come to maturity, and it wil

73
results. The Mediterranean Region is an even 

complicated environment, where few frameworks 

some chances to succeed, particularly when they 

sovereignty aspects which are terribly sensitive to 

governments outside the EU zone.

Institutions are surely not the panacea, but they h

better organizing common efforts. Apart from more o

universal groupings like the U.N., Interpol, the OEC

the G-7/G-8 or from specific multilateral initiatives (S

El Sheikh summit, multilateral meetings among In

ministers or intelligence chiefs), the only institution 

can do something here is the EU.

Despite the sometimes dismissive remarks of 

commentators on its CFSP, the EU has altogethe

consensus, relative will, and the concrete means to 

this respect. This fact was authoritatively confirmed 

policy adopted by NATO itself. EU is the le

organization, while NATO can only be seen as a facilita

What are the comparative advantages of the EU?

• Its successful experience concerning the JHA 

denominated the third pillar), because it succ

first in securing consensus of sovereign countrie

an intrusive agreement like the Schengen treat

then in extending this acquis to the rest of Eur

partners.

• Its multiple dimensions, political, economic

security, embodied in the Barcelona process. 

will help gradually in developing that m

understanding that is the precondition t

scenario of partnership and democratization 

area.

• The availability of the WEU as a vehicle for co

security initiatives, including out-of-area 

74
basis of an implicit or explicit EU mandate.

• Its political profile that is, rightly or wr

perceived as less imposing, unilaterally actin

biased than the U.S. one.

Much of what will be mentioned is already being 

but it is useful to stress it again. What can be done b

EU?

• Continue in the gradual integration of he

enforcement and judicial space. EU countrie

among the most lucrative markets for transna

organized crime and a traditional target for extr

political groups. Therefore, preventing and comb

effectively these phenomena will create a zone 

and order with direct and indirect positive effe

neighbouring countries.

• Prepare her enlargement through policies 

enhance formally and informally the coope

among actors interested in stability and eco

development. Few people realize that a good refo

the much decried Common Agricultural Polic

help ease the tensions created by clande

immigration and its attendant criminality thro

further opening of Mediterranean agricu

imports.

• Continue support to Russia in order to contrib

much as possible in avoiding the foundering 

state and of the economy and to prevent fu

inroads by transnational organized crime.

• Devise appropriate policies for the assistance 

enforcement agencies in the accomplishme

objectives of common interest among 

Mediterranean partners. Europol could be deve

gradually into a regional focal point for assistanc

75
of third countries.

Beyond the established institutional and econom

contexts, another policy could be considered at p

intergovernmental level.

Cooperation among law enforcement agencies als

made significant strides on both sides of the Atlan

shown by the successful working relationship betwee

director of the FBI, Mr. Louis Freeh, and the ge

prosecutor of Palermo, Mr. Giovanni Falcone. Wh

lacking is a better cooperation among foreign intelli

services in the new fields of transnational organized c

money laundering, and drug trafficking.

Here again, European governments should take th

because their intelligence agencies suffer from exc

duplication, fragmentation, and relatively low budget

new strategic environment already puts an enormous 

on their limited resources concerning their tradi

tasks. It would be interesting to develop a com

framework and understanding in order to repea

improve the successes achieved in the fields of interna

terrorism and counterproliferation.

This framework, that could be called a Eur

intelligence policy, means that a new informal alter

collaboration culture should be shaped among the dif

intelligence services, shaping in turn their coll

behaviour.

Concerning the specific new risks issue, a com

discussion among intelligence directors could be star

basic requirements (a first one could be to include fin

and organized crime within the broader analysis of fo

governments), leading gradually to joint assessment

eventually to the joint training of analysts in this 

Another subject that could be broached in this context 

division of labour between internal security and ex

intelligence services at a European level. 76

76
1. That is, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, and Turk

2. That is, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, 

and Israel. Libya is still out due to the freezing of diplomatic ti

the Lockerbie incident, but might in the medium term be involve

in principle. The partners of dialogue do not fully coincide betw

two security organizations.

3. The Western European subregion includes Portugal, 

France, and Italy. The Balkan/Black Sea subregion com

Slovenia, Croatia, FRY, Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, F

Albania, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, 

Georgia, and Turkey (Hungary being a bridge towards Central E

The Middle East/Red Sea subregion includes Syria, Jordan, Ira

Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 

Yemen, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, Israel, Pale

Territories, and Lebanon. The Maghreb subregion is represente

classic quartet of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, 

Mauritania has been politically added.

4. For a succinct review of the different theories and 

bibliography, see Paul B. Stares, ed., The New Security Age

Global Survey, Tokyo-New York: JCIE, 1998. Besides the cha

North America (Florini-Simmons), for the concerned area, see 

chapters on FSU (Medvedev), Western Europe (Politi), and Midd

(Shehadi).

5. Just to name some examples for each mentioned category 

the repeated civil wars in the republican and imperial Rom

Cossack revolt (18th century), the “brigandage” in Italy (19th

Norman, Mongol, Turkish migrations throughout the Middle Ag

settlers’ migrations in the Sioux and other Amerindian 

territories (19th); the availability of water and fertile land 

modern agricultural techniques; the availability of timber for 

before the spreading of iron hulls; religious terrorism in the M

(the sect of Assassins) and in India’s different kingdoms (Thug se

piracy in different centuries.

6. Giovarnbattista Vico,Principi della scienza nuova, 3rd ed.

7. See International Military and Defense Encyclopedia,Tr

Dupuy, et al., eds., Washington-New York: Brassey’s, 1993; Edw

Luttwak, Strategy, The Logic of War and Peace, Cambrid

Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 180. For the 

77
by which a society secures its future); of Basil H. Liddell Hart 

strategy as guide and coordination of all the resources of a natio

alliance to attain the political objectives established); of 

Luttwak (“grand strategy is the highest level of interaction betw

parties capable to use unregulated force against one another”)

Helmuth Schmidt (grand strategy as the harmonization of n

economic and security policies among Western countries, since 

individually can achieve security) are used.

8. See also Barry Buzan, “Rethinking Security After the Col

Cooperation and Conflict, Sage Publications, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 5

an analytical point of view.

9. It is important to keep in mind that in this context th

“challenge” is synonymous with “risk” rather than with the co

outright threat. This is also necessary in order to qualify the seri

of different challenges.

10. This applies also to Abkhazia, Albania, Chechenya, 

Iraq, Israel, Kosovo, Ossetia, Palestinian Authority Territories

Trasnistria, Turkey, or Yemen. Lebanon and Bosnia were cases

Vietnam, where a quasi-conventional war, a conventional wa

international low intensity conflict were merged with an insur

11. For an overview of a sample the different definitions pr

see W. Hagan, “Organized Crime Continuum: A Further Specific

a New Conceptual Model” in Criminal Justice Review, 1983, 

which he lists 13 different conditions for organized crime, define

different authors, and finds 11 elements that could be include

concept of organized crime; Didier Bigo, “Pertinence et limite

notion de crime organisé,” in Relations internationales et strat

20, Hiver 1995, pp. 134-8; Peter Kopp, “Analyse Economiq

Organizations Criminelles,” pp. 139-43; Marcelle Padovani, “Le 

Cosa Nostra," pp. 113-15; Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzma

The Economics of Organized Crime, Cambridge: Cambridge Un

Press, 1995, pp. 1-30; Pierre Tremblay et Maurice Cusson, “M

criminels transnationaux et analyse strategique,” in Marcel 

ed., La Criminalite Organisee, La Documentation Frangaise

Paris, pp. 19-42; Ernesto U. Savona, “La regulation du 

criminel,” pp. 263-264. In general, the paper will try to avoid th

“mafia” or “mafiosi.”

12. Ad Hoc Group on Organized Crime, Report on the Situ

Organized Crime in EU, 1993. This definition could gradually 

the older definition adopted by the OIPC-Interpol since 1988.

78
transnational security risks, see also Alessandro Politi, N

risques et sécurité europeenne, Cahier de Chaillot nr. 29, IE

Octobre 1997, Paris, pp. 4-11.

14. According to Dutch Justice minister Winnie Sor

however, 50 percent of the hashish seized in the Netherlands 

from France and Belgium, while 80 percent of the seized hero

Germany and Balkan countries. See Associated Press, Rotterdam

22, 1997.

15. For an essential survey of definitions of terrorism, se

Rene Beres, “The Meaning of Terrorism for the Military Comm

Comparative Strategy, Vol. 14, No. 3, July-September 

Basingstoke: Taylor & Francis, 1995, pp. 287-99; Paul Wil

“Terrorist Targets and Tactics: New Risks to World Order,” in 

Jamieson, ed., Terrorism and Drug Trafficking in the 1990s, Ald

Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1994, p. 179; Alain Joxe, “Un 

fourre-tout: le terrorisme,” in Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1

6-7; Vittorfranco S. Pisano, “Contemporary Terrorism and the W

Occidente, October 4, 1994, p. 28-29.

16. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, Ap

(Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., Coordinator for Counterter

The definition itself is drawn from the Title 22 of the United 

Code, Section 2656f(d) and has been used for statistical and an

purposes since 1983.

17. The U.S. Department of State specifies that th

”noncombatant” is interpreted to include, in addition to ci

military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed 

not on duty. Also considered acts of terrorism are the attacks on m

installations or on armed military personnel when a state of m

hostilities does not exist at the site.

18. See L. R. Beres. The principle of just cause maintains 

insurgency may exercise law-enforcing measures under intern

law. This argument is deducible from the existence of an autho

human rights regime in international law and from the c

absence of a central enforcement mechanism for this regim

codified inter alia at the Report of the Ad Hoc Commi

International Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 29th sess., supp. no. 28, at 

Doc. A/9028 (1973); see also Article 7 of the U.N. General Ass

1974 Definition of Aggression. Article 7 refers to the October 2

Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning F

79
has been brought to bear on non-state actors in world politics by 

3, common to the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949

the two protocols to these conventions. Protocol I applies human

international law to conflicts fought for self-determination. A pr

all armed conflicts that are not covered by Protocol I and that too

since the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Devel

of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Confli

ended on June 10, 1977, the protocol brings irregular forces wit

full scope of law. Protocol II, also additional to the Geneva Conve

concerns protection of victims of noninternational armed conflic

protocol thus applies within the territory of a state between its 

forces and dissident armed forces.

19. Although it remained difficult to understand in the devel

of the case until the end of January 1999, how some German and 

politicians continued to ignore that the PKK leader was se

involved in drug trafficking, and whose political/freedom fight ra

begs some questions.

20. A precursor case was the attempted investigation by the 

massacres allegedly committed by the new ruler of the Dem

Republic of Congo, Laurent Desire Kabila. It would have been 

to distinguish between his responsibilities as guerrilla chief 

president of the new republic, and in both cases he remained 

accountable. 

21. That is, where indigenous attackers constantly target 

within the same country—the denominations express inc

degrees of violence. Examples of endemic terrorism might be f

Northern Ireland or Spain, while civil war is ongoing as of Janua

in Algeria.

22. Citizens of another country are attacked in an area pla

local, usually endemic terrorism, e.g., if a European dies in 

attack against a bus in Tel Aviv.

23. Citizens of another country are attacked in an area adja

that plagued by endemic terrorism, e.g., Tunisian border gua

attacked by Algerian terrorists.

24. Support in different kinds by non-state actors—

governments on an occasional basis—to armed/terrorist group

their front political organizations, acting in the theatre where e

terrorism or civil war is ongoing, e.g., the Islamic charities’ netw

the pro-IRA fund raising actions in the United States.

80
armed/terrorist groups, acting in the theater where the confront

happening, as, for instance, the support of Syria and Iran 

Hezb’allah in Lebanon. This category includes all manipula

armed/terrorist groups made by intelligence agencies. If a g

based in a particular country, this amounts to sponsoring 

country, not to a support role.

26. It can receive international support or state sponsorship

including all intelligence manipulations in the preceding no

terrorism can be perpetrated in support of an endemic t

confrontation (e.g., attacks by the PKK in Western Europe); in 

of a wider political confrontation at political, ideological, or r

level (e.g., the bomb detonated on December 23, 1995, at the offic

Peruvian Honorary Consulate, claimed later by the Anti-Imp

Cells—AIZ, the successor organization to the RAF); and as a p

indirect confrontation between governments.

27. Covert operation has here a narrower meaning, since m

the intelligence manipulations in categories 5 and 6 normally 

this bracket. Covert operations can be the French retaliations a

bomb attack in Beirut in 1986, or the Iranian-sponsored kil

dissidents in Germany, proved in April 1997.

28. Such may allegedly be the case of several “death squad

Latin America during the Cold War, of a spate of bomb attacks in 

the late 1960s or mid-1970s, or of the GAL (Group of Anti-t

Liberation) in Spain. It should be noted that even w

nondemocratic country, the creation of clandestine terrorist 

muddles the existing chains of command and political 

constellations, as in Algeria for instance.

29. In the year 1991, heroin overdose casualties amounted t

only among the eight countries of the Schengen space. The m

annual increase is, allowing for statistical fluctuations, around 

dead. See Marie-Christine Dupuis, Stupifiants, prix, profits

Paris, 1996, p. 139. Concerning the United States, in 1995, o

casualties amounted to 8,400 people against 530,000 drug

hospital emergencies. See Strategic Assessment 1994, H. Bin

and P. Clawson, eds., Washington: Institute for National S

Studies, National Defense University, 1997, pp. 202-203; see a

59.

30 Stephen Fidler and Jimmy Bums, “Illicit Drugs Trade i

$400bn,” Financial Times, June 26, 1997, p. 4. According to th

81
a yearly money laundering turnover of at least $1 trillion.

31. See Alessandro Politi, “Russian organized crime and Eu

security,” in European Commission, Reinhardt Rummel and 

Weyand, eds., Illicit trade and organized crime - New threats to ec

security?, European Union External Relations (DG-1) 

Luxembourg, 1998, pp. 39-46.

32. See Bertrand Gallet, “La grande criminalité organisée, 

de déstabilisation mondiale?,” in Relations Internation

stratégiques, Grande criminalité organisée: dessous et enjeux, 

Hiver 1995, pp. 95-98. The rapporteur of the Loi de program

militaire 1991-93 at the French Assemblee Nationale spoke o

grises” defined as ”regions devenues inaccessibles et hostiles 

pénétration, où aucun gouvernement n’est en mesure de faire ap

les regles minimales du droit” (Regions that have become inac

and hostile to any penetration, where no government is cap

enforce the minimal rules of law). Generally these grey zones ar

where a civil war is ongoing (Afghanistan, the border regions of 

and Thailand), where political confrontation and infringement

law are a normal means for controlling any type of trafficki

Beqa’a Valley, the Andine Cordillera, the Chinese region of X

some parts of Northern and Southern Albania). But they can 

areas where the nation-state has disappeared (e.g., former Yug

during the war, Somalia); where guerrillas, militias, an

traffickers hold sway (e.g., jungles and other rough territory); 

suburbs in major third world cities and in a fair number of citie

industrialised countries. See Xavier Raufer, “The New post-Co

Terrorist Threats,” in Democracy & Security, Issue 7, Ma

GIRIS/IGRIS. Although there are some ideas that the cybers

Internet could be considered a grey zone for some cr

undertakings, it simply cannot be considered neither inaccess

hostile to any penetration. A further classification sees the dis

between grey zones, chaotic territories, and concrete jungles. 

territories are those at the border of different old empires and 

crossing of different cultures, left to their own devices and 

chronic instability (Central Asia, Caucasus, former-Yugo

Concrete jungles are found in each megalopolis and its own s

bidonvilles (Cairo, Istanbul, Karachi, Lagos Lima, Los Angeles

Janeiro). See VV AA, CHEAr, GRR nr. 12, Défense et sécurité à l

2000, Nouveaux défis, nouveaux moyens, Paris, September 19

35-27. 

82
Threat?,” in Strategic Survey 1994/95, London: International In

for Strategic Studies, Oxford Press, 1995, pp. 25-33.

34. James Holden-Rhodes, intervention at the seminar ”Ne

and European Security," WEU-ISS, November 28-29, 1997, Pa

35. According to recent estimates, the Camorra is made up 

“families,” Cosa Nostra by some 130-186 cosche, the ‘Ndrangheta 

‘ndrine, the Nuova SCU by 51 families, the Russian groups sh

some 12,000, 300 among which have an international dim

(including Georgian ones), while the Turkish-Kurdish clans sh

12-10. See F. Rizzi, “L’oro, ultima frontiera del crimine,” Il Mess

September 24, 1998. According to other sources in Russia, mo

6,000 criminal groups and more than 150 criminal societies are 

while in Ukraine some 400 criminal groups are present. See 

Stares, Sergei Medvedev, Former Soviet Union, p. 89.

36. See “BKA sieht mit Unbehagen der Einfiffirung de

entgegen,” in Frankfurter Allgemeine (further FAZ), Novem

1998; “700 Fltichtlinge kommen iiber die Adria nach Italien

December 28, 1998; John Mason, “Organized Crime Licks Its Li

Forgeries,” Financial Times, January 9, 1999; John Mason, “Cr

Will Profit from Euro,” Financial Times, January 20, 1999; 

Prints Millions of Counterfeit Euros,” The Telegraph, January 3

www.telegraph.co.uk:80/et (January 31, 1999); “Mafia 

falsificando euro,” RAI TV, February 26, 1999. The last news 

refers to the first confiscation of a fully equipped printing 

Palermo by the police forces, following a lead of the SISDE, the i

intelligence service.

37. See “Mafias y Estados son complices, segun el Observato

Droga,” El Pais (on AFP source), October 16, 1998. Serious or

criminal infiltrations should also be considered in the me

offshore centers. See IASOC, Criminal Organizations, Org

Crime: The International Report, Cyprus, (on Reuters source)

acsp.uic.edu/iasoc/crim org/volIO-4/artOg.htm (23/9/1998).

38. See Alessandro Politi, pp. 45-46.

39. See Paul B. Stares; Sergei Medvedev, Former Soviet 

table I., pp. 84-85; Phil Reeves, “Russian Spies Running Pr

Rackets,” The Independent, November 18, 1998; “Meu

Saint-Petersbourg,” Le Monde, November 24, 1998; Massimo Ca

“The East Mafia,” Time, November 30, 1998; Alain Lallemand

russe: I’Europe du crime,” Le Point, December 19-26, 1998; 

83
1998.

40. See Associated Press, February 9, 1999, mention

unclassified CIA report on proliferation to the Congress. Inter

enough, the other country mentioned is China, another major ce

organized criminal activities.

41. See Paul B. Stares, Sergei Medvedev, Former Soviet U

89, reporting a testimony of former CIA director John Deuts

same official estimated a total of some 30 countries in 1994 and 

1996 where the presence of FSU organized criminal grou

signalled.

42. Cosa Nostra in Sicily, despite Fascist energetic repressio

did disappear; Camorra was, after World War II, a constant fe

the Neapolitan hinterland and of its Campania Region, wh

‘Ndrangheta became more visible in the 1970s. On the other ha

SCU in Apulia was practically a spawn of the Camorra in the firs

the 1980s.

43. Laundering takes place in Cyprus, Sweden, and Switze

44. See Dominique Dunglas, “Italie, les negriers de I’Adriati

Point, December 14, 1998; Alberto Berticelli & Marco Dal Flor, 

sangue a Milano, altri due morti,” Il Corriere della Sera 

Corsera), January 10, 1999; Rose-Marie Borngässer, “Albaner ha

Mafia längst verdrängt,” Die Welt, January 11, 1999; Richard 

“Immigrants Take Blame for Crime Wave in Milan,” The 

January 12, 1999; Kerstin Becker, “Gangster führen einen See

der Adria,” Die Welt, January 12, 1999; Paul Betts, “Murder N

Fashion in Italy’s Fashion Capital,” Finantial Times, January 1

Hans-Jürgen Schlamp, “Operation Schwarzer Mann,” Der 

April 1999, January 25, 1999; Eva M. Kallinger, Konkurrenz 

Mafia, April 1999, Focus, January 25, 1999; Peter Münch, U

ohne Zeugen, Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 15, 1999.

45. See Richard Heuze, “La derive terroriste a Naples,” Le 

October 5, 1998.

46. Mrs. Alessandra Sgarella was a Milanese entrepreneu

captivity, ended last year, passed 200 days. It is still unclea

ransom of more than 2 million Euro ($2,4 million) was paid.

47. As an example, local police forces are still facing, 

repeated arrests, the powerful narcomafia of Cerignola. Its pow

84
allowing it in the nearby villages.

48. See Alexandra de Montbrial, “L’empire des mafias,” Le 

Observateur, November 11, 1998; Nicole Pope, “La multiplicat

scandales politico-mafieux menace le premier ministre turc,” Le 

November 12, 1998; Marc Semo, “Le pouvoir turc gangrené 

mafia,” Libiration, November 19, 1998; “BC, Ministerprasident 

durch MisBtrauensvoturn gestürzt,” FAZ, November 26

Wolfgang Koydl, “Der Mann der Zuviel wuBte,” Suddeutsche Z

December 17, 1998; Jason Bennetto, “Gangs Smuggle 4,000 Mig

a Month to UK,” The Independent, December 29, 1998; “MW

Meisten Opfer kommen aus Polen,” FAZ, January 8, 1999.

49. See Camera dei Deputati, Rapporto sulla crim

organizzata (anno 1996), presentato dal Ministro dell’I

(Napolitano), Atti Parlamentari XIII Legislatura, doc. XXXVII

2, Stab. Tipografici Carlo Colombo, Roma, September 1, 19

375-440.

50. One of their specializations is human trafficking of C

nationals towards Germany as main entry point via Moscow

Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgar

Rumania.

51. See “Shrinking Crops and Multiplying Networks,” La D

Internationale des Drogues, n’ 46, August 1995, (www.ogd@o

22/2/1999).

52. Since 1988 Interpol warned about the importance of thi

stretching from South West Asia through Turkey (via Istan

Ankara) through Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to Italy and Austria. T

tracing is Turkey, Greece, FYROM, and Albania (ports of 

Vlöres, Särände). See Alison Jamieson, “Backgroun

Characteristics of the World Illicit Drug Traffic,” Alison Jamies

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking in the 1990s, Aldershot: Dar

Publishing Co., 1994, pp. 69-109; Vladimiro Odinzov, “D

prostituzione nel dopoguerra bosniaco,” in La Repubblica, Janu

1996, p. 10; Alessandro Politi, p. 22; Nicololas Mikletic, Trafics e

dans les Balkans, PUF, Paris, 1998; Camera dei Deputati, p. 4

53. The U.N. International Police Task Force (IPTF) has the 

assisting local police forces in fighting against crime, but it 

enforcing powers, with obvious consequences. The EU-spo

Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office (CAFAO) has succee

starting a cooperation between the Republika Srpska a

85
organized crime, exploiting the loopholes between the two B

entities. It remains to be seen how long it will resist political pre

See Kevin Done, “Former Bosnian Foes Unite to Crack D

Customs Fraud, Financial Times, October 15, 1998.

54. See also Andrew Jack, “When Nationalist Struggles Give 

Banditry,” in Weekend Financial Times, August 10-11, 1996, p

and VV AA, Les dossiers du Canard enchaine, La Corse demasq

60, Juillet 1995, Paris.

55. See Pascal Istorza and Dominique Versini, “La Cuncol

son leader,” Le Point, October 6, 1998; Franck Johannes, “Perqu

autour de la Cuncolta,” Libiration, October 14, 1998; Jacques F

“Le juje Bruguiere a etabli un lien entre un nationaliste cors

ancien policier,” Le Monde, October 29, 1998; “Santoni lib

desaveu de la methode Bruguiere,” Libiration, November 11

Pascal Ceaux, “La police judiciaire supconneMathieu Filido

Monde, January 15, 1999; Jacques Folloroux, “Rivalites et con

retarde 1’enquete sur I’assassinat de M. Erignac,” Le Monde, J

15, 1999; Paul Silvani, “M. Chevenement reprend sa croisade en 

de l’instauration de I’Etat de droit en Corse,” Le Monde, Janu

1999; “Corse: Bruguiere tente la piste intello,” Libiration, Novem

1998.

56. See J. Y., “Mas de 60 detenidos en la desarticulacion de 

de narcotraficantes,” El Pais, October 29, 1998; Jose Diaz de 

“Espana se situa come terce pais de Europa en pirateria informa

Pais, November 4, 1998; Juan Arias and Jesus Duva, “Maflas es

y rusas controla el trafico de prostitutas brasilenas, segun un in

El Pais, November 10, 1998; “Le boom de la contrabande de cigar

Europe,” Liberation, December 29, 1998.

57. See UNDCP, Information Sheet nr. 2, www.undcp.org

gass/info2.htm (September 23, 1998).

58. With the contribution of Pakistan and, on a minor leve

neighbouring Central Asiatic countries, i.e., Turkmen

Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tadjikistan.

59. Respectively Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Burma

and Thailand.

60. See “Europe’s Smuggled Masses,” The Economist, Febru

1999.

86
Peninsula and the Red Sea, the khat drug is often used. A sy

variant (Methcathinone), known on the street as ”Cat,” has 

being produced. As of 1997, khat was not an internationally con

substance, although the DEA chose to list it among the fo

substances, even if not always very consistently.

62. See Alain Labrousse and Michel Koutouzis, “Geopolit

Geostrategies des Drogues,” Economica, 1996, Paris, pp. 28-30

63. See Felix Kurz and Georg Mascolo, “Besonders 

Kampfer,” Der Spiegel, November 9, 1998; “Portrait: World

Wanted," The Guardian, November 25, 1998; “Von der alten 

wenig übriggeblieben,” FAZ, November 27, 1998; Marie 

“L’implacable ascension du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdist

Monde, December 4, 1998; Nemo Aziz, “Ocalan ist die Antwort 

turkische Kurdenpolitik,” FAZ, December 29, 1998; Hans Leyen

“Mord auf personliche Anweisung,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, Janu

1999.

64. Evangelos Antonaros, “Nicht alle PKK-Kader schwo

Gewalt ab,” Die Welt, November 10, 1998; see Marie Jego, “A

Ocalan aurait recemment negocie ‘une solution politique’ a

generaux turcs,” December 10, 1998; Michael Evans, “Britai

New Terrorist Attacks,”The Times,February 17, 1999; Caroline 

Annette Grossbongart, Udo Ludwig, and Georg Mascolo, “Blutra

Apo,” Der Spiegel, September 8, October 22, 1999; Ley, “Deut

droht neuer Terror durch PKK,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, Febru

1999. 

65. See Magdi Allam, “Il miliardario di Allah e 1’eser

terrorismo,” in La Repubblica, June 27, 1996, p. 4; and Guido O

“L’impazienza di Sonny e la tela di ragno,” Corsera, August 6, 19

James Walsh, “Osama bin Laden,” Time, December 22, 199

cannot avoid comparing bin Laden with Giangiacomo Feltrin

Italian presumed terrorist millionaire known in the 1960s. Th

died probably while handling an explosive charge. Bin Lad

financial manager of terrorist activities who takes care not 

companies under U.S. legislation and not to use dollars that c

tracked by the U.S. intelligence services.

66. See Aaron Karp, “The Demise of the Middle East Arms R

The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4, Autumn 1995, Wash

CSIS, 1995.

87
Risen, “Master Terrorist is Believed to be in Iraq,” IHT, Janu

1999; Gerold Buchner, “GroB-vater des Krieges,” Süddeutsche Z

January 29, 1999; Vernon Loeb, “Has the U.S. Blunted bin L

Washington Post, February 17, 1999; “Bin Laden was Stopped 

Times,” USA Today, February 24, 1999.

68. On the other hand, it should be taken into account that t

bombings against Osama bin Laden created a political backf

Laden’s prestige, already high due to his strong anti-corruption 

has risen throughout the Arab and Muslim world. See Tim Wei

Islamic World Bin Laden’s Esteem Rises,” The New York 

February 8, 1999.

69. It is true that Arab countries still uphold the exception t

liberation struggle of Palestinians against Israeli occupation 

territories cannot be defined as terrorism, but one should not for

in due time the distinction of just cause/just means can, and sh

applied to both contenders in that land.

70. According to some analysts, Hamas is today is an irr

force, and the brigade Izzeddin al Qassem consists of some six p

See also Christophe Ayad, “Un an apres Louxor, le chaos isla

Liberation, November 17, 1998; Christophe Ayad, “Yemen: 

contre le Jihad,” Liberation, December 30, 1998; Patrick Cockbu

Gary Finn, “Yemen Seeks Extradition of Militant London Ima

Independent, January 26, 1999; Mona Eltahawy, “More Than 

Court as Egypt Cracks Down on Militants,” The Guardian, Feb

1999. Concerning ETA, see Jean-Hebert Armengaud, “L’ETA te

l’adieu aux armes?,” Liberation, October 29, 1998; L. Gomez 

Galan, “HB reclama en Roma y Londres una negociacion poli

ETA,” El Pais, November 11, 1998; Luis. R. Aizpeolea, “Aznar 

que el comunicado de ETA ‘abre la esperanza de una paz definit

Pais, December 23, 1998. It should be remembered that a

petromonarchies were considered very vulnerable to Shi’ia subv

but, indeed, since 1980 no significant revolution has taken plac

model of the Iranian one.

71. See Alessandro Politi, “Terrorism, Domestic and Intern

Ramification: A European Perspective,” and also Rich

Falkenrath, “Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terr

Understanding the Threat,” both in James Brown, ed., New H

and New Strategies in Arms Control, Albuquerque: Sandia N

Laboratories, 1999, pp. 257-258 and 193-243, respectively; Ja

Ford, “Radiological Dispersal Devices,” Strategic Forum, INSS, 

March 1998; Judith Miller and William J. Broad, “Clinton De

88
1999; AP, “Doctors may be key to bioterrorism;” The New York 

February 17, 1999; C.D., “La diplomatie obscure des cyberterro

Le Figaro, January 14, 1999.

72. See Herve Gattegno and Erich Inciyan, Depuis 19

frontiere entre militants islamistes et delinquants est d

incertaine et permeable,” in Le Monde, April 4, 1996, p. 11. The 

group, dismantled in 1994, mixed intimately organized crim

trafficking, and extremist Islamism. 

73. CHEAr, p. 36-37.

74. See Giuseppe D’Avanzo, “Nicoletti e i ‘ragazzi’ della Ma

in La Repubblica, May 30, 1996, p. 17. It appears to have been i

more or less directly in the abduction of the premier Aldo Moro, 

attack to a train, the homicide of a political journalist, and 

liberation from the Red Brigades terrorists of a minor politician t

contacts with the Camorra. Italian police deputy chief Gia

Gennaro believes, instead, it was simple ordinary criminality in 

with other criminal powers.

75. See Pablo Ordaz, “Mas de 100.000 espanoles viven atrap

las redes de 200 sectas destructivas,” El Pais, November 11, 199

Dunn, “Millennium Suicide Sect Found in Israel,”The Times, No

24, 1998; Ph. Br. and E. In., “L’Eglise de scientologie reste 

menace d’un nouveau proces,” and “Un service de reinseig

organise de facon quasi militaire,” Le Monde, December 16

Nikolaus Nowak, “Spanien is beunruigt über den Vormar

Sekten,” Die Welt, January 19, 1999.

76. See Alessandro Politi, ed., Towards a European Inte

Policy, Chaillot Papers, nr. 34, WEU ISS, Paris, December 19

3-18.

89
AFP Agence France Presse (France, French Pre

Wire Service)

AP Associated Press

ATS Amphetamine-Type Stimulants

BKA Bundeskriminalamt (Germany, Federal

Criminal Office)

CEEC Eastern European Countries

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIS Confederation of Independent States

ETA Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (Spain, Basque

language, Basque Land and Freedom)

FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

FT Financial Times

FSU Former Soviet Union

GIA Groupe Islamique Anne (Algeria, Armed Is

Group)

HADEP Popular-Democratic Party (Kurdish party,

political wing of PKK)

IRA Irish Republican Army 

JHA Justice and Home Affairs 

KUK Liberators of Kurdistan

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation an

Development 

OGD Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues (Fr

 Geopolitical Drugs Observatory)

PKK Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Turkey, Kurd

Workers’ Party)

90
Fraction) 

RDD Radiological Dispersion Devices

SCU Sacra Corona Unita (Italy, Sacred United

Crown) 

SFOR Stabilization Force 

SISDE Servizio Informazioni e Sicurezza Democra

(Italy, Democratic Intelligence and Securit

Service) 

SISMI Servizio Informazioni e Sicurezza Militare

(Italy, Military Intelligence and Security

Service) 

U.N. United Nations

UNDCP U.N. Drug Control Project

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

91
REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Stephen Calleya

This paper examines the role the North Atlantic T

Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU

playing in the Mediterranean area and discusses the im

such international organizations can have on managin

security challenges of proliferation of weapons and 

control. An attempt is also made to conceptualize a se

model that can assist in improving cooperative rel

between Europe and the Arab world. A specific se

proposal put forth is that of establishing a 

Mediterranean Maritime Coastguard that wou

mandated to carry out stop and search exercises 

number of areas, including those of weapons prolifer

This analysis concludes with an assessment of re

relations to 2010. Unless international organiza

address more effectively the political difference

economic disparities that continue to separate the cou

along the northern and southern shores o

Mediterranean, the issues of managing the proliferat

weapons and arms control will remain more of an aspi

than an achievable goal.

A Security Model to Manage Proliferation and 

Control: What Role for NATO?

The post-Cold War period is proving to 

revolutionary era due to the fact that dividing lines 

past have faded or disappeared completely. Yet no 

pattern of international relations has emerged in 

place. This period of rapid flux presents NATO wi

identity crisis that is exacerbated when seen throug

93
presents the Alliance with an opportunity to forge new 

with Mediterranean nonmembers. Although the co

developing an active alliance network across this wat

will be high, the costs of failing to establish such a s

could be higher in the long-term, should instability fro

Mediterranean spread northwards. 

NATO’s successful Cold War track record makes it 

the most prominent security institutions functioning 

One way to preserve this position is by leading coope

efforts with other institutional associations that also 

an interest in ensuring stability in areas lik

Mediterranean. By forming coalitions and relation

with other international organizations in the basin, N

could play a direct role in helping to prevent the emer

of conflictual patterns of relations between the We

European and Middle Eastern international regions

relations could easily evolve if political and mi

misperceptions and the increase in the proliferat

weapons is not checked in the short term. Containm

the erratic pattern of relations between the rival N

members of Greece and Turkey is indicative o

confidence-building role the Atlantic Alliance can pla

subregional level across the Mediterranean. Particip

in NATO activities will also assist in removing some 

negative perceptions nonmember Mediterranean cou

harbour about the Alliance. For example, perm

countries in the Maghreb and the Levant to attend c

NATO sessions will assist in nurturing the fact that N

is a common defense grouping and not an aggr

military alliance. In the longer term, it has also 

suggested that those Southern Mediterranean n

which are emerging as democracies should be aff

observer status in NATO.

1

 The inclusion of nonm

Mediterranean countries in NATO’s consultative f

work would help remove existing misperceptions on 

sides of the Mediterranean basin and could help gen

94
area of military issues.

As the most active military international organizat

the Mediterranean basin, NATO has the capac

influence the patterns of relations across and aroun

basin. In the end, it will come down to the Alliance’s a

to read the indigenous patterns of relations an

according to these trends. Like other internat

organizations operating in the Mediterranean, NA

finding it difficult to implement a comprehensiv

coherent security program in this area. Rather than 

blame the Alliance for this outcome, it seems more acc

to indicate that NATO’s apathy in the South is mo

combination of the Mediterranean’s incoherent and d

regional dynamics and NATO’s inability to act.

The emergence of a more multipolar interna

system in the last 7 years has seen an increa

multilateral intrusive behavior around the world. 

powers are eager to at least appear to be a

multilaterally in their foreign policy endeavors. The 

emphasis on obtaining a U.N. mandate before it acts o

its borders as it did in the Persian Gulf War in 19

Somalia in 1992-93, and Haiti in 1994 illustrates this t

This review of NATO’s role in the Mediterrane

indicative of the impact international organizations ha

regional dynamics. The end of the Cold War, the proc

EU, and the winds of peace blowing from the Middle 

have changed the parameters of Mediterranean re

politics. One significant shift is that Mediterranean l

states are much more keen to develop active relation

the rest of the world. Although they are still apprehe

about the implications of an enhanced Americ

European role in the area, they actively seek relation

the West now that competition for foreign direct inves

has increased.

A U.S. security presence in the vicinity as a ba

against the revival of old or new hegemonic threats, o

95
mentalism, is also still favored among the major

countries in the basin. Appeals to establish a nuclea

weapons zone or to establish a multilateral security 

may find their place in the future, but so far both re

symbolic aspirations.2

Post-Cold War considerations have led outside p

and international organizations such as NAT

reevaluate their policies towards the Mediterra

Conversely, regional leaders have had to explore 

external alignments in light of the sea-change i

international system since 1989. Two recent changes 

dynamics of the Mediterranean regional politics may 

the nature of intrusive influence in the Mediterra

First is the Arab-Israeli reconciliation process. The 

treaties signed between Israel and the PLO and Isra

Jordan may become preliminary steps towards even

establishing a cooperative pattern of intergovernm

relations in the Levant. Rapprochement between Isra

the Arab countries has the additional benefit of rem

one of the stumbling blocks that has prevented 

relations between the Levant and other Middle Ea

subregions such as the Maghreb and the Gulf. The se

Middle East international financial meetings he

Casablanca, Amman, Cairo, and Doha in 1994, 1995, 

and 1997, respectively, highlights the potential 

peaceful relations can bring to this international regi

stability persists, and this is no foregone concl

attracting foreign direct investment to the area may be

a more feasible enterprise. Such a development would 

with the hypothesis that extra-regional actors are 

influential in international regional relations when 

complement the basic pattern of regional alignmen

conflict. 

The second shift in Mediterranean politics is 

internally and externally motivated. After years of 

accused of marginalizing and isolating its southern 

NATO has imitated actions taken by other sec

96
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) by propos

establish closer relations with a selection of nonme

countries in the Mediterranean area, incorporatin

Levant and the Maghreb.

At first, it might appear that NATO could attem

establish some kind of outer zone of suzerainty i

Mediterranean. In reality, it must be stressed that N

has yet to formulate a coherent vision of long-term goal

could justify such possibilities. In addition, NA

enlargement agenda towards the East, and the pleth

security issues it will have to contend with vis-à-vis R

will leave very little diplomatic resources to begin ta

the multitude of security challenges which exist acro

Mediterranean. At most, NATO’s most recent out

program towards a selection of nonmember Mediterr

countries can promote political interaction among sta

the area. It is unlikely that NATO’s exchange plan

elevate cross-cultural, environmental, or military relat

If successful in the long term, this extra-Mediterr

led effort to enhance politico-military cooperation be

Europe and the Middle East could indirectly b

trans-Mediterranean initiatives. The evolution of a 

integrated and interdependent Mediterranean se

community would make it more difficult for actors 

basin to upset the balance of power due to the num

consequences they would have to confront as a result

The fact that Western Europe has develop

multi-level international society, in which interna

organizations such as the EU, the OSCE, and NAT

interact with states and subnational institutions, put

comprehensive international region in a strong posit

approach security issues in the Mediterranean 

multi-institutional and multi-functional manner. Giv

lack of unity in the perceptions of the countries i

Mediterranean and those powers with an interest 

area, it is unrealistic to assume that a single interna

97
across the Mediterranean. A more realistic alternat

one in which a single international organizatio

example NATO, complements the actions taken by oth

the area. As the international organization with a 

proportion of Mediterranean member-states and the 

active military actor in the Mediterranean, NATO i

positioned to complement the EU’s socio-economi

political endeavors in the south. But NATO shou

attempt to lead European multilateral initiatives as it 

perceived as positively as either the EU or the OSC

that matter, by the majority of countries located i

Mediterranean. For example, NATO’s Cold War m

record makes it an unattractive partner to several cou

in the Middle East. An enlarged NATO presence i

Mediterranean could even increase accusatio

“neo-imperialist” designs by Arabists and Islamist

thus fuel support for the already very active Is

fundamentalist groupings operating in various subre

of the Middle East. American leadership in NATO 

makes this organization appear more like a vehicle of 

power interests than one concerned with adva

Mediterranean causes.

Absent the creation of a trans-Mediterra

international forum, which would certainly be perceiv

much more representative of Mediterranean reg

interests and not some self-referenced or great 

interests, the EU currently appears the most acce

international organization across the Mediterranean 

can intensify cooperative patterns of relations throu

this area.

Post-Cold War international relations show 

multilateralism has failed to address effectivel

increase in domestic regional hostilities. Over the 

years, most regions of the world have been touched 

resurgence of such intolerance based on traits that in

ethnicity, language, and religion. The Mediterranean 

is no exception. The ad hoc and often ineffe

98
question mark on the relevance of the multila

mechanisms designed to contend with different ty

problems, i.e., of an international nature. Civil confli

regional tensions are not the only security issues tha

to be addressed in the Mediterranean. Yet, interna

organizations must adapt their modus operandi if th

to play a pivotal role in diffusing such contentious iss

environmental degradation, economic disparities, m

tion, weapons proliferation, and narcotics trafficking

The United Nations remains the principal interna

organization for achieving such multilateral endeavor

U.N. is, however, already suffering from overstretc

cannot be expected to focus on such an extensive 

challenges on its own. Other institutions and agencies 

area such as NATO, the EU, the Western European 

(WEU), the OSCE, the Arab League, and the Arab Ma

Union will also have to play a supportive role to the U

an effective multilateral Mediterranean mechanism 

emerge. In a world without a political, ideologic

geographical strait-jacket, each institution or agenc

play on its comparative advantages to ensure max

effectiveness.

Multilateral agencies must however be caut

against expecting rewards from their efforts in the sho

medium term. In an area as diverse as the Mediterra

regional coordination and cooperation is probably the 

that can be initially achieved. For example, a more 

OSCE in the Mediterranean can lead to an increa

political, social, and environmental exchanges. Nonme

OSCE states in the Mediterranean have already sho

keen interest in cooperating in this forum, and ther

also been a call to extend associate membership t

area.

5

 Such multilateral governmental action could l

groundwork for similar exchanges at a transnational 

If supplemented by nongovernmental organizations 

are already active in the area, existing disparities be

99
regions can be gradually bridged.

Several countries bordering the Mediterranean 

sought external support to help create a single institu

framework in which discourse and dialogu

Mediterranean issues can take place. On the other 

states such as Libya and Syria remain reluctant to ac

engage themselves in such endeavors for a numb

reasons: sometimes because of animosities dating b

former colonial days, and also due to mutual rivalry a

themselves for spheres of influence. The proliferat

weapons in North Africa and the Levant continues 

fuelled by systemic, regional, and internal motives

regional actors, including Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syri

Iran, are engaged in an active search for geopo

“weight” and national prestige in the post-Cold War w

The political and economic fault-lines that exist al

north-south and south-south axis also provide motiv

proliferation.

The superpower track record in the Mediterra

offers two cautionary notes in this respect. First, ex

actors can only influence and not dictate reg

dynamics.

7

 International organizations such as NATO 

therefore read and decode the mixed signals originat

the Mediterranean if they do not want their eff

consolidate a sphere of influence across this waterw

result in a conflict-based international regio

cross-border political and military measures are intro

in consultation and agreement with the Mediterr

states, NATO’s outreach scheme towards the south 

act as a catalyst toward regional collaboration in 

areas. 

If nonregional actions are perceived as attem

dominate intra-Mediterranean patterns of interactio

latter could retaliate by uniting and becoming 

cooperative in their dealings with external actors who 

substantial political and economic interests in the 

100
Mediterranean backlash included the key oil an

producers. 

In the post-Cold War period, domestic politics p

major role in foreign policy considerations. This tr

likely to continue as internal interest groups become 

assertive. This is especially the case in countries acro

Maghreb, particularly Algeria, where Islamic move

are already constraining government policies. If cu

Arab regimes are not pressured by external actors at 

bilateral and multilateral level to establish wo

relationships with other political activists within 

boundaries, the aspiration of nurturing more in

cooperative patterns of trans-Mediterranean relation

surely recede.

9

Failure to identify and complement regional patte

relations functioning around the Mediterranean are

also ultimately result in increasing discord among N

member-states. In recent years distinct subreg

dynamics have on several occasions shed light on 

chords of disunity which exist within the Alli

Greek-Turkish rivalry almost resulted in the outbre

hostilities in early 1996 over the contested Aegean Is

and procurement of armaments by these two cou

remains among the highest in the western world.

10

 Di

among NATO member-states, particularly the U

States and France, is also apparent in the unilateral M

East policies which they have been put forw

Transatlantic differences of opinion toward

Mediterranean surfaced again in late 1996 when Fr

with the support of Germany, Spain and I

unsuccessfully called for NATO’s Southern Com

headquarters in Naples to be taken over by a Eur

admiral as part of a general effort to enhance Eu

contribution to the Alliance.

11

 It could also be argued 

whereas enlargement towards central and eastern E

has assisted in boosting NATO cohesiveness

Mediterranean is serving as a strategic backdrop wh

101
to explain NATO’s reluctance to attempt introducing a 

comprehensive strategic framework towards the s

opting instead for a more ad hoc/selective engag

approach. 

It is a truism that the end of the Cold War has rel

the superpower grip on the Mediterranean. Bu

indicators discussed above suggest that one ty

intrusive dominant system (bipolar superpower mode

been swept aside, only to make room for a different t

intrusive dominant system (multipolar great power m

This more multipolar design is reflected in the incre

activity registered by international organizatio

regional relations. The more non-Mediterra

multilateral organizations, such as NATO, com

dominate patterns of relations in the Mediterranean 

the more they are likely to stifle a resurgen

intra-Mediterranean patterns of relations. As a r

contemporary European international organiz

involvement in the Mediterranean is best seen 

boundary management exercise, which aim

safeguarding the regional dynamics of integrati

Western Europe from those of fragmentation whic

active in the Middle East.

A Euro-Mediterranean Response.

At the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference whic

place in Barcelona in November 1995, the 27-pa

countries established three principal areas of coopera

political and security partnership with the a

establishing a common area of peace and stabilit

economic and financial partnership with the aim of cre

an area of shared prosperity; and a partnership in s

cultural, and human affairs in an effort to pro

understanding between cultures and exchanges be

civil societies.

102
meeting in Malta in April 1997 and the informal minis

meeting in Palermo in June 1998 was for the member-

to elaborate more specifically on implementation 

partnership program and to set up short-term action 

so that tangible cooperative ventures could commenc

At the top of the agenda was the endorsement, or a

elaboration, of a security charter that will la

foundations for the peaceful resolution of crisis situ

and conflicts throughout the Euro-Mediterranean 

Such a charter would enable the partners to identi

factors of friction and tension in the Euro-Mediterr

area and to carry out an assessment of how 

destablizing focal points can be managed.

In actual fact the Malta Declaration indicated tha

little headway has been registered in implementing su

aspiration:

The Participants take note of the work of Senior Officials o

Charter for peace and stability in the Euro-Mediterrane

region, and instruct them to continue the preparatory wo

taking due account of the exchanged documents, in order 

submit an agreed text at a future Ministerial Meeting wh

political circumstances allow.

12

The vagueness of the above phrase is a clear indica

the lack of progress that has been achiev

conceptualizing a framework for setting up a pan-

Mediterranean security arrangement. The pa

countries failed to commit themselves to an increm

work program that would at least seek to creat

necessary cooperative relations that would allow fo

introduction of such a charter.

They have also avoided hammering out a sp

timetable within which such a framework of analysis c

carried out. As a result, it now seems more logical 

Euro-Mediterranean process (EMP) countries sta

dedicate their diplomatic resources to defining a pack

103
necessary atmosphere within which a more elab

mechanism, such as a charter, can be fleshed out.

When it comes to the direct tangible endeavors th

EMP should seek to realize, these can primar

classified into time-oriented categories. In the short 

the 27-partner countries must introduce a basic ty

confidence-building measure network that will cont

to removing the curtain of prejudice and misperce

that continues to divide the Mediterranean alo

North-South axis.

Such a network should eventually also ass

managing and containing the large number of se

challenges that risk upsetting stability acros

Euro-Mediterranean area. The long list of security 

that could derail the EMP includes the proliferat

weapons of mass destruction, maritime safety, en

mental pollution, narcotics trafficking, and the fl

illegal migration.

At the moment there are no elaborate mechanis

contend with such security crises or even an incident s

an accidental collision at sea between transport ta

crossing through the Straits of Sicily, or the alarming r

degradation which is currently taking place i

environmental sector. One must also mentio

proliferation of drug consignments which are reachin

deeper into the civil societies of the Mediterranean, an

accentuation of illegal migratory flows from south to 

which risks destablizing the legal structures of the st

A confidence-building initiative that can be intro

as part of the political and security charter of the E

that of establishing a flexible security framework t

already addressing security issues as those outlined ea

It will set the stage for tackling more sensitive se

challenges which include intolerant fundamenta

demographic expansion, and outright conflict.

104
effort should be made to investigate the feasibility of s

up a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coastguard (EM

The EMMC would be mandated to carry out stop and s

exercises in a number of areas: maritime safety, mar

pollution, narcotics trafficking, the transport of i

migrants, and the proliferation of weapons. Such an 

warning and crisis prevention mechanism shou

introduced in accordance with the principal of consen

open to any of the Euro-Mediterranean partner-state

wish to participate in such a flexible soft sec

arrangement. In order to ensure that such a security 

can become operational in the shortest period possib

EMMC should consist of sectoral types of soft se

cooperation. 

For example, any two or more EMP member

formulate cooperative alliances in specific sectors, su

that pertaining to narcotics trafficking, without hav

wait until all partners are in a position to introduce 

measures. Such a plan will enable the EMMC to e

along subregional security fault-lines in the first ins

until it becomes feasible to establish a fully fl

Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard at a later date.

In addition to strengthening political and se

channels of communication, the establishment of s

Euro-Mediterranean early warning and conflict preve

network will assist in cultivating more intense 

management mechanisms in an area where thes

lacking. In order to ensure that such a flexible se

arrangement moves beyond the conceptual stage i

shortest time-frame possible, its primary mandate m

limited to the following codes of conduct: fact-findin

consultation missions, inspection, and monit

delegations. Such traditional rules of engagement ma

be supplemented by operations that include the facili

of humanitarian relief, particularly in times of na

disasters. At a later stage, situation centers may be 

105
mandate.

Only after such a threshold has been reached, sh

concerted effort be made to spell out the parameter

security charter which will include both confidence-bu

and crisis prevention measures that seek to further ad

regional disarmament. The introduction of a 

Mediterranean security charter will also assist in crea

climate where the partner countries can develop com

and control mechanisms to intervene as early as possi

crisis situations. Acting only after an aggresso

acquired territory or access to natural resources is to 

the unwelcome choice between a massive military res

and a major strategic debacle. The later the interna

community and security organizations intervene, the 

the cost and the less chance to restore stability.

Prospects for the Future: A Regional Assessme

to 2010.

A number of indicators extant today can be us

project the strategic environment in the Mediterrane

2010. Unless these indicators change significantly

environment for the first 10 years of the next century w

set by the year 2000. The speed with which the eve

Europe and the Middle East are moving makes it likel

the shape this part of the world will take by 2010 w

clearly discernible by the end of this century. The U

States and Europe will continue to depend on the Pe

Gulf and North Africa for much of their energy sup

They will however be joined by the likes of China and 

that will need to satisfy their growing energy demand

therefore access to these areas will remain a high fo

policy priority. 

In the first half of the 1990s the Mediterranean sh

signs of becoming a cooperative dominant area. But 

past 2 years there has been an increase in confl

relations throughout the Mediterranean and a res

106
north-south and south-south axis have become 

apparent, with no sign of a process of regional 

formation taking place.

As relations stand, two scenarios are possible: the f

one in which a number of Mediterranean countries m

to integrate at both a regional and international level, 

the rest collapse completely. The second is one in whi

majority of countries in the Mediterranean fail to inte

and are marginalized from the international po

economy. 

As patterns of relations across the Euro-Mediterr

area stand, the majority of littoral countries i

Mediterranean are unlikely to integrate into the 

political economy that is emerging. Transnational ven

will remain limited, with states in the area more conc

with intra-state issues than with inter-state typ

cooperation. 

What is thus required is an urgent concerted eff

the Mediterranean states themselves to cre

transnational network upon which cross-border ty

economic and financial interaction can take place. 

Mediterranean is to compete and prosper in the 

village of tomorrow, it must nurture an environment w

people, products, ideas, and services are allowed to 

freely. At the moment there are too many bottlenecks 

system. 

In contrast to the cooperative South-East Asia

Latin American developing regions, the Mediterra

currently consists of a number of subregional constella

i.e., Southern Europe, the Maghreb, the Mashreq

Balkans, that are evolving along separate and di

paths. Perhaps the label that best describes the patt

relations in the area is “fragmegration” which denot

integration efforts being pursued by the EU Sou

European countries and the fragmentation type of rel

that continue to dominate the southern and eastern s

107
to date somewhat mirrors regional dynamics manif

themselves across central Africa.13

During the first 10 years of the new millennium

United States will shift its foreign policy concerns 

region further east, focusing on the manageme

relations in the Mashreq and the Persian Gulf. The r

the Mediterranean will become a EU sphere of infl

once a common foreign and security policy is introduc

the interim, the EU will continue to contain instabilit

may emerge along its southern periphery through NA

The Mediterranean has shifted from an imperial B

lake in the 19th century to a superpower sea in the 20t

the eve of the 21st century, the Mediterranean is mor

to a fault-line between the prosperous North (the h

and an impoverished South, (the have-nots). Th

development to watch in the Mediterranean in the 

decade will be whether the phase of cooperative compe

that has dominated post-Cold War relations to d

eventually superseded by an era of conflictual compe

This is sure to happen if states on the lower levels 

development curve come to the conclusion that they a

going to be able to move up the ladder anytime soon. 

age of indifference scenario does take hold, disorde

dominate Mediterranean relations and, as resource

depleted, the region will become an economic wastela

In the post-Cold War world that has emerged

patterns of relations in the Mediterranean have al

moved away from a cooperative security dom

framework to a more competitive security based mo

trends continue as they have been, the Mediterrane

destined to become a geo-strategic cross-cultural zo

indifference. Security risks will multiply, demogr

growth will exacerbate economic problems, an

developed world will adopt a selective engage

approach towards the area.

108
the EU adopt a policy of strategic optimism toward

Mediterranean. Based on the theory of realism, the do

of strategic optimism is one in which internat

organizations seek change in a positive directi

identifying those areas where such progress can be 

When drawing up security policies to contai

proliferation of weapons, European security organiz

must ensure that their efforts to contain such risks d

result in them becoming part of the problem.

A more transparent and engaging NATO policy 

complements a overhauled EU Euro-Med Partne

process is thus necessary if an effective collective se

framework is to be established in the area. This shou

supplemented by a more proactive approach by in

tional economic institutions such as the World Bank a

IMF in their dealings with the region, an approach 

assists the Mediterranean countries to adopt more 

self-help mentality. Only then will efforts to conta

proliferation of weapons have a serious chance of 

effective in the Mediterranean.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Rodrigo de Rato, “Cooperation and security in the M

ranean,” North Atlantic Assembly Report, 1994, p. 17.

2. “Proposals for an integrated security in the Mediterr

Palma Report, June 1992.

3. Edmund Blair, “Winning over the world’s investors,” MEE

39, No. 40, October 1995, pp. 4-5.

4. E. Anyaoku, “The Commonwealth and the new multilate

The Round Table, No. 331, July 1994, p. 318.

5. Maurice Abela, Maltese Ambassador to the OSCE, sta

presented at the OSCE Mediterranean Seminar, Tel Aviv, June 1

6. I.O. Lesser and Ashley J. Tellis, Strategic Exposure, Proli

Around the Mediterranean, Rand, 1996, pp. 31-34. 

109
Post-Cold War World, Patterns of Relations in the Mediter

Dartmouth, 1997, Ch. 7.

8. Stephen C. Calleya, “NATO and the EU in the Mediter

What Relationship?,” in NATO’s Southern Flank, House of Co

Defense Committee Report, Session 1995-96, London: HMSO

1996, pp. 43-54.

9. Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt, The Algerian 

Policy Options for the West, Washington DC: Carnegie, 1996.

10. Richard Owen, “Old Aegean Foes,” The Times (L

December 18, 1996, p. 33.

11. Joseph Fitchett, “U.S. tries to fend off Paris on a NAT

International Herald Tribune, December 4, 1996, p. 8; and 

Fitchett, “War over Naples,” The Economist, November 30, 19

34-35.

12. Stephen C. Calleya, “The Euro-Mediterranean Proces

Malta: What Prospects?,” Mediterranean Politics, Fran

Publications, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1997, pp. 1-22.

13. James N. Rosenau, Rountable on “Is International Stu

Anachronism?,” International Studies Association Annual Conv

Minneapolis, MN, March 20, 1998.

110
NATO IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Mario Zucconi

After the end of the Cold War, the greatest p

NATO’s energies, operational activities, fina

resources, and policy disputes have been spen

addressed to, and originated from troubles i

Mediterranean region. From the drawn-out B

experience, the Alliance derived the stimuli and pres

to adapt to new missions, create flexible capabilit

respond to non-Article 5 security, and offer itself a

organizing element of larger, international stabiliz

forces. In the Balkans—if only from 1995 on—the Al

established the credibility of its capabilities and 

members’ collective will. It solidified its authoritativ

as main instrument of international stability.

After the end of the Cold War, for a while it looke

the United States was drastically cutting down 

presence and interest in this area. However, the Bo

crisis compelled it back to a strong conmitment t

stability there. Overall, and for some time in the futur

United States is bound to remain an essential and 

influential actor with regard to the Mediterranean th

But due to the character of many of the sources of insta

here, it is most important that the main Western Eur

countries and European institutions take 

responsibility, develop mechanisms and strategi

collective action, and invest much more than the

presently doing in creating stability around the Me

ranean.

111
Concept.

In recent years, Western policymakers and N

officials have increasingly expressed concern abou

Mediterranean as an area of instability. They hav

referred to it as to an area of allied interest

Mediterranean is the small lake in which the powerfu

Sixth Fleet is stationed. And in Naples resi

double-hatted U.S. admiral—both commander of that 

Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of NATO Sou

Command (AFSOUTH or Allied Forces South.)

However, the Mediterranean is not a geopolit

defined area—as it could be considered with regard 

time of Rome and Carthage, or Sparta and Athens. It 

an area with distinctive and unitary political chara

And, in fact, it may encompass today a number of dif

major geopolitical areas, of different and most impo

international problems. Moreover, the view of whe

main issues lie in the Mediterranean changes conside

in Washington and in the Western European capital

even the limits of this area are precisely defined

Commander of the Sixth Fleet oversees operations 

Gibraltar to the Black Sea and from the Baltic to 

Africa. The Mediterranean is also the main base from 

power was projected in the Persian Gulf since the K

crisis of 1990-91.

And the fact that the Mediterranean is not a u

political problem is not irrelevant. The polarizat

international power during the Cold War carrie

possibility, by pressing and negotiating with Mosco

dealing with issues as diverse as Syria’s attem

destabilize Jordan in September 1970, or the mi

uprisings in the Shaba region of Zaire, or the guer

attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan government 

1980s, or the worrisome presence of Cuban troop

military instructors in several parts of Africa for almo

decades. And if, in fact, Moscow was unable to deliver 

112
Soviet international influence helped justify interven

a range of disparate cases. In contrast, the sep

discrete crises of the post-Cold War world—and o

Mediterranean area in particular—require diff

individual explanation and a case-by-case rationa

intervention.

An Area of “Growing Instability”?

It has become commonplace among political analy

relate recent sources of instability to the end of the 

War. On the contrary, most of the issues we had to dea

in recent times in this vast area are old ones. No do

crisis brewing for a long time in Yugoslavia reache

boiling point when systemic pressures on that 

diminished in the early 1990s. But the root causes o

crisis are economic and political, and began to emerg

steadily grow at the beginning of the 1980s. The issue

sour Turkish-Greek relations—disputed territory i

Aegean, Cyprus, Greek alleged support for Ku

separatism in Turkey—have been there for a long ti

half-century of Arab-Israeli dispute, political and rel

issues, and oil make the whole Middle Eastern area 

great political pressures and instability.

On the shores of the Black Sea, the end of the Sovie

freed political pressures, ethnic rivalries, and compe

among ruling elites that are today a source of instabil

an area again, of great interest for production 

movement of oil and gas). But the civil war betwee

Turkish army and Kurdish guerrillas in Eastern Anat

an older problem, going back to the early 1960s. And 

between the Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad goes back 

middle 1970s.

While their aspiration is not a unified Kurdistan f

different Kurdish communities in different state

Kurds are at the source of a number of important po

problems in the area. In October 1998 Ankara threate

113
was known to be offering leaders of the Kurdistan Wo

Party (PKK). But then, if Turkey has recently estab

an important military cooperation with Israel, its pr

with Syria (caused, first of all, by control over 

resources) is beginning to grow into a larger probl

regional alignments—with Syria finding support in G

and Iran.

West of Suez, the main source of instability—dif

militant brands of Islamic fundamentalism—is, once 

older than the end of the Cold War. It is a relatively 

problem in Algeria, but a much older one in Egypt. Lib

course, is a problem of its own. And, finally, if ther

common, unifying character of the instability o

southern shore of the Mediterranean (with the except

Israel, of course), it is the general conditions of econom

political backwardness of the area.

Strategic Importance of the Mediterranean.

Needless to say, the states and issues mentioned 

are of primary importance for the well-being o

industrialized world and for overall international sta

Italy imports more than 50 percent of its gas solely 

Algeria. And to Spain, Algeria makes up 70 percent 

supply. To France, Algeria means not solely gas but 

large community of foreign-born residents and 

important political ties.

Washington may be less directly concerned b

Algerian civil war, but for half a century has been a 

influential actor in the Middle East. Its ability to infl

the flow and price of oil—related in turn to its ability t

with Arab-Israeli issues and with other ones i

region—long has been the main reason for its la

hegemonic position among the industrialized countri

Turkey may be the case the importance of whic

Western allies—but especially the Western Europe

114
lies at the intersection of different main politica

cultural areas and currents. It is the industrial 

bordering the raw material-producing south of the f

Soviet Union. Had Turkey, its power, and infrastru

not been available and Ankara unwilling to pay the s

costs paid for it, the conduct of the operators in the G

1990-91 would have been much more complex and co

In Washington, there is today growing awareness 

strategic importance of a country such as Turkey. How

doubts, ambivalence, and great reluctance continue 

present in the debate about the U.S. commitment 

stabilization of the Balkans.

1

 Are the Balkans, amo

different security issues in the Mediterranean

important or marginal?

“We don’t have a dog in this fight,” Secretary of 

James Baker said in 1991 to qualify the U.S. interest i

crisis.

2

 Still, if most Western countries looked a

Yugoslav crisis at its outset with a simplistic “vital int

approach, all came out of it in 1995 realizing that the 

can ill-afford large-scale conflicts in adjacent regions

if the countries involved are economically irrelevant. 

of refugees and terrible abuse of human rights carrie

everybody’s living room by CNN-type TV broadcasting 

become issues as vital politically as the unimpeded f

oil through the Persian Gulf. And as long as the We

European allies are unable to take care of that or s

problems, the domestic and international pres

deriving from them are as important for far-

Washington as they are for closer-by Paris, Bonn, or Ro

The importance of the Mediterranean in security 

derives not from the fact that six NATO member-cou

are on its shores, as many analysts pointed out 

recently, but rather from the fact that it is an area of 

interest, adjacent to the European continent and an 

which, unfortunately, is also characterized in the over

great instability. Many analysts agree that if NATO is 

115
Mediterranean region. And even more, if there i

possibility of activation of Article 5 of the North At

Treaty (that is, collective territorial defense), 

possibility today concerns the states borderin

Mediterranean and, first of all, Greece and Turkey.

Militarily a Profound Restructuring of the Alli

Not that there is lack of awareness, particularly a

officials and the military in Western countries, o

relevance and complexity of Mediterranean security i

NATO senior officers are especially aware of the cond

and pressures that are profoundly reshaping the All

In Mons, Belgium, the atomic bunker built to shelt

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) in c

attack will probably be visited by growing numb

schoolchildren and their teachers in the coming yea

Naples, in contrast, both the Sixth Fleet Comman

AFSOUTH compound are being rebuilt in view 

possibility of missile attacks from somewhere in the M

Eastern region.

Moreover, even while much attention was being gi

the enlargement of NATO in Central Eastern Europ

largest part of allied planning, operations, and allocat

resources had to do with the problems the A

encountered in the Mediterranean region—Bosnia 

all, in the last 7 years. More precisely, while N

enlargement is mostly a political-diplomatic exercise a

the end may shrink down to an operation of cons

buttressing for the Alliance (especially in the 

Congress), the Mediterranean is where NATO wea

camouflage and flak jackets and moves around in arm

personnel carriers and tanks; where it uses its fi

bombers and naval units. It is in the Mediterranean 

NATO, as a collective body and structure, went into co

for the first time in its history. It is there that the We

countries need today to exert effectively their m

116
the Mediterranean that was the motor of the pro

reshaping and adaptation of the Alliance that has 

place since the early 1990s.

The Gulf war and immediately after that the conf

the former Yugoslavia were the two most impo

experiences that caused the Alliance to refocus its int

and adapt to new missions. An issue always present in 

relations, that of the “out-of-area” tasks, became ag

central one after the Soviet intervention in Afghan

However, Washington’s pressures at the time manage

to have put explicitly on record the unwillingne

Western European countries to assume a role in non-A

5 situations. In the Gulf, most Western allies interv

but especially the French remained rigidly oppos

labeling the allied participation as a NATO operation

That stand became impossible to maintain whe

political pressures deriving from the Yugoslav co

combined in 1991-92 with the uncertain post-Cold 

legitimacy of the Alliance. Thus the first decisi

participate in international missions outside the T

area came in June 1992 at the Oslo North Atlantic Co

That was 2 months after the outset of the Bosnian co

and it was the beginning of an adaptation that from 19

would turn NATO into the main institutional ac

maintaining stability in the Balkans.

In the same context of political necessity deriving 

the Bosnian conflict, other important developments 

place. After much agonizing over the issue, Ger

decided in favor of participation in allied operations ou

the Treaty area. And because France wanted to have 

in the decisions that now counted, it announced in 19

willingness to come back after almost 30 years t

military structures of the Alliance (even though late

context of diminished pressure, it tied that participat

other conditions). Similarly, Spain began to broad

NATO participation with the same military structur

117
useful framework in the post-Dayton Allied intervent

Bosnia. That experience, in turn, gave substance 

better focus to the PfP program. It is, once more, in 

context of real operation that the idea, first advanc

January 1994, of flexible Combined Joint Task F

(CTTF) began to shape up.

Two final points should be made with regard to B

and the Balkans as a motivator of evolution of the All

The Bosnia experience—years of suffering for the 

Western capitals, followed by the proved effectiveness 

U.S.-NATO commitment in September 1995—brou

great clarification with regard to power structure

institutions which can effectively deal with impo

sources of instability. In most Western European cap

the post-Cold War urge to establish a European se

identity (ESDI) and related structures quickly reced

NATO proved effective, especially because of its ess

U.S. component. At the Berlin summit of June 199

French accepted the idea that any ESDI would be s

within and not outside NATO.

And, finally, because of the pressure deriving 

Serbian repression in Kosovo, we may be today at a de

moment with regard to NATO non-Article 5 operatio

October 1998, Richard Holbrooke coerced President 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevi

accepting Western conditions under threat of a N

attack. The protracted NATO air campaig

August-September 1995 gave credibility to the threat 

bombings. What was new this time, concerning the 

with respect to December 1990, to August-September 

and to the very policy established by the North At

Council in December 1992, is that the Western m

instrument was used in the negotiations with the ex

opposition of Russia, a permanent member of the Se

Council. One may agree or disagree with the decision 

taken to Western capitals, but the point is that i

probably remain as an important development in the 

118
more, because of instability in the Mediterranean.

Politically Serious Disagreement Over Mandat

The growing importance of the Mediterranean th

for the future of Western security does not immed

translate into a corresponding, broad consensus amon

Allies, into well-thought-out general plans and 

sponding resources. In fact, the Allies continue to 

make adequate investments and adapt rapidly enou

the changing security environment. NATO (and We

security arrangements) seem to be pulled in two dif

directions: fast adapting its military structures to 

problems and missions, and having its pote

effectiveness limited by the political differences amon

Allies about where, when, and how to intervene.

To start with, contingencies increase and reso

dwindle. Awareness of the problem is kept mute, an

mandates to deal with those issues remain precar

when not controversial. American officials point out t

percent of military contingencies involving the U

States since the disappearance of the Soviet U

(December 1991) have occurred within the Sixth F

zone of responsibility.

3

 And Admiral T. Joseph L

former Commander-in-Chief of AFSOUTH, in a le

given 1 year ago, was reminding his audience how t

countries of concern to NATO’s Southern Region i

1980s have now become more than 40—and often, on

add, with new and individual problems.

And possibly, the main problem is not so muc

dwindling budget and reduced force structure, as mu

the lack of overall, articulated strategies and of 

determination to be engaged in upholding stability i

area. In fact, there is much improvisation and, in 

measure, inability to come to grips with the crisis befo

issue becomes an intractable one. In interviews wit

author at NATO in Brussels in June 1998 about wha

119
officials and military officers started by warning th

arrival of Christiane Amanpour, the CNN report

Pristina meant that NATO “had to do somethi

needless to say, an indication of lack of overall polic

strategic planning and even of well-defined mandate

Since 1993, all ministerial North Atlantic Co

(NAC) and summits have mentioned the Mediterrane

1994 a Mediterranean Dialogue was started with five

six, countries in the proximity of the Southern shore (E

Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan.)

4

 

officials point to the carrying out in early 1998 

CJTF-type exercise in the Southern Region, with 

countries participating and the first one to develop con

operational procedures. People implementing We

policies in the Mediterranean stress the importanc

visible presence of Western power as a deterrent. Ad

Lopez repeatedly spoke about “forward engagem

However, the dialogue initiative or the recent exercis

more a sign of the recognition of a need than the beginn

an adequate response to existing problems.

Of course, it is not easy to move Western security po

toward a new focus. The NATO Southern Command d

the Cold War not only had to guard a smaller num

countries, but was doing that with a clear focus 

well-defined threat. Indeed, the Western alliance deve

mostly around the problem posed by the presence of S

power in Europe. It is easy to enlarge NATO to C

Eastern European countries, for no one doubts that 

countries belong today to the expanded European z

peace. Enlargement is a no-risk initiative and 

immediate political dividends. Its financial costs re

undetermined and can always be delayed to future 

years. A U.S. administration can always blam

Europeans for being irresponsible in that respect

Europeans can always say Washington should pay for 

at the Madrid summit came out as an American vers

enlargement.

120
7 billion dollars a year since 1995. And those are fin

resources that need be found, year after year, in dif

parts of the budget of the countries participating in i

same applies to the Gulf war—many tens of billion of d

in the end found through a fund-raising campaign 

United States and in other Western countries.

A Broader Approach to Western Security.

But even a better understanding among Alli

NATO’s new competencies and more sufficient reso

are only a small part of the remedy to adequately dea

the different sources of instability in the Mediterr

region. Except for a few issues, the response to wh

solely military (such as Saddam Hussein’s policies), 

other issues require a complex array of instruments 

dealt with—beginning with economic power. Wer

Western European countries able to unify and effec

exert their potential influence, they would be decis

different critical issues in the Mediterranean area.

The Western European countries created mecha

for producing a common foreign and security policy (C

with the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties). 

European Union (then Community) failed to contr

crisis in Yugoslavia in 1991, officials and analysts 

explain that that was before it created the new mechan

One analyst found that the Yugoslav crisis 

premature,” for Europe was then in the process of rede

itself.

5

 But 3 more years of war, the successive stabili

period, and then the new Kosovo crisis proved the Eur

CFSP mechanisms unable to produce policies any 

unified and effective than those of the pre-Maas

Community. In 1998, a small, manageable but also h

visible operation in Albania to stabilize politicall

situation there was left to the Italians and French to 

out. They refused any European institutional suppor

labeling.

121
played, with the United States as the single power d

with most non-European crises and sources of insta

are difficult to substitute with a culture of s

responsibility. Moreover, with the regional issues 

themselves and no longer fed by the global U.S.-S

rivalry and linked to the compellance of strategic wea

those issues became tempting occasions for raisin

political profile of different countries or for testing one

influence. The result is a diminished ability to stead

collectively for most influential Western European cap

foreign policies more dependent on domestic politics, a

times, even frivolous policies. In the former Yugos

even more important than for the additional firepo

brought with it, the United States has been essential 

unifying element of Western will and power.

The result is a vacuum of jurisdiction amon

Western countries over different issues or even dif

regions. (Whose responsibility was dealing 

Yugoslavia? Where were the Europeans?) The coll

intervention then takes place only when the situ

creates too many direct, unbearable pressures—bu

when an issue, largely manageable early on, has beco

intractable one, as in the former Yugoslavia. And a

point, the outside intervention ends up being neces

massive, only military, costly, risky, and requir

long-term commitment. In the former Yugoslavia

United States and NATO intervened after other coll

instruments failed in the early phases of the 

However, that does not necessarily mean that NATO 

the sole right instrument—the lack of a real institu

“common” European policy and the inability to inte

early in the crisis are other explanations for the fail

the Western countries to deal with an issue bef

becomes totally militarized in character.

The regions around the Mediterranean are whe

West will have to make the largest investment for sta

and for defending its interests in the near future. Exce

122
through an early commitment, a broad array of instrum

and, above all, economic ones. NATO’s capabilitie

contribute significantly and need be present and vis

but not be the substitute for other forms of influence

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Typical or even extreme positions in opposition to th

commitment in the Balkans are aptly presented in the chapter on 

of the Cato Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations 

106th Congress, Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1999.

2. Cited in Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, New York: R

House, 1998, p. 27.

3. See William Drozdiak, “Sixth Fleet is Smaller but Still on 

Move Fast to Crisis Area,” WPI International Herald Tribune, 

20, 1998.

4. For a short history of the initiative, see Jette Norda

Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling Misconceptions and B

Confidence,” NATO Review, July-August 1997.

5. James E. Steinberg, “The Response of International Inst

to the Yugoslavia Conflict: Implications and Lessons,” in 

Larrabee, Europe’s Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security after t

War, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994.

123
EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY PERCEPTI

AND POLICIES TOWARDS

THE MEDITERRANEAN

Roberto Aliboni

This paper takes into consideration, first, the se

challenges the European Union (EU) member s

perceive with respect to the Mediterranean area

second, the policy responses of the EU states to 

challenges and perceptions. Mediterranean sec

perceptions comprise an uneven set of military 

nonmilitary challenges, with an emphasis on the latte

paper begins by examining military challenges and m

then to nonmilitary ones. Finally, it considers the Eur

overall Mediterranean security doctrine which links th

clusters of challenges.

This Mediterranean security doctrine explains po

well as institutional responses actually undertaken b

EU states in the 1990s. Such responses are conside

the last section of the paper. A brief conclusion provid

assessment of the EU Mediterranean policy effective

Military Challenges: Proliferation.

No state in the Mediterranean areas of the Middl

and North Africa (MENA) would be capable of conduc

full military attack on European countries and, in fa

such threat is minimally perceived or even taken 

consideration in the Northern part of the region (m

with the exception of Turkey with respect to Syria). M

challenges and related risk perceptions in the 

concern proliferation of weapons of mass destru

(WMD) and their delivery means.

125
proliferation is less a threat than a risk for the Eur

countries and the West. Its effects are likely to be l

military than diplomatic and political character. This 

to a number of factors, like:

• The pulling force towards proliferation, irrespec

its actual military effectiveness, is the po

necessity to earn some strategic “weight” and 

from the possession of WMD and missiles. As no

Lesser and Tellis, these states want to be “

seriously” by the West (as well as by neighb

During the Cold War, these states could o

strategic weight internationally by aligning o

aligning themselves in the framework of the 

East-West confrontation. In a sense, WMD 

missiles are a substitute for alignment i

post-Cold War world. By the same token, posse

WMD is regarded, particularly by Arab states

proof of their technological capacity, alle

improving their political and strategic status.

• On the other hand, there is no doubt that 

MENA states feel insecure with respect to 

regional enemies and the West. In this sense, 

must be regarded as a form of gross militar

political deterrence or as an instrument of 

diction and coercive diplomacy.

• Many analysts point out that MENA countries’ 

and missiles are essentially targeted on 

Southern neighbors. As a matter of fact, it is 

South-South context that MENA states face 

military threats and more often than not have p

to be willing or able to resort to military instru

to solve their disputes, by diplomatic coercion a

as other forms of conflict. The North is not a pr

target of Southern WMD and missiles, at least f

narrower military point of view.

126
ay, ceeteuse ad otes, beca

MENA’s poor industrial and technological 

ground, the military effectiveness of their WM

related projection capacities are challenged by 

analysts.

Despite the importance of nonmilitary motives, 

poor effectiveness, the lack of an adequate indu

background, their uneven development and their m

South-South orientation, there is no doubt that sou

proliferation of WMD and related delivery means a

regional stability in a very general sense. From a nar

military angle, it makes the European Union an

principal allies (the U.S. forces deployed in Sou

Europe and Turkey) more vulnerable. Southern Eur

already encompassed by a number of delivery veh

Even if such exposure remained a minor military thr

the EU and EU allies’ security, still it would bring a

degree of political and military interdiction. Dealing w

growing instability with less freedom of maneuver 

prove very difficult and risky.

The EU states belonging to NATO have recognize

risks put forward by proliferation in the NATO Ist

Declaration of 1994. In the November 1995 Barc

Declaration,

2

 signed by the EU states and 12 no

Mediterranean partners, there is a joint commi

against proliferation beside other commitments to co

or diminish the level of armaments, as well as 

offensive or inhumane nature.

Nonmilitary Security Challenges: Migration,

Terrorism And Criminality.

Although recognizing proliferation as a major ris

states’ concerns are focusing on nonmilitary se

challenges. First, the basic European feeling is that m

the Mediterranean armed conflict is linked to global r

than regional factors and trends. Proliferation, just to 

an example, is not precisely a regional, Mediterr

127
outstanding armed conflicts in the area requi

international management to which the EU can cont

but cannot tackle in isolation.

Second, the EU aims at working out the conditio

stability in the Mediterranean area, by acting principa

political, social, economic and cultural factors. I

European vision, instability in the Mediterranean 

essentially from these nonmilitary factors. Economi

social underdevelopment coupled with the ru

authoritarian regimes brings about instab

domestically. Such domestic instability turns regi

into spill-over effects which intrude in Europe and 

European security. What is at stake is not national se

in a conventional sense, but the security of Eur

democratic polities and the welfare and civic order 

latter as they have developed after the end of the S

World War.

The most important spill-over effects concerning t

are related to immigration, terrorism and internati

organized criminality. These issues are contemplated 

third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration. As a mat

fact, rightly or wrongly, they are more and more impo

and visible in the daily political and social life o

European members of the Union.

Immigration is not a threat to employment, alth

unemployment is currently raging in Western Europe

a European demographic growth approaching 

(particularly in Southern Europe) and a very 

propensity by young Europeans to accept menial job

mobility, immigrants are in fact almost badly n

economically. Western Europe, however, is not prepa

accept immigration (or more immigration) for politica

most of all, cultural reasons.

As a matter of fact, situations are varying from co

to country because of very different legal, histo

political and cultural legacies regarding immigratio

128
European countries there is an articulated relatio

between communities and the state which allows f

presence of even numerous immigrant groups a

relatively high degree of cultural-political autonomy 

latter, in Southern Europe and in Germany this 

relationship is definitely less flexible. This lack of flex

makes relations with culturally assertive communitie

Muslim ones, very difficult, for these communities eit

not accept assimilation (a mainly French solution) o

feel discriminated and marginalized (like in Germ

Spain and Italy) because, as well as they may be treate

this is not always the case), they do not get the recog

they wish.

As a result of difficulties in accommodating a gr

migration from the Mediterranean and other num

areas (among which the Balkans play a politica

definitely more important than that playe

Mediterranean peoples), in Europe xenophobia and r

are increasing and giving way to organized po

movements. Besides exacerbating tensions stemming 

migration anyway, these developments put strains o

democratic character of the European polities. This is 

important risk perceived today in Europe by conc

democratic people and leaderships. At the beginning 

1990s, the EU Commission had explicitly warned 

such risk and consequently advocated the necessit

more articulated and important European Mediterr

policy.

A second risk comes from political links bet

immigrated groups, notably Muslims, and resp

sending countries. European inability and unwillingn

integrate immigrated people, increasingly turning 

xenophobic and racist criminal attacks on individua

groups or mistreatment, is resented by Muslim and 

public opinion in sending countries as an evidence of a 

and fundamental European-Christian hostility to

Islam and Arabs. In this respect it is linked to 

129
Muslims. This alleged European hostility stirs in M

communities a sense of danger and reinforces 

spontaneous identitarian assertiveness. Islamist act

is diffuse in Europe as a form of defense and ident

assertiveness backed by substantive relations 

religious-political organizations at home. In this 

migration brings the Islamist movements’ anti-We

hostility inside Europe and tends to exacerbate diffic

in international relations.

To a large extent, immigration is a source of confli

instability just because the European states are una

agree on common policies. Joint policies to co

immigration are now operated within the Sche

agreement (which provides for free movements of Eur

citizens among a number of EU member sta

Cooperation within the Schengen agreement remains 

however, because it is not yet predicated on 

articulated joint policies with respect to migrants st

and working in the EU states. This risk to Eur

security is largely due to European inertia.

To some extent, the link between migration and Isl

anti-Western attitude we have just talked about ex

also European involvement with terrorism. Immigrat

fact, brings about an environment in which terroris

able to move with relative ease. While MENA terroris

new development in the United States, Europe is not n

terrorism originating from these regions. Some

Europe is no more than a logistic base or a battlefield, 

the “Mikonos” affair. In other cases, Europe is more o

directly involved for its past colonial links (as in the c

France with current Algerian terrorism) or becaus

regarded as a more or less direct player with resp

Islamists’ domestic and international interests.

Finally, immigration and terrorism link up 

international criminality. Though an evil in itself, 

immigration is more and more becoming a bus

130
operationally associated with other kinds of traffic

drugs and armaments. Illegal traffic organize

international criminal gangs is another effect of insta

Intra-state and inter-state conflict as well as terrorism 

the vicious circles of drugs and displaced persons traff

in order to finance arms transfers. The unfinished cy

conflict in the Balkans and in Northern Iraq-Southea

Anatolia has shown the strict and formidable intermin

of criminality, conflicts and migrations.

Structural Causes.

These challenges are regarded by European an

and governments as proximate causes of instabilit

insecurity in the Mediterranean. These proximate c

trace back to structural causes, however, i.e. the ro

instability and insecurity. In the Mediterranean are

main clusters of structural causes can be identified: (

weakness of Arab regimes and governments on the gr

of political legitimacy; (b) the lack of good governanc

political freedom bringing about political and 

disruptions and economic underdevelopment. As the 

is not a secondary source of political radicalism 

systemic opposition, the two clusters intermingle.

Figure 1 is an attempt at mapping out the EU vis

the hierarchy of structural causes of instability i

Mediterranean and their linkages 3. The figure is 

guide to EU policy responses intended to correct such c

or contain their effects. To be sure, the links establish

the figure are not necessarily valid from a scientific p

view: on policy grounds, however, they are helpful a

point out the political values and expectations which 

EU action. While this section describes the network

structural causes of instability, as interpreted by th

next one will provide an overview of the policies work

by the EU to attain stability in the Mediterranean.

131
132
largely inspired by the model of cooperation and integ

of the EU itself. In a 1993 document of the EU Comm

related to the “Future Relations and Co-operation be

the Community and the Middle East,” it was stated t

The Community’s own experience demonstrates that w

between previously hostile parties can be made unthinka

through economic integration. While this model cannot eas

be transposed to the Middle East, it does suggest that t

development of regional economic co-operation can be 

powerful tool in reducing the level of conflict, making pea

irreversible and encouraging the people of the region to lea

to leave in peace.

4

Strongly influenced by EU’s experience in dealing 

post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe, the Barc

Declaration puts forward a systemic interplay a

democracy, integration, and peace as the basic ingre

to affect root causes of instability.

Consequently, the agenda suggested by the Decla

starts from the necessity to use the Euro-Mediterr

Partnership (EMP) to introduce democracy and plur

as well as strengthen political legitimacy and its unde

civil society. The emergence of such factors would all

turn, the achievement of inter-state relations bas

peaceful resolution of disputes and the respect o

fundamental principles of international law (recal

detail by the Declaration, in the same way as the He

Declaration).

According to the model shown in Figure 1

consolidation of peaceful relations between states 

bring about stability in international as well 

intra-state relations. The existence of peaceful rela

especially in the Middle East, would open the way 

substantive disarmament and to the possibility of ach

some degree of regional economic integration.

133
and reduces the role of the state in the economy, mak

possible to liberalize the latter and proceed to privatiz

This development would help regional economic integ

and cooperation. At the same time, the overall domest

regional stabilization coupled with the strengthening 

market economy would allow for capital abroad to r

home (an extremely significant amount in the M

region) and for foreign capital to enter in the form of 

investments and new technologies.

Economic growth made possible by political sta

attained in intra-state as well as inter-state relations 

allow for reducing unemployment, particularly in re

to young generations, and lowering poverty. These wo

key factors in discouraging political radicalization as w

emigration.

By indicating the introduction of democracy as th

mover of the virtuous circles described above, the EU 

the Barcelona Declaration has pointed out the stru

causes of instability in the Mediterranean and the cha

and primary sources of insecurity in the area, at leas

its point of view. The Declaration is not an explicit an

of such causes but alludes to them indirectly by setti

agenda directed at eliminating and containing such c

of instability. This is the topic of next section.

The Euro-Mediterranean Security Agenda.

In the Euro-Mediterranean security agenda, as ou

by the Barcelona Declaration, there are two policy lay

broader one directed at shaping the structural factors 

would allow for stability and, thus, security i

Mediterranean; a narrower one constituted by sp

policies to be implemented jointly and cooperatively b

members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

All in all, the Barcelona process resemble

CSCE/OSCE experience. It is a cooperative sec

134
attain security and escape security dilemmas by the 

cooperative instruments (instead of being guided by po

of balance of power and deterrence). The coope

security scheme envisaged by the Barcelona Declarat

strongly predicated on a concept of comprehensive sec

in which both military and nonmilitary factors are inc

and integrated. This is reflected (and is the outcome) 

EU analysis of Mediterranean instability on whic

argued in the above, the security scheme is predicate

It must be added that from the point of view of th

the emphasis on nonmilitary factors does not come 

objective analysis only, but also from the very “civ

nature of the European Union. The Treaty of Amste

having failed once again to provide an operational an

integrated Common Foreign and Security Policy (CF

the Union, remains more a civilian-economic power t

politico-military one. Having said that, however, it wo

wrong to think that the EU is not pursuing milita

military-related cooperation in the Mediterra

Although to a minor extent and with poor effectiv

military cooperation is tried nonetheless .

On this backdrop, the broader and structural la

EMP cooperative security scheme is tasked to prov

common code of conduct, which includes a set of 

principles for international cooperation and pea

relations. The aim is similar to the Helsinki Ac

Barcelona Declaration commits its membe

democratization, pluralism, the implementation of the 

of law, respect for human rights and minorities, 

neighborly relations, etc. as the frame which would 

cooperative security work. Like the CSCE, the EM

politically binding only. Its pivotal mechanism 

political dialogue, which is conducted in its institution

biennial Conference of Foreign Ministers, the 

Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Pr

(Euro-Med Committee), and the High Officials Comm

The political dialogue is aimed, first, to create coope

135
and, secondly, to manage jointly what cooperat

actually worked out.

The narrower layer makes reference to the 

chapters of the Declaration. The first and third cha

envisage a set of specific policies related to securi

practice to the military and nonmilitary factors that 

been pointed out in the two previous sections: WMD 

missiles proliferation coupled with other military t

and migration, terrorism and organized interna

criminality. The second chapter envisages strong sup

economic development and the integration of the Sou

Mediterranean economies in the international setti

the creation at 2010 of a free trade area.

As for nonmilitary factors, it is important to note th

Barcelona Declaration emphasizes the necess

promoting the cultural dialogue between the different 

of the Mediterranean as a tool working across the boar

in relation to the varying social and human dimension

are involved in the broad notion of Mediterranean se

and peaceful relations. The Declaration gives s

emphasis to the role of civil society in reinforcing cu

understanding and, most of all, promoting politica

economic liberalization and cohesiveness in their resp

societies.

Beside the aforementioned diplomatic and po

instruments that can be used within the political dia

incentives to democratization are provided by a smal

devoted to support of nongovernmental initiativ

reinforce and spread democracy (Meda-Democracy). O

other hand, the fund designated for developmental 

considerable (a little bit more than 4 billion EC

concessional aid and as much from the Euro

Investment Bank). The incentives to promote demo

and to respect human rights and law, are supported 

strict scheme of “conditionality” that is related t

disbursement of aid.

136
points out the prominent necessity to stop or co

proliferation. At the same time, it stresses other targ

arms control, arms limitation and disarmament, as w

the necessity to promote confidence-building measure

introduce conflict prevention capacities into the sc

The relevant key passage of the Declaration points ou

the Parties will:

consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nucle

chemical and biological weapons;

refrain from developing military capacity beyond th

legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirm

their resolve to achieve the same degree of security a

mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops a

weaponry and adherence to CCW;

promote conditions likely to develop good security, prosper

and regional and subregional cooperation;

consider any confidence- and security-building measures th

could be taken between the Parties with a view to the creat

of an “area of peace and stability in the Mediterranea

including the long-term possibility of establishing 

Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.

This set of measures is named by the Declaratio

“area of peace and stability.” To establish the “area,” S

Officials have begun setting out two main agenda

Action Plan and, later on, the Euro-Mediterranean Ch

for Peace and Stability. While the Action Plan woul

list of measures and policies that the Partners would p

and negotiate over time according to priorities and m

they would remain free to gradually agree upon

Charter would be an institutional framework w

normative ambition and a stronger mechanism of po

dialogue. In a sense, the Charter would b

“Euro-Mediterranean Pact” mentioned at the end 

just-quoted passage and its substance would resemb

137
CSCE/OSCE.

The Barcelona Declaration is not exhaustin

military instruments available to the EU for ach

security in the Mediterranean. Beside the principle

policies the EU shares with its Mediterranean partn

the framework of the EMP, instruments available 

Union in the framework of the WEU and multina

forces set up by members of the Union, like Eurofo

Euromarfor, must also be taken into consider

(although they are not directed specifically t

Mediterranean). These instruments are part of the de

forces of the Union, its members and its allies, and t

primarily to their national security. There is no d

however, that their use is intended f or coope

purposes. These purposes are listed by the 1992 Peter

Declaration, in which the WEU members have point

that military forces answerable to the WEU are to be 

eventually for the management of crises as well 

peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Eurofo

Euromarfor, made answerable to the WEU (as w

NATO and other regional security organizations) b

governments of France, Italy, Portugal and Spain

endowed with a special maritime mobility and fo

reason have a natural destination to act in 

Mediterranean (although not necessarily there).

Since 1993 the WEU has conducted a Mediterr

Dialogue with Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia

Egypt (since 1995). In the first semester of 1998, the 

Council decided to enlarge its dialogue to Jordan as 

The dialogue amounts to biannual meetings 

representatives of these countries to exchange inform

Recently, the non-WEU Mediterranean partners have 

invited to visit, first, the WEU Torrejón Satellite C

(Spain) and, secondly, the WEU Planning Cell in Bru

Principally because of the EU members reluctance to 

the WEU work effectively, this organizat

Mediterranean agenda (not unlike other agendas) p

138
broad confidence-building measure directed to en

transparency. The establishment of Eurofor 

Euromarfor, on the other hand, was not welcome b

Mediterranean partners (and countries at large) for 

forces are not included in an explicit cooperative fram

and would thus operate unilaterally.

Conclusions.

EU security perceptions with respect to 

Mediterranean are predicated essentially on nonm

structural causes. Proximate causes of instability ma

be of military nature, like proliferation. Still, nonm

proximate causes, such as migration or terrorism, ar

as most important. Accordingly, EU instruments to 

with security in the Mediterranean are less military 

political, economic, and cultural in their character.

It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the 

overlooking military and military-related instrument

issues. The cooperative security scheme envisaged by 

the Barcelona Declaration defines as the “area of peac

stability” is very important not only because the 

aware of the fact that in the middle-longer term the 

and quality of armaments in the region will be decisi

its overall stability (and will be no less important 

nonmilitary factors), but also because acquiring a capa

to manage military and military-related relations 

important element for EU’s ongoing political and d

integration. In fact, from the point of view of the EU, 

Barcelona policies directed at improving econ

development, containing illegal immigration

countering terrorism as well as international crimi

are of the utmost importance for European securit

implementation of the “area of peace and stab

corresponds to a no less important investment from bo

point of view of security in the area and EU’s po

identity. In the light of these purposes, what is the ba

139
1990s?

In its 3-year life, the Euro-Mediterranean Partn

has duly progressed in implementing its agenda of eco

cooperation, but less so in shaping the varying aspe

security cooperation envisaged by the first and 

chapter of the Barcelona Declaration. In fact, the ba

sheet, after the second ministerial meeting in Malta 

15-16, 1997) and the ad hoc ministerial meeting h

Palermo on June 4-5, 1998, is somehow disappoint

this respect. It must be added that it is maybe disappo

more in relation to migration, terrorism and crimi

than the “area of peace and stability."

While the standstill in the Middle East peace proce

been a serious stumbling block on the road to build u

“area of peace and stability,” the EU and EMP inertia 

respect to illegal immigration, terrorism and crimina

explained by the modest level of integration in the Un

relation to such matters, particularly immigration. In 

general terms, the weakness of the CFSP is an impo

factor in slowing down the EU Mediterranean se

agenda. It must be also noted, however, that despite 

rhetoric, especially in Southern Europe, EU se

concerns concentrate elsewhere than in the Mediterra

i.e., in the Balkans and in Russia.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Ian O. Lesser and Ashley J. Tellis, Strategic Ex

Proliferation around the Mediterranean, Santa Monica, CA: 

1996, p. 7.

2. The English text of the Declaration is published by M

ranean Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1, Summer 1997, pp. 177-187.

3. This section is a version of part of an earlier study publi

Italian by the author: Roberto Aliboni, “Riforme economi

Mediterraneo: il contesto politico” (“The political context of ec

reforms in the Mediterranean”), in G. Barba Navaretti, R. Fai

Nuove prospettive per la cooperazione allo sviluppo. I proc

140
perspectives on development cooperation. Political and ec

integrative processes with the Mediterranean countries), Bolo

Mulino, 1997, pp. 183-222.

4. Communication from the Commission of the Eu

Communities, COM 93 (375), September 8, 1993.

141
ARAB PERCEPTIONS

OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S

EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PROJECTS

Mohammad El-Sayed Selim

Introduction.

In October 1994 the European Union (EU) announ

proposal to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Partne

(EMP). According to this proposal, the EMP was di

towards “support for establishing a zone of stabilit

security and creating conditions for lasting and sustai

rapid economic development in the Mediterra

countries.” The proposal reiterated two main dimensi

the Partnership, namely, establishing a E

Mediterranean Zone of Political Stability and Securit

establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area

objective was to establish a free trade area 

manufactured products between the EU an

Mediterranean countries, preferential and reciprocal a

for agricultural products, and a free trade area a

Mediterranean countries themselves. “The 

Mediterranean free trade zone would constitute the b

free trade area in the world covering 600-800 million p

in some 30-40 countries.” The EU Proposal also pro

financial support of Ecu 5.5bn for the period 1995-99 t

Mediterranean nonmember states to realize 

objectives. It also called for a Euro-Mediterra

conference.

The projected Euro-Mediterranean minist

conference was held on November 27-28, 199

Barcelona, Spain. The conference attendees witn

heated debates between the EU and nonme

Mediterranean countries’ representatives on the ele

143
the conference, the Barcelona Declaration, reflected 

large extent the European viewpoint, as far as the nat

peace and stability and the free trade area that w

established by the year 2010.

The EU drafted a model “association agreement

the southern Mediterranean countries as the starting 

of the partnership negotiations. Negotiations have 

conducted separately between the EU and wou

Mediterranean partners. So far, they have result

partnership agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, Jo

and Israel. Negotiations are under way between the E

Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.

Each of the Mediterranean partners was handed a 

draft agreement, and negotiations evolved around 

draft. The final agreements were more or less modific

of the draft agreements. The draft agreements and th

agreements contained seven main items, namely:

Political Dialogue. The establishment of a re

political dialogue, between Egypt and the EU, that 

cover all issues of common interest, and would be h

regular intervals and whenever necessary at minis

and senior official levels and through all diplo

channels.

Free Movement of Goods. The establishment of 

trade area over a transitional period lasting a maxim

12 years starting from the date of entry into force 

agreement. Custom duties on industrial products exp

by the EU to Mediterranean countries wou

progressively abolished, but industrial products origin

in these countries would be imported into the EU f

customs duties and charges as soon as the agreemen

finalized without quantitative restrictions or mea

Agricultural and fishery exports of each party wou

allowed access to the other party’s markets free of cu

duties within a pre-set quota and in specific seasons.

144
the right of establishment of one party’s firms o

territory of the other and the liberalization of the pro

of services by one party’s firms to consumers of service 

other.

Competition and Other Economic Provisions

elimination of all agreements and practices that rest

distort competition. However, certain concessions 

given to Mediterranean countries for a limited time p

such as the right to continue state aid to their firm

such aid would be limited to what was necessary in or

maintain and restore the viability of firms. Furthe

parties shall provide suitable and effective protect

intellectual and commercial property rights in line wi

highest international standards. The parties w

promote the use by Mediterranean countries of the 

technical rules and European standards for industria

agricultural products and certification procedures

would also conclude agreements for the mutual recog

of certifications. The EU would also assist in are

activity suffering the effects of internal constraint

difficulties or affected by the process of liberalizi

economy and foreign trade.

Cooperation in the Areas of Education and Tra

Science and Technology, and Environment . S

emphasis was put on industrial cooperation with a v

modernizing and restructuring the industrial s

including the agri-food industry in Mediterra

countries. The draft agreements and final agreement

referred to the promotion and protection of invest

cooperation in standardization and conformity assess

financial services, agriculture and fisheries, tran

telecommunications and information technology, en

tourism and cooperation in customs matters, stat

combating money laundering, and drug use and traffic

Cooperation in Social and Cultural Matters. 

included reciprocal treatment of the workers of each 

145
Mediterranean countries will also enter a dialogue o

social matters that are of interest to them such as mig

and the conditions of migrant workers, the promotion 

role of woman, family planning, the promotion of h

rights, and cooperation in the area of strengthening m

understanding.

Financial Cooperation. This would include fin

support by the EU to facilitate reforms aim

modernizing the economy, updating economic 

structure, promoting private investment and job cre

activities, and alleviating the effects on the Mediterra

economies of the progressive introduction of the free 

area.

1

Arab countries reacted differently to the EU pro

Within each country there were also different reacti

various political and economic groups. Such reaction

have long-term implications for the viability of the proj

EMP. The objective of this essay is to review the perce

of Arab countries to the projected EMP; and to asse

policy implications of these perceptions to proj

partnership.

Perceptions of the Need to Establish the EMP.

Arab governments acknowledged the need to re

positively to the European proposal. Egypt’s o

response to the projected partnership was positive

response was clearly articulated in the public debat

was initiated after the Barcelona conference and in 

statements and documents of the Egyptian Fo

Ministry. A concept paper circulated by the foreign mi

endorsing the EMP argued that the European pro

must strive to create a Euro-Mediterranean economi

that would enhance the position of the partners in thi

within the international economic system, achieve p

stability, and security in the Mediterranean, and prom

dialogue among Mediterranean civilizations. It adde

146
thereby reflecting the diverse interests o

Mediterranean countries. It should not conflict with 

commitments of the partners.

Egypt’s Foreign and Industry Ministries were the 

outspoken advocates of the Egyptian-Euro

Partnership (EEP). They defended the agreement m

on grounds of market expansion, job creation, and incr

foreign investment. Egyptian manufactured pro

would get free access to the huge European market

would lead to industry expansion and the generation 

opportunities. Foreign investors would also be temp

manufacture in Egypt in order to benefit from the cu

duty-free European market. According to Egypt’s 

negotiator with the EU,

the EEP conformed with the goal of Egyptian econom

development. It would generate more job opportunities, a

open a huge market of U.S. $800 million to Egyptian expor

Through the EEP, Egypt would be granted U.S. $2 billion a

loaned another U.S. $2 billion to develop industry, educati

training, and scientific research within the next 3 years. T

EEP provides Egypt with privileges such as the progress

reduction of customs duties over 12 years.

2

Ibrahim Fawzy, Minister of Industry in 1995

almost deterministic in presenting the case of EEP 

Egyptian business community. He contended tha

post-Cold War era was the era of grand economic 

Egypt was a small country, and, as a result, it had to 

large bloc or it would risk marginalization. Consequ

the EEP was “a compulsory option.” The EU was not 

control the Egyptian Market because Egypt’s i

potential was limited. The EU’s goal, according t

Fawzy, was to “develop Egypt” and to “create an eco

bloc to confront the American bloc and the East Asian 

Egypt would also gain access to the huge European m

and that would generate 1.4 million job opportu

annually. That the projected agreement did not includ

freedom of labor movement into its provisions was 

147
from Egypt to Europe. The choice for Egypt, he added

not the United States or East Asia, it was the Eur

Union.

3

The projected EMP was also viewed as compleme

the Mediterranean Forum (MF) that Egypt had lo

heavily to establish in 1994. The Egyptians argued th

MF, which is a purely Mediterranean framework, 

serve to regulate cooperation between the Mediterra

countries that are members in the EMP. Both institu

could mutually reinforce each other.

The Tunisian government perceived the EM

urgently needed to ensure better utilization of reso

achieving co-development in the Mediterranean

securing the process of democratic transforma

Ben-Yehia, Tunisia’s Foreign Minister, argued i

address at the Forum of the Constitutional Demo

Party in November 1995 that the EMP “provide

Mediterranean with a historic opportunity that 

enable the area to formulate a comprehensive strate

development.”

Despite their serious misgivings about the EM

Syrians joined the EMP negotiations in 1997, arguin

it could bring about certain gains. The Libyans, too

clearly expressed their desire to join the EMP.

4

How do we account for the Arab endorsement of the 

idea of the EMP despite their major reservations (whic

be outlined at a later section)? Arab desire to join the E

an outcome of Arab tremendous economic linkages wi

EU. The EU is the major trade partner for all 

Mediterranean countries. It is also a major don

economic aid and technology. The Arabs fear that 

interests will be jeopardized if they do not join. Furthe

Arabs perceive the EMP as a mechanism to counterba

American economic hegemony in the Middle East. 

would like to see a more active European role in the M

East as Europe is perceived to be less biased towards 

148
through negotiations they will be able to persuade the 

give them more concessions than have been already o

in the draft association agreements.

Arab Perceptions of the Scope of the EMP and 

Impact on Arab Regional Cooperation.

In 1992, European countries suspended all for

multilateral cooperation in which Libya was involved

rationale for the decision was that such cooperation 

only be resumed after Libya hands over two Li

suspected of being involved in the downing of an Ame

airliner. In this context, the 5+5 formula was suspe

and Libya was not invited to participate in the negoti

to build an EMP. Although Arab countries b

negotiations without Libya, most of them contended 

Libya should be brought into the Euro-Med pr

including the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the Mor

Prime Minister.

5

 However, they did not specify wheth

should occur immediately or after the resolution 

Libyan-Western crisis. Arab interest in bringing Liby

the EMP stems from a major concern over its pot

negative impact on inter-Arab regional cooperation.

There is also a concern that the EMP will estab

system of vertical cooperation between each Arab co

and Europe, thereby jeopardizing horizontal 

cooperation, especially the prospects of establishin

Arab free trade area. In response to this concern, the 

Arab governments participating in the EMP, in addit

Libya and Mauritania, launched a system of re

consultations to benefit from the experience of the EM

promoting inter-Arab economic cooperation. The 

meeting of this group was held in Cairo, Egypt, in July 

149
of the EMP.

Of all the dimensions of the EMP, the economic 

were the most severely and widely criticized by the A

This is understandable, given the expected strong imp

the EMP on Arab economic security.

The issue of the Arab agricultural exports to the E

the major stumbling block in the ongoing negotiatio

the case of Egypt, whereas the draft agreement exem

European industrial exports to Egypt from all Egy

tariff and nontariff barriers, it put restrictions on E

agricultural exports to the EU. The EU offered li

increases in the quotas of Egyptian agricultural ex

extensions of the importation seasons, and granted 

agricultural products entry to the EU market

Egyptians rejected this offer. They argued tha

association agreement must maintain a balance be

the liberalization of industrial trade and agricultural 

Each party was entitled to benefit from the areas in w

enjoyed a relative advantage. The liberalization of E

agricultural trade with the EU would not hurt Eur

agriculture as such trade represented a small fraction 

EU’s total agricultural production and import

Further, Egypt was a net importer of European agricu

goods. The EU’s agricultural exports to Egypt were a

five times Egypt’s agricultural exports to the EU. Acco

to the 1995 statistics, Egypt’s agricultural exports to t

were U.S. $154 million, and its total exports from th

were U.S. $840 million. The association agreement h

address this trade imbalance if the philosophy o

association were to be based upon the econ

development of Egypt and reciprocal commitments

strategy of the 1977 Egyptian-European protoco

restricted Egyptian agricultural exports to the EU w

longer a viable one, not only because of the new assoc

philosophy, but also because of Egypt’s growing expor

potential and the centrality of the agricultural sector 

economy. Almost 56 percent of the Egyptians dep

150
economies, the Egyptian economy is the most depe

upon agriculture; that called for a different strategy 

the one applied to Tunisia, Morocco, or Israel, cou

which had already signed association agreements wi

EU.6

During the negotiations, Egypt offered the EU 

alternatives: (1) full liberalization of agricultura

industrial trade; (2) de facto liberalization of Egy

agricultural exports by exempting more agricu

exports from customs duties and increasing the quota

exportation seasons, so the value of Egypt’s agricu

exports would reach U.S. $1.5 billion; (3) th

liberalization of the exportation of certain Egy

agricultural exports without quotas; and, (4) any oth

alternative that would create a balance in Egyp

agricultural trade.

7

 The Egyptians also demande

removal of unjustified nontariff barriers such a

designation of specific ports for the entry of Egy

agricultural products and the exaggerated sa

quantities required for laboratory testing.

The term “Four Ghosts” referred to four items 

projected association agreement that had genera

public controversy within the Egyptian bus

community concerning their potential impact o

country’s economy. These items were related to Stan

and Specifications, Rules of Origin, Intellectual Pro

Rights, and Competition Policy. Egyptian busines

argued that these items would act as nontariff ba

hindering the flow of Egypt’s exports to the EU. E

chief negotiator for the agreement, Ambassador G

Bayoumi, introduced the term, “the Four Ghosts” 

agreement, to describe these items. In his judg

business apprehensions about these items were not t

justified. According to him, these items were like g

Once subjected to the light of day, they would disapp

151
proposed to approximate the European rules gove

them and to achieve mutual recognition of certif

within this field. Egyptian exporters would have to co

to the EU norms and specifications that were tailored 

needs and tastes of European consumers. Egyptian ex

would find it difficult to adapt to these rules in 12 

According to Farid Khamis, the head of the Egy

Industries Union, it took Europe 200 years to reach 

standards, and it was not fair to force Egypt to confo

them in 12 years.

The second item is the Rules of Origin. The EU pro

a Unified Protocol on this item to all its Mediterr

partners, to be annexed to each agreement. The critics 

proposed agreement argued that the Unified Protocol w

impose a ceiling on the value of the nonorigin

materials as a percentage of the total cost of the 

product. This was in contradiction with the Uruguay R

Agreements that required a minimum local added 

According to the EU proposed formula, as the total c

the final product diminishes, the value o

nonoriginating materials should also diminish. As 

had a relative advantage in the area of the cost of 

which means lower final cost, Egypt can only use a li

amount of nonoriginating materials. Khamis argued 

this was a nontariff barrier imposed by the EU and 

result in the destruction of Egyptian industries. How

Bayoumi pointed out the principle of multilatera

bilateral cumulation in the agreement as a major adva

to Egyptian economy. Such principle would pro

regional cooperation.

In the field of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs

EU asked Egypt to accede to seven international tr

relating to IPRs. Egypt was already a member of th

these treaties. IPRs would be applied 3 years afte

finalization of the agreement. Under the Uruguay R

agreements, Egypt enjoyed a 5-year grace period, ext

to 10 years in the case of the pharmaceutical ind

152
have a positive effect on the flow of foreign d

investments to Egypt, others contended they w

constrain Egypt’s ability to use modern technolog

would negatively influence the pharmaceutical ind

and the availability of medicine at reasonable prices.

The fourth “ghost” was the rules governing compe

The EU proposed that its rules of competition shou

used as a reference point, arguing that the harmoniza

competition legislation was vital for the smooth funct

of economic relations between both sides. This app

would require Egyptian businessmen, in the case o

future trade dispute concerning rules of competiti

resort to European and international law firms with

territories of the EU, which would entail high costs.

The EMP was subjected to severe criticisms by 

professional and businessmen associations. Perhap

most crucial of these criticisms were the following:

• The flawed philosophy of the EMP. The EMP ev

around the notion of trade liberalization. Hist

experience testifies that such a notion di

necessarily result in economic development

experience of the East Asian tigers pointed ou

they achieved development not because they o

their markets to imported industrial product

because they had not pursued that strategy.

• No new concessions were given. The EMP did no

Arab nations any more major concessions than 

provided under the present Euro-Arab Protocols

as the 1977 Euro-Egyptian and Euro-Syrian pro

and those under the 1994 Uruguay R

agreements. 

• Erosion of Arab industries. Critics of the agree

contended that providing European indu

products with full access to the Arab market w

153
production. Arab industries would not be a

compete with European ones, even afte

transitional period that was viewed as insuffici

restructure Egyptian industries.

8

 Nabil Al-Gaj

representative of the Syrian private sector i

Euro-Syrian negotiations, argued that S

industries will be destroyed, and that the S

treasury will lose U.S. $220 million annually 

result of the loss of customs duties.

9

• Social instability. The critics argued tha

destruction of Arab industries resulting from 

EMP would lead to the loss of job opportunitie

integration into the European economy woul

result in rising social expectations withou

economic development. All of this would le

various forms of social instabilities and disloca

• Insufficient European aid. Although the amo

economic aid promised to the Mediterra

countries was the largest in the history o

Mediterranean relations, the critics contended 

such aid, if compared with what has been promi

Eastern Europe, was insufficient. EU pro

Eastern European countries, whose total popu

was 96 million, aid of U.S. $8.8 billion. But it o

the Mediterranean countries, whose total popu

was 203 million, only U.S. $6 billion. If one recall

the Mediterranean countries are less developed 

their Eastern European counterparts, one 

comprehend the limited aid promised unde

EMP.

10

Arab Perceptions of the Politico-Security Aspe

of the EMP.

Although Arab countries accepted the major prin

of the political dialogue suggested by the EU, they crit

154
process in the Middle East. They argued that the 

would entail a Mediterranean economic reg

cooperation that would include Israel. Such cooperatio

not likely to materialize without an agreement on the 

political elements of the future relationships betwee

Arabs and the Israelis.

11 They contended that, witho

Madrid peace process, the Barcelona agreements w

have never materialized. Consequently, no progress o

Barcelona formula would be possible witho

corresponding progress on the Madrid formula. Barc

was organically linked with Madrid. As it became clea

the Netanyahu Israeli government was determin

destroy the Madrid process, the Arabs expressed 

misgivings in the second ministerial meeting of the 

held in Malta in 1997, on the future of the EMP

participants failed to agree on the basic principle

politico-security charter because the Europeans 

reluctant to deal with Arab concerns over the I

occupation of Arab territories.

Further, the Arabs resented the reluctance of the 

discuss the issue of the presence of nuclear weapons 

Middle East. Although the Barcelona Declaration re

to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction (W

from the Middle East, it tended to focus on chemica

biological weapons, leaving the Israeli nuclear ar

untouched.

In fact, there is a strong feeling among the Arabs th

EU is giving Israel preferential political and eco

treatment that it is not willing to extend to the Arabs

was clearly spelled out by Egypt’s Foreign Minister 

Moussa in his address at the Euro-Egyptian Coope

Council in October 1996.

Finally, the establishment by four EU countries 

European Force (EUROFOR) and European Mar

Force (EUROMARFOR) added to Arab apprehen

about Europe’s real objectives. The European countri

155
ruled out the use of force if it is necessary to a

European goals.

Conclusion.

Although Arab countries have accepted the princ

establishing an EMP, they have expressed s

misgivings about its likely impact on their economie

the structure of the peace process in the Middle Eas

arguments in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco seem 

the same. Arab industries would be destroyed, and E

is a reluctant partner in the Middle East peace process

result, as long as the EU insists on its unidirec

approach, the Arabs will be ambivalent partners 

Barcelona process. This is evident in the case of Tunisi

Morocco. Although the two countries have s

partnership agreements with the EU, they are now h

second thoughts about the viability of this process. In 

there is a deep concern about the potential impact 

EMP on Egyptian agriculture. Further, the unil

military actions of some EU countries in the Mediterra

will only serve to reinforce Arab suspicions.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. For a review of the main provisions of the association agre

by a Tunisian scholar, see al-shazly al-Ayary, “The Ba

Declaration Under the Light of the Euro-Tunisian Asso

Agreement,” Arab Economic Journal, Vol. 5, Spring 1996, pp. 5

2. These views were articulated by Ambassador Gamal Bayo

Al-Ahram (Cairo), April 28, 1995, and October 23, 1995.

3. Statements by Ibrahim Fawzy, then Minister of In

Al-Ahram, October 13, 1995.

4. Statements of the Syrian and Libyan representatives 

Arab-Euro meeting in Cairo, Al-Ahram, July 27, 1998.

5. Foreign Ministry, Arab Republic of Egypt, “Concept Pa

Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation,” and 

156
1998.

6. Statements by Saad Nassar, member of the Egyptian del

to the Euro-Egyptian partnership negotiations, Al-Ahram, Octo

1995, December 16, 1995, April 16, 1996, April 27, 1996, and J

1996.

7. Foreign Ministry of Egypt, 1996.

8. These criticisms were articulated by manufacturers of c

home appliances. Car manufacturers pleaded for the inclusio

item that would oblige their European counterparts to impor

percent of the components of their cars from Egypt if it w

exported to Egypt. Al-Ahram, April 14, 1998.

9. Quoted in al-Ra’y Al-Am (Kuwait), February 13, 1998.

10. For a full review of these criticisms by a Libyan scholar

al-Hussaini, “The European Union and the Future of Arab 

Trade,” Arab Economic Journal, Spring 1998, pp. 31-65.

11. Interview with the ambassador of Egypt to the EU, Al-

July 25, 1996.

157
THE SECURITY CHALLENGE IN KOSOV

TOWARD A REGION-STABILIZING SOLUT

Steven L. Burg

Introduction.

The current violence in Kosovo has already draw

United States and its NATO partners to the bri

another military intervention in the Balkans. Interve

in Bosnia, however, has demonstrated the difficu

resolving such conflicts by force alone, as well a

difficulty of extricating oneself from involvement 

troops have been deployed. Despite the app

irreconcilability of the three sides in the K

conflict—the Milosevic leadership in Belgrade

Albanian leadership in Kosovo clustered around Ib

Rugova, and the Kosovo Liberation Army waging an a

struggle against Serbia—there may yet be a way to r

the conflict short of military intervention. To do so, how

will require the discovery of innovative political soluti

the clash between the claims of an ethnic group to na

self-determination, and the claims of a state to preser

territorial integrity. This is the conflict of comp

principles that underlies many such ethno-reg

conflicts, and the solution adopted in Kosovo may 

determine the course of similar conflicts elsewhere 

Balkans; most immediately, of course, in neighb

Macedonia, where a large Albanian minority with clos

to Kosovo is waging its own struggle for gr

recognition.

1

There is no way to reconcile the competing 

conflicting claims of the Serbs and Albanians to histor

political “ownership” of Kosovo. Any explicit effort to c

between these claims must result in failure. Inste

159
between Belgrade and Kosovo without shutting of

future options, so as to permit the negotiation 

longer-term solution. The process of resolving the co

must first provide an interim agreement that immed

alleviates the present state of repression in Kosov

begins restoring both Kosovo and Yugoslavia to “no

social, political, and especially economic activity. It s

contribute in the medium-term to weakening the 

bases of support for violence among both Kosovar Alba

and Serbs, and open possibilities for democ

development in Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia, w

which no longer-term solution is possible. In

arrangements should give way quickly to transi

arrangements that create pathways to a lasting nego

resolution of the conflict. Neither the interim agreeme

the transitional arrangements should preclude eithe

from pursuing its long-term goals through conti

peaceful negotiations.

The scholarly literature on ethnic conflict focus

three main strategies for managing conflict: integr

power-sharing, and partition.

2

 Four European exam

the application of one or more of these approaches 

solution of ethno-regional conflict are sometimes cit

potential “models” for the solution of the conflict in K

the power-sharing approach adopted in Belgium

cultural and territorial autonomy strategy adopted 

South Tyrol/Alto Adige region of Italy,

4

 the par

strategy adopted in the Jura region of Switzerland,

5

 a

autonomous communities/devolution strategy adopt

response to ethno-regionalisms in Spain.

6

 These m

have drawn the attention of Western scholars and 

Serbian analysts.

7

 Developments in Spain, in parti

are now the object of intensive scrutiny sponsored b

Belgrade regime.

8

 Kosovar Albanian writers, in con

have focused in their public discourse almost exclusiv

arguments denying Serbian claims to rule over Kosov

advancing Kosovar claims to outright independence f

160
Northern Ireland, which incorporates elemen

power-sharing, may now also draw the attenti

Westerners or Serbs interested in solving the cri

Kosovo. But none of these conflicts was/is di

equivalent to the conditions present in Kosovo, and n

these solutions can be applied wholesale to the K

conflict. Rather, selected elements of these examples 

successful management of ethno-regional conflict m

adapted to the particular, and difficult conditions in Ko

Constraints.

A solution to the conflict in Kosovo must take 

account certain constitutional, political, economic

regional parameters, which are themselves in some 

contradictory. Constitutionally, Kosovo is a region w

Serbia, which is itself a republic of the federat

Yugoslavia. This is the status presently recognize

supported by the international community as part 

efforts to underscore the inviolability of borders i

region. This simple fact distinguishes the conflict in K

from that in Bosnia-Herzegovina and complicat

solution. It is also the status on which the Se

leadership insists, and on which the Serbs base 

opposition to international third party involvement in 

they define as an “internal” matter. Yet, the refu

recognize or accept this status is at the heart o

nationalist resistance movement among the ethn

Albanian Kosovars. The Kosovar Albanians argue th

constitutional/international legitimacy of this status c

to exist when the former Yugoslavia ceased to exist. Ko

leaders further argue that the persistent patte

repression and abuse carried out by the present Se

regime negates any claim it might have to rule over K

The apparent deadlock between Serb and Alb

positions is, in many ways, similar to the deadlock be

Republican and Unionist positions in Northern Ir

prior to negotiations. Kosovar leaders, however, ins

161
than demanding immediate integration with the Alb

state across the border—although many Kosovars o

advocate integration of all Albanian populated terri

into a “greater Albania.”

No formula that retains the existing constitu

status of the province—or simply returns to the stat

prior to 1988—will be acceptable to the Kosovars. Inde

Kosovar political leadership can afford to accept s

formula in the face of the armed opposition of the K

Liberation Army (UCK), which has demonstrate

readiness to assassinate individuals it deems to 

betrayed its nationalist-separatist goals. Hence

solution to the Kosovo conflict must reconcil

contradictory—indeed, seemingly irreconcilable—Ser

Albanian positions by finding some formulation 

addresses both the demand for independence an

demand to uphold territorial integrity, and thereby 

both the moderate Kosovar Albanian leadership an

Serbian supporters of compromise some basis for mobi

their respective constituencies in support of a settlem

Politically, a compromise settlement must also tak

account the fact that Serbian leaders and 

Serbs—including intellectuals otherwise inclined to

“liberal” positions on the national issue—fea

consequences of Albanian participation in Serbian, o

Yugoslav politics.10 For the local Serbs of Kosovo, the r

of the Albanians to formal political participation rais

threat that the Serbs of Kosovo might be reduced 

oppressed minority—a fear magnified by the prospec

Kosovo might become independent. For Milosevi

return of Albanian voters, and the representation 

participation of a self-governing Kosovo entity i

federation raises the prospect of a weakening of his h

power—both locally, in Kosovo, and on the level 

federation. At the same time, however, the Ko

Albanians refuse to participate in either Serbi

Yugoslav politics, for they view such participati

162
status to which they object. They view participati

undermining their claim to full independence as th

acceptable expression of their right to self-determin

For the Kosovars to accept a settlement, therefore, it 

hold out at least the possibility—if not 

inevitability—that further negotiations would res

independence.

11

 This is an inevitability that some Se

intellectuals already accept—they are concerned n

much with preventing independence for Kosovo (or 

part of it) as with preventing independence for Kosovo 

becoming a precedent for the further disintegrat

Serbia.

12

 This perspective opens the possibility of ach

an interim solution that affirms territorial integrit

leaves the door open to later separation, as doe

Northern Ireland agreement.

Thus, while Serbian leaders refuse to recognize Ko

claims to independence, they do not wish to se

Albanians re-enter Serbian and Yugoslav political lif

Serbian leadership (Milosevic) would be content to allo

Albanian refusal to participate in Serbian or Yug

institutions to go on indefinitely. Indeed, for many S

the prospect that Kosovar Albanians might have infl

over internal Serbian matters, as they did unde

provisions of the 1974 Yugoslav and Serbian constitu

is unacceptable. Hence, any solution to the Kosovo co

that attempts to uphold the territorial integrity of S

and Yugoslavia—as may be required by the reg

constraints noted below—must include some fo

participation in a common state. But, it must also allo

Serb and Albanian communities each to avoid the influ

or perceived domination, of the other at either the lo

federal levels. Such contradictory arrangement

characteristic of the power-sharing approach as adop

Belgium, and of the autonomy/devolution strategy ad

in Spain.

Some Serbs assign special emotional significan

Kosovo because of the importance of the region i

163
often couched in terms of Kosovo as the “Jerusalem” 

Serbs.13 However, Albanian analysts sometimes 

similar arguments about Kosovo, centered on the hist

importance of events in Prizren for the formation 

modern Albanian nation.

14

 Other Serbs outside of K

focus their concerns on the fate of the many importan

cultural institutions and monuments in Kosovo, such 

monasteries of Pec, Decani, and Gracanica, rather th

the region as a whole. Any settlement of the conflic

Kosovo will have to address at least these specific con

in an effort to defuse the larger emotional issue amon

Serbs. Yet it will have to do so in a manner that do

devalue or neglect the cultural and historical institut

the Albanians.

Opposition to any settlement can be expected to be 

within some constituencies in Serbia. For nation

extremist Serbs who win election to the Serbian/Yug

parliament from Kosovo, the return of Albanian vot

the Serbian and Yugoslav electorate will eliminate 

sinecures and, perhaps, reduce their numbe

parliament. Some Serbian analysts suggest that Serb

emigrated from Kosovo might become a base for po

opposition to such a settlement and to any Se

politician who agreed to it. It is therefore essential tha

settlement be accompanied by the delivery of co

benefits to Serbia that can be used to mobilize su

among the general population. Nor can a settlement 

the continued impoverishment of the Kosovo popul

Economic assistance to the province will be requir

create support within the Kosovar population for a pe

approach, and draw support away from the UCK. Exte

economic authority over the region will have to shift 

Belgrade to Pristina. But the Serbs are unlikely to sig

such agreement unless it offers parallel benef

Serbia/Yugoslavia. While assistance to Kosovo will 

likely require the allocation of even more resources th

presently being committed through the U.S. Agen

164
agencies, economic benefits can be delivered to Serbia 

easily by matching Serbian implementation of 

agreement with the lifting of economic and other sanc

on a carefully linked basis.

Finally, a solution to the Kosovo conflict mu

constructed with certain regional constraints in mind

most immediate of these are the probable consequenc

settlement in Kosovo for Albanian-Macedonian relati

Macedonia. The large and restive ethnic Alba

population in Macedonia is territorially concentrat

provinces along the borders with Kosovo and Albania, 

closely linked to both Kosovo and Albania through per

familial, and political ties. Although political views a

the Albanians of Macedonia are diverse, there are s

popular sentiments and political support for ethno-re

autonomy, or even outright independence. The UC

claimed responsibility for isolated bombings carried 

Macedonia, and may be active in the country. The fo

adopted in Kosovo must therefore underscore the terr

integrity of Yugoslavia and, perhaps, even Serbia, if it 

to lead almost immediately to the disintegrati

Macedonia. Similarly, nationalist Serbs in B

(Republika Srpska) will scrutinize any settlement in K

to find a basis for legitimating their own clai

independence on the basis of self-determination, a

some Montenegrins, Muslims in the Sandzak

Hungarians in Vojvodina. For a solution in Kosovo to 

escalating conflicts in these neighboring regions, it 

provide clearly for the territorial integrity of the ex

state (Serbia and Yugoslavia) within the limits impos

the need to accommodate Kosovar Albanian demands

an approach does not, it should be made clear, cons

“rewarding Serbia.” Indeed, if elements of the settle

contribute to democratization in Serbia, then it will pr

additional pressure for change in the current regime

165
The clash between ethno-regional demand

autonomy or independence and the claims of an ex

state to sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well 

presence of an armed movement carrying out violent a

against state authority, was/is common to most of the 

European cases of ethno-regionalism cited above

Basque ETA and the Irish Republic Army (IRA) p

close parallels to the Kosovar UCK. The intensity 

conflict in Kosovo has already reached levels equal 

more deadly than the worst period of “troubles” in Nor

Ireland. In South Tyrol and the Jura, in contrast, vio

was more limited and, in the Jura, of more limited dur

In Belgium, and in the Catalan region of Spain, ther

little or no violence associated with claims to self-rule

even in the cases of violent conflict, peaceful settle

were reached. The ethno-regional conflicts in Bel

Spain, Switzerland, and Italy all have been resolve

institutionalized, and the conflict in Northern Irelan

appears headed toward the institutionalization 

peaceful settlement. These successes may be attributa

factors and conditions that are not—as yet—prese

Kosovo. One of the challenges in forging a settlem

Kosovo, therefore, is to induce conflict-resolving beh

in the conflicting parties in the absence of these facto

All five European ethno-regional conflicts were res

in the context of democratic states, although the confl

Spain each involved a centuries-long history of c

periphery tensions, and a decades-long history of cu

repression under the fascist authoritarian regime 

preceded democracy. The autonomy/devolution str

adopted in Spain was an essential element of the tran

to democracy itself. Democratization and devol

autonomy were mutually-reinforcing processes in S

Nevertheless, the negotiations of regional auto

agreements were long and contentious processes, in 

central institutions proved resistant to relinquishing 

166
autonomy did not immediately end the violence i

Basque lands. Indeed, ETA violence, and especially th

of the military in a counterinsurgency role, endanger

only democracy, but devolution as well. Violence 

Basque lands ended only when the successful develop

of the autonomous ethno-regional community wit

democratic Spain, and the deepening of a demo

political culture, undermined the popular legitimacy o

demands and methods. The support of the Eur

Community for democratization, and especially the pr

of membership contingent on democratization w

important factor contributing to success in the Sp

case. Both Basque and Catalan nationalists—

ethno-regional leaders in Belgium—recognized tha

Spanish state provided a path, or gateway to members

the European Community, which they highly value

which was not otherwise available to them.

Successful resolution of the conflict in Northern Ir

has taken place in the context of two well-institution

democratic states—the United Kingdom and the Repu

Ireland—that exercised enormous influence ove

conflicting parties. The convergence of interests be

these two states in ending the violence and achiev

peaceful settlement, and their commitment to demo

principles of governance that enjoy widespread legit

in the population of Northern Ireland itself, pushe

conflict toward settlement. Similarly, the South 

conflict was settled in large part through negoti

between democratic states—that is, between the 

within whose territory the conflict was taking place (

and the neighboring state with which the local mi

identified, or at least shared an ethnic identity (Au

The commitment of the external, “homeland” sta

European Community, in the case of Spain) to demo

processes, and especially its rejection of the v

alternative, eliminated an important basis of resista

negotiated settlement on the part of the nation

167
Basque, Tyrolian, and Northern Ireland cases demons

violence in the form of terrorist acts often continues to 

even after a conflict is well on the road to solution. Se

arrangements that address this problem, and whic

acceptable to both sides, are therefore essential eleme

a negotiated solution to such conflicts.

The democratic context, and especially the streng

democratic political culture, was an especially impo

factor in Belgium, and Switzerland as well. In these 

the inclination and institutional mechanisms to r

conflicts through compromise were already 

established. The principle that all interests shou

represented and participate in decisionmaking proces

Belgium pre-dated the rise of ethno-regiona

Representation of ethno-regional identities and int

was thus introduced into the Belgian party system w

major upheaval in the 1960s. This facilitated the proc

constitutional change and the institutionalizat

ethno-regionalism in the 1970s. Paradoxically, a s

process of institutionalizing such cleavages in na

decisionmaking institutions and processes was unfold

the former Yugoslavia at the same time. But in the B

case, power-sharing facilitated an increasingly-com

dismantling of the common state through peaceful m

and creation of distinct, ethnically-defined, terri

entities with increasingly comprehensive indepe

decisionmaking authority. There is now little left 

Belgian state over which the territorial entities can a

other than the existence of the state itself. In the f

Yugoslavia, in contrast, power-sharing produced dea

which accelerated the descent into war. Although po

culture is difficult to quantify, there is little doubt th

inclination to democratic compromise in Belgium 

Switzerland is a critical factor in explaining succ

conflict resolution in these states, and that that inclin

cannot be established in Yugoslavia in the short-run, i

168
throughout the dismantling process. One was the cont

presence of a shared identity that overarche

ethno-regional identities. The second, and more impo

factor was the presence of interests and identities th

across the ethno-regions and provide the basis for com

political action in central decisionmaking institution

most important of these, of course, has been class ide

and the class interests and political agendas that cut a

the ethno-regions. The presence of common, cross-c

interests and identities led to preservation of the u

market and, therefore, the requisite common mon

financial, and other economic institutions and functi

the Belgian state. In Spain, too, the disintegrative eff

devolution and the creation of autonomous commu

were counterbalanced by strong economic interests 

linked Catalonia and the Basque lands to the rest of S

Perhaps the most important factor contributi

peacefulness in Belgium as well as Spain, howeve

been the strongly democratic character of the state, an

resultant high level of legitimacy of existing dec

making processes. Democratic legitimacy create

certainty that no single actor could or would at

unilaterally to override a decision arrived at th

established decisionmaking processes. In Belgium, 

factors contributed to moderating the expanding m

veto power enjoyed by each of the ethno-linguistic/re

groups, making compromise on the dismantling of com

state institutions and the devolution of state p

possible.

Power-sharing has led to a more complete dismant

the state in Belgium than in Spain. That disma

process is unlikely to go further because of the app

absence of any further economic or material gains 

made by the regional leaderships from eliminatin

common state entirely, the difficulty of resolving the s

of certain ethno-linguistic border regions (incl

Brussels), and the unpredictability of the consequen

169
the absence of such limiting factors, the features of p

sharing might very well have provided the institution

organizational foundations for successful partition 

Belgian state.

In the Swiss case, both the principle of loca

determination and the mechanism of territorial par

were recognized long before the political movement 

independent Jura intensified its efforts and a sep

group initiated violence. The path toward a pea

settlement was initiated when Bern cantonal autho

responded to separatist intransigence by open

reconsideration of the issue that did not exclud

outcome. Partition was carried out through a ser

changes to the Bern Canton constitution and referen

the regional (Jura), district, and local (commune) level

allowed local communities to express and—under ce

conditions—to act on their preferences, independen

the overall majority. (A referendum on the federal le

amend the Swiss constitution was the final step i

process.) As a result, the creation of the Jura canto

Bern divided into noncontiguous areas. Despite provo

by separatist extremists that included the use of vio

and the escalation of tensions that accompanied some 

referenda,

15

 the entire process of partition was carri

peacefully, and with due regard for the preferen

minority populations that constituted local majoritie

Thus, in all the cases cited above, the prior existe

well-established democratic political cultures o

presence of influential and democratic outside 

committed to peaceful settlement, or both, were impo

factors contributing to successful conflict resolutio

some cases, mechanisms for addressing demand

self-rule were already well-established, such as the p

sharing principles operating in Belgium and the prin

of partition and territorial self-rule operati

Switzerland, and these were applied to the conflict at 

In other cases, new arrangements were negotiated by 

170
Northern Ireland. In all cases, however, the proc

resolution—from immediate or interim settleme

eventual partition—was agreed in advance; that is, po

actors on both sides defined the “road map” for resolvi

conflict and then adhered to it. Willingness of Ko

Albanian and Serbian leaders to agree on such a road 

thus represents only the first step in the settlement pr

they must also adhere to it even in the face of in

opposition.

The pluralism of political actors in the regions 

critical element in the ability of regimes and regional 

to negotiate settlements in Belgium, Switzerland, S

Italy, and Northern Ireland. In each of the ethno-re

the nationalist-separatist or independence movement

especially the advocates of violence—faced pol

competition from other parties or movements interes

compromise, or even loyal to the larger state. In some 

the constituency of support for compromise and mode

was rooted in “immigrant” populations with strong 

the larger state. But economic interest—the economic 

local actors to the larger state and its market (or the 

European market accessible through that state)—pla

key moderating role in Belgium and in both Cataloni

the Basque lands of Spain. Thus, democratic cu

political pluralism, and cross-cutting economic 

therefore, political) interests, as well as supportive ex

actors, are important factors explaining successful ca

ethno-regional conflict resolution. Most of these cond

are not as yet present in Kosovo. However, while neith

neighboring “homeland” state (Albania) nor the ex

state (Yugoslavia/Serbia) is democratic or support

negotiating a solution, other external actors (includin

United States and the European Union) may be a

provide incentives to negotiate an interim settlemen

to assist in mobilizing popular support for an in

settlement once it is concluded. In order to increas

probability of a stable, long-term solution, an in

171
of pluralization and, eventually, democratization in 

Serbia and Kosovo. But one should have no illusions 

the difficulties of negotiating a long-term solution 

absence of genuine democracy in either Serbia or Kos

Mechanisms adopted for the management of e

regional conflicts in nondemocratic contexts share m

the characteristics of the settlements achiev

democratic contexts. In Russia, for example, the d

between Moscow and Tatarstan over sovereignty 

settled by the devolution of limited self-administ

authority to Tatarstan, which included sym

concessions to the statehood of the territory. Althoug

February 1994 treaty located most authority i

federation, it did give local government control over na

resources, housing and family law, and granted the ri

alternative military service to the local population

treaty assigned joint authority to the federation and 

republic governments in the administrati

transportation, social welfare (including health, cu

sport, and education and research), and police and se

services. Agreement between Tatarstan and Russia w

be sure, facilitated by two unique structural factors

the fact that Tatarstan is located wholly within Russia

no other international borders; and second, the 

proportion of ethnic Russians in the population an

important roles they play in the local economy. Russia 

no realistic security threat from the Tatarstan sovere

movement.

The situation in Chechnya offers a sharp contrast 

situation in Tatarstan. In Chechnya, the conflict be

Moscow and local nationalists/separatists was espe

violent, and Moscow realized that it could not achi

military solution to the conflict. It was this realizatio

led to agreements that de-escalated the armed co

through a withdrawal of Russian forces, stabilized 

government, and restored some degree of confiden

establishing joint Russian-Chechnyan administr

172
negotiation of a political settlement by freezing the sta

the region for 5 years. But they did not prov

long-lasting solution. In both Tatarstan and Chec

de-escalation of the conflict involved significant conce

by the center to local self-administration and, in the c

Chechnya, opened opportunities to negotiate 

extensive local autonomy.

Once regional conflict in a nondemocratic context 

violent, however, there is a tendency for it to b

prolonged, and to be resolved by force. The conflict 

Sudan between the Muslim government and secess

Christian forces in the south remains unresolved even 

15 years of conflict. In Ethiopia, the Eritrean secess

movement succeeded only after a 30-year armed str

that ended with a military victory over the governmen

cost 500,000 lives. In Sri Lanka, it was the governmen

eventually achieved a costly military victory over 

separatists after 15 years of fighting. But even wher

side or the other has achieved a military victory, vi

has reemerged, fueled by the lack of a political resolut

the ethno-cultural and political issues at the foundat

the conflict. Thus, a political agreement betwee

conflicting parties that resolves these issues (or at 

provides mechanisms for reducing frictions over 

seems essential to a stable settlement. Indeed, the fa

of intervention by outside forces to resolve the con

between the Kurds and Iraq, between Arme

secessionists in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azerbaid

government, and between the Sri Lankan governmen

secessionist Tamils, caution against becoming involv

any intervention in the absence of a prior po

agreement between the warring sides—even if 

agreement is imposed by outside pressures.

173
External Supports . Elements of the devoluti

strategies negotiated in democratic and nondemo

cases can be adapted to devise a settlement for Kosov

the clear absence of democratic political cultures on 

sides of the Kosovo conflict will require outside act

provide significant negative and positive incentives fo

side to accept norms of behavior consistent with a pe

settlement. Salient external actors must establish 

limits on the aspirations or expectations of local a

They must promise and deliver rewards for complianc

these limits, as well as imposing costs on those who v

them. The ethnic “homeland” state—Albania—mus

only support a peaceful settlement, but it must ac

reject the violent alternative. While it may be unreaso

to expect any leadership of Albania publicly to oppo

UCK, that leadership can—with support from the U

States and Europe—exercise more effective control ov

border so as to reduce the flow of arms and other supp

the UCK. The leadership of Albania can also pr

important political support to a Kosovar leadership 

undertakes the task of negotiating a settlement. O

actors will also have to provide the negative and po

incentives necessary to persuade the “host” st

Serbia/Yugoslavia—to forego violence and repression 

solution and open the door to negotiating a solution w

excluding any outcome in advance; a commitment tha

have to be matched by the Kosovar Albanian leade

despite its apparent inability to control the UCK.

The Kosovar Albanian leadership is internally d

on the basis of both politics and personality. In the ab

of significant progress, the Kosovar Albanian leade

may quickly fall prey to the internal violence characte

of the Chechens—an outcome even more likely in light 

apparent absence of any linkages between political le

around Rugova or opposed to him and the armed UC

174
impossible, for the Kosovar Albanian leadership a

Rugova to enter into actual negotiations (as opposed to 

tentative “talks about talks”) as long as the present le

violence and repression continues.Certainly, no ne

tions can succeed as long as there is no improveme

conditions. Hence, significant steps must be tak

Serbia/Yugoslavia to normalize conditions in Koso

order to get meaningful negotiations underway. 

steps, beginning with the lifting of the state of emer

declared in 1989, would constitute confidence-bu

measures rather than a solution to the conflict. To tak

steps would, however, raise an immediate security dile

for Serbia/Yugoslavia: how will security be assured 

face of UCK violence?

In other cases of ethno-regional conflict that t

violent, such incidents continued to occur even afte

conflict moved toward settlement (as in the Ba

Tyrolian, Northern Ireland cases) or after an app

agreement or demilitarization had been rea

(Chechnya). The deployment of NATO forces to Alban

Macedonia to assist in securing the borders of K

against the infiltration of arms and guerrilla forces 

these states (and against the movement of armed gu

forces from Kosovo into Macedonia) can play an imp

role in preventing further escalation of the violence 

Kosovo, and thereby make it somewhat easier fo

Yugoslav government to de-escalate its own use of fo

the region. It can also help prevent spillover of the co

into neighboring countries. The deployment of NATO 

inside Kosovo to prevent such violence is not practica

NATO forces cannot be deployed under condition

would leave them defending a situation that might 

become defense of the status quo rather than pr

toward a settlement (the fate of the U.N. Protection 

(in Bosnia) or, even more problematic, the d

dismemberment of a state through armed interventio

act likely to arouse considerable opposition in the U

175
states vulnerable to internal ethnic conflict. Deploym

NATO forces inside Kosovo will produce a defacto pa

along the lines of deployment. If NATO troops are dep

in an effort to end the violence in the province, they 

very well face the task of suppressing UCK violen

NATO air campaign directed against Serbia and 

targets in Kosovo would almost certainly encourage 

violence. Short of a NATO intervention in support 

independent Kosovo, the Yugoslav leadership will ins

its right to defend the security and territorial integ

the state.

The right of a state to defend its security and integ

one that the Yugoslavs cannot be expected to give up

efforts to end the violence associated with 

ethno-regional conflicts suggest how the exercise o

right by the Yugoslavs can be subjected to scrutin

constraints. In the Basque lands, where a ter

organization remained actively opposed to an eme

settlement, the security issue was addressed th

creation of a joint Basque-Spanish security commiss

key element in the Khasavyurt accord ending the fight

Chechnya was the establishment of similar 

Russian-Chechnyan commissions. In Kosovo, the cre

of a joint security commission consisting of Yug

(federal) Serbian, Kosovar Albanian, and interna

actors might provide an equivalent solution.

Such an organization could provide effective verifi

of events, and oversee a rapid, phased reduction to “no

levels of the military and special police units i

province—or to levels consistent with the level of vio

that continues to be directed against the regime. It 

also begin the process of reforming civil police organiz

in the province. This commission could also ex

international monitoring of judicial and penal institu

in the province. The presence of international mo

would serve the interests of both the Yugoslav/Se

leadership (intent on retaining the ability to defend 

176
unfounded charges of repression) and the Ko

leadership (intent on defending its people against the 

force for repression and intimidation).

However, it is important to note that even in demo

Spain, use of the military in a counterinsurgency role n

derailed the regional autonomy approach. Coope

between the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian leadersh

not likely to be achieved if the extensive use of force ag

the Kosovo population is sustained for much longer

especially not if it escalates. But, in the almost certain 

of continued attacks by the UCK after the on

negotiations or implementation of an interim agree

the joint security commission will be faced wit

challenge of overseeing the legitimate use of force in K

Only the accession of the UCK to a cease-fire agree

can avoid this dilemma. In Northern Ireland, the 

participated in peace talks through its political party

Fein. The talks produced an agreement in principle o

necessity of decommissioning (disarmament) b

paramilitary organizations, to be overseen b

independent international commission. While di

ament has not yet taken place and is unlikely ever t

place, the agreement in principle contribut

establishing an atmosphere supportive of a cease-fi

Kosovo, however, no existing political party appears to 

such links to the UCK, and the UCK has not yet estab

a political party of its own. Any Kosovar Alb

leadership committed to negotiating a settlement 

conflict will therefore have to establish its influence, 

some degree of control, over the UCK if it is to mak

cease-fire agreement credible. This might be poss

Kosovar Albanian leaders could deliver both a reduct

Yugoslav security/military forces in Kosovo

international monitoring of the forces that remain. Bu

unlikely to happen if Western involvement appears 

too clearly at supporting independence for Kosovo.

177
commitment by the British government to “normaliza

security arrangements and practices” and “as early a r

as possible to normal security arrangements in Nor

Ireland, consistent with the level of threat and a pub

overall strategy.”

16

This formulation offers a po

solution to the dilemma of reconciling the Serbian/Yug

government’s insistence on the right to combat w

views as terrorism, and the Kosovar Albanian deman

violence against the civilian population be halted.

International Monitoring. The restoration 

expansion of international monitoring missio

Yugoslavia would be required in order to establish s

joint security commission. But no restorati

international monitoring missions is likely to take 

until Yugoslavia’s insistence on restoration 

membership in the Organization for Security 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is addressed. Henc

initial steps toward negotiations over the future sta

Kosovo will require a complex set of tradeoffs a

Kosovar, Serbian (Yugoslav), and international actor

Yugoslav leaders will have to accept the return of 

monitoring missions to their country, and a signi

expansion of the authority of OSCE monitors in Kos

enable them to participate effectively in a joint Ko

Serbian-Yugoslav-OSCE security commission. It is un

that nongovernment organizations could suppl

police/military expertise necessary to the success of s

commission. The OSCE-NATO relationship might p

the institutional means through which to furnish 

expertise, but without involving NATO as an organiz

on the ground inside Kosovo.

Kosovar leaders will have to accept “normalization

international monitoring instead of independence 

short-term outcome, as well as the right of the Yu

government to continue to carry out security oper

consistent with the level of threat, and conducted 

178
norms. Agreement on “normalization of sec

arrangements and practices” should include an explici

for the phased reduction of the number of Yugoslav se

and military forces in the region over time. Agreeme

“normalization” and international monitoring shou

accompanied by agreement between Serbian/Yug

leaders and Kosovar Albanian leaders to enter 

good-faith negotiation over the longer-term status 

province. Successful implementation of the normaliz

monitoring agreement and the onset of good

negotiations should be recognized by the interna

community as a sign of significant progress, and res

some improvement in the status of Yugoslavia i

international community.

“Joint Administration.” Initial negotiations s

therefore be focused at the outset on achiev

“normalization” of social and political conditions in K

paralleling the “normalization” of security arrangem

“Normalization” should not be understood as a solut

itself, but as a means of creating conditions under whi

compromises necessary to achieve a solution might be

possible. The “normalization” of social, economic

political conditions in the province will requi

immediate interim resolution of the ongoing di

between the Albanian Kosovar and Serbian leade

over the division of competencies between Serbia

Kosovar authorities, so as to permit public institution

as schools and health facilities to function normally.

The deployment of NATO forces to Albania 

Macedonia, a step that would strengthen the se

dimensions of this package, need not and should not b

of the interim agreement itself. But deployment sho

undertaken as a means of supporting the operation 

joint security commission described above, as w

strengthening NATO intervention capabilities.

179
The interim agreement outlined above consists 

largely of confidence-building measures. They d

constitute a solution to the conflict over control of Koso

order to provide a medium-term, or “transitional” so

to the constitutional issues surrounding Kosovo 

manner that does not destabilize the region, it w

necessary to grant substantial independence to the Ko

Albanians, but not necessarily to Kosovo. This disti

between territory and ethnic community lies at the he

the Belgian approach. It allows each ethno-linguistic 

to exercise the right of “self-determination” th

“self-administration” of those activities most di

related to ethno-linguistic cultural identity. 

self-administration of cultural affairs transcends, r

than replaces, territorial divisions. Thus, the Albania

Serbian “communities” of Kosovo could be gr

extensive powers of self-administration in such are

education and occupational training; youth, sport

cultural activities; and the media, although the p

areas of cultural self-administration would have to be 

negotiations between the parties themselves.

At the same time, self-administering territor

regions could be established within Kosovo, based prim

on the ethnic composition of the population. E

authorities in these self-administering regions would 

over the formulation and implementation of public p

with respect to such matters as local planning, public 

(roads, transportation, utilities, etc.) housing, agricu

local resources management, and other activities u

associated with local government. As in Belg

ethnically-mixed areas might be designated as dual-cu

regions (Prishtina and Pec, for example, might be trea

a manner analogous to the treatment of Brussels

existing administrative units (opstina) that over

demographic divide might be divided between regio

Brabant was divided between the Flemish region

180
be prohibited from actions that violate the rights of cit

including the rights of citizens to exercise 

administration over cultural affairs through their cu

“communities.” Particularly significant cul

institutions or monuments of a cultural community 

be subject to the administration of that cultural comm

rather than the region in which they are located, alth

the cultural community would necessarily have to neg

with the regional authority over a whole host of pra

issues. The definition of objects subject to 

administration would be determined through negotia

but could be facilitated by reference to the already ex

list of significant historical/cultural monuments e

lished during the communist era, with the participat

Kosovar Albanian communist officials. The extra-terr

dimension of cultural self-administration would ad

Serbian concerns outlined earlier.

The territory of Kosovo would thus encompas

self-administering cultural communities (Albanian 

Serbian) and a number of self-administering regions 

determined through negotiation, but including region

predominantly Albanian population, predomin

Serbian population, and mixed population). Although 

has been some public discussion in Yugoslavia of a r

proposal to devolve governmental authority in Ser

geographical regions, the self-administering re

proposed here involve the creation of substantially sm

units (the regional devolution proposal foresees the di

of Kosovo into two regions: “Metohija” and “Kosovo”)

Because of the presently nondemocratic nature 

Yugoslav/Serbian state, the national judicial instituti

the state cannot be relied upon to provide just judg

when the actions of public authorities in Kosov

challenged by citizens claiming the violation of their r

An alternative path for citizen challenges to p

authority can be established by incorporating the ri

citizens to appeal to European transnational institu

181
establish such a right, however, would requir

admission of Yugoslavia into the correspon

transnational organizations—an additional reaso

including this as part of the initial, confidence-bu

measures outlined earlier.

The need to secure justice in Kosovo extends 

victims of past repression, as well. The return of Ko

Albanian personnel who left or were expelled from 

institutions is one element of the interim agreemen

must be achieved expeditiously. As part of the transi

arrangements, a judicial review process mu

established for cases involving arrests, prosecutions

convictions for activities protected by the human an

rights norms articulated in Helsinki documents and u

not considered criminal in democratic states. Becau

Helsinki process documents are not binding treatie

because these documents contain potentially contrad

elements to which the Serbian and Kosovar sides 

simultaneously appeal, it may be necessary to o

international representation in the judicial review p

to secure the interpretation of these documents in a m

consistent with democratic norms. As in Belgium, and 

recently Northern Ireland, the organization 

decisionmaking rules of the provincial orga

government would have to incorporate power-sh

principles that assured each group the opportun

participate in, and influence the shape of, each decisio

adoption of such principles in Kosovo must avoi

deadlock of a mutual veto, and can do so if 

governmental functions are devolved to the commu

and regions. Moreover, establishment of both cultura

regional communities with their own separately-e

authorities would create opportunities for the emerge

inter-ethnic cooperation among those responsib

technical, or functional issues in the regions and, per

the emergence of shared values and interests among 

This might contribute to moderating tensions durin

182
province.

Provincial-Republic Relations. As a transi

measure, Kosovo would have to be granted 

administering” (i.e., autonomous) status. All autono

power of self-administration would be exercised b

elected leaderships of the self-administering cu

communities with respect to cultural affairs. The ki

activities to be carried out by these communitie

suggested above, but the precise list of legal competen

these communities would have to be negotiated by th

sides. With respect to local or regional affairs

autonomous power of self-administration granted t

province would be exercised by the elected governme

the self-administering regions, with the precise l

competencies to be negotiated.

 Provincial-Federal Relations. Provincial-fe

relations are at the heart of the conflict over Kosovo

“transitional” arrangements for Kosovo must includ

convening of further negotiations on long

arrangements for governing the province itself and de

its relationship to the rest of Yugoslavia. This is nece

in order to make it possible for Kosovars to particip

federal institutions without fear that, by doing so, the

give up the opportunity to change them. But it mus

make it possible for them to continue to boycott 

participation. Some changes in the federal parlia

paralleling those outlined for the republic parliamen

be necessary as part of the transitional arrangem

These may include defining the size and composition 

Kosovar parliamentary delegation, as well as its r

parliamentary decisionmaking.

From a “Transitional” to a Long-Term Solution

Power-sharing in the context of a province that 

part of Serbia and continued subordination to the fede

in international and security affairs is unlikely to satis

183
Albanians. These relationships must become the fo

further negotiations, with no limits on their eve

outcome. Movement toward further autonomy for Kos

these areas is, effectively, movement toward independ

The so-called “third republic” scenario, in which Kos

separated from Serbia to become the third republic 

Yugoslav federation, is widely seen as little more than 

toward what the Serbs see as “secession,” an

independence demanded by the Kosovar Albanians. T

the issue of independence is to be dealt with, it must be 

with directly, and the outstanding issues of concern t

sides must become the subjects of explicit negotiation

It is important to define as early as possible the a

mechanisms, or process, by which independence mig

secured. But negotiation of a separation process shou

begin until at least the transitional arrangements ou

above have been implemented, and they have been al

to operate over some agreed period of time—th

creating an opportunity for inter-ethnic tensions i

region to subside. The process of separation/indepen

should be defined in the course of the further negoti

over the long-term status of the province. If it appears 

long-term agreement is within reach, it might be poss

leave the definition of a separation/independ

agreement until long-term arrangements are operatin

this is highly unlikely. It is far more likely 

separation/independence and the establishme

long-term arrangements will have to be develop

alternative proposals.

 Independence, in turn, necessarily raises the ques

partition; that is, of whether all or part of Kosovo sho

subject to the Kosovar Albanians’ claim to indepen

Independence for Kosovo has long been linked to par

in Serbian discussions, but partition is uniformly re

as an option by the Kosovar Albanians, who lay claim 

whole province. Yet, the Albanian claim to all of K

serves only to provoke intense resistance to 

184
separation/independence is to be achievable peace

both the question of independence and the question of 

territories are to become independent must be de

together.

Certain lessons drawn by a Canadian journalist fro

Swiss experience of creating a distinct Jura canton

1

usefully be applied to addressing these questions in K

First, the process for achieving independence mu

established in advance of any decision to separate

negotiations suggested above to develop constitutiona

other frameworks for defining the long-term stat

Kosovo must develop as an alternative to provisio

initiating and carrying out a process for separ

Kosovo—that is, for achieving independence. Secon

process for achieving separation/independence mu

democratic; that is, it must allow local populatio

express and fulfill their preferences. In the absenc

significant transitional period and a meaningful altern

to separation, even a democratic referendum will be 

more than an ethnic census. Third, the express

popular preferences must take place at the most local 

possible. The self-administering regions proposed as p

the transitional arrangements outlined above—w

should reflect the actual composition of the populat

the province—may also serve as the electoral units i

process. Fourth, the preferences of local major

articulated in a democratic referendum process, shoul

precedence over any provincial majority, as well as ove

historical or other arguments concerning the owners

future fate of any territory. Hence, statutory provisio

achieving separation/independence must incorp

provisions for allowing local majorities in 

self-administering regions to choose different outc

limited only by considerations of geography.

 Referenda and competitive democratic elections 

provided important mechanisms for allowing populati

carry out processes of separation peacefully, an

185
completed in Northern Ireland has underscore

legitimacy of the settlement process negotiated by 

The demonstrated popularity of the settlement is lik

compel political parties in Northern Ireland to inc

their support for it in order to secure voter support 

next round of elections. In Switzerland , the refere

mechanism was applied at three different territorial 

of the electorate to ensure that the separation of the 

from Berrie canton had the support of a majority 

population in the region, and that the populatio

localities in the new Jura canton agreed with 

incorporation into it. By allowing for voting in rela

small communities, the Swiss referendum pr

permitted communities on the border of the propose

canton to choose whether to be separated from Bern. I

allowed a noncontiguous district (Laufen) to remain p

Bern. The Swiss approach thus minimized—but d

eliminate entirely—the problem of local populations 

separated from Bern (partitioned) against their w

order to implement a Swiss-like strateg

separation/independence/partition by referendu

Kosovo, it will be necessary to secure prior agreement 

minimum criteria for allowing a given population to d

its own fate (i.e., size, location, composition, economy

This, as the Swiss experience demonstrates, would am

to agreement on the broad criteria for partition. I

absence of such an agreement, the use of a refere

might result in territorially-isolated “micro-autonom

Dilemmas of Implementation.

The current escalation in Serbian/Yugoslav use o

against the UCK, and the violent response by the UC

undermining the chances for any kind of nego

settlement. If such violence, and the forced popu

displacement that is accompanying it, continues 

longer, no Kosovar politician will be able to mobilize po

support in Kosovo for a negotiated settlement. 

186
guerrilla warfare in the province than to a nego

settlement of the conflict.

The interim agreement outlined above will not pro

basis for other groups to mount demands ag

Serbia/Yugoslavia or other states. But it will 

exceedingly difficult to prevent Muslims and Hungari

Yugoslavia, and Albanians in Macedonia, from seekin

same “self-administering” status granted to Kosovo a

Kosovar Serbs and Albanians as part of the “transit

arrangements proposed above. In Spain, for exam

proved impossible to limit the grant of autonomy 

“historic” regions of Galicia, Catalonia, and the B

lands; the movement for autonomy quickly spread to 

Spain, which now contains 17 autonomous regions

differing elements of autonomy. In Serbia, the provi

Vojvodina has the same constitutional status as Kosov

may claim the same rights of self-administratio

Vojvodina, Serbs constitute the majority and Hunga

the largest minority, but only about 17 percent o

population. Much of the Hungarian population is, how

located along the border with Hungary, raising the pro

that populations in these areas might seek the same ri

separation/independence as the Kosovar Albanians

the lack of constitutional status as an autonomous pro

cannot be expected to prevent the Muslims of the Sa

region from demanding the same treatment as the Ko

Albanians, as well.

However, by limiting the interim and transi

arrangements to the realm of statutory rather 

constitutional change, and by deferring the iss

separation/independence until after transit

arrangements are operative, it may be possible to w

the attractiveness of these changes for other gr

Moreover, by adopting the three-tiered, referendum-

approach to the question of separation/indepen

outlined above, Serbs in Vojvodina (more than 57 perc

the population) and in “narrow” Serbia (almost 90 perc

187
democratic referendum at the first stage; althoug

Hungarians of Vojvodina and Muslims of the Sandzak 

demand the same right as Kosovar Serbs to p

preferences that contradict those of the regional maj

The potentially most destabilizing consequences 

approach outlined above may appear in Maced

Nationalist-separatist sentiments have been gro

among the large and restive ethnic Albanian populat

Western Macedonia in recent years. But the strate

self-administration differs only in degree, not in kind

the Macedonian strategy of granting local commu

extensive, self-government rights. The main differe

and what may be the most disconcerting element fro

Macedonian perspective—lies in the extra-terri

cultural rights and the joint administration of com

cultural institutions such as the university called for 

approach outlined here. Control over Skopje Universi

been a focus of Albanian-Macedonian confrontation, a

university is, itself, a bastion of Macedonian natio

resistance to equality between the cultures. H

implementation of the above changes in Kosovo migh

to renewed confrontation over Skopje University, as w

demands for the establishment of self-administ

regions in the Albanian-majority areas of we

Macedonia.

Paradoxically, however, movement toward e

Albanian self-administration in Kosovo may ac

reduce separatist pressure in Macedonia. Much o

nationalist-separatist leadership among the Albania

Macedonia consists of individuals formerly from Koso

the extent that conditions in Kosovo are normalize

Kosovar Albanians gain extensive autonomy th

self-administration, some Macedonian Albanians m

drawn back to Kosovo to participate in the construct

Albanian institutions there. Much of the pressure to 

an Albanian university in Tetovo, for example, can be t

to the effective closure of Prishtina University t

188
University to normal operations may very well 

students and faculty away from Macedonia and thus r

pressure to create an Albanian university in Tetovo.

The steps outlined above for an interim agreemen

transitional arrangements are not likely to provoke fu

unrest among the Bosnian Serbs. The potential pow

the Bosnian Serbs and the Republika Srpska i

post-Dayton constitutional system of Bosnia-Herzeg

already exceed those proposed here for Kosovo. 

movement toward the long-term, or “final,” status of K

that may provoke renewed political demands b

Bosnian Serbs for independence. Steps toward gra

Kosovar Albanians the opportunity to ac

independence through democratic means will likely 

similar demands not only among the Bosnian Serb

among the Bosnian Croats, as well as the Albania

Macedonia. Thus, while it is essential to the preservat

regional stability that the “transitional” arrangemen

Kosovo outlined above be achieved as soon as possibl

also essential that movement beyond these arrangeme

to the definition of the long-term, or “final” status 

province—be deferred for as long as possible. The Bo

Serbs and Croats already enjoy more autonomy and g

blocking power over the Bosnian government and Bo

Federation, respectively, than is granted to the Ko

Albanians by the strategy outlined above—not to me

military power. Only the successful operati

transitional institutions in Kosovo offers the possibi

achieving agreement on a long-term solution that am

to de facto autonomy within the framework of the Yug

or even Serbian, state and the protection of other 

borders—in Macedonia and Bosnia—against secess

pressures. External support for both the integr

existing borders and the operation of such transi

arrangements is essential to that success.

189
1. I have explored the Kosovo-Macedonia connection 

contributions to Toward Comprehensive Peace in Southeast 

Barnett R. Rubin, ed., New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press

2. See Timothy D. Sisk,Power Sharing and International Me

in Ethnic Conflicts, Washington, DC: United States Institute o

Press, 1996; Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacema

Multiethnic Societies, Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Co., 19

Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: Unive

California Press, 1985.

 3. For background, see Arend Lijphart, ed., Conflict and Coe

in Belgium, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, Unive

California, Berkeley, 1991. For more recent developments, see 

Senelle, “The Reform of the Belgian State” in Joachim Jens He

Vincent Wright, eds., Federalizing Europe?, Oxford: Oxford Un

Press, 1996, pp. 266-324; and Richard Lewis, “The Exam

Belgium,” Global Forum Series Occasional Paper No. 96-01.2, D

NC: Center for International Studies, Duke University, April 1

 4. See F. Gunther Eyck, “South Tyrol and Mult

Relationships” in Montvile, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking, pp. 2

Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determinati

Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, Philadelphia: Unive

Pennsylvania Press, 1990, pp. 432-440; and Oliver Schmidtke, 

Mobilization in South Tyrol,” Innovation, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 1

25-42.

 5. See Kenneth D. McRae, Conflict and Comprom

Multilingual Societies: Switzerland, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid 

University Press, 1983, pp. 185-213; and Scott Reid, Canada Rem

How the Partition of Quebec Will Reshape the Nation, Vancouve

Press, 1992, pp. 23-36.

6. Juan Jose Solozabal, “Spain: A Federation in the Mak

Hess and Wright, eds.,Federalizing Europe?, pp. 204-265; and R

Clark, “Spanish Democracy and Regional Autonomy: The Auto

Community System and Self-Government for the Ethnic Homela

Joseph P. Rudolph, Jr. and Robert J. Thompson, eds., Ethnoter

Politics, Policy and the Western World, Boulder: Lynne R

Publishers, 1989, pp. 15-43.

7. See, e.g., Nina Dobrkovic, “Juzni Tirol-model za re

polozaja i statusa nacionalnih manjina?” (South Tyrol-Mo

190
Medjunarodniproblemi, Vol. 44, Nos. 3-4, 1992, pp. 272-286; 

Simic, “The Autonomy Statue of Trentino-South Tyrol—a [E]u

model for the Kosovo crisis?” in Josef Janning and Martin Brus

Exploring Futures for Kosovo: Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in D

Munich: Research Group in European Affairs, August 1997, pp

and Radmila Nakarada, “Svajcarsld model resavanja s

preduslovi i granice njegove primene najugoslovenski sluca

Swiss model of resolving conflicts: preconditions and limit

application to the Yugoslav case), in Tomas Flajner and S

Samardzic, eds., Federalizam iproblem manjina u viseet

zajednicama (Federalism and the problem of minorities in mu

communities), Belgrade: Institute za Evropske Studije, 19

115-138.

8. Reported in a confidential conversation, Belgrade, May 1

9. The gulf between Serbian and Kosovar Albanian views is 

in the materials from three recent meetings convened by outside 

See Project on Ethnic Relations, The New York Roundtable: 

Peaceful Accommodation in Kosovo, Princeton: Project on 

Relations, 1997; Ger Duijzings, Dusan Janjic, and Shkelzen 

eds., Kosovo-Kosova: Confrontation or Coexistence, Nij

Netherlands: Peace Research Centre, University of Nijmeg

Political Cultural Centre 042, 1997; and Janning and Brus

Exploring Futures for Kosovo.

10. This view was expressed during a discussion with 

Serbian analysts which was organized by the Center for 

Alternatives in Belgrade in May 1998.

11. This was a key conclusion of the Council on Foreign R

Working Group on the South Balkans. See Toward Compre

Peace in Southeast Europe, Barnett R. Rubin, ed., New York: Tw

Century Fund Press, 1996. See also the conclusion of the Ne

meeting of the Project on Ethnic Relations, cited above.

12. Discussion at Center for Policy Alternatives, May 1998

13. See, e.g., the emotional cultural-historical argum

Branislav Krstic, Kosovo izmedju istorijskog i etnickogprava 

between historical and ethnic rights), Belgrade: Kuca Vid, 1994

several of the contributions to Veljko B. Kadijevic, ed., K

Metohija: izazovi I odgovori (Kosovo and Metohija: challeng

responses), Belgrade: Institut za geopoliticke studije, 1997.

191
Yugoslavia, Prishtina [?]: Kosova Information Centre, n.d., p. 1

15. These are generally ignored in scholarly treatmen

reported by Reid, a freelance journalist, in Canada Remapp

34-35.

16. Text of the agreement, sections on “decommissionin

“security,” as distributed by the British Consulate-General in 

Office of Press and Public Affairs.

17. Reid, Canada Remapped, pp. 32-36.

192
THE CULTURAL SCOPE

OF BALKAN SECURITY

Stefano Bianchini

SECURITY: A CHANGING NOTION

According to a common and largely shared op

security is a notion strictly connected to the defens

state. As a result of concerns of policymakers, expe

international relations and strategic studies have pla

special emphasis on the military and diplomacy, as th

scopes able to guarantee security, exclusively or prim

Short-term and long-term measures are taken 

consideration in this framework, albeit a certain atte

has been paid in more recent times even to the eco

sphere.

1

In many respects, this “traditional” approach to se

has been founded in truth in the past decades. Dif

factors contributed to this, for example, the long

attitudes to power policies and the relevance of the pa

based on the balance of powers; the peculiar rel

between the camps during the Cold War (“containmen

“roll back” in the American policy, the “besieged fortre

the Soviet policy, détente and nuclear balance in 

approaches); the worldwide increasing interdepende

politics and economics. All these features mirro

situation where the military and diplomacy playe

evident crucial role in international relations.

Nevertheless, and however provocative it may s

these approaches are inadequate to understand and fa

challenges of the post-Communist international ba

and particularly the Balkan events. In fact, a radical c

occurred in Europe when communism collapsed. 

193
decades, emerged powerfully. In this context, secur

depending increasingly on a wide variety of factors. B

the military, diplomacy, and economic interdepend

other features crucially contribute to define the se

security of a political community. A special evidenc

been showed by demography (particularly the rate of 

and the immigration/emigration flows); by the dom

degree of economic and social development of dif

strata and regions; by the quality and the distribut

information and media systems; by the attractive pow

symbols and myths in a group; by the complex 

contradictory relations between history and memor

these elements have a great impact on the percept

security of people and political communities.

Additionally, the 20th century has been a ce

characterized by a predominant role of ideologie

unpredictable acceleration of the stages of s

developments—through the industrial revolution, th

of machines, the improvement of medicine, the 

society, and, finally, the universal suffrage—has im

an epochal transformation to human societies. On th

hand, a new system of production (with industries, se

and, later, new communication systems) emerged, 

world space was shrinking drastically, time was pre

increasingly, and the health of populations imp

significantly.

2

 On the other, the sources of legitimiza

powers and the system of selection of the elites, 

remained similar for thousands of years, radically cha

when the whole adult population of a political comm

regardless of sex, education, or income, had the right t

and was included into the institutions. In the en

system of building human societies has changed quick

radically in few decades.

In this new system, political elites sought to pre

their predominant role by obtaining the support 

population by any means, legal or illegal, ethic or vi

according to the situations and the countries. Consist

194
loyalties, political knowledge and expectations

cultural backgrounds of the populations be

increasingly relevant in a political community and 

relations between rulers and ruled.

Therefore, political cultures increasingly influ

policymakers and different strata of a society sinc

beginning of the 20th century. Hence, it is evident tha

the perception of security has to be considered in 

framework. In fact, the impact of these transformatio

security issues is relevant indeed.

The emphasis on these aspects, however, does not 

that the impact of the military and the diplomatic f

are to be underestimated or marginalized, both in ge

terms and in the specific context of the current B

crisis, either at local or international levels. Simply s

referring to a deep changing context may better clarif

any approach to security issues restricted to the m

and diplomatic factors only, is, today, inadequa

understand the evolution of the events and to infl

their developments, particularly in the Balkan peni

In fact, and despite the successful intervention of NA

Bosnia in 1995, stabilization of the area is unlikely 

reached in a short while, and even in medium terms, m

because of the neglected (by international subjects

extremely relevant, cultural scope of the Balkan cris

In other words, the origin of the Balkan crisis 

1990s cannot be traced back merely in an attem

establish a political and military predominant role of a 

(or a group of states, or a specific leadership, or a s

political elite) over a certain territory or region. We a

facing a crisis where the aggressor can be merely iden

with a state whose leadership wishes to recast the reg

balance of powers by establishing its predominan

through a medium-sized power policy.

3

Truly, the reasons why this interpretation of the e

has been often supported by some Balkan leadersh

195
as the “victims of the aggressor” by appealing 

traditional scheme of international conflicts. However

offered an “easy political answer” to a problem which 

fact, more complex.

The “power policy” interpretation, in fact, is power

explain why, during the Yugoslav secession war, a

parties involved violated cease-fires and agreem

systematically, in spite of their being internatio

mediated or even imposed. Additionally, this interpre

fails to clarify why all the parties involved carrie

domestic policies aimed at sanctioning individual

groups who wished to reestablish dialogue betwee

populations of the parties. Particularly in the S

Croatian cultural space, all parties promoted e

cleansing, violence against civilians including r

regardless of the, albeit evident, different responsibili

leaderships in provoking the war.

The more the separation from those even

chronologically growing, the more this picture is beco

evident, in spite of the fact that sources of informatio

still fragmented. As a result, not only is the “power p

interpretation showing a lack of effectiveness, but al

categories of aggressors and victims strictly applied to 

attitudes are becoming powerless to explain what hap

and what should be needed, in order to find a l

solution to the crisis.

Crucially, aggressors and victims did exist and ar

existing (for example, in the Kosovo case). This 

disputed. What is disputable is to what extent and to 

subjects these categories have been ascribed. In fac

effectiveness in applying these categories with the g

understanding the events depends on the peculiarit

the conflict. In the Balkan case, the conflict was pro

only to a certain extent by wishes or aspirations of 

policy.

196
mainly provoked by a political culture, namely nation

which has been used by local political elites in ord

redefine the territory of the state and its membershi

Truly, nationalism as a political culture played a c

and progressive role for a certain period, particularly d

the 19th century when emancipation and moderniz

were the main goals to be achieved with the overcom

the backward institutions of the great empires. In 

context, Giuseppe Mazzini has played an indispu

influential role.

4

Since then, however, the world changed deeply

political ideologies changed as well. At the end of the 

century, any attempt at identifying the political th

and action of Giuseppe Mazzini with those of Ra

Karadzic sounds extremely difficult. Still, each reli

nationalism and claimed (or claims) to be a nation

Nevertheless, and albeit any comparison between the

personalities is an hazard, the enormous distance be

Mazzini and Karadzic makes evident the transformat

nationalism: in fact, this political culture has 

gradually transformed in a peculiar state/party ideol

As a result of this transformation, a realistic appro

currently unavoidable by both scholars and policymak

means that both have nothing to do but recognize the n

of this change. This change implies that, especially 

Balkans, nationalist ideology and nationalist po

culture have gradually become effective tools us

political elites for recasting the territory of a state a

membership. In this context, members of a n

established political community have difficulty 

considered as “citizens,” but are something else tha

still to be defined. Additionally, it has to be emphasize

nationalist transformation of the society and st

considered by nationalists as a crucial prerequisite 

the achievement of political modernization, (b) eco

197
the state and its members.

All these factors roughly lead to the conclusion th

idea of state is the main focus of post-Communist tran

in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, and to a certain e

even in East-Central Europe.

5

 In fact, after the Comm

collapse, the meaning, the scope, and the perspectives 

change have implied the recasting of the state a

powerful structure able to guarantee the conditio

development and wealth. This belief was not only a leg

Communism (in spite of the fact that the state did p

central role under Communist rule). It was also a leg

the pre-Communist period, when backward countr

Eastern Europe faced the challenge of development in 

difficult conditions, because they lacked capital

technologies were increasingly expensive. Without a r

and reliable financial system, these societies were do

to rely on the fiscal system of the state, in order to c

resources for development. This crucial role played b

state was studied effectively by Alexander Gersche

and other prominent scholars of economic history 

1950s and 1960s.

6

 We do not need to insist further on 

aspects. Additionally, we can emphasize that s

process, encouraging the state to become the lev

development, has strengthened its magnet ro

bureaucracy and policymakers who tried to use it as 

for establishing their predominant control over socie

After the collapse of three political systems in 80 

(namely, the empire, the interwar authoritarian stat

the Communist state) 7—when, simultaneously, a 

society was created—the implications of these factors 

proved to be extremely broad: changes of the 

structure, in fact, have implied changes of territor

people, of history, of language, of monuments and sym

because the legitimization of the newly created rea

needed both a confirmation from an asserted continu

the past and the charging of previous failures to 

subjects.” Consistently, the establishment of new for

198
terms of development and corruption, according t

quality and the choices of the ruling class, appeared a 

opportunity to many groups and individuals.

8

Since the goals of corruption, self-social promotion

self-enrichment were not openly claimed for ev

reasons, new political parties turned their attent

state-building and development issues, by empha

that the economic crisis of the 1980s had been provok

neighboring peoples or countries. By blaming “othe

and claiming development simultaneously, nationali

particular were able to collect significant support fro

exhausted population and, at the same time, to emph

the achievement of the development of the commun

the main goal of their political action.

9

In this sense, a radical change occurred to the i

State, because this was considered the prerequisi

strengthening political modernization, economic de

ment and (ethnic) security. As a result, national

better, its ethno-nationalist interpretation— has 

promoted by the new ruling class as a state or state

ideology with the aim of encouraging and spre

simultaneously into the population a peculiar set of po

beliefs, expectations, foci of identifications, symbols

perceptions of self. Thanks to this, the cul

identification of rulers and ruled has become the 

source of both the legitimization of power and security 

newly established political communities.

Crucially, nationalist political culture has prov

have a great impact in the society in terms of (a) legit

of the rulers; (b) loyalties of the ruled; and, (c) state-bu

processes. In this context, which has been 

strengthened by uncertainties of post-Comm

transition, the nationalist approach is aggressive in or

recast territory and membership of the states. 

competing with each other for territories, they 

similar mechanisms in domestic policies because they 

199
homogenization. This explains why ethnic homogenei

been pursued by all nationalisms in former Yugoslav

cynical it may appear, differences in their aggressive 

and praxis depended primarily on the quantity of we

nationalist movements had when they sought to car

their project.

Milosevic first made nationalism a tool for po

actions and popular support in Serbia; the dismembe

of Yugoslavia and the war were provoked by him

brutality against the population, the systematic mass

and the humanitarian disasters which occurred 

Slovenia to Kosovo since the beginning of the 1990

definitely to be considered the outcome of his po

However, he was not the sole culprit of those events 

those that followed. Besides the political responsibi

the Slovenian leadership, which is unquestion

although often neglected, a largely-shared natio

political culture made possible the war of HVO ag

Bosnia, the ethnic cleansing of Krajina by the Cro

Army, the Kazanj massacre against the Serbs of Sar

and the killing of no-nationalist Albanians in Kosovo 

UCK.

In all the above-mentioned cases, nationalism has 

the political culture which created turmoil and insec

By way of confirmation, it was not by chance that the w

conducting the war in the Yugoslav region in the 

differed from previous European experiences rad

Instead of battles between opposing armies, the Yug

secession war was characterized by an aggression prim

against civilians. Traditional battles played a seco

role, because the question of borders, however impo

was less relevant than the goal of achieving (a) e

homogeneity, (b) forced assimilation and/or at least (

subjugation of the “other” within a certain State.

11

In contrast, brutality of attitudes characterized m

operations of both regular and irregular corps when 

200
Vukovar), anti-nationalist individuals, and those 

declared themselves as “Yugoslavs.” The fate of the la

particularly interesting. With the Yugoslav col

Yugoslavs lost their country and their foci of cu

identification, because Milosevic embezzled the na

“Yugoslavia” in order to establish his control ove

property of the federation. Additionally, no one signi

political organization or country in the international 

claimed the protection of the right of self-determinati

“Yugoslavs.”

12

As a result, the categories of “aggressors” and “vic

are to be recast, not with reference to the e

membership, but by taking into consideration the po

culture to which they belong. In other words, “aggre

are not whole people, but nationalists of all pe

“victims” are not people in a generic way, but thos

share an intercultural or multiple identity.

In sum, because the traditional intercultural web 

Balkans is put under discussion by nationalists, the cu

Balkan dilemmas on state building and security—

emerged since the Dayton Agreement was sign

1995—confirm how the nationalist idea of state an

persistence of destabilization are strictly connected.

THE BALKANS UNDER NATIONALISM: 

A COMPARATIVE PICTURE OF THE SITUATI

Let us observe what is going on in the area recen

short comparison among the situations of Kosovo and 

Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Slo

and Moldavia offers a good picture of the role play

political cultures in a security/insecurity context.

Kosovo and FRY.

In Kosovo, both the parties in conflict do not 

interested in reaching a compromise. A perspect

201
leaders with good reason; they fear that autonomy c

threatened by Serb leadership at any time to come, as 

occurred in the past. In contrast, Serb leaders are relu

to accept autonomy, and they have good reason, too

international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 

has proven that administrative borders may be recog

as international borders in the event of a clai

independence led by the majority of a local populatio

Independence of Kosovo is firmly rejected by Se

leaders, who claim their right to protect state border

context which has been de facto legitimized b

International Community through the mechanis

recognition adopted for successor states of the Soviet U

Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. In contrast, any cha

this principle may lead to a threat of stability in B

Macedonia, and Cyprus. Indeed, the perspective 

partition of Kosovo is questioned, too, and can lead to 

In fact, both Serb and Albanian parties claim 

sovereignty over territories with rich natural resourc

the end, the large autonomy of Kosovo in a federat

three equal subjects is rejected by Montenegro. The so

has been seen as an attempt at diminishing the cu

overestimated role of Montenegro in the feder

particularly in a period when Milosevic aims at doing 

the end, Milosevic is aware that the participation 

Albanians in Serb polls and/or the full members

Kosovo in the federation may affect seriousl

predominant position in the country and even provo

political defeat. In other words, the three subjects inv

in the issue (Albanian, Serb, and Montenegrin po

elites) are unwilling to find a political solution at le

medium-to-short terms. They lack a mutual confiden

an outcome of 10 years of tensions and Serb repress

Albanians claims. This situation has led both the par

Kosovo to violate the agreements imposed by the diplo

of the contact group, and the agreement reach

Milosevic and Holbrook in October 1998 in order to st

202
by Fehmi Agani (and not only by UCK, FARK, and 

Demaqi).

Meanwhile, the autonomy of the University of Bel

has been suppressed without any international rea

and state control over the media systematically impos

a result, an international military operation in Kos

doomed to radicalize the situation and particularly 

impossible the persistence of Kosovo within Serbia

means that changes in state borders will be forced 

international intervention. The unavoidable outcome 

is that the ethnic state is a welcome solution. In such a 

the risks of a destabilization of Bosnia, Macedonia

Albania are likely to be strengthened. In conclusio

Kosovo question reveals an evident geopolitical 

which is strictly connected with a broad problem of 

building.

Bosnia.

At the end of 1998, the picture in the Serb camp is 

dark as it may appear. In fact, recent elections have p

that a political differentiation is increasing, in spite 

fact that the radical Nikola Poplasen has been e

president of the entity. In contrast, both the assembly 

entity and the Serb representative in the Bo

presidency are characterized by more moderate appro

than those of the president of the entity. Additio

members of the Serbian elite are increasingly attrac

the idea of being the first Serbs to be included in a proc

European integration in the event that the supp

European Union (EU) to Bosnian integration is 

further. This perspective is really serious and may ope

differentiation processes between Serbia and the Repu

Srpska.

The new European common currency which has 

instituted in 1999 is another factor that can have a 

impact as a magnet on Bosnia, and particularly o

203
for the everyday needs of the population, the German 

presumably will be replaced by the Euro soon. As a r

Bosnia possibly may be included in the EU, althoug

specific process of enlargement to this country has no

started yet.

It will be extremely interesting to see how the fut

Bosnia will evolve in the years to come in connection 

the European integration processes. On the contra

seems that threats to the Bosnian integrity can eme

the Croatian camp. Although in Herzegovina po

differentiation is increasing, and the hard-liner 

Jelavic has been elected to the Bosnian Presidency 

only 52 percent of the votes (in the past elections, the 

candidate, Kresimir Zubak, got 88.7 percent of the pol

a fact that the most extremist member of this governm

Jelavic. Tensions between Croats and Muslim

emerging on many occasions, while domestic events 

neighboring Croatia are not encouraging. In this cont

negative repercussion is likely to be the outcome beca

the efforts made by U.S. representatives who force

reluctant Muslim leaders to sign a special treaty 

Croatia in November 1998, in order to accomplish D

Agreements. This was, in fact, the most ambiguous p

the treaty because its nationalist interpretation (from 

the Croatian and Serb sides) is in evident contrast wi

goal of preserving the integrity of Bosnia, also includ

the Dayton Agreements. As a result, a similar 

between the Republika Srpska and the rump Yugo

presumably will be signed, despite opposition effor

Biljana Plavsic and Milorad Dodik in 1997.

In such a way, the process of differentiation in the 

camp can have a negative impact on attempts at rel

tensions in the area. Hard-liners and the Radical part

be encouraged to achieve their goal of erasing bo

between Serbia and Republika Srpska. Additionally

perspective will be strengthened whether Serb bord

rump Yugoslavia are going to be changed in Kosov

204
still truly disputed. Integration and disintegration ar

to be considered open options, for domestic 

international reasons.

Croatia.

In Croatia, Tudjman’s succession has commenc

great economic crisis is threatening the country beca

the high value of the currency and the lack of produ

The Dubrovnik bank scandal and the death of Gojko S

have strengthened a settlement of the accounts w

HDZ. Despite the information launched by the press

not true that only soft-liners resigned recently. E

hard-liner but dogmatic figure such as Andrija He

was forced to resign when he started to make order 

ministry of defense where the Herzegovinian lobby

particularly the young and ambitious Ivic Pasalic, 

absolute bosses. A quite intricate connection is eme

between the economic/financial interests of a pow

group within the state and the role played by this gro

defining the Croatian interest in Bosnia. In other word

effort of HDZ hard-liners to establish their own s

control over the ruling Croatian party is likely to 

Bosnian stabilization by encouraging Herzegov

extremists to carry out the goal of Croatian unificatio

contrast, HDZ is clearly loosing its appeal in the b

Local elections in Osijek and Dubrovnik in Fall 

confirmed a coalition of opposition parties was able to 

solid majority, successfully defeating HDZ. 

perspective, however, can encourage both a split in 

between soft- and hard-liners and the attem

hard-liners to get a stronger control over the levers of 

before their central power system in Zagreb is ser

threatened. In conclusion, the political future in Cro

dominated by an uncertainty which may have effect

only within Croatian borders but also in neighb

countries—particularly Bosnia. Also, a repercussi

205
contested issues need to be resolved, is not excluded.

Macedonia.

In Macedonia, the key issue for the future of the co

is the complexity of the ethnic question. How the rel

between Slav Macedonians and Albanians may evolve 

a predominant role. The elections of November 

provoked a great change in the government of the co

when a new contradictory coalition of nationalist and 

parties defeated the former communists, and a new ba

emerged in the country. The reasons for this chang

based mainly on social dissatisfaction rather than on e

tensions, and this is why a coalition between Maced

nationalists of VMRO and the newly created civic par

by Vasil Tupurkovski (the Democratic Alliance) be

possible. Furthermore, Tupurkovski is the stro

candidate for the 1999 presidential elections when cu

President Kiro Gligorov will be unable to run again. In 

words, Macedonia is facing a drastic turnover. How

stability is still unpredictable. Macedonian-Albanian e

polarization is far from overcome, although the 

extremist of the Albanian parties, the PDPA led by A

Xhaferri, has been included in the government with V

and DA. Paradoxically enough, the moderate Albani

PDP (which supported former Communists in the 

government) were not. In this framework, it is u

whether the coalition can survive when old unsolved 

(such as that of the Tetovë University) are coming 

again to the agenda. Truly, both VMRO and DA point

that economic recovery is their first and main commit

however, they do not share similar ethno-pol

strategies. VMRO is still a Macedonian nationalist 

while DA is a civic movement which includes in it

ranks members of Serb, Roma, and Albanian minorit

can be expected that a contrast between these two p

will emerge after the presidential elections as Tupurk

needs the VMRO support to win. However, he may not 

206
relations worsen. In this context, the role of the Alb

parties will be crucial, taking into consideration the i

of the Kosovo events.

Strong links were established between Albania

Kosovo and of Macedonia during Titoist Yugoslavia, a

as after the dismemberment of the country when 

repression policies increased dramatically in Kosovo

result, migration flows from Kosovo to Mace

intensified, threatening ethnic balance in Macedoni

making more interdependent the events in Serbia 

Macedonia. In this context, appeals to moderation ca

any effectiveness, and Albanian politicians w

encouraged to claim independence or the establishm

an autonomous region, at least while Macedonian p

oppose both these goals. In the end, many unpredi

factors are still affecting regional stability. In other w

as in Albania, the further existence of the Macedonian 

remains under discussion, and the possibility of a co

has not been avoided yet.

Albania.

Turmoil in Albania is far from being contained

collapse of the state is still a possible outcome 

consequence of several factors.

After the election of a new, young premier, Pa

Majko, untainted by a communist past and commit

overcoming Berisha-Nano animosity, the country app

in a referendum on November 22, 1998, a new Constit

still strongly contested by the Democratic P

Previously, this party boycotted the Parliament an

commission where the draft of the Constitution 

prepared in order to reject any compromise. The at

was that of convincing the population that the cu

government has no legitimization. A further step o

policy was that of claiming new elections with the h

revenge over the socialists. In fact, the real victim of su

207
the country, which was affected by the double collapse 

state in 1991 and in 1997.

To make the picture even darker, these develop

are occurring simultaneously with the worsening 

Kosovo issue. Politically, the Kosovo leadership estab

good relations with Berisha and the Democratic Party 

the early 1990s, while serious contrasts emerged with 

Nano when he met Milosevic in Crete in Fall 

Meanwhile, the Albanian governments of Nano and M

proved unable to reestablish their control over the nor

borders of the country, where Kosovo’s war was becom

economic lifeline. In this framework, the relations be

the two military forces operating in the Yugoslav r

(FARK and UCK) deteriorated and endangere

territorial integrity of Albania, because of the flo

weapons, armed irregulars and refugees across the bor

Since 1997, the situation has become increas

complicated. In fact, the attempts of Berisha at t

advantage of the crisis in Kosovo are likely to inc

negative reactions of the Albanian population in the 

of the country. Truly, Berisha does not seem to have a 

support in the country, but his relations with the Ko

political elite are still close, and it cannot be exclude

Berisha may have a new opportunity to take over the 

in the event that Kosovo is included in Albania. Howe

remains to be seen whether this perspective will be acc

in the south or lead to a new collapse of the Albanian 

by encouraging a North-South or Gheg/Tosk confront

In other words, because of the weakness of Alb

political institutions in a unstable regional context, th

of a new collapse of the state is still possible and m

provoked by an interaction of factors, most of 

unpredictable. 

208
Albeit geopolitically marginal in respect to the Ba

both Slovenia and Moldavia are to be considered cou

open to possible threats in terms of regional sec

Two-thirds of both land and maritime borders be

Slovenia and Croatia are contested. Despite rep

attempts at mediating, bilateral relations are some

exacerbated. In these cases, tensions increase sud

with unpredictable outlets which can lead Ljubljan

nationalist confrontation with Zagreb—under the pre

of extremist movements which are at the moment cont

into the opposition ranks, but which have sometimes p

to have a significant impact on the population.

As for Moldavia, the country is located in a de

geopolitical crossroad between two big destabilized 

the Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent S

(CIS). By way of confirmation, a document recently s

in Chisinau by the leaders of Moldavia, Ukraine

Romania urged Russia to withdraw its troops 

Transdniester region, a reminder of a careless interna

public opinion that another recent ethno-national co

was not over. In fact, the Russian Duma has not yet ra

the treaty that ended the 5-month war in 

Furthermore, domestic tensions in Russia, combined 

the uncertainties of the economic and pol

(presidential) situation, may intertwine with 

international developments in Kosovo in the even

NATO intervention without a supporting vote o

Security Council. As a result of worsening East

relations, Duma is likely to postpone indefinitel

withdrawal of the troops still arrayed in the CIS by aff

simultaneous relations in the area. In this context, be

Russian policymakers are still uncertain whether to b

civic state, an ethno-nation state or—again, 

possible—an empire, it is evident that local tensions 

possible subsequent international intervention are do

to have a great impact on the process of state-buildin

209
may eventually have destabilizing effects.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PROPOSALS

This rapid overview makes evident the follo

conclusions:

• The different crises in the Balkans are st

intertwined. They require an overall solution, 

cannot be found when a situation is exacerbate

the International Community appeals to milit

diplomatic tools only, in order to restore a truc

• The main factor which connects these cri

nationalism, namely its idea of state wh

embodied in the attempt at establishin

ethno-national legitimization of powers. Ho

pursued, such a legitimization affects secur

neighboring countries, because it is based on 

mistrust towards the “others” and disp

historical/territorial/cultural claims. With 

premises, the future of a political commun

increasingly built against (and not along 

neighbors. As a result, defense reasons encour

country which perceives itself as threatened to 

in similar ways. In the end, the criteria of geopo

arrangement that will be carried out by loca

international subjects in a specific area are go

influence radically the future of the whole Balka

terms of rules and patterns to be applied in the 

of the “equality” of nations.

• The effectiveness of the military and political to

the International Community in order to create 

force) conditions for stability at the beginning

later for peace, run serious risks of being influ

by the political culture of local political elites. I

context, a great disaster in terms of regiona

210
military and diplomatic intervention is interpre

the local parties as a support offered b

International Community to a nationalist app

against the other.

This can be particularly the case of Kosovo, which d

radically from those of Bosnia and Albania in the 1

Previously, in fact, NATO intervention in Bosnia 

authorized by the United Nations (U.N.) and be

possible because the Bosnian war had been consider

international war provoked by domestic uprising, 

direct support coming from Serbia and Croatia. (Trul

interpretation of the facts has been denied by a con

decision of the Hague tribunal which pointed out th

character of the Bosnian war and dropped a long ser

charges in the Tadic case. In contrast, this approac

been later overthrown by a different court, w

emphasized the international scope of the war an

Croatian military involvement in its decision on the Ce

case.)13

As for Albania in 1997, the “ALBA” operation 

formally requested by the local government.

14

 I

context, the Kosovo situation is peculiar indeed. On th

hand, a military intervention of NATO is likely 

opposed by the veto of Russia and China in the Se

Council; on the other, it has no chance to be requested 

Serb government. Albeit for different reasons, 

attitudes are originated by a common principle

absolute sovereignty of the state. In the former 

because Russia and China are concerned for po

domestic consequences in delicate issues such tho

Chechnya and Tibet; in the latter, because Serbia wa

protect its borders.

As a result, without an undisputed U.N. legitimiz

the military intervention of NATO is going to be “si

considered an action of a military alliance, rather th

action of the International Community (howeve

211
guaranteed by worldwide recognized supranat

institutions (as the U.N.) or by the most powerful m

subject is a topic for a specific study on security 

international relations, which exceeds the approach 

present analyses. Rather, let the attention of the r

turn to the impact that both these forms of interven

(with or without U.N. support) are going to have o

perception of the state in the specific context of Kosov

the Balkans. In fact, it is evident that the political cu

which suggests and supports such a military action, is 

on the conception that the absolute sovereignty of the 

has to be contained.

15

This is neither an accident nor an unpredictable ou

of the post-Cold War politics. Truly, since the end of 

War II, an increasing series of events has confirmed 

state sovereignty as a principle is coming to an end. 

the Communist collapse and the end of the Col

confrontation, this trend has been even more strength

Both globalization and regionalization are threatenin

predominant role of the nation-state, the Westph

system of international relations and the princi

absolute sovereignty of the state. This change is a 

challenge for the existing political communities and 

the main repercussions of the post-Communist transit

Consistent with this general framework, the thre

military intervention in Kosovo has been justified in 1

order (1) to stop Serb repression, (2) to stop a humanit

disaster, and (3) to reestablish the autonomy of the r

In other words, the goals to be achieved by a po

military intervention in Kosovo are doomed to affe

sovereignty of Serbia/Rump Yugoslavia in a very pe

way, because its main reason—as it was stated in the N

camp—is the desire to change the domestic policy o

state, not its borders.

By contrast, the current predominant political cult

the local political and military elites suggests exact

212
leaderships consider that a NATO intervention has 

encouraged, or blamed, because it aims at diminishin

territorial sovereignty of Ramp Yugoslavia, whil

impact of the action on domestic policy is largely negl

This interpretation is largely shared by the cu

leaderships of the other Balkan States.

In a sense, an approach emphasizing territory r

than domestic policy is understandable in a natio

context. Actually, the intimate nature of nationalism 

not allow accepting the idea of a both “inner and 

contained sovereignty of the state.” However, this ge

approach is softened, as for the outer sovereignty, bec

at least temporarily, a state may suffer a loss of ter

because of a war. Additionally, a state may submit to s

international pressures as an outcome of an ad

balance in the system of international alliances, whic

be reversed when a new opportunity emerges. In con

any threat to inner sovereignty is not even taken 

consideration, for the simple reason that it is unthinka

As a result, a great cultural misunderstanding thre

the effectiveness of any action promoted by interna

bodies in the Balkans. In other words, the goals of m

interventions and other engagements of interna

bodies in the Balkans need an evident anti-natio

cultural support if they want to be effective.

In fact, nationalism as a state ideology is a thr

international security because it aims at strengthenin

sovereignty of the state against neighbors, whil

International Community—through the role of the 

the creation of an International Penal Tribuna

protection of human rights, and the process of Eur

integration, just to mention a few—is increas

supporting interdependence, multilateral cooperat

new supranational legal system, and, finally, a contain

of sovereignty extended to domestic policies. The eve

the end of 1998, with the arrests of General Pinoc

213
confirmation of a general trend of interdependenc

containment of the state, which is not any more th

institution able to persecute a crime committed with

borders.

17

It is exactly this interdependence that is clashing 

nationalism as an ethno-cultural ideology and a fo

protection of the absolute sovereignty of the state. Be

nationalism is a mutant with multifaceted stateme

may express forms emphasizing either sovereignty or 

of ethnicity and sovereignty. This quite complex p

makes unclear—for the concrete political world

boundaries between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism, 

they are well-defined in the more sophisticated aca

world.

18

Additionally, the persistence of a “nati

legitimization of state powers is contributing to stre

ambiguous nature of the nation-state, weakenin

effectiveness of international actions. In fact, it is ev

that any, open or surreptitious, support to a nationalis

against another nationalist one is doomed to affe

international effort to find a peaceful solution to te

Furthermore, in this case, a sense of dissatisfactio

revenge may arise among local elites, encouragin

search for an outer, more powerful “protection,” whic

be used, once it has been found, for further destabilizat

These mechanisms are well-known. However, it 

persistence of a “national” legitimization of state p

that makes evident why the European Community ha

powerless in facing the Yugoslav crisis in 1991. Mor

the difficulties which arose during the negotiations f

Maastricht Treaty, the political and cultural limit

which suffered from the final version of the treaty, an

attempts at containing the European integration p

within the economic sphere for a longer period of time

a common origin and can be explained mainly in a con

214
leadership seized with the idea of nation. 19

In the end, this framework permits an understand

why the Balkan challenges on the threshold of th

millennium are embodied in a modern (or m

post-modern) process of change in international rela

rather than originated by medieval attitudes 

traditions. The focus is on the state-building pr

through a new articulation of the roles of state and n

New patterns are emerging from the current B

tensions and showing a potentially attractive ability, 

is a serious threat to peace.

As a result, stabilization and security in the Balkan

be achieved only in a new, anti-nationalist frame

which has yet to be built. This means that the na

legitimization of state powers has to be overcome an

patterns offered in terms of:

• secularization; 

• citizenship; 

• softening borders;

• free flows of labor and capital;

• democratic management of differences; and,

• recognition of existing multiple identities w

individuals and within communities, with an ev

impact on state symbols, use of langu

administration (devolution), education syste

terms of flexibility, and permeability of culture

The main assumption is as follows. The 

neighboring societies are articulated and m

knowledge is rooted, the more security is strengthene

contrast, the more neighboring societies are c

215
insecurity is going to affect peace in the area.

In this context, the actions of the interna

community may be effective and prepare a lasting se

framework for Europe if they are supported by a 

strategy of encouraging permeability and communi

among neighboring countries in the Balkans. Definite

implementation of such a strategy may provok

opposition of local political elites, as in the case of cu

nationalist leaderships in the Balkans. However, be

the sovereignty of states is under discussion ev

domestic policies, this opposition cannot sto

international engagement in order to encourage altern

education systems, strengthening democratiz

(through the free flow of ideas and their 

representation), and freedom of the media.

Since the Helsinki agreement was signed in 197

policy of human rights played a crucial role in prepari

collapse of communism.

20

 A similar approach has 

developed towards nationalism. In this s

strengthening alternative political cultures

21—whi

emerging all over the Balkans, while needing s

supports in order to break isolation in the country—is 

considered a prerequisite for stabilization.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, the threat 

international intervention in Kosovo has confirmed th

principle of the sovereignty of a state can be affected 

an ethnic group is persecuted and collective righ

denied. However, in the Balkan context, the effectiven

an international engagement depends mainly on its a

to encourage regional permeability and flexibility. Th

be done through a series of tools able to guarante

example:

• the autonomy of the universities in Serbia, B

and Croatia;

• the freedom of media;

216
te educatostoy ad potcascece (

means civic education) of the population; and,

• the education of specific categories of workers, s

teachers, policemen, judges, and all those who 

relevant role in spreading a sense of belong

democratic institutions as the institutions 

whole society.

It is quite evident that the lack of democracy in Se

worsening the Kosovo issue and, vice versa, the wors

of Kosovo issue is affecting the existence of a civil s

and the role of anti-nationalist opposition in the co

Therefore, no political solution of the Kosovo issu

cause dramatic repercussions in Macedonia, Alb

Bosnia, and Cyprus, at least.

Crucial questions include: Are military interve

and diplomatic or other international engagements jus

when an ethnic community is threatened only? Is the 

issue the unique one that may affect regional securit

vice versa, is the lack of democracy in a country the 

factor that is affecting security? If the answer is the l

democracy, as the author of this chapter does believe

means that nationalism and democracy are incompa

as well as are nationalism and security. As a result, w

a radical change in political culture, namely a change a

distinguish democracy from nationalism and to 

security to individuals and groups as well as the resp

ethnic identities without nationalism, it is impossi

have an effectiveness in military and political actions 

current Balkan and Eastern European crisis.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. Compare, for example, Dale C. Copeland, “Ec

Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expecta

International Security, Vol. V, No. 20, 1996; Peter Paret, ed., M

Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, 

Clarendon Press, 1986; James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfa

Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, New York: 

217
York: Random House, 1979; Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trage

Economic Issues and National Security, Lawrence: Regents P

Kansas, 1977.

2. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, L

Blackwell, 1990.

3. See Stefano Bianchini and Robert Craig Nation, ed

Yugoslav Conflict and Its Implications for International Re

Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1998; Susan L. Woodward, Balkan T

Washington DC: The Brookings Institutions, 1995; Stefano Bi

and Paul Shoup, eds., The Yugoslav War, Europe and the Balka

to Achieve Security?, Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1995; Leonard J. 

Broken Bonds. Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Pol

Transition, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.

4. Compare Maurizio Viroli, For Love of Country, Oxford: 

University Press, 1995; Federico Chabod, L’idea di nazione, 

Bari: Laterza, 1979; Giuseppe Mazzini, Scritti politici, Torin

1972; Giuseppe Mazzini, Scritti editi e inediti di Giuseppe M

Imola: Galeati, 1976.

5. Stefano Bianchini and George Schopflin, eds., State Bui

the Balkans, Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1998.

6. See Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backward

Historical Perspective, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press

Compare with the following studies: Francesco Privitera, La tran

continua, Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1996; Daniel Chirot, The Or

Backwardness in Eastern Europe, Berkeley: University Of Ca

Press, 1989; John Lampe and Marvin Jackson, Balkan Ec

History, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982; Iván T. 

and György Ránki, Economic Development in East Central Europ

19th and 20th Century, New York: Columbia University Press, 

7. Stephano Bianchini, Atlante geopolitico dell’E

centro-orientale, in “Limes,” n. 1, 1996, pp. 95-123.

8. Fadil Ademovic, Beznadje zla, Sarajevo: Medjunarodni Ce

mir, 1997; Nebojsa Popov, ed., Srpska strana rata, Beograd: Rep

1996; Rada Ivekovic and Dunja Blazevic, Hommage à Sa

Destruction de l’image/Image de la destruction, Paris: L’Harm

1996; Adil Zulfikarpasic, Vlado Gotovac, Miko Tripalo, Ivo 

Okovana Bosna. Razgovor, Zürich: Bosnjacki Institut, 1995

218
Against Censorship, 1994.

9. See Ivan Siber, “Psychological approaches to Ethnic Co

the Territories of Former Yugoslavia,” in Dusan Janjic, ed., 

Conflict Management. The Case of Yugoslavia, Ravenna: Longo E

1997; Stefano Bianchini, Sarajevo. Le radici dell’odio, 2d ed.

Edizioni associate, 1996; Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel, B

Westview Press, 1996.

10. Srebrenica 1995, Sarajevo: Institut za istrazivanje zlocin

covjecnosti i medjunarodnog prava, 1998 with documents; Smai

The aggression on Bosnia and Genocide against Bosniacs 199

Sarajevo: Institut za istrazivanje zlocinaprotiv covjec

medjunarodnog prava, 1995 with documents.

11. See Sefer Halilovic, Lukava strategija, Sarajevo: Marsa

Kasim Begovic, Bosna i Hercegovina od Vanceove misije do Day

sporazuma, Sarajevo: Bosanska Knjiga, 1997; Xavier Bougarel, 

Anatomie d’un conflict, Paris: La Découverte, 1996; Heni 

Ispodvijesti, Split: Feral Tibune, 1995; Stefano Bian

“Yugosklavism and Nationalism: the Rebirth of National Serb In

South East European Monitor, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1995, pp. 50-66; 

Letica, Divlje misli, Zagreb: AGM, 1993; Zoran Obenovic, Srbij

poredak, Nis: Gradina, 1992; Dobrila Gajic-Glisic, Srpska 

Cacak: M. T. Spasojevic, 1992.

12. See Melita Richter Malabotta, L’altra Serbia: gli intellett

guerra, Milano: Selene Edizioni, 1996; Federacija Bosna i Herce

drzava i civilno drustvo; Zagreb: Novi Liber, 1995; Rada Iveko

La Croatie depuis l’effrondrement de la Yougoslavie. L’opp

non-nationaliste, Paris: l’Harmattan, 1994.

13. Compare M. Cherif Bassiouni, Indagine sui crimini di 

nell’ex Jugoslavia, Milano: Giuffrè, 1997; International C

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Indictment: Delalic, Muci

Landzo (Celebici), The Hague: Press and Information Office

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo

Indictment: Tadic and the Others, The Hague: Press and Infor

Office, 1995.

14. See Pino Agnetti, Operazione Alba, Stato Maggiore della 

Novara: De Agostini, 1997; and Albania, strategia e linee d’azio

diplomazia italiana gennaio-ottobre 1997, Roma: Ministero deg

Esteri, 1997.

219
1997.

16. Michael Heffernan, The Meaning of Europe, London: 

1998; Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe. Idea, Identity, Reali

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995; Altiero Spinelli, La crisi deg

nazionali. Germania, Italia, Francia, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991

17. See Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of P

Community, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998; Karl Cordell, ed., E

and Democratisation in the New Europe, London: Routledge, 1

18. Compare Anna Krasteva, ed., Communities and Id

Petekston, Sofija, 1998; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citiz

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995; Tiziano Bonazzi and Michael 

eds., Cittadinanza e diritti nelle società multiculturali, Bolo

Mulino, 1994; Raymon Breton, “From Ethnic to Civic Nation

Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1988, pp. 86-102.

19. Zekerijah Smajic, Evropska unija i zemlje bivse Jugo

Sarajevo: Oko, 1997; Paolo Facchi, Melita Richter Malabotta, 

Venza, eds., Conflittualità balcanica. Integrazione europea, 

Eitre, 1993.

20. Francois Fejtö, La fin des démocraties populaires, Paris

1992; E.Fanara, ed., I diritti dell’uomo da Helsinki a Belgrado: r

e prospettive, Milano: Giuffrè, 1981.

21. Stefano Bianchini, “Political Culture and Democratisa

the Balkans,” in Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallaghan

Democratisation in the Balkans, London: Routledge (forthc

Marilyn Rueschemeyer, ed., Women in the Politics of Postcom

Eastern Europe, New York: Sharpe, 1998; Stasa Zajovic, ed., 

mir, Beograd: Zene u crnom, 1997; Mary Kaldor and Ivan V

“Democratization in East and Central European Cou

International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, January 1997, pp. 59-8

Zgodic, Gradjanska Bosna, Tuzla: Ritam, 1996.

220
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

AT THE BRINK OF THE NEW CENTUR

THE SECURITY ASPECT

Valeri Ratchev

Introduction.

The sole mentioning of the Balkans (or southea

Europe, as all the countries of the region prefer it 

called) is often sufficient to spoil the mood of a

introduce skepticism among the participants a

conference on international security issues. 

immediately reminds them of the scenes of violence 

TV screens since the end of the 1980s, starting 

Timisoara in Romania, passing through Bihac 

Srebrenitsa in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and endi

practically any village in Kosovo.

It would be wrong to say that people were not u

seeing violence on TV before 1989. The terrorist a

Northern Ireland and Spain, for example, were not ple

to watch, either. The difference, however, is not so m

the essence of the problems, but rather in their po

interpretation, in their print and televised media cov

The Balkans in Fire: Nightmare in Yugoslavia, B

Ghosts: A Journey through History, Fifty Years of Wa

Diplomacy in the Balkans, Balkan Tragedy: Chao

Dissolution After the Cold War , and Summer in the Ba

Laughter and Tears After Communism are only sam

the titles and headlines of books and publications by 

prestigious international figures as James Hill, Yves D

Robert Kaplan, Carol Sforza, Susan Woodward, and R

Baker. The apotheosis of this rhetoric is in the words 

the way of thinking) of a senior European dipl

“Whether we like or not, NATO has become the she

221
spoken is past recalling.

The Situation in the Balkans.

Rightly or not, the Balkans will enter the 21st cent

a by-word for instability and conflicts. Researchers fr

over the world are seeking the roots of this un

situation in the conflicting nature of the Balkan peop

the heritage of the Ottoman Empire and the Cold W

the contradictory policy of the great powers for cen

and, even now, aiming at redistribution of the space 

region, and in new geopolitical and economic interest

The truth probably includes elements of all 

reasons. However, what is strategically important 

the nations of the region is that ongoing and pot

conflicts isolate it from the rapid integration proces

Europe, divert huge resources from development prog

increase the technological backwardness of the cou

and of the regional infrastructure as a whole

immensely reduce the standard and quality of life 

peoples.

As a result of these circumstances, the Balkan Pen

became a specific space from the perspective of Eur

security:

• the largest military operation in Europe for 

century was carried out in this region;

• this is the region, where, contrary to all other pa

Europe, the level of heavy armaments continues 

maintained at the highest possible level, and in 

cases is being increased;

• the level of political contacts between the B

countries continues to carry signs of geome

configurations (the well-known axes and tria

222
the necessary contemporary approach;

• the regional infrastructure, the economic excha

and the regional distribution of labor are still at 

low level compared to the other parts of Europe; 

• the standard and quality of life of the Balkan p

lag considerably behind that of the rest of Europ

this makes the region unattractive, even f

inhabitants.

Risks and Threats to Security.

The main threat to security in Southeastern Eur

the economic, social, and ethno-religious insta

emerging against the background of still pow

nationalism, of aspirations for national and e

self-determination, and of related territorial dispute

collapse of the totalitarian form of government activ

number of latent contradictions, hidden forcefully by t

regimes. These contradictions create new risks 

challenges to security.

The dismantling of the biggest Balkan state began 

the collapse of the bi-polar system. The bloody Yug

quake sent tectonic waves all over the region that c

threats of different degrees to the neighboring coun

The 5 years of war in former Yugoslavia, the 2 1/2 ye

efforts to implement the Dayton Peace Agreements, th

orientation of the former communist states, the Alb

and the Cyprus crises—all these circumstances profo

altered the geo-political picture of the region. Fr

political prospective, the Balkans are so radically dif

now that the use of the term, Balkans , is al

unreasonable.

The level of stability, the security policy orientatio

relations with the other European states, the Eur

Union (EU), the United States, NATO, and Russia, f

223
and Herzegovina) are completely different from those 

southern sub-region (Bulgaria, Romania, Greece

Turkey) and the central sub-region (Albania, Mace

and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). It is precis

the Central Balkans where the ongoing and pot

conflict sources are concentrated. On the background 

approach to the configuration of the Balkans, the cr

the last decade is the epicenter of the tensions that sen

tectonic waves to the southeast.

In the northern sub-region, the tensions, accumula

the period after World War II, resulted in the rupture 

Yugoslav Federation by force of arms. After a long “sta

period," however, the commitment of the West was of a 

intensity and eventually lead to a large scale peaceke

operation, to the Dayton formula for creation of a new 

and to a program for economic recovering of the regio

The shift of the conflict to the central Balkan sub-r

could be expected because of the almost identical cha

of the contradictions and their nonsettlement i

framework of the Dayton process in Bosnia 

Herzegovina. Although similar in roots, the cases of K

Macedonia, and Albania are very different from the o

the north, and very little of the accumulated experien

be mechanically applied. Precisely these circumst

opened the way for some Bulgarian initiatives on K

that were supported by its neighbors.

The contradictions in the Southern Balkans a

another nature and do not stem from the crisis that be

Yugoslavia a decade ago. Their dimensions are at a h

strategic level because they affect the interests o

United States, Russia, and the states of the EU i

Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Neverth

there is a threat of a chain reaction of the conflict spre

from the central sub-region to the Southern Balkans

224
Three crisis areas with different degrees of int

dominate in Southeastern Europe:

• the “hot crisis” in Kosovo and the issue of Albani

Macedonia;

• the “fading (for the time being) crisis” in Bosni

Herzegovina; and,

• the “cold crisis” in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus

There was nothing unusual in the development 

Kosovo crisis. In Chechnya and Kurdistan and in Afric

Central America, the regular armies deal with the 

and the separatists in the same way—through cleans

the ethnic groups and the social groupings that su

them. The Serbs applied the same tactics in the beginn

the war against the dismantling of the Yugoslav Feder

The Croats and the Bosnians did the same towards th

of the war.

Throughout the Kosovo crisis, the West could no

the right tune. It declared some Serb operatio

legitimate defense against the separatists and othe

requiring immediate NATO interventions, whil

cleansing operations in Central Kosovo in July 1998 

passed with silence. The western countries looked 

actors in a drama in which they play the roles that they 

chosen themselves, depending on their culture and 

their own languages.

For the time being, NATO succeeded in haltin

violence without military intervention, but much tim

wasted. Because of this, the main motive for su

intervention became the refugee problem. There is no 

that this problem is important, but its possible solutio

not eliminate the roots of the conflict in the province

Albanians will probably accept some parts o

agreements, but giving up the demands for indepen

225
concessions on obvious issues, but giving up the de 

control over Kosovo and the border with Albania will 

among them.

The problem is that none of the parties involved 

conflict—the Serbs, the Albanians, or the part o

international community that has authorized it to 

decisions—has a strategy for its real solution. The l

strategy creates the possibility for offensiveness o

claims, opens the door for expansionism, and lea

permanent escalation of pretensions of an Is

Palestinian type.

The way in which the conflict was prevented at this 

is characterized by some important elements that will 

a lasting imprint on the future situation in the regio

• It was admitted that the conflict is stained with 

to a stage when “the victims cannot be forgo

Whatever the political development in the futu

these victims will hang as a “sword of Damocles

the ethnic peace in the province.

• Although the western leaders and media see the 

of evil in the person of Yugoslav President Slo

Milosevic, the United States again decid

negotiate with him for the solution of a crisis cr

by his government. The end of the Milosevic 

postponed for the indefinite future. The questio

for whom is that “good," and for whom is that ”

• The countries of the region were once more is

from the decisionmaking on issues that concern 

vital interests, although the West admitted th

mistake to isolate the neighbors around the D

Agreements should not be repeated. Ther

continuous statements that partnership 

associated membership status make s

participants in the crisis management, the las

226
their intentions and acts were the countries o

region. And this is an overstatement, in fact 

countries were not consulted at all. There w

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (E

mechanism, there was no “strategic partner

There was just a note requesting air space cor

that could be dispatched with the same word

Sweden as well.

• Despite the obvious potential “domino effect

approach to the management of this crisis was 

dominated by military threats. The efforts to for

Albanians to work out a common position in 

weeks that they have not succeeded in doing 

years is an example of pseudo-diplomacy. The 

result of the diplomatic pressure on Serbia wa

consolidation of the nation around Milos

political camarilla. The pick was reached 

Milosevic was called to Moscow to accept the dem

of the Contact Group, while at the same ti

Brussels, Rugova was instructed to 

negotiations.

• The solution of the crisis even at this stage put a

to Russia’s geo-political presence in the C

Balkans. Bulgaria and Romania were lost fo

Russian cause forever. For the first time, Serb

Russia’s weakness on its back and will proba

longer count on its support. The area of the Nor

and Central Balkans will remain under NATO

with all evolving consequences.

The other regional conflict, one that could be qualif

a “fading” or ”cooling” crisis, is the one in Bosni

Herzegovina, in other words, the zone of action 

Dayton Peace Agreements. This crisis became a str

challenge of a new type for the democratic community

precisely in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the N

horizons started to expand, and the idea that peaceke

227
could, if not be dominant, be at least equally importa

the collective defense.

Second, it is very important to note that in Bosn

Herzegovina, NATO demonstrated abilities to ove

contradictions with nonmember countries and 

international organizations, such as the Western Eur

Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Russia’s participat

the peacekeeping operations is a historic precede

cooperation with NATO and facilitated the signature 

Founding Act in May 1997.

Third, the NATO peacekeeping Implementation 

(IFOR)/Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation demonst

that, in a period of general reduction of the armed force

activities in coalition and cooperation between armed 

of different states is the approach that will lead t

creation of a base for a collective instrumen

maintenance of international peace and stability.

What is new in the development of the situat

Bosnia and Herzegovina is the change of the ge

situation.

• The Milorad Dodic government was the first 

Bosnian Serb Republic that was pro-Dayton, an

facilitated the implementation of the agreeme

nationalistic-oriented government took over aft

last elections in 1998, and it remains to be see

this will influence the future developments

Muslim-Croat Federation improves slowly as a 

formation, but the national and religious disun

the community level is still very strong. It re

evident, however, that further implementation 

Dayton Peace Agreement is impossible wi

external pressure, including military presence.

• The SFOR contingent is the only dominant m

force in the region, and, as a result, no threat 

228
international forces in the implementation of 

future missions. The Bosnian Federation Ar

being slowly formed, and its main problem is th

of well-trained commanders. The Serb army is 

its superiority in heavy armaments, but it i

much better manned with qualified personnel.

• The probability of resuming the combat activi

practically nonexistent for the time being. The th

to security come mainly from the unsolved issue 

return of refugees and the related possible clash

local level. The existence of scores of armed cri

groupings and persons that pillage the populatio

the refugees in the less controlled regions is 

serious problem.

The disputes between Greece and Turkey on Cypru

the Aegean Sea are a sort of Cold War with an unpredi

prospective. Two elements continue to further comp

the situation.

• The first is last year’s official statement of the E

the leading member-states that they are not re

consider the application of Turkey for 

membership (at least for the time being). D

some softening of the EU position, Turkey agai

not invited to participate in the Vienna Summ

December 1998 as a potential member of the U

The scalding of the more than two decade

ambitions of Turkey introduces new elements 

European and Balkan policy. They can hard

expected to be entirely positive to Europe, alt

Ankara is likely to initiate steps for improvin

bilateral relations with the Balkan countries, G

excluded. Last year, certain differences of the 

and Turkish positions concerning the reg

military cooperation could be registered. The fad

the European integration goal will inevitably fe

pro-fundamentalist moods and actions in the cou

229
very important factor with regard to the Balkan

it is of common interest that its political stabi

preserved.

• The second element was the deal between Russ

the Republic of Cyprus for delivery of ground-

missiles C-300 to the Greek Cypriots, i.e., 

deployment in the integrated Greek-Cypriot d

space. This led to the freezing of initial d

between Greece and Turkey. The decision to d

the missiles on Crete Island and the possible pur

of other types Russian ground-to-air missil

Nicosia will hardly ease the tensions between G

and Turkey. The present situation leads t

following conclusions that may change unde

influence of new developments: (1) in the Cyprus 

there is another “player”—Russia; (2) a cha

contrameasures and possible answers to them 

probably follow; (3) it will give another argume

delaying the beginning of possible pol

negotiations; and, (4) the policy of all external f

to the region will have to become more cautiou

It is evident that, whatever the international med

efforts might be, the solution of the open issues be

Greece and Turkey continues to be in the hands of th

countries.

Transnational Risk Factors.

The organized crime in Southeastern Europe is gro

due to the transition processes in some of the countrie

the existence of sources of tension and military confl

the Balkans as well as in the adjoining geo-str

regions. One of the main “traditional” (the so-called Ba

roads for narcotics traffic to Western Europe passes th

Southeastern Europe from the “Golden Cres

(Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran) as well as from 

Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. (It is estimated that 

230
this route.) “The Balkan Road” is also used in the op

direction—for the transportation to the Near an

Middle East of chemicals produced in Western E

needed for drug production. In the last years, gr

efforts are being observed for the creation of new cha

for drug traffic.

There is a tendency for increasing the illegal tra

arms, ammunition, and explosives. Several channels 

through the Balkans—from Western Europe to Turke

the Middle East, from Russia to former Yugoslavia (th

Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece), to Turkey and the M

East, from Serbia to the neighboring countries, 

recently, from Albania to Kosovo and Macedonia

increase of the quantities of arms, ammunition

explosives in the illegal markets in the Balkans 

objective factor for the expansion of political and cri

terrorism.

The traffic of strategic goods and raw material

relatively new phenomenon in the region. Besides the 

criminal results, this traffic creates a real danger of nu

chemical, and bacteriological terrorism on a reg

European, and world-wide scale.

Due to its geographic situation, Southeastern Eur

one of the migration “highways” from Asia and Africa 

developed countries of Western Europe and the U

States. One of the touch-lines between the Christia

the Muslim worlds passes precisely here, and ther

constant danger of infiltration of Islamic fundamen

groups and activists. The balance of security o

Southeastern European countries is particularly sen

to these processes. In fact, in defending their na

interests, the countries of the region, including Bul

are buffers on the way of the migration waves.

The region is very vulnerable to money launderin

liberalization of the internal and external econ

relations and the great increase of the number of fin

231
that are not being sufficiently controlled, create favo

conditions for money laundering.

The acts of terrorism in southeastern Europe show 

the degree of terrorist threat is very different i

different countries of the region. The terrorist act

have mainly internal characters. At the same tim

different terrorist pressures on the states lead to differ

in their reactions. The varying degrees of preparedn

the defense systems of the individual countries create 

of maneuver for terrorist organizations and conditio

the “transfer” of terrorism. This converts internal terr

into a regional threat.

The Caspian Energy Resources: Impact

on Southeastern Europe.

The picture of southeastern Europe will not be com

if the situation in the adjoining region—the Black Se

Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea—is not kept in mind

The shallow waters of the northeastern Caspia

have become an obsession for the world’s biggest ind

and some of the world’s most powerful countries. Geol

studies have suggested that the salt dome there sits 

potentially gigantic oil field, called Kashagan, and 

together with the large Tengiz field nearby and thou

of other smaller wells in the region, could be worth b

to the companies that control it—and to Kazakhstan 

In recent months a near hysteria has enveloped Kash

for perhaps the richest prize of this decade’s high-s

competition for Caspian oil and natural gas. 

The U.S. Government has made the energy-rich re

strategic priority. The official statements in the win

1998 suggested that the goal of the United States is to 

the investment and revenues generated by the Caspia

Caucasus region’s energy resources play a crucial r

furthering its economic and political development. 

232
pipelines through Iran that would be of interest to n

the western countries nor to Russia.

The United States declared that it support

construction of multiple pipelines in order to e

unimpeded oil and gas supplies in the future. “We str

support the development of transport routes for Ca

energy through Russia, which we believe is in the inte

all the regional states,” Jan Kalicki, the U.S. Com

Department envoy to the region, said on February 25, 

He particularly supported the completion of the Ca

Pipeline Consortium (CPC) project from Kazakhst

Novorosiisk.

This considerably diverges from the recent U.S. s

Washington wants to deprive the neighborhood to

Russia and Iran, control over more than a token share 

oil from Kashagan.

2

 To do that, the United State

proposed the construction of a massive 1,087-mile 

km) east-west pipeline, which would start from Kazak

and Turkmenistan, then run west under the sea to 

the capital of Azerbaijan—and the center of the Casp

business. From there, it would cross Georgia and term

in Ceihan, a Turkish port city on the Mediterranean

key is that no oil would pass through Russia or Iran.

What is odd about the rush on the pipeline issue i

nobody yet knows whether Kashagan is flush with 

only a major dud. The results of the definitive drilling 

by a consortium of major oil companies that should 

started in December 1999 will not be available unti

summer, at the earliest. Still no one has forgotten the 

seismic studies showing that Kashagan cou

two-and-half times as large as Kazakhstan’s Tengi

Caspian’s largest proven field. Tengiz has 6 billion 

billion barrels of producible reserves—a remarkable fi

world standards. The governments backing Baku-C

worry that, unless the pipeline is started soon, a 

geo-strategic opportunity will be missed.

233
world-wide, has set off a tense squabble between t

companies, which would have to foot most of the estim

$4 billion pipeline bill, and the U.S. Government wh

determined to press ahead with the project.

In the end of October 1998, the oil companies—a

them Shell, Mobil, and British Petroleum—held a top

meeting with U.S. officials to discuss the matter

outcome of the talks was as muddy as some r

disappointing dry holes in the Caspian. “We all agree

Baku-Ceyhan makes sense. What we need to do is find 

to make it commercially viable in the shortest po

time.” said an American official. “Baku-Ceyhan is go

happen. The main reason is that the governments w

and politics do matter,” Jan Kalicki, the U.S. Com

Department envoy to the region, said.

In the meantime, it was announced that the Weste

consortium would be prepared to build a shorter pip

which would terminate at Georgia’s Black Sea p

Supsa. It would be roughly half the length o

Baku-Ceyhan plan—and cost roughly half as much.

U.S. Government officials considered the Supsa 

temporary solution. Before their meeting with oil exec

at the end of October 1998, they were at pains to dismi

notion that the original pipeline idea was unten

Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Stroub Talbott called re

of its imminent demise “wrong and inaccur

Washington’s Caspian allies also spoke out. Tu

president Suleyman Demiril said: “Azerbaij

determined [to go ahead with the Baku-Ceyhan 

Georgia and Turkey are determined, and the United S

is backing the project.”

In Ankara, Turkey, on November 3, 1998, the presi

of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia

Uzbekistan signed a joint statement, supportin

Turkish Baku-Ceyhan project. The statement, that 

“symbolic character,” was signed also by U.S. E

234
last-moment withdrawal of the President of Turkmen

without further explanations.

Just before signing the statement, Turkish Fo

Minister Ismail Jem threatened that his country 

address itself to other energy sources and producers to 

its needs if the “mistake” were made not to finaliz

Baku-Ceyhan project. He repeated Turkey’s position t

would not allow the Bosporus and the Dardanelle

Straits) to become a “pipeline."

Commissary of the European Commission Ch

Papautsis emphasized, however, that “from a politica

strategic point of view, it is better that more than one 

exists” for the transportation of the Caspian oil, addin

Russia should not be excluded. The diversification 

energy supplies is one of our principle goals in guaran

these supplies, he added.

The unsolved status of the Caspian Sea is an obsta

the development of the Caspian energy projects. 

important, however, is that many of them are comp

and may cause serious conflict situations in the regio

It can be expected that, at this stage, the ambitious 

of many companies for exploitation and transportat

Caspian gas and oil will not be implemented. A

investments are considerably lower than previ

announced, and the conclusion may be made that the g

the conservation of the Caspian fields rather than the

and complete exploitation. This is due both t

international conjuncture (energy overproduction 

considerable decrease of their international prices) a

the interests of the main geo-political and economic act

In the regions that are main energy transport kn

serious increase in the political, social, and ethnic ten

may be expected, even to the creation of more large

conflicts. That is particularly valid for the Caspian s

Turkey, and the Balkans.

235
information?

• The U.S. Government is considering the issue 

strategic and political one; its main goal is to i

Iran and Russia (it is to be discussed which of th

should occupy the first place in this negative ra

In fact, the United States is trying to isolate the 

Eurasian region (the oil field countries and T

excluded) from the supply route to the world mar

• As it is still not absolutely sure that the Caspi

and gas are worth the huge investments tha

planned, the interests of the U.S. Governmen

those of the major oil companies do not en

coincide. Another reason for such possible differ

is that the Caspian oil and gas may undermin

world energy prices that are at a low even witho

appearance of the new supplies.

• Although five countries (Turkey, Azerba

Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan) plu

United States already supported the Baku-C

project, this should not be regarded as anything 

than a political declaration. The implementat

the project will inevitably lead to econ

contradictions that will be not easy to 

Turkmenistan’s last-moment withdrawal 

indication of this.

• Russia evidently will be against the southern ro

the only solution. Moscow will insist on the we

route (using the already existing pipeline to the 

Sea port, Novorossiisk) and probably much mo

the future north-western pipeline (through R

Ukraine, and Poland to Western Europe). It is a

sure that Russia will be supported by Ukrain

Poland (mainly for economic reasons), but 

probably will be also supported by severa

236
Guaranteeing the diversification of the e

supplies will be among the main arguments fo

support.

The main conclusion for us is that the Balkans (Bu

and Romania, and, to a certain extent, Greece) will 

remain outside of the energy highways to Western Eu

Nobody seems to be very keen to invest in a pipeline 

the Black Sea from Novorossiisk or Supsa (Georg

Romania and Bulgaria (at least for the time being). 

best case, some oil will be delivered by tankers to the 

Sea ports of the two countries, but the quantities w

marginal. The situation with the gas might be sl

better because of the existing infrastructure. The proj

construction of a gas pipeline from the Bulgarian Blac

port of Burgas to the Greek Aegean Sea po

Alexandroupolis will still remain under question. (R

has already declared that it will not support the p

because it is economically unprofitable.) The pol

strategic, and economic importance of Turkey will inc

enormously, compared to her Balkan neighbors.

Conflicts and Integration.

Security is the key word for any region, and, of cour

the Balkans, too. Investing in the security of this regio

whole will certainly have a direct positive impact o

zones of conflict as well. In such a case, the conflict w

only be “capsulated” and the risk of its expansion beyo

zone will sharply diminish, but a sort of political “ma

will be created, attracting the sides of the conflict 

certain type of behavior encouraged by external fa

Such a powerful “magnet” or stimulation shou

membership in the EU, and—as far as secur

concerned—in NATO, of countries with proven po

stability and democratic development.

In fact southeastern Europe has its stra

advantages. The region is a linking point between Eas

237
economic, and information linch pin of the EU t

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and C

Asia. The region shapes the NATO Southern Fla

increases the Alliance’s strategic depth wi

significantly extending its outer borders.

The countries of southeastern Europe may ha

important contribution to make to conflict preventio

the struggle against the new threats to interna

security. If integrated, they will be a reliable a

preventing the proliferation of weapons of 

destruction, and in cutting the channels for illegal tra

narcotics and arms. These are threats against the se

of Europe and the United States, but not all the alli

ready to fight them unconditionally. 

The crises in Former Yugoslavia and Albania an

problems in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea have a p

influence on the image of the whole region. Se

countries that were not involved in any conflict, and 

contributed substantially to the success of interna

efforts for their solution, are de facto partially is

geographically, economically, and politically from 

processes in the part of Europe west of the conflict 

They are in the shadow of the conflicts that determin

ways of political thinking and behavior. The ge

characteristic of the countries of the region is 

insufficient decisiveness in carrying out the obv

needed radical reforms in the economic, internal

foreign policy fields. The rating of the Balkan countrie

an economic and financial point of view is low, and to a 

extent continues to be determined by the conflicts’ inte

As a result, a conceptual vacuum is created conce

the states of the region. Western Europe and the U

States define their main accents and strategy usin

conflicts as a point of departure (starting point). 

actions are directed mainly by “point decisions” 

unfortunate), aimed at settling already exi

238
the conflict solution are not sufficiently considered (if a

and no strategy for the political and economic investm

the region is worked out. The military and political-m

measures have priority in the attempts to maste

situation.

In its policy towards southeastern Europe, Russia

power with traditional interests and influence in the r

also has as a main priority the settlement of the cri

Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Albania and Kosovo. R

also tries to maintain friendly relations wit

governments there, to preserve the inherited mil

strategic balance in the region through which to enco

the countries to adopt a policy of neutrality, and, abo

to ensure favorable conditions for functioning of the Ru

infrastructure energy systems passing through or fe

the countries of the region. These energy systems bec

part of the political instrument for achieving Russia’s 

in the region. (Boris Yeltsin stated, “What is goo

GASPROM is good for Russia.”)

It should be emphasized that in this context the B

states are not offered the possibility to actively defend 

case.” In a much lesser degree, they are regarded as s

(and reliable as far as investments are concerned) al

the efforts to build up a homogeneous security zone. D

their ambitions, they are forced to feel rather as a part 

problem than a part of the solution.

The countries of the region are particularly sensit

some aspects of the implementation of the We

integration concepts. NATO has always been consi

here as a political test for the attitude of Western E

and the United States to the Balkans. Excluding cou

such as Slovenia and particularly Romania from th

enlargement wave dispatched to the region a clear sig

the prematurity of the expectations. The ground 

created for spreading doubts concerning the place 

region in the geo-strategy of the 16 capitals. Concerns 

239
between the countries of Central and Eastern Europ

share the same political heritage and do not dramat

differ in their post-communist development

“Yalta/Malta” syndrome became actual again in se

countries. The governing reformist majorities in cou

such as Bulgaria and Romania were forced to rend

account of why countries, distant from areas tha

neuralgic for the Euro-Atlantic security, were prefer

join the first group invited to adhere to the Alliance.

In Expectation of Washington 1999.

With the approaching of NATO’s 50th Anniversar

the Washington Summit, the public debate on the Alli

enlargement is inflaming again in the candidate coun

The reactions of the “strong” candidates—Romani

Slovenia—to the Madrid Summit decisions were t

deception, and even offense, because of placing them a

the “second rate states." The NATO member-states 

supported their candidacy were declared “friends for

even some heads of state became honorary citizens 

unfortunate candidates. Those who were against a

became enemies of the nation.

In Bulgaria the decisions of the Madrid Summit 

accepted with understanding from both supporter

opponents—it was clear to everyone to what exten

Bulgarian candidacy was desperately late and to 

extent the country was unprepared for the task whe

decision was taken.

Despite everything else, all Balkan countries hav

bitter impression that they still are the “bad boys

there are still numerous and important consideratio

their isolation from the real integration that have noth

do with strategy or even politics.

It is still not entirely clear whether new states w

invited in Washington or if the issue will be left fo

240
William Cohen in Portugal, no new invitations are for

in April 1999. If we judge the statements of some Eur

leaders, they will insist on a second group. However, 

an internal NATO debate and will obviously remain 

way. It is understandable that the Alliance needs ti

absorb the three new members and to make the n

conclusions on the basis of accumulated experience.

The improvisations on the thesis—will there be an

wave of NATO enlargement in April 1999—are unfr

and even senseless. While we were dealing with 

improvisations in 1994-1997, we missed the time to 

out the necessary reforms that were successfully do

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. We should 

upset that the opinion not to invite any country in 1

prevailing. Our main task is to achieve the criter

membership with the clear understanding that, due 

NATO open-door policy, our turn will inevitably come 

time. A different long-term development wou

unfortunate not only for the candidate-countries, bu

Alliance and the European security as well.

The countries of southeastern Europe, how

continue to make enormous efforts in order to a

attention. Some extremes can also be watched: eff

promotions are being carried out, avalanches of PfP a

are being proposed, and multinational military form

are shooting up like mushrooms and are expecting a 

anywhere so that they may demonstrate their 

“NATO-like” abilities. All this is understandable and 

right because the stakes are very high. At the same 

however, this strains the questions that naturally em

the main one being, “If the enlargement is post

indefinitely (we should not forget that the enlarg

costs were calculated for a period of 10-12 years), wha

the European security system look like?”

It seems obvious that the promised all-Euro

security system will be replaced by a collective se

241
cooperative system for the others. On the border be

them, a very important division line will emerge. F

purely military point of view, this is not all that esse

but it becomes extremely important because o

restrictive measures for crossing the borders, of 

protectionism, of information and cultural domination

If NATO does not expand, the military aspect 

security of the countries that remain outside the Al

will not change considerably; it can hardly be expecte

bilateral or multinational regional military alliances w

formed, even under the threat of new crises. Wha

change, however, is the assessment of the general se

level, the state of the so-called enhanced national sec

It is a question of principle for us whether the N

member-states are in a position to change 

enlargement philosophy from “adherence of stabili

“adherence for stability." This is unthinkable toda

precisely this attitude opens possibilities to those who 

“other” geo-strategic and geo-economic interests to dra

conclusion. If the conflicts stop the integration, the

best way to keep enormous areas fluid is to mainta

conflict situations through arms sales, supporting one

confronting others, economic and customs restric

splitting friendly and friendly to our enemies state

governments, etc. 

So we come to the question, “Will NATO contin

emphasize and develop the collective defense as a dom

function, i.e., if Article 5 of the Washington Tre

stressed, how will the difference between membershi

partnership be gradually eliminated (what was promi

a lot of statements after Madrid)?” Defense , even if th

to modify the notion, is dealing with precise concepts

as war theaters, adversaries, military potentials, str

and operational areas, etc. In Southeastern Europe w

trying to adopt the liberal way of thinking, but it is 

242
compensate for the advantages of the membership.

These questions may be easy to answer fro

academic point of view, but they are very difficult to a

from a political point of view. Our governments need su

in order to carry out political and economic reforms, su

that should have a small but steady development. And 

practically everything in our countries is invest

integration, and this integration is practically non-exi

one day somebody may ask unpleasant questions abo

wasted resources, about the wasted political confid

and about the lost opportunities. We hope that in N

nobody fools himself that in their present shape EAP

PfP may exhaust the integration issue. It is fully po

that the NATO and EU states close themselves in thei

problems (they have enough of them and have full ri

do so because their governments must also render acc

of the spent resources), and to marginalize their str

responsibility of the countries which are still in “the 

zone." This will not be the end of life in the Balkans, a

the people will not emigrate to the West. But the pict

southeastern Europe will be complicated an

development—unpredictable:

• For a long period, the borders between the B

countries will remain frontiers. These frontie

have to be protected and defended. The issue 

military balance will continue to occup

militaries’ minds when they propose or 

decisions on defense issues. The defense of a cla

type will be a main trend of the military buildu

the basic task of the military policy. The re

military cooperation will consist rath

compensating the imbalances than in an express

a high mutual confidence.

• The threat of the “domino effect” will paralyz

relations between the countries of the region for 

time. Kosovo, the Serb Republic in Bosnia 

243
Turks in Bulgaria and Greece, the Kurds, Cyp

all these are elements of one and the same do

The problem of the Balkans, however, is not 

ethnic diversity, the problem is in the pove

poverty that is not very different than the one 

beginning of this century when the Balkans be

known as the “powder keg” of Europe. T

however, the poverty is placed in a new politica

information environment. This environ

complicates the solution of the problem

peace-work,” it unifies causes that are at a dista

many hundreds of kilometers.

• The policy of Western Europe towards the ea

part of the continent will be dominated by th

states. The weak relations of the Balkan cou

with the EU combined with the further restri

due to the future adherence of the Czech Rep

Poland, Hungary, and Slovene in EU will le

shrinking of the markets, the communication

political contacts, and the cultural exchanges. I

this is added the possible limitation of the 

presence and the practically complete disengage

of Russia from European affairs, their policy wil

no alternative and no corrective. For the cou

that fall in the zone of direct interests of some We

European countries, this could be the source 

progressive development. For all the others, how

the solution will be to return to the Russian 

Ukrainian markets where the crisis will lead 

demand for goods that are not of the quality 

western or Japanese, but are of much lower p

The increased trade exchanges with Russia 

Ukraine will not be based on direct payments b

barter. And our 10-years’ experience shows 

barter is the most powerful source of illegal in

and organized crime.

244
e beaad poesteteectuas b

first to perceive the lack of perspective in thei

countries and will seek ways to realize them

abroad. This will have as a consequenc

diminishing of the reserve of democratic politi

At all elections the political elite will be grad

replaced by figureheads of the economic grou

Every crisis will revitalize the nationalistic m

just because no other ideology will get suppor

civil society institutions, whose creation req

such enormous efforts in the last years, will grad

politicize.

• Evidently, we have to admit that in the Balkans 

are problems which are impossible to solve 

impossibility to solve them is, above a

consequence of the lack of resources. The pr

solution of all sorts is becoming more and 

expensive, and the lack of operative resour

becoming a critical factor in crises managemen

conflict prevention. The lack of resources resu

lack of alternatives. The lack of alternatives m

the armed forces the only real argument. That i

Turkey adopted a $125 billion rearmament pro

Greece declared the purchase of modern wea

Romania is negotiating a deal to buy co

helicopters, and Macedonia is planning to de

30,000-man army.

We understand that the enlargement of a mi

political alliance like NATO by accepting new member

going through difficult political, economic, and 

reforms in a radically changed international environ

is a very complicated and long process. We d

underestimate the complexity of the tasks which NAT

the member countries have to solve in this context. B

the same time, we expect from NATO a reciprocal 

solidarity, giving Bulgaria concrete perspectives. W

convinced that we have the right to expect that in the 

245
will be especially mentioned as a serious applica

membership, and South Eastern Europe will be defin

the natural direction of the next phase of the enlarge

process.

Going Ahead: Alone? Together?

When discussing the security issues in southea

Europe, it is difficult to say what is pessimistic and w

realistic. It is even more difficult to make concret

specific suggestions to Balkan governments to do t

Bosnia, or that in Kosovo, or something else in Cypru

approach of the countries of the region—reserv

positive—is very important.

• We may criticize the hasty, short-sighted decisi

the first stages of the Yugoslav crisis which cer

exacerbated an already tense situation.

• We may shake our heads critically at the opt

with which the United States thought t

crazy-quilt pattern, as concocted in Bosnia, 

work effectively.

• We may reproach the EU, the United States, an

United Nations that they have known for year

Kosovo would sooner or later explode, yet the

nothing to prevent it.

• We may regret that, in particular, the EU ha

been able to go beyond talks, visits, and high-

words and take any positive steps.

• We may be also critical of unrealistic schemes, s

bringing the war criminals to justice, which ha

gone beyond a few paltry cases.

What the countries of southeastern Europe can do i

246
oad adse botte teat

organizations and the major power governmen

situations which we, because of our proximity a

our greater knowledge of the area, are b

equipped to know and to assess;

• Keep in touch with each other in a spirit not j

cooperation, but rather in the awareness of a com

problem in our own backyard;

• Talk in a friendly and firm way to all parties inv

official or unofficial, trying to show them that an

they may secure by the force of arms is bound t

them much dearer in terms of losing touch wit

realities of this beginning 21st century; and, fin

• Show by our own example of creative cooperatio

the path we have chosen for our countrie

members or candidates in the European constru

is more promising for our future.

An extraordinary example of a positive approach 

regional cooperation is the establishment o

Multi-National Peace Forces-Southeastern E

(MNPFSEE) by seven countries—Albania, Bulg

Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey. Thi

be considered as an extremely positive achieve

because MNPFSEE unites three NATO member-s

they unite two of which do not maintain the best po

relations, two countries that have no diplomatic rel

and the name of the one is disputed by the other

consist of countries with very different status i

European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The establishment of these forces is a pra

expression of the political will for military cooperation 

the goal of building confidence among neighboring s

MNPFSEE is a concrete element of the military refor

the preparation for accession to NATO, and a w

materialize the new policy of participation in solvin

247
international community.

And last but not least, the establishment of MNP

demonstrates that, when the spirit of cooperation pr

over the differences, our region has a future.

ENDNOTES- CHAPTER 9

1. William Drozdiak, International Herald Tribune, Octo

1998.

2. Steve LeVine, Newsweek, November 2, 1998.

248
TURKISH CHALLENGE

AND EUROPEAN OPPORTUNITY:

GREEK FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIE

IN A POST-COLD WAR SETTING

Theodore A. Couloumbis

Greek Foreign Policy Priorities in a Post-Cold 

Setting.

The post-Cold War period (let us better call it the 1

seems to have falsified the prophesies of both the univ

order and the universal disorder schools of though

present, the world appears to be moving toward a 

variant of bipolarity defined primarily in economic 

than military/political/ideological terms. One pole g

advanced, industrial, and democratic states; whil

second pole comprises regions of the Third World an

former Soviet bloc that are characterized by eco

scarcity and underdevelopment, as well as by po

systems that vacillate between traditional autho

anism, unstable democracy and praetorian manageria

The first pole, a world island of econ

interdependence, democracy, and political stability, is 

up of North America, the European Union (EU), Japa

the remaining economically advanced countries o

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop

(OECD). Greece has managed to consolidate its prese

this zone of stable interdependence by virtue of enteri

European Community on January 1, 1981.

In the second pole, the so-called “poor south” 

planet, one finds countries with developing economie

conflict-prone polities that are unable as of yet to su

consolidated systems of democracy founded on plurali

249
examples of flash points in this region in

humanitarian nightmares in Rwanda, Burundi, 

(Kinshasa), Algeria, Zaire, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghan

Kashmir, Cambodia and North Korea, just to name a 

Hovering somewhere between the two poles are so

the former communist countries of central, eastern

southeastern Europe. These states are in the middl

very sensitive transition process that will either guide 

safely into the ranks of the pole of stability and peace

the second pole of instability, civil strife, and war. U

former Yugoslavia and certain regions of the former S

Union, countries such as Poland, the Czech Rep

Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, an

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 

despite occasional difficulties, to be moving well on th

to a market economy and consolidated democracy.

Greece belongs institutionally to the pole of stabilit

unlike its remaining EU partners, it borders on a reg

fluidity and real or potential conflict north and east 

frontiers. Therefore, the gamut (nearly) of Greece’s po

parties as well as an overwhelming majority of 

opinion have supported, increasingly since the mid-1

the process of Greece’s multidimensional integratio

the mechanisms and institutions of the Western fam

nations. The dominant paradigm premised on mu

eralism and reflecting Greece’s foreign policy prio

could be summarized as follows.

The first priority of foreign policy since 1974 has 

the consolidation of democracy and the adoption 

economic convergence strategy (with the more advanc

partners) designed to safeguard Greece’s historic Eur

option. In their efforts to secure full integration in

“hard core” of post-Maastricht Europe, Greek policyma

whether drawn from the ranks of New Democra

government between 1990 and 1993) or of PASO

government since October 1993), have avoided the so-

250
They have opted instead for a Euro-Atlanticist stance 

to the British, Portuguese and Italian models) recog

that there is adequate complementarity in a strateg

pursues political and economic integration through th

and, simultaneously, relies chiefly on NATO fo

provision of the collective defense and collective se

values.

The second (first from a defense and security stand

priority in Greek foreign policy is the maintenanc

sufficient regime of military balance in the Greek-Tu

nexus of relations. Since 1974 (following the Tu

invasion and continuing occupation of northern Cypru

of Greece’s political parties have been perceiving Turk

posing a major threat to Greece’s territorial integrity 

Aegean and in Western Thrace. In this connection, G

bipartisan policy calls for the maintenance of an ade

balance of forces (especially in the air and sea) 

avoiding highly destabilizing and economically costly 

races. NATO has been repeatedly urged by Greece’s fo

minister, Theodoros Pangalos, to seriously conside

development of an intra-NATO dispute settle

mechanism which would help resolve differences peac

as well as strengthen the appeal of the Atlantic Allianc

collective security as well as collective defense prov

institution.

Under the Constantinos Simitis government (bu

under New Democracy rule in 1990-93), the Greek s

vis-à-vis Turkey’s oft-declared European option has b

move away gradually from a strategy of condi

sanctions and toward one of conditional rewards. In 

words, Greece now openly declares its willingness to 

objections (given its veto power in the EU) to the build

a close relationship between the EU and Turkey, pro

the latter abandons its threats of going to war ov

Aegean question and contributes substantively tow

functional and mutually acceptable solution to the C

problem, permitting the reunification of Cyprus 

251
member of the EU and NATO. Cyprus could thus b

one of the first candidates for NATO expansion i

Eastern Mediterranean setting.

The remaining priorities of Greek foreign policy in

relations with post-Communist Balkan neighbors and 

the non-EU and non-NATO states of the Mediterr

region. In the case of the Balkans, after a painful inte

(1992-94) of near involvement in a regional imbr

Greece has opted for a multilateralist foreign 

(together with its EU, WEU, OSCE and NATO par

designed to contribute to successful transition po

toward democracy and market economy in each of the 

north of its borders. After smoothing its troubled rel

with Albania and FYROM and while continuing to cul

good relations with Bulgaria and Romania, Greece ha

proceeded to adopt a purely equidistant stance (vis

Serbia, Croatia, and Albania) in the questions of Bosn

Kosovo, respectively. The Greek policy toward the Ba

could be summarized today as “not becoming a part 

problem but joining, instead, the coalitions of the w

that act collectively as part of the solution.” In this re

Greece has joined Western peacekeeping and 

enforcement initiatives in Albania, Bosnia, and elsew

in former Yugoslavia, including its mid-May 

participation in PfP military exercises on the territ

FYROM and mid-summer 1998 NATO exercises in Al

together with troops from the United States, Italy

Turkey, among others.

The process of EU and NATO enlargements fit

with Greece’s strategic objective of encouraging sta

and peace in the Balkan region, thus distancin

unpleasant contingency of having to face a s

diplomatic/military front in addition to what has 

widely perceived as a clear and present danger eman

from Turkey. Further, Greece’s substantive suppor

involvement in EU regional, developmental progra

252
Balkans. 

With respect to Greece’s role in the Mediterranea

multilateralist formula applied to the Balkans i

orienting principle for Greek foreign policy in this reg

well. Here the opportunities for NATO and EU initi

are more than apparent. The EuroAtlantic communi

every incentive to extend the values of security 

cooperation into this structurally unbalanced region (w

the EU North is rich and demographically stable whi

non-EU South is economically disadvantaged 

demographically explosive). For the time being

EU/MEDA fund, which amounts to a very substantiv

of 4.7 billion Ecus for the 1995-99 period, is a concret

much needed first step in a gradual convergence str

designed to facilitate economic and political developm

the disadvantaged littoral states of the no

Mediterranean south.

Greek policymakers also find that NATO offers exc

opportunities for military cooperation (be

confidence-building measures) between the allianc

critically important eastern Mediterranean states su

Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Cyprus. The opportuniti

substantive cooperation between NATO and these 

will increase geometrically if the nexus of Greek-Tu

difficulties (which we will address later in this chap

adequately addressed, and Cyprus is permitted to jo

ranks of NATO and the EU (given the overwhe

benefits that such a prospect ensures for both commu

on the embattled island).

Finally, in Greece’s list of priorities, the relatio

with the United States occupies a critical position. 

has been a dramatic improvement in the U.S.-G

relationship during the 1990s. One could argue tha

profile of this relationship from 1947 (the Truman Doc

to 1974 (the collapse of the Athens dictatorship) had b

the classical patron-client variety. The United Sta

253
but internally divided small state, could not have av

the center-periphery dependence relationship. It 

indeed decisive American intervention in the 19

period which prevented a Communist take-over i

Greek Civil War. The victors, the majority in Greece

indeed grateful, and Harry Truman’s statue was e

overlooking a central and busy Greek boulevard. How

the vanquished, a sizable minority, viewed the U

States as an “evil Empire” that had been responsib

their final defeat in 1949.

In the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, Greek-Ame

relations were adversely affected by a constantly esca

Greek-Turkish conflict over the fate of the island of Cy

Perceptions in Athens were that the United State

systematically tilting in favor of Turkey (whose str

value was heavily exaggerated by American stra

thinkers). Anti-Americanism assumed even gr

proportions by what the Greek people considere

American stance of benign neglect (if not outright supp

the dictators) during the 1967-74 period, when Greec

placed under the oppressive regime of the Athens Col

The Greek military regime not only violated basic h

rights but also triggered a criminal coup against Pres

Makarios of Cyprus (July 15, 1974) which—in turn—

the Turkish invasion and the subsequent occupation 

percent of Cypriot territory.

In the years following the restoration of democr

Greece (1974), despite the anti-American rheto

Andreas Papandreou and his left-of-center political 

(PASOK), the image of the United States began impr

again. The gradual consolidation of democracy

incorporation of the vanquished of the Civil War in

political process, continuing economic development, 

into the EU (January 1981), the alternati

Left-and-Right-of-Center parties in power, an

establishment of strict civilian control over the A

Forces, have permitted Greece to move in the direct

254
of independent and antagonistic media (radio and tele

that had been previously state controlled) have 

permitted the kind of complex public exchange that re

dogmatism and challenges Manichean (light vs. dark

oversimplifications.

A Path toward Greek-Turkish Reconciliation.

The points of friction between Greece and Turke

multiple, and much ink has been spilled in descri

analysis, and interpretation of these problems as wel

the presentation of a variety of Greek-oriented, Tu

oriented, and third-party perspectives.

2

Regardless of the merits and demerits of the case o

of the disputants, the central question that needs 

asked is whether Greece and Turkey, which have 

involved in an undisguised Cold War since the m

late-1950s, will be better off in a condition of protr

conflict, as compared to entering into a new phase of m

and active engagement and even coopera

Unequivocally, the answer is that both countries wo

much better off if they were to reach a final reconcilia

new historic compromise, reminiscent of the Lau

settlement of 1923, and the Venizelos-Ataturk tre

friendship of 1930.

The Imia islets and Cyprus crises of 1996, how

underscore the ease with which a state of protracted te

between the two countries may degenerate into orga

violence and warfare. Hopefully, the leaderships in G

and Turkey will have realized by now that Greek-Tu

war is unthinkable because, to begin with, it will i

both belligerants from their Western institut

affiliations. Further, even if Greece or Turkey we

secure some marginal territorial gains after some 

battles, a chain of revanchist conflicts will surely f

classifying both countries as high risk zones w

devastating impact on their economies and societies.

255
current international setting, can only be based o

assumption that Turkey will cement its West Eur

profile. Greece, since 1974, has developed durabl

tested democratic institutions and has become a mem

the EU. Turkey is currently at the crossroads of the 

choice between a European and a non-Euro

orientation. Like post-World War II France and Germ

Turkey and Greece can bury the geopolitical divisions 

past, accept and respect the territorial status quo 

emerged after World War II, and resolve to proscribe t

of the force in their bilateral relations.

A comprehensive Greek-Turkish settlement will 

likely not be achieved without a just and mut

acceptable solution to the prickly problem of Cy

Cyprus has long been at the center of Greek-Turkish 

and still remains so. As long as the present situat

Cyprus continues, whereby the armed forces of T

occupy 37 percent of the island’s territory, Greek-Tu

relations will remain tense, and a solution to C

question will most likely not be forthcoming.

A genuine settlement of the Cyprus problem, wh

today “ripe” for a solution,

3

 would exclude enosis (un

Cyprus with Greece) and taksim (partition of the is

The historic compromise, therefore, calls for indepen

of a federal, bizonal, and bicommunal state, along the 

of the Makarios-Denktash (1977) and Kyprianou-Den

(1979) agreements. Furthermore, Greece and T

cannot, and must not, attempt to impose a settleme

Cyprus. Reconciliation and peace in Cyprus are matte

the two Cypriot communities to agree upon.

4

The new state of Cyprus that will emerge, follow

putative agreement between the representatives o

Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, will be giv

excellent chance to survive and prosper if, at the time 

second birth, the “Federal Republic of Cyprus” w

become simultaneously a member state of the EU a

256
genuine collective guarantees, demilitarization (exce

the British sovereign base areas), and a United N

(U.N.) or preferably a NATO-commanded multina

implementation force (until mutual confiden

established), will allow the troubled Cypriots to 

gradually a long-lived unity based on all the rights, d

and freedoms that democracy provides.

A genuine settlement of Cyprus, while presupp

political equality of the two communities, cannot res

premise equating (in terms of shares of territory, 

national product, and federal parliamentary and exe

powers) the 80 percent of the Greek-Cypriot comm

with the 18 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot commun

fact, all states and governments in the ethnically vo

Balkan and eastern Mediterranean regions must be

abide by a simple and logical rule of behavior; otherwis

chance of having peace in the region will be very slim

rule could be articulated as follows: “Treat min

communities and other dual identity groups resid

your own country as well as you would expect 

countries to treat minorities and other dual-identity g

that are ethnically related to you.” For example, G

should treat its Moslem (i.e., Turkic, Pomak, and 

minority in western Thrace as well as it would like A

to treat the Greek minority in southern Albania. Sim

Turkey should treat (i.e., offer similar rights 

guarantees) its Kurdish community in eastern Turk

well as it would prefer Turkish minority communitie

treated outside of Turkey, whether in Cyprus, G

Bulgaria, or elsewhere. Albania, to give one more exa

should treat the Greek minority in southern Albania a

as it would like Albanian minorities living in neighb

states to be treated. One could proceed offering exa

involving a variety of states with ethnically heteroge

populations in the eastern Mediterranean and Balka

well as in other parts in the world.

257
compromise between Greece and Turkey must rest o

general and two operational principles of foreign 

behavior. The first general principle involves the m

denunciation of the use of force by Greece and Turkey 

by both countries signing and ratifying a non-aggre

pact). The second general principle, which follows fro

first, is that the Greek-Turkish dispute(s) in the Aegea

follow the road of peaceful settlement involving time-

methods such as bilateral negotiations and, in ca

deadlocks, arbitration and adjudication.

The two operational principles apply to Turke

Greece respectively. For the benefit of Turkey and oth

faring countries traversing the Aegean, it must be 

clear that the sea will not be transformed into a “

lake.” For the benefit of Greece, it also must be made 

that the Aegean cannot be partitioned or subdivided i

fashion that encloses (enclaves) Greek territories su

the Dodecanese and eastern Aegean islands into a zo

zones) of Turkish functional jurisdiction. The two prin

together add up to the mutual acceptance of the statu

and the mutual commitment to exclude force 

instrument of policy in the relations of the two count

Concluding Remarks.

Looking from a Greek perspective at the reco

Greek-Turkish relations since the July 1997 M

summit, the optimist would say the glass is half fu

pessimist would retort it was half empty, an

pragmatist might say to both “get a smaller glass

arguments that the optimists tend to employ includ

following: Greece’s domestic conditions (politica

economic) have improved considerably since the days 

Papandreou succession saga (November 1995-July 

Greece has a prime-minister with a pragmatic 

Eurocentric orientation who has managed to est

control over his party, while enjoying a comfor

258
abroad. The party of the loyal opposition, under yo

and modernizing leadership, has lowered the ton

criticism on vital foreign policy questions abandon

“tradition” in Greek politics of automatic dissent 

issues in order to score points with the perman

frustrated Greek public. In Madrid (1997) the Tu

President (with the implicit blessing of his armed f

committed his country to the non-use of force and 

employment of peaceful process for the settleme

disputes. The obdurate behavior of leaders such as 

Denktash and Bulent Ecevit has met with mildly to h

critical responses in the international community

Turkey (and the Turkish Cypriots) is singled o

primarily responsible for the lack of progress in the tor

Cypriot peace process. All this is happening whi

inflation of Greece is falling toward the 2.5 percent 

and the remaining Maastricht (EMU qualification) cr

are within plausible striking distance before the e

1999.

The pessimist, wearing dark glasses, shakes h

head and dismisses the above as reflecting a mixt

utopian thinking and mirage-making. For the pess

the Maastricht regime is being pursued at the expense 

poor and disadvantaged in Greece. Turkey is conti

despite Madrid, to escalate its revisionist demands 

Aegean and in Cyprus, and the “good boy” approach ad

by the current Greek government is being perceiv

Ankara as a sign of weakness. Exhibiting a longing f

now gone “strong, proud, and charismatic” leadershi

pessimists are sounding the alarm for the declining 

population that is “turning decadent, consumerist, s

and, at best, indifferent.” Greece, for the pessimist, st

a chance to survive if it arms well, abandons w

thinking, trusts less on the so-called solidarity 

European partners, and embarks on an interna

crusade condemning Turkey for its miserable human 

259
policy objectives.

At first blush, one might think that both appro

make sense and, in Nasreddin Hodza fashion, 

pronounce them both right! Obviously both optimist

pessimists have similar long-range objectives. They 

want a Turkey that respects the international status 

the Aegean and permits the peace process in the Repu

Cyprus to continue as accession talks for its admiss

the EU are proceeding toward their logical conclusion

optimists and pessimists have no illusions abou

chances of Turkey (given the current fluiditie

contradictions in its society, economy, and polity) op

the gates of a historic reconciliation with Greece. 

optimists and pessimists agree that effective deter

vis-à-vis Turkey depends first and foremost o

maintenance of a sufficient balance of power, 

avoiding—if possible—a costly and destabilizing arms 

But here the similarities end.

The optimists believe that a policy of Euro

integration adds considerably to Greece’s diplo

calculus of deterrence. The pessimists, on the contrar

unilateralist and ethnocentric in orientation. The opt

argue that a policy of tension-reduction is to Gr

advantage, given its privileged condition in politica

economic terms. The pessimists retort that time is wo

in favor of the rapidly growing (in population and m

prowess) Turkey. Between the lines, one reads i

pessimist argument that eventually war is inevitabl

their conclusion is “si vis pacis para bellus.” Finally, 

optimists, ultimately, the argument is summarized 

“how can we avoid war without losing in peace.”

This writer shares the problematique of the opt

and believes that the objective of Greece should be to e

Turkey in a patient, clear-sighted, and long-

campaign in order to convince it that its own best ch

the Euro-Atlantic community of nations. This strategy 

260
rewards” to our complex and vacillating eastern neig

The Turks will hopefully realize that Europe offers the

best future and that in order to join its family fully

must abandon rusty, geopolitical instruments of state

The desired result may take time, but there seems to 

better way whether one wears rosy or dark glasses.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. The literature on post-Cold War systemic changes is v

growing. On the side of those predicting a new world order found

concert of great powers that projects the values of pluralism, dem

and market economy, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of Hist

the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992; and Charles A. Kupch

Clifford A. Kupchan, “The Promise of Collective Security,” Intern

Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 52-61. On the oth

predicting the return of history in a world of great conflict, see Sa

Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking o

Order, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996; and Zbigniew Brz

Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century, Ne

Scribner, 1993.

2. For a detailed and detached review of the positions ta

Greece and Turkey on their bilateral dispute(s), see Andrew Wils

Aegean Dispute, Adelphi Paper No. 15., London: International I

for Strategic Studies, 1979-80; see also Theodore A. Couloumb

United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle, Ne

Praeger, 1983; Thanos Veremis, “Greece,” in Douglas T. Stua

Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic A

Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1988, pp. 137-156

Karaosmanglou, “Turkey’s Security Policy: Continuity and Cha

Douglas T. Stuart, ed., Politics and Security in the Southern R

the Atlantic Alliance, pp. 157-180; Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-T

Relations Since 1955, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990; and Mo

Stearns, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turk

Cyprus, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992.

3. In the view of the author, the end of the Cold War offers p

incentives to the parties in the dispute (Greek and Turkish 

communities) to proceed with a settlement which would ad

Cypriot citizens’ welfare and security by facilitating the entry of 

into the EU and its defense umbrella, NATO.

261
enjoy the concurrence of Greece and Turkey will be less likely 

hold and succeed, given both Cypriot communities’ close affinit

Greece and Turkey respectively.

262
TURKISH SECURITY CHALLENGES

IN THE 1990s

Duygu Bazoglu Sezer

Introduction.

This study will use the term “security” to refer prim

to its external dimension rather than internal, and 

political-military aspect of security rather than its p

political, diplomatic, and social aspects.

It is nobody’s secret that Turkey is faced with a dom

challenge to its territorial integrity in the form of Ku

separatism led by the the Kurdish Workers’ Party (

since 1984. It is also widely known that the Ku

question has negatively penetrated several areas of Tu

foreign policy, souring Turkey’s diplomatic and m

relations with many of its traditional friends and allies

developments in September 1998 have caused a deep 

of disillusionment in Turkey: the re-sponsorsh

Washington of preparations for Kurdish autonom

Northern Iraq, and the meeting of the so-called “Ku

deputies” at the Italian parliament with several I

parliamentarians on September 29.

This paper will limit the discussion of the role of the 

for Turkish security to those cases where its manipu

of the external environment to enhance its ability to w

the Turkish resolve to resist has been narrowin

threshold of human and material damage acceptab

Turkey. The sanctuary and direct assistance provided 

leadership of the PKK by Syria is the most glaring ex

of such cases. For years Turkey has maintained th

freedom enjoyed by the PKK in Syria and the Bekaa V

263
inflict increasingly greater, and therefore unaccep

damage to Turkey. In early October 1998, Turkis

Syrian troops stood face-to-face across the border foll

the Turkish warning of October 1 to Damascus that it 

cease to nurture the PKK or else face the consequenc

This paper will first survey the main features of th

security environment for Turkey, then follow w

discussion of the specific challenges as seen by it.

The New Security Environment.

Turkey has been in the forefront of those cou

whose security situation has dramatically shifted 

1990s. This shift has entailed two contradictory direc

one positive, the other negative.

On the positive side, the end of the Cold Wa

removed the threat of war between the United State

the former Soviet Union which, according to conven

strategic wisdom, would have escalated to the nuclea

at some point.

Turkey, situated directly on the former Soviet U

southwestern borders and hence forming the 

southeastern flank of NATO, most plausibly would 

been physically drawn into such potentially catacl

war. The end of the Cold War appears to have g

diminished the plausibility of such war. This has be

enormous relief for Turkey, the target of outright n

intimidation and attempted blackmail by Soviet le

several times during the height of the Cold War.

However, the anticipation of near-perfect securit

the concomitant peace dividend that the phasing out 

Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet 

heralded in the early 1990s for the world, in general, a

Transatlantic nations, in particular, has proven 

largely illusory for Turkey. Granted, the threat of ge

war seems to have been greatly reduced, and Russi

264
Union, is much, much weakened. Yet, the reg

environment around Turkey breeds both old and new 

of political and military risks and threats that challen

times intrinsically and at others extrinsically, the 

prerequisite of Turkish security. I define that 

prerequisite as “the preservation of Turkey’s will and a

to maintain its domestic unity and socio-economic via

as a democratically-governed, independent political 

while at the same time keeping intact the cou

territorial integrity.”

The Crescent of Instability.

A crescent of instability encircles Turkey almos

circle: from the Balkans in the north, down to the Aeg

the west and the eastern Mediterranean in the south

through the northern Gulf in the south, and, finally, 

Caucasus in the northeast. No other part of the world

even Northeast Asia— parallels this multi-reg

crescent of instability in terms of its vast space, the nu

of inter-state and intra-state conflicts, the number of f

cease-fires, the coercive involvement of the world’s 

powerful military alliance, namely NATO, for peacema

etc. Turkey is the only land bridge that physically con

the three sub-regions of instability situated in 

continents, Asia and Europe.

This exposure to several regions of instability 

have direct and indirect bearing on Turkish interest

example, Turkish interests would be adversely affec

some of the regional conflicts resulted in the violation 

security interests of those states in the region tha

friendly towards Turkey, like Bosnia-Herzego

Albania, Macedonia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Se

developments that would usher in a radical shift 

regional configuration of power through irredentist po

and/or coalition-building would threaten Turkish int

by undermining its relative standing in the region. D

265
Greater Serbia and a Greek-Serbian-Russian (Orth

Alliance were feared, both for their impact generally o

Balkan balance of power and specifically on what 

would imply for Turkey’s place in that balance. T

would be outnumbered and outmaneuvered.

The crescent of instability around Turkey prese

with direct challenges as well. For example, the inten

Iran, Syria and Iraq to obtain weapons of mass destr

(WMD) capability of one sort or another purported

counter Israeli capabilities presents a direct challen

Turkish security. Or, the presence of Russian military 

and troops in the southern Caucasus (not on

peacekeeping in Abkhasia but also to man the m

bases in Georgia and Armenia, and to stand guard 

Armenian-Turkish and Georgian-Turkish bor

certainly is not a source of security for Turkey. Such sp

challenges to Turkish security will be discussed in 

detail in the following pages.

Transformation of the Western Alliance.

The seriousness of the instabilities and vulnerab

in the 1990s emanating from the regions around T

acquires added significance against the background 

transformation that the Western alliance has unde

since 1990, in response to the elimination of the S

threat and the emergence of regional conflicts such 

wars in the former Yugoslavia. Thus, NATO is no long

NATO of the Cold War years. More specifically

relevance of Article 5 is very much in doubt under t

circumstances. This implies that Turkey, or any othe

on the flanks, should have less confidence than it 

have had during the Cold War that the principle of coll

defense would be invoked in case of aggression agai

Moreover, Turkey is only an Associate Member of the 

European Union (WEU), by virtue of the fact that it 

nor is it likely to be, a member of the European Union 

266
architecture in Europe have not been designed to offe

protection or assurances, anyway. As a result, NAT

Turkey can no longer count on its protection, presu

still in force.

Security Challenges in the 1990s: Old and New

While for the sake of convenience one can cate

today’s security challenges as “new,” and “old,” one 

need to note the interconnections and linkages among 

Through a process of cross-mutation, new an

challenges get tied to each other at various junctures o

and space, thus acquiring complex and novel 

dimensions. For example, the security challenge 

Greece is old, but it has acquired altogether new dimen

in the 1990s when Athens is pursuing a strategy 

encirclement of Turkey by promoting an anti-Tu

coalition among Greece, Syria and Armenia, 

neighboring countries not reputed for their friendsh

Turkey.

The Threat from Greece and Cyprus.

The perception of Greece as the single most impo

security threat is at its zenith today in Turkey. This is 

compared to the nearly half a century of the Cold War 

this perception was not so all-pervasive, but when th

countries even went to the brink of war several times

There is a qualitative difference in the nature 

Greek threat in the post-Cold War era. Previously, G

posed a threat to Turkish interests in the Aegea

Cyprus. In the 1980s, immediately upon winning entr

the European Union (European Community the

concentrated its diplomatic energies on barring Tu

admission into the processes of European integration. 

the primary Greek objectives with regard to Turkey w

gain exclusive control over the Aegean, and indirectl

Cyprus; and, to secure Turkey’s exclusion from Euro

267
strategic objectives with regard to Turkey have 

broadened to include the following: 1) to entertain, in 

strategic planning, the possibility that Turkey mig

headed for dismemberment by Kurdish separ

spearheaded by the PKK; and, 2) to promote the form

of an anti-Turkey regional coalition in Turkey’s imme

neighborhood in the south and east by exploiting the s

in Turkey’s relations with Syria and Armenia. The foll

pages will discuss Turkish views of the two new eleme

the Greek strategy towards Turkey in the 1990s

traditional conflict over the Aegean and Cyprus an

struggle to bar Turkey from Europe will not be addr

here.

The logic behind the two new elements incorporate

Greek strategic thinking with regard to Turkey was s

A Turkey that might be embroiled in a country-wid

war against Kurdish separatism; a Turkey that mig

isolated by and subjected to the pressures of a coalit

unfriendly forces on its borders in the south and the 

thus a Turkey that would find itself much beleag

domestically and externally would give Greece the fre

to pursue the realization of its objectives on the Aegea

possibly also those on the western coasts of Turkey.

 Turkey has repeatedly charged that Greece, encou

into such thinking by the PKK’s terrorist successe

viewed the latter as a natural ally in its struggle ag

Turkey, extending it political and material support in 

to facilitate the division of Turkey at no cost to itself

Clearly Kurdish separatism and its terrorist arm

PKK, have played into the hands of Turkey’s antagon

the immediate region. Any country with grievances ag

Turkey theoretically could, and in many cases actually 

used the issue to pressure Turkey into “correct beha

This has been true most critically for Syria, and to a 

degree for Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and Russia. While 

European countries and Washington have tried to dea

268
Kurdish separatism by applying a human r

perspective and an anti-terrorism posture, Tur

neighbors in the east have been bound by no 

constraints that inherently showed deference t

systemic features and norms of the international 

which honor the territorial integrity of states. Gen

speaking, Turkey’s immediate neighbors have viewe

issue of Kurdish separatism more like a zero-sum 

whose successful exploitation was anticipated to serve 

respective self-interest. In the event that Turkey ultim

lost to the separatists and was divided, in the zer

thinking Turkey’s loss would automatically result in 

for them, above all for Greece and Syria.

It is in this frame of mind that Turkey has been wat

with concern the progression of national and reg

initiatives towards the creation of what appears to 

anti-Turkey grouping in its immediate vic

spearheaded by Greece and Syria. The first f

manifestation of this process was the signing of a de

cooperation agreement between Greece and Syria in 

1995. In response to expressions of concern by Turkey, 

apparently immediately assured Ankara tha

agreement did not give Greece a right to use Syria

bases. 

Between 1995-98, the diplomatic horizon of G

vastly expanded as it concerned Greece’s anti-Tu

strategy. Greece simultaneously engaged in a bilatera

multilateral diplomatic campaign, first, to establish 

working relations with Damascus, Teheran and Ereva

one-on-one basis, and, second, to promote the idea 

regional grouping between Greece, a Balkan country

three physically and culturally distant countries a

whom no tradition of institutionalized multila

cooperation had ever existed before. All of a sudden in 

Greece decided to launch a diplomatic initiative a

present itself as a leading external force willing and ca

269
the east of Turkey.

Since 1995, a pattern of annual consultations 

Trilateral Meetings have taken shape among Greece

and Armenia with the participation of their resp

foreign ministers. The first meeting took place in Ath

1995, the second in Teheran in 1996, and the third in A

in 1997. The fourth, and final, Trilateral Meeting wa

in Teheran on September 9, 1998. In the mean

numerous high-level bilateral visits have been exch

among the three capitals during which a series of 

communications, energy, and military cooper

agreements were concluded.

What is important at this point is the perception th

anti-Turkey impulse appears to have energize

momentum for cooperation among Greece, Syria, Teh

and Armenia since 1995. The fact that these contacts 

not yet assumed a militarily significant phase capa

posing a coordinated military challenge to Turkey fa

significance from a long term perspective. What o

witnessing in the Athens-Syria-Teheran-Er

interaction is a process that has the potential 

dangerous to Turkey’s long-term interests. No co

would feel safe in the long term if and when it is encirc

a potential coalition of three hostile states, namely G

Syria, and Armenia. The Iranian motive in joinin

explicitly antagonistic grouping is more ambivalent, 

complex.

In summary, Turkey at this point can only determi

presence of the Greek intention to leapfrog to Turkey

in order make life difficult for Turkey in its own vicinit

arguments and statements of officials like Defense Mi

Yerasimos Arsenis, who have declared that Greece s

conclude military alliances with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Arm

Russia, and Bulgaria to establish an anti-Turkish 

verify the Greek thinking behind these developments

270
and Israel reached in February 1996 should be seen ag

the background, first and foremost, of gro

Greek-Syrian ties in 1995. While the Arab world has re

to Turkish-Israeli military cooperation angrily, they 

failed to take into account the impact of Greek-S

defense cooperation on Turkish perceptions of threat

Cyprus.

Two developments in the 1990s concerning Cypru

serious challenges to Turkish security—the decision 

EU to admit Cyprus as a full member at the end of acce

negotiations, and the purchase by Nicosia of reported

S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia for deploym

southern Cyprus in Fall 1998.

Turkey is opposed to the accession of Cyprus to th

above all else on the argument that the Guar

Agreements of 1960 rule out the accession of Cyprus 

that of Turkey. In other words, the proposed access

Cyprus to the EU would be in violation of the interna

agreements that created the republic in the 

place—until after Turkey has joined.

Obviously neither the arguments of Ankara no

Turkish-Cypriot government’s opposition to being exc

from the accession negotiations (except on the EU’

terms) have carried weight before Brussels. The Tu

Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Ankara 

been forced to seek their own solution to coping wit

approaching new order on the island: the Greek part 

island becoming EU-territory, and the Turkish part 

island being left to struggle for survival in the shado

hostile neighbor protected now by the EU hat. The a

has been agreement for eventual integration betwee

two. Clearly, this is not the best of solutions fo

long-term interests of either the Turkish-Cypriots 

Turkey. On the other hand, Brussel’s decision to 

Cyprus in the first round of EU enlargement has 

271
perhaps irreversible stage in over 20 years of transitio

facto division of the island.

Developments in the military field are not prom

either. The upgrading of military relations between A

and Nicosia with the signing of a military coope

agreement and the adoption of a joint defense doctr

1993-94, and the planned deployment of Russian-

S-300 air-defense missiles at the recently opened air b

Paphos are all very serious challenges to Turkish sec

Turkey has warned that it would not tolerate 

deployment. Greece, for its part, has declared that it 

view Turkish military strikes against Greek-Cyprus a 

belli. 

In summary, the triangular relations between G

Turkey, and Cyprus have reached an unprecedented le

complexity and tension since mid-1990s. In addition

the planned deployment of the S-300 SAMs on Cy

Russia will have gained, for the first time in history, a 

military/technical presence on the island. Moscow and 

circles in the West argue that the sale of these we

systems to Cyprus is a commercial rather than a str

deal. However, simple strategic logic defies this argu

that logic dictates that a power like Russia not overloo

enormous strategic advantages such a deal would acc

its power position in the eastern Mediterranean espe

at a time when NATO’s eastward expansion

Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities in Central Asia

the West’s intense engagement in the Caspian Sea r

have been taken very hard by the Russian political c

On The Brink of War with Syria.

On October 1, 1998, Turkey issued the stro

warning to Syria to date to immediately stop supp

PKK-terrorism or face Turkish retaliation. In the 

since, diplomatic channels and mediation attemp

Egypt and Iran have somewhat defused the anticipatio

272
possible use of force at some point in the near future 

the leaderships of all major political parties have a

Syria’s role in PKK terrorism has reached intole

proportions, and Turkey is using its right of self-de

when threatening the use of force. The Turkish action 

comes at a moment when there is a national consensu

the country will not tolerate more damage from 

terrorism that is sheltered and materially aided by Tu

neighbors, most dangerously by Syria. 

Is there a reasonable motive for Syria to h

ill-feelings for Turkey? The answer lies in the follo

Syria is a country which refuses to recognize Tu

international boundaries, claiming for itself the provi

Hatay, which acceded to Turkey in 1939 following a 20

French protection since the end of World War I, whic

the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire’s Ara

Balkan lands. Damascus and Baghdad also resent Tu

grandiose dam projects on the Euphrates River, which 

been developing on an accelerated pace only over the l

years. No other major upstream country has waite

long to exploit the water resources it derives from 

major transboundary river systems, willfully allowin

downstream countries to get unlimited benefits 

unlimited flow of water. On the basis of a Turkish-S

agreement worked out during the tenure of Prime Mi

Turgut Ozal, Turkey is obligated to release 500 cubic m

of water per second at the Turkish-Syrian borde

obligation which it has been faithfully honoring.

Northern Iraq.

Northern Iraq is another sancutary from where the 

has conducted its operations against Turkey with imp

The transformation of Northern Iraq virtually into 

man’s land following the Gulf War, with Kurdish wa

roaming the area, has allowed the PKK the freed

273
Turkey in human and material terms.

Clearly, the unsettled question of the future sta

Iraq in the regional order nourishes a most destab

neighborhood for Turkey. Control over Northern Ir

Baghdad would most probably have curtailed the 

destructive aspects of PKK activity. President Sa

Hussein is frustrated with Turkey primarily because 

latter’s support of the Gulf War and the United N

(U.N.) resolutions, and therefore takes anti-T

positions at times. Bilateral relations would be norma

however, if Iraq resumed a normal place in the reg

which would, in the first instance, require it to hon

disarmament obligations to the U.N.

The PKK is only one dimension, the armed dimens

the question of Northern Iraq. As mentioned i

Introduction, the political and diplomatic dimension 

future of Northern Iraq is of utmost importance to Tu

security. Turks feels that any federated Kurdish st

Northern Iraq would affect Turkish security extr

negatively—hence the deep concern over Washin

revival of Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq.

Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Three countries in the Middle East which are kno

the international community either to have had som

of WMD capability or to entertain the intention even

to develop it are Iraq, Syria, and Iran. All three ar

noted for their ballistic missile capability. These 

countries are Turkey’s immediate neighbors. Turkey, 

part, possesses neither the capability in any of 

weapons nor the intention to develop them.

Of the three, the potential threat from Iraq’s WM

missile capabilities have been eliminated to an impo

extent as a result of UNSCOM’s operations on the grou

Iraq—until they were halted by Baghdad last sum

274
from a concerted effort to reacquire WMD capability 

event that Saddam Hussein somehow succeeds in ri

Iraq of UNSCOM’s thorough and intrusive inspectio

the future.

Until recently, Turkey tended to rationalize the gr

WMD missile capability to its south in the context 

Arab-Israeli conflict, believing that Israel was the pot

target. However, the current confrontation with Syr

sharpened the sense of danger to Turkey from S

missiles and chemical weapons, just as the Gulf War in 

had done concerning Iraqi missiles and chemical wea

We did not know then that Iraq had virtually mas

nuclear weapons capability. Iran’s nuclear and m

programs are serious potential security challenges no

to Turkey, but to the region as a whole. Iran insists th

nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, and that 

passed the IAEA inspections that verified Iran’s comp

with the NPT. American and Israeli intellig

communities believe otherwise, pressuring Russia, 

major source of supply of nuclear technology, not t

sensitive technologies to Iran. Under pressure from 

President William Clinton shortly before the U.S.-R

summit in Moscow in 1995, Russian President Boris Y

agreed not to sell Iran gas-centrifuge uranium-enrich

technology, which could be used to make bomb-

uranium, and not to train Iranian nuclear physicists

This incident was illuminating also from an

perspective: that such a critical deal could be made w

authorization by the Kremlin or the Russian Fo

Ministry, as neither the Kremlin nor the Foreign Mi

purportedly had prior knowledge of the intention o

Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov 

this technology to Iran.

Amid the controversy about Iran’s real inten

concerning nuclear weapons, Turkey and other non-n

weapon states in the region will have to keep in min

275
clandestinely, while at the same time seeming to adh

the NPT.

In July 1998, Iran successfully tested the Sha

medium-range missile. Iranian officials describe

test-firing as a defensive move aimed at creating a ba

in the region, meaning specifically a balance that 

neutralize the American presence in the Gulf

demonstration of Iran’s medium-range missile capabi

certainly not a welcome development from the persp

of Turkey, especially in view of the fact that Iran is str

suspected—despite strong denials—of pursuing nu

weapons capability. It is interesting that, followin

firing, Iran took pains to send a message virtually 

whole world that none of its neighbors seemed troub

the successful testing of the missile. 

Russia.

Turkey and Russia do not contest each other ove

hard sovereignty questions. The closest sovereignty-re

controversy between the two is the Turkish decision 

Summer 1994 to regulate the traffic going throug

Turkish Straits in order to improve the safety and se

of the city of Istanbul and its environs against the pot

risks and hazards of projected increasing volumes of t

traffic to be carrying Caspian Sea oil as it is shipped to 

markets. Russia argues that the Turkish move 

violation of the Montreaux Treaty of 1936 that estab

the legal regime of these straits. It charges that Tur

motivated by a desire to eliminate Russian territory an

port of Novorossisk as the most attractive route f

export of Caspian Sea oil to world markets.

The absence of hard sovereignty disagreements h

meant the absence of political tensions, however. Riva

influence first and foremost in the Southern Caucasu

secondarily in Central Asia has been the fundamental 

of the uneasiness in Turkish-Russian relations in the 1

276
transport Caspian Sea oil to world markets 

manifestation of this rivalry in the economic/comm

realm with significant long-term political implication

Chechen separatism in Russia and Kurdish separ

in Turkey have adversely affected the two countries’ m

security perceptions, each accusing the other of instig

separatism in order to undermine the other’s terr

integrity. On the other hand, while no Tu

parliamentarian has been cited for his activities in su

of Chechen separatism, Russia’s Duma members have 

Russia’s regional diplomacy in general and its 

exports to Iran and the Greek-Cypriot governme

particular are among the most serious challeng

Turkish security interests—even if Moscow seems to 

only in the background. Like Greece, Moscow seems 

utility in the idea of an anti-Turkey coalition among G

Iran, and Armenia, as suggested by ample eviden

official and unofficial statements to this effec

mentioned before, the Turkish-Israeli military coope

agreement of February 1996 emerged against 

background of unfriendly regional diplomacy.

 Notwithstanding these tensions, Russia is not lik

confront Turkey with a conventional threat i

near-to-medium term for two main reasons: politica

economic stability that underwrites a country’s m

muscle does not seem likely to dawn on the Russian 

and society in the near future, and political and eco

independence in the Southern Caucasus—exce

Armenia—where Russian and Turkish long-term str

interests compete with each other most intensely see

be getting firmer roots. The nature of Russian-Arm

relations obviously defies this generalization.

On the other hand, one cannot rule out circumst

that might lead to another type of Russia, an aggr

Russia: the coming to power of Russian ultra-national

Moscow, and a new round of fighting between Armen

277
defeat. A contingency of this nature might ultimately 

Turkey and Russia into the imbroglio, the former to d

Azerbaijan and the latter to defend Armenia. Ru

military bases and Russian troops in their various 

scattered around Georgia and Armenia—and directly 

borders with Turkey—and upgraded forces of the 

Caucasus Military District legitimized in the C

adaptation in 1997 will undoubtedly be activated in or

repulse any Turkish action against Armenia. If thin

not go right in such a contingency, Russia might be tem

to resort either to nuclear blackmail, or failing to get T

to retreat, might use limited nuclear strikes. The o

military doctrine and Russian elite’s thinking abou

utility of tactical nuclear weapons in regional conflicts 

already set in place the conceptual and political fram

to make resort to tactical nuclear weapons in 

contingencies politically acceptable and legitimate.

Conclusion.

As the discussion in the previous pages suggest, Tu

security perceptions are dominated primarily by con

over long-term Greek intentions to gain control ove

Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, and ove

multi-faceted regional strategy of encirclement that 

been pursuing since mid-1990s to realize those aims. 

Syrian claims on the Turkish province of Hata

implicit claims by a newly independent Armenia on pa

eastern Turkey have turned them into potential al

Greece. It appears that in the new scheme of things in 

strategic thinking, a weakened and possibly divided T

would cease to be an obstacle to the realization of 

aspirations in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterran

The challenge of Kurdish separatism to Tu

security, a challenge with powerful domestic roots

nevertheless been magnified in its scope only in conjun

with the nurturing it has been receiving from the ex

278
extent Iraq and Iran, have been extending material su

to the PKK, recognized as a terrorist organization by se

leading governments in Europe and by Washington

belief has been documented by Turkish authorities—

the recent confrontation with Syria. PKK terrorism an

support it receives from Turkey’s neighbors not 

threaten Turkish territorial integrity, but they foresta

consolidation of Turkish democracy.

The consequences of attempts by Turkey’s revis

neighbors to tamper with the territorial integrity of T

would, if eventually successful, naturally be extr

destabilizing for a very broad region stretching fro

Balkans to the Persian Gulf and to Central 

threatening the geopolitical status quo for nearly two 

countries inhabiting this vast space.

279
GREEK-TURKISH RIVALRY

AND THE MEDITERRANEAN SECURIT

DILEMMA

R. Craig Nation

Introduction.

In the best of all possible worlds, Greece and T

would be pillars of stability amidst the turbulen

southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean

their privileged access to European institut

substantial economic prospects, and powerful 

traditions, they have multiple assets that could be br

to bear to help promote development and securi

reality, however, existing Greek-Turkish relations pr

a depressingly diverse aspect. Athens and Ankara ar

rivals, whose mutual enmity often approaches the le

preoccupation. Rather than contributing to a resolut

the Mediterranean security dilemma, Greece and T

are among its biggest progenitors.

Greek-Turkish rivalry is unusual in tha

protagonists are very unevenly matched. Greece is a 

Balkan state with a population of 10.5 million, but 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Eur

Union (EU) member with an international ag

dominated by its relationship with institutiona

Europe. Turkey has a large and rapidly growing popu

of almost 65 million. It has European aspirations but 

significant Asian frontier, and it confronts an interna

situation that is extremely threatening and complex, “

centre of a crescent-shaped wedge of territory stret

from Kazakhstan to the Gulf and Suez and finally 

North African coast, containing the most volatile coll

of states in the world.”

1

281
1952, but its relationship with the EU is contentious. 

assumed significant commitments in the war

Caucasus and Central Asian regions since the break

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), its rel

with Syria and Iraq are potentially explosive, a

confronts an open-ended domestic insurrecti

Kurdestan with important international ramificat

Greece and Turkey are highly militarized—Turkey de

3.8 percent of its Gross Domestic Product to de

spending and Greece 4.7 percent (against a NATO av

of 2.2 percent), and both have launched ambitious mi

build-ups. There is, however, little doubt that the Tu

side has the wherewithal to prevail in an a

confrontation. Turkish Gross Domestic Produ

approximately 1.5 times that of Greece, and in p

military terms, Turkey enjoys something like a 4-1 ra

superiority, with 594,000 men at arms (477,000 in 

armies, 63,000 in the air force, and 54,000 in marine f

compared to a Greek force of 168,700 (116,000 on 

33,000 in the air, and 19,700 at sea).

Despite its physical superiority, the unresolved c

impacts negatively upon Turkey’s foreign policy agen

well. Ankara’s long-standing goal of accession to the E

been sacrificed on the alter of Greek-Turkish rivalry, a

view of the many and substantial challenges th

confronts on other fronts, eternal bickering with G

might well be portrayed as a luxury, if not an extravag

The rivalry is nonetheless alive and well, irrespective 

constant ministrations of NATO, the good w

innumerable mediators and profferers of good offices

the real best interests of almost all those involved.

There are at least two reasons why this is so. 

though sometimes concerned as much with symbol a

substance, Greek-Turkish rivalry is deeply rooted 

complex, with multiple dimensions that have tended 

time to become mutually reinforcing. The underlying 

are neither trivial nor straightforward, and they 

282
a larger spacial and temporal context, and has 

sensitive to patterns of change in the geostrategi

historical environment. Greek-Turkish relations are 

discussed on the basis of “ancient hatreds” assum

that emphasize their timeless and unchan

character—what Henry Kissinger has called the “ata

bitterness” and “primeval hatred of Greeks and Tu

But the relationship is also a dynamic one, and at pres

very much conditioned by circumstances specific t

post-Cold War period.

Historical and Cultural Foundations.

Greek nationalism has three foundations; the leg

the great classical civilization of the age of antiquit

Byzantine and Orthodox Christian heritage of the M

Ages, and the national revival of the modern period

classical legacy is timeless and in a sense universal, th

its fundamental importance as a source of specifically 

identity is revealed by the furor unleashed by the 

century Austrian historian J. P. Fallmerayer’s attem

deny an organic link between the modern Greek people

their classical ancestors.

4

 The conquest of the Ort

Christian civilizations of the Balkan peninsula and A

island groups by the expanding Ottoman dynasty 

14th and 15th centuries, culminating with the f

Constantinople in 1453, is almost universally regarde

tragedy of epic proportions and the prelude to a dark 

cultural effacement, the Turkokratia or peri

unadulterated Turkish domination.

Modern Greek national identity is a direct product 

19th century national revival, waged as a bitter str

against Ottoman overlordship beginning with the 

Greek uprising in 1821. The Greek national state, crea

1830 at the behest of the European great powers, inc

only about a third of the Greek peoples of the Balkan r

Thereafter, the Greek state was built up piece by pie

283
maneuvers, and uprisings on behalf of the goal of en

union, inspired by the Megali Idea (Great Idea) of unit

the Greek peoples of the Aegean and Anatolia wit

single national entity. In Turkish national memory

process is conterminous with the long decline of Ott

civilization, and therefore linked with the Turkish p

loss of great power status and cultural preeminence.

The tragic culmination of the Megali Idea came 

end of World War I, with the defeat of the G

expeditionary force in Asia Minor at the hands of Mu

Kemal’s new Turkish national movement, the f

Smyrna in September 1922 and the ensuing massacre 

city’s Greek and Armenian populations, and the tre

Lausanne in 1923. The treaty regularized a Greek-Tu

border at the expense of the nearly one and a half m

Greek and Turkish refugees forced to participate 

officially sponsored population transfer. For the Turk

is remembered as the “war of independence” whose ou

ensured the survival of a Turkish national state. F

Greeks it is “the catastrophe,” a cataclysmic defeat 

brought a violent end to the millennial Hellenic civiliz

of Asia Minor. Like other peoples whose national idea 

upon a cult of martyrdom derived from a long and 

partially realized struggle for independence, the G

national identity has been culturally constructed as a 

of resistance to a barbaric, alien, and perman

menacing other. In the case of Turkey, national identi

been defined against the foil of rivalry with an eternal 

enemy, always ready to take advantage of Tu

weakness, that is simultaneously resented and scorn

Outside the context of this mythic structure, of c

Greek-Turkish relations have been considerably 

nuanced. The peace of Lausanne was followed by a per

rapprochement under the direction of Mustafa K

(Ataturk) and Elefterios Venezelos, architects of w

1919 but by the late 1920s determined to prioritize th

of domestic restructuring and reform. The policy sur

284
significant factor in international relations durin

period 1930-55.

6

 It was only with the rise of anti-B

national agitation in Cyprus that the Greek-Turkish r

made a comeback. In the postwar decades, both Greec

Turkey were modernizing societies undergoing a proc

traumatic social change, including rapid urbaniz

progress toward universal literacy, and the rise of 

democratic cultures where the evocation of an “inve

national tradition against the foil of a despised rival p

well in public forums. On both sides, political 

manipulated national sentiments to further their que

power, in the process conjuring up and exacerbat

strategic rivalry that would quickly take on a life of its 

Aegean Issues.

The essence of Greek-Turkish strategic rivalry 

struggle for physical control of the Aegean and ea

Mediterranean. This is by any measure a vital intere

both sides. For Greece, the Aegean represents an ess

part of the national whole, linking the Greek mainland 

major islands and island groups. For Turkey, the A

covers the north-south maritime artery attachin

Dardanelles to the Mediterranean coast including th

of Izmir, and the air corridors providing access fo

aviation toward the west. The Aegean and ea

Mediterranean also possess geostrategic significance 

western pole of a commercial axis stretching eas

southward toward the Caspian Sea and Persian 

Marcia Christoff Kurop notes that “the ea

Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf form a single 

with Turkey and Egypt providing a continenta

maritime bridge between Europe and the Middle East

Margarita Mathiopoulos, the Aegean is “a geopo

region of vital interest” as “NATO’s corridor of sta

between Europe, the Middle East, and the former S

Asian territories.”

8

285
imposing population transfers and clearly delin

spheres of influence, the treaty of Lausanne was br

successful in creating a kind of equilibrium between G

and Turkey in the region, but that equilibrium beg

unravel with the emergence of the Cyprus question 

1950s. By the 1970s, a long list of points of discor

emerged which continue to defy resolution.

Sovereignty and the Militarization of Strategic

Islands.

There are some 3,000 Greek islands in the Aegean S

which only about 130 are inhabited. At Lausanne in 

and in the 1947 treaty of Paris, which effected the tran

the Dodecanese island group from Italy to Greece, A

agreed to keep only lightly armed security forces on we

Aegean islands and to refrain from the construct

fortifications. The militarization of selected island

nonetheless begun in 1964, and by the 1970s, over 2

Greek soldiers were stationed in the Dodecanese 

group adjacent to Turkey’s Mediterranean coastlin

Lemnos, Samothrace, and smaller islands nea

entrance to the Dardanelles, and on certain central A

islands.

Greece has argued according to the clausala reb

stantibus that the Montreux Straits Convention of 193

the demilitarized status of islands adjacent t

Dardanelles; that Turkey is not a signatory to the 

treaty of Paris and that therefore the Dodecanese c

armed; and that, especially in the wake of the C

occupation of 1974 and the creation of a 4th Aegean 

unattached to NATO on the eastern coast of the Tu

mainland with its headquarters in Izmir in 1975, G

perceives a Turkish threat to which it may legitim

react on the basis of the principle of self-defense 

article 51 of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter. Turke

responded that the demilitarization of eastern A

islands is a legal condition of Greek sovereignty; th

286
Paris treaty of 1947 also applies to nonsignatories; th

Montreux convention does not change the status of Le

and adjacent islands; and that there was no prior Tu

threat motivating Greek actions—Ankara has only 

countermeasures in the face of severe Greek provoca

These issues remain unresolved, and the militarized is

are points of constant friction.

The problem of militarization is complement

disputes over sovereignty. The maritime frontier be

the Dodecanese group and the Turkish coast was pre

delineated in a 1932 agreement between Italy and Tu

but since April 1996 Ankara has posed new concerns 

“grey zones” of uncertain sovereignty further to the 

where the terms of the 1923 Lausanne treaty are less 

as well as in the sea of Crete. The Turkish deman

adjudication of the issue has been portrayed as a mea

obtain leverage in a future comprehensive resolut

Aegean issues, but it also has a strategic dimension

sensitivities evoked by the issue were demonstrated w

January 1996 naval incident posing the issue of sovere

over the tiny rock of Imia (Kardak in Turkish), i

Dodecanese group adjacent to the Bodrun peninsula a

island of Kos, brought the two Aegean antagonists 

brink of war. Strong U.S. diplomatic pressure was req

to reverse the course of events, in a scenario that co

replayed in any number of other settings at almos

moment.

Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.

The issue of control over the Aegean sea bed bec

contentious one following the discovery of oil deposits o

island of Thasos in 1974. Bilateral negotiations beg

1981 were broken off at Greek initiative in 1987. T

responded by initiating seismic activities and drill

disputed areas, giving rise to a sharp crisis in the spr

that year. In the years since 1987, the issue has lost so

287
hydrocarbons on world markets and to the modest ext

the resources in question, but it is far from having 

resolved. Athens argues that (a) the islands facin

Turkish mainland are a part of Greece, and that 

lands must be considered as an integral whole; (b

Geneva convention of 1958 on the continental shelf spe

that islands possess continental shelves; and, (c

continental shelf border between Turkey and the adj

Greek islands must be based on the equidistance pri

measured from the nearest Turkish coast. If appl

practice, these premises would give Greece effective c

over nearly all the Aegean Sea, leaving only a n

coastal strip for Turkey.

In response, Ankara has argued that (a) islands lo

on the natural prolongation of a continental land ma

not have continental shelves of their own; (b) the 198

of the Sea Convention disallows consolidation of A

islands with continental Greece by forbiddin

“archipelago regime” or “national integrity” princip

there is no rule of law or logic that dictates an “equidis

principle” between small islands and a large adjacen

mass; and, (d) the treaty of Lausanne requi

Greek-Turkish balance that allows each side to utili

Aegean on an equitable basis. A broad range of f

specific to the nature of the Aegean, includin

semi-closed character, the Greek archipelago regim

distribution of natural resources, mutual security inte

and accessible transportation routes must th

considered in measuring access. Turkey’s ideal so

would impose a line of division allowing it to exp

significant part of the eastern half of the seabed. A

has, however, consistently refused Greek requests to 

the issue before the International Court of Ju

preferring the route of bilateral negotiations, perhap

due to the merits of the case in question than because 

potential implications of a definitive court ruling for 

288
Iraq over control of the waters of the Euphrates.

10

Territorial Waters.

At Lausanne, territorial waters in the Aegean ext

for only three miles. In 1936, Greece unilaterally exp

its own territorial waters to six miles, and following W

War II, Turkey reciprocated. At present, with a six

limit as standard, Greece possesses 48.86 percent 

Aegean and Turkey 7.47 percent, leaving 48.85 perc

international waters. The Law of the Sea Treaty of 

which the Turkish regime has refused to sign, all

12-mile extension of territorial waters, the extension 

Turkey itself applies to its Mediterranean and Blac

coastlines. In 1995, after the entry into vigor of this t

the Greek parliament stated its right to enforce a 12

limit in the Aegean, a gesture whose realization A

promptly stated would become a casus belli. Thoug

Turkish response was aggressive, the Greek claim 

clearly provocatory. The imposition of a 12-mile limit 

bring together Greek territorial waters betwee

Cyclades and Dodecanese archipelagos, giving A

hypothetical control over Turkey’s vital north-

maritime route, as well as over maritime access to the 

Sea.

The issue is arguably more symbolic than rea

extent of effective control that an extension to the 1

limit would bring is not necessarily great. Internation

does not permit interdiction of peaceful commercial t

nor even of the passage of warships, except in cases of s

tension or open conflict. A 12-mile extension is mor

opposed by almost every other power with mar

interests in the Aegean, and not least the major N

powers. If the issue persists, it is in some measure be

of its implications for the related problem of contro

airspace.

289
International law and the Chicago convention of 

require that the extent of national airspace correspo

the extent of territorial waters. Since 1931 Greec

asserted a national airspace limit of ten miles, valid fo

continental Greece and the Greek archipelago, desp

formal adherence to six-mile territorial waters. From 

onward, Turkey has formally protested agains

incongruity, and reinforced its position by systemat

conducting overflights in the four-mile grey zone. 

interventions are regularly challenged by Greek avi

leading to numerous instances of mock comba

occasional crashes. Disputes over airspace have give

to other sources of tension, including differences ov

Istanbul-Athens flight region, international flight ro

terminal areas, and military flight issues su

early-warning borders, command and control areas, an

extent of air maneuvers. The argument directly a

flight borders for two NATO commands, the south-c

NATO headquarters in Izmir (Izmir also hosts Turkey

Allied Tactical Air Force) and the 7th Tactical Air Fo

Larisa, Greece.

Treatment of Minorities.

Greece and Turkey have been chronically at odd

the treatment accorded their respective minorities. D

the mass population transfers carried out under the 

of the Lausanne treaty, a sizable Turkish min

remained in western Thrace (in 1923 the M

population of western Thrace was estimated at 130,00

of a total regional population of 190,000) together w

large Greek population in Istanbul (somewhat 

100,000) as well as smaller minorities on the Tu

islands of Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Gokceada (Im

(7,000 and 1,200, respectively). Lausanne made sp

reference to these “Muslim and non-Muslim” minoritie

290
religious, cultural, and educational institutions.

The Greek side is fond of pointing out that the 

population of Istanbul has been reduced today to well 

10,000, and that only 250 Greeks remain on Gokcead

100 on Bozcaada, while the Muslim population of we

Thrace has remained fairly stable at around 12

Ankara retorts that a natural rate of increase would 

more than doubled the minority population of we

Thrace were it not for mass migration provoked by a 

policy of denial of identity and systematic repression

numbers are disputed, but the larger climate of ho

that infects Greek-Turkish relations probably lends 

degree of truth to both positions.

11

Athens has reacted to international criticism of its 

in western Thrace by offering a number of conce

including educational incentives and limited 

government, but it refuses to designate the minor

Thrace as Turkish, clinging instead to the “Mu

designation used in the text of the Lausanne t

According to Greek sources, about 50 percent o

minority are of Turkish descent, 35 percen

Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks (Muslim Slavs), an

percent are Muslim Roma (Gypsies). The conc

populations have a long list of grievances that includ

expropriation of land by the Greek state, den

citizenship to members of the Turkish minority retu

from trips abroad, educational discrimination, refusal 

right of election of local religious leaders or Muftis (in 

Greece suspended the election of local Muftis in fa

appointment by the state), and electoral gerrymand

aimed at denying the Turkish minority 

representation.

12

 The status of the Greek minorit

Orthodox patriarchate in Istanbul remain sore point

Greek public opinion, and, as an ethnically Turkish r

with a long list of grievances that is territorially conti

with Turkey proper, western Thrace is militarily ex

291
strategic competition.

The Cyprus Question.

The beautiful island of Cyprus, mythical birthpl

Aphrodite, has a vital location some 80 kilomete

Turkey’s southern Mediterranean coast and a co

political history accurately reflecting its stra

importance. Culturally and socially, it has been subjec

waves of Byzantine, Venetian, Hellenic, Turkic, and B

influences. From 1571-1878 it was part of the Ott

empire, but at the Congress of Berlin in the summer o

year, which presided over a peace settlement afte

Ottoman defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, 

leased to Britain for use as a naval basing area. Cypru

annexed in 1918 and declared a crown colony in 1925

The population of Cyprus today is around 78

divided between a Greek majority representing abo

percent of the total and a Turkish minority represent

percent. These communities traditionally 

interspersed throughout the island, including w

numerous mixed villages. The anticolonial move

launched in the 1950s, however, was simultaneou

Greek nationalist movement that sought to link the c

independence to the goal of enosis, or attachment to G

The Turkish Cypriot community responded with a c

taksim, or partition.

In 1955 the United Kingdom, whose governmen

originally resisted the idea of granting Cypriot 

determination, sought to resolve the problem by conv

a London conference, in the course of which a bomb exp

at the Turkish consulate at Salonika (in the imm

vicinity of the house in which Ataturk was born). This 

terrorism was eventually discovered to have been a Tu

provocation, responsibility for which became one o

items in the indictment brought against then 

minister Adnan Menderes that would lead to his exec

292
series of anti-Greek pogroms in Izmir and Istanbul, w

over 2,000 Greeks were killed and many more driven 

the cities as refugees.

Between 1956-60 Cypriot politics were dominated 

terrorist anti-British agitation of the National Organiz

of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) led by Georgios Grivas, a r

army colonel with extreme right-wing political affilia

After a British expeditionary force of over 30,000 so

proved incapable of controlling the violence, a Z

agreement in 1960 defined terms for independence. G

Turkey, and the United Kingdom were designat

guaranteeing powers. Britain was granted two mi

base areas (which it still maintains), and Greece and T

were permitted to garrison 950 and 650 sold

respectively, on the island. The constitution speci

forbids attachment to another state, uniting Cyprus 

Austria as the only other state in the world w

sovereignty is similarly circumscribed. The text also de

a power-sharing arrangement according to whic

president would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice presi

Turkish Cypriot, with four Greek and three Tu

ministers. Thirty percent of the seats in the Hou

Representatives were reserved for the Turkish C

minority, 40 percent of commissions in the National G

and 30 percent of positions in the police force and 

service—percentages that granted disproporti

representation to the Turkish Cypriot communit

August 1960 Greek Archbishop Makarios III becam

first president, and the Turkish Cypriot Fazil Kucu

first vice-president, of an independent but badly d

Republic of Cyprus.

The Cypriot constitution was badly flawed and q

proved to be unworkable. Makarios provoked the crisi

undermined the fragile equilibrium which it soug

define on November 30, 1963, by proposing 13 amend

designed to curtail the special advantages of the Tu

minority and create a unitary state. Within a mat

293
systematic harassment of Turkish Cypriots, incl

attempts to “ethnically cleanse” whole districts by exp

them from their homes. In 1964 a U.N. multila

peacekeeping force (the U.N. force in Cyprus-UNF

arrived on the island to police a 180-kilometer long “

Line” of separation between the warring commun

where it has remained to this day at a cumulative expe

over $3 billion.

These events were decisive. The atrocities commit

Greek irregulars terrorized Turkish Cypriots, driving 

as refugees into protected areas and shattering the is

delicate ethnic balances. Reliance upon U.N. peaceke

was both an admission that the island’s problems 

unresolvable in their own terms and a panacea that 

division provoked by violence appear tolerable

Makarios government was discredited, and outside p

were quick to move into the void of power—the Tu

military contingent assuming strategic positions i

north of the island and occupying the Nicosia-Ky

highway, Greek forces building up to over 10,000 by 

and the United States taking up the role of the U

Kingdom as great power sponsor and crisis manag

both 1964 and 1967 Turkey threatened to invade the 

to restore order and protect the Turkish Cypriot min

and was only dissuaded by vigorous warnings 

Washington.

In 1968 inter-communal talks began, mediated by 

envoy Cyrus Vance, with Rauf Denktash representin

Turkish Cypriot community and Glavkos Cleride

Greek Cypriots, both lawyers, associates since their 

days, and seemingly permanent pieces of the C

puzzle. But events had already spun out of the hands o

actors. The increasing intensity of East-West competit

the eastern Mediterranean, U.S. distrust for the nona

orientation and left-wing supporters of the Mak

regime, the increasingly desperate search of the col

regime in Athens for some kind of dramatic succ

294
Turkish armed forces, after overthrowing the govern

for the second time in a decade in 1971, for new sour

domestic legitimacy, created a volatile intermingl

interests which would soon set the Cyprus tinderbox 

In November 1973 a student uprising agains

colonels’ junta culminated with a massacre in the he

Athens. Under growing pressure, the new Greek stron

Dimitrios Ioannides turned to Grivas and his right

nationalist allies in Cyprus, apparently hoping to r

his position by attaching the island to Greece with a su

coup de main. On July 15, 1974, National Guard and 

national contingents seized power in Cyprus, but fai

their attempt to capture and murder Makarios

managed to escape to London with British assistance

Cypriot presidency now fell temporarily into the ha

the former EOKA gunman Nikos Sampson, 

inter-communal violence flared up in all directions. O

19, a Turkish expeditionary force set sail from M

securing control of a narrow coastal strip but failing to 

Nicosia airport. On July 22 a U.N.-imposed cease-fir

hold, and on July 24, after the Greek armed forces refu

follow Ioannides’ desperate call for an all-out atta

Turkey, the Greek junta fell in Athens, with power p

into the hands of a civilian coalition led by Konstan

Karamanlis.

The military fiasco was followed by a diplomatic fia

Geneva. Here, in a hastily organized diplomatic f

Ankara presented demands for a federated Cyprus 

equal status for the Turkish Cypriot minority and Tu

administration for numerous scattered ethnic canton

disorganized Greek government was not in a posit

react to these claims, and a distracted United States (

midst of its domestic Watergate crisis) did not cho

oppose them. After articulating its demands, and wi

time to regroup its forces, on August 14 the Turkish “

force” in Cyprus fanned out to the east and west, even

seizing about 40 percent of the island’s territory 

295
about 200,000 people from their homes (180,000 of 

Greek Cypriots), grouping the Turkish Cypriot popu

under Ankara’s protection in the north and forcin

Greek Cypriot population across a military demar

line into the south. On February 11, 1975, the proces

completed by the creation of a “Turkish Federated St

Cyprus” with Denktash as president, formalized in 19

the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), 

date accorded diplomatic recognition only by the Tu

Republic itself.

Christopher Hitchens has argued that the essence 

Cyprus tragedy from 1960 onward was “the exploitat

outside powers of internal differences that were genu

themselves” with the purpose “to suborn the indepen

of the island.”13 His thesis is controversial, but there i

doubt that, in the Cold War context within which e

unfolded, specifically Cypriot issues were interpreted 

context of an overriding western interest in man

Greek-Turkish rivalry and frustrating the emergence 

independent-minded and nonaligned Cypriot regime

Though the second Turkish invasion clearly 

beyond reasonable bounds in asserting physical contro

more than a third of the island, the final result was in 

ways comparable to the U.S. agenda for a combinat

enosis and taksim outlined prior to the invasion i

so-called Acheson plan—an imposed partitio

independent, Greek-oriented Republic of Cyprus, 

permanent Turkish presence in a northern Cy

dependency. This was an acceptable, if less than 

solution, and it has proven to be enduring. For Athen

outcome was a defeat and a humiliation, but it remaine

position to cultivate special relations with the Repu

Cyprus. Ankara warded off the worst-case of a succ

Greek coup, reinforced its military position, and en

that the Turkish Cypriot community would re

dependent upon Turkish sponsorship. The United S

avoided a direct Greek-Turkish clash with the poten

296
strategic agenda. Or so it thought. In fact, the C

question was left as an open wound that has subsequ

poisoned all attempts to effect an enduring Greek-Tu

rapprochement.

Greek-Turkish Rivalry after the Cold War.

The Cyprus problem has changed remarkably little 

overall contours in the quarter century that has p

since the Turkish invasion. The TRNC, with 37 perc

the island’s territory and 18 percent of its population a

uniquely of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot extracti

permanently occupied by approximately 35,000 sold

the Turkish 3rd Army. Turkey also maintains a dom

position within the TRNC’s police force, militia, and 

services. The mini-state is isolated internationally an

all intents and purposes a Turkish protectorate. T

south, across the Green Line patrolled by 1,200 sold

the UNFICYP, lies the predominantly Greek C

Republic of Cyprus, internationally recognized a

legitimate government of the island but withou

authority over the Turkish zone. The record of initi

aimed at overcoming the impasse, pursued over decad

U.N. secretary generals, U.S. presidents, and multil

negotiating forums, reads like an encycloped

diplomacy, but nothing of substance has been achieve

Cyprus problem, like the poor, seems destined to alwa

with us.

The perception of stasis is, however, misleading, b

the case of Cyprus and as pertains to the Greek-Tu

rivalry as a whole. During the Cold War decades, G

Turkish competition was constrained by a numb

domestic and international factors. Both sides were 

that they shared an overriding interest in helping to co

Soviet power. Both were significantly dependent upon 

links to the North Atlantic Alliance for security assis

Not least, because the driving force of the rivalry was 

297
self-other images, neither had any real reason to all

escalation of tension to sweep out of hand. Greek-Tu

rivalry was played out in the shadow of the arsenals 

superpowers, and, like many other Cold War conflict

direct implications for the East-West balance, constr

by the exigencies of competitive bipolarity.

The end of the Cold War has removed many of 

constraints, and transformed what was a chron

contained rivalry into a potentially more volatile 

dangerous one. The new configuration of power in the 

crisis” along Russia’s southern flank has enhanced Tu

strategic weight, lent impetus to the emergence of a 

assertive foreign policy agenda, encouraged familiar 

fears of a bigger and more powerful neighbor

stimulated renewed cultural friction. In the new geop

of the post-Cold War, the eastern Mediterranea

become a seismic point for “a multi-regional str

calculus incorporating southeastern Europe, the M

East, and the Caucasus.” 14 As a result, the f

Greek-Turkish relationship is being subjected to new 

of strains and tensions that it is ill-prepared to bear.

Neither Greece nor Turkey succeeded in utilizin

window of opportunity opened by the end of the Cold W

forward a policy of reconciliation. The Greek administ

of prime minister Kostas Simitis began its tenure in 

with proposals for the creation of a joint committee 

EU auspices to ameliorate Greek-Turkish relation

Simitis has confronted strong opposition from the na

populist wing of his own ruling party. 15 On the Turkis

disappointing economic performance, political insta

(Turkey has experienced five governments since the ge

elections of December 1995), and a crisis of confide

ruling institutions provoked by corruption scandals 

encouraged a tendency towards nationalistic posturin

self-preoccupation. Each side, because of int

weaknesses, has opted to play the nationalism 

repeatedly.

298
new tensions that have emerged in Turkey’s relation

Europe. Ankara concluded an EU association agreem

1963, and in 1987 it applied in due form for full membe

but in 1989 its candidacy was pushed to the back of th

of new post-communist democracies. In its July 

blueprint for enlargement entitled Agenda 2000, th

eliminated Turkey from its list of candidates altog

This gesture was partly motivated by a prag

awareness of developmental and demographic imbala

and partly by a sincere concern for Ankara’s less 

adequate human rights record. But it also seemed to d

line between a European “Christian club” and the la

the East, perceived in Orientalist fashion as the dom

backwardness and cultural exoticism. 16

Turkey’s clash with the EU has coincided wi

intensifying search for alternative patterns of cu

identification and diplomatic alignment, provoked 

weakening of the Kemalist consensus domestica

Kemal’s original vision included the rejection o

Ottoman imperial tradition on behalf of a unitary Tu

national state, centralized political control under the 

of the progressive officer corps, strictly enforced secula

a statist and Listian philosophy of economic develop

and a pro-Western strategic orientation. The disappea

of the Soviet Union, and with it a centuries-old com

border with Russia to the north, weakened one pillar 

edifice of Kemalism by calling the necessity of a pro-we

alignment into question. Turgut Ozal’s opening o

Turkish economy during the 1980s removed anothe

electoral victory of Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamic W

party in December 1995 and Erbakan’s appointme

prime minister in January 1996 seemed to threaten a t

These trends have been accompanied by a new in

in Turkey’s Ottoman past, regarded not as a mo

emulate but rather as a neglected source of cu

orientation.

18 For centuries Turkey considered itself 

the center of an autonomous geopolitical space an

299
greater Europe. The Kemalist assertion of a Eur

destiny contradicts this tradition, but it may yet prove 

incapable of replacing it. The dynamics of the B

conflict, where the Bosnian Muslims and Ko

Albanians have been widely viewed as victims of camp

of genocide at least passively abetted by the We

powers, the outcome of the Gulf War, where Turk

perceived to have made important sacrifices on behalf 

allied coalition and to have been rewarded by We

championship of Kurdish nationalism in northern Ira

the EU’s apparent indifference to Turkey’s prof

European vocation, have all contributed to 

crystallization of a sharper and less dependent Tu

national idea. The “soft coup,” which led to Erba

resignation under military pressure in June 1997 an

subsequent outlawing of the Welfare party by the Tu

Constitutional Court, has represented a Kem

reassertion of sorts, but at the expense of an ever

intrusive political role for the Turkish military hiera

traditionally committed to the pursuit of a hard line ag

Athens.

Intensified political tension and cultural friction 

been accompanied by aggravated strategic competitio

area’s Cold War status as the “southern flank” o

extended front of East-West confrontation has be

irrelevant with the demise of the Soviet Union

strategic stakes at issue are, however, at least as great 

greater than in the past. In the post-bipolar context, G

and Turkey may once again be perceived as part 

“Levant” that opens to the economic promise of the ext

Middle East and southwestern Asia. They represen

westernmost pole of a new strategic axis stretching th

the Black Sea and Caucasus to the untapped natur

and oil reserves of the Caspian basin. Many i

concerning the construction of a main export pipel

bring Caspian oil into world markets, includin

short-term economic viability of the entire ende

300
resources represent a long-term strategic asset of 

importance, and that the issue of access has upped th

of strategic competition in the eastern Mediterra

theater as a whole.

19

From a Western perspective, the importance 

Greek-Turkish relationship has been enhanced by N

extensive engagement in Balkan conflict manage

There is no realistic “exit strategy” for the 30,000 N

troops deployed since 1995 in war-ravaged Bo

Herzegovina. The Bosnia elections of the summer of 

which reinforced intolerant nationalist leadership 

three of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s mutually hostile e

communities, made clear that NATO’s peaceke

responsibilities will be indispensable for the forese

future. NATO plays an important role in propping u

fragile institutions of governance in Albania an

Republic of Macedonia, and it has recently been draw

responsibilities for monitoring the Kosovo con

“Whether we like it or not,” argues an anonymous 

European diplomat, “NATO has become the sher

Europe’s wild southeast. We need to expand our perce

from the microcosm of Bosnia to an overall strategy f

Balkans, because NATO has become the central orga

force for the entire region.”20

Unfortunately, Balkan turmoil has also sharpene

competitive edge of the Greek-Turkish relationship. 

concern with Turkey’s superior military pote

reinforced by the perception of an ambitious Tu

Balkan policy inspired by the imperial premis

neo-Ottomanism, has been reflected in a combative s

for unilateral advantage. 21 Simultaneously, Tu

exposure on multiple fronts makes it highly sensitive t

and imagined Greek provocations. The Aegean feu

thus become entangled with international engagem

the Bosnian conflict, the complicated relationship be

Turkey and the EU, the emerging Turkish-Israel str

partnership, the role of Turkey as an arm of the West 

301
NATO enlargement, and a host of other issues.

22

Many of these dynamics have crystallized aroun

Cyprus problem. In 1992, then U.N. Secretary Ge

Boutros Boutros Ghali launched a major diplo

initiative designated as the “Set of Ideas,” intend

provide a comprehensive formula for overcomin

post-1974 stalemate. These proposals, in the tradition 

U.S.-sponsored Nimetz Plan of the 1970s and U.N. Ge

Secretary Javier Perez de Cuellar’s Proximity Talks 

1980s, recommended the creation of a Cypriot republi

a single international personality and citizenship pre

over broadly autonomous federal units in the nort

south.

The Set of Ideas suggested reducing the northern z

28 percent of the island’s territory by returning to 

Cypriot control the Varosha district of Famagusta

northern citrus growing area of Morphou, and 34 

villages. The federal units were to receive equal po

with safeguards to prevent impingement upon 

authority by the central government, whose responsib

would be limited to foreign affairs, defense, federal jur

and police matters, central banking, customs 

immigration, posts and telecommunications, patent

trade marks, and health and environmental is

Politically, the hope was to resurrect the princip

proportional representation, with a Greek Cy

president and Turkish Cypriot vice president a

bicameral legislature with 50/50 percent representat

the upper house and 70/30 percent in the lower hous

The framework was accompanied by a ser

confidence-building measures (the transfer of Varos

U.N. control and its gradual opening to commerce inv

both communities, the reopening of Nicosia airport 

the auspices of the U.N. and the International 

Aviation Authority with freedom of access for both 

and the relaxation of the Greek Cypriot embargo o

302
president Georgios Vassilou accepted the Set of Idea

basis for discussion, but in the end, the project broke 

around the core issue of sovereignty, with Den

demanding prior recognition of the TRNC as a condit

negotiations and formal equality between federal 

including a rotating presidency, separate comm

elections, strict equality in representation in governm

institutions, and a rule of consensus for Council of Mi

decisions.

In the wake of this failure, the United States pick

the torch, presiding over the signing of a brief docum

NATO’s Madrid summit in July 1997 in which Greec

Turkey declared that they would respect each others 

interests” in the Aegean and pledged to resolve dis

peacefully, and kick-starting U.N.-sponsored negoti

on Cyprus in the summer of 1997 at Troutbeck, New 

and Montreux, Switzerland.23 These initiatives, l

many before them, were quickly side-tracked, this ti

Turkish reactions to the EU’s Agenda 2000. The fail

the Set of Ideas and subsequent U.S. proposals left 

with the conviction that in Cyprus diplomacy had arri

the end of the road.

Already in 1990 Vassiliou had opened a door lead

another direction by filing a formal application to ent

EU. Accession was a legitimate goal in view of the Re

of Cyprus’ economic achievements, but it was w

considered impossible prior to a negotiated agree

between north and south. Vassiliou’s real hope 

probably to win negotiating leverage and to encoura

EU to become more active in facilitating a diplo

outcome. In 1995, however, in part as a result of 

pressure, in part as a consequence of annoyance 

Turkish Cypriot diplomatic intransigence, and in pa

to a desire to discipline Ankara for its continued refu

move forward on European concerns with humans 

abuses and respect for democratic norms, the reques

accepted by the EU Council of Ministers. In April 

303
reaction of Denktash was an uncompromising refu

participate in any accession negotiation, accompanie

threat to encourage the annexation of the north to Tur

the event that EU membership should become a re

This was not an empty threat. In the course of 1998, T

and the TRNC proceeded to establish a joint economi

and put into place the institutional foundations fo

annexation.

The friction provoked by the EU accession agend

been paralleled by rising military tensions. In 1993 G

and the Republic of Cyprus announced a strate

common defense intended to bring Cyprus inside 

Greek national defensive umbrella. Under the terms 

agreement, Greece and Cyprus have conducted 

military exercises and opened a naval and air st

appropriately named “Andreas Papandreou,” o

southwest coast near the tourist resort area of Pa

When fully operational, this facility will extend the ra

Greek air-power to include a militarily vital stre

Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. As such, it has been bi

resisted by Ankara. When, on June 16, 1998, in the m

a European summit in Cardiff, Wales, United Kin

with the Cyprus problem on the agenda, four Greek 

warplanes and two C-130 transports visited the base a

of a military exercise, another sharp crisis in bil

relations ensured.

24

In 1996, the Republic of Cyprus announced the pur

of four systems of Russian-made S-300 (SA-10 in the N

designation) surface-to-air missiles, each equipped w

missiles with a range of 160 kilometers.

25 The purch

brought to fruition, would have served several di

functions. The missile systems are capable of contrib

to a more credible defensive capacity for the Repub

Cyprus, which, at present, lacks an air force altog

They could also also serve to protect the An

Papandreou facility. Less tangibly, but of conside

importance, deployment would to some extent salv

304
most Greek Cypriots. “The missile crisis,” writes 

Kadritzke, “is rooted in the fears of men and women wh

themselves to have been abandoned by the entire worl

The announcement of an intention to deploy the m

encouraged a good deal of belligerent rhetoric. T

unambiguously condemned the move as an aggr

gesture which “poses a direct threat to Turkish secu

and announced its intention to attack the sites, s

deployment commence.

27

 Taken aback by the poten

dramatic consequences of its actions, the Cle

government offered to suspend the purchase in exchan

an acceptance of a 1979 agreement, never honored, de

the terms of a demilitarization of the island

surprisingly, the offer was abruptly refused. 

The Turkish ultimatum made deployment an extr

high-risk undertaking, but the Clerides govern

confronted considerable domestic pressure to make go

its commitments. In the midst of the controversy, the 

Cypriot minister of defense Iannakis Omirou demons

described the deployments as critical to Cypriot sec

and threatened to resign should they be canceled or de

Twenty percent of the Greek Cypriot electorate pre

backs a “Front of Refusal” which is committed to reun

the island under Greek hegemony and strongly suppor

missile purchase, and many Greeks are convinced th

demilitarization of Cyprus would amount t

acknowledgment of forced partition as a legitimate 

quo. Despite these pressures, in December 1998 Cl

backed away from a commitment to deploy, suggestin

island of Crete as an alternative venue—a suggestion 

Ankara promptly labeled as equally unacceptable. I

end it is likely that Turkish intransigence will be suff

to block deployments on Cyprus. The larger clim

strategic rivalry out of which the controversy has g

will, however, remain intact.

305
unstable foundation. Western policy has been built up

minimalist foundation of sustaining the post-1974 

quo. Simultaneous efforts to encourage a negot

settlement have never been accompanied by the kin

pressure that would be necessary to provoke de

concessions. The currently preferred diplomatic initia

the direct heir of Boutros Ghali’s Set of Ideas, calling f

creation of a “bi-communal and bi-zonal federation

would create a facade of unity while providing the T

with nearly full sovereignty in all but name. But tren

at work that will soon make the status quo unsustai

and the ideal of the bi-zonal federation unobtaina

Diplomatic alternatives to de facto partition rest 

resurrecting a common Cypriot identity as a foundati

reconciliation, but on both sides of the island that iden

at risk.29 Economic success and Greece’s status as a

member have inevitably oriented the Republic of C

towards western Europe. The foundation for its hig

strategy of accession, described by Denktash as “ 

through the EU,” is a deeply-rooted frustration wi

eternal stalemate on the diplomatic front that only wo

the advantage of the Turkish side. 30 Should the Repu

Cyprus come into the EU without the north, howe

gauntlet will have been thrown down that will inexo

lead toward the TRNC’s annexation by Ankara.

Within the TRNC, the emigration of the indig

Turkish Cypriot population combined with a steady 

of Turkish immigrants from Anatolia provides an ever 

substantial foundation for a long-term strategy aim

reducing the north to the status of a Turkish pro

According to Alpay Durduran, head of the Turkish C

opposition party Yeni Kibris (New Cyprus), over 4

Turkish Cypriots have left the island since 1974

majority taking up permanent residence in Great Br

The 80,000 indigenous Turkish Cypriots who remain 

up almost exactly half of the TRNC’s total populat

160,000 as recorded in the 1997 census.

3 

306
opposition to Denktash. That opposition strongly sup

the agenda for a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation

it soon risks becoming a minority within its own land

Alternatives for the West.

The Greek-Turkish rivalry has brought low so 

carefully considered programs for conflict resolution t

seems superfluous to attempt to develop yet an

integrated set of proposals. In lieu of an ideal solut

may be more useful to consider points of orientation 

could be helpful in addressing or understandin

problem in new and positive ways.

1. Although it is usually treated as a unique cas

Greek-Turkish rivalry displays much in common with 

other contemporary inter-state and regional conflict

one level it is a civilizational conflict waged a

linguistic, cultural, and confessional fault lines. On 

sides it rests upon a culturally constructed and assidu

cultivated image of the enemy with a strong m

component. It is part of a larger crisis of regional 

affecting all of southeastern Europe, pitting polit

fragile polities one against the other in a series of co

over sovereignty and status. It is a quarrel be

modernizing societies subject to all sorts of strains, w

nationalism and national enmity are prone to manipu

by ambitious political elites in search of a rallying cry. 

strategic rivalry between insecure neighbors with mu

exclusive claims to strategic terrain, maritime choke p

and air corridors, fed by an international military orde

prioritizes competitive bidding for arms markets. A

least in regard to Cyprus, it has engaged and bogged 

the international community as peacekeeper and wou

conflict resolver. One part of a long-term solution 

Greek-Turkish rivalry will have to address the world 

concerns—cultural, developmental, strategic—from 

these kind of dilemmas derive.

307
immobile. From 1930-1955, bilateral relations 

reasonably stable, and it was only with the emergence 

Cyprus problem that the current phase of more in

rivalry ensued. During the Cold War decades, rivalr

imbedded within the Western Alliance and constrain

the presence of a common external threat. In the pos

War strategic environment, these constraints have b

less relevant, and the potential for an open clash h

some ways actually increased. Bilateral relations be

Athens and Ankara have become an integral part of a 

pattern of geopolitical rivalry stretching from the B

peninsula and Aegean Sea, through the Black and Ca

Seas, into post-Soviet Central Asia. Policym

committed to encouraging rapprochement need 

sensitive to the dynamic character of the relationshi

the altered strategic context that has intensified, r

than reduced, its volatility.

3. There is also a positive side to the picture. All 

amiss in Greek-Turkish relations, and there are 

grounds to hope that a self-generated proce

rapprochement could eventually take hold. Bui

bridges between neighboring cultures, that in the end 

a great deal in common through institutionalized dia

and cultural exchange, has long been a goal of progr

minded artists, intellectuals, and well-meaning cit

Both sides have agreed to terms of participation 

brigade-sized Balkan peacekeeping force, and are en

in efforts to generate an ongoing regional dialogue o

foreign ministers level.

32

 Neither has any inter

allowing their rivalry to slip beyond the edge of 

confrontation; angling for leverage is one thing, but a

and out fight, which would inevitably be vastly destru

is quite another. And none of the issues that have d

the two sides in the past are unresolvable in thei

terms.

The International Court of Justice is a per

adequate venue for the resolution of differences over a

308
could be granted an economic zone encompassing ab

third of the sea’s nonsovereign area, proportional 

share of the Aegean coastline and comprising two or 

broad passages stretching past the Greek islands of 

and Lesbos.

33

 Such an outcome would represent a 

compromise that would deny Greece the vain ho

transforming the Aegean into a mare nostrum

simultaneously recognize the Greek islands lying o

Turkish coast as integral parts of the Greek whole, r

than enclaves in the “Turkish half” of the sea.

34

 The 

of respective minorities could be resolved on the ba

OSCE norms, if need be, with the help of interna

monitoring. Even the Cyprus imbroglio is amena

reasonable compromise. The bi-zonal, bi-comm

federation agenda is far from ideal, but it takes into ac

the minimal demands of the respective communities 

probably the best compromise that circumstances pe

4. None of these benign outcomes can be ach

without progress in addressing core security concerns

Turkish military threat to Greek sovereignty and frust

Turkish desire for fuller access to European institu

The keys to resolving these concerns lie in the hands 

United States and the EU.

U.S. policymakers have defined Turkey as a c

strategic ally whose allegiance is to be cultivated 

costs—"I think it is very important that we do every

reasonable to anchor Turkey to the West," in the wo

U.S. President William Clinton.35

 This has encoura

great deal of tolerance for assertive Turkish policies a

the dominant political role of the Turkish armed for

reliable ally of the West in many ways but also the cham

of a geostrategic agenda with destabilizing implicati

Washington has looked on impassively as Ankar

maintained an illegal occupation of northern Cypru

several generations, pursued the chimera of a m

resolution to the Kurdish question by focusing its effo

the destruction of the Kurdestan Workers’ party, repea

309
military reprisals, reinforced a strategic partnership 

Israel that threatens to alienate much of the Arab w

launched military incursions into northern Iraq, mob

its forces against Syria, presided over three armed c

and most recently engineered the resignation o

democratically elected government of Erbakan’s W

party.

37

 The United States has considerable influenc

its Turkish ally, and should perhaps contemplate usin

a more positive manner—to restrain the Turkish m

leadership, encourage political pluralism, and dete

kind of aggressive posturing that Greece cannot he

perceive as an existential threat.

38

The EU, on the other hand, by turning its ba

Turkey’s European aspirations and opening the d

accession for the Republic of Cyprus, has all but pu

lined up with Athens against Ankara. In so doing, 

viscerally threatened what can fairly be defined as Tu

vital interests. While this situation prevails, Ankara c

expected to continue to place pressure upon Greece 

source of military and diplomatic leverage. Only a 

open and flexible European process can supply the po

incentives necessary to move Turkey toward a pol

rapprochement and concession. The problem of G

Turkish rivalry cannot be resolved so long as A

perceives the door that leads to Europe to be locke

barred.

5. Western policy has focused on “managing

problem of Greek-Turkish rivalry and in so doin

contributed to perpetuating it. The more ambitious g

transcending the rivalry by focusing on the two antago

core security concerns may prove to be more product

the long term. Neither Greece nor Turkey can be coer

accept arrangements that they do not feel contrib

their national interests, but they can be encouraged t

into mutually beneficial trade-offs designed to inte

and reconcile. These kind of trade-offs can only be arr

within the larger European and Euro-Atlantic co

310
to disproportionate rights in the Aegean in exchan

Turkish recognition of Greek sovereignty over dis

islands; a negotiated nonaggression pact guaranteed 

United States, including demilitarization agreem

affecting militarized Greek islands as well as Turkish 

on the mainland in Izmir or adjacent to Rhodes; o

acceptance of a bi-zonal arrangement in Cyprus mon

by NATO with significant Turkish military participat

a prerequisite for the island’s accession to the EU

prelude to a revived relationship between Brussel

Turkey itself. However they are defined, such trad

should involve mutual concessions, shared advantag

consistent Western monitoring.

All of these initiatives involve considerable risk

there is even greater risk in not pursuing t

Greek-Turkish relations are subject to severe 

pressures, the status quo cannot be maintained indefi

and, in the worst case of an open rift, U.S. and We

interests in the Mediterranean basin would s

severely.

39

 Greek-Turkish rivalry is a fundamental b

blocking the way to an effective Mediterranean se

regime and a critical risk for NATO. It is also a cha

that balanced, coordinated, patient, and persistent We

policies can still hope to confront successfully.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. John Redmond and Roderick Pace, “European Security 

1990s and Beyond: The Implications of the Accession of Cyp

Malta to the European Union,” Contemporary Security Policy, 

No. 3, December 1996, p. 438.

2. See Nimet Beriker-Atiyas, “The Kurdish Conflict in T

Issues, Parties and Prospects,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 

pp. 439-452; Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s K

Question, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 19

Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey, New Y

Martin’s Press, 1997.

311
pp. 147-151.

4. Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, Cam

Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 2.

5. The argument is presented from a Turkish perspective in 

D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, Turks and Greeks: Neigh

Conflict, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1994.

6. Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, B

Westview Press, 1990, pp. 5-18.

7. Marcia Christoff Kurop, “Greece and Turkey: Can The

Fences?,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1, January-February 1998

8. Margarita Mathiopoulos, “Toward an Aegean Treaty: 

Turkey and Greece,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3, S

1997, p. 116.

9. Niels Kadritzke, “Athenes et Ankara se disputent la me

Le Monde diplomatique, October 1996, pp. 14-15.

10. Frank Brenchley, “Aegean Conflict and the Law of the 

Frank Brenchley and Edward Fursdon, The Aegean and 

Conflict Studies No. 232, London, Research Institute for the S

Conflict and Terrorism, June 1990, pp. 1-8.

11. For a balanced evaluation, see Hugh Poulton, The B

Minorities and States in Conflict, London: Minority Rights Publi

1997, pp. 173-192.

12. Turkish Minority in Western Thrace: Briefing of the Com

on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, DC: Com

on Security and Cooperation in Europe, April 1996.

13. Christopher Hitchens, Cyprus, London: Quartet Books, 

51.

14. Elizabeth H. Prodromou, “Reintegrating Cyprus: The Ne

New Approach,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3, Autumn 1998, p. 5.

15. Wes Jonassen, “Greece and Turkey: Still on the Rocks,” 

East International, June 27, 1997, p. 20.

16. Salahi R. Sonyel, “The European Union and the 

Imbroglio,” Perceptions, Vol. 3, No. 2, June-August 1998, pp. 73

312
in Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, eds., Rethinking Modern

National Identity in Turkey, Seattle: University of Washington 

1997, pp. 15-36.

18. Kemal H. Karpat, “The Ottoman Role in Europe Fr

Perspective of 1994,” in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Natio

Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising R

Power, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 1-44.

19. Ian Bremmer, “Oil Politics: America and the Riches 

Caspian Basin, ” World Policy Journal, Vol. XV, No. 1, Spring 1

27-35; Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in the Caucas

Central Asia: Prospects for Oil Exploitation and Export in the C

Basin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

20. Cited in William Drozdiak, “NATO Role Grows as Th

Force Calms Kosovo Crisis,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, Octo

1998, p. E4.

21. Elaborated in Peter Varraroussis, “Die griechische Dip

auf dem Balkan—Ruckkehr in die Geschichte?,” Sudosteurop

6-7, 1995, pp. 373-384. See also Ekavi Athanassopoulou, “Turk

the Balkans: The View from Athens,” The International Specta

XXIX, No. 4, October-December 1994, pp. 55-64.

22. The Ankara-Tel Aviv strategic axis has recently beco

subject of particular concern, typically described in the Syrian pr

a destabilizing element which will provoke conflicts and br

back the climate of the 1950s in the Middle East, when 

politics of alliances sparked conflicts and animated hostil

towards the West in general and the United States 

particular.

Cited in Mouna Naim, “Vives critiques contre des manoeuvres 

turcs-americaines en Mediterranee,” Le Monde, June 7, 1998, p

23. Evan Liaris, “A European Solution” Opportun

Rapprochement in Cyprus," Harvard International Review, Vol. 

1, Winter 1997-98, pp. 38-41.

24. “Greek Fighters Land in Cyprus,” The Washington Time

17, 1998, p. 17; and “Turkish F-16s Sent to Cyprus,” The Was

Post, June 19, 1998, p. 33.

313
Russians,” The New York Times, April 29, 1998, pp. A1 and A3

26. Niels Kadritzke, “Chypre, otage de l’affrontement entre A

et Ankara,” Le Monde diplomatique, September 1998, p. 7.

27. Nuzhet Kandemir, “Turkey: Secure Bridge Over T

Waters,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4, Fall 1997, p. 1

28. Prodromou, p. 8, argues that current circumstances “rev

status quo option as unsustainable and irrelevant to any effort t

meaningful peace-building in Cyprus.”

29. Thomas F. Farr, “Overcoming the Cyprus Tragedy: Let C

Be Cypriots,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4, Fall 19

32-62.

30. Denktash’s observation is cited in Redmond and Page, 

31. Niels Kadritzke, “Rêve d’Europe dans le nord de l’île,” Le 

diplomatique, September 1998, p. 7.

32. Ünal Cevikoz, “European Integration and Re

Co-Operation in Southeast Europe,” Perceptions, Vol. II, 

December-February 1997-1998, p. 153.

33. Kadritzke, “Athenes et Ankara se disputent la mer Ege

Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Question, Adelphi Paper no. 155, L

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979.

34. Theodore Couloumbis and Piodromos Yonnes, “Alte

Futures in the Post-Cold War International System and 

Implications for Greece,” in Heinz-Jürgen Axl, ed., Beiträ

Mobilisierung Südosteuropas aus deutscher und griechische

Munich: Südosteuropa Aktuell, 1995, p. 58.

35. Cited from remarks to reporters in Kelly Couturier, “T

Premier Expected to Press Clinton on Pipeline,” The Washingt

December 19, 1997, p. 46.

36. Andrew Borowiec, “Army Runs Turkey Behind the S

Washington Times, July 18, 1998, p. 16; and for background, W

Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, London: Routledge, 19

37. Michael M. Gunter, “The Silent Coup: The Secularist-I

Struggle in Turkey,” Journal of South Asian and Middle 

Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, Spring 1998, pp. 1-12; and Ben Lo

314
Quarterly, Vol. 112, No. 2, 1997, pp. 191-215.

38. Jim Hoaglund, “Before Turkey Joins Europe,” The Was

Post, November 2, 1997, p. C7.

39. Heinz Kramer, “The Cyprus Problem and European Se

Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 16-32.

315
THE STALLED PEACE PROCESS:

ISRAELI-SYRIAN TRACK

Sami G. Hajjar

Shimon Peres is a great diplomat who wants peace, Eh

Baraq is on the road to peace; but Netanyahu. is a strange m

whose declarations are strange.

Hafiz Al-Asad1

Introduction.

In this chapter, the author examines the stalled M

East peace process and focuses especially o

Israeli-Syrian track. He argues that, for ideologica

strategic security considerations, the Likud governm

Prime Minister Benjamin Netenyahu is unwilling to 

by the “land for peace” formula established in the 

Madrid Peace Conference. Also, Mr. Netenyahu an

foreign policy advisors hold certain assumptions 

Syria, whereby the return of the Golan Heights is a 

national priority for President Asad. Syria, on the 

hand, will not agree to any territorial compromises o

Golan Heights and refuses to endorse any separate 

between Israel and Lebanon. The future prospects 

lasting peace in the Middle East is in doubt. The a

believes that a vigorous U.S. involvement, along w

meaningful European role, hold the best chance for rev

the peace process leading to a settlement o

Israeli-Syrian (and Lebanese) track.

On October 23, 1998, at a White House cere

witnessed by U.S. President William Clinton and 

Hussein of Jordan, Prime Minister Netenyahu 

Chairman Yasir Arafat signed the Wye River Mem

317
the press, represented a considerable investment in 

and effort on the part of President Clinton and his 

foreign policy advisors to revive the Palestinian-I

peace track and gave hope that the Middle East 

process could be resuscitated after almost 2 1/2 ye

hiatus.

2

 However, the agreement suffered a series of 

setbacks, including the decision of the Israeli cabi

require added conditions for implementing the pact, an

decision of the Knesset to hold general elections i

spring or early summer of 1999 has placed 

implementation of the Wye Agreement on hold at leas

after Israel elects a new prime minister and a new Kne

The peace process is again frozen. How did it get f

in the first place? A brief background focusing on 

Minister’s Netenyahu’s first 2 years in office may h

understand why and how the process was placed on 

Background.

The election of hard-line Likud leader Benj

Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel on May 29, 

profoundly changed the tempo and direction of the M

East peace process. Netanyahu’s disdain of the 

agreement reached between the previous L

government and the Palestinian Authority, his attem

separate the Lebanese-Israeli peace track from 

Israeli-Syrian track, and his insistence tha

Israeli-Syrian negotiations be resumed wit

preconditions and irrespective of progress made be

the Syrians and the Labor government negotiators 

effectively frozen the peace process between Israel a

two neighbors to the north. The current deadlock bas

deeply-held ideological beliefs, sovereignty claims

national security consideration is not likely to l

without the continued direct personal involvement 

President of the United States along, perhaps, with 

for the European community.

4

 Vital U.S. interests 

318
process, begun in Madrid in 1991, is not succes

concluded.

5

The process had its roots in United Nations 

Resolution 242 that, following the 1967 Arab-Israel

recognized the “inadmissibility of the acquisiti

territory by war,” and the need for the “establishmen

just and lasting peace in the Middle East.” These aspe

U.N. 242 became popularly known as the “land for p

formula that led to the Israeli -Egyptian peace based 

Camp David Accords of 1979. It was also the basis on 

the Madrid Conference of 1991 was convened that res

in an Israeli-Palestinian Agreement in 1993 an

Israeli-Jordanian full peace treaty in 1995. Further

the “land for peace” formula generated a strong mome

toward regional peace as relations between Israe

several Arab states began to normalize.

Prime Minister Netanyahu made it clear durin

election campaign and after his victory that he rejec

“land for peace” formula and will seek instead “peace 

security.” He vowed never to return the Golan Heig

Syria, accept Palestinian statehood, or compromis

sovereignty of Jerusalem.

6

 Having made clear what h

not do, he called on the Arabs to negotiate peace w

preconditions.

A 2-day Arab summit in Cairo in late June 

produced a communique in which Arab lea

representing 21 nations “called on Israel to withdraw 

all occupied Arab lands and to permit the Palestinia

establish an independent state with East Jerusalem 

capital.” They warned that, if Israel is to delay or pr

differently, this would “compel all the Arab sta

reconsider steps taken in the context of the peace proc

In a written statement issued by his office, Mr. Netan

responded, “One-sided demands that harm security a

reconcilable with peace talks. In order for the proc

319
stop.”

8

With the hardening of positions on both sides, f

U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher trave

Israel for meetings with the new Prime Minister to ex

ways in which the peace process could continue. 

reports following their meeting on June 25 suggeste

Mr. Netanyahu, 

refused to yield on his hard-line stands that have raised fear

a slowdown in Arab-Israeli peacemaking . . . and [d]es

Christopher’s lawyerly effort to skirt points of content

Netanyahu stood firm on several points that, if maintained 

negotiations, would differ markedly from what the Un

States has been promoting in the Middle East for the 

several years . . .

9

Still, many analysts advised then that Mr. Netan

needs to be given a chance to develop his foreign 

priorities. The logic of the advice was that election cam

rhetoric will eventually give way to the responsibilit

governing. As one Israeli investment manager 

experienced the economic benefits of peace with the 

has stated, “People are a little afraid of wh

[Netanyahu] says. But between what he says and wh

does there is a difference—at least I hope so.”

10

During the next 2 months after the Arab summ

Cairo, a flurry of high-level meetings and diplo

activities took place. These included the well-publ

Netanyahu visit to Washington on July 9-10 where h

President Clinton and addressed a joint session of Con

and his visit to Cairo July 18. Press and analysts’ r

were mixed, but most suggested that no substa

progress toward resumption of the peace process was 

because of these meetings. In fact, when in Washingto

Despite royal treatment, Netanyahu made no concession

U.S. peace policies . . . Specifically, [he] did not embrace the U

land for peace formula or agree to curb settlements to lift 

320
Hebron or the Golan Heights, to meet Yasir Arafat or 

recognize Palestinian statehood. Instead he emphatica

asserted that Jerusalem would forever be Israel’s capital. H

unabashedly hard line must have come as a surprise to ma

Americans, who have been assured by much of the U.S. me

that he is simply ‘pragmatic politician, whose views will 

tempered by high office.’

11

On the other hand, the respected Jordanian w

Shihan, quoting special sources in Washington, rep

that Netanyahu offered to the U.S. Administration,

to revive the secret forum between Israel and Syria as 

irreversible Israeli condition if Syria wants to join real ta

that could culminate in its recovery of the Golan Heights a

secure Israel against any future Syrian military threat.

12

The report went on to detail the elements o

Netanyahu proposal including the decoupling o

Lebanese and Syrian tracks, Israeli complete withd

from the Golan Heights in return for guarantees f

security along certain lines including the station

10,000 American troops in the Syrian Heights to mon

demilitarized zone between the two countries, and 

distribution of common water sources. The substance 

Israeli offer, according to the source, should have 

acceptable to Syria, however, the stall in the talks had 

with mechanics, rather than details.

The Syrian leadership sensed that the Americans and Israe

would be setting a trap for them if they proceed with the sec

talks, without bringing in another world power, like Russ

that would strengthen Syria’s hand in the negotiations a

hold the Israelis and Americans to the provisions of 

treaty.

13

If Prime Minister Netanyahu made such an offer 

U.S. administration, this would explain why U.S. 

process coordinator Dennis Ross was dispatched t

region in late July 1996 to revive the peace talks. One 

assume that if Netanyahu’s secret offer to the Syrian

321
then Mr. Ross could have had little basis on wh

rekindle the stalled talks. In short, there were mixed s

on the future of the peace process and specifical

Israeli-Syrian track.

14

Between the time of Netenyahu’s election an

meeting at Wye River Plantation, there were 

attempts to move the peace process forward. Howeve

despite many meetings between regional leaders, tr

several U.S. and European envoys, and the floating o

and fresh proposals, the peace process was no further 

than where it was when Netenyahu took office in 

1996.

15

 For in this time period, Netanyahu’s har

stances were designed to change the basis on whic

peace process was predicated. On the Palestinian tra

objected to the Oslo agreement entered into by the pre

government as endangering Israeli security, and gav

green light for the building of a new settlement on 

Homa in East Jerusalem. The decision to build 

settlement was the primary reason for the freezing 

peace process.

16

On the Israeli-Syrian track, Netanyahu declared 

negotiations must begin anew and not proceed, a

Syrians demanded, from where they left off wit

previous government. Netanyahu also propose

“Lebanon First” option—a non-starter proposal fo

Lebanese and Syrians who considered it a trick desig

split the Lebanese-Syrian tracks, and therefore weak

negotiating position of each side. 17

Finally, it was Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blai

invited Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Arafat to meet in Lon

May 1998, in an effort to restart the process, at 

initially on the Israeli-Palestinian track. The Lo

meeting succeeded only in revealing a rift betwee

United States and Israel over the American proposal 

Israeli withdrawal from an additional 13.1 percent 

West Bank. Before the London meeting, Arafa

322
from 9 percent only.

18 American diplomacy did even

reach a deal with Mr. Netanyahu on the size o

withdrawal that was also acceptable to the Palesti

That deal was, of course, the Wye Plantation Memoran

This agreement, however, while an important step for

is hardly the key to “unlock the door to the long-e

regional peace between Israel and its Arab neighbor

Vice President Gore hoped.

19 The key to regional 

remains a comprehensive “land for peace” formula.

This remainder of this chapter will focus o

Israeli-Syrian peace track. It contends that little diffe

exists between what Mr. Netanyahu says and what he 

The same should be true of any Likud success

Netenyahu. The reason, besides traditional L

ideological arguments in favor of retaining captured 

is that Netanyahu (Likud) and his foreign policy ad

hold certain assumptions about Syria whereby the ret

the Golan Heights is a lesser national priority for Pre

Asad. In addition, Netanyahu seeks to benefit from 

policy of istifrad—a rich Levantine-Arabic term me

isolation, separation, seclusion, and loneness—that 

weaken Syria and leave it with virtually no barga

options vis-à-vis an Israeli government that values se

above peace. Finally, Israel’s hand is further strengt

through its 1996 military agreement and alliance 

Turkey which has created a new regional geopo

reality in which Syria has become encircled by h

states.

20

The United States faces solemn challenges in try

move the peace process forward in the cu

circumstances. It is difficult to assess how Pres

Clinton’s domestic political problems will impact his a

to be fully and personally engaged in the peace pr

Equally uncertain are the results of the Israeli 

elections and the choice of prime minister. Still, even 

diplomacy, during the remaining time of the C

administration, with all its attendant arsenals of eco

323
government to return to the “land for peace” formul

size of the aid package and the domestic political pre

the administration will have to endure may be too g

price to pay. The chapter will conclude by postulating 

general policy recommendations.

The Golan Heights and Israeli-Syrian Relation

The Golan Heights as an area of friction and conte

between Israel and Syria dates back to 1949 when th

countries signed a U.N.-brokered armistice agreem

end the state of hostilities following the 1949 Arab-I

war. Relations between the two countries over the 

issue could be divided into two periods. The first 

period before 1967 when the Heights were under S

control. The second period beginning 1967 to d

characterized by Israeli occupation of about 1,250 s

kilometers of the 1,750 square kilometers that compri

Heights, and Syria’s attempt to regain sovereignty 

them. 

During the first period, Israeli-Syrian relations inv

border incidents often culminating in major mi

clashes. According to Muhammad Muslih,

At issue was the DMZ [demilitarized zone], an area of less t

100 square miles stretching from above Lake Huleh to sout

the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberia). The zone was composed 

three separate sectors of land along the Israel-Syria border. 

northern sector was formed by Syrian, Palestinian and Isr

villages, while the central and southern sectors were m

important from a strategic point of view because they w

heavily populated and straddled the Jordan River between 

Sea of Galilee and Lake Huleh.

21

From the beginning, Israel sought to have exc

control over the Sea of Galilee for settlement and eco

purposes. Israel, acting under the counsel of its 

advisors as to the legal status of the DMZ, began: 

324
was the imposition of Israeli sovereignty over the DMZ. T

objective was to drain the Lake Huleh marshes, win exclus

control of the Sea of Galilee, and complete Israel’s Natu

Water Carrier, a project whose aim was to divert water fr

the Jordan River to the northern part of the Negev desert 

the south.

22

Syria, therefore, was determined to check Is

encroachment that involved such measures as the pla

of mines and minefields, erection of fortifications, exte

of Israeli cultivation and the restriction of the movem

U.N. military observers—all viewed by Syria as cre

annexation of the DMZ which, from a Syrian 

viewpoint, was neither under Syrian nor Is

sovereignty. The point here is that both sides have co

regard the region as important economically and mil

for their national interests. Numerous incidents took 

during the period before the Six-Day War of 1967 

demonstrated the value of the area to each side.

The second period in Israeli-Syrian relations beg

June 1967 after Israel captured the Golan Heights an

high point on Mount Hermon (2,224 meters) from 

Acquisition of the Golan has given Israel treme

strategic advantage with its army stationed on

kilometers from the Syrian capital of Damascus, allow

to install highly sophisticated eavesdropping devic

Mount Hermon, giving it control of water sources incl

the Banias River—a major tributary of the Jordan 

feeding it with 14,000 cubic meters of water 

hour—and providing opportunities to create new J

settlements in the area.

23

From a Syrian perspective, the loss of the Golan H

makes it extremely vulnerable to an Israeli land atta

the Heights formed a critical natural defense against I

Their return is a vital geo-strategic objective. Further

the Israeli occupation of the Golan has had other 

Control of the water sources was an obvious cost, give

significance of water issues in a situation of incre

325
citizens on the Golan are left unprotected and ab

Because of Israeli policies, only 16,000 people in five 

villages remain, compared to 130,000 people in 139 vi

in 1967. Additionally, Syria regards the 15,000 I

settlers in some 35 Jewish settlements to be intrude

Syrian sovereignty.

25

Compared to the first period, the 1967-to-present p

in Israeli-Syrian relations has been largely characteriz

the relative quiet and lack of border incidents betwee

two countries on the Golan with one major exce

Instead, Syria has used the surrogate Hizballah in 

Lebanon as its main military weapon against Israe

exception was the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War d

which Syria attempted a surprise attack to recov

occupied territories. That war ended with the retur

small strip of territory in 1974 and the establishmen

U.N.-patrolled buffer zone between the two armies 

result of Henry Kissinger’s mediation efforts.

26

For the Israelis, the occupation of the Golan po

serious dilemma which is reflected in the division amo

Israeli public over this issue. To some, the Golan offe

opportunity to trade captured territories for real peace 

Syria (and by extension with Lebanon), thus endin

50-year old Arab-Israeli dispute. Apparently, the pre

Labor government was moving in this direction, h

concluded that President Asad had indeed made a str

decision to enter into a lasting peace with I

Consequently, the Rabin-Peres governments were pre

to trade land for peace. To other Israelis, however, the 

should never be given up to the Syrians, for its posse

affords Israel the best security guarantee agains

future Syrian attack. Finally, there are those who t

somewhat middle position, arguing for partial withd

as the price to be paid for peace with Syria. 27

The late-1997 news regarding a Mossad agen

fabricated reports on Syria is likely to add an int

326
Gil, responsible for watching Syria, apparently pro

false information for several years that influence

Israeli decisions on Syria which nearly caused two w

was Gil’s information portraying the Syrian leadershi

especially President Asad, as opposed to making peac

played a role in Rabin’s decision to emphasiz

Israeli-Palestinian track vice the Israeli-Syrian track

The Israeli Position.

The position of the current Likud Israeli governme

the Golan Heights is largely shaped by Israel’s 

Ambassador Dr. Dore Gold—formerly Netany

principal national security advisor, and director of th

foreign and defense policy project at the Jaffee Cent

Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University.

Gold’s writings are largely centered on operationa

tactical considerations as the principal factors to b

according to Israeli security requirements. In turn, 

requirements constitute the only bases for the 

process. In addition, the U.S.-born and educated 

argues in favor of settlement arrangements wit

Syrians that would preclude the stationing of Ame

troops as peacekeepers on the Golan. Of course, this is 

popular stance in the United States, especially a

members of Congress who are loath to place Ame

troops in what might be harm’s way. Consequently, 

must retain significant portions of the Golan to guar

its security. Similarly, operational and tactical f

require that Israel does not withdraw completely fro

West Bank, and the Oslo Agreement, that the pre

Labor government concluded with the Palest

Authority, is viewed with extreme suspicion by Gold a

Likud government.

Gold’s starting premise is the existence of two ty

structural asymmetries between Israel and its 

adversaries that seriously imperil Israeli security. Th

327
population and the populations of its Arab neighbor

allows the Arabs to maintain relatively large mi

establishments. The numbers imbalance becomes 

significant, considering that the bulk of Israeli format

reserve units compared to Arab divisions that are sta

active service units.

The other asymmetry pertains to coalition form

potential. Within the region, and despite inter

rivalries, the Arab military have managed to 

multi-state coalitions against Israel in every Arab-I

war. By contrast, Israel has no regional alliances sa

cooperative ties with “periphery states” such as Iran 

the Shah, and recently Turkey.

The net effect, as Gold sees it, is that “these asymm

mean that the central strategic challenge for Isr

countering the potential conventional military super

of its Arab state adversaries individually, and especia

coalition.”

29

To overcome the strategic challenge posed b

conventional military power asymmetries, Gold argu

Israeli military control of the Golan Heights and the 

Bank as these occupied territories afford Israel with 

important security advantages. The first is denial, wh

Syrian forces can no longer threaten the Sea of Galilee 

the Golan and are denied the ability to control the sour

the Jordan River. Control of the West Bank denie

Arabs (Palestinians and/or Jordanians) the abil

threaten Israel’s coastal plain where 70 percent 

population dwell and that is the principal site of I

industrial plants. It also increases the distance betwe

Mediterranean and the pre-1967 border that was on

miles and made Israel vulnerable to Arab attack 

narrow waist.

30

The second advantage is warning, whereby contro

territories gives Israel early warning capabilities. I

case of Syria, Israel can detect Syrian military activit

328
definition denied Syria comparable coverage of the G

region. In the West Bank, Israeli deployment of air de

units reduces the threat of air attacks by Arab 

originating from the direction of Jordan or Iraq. Con

West Bank airspace “is vital for the defense of the sk

Israel against Arab war coalition aircraft.

31

The last advantage is defense, and Gold makes i

that this is because of Israeli control of topograph

favorable terrain.The Golan Heights and the West 

provide Israel with an excellent shield against conven

military attack. They also improve Israeli counter-offe

capability that traditionally has emphasized m

warfare with the objective of taking the war to the en

heartland.32

Gold concluded his essay by positing the dilemma 

Israel: “. . . to hold on to all the 1967 territories and 

Israel more defensible or give up these territorial ba

and reduce the enmity of its neighbors?” Put different

difficult security choice is between military str

considerations and diplomatic political arrangement

answer depends on the nature of the Middle East a

given time and “peace between Israel and the Arab 

could not be superior to the relations between Arab 

themselves.”

33

 Therefore, and with respect to Syria, S

intentions and capabilities are critical elements for a 

arrangement with Israel. They are, however, diffic

measure. Consequently, Israel will require agreed

limits on Syrian offensive capabilities in exchang

Israeli withdrawal from Golan territories. Syria ma

however, agree to any force structure reduction since 

claim threats to its security from other quarter

alternate consideration might be a demilitarized 

Heights. This, according to Gold, is unacceptable, for u

the Sinai, the Golan does not provide a deep enough 

against Syrian forces who will remain within close st

distance to Israel.

329
Palestinians are not a military power, nevertheless 

must have access to the West Bank as defense ag

potential Arab enemy attack from the east. His conclus

. . . Israel will have to take a conservative approach 

outstanding territorial differences with its neighbo

Premature Israeli withdrawal, while the basic elements 

Middle East instability persists, [ethno-religious confli

frontier disputes, serious economic differences] wo

destabilize the region and could increase the chances of 

more than continuation of the status quo.

34

It is the desire to perpetuate the status quo that 

key to Netanyahu’s attitude and policy toward the 

process. The military strategic consideration

buttressed by Likud’s ideological inclination to clai

occupied territories as part of the historical land of 

that belongs to the Jews.

35

Since coming to power, Netanyahu’s governmen

purposefully pursued a policy of not accommodatin

“land for peace” formula that is at the heart o

U.S.-sponsored peace process. The alleged assumpt

that such a formula does not guarantee Israeli securit

what about the use of U.S. forces on the Golan Heigh

post “land for peace” settlement as a buffer between S

and Israeli forces? Gold provides the arguments abou

such a proposal is unworkable or at least undesirable

In a Jaffee Center memorandum, Gold argued tha

forces on the Golan, for reasons already stated, would 

have to perform peacekeeping and peace-enfo

activities. The former involves monitoring activities s

to the Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO) in 

Peace-enforcing would involve early warning and po

to act as a deterrence force in case of Syrian hostile i

and as a defense force in case of a Syrian attack. 

carefully weighs each of these peace enforcing function

notes that their performance by U.S. forces, beside neg

long-standing Israeli national security doctrine by m

330
lead to friction between the two countries that could 

their strategic relationship. The conclusion he reache

that

. . . the presence of a large American force on the Golan Heig

would, in the final analysis, be disadvantageous for Isra

security. Beyond the risks associated explicitly with 

deployment of a substantial American presence on the Gol

there are a number of domestic American political factors th

in any case reduce the chances that such a presence would 

acceptable to the U.S.

36

It should be evident that Gold’s arguments are 

heart of the Netanyahu policies regarding the 

process. Israeli security is very important and could o

achieved by direct Israeli military strategic adva

Peace agreements that diminish Israeli military str

advantage or the presence of surrogate forces such a

United States as guarantors of peace are unaccep

alternatives. Given the general conditions of the reg

would be unrealistic to expect Israeli-Arab relations 

superior to existing Arab-Arab relations. Consequent

status quo with its attendant Israeli military superior

for the time being, an acceptable option.

The security arguments of Dore Gold are not L

only supporting arguments. There are the contenti

Daniel Pipes who at one point argued that Asad 

primarily interested in absorbing Lebanon. The impli

is that he is willing to reach a deal by which the 

Heights are “traded” for Lebanon.

37

 Later, Pipes a

that Asad was not truly interested in achieving a settle

on the Golan; his goal, for reasons of regime survival, 

peace but a peace process.”38There were, furthermor

arguments of Professor Beres and Ambassador S

(Israeli Ambassador to the United States) that, beyon

immediate security concerns, withdrawal from the 

Heights would “uproot 32 Golan Jewish communitie

threaten a third of Israel’s water supply.”

39

 

331
the Golan. The Times (London) recently reported th

number of Jewish settlers on the Golan is increasin

continues to rise. The central thesis of this report was t

Israel is consolidating its presence on the occupied Go

Heights to the extent that leaders of the Jewish settlers here 

longer fear the land being handed back to Syria as they 

before the 1996 election.

40

To all the above discussion could be adde

observation that in the post-Soviet world, the perpetu

of the status quo on the Israeli-Syrian front clearly f

the Israelis. Syria’s lacking a superpower patron

Israel’s success in forging a military alliance with Tu

mean that the gap between Israeli and Syrian m

strength is widening in Israel’s favor. The longer the s

quo continues, presumably the less is Syria’s abil

negotiate a favorable peace settlement. This i

realization that both Israel and Syria must have arri

which explains Israeli government stalling tactic

Syrian eagerness for the resumption of the negotiatio

the basis of the “land for peace” formula.

The Syrian Position.

The geo-strategic environment of the region i

aftermath of the Gulf war provided the United Stat

opportunity to cooperate with the Soviet Union and co

the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference based on the “la

peace” principle. Syria, which until then had depend

the Soviet Union for political and military sup

concluded that relations between the two superpowers 

changing rapidly, and blanket Soviet support was no l

assured. Madrid was a viable option to achieve peace. 

all, Syria and several Arab states had participated 

U.S.-led coalition against Iraq and could now hope to 

on a vigorous and even-handed peace role by the U

States.

332
based on two conditions: all lands occupied by Israel in 

were to be returned as a precondition for any 

agreement, and the peace agreement shou

comprehensive. This meant that Israel must agr

withdraw from all the lands occupied in 1967. I

Israel’s participation in the Madrid Conference m

acceptance of the “land for peace’ formula as the bas

future negotiations. Syria also preferred th

comprehensive peace agreement be reached simultane

settling all outstanding issues between Israel and th

the Palestinians, Jordanians, Lebanese, and Syrians

an approach would strengthen the Arab negot

position in addition to salvaging what has remained o

solidarity after the Gulf war.

Syria’s approach to the peace process and a de

accounting of its negotiations with Israel was re

revealed by Walid Al-Moulalem, Ambassador to the 

and head of the Syrian delegation to the peace ta

Ambassador Al-Moualem made it clear that Syria 

never negotiate with Israel if it was not understood 

Israel was willing to withdraw from the entire Golan 

June 4, 1967, international boundary.

42

 In other word

purpose of the negotiations was for Syria to r

sovereignty over all of its territory in exchange for peac

normalization of relations with Israel. He claimed 

Prime Minister Rabin understood this point and comm

Israel to withdrawal. The Syrian Ambassador stated

From Madrid onward, the only issue we would even consen

discuss was full withdrawal. Under Likud, of course, it wa

dialogue of the deaf—I think Ben Aharon, the head of t

Israeli delegation, was following to the letter [former Pri

Minister Yitzhak] Shamir’s instructions to continue talk

for ten years without result. After Rabin became pri

minister in June 1992, we still insisted on discussi

withdrawal only. When Rabin finally realized that the Syria

would not move a step ahead in discussing any of the oth

elements of a peace settlement before being convinced 

Israel’s intention on full withdrawal, he made the opening

333
commitment, and the reason an agreement was not re

then was because Peres decided to call for elec

Al-Moualem made it clear that, precisely becaus

Israelis accepted the principle of “land for peace

withdrawal, that negotiations were progressing o

other elements of a peace agreement including no

ization, security arrangements, and the timetab

fulfillment. Al-Moualem also noted the negotiating str

of Rabin that sought to separate each of the peace 

that Israel was engaged in. Consequently, when pro

was being made on the Israeli-Palestinian track in 199

[Rabin] informed us through the Americans that he 

not proceed on the Syrian track because the Israeli 

needed time to digest the Oslo Accord. So he suspende

talks.” Peres, by contrast, wanted to “enter the ele

with a Syrian-Israeli agreement in his hand. He wan

‘fly high and fast’ . . .”

44 The Syrians, however, we

prepared to move that quickly since the issues to be s

with respect to the other elements of a peace agree

were complicated, and time was needed to se

agreement to the Syrian public. Still, Peres calle

elections less than 3 months after taking office and the 

were suspended in 1996.

45

Syria has made its position very clear to Netany

government. First, Syria has opted for peace as a str

choice. Second, negotiations must be resumed from 

point they were left off. All understandings re

between the parties concerning withdrawal of Israeli 

from the Golan and agreements about sec

arrangements must be considered valid. Third, the S

and Lebanese tracks are inseparable.

The Syrian option for peace was stated clear

President Asad during a joint news conference in Gen

January 1994, following meetings with President Cl

He said,

334
strategic choice that secures Arab rights, ends the Isra

occupation, and enables all peoples in the region to live 

peace, security, and dignity, and in honor we shall ma

peace.

46

This statement, made for the benefit of the Israel

international mediators, especially the United State

meant to convey the sincerity of the Syrians in reach

final settlement with the Israelis if the Golan Heigh

returned to Syrian sovereignty.

47

 Pragmatically, 

“strategic choice” was the only one left for him unde

circumstances. As a realist, “driven not by ideol

considerations but by raison d’etat . . . Asad is very aw

his strategic predicament vis-à-vis Israel.”

48 Lack

superpower patron, his predicament is Syria’s inabi

effectively balance Israel’s power or else conta

Consequently, the peace option as a “strategic c

exposes his weakness and, therefore, vulnerability. 49

A major difference separates the Syrian and I

positions with respect to possible resumpti

negotiations between them. Netanyahu believes 

negotiations should be resumed without any precond

so that “both sides would be free to raise any negot

demand they wish . . .”

50

 He justified his position o

strength of the argument that,

there is no contractual mechanism between the two sta

with regard to a peace arrangement. He [Netanyahu] asser

that the United States understands it and agrees that issu

discussed in talks conducted by the previous government a

not binding on Israel.

51

Put differently, Netanyahu would honor signed agree

entered into by the previous government, but i

obligated to accept his predecessor’s bargaining pos

In yet another statement attributed to him, the I

Prime Minister suggested that he was in no hur

conclude a peace treaty with Syria:

335
with it has not ended. There are obstacles on the way, but 

will achieve peace. We will work for it during the current ph

(phase ending in the year 2000), otherwise in the next (y

2004).

52

Syria, on the other hand, insists that agreem

reached in negotiations with the previous govern

including Rabin’s willingness to withdraw to the Ju

1967, line, should be the starting point for the resump

talks. Syrian negotiator Al-Moualem claims that the I

offer to withdraw from all of the Golan was in writing

was also confirmed by Defense Minister General Mu

Tlass.53 To go back to point zero as Netanyahu dem

means, in the words of the Syrian Vice President Khad

that “the negotiations could last another century . . . 

every time there is a new Israeli government we ha

return to point zero.”54 Accepting Netanyahu’s po

would also mean accepting his harder line, and giv

false impression that Syria might be willing to 

territorial concessions.

Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon has become its s

weapon against the policy of istifrad. If Israel co

denied the option of a separate peace with Lebanon

Israel will have to continue its involvement i

increasingly unpopular “security zone” on its nor

border. It also means that the goal of achieving 

between Israel and all of its neighboring states will b

half fulfilled. Not surprisingly, therefore, the rela

recent Israeli proposal to implement U.N. Security C

Resolution 425 (calling on Israel to withdraw from Leb

met with strong Syrian condemnation. This is becau

Israeli withdrawal plan would take away an impo

Syrian weapon—using Hizballah against Israel.

The Israeli proposal offered to comply with Reso

425 if Lebanon takes steps to insure security alon

border. In Netanyahu’s words,

336
assessment that would increase Hezbollah attacks into t

Galilee . . . If the government of Lebanon will join us 

establishing the proper security arrangements in southe

Lebanon, we will be happy to get out of Lebanon in t

framework of implementing U.N. Resolution 425.

55

For Syria (and Lebanon), Israeli withdrawal mu

unconditional as called for by Resolution 425. The S

message is clear, security on the border and peace in G

is obtainable once Israel agrees to withdraw simultane

from south Lebanon and the Golan Heights.

56

Finally, and with respect to the broader issue of alli

and “encirclement,” it is not surprising that Syria’s res

has been an attempt to balance Israel’s alliance wit

United States and the more recent Turkish-Israeli all

Since the United States is viewed by Syria as biased to

Israel, Syria has vigorously advocated for a European 

the peace process, especially after Netenyahu ca

power. President Asad believes that, given the stalem

peace process, the European Union, and particu

France, should have a role to play in the peace process

to replace the Americans, but to have a role along wi

Americans in pushing the peace process forward

remains to be seen what role Europe can play, given “I

animosity toward French and European diplo

intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict.”

58

 The Tu

Israeli military alliance has sufficiently worried Sy

that President Asad traveled to Iran in July 1997 to b

Syria’s relations with that country. Syria has also 

steps to establish contacts with Iraq, its neighbor and 

Party ideological enemy. “Together with them, the Sy

could face Turkey and signal the Americans that the

have partners in spite of attempts to isolate them.”

Turkish-Israeli military agreement concerns not only 

but also most nations in the region leading to the emer

of “a front led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria

remains to be seen, however, if the new realignments t

337
another.

The above discussion discloses why the Israeli-S

peace track is deadlocked. The problem is the in

relationship between the defining elements o

stalemate: Syrian demand for sovereignty and Israeli 

for security. If American diplomacy is to succeed in m

the Israeli-Syrian peace track forward, it must do so 

on proposals that can accommodate these conflicting c

Observations and Policy Recommendations.

On May 6, 1998, Hillary Rodham Clinton, speakin

group of Arab and Israeli teenagers, said that crea

Palestinian state is “very important for the broader g

peace in the Middle East.”

61

 Not surprisingly

statement touched off criticisms of the First Lady in 

pro-Israeli quarters in and outside of the United S

However, it is precisely this realistic future assessm

the region that is required of the United States if i

secure its long-term vital interests. One such intere

lasting and comprehensive Middle East peace. O

Israeli-Syrian peace track, a comparable rea

assessment is the fact that Syria will not make terr

concessions in the Golan Heights, and will not waver 

demand for full sovereignty over its occupied l

Additionally, there is absolutely no reason to believe 

any post-Asad government will accept anything less.

In this author’s view, the long-standing 

commitment, by word and deed, to the security 

well-being of the State of Israel was a major fac

bringing the Arabs to the realization that Israel is 

region to stay. Today, no responsible Arab leader or c

harbors any false hopes that Israel could be eliminated 

the political landscape of the Middle East. Arab willin

to recognize and negotiate with Israel since the M

Peace Conference attests to this fact. Similarly, the U

States must now dispel any false hopes entertained b

338
Israeli citizens (and their U.S. supporters), that they 

permanently annex all or some of the Golan territory; j

the First Lady’s statement helped dispel the notion 

somehow Palestinian national aspirations cou

negotiated or withered away. A realistic assessme

future regional conditions by the principals involved 

peace process is the prerequisite step to breakin

deadlock. As major mediator between the parties 

peace process, but also as the sole superpower with 

interests in the Middle East, the United States 

publicly endorse the reasonable and legitimate dema

the parties—Syrian sovereignty over its occu

territories, and Israeli demands for security concerns 

Galilee and northern Israel.

With the dawning of a new international era foll

the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new reality has em

in the Middle East. It is the linkage and the 

connectivity that exist between the various subregi

the Middle East. Saddam Hussein proved vividly 

connection when he fired Scud missiles on downtow

Aviv. Also true is the interconnectivity between the va

tracks of the peace process. The failed Doha eco

conference of 1997 showed how failure on one 

(Israeli-Palestinian standoff over the proposed settle

on Har Homa) can affect another. As the former Ass

Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs warned

United States is making a dangerous mistake by foc

its efforts in the Middle East peace process solely on 

and the Palestinians, without also involving Syri

Lebanon.”

62

 The impression that the Israeli-Syrian tr

deliberately being put on hold reinforces the Syrian 

that the United States is less than an “honest b

assisting in the Israeli tactic of ‘istifrad’ing’ and ‘enci

Syria.

In the Arab street, the image of the United Sta

responsible “honest broker” is less than positive 

continues to deteriorate. Anyone who follows the Arab 

339
this fact. The most common charge is that of “d

standards” by which the United States is willing to lo

other way when Israel stands in violation of U.N. Se

Council resolutions, but insists on the strictest adhe

by Iraq to U.N. sanction resolutions.

63

The popular negative image of the United States 

Arab governments, including friendly ones, to dis

themselves from U.S. policies. In years past, 

governments were in a far better position to influenc

shape public opinion in their countries through their c

of the media. But since the “migration” of the leading 

print media (e.g., the influential dailies Al-Haya

Ashorq al-Awsat, and magazines as Al-Watan al-Ara

Al-Wasat) to Paris and London, and the establishm

the influential Middle East Broadcasting (MBC) tele

in London—regarded as the CNN of the Arab w

(because of increasing local censorship, and the Leb

civil war that forced many free Arab press out of Be

local governments find it extremely difficult to con

molding public opinion in their countries. This “immig

and popular Arab press addresses itself to a wider 

audience and focuses on broad regional issues. Hen

example, the reader in a Gulf state is likely to be as info

and concerned about the intricacies of the peace proc

the average reader anywhere else in the Arab world

rapid spread of the Internet and the satellite d

enhances this phenomenon and the interconnectivity 

region as a whole. In short, the traditional local pres

its focus on the alleged accomplishments of the state

the antics of the rulers and their progeny is ra

becoming irrelevant.

The prevailing trend toward regional linkage

interconnectivity of issues can potentially desta

regimes in the area friendly to the United States. 

governments are made aware of this trend by the incre

public pressure to adopt policies more in line with po

sentiments. Ironically, these developments are unf

340
efforts. The U.S. Information Agency, whose pr

mission is to foster an understanding and appreciat

U.S. foreign policy among overseas nationals, is 

eliminated as part of a plan to restructure the fo

service establishment.

The success of U.S. foreign policy objectives i

Middle East hinge on the outcome of a peace process t

currently stalled and frozen. Although President Clin

understandably reluctant to undermine his high app

rating at home by pursuing a Middle East policy contr

the wishes of the powerful pro-Israeli lobby, he is 

unique position of not having to face re-election and s

move the process forward. The President, who is lik

survive a Senate impeachment trial, must perso

become once again engaged in the process, and to offer 

for the European Union in the search of a final settlem

the Arab-Israeli conflict. A European role as a med

partner with the United States, at a time when Eur

emerging as potentially the world’s strongest eco

power, will send clear signals that the Western allianc

whom Arabs and Israelis have extensive economi

political relations is serious about a final just settlem

On the Israeli-Syrian track, this means pressurin

Israeli government to accept concessions made b

previous Labor government in its negotiations wit

Syrians. To argue that such a recommendation ignor

results of the 1996 Israeli elections (or the 1999 elect

Netenyahu is returned to power), and that only the I

government can decide the parameters of its se

requirements, is to argue in favor of abandoning the 

process and U.S. interests in the region. In this regar

time that congressional leaders realize the anom

allowing their institution to be used by a foreign lea

pressure the U.S. President against his better judgem

America’s long-term interests.

341
should offer Israel additional security commitm

including the possibility of stationing U.S. troops o

Golan Heights for a period of time. Similarly, the U

States and Europe should see to it that every phased I

withdrawal from the Golan is reciprocated on the S

side by confidence-building measures and concrete 

toward normalization of relations between the 

countries.

Finally, Dore Gold’s arguments notwithstanding

only with peace based on the “land for peace” formul

Israel could be transformed from a nation in the M

East to a nation of the Middle East. By pressuring for a 

settlement, the United States, as the world’s 

superpower, transforms itself from a hapless mediato

responsible actor. A successful peace process wil

ensure the long-term interests of the United States in 

the Middle East.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13

1. Quoted in Ma’ariv, Tel Aviv, Internet Edition, August 13

2. For a complete text of the Wye Memorandum, see New Yor

(Internet Edition), October 24, 1998. President Clinton’s invol

included his personal participation for many long hours 

negotiations at the Wye River Plantation and his subsequent 

visit to Israel and Gaza to give impetus for the implementatio

Wye Agreement. See Deborah Sontag, “Clinton, Despite Hurdl

Up Crucial Salvage Mission,” New York Times, (Internet E

December 14, 1998. Also in mid-December 1998 U.S. Senato

Specter (Chairman of the Senate Committee on Intelligenc

traveled with President Clinton to Israel, went to Damasc

delivered a message to President Asad from Prime Minister Net

indicating Israeli interest in resuming peace talks with Syria, an

message from President Clinton urging Syria to reach agreeme

Tel Aviv on resumption of peace talks. See London Al Hayat (in A

December 18, 1998, p. 7.

3. See Lee Hockstader, “Israel Puts Pact in Doubt,” The Was

Post, November 1998, pp. Al, A27.

342
more complicated by the impeachment of the President and his p

trial in the Senate. Give the high approval ratings that the Pr

has in the polls, and despite his likely censure by the Senate, Pr

Clinton can exert tremendous leverage on any post-1999 Israeli 

government to move the peace process forward.

5. See The White House, A National Security Strategy for 

Century, October 1998, p. 52.

6. See George Joffe, “Israel After the Elections: What You 

What You Get,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 8, No. 8, August 

365.

7. New York Times, June 24, 1996, p. 1.

8. Ibid., p. A8.

9. The Washington Post, June 26, 1996, p. A23.

10. The Washington Post, June 25, 1996, p. A11.

11. Donald Neff, “Netanyahu Gets the Royal Treatm

Washington," Middle East International, July 19, 1996, p. 4. In 

President Mubarak and Prime Minister Netanyahu held a join

conference following their meeting in which they indicated thei

to pursue the peace process, widen the circle of peace, an

commitments already made. For a full text of the press confere

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS)-96-14

19, 1996, pp. 13-17.

12. Shihan (Amman, in Arabic), July 20-26, 1996, p. 

FBIS-NES-96-141, July 22, 1996, p. 12.

13. Ibid., p. 14.

14. Mixed signals have continued during and after Mr. Neta

visit to Amman in early August. It may be recalled that King H

had, a few days earlier, visited Damascus for talks with Presiden

Press reports indicated that the King was “very optimistic a

reassured” that negotiations will continue until there is compre

peace. Netanyahu stated that the deadlock on how to proceed w

peace talks with Syria could be broken at once if there is goodwi

side of Syria. The following day, however, Syria rejected resum

talks with Israel arguing that the Israelis wanted to discus

Lebanon without making any commitment to trade for peace 

Golan. The editor of Syria’s state-run daily Tishrin stated the n

343
peace. See The Washington Post, August 6, 1996, p. 1/11, and A

1996, p. A24. Also, President Asad stated that “The Israeli gove

wants ‘to resume the peace process without any foundation or gro

action,’ . . . I don’t think that this will lead to any result

Washington Post, August 8, 1996, p. A26. 

15. For example, see David Makovsky, “Israel-U.S. Face-Off 

As Ross Goes Home Empty-handed,” Ha’aretz (Internet Edition)

31, 1998.

16. See “Israel’s Bad Decision on Har Homa,” Chicago T

February 28, 1997, p. 22; Joel Greenberg, “Ending Silence, Pales

Battle Israeli Units,” New York Times, March 21, 1997, p. A11; R

Trounson, “Netenyahu Shrugs Off East Jerusalem Furor,” Los 

Times, November 13, 1998, p. 14; and Aliza Marcus, “Israel As

for Building Site in E. Jerusalem, Har Homa Plan Angers Palest

Boston Globe, November 13, 1998, p. A2.

17. See Hene R. Prusher, “Israel’s Tough New Peace Plan 

Syria Into Hard Choice,”The Christian Science Monitor, August 

p. 6.

18. See Barton Gellman, “A Gamble On Forcing Israel’s Han

Washington Post, May 7, 1998, p. Al; and Lee Hockstader, “U.S. E

Rebuffed By Israeli,” The Washington Post, May 11, 1998, p. A

19. The Washington Post, May 4, 1998, p. A1.

20. For a detailed discussion of this point, see the excellent a

Alain Gresh, “Turkish-Israeli-Syrian Relations And Their Imp

The Middle East,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, Spring 1

188-203.

21. Muhammad Muslish, “The Golan: Israel, Syria, and S

Calculations,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 4, Autumn 1993

1 shall rely almost exclusively on this source to highlight the two 

involved in Israeli-Syrian relations on the Golan.

22. Ibid., p. 615.

23. See Robert I. Friedman, “Ceding the High Ground,” H

Magazine, April 1995, pp. 66-67.

24. According to one estimate, Israel uses 500 million cubic 

of Golan water per year or approximately one fourth of its annua

needs. See Ali Said Badwan, “The Golan Heights: Its St

344
January 29, 1997, p. 15.

25. For a full discussion of the Syrian position and Israeli ac

the Golan see Muslih, pp. 625ff; and Tayseer Mara’i and Us

Halabi, “Life Under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” Jou

Palestine Studies, Vol. XXII, No. 1, Autumn 1992, pp. 78-93.

26. For a full exposition of these positions, see Muslish, pp. 6

Also, for a discussion on the modalities of peace between Isr

Syria, see Alon Ben-Meir, “Israel and Syria: The Search 

‘Risk-Free’ Peace,” Middle East Policy, Vol., 4, Nos. 1 and 2, Sep

1995, pp. 140-155.

27. Muslish, Ibid.

28. See New York Times, (Internet Edition), December 7, 19

Ha’aretz, (Israel), Internet English Edition, December 7, 1997.

29. Dore Gold, “Fundamental Factors in a Stabilized Midd

Security, Territory, and Peace,” Gottesman Lecture 

Washington, DC: Jewish Institute for National Security Affair

p. 6.

30. See Ibid., p. 9.

31. Ibid., p. 10.

32. Ibid., pp. 8-12.

33. Ibid., p. 13.

34. Ibid,. p. 17.

35. This view is also held by Moshe Arens, former Israeli 

and foreign minister and Netenyahu’s political godfather, who 

that Israel must retain the Golan Heights essentially for s

reasons. “We would risk paying dearly for giving it up. Dur

October 1973 war, the Golan was almost entirely reconquered by 

troops who could have gone on advancing right up to Haifa.” Qu

Alain Gresh, p. 189.

36. Dore Gold, US Forces on the Golan Heights and Israeli

Security Arrangements, Memorandum No. 44, Tel Aviv Uni

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, August 1994, p. 48.

345
Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 1987, pp. 663-682. Dore Gold is also of the 

that President Asad is interested in controlling Lebanon and 

might be “willing to forgo most of the Golan in favor of Lebanon. 

Ilene R. Prusher, “Israel’s Tough New Peace Plan Forces Sy

Hard Choice," Christian Science Monitor, August 8, 1996, p. 6.

38. Daniel Pipes, “Syria’s Peace Bluff: Just Kidding,” T

Republic, January 8 and 15, 1996, pp. 18-19.

39. Louis Rene Beres and Zalman Shoval, “Why 

Demilitarization Would Not Work,” TVI Report, Vol, 11, No. 4, 

12.

40. Christopher Walker, “Golan Boom Quells Settlers’ F

Pullout,” The Times (London), Internet Edition, March 9, 1998

41. See interview with Ambassador Walid Al-Moualem, 

Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations,” Journal of P

Studies, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Winter 1997, pp. 81-94. This was 

interview by a Syrian diplomat which received wide attention 

international press, including The Jerusalem Post, January 3

pp. 7,19; Al-Safir, (Beirut, in Arabic), Internet Edition, Febr

1997; and The Washington Post, January 29, 1997, p. 6. The Jer

Post wrote, “. . . the interview, exceptional in its depth, scope and 

could be the opening diplomatic salvo from Damascus in an of

that is intended to lead to military conflict.”

42. Even if Israel is to agree to return the Golan to Syria in ex

for peace, it is likely to demand adjustments in the intern

boundary in order to avoid the cross-border tensions and to 

control of Lake Tiberias and other water resources. See B

Mandell, “Getting to Peacekeeping in Principal Rivalries: Antic

An Israeli-Syrian Peace Treaty,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 

No. 2, June 1996, p. 243.

43. Ibid., p. 84.

44. Ibid., p. 85.

45. For a detailed survey of the Israeli-Syrian interaction b

1991 (Madrid Peace Conference) and the suspension of the talks 

see Helena Cobban, Syria and the Peace: A Good Chance 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic 

Institute, July 7, 1997.

346
of Syria in Geneva,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docume

30, Issue 3, January 24, 1994, p. 92.

47. A few months later, Syrian Minister of Defense General M

Tlass amplified on this position, indicating Syria’s willing

cooperate with the U.S. initiative and to adhere to “the resol

international legitimacy.” See General Mustafa Tlass, “Syria 

Future of the Peace Process,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 6

September 1996, pp. 412-13.

48. Hisham Melhen, “Syria Between Two Transitions,” Midd

Report, Spring 1997, p. 4.

49. Syria’s vulnerability was clearly demonstrated in Octob

when Turkey threatened military action against Syria if Syria 

end its support of Kurdistan Workers Party rebels operating 

Turkey from Syrian territories. The initial Syrian reaction wa

Turkey’s threat a plot with Israel to undermine Syria. Howeve

quickly sought Arab and Islamic mediation of the crisis, resultin

agreement between the two sides whereby Syria presumably acc

Turkey’s security concerns. See “Turkey Warns Syria Again 

Support Rebel Kurds,” International Herald Tribune, October 

“Syria Calls Turkish Threat a Plot,” The Washington Post (I

Edition), October 2, 1998; Stephen Kinzer, “Syria Agrees 

Supporting Kurds, Defusing Crisis With Turkey,” New York 

October 22, 1998; and “Turkish-Syrian Discussions,” Abu 

Al-Ittihad, (Internet Edition in Arabic), October 30, 1998.

50. Ze’ev Schiff, “Netanyahu Proposes New Syrian Fo

Ha’aretz, (Israel), Internet Edition, September 21, 1997.

51. See Jerusalem Qol Yisra’el (in Hebrew), August 28, 1

FBIS-NES-97-24, August 29, 1997.

52. See Asharq Al-Awsat (London, in Arabic), April 5, 1997

53. See Thomas Lippman, “Election Cited for Derailing M

Peace Move,” The Washington Post, January 29, 1997, p. 

Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi in Arabic), Internet Edition, April 12

which quoted Tlass as saying “President Asad has a written do

signed by President Clinton indicating the willingness of the p

Israeli Labor Government to withdraw from the Golan Height

June 4, 1967, line.”

54. Quoted in Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi in Arabic), Internet E

February 17, 1997.

347
Lebanon,” The New York Times, Internet Edition, March 2, 199

56. Lebanon’s newly elected President, former Army Com

Emile Lahhoud, has endorsed the Syrian position on L

emphasizing among other things the demand that Israel accep

resolution 425 unconditionally, that Israeli withdrawal shou

simultaneously from south Lebanon and the Golan Heights, a

the Lebanese Army will not make its mission that of preserv

security of northern Israel. See Rafiq Nasrallah, “Lahhoud Esta

The Policy Of His Country Toward Israel,” Abu Dhabi Al

(Internet Edition in Arabic), December 12, 1998.

57. See “Interview of President Asad With French Televisio

Dhabi Al-Ittihad (Internet Edition in Arabic), July 16, 1998. Fra

been actively seeking a role in the Middle East, especially in L

and Syria, its former “colonies” under the old League of 

mandate system, a role which apparently Syria and Lebanon w

See Pia Christina Wood, “Chirac’s ‘New Arab Policy’ And Midd

Challenges: The Arab Israeli Conflict, Iraq And Iran,” Midd

Journal, Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 563-580.

58. Wood, p. 565.

59. “Syria Said To See Iran as Ally Against Israel-Turkey 

Ha’aretz (in English), August 1, 1997, in FBIS-NES-97-213, Au

pp. 19-97.

60. Gresh, p. 188.

61. “International Section,” New York Times, (Internet E

May 8, 1998. Several months later, the Clinton adminis

“informally asked Israel to consider accepting the principl

eventual Palestinian state as part of a final Wye Plantation 

document . . .” See David Makovsky, “U.S. asks: ‘consider’ Pale

state,” Israel Ha’aretz (Internet Edition in English), October 14

62. Edware P. Djerejian, “No Talks, No Peace,” New York 

August 21, 1997, p. 32.

63. Gresh, p. 188.

348
ISRAELI SECURITY IN A CHANGING

ENVIRONMENT:

CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES

Gerald M. Steinberg

THE NEW THREAT ENVIRONMENT

The threat environment in the Middle East is cha

rapidly, reflecting the combined impacts of the unc

peace process, the end of the Cold War, the unresolved 

threat, concern over developing Iranian capabilities

most importantly, the proliferation of ballistic missile

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the region. 

factors have created new challenges for Israeli mi

planners and decisionmakers in the Mediterranean a

Israel, in particular.

As the dangers of a large-scale combined conven

attack that threatened national survival from 1948 th

1973 and beyond seem to recede (although they re

formidable), the WMD threats posed by neighborin

more distant states are growing. In 1991, Iraq posses

large arsenal of chemical and apparently also biol

warheads, as well as ballistic missiles to attack targ

Israel, as well as other states in the region. Despite 

years of United Nations (U.N.) inspections and sanc

Saddam Hussein’s regime has developed and implem

a vast program of concealment to hold onto conside

capabilities. Once the inspections and threat of m

action are lifted, Iraq will be able to reconstitu

stockpiles in a very short period of time. As a result

remains a formidable threat to Israel and to the regi

In addition, Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Iran all p

significant chemical weapons capabilities (Egypt ha

349
its campaigns in Yemen, but not against Israel). Th

also increasing evidence that many of these state

developing biological weapons.

In the past, the domination of the Israeli Air Forc

protected population centers from Arab air attacks, b

proliferation of ballistic missiles has increase

vulnerability of Israeli cities and other civil targets. 

has Russian SS-21 and North Korean Scud-C mi

Egypt is obtaining missiles and technology from 

Korea, and in July 1998, Iran tested the Shihab 3, w

range of 1300 kilometers (based on North Korean 

Russian technology).

These missiles are of strategic importance 

combined with WMD warheads, and with nuclear we

in particular. According to most estimates, the Iraqi nu

weapons development program had progressed to wi

year of producing a weapon before the 1991 war. F

United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) ins

Scott Ritter has noted that Iraq maintains the com

casings for three nuclear weapons, which will be

weapons with the addition of fissile material 1

There is also considerable evidence that Iran is pur

nuclear weapons, using technology and facilities acq

from Russia, and Syria is acquiring a large research r

from Russia in order to develop a nuclear infrastru

These programs are in the first stages, and the develop

of a nuclear threat to Israel is still likely to be at least 

perhaps 10 years away, (assuming that the inspection

other limitations on Iraq continue), but the develop

will be monitored carefully, and Israel must 

developing its strategic responses to these developme

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakis

1998 may have accelerated the rate of nuclear prolife

in the Middle East. These tests shattered the rela

static global nuclear framework, and it is very diffic

predict the long-term impact of these developm

350
technology transfer from Pakistan to Iran or Iraq m

exaggerated, the sudden weakening of the interna

nuclear non-proliferation regime could serve to increa

incentives for Iran, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern sta

develop such weapons. If the responses and san

imposed by the United States and the interna

community appear to be weak in the views of the 

decisionmakers in these countries, the implications w

drawn, and additional states will be willing to pursue 

weapons without fear of censure or stigma. Thus, 

Middle East, the emergence of a multipolar nu

environment in the next decade seems to be very like

ISRAELI STRATEGIC OPTIONS

As a result of these developments, Israeli dec

makers and analysts have recognized the nee

accompanying changes in security doctrine, budg

procurement, and training. For many years, Israel rel

the combination of preemption (against conven

threats, as in 1967), preventive attack, conven

deterrence, and qualitative superiority to offset the 

quantitative advantage. In addition, since the 1960

perceived nuclear option provided a weapon-of-last-

to deter threats to national survival. This policy succ

in avoiding a direct clash with the U.S. Government

its emphasis on non-proliferation.

For many years, American-led export-control p

may have slowed the rate of WMD and missile prolife

in the region. However, in the past decade, these limit

have become increasingly ineffective, in large part d

Russian, Chinese, and North Korean technology tran

In addition, since the 1981 attack on the Iraqi n

facilities, preventive attacks (under the Begin Doc

have become far more difficult to implement. The WM

missile development programs of Iraq, Iran and Syr

often placed underground and are well-defended, an

351
Although the combination of tightened export contro

military operations (not necessarily conducted by I

might, under optimum circumstances, slow the r

proliferation, it is unlikely to be stopped. As a result, 

will have to adapt its military doctrine to this eme

reality and threats to stability and security.

In a broad sense, three general approaches c

identified:

2 strengthened deterrence; defense; and re

alliances. (Regional arms limitation is also a theor

option, but the experience to date in the multilateral 

Control and Regional Security talks has not 

encouraging, and it is clear that any agreements wil

many years.) Each provides advantages and limita

and the optimum security doctrine should combine a

of all three in order to maximize the benefits and min

the disadvantages.

Stable Mutual Deterrence.

As noted, both conventional and nuclear deterrence 

been prominent aspects of Israel security doctrine for 

years. In a Hobbesian world or region, in which there a

rules of conduct or recognition of common interests, a

which hatreds are very deep, the development of a cr

threat to inflict unacceptable punishment is seen as th

means of enhancing stability and dissuading pot

aggressors. 

Since defeating the Arab armies that invaded in 

Israel has consistently emphasized deterrence polic

preventing attacks. At that time, the narrow borders, 

population, and image of weakness and vulnerability 

seen as inviting attack, and in response, Israeli leader

as Ben Gurion and Dayan emphasized the creation 

strong army able not only to defend the state, but a

deter threats by carrying the war to the territory 

aggressors and bringing it quickly to a conclusion.

352
Arab strategies following the wars between 1967 and 

and for the past 20 years, the absence of major wars 

the possible exception of Lebanon in 1982) mig

attributed, in part, to the success of deterrence.

Similarly, over the past 30 years, the “ambig

nuclear deterrent policy has been viewed as very succe

The perceived nuclear retaliatory capability is credited 

preventing Egypt from going beyond a limited attack 

1973 war, and Egyptian military sources 

acknowledged this factor. In addition, the evi

indicates that the fear of massive Israeli retal

deterred Saddam Hussein from using chemical or biol

weapons against Israel before or during the 1991 Gulf 

(It is now clear that the Iraqis possessed Scud war

with chemical and biological agents at the time, and 

Saddam sought to bring Israel into the war, he wa

willing to accept the consequences of massive I

retaliation.) During the war, U.S. Secretary of De

Cheney also invoked the prospect of Israeli nu

retaliation to deter the Iraqi leader from attacking 

with chemical weapons. Shimon Peres and other I

leaders attribute the growing Arab willingness to acce

existence and legitimacy of Israel, and to negotiate 

agreements, to the recognition that Israel’s nu

deterrent capability prevents the Arabs from achiev

decisive military victory that would put an end to the J

state.4

The Israeli monopoly has been steadily reduced as 

states in the region seek to gain nuclear, chemic

biological weapons. In response, Israeli leaders 

increased the emphasis on and credibility of the thre

massive retaliation and deterrence. In January 

during a Knesset debate on the Iranian nuclear t

Deputy Defense Minister Gur warned Islamic nation

if one of them uses nonconventional weapons against I

no one will escape the consequences of that war.

353
allow ourselves to be behind and we will not expose ourselves 

this danger]. . . . The radical Islamic world knows the natur

war. The Iran-Iraq war reached its end after 200 Iraqi miss

were fired against Teheran. This means that even 

Khomenist leadership understands what happens when 

people are injured. Don’t think that a leader of a people w

60-65 million people could suddenly arise and go to war w

grave danger without taking into consideration the terr

suffering that he would cause to his people. . . . Israel must t

this option into consideration; Israel decided that she will e

despite the existence of nuclear weapons in the world. We h

to be ready across different fronts and time frames, and in 

area, we must not take any chances."

5

Similarly, after the Iranian missile test of July 1998, 

Minister Netanyahu remarked that “I think it shou

remembered that Israel is the strongest country 

region. It has answers, and I think that every country 

region knows Israel’s power.”6

In the context of an eroding monopoly, the viability 

invisible deterrent that is entirely separate from the I

war fighting doctrine and order of battle is questionab

some point, this will be insufficient and a more visib

robust deterrence capability will become necessary, ca

of a credible response to different levels of threa

potential attack scenarios. There are increasing sign

the Israeli leadership is considering the requiremen

these changes in its deterrent posture. Major Ge

Yitzhak Ben-Yisrael, head of the Armaments Researc

Development Administration at the Defense Min

indicated that the policy is being reevaluated, and not

limitations of the invisible deterrent. “If Israel’s de

doctrine is deterrence, you can’t deter anyone exce

showing him your capability.”7

As long as Israel’s vulnerability to a strategic first 

is very limited, survivable second strike capabi

including the appropriate command and control sy

(C3-I) are not a high priority. However, this situat

354
WMD systems. If another state in the region m

progress towards a nuclear weapons capability, Isr

likely to abandon the ambiguous nuclear posture and 

an overt nuclear deterrent. (Israel is a signatory 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and although it ha

yet ratified the agreement, policy makers are norma

bound by the terms, unless the security situation ch

very radically.)

In developing a strategic response, Israel has beg

investing in strategic intelligence and early warning

Ofeq 3 satellite, which was developed and launch

Israel after the U.S. rejected Israeli requests for acc

American satellite data, is reportedly capable of retu

high-resolution images, and additional satellite

planned.

8

 (The launch of Ofeq 4 ended in failure, 

replacement is reportedly being prepared for launch.

With respect to delivery systems, Israel has re

acquired long-range F-15 I aircraft from the United S

with the well-publicized capability of striking targ

Iran without the need for refueling. Given Is

air-superiority and the ability to defeat or evade air de

systems that are deployed or likely to be deployed 

region, this represents an important and flexible dete

capability. In order to assure the maintenance 

survivable second strike, a number of these aircraft c

maintained on airborne alert during periods of crisis, a

done with other initial approach fix (IAF) systems d

the 1991 Gulf War.

Israel also possesses a long-range ballistic m

capability with ranges of at least 2,000 kilom

Although there is no official confirmation regardin

existence of the Jericho missile,

9

 the evidence is clear

Israeli Shavit launcher, which is apparently bas

similar technology, has placed three small satellite

orbit, and any launcher can also serve as a ballistic m

The range will vary with the size of the payload.) 

355
deployment, these systems are secure against all th

with the exception of nuclear weapons. (The author 

article in Jane’s Intelligence Review claimed that 50 n

warheads on Jericho-II intermediate-range missile

deployed for this purpose.)

There are also unconfirmed reports that Isr

developing a cruise missile (known as the Popeye T

with a range of 350 kilometers, to be operational in 2

The recent delivery of three new Dolphin-class subm

built for Israel in Germany sparked speculation rega

the possible development of a sea-based second 

deterrent. Press reports suggested that these subma

could be converted to carry “nuclear-tipped c

missiles.”

11 However, given the absence of reliable evi

and the plethora of unsubstantiated rumors dealing 

Israeli strategic capabilities, these reports must be tr

with a great deal of caution.

With respect to deterrence against attacks inv

chemical and biological weapons, the requirement

subject to intense debate. Despite some claims 

chemical weapons are the strategic equivalents of n

weapons, the damage caused by chemical weapons 

attacks, particularly from a small number of missiles 

small payloads, is quite limited. As a result, the thr

use nuclear weapons in retaliation is not credible, d

the speculation that Israel might use such weapo

response to Iraqi threats to “incinerate half of Tel Aviv 

nuclear weapons." Although a response in kind c

considered to provide an effective deterrent, there 

public information regarding Israeli chemical we

capabilities, if any. (There has been a great de

speculation on this issue, but no reliable evidence exist

way or the other.) This issue has come to be a central a

of the debate regarding ratification of the Che

Weapons Convention, with opponents arguing th

ratifying this treaty, Israel would be weakenin

356
a chemical attack.

Deterring biological weapons (BW) attacks 

additional problems, particularly given the high deg

uncertainty with respect to the nature of the threat. 

are, as some analysts contend, far more lethal than 

then the threat to use nuclear weapons in response to 

attack is credible. However, if the scale is closer to the t

posed by CW, the deterrence issues are also similar.

The Limitations Of Mutual Deterrence in the M

East. Any decision to adopt a strategy based on m

deterrence must face the basic requirements for sta

particularly in a multipolar environment. Whil

deterrence system developed during the Cold War m

deemed to have prevented war (although critics argu

the mutual deterrence strategy was flawed, and nu

conflict was avoided despite these flaws), there are 

different factors in the Middle East. In this regio

conflicts are ethno-national and not ideological, the 

actors share common borders and have fought a num

conventional wars, and there are questions regardin

rationality of the leaders and their readiness to take 

risks. Instead of a bipolar deterrence system, as wa

case in the Cold War, Middle Eastern deterrence wo

multipolar, adding additional complexities and sour

instability. The level and quality of communication is 

poor (Israel and Iran do not have direct links 

misperceptions are common.) The long history of v

terrorism demonstrates the willingness of some indiv

and groups to kill large numbers of people in the nam

particular cause. In this environment, the creatio

maintenance of a stable system of deterrence w

difficult.

At the same time, the options available to I

decisionmakers are limited, and, as noted above

historical record demonstrates that deterrence bas

massive retaliation and threats directed at the leade

357
Saddam Hussein first indicated a willingness to with

from Kuwait after an American precision guided w

penetrated a command bunker that also housed memb

the Iraqi elite. When the Iraqi leader realized the ext

his vulnerability, he acted according to a rat

calculus.)

12

 In the absence of a preferred altern

strengthened mutual deterrence is likely to continue 

the basis for Israel’s military doctrine in the fa

proliferation of WMD and long-range ballistic missile

Defensive Strategies and Approaches.

Until the past few years, Israeli military planne

not invest significant resources in defensive systems

very small size of the country and the need to bring wa

rapid conclusion in order to allow the reserve for

return to civilian life have led to adoption of an offe

approach, in which battles are fought in enemy terr

before the Israeli population is placed at risk. In add

the air superiority established by the IAF is also cre

with protecting the country.

However, the acquisition of missiles and CW 

number of Arab countries has forced Israel to deve

defensive strategy, both active and passive. The p

approach to defense consists of the distribution of gas m

to the entire population, and the creation of “sealed r

in houses and other buildings as barriers to the penet

of chemical and biological agents. This population de

was applied during the 1991 Gulf War, and has 

maintained since, particularly in the face of ren

concerns regarding the potential for an Iraqi attack.

At the same time, active missile defense programs 

been pursued, primarily in the form of the Homa 

ballistic missile defense (BMD) project, which includ

Arrow missile system, the Green Pines fire-control 

system, a command and control system and 

sub-systems. Research and development of the Ar

358
Government), and most of the technology, includin

radar system, is being developed in Israel.

The operational Arrow 2 is designed to provide ter

defense against incoming missiles, by destroying them 

altitude of between 10 and 40 kilometers. A num

development tests of the Arrow have demonstrate

potential for this system, particularly given the diffic

and much higher costs associated with the American 

programs (theater high-altitude area defense [THAAD

the Navy’s Theater-Wide systems).

In May 1998, Defense Minister Yitzhak Mord

approved a multi-year project to build and deploy the 

BMD system. The U.S. Government has agreed to p

some of the funding for three Arrow batteries 

estimated cost of $80 million per battery), with the 

operational capability expected towards the end of 19

September 1998, a successful test of the integrated sy

which tracked and “destroyed” a simulated target, ma

major milestone in the development process.

However, there are a number of obstacles to 

deployment of the Arrow. These include an unfav

cost-exchange ratio (each Arrow defensive miss

expected to cost from $1 to $2 million, and an average 

Arrows must be allocated to each incoming warhead, 

surface-to-surface [SCUD]-type offensive missiles c

added at a fraction of this cost), and the ability of 

advanced weapons to defeat the Arrow.

As an alternative, or primary layer, Israeli m

planners are giving greater consideration t

development of boost-phase intercept (BPI) BMD sys

BPI has the advantage of being able to destroy offe

missiles in the first stages of their flight, while the

moving slowly, present large targets, and threat

release their payloads over the countries tha

attempting to launch these systems, rather than cl

359
such as the Arrow. 

A number of approaches to BPI have been consid

The United States is planning to develop and te

Airborne Laser (ABL) system carried in a modified B

747 aircraft. Israeli R&D funds have been directed tow

the development of a lower cost system, based on 

kinetic energy “kill vehicles” (Missile Optim

Anti-Ballistic weapons or MOAB, also known as I

fired from hovering drones or unmanned aerial ve

(UAVs). This approach is strongly supported by 

General (Res.) David Ivri, and some money has 

allocated for conceptual studies. Critics view Ivri’s rol

combination of technological enthusiasm and an eff

provide contracts for the Israeli defense industries

BPI’s future is highly uncertain.

In order to be effective, the BPI carriers must 

station near the launch sites at the time of attack, and 

be able to survive attacks by air defense systems. Thi

be achievable for relatively short periods, partic

during times of crisis, and for longer periods with resp

neighboring countries. For example, UAV-based BP

possibly counter the Syrian missile threat (althoug

farther the launch sites are from the Israeli border, the 

difficult this will become), but it is much more diffic

achieve with respect to Iraq and Iran. Althoug

laser-based ABL has a theoretical range of 200 kilom

(or more, depending on the laser), there are many tec

uncertainties, and such a large object, even if maint

far away from the launch site, would be vulnera

preemptive attack. In addition, there are va

inexpensive countermeasures, such as coating missile

reflective paint, which could neutralize the laser.

More fundamentally, as Yisrael Tal has noted, u

the defensive system provides 100 percent protection, 

no system can, it is not sufficient to protect a small co

like Israel against a nuclear threat. Tal noted that 

360
there is a certain belief that defense is stronger than offen

That is, that we can best the enemy from defense positio

This is very dangerous. The Arabs can afford to remain i

defensive posture. We cannot afford this.14

BMD, whether terminal, as in the case of the Arr

BPI, or a combination, may be part of a new Israeli str

but it will not remove the need for or primary empha

deterrence and assured second strike capabilities.

15

Regional Security Alliances.

While the strategic debate continues, the developm

regional security relationships, and the growth 

extensive system of security cooperation between Isra

Turkey mark a very important change. In the past 5 

this relationship has grown to encompass use of each o

airspace for training flights and exercises, Israeli mi

exports and upgrade packages, consultations 

exchanges at the highest levels, and a highly publ

naval search and rescue exercise involving the U

States, and with Jordanian observers.

This strategic relationship and proto-alliance 

Turkey has ended decades of Israeli regional isolation

provided a balance to the Arab alliances that have l

military forces against Israel in the past. The links be

Ankara and Jerusalem also serve to offset the Ira

Syrian alliance which has been seen in Israel 

additional concern and source of regional insta

Turkey and Israel share concerns regarding Syrian th

including missile and WMD, and also about Ira

supported Islamic fundamentalism in the region.

Beyond the defense cooperation with Israel, Tur

also developing a bilateral relationship with Jordan. 

also has good, although generally unpublicized coope

security links with Jordan, based on shared perce

regarding Palestinian and Iraqi threats. These s

interests are likely to increase if a Palestinian st

361
international sanctions regime and resume his effo

achieve regional dominance. 

Thus it is possible that in the next decade

depending on political developments in all three cou

and the region, Turkey, Jordan, and Israel could for

nucleus of a defensive regional security structure. Po

changes and reevaluations of Egyptian interests 

possibly create a situation in which Cairo would joi

framework, and then other states might follow.

There are, however, a number of uncertainties in 

relationships, and the future may not be as cooperat

the Israeli optimists hope. If the Islamic forces 

strength, and these groups oppose security links to Isr

ideological grounds, the alliance could be frozen or 

back. In addition, the limits of the alliance need 

defined. Turkey is likely to distance itself in the ev

confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians

Israel will avoid becoming involved in the conflicts wi

Kurds and any Turkish military involvement in Cyp

THE CENTRALITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP

WITH THE UNITED STATES

Since the mid-1960s, the strategic ties bet

Washington and Jerusalem have been a centra

growing factor in Israeli assessments, decisionmakin

policy. Israel receives most of its weapons platform

much of its technology from the United States

American military assistance helps to pay for str

systems such as the F-15 and Arrow. 

In addition, Israel is aware that only the United S

has the potential power and global sense of responsibi

attempt to slow the process of WMD and m

proliferation in the Middle East. With Russia continu

provide technology and assistance, particularly to Ira

leaders in Moscow, such as Yevgeny Primakov, see 

362
response to NATO expansion and other factors, Ame

counterpressure on Russia on these issues is extr

important for Middle East stability. In this sense, the 

War may be returning to the region.

At the same time, there is a growing sense that bo

capability and the resolve of the United States to inte

in the region is diminishing steadily. This is most app

in the case of Iraq, but is also visible with respect 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD

missiles in Iran, Syria, and other states that pose a d

to the region, in general, and to Israel, in particular.

From the 1970s and through the 1980s, many 

intelligence and high-level policymakers consist

missed or underestimated Saddam Hussein’s program

1981, the U.S. Government was surprised when 

decided it needed to destroy the Iraqi reactor, and ag

1990 when the almost completed Iraqi nuclear we

capability was suddenly uncovered. The combination 

tilt to Iraq during the war with Iran, the pro-Iraqi lob

of Arab states (primarily Egypt and Saudi Arabia), an

fact that the vast majority of intelligence assets 

directed toward monitoring the disintegrating S

Union, all contributed to this complacency an

asymmetry in assessments between Washington 

Jerusalem.

Following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U

States responded with a major military campaign, bu

war ended before Saddam Hussein had been removed 

office, and without the destruction of Iraq’s missile

nuclear, chemical, and biological technology 

infrastructure. Since then, Saddam Hussein has succ

in evading the UNSCOM regime, and in maintaining

perhaps even adding to his WMD arsenal. From an I

perspective, the Americans have failed to fully re

pledges to destroy these capabilities during the 1991 

war, when the Bush Administration pressed Israel 

363
are many factors that have complicated the destruct

the Iraqi capability, American credibility has erode

the millions of Israelis who spent 6 weeks in sealed 

with gas masks and face this prospect again, the lapse

frequent departures from a strong, consistent 

leadership role have a strong impact.

Although the Clinton Administration has focus

Middle East issues, the Arab-Israeli peace proces

claimed most of the time and resources of those respo

for formulating and implementing U.S. regional pol

the Middle East. The accelerating proliferation of WM

the region is often relegated to secondary status e

during periods of crisis and sudden and intense activi

Washington, some policy makers have claimed tha

freeze in the peace process has weakened the Ame

ability to influence Arab states to support military 

against Iraq. However, the evidence suggests tha

causality is reversed. It is U.S. actions, or lack of a

with respect to WMD proliferation that affects the 

ability to influence the peace process.)

Criticisms of U.S. policy with respect to Iraqi we

capabilities have been highlighted both in Washingto

Israel. A 1998 report of the Senate Subcommitt

International Security, Proliferation and Federal Se

concludes, “By speaking loudly but carrying a smal

the Clinton Administration risks its nonprolifer

credibility and America’s security.” 16 In early 

following the Iraqi suspension of UNSCOM inspection

dispatch of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Anan to neg

an agreement over further inspections, and the subse

agreement, was widely criticized. Claims by U.N. ins

Scott Ritter and evidence that the U.S. Governmen

asked the UNSCOM team to avoid searching too ha

Iraqi weapons and facilities, in order to prev

confrontation with Iraq, were seen in Israel and throu

the Middle East as signs of American weakness and l

resolve.

17

 This evaluation increased significantly in th

364
Lewinsky Affair, and Iraq again suspended UNS

inspections.

Similarly, the slow American response to Ru

exports of missile and nuclear technology and expert

Iran was seen as a sign of weakness. Although I

intelligence information showed a steady flow of techn

from Russia to Iran beginning in early 1997, the 

Government did not act for many months. After the 

Congress passed mandatory sanctions legislati

mid-1998, (and with a wide majority that insured the a

to override Clinton’s veto), the Russian govern

announced the opening of an investigation regarding 

of the firms involved in this technology transfer. A

stage, the U.S. Government imposed sanctions of 

firms. However, in July 1998, the Iranians teste

Shihab 3 missile, with a reported range of 1300 kilom

(placing Israel within range), and even if all Ru

assistance were stopped, it appeared that the Ira

would be able to complete the development independen

More recently, the emergence of internal splits in 

and the election of Khatami has led to a “softer” 

approach and relaxation of sanctions, while the Ir

nuclear and missile programs, as well as support for 

and threats directed at Israel have not changed. 

process has not increased Israeli confidence in the Ame

ability to slow the flow of WMD technology to the regi

to protect Israel’s vital security interests.

Perceptions of American Weakness.

In a broader sense, Israel’s threat perception

strategic concepts very much depend on the degree to 

the United States acts as the world’s only superpowe

accepts the new responsibilities that came with this ro

other states—including Russia, Britain, and France

and do behave as ordinary states, emphasizing thei

365
Americans.

However, the United States has acted inconsist

prevaricating and delaying, while WMD programs 

from early research to advanced development and te

In confronting Iraq, the United States has consis

sought the backing of an international coalition—a str

that has distinct advantages but with costs gen

underestimated in Washington.

As Eliot Cohen has noted, other countries in the 

depend on America’s willingness to act “as a global em

rather than as one of two rival superpowers, or a n

state.” However, the radical reduction in U.S. m

capabilities and frequent cycle of threats and conce

have severely reduced American credibility in act

enforce the Iraqi cease-fire requirements and in other 

As Cohen notes, these changes have “steadily but notic

eroded morale and equipment readiness.”

 18

When the United States acts like an ordinary state 

Middle East, looking for allies before responding t

growing threats from Iraq and Iran, this is inconsi

Cohen diagnoses the problem precisely, observing

When, as in Bosnia, it is prepared to act, its allies usually 

along; when, as in the recent confrontation with Sadd

Hussein, the United States wavers, friendly states retreat 

passivity. 

When, on some occasions, the United State

demonstrated an ability to act powerfully (although 

after a long period of deliberation and preparation), 

not shown the staying power necessary to deal wit

persistent threats posed by countries such as Iraq, w

well-entrenched WMD infrastructure. To cite Cohen, 

planners would prefer to prepare for quick, unconstr

knock-down fights with easily identified oppon

However, in the Middle East, the long haul is what f

counts.

19

366
Although Israel must retain the capability of respo

independently of the United States in the face of th

posed from states in the region (as demonstrated in th

of Iraq), the strategic relationship with the United S

will continue to be of primary importance to Israeli sec

As Cohen, et. al., note, 

Israel’s strategic dependence on its patron will grow in com

years. Developing an effective defense against missiles a

nonconventional weapons will require a high level 

technological cooperation. . . Israel is likely in a future war 

require some form of direct U.S. assistance. . . .

20

As result, as Israeli leaders consider the option

their implications, it will be important to maintai

intensify the strategic dialogue with the Ame

government, and to seek coordination and agreement 

extent possible. (Between 1992 and 1996, under the 

Government, Israel considered a number of po

formulae to formalize the defense relationship wit

United States. In 1996, following the assassination of 

Minister Rabin, his successor, Shimon Peres, raise

possibility of a formal defense treaty in the contex

possible agreement with Syria and withdrawal fro

Golan Heights.) Israeli leaders will have to put increa

greater efforts into convincing the American govern

that its own (i.e., the United States) interests are serv

intervention in the region, and by military action, 

necessary. 

At the same time, if Israel detects a steady weaken

Washington’s capability to intervene in the region, or 

resolve, the alternative is greater emphasis on unil

action.

367
To the extent possible, Israeli leaders should and 

prefer to pursue all available options. However, the 

cost of defense and stable deterrence has placed some 

on their simultaneous pursuit. The acquisition 

operation of the Dolphin submarines, the 

reconnaissance satellites, the F-15 strike aircraft, an

Homa BMD system, are each extremely costly, even 

substantial assistance from the United States.

As was demonstrated during the Cold War

maintenance of a reliable second strike deterrent 

dynamic situation is costly, requiring con

improvements in response to external developm

Although, eventually, it is possible that the nations 

Middle East will realize their common interest in veri

arms limitation agreements, this is still a long way of

in the interim, the costs will remain very high.

At the same time, the Israeli defense budget has 

declining steadily over the past decade, reflecting 

reductions in government spending in order to allo

economic growth, and also a change in prioritie

increased emphasis on social programs, including h

education, and welfare. Efforts by the Defense Min

and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff to re

this trend have failed to date.

Furthermore, as critics note, the bulk of the ava

resources for weapons and technology are still alloca

the acquisition of conventional platforms (fighter air

helicopters, and tanks), and in the current 5-year pla

billion are earmarked for these weapons. Wit

additional local costs of the Homa BMD and Ofeq, a

operation of other major systems, the economy c

provide much more for research and development o

acquisition of such systems. It will prove diffic

maintain and modernize widespread missile de

systems and an advanced second strike deterrent

368
decisionmaking at all levels.

In a broader sense, it is clear that the strategic bala

the trans-Mediterranean and Middle East is cha

rapidly, with constantly shifting weapons, technol

and alliances. In this context, Israel, like other 

confronted with this situation, must be prepared to a

its strategic policies and doctrine accordingly. Bu

weapons acquisitions, research and developm

manpower policies, training, tactics, and operations 

all be adjusted and made consistent with these cha

requirements. The difficulties should not be u

estimated, given the massive bureaucratic inertia o

military organization, as well as the vested interests 

status quo and the need to maintain a formi

operational capability, while also introducing basic ch

in each of these areas. However, in the Middle East, a

the Israeli environment, in particular, a static respon

dynamic environment is doomed to failure. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14

1. Ze’ev Schiff, “Former U.N. Arms Inspector Charges: ‘Ir

Has Three Virtually Complete Nuclear Bombs’," Ha’aretz, Septe

1998, p. 1A.

2. This study is focused on the “top of the strategic pyrami

response to the threats from weapons of mass destruction and 

missiles. In parallel, major changes in Israel’s conventiona

doctrine and strategy are taking place, in the broader contex

“revolution in military affairs” (RMA) including the introdu

counter-offensive operations using a wide range of precision 

munitions, the transition from an army based on universal cons

to a smaller high-tech based military, and organizational cha

maximize the efficiency of these changes. For a detailed discu

these issues, see, for example, Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eise

and Andrew J. Bacevich, Knives, Tanks and Missiles: Israel’s S

Revolution, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Nea

Policy, 1998; and Ze’ev Bonen and Eliot Cohen, Advanced Tec

and Future Warfare, Security and Policy Studies No. 28, Ram

Israel: BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University

369
Warfare,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 20., No. 1, Fall 19

85-101. For an analysis of Arab perceptions of the Israeli 

deterrent, see Ariel Levite and Emily Landau, Israel’s Nuclear 

Arab Perceptions of Israel’s Nuclear Posture, Tel Aviv: Papyru

(Hebrew).

4. Michal Yudelman, “Peres Gives Sign of Nuclear Capa

Jerusalem Post, July 14, 1998.

5. Ha’aretz, January 12, 1995.

6. Gideon Alon, “Netanyahu Warns Iran: ‘Israel Will Defend 

Ha’aretz, August 5 1998, http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/s

show_katava.asp?id=25328&mador=1&datee=8/5/98.

7. Amnon Barzilai, “Military Reviews Nuclear Policy, A

Called ‘Vulnerable’ To Missile Attack,” Haaretz, August 25, 199

Defense News.

8. See Gerald M. Steinberg, Dual Use Aspects of Com

High-Resolution Imaging Satellites, Security and Policy Serie

No. 17, Ramat Gan: BESA Center for Strategic Studies, B

University, 1998; Gerald Steinberg, “Middle East Space Race G

Pace,” International Defense Review, October 1995, Vol. 28.

9. In an interview with Reuters, former minister Yuval N

revealed that during 1973, the Israelis deployed Jericho missil

open area to insure that they would be visible to Soviet satellit

the objective of deterring Soviet deployment of nuclear wea

Egypt. According to Neeman, these missiles were not arme

nuclear warheads. Reuters, “Israel Deployed Nuke-Capable Mis

1973 War," September 26, 1998.

10. Amnon Barzilai, “Israel developing cruise missile?”H

July 30, 1998; Douglas Davis, “Report: Israel to Get Subs with 

Strike Capability,” Jerusalem Post, July 3, 1998; Martin Sieff

Buying 3 Submarines to Carry Nuclear Missiles,” The Was

Times, July 1, 1998.

11. Davis; Sieff.

12. See, for example, Gerald M. Steinberg, “Israeli Response

Threat of Chemical Warfare,” pp. 85-101.

13. Interview with Lieutenant General Lester L. Lyles in th

Air Force Journal and cited by Amnon Barzilai, “Military R

370
“One on One," Defense News, August 17, 1998, p. 22.

14. Steve Rodan, “Return to Sender,"Jerusalem Post, July 19

15. Counteroffensive measures, aimed at destroying mob

fixed-site launchers, are also under consideration, and Israeli a

have sought to improve on the American failure to destroy Iraq

launchers during the 1991 Gulf War. See Cohen, Eisensta

Bacevich.

16. The Proliferation Primer, A Majority Report of the Subcom

on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Se

Washington, DC: Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. 

January 1998, p. 1.

17. Scott Ritter, “The Final Straw," Wall Street Journal, Sep

3, 1998 (via Iraq News), and “Uncovering Iraq’s Weapons o

Destruction: Past Achievements, Current Challenges," Polic

338, summary of presentation by Scott Ritter before the Was

Institute for Near East Policy, September 8, 1998.

18. Eliot A. Cohen, “Calling Mr. X,” The New Republic, Janu

1998.

19. Ibid.

20. Cohen, Eisenstadt, and Bracevich, p. xvii.

371
AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDD

EAST IN CLINTON’S SECOND TERM

Robert O. Freedman

INTRODUCTION*

While U.S. President Bill Clinton achieved a num

successes in his Middle East policy during his first te

office—most noticeably the Oslo peace agreement be

Israel and the PLO that was signed on the White H

lawn in September 1993—during his second term 

Middle East policy has proved much more problem

Not only has the Oslo peace process run into se

difficulty, but the U.S. “dual containment” policy to

Iran and Iraq, which he inherited from the 

administration and then intensified during his first 

had come close to collapse. The United States ha

encountered problems in peripheral areas of the r

such as Cyprus, while also becoming beset by the prob

terrorism. Compounding the President’s difficulties 

Republican-dominated Congress which be

increasingly assertive as President Clinton became b

down in the Lewinsky affair which, after January 

began to seriously threaten his presidency. This ch

will examine U.S. policy toward the Middle East in th

2 years of Clinton’s second term, looking first at 

American goals were at the time President Clinto

reelected in November 1996 and then assessin

administration’s success or failure in meeting these go

January 1999, with a concentration on the U.S. role 

373

*I am indebted to Dr. Robert Lieber of Georgetown University 

Dr. Steven David of Johns Hopkins University for their comme

the first draft of this paper.
Iran.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

U.S. goals for the Middle East in the period just 

the 1996 U.S. presidential election were clearly 

concisely spelled out by then U.S. Assistant Secret

State for Near Eastern Affairs Robert H. Pelletrau 

speech before the Fifth Annual Southwest Asia symp

of the U.S. Central Command (CENTO).

Securing a just, lasting and comprehensive peace betw

Israel and its neighbors remains a cornerstone of our ove

foreign policy. A successful peace process will enhance regio

stability, remove a rallying point for fanaticism, and enha

prospects for political and economic development. The Un

States is engaged in several fronts to advance pe

negotiations, an engagement which in turn helps achieve 

other objectives in the Middle East. These include preserv

Israel’s security and well-being; maintaining secu

arrangements to preserve stability in the Persian Gulf 

commercial access to its resources; combating terrorism 

weapons proliferation; assisting U.S. businesses, a

promoting political and economic reform.

2

Pelletrau’s emphasis on the peace process as the 

overall U.S. policy in the Middle East reflected a realiz

that had become concretized in U.S. policy over the pa

decades: that it was very difficult for the United Sta

simultaneously maintain good relations with Israe

with friendly Arab states—especially the oil produc

the Persian Gulf—unless Washington was working 

assiduously and successfully to bring about a 

agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 

much of the Arab world, seeing a direct threat from Ira

rally around U.S. efforts to repel Iraqi aggression ag

Kuwait in the August 1990-March 1991 period, at a 

when the Arab-Israeli peace process was making 

progress; during Clinton’s second term, the United S

was to have a great deal of difficulty rallying Arab su

374
Council Resolutions in November 1997 and Jan

February 1998, at least in part because of the near co

of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Conversely, onc

United States got the peace process back on track wi

Wye Agreement in October 1998, Clinton got far 

support from the Arab states during the mid-Nove

1998 confrontation with Iraq, although as Wye falte

December 1998, this was to negatively affect po

opinion in parts of the Arab world when the United S

finally decided to bomb Iraq.

A year before the U.S. presidential election of 199

Arab-Israeli peace process had suffered its first blow 

an Israeli religious fanatic, Yigal Amir, assassinated I

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin who had pioneered the 

to reach peace with the Palestinians. In 1993 Rabi

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Y

Arafat had signed the Oslo I “Declaration of Principl

the White House lawn, a ceremony which underline

U.S. backing of the peace agreement which, howeve

been forged by direct negotiations between Israeli

Palestinians. A year later, with President Clinton 

present, Rabin and King Hussein ibn Talal of Jordan s

a peace treaty, which transformed the unofficial pe

relationship between Israel and Jordan into a public o

September 1995, despite a series of Hamas and Is

Jihad terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, Rabi

Arafat signed the Oslo II agreement that turned ov

major Palestinian cities of the West Bank (exce

Hebron) to Palestinian rule, a process that was com

by January 1996 and accompanied by elections 

Palestinian Parliament and Palestinian Executiv

latter won, to no one’s surprise, by Arafat.

As the peace process developed between 1993 and 

the United States took the lead in fostering multil

working groups bringing representatives from Israel a

Arab countries, along with 30 countries from outsid

Arab world, to deal with problems that cut across the r

375
issue, and arms control and security.

3

 The highlig

these multilateral meetings were the economic su

that took place in Arab capitals such as Amman, Cair

Casablanca and brought together Arab and I

businessmen to discuss possible business deals.

Following the assassination of Rabin, howeve

peace process began to deteriorate—in spite of the 

efforts of his successor, Shimon Peres, to hold it togeth

February and March 1996 Hamas terrorist bombings 

heart of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv helped crea

atmosphere that led to the election of anti-Oslo I

politician Benjamin Netanyahu as Israeli Prime Minis

May 1996, despite the attempts of the United States to 

support for Peres by organizing an anti-terrorism sum

the Egyptian town of Sharm el-Sheikh in March 199

Following the election of Netanyahu, one of the 

things the Israeli leader did, once he put togethe

governing coalition, was to journey to Washington. Be

meeting President Clinton, he also addressed the Ame

Congress, and in his speech made assertions that 

clearly aimed at winning over the Republican-domi

body, such as announcing his plans to privatize state-o

Israeli companies, deregulate the Israeli economy 

eliminate U.S. foreign aid to Israel. The alli

Netanyahu was to reinforce with key Republican le

(he had been a frequent visitor to Congress when he w

Likud opposition leader from 1993-96) were to great

him when he came into conflict with Clinton over the 

process, something he was soon to do. Indeed, while 

inaugural speech in the Israeli Knesset, Netanyahu o

peace to both the Palestinians (in return for “max

security for Israel in the face of terror and war”) 4 

Israel’s Arab neighbors, his policy of expanding J

settlements on the West Bank angered the A

Israeli-Palestinian relations hit a crisis in late Septe

1996 when, after unilaterally ordering the opening 

Hasmonean tunnel near the Temple Mount which wa

376
Israelis and Palestinians, causing the deaths of 70 p

President Clinton, in an effort to defuse the crisis whic

place little more than a month before the presid

election, invited Netanyahu, Arafat, King Hussein

Hosni Mubarak to Washington (Mubarak refused to 

sign of the chilling of U.S.-Egyptian relations). Whi

emergency summit achieved little in substance, the 

was eased. Nonetheless, the degree of trust between A

and Netanyahu, never very high to start with, a

evaporated, and it was to be the United States tha

forced to get intensively involved in the peace p

(unlike the situation in the Oslo I and Oslo II negotia

in order to broker an agreement for the partial (80 pe

Israeli withdrawal from the city of Hebron in January 

The agreement also stipulated that Israel would unde

three additional troop redeployments over the ne

months.

Just a month later, however, Israeli-Palest

relations received a major blow. Prime Minister Netan

possibly reacting to pressure from the right wing 

governing coalition, which had been strongly opposed 

Hebron agreement, announced on February 26 that 

would build a new Jewish neighborhood, which he 

Har Homa, of 6,500 housing units in traditionally Ara

Jerusalem. When he announced days later that the 

Israeli troop redeployment would turn over only 2.7 pe

of Israeli-controlled West Bank territory to the Pales

Authority, the peace process came to a halt. Arafat th

only broke off talks with Netanyahu, he also sh

diminished the security cooperation betwee

Palestinian police and the Israeli army stipulated b

Oslo II agreement, leading Israelis to charge that h

encouraging terrorism. Terrorism in fact did resume, w

bomb in a Tel Aviv cafe in March set off by Hamas, ki

Israelis, and additional bombs in Jerusalem on July 3

September 4, killing a total of 21 Israelis and wou

hundreds more. Netanyahu reacted to the bombin

377
the West Bank and Gaza from working in Israel (a 

also periodically used by Rabin), by withholdin

payments previously collected from Palestinians work

Israel and owed to the Palestinian Authority, a

threatening to send Israeli forces into Palestinian ar

root out the terrorists.

In September 1997, after appearing to withdraw 

the Middle East peace effort, the United States 

intervened, this time with the peace process on the ve

total collapse after the two Hamas bombings. The new 

Secretary of State Madeline Albright, who had been 

in on January 23, 1997, but had not yet made an officia

to the Middle East, came to Israel in an effort to jump

the stalled peace process. She appealed to Arafat to 

unilateral action to root out the terrorist infrastructur

called on Netanyahu for a “time-out” in settle

construction in the occupied territories, a plea Netan

rejected. The peace process continued to stagnate 

November when the Israeli cabinet voted in princi

favor of another troop withdrawal but specified neith

extent nor its timing. Meanwhile, Clinton had g

exasperated with what his administration perceiv

stalling by Netanyahu and publicly snubbed the I

Prime Minister during Netanyahu’s November 1997 v

the United States to talk to Jewish organiza

Netanyahu’s ties to the Republicans in Congress a

their allies on the religious right of the American po

spectrum (such as Jerry Falwell whose Liberty Univ

students regularly make pilgrimages to Israel) 5 h

insulate the Israeli leader from U.S. pressure, a proces

would continue into 1998 as a weakened Clinton got b

down in the Lewinsky scandal.

Despite his growing weakness, Clinton, acting th

his Secretary of State Madeline Albright, again sou

May 1998 to salvage the peace process whose app

demise was badly damaging the U.S. position in the M

East. Arab friends of the United States, as well as its 

378
standard” in the region of pressuring Iraq (see below) 

not pressuring Israel. Albright, in an effort to revers

situation, following meetings with Netanyahu and Ara

London, issued an ultimatum for Israel to accept 

percent withdrawal. This, however, failed due t

support Netanyahu received from Republicans in th

Congress, the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States 

the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AI

and the Christian Religious Right.

6

Interestingly en

however, American Jewry was badly split over Netany

policy, with Reform and Conservative Jews, already 

at Netanyahu for his favoritism to Israel’s orthodox 

calling for Netanyahu to more energetically engage 

peace process while Orthodox Jews (a clear minority 

American Jewish community) tended to support the I

Prime Minister.

Albright continued her efforts during the sum

however, reportedly calling Netanyahu seven 

between July 5 and 8.

7

 On July 10, after Albright’s m

with two senior Palestinian negotiators—Saeb Uraqa

Nabil Sha’th—U.S. White House spokesman Mike Mc

stated that there was “a limit to the degree in whi

participate in a process that doesn’t have utility,” 8 a

July 13, State Department spokesman James R

pointedly noted:

the ball is not in the Palestinian court; the ball is in the cour

the Israelis to try to work with the Palestinians and work w

us to come to a second ‘yes’. We have a ‘yes’ from t

Palestinians, and we are looking to get ourselves in a posit

where the Israelis can say ‘yes’ as well.

9

During the summer of 1998 the U.S. effort took on 

focus—seeking to get Israeli approval by linking the I

withdrawal in stages, to Palestinian action to co

terrorism and assure Israeli security. Meanwhile a 

element had been added to the Israeli-Palestinian co

Yasser Arafat’s threat to unilaterally declare a Pales

379
1999. While Netanyahu issued a counter-threat 

unilateral Israeli response, which many interpret

annexation of large parts of the West Bank if Arafat 

ahead to declare a state, the Palestinian leader’s threa

have been enough to get Netanyahu to agree to meet A

in late September 1998 in Washington when both le

would be in the United States to address the U.N. A

first meeting with Arafat in a year, Netanyahu f

agreed in the presence of Clinton to the 13 pe

withdrawal figure stipulated by the United States, bu

on condition that 3 percent of the area would be a “n

reserve” on which the Palestinians would be proh

from building, a condition to which Arafat agreed.

10 T

percent figure was a considerable concession for Arafa

had initially demanded a 30 percent withdrawal, an

Palestinian leader also toned down his speech at the 

where he refrained from threatening to declare a sta

May 4, 1999. But other issues continued to raise que

about the ultimate success of the negotiations ev

Netanyahu and Arafat agreed to return to Washing

mid-October. First and foremost were the sec

agreements which Israel demanded in return for its p

13 percent withdrawal. These included the specif

Palestinian action to dismantle terrorist cells, ext

prisoners, confiscate excess guns, and stop what the Is

called “incitement” of citizens through anti-Is

speeches, sermons, and propaganda.

11

 Other 

included the opening of an airport in Gaza, safe passa

Palestinian officials traveling between the West Ban

Gaza, and a clear repudiation by the PLO of its ch

calling for the destruction of Israel. Then, of course, 

were “final status” issues such as Jerusalem, bo

water, refugees, and the future of Israeli settlement

were supposed to be negotiated by May 4, 1999. Clinto

with Arafat separately the next day to urge him to 

effectively to combat terrorism, although the ult

success of the U.S. President’s efforts remained to be 

Nonetheless, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA

380
Palestinian Authority, was proposed as a compr

institution to monitor Palestinian efforts to curb terro

Indeed, as far back as March 1998, the Hamas spoke

Ibrahim Ghawsah, had noted the effectiveness of th

when he complained that “military operations” ag

Israel had “become difficult” because of security coope

between Arafat’s Palestinian Authority and I

“especially after the CIA joined in this coordination.”

However, beside the security questions involved 

Palestinian-Israeli agreement, there were real con

whether Clinton was strong enough to broke

agreement, given the Lewinsky affair. Natan Shara

Minister of Industry and Trade in Netanyahu’s govern

and a close confidant of the Israeli Prime Minister, o

wondered “America is weak, so Arafat must w

whether they can deliver and that affects their role he

On the Palestinian side, Ziad Amir Amr, a Pales

lawmaker stated:

Before the scandal, at least, [Clinton] had some credibility. 

could send an envoy or secretary of state and people wo

take it seriously. I don’t think he can be taken seriously. 

has no ability to do anything about the peace process. Its 

even a realistic option.

14

If this situation were not bad enough, the United S

faced another dilemma, the illness of King Hussein w

country, Jordan, was now not only Israel’s closest 

friend (at least on the elite level) but also, after 

disruptions during the Gulf War when the King supp

Saddam Hussein, was again a major U.S. ally in the 

world. Should Hussein die, not only could Is

Palestinian relations be further strained, but the 

Middle East peace process could be jeopardized.

Despite the skepticism of both Israeli and Pales

parliamentarians and the illness of King Hussein, C

was able to move the peace process several steps forw

mid-October as Netanyahu, Arafat, and King Hussein 

381
gathered with U.S. officials at the Conference Center 

Wye Plantation on Maryland’s Eastern Shore. After 8 

of intense bargaining which involved the threat of a wa

by Netanyahu and Clinton’s postponement of a t

California to aid the reelection campaign of the emb

Senator Barbara Boxer, a modest agreement was ach

between Netanyahu and Arafat. The agreement inv

Israel withdrawing in three stages from 13.1 perc

West Bank land (3 percent of which would become a n

preserve), transferring an additional 14.2 percent o

jointly controlled to sole Palestinian control, releasin

prisoners, and agreeing to the opening of a Pales

airport in Gaza, of two corridors of safe passage be

Gaza and the West Bank, and of an industrial zone be

Israel and Gaza. In return, Arafat agreed to changin

Palestine National Charter to clearly eliminate t

articles calling for Israel’s destruction, althoug

manner in which the change was to take place was 

vague (reference was made to an assembly of Pales

notables). Clinton’s promise to be present durin

Palestinian action, however, would serve to dramati

event. Arafat also agreed to issue a decree prohibiti

forms of incitement to violence, to cut the numb

Palestinian police to 30,000 (from 40,000), to arres

confine 30 terrorism suspects wanted by Israel, to c

illegal weapons and suppress terrorism, with the 

attesting to the fact that the Palestinian Authorit

making every effort to crack down on terrorism.

15

 T

sides also agreed to resume negotiations on final 

issues.

16

Given the issues still to be resolved between Israe

the Palestinians, the achievements at Wye were 

modest, and the modicum of trust between Arafa

Netanyahu that had been achieved at Wye seem

evaporate following their return home, as each i

bellicose statements while terrorist acts orchestrat

Hamas threatened the process of the planned three

382
several important things as a result of the Wye Agree

First, by demonstrating that he was still a leader 

international influence, he helped dispel the wea

image of the American presidency caused by the M

Lewinsky affair. Second, by getting the peace process 

on track, he demonstrated to the Arabs that the U

States was not following a double standard vis-à-vi

and Israel. Indeed, in the subsequent confrontation 

Iraq in mid-November 1998, this development was t

the United States isolate Iraq in much of the Arab w

Third, Clinton’s political position vis-à-vis Netanyah

strengthened. The Israeli Prime Minister’s unwise r

of the Jonathan Pollard affair in the latter stage 

negotiations alienated some of Netanyahu’s Repu

supporters. Netanyahu suffered a second political blo

result of Republican losses in the House of Represent

in the U.S. mid-term elections that took place less t

weeks after the Wye summit, and which were widely s

a repudiation of Republican efforts to impeach Cl

Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives 

Gingrich, perhaps Netanyahu’s closest ally i

Republican-dominated Congress, was forced to resig

result of the Republican defeat (Gingrich had pre

gains of 35-40 Republican seats), to be replaced (albei

temporarily due to his own sex scandal) by R

Livingston, who was considerably more cool to Is

While the House of Representatives, in a highly pa

independent process, went on to vote two artic

impeachment against Clinton, the President’s stand

American public opinion polls soared, and the impeach

vote did not serve to weaken him politically. Wh

Clinton could use his restored political position to 

added pressure on Netanyahu to move the peace p

forward soon became a moot point, however, as the I

Prime Minister, beset by defections from his 

government, moved to call for new elections. In the pr

implementation of the Wye Agreement, which had 

383
frozen.

Initially, the Wye Agreement appeared to rest

modicum of confidence between Arafat and Netan

Israeli troops, in the first stage of the agreement, with

from 2 percent of the occupied West Bank; Israel rel

250 Palestinian prisoners, and allowed the opening 

Palestinian airport in Gaza. However, the momentu

peace was quickly reversed. Palestinians, complainin

the prisoners who were released were only “car thieve

the political detainees they wanted, carried on v

protest activities.19 These protests, together with a se

Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israelis, includin

attempt by a Hamas suicide bomber to ram a bus filled 

Israeli school children in Gaza, an attempt to set off a 

in the Mahane Yehudah market in Jerusalem, an

attack on an Israeli soldier in Rainallah (actions 

Arafat proved unwilling or unable to prevent

Netanyahu, under heavy pressure from right

elements in his governing coalition. to freeze addi

troop withdrawals on December 2. The Israeli 

Minister conditioned the resumption of the withdraw

Arafat, halting what he called a campaign of incite

against Israel, foregoing his intention to decl

Palestinian state on May 4, 1999, and acceding to Is

selection of the prisoners who were to be released.

20

For its part, the Clinton administration, despit

ongoing impeachment process, was making major effo

keep the peace process going. On November 29, speak

a Palestinian donor conference he had conven

Washington, President Clinton pledged $400 milli

additional aid to the Palestinians, on top of the $500 m

he had pledged in 1993. All told, some $3 billion in ai

pledged to the Palestinians, an amount that would g

help the beleaguered Palestinian economy, alth

questions were raised at the conference about co

Palestinian officials siphoning off previous aid for the

personal use.

21

 The United States also sought to dow

384
troop withdrawals under the Wye Agreement, with 

Department spokesman James P. Rubin statin

December 2, 1998, “The agreement should be implem

as signed. We do not believe it is appropriate to ad

conditions to implementation of the agreement.” 22 Th

important effort to restore momentum to the Is

Palestinian peace process was taken by Clinton h

when he journeyed to Gaza in mid-December to witne

Palestinians formally abrogate the clauses in the Pal

National Charter calling for Israel’s destruction, an 

which the Netanyahu government had long dema

While Clinton was on hand to witness the vote that h

had urged on Arafat, the end result of his visit w

warming of relations between the United States an

Palestinian Authority, which received incre

international legitimacy as a result of the U.S. Presi

visit—an outcome which Israeli critics of Netan

blamed on Netanyahu. As Bar-Ilan University pro

Shmuel Sandler noted, “Netanyahu boxed himse

wanting to survive politically and believing he can ha

cake and eat it [too]. He will have to pay a pr

Washington opens up to the Palestinians.”

23

While U.S.-Palestinian relations, at least on the le

the Palestinian “street,” were to suffer a serious blow 

the United States bombed Iraq 2 days after Clinton’s v

the Palestinian Authority,

24

 Clinton’s personal relatio

with Arafat was to remain strong, as Arafat was to 

Clinton and Albright in Washington in early Februa

any case, Clinton’s summit with Arafat and Netan

following the visit to Gaza proved unsuccessful despi

U.S. president’s claims of reviving the stalled Middle 

peace talks, as Netanyahu held fast to his position th

further withdrawals would take place until the Palest

met his conditions.

25

 This position, however, prove

death knell for his coalition government, as members 

within Netanyahu’s ruling Likud party, led by De

Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, threatened to pull out 

385
the peace process. Suffering a major political blow wh

Finance Minister Ya’acov Ne’eman resigned, Netan

moved to call for new elections before his government 

fall on a non-confidence vote.

26

 With elections schedu

May 17, 1999, the peace process was in effect frozen, le

the United States somewhat nervously on the diplo

sidelines, hoping that Arafat would not prematurely d

a Palestinian state, and thus strengthen the chanc

Netanyahu’s reelection.

At the same time, American leaders had to be conc

about the sudden succession process in Jordan. 

Hussein, who was suffering a relapse of his cancer, le

United States where he was undegoing cancer treatm

fly back to Jordan. There the King replaced his br

Hassan, as Crown Prince, with Hussein’s eldes

Abdullah. Given the fact that Hassan, who had been C

Prince for more than 30 years, was a strong supporter 

peace process and that Abdullah, a general in the Jord

army, was politically inexperienced, U.S. officials had 

concerned. While Secretary of State Albright quickly v

the Crown Prince to offer U.S. support, and Pre

Clinton offered $300 million in additional aid, the de

King Hussein, which came soon after his selecti

Abdullah as Crown Prince, added a new challenge 

U.S. leadership because it removed a moderating infl

from the often volatile Palestinian-Israeli relationshi

King Hussein, who had been so valuable at Wye, wo

sorely missed.27

THE RISE AND FALL OF DUAL CONTAINMEN

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ AND IRAN

If President Clinton was encountering difficu

fostering peace between Israel and the Palestinian

efforts at containing both Iraq and Iran, a policy he ac

pursued during his first term in office, had all but coll

in the 2 years following his reelection in November 

For dual containment to be effective, the United State

386
the Persian Gulf, but also to have the will to use th

either Iran or Iraq got out of line, rather than use o

check the other as the United States had done in the 

and 1980s. Two states also had to be kept isolated 

countries in their immediate region and be prevented 

receiving support from outside countries.

28

 Iran

which the European Union countries followed a po

“constructive engagement,” never really faced 

isolation, while Iraq, a pariah in most of the Arab 

because of its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, by 1997 beg

acquire increased support from Arab countries su

Egypt and Syria, while having received support from R

as far back as 1993. In addition, U.S. policy toward Ira

clearly shifted by June 1998 from containment to an 

at a rapprochement, in large part because of the electio

reform-minded Iranian cleric, Mohammed Khatam

President of Iran.

U.S. Policy Toward Iraq.

During his first term, Clinton had been challeng

Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein on a number of occasion

June 1993, following an abortive Iraqi attem

assassinate former U.S. President George Bush wh

visiting Kuwait, the United States bombed an intelli

center in Baghdad. In October 1994, Saddam Hu

moved his army toward Kuwait, and the United S

responded by airlifting military forces to Kuwai

warning Iraq not to invade, a threat that achiev

purpose. The United States was less successful in 

August 1996, however, when Iraqi troops, in coope

with the KDP (the Masud Barzani faction of the Ku

opposition), attacked the rival PUK faction of 

Talabani which had been aided by Iran, and drove i

Irbil, thus severely damaging U.S. efforts to forge a u

opposition to the Iraqi regime. The United States resp

by expanding its “no-fly” zone in the south of Iraq to th

parallel, and by bombarding Iraqi air defense installa

387
United States in maintaining the “no-fly” zone, did 

the newly extended part of the zone.

29

 The Arab oppo

may have also been caused by their view of limited 

cruise missile attacks as worse than useless, stirring 

Arab popular anger while not threatening the ba

Saddam Hussein’s power.

The major Iraqi challenges to the United States w

come in the fall of 1997 and the winter of 1998 and w

result in a weakening of the U.S. containment 

something that was to be the result both of a sharp e

in President Clinton’s domestic political stature, a

support for his anti-Iraqi policies in the Arab world. M

matters more difficult for the United States was the 

diplomacy of Russia which was seeking to rebui

position in the Middle East.

There were three main reasons for Russian leader 

Yeltsin’s support of Iraq. First, to demonstrate to the 

and to an often hostile Duma (Parliament) that R

remained an important factor in the world, both willin

able to oppose the United States. Second, to o

repayment for the $7 billion owed Russia’s predecesso

Soviet Union—something that will not happen unti

the lifting of sanctions on Iraq. Third, Russian 

manufacturers and oil and gas companies seek contra

Iraq, even though they cannot actually begin oper

until sanctions are lifted. With these interests in min

easy to explain Russian behavior in both the Oc

November 1997 and January-February 1998 c

although Russian policy was far more coherent i

October-November crisis.

30

In the fall of 1997, U.S. weapons inspectors, who w

Iraq as part of the U.N. inspection team (UNS

checking on Iraq’s development of weapons of 

destruction (WMD), were prohibited by Iraq from car

out their mission and left the country, followed by the 

U.N. inspectors. The United States threatened m

388
peak of the crisis, Russian Foreign Minister Ye

Primakov called Secretary of State Madeline Albrigh

from a visit to India and met with her and other memb

the U.N. Security Council at 2:00 a.m. in Gene

November 20, 1997. With the help of France, which wa

pursuing lucrative arms and business deals in 

Primakov put together an agreement under whic

weapons inspectors would be let back into Iraq in retu

a vague promise about lifting the sanctions. 

The agreement proved short-lived, however, a

January Saddam Hussein, claiming that the U.S. san

were starving the Iraqi people, began backtracking o

agreement by prohibiting inspections of his “presid

palaces,” which were suspected as weapons deposit

This led to the United States and Great Britain ma

their forces in the Persian Gulf, and it appeared a

conflict was imminent. 

Several factors, however, prevented the outbreak o

First, Clinton was now beset by the Monica Lewinsky 

which became public in late January and which erod

political position. Second, domestic support for an atta

Iraq proved not as strong as the Clinton administratio

hoped, as on February 18, 1998, Secretary of State Al

and some of her administration colleagues encounte

hostile reception during a Town Hall meeting at Ohio 

University on U.S. policy toward Iraq that was broa

worldwide by CNN.

31

 A third factor was a clear l

support from America’s Arab allies who appeared 

moved by Saddam’s portrayal of his suffering peop

November 1997, at the height of the first crisis with 

many of America’s major Arab allies, including 

Arabia, Morocco, and Egypt, boycotted the U.S.-spon

regional Arab-Israeli economic conference held in 

Qatar. As the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, 

usually reflects government opinion, noted—despi

U.S. support for the “oil for food” agreement that al

Iraq to import substantial amounts of food 

389
described as anything but coercive, aggressive, unwis

uncaring about the lives of Iraqis, who are unneces

subject to sanctions and humiliations.”

32

 The Arab le

also made clear their dissatisfaction with the United S

for not pressing the Netanyahu government to move 

with the peace process, complaining that the United S

had a double standard in the Middle East, pressurin

but not Israel. 

Arab criticism of the United States continued in

February crisis when Saudi Arabia would not perm

United States to use bases on its soil to attack 

reportedly because of U.S. “inability to push forwar

quest for a broader peace between the Arabs and Israe

The Arab opposition may also have been caused by thei

that limited U.S. cruise missile strikes would be worse 

useless, stirring up the anger of the “Arab street,” wh

threatening the bases of Saddam Hussein’s power. 

In the face of these constraints as well as opposition 

Russia and France to a U.S. military attack, Pre

Clinton chose a diplomatic way out of the impasse, thi

with the help of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan

extracted the promise from Saddam Hussein that the 

leader would not interfere with UNSCOM inspections

agreement, however, was strongly criticized by Repu

leaders in Congress such as Trent Lott, Jesse Helms

John McCain, who, as Clinton weakened politically, be

increasingly assertive spokesmen on U.S. foreign po

Their clamor became louder in late August when the 

U.S. inspector on the UNSCOM team, Scott Ritter, res

in protest at what he said were deliberate U.S. efforts 

Secretary of State Madeline Albright to derail inspecti

order to avoid another military confrontation with I

The resignation occurred on August 26, 3 weeks 

Saddam Hussein on August 5, barred surprise inspe

and said he would only allow remote monitoring and r

visits to known sites. Since the Iraqi leader had long 

policy of trying to hide evidence of Iraq’s efforts to con

390
been successful in ferreting out the WMD inform

primarily by surprise inspections (although the inform

released by Iraq after the defection in 1995 of Sad

son-in-law, Hussein Kamil, was also helpful). Sad

barring of surprise inspections meant the effective e

U.N. monitoring of Iraq’s weapons programs; and th

failure to react to the Iraqi move, which Ritter (and 

others) saw was in direct contravention of UNSC Reso

687, precipitated his resignation. While the United S

was subsequently to get a unanimous U.N. Security C

condemnation of the Iraqi leader’s action (follo

Saddam’s decision to interfere with routine UNS

monitoring)

36

 along with a deferment of any Se

Council decision on lifting sanctions,

37

 it appeared tha

was now relatively free to engage in a crash progr

build WMD, although the continuation of the sanctio

his regime appeared to limit Saddam’s ability to do s

Following Ritter’s resignation, Congress

Republicans held hearings on what they called a reve

U.S. policy toward Iraq, with House Speaker Newt Gin

saying that what was involved suggested a “secret 

from confrontation to appeasement” that was in 

conflict with the government’s public rhetoric. Ging

further attacked Clinton by stating that, if Ri

accusations were true, “Your administration’s 

rhetoric on Iraq has been a deception, masking a real 

of weakness and concession.”

39 In response, Secret

State Albright, citing the unanimous U.N. Security C

vote against Iraq, asserted that the administration’s 

would be more effective in curbing Saddam Hussein 

that of Scott Ritter,40 although few Republicans app

convinced. The administration did score a success in it

policy, albeit perhaps only a small one, in mid-Septe

when it persuaded the Kurdish factions of Masud Ba

and Jallal Talabani, whose internecine conflic

facilitated the capture of Irbil by Saddam Hussein’s fo

years earlier, to work together and share power in Nor

391
remained to be seen. Meanwhile, Senate Majority L

Trent Lott and House International Relations Comm

Chairman Benjamin Gillman introduced a bill at the 

September 1998 that authorized the Cl

administration to select one or more Iraqi opposition g

that would receive up to $97 million in U.S. De

Department equipment and military training “to se

remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein in Ira

promote the emergence of a democratic governme

While the Clinton administration initially opposed th

(although Clinton was later to sign it) because it limit

flexibility of action over Iraq, it appeared tha

congressional Republicans, unhappy with Clin

handling of Iraq, were thrusting forward an altern

policy.

Fortunately for Clinton, Saddam Hussein 

overreached himself and allowed the American Pres

albeit for only a very short time, to seize the init

against the Iraqi leader. On October 31, 1998, Sa

Hussein ended all Iraqi cooperation with UNS

precipitating yet another unanimous Security Counc

condemning Iraq and demanding that the ba

cooperation with UNSCOM be ended.

43

 When Iraq r

to change its policy, the UNSCOM inspectors left Ira

Clinton again began to mobilize U.S. forces for a po

strike against the Iraqi leader. But the political situat

November 1998 was far different from what it had 

during the November 1997 and February 1998 crises. 

first place, Clinton was greatly strengthened by the 

mid-term elections which were seen, as noted above

public repudiation of Republican attempts to impeach 

Second, after Clinton concluded the Wye Agreement, 

involved a further Israeli withdrawal from occ

territory, the Arab world was far less hostile to 

pressure against Iraq. Indeed, the Arab Gulf coalitio

fought against Iraq—Egypt, Syria, and the 

392
Iraq on November 12, stating:

Iraq must heed U.N. Security Council resolutions and abide 

them to avoid military confrontation . . . The Iraqi governme

will be solely responsible for all repercussions resulting fr

its decision to block UNSCOM from carrying out 

inspections . . .

44

A third problem which had hampered U.S. a

against Iraq in the previous two crises, Russian oppos

had all but dissipated by November 1998. Beset 

monumental economic crisis, having defaulted on its fo

loans, and now having to virtually beg the United S

and Europe for food to get through the winter, Russia w

no position to try to block a U.S. military strike on Ir

In this strengthened political position, Clinton de

to launch a major military attack against Iraq, only to 

back at the very last minute after receiving informatio

Iraq, under the imminent threat of attack, had agr

allow the UNSCOM inspectors to resume their w

While Clinton claimed the Iraqis had “backed down

threatened to initiate attacks if Iraq failed to fully coop

with UNSCOM,

47 many commentators thought Clinto

lost a golden opportunity, now that he had both the 

world and a united Security Council behind him, to de

the bases of Saddam’s power, including the Repu

Guard, the suspected sites of WMD, and Iraq’s rema

military capability. While in his November 15 

conference Clinton asserted that,

the return of the inspectors, if they can operate in 

unfettered way, is the best outcome, because they have be

and remain the most effective tool to uncover, destroy a

prevent Iraq from rebuilding its weapons of ma

destruction,

48

Clinton’s critics asserted that it was only a matter o

before Saddam Hussein again interfered wit

UNSCOM inspectors, and at that time Clinton mig

393
enable him to launch a major military attack against 

Indeed, this was to be the case 1 month later w

politically weakened Clinton decided, in cooperation 

the British, finally to launch a military attack against 

By mid-December 1998, Clinton’s position 

weakened on two fronts. In the Middle East, Israeli 

Minister Netanyahu, as noted above, had suspended I

participation in the Wye River Agreement, and Clinto

not been able to reverse the decision. At home in the U

States, the Republican-dominated House Jud

Committee, in what was generally seen as a highly pa

action, had pushed through, on a party-line vo

four-count impeachment indictment against Clinton

the resolution was awaiting action by the full Hou

Representatives. It was precisely at this point that Cl

citing UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler’s report th

Iraqis had again seriously interfered with the activi

the inspectors, and concerned that, with the Islami

month of Ramadan coming in a few days, the United S

would have had to postpone the attack for more t

month, giving Saddam time to hide his WMD equip

launched the attack. In the words of President Clinto

The conclusions [of UNSCOM chairman, Richard Butl

report] are stark, sobering, and profoundly disturbing . . 

short, the inspectors are saying that, even if they could sta

Iraq, their work would be a sham. Saddam’s deception 

defeated their effectiveness. Instead of the inspectors disarm

Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors.

This situation presents a clear and present danger to 

stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of peo

everywhere. The international community gave Saddam 

last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspect

Saddam has failed to seize the chance.

And so we had to act and to act now. Let me explain why: F

without a strong inspection system, Iraq would be free to ret

and begin to rebuild its chemical, biological, and nuc

394
can cripple the weapons inspection system and get away w

it, he would conclude that the international community, led 

the United States, had simply lost its will. He will surmise th

he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction. And so

day, make no mistake, he will use it again as he has in the pa

Third, in halting our air strikes in November, I gave Saddam 

chance, not a licence. If we turn our backs on his defiance, t

credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam will 

destroyed.

That is why on the unanimous recommendation of my natio

security team, including the vice president, the secretary 

defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, t

secretary of state and the national security adviser, I ha

ordered a strong sustained series of air strikes against Ir

The are designed to degrade Saddam’s capacity to develop a

deliver weapons of mass destruction and to degrade his abil

to threaten his neighbors.

49

The attack on Iraq, coming on the eve o

impeachment vote, gave rise to strong criticism both 

United States and abroad. While many Republicans su

outgoing House Majority Leader Newt Gingrich 

Senator John McCain of Arizona supported the a

Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, who heretofor

urged Clinton to take a tougher stand on Iraq, stat

cannot support this military action in the Persian G

this time. Both the timing and the policy are subj

question.”

50

 While Lott later backed away from 

statement, the political damage had been done, an

reinforced by Republican Representative Gerald Sol

the Chairman of the House Rules Committee, who ass

“Never underestimate a desperate President.”

51

Even before the United States launched the a

National Security Adviser Samuel Berger, in a spee

Stanford University on December 8, had articulate

more detailed way than ever before, the administra

strategy toward Iraq. He noted that the United S

would be working “step-by-step, in a practical and eff

way” to undermine and eventually oust Saddam Hu

395
necessary.” Berger’s statement was coupled with ince

for people in the center of power in Baghdad to over

Saddam, as the U.S. official promised “to ease eco

sanctions” against a new Iraqi regime and also “wo

relieve Iraq’s massive economic debts.”

52

In this light, an analysis of the military attack 

which lasted 70 hours, reveals that it was not only aim

weakening Saddam’s capacity to make WMD and thr

Iraq’s neighbors, but also to weaken the very basis 

regime. Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Shelton estimated that between 600 and 1,600 memb

the Iraqi Republican Guard, a main prop of the 

government, had been killed in the U.S. attacks, whic

targeted the headquarters of Iraqi military intelligenc

special Republican Guard, and the special sec

organization, while leaving regular army units alone.

U.S. strategy in doing so seemed aimed at encourag

future coup, on the assumption that regular army o

were less likely to support Saddam than the Repu

Guard, the special Republican Guard, or the special se

organization. The United States also claimed succ

degrading Saddam’s WMD capability even though 

use” facilities such as pharmaceutical plants wer

targeted, to avoid civilian casualties. The U.S. comm

in the Persian Gulf, General Anthony Zinni, stated th

a result of the attacks, Iraq’s missile development 

have been set back 2 years.

54

 The United States also 

oil refinery near Basra that Saddam was using to ref

to be smuggled out through the Persian Gulf in violat

U.N. sanctions. Zinni asserted that the 300 ship-lau

cruise missiles were particularly effective, hitting 

than 85 percent of their targets; while overall, 75 perc

the strikes were rated “fully successful.”

55

Following the end of the bombing campaign, B

again articulated U.S. policy toward Iraq, this time 

speech to the National Press Club. He noted that there 

only two possible outcomes to U.S. policy toward Iraq—

396
which he stated was “unlikely”; or the downfall of Sa

Hussein, which he said was “inevitable.” Berger note

the United States opposed a return to the pre-a

situation in which Saddam could instigate crises whe

he wanted by promising to give UNSCOM unfettered 

and then obstructing the inspectors’ work. He also s

that the United States now had an open-ended commi

to use military force to block the rebuilding of the WM

communications equipment destroyed by the U.S

British attacks. In addition, Berger asserted tha

United States was prepared to devote resources to “pra

and effective” efforts to build an opposition to Sadd

However, Berger also stated that the United States w

willing to ensure Saddam’s immediate departure th

the commitment of the hundreds of thousands of U.S. t

which would be needed for the task.

57

While the U.S. was evaluating the impact of the m

and air strikes, and working to undermine Sad

position within Iraq, it was coming under strong cri

for its actions from Russia, France, and China

Russians, who had long sought to lift the embargo ag

Iraq, seized on the U.S.-British attack not only to sev

criticize the United States, but also to push for the lift

the embargo. A sick Yeltsin, under attack from comm

in his Parliament who sought to impeach him, used th

attack to try to demonstrate Russia’s contin

importance in the world, despite its serious eco

problems. He denounced the attack and withdrew, 

only for a short time, the Russian ambassadors fro

United States and Great Britain. Russian ambassa

NATO Sergei Kise1jack went so far as to accuse the U

States of launching the strikes just to test its n

weapons.

58

 In addition Moscow sought the ous

UNSCOM Chairman Richard Bulter, whom Ru

deputy UNSC representative, Yuri Fedotov, said, “W

don’t trust.”59 Yeltsin also sought to increase the r

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in dealing wit

397
refused to readmit the UNSCOM inspectors.

France, which also denounced the attack and 

wished to secure economic benefits in Iraq, soug

capture the diplomatic initiative by tying the lifting 

oil and petroleum embargo against Iraq t

establishment of a new “independent and profes

control commission under the authority of the Se

Council,” while continuing the ban on forbidden we

into Iraq.

60

 While Russia supported the French pla

United States opposed it, demanding that UNS

remain the U.N. inspection arm, although in an eff

demonstrate it was not opposed to the welfare of the 

people, the United States offered to allow Iraq both 

more oil and to import spare parts for its oil indus

Meanwhile, someone in the office of the U.N. Se

Council leaked the information that UNS

investigators had collected eavesdropping intelligenc

given it to the United States to help it undermin

Saddam Hussein regime.

62

 Both the United State

Butler denied the charge, and Kofi Annan himself s

through a spokesman, that he had “no evidence of any 

that UNSCOM had assisted U.S. intelligence.” 63

leaking of the story, however, timed as it was, appea

be an effort to undermine the credibility of UNSCO

general, and Butler in particular, and was utilized no

by Iraq, but by Russia and France as well, to deman

end to UNSCOM.

While the inconclusive discussions at the U.N. 

proceedmg, Saddam Hussein was seeking to recaptu

initiative in the Gulf, although once again his heavy-h

actions appeared to backfire. Thus, after offering vir

no resistance to the joint U.S.-British attacks, at the 

December Saddam declared the U.S. no-fly zones “nu

void” and began to launch attacks against U.S. and B

planes patrolling the zones. The end result of the p

was the further weakening of Iraq’s defense capabil

by the end of January, the United States claimed to 

398
installations, while suffering no losses of its o

Meanwhile, on the Arab diplomatic front, Saddam wa

suffering losses. Frustrated because of a lack of 

support during the U.S. and British attacks, Saddam 

for an Arab summit, only to pull out his delegation wh

Arab delegations present demanded that Iraq ren

“provocations” against its neighbors and that it comply 

all U.N. resolutions before economic sanctions cou

lifted.

65 Before the meeting, Saddam had called for the 

masses to overthrow their leaders, and had dir

particular criticism against the Egyptian regime of 

Mubarak. Speaking on Iraqi television, Saddam urge

Arabs to “revolt and unseat those stooges, collabor

throne dwarfs, and cowards! Revolt against inju

Surely we will remain forever as revolutionaries a

them.”

66

 Such statements were not calculated to w

support of Arab leaders, and, by the end of January

was even more isolated in the Arab world than it had 

before the U.S.-British attacks.

As Iraq remained isolated in the Arab world 

weakened militarily by its ongoing military conflict wi

United States, there was yet another attempt to forge a 

Security Council consensus on action toward Iraq. A

end of January, the Security Council agreed to a Can

proposal for a three-part review of the Iraqi situation 

which there would be a review of (1) Iraq’s disarma

situation, (2) the condition of the Iraqi population 

under sanctions, and (3) an accounting of missing Ku

and others during Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait from A

2, 1990 to March 1, 1991. 67 While Iraq turned down th

proposal, demanding that the U.N. Security Co

condemn the U.S. and British air strikes and immed

lift the embargo, at a minimum the Security Counc

again cooperating on Iraq, albeit on at a rather mi

level.

As the U.N. was again grappling with the Iraqi situ

the United States was stepping up its efforts to over

399
State Albright appointed Frank Ricciardone to the p

special representative to the opposition groups work

overthrow Saddam. Earlier she had announced the 

opposition groups eligible for the $97 million in U.

under the Iraq Liberation Act (the Iraqi National Con

the Iraqi National Accord, the Islamic Movement of 

Kurdistan, the Movement for the Constitutional Mona

the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Un

Kurdistan).

68

 Given the differences among the six gro

seventh group, the Iranian-backed Supreme Coun

Islamic Revolution in Iraq, rejected U.S. help), the U

States faced a formidable task in coordinating an ef

overthrow Saddam. This point was made abund

clear—albeit in a rather nondiplomatic way—by Ge

Zinni who, in testimony to the Senate Armed Se

Committee, stated that none of the Iraqi opposition g

“had the viability to overthrow Saddam at this point

he warned that, if the opposition did prove successfu

end result could be “a disintegrated, fragmented Iraq . 

the last thing we need is another rogue state.”

69

 Wh

administration sought to put the best face on Ge

Zinni’s remarks, with State Department spokesman J

Foley noting that he agreed with Zinni’s conclusion 

“this is not going to be an easy or short term effort,”

70 

was some question whether U.S. policy on Iraq was 

coordinated. In any case, while Saddam had been effec

isolated in the Arab world—mostly through his 

mistaken diplomacy—and his military power had 

considerably weakened, the United States still appea

have a long way to go before the Clinton administra

new policy toward Iraq, the overthrow of the Sa

Hussein regime, was realized.

Iran.

While even during Clinton’s first term there were 

in Washington calling for an improvement in relation

Iran, the memories of the hostage crisis of 1979-80 a

400
Iran’s death sentence on the writer Salman Rushd

conduct of terrorism abroad, its efforts to obtain WMD

its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, whic

the form of military aid to such anti-Israeli terrorist g

as Islamic Jihad, helped prevent any policy change, 

the Republican sweep of Congress in the 1994 elec

Indeed, Iranian-American relations actually deterio

further during Clinton’s first term

71

 as the United 

refused to permit the U.S. airplane manufacturer Boe

sell passenger aircraft to Iran. Similarly, the United S

pressured Azerbaizhan to drop Iran from an interna

consortium developing one of Azerbaizhan’s off-sho

fields, and in 1995 President Clinton signed a Presid

order banning U.S. companies from investing in Ira

industry, thereby forcing U.S. oil firm Conoco to cance

billion agreement to develop two Iranian off-shore oil 

In 1996, Clinton went further and signed the Repub

inspired Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) which impo

number of sanctions against foreign firms investing 

than $40 million in Iran’s oil and gas industry. Yet an

blow to U.S.-Iranian relations in 1996 was the ter

attack against the Khobar Towers residence of U.S. a

in Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 U.S. airmen. At the 

the terrorist attack was widely attributed to Iran 

made no secret of its opposition to U.S. forces in the Pe

Gulf, although more recently suspicion has shift

Osama Bin Laden.

While the United States was endeavoring to isolate 

it did not receive much help from its NATO allies

French firm, Total, signed the off-shore oil deal that C

had been forced to cancel, and Turkey, which faced a ra

growing demand for natural gas, signed a 20-year

billion dollar agreement to import gas from 

Energy-related issues also divided the United States 

its allies on the question of the preferred export rou

Caspian Sea oil and natural gas. Many European

depend more on energy imports than the United S

401
from the Caspian through Iran to the Persian Gulf

United States backed the more expensive, longer, and 

more insecure route from Azerbaizhan through Georg

Turkey to the Mediterranean (the Baku-Ceyhan r

The United States also clashed repeatedly with Russi

Iran because Russia was Iran’s major suppl

sophisticated military equipment, such as aircraf

submarines, and was also selling nuclear reactor

missile technology to Iran.

The hostility between the United States and Ir

evident during Clinton’s first term, began to dim

during the early part of his second term. The precipi

factor was the unexpected and overwhelming (70 perc

the vote) election of Mohammed Khatami as 

President in May 1997. The moderate Iranian le

although challenged by hardliners in the Iranian r

including Iran’s religious leader, Ayatollah Khamein

controlled important levers of power such as the 

police, and Pasdaran, sought to increase cultura

personal freedom in Iran, while also improving rel

with Iran’s Gulf neighbors, Europe, and, to a lesser d

with the United States.

Khatami’s efforts to improve Iran’s regional po

began with the dispatch of the new Iranian Fo

Minister, Kamal Kharazzi, on a tour of Arab capitals w

message that Iran wanted peaceful and cooper

relations with the Arab world.

72

 Next cam

Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) Summit h

Teheran in December 1997, where Khatami 

unanimously elected as chairman of the OIC for the 

years. At the summit, Khatami moderated Iran’s po

on the Arab-Israeli peace process, stating Iran would a

any solution which the Palestinians accepted, and Ira

the support of the other Islamic countries in opposin

sanctions.

73

 The rapprochement between Iran a

neighbors continued in March 1998 with the visit of f

Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, hims

402
discussed, inter alia, the drop in oil prices to below 

barrel, a development that hurt both countries. 

Arabia and Iran were subsequently to agree to a

production cutback.

74 Iran also sent out feelers to Ira

the hard-pressed regime of Saddam Hussein, look

escape its own isolated position, responded posi

although the two countries remained at odds over uns

issues from their 1980-88 war. By mid 1998, the only is

consequence remaining in Iranian-Gulf Arab relation

the dispute over the three islands in the Persian Gu

Tunb, Little Tunb, and Abu Musa) which are claimed 

by Iran and the United Arab Emirates but are cur

occupied by Iran—an occupation that dates back to th

of the Shah. In the new mood of Gulf Cooperation C

(GCC)-Iran cooperation, however, the islands issue 

appears to be far less of an area of contention that it w

the past.

As Iran was improving its ties with the Gulf Ara

was stepping up its relations with Russia and France, 

its leading trade partners. Russia, which was Iran’s le

supplier of military equipment as well as nuclear rea

saw Iran as a useful ally in a number of Caucasia

Central Asian trouble spots from Chechnya to the Taji

war to Afghanistan, as well as a major market for Ru

military and civilian exports.

75 For its part, Franc

rejected U.S. efforts to isolate Iran economically, a

1997 Total joined with Russian and Malaysian e

companies in an agreement to develop Iran’s South 

natural gas field—a direct challenge to U.S. efforts to 

Iranian energy development.

The challenge, however, was not met by the U

States because Iran’s efforts at improving its ties 

foreign countries by 1998 now also included the U

States, which was to reply in kind. What could be ca

limited rapprochement began in December 1997 whe

news conference, President Khatami stated, “I first 

pay my respects to the great people and nati

403
proposed to the United States the idea of an excha

“professionals, writers, scholars, artists, journalists

tourists.” President Clinton responded in kind at the 

January when he broke the U.S. public stereotype of I

a hostage-holding terrorist nation by calling Ira

important country with a rich and ancient cultural he

of which Iranians are justifiably proud” and asserte

the current differences between Iran and the United S

were not “insurmountable.”

77

The first tangible results of the new atmosphere be

the two countries came in February 1998 when a gr

American wrestlers were triumphantly received by Ir

wrestling fans during the Takhiti Cup tourname

Teheran.

78

 During the spring, the United States too

further actions to build up momentum for a rapproche

In May Clinton waived sanctions against the Fr

Russian, and Malaysian companies planning to de

Iran’s South Pars gas field,

79 and in June Secretary of 

Madeline Albright, in a speech to the Asia Society in 

York, after noting that the United States had implem

a more streamlined procedure for issuing visas to Iran

offered to “develop, with the Islamic Republic when 

ready, a road map leading to normal relations.” 80

During the summer and early fall, however, the r

normal relations developed a few potholes. Under pre

from the Republicans in the U.S. Congress, the U

States extended the mandate of Radio Free Europ

Radio Liberty to broadcast into Iran to “pro

democracy.”

81

 In addition, Iran’s testing of a medium 

missile, the Shahab 3, in July raised concerns in the U

States that Iran was making unexpectedly rapid pro

on its way to developing WMD, a concern shared by 

and its lobby in the United States. Despite these e

there was a great deal of expectation of a further th

U.S.-Iranian relations when Khatami and his Fo

Minister Kamal Kharazzi journeyed to New York f

opening of the fall session of the U.N. In his U.N. sp

404
to declare the year 2001 the “year of dialogue a

civilizations.” However, he took a sharply anti-Israel

stating that peace and security would come to the M

East only when all Palestinians had the right to “ex

sovereignty over their ancestral homeland,” and 

“Palestine is the homeland of Moslems, Christians

Jews, not the laboratory for the violent whims of Zio

The Iranian leader, nine of whose diplomats had been 

by the Taliban in Afghanistan and whose army 

maneuvered menacingly on the border of that country

called for a broad-based government in Afghan

representing all ethnic groups and communities.

82

 Th

day, Khatami also took a critical stance toward the U

States in a news conference in which he rejected the i

government-to-government talks between the United 

and Iran, although he did welcome what he termed a “c

in speech” by the United States. He complained, how

about a number of American actions, including the 

economic embargo against Iran and U.S. opposit

pipelines carrying Caspian Sea oil through Iran. H

protested the failure of the United States to retur

Iranian assets it had frozen, and for allocating mon

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for Persian-lan

broadcasts that would “hurt the government of Iran.” 

effort to diffuse criticism of Iran’s human rights po

however, Khatami seemed to lift the Iranian death 

against the author Salman Rushdie by stating, “We s

consider the Salman Rushdie issue as completely finish

The Iranian government has officially announced th

practice, it has made no decision to act on this matter

assertion which, while welcome in the West (Great B

immediately upgraded diplomatic relations with 

provoked a firestorm of criticism among Khatami’s har

opponents in Iran.

83

 The Iranian President also met 

group of Iranians living in the United States and Canad

asked them to invest in Iran as he set out to dev

dialogue with the Iranian exile community.

84

405
appeal for a road map to improve relations came in Fo

Minister Kharazzi’s speech to the Asia Socie

September 28, and it was filled with criticism of the U

States, emphasizing a number of the points already s

by Khatami in his news conference several days e

These included attacking the United States because 

imposition of sanctions against Iran, U.S. effo

“sabotage” Iran’s efforts to play a role in promoting reg

stability, the U.S. propaganda war against Iran beca

its Persian-language broadcasts on Radio Free Europ

America’s “retarding economic prosperity of Iran an

region” by its obstruction of the building of a pi

through Iran to ship oil and gas from Central Asia an

Caucasus.

85

 Iran also chose not to exploit the opport

for person-to-person diplomacy on the Afghan issue, an 

of common interest with the United States. The C

administration also opposed the Taliban and had 

bombed Osama Bin-Laden’s terrorist bases locat

Afghanistan. Nonetheless Kharazzi decided, reported

the orders of Khameini, not to participate 

U.N.-sponsored meeting on Afghanistan at which Secr

of State Madeline Albright was present.

86

In analyzing the hard-line positions of both Khatam

Kharazzi, it appears that the central factor affecting 

behavior was the strong conservative counterattack ag

Khatami in Iran during the summer. The mayor of Teh

Gholanhossen Karabaschi, an ally of Khatami

sentenced to 5 years in prison on alleged corruption ch

in July. Former Interior Minister Abdollah Nouri lo

post in June and in early September was phys

attacked, along with Ayatollah Mahajerani, an

Khatami ally who was the Minister of Culture and Is

Guidance, by thugs apparently sent by hard

conservative forces.

87

 Making matters worse, 

supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Khameini, launch

attack against the Iranian media which had been 

with considerably more freedom following Khat

406
abused their freedom, and that action would be 

against their “creeping excesses.” 88 Soon afterward

popular Iranian newspaper Tous was closed, a

managing director and two of its staff members were j

Then the weekly magazine New Way was also close

senior editors at the state-owned Islamic Republic 

agency were jailed, and two-thirds of the Ira

parliament (180 of 270) called for journalists who 

against “Islamic principles” to be tried for threat

national security.

89

 The situation got so bad that an Ir

judge was quoted as saying that the jailed journalists 

face the death penalty for “fighting God.”

90

It appeared that the Iranian conservatives were 

the war scare with Afghanistan to fight back ag

Khatami’s policies of domestic and foreign moderatio

by mid October, it was an open question as to whic

would emerge victorious. In any case, followin

Khatami visit to the United States, it appeared 

U.S.-Iranian relations had come to a crossroads. In 

countries there was opposition to moving ahead wit

rapprochement. In the United States, it was primari

Republicans in Congress, linked to anti-Iranian eleme

the Israeli lobby.

91

 They remain suspicious of Iran, ar

that Khatami can’t really control the radicals in Iran, e

he wanted to, and they openly wonder whether Kha

“charm offensive” is nothing more than a tactic to put 

enemies off guard, while Iran was acquiring W

Khameini’s strong criticism of the Wye Agreement ser

reinforce their opposition. On the Iranian side, Kha

conservative opponents, still smarting over his el

victory, have opposed not only his domestic reforms bu

his moderate foreign policy approach to the United S

With President Khatami now under onslaught from Ir

conservatives, it is not at all clear as to whethe

rapprochement can continue, unless the United Sta

forthcoming with a major concession such as the rele

frozen Iranian assets, permission for U.S. compan

407
opposition to foreign investment in Iranian oil pipe

Whether Clinton, despite his improved political po

following the Wye Agreement and the midterm electio

strong enough to take such steps is very much in dou

CONCLUSIONS

In assessing U.S. policy toward the Middle East 

first 2 years of the second term of President Clinton, se

conclusions can be drawn. First, the clear-cut 

direction evident in his first term of office has now 

into disarray. Second, while Clinton secured a num

Middle East policy successes during his first term

second term has been marked by some significant fai

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, Clinton’s effort to promo

peace process has run into serious problems as negoti

between Israel and the PLO virtually ended be

February 1997 and September 1998, and the li

progress he achieved in the fall of 1998 in the 

Agreement, which quickly ran into trouble, pales 

insignificance when compared to the issues that still n

be negotiated between Israelis and Palestinian

Clinton’s first term, Israelis and both Palestinian

Jordanians did most of the negotiating themselves, wi

United States essentially standing on the sidelines 

cheerleader. During the American leader’s second ter

lack of trust between Arafat and Netanyahu necessit

much more active role for the United States. Ye

American effort, at least at the top level (Presiden

Secretary of State) seemed disjointed. Newly appo

Secretary of State Madeline Albright did not even m

visit to the Middle East until 8 months into her term 

then only after a series of terrorist bombings. For his 

President Clinton, apparently exasperated by Netany

policies, publicly snubbed the Israeli leader durin

November 1997 visit to the United States and t

through Albright—gave an ultimatum to Netany

months later, only to prove unable to enforce it. Give

408
something regional leaders have come to expect, Cli

policy of apparent benign neglect followed by fr

activity raised serious questions about U.S. policy, an

freezing of the implementation of the Wye Agreeme

Netanyahu in December 1998, despite Clin

protestations, could only raise further doubts abou

policy capability.

If Clinton’s policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflic

had, at best, limited success, during the first 2 years 

second term, U.S. policy toward Iraq has been even 

problematic, and the degree of success the United S

achieved in its zero-sum game conflict with Iraq w

large part, due to Saddam Hussein’s mistakes. Durin

period, U.S. strategy evolved from supporting UNS

despite numerous infractions of U.N. resolutio

Saddam Hussein who sought in every way possi

impede the UNSCOM inspectors, to a policy of workin

Iraqi opposition groups under the Iraq Liberation A

overthrow Saddam, a policy that was stepped up foll

Clinton’s decision in December 1998 to belatedly bomb 

This action, while it was aimed both a weakening 

WMD capability and striking at the major suppo

Saddam’s regime like the Republican Guard, also le

Iraqis to prohibit the return of UNSCOM inspectors. 

effort to demonstrate to the Arab world that the U

States was only opposed to the regime of Saddam Hu

not to the Iraqi people, the United States also pioneer

“food for oil” agreement, although the impact on the 

street” of this measure did not seem signifi

Meanwhile, beginning in the summer of 1998

Republican-led Congress began to urge Clinton to tak

stronger measures against Iraq, although several of 

Republican hawks, like Senator Lott, did not choo

support Clinton when he finally attacked Iraq in Dec

1998—on the eve of the House impeacement 

Fortunately for Clinton, however, Saddam’s heavy-h

attempts to overthrow opposing Arab regimes led 

409
challenge the U.S. and British planes in the no-fly zo

northern and southern Iraq led to the further degrada

his military capacity. Finally, his main ally on the 

Security Council, Russia, was far too weak econom

and politically, let along militarily, to take action to p

him.

In the case of Iran, U.S. policy has had more of a m

result. The old policy of dual containment pursu

strongly during Clinton’s first term seems now to have 

jettisoned, with the United States now seeking to im

relations with Iran while keeping Iraq isolated. The U

States embarked on a policy of rapprochement with 

following the election of Mohamed Khatami as 

President in May 1997. Yet the policy of lim

rapprochement, replete with positive oratory and sym

actions by both sides, seems to have run its course, 

remains to be seen if U.S. and Iranian leaders, each of 

is beset by domestic opposition to the lim

rapprochement, can push the process much farther.

In looking to the reasons for the U.S. policy disarra

Clinton’s relative lack of success in his Middle East p

during his second term, several factors appear param

First is the Republican Congress which provided supp

hard-line Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanya

his efforts to slow the peace process and rebuff Cli

pressure, and which challenged Clinton’s policies on 

and Iran as well. While Clinton cannot personally be 

responsible for the election of Netanyahu which, along 

the Hamas terrorism that Arafat proved unwilli

unable to suppress, proved to be a major obstacle t

efforts to forge a Middle East peace, he can certainly b

responsible for the Monica Lewinsky affair which bre

new life into the Ken Starr special counsel investigat

his presidency and led to the beginning of an impeach

process. This process strengthened the role of Congr

U.S. foreign policy and enabled foreign leaders 

Netanyahu and Saddam Hussein to resist U.S. pre

410
coalition against Saddam Hussein in February 19

much of the world’s perception (whether true or 

besides the point) was that the crisis stemmed, not 

Saddam’s defiance of the U.N. inspectors, but from Cli

efforts to divert attention from the Monica Lewinsky 

Similar criticism was leveled against Clinton wh

finally decided to launch a major attack on Iraq in 

December 1998, just as the House of Representative

preparing to vote articles of impeachment against 

Indeed, one of the weaknesses of U.S. policy toward Ira

been Clinton’s unwillingness to use force when the po

situation favored it, and poor timing when he bela

chose to use significant force. There are tim

international crises when force must be used, and it 

clear that Clinton fully understands this.

Finally, the weakness of his presidency appears to 

how far Clinton can go in building on the oppor

provided by the election of a moderate to the preside

Iran. With the administration’s dual containment str

now a matter of history, the chance to build a 

relationship with Iran is the first genuine opportun

the United States to change direction on Iran in two de

and to improve the American position in the Persian G

a result. Yet the weakness of the Clinton administ

seems to preclude the steps needed to move the U.S.-Ir

rapprochement on to the next stage, although the dom

opposition faced by Khatami is certainly a major fac

well.

In sum, despite some small and perhaps tran

successes like the Wye Agreement, American policy to

the Middle East during the first 2 years of Pres

Clinton’s second term has been a highly problemati

Whether the United States can be more success

pursuing its policy goals in the region during the rema

of Clinton’s term is a very open question.

411
1. For an overview of U.S. policy toward the Middle East in C

first term, see Don Peretz, “U.S. Middle East Policy in the 199

Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Middle East and the Peace 

Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998, pp. 347-364.

2. Robert H. Pelletrau, American Objectives in the Midd

Occasional Paper Series No. 7, US-GCC Corporate Coop

Committee, Washington, DC, 1996, pp. 2-3.

3. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

4. The text of Netanyahu’s speech can be found in C

International Yearbook, New York: Collier-Newfeld, 1997, p. 1

5. David Coven, “Liberty U. to send 3,000 students on a study 

Israel,” Chronicle of Higher Education, September 25, 1995, p. 

6. For an analysis critical of U.S. strategy at this time, see 

Satloff, “Shifting Sands: The U.S.’s Disturbing New Israel Polic

Republic, June 1, 1998.

7. Cited in Donald Neff, “American Impatience Grows,” Midd

International, No. 579, July 17, 1998, pp. 10-11.

8. Ibid., p. 11.

9. Ibid.

10. Martin Sief, “Arafat Accepts Israeli Land Deal for West 

Washington Times, September 30, 1998.

11. Steven Erlanger, “U.S., Israel and Arafat Inch Towar

New York Times, September 29, 1998.

12. Vernon Loeb, “CIA Emerges to Resolve Middle East Dis

The Washington Post, September 30, 1998.

13. Deborah Sontag, “Patch of Desert Key to Mid East Tal

Step,” New York Times, September 9, 1998.

14. Lee Hockstader, The Washington Post, September 18, 

15. Eric Schmitt, “The CIA: New Role as Umpire May Brin

Risk,” New York Times, October 24, 1998. For an article s

412
Reform, Not New Missions,” Wall Street Journal, November 19

16. For a description of the Wye Agreement, see Barton G

“Netanyahu, Arafat Sign Accord,” The Washington Post, Octo

1998.

17. Nonetheless, despite strong opposition from the right 

the Israeli political spectrum, the Israeli cabinet approved t

Accord by a vote of 8 to 4, with 5 abstentions. The cabinet’s condit

so agreeing, however, which included a required Palestinian 

repeal the 26 offending articles of the Palestine National Cha

issue fudged at Wye) may presage future problems. S

Hockstader, “Israel Puts Pact in Doubt: Cabinet Votes Appro

Adds Conditions,” The Washington Post, November 12, 1998. T

Agreement supported by Labor, Meretz, and the Arab parti

passed overwhelmingly in the Israeli Knesset by a vote of 75 to 

9 abstentions. (See Nina Gilbert and Danna Harman, “K

approves Wye,” Jerusalem Post, November 18, 1998.)

18. See William A. Orme, Jr., “Paying for Mideast Plan, U.S

Tightrope,” New York Times, November 19, 1998; and Seth Gite

of Gingrich Leaves Netanyahu Bereft of Key Ally in Con

Forward, November 13, 1998.

19. Lee Hockstader, “Attacks Kill Arab; Injure 3 Israel

Washington Post, December 3, 1998.

20. Ann LeLordo, “Israel Issues Ultimatum, Halts Wes

Pull-out,” Baltimore Sun, December 3, 1998.

21. Philip Shenon, “U.S. and Other Nations Plan More 

Palestinians,” New York Times, December 1, 1998; and Marti

“Palestinians Get More U.S. Aid,” Washington Times, Decem

1998.

22. Hockstader, “Attacks Kill Arab, Injure 3 Israelis.”

23. Judy Dempsey, “Palestinians Turn the Tables on I

Arafat Poses as Clinton’s Friend as Netanyahu Sulks,”Financia

December 16, 1998.

24. Toni Marshall, “Clinton Goes from Cheers to Jeers 

Days,” Washington Times, December 18, 1998.

25. Stephen Fidler and Judy Dempsey, “U.S. Claims It H

Peace Process Back on Track,” Financial Times, December 16, 

413
December 23, 1998.

27. Philip Shenon, “Wary U.S. Broods on a Peace Process 

King Hussein, New York Times, January 31, 1998.

28. For a background on the dual containment policy, see Pe

353-355. For a recent debate on the continued utility of the po

The Middle East Institute Newsletter, Vol. 49, No. 5, Septembe

pp. 1, 6. For a highly negative view of dual containment, see 

Melham, “Dual Containment: The Demise of a Fallacy,” Wash

DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1997.

29. For an analysis of these events, see Phebe Marr, “Iraq A

Gulf War: The Fallen Idol,” The Middle East and the Peace Pro

232.

30. Russia’s motivations and policy are discussed in Ro

Freedman, “Russia’s Middle East Ambitions,” Middle East Qu

September 1998, pp. 31-40.

31. The ill-fated Town Hall meeting is described by Sam H

“Short Circuiting the Media/Policy Machine,” Middle East Resea

Information Project, No. 208, Fall 1998, p. 33.

32. R. K. Ramazani, “The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapproch

Towards an Integrated U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” Midd

Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 1998, p. 51.

33. Ibid., p. 52.

34. Stephen Zunes, “Confrontation with Iraq: A Bankru

Policy,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 1998, p. 100.

35. The text of Ritter’s resignation statement can be fo

Washington Times, August 28, 1998.

36. Barbara Crosette, “Chief U.N. Inspector Report

Interference by Iraq,” New York Times, September 4, 1998.

37. Robert S. Greenberger, “Security Council Suspends Iraq 

Pending an Agreement Over Inspection,” Wall Street J

September 10, 1998.

38. Barton Gillman, “Gingrich Opens Fire on White Hou

Policy,” The Washington Post, August 29, 1998.

414
Inspections,” New York Times, August 29, 1998.

40. Thomas Lippman, “Albright Defends Handling of Ira

Washington Post, September 10, 1998.

41. Philip Shenon, “Two Kurd groups unite against Baghdad 

brokered by U.S.,” New York Times, September 18, 1998.

42. Walter Pincus, “Bill Attempts to Shift U.S. Policy on Ira

Washington Post, October 1, 1998. See also Sean Scully, 

Strongly Backs Anti-Saddam Activities,” Washington Times, Oc

1998; and Philip Shenon, “House Votes $100 Million to Aid 

Baghdad,” New York Times, October 7, 1998. The bill passed th

of Representatives by a vote of 360-38.

43. Barbara Crosette, “U.N. Avoiding Talk of Force, Critici

on Arms Team,” New York Times, November 6, 1998.

44. Thomas Lippman and Bradley Graham, “Support f

Stance on Iraq Grows,” The Washington Post, November 13, 19

Howard Schneider, “Baghdad Stiffens as U.S. Air Armada Ass

Nearby,” The Washington Post, November 13, 1998.

45. Michael R. Gordon, “Food Crisis Forces Russia to Swa

Pride,” New York Times, November 7, 1998.

46. For an analysis of this decision, see Bradley Graham, 

House Advisers Split on Halting Attack,” The Washingto

November 16, 1998.

47. In his news conference, Clinton laid out five conditions 

to meet: First, Iraq must resolve all outstanding issues ra

UNSCOM and the IAEA; second, it must give inspectors un

access to inspect and monitor all sites they choose, with no rest

or qualifications, consistent with the memorandum of unders

Iraq itself signed with U.N. Secretary General Annan in Fe

third, it must turn over all relevant documents; fourth, it must ac

weapons of mass destruction related resolutions; and, fifth, it m

interfere with the independence or the professional expertise 

weapons inspectors. The Washington Post, November 16, 1998

48. Ibid.

49. Washington Post, December 17, 1998.

415
Says He Supports U.S. Strikes Against Iraq,” The Washingto

December 18, 1998.

51. Gerald Baker, “Cynical View from Clinton Oppo

Financial Times, December 17, 1998.

52. Barton Gellman, “U.S. Committed to Change in Ba

Berger Says,” The Washington Post, December 9, 1998.

53. Steven Fidler, “U.S. General Claims up to 1,600 Iraqi 

Killed,” Financial Times, January 9, 1999. See also Bradley G

“The Big Military Question: What’s Next?,” The Washingto

December 21, 1998.

54. Ibid.

55. Dana Priest, “U.S. Commander Unsure of How Long Ir

Need to Rebuild,” The Washington Post, December 22, 1998.

56. Thomas Lippman, “Two Options for U.S. Policy

Washington Post, December 24, 1998.

57. Rowan Scarborough, “Ground Troops Not Part of 

Washington Times, December 24, 1998.

58. David Buchan, “Europeans Rally to Allies’ Cause,” Fi

Times, December 19, 1998.

59. Barbara Crosette, “U.S. Is Urged to Ease Call to Inspect 

Arms,” New York Times, December 22, 1998.

60. Herbert Vedrine (the French Foreign Minister), “Way Ou

Impasse,” Financial Times, January 18, 1999.

61. Associated Press, “Clinton Eases Curbs on Sale of Spar

for Iraq’s Oil Industry,” Wall Street Journal, January 18, 1999

62. The information was leaked to The Washington Po

Barton Gellman, “Annan suspicious of UNSCOM Role

Washington Post, January 6, 1999. 

63. Michael Littlejohns, “U.N. Rejects Claims that Ira

Inspectors Spied for the U.S.,” Financial Times, January 7, 19

64. Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Presses Air Attacks on Ir

Low-Level War of Attrition,” New York Times, February 3, 199

416
They Walk Out of Meeting,” New York Times, January 25, 199

66. Douglas Jehl, “Iraq’s Angry Call for Revolt Splits Arab N

New York Times, January 6, 1999.

67. Reuters, “Baghdad Slams U.N. Plan to Review Relation

Washington Post, February 1, 1999.

68. Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Names New Representative fo

Anti-Saddam Groups,” The Washington Post, January 22, 1999

69. Vernon Loeb, “General Wary of Plan to Arm Groups i

The Washington Post, January 29, 1999.

70. Associated Press, “Clinton’s Plan to Oust Saddam Fault

Tells Senate Panel,” The Washington Post, January 29, 1999.

71. For a review of U.S. policy toward Iran in Clinton’s firs

see Shaul Bakhash, “Iran Since the Gulf War,” in The Middle E

the Peace Process, pp. 248-250. See also Kenneth Katzman, “

Dual Containment: Revisited,” Middle East Insight, Sept

October 1998, pp. 4-5.

72. Ramazani, p. 56.

73. Ibid., p. 55.

74. Ibid., p. 57.

75. For a study of Russian-Iranian relations, see Ro

Freedman, “Russia and Iran: A Tactical Alliance,” SAIS 

Summer-Fall 1997, pp. 93-109.

76. Ramazani, p. 58.

77. Ibid.

78. John Marks, “Wrestling Diplomacy,” Middle East 

September-October 1998, pp. 47-48. Marks is the president of 

for Common Ground,” an organization dedicated to bringing t

countries that are at odds with each other. The author of this ch

also a member of that organization.

79. Robert S. Greenberger, “U.S. Sees Limits to Ec

Sanctions,” Wall Street Journal, September 9, 1998.

417
September-October 1998, pp. 45-46.

81. See Thomas A. Dine, “Broadcasting to Iran,” Midd

Insight, September-October 1998, p. 51.

82. Elaine Sciolino, “Iranian President Paints a Picture o

and Moderation,” New York Times, September 22, 1998.

83. Elaine Sciolino, “Iranian Dismisses all hope now for a p

thaw,” New York Times, September 23, 1998. For an explanatio

role of the Persian language service of RFE/RL by its director

Fairbanks, see Gulf 2,000 List, November 18, 1998.

84. Howard Schneider, “Iranians Hope to End Rogue Statu

Washington Post, September 23, 1998; and “Khatami Urges Ira

Invest in Their Country,” Financial Times, September 21, 1998

85. Elaine Sciolino, “Top Iranian Official Rejects U.S. Overt

New Ties,” New York Times, September 29, 1998.

86. Betsy Pisik, “U.S. Iran Officials Meet on Afghanistan Pr

Washington Times, September 22, 1998; and author’s interview 

Iranian scholar, Washington, DC, October 16, 1998, who assert

Khameini did so to reassert his primacy in Iranian foreign polic

was doing in domestic policy.

87. Mark Huband, “Pressure on Iran Media Grows,” Fi

Times, September 24, 1998.

88. Douglas Jehl, “Iran Shuts Popular Newspaper that Que

Hard Line on Taliban and Arrests Top Editors,” New York 

September 18, 1998.

89. Howard Schneider, “Guessing Wrong What News Wa

Print,” The Washington Post, September 28, 1998; “Iran Su

Several Moderate Magazines,” The Washington Post, Septem

1998; and “Iranian Journalists Targeted by Parliamen

Washington Post, September 24, 1998.

90. “Iranian Judge Threatens Journalists,” The Washingto

September 22, 1998.

91. See James Morrison, “Embassy Row: Iran Still ‘O

Washington Times, September 16, 1998. See also “Next Steps wi

A debate with Patrick Clawson, Geoffrey Kemp, Edward Shir

Kenneth Timmerman,” Middle East Quarterly, June 1998, pp. 

418
EUROPE, THE MEDITERRANEAN

AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Rodolfo Ragionieri

Introduction.

The records of European policies with respect t

Mediterranean and the Middle East are mixed 

perplexing. On one side you have the attention perman

devoted to the region by all the Southern and most We

European countries. Moreover, more than one attemp

started in the past to develop a common Western Eur

approach to the relations with countries of the Souther

Eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, and partic

Arab countries, since the Euro-Arab dialogue of the 

up to the Barcelona process of the 1990s. Nevertheles

burden of past legacies, the pursuit of national policie

last but not least, the overwhelming presence of the U

States in the area have often (if not in most cases) wea

these efforts.

This is especially apparent as far as the hottest iss

the area, such as the Israeli-Palestinian peace proc

the ongoing conflict in Algeria, are concerned. For exa

in 1993 the late Alex Langer, in a question at the Eur

Parliament, openly stated what is a widespread 

concerning the European role in the peace process 

Middle East: “I have the impression that Norway has d

great deal more in real terms than the European Unio

I am rather sad about that.”

1

Does this impression correspond to reality? Th

certainly a part of truth: if you look at publications o

history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the role of Eur

states (with the exception of Norway) and of the Eur

419
the Israeli and Palestinian press, the interest giv

Europe is much less prominent than that granted 

United States.

Generally speaking, many questions can be put fo

and should be answered. First, are national policies of 

European countries totally at odds with each other, o

possible to observe in some respect an even unwil

emerging European consensus? Second, can we spe

some respect of a foreign policy of the European Union 

in the area (if we can speak about that at all) ? Third

are the possible obstructions to this policy?

In order to give an answer, first an overview of ge

European interests and perceptions of the area w

given. After that, an outline of different national polic

the area will be developed. Before coming to 

conclusion, the role of the EU in the peace process 

Middle East will be discussed.

2

General Perceptions: From Threat to Risk.

It is important to stress the importance of the whol

and of all of its problems and conflicts for European sec

It is not unusual to listen to people (especially Ame

scholars or officials) maintaining that , for Eu

Mediterranean policy is important only as a tool to pr

massive immigration. It is a curious view that the U

States (thousands of miles away from the Middle 

would be more involved in Middle Eastern security tha

EU and single European countries. It would be equiva

the statement that the United States is interested in 

American politics with the only purpose being to put 

control the immigration from the southern part o

Americas.

There are basically four reasons for European int

dependence on energy raw materials (and, gen

speaking, economic relations), geographic proxi

420
issue (this must be taken into consideration separately 

migration issues).

Economic relations. Energy supplies from Middle 

and North Africa (MENA) are more critical to Europe 

to the United States (obviously excluding Europe

producers, like the United Kingdom and Norway

example, in 1995 Western Europe imported 9.6 mill

barrels/day; of these, 5.5 million from countries of M

During the same year, the United States importe

million oil barrels/day; of these, 1.8 from the same re

Import and export between the EU and these cou

is moreover much more relevant than between the r

and the United States: European exports to deve

countries represent 18 percent of the total, against a 

percentage of 8.8 percent; imports are 15 percent , aga

percent.

Geographic proximity. First of all, any crisis in M

threatens Europe by means of horizontal escalation. E

is the natural geographic rear of any military operati

the area, as it was during the Gulf War. Thus, con

about proliferation of weapons of mass destructio

related to immediate security concerns and not o

wider fears regarding conflicts and stability i

international system.

Migrations. Large numbers of immigrants 

Mediterranean countries are hosted by most EU coun

Among them there are older immigration countrie

France and Germany, and more recently ones like Ita

Spain. Thus, migrations are a concern of domestic po

inner European policy, and foreign policies. The prese

Western Europe of millions of immigrants from the 

region—from Morocco to Iran—makes European con

about stability a very concrete issue. In case of crises 

region, an influx of refugees could increase the al

consistent flow, as, for example, the case of Kos

Kurdistan.

421
countries of substantial and often increasing M

minorities makes Islam both a domestic and foreign 

issue. This is related not only to immigration, because 

permanent Muslim communities are present in Franc

Germany.

3

It is quite clear that the perception of the situ

evolved from a picture of threat that characterized the 

War era, to a more subtle awareness of latent risks. T

nevertheless, enough to define very basic sec

perceptions and interests even in a very rough r

framework. Moreover, there are historical ties to Isra

Arab countries which cannot be described only in ter

“national interests as power.” These historical tie

heritages are obviously different for different countri

Europe: Unity and Diversity.

Almost any European country has its own sp

problems with respect to the Mediterranean. Spai

enclaves in Ceuta and Melilla. France has major mag

communities and its historical ties, especially to Al

Germany has the difficult problem concerning po

relations with Israel, without damaging the relations 

Muslim countries, and the relevant permanent Turkis

Kurdish communities.

While dealing with the tensions betwee

contradiction of a common European foreign and se

policy and national policies, one has to consider two 

complexes, which could be roughly defined as the “obje

and the “subjective” variables. The first set is form

what are sometimes called “geopolitical variables.

second set is composed by inherited traditions, percep

and, generally speaking, the foreign policy ident

countries. These factors make, for example, two count

comparable size in population and gross national pr

like Italy and France 4completely different i

self-representation of their international role, and th

422
conditions, the elites of different European countries 

been constructing their different Mediterranean poli

Even though foreign policies are often constructe

formulated in terms of national interests, perceptio

threat and the search for relative or absolute gain

shaped into foreign policies by so -called national trad

Inherited perceptions and prevalent ideas on na

identity and their relative places and roles in interna

society shape the action of political, diplomatic and m

personnel in each country.

5

In this outline the main features of policies of maj

countries are reviewed. Greece and Turkey are exclud

two reasons. First, because their respective policie

considered elsewhere. Second, because they are enta

in a conflict making them at the same time actors a

issue in European policies.

Italy. Italian policy with respect to the Mediterr

has been characterized by a permanence, i.e., the exis

of an Arab policy, since the 1950s. It would perhaps be 

precise to speak about a Mediterranean policy, or 

attention with respect to Arab countries and actors, be

many scholars argue that these policies have been 

contradictory and pursued by different actors in the I

political and economic arena.

6

These policies have not only been ideologica

Third-World-ist, as Italy’s critics claim, but have 

corresponded to a certain construction of Italian na

interests. They were defined in the 1950s by a part 

Christian Democrats, and by the national agency for e

(ENI, Ente nazionale idrocarburi, i.e., literally Na

Agency for Hydrocarbons), and its director , M

Moreover, during the 1970s and after, there w

substantial agreement between most of government p

and the leftist opposition (i.e., the Italian Communist P

with respect to Middle Eastern policy. At the beginn

that decade the Christian Democrat Aldo Moro, fo

423
promoters of the Euro-Arab dialogue .

7

It is remarkable that during the 1980s, a per

highest confrontation (at least in declaratory po

within the government and particularly betwee

Socialist Party and its leader , Bettino Craxi, an

Communist Party and its leaders, among them E

Berlinguer, there was substantial agreement o

relations with Arab countries and on the possible solu

of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

8

This was made stronger 

personal ties of Giulio Andreotti, Bettino Craxi, and E

Berlinguer with many Arab leaders, first among them 

Arafat. The orientation of the Italian foreign polic

made evident by the Sigonella affair (December 1985), 

a confrontation between Carabinieri and the Seal

place during the Achille Lauro hijacking.

A potential discontinuity in this policy was decla

Antonio Martino, the Foreign Minister of the center

Berlusconi government (May-December 1994). Just 

the formation of the cabinet, during a visit to the U

States, he declared that “the Berlusconi governmen

pursue the most pro-Israeli policy in the last twenty 

although without taking distances from the Pal

Liberation Organization (PLO)” and that in Middle Ea

affairs Italy would not be ideologically pro-A

Nevertheless, he had to make a considerable eff

convince the Israeli diplomacy of the democratic conve

of the post-fascist party Alleanza Nazionale (Na

Alliance). Moreover, he was the first European mi

visiting Gaza after the establishment of the Pales

National Authority.

10

This general attitude is reflected by the active r

Italian governments and nongovernment organiz

(NGOs) cooperating in the economic developme

Palestinian territories. Some Israeli perce

notwithstanding, Italian public opinion is not hostile 

Jewish state. According to a poll published by the jo

424
condition for the existence of a Palestinian state is pro

by its full acknowledgment of the state of Israel. O

other side, the majority (58.8 percent) of Italians ref

take a partisan position, declaring to prefer both Is

and Palestinians.

12Moreover, it should not be forgotte

the Italian delegation at the United Nations (U.N

instrumental in the cancellation of the (in)famous Zi

equals to racism resolution of the General Asse

According to the Italian columnist Arrigo Levi, thi

reflected the fact that in Italy the roots of anti-semitis

not deep, and that the connection between Israel an

Jews plays a positive role.

13

Just because of its ties to Middle Eastern cou

and/or personalities, sometimes Italy acted as a forer

to European and even Western policies, as happen

March 1997 when Italian Minister for Foreign A

Lamberto Dini went to Teheran few days after Rafsan

visit to ar-Riadh, during a phase of mutual open

foreign policies between Iran and western countries

year later, Italy was the first Western country to be v

by an Iranian president, Khatami, after the Is

revolution.

Another factor making a difference in Italian fo

political and economic relations has been Libya. I

companies of different dimensions have an intere

cooperation with Libya, and this country is a tradi

important supplier of oil for Italy. Economic interest

with a traditional propension to dialogue, confirme

example, in the last years by former Prime Mi

Romano Prodi.

14

France. France is the only European state which h

ambition to play openly the role of a global medium 

power. This is especially true as far as Arab, and gen

speaking Mediterranean, countries are concerned. 

Algeria’s independence, de Gaulle declared and purs

French Arab policy. After the years marked by the e

425
transformation from an Arab policy to a Mediterr

policy.

15

This is reflected in an interview the French fo

minister released to the French quarterly journal, Po

internationale, where he declared:

I think that the expression “Arab Policy” can give rise 

confusion. If the matter is on one side to have active relati

with “Arab countries” and, on the other, to take i

consideration the Arab dimension of global problems, then 

policy is pertinent for France. But if you mean that Fra

should have one Arab policy, global and undifferentiated, 

support all Arab points of view, the expression is neit

justified nor convenient.

16

In the Mediterranean area, this role is play

different theaters: the Maghreb, the Levant, the Ba

and the Gulf, if you take into consideration the enl

Mediterranean. In each of these theaters , France can 

both contemporary interests and a historical traditio

example, Algeria represents a special interest for F

and the special relationship has been characteriz

bilateral relations since the independence .

17 

unthinkable that any French president or govern

would give up a national policy with respect to Alger

the same time, French politicians cannot pursu

interventionist course in Algerian politics, since that 

be charged with “colonial attitudes.” Moreover, 

difficulties have been provoked by diverging, or s

different, views within the French leadership. A 

dividing issue was provided by the Sant’Egidio initi

when the external leadership of the Front Islamiq

Salut, (FIS, Islamic Front of Salvation) met with the 

of National Liberation, the Front of Socialist Force

other minor groups in Rome, at the Sant’Egidio comm

At that time there was a difference between Prime Mi

Balladour, very cautious with respect to any interfe

into Algerian affairs and support to the Sant’E

initiative, and Defence Minister Leotard, who o

supported a political arrangement between the Alg

426
difference surfaced later, in the socialist government: 

beginning of 1998, where Prime Minister Jospin expr

his opinion that the Algerian government bore 

responsibility for the violence occurring in the co

Foreign Minister Vedrine declared he had no doubt 

the official version. These differences do not conc

substantial support of the Algerian government, but t

not make it easier for the EU to articulate its own po

on this issue.

In the Gulf, French policy has (or had) been mark

good relations with Iraq. The former French de

minister Chévenement went so far as to decla

February 1990, that the development of the Hussein m

was a factor enhancing stability in the region of the 

This position has not been officially repudiated: Vé

remarked that there is a difference between Iraq 

1970s and the 1980s, and the same country in the 1

and that the change in French foreign policy was caus

the occupation of Kuwait in August 1990.

As far as the Israeli-Palestinian peace proce

concerned, it was apparent during Chirac’s visit 

Palestinian Territories in the Fall of 1996 that he w

his country to play a more visible role in the diplo

process in the Middle East. When Chirac took the fl

front of the Palestinian Legislative Council and 

Arafat, he spoke as though he were speaking t

representatives of a fully sovereign and demo

country.

18

In his speech he accepted most of the Pales

positions, and underlined the importance o

development of Palestinian institutions and of the cre

of a Palestinian state. These outspoken statements 

certainly not contradictory with the declaratory policy 

EU, but the decision to take such a clear stand w

contrast with the low profile adopted at that moment 

EU.

427
Spain has been conditioned by its interest in the Mag

both political and economic. Spanish-Moroccan rela

have been always shadowed by the question of the en

of Ceuta and Melilla, and by the objective concu

between Spanish and Moroccan agricultural pro

Nevertheless “Spain’s long-term interest di

necessarily coincide with the short-term interest o

producers. In short, one could not reduce Hispano-Mor

relations simply to a discussion about tomatoes.

”19

The importance for Spain of a Mediterranean poli

always been reflected, since Franco’s death and her a

into the EC, by Spanish activism to implement a Eur

framework for the Mediterranean.

Britain. British foreign policy has been oscillating 

last few years. The problem of the identity of British fo

policy in this area is as old as the decision to retreat e

Suez. This decision implied giving up a direct indepe

role in the Near East and the Gulf. Often in this 

influence was exerted by means or in cooperation 

American power, and sometimes by means of interna

organizations. However, conservative prime min

always appraised the preferential relationship 

Washington more valuable than any kind of indepe

initiative in the area or European cooperation. Th

changed, at least in declarations, with the Blair govern

and the appointment of Cook as foreign minister. T

particularly clear if you compare the reaction of J

Rifkin, foreign minister in the Major cabinet, to the v

Israel and the Palestinian Territories of the F

President Chirac, and the initiatives of Robin Cook 

spring of 1998. It is well-known that Rifkin eval

Chirac’s initiative during his visit as “romantic,” and 

that “it endangers the American role in the peace proce

In this connection it must be noted that he conside

Palestinian state as a viable option, and this cou

considered as an evolution in British foreign policy, 

was perhaps brought about by a kind of “European 

428
stance, especially with respect to the issue of settlem

and in particular the settlement of Jebel Abu Ghneim

Homa.

 21During his visit, he confirmed that his concer

Israeli settlement policy was shared by the EU mem

Robin Cook’s attitude was obviously a consequence 

European role he was performing, but also appa

reflected a break with respect to his predecessor R

positions.

Nevertheless, as far as the Gulf is concerned, B

governments have so far been very close to U.S. state

and actions. The question is whether this can be consi

contradictory with a British nouvelle vague aim

creating an increasing European integration in the a

security and foreign policy.

Germany. The German

22 approach to the Middle 

and to the relation with Arab countries has been determ

since the foundation of the republic by differen

sometimes conflicting factors.

23 On one side the his

guilt with respect to the Jewish people has 

German-Israeli relations distinctive. They were mark

the beginning by the question of reparations due to Isr

the representative of the Jewish people. This mad

traditionally good relations with Arab countries tens

Arab countries played a peripheral role in German fo

policy, even though they grew more important as e

raw materials suppliers.

Nevertheless, after the substantial failure of Ge

Middle East policy and the change in government 

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the 1960

Palestinian question played a more relevant role. Th

policy was defined as characterized by Ausgewog

(balance).

From this point of view, self-determination, whic

requested for the Germans, could not be denied 

Palestinians. The expression “right of the Pales

people for self-determination” was for the first 

429
U.N. (vote for a declaration). It is interesting tha

German position was charged with unilaterality—

1969 in favor of Israel, and in the 1970s and later in fa

the Palestinians.

Things did not change much with the end of the 

War, the Gulf War, and the beginning of the peace pro

Germany follows a two-track policy, German and Euro

Whereas there can be reasonable doubts abou

European character of the foreign policy of Bonn in 

areas, like the Balkans, it is undoubtable that in the M

East a fairly integrated approach is taken. In many res

there is both a domestic and a foreign policy focus, b

subregional and functional issues.

Another serious issue contributing to the determin

of German policies is the presence of relevant Turkis

Kurdish communities of immigrants in Germany

German government must always keep a delicat

sometimes precarious balance. This was clear durin

crisis triggered by the arrival of the Kurdish l

Abdallah Ocalan in Italy and his arrest. The Ge

government did not ask for extradition, even thoug

German magistracy had called for his arrest. The t

Ocalan in Germany would have implied a confron

between the Kurdish and Turkish communiti

Germany, with relevant consequences on domestic p

from the point of view of order and security, and fo

policy (German-Turkish relations). This combinat

domestic and foreign policy is the primary reason f

German approach to the issues of Islam, fundament

and a relevant permanent Muslim community in Germ

The EC and the Middle East.

At the beginning of this chapter it is important t

how European positions with respect to the conflict ev

until the Venice Declaration and its further specifica

The start of change can be located in the oil crisis aft

430
differentiation of European and American interests.

In a declaration released just after the war (Novem

1973), EC states agreed that a just peace had to tak

account the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, that 

not admissible that territories are taken by force, an

Israel should terminate the military occupation o

territories taken during the Six-Day War. Togethe

these statements, EC states always stressed the neces

a global approach to peace in the Middle East

consequently they expressed doubts with respect t

Camp David process. Nevertheless, EC states did not i

to transform the differences between themselves an

United States into a full-fledged transatlantic crisis.

The ensuing Euro-Arab dialogue substantially f

mainly because Europe was basically interested 

supplies, and Arab countries in a dramatic change 

European attitude with respect to the Palestinian pro

More precisely, one of the main obstacles wa

acknowledgement of the PLO.

The process of evolution of European positions a

differentiation of European and American interest

views led in the following decade to the Venice decla

that was issued by the European Council after a 

conference in Venice on June 13, 1980:

The time has come to promote the recognition a

implementation of the two principles universally accepted 

the international community: the right to existence and 

security of all the states in the region, including Israel, a

justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of 

legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

A just solution must finally be found to the Palestin

problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestin

people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be plac

in a condition, by an appropriate process defined in t

framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exerc

fully its right to self-determination. These principles apply 

431
the PLO, which have to be associated with the negotiations

Other points which would mark the European at

in the following years were the call for the end 

occupation of Palestinian territories, and a firm s

against unilateral initiatives in Jerusalem and settle

policy. The position of the EC and of the European Po

Cooperation did not change in the years followin

Venice declaration, and was possibly strengthened aft

failures of the Israeli attempts to create a leade

alternative to the PLO and the beginning of the intif

In Madrid, Hans van der Broek, Minister of Fo

Affairs of the Netherlands and acting President 

Council of Ministers, confirmed the Community’s vie

the peace process in the Middle East:

. . . The Twelve consider it of the utmost importance that 

parties have committed themselves to the road map of 

conference: direct negotiations on the basis of resolutions 

and 338 . . . The political negotiations are to be underpinne

multilateral negotiations on regional cooperation in field

mutual interests. We look forward and expect to be work

closely with all the parties to ensure progress along these line

. The Twelve’s guiding principles throughout the negotia

process are those which have since long governed our posit

They remain unchanged. These principles are Security Cou

resolution 242 and 338, the principle of land for peace, the r

of all states in the region, including Israel, to live within sec

and recognized boundaries and the proper expression of 

right to self-determination of the Palestinian people.

In van der Broek’s speech you can find a functio

and rationalist attitude that was partially successful 

process of European integration, and the illusion t

process modelled on the Conference for Security 

Cooperation in Europe could be started in Madrid. As w

below, the same functionalist attitude characterize

approach to multilateral talks. Unfortunately, 

illusions have been so far doomed because of the 

difficulties in the Palestinian and in the Syrian track

432
After the peace conference was convened in Mad

the end of October 1991, two processes started: the 

known bilateral talks, and the multilateral track .

2

well-known, bilateral talks brought about peace be

Israel and Jordan, whereas the present course o

Israeli-Palestinian process took other paths afte

success of the left-wing coalition in the Israeli elect

May 1992 and secret contacts between PLO and Isr

Scandinavia just before the elections.

The multilateral track was structured into five wo

groups, respectively on arms control and regional sec

water, environment, refugees, and economic develop

Other multilateral processes developed in the area, li

Middle East and North Africa economic summits, and 

1995 the Barcelona process. It makes sense to ask wh

this multitude of multilateral processes has bee

advantage or a hindrance.

The idea of the multilateral track is grounded 

functionalist conception of international cooperation

is, presumed to start from “technical” issue areas

cooperation in those issue areas would induce the sta

put aside or to solve their “high politics” problems

dynamics and explication and denomination o

processes of cooperation is variable according to the va

schools of thought of functionalism and neo-function

However, the expectation is that the advantag

cooperation and the mutual learning and understand

“lower politics” or technical issue areas would crea

climate for agreements in security.

The multilateral talks had basically two aims. Th

was obviously to try to start cooperation in sensitive, 

some cases “technical ,” areas such as water resources 

extend it to more sensitive and “political” ones. Thi

objective reflected the above quoted “function

mentality. The other aim was drawing the interna

433
consolation prize, but excluding the EU from the 

relevant—both from the political and mediatic po

view—bilateral talks, chausse gardé of the United St

The EU had to run the Regional Economic Develop

(RED) Group. Meetings of this group took place in Br

in May 1992, in Paris in October 1992, in Rome in May 

in Copenhagen in October 1993, and in Rabat and in B

January 1994. After the Declaration of Principles 

Copenhagen round, every part agreed on the necess

intensify the work of the RED Group to ensure it wou

be marginalized. The EU tried to encourage the va

delegations about long-term economic relations and 

possible institutional mechanisms, processes

frameworks to support the efforts towards reg

cooperation. After Rabat, a monitoring committee 

established, and after that a secretariat, which had 

based in Amman. After the 1996 Israeli election

multilateral track (and the RED Group) virtually c

their activities, and it is difficult to point out any 

important issue where an achievement can be foun

that was linked to progress in bilateral talks.

In the diplomatic process following the M

conference, functionalist dynamics have not been a

work (even approximately) because security problems 

so far been of the existential type (or are perceived to 

for all actors, and especially for those at the core 

problem, i.e., Israelis and Palestinians.

The European Role after the Establishment

of the National Palestinian Authority.

After the establishment of the Palestinian Na

Authority (PNA) the activity of the EU and of EU state

marked by economic aid and (sometimes un-)diplo

missions. If you look at the political and diplomatic ac

in this period of time (at least until the appointm

Moratinos in October 1996), there is not much new: 

434
confirming the usual position of the EU. Some of them

those concerning settlement policy and Jerusalem, we

particularly agreeable for Israeli governments. How

condemnation of terrorist acts has always 

uncompromising, Arafat was often requested to 

terrorism more effectively, and calls for the end 

boycott to Israel were a must in most Euro

declarations.

European economic role, on the contrary, has been 

relevant: 45 percent of the aid to the Palestinian Terri

comes from the EU as such (not from member coun

For example, in the years 1990-91, 60 millions of Ecu (

were supplied by the EU as development aid. In the 

1991, 43 percent of the total aid to the United Nations 

and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA ) 

Middle East was provided by the EU. In 199

Palestinian universities and five administration s re

75 mecu. For the years 1994-98, 500 mecu were delibe

in 1993, and that sum was later increased. In April 19

Council decided to support the establishment o

Palestinian police with a sum of 10 mecu, though 

decision was characterized by formal problems i

decisionmaking process between Council, Commissio

the Parliament. After the Taba/Washington agreeme

European role in Palestinian elections was abso

essential, with financial (14 mecu) and political su

given by the presence of 300 observers, 30 of whom 

members of the European Parliament.

The economic support of the EU can be considered 

effect and a cause—at the same time—of the Eur

concern for the peace process. On one side there is a 

agreement that economic development in the Pales

territories is an important factor of stabilization. O

other side, any stalemate in the process puts Pales

economy under stress for closures of the Palestinian 

or any kind of constraint, and this makes Eur

continuing aid (and financial burden) necessary.

435
government) there were bilateral agreements signed 

EU and Israel, such as the agreement of November 11, 

for a political dialogue on a regular basis, eco

cooperation and the establishment of a free trade 

(according to the Barcelona spirit), and agreeme

telecommunications.

This economic role notwithstanding, the EU has 

far been able to develop an adequate political role 

process. The reasons for this diminished role are man

They can be traced back to three main factors: the at

decided in Barcelona with respect to existing framew

the U.S. purpose to maintain leadership in the proces

the Israeli and (to a lesser extent) Arab perceptions 

European role.

As is well-known, the European approach to ex

frameworks for conflict resolution has been not to int

with already existing diplomatic processes. This has c

the noninterference with the Oslo process, which star

a sense even before Labor success in 1992 elections .

European attitude was reinforced by the American w

to share the leadership in areas perceived as abso

vital to U.S. interests. Moreover, U.S. administrations 

often perceived European perspectives as different in 

respects, particularly as far as the attitude towards a

terrorist organizations or pariah states is concerne

example, many European governments and the EC 

relations with the PLO, even when the United S

considered it officially as a terrorist organization, an

differences with respect to Iran or Libya are well-kno

The problem of Israeli perception is not related o

the Venice declaration and “Arab policies” of 

European countries and the EU.

27

The historical col

memory of the Jewish people represents Europe a

continent of anti-semitism, pogroms, and the S

Moreover, European reactions to the intifada 

perceived by Israelis (and sometimes were real

436
words such as genocide and extermination tended to e

Israeli behavior with respect to Palestinians with the 

treatment of Jews. The Israeli public opinion, on the 

side, tended to generalize European exaggerations and 

taste” (to make use of understatement), and 

attributed to Europeans the will to “normalize” the 

and so get rid of any guilt feeling.

These perceptions have been made stronger 

behavior which is perceived as a double standard, i.e

fact that heavier human rights violations in Arab cou

(and later, sometimes, in the Palestinian territories) 

not been criticized with the same eagerness ma

criticisms against Israel. Obviously these perceptions 

make it easier for the Israelis to overcome the though

all this is a modern variety of the old—even thou

different types—European anti-semitism.

As is the case for the behavior of the B

administration during the mandate, Arab and Pales

perceptions are in a sense the mirror image of Israeli o

First, often, especially in the public opinion, th

little—yet increasing—awareness of differences be

European countries and the United States, and comp

are made against “the West” as a whole. Moreover

those making a difference object to Europeans that th

no coherence between statements and actions, 

declarations would imply a tougher stance, and po

economic sanctions against Israel, which has always 

rejected by European states and the EU. In this respe

Arabs charge Western countries with a double stan

because, for example, Iraq is much more heavily pun

than Israel for not complying with U.N. Security C

resolutions.

A frequent criticism is the lack of a real com

European foreign policy. This criticism is stronger 

divergent attitudes emerge, as in the case o

Chirac-Rifkind controversy.

437
difficulties in the implementation of a European rol

Council appointed Miguel Angel Moratinos as a “s

envoy” to the Middle East on October 28, 1996. His ma

is to have contacts with all the interested parties

countries of the region, the United States, an

international organizations—observe the evolution 

contribute to the implementation of the agreements.

The reactions to Moratinos’ appointment were di

The Americans did not fully agree. The U.S. special 

disagreed, stating in a quintessential diplomatic styl

I think that it is important when you are in a delicate stage 

negotiating process for all those who want to be helpful to 

the best ways to be supportive. Right now, I think that 

generally agreed, not only by the party, but by others, that 

effort that we are making is the one they support.

29

On the Palestinian side, PLO representative in Br

Leyla Shaheed declared: 

The U.S. and Europe have different opinions about how 

develop and support the peace process. The European posi

concerning the Palestinian issue and other matters in 

region is far more advanced than that of America . . . There 

European countries which . . . call clearly for a Palestinian s

. . . Israel prefers to deal with the Arabs through the Americ

and therefore, does not want a European role, because 

European position toward peace is similar to the Arab 

Palestinian one.

30

The record of Moratinos’ activity is generally po

but it has been marked by low profile. Even his inter

often reflect this; for example, a recent interview 

Palestinian weekly is a masterpiece of diplomati

profile. This does not mean that his activity has been j

as insignificant. On the contrary, his mediation has in 

situations contributed to keep channels of communic

alive. Israeli attitudes, which were at the begi

cautious, became later more favorable.

438
For example, in March 1999 the usual question conce

Jerusalem was raised again by a note of the Israeli fo

minister Ariel Sharon concerning the Orient House in 

Jerusalem, expressing the Israeli view that Eur

representatives cannot visit it because PNA institutio

not allowed in Jerusalem. The European pos

confirmed in the occasion by the German ambassad

that the Orient House is a PLO, and not a PNA, instit

and that East Jerusalem is by no means a part of I

This only makes clear that even sharp differences ha

so far been overcome.

Final Considerations.

At the conclusion of the chapter I must giv

answer—at least tentative—to the questions posed 

beginning. First, there is not much difference with r

to perceived threats to security and objectives of foreig

security policy. A difference can be made for the Gu

this has more to do with transatlantic relations than 

real perceptions of threat. Second, a consensus is eme

at least with respect to some important issues, such 

Middle East peace process. As far as problems like Al

the divisions between different school s of thought seem 

rather transnational than national in character.

The obstructions are provided more by natio

located bureaucratic interests than by clear and 

founded national interests: diplomacies do not wa

share their decisionmaking processes, military pers

do not want to be reduced or submitted to different cha

command, and so on. Moreover, the coordination of dif

national traditions is not easy, especially when some 

want always to stand in the first rows.

Whereas, as written above, a consensus is emerg

the area of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process 

generally speaking, of Israeli-Arab relations, thing

more difficult with respect to the Gulf and Algeria.

439
not shared by all Europeans. Differences within th

became apparent during the Anglo-American attack 

in December 1998, when Blair was almost totally is

from the Continent (with the exception of the Sp

leader, Aznar). In this case the problem is related to 

main factors. First, Britain’s attempt to maintain bo

traditional relation with the United States and its ef

foster a more coordinated European foreign policy

double track is probably perceived by Blair and his fo

minister Cook as not contradictory. Maybe it is not 

short run, at least formally, but it cannot be sustained 

long run. Second, the fact that the Gulf is outsid

geographical scope of any common enterprise of the EU

in the Middle East, but outside the range of Barc

Third, the most important factor is probably the stagn

of CFSP, which will be the subject of the concl

remarks.

As far as Algeria is concerned, the difficulties F

governments have so far met in dealing with this confl

magnified in the European case.

31 Obviously all EU 

are torn between the possible charge of neo-colon

interference on one side, and, on the other, the hu

tarian horror of slaughters, and the more politica

security related concern for the possible spread of u

and terrorism to Europe. Troikas and delegations 

Parliament carried out missions in Algeria, and me

President and members of the government and o

Parliament. Nevertheless all the institutional instan

the EU have so far refrained from any role of med

between the parties. This is the picture emergin

example, from the meeting of the EU foreign minist

Luxembourg in November 1997,32or from the visit 

delegation of the European Parliament to Algeria (Feb

8-12, 1998).

33

In this context, it is not possible even to outlin

possible causes of what has been called “Europaralis

the stagnating process of a CFSP. 34Certainly one pr

440
summit with its worst nightmare, i.e., the war in f

Yugoslavia. However, the lack of unity with respect 

Gulf and the pretense of national bureaucraci

individual personalities to play their own role, or to go 

own way in single issues or conflicts, are all element

make European policies less credible. Moreover

perspective reduction of the Barcelona proce

agreements for economic openings does not genera

momentum necessary for a strengthened role i

Mediterranean and the Middle East.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 16

1. Question 693/93 by Alex Langer, et al., at the Eu

Parliament.

2. The Barcelona process is only referred to in this paper, 

discussed in Roberto Aliboni’s contribution to this publication.

3. This could or should be an increasing factor even in U.S. d

policy, but the impact of the Muslim community in the United S

still negligible with respect to its size.

4. In 1993 France had a GNP of U.S.$1,289,054,000 (U.S.

per capita), whereas Italy had a GNP of U.S.$1,134,800,0

(U.S.$19,620 per capita).

5. See Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interest,” Eu

Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3, Autumn 1996, p

6. See Antonio Varsori, L’Italia nelle relazioni internazion

1943 al 1992 (Italy in International Relations from 1943 to 1992)

Laterza, 1998.

7. See Piero Craveri, La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992 (The R

from 1958 to 1992), Torino: UTET, 1995.

8. A difference was made by some erratic references, on the s

side, to a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation.

9. See Ennio Caretto, “Martino: saremo piu filo-isra

(“Martino: we shall be more pro-Israeli”) Il Corriere della sera, 

No. 5., 1994, p. 7.

441
p. 7.

11. See “Le sabbie mobili e la regina di Saba” (“Mobile Sands 

Queen of Sheba”), Limes, Vol. 4, No. 1.

12. 5.2 percent preferred the Israelis, 8.9 percent the Pales

14.6 none of them.

13. See Arrigo Levi, “Il tricolore in Terra Santa?” (“The Tri-

the Holy Land?”), Il corriere della sera, March 4, 1997, p. 8

opinions concerning Jewish-Italian and Israeli-Italian relations 

shared by all observers, especially in the Italian Jewish commu

14. See Franco Venturini, “Sì al dialogo con Irak e Libia” 

Dialogue with Iraq and Libya”), Il corriere della sera, July 17, 

13.

15. See Hayète Chérigui, La politique méditerranéenne de la 

entre diplomatie collective et leadership, L’Harmattan, Paris 1

13-15.

16. “De l’utilité de la France” (“On the Utility of France,” in

with Hubert Védrine, French Minister for Foreign Affairs), P

internationale, No. 78, Winter 1997-98, p. 44.

17. See Ulla Holm, “Algeria: France’s Untenable Engag

Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 1998, p. 104; Pau

de La Gorce, “La France et le Maghreb” (“France and the Mag

Politique Étrangère, Vol. 60, No. 4, Winter 1995/96, p. 927.

18. See “Voyage au Proche-Orient—Discours prononcé 

président de la République, devant le Conseil législatif pale

(“Journey to the Near East, Speech given by the President 

Republic in front of the Palestinian Legislative Council”), La p

Étrangere de la France, 1996, p. 245-247.

19. Richard Gillespie, “Spanish Protagonismo and the Eu

Partnership Initiative,” in Richard Gillespie, ed., The 

Mediterranean Partnership. Political and Economoic Pers

London: Frank Cass, 1997, p. 42.

20. See Mohammed Shaker Ahmed, “Chirac the Romant

Jerusalem Times, Vol. 3, No. 143, November 1, 1996, p. 5.; Vo

215, March 20, 1998, p. 1.

442
policy,”The Jerusalem Times, Vol. 5, No. 215, March 20, 1998, 

22. I deal here only with the FRG, even though triangular r

between FRG, GDR, and third countries played a role, especially 

the Adenauer and Erhardt era, i.e., the 1950s and the 1960s.

23. See Friedemann Büttner and Peter Hünseler, “Die pol

Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands u

Arabischen Staaten,” in Karl Kaiser and Udo Steinbach

Deutsch-Arabische Beziehungen, München: Oldenbourg, 19

111-152.

24. See Udo Steinbach, “Interesse und Handlungsmöglich

Deutschland in Nahen und Mittleren Osten,” in Karl Kaiser, Ha

Maull, and Joachim Krause, eds., Deutschlands neue Aussenpol

3 Interessen und Strategien, München: Oldenbourg, 1996, pp. 18

25. On the multilateral track, see Joel Peters, “The Ba

Process and Arab-Israeli Multilatral Talks: Competit

Convergence?," conference paper, Workshop of the Berte

Foundation, “The Political Role of the EU in the Middle 

Frankfurt, October 26-28, 1997.

26. See Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Through Secret Ch

Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1995.

27. See Shlomo Ben Ami, “Europa y el conflicto de oriente P

(“Europe and the Middle East Conflict”), Política Exterior, Vol. 

12, November/December 1998, pp. 97-111; Joseph Alpher, “The P

Role of the EU in the Middle East: Israeli Aspirations," con

paper, Workshop of the Bertelsmann Foundation, “The Political 

the EU in the Middle East," Frankfurt, October 26-28, 1997.

28. See, for example, Abdel Monem Said Aly, “The Political 

the EU in the Middle East: An Arab Perspective," conference 

Workshop of the Bertelsmann Foundation, “The Political Role of 

in the Middle East," Frankfurt, October 26-28, 1997.

29. See The Jerusalem Times, Vol. 3, No. 142, October 25, 1

30. Ibid.

31. See for example, Claire Spencer, “Algeria: France’s Disar

Europe’s Conundrum," in Barbara A. Robertson, ed., The Midd

and Europe. The Power Deficit, London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 1

443
l’Algeria’” (“Europe Looks For a Way to Help Algeria”), Il corrie

sera, October 26, 1997.

33. See DOC\CR\346\346221, PE 226.130, March 3, 1998

34. A whole literature on the subject is flourishing. See, for ex

Jan Zielonka, Europaralisis, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998.

444
THE SPIRIT OF ETERNAL NEGATION

RUSSIA’S HOUR IN THE MIDDLE EAS

Stephen J. Blank

After the Cold War many believed that the United S

could act more unilaterally and more deeply in the M

East to resolve existing conflicts without running the 

risks stemming from superpower competition. 1 Toda

hope is in danger of frustration. One reason is that su

great power competition has returned to the area. 

1994, Russia has shown increasing determination to r

something like its traditional regional role. Certain

Middle East’s inherent proclivities for conflict 

facilitated Russia’s return to the area and frustrated 

policy. But Russia’s overall international situation 

perception of it, as well as the structure of Russian dom

politics, present even more compelling motives for Mos

revived policy. Russian Middle East policy results fro

intersection of global, regional, and domestic force

interaction that must be analyzed to make sen

Moscow’s policies.

Historically the non-European region most penet

by foreign intervention, the Middle East’s int

cleavages still lead foreign governments into rep

involvement in its affairs and rivalries, for two 

reasons. First, this foreign intervention certifie

interveners’ international role, status, and power. 

certification is as much a weapon in those governm

domestic policies as it is in their foreign polic

enhancing their foreign standing, governments o

greater leverage with which to maneuver amid sh

domestic coalitions as well as abroad. Often those coal

add a strong foreign policy component to their 

domestic orientation.

2

445
gained by being seen as a credible regional play

overturn the local and “global” status quos and r

thereby a government’s local, regional, and global str

interests. The Middle East remains an area where a 

aspiring to a higher status because it is blocked elsew

can act with reasonable impunity to upset the statu

when a crisis emerges and force its way into the coun

the mighty. The Middle East now enjoys the ro

Balkans played in world politics before 1914 and re

the true seat of today’s “Eastern Question” in interna

politics.

But today’s Middle East is not that of the Cold 

Many analysts now accept that the linkages betwee

former Soviet republics of the Transcaucasus and C

Asia with the classical Middle East are reshapin

Middle East’s definition. Today, Middle Eastern pl

notably Israel, Turkey, and Iran, act resolutely throu

Central Asia and Transcaucasia, thereby erasin

former dividing lines between them.

3

Consequently, Russia’s Middle Eastern policy em

out of numerous opportunities and dangers, if not th

emanating from the region, from world politics in ge

and from domestic sources. Even as Russia’s regional 

and its new diplomatic offensives realize these two pur

of foreign intervention, they are also responses t

combination of threat and opportunity. Undoub

Moscow will continue to seek to enlarge its role in the 

especially under the new government led by Ye

Primakov. Earlier, as Foreign Minister, Primakov pul

notable diplomatic victories with regard to Iraq, main

to U.S. incompetence and ineptitude rather than Ru

power. The U.S. fiasco in the crises over U.N. inspecti

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilit

prevent their reappearance in 1997-98 seem

highlighted Moscow’s role as a potential equal or aspir

that role vis-à-vis Washington in the Middle East. 

result, the sanctions regime will come under con

446
U.S. intelligence maintains that Iraq could rest

credible WMD and missile capability in the region w

1-3 years after that.

4

 While Russia surely won 

temporary victories in 1997-98, the lasting stra

benefits are harder to discern.

The Forces Behind Russian Policy.

Moscow’s regional policies constitute part of a br

quest to enlarge its domestic room for maneuve

international status. Primakov has often proclaimed 

Russia must have a global role and policy. As Pre

Boris Yeltsin’s 1996 action policy stated, Russia s

conduct a global, i.e., “multivector,” foreign policy, le

to a situation where its word would be decisive in 

affairs, and no major decision in international affairs 

be reached without Russia. Primakov even asserts 

Russia’s return to global prominence is “as a natural 

in the multipolar world.” 5 In pursuit of these obje

Russia has intervened diplomatically and shipped mi

systems in Cyprus, in the Arab-Israeli peace process, 

sanctions regime against Iraq, and in support of 

political ambitions. It has asserted itself regionall

globally to force Washington and skeptical 

governments, e.g., Israel, to take it seriously as an eq

the United States. In the Gulf it also seeks to fractu

U.S.-built alliance system and leverage the congr

between its and France’s Middle Eastern policies to 

the European and global chessboard. As Le N

Observateur reported, one of French President Ja

Chirac’s confidants stated that if France wants to pl

international role, it benefits from the existence of a s

Russia which helps it reaffirm itself as a major powe

from any complex and ready to play the card of stab

Translated into clear English (or French in the origina

means that:

447
friendships and offer Arab and Israeli leaders a chance to tal

someone else than Washington. France can only do this 

acting as the EU’s political driving force, and Russia has b

helping it to gain this status. As for Russia, it can only achi

this goal by making sure it does not appear to be schem

against Western interests, a risk it can avoid thro

consultation with France.

6

The implicit, and sometimes explicit, threat is a

that Moscow might then exploit its formidable capab

for disrupting the Middle Eastern and even Eur

status quo to make life uncomfortable for its op

numbers. 

Moscow must invoke the specter of its trouble-m

capabilities and even on occasion actually deploy 

because it operates in a highly unfavorable climate 

Middle East and more generally on the world stage

most profound, overarching, and inescapable threa

one that grips Moscow on a daily basis, is that Russia 

for some time has been a failing state. As of August 

one may even say it became a failed state. This failure 

include the total breakdown of the center’s ability to 

taxes, disburse funds, enforce laws, govern the ou

provinces, and maintain a monopoly on the legitimate 

force throughout the state.

7

 By whatever standard o

failure one measures, Russia is uncomfortably clos

perfect correspondence with those standards. 8 The s

of state disintegration due to those factors cons

weighs upon the calculations of Russia’s policymaker

political community.

9

 Thus while we in the United 

might argue that the post-Soviet picture was the 

benign threat environment in recorded Russian hi

prominent Russian analysts concluded by 1993 that th

abounded everywhere and the situation was ste

worsening.

10

 Hence the security issue or dilemma 

drives policy towards the new Middle East is now as 

inside Russia’s borders as it is an external threat.

448
risks that shape its policy. The primary foreign threa

Yeltsin and Primakov, not to mention others, invok

Russia’s integrity.

11

 One reason why Russia’s integrit

risk is because Russia’s deimperialization and dem

tization remain incomplete. Prominent politician

argue that the former Soviet republics will return to 

form of complete integration with Moscow on Mo

terms.

12

 Therefore Moscow still cannot fully accept 

the new borders of the Commonwealth of Indepe

States (CIS) or of the Baltic states, as well as the notio

the “successor states” have or should have the 

sovereignty as other states. A Brezhnev doctrine fo

former Soviet Union still haunts the Kremlin’s imagin

One major reason for continuing to pursue the g

integration—the priority in foreign policy—is precis

prevent any further internal separatism within Ru

This is a classic attribute of an imperial policy to 

attention from internal weakness. Yet it takes place w

Russia’s military and economic policy instrument

relatively useless.

Therefore, Russian policy or strategy toward

Middle East is essentially negative. It is haunted b

prospect of any foreign power getting a lasting fo

there, and from there into the CIS. Like Goe

Mephistopheles, it incarnates the spirit of eternal neg

Russia until now has been able occasionally to obstr

frustrate foreign policies of other governments, but 

failed spectacularly to create anything of a positive la

nature abroad. For Moscow, the CIS and the adj

Middle East cannot be allowed to come under fo

influence. We can characterize the Kremlin’s pol

strategic denial across the board, in economics, diplo

and military policy. Moscow discerns threats of va

intensity, but always of substance from any consol

Western presence in the CIS or in the Middle East 

would open the way to that presence in the CIS. S

Arutinov, a renowned ethnologist in Moscow argues 

449
world-wide point of view. But generally it would wor

Russian-Turkish and Russian-Israeli relations. It may a

provoke the reemerging of anti-Semitism in Russia. It 

evoke much anxiety in Armenia too. First, a mutu

acceptable solution about Karabakh must be found and o

then a Turkish-Israeli cooperation may start to be realize

the Near East and the former USSR states. Otherwise, it m

trigger Russian-Iraqi, Russian Iranian, Armenian-Iran

rapprochements, push Armenian extremists in the world 

cooperation with Palestinian extremists.

14

Moscow often employed a similar argument a

NATO enlargement. However, the assertion tha

foreign advance will undo Russia’s friendship toward

identification with the West only reflects how shallow 

friendship and identification are. Likewise, in the M

East, Moscow’s policy presents a similar negativity

example, Primakov has repeatedly complained 

Russia being marginalized in the peace process be

Israel and the Arabs. Instead, he argues that the 

monopoly should give way to greater participati

Russia and the European Union (EU). Yet, at the same 

Moscow makes wholly unrealistic demands that the 

process be a comprehensive and simultaneous affair

peace being made with all the remaining belligere

once and is busy arming all of Israel’s enemies, Iran, 

and even covertly Iraq. Naturally, Israel rejects Ru

participation on this basis. Meanwhile Primakov w

far as to boast, when the peace process appeared to be 

that he was content not to share the U.S. failure.

1

attitude of simultaneous complaint, yet refus

participate constructively and offer useful ideas, ty

Moscow’s overall policy. 

This program of strategic denial becomes partic

clear when Moscow confronts not just Israel’s or Tu

presence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, bu

Washington’s and NATO’s appearance there. The pre

of huge deposits of oil and gas in Kazakstan, Turkmen

and Azerbaijan has lured American and Western inve

450
Central Asia in such a way as to make these 

increasing hotbeds of competition with Russia and t

what Moscow sees as a mortal threat to its vital intere

integration and internal stability. 1 6 Wou

geopoliticians like Zbigniew Brzezinski argue that 

vital U.S. interest to so firmly implant itself in these 

as to exclude Russian influence there.

17 Whether or n

is the proper U.S. objective, Washington is foll

through on this policy, thus arousing Moscow’s de

fears.

18

Yet precisely because Moscow views these area

sovereignty and its consolidation as a threat to its su

as a state, this Western presence, whether Ame

Turkish, or Israeli, is unsettling at best and a major t

at worst. This only shows the continuing hold of zer

thinking over Russian policy. If Russia’s neighbors ar

secure and cannot be threatened by Russia, due to 

states’ strong interest in them and their own in

stability, then Russia itself is threatened. As U.S. an

Alvin Rubinstein observed,

Clearly, any strategic vision worthy of critical examinat

must be rooted in historical context. With respect to Cent

Asia, this means a view of the region as a vast borderla

between Russia and the Middle East. Any policy th

contributes to the viability of the new republics and ensu

their non-threatening character to Russia must, by virtue 

consolidating this strategic buffer zone, redound to 

long-term security of Turkey, Iran, and the Arab states of t

Persian Gulf region.

19

The U.S. regional policies are closely tied to N

enlargement and the dual containment of Iran and 

U.S. writers increasingly call the CIS part of the “g

Middle East” and the “strategic fulcrum of the future” 

“strategic high ground,” due to its energy resour

Robert Blackwill and Michael Stuermer claim tha

Western power has been safe without some measu

influence or control over the southern and eastern sho

451
Transcaspian, since Washington and Ankara wan

terminus of Transcaspian oil and gas to be Ceyhan o

Southeastern Mediterranean. Nor do U.S. officials s

from spelling out their grander visions of the future.

Ambassador Matthew Nimetz postulates the gr

importance of the Mediterranean region as a w

Therefore, a clear U.S. commitment to remaining a m

power here will markedly enhance regional security. T

true for the major NATO powers as well: France, Germ

Italy, Great Britain, Spain, Greece, and Turkey

maintain regional security, NATO must not only inte

the entire region into the Western economy and fost

development of “pluralistic institutions,” NATO mus

grasp the military nettle.

The Pax NATO is the only logical regime to maintain securit

the traditional sense. As NATO maintains its dominant rol

the Mediterranean, it must recognize a need for the expansio

its stabilizing influence in adjacent areas, particularly 

Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea region (in concert

course, with the regional powers, primarily Russia, Ukra

Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) and in the Arabian/Pers

Gulf. The United States must continue to play the major rol

this security system. The Sixth Fleet will be the vehicle 

implement this commitment for years to come, although th

something that might be reviewed some time down the roa

Supposedly, Russia’s views either do not count or R

will blithely accept this outcome.

Given the centrality of energy to Russia’s economy 

the West, what conclusion about NATO’s future activi

the CIS and Middle East should a Russian plann

policymaker adopt when analyzing Nimetz’ words o

following statement by former Secretary of State W

Christopher and former Secretary of Defense W

Perry?

The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to tod

reality: the danger to the security of its members is 

452
threats to their collective interests beyond their territo

Shifting the alliance’s emphasis from defense of membe

territory to defense of common interests is the strate

imperative. These threats include the proliferation of weapo

of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of oil, terroris

genocidal violence, and wars of aggression in other regio

that threaten to cause great disruption. To deal with su

threats alliance members need to have a way to rapidly fo

military coalitions that can accomplish goals beyond NA

territory.

24

Thus Russian elites, and not Primakov alone, cons

profess that they face linked challenges in Europe, th

and the Middle East due to the American hegemonic 

And from the point of view of Realpolitik, they have 

justification for seeing things in this way. The proble

Primakov and his colleagues is that they apparently s

world exclusively in terms of a zero-sum game, often 

the open threat of force.

25

 U.S. leaders, on the other 

see things in an entirely different and Wilsonian, or 

Walter MacDougall calls a global meliorist light, so 

we do not have a clash of ideologies in the old 

fundamental approaches to international relations 

politics are embroiled here in the Russo-Ame

confrontation in the Middle East.

26

Nor are these the only threats that Moscow 

Russian analysts and officials habitually worry that R

may be excluded from European and Middle Ea

decisionmaking as Washington and NATO move clo

its border. Russia may also be consigned to an econom

as a provider of raw materials and deprived o

opportunity to partake of the contemporary technol

and post-industrial revolution. This would leave it 

perpetually inferior power.

27

 They also worry abou

form of Muslim self-assertion, whether nation

religious, as a threat and often associate either of 

phenomena under the terms, Wahhabism, Pan-Turki

Pan-Islamism, without regard for the scholarly distin

among these phenomena. 28

453
indicates, Russia fears any spillover of any of 

phenomena into Central Asia, the advent of ma

refugee problems, and the involvement of its troo

containing these threats from Afghanistan. Further

there is the persistent danger that some analogous k

movement might commence in Russia itself, detac

affected area from Russian control, and spread throu

Russia, reviving fears of the state’s disintegration. 

dangerous, yet, is the possibility that outside sponsor

Turkey or Iran may actively encourage and support 

movements.29 Precisely because Iran could e

undertake such a policy, Russia, already in February 

indicated its continuing willingness to supply Iran 

conventional and dual-use arms and technology sales

However, aiding Iran thusly brings Russia face t

with the prospect of such an internal threat being com

with an external threat from a Muslim regime. This 

range from upheaval caused by some form of M

self-assertion, either religious or national, to conven

support from abroad for that group in rebellion. Or the 

of threat could escalate further. If proliferation to Ru

south is allowed to go unchecked, then weapons of 

destruction could figure either as deterrents of one o

sides or as active weapons in the conflict.

31

The following analysis captures the diversity of m

the regional threats as seen from Moscow (and not only 

there).

Geopolitically, the black hole of Central Asia now constitute

expanded part of the new Middle East. Geoculturally, few ot

regions entail a nation-state border system of such poten

transparency, where common and cross-border religio

ethnic, linguistic, and collective memories could act individu

or jointly as destabilizing or integrating factors. Fr

Kazakhstan to Egypt (and one could substitute Tajikista

Algeria and Sudan-SB) dynamics of anticolonial feeling [ol

new], economic underdevelopment, uneven developme

454
ethnoterritorially driven conflicts are characteristic.

32

These regional threats are complicated by th

played by the United States in its own right and as lea

several global alliances, e.g., its alliance with NATO, 

and Turkey, all of whom are seen as encroaching on Ru

vital interests. Russian analysts take for granted th

United States wants to oust Russia from its traditiona

interests and destroy it as a great power.

33

 Naturall

threat is intolerable. It is all the more intolerable be

Russia harbors dreams of equality with the United Sta

dream voiced by Yeltsin many times.

34 Sergei R

director of the USA Institute and an advisor t

government and Foreign Ministry, has written that,

First of all, Moscow should seek to preserve the spec

character of Russian-American relations. Washington sho

recognize the exceptional status of the Russian Federation 

the formation of a new system of international relations, a r

different from that which Germany, Japan, or China or a

other center of power plays in the global arena.35

As Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment obs

Russian analysts argue that current difficultie

transient but Russia is entitled to this “presidium se

Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and on global issues.

any realistic analysis knows this aspiration is a dang

illusion given Russia’s weaknesses. Thus Mos

negative policies must be calibrated so as to pr

Washington from slamming the door on Russia even 

works to frustrate U.S. policies.

However, Moscow also discerns opportunities whi

seen as offsetting or that allow it to keep those threat

distance. Within the Middle East itself, the internal e

rivalries within states, e.g., Kurds vs. Turkey, Palest

vs. Israel, offer both neighbors of those states and inter

outside players opportunities to interfere with and 

the host states’ policies. Thus Moscow has aided the 

on numerous occasions, just as it has consistently supp

455
Moscow has also tried to broker a truce between 

Kurdish factions in Iraq, to bolster Saddam Hus

regime in Baghdad, and to discomfit Ankara which re

any unified Kurdish political stance, even one acros

border in Iraq, with unfeigned alarm and suspicion.

3

A second cleavage in the Middle East is the linked 

of inter-state rivalries. Iran vs. Arabs, Israel vs. Arabs

vs. Israel, inter-Arab strife, now most notably in the 

but also in Lebanon, for example. These reg

“contradictions,” to use the Soviet term, show little s

disappearing. Few, if any, regional governments 

adopted the thinking of U.S. professors with rega

international politics nor do they accept the new l

dispensation. Security is still conceived largely in m

terms. Strategic territory is still vital, zero-sum thi

and proliferation of WMD are pervasive. Uncoope

behavior is rampant and so on.

39

 Naturally such be

not only obstructs the search for resolution of re

conflicts, it also impedes U.S. efforts in its search for 

and raises the constant specter of American mi

engagement, as in Iraq. These contradictions facilita

entry of a power who seeks to exploit them, through 

sales, diplomatic support, covert support for break

movements, and the like, for grander strategic object

Further contradictions derive from the fact 

Washington very much wants Russia to join with 

global initiatives and has shown an exceptional forbea

to Russia in the face of a lot of provocation and bad te

Unfortunately, this forbearance, whatever else i

gained, also has reaped more “tantrums” and prote

U.S. policy. While they only further poison the bil

well; they offer many Russian elites the consoling illus

standing up to Washington even as Russia falls apar

Other contradictions apply as well to America’s 

especially France. Russia and France both view each 

as states which must be cultivated in order to enhance 

456
Washington will offer them more benefits in order to 

them on its side and pay more attention to their intere

pursuing its own goals.

40

 Thus the cultivation of Fran

support for its opposition to American policies in the 

and the Israel-Palestine conflict translates into a sear

global leverage vis-à-vis the United States, especia

Europe.

41

 France, too, seeks to enhance its sta

vis-à-vis Moscow and Washington as well as in the M

East by its calculated display of distance from Ame

policy.

42

Therefore Primakov’s diplomacy and policy 

leverage by trying to create regional and/or str

partnerships with states who are willing to some deg

align their goals with Moscow’s in different areas 

globe.

43 Primakov’s approach very much follow

tradition of Alexander II’s Foreign Minister P

Gorchakov who, after the defeat in the Crimean 

sought to minimize threats to Russia and enhanc

status by precisely the same search for reg

partnerships and the exploitation of contradictions in 

where Russia could advance. Primakov has exp

invoked this aspect of his predecessor’s policies a

clearly inspired by it.

44 As an article in the Fo

Ministry’s journal, International Affairs, stated,

For Russia, the transition to a multi-polar world will cre

the possibility of diversifying the directions of foreign pol

and of developing constructive strategic relations immediat

with some influential partners. This increases the possibil

of a maneuver necessary for ensuring the country’s secur

under the conditions of a resource deficit and of the transit

period in the development of our country which is attended 

difficulties.

45

Primakov’s successor as Foreign Minister, Igor Iv

echoed this sentiment when he noted that Russian fo

policy now demanded the skill of seeking compro

considering different states’ interests, and of seeking 

“not for life but for a specific given instance.”46

457
Moscow’s Middle Eastern policies have fully crysta

under Primakov’s intellectual and political leadersh

Primakov has become Prime Minister, they are lik

continue along those same lines. This approach also 

clearly enjoys the support of President Boris Yeltsi

Russian elite opinion. It comprises a doctrine that is 

multipolarity but which stems from traditional geopo

a doctrine having dangerous implications for Russia.

The emphasis on geopolitics implies that Russia’s 

to be a great, even global, power is guaranteed by vir

its size and location irrespective of its internal st

affairs and the qualities of its domestic, economic

military performance.48 Primakov and Yeltsin have a

that Russia has global interests and its potential, n

reality, is what counts.49 The doctrine of multipo

postulates that Russia increasingly lives in a mult

world where any one power or bloc, i.e., the United S

cannot be allowed to dominate in a hegemonic fa

anywhere, e.g., the Middle East. Russia, as a great 

due to its potential, if not yet its reality, must play a 

role, not just a regional one, and be seated at the “pres

table” of all international affairs.

50

 Or as Leonid Bre

and his Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko state

international issue can be decided without Ru

participation. A consensus exists that Russia, in Ye

words, “deserves to be a great power.” Unfortun

employing this formulation means that Russia is not a 

power. Russia claims a status beyond its real capacitie

one that encourages any other party who is dissatisfied 

the status quo. Primakov, in the face of much e

reformist doctrine to the fact that Russia is now o

regional power, has said Russia is a global acto

conducts an avowedly global policy and has adopte

Brezhnev line.

51 And that globalism, despite rhetoric 

contrary, often directly challenges U.S. policies, no

rhetorically, but through tangible political actions.

458
from two axioms which are held with almost rel

certainty across the Russian political spectrum. As Ge

Makhmut A. Gareev, one of Russia’s most resp

military theorists, writes,

The main idea of contemporary Russia is that it can, must, a

will be reborn and develop as a great power. This is 

determined by someone’s wishes, but by fundamen

objective factors: historical traditions, geopolitical situation 

the world, real economic, political, and spiritual needs, wh

would always manifest themselves and are impossible 

‘cancel.’ We must be ready to defend this idea.

52

Key security figures, like former Deputy Defense Mi

and Security Council Secretary Andrei Kokoshin, 

espoused comparable views.

53 Logically, therefore, Ru

future status, if not present weakness, should entail it

at the “presidium table” of world politics.

This outlook resonates across Russia’s pol

spectrum and is expressed in the term Derzhavno

inherent, objectively given great power status. This l

goes back to the Tsars and is perhaps one of the gr

fetters upon Russia’s ability to maneuver in contemp

international affairs. Because Russia’s elite instinc

believes that Russia’s potential and size mak

automatically a great power, these elites have sacr

Russia’s economic welfare to the paraphernalia of sec

great power status. Hence Russia lacks a solid found

for maintaining that status. Moscow has consis

striven to attain an international and now global pos

based mainly on military factors that its econom

society could not sustain. This striving has also consis

precluded or inhibited efforts at democratic reform 

arouses international suspicion about Russia’s ult

aims.

Today’s globalism is also based on the second axiom 

Russian national interest dictates a policy of counteri

United States in all the key regions, Europe, the M

459
national interest and great power status as Washin

equal.

54

 One advocate of “limited globalism,” Ol

Davydov, describes it as a policy of accepting that Ru

fated to be a global power and one of the key cent

multipolarity as it develops. But it must also pur

pragmatic line of engagement where and when its 

interests are joined. Other comparable analyses 

along similar lines.

55 The logical corollary of this 

dating back beyond the Bolsheviks to the Tsars, is tha

Western influence near Russia’s “sphere of influ

automatically is hostile and a threat that mu

countered.

56

First and foremost, this policy line aims to ap

Russian domestic policy, and it has allowed Primakov 

the doctrine of Derzhavnost’ to increase domestic supp

foreign policy and remove it as an issue in the dom

struggle for power. Instead, as Ivanov stressed, there 

a basic consensus with the Duma and across the el

foreign policy deriving from the mystiqu

“Derzhavnost.”57 Second, by acting along the line of na

interest apart from and against the United S

Primakov has followed a policy that commanded Ye

support, without which he could not function. T

Primakov has also wrested control of foreign policy 

from many of the rivals that his predecessor, A

Kozyrev, faced unsuccessfully. Fourth, Primakov ha

benefited from the tough negotiations and agreeme

won on NATO enlargement that is universally regard

the best deal Russia could get, and his brilliant exploi

of the inept U.S. policy toward Iraq during 1997-98. 

successes have allowed Primakov to conduct a pol

cultivating allies or partners with whom to pr

American hegemony in each regional domain. In the M

East these partners are Iran, Iraq, Syria, Cyprus, L

and Sudan. Moscow cultivates them using all the tools 

trade, diplomatic support through the U.N. and inter

relations, commercial trade, shared interests in e

460
perhaps most importantly, the cultivation of a com

approach to the Middle East and its security issues.

Primakov has long argued that it is essential for R

and the Middle East that the United States not play th

role of regional hegemon.

58

 Russia must constitute an 

and opposing presence. In 1991, on a mission to the a

save the Soviet Union’s regional position, he said 

Middle Eastern leaders, “consider it necessary that a u

economic and military-strategic area of the USS

preserved.”

They wanted a USSR presence in the Middle East because t

would preserve the balance of power. Nobody wants so

power to maintain a monopoly position there. These sta

understand that our country creates an area of stability in t

region with its new policy of non-confrontation with anyone

policy oriented toward searching for ways of making intere

coincide with those of other countries.

59

There is no reason to believe that he has changed his 

which clearly constitute the foundation of Mos

regional policy.

And indeed, there is much truth to this perce

Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and Yasser A

among others, have publicly urged Moscow to return 

active role in the Middle East. Syria announced in M

1998 that, while it had not previously exerted much ef

develop ties with Russia, it was now doing so at the h

level. Iraq and Iran also welcome Russia’s greater re

presence.

60 Consequently, Primakov’s policies 

regional and domestic support.

Indeed, from the start of his tenure as Foreign Min

Primakov and Yeltsin insisted that Russia would de

an increasing role in the Middle East to counter Ame

monopoly of the peace process.

61

 Primakov also 

observed that the previous policies were misguided.

461
that our efforts were aimed at evening our relations with 

former cold war adversaries. But this was done without 

understanding of the fact that, by not surrendering 

positions in the region and even strengthening them, we wo

have paved the way to the normalization of relations a sho

and more direct way.

62

Unquestionably this policy has discomfited the U

States. It surprised Secretary Christopher in 1996 wh

first encountered it, and it certainly has helped unde

the foundations of our erratic policy in the Gulf. 63 Bu

tellingly, it also has struck at the U.S. increasingly v

regional unilateralism.

This became clear very soon after Primakov ca

power in 1996. Another Lebanese crisis broke out, a

attempted to mediate between Israel, the Leb

guerrillas, and Syria. He offered his good offices based 

contacts with Syria, Iran, and these guerrillas, but 

same time blamed the Peres government in Jerusale

the crisis. Not surprisingly, Israel and the United S

rejected his overtures and criticism and his mission 

But he used it to begin cementing Russian relations 

France as well as with the broader Arab world in or

obtain his larger goals. Indeed, Primakov appar

viewed Peres’ electoral defeat by Benyamin Netan

shortly afterwards with considerable satisfaction. O

one hand, Russia felt that Shimon Peres’ Is

government had been insufficiently warm to it, 

Netanyahu had called for improved relations with Mo

On the other hand, he correctly believed that Netan

would slow implementation of the Oslo peace plan 

process to the point where serious strains would 

between Israel and the Arabs, and between Washingto

the Arabs, and this slowdown of the peace process 

offer Moscow numerous opportunities for improvi

regional position. Moscow’s former ambassador to I

Aleksandr’ Bovin, actually observed that Primakov w

particularly friendly to Israel. Certainly Primakov pu

462
failure to achieve progress between Israel an

Palestinians in 1998.

64

And this constitutes the danger in Russian policy

problem is not just its confrontational posture to

Washington, Jerusalem, and Ankara. Rather, the pr

is that Russia fuels regional tensions that Moscow 

neither control nor avoid and which may rebound ag

Russia’s own strategic interests. The great powers 

Middle East are as often as not unable to control 

clients and instead have to follow up their play, le

them into dangerous, if not failed, policies.

65 Also, the

been no public sign of Russian ideas to advance the 

process. In view of the fact that a slowdown of the 

process and the implicit corollary of renewed Israeli

tension are believed to be in Russia’s national interest

cannot credibly envision Russia as a valuable interlo

or equal player in the peace process. So its demand 

equal seat at the table appears to be based ultimate

nothing more than a policy of eternal negation of Ame

initiatives and Israeli policy. Yet this stance 

perpetuating and solidifying the high degree of re

tension that already exists. And arms supplies to one s

another do even more to poison that well and fru

American policies in the peace process and in the 

Certainly Russia’s perceptions appear to be at least to 

degree behind Syria’s, Iraq’s, and perhaps even Ar

calculations. They fear that without Moscow they l

credible source of counter-pressure to Washington 

Jerusalem and want to force Israel to retreat to O

perhaps 1967. Unfortunately, Russia’s policies ren

incapable of gaining Israel’s trust as a guarantor 

security or of inspiring the trust needed to bring all 

closer to peace. Moreover, because Russia is Iraq’s 

support against sanctions and Iran’s nuclear sp

Moscow’s policies have injured possibilities for re

peace. 

463
utter economic prostration. After all, a state that b

that it did not spend one Kopek on the peace process h

deserves a seat at the peace process table.

66

 But the 

policy being conducted seems to have more to do 

pacifying domestic elites and evoking memories of a s

that Russia cannot maintain than with progress to

true domestic reform, reconstruction, and a 

enhancement of Russia’s foreign standing. This is be

the insistence on empire and Derzhavnost have alway

the rock upon which reform efforts have foundered. 

aspects of Russian policy are evident in the four ca

policy towards Iraq, Iran, Cyprus, and the peace pr

And they clearly involve playing to the domestic gal

especially insofar as the issues of energy and prolife

are concerned.

Indeed, the domestic galleries are crucial becaus

failure to create a viable state and coherent na

security policy process or mechanisms has given 

galleries a disproportionate role in the formulatio

conduct of policy. As Nikolai Sokov observes,

The ability of the government to develop and implement po

will be strongly limited by the influence of politically relev

domestic actors, each of whom will hold a virtual right of v

over specific aspects of policy. Unlike in pluralist systems, 

government] will have only a limited ability to manipu

domestic coalitions for the simple reason that the coalition 

be nearly all-encompassing and very stable.

67

Furthermore, because these coalitions are so stable

if some shock to the system (perhaps Primakov’s acce

to power and subsequent new economic policies) occur

the dominant coalitions be unseated and new departu

policy take place.68 And in such a system, governmen

try to incorporate all interests into foreign policy be

their influence is so pervasive and stable. 69 The fact th

a single defense industry has been closed for bankr

until now, despite the utterly useless nature of much o

464
anti-national interests and value-subtracting firms a

ability to bend the state to its will.

70

 Therefore it is 

and cheaper politically to incorporate these lobbies in

policy process early in the game and legitimate 

presence through all of its stages. Therefore, as Sokov 

notes, policy does not correspond to anything lik

rational-actor model. Sectoral or partial interest

exalted and pursued at the expense of any coherent na

interest. The failure of the state leads to the privatizat

the state and the policy process.

71

 In Russia’s M

Eastern policy, the energy and defense industry lo

provide particularly telling examples of how this p

occurs in actual policymaking.

Russia and the Gulf: Energy and Weapons.

Since 1991, the Gulf has become the main foc

Russia’s Middle Eastern policy. This attests both to Ru

shrunken reach, the rise of the peace process after 199

Iran’s enhanced strategic importance vis-à-vis the C

Russia. But it also reflects the rising importance 

struggle for energy shares in the CIS, a struggle tha

probably determine the geopolitical fate o

Transcaspian states.

72 Russian support for Iraq and I

almost overdetermined, since these two states’ suppo

Russia not only anchors its position in the Gulf, bu

materially helps it in the struggle for energy.

The turn to Iran reinforces the existing partn

between the two states. It makes sense, given the 

blockade or embargo on Iran that drives Tehran t

other partners and both sides’ need to establis

arrangement or regime, to sort out Central Asian 

Caucasian conflicts and energy issues. Not surprising

two states conducting policies that have isolated th

some degree from the international community 

together. At a 1995 Irano-Russian roundtable,

465
identity and to Russia’s political determination to prevent 

country from dominating the region [Central Asia and 

Caucasus]. It was stressed that Iran and Russia are nat

allies with distinctive natural resources and the predomina

of any third power should be prevented. This is related to 

manner in which the two sides define their strategic objecti

It was also stated that Russia’s influence in Central Asia 

the Caucasus should be treated with respect and if domina

is not the objective, cooperation is possible.

73

This was hardly the first time this conclusion was s

It had already achieved the force of policy well before 

In 1992 Russian authorities already understood tha

needed to continue providing Iran with conven

weapons (if not more dangerous dual-use technology

Iran make trouble for Moscow in Central Asia an

Caucasus, a perception that continues until now.

74

 

same time, this strategic partnership also belies or at 

neutralizes Iran as the avatar of the Islamic threat u

the Russian media and by Russian elites to j

everything from Chechnya to Tajikistan. Iran is simp

regarded as a threat in actuality, no matter what mig

said about fundamentalism in general. Perhaps this 

to the U.S. isolation of Iran that pushes it ag

Washington and towards Moscow, or it comes from 

highly circumspect policy in the CIS, or from the Ru

weapon and technology transfers. Or perhaps all th

these factors help limit Iran’s interests in the CIS. In 

many policymakers recommend dealing with M

societies, specifically Iran, in order to engage 

phenomenon and turn it away from threatening Rus

solution that Primakov has espoused in the past.

75

 Ye

advisor, Andranik Migranyan, who calls for Ru

hegemony in the CIS, stated that,

In many areas Iran can be a good and strategic ally of Russi

[the] global level to check the hegemony of third parties 

keep the balance of power. . . . Russia will try to furt

cooperate with Iran as a big regional power. We will not let 

West dictate to Russia how far it can go in its relations. 

466
relations with the West.

76

Russia also clearly wants to “internationalize” the 

of Gulf security, obtain a role as a recognized guaran

the area, either through the U.N. or through a re

alignment, and displace the U.S. primacy there, even 

recognizes the latter’s strong regional intere

Accordingly, Primakov supports the removal of foreig

troops from the Gulf. Hence one goal of Russia’s supp

Iraq may be to achieve just this objective.

78 Iranian of

statements also indicated an overt desire to arrive 

“division of responsibilities with Russia in rega

regional conflicts and energy issues.”

79

Therefore they are openly very critical of any Ru

backsliding on energy issues in the Caspian.

80

backsliding, as in Russia’s recent deal with Kazakst

the nature of the Caspian Sea that reflected Ru

waning ability to dictate to Kazakstan, led to sharp Ir

criticism and to a hurried visit by Deputy Foreign Mi

Boris Pastukhov to reassure everyone that all was w

Accordingly, until and unless Washington relaxes its e

to isolate Iran from oil deals in Central Asia an

Caucasus, trade abroad and nuclear power deals, co

with Russian resentment at U.S. policies, will p

excellent grounds for a durable marriage of conven

Energy issues dictate much of these grounds fo

marriage. The struggle for energy has made the 

Transcaspian area an arena for geopolitical conflict.

Unfortunately, the logic of the evolution of the 

policy of a full-scale, coordinated economic-mil

political program to integrate the entire area firmly in

West has much to answer for in this connection.

82

 

there are solid reasons for so acting and certainl

prospect offers the region much more than being t

Moscow’s corpse, it nonetheless extends U.S. powe

what formerly was a Russian preserve.

467
than the Ghawar field in Saudi Arabia, the largest oi

in the world, a stake of this magnitude jus

Washington’s compelling interest in the Transcasp

However, Russia, too, has compelling strategic intere

solidifying its position with Iraq and Iran due to the 

energy situation. Energy revenues are crucial to every 

in the region, including Russia, for reasons connec

their own internal political economy. All these stat

rentier states whose main revenue comes from oil an

sales, an external royalty or rent, the production of wh

largely unrelated to the rest of the domestic economy

concept of the rentier state originated with regard to 

under Shah Mohammad Pahlavi (1941-79) but has gro

include other oil producing Arab states, e.g., Kuw

Qatar. Some analysts substitute the term allocative 

but both refer to the same phenomenon.

84

The establishment of rentier states in the CIS m

that their stability depends on a continuing flow of e

revenues. To the degree that those revenues are interr

or interdicted, these states’ internal and external sta

comes into question. It is not enough for these sta

obtain foreign investment and diplomatic-military su

they must use those newly acquired advantages wisel

a long time to develop and stabilize.

Because they are rentier states, the Transcaspian 

and Russia compete for the same export markets for en

Russia’s energy interests are vital to the survival 

government and state in their present form. The str

between the particular interest of the energy comp

who seek more and more profits, from participating 

regional energy bonanza, and the Foreign Ministry 

seeks to uphold a national state interest and clos

region’s prospects down altogether, has bedeviled Ru

foreign policy and confirms Sokov’s observations abo

nature of the policy process.

85

 This does not mean 

Russia’s survival as such is necessarily endangered 

failure to attain those interests and close the door on f

468
such a failure because of its incoherent national se

policy process and weakness vis-à-vis the world econ

Russia’s energy interests are more extensive than 

of its neighbors. Therefore Russian policy, as determin

the energy companies, and/or by the Foreign Min

fights to retain control over the CIS energy network. O

natural gas, which constitute the very foundations 

Russian economy and account for more than ha

country’s entire export earnings, are at stake. One 

also contend that since the allocation of the oil rent 

key relationship between the ruler and the ruled, it 

basis of the government’s legitimacy, something tha

confirmed when the oilmen and bankers forced the co

of the Kiriyenko government in 1998 when it tried to 

their taxes. And since foreign policy in such states co

largely of creating an environment conducive t

expansion and allocation of those rents, and the stabi

the ruler’s position, a hegemonic aspect is likewise int

to their foreign policy. 86 Certainly this is the case for R

although we may see prolonged struggles bet

Primakov’s government and the energy lobby on dom

issues in the months ahead.

As one of the world’s leading producers and expor

hydrocarbons, Russia cannot ignore Central Asia 

Azerbaijan’s intention to increase the extraction and e

of oil and natural gas. The emergence of major 

producers could reconfigure the global energy market

profoundly affect price dynamics with immediat

severe consequences for Russia’s economy. Coordin

Moscow’s energy strategy with plans to increas

production and export of oil and gas in the CIS constit

primary national interest for Russia. Therefore R

reacts negatively toward any external “meddling” i

energy affairs.

87

Russia’s efforts to take over the Caspian energy eco

became visible in 1994, but its most recent formal polic

469
Ministry of Fuel and Energy proclaimed energy a 

factor in safeguarding Russia’s security. The fuel eco

faces internal threats from the low level of energy effic

in Russia, the non-payments crisis where debtors do n

their bills for goods and services, and the lack of fo

investments. The solution to the internal economic fai

economic imperialism, i.e., “access to internal mark

neighboring countries,” preserving and expanding “re

external marketing outlets, and thus ensuring the t

through Russia energy carriers.” 88

Russia’s “fuel diplomacy” should focus on establis

common CIS system of energy security, including s

property, common development, integrated produ

companies, and free access to markets and resource

states should view Russia as their major partne

collaborations with other countries as “econom

inexpedient.” Moscow would encourage Russia’s oil g

Gazprom, Lukoil (the premier gas and oil companies

Transneft (the main pipeline company) to reach ou

Kazakstan and Turkmenistan to preserve Ru

dominance over those states’ economies and perpetu

closed, exclusive sphere of influence there.

89

As the largest exporter and refiner of oil and ga

controls the shipment of all petroleum products throu

“steel umbilical cord” across the CIS, Russia has comp

reasons for this policy. On economic grounds alone, 

every reason to oppose any expansion of its rivals’ m

share should they be able to sell freely abroad. Theref

wages unceasing economic warfare against them 

demands a cut from all of their projects, to explore or s

and gas. Russia has repeatedly blackmailed Kazak

Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan into admitting Russia

on concessionary terms, to their energy projects. 90

Meanwhile Russia’s own productive capacity in bo

and gas has steadily declined, and its energy industri

entangled in numerous dysfunctional economic 

470
profitability. Serious competition for Russia’s cu

markets, especially from modernized producers 

foreign capital, technology, and infrastructure

enjoying Western political support, would undo Ru

domestic and foreign economic position. Moreove

economic collapse ignited by the Asian crisis in late 

has already forced Russia to export more oil to obtain s

foreign capital and squeeze domestic producers who w

under more domestic pressure to pay taxes. So e

producers face strong internal pressures to export mor

restrict competition.

Since Russia’s main source of foreign exchange d

from its energy exports, if those exports dec

substantially, Russia’s ability to earn foreign exchang

meet its large and growing international debts a

ability to sustain itself at home through access to fo

capital markets and international economic agencies 

fall, too. Indeed, many Russian observers worry greatl

Russia might remain consigned for years to come 

semi-peripheral state in the world economy as an exp

of raw materials like oil and gas, and be unable to 

modern levels and forms of economic, industrial

technological development. They fear a la

economic-technological, and hence military, backward

leaving Russia at the mercy of the United States or 

foreign coalitions.

91

 Unhappily for them, there see

way out unless Russia can convert its foreign earning

development and internal investment capital. Until 

Russia must rely mainly on its energy economy for fo

exchange and seek to drive out competition as befits 

aspirant to monopoly status. But Russia’s political eco

promotes rent-seeking, not investment, and re

economic-political pathologies throughout the system

Complicating matters for Russia is its declining ca

to produce energy products. Its infrastructure is dilapi

and worsening, and its new sources of energy 

formidable costs to explore and ship because of 

471
because there has been precious little investment 

abroad or internally for over a decade. Furthermor

present Russian economic climate does not favor exter

even internal energy investment, and foreign firm

leaving in frustration and disgust. If anything

situation will worsen, given the continuing inhosp

climate for foreign investment, one that may even w

before it improves.

Meanwhile, Russia and the CIS states remain extr

wasteful consumers of energy, dependent on subs

consumption at below market prices and on the big o

gas firms’ subsidization of housing, social welfare func

etc. Without foreign income, because CIS and Ru

purchases are way down since 1991, this whole r

structure could come apart. Indeed, when the govern

started pressing Gazprom to pay more taxes in mid-19

a major financial crisis hit it, Gazprom predictably 

demanding more payment from its foreign customers 

CIS.

92

Gazprom’s situation exemplifies the precariousn

this house of cards. Gazprom receives only 5-15 perc

its receipts for its goods and services in cash. Its ex

therefore, must subsidize its domestic operations whi

in any case endangered as the infrastructure declin

exploits this situation to justify its monopoly positio

enormous tax arrears by citing its willingness to con

subsidizing customers who do not pay in cash—a cat

that includes most of Russia’s city governments. Gaz

effectively has replaced the failing state and tak

payment for services rendered in the taxes that it do

pay. Yet its profits and those of other energy companie

exports do not return to the economy either as ta

investments or even to cover current costs.

93

Thus, if Gazprom’s exports decline while other 

provide cheaper gas and more of it through better pip

and with foreign backing, its ability to subsidiz

472
with it. But worse, much of the municipal sector’s eco

declines with Gazprom for lack of gas and with that 

banks, housing, and others are all severely endangere

dependence of key sectors of Russia’s economy on Gaz

the firm that was former Prime Minister V

Chernomyrdin’s former employer, exemplifie

pathology of the rentier state. And the skewed depen

upon state protection, tax breaks, and non-cash pay

underscores the extent to which Russia has failed to 

the economic transition to a genuine market econo

Certainly such dangers and the benefits of state prot

that accrue to firms like Gazprom can explain the p

economic motives of Russia’s energy barons 

government when facing the prospect of enhanced r

from former satrapies whose independence Moscow 

cannot accept.

The foregoing analysis explains why Gazprom 

obstructed any Turkmen penetration of the Ru

market, pipelines or access to customers outside Rus

also explains the economic motives behind Russia’s e

to curtail the emergence of the Transcaspian states’ e

economies. At the same time, Russia has consis

advanced a geopolitical rationale for reintegratin

whole area around itself as the main task of all 

agencies.

95 However, the interests of the energy comp

do not necessarily comport either with this geopo

rationale or with Russia’s own best interests. Gazp

energy war against Turkmenistan, abetted by Mo

drove Ashkhabad to Iran, Turkey, Germany, and the U

States for financial, economic, and political suppor

weakened Moscow’s future ability to leverage the situ

in Turkmenistan. Neither Russian consumers, no

economy, nor Russian national interests benefit from 

policies, but Gazprom does. And its unassai

connections display how the privatization of Ru

foreign policy undermines regional stability 

473
motivation for Russia’s policies towards Iraq and Ira

Foreign observers like the International Institu

Strategic Studies in London (IISS) deride the U.S. 

concerning the size of regional oil and gas deposits w

would make the entire region’s holding larger than Pr

Bay, the East Texas fields, and the Ghawar field com

Other energy industry figures and the calculatio

specialists like Robert Ebel of the Washington-based C

for Strategic and International Studies argue that o

U.S. estimates are far too high and claim that Ca

holdings will amount to no more than about 3-4 perc

global energy reserves.

96 Furthermore, the IISS argue

the cost of moving equipment into the area, the expe

construction and the transit fees that must be paid 

Caspian investment of marginal utility at the low e

current oil prices. As oil prices have fallen further to 

lowest point in a decade since the IISS went to 

investment will probably be affected and could be

unviable. Oil and gas companies would probably 

return to the Middle East because of the preex

infrastructure and business arrangements.

97

But that outcome would undermine the whole thr

U.S. policy that seeks to minimize the need for Gulf o

gas and to look elsewhere. As the IISS remarked, due 

cheaper cost involved in transporting Iraqi oil and 

opening those products up to international market

repealing the sanctions regime—an increasingly 

denouement—represents a major challenge to fu

development of Caspian energy holdings.

98

 This 

major explanation of why Russia pushes so hard to en

sanctions on Iraq, an outcome that can only be see

major U.S. defeat and an equal setback to the Transca

states.

99

And that consideration underlines the strategic lin

tying this region to the Middle East. To the extent th

Caspian region can be stabilized, the United State

474
and oil and reduce Iran’s, Iraq’s, and Russia’s poten

play decisive roles in the Western and American e

economy.

100

 The diversification of supplies to 

excessive reliance on unstable and volatile areas const

a major U.S. objective. But, at the macro or geostr

level, U.S. policy strikes at Russia’s main reg

objectives as well as Iran and Iraq’s hopes for a way 

their current strategic and economic impasses.

Local U.S. diplomats and the administration now r

the Transcaspian area as a “backup” to or substitu

dependence upon the Middle East if that region

supplies become problematic.

101

 Russia’s Iraq polic

combines many of the same motives, especially the 

for markets and an economic foot in the door and the 

for political leverage. There are undoubtedly, as well, 

Russian political figures who loudly advocate breakin

U.N. sanctions on Iraq or overturning them so that Ira

Russia could establish friendship, pay off Baghda

billion debt to Russia through oil sales and become a m

for Russian business, especially in energy sectors. T

degree that Iraq breaks out of the sanctions regime, 

then not only pay off its debts to Russia, it can br

Russian technology and capital to major investment 

and bypass the Transcaspian states, keeping them 

becoming independent market rivals of Russia. It als

staunchly stand against any return of U.S. power 

Gulf. Likewise, Russian officials reiterate their des

sustain the large Soviet economic investment in Ira

develop it further.

Russia’s political motives are equally important vi

Iraq. When Russia mediated the crisis in November 

that looked like a resumption of the war with Kuwait, 

much credit in Baghdad because it showed the erosion 

united front in the Security Council. The U.S.-led 

appeared to be in disarray. Russia’s actions were r

seen as a declaration of Russia’s independence in the 

and assertion of the equal importance of its intere

475
Chief of Mission in Baghdad observed, Russia’s polic

be based on reinforcing strategic interests, and Ru

interests in Iraq and the Middle East are no less impo

than America’s interests. Stressing that local events 

great repercussions in Russia, he played up trade r

with Washington, not ideological rivalry. 103 V

Posvalyuk, the Foreign Ministry’s roving ambassador 

region, used that crisis to reiterate Russia’s demand 

all-inclusive Gulf security system that it would help 

into being.104 Primakov’s tremendous diplomatic vict

1997-98, when he twice brokered deals that forced Am

to back away from enforcing inspections of Iraq’s 

program, dramatically enhanced the perception of Ru

return and American disarray in the area. But it bu

previous achievements.

It now appears that the sanctions regime will 

under continuing pressure and contention as Iraq stru

to escape from “the box” that U.S. officials foo

maintained they put Saddam Hussein in.

105 In fac

U.S. policy toward Iraq, as revealed in mid-summer 

looked both duplicitous and weak, a deadly combinat

While the most recent crisis of November 1998 end

Iraq’s retreat and reacceptance of United Nations S

Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspections, it will 

the last crisis triggered by Iraq’s determinati

overthrow the sanctions regime. Accordingly, we can e

that the other main reason for Russian domestic lo

support for Iraq—the desire of the oil, gas, and de

industry and the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minato

sell their wares in Iraq—will come even more to the f

the Gulf and throughout the Middle East than before

Proliferation Policy.

As in energy, Russia’s proliferation policy in the M

East and elsewhere links domestic policy groups and f

with foreign policy interests. Russia’s proliferation po

476
has a very sophisticated set of rules, laws, and decree

have taken shape since 1992. These enactments 

established a detailed and heavily bureaucratic r

governing customs controls, exports of dual-use

military technology to the point where many Ru

commentators flatly assert that no weapons or du

technologies can be sold or exported withou

government knowing about it or against its wishes. 107

rules also attest to Russia’s continuing desire to be 

seriously as a Western “liberal” state that sup

non-proliferation.

108

 Hence Russian writers maintain 

even if Russia is not a formal member of va

international export control bodies, its regulations and 

are written with an eye towards conformity 

international procedures.

109

Although there have been many statements cla

that Russia opposes nuclear or other WMD prolifer

official reports consistently deny that Russia is 

threatened by proliferation. The Duma, too, doe

consider proliferation of WMD to be a threat to Ru

security even if neighbors get these weapons.

110 And, 

case, it is the U.N.’s job to identify states wh

contemplating proliferation. Russia opposes any e

controls other than those imposed by the U.N. and 

and insists that Iran and Iraq are nowhere nea

achievement of a nuclear capability. Therefore the 

“nuclear file” should be closed, and inspections ce

Likewise, Russia refuses to participate in U.S. sancti

blacklists against Iran, claiming that the IAEA report

to be in full compliance with international standard

procedures.

111

 And Primakov has repeatedly denied 

Russia sells dual-use or nuclear weapons’ capabilit

Iran. Therefore, attempts by outside actors like the U

States to target states who otherwise are list

complying with the IAEA, e.g., Iran, are unwarrante

merely an effort to undermine Iran’s and Russia’s pre

in the marketplace for weapons where the competit

477
shun terms like rogue states. Instead, Russia espou

policy of engagement with these states to deal 

potential issues of proliferation while pursuing its 

interests.

113 In fact,

Rules to exclude “violator-participants” are not envisioned 

the context of multilateral agreements. The nations take 

recommended lists and guiding principles [of internatio

conventions and agreements] as a foundation when consider

the possibility of making specific foreign and economic de

but these principles are interpreted by each country proceed

from its own national interests. The imposition of sanctions a

depends on national legislation. The regimes under analysis 

in fact an aggregate of parallel and coordinated systems of exp

controls of all nations that adhere to the basic rules of exp

control.

114

 (italics author)

Furthermore, Russia’s political establishment 

American policy as hypocritical in that it seeks t

Russian exports of the same kind of reactor to Iran 

Washington has exported to North Korea. Russian an

argue that,

It is highly likely that a flexible policy in relation to North Ko

could prove to be more sensible for strengthening 

international non-proliferation regime under cert

circumstances. But the opinion prevails among the Russ

leadership that an uncompromising policy towards a numbe

other nations is not effective either. Whether Russia

entering into agreements on technical collaboration, will be a

to have a positive influence on the policy of such partners as I

is another matter.

115

The official rationale for proliferation policy emer

Primakov’s 1995 report as head of Russian Fo

Intelligence, the SVR. This report stated that Ru

authorities strongly oppose nuclear proliferation pre

because Russia is especially vulnerable to the threats 

by proliferation, as a state close to many of the re

where would-be proliferators, who are already at odd

478
The report stated that:

For Russia the specific fate of the NPT (Non-Proliferat

Treaty) will not only inevitably affect its strategic course 

enduring security, but will also have a major impact 

national security interests. The appearance of new nucl

countries on RF (Russian Federation) borders would creat

real threat, destabilize the situation in the “near abroad” zo

and force it to revise the guidelines of Russian defense poli

including in terms of its nuclear component.

116

Hence the main threat to the nonproliferation reg

countries like Israel, Pakistan, and India who are de 

nuclear powers but remain outside the treaty. 

capability is dangerous in itself and can spread

Pakistan’s transfer of know-how to Iran and North K

export of missile technology to Pakistan. Since these 

stand outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they c

rely on the international community to provide “real l

to stop their potential enemies from going nu

Accordingly, their exclusion from the NPT regime 

regionally destabilizing factor. That exclusion stim

their enemies to follow suit. Surely Iran fulfill

designation. That fact alone logically should lead Mos

resist any further nuclearization of the Middle East.

1

Moscow still claims it follows this logic and this polic

Furthermore, the SVR report categorically stated 

Russia cannot support states pursuing a double sta

toward “unofficial” nuclear countries or states, like 

who are on the nuclear threshold or seeking to ac

weapons. Because such tactics allow these threshold 

to nuclearize further and triggers arms races among 

and their enemies, supporting them is a highly dang

policy.

118 At the same time, this policy comports 

Russia’s broader and oft-stated justification for exp

conventional weapons abroad.

Russian authorities state that national interest 

main factor determining foreign military-tech

479
of Russia’s treaty and political obligations to the 

community regarding the arms trade and of exp

transparency in such weapons transfers. These oblig

include treaties like the NPT and other agreeme

prevent the proliferation of WMD and missile technol

Moscow further adjusts the volume of its sales t

capabilities of foreign states to provide them w

reasonable degree of training and proficiency that su

for defense. But those trade balances preclude suppo

the excessive militarization of the recipient’s econom

the ensuing aggravation of internal socio-economi

external regional tensions that undermine peace 

development. Russia limits “to a maximum degre

export of weapons to countries who violate interna

agreements with Russia or who are engaged in con

Sometimes Russia forbids exports of certain systems, 

will not export weapons and combat equipment to 

who may use them against Russian citizens, pro

interests, and installations.

119 Many Russian write

arms sales also now contend, as noted above, that the 

has very strong controls over arms sales. And due to 

extensive bureaucratic controls, it is unthinkable tha

producer along with myriad sub-contractors could get 

with secret, covert arms sales abroad.

120

Moreover, with respect to Iran, Moscow has argue

there is absolutely no state policy of transferring 

technology or know-how to Iran and that, in any case

does comply with IAEA requirements and inspectio

Likewise, Primakov and others assert that Iran is no

to having a nuclear weapon and hence does not repre

threat to Russia.

122

Obviously, if this is the policy, it is a highly respo

one even as it advances Russian economic, military

political interests. But if this be the case, then Ru

authorities and analysts cannot simultaneously cla

they and their sympathizers within the administ

regularly do, that they cannot control the exp

480
weapons.

123 Indeed, some Russian writers, notably A

Kortunov and Andrei Shumikhin, deny the whole cla

rigorous controls. They observed that Russian pol

distinguished by the absence of coherence and consis

due to the struggle among the “multipolar” interest

opinions at the policymaking level and the governm

utter disorganization.

124 In this struggle, powerful fa

in and around Russia’s government strive to monopo

much as possible of the policy processes that concern 

In highly technical issues like arms sales, it is easi

these interests to gain their goals.

125

 Thus,

In the area of WMD (and especially BM-ballistic missil

proliferation, it is the narrow interest groups represent

producers of some types of exportable hardware and materi

that are especially eager to obtain “absolute” authority 

laying out and implementing policies benefiting primar

their own positions. As traditionally was done in the form

Soviet Union, additional practical means of achieving suc

monopoly position are setting up a heavy veil of secrecy a

acting under the guise of “overriding national secur

expediency.”126

Since arms sales are so profitable, they have 

repeatedly acknowledged to be a source of en

corruption and one in which powerful political figur

involved to enrich themselves or to provide funds for 

political war chests.

127 In fact, the former head of Ru

domestic intelligence service, the Federal Security S

(FSB), General Nikolai Kovalev conceded, how

opaquely, that many businessmen have little rega

Russia’s proliferation interests and sell weapo

technology illegally or covertly.

128 Many analysts b

that such criminality is indeed possible, and even perv

for at least some classes of weapons. Therefore, these c

of strict controls point at two opposing but comp

conclusions.

129

 If those claims of strict contro

mendacious and Russia cannot control arms sales, 

481
national interest.

If, on the other hand, the claims of strict control are 

the reports of corruption mean that it takes place wi

active knowledge and participation of the Ru

authorities. Inasmuch as we have repeated eviden

corruption admitted by those selfsame authorit

Russian journalists, this loss of control over policy 

obvious, but Russia cannot and will not admit it. But, 

same time, since this corruption is pervasive up to th

top of the government ladder, it is also clear that much 

corruption and mendacity is state sponsored. In 

words, the fine words of the SVR report and other o

statements of rectitude regarding proliferation ar

that, words. The reality blends pervasive corru

private aggrandizement, active official participation i

connivance with that corruption, and strict paper con

Claims that Moscow cannot stop this trade or th

regulations preclude it strain credulity. The rheto

nonproliferation conceals a policy that abets prolifera

The Reality of Russian Proliferation.

That reality, as revealed over the last several ye

then quite alarming. Russian and Western press re

indicate that Russia has become a conscious, willing

major proliferator of WMD, including biological w

capabilities. Iran’s difficulties have forced it to let R

take over its Bushehr reactor project as a turnkey oper

But even before that, U.S. and Israeli intelligence rep

that Iran is now within 1 year of a nuclear m

capability, even if Russia now desists from helping 

Since Russian authorities have acknowledged that 

has presented a more comprehensive vie

Iranian-Russian collaboration than did the United S

and Israeli intelligence throughout has been on the 

regarding Iran, there seems no reason to disput

assessment.

131 These and other sources also cite Iran’s 

482
potentially Russian help.

132 Recent Russian reports 

the conscious participation and coordination of Ru

FSB, the high-level state commissions on non-prolifer

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and probably the Minis

Defense in projects to send Russian scientists to Ir

transfer nuclear know-how as Iran aims at interm

range and then intercontinental ballistic missile capa

(IRBMs and ICBMs, respectively). Furthermore, in 

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of External Eco

Relations Oleg Davydov revealed that Russia woul

Iran over $4 billion of machinery and equipment, incl

military equipment over the next 10 years, and 

military hardware and complete sets of equipme

Iranian enterprises now constitute 85 percent of the 

volume of deliveries to Tehran and could grow. In late 

the Iranian government also expressed an intere

raising the level of purchases of hardware, machinery

equipment to $1 billion a year for the next 2 years, 19

Should Iran pay off its debts to Russia by 2005, Russia 

be exporting $4.5-5 billion annually.

133

The known technology transfers of WMD to Iran in

SS-4 technology and the reactor at Bushehr as w

exchange of scientific know-how with Iranian scientis

training in Russia for them. The Bushehr reactor com

four reactors plus turbines that Russia is now expec

provide, along with more military technology and we

since Ukraine dropped out under American pressure

all this assistance occurs even though Russian of

know full well and publicly profess that Iran intends to 

nuclear weapons with this assistance!

134

Russia is also helping Iran develop a nat

communications satellite that will have an 

monitoring capability. The firm doing this work, the 

Science and Production Center, is known for its wo

classified space programs. The space apparatus its

being developed by the Reutov Mashinostroyenie S

and Production Association, which used to develop ba

483
systems. The Izhevsk Radio Plant and the Aksion 

Stock Company also regularly participated in Soviet 

programs. Russia clearly knows this is a dual-use sy

that Iran will have exclusive control over once it is des

and that it will take 2-3 years from signing the contra

finish the satellite.

135

 More recently, it was reporte

Russia is about to demonstrate gas centrifuges that ar

to the construction of atomic bombs to Iran, and 

tritium (heavy water) as well.

136 These demonstration

sales clearly violate President Yeltsin’s 1995 agree

with President Clinton to terminate nuclear sales to 

The transfer of missile technology openly violate

membership rules for the Missile Technology C

Regime (MTCR) where Russia is a member and 

automatically makes it subject to sanctions. And n

this includes the sizable and ongoing conventional we

sales program to Iran which also flouts past promises t

would stop.

Yet Iran is a state whose nuclearization was lis

1995 as a clear potential threat to Russia. Selling 

potential enemies the atomic rope with which to han

should not make good policy. Yet Russia persists an

ready answers to those who question the logic of its p

Already in 1992 officials argued that Russia must sel

to prevent Iranian support for Islam in the souther

and Russia, and that it is best to influence Iranian pro

by these sales to limit the threat. 137 That rational

operates today.

Other political considerations also are present. Th

report says:

Russian-Iranian cooperation could be a unique testing gro

where the possibility and need for a member state of 

“nuclear club” to fulfill its obligations under Article IV of 

NPT whereby the participants in the Treaty must prom

equitable, nondiscriminatory cooperation in the field of peac

atomic power engineering but must, in doing so, prev

conditions for the proliferation of nuclear weapons [and t

484
replacing the North Korean gas-graphite reactors with lig

water ones can also be the same kind of example.

138

Russia seems to feel it must provide these techno

in order to prove its bona fides to Tehran. Clearly the 

here is an Irano-Russian security partnership on iss

common concern: Azerbaijan’s westward turn, cont

Caspian Sea oil and gas flows, stabilizing Central 

especially Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and Transcau

Russia’s search for Iranian cooperation and entry in

Gulf parallels its search for a point of entry into the K

peace process by seeking access to the consortium to pr

North Korea with reactors, gaining leverage in Kore

Asia. Thus nuclear sales are a large part of the entry 

into the Gulf, Central Asian, and Korean pol

sweepstakes. North Korea’s recurrent blackmail o

United States, Japan, and South Korea through thre

go nuclear if it does not receive sufficient funding ind

how that regional game is played. 

Therefore in the Middle East, Russia also suppor

withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Gulf, and aims to cr

bloc of pro-Russian forces against U.S. and Israeli int

to compel Washington to admit Russia as an equal p

with a veto into the peace process and Gulf security.

13

ambition resurrects much of the previous Soviet polic

bloc or entente among the former “rejectionist front” 

late 1970s to support Moscow’s efforts to jeopardiz

peace process against Israel and the U.S. monopoly 

This is also the geostrategic factor driving suppo

Iran’s, Iraq’s, Libya’s, Sudan’s, and Syria’s conven

and WMD rearmament. Iraqi buyers have toured Ru

factories, bought gyroscopes from discarded SLBMs

had these gyroscopes certified by the Russians. 

Jordan intercepted the shipment, a rare table used t

guidance instruments was found. Although the Ru

claim the gyroscopes were scrap metal, the table clearl

not, and its sale constitutes another violation of the M

Technology Control Regime that Russia has appa

485
believes that once Iraq escapes sanctions, as s

increasingly likely, it will rapidly redevelop its capabil

using WMD, it seems quite possible that Russian firm

help Iraq achieve this goal.

141 Nor are these the only ca

arms transfers to the Middle East. Syria has been rec

Russian conventional weapons, yet there are con

reports of Syrian interest in Russian collaborati

upgrading Syria’s chemical and biological wea

capabilities and missile technologies. And apparentl

conventional arms deals are in the offing with Syria, E

and even possibly Iraq.

142

 Yemen is also coming to Ru

buy SU-27 fighters and trainers, and S-300 surface

missiles. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union 

exported freely to Yemen who for years was engage

civil war and conflicts with its neighbors. While 

stopped for a while when the Cold War ended, Yeme

returned to negotiate these sales, apparently to cou

threat it perceives either from Saudi Arabia or Ethio

And there are growing signs of a Libyan-Ru

rapprochement that could lead to atomic techn

transfers and arms sales.

144 

Nor can Moscow pretend any longer that Iran 

seeking to go nuclear. When Iran tested its Shihab-3 m

in 1998, it became clear that Iran had adapted a 

Korean Nodong missile to a mobile launcher, mak

virtually invulnerable to antimissile systems. This mi

range comprises virtually the entire Middle East and 

of Russia. And “Not a single expert has any doubts tha

vehicle is capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” 145

Analyzing Russia’s Motives.

However, diplomatic objectives are arguably no

only, or perhaps not even the dominating considerati

Russia’s support for international proliferation. Cer

Russia, like the Soviet Union, talked one way and 

another. In the late Soviet period, Moscow also supp

486
policy is nothing new.146 And indeed, the conditions le

Moscow to favor it are, if anything, more desperate 

than before.

Apart from influence over friendly states’ militar

foreign policies, another critical motive for militar

civilian transfers of conventional as well as nu

weapons and technologies of mass destruction is to 

Russian civilian and defense industry. Primakov re

listed that goal as one of the foundations and main go

Russian foreign policy.

147 That announcement repres

a major departure from previous policy. Until no

Russia, as elsewhere, conventional arms sales 

regarded as an essential and legitimate policy instru

with which to uphold national defense industries whic

great pressure from cutbacks in the post-Cold 

environment. Now Russia has apparently given 

getting capital for its civilian reconstruction from 

civilian sources and will aggressively sell wea

anywhere to restore civilian and defense industry.

This tallies with the report given by Duma membe

military expert Alexei Arbatov to a conference in Cali

last year. Arbatov revealed that the Defense Ministr

producers it cannot buy their weapons until 2005 w

hopes the situation will be stabilized so that Russi

reenter the next round of conventional procurement. 

then, they are free to sell any and all conventional sy

without government export controls. And indeed, they 

do so to obtain the income needed for research 

development (R&D) for 2005.

148

 Since arms sales ar

supposed to fund military reform as well as de

industry and political operations like election camp

the pressure to sell anything abroad, even state-of-t

systems, will surely intensify. Russian arms sellers pr

point out that they do not attach political criteria to de

refrain from selling their state-of-the-art production.

1

implications are clear. A fight for markets and likely 

487
pushing weapons.

This rationale also conforms to statements by Min

about its sales of centrifuges and other nuclear techn

to Iran. These sales prevent the layoff of thousan

workers in Minatom’s far-flung empire, gain scarce fo

capital, and demonstrate and extend the level of Ru

production technologies and know-how.

150

 Fear of Ir

nuclear weapons was dismissed as a cover for eco

rivalry as America’s main objective. And as a final ex

of the utter cynicism with which this proliferation po

conducted, Moscow and Iran jointly issued a joint cal

non-nuclear Middle East.

151

Since Russia is engaged in a global quest for marke

can expect a bruising competition with Western and 

producers. Especially in troubled areas like the M

East, this competition can only help further militar

security relationships for Iran, its neighbors (includin

and the other Gulf states), Syria, Turkey, and Israel. 

and technology sales which are also a major dom

political money tree, have duly become now a major 

priority and a factor in destabilizing critical areas. 

from offering Syria weapons, Russia is selling 

(SA-10s) to Cyprus and Iran, and offering nu

technology, weapons technology, and reactors to 

China, Pakistan, Cuba, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. There i

of $5 billion in atomic reactor deals and even of 

transfers of reactors for cash to China.

152

The foregoing goes beyond arguing that arms sal

undertaken to rescue Russian defense industry or 

civilian industry, and the atomic industry locat

Minatom. Arguably we see the takeover of a key dom

foreign, defense, and economic policy by an interest gr

groups, defense industry, and the atomic industry. Th

intent on rescuing themselves at the expense of Ru

civilian reconstruction or its vital strategic long-

security interests. Moreover, because the arms and nu

488
currencies and markets, it has become a cash co

politicians to milk for purposes of building their privat

chests. This helps explain why the arms sales progra

undergone constant reorganization and changes 

leadership almost from the start, and has always bee

subject of a continuing struggle for control over its rev

among the highest levels of the Russian govern

Essentially in arms sales, including nuclear and 

WMD sales, the lust for private gain has overtake

effort to devise and execute a coherent national interes

strategy.

This privatization of the state does not mean 

weapons and technologies are solely sold abroad for p

gains. But it does suggest that the leaders of the 

cannot disentangle their private interests from th

Russia or of international security more broadly, an

engaged in wholesale subversion of their own law

treaties they have signed. In the past, and perhaps 

now, there have been many cases of covert arm

technology transfer abroad. Foreign pressur

repeatedly led to the promulgation of new decree

programs of export controls of sensitive and du

systems, all seemingly to no avail. The Iranian and 

cases described below show us repeatedly that the c

about strict bureaucratic controls are mocked by high

officials like Primakov who loudly deny Ru

involvement in proliferation even as they are d

engaged in subverting their own laws. This conflue

private with public interests and high officials’ conti

subversion of the state’s laws and interests graph

testify to Russia’s raging crisis of statehood, an

absence of a coherent national interest. Indeed, at the 

moment as Russia sells weapons that are most likely 

used against Israel, its defense industry pushes 

Israeli-Russian deals for sales abroad, e.g., to China! 

Minatom exemplifies this fusion of private and na

interests. Its responsibilities include not just its empl

489
and their families as well as all of Russia’s reactor

civilian nuclear installations. Its two ministers, V

Mikhailov and his successor, Yevgeny Adamov, believ

must mount an aggressive international mark

campaign to provide for its well-being and that 

employees. Therefore Minatom strongly pushes n

exports to China, Iran, India, and more recently Syr

Cuba, all ostensibly for civilian use.

154

 Minatom cla

must market its reactors aggressively to survive and 

arguments do not move it for good reason. More rec

Minatom stated the aim of becoming a global compet

second Gazprom.155

There is every reason to expect this state of affa

continue, if not entrench itself further. Primakov’s 

are already known, but the factors cited above accu

reflect the ongoing strength of the defense industry 

Since 1992 the myth has grown that arms sales are th

to recovery. And today’s desperation, plus the assidu

Russia’s arms sellers, has encouraged this fantas

created important constituencies for supporting a po

making defense exports the priority of industrial polic

emphasis on defense production as the expected locom

of recovery was first voiced in 1992 by Mikhail M

Yeltsin’s advisor on these issues, and was no more re

then than it is now.

156

 But the fantasy retains great a

and is strongly entrenched among members of the 

sales community, like Yevgeny Anan’ev, the direc

Rosvooruzhenie—the state’s official agency for arms 

abroad. Arms sales command popular support amon

regional governors, as they fund factories and keep p

working while bringing in some desperately needed fo

revenue. Indeed, whole factories are working only for e

now and would otherwise shut down, despite the ri

selling abroad.

157

And as central power collapses, the regional gove

are becoming increasingly influential players who w

preserve the current regime at Rosvooruzhenie and d

490
Apparently they have been able to prevail and help 

Anan’ev in power, because he is quite solicitous of 

interests and remits monies to them.

158 Thus key eco

and political lobbies made up of governors, de

industry, and its numerous patrons or dependents 

sustain defense industry as yet another unprod

rent-seeking sector of the economy. Whenever any effo

been made to shut down defense plants, among the 

unproductive in the entire economy, a vociferous lob

campaign has arisen to prevent this. Therefo

approximately 1700 factories producing defense goods

500 produce anything worthwhile, and the rest canno

be sold off at bankruptcy auctions. Yet they continue 

books and remain value-subtracting industries and a 

component of Russia’s “virtual economy.” 159

Politicians have also bought into this mythology. A

same time, Primakov’s Deputy Prime Minister 

Maslyukov has made no secret of his desire to take c

over the entire defense industry and foreign arms sa

order to reconstitute something like the Soviet de

industrial structure. So clearly the arms trade in its en

will remain a political football.

160 Primakov’s suppo

expanded arms sales in order to revitalize not just de

industry but civilian industry as well reveals a desire 

state policy consciously to reverse the global trend wh

civilian discoveries generate advances in mi

production.

161

 The current crisis can only intensify the 

to sell dual-use technologies and weapons abroad 

though Russia well understands that the global mark

weapons is currently shrinking and that it often req

foreign financing to produce products that are sa

abroad. 

Russian arms sales leaders have long since reno

any efforts to sell on the grounds of ideological conv

Rather, arms are sold for economic and pol

considerations—a fact that has not precluded fre

barter deals which make no sense.

162 They hav

491
Russian armed forces do not yet have since they c

afford to buy them, and it costs more to produce fo

domestic than the foreign market! Anan’ev now main

that, 

In essence, weapons are now the most high-tech Russ

exports meeting world standards today. Weapons repres

around 80 percent of all Russian industrial exports. This al

justifies the creation of all of the necessary conditions 

successful export expansion in the defense sector of 

economy.

163

Anan’ev clearly is calling for continued efforts to re

all of Moscow’s previous markets and implicit

remilitarizing the economy to promote arms sales that 

so much to Russia. He claims that increased arms sal

also linked with the recovery of Moscow’s voice o

international stage. Arms sales have followed Ru

reassertion of its national interests and contribute 

successful promotion of those interests abroad. A

concludes, 

Military-technical cooperation with foreign countries is still 

of the highest priorities of state activity in Russia. It is 

source of a high percentage of state budget receipts in h

currency, represents an important means of paying the st

debt, secures the employment of a large segment of the a

population, and guarantees the continued existence of 

Russian military-industrial complex, which now produ

products in high demand in the international mark

surpassed only by energy resources in their competi

potential. Russian military have good prospects, but progres

this field will require the utmost consolidation of the effort

all the structures and agencies participating 

military-technical cooperation and legislative bodies on 

levels.

164

Cyprus.

Many of Russia’s ambitions and the risks it runs th

emerge in its arms deals with Cyprus to provide it 

492
easily be reconfigured to attack Turkey proper. Both C

and Greece intended these weapons to be bargaining 

to compel Ankara and perhaps Washington to pay atte

to the situation on Cyprus and negotiate a settlement 

issue of Turkish forces there.

165

Moscow saw things otherwise. Not only did it gain 

client for its defense industries and further exte

influence into Cyprus, a known haven for Ru

money-laundering, Moscow also saw a golden oppor

to drive a deep division into NATO by aggrav

Greco-Turkish competition. One of the hallmar

Russian policy has been a renewed emphasis on fos

ties with Greece to check Turkish ambitions and NA

presence in the Balkans. This is based on Serbia’

Greece’s interest in keeping Albania and Macedonia 

and not allowing Kossovo to secede. The pursuit 

rapprochement with Athens has even led to re

Greco-Russian security discussions and more recen

arms deals.166 Naturally, Russia was more than ha

comply with Cyprus’ request and train the Cypriots 

use of the system.

But for Ankara, this was and is a major threat, 

announced that it would shoot down the missiles or 

the ships carrying them through the Straits. Ru

spokesmen retorted that Russia might react to such a

as if they were an act of war. Russia’s opportunism no

fair to embroil it in a European war against Turke

implicitly NATO. While this sat well with the 

members of the elite who regard Turkey as a threat 

its unconcealed ambitions to build a Trans-Cauc

barrier against Russian influence and wrest e

pipelines and terminals away from Russia, this woul

strike at one of Russia’s major trading partners and at 

of the most flourishing trade relationships that M

currently enjoys. Furthermore, Turkey let it be know

it might bar Russia from its huge defense contracts

493
outcome and see little prospect for that market.

167

In short, Russian opportunism and its st

short-term horizon—raising ready cash from de

sales—threatened some of its most vital interest

security. As a sign of what Russia stood to lose from the 

originally announced in late 1996, Pavel Felgeng

Russia’s leading defense correspondent, wrote th

December 1996 Turkish Prime Minister Tansu 

offered to prevent NATO enlargement from becoming 

dividing line in Europe or a threat against Russia.

16

But the Russian arms traders and the all-powerful banks t

finance and control arms trade were not interested. They 

something more important than enlargement on th

minds—profits. The Cyprus deal is strictly a commercial 

which will bring huge returns to middle-men. Arms shipme

to Turkey, on the other hand, only cover previous Russ

government debt. And such deals do not bring any substan

profits to traders. The Russian arms trade lobby wanted 

Cyprus contract as soon as possible in order to sec

government-guaranteed commercial credit to the ar

industry.Lending rates are falling in Russia and the earli

good loan can be clinched, the better.169

Although there is clearly a disposition to see Turk

the enemy, as an expansionist power, and as a leader 

attempt to penetrate Transcaucasia and the Black 

Russia cannot directly confront it yet. But the Blac

Fleet clearly views Turkey as a threat and seeks parity 

it.

170

Furthermore, the crisis became internationa

Turkey and Israel became close military partners

Israel trained Turkish pilots in attacks against 

missiles. Britain and the United States became alarm

the military and intelligence issues involved if Cypr

Russian technicians to run its air defenses. Moscow 

warned Israel to desist from involvement. Fi

Washington has now directly brought its pressure to b

494
Turkey. The pursuit of short-term and crass opportu

on Russia’s part frightened Cyprus and Greece, neit

whom wants a conflict. Thus they decided to take deliv

November 1998 rather than July, ostensibly because 

did not want to disrupt the tourist season. 171

Since then, Russia has reiterated its intention to 

every part of the contract as far as training, installin

operating those weapons until the Cypriots learn how 

them. Moreover, there are reports of a long-term de

accord, presumably entailing further sales to Cyprus a

Greece.172 At the time of this writing, the situation re

unclear. Russia may get its money, but it is not certa

weapons will be delivered or that there will be fu

contracts. On the other hand, the arms might indeed 

Cyprus with unforeseeable consequences. But wh

already certain is that an arms race has begun i

Eastern Mediterranean with Turkey, Greece, and C

all racing to modernize and reequip their armed force

this arms race takes place in an atmosphere of gr

Turkish fears of being surrounded on all sides by Ru

missiles in the hands of Moscow’s partners an

enemies.

173

 We abetted this by cascading surplus we

in Europe to Greece and Turkey after the CFE treaty 

into effect, and these new Russian sales add more fuel 

fire. In either case, one may ask what lasting long

benefits will accrue to Russia from this adventure com

to the costs involved.

Russia and the Peace Process.

Although Moscow certainly does not want a new w

the area since another Arab-Israeli war will only int

Washington’s dominance in the area, its policies to

the peace process are hardly helpful. This does not 

Moscow is the main author of the reasons for its p

crisis, but its policies are now inimical to the cause of p

Israel does not trust it, hopes of a rapprochement 

495
offer any of the parties.

It did not have to be this way. There were forces 

Russian government, namely the military, led in thi

by former Defense Minister General Pavel Grache

more recently by Security Council chairman A

Kokoshin, who sought a lasting strategic dialogue, 

partnership with Israel. They very much sough

dialogue on behalf of Russian defense industry which 

big opportunity to work with Israel’s highly reg

defense and high-tech industries to gain access to 

systems, Western technology and know-how, and 

markets. Israel is making a fortune on revamping old S

arms, and the Russian defense industry clearly w

access to this process. Accordingly, Grachev sign

agreement with Israel in 1995.

174 Kokoshin, too, wan

continue this partnership and strategic dialogue with 

to benefit the Russian defense industry. 175

However, Russian proliferation towards Iran 

support for Iraq and Syria’s rearmament has ma

difficult, if not impossible, to continue this partnership

Israel has suspended economic cooperation with Rus

Kokoshin was fired from the Security Council 

Primakov became Prime Minister, although this 

apparently done for internal reasons connected wit

struggle for power in Russia. Still, Primakov’s policie

made it quite impossible for Jerusalem and Russia to 

a rapprochement, and this seems to have been Prima

goal. For example, when Israel advanced a new propo

leaving Southern Lebanon through direct bila

negotiations with Beirut, he supported Syria’s pol

quashing this attempt and retaining Dama

protectorate over Lebanon; in other words, preserv

source of tension in the area.

177 Primakov also gratui

stated that, once the Palestinian Authority proc

statehood, Russia would recognize it. Furthermore, R

quite clearly is trying to associate itself with the E

leaders in the peace process. This gambit won no plaud

496
and not impartial, bystanders.

178 These actions, co

with the mendacious policy towards proliferation and 

led Israel to lobby the U.S. Congress to impose sanctio

Russia, a prospect that clearly antagonized Moscow a

not help it or Washington in their mutual relations

became especially true when Iran tested its Shi

missile made with Russian help and demonstrat

growing missile capabilities.

Here again Primakov sacrificed economic adva

since Israel is Moscow’s largest trading partner in the 

and the possibility of aiding the defense establishme

this strategic partnership, in favor of a policy whose 

date back to Brezhnev of orchestrating an anti-Ame

and anti-Israeli bloc among Syria, Iraq, and Iran

evident purpose of this policy seems only to 

Washington to let Russia back into the Middle Ea

raising the high degree of tension that already exists 

Bereft of constructive ideas about the peace proces

unwilling to invest in confidence-building measur

policies, Russia seems intent on playing a spoiler’s r

the area’s potentially most dangerous conflict. Yet th

little chance of it successfully persuading Washing

admit it to the peace process in any meaningful way.

In October 1998 its weak position was exposed 

Yasser Arafat called for Russia to participate in the O

15, 1998, negotiations with Israel and the United Sta

the Wye Plantation. Arafat, appealing to Russia as co

of the Madrid conference of 1991, the formal genesis 

peace process, clearly wanted Moscow’s full support f

goals of increased autonomy and eventual statehood

Moscow can only support him to a limited degree. Alth

there is clearly much sympathy for his position an

Palestinian cause in the Duma and the government, 

considerations also apply.

179

Moscow’s utter prostration and need for foreign su

limits the degree to which it can directly confront the U

497
that the creation of an independent Palestinian 

“cannot contradict Israel’s national interests, especia

the sphere of security.”

180

 Presumably this is not e

what Arafat wanted to hear from Moscow. While M

stated a request to participate in the Wye Plan

negotiations, at the same time it clearly had no new id

offer to either side. 181 But while this stance may not 

problems with Washington over an issue where M

cannot really exercise much leverage, it does not 

calculated to win over the suspicious Israelis or to con

the Palestinians that Moscow can be relied upon. 

much of Russian foreign policy, we see here a defe

demand to be taken seriously, a plea which in itself be

the fact that here, as in Kosovo for example, Mosc

“irrelevant” to vital U.S. decisions and policy-m

mechanisms.

Conclusions.

Unquestionably Primakov and his policies have 

lionized at home. But it is unclear to what degree they 

made Russia more secure, although some elites now 

better about Russia. However, tangible economi

political gains have been sacrificed, and it is not clea

Primakov’s victories have achieved more than to ann

United States and Israel. He certainly owes much to 

could be the most inept U.S. policy in the Gulf in se

years. While he has maneuvered most ably on the Ru

and world stage, he oversees a still ruined estate w

management did nothing in the time he gave it to im

conditions or exploit the gains he made.

Moreover, his policies have abetted some of the 

dangerous trends in world politics, specifically the diff

of nuclear and other military technologies. From a 

point of view, these policies threaten our allies an

strategy which places a premium on foreign pre

Conventional, not to say nuclear, or chemical, or biolo

498
complicates any hope of using Middle Eastern lodge

as forward bases. And as missile capabilities spread

will embrace Europe and North Africa, with similar r

for us. But this not a reason for Moscow to rejoice e

Those capabilities also put more and more of Russia’

mass at risk. Although Primakov and Yeltsin 

repeatedly denied that they would be crazy enou

permit these capabilities to spread to states like Iran, t

exactly what they have done. Here, too, ultimately Ru

policy’s strength lies essentially in its capacity for neg

of American and local initiatives that would possibly 

peace to the region and help calm Russia’s own tro

southern frontier. As in the past, Russia has chosen 

and prestige over true security and lasting comm

benefit for itself and its peoples. However, the old 

seems to offer little but future danger to Russia. After 

the present trend towards maximizing the state’s 

and reputation abroad grows at the expense of its abi

provide for domestic security, Russia, too, could th

burned in the fire that its policies have helped to stok

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 17

1. Graham E. Fuller, “Soviet-American Competition in the 

East: The Changing Face of International Conflict” and St

Spiegel, “Arab-Israeli Crises, 1945-1990: The Soviet-Am

Dimension,” both in Steven L. Spiegel, ed., Conflict Managemen

Middle East, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 2

respectively.

2. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politi

International Ambition, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: D

Politics and International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Pr

University Press, 1998.

3. Philip Robins, “The Middle East and Central Asia,

Ferdinand, ed., The New States of Central Asia and Their Nei

New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, p. 57; 

Pipes, “The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet Muslim Republics 

the Middle East,” in Michael Mandlebaum, ed., Central Asia 

499
Andrei Tchistiakov, “Changes in the Middle East and the 

World,” International Affairs, No. 11-12, November-December 1

107, 111; Bulent Aras, “Israel’s Strategy in Azerbaijan and 

Asia,” Middle East Policy, Vol. V, No. 4, 1998, pp. 68-81; 

Menashri, ed., Central Asia Meets the Middle East, London: Fra

Publishers, 1998. Even Robins, who is skeptical of efforts to ass

linkage, concedes that, if there is more interaction between Cent

and the Middle East, they will draw nearer as geopolitical e

Robins, pp. 55-74. But we must remember that for Russia, the Ca

and Central Asia have been the only geographical roads to those 

4. John Donnelly, “CIA: Iraq Could Restart Doomsday 

‘overnight’,” Defense News, September 8, 1998, p. 1.

5. Moscow, Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, in Russian, No. 7, Jul

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia (hen

FBIS-SOV)-96-211, October 31, 1996; Coit D. Blacker, “Russia 

West,” Michael Mandlebaum, ed.,The New Russian Foreign Poli

York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998, p. 183; Jo

Russia List, no. 2097, March 8, 1998, davidjohnson@erols.com.

6. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, September 27

FBIS-SOV-97-272, September 30, 1997; Paris, Le Nouvel Obse

in French, August 8-16, 1996, Foreign Broadcast Information 

Western Europe (henceforthFBIS-WEU)-96-156, August 12, 199

7. Stephen Blank, “State and Armed Forces in Russia; Tow

African Scenario,” forthcoming in a book to be edited by Antho

and published by Praeger Publishers.

8. Ralph Peters, “Spotting the Losers: Seven Si

Non-competitive States,” Parameters, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, Sprin

pp. 36-42; Pauline Baker and John A. Ausink, “State Violence: T

Predictive Model,” Parameters, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Fall 1996, pp

and Robert Dorff, “Democratization and Failed States: The Chal

Ungovernability,” Parameters, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Summer 19

20-23; Carnegie Commission On Preventing Deadly C

Preventing Deadly Conflict, Final Report and Executive Summa

York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997, p. 44.

9. “Yeltsin Address to Diplomats,” Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn

June 1998, and The Russian Weekly, No. 6, July 24, 

davidjohnson@erols.com (henceforth Yeltsin Address). S

Moscow, Vooruzhenie, Politika, Konversiya, No. 2, February 1

FBIS-SOV, August 23, 1998, for an interview with Ivan Rybk

500
Johnson’s Russia List, August 15, 1997, davidjohnson @erols.co

Goble, “Can Russian Diplomacy Hold Russia Together,” Rad

Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, September 23, 1998; The M

March 19, 1998 and September 23, 1998; Yevgeny Primakov, “

Reforms and Foreign Policy,” International Affairs, (Moscow)

1998, pp. 3-6.

10. Leon Aron, “The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcom

Russia and Its Domestic Context,” Michael Mandlebaum, ed., T

Russian Foreign Policy, New York: Council on Foreign Relation

1998, pp. 27-33.

11. See the sources cited in Endnote No. 9.

12. “Seleznev Calls Ukraine to Order,” The Jamestown Foun

Prism, October 2, 1998.

13. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, September 2

FBIS-SOV-95-188, September 28, 1995, pp. 19-22; The Jam

Foundation, Prism, Part 1, “The Fortnight in Review,” Novem

1998.

14. Quoted in Aras, p. 72.

15. Jim Hoagland, “Primakov’s Task,” Washington Post, Sep

17, 1998, p. 21; Moscow, Interfax, in English, February 22

FBIS-SOV-96-037, February 23, 1996, p. 18; London, Al-Ha

Arabic, January 3, 1996; FBIS-SOV-96-003, January 4, 199

Moscow, ITAR-TASS World Service, in Russian, October 31

FBIS-SOV-97-304, November 4, 1997.

16. Stephen Blank, “Every Shark East of Suez: Great 

Interests, Policies, and Tactics in the Trans-Caspian Energy 

forthcoming in Central Asian Survey.

17. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: Am

Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York: Basic Book

and, “A Geostrategy for Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. LXXVI

September-October 1997, pp. 50-64.

18. Blank, “Every Shark East of Suez," forthcoming.

19. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “The Geopolitical Pull on Russia,

Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 579-80.

501
the Changing Middle East, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowm

International Peace, 1997, “Introduction,” p. xiii.

21. Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stuermer, “Introd

Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stuermer, eds., Allies D

Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, Cambridge M

University Press, 1997, p. 2.

22. Ambassador Matthew Nimetz, “Mediterranean Securi

the Cold War,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 2, Sprin

p. 29.

23. Ibid.

24. Warren Christopher and William J. Perry, “NATO

Mission,” New York Times, October 21, 1997, p. 25.

25. David Kerr, “The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopo

Russia’s Foreign Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. XLVII, No. 

pp. 977-988; Nikolai Sokov, “A New Cold War? Reflections of a R

Diplomat,” International Journal, Vol. XLIX, No. 4, Autumn 1

914-915.

26. Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader Sta

American Encounter with the World Since 1776, Boston: Ho

Mifflin, 1997, pp. 172-222.

27. “Russia’s National Interests:, Johnson’s Russia List, Au

1997, davidjohnson@erols.com.

28. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Russia and The Geopolitics of the 

South,” in Mohiaddin Mesbahi, ed., Central Asia and the Caucas

the Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics, Gain

FL: University Press of Florida, 1994, p. 295.

29. See, for example, General-Major Evgeny G. Nikitenko, “R

Role, Allies, and Threats in the New Eurasian World,” Def

Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, June 1998, p. 10; Dushanbe, 

Politika, in Russian, September 11, 1998, FBIS-SOV, October 

for an interview with Russia’s ambassador to Tajikistan, Y

Belov, who makes similar charges.

30. Stephen Blank, “Russia and Iran in a New Middle 

Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. III, No. 4, Fall 1992, pp. 124-127

31. Nikitenko, p. 10.

502
States of Central Asia and the Caucasus,” in Mesbahi, ed., p. 2

33. Henry Trofimenko, “’New World Order’ and Russian-Am

Relations,” Hafeez Malik, ed., The Roles of the United States, 

and China in the New World Order, New York: St. Martin’s Pres

pp. 51-53.

34. Yeltsin Address, Reuters, January 19, 1997.

35. Sergey M. Rogov, “Russia and NATO’s Enlargement: The 

for a Compromise at the Helsinki Summit,” Center for Naval An

Alexandria, VA, CIM 513/May 1997, p. 10.

36. For Trenin’s views and other such expressions, see E-mai

from Darrell Hammer, Johnson’s Russia List, February 5, 1997; 

Trenin, “Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy: NATO Ex

Can Have Negative Consequences for the West,” Nezavisimaya 

February 5, 1997, E-Mail Transmission; J. Michael Waller, “Prim

Imperial Line,” Perspective, Vol. VII, No. 3, January-February 1

2-6; “Primakov, Setting a New, Tougher Foreign Policy,” Curren

of the Post-Soviet Press (henceforth CDPP), Vol. XLIX, No. 2, F

12, 1997, pp. 4-7.

37. Indeed, as Dmitri Trenin points out, Moscow has bee

sides of all questions in the Caucasus. Dmitry Trenin, “Russia’s S

Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region,” Bruno Coppiet

Contested Borders in the Caucasus, Brussels: VUB University 

1996, p. 99.

38. London, Al-Hayah, in Arabic, April 18, 1998, Foreign Br

Information Service Near East and South Asia, (hen

FBIS-NES)-98-111, April 23, 1998.

39. Spiegel, pp. 166-172; Zeev Maoz, “Regional Security 

Middle East: Past Trends, Present Realities, and Future Cha

Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. XX, No. 1, March 1997, pp. 1

40. FBIS-SOV, September 30, 1997, FBIS-WEU, August 12

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.; Blacker, p. 183; Moscow, Komsomolskaya Pra

Russian, September 30, 1998, FBIS-SOV, September 30, 1998.

503
Affairs (Moscow), No. 3, 1998, pp. 7-13.

45. V. Lukov, “Russia’s Security Challenges,” International 

(Moscow), No. 1, 1997, pp. 14-15.

46. FBIS-SOV, September 30, 1998.

47. Yeltsin Address, The Monitor, September 23, 1998.

48. Gerhard Simon, “Russia’s Identity and International P

Aussenpolitik, English Language Edition, No. 3, 1997, pp. 245-

49. Yeltsin Address.

50. Trenin; Hammer.

51. Yeltsin Address; “Ivan Rybkin on Russia’s Globa

Johnson’s Russia List, July 8, 1997, davidjohnson@erols.com.; M

Izvestiya, in Russian, January 21, 1998, FBIS-SOV-98-034, Feb

1998; Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Russian Foreign Policy and Sec

Central Asia and the Caucasus,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. XI

1993, p. 187, for Primakov’s globalism and statement that histor

nullifies geopolitical values.

52. Gareev is quoted in Mikhail Tsypkin, “Military Po

Russian National Security Policy,” Sanford R. Lieberman, D

Powell, Carol R. Saivetz, and Sarah M. Terry, eds., The Soviet 

Reconsidered: Essays in Honor of Adam B. Ulam, Boulde

Westview Press, 1995, p. 204.

53. Andrei A. Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, CSIA Studies in International S

1998, p. 195.

54. Aron, pp. 23-63; and for an official Chinese view, see 

Renmin Ribao Overseas Edition, in Chinese, February 10, 1998,

Broadcast Information Service China (henceforth FBIS-CHI)-

February 12, 1998.

55. Oleg V. Davydov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy in Tra

Prospects and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 

Perspective, Vol. XXII, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 53-69; Mik

Alekseev, “Russia’s Cold Peace Consensus: Transcendi

Presidential Election,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. XX

Winter-Spring 1997, pp. 33-51.

504
1700-1917, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

57. Aron, pp. 23-63; Alekseev, pp. 33-51; Lally Weymouth

Ivanov Wants,” Washington Post, October 6, 1998, p. 23.

58. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “Moscow and Teheran: The 

Accommodation,” Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansk

Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, an

Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. and Co., 1994, p. 31.

59. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

60. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, October 9, 1998, FBI

October 9, 1998, for Arafat’s proposal that Russia join what was t

upcoming summit at the Wye Plantation; for Mubarak, see M

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, September 23, 

FBIS-SOV-97-266, September 24, 1997; for Syria, see L

Al-Hawadith, in Arabic, March 13, 1998, FBIS-SOV-98-111, A

1998.

61. Moscow, Komsomolskaya Pravda, in Russian, March 2

FBIS-SOV-96-056, March 21, 1996, p. 16; The Jamestown M

March 14, 1996.

62. Ibid.

63. Moscow, Izvestiya, in Russian, June 8, 1996, FBIS-SOV-

pp. 24-25.

64. Hoagland, p. 21; Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, A

1996, FBIS-SOV-96-080, April 24, 1996, p. 24; Moscow, Inte

English, Ibid., pp. 22-23. For an account by the Russia

newspaper, Izvestiya, which is rather critical of Prim

undiplomatic tactics, see Moscow, Izvestiya, in Russian, April 2

FBIS-SOV-96-082, April 26, 1996, pp. 23-24; William Drozdiak

Says U.S. Should Broker Peace,” Washington Post, April 22, 1

A10; and Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, April 22, 

FBIS-SOV-96-079, April 23, 1996, p. 27.

65. This is hardly a recent trend. For an outstanding demons

of this trend for the 1950s, see Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpow

the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 195

William Quandt, “Foreword,” Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 19

more recently, Haim Shemesh, Soviet Iraqi Relations 1968-1988

Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienne

Oles Smolansky with Bettie M. Smolansky, The USSR and Ir

505
and Moshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch, eds., Superpowers and 

States in the Middle East, London and New York: Routledge, 1

66. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, March 23, 

FBIS-SOV-95-060, March 29, 1995, p. 11.

67. Nikolai Sokov, Domestic Structure, Economic Grow

Russian Foreign Policy, Program on New Approaches to R

Security, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard Uni

Cambridge, MA, Policy Memo Series, No. 23, 1997, pp. 1-3.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, “Russia’s 

Economy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. LXXVII, No. 5, September-

1998, pp. 53-67.

71. Sokov, pp. 1-3; Stephen Blank, “Who’s Minding the Sta

Failure of Russian Security Policy,” Problems of Post-Communis

XLV, No. 2, March-April 1998, pp. 3-11.

72. Stephen Blank, Energy, Economics and Security in Centr

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Arm

College, May 1995.

73. Tehran, Abrar in Persian, March 7, 1995, FBIS-NES-

March 17, 1995, pp. 71-72.

74. Blank, “Russia and Iran,” pp. 124-127.

75. Moscow, Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnos

No. 1, January, 1995 (World Economy and International Rel

FBIS-SOV-95-056-S, March 23, 1995, pp. 11-16.

76. Tehran, Irna, in English, March 8, 1995, FBIS-NES-

March 8, 1995, p. 51.

77. Tehran, Abrar, in Persian, March 7, 1995, FBIS-NES-

March 17, 1995, pp. 71-72; Paris AFP, in English, March 21

FBIS-NES-95-056, March 23, 1995, pp. 47-48; Judith Perera, “

Stepping Into the Gulf,” Middle East International, March 20, 

13; Moscow, Interfax, in English, December 5, 1995, FBIS-SOV-

December 6, 1995, p. 25.

506
Persian Gulf,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 1, March, 19

87-92; Alexei Vassiliev, Russian Foreign Policy in the Midd

From Messianism to Pragmatism, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993, p

79. Tehran, IRNA in English, May 30, 1995, FBIS-NES-

May 31, 1995, pp. 65-66.

80. Tehran, IRNA, in English, July 20, 1998, FBIS-NES-

July 21, 1998.

81. Ibid.

82. Blank, “Every Shark East of Suez.”

83. International Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic 

1997/98, London: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 22-29.

84. Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merch

Kuwait and Qatar, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Giacomo Luciani, “The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the Sta

Democratization,” Ghassan Salame, ed., Democracy W

Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, Lond

Tauris Publishers, 1994, pp. 130-155; Jacques Delacroix

Distributive State in the World System,” Studies in Comp

International Development, Vol. XV, No. 3, Fall 1980, pp. 3-21; 

Bebalwi, and Giacomo Luciani, eds., The Rentier State, Vol. II, L

Croon Helm, 1990; H. Mahdawy, “The Problems and Patt

Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran,” M.A

ed., Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, London

University Press, 1970, pp. 428-467.

85. Sokov, pp. 1-3.

86. Johannes Reisner, “Europe, the United States, and the 

Gulf,” in Blackwill and Sturmer, pp. 126-127.

87. Blank, “Every Shark East of Suez.”

88. Elaine Holoboff, “Russia’s Strategic Pipelines.” B

Defence Yearbook, 1997, London: Brassey’s, 1997, pp. 119-120.

89. Ibid. 

90. Blank, “Energy, Economics, and Security in Central As

507
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Digest, December 19, 1997.

92. Sebastian Allison, “Gazprom Threats Seen as Empty,” 

Times, June 16, 1998.

93. The Jamestown Monitor, December 23, 1997.

94. Gaddy and Ickes, pp. 53-69, which shows that Ga

situation is hardly unique.

95. FBIS-SOV, September 28, 1995.

96. Robert Ebel, Energy Choices in the Near Abroad: The Ha

Have-Nots Face the Future, Washington: Center for Strate

International Studies, 1997, pp. 11-12; Strategic Survey, pp. 22

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Leads Peacekeeping D

Kazakstan,” Washington Post, September 15, 1997, p. 17.

102. M. A. Smith, Russia and the Middle East, Conflict 

Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, 1994, pp. 3-4; Perera, p. 13

103. Baghdad, Al-Jumhuriyah, in Arabic, January 25

FBIS-NES-95-071, April 13, 1995, p. 39.

104. M. A. Smith, pp. 3-5.

105. This is widely expected even after Saddam retreated in 

of superior U.S. force in November 1998.

106. Barton Gellman, “U.S. Fought Surprise Iraqi Inspe

Washington Post, August 14, 1998, p. 1.

107. Pavel Felgengauer, “An Uneasy Partnership: Sino-R

Defense Cooperation and Arms Sales,” Andrew J. Pierre and D

Trenin, eds., Russia in the World Arms Trade, Washingto

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997, pp. 87-105

508
Controls,” Gary K. Bertsch and Suzette R. Grillot, Editors, Arm

Market: Reducing the Risk of Proliferation in the Former Soviet 

Foreword by Sam Nunn, New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 37-38

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., “The Non-Proliferation Treaty Must Be Prol

Moscow News, April 21-27, 1995, p. 13, is one of the first 

continuing series of arguments that have not changed throug

For example, Moscow, Russkiy Telegraf, in Russian, May 20

FBIS-SOV-98-140, May 21, 1998; and on Iraq, see Moscow, Inte

English, July 31, 1998, FBIS-SOV-98-216, August 6, 1998.

112. Beck, pp. 37-38.

113. Moscow, Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhduna

Otnosheniya, in Russian, No. 7, July 1998, pp. 50-60, FBI

August 28, 1998.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid.

116. Joint Publications Research Service, Arms Control, (hen

JPRS-TAC)-95-009-L, April 6, 1995, p. 1.

117. Ibid, pp. 5-7.

118. Ibid.

119. Admiral Valentin Yegorovich Selivanov (Chief of Sta

Navy), “A Navy’s Job,” Naval Forces, Vol. XV, No. 2, 1994, p. 3

120. Pavel Felgengauer, “An Uneasy Partnership: Sino-R

Defense Cooperation and Arms Sales,” Andrew J. Pierre and D

Trenin, eds., Russia in the World Arms Trade, Washingto

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997, pp. 87-105

121. JPRS TAC-95-009-L, April 6, 1995, pp. 5-7.

122. “The Non-Proliferation Treaty Must Be Prolonged,” 

News, April 21-27, 1995, p. 13, is one of the first in this continuin

of arguments that have not changed through 1998.
1998, pp. 11-12.

124. Andrei Kortunov and Andrei Shumikhin, “Russia: Ch

Attitudes Toward Proliferation of Missiles and Weapons o

Destruction,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. XV, No. 2, April, 1996, 

125. Ibid., pp. 163-164.

126. Ibid., p. 164.

127. Stephen Blank, “Dreams of a Salesman: Russia a

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The World & I, 

1998, pp. 302-19.

128. Moscow, ITAR-TASS World Service, in Russian, July 1

FBIS-SOV-98-194, July 15, 1998.

129. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “Weapons Proliferati

Organized Crime: The Russian Military and Security 

Dimension,” Occasional Papers of the Institute for National S

Studies, No. 10, Colorado Springs, CO: U.S. Air Force Academ

1996.

130. Steve Rodan, “Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can 

Missile in Year,” Defense News, October 6-12, 1997, pp. 4, 28; Do

p. 1.

131. Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian, August 11

FBIS-SOV-98-223, August 17, 1998; Moscow, Novye Izves

Russian, August 14, 1998, FBIS-SOV-98-229, August 18, 1998

132. Ibid.

133. “Middle East: Iran,” CDPP, Vol. XLVIII, No. 48, Decem

1996, p. 22; Moscow, Novaya Gazeta Ponedelnik, in Russian, 

16-22, 1998, FBIS-TAC-98-076, March 17, 1998; Moscow, ITAR

World Service, in Russian, March 16, 1998, Foreign Bro

Information Service, Military Affairs, (henceforth FBIS-UMA)-

Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Ass

Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July 15, 1998, Purs

Public Law 201, 104th Congress, (henceforth Executive Sum

Moscow, Russkiy Telegraf, in Russian, June 6, 1998, FBIS-TAC-

June 10, 1998.

510
1998, FBIS SOV, May 13, 1998; FBIS-UMA, March 17

FBIS-TAC-98-076, March 17, 1998.

135. Moscow, Russkiy Telegraf, in Russian, February 25

FBIS-SOV-98-056, March 2, 1998.

136. Moscow, Izvestiya, in Russian, February 27, 

FBIS-TAC-98-057, March 2, 1998.

137. London,The Guardian, May 31, 1995,FBIS-SOV-95-10

1, 1995, p. 16, 137; Blank, “Russia and Iran, pp. 124-127. I

Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev confirmed that the sale of w

and nuclear components occurred on condition that Iran renoun

possession of nuclear weapons and support for the expansion of 

fundamentalism “of the extremist sort” into Central Asia. M

Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, in Russ

4, April, 1994, Joint Publication Research Service, Military 

(henceforth JPRS-UMA)-94-029, July 8, 1994, p. 41.

138. JPRS-TAC, April 6, 1995, p. 7.

139. Stephen Blank, “Russia’s Return to Mideast Dipl

Orbis, Vol. XL, No. 4, Fall 1996, pp. 517-535.

140. William C. Potter, “The Case That Russia Forgot,” Ne

Times, April 3, 1998, p. A-25.

141. Donnelly, p. 1.

142. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, November 15

FBIS-SOV, November 15, 1998; Moscow, Novye Izvestiya, in R

June 26, 1998, FBIS-TAC-98-177, June 29, 1998; Steve Rodan

Issue Fails to Derail Russia-Syria Talks on S-300,” Defense New

1-7, 1998, p. 54; Moscow, Segodnya, in Russian, February 17

FBIS-SOV, February 17, 1999; and Moscow, Izvestiya, in R

February 19, 1999, FBIS-SOV, February 18, 1999.

143. Ed Blanche, “Yemen in Secret Talks to Buy SU-27 A

Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 30, 1998, p. 20; Moscow, 

Telegraf, in Russian, July 22, 1998, FBIS-TAC-98-208, July 28

144. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, October 1

Moscow, Interfax, in English, March 28, 1996, FBIS-SOV-

March 28, 1996, p. 14; Moscow, Interfax, in English, March 28

FBIS-SOV-96-062, March 29, 1996, p. 15; Moscow, Izves

Russian, FBIS-SOV-96-063, April 1, 1996, pp. 21-22.

511
FBIS-TAC-98-208, July 27, 1998.

146. William C. Potter, “The New Suppliers,” Orbis, Vol. XXX

2, Spring 1992, pp. 206-209.

147. Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, FBIS-SOV-

March 18, 1998.

148. Arbatov made his remarks to the V Annual Confer

Russian Defense Decisionmaking sponsored by the U.S. 

Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 25-27, 1998.

149. Moscow, Segodnya, in Russian, December 14

FBIS-SOV-96-028-S, May 1, 1996.

150. Moscow, RIA, in English, July 6, 1998, FBIS-SOV-98-1

8, 1998; Matthew Brzezinski, ”U.S. Frets Over Plan to Co

Reactor in Cuba,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 1998, pp. 14; C

Dinamani (Internet Version) in Tamil, March 25, 1998, 

Broadcast Information Service Near East and South Asia (hen

FBIS-NEA)-98-084, March 27, 1998; Moscow, Moskovskiye Nov

Russian, March 8-15, 1998, FBIS-SOV-98-070, March 12

Moscow, Interfax, in English, March 17, 1998, FBIS-SOV-

March 18, 1998; Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian, Ma

1998, FBIS-SOV-98-077, March 19, 1998; and most recently Ru

announced plans to build still another “research” reactor in Ir

will not stop selling one to India, “Russia Plans New Reactor 

Official Says,” Washington Post Foreign Service, April 7, 1998

RFE/RL Newsline, May 19, 1998.

151. Tehran, IRNA, in English, July 17, 1998, FBIS-TAC-

July 20, 1998.

152. See Endnote 150.

153. “Arms Trade,” CDPP, Vol. XLIX, No. 25, July 23, 1997

154. See Endnote 150.

155. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, June 5

FBIS-SOV-98-160, June 10, 1998.

156. Stephen Blank, Challenging the New World Order: Th

Transfer Policies of the Russian Republic, Carlisle Barrac

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993, pp. 6, 1

512
Future in Asia, New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1

38-39, 46.

158. Moscow, Russkiy Telegraf, in Russian, July 14

FBIS-SOV-98-195, July 15, 1998.

159. Ickes and Gaddy, pp. 53-67.

160. For Maslyukov’s views, see his ar

“Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kompleks: Poka Degredatsiia 

Obratima,” Pravda, March 6-13, 1998, pp. 32-35, and “Oboro

Kompleks Nado Pomoshch’,” VTS, January 19-25, 1998, pp. 32-

made available to the author by Dr. Igor Khripunov of the Unive

Georgia.

161. FBIS-SOV, March 18, 1998.

162. Moscow, Segodnya, in Russian, December 14

FBIS-SOV-96-028-S, May 1, 1996.

163. Moscow, Izvestiya, in Russian, December 24, 

FBIS-SOV-96-248, December 26, 1996; Moscow, Nezavisimaya 

in Russian, (Electronic Version), July 22, 1998, FBIS-SOV-

August 13, 1998.

164. Ibid.

165. Athens, I Katheimerini, in English, September 1

FBIS-SOV, September 1, 1998.

166. Moscow, Interfax, in English, October 2, 1998, FBI

October 2, 1998.

167. See the remarks of Aleksei Arbatov in Cyprus, Nicosia, 

News Agency in English, September 27, 1998, FBIS-SOV, Sep

27, 1998; and Moscow, Novye Izvestiya in Russian, July 1

FBIS-SOV-98-183, July 6, 1998; Simon Saradzhiyan, “Russia

Skeptical of Turkish Accord,” Defense News, June 1-7, 1998, p. 

worth noting that Dmitri Trenin characterizes Russia’s Turkey p

“schizophrenic.” Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Turkey: A C

Schizophrenia,” Perspectives, Vol. II, No. 2, June-August 19

57-65.

168. Pavel Felgengauer, “Cyprus Arms Sales for Pro

Petersburg Times, January 26-February 2, 1997. Incide

Felgengauer is one of the strongest advocates of the view that arm

513
but a contradiction that remains unreconciled.

169. Ibid.

170. Nikitenko, p. 10; Umit Eginsoy, “Turkish Moves 

Caucasus, Balkans, Irk Rivals in Region,” Defense News, Aug

1998, p. 12; Istanbul, Milliyet, July 31, 1997, FBIS-WEU-

August 1, 1997.

171. Istanbul, Cumhurriyet, in Turkish, March 11

FBIS-WEU-97-072, March 15, 1997; Ibid., pp. 97-240, August 2

Tel Aviv, Ma’ariv, in Hebrew, April 16, 1998, FBIS-TAC-98-10

17, 1998; Nicosia, I Makhi in Greek, August 11, 1998, Foreign Br

Information Service Western Europe (henceforth FBIS-WEU)-

August 17, 1998.

172. Nicosia, O Filevtheros, in Greek, September 30

FBIS-SOV, September 30, 1998.

173. Andrew Borowiec, “Turkey, Foes Engage in Race to Buy 

Washington Times, October 14, 1998, p. 13; FBIS-WEU, Ma

1997, August 28, 1997.

174. Eugene Kogan, “Clandestine Liaisons: Israeli-Russian 

Co-Operation,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1996, pp. 2

Moscow, NTV, in Russian, December 1, 1995, FBIS-SOV-

December 4, 1995, p. 23; Moscow, Radio Rossii Network, in R

December 5, 1995, FBIS-SOV-95-234, December 6, 1995, p. 25; M

Interfax, in English, December 9, 1995, FBIS-SOV-95-237, De

11, 1995, p. 30; Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, Dece

1995, FBIS-SOV-95-233, December 5, 1995, pp. 20-21.

175. Tel Aviv, Ha’aretz in English (Internet Version), Aug

1998, FBIS-NES-98-222, August 13, 1998; The Jamestown M

August 12, 1998, August 13, 1998, FBIS-SOV, August 17

FBIS-SOV-98-229, August 18, 1998.

176. Ed Blanche, “Israel Stops Gas Deal in Russia-Iran 

Row,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 17, 1997, p. 3.

177. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, March 30, 

FBIS-SOV-98-089, March 31, 1998.

178. London, Al-Hayah, in Arabic, June 4, 1998, FBIS-SOV-

June 9, 1998.

514
Review,” p. 3.

180. Moscow, Interfax, in English, October 9, 1998, FBI

October 9, 1998.

181. Jamestown, Prism, October 16, 1998, p. 3.

515
DR. ROBERTO ALIBONI is Director of Studies a

Institute of International Affairs, Rome.

DR. STEFANO BIANCHINI is Director of the Cent

Studies on East-Central and Balkan Europe, Univer

Bologna.

DR. STEPHEN J. BLANK is Research Profess

Russian/Soviet Affairs at the Strategic Studies Inst

U.S. Army War College.

DR. STEVEN L. BURG is Professor of Politics, Bra

University.

DR. STEPHEN C. CALLEYA is Deputy Directo

Lecturer in International Relations, Mediterra

Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta

International Representative of the International O

University of Warwick.

DR. THEODORE A. COULOUMBIS is Profess

International Relations, University of Athens, and 

President of the Hellenic Foundation for Europea

Foreign Policy.

DR. ROBERT O. FREEDMAN is President of Balt

Hebrew University.

DR. SAMI G. HAJJAR is Director, Middle East St

Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. 

War College.

DR. R. CRAIG NATION is the Elihu Root Profes

Military Studies, U.S. Army War College.

DR. ALESSANDRO POLITI is at the Ministry of De

Rome.

DR. RODOLFO RAGIONIERI is at the Departme

Political and Social Science, Center for the Study of Wa

Peace, Florence.

517
Center for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defe

Bulgaria.

DR. MOHAMMAD EL-SAYED SELIM is Profess

Political Science, Faculty of Economics and Po

Science, Cairo University.

DR. DUYGU BAZOGLU SEZER is Professor of 

national Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara, Tur

DR. GERALD M. STEINBERG is Associate Profes

Political Studies at Bar Ilan University; and Direc

Conflict Management and Resolution, and Senior Res

Associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Stu

DR. MARIO ZUCCONI is at the University of U

Urbino, Italy.

518
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Larry M. Wortzel

Acting Director of Research

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Editor

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

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Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

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Mr. James E. Kistler