POPULATION DIVERSITY AND THE U.S. AR

Lloyd J. Matthews

Editor

and

Tinaz Pavri

Co-editor

June 1999
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Depart

the Army, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Governm

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ISBN 1-58487-002-8

ii
iii

Foreword ..........................

1. Introduction: Primer on Future Recruit Diversity

Lloyd J. Matthews ............................

2. The Russian People and Their Army:

 A Negative Example for America

Robert Pringle.................................

3. The American Military and the People It Serves:

 Together or Drifting Apart?

John R. Groves, Jr..............................

4. The U.S. Army and Ethnic Diversity:

 A Historical Overview

Douglas V. Johnson II .........................

5. Diversity in the 21st Century Army:

 Leadership Issues

Joseph C. Jones ..............................

6. Systematic Planning for Raising the Future Force

Michael J. Stehlik.............................

7. The Hispanic Market: An Overview

Ricardo F. Diaz...............................

8. Women in the United States Military

Myra J. Peterson..............................

9. Person to Person: The Diversity Challenge

 for the Army After Next 1

Andre H. Sayles ..............................

10. Conclusion: Approaching the Issues of Recruit Divers

Lloyd J. Matthews .............................

Biographical Sketches...................
At times, an institution needs to examine itself an

stock of its future. The “Army” writ large as an institu

above all, an assembly of people—all with a common 

and task. This book deals with the vital question of h

United States armed forces in general, and the Army 

institution in particular, can best accommodate in 

recruiting efforts the rapid changes in U.S. popu

patterns over the next half century. It is an eff

self-examination. The book is an outgrowth of conv

initiatives on the part of two American educa

institutions—the U.S. Army War College at Ca

Barracks, Pennsylvania, and Spelman College in At

Georgia—the two having formed a fruitful partners

co-sponsor a conference titled “Population Diversity a

U.S. Army in 2030,” held at Spelman College on Aug

1998.

The Army War College, through its Strategic Ou

Program, makes a concerted effort to connect with v

American civilian entities not only to promote m

understanding, but also to find collaborative solutio

military problems that ultimately affect all Amer

Spelman College, positioned at the core of the netw

historically black colleges in Atlanta and having a st

body of black women, provided an ideal venue for exam

issues regarding demographic and ethnic change th

expect in America over the next several decades. We s

acknowledge as well the yeoman assistance of th

Army Recruiting Command located at Fort 

Kentucky, which provided to conferees useful bri

wholly devoid of academic vapors, focusing rather up

unvarnished realities of future projections o

composition of America’s population. Our Recr

Command colleagues also discussed in clear term

Army’s efforts to enlist women and members of 

diverse groups in the recruiting market of today—and 

we can expect tomorrow.

v
proceedings. Rather, it is an anthology of se

presentations that not only portrays the main chal

confronting those who must staff the future force in th

of unprecedented demographic flux, but also provid

attitudes and hopes of women and minorities who ar

of today’s Army.

The reader should pay particular attention to Cha

which examines the Russian military. Its author, R

Pringle, gives us a case study in what happens wh

institution collapses because it can not accomm

diversity and change.

LARRY M. WORTZEL

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Instit

vi
INTRODUCTION:

PRIMER ON FUTURE RECRUIT DIVERS

Lloyd J. Matthews

If we do not learn from history, we shall be compelled to rel

it. True. But if we do not change the future, we shall 

compelled to endure it. And that could be worse.

Alvin Toffler

1

The premises of this monograph are th

epoch-defining demographic ferment is in progress 

United States today, that this ferment will pr

fundamental changes in the composition of the Arm

that the Army must adapt to such changes with 

wisdom if the emotion-laden issues evoked at every tu

not to stymie the muster of an optimum ground forc

the next several decades.

Evidence of demographic flux is everywhere, in p

literature as well as the Census Bureau’s o

projections. Consider, for example, the eye-po

projection that Americans of European background

comprising about 72 percent of the U.S. populatio

diminish to about 53 percent by the year 2050, meanin

so-called “white Anglo-Saxons” are headed for mi

status. The fastest-growing ethnic group is th

Hispanic origin, who if current trends hold will com

one-quarter of the population by mid-century.

2

 T

Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan once avowe

“with our increased birthrates the black man and w

can actually breed ourselves into power,”3 the like

rather is that as early as the year 2008, Hispanics

numbering 30.5 million, will have eclipsed blacks an

1
an even stronger claim:

Hispanics already constitute the largest single ethnic 

cultural minority in the U.S., contrary to Census Bur

figures, which do not include more than 4 million Hispa

living here illegally, as well as the nearly 4 million Pu

Ricans on their island. This puts their numbers above thos

African-Americans. With 600,000 new immigrant

year—about half of them illegal—Hispanics will reach 

million [by 2005].4

Another American ethnic group experiencing a 

increase in its numbers is the Asian and Pacific Is

populations, now constituting less than four percent o

citizens but expected to reach 8.2 percent by mid-ce

Blacks, currently numbering about 12.2 percen

projected to remain relatively steady at 13.6 percen

that same period.

But ethnicity and race are not the only popu

variables that can bear on the composition 

army—gender, sexual orientation, and religion, to n

few others that spring most prominently to mind

obviously relevant.

5

 Women are knocking at the door 

armed forces in growing numbers. Females sl

outnumber males in the U.S. population, and th

gradually exercising ballot clout and employment o

more proportionate to their numbers. As an exa

January 1999 saw the swearing in of the top five e

state officials in Arizona who were all women! Mean

Elizabeth Dole ponders a run for the Repub

presidential nomination.

Homosexuals are also demanding access to m

careers, and while their relative numbers may n

increasing their militance is. The current “don’t ask

tell” policy—a middle path between outright reject

homosexuals on one hand, and total acceptance o

other—was ruled constitutional by the 2d U.S. C

Court of Appeals in New York on September 23, 

2
homosexuals were not classified as a minority 

deserving of special civil rights protection. B

knowledgeable observer expects this to be the last 

sounded on the issue.

Meanwhile, a survey among soldiers conduct

Charles Moskos and Laura Miller suggested that in

resistance to homosexuals in the military may be soft

Of 270 male soldiers surveyed, only 36 percent 

“strongly opposed,” with 22 percent “not sure.” W

favored accepting homosexuals by better than two t

The survey samples were smallish and not se

scientifically, but if the numbers hold up they co

important since one of the arguments against homos

in the military rests on the assumption that they wo

rejected by heterosexual comrades in the r

jeopardizing unit cohesion.

On the religious front, the number of faiths repres

among service members has grown well beyon

traditional “Big Three”—Protestant, Catholic, Jewish

Buddhist Churches of America became the 

non-Judeo-Christian chaplaincy endorsing agency in 

By 1989, more than 100 religious denominations 

represented among active duty Army chaplains.

10

 In 

Chaplain Abdul R. Muhammad became the first I

chaplain on active duty, and we are now seein

establishment of “mosques” on some Army posts, e.g

Bragg, North Carolina, where Muslim soldiers can w

in appropriate facilities.

11

 By 1994, there were 

Muslims and 1,240 Buddhists in the Total Army, nu

that showed every promise of growing.

12

The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that 

tectonic plates comprising the U.S. population conti

shift, there will be inevitable reflections of these chan

the Army’s composition. To acquire richer divers

human capital can bring with it enormous advantag

any country or institution, as the American imm

3
demonstrated. But the process of acquiring that div

can be unsettling at best and explosively controver

worst. This is why intelligent planning and 

management become so critical for the Army duri

encounter with growing recruit diversity over the 

several decades. We can glimpse the nature of the pr

by reference to several examples.

In the best of all possible worlds, ethnic represen

within the Army should reflect at least roughly the 

proportions of the general population. When 

proportions are seriously out of whack or are perceive

so, particularly in combat units during wartim

“cannon-fodder” allegation inevitably arises. Comp

were registered during both the Vietnam and Persia

wars that poor blacks bore a disproportionate share 

combat risks. African-American leaders Jesse Jackso

Benjamin Hooks, for example, protested that U.S. 

forces sent to the Gulf were 30 percent black, where

U.S. population was only 11 percent black. After th

War, Professor Ronald Walters of the Howard Univ

faculty recommended binding quotas limiting blacks 

military to their proportion of the population at larg

In fact, however, as Charles Moskos and John 

Butler have pointed out, in the Vietnam War black fat

came to only 12.1 percent of the total for all Americ

percentage corresponding almost exactly to the perce

of blacks in the general population and far belo

percentage of blacks in the military at that time. 

further, Moskos and Butler collected data on combat d

by race in seven U.S. overseas interventions 

Vietnam—Mayaguez (Cambodia), Lebanon, Gre

Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Bosnia. B

accounted for only 14 percent of the U.S. combat fata

Moskos and Butler conclude: “No serious case can be 

that African-Americans suffer disproportionate casu

in America’s wars and interventions.”

14

4
foregoing analysis, however, since the subj

comparative ethnic shares of combat risk rema

extraordinarily sensitive—thus ever vulnera

demagoguery—and since combat risk projections by 

leaders and opinion-makers are usually based 

unnaturally) upon ethnic representation in the tota

rather than in frontline combat units. Ironically, acco

to Moskos and Butler, the percentage of blacks 

infantry has dropped steadily from 30 percent in 198

percent currently, while the portion of blacks in lo

units today often runs in excess of 50 percent. Mosk

Butler believe that “the reasons for and consequences 

development require attention.”

15

 The lesson for the 

is clear: as the Hispanic share of the U.S. population 

toward 25 percent by the middle of the next century, a 

double that of blacks, a correspondingly rising sh

Hispanics is likely to find its way into the Army’s ra

this development is not managed with care, the 

cannon-fodder charges that have dogged the Army 

respect to blacks could begin to emerge with resp

Hispanics.

Nor do causes for concern cease here. Linda C

president of the Center for Equal Opportun

Washington and author of Out of the Barrio: Toward 

Politics of Assimilation (Basic Books), has reported 

episode in Los Angeles in February 1998 that coul

represent a premonitory microcosm of larger moveme

the future:

A crowd of over 91,000 fans, made up predominantly 

Latinos who live and work in southern California, gathered 

the Gold Cup soccer match between the Mexican and U

national teams. They did not come to root for the home tea

Rather, they booed and whistled through the singing of T

Star Spangled Banner, and then proceeded to pelt the play

on the American team with food, bottles, and cans. . . 

Mexican-American fan complained bitterly that he and 

young son had been sprayed with beer and soda for having t

temerity to display a small American flag. . . . Dozens of 

5
immigrants who were happy to take advantage of Ameri

jobs, education, medical care, and welfare benefits w

spitting on American symbols.

16

In graphic language, Mrs. Chavez has broached 

the most sensitive but crucial questions arising fro

Hispanic immigration movement: Will Hispa

particularly those of Mexican ancestry who reside in t

of southwestern U.S. border states contiguous to M

assimilate into the American melting pot like other 

groups, or will they instead remain a separate comm

within a community, maintaining their original lan

identity, culture, and national loyalty?

Mrs. Chavez feels that prospects for assimilati

poor, noting the low rates of naturalization (“even 

nearly 20 years of U.S. residence, it seems that fewe

one in five Mexican-Americans chooses to acquire Am

citizenship”) and the resistance to learning English 

1990, three-quarters of Mexican immigrants who arr

the 1980s still spoke little or no English; about one q

of all Mexican immigrants have not learned to 

English even after decades in the U.S.”).

17

 Tad Sz

comparison, takes a more upbeat view of the Hi

community-within-community approach to life 

United States:

The Ramoses [for example] are a proud Mexican-Ameri

family, participating fully in American life with

relinquishing their Mexican identity. In many ways, their st

reflects that of other Hispanics across the U.S. The abilit

come to terms with two identities is perhaps the secret of 

rich Hispanic culture that has taken root in this country. 

Ultimately, the Spanish language is the great unifier of the 

and disparate Hispanic culture. And that culture—in all 

vibrant accents and through its music, food, literature, 

political concerns—is braiding itself into the diverse Ameri

fabric and becoming, at the advent of the 21st century, a n

American culture.

18

6
multiculturist movement that has taken hold in Am

education over the past quarter of a century, is by no 

shared by all. No less an observer than Arthur Schles

Jr., who has always marched in the vanguard of th

rights movement in this country, in a 1992 book disa

with the view “that a main objective of public edu

should be the protection, strengthening, celebration

perpetuation” of different ethnic identities.

19

 If the “

ethnicity” ever became fully ascendant in this coun

could in Schlesinger’s view threaten the unity, coh

and identity that define us as a nation.

Fortunately, we need not enter this great na

debate except to note its implications for recruitin

future Army. Two points are salient. First, the le

English language fluency among the Hispanic 18-2

cohort could impair our ability to make full use o

growing segment of the U.S. population. As the Inform

Age comes fully into view, the U.S. Army will bec

communicating army like no army before it, and 

require soldiers who write and speak a common lan

Lacking such facility, soldiers would be unable to tr

with fellow soldiers in the elementary grammar of wa

they could be unable to capitalize upon the techno

manna that daily descends upon the forces. 

responsible for raising and training the Army Afte

will need to give the language question a great deal o

thought.

Second, despite the possibility that language coul

problems for the incorporation of Hispanic youth in na

defense, it seems nonetheless inevitable that the 

numbers in the recruiting pool will make themselv

and that some units in the Army might even

experience Hispanic representation on the order of 2

percent, the largest share of which could be of M

derivation.

20

 A hint of things to come can be seen 

Army’s accession figures for Hispanics since FY 

showing a steady annual rise from 3.5 percent to ab

7
“cannon-fodder” charges when casualty figures of part

ethnic groups are perceived to grow significantly out o

Of course, the problems presented by recruit div

are not exclusively ethnic. Gender integration has br

its own distinct set of problems, and, if anythin

resulting dialogue has been marked by far more he

acrimony than has ethnic discussion. Jean Holm, w

written perhaps the best and most evenhanded brief h

of women in the armed forces, here describe

deliberations of the blue-ribbon, 15-member Presid

Commission on Women’s Assignments, which rende

report in November 1992:

Almost from the outset the commission’s meetings w

contentious and combative. Discussions frequently degenera

into rancorous debate . . . . Each [side] accused the other of clo

minds and bad faith. . . . The report . . . was described by man

a partisan mess and, as expected, stirred up a firestorm 

criticism.

22

But what precisely is the nub of the controversy 

All statutory combat exclusions affecting women hav

repealed. By policy, women are permitted to comp

assignments in aircraft, including those engaged in c

missions. They are permitted assignment to shi

combat missions.

23

 The main remaining policy 

combat participation by women lies in the directiv

they not be assigned “to units engaged in direct com

the ground,”

24

 which ostensibly would prohibit assign

to infantry, armor, cavalry, artillery, and combat engi

though the de facto prohibitions will likely be subj

evolving interpretation.

The story of the gradual opening of military assign

to women is the story of continual unyielding press

sincere female service members and their advoca

secure as many openings as possible, with the ultima

of abolishing all exclusions. Meanwhile, many sincer

service members and their advocates, motivated b

8
men, argue that assignments should reflect this distin

I have tried to flesh out the positions of the two camp

the narratives below, which are intentionally expres

tones of dogmatic certitude.

According to the “Traditionalist” argument, the 

powerful chemical warfare agent known to scie

testosterone, the vital masculinizing hormone pro

primarily by males. It is responsible for the size, str

and aggressiveness that distinguish the male fro

female. All other factors being equal, a male arm

defeat a female army. All other factors being equal, a 

army will defeat a coed army. If two male armies fig

victor will be the one with the least femin

acculturation, all other factors being equal. If, in the 

of equal rights or equal economic opportunity, gover

selects the less fit to fight its wars, it betrays its sacred 

to protect the people and preserve the nation.

The Feminist 25 responds that war is no l

epitomized by individual soldiers engaged in hand-to

combat, where victory goes to the combatant with 

physical prowess and brawn. War instead has bec

corporate endeavor, fought by complex organizati

great distances, employing technology to locate the 

and advanced weaponry to destroy him. In place of so

who are big, fast, strong, and fierce, the Army of the 

will require those who are smart, educated, techn

trainable, and able to work compatibly as member

team, traits a woman can supply as well and perhaps 

than a man. In modern warfare, soldiers seldom lay e

an actual enemy, instead relying on sensors to find hi

stand-off weapons to destroy him. A woman can o

sensing devices and activate automated weapons as w

a man. Defending one’s country is at once a ri

privilege, and an obligation, accruing unde

Constitution to women as well as men. Our country 

better served by a willing female soldier than a rel

male. Even if it were demonstrable that some few pos

9
roles can be satisfactorily performed by females. In th

analysis, the argument is moot because the realities 

recruiting market in the era of the all-volunteer for

dictate an increasing share of women in the Army.

As we progress into the new century, we can expe

tension between the Traditionalist and Feminist pos

on women’s assignments to be played out again

backdrop of continued evolution in the technolog

methods of warfare, fluctuations in the military budg

manpower ceilings as dictated by Congress, na

economic conditions, and variations in the size, qualit

attitudes of the available manpower--and womanp

pool. Over the last 15 years, the proportion of women 

Army has risen continuously; today one in ever

soldiers inducted is female.26

Except for judicial tests in the nation’s higher c

controversy with respect to homosexuals in the milita

been generally muted since implementation of the 

ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue” policy in July 19

September of the same year, Congress inserted a cla

the National Defense Authorization Act that could m

harder for presidents in the future to relax the p

policy, which requires discharge of any military m

who engages in a homosexual act. The clause inser

Congress declares that “persons who demonstr

propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts 

create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of m

good order and discipline.”

27

During the national debates in 1992-93 leading up 

“don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue” policy, homo

advocates sought to draw an analogy betwee

predicament of homosexuals at that time an

predicament of blacks seeking full integration in

armed forces in 1948. Just as charges that the integra

blacks into the ranks would destroy unit cohesion p

false, according to homosexual proponents, similar 

10
However, General Colin Powell and Lieutenant G

Calvin Waller, both prominent black officers, exp

disagreement with such an analogy. Testifying befo

Senate Armed Services Committee on April 29, 199

example, General Waller pointed out that blacks c

change or conceal the blackness for which they 

discrimination. By way of contrast, according to W

homosexuals can change or conceal their homos

behavior, a fact that renders the African-Ame

experience entirely different.

28

Because of the silence imposed by the “don’t ask

tell” policy, we cannot be sure how many homosexua

entering the Army under the resulting umbrella

formulation does represent a liberalization of pre

policy, however, in the sense that homosexual soldie

expect a reduced threat of exposure, meaning that 

numbers may well increase in the future force.

29

Turning to the subject of religious diversity, we fin

the proliferation of faiths represented in the Arm

potentially present special problems in ter

requirements for distinctive, religion-imposed ap

uniform accoutrements, diet, medical needs, times o

and hair length and grooming, as well as for faith-s

worship facilities.

30

 The yarmulke for Conservative J

male soldiers and the turban, beard, and 

particularities for Sikhs are examples of issues encou

in the past. To codify policy in this area, the 

promulgated AR 600-20, Accommodation of Rel

Practices Within the U.S. Army, in 1986.

31

 The c

version of the regulation notes that “a complete proh

on the wearing of any visible item of religious appare

be appropriate under unique circumstances,” bu

commander is allowed to make the final decision

practice thus far, commanders have construe

regulation liberally and the issue has generated 

controversy in the ranks.

33

 Potential for controversy a

lies just beneath the surface, however, particularly if 

11
the news media.

In the two chapters that immediately follow, w

locate the recruit diversity phenomenon within the 

context of civil-military relations, since such relatio

be decisive in the Army’s efforts to raise an optimum f

the face of a radically changing recruitment 

Subsequent chapters will focus primarily upon the 

aspects of diversity, because it is in this area th

greatest changes from patterns of the past are lik

occur.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Alvin Toffler, “Introduction: Probing Tomorrow,” 

Futurists, ed. Alvin Toffler, New York: Random House, 1972, p

2. Technically, the term “Hispanic” applies to those native to 

Spain-Portugal, or Latin America. In the eastern United States, 

Spanish descent prefer to call themselves Hispanic, while 

American Southwest, they prefer Latino (compare Latin Am

Chicanos, Americans of Mexican descent, represent a subset of L

Despite regional preferences, Hispanic and Latino are ess

interchangeable. “Anglo” is the term used by Hispanics and La

refer to non-Hispanic whites. See Tad Szulc, “The Fastest-G

Minority in America,”Parade Magazine, January 3, 1999, pp. 4-

taxonomy employed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, per

Hispanic origin may be of any race, including of course white an

The Bureau classifies “Hispanic origin” as an ethnicity. When th

white and black are used in this book for demographic purpos

are understood to refer to non-Hispanic whites and non-H

blacks, respectively. The population figures given here and below 

from Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997, 117th editio

Department of Commerce, October 1997, Table 19, p. 19. The fig

“today” are actually projections for 1999 made in 1997. Informa

the taxonomy used by the Bureau is taken from Section 1, pp

Statistical Abstract. For an excellent brief discussion of U.S. n

population projections with special attention to ethnic trends, s

Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P

Population Profile of the United States: 1997, Washington, D

Government Printing Office, 1998, pp. 2-3, 6-9, 42-47, 52-53.

12
Acting to Hurt Blacks,” Washington Post, April 24, 1989, p. A3

4. Szulc, p. 6.

5. “Ethnic” is a protean term that can apply to a variety o

classifications such as common racial, national, tribal, re

linguistic, or cultural background. In America’s past, ethnicity h

been used to refer to original nationality in contradistinction 

which cuts across national boundaries. In the present book, “ethn

generally apply to both race and nationality, but if a different 

intended the meaning will be clear from the context.

6. Nick Adde, “‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Ruled Constitutional

Times, October 5, 1998, p. 20.

7. G. E. Willis, “Are Troops More Tolerant on Sex?” Army 

October 5, 1998, p. 20.

8. John W. Brinsfield, Jr., The United States Army Cha

1975-1995, 2 parts, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, O

the Chief of Chaplains, 1997, pt. 1, p. 70. Chaplain (Colonel) Brin

book is a work of consummate scholarship, serving as an e

starting point for those who wish to delve deeper into the su

religious diversity in the Army.

9. Ibid., pt. 1, p. 437.

10. Ibid., pt. 1, pp. 437-438.

11. Ibid., pt. 1, p. 440.

12. Ibid., pt. 1, p. 331.

13. David J. Armor, “Race and Gender in the U.S. Military,” 

Forces & Society, Vol. 23, No. 1, Fall 1996, pp. 7-27.

14. Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler, “Racial Integra

Army Way,” ARMY Magazine, July 1998, pp. 30-31; see also Ar

22. Moskos and Butler also make a useful point regarding the f

the Army must walk in dealing with this sensitive point: “Th

number of African-Americans in the Army seemingly poses a ‘pe

benefit’ versus ‘wartime burden’ dilemma. In times of w

disproportionate numbers of blacks in the Army are seen as in

casualties on America’s most victimized group. In times of peac

same numbers are viewed as employment opportunit

African-Americans” (p. 30).

13
16. Linda Chavez, “Our Hispanic Predicament,” Commentar

1998, p. 47.

17. Chavez, p. 49.

18. Szulc, pp. 5-6.

19. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of Americ

York: W. W. Norton, 1992, pp. 9-20. See also James W. Ceas

Patrick J. McGuinn, “Civic Education Reconsidered,” The 

Interest, No. 133, Fall 1998, pp. 84-103.

20. Chavez, p. 48.

21. For the Hispanic accession figures since FY 1985, see 

States Army Recruiting Command, “Accession Demographics (I

Prior Service),” June 1, 1998, p. 1. Hispanics constitute ne

percent of the U.S. population today according to Szulc (p. 6

Statistical Abstract, however, we derive a figure of 11.2 percen

19, p. 19).

22. Jean M. Holm, “Women in the Armed Forces,” in Encyclo

the American Military, Vol. III, ed. John E. Jessup and Louise B

New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1994, p. 2020.

23. Ibid., pp. 2020, 2025; Armor, p. 8.

24. Holm, p. 2025.

25. I use the terms “Traditionalist” and “Feminist” as con

shorthand, confining their application solely to the positions on 

soldiers’ assignments herein set forth. In using these terms, I 

wish to associate the issues at hand with such larger themes as t

between the sexes,” the women’s movement, or feminist id

though I recognize of course that there will be those who ma

connections. I acknowledge also, of course, that not all male 

oppose women in combat and not all women support it.

26. United States Army Recruiting Command, “Ac

Demographics (Includes Prior Service),” June 1, 1998, p. 1.

27. Judith H. Stiehm, “Sexual Orientation and the Milit

Encyclopedia of the American Military, Vol. III, ed. John E. Jess

Louise B. Ketz, New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1994, pp. 2061-2

14
29. Ibid., p. 2070.

30. Brinsfield, pt. 1, pp. 187-188, 259-263.

31. Ibid., pt. 1, pp. 188, 259-261, 436.

32. The subject of accommodating religious practices has sin

incorporated in AR 600-20, now titled Army Command Policy

March 30, 1988 (with Interim Change I04, dated September 17

para. 5-6. For the quotation, see para. 5-6.h.(4)(a)6. on pp. 16-

also Brinsfield, pt. 1, p. 261.

33. Brinsfield, pt. 1, p. 290, n. 138.

15
THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR AR

A NEGATIVE EXAMPLE FOR AMERIC

Robert Pringle

INTRODUCTION

Discussion of diversity issues affecting an army u

arises within the larger context of the relations be

that army and the civilian population of the nation inv

If we are truly to understand how diversity consider

affect an army, whether for better or worse, we mus

gain some appreciation of the society from which so

are drawn. Society’s attitude toward the mil

particularly insofar as that attitude is reflected in the 

of potential recruits, can be a decisive factor not o

recruiting a quality force, but also in maintainin

morale and viability of the force once it is raised.

Unfortunately, contemplation of diversity issues 

the U.S. army today, not to mention the high-

operational uses and commitments of its soldiers 

still-dangerous world, is a subject overladen with 

feelings. Questions of ethnic and gender equity, to wh

superadded questions of placing our children in harm

form an extraordinarily emotive brew, and it is 

difficult to discern the path of wisdom when em

become engaged.

At such times, to regain our analytical detachm

can be helpful to shift our scrutiny to a competing mod

that is emotively neutral but yet sufficiently analog

our own to be instructive. For this purpose, we 

examine the situation in Russia, where the army a

people have come to the point of undisguised m

hostility. Armed with a perspective of events in Russ

17
country in a more dispassionate light.

HISTORICAL HERITAGE

During the heyday of the Soviet Union, 

institutions constituted the political troika on which 

was based: the Communist Party, the Committee of 

Security (KGB), and the Red army. Of these three, the 

had the greatest legitimacy and enjoyed the most p

support. If, in the eyes of the people, the Party and th

represented the authority and the power, the army 

the people themselves. How was it possible, then, fo

have lost standing so rapidly during the waning days 

Cold War and in post-Cold War democratic Russia?

Ties between the people and the Red army 

cemented by the terrible cost of victory in what 

citizens called the “Great Patriotic War.” More th

million members of the Soviet armed forces were ki

wounded in the war against Nazi Germany.

1

 To put 

losses into perspective, the Red army in 1941 lost a

twice as many men killed in the 10-week defe

Moscow—514,338—than the United States lost in c

in all of World War II.

2

 The war created a set of gen

popular uniformed heroes seemingly untouched b

horrors of the Stalin terror.

During the post-Stalin period, the Party an

Ministry of Defense further publicized the cult of vic

enhance the regime’s legitimacy. Victory Day on 

became one of the most important and most popular a

holidays. Military art became a major state indust

example, statues from Volgograd to Berlin celebrat

role of the Soviet soldier and officer in defendin

motherland and “liberating” the countries of Ea

Europe.3

During the Brezhnev years (1964-82), the Soviet 

forces continued to be the subject of uncritical adu

18
integral to becoming a man. Thousands of books, ar

poems, plays, and movies highlighted the role 

military in defeating the German Fascists and defe

the country against imperialism. Children’s 

celebrated the brave border guards and soldiers, 

Brezhnev’s memoirs of the war embroidered his own 

a brigade political commissar in fighting the N

Brezhnev’s book sold millions of copies, as did memo

other leaders.

Beneath the surface, however, there was evide

growing popular discontent within society and the m

itself with regard to the regime’s management of the 

forces. Stories of the mistreatment of draftees circula

the press. Of greater concern to the leadership w

participation of junior army and naval officers in dis

movements and in at least two acts of political violenc

attempt against the life of Brezhnev in 1969 an

hijacking of a destroyer by several junior officers in 

Even Brezhnev’s overblown military reputation beca

butt of underground political humor. In one joke, S

during a particularly difficult moment in the war, i

Brigade Commander Brezhnev to the Kremlin to as

how to defeat the Wehrmacht.

CRACKS IN THE EDIFICE

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev came to 

only weeks after the 40th anniversary of the 

surrender. His speech on Victory Day 1985 extolled t

of the Red army and the Party’s leadership in def

Germany. Nevertheless, it was Gorbachev’s pol

glasnost (openness) that legitimized criticism 

military, especially in the handling of draftees an

conduct of the war in Afghanistan. By the 1980s, the d

of thousands of draftees because of hazing had becom

of the dirty little secrets of Soviet society. Articles 

press beginning in 1988 reported how nasty and bru

19
violence against new draftees that annually killed or 

thousands to commit suicide. The war in Afghan

which Gorbachev described as a “bleeding wound

speech to the Communist Party conference, had b

unpopular by 1986. Families resented sending 

children “there”—that is, to Afghanistan. Press rep

how poorly the army honored their dead, how the child

the privileged class were spared duty in Afghanista

how blunders cost draftees their lives, colored 

perceptions of the armed forces.

The rediscovery of Soviet history, another asp

glasnost, led to a further reduction of the moral autho

the army. Books and articles based on declas

information about the Great Patriotic War raised que

about military brutality and mismanagement. For th

time, World War II military orders were made publ

equated being taken prisoner with treason, stipulatin

families of prisoners of war would suffer dire consequ

As a veteran of the partisan movement put it in ass

the cost of victory, “In paying an immense price f

victory over Hitler, the people facilitated the com

victory of Stalin’s absolute tyranny.”6

It was Gorbachev’s decision to use the military to c

and suppress nationalist violence, however, that d

most damage to the military’s crumbling reput

Alexander Lebed, earlier an airborne regimenta

division commander, noted in his memoirs that the 

elite airborne divisions to police nationalist disturban

Azerbaijan, Armenia, Central Asia, and the 

exacerbated ethnic tensions throughout the militar

created a growing rift between the army and socie

America pay heed). Writing of the impact first of the A

War and then of political intervention, Lebed wrote:

This incompetent political adventure, this attempt to export 

revolution, which had not justified itself, spelled the beginn

of the end. In 1986 Alma-Ata caught fire, and then Karaba

20
of those killed and wounded on Soviet Union territory has lo

since outstripped the number killed on Afghan soil.

7

YELTSIN’S RUSSIA, WHOSE ARMY?

In December 1991, Russia’s new president, 

Yeltsin, inherited a world-class army that had been 

compromised during the final days of the Soviet r

Elite airborne regiments had been rushed to Moscow t

part in the abortive August 1991 coup, and we now 

that violence was only narrowly averted on se

occasions.

8

 Moreover, Yeltsin, who had no activ

military experience, selected an airborne comma

General Pavel Grachev, to head the Ministry of D

based on the sole qualification that he had not support

August coup that would have restored the Soviet old g

It is therefore hardly surprising that efforts by Yel

manage the Russian army have been unsuccessful an

broadened the gap between the army and society in

abyss. In attempting to understand the army’s l

legitimacy, we shall discuss in turn the followin

interrelated issues: the failure of military reform; m

corruption; hazing; and the war in Chechnya.

The Failure of Military Reform.

During his battles with Communist Party 

Gorbachev, Yeltsin had called for a reformed, apo

Russian military establishment. While these dem

played well in the reformist Moscow media (and the 

Yeltsin quickly demonstrated on taking power that h

little idea of how to implement reform of the m

establishment. The military budget was repeatedly sl

but little effort was made to reduce the size of the 

corps, restructure the components of the Minis

Defense, or redefine the mission of the Russian army

During the Soviet period, the armed forces had b

top-heavy. Russian journalists with ties to the m

21
many flag officers as the American, far in excess of wh

relative sizes of the two forces would have jus

Gorbachev made no effort to control the perks of the 

corps in the late 1980s, but rather accepted m

privilege as natural, much like the political benefits e

by the Party elite. Yeltsin has chosen to manage the 

forces as a benevolent, if distant, administrator. L

rather than competence has been rewarded. Two min

of defense have been dismissed as well as a chief 

general staff and other senior officers. The Ru

president, however, has systematically refused to app

civilian minister of defense, preferring to divide 

between political appointees in the National Se

Council and military officers on the general staff. In 

this, Yeltsin has demonstrated a preference to see 

remain divided between powerful subordinates rathe

initiate real reform.

Yeltsin has made no effort to restructure the 

corps. Rather than turning to a civilian minister of de

Yeltsin has allowed a general staff that was soci

promoted, and rewarded by the Soviet system to mana

transition from the Soviet era to democracy. It turned 

be the critical error. While the high command was ma

successful in managing its stockpile of nuclear weap

failed to cope with myriad problems associated with t

of the Cold War.

Restructuring of the forces has also fallen on hard 

The armed forces of the Soviet Union were concentra

three competing bureaucracies. While the Minis

Defense was responsible for the lion’s share of pers

more than 400,000 soldiers served in the Internal Tro

the Ministry of Interior and the Chief Directorate of B

Guards of the KGB. Moreover, the Defense Ministr

divided into five major components, each with it

installations, staffs, and military schools. In al

Ministry of Defense had more than 100 schools tr

junior officers. It would have taken a platoon of m

22
time of rapidly declining financial support, but non

readily available.

Attempts at restructuring since 1992 have led to 

not order. Today, more than a dozen separate Ru

government organizations have their own armed 

Besides the Ministry of Defense, these include the Mi

of Interior, the Federal Security Service, the Presid

Security Organization, the Main Security Directorat

the Directorate of Emergency Services. According 

senior defense ministry official, these other armed 

“are bigger than the army and the fleet,” continuing t

while the Defense Ministry faces severe fina

problems.

10

With the end of the Cold War and the decamping 

Soviet republics, the Russian soldier lost not only m

his “motherland” but lost his historical national miss

well. New political developments raised questions as 

was a Russian soldier, and what exactly was he to d

Was a man with a Ukrainian surname, born in Georg

Russian mother and a Jewish father, a Russian? (A 

Russian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have e

that lineage.) If NATO, the United States, or China w

longer the enemy, who or what was?

More important, politicization of the armed forc

intensified during the post-Soviet period. A noted R

military correspondent wrote that Yeltsin’s not

civilian control of the military is that he alone shall ex

such control lest someone else develop a power base.

11

troops have been used on several occasions since 1

quell internal unrest—traditionally the responsibility 

Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affair

example, in October 1993, Yeltsin used troops from th

2nd Guards Infantry and 4th Guards Armor Divisi

quash a parliamentary revolt. Tank and small arms f

the government building on fire, and in the followin

more than 150 Russian soldiers and civilians were 

23
and 106th Airborne Divisions were deployed to Mos

help the city police operate against suspected Ch

terrorism.

12

Military Corruption.

Limited anecdotal evidence suggests that corr

had begun to be a problem for the Soviet army in the 

According to one military joke, a senior military off

asked, “Why can’t the children of generals be

marshals?” The answer: “Well, the marshals have ch

too.” During the 1980s, senior military officers com

built luxurious dachas in the Moscow environs 

military money and military labor. Other mi

commanders leased their units to both Party officia

underground millionaires for everything from 

building to guard services.

During the last years of the Gorbachev regime, sto

military corruption began to percolate through the 

Then after Yeltsin came to power, this stream of s

became a flood. Accounts appeared in the press of m

corruption involving senior officers in Moscow. Follow

story involving corruption in the Ministry of Defen

intrepid reporter was killed by a sophisticated bomb h

in a briefcase. The Russian media reported rumors th

bomb had been placed by senior GRU (Military Intelli

officers on the order of General Pavel Grachev.

Efforts to stem military corruption by the polic

military have largely failed, and it remains a public sc

further undermining the Russian army’s relationshi

society. According to reports in the Russian media, fo

garrisons in the Russian Far East has been sold by 

officers. As a result, there has been malnutrition a

least one case of starvation in troop units.

24
By 1990, draft evasion had become a major probl

the Soviet army. According to all sources, the major r

for evasion and desertion was hazing. In the last days 

Soviet regime, organizations such as Shield and So

Mothers were organized to protect the rights of servic

and their work intensified public concern abou

treatment of conscripts.

The Yeltsin regime has made no effort to cope wi

hazing problem. Information from voluntary organiza

the media, and parliamentary investigations indicat

the problem continues throughout the armed force

investigation by the Duma found that during a 

28-month period, more than 2,500 Russian servi

committed suicide, most of them presumably ow

hazing.

13 Even in elite units such as the Dzerzh

Division, hazing is tolerated and encouraged. A R

human rights commission found that 100 soldier

suffered severe trauma and injuries from such treatm

The impact of hazing on society’s perception 

military has been drastically negative. Draft-dodgin

become commonplace. The army admitted in March 

that 70,000 youths avoided conscription the previous 

and that 40,000 deserters were on the run. Surveys 

Russian media show growing disrespect for the profes

arms and military service. According to a mi

correspondent, there is an acute shortage of junior o

in the army today as thousands of lieutenants and ca

have recently resigned.

15

The War in Chechnya.

For many Russians the Chechen War, waged be

Moscow and the tiny breakaway republic from Dec

1994 to August 1996, was an epiphany. The failure 

military to win a decisive victory against the rebe

highly visible military incompetence, and its b

25
its own dead signaled that the army was no longer 

people.

Despite the claim by Grachev that the Chechen c

Grozny could be taken by an armored regiment in a 

morning, it took elements of several divisions we

capture the city. According to Western and Ru

journalists on the scene, Chechen rebels killed over 

Russian soldiers on the war’s first day as they sou

fight their way into the Chechen capital. In the fight

Grozny and other Chechen cities, artillery, armo

helicopter gunships were used against heavily pop

centers—including areas inhabited by Russians. R

commanders made little effort to retrieve the bodies o

own soldiers and return them to their families. Ther

little or no effort to locate or identify Russian dead or 

missing on the Chechen battlefield.

16

THE “NATIONALITIES” PROBLEM

The USSR was a multinational state encompassin

over a 100 ethnic groups. It was the only world pow

which the ascendant nationality—in its case

Russians—barely held a majority. Despite thei

attempts at Russification, the Soviets were never a

extinguish the flame of nationalism among the main 

minorities.17 Though the Russian language was suppo

be the lingua franca of the Soviet Union, the percent

members of the main ethnic groups claiming Russia

mother tongue remained minuscule for the most part

even the percentage of those claiming fluency in Russ

a second language remained surprisingly low.

In 1970, for example, the figures for Ukrainians 

14.2 percent and 36.3 percent, respectively, meanin

nearly 50 percent lacked fluency in the official langu

the Soviet Union. So far as ethnic minorities f

removed from the European center were concerne

situation was even more dismal.

18 With a populat

26
to assimilate the nationalities into a unified, 

integrated body politic.

The collapse of the Moscow coup in August 1991 

motion forces of disintegration, resulting in the ev

declaration of independence by 14 of the 15 rep

comprising the USSR, leaving only the Russian 

Federated Socialist Republic, now known formally 

Russian Federation (“Russia,” in short form). With th

of the ethnic republics in almost a single stroke, the Ru

Federation found its nationalities problem mitiga

some extent, though the problem has by no m

disappeared.19 True, the percentage of Russians ros

53-55 percent of the population to about 82 percent to

But there are still over 100 languages spoken in Russ

over 100 national minorities, including Tatars (3.8 pe

Ukrainians (3.0 percent), Chuvash (1.2 percent), Ba

(.9 percent), Belorussians (.8 percent), etc.

21

In fact, 32 ethnically designated jurisdictions had 

established within Russia by 1996. 22 The Ru

population peaked at nearly 149 million people in 199

has been shrinking since, a trend expected to conti

least through the year 2005, particularly among male

the extent that military recruiting focuses on 

minorities to make up for shortfalls among Russian 

the problems of ethnic nationalism and lan

inadequacy become correspondingly more impo

because they can erode discipline and cohesion w

military units.

24

It would be a mistake for Americans to attempt to 

mirror image of their own diversity situation i

nationalities context of Russia. But as issues of Am

ethnic diversity are explored in subsequent chapters 

book, it may prove illuminating to recall by w

comparison the USSR’s and now Russia’s experience

their own unique brands of “diversity.”

27
In 1997, a leading Moscow foreign policy research 

reported that the Russian army was rapidly becom

threat to the Russian people and their governmen

though it could not defend them against any foreign fo

study predicted that, unless appropriate steps were 

the Russian army would either “disappear as such, br

into armed groups which will support themselves th

arms sales and robbery, or even stage a coup”—any 

which could produce dictatorship or civil war.

2

prospect of such a calamitous schism between the m

and the populace in Russia provides food for though 

politico-military observers, regardless of nationality

• Political Leadership is Critical. Military r

requires sustained political leadership, a

transformation of the Spanish military foll

Franco and reform efforts in Latin Ame

militaries confirm. In the United States, Co

supported the executive branch in a decade-long 

to transform the degraded Vietnam-era army i

effective all-volunteer force. In Russia, how

Yeltsin’s style of government militated a

reform. Yeltsin offered the Russian general sta

most corrupt of bargains—stay loyal, and you 

your perks and dictate the pace and substa

reform. As many U.S. analysts of post-Soviet m

affairs have pointed out, a painful but nec

revolution in military thinking has not occur

tandem with the drastic budget reductions.

26

• An Army in Transition Needs Popular Sup

In a time of troubles, a country’s military 

widespread popular support to accompli

mission. By neglecting questions dealing 

military corruption and the treatme

recruits—questions of urgent concern t

public—the Russian army forfeited what remai

28
where large segments of the population 

impoverished by attempted economic reform 

where a declining birthrate often produced fa

with only one child, the death of a son usually 

far greater personal tragedy and material ha

than was the case in countries enjoying h

birthrates.

• War in Time of Reform Is Especially Dange

Three times in this century Russian rulers hav

undone by what were supposed to be “small vict

wars.” The Russo-Japanese War of 1905-06, m

intervention in Afghanistan in 1980-88, an

Chechen war in 1994-96 all discouraged effo

conduct reform. Afghanistan and Chec

moreover, damaged the Russian armed forces 

eyes of the population. Several decorated R

officers complained about sending “untrained 

into combat. The Russian army learned noth

Afghanistan. It repeated the same mistak

Chechnya that it made in the Hindu Kush a d

earlier, and the resulting deaths of thousa

teenage Russian conscripts mortally damage

prestige of the army as a national institutio

recent opinion poll showed that 82 percent of 

Russian men did not want to serve in the 

forces.

• Anything Taken for Granted Will Be Lost. 

officers seem to have taken as a given the comf

shibboleths of the Soviet period, failing to factor 

impact of open news media on society and the 

forces. In the Soviet period, billboards proclaimi

eternal unity of the Soviet people, the glories of 

and the eventual victory of Leninism 

everywhere. By the late 1980s, they had b

shopworn myths of the aging Soviet state. The 

military victory also had gone stale by the 

29
army stormed the Reichstag. The military unive

extolled as the “school of life” under the Soviets 

loathed by Russian sons as a hellish prison 

avoided at all costs. The estrangement betwe

Russian people and its army is now com

providing an instructive lesson for those in the U

States concerned with civil-military relations.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans C

Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995, p. 292. These figur

kept secret by the Soviet regime, were recently declassified.

2. Ibid., p. 294.

3. Nina Tumarkin,The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fa

Cult of World War II in Russia, New York: Basic Books, 19

95-124.

4. Malaya Zemlya (The Little Land) was the name giv

beachhead created near Novorossisykh in southern Russia in 

Soviet naval infantry. Brezhnev was a brigade commissar w

landing force.

5. For the mutiny on the Starezhevoi (Sentry), see Washingt

November 18, 1992, p. A25.

6. Quoted in Turmarkin, p. 207.

7. Alexander Lebed, My Life and My Country, p. 130. The R

title—I am Ashamed of My Country—is far more revealing.

8. See John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Declin

Soviet Union, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 

9. Yeltsin had received a reserve commission on graduation 

engineering faculty and was promoted within the reserves to the 

colonel without ever having served on active duty. Boris Yelts

Struggle for Russia, New York: Random House, 1994, p. 239.

10. Scott Parrish, “Yeltsin Replaces Chief of General Staff,

Free Europe Analytical Brief #411. For a brief general commen

current reform and restructuring efforts, see Strategic 

30
Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 119-120; and The Military B

1997/1998, International Institute for Strategic Studies, L

Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 101-102.

11. Stephen J. Blank, Russian Defense Legislation and R

Democracy, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic 

Institute, 1995, p. 3.

12. Yeltsin, pp. 272ff. Yeltsin admits in his memoirs tha

senior officers were unwilling at first to get involved in a civil w

13. TASS, June 10, 1998.

14. Foreign Reports, 2475, reviewing articles in the Russia

during the period 1997-98. See also Daniel Williams, “R

Conscripts Muster Wits to Evade Army,” Washington Post, De

29, 1998, pp. A1, A11.

15. Vladimir Mukhin, “The Army May Get Out of C

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 17, 1998; Fred Weir, “New Russian 

Hindustan Times, March 1, 1998.

16. Peter Rutland, “Military Lessons of the Chechen War,” R

Analytical Brief #427; Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Ch

Calamity in the Caucasus, New York, New York University Pres

passim; “The Chechen Conflict: A Microcosm of the Russian 

Past, Present, and Future,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special 

September 11, 1996.

17. Richard Pipes, “Introduction: The Nationality Probl

Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, Zev Katz, et al., eds., Ne

Free Press, 1975, pp. 1, 3.

18. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, with Raymond Sturge

Army As the Instrument of National Integration, Carlisle Barrac

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 31, 197

19. Glenn E. Curtis, ed., Russia: A Country Study, Wash

Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1968 [Depart

Army Pamphlet 550-115], p. 172.

20. Piper, p. 1; Curtis, pp. xliv, 153.

21. Curtis, pp. 153, 601.

22. Ibid., p. 603.

31
24. On the language problem, note Rakowska-Harmstone, 

the unpopularity of military service in Russia and the cons

recruiting problems, see Curtis, pp. 549-550. Russia’s cons

system has proven to be ineffectual, and we are seeing 

discussion of whether to go to a volunteer force. Russia ha

experimenting with the use of contract personnel to fill the ra

1996, an estimated 300,000 soldiers were serving on contr

percent of the total). Interestingly, more than half of the new c

personnel at that time were women (Curtis, p. 150).

25. Paul Goble, “The Russian Army a Threat to Russia,” R

Analysis, February 17, 1997; Curtis, pp. 545-547.

26. See recent studies conducted by the Foreign Military 

Office and by Stephen Blank at the U.S. Army War College.

27. Gall and de Wall, p. 161. Minister of Interior 

recommended war against Japan, reportedly saying that the 

needed “a small victorious war to avert the revolution.”

32
THE AMERICAN MILITARY

AND THE PEOPLE IT SERVES:

TOGETHER OR DRIFTING APART?

John R. Groves, Jr.

This chapter discusses whether there is today a gr

estrangement between the U.S. military and the pu

serves. The recent experience in Russia as portrayed 

preceding chapter dramatizes the need in America 

parties—particularly the military—to rebuild the b

between the people and soldiers when they are broke

to strengthen them when they are weak.

FLYING IN FORMATION OR CHAOS IN 3D

When asked, most Americans will express respect 

U.S. military as a venerable, honorable, and ess

institution. Service sex scandals in 1996-98 an

recurring allegations of fraud, waste, and mismanag

have done little to diminish a generally high rega

American armed forces. 

While many who join the military make it a car

large percentage remain for a shorter period follow

separation and return to civilian life or continued ser

the Reserve or National Guard. In addition, virtua

who remain in uniform for 20 or more years and then 

with full benefits proceed to enter nonmilitary occupa

often for periods longer than the term of their m

service. Thus it would seem that the military rank-a

remain near the occupational mainstream and col

conscious of the nation, helping maintain a strong li

between grassroots America and its uniformed defen

33
observers of the military take an opposing view, h

that the military of the United States is bec

increasingly isolated from the people it serves. The

the following considerations:

Bearing out the proverb, “Out of sight, out of min

long as the United States is at peace the American 

have increasingly less involvement with the personn

operations of the military. The result might be a dec

appreciation for the needs and costs associated 

maintaining an effective defense establishment.

In such a peaceful environment, forced to compet

the nonmilitary social agenda of the nation for 

resources, senior military commanders may feel com

to speak out vigorously in ways that seem to grate a

the traditional concept of civilian control over the mili

The American public has reached—or is perceiv

political leaders to have reached—a zero toleran

casualties in military operations (setting aside 

conflicts in which America’s existence or core valu

threatened). To the extent that the military feels dr

seek funding for new casualty-negating battl

technologies, these expectations are perpetuated.

Domestic economic and social conditions are aff

the composition of the U.S. armed forces in way

degrade national security. For example, attracting re

has become more difficult as our healthy economy 

alternative employment to middle-class high s

graduates from which the majority of volunteers have 

since the end of the draft. With the consequent dimi

of middle-class input to the recruitment pool, in the 

fewer political and business leaders will have had m

experience. Moreover, recruits who man the future 

forces may be tempting targets for the prolife

extremist hate groups, separatist “militias,” and cr

fringe movements seeking to foment racial and 

conflict within military units.

2

34
development, especially considering the significant n

of current and former military members in their rank

factors behind their growth are complex, embracing fe

of disenfranchisement from government and demo

institutions; economic dislocation; and the gr

authority of extremist organizations among ce

elements of our society. In an ironic twist, the very m

that, in extremis, serves to protect the American 

from domestic violence, may itself become a tempting 

of extremist groups. Indeed, the continuing th

weapons and explosives from National Guard armori

depots suggests that the threat to the armed for

continuing to escalate.

THE EFFECT OF A PROLONGED PERIOD

OF PEACE

Public support for the military surged briefly durin

following Operations DESERT SHIELD and DE

STORM in 1990-91. The almost painless victory by co

forces generated widespread expressions of patriotis

retrospect, the duration of patriotic fervor seems to 

been in almost direct proportion to the length of the co

Public response was heartfelt, but the nation q

returned to business as usual. Indeed, President G

Bush, whose popularity soared immediately followi

victory, saw a dramatic reversal of support over th

year and was defeated in the 1992 presidential elect

Though the warm glow of public acclaim died q

following the success of U.S. forces in the Iraqi desert

were potentially far more enduring effects on p

perceptions. Compared to World War II, Korea

Vietnam, DESERT SHIELD was of extremely 

duration. The actual ground campaign lasted 5 

American casualties were light; and most American 

returned home quickly. Moreover, while Reserv

National Guard units were utilized, no maneuver 

took part in the ground war. Thus DESERT STORM 

35
Reserve deployment.

In sum, Operation DESERT STORM set before th

of the American people a vision of modern war tha

remarkable for two reasons. First, it portrayed a wa

was resolved quickly and with negligible casu

Second, it presented to the American people a view 

modeled on the computer games they and their ch

play, in which smart bombs, precision munitions

stealth technology replaced the anguish, pain, and te

graphically associated with Vietnam.

The extent to which DESERT STORM may affe

expectations of Americans remains to be seen. 

military and civilian leaders believe that in the futu

American people will have a lower threshold of tolera

prolonged, bloody conflicts. The war in the Iraqi d

therefore, may stand as a benchmark for the 

generation of Americans in making judgments on m

success, casualties, and duration of hostilities. 

INCREASED SERVICE COMPETITION

FOR FEDERAL FUNDING

The post-Cold War period has seen a series of in

inquiries within the military to identify the future thr

the nation and to define military needs. Base Forc

Commission on Roles and Missions, The Bottom-Up R

The Quadrennial Defense Review, and The National D

Panel were all created to make recommenda

concerning the composition of military forces necess

support the national security strategy. With Rus

longer qualifying as a peer competitor, this process ha

complex and controversial. The period has seen g

emphasis upon new technologies and a subst

reduction in the active and reserve forces. The pos

War period has been marked by greater pressure on fu

for conventional military activities within the indi

services. 

36
enormous increase in the operational tempo of the 

producing a greater number of deployments of both 

and reserve military units. As a result of 

deployments—primarily in the categories of peac

engagement and conflict prevention—some have o

that the military has lost its warfighting edge.3 Crit

to realize that this trend has been driven by a redefini

the main threat to American security. Nevertheless

trends may sharply alter the role of the citizen-s

reduce popular support, and increase friction be

active and reserve components.

4

 For example, the 

reserve forces in the Bosnian peacekeeping operatio

similar commitments entailing several months of ov

activity duty during peacetime could lead to a revision 

traditional concept “citizen first, soldier second.” Mor

in such a scenario, it could become far more diffic

convince employers to accept drills and long

deployment of their employees in time of peace. Th

may generate conflict between the National Guar

active Army over mission and funding. 

A future marked by pressure to reduce mi

capabilities is not comforting to military leaders. 

these fears, as some have suggested, become so grea

cause senior leaders to consider means that bypass c

control?5 The answer is, not anytime soon, if 

Nonetheless, if the military of the United States con

to decline, new definitions of national interests ma

become necessary for citizen-soldiers, for 

commanders, and for the American people.

While it is inconceivable that our military could 

diminished as to lose the capability to repel an invad

ability of the armed services to project power and enfo

will of the nation upon our enemies is another que

Military planners have publicly declared that the U

States would be hard pressed to mount another cam

like DESERT STORM. Furthermore, although 

major-theater-war (MTW) threat remains the founda

37
problematic whether the United States could fight an

two MTWs simultaneously.

Pressure on military resources and operating fun

continue to increase, while at the same tim

fundamental mission of the U.S. military to fight an

the nation’s wars will remain intact. Several times 

nation’s history draconian cuts in defense spending 

been mandated. As recently as 1945, the U.S. armed 

were drawn down by nine-tenths of their manpower

present period of downsizing comes, however, as the U

States proclaims its status as the globe’s sole rem

superpower. It also comes at a time when techno

changing the role of the soldier, and at a time wh

traditional missions of the armed forces have change

THE TECHNOLOGY PARADOX

The Army is well on its way to providing not on

weapons, but a wide range of personal protection dev

the individual soldier. New body armor, personal m

monitoring systems, and communications technologi

cite only a few examples—are in place. The goal is to p

the soldier and his commander with technological too

minimize casualties and prevent tactical surprise.

7

A critical question for the military is how this tech

will affect its mission and the public’s perception 

military’s role. On one hand, technology can r

casualties and improve chances for survival amon

wounded. On the other hand, the consequent reduc

casualties raises public expectations for further redu

until the public eventually reaches the po

zero-tolerance. This in turn places pressure on comma

(and political leaders) to put casualty avoidance ah

mission accomplishment (and national itneres

ordering their priorities. Since Vietnam, the Am

people have not witnessed large numbers of casu

among their armed forces despite the fact that duri

38
overseas by the National Command Authorities to su

national strategic interests. Since Vietnam, many of 

deployments have not involved armed conflict—an

same pattern can be expected to continue.

The irony is obvious. Military deployment

continue. Missions will be undertaken in support of na

interests as needed. At the same time, howeve

evidence suggests that public opinion will remain 

concerned with American casualties and nonsuppor

those operations that put U.S. fighting men and wom

harm’s way. Public support for DESERT STORM 

enhanced as the public realized that American losse

far lower than expected. But American public supp

intervention in Somalia evaporated following the amb

a Ranger company that produced high American los

MAINTAINING MILITARY PERSONNEL

STRENGTH

Numerically, the membership of the armed 

amounts to less than one percent of our population. R

ethnic, and religious characteristics of the armed forc

generally similar to American society. Most recruits 

percent) enter the military with a high school deg

equivalent. Moreover, senior enlisted members, esp

those remaining in the services until retirement, gen

maintain economic parity with their nonmilitary 

during their years of service.

Since the beginning of the all-volunteer Arm

armed forces have been largely drawn from middl

volunteers, but that situation seems to be changin

important question for those interested in the milit

the next millennium is the impact of an all-voluntee

drawn mostly from the lower economic strata. Wh

U.S. Army following the Civil War and World War 

largely composed of recruits drawn from the lower (an

less educated) classes, a return to such a situation 

39
society and the technological demands of the Army 

Next.

A gulf between the military and society is one that 

paramilitary organizations are eager to fill. Many of 

self-styled “militias” have a militant ideology, a 

distrust of federal, state, and local government, 

proclivity toward violence. Most see themselves as 

and chauvinistic organizations. Many are well-arme

some have boasted of possession of biological weapon

While these militias do not now provide a danger 

armed forces, they can be expected to thrive whe

military is perceived as not carrying out its mission. 

extent that the military becomes smaller or loses touc

the public, the growth of private, often single-issu

almost always anti-government groups is possible

militias pose a further threat of increasing polari

within the military itself.

Since Vietnam, the military has successfully re

high standards of professionalism within the r

Cleaning up the drug problem, restoring racial har

and the creation of extensive family networks are exa

They have won a large measure of support in socie

indeed serve as an important bridge between the unif

military and the people. These developments hav

however, eliminated strains between our society an

military. 

Indeed, strong but misdirected unit loyalties can cr

type of polarization posing potential dangers for the 

forces of 2030. With the spread of permissivism 

country, the military may increasingly come to view it

a “sub-society” with values that are “better” than th

civilian society. This perception may translate into an 

disdain, viewing the greater society as being at odd

the classic military virtues of sacrifice, self-disciplin

focus upon the interest of the group before that 

individual.

8

 If this process continued, incre

40
reach alarming dimensions.

9

Complicating the problem is the frequency of 

publicized ethical, moral, and legal transgressio

members of the military, from drill sergeants to gen

Although relatively few in number, even a single insta

dishonorable behavior attracts wide public notice, e

popular belief in the traditional exemplary standa

conduct among the military. 

One result of such scandal can be a siege menta

which loyalty to the unit is placed above prosecution 

offender, with organizational solidarity becomin

paramount good.

10

 This reaction leads to further iso

from the public and—ironically—from the value

services are supposed to represent.

CONCLUSION

Vietnam answered the question of whether Am

soldiers should be committed to prolonged war witho

support of the American public. The answer w

resounding no. A new set of questions now faces th

military—both active duty and reservists—in the pos

War world. These questions derive from the broad pr

of how to employ reserve forces to accomplish missio

high-optempo environment, frequently on a sus

basis, while preserving long-term support for bot

mission and the military components that carry the

For example:

At what point in a developing military confron

should Reserves and National Guard units be mobili

For what duration should they be committ

conditions short of declared war?

Should they have a role in homeland def

particularly in dealing with the threat against the U

States posed by weapons of mass destruction?

11

41
questions. The answers that we as a society provide w

long way in determining whether the forces that t

separate the American military from the people it 

will prevail. All national defense policy debate sho

tempered by a determination to keep the American s

and the American people together, for they are, after a

and the same.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control, The Crisis in Civil M

Relations,” The National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17. Kohn vi

officer corp as increasingly conservative (Republican), partis

openly critical and at times resentful of civilian control. He id

President Clinton as the target of a level of disrespect (as a per

the military not seen in modern times.

2. Gary Hart, The Minutemen: Restoring the Army of the 

New York: The Free Press, 1998, chapter 1.

3. Dov Zakheim, “Global Peacekeeping Burden Strain

Capabilities,” Defense News, April 6-12, 1998, p. 19. Also John G

“Peacekeeping’s Toll, High ‘Personnel Tempo’ Eroding Readi

Several Fronts,” Armed Forces Journal International, March 1

18-19; and John Hillen, “Hollow to the Corps, The Presi

Relentlessly Shrinking the Armed Forces While Thinking of M

More Things for Them to Do,” National Review, March 9, 1988

38-40. For a contrary view, see Thomas G. McInerney and Eric R

“Bolstering Military Strength by Downsizing the Pentagon,” Is

Science and Technology, Winter 1997-98, pp. 1-6.

4. All branches of the military, with the exception of the M

are facing recruiting challenges (at this writing). The Army ha

short of goals, and a growing number of specialty areas from p

computer programmers are experiencing acute shortages. Larr

“Role Playing for Bosnia,” Soldiers, March 1998, pp. 20-21. A 

Department of Defense effort entitled “Employer Support for the 

and Reserve” (ESGR, Source: National Committee for Em

Support of the Guard and Reserve, 1555 Wilson Blvd., Sui

Arlington, VA) has been enacted to encourage civic leade

employers to give maximum support and eliminate barriers t

who attempt to balance civilian careers with membership in the 

or Reserve. Jonathan S. Landay, “New Roles for America’s W

42
but one from a litany of writings in this ongoing and strident d

5. James Carroll, “An Enemy Within the U.S. Military,” 

Globe, November 18, 1997, p. A25; and Charles J. Dunlap, J

Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,” Parameters, 

1992-93, pp. 2-20.

6. Threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), infor

warfare (also called information operations), and asymmetrical 

are potential “invaders” of a more sinister description, however

7. These are a few of the many technological goals for Fo

Army and the Army After Next, the two central sources that wi

the future of the U.S. military, specifically the Army.

8. Thomas E. Ricks, “The Widening Gap Between the Milit

Society,” The Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 66-78.

9. Kohn, p. 17.

10. James Kitfield, “Crisis of Conscience,” Government Ex

October 1995, p. 16.

11. Lisa Burgess, “Initiative Expands Guard’s Role in B

Defense,” Army Times, April 6, 1998, p. 23. See also Rick Maze, 

to Respond to Terror Incidents,” Defense News, March 2-8, 199

Joseph Douglas, Jr., “A Biological Weapons Threat Wors

Saddam,” The Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1998, p. 22; New

the Front: Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Dest

(WMD), U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

for Army Lessons Learned, January-February 1998, pp. 1-4.

43
THE U.S. ARMY AND ETHNIC DIVERSI

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Douglas V. Johnson II

To set the stage for the various treatme

contemporary diversity issues contained in the ch

that follow, I shall present a compressed historica

d’horizon of the employment of black and other mi

soldiers in the American Army from the Revolut

period. Admittedly, “diversity” embraces far more th

male experience. Certainly women did sometimes se

uniform in various capacities, but they were seldom 

and always auxiliary. Therefore, without at all denyi

worthwhile contribution of women to national defens

the years, diversity inquiries into the period prior to 

War II devolve essentially to ethnicity. In treatin

subject, I shall for the sake of historical verisimilitu

using language taken verbatim from the official reco

doing so, I mean, of course, no disrespect to any per

group.

Many readers will recall Crispus Attucks (born 17

black man who became a victim of the Boston Massa

March 5, 1770. Considerable irony attaches to the fac

while he was one of the first to die in the strugg

American independence, his freedom would have 

means been assured even after the Revolution. He wa

soldier per se, since there was no Army, but once the 

began in earnest, the criterion for inclusion became—

usually does in such circumstances—one’s willingn

confront the enemy and not much more.

In the New England states, free negroes were in

enrolled without prejudice. That situation did not 

however, for Congress passed a law forbidding 

45
white volunteers got really short again, and the Secre

War persuaded Congress to repeal the law.

1

 Black so

were integrated in most units, but in 1778 when a g

reorganization took place throughout the Army, 

Island consolidated all its black soldiers into one reg

the first segregated unit I was able to identify. Since 

not know the details of that act, I am not ce

“segregated” as we understand the word today is pr

descriptive.

2

While bigotry toward any group is always 

condemned on its face, there were relatively few pro

with ethnicity in the Army in the early decades, at lea

in any sense that one could argue plausibly that eth

acted against “good order and discipline.” Ironically, 

late 1940s, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall a

against President Truman’s order to desegregate the 

forces on the ground that integration would be disrup

good order and discipline and would thus reduce the c

readiness of the Army as a whole.

In 1976, Robert A. Gross published a stu

Minutemen centered on Concord, Massachussets. In 

notes: “No longer did young men of substance volunt

common duty in any sizable numbers. The war wa

being fought principally by landless younger sons, 

permanent poor and blacks.” He continues wit

observation that eventually the town of Concord filled 

percent of its quota with blacks. But he also noted that 

service meant freedom for black soldiers; the 

protected former slaves within its ranks, supporting 

cause in court against their former owners. Whet

would have continued to do so when the dema

manpower was lower, we can not say from this sourc

With independence won, the country embarked u

first downsizing of the Army, one that would have re

zero had not several prominent voices intervened. Af

American independence was not truly won until aft

46
former self—718 officers and enlisted in 1789—

having been particularly large in the first place.

4

 The 

now undertook to protect the frontiers, initially shi

the Indians against voracious, land-grabbing se

Ethnicity was not an issue. But those heart

adventuresome enough to enlist died in the wildern

depressing numbers.

The Army swelled to 44,736 by the end of the M

War in 1847, but only 6 years later it was down to 10

Of these, 8,000 were deployed somewhere—and we th

are overstretched today!

6

The periodic wars entailing accordian-like 

buildups and subsequent drawdowns, the incredibly 

and brutal conditions on the frontier, the over-exten

the force, the low pay, and the fanciful rumors of riche

won in the mountains further west all combined to m

difficult to hang onto the troops we had, much less to r

new ones. With 4,600 recruits required to fill the ra

1853, for example, the Secretary of War in his annual 

said, “To obtain these at the prevailing rate of pay, 

the present prosperous state of the country, can scarc

expected.” Sound familiar? Combining the lure of g

California (reputed to be responsible for 530 deser

desertions in general were running over 12 percen

taken together with other losses required more 

one-third of the entire Army to be recruited 

year—one-third!

7

 Is it any wonder, then, that des

recruiters began to look at heretofore untapped sou

recruit material?

Notice that so far I have not spoken of diversity 

form—the official reports are silent thereupon. But in 

there is a curious entry in the Secretary of War’s a

report. After detailing the continuation of the 30 perce

annum loss rate, the Secretary states, “Reports sh

unusually large proportion of Americans amon

detachments recently sent to regiments.” So the dirt

47
been enlisting in the Army were not Americans. Wha

that mean?8

In 1857 we get a better glimpse of the truth. 

showing casualties and decorations from combat 

Indians reveal the following names: Kuhn, Str

Mueller, Weiss, Zinzenhoffer, Franz—and Ro

McManus, McKim, Dougherty, Sullivan, Du

McCandle, Quinn, O’Donnell, McKay, McEo

Americans? Maybe in death, beforehand we cannot t

certain. They represent substantial minority grou

within the Army of that time, but they ha

advantage—if they kept their mouths shut, they were 

easily distinguishable as were soldiers of color.

Service in the Army was one road to Ame

citizenship. In addition, for much of our history, the 

remained a steady employer for those unable to get 

elsewhere or for other reasons about which we 

speculate endlessly. The old explanation for 

enlistments was that “the mercurial sons of Erin” 

given to poetry and blood by nature, and Army drin

cheap. In fact, ours is one of the few armies in histor

did not provide a liquor ration.

This manifestation of diversity had, to this point, c

trouble only once. During the Mexican War, a gr

soldiers of Irish descent deserted and joined the M

Army, forming what was known as the “San Pa

Battalion. We do not know the number of deserters in 

when that battalion was defeated in battle, those ide

as deserters were shot as traitors. The reluctance o

Catholics to fight Mexican Catholics played a role 

desertions.

How far religion might have come to be a disruptiv

was never answered, as the great and tragic Civil War 

upon the nation within the next few years. The co

intermingling of issues of slavery and preservation 

Union is well enough known that we need not enter i

48
increasing importance.

In his 1863 report, the Secretary of War not

establishment of the “Bureau for Colored Troops,” me

that enough black men had joined the Army to crea

need for a separate management office. In his 1864 

the Secretary reported that 58,301 colored troops ha

raised from within the rebel states. He noted furthe

while in October 1863 there had been only 58 c

regiments totalling 37,707 soldiers, by October 18

numbers had risen to 140 regiments and 101,950 so

certainly impressive numbers.10

But there was also a sour note. The Adjutant G

noted that when black soldiers were first enlisted, the

frequently consigned to labor duties rather than fig

He voiced his own strenuous objections thereto and in

that black soldiers be properly trained as soldier

employed as such: “The prejudice in the Army agains

employment as troops was very great; but now, sin

blacks have fully shown their fighting qualitie

manliness, it has greatly changed."11

There was a particular situation during the Civil W

which ethnic diversity had a strongly negative effec

11th Corps of the Union Army was popularly known 

German Corps, containing many soldiers of Ger

origin who fled Europe following the 1848 revolution

corps had the great misfortune to have been thrown in

right of the Union line at the battle of Chancellor

where it was a sitting duck for Stonewall Jackson’s 

Jackson had marched his troops behind Confederate l

hopes of finding an unprotected Union right flank. B

time he arrived, the 11th Corps was “protecting” that 

but it was totally ignorant of its mission or of any ene

its front or flank. Jackson’s attack caught the 

unaware and drove it from the field as it would have 

any unit so caught. Morale remained intact, and th

Corps recovered its balance and reassembled. Th

49
the right of the line. But even though the higher com

knew a Confederate division was en route to Getty

from the east, no reconnaissance was made, and once 

the Confederates slammed into the unprotected right 

of the 11th Corps and drove it from the field.12 The A

the Potomac cursed those “damned Germans” liberal

long thereafter. In truth, the Germans in that corps d

fight badly at all, but they were bedevilled by their pr

failures, their lack of confidence in their commande

residual political confusions. There were sharp clea

between the old European aristocracy and the 

arrived liberals who were ardent supporte

emancipation—a good deal more ardent than most 

Union soldiers whose principal identifiable goa

restoration of the Union.

13

We will pass over the terribly unhappy per

Reconstruction during which the Army found 

administering the southern states. This experience 

resulted in legislation forbidding regular Army per

from exercising any police powers whatsoever so lo

competent civil authority existed.

14

Instead we jump ahead to the 1890’s. Not unt

period do the records finally begin to reflect the tr

diversity in statistical terms. In the report for 1894, 

people applied for enlistment in the Army. Of these, 

were accepted. Of those accepted, 7,352 were whit

colored, 46 Indian. The record also notes that 2,891 

applicants were of foreign birth. While it does not rep

figures, it records that acceptance rates were as fo

white 43.34 percent; colored 44 percent; Indian 74 per

In the following year’s report, the ethnic breakout be

more detailed, but we discover that the standar

enlistment were made far more stringent:

By the Act of August 1, 1894, enlistments were confined 

citizens, or those who declared their intentions to become su

50
English language.

This is the first time those requirements can be fo

exist.16

The ethnic breakout per 1,000 recruits as set forth 

1895 report is as follows: White, 927; Negro, 67; Indian

of the 927 whites, only 608 were “native U.S. citizens

remaining 319 were composed of such nationalities as 

German, English, Canadian, Swedish, Danish

Austrian, with Irish (95) and German (94) predomin

Thus, about 32 percent of the incoming recruits 

non-native-born whites.

17

In the 1896 report we find roughly comparable fi

though it was noted that, for the first time in a decad

figures for both the Germans and Irish had dropped 

90. The Surgeon General included some interesting m

data, reporting that while the average white soldier l

average of 12.6 days for illness, the average colored s

lost only 9.6 days. These figures led him to conclud

“the enlisted men of the colored regiments are appa

less susceptible to most diseases that the whites.”

18

In the report for the following year, the white dis

rate (for all nondisciplinary causes) was placed at 

thousand, that of Negro soldiers at 26. Disability los

days per soldier per year were 13 for whites, 9 for 

soldiers.

19

 In addressing alcoholism as a major prob

the Army of the day, the Surgeon General noted th

Army-wide average was 29 per thousand, but among 

troops it was only 6.

20 Though it may be in contraven

received wisdom to say so, black soldiers by this tim

clearly established an enviable record of behavio

reliability. Such revelations validate once again the 

every Ph.D. dissertation advisor: “Go to the pr

sources!”

Manifestly, despite the postive notes observed 

foregoing survey, prejudice toward minorities of mo

51
institutions. It culminated when General John J. Pe

was forming the American Expeditionary Forces in F

in 1917 and 1918. Provided two division equivalents o

soldiers, he refused their services and literally palmed 

off on the French. Pershing was adamant that he was 

to form an American Army and was not going to giv

Allied appeals for men to provide individual fillers fo

units. Americans were going to fight as Americans 

American command-–except for black units.

21

 The F

who had long experience with black African troops

delighted to have any soldiers. By and large, these so

did as well as any, considering the gross tra

deficiencies that afflicted the entire force.

It is unfortunate that attitudes like Pers

continued into World War II. In a reprise of what w

during the early part of the Civil War, black American

relegated in large numbers to stevedore units in the 

theater and elsewhere. However, some made it into co

vindicating President Truman’s bold desegregation 

after the war. But as General Julius Becton has often 

even Truman’s directive did not result in full integra

effective equality until after the Korean War—and 

would argue not until after Vietnam.

As we have observed from the annual Secretary o

reports on recruit acquisitions, ethnic diversity is 

new to the Army. By and large, the Army has handle

diversity with relative equanimity, focusing primarily 

the ability of soldiers to do their duty regardless of an

else. There have been and will continue to be incide

bigotry and discrimination. Such is human natur

there are few places in the world where such acts o

attitudes are as fully and legally proscribed as in th

military. 

It will soon be the turn of Hispanics to test the effi

those legal proscriptions. In the fall of 1998, the 

statisticians announced that Hispanic teenagers 

52
bracket, which will render them a prime obj

recruitment efforts in the very near future. Historical

Army has already experienced two waves of Hi

enlistments, once during the period after Cuba fell to C

in 1959, and again when large numbers of Puerto 

were drafted for the Vietnam War. If the U.S. Army 

win the Civil War in which entire units spoke 

language other than English; if it could hold tog

barely, when a disproportionate number of its infantr

minority soldiers in Vietnam, its most unpopular wa

the War of 1812; if it has been cited again and again, d

its flaws, as the best model of social engineering i

nation’s history—then I would hazard to suggest that 

continue to do as well in the future. It will continue to l

much as humanly possible beyond diversity issue

when it comes down to killing, which is ultimatel

armies exist, there is only one question that matters

that soldier be depended upon to do the job?” 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Robert K. Wright, Jr., The Continental Army, Army 

Series, Washington: Center For Military History, 1983, p. 

information on Crispus Attucks, see Webster’s American M

Biographies, Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam, 1978, p. 16.

2. Wright, p. 149.

3. Robert A. Gross, The Minutemen and Their World, New Yo

And Wang, 1976, pp. 151-152.

4. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, L

Macmillan, 1967, p. 566.

5. Weigley, p. 567.

6. “Report of the Secretary of War,” Message from the Preside

United States to the Two Houses of the Second Session of 

Congress, Vol. I, Washington: Robert Armstrong, Printer, 1852

7. “Report of the Secretary of War,” Message from the Preside

United States to the Two Houses of Congress of the First Sessio

53
pp. 3, 7-8.

8. “Report of the Adjutant General,” Message from the Pres

the United States to the Two Houses of Congress of the Third Se

the 34th Congress, Vol. II, Washington: Cornelius Wendell, 

1856, p. 250.

9. “Report of the Secretary of War,” Message from the Preside

United States to the Two Houses of Congress of the First Sessio

35th Congress, Vol. I, Washington: Cornelius Wendell, Printe

pp. 3, 51-58.

10. “Annual Report of the General in Chief,” Report of the S

of War, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1863, p

11. “Report of the Adjutant General,” Report of the Secretary 

Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1864, pp. 26, 29, 

12. Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A S

Command, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1984.

13. James S. Pulu, For Liberty and Justice: The Life and T

Waldimir Krzyzanewski, Chicago: Polish American Co

Charitable Foundation, 1978.

14. The Posse Comitatus Act of June 18, 1878.

15. Report of the Secretary of War, Vol. I, Washingto

Government Printing Office, 1894, p. 12.

16. Annual Report of the Secretary of War, Vol. I, Washingto

Government Printing Office, 1895, pp. 5, 69, 75; “Report of the A

General,” pp. 398-399.

17. Ibid.

18. Report of the Secretary of War for the Year 1896, 

Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1896, p. 10. S

“Report of the Surgeon General,” p. 419.

19. “Report of the Secretary of War,” Annual Report of t

Department, Vol. I, Washington: U.S. Government Printing 

1897, p. 16.

54
Department, Vol. I, Washington: U.S. Government Printing 

1897, pp. 29, 495.

21. John J. Pershing, Record Group 165, File 8481-60, N

Archives, “Memorandum to Chief of Staff, December 6, 1917, S

General Pershing’s Request Regarding Composition Of Second C

55
DIVERSITY IN THE 21st CENTURY ARM

LEADERSHIP ISSUES

Joseph C. Jones

INTRODUCTION

The ethnic makeup of the Army is a concern of m

and civilian leaders within the Department of Defen

Congress alike. Based upon Census Bureau popu

projections, Hispanics will become the largest mi

group in the country by 2005, surpassing A

Americans. If residents of Puerto Rico are included 

tally, then Hispanics will become the largest minority 

even earlier, by the turn of the century in fact. Immig

and fertility rates are indeed changing Ame

complexion, and such change will inevitably affect 

representation in the Army.

This chapter will address Census Bureau demog

projections, Army demographic trends, societa

military implications, and, finally, organiza

leadership issues arising from diversity changes in th

of the future. Since my past research has prim

concerned Hispanic representation in the Army, I wil

upon this research in order to highlight that minority 

and its possible effect on ethnic representation in the 

of the future.

DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS

In terms of national demographic projection

highlights below, providing insights to how Americ

look in the future, are taken from the Census Bu

population reports issued in 1996.

1

 Specifically, the 

indicates that:

57
e te sae ote USpopuato(os

will fall from 74 percent in 1995 to 72 percent in 

64 percent in 2020, and 53 percent in 2050.

• Also by 2050, the black population will rise 

million, nearly double what it was in 1995. After 

more blacks than non-Hispanic whites will ent

population annually.

• From today to 2050, less than half of U.S. popu

growth will occur in combined black and 

non-Hispanic populations.

• The highest rates of increase will be i

Hispanic-origin and the Asian and Pacific Is

populations, with annual growth rates tha

exceed 2 percent until 2030.

2

• Annually from now to 2050, the ethnic group a

the largest number to the population will 

Hispanic origin. Moreover, starting in 2020, 

Hispanics will be added to the U.S. population 

year than all other ethnic groups combined. By 

the Hispanic-origin population will become the s

largest ethnic group.

• By 2030, the non-Hispanic white populatio

constitute less than half of the U.S. population 

age 18. But in that year, the non-Hispanic whit

still comprise three-quarters of the 65 and 

population.

Inevitably, with such enormous flux in e

proportions projected out to the middle of the next ce

especially among the under-18 age cohort, the milita

be deeply affected.

3

58
Though change is inevitable, the degree of change 

based upon a number of variables. First, the le

assimilation of various ethnic groups into American c

will directly impact the demographic content of the mi

If Hispanics, who will become the largest minority gr

the near future, embrace the larger culture of Am

society and assimilate into it, then it will be easier to r

and retain them in the active force. However, if His

fail to assimilate to a sufficient degree, they will pr

not readily enter military service primarily because 

language heritage will preclude them from performin

enough to gain entry.4

Acculturation—the process of breaking down plu

group tendencies—was initially forced on Me

Americans during the 19th century. Since that 

various groups within the Hispanic culture 

acculturated to varying degrees. The largest Hi

population is Mexican Americans, but the His

community is also comprised of people from Cuba, P

Rico, and other Central and South American cou

Each of these national groups carries different cultur

traditions from their home countries. The Spanish lan

is what links these diverse groups together, but to 

that all Hispanics are the same is folly. Therefore, th

of acculturation and hence assimilation in the 21st ce

will be a combination of highly variable inputs.

The level of integration of minority group

American society can also help explain what the A

demographic content will become. Similar to accultur

integration goes one step further by bringing memb

the minority group into all aspects of the dominant s

including its political, economic, and cultural institut

minorities and immigrants integrate into society at 

rates than at present, then they may participate in m

service if this service is perceived as being beneficial

59
education, encouraging soldiers to get college c

through evening courses and nontraditional m

Education is seen as a means of advancing throug

ranks, since military and civilian education is co

towards promotion points for advancement to sergea

staff sergeant. This view, consistent with Human C

Theory, is validated by many minority success s

achieved through individual efforts and education.

5

The force of the future will have to rely on traine

educated soldiers to accomplish complex, techn

dependent missions. The military already excludes 

potential recruits who score in the bottom 10 perc

mental acuity. It considers quality recruits to be 

scoring in the upper 50 percent of the Armed 

Qualification Test (AFQT). As long as the military is 

attract high quality applicants regardle

socio-demographic variables, it will be able to conten

the challenges of increased technology because it will 

force with the mental aptitude to adapt.

A major concern for the future is whether minoriti

immigrants will qualify in sufficient numbers for ser

the military. While Hispanics today have only abou

percent high school graduation rate, the Army require

no less than 90 percent of recruits have a high 

diploma. If the Hispanic high school graduation rat

not increase, a large proportion of this growing pool w

itself ineligible to enlist.

When more Hispanics and other minorities do ent

ranks, the Army must continue to support them by fo

on quality enhancement. English language compreh

looms as the most pressing problem for Hispanics 

Army. The Army can tap into various existing resou

support such soldiers. Through English as a S

Language classes run by Army Community Service

other computer-assisted educational programs presen

Army Education Centers, any immigrant soldie

60
Army is serious about increasing the number of His

in the ranks, such steps are crucial. Minoritie

immigrants must not be made to feel like “second 

citizens.” At no time will the Army’s recruitment sloga

All You Can Be,” become more relevant than to mi

recruits of the 21st century.

As with any profession based on unique skills, it 

time to grow senior officers and NCOs—normally 17 

for a battalion commander or platoon sergeant.

6

 Min

have done well in attaining the highest ranks of the 

corps, but they are under-represented at the general 

level. Unlike corporate America, the military does n

colonels and generals from civilian society. These o

attain the rank through promotions after considerabl

experience and commensurate military and ci

education. The Army must begin now to attract and 

more minority officer candidates so that in the 21st ce

ethnic soldiers will find role models and sour

inspiration among the higher ranks.

INDIVIDUAL LEADERSHIP

The U.S. military moving into the 21st century w

far more heterogeneous force, capable of execu

complex array of missions and duties. It will 

multicultural organization that appreciates and valu

diversity of its soldiers. The multicultural approach 

from a pluralistic design in that we work to increa

level of appreciation for the differences associated w

heritage and values of many different groups.

7

 For exa

throughout the year specific months are set as

recognize the presence and contributions of b

Hispanics, and women. The military must value div

and demonstrate its positive attitude through thes

other programs aimed at celebrating and capitalizing 

its diverse force.

61
however, which we shall consider shortly, there 

question of individual leadership by those in positi

authority within the heterogeneous, multicul

ethnically diverse force of the next century. Followi

several suggestions for how to tailor one’s lead

approach to the unique demands of the post-mille

Army.

• Demonstrate Commitment. Army leaders 

echelons must have a commitment to diversit

equal opportunity, a commitment that actively 

leader conduct and human interactions. 

commitment is the keystone to our entire 

structure. Leaders must recognize and accept th

composition of the military is changing i

direction of increased numbers of minoritie

women. Leaders must prevent issues of diversit

adversely affecting decisionmaking as they gui

organization toward mission accomplishme

their zeal to develop organizational cohesivenes

important that leaders not forfeit the ver

benefits of increased organizational creativit

problem-solving ability derivable from a diver

cultural inputs.

• Get Educated. Americans tend to be ignorant 

other societies and even about subcultures w

their own society. Leaders should find out as m

possible about the cultural backgrounds of 

soldiers. It is wise to use materials (including 

books, newspapers, magazines, plays, songs, p

websites, etc.) written by members of a re

subculture to complement “academic sou

Whether dealing with foreign or domestic cu

the leader must always keep in mind that he or 

viewing others through a biased cultural lens be

of the potential for the existence of ethnocentr

62
e Opeut ot Go ateo oe e

leaders to be someone they’re not. While sh

interest in and warm receptivity to another cul

appreciated, mimicking it is not, and in fact c

insulting. Invitations to cultural gatherings or r

should be graciously accepted, but as a guest an

convert lest enthusiasm be mistaken for a patro

attitude. Leaders should not worry overmuch 

making honest mistakes in cultural accommo

so long as their good will and honorable intentio

clear. 

• Listen. Americans have a reputation for arro

and wanting to dictate to others. Get the m

done, but hear what others have to say a

receptive to alternatives. The mission and sa

the troops obviously come first, but there are dif

ways to “skin a cat,” and the leader must 

assume that his particular way was blessed 

heavens. 

• Develop Cultural Awareness. An importan

of organizational cultural awareness training is 

soldiers from the various cultures to ho

share—before the assembled group—their prej

about different cultures in American society as w

those of foreign countries, especially the ones to 

the unit might be deploying. Such public cando

well evoke heated discussion, but so long a

discussion cuts in all directions and i

constructively, the unit benefits. H

communication is the best antidote to bigotry.

• Set Up and Maintain Review Systems. 

should encourage continuous improvement in 

to the leadership of diverse organizati

scrutinizing the organization periodically to un

new problems and establish plans of action to fix 

problems. Such surveys, assisted by focus group

63
tolerance and cooperation.

• Empathize with the Disadvantaged. No 

can truly understand or appreciate a culture u

or she has considered it through the eyes of w

the poor, or other disenfranchised groups 

society. In reacting to soldiers’ breaches of cu

decorum or any other lapse from the desired 

leaders in a culturally diverse organization wo

well to hearken to the ancient canon, “Judge n

you yourself have walked in the sinner’s shoes.” 

a leader forces himself to realize that not a

subordinates have enjoyed his advantages, h

come to view them in an entirely new light.

ORGANIZATIONAL INITIATIVES

The previous section focussed on acts and attitu

individual leaders, primarily those at the lower ec

who deal directly with soldiers. But it is also necessa

the leaders of large organizations—e.g., an inf

division—to recognize that they too have a vital role t

The higher commander—through his personal exa

articulated priorities, and organizational programs

the tone for the entire command. If a high-level comm

of an ethnically diverse organization is indifferent 

special problems posed by diversity, we can be abso

certain that such indifference will soon permeate all th

down to the most junior enlisted leaders.

Following is a broad menu, by no means exhaust

measures that senior commanders, acting either dire

through organizational programs, can select to fash

enlightened command approach to diversity.

8

• Inform top leaders and those in positions of aut

that they need to be fully committed to 

opportunity and appreciation of cultural diver

64
whatever means necessary.

• Recognize equal opportunity and cultural diver

organizational issues and portray them that w

soldiers and officers.

• Assign responsibility for equal opportunit

cultural diversity programs to top leadership.

• Set goals and objectives, measure performanc

employ appropriate incentives exactly as wit

other command program.

• Stress the importance of promoting equal oppor

and valuing cultural diversity in the m

statement.

• Set up special committees to advise top leaders

diversity issues.

• Offer training programs in support of 

opportunity and cultural diversity.

• Involve leaders at all levels in the desig

implementation of equal opportunity and cu

diversity programs.

• Stress that competence is the first screening cri

for filling open positions.

Such measures as those above, plus others that mi

suggested by minority groups themselves withi

command, should go a long way toward ensuring a h

cultural climate. Senior leaders must do more than p

service to diversity. They must infuse throughout 

organization a realization that diversity is here to sta

that it must be effectively managed rather than s

reacted to.

65
U.S. Military Academy can serve as a useful mod

organizations and institutions provided there is suf

oversight to ensure program objectives are being 

Already adopted by the Military District of Washingt

Consideration for Others Program holds great prom

inculcating in the Army’s collective consciousness a p

blueprint for enlightened progress in resolving div

issues.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports—Pop

Projections of the United States by Age, Race, and Hispanic 

1995-2050; February 1996, p. 1.

2. By way of comparison, the U.S. population has never gro

percent per year, not even at the peak of the Baby Boom era.

3. To gain a better basis for understanding future change, c

the following break-out of ethnic-gender percentages in the 199

Of male officers, 81.4 percent are white, 10.1 percent black, 3.6 

Hispanic. Of female officers, 68.6 percent are white, 20.8 percen

3.8 percent Hispanic. Thus, among all officers, 79.8 percent are 

11.5 percent black, 3.6 percent Hispanic. Of male enlisted soldie

percent are white, 26.7 percent black, 7.2 percent Hispanic. Of 

enlisted, 40.5 percent are white, 46.8 percent black, 6.0 

Hispanic. Thus, among all enlisted, 56.7 percent are white, 29.7 

black, 7.0 percent Hispanic. The foregoing figures were kindly s

to the author by Dr. Naomi Verdugo, Demographic Unit, Offic

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army.

4. “Pluralism” describes the situation where groups retain s

identifies, culture, and organizational structures.

5. Human Capital Theory, the traditional view of assim

interprets success within American society to be a direct r

individual efforts, personal values, personal skills, and educat

Joseph F. Healey, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class: The Soci

Group Conflict and Change, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge 

1998.

6. Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Roundtable on Future Respon

Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrica

66
U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, p. 33

7. Pluralism and multiculturalism are similar to the exte

both apply to groups which retain their original identities, cultu

language. But multiculturalism also implies a broad mutual e

the different groups to accept, understand, appreciate, and har

with one another.

8. Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, M

Leadership Course Guide, West Point, NY: U.S. Military Ac

1998, pp. 306-308.

9. For further elaboration upon the Consideration for 

Program, see chapter 9.

67
SYSTEMATIC PLANNING FOR RAISING 

FUTURE FORCE

Michael J. Stehlik

INTRODUCTION

Will the armed forces of the United States be a

attract and retain the human capital necessary to br

fruition the forces they are designing for the earl

century? We shall explore this question primarily th

an Army personnel lens focused on America’s milita

civil societies. 

The Army is embarking on a major restruc

endeavor as it seeks to bring Army XXI into existenc

the next decade and make the Army After Next (A

reality within a time frame extending out to about 

Each of these armies will increasingly rely on techno

dissipate the fog of war and increase the tempo and let

of combat operations. To manage this change, the 

established the Force XXI process to guide it throu

conceptual development, experimentation, and field

each of these armies. They are looking at human fa

technology, and organizational structures.

Implicit in the Army’s overall restructuring pro

the question of whether the Army will be able to attra

people necessary to bring these two armies to fr

despite the fact that little is known about the pers

characteristics required for each. In other words, the 

is taking a “build it and they will come” view of the 

engendered by the unimaginable success o

all-volunteer Army epitomized by the DE

SHIELD/DESERT STORM romp in 1990-91. But are 

trends in American society and national or interna

69
untenable? Is it possible that the splendid success 

all-volunteer force of the past could be follow

ignominious failure on the part of an all-volunteer fo

the AAN time period?

Unfortunately, there are several emerging indicat

America’s civil and military societies that future a

may be increasingly difficult to staff. Moreover, the 

lacks a sensitive prognostic system for providing 

warning of future personnel problems, thus incr

chances for disagreeable surprises as critical ma

junctures approach.

PERSONNEL STATUS

For the ground service to evolve from today’s Ar

Excellence through Army XXI to the Army After 

requires leaders who know where we are and where w

going. To establish some terms of reference, let’s revie

the Army and the other services ended fiscal year 19

97) in terms of their personnel status. In FY 97, the 

arguably experienced its most difficult year for en

recruiting since FY 79 as it added hundreds of recr

and millions of dollars to the recruiting effort while low

enlistment standards and posting the lowest

1

 fill of it

structure in almost 20 years. The difficulties encou

are not reserved for the enlisted ranks. Some clas

helicopter pilot losses are running ahead of historical 

And the Army is not alone in its personnel problem

Navy’s surface ships were undermanned by as much 

percent in FY 97, a manning shortage projected to co

until sometime in FY 99 due to critical shortages in 

skilled enlisted sailors.

2

 The Navy was also experi

enlisted recruiting difficulties in the early part of FY 9

Air Force is having its own personnel woes as many 

mid-career pilots are choosing to resign. The Air 

predicts that they will be short at least 700 pilots an

through the year 2000.3

70
CRISIS

Why is the Army specifically, and the services gen

facing such serious personnel problems? Let’s explo

most cited reason—the economy. We know that the o

unemployment rate is at its lowest level in almost a q

of a century and that for 16- to 19-year-old

unemployment rate is also at its lowest level since 199

also know that the strength of the economy may be at

to by other measures such as the rise in the comm

markets, renewed public confidence, and possib

civilian-military wage gap. The wage gap represen

percentage increase that would equate cumulative m

pay with cumulative civilian pay. From 1982 through 

the civilian-military wage gap increased in favor 

civilians every year except two. By 1998, the military 

have required a 13.5 percent increase to match their c

counterparts.

4

On the other hand, we know that the Army’s recr

problems began in 1994 or earlier when unemplo

rates were not remarkably low, when the economy w

as dynamic as today, and when the wage gap was 

wide as it is today. Additionally, the Army succes

recruited in both good and bad economic conditions an

a period of steadily decreasing military wages rela

civilian wages throughout the 1980s and early 199

early FY 97, as the magnitude of the impending en

shortfall became apparent, the Army substan

increased the value of educational and enlis

incentives to offset the lure of the civilian economy. Bu

these substantially higher incentives failed to a

sufficient people onto active duty.

Does the economy offer a sufficient explanation 

current staffing problems? Maybe. However, it is n

only factor that might affect a young American’s deci

serve in the military. Let us look at some of the 

relevant factors.

71
America’s aversion to sustaining a large standing 

during times of peace is of long standing. One has o

look at the variable size of the Army over time and cor

it with the periods of peace and war to begin to unde

the depth of that aversion. There are, howeve

exceptions to this pattern: the Cold War and today. D

the Cold War, the public was sufficiently convinced 

was “at war” that it was willing to sustain a be

standing army. Since the fall of the Berlin Wa

government has failed to convince the public that th

any credible threat—near or long term—justify

standing Army of 1.4 million plus people. Does this av

to a large standing military affect Americans as 

consider whether or not to serve in their militar

simply do not know. But since this aversion appears 

part of the American persona, maybe the Army shou

more deeply into the matter. 

In addition to America’s aversion to a large sta

army, it is possible that community or selfless servi

waning social attribute. In 1994, the Boy Scouts of Am

conducted a poll among men and boys who had been se

for Who’s Who. The results were startling. At the bot

the top ten attributes or activities associated with b

good citizen were those such as “participate in charit

“volunteer time in the community.”

5

 Looking at it s

differently, Derek Bok in his book, The State of the N

asserts that Americans appear to be less responsi

fulfilling basic civic obligations.

6

 Others find today’s s

to be at odds with the military values of sacrifice, 

self-discipline, and teamwork.

7

 Still others assert th

serving in the military was the moral thing to do on

all-volunteer Force was created in 1973.

8

Michael Sandel in Democracy’s Discontent asserts

time when democratic ideals seem ascendant abroad

is reason to wonder whether we have lost possession o

at home. Our public life is rife with discontent. Ame

72
and do not trust the government to do the right t

Samuel Huntington in The Erosion of American Na

Interests suggests that rising opposition to the f

government may be a consequence of the end of th

War.

10

 The Boy Scouts of America’s survey affirm

males are dissatisfied with American society.

11

 M

service requires a family’s most precious resourc

children. Is it possible that parents, increas

discontented with their government and society, are lo

surrender their children to military service?

In addition to a diminishing desire to serve, a

fading attribute in our postmodern society could be l

to the “nation-state.” Samuel Huntington writes th

process of “Americanization and assimila

characterizing past immigration has changed. Now t

a distinct trend in which immigrants seek to retain 

national identities, in some cases retaining their eth

as their defining characteristic. America may increa

become a multicultural regime where the melting po

is discarded and subnational issues dominate the po

landscape.

12

Another daunting hurdle for future recruitment m

the impact of technology on jobs, combined with st

increasing college graduate wage premiums as tech

drives up the cost of the human capital necessary to 

the AAN into being. In such a process, several factors 

into play. First, information technologies are now resh

the workplace through such innovations as intelligen

Intelligent tools increase the skill prerequisites of wo

increase their effectiveness, and drive up their salarie

higher salaries strengthen the inducement of high 

graduates to attend college so as to qualify fo

technologically-based, higher-salaried positions bec

available, thereby siphoning off young people who 

otherwise have been candidates for enlistment 

services. If the services are to compete successfully

73
made more expensive.

13

Second, the economic benefit of military service re

to college followed by civilian employment is continu

fall further behind, indicating that the Army may 

competing effectively enough.14 While the wage pre

for those with 1-3 years of college has remained rela

constant, those with a 4-year degree have seen their 

grow from 140 percent to almost 160 percent of the wa

people with only a high school diploma.

15

 RAND re

into recruiting indicates that there has been a subst

drop in the numbers of students taking the Armed Se

Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) from 1988 th

1994. Additionally, the number of seniors takin

ASVAB has also dropped substantially.

16

 Since taki

battery, a prerequisite to joining a service, is volunta

numbers taking it provide a good barometer of recr

prospects. 

How might these trends combine to affect the A

ability to bring the AAN force to fruition in 2025? F

seems likely that there will be a dilution of certain jo

prerequisites in the AAN force owing to the prolifera

smart machines. But it also seems likely that 

intelligent but technologically challenging tools wil

abundance, thus requiring quality soldiers to use 

effectively.

17 This bifurcation of jobs and skills 

military will also permeate the civilian ma

Consequently, both the Army and civilian employe

need and seek the same two quality groups a

employees.

18

Moreover, there is research indicating tha

increasing college wage premium may actually be le

the Army a lower-quality pool of applicants from wh

recruit, since high-quality youth who previously enlis

the Army are now attending college.

19

 The lower A

test rates for seniors may indicate that they are s

college as the ticket to success. Further, their parent

74
service as they consider the broad array of attractive o

available to their children.

20

 Cumulatively, then, the 

quality personnel will increasingly be pursued by bo

Army and other institutions. However, the grow

economic incentives offered by the civil sector indicat

the Army may have an increasingly difficult time 

those people onto active duty.

Even as the impact of technology appears likely to 

both the military and civilian organizations to see

same qualified people over the next quarter of a ce

there may be other educational trends that will f

increase the competition for quality people. Specif

despite the fact that college attendance is increasing

is evidence that proficiency levels among both colleg

noncollege bound youth are not increasing. More impo

though, there may be more “inequality” in the quality 

market than traditional statistics indicate.

21

 Consequ

the previously discussed competition for quality yout

in fact take place within a smaller pool of “quality y

acceptable to the military, civilian employers, and co

If so, given the previous discussion of technology an

the Army will face even stiffer competition fo

high-quality youth necessary to man the AAN.

The last civil trend that may bear on military ser

that associated with values and morals. Clausewitz 

War notes that the moral domain is among the 

important in war. But in American society, moral ele

necessary to a successful Army may be disappearin

example, the Boy Scouts of America survey allud

earlier concluded that “such values as citize

patriotism, or social responsibility are ass

considerably less importance by teens aged 14-19 th

younger boys.”22 With regard to older males, the s

concluded that “the ethical and moral values of man

fall short of the ideal and reflect a degree of cynicism 

society.”23 The military is an organization where succ

the battlefield demands acknowledgement o

75
discounted in the pool from which soldiers will be d

What are the implications for the military of declining 

stock among the population? In the near term, the M

extended and toughened their boot camp, but even th

may not be enough.

24

 In the long term, we simply 

know.

Another indicator of the state of moral values 

crime rate. How does the youth crime rate affect the A

ability to recruit today? In 2025? Recently, there ha

considerable press discussion regarding the falling 

rate.25 Others, however, suggest that this developm

really the lull before the storm. Even though the n

crime rate has leveled off, the level of crime is still well 

historical levels and remains alarming. Crime vict

nearly 42 million Americans in 1994—31 million pr

crimes and 10.8 million violent crimes. Most of these c

were committed by men under the age of 25, u

rendering the perpetrators ineligible for military ser

Will the Army continue to obtain enough qua

minorities when the crime statistics are projected 

racial lines?

TRENDS IN AMERICAN MILITARY SOCIETY

We have discussed a number of trends in America

society as they might affect the Army’s ability to bri

AAN into being circa 2025. But there are tren

America’s military society itself that also may affe

Army’s ability to field AAN.

As mentioned earlier, the civilian-military wag

currently stands at 13.5 percent, but even this 

difference does not capture fully the economic oppor

cost to military couples. Increasingly, working wive

become the norm in America, but military wives 

heavy economic opportunity cost because the posit

location of their soldier husbands often prevents them 

working at all or prevents them from developing s

76
as being up to 35 percent of a lieutenant colonel’s r

pay.

27

 Thus, if the current civilian-military wag

computation were to include the lost economic oppor

cost of military spouses, the wage gap would increas

significant margin. Making this economic situation 

more ominous for future military staffing is the fac

over 56 percent of the enlisted force and over 70 perc

the officer corps had or has a father who served 

military.

27 Therefore, if the serving military be

bearish on military service, it could become even 

difficult for the Army to recruit its future AAN force

all, fathers do counsel sons.

Charles Moskos contends that the decline of m

service as a gate for those bound for elite positi

society—such as it was after World War II and the K

War—is the most important reason for the widenin

between the military and the society it serves. F

estrangement is adumbrated by the comparative l

military service within the current administratio

Congress.

29

 What is the impact on society when its elit

not serve? We cannot trace out all the ramifications 

but we know a priori that if talented young men and w

believe military service is irrelevant to their subse

prospects for entry into the nation’s social and eco

elite, then they will be much more prone to avoid it.

In summary, it appears that there may be imp

social, economic, and moral trends affecting 

Americans as they consider whether to serve or no

most problematic eventuality appears to be that the 

colleges, and civilian employers will be actively pu

the same, and possibly dwindling, group of youth wit

technological aptitude. Also boding ill for the AAN 

waning of civic responsibility and the rise of a multicu

society in lieu of the traditional melting pot. The A

knowledge of many of these trends is limited at 

Obviously, with so much uncertainty about the 

availability of personnel, there is work to be done.

77
If the Army had a rigorous, methodical process by 

the “fog” of the future personnel situation cou

dissipated, then the task of bringing the AAN fo

fruition would not be as difficult. The Army does h

long-range planning document called The Army Plan 

However, TAP is not an appropriate mechanis

attending to the various imponderables. However, the 

does have a proven systematic process that is speci

designed to remove, or at least thin, the “fog” of uncer

in a tactical context. It is called the Intelligence Prepa

of the Battlefield (IPB). Fortunately, the analytical p

embodied in the IPB applies to the preparations for s

any complex problem where numerous data inputs m

successfully accounted for. Let us see how it can help 

understanding and solving the problem of staffing the 

The IPB is a systematic, continuous process of ana

the threat and environment in a specific geographic a

it affects military operations. Specifically, the IPB

• Identifies facts and assumptions about the batt

environment and the threat. This enables 

planning and the development of courses of ac

• Provides the basis for intelligence directio

synchronization that supports the command’s c

course of action.

• Contributes to complete staff synchronization a

successful completion of several other 

processes.

30

The intelligence estimate is completed before any 

other estimates are completed. It provides the fac

assumptions driving all other estimates. The product 

IPB is the basis of the intelligence estimate. Th

process identifies critical gaps in the command’s know

of the battlefield. The commander, using the IPB pr

78
command’s collection manager uses the results of the 

develop and implement a collection plan satisfyin

commander’s priority intelligence requirements. The 

template identifies where an activity will occur. The 

matrix describes the indicators associated with 

activity. Finally, the intelligence synchronization m

depicts the collection strategy that supports the comm

chosen course of action. The collection manager a

specific responsibility to one or more organizati

monitor one or more areas of interest.

Intelligence synchronization is more than s

ensuring that collection systems of various sor

operating. The collection manager directs the activi

organizations and intelligence systems, receive

information they produce, processes it, and then pac

and disseminates intelligence of value to the comman

time to support his decisions.

ADAPTING IPB IN SUPPORT OF A PERSONN

SYNCHRONIZATION PLAN

Intelligence synchronization provides a framewo

understanding disparate data. If it could be applied 

problem of future personnel, then it could go a lon

toward removing the element of contingency that su

all discussion thus far. Moreover, it is the synchroniza

the data that will identify which trends or developmen

relevant and those that are not. To use intell

synchronization as a model for studying personnel re

that we identify relevant areas of interest (RAIs

decision points. There appear to be five broad 

applicable to our problem: (1) popular aversion to a sta

Army; (2) willingness to serve; (3) economic facto

military isolation; and, (5) moral, physical, and cog

attributes of society.

The first RAI—popular aversion to a large sta

army in peacetime—seeks to measure the imp

79
society in undertaking the necessaries to provid

necessary personnel for a viable force.

The second RAI—willingness to serve—is directed 

potential recruit rather than to society as a whole

measure may have generally been supplied by the 

Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS), but meas

“willingness to serve” is actually far more complicate

simply tapping into individual attitude. Willingn

serve could also be affected, for example, by such 

trends as the weakening of the melting pot ideal.

31

RAI (3) encompasses all economic factors that 

bear on a youth’s decision to serve in the military. It 

measure the relative economic advantage (or disadva

at discrete future years of civilian employment immed

following high school, military service, and college

measure should be nuanced enough to measur

difficulty of luring quality people onto active duty from 

to year. Additionally, the measure should addre

economic cost to parents of their offspring’s c

attendance in light of contributions that could be m

institutions other than the Army. This RAI woul

factor in the size of the youth cohort, demand by c

employers, unemployment levels, and military eco

incentives (bonuses, money for college, retirement be

etc.). 

Military isolationism, the fourth RAI, seeks to asse

impact on military recruitment and retention o

weakening bonds of unity and common cause betwe

military and the society it serves. This measure s

address, among other things, how favorably se

military personnel view military service. Given the 

portion of the force that had fathers in the milit

negative view of military service by serving personne

be extremely detrimental to the Army’s recruitin

retention efforts.

80
educational attributes of society should be examine

particular attention to how these will shape th

material of the recruitment pool. Such measurement s

lead to refinements in the focus of recruiting e

adjustments of enlistment criteria, changes in tr

programs, and other adaptations to the realities of q

in the recruitment pool. The measurements reflec

these RAIs should be linked to the relevant decision 

portrayed on a planning time-line out to the year 20

The first decision point would address strateg

recruitment from the age cohort of 17-21 years

Recruiting Command and a number of res

organizations actively study this group. The second de

point would aim at youth cohorts from elementary t

school. It may be reasonable to split this group in two

research indicates that children older than 12 respon

markedly different manner to TV than those younge

12. The last decision point would address cohorts of th

yet unborn or not in school. At first blush it a

ridiculous to consider this last group. However, the A

building a force over 25 years into the future, one pred

on the twin assumptions that we will field ena

leap-ahead technology and that we will find technolo

qualified soldiers to operate it. To make those assum

valid, we must plan at least 25 years ahead.

Lastly, to capitalize upon a Personnel Synchroni

Plan requires that the Army appoint a data coll

manager. Although there may be a number of organiz

that could perform this role, the Office of the Deputy C

Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) is an approp

organization to take on this responsibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The most often cited reason for personnel sho

among the services is our robust economy. Upon 

inspection, however, we find that there are emergent 

81
exercise even more decisive negative effects 

recruitment. The Army does not have an institution

mechanism for adjusting to such trends in a holistic pr

Without such a mechanism, bringing the AAN 

successful result will be distinctly problematic

suggested Personnel Synchronization Plan is a syst

process the Army could use to assess the impact of the 

relevant social, cultural, and economic trends affecti

various age cohorts insofar as their willingness 

recruited is concerned.

It is therefore recommended that the Army und

the following steps.

• Appoint a data collection manager. ODCSPER 

logical candidate, and the Director of Pers

Technologies may be the logical executive agen

• Implement an integrated process to synchroni

of future personnel intelligence. A Pers

Synchronization Plan (PSP), focusing on th

relevant areas of interest, is one such process 

concepts are generally familiar within the Arm

• The collection manager should identify 

organizations can and should monitor each n

area of interest and then assign them 

responsibility to do so.

• The collection manger should publish, pro

quadrennially, a document describing the 

situational data for personnel. R&D planners

developers, and training designers would empl

data in the prosecution of their responsibilities

82
1. Excluding FY 93.

2. James W. Crawley, “Brain Drain Threatens Navy’s Rea

San Diego Union Tribune, October 10, 1997, p. 1.

3. Faye Bowers, “Air Force’s Pressing Mission: Keep More P

Board,” Christian Science Monitor, September 19, 1997, p. 3.

4. James R. Hosek, Christine E. Peterson, and Joanna Z. Hei

Military Pay Gaps and Caps, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp

1994, p. 4. The baseline year is 1982, civilian pay being defined 

to the employment cost index. The wage gap is a measure of rela

growth, not necessarily pay comparability.

5. Boy Scouts of America, The Values of Men and Boys in A

New York: Louis & Associates, Inc., 1994, p. 16.

6. Derek Bok, The State of the Nation, Cambridge, MA: H

University Press, 1996, p. 376.

7. Thomas E. Ricks, “The Widening Gap Between the Milit

Society,” Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 66-78.

8. Amy Waldman, “Strangers in Uniform,” UTNE RE

March-April 1997, p. 67.

9. Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, Cambridg

Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 1.

10. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of American N

Interests,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5, September/October 1

28-49.

11. Boy Scouts of America, p. 14.

12. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interes

33-42. See also Charles C. Moskos and James Burke, “The Post

Military,” in The Military in New Times, James Burk, ed., Bould

Westview Press, 1994, pp. 141-162.

13. Christopher J. Dede, “Emerging Educational Trends an

Impact on the Youth Cohort in 1020,” inFuture Soldiers and the 

Imperative: The Army 2020 Conference (hereinafter Future Sold

L. Philips and M. R. Thurman, eds., n.p., 1994, pp. 159-202.

83
Contemporary Sociological Research,” in Future Soldiers, pp. 3

15. Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, The Labor 

for Soldiers, West Point, NY: United States Military Ac

Department of Social Sciences, 1997, p. 8.

16. Bruce R. Orvis, Narayan Sastry, and Laurie L. Mc

Military Recruiting Outlook: Recent Trends in Enlistment Pro

and Conversion of Potential Enlisted Supply, Santa Monica, CA: 

1996, p. 33.

17. Donald A. Smith, Paul J. Sticha, and John E. Morriso

Soldier as Adaptive Problem Solver and Decision Maker in 2

Future Soldiers, pp. 97-122.

8. Paul J. Andrisani and Thomas N. Daymont, “Critical As

Youth Labor Market in 2010,” in Future Soldiers, pp. 275-294.

9. Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, p. 8.

20. Ibid., p. 9.

21. Andrisani and Daymont, p. 279.

22. Boy Scouts of America, p. 8.

23. Ibid., p. 12.

24. Lisa Hoffman, “Top Marine: Morality Key to Strong M

Beaufort Gazette, August 24, 1997, p. 1.

25. See, for example, Peter Brimlow, “The Wild Ones,” FO

Vol. 159, No. 4, February 1997, pp. 46-48.

26. William J. Bennett, John J. Dilulio, Jr., and John P. W

Body Count, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, pp. 18-21.

27. Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, p. 29.

28. Patricia M. Shields, “Changing Family Demographics 

Impact on Accession, Trainability, Motivation, Characte

Performance,” in Future Soldiers, pp. 247-274.

29. Charles Moskos, “Bridging the Gap: Normative Conside

in 2010,” in Future Soldiers, pp. 381-396. See also Thomas W. Li

84
Washington Post, September 8, 1998, p. A13.

30. Department of the Army, FM 34-130, Intelligence Prepar

the Battlefield, Washington, DC: Department of the Army

chapter 1.

31. Moskos and Burk, “Postmodern,” p. 143.

85
THE HISPANIC MARKET: AN OVERVIE

Ricardo F. Diaz

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the Hispanic market comp

of the United States Army Recruiting Comm

(USAREC) FY 1999 Marketing Plan, in the p

highlighting some of the Hispanic attributes and beh

that influence their decision to join the United States 

The focus is on the strategies to be followed in the na

market.

1

Hispanics are the fastest growing population comp

in the United States and are projected to become the l

minority by year 2010. It is in the best interest of the 

services to learn the demographic issues associated 

this shift in the U.S. population and the impact of recr

from this group of youth.

WHO ARE THE HISPANICS?

The first problem is the definition itself. Hispan

those who identify themselves as being of Spanish 

regardless of race. There are, of course, individual

have chosen not to be identified as Hispanics even t

they otherwise would be considered as being of Hi

ethnicity. Hispanics can also be identified as a group

ethnicities with a common Spanish language backg

The five major groups of Hispanics are Mexican, P

Rican, Cuban, Central and South American, and all o

Other problems with accurate classification of His

derive from the reporting procedures themselves. For 

years Hispanics were grouped as “others” in many 

forms used by the government. It was not until recent

87
many of the reporting forms.

The 1998 edition of the Yankelovich Hispanic M

reports that Mexico is the leading country of orig

Hispanics in the United States, with 64.2 percent 

Hispanics. Central and South America are second, w

estimated 21.3 percent, followed by Puerto Rico wit

percent, and Cuba and others with 4.1 percent. “O

refers primarily to persons whose origin is one of the 

Caribbean islands. However, it can also refer to any 

Hispanic ethnicity not covered under the four 

countries of origin.

MARKET LOCATION

Hispanics, like many other ethnic minorities, t

concentrate in major metropolitan areas. Hispanic

tend to remain for a good while close to the ports of ent

the United States. The already established His

communities in such cities as Miami can provide sou

employment and support to newcomers as well as sha

common language.

Information obtained from the U.S. Census B

indicates that Hispanics of Mexican origin tend to r

close to the border states of California and Texas. His

of Puerto Rican origin are primarily located in New 

City and the northeastern United States, while Hispa

Cuban origin concentrate in the Miami and Centr

South Florida areas. Hispanics of Central and 

American origin are primarily in the Miami area, bu

also migrated to New York City as well as Los An

Hispanic communities have been gradually estab

throughout the United States in some of the other 

cities such as Chicago, Kansas City, and Seattle.

Recruitment advertising directed at Hispanics 

national basis fails to achieve identification wit

separate groups and thus cannot accomplish much 

88
Marketing and advertising directed at the His

community are more effectively communicated by 

geo-clustering techniques that will account for nation

of origin and their particular language colloquialis

well as cultural and social differences within the v

Hispanic communities.

A large proportion of the Hispanic populatio

percent) is concentrated in only 10 of the countr

recruiting battalion areas. Ninety-five perce

USAREC’s Hispanic recruitment comes from only 12 

recruiting battalion areas. These 12 are San Anton

Angeles, Phoenix, New York City, Southern Calif

Miami (to include Puerto Rico), Houston, Sacram

Dallas, Tampa, Denver, and Chicago. Concentrati

these few areas produces the most bang for the buck

DEMOGRAPHICS

Hispanic youth now comprise approximately 13 p

of USAREC’s prime market (males aged 17 to 21), an

share will grow rapidly. Hispanics have the traditiona

of “The American Dream.” Hispanic immigration, ju

that of others, is driven by the quest for opportunit

opportunity being sought is not only financial, bu

educational and social, if not for the adults then f

children.

However, information obtained from the Departm

Labor indicates that Hispanics tend to cluster in blue

or low-paying white-collar occupations. Hispanics ar

nearly twice as likely as whites to be unemployed

come from a larger-than-average household, 

lower-than-average household income. Data from th

Census Bureau indicate that the rate of Hispanics 

below the poverty level was 30.3 percent in 1995 an

percent in 1996. These figures are the highest o

ethnicity. A number of factors—inadequate Englis

education, and lack of proper training, among others

89
The data also suggest that as children become older

are required to join the work force in lower-paying j

assist in the sustenance of the family rather than p

higher education. Sadly, it has proved very difficu

Hispanics to break this self-perpetuating cycle.

In the 1997 edition of the Yankelovich Mo

participants were asked to identify the best way f

young to get ahead. Hispanics responded that go

college was the best method. However, in a 1996 stud

National Center for Educational Statistics (N

established that Hispanics had the lowest expec

among the main ethnic groups of attaining a baccala

degree. Related studies by the NCES have establishe

Hispanics also have the highest high school dropou

(30-35 percent). In an NCES study of Hispanic stu

entering the eighth grade in 1988, it was found that b

only 72.7 percent had managed to obtain a high 

diploma and 5.9 percent a GED; 1.4 percent wer

enrolled in high school, 5.7 percent were working to

high school equivalency diplomas, and 14.3 percent 

complete dropouts. Though the dropout rate did not 

the 30-35 percent level mentioned above, Hispanics st

the highest complete dropout rate among any of the 

groups in this particular study.

Moreover, NCES found that only 53 percent of Hi

high school graduates were qualified for admissio

4-year institution. The qualification index used was 

on such factors as grade point average, senior class 

SAT and ACT scores, and curricular rigor. It is th

surprise to read of NCES’s finding in 1998 that His

were completing bachelor’s degrees only 32.4 percent 

time, and that 36.6 percent of Hispanic students 

dropping out of college without any degree at al

reasons most often cited for these discouraging resu

lack of financial resources and family obligations.

90
have not yet achieved the “American Dream.” T

education has been identified as the key to getting a

Hispanics have the lowest educational achieve

statistics among any ethnicity. Fortunately, the Army 

one of the best packages of educational opportunities 

employer in the country. In view of the Army College 

and college loan repayment assistance, as w

educational opportunities while in service throug

Army Education Centers, it would seem that the A

the right choice for many Hispanics looking to get a

However, the truth of the matter is that because 

restrictions contained in some of the incentives, and t

educational attainment of Hispanic youth as a cohort

would not qualify for these otherwise very attr

incentives.

WHAT DO HISPANICS WANT?

We have already mentioned that Hispanics hav

traditional view of the “American Dream.” How

Hispanics remain firmly attached to their family 

According to the 1998 Yankelovich Monitor, the b

sources of satisfaction for Hispanics after family and 

are the acquisition of prestigious brand-name produc

shopping in general. More specifically, Hispanic need

priorities are categorized as follows:

• Retro-acculturation. Hispanics are in a co

internal balancing act between maintaining 

own cultural roots and assimilating into the Am

mainstream. Hispanics wish to maintain 

Hispanic earmarks and are proud of their Hi

background. For the most part, they wa

participate in Hispanic heritage activities, an

feel the need to maintain ethnic allegiance. But 

same time, Hispanics have the desire to assi

and achieve success. Most Hispanics agree 

immigrants should learn English and acce

91
important to be accepted by non-Hispanics.

• Name-brand Leadership. A marker for eco

and social success is perceived as the ability to a

“brand” items. Generic products are considered 

lower in quality, acquired only by those who ha

yet “made it.” The ownership of name-brand pr

is seen as an objective testament that the per

family who owns them is advancing and getting 

in American society.

• Shopping Enjoyment. Another voucher of s

is having the wherewithal to examine all the sho

options and decide which is the smart value. No 

is the family forced to acquire the cheapest and 

quality item, for now, as the family progresses 

achievement ladder, it can elect the product 

accordant with its aspirations and chosen lifes

• Technology Empowerment. Finally, His

feel that technology, as an extension of educat

the marker of future success. Many Hispanics 

United States are immigrants from third 

countries where very limited technological res

were available to the population. Now that they 

the United States—the very cradle of techno

prowess—they view their ability to obtain and 

the fruits of modern technological advancemen

a form of empowerment and status.

HOW CAN RECRUITERS CAPITALIZE UPON

THESE WANTS?

In our effort to recruit in the Hispanic communiti

must portray Army service as a way of enabling Hispa

achieve their goals while serving the country. There 

least two significant Hispanic needs that must be sati

the Army is to be successful in this market.

92
friendly. The Hispanic soldier must feel that his fami

be provided for and that his desire to be stationed close 

extended family will be respected to the maximum po

extent consistent with the needs of the Army. Recr

must participate in Hispanic community activities to 

reciprocal acceptance. Recruiters have the challen

only of recruiting Hispanic youth, but also of recruiti

parents, especially the mother, convincing them o

their son or daughter is better off joining the Army 

remaining at home. One of the ways to win over the p

is by promoting the Army as a place to achieve pe

ambitions and acquire needed skills. The youth i

provided the opportunity to prepare for and be succes

life. Army service also makes leaders out of soldiers, 

(brand leadership) that will distinguish former so

throughout their lives. Finally, recruiters must rei

the Hispanic values of patriotism, duty, and wor

affirming the Army’s high and noble standards, recr

sell the exclusivity of the institution. The unif

equipment, and mission accentuate becoming part 

American institution that signifies the best of what Am

has to offer.

Second, the Army must be perceived as a smart 

The Army must become a source of pleasure, excite

and social connections. It must also provide a comfo

living for the family. But most important, the Army 

provide opportunities for future success, such as 

technology training that produces transferable skills

youth to commit to a term in service, there mus

demonstrated advantage over time spent elsew

Finally, for those youths who have wandered withou

direction, the Army must provide them the opportu

make up for the lost time and never-acquired techno

skills and education.

93
Hispanics have the highest tendency to join the s

among any of the ethnic groups. As of September 

Hispanic males in the 16-to-21 age group indica

positive propensity for active Army service of abo

percent, compared to 16 percent for blacks and 8 perc

whites.

2

The 1997 Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (Y

identifies certain values that set Hispanics apart fro

general population in terms of response rates:

• Money for Education

• Parents’ Approval

• Staying Near Family And Friends

• Working In Hi-Tech Environment

• Opportunity To Travel

The survey thus reinforces other reports of the 

priority on education among the Hispanics. It also co

the importance to Hispanics of family and high tech

jobs. The New Recruit Survey also confirms that His

are subject to relatively more parental influence 

enlistment decision. In a similar vein, the 1997 

indicates that Hispanics are less fearful of basic tr

but identify “family obligation” as a barrier to enlistm

higher rates than the general population.

With regard to Hispanic performance on the A

Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), it has proved som

disappointing thus far. The AFQT results show tha

47.2 percent of Hispanics fall into Test Score Cate

I-IIIA, which would qualify them for better incentiv

enlistment options. By way of comparison, 67.4 perc

Army recruits in FY 1998 scored in that bracket.

3

 P

Ricans have scored significantly lower on the AFQT 

94
Thus, though the Army provides opportunities th

highly attractive to the Hispanic community, due 

educational attainment many Hispanic youths d

qualify for them.

SIZE OF THE HISPANIC MARKET

According to Census Bureau estimates, there a

million Hispanic youths 17-21 years old. The num

males in this group is estimated at 1.4 million. The fa

Hispanics have higher high school dropout rates and 

AFQT averages than the general population explain

they qualify for enlistment in the Army at lower rate

the general population. Preliminary studies b

Recruiting Command estimate that the number of qu

Test Score Category I-IIIA Hispanic males in the 17

population in the United States is 171,144. From 

number, based on propensity-to-enlist surveys, we 

42,444 to be potentially available. In FY 1998, 2

Hispanics were successfully recruited by the service

whole, of which 7,450, or 35.5 percent, enlisted in the A

GROWTH TRENDS

If all the services are currently recruiting some 

Hispanic youths, then there remains a mark

21,000-plus individuals who are potentially interest

are not enlisting in any of the services. We have to rec

that these individuals may not be enlisting because 

high quality of their records and the consequent luc

opportunities available to them in the private sector. 

may also be other factors discouraging these indiv

from enlisting that are not detected in any of the sur

The Hispanic market is indisputably the fastest gr

population segment in the United States. However, 

reasons we have seen, the services may not be a

depend solely on population growth as a source of add

enlistees for the next decade. For Hispanics to 

95
other services must actively involve themselves 

educational remediation of these youths.

TELEVISION AND MUSIC AS RECRUITING TO

According to the 1996 Teenage Research Unl

study, Hispanic teens, like the general market, watch 

the biggest leisure time activity. Additionally, listen

music is very popular, but the Hispanic taste in m

more diversified than that of other ethnicities. Hi

teens prefer alternative, rap, rhythm and blues/sou

Top 40 in that order.

A study conducted by the Nielsen and Roslow Re

Project in 1995 concluded that 83 percent of His

watched Spanish TV and could recall TV commerci

percent more accurately if they saw them in Spanish 

than English. Advertising the Army to Hispanics in Sp

is thus far more effective than in English. Also 

considered is that Hispanic parents may not have the 

command of the English language as their children. I

same parents are, in fact, major influencers, 

Spanish-language TV commercials would be able to 

them much more effectively than those in English.

CONCLUSIONS

The Hispanic market is experiencing the f

increase in population, but it may be overstated beca

disqualifiers that prevent Hispanic youths from en

the service. From a recruiting viewpoint, raisin

educational achievement of ethnic minorities thus be

all-important. Collectively, we need to reach into s

earlier and encourage young people to stay in scho

take stronger college preparation programs.

The labor and educational statistics would se

indicate that Hispanics have not yet achieve

“American Dream.” Lack of educational attainm

96
desirable enlistment benefits and job opportunitie

Army must revisit some of its definitions of qual

applied to trainability and retention to ensure that we 

fact measuring the right attributes and not lim

enlistment opportunities for the Hispanic comm

unnecessarily.

USAREC itself must undertake initiatives tha

enable us to expand our reach into the rapidly gr

Hispanic youth cohort. It must implement a targeted 

to reach the Hispanic community in terms of sellin

explaining the product, increasing advertising exp

and reaching out to the community.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Other than estimating the location of the Hispanic youth 

in reference to USAREC’s recruiting battalions and the Armed S

Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) tester database for calc

Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) projections, the discu

this chapter usually applies only to Hispanics located wit

continental United States, excluding data from Puerto Rico.

2. “Army Demographics” (Working Draft), Headqu

Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of S

Personnel, Human Resources Directorate, dated April 6, 1998.

3. United States Army Recruiting Command, “Acc

Demographics (Includes Prior Service),” June 1, 1998, p. 1.

97
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES MILIT

Myra J. Peterson

Despite the rapid growth in some ethnic segments 

U.S. population, the female segment truly hasn’t ch

much at all in terms of its size, nor is there expected 

any significant shift in the near future. Women 

composed about 50 percent of the population right fro

beginning and have remained that proportion 

remarkable steadfastness. Even following wars and fa

the gender balance returns to even with remarkably 

influence or attention on anyone’s part.

In this chapter, I’m going to discuss the changes 

Army over the past 25 years and then draw 

conclusions about what these shifts might presage f

next 25 or so years. With regard to the demog

composition of the U.S. Army in the year 2030, the be

to look at where we’re headed is to see how far we’ve 

and note where we are now.

This examination could not occur at a more opp

time. It happens that in July 1998 the U.S. Army cele

the 25th Anniversary of the All-Volunteer Army a

June 1998, the 50th Anniversary of the integration 

armed services. These are two key events in our m

heritage that I shall discuss.

We are undeniably the best equipped, best traine

best prepared fighting force in the world today. But w

be able to maintain that status only if we continue to r

train, and retain soldiers of the same high quality.

In 1948, President Truman signed Executive O

99-80 and 99-81 which laid the foundation for fair and 

treatment in the armed forces as we know it today. Th

99
the way for integration of our black Americans. The

amazing parallels in the achievement of rights for A

Americans and for women. Both have suffered from s

attitudes which suggested that their worth was som

lessened by their race or gender. But the Army has ser

the frontier for change in terms of its embrace of p

that support equal opportunity, equal pay, and equal 

There is still uncharted ground ahead, but the Army 

rich history of pioneering social change for the betterm

our nation at large.

In fact, the year 1973 marked the beginning 

unprecedented concept in service. The last man was d

in December 1972 and reported for training in June 

All soldiers who entered active service since this date 

because they wanted to. No longer were young men s

to the draft and mandatory conscription. The be

deriving from this change have enabled our force to d

into the strong, cohesive, effective fighting force th

claim victory in the Cold War as its legacy. The Army 

the highest quality force in its history owing to the 

brought about by an all-volunteer force—an

underlying success of the all-volunteer force rests wi

inclusion of women.

Once the Army acknowledged that they needed w

they had to decide how to use them. In that evaluatio

overriding issue was not cost-effectiveness but c

effectiveness. In that context, other factors came int

First, women tend to be physically weaker than men, 

limits some of the work they can do; second, women 

excluded by law or policy from combat units and pos

calling for combat skills. These two factors re

utilization and assignment flexibility.

The tradeoff in the recruiting market of the early 

was thus between a high quality female and a low q

male. Within this tradeoff, the average woman availa

be recruited is smaller, weighs less, and is phys

100
is brighter, better educated (a high school graduate), 

higher on the aptitude tests, and is less likely to bec

disciplinary problem.

To phrase the question bluntly: Is recruiting a mal

school dropout in preference to a smaller, weake

higher quality female erring on the side of national se

in view of the kinds of jobs which must be done in t

military? The answer to that question is central 

decision on how many women should be used in the v

services. Sometimes the answer will be yes, and some

it will be no, but the question continues to be relevan

Wars are seen as embodying the very worst beha

humanity. They reflect our intolerance for others an

desire to improve our own situation at the expense of o

Wars are made in the name of religion, in the na

liberty, and in the defense of the rights and values w

dear and feel are threatened by another society

happens because people find themselves in circums

in which they would rather die than tolerate. Paradox

war can produce some positive results.

For example, war and the GI Bill seem necessary 

males through college. In 1940, only 6.9 percent of 

males had bachelor’s degrees. This percentage contin

rise until 1976 when it reached a peak of 27.5 perce

then dropped to 22.3 percent by 1987. The rate reco

gradually to 22.5 in 1994 and jumped to 26.3 by 1997

that the 1997 rate is still below the rate of 27.5 p

reached two decades earlier, following the end 

Vietnam War.

Many of the advances in our society are tied 

presence of women in public. The proportion of female

25 to 29 years old with at least a bachelor’s degr

shown huge and continuing growth since 1940. This p

of year-to-year record-setting gains is almost unbroke

percentage of females 25-29 having at least a bac

degree rose from 4.9 percent in 1940 to 29.3 percent by 

101
from 24.0 to 29.3 percent in just 3 years, which is the f

rate of growth at any time in the last six decades.

The steady gains of young women have carried 

past the slow progress of young men. In 1991 the prop

of females with bachelor’s degrees passed the rate for 

for the first time. By 1997 the women were three perce

points ahead of the males and pulling away rapidly.

The implications here are enormous. The educa

requirements of the labor market keep escalating

competition for the high quality, educated female is gr

and is likely to become even more fierce. But the rapid 

of women into the labor market—and into the Army

create divisiveness.

Whenever the value of female service is exam

certain issues inevitably surface. The data below 

provided by Dr. Naomi Verdugo of the Office of the D

Chief of Staff for Personnel, Human Resources Direct

Department of the Army. She was kind enough to sha

results of studies she has either performed or collecte

bear upon the issues surrounding women in the forc

• Pregnancy rates during deployments are the sa

before deployment, according to two separate st

However, pregnancy rates of soldiers are lowe

for civilians the same age.

• On average, married service members hav

children; female service members have fewer 

males; dual-service couples have fewer ch

overall.

• The percentage of married enlisted men in the 

is almost 60 percent; married enlisted femal

close to 50 percent. Of married enlisted fema

percent are in dual-service marriages, while 

percent of enlisted males are in dual-s

marriages. For officers, 5 percent of males 

102
married women officers.

• Although the percentages are close for enlisted 

parents, males outnumber females as single p

because they represent a larger proportion 

force. Of males, 15 percent are single parents, 

20 percent of females are single parents. A

officers, 11 percent of males are single parents

10 percent of females are single parents.

• Women have a tougher time meeting w

standards. Age and childbearing only make it h

At the rank of E-6 and below, men and w

experience weight difficulty at similar rates. 

officer ranks and at the senior NCO level, wome

it twice as tough.

• Females fail to deploy for child dependency reas

a greater rate than males, but experience fewer 

for indiscipline, performance, criminal acts, and 

Beyond youth market propensity for Army servi

attempt to track the attributes young people seek in 

future lives. We use this information to refin

advertising strategies and recruiter presentations

1997 Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS), 

included approximately 10,000 military-aged youth 

was based upon a 30-minute telephone survey star

1975. Teenage Research Unlimited is a direct mail su

a representative sample of approximately 2,000 tee

aged 12-19. Responses were tracked to guide adver

and marketing efforts.

In general, the Army is becoming older, more ethn

diverse, more likely to be married, better educated

more female. But merely identifying these changes d

really address the impacts we can expect to expe

because of such shifts. It’s easy to see that some libera

developments are to be expected, given the greater 

103
youth. It is they, after all, who provide the ever-nec

turnover of first-term recruits. Some of the impact

come about relatively soon—2030 may be too soon for 

of the others.

Our society currently finds the prospect of fema

casualties too repellent to purposely place them in pos

that have a high combat probability. That sentiment i

drives the combat exclusion policy, which influenc

number of female positions available more than any 

factor. And it is this sentiment that permit

perpetuation of traditions and myths about the m

institution and women’s proper role in it. The st

against such traditions and myths was never about w

seeking special privileges or double standards. It was 

being allowed to compete based on ability instead of g

It was never about proving that women can do anyt

man can do, but about being judged as individuals 

same standards as men in any job for which the

qualify. It has always been about being allowed to pu

career based on their individual qualifications rathe

sex stereotypes and male norms unrelated to the job. 

never about women’s equality to the exclusion of rea

considerations. It was about the privilege of serving 

country without artificial barriers based solely on ge

The mission of the armed forces is to provide th

possible national defense within the funds allocated fo

purpose. The goal of the military personnel systems m

to provide the right people to do the job. So the bottom 

that no individual, male or female, should be allow

required to fill any job he or she cannot pe

satisfactorily in war for whatever reason. Gender is r

if ever, the best criterion.

So the issue, really, is attitude and societal value

what will it take for our society to accept the neces

female service? Will the inability to recruit sufficient 

cause us to reconsider or will we look to the draft, 

104
all-volunteer force? Are young men today so obligin

they will accept the inequality of a male-only draft p

Can we sacrifice quality for the sake of our desire to 

our female population?

These are questions that can be addressed on

national developments yet unwritten, especially a

play upon American public opinion. We are more lik

have a female Commander in Chief before we have a f

Chief of Staff of the Army.

105
PERSON TO PERSON:

THE DIVERSITY CHALLENGE

FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT

1

Andre H. Sayles

INTRODUCTION

Organizations across America are today addr

issues related to living and working in a culturally d

environment. For example, the Army is implementing 

is known as the Consideration of Others Program

effort was pioneered at the U.S. Military Academy d

the early 1990s, and was subsequently adopted b

Military District of Washington. Moreover, diversity 

curricular theme for the U.S. Army War College C

1998. In this chapter, I hope to encourage readers to a

positive outlook on the value of diversity and rea

understanding of how we can build on that value 

benefit of both the individual and the Army.

2

WHAT IS DIVERSITY?

The meaning of diversity depends upon both the p

and the context. In any group of several individuals, w

expect diversity. Differences may be derived fro

endless list of possibilities, including place of birth, 

status, language, culture, height, weight, and age. A

have taken part in discussions regarding how soldier

the south may have a perspective different than so

from the north. At times, we even make generaliz

about individuals from particular states or regions w

states. The same is true when we compare life in a 

environment with life in the city. I mention 

possibilities because I want to encourage an understa

107
I suggest that we are all novices when it comes to w

with diversity issues. Accordingly, we need to do the b

can to focus on the primary differences that affe

workplace before addressing sources of diversity that 

lesser impact on our organization.

Judging from my experiences in the Army, we sho

concerned about the primary differences in people ba

ethnicity, gender, and religion. Ethnic diversity issu

often derived from cultural differences that can le

misunderstandings. In contrast, racial difference

usually based on physical and biological character

Although two people of different races can have a s

culture, we often associate minority races w

stereotypical ethnic minority culture. In theory, 

differences should not lead to misunderstandings 

cultural or some other differences are also pr

However, minorities in the Army usually have a c

that differs from what I will call the dominant m

culture. In cases where cultural differences betwee

people are insignificant, racial biases can still hind

relationship. For convenience, I have lumped ethnici

race together. If we can make significant progr

understanding the three general areas of ethnicity, g

and religion, then a second order effect will be an inc

appreciation of the many other possible differen

people.

When we talk about diversity, we are talking 

relationships between individuals or betwee

individual and the institution, especially wher

institution reflects the attitude of its leadership. Div

concerns are often associated with a minority popu

although diversity does not always imply min

Minority issues are derived from the concerns of or 

racial or ethnic minorities. Gender issues originate be

of differences between men and women. Therefore, wh

want to speak collectively about those who are most af

by gender and ethnic minority issues, we should refer 

108
exists between gender and ethnic issues, there are als

fundamental differences. If we intend to get to the c

gender issues, we want to avoid lumping women in

minority category. We have both minority wome

majority women. Therefore, minority women hav

overlapping sets of concerns. We should speak of w

when we refer to gender concerns and minorities wh

talk about ethnic minority issues. Currently, wome

minorities in uniform make up approximately 46 per

the Army and 52 percent of the Army NCO Corps.

THE SAME OR DIFFERENT?

Over the years, we have seen a number of approac

building diverse environments. For example, some of 

that the best way to handle diversity is to treat everyo

same. During the past few months, I have heard s

minority colleagues say that they just wanted to be t

the same as everyone else. Not too long ago, one 

favorite statements was that we do not have men or w

soldiers, we just have soldiers—essentially implyin

everyone should be looked upon as the same. Assim

refers to the cultural absorption of a minority group 

larger body. This assimilation requires the minority 

to abandon its culture in favor of the organizational cu

The success of assimilation depends on how we

minority group can adapt to and become the same 

main cultural group.

In some organizations we see an approach to div

that focuses primarily on individual differences. 

private sector, this notion is frequently driven by econ

because it may be more profitable to ask a Hi

employee to sell the company’s products in a Hi

community than it would be to have a member 

majority population go to that location. Inste

considering everyone to be the same, women and min

are frequently thought of as being different. It may 

109
programs that will prepare organizations for the time 

racial minorities will make up more than 50 percent 

work force. The success of an approach that fo

primarily on differences may depend on how we

organization can provide an environment in which w

and minorities can be productive and continue to r

promotions.

I am convinced that the most effective w

encouraging diversity is to combine these two appro

and consider people to be the same—but different. W

to understand how people are the same and how th

different in order to successfully manage diversity. W

realize that our military culture has evolved over 

years. To every soldier who signs up, the Army is alr

work in progress with an established culture—a c

that we cannot expect to change quickly. It is up 

individual to make the adjustment to adequately conf

this dominant military culture. For some soldier

changes are comparatively minor. For women 

minorities, however, the required adjustment is u

greater because of gender and ethnic differences.

If we recognize that a dominant military culture 

then women and minorities will conform to that cultu

certain extent in order to be successful, but they wi

differ from that culture. It is not adequate simply to 

women and minorities the same as everyone else. It 

not enough just to look upon them as being different

treat every person the same all the time, on the sur

would seem as though we could never make a mi

However, the first problem would be that everyone is n

same. The second problem would be that the objective 

dealings with others should not be simply to avoid mi

or to protect ourselves. Similarly, if we only see oth

being different, our approach will create its own 

problems. We will fail to create the best po

environment if, for the sake of efficiency and good ord

110
everyone is the same.

THE KEY TO SUCCESS

The concept of “same but different” will enable 

continue to build effective organizations as the imp

diversity becomes greater in the next century. We 

develop a clear understanding of how we are the sam

how we are different. We must complement 

understanding with knowledge of when individuals s

be treated the same and when they need to be t

differently. We need to understand our organiza

culture and the extent to which we want those w

different to adapt to that culture. If we ask for 100 p

adaptation or assimilation, we are asking some indiv

to give up all of their past. If we ask for no adaptation

our organization has no culture of its own and it fails

balance between the individual’s need to align wi

organizational culture and the organization’s ne

recognize individual differences leads to succe

managing diversity. This balance of “same but diff

creates an environment in which each of us can ex

working to our full potential.

WHY CONSIDERATION OF OTHERS?

Consideration can be defined as thoughtful rega

others. It may be possible to respect another perso

occasionally treat that person poorly. However, if w

considerate of others, we will consistently treat them 

respect and dignity. Consideration requires ful

respect for others, regardless of our personal fe

towards them. When we adopt consideration of othe

way of life, we will see that it spans the full range of h

interactions. We cannot treat others poorly beca

differences attributed to gender, race, ethnicity, cu

and religion, or other factors such as alcohol use, h

medical limitations, or personal opinion—

111
philosophy for dealing with others that is independ

circumstances or physical characteristics.

The ability to be considerate of others can be ac

through sensitivity training. The objective is a d

understanding of others and oneself through an excha

thoughts and expression of feelings. This understa

focuses mostly on how people are different. We can 

achieve perfect sensitivity. The growth process must 

over many years. Sensitivity is like a curve that appro

a straight line or asymptote but never actually reache

line. The farther the curve is from the asymptot

greater our likelihood of being inconsiderate. A

sensitivity develops and we start to understand 

better, we move along the curve and get closer 

asymptote. Eventually, we reach a point wher

understanding of differences allows us to know bo

meaning and the application of Consideration of Othe

will continue to make mistakes because we can never 

the asymptote, but our sensitivity will be elevated 

point that we will know when we have made a mistak

we will understand that we must go back to the indi

and “set things right” at the first opportunity. W

sensitivity training, we will make mistakes in how w

people and not realize that we have been inconsid

Since we can never reach perfection, consider

of-others training must be a continuous process ov

duration of a career. Many years of working to under

others will bring us closer and closer to the e

asymptote of perfection, though we can never actually 

it.

WE NEED TO COMMUNICATE

Understanding others can be achieved through a 

of frank, face-to-face discussions. People fail to unde

each other because they do not communicate with 

other. They do not communicate with each other be

112
Consideration of Others Program brings soldiers to

in small groups to facilitate communication and pr

understanding. Eventually, we learn to speak dif

cultural languages. We understand how we are the 

within the institutional culture and how we are diff

Ultimately, we begin to understand how we mu

subordinate our individual views for the benefit 

organization. We also begin to see when and ho

organization should respect our differences. We lear

we each look upon ourselves as individuals, but also a

of an organization. We are beginning to achieve our 

when the institution looks back at us and sees the 

picture. Through consideration of others, we are not d

changing the institutional culture. We are changing th

people in the organization behave. Over time, this cha

behavior will have a positive impact on the institu

culture from the bottom up. Moreover, an increase of w

and minority senior leadership could have a complem

effect from the top down.

GOLD OR PLATINUM?

As explained by Major General Robert F. Fole

Major Denise A. Goudreau in their article, “Considera

Others,” the Golden Rule is the essence of 

consideration.

3 We want to be able to treat others 

respect and dignity just as we want them to treat us w

same respect and dignity. The Golden Rule comes 

several places in the Bible, most importantly Matthe

and Luke 6:31. Similar maxims can be found in 

religions in either positive or negative form (e.g., do no

others what you would not want them to do to yo

Matthew, the Golden Rule is positive and can be sta

“So whatever you wish that men would do to you, d

them. This is the law and the prophet.”

The Golden Rule is a principle that we should est

for our own guidance in our interactions with o

113
and, more importantly, how our subordinates vi

Treating others the way we want them to treat us is v

the macroscopic level or as a general way of workin

people. For example, it makes sense to interpret Ma

7:12 as a mandate to treat others with kindness becau

want others to treat us with kindness. It would be a mi

however, for us to use our own culture or ou

preferences as the sole basis for determining how we 

others. For example, a Christian wants to be treated 

Christian, but it would not be appropriate for a Chris

treat a Muslim like a Christian. Similarly, a man shou

necessarily treat a woman the way a man wants 

treated. If we interpret the Golden Rule in this 

manner of treating others the way we want to be treat

Consideration of Others Program will not neces

change the way we approach diversity. We are 

knowing how we want to be treated and do not need tr

to enable us to treat others as if they were like us. The 

interpretation of the Golden Rule obviously has 

shortcomings.

FROM GOLD TO PLATINUM TO RAINBOW

Consideration of others is about understanding 

people so that we can treat them accordingly. The G

Rule should be interpreted as a mandate to “treat oth

you would have them treat you if you were in their p

We can capture this interpretation in what I have 

others call the Platinum Rule, and what I recently 

calling the Rainbow Rule. This clarification of the G

Rule can be stated as follows: “Treat others the wa

would have you treat them.” My metaphor of the ra

derives from the myth that a rainbow extends from a 

gold. It is also interesting to note how the colors 

rainbow are joined together for a single purpose in the 

band of refracted light, but with each color retain

distinction or difference. This is exactly how we 

effective diverse organizations. Individuals mus

114
while the organization respects individual difference

allows those differences to be visible.

The Rainbow Rule is a straightforward w

understanding the importance of consideration of oth

our objective is to “treat others the way they would h

treat them,” then we must understand other people 

we can know how they want to be treated

Consideration of Others Program brings our so

together in small group settings so that they can be

understand each other better. With this understandin

soldiers are armed with the tools they need to start tr

others the way they should to be treated or the wa

want to be treated. Christians must understand Musl

order to treat Muslims the way they want to be treated

must understand women, and majorities must under

ethnic minorities. Likewise, women must understan

and minorities must understand the majority populat

the latter case, women and minorities may have a hea

because they are already working in a majority dom

culture and to an extent will understand that cult

default.

5 Their understanding of the dominant cult

necessary for success of the organization and succ

individuals within the organization.

FROM TODAY TO TOMORROW

The Consideration of Others Program is import

our efforts to create a better environment within t

Army. The program will be even more importa

preparing the Army for the future. As America be

more diverse, the Army will also become more diver

the year 2030, minorities in America will likely in

from the current 28 percent to approximately 40 perc

our national population. This minority population c

will be largely due to the increasing proportion of Hisp

Women and minorities will play a major role in the 

of the future. Their combined population in the Arm

115
percent early in the next century. This implies that w

to learn more about diversity now so that our growth 

institution will not be inhibited by changing demogra

Today’s efforts should encourage emergence of a fut

which diversity is an effectiveness multiplier instea

problem to be managed.

A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE

The Army of the future will likely include 

warfighting elements that combine in a vari

configurations, move quickly to anyplace in the worl

connect through vision and voice to any point on eart

individual soldier may be outfitted in climate-cont

individual armor with protective defense against ch

agents, small arms fires, and adverse environm

conditions. Global communications via satellit

complement regional communications based on wire

cellular systems enhanced by unmanned aerial vehic

the touch of a button or perhaps in response 

inconspicuous mental or physical gesture, the head

display will provide the positions of enemy and fr

forces, targeting information, mission status

environmental conditions. The individual weapon w

able to automatically identify and target the enem

land warrior will have no concerns about temp

environmental conditions such as day and night. Lik

the ability to be extracted or resupplied at just the righ

will be taken for granted.

Although none of us can predict the future, the poin

I want to make about the Army After Next in 

abbreviated scenario is that our forces will be inte

and fast-moving. In fact, we may not have a separate 

Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in 2030. We may 

single service or perhaps two services. Regardless 

exact nature of the future force structure, it will de

total integration of personnel. Our effectiveness in 20

116
color and whites are interchangeable. My u

interchangeable does not imply that women and min

will be assimilated into a single culture. It means tha

our soldiers will understand each other and can ma

immediate adjustment to accommodate the person at 

her side. Interchangeable also means that by 2030, w

and men may perform the same job functions. In t

Army, that would imply that women would eventua

introduced into all branches. In a future scenari

integrated environment may make little or no disti

between branches—if we have branches at all. Rega

the pace of conflict in 2030 will dictate that soldi

interchangeable. We will not have the time to s

fast-moving operation and raise the heads-up disp

check soldiers for gender, religion, or ethnicity before 

into battle.

WE MUST MOVE FORWARD

If our “mark on the wall” for 2030 is total integratio

interchangeability of service members, we need t

backwards from the Army After Next time period an

what that means today. It means that we need to vigo

pursue consideration of others in hopes that all soldie

have reached the necessary understanding of oth

early in the next century. We must continue m

available to women all Army opportunities. It is crit

the Army After Next that we move forward from our c

posture on gender integrated training and fighting

retreat from gender integration initiatives, the second 

effect throughout the Army will be an attitude that w

are a problem. We are ill-prepared to deal with s

backlash. This negative attitude will not easily die

stop progress now, it will take years to get back to the 

where we accept the critical role of women in the futu

cannot stop and re-start the integration process on t

When dealing with people, transitions take genera

The year 2030 is only 31 years away. If we look back 31 

117
made, it becomes obvious that integration is a slow p

because for it affects the culture of an organization. W

reach our target in the next century only if we conti

seek out and implement new integration opportunitie

this point forward.

EFFECTIVE DIVERSE ENVIRONMENT?

I have written about the need to build d

environments by using the notion of “same but diffe

This concept accounts for the ways in which people a

same as well as those in which they are diff

Organizations that expect individuals to totally assi

by giving up their own culture will always operate 

than the optimum level. The same is true f

organization that only focuses on differences.

Women and minorities can and must adapt to the 

culture. Common ground is necessary in any organiz

At the same time, leaders must understand that indiv

need to nurture their differences. In his autobiog

General Colin Powell talked about the student enviro

at Fort Leavenworth as follows:

Nevertheless, we had made it this far up the 

precisely because we had the ability to shift back in

white-dominated world on Monday morning. Leaven

represented integration in the best sense of the 

Blacks could hang around with brothers in their free 

and no one gave it any more thought than the fact tha

Pointers, tankers, or engineers went off by themselves

was exactly the kind of integration we had been fighti

to be permitted our blackness and also to be able to m

in a mostly white world.

6

General Powell describes his Fort Leaven

environment as a place where he assimilated for the g

the organization, but was allowed to be differe

importance is the suggestion that others recognize

118
off-duty time.

7

 This brings me to some specific exam

the “same but different” concept.

WE NEED ROLE MODELS

To a certain extent, all soldiers are the same. This 

that men can mentor women and whites can mentor b

at least to the extent that they are the same

mentorship that we can offer our subordinate

adequately provide for their needs, regardless of g

ethnicity, or religion. On the other hand, a small pa

woman’s mentorship needs often can be provided o

another woman. The same is true for minorities. Ho

the fact that a black soldier can get only the last 5 per

his or her mentorship needs from another black soldie

reason for a white soldier to avoid providing the fi

percent of the mentorship. We all can and should s

satisfy the mentorship needs of our fellow soldier

subordinates, regardless of our differences.

A very important part of an effective di

environment is ensuring that role models are availabl

members of the organization. An organization tha

women and minority members should have visible w

and minority leadership at the highest levels

environment should inspire subordinates to work to 

full potential and create opportunities for success 

reward for that hard work. Women and minorities wil

for sure that they can achieve success through hard 

only if they have seen it done by one of their own. The

to believe that they can be the same but different an

make it to the top. They need to know that they c

successful without abandoning all of their differen

order to fully emulate the dominant culture. Wome

minority role models that go beyond tokenism 

organization prove that stories about glass ceiling

“good old boy” networks are not true. For the Army

119
levels in all branches.

TOLERANCE PROMOTES UNDERSTANDING

Women and minorities nurture their differenc

sharing experiences with those who have a co

background. We should be supportive when wom

minorities spend time together nurturing their diffe

as a break from many hours or days of being the same 

sake of the organization. These opportunities to n

differences often give women and minorities the stren

do a better job of being the same when the time come

so. For example, when Hispanic soldiers are spe

Spanish after work, they are not conspiring again

organization. They are nurturing their differences 

break from spending the work day being the sam

identical principle applies to a group of women who 

lunch or dinner together.

The Consideration of Others Program will even

lead us to an understanding of such differences an

impact upon our organization. It will become clear 

black soldier in a stressful environment may want to 

quarters with another black soldier for the sake of ha

few minutes to nurture differences after duty. It has n

to do with segregation, but everything to do 

integration. We will understand how the sol

preference fits in with mission requirements tha

prevent such a living arrangement. We will understan

a woman’s approach to communications may be dif

from a man’s approach. We will understand how me

work side-by-side with women in a professional relatio

without fear of sexual harassment claims. W

understand how majorities can work with mino

without fear of racial bias allegations. We will unde

the adjustment that women and minorities must m

adapting to the Army culture. We will understand why 

women and minorities have concerns about being left 

120
socially deprives women and minorities of an imp

opportunity to sell their competence. We will unde

how some women and minorities feel that they must b

like white males in order to be successful. We will b

comfortable with all soldiers because we will under

each other.

CONCLUSION

As leaders, we are asked to establish a long-term 

for our organization and to point our subordinates 

direction of that vision. A realistic projection for diver

the Army is that we will need to achieve total integ

early in the next century. Our approach to diversity s

be based on the “same but different" concept. We will n

expect our service members to become the same with

organizational culture while the organization reco

that individuals need to hold onto some of their differe

I can see three levels to my suggested approa

building an effective, diverse environment. At the firs

the organization recognizes the need for people to 

same, while respecting their differences. At the second 

the organization uses programs like Considerat

Others to help members understand differences and 

to treat others the way they want to be treated. At the 

level, the organization recognizes the value of diffe

and makes use of the alternative perspectives to crea

best possible working environment.

For clarity, I will briefly outline these three level

first level is a decision to buy into the “same but diff

concept. We must accept the argument that 

assimilation will never lead to the best po

environment for our subordinates. If we ask our sold

completely give up who they are in order to become the 

as our organizational culture, the backlash will even

show itself in the form of discontent and frustration. 

same time, as leaders we must expect our subordina

121
this level we simply want to recognize that there need

a balance between adaptation to the organizational c

and respect for individual differences.

After buying into the “same but different” conce

can move to the second level by beginning to unde

how we are different. Initially, we need to focus on t

differences of ethnicity, gender, and religion. An ef

approach to understanding differences is already bu

the Consideration of Others Program. Simply talkin

listening in a small group setting will go a long wa

must keep in mind that our road to sensitivity is a

under construction. We can never be perfect. As we 

harder to understand differences, we will be

comfortable with our daily interactions. We will unde

how others want to be treated. We will begin to sense 

others want to be treated the same and when they w

to respect their differences.

At the third level of diversity management, we wi

accepted the “same but different” concept and have ac

a basic understanding of differences. Eventually, w

become comfortable with those who are of a dif

gender, ethnicity, or religion. Our reduced inhibition

allow us to appreciate diversity. Those strange opinio

unorthodox approaches to problems that come 

diversity will no longer be dismissed without discu

Instead, they will be considered alongside traditional 

We will begin to value diversity and incorporate alter

approaches into our ways of doing business. We w

effectively managing diversity.

This approach to diversity applies to other organiz

as well as the Army.

8 We need to understand where w

headed, but know that we cannot get there in a day o

years. Our goal is to build an integrated environm

which each person can work to his or her potential 

knowing that accomplishments will be recognized an

promotion opportunities will be granted. Men, w

122
and learn to work with each other to the extent tha

become interchangeable. Simply stated, we will be a

treat others the way they should be treated.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. My thoughts on the topic of this chapter greatly benefitt

my year as a student at the U.S. Army War College, Class of 1998

to thank my classmate, Janice K. Rauker, for providing a 

perspective on diversity issues throughout the year. I am al

grateful to classmates who revised early drafts of this chapter

classmate Ronald L. Miller, who helped with the translation 

Golden Rule. I have been particularly inspired by three College s

faculty members: Colonel Thomas P. Watts, USA; Dr. Herbert 

and Ms. Jenny Silkett. Finally, I want to acknowledge the suppo

Cheryl Miller, Dr. Rita Nethersole, and Dr. Sandra Adell from 

the Army War College.

2. This chapter is a slightly edited version of my essay under 

On Diversity, previously published as Army Issue Paper No. 1 (1

the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. M

on diversity are primarily based on personal observations. 

regard, I am more of an experimentalist than a theorist. Thus, I h

relied extensively on other sources.

3. Major General Robert F. Foley and Major Denise A. Go

“Consideration of Others,” Military Review, January-Februar

pp. 25-28.

4. A discussion of the Golden Rule can be found in The Inter

Bible, New York: Abingdon Press, 1951, Vol. VII, pp. 329-3

12-volume set is available to most military chaplains.

5. The argument that women are more comfortable than me

in the position of leading a diverse organization can be supporte

notion that women must adjust to the dominant military cu

order to be successful. If the dominant organizational culture is 

from male leadership, then out of necessity women will understa

better than men understand women. It follows that women may 

comfortable when leading men than men may be when leading 

A similar argument may apply to majority/minority leadership

6. General Colin Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, My Am

Journey, New York: Ballantine Books, 1995, p. 120.

123
I want to share some thoughts on terminology. The black popul

America continues to search for an identity. About 30 years 

decided that we wanted to be called “black” after rejecting th

names of colored and Negro. “Afro-American” was also used fo

years as an alternative to the use of black. Afro-American is som

thought of as a more distinguished or official designation becaus

used by the Library of Congress and many other academic inst

that wanted to start new programs in black studies. This 

Afro-American still exists because there is no pressure to unde

expense of change. A few years ago, “African-American” 

popular. In theory, African-American implies descendants of Af

more specifically, descendants of African slaves. However, 

percentage of blacks do not necessarily consider themselve

African-American because they are not descendants of slav

bottom line is that many blacks do not have a preference. Those 

have a preference usually would rather not be called Afro-Am

Most new literature avoids this term as well. This means that i

be safe to avoid the use of Afro-American while using bla

African-American on an interchangeable basis. Keep in mind tha

literature mostly reflects the use of African-American, and that 

a more global term that also includes those who are not Ameri

8. The “same but different” concept can be applied at many l

many different organizations. In an international setting, we wo

to see different nations treating each other with respect and 

Understanding differences is critical to that process since resp

dignity take on different meanings in different cultures. Our a

shape the international environment and spread American 

depends on our understanding of how other cultures are the sam

American culture and how they are different. Effective d

programs in the Army will give our soldiers a better founda

understanding how to operate in the international arena.

124
CONCLUSION: APPROACHING THE ISS

OF RECRUIT DIVERSITY

Lloyd J. Matthews

The military, ostensibly a practical bunch, spends more ti

peering into the future than any other branch of Americ

government or society.

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

1

In the preceding chapters of this anthology, we hav

detailed discussions of projected population diversi

its implications for recruit diversity, expressed in te

considerable numerical and statistical quantificatio

have also seen some suggestions of accompanying pro

along with approaches to solving them, within 

delineated compartments of the diversity phenomeno

what this anthology offers, ultimately, is not a clairv

recital of every major problem that recruit diversit

surely present to Army planners in the near term, o

over the next 2-3 decades. Even more to the poin

anthology does not offer hard-wired solutions to 

problems, since presently they remain potential and 

realizable at this early juncture.

What this anthology seeks to do is make tentativ

reasonable extrapolations from current trends and a

the results with disciplined imagination to discern w

difficulties are likely to surface. Through this effort w

to identify developing or potential trouble spots and 

motion measures that avoid them, thus sparing our

disagreeable surprises late in the game.

Much has been made, for example, of the A

recruiting shortfall in 1998 and the declining high 

graduation rates and test scores of those recru

125
addressed. For purposes of this book, however, we nee

further and inquire whether in such developments w

simply witnessing the fruits of traditional undulati

the American business cycle (which affects mi

recruiting through its influence on the availability o

or whether we are witnessing instead some 

development that could adversely affect recruiting we

the next century. It is precisely this longer-

perspective that Michael Stehlik takes in Chapter 6

As part of a long-range analytical framework

important to ascertain whether particular problem

amenable to direct resolution by the Army itself, or w

the means for resolution lie beyond the Army’s c

forcing the Army to adapt as an institution. With 

considerations in mind, let us now review some of the 

potential problem areas that may emerge over th

several decades and see how well they lend themse

solution.

It was earlier suggested that ideally the ethnic gro

America should be represented within the Army in ro

the same proportions as in the general population.

representation would cater to demands, in the na

fairness and equity, that each group shoulder its fair 

of the nation’s defense burden. But during the post-

War II era, we have never achieved such propor

representation, and achieving it will likely remain b

the nation’s reach for some time. As Linda Gorma

George Thomas have accurately pointed out, 

composition of a volunteer military will reflect that 

population only if all segments of the population ha

equal interest in joining and an equal ability to me

services’ eligibility requirements.”

4

 But neither of 

conditions is satisfied in contemporary America. 

interest in joining the military often correlates 

economic class—the poor being more prone to join the 

and the comparatively well off being less so—and 

whites have a higher median income, we find differen

126
distribution.5

Nor is the ability to meet eligibility requiremen

reflected in standardized aptitude tests, equally distr

among ethnic groups.

6

 It thus becomes apparent th

successful effort to achieve something approxim

proportionate ethnic representation in the Army duri

all-volunteer milieu might require imposing quot

overrepresented groups or lowering aptitude test stan

for underrepresented groups. Since either of 

measures appears unacceptable on its face, the g

proportionate ethnic representation in the Arm

remain elusive for the foreseeable future. In fact, giv

correlation between economic success in the market 

and enlistment, the Army may be lucky to achiev

maintain the high levels of educational attainment w

its recruit base necessary to underwrite the technol

information-based force planned for the next century

Of course, there are weapons to be brought to bear 

Army’s campaign to recruit soldiers with sufficientl

educational achievement, but most of these require m

which in turn requires a cooperative Congress. We 

here of such measures as reinforcing the recr

establishment, which would entail more recruiters 

larger advertising budget; of improved enlis

incentives, taking such forms as cash entry bonuse

educational benefits; and of such career incentiv

increased reenlistment bonuses, military specialty bo

pay, and retirement benefits.

Recognizing the Army’s present recruiting plight a

retention problems, Congress in late 1998 approp

unusually large sums both to beef up the Army Recr

Command and to provide positive incentives for Am

youth to join the Army. For example, a $3000 cash 

will be paid to almost everyone who joins the Regular 

regardless of Military Occupational Specialty chose

combined Montgomery GI Bill and Army College 

127
regulars.

7

 Even more dramatic, a congressionally app

commission on service members’ and veterans’ tran

assistance recently called for a fully government-f

4-year college education for qualified recruits agree

serve a 4-year tour of active duty.8 The appeal of s

program would be nearly universal. Even middle and 

class families have increasing difficulty in sending 

sons and daughters to college because of the soaring c

higher education. An influx of enlistees from this 

would go a long way toward solving the Army’s needs 

technological era, but the program would be expensiv

estimated $400 million the first year—and one can

optimistic about its prospects for passage. However

national recruiting environment ever degenerates 

point where the Army simply cannot man a satisf

force, it may compel the nation to reexamine the con

an all-volunteer force. Faced with the specter of hav

reimpose conscription, Congress might find the idea o

college education for 4-year enlistees a bargain after 

In addition to recruiting and retention incenti

entice qualified young people to join, another tack wo

for the Army to deliberately induct intelligen

marginally unqualified recruits with the intent

providing remediation in basic education. In the c

recruits who need to improve English language fluen

Army could administer basic instruction in English, 

before or as an adjunct to basic recruit training. 

programs are expensive and inefficient, but if a true cr

recruitment materializes, remedial programs are a 

of salvaging high-potential youth who otherwis

overlooked by the recruiting market.

Finally, as so compellingly argued in Chapter 3 by 

Groves, recruiting is facilitated when there are s

affectionate bonds between the Army and the Am

people. It is an elementary necessity, no matter how 

such efforts appear to divert the Army from its 

mission,” for the institution to build bridges to the pe

128
From providing bands and marching contingents a

patriotic events to cooperative interaction with ind

and academe as embodied in the Army War Co

Strategic Outreach Program, the Army needs to 

communications alive so that every citizen comes to 

the soldier and feel he or she is part of their 

Washington Post writer Stephen Rosenfeld, on re

being invited to a seminar at the Industrial College 

Armed Forces, expressed the view that might have 

spoken by all Americans: “I like the military’s reachi

to mix with civilians: It speaks of respect for an 

society.”9

We earlier noted that it is not likely that 

representation in the Army would ever m

proportionally that of the population at large. But a fa

important question raised in Chapter 1 is whether a ro

proportionate alignment can or should be achiev

frontline combat units. It is these soldiers who mus

with the enemy, kill him, and occupy his ground. It is 

soldiers who will inevitably take most of the casualt

The automated, technologized combat soldier 

designed for the Army After Next will require a far 

degree of technical trainability than he (or she) has 

past. Moreover, the requisite technical qualification

rise even more for soldiers of other branches. Opt

allocation of technological trainability among a

competing branch constituencies will thus be a task 

modern-day Solomon: there will never be enough of th

intellectually gifted soldiers to satisfy every branch

percentage of blacks in the infantry toda

percent—already corresponds fairly well wit

percentage in the U.S. population (12.2 percent).

10

 On

to expand sources of recruits with higher educa

achievement would be to raise or eliminate f

recruiting ceilings,

11

 but this avenue bumps up a

male-female ratios dictated by the prohibition a

assigning women to units engaged in direct combat 

129
Defense policy, not statute, thus it is presumably sub

change. Before that could happen, however, there 

occur further change in the U.S. political climate. Tho

one can predict the political winds of the future, Ame

at the approach of the 21st century appear reaso

comfortable with the idea of expanding roles for wom

the armed forces as a general principle, even nudging 

into a few positions where they might be called upon t

violence upon the enemy and suffer it in return.

Americans appear determined to spare women the m

embrace of tooth-to-tooth, nail-to-nail, breath-to-b

clashes with enemy warriors. Though some propone

removing all gender-based combat exclusions sin

believe that war of the future will be sanitize

bowdlerized, largely a matter of sitting at the comput

pushing buttons, Americans instinctively feel that wa

ultimate expressions will remain the nasty, br

masculine horror it was in the world of Homer, where 

Achilles slew Hector on the bloody fields of Troy.

As we reflect over the preceding nine chapt

becomes clear that this anthology, dealing as it doe

the hazy future, raises far more questions than it an

But this is all to the good, because by raising questio

sensitizing us to potential roadblocks that may lie alo

road to our future Army. These chapters equip 

anticipate and deal with problems before they arise. D

the contingent nature of much of the previous discu

one premise embedded there remains clear, true

unchallengeable: While today’s Army will design and 

the Army After Next, it is the individual men and w

inhabiting that Army who will have to make it wo

deflecting our focus from the Army as an institution 

individual soldier, Andre Sayles in Chapter 9 makes 

that managing diversity in the Army is as much a 

problem as a recruiting problem. If Army leaders fail t

Sayles’ eloquent plea to inculcate in the members 

force an understanding and acceptance of h

130
technology, and our farseeing doctrine and force str

will ultimately come to naught.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “Ready for the Last War,” Washingt

January 15, 1999, p. A29.

2. For typical recent statements of the problem, see Jane M

“Coming Up Short,” Army Times, November 9, 1998, p. 13; “N

Recruit More Non-Graduates,” The Sentinel (Carlisle, PA), Janu

1999, p. 3; and Dana Priest, “Services Combat Recruit Sh

Washington Post, February 17, 1999, pp. A1, A5. Whereas t

school graduation rate for recruits was 95.3% in FY 1996, it dro

90.6% in FY 1997 and 90.4 in FY 1998 (as of May 1, 1998). Acces

the top two test categories totalled 38.8% in FY 1996, but dro

37.9 in FY 1997 and 36.1 in FY 1998. See United States Army Rec

Command, “Accession Demographics (Includes Prior Service),” 

1998, p. 1.

3. Chapter 1; see also David J. Armor, “Race and Gender in t

Military,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 23, No. 1, Fall 1996, pp

To get a better perspective on the representation situation, comp

percentages below:

Projected U.S. Army U.S

U.S. Ethnic U.S. Ethnic Ethnic E

Proportions Proportions Proportions Prop

Today 2050 for Enlisted for R

(Percent)* (Percent)* (Percent)** (Per

White 72.1 52.8 56.7 6

Black 12.2 13.6 29.7 2

Hispanic 11.2 24.5 7.0 

*Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997, 117th edition, U.S. Department of Commer

1997, Table 19, p. 19.

**See “Army Demographics” (working draft), Headquarters, Department of the Army, O

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Human Resources Directorate, ATTN: SPC Gerry 

Washington, DC, Demographic Profile As of April 6, 1998; Data As of September 17, 1997

***United States Army Recruiting Command, “Accession Demographics (Includes Prio

June 1, 1998, p. 1.

131
Achievement, Enlistment Intentions, and Racial Representative

the U.S. Military,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 19, No. 4, S

1993, pp. 611-624.

5. Gorman and Thomas provide an excellent analysis 

correlations among race, poverty, AFQT scores, and inclina

military service. See ibid., particularly pp. 619-622.

6. Ibid., pp. 612, 621.

7. Jane McHugh, “Recruits to Get More Money,” Army 

November 23, 1998, pp. 3, 13.

8. Bill McAllister, “Expanded Benefits Urged for Vet

Washington Post, January 15, 1999, p. A27.

9. Rosenfeld, p. A29.

10. Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler, “Racial Integra

Army Way,” ARMY Magazine, July 1998, pp. 30-31. See also 

note 3.

12. Armor, pp. 24-25. The point is not that women are smart

men, but rather that they would increase the available pool from 

recruits with higher educational achievement could be 

Interestingly, of males entering the Army in 1998, 37% scored in 

two (of five) test score categories. Of females, 34.2% scored in the 

categories. See United States Army Recruiting Command, “

Accession Demographics (Includes Prior Service),” June 1, 199

3.

13. Jeanne M. Holm, “Women in the Armed Forces,” in Encyc

of the American Military, Vol. III, ed. John E. Jessup and Louise 

New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1994, p. 1987.

132
MAJOR RICARDO F. DIAZ, U.S. Army, is an Oper

Research Analyst and is serving as the Chief, M

Research Team, United States Army Recruiting Com

(USAREC), at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Major Diaz re

his B.S. degree in Management from the United 

Military Academy in 1988 and recently complet

M.B.A. in Information Management at the Univer

Texas at Austin. His responsibilities at USAREC i

oversight of all market research activities as well 

development of the Market Information Center to s

USAREC requirements.

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. GROVES, JR., 

Adjutant General of the Commonwealth of Kentuck

Commander of the Kentucky Army and Air National G

After 4 years of enlisted service, he was commissioned 

officer in 1968. His civilian education includes a Bach

Architecture, Juris Doctor, and Ph.D. in Policy Stud

Higher Education from the University of Kentucky

also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and G

Staff College and the U.S. Army War College, at the la

which he served on the faculty. His prior mi

assignments include command of the 201st En

Battalion and the 75th Troop Command. A regi

architect and licensed attorney, General Groves is pre

on leave of absence from the faculty of the Univer

Kentucky, where he is the Assistant Dean of the Col

Architecture. General Groves has been a member of th

Department of Defense’s Reserve Forces Policy Board 

June 1997.

DR. DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II graduated from th

Military Academy in 1963, and took his Master’s d

from the University of Michigan in 1973 and his Doc

from Temple University in 1992, both in Histor

attended the U.S. Army Command and General 

College in 1974, to which he returned in 1981 wh

became co-founder of the School of Advanced M

133
artilleryman, Dr. Johnson is currently an Ass

Research Professor of National Security Affairs 

Strategic Studies Institute, and directs the USAWC 

After Next Seminar.

MAJOR JOSEPH C. JONES, U.S. Army, is an instru

the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leaders

the U.S. Military Academy, where he teaches such c

as Social Inequality: Race, Gender, and Ethn

Introductory Sociology; and Armed Forces and Societ

also serves as the department’s Human Relations ad

He holds a Bachelor of Business Administration 

Howard University; a Master of Business and 

Administration from Southeastern University; and a

in Sociology from the University of Maryland. After s

in the Army as an enlisted man, Major Jones att

Officers Candidate School, receiving his commission 

Defense Artillery with the PATRIOT missile system. H

performed extensive research in Hispanic recru

presenting his findings at the DoD-sponsored 2nd Bi

Equal Opportunity Research Symposium in Dec

1997.

COLONEL LLOYD J. MATTHEWS, U.S. Army, R

graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, has an 

from Harvard University and a Ph.D. from the Univer

Virginia, and is a graduate of the Armed Forces 

College and the U.S. Army War College. His overseas 

included Germany and Vietnam. In other assignmen

was a battalion commander; editor of Parameters, th

Army War College Quarterly; and Associate Dean 

U.S. Military Academy. He is the editor of six 

Assessing the Vietnam War (1987), The Parameters o

(1987), The Challenge of Military Leadership (1989

Parameters of Military Ethics (1989), Newsmen 

National Defense (1991), and Challenging the United 

Symmetrically and Asymmetrically (1998), the firs

having been co-edited with Dale Brown. Additionally

the author of some 90 articles, features, reviews

134
Parameters, ARMY Magazine, Military Review

Airpower Journal.

DR. TINAZ PAVRI is Assistant Professor of Po

Science at Spelman College in Atlanta, Georgia, whe

teaches courses in Comparative Political Systems, A

Diaspora and the World, Japan in Asia, and C

Resolution and Human Rights. Her B.A. and M.A., b

Political Science, are from St. Xavier’s College Bomba

Ohio University, respectively. She received her Ph

Political Science, with a specialization in Interna

Relations, from The Ohio State University in 199

Pavri’s areas of expertise are conflict resol

nationalism, and security studies, while her geogra

area of focus is South Asia. She has published recent a

on India-Pakistan negotiations and the question of na

identity. Dr. Pavri played a major role in bringin

present conference to fruition and served as Modera

Session II.

MAJOR MYRA J. PETERSON, U.S. Army, receiv

B.S. degree in International Relations from the U

States Military Academy in 1986 and her M.S. deg

Operations Research and Management Science 

George Mason University in 1997. She has served on 

duty in the U.S. Army for more than 12 years. 

Peterson’s present assignment is with the U.S. 

Recruiting Command at Fort Knox, Kentucky, as a re

analyst. She is the chief of the advertising research b

within the Program Analysis and Evaluations direc

Her responsibilities include oversight of minority m

research, including the Hispanic and African Am

segments, as well as the female segment. 

DR. ROBERT PRINGLE is Adjunct Professor i

Patterson School of Diplomacy and Internat

Commerce at the University of Kentucky. He took hi

and Ph.D., both in History, from the University of Vi

Dr. Pringle served in the Army from 1969 to 1973, inc

135
officer. From 1974 to 1983, he served with the 

Department, where his assignments included to

Africa and the Soviet Union, in the latter as Co

Officer and Political Officer. From 1983 to 1998, Dr. P

was an Intelligence Officer with the Central Intell

Agency.

COLONEL ANDRE H. SAYLES, U.S. Army, is Pro

and Deputy Head, Department of Electrical Engin

and Computer Science, at the U.S. Military Academ

was commissioned from the Academy in 1973 i

Engineers. His military service includes assignment

the 902nd Engineer Company (Float Bridge) at Ft. B

Virginia, and the 54th Engineer Battalion in Wildfl

Germany. He is a graduate of the Naval Colle

Command and Staff, receiving a Master’s deg

National Security and Strategic Studies, and he 

graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He also h

Master’s degree in Management from Salve R

University, and an M.S. and Ph.D. in Electrical Engin

from Georgia Institute of Technology. Colonel Sayl

published more than 25 articles in professional journa

proceedings.

MAJOR MICHAEL J. STEHLIK, U.S. Army, is a 

officer in the Directorate for Force Structure, Reso

and Assessment (J-8) of the Joint Staff. He graduate

the U.S. Military Academy in 1983, receiving a B.S. 

concentration in Electrical Engineering, and 

commissioned as an Armor officer. He later received a

in Mathematics from the Colorado School of Mine

attended the U.S. Army Command and General 

College. He has served as a company officer and staff 

in the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 

Separate Infantry Brigade. As an Operations Re

Officer, Major Stehlik has served in the Recr

Command, the Enlisted Accessions Division of the O

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and the Pr

Analysis and Evaluation Branch of the Office of the 

136
interest in the subject of U.S. civil-military relations

COLONEL LARRY M. WORTZEL, U.S. Army, is Dire

the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army 

College. After enlisted service in both the Marine Cor

Army, he was commissioned in the Infantry from O

Candidate School in 1973. He holds an M.A. and Ph.D

in Political Science, from the University of Hawaii, a

graduate and former faculty member of the U.S. Arm

College. Colonel Wortzel is a Foreign Area Officer, 

concentration on China and East Asia. He serv

Assistant Army Attaché in China from 1988 to 199

Army Attaché in China from 1995 to 1997. Add

overseas tours were in Morocco, Korea, Thailand

Singapore. From 1984 to 1988, he served as an Intell

Officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In ad

to several articles on China and Asian regional se

issues, Colonel Wortzel has published three books: C

China: Stratification in a Classless Society (1987), C

Military Modernization (1988), and Contemporary C

Military History (forthcoming). In the present confe

he served as Moderator for Session I.

137
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Larry M. Wortzel

Acting Director of Research

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Editor

Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews, U.S. Army Retir

Co-editor

Dr. Tinaz Pavri, Spelman College

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler