GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight 

of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

STATE 

DEPARTMENT 

Diplomatic Security’s 

Recent Growth 

Warrants Strategic 

Review 

November 2009 

GAO-10-156 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2009

STATE DEPARTMENT

Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants

Strategic Review 

Highlights of GAO-10-156, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

State Department’s (State) Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic 

Security) is responsible for the 

protection of people, information, 

and property at over 400 foreign 

missions and domestic locations. 

Diplomatic Security must be 

prepared to counter threats such as 

crime, espionage, visa and passport 

fraud, technological intrusions, 

political violence, and terrorism. 

GAO was asked to assess (1) how 

Diplomatic Security’s mission has 

evolved since 1998, (2) how its 

resources have changed over the 

last 10 years, and (3) the challenges 

it faces in conducting its missions. 

GAO analyzed Diplomatic Security 

data; reviewed relevant documents; 

and interviewed officials at several 

domestic facilities and 18 

international missions. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of State review the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security—as 

part of the Quadrennial Diplomacy 

and Development Review (QDDR) 

or separately—to ensure that its 

mission addresses the department’s 

priority needs. This review should 

address challenges such as: (1) 

operating with adequate staff, 

(2) securing facilities that do not 

meet security standards, 

(3) staffing foreign missions with 

officials who have appropriate 

language skills, (4) operating 

programs with experienced staff, 

and (5) balancing security with 

State’s diplomatic mission. 

State agreed with GAO’s 

recommendation and stated that it 

is completely committed to 

ensuring that Diplomatic Security's 

mission will benefit from the 

QDDR. 

Diplomatic Security’s mission, to ensure a safe environment for the conduct of 

U.S. foreign policy, involves activities such as the protection of people, 

information, and property overseas, and dignitary protection and passport and 

visa fraud investigations domestically. These activities have grown since 1998 

in reaction to a number of security incidents. 

Diplomatic Security funding and personnel have also increased considerably 

over the last 10 years. In 1998, Diplomatic Security’s budget was about $200 

million; by fiscal year 2008, it had grown to approximately $1.8 billion, of 

which over $300 million was for security in Iraq (see fig.). In addition, the size 

of Diplomatic Security’s direct-hire workforce has doubled since 1998 and will 

likely continue to expand. Recently, Diplomatic Security’s reliance on 

contractors has grown to fill critical needs in high-threat posts.

Diplomatic Security Budget, 1998-2009 

Source: GAO analysis of Diplomatic Security data.

Year

Dollars in millions

1998: Bombings

of U.S. Embassies

in Africa

2004: State 

initiates diplomatic 

2001: September 11 presence in Iraq

attacks

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Diplomatic Security faces several challenges that could affect the bureau’s 

ability to provide security and use its resources efficiently. First, State’s policy 

to maintain missions in increasingly dangerous posts requires a substantial 

amount of resources. Second, although Diplomatic Security’s workforce has 

grown considerably over the last 10 years, staffing shortages in domestic 

offices and other operational challenges—such as inadequate facilities, 

language deficiencies, experience gaps, and balancing security needs with 

State’s diplomatic mission—further tax its ability to implement all of its 

missions. Finally, Diplomatic Security’s tremendous growth has been in 

reaction to events and does not benefit from adequate strategic guidance. 

Neither State’s departmental strategic plan nor Diplomatic Security’s bureau 

strategic plan specifically addresses the bureau’s resource needs or 

View GAO-10-156 or key components. management challenges. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-10-156 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 2 

Diplomatic Security’s Mission Has Grown in Reaction to a Number 

of Major Security Incidents 11 

Diplomatic Security Funding Has Increased Considerably, and 

Personnel Has Doubled Since 1998 16 

Dangerous Environments, Staffing Shortages, and Reactive 

Planning Challenge Diplomatic Security 23 

Conclusions 37 

Recommendations for Executive Action 38 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 38 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 40 

Appendix II Diplomatic Security Service 44 

Appendix III Security Infrastructure 45 

Appendix IV Countermeasures 46 

Appendix V Executive Office 47 

Appendix VI Office of Foreign Missions 48 

Appendix VII Funding Allocations, Other 49 

Appendix VIII Diplomatic Security Collaborates with Other 

U.S. Government Agencies to Meet Its Mission 50 

 State Department 
Appendix IX Attacks against U.S. Embassies and Consulates 

(excluding Baghdad), 1998-2008 53 

Appendix X Comments from the U.S. Department of State 55 

Appendix XI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 58 

Related GAO Products 59 

Tables 

Table 1: Overview of Diplomatic Security Personnel, Fiscal Year 

2008 10 

Table 2: Change in Perimeter Patrol Requirements by Threat Level 29 

Table 3: Attacks against U.S. Embassies and Consulates 53 

Figures 

Figure 1: Organization of Diplomatic Security 3 

Figure 2: Diplomatic Security Budget, by Program Area, Fiscal Year 

2008 9 

Figure 3: Timeline of Events Affecting Diplomatic Security 12 

Figure 4: Historical Trend in Diplomatic Security Budget 17 

Figure 5: Growth of Security Specialist Workforce: 1998-2009 20 

Figure 6: Diplomatic Security Reliance on Contractors 21 

Figure 7: Evacuations of U.S. Missions, 1997-2008 26 

Figure 8: Trend in Number of Posts with Danger Pay, 1997-2009 28 

Page ii GAO-10-156 State Department
Abbreviations 

ARSO Assistant Regional Security Officer 

ARSO-I ARSO-Investigator 

ATA Antiterrorism Assistance 

Diplomatic Security Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

DSS Diplomatic Security Service 

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force 

LES Locally Employed Staff 

MSD Mobile Security Deployment 

OBO Bureau of Overseas Building Operations 

OSAC Overseas Security Advisory Council 

QDDR Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review 

RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade 

RSO Regional Security Officer 

SPS Security Protection Specialist 

State U.S. Department of State 

WPPS Worldwide Personal Protective Services 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page iii GAO-10-156 State Department
Page 1 GAO-10-156 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

November 12, 2009 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman 

The Honorable George V. Voinovich, Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 

 the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

On August 7, 1998, terrorists detonated truck bombs almost 

simultaneously outside the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 

over 300 people, including 12 Americans, and injuring over 5,000. The 1998 

bombings marked a pivotal moment in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, as it 

became clear that terrorist networks had the ability and intent to exploit 

security vulnerabilities at American diplomatic missions. Since 1998, the 

scope and complexity of threats facing Americans abroad and at home has 

continued to increase. 

The State Department’s (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic 

Security) is responsible for the protection of people, information, and 

property at State’s 285 foreign missions and 122 domestic locations. In 

addition to terrorism, Diplomatic Security must also be prepared to 

counter threats such as crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, 

technological intrusions, political violence, and weapons of mass 

destruction. 

In this light, we examined (1) how Diplomatic Security’s mission has 

evolved since the embassy attacks in 1998, (2) the change in human and 

financial resources for Diplomatic Security over the last 10 years, and 

(3) the challenges Diplomatic Security faces in conducting its missions. 

To address these objectives, we (1) interviewed numerous officials at 

Diplomatic Security headquarters, several domestic facilities, and 18 

international postings; (2) analyzed Diplomatic Security and State budget 

and personnel data; and (3) assessed challenges facing Diplomatic 

Security through analysis of interviews with personnel positioned 

domestically and internationally, budget and personnel data provided by 

State and Diplomatic Security, and planning and strategic documentation. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to November 

2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

 State Department 
 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. (See app. I for a more 

complete description of our objectives, scope, and methodology.) 

State established Diplomatic Security’s predecessor in 1916 to conduct 

sensitive investigations, particularly on the operations of foreign agents 

and their activities in the United States. Two years later, when Congress 

passed legislation requiring passports for Americans traveling abroad and 

visas for aliens wishing to enter the United States, the office’s 

responsibilities grew to include investigating passport and visa fraud. 

Diplomatic Security special agents also began protecting distinguished 

visitors to the United States at that time. In the 1940s, State began posting 

special agents overseas to manage security issues at diplomatic missions. 

Background 

Diplomatic Security’s mission is to provide a safe and secure environment 

for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy worldwide. (See fig. 1.) 

Page 2 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Page 3 GAO-10-156 State Department 

Figure 1: Organization of Diplomatic Security 

Diplomatic 

Security 

Service

Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Security 

Infrastructure

Directorate

Countermeasures

Directorate

Office of 

Foreign 

Missions

Executive Office

Directorate

• Formulates and implements security programs 

and policies.

• Oversees the worldwide law enforcement and 

protective security responsibilities of Diplomatic 

Security.

• Manages the day-to-day security operations at 

U.S. diplomatic and consular missions.

• Manages information security, computer security, 

and personnel security and suitability.

• Manages all Diplomatic Security’s physical and 

technical countermeasures security programs.

• Provides services to the foreign diplomatic and 

consular community related to motor vehicles, taxes, 

customs entry, property acquisition, and travel.

• Fosters reciprocal treatment of U.S. diplomats 

overseas.

• Responsible for management, policy, 

administrative, planning, and resource issues.

The Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security, the law enforcement 

and security arm of the U.S. 

Department of State (State), 

provides a secure environment 

for the conduct of American 

diplomacy. Diplomatic Security 

protects people, property, and 

information at more than 285 

State missions worldwide and 

122 domestic facilities.

International 

Programs 

Directorate

Domestic 

Operations

 Directorate

Training

 Directorate

Threat

Investigations 

and Analysis 

Directorate 

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Bureau Unit Directorate/Office Activities

INSTRUCTIONS

for Interactive graphic:

Clicking the mouse on the 

Unit, Directorate, or Office 

name will take you to the 

appropriate appendix for 

more information.

The Diplomatic Security Service is the bureau’s most expansive division—

both in terms of funding and personnel—and is responsible for: personal 

protection, protection of facilities, investigations, threat analysis, and 
 

training. The other divisions provide important support functions, such as 

the protection of information. (See apps. II through VII.) 

Personal protection: Diplomatic Security provides protection to the 

Secretary of State, foreign dignitaries visiting the United States, and 

several other U.S. government officials.1

 Diplomatic Security dedicates 72 

special agents to provide a 24-hour protective detail for the Secretary of 

State.2

 The bureau pulls additional support from field offices when the 

Secretary travels and relies on the support of Regional Security Officers to 

provide advance work for the Secretary’s travels overseas. Providing 

protection to dignitaries visiting the United States requires similar levels of 

resources. Diplomatic Security also protects U.S. athletes at several 

international events such as the Olympic Games and the World Cup.3

 As 

with other protective duties, Diplomatic Security draws special agents 

primarily from its field offices to cover these periodic events. 

Protection of facilities: Diplomatic Security Service, in conjunction with 

the Countermeasures Directorate, ensures that physical security standards 

are met at more than 285 diplomatic missions overseas and 122 domestic 

facilities. The physical security features at many of State’s diplomatic 

facilities overseas include: a 100-foot setback from uncontrolled areas, 

high perimeter walls or fences that are difficult to climb, antiram barriers 

to ensure that vehicles cannot breach the facility perimeter, blast-resistant 

construction techniques and materials, and controlled access of 

pedestrians and vehicles at the perimeter of a compound. Diplomatic 

Security uses similar physical security measures to secure 122 domestic 

facilities, including State’s headquarters, the President’s guest quarters, the 

U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 9 Diplomatic Security field offices, 14 

resident agent offices, and 20 passport agency offices. Diplomatic 

 

1

In addition to the Secretary, Diplomatic Security provides protection to the Deputy 

Secretary of State, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and congressional 

delegations traveling overseas. 

2

Because Secretary Clinton is both the Secretary of State and a former First Lady, 

Diplomatic Security shares protection responsibilities with the Secret Service. 

3

Diplomatic Security has played a key protective role in all Olympic Games since 1984. 

Page 4 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Security’s uniformed protection officers, a standing force of 750, ensure 

the controlled access to these domestic facilities. 4

Investigations: Diplomatic Security is responsible for conducting 

investigations on visa and passport fraud, domestically and internationally, 

as well as other State matters. Domestically, Diplomatic Security has 

Foreign Service special agents and civil service Criminal Investigators in 

field offices and resident offices across the country, responsible for 

investigating visa and passport fraud, threats and suspicious activity 

against State personnel and facilities, and allegations of criminal and 

administrative misconduct among State personnel.5

 Special agents also 

conduct counterintelligence investigations. Overseas, special agents in 

part work with their law enforcement counterparts to pursue leads on U.S. 

fugitives wanted for crimes such as homicide, narcotics trafficking, and 

pedophilia. Special agents also conduct visa and passport fraud 

investigations at posts. (See app. VIII for more information on Diplomatic 

Security’s collaboration with other agencies on investigations.) 

Threat analysis: In May 2008, Diplomatic Security created the Threat 

Investigations and Analysis Directorate, which consolidated the 

monitoring, analysis, and distribution of both open source and classified 

intelligence on terrorist activities directed toward U.S. citizens and U.S. 

diplomatic and consular facilities abroad. The Threat Investigations and 

Analysis Directorate monitors, analyzes, and investigates threats made 

against the Secretary of State, senior U.S. officials, visiting foreign 

dignitaries, resident foreign diplomats, and foreign missions in the United 

States for whom Diplomatic Security has protective security 

responsibility. In addition, the Threat Investigations and Analysis 

Directorate helps to determine threat ratings for U.S. diplomatic missions 

that affect security preparedness. 

 

4

For a review of State’s Bureau of Overseas Building Operations’ (OBO) Compound 

Security Upgrade Program see GAO, Embassy Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced 

Security, but Site Conditions Prevent Full Adherence to Standards, GAO-08-162

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2008). 

5

State’s Office of Inspector General is also authorized to conduct investigations on alleged 

misconduct of State personnel. The Office of Inspector General and Diplomatic Security 

are in the process of delineating areas of responsibility. For more information, see GAO, 

Inspectors General: Activities of the Department of State Office of Inspector General, 

GAO-07-138 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2007). 

Page 5 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Training: Diplomatic Security trains its law enforcement and technical 

security specialists and runs several specialized programs that enhance 

Diplomatic Security’s capacity overseas. Diplomatic Security is in the 

process of establishing an integrated training center that would house 

most of its training programs that are currently located in several different 

states. Through its Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, Diplomatic Security 

also enhances the antiterrorism awareness and skills of foreign law 

enforcement officials and civilians.6

 As part of its training mission, 

Diplomatic Security has a Mobile Security Deployment Office that deploys 

teams to provide three core services: on-site security training, tactical 

security, and enhanced security support. Available courses provide 

embassy personnel training in protective tactics such as terrorist 

surveillance, hostage survival, and defensive driving. Tactical security 

missions provide counterassault capability for Diplomatic Security 

protective security details operating both domestically and overseas. 

These missions are unscheduled deployments, requested by senior 

Diplomatic Security officials based on assessed threats to the dignitary or 

official being protected. Finally, security support missions provide 

emergency support to overseas posts experiencing civil disorder, armed 

conflict, or increased threat of attack. 

Protection of information: Diplomatic Security administers a number of 

programs designed to protect State’s information. Diplomatic Security 

manages a robust information security program, staffed by security 

engineers and technicians, to detect and prevent the loss of sensitive 

information from technical espionage. Diplomatic Security also 

collaborates with Marine Security Guards who provide a cleared, 24-hour 

American presence at the facilities to protect classified information,7

 and 

also operates a courier service to ensure the secure movement of 

classified U.S. government materials across international borders through 

the use of the diplomatic pouch. In 2008, the courier service delivered 

more than 55 million pounds of classified diplomatic pouch materials to 

U.S. embassies and consulates throughout the world. 

 

6

For GAO’s review of Antiterrorism Assistance, see Combating Terrorism: State 

Department’s Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic 

Assessments of Outcomes, GAO-08-336 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008). 

7

Currently, there are more than 130 Marine Security Guard detachments with more than 

1,200 officers assigned to diplomatic missions throughout the world. 

Page 6 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Diplomatic Security coordinates its work overseas with a number of 

actors. The head special agent, known as the Regional Security Officer 

(RSO), works closely with the Chief of Mission (Ambassador or Principal 

Officer) who is ultimately responsible for the security of facilities, 

information, and all personnel under Chief of Mission authority at the post. 

The Chief of Mission and RSO are assisted by an Emergency Action 

Committee in planning and preparing for crises. Diplomatic Security also 

coordinates with State’s Bureau of Overseas Building Operations (OBO) 

on security measures for State’s facilities.8

 According to State, Diplomatic 

Security creates the Diplomatic Security Vulnerability List each year, 

which ranks facilities according to their vulnerability across a wide variety 

of security threats. OBO uses this list to prioritize its projects. In addition, 

Diplomatic Security created the building standards that OBO has used to 

complete 68 major construction projects since 2001. Diplomatic Security 

also works with host country governments who are required by the Vienna 

Convention on Diplomatic Relations to provide security to the U.S. 

missions.9

Coordination and 

Establishment of Security 

Standards 

The security standards that form the basis for Diplomatic Security’s work 

at posts overseas were created by the Overseas Security Policy Board, 

which includes representatives from several U.S. government agencies 

that have a presence overseas and is chaired by the Assistant Secretary for 

Diplomatic Security. Diplomatic Security, in consultation with posts, other 

State bureaus, and other government agencies, uses these standards, 

called the Security Environment Threat List, to assign threat levels to each 

post. There are six threat categories: international terrorism, indigenous 

terrorism, political violence, crime, human intelligence, and technical 

threat. Each post is assigned one of four threat levels for each threat 

category. A post’s threat level dictates what security measures should be 

in place. The levels are as follows: 

 

8

OBO directs State’s overseas building program; its mission is to create more secure, safer, 

and well-maintained facilities for the conduct of U.S. diplomacy worldwide. 

9

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, of 1961, outlines several security items 

for which the host country government is responsible, namely: (1) protecting the premises 

of the mission, including private residences of all diplomats, (2) ensuring diplomats’ 

freedom of movement and travel in its territory; and (3) in the case of armed conflict, 

enabling diplomats to evacuate the country at the earliest possible moment. Diplomatic 

Security overseas agents enhance security measures provided by host governments. 

Page 7 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

• Critical: grave impact on American diplomats 

• High: serious impact on American diplomats 

• Medium: moderate impact on American diplomats 

• Low: minor impact on American diplomats 

Diplomatic Security 

Budget Overview 

Approximately 60 percent of Diplomatic Security’s budget is dedicated 

overseas. Diplomatic Security domestic operations include funding for 

protection operations and investigations at 25 domestic offices. 

Diplomatic Security international activities include security upgrades to 

residences and existing diplomatic posts, as well as Diplomatic Security 

guard forces. Approximately 20 percent of the Diplomatic Security budget 

is for the Countermeasures Directorate, which provides physical and 

technical security enhancements at posts, as well as diplomatic courier 

services for all of State. Diplomatic Security also funds Security 

Infrastructure activities, which provide for the security of all of State’s 

classified and sensitive information (including computer networks), as 

well as background investigations on all State personnel. Funding for 

Management is primarily for the Executive Directorate, which provides 

management and administrative support functions to all of Diplomatic 

Security. The majority of funding for Training is for operating the 

Diplomatic Security training center, which provides training to security 

specialists, as well as counterterrorism training for State diplomats 

assigned to certain high-risk posts. (See fig. 2.) 

Page 8 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Figure 2: Diplomatic Security Budget, by Program Area, Fiscal Year 2008 

Security Infrastructure

International activities

Management

3%

Training

Domestic operations

Countermeasures

9%

18%

7%

5%

58%

Source: Diplomatic Security.

Note: The figure depicts Diplomatic Security’s financial plan for fiscal year 2008, which was based on 

regularly appropriated funds and fees and does not include supplemental appropriations intended 

solely for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Diplomatic Security 

Workforce Overview 

Diplomatic Security employs a broad workforce of over 40,000 to carry out 

its missions and activities. Diplomatic Security utilizes a combination of 

direct-hire employees, other U.S. government support staff, and 

contractors. Table 1 below details the position name, number of 

employees, and description of Diplomatic Security positions for fiscal year 

2008. 

Page 9 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Page 10 GAO-10-156 State Department 

Table 1: Overview of Diplomatic Security Personnel, Fiscal Year 2008 

Direct-hires 

Position Number Description 

Special agents 1,585 Special agents are the lead operational employees of Diplomatic Security. 

About 40 percent serve as RSOs (and assistants) overseas, managing all 

post security requirements. About 60 percent serve domestically, 

conducting investigations and providing protective details to foreign 

dignitaries. Special agents also serve in headquarters positions that 

support and manage Diplomatic Security operations. 

ARSO-Investigator 

(ARSO-I) 

 ARSO-Is are special agents that focus on investigations into passport and 

visa fraud at posts with high levels of fraud. ARSO-Is also augment post 

security on an as needed basis. In 2008, 50 special agents were assigned 

as ARSO-Is. 

Criminal Investigator 44 Diplomatic Security posts civil service Criminal Investigators at domestic 

field offices to conduct criminal investigations—including visa and passport 

fraud cases—alongside the Foreign Service special agents. 

Security engineers and technicians 293 Engineers and technicians are responsible for technical and informational 

security programs domestically and at overseas posts. They service and 

maintain security equipment at posts overseas, such as cameras, alarms, 

and screening systems that help to secure posts, among other 

responsibilities. 

Couriers 98 Couriers ensure the secure movement of classified U.S. government 

materials across international borders. 

Security Protection Specialists (SPS) 0a SPS agents are intended to serve as supervisory agents on protective 

details in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. 

Locally Employed Staff (LES)b 350 LES at overseas posts support Diplomatic Security operations. LES staff 

remain at the same post and provide continuity and institutional knowledge 

for the Regional Security Offices at posts. 

Management support staff 548 Management support staff includes nonagent civil service employees who 

provide managerial and administrative services. 

Subtotal 2,918 

Other U.S. government support staff 

Marine Security Guards 1,134 Marine Security Guards’ primary role is to protect classified information at 

posts. Marine Security Guards control access to State facilities overseas. 

Seabees 166 Seabees are active duty Navy construction personnel with skills in building 

construction, maintenance, and repair essential to State facilities and 

security programs located worldwide. 

Subtotal 1,300 

Contract and support staff 

Private security contractors 2,000c Private security contractors provide protective services for dignitaries in 

critical threat environments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Israel. 

Diplomatic Security guards and 

surveillance detection 

33,491 Diplomatic Security guards provide perimeter security to post compounds, 

as well as residential security. Surveillance detection teams augment post 

security by identifying suspicious activity outside of post compounds. 
 

Contract and support staff 

Position Number Description 

Support contractors 1,300 Diplomatic Security also employs contractor support staff at headquarters, 

who provide administrative support. 

Uniformed protective officers 775 Officers provide security at domestic facilities, such as State’s 

headquarters 

Subtotal 37,566

Total 41,784

Source: GAO review of documentary and testimonial evidence provided by State and Diplomatic Security. 

a

The SPS position is currently under development. There were no SPSs in 2008. The first four 

entered duty on July 29, 2009. 

b

State uses the term “Locally Employed Staff” to characterize employees hired locally who do not 

have diplomatic status and can either be from the host country, a third country, or the United States. 

c

The number of private security contractors is an estimate provided by senior Diplomatic Security 

officials. 

Over the last decade, Diplomatic Security’s mission and activities have 

grown in reaction to a number of security incidents. These include 39 

attacks on embassies, consulates, or official U.S. personnel—starting with 

the 1998 attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; the 

attacks on September 11, 2001; and the U.S. involvement in Iraq starting in 

2003. (See fig. 3 for a timeline of significant events affecting Diplomatic 

Security missions and activities.) 

Diplomatic Security’s 

Mission Has Grown in 

Reaction to a Number 

of Major Security 

Incidents 

Page 11 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Figure 3: Timeline of Events Affecting Diplomatic Security 

Incident

Diplomatic Security Response

Congressional Action

7 Rocket 

Propelled 

Grenades, 

(RPG) fired at 

Embassy, 

Beirut 

Both 

embassies

simultaneously 

attacked with 

truck bombs, 

Nairobi and 

Dar-es-Salaam

Attempted RPG 

attack; gunmen 

fire on Embassy, 

Moscow 

Bombing near 

U.S./UK 

Consulate 

General, 

Yekaterinburg

Tribesmen 

attempt to kidnap 

embassy 

employee, 

Sana’a

Terrorist launch 

RPG at 

Consulate, 

Istanbul

Rockets

launched at 

Embassy, 

injuring local 

guard, Islamabad

Sept. 11 

Terrorist attacks

on the World 

Trade Center 

and 

the Pentagon

Secure Embassy Construction 

and Counterterrorism Act of 1999

FY 99 Emergency Security Supplemental

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Gunmen attack 

Consulate, 

Calcutta

Two grenades

thrown at 

Embassy, Sana’a

U.S. diplomat killed 

in attack near 

Embassy, 

Islamabad

Car bomb

explodes near 

Embassy, Lima

Truck bomb

detonates outside 

Consulate, Karachi

Consular Office 

bombed as part of 

the Bali bombings, 

Denpasar

Al-Qa’ida

assassinates

USAID Director, 

Amman

RPG fired 

at Embassy, 

Athens

Fire on helicopter 

carrying 

Ambassador, 

Batticaloa

Suicide bomber 

destroys

embassy vehicle, 

Kabul

Two suicide 

bombers target 

U.S. diplomatic 

facilities, 

Casablanca

Maoists attack

ambassador’s

vehicle, 

Kathmandu

Terrorists launch 

mortars at 

Consulate 

(Oct. and Dec.), 

Peshawar

Terrorist 

assassinates

USAID employee, 

Khartoum

Gunmen fire on 

Ambassador 

during ceremony, 

Kabul

Armed attack 

against Consulate, 

Istanbul

Bullets and 

grenade shot at 

U.S. Consulate, 

Monterrey

Gunmen attempt 

to kidnap Principal 

Officer, Peshawar

Two car bombs

outside U.S. 

Embassy in 

Yemeni capital, 

Sana'a

Suicide 

bomber kills

U.S. diplomat 

near 

Consulate, 

Karachi

INL 

motorcade 

attacked by 

suicide car 

bomb, Herat

INL vehicle 

destroyed by 

roadside 

bomb, Kabul

Suicide car 

bomb

detonates

outside 

Embassy, 

Kabul

Gunmen raid 

U.S. 

Embassy, 

Damascus

U.S. led 

invasion

of Iraq

Gunmen 

attack 

Embassy, 

Islamabad

Truck bomb

fails to 

detonate 

near 

Consulate, 

Karachi

Suicide 

bomber 

attacks

Embassy, 

Tashkent

U.S. diplomat 

injured in 

bombing at 

hotel, 

Islamabad

Gunmen 

raid 

diplomatic 

compound, 

Jeddah

Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism 

Prevention Act passed

Protection responsibilities

for Mission Iraq begin

Signed MOU with Consular 

Affairs for the assignment 

of Diplomatic Security 

special agents to conduct 

fraud investigations in 

consular sections abroad

Physical and technical 

security upgrades initiated 

Armored vehicles provided for all posts worldwide

Increased Diplomatic Security guard forces to 

implement enhanced security procedures

First WPPS

contract 

awarded

Diplomatic 

Security 

Passport and 

Visa Strategic 

Plan 

submitted to 

Congress

Bomb

damages

U.S. 

Embassy 

vehicle, 

wounds

two, Kabul

Diplomatic 

Security’s

Threat 

Investigations

and Analysis

Directorate 

established

Western 

Hemisphere 

Travel 

Initiative fully 

implemented

$3.2 billion in supplemental funding for Iraq Security

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Page 12 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

1998 Bombings Created a 

New Focus on the Physical 

Security of Posts Overseas 

In response to the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 

Diplomatic Security sought to improve U.S. security and antiterrorism 

efforts worldwide. Following the 1998 attacks, State determined that more 

than 85 percent of diplomatic facilities did not meet security standards at 

that time and were also vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In response, 

Diplomatic Security added many of the physical security measures 

currently in place at most U.S. missions worldwide such as additional 

barriers, alarms and public address systems, and enhanced access 

procedures such as mandatory inspections of vehicles entering the U.S. 

diplomatic facilities. Diplomatic Security also introduced the concept of 

“surveillance detection teams” at nearly all of their diplomatic postings. 

These teams look for terrorist surveillance directed against diplomatic 

facilities. In addition, Diplomatic Security expanded antiterrorism training 

to aid foreign police in combating terrorism, and determined that it was 

imperative that each Chief of Mission and Principal Officer be provided 

with a fully armored vehicle. Prior to the 1998 bombings, 50 armored 

vehicles were provided to chiefs of mission at critical and high-threat 

posts. Now there are more than 3,600 armored vehicles worldwide, 

including 246 armored vehicles for Chiefs of Mission and over 1,100 for 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Diplomatic Security also increased its 

security personnel and hired additional local guards and assigned 

additional security personnel to missions abroad. 

Since 1998, there have been 39 attacks aimed at U.S. Embassies or 

Consulates or Chief of Mission personnel, not including regular attacks 

against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad since 2004. The nature of some of 

these attacks has led Diplomatic Security to adapt its security measures. 

(See app. IX for a list of attacks.) The December 6, 2004, attack on the U.S. 

consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, provides a specific example of how 

Diplomatic Security adjusts its security procedures. According to State, 

the attackers gained entry into the U.S. consulate by running through the 

vehicle access gate. While Diplomatic Security had installed a device to 

force vehicles to stop for inspection before entering a compound, it did 

not prevent the attackers from entering the compound by foot once the 

barrier was lowered. To correct that vulnerability, Diplomatic Security has 

incorporated “man-traps” in conjunction with the vehicle barriers at 

Page 13 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

vehicle entry points at most high and critical threat posts,10 whereby, when 

the barrier is lowered, the vehicle enters a holding pen, or “man-trap,” for 

inspection before a second barrier in front of the vehicle opens into the 

compound. In addition to the direct attacks on U.S. facilities and 

personnel overseas, Diplomatic Security’s workload has also been affected 

by the recent attacks aimed at hotels frequented by Westerners in 

Pakistan, India, and Indonesia.11 To address these security threats, 

Diplomatic Security has a increased its focus on security awareness 

training to employees traveling outside of the official State compound. In 

addition, the emergence of terrorist tactics in targeting nongovernment 

personnel and facilities led to the rapid expansion of another Diplomatic 

Security program, the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). 

Formed in 1985 to improve the exchange of security information between 

the government and the private sector, OSAC has formed councils in more 

than 100 cities around the world to improve security for American 

organizations operating outside of the United States. 

After 2001, Diplomatic 

Security Increased Focus 

on Domestic Security 

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks underscored the importance of 

Diplomatic Security upgrading its domestic security programs and 

enhancing its investigative capacity. Following the attacks, Diplomatic 

Security significantly upgraded its domestic technical and procedural 

security programs and strengthened its counterintelligence program. In 

addition, Diplomatic Security acquired additional security personnel to 

provide added perimeter control and surveillance detection to address the 

changing threat environment, and hired and deployed additional security 

engineers, to provide necessary technical expertise in support of 

Diplomatic Security’s technical security programs. In addition, in 2006, 

Diplomatic Security submitted to Congress a strategic plan that entailed 

 

10OBO incorporates man-traps into the design of new embassy compounds and as part of 

major physical security upgrade projects at existing facilities. Diplomatic Security, in 

coordination with OBO and the Overseas Security Policy Board, is in the process of 

formalizing physical security standards mandating the construction of man-traps at all 

existing embassy and consulate compounds to the maximum extent feasible. 

11Recent attacks on hotels frequented by Westerners occurred in Pakistan on September 20, 

2008 (Islamabad) and June 9, 2009 (Peshawar); in India on November 26, 2008 (Mumbai); 

and in Indonesia on July 17, 2009 (Jakarta). 

Page 14 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

significantly expanding the bureau’s investigative capacity.12 For example, 

Diplomatic Security expanded its liaison and task force efforts with 

several federal law enforcement agencies and intelligence organizations 

and assigned additional special agents to Consular Affairs’ Fraud 

Prevention offices, the National Passport Center, the National Visa Center, 

and the Kentucky Consular Center to ensure the timely investigation of 

suspected fraudulent travel documents. 

U.S. Involvement in Iraq 

Was Followed by a Policy 

of Maintaining Diplomatic 

Missions in War-Torn, 

Hostile Environments 

Following the onset of U.S. operations in Iraq in 2003, Diplomatic Security 

has had to provide security in the Iraq war zone and other increasingly 

hostile environments. On June 28, 2004, Diplomatic Security assumed 

protection responsibilities of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. The Embassy 

is located within the International Zone, an area in the center of Baghdad 

completely surrounded by high concrete blast walls and barbed wire, 

which was controlled by United States and other Coalition forces, until 

January 2009 when the Iraqi government assumed responsibility. A 

bilateral security agreement between the United States and the new 

government of Iraq requires the United States to remove all of its 

remaining forces by December 31, 2011, which will impact Diplomatic 

Security’s operations.13

Conducting diplomacy in a war zone was part of a Bush administration 

initiative called “Transformational Diplomacy.” Former Secretary of State 

Rice stated that the objective of transformational diplomacy was to build 

and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the 

needs of those nations’ people and conduct themselves responsibly in the 

international system. State’s transformational diplomacy initiative has 

required a shift of human resources to increasingly critical regions such as 

Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East and, in turn, Diplomatic Security has 

been required to provide security to more dangerous posts in these 

regions, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

 

12In December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission report. The 9/11 

Commission had identified a number of factors that allowed terrorists to exploit the 

vulnerabilities of U.S. travel documents. The act mandated Diplomatic Security to devise a 

strategic plan to target individuals involved in the fraudulent production, disruption, and 

use of U.S. travel documents. 

13GAO has ongoing work regarding the drawdown of U.S. military in Iraq and its impact on 

civilian organizations. 

Page 15 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

In response to the growing Diplomatic Security mission, Diplomatic 

Security funding and personnel have increased considerably since the 1998 

bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Prior to the 

bombings, Diplomatic Security operated on an annual budget of about 

$170 million;14 by fiscal year 2008, the Diplomatic Security budget was 

approximately $1.8 billion, of which over $300 million was for security in 

Iraq. In addition to major increases in funding, Diplomatic Security has 

doubled the size of its direct-hire workforce since 1998 and continues to 

increase levels of direct-hires and contract support personnel to address 

growing security needs. 

Diplomatic Security 

Funding Has 

Increased 

Considerably, and 

Personnel Has 

Doubled Since 1998 

The Diplomatic Security 

Budget Has Increased 

Considerably Since 1998, 

though Total Security 

Costs Are Not Captured in 

Diplomatic Security Data 

Diplomatic Security reports that its budget15 has increased from about $200 

million in 1998 to $1.8 billion in 2008. The budget increased largely due to 

new security procedures put in place after the 1998 bombings in Africa, as 

well as the need to provide security for diplomats in the conflict zones of 

Iraq and Afghanistan. Diplomatic Security budget data does not capture all 

of the expenses related to the bureau. In fiscal year 2008, State allocated 

approximately $2.2 billion for all Diplomatic Security functions. 

In response to the 1998 embassy attacks, Diplomatic Security received a 

considerable increase in funds to immediately address security 

vulnerabilities at posts worldwide and, since then, funding for worldwide 

operations outside of conflict zones has grown steadily. Prior to the 

bombings, from 1995-1998, the Diplomatic Security budget averaged about 

$173 million annually. In 1999, the Diplomatic Security budget spiked to 

$784 million after Congress provided Diplomatic Security with emergency 

supplemental funding to begin an overhaul of security standards at posts 

worldwide.16 Diplomatic Security has continued to receive funding to 

 

14Diplomatic Security noted that the $170 million figure for fiscal year 1998 does not 

include fees, reimbursements, and other funds. Diplomatic Security did not provide us with 

other data for this fiscal year. 

15By “budget,” we are referring to what Diplomatic Security calls “Bureau Managed Funds,” 

which is composed of funds received through annual appropriations, fees collected 

through visa processing, reimbursements from other agencies, and appropriated funds 

carried over from prior fiscal years. Diplomatic Security has management authority over 

Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) programs, but did not provide ATA funding data and, 

therefore, ATA funds are not included in the discussion of the Diplomatic Security budget. 

16The increase in funding for Diplomatic Security in fiscal year 1999 was part of the 

Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which provided 

State with a total of $1.4 billion to reestablish diplomatic facilities in Kenya and Tanzania 

and to overhaul overseas security standards. 

Page 16 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

implement and maintain security upgrades. (See fig. 4.) Funding is 

provided through annual appropriations for Worldwide Security 

Protection.17 Worldwide Security Protection funds are used primarily for: 

(1) physical and technical security upgrades at posts,18 (2) replacement of 

armored vehicles at posts worldwide, (3) increased diplomatic security 

guard forces to implement enhanced security procedures, and (4) 

additional direct-hire personnel and crisis management training. State’s 

foreign affairs budget allocated for security more than tripled from 1998 to 

1999, from 9 percent of the total foreign affairs budget to 22 percent. 

d from 1998 to 

Figure 4: Historical Trend in Diplomatic Security Budget 

Source: GAO analysis of Diplomatic Security budget data.

Year

Dollars in millions

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

1998: Bombings

of U.S. Embassies

in Africa

2004: State 

initiates diplomatic 

presence in Iraq

2001: September 11 

attacks

Note: This figure represents the Diplomatic Security annual budget for fiscal years 1998-2009 and 

does not include Antiterrorism Assistance funding, personnel salaries, or support costs for overseas 

agents. Budget data is presented in nominal dollars. However, when adjusting for inflation, the 

Diplomatic Security budget still had tremendous growth from 1998 to 2009. For example, using the 

chain-weighted GDP Price Index, the 1998 budget figure of $172 million would be $222 million in 

2009 dollars. 

 

17The Worldwide Security Protection program was initially named the Worldwide Security 

Upgrades program; however, the name changed in 2007. 

18Physical and technical improvements have been implemented continually over the course 

of many years. 

Page 17 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

A large portion of the increase in the Diplomatic Security budget is due to 

security requirements associated with State operations in the conflict 

areas of Iraq and Afghanistan. Diplomatic Security received approximately 

$3.5 billion to provide security in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2004-2009, 

about 40 percent of the budget for all security operations domestically and 

worldwide during this time period. In fiscal year 2009, the Diplomatic 

Security budget for Iraq security alone is estimated at $900 million, 

representing approximately 40 percent of the total Diplomatic Security 

budget. Much of the funding for Iraq is dedicated to contractor support 

personnel for protective details and compound security. For example, the 

department obligated over $1.1 billion from fiscal years 2006 through 2008 

to fund five task orders under the Worldwide Personal Protective Services 

contract, employing approximately 1,400 private security contractors who 

provide high-threat protection to U.S. officials traveling in Iraq. In 

addition, Diplomatic Security funds over 1,800 contract guards in Iraq 

under the Baghdad Embassy Security Force contract, and over 600 guards 

and private security contractors in Afghanistan. Spending on Diplomatic 

Security guards worldwide has also nearly doubled since 2003, from $267 

million per year to $490 million in 2009. 

The Diplomatic Security budget does not capture all the funding directed 

to the bureau and its employees, which was approximately $2.2 billion in 

fiscal year 2008. This estimate includes salaries of all Diplomatic Security 

employees, support costs, antiterrorism training provided to overseas 

partners, and indirect funding for Diplomatic Security personnel operating 

overseas.19 The Diplomatic Security budget is composed of direct funding 

through appropriations, fees collected through visa processing, and 

reimbursements from other bureaus and agencies. However, Diplomatic 

Security receives indirect funding through State regional bureaus, which 

as of fiscal year 2008, provided for the salaries and expenses of over 600 

special agents and 350 Locally Employed Staff (LES) posted overseas.20

Additionally, Diplomatic Security, along with the State Office of 

Coordinator for Counterterrorism, manages funds under the Antiterrorism 

 

19The $2.2 billion estimate for fiscal year 2008 is based on actual 2008 appropriations as 

reported in the Fiscal Year 2010 Congressional Budget Justification document for State. 

20Special agents posted overseas as RSOs and assistant RSOs are assigned to the State 

regional bureaus, and salaries and expenses are paid for out of regional bureau funds. For 

example, the State Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau pays salaries and expenses for 

special agents assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. 

Page 18 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Assistance Program, which provides partner nations with 

counterterrorism training and equipment.21

Diplomatic Security Has 

Doubled Its Direct-Hire 

Workforce Since 1998 and 

Become Increasingly 

Reliant on Contractor 

Support 

The size of the direct-hire workforce has doubled since 1998, and 

Diplomatic Security plans to continue to expand its workforce. At the 

same time, Diplomatic Security’s reliance on contractors has grown, 

largely to fill critical needs in the high-threat posts of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The size of Diplomatic Security’s direct-hire security specialist workforce 

(special agents, engineers, technicians, and couriers) has doubled since 

1998. The number of direct-hire security specialists increased from just 

under 1,000 in 1998 to over 2,000 in 2009. In response to the bombings in 

1998, the Worldwide Security Protection program provided for the first 

major increase in Diplomatic Security personnel in 13 years, and personnel 

numbers continued to climb throughout the decade as U.S. diplomatic 

missions and official U.S. personnel overseas faced 39 attacks between 

1998 and 2008. Diplomatic Security had an almost 60 percent increase in 

the security specialist workforce from 1998-2002. The initial funding for 

the Worldwide Security Protection program provided an additional 271 

security specialists and 89 support personnel. Diplomatic Security 

requested additional staff in 2001 in order to bolster its investigative 

capabilities at domestic field offices, as well as the many global security 

programs. Diplomatic Security also requested additional domestic 

personnel at program offices at headquarters to coordinate Diplomatic 

Security programs. Since 2002, Diplomatic Security personnel numbers 

have continued to grow steadily. Much of the growth has been among 

special agents, which increased from 1,244 agents in 2002 to 1,702 agents 

in 2009 (about 37 percent). (See fig. 5.) Diplomatic Security is projected to 

add over 350 security positions in fiscal year 2010, in part to increase the 

number of security personnel in high-threat environments. 

Diplomatic Security Has More 

than Doubled the Number of 

Direct-Hire Security Specialists 

Since 1998 

 

21In fiscal year 2008, approximately $128 million was provided for the Antiterrorism 

Assistance program. For more information on the Antiterrorism Assistance Program, see 

GAO-08-336. 

Page 19 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Figure 5: Growth of Security Specialist Workforce: 1998-2009 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

Security technicians

Security engineers

Couriers

Special agents

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Actual employees

Fiscal year

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Since 1998, Diplomatic Security has increased the size of the civil service 

workforce and has positioned many additional special agents 

domestically. Between 1998 and 2008, the number of civil service 

personnel more than doubled, from 258 to 592 personnel. Diplomatic 

Security identified the need for more domestically based security 

personnel to allow maximum control and flexibility of resources, as well 

as to provide more personnel to conduct investigations and staff 

protection details for foreign dignitaries and the Secretary of State. 

Additionally, Diplomatic Security noted in 2001 that domestic offices were 

facing backlogs and were frequently understaffed due to protective detail 

and emergency overseas requirements and wanted to increase the size of 

the domestic offices to better meet program requirements. 

Page 20 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

In 2004, Congressional legislation mandated Diplomatic Security to 

enhance its efforts to provide for greater visa and passport security in 

order to target and disrupt terrorist travel.22 In response, Diplomatic 

Security has increased the number of special agents at domestic field 

offices, and has also increased the number of civil service Criminal 

Investigator positions that only work domestically.23 From 2004 to 2009, 

Diplomatic Security increased the number of criminal investigators from 

17 to 59. 

Diplomatic Security has increased its use of contractors to support 

security operations worldwide, specifically through increases in the 

Diplomatic Security guard force and the use of contractors to provide 

protective details for American diplomats in high-threat environments. 

Diplomatic Security also utilizes contractors in management support 

positions. Approximately 90 percent of all Diplomatic Security personnel 

are contractors. (See fig. 6.) 

ty personnel 

Diplomatic Security Has 

Become Increasingly Reliant on 

Contractors 

Figure 6: Diplomatic Security Reliance on Contractors

Direct hire

Contractors

10%

90%

Source: GAO analysis of Diplomatic Security data.

 

22The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 mandated Diplomatic 

Security to produce a strategic plan to target individuals involved in the fraudulent 

production, distribution, and use of U.S. travel documents. 

23Foreign Service specialists rotate assignments every 1-3 years and may not serve in a 

domestic capacity longer than 5 consecutive years. Civil service Criminal Investigators 

work at domestic field offices and are not required to serve overseas, thereby providing 

continuity and leadership in domestic investigations. 

Page 21 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

The majority of Diplomatic Security contractors are part of the global 

Diplomatic Security guard force. Diplomatic Security uses contracts for 

diplomatic guard forces that provide physical protection at overseas posts. 

While host governments are required to provide security for U.S. facilities 

overseas, Diplomatic Security augments security with Diplomatic Security 

guards at posts, two-thirds of which are provided through contracts with 

guard companies with the rest hired through Personal Service 

Agreements, where individuals contract directly with the U.S. mission to 

provide security.24 Following the 1998 bombings, Diplomatic Security 

increased staffing under the Diplomatic Security guard program to help 

implement new security procedures. For example, State made inspection 

of all vehicles entering all U.S. posts abroad mandatory, and new 

Diplomatic Security guard teams were established to detect terrorist 

surveillance of U.S. personnel and facilities. Diplomatic Security guards 

are usually composed of host country nationals, and their numbers are 

largely driven by the threat level and security situation in the host country. 

For example, Mexico has one of the largest guard programs in the world, 

with 563 guards covering the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, six Consulates 

General, two Consulates, and two Consular Agencies. 

State has acknowledged that it relies on thousands of private security 

contractors to meet the agency’s increasing requirements for protective 

details, specifically in conflict zones. Over the past 10 years, State has 

increasingly assigned Diplomatic Security to provide protective services in 

conflict zones, and Diplomatic Security has been unable to do so from the 

limited cadre of special agents. State’s Worldwide Personal Protective 

Services (WPPS) program began in 2000 to provide contractor support for 

such protective details. Diplomatic Security uses contractors for functions 

it does not have the personnel capacity to support, and in situations where 

it may have to increase or decrease the number of personnel rapidly. 

Persistent turmoil in the Middle East and prolonged postwar stabilization 

efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have required the continuous deployment 

of WPPS contractors, with the largest growth in contract usage beginning 

in 2004 due to operations in Iraq. Diplomatic Security has spent over $2.1 

billion on 581 separate WPPS contracts to date. As of October 2008, there 

are 1,400 WPPS contractors in Iraq alone. According to State, the use of 

 

24Personal Service Agreements are individual contracts between a U.S. diplomatic post and 

a person hired to work as a Diplomatic Security guard. Under a Personal Service 

Agreement, guards are paid directly by the post, and the Regional Security Officer is 

responsible for providing training. 

Page 22 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

contractors is critical in quickly placing needed personnel in high-threat 

environments. 

Diplomatic Security utilizes contractors to fill administrative support 

positions but is planning to replace some contractor roles with full-time 

positions. In addition to guards and security contractors, Diplomatic 

Security uses over 1,000 contractors to provide administrative functions. 

According to Diplomatic Security officials, the previous administration 

advocated for the increased use of contractor support; however, the 

current administration is reexamining this approach and is seeking to 

reduce expenses related to contractors. Diplomatic Security officials said 

the bureau is seeking to increase the number of civil service positions 

intended in part to replace some contractors in key positions. 

Diplomatic Security faces several policy and operational challenges. First, 

according to Diplomatic Security officials, State is maintaining missions in 

countries where it would have previously evacuated personnel, which 

requires more resources and, therefore, makes it more difficult for 

Diplomatic Security to provide a secure environment. Second, although 

Diplomatic Security has grown considerably in staff over the last 10 years, 

staffing shortages in domestic offices and other operational challenges 

further tax Diplomatic Security’s ability to implement all of its missions. 

Finally, State has expanded Diplomatic Security without the benefit of 

solid strategic planning; neither State’s departmental strategic plan nor 

Diplomatic Security’s bureau strategic plan specifically addresses the 

bureau’s resource needs or its management challenges. 

Dangerous 

Environments, 

Staffing Shortages, 

and Reactive Planning 

Challenge Diplomatic 

Security 

Maintaining Missions in 

Iraq and Other Increasingly 

Dangerous Posts 

Significantly Affects 

Diplomatic Security’s Work 

Maintaining diplomatic missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other 

increasingly dangerous environments has required an unprecedented 

amount of security resources, straining Diplomatic Security’s ability to 

provide security. 

In 2004, when the U.S. government and Coalition forces transferred 

sovereignty to the interim Iraqi government, security for the U.S. Embassy 

in Baghdad transferred from the U.S. Department of Defense to Diplomatic 

Security. Since then, keeping staff secure, yet productive, in Iraq has been 

one of Diplomatic Security’s largest challenges because the mission is 

subject to regular threats and attacks. The U.S. mission in Baghdad—with 

1,300 authorized U.S. civilian personnel—is one of the largest in the world. 

Maintaining Diplomatic Security operations in Iraq has required 

Iraq

Page 23 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

approximately 36 percent of its entire budget each fiscal year since 2004 

and, as of September 2008, it required 81 special agents to manage security 

operations. In order to support the security operations in Iraq, Diplomatic 

Security has had to draw staff and other resources away from other 

programs and activities. 

Special agents posted in Baghdad report that one of the most difficult 

aspects of their work—and, therefore, an area that has required many 

physical and staff resources—is protecting embassy personnel from 

attacks when traveling outside the embassy. Due to the dangerous security 

environment, Diplomatic Security provides a protective detail for embassy 

officials when they leave the embassy compound. This has required 

Diplomatic Security to maintain a costly transportation network, which 

includes an air wing, a fleet of armored vehicles, and the appropriate 

contract staff to operate the aviation equipment. Iraq is the only country 

where Diplomatic Security maintains an aviation program, which is 

needed to provide transportation for U.S. officials to other cities within 

Iraq, quick reaction to security incidents, search and rescue missions, and 

motorcade surveillance. Diplomatic Security stated that, as of October 

2009, there were 914 armored vehicles in service in Iraq—approximately 

32 percent of all armored vehicles Diplomatic Security has in service 

worldwide. Each armored vehicle costs, on average, approximately 

$173,000 and, according to Diplomatic Security, has a useful life of about 3 

years due to constant use in Iraq’s difficult terrain. 

Diplomatic Security constantly needs agents to fill the positions in Iraq, 

which draws from other programs and activities. The Iraq mission has 

more special agents than any other post in the world25 in part because 

State has required that Diplomatic Security include a special agent in all 

contractor convoys to provide better oversight of the contractors who 

provide the personal security details.26 Furthermore, the assignments are 

only 1-year long due to the dangerous nature of the post. In an effort to 

decrease the number of special agents needed to staff the mission in Iraq, 

Diplomatic Security officials stated that the bureau has created a new 

 

25While the majority of State posts have between 1 and 3 special agents, there are 81 special 

agents assigned to Iraq. 

26On September 16, 2007, an incident involving a personal security contractor firm working 

for the Department of State resulted in the deaths of 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad. For 

GAO’s review of security contractors in Iraq, see GAO-08-966. 

Page 24 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

employee position, Security Protection Specialists (SPS), that is trained 

only to provide oversight to protection details. 

Diplomatic Security’s operations in Iraq will again be affected as the U.S. 

military withdraws its troops from the country. State has relied on support 

from the U.S. military to secure the embassy personnel and safeguard 

embassy information in Iraq; however, under the November 2008 bilateral 

security agreement between the United States and Iraq, the United States 

must remove all of its remaining forces by December 31, 2011. Earlier in 

2009, GAO reported that Diplomatic Security’s workload—and thus its 

resource requirements—will likely increase as the U.S. military transitions 

out of Iraq;27 GAO will continue to monitor the plans as part of our 

engagement on civilian planning for the drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq. 

U.S. policymakers’ increased focus on Afghanistan poses another 

significant challenge for Diplomatic Security. The security situation in 

Afghanistan has deteriorated since 2005, and the number of attacks 

increased from 2,388 in 2005 to 10,889 in 2008. As with Iraq, the special 

agents in Afghanistan reported that the greatest challenge for them is 

safely transporting American officials from the embassy to other locations. 

Afghanistan is currently Diplomatic Security’s second largest overseas 

post with a staff of 16 special agents in 2008, which increased to 22 special 

agents in 2009. As of April 2009, Diplomatic Security was responsible for 

the security of approximately 300 authorized U.S. civilian personnel, 

although Diplomatic Security expects that number to increase if State 

opens consular offices in the cities of Herat and Mazar-e-Sherif. While 

Diplomatic Security has not been placing a special agent in every 

contractor-led convoy, as in Iraq, Diplomatic Security plans to increase the 

use of Diplomatic Security staff for all convoys. To address these changes, 

Diplomatic Security plans to add an additional 25 special agents in 2010, 

effectively doubling the number of agents in Afghanistan. 

Afghanistan 

In addition to operating in war zones, State is maintaining missions in 

countries where it would have previously evacuated personnel. According 

to Diplomatic Security officials, maintaining missions in these dangerous 

environments requires more resources and, therefore, makes it more 

difficult for Diplomatic Security to provide a secure environment. (Fig. 7 

shows that the number of posts evacuated for security-related reasons 

State Operates in More 

Dangerous Environments Than 

10 Years Ago, Which Affects 

Diplomatic Security’s Work 

 

27GAO, Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-09-294SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 24, 2009).

Page 25 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

increased after significant events in 1998, 2001, and 2003, and has 

subsequently decreased since 2003; it also shows that State did not close 

any posts between 2003 and 2008.) 

Figure 7: Evacuations of U.S. Missions, 1997-2008 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Post closure

Ordered

Authorized

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Number

Year

3

5

4

10

10

4

9

20

1

7

1

4

2

4

1 2 1

3

1

9

9

1

14

4

3

4

1

Note: GAO did not include evacuations for weather, pandemic, or technological (Y2K) reasons and 

evacuations for nonofficial Americans in this tabulation. In addition, only the most serious action is 

counted. For example: if there was an authorized evacuation followed by an ordered evacuation, we 

counted that as an ordered evacuation only. 

Several Diplomatic Security officials cited the agency’s Transformational 

Diplomacy Initiative as a reason that State maintains missions in areas 

where previously it would have evacuated. Implementing 

Transformational Diplomacy involved repositioning U.S. diplomats from 

countries where the United States had established partnerships, such as 

those in Western Europe, to those where democratic governance needed 

support, such as China and India. According to one official, for example, 

prior to the Transformational Diplomacy Initiative, State would have 

evacuated the post in Peshawar, Pakistan, 2 years ago. However, the U.S. 

government considers its operations in Pakistan to be critically important. 

Page 26 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Another indication that State is operating in an increasing number of 

hostile environments is its growing use of danger pay.28 Despite the 

fluctuation in the number of posts warranting danger pay, there is a 

statistically significant trend to maintain operations in more countries 

warranting danger pay.29 (See fig. 8.) Peshawar is one example of a post 

that has become increasingly more volatile over the last 10 years. While 

the danger pay rating for Peshawar decreased from 25 percent in 1997 to 

15 percent in 1998, the rating has subsequently increased three times, 

returning to 25 percent in 2002, increasing to 30 percent in 2008, and 

increasing again in 2009 to 35 percent. Sana’a, Yemen, is another example: 

prior to 2002, U.S. officials living in Sana’a did not receive a danger pay 

differential. State instituted a 15 percent differential for Sana’a in 2002, 

which increased to 20 percent in 2006 and to 30 percent in 2009. 

 

28Danger pay is additional compensation above basic compensation given to all U.S. 

government civilian employees for service in foreign areas where there exists conditions of 

civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or wartime conditions that threaten the health or 

well-being of an employee. 

29The relationship between the number of danger pay posts and time is statistically 

significant at the 1 percent level. In other words, the likelihood of seeing this trend over 

time if there were no relationship is roughly 1 percent. 

Page 27 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Figure 8: Trend in Number of Posts with Danger Pay, 1997-2009 

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Year

Number of posts

0

20

40

60

80

100

Trend line

Danger pay posts

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Note: The trend line in this figure assumes a constant exponential rate of growth over time. Data for 

2009 is as of June 2009. 

In addition to exposing employees to riskier situations, maintaining posts 

in dangerous environments requires more security resources. Diplomatic 

Security recognizes a post’s deteriorating security environment by 

increasing its security threat level rating. Each threat level requires 

different security measures, as laid out in the Overseas Security Policy 

Board interagency coordinated standards. Below is one example of how 

more is required of the local guard force as the security threat heightens. 

(See table 2.) 

Page 28 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Table 2: Change in Perimeter Patrol Requirements by Threat Level 

Threat level

Requirement for local guards to patrol the perimeter of official 

facilities

Low No provision for foot patrol of official facilities’ perimeters.a

Medium 12-hour foot patrol of perimeter during the day and at residences at night, 

where required, to supplement host country support at official facilities. 

High 24-hour foot patrol at official facilities and residences for the Ambassador, 

Deputy Chief of Mission, Principal Officers, and Marine Security Guards. 

Critical 24-hour foot patrol at official facilities and residences for the Ambassador, 

Deputy Chief of Mission, Principal Officers, and Marine Security Guards. 

Guards are to be armed unless prohibited by law. 

Source: Foreign Affairs Handbook (12 FAH 6, H-110 through H-114). 

a

Except in unusual, individual circumstances. 

Very dangerous environments might require Diplomatic Security to 

provide additional resources beyond what the security standards require. 

For instance, to maintain the consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan, Diplomatic 

Security officials stated that they had to enhance the compound’s physical 

security by deploying two Security Support Teams. Diplomatic Security 

usually uses these teams as emergency support to overseas posts 

experiencing civil disorder, armed conflict, or increased threat of attack. 

However, because the security situation in Peshawar is so critical, 

Diplomatic Security has had two teams posted there since late 2008. In 

addition, Diplomatic Security provided $4 million toward the improvement 

of access controls to the diplomatic enclave in Islamabad, Pakistan. 

According to Diplomatic Security, these improvements are part of a 

collective effort to improve highly vulnerable locations. 

Diplomatic Security Faces 

Operational Challenges 

That Negatively Affect Its 

Ability to Implement 

Important Activities 

Diplomatic Security’s ability to fully carry out its mission of providing 

security worldwide is hindered by staffing shortages in domestic offices—

even in light of its workforce growth—and other operational challenges 

such as inadequate facilities, pervasive language proficiency shortfalls, and 

host-country constraints, among others. 

Despite Diplomatic Security’s growth in staff over the last 10 years, some 

offices have been operating with severe staffing shortages. Some of the 

shortages are caused by unpredictable circumstances—like visits from 

foreign dignitaries who require protection details—however, the annual 

staffing cycle, while predictable, also affects staffing shortages. Diplomatic 

Security has taken some steps to address the staffing shortage, but 

challenges remain. 

Some Diplomatic Security 

Offices Operate with Severe 

Shortages of Staff 

Page 29 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

In 2008, approximately one-third of Diplomatic Security’s domestic 

suboffices operated with a 25 percent vacancy rate or higher. Several 

offices report that this shortage of staff affected their ability to conduct 

their work: 

• The Houston field office reported that for 6 months of the year, it operated 

at 50 percent capacity of nonsupervisory agents or lower and for 2 months 

during the summer, it dipped down to a low of 35 percent. This staffing 

gap happened while the field office was experiencing a significant increase 

in its caseload due to the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. As a 

result, the Houston field office management reported that this 

combination overwhelmed its capabilities and resulted in a significant 

backlog of cases.30

• The New York field office reported that the number of special agents 

dropped to 66 in 2008 from more than 110 agents in 2007. As a result, the 

office had to draw special agents from other field offices to cover their 

heavy dignitary protection load. 

• In 2008, the Mobile Security Deployment (MSD) Office was authorized to 

have 94 special agent positions, but only 76 were filled. Furthermore 

Diplomatic Security officials noted that not all filled staff positions are 

available for duty. For example, in 2009, 22 agents assigned to MSD were 

in training. As a result of the low level of available staff, Diplomatic 

Security reported that many posts go for years without updating their 

security training.31 Officials noted that this lack of available teams is 

particularly problematic given the high number of critical threat posts that 

are only 1-year tours that would benefit from frequent training. 

• Officials in the Professional Responsibility Office stated in February 2009 

that only 60 percent of its positions were filled. They also stated that their 

staff allocation was insufficient in comparison with sister organizations 

with similar functions, noting that Diplomatic Security staffs their office 

with 1 professional responsibility investigator for every 2,000 employees, 

while the Drug Enforcement Agency maintains a 1:288 ratio, and the 

Department of Justice maintains a 1:170 ratio. 

 

30Houston field office planned to use an increased number of agents scheduled to arrive in 

early 2009 to address the backlog of cases. 

31Currently, the MSD Office has two teams posted in Peshawar, Pakistan, and one in Iraq 

supplementing security. The office must use its four remaining teams to (1) prepare to 

relieve one of the sitting teams in Peshawar and Baghdad and (2) cover the other parts of 

its mission. 

Page 30 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Diplomatic Security officials maintain that most of the special agent 

staffing shortages are in domestic offices. However, three overseas posts 

we visited also reported staffing gaps: 

• New Delhi, India: The Regional Security Office had only two of seven 

allocated special agents until late fall of 2008, which embassy officials 

reported was insufficient to carry out its full workload. 

• Tunis, Tunisia: Because one special agent curtailed his tour to go to Iraq, 

there was a 6-week gap before the replacement RSO could arrive. During 

that 6-week gap a first tour ARSO handled all the RSO duties. 

• Abuja, Nigeria: There was a period of 2 months when the Regional 

Security Office only had one of four staff members assigned. Because of 

the lack of staff, the RSO was unable to properly oversee the surveillance 

detection program, which relied on contractors who were no longer 

fulfilling their duties. 

State officials attributed these shortages to three main factors: staffing the 

Iraq mission, protection details, and the annual staffing/training cycle. 

• Staffing the Iraq mission: As previously discussed, staffing the large 

number of special agents at the Iraq embassy has drawn staff away from 

other missions and offices. Iraq is a critical threat post; therefore, 

Diplomatic Security fills it and other critical threat posts first. In 2008, 81 

Diplomatic Security special agents—or 16 percent of Diplomatic Security 

staff—were posted to Iraq for 1-year tours. To fill this need, State officials 

reported that special agents frequently leave positions in other countries 

before completing the end of their tours to serve in Iraq. In 2008, we 

reported that, in order to provide enough Diplomatic Security special 

agents in Iraq, Diplomatic Security had to move agents from other 

programs, and those moves have affected the agency’s ability to perform 

other missions, including providing security for visiting dignitaries and 

visa, passport, and identity fraud investigations.32

• Protection details: Diplomatic Security draws agents from field offices, 

headquarters, and overseas posts to participate in protective details and 

special events. At least three field offices provided 12 or more agents for 

temporary duty assignment during 2008 on the Secretary’s protective 

detail that often lasted 30 days or more. One field office noted that the 

number of details doubled from the previous year. Field offices also 

 

32GAO-08-966. 

Page 31 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

provided agents to protect a number of visiting foreign dignitaries. In 

addition, Diplomatic Security’s role in providing protection at major 

events—such as the Olympics—has grown, which will require more staff 

to cover these events. Several field offices reported that they provided 

multiple agents for the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, China, for tours that 

lasted between 30 and 60 days. 

• Normal rotations: Staff take home leave between postings and sometimes 

are required to take training before starting the next assignment. This 

process regularly creates a labor shortage, which affects Diplomatic 

Security’s ability to meet the increased security demands placed on the 

bureau. For example, Diplomatic Security reported that, in November 

2004, 100 special agents were in training, on temporary duty, or leavewithout-pay, leaving the duties of those positions unperformed. Our 

fieldwork confirmed that this situation continues. In 2005, Diplomatic 

Security identified the need for a training float—additional staff that 

would allow the bureau to fill critical positions and still allow staff time for 

critical job training—but the bureau has not been able to implement one. 

Diplomatic Security Efforts to Address Staffing Challenges 

Diplomatic Security has taken several steps to address the staffing 

shortages, including doubling the staff size since 1998 and requesting 

funding to hire over 350 security positions in fiscal year 2010. While 

Diplomatic Security’s staff size has increased dramatically, new hires 

cannot be immediately deployed to critical overseas posts. According to 

Diplomatic Security, it takes approximately 3 years to prepare a new hire 

for his or her first tour overseas due to required law enforcement, RSO, 

and on-the-job investigative training at a domestic field office. According 

to Diplomatic Security officials, the bureau has shortened the basic 

training requirements and the required time spent in first rotation in order 

to get new hires overseas more quickly. 

In addition to hiring new special agents, Diplomatic Security created the 

SPS position in February 2009. The bureau’s intent was to hire, on a 

limited-term basis, a cadre of professionals specifically trained in 

personnel protection who would serve in Iraq and other high-threat posts 

to provide oversight for the contractor-operated protective details. 

Because of the more targeted training requirements, Diplomatic Security 

would be able to deploy the SPS staff more quickly than new hire special 

agents. However, Diplomatic Security has had difficulty recruiting and 

hiring a sufficient number of SPS candidates. Diplomatic Security 

originally intended to hire and train 25 SPSs and later add 20 more 

Page 32 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

positions. Diplomatic Security officials reported having difficulty filling the 

positions because they compete with private security contractors for new 

hires and, at the end of September 2009, only 10 positions had been filled. 

According to senior Diplomatic Security officials, the bureau may cancel 

the program if they can not recruit enough qualified candidates. 

In order to make special agents available for critical posts, Diplomatic 

Security has also enacted three administrative initiatives. First, Diplomatic 

Security stated that it fills all positions in Iraq and Afghanistan before 

filling any other positions. Second, Diplomatic Security has identified a 

number of positions that it will not fill in this year’s staffing cycle. 

According to Diplomatic Security officials the identified positions are 

usually at posts that have a number of assistant RSOs (ARSO) and, 

therefore, are better able to distribute the workload. Finally, Diplomatic 

Security stated that it has begun restricting its employees’ annual leave on 

a limited basis, during major events requiring a large protective security 

commitment such as the UN General Assembly. While these measures help 

ensure that critical needs missions are adequately staffed, they can 

exacerbate staffing shortages for other missions and offices. 

Diplomatic Security also faces a number of other operational challenges 

that impede the full implementation of its missions and activities. 

However, Diplomatic Security is not always able to implement security 

programs to the established standard because of certain operational 

challenges, including the following: 

Other Operational Challenges 

Also Impede Diplomatic 

Security’s Ability to Fully 

Implement Its Missions and 

Activities 

• Inadequate buildings: While State is in the process of updating and 

building many new facilities, in a previously published report, GAO 

identified many posts that are still situated in buildings that do not meet all 

security standards delineated by the Overseas Security Policy Board and 

in the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999. 

For example, many buildings do not have a 100-foot setback, increasing 

the risk of serious injury from bomb blasts.33 As a result, many buildings 

and their occupants may remain vulnerable to attack. 

• Foreign language deficiencies: Earlier this year, GAO found that 53 

percent of RSOs do not speak and read at the level required by their 

positions. According to officials in Diplomatic Security, language training 

for security officers is often cut short because many ambassadors are 

 

33For a review of OBO’s Compound Security Upgrade Program see GAO-08-162.

Page 33 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

unwilling to leave security positions vacant. However, GAO concluded that 

these foreign language shortfalls could be negatively affecting several 

aspects of U.S. diplomacy, including security operations. For example, an 

officer at a post of strategic interest said because she did not speak the 

language, she had transferred a sensitive telephone call from a local 

informant to a local employee, which could have compromised the 

informant’s identity.34

• Experience gaps: Thirty-four percent of Diplomatic Security’s positions 

(not including those in Baghdad) are filled with officers below the 

position’s grade. In a previous publication, GAO reported that experience 

gaps can compromise diplomatic readiness.35 In addition, Diplomatic 

Security officials stated that these gaps between the experience level 

required by the position and the experience level of the employee assigned 

can affect the quality of Diplomatic Security’s work. For example, several 

ARSOs with whom we met were in their first overseas positions and stated 

that they did not feel adequately prepared for their job, particularly their 

responsibility to manage large security contracts. 

• Host country laws: At times, host country laws prohibit Diplomatic 

Security from taking all the security precautions it would like outside the 

embassy. For example, Diplomatic Security officials said that they prefer 

to arm their local guard forces and their special agents; however, several 

countries prohibit it. In cases of attack, this prohibition limits Diplomatic 

Security’s ability to protect the compound. 

• Balancing security with diplomatic mission: Diplomatic Security’s 

desire to provide the best security possible for State’s diplomatic corps 

has, at times, been in tension with State’s diplomatic mission. For 

example, Diplomatic Security has established strict policies concerning 

access to U.S. facilities that usually include personal and vehicle 

screening. Some public affairs officials—whose job it is to foster relations 

with host country nationals—have expressed concerns that the security 

measures discourage visitors from attending U.S. embassy events or 

exhibits. In addition, the new embassies and consulates, with their high 

walls, deep setback, and strict screening procedures, have evoked the 

 

34For GAO’s review of language training at State, see GAO, Department of State: 

Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address Persistent Foreign Language Shortfalls, 

GAO-09-955 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009). 

35For GAO’s review on experience gaps at hardship posts, see GAO, Department of State: 

Additional Steps Needed to Address Continuing Staffing and Experience Gaps at 

Hardship Posts, GAO-09-874 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009). 

Page 34 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

nickname, “Fortress America.” State has also received criticism from U.S. 

think tanks for adopting what seems to be a “zero tolerance” for security 

incidents. Two are encouraging State to change its security culture and 

practices from risk avoidance to risk management. 

Although Some Planning 

Initiatives Have Been 

Undertaken, Diplomatic 

Security’s Growth Has 

Been More Reactive Than 

Strategic 

Although some planning initiatives have been undertaken, neither State’s 

departmental strategic plan nor Diplomatic Security’s bureau strategic 

plan specifically address the bureau’s resource needs or its management 

challenges. Therefore, Diplomatic Security’s tremendous growth over the 

last 10 years has been in reaction to events and has not benefited from 

adequate strategic guidance. 

State’s departmental strategic plan does not specifically address 

Diplomatic Security’s resource needs or management challenges. State is 

required by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) to 

regularly submit a strategic plan for the department. GPRA requires that a 

strategic plan contain six elements.36 The committee report37

accompanying GPRA summarizes the requirements, stating that a 

multiyear strategic plan should articulate the fundamental mission (or 

missions) of an organization and lay out its long-term general goals for 

implementing that mission, including the resources needed to reach these 

goals. GAO has further suggested that addressing management challenges, 

in addition to other factors, would enhance the usefulness of agencies’ 

strategic plans. While State’s strategic plan for 2007-2012 does have a 

section identifying security priorities and goals, we found that it did not 

identify the resources needed to meet these goals or address all of the 

management challenges we identified in this report. 

Diplomatic Security has undertaken some planning efforts at the bureau 

and office level, but these efforts also have limitations. As with every State 

bureau, Diplomatic Security produces an annual bureau strategic plan.38

While the plan lists priorities, goals, and indicators for the bureau, they do 

not always track. For example, in the fiscal year 2011 plan, Diplomatic 

 

36The six elements are: (1) Mission Statement, (2) General (also known as Strategic or 

Long-Term) Goals and Objectives, (3) Approaches or Strategies to Achieve Goals and 

Objectives, (4) Relationship between General Goals and Annual Goals, (5) External 

Factors, and (6) Program Evaluations. 

37S. Rpt. 103-58. 

38Bureau strategic plans were previously called bureau performance plans. State changed 

the document’s name in fiscal year 2009. 

Page 35 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

Security lists Foreign Affairs security training center activities as a 

priority, but it does not list corresponding goals or indicators that would 

track the bureau’s progress. In addition, the plan does not identify what 

staff, equipment, or funding would be needed. Diplomatic Security has 

also created a plan to guide its visa and passport fraud investigative work. 

Diplomatic Security created the Visa and Passport Security Strategic Plan 

to guide its efforts to disrupt individuals and organizations that attempt to 

compromise the integrity of U.S. travel documents. According to 

Diplomatic Security officials, in response to the plan, the bureau has 

increased the number of domestic positions for investigators and the 

number of investigators overseas through its ARSO-I program. However, 

Diplomatic Security noted that it has not been able to expand the overseas 

investigator portion to the extent planned due to resource limitations.39 In 

addition, Diplomatic Security uses established security standards and 

staffing matrixes to determine what resources are needed for various 

activities. However, while the tools help specific offices or missions plan 

their resource requests, they are not useful for determining overall bureau 

needs. 

Several senior Diplomatic Security officials noted that Diplomatic Security 

remains reactive in nature. Diplomatic Security officials in charge of 

workforce planning gave us several reasons for their lack of long-term 

strategic planning. First, Diplomatic Security provides a support function 

and, therefore, must react to the needs of State; therefore, the bureau 

cannot plan its own resources until State determines its policy direction. 

For example, given that the U.S. military has helped provide security to 

U.S. diplomats in Iraq, the planned drawdown of U.S. forces significantly 

affects Diplomatic Security’s workload. Diplomatic Security, however, 

could not provide us a plan for how they will address that change because 

they must wait for the department to decide what its overall footprint will 

be in the country at that time. Diplomatic Security is, however, 

participating in State’s “2012” exercise to determine what its presence will 

look like in Iraq when the U.S. military withdraws. Second, while State has 

a 5-year workforce plan that addresses all bureaus, several senior 

Diplomatic Security officials stated that Diplomatic Security does not use 

the plan to determine their staffing needs. The officials also stated that 

Diplomatic Security did not have its own workforce plan but rather plans 

 

39As of October 2009, Diplomatic Security reported that several directorates were also in 

various stages of developing their own strategic plans; however, they provided us with 

limited information regarding these efforts. 

Page 36 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

positions 2 years out—based on strategic priorities developed by the 

Assistant Secretary—as part of the annual budget and planning process. 

Finally, past efforts to further plan Diplomatic Security resources have 

gone unheeded. Diplomatic Security’s bureau strategic plan for fiscal year 

2006 (written in 2005) identified a need to (1) develop a workforce 

strategy to recruit and sustain a diverse and highly skilled security 

personnel base and (2) to establish a training float to address recurring 

staffing problems. As of September 2009, Diplomatic Security had not 

addressed either of those needs. However, Diplomatic Security reported 

that it is currently examining all of its security programs to determine how 

funding and personnel resources are distributed and supporting the 

bureau’s strategic goals. 

Diplomatic Security officials stated that they hope to participate in a new 

department management initiative. On July 10, 2009, the Secretary of State 

announced the creation of a new Quadrennial Diplomatic and 

Development Review (QDDR). This review, which will be managed by a 

senior leadership team under the direction of the Secretary of State, is 

designed to provide the short-, medium-, and long-term blueprint for 

State’s diplomatic and development efforts, including how to transition 

from approaches no longer commensurate with current challenges. It will 

offer guidance on how State develops policies; allocates its resources; 

deploys its staff; and exercises its authorities. 

In the last decade, Diplomatic Security’s missions and responsibilities have 

expanded internationally and domestically, largely in reaction to security 

incidents and changing diplomatic priorities of the United States. 

Internationally, Diplomatic Security has been required to provide security 

at an ever-increasing number of posts in hostile areas, including many 

facing conditions that historically may have triggered evacuation. This has 

resulted in major security costs and increased risks to American 

diplomats. Domestically, Diplomatic Security’s traditional responsibilities 

have expanded to include a more prominent role in protecting the United 

States through increased investigations of visa and passport fraud, as well 

as increased protection responsibilities. Diplomatic Security resources 

have significantly expanded in response to these changes. However, due to 

mission priorities, several Diplomatic Security offices operate with staffing 

shortages and important tasks—such as security training and program 

oversight—may not get done. Diplomatic Security’s Domestic Operations 

have been particularly affected as the bureau often draws security 

personnel from domestic offices to cover gaps at critical posts overseas 

and to provide protection details. While this stopgap measure prioritizes 

Conclusions 

Page 37 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

life and safety issues, it interrupts important investigations needed to 

protect the United States and limits specialized training for high-threat 

posts and investigations. Moreover, Diplomatic Security faces human 

capital challenges, such as inexperienced staff and foreign language 

proficiency shortfalls. The implications of this growth—in conjunction 

with the potential for increased challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other 

hostile environments as well as the management challenges listed above—

have not been strategically reviewed by the department. Nevertheless, 

State leadership acknowledges the importance of broad strategic planning, 

as evidenced by the Secretary’s new QDDR, which is intended to ensure 

people, programs, and resources serve the highest priorities at State. 

We recommend that the Secretary of State—as part of the QDDR or as a 

separate initiative—conduct a strategic review of the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security to ensure that its missions and activities address the 

department’s priority needs. This review should also address key human 

capital and operational challenges faced by Diplomatic Security, such as 

• operating domestic and international activities with adequate staff; 

• providing security for facilities that do not meet all security standards; 

• staffing foreign missions with officials who have appropriate language 

skills; 

• operating programs with experienced staff, at the commensurate grade 

levels; and 

• balancing security needs with State’s need to conduct its diplomatic 

mission. 

We provided a draft of this report to State for review and comment. State 

agreed with the report’s recommendation and noted that, although it is 

currently not planning to perform a strategic review of the full Diplomatic 

Security mission and capabilities in the QDDR, the Under Secretary for 

Management and the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security are 

completely committed to ensuring that Diplomatic Security’s mission will 

benefit from this initiative. State’s official comments are reprinted in 

appendix X. Technical comments provided by the department were 

incorporated, as appropriate. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 38 GAO-10-156 State Department
 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional 

committees and to the Secretary of State. The report also will be available 

at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact Jess 

T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff members who made contributions to this 

Jess T. Ford 

report are listed in appendix XI. 

Director, International Affairs Trade 

Page 39 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 40 GAO-10-156 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

To conduct our review of the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security), we examined (1) how 

Diplomatic Security’s mission has evolved since the embassy attacks in 

1998, (2) the change in human and financial resources for Diplomatic 

Security over the last 10 years, and (3) the challenges Diplomatic Security 

faces in conducting its missions. 

In order to address all three objectives, we interviewed senior Diplomatic 

Security officials in each of the directorates and most of the suboffices. 

We interviewed Diplomatic Security special agents at the New York and 

Washington, D.C., field offices and the San Diego resident office. We 

selected the New York and Washington, D.C., domestic field offices 

because they are the largest Diplomatic Security field offices. We selected 

the San Diego resident office to allow for observation of activities along 

the border region, including coordination between Diplomatic Security 

and the Department of Homeland Security, as well as the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office. In addition, we observed Diplomatic Security protection activities 

at the UN General Assembly and attended the annual meeting of the 

Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). 

We met with the Regional Security Officers (RSO), Chiefs of Mission, other 

State officials, and representatives from other U.S. law enforcement 

agencies at 15 diplomatic posts in 9 countries: Egypt (Cairo and 

Alexandria), Germany (Frankfurt), India (New Delhi and Mumbai), Mexico 

(Mexico City, Tijuana, and Merida), Tunisia (Tunis), Turkey (Ankara and 

Istanbul), Saudi Arabia (Riyadh and Jeddah), the Philippines (Manila), and 

Indonesia (Jakarta). We also conducted video-teleconferences with RSOs 

in 3 additional posts: Iraq (Baghdad), Afghanistan (Kabul), and Pakistan 

(Islamabad). We selected the overseas posts we visited based on multiple 

criteria that allowed us to observe a variety of different types of posts. 

Post selection criteria included post size (small, medium, and large), the 

number of posts in the same country, threat levels (low, medium, high, 

critical), new embassy construction, the presence of an ARSOInvestigator, and whether posts were unaccompanied or restricted. We 

conducted video-teleconferences with officials in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

Pakistan because a significant amount of Diplomatic Security resources 

are dedicated to these countries, and because Diplomatic Security 

considers these locations to have the most challenging security 

environments. 

In order to determine how Diplomatic Security’s mission has evolved since 

the embassy attacks in 1998, we discussed the growth of mission and 

activities with cognizant Diplomatic Security officials. We also reviewed 

 State Department 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

relevant documents including State Congressional Budget Justifications; 

briefing materials provided by Diplomatic Security; Diplomatic Security 

performance/strategic plans for fiscal years 2002-2011 (for an overview of 

the planned growth for the bureau at that time and to provide the context 

under which strategic shifts were made); the State Foreign Affairs Manual 

(to determine the organization responsibilities and authorities of 

Diplomatic Security); and House hearings on State Appropriations for 

fiscal years 1999-2004 (to determine how the Diplomatic Security mission 

and activities expanded during this period). 

In order to determine the change in human and financial resources for 

Diplomatic Security over the last 10 years, we interviewed cognizant 

officials in both Diplomatic Security and State’s Management Bureau. We 

reviewed data from both of those offices and from State’s Congressional 

Budget Justification. To determine the growth of Diplomatic Security 

personnel since 1998, we reviewed Diplomatic Security human resources 

data that presented total career full-time permanent security specialist 

employees and positions (both Foreign Service and civil service) as of the 

end of each fiscal year. We also reviewed data on all domestic career fulltime permanent employees by major occupational category, as of the end 

of each fiscal year. To determine staffing gaps over time, we analyzed the 

differences between employees and positions. To determine the growth of 

civil service security specialists over time, we reviewed historical data 

provided by Diplomatic Security’s Executive Directorate. To determine the 

total Diplomatic Security workforce for fiscal year 2008, we collected data 

from Diplomatic Security on direct-hire employees, other U.S. government 

support staff, and contractor and support staff. 

To determine the growth of Diplomatic Security’s budget over time, we 

reviewed Diplomatic Security financial data, including bureau managed 

funds, contract costs, and historical budget data. We also reviewed annual 

State Congressional Budget Justifications and House Hearings on State 

Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1999-2004, including details of the fiscal 

year 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act, which provided for a major increase in funding to 

Diplomatic Security. To determine all State expenditures for Diplomatic 

Security operations, we used data from the fiscal year 2010 Congressional 

Budget Justification that presents actual numbers for fiscal year 2008. 

Diplomatic Security and State officials told us financial data provided by 

Diplomatic Security does not reflect salaries for personnel, while the 

Congressional Budget Justifications always reflect salaries. We 

experienced challenges in receiving budget and personnel data from 

Diplomatic Security. In addition, budget and personnel data contained 

Page 41 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

inconsistencies, and we encountered difficulty in seeking clarification on 

the numbers. 

In order to determine the challenges Diplomatic Security faces in 

conducting its missions we interviewed numerous officials from State 

(listed earlier), the State Office of Inspector General, and collaborating 

agencies (such as Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement). We reviewed bureau planning and reporting documents 

from Diplomatic Security including: field office reports from all 12 field 

offices for 2006 and 2008 and briefing materials from several Diplomatic 

Security offices. We also reviewed reports on security issues conducted by 

GAO, the State Office of Inspector General, several think tanks, and the 

Congressional Research Service. 

To determine the trend in post evacuations, we analyzed State evacuation 

data through September 8, 2008. We tabulated the number of evacuations 

due to security reasons and excluded those due to earthquakes, 

hurricanes, cyclones, flooding, other environmental factors, Severe Acute 

Respiratory Syndrome, or Y2K computer program design problems. In 

cases where post evacuations were listed as more than one type 

(authorized, ordered, or post closure), we only recorded the most serious 

action. For example, if there was an authorized evacuation followed by an 

ordered evacuation, we counted that as an ordered evacuation only. 

To determine the trend in danger pay time series, we analyzed State data 

regarding Danger Pay Allowance Percentage of Basic Compensation and 

estimated a time series model of the number of danger pay posts in a given 

year (from 1997-2009). We estimated a simple model with an intercept and 

time trend. We estimated a total of four models with combinations of the 

following four factors: linear vs. exponential model and independent and 

identically distributed (iid) normal errors vs. Newey-West errors. (Linear 

model: y = α + βt + ε ; Exponential model: y = αe

βt

 + ε (equivalent to 

α β ε

~ ln = + ty + ) ) where y is the number of danger pay posts, ε is the 

error term, and α, β are coefficients to be estimated. We first estimated 

exponential and linear models of the data with iid normal errors and found 

visual evidence of autocorrelation, so we then estimated exponential and 

linear models with Newey-West standard errors, which slightly altered the 

standard errors and therefore degree of statistical significance (but did not 

change coefficient values). 

Page 42 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

To evaluate State and Diplomatic Security’s strategic planning for security 

activities, we compared State and Diplomatic Security planning 

documents with standards established in the Government Performance 

and Results Act (GPRA). We reviewed State’s strategic plan for 2007-

2012; Diplomatic Security’s bureau strategic/performance plans for fiscal 

years 2001 through 2011; Diplomatic Security’s Visa and Passport Security 

Strategic Plan; and planning documents for Diplomatic Security’s initiative 

to create a strategic plan for their International Programs Directorate. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to November 

2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 43 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix II: Diplomatic Security Service 

Page 44 GAO-10-156 

Appendix II: Diplomatic Security Service 

Diplomatic 

Security Service

Unit/Directorate Directorate Activities

Security 

Infrastructure

Directorate

Countermeasures 

Directorate

Office of Foreign 

Missions

Executive Office

Directorate

International 

Programs

Directorate

Domestic 

Operations

Directorate

Training

Directorate

Threat

Investigations 

and Analysis

Directorate 

• Serves as the focal point within Diplomatic Security for coordinating 

international security programs.

• Manages and directs the formulation, planning, coordination, policy 

development, and implementation of security programs that protect U.S. 

missions abroad from physical, electronic, and chemical/biological attack. 

• Protects the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials and certain foreign 

dignitaries visiting the United States. 

• Conducts criminal investigations concerning passport and visa issuance, as

well as professional responsibility and counterintelligence investigations.

• Manages the operational security programs for State’s domestic facilities. 

• Provides all training programs and policies for Diplomatic Security. 

• Provides training and related equipment assistance to foreign government 

security and law enforcement personnel to deter and counter terrorism.

• Researches and analyzes, and distributes all-source intelligence on terrorist 

activities and threats that may affect official U.S. personnel and U.S. facilities, 

both domestic and overseas.

• Investigates threats to the Secretary of State, visiting and resident foreign 

officials in the United States, and State employees and facilities worldwide. 

• Acts as the interface between Diplomatic Security and the U.S. intelligence 

community on intelligence and threat issues.

• Coordinates with the private sector on threats/security matters to U.S. 

member businesses, educational, and nongovernmental organizations

through the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC).

• Coordinates the Rewards for Justice program that provides rewards for 

information related to terroristic threats to U.S. persons or property 

worldwide.

• Operates the Diplomatic Security Command Center 24 hours a day in 

support of law enforcement duties and as a central command and 

communications platform for monitoring security at State’s domestic and 

international locations. 

Diplomatic Security 

Service (DSS) was

established pursuant to 

Title II of the Omnibus

Diplomatic Security and 

Antiterrorism Act of 1986. 

DSS is principally 

responsible for managing 

Diplomatic Security’s 

day-to-day security 

operations. 

INSTRUCTIONS for Interactive graphic: Click your mouse here to return to Figure 1.

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

DSS, $523.9

Funding allocation

Total financial plan $905.5a

FY 2008 (dollars in millions)

58%

a

The total depicts Diplomatic Security’s financial plan for fiscal year 2008, as well as the budget for 

the Office of Foreign Missions, which are based on regularly appropriated funds and fees. The total 

does not include salaries or other expenses for special agents overseas, Antiterrorism Assistance 

funds, or supplemental appropriations intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

 State Department 
Appendix III: Security Infrastructure Appendix III: Security Infrastructure 

Diplomatic 

Security Service

Unit/Directorate Office Activities

Security 

Infrastructure

Directorate

Countermeasures 

Directorate

Office of Foreign 

Missions

Executive Office

Directorate

Security 

Infrastructure handles

security for State’s

classified and sensitive 

information and computer 

networks. In addition, 

Security Infrastructure 

conducts background 

investigations for State 

employees and critical 

contractors supporting 

such missions as Iraq

and Afghanistan. 

INSTRUCTIONS for Interactive graphic: Click your mouse here to return to Figure 1.

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Funding allocation

Total financial plan $905.5a

FY 2008 (dollars in millions)

5%

Security 

Infrastructure

Directorate, 

$46.6

Office of 

Information 

Security 

Office of 

Computer 

Security

Office of 

Personnel 

Security and 

Suitability 

• Manages State’s information protection programs.

• Recommends, develops, and coordinates cyber security policy 

standards and guidelines.

• Manages State’s personnel security and suitability programs.

• Administers the contract background security investigator program. 

• Manages State’s policy on personnel security investigations and their 

subsequent adjudication.

a

The total depicts Diplomatic Security’s financial plan for fiscal year 2008, as well as the budget for 

the Office of Foreign Missions, which are based on regularly appropriated funds and fees. The total 

does not include salaries or other expenses for special agents overseas, Antiterrorism Assistance 

funds, or supplemental appropriations intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Page 45 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix IV: Countermeasures Appendix IV: Countermeasures 

Office of 

Security 

Technology

Office of

Physical

Security 

Programs

Office of 

Diplomatic 

Courier

Service

• Directs the development of standards, policies, and procedures 

associated with technical countermeasures, security technology 

operations, and facility security engineering programs domestically 

and abroad. Manages and supports Security Engineering Officers and 

Technicians.

• Provides secure transmission of classified and sensitive 

correspondence, equipment, and materials worldwide. 

• Directs and assists in the development of standards, policies, and 

procedures for protecting personnel, facilities, and national security 

information domestically and abroad.

• Ensures implementation of and compliance with the Overseas Security 

Policy Board physical security standards and Interagency Security 

Committee Physical Security Criteria for Federal Facilities. 

• Implements requirements of the Secure Embassy Construction and 

Counterterrorism Act of 1999.

• Conducts construction security certifications and accreditations.

• Evaluates, procures, and supplies special protective equipment 

worldwide and manages the armored vehicle program.

Diplomatic 

Security Service

Unit/Directorate Office Activities

Security 

Infrastructure

Directorate

Countermeasures 

Directorate

Office of Foreign 

Missions

Executive Office

Directorate

Countermeasures 

Directorate manages

all of Diplomatic 

Security’s physical and 

technical 

countermeasures

security programs.

INSTRUCTIONS for Interactive graphic: Click your mouse here to return to Figure 1.

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Funding allocation

Total financial plan $905.5a

 FY 2008 (dollars in millions)

Countermeasures

Directorate, $164.1

18%

a

The total depicts Diplomatic Security’s financial plan for fiscal year 2008, as well as the budget for 

the Office of Foreign Missions, which are based on regularly appropriated funds and fees. The total 

does not include salaries or other expenses for special agents overseas, Antiterrorism Assistance 

funds, or supplemental appropriations intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Page 46 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix V: Executive Office Appendix V: Executive Office 

INSTRUCTIONS for Interactive graphic: Click your mouse here to return to Figure 1.

Diplomatic 

Security Service

Unit/Directorate Office Activities

Security 

Infrastructure

Directorate

Countermeasures 

Directorate

Office of Foreign 

Missions

Executive Office

Directorate

Executive Office 

Directorate develops

and implements

administrative and 

management policies, 

plans, and procedures to 

ensure that Diplomatic 

Security resources are 

allocated, administered, 

and accounted for in 

accordance with U.S. law 

and government 

regulations. 

Funding allocation

Total financial plan $905.5a

 FY 2008 (dollars in millions)

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Office of 

Management 

Services 

Office of the 

Chief Financial 

Officer

Office of the 

Chief

Technology 

Officer

• Provides management and administrative services to Diplomatic 

Security, including: general services, contracting and procurement 

services, policy analysis and planning, and human resource 

management. 

• Directs all aspects of Diplomatic Security’s financial resources.

• Provides consolidated automated systems support for Diplomatic 

Security. 

• Manages the program for processing requests for Diplomatic Security 

documents under the Freedom of Information Act and the records 

management programs. 

5%

Executive 

Director, 

$43.8

a

The total depicts Diplomatic Security’s financial plan for fiscal year 2008, as well as the budget for 

the Office of Foreign Missions, which are based on regularly appropriated funds and fees. The total 

does not include salaries or other expenses for special agents overseas, Antiterrorism Assistance 

funds, or supplemental appropriations intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Page 47 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix VI: Office of Foreign Missions Appendix VI: Office of Foreign Missions 

INSTRUCTIONS for Interactive graphic: Click your mouse here to return to Figure 1.

Diplomatic 

Security Service

Unit/Directorate Office Activities

Security 

Infrastructure

Directorate

Countermeasures 

Directorate

Office of Foreign 

Missions

Executive Office

Directorate

Office of Foreign 

Missions provides for 

the formulation and 

implementation of 

policies designed to 

provide for reciprocity of 

treatment between U.S. 

missions abroad and 

foreign missions in the 

United States. Ensures

compliance of diplomatic 

privileges and immunities

in order to safeguard the 

American public.

Funding allocation

Total financial plan $905.5a

FY 2008 (dollars in millions)

1%

Office of 

Foreign 

Missions, 

$8.5

Office of Property 

Acquisition, Tax, 

Travel Services, and 

Customs Programs

Office of Diplomatic 

Motor Vehicles, 

Enforcement, 

Outreach and 

Customer Service

Administration

Information

Management 

• Manages acquisitions, alterations, and sales of real property by 

foreign missions. 

• Manages travel restrictions and controls on foreign missions 

for reasons of national security and reciprocity. 

• Manages the diplomatic tax and customs program and ensures 

reciprocity is considered when providing such privileges to 

foreign missions in the United States.

• Assists U.S. missions in negotiating the reduction or 

elimination of tax and customs duties for State's overseas 

operations.

• Provides administrative services to the Office of Foreign 

Missions, including: contracting, administration of custodial 

bank accounts, budget, and general services support. 

• Oversees the responsibilities assigned to the Enforcement, 

Compliance and Reciprocity program, the Vehicle 

Documentation program, and the Diplomatic Customer 

Service Center.

• Advises, assists, and performs planning, acquisition, and 

deployment of all information technology hardware and 

systems to support the mission of the office. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

a

The total depicts Diplomatic Security’s financial plan for fiscal year 2008, as well as the budget for 

the Office of Foreign Missions, which are based on regularly appropriated funds and fees. The total 

does not include salaries or other expenses for special agents overseas, Antiterrorism Assistance 

funds, or supplemental appropriations intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Page 48 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix VII: Funding Allocations, Other Appendix VII: Funding Allocations, Other 

12%

5%

58%

18%

5%

In addition to funding specifically allocated to its directorates and offices, 

Diplomatic Security's financial plan includes cross-cutting categories such 

as: Diplomatic Security Central Costs, Bureau Wide Costs, and support 

for the Assistant Secretary's office. Those categories are represented 

below as “Other.”

Funding allocation

Total financial plan $905.5a

 FY 2008 (dollars in millions)

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Security Infrastructure, $46.5

1%

Office of Foreign Missions, $8.5

Diplomatic Security Service, $523.9

Countermeasures, $164.0

Executive Director, $43.8

Other 

$118.7

a

The total depicts Diplomatic Security’s financial plan for fiscal year 2008, as well as the budget for 

the Office of Foreign Missions, which are based on regularly appropriated funds and fees. The total 

does not include salaries or other expenses for special agents overseas, Antiterrorism Assistance 

funds, or supplemental appropriations intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Page 49 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix VIII: Diplomatic Security 

Collaborates with Other U.S. Government Appendix VIII: Diplomatic Security Agencies to Meet Its Mission 

Collaborates with Other U.S. Government 

Agencies to Meet Its Mission 

Diplomatic Security collaborates with a number of other federal and local 

law enforcement agencies in order to carry out its investigation and 

protection activities. 

Investigations Domestically, Diplomatic Security participates in a number of multiagency 

task forces to enhance their ability to investigate visa and passport fraud. 

Some of those collaborative efforts include the following: 

• Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF): The Federal Bureau of Investigation 

brings together more than 40 federal, state, and local agencies to pursue 

criminal investigations involving terrorist activities. Diplomatic Security 

special agents participate in 26 JTTFs and the National JTTF. A 

Department of Justice official noted that it is useful to have a Diplomatic 

Security presence on the JTTF because if the Department of Justice 

cannot arrest a suspected criminal on terrorism charges, frequently they 

can arrest them on visa or passport fraud charges. 

• Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces: Led by U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, the document and benefits fraud task forces bring 

investigators together from a variety of agencies to target two types of 

crimes: (1) document fraud refers to the manufacture, sale, or use of 

counterfeit identity documents—such as Resident Alien cards, birth 

certificates, Social Security cards, or passports—for immigration fraud or 

other criminal activity, including efforts to obtain genuine identity 

documents through fraudulent means, and (2) benefit fraud refers to the 

misrepresentation or omission of material facts on an application to obtain 

an immigration benefit one is not entitled to—such as U.S. citizenship, 

political asylum or a valid visa. Any case in which a sufficient nexus to 

terrorism is discovered will be referred to the JTTFs. Diplomatic Security 

has special agents assigned to 11 document and benefit fraud task forces. 

• High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Fusion Center: Diplomatic 

Security participates in the New York/New Jersey High Intensity Drug 

Trafficking Area Fusion Center. Supported with funding from the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy, Diplomatic Security is one of the local and 

federal law enforcement organizations within the fusion center that 

combats the production, manufacture, transportation, distribution, and 

chronic use of illegal drugs and money laundering. 

Several officials from the other collaborating agencies noted that 

Diplomatic Security is an asset to the task forces because it has access to a 

global network of colleagues posted in the embassies and consulates 

around the world. According to two U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Page 50 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix VIII: Diplomatic Security 

Collaborates with Other U.S. Government 

Agencies to Meet Its Mission 

Enforcement officials we met with, other U.S. law enforcement agencies 

are able to leverage the contacts and other valuable information gleaned 

overseas through Diplomatic Security’s expansive global network of law 

enforcement agents. 

Diplomatic Security participates in several other collaborative initiatives 

such as the following: 

• Border Initiatives: Diplomatic Security stated that the bureau has posted 

several Diplomatic Security agents to high traffic border crossing points, 

such as at San Ysidro, California, to work with the U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection and the U.S. Attorney’s Office to identify, investigate, 

and prosecute visa and passport fraud. In 2008, a representative from the 

U.S. Attorney’s office in San Diego reported that his unit prosecuted 167 

passport cases in 2008 compared to an average of 25 to 30 cases in past 

years. He attributed this increase in cases, in part, to greater collaboration 

with Diplomatic Security and Diplomatic Security’s involvement on the 

border. 

• Global Pursuit Initiative: Through Diplomatic Security’s Global Pursuit 

Initiative, Diplomatic Security special agents are assigned to major 

international airports throughout the United States to assist the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security in investigating visa and passport 

irregularities. 

Protection Diplomatic Security collaborates with local law enforcement agencies and 

the U.S. Secret Service to conduct its protection activities. Diplomatic 

Security officials stated that the bureau relies on state and local police for 

assistance with crowd control and extra patrols at consulates when there 

is an indication of a threat. For special events, Diplomatic Security relies 

on local police forces. For example, every year, Diplomatic Security works 

with the New York police force to provide security at the UN General 

Assembly. 

Diplomatic Security also collaborates with U.S. Secret Service when the 

Secretary of State and the President travel together and other joint 

missions, such as coordination between Diplomatic Security Regional 

Security Officers and the Secret Service when their protectees travel 

overseas. Diplomatic Security is responsible for providing protection to 

the Secretary of State and visiting dignitaries at the Secretary’s level, while 

the Secret Service provides protection to the President and visiting heads 

of state. These two agencies frequently have to work together when, for 

example, the Secretary of State and the President travel together. 

Page 51 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix VIII: Diplomatic Security 

Collaborates with Other U.S. Government 

Agencies to Meet Its Mission 

Secretary Clinton has brought a new level of coordination between the 

two agencies given her unique status as both a former first lady—whose 

protection falls under the purview of Secret Service—and as the current 

Secretary of State—whose protection falls under the purview of 

Diplomatic Security. 

Overseas At overseas posts, Diplomatic Security collaborates closely with other U.S. 

law enforcement agencies that have a presence at a particular post. 

Diplomatic Security has the widest representation of security and law 

enforcement officials overseas; however, other law enforcement agencies 

may place agents in embassies or consulates in areas with specific needs. 

For example, the Drug Enforcement Agency has officers in many U.S. 

missions to work with the host governments on combating drug 

trafficking. To coordinate the various agencies’ work, some posts have 

established a Law Enforcement Working Group. The RSO chairs a working 

group. 

Page 52 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix IX: Attacks against U.S. Embassies 

and Consulates (excluding Baghdad), 1998- Appendix IX: Attacks against U.S. Embassies 2008 

and Consulates (excluding Baghdad), 1998-

2008 

There were 39 attacks against U.S. embassies and consulates and official 

U.S. personnel overseas between 1998 and 2008, in addition to regular 

attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad since 2004 (see table 3).1

Table 3: Attacks against U.S. Embassies and Consulates

Year Date City Description of attack 

1998 June 21, 1998 Beirut 7 rocket propelled grenades (RPG) fired at embassy. 

August 7, 1998 Nairobi 

August 7, 1998 Dar-es-Salaam 

Both embassies simultaneously attacked with truck bombs. 

1999 March 28, 1999 Moscow Attempted RPG attack; gunmen fire on embassy. 

April 24, 1999 Yekaterinburg Bombing near U.S./UK Consulate General. 

May 27, 1999 Sana’a Tribesmen attempt to kidnap embassy employee. 

June 4, 1999 Istanbul Terrorist launch RPG at Consulate. 

November 12, 1999 Islamabad Rockets launched at embassy, injuring local guard. 

2002 January 22, 2002 Calcutta Gunmen attack Consulate. 

March 15, 2002 Sana’a Two grenades thrown at embassy. 

March 17, 2002 Islamabad U.S. diplomat killed in attack near embassy. 

March 22, 2002 Lima Car bomb explodes near embassy. 

June 14, 2002 Karachi Truck bomb detonates outside Consulate. 

October 12, 2002 Denpasar Consular Office bombed as part of the Bali bombings. 

October 28, 2002 Amman Al-Qa’ida assassinates USAID Director. 

2003 February 28, 2003 Islamabad Gunmen attack embassy. 

2004 March 15, 2004 Karachi Truck bomb fails to detonate near consulate. 

June 30, 2004 Tashkent Suicide bomber attacks embassy. 

October 28, 2004 Islamabad U.S. diplomat injured in bombing at hotel. 

December 6, 2004 Jeddah Gunmen raid diplomatic compound. 

2005 August 21, 2005 Kabul Bomb damages U.S. embassy vehicle, wounds two. 

2006 March 2, 2006 Karachi Suicide bomber kills U.S. diplomat near Consulate. 

May 19, 2006 Herat International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

motorcade attacked by suicide car bomb. 

August 29, 2006 Kabul International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs vehicle 

destroyed by roadside bomb. 

September 8, 2006 Kabul Suicide car bomb detonates outside embassy. 

 

1

Diplomatic Security does not include attacks against U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in its 

significant incident report. Iraq is a war zone and inclusion of each incident that occurs 

there would overshadow the overall number of significant attacks that have been 

conducted against other embassy facilities around the world. 

Page 53 GAO-10-156 State Department 
Appendix IX: Attacks against U.S. Embassies 

and Consulates (excluding Baghdad), 1998-

2008 

Year Date City Description of attack 

September 12, 2006 Damascus Gunmen raid U.S. embassy. 

2007 January 12, 2007 Athens RPG fired at embassy. 

 February 27, 2007 Batticaloa Fire on helicopter carrying Ambassador. 

March 19, 2007 Kabul Suicide bomber destroys embassy vehicle. 

April 14, 2007 Casablanca Two suicide bombers target U.S. diplomatic facilities. 

May 25, 2007 Kathmandu Maoists attack Ambassador’s vehicle. 

October 27, 2007 Peshawar Terrorists launch mortars at Consulate. 

December 9, 2007 Peshawar Terrorists launch mortars at Consulate. 

2008 January 1, 2008 Khartoum Terrorist assassinate USAID employee. 

April 27, 2008 Kabul Gunmen fire on Ambassador during ceremony. 

July 9, 2008 Istanbul Armed attack against Consulate. 

October 12, 2008 Monterrey Bullets and grenade shot at U.S. Consulate. 

August 26, 2008 Peshawar Gunmen attempt to kidnap Principal Officer. 

September 17, 2008 Sana’a Two car bombs outside U.S. embassy in Yemeni capital. 

Source: Diplomatic Security Office of Investigations and Threat Analysis. 

Page 54 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix X: Comments from the U.S. Appendix X: Comments from the U.S. Department of State 

Department of State 

Page 55 GAO-10-156 State Department 
Appendix X: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State 

Page 56 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix X: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State 

Page 57 GAO-10-156 State Department
Appendix XI: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 58 GAO-10-156 

Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128, or fordj@gao.gov 

In addition to the individual named above, the following individuals made 

key contributions to this report: Anthony Moran, Assistant Director; 

Miriam Carroll Fenton; Jon Fremont; Antoine Clark; and Zina Merritt. The 

following individuals provided technical assistance: Joe Carney, Etana 

Finkler, Jena Sinkfield, Amanda Miller, and Grace Lui. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

 State Department 
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Page 59 GAO-10-156 State Department
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(320607) Page 60 GAO-10-156 State Department
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