No. 249, October 2009 Strategic Forum 1

U.S. policy toward Burma has kept attention riveted on democracy, on nudging the 

Burmese military junta toward a commitment to elections, on holding the State Peace 

and Development Council (SPDC) to high 

standards regarding human rights and religious freedom, and on galvanizing regional 

and global support for a policy trajectory that 

edges the country closer to a moment when 

free speech, assembly, and freedom from fear 

dislodge the stranglehold of the military dictatorship that has dominated Burma since the 

early 1990s.

U.S. policy has worked to keep Aung San 

Suu Kyi situated in the forefront of the effort 

to leverage the junta into compliance with a 

roadmap-like way of moving out from under 

the long and costly impasse, and it has featured the role of the long suffering United 

Nations (UN) special representative position 

that seeks to keep the region and other players 

interested in resolving the Burma conundrum.

Indeed, U.S. policy has been successful 

in getting the Burmese leadership to accept a 

manageable bundle of graduated steps toward 

counternarcotics cooperation, and has consistently focused on urging the junta toward 

permitting steps aimed at suppressing opium 

production. U.S. policy has urged the junta 

to allow Red Cross observers into the country, 

and has focused on convincing the Burmese 

leadership to stick to a commitment to writing a new constitution, enabling free and 

unfettered electoral competition on a “level 

U.S. policy has sought to nudge the junta 

in Burma toward a more reasonable approach 

to its dilemma, either in the form of managing 

Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest in a 

semitransparent fashion, allowing the release 

of imprisoned prodemocracy activists and 

the National League for Democracy cadre, 

agreeing to visits from United Nations special 

representatives, or accepting regional 

advice and guidance at critical moments. But 

Burma is a minuet dramatizing the “one step 

forward, two steps backward” description 

of progress. Even as the administration of 

President Barack Obama commits itself in 

principle to reaching out to Burma, events 

conspire against another effort to coax 

the junta toward a reasonable, regionally 

acceptable solution to its hard edge.

Exigencies occasioned by Cyclone 

Nargis compelled a limited “opening” in 

the aftermath of the humanitarian crisis, but 

these were no watershed events signaling a 

more reasonable posture by the junta toward 

its neighbors, toward the West, or toward 

the United States. Nevertheless, they did 

represent instances of change, and they did 

provide the foundation for regrouping to determine whether there was a basis for altering some U.S. tactical approaches to Burma. 

The question is, to what extent do these slight 

changes represent a real basis for confidence 

in forward movement?

 Strategic Forum No. 249

October 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Burma in Strategic Perspective: 

Renewing Discussion of Options

by Lewis M. Stern, George Thomas, and Julia A. Thompson

playing field,” and gradually transitioning to 

a system premised on civilian rule.

U.S. policy has looked for ways 

of leveraging the influence of players 

(especially Suu Kyi), and sought to deploy 

economic sanctions as a blunt-edged 

instrument against junta dominance; some 

of the targeted sanctions against the assets 

belonging to the top leaders and cronies and 

state-owned enterprises have had a much 

more measurable effect than the broader 

sanctions. The United States has also focused 

on utilizing rules governing visas and U.S. 

legislation to constrain and confine the 

junta leadership. Additionally, Washington 

has sought to rely on the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 

“frontline states” such as Thailand to 

wield influence and deploy effective moral 

suasion as a means of pushing the junta to 

an inclusive constitutional drafting process, 

responsiveness to Western and regional 

concerns regarding Suu Kyi’s health and 

well-being, and ever more liberal possibilities 

regarding the participation in the process of 

the National League for Democracy (NLD).

It seems that the missing ingredient is a 

policy that focuses on the people of Burma, 

and one that is prepared to take advantage 

of the circumstances of late 2007, when the 

citizenry reacted against an unannounced 

decision of the SPDC to remove fuel subsidies, which caused the price of diesel and 

petrol to suddenly rise as much as 66 percent 
2 Strategic Forum No. 249, October 2009

and the price of compressed natural gas for 

buses to increase fivefold in less than a week. 

Students and opposition political activists led 

antiregime demonstrations that the junta 

reacted to quickly and harshly with a range 

of arrests and detentions. Beginning in midSeptember 2008, Buddhist monks led the 

conflict until a renewed government crackdown on September 26, 2008.

At various times, elements of all of these 

aspects of U.S. policy and regional involvement 

have been deployed in an attempt to nudge 

the junta toward a more reasonable approach 

to its dilemma, either in the form of managing Suu Kyi’s house arrest in a semitransparent fashion, allowing the release of imprisoned 

prodemocracy activists and NLD cadre, agreeing to visits from UN special representatives, or 

accepting regional advice and guidance at critical moments (such as in the midst of attempts 

to define a role for regional and U.S. aid mechanisms in the context of global response to the 

devastation of Cyclone Nargis).

The extremely frustrating pendulum 

swing between positive moments of optimism and reversals that seem to wreak havoc 

on the possibility of progress on Burma continues to describe the events involving this 

challenge. Alongside of efforts by the administration of Barack Obama to review Burma 

policy and devise ways of signaling the potential for forward motion, events conspire 

against efforts to persuade the junta to alter 

its preferred course of action. Suu Kyi and two 

companions were sentenced by a governmentrun court on August 11, 2009, to 18 months 

under house arrest for allowing an American 

supporter who entered her heavily guarded 

villa uninvited to stay for several days. John 

W. Yettaw, the 54-year-old American who 

swam across a lake to get to Suu Kyi’s home, 

was sentenced to 7 years in prison, including 

4 years of hard labor.1 Senator James Webb’s 

visit to Burma, talks with the leadership, and 

ability to secure the release of Yettaw have 

breathed life into the possibility of devising 

a more positive level of engagement between 

Burma and the United States.2

After Care

In the aftermath of Joint Task Force 

(JTF) Caring Response, the U.S. response 

to the impact of Nargis on the Irrawaddy 

Delta, and in the face of bolder regime moves 

against Suu Kyi en route to the 2010 election, 

we need to explore the dividends that might 

spring from continued efforts to prod the 

junta toward a more reasonable posture.

U.S. policy has stipulated the need for 

progress in national reconciliation, particularly in the form of a dialogue between the 

SPDC and Suu Kyi. The situation was changing in slow and modest ways. The SPDC 

entered into talks with Suu Kyi in October 

2000, who was released from 20 months of 

house arrest in May 2002 and was allowed 

to undertake limited political activities. The 

Burmese responded favorably during initial discussions on POW/MIA recovery missions, and in 2002 it was thought that they 

would agree to restarting operations in 2003. 

Periodic reassessments of U.S. Burma policy 

have taken into account advances in counterterrorism cooperation, the junta’s helpfulness 

on POW/MIA issues, and some slight indications that the regime was prepared to be reasonable about moving toward democracy, 

attitudes toward the opposition, and relations 

with the United States.

In April 2002, in the context of a systematic interagency review of policy options 

in response to the dialogue between the SPDC 

and Suu Kyi, the U.S. Department of State/

U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) was tasked with developing and 

implementing a humanitarian assistance 

package, as well as a roadmap articulating 

benchmarks that should be met by Rangoon 

to be certified on counternarcotics cooperation. The physical attack of Suu Kyi by supporters of the junta in May 2003, and the 

subsequent renewal of Suu Kyi’s arrest by the 

SPDC, was followed by a brief effort to define 

a “roadmap toward democracy” by Khin 

Nyunt, chief of Burma’s defense intelligence 

organization in August that year who, by 

October 2004, had been placed under arrest 

along with his supporters, and supplanted 

by a less flexible leadership group headed by 

Senior General Than Shwe and Vice Senior 

General Maung Aye, the army’s commander 

in chief. In 2005–2006, however, Burma 

was fully cooperating in the war on terror, 

assisting in a positive fashion in the case of 

a Burmese forger who was captured carrying false travel documents in August 2002 

(and who assisted Pakistani security and 

police officials by identifying the apartment 

block where suspected al Qaeda members 

had been living in Karachi), and also taking 

an uncharacteristically cooperative posture 

regarding overflight for Operation Enduring 

Freedom aircraft in 2002. Of course, since 

then the junta has reestablished a much 

harsher position on Suu Kyi and, in 2008, 

extended her house arrest.

Junta in 2008–2009

Burma did not embrace the possibility of rapproachement on the basis of U.S. 

and Western efforts to describe a trajectory 

toward democracy, and subsequently defined 

its own path toward democracy, rearticulated 

in 2008, in a way that repeated the byzantine trajectory this arc would take through 

the year 2010 while simultaneously continuing to arrest and harass opposition members, 

stick to the formula for democracy in a juntawritten constitution that essentially preserved 

military preeminence, and minimize the 

likelihood that Suu Kyi and the NLD would 

be able to develop into a credible, functioning 

democratic opposition.

In May 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit Burma. 

Nearly 85,000 people died in its aftermath. 

According to the New York Times, a year 

later, an additional 54,000 people were still 

listed as missing. The storm’s winds reached 

as high as 121 miles per hour at landfall. A 

tidal surge drove inland from the sea, blowing away 700,000 homes in the delta, killing 

three-fourths of the livestock, sinking half 

Lewis M. Stern is a Visiting Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at 

the National Defense University. George Thomas is a retired U.S. Government linguist with extensive 

experience in the Far East. Julia A. Thompson was an INSS Intern during the summer of 2009. The authors 

wish to thank Captain David Chase, USN, Mr. Robert Manning, and Ms. Elizabeth Phu for their comments on 

draft versions of this article.
No. 249, October 2009 Strategic Forum 3

the fishing fleet, and salting a million acres 

of rice paddies.3 Exigencies occasioned by 

Nargis compelled a limited “opening” in the 

aftermath of the humanitarian crisis:

■ The Burmese junta agreed to receive 

the commander of U.S. Pacific Command 

(USPACOM) in the midst of efforts to find a 

way to make use of U.S. military resources for 

relief efforts in the aftermath of Nargis.

■ The SPDC leadership agreed to C–130 

flights under the condition that the junta 

would take control of the loads on U.S. military aircraft initially.

■ The junta found a midway point in 

discussions with ASEAN and the UN that 

allowed some nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers into the country without 

granting blanket clearance to all NGOs seeking to be helpful with the relief effort.

While there was no junta support for utilizing U.S. military helicopters in the relief 

effort, allowing the involvement of assets 

from the USS Essex group, or agreeing to a 

USAID-led assessment team, elements of the 

Burmese junta were responsive to U.S. efforts 

to continue C–130 flights. Burmese military officials responsible for the airport in 

Rangoon were cooperative with U.S. military 

officials seeking to facilitate operations during Caring Response.

These were not watershed events signaling a more reasonable posture by the 

junta toward its neighbors, the West, and the 

United States. In fact, the rhetoric displayed 

in the regime’s daily newspaper during the 

regional/global response to Nargis suggested 

a consistent antipathy toward the United 

States. Moreover, the isolation and secrecy 

of the Burmese military junta remains palpable, and the leadership of the junta has 

not become more amenable to change. The 

May 2008 realignment of the military’s officer corps represented an effort by the senior 

military leadership to remove older officers resisting Than Shwe’s “Roadmap to 

Discipline–Flourishing Democracy” and an 

attempt to neutralize ranking officers frustrated by slow promotions. Nevertheless, 

they did represent instances of change, and 

they did provide the foundation for regrouping to determine whether there was a basis 

for altering some of our tactical approaches 

to Burma, if not U.S. strategic thinking. The 

question that confronted the Obama administration beginning in January 2009 was the 

extent to which these slight changes represented a real basis for confidence in the possibility of forward movement.

There is probably little basis for agreement on the efficacy of rewarding the regime 

for the more moderate and reasonable attitudes taken on the issue of international aid 

flows following Nargis, especially since the 

pendulum was flung in the opposite direction with the mid-May arrest and subsequent 

August 2009 resentencing of Suu Kyi. A course 

of action predicated on much more positive 

inducements is unlikely to make sense largely 

because the compromises the junta made in 

order to receive, for example, the USPACOM 

commander did not represent benchmark 

moments in junta history; essentially, the 

Burmese military leadership accommodated 

changes in procedure to reap the dividends 

that access to international largesse offered.

There is similarly no basis for the argument that it would be possible to expand the 

“cracks” in the leadership that, from some 

perspectives, emerged during the Nargis crisis 

into large-scale fissures. There is little traction to the argument that these slight shifts 

could be construed as the first objective signal that regime change is possible and that 

elements of the junta could indeed work with 

the United States and other countries on a 

wide range of civilizing initiatives.

Emerging Constituency

What seems to have emerged as the 

result of the international relief effort is some 

slight indication that the behavior of the 

regime can be altered by ASEAN-led regional 

cooperation. Channels of communication can 

be developed, especially on the basis of practical requirements for coordination on operational equities (such as overflight, landing 

clearance, and consignments). New contacts 

can emerge. Slightly greater understanding 

regarding the operational code of the middle level military leadership could be derived 

from these interactions. Moreover, there 

appears to be a renewed willingness of some 

in the region, such as Thailand and perhaps 

Singapore, to take an effective leading role in 

managing relations with Burma.

Finally, there seems more of a basis now 

for supporting slight changes in the way the 

United States conducts relations with Burma. 

There is more of a consensus among analysts and U.S. policymakers on the extent to 

which sustaining the lines of communication 

that emerged operationally during Caring 

Response represents a useful, potentially positive alternative. There was at least momentary consideration in May 2008 of the utility 

of sustaining senior level contacts made during Caring Response in a fashion that would 

enable the United States to gauge the willingness of junta counterparts to share an 

occasional contact, although the recent conservative swing of the pendulum has once 

again marred the possibilities for change.

There might be support for Burmese 

involvement in Title 10–funded activities with 

a humanitarian assistance theme, or for some 

effort a year after the initial surge to look at 

the situation in the delta, population requirements, and ways to address lingering issues 

there. None of this need be configured in a way 

that suggests these modest outreach efforts are 

intended to represent a positive inducement 

timed in proximity to the election. Strong support for the conduct of an election, and at least 

symbolic transition to a civilian regime, would 

indeed put the United States and ASEAN and 

many of the other players on the same sheet of 

music, but an election alone will not necessarily trigger the transition observers and longtime supporters of democratization in Burma 

have called for largely because:

■ The military may represent the most 

coherent, organized interest group in Burma, 

and perhaps the entity most capable of basic rule, 

delivery of services, and provision of security. 

■ The political opposition is 

severely fragmented, limited in vision, 

underresourced, and dependent on the 

kindness of overseas supporters.

■ Local groups of monks showed themselves as the most coherent Burmese organizations capable of touching the people where they 

live, organizing rapidly to solve local problems, 
4 Strategic Forum No. 249, October 2009

Southeast Asia capable of and willing to exert 

influence and strategic leadership. Several 

countries have stood up and attempted to 

assert some leadership on Burma, including 

Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. 

None of them, critics argue, holds the key to 

“resolving” the status quo either because of 

their own domestic disorder (Thailand), economic interdependence (Thailand, China), 

or weak ties to the junta that have not translated into effective influence (Singapore). 

The key argument in this context is that the 

United States has not paid sufficient attention 

to other states such as Indonesia, whose strategic interests and growing ability to exert influence position Jakarta in a credible way, with 

a level of capability that outstrips that of the 

other presumptive frontline states. Additionally, 

China may have secured the latest natural gas 

contract in Burma, but Delhi continues to play 

an important role there. Beyond the issue of 

energy, India’s strong historical links have animated Indo-China competition in Burma.

The United States must take the lead in 

sculpting a more robust multilateral agenda 

for handling the Burma problem. Resolution 

of the Burmese challenge will require cooperation from a variety of actors. Aside from 

India, China, and key Southeast Asian nations, 

some have argued that Norway, a neutral 

agent familiar with the key players in Burma, 

is a critical interlocutor and that leveraging 

Norway’s assistance could help create an institutionalized diplomatic architecture to deal 

with Burma (similar to the Six Party process).

The United States should galvanize an 

effort to synthesize the key perspectives from 

China, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia in a 

fashion that clarifies the relationship between 

the goals of those interested parties and our 

own equities regarding the Burma issue and, 

more broadly, Southeast Asia’s well-being as 

a region.

These are clever interpretations of what 

is wrong with the current U.S. approach, 

but they all miss the key point. These interpretations argue on behalf of formulating a 

much more muscular multilateral approach 

with a distinctively strategic depth aimed 

at integrating an understanding of the bigger picture and coming up with an appropriate plan befitting the situation, establishing 

a goal, and anticipating possible challenges. 

and addressing the issues related to putting in 

the plumbing for disaster relief work.

■ Civil groups that stepped up during Caring Response provided aid and services where the government failed to do so in 

a way that showed that these groups, properly 

resourced and empowered, could represent a 

key component to real democratic change.

The situation in Burma may be changing in modest ways that probably should 

not be the basis for a strategic overhaul of 

current policy starting points, but should 

prompt exploring methods of consolidating lines of communication that opened in 

modest ways as a result of the limited cooperation allowed during the aftermath of 

Nargis. We should focus on these changes 

and the opportunities that they may present 

without losing sight of the overall repugnant 

character of the junta’s leadership and the 

basic motivation for current policy.

Reactions from Critics 

Critics of U.S. policy argue that there are 

basically four tasks that must be confronted in 

reviewing Burma policy. America’s core strategic objectives regarding Burma need to be 

articulated with greater clarity, and American 

policy toward Burma must begin to speak 

to the issue of how to reconcile the democracy-promotion agenda with a more realistic 

assessment of what President Obama will be 

able to accomplish in the next few years.

One criticism leveled at U.S. Burma 

policy is that the entire approach is bereft 

of strategic thinking, that little effort and 

energy have been invested in identifying what 

America’s core strategic objectives are with 

Burma, and that no attempt has been made 

to reconcile the democracy-promotion agenda 

with a more realistic assessment of what can 

be accomplished in a way that serves U.S. 

strategic interests. More often than not, such 

criticisms end by arguing that the American 

commitment to the creation of a democratic 

government revolving around the NLD does 

not represent a realistic goal and does nothing to advance larger U.S. policy agendas in 

the region.

The United States must clarify for itself 

key players in the region and outside of 

However, the U.S. policy toward Burma has 

foundered not because of lack of strategic 

foresight and not because of the failure to 

think in terms of bringing appropriate and 

capable allies and friends into the mix with 

unique resources and specific ways of altering 

the playing field.

U.S. policy toward Burma has failed 

because it is not foreign policy. Since the 

late 1980s, U.S. Burma policy has revolved 

around a series of internal arguments aimed 

at practicing what it preaches. That policy has been preoccupied with defining the 

moral basis for a relationship with a country 

that is not important enough so that it would 

matter whether the argument goes well, or 

takes decades to sort out, or occurs in a vacuum separated from the political and military realities of Southeast Asia. Burma was 

the one place where, from 1988, we could 

afford to act on the basis of the courage of 

our convictions without undermining a lucrative trade relationship, sacrificing key and 

concrete foreign policy objectives in the area, 

or compromising the interests of friends and 

treaty allies in measurable ways.

Strategic Objectives

Suu Kyi, who has dedicated her life 

to Burma’s future at considerable personal 

expense, has exercised judgment and made 

political choices that have had grave political 

consequences. Her 2003 decision to go to 

Sagaing Division, for example, in an effort 

to incite her supporters against the advice 

of some wiser NLD figures and some of her 

strategic choices and views regarding the 

role of the League have alienated some in 

the NLD and broken the organization into 

quarreling factions.

The NLD, though perhaps not a spent 

force, is one that has seen a lot of miles, and it 

has racked up a checkered record in pursuing 

its goal. Fealty to the NLD may indeed fetter 

the cause of achieving peace, stability, economic prosperity, and democracy in Burma if 

only because the NLD’s survival has required 

it to act politically, and in so doing it has 

come to resemble other political structures 

elsewhere that have sought to preserve influence in combative circumstances by committing tactical acts requiring compromises with 
No. 249, October 2009 Strategic Forum 5

principles in order to sustain its energy and 

organization against mounting odds.

What Burma needs most right now is 

peace, and an end to the sectarian-based, ethnically focused insurgencies. Burma requires 

a government that generates room for economic activity and civil society. Some of the 

regional SPDC authorities appear to recognize the need to allow the people the space 

necessary to exercise economic initiative, and 

to organize and assemble to articulate their 

interests. One can see a certain amount of 

this in the Mandalay, Irrawaddy, and Pegu 

Divisions, and in the Karen and Kachin States.

Local decisions by military leaders 

appear to be allowing for the possibility that 

provincial-level SPDC leadership has recognized that prosperity will trigger the building of Burma. Perhaps this local leadership 

is getting the sense that allowing more room 

for independent economic decisions will pay 

off by enabling local investment and growth 

in a fashion that will fuel a thriving economy, with minimal intervention from military leaders and a much greater role for 

managers, technicians, and economic planners. The fact is that in the remote localities, 

the Burmese army can play a constructive 

economic role. It has established itself, for 

example, as the primary means of farm-tomarket transportation. Even in Rangoon, the 

army seems to have come to exercise restraint 

on price-gouging. In many ways, in adopting populist gestures, the army has come to 

operate in the same way the Thai army did 

in the 1970s and 1980s—as a force prepared 

to speak out for the interests of the common, 

and largely poor, citizenry.

Key Players

The problem with the argument that 

Thailand is the wrong player, wrong ally, at 

the wrong time, insofar as it speaks to the 

question of Thailand’s foreign policy capabilities in the midst of domestic ferment, is 

that the Thai still regard themselves as a 

capable, influential regional power with the 

credibility necessary to take a leadership 

role and have sought to remain involved and 

relevant, although with a lessened impact as 

the result of preoccupation with their own 

domestic state.

Thailand’s distinctive lack of domestic tranquility since 2006 has undermined 

U.S. confidence in Bangkok’s ability to govern effectively and to sustain a commitment to democratic growth. In the eyes of 

Thailand’s neighbors in the region, however, 

power has been used effectively by its military 

and civilian leadership, whose efforts to manage issues have demonstrated both resolve 

and the right instincts. Moreover, Thailand’s 

assertive foreign policy positions on Burma 

have given friends in the region the basis 

for confidence in and support for Bangkok’s 

positions on key regional issues, such as 

Thailand’s response to the Burmese junta’s 

May 2009 incarceration of Suu Kyi.

The Thai were one of the first responders to Nargis that crippled Burma in 2008, 

while Thailand held the ASEAN chair. They 

moved a C–130 into Rangoon early in the 

aftermath of the cyclone’s deadly foray 

through the Irrawaddy Delta. Prime Minister 

Samak Sundaravej lent his voice to the international effort to nudge the Burmese military leadership to begin issuing visas to 

international aid experts and to allow aircraft into Burma with specialists who could 

facilitate the distribution of relief commodities. The Burmese rebuffed the international 

community, insisted that they could handle 

the consequences of the cyclone, and continued to allow only select relief flights by the 

United Nations and, beginning on May 9, the 

United States.

Prime Minister Samak, initially snubbed 

by the junta, visited Burma on May 14. He 

was instrumental in getting an agreement 

in principle from the Burmese to receive an 

ASEAN disaster assessment team. Thailand 

worked closely with Singapore in organizing the ASEAN effort to press the Burmese 

toward flexibility on relief flights and access 

for regional assessment teams and disaster 

response experts. Thailand provided a staging area at Utapao for the USPACOM joint 

task force and accommodated the presence 

of a USAID Disaster Assistance Response 

Team. Moreover, in late May, with many of 

the U.S. assets already in theater to support 

Caring Response, the Thai hosted the 27th

annual Cobra Gold exercise, with a significant humanitarian disaster response component to its command post dimension.

The Thai have long felt that they had 

something to offer the United States in terms 

of perspectives regarding, and access to, the 

leadership of Burma. Bangkok has urged flexibility, understanding, a certain amount of 

accommodation, and real recognition that 

the equation of power in Burma suggests that 

the military will be in a leadership role for a 

long time. From the days of General Suchinda 

Kraprayoon’s close and friendly relations with 

the SPDC’s predecessor, the State Law and 

Order Restoration Council leadership, the 

United States has rebuffed those views, which 

struck a succession of U.S. administrations as 

deriving from individual relations between the 

Thai military and their Burmese counterparts.

That Thai perspective, to Washington’s 

way of thinking, placed primacy on using 

those channels of communication between 

the Thai military and their Burmese counterparts to establish peace and quiet rather than 

determining ways to press the Burmese toward 

the vision of a democratic state capable of 

conducting free and fair elections, willing to 

achieve peace with the ethnic groups seeking 

independence, and prepared to allow the population to engage in trade and commerce.

Washington policymakers have prioritized achieving the junta’s eventual replacement by a coalition of some sort that 

integrates a wide range of players into the 

formula for a national government in Burma. 

The Thai appear confident in the perspective, increasingly shared by ASEAN, of sustaining lines of communication with the 

junta because it is the only source of power 

in the country, while ceasing efforts to justify 

Burma’s domestic policies internationally.

Any attempt to “multilateralize” the 

issue in a fashion that brings new players into the mix, and in a way that clearly 

suggests an external effort to supplant 

Thailand’s role in this fray, will quickly 

come to be seen by the region as a potentially painful shift for Thailand, and will 

lose the support of ASEAN members who 

would not do anything that would compromise Thailand’s standing in the region or 

damage Bangkok’s status and leadership.

It is not clear that Bangkok is in a position to add more to the mix. It is clear, however, that the Thai have grown closer to the 

Singaporean view of how Burma should 
6 Strategic Forum No. 249, October 2009

nomic—and therefore political—levers on 

Burma are going to be Asian.

Apart from these levers, the reality of 

India’s nexus with Burma requires consideration. These two countries have serious 

common strategic interests beginning with 

reining in separatist/terrorist groups that 

cross borders and cause trouble. India and 

Burma remain focused on dealing with the 

consequences of a common colonial past, 

and have done so in ways that are supportive of each other—tactically, strategically, 

and diplomatically. The SPDC benefits from 

its India ties, but the Indians have tremendous influence and (probably) leverage that 

has not yet been harnessed productively. The 

Indian navy was the first to actually receive 

diplomatic clearance to enter Burmese ports 

to offload supplies in the immediate aftermath of Nargis.

An economic consortium that includes 

some of the above mentioned players might 

be able to persuade Burma that its national 

interest lies in freeing up the economy, making business law transparent, developing 

tourism as the cash cow, and entering the 21st

century with some grace. Those noted above 

are in the best shape to do this, as they are 

ignoring the sanctions. Nothing will happen until the Burmese army can shed its 

street reputation as a human rights violator. 

However, it is important to reiterate that targeted sanctions against state-owned enterprises and individuals are having a marked 

effect, unlike the broader, toothless, difficult-to-enforce sanctions. Targeted sanctions 

will clearly have to be factored into the equation as the West continues looking for ways to 

exert influence over the junta.

There might be a widely shared multinational consensus that Than Shwe and his 

inner circle have to go before anything positive can happen in Burma, and there might 

even be a sense that the 2010 elections could 

emerge as the basis for a graceful exit. Could 

Khin Nyunt and Suu Kyi work in the manner 

in which F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela 

approached the future of South Africa? Would 

Nyunt attract a Thai-style “Democratic 

Soldier” following in the Burmese army—

similar to the views of the Thai Young Turks 

of the early 1980s who were committed to 

democratic representation, social justice, and 

be managed in the ASEAN context than to 

Washington’s perspective over the last 15 years.

The problem with the argument that 

Singapore does not have real strategic influence over Burma is that Singapore has in 

fact exercised its best diplomatic capabilities 

and pursued a clever, effective, and practical 

course of action aimed at dealing with the 

Burma situation. The Singaporean position 

on Burma is straightforward and unencumbered by the complexities presumed to derive 

from entangling commercial relationships 

with Burmese businesses that do their banking in Singapore: domestic developments in 

Burma, the Foreign Ministry states unequivocally, have adversely affected the reputation 

and credibility of ASEAN. Singapore has supported ASEAN’s repeated calls for the release 

of Suu Kyi. It has stalwartly held the position that, since Burma has ratified the ASEAN 

charter, Burma has certain obligations to 

human rights under it. Singapore has also 

argued that the question of expulsion or suspension of Burma from ASEAN’s ranks is 

not as straightforward as it seems, especially 

since Western sanctions have little effect on 

Burma so long as China and India keep their 

borders with Burma open. ASEAN, Singapore 

insists, is likely to have more influence over 

Burma, however limited, through efforts to 

engage the SPDC rather than attempts to isolate it. Singapore takes solace in the fact that 

despite frequent criticisms by ASEAN, Burma 

has remained committed to ASEAN and 

attended all meetings.

The Singaporean argument—that 

Burma has been a serious member, attending meetings and fulfilling organizational 

obligations, that ASEAN would have already 

isolated Burma if that would have solved the 

problem, and that patient engagement is the 

answer—suggests to some that Singapore is 

counseling understanding and sympathy in 

its call for patience. In fact, Singapore has 

deployed its most effective diplomats, unstintingly dedicated itself to working the issue, 

and invested energy and resources in trying 

to shape the regional response in an active, 

effective way. In the context of the Burmese 

military junta’s irrational reaction to Western 

offers of post-cyclone assistance, Singapore 

supported an approach that placed a primacy 

on putting local resources on the ground 

since Burma was more likely to respond 

positively to ASEAN efforts to construct an 

in-country aid hub and mechanisms for 

delivering assistance.

All the while, even when counseling a 

specifically ASEAN response to the Burma 

situation, Singapore has supported efforts 

by the international community, in particular by the UN, to bring about change 

in Burma. Moreover, Singapore has not 

taken the position that keeping Burma as 

an ASEAN member undermines the credibility of the regional association. Singapore 

has calculated that ASEAN’s credibility does 

not just hinge on Burma, and so Singapore 

rejected the notion that the regional association could not be any stronger than its weakest link. ASEAN’s credibility, the Migrant 

Forum in Asia has stated, was built over 

years. Moreover, Singapore has not shrunk 

from supporting global organizations, specifically the United Nations, in its unremitting effort to pressure the Burmese military 

junta to take a more realistic position on 

internal matters. Importantly, when Burma 

accused Thailand of meddling in its internal affairs in mid-2009, Singapore insisted 

that Thailand had the right as the ASEAN 

chair to make the kind of statement that it 

did, a statement that Singapore’s Foreign 

Ministry defended as well within the bounds 

of Thailand’s responsibilities at the time.

Sculpting an Agenda

Thinking about Burma in exclusively 

bilateral terms is an ineffective approach 

to the problem. Though resolution of the 

Burmese challenge will require cooperation 

from a variety of actors, it is not clear that the 

right players have been fingered for involvement in a coalition of the willing. Norway is 

not part of the European Union (EU)—hence 

it is a lesser party to EU sanction regimes, 

and that is the basis for the assumption that 

Norway could play a careful role in prodding 

the EU agenda forward. At the same time, 

ASEAN, China, India, and South Korea have 

business interests in Rangoon and elsewhere 

in Burma that might be leveraged. Japan is 

a key player that generally manages to stay 

in SPDC good graces despite Tokyo’s periodic 

joining of harsh criticism barrages. The eco-
No. 249, October 2009 Strategic Forum 7

legal rights—that would shield the defense 

establishment from the argument that the 

entire army above the rank of major should 

be placed before a war crimes tribunal? Even 

if there was a remote possibility of any of 

this, the extension of Suu Kyi’s arrest virtually guarantees that she will be unable to 

mount any kind of serious challenge.

A Nuclear Burma

In early August 2009, international 

media reports told the story of two Burmese 

defectors, unknown to each other—one a 

Russian-trained officer in a Burmese “secret 

nuclear battalion,” and the other a former 

executive who handled nuclear contracts with 

Russia and North Korea—who shed light on 

a secret complex, allegedly located in tunnels at Naung Laing, a mountain in northern 

Burma adjacent to a Russian-built civilian reactor, which was the center of Burma’s 

attempt to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. The defectors claimed that, with North 

Korean assistance, Rangoon was building a hidden nuclear reactor and plutonium 

extraction facilities.4

In June, the United States used UN 

Security Council Resolution 1874, the new 

sanction against North Korea, as the basis for 

a decision to order the U.S. Navy to track the 

North Korean government-owned freighter 

Kang Nam, suspected of attempting to 

deliver illicit cargo to Burma in support of 

weapons programs. While the North Koreans 

insisted that they would consider any international inspection of the ship as an “act 

of war,” the ship returned abruptly to North 

Korea after a week without delivering its 

cargo. Chinese pressure in particular helped 

persuade Rangoon to turn away the freighter. 

In August, Indian authorities detained and 

searched a North Korean ship for radioactive materials when that ship, with a declared 

destination of the Middle East, ventured close 

to Burma. Reflecting significant regional discomfort over the possibility that Rangoon was 

angling to acquire nuclear weapons capability, ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan 

declared that, if Burma were in fact pursuing 

such a program in violation of ASEAN agreements, such actions could result in expulsion 

from the group.

Burmese pursuit of a nuclear weapons 

program has been interpreted as a signal that 

the junta wishes to close itself off from any 

possibility of rapprochement with the United 

States, a view that fails to explain Rangoon’s 

decision to release the American whose swimming escapade at the site of Suu Kyi’s house 

arrest was at least the proximate cause of the 

SPDC’s most recent actions against her. The 

Burmese tilt in the direction of North Korea 

has been viewed speculatively as part of a 

decision to acquire a nuclear deterrent in 

the face of mounting threats (of an unspecified sort) against the military junta. Finally, 

Burma’s effort to become a nuclear “power” 

has been viewed as an attempt to accrue 

international respect and prestige, or a strategy for securing a bargaining chip for future 

negotiations with the United States.

Explanations of Rangoon’s intentions 

notwithstanding, Burma is a signatory of the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has 

concluded a safeguards agreement with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

with a small-quantities protocol designed for 

states that have little or no nuclear material, all of which obligate Burma to inform 

the IAEA no later than 6 months prior to 

operating a nuclear facility. Burmese cooperation with North Korea to achieve its presumed goals suggests that Rangoon has no 

intention of abiding by the safeguards agreement, meaning that the UN Security Council 

would have to confront this challenge, and 

that China, driven by its close economic relationship with Burma, could be prompted to 

deploy its veto authority on the council to 

block any effort to make Burma’s noncompliance consequential for the military junta.

However, China, in spite of its longstanding willingness to press against international 

efforts to isolate Burma, has not necessarily had an easy time in its relationship with 

this unpredictable, demanding partner, and 

Beijing cannot possibly have a comfort level 

with the prospect of its neighbors having 

their own hair trigger. China could find convincing reasons to nudge Burma to express 

peaceful nuclear intentions. Beijing might 

be convinced of the sensibility of supporting aspects of U.S. efforts to press Rangoon 

to invite observers in for a full tour, endorse 

the Proliferation Security Initiative, and sign 

an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, which 

would enhance inspections.

The prospect of Burma, conceivably the 

world’s most isolated leadership, taking hints 

from North Korea, a practiced prevaricator, is 

alarming in the extreme, and could take herculean efforts by the international community and the region to reverse, an effort that 

will severely test the resolve and staying power 

of ASEAN, increasingly wearied by the potentially destructive antics of the SPDC, and as 

stymied as the rest of the world by the challenge of holding the junta to standards of civilized behavior.

What Is to Be Done?

There are several opening gambits that 

could build on lines of communication to the 

isolated, repugnant SPDC and embroider on 

existing elements in the bilateral relationship 

without signaling a sea change in attitudes 

toward the military junta.

For example, counterterrorist cooperation could afford a real chance of a successful opening for contact with elements of 

the national defense establishment focused 

on rational courses of action in a way that 

resonates positively with regional priorities and ASEAN equities. Efforts to enlist the 

SPDC in counterterrorist cooperation could 

be managed in small steps, beginning with 

U.S.-hosted multilateral seminars such as 

those conducted by the Asia Pacific Center 

for Security Studies, and USPACOM-hosted, 

Title 10–funded multilateral conferences, 

and Department of Defense (DOD) sponsorship of working level visits for Burmese officials responsible for regional counterterrorist 

cooperation. Burma might be more amenable to a focus on transnational threats than 

counterterrorism given Rangoon’s vested 

interest in protecting its borders from illicit 

movement of drugs, people, and weapons, 

and its desire to acquire the technology necessary to counter those threats. Additionally, 

expanded counternarcotics cooperation 

including an invitation to Burma to attend 

the Military Law Enforcement Academy in 

Bangkok would be a possible, positive step.

Tying Burma into regional approaches to 

disaster relief is another value-neutral channel that could accommodate first efforts to 
8 Strategic Forum No. 249, October 2009

develop points of contact in the SPDC that DOD 

would be prepared to work. Training or briefings on lifesaving methods and search and 

rescue technologies and processes, the addition of Burma to the list of stops for a future 

Pacific Partnership or Pacific Angel program, 

and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 

could build on the interests of NGOs in Burma 

that demonstrated some capacity during the 

aftermath of the cyclone, enable the United 

States to develop synergies with these humanitarian-focused NGOs, and create some space for 

the development of civil society.

Providing jobs for Burmese would greatly 

improve living standards and reduce migration. Burma has huge oil and gas reserves. A 

number of Western firms have had profitable 

relations with the Burmese. Tearing down the 

barriers to U.S. firms getting in on the deal 

would help replicate the thriving mini-economies that have developed in the Karen and 

Kachin States because of active, profitable 

trading with Thailand. It is important that the 

United States consider encouraging a revival 

of former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin’s idea 

of a railway line and roadway from northeastern India to the South China Sea, or supporting ASEAN and Indian efforts to develop this 

infrastructure. A focused, multilateral effort 

to engender an interest in real national development of critical transportation systems 

would create good jobs for the Burmese people, and, with effective involvement by ASEAN, 

the manipulative possibilities that enable 

“slave labor” arrangements to develop as the 

key resource for accomplishing these big ticket 

developmental projects could be quashed.

These modest starting points could be 

framed in ways that remind the junta of the 

limited, humanitarian-focused concentration 

of activities aimed at serving the interests of 

the Burmese people without legitimating the 

SPDC. However, they do not obviate the need 

to begin looking for elements of the Burmese 

military establishment with which the United 

States could engage if only to establish the 

most fundamental channels of contact with 

military leaders intent on fulfilling the more 

rational responsibilities of a national defense 

mechanism, such as securing borders, providing for the common defense, performing 

rudimentary developmental responsibilities, 

and building national infrastructure.

Selective, discriminating, and mindful 

attempts to identify Burmese army field grade 

officers who could conceivably benefit from 

observing the multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief component of Cobra 

Gold should be taken. A good starting point 

would be low-key efforts to identify common 

starting points with working level defense ministry officials responsible for external relations 

through “orientation trips” to USPACOM aimed 

at explaining theater engagement, demonstrating regional command responsibilities for multilateral outreach in disaster response, and 

USPACOM involvement in developing regional 

capacities in areas such as search and rescue 

and consequence management.

The Obama administration’s consideration to allow U.S. investments (now prohibited under economic sanctions) in exchange 

for Suu Kyi’s release and to allow opposition 

groups, including her NLD, to participate in 

elections scheduled for next year demonstrates 

a seriousness about nudging things beyond 

the standoff achieved by sanctions and sanctimoniousness. Senator Webb’s recommendation to focus first on what is possible places a 

primacy on engagement, in spite of the flawed 

constitution approved last year, and the junta’s “seven steps toward democracy” that are 

bound and determined to enable the military 

to retain its domination of the government.5

The lessons from the history of democratic transitions over the past 25 years in 

Southeast Asia suggest that economic growth 

fostering a middle class, U.S. policies that 

emphasized security and export-oriented economics, and recognition of the role of business 

interests, civil society, and NGOs were critical 

parts of the equation, as was U.S. involvement 

in defining education opportunities, cultural 

exchanges, and scientific and technological 

cooperation. In the Burmese context, all this 

plus the importance of humanitarian engagement and infrastructure projects and patient 

attempts to identify areas of commonality—

disaster relief, humanitarian aid, adaption to 

climate change—are important steps.

Notes

1

 The Obama administration signaled the possibility of a less confrontational 

approach to the Burmese military government: “Imposing sanctions has not influenced the junta,” Secretary of State Hillary 

Rodham Clinton stated in February. See Sheryl 

Gay Stolberg and Liz Robbins, “U.S. Senator 

in Myanmar to Meet Leader,” The New York 

Times, August 14, 2009, available at <www.

nytimes.com/2009/08/15/world/asia/15myanmar.

html?nl=pol&emc=pola1>. 2

 Jim Webb, “We Can’t Afford to 

Ignore Myanmar,” The New York Times, 

August 25, 2009, available at <www.

nytimes.com/2009/08/26/opinion/26webb.

html?emc=eta1>. 3

 “Cyclone Nargis,” The New York Times, 

updated April 30, 2009, available at <http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/international/countriesandterritories/myanmar/cyclone_nargis/

index.html>. 4

 See, for example, <www.independent.

co.uk/news/world/asia/defectors-tell-of--burmas-secret-nuclear-reactor-1766566.html>; 

and <www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/

nw_20090810_9726.php>. 5

 Webb.

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I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Patrick M. Cronin

Eugene B. Rumer Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press