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53–758 2009

SECURING PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE 

INFORMATION WITHIN THE UNITED 

STATES CAPITOL POLICE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITOL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE 

ADMINISTRATION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, OCTOBER 14, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration 

( 

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/administration/index.html 


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COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

Vice-Chairwoman 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

Ranking Minority Member 

KEVIN MCCARTHY, California 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

JAMIE FLEET, Staff Director 

VICTOR ARNOLD-BIK, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITOL SECURITY

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts, 

Chairman 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 


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SECURING PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 

CAPITOL POLICE 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 2009 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITOL SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:02 a.m., in room 

1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Michael E. Capuano 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Capuano and Lungren. 

Staff Present: Jamie Fleet, Staff Director; Charles Howell, Chief 

Counsel; Matt Pinkus, Professional Staff Member, Parliamentarian; Kyle Anderson, Press Director; Greg Abbott, Professional 

Staff Member; Darrell O’Connor, Professional Staff Member; 

Shervan Sebastian, Staff Assistant; Matt Field, Minority Professional Staff; and Joe Wallace, Legislative Clerk. 

Mr. CAPUANO. First, I want to welcome everybody to the hearing 

this morning. I want to welcome the Chief and Mr. Hoecker particularly for coming and catching us up on this issue. As I understand, this hearing is being held in relation to H. Res. 40, which 

relates to the oversight—I forgot about the technology—H. Res. 40, 

which relates to oversight for various items. And my understanding 

is today we are going to talk about some PII—I love these initials— 

personal information, whatever the hell it is, I don’t know. And I 

am basically going to put the official statement on the record because I hate it when these things get read. I am not going to do 

that. And with that, I am going to ask Mr. Lungren if he wants 

to do his. 

[The statement of Mr. Capuano follows:] 


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Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is correct 

that we are calling this meeting pursuant to our requirement for 

this oversight. I think, first of all, I would like to express my appreciation to the Capitol Police for the great job that they are doing 

in protecting our visitors and the Members who are here. I think 

we have passed the 2 million mark now over at the CVC. So we 

are having a tremendous increase in the number of people who are 

able to access their Nation’s Capitol. But also we had the recent 

shooting incident near the Senate office buildings. The swift initial 

defensive actions of the officers involved, as well as the subsequent 

efforts to prevent further injury to the perpetrator are a credit to 

both their professionalism and their training. And I think it is good 

for us to acknowledge that publicly. So Chief, I hope that you will 

give that message to your people. And I am pleased that we are 

here dealing with an issue that may sound arcane, but it is rather 

important. It is what we do with the personal private information 

of members and staff. When should be it released? Under what circumstances should it be released? How should it be protected? Do 

we have the means by which we are protecting it? Oftentimes here 

in this House of Representatives we are busy concerned with the 

privacy rights of individuals, which is extremely important, but we 

also ought to take a moment to see how we are handling the privacy information of Members of Congress, which could also relate 

to their families, and staff here who are helping us. And so I believe that having both the Chief and the inspector general with us 

will help us to see where we are now and how we might improve, 

and give some assurance to those with whom we serve as well as 

those who work with us that we consider their privacy information 

important as well. So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this, 

and I look forward to the testimony. 

Prepared Statement of the Hon. Robert Brady 

I would like to thank Chief Morse, and the Inspector General Mr. Carl Hoecker, 

for being here today. 

With identity theft becoming more and more commonplace, the need to protect 

personally identifying information has become increasingly important. It is obvious 

that as part of their day-to-day operations, the Capitol Police would have to process 

personally identifying information. Developing and implementing systems to protect 

that information is a vitally important component of the mission of the USCP. This 

is not just vital for Capitol Police employees, but for Members and their staffs as 

well. 

I would like to commend the diligence of the Inspector General in identifying 

ways to improve information security within the Capitol Police Force. Furthermore, 

I would like to commend Chief Morse for immediately beginning, and actively implementing, the IG recommendations. I appreciate the seriousness with which your department has treated this matter. 

Today, I look forward to hearing how the Capitol Police have already begun to 

safeguard sensitive information, and what improvements we can expect down the 

road. I want to ensure Members and their staffers that their personal information 

is safe in the hands of the U.S. Capitol Police. 

STATEMENTS OF PHILLIP D. MORSE, SR., CHIEF, UNITED 

STATES CAPITOL POLICE; AND CARL W. HOECKER, INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE 

Mr. CAPUANO. Chief. 


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STATEMENT OF PHILLIP MORSE, SR. 

Chief MORSE. Good morning, Chairman, and good morning, Mr. 

Lungren. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on 

personally identifiable information, or PII, of the department’s 

stakeholders. In addition to insuring the privacy of our employees, 

the United States Capitol Police has the unique responsibility of insuring the privacy of the Members of Congress, congressional staff, 

and members of the public with whom we have reason to come in 

contact. Also the U.S. Capitol Police maintain some Department 

employee PII. The most sensitive employee information is primarily 

maintained by cross-servicing partner agencies. We actively and 

continually work with our partners to protect this employee PII. In 

addition to carrying out our mission, the department’s policy is to 

secure and maintain very limited personally identifiable information on Members of Congress, such as names, residences, addresses, and contact numbers. The Department also securely maintains 

PII that is collected for law enforcement purposes involving the 

public. 

The Department has various policies, procedures, and protocols 

in place to ensure that PII collected in these various areas is necessary, reasonable, appropriately secured, and properly maintained. Earlier this fiscal year, the U.S. Capitol Police Office of Inspector General conducted an audit on the Department’s privacy 

program. In that audit, the inspector general made three recommendations regarding the measures the Department should take 

to establish a more unified and formal privacy program to enhance 

the protection of PII. 

As indicated in my response to the inspector general’s report, I 

concur and I embrace all of the recommendations. I am also 

pleased to convey that we have taken steps to address a number 

of these issues, and are actively engaged in deploying plans on how 

to best address the remaining issues. Recently, the Department appointed Mr. Norman Farley as our new chief administrative officer 

and chief privacy officer. Related to his duties as the Department’s 

chief privacy officer, I have asked Mr. Farley to review all existing 

policies, procedures, and protocols, addressing privacy-related risks, 

and developing cohesive guidance to assist in the identification, implementation, and maintenance of a unified privacy program in coordination with the Department’s executive management team and 

our Office of General Counsel. 

In the short time since his appointment, Mr. Farley has already 

begun to assess the Department’s current activities related to PII, 

and is slated to provide his findings and implementation plan to 

the Department’s executive team within the next few months. This 

plan will include establishing timelines and milestones for the full 

implementation of a unified privacy program within the Department. Although the office of inspector general audit recommendations will remain open until the unified privacy program and policy 

are finalized and implemented, I am also pleased to report that the 

corrective actions we have identified to resolve the issues raised in 

this report have been deemed by the inspector general to be effective approaches to the issue. 

I believe that the Department has the initial tools required to effectively and efficiently facilitate the establishment of a unified priVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:02 Dec 16, 2009 Jkt 053758 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B758.XXX B758

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vacy program that will mitigate identified privacy-related issues 

and risks. Please be assured that we are fully committed to executing this plan to ensure the security and privacy of our employees, the public, and Members of Congress and their staffs. 

Again I just want to thank you for the opportunity to appear 

here today, and I am happy to answer any questions that you may 

have. Thank you. 

[The statement of Chief Morse follows:] 


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Mr. CAPUANO. Mr. Hoecker. 

STATEMENT OF CARL HOECKER 

Mr. HOECKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lungren. Good 

morning. My name is Carl Hoecker. I am the Inspector General for 

the Capitol Police. Thank you for inviting me here this morning to 

discuss our work regarding the Department’s privacy program. My 

office conducted an audit of the Department’s privacy efforts. The 

objectives were to determine if the Capitol Police had developed a 

privacy program that adheres to Federal standards and best practices, and if the program’s safeguards assisted the Department in 

protecting stakeholder information from potential disclosure, specifically that of Congressional Members and their staff. Our scope 

included the Department’s privacy programs in effect as of October 

1st, 2008. 

We defined the term Personally Identifiable Information, PII, as 

the information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as their name, social security number, biometric 

records, et cetera, alone, or when combined with other personal or 

identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, 

et cetera. While the Capitol Police is a legislative branch agency 

and generally not required to comply with executive branch regulations, the Department views the principles of the Office of Management and Budget, (OMB), guidance and other sources as best practices to develop its policies and procedures. 

Federal privacy best practices require that each Federal agency 

develop and implement policies and procedures for an overall privacy program; identify and safeguard PII in both paper and electronic form; develop a training program to annually educate employees on requirements for handling PII; perform risk assessments 

over major information systems and implement appropriate safeguards based upon those risks; and implement secure baseline configurations over information systems. OIG found the Department 

does not have a formal privacy program that ensures privacy-related risks have been identified and adequately addressed. While 

the Capitol Police do collect and handle PII of Congressional Members and their staff, the Department has not identified where the 

PII is collected, maintained, processed, or disseminated. The Department has neither clearly defined the roles and responsibilities 

of key privacy personnel, nor provided applicable training to such 

personnel. We also noted that the Capitol Police organizational 

chart did not identify the Chief Privacy Officer, or CPO, or include 

this position within its organizational structure. Additionally, the 

role of the CPO has not yet been defined by the Department. The 

lack of a CPO position on the organizational chart and the absence 

of a clear role for the CPO indicate that the position’s authority has 

not been communicated or recognized within the Department. 

During the course of our work, OIG noted no instances of either 

intentional or inadvertent releases of PII. However, the scope of the 

audit was not designed to identify breaches of PII. The Department 

appointed a CPO in August of 2007. The Department also had established a privacy board consisting of a CPO and other key personnel. The board’s overall objective is to determine the approVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:02 Dec 16, 2009 Jkt 053758 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B758.XXX B758

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priate policy, procedures, operational, administrative, and technological issues within the Department that affect individual privacy, 

as well as data integrity and data interoperability and other privacy matters. 

While the board has taken some action to address the privacy 

concerns, the majority of the actions taken at the time of our audit 

were either in draft or initial stages, and, therefore, not functioning 

effectively. To improve the internal efficiency and effectiveness of 

the Department’s PII program, and to assist in safeguarding such 

information, OIG recommended that the Department finalize its 

policies and procedures, identify the CPO in the org chart, clearly 

define roles, responsibilities, and the authorities of the CPO and 

other key privacy personnel, and to provide applicable privacy 

training to all contractors and employees. Additionally, we recommended that the Department immediately conduct a review to 

identify where PII is collected, maintained, processed, and disseminated within the organization. The Department has agreed with 

the recommendations. Initial steps have been taken by the Department toward improving programs. However, the recommendations 

are still open. This concludes my testimony. I would be happy to 

address your questions. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Thank you, Mr. Hoecker. 

[The statement of Mr. Hoecker follows:] 


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Mr. CAPUANO. Chief, I am just curious, I am less interested in 

my own privacy, because I have chosen a public life, and I kind of 

figure pretty much everything you have anybody can find out is my 

guess. Is that a reasonable—what do you have on me that I don’t 

already know? 

Chief MORSE. The limited information that we have on Members 

is provided to us in hard copy, not electronically. It is name, address, phone number, those types of things for emergency contact. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Okay. That is what I figured. For me, pretty much 

everything can be found. And I think for most of us that is pretty 

readily available by junior league person on the Internet. So I am 

not worried about that. But I am interested in the staff for the very 

simple reason that they have not chosen the public life. I guess, 

Mr. Hoecker, I wanted to ask, when audits get done, that is fine. 

At this point in time are you reasonably satisfied that they are 

making reasonable progress towards addressing the issues raised? 

Mr. HOECKER. Yes, sir, I am. I think they have taken the initial 

foundations, set the stage. The way that works is when they satisfy 

or when the Department believes they have satisfied a recommendation, they provide evidence to my office, and we would 

look at it and make sure that that is kind of where we are coming 

from. I think they are headed in the right direction, to answer your 

question, sir. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Okay. I think that is what audits always do. I was 

a little concerned, though, when you said it was a procedures-oriented, if I remember the terms, audit, as opposed to one looking 

for breaches. At some point, once the proper procedures are in 

place, who will then check whether to make sure that the procedures actually work or they have to be amended or whatever? 

Would that be you or the Department itself or both? 

Mr. HOECKER. It could be both, sir. What this looked at is since 

there wasn’t a formal policy, what we would do is when there is 

a policy, we could test it if it is actually being effectively implemented. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Because even with the best of policies there is 

going to be somebody, even the State Department, you know, we 

read about all the time somebody at the State Department, somebody at the IRS, State level, same thing, somebody will access it 

inappropriately. And that is bad enough, but then they will oftentimes catch it. I think that is kind of important as well, to have 

the right procedures, but also have the right investigative tools 

available after the fact. 

Mr. HOECKER. Yes, sir. 

Chief MORSE. Yeah, one of the things that the program and policies and procedures will address is internal controls to prevent, obviously, any breaches of personal information, but also to constantly check to ensure that those policies and procedures are followed and updated on a regular basis. 

Mr. CAPUANO. What kind of information do you have on the average staff person? Same type of information? 

Chief MORSE. Yeah, there is really no reason for us to keep information on any staff, because our emergency notification system is 

more of a general notification through e-mail and alert systems. 

Sometimes there may be information that, you know, their names. 


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But there is really no other reason to have any other information 

unless there is a police report taken. In the instance of police reports, whenever there is a damage to auto or traffic accident or a 

crime, generally speaking, those only require a name, and then 

their addresses and phone numbers and things like that are identified as on file. 

And then we have an internal document or police report that 

identifies them as staff and who they work for and the information 

that is needed. And then that is maintained in our reports processing section. 

Mr. CAPUANO. I heard some mention of the word ‘‘biometrics.’’ I 

mean, you got my DNA on file someplace? 

Chief MORSE. I do not. 

Mr. CAPUANO. I can’t imagine why you would want it, but that 

is—all right. So at the moment you are not keeping any biometric 

information on anybody then? 

Chief MORSE. Not that I am aware of. 

Mr. CAPUANO. I don’t know if that is the full answer now, Chief. 

You are not supposed to be doing it. 

Chief MORSE. I do not keep any of that information, no, or collect 

it. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Lungren. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Why do you think they provide the water bottles 

for you there? Thanks very much for your testimony. Chief, according to your testimony, Mr. Hoecker’s testimony, there was appointed by the Department a chief privacy officer in August of 

2007, yet Mr. Hoecker’s work was done as of October 1, 2008. And 

I know you have mentioned that you recently appointed a new 

chief information officer, chief privacy officer. What happened between August 2007 and October 1, 2008, if we didn’t have any policies in place at that point in time? 

Chief MORSE. Well, I just want to clarify that the Department 

does have policies and procedures in place. They just don’t fall 

under any unified program or chief information officer, which we 

plan to do with this new program. So we do have policies and procedures in place at various entities within the police department 

that collect personal identifiable information on employees. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I am just trying to get at, did I misunderstand 

you, Mr. Hoecker, when you said they didn’t have a policy in place? 

Mr. HOECKER. I think the clarification is they don’t have any PII 

policy, something that rolls that all up. There may be policies, for 

instance in the police section, where when you apprehend a suspect 

and fill out a form, there may be policies that safeguard reports, 

but there is no overall PII policy. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Chief, when you mentioned that you have information, limited information, personally identifiable information on 

Members of Congress, names, residence addresses, contact telephone numbers and so forth, is that your independently kept 

record or is that information you get from the CAO or the Speaker’s office or someplace? 

Chief MORSE. Yeah, the information that I referred to is provided 

to us in hard copy from the House Sergeant at Arms office and is 

updated as necessary. 


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Mr. LUNGREN. So do you maintain a separate file from the Sergeant at Arms? 

Chief MORSE. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Does Sergeant at Arms maintain a file do you 

know? 

Chief MORSE. Yes, I would assume they do, because we get a 

hard copy matrix from them that is updated periodically. It is kept 

in the command center of headquarters in a safe. And there is a 

special operating procedure to direct what happens to that information and how it is released or when it is released. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Do you have it maintained electronically? 

Chief MORSE. We do not. It is only provided to us in hard copy. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So you haven’t—you don’t have any computer list 

that you can access for Members if you need to get ahold of them 

in an emergency or something? 

Chief MORSE. We do not. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. I know that the police department, your office affords a function to Members’ district offices. I know you go 

out there and do reviews, security reviews and so forth, and make 

recommendations. We have been the beneficiary of that. In the 

course of that, do you identify individual employees so that you 

have names and numbers of people at district offices as opposed to 

just what happens here on the Hill? 

Chief MORSE. Yes, we do. And we protect that information. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Is that also held in hard copy as opposed to any 

computer information list? 

Chief MORSE. It is held in hard copy. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Is there any plan to computerize those things as 

we do just about everything else? 

Chief MORSE. I don’t know that we have any plans to do that, 

but we safeguard it, minimizing the risk that anyone else can access it by having hard copy only. Once you go electronically, then 

the risks increase that other people can obtain that. So our preference is to maintain it hard copy fashion. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Hoecker, when you did your audit, how did 

the United States Capitol Police’s privacy program compare to 

other Federal agencies, even though I know those are executive 

branch agencies? 

Mr. HOECKER. Well, sir, I haven’t done any audits of other executive branch agencies. But my sense is there is a mixed bag of policies that are in place—specifically dealing with PII versus agencies 

that don’t have that policy. In that regard, I think since the Capitol 

Police are a police organization, I believe that my judgment would 

be that there is a significant reduction of that risk because of the 

nature of a police organization. So that you are dealing with witnesses, you are dealing with subjects on an everyday basis. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Chief, with respect to dealing with other law enforcement agencies, do you treat the information that you have on 

Members any differently than you would with other information 

you would have dealing with other police organizations? 

Chief MORSE. Well, there are seldom times when we, you know, 

would share information that they don’t already have. In other 

words, we wouldn’t provide them any. So as an example, if we are 

doing a threat case, the bureau has the primary responsibility and 


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the investigation of that threat case, and we are simply an assisting agency in helping facilitate that investigation. So the information they have they protect, and there is rarely an opportunity or 

situation that would come up where we needed to provide them 

with personal information of the person that they are investigating. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Now here on the Hill, for I.D. purposes we have 

I.D. that is created for family members. They have to give certain 

information for that in order to assure that the person who has the 

I.D. is the family member. Do you have that information? 

Chief MORSE. I can’t answer that now. I do not believe that information is provided to us, because I don’t believe we are the ones 

who issue the identification. 

Mr. LUNGREN. As far as you know, you do not maintain that information on family members of Members of Congress? 

Chief MORSE. I do not believe we do. I can verify that and give 

it to you for the record. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. Mr. Hoecker, any further recommendations 

for the United States Capitol Police at this time? 

Mr. HOECKER. No, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CAPUANO. I just have one last question, Chief. How long do 

you hang onto these things? When somebody leaves, how long do 

you hang onto them? Can you give me Tip O’Neill’s cell phone 

number? 

Chief MORSE. No. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Haven’t been able to talk to him recently? 

Mr. CAPUANO. Direct line. 

Chief MORSE. Once we are given a new hard copy that is updated, the old copy is destroyed. So it is only current members that 

we would need to contact or respond to their residence in an emergency situation. So that is the only record that we maintain. 

Mr. CAPUANO. So when I leave, you are never going to call me 

again? 

Chief MORSE. I will call you, but I guess I will have to get that 

through somebody else, not my own information. 

Mr. CAPUANO. All right. Thank you. I appreciate it. And I appreciate the progress, too. I understand this is what audits do, they 

show some weaknesses. And the measure is not in the weaknesses, 

the measure is in the response to identified weaknesses. And I congratulate you for making the IG happy. And by doing so you are 

making us happy by making progress. So as far as I am concerned, 

it sounds like you are going in the right direction, and I appreciate 

the efforts. All set? 

Mr. LUNGREN. I am all set. I would just say if you ascend to the 

Senate, they will probably keep your information while you are 

over there. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Just change it to a different safe. Thank you very 

much. I really appreciate it. And I appreciate taking time to update 

us on this and the progress you have made. Thank you very much, 

gentlemen. 

[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ 


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