GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on National Security and Foreign 

Affairs, Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Many Analyses of 

Alternatives Have Not 

Provided a Robust 

Assessment of 

Weapon System 

Options 

September 2009 

GAO-09-665 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2009

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Many Analyses of Alternatives Have Not Provided a 

Robust Assessment of Weapon System Options 

Highlights of GAO-09-665, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on National 

Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform, 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

weapon programs often experience 

significant cost and schedule 

problems because they are allowed 

to start with too many technical 

unknowns and not enough 

knowledge about the development 

and production risks they entail. 

GAO was asked to review the 

department’s Analysis of 

Alternatives (AOA) process—a key 

first step in the acquisition process 

intended to assess the operational 

effectiveness, costs, and risks of 

alternative weapon system 

solutions for addressing a validated 

warfighting need. This report 

(1) examines whether AOAs have 

been effective in identifying the 

most promising options and 

providing a sound rationale for 

weapon program initiation, 

(2) determines what factors have 

affected the scope and quality of 

AOAs, and (3) assesses whether 

recent DOD policy changes will 

enhance the effectiveness of AOAs. 

To meet these objectives, GAO 

efforts included collecting 

information on AOAs from 32 

major defense acquisition 

programs, reviewing guidance and 

other documents, and interviewing 

subject matter experts. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD 

establish criteria and guidance for 

how AOAs should be conducted 

and ensure AOAs are completed 

before requirements are set. DOD 

concurred, and stated that recently 

revised policies improve AOAs. We 

believe that the policy revisions do 

not go far enough to address our 

recommendations. 

Although an AOA is just one of several inputs required to initiate a weapon 

system program, a robust AOA can be a key element to ensure that new 

programs have a sound, executable business case. Many of the AOAs that 

GAO reviewed did not effectively consider a broad range of alternatives for 

addressing a warfighting need or assess technical and other risks associated 

with each alternative. For example, the AOA for the Future Combat System 

program, one of DOD’s large and most complex development efforts, analyzed 

the operational performance and cost of its alternatives but failed to compare 

the technical feasibility and risks, assuming that the technologies would 

perform as forecasted. Without a sufficient comparison of alternatives and 

focus on technical and other risks, AOAs may identify solutions that are not 

feasible and decision makers may approve programs based on limited 

knowledge. While many factors can affect cost and schedule outcomes, we 

found that programs that had a limited assessment of alternatives tended to 

have poorer outcomes than those that had more robust AOAs. 

The narrow scope and limited risk analyses in AOAs can be attributed in part 

to program sponsors choosing a solution too early in the process, the 

compressed timeframes that AOAs are conducted under, and the lack of 

guidance for conducting AOAs. While AOAs are supposed to provide a reliable 

and objective assessment of viable weapon solutions, we found that service 

sponsors sometimes identify a preferred solution or a narrow range of 

solutions early on, before an AOA is conducted. The timing of AOAs has also 

been problematic. Some AOAs are conducted under compressed timeframes 

in order to meet a planned milestone or weapon system fielding date and are 

conducted concurrently with other key activities required to become a 

program of record. This can short-change a comprehensive assessment of 

risks and preclude effective cost, schedule, and performance trade offs from 

taking place prior to beginning development. Furthermore, while DOD has an 

opportunity to influence the scope and quality of AOAs, it has not always 

provided guidance for conducting individual AOAs. 

Recognizing the need for more discipline in weapon systems acquisition, DOD 

recently revised its overall acquisition and requirements policies. If 

implemented properly, the revised policies could provide a better foundation 

for planning and starting new programs with sound, knowledge-based 

business cases. Included in the revised acquisition policy are several 

mechanisms to improve the AOA process. For example, the policy revisions 

should help ensure that DOD direction is provided before AOAs are started 

and that they are conducted at an early point in the acquisition process where 

their results can inform decisions affecting program initiation. While these 

policy changes are promising, DOD must ensure that they are consistently 

implemented and reflected in decisions on individual programs. Furthermore, 

more specific criteria and guidance for how AOAs should be conducted may 

need to be developed to ensure they meet their intended objectives and 

provide an in-depth assessment of alternatives. 

View GAO-09-665 or key components.

For more information, contact Michael J. 

Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 

sullivanm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 3 

Most Programs Have Not Conducted a Robust Assessment of 

Alternatives 6 

Choosing an Alternative Too Early and Conducting AOAs under 

Compressed Time Frames and without Effective Guidance Limit 

the Scope And Quality of AOAs 16 

Recent DOD Policy Changes Could Improve AOA Effectiveness 23 

Conclusions 25 

Recommendations for Executive Action 26 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 26 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 31 

Appendix III Key Characteristics of AOAs 33 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36 

Tables 

Table 1: Comparison of the Scope of Alternatives Considered with 

Program Cost and Schedule Growth 7 

Table 2: Programs That Did Not Conduct AOAs 8 

Table 3: Scope of Alternatives Considered in AOAs 10 

Table 4: Risk Assessment of AOAs by Program 13 

Table 5: Comparison of Quality of AOA Risk Assessments and 

Program Cost and Schedule Growth 14 

Table 6: Factors Associated with AOAs That Had Different Scope 

and Risk Assessments 17 

Table 7: Policy Revisions That Affect AOAs 24 

Table 8: Key Characteristics of Programs That Conducted AOAs 33 
Figures 

Figure 1: Where AOAs Fit within the Requirements and Acquisition 

Processes 3 

Figure 2: Alternatives Considered for the ARH Program 19 

Figure 3: Milestones for WIN-T Program 22 

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Page ii GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
Page 1 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

September 24, 2009 

The Honorable John F. Tierney 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Cost, schedule, and performance problems in the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) weapon system programs are serious. Recently, we reported that 

the department’s 2008 portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs 

experienced cost growth of $296 billion, experienced an average delay in 

delivering initial capabilities of 22 months, and have delivered fewer 

quantities and capabilities to the warfighter than originally planned.1

 Over 

the past several years, our work has highlighted a number of underlying 

causes for why poor outcomes have occurred in weapon programs. One 

key cause is that DOD allows programs to begin without a sound match 

between requirements and the resources needed to achieve them. That is, 

programs enter the acquisition process with requirements that are not fully 

understood, cost and schedule estimates that are based on optimistic 

assumptions, and a lack of sufficient knowledge about technology, design, 

and manufacturing. 

With the growing fiscal pressures now facing the nation, DOD needs to get 

the best value for every dollar it invests in weapon system programs. The 

department’s management of its weapon system programs has been a 

matter of congressional concern for many years. In 2008, the 

Subcommittee requested that we study how DOD makes trade offs in 

requirements, costs, and technical risks before approving programs to 

start development. Specifically, the Subcommittee asked us to review the 

department’s Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) process—a key first step in 

the acquisition process intended to assess the operational effectiveness, 

costs, and risks of alternative weapon system solutions for addressing a 

validated warfighting need. Determining what type of weapon system to 

pursue is critical because, according to a recent estimate, about three1

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-326SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009). 
17B 

quarters of a program’s total life-cycle cost is influenced by decisions 

made before it is approved to start development.2

 This report assesses 

(1) whether AOAs have been effective in identifying the most promising 

options and providing a sound rationale for weapon program initiation, 

(2) the factors that affect the scope and quality of AOAs, and (3) whether 

recent DOD policy changes will enhance the effectiveness of AOAs. 

To assess DOD’s AOA process, we reviewed relevant DOD and military 

service policy and guidance, and interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, 

Office of Program Analysis & Evaluation, Air Force Office of Aerospace 

Studies, Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center, and other 

subject matter experts. We also collected and analyzed information on 

AOAs from 32 major defense acquisition programs3

 that had started since 

fiscal year 2003.4

 We obtained information from program officials on how 

these AOAs were conducted and whether the AOAs contributed to 

changes in the program’s weapon system concept. Furthermore, we 

reviewed AOA documents and DOD and service guidance for conducting 

these AOAs. In reviewing AOAs, we examined the scope of alternatives 

that were considered and the extent of risk assessments conducted for 

each alternative. This work was conducted from June 2008 to September 

2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

 

2

 National Research Council, Pre-Milestone A and Early Phase Systems Engineering: A 

Retrospective Review and Benefits for Future Air Force Systems Acquisition

(Washington, D.C.: 2008). 

3

 Major defense acquisition programs, referred to as acquisition category (ACAT) I 

programs, are defined as those that are expected to exceed $365 million (in fiscal year 2000 

constant dollars) in research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) or $2.19 billion 

(in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars) in procurement costs. For ACAT ID programs, the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics serves as the 

Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) and determines whether the program can proceed to 

the next phase of acquisition while, for ACAT IC programs, the MDA is the head of the 

DOD component or, if delegated, the service Component Acquisition Executive. 

4

 We selected programs that started after 2003, to correspond with significant revisions that 

had been made to DOD’s acquisition policy at that time. 

Page 2 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
17B 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional information 

about our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I; appendix III 

contains information about the programs and AOAs we reviewed. 

Before service or joint sponsors can initiate major defense acquisition 

programs and begin system development at Milestone (MS) B, they are 

required by DOD’s acquisition policy to conduct an AOA.5

 The AOA is an 

analytical study that is intended to compare the operational effectiveness, 

cost, and risks of a number of alternative potential solutions to address 

valid needs and shortfalls in operational capability. The basis for 

conducting an AOA begins when a capability need is validated or approved 

through the department’s requirements determination process—the Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) (See fig. 1). 

Background 

Figure 1: Where AOAs Fit within the Requirements and Acquisition Processes 

Requirements

Acquisition

MS A MS B

ICD

AOA

CDD

Identifies capability gaps

and proposes solutions

Defines system

capabilities

Source: GAO presentation of DOD policies.

AOA Analysis of alternatives

ICD Initial capabilities document

CDD Capability development document

MS A Milestone A

MS B Milestone B

 

5

 DOD’s acquisition policy covering the time frame of our analysis, including guidance for 

conducting AOAs, is contained in DOD Instruction 5000.2, May 2003 revision to the 

Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. If a program does not require development, 

it may enter at Milestone C. DOD Instruction 5000.2 was revised and reissued as DOD 

Instruction 5000.02 in December 2008. 

Page 3 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
17B 

A sponsor, usually a military service, submits a capability proposal—called 

an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)—through JCIDS, which identifies 

the existence of a capability gap, the operational risks associated with the 

gap, and a recommended solution or preferred set of solutions for filling 

the gap. When a capability proposal is validated, before a major defense 

acquisition program begins, an AOA is undertaken to compare potential 

solutions and determine the most promising and cost-effective weapon 

system to acquire. The AOA is a key input to defining the system 

capabilities of the major defense acquisition program, which are 

established in a capability development document (CDD). 

Most AOAs are sponsored by a single military service, but some may be 

conducted jointly by more than one service, in which case, the Milestone 

Decision Authority (MDA) designates a lead service as the sponsor. AOAs 

are conducted by study teams, the composition of which depends on the 

service—most of the Army’s AOAs are conducted by the Army’s Training 

and Doctrine Command Analysis Center, most of the Air Force’s AOAs are 

conducted by the Air Force’s major commands, such as the Air Combat 

Command, and most of the Navy’s AOAs are contracted out to federally 

funded research and development centers and the Navy’s various study 

centers. Both the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the 

services are responsible for issuing study guidance to scope the AOA, 

which provide a minimum set of alternatives to analyze and shape the 

analysis through a series of study questions. Conducting an AOA may take 

anywhere from a few months to several years and cost from a few hundred 

thousand to several million dollars depending on its scope and complexity. 

The final results and recommendations of the AOA are then presented to 

decision makers, who decide on which alternative to select for program 

initiation. According to the Air Force’s manual6

 on conducting AOAs, some 

of the key questions that decision makers need the AOA to answer include: 

• What alternatives provide validated capabilities? 

• Are the alternatives operationally suitable and effective? 

• Can the alternatives be supported? 

• What are the risks (technical, operational, programmatic) for each 

alternative? 

• What are the life-cycle costs for each alternative? 

• How do the alternatives compare to one another? 

 

6

 While DOD Instruction 5000.2 provides general policy for conducting AOAs, it does not 

specify how AOAs should be conducted. The Air Force has developed detailed guidance for 

conducting AOAs. 

Page 4 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
17B 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation 

(OSD PA&E), plays a central role in the AOA process because it is 

responsible for providing initial guidance to the AOA study team, 

reviewing the proposed AOA study plan, and assessing the completed 

AOA. In carrying out these functions, OSD PA&E provides a DOD 

enterprise-level perspective to AOAs and encourages service sponsors to 

consider all viable concepts to fill a capability need, even if they were not 

initially considered by the service sponsors, and to assess technical risks 

and costs of each alternative. 

The AOA is one of several inputs required for a program’s initiation at MS 

B,7

 and it is a key element in planning and establishing a sound business 

case for a weapon system program. We have frequently reported on the 

importance of using a solid, executable business case before committing 

resources to a new product development effort.8

 The business case in its 

simplest form is demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter’s needs are 

valid and that they can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the 

chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing 

resources—that is, proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate 

funding, and adequate time to deliver the product when it is needed. The 

AOA addresses the first point of a business case by providing a foundation 

for developing and refining the operational requirements for a weapon 

system program. An AOA also addresses the second point of a business 

case by providing insight into the technical feasibility and costs of 

alternatives. By contributing to business cases, AOAs should provide 

programs with a sound basis for program initiation. 

 

7

 Other key elements required for Milestone B include the technology readiness 

assessment, independent cost estimate, acquisition strategy, and Capability Development 

Document (CDD). 

8

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Sound Business Case Needed to Implement Missile Defense 

Agency’s Targets Program, GAO-08-1113 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008), Defense 

Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Is Needed for Future Combat System’s Successful 

Outcome, GAO-06-367 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006), and Tactical Aircraft: Air Force 

Still Needs Business Case to Support F/A-22 Quantities and Increased Capabilities, 

GAO-05-304 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005). 

Page 5 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
17B 

Most Programs Have 

Not Conducted a 

Robust Assessment of 

Alternatives 

Most of the programs we reviewed either did not conduct an AOA or 

conducted an AOA that focused on a narrow scope of alternatives and did 

not adequately assess and compare technical and other risks of each 

alternative. While many factors can affect program cost and schedule 

outcomes, we found that programs that conducted a limited assessment of 

alternatives before the start of system development tended to experience 

poorer outcomes than the programs that conducted more robust AOAs. 

According to several DOD and program officials, AOAs have often simply 

validated a concept selected by the sponsor and are not used as intended 

to make trade offs among performance, cost, and risks to achieve an 

optimal weapon system concept that satisfies the warfighter’s needs 

within available resource constraints. 

Most Programs Analyzed a 

Narrow Scope of 

Alternatives before They 

Started 

Most of the programs we reviewed considered a narrow scope of 

alternatives to support program start. Ten of the 32 programs did not 

conduct AOAs and focused on an already selected weapon system 

solution. Of the 22 programs that had AOAs, 13 of them examined a limited 

number of alternatives within a single weapon system concept such as 

helicopters or specific classes of ships, while 9 considered a relatively 

broad range of alternatives, by assessing many alternatives within a single 

weapon concept or alternatives across multiple concepts, such as 

comparing ships to aircraft. We found that the programs that considered a 

broad range of alternatives tended to have better cost and schedule 

outcomes than the programs that looked at a narrow scope of alternatives 

(see table 1). For example, 1 of the 9 programs that examined a broad set 

of alternatives experienced high cost or schedule growth whereas 8 of the 

13 programs that considered only a limited number of alternatives 

experienced high cost or schedule growth. 

Page 6 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
17B 

Table 1: Comparison of the Scope of Alternatives Considered with Program Cost 

and Schedule Growth 

Number of programs with cost or 

schedule growtha

Scope of alternativesbLow Moderate High

No AOA conducted 7 0 3

AOA included broad scope of alternatives 7 1 1

AOA included narrow scope of alternatives 4 1 8

Source: GAO. 

a

 Cost growth: High = 25 percent or greater growth in development cost (or procurement costs for 

nondevelopmental programs) from initial baseline to current estimates, Moderate = 10 to 24 percent 

growth in development cost (or procurement costs for nondevelopmental programs) from initial 

baseline to current estimates, Low = less than 10 percent growth in development cost (or 

procurement costs for nondevelopmental programs) from initial baseline to current estimates. 

Schedule growth: High = greater than 12 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle, Moderate = 7 to 12 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle, Low = less than 7 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle. 

b

 Narrow scope of alternatives = 2-5 alternatives within one concept; broad scope of alternatives = 8-

26 alternatives within one concept, or alternatives within multiple concepts. 

For various reasons, 10 of the 32 weapon programs we reviewed did not 

have formal AOAs to support program start (see table 2). For 7 of these 

programs, it may have been appropriate not to conduct the AOA because 

the programs involved a planned modernization to an existing weapon 

system or there was support from other analyses to warrant the chosen 

concept. This was the case, for example, with the Navy’s Standard Missile 

6 (SM-6) program. Because the missile was the next planned increment in 

a long history of missile development efforts and an AOA had been 

conducted for the previous standard missile increment, a separate AOA for 

SM-6 was considered repetitive and waived. The program started 

development in 2004 and has remained on track with its planned cost and 

schedule objectives. Similarly, an AOA was not conducted for the Air 

Force’s Global Positioning System IIIA program because there was a body 

of analysis available that served the purpose of an AOA and the proposed 

program was considered a follow-on increment to a multiprogram effort to 

modernize global positioning system capabilities. Since it started 

development in 2008, the program has remained on cost and schedule. 

Programs That Did Not 

Conduct AOAs 

Page 7 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
17B 

Table 2: Programs That Did Not Conduct AOAs 

Program Reasons for not conducting an AOA 

Cost or schedule growth 

(low, moderate, or high)a

B-2 RMP – B-2 Radar Modernization 

Program 

The Radar Modernization Program (RMP) only changes the 

operating frequency of the radar with no functional upgrades. 

The B-2 system program office considers the analysis leading 

to the radar modernization to be an informal AOA. 

Low 

B-2 EHF INCREMENT I – B-2 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

SatCom Capability 

The program had previous analyses on processors and 

antennas that fulfilled the intent of an AOA. The milestone 

decision authority for the program waived the AOA 

requirement. 

Low 

F-22A Modernization Program The F-22 program had completed a cost and operational 

effectiveness analysis in 1991. No analysis was conducted for 

the modernization component of the F-22 program. 

High 

Global Positioning Satellite III (GPS 

IIIA) 

The Air Force had conducted multiple studies and analyses 

that together fulfilled the intent of an AOA. 

Low 

JTRS HMS – Joint Tactical Radio 

System Handheld, Manpack, and 

Small Form Fit Radios 

The Army conducted a study which represents the results of a 

mission needs analysis, an operational requirements analysis, 

and a cost-effectiveness and affordability analysis. There was 

no comparison of alternatives. This report served as their 

AOA. 

High 

MP RTIP – Multi-Platform Radar 

Technology Insertion Program 

The Radar Technology Insertion Program was initially a 

Previously Planned Product Improvement for the Joint STARS 

aircraft. 

Low 

NMT – Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency Navy Multiband Terminal 

Satellite Program 

This NMT program began as an ACAT II, and ACAT II 

programs are not required to have AOAs at program start. 

Low 

SBSS B10 – Space-Based Space 

Surveillance Block 10 

An AOA was not conducted because of the Air Force’s 

direction to quickly develop and field a replacement for the 

current satellite surveillance system in order to prevent an 

operational capability gap. 

Low 

SKY WARRIOR – Unmanned Aircraft 

System 

The Army had already made the decision to procure an 

unmanned aerial system. The Army argued, among other 

things, that the source selection process would drive 

competitive selection of alternatives. 

High 

SM-6 – Standard Missile-6 No AOA was conducted because several analyses were 

completed for previous iterations of the program. 

Low 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD program offices. 

a

 Cost growth: High = 25 percent or greater growth in development cost (or procurement costs for 

nondevelopmental programs) from initial baseline to current estimates, Moderate = 10 to 24 percent 

growth in development cost (or procurement costs for nondevelopmental programs) from initial 

baseline to current estimates, Low = less than 10 percent growth in development cost (or 

procurement costs for nondevelopmental programs) from initial baseline to current estimates. 

Schedule growth: High = greater than 12 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle, Moderate = 7 to 12 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle, Low = less than 7 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle. 

Page 8 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
17B 

However, in the other 3 programs that did not have AOAs, the 

requirements and development effort proved to be more demanding and 

cost and schedule growth occurred. In the case of the Army’s Sky Warrior 

Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) program, an Army executive waived the 

AOA requirement because the Army believed, among other things, that the 

source selection process would provide an adequate way to compare 

alternatives. However, when the Air Force and Joint Staff were reviewing 

the Sky Warrior’s draft requirements and acquisition documentation, they 

raised concerns that the requirements potentially duplicated capability 

provided by the Air Force’s Predator UAS. The Army cited the urgent need 

of battlefield commanders for the capability and gained approval to 

proceed to source selection. Three years after the Sky Warrior AOA was 

waived, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that the two UAS 

programs be combined into a single acquisition program to achieve 

efficiencies in areas such as common development, procurement, and 

training activities. However, the Army and Air Force have continued to 

pursue unique systems. In the meantime, the Sky Warrior UAS has 

experienced a 138 percent increase in total cost and 47-month schedule 

delay from original plans. By relying on industry-provided information in 

source selection and not conducting an independent AOA, the Army 

missed an opportunity to gain a better understanding of the other services’ 

UAS capabilities, and pursue an acquisition strategy that would have taken 

advantage of commonalities and used resources more efficiently. 

Of the 22 programs that conducted AOAs, 13 focused on a limited number 

of alternatives within a single weapon system concept while 9 focused on 

many alternatives9

 (see table 3). According to DOD and service officials, 

the scope of an AOA can be different for each program and dependent 

upon many factors, including the nature of the capability need, the 

proposed time frame for fielding the capability, and the type of program 

being pursued–whether it is a new development start, a modification of a 

commercially available system, or an upgrade to an existing system. As a 

result, AOAs that focus on a limited number of alternatives within a single 

weapon system concept may be appropriate in some cases. For instance, 

Programs That Conducted 

AOAs 

 

9

 Although DOD has no specific criteria for how many alternatives are to be considered in 

an AOA, Air Force guidance indicates that AOAs should consider a comprehensive set of 

alternatives representing all reasonable solutions. For the AOAs we reviewed, we 

categorized “limited” number of alternatives as AOAs that examined two to five 

alternatives within a single weapon system concept and “many” alternatives as AOAs that 

examined eight or more alternatives within a single weapon system concept or alternatives 

across multiple weapon system concepts. 

Page 9 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
17B 

when the capability need was defined in terms of upgrading an existing 

weapon system, AOAs focused on refining a single platform concept and 

its system-level specifications and attributes. The AOA for the Army’s 

Apache Block III program is an example of an appropriately, but narrowly 

scoped AOA. It examined various block upgrade options for the existing 

Longbow Apache helicopter to improve interoperability and other 

shortcomings in the helicopter. The program started development in 2006 

and has remained on track with its planned cost and schedule objectives. 

Table 3: Scope of Alternatives Considered in AOAs 

AOAs with narrow scope of 

alternativesa

Cost or schedule growth 

(low, moderate, or high)b

AOAs with broad scope of 

alternativesa

Cost or schedule growth 

(low, moderate, or high)b

AGM-88E AARGM – AGM-88E 

Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided 

Missile (AARGM) Program 

Low BAMS – Broad Area Maritime 

Surveillance 

High 

AB3 – Apache Block III Low EA-18G – Electronic attack variant 

of the F/A-18 aircraft 

Low 

ARH – Armed Reconnaissance 

Helicopter 

High CH-53K – Heavy Lift Replacement 

Program 

Low 

CVN 21 – Next Generation 

Nuclear Aircraft Carrier 

Moderate JCA – Joint Cargo Aircraft Low 

DDG 1000 – ZUMWALT CLASS 

Destroyer 

High JLENS – Joint Land Attack Cruise 

Missile Defense Elevated Netted 

Sensor System 

Low 

E-2D AHE – E-2D Advanced 

Hawkeye 

High LUH – Light Utility Helicopter Low 

FCS – Future Combat Systems High MUOS – Mobile User Objective 

System 

Moderate 

JTRS AMF – Joint Tactical Radio 

System Airborne, Maritime/Fixed 

Station 

Low P-8A – Poseidon Program Low 

LCS – Littoral Combat Ship High SDB I – Small Diameter Bomb 

Increment I 

Low 

LHA REPLACEMENT – New 

Amphibious Assault Ship 

Low 

MPS – Mission Planning System High 

VH-71 – Presidential Helicopter 

Fleet Replacement Program 

High 

WIN-T – Warfighter Information 

Network – Tactical 

High 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD program offices. 

a

 Narrow scope of alternatives = 2-5 alternatives within one concept; broad scope of alternatives = 8-

26 alternatives within one concept, or alternatives within multiple concepts. 

Page 10 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
17B 

b

 Cost growth: High = 25 percent or greater growth in development cost (or procurement costs for 

nondevelopmental programs) from initial baseline to current estimates, Moderate = 10 to 24 percent 

growth in development cost (or procurement costs for nondevelopmental programs) from initial 

baseline to current estimates, Low = less than 10 percent growth in development cost (or 

procurement costs for nondevelopmental programs) from initial baseline to current estimates. 

Schedule growth: High = greater than 12 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle, Moderate = 7 to 12 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle, Low = less than 7 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle. 

In a few of the other AOAs that had a narrow scope, the capability need 

involved the replacement of an aging weapon system and the AOAs 

presumed that the concept of the aging weapon system was the 

appropriate starting point for analysis rather than examining whether 

other concepts could also meet the need. For example, the AOA for the 

Army’s Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program, which was 

intended to replace the aging Kiowa helicopter fleet and improve attack 

and reconnaissance capabilities, examined two options: improving the 

legacy Kiowa helicopter or procuring nondevelopmental helicopters. The 

AOA did not explore other potential solutions, such as developing 

unmanned aerial systems, increasing the purchase of existing attack 

helicopters, increasing the purchase of other reconnaissance assets, or 

relying on a mix of solutions. After 3 years of development, the ARH 

program’s research and development costs increased from about $360 

million to $940 million. A Center for Naval Analyses report commissioned 

by the Army after the ARH program began having execution problems 

identified several factors that contributed to the significant cost growth, 

including questionable requirements, an aggressive schedule, limited 

oversight, and a perceived preference for one helicopter model. As a result 

of the cost growth and other problems, DOD cancelled the program in 

2008 after determining that at least one alternative could provide equal or 

greater capability at less cost. 

Most of the programs (7 of 9) that examined a broad scope of alternatives 

have tracked well with their planned cost and schedule targets. The AOA 

for the Navy’s P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft, which is a program 

designed to replace the P-3C aircraft and provide maritime patrol and 

reconnaissance for the Navy, explored multiple concepts and many 

alternatives in response to study guidance issued by OSD PA&E, including 

several nonmanned aircraft alternatives such as submarines, helicopters, 

and UAS. The AOA concluded that a manned aircraft would still be the 

best option to replace the P-3C. However, the AOA also helped the Navy to 

recognize that a UAS could perform some of the maritime patrol missions 

as an adjunct platform, eventually leading to the Broad Area Maritime 

Surveillance (BAMS) UAS AOA and program. The P-8A program has not 

Page 11 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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experienced cost growth over its 4 years of development and remains on 

schedule. Similarly, the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated 

Netted Sensor System (JLENS), which is designed to provide over the 

horizon detecting and tracking of land attack cruise missile and other 

targets, had an AOA that explored alternatives across multiple concepts, 

including aerostat sensors, sea-based sensors, and nonaerostat elevated 

sensors. The Army chose the aerostat concept and has developed an 

incremental program that has experienced low cost and schedule growth 

since starting development in 2005. 

Many AOAs Have Not 

Adequately Assessed Risks 

for the Alternatives 

DOD acquisition policy requires that AOAs assess the technical risk of 

alternatives, but it does not provide criteria and guidance for how and to 

what extent technical risks should be addressed and it does not specify 

that other types of risks should be assessed.10 Risks are important to 

assess because there may be technical, programmatic, or operational 

uncertainties associated with different alternatives that should be 

considered in determining the best weapon system approach. For 

example, it may be the case that one alternative is more effective than 

another in meeting a capability need but has more technical or other risks 

that may make the alternative infeasible to develop. Many of the AOAs we 

reviewed (12 of the 22) conducted limited assessments of the risks of each 

alternative presented (see table 4).11 Some AOAs we reviewed did not 

examine risks at all, focusing only on the operational effectiveness and 

costs of alternatives. Other AOAs had relatively limited risk assessments. 

For example, several AOAs did not discuss integration risks even though 

they were examining modified commercial systems that required the 

integration of subsystems or equipment packages, while other AOAs did 

not examine the schedule risks of the various alternatives, despite 

accelerated schedules and fielding dates for the programs. We found that 

programs with AOAs that conducted a more comprehensive assessment of 

 

10 While DOD acquisition policy (DODI 5000.2) indicates that an AOA shall assess 

technology risk and maturity, Air Force guidance for conducting AOAs advocates that 

programmatic and operational risks should be considered as well. The Air Force guidance 

indicates that AOA study teams should determine, as a first step in conducting a risk 

analysis, what technical, programmatic, and operational factors are relevant to each 

alternative. For example, open architecture, schedule, overarching dependencies, and 

maintenance requirements may be important risk factors for some AOAs. 

11 We defined “limited” risk assessments as AOAs that did not examine risks at all or 

examined only one risk factor such as technology maturity. We defined AOAs as having a 

more robust risk assessment if they examined multiple risk factors such as technology, 

integration, and schedule. 

Page 12 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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risks tended to have better cost and schedule outcomes than those that did 

not (see table 5). 

Table 4: Risk Assessment of AOAs by Program 

AOAs with no or limited 

assessment of risksa

Cost or schedule growth 

(low, moderate, or high)b

AOAs with adequate 

assessment of risksa

Cost or schedule growth 

(low, moderate, or high)b

AGM-88E AARGM – AGM 88E 

Advanced Anti–Radiation Guided 

Missile (AARGM) Program 

Low BAMS – Broad Area Maritime 

Surveillance 

High 

AB3 – Apache Block III Low DDG 1000 – ZUMWALT CLASS 

Destroyer 

High 

ARH – Armed Reconnaissance 

Helicopter 

High EA-18G – Electronic attack variant 

of the F/A-18 aircraft 

Low 

CVN-21 – Next Generation 

Nuclear Aircraft Carrier 

Moderate CH-53K – Heavy Lift Replacement 

Program 

Low 

E-2D AHE – E-2D Advanced 

Hawkeye 

High JCA – Joint Cargo Aircraft Low 

FCS – Future Combat Systems High JTRS AMF – Joint Tactical Radio 

System Airborne & Maritime/Fixed 

Station 

Low 

JLENS – Joint Land Attack Cruise 

Missile Defense Elevated Netted 

Sensor System 

Low LUH – Light Utility Helicopter Low 

LCS – Littoral Combat Ship High MUOS – Mobile User Objective 

System 

Moderate 

LHA REPLACEMENT – New 

Amphibious Assault Ship 

Low P-8A – Poseidon Program Low 

MPS – Mission Planning System High SDB I – Small Diameter Bomb 

Increment I 

Low 

VH-71 – Presidential Helicopter 

Fleet Replacement Program 

High 

WIN-T – Warfighter Information 

Network – Tactical 

High 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD program offices. 

Page 13 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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a

 No assessment = no discussion in AOA of technical, integration, or other risks; limited assessment = 

only technical risk addressed or not all of the alternatives are assessed for technical and other risks; 

adequate assessment = all alternatives are assessed for multiple factors such as technical, 

integration, and other risks. 

b

 Cost growth: High = 25 percent or greater growth in development cost (or procurement costs for 

nondevelopmental programs) from initial baseline to current estimates, Moderate = 10 to 24 percent 

growth in development cost (or procurement costs for nondevelopmental programs) from initial 

baseline to current estimates, Low = less than 10 percent growth in development cost (or 

procurement costs for nondevelopmental programs) from initial baseline to current estimates. 

Schedule growth: High = greater than 12 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle, Moderate = 7 to 12 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle, Low = less than 7 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle. 

Table 5: Comparison of Quality of AOA Risk Assessments and Program Cost and 

Schedule Growth 

Number of programs with cost or 

schedule growtha

Quality of risk assessmentbLow Moderate High

AOAs with no or limited assessment of risks 4 1 7

AOAs with adequate assessment of risks 7 1 2

Source: GAO. 

a

 Cost growth: High = 25 percent or greater growth in development cost (or procurement costs for 

nondevelopmental programs) from initial baseline to current estimates, Moderate = 10 to 24 percent 

growth in development cost (or procurement costs for nondevelopmental programs) from initial 

baseline to current estimates, Low = less than 10 percent growth in development cost (or 

procurement costs for nondevelopmental programs) from initial baseline to current estimates. 

Schedule growth: High = greater than 12 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle, Moderate = 7 to 12 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle, Low = less than 7 month delay for the initial operational capability date or 

acquisition cycle. 

b

 No assessment = no discussion in AOA of technical, integration, or other risks; limited assessment = 

only technical risk addressed or not all of the alternatives are assessed for technical and other risks; 

adequate assessment = all alternatives are assessed for multiple factors such as technical, 

integration, and other risks. 

AOAs that do not examine risks could provide overly optimistic 

assessments of alternatives, which do not provide for sound business case 

decisions. Comparing risks across alternatives is especially critical for new 

development programs, which rely on breakthrough technologies and 

assume that technology will be achieved as planned. Of the 22 programs 

that had AOAs, 8 were new development starts involving technology 

development. Of the 8 new development starts, only 4 had AOAs that 

performed adequate risk analyses. The other 4 AOAs did not assess 

technical, integration, or other risks as criteria for comparing the 

alternatives or neglected to analyze these risks altogether. For example, 

the AOA for the Future Combat Systems (FCS), one of most complex and 

technically challenging programs ever undertaken according to the Army, 

Page 14 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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assessed the technical risks of each of the new development concepts for 

FCS, but did not assess and compare the risks with those of the other 

alternatives. The AOA concluded that the new FCS development option 

was more costly but more operationally effective than the baseline and 

improved baseline alternatives.12 By not comparing the risks of the 

alternatives, the FCS AOA missed an opportunity to provide the Army with 

a meaningful trade off among operational effectiveness, costs, and risks. 

Now, after 6 years of development, some of the critical technologies for 

the FCS program are still immature. The latest estimates for the program 

show that development costs have grown 38 percent or about $8 billion, 

and the fielding date has been delayed 57 months. As a result, DOD 

recently proposed canceling the FCS acquisition program. 

Also, the AOA for the Army’s Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 

(WIN-T) program, which involves development of new on-the-move 

networking capabilities, did not address technical or programmatic risks. 

Army officials stated that WIN-T was largely based on a concept that did 

not have well-defined requirements of the proposed network and 

operations, and the WIN-T development alternative in the AOA was based 

on preliminary design concepts, from two competing contractors, which 

were blended together by the Army. The AOA did not take these risks into 

account and concluded that the new WIN-T alternative was the most 

operational and cost-effective solution available. In March of 2007, the 

WIN-T program had a Nunn McCurdy cost breach (25 percent or more unit 

cost growth) and was subsequently restructured by DOD. Insufficient 

technical readiness was cited as one of the key factors leading to the cost 

breach. 

Assessing risks is also important for programs based on commercial 

products that require significant modifications. Based upon a recent 

Defense Science Board report on buying commercially-based defense 

systems, programs that do not assess the systems engineering and 

programmatic risks of alternatives do not understand the true costs 

associated with militarizing commercial platforms or integrating various 

 

12 The AOA for the FCS program examined the following seven alternatives: Base Case – 

Heavy Force, Base Case – Light Force, Base Case – Interim Force, FCS – Block II, FCS – 

Block I, FCS – Increment 1, Product Improved Stryker Brigade Combat Team. 

Page 15 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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commercial components.13 As a result of this incomplete understanding of 

inherent technical and integration risks of programs, DOD fails to fully 

take advantage of efficiencies and cost savings from commercially 

available technologies. Several of the programs we reviewed that involved 

modified commercial products had AOAs with weak risk assessments. For 

example, the AOA for the Marine Corps’ replacement for the Presidential 

Helicopter, VH-71, failed to assess the technical, integration, and schedule 

risks associated with its three alternatives. It instead compared 

alternatives based on costs and performance attributes, such as cabin size, 

deployability, and performance. One program official stated that the focus 

of the VH-71 AOA was to merely identify platforms that had the best 

probability of meeting the requirements. According to a statement by the 

Secretary of Defense, the program’s costs have nearly doubled, increasing 

from $6.5 billion to $13 billion, and the schedule has fallen behind by 

several years. DOD recently cancelled the program. The Defense Science 

Board, which assessed the VH-71 program, concluded that some of the 

program’s requirements plainly exceeded the limits of the available 

technology and schedule. 

We identified several factors that may have limited the effectiveness of 

AOAs and their ability to identify the most promising option and 

contribute to a sound business case for starting a weapon system program: 

(1) service sponsors lock into a solution early on when a capability need is 

first validated through DOD’s requirements process and before an AOA is 

conducted; (2) AOAs are conducted under compressed time frames in 

order to meet a planned milestone review or fielding date and their results 

come too late to inform key trade off decisions; and (3) DOD does not 

always provide guidance for conducting individual AOAs. The AOAs with 

one or more of these factors tended to be AOAs that had a limited scope 

and assessment of risks (see table 6). 

Choosing an 

Alternative Too Early 

and Conducting AOAs 

under Compressed 

Time Frames and 

without Effective 

Guidance Limit the 

Scope and Quality of 

AOAs 

 

13 Defense Science Board, Buying Commercial: Gaining the Cost/Schedule Benefits for 

Defense Systems. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Integrating 

Commercial Systems into the DOD, Effectively and Efficiently (Washington, D.C.: 

February 2009). 

Page 16 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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Table 6: Factors Associated with AOAs That Had Different Scope and Risk Assessments 

Choosing an alternative too 

early Problematic timing No or late PA&E guidance 

AOAs with limited 

scope and risk 

assessments 

ARH – Armed 

Reconnaissance Helicopter 

CVN 21 – Next Generation 

Nuclear Aircraft Carrier 

FCS – Future Combat 

Systems 

LCS – Littoral Combat Ship 

AB3 – Apache Block III 

ARH – Armed Reconnaissance 

Helicopter 

CVN 21 – Next Generation Nuclear 

Aircraft Carrier 

FCS – Future Combat Systems 

LCS – Littoral Combat Ship 

VH-71 – Presidential Helicopter Fleet 

Replacement Program 

WIN-T – Warfighter Information 

Network-Tactical 

AGM-88E AARGM – AGM-88E 

Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided 

Missile (AARGM) Program 

E-2D AHE – E-2D Advanced 

Hawkeye 

FCS – Future Combat Systems 

LCS – Littoral Combat Ship 

MPS – Mission Planning System 

VH-71 – Presidential Helicopter 

Fleet Replacement Program 

AOAs with broad scope 

and adequate risk 

assessments 

CH-53K – Heavy Lift 

Replacement Program 

LUH – Light Utility Helicopter 

CH-53K – Heavy Lift Replacement 

Program 

LUH – Light Utility Helicopter 

BAMS – Broad Area Maritime 

Surveillance 

CH-53K – Heavy Lift Replacement 

Program 

SDB I – Small Diameter Bomb 

Increment I 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD program offices. 

Service Sponsors Lock 

Into a Program Solution or 

Establish Requirements 

Prior to the AOA 

In developing a capability proposal, sponsors not only justify the need to 

fill an existing capability gap, but also conduct an assessment—called a 

functional solutions analysis (FSA)—to identify a potential concept or set 

of solutions to fill the gap. The identification of a potential concept is 

intended to provide a general approach for addressing the gap and set the 

stage for a more in-depth assessment of alternatives to be conducted in the 

AOA. In four cases, AOAs were limited because program sponsors had 

decided on a preferred solution prior to the AOA, when a capability need 

was first proposed through the department’s requirements determination 

process. Approval of the capability proposal then led to a narrowly scoped 

AOA that supported or refined the preferred solution. According to DOD 

officials, the analysis supporting a capability proposal is generally 

conducted by the operational requirements community within a military 

service and contains only rudimentary assessments of the costs and 

technical feasibility of the solutions identified. 

With the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program, for example, the 

Army proposed acquiring an armed reconnaissance helicopter after the 

termination of the Comanche helicopter program, which had experienced 

Page 17 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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significant cost and schedule problems.14 While the initial capability 

proposal submitted to JCIDS for the ARH considered nonhelicopter 

concepts, such as unmanned aerial systems, the Army concluded that a 

modified version of an existing armed reconnaissance helicopter was the 

preferred solution. According to Army officials, the modified helicopter 

solution was pushed in part because there was a desire to field a system 

within a relatively short time frame, a similar helicopter variant was in use 

by the special operations forces, and funding available from the 

terminated Comanche helicopter program needed to be used quickly. 

Because the Army effectively locked into a solution in this early stage, the 

AOA primarily focused on comparing the performance and costs of 

existing helicopter alternatives (see fig. 2). 

 

14 The termination of the Comanche helicopter program provided the Army the opportunity 

to redirect its resources to fund a broad range of programs and activities, including the 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, which is intended to address numerous shortcomings 

in the reconnaissance helicopter fleet. 

Page 18 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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Figure 2: Alternatives Considered for the ARH Program 

Alternatives Considered

Before AOA

(in Initial Capabilities Document)

Alternatives Examined in AOA Platform Chosen

• Upgrade of existing ARH

• Increase use of attack helicopters

• Initiate a new-start ARH program

• Increased use of Reconnaissance

Surveillance Target Acquisition assets

• Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft

• Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems

Upgrade of existing ARH alternatives:

• Improve Kiowa (legacy helicopter)

• Non-developmental helicopters

 1) OH 6/MH-6 MELB

 2) Eurocopter EC-635

3) Eurocopter AS-550 C3

 4) Mil Bell 407

Mil Bell 407

helicopter

Upgrade of existing ARH is preferred solution No recommended solution

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data.

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH)

Similarly, we have previously reported15 that the Navy began the Littoral 

Combat Ship (LCS) program before fully examining alternatives. 

Beginning in 1998, the Navy conducted a series of wargames and studies to 

test new concepts for surface combatant ships that could address known 

threats in littoral areas. Following these efforts, the Navy began an 

analysis of multiple concepts study16 in 2002 to further refine the Navy’s 

preferred solution—a new warship along the lines of LCS. Concurrently, 

the Navy established an LCS program office and issued a request for 

 

15 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate 

Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships, GAO 05-255 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2005). 

16 The Navy conducted an Analysis of Multiple Concepts, one of the studies required by 

DOD acquisition policy in 2002 for program initiation, which was subsequently approved by 

OSD PA&E as a tailored AOA. 

Page 19 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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proposal to industry to submit LCS concepts. The Office of the Secretary 

of Defense and the Joint Staff were concerned that the Navy’s focus on a 

single solution did not adequately consider other ways to address littoral 

capability gaps. Based on these concerns in late 2003, the Navy was 

directed to consider alternatives to surface ships such as submarines and 

manned aircrafts in the ongoing analysis of multiple concepts. The 

analysis, which was led by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, compared 

nonship alternatives to LCS-concept ships and concluded that the LCS 

concept remained the best solution to provide capabilities in the littorals. 

However, the estimated costs for the various LCS ship alternatives 

developed in the analysis far exceeded the $220 million (fiscal year 2005 

dollars) target that the Navy had set for the program. The Navy stated that 

because the cost estimates were rough-order-of-magnitude estimates and 

were based on preliminary concept designs, those costs were not used to 

make cost decisions for LCS. However, since starting development in 2004, 

the LCS program has experienced a 151 percent growth in development 

costs and its costs are closer to the cost estimates from the analysis of 

multiple concepts than the target cost set by the Navy. 

DOD and service officials responsible for conducting AOAs indicated that 

often capability requirements are proposed that are so specific that they 

effectively eliminate all but the service sponsor’s preferred concepts 

instead of considering other alternatives. For example, in recent proposals 

to address a global strike capability need, two components of the Air 

Force—the Air Combat Command and Space Command—defined initial 

performance requirements that required two different approaches. The Air 

Force Air Combat Command defined the requirement as the ability to 

strike a target within 1 day, which meant that bombers, which fall under 

the Air Force Air Combat Command’s portfolio, could address the gap. 

However, the Air Force Space Command defined the requirement in the 

capability proposal as the ability to strike a target within a certain number 

of hours, which meant only missiles, which fall under the Air Force Space 

Command, could fulfill the need. Although OSD PA&E attempted to get 

the Air Force to consider both bombers and missiles in the same analysis, 

the major commands argued that their requirements were different enough 

to require two separate analyses. As a result, the Air Force Air Combat 

Command initiated the Next Generation Long-Range Strike AOA for a new 

bomber, while the Air Force Space Command initiated the Prompt Global 

Strike AOA separately. 

Similarly, for the ARH AOA, the Army called for very specific deployability 

requirements. These requirements included the ability to fit two 

helicopters into a C-130 aircraft and for the helicopter to be “fightable” 

Page 20 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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within 15 minutes of arrival. The Center for Naval Analyses, in its report 

on the factors that led to significant cost and schedule growth in the ARH 

program, noted that it was not clear whether these requirements were 

needed to fulfill the operational gap. Furthermore, the Center for Naval 

Analyses noted that due to the stringent deployability requirements, the 

program had effectively eliminated other potentially feasible and costeffective alternatives, such as twin-engine helicopters, and limited the 

analysis to single engine alternatives. 

Timing of AOAs May Not 

Be Conducive to Informing 

Trade Offs 

Many AOAs are also conducted under compressed time frames—6 months 

or less—or concurrently with other key activities that are required for 

program initiation, in order to meet a planned milestone decision or 

weapon system fielding date. Consequently, AOAs may not have enough 

time to assess a broad range of alternatives and their risks, or be 

completed too late in the process to inform effective trade discussions 

prior to beginning development. In 9 of the 22 programs we reviewed that 

had AOAs, the timing of the AOAs was compressed or concurrent with 

other planning activities. In 7 of these 9 programs, the AOAs were limited. 

For instance, the AOA for the Future Combat Systems program was a 

complex undertaking; however, according to the authors of the AOA, it 

was conducted in half the time that a less complex AOA would typically be 

conducted. In addition, due to schedule constraints imposed to meet a 

preset milestone review date, the AOA was performed concurrently with 

concept development, requirements determination, and system definition 

documents. Ultimately, the Future Combat Systems AOA was completed 1 

month after the operational requirements were validated and the same 

month that the program was approved to begin system development, 

which precluded trade off discussions among cost, performance, and risks 

from taking place. In addition, although AOAs are required to be done for a 

Milestone B decision, the Army’s Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 

(WIN-T) program was approved to begin without one. The milestone 

decision authority for the program waived the AOA requirement until a 

later date. The WIN-T AOA was completed approximately 16 months after 

the program started (see fig. 3). 

Page 21 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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Figure 3: Milestones for WIN-T Program 

Jul./02 Apr./03 Jul./03 Nov./04

Final

requirements

approved

Initial

requirements

approved

MS B

program

initiation

AOA

completed

Nov./02

AOA started

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data.

DOD Has Not Consistently 

Provided Guidance for 

Conducting Individual 

AOAs 

While DOD acquisition policy17 requires that major defense acquisition 

programs conduct an AOA prior to program initiation at Milestone B, the 

policy does not specify criteria or guidance for how AOAs should be 

conducted. According to the policy, OSD PA&E is to provide guidance to 

programs prior to, during, and after their AOA has been completed. The 

guidance is intended to ensure that the services are examining a sufficient 

number of alternatives that take into consideration joint plans and 

interoperability, but to also ensure that AOAs are analyzing key risks such 

as technology, cost, and schedule. In 9 of the 22 programs we reviewed 

that had AOAs, OSD PA&E either provided late guidance or did not 

provide formal guidance when AOAs were started. In 6 of these 9 

programs, the AOAs were limited. For instance, OSD PA&E did not 

provide guidance for the AOA that supported initiation of the VH-71 

Presidential Helicopter program. In this AOA, the service had very specific 

performance requirements that narrowed the scope of the alternatives 

examined. In addition, the service conducted the AOA under a compressed 

schedule to meet a previously planned milestone, which may not have 

allowed for robust analyses of technology and integration risks. These 

factors most likely played a part in the AOA examining only 3 alternatives 

and eliminating 19 other alternatives early on. 

DOD officials have also stated that when OSD PA&E guidance is provided, 

it is sometimes late. For example, the LCS program AOA had been 

underway for about a year before OSD PA&E provided guidance to the 

Navy. Officials also explained that guidance is often informal, sometimes 

 

17 DOD’s acquisition policy is contained in DOD Instruction 5000.2, the Operation of the 

Defense Acquisition System. 

Page 22 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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provided over the telephone, or if written, remains in draft form for long 

periods, preventing the services from formulating and having analysis 

plans approved. However, according to PA&E officials, sometimes 

guidance is never formalized or written because the services do not have a 

validated capability proposal or do not agree with the scope and direction 

provided. By not providing timely formal guidance before AOAs are 

started, DOD is missing an opportunity to ensure AOAs examine an 

appropriate scope of alternatives and conduct robust risk assessments. 

In December 2008, DOD revised its acquisition policy and introduced 

several initiatives based in part on direction from Congress that could 

provide a better foundation for establishing knowledge-based business 

cases for initiating weapon system programs. The revised policy 

strengthens the front end of the acquisition process by requiring key 

systems engineering activities and early prototyping, and establishing 

required milestone reviews to assess whether programs are acquiring the 

requisite knowledge as they move towards the start of system 

development. In addition, in March 2009, DOD revised its policy governing 

the JCIDS process, to help streamline the determination of capability 

needs and improve the integration between JCIDS and the acquisition 

process. In revising these policies, DOD elevated the role of AOAs in 

determining weapon system concepts and strengthened how they are to be 

implemented. Improving the effectiveness of AOAs will depend on DOD’s 

ability to ensure that its policy changes are consistently implemented and 

reflected in decisions on individual weapon system programs. We have 

reported in the past that inconsistent implementation of existing policies 

has hindered DOD’s efforts to plan and execute programs effectively.18 The 

key revisions to the policies that impact AOAs are summarized in table 7. 

Recent DOD Policy 

Changes Could 

Improve AOA 

Effectiveness 

 

18 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Must Balance Its Needs with Available Resources and 

Follow an Incremental Approach to Acquiring Weapon Systems, GAO-09-431T 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2009). 

Page 23 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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Table 7: Policy Revisions That Affect AOAs 

DOD 5000.2 (May 2003 Revision) 

DOD 5000.02 (December 2008 

Revision) Differences 

AOA required by regulation for Major 

Defense Acquisition Programs. 

AOA required by statute for Milestone B 

certification. 

Policy now reflects congressional legislation 

passed in 2006 that requires the milestone 

decision authority to certify to Congress that 

programs approved at MS B have, among 

other things, conducted an AOA. 

AOA to be conducted during concept 

refinement phase leading up to Milestone 

A review that may be waived. 

AOA to be conducted during Materiel 

Solution phase leading up to Milestone A 

review that must be certified by the 

milestone decision authority. 

Policy now places greater emphasis on 

Milestone A. This should help ensure AOAs 

are conducted earlier. 

Focus of the AOA is to refine the selected 

concept documented in the approved 

capability proposal document. 

AOA is to assess potential materiel 

solutions to satisfy the capability need. 

AOA intended now to conduct broader 

examination of alternatives. 

PA&E to provide guidance prior to the 

start of AOA. 

PA&E to provide AOA guidance for 

approval by the milestone decision 

authority. 

AOA guidance now required to be approved 

by milestone decision authority. 

AOA study plan to be prepared for review 

by PA&E. 

AOA study plan to be approved by PA&E. AOA study plan must now be approved by 

PA&E. 

AOA shall assess the critical technologies 

associated with concepts, including 

technology maturity, technical risk, and, if 

necessary, technology maturation and 

demonstration needs. 

The AOA shall assess the critical 

technology elements associated with each 

proposed materiel solution, including 

technology maturity, integration risk, 

manufacturing feasibility, and, where 

necessary, technology maturation and 

demonstration needs. 

Policy broadens the focus of AOA risk 

assessments to include integration risk and 

manufacturing feasibility. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction 3170.01F (May 2007 

Revision) 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction 3170.01G (March 2009 

Revision) 

Differences 

If a materiel solution is needed, sponsor 

identifies a potential solution or set of 

solutions to fill a capability gap. 

If a materiel solution is needed, sponsor 

will make recommendation on the broad 

type of materiel solution preferred—

information system, evolutionary 

development of an existing capability, or a 

transformational approach. 

Policy change should help mitigate sponsors 

identifying a preferred solution early on in a 

proposed capability document. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD 5000 and CJCSI 3170 policies. 

DOD’s revised policies, for example, may help mitigate service sponsors 

from locking into a solution too early in the process by eliminating the 

functional solutions analysis in a capability proposal, which identified a 

preferred solution and influenced the scope of alternatives in an AOA. In 

the revision, the capability proposal will only identify a broad category of 

the type of materiel solution that should be considered; for example, 

whether it should be an incremental or transformational development 

approach. The AOA will then assess potential solutions as determined by 

the milestone decision authority and within the broad category 

Page 24 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
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recommended. This change integrates essentially what had been two 

separate trade space analyses into one analysis. In doing so, it sets up a 

better opportunity for a more robust analysis of alternatives. 

DOD’s revised acquisition policy also now imposes early milestone 

reviews which should help resolve the timing issues we found with several 

AOAs in the past. Under the previous policy, AOAs were required for 

program initiation at Milestone B, which may have led to some AOAs being 

completed just prior or even after program initiation. Under the revised 

policy, AOAs are generally required earlier in the process. Furthermore, 

DOD PA&E is required to be involved much earlier in the process by 

providing requisite guidance at the Materiel Development Decision as well 

as approving AOA study plans before an AOA is started. These additional 

reviews with required guidance earlier in the acquisition process should 

help mitigate conducting AOAs under compressed time frames. However, 

while the revised policy strengthens the front end of the acquisition 

process, the AOA is still constrained to a given set of requirements that 

may be unfeasible and could lead to unsuccessful program outcomes, such 

as with the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter and Future Combat 

Systems. 

With increased demand and competition for funding, it is critical that DOD 

weapon system programs provide the best value to the warfighter and to 

the taxpayer. Yet in too many cases, DOD programs do not accomplish this 

and experience significant cost, schedule, and performance problems. 

Many of these problems could be avoided if programs started with sound, 

knowledge-based business cases. A key to developing such business cases 

is having effective AOAs that analyze and compare the performance, costs, 

and risks of competing solutions, and identify the most promising weapon 

system solution to acquire. The majority of AOAs we reviewed were 

limited and thus did not sufficiently inform the business case for starting 

new programs. 

Conclusions 

DOD’s recent policy revisions are positive steps that could, if implemented 

properly, provide a better foundation for conducting AOAs and 

establishing sound business cases for starting acquisition programs. The 

revisions, for example, should help ensure that DOD direction is provided 

before AOAs are started and that AOAs are conducted at an early point in 

the acquisition process where their results can inform key decisions 

affecting program initiation. However, these policy changes alone will not 

be sufficient to ensure AOAs achieve their intended objectives. Unless 

mechanisms are established to ensure policy is followed, specific guidance 

Page 25 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
17B 

and criteria are developed for how AOAs should be conducted, and AOAs 

are completed before program requirements are set, AOAs will not provide 

effective in-depth analyses and DOD will continue to struggle to make 

informed trade offs and start executable programs. 

To further strengthen the effectiveness of AOAs in helping DOD establish 

sound business cases for major weapon programs, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense take the two following actions: 

• Establish specific criteria and guidance for how AOAs should be 

conducted, including how technical and other programmatic risks should 

be assessed and compared. 

• Ensure that AOAs are completed and approved before program 

requirements—key performance parameters and attributes—are finalized 

and approved. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendations. DOD’s response is reprinted in appendix II. DOD stated 

in response to our first recommendation that it had made significant 

progress in establishing criteria and guidance for conducting AOAs, and in 

defining the relationship/role of the AOA in both the acquisition and 

capabilities determination processes. DOD indicated that the role of the 

AOA has been defined in recently revised acquisition policy (Department 

of Defense Instruction 5000.02, dated Dec. 2, 2008) and capabilities policy 

(Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01G, dated Mar. 1, 2009). 

While we agree that promising improvements have been made in revising 

the policies, they do not go far enough in providing specific criteria and 

guidance for how AOAs should be conducted. Without such direction, 

there is a risk that AOAs will continue to provide limited assessments of 

weapon system options, and DOD will initiate programs without sound, 

executable business cases. In concurring with our second 

recommendation—that AOAs be completed before requirements are 

finalized—DOD pointed out that under its revised acquisition policy, AOAs 

are now required to be completed before the formal initiation of an 

acquisition program. We agree that the policy should help improve the 

timing of AOAs so that they are conducted at an early point in the 

acquisition process and provide an opportunity for trade offs to take place. 

However, establishing and approving requirements is another key step 

required for initiating an acquisition program and this is done under a 

separate process—the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System. We believe that DOD needs to take steps to ensure that program 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 26 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
17B 

requirements are not finalized before the AOA is completed and that the 

results of the AOA are used to inform the setting of requirements. 

DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated where 

appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary 

of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; and 

interested congressional committees. This report will also be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, 

please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

n, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Michael J. Sulliva

Page 27 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess whether analyses of alternatives (AOA) have been effective in 

identifying the most promising options and providing a sound rationale for 

program initiation, we analyzed data and documents for Acquisition 

Category (ACAT) I programs that have been initiated between fiscal years 

(FY) 2003 and 2008 and were in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) FY 

2008 Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) list. The relevant policy 

that governs the AOA process for these programs, DOD Instruction 5000.2 

(Operation of the Defense Acquisition System), was revised by DOD in 

May of 2003 and revised again in December of 2008 to become DOD 

Instruction 5000.02. As a result, we used the May 2003 DOD Instruction to 

assess the AOAs. Using DOD’s FY 2008 MDAP list and Milestone B dates 

provided by DOD, we identified 34 ACAT I programs that had been 

initiated, or started system development and production, between 2003 

and 2008. Programs that had been initiated between 2003 and 2008 but 

were not in the FY 2008 MDAP list, such as programs terminated before 

2008, were not included in the analysis. We collected AOA full reports, 

executive summaries, guidance documents, and study plans when 

available, from program officials. Program officials also responded to data 

collection surveys we distributed through service action officers to gather 

information about their programs’ AOA, guidance, capability documents, 

and how the AOA led to changes to the program concept. An official for 

the Cobra Judy Replacement program responded to the survey, but 

officials did not respond to several phone calls and e-mails requesting 

additional documentation, so this program was not included in the 

analysis. In addition, because the Combat Search and Rescue Replacement 

Vehicle (CSAR-X) program did not start development. 

Of the remaining 32 programs, 10 programs did not have AOAs. Whether a 

program had an AOA or not was determined through analysis of program 

documents and survey responses. For the 22 programs that had AOAs, 

program documents and survey data were reviewed to determine the 

scope of the AOAs and whether the AOA assessed technology and 

integration risks. An AOA’s scope was assessed to be narrow if the AOA 

examined 2 to 5 alternatives within a single concept and assessed to be 

broad if the AOA examined 8 to 26 alternatives within a single concept or 

multiple concepts. An AOA was assessed to have not completed any risk 

analyses for its alternatives when it made no mention of risks in the entire 

AOA report; assessed to be limited if the risk analyses were not completed 

for all of the alternatives, if integration risks were not examined, or if the 

risk analyses were not emphasized in the conclusions and 

recommendations; and assessed to be adequate if technical and integration 

risks were analyzed and compared for all of the alternatives. We followed 

up with some program officials through phone calls and e-mails for 

Page 28 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

additional information. To assess how the quality of AOAs correlates with 

programs’ outcomes, we also collected program and cost data from DOD’s 

Selected Acquisition Reports and GAO’s Annual Assessments of Selected 

Weapon Programs. Programs with less than 10 percent cost growth were 

considered to have low cost growth, programs with 10 to 24 percent cost 

growth were considered to have moderate cost growth, and programs with 

25 percent or more cost growth were considered to have high cost growth. 

Programs with less than 7 months of delay in initial operational capability 

or acquisition cycles were considered to have low schedule growth, 

programs with 7 to12 months of delay in initial operational capability or 

acquisition cycles were considered to have moderate schedule growth, 

and programs with greater than 12 months of delay in initial operational 

capability or acquisition cycles were considered to have high schedule 

growth. The 32 programs we reviewed accounted for one third of the 96 

programs in DOD’s 2008 Major Defense Acquisition Program portfolio and 

approximately 22 percent of the total planned funding commitments. 

To identify the factors that have affected the scope and quality of AOAs, 

we reviewed program documents, analyzed data from the survey, and 

reviewed DOD policy. We reviewed Initial Capabilities Documents (ICD) 

gathered from the Joint Staff’s Knowledge Management/Decision Support 

tool and AOAs to determine how preferred solutions were carried from the 

requirements-generation process to the acquisition process. To determine 

how program schedules affected AOA scope and methodology, we 

analyzed AOA documents, program milestone dates, and AOA completion 

dates. To assess how DOD study guidance affected the quality of AOAs, we 

analyzed whether DOD provided guidance through survey responses and 

followed up with DOD to confirm those responses. We also reviewed 

regulations and policies issued by the Joint Staff, the military services, and 

DOD, as well as other DOD-produced documentation related to AOAs. 

To determine what additional actions may be needed to address the 

limitations in the AOA process, we analyzed relevant DOD policies and 

federal statutes, including DOD Instruction 5000.2 (May 2003), DOD 

Instruction 5000.02 (December 2008), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01C (May 2007), CJCSM 3170.01 (March 2009), 

and Section 2366a of Title 10, United States Code. 

In researching all three objectives, we interviewed officials from the U.S. 

Army G3; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center 

(TRAC); U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC); U.S. Air Force 

Office of Aerospace Studies; Office of the Assistant Secretary for 

Acquisition, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, 

Page 29 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Technology, and Engineering; Air Force Acquisitions - Global Reach; 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition and Logistics 

Management (A&LM); Deputy Directorate for Antiterrorism and Homeland 

Defense, J-34, Joint Staff; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, 

Technology & Logistics; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program 

Analysis and Evaluation; Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Science and Technology (Acquisition and Technology)/Systems and 

Software Engineering; Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Product 

Manager’s Office; U.S. Army Aviation Center; Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of the Navy, Ship Programs; Littoral Combat Ship Program Office; Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command; Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities 

and Resources (N8), Director of Warfare Integration (N8F), Director of 

Surface Warfare (N86); Air Combat Command/A8I (Requirements), 

Secretary of the Air Force Technical and Analytical Support; and the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 to September 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 30 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 31 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 32 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
Appendix III: Key Characteristics of AOAs Appendix III: Key Characteristics of AOAs 

We surveyed 32 major defense acquisition programs on their analyses of 

alternatives process and outputs. Ten of the programs did not conduct 

AOAs. The following table provides characteristics of the 22 programs that 

conducted AOAs.1

Table 8: Key Characteristics of Programs That Conducted AOAs 

Program 

Acquisition 

category 

Service 

sponsor 

Organization 

conducting 

AOA 

Type of 

organization 

Length of AOA 

(in months) Joint 

Months 

between AOA 

completion 

and program 

start 

AGM-88E AARGM – 

AGM-88E Advanced 

Anti-Radiation Guided 

Missile (AARGM) 

Program 

IC Navy Center for Naval 

Analyses (CNA); 

Naval Air 

Warfare Center, 

China Lake 

FFRDC and 

Service 

Cannot be 

Determined 

No Cannot be 

Determined 

AB3 – Apache Block III ID Army Army’s TRADOC 

Analysis Center 

(TRAC) 

Service 6 No 18 

ARH – Armed 

Reconnaissance 

Helicopter 

ID Army Army’s TRADOC 

Analysis Center 

(TRAC) 

Service 6 No 6 

BAMS – Broad Area 

Maritime Surveillance 

ID Navy MITRE 

Corporation 

FFRDC 15 No 55 

CVN 21 – Next 

Generation Nuclear 

Aircraft Carrier 

ID OSD with 

Navy 

Support 

Center for Naval 

Analyses (CNA) 

FFRDC 46 Yes 52 

DDG 1000 – 

ZUMWALT CLASS 

Destroyer 

ID Navy Center for Naval 

Analyses (CNA) 

FFRDC 39 No 92 

E-2D AHE – E-2D 

Advanced Hawkeye 

ID Navy Naval Research 

Lab and Whitney, 

Bradley & Brown, 

Inc. 

Service and 

Contractor 

32 No 7 

 

1

 We removed the CSAR-X program from our analysis because the program was terminated 

before contracts were awarded. 

Page 33 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
Appendix III: Key Characteristics of AOAs 

Program 

Acquisition 

category 

Service 

sponsor 

Organization 

conducting 

AOA 

Type of 

organization 

Length of AOA 

(in months) Joint 

Months 

between AOA 

completion 

and program 

start 

EA-18G – Electronic 

attack variant of the 

F/A-18 aircraft 

ID OSD with 

Navy 

Support 

Various, 

including military 

and government 

agencies as well 

as the Johns 

Hopkins 

University 

Applied Physics 

Lab 

Multiple 

Services, FFRDC 

and Contractor 

29 Yes 24 

FCS – Future Combat 

Systems 

ID Army Army’s TRADOC 

Analysis Center 

(TRAC) 

Service 15 No 0 

CH-53K – Heavy Lift 

Replacement Program 

ID Navy Booz Allen 

Hamilton 

Contractor 5 No 27 

JCA – Joint Cargo 

Aircraft 

ID Army Army’s TRADOC 

Analysis Center 

(TRAC) 

Service 9 No 24 

JLENS – Joint Land 

Attack Cruise Missile 

Defense Elevated 

Netted Sensor System 

ID Army Army’s TRADOC 

Analysis Center 

(TRAC) 

Service 17 No 34 

JTRS AMF – Joint 

Tactical Radio System 

Airborne & 

Maritime/Fixed Station 

ID ASD NII 

and the 

Joint Staff 

Institute for 

Defense 

Analyses (IDA) 

and the Johns 

Hopkins Applied 

Physics Lab 

FFRDC and 

University 

Affiliated 

Research Center 

13 Yes 26 

LCS – Littoral Combat 

Ship 

ID Navy Naval Surface 

Warfare Center, 

Dahlgren 

Service 10 No 1 

LHA REPLACEMENT 

– New Amphibious 

Assault Ship 

ID Navy Center for Naval 

Analyses (CNA) 

FFRDC 15 No 40 

LUH – Light Utility 

Helicopter 

IC Army Army’s TRADOC 

Analysis Center 

(TRAC) 

Service 4 No 18 

MPS – Mission 

Planning System 

ID Air Force Air Force Air 

Combat 

Command 

Service 14 No 54 

MUOS – Mobile User 

Objective System 

ID Navy Aerospace 

Corporation 

FFRDC 28 No 30 

P-8A – Poseidon 

Program 

ID Navy Center for Naval 

Analyses (CNA) 

FFRDC 19 No 28 

Page 34 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
Appendix III: Key Characteristics of AOAs 

Program 

Acquisition 

category 

Service 

sponsor 

Organization 

conducting 

AOA 

Type of 

organization 

Length of AOA 

(in months) Joint 

Months 

between AOA 

completion 

and program 

start 

SDB I – Small 

Diameter Bomb 

Increment I 

IC Air Force Air Combat 

Command with 

support from 

Boeing, 

Raytheon, 

Lockheed Martin, 

and Northrup 

Grumman 

Service 

contractors 

28 Yes 35 

VH-71 – Presidential 

Helicopter Fleet 

Replacement Program 

ID Navy Center for Naval 

Analyses (CNA) 

FFRDC 17 No 15 

WIN-T – Warfighter 

Information NetworkTactical 

ID Army Army’s TRADOC 

Analysis Center 

(TRAC) 

Service 25 No 16 months after 

MS B 

Source: GAO. 

Page 35 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 36 GAO-09-665 Analysis of Alternatives 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made 

key contributions to this report: John Oppenheim (Assistant Director), 

Martin G. Campbell, James Kim, John Krump, Claire Li, Guisseli ReyesTurnell, and Tatiana Winger. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(120747) 
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