SECURITY AND CIVIL

MILITARY RELATION

IN THE NEW WORLD DISORDER:

THE USE OF ARMED FORCES IN THE AMERI

An Anthology from a Symposium Cosponsored 

The Chief of Staff, United States Army,

The George Bush School

of Government and Public Service,

and The U.S. Army War College

Max G. Manwaring

Editor

September 1999
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ISBN 1-58487-005-2

ii
iii

Foreword ..........................

The United States and Latin America:

 A Strategic Perspective

Donald E. Schulz....................

The Three Temptations of Latin America

Peter Hakim.......................

Economic Development and Economic Policy

 in Latin America

Terry L. McCoy .....................

A New Vision of U.S.-Latin American Relations

Ambler H. Moss, Jr....................

The Role of the U.S. Army in Promoting Democracy

 in the Americas

Donald E. Schulz ....................

The Role of Land Forces in Drug Interdiction:

 The Need for Caution in a Pragmatic Struggle

John D. Negroponte...................

The Use of Armed Forces in Drug Interdiction:

 The Strategic Context

Bruce M. Bagley.....................

Some Final Thoughts

William W. Hartzog...................

The Use of Armed Forces in the Americas:

 An Overview

Max G. Manwaring ...................

About the Contributors...................
In December 1998, the U.S. Army War College 

with the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and the George 

School of Government and Public Service at Texas 

University to cosponsor a conference entitled “The 

Land Forces in the Americas.” It was held on Decemb

1998, at the Bush School and was hosted by the Presid

Texas A&M University—Kingsville, Lieutenant G

Marc Cisneros, USA (Retired).

The conference brought together over 100 prom

U.S. academic, civilian governmental, and military l

and some distinguished Latin American scholars. 

designed to support U.S. and Latin American goal

were first articulated in President Bush’s “The Ente

for the Americas” speech in June 1990. Our mutual g

neighbors in the hemisphere are to promote demo

encourage stability, preserve the peace, and provide f

nations’ common well-being now and into the 21st cen

The various presentations, the level and sco

participation, the candor of the dialogue, the outsta

support provided by the cosponsors, and the re

atmosphere generated by the personal efforts of G

Cisneros and former President Bush all contribute

forward-looking and fruitful meeting. This book stem

the symposium, however it is not a comprehensive re

the proceedings. Rather, the book is organized 

anthology of the best of a series of excellent symp

presentations, revised in light of the discussions tha

place there, and complemented by an explanation 

strategic interests of the United States in Latin Am

and an overview. The anthology examines the 

political, economic, and social trends in Latin Am

strategic issues that relate to the use of U.S. armed fo

the Americas; and, civil-military relations for now a

future.

v
more deeply upon the cogent issues discussed a

conference that affect the vital interests of the 

hemisphere.

LARRY M. WORTZEL

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute

vi
THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMER

A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

Donald E. Schulz

The end of the Cold War has witnessed a 

transformation of the international security environ

The Evil Empire is no more. Yet, early predictions th

were entering a “New World Order” have proven prem

The growing chaos in Russia, the Asian economic cris

bloodbaths in the Balkans and Central Africa, the U.S

war, the spread of non-state threats (e.g., from ter

and drug mafias), and other dangers to international 

and stability suggest that, while the old order has cha

a new one has yet to emerge. In many respects, indee

current milieu bears as much resemblence to a “New 

Disorder” as anything else.

1

 Latin America is no exception. While consid

progress has been made on some fronts—especially 

regard to democratization and the adoption of m

reforms—there has been a tendency to overlo

underestimate growing disintegrative forces in cou

like Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. At the same 

there remain significant “holdover” threats t

consolidation of democracy and regional stability. 

consequence, this chapter discusses current U.S. na

interests in the region and assesses their re

importance to the United States.

The Importance of Latin America

and the Caribbean to U.S. National Interests.

The U.S. National Security Strategy of “Engagem

built on three core objectives: (1) Creating a stable, pe

international security environment in which our n

1
American economic prosperity through increasingly 

international trade and sustainable growth in the 

economy; and, (3) The promotion of democracy, h

rights and the rule of law.

2

 At the same time, U.S. interests can be groupe

three categories: Vital Interests—that is, those of 

overriding importance to the survival, safety and vita

the nation; Important Interests—those which, whi

affecting national survival, do affect our national well

and the world in which we live; and Peripheral Inter

which might lead us to act because our values dem

but which do not have a substantial impact on us.

 How does Latin America fit into this scheme? Th

thing that must be said is that in a hemisphere t

increasingly integrated and interdependent, the g

and prosperity of the Latin America economie

profoundly affect the prosperity of the United State

Latin American and Caribbean nations have a

become the United States’ fastest growing export m

with exports in 1998 expected to exceed those going 

European Union.

3

 By 2010, indeed, overall U.S. trad

the region is projected to exceed that with Europe and 

combined. Some of this, at least, is of strategic impor

Venezuela alone provides as much oil to the United 

as do all of the Persian Gulf states together.

4

 The con

provision of Venezuelan and Mexican petroleum, as w

access to the major new oil reserves of Colombia, const

an important—and arguably vital—U.S. interest 

directly affects national well-being.

 A second major interest is the promotion of demo

At first glance, this might appear to be a peripheral co

For much of its history, the United States was pe

comfortable with authoritarian regimes in Latin Am

so long as they did not threaten higher priority interes

regional security or U.S. economic holdings. But tha

longer the case. U.S. values have changed; democra

2
part, this has been because American leaders have ga

greater appreciation of the role of legitimacy as a sou

political stability. Governments that are popularly e

and respect human rights and the rule of law ar

dangerous to both their citizens and their neig

Nations which are substantively democratic tend no

to war with one another. They are also less vulnerable 

threat of internal war provoked, in part, by gover

violence and illegality.

5

 In short, democracy and economic integration a

simply value preferences, but are increasingly bou

with hemispheric security. To take just one exampl

restoration of democracy in Brazil and Argentina and 

increasingly strong and profitable relationship in Me

have contributed in no small degree to their decisi

foresake the development of nuclear weapons. Perce

of threat have declined, and perceptions of the bene

cooperation have grown, and this has permitted progr

a range of security issues from border disput

peacekeeping, environmental protection, counternar

and the combat of organized crime.

 This leads us to those interests which are 

commonly defined as “vital”—i.e., the need to prev

contain direct threats to the “survival, safety, and vita

our nation,” including the “physical security of our ter

and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens, our eco

well-being, and the protection of our critical 

structure.” 6

 The most obvious threat of this kind would 

from the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (W

by a hostile government or terrorist organization

closest this hemisphere has come to such a scenar

during the Cuban Missile Crisis, though more re

there was concern about the spread of such weapons 

Southern Cone. That danger has been at least tempo

alleviated, however, with the result that the sho

medium-term threat from national governme

3
the undisputed hegemonic power in the hemisphere.

 The situation with regard to subnationa

transnational entities is considerably less sanguin

principal security concerns in the hemisphere toda

transnational in nature, stemming from such activi

drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, 

immigration, and terrorism.

7

 Of these, narcotraff

probably poses the most serious danger. Illicit 

account for roughly 14,000 U.S. deaths every year, an

American society an estimated $110 billion.

8

 The m

have spread corruption and violence in numerous 

American and Caribbean countries, subverting na

institutions, endangering political stability, and ma

mockery of the notion of sovereignty. The outlook f

future is at best uncertain.

 Finally, the United States also has humanitaria

other concerns, including the need to respond to natur

manmade disasters, the preservation of human 

demining, the promotion of sustainable developmen

support for democratization and civilian control 

military.9 While some of these interests may be perip

others are based on more than just ideologi

humanitarian values. Some have security implication

might place them in a higher priority of interests. H

rights violations, for instance, did much to fuel the C

American conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s. And so did 

or corrupted attempts at disaster relief, such a

Nicaraguan and Guatemalan governments’ respon

the earthquakes of 1972 and 1976. In this sense, the

international response to the recent devastat

Honduras and Nicaragua by Hurricane Mitch sho

considered not simply a humanitarian effort, but an ef

preserve political stability in a region that has only re

emerged from civil war.

4
Threats and Challenges.

What are the major threats confronting Latin Am

how do they affect U.S. security interests, and how 

configuration likely to change over the next qu

century? Currently, there are several concerns. One 

most important is the danger posed by economic insta

By late 1998, the international financial crisis tha

begun in Asia in 1997, and then moved on to dev

Russia in the summer of 1998, hit Latin America. 

seemed to be teetering on the brink of disaster. C

flight was depleting its reserves, raising questions abo

country’s ability to pay its short-term debt.

10

 As the 

largest economy in the world, Brazil accounts for abo

of the output of Latin America, a region which buys ro

a fifth of U.S. exports. If the Brazilian economy went 

deep and prolonged recession, the spillover into 

countries might trigger social and political turmo

could endanger the region’s young and still f

democracies. Similarly, the impact on the U.S. ba

system and economy would be substantial. More than 

the Fortune 500 companies do business in Brazil, 

receives more direct foreign investment from the U

States than any other country except China.

11

 Fears 

the country’s economic health were already affecti

U.S. stock market.

With this in mind, in November 1998 the C

administration and the International Monetary 

announced a “precautionary” $41.5 billion aid pack

part of a new strategy to help countries reform 

economies before they were overwhelmed b

tumultuous global market forces that were sweepi

international system. Subsequently, President Fer

Henrique Cardoso persuaded a reluctant Congr

reduce social security benefits, a move foreign officia

investors viewed as a litmus test of the governm

willingness to put the country’s economic house in ord

January, the government announced it would allow th

5
plunge in its value. At that point, the country was r

plunging into a recession, and the only question seem

be how deep and prolonged it would be, and how 

impact it will have on other Latin American countrie

 As of June 1999, the situation has imp

considerably. As early as April, Brazil made a trium

return to the international capital markets. 

near-record lows in the first turbulent days of the cris

stock market rose by over 50 percent, more than reco

its losses. Meanwhile, interest rates fell, and inves

began flooding back into the country. Foreign reserve

rapidly, inflation eased. While the central bank contin

buy and sell currency in the foreign exchange market t

stabilize the real, the objective now was no longer to 

up but to prevent it from becoming too strong. Thus ha

sleepless nights of January” given way to a resurge

optimism. Talk of a Brazilian “contagion” all but van

The only major downside was the continuing impact 

crisis on the Brazilian people, who still had to be

burden of the austerity that had been imposed on th

 What is striking about this episode is not jus

quickly the crisis disappeared, but the continuing fr

and volatility of the Brazilian and Latin Ame

economies. Clearly, economic analysts and investor

overestimated and overreacted to the initial sig

trouble. But just as clearly, they were also overly opti

about the future. The bottom line is that the re

economies remain highly vulnerable to foreign s

whether from financial crises half way around the wor

decision of the U.S. Federal Reserve to raise the di

rate. Just how vulnerable became evident in May 

investor euphoria turned to panic, following hint

coming rise in U.S. interest rates.

14

 A second major concern is the growing turmoil 

northwest quadrant of South America, especia

Colombia.

15

 There the armed forces have been st

6
the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC

the National Liberation Army (ELN). The rebels effec

control large chunks of rural Colombia. Over the 

years, they have inflicted a number of significant m

defeats on government forces. They are well-arme

result of the war chest they have accumulated throug

taxes, kidnappings, and a wide range of bus

investments. Nor are these the only combatants. Th

rapidly growing violent groups in the country toda

right-wing paramilitary organizations which are wa

holy war against the guerrillas, often in tacit allianc

the Colombian Army. There are now several thous

these combatants. They are increasingly well-arme

organized, and are believed to be responsible for roug

percent of the political killings in the country today. 

the government is nowhere near collapse, the momen

clearly in favor of the guerrillas and paramilitarie

danger is that Colombia will become increas

balkanized and divided among regional warlords, an

the violence will spill over the borders into neigh

countries. This process has already begun, especially 

Venezuelan and Panamanian borderlands, and it m

expected to get worse.

 Closely related to these threats is the scou

narcotrafficking. Violence and corruption have alway

a problem in Colombia, as has the weakness of the stat

inability to command an effective presence—in rural 

But the narcorevolution of the 1980s served as a catal

worsening these afflictions by channeling new res

(both financial and military) to old foes and creatin

social actors, which transformed a polarized armed c

between two sides (the armed forces and the guerrilla

one in which multiple groups and sectors are armed. N

the paramilitaries and the guerrillas the only group

ties to the narcos. The latter have penetrated all bran

government, from the national level to the local. Wh

case of Ernesto Samper (in which the former pre

7
the most notorious instance, it should not obscure t

that scores of congressmen have also accepted drug 

in return for providing political protection for the m

Similarly, countless judges have not prosecuted 

because of bribery or intimidation. Nor have m

officers been exempt from such temptations, or civil s

for that matter. The Colombian economy is far 

dependent on narcotrafficking than, for instance, M

and in the process of circulation, it taints virtually all 

sectors. 

 In short, Colombia is an incipient narcostate. 

traffickers cannot control the political system, they 

nevertheless had a profound influence. Eve

destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels ha

diminished their empire, for, in the aftermath, the ind

decentralized into smaller mafias which, in turn

shifted much of the coca production from Peru and Bol

Colombia. Today, Colombia has surpassed those cou

to become the largest producer of raw coca in the 

Some 80 percent of the world’s cocaine comes from wit

borders. Needless to say, there has been no diminu

the flow of Colombian drugs (including marijuana 

increasingly, heroin) into the United States. All of 

suggests that, while mafias and mafiosos may come a

the basic problem has not been unresolved. Nor is it lik

be, at least not within the foreseeable future.

 Venezuela also is entering perilous waters

increasingly unstable. The past couple of decades 

witnessed severe socioeconomic decline and wides

corruption, which have decimated living standards

undermined the legitimacy of the traditional po

parties and the democratic system. The electi

December of retired Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez 

next president of Venezuela was a reflection o

discontent. Chavez is a populist demagogue, w

allegiance to democracy is suspect. In 1992, he laun

bloody but unsuccessful golpe de estado agains

8
dissolve Congress and replace it with a Constitu

Assembly which would rewrite Venezuela’s charter. 

fear that he will use his broad support to as

near-dictatorial powers, curtailing freedom of expre

and essentially eliminating the democratic two

system that has prevailed since 1958. At the same ti

has also suggested that he will stop paymen

Venezuela’s foreign debt and reverse key privati

initiatives in the petroleum industry.

 What Chavez will actually do, of course, remain

seen. Some observers have raised questions abou

quality of his radicalism. He has not been above 

different things to different audiences, an

pronouncements have become more moderate as h

moved closer to power. Moreover, as president he wil

to operate within considerable constraints, not the l

which are the economic and political pressures the U

States and the international community can bring t

on him to avoid radical economic measures an

breakdown of democracy. This being said, howeve

election has alarmed not only Venezuela’s tradi

political and economic elites, but elites througho

region. It has been a wake-up call that long-fes

problems of poverty, inequality, and corruption c

longer be ignored, lest the populace revolt and r

current leadership with a new generation of cau

(strongmen), modelled perhaps along the lines of C

and his Peruvian counterpart, Alberto Fujimori, b

whom came to power through democratic means. A

same time, there is a fear, not simply of a return 

statist and protectionist policies of the past, but 

spread of the economic chaos and political instabilit

would probably engender.

 How all this might affect U.S. access to Venezuela

not clear, but it is worth noting that we have a consid

stake in that pot. Venezuela is currently our leading f

supplier of petroleum, and unstable Colombia nex

9
the Chavez government would endanger that acc

difficult to say. This is not the 1960s, and Chavez do

have the option of turning to the Soviet Union 

alternative market in the event of a breakdown of rel

with the United States. Indeed, given the curren

international demand for oil Chavez might well think 

about alienating his best customer.

 But as important as Brazil, Colombia and Venezue

to U.S. security interests, they pale beside Mexico

countries are more vital to the well-being of the U

States than its neighbor to the south. Not only is Mex

second largest trading partner, but the two countries 

a 2,000-mile boundary. Any serious political or eco

turmoil below the Rio Grande River is almost certain 

over the border in the form of illegal immigrants, po

refugees, narcotrafficking, violence, or corruption.

 U.S. national security interests in Mexico are ba

several concerns, the most important being (1) narcop

and drug trafficking,(2) political instability and violen

insurgency, and (4) economic crisis.

 Of these threats, the first is the most pressin

decade of the 1990s has witnessed an unprecedented g

and proliferation of major drug mafias. These synd

have amassed huge fortunes, bought political protec

all levels of government, and engaged in intern

warfare against each other and anyone else unlucky e

to get in their way. In the process, they have so pene

the Mexican state and socioeconomic structure tha

have effectively subverted the country’s institution

undermined national sovereignty. You nam

institution, and it has to one extent or another 

corrupted: Congress, the courts, state governors, the 

businesses, the military, the police. The Federal J

Police have been so corrupted that it is no longer poss

make clear-cut distinctions between them and the crim

they are supposed to apprehend. In Mexico, the polic

10
narcotrafficking. Even the presidency has been touch

least indirectly. There have been numerous repo

former cabinet members and other high officials with 

connections. A former member of President Zedillo

ex-President Salinas’ security detail has admitted h

been an operative for the Tijuana Mafia. Salinas’ br

Raul, probably had ties with the Gulf of Mexico carte

possibly with the Tijuana cartel as well.17

 The ultimate danger, of course, is that Mexico 

develop into a full-fledged narcostate. Already some 

percent of the cocaine, up to 80 percent of the marijuan

20-30 percent of the heroin imported into the United 

comes from or through Mexico.18 In addition, the M

mafias have dominated the methamphetamine “revol

of the 1990s. These drugs are poisoning American s

destroying the social fabric, spreading crime and vio

and costing the American taxpayers billions of doll

loss of productivity and costs of hospitalizing and 

taining “coca babies” and children.

The syndicates operate deep inside the United S

and there is mounting evidence of their corrupting effe

U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement age

financial institutions, and other socioeconomic and po

structures. Even the U.S. military has been affected

evidenced by the several dozen servicemen investiga

recent years for drug running.

19

 Should narcotics-r

violence in Mexico escalate, moreover, the United 

will not be immune. It will spread over the border. Ind

already has.

20

 Another danger, which seemed on the ve

realization during the traumatic year of 1994, is that M

might become “ungovernable.”

21 This might occur in v

forms and degrees, the worst case being a descen

anarchy or civil war. One possibility, for instance, 

result from an intensification of the political str

between the governing Party of Revolutionary Instit

11
(PRD) and National Action Party (PAN). The PRI has 

lot of ground in recent years. It no longer exercises th

of dominance it did in the early 1990s, when Mario V

Llosa described Mexico as “the perfect dictators

Today, it no longer controls the Mexico City governm

the Chamber of Deputies. Six governorships are 

hands of the opposition. It is not at all unthinkable t

opposition candidate might win the presidency in th

elections. As the struggle for power intensifies, it coul

nasty. Moreover, the situation is complicated by an in

power struggle within the PRI. While the moder

technocratic elements have been able to captu

presidency during the last three national elec

imposing a reform agenda that has included the 

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) a

substantial transition towards democracy, the Old 

party bosses or “dinosaurs” are attempting a com

They blame the tecnicos for the erosion of the PRI’s po

hegemony, and want to turn back the clock. The stak

high, and the possibilities of violence cannot be dism

(Some observers, indeed, still believe that the 

assassinations of PRI presidential candidate Luis Do

Colosio and PRI secretary general Jose Francisco 

Massieu were the product of such conflicts.)

23

 Even if Mexico is able to avoid major intra-eli

partisan violence, there remain serious doubts 

Mexico’s future. If the PRI loses power, what will repl

The opposition is deeply divided between the leftis

and the rightist PAN. Can these very different tend

cooperate with one another to effectively gover

country? One could conceive a situation, for instan

which the PRD’s Cuauhtemoc Cardenas win

presidency, but then is stiffled in his efforts to gover

conservative PRI-PAN coalition. The ensuing po

conflicts and immobilism could frighten foreign inv

damage the economy, and aggravate an already d

socioeconomic situation.

12
the insurgencies that have cropped up in Chiapas and 

(mostly southern) states during the past half-decad

socioeconomic conditions that gave rise to these move

have not been eliminated, and in some respects have 

worse. Moreover, human rights violations by the mi

local authorities, and paramilitary groups often lin

them have added to the volatility of the situation. Wh

difficult to conceive of current conditions developing in

kind of massive revolutionary violence that swe

country early this century, things could certainly get 

Another economic crisis would undoubtedly fu

discontent. If at the same time Mexico experienc

upsurge of conflict from other sources (factional 

within the PRI, violence aimed at the political oppo

mafia-related killings, common crime), this combina

factors could potentially lead to a situation of ung

ability. Under such circumstances, the government 

be tempted to return to more authoritarian meth

maintain order. Though unlikely, a military coup “t

the patria” is not unthinkable. Nor is the rise of a c

strongman, perhaps backed by the armed forces.

 Finally, there is the uncertain course of the M

economy. For over 2 decades, the country has been 

rollercoaster ride of boom-bust cycles. In the process, 

and expectations for a better future have been repe

raised, only to be dashed on the shoals of neoliberal re

and unstable capital flows. There is no particular rea

think that the pattern will end soon. Though the Z

administration has done all the things the Interna

Financial Institutions wanted, the growing interde

ence of the world economic system means that eco

shocks on the other side of the earth can have a trau

effect on Latin America. Not until internat

mechanisms are created capable of preventing, or a

minimizing such “contagion,” will Mexico, or anyone e

really secure.

13
can lead to crisis. Political instability and violence cou

increase in the years ahead. Growing socioeco

inequalities and poverty (which have been worsen

neoliberal reforms) could trigger popular unrest

governments could come into office less commit

neoliberal programs, or even pledging to turn back re

already made. Such developments could spark capita

and thrust the economy into a downward spira

indicator to watch is how the economy behaves as th

elections approach. Ever since the mid-1970s, Mexi

suffered from a syndrome in which the economy ha

subjected to disruption or decline as each administ

has drawn to a close. Will Zedillo be able to escape the 

of the Mexican presidents”? Will his successors?

Pitfalls and Prospects of the Future.

And what of U.S. national security interest

objectives in the hemisphere 20 years from now? In g

terms, they will be pretty much what they are toda

United States will seek to shape a stable, peaceful re

security environment; it will try to foster Ame

prosperity through expanding trade and regional eco

growth; and it will in all likelihood continue to pr

democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Thus, 

of the challenges we will face will reflect current probl

 One of the most obvious needs between then an

will be the creation of mechanisms to maintain the sta

of the emerging new international economic system. A

Antonio Ocampo has noted, the world faces a systemic 

associated with the “enormous asymmetry existing be

an increasingly sophisticated and dynamic interna

financial world and the absence of a suitable institu

framework to regulate this.” While in the short ru

answer is expansionist policies in the industrial econ

there is a long-term need for far-reaching reform 

international financial establishment, increasing 

America’s capacity to handle financial volatility w

14
not done, the consequence is likely to be chronic eco

instability. Economic crises would become more fre

along with the social and political turmoil that 

engender. The implications for personal security, po

stability, and democracy would not be salutary.

25

 But even if international economic stability c

established, one cannot be confident about the prosp

stability. The neoliberal model of economic developme

not yet proven it can generate an equitable distribu

wealth. Thus far, indeed, it has had a polarizing im

increasing the gaps between rich and poor. Whether th

short-term phenomenon, which will be reversed 

economic stability is attained and the benefits of g

“trickle down” to the masses, or whether the inequ

and poverty generated will prove intractable cann

predicted with confidence. Should the latter be the 

however, it will make the task of maintaining po

legitimacy and stability that much more difficu

Cynthia McClintock has noted, formal democracy 

enough. Unless people believe that a political s

provides tangible benefits—e.g., improved 

conditions, law and order, respect for human rights—

may withhold their support or cast it to demagog

guerrilla groups who promise “real” democracy or a 

fully “developed” democracy, or who reject l

democracy altogether in favor of caudillo rule or som

of “totalitarian democracy.”

26

 And let there be no mistake, there will be an abun

of societal and political weaknesses for such lead

exploit. Unless rural areas can be rejuvenated and 

economically viable for their inhabitants, proble

landlessness and land poverty will continue to provi

raw materials for insurgency and urban migration. 

same time, continuing rapid urban population growth

all the attendant problems of decapitalization, corru

unemployment, violent crime, and poverty, will 

conditions fostering “ungovernability,” including terr

15
internal security. The upshot will be continuing large

migration to the United States, which will serve 

escape valve to avoid social explosion, and quite pos

return to less democratic forms of governance.

 One must place this within the context of the re

history. In the past, Latin American countries hav

through cycles of democracy and dictatorship. W

wholesale authoritarian restoration could conceivably 

again, a more plausible scenario would be a li

reversion, with the pendulum swinging only part-way 

Thus, most countries would remain more-o

democratic, with some developing more substa

democracy, others combining democratic form 

authoritarian substance, and a few perhaps revert

outright dictatorship. Needless to say, authori

restorations would be most likely where democra

elected governments lose legitimacy because of a fail

meet popular expectations.27

Conclusion.

The preceding analysis, it must be emphasized, is 

in the realm of speculation about potential problems 

prediction of the future. Latin America is a hug

enormously complex region, and the farther in

distance one attempts to extrapolate from current 

and realities, the less accurate the forecast is likely 

Yet, even if one takes a more optimistic view of the 

than I am inclined to do,28 the previous pages should p

ample warning against complaisance. The next q

century is as likely to be marked by political tu

violence, poverty, and inequality as by democratizatio

socioeconomic development.

 It is especially important that this be recog

because U.S. attention to Latin America has histo

ebbed and flowed. Unless there is a crisis, we tend t

the region for granted. Economic ties may be an exce

16
Congress’ unwillingness to grant the Clinton ad

tration “fast-track” authority for an extension of NAF

Chile. Benign neglect is our preferred posture. As 

Reston once observed, Americans will do anything for 

Americans except read about them. 

 The problem is that what happens in Latin Am

matters. Regional stability deeply affects U.S. na

interests and security, and, unless the United 

remains engaged, it is likely to find itself unprepar

crises when they arise. And they will arise. If we 

learned anything from history, it is that bad times a

return. 

ENDNOTES

1. See, e.g., Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, eds., 

Responsibility in the New World Disorder, London: Frank Cass

2. President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strate

New Century, Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1998

3. Ibid., p. 49.

4. Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Comm

in-Chief, United States Southern Command, before the 105th Co

Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, March 5, 

2.

5. See Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, “Insurgen

Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach,” Sma

and Insurgencies, Vol. 3, No. 3, Winter 1992, pp. 272-310.

6. Clinton, p. 5.

7. Ibid., p. 48.

8. Barry R. McCaffrey, “A Strategy for Confronting the N

Drug Problem,” San Diego Tribune, August 2, 1998.

9. Clinton, p. 6.

17
October 29, 1998.

11. Anthony Faiola, “$1 Billion Flows Out of Brazil,” Ne

Times, January 15, 1999; and “Unpredictable Congress Key to B

Reform,” New York Times, January 20, 1999.

12. On the Brazilian crisis, see Kenneth Maxwell, “B

Meltdown,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp

13. Larry Rohter, “There’s a Lot of Grit in Brazil,” New York 

April 23, 1999.

14. “Euphoria Wanes as Old Fears Return,” Latin American 

Report, June 1, 1999.

15. The following is based primarily on Gabriel Marcella and 

E. Schulz, Colombia’s Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Cros

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Arm

College, March 5, 1999.

16. Between 1977 and 1993, per capita Gross National Inc

from U.S.$3,310 to U.S.$2,600. International Bank for Reconst

and Development, World Bank Tables 1995, Baltimore, MD

Hopkins Press, 1995, pp. 8-9.

17. For details, see Donald E. Schulz, “Narcopolitics in M

draft manuscript, January 1999.

18. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International N

and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control S

Reports, 1996-1998.

19. H.G. Reza, “Drug Probes Find Smugglers in the Milita

Angeles Times, December 13, 1998.

20. See, e.g., the testimony of DEA Administrator Tho

Constantine before the House Government Reform and Ov

Committee’s National Security, International Affairs, and C

Justice Subcommittee, February 25, 1997, pp. 10-11; and H

LaFranchi, “U.S. Awakes to Drug Violence Spilling North 

Mexico,” Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 1997.

21. See, especially, Donald E. Schulz, “Mexico in Crisis,”Sma

and Insurgencies, Vol. 6, No. 2, Autumn 1995, pp. 224-268.

22. Vargas Llosa stated:

18
Union, not Cuba, but Mexico, because it is a camouflag

dictatorship. It may not seem to be a dictatorship, but it has 

the characteristics of dictatorship: the perpetuation, not of o

person, but of an irremovable party, a party that allo

sufficient space for criticism, provided such criticism serves 

maintain the appearance of a democratic party, but wh

suppresses by all means, including the worst, whatev

criticism may threaten its perpetuation in power.

Proceso, No. 723, September 10, 1990, p. 53.

23. Such arguments are highly speculative. Neither case h

satisfactorily resolved. Though Raul Salinas was recently conv

masterminding the Ruiz Massieu killing, most of the eviden

circumstantial or hearsay. Nor is his alleged motive entirely cl

24. “Impact of Crisis ‘Greater Than Expected,’” Latin Am

Weekly Report, December 8, 1998, p. 570. On these issues, s

Antonio Ocampo, Reforming the International Financial Archi

Consensus and Divergence, at www.eclac.org.cl.

25. For a detailed analysis, see William Greider, One World

or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism, New York: Sim

Schuster, 1997.

26. See Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements i

America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s Shining Path, Wash

DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, pp. 93-155, es

p. 155. On the notion of “totalitarian democracy,” see J. L. Talm

Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, New York: Frederick A. P

1960.

27. For a detailed and insightful analysis of the weaknesses 

American democracy, see Howard J. Wiarda, “Consensus 

Consensus Lost: Disjunctures in U.S. Policy Toward Latin Am

the Turn of the Century,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and 

Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1, Spring 1997, especially pp. 15-20.

28. See, e.g., the INSS’s Strategic Assessment 1998; and S

MacDonald and Georges A. Fauriol,Fast Forward: Latin Americ

Edge of the 21st Century, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Pub

1997.

19
THE THREE TEMPTATIONS

OF LATIN AMERICA

Peter Hakim

I would like to discuss the three temptations of 

America. The basic challenges confronting Latin Am

nations are to achieve stable and sustained eco

development; to build strong representative democrac

reduce pervasive poverty and inequality; and to forge 

productive hemispheric cooperation (both amon

countries of the region and with the United State

Canada).

For most of this century, these challenges 

remained out of reach because Latin Ame

governments have failed, time and again, to resist 

temptations—authoritarian politics, populist econ

and anti-Americanism. Yielding to these temptatio

led to squandered opportunities for decent, demo

government and sustained economic advance. 

It is easy to demonstrate how regularly nations 

fallen victim to these temptations. The arrest of G

Augusto Pinochet in London during the past yea

example, reminds us how much of Latin America’s 

history has been dominated by authoritarian politics. 

years that Pinochet took and consolidated political p

dictators ruled in eight of ten South American countri

five of six Central American republics. Not all of 

authoritarian regimes were run by military officers. 

dictators, like Somoza and Stroessner, were trad

caudillos or political strongmen. One—Fidel Castro—

revolutionary leader. Other authoritarian regimes 

headed by elected leaders, most notably in Mexico, 

21
some exaggeration, the “perfect dictatorship.” 

Latin America’s authoritarian regimes were rar

ever, the consequence of a single power hungry indiv

nor were they the work of a small cabal of conspirators

a very few were the work of the armed forces acting on 

own. In nearly every case, for a variety of reasons

sectors of the population (sometimes a large ma

supported the rise of authoritarian rule and al

dictators to assume and keep power. Dictatorships m

resulted from nations—not individuals or gro

succumbing to the temptation of authoritarian politi

Populism has also been a pervasive presence in 

America over the years. Its effects have been insidi

virtually every country in which it was introduced. Po

economic policies invariably led to high rates of inf

and sometimes hyperinflation. Indeed, for many year

made Latin America the world champion of inf

Populism also resulted in the destruction of na

currencies, huge—and sometimes unpayable—gover

debts, shrinking exports, hemorrhaging foreign exch

and often severe shortages of essential goods, includin

and foodstuffs.

All this happened in Chile during the 3-year pres

of Salvador Allende (1970-73). It also happened in 

during that country’s 5 years of Alan Garcia’s gover

(1985–90). Under Garcia, hyperinflation and na

recession caused government expenditures to s

radically—by as much as 80 percent, according to 

analysts—a downsizing far more dramatic and bruta

that of any market-oriented government in the regio

The authoritarian temptation has often emerged 

wake of an economy devastated by populism. This is 

happened in Chile, when Pinochet replaced Allend

ended democratic rule in the country for 17 year

populism has not been a sin of civilian governments 

Generals Velasco in Peru and Vargas in Brazil com

22
democratic institutions and their economies impoveri

It is important to be clear, however. Not all govern

that spend large amounts on social services are popu

series of Costa Rican and Uruguayan governments 

expanded social spending, but did so without bankr

the economy—and, instead, improved the lives of 

citizens. Chile today, which pursues the most disci

economic policy in all of Latin America, also spends 

than almost every other country on education, healt

other social programs.

Anti-Americanism is the third temptation. It, to

long played an important role in Latin American p

Latin American objections to and distaste for U.S. p

and actions have often been justified. Time and aga

United States has intervened in a heavy-handed, and 

callous fashion to promote its political or economic int

The degree of U.S. influence has been exaggerat

doubt—and Latin Americans have often downplay

ignored constructive U.S. initiatives.

Whatever the cause—justified or not—

Americanism was a pervasive phenomenon in 

America for many years. And it clearly and freq

blocked cooperation between the United States an

region. Anti-Americanism was an undercurrent that 

a responsive chord among many people in most cou

Latin American leaders could often not resis

temptation to use that chord when they wanted to sh

their popularity or explain away an embarrassing f

Politicians of the right and the left, particularly, reg

whipped up anti-American feeling to win elections.

There have been some dramatic changes. Over th

20 years, Latin America appears to have forged a gr

resistance to the three temptations. Country after co

has turned to democratic politics and free-m

economics, and is actively seeking political and eco

cooperation with the United States.

23
dramatic and remarkable as the changes that have oc

in Eastern Europe. Some have called Latin Am

evolution the slow motion equivalent of the toppling 

Berlin Wall.

In the 1960s and 1970s, elected leaders governe

two of 10 South American countries. Today, every co

on the mainland of Latin America is ruled by an e

president. In Mexico, opposition parties are no

majority in the lower house of Congress, and next year 

a good chance of capturing the presidency. Perhaps th

striking fact is that, since 1976, only one elected presid

all of Latin America and the Caribbean has been forc

of office by a military coup. And Haitian President A

was subsequently restored to power 3 years aft

removal. Several other attempts were made to a

power illegally, but these all failed. There have be

coups in any Spanish- or Portuguese-speaking coun

nearly a generation—a remarkable achievement in a 

that had been notorious for its instability and fre

constitutional interruptions.

The shift to market-oriented economic systems ha

equally dramatic. Since the mid-1980s, virtually 

country in Latin America, to a greater or lesser degre

sold off state-owned enterprises, struggled get its 

house in order, opened its economy to foreign trad

investment, and brought inflation under control. 

early 1990s, annual inflation for Latin America as a 

was pushing toward triple digits. Today, the re

inflation rate, on average, is only about 12 percent, a

country has a rate in excess of 100 percent. 

It is hard to believe that the most widely cited cat

and progress report on economic reform efforts in 

America—the Washington Consensus—was pub

nearly 10 years ago. Economic reform is now more t

decade old in nearly all of the region’s major cou

Today, in most countries, market reforms are no

24
performance and rapid growth; they are also seen 

path to political office. With few exceptions, almost 

presidential election in the past half a dozen years in 

America has been won by the candidate promis

sustain economic reforms; in many elections, 

candidates have promised to do so. Good economics 

become smart politics as well.

Anti-Americanism has also lost its seductive pow

Latin America. Carlos Andrés Pérez said in 1976 that 

America had never had good relations with the U

States. The statement appealed to me at the time—

used it in an article some 15 years later in 1991, w

wrote that Pérez would not make that statement toda

article—“US and Latin America: Good Neig

Again?”—discussed the important range of Latin Am

policy initiatives undertaken by President Bush a

advisors. These included the Brady debt relief plan, 

signaled the end of the Latin American debt cris

settlement of the Contra war in Nicaragua; the start 

North American Free Trade Agreement (NA

negotiations; and President Bush’s declaration th

United States would seek free trade arrangement

every country in the hemisphere through the Enterpr

the Americas Initiative.

There is no shortage of disagreements betwee

United States and Latin America—but auto

anti-Americanism has virtually disappeared fro

region. Anti-Americanism does not win elections any 

On the contrary, most Latin American nations want 

more cooperative relations with the United States in 

sphere. This was evident at the two Summits 

Americas, which brought together the hemisphere’s 

of state, first in Miami in 1994 and again 3 years la

Santiago, Chile. Brazilian President Fernando He

Cardoso recently stated that Brazil and the United 

have never had better relations, and that is the situat

many other Latin American countries, as well.

25
longer yielding to destructive temptations, most 

American countries have not yet made much progr

resolving their long-standing problems of slow and un

economic growth, poverty, and social exclusion, and 

performing national institutions. Throughout the r

remarkable changes have taken place in eco

management and political practice, but these have n

produced the results that had been promised and expe

Plainly, Latin America’s economies are not expa

fast enough. Over the past 10 years, from 1990 to 

economic growth will average, for the region as a who

than 3 percent per year or about 1.5 percent per capita

is better than the 1980s, the lost decade of the debt 

when the economies of Latin America grew by an a

average of only 1.1 percent, and income per capita de

almost everywhere. But growth still falls far short of w

needed for a sustained attack on poverty. Indeed, i

decade, only a handful of Latin American countrie

achieve the 4 to 5 percent expansion that the World 

suggests is needed for any meaningful improvem

social conditions.

Latin America has enjoyed some good years in the 

but each time that the region seemed headed tow

period of sustained growth, it has confronted a new 

The Mexico peso collapse in 1995, and global turmo

year and last provoked economic slumps throughout 

America. The economies of Central America—partic

Nicaragua and Honduras—were devastated by Hur

Mitch. The combination of slow growth and high volat

particularly ruinous for poor families. Their low inc

modest assets, and unstable employment leave 

unprotected against either natural or man-made disa

Continuing boom and bust cycles are one of the 

causes of the extreme inequality that pervades 

America, which is the most unequal region in the 

According to the Inter-American Development Ban

26
with one-quarter of the national product, while the b

third obtain only 9 percent. In comparison, the top 5 p

in East Asia receive 15 percent of national income, w

percent goes to the bottom 30 percent. This is an eno

difference.

One central question is whether Latin Americ

effectively manage its economies in our globalized 

Can it take good advantage of the immense availab

investment capital, while avoiding the dangers that 

capital movements can produce—turbulence, volatilit

financial shocks? Can it take advantage of the increa

open trading rules of the world economy by exporting 

and upgrading the quality of its exports? Or w

countries of the region find themselves overwhelm

cheaper and higher quality imports? 

Most of the region’s financial officials and po

leaders are betting that Latin America can be gl

competitive. They are organizing their economie

shaping their policies to make that happen, and the

accomplished a great deal. Inflation has been brought 

control, large numbers of industries have been priva

most countries are effectively strengthening their ba

systems, high quality economic management is com

place, and regional economic integration is unde

although moving at times in fits and starts. The

encouraging advances, but they have not yet produc

expected improvements in economic growth and stab

Turning to politics, it is clear that, in most countri

most important institutions of democracy are ju

working very well—that is, aside from the electoral pr

In nearly every country of the region, election

considered free and fair; the results are rarely cont

Other critical democratic institutions—legislatures

systems, political parties, and trade unions—are li

badly. Parliaments, for the most part, are f

subservient either to the president or to regional an

27
competent and fundamentally unjust; in some th

cruel and corrupt. In many places, political parties no 

command much respect or credibility; in some

Venezuela and Peru, they have virtually fallen 

Freedom of the press has been a bright spot, but the 

still operates under restrictions in many countries. 

Moreover, with few exceptions, Latin Ame

democratically elected governments are not doing 

good job of governing. Such public goods and services 

and order, quality education, health care, clean street

adequate water supply are simply not available to a 

share of Latin America’s population. Throughout 

America, cities are crumbling, and school and h

systems have deteriorated in the past several years. T

and pollution, along with skyrocketing crime, threat

quality of life and welfare of citizens everywhere 

region. 

Despite these difficulties, the danger now seems 

that Latin American countries will once again succu

the kind of military or authoritarian rule that was o

common in the region. To be sure, there are reaso

concern about the election of former military dictator 

Banzer as President of Bolivia and that of coup leader 

Chávez as President of Venezuela. The conti

popularity of autocratic generals Lino Oviedo in Par

and Rios Montt in Guatemala is also worrying, as 

concentration of power in Peru and the outsized po

influence of the country’s security forces. 

But Latin America and the world have changed too 

for a return to authoritarian rule. Democratic election

been the only way to obtain power in Latin Amer

nearly a generation. Civilians no longer think 

military as the final arbiter of political disputes—an

civilian and military leaders are aware of the high cos

financial markets impose on economies rent by po

disruption. Sure, in one or another country, the 

28
We are, however, unlikely ever to see the military r

long stretches as they did in the recent past.

What remains of the authoritarian temptation is 

instead, to provoke democratically elected leaders, pe

like Chávez, to take the route of President Alberto Fu

in Peru—to assume more power than they are con

tionally allowed, perhaps with the help of the armed 

We are not, however, likely to see massive, pro

interruptions of democratic processes. The main qu

now is one of the quality, effectiveness, and inclusive

democracy and democratic institutions—and the an

so far are not reassuring.

Anti-Americanism—the final temptation—is h

uncover these days in Latin America, at least not 

virulent form that was once common. It is noteworth

not a single electoral campaign in the past several yea

been grounded on anti-U.S. rhetoric. The leaders of 

America, instead, are seeking cooperation, particula

the areas of trade and investment. The issue is wheth

improved political situation can be turned to the m

advantage of both Latin America and the United S

Experience over the past several years has been disap

ing. Expectations had been rising that U.S.-Latin Am

relations would be closer and more productive, ancho

hemisphere-wide free trade arrangements. These 

however, been frustrated— most importantly by the f

of the United States to secure fast track negot

authority, but also by a declining commitment to 

trade liberalization in major Latin American countri

The opportunities for hemispheric partnersh

clearly fading and need to be renewed. Whether th

occur anytime soon is, at best, uncertain. Among th

questions that remain open are:

• Can the nations of the hemisphere succeed in 

negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Am

now scheduled to be completed in 2005? 

29
Cate Uted States ad ateca ag

how to reform and increase the effectiveness 

Organization of American States and other 

American institutions?

• Is the United States ready to refrain fro

long-standing tendency to resort to unilateral 

when it cannot get its way through coope

initiative? 

• Is the United States able and willing to t

leadership role in hemispheric integration effo

there sufficient agreement on the future sh

hemispheric integration among the United Stat

other major countries like Brazil and Mexico to 

progress possible? Between the larger nations a

smaller states of Central America and the Carib

Thank you.

30
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN LATIN AMER

Terry L. McCoy

Thank you very much. I would like to than

organizers of this event for the opportunity to speak 

follow economic developments and economic policy in 

America. The news on that front is not good. We hav

accustomed to really pretty good news from Latin Am

during the 1990s—the Central America peace accord

democratic transition that has occurred througho

region, economic reform and economic growth, an

regional integration process. These are developmen

began under the Bush administration. And now the

questions about sustaining them. I would like to 

particularly in the economic area because I think the 

there is troubling, even worrisome.

Thus far, Latin America has avoided the much 

economic melt-down, an Asian-like scenario in which 

would have to do a maxi devaluation, and the rest 

hemisphere would follow into a major economic crisi

unlike that of the 1980s—which would reverse every

that has happened in terms of economic progres

decade. But there is clearly an economic slow

occurring in Latin America. Growth rates are going 

down this year and next. In some countries there w

negative growth. And not just any countries—Brazil

probability, will experience a recession. Brazil genera

percent of regional gross product of Latin America.

Other important countries that have been accusto

high growth rates will have low growth rates. The C

growth rate will probably be a third of what it has bee

the last several years, if that. Even Argentina, which 

31
going to have a difficult time, not only in 1998, but also 

Other economic indicators are equally discour

Fiscal deficits are really out of control in some countr

to 8 percent in Brazil; 7 percent in Chile, which is als

surprising; and there are very large current account d

because of the problems in the balance of trade.

These are the kinds of problems that presumably 

America had resolved by adopting tough-minded eco

reforms. The first piece of the Washington consensus 

impose macroeconomic stability. And it appeared 

1990s wound down as though that had been accomp

But this is not the case.

The slowdown and uncertainty of late 1998 come 

of a reexamination of the accomplishments of eco

reforms adopted throughout Latin America in the 

Observers are questioning whether the reforms hav

up to expectations. To begin with, growth rates are no

good—by historical standards in Latin America, in te

the task that needs to be accomplished, nor by 

standards either. So that is the first thing that is distu

But even more disturbing is that the economic reforms 

1980s have not significantly diminished the wides

poverty in the hemisphere nor the extremes of i

inequality.

Now, what are the roots of the economic downtur

most obvious one is the Asian financial crisis which be

October 1997. It has impacted Latin America th

volatility in short-term capital flows, the so-called em

markets contagion. It has had an impact through dec

demand for Latin America exports to Asia and in te

declining commodity prices. These are the vectors th

which this crisis has been transmitted to the doors

Latin America.

And the fear is, of course, that the Asian crisis wou

over in full force into Latin America and create the so

32
the Brazilian bail-out plan is all about, and why Braz

important.

I think there are other roots to Latin America’s eco

vulnerability. There is the whole question of the incom

nature of the democratic consolidation in Latin Ame

the lack of viable institutions of government and p

that is now affecting the policy process, the inabi

maintain coherent policies, and to implement those p

across-the-board. Not only must a president decree th

country is going to have a certain exchange rate polic

the other institutions in the government—the legisl

and particularly the judicial branch—must impleme

policy. And we are seeing now that those kin

institutional weaknesses are affecting the economic p

and performances of the region.

This convergence of the economic crisis from As

the incomplete nature of political reform in Latin Ame

a dangerous situation. It produces the possibility 

political backlash, that is, a breakdown of the cons

that has supported economic reform in Latin Americ

possible retreat on policies opening the region to integ

in the new global economy. I think it is even more pr

that it will create uncertainty and drift over the 

years. And I think we can see this in places whi

surprising, such as Chile and Argentina.

The Mexican case is interesting because of the el

The first freely-contested election in Mexican histor

long time comes up in 2000, precisely at a time that M

is struggling with a whole series of very deep eco

policy issues.

And I think a final element of the economic down

the disengagement of the United States from Latin Am

over the last several years; since the Miami Sum

December 1994, to be precise. The tip of the iceberg 

inability of the president to get “fast track” authorit

Congress. This is important not only because 

33
Agreement without it, but it is also important symbo

It is a statement that the United States is incapable 

uninterested in maintaining engagement with the 

the hemisphere.

Thank you.

34
A NEW VISION

OF U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATION

Ambler H. Moss, Jr.

Thank you very much. I notice the Congressman d

bring along his red, orange, and green committee lig

keep me on time, but I have my watch here, and I am 

to try to hold it to about 10 minutes so we can get on w

interactive phase.

Dr. Hermann, General Cisneros, I really apprecia

opportunity to be with you today and also appreciate t

that you have invited such a strong Florida delegat

Texas. That is certainly a first.

Let me recall another first, since we are at The 

School. It has already been referred to this mornin

needs saying again. In the minds of many of us 

Americanists of all stripes, the new era in U.S.

American relations in many ways began with Pre

George Bush’s speech, “The Enterprise for the Americ

June 1990. I remember it very well. It had an overwhe

positive reaction in Latin America.

That speech was the first any post-World W

American president has given with the East-West o

clearly lifted off of the North-South context. The Col

was over. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative s

was the first post-Cold War speech which really enun

a new vision of U.S.-Latin America relations. It was 

on three pillars: a free trade area from the top to the b

of the hemisphere; relief from the debt problem; an

investment in a free market economic structure. Wit

of course, inherently went the promotion of democracy

was a bold new vision which really set the tone; so m

35
William Clinton reaffirmed President Bush’s commi

to free trade. Later he picked up the torch of the 

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), brought 

free trade as the centerpiece of the Summit of the Am

in Miami in December 1994, and has continued, desp

unfortunate loss of fast track. I still feel, however, th

United States, as a country, is fully engaged in the free 

process and the summit process. Sooner or later, it w

its act together and have fast track. In the mea

however, in the nine negotiating groups set up und

summit process, it is going forward, and looking ah

the year 2005 as the culmination of the Free Trade A

the Americas (FTAA).

I want to get to some very specific ways in which I 

the U.S. military can be helpful in the promot

democracy. Don Schulz offered an outline that is 

complete and with which I thoroughly agree.

But let me first mention that what we hear

morning was a mixture of optimism and pessimism. 

are a lot of optimists that look at Latin American dem

as something here to stay; yet a lot of pessimists say 

are so many things besieging it, how can it survive? I 

Peter Hakim combines a marvelous combinat

optimism and pessimism in the same person 

characterizes much of our ambivalence about th

things are going.

I brought with me a book that North-South Cent

recently published not just because I am here t

books—I am actually going to leave copies of the

General Cisneros and Dr. Hermann—but I just wan

call attention to the title, The Fault Lines of Democr

Post-Transition Latin America. Post-transition mea

transition to democracy. I am sure Ambassador Negro

and I, who came into the foreign service practically 

same time, more years ago than we are going to admit

thought that in our lifetime we would ever see 34 

36
to admit that I was actually in the U.S. Delegation 

1967 Summit in Punta del Este, and it was not tha

then. But the world was different in 1994, and it has 

different, and we hope it continues that way.

Nonetheless, of course, as we heard this mo

democracy is under siege not because there is a l

electoral commitment to it, but, as is pointed ou

morning and we have to keep in mind, because m

establishments in Latin America are part of society. 

you see the weakness of democratic institutions and 

infrastructures supporting that electoral demo

persistent and worsening inequality during the 

poverty on the increase, inequality between rich an

growing along with unemployment, economic growth 

has slowed down to below what the former World Ban

economist Sebastian Edwards calls the minimum le

3.6 percent economic growth needed simply to retain 

America where it is keeping up with the population g

rate—all of these are a mixed picture, constituting 

many different fault lines of democracy.

The good news, however, is that although the Free 

Area of the Americas has not expressed democracy in 

explicit words as the Treaty of Rome did for Europ

FTAA has become a democratic club. It is written be

the lines, even in the lines practically, that to rem

member of that club and to participate fully in the 

countries are expected to stay under demo

governance.

The pattern, of course, is, is mixed. In my 

civil-military relations have not made the full tran

that electoral democracy has. If you look at s

examples, you will find that the relationship is mi

different countries. Encouragingly, one country, Arge

where the military were most dominant and in 

anti-Americanism was very strong, has made perha

most complete transition to civilian governance of any 

37
especially when you think that since 1943, up until t

of the Malvinas or Falklands War in 1986, its politic

dominated by the military. That has disappeared alon

anti-Americanism. I go to Argentina quite a lot. 

Americanism has subsided to the point where 

practically vanished. The Argentine military have ta

the new and idealistic mission of peacekeeping. Th

one of the leading peacekeeping forces in the world 

along with the Canadians. They now teach it to other

academy in Buenos Aires.

In Brazil, there is a great public acceptance of m

involvement in fighting street crime, and that perh

one limitation to the military’s retirement from civilia

Certainly, in all countries, elected governments 

reduced the influence of armed forces in nonmilitary 

However, some commentators talk about the ne

governments to avoid the temptation to give the mil

routine role in issues of internal public security that 

belongs within competent civilian police organiza

Often this happens by default. In many countries, the 

organizations are inadequate to handle street crime. T

why the military moves in. They are not pushing the d

get in. They probably do not even want to be ther

unless civilian institutions and police organizations 

strengthened, that is simply what is going to happen

In some other countries, of course, the civil-m

transition is less complete. In another southern 

country, Chile, the situation is less resolved th

Argentina. There the military still have subst

political and economic prerogatives. When they left 

General Pinochet remained as head of the Army, an

voted themselves immunity from crimes against the c

population.

The Chilean military still has a considerable ove

capacity in its national security council. Ther

limitations on the civilian government to appoin

38
power of government to control the military budge

example, 10 percent of all the profits from the state 

company, CODELCO, which has not been and probab

not be privatized, go directly to the military.

Now, let me move on, because I promised we wo

very quick and get on to the interactive part of this. L

continue by building on and maybe adding a cou

thoughts on what the U.S. military can do. I am privile

live in a place where I am a close neighbor of G

Sanchez, General Wilhelm, and the people of SOUTH

They do a magnificent job in all of this, in prom

democratic values and helping institutions in the hur

relief cleanup and making sure that other units that a

permanently assigned to Latin America, such a

numerous National Guard units and reserve units t

down to Latin America, can play a helpful role. Th

tremendous resource.

Most of the people that go down into Honduras 

areas affected by the hurricane come from National 

units. These people bring tremendous expertise b

they are, most of the time, civilians who have a lot o

and technology that could be transferred, as well as 

positive attitudes.

I would say everywhere, and this is certainly t

what General Wesley Clark is doing in Europe righ

the person-to-person contact between the U.S. milita

Latin American military, in this case, can do what our 

in Europe is doing right down the the whole sw

Eastern Europe, everywhere from Estonia to Albani

missions are very much the same, and the message 

same: Encourage armies to adopt an affordable 

something that makes sense in their own national se

context; promote—and this needs reiterating al

again—the idea of civilian control; adopt a ra

budgeting system; decentralize decision-making.

39
training civilians to take an interest and become exp

national security matters. It has been, again by defaul

the military moved into these areas because there w

civilians that knew or cared about it. Now they can a

getting involved. Teaching democracy and human rig

U.S. military schools is another important area.

I have been privileged for the last few years to be 

Board of Visitors of the U.S. Army School of the Am

under the dedicated, visionary leadership of Ge

Hartzog as Commander of the Training and Do

Command (TRADOC). I can report to you that I am re

stand up any day and debate anybody that says th

School of the Americas should be closed. Peop

essentially fighting the history books, going back to 

other era in which they allege that the School pro

dictatorship, torture, and the violation of human 

which it never did. I would roundly debate those cr

the school. But I would say that is totally irrelevant. W

relevant is what the school teaches now, and I know 

well. I have been to Fort Benning a number of times. 

the routine of the Board of Visitors is to be in a classroo

of the students without any of the instructors. And th

time I met with a group, mostly Peruvians and a few 

from several other countries, I said, “All right. What a

learning in this school?” What do they come up with ri

the bat? Human rights, and not simply limited to the r

engagement but the whole conceptual basis of what h

rights are really all about. I was very impressed at wh

school had gotten across. I think a school has to be judg

what it is teaching currently, how much impact 

currently. I am absolutely satisfied that the School 

Americas is doing a splendid job in promoting dem

and human rights.

I would urge the Army and any interested civ

particularly members of Congress, to take an active 

in not only defending the School of the Americas whe

attacked, but actually promoting it as an ideal vehic

40
one—foreign military officers tend to pay more atten

U.S. military officers than they do to civilians from 

own country. Certainly they are not going to pa

attention to “gringo” civilians, however well-intention

these subjects.

So, I think the school ought to be maintaine

promoted. TRADOC runs the school, but the Sou

Command is its major client. It is a marvelous insti

that teaches in Spanish, unlike all the other fine 

schools where you have to learn English to attend the

I think that kind of experience repeated across the b

military schools that we have is an absolutely won

vehicle for promoting democracy.

Thank you.

41
THE ROLE OF THE U.S. ARMY

IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

IN THE AMERICAS

Donald E. Schulz

I’ve been asked to say a few words about the role 

U.S. Army in promoting democracy in the Americas 

use the phrase employed in the letter of invitation 

received to this conference—What role, if any, can th

Army play in encouraging the development of dem

institutions in the Americas?

A certain amount of skepticism is understandab

are accustomed to think of the Army in a less constr

role in Latin America. We have a long histo

intervention in the region. And Latin Americans, at 

tend to think of the U.S. military more in those term

as a force for political stability and democracy.

But times have changed. The Cold War is over and 

the days when the United States was willing to embra

repressive dictatorship simply because it was a

maintain political stability and prevent communism 

coming to power.

Today, the promotion of democracy is a priority i

the U.S. foreign policy agenda in the hemisphere. A

U.S. Army, as an instrument of that policy, is 

employed to help further that cause. How? In what w

the Army promoting democracy in Latin America?

Well, one way is by encouraging Latin Am

military officers to envision their profession in a m

that fosters democratic civil-military relations. 

education and training are critical. A military doctrin

be developed that emphasizes the proper role of the 

43
about respecting democratic elections or refraining 

launching golpes de estado, but about a willingness t

civilian authorities and respect human rights an

liberties.

Democracy is not a one-dimensional phenom

however. It is entirely possible to have a situation whe

have honest elections and yet the quality of that dem

is seriously undermined by violations of human 

Honduras, in the early 1980s, quickly comes to mi

perhaps Mexico today. And so there is a need to ed

Latin American military officers in democratic 

military relations and in the value of human rights.

This training must be explicit, substantive, and on

It is not a one-shot proposition. Going through the m

is not enough. You cannot just bring Latin American o

to the United States under the assumption that a s

exposure to U.S. society or to U.S. military profession

will foster democratic values. Osmosis does not wor

are talking about the transformation of highly a

itarian military cultures and the creation of new patte

democratic civil-military relations. That is not an 

thing. It never is. It will take more than one genera

transform the Latin American military culture. We w

that in the process there will be some military culture

will be much more difficult to transform than others

At the same time, education and training can

limited to the military. It is equally important to ed

civilians. One of the greatest impediments t

development of democratic civil-military relations 

remains a lack of competence and interest in na

defense and national security issues on the part of c

authorities. 

This is perhaps not surprising. In the past, na

security issues were dominated by the armed forces. 

American civilians had very little role in these matter

so, consequently, they had very little interest 

44
even when you had civilian ministers of defense

tended to be figureheads. Real power remained wi

military commanders.

Today, this has begun to change. When last I l

there were something like 20 civilian ministers of defe

Latin America, some of whom are exercising subst

authority. This being said, however, civilian control 

military still has a long way to go. And, in part, I 

argue, this is because of a lack of civilian competence—

competence—in national security matters.

One cannot expect military professionals to r

civilian leaders unless those leaders are also com

professionals. Without that, there will always be a c

distrust and, indeed, contempt underminin

relationship and, consequently, a temptation to 

civilian control, to ignore official policies, and perhap

resort to golpes de estado whenever civilian leade

perceived as endangering national security through 

incompetence and irresponsibility.

Thus it is important to educate civilian lead

national security issues; issues like defense manage

and military strategy, roles, and missions. And no

political leaders, there is also a need for a g

understanding and involvement of civil society in acad

in the private sector, and elsewhere.

It was with this need for civilian education in min

the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies was re

founded at the National Defense University at Fort M

in Washington, DC. Similarly, the Department of D

and the Department of the Army have been very ac

sponsoring conferences and seminars, such as last 

Sante Fe conference on “The Role of the Armed Forces 

Americas,” and this year’s Buenos Aires confe

designed to bring together civilians and military from 

Latin America and the United States to explore 

critical issues.

45
established programs and institutions of their own to 

together civilians and military officers in cours

national security issues. The U.S. Department of D

and the Department of the Army have played an imp

role in fostering and funding these kinds of activities

In sum, these programs, I believe, are steps in the 

direction. I think it would be a tremendous mistake f

U.S. military to keep its Latin American counterpa

arm’s length. It would be sending precisely the 

message, namely, that we do not care how they behav

that there would be no cost involved in return

traditional practices of political intervention and h

rights abuse. Latin Americans need armed forces th

more professional and more committed to working w

democratic system, not less. And here the U.S. Army 

important role to play as a teacher, mentor, and role m

Now this being said, I think it also has to be emph

that this is not an easy road that we are embarked 

There is a danger, I believe, in modernizing 

professionalizing the military without a compa

strengthening of the capacity of civilians to p

competent leadership. To strengthen the military w

strengthening civilian institutions and civilian lead

can weaken democratic civil-military relations by m

the civilians more dependent on the military and tem

the latter to intervene or assume a dominant role behi

scenes.

There are other ways also in which the U.S. 

supports democracy. The provision of humanit

assistance in the wake of Hurricane Mitch, for instanc

not merely done out of the goodness of our hearts. Th

not just humanitarian aid; it was also stability assis

One need only look back to the 1970s and the disa

earthquakes in Nicaragua and Guatemala to apprecia

destabilizing impact that such events can have on 

small and vulnerable societies. The inability 

46
these humanitarian crises and the incredible corr

that attended their efforts at relief and reconstructio

the effect of delegitimizing those governments and 

impetus to the guerrilla movements that flourished 

years that followed. By the same token, the inability 

Honduran and Nicaraguan governments today to cop

the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch could have pote

similar consequences.

Democracy rests on legitimacy. And the weaken

destruction of that foundation will imperil these n

and their still very fragile democratic systems. And 

very much in the U.S. interest to provide disaster reli

help reconstruct these countries. Here the U.S. mi

with its transport and medical and engineering capab

is providing a critical support to political stabilit

democracy in Central America. And it is doing s

things, I might add, in Haiti, where you have a M

Support Group engaged in engineering and medic

critical socioeconomic functions that the governm

Haiti cannot provide its citizens.

It should not be overlooked that the U.S. Arm

played a significant role in democracy restor

campaigns in recent years. Here I would simply ci

examples of Panama and Haiti. By the same token, 

even be argued that U.S. involvement in Central Ame

the 1980s helped bring democracy to countries l

Salvador and Honduras.

Now, this is something nobody likes to talk 

because military intervention is no longer fashionab

no longer politically acceptable. Even with the b

intentions, it cannot but stir memories of the old days

the United States intervened in Latin America at the d

a hat, for reasons that often had very little to do wi

promotion of democracy. Largely for this reason, an

fear of triggering an anti-U.S. reaction and because t

so little domestic political support in the United Sta

47
be options of last resort that are undertaken only wh

else fails. Or when they are undertaken, they are likel

multilateral rather than unilateral in nature, for ins

under the auspices of the United Nations.

I must point out that this is a very tricky area. E

Haiti, it can be argued that U.S. intervention was pro

less by a desire to restore democracy than by 

considerations. And that, in turn, suggests one 

pitfalls of the future. There may be circumst

somewhere down the line where the United States ma

again be tempted to intervene, and that the defe

democracy may serve as a legitimizing pretext fo

intervention.

And on that comforting thought, I will turn the p

over to the next person.

48
THE ROLE OF LAND FORCES

IN DRUG INTERDICTION:

THE NEED FOR CAUTION IN A PRAGMA

STRUGGLE

John D. Negroponte

Good afternoon, everybody.

I thought, both in the interest of time and also I s

this morning that there were a few occasions when w

not get to everybody’s questions and did not have a cha

discuss some of the issues as thoroughly as we migh

wanted to, that perhaps brevity is what is called for 

moment, and hopefully we can have a good disc

afterwards.

I thought Peter Hakim’s discussion this morning 

trends was really important in setting the stage f

meeting today. Just to recapitulate some of the poi

made, but also to add a thought of my own with resp

major global trends, let me mention a couple of the 

that he discussed. One was, of course, the trend t

democratization, and that is not only a Latin Am

trend, it is a worldwide one. The globalization of the w

economies is obviously another key trend. I would p

empowerment of individuals as certainly an imp

global trend that’s every bit as applicable to Latin Am

as it is to other parts of the world. The internet, m

technology, educational opportunities, all of these th

think, are working to empower individual citizens a

the world much more than they used to.

I think another important trend we have got t

about in the context of our meetings here today 

significant reduction of defense budgets around the 

49
existed during the Cold War. One of the most stagger

of numbers to look at is the information about the size 

current Russian economy, not the Russian defense b

the Russian economy, which is something on the or

400 or $500 billion. And when you think that at the he

our defense expenditures during the Re

administration, we had a $300 billion defense budget

was probably, in the terms of the dollars at that tim

that different than the size of the whole Russian ec

today. So you have got to think about that and wh

implications are in terms of reduced spending for m

activities and operations around the world.

Another point I would like to make, just in terms 

political changes we were talking about in the second 

this morning, is crucial and that is that political chan

come principally from within the various countries a

the world which have experienced that trend to

democracy. It has not been because we were there 

agent for the change. Surely, we played a r

encouraging it, and we certainly applauded it w

happened. But let’s not forget that the principal stimu

the political change towards democratization, whet

was in Eastern Europe or in the former Soviet Unio

Latin America, came from within these cou

themselves. And if you look at the dates when they occ

these pressures for change and this movement to

democratization started before the end of the Cold 

Perhaps it was accelerated by the end of the Cold War

started earlier and was attributable to a whole num

factors.

Now, against this very hasty background and wi

benefit of all the discussion that occurred this mo

what is the best role for the military in such matters a

enforcement? I would like to submit, first of all, that 

really are some philosophical problems with u

involving the military in such matters as counternarco

50
or should be a core competence of the military, w

we’re talking about the military in the United States 

military in other countries. I have in mind the quest

what is the mission of the military, and do counterna

activities really fit within that mandate?

The second issue I would raise on a philosophical p

whether or not the involvement of the military in co

narcotics activity, however justified by the immedia

specific situation, runs the risk corrupting the m

institution and, as a result, exacerbating the situa

think there are a number of countries that we can 

examples of this problem or at least where the questi

arisen.

Panama, I think, would be a good one, where, i

ultimately the Panamanian Defense Force became ba

a racketeering organization rather than an institutio

was fighting narcotics trafficking.

Clearly, in Mexico, that’s a philosophical issue th

been raised in the past and, I suspect, continues to be 

today. I certainly remember in my conversations wi

Mexican Minister of Defense that he had grave app

sions about involving the Mexican military i

counternarcotics struggle, other than the rather limit

of destroying marijuana crops.

You will remember that the Mexican Army ha

mission of going out about 25,000 strong every year d

the appropriate times to destroy the marijuana crop

other than that, they had an extremely limited rol

that, of course, has changed since that time.

But perhaps the most important philosop

operation, to my way of thinking is, does entrustin

military with a counternarcotics role delay the develo

of a genuinely effective law enforcement institution

you involve the military in your counternarcotics ac

Does that become a pretext for the body politic o

51
disregard what I think is the really difficult problem, 

is to develop an effective law enforcement institutio

country concerned? So let’s go back to the fundam

question: What is the most appropriate role?

I guess at the risk of seeming a little bit impre

would just say the appropriate role for the military i

the minimum necessary. On the other hand, one 

recognize the practicalities of certain situations. 

brings us now from the philosophical to the pragmati

it seems to me that there are certain types of pr

situations which call for the limited utilization of m

forces in the counternarcotics struggle. Clearly, one o

is in situations where the traffickers are using bla

military means. I mean, how can you argue that 

traffickers are basically a military force, that we cann

military force to counter them? You have to fight fir

fire. I suppose in today’s context, perhaps, the coun

Colombia would perhaps be one of the best examples

Another one would be to deal with specific issues th

beyond the capability of law enforcement agencie

thinking particularly of air and sea detection 

surveillance. When you are talking about a nar

problem that extends well beyond the national bord

any given country, but which is nonetheless a 

component of the situation, such as illicit flights or 

vessel traffic that are carrying drugs, it seems to me t

a very good case that can be made and has been ma

using air and naval assets for detection and surveilla

And certainly during my time in Mexico, from 198

think we saw some very successful applications o

model. We set up a so-called Northern Border Res

mechanism within the country of Mexico, that dep

heavily on intelligence information that came on a rea

basis from our air and naval assets that were working 

over international waters and air space.

52
must be constraints. I do not think that counterna

should be the core military mission. I think that 

missions as are undertaken should be viewed as tem

or transitional.

Now, when we’re talking about the use of our 

forces in the 21st century, you might ask, “Well, how 

temporary or transitional?” I don’t know; several yea

years. But I don’t see that kind of a mission neces

being something that military forces should be under

well into the next century.

Another point I would make is that, to the 

possible, that interdiction should be as close to the sou

possible.

I recall when these flights that we were tracking 

come into Mexico, if you did not catch them wher

landed, forget it. Once they had gotten onto the groun

were able to unload their cargo to trucks, taxis, wh

other conveyance they used to then move up north a

the narcotics across our land border, you were really lo

for a needle in a haystack. I think whatever activit

undertake should be undertaken in the context of 

funding for the development of law enforcement ag

and building up their capabilities to the maximum 

possible.

Finally, let me suggest that, as we try to draw 

conclusions in this discussion, we be careful not to forg

overall policy context in which we are operating. I 

think that we can talk in terms of our assisting the 

American military, supporting or assisting them 

counternarcotics struggle in isolation from overall pol

I think that President Bush, in mentioning the 

Trade Initiative that occurred during his administr

the overall effort to develop a sense of community 

hemisphere, these are the key policy initiatives, it se

me, that need to be encouraged. And a counterna

53
policy context. And I would submit that if all you h

assisting Latin American military in combating drug

you neglect these other aspects, such as the free 

arrangement for the Americas, sooner or later that po

bound to founder.

54
THE USE OF ARMED FORCES

IN DRUG INTERDICTION:

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Bruce M. Bagley

Good afternoon. I was invited here actually as a 

advocate. I was told that someone had read a mono

that I wrote for the North-South Center called 

militarization” and that I was expected to lay o

problems that are involved in the use of the military

the U.S. and Latin American militaries. I come and 

this morning that Ambassador Negroponte and I ag

many of these central issues. So my role as devil’s ad

need not be quite as intense as I thought it might be

But let me lay out what I think are the basic mi

that are involved with regard to the United States 

war on drugs, particularly in Latin America. I then w

move on to a second set of points regarding the limitat

the downside or the counterproductive aspects of the 

the U.S. and of Latin American militaries—some of 

were mentioned by Ambassador Negroponte already

then, finally, I would like to move to what other compo

are necessary beyond the role of the U.S. and the 

American militaries to even begin to address the iss

drug trafficking and the national security problem

they represent.

Very quickly, I think that the inventory of pri

missions for the U.S. military in the war on drugs in 

America and, to some extent here at home, are four-fol

first, and one that has been carried out, I think, with 

considerable efficiency, is the support of the interdic

illegal drug shipments from Latin America into the U

States in the air, on the seas, and along our borders

55
years—since President Reagan first declared this 

national security issue in 1985-86.

But I also want to point out at the start that, desp

increased involvement of the U.S. military and the 

our equipment, illegal shipments of drugs are 

available in the United States, drugs are cheaper and 

to get in our country today than they were when we s

this; and that anyone who thinks that interdicti

matter how much we spend on it, is going to solv

problem, is fundamentally mistaken. It is not a st

which can work, in any overall sense, to halt the f

drugs from Latin America or other parts of the wor

the United States.

I think there is a second major role that the U.S. m

can play which has to do with planning and carrying 

intelligence operations and the sharing of that inform

both with Latin American militaries and with 

American law enforcement agencies as well as our ag

here. The U.S. military is particularly well-equip

carry out that mission.

One of the fundamental limitations has bee

inability to share that information both within the ag

here in the United States and a variety of law enforc

and military establishments in Latin America. We ne

go beyond the examples that Ambassador Negropon

indicated.

I think there is a third mission for the U.S. mi

which is the training of both military and law enforc

personnel in the strategies and tactics that the U.S. m

uses and that it considers most appropriate in all th

We have a serious problem here in using that tr

and making it adequate and inculcating it into the m

establishments of a variety of Latin American cou

whose priorities and whose missions are very 

56
here in the United States.

Finally, the U.S. military has the capacity to 

example for Latin American militaries througho

region with regard to the proper subordination 

military to civilian leadership and the educatio

training of military establishments in the region on ho

conducts a professional military operation.

That being said, I think that this fourth mission is 

the more important ones that the U.S. military has

was very happy to hear from a variety of speakers that 

become an increasingly important part of the way th

military looks at its mission in Latin America.

As I move to the second set of points, I want to emp

the problems and risks and counterproductive asp

want to begin with a statement which runs slightly co

to some of the optimistic statements about democrac

were made this morning.

In my opinion, one of the fundamental problems th

U.S. military confronts in dealing with drug traffick

Latin America and in training and educating 

American military and law enforcement institutions 

total absence of effective democracy in many of 

countries. It is difficult to subordinate the militar

nonexistent or a corrupt or ineffective demo

leadership. Colombia has had major crises in its lead

under President Sampar. Mexico has for years 

considered one of the more corrupt countries i

hemisphere. We need not talk about President Zedil

we could talk about President Carlos Salinas de Gorta

his brother, Raul.

Given such examples, subordination to e

authorities rings a bit hollow in a variety of Latin Am

countries. And I think that is a fundamental problem 

the U.S. military must confront in its dealings with 

American militaries when we preach the subordina

57
authorities lack legitimacy in places where only f

democracy is adhered to—where corruption runs ram

If that kind of starting point is accepted, at least fo

of the countries in the region, I think that we hav

serious difficulty in implementing some of the ver

words that were said this morning about the subordi

of Latin American militaries to democratic auth

throughout the region. We have what I think are 

formal democracies. Everybody points to the fact th

have democratically elected governments, but we 

effective, responsible, and legitimate democracy in 

parts of Latin America. Certainly in the Andean r

whether we are talking about Peru or Ecuador or Col

or Venezuela, we should have serious concerns abou

deeply democratic the commitments of the ci

leadership, in fact, are.

Moving on to a second point. I think that th

military runs, as does the U.S. Government in general

severe risks of distorting the precarious balance be

military and civilian leadership in a variety of 

American countries. First, inflated budgets created b

aid for narcotics interdiction provide huge amou

resources within the context of Latin America. Not w

the context of our own country—but within the con

Latin America—military establishments there are 

often only tenuously controlled by civilian leadership

President Andres Pastrana went to Washingto

came back with a package of $289 million. Primarily, 

aid to be given to the military and the police—the na

police in Colombia, which is subordinate to the mi

Under these circumstances, that is a huge increase 

military budget and distorts balance and control, 

opinion—or at least has that potential. In countrie

Ecuador or Peru or Bolivia, where national budge

extremely limited, a few hundred million here and the

up to a lot of money in terms of political power f

58
careful of. These are not necessarily decisions th

military makes. But the U.S. military is ofte

instrument of implementation chosen by Washi

particularly in the current context, and one that def

can introduce distorting effects in the balance betwee

and military authorities.

I also think that there is a second problem. In 

countries, it has become more obvious than others. I 

call it, just to give a shorthand version, the establishm

back-channel communications between military gro

that is, communications between the U.S. militar

military establishments in Latin America that 

circumvent or only pay formal lip service to civilian c

The adoption of General Serrano, the police ch

Colombia, is one example of how the United State

elevated a particular individual, whom I think is 

respectable, without any question, but who has take

much larger-than-life role.

Finally, I think that there is a potential in this con

overemphasizing the military’s role in halting the pro

drug trafficking in Latin America over other prioriti

increasing the potential for authoritarian arrangeme

emerge. I do not mean military coups. I think military 

have largely been ruled out—both because of 

experiences and because of the automatic nature o

reaction to any military golpe in Latin America. I refe

more to the likelihood of Fujimori-style (President of 

relationships, in which the military and some c

authorities basically shunt aside institutions such 

judiciary or the Congress or other parts of governmen

effectively rule the country without any true demo

participation.

Ultimately, by distorting budgets, by establishin

channels, and by increasing the role of the military a

authority within these countries, unintended consequ

59
have to be extremely careful of.

I agree with Ambassador Negroponte that making 

American militaries the punta de lanca (point of the 

in the war on drugs in various Latin American cou

runs the very high risk of exposing them extraordina

the corruptive and corrosive effects of drug traffi

Mexico is the best example possible.

President Zedillo, in an act of desperation, broug

military into the war on drugs in Mexico. I am not sur

the count on generals is right now who are under arr

under indictment, but we are talking at least a half a 

In a variety of other Latin American countries, we hav

the same thing, and it runs right down through the 

command structure, interrupting the chain of com

distracting military establishments from some of 

principal missions in these countries, and running th

of corrupting yet another institution in very serious 

That corruption will generate not just a couple of ye

problems, but decades of problems in various 

American countries.

I also think that it overshadows the nee

Ambassador Negroponte pointed out, of strength

civilian law enforcement agencies and the administra

justice in a variety of these countries. We can talk 

extradition of criminals, whether the Medellin o

cartels or some other cartel in Colombia or—the four 

families in Mexico. We can talk about their extradi

the United States. But until countries in the region ar

to administer justice effectively, deal with thei

transnational criminal organizations and bring th

justice, imprison them and stop them from trafficki

have not succeeded in what is the major task of this 

To postpone that effort by throwing the military in 

short-term basis seems to me not only dangerou

ultimately counterproductive. It is the strengthen

civilian law enforcement and the administration of j

60
going to strengthen democracy throughout the regio

Finally, there are two points here that I think m

added in the counterproductive part. First, ther

problem in a country like Colombia, that bringin

military into the drug trafficking problem also brin

U.S. military increasingly into contact with the intern

within Colombia—that is, with the guerrilla war.

The argument from the Colombian military, and I 

rightly so, has been that some elements of the 

Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC

increasingly active in drug trafficking. There is no qu

that they are. Nonetheless, the United States is find

difficult to maintain a distinction between insurge

guerrilla warfare on the one hand, and drug traffick

the other. Colombia represents the ultimate nightm

that is, the involvement of the United States in an in

war in a country in Latin America where there ha

fighting for almost 40 years.

Finally, and most importantly, I think that the 

rization of the drug war runs the risk of overshadowi

alternative policies that must be pursued if any drug c

effort or drug war is going to be effective.

I want to quickly enumerate what I consider to 

central or key elements, more important than the role 

military itself. The first that I would emphasize is the 

issue of alternative development. This means no

eradication, not fumigation, not spraying, not 

substitution, but a development strategy for those ar

Peru, in Colombia, and in parts of Mexico, for exampl

have been engaged in drug trafficking for decades, an

have been largely abandoned by their countries 

hundreds of years. We are not talking about somethin

is recent. We are talking about something that is been 

on for centuries in several parts of Latin America.

61
roads now and have never been effectively connected 

the central parts of the country. It is a quest

development, and until that effort is undertaken, the

be groups of peasants out in these regions under the s

the FARC that have no realistic alternative. To spra

eradicate crops is to leave them with nothing and to cr

recruitment program for the FARC—nothing else.

Under these circumstances, a serious altern

development program, which will cost billions—some

called the Mini-Marshall Plan by a variety of count

the region—seems to me the sina qua non of any s

effort at drug control over the long term. That k

economic commitment is probably not available; cer

not in the context of the economic downturn that we 

described this morning. But without development, w

going to be back here in 5 years talking about the role o

forces in the war on drugs one more time.

I think institution building, in the largest sense, 

second major priority. One where the military has 

role, but where other, mainly civilian, agencies have c

roles. The Department of Justice, Agency for Interna

Development (AID), the State Department to an exten

other civilian agencies, all have critical roles in deve

civilian law enforcement, justice systems, and congre

many of these areas.

And, finally, given my lack of time, I would emp

that, if we are going to develop a hemispheric comm

to a war on drugs, it has to be one in which the c

leadership feels like a participant in a proce

multilateral monitoring and certification, not a proc

unilateral U.S. certification which stimulates or pro

nationalist reactions in a variety of countries.

Thank you.

62
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS

William W. Hartzog

There is a great philosopher some of you might 

named Gary McCord. He titled a book, “A Range Ba

Box of Titlist.” I know, this afternoon, what he was f

when he wrote that.

I am a mechanic. I am not a student. I am 

philosopher or strategist or anything else about this 

But I have spent 9 years in the business of Latin Am

and counternarcotics in a variety of places. I wa

operations officer in JUST CAUSE, and I replaced a 

named Marc Cisneros, whom some of you might kn

the Commander of our forces in Latin America afte

Over the rest of my military career, I have had the cha

provide forces to the border in the Task Force 6 area, a

Mexican border. I was one of the chief planners for the 

Operation. And I spent the last 4 years trying to p

what the U.S. Army would be like in the future.

I would like to spend about 5 minutes—and I p

you I will make it as short as I can—trying to emp

some things regarding counternarcotics operation

have not been discussed. I will try to do it at a lower l

mechanical level, and to focus on what the Army migh

to this kind of operation—this type of campaign. 

reluctant to use the word “war,” because I think th

poor word and not analogous to what we are trying t

all.

I would like to end with a minute’s worth of som

we have not touched on today: to try to forecast the fut

look at what might be 10, 15 years from now in this 

and to bring all of our minds to bear on what the land 

role might be in a scenario that we can only dream abo

63
the crystal ball with me.

I turned over command of the forces in Latin Ame

1991. We had three huge problems. What if someon

asked me, “What is inhibiting our ability to make pr

in counternarcotics operations from a U.S. perspe

The military is not the lead, nor has ever been the le

this operation—we have been in a support role for the 

time. I would have told them three things. First, I 

have said that we do not have a long-term commitme

do not have a long-term view. Every plan I participa

writing; every plan, indeed, that I participated in exec

was 1, 2, or 3 years. This is not a 1-, 2-, or 3-year con

Historically, it hasn’t been, and likely won’t be. The s

thing I would have said is that it is not very well fund

the time, I think we had something like 3 percent 

foreign military sales budget to spend in the region 

That has been halved and almost eradicated since. T

would have said that we didn’t have a way of mea

whether we are doing anything or not. We can pat our

on the back, we can look at prices, we can look at gr

things, we can take pictures, we can use hectares, w

use numbers of deaths, we can use any number of t

But we had no consensus on whether or not we were m

progress.

Since that time, we have established the Off

National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). They 

published a number of 10-year strategies. I think th

number of organizations within the United State

understand what those strategies are about, an

confluence of different agencies that participate in th

growing.

The budget has increased. In 1981, for example, 

lumped all of the dollars from our budget together from 

our agencies that had anything to do with this problem

totaled about a billion-and-a-half dollars. In 1998, 

used the same contributors, you will have about $16 

64
not. We will come back to that in a moment.

In the last several years, we have produced two dif

documents that try to get at orders of measurement—

that we might try, things that we can grade ourselv

things to tell us whether or not we are making any pro

Are we winning, are we helping, or are we part 

problem, as some have alluded to today?

Well, before I talk about the land force, let us r

quickly what the goals of the United States—n

military, not the land force, but the goals of the U

States—are in drug control: Drug control—all drugs

We say that we are going to educate our youth

brings some ideas to mind. This is a generational pr

Is educating our youth once enough? The answer, obv

is no. You might educate a youth, but you might not ed

the son, grandson, or granddaughter of that same yo

We include alcohol and tobacco in those things th

are going to call illicit drugs, at least in our policy. I

right or not? I do not know, but it certainly stretch

horizon of what we are trying to cover. We are try

reduce drug-related crime and drug-related violen

there a role for the military in that? Maybe. I will com

to that.

We are trying to reduce health and social costs. T

a tremendous correlation between drug use and ill 

and drug use and crime and violence.

The two things that are most traditionally asso

with land forces are shielding our borders, and doing 

things outside our borders to assist our friends an

allied nations who have these problems—both 

growing and interdiction areas. These efforts attem

eradicate or to diminish the supply. This is a supp

demand problem.

65
very best folks that I could find in ONDCP and other 

and had them produce for me all of the statistics bec

wanted to tell you—“This is how we are doing.” There 

lot of protestations and a lot of discussions. You migh

these numbers I am about to give you nauseating

might find them false. Alternatively, you might find 

encouraging. I do not know.

Since 1979, the number of current users of illicit dr

this country has declined from 25.4 million to 13.9 mi

45 percent decline. Do you believe it? If you do, in the 

time frame, our budget has gone from 1 1/2 billion to 

billion dollars.

Second, the nation is moving away from cocaine. C

use of cocaine in the household population is down f

peak in 1985 of 5.7 million users to 1 1/2 million in 19

the same time, I would tell you marijuana use is incr

dramatically among the younger part of our populat

At the same time that these things have been 

tionally our targets, as far as the United States is conc

use rates are coming down. Overall, heroin, in a num

different forms, is on the rise. Methamphetamines a

on the rise. They are no longer emergent drugs. Th

drugs that are with us, and with us in a very large w

We have a strategy in our nation today. Our na

priorities for how we are going to combat this and r

supply is cocaine first, heroin second, methampheta

third, and marijuana fourth. We have regional pri

about how we are going to help in the growin

interdiction areas. Colombia is the first priority, M

second, Peru and Bolivia, third and fourth.

We have Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs

give us the reason for why we are doing this. And a

that whole background, since 1989, and my pe

experience, the military has had a role. It is a suppor

We have statutory responsibilities. We have the lead i

66
of the shipment of drugs between production an

borders.

We also have a primary assist role in integ

command and control apparatus—moving inform

about targets back and forth. We make inform

available when our policies say that we can do that f

allied and partner countries.

We have the responsibility to approve and fund c

National Guard programs. And we have the respons

to provide support on an as-needed basis to othe

agencies. Now, there are problems with all that, and 

get very pragmatic and very practical about it all.

We are not the lead agency. We respond to 

agencies, and do it rather well. But we are not there at 

of the endgames, because the endgame requires the 

to arrest. The military is not in that, has not been in it

would say to you, in my personal opinion, should 

involved in it. So we are in assistance to a lot of dif

agencies. What effect does that have on the readin

units?

Well, you have to work hard to make the supp

counternarcotics operations compatible with traini

larger, hot wars. It is possible. It can be done. Bu

difficult. And it is something that you have to put a 

time and planning effort in to make it occur. Those 

that I jotted down here that I have personal knowle

and that I have been involved with during the last 10 

are things like running radars, training people how 

radars, monitoring movement of transit business. M

host nation support. Mostly allied force-to-force m

training teams and training missions. We hav

provided intelligence to countries who needed it. A

same time, we have provided planning, logistical tra

and manpower support to countries who needed it. W

conducted exchange programs with a number of tr

67
schools, proudly, was the School of the Americas.

We are also involved in the research, developmen

acquisition of different kinds of hardware and techno

that you might use in working or eradicating the drug 

So the role of the military is in the organizat

operational, and institutional modes.

Lastly, and here is where I am going to have you su

judgement with me. There are two ways to think abo

future, in my judgement. You stand rooted in the pr

understand where you are, know the conditions aroun

and move cautiously and reactively into a future that 

upon you. We talked this morning about threats th

were not in front of. There is another way to change 

move forward. That is with more courage, anticipate o

mentally out into the future, and stand on a theo

mountain top and describe what you think might be

then look back to where you are today and pull yo

forward. I have always preferred to try to do that. So 

walk into the future and see where we might be 10, 

years from now in this business. I will paint 

parameters here, because I am both optimisti

pessimistic, as many of us are.

I think it is a sure bet that illicit drugs and the 

illicit drugs are pandemic, they are worldwide. As fa

can see into the future, they will continue to be a 

societal problem. In my judgement, this is a genera

problem. It is something that cannot be cured in a 

time, or done once. It is something that req

particularly on the demand side, continuing edu

throughout generations.

It seems to me that there is a trend in reduction 

use of chemical, biological, and natural agents; may

increase in the use of purely synthetic agents.

Now, you do not have to be a Star Trek reader to a

some of the things that are written in our science fictio

68
assumptions and assertions of many kinds of addictiv

devices and other things that may not even fit the n

that we call illicit drugs today—things that we ha

begun to dream about yet, synthetics.

Many of the cartels in the large drug traff

organizations were things we all fought, understood

plotted to work against in the early 1990s. They 

fractured and broken into smaller mom-and-pop o

zations. Maybe it is fair to say that we are headed tow

future in which there is a fragmented and ill-d

structure. Perhaps an analogy to “the Berlin Wall” c

down.

You can understand a diagram of familie

organizations. You can target a company that runs air

But, if it is 16 different countries and different places 

folks who do not normally or culturally do that sort of 

you have a much more difficult case.

There seems to be a reduction in tobacco use in old

citizens, but an increase in younger age. What does th

us? There are increases in alcohol use at all ages a

the-board. What does that tell us? What does our 

landscape tell us?

We know that information is a burgeoning thin

ability to move information bits—the digitization 

world. We can see things today, instantly, that took a 

or two to see before. It took 8 to 10 hours to send a 

message of five kilometers in 1865, 1864, at Gettysb

took about 6 hours to send the same sort of message in 

War II by telegraph. Today, we can all look at the same 

on the same screen at the same time. What do sat

have to do with overhead view and 2015 in the co

narcotics business? We should not be afraid of techno

is with us.

One of the things that I firmly believe is that w

spend all of the energy in doing support operations, a

69
deal with these problems. We can do it in the air, on 

and at sea. The land part of it is mostly, in my judge

training, intelligence collection, analysis sharin

supporting, qualifications like linguistic training

document exploitation. Those sorts of things that 

long-term benefits. “Train the trainer” still comes to 

when I think about these things.

There are some technical breakthroughs that we h

commit ourselves to, both medically and otherwise. M

there is a chemical of some description that is the an

Antabuse that will tell you it is a very lousy thing to 

illicit drug. I do not know. But those are things that w

work on.

I do not know if this is our future, but I do know 

there is a role for the land force in it. It is 

straightforward one. It does impact on the readin

forces to do other things. It has to be managed careful

in my judgement, it cannot be avoided.

70
THE USE OF ARMED FORCES

IN THE AMERICAS: AN OVERVIEW

Max G. Manwaring

Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of the 

system and the verities that shaped nations’ pur

policies, and priorities have undergone fundam

changes. Old concepts of security are no longer comp

relevant. In this connection, there are powerful intern

external organizations and individuals who argu

there is no longer any military requirement for armed 

in Latin America. Moreover, there is also a strong arg

that military forces—indigenous and foreign—ar

primary obstacle to democracy in the hemisphere

consequence, there is considerable pressure for the 

forces either to find new missions or to fold their tents 

away.

This anthology examines the related proble

security and civil-military relations within the con

the contemporary “new world disorder.” Thus, wh

danger from the destabilizing efforts of the Soviet 

and Cuba is no longer credible, it has been replaced 

less direct “nontraditional” threats emanating 

narcotrafficking, organized crime, and corruption. 

sure, in the meantime, insurgencies in Colombia, M

and Peru drag on; border problems—most notably be

Ecuador and Peru, and between Brazil and those who 

encroach on its Amazon territories—persist; and, fin

struggle for the controversial resources of the terr

seas looms in the dim future as a very real national se

issue for every country in South America except Para

Nevertheless, the consensus is that the most poten

most immediate threats to national security and surv

71
pervasive illegal drug industry.

In elaborating this thesis, this overview develo

argument that the security of Latin America and the 

the global community will depend on internationa

domestic policies that provide for political sta

economic progress, and social justice. A corollary t

argument is that internal and external securit

depends on a cooperative and constructive civil-m

relationship. Within this context, this overview exa

(1) the major political, economic, and social trends in 

America; (2) strategic issues that relate to the use o

forces in the Americas; and (3) civil-military relation

and for the future. It draws from points made b

speakers at the conference.

Major Trends in the Americas.

The end of the Cold War brought significant im

ments in U.S. relations with Latin America, and chan

the role of the armed forces and civil-military rel

throughout the region. The so-called neo-liberal revo

gave democratically-elected civilian leaders new str

and eroded the influence of the military. It also gener

sea change in the economies of the hemisphere, movin

the command economies of a long authoritarian era 

free market economies of today. In this context, 

America has enjoyed the fruits of the “new world orde

much greater extent than most of the rest of the worl

something of the “new world disorder” has also crep

this part of the global community.

Peter Hakim elaborates on these changes and ca

of the temptations associated with such immediat

profound political, economic, and social transformati

identifies the key trends in Latin America as (

strengthening of democracy, (2) sustaining eco

development, (3) overcoming the vast povert

72
Americas. In these terms, it is important to note tha

• There has been no coup in the hemisphere in al

generation;

• Every country in the region has sold off many 

state-owned enterprises and has initiate

economic reforms necessary to get its fiscal ho

order;

• The resultant economic growth, however, i

below what is needed to effectively address the t

reducing poverty and inequality; and,

• Anti-Americanism does not win elections anym

most Latin American countries want closer, 

cooperative relations with the United States. T

the good news.

The bad news is that the changes these trends in 

America portend have not yet produced the result

could and should have been achieved. In this connec

• Democratic institutions are not working very 

there are still enormous problems of governa

and there is still a serious question rega

reconciliation of the authoritarian misdeeds 

past and the resultant polarization of some socie

• As noted above, the economies of the regio

growing too slowly.

• Latin America remains the most socially unequ

of the world.

• The United States seems to be unable to u

current good relations to build a more genuin

enduring relationship in the hemisphere.

Terry McCoy is even less sanguine and points out t

73
e oe questoote acoabe po

institutions is adversely affecting economic poli

progress.

• There is an obvious economic slow-down taking 

in Latin America that could easily result in a 

recession.

• Political and economic reforms have not affecte

positive way, widespread poverty and in

inequality.

• Lack of U.S. commitment—most importantly 

promulgating Fast-Track negotiating author

not allowing the possibility of fulfilling its pot

partnership in Latin America.

Thus, the trends toward democracy, free m

economies, social equality, and viable partnership w

United States are not only trends. They are also chal

for now and the future. There is not only a challe

better political, economic, social, and partne

performance, however. There is the additional challe

overcoming temptations that Latin America, for the 

part, has been historically unable to resist. 

temptations involve:

• A reversion to authoritarian politics to allow a 

leader to solve difficult problems for the polity

• A reversion to irresponsible populist econom

placate restless populations; and, 

• A reversion to anti-Americanism to excuse e

rassing internal authoritarian failures.

Mr. Hakim reminds us that, “Yielding to 

temptations over time has led to squandered opportu

for decent democratic government and sustained eco

advance.” Clearly, no one should underestimat

challenges ahead. What is being attempted in 

74
dimensions—political, economic, social, and diplom

simultaneously.

Strategic Issues that Relate to the Use

of Land Forces in the Americas.

In the past, security on the U.S. southern flan

primarily associated with possible external trad

military threats concerning access to or denial of s

strategic raw materials, military bases and m

support, vital maritime routes and choke points

regional markets to actual or perceived enemies. 

these were the things that mattered, the United 

could ignore internal conditions within the hemisph

however, what concerns the United States abo

southern flank today is the capacity to buy U.S. pro

reduce instability and continue the developme

democratic and free market institutions; and to coo

on shared problems like the environment, refugee 

and illegal drug trafficking, the United States will co

to have an important—but more internal—na

security stake in Latin America.

A corollary to this argument is that U.S. and 

American security depends on a cooperativ

constructive civil-military relationship. What is req

then, is a combined civil-military effort to apply th

human and physical resources of cooperating nati

generate the real well-being of an individual country a

political, economic, and geographic partners.

Dr. McCoy, Ambassador Moss, and Ambas

Negroponte strongly associate the current t

characterizing the political and economic transforma

Latin America with initiatives that began under the 

administration. Ambassador Moss asserts that 

Enterprise for the Americas Initiative” speec

President made 10 years ago “really enunciated 

beginning for U.S.-Latin American relations. That 

75
administration, but also for the Clinton administrat

Former President George Bush, in his luncheon s

to the conference on December 15, 1998, explaine

“there is no substitute for decisive U.S. leadership as 

for peace, a force for freedom in the world.” He wen

state that there are plenty of threats to peace and fre

and that,

In Latin America threats come specifically in the form of 

drug cartels and corruption. If left unchecked, these two canc

alone would corrode and ultimately destroy the fruits 

hard-won reforms which have already done so much to prov

stability and lift the standard of living for much of 

hemisphere.

Bush further implied that in the post-Cold War e

dominant threats to the Western Hemisphere, and th

of the world, are manifested in nontraditional way

most acute national security challenges toda

transnational and internal threats that emanate 

nonstate actors and the corruption they engender.

If not confronted effectively (at the strategic as wel

operational levels) they can corrode the very fabric of soc

and the fundamental institutions of law and order.

Ambassador Moss takes President Bush’s logic 

further and suggests that the Bush and Clinton initi

for peace, freedom, and stability in Latin America r

an integrated, holistic approach in which land forc

participate and contribute.

I think any kind of professional military endeavor, whethe

medicine or law or engineering or anything else in which her

interchange, is assistance and it is also a transfer of technolo

That is a positive inducement to the promotion of democr

simply because it is building civilian infrastructure as wel

building of civilian societies.

76
forces—and particularly the U.S. Army—in encou

the development of democratic political, economic, 

and military institutions in the Americas comes into c

focus. Donald E. Schulz outlines three ways the 

military acts as a force for democracy and stability.

First, the U.S. Army is encouraging Latin Am

officers to envision their profession in a manner that f

democratic and constructive civil-military relations

values human rights. The key enablers are the ex

programs and the military-to-military programs cond

by the armed forces of the United States. Second, S

argues that education and training cannot be limited 

military. It is also important to develop civ

competence—basic competence—in national se

matters to preclude the perception that civilian

endanger the national security as a result of 

incompetence and irresponsibility. Continuing edu

conducted by the U.S. armed forces is helping 

American countries keep from falling victim to the 

temptations that were described by Peter Hakim. F

the provision of humanitarian assistance—as in the c

the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch—is not merely hu

tarian assistance. It is also stability assistance. Thu

U.S. military has an important role to play as “a te

mentor, and role model.”

Ambassador Negroponte agrees that armed forc

make a contribution to overall peace, developmen

stability efforts. He also agrees that it is some

necessary for the military to step in and deal with situ

police cannot handle. Even so, he argues for limit

caution.

I would just say the appropriate role is for the military to 

the minimum necessary; but, on the other hand, one has 

recognize the practicabilities of certain situations. That brin

us now from the philosophical to the pragmatic. It seems to 

that there are certain types of practical situations which c

for the limited utilization of military forces in the count

77
the traffickers are using blatantly military means. I mean, h

can you argue that if the traffickers are basically military fo

that we can’t use military force to counter them? You hav

fight fire with fire . . . But still, even under these circumstan

I think there must be constraints. I don’t think t

counternarcotics should be the core military mission. I th

that such missions as are undertaken should be viewed 

temporary or transitional.

Bruce Bagley finds himself in basic agreemen

Ambassador Negroponte, but takes his argument for 

and caution another step toward the strategic reality

The first thing I would emphasize is the whole issue 

alternative development . . . To spray, to eradicate crops, i

leave people with nothing and to create a recruitment progr

for the FARC (a Colombian insurgent force), nothing else 

Under these circumstances, a serious alternative developm

program, which will cost billions—sometimes called 

Mini-Marshall Plan by a variety of countries in 

region—seems to me the sina qua non of any serious effor

drug control over the long-term . . . Without it, we’re going t

back here 5 years from now talking about the role of land fo

in the war on drugs once again . . . I think institution building

the largest sense, is the second major priority. One where 

military has some role, but where other, mainly civi

agencies, have critical roles.

These discussions of the strategic application of m

power to the Latin American threat environment ta

United States back to the issues of civil-military rel

and U.S.-Latin American cooperation.

Suffice it to say here that solutions to nationa

international security issues involving contemp

defense, democracy, development, drug trafficking

stability and instability are too important and too 

only one or a few institutions of a society—or even 

societies—to confront. Governance, socio-economic j

and stability requirements demand integrated str

political, economic, social, and diplomatic—as w

78
expertise and the resources of an institution—e

distrusted military—that could be used to help ge

necessary reforms and development solutions to na

and regional security and stability problems would 

terrible waste of scarce resources.

These would be but two of several reasons that p

added strength to the case for continued, sustaine

active engagement in Latin America. It would appear

that leadership in the U.S.-Latin American security c

requires a long-term commitment and a conti

dialogue on the part of all the parties to the issue.

Civil-Military Relations Now and for the Futur

Since the end of the Cold War, the nature 

international security system and the verities that s

U.S. and Western national purposes, policies, stra

and priorities have undergone fundamental chang

place of the predictable Cold War international stru

we now have a world of dangerous uncertainty and po

ambiguity in which time-honored concepts of securi

the classical military means to attain it, while nec

under some circumstances, are no longer sufficient

consequence, it is important to revisit some of the im

tives of contemporary inter-agency and multina

counternarcotics and stability operations. It i

important to consider the implications of what we 

about the role of military forces in counternarcotic

stability operations in the future.

Retired U.S. Army General William W. Hartzog 

out that:

• These kinds of operations are not the usual on

or three year short-term commitment—“Histor

it hasn’t been, and likely won’t be.”

79
Couteacotcs opeatos oateca 

not been very well-funded, yet better fund

necessary to carry out the given tasks.

• Consensus measures of effectiveness have 

lacking, but are necessary to determine progr

lack of it.

• The counternarcotics problem is a supply and de

problem, thus, in addition to cutting supply, w

also educate our youth to help cut demand.

• The military is not the lead agency i

counternarcotics arena, but the armed forces 

role—“it is a support role.”

• You have to work hard to make support comp

with training for larger, hot wars—it is possibl

it can be done.

Clearly these points reflect strategic realities in t

of armed forces in Latin America—and elsewhere. 

realities direct attention to at least two current and 

requirements. First, it is necessary to prepare adeq

for a long-term commitment. Second, it is import

appreciate the fact that the armed forces can and will 

positive but limited role in support of other U.S. ag

and allied countries in promoting defense, demo

development; and more effectively controlling illega

trafficking.

Regarding the future, specifically, General H

acknowledges the likelihood that illegal drugs—pr

more in the form of synthetics than na

substances—will continue to generate broad so

problems 10 to 15 years from now. His summary 

situation is succinct: “I don’t know if this is our future

do know that there is a role for the land force in it. It i

straightforward one. It does impact on the readin

80
in my judgement, it cannot be avoided.”

81
BRUCE M. BAGLEY is a Professor of International S

at the School of International Studies (SIS), Univer

Miami. He is also coeditor (with Dr. William C. Smith) 

Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affair

principal research interests center on U.S. and 

American relations with particular emphasis on illega

trafficking in Colombia, other Andean countries, C

America, and Mexico. Among his recent publicatio

Drug Trafficking in the Americas and Drug Traff

Research in the Americas: A Bibliographic Survey.

PETER HAKIM is President of the Inter-Ame

Dialogue, a Washington-based center for policy an

and exchange on Western Hemisphere relation

addition, he authors a regular column for the Chr

Science Monitor, and serves on the External Ad

Committees of the Latin American Program of the 

Bank. Previously, Mr. Hakim was a Vice President 

Inter-American Foundation, a U.S. Government foun

that supports grassroots development projects in 

America, and he managed the international resourc

environment program of the Ford Foundation. H

published numerous articles on political and eco

issues in the Western Hemisphere in major newsp

magazines, and professional journals. He is the pri

author of Development, Reform and Malnutrition in 

and coeditor of Direct to the Poor: A Reader in Gras

Development. 

WILLIAM W. HARTZOG, a retired U.S. Army gene

currently a officer at Bradeshaw Associates Ltd. Prev

he served as Commanding General of the U.S. 

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Chief o

of the United States Atlantic Command (LANTC

Commanding General of the lst Infantry Division

Commanding General of U.S. Army South (Pan

83
awards, and is recognized as the architect of Am

Army of the future.

MAX G. MANWARING is a retired U.S. Army colon

an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dick

College. He as served in various civilian and m

positions at the U.S. Army War College, the United 

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and the De

Intelligence Agency (DIA). Dr. Manwaring is the auth

coauthor of several articles and reports dealing 

political-military affairs. He is also the editor or coed

El Salvador at War; Gray Area Phenomena; Man

Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success; To

Responsibility in the New World Disorder; and, B

Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challen

Peace and Stability Operations.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR., a retired ambassador, is pre

Director of the North-South Center and Profes

International Studies at the University of Miami. He 

counsel to the law firm of Greenberg, Trourig, Ho

Lipoff, Rosen & Quentel in Miami. Previously, as a 

Foreign Service officer, he served as U.S. Ambassa

Panama, was involved with the negotiations o

U.S.-Panama Canal Treaties and their ratification, 

in the U.S. delegation to the Organization of Am

States (OAS), and served as the Spanish desk officer 

Department of State. Ambassador Moss has re

numerous foreign and U.S. awards, and has written s

articles and spoken on subjects relating to Inter-Am

affairs, U.S. foreign policy, and diplomatic negotiatio

TERRY L. McCOY is a Professor of Latin American S

and Political Science at the University of Florida, wh

also directs the Latin American Business Enviro

Program. He received his Ph.D. from the Univers

Wisconsin and taught at The Ohio State University 

joining the faculty of the University of Florida. Dr. M

current research focuses on the Latin American bu

84
Cuba as an issue in international relations, and the i

of globalization on the Caribbean. He is author of num

scholarly articles and is editor of The Dynam

Population Policy in Latin America and is a contribu

the Christian Science Monitor and the Wall Street Jou

JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, a retired ambassad

Executive Vice President of Global Markets, the Mc

Hill Companies. He is also a member of the Coun

Foreign Relations in New York City, Chairman 

French-American Foundation, Co-President o

U.S.-Mexico Commission for Educational and Cu

Exchange, and a Fellow of the Foreign Policy Assoc

As a member of the career Foreign Service, Ambas

Negroponte served as Special Coordinator for Pos

U.S. presence in Panama, Ambassador to the Philip

Ambassador to Mexico, Ambassador to Honduras, a

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Se

Affairs.

DONALD E. SCHULZ is currently Chairman 

Political Science Department at Cleveland 

University. Previously, he was a Research Profes

National Security Policy at the Strategic Studies In

of the U.S. Army War College. His current research c

on Mexico, Colombia, and narcopolitics. Dr. Schu

authored or edited a number of articles and book

include Mexico Faces the 21st Century; The United S

Honduras and the Crisis in Central America; Cuba a

Future; Revolution and Counterrevolution in C

America and the Caribbean; and Political Participat

Communist Systems.

85
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Larry M. Wortzel

Research Coordinator

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Editor

Max G. Manwaring

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler