SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A - 3424
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THE HISTORIC COTSWOLD CONDO MINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. , Plaintiff
- Respondent ,
v. COTSWOLD , LLC , Defendant
- Appellant, and UNION CENTER NATIONAL BANK, FRANCES P. DILLER and WILFRED DILLER , Defendant s .

_______

______ ________________ Argued September 20 , 2017
– Decided Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Suter On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Bergen County , Docket No. C - 000 106
- 15 . Luke J. Kealy argued the cause for appellant (Greenbaum , Rowe, Smith and Davis, LLP, attorneys; John D. North, of counsel and on the brief; Mr. Kealy, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court . " A lthough it is posted on the internet , this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36
- 3.

October 17, 20172 A - 3424
- 15T3 Sanford F. Young argued the cause for respondent . PER CURIAM Defendant Cotswold, LLC (Cotswald) appeals from a February
11 , 2016 order grantin g summary judgment to plaintiff The Historic Cotswold Condo minium As sociation, Inc. (Association) in its dispute over the right to assign and control parking spaces at The Historic Cotswold, A Condominium, a complex in the Borough of Tenafly. We affirm su bstantially for the reasons set forth in the sixteen
- page written opinion of Judge Men e laos W. Toskos. The procedures for establishing and governing a condominium development are set forth in the New Jersey Condominium Act (the Act) . See Siddons v. Cook , 382 N.J. Super. 1, 6
- 7 (App. Div. 2005) (citing N.J.S.A. 46:8B
- 1 to
- 38). A condominium is established by the recording of a master deed . N.J.S.A. 46:8B
- 8.
It is governed by an association, which acts through a board of directors, whose composition is composed of members of the condominium's sponsor or developer and individual unit owners in accordance with the Act. N.J.S.A. 46:8B
- 12 . The Cotswold C ondominium contains thirteen residential units and nineteen parking spaces, six of which are indoor gar age spaces and thirteen of which are o utdoor spaces. Under the c ondominium's 2005 master deed , the parking spaces are common e lements, meaning that they are available for the use of all unit o wners. The master3 A - 3424
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d eed further provides that the parkin g spaces may be designated as limited common elements, reserved f or the benefit of a particular unit o wner , through the designation o f the space in the unit d eed transferring ownership to the unit o wner. Cotswold made numerous such assignments in the c ourse of selling the available

u nits. Several of the unit owners obtained one or two parking spaces as a limited common element. Other unit owners did not obtain a parking space. While the master d eed is silent as to who may designate a parking space as a li mited common e leme nt appurtenant to a particular unit, the a ss ociation's by
- laws provide that the Association's b oard may "establish and enforce Rules and Regulations for parking by and the assignment of parking spaces to Unit Owners, subject to the provis ions of the Master Deed, Certificate of Incorporation and these By
- Laws[.]" Upon the sale of t he tenth of thirteen available u ni ts in May 2007, control of the b oard statutorily passed to the Association, as u n it owners now held " at least seventy
- five perc ent of the available units . "
See N.J.S.A. 46:8B
- 12.1 Cotswold continued to assign parking spaces through a deed subsequent to contr ol of the b oard changing hands . S even years later, in 2014 , after two further conveyances that included parking
spaces as limited common elements , the b oard sought to u tilize its4 A - 3424
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authority under the by
- l aws to regulate parking at the c ondominium by charging rent for those spaces not used exclusively by any unit . T hree unsold u nits and eight unassigned parking spaces

rema ined . Months later , in January 2015, Cotswold deeded the three remaining unsold u nits to itself, assigning the rem aining eight parking spaces as limited common e lements to those three

u nits. The Association then filed an action to quiet title, challengin g the January 2015 conveyances made by Cotswold to itself. After the parties filed competing cross
- motions for summary judgment, agreeing to the lack of factual issues , Judge Toskos granted summary judgment in favor of the Association . He concluded that while Cotswold retaine d the right to sell unsold units pursuant to the master d eed, that right did not encompass the right to assign a nd designate parking spaces as limited common

e lements, because , pursuant to the by
- laws, Cotswo ld retained no inter est in the condominium's common e lements, which belong proportionately and indivisibly to the unit o wners. T he Association, comprised of unit owners, owned the condominium's

common e lements including th e parking spaces . T he by
- laws grant the Association' s b oard the p ower to assign and control the

c ondominium's parking spaces.5 A - 3424
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Judge Toskos concluded that the governing documents, consisting of the master deed and by
- l a ws, read together, "vest the [b] oard with authority to control the actions of the [c] ondo minium," including the p ower to "establish and enforce [r]ules and [r] egulations for parking by and the a ssignment of parking spaces to [u]nit [o] wners." The judge noted that because the Association did not elect to utilize this authority until 2014, the o nly conveyances at issue were the January 2015
conveyances made by Cotswold to itself.
We review the trial court's decision de novo. Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs. , 204 N.J. 320 (2010) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Manalapan Twp. Comm. , 140 N. J. 366, 378 (1995)). In reviewing the trial court's granting of summary judgment, we apply the same standard used by the trial judge. Ibid. We must consider, when viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Cotswold, "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one
- sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A. , 189 N.J. 436 (2007) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995)). While the Association did not explicitly raise the issue of Cotswold's self
- d ealing, the self
- dealing nature of t he transactions is read ily apparent. In conveying the unit d eeds to6 A - 3424
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itself with spe cific parking spaces listed as limited common elements appurtenant to the u nit, it is clear that Cotswold's sole purpose in conveying the unit d eeds to itself was to assert control over the remaining unassigned parking spaces. As Judge Toskos

conc luded based on a review of the master deed and by
- l aws, that control appropriately rested with the Association, via the board, once control of the b oard passed to the Association in 2007 . The parties represented that they tried but were unable to resolve this issue through mediation. Given the likelihood of further disagreements, we hope the parties will make every effort in the future not to resort to the expense and delay inhere nt in litigation. Affirmed.