### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION RENTON, WASHINGTON 98057-3356

In the matter ofthe petition of 

### Exemption No. 11068

The Boeing Company Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2014-0091 for an exemption from§§ 25.777(a); 25.1301(a) ,(b), and (d); and 25.1309(a) and (c) ofTitle 14, Code ofFederal Regulations



### GRANT OF EXEMPTION By letter no. RA-14-00771 , dated February 28 , 2014, Mr. Douglas M. Lane, ODA Deputy Lead Administrator, The Boeing Company, P.O. Box 3707 MC 03-56, Seattle, WA 98124, petitioned for an exemption from the requirements of§§ 25.777(a); 25.130l(a),(b) , and (d); and 25.1309(a) and (c) at Amendment 25-46 ofTitle 14, Code ofFederal Regulations (14 CFR), to permit relief from the requirements to minimize crew confusion regarding the location, inadvertent operation, functionality, labeling, and design ofcertain flight-deck controls, buttons, and switches on Boeing Model 767-2C airplanes. 

### The petitioner requests relieffrom the following regulations: Section 25.777(a) at Amendment 25-46 - requires that each cockpit control must be located to prevent confusion and inadvertent operation. 

### Section 25.130l(a) at Amendment 25-0 - requires that each item ofinstalled equipment must be ofa kind and design appropriate to its intended function

. 

### Section 25.130l(b) at Amendment 25-0 - requires that each item of installed equipment must be labeled as to its operating limitations

. 

### Section 25.130l(d) at Amendment 25-0 - requires that each item ofinstalled equipment must function properly when installed. 

### Section 25.1309(a) at Amendment 25-41 -requires that required equipment must perform intended function under any foreseeable operating condition.

### Section 25.1309(c) at Amendment 25-41 - requires that controls must be designed to mmimize crew errors. 

### The petitioner supports their request with the following information. This section summarizes and quotes , in pertinent part, the relevant information from the petitioner' s request, with minor edits for clarity. The complete petition is available at the Department ofTransportation's Federal Docket Management System, on the Internet at http ://re!.!.ulations.gov, in docket no. FAA-2014-0091. Boeing is developing a commercial derivative ofthe 767-200 (i.e., the 767-2C) that provides increased capabilities such as Maximum TakeoffWeight (MTOW) , upgraded flight deck, etc. The first 767-2C customer plans to have certain additional features, capabilities, and equipment installed after the amended type certificate (ATC) is granted. These modifications will be installed via an FAA-approved supplemental type certificate (STC). Certain switches, equipment, and components are proposed to be included as part ofthe ATC project that will support the subsequent STC installation. However, the components' installation results in some non-compliances with the aforementioned regulations. The overall cost ofmanufacturing the airplane can be reduced, and potential enors avoided, ifthese switches, equipment, and components are included as part ofthe 767-2C manufacturing process, rather than reworking the airplane to install them postATC. This exemption is limited to the 767-2C ATC configuration with the following design features: STC provisioned operational switches that can be set to a position that would result in a non-compliant condition:
• six-position rotary switch • continuously variable switch • on-offpush button switch STC provisioned non-operational switches:
• on-offpush button switch • continuously variable • guarded toggle switch • three-position rotary switch The installation ofthese switches causes a short-term noncompliance that will be resolved by the installation ofthe STC. At the completion ofthe STC project, the switches will enable additional customer-specific functionality, and the inoperative switches will meet all applicable FAA requirements. Full compliance will be demonstrated for the STC, and this exemption will no longer be applicable to the airplane in the final configuration.



### 2

### Switches with Additional Customer Specific Functionality 

### Six Position Rotary Switch In support ofthe STC project, a six-position rotary switch will be provided. Position 1 is compliant with all applicable FAA regulations, and compliance will be demonstrated for ATC. Positions 2-6 do not meet FAA requirements. 

### Continuously Variable Switch In supp011 ofthe STC project, a continuously variable Switch will be made functional on the ATC project. In the MAX position, this item will be compliant to all applicable FAA regulations, and compliance will be demonstrated for ATC. When the switch is not in the MAX position, the functionality controlled by the switch does not meet the FAA requirements. 

### On-Off Pushbutton Switch In support ofthe STC project, an on-offpushbutton switch will be included on the ATC project. When the switch is OFF, all associated functionality operates normally. Compliance to all applicable regulations will be demonstrated for ATC with the pushbutton in the OFF position. When the switch is in the ON position, the functionality does not meet FAA requirements. The pilots will receive an engine-indicating-and-crewalerting system (EICAS) Memo message when the on-offpushbutton is in the 'ON' position which provides additional awareness ofthe selected switch position. 

### Inoperative Switches In support ofthe STC project, guarded toggle, three-position rotary, on-offpush button, and continuously variable switches will be added to the ATC flight deck. For ATC, these switches will not be functional. "Inoperative" (rNOP) placards will be added to provide the pilot with an awareness that the switches are non-functional. 

### Public Interest Boeing argues that deferring the design, installation, and testing ofthe systems supported by the aforementioned switches until after the 767-2C is built and certified would result in the total program cost being unnecessarily higher than needed.
A more economical option is to provision the 767-2C with such systems and equipment to the extent allowed by the FAA. As previously mentioned, when modified by the STC, the airplane will comply with all FAA requirements. The extra cost ofmaking the interim state compliant provides no net benefit in the configuration and no commensurate increase in safety.
This interim-state airplane will always be under the control ofthe Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) , and as such, the provisions ofthis exemption are proposed to apply only to the airplane under the control ofThe Boeing Company.

3In the absence ofan FAA grant ofexemption in this case, significant modifications to all 767-2C airplanes would be required after delivery from the Everett, Washington factory, thus incurring additional and unnecessary costs. These additional modifications also expose each airplane to the possibility ofintroducing Foreign Object Debris (FOD) or unintentional damage to wiring that could reduce the overall safety and reliability ofthe airplane. Therefore, it is in the public interest to facilitate The Boeing Company decision to employ the more-efficient design, production, and certification processes on the 767-2C Program. 

### Statement ofNo Adverse Effect on Safety This exemption is limited to 767-2C ATC configuration with the following design features: STC-provisioned operational switches that can be set to a position that would result in a non-compliant condition:
• six-position rotary switch • continuously variable switch • on-offpush button switch STC-provisioned non-operational switches:
• on-otT push button switch • continuously variable switch • guarded toggle switch • three-position rotary switch The airplanes will be operated by Boeing pilots who are thoroughly familiar with these specific features for the short-term purpose ofpreparing them for the final configuration. The inoperative provisions subject to this exemption are installed to support the followon modification by the STC. The functions to be provided by these provisions are not required for civil operation. Therefore, the inoperative nature ofthese functions has no effect on the airworthiness ofthe airplane. Airplane functionality will be set procedurally by the airplane flight manual (AFM), in a fully compliant state throughout all flights subject to this exemption. Ifthe provisioned functionality is inadvertently put into a non-compliant position, the highest failure effect classification for the 767-2C airplane is minor for the ATC. The inoperative provisions subject to this exemption are installed to support the follow-on modification by the STC. Ifincorrectly set, there would be no impact on airplane operation. Boeing is provisioning the 767-2C ATC type design with flight deck functionality and switches which support the 767-2C STC. Boeing will provide AFM limitations and INOP placards, where necessary, for the ATC. The STC will complete the certification ofthe above listed switches in a configuration that will comply with all applicable FAA regulations. As such, Boeing requests relieffor the aforementioned regulations to obtain

4certification ofthe 767-2C type design provided the airplane remain under the ownership ofThe Boeing Company. Federal Register publication
A summary ofthe petition was published in the Federal Register on April4, 2014 [79 FR 18947]. No comments were received. The FAA's analysis The requirements of§§ 25.777(a); 25.1301(a),(b), and (d); and 25.1309(a) and (c) at Amendment 25-46, from which Boeing seeks relief, are primarily intended to prevent flightcrew confusion, inadvertent system operation, and flightcrew errors. The petitioner intends that this reliefwould only apply to Model 767-2C airplanes while they remain under the petitioner's possession and operation, until the provisions ofan approved STC are implemented and the airplanes are returned to a fully compliant configuration. Hence, the airplanes would not be used in service by non-Boeing personnel. During this temporary period, the FAA considers it very unlikely that Boeing pilots, who are thoroughly familiar with the status and configuration ofthe switches and buttons, would experience crew confusion, inadvertent system operation, and crew errors, which the rules are intended to prevent. Furthermore, no inadvertent switch position, on-offbutton selection, or toggle-switch position could result in unsafe system behavior.
The FAA believes that, under these conditions, the additional costs ofassembling the 767-2C in a fully compliant ATC configuration (i.e. , without exemption), and then modifying the airplanes under the provisions ofthe approved STC , provides no safety benefit, but would instead incur considerable and mmecessary expense for the petitioner.
Ifthe 767-2C ATC configuration without the STC modifications were to be delivered to and operated by non-Boeing personnel, it is more likely, over the long term, that inadvertent switch and button selections would occur. While such crew errors are unlikely to directly create unsafe system behavior, they are likely to contribute to undue crew confusion, distraction and workload that the regulations are intended to prevent. Therefore, it is essential that no 767-2C be delivered and operated by non-Boeing pilots in the ATC configuration without the STC modifications installed.
As Boeing has proposed, appropriate flight-deck placards and AFM limitations must be part of the ATC configuration until the approved STC modifications are installed. The FAA's decision
In consideration ofthe foregoing , I find that a grant ofexemption is in the public interest and will not adversely affect the level ofsafety provided by the regulations. Therefore, pursuant to the



### 5authority contained in 49 U.S

.C. 40113 and 44701 , delegated to me by the Administrator, I grant petition ofThe Boeing Company for an exemption from 25.777(a); 25.1301(a),(b), and (d) ; and 25.1309(a) and (c) at Amendment 25-46 ofTitle 14, Code ofFederal Regulations (14 CFR), to permit relieffrom the requirements to minimize crew confusion regarding the location, inadvertent operation, functionality, labeling, and design ofcertain flight-deck controls, buttons, and switches on Boeing Model 767-2C airplanes, with the following conditions and limitations:
I. Placards must be installed to identify inoperative switches and to state that only Boeing company pilots may operate the airplane.
2. The AFM Normal Procedures must address the functionality and proper use ofthe noncomplaint flight deck controls, buttons, and switches to provide pilot understanding ofthe functionality ofthe non-complaint flight deck controls, buttons, and switches, and to prevent misuse ofthem.
3. The following limitation must be included in the airplane flight manual (AFM) for Model 767-2C series airplanes until modified by the STC : Only Boeing company pilots may operate this airplane.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

## SEP 1 9 2014 

# ft+i-r £.

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Jefirey E. Duven Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate Aircraft Certification Service

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