Flight Attendant Fatigue, Part IV: 

Analysis of Incident Reports

Kali Holcomb

Katrina Avers

Lena Dobbins

Joy Banks

Lauren Blackwell

Thomas Nesthus

Civil Aerospace Medical Institute

Federal Aviation Administration

Oklahoma City, OK 73125

December 2009

Final Report

DOT/FAA/AM-09/25

Office of Aerospace Medicine

Washington, DC 20591

OK-10-0077
NOTICE

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of information exchange. The United States Government 

assumes no liability for the contents thereof.

___________

This publication and all Office of Aerospace Medicine 

technical reports are available in full-text from the Civil 

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1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. 

DOT/FAA/AM-09/25 

4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date 

Flight Attendant Fatigue, Part IV: Analysis of Incident Reports December 2009 

6. Performing Organization Code 

 

7. Author(s) 8. Performing Organization Report No. 

Holcomb K, Avers K, Dobbins L, Banks J, Blackwell L, Nesthus T 

9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS) 

FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute 

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Oklahoma City, OK 73125 

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Office of Aerospace Medicine 

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15. Supplemental Notes 

Work was accomplished under approved task AM-A-08-HRR-521 

16. Abstract 

Voluntary safety reporting is one method by which aviation personnel can report safety issues to their airline and 

the Federal Aviation Administration. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a program managed by 

the National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) Ames Research Center. This study reviewed flight 

attendant reports from the ASRS database to identify the frequency of fatigue reports and the conditions under 

which fatigue occurred. During June 2008, 2,628 cabin crew reports were downloaded from the NASA ASRS 

Web site for reports made between January 1990 and December 2007. CAMI researchers reviewed each fullform report narrative for possible contributors to fatigue, or indicators of fatigue. Although the overall number of 

flight attendant ASRS reports for which full-form coding was completed has decreased over the last 3 years, both 

total flight attendant reporting and the number of full-form narratives related to fatigue have increased 

substantially. This voluntary data allows regulators and operators to discover potential problems in the aviation 

industry before they result in a mishap. The results of this review indicate that flight attendant fatigue may be 

occurring more frequently and warrant more attention. 

 

17. Key Words 18. Distribution Statement 

 

 

Flight Attendants, Fatigue, Incidents, Volunteer Safety 

Reporting 

Document is available to the public through the 

Defense Technical Information Center, Ft. Belvoir, VA 

22060; and the National Technical Information 

Service, Springfield, VA 22161 

19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 22. Price 

Unclassified Unclassified 35 

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iii

Acknowledgments

Special thanks to Cristy Brown for her support and encouragement throughout this project. Another thanks 

to Christopher MacWhorther and Thomas Longridge of the Flight Standards Volunteer Safety Program Branch 

of the Federal Aviation Administration for their assistance with the Aviation Safety Action Program survey.

v

Contents

Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Part I: Aviation Safety Reporting System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Part II: Aviation Safety Action Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Part I: Aviation Safety Reporting System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Part II: Aviation Safety Action Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Appendix A: Flight attendant survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A1

Appendix B: Narratives relating to fatigue (source: ASRS online database). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B1

1

Flight Attendant Fatigue, Part IV: 

Analysis of Incident Reports

Background

While a great deal of research has been conducted on 

human circadian processes as applied to scheduling and 

training of flight crews, relatively little research has been 

accomplished among cabin crews. Performance of cabin 

duties is critical to both safety and security, and the literature suggests that all human performance is vulnerable to 

sleep loss and daily variations in physiological processes 

tied to underlying body-clock mechanisms. The extent 

of sleep loss, fatigue, and their impact upon performance 

of duties among the cabin crew population and within 

the current duty regulations is unknown. 

In 2005, a Congressional directive was given to the 

Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) to address issues regarding flight attendant fatigue. CAMI contracted 

with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) Ames Research Center’s Fatigue Countermeasures Group to conduct literature and incident report 

reviews and examine a range of typical flight attendant 

schedules to assess potential vulnerability to fatigue. Two 

reports were delivered by NASA and were integrated and 

published as a Federal Aviation Administration Office of 

Aerospace Medicine Technical Report (Nesthus, Schroeder, Connors, Rentmeister-Bryant, & DeRoshia, 2007). 

In this report, NASA concluded that some degree of 

fatigue-related performance impacts were likely under the 

current regulations and suggested six areas of research that 

would facilitate understanding and government-industry 

decision-making. The six recommendations included: 1) 

a survey of field operations; 2) field research on the effects 

of fatigue; 3) a validation of models for assessing flight 

attendant fatigue; 4) a focused study of incident reports; 

5) a review of international policies and practices; and 6) 

the potential benefits of training. 

In 2008, Congress provided another directive for 

CAMI to conduct follow-on studies in each of the six 

recommendation areas noted in the 2007 report. To accomplish this directive, CAMI researchers developed a 

project plan for completing each recommendation. To 

facilitate support for these projects and ensure participation, CAMI researchers coordinated with representatives 

of vested organizations (e.g., Air Transport Association, 

Regional Airline Association, Coalition of Flight Attendants Association of Flight Attendants, Association of 

Professional Flight Attendants, Transportation Workers 

Union, International Association Machinists, United Steel 

Workers, Delta Air Lines, and non-unionized airlines) 

and provided them with the opportunity to review and 

comment on aspects of the project plan prior to commencement. 

The current report provides specific details regarding 

the fatigue-related content of incident reports filed by 

flight attendants (recommendation # 4 - incident reports). 

Introduction

Fatigue is an issue of growing concern within the 

aviation industry. In general, any workgroup involved in 

shiftwork and/or operation across time zones is likely to 

encounter circadian effects. This would include pilots, 

mechanics, flight attendants, and other crew members 

directly serving aircraft operations. While flight attendants may not be at the controls of the aircraft, they are 

responsible for the safety of the passengers and serve the 

pilots as their eyes and ears in the aircraft cabin. Additional 

safety-related duties include handling medical emergencies 

in an efficient and expeditious manner, as well as assessing safety threats to passengers and crew (including the 

increasing occurrence of passenger noncompliance and 

misconduct; MacDonald, Deddens, Grajewski, Whelan, 

& Hurrell, 2003).

Flight attendants’ regularly scheduled duties include 

being briefed by the captain; checking first aid kits, 

emergency equipment, and food/beverages; greeting 

passengers; checking tickets; assisting with bag storage; 

giving safety announcements; ensuring that federal regulations (i.e., wearing seatbelts or upright seat backs) are 

followed; reassuring passengers; distributing materials 

(i.e., paperwork, pillows, blankets); assisting passengers 

with special needs; administering first aid; serving food 

and beverages, as well as documenting inventory of onboard supplies (Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.; Nesthus 

et al., 2007).

Aviation has become a 24-hour operation, which 

includes nights, weekends, and holidays (Bureau of 

Labor Statistics, n.d.). During these around-the-clock 

operations, physiological challenges can alter the way 

individuals perform their job (Rosekind, et al., 1996). One 

of these challenges is fatigue. In a survey of flight crews, 

the number of times that fatigue was cited as an issue by 

cabin crew members was nearly double that reported by 
2

cockpit crew members (Haugli, Skogstad, & Hellesoy, 

1994). Fatigue, in turn, has the potential to adversely 

affect flight safety (Caldwell, 2005). It is important that 

safety-related issues are recognized, documented, and 

evaluated.

Aviation personnel are able to report safety-related 

issues to airlines or government entities such as the FAA, 

without penalty, through voluntary safety reporting systems. A number of safety-reporting venues exist for aviation personnel, including the Aviation Safety Reporting 

System (ASRS) and the Aviation Safety Action Program 

(ASAP). ASRS is a national program that includes all 

aspects of aviation operations. ASRS is managed by the 

NASA Ames Research Center and enables air traffic 

controllers, dispatchers, pilots, mechanics, and cabin 

crew personnel to voluntarily and confidentially report 

a safety incident without punitive action (Rosenkrans, 

2008; Aviation Safety Information and Analysis Sharing, 

n.d.). ASAP is similar to ASRS in that it is a voluntary 

reporting program; however, ASAP is intended for 

certificate-holding air carriers and major repair stations 

that maintain a memorandum of understanding with 

the FAA. In other words, ASAP has limited membership, typically workgroups within a single airline. To 

the good, this results in airlines taking actions to correct 

their own problems. However, integration across airlines 

is necessary to ensure that problems of national scope 

are not treated as unique or isolated issues. Data from 

ASAP are not consolidated into one central database but 

are held by the airlines. The Aviation Safety Information 

Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) now compiles or accesses 

many aviation safety databases, including participating 

airlines’ ASAP programs, though this has not yet extended 

to flight attendant programs. Thus, any examination of 

safety issues reported by flight attendants is limited to 

studies of the ASRS database.

The purpose of this study was to utilize existing safety 

reports to identify commonly cited safety issues and conditions associated with fatigue-related reports for flight 

attendants. Additional information was requested from 

Event Review Committee (ERC) members representing 

the flight attendant ASAP programs to gain insight into 

fatigue-related issues identified within airline programs.

Methods

Part I: Aviation Safety Reporting System

The NASA ASRS public Web site was queried to examine existing flight attendant safety reports (National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration Aviation Safety 

Reporting System, n.d.). The public Web site consists of 

full-form records entered into a permanent Web site by 

NASA. Full-form records are a subset of reports received 

by ASRS. Historically, less than 20% of all reports have 

been entered into the database (ASIAS, n.d). However, 

the inclusion rate for flight attendants has been greater, 

averaging 36% from 1997 to 2007 (C.R. Drew, personal 

communication, November 10, 2009). 

The query was restricted to reports submitted between 

January 1990 and December 2007. The query resulted 

in 2,628 reports. 

NASA analyzed the reports for a wide variety of safety 

issues. For the purposes of this study, CAMI researchers 

then reviewed each full-form report narrative to identify 

common themes. Using this review process, we identified 

a number of categories that could be considered as either 

1) possible contributors to fatigue, or 2) indicators of 

fatigue. To confirm the relevance of each identified category, a comparison to an existing flight attendant fatigue 

literature review (Nesthus et al., 2007) was conducted. 

Every identified category was also cited in the literature as 

a possible contributor to fatigue and was therefore retained 

for further analysis in the current report. See Table 1 for 

descriptions of the identified categories and operational 

definitions. Once the categories were identified and 

confirmed, all of the report narratives were reviewed 

and analyzed using those categories. Along with those 

categories, a few of the many NASA ASRS categories 

(passenger illness and aircraft equipment problems [critical 

and less severe]) were used in the analyses for this report.

Part II: Aviation Safety Action Program

To gather additional information observed by ERC 

members of the flight attendant ASAP programs, a survey 

was developed. Surveys were distributed via E-Mail to 

23 participants for airlines that had a flight attendant 

program for at least 6 months prior to the March 2009 

distribution. The participants consisted of an FAA representative, company representative, labor representative, 

and the principal operations inspector for each airline. 

The survey asked the participants for feedback regarding 

their ASAP program and more specifically about fatiguerelated reports they had received. E-Mails sent to each 

committee member contained a link to the survey that 

was created through the SNAP Surveys© software. The 

survey was approximately 20 questions in length and 

consisted of multiple-choice options, as well as openitem response options (Appendix A). Ten surveys were 

returned, but only seven respondents met the criteria for 

inclusion (i.e., had at least one report submitted to the 

program that involved fatigue/scheduling issues).
3

Table 1. Operational Definitions of Identified Categories. 

Possible Contributors to Fatigue 

Crew Coordination/ Communication Disagreements or lack of communication with any combination of flight 

attendant(s), flight crew(s), or gate agent(s)

Crew Illness/Injury Flight attendant or flight crew becomes sick or injured during the flight

Passenger Misconduct 

Alcohol Passenger(s) having excessive amounts or unapproved alcohol

Bomb/Hijack Threat Verbal/written communication was heard/seen by a flight attendant 

regarding a bomb on board, or threats of overtaking the cockpit

Disruptive/Rude 

Passenger(s) were disruptive to the duties of the flight attendant, rude to 

flight attendant (both verbally and/or physically); passengers fighting or just 

causing havoc

Drug/Medicine Passengers had signs of illegal drug use, overmedicated, or under-medicated

Electronic Device Passengers refused to turn off/discontinue use of an electronic device (cell 

phone, laptop)

Luggage/Baggage Storage Luggage/baggage was not properly stowed, was oversized, or required flight 

attendant assistance

Pets Passengers refusing to properly store their pets during flight

Smoking Passengers caught/suspected of smoking on board the aircraft

Unauthorized Passenger Individual was on board the aircraft without the appropriate paperwork

Other Something that caused a problem or was an issue for the flight attendant that 

was not previously identified in the other categories

Indicators of fatigue 

Crew Rest Facility Less than adequate environment for a rest facility, too much or lack of noise, 

light, and/or turbulence disrupting rest

Duty Time Hours during a shift

Fatigue Tired, fatigued, exhausted, worn out, etc

Lack of Sleep/Rest Hours of sleep or rest

No/Missing Break/Meal Flight attendant missed a break (including meal breaks) or one was not 

scheduled during or between flights

Scheduling Number of days worked without a day off and/or working night shifts or 

early morning
4

Results

Part I: Aviation Safety ReportingSystem

Overall Cabin Crew Reports. A review of the number 

of flight attendant reports filed between 1990 and 2007 

revealed substantial variation in the number of reports filed 

each year and in the rate at which reports were full-form 

coded and available in the public database (see Table 2). 

ASRS did not offer cabin crew-specific reporting prior to 

1995 but received and processed some reports. Reporting 

decreased after 2001 (perhaps reflecting the post-9/11 

reduction in total industry flights) but increased sharply 

in 2006 and 2007. Full-form coding rates have not kept 

pace with reporting rates, which limits the representativeness of the reports available for content analysis. 

Contributing Factor Narratives. Content analysis of 

ASRS narratives revealed that a number of safety-related 

issues could also be considered contributors to fatigue. 

In other words, there were numerous in-flight issues that 

probably created extra work and stress for flight attendants. 

For example, passenger misconduct was reported in more 

than one-third (36.1%) of the narratives. Of those, the 

most frequently occurring reports (80%) involved passengers that were disruptive and/or rude. The second highest 

reported issue involved excessive or unapproved use of 

alcohol (32%). All other types of passenger misconduct 

were reported less frequently (Figure 1). 

Illness or injury to passengers and/or crew members 

was identified as another issue that could contribute to 

flight attendant fatigue; 22.3% of the narratives involved 

some type of injury or illness of passenger(s) or crew. 

Passenger illness was reported in 46.8% of those narratives (Figure 2). 

Flight attendants are also exposed to problems that 

occur both outside and inside the aircraft cabin. Thirtyfive percent of the narratives had an aircraft equipment 

problem that was rated as either critical (27.7%) or less 

severe (7.5%). When the problem occurred outside of 

the cabin, flight attendants were sometimes required to 

prepare the aircraft for an emergency, diversion, or unscheduled landing. In these instances, as well as during normal operations, crew coordination and communication 

are essential. Crew coordination/communication issues 

were reported in a little more than 6% of the narratives. 

Cabin Crew Fatigue Reports. Of the 2,628 narratives 

analyzed, 62 (2.4%) reports cited some type of flight 

attendant fatigue issue (see Appendix B). Although the 

ASRS full-form processing strategy was not uniformly 

applied and cannot be generalized, the trend in the ASRS 

database suggests the percentage of full-form reports discussing fatigue is increasing. See Table 3 for the number 

and corresponding percentage of fatigue-related reports 

receiving full-form processing each year since 1990.

An examination of the fatigue-related narratives revealed that duty time (51.6%) and scheduling (48.4%) 

concerns occurred most frequently. Figure 3 shows the 

relative percentage of occurrence for the issues identified 

as fatigue-related factors in the cabin crew narratives.

A number of the fatigue-related reports (N=41) specified the approximate time of day for the incident. The late 

evening/night (1801-2400) and morning (0601-1200) 

timeframes were the most common times for an event 

resulting in a fatigue-related narrative to occur (31.7% 

and 29.3%, respectively; Figure 4). 

A co-occurrence examination was conducted of the 

potential fatigue contributors with the fatigue-related 

incidents. The results revealed that passenger misconduct 

was discussed in 8.1% of the fatigue-related narratives. 

Of these, passenger disruptiveness and/or rudeness were 

identified 100% of the time. One narrative included both 

alcohol and drug complaints (Figure 5).

An examination of crew illness/injury and its cooccurrence with fatigue-related narratives indicates that 

crew illness/injury was discussed almost 10% more frequently in fatigue-related reports than in other full-form 

narratives (Figure 6). 

Table 2. Number of ASRS Reports Filed by 

Cabin Crew.a 

Year Reports 

Receivedb

Full-form 

Reports 

Full-form 

Percentage 

1990 unavailable 2 

1991 unavailable 6 

1992 unavailable 2 

1993 unavailable 6 

1994 unavailable 3 

1995 unavailable 9 

1996 unavailable 23 

1997 50 59 118.0% 

1998 622 387 62.2% 

1999 737 551 74.8% 

2000 896 440 49.1% 

2001 754 267 35.4% 

2002 505 244 48.3% 

2003 437 245 56.0% 

2004 489 139 28.4% 

2005 585 68 11.6% 

2006 1,093 115 10.5% 

2007 1,035 62 5.9% 

Total 7,203 2,628 36.1% 

a “...the full form counts are sorted by Item date (incident 

date), not received date, so there is the possibility of year 

cross over” (Drew, personal communication, November 10, 

2009). 

b

 Reports received were not recorded prior to 1997; 

therefore, these data are unavailable. 
5

Figure 1. Percentage of passenger misconduct reports by misconduct category 

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Unauthorized Pax

Smoking

Pets

Luggage/Bag Storage

Electronic Devices

Drug/Medicine

Disruptive/Rude

Bomb/Hijack Threat

Alcohol

Percentage

Figure 2. Percentage of illness and injury in cabin crew reports.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Passenger Illness* Passenger Injury Crew Illness/Injury

Percentage

*Note: Prior to 1998, passenger illness on a flight was not documented in the database.
6

Table 3. Number and Corresponding Percentage of 

Cabin Crew Fatigue Reports by Year. 

Year Number of fullform reports 

discussing fatigue 

Percentage of fullform reports 

discussing fatigue a

1990 0 0.0% 

1991 0 0.0% 

1992 1 50.0% 

1993 0 0.0% 

1994 0 0.0% 

1995 1 11.1% 

1996 1 4.3% 

1997 2 3.4% 

1998 2 0.5% 

1999 6 1.1% 

2000 6 1.4% 

2001 3 1.1% 

2002 0 0.0% 

2003 5 2.0% 

2004 3 2.2% 

2005 11 16.2% 

2006 11 9.6% 

2007 10 16.1% 

Total 62 2.4% a

 Percentage of full-form reports discussing fatigue calculated 

by dividing the total number of full form reports available in 

ASRS database. 

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Percentage

Other

Scheduling

No/Missing 

Breaks/Meals

Lack of 

Sleep/Rest

Fatigue

Duty Time

Crew Rest 

Facilities

Figure 3. Percentage of fatigue factors discussed in narratives. 
7

0001 to 0600

1801 to 2400 17.1%

31.7%

0601 to 1200

29.3%

1201 to 1800

22.0%

Figure 4. Percentage of full-form fatigue reports by incident time 

of day.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Unauthorized Pax

Smoking

Pets

Luggage/Bag Storage

Electronic Devices

Drug/Medicine

Disruptive/Rude

Bomb/Hijack Threat

Alcohol

Percentage

Figure 5. Percentage of passenger misconduct categories in fatigue-related reports. 
8

8000000

9000000

10000000

11000000

12000000

13000000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

80000

90000

100000

110000

120000

130000

Flights Employed FAs

# of Flights

# of Employed FAs

Figure 7. Number of flights and number of employed flight attendants as reported by the Bureau of 

Transportation Statistics (2008 & n.d.).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Passenger Illness* Passenger Injury Crew Illness/Injury

Percentage

*Note: Prior to 1998, passenger illness on a flight was not documented in the database.

Figure 6. Percentage of illness and injury of those reports involving fatigue.
9

Of the narratives involving fatigue, 24.2% discussed 

an aircraft equipment problem that was either critical 

(12.9%) or less severe (11.3%). Percentages of critical 

aircraft problems were less than those among other 

full-form narratives. In contrast, percentages of less severe equipment problems were discussed much more 

frequently (nearly double) in fatigue-related narratives 

than among other full-form narratives. Similarly, crew 

coordination/communication issues were discussed more 

frequently in fatigue-related narratives than among other 

full-form narratives (8.1% versus 2%).

Part II: Aviation Safety Action Program

With such a small sample size and low return rate of 

the ASAP survey responses, meaningful analyses could 

not be conducted. Confidentiality could not be assured, 

and the results could not be generalized to the population. 

However, qualitative responses to the open-item questions 

did reveal some common issues and recommendations 

for more effective education. Specifically, several respondents discussed the need to provide education concerning 

health issues and effects of fatigue to the flight attendant 

community.

Conclusions

Although the overall number of flight attendant ASRS 

reports for which full-form coding was completed has 

decreased over the last 3 years, both total flight attendant 

reporting and the number of full-form narratives related to 

fatigue have increased substantially. From 1990 to 2004, 

the number of fatigue-related full-form reports per year 

averaged 2.4. In the past 3 years, the number of fatiguerelated full-form reports per year averaged 10.5. Without 

access to the narratives for which full-form coding was not 

completed, we cannot determine whether the underlying 

fatigue-related reporting rate has changed. However, assuming full-form reports are representative of all submitted 

reports, this suggests an increase in the typical number of 

fatigue-related incidents. This is consistent with growing 

concerns voiced by the flight attendants and with results 

found in recent survey results examining flight attendant 

fatigue (Avers, King, et al., 2009).

We must also consider whether documenting a change in 

reporting or in underlying fatigue-related events is necessary 

to being concerned about fatigue among flight attendants. 

Voluntary safety reports are important to aviation safety 

because they can identify issues and problems of which 

the airline, industry, and government would otherwise be 

unaware. From that perspective, every report is important, 

and most we would prefer that events not occur at all. 

However, the reports provide only one perspective on the 

events and do not include other objective data concerning 

an event (except among ASAP reports examined within 

individual airlines). Statistical analysis of voluntary reports 

introduces other limitations – a report database will include 

only those events people cared enough to report, potentially under-or over-representing events in unknown ways. 

So, conclusions from statistical analyses must be limited 

to trends in reporting. For the present ASRS analysis, the 

varying rate of full-form processing was especially limiting – we can only discuss the extent to which fatigue or 

potentially-contributing issues are represented in full-form 

narratives. Nonetheless, these narratives are often quite rich 

in their discussion of individual events and can be treated as 

illustrations of the issues flight attendants encounter during 

their duties. The content of the reports must be compared 

or contrasted with the data collected in surveys (Avers, King, 

et al., 2009) and field studies among flight attendants. For 

example, approximately 50% of the fatigue-related narratives involved concerns associated with scheduling and/or 

duty time issues – a finding that is largely consistent with 

recent survey results examining flight attendant fatigue 

(Avers, King, et al., 2009). 

Comparison of overall ASRS reporting rates to changes 

in flight attendant reporting may offer an additional insight. 

An examination of Bureau of Transportation Statistics reports (2008, n.d.) indicates that the number of flights has 

increased, while the number of employed flight attendants 

has decreased markedly over the last several years (Figure 7). 

Similar trends were reported in a study of Japanese flight 

attendant fatigue (Ono, Watanabe, Kaneko, Matsumoto, 

& Miyao, 1991). The increase in ASRS flight attendant 

reporting in 2006 and 2007 (double that received in each 

of the previous 4 years) is out of step with flight attendant 

employment. There are numerous other factors that could 

account for reporting changes, but the co-occurrence of 

increased reporting, increases in flight operations, and 

reductions in the number of flight attendants should be 

further examined. 

The scheduling and/or duty time concerns cited in 

ASRS narratives are likely tied to physiological processes 

known to impact humans supporting 24/7 operations. 

Flight attendants travel nationally and internationally across 

multiple time zones in a manner that is likely to disrupt 

their normal circadian rhythms (Nesthus et al., 2007). 

The impact of time zone changes on aviation personnel 

is well documented. Task performance has been found 

to degrade significantly during shiftwork coupled with 

time zone changes (Caldwell, 2005). Caldwell also found 

that incident reports were more frequent and simulator 

performance less effective among pilots during the earlymorning hours. Similarly, fatigue narratives analyzed in 

the present ASRS study largely involved flights between 

0600 and noon. Although the times provided in the ASRS 

reports were “local times” associated with the event, the 
10

time reported may not have been the same as the biological 

clock-time for the flight attendant. 

In addition to time zone changes, long duty days have 

also been reported to impact fatigue. Avers, King, and associates (2009) found that length of duty day was one of 

the most frequently reported fatigue factors among flight 

attendants. The narratives analyzed in the present study 

offer illustrations of this issue. 

In a study conducted by Brown (2009), pilots and flight 

attendants were asked the following question, “Have the 

effects of fatigue due to jet lag, short layovers, long duty 

days, or long haul flights, ever affected your ability to 

perform your duties safely?” A large portion of that study’s 

participants responded that it “would greatly affect safety.” 

(p. 44).

Lack of sleep/rest was cited as another fatigue-related 

factor in 25% of the narratives. Rosekind et al. (1996) 

concluded that “Sleep loss creates sleepiness, which can 

be associated with decrements in vigilance, reaction time, 

memory, psychomotor coordination, information processing, and decision making (e.g., fixation on certain aspects 

of a situation to the neglect of other information). With 

increasing sleepiness, individuals demonstrate poorer performance despite increased effort ...” (p. 158). 

This report examined the fatigue-related issues reported 

by flight attendants to the ASRS and ASAP programs. Various types of physical and mental fatigue were discussed in 

narratives, and most can be linked in some way to underlying 

human physiology. Effective education and training may 

combat mental and physiological fatigue. Avers, Hauck, 

Blackwell, and Nesthus (2009) reviewed fatigue training 

programs and their beneficial effects on personnel. They 

identified many critical components of a comprehensive 

program and concluded that a flight attendant fatigue 

training program would be a “beneficial method for managing and mitigating the effects of fatigue.” Additionally, 

the review of ASAP program comments provided valuable 

insight into the benefits and potential recommendations 

for flight attendant fatigue countermeasures. Educating 

flight attendants was a central recommendation, as well as 

reducing the maximum number of flight duty hours for 

flight attendants. Caldwell (2005) stated that “...fatiguemanagement strategy is crucial for fighting the acute sleep 

loss/sleep debt, the sustained periods of wakefulness, and 

the circadian factors that are primary contributors to 

fatigue-related flight mishaps.” (p. 90). Nevertheless, one 

of the problems in developing fatigue mitigation strategies 

is that everyone’s physiology (including circadian rhythms 

and tolerance to sleep loss) is different, and creating an allencompassing fatigue training program that fits everyone’s 

needs is difficult (Caldwell, 2005; Rosekind et al., 1996). 

Another suggested contributor to fatigue is the mental 

demand placed on flight attendants (MacDonald et al., 

2003). Narratives often discussed crew coordination/

communication and circumstances involving passengers, 

sources of increased mental demand, or workload. Passengers that caused disruption or were under the influence 

of alcohol were highlighted in many narratives. Most of 

the communication/coordination complaints described in 

the full-form narratives involved communication between 

a flight attendant and the cockpit crew. Coordination/

communication between pilots and flight attendants has 

been highlighted by Chute & Wiener (1995), suggesting a 

disjunction of culture between the two work groups. These 

differences have resulted in problems in communication of 

safety-related information (Chute & Wiener, 1996). The 

narratives suggest that miscommunication and/or lack of 

communication between pilots and flight attendants can add 

additional stress to the cabin crew, working to exacerbate, 

rather than reduce, fatigue among both groups. 

Data represented in the ASRS reports are submitted by 

flight attendants, so not every report was linked to fatigue 

or contributors of fatigue. For instance, the mental demand 

for a passenger who is caught smoking on the aircraft, who 

then apologizes and behaves for the rest of the flight, is 

much different than the demand imposed by a passenger 

who continues to smoke for the rest of the flight.

Summary

ASRS and ASAP data are not completely representative of the issues that are faced by the flight attendant 

population; however, there is no single, representative 

database of flight attendant issues. First, these programs 

are voluntary, and the data are not required to be reported; 

therefore, not every occurrence of the issues we examined 

may be captured in their entirety, and some issues may 

not have been addressed at all. Second, the information 

usually reported in these programs is related to critical 

events, issues, or problems, and are generally not positive. 

The information reported is based upon experiences of 

the cabin crewmembers and may be influenced by their 

perspective (Aviation Safety Information and Analysis 

Sharing, n.d.). However, analyses of voluntary reporting 

program data can uncover potential problems and provide 

evidence and recommendations for developing effective 

methods to improve the issues before they become a 

serious hazard. The results of this review and analysis indicate that flight attendants report fatigue and potentially 

contributing factors somewhat frequently. The specific 

issues they discuss should be treated as illustrations of 

the issues identified in surveys and field studies of flight 

attendant fatigue. Themes in the narratives analyzed echo 

issues raised in the survey (Avers, King, et al., 2009) and 

provide support for its recommendations for science-based 

scheduling and countermeasure training.
11

References

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Safety Reporting System (ASRS). (n.d.). Retrieved 

January 22, 2009 from www.asias.faa.gov/pls/

portal/docs/PAGE/ASIAS_PAGES/LEARN_

ABOUTS/ASRS_LA.html.

Avers, K., King, S., Nesthus, T., Thomas, S., & Banks, 

J. (2009). Flight attendant fatigue, Part I: National 

duty, rest, and fatigue survey. (Technical Report 

DOT/FAA/AM-09/24). Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Aerospace 

Medicine.

Avers, K., Hauck, E., Blackwell, L., & Nesthus, T. (2009). 

Flight attendant fatigue, Part VI: Fatigue countermeasures training and potential benefits. (Technical 

Report DOT/FAA/AM-09/20). Washington, DC: 

Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Aerospace Medicine.

Brown, L. (2009). The efficacy of flight attendant/pilot 

communications in a post 9/11 environment: Viewed 

from both sides of the fortress door. Unpublished draft 

manuscript.

Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.) Occupational outlook 

handbook, 2008-09 edition: Flight attendant. Retrieved August 11, 2009 from www.bls.gov/oco/

ocos171.htm.

Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2008). National 

transportation statistics. Retrieved July 21, 2009 

from www.bts.gov/.

Bureau of Transportation Statistics (n.d). Retrieved July 

21, 2009 from www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=2.

Caldwell, J. (2005). Fatigue in aviation. Travel Medicine 

and Infectious Disease, 3, 85-96.

Chute, R. & Wiener, E. (1995). Cockpit-cabin communication: I. A tale of two cultures. The International 

Journal of Aviation Psychology, 5(3), 257-276.

Chute, R. & Wiener, E. (1996). Cockpit-cabin communication: II. Shall we tell the pilots? The International 

Journal of Aviation Psychology, 6(3), 211-231.

Federal Aviation Administration (2002). Advisory circular 

number 120-66B: Aviation Safety Action Program 

(ASAP). Retrieved July 21, 2009 from rgl.faa.gov/

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/61c319d7a04907a886256c79006 

48358/$FILE/AC120-66B.pdf.

Haugli, L. Skogstad, A., & Hellesoy, O. (1994). Health, 

sleep, and mood perceptions reported by airline 

crews flying short and long hauls. Aviation, Space, 

and Environmental Medicine, 65(1), 27-34.

MacDonald, L., Deddens, J., Grajewski, B., Whelan, E., 

& Hurrell, J. (2003). Job stress among female flight 

attendants. Journal of Environmental Medicine, 45

(7), 703-714.

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Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Retrieved in 2009 from asrs.arc.nasa.gov/.

Nesthus, T., Schroeder, D., Connors, M., RentmeisterBryant, H., & DeRoshia, C. (2007). Flight attendant 

fatigue. (Technical Report DOT/FAA/AM-07/21). 

Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration, 

Office of Aerospace Medicine.

Ono, Y., Watanabe, S., Kaneko, S., Matsumoto, K., & 

Miyao, M. (1991). Working hours and fatigue of 

Japanese flight attendants. Journal of Human Ergology, 20(2), 155-164.

Rosekind, M., Gander, P., Gregory, K., Smith, R., Miller, 

D., Oyung, R, et al. (1996). Managing fatigue in 

operational settings 1: Physiological consideration 

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157-165.

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World, 34-39.

A1

Appendix A

1. When did you start serving on the ASAP ERC for Flight Attendant reporting? 

2. What type of air carrier do you oversee?

a. Network (Operates a significant portion of flights using at last one hub where connections are made for flights 

on spoke systems [e.g. American, United, Continental])

b. Low Cost (Industry recognizes as operating under a low-cost business model, with lower infrastructure costs 

and higher rates of productivity [e.g., Southwest, US Airways, Jetblue])

c. Regional (Provides service from small cities, using primarily regional jets to support the network carriers hub 

and spoke systems [e.g., Sky West, American Eagle, Express jet])

d. Other Carrier (Other airline not listed above that operates within a specific niche market [e.g., Hawaiian 

Airlines])

3. When did your air carrier become involved with the Flight Attendant ASAP program?

4. On average, how many Flight Attendants are employed by your air carrier?

5. How many Flight Attendant ASAP events have been submitted for your air carrier? (Required)

6. What percentage of Flight Attendant ASAP events are also reported to NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System 

(ASRS)?

7. Have you discussed Flight Attendant fatigue/scheduling issues within your ERC?

8. What percentage of Flight Attendant ASAP events have involved scheduling/fatigue issues? (Required)

9. What specific issues were involved in fatigue-related ASAP events? (Mark all that apply)

a. Fatigue 

b. Scheduling 

c. Length of duty time 

d. Other ________________________

10. When did fatigue-related ASAP events most frequently occur?

a. 06:00-09:59 

b. 10:00-13:59

c. 14:00-17:59

d. 18:00-21:59

e. 22:00-01:59

f. 02:00-05:59

11. When did fatigue-related ASAP events most frequently occur in the duty day?

a. Early in the duty day

b. Middle of the duty day

c. Late into the duty day

12. Did fatigue-related ASAP events typically occur during a single leg or multiple leg duty day?

a. Single leg

b. Multiple leg

13. When did fatigue-related ASAP events typically occur?

a. Boarding

b. Deplaning

c. During service

d. Safety-related duties

e. Other______________________

14. What percentage of fatigue-related ASAP events resulted in a severe outcome?

15. What percentage of fatigue-related ASAP events resulted in injury(s) to...

a. passengers __________

b. flight attendants ____________

c. other crew members__________

16. What percentage of fatigue-related ASAP events resulted in an evacuation?

17. What issues have you identified as common precursors to fatigue-related ASAP events?

18. Based on your experience, do you have any recommendations for minimizing or reducing fatigue-related ASAP 

events?

19. Any additional information regarding fatigue-related events

B1

Appendix B

Report numbers and narratives of the reports are categorized as fatigue. Narratives came from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Aviation Safety Reporting System’s online database. (Note: Narrative formats were 

changed for legibility.)

230404

Narrative: On Dec/Sun/92, I was a flight attendant on an 

air carrier flight from Charlotte to Raleigh Durham. Due to the 

weather conditions, freezing rain and low temperatures, aircraft 

deicing was being done. We were experiencing 3 1/2 to 4 hour 

delays to be deiced. At approximately PM45, we finally took 

our turn on the deicing pad. It is my understanding that the 

pilots and ground crew had communication with one another 

and that the procedure had been completed. We then got into 

position for the active runway. Shortly after that the captain 

made the announcement for the flight attendants to prepare 

for departure. A passenger informed me that the left wing had 

not been deiced. I immediately telephoned the captain and we 

were able to leave the runway and avoided takeoff. It was later 

confirmed that the wing had not been deiced. The pilots have 

to rely on the ground crew to perform the deicing procedure 

properly. It is my strong belief that the only way to avoid a 

similar incident from occurring would be to require a visual 

check by a pilot after each deicing procedure has taken place 

regardless of precipitation or the length of time to take the 

runway. Supplemental info from ACN 230403: There were 

40 planes in front of us waiting to be deiced. At 1 point, I 

was on my jump seat when a hysterical woman came forward 

shaking, crying, yelling, and cursing, demanding to get off the 

plane. We had been sitting in line for deicing about 2 hours and 

everyone was most uptight. As I passed a passenger on my way 

to the jump seat, she told me she did not think we were deiced 

on the left side. The captain then asked to be deiced where we 

were rather than waiting in that long line again. After a lot of 

disagreeing between the company and the captain, they agreed 

to deice us again at the freight pad. During this time I answered 

a call bell to learn that a girl was going into diabetic shock. I 

ran up to the cockpit and informed the captain, who told the 

passenger that there was a medical emergency on board and 

that we are going back to the gate. It was my understanding 

they only had 2 trucks deicing that night and the trucks had 

to keep going back to the terminal to refill, explaining the 

lengthy delay. I asked the first officer why he didn’t have to 

check the wings the first time, when the left side wasn’t deiced, 

and he explained there wasn’t any moisture then and there 

was this time. We finally took off arriving 5 1/2 hours late. 

This flight is usually 30 minutes. Our crew had to work on to 

Pittsburgh arriving at XX15. We were on duty almost 14 hours. 

Synopsis: 2 air carrier flight attendants report that a passenger 

noted that the left wing had not been deiced. The aircraft was 

on the runway for takeoff. Preflight procedure deicing.

304597

Narrative: Flight XXX (DHN-ATL) EMB-120, 28 passengers. Passenger in seat XX (exit row on EMB-120) had a large 

duffel bag. I attempted to gate check the bag. The passenger 

wanted to keep the bag. I spoke to the passenger twice and told 

him to put the bag under the seat as far as it would go. I told 

him to push it with his feet. I pulled it all the way forward to 

the bar beneath the seat in front. The bag was secured. It was 

protruding approximately 6 inches. As the flight attendant, I 

did not feel this was an obstruction (the exit row) compromising 

the safety of the passenger. The man still had ample room for 

his feet. I made all required announcements. Upon deplaning, passenger in seat XX asked why I allowed the row to be 

blocked. Not knowing at this time who he was, I explained 

the bag was securely stowed. Passenger in seat XX said the bag 

was too large and he thought it was a violation of the federal 

aviation regulations. Passenger in seat XX then stated he was 

an FAA inspector, only upon leaving the aircraft. The problem 

arose by trying to combine safety and service and complying 

with both. Also, there was a maximum of passenger and bags 

because of the weather and ‘0’ fuel weight of the aircraft and 

we were trying to accommodate all concerned. Furthermore, 

passenger should be more aware of exactly why flight attendants 

are on the airplane. The problem did not arise until the end of 

the flight when the passenger in seat XX stated he thought this 

was an obstruction. The corrective action, if any was needed, 

was not mentioned until the end of the flight. Perception and 

judgment factors were both involved because it is one person’s 

perception of what is too big and if the aisle is still passable. 

EMB-120 has 1 flight attendant to make the decisions in the 

cabin. That 1 flight attendant has to be ‘perfect’ at all times 

with no one else to assist him/her. Also, it was the last flight of 

8 flights in a 22 hour period with 8 hours on the ground. The 

lack of rest contributed to the alertness of that 1 crew member 

and his/her judgments. If this was truly a compromise of safety, 

it should have been brought to my attention before the plane 

left the gate in Dothan. Callback conversation with reporter 

revealed the following info: flight attendant states that there is 

a lot of pressure from the company to ‘just do your job, but no 

substantial training, and no backing,’ to promote job performance. Then, ‘it seems that all the passenger thinks that you 

are there for is pretzels and peanuts.’ Reporter was reminded 

that the flight attendant position is required by federal aviation 

regulations, and the job’s primary focus should be safety. Flight 

attendant stated that this is not the company’s representation 

of the job description, but that others have conveyed this attitude. Reporter agreed that one can assert his/her position 

in a manner that would still meet with the company’s service 

orientation. Reporter’s call to Dothan revealed that the inspector 

was traveling on business unrelated to this company’s operation, and that FAA person was not an ACI for this air carrier. 

Synopsis: After a flight segment was completed, an FAA 

inspector passenger identified self, and questioned the flight 

attendant regarding stowage of a passenger’s bag. The inspector 

asserted that the bag had not been stowed properly and that 

this was a violation of federal aviation regulations.

330380

Narrative: I am uncertain of the legality of the times and 

was the crew legal to continue the next day? Supplemental 

info from ACN 330381: Duty began XA20 EST at EWR. 

Itinerary: EWR-ATL-TPA-MDW with duty to end at MDW 

at XI25 CST, for 9 hours 5 minutes and 5 hours 49 minutes 
B2

flight time. We finished with 10 hours 12 minutes flight time 

and 18 hours 45 minutes on duty. I’m a sure candidate for 

more than 30 in 7 and more than 8 in 24, but a careful check 

of federal aviation regulations and the interpretation of having flown as scheduled and continuing within the intent of 

our itinerary allowed us to finish at MDW, legally. We arrived 

ATL when the fast moving weather (windshear) necessitated 

abandoning approach at 200 ft. Airport closed, we diverted to 

CHA. Refueled on to ATL, then on to TPA. Enroute to MDW, 

unexpected heavy snow closed airport (below minimums). 

Diverted to Rockford, IL. RFD fix-based operator did a great 

job but the staff was overwhelmed since 10-12 aircraft also 

diverted there. We finally had buses to take our passenger but 

had to leave 7 behind (all elderly). Passenger had to walk 200 

ft ramp on ice into 20 plus KT wind at 10 degrees Fahrenheit. 

Security wouldn’t allow buses to aircraft, but loaded buses came 

to aircraft. Flight crew transferred bags in miserable conditions. 

(There’s much more to this story though.) We finally flew 

RFD to MDW, exhausted! (with 7 passengers.) A 30 minute 

flight, but took 1 hour 47 minutes which included 1 hour 5 

minutes on ground at MDW awaiting a gate. We all watched 

8 in 24 closely. Company wanted us to Part 91 Ferry to avoid 

8 in 24, but passenger (7) had to go (age, infirmity, etc). We 

were assured of legality since we were not scheduled more 

than 8 in 24, nor were we rescheduled to another destination 

or as a different flight number. As a small company, we tend 

to do whatever it takes to keep it going. So it is very possible 

a sitituation like this can lead to an inadvertent boo- boo! Let 

others beware. The fatigue factor is a real danger too. But we 

deliberately discussed this and took extra precautions while 

operating as the day wore (us) on. Know the regulations! Work 

closely with crew schedule/dispatch and practice good CRM. 

(This was the wildestination day in my 44 years of flying, 

30 with airlines.) Callback conversation with reporter ACN

330380 revealed the following info: reporter flight attendant 

was contacted because in her report she requested feedback. 

Their flight crew finished the day with 18 hours 45 minutes 

of duty time and 10 hours 12 minutes of flight time. The pilot 

flight crew as well as the flight attendant crew were all concerned 

about their legalities under the federal aviation regulations. After 

arriving at MDW, they were sent to the hotel for a short night 

and took the flight out the next morning. They had arranged 

ahead of time with their company that they would fly only the 

one leg and then be relieved for rest. Reporter flight attendant 

says the entire flight crew went into their president’s office 

and relayed the difficult trip, and that after such a trip they 

needed more rest. The legalities are very hazy and not spelled 

out in the federal aviation regulations. When there are irregular 

operations due to weather conditions, there are limited guidelines which apply and mostly are contractual items. Reporter 

says the president was sympathetic and guaranteed that they 

would handle the rest period better in the future operations. 

Synopsis: Flight crew contended with numerous weather 

problems extending their duty day to over 18 hours. Legalities 

were maintained, however, though the rest time allotted to the 

flight attendant at the conclusion was questionable.

380694

Narrative: Scheduled for federal aviation administration 

mandated recurrent training on Sep/XA/97. If recurrent 

training is counted as a part of or applies to the 24 in 7 rule 

then I worked 7 consecutive days without a 24 hour break. 

Originally, I was scheduled to work 4 days of reserve on 

Sep/A,B,C,D/97, I then picked up an additional 2 day trip on 

Sep/E,F/97 for a total of 6 days of work. Moments later recurrent training was assigned to me for a total of 7 days. Although 

I addressed this issue with our scheduling dept, I was told 

recurrent training does not count towards a part of the 24 in 

7 rule. I’m still uncertain about this federal aviation regulation. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant questioned the legality of scheduling 

recurrent training on the seventh day of duty without having 24 

hours off duty. Company said that cabin attendant training is 

not included in company duty time for computing rest periods.

387700

Narrative: On Nov/XA/97 at XX00, DCA-HSV was delayed causing a delayed arrival in HSV. Upon checking out at 

XX30 the crew did not realize we were not going to have the 

entire scheduled reduced rest period. The time change from 

eastern standard to central could have added confusion. Also 

the company’s current crew track system did not flag our section 

to advise us of the need for a delayed check-in for the following day. We checked in at XA36, our scheduled check-in time. 

Still not aware of not getting our full 9 hours of reduced rest, 

the following day I was advised by my crew that we did not 

get enough crew rest. Crew scheduling had called the captain. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant reported less than scheduled rest 

due to the flight being delayed in starting from the origination 

point which caused it to terminate later than scheduled and 

consequently less time than scheduled between the next duty 

starting period.

400339

Narrative: At origination we were delayed due to the valve 

problem in the #1 engine. It was fixed and logged in the book. 

Meaning we were signed off that it was fixed. We took off and 

felt no incident until we got a phone call from the captain stating that he shut down the #1 engine and that everything was 

okay, that we were 40 miles from MIA and we did not need to 

prepare the cabin for an emergency landing. We landed with no 

incident and the same aircraft was repaired and as for the flight 

attendant crew I was on we went illegal to fly because too many 

hours on duty. The flight went out with no further incident. 

Synopsis: Flight attendant report regarding B727 engine 

valve problem requiring an engine shutdown and a return for 

maintenance. This resulted in cabin attendant illegal duty time.

410667

Narrative: I worked a flight from Chicago to Los Angeles. 

I was #1 flight attendant. Some background is necessary to 

explain my reason for medical attention. I had been on a diet 

for 2 weeks which consists of no caffeine, no sugar and no carbohydrates. Prior to my flight in Chicago, I drank an extra large 

coffee (with caffeine), as our flight was a late departure, and it 

was a long duty day due to a schedule change. Approximately 

2 1/2 hours into the flight I felt strange. My initial thought 

was hypoxia. I asked the other 2 flight attendants if they felt 

unusual, and they said no. My next suspicion was possible 

hypoglycemia. I drank orange juice, had some sugar and water. 

Nothing helped. From my first aid training, I deduced that 

I might be having the symptoms of an oncoming seizure. #4 

flight attendant made a public address asking for a doctor or 

medically trained person, however there was no response. I felt 

progressively worse. The first officer took my pulse, and asked 
B3

if I felt that an emergency landing was necessary. There was 

absolutely no doubt in my mind, I felt that this was a potentially 

life threatening situation. We diverted to Las Vegas. Paramedics met the flight. I was put into an ambulance, and taken to 

the hospital. The emergency room physician determined that 

I had an acute anxiety attack due to the caffeine that I drank. 

He said the diet I was on is not safe. I learned later the diet 

dehydrated the body, and affects the electrolytes, and also 

causes low blood sugar. The doctor felt that a CAT scan and 

blood work was not necessary. My vital signs were normal, 

and I was released. Overnight arrangements were made, and I 

flew to Los Angeles. I went directly to my physician (internal 

medicine/cardiologist). He gave me an EKG and performed 

blood work. He concluded the same as the doctor in Las Vegas, 

due to the diet, I had an adverse reaction to the caffeine. No 

further medical treatment was necessary. I was immediately 

released to full duty, and assumed my normal flying schedule. 

Synopsis: At cruise, onboard MD80s, cabin attendant became 

ill and flight crew diverted to alternate to get medical assistance.

432684

Narrative: A cleaning agent was used on ovens that became 

toxic with fumes and smoke once ovens were turned on. The 

smell was ‘extremely powerful’ before ovens were turned on 

-- which became smoky once ovens were ‘on’ and ‘heating,’ 

creating nausea, fatigue, headache, as well as a feeling of 

heavy breathing due to the inhalation of ‘smell and smoke.’ 

All cleaning agents should be checked before being used on 

these ovens. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the 

following information: Reporter states that the flight diverted 

to RDU instead of continuing to DCA as scheduled. The flight 

attendants were taken directly to the hospital. There were no 

long term effects and the reporter was back to work again 

after a 48 hour recovery. Several different bases were checked 

to determine what kind of cleaning agents are used. Some of 

the bases use only soap and water, others use a variety of cleaning agents. They were unable to find out just what was used 

in these ovens. Reporter believes this aircraft had come from 

Cancun. The company is aware and hopefully will follow up. 

Synopsis: Flight attendant report regarding the noxious and 

toxic fumes, then smoke once ovens were turned on. The 

smell caused nausea, fatigue, headaches and a feeling of heavy 

breathing. Flight diverted. Cabin attendants were taken to 

the hospital.

441257

Narrative: An auxiliary door light came on in the cockpit 

after takeoff. This has been written up repeatedly in the cabin 

log. When the captain contacted dispatch, he was requested to 

‘go-on’ and to take this airplane. He elected not to, and although 

we did not evacuation, he asked us to go over our commands 

to ourselves and to know that it was possible we would blow 

tires due to being heavy. We returned without incident. The 

cockpit crew were illegal and said they did not discover this 

until we were airborne. My feeling is they had enough to do 

without also having to establish their legality. I was not happy 

to hear that dispatch asked the captain to ignore the sanitation 

and to continue on. We got to Madrid 6 hours late and were 

totally exhausted. Supplemental info from ACN 441258: The 

landing seemed to use most of the runway, but was otherwise 

unremarkable. Supplemental info from ACN 441259: the 

fire trucks checked us out and aircraft was allowed to taxi in. 

Synopsis: multiple flight attendant reports, B767-300, MIAmad, aux door light on, return to MIA, heavy, maintenance.

448619

Narrative: Completing meal service in main cabin ready 

for movie to start. Informed of fuel leak and we would be 

turning around going back to LAX. Landed 20-25 minutes 

later. Kept passenger calm. Remained on taxiway for some 

time. Then we got a gate. Passenger were wanting off. After 

some time -- 40-45 minutes -- passenger told to get off and 

change planes. We stowed catering equipment and went to 

the new plane DC10 (lower lobe). Cockpit went illegal, went 

to hotel. We were not released until XA00. Arrived hotel 

around XB00. Pick-up the next morning at XM30. Continued on to HNL, arrived XR45. Pick-up at hotel in HNL 

XR30 on Aug/XB/99. Arrived DFW on Aug/XC/99 at XA00. 

Returned home and that night I was exhausted -- more so 

than usual. The hours of sleep being different and not getting 

a good night’s rest on the trip may have contributed to my 

restlessness or jet lag when I returned home. My next trip is 

not until Aug/XG/99 and I need every bit of that to recover. 

Synopsis: Flight attendant report, DC10, DFW-HNL, fuel 

leak, return to LAX, flight canceled. Pilots went illegal, cabin 

crew did not, but had minimum rest.

453946

Narrative: Flight attendants are sent out on red-eye flights 

on the same day they arrive from a transpacific/transatlantic 

flight. Then some are forced to work an additional segment 

immediately after the red-eye. Our concern is a safety and 

health issue. We are fatigued, exhausted, and believe it or not 

-- jet lagged! We are pushing the line on physical functionality 

should we be required to perform and react to an emergency. 

It is ridiculous that this is even legal, as this is physically and 

mentally horrid. One of the reasons why this occurs is airline 

X is constantly short-staffed flight attendants. Already this year, 

300 newly hired flight attendants quit airline to pursue other 

airlines and opportunities (airlines y and z). This is because 

of airline X refusal to work with employees to settle labor 

disputes, refusal to settle a flight attendant contract, low pay 

and poor work rules at airline X. Solution: flight attendants 

need a contract with decent pay and retirement, we need health 

regulations. Unless regulations are made, airline X management 

will continue to unravel at the safety of the airline like a ball 

of string. Because of airline X poor management decisions, 

the flying public was taken advantage of enough, and the 

passenger’s bill of rights arose. Now the flight crews have had 

enough, and we want and are in desperate need of a bill of 

rights for our safety and health. If you are on a flight and an 

emergency occurred, what kind of flight crew do you want to be 

with? What would increase your chance of survival? Please help 

make our airline safer. Please help us to maintain the safety and 

health of our crews. We appreciate any support and guidance 

in helping to direct airline X to be a safe United States carrier. 

Synopsis: Collective flight attendants from airline X, a report 

on lack of federal regulations for cabin attendant fatigue duty 

time and rest time. Safety issue.

453948

Narrative: In conjunction with the enclosed report to airline, 

the 2 main issues that concern me and that I feel should be 

investigated are the 15 1/2 hour duty day that the cockpit and 
B4

flight attendants worked, as well as the unsanitary conditions 

of an aircraft without any running water for approximately 7 

1/2 hours that passenger were onboard. I was flight attendant 

#5 from JFK to PAP on Aug/XA/99. We arrived late from 

JFK. When we arrived in PAP, we were informed that our 

aircraft was to be used for the PAP-MIA trip which had been 

delayed from the day prior. We had a decision on our aircraft 

of XA00 local time, awaiting parts and mechanics from MIA. 

Once they arrived we went to the terminal to wait. During 

this time, we were told that if we left, we would not be catered 

-- no water would be added, and no ice would be brought on 

-- there would be no water in the lavatories as well. At approximately XA00, we all went back to the aircraft and began 

boarding about 15 minutes later. Passengers were angry and 

frustrated when they came on, especially after they found out 

that there would be no catering or water onboard. They said 

they were not informed of this at all in the terminal. After all 

the passengers were onboard, we were told that we would be 

receiving sandwiches and sodas in a short while. A short time 

turned into a long time. Passenger starting hitting call lights, 

wanting to know how much longer. I was in the aft cabin with 

the 4L door still open with air stairs attached. At approximately 

XA00, about 2 hours after boarding, I saw a whole crowd of 

people standing and yelling inciting a riot. At that point, call 

lights were going off one after the other. At that point, I was 

feeling uneasy in the back of the plane, but the 4L door was 

still open, so I felt like I could still get out if I needed to. The 

shouting up front continued to worsen. I went into the cabin for 

a minute to listen to a public address the captain was making, 

telling everyone to sit down or we weren’t leaving until they 

did so. No one listened -- it only incited them further. When I 

returned to the rear, the 4L door was closed and stairs removed. 

The shouting was persistent with more people standing. At 

that point, I was feeling trapped and unsafe in the aft cabin. I 

decided to move up to the forward part of the aircraft, where I 

figured the rest of the crew was. I fought my way through the 

crowd, yelling, pushing and climbing over bags. I felt a little 

bit better once I was with the rest of the crew in the forward 

galley, closer to an open door. The captain was not doing much 

at this point to control the sit, except make loud remarks so 

that first class could hear, like ‘if they can’t take a joke, screw 

‘em.’ the crowd did not relent. I expressed my feelings to the 

crew that I did not feel safe onboard the aircraft. Many others expressed the same. At this point the captain was on the 

megaphone -- telling everyone to calm down, that the food 

would be there any minute. That seemed to get them even 

angrier. This went on for about 20 minutes, when the purser 

said he no longer felt safe and was leaving the aircraft. At that 

point, I said, I no longer felt safe onboard and I told the crew 

and the captain that I was leaving. He was still talking on the 

megaphone and had no control over the sit. Flight attendant 

#2 and myself waited on the ramp by the gate area -- 3 other 

flight attendants came out also and said they did not feel safe 

on the aircraft (this all happened about XA30 local time). The 

flight attendants then came out, said it was still out of control 

onboard. The ground staff was trying to convince us to go 

back onboard so the flight could leave. A few minutes later the 

captain made a plea to flight attendant #2 over the megaphone 

to return to the aircraft and speak with him -- we did not go 

back -- feeling it was still unsafe. Shortly after that another 

flight attendant came out and said it was a little better onboard. 

All but flight attendant #2 and myself returned to the aircraft. 

Everyone kept trying to convince us that it was safe. The door 

to the aircraft soon closed and stairs pulled away -- ready to 

depart. We were inside the terminal and asked for assistance 

in getting a hotel and transportation. About 10 minutes later, 

a manager came and told flight attendant #2 that she was 

confident that it was safe for us to return. Flight attendant #2 

had flown with her many times and trusted her judgment. At 

that point I decided it was not safe for me to stay in PAP by 

myself and I opted to return to the aircraft. After I returned to 

the aircraft, flight attendant #5 told me that when the captain 

returned onboard after he tried to convince me and flight attendant #2 to return, he said in front of the crew and the first 

officer that, ‘those two @#%^&$* $#%^*@# are staying.’ I did 

not say anything to the captain about this statement or about 

anything else. I continued to perform my duties as a flight attendant throughout the remainder of the trip. The lavatories 

and the rear galley were disgusting and unsanitary -- there was 

no running water in the lavatories for the 3 1/2 hour flight 

to JFK, plus the 2 1/2 hours on the ground with passenger 

onboard. I feel that my safety and well being was compromised 

by air carrier X airlines, represented by captain and that I was 

viewed in a discriminatory fashion by air carrier X airlines in 

the comment expressed by captain. No further incident took 

place onboard the flight to JFK. Callback conversation with 

reporter revealed the following info: the reporter said that 

the company has reviewed the case and has chosen not to do 

anything about it. The captain has denied ever calling them 

names. The reporter feels that this must violate public health 

laws and believes that it violated federal aviation regulations. 

He feels that the whole sit was shoved underneath a rug and 

forgotten about. He said that the Port au Prince and Santo 

Domingo flights were notorious for the passenger getting out of 

control. He may try calling the public health board to get some 

action on the sanitary and safety issues involved. At the present 

time, he feels helpless to change the airline’s policy of taking 

and accepting an airplane with no water on a long flight. The 

company told him that because there were a couple of bottles 

of water onboard, they considered it to have running water. 

Synopsis: Flight attendant report, A300, Port au P-JFK. Airline and the captain accepted an airplane with no water at all. 

Passenger rioted and were out of control after 3 hour delay.

459500

Narrative: A passenger rang call light. I found passenger 

having a seizure. She stopped breathing and was unconscious. 

The cockpit decided to make an emergency landing in LNK. 

The passenger regained consciousness within 1 - 1 1/2 minutes. Paramedics met the flight. The passenger was removed. 

While refueling, there was a fuel spill and fumes entered the 

cabin. The cabin temp was very warm and air conditioning 

increased the fumes in the cabin. The air conditioning was 

turned off. Passengers were complaining of heat, eyes burning and throats burning. I wear contact lenses -- my eyes and 

throat were burning also. My contacts had to be discarded per 

my eye doctor’s instructions. I think the captain should have 

allowed passenger and crew off the aircraft and away from 

the fumes. This would have prevented many passengers from 

vomiting and a lot less stress. We took off and landed safely 

in LAS. Crew only had 8 hours rest and had to work next day. 

I think rest should have been longer after such a stressful sit. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant report, MD80, ORD-LAS. Passenger had seizure. Divert to LNK. Passenger removed. Fuel 
B5

spill in LNK. Passenger and cabin crew got sick from fumes. 

Minimum rest in LAS.

470974

Narrative: Attached are 4 pages of notes from my flight log 

regarding the unhealthy air quality on some of our DC10’s. 

SFO-HNL, dating from Nov/XA/99, to the present. The stinky, 

stuffy, stale, stagnant, dirty, and chemical smelling air, lacking 

in breathable air, becomes a problem for passenger and working flight attendants when all the pack flow control switches 

are not set on normal (high), or when two are turned on low. 

Some of the symptoms of breathing this poorly ventilated air 

include: shortness of breath, difficulty breathing, headaches, 

stuffy or drippy nose, congested lungs and sinuses, sinus pain, 

sneezing, sore throat, coughing, head cold, burning and tired 

eyes, pressure behind eyes, tearing eyes, lightheadedness, dizzy, 

weak extremities, muscle aches, tired, sleepy, lethargy, fatigue, 

stress, and reduced mental capacity. The lack of adequate 

ventilation in the aircraft reduces air quality by permitting 

pollutants to accumulate. Some of these pollutants may include 

carbon dioxide, produced by dry ice and human breathing, 

atmospheric ozone, fibers and dust, formaldehyde in carpets 

and seat material, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds 

from fuel, cleaning fluids, a mix of toilet chemicals, dirty air 

filters, pesticides, possible cigarette smoke residue, and bacteria, 

fungi and viruses from passenger and food. It is a known fact 

that increasing the ventilation flow rate, as within other microenvironments, improves public health, reduces symptoms, and 

decreases the risk of contracting illnesses and airborne bacteria 

and viruses. Contrary to the company’s manual position that 

passenger comfort is increased by reducing air flow noise, cabin 

conditions on these old DC10’s are such that passenger comfort 

is adversely compromised by reduced air flow, as is the health of 

working flight attendants, resulting in possible toxic chemical 

poisoning. Flight attendants have a right to a workplace with full 

utilization of air. An aircraft is an environmental control sys. It 

is not only the aft cabin that has poor air quality, it’s the entire 

passenger cabin, lavatories, service center and galley. Zone A, 

B and C are not confined, isolated self-sustaining entities, but 

a single, self-contained aircraft. Knowing the poor air quality 

ventilation consequences of not operating with all 3 pack flow 

control switches on normal, it has been standard operating 

procedure for most pilots to leave them all on during flight, 

or at least to turn them all on normal when advised by flight 

attendants of lack of ventilation. Is company policy on pack 

settings different than flight manual ? After 34 years of flying, 

and probably the last 20 years on DC10’s, a concern for my own 

health and that of my flying partners and our passenger is my 

priority in reporting this ongoing problem. In these last months 

of DC10 flying, there is no time to waste in resolving this issue. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant report, DC10, SFO-HNL. Sites 

airline’s DC10 manual for air flow packs set on low, or #3 

turned off, for passenger comfort as being the opposite: health 

threat for passenger and cabin attendants.

476689

Narrative: We were reassigned at the last minute off our 

deadheading back to SNA to work a full B767-300 DFW-MIA 

because the cabin crew had gone illegal. It was very chaotic 

with the illegal crew getting off and the 3 of us trying to get 

on. The passenger service manager or lead agent had told us 

that we were a minimum crew of 5 and that 2 deadheaders 

on the flight had been informed that they would be our #3 

and #5. She read out our names and position as we got on the 

plane. We didn’t have a crew list. I had been assigned purser. 

I am not a qualified purser. As the illegal flight attendants got 

off the aircraft, we also asked them if the 2 deadheaders had 

been contacted that they were to work and they said ‘yes.’ 

as soon as we got on I went up to the cockpit to introduce 

myself to the captain that we were a minimum of 5 -- stowed 

luggage, checked emergency equipment, the door closed, and 

we prepared for departure video safety checks. As we took off, 

I noticed that the #5 had not gotten to their jump seat. I was 

thinking that the #5 had taken the wrong jump seat for takeoff 

and must correct them for landing. I went up to the cockpit to 

get the crew list. The captain did not have a working crew list, 

but did have a list of all the deadheaders that were originally 

scheduled to deadhead. I went to the #3, who was originally 

scheduled to deadhead, but was now working to point out 

the other 2 deadheaders to me. I got them in the galley and 

asked who was supposed to be working #5 position. They 

both said that they had not been contacted to work. I said, 

‘you are both working now and designated one to sit the #5 

jump seat 1RC for landing. I informed the captain that the 

other 2 deadheaders were working and I had designated #5 for 

jump seat for landing. To prevent a reoccurrence -- all flight 

attendants must work their assigned position and sit in their 

proper jump seats. I won’t be pressured by the ground crew 

to get a flight out, especially in a chaotic sit like we had. Even 

if I have to cause a further delay, I will make sure the captain 

has a briefing with me (he’s supposed to anyway) and I have a 

briefing with flight attendants assigned to work. Supplemental 

info from ACN 476405: the only problem -- door 1R was not 

manned during takeoff. I was not informed of this before takeoff. 

Synopsis: Multiple pilot and cabin attendant report, B767-

300, DFW-MIA. Original cabin crew illegal. 3 cabin attendants grabbed off another flight to work (FAA minimum 5), 

including 2 deadheaders. In the confusing crew change, door 

1 unmanned for takeoff.

482503

Narrative: Flight X was delayed due to maintenance. There 

was no air on aircraft. Maintenance signed off. We pushed 

back. We had no air. It was about 90 degrees in the back of 

aircraft. It took about 20 minutes or more to take off. We took 

off and still had no air. Mothers were taking the clothes off 

their kids to get cool. Everyone was upset on how hot it was. 

We were then informed that we were returning to DFW. We 

were told to watch for smoke in the cabin and fuel smells. The 

fire trucks met us on landing. They got out of their trucks to 

give our aircraft a visual. Still no air. We taxied into the gate. 

We deplaned. We were met by an inflight supervisor and given 

the option to be pulled from the flight if it continued. We 

(all 3) were pulled. We did not evacuate the aircraft, but we 

did in our minds. We were set to go! Not one of us (the flight 

attendants) had a dry piece of uniform on. We were removed 

by choice for safety reasons. We were spent! We now have 

marks on our record. Pushback from gate to landing was 53 

minutes. Add 30 minutes for boarding full aircraft with no 

air conditioning. Callback conversation with reporter revealed 

the following info: The reporter stated that she didn’t know 

if the cockpit had any air when they accepted the logbook 

signoff, or if they were aware that they were going to take a 

plane with no air. Once the problem became apparent in the 
B6

air, some of the elderly women started to panic and came close 

to passing out. The captain never told the cabin crew why 

they were to look out for smoke, nor did he communicate 

with them about the nature of the problem. After landing, the 

plane was taken out of service and another plane was brought 

in. The company docked the flight attendants a day’s pay for 

walking off the trip and it went on their records as a negative. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant report, B727, DFW-MCO. 

Maintenance delay, no air on aircraft, maintenance signed off. 

Takeoff still no air return to DFW. Emergency fire equipment 

met flight, passenger upset, cabin attendants removed from 

trip emotionally drained.

482570

Narrative: Flight #XX SFO-HNL DC10, aircraft #1, #2, 

#3 all have had major mechanical problems -- many with a 

loss of the engine, hydraulics, oil leaks, loss of #1 engine. Jul/

XX/00 we lost the #2 engine on aircraft #2. Jul/YY/00 (my 

flight that aborted this takeoff.) We had extreme delays with 

crews duty days, 16 hours long. 2 flights returned Aug/XX/00 

after 1 hour in the air. Also on flight #XY, all 10 flight attendants walked off the plane. On Jul/XX/00 they/we refused 

to fly after the mechanical delay and we aborted the takeoff. 

Supplemental info from ACN 480917: there have been major 

delays and cancellations due to the condition and age of the 

DC10’s flying this route. The concern by flight attendants 

flying this route has been so great that they have been refusing 

to work on these airplanes because they feel they are unsafe. 

Synopsis: Multiple cabin attendant report, DC10, SFO-HNL. 

Aborted takeoff, loss of engine #2. Report of multiple mechanical delays for DC10. 10 cabin attendants refused to fly it, due 

to fear for own safety and walked off flight.

485723

Narrative: I was not involved in the incident. I was flight 

attendant #5 working first class galley. However, I do have 

some input. Every time XHJ are sold on a B767-300, there is 

always a problem. There was no need, on that day, to give out 

XHJ, as the coach cabin had lots of empty seats. These seats 

should never be sold. Flight attendants also have rights. Passengers expect us to shut off the light, be quiet, etc. I cannot 

sit in a dark galley on an insert (bin). It is inhumane. I always 

fly either #4 or #5, so I also encounter problems when those 

seats are occupied. This, in my mind, is a major safety issue. 

Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following info: 

The reporter stated that she was working in the first class galley 

and heard loud voices, when a call came from another flight 

attendant to the purser to immediately come to business class 

for a passenger assault of a flight attendant. According to the 

purser, the incident started on the ground. A first class passenger, who was a big, burly man, took his wife some champagne 

back to coach, where she was sitting. She happened to have 

been booked in the crew rest seats, which are across from the 

business class galley. The company is not supposed to book 

these seats if the flight is over 8 hours, and should not book 

them when the plane is not full, because the business class flight 

attendants use them as a vital extension of their small galley. At 

this point, it is unclear if the assaulted flight attendant chastised 

him for bringing his wife some champagne, but the wife told 

her husband that the flight attendants were nasty to her. Later 

in the flight, words were said and the man had pinned the 

flight attendant’s arm against the fuselage wall, injuring her. 

She was heard screaming and crying. The pilots were told of 

the incident, but did not leave the cockpit. The injured flight 

attendant didn’t go to the layover hotel, because her arm was 

injured and she was traumatized, so she wanted to deadhead 

home immediately. She is now in the process of suing the man. 

No authorities met the flight to interview or arrest the man. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant report, B767-300, JFK-CDG. First 

class passenger (man) assaulted cabin attendant working in business class, injuring her arm over dispute about wife in coach.

487811

Narrative: Passenger X was our passenger on our flight on 

Sep/XA/00, JFK-GIG. He drank a lot, but was an amiable 

passenger. Mr. X returned with us on sep/XB/00, GIG to JFK. 

Again he drank a lot, but remained calm, quiet and friendly. 

After meal and duty free service were completed, flight attendant 

#4 came to first class to inform me Mr. X was now sitting on 

the floor at our flight attendant crew rest area. Previously he 

had nearly fallen on top of flight attendant #4 in the galley. I 

approached Mr. X and asked if he was all right. He said he was 

anxious and depressed. I asked him if he wanted to talk about 

it. My crew pitched in. They watched the cabin. They started 

paperwork. I spent the next 2+ hours talking with Mr X. He 

expressed great sadness in his life and feelings of depression. 

He indicated he was an alcoholic (off the wagon) who began 

drinking again on our trip on Sep/XA/00. He had been sober 

125 days. He indicated he wanted to hurt himself on several 

occasions during our conversation. He said he was on prozac. I 

mentioned combining prozac with alcohol was not a good idea. 

Mr. X said he had been abusive on a pervious X airline domestic 

flight. He was drunk. He hit a wall and seat backs. That flight 

the captain came back and talked with him. He said the FBI 

removed him from the plane. Tonight, Mr. X told me he had 

a knife in his briefcase, and he wanted to use it on himself. I 

told him, ‘we will have none of that. I do not allow my flight 

attendants, crew, or passenger to be threatened.’ I asked to see 

the knife. He ignored my request. As time passed, Mr. X calmed 

down. He returned to his seat and put on his headphones. A 

few minutes later, flight attendant #8 informed me he had a 

knife out. I checked. The knife was gone. A minute later. Our 

flight attendant #4 said, ‘he’s holding a swiss army knife in his 

left hand, tossing it back and forth between both hands. This 

time, I went to him. I saw him trying to hide the knife. I reached 

out for it and said, ‘give me that. You know better than that. 

Shame on you.’ he smiled, and gave me the knife. I took it to 

the cockpit. The captain had been advised of entire incident 

from the beginning. Flight attendant #9 advised me that Mr. 

X has been on previous flights on our airline, and behaved the 

same way. He got drunk. One of the flight attendants spent 

a lot of the time talking to him. He then calmed down. He 

had no knife previously. My concern is, now Mr. X is carrying 

and bandying around a swiss army knife. He opens and closes 

it. He pretends to hide it. He admits he had been violent on 

flights before. My recommendation is, at minimum, refuse 

to serve Mr. X any alcohol, and secondly, check his carry-on 

bags for weapons. Once we landed, Mr. X rushed off flight. I 

informed the agent of the incident in case Mr. X claimed his 

knife. I do not know what he chose to do once he left our flight. 

Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following 

info: The reporter stated that the man was in business class. 

He sat on the floor in the crew rest area, which consisted of 

some curtained-off seats in business class. The crew couldn’t 
B7

use the crew rest seats for their breaks, because she was sitting 

on a seat, and the man was sitting on the floor, talking for 2 

1/2 hours. The man had been refused more alcohol several 

hours earlier, before falling on the galley flight attendant. She 

believes that he was just playing a game with the swiss army 

knife, and probably wasn’t trying to injure himself. She never 

asked the captain to call for police or the FBI to meet the flight. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant report, B767-200, GIG-JFK. Man 

flew round trip with same crew, intoxicated, depressed, sat in 

crew rest area, pocket knife confiscated. History of violence 

on other flights.

521206

Narrative: Passenger appeared to be having a heart attack. 

Another passenger noticed him and called for help. A public 

address paged for a physician, and one responded and assisted 

us. 2 flight attendants attached the AED to the passenger, I 

obtained solid state oxygen and turned it on, the physician 

attached the mask to passenger’s face. Another flight attendant 

obtained a medical kit and physician used nitroglycerine on 

passenger, who then improved, but physician insisted we land 

because passenger would not make it all the way to JFK. We 

landed shortly thereafter (heavy) in BSB, paramedics came on 

and removed passenger, then we canceled because 8 tires needed 

to be replaced, 5 of which were flat. Passenger had bypass surgery and was on his way to New York to consult a cardiologist. 

Passenger forgot to bring his heart medicine. Passenger told no 

one, and was traveling alone. Problem: Crew waited until every 

passenger had been given a hotel room, then we were assisted 

last. We (crew) also had 3 unaccompanied minors with us. The 

following day we were told by several passenger that passenger 

who had heart attack entered hotel lobby as last passenger were 

being checked in, and he and 2 or 3 other passenger from flight 

stayed up until XA00 am smoking and drinking! Passenger 

attempted to board plane next day as if nothing happened. 

He was denied boarding, however, by agents and captain. 

Synopsis: B767 crew had a passenger heart attack in cruise 

flight in SBBS class A.

521765

Narrative: Purser came to business class and asked us to come 

to the galley (position 78 and 4) and explained the cockpit had 

various inoperative instruments and we would continue to JFK

to have the problem evaluated. A very important safety issue 

that did arise because of this unscheduled landing, delay, etc, 

was flight attendant crew rest seats. Because of less than an 8 

hour flight time, ORD to GLA, all seats plus crew seats were 

sold. A late night departure, XA00 flight time to JFK, delay to 

fix the aircraft, flight time JFK to GLA, made for an extremely 

long night and over 8 hours of flight time. On landing, all 

crew had been up for at least 24 hours and were exhausted. 

In business class we sat on plastic inserts to rest, or tried to. 

Lack of proper rest space, in such a sit, is quite unsafe. One 

cannot be 100% in an emergency situation. This is a continuous problem with air carrier X concerning proper crew rest. 

Synopsis: A B767-200 cabin attendant reports that with long 

duty time and mechanical flight delays cabin attendants do 

not have crew rest seats.

522844

Narrative: This flight was diverted from MEX to ACA. 

Approximately, one and a half hours after arrival a passenger 

required medical attention due to dizziness. Flight attendant 

#2 and #7 paged for physician and obtained oxygen. 3 doctors 

responded and requested a flashlight to check her pupils. I 

was obtaining my personal flashlight when another passenger 

ripped the flashlight from the wall at door. An ambulance 

came and passenger was removed. An hour after that, we were 

finally able to deplane our passenger. Ground services assisted 

our passenger. During the deplaning process which took some 

time due to the necessity of using busses and passenger need 

to clear customs, flight attendant #2 noticed that another 

flashlight had also been ripped from the wall. Unlike the other 

flashlight which was returned immediately the #2 had to page 

to ask for its return. It was surrendered at that time. Before the 

crew deplaned, flight attendant #2 also noticed that the pin 

from the halon located behind the last row of seats in main 

cabin on aircraft right was missing. This was never found or 

returned. The following day airport security discovered oxygen 

cartridges (passenger lifevest) with passenger carry on baggage. 

Lifevest were requested from passenger (by crew) involved and 

all three were returned. The law enforcement officers in MEX

met the flight and removed the passenger who had taken the 

equipment. This was a ten hour ordeal for our passenger. Four 

of these hours were spent flying, the remaining hours were chaotic for everyone. The aircraft was hot, our supplies were low, 

little ice and no food other than snack bars, and our passenger 

were close to rioting. Additional cabin crew would have helped 

with crowd control and a faster deplaning process would have 

helped everyone. Cabin crew was on duty for 17.30 hours. 

Synopsis: A flight attendant report on loss of control of the 

passenger on board a diverted airliner sitting on the ramp at 

MMAA, FO.

590450

Narrative: I was calling in fatigued the previous day and 

was still made to fly the schedule I was given. I had to go off 

on medical. They took me off from flying for 24 hours and 

told me to rest. I was on long days and short overnights. I 

was not getting enough sleep during the nights. I called my 

manager and told her I felt unsafe to fly and did not feel I 

could do my job. The company did nothing to help me in 

this matter. I was tired and sick and was still penalized for not 

flying. Over 12 hours is too hard to work and be safe on short 

overnights. For 3 days I was on less than 9 hours 30 minute 

overnights and over 12 hours 45 minutes on duty time. I had 

to file a complaint. I was on reserve duty and all was legal 

to fly. However, the days I was asked to work was making 

me tired and sick. I was not safe and even felt lethargic. I 

went to the doctor and she even said it was not safe to fly so 

much and so little ‘actual time sleeping,’ less than 7 hours 30 

minutes on each overnight, followed by over 13 hour duty 

days. We do not get ‘behind the door time’ (it is ‘block in’ 

time) which can be more than a full hour -- a big difference. 

Synopsis: Flight attendant report regarding the work scheduling that was alleged to have created an unsatisfactory work 

environment, with long duty days and short scheduled rest 

periods out of DFW, TX.

591882

Narrative: from our departure in Sao Paulo we experienced 

a light to moderate rough air (chop). It felt like the plane was 

traveling so fast it was shaking apart. I called the cockpit once 

to let them know that we were having a tough time walking 
B8

due to chop and I was concerned that passenger were ignoring 

the seatbelt sign because it had been on so long. I was told we 

were trying to save fuel by traveling at this rate and that we 

were boxed into this alt for now by traffic. The flight seemed 

to smooth out about 1/2 hour later, but I remember sitting 

down for my break and being unable to rest due to a constant 

light, jarring chop. We started breakfast service at XA15, 15 

minutes earlier than usual because with the tailwind or speed 

we were arriving more than 30 minutes before schedule. I was 

assigned to work R-hand side coach cabin. After I picked up 

service items and trays in coach, I did a double-careful seatbelt 

check. I had noticed at least 2 kids sleeping on seats without 

belts on while their parents were in the lavatory or wandering 

around. I did strap those little ones in as well as I could and 

moved to business class. I saw at least 4 trays out. Since we were 

about 20 minutes from touchdown (landing), I cleared 2 trays 

and made my way to the galley, bracing my legs in the aisle 

between the seats. About the time I reached the 2R door by the 

entertainment module, there was a hard jolt. I tried to hand a 

tray to another flight attendant so I could grab something and 

stabilize myself. I released one tray, then felt airborne briefly, 

before feeling like a rag doll smashed into the floor. My legs 

flew out from under me and I landed hard on my right elbow 

then rolled to my left hip. There was no free hand hold I could 

grab. I heard lots of crashing china and glassware, the business 

and first class galley compartments emptied themselves of their 

contents, much of it landing on top of other flight attendants 

in the business galley that I could see. It’s a miracle no one 

was cut. I crawled to the 2L jumpseat and strapped in. My 

right elbow was scraped, bruised and swollen. I got some ice 

from another flight attendant. I made my way back to the 4R

jumpseat for landing and noticed almost complete seatbelt 

compliance! We were met by the agent and EMS crew and 

police. Several flight attendants were bruised, sore, limping. I 

went with the EMS crew and one other attendant to the port 

auth medical. I do not hold our cockpit crew responsible for this 

incident. I was very relieved that the seatbelt sign was on and 

that I knew I had made extra careful seatbelt checks. Injuries 

could have been prevented if trays had been picked up as soon 

as passenger finished eating and especially if the galley doors 

(compartment doors) had been locked. The key is, especially 

during turbulence, to stow and lock all compartments. I’m 

sure that saved the aft galley staff from more serious injury. 

Turbulence happens. In order to diminish the likelihood of 

injury, remove all flying objects (trays, glassware) as soon as 

possible, batten down the hatches and make sure you aren’t 

a flying object by staying strapped in when chop is present! 

Synopsis: In a night operation arrival in an area of thunderstorm activity, there were numerous flight attendant injuries 

reported in a B777 during descent into JFK, NY.

592062

Narrative: Reported to work on Jul/Wed/03 at XA10. 

Boarded airplane at approximately XA35 and departed ZZZ. 

Captain discovered problem with a battery charger and company 

advised a return to ZZZ1 to repair. Landed at ZZZ1 at XC04. 

Flight attendants stayed on board with passenger during 2 hour 

14 minute time on ground. Departed ZZZ1 at XE18, arriving 

in ZZZ2 at XG22. Cabin cleared with lights on bright during 

ground time. Flight attendants called crew tracking to question 

our legalities for continuing home to ZZZ. Flight attendants 

all reported feeling very tired at this point. Body time was 

Xk00. Tracking stated that as long as we weren’t ‘scheduled or 

rescheduled’ to be on duty over 14 hours, that we were legal. 

Reboarded aircraft at approximately XH01 and flew to ZZZ 

arriving at ZZZ at XP18. Including our 30 minute debriefing, 

this duty day was 15 hours 38 minutes. Considering the following factors, I strongly believe this trip should have become 

a layover for the flight attendants in ZZZ2: 1) night flight. 

2) not 1 minute of time away from passenger for ‘rest break’ 

-- ground time in ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 was not our own time 

for any rest. 3). Company was aware of our extended duty 

period from the time we left ZZZ1 for ZZZ2, allowing them 

sufficient time to remedy the sit (i.e., cancel return flight and 

put passenger on alternate flights or delay flight until following 

morning, allowing for adequate crew rest). 4) duty day was 

showing 15 hours 38 minutes before we reboarded aircraft in 

ZZZ2. Just because it’s not ‘scheduled’ that way doesn’t change 

the fact that it’s ‘actually’ going to be 15 hours 38 minutes or 

more. If another incident occurred (delay due to fog in ZZZ 

or diversion for mechanical/emergency) we would’ve been way 

over 16 hour limit. Fatigue (especially at night) leads to errors. 

Synopsis: B757-200. The flight attendants were scheduled 

for a 15 hour 38 minute duty day, all night, ZZZ2 turn. The 

flight attendants complained of fatigue, and did not have the 

opportunity for any rest break.

598805

Narrative: We experienced a 31 minute delay while waiting 

for 3 connecting passenger. After several hours in flight, we 

began to notice that 1 lavatory after another stopped functioning, unable to flush, and filling up. One by one, the lavatories 

were blocked off and inaccessible for passenger use. Captain 

(after conferring with many sources), made the decision to 

divert to SLVR. We were on the ground there approximately 

1/2 hour. We then continued on to SAEZ, and upon arrival, 

we had been on duty 14 hours, 59 minutes. Due to the fact 

that this was an special flight, the hotel had a cake for us, which 

was the first food several of us had eaten, as there was little or 

no food left on board, and we no longer have meals provided 

for us. When I arrived in my room, I looked at the clock and 

realized it was exactly 7 hours until pickup for our return 

flight. This was all the time we had available to unwind/sleep/

shower and get ready to fly again. According to my schedule, 

the ODL was XA51, but this didn’t count travel to and from 

the airport to our downtown hotel. Certainly no time to 

have a meal after arrival or prior to departure. Our #2 flight 

attendant really felt the effects of this sit -- as he was unable 

to return with us due to a migraine and total lack of sleep. I 

felt like I had been beaten up. When we arrived at the airport 

once again, because it was a special flight out of SAEZ, there 

was a cake for us. For most of us ate the cake at the hotel and 

this cake was the only sustenance we had to eat since leaving. 

(2 pieces of cake in 24 hours.) We were exhausted due to lack 

of layover time to sleep. If our sit was at all legal, then the 

FAA needs to take a serious look at these limits. Proper rest 

times are essential as well as time to eat a decent meal. I believe 

our safety is compromised greatly by the present guidelines. 

Supplemental info from ACN 598806: flight crew very tired, 

not sure I could evacuate in an emergency with such little rest. 

Synopsis:Departure delay and a diversion to an enroute airport 

for a mechanical resulting in a late arrival at destination resulting 

in minimum rest along with inability to acquire food for the 

crew is sighted by a cabin crew as a safety hazard.
B9

601176

Narrative: I finished business class beverage service, noticed 

flight attendant #4 kneeling over passenger. I climbed over flight 

attendant #4 and passenger. Another flight attendant handed me 

AED. I put on gloves and felt passenger’s forehead, passenger 

was sweaty and cold. Doctor arrived and decided we should 

monitor passenger’s heartbeat. I turned on AED while #4 flight 

attendant removed shirt and sweater. I tried to shave chest, razor 

didn’t work, passenger had too much hair. I applied pads, AED

advised ‘no shock advised.’ Flight attendant #4 administered 

oxygen. Passenger passed in and out of consciousness. Flight 

attendant gave passenger orange juice. Passenger looked gray. 

Passenger remained on oxygen until we landed in PIT. Passenger was removed from aircraft in an aisle chair. I wish I was 

better rested, I would have felt more confident during the sit. 

6 hours of sleep plus a headache medicine did affect my judgment. Our layover was cut too short due to a delay leaving the 

previous day. The sit left me emotionally and physically drained. 

Synopsis: A passenger on board a B767 became ill resulting 

in medical attention by the cabin attendants and a doctor that 

was on board.

605017

Narrative:On the second leg of our trip, we were to fly from 

SJU-PHL. While boarding the flight, a passenger collapsed on 

the jetbridge. Paramedics were called to the gate. When they 

arrived, it was determined that she should not fly. Then, when 

the last passenger was boarding we were informed that she was 

claustrophobic. Right as they were closing the aircraft door 

the passenger decided she could not fly and had to have her 

deplaned. After these sits, we departed only 10 minutes late. 

During the first beverage service, a teenage passenger traveling 

with his father had a seizure. Our #2 flight attendant attended 

to him. He seemed fine after the seizure but, during our meal 

service, he had 2 more seizures. We paged for a doctor but there 

was no response. After the #3 flight attendant spoke with the 

father, who spoke mostly Spanish, it was determined that the 

father had over medicated his son due to a change of dosage 

by his doctor that day. The father misunderstood the dosage 

and gave the son 900 mg instead of 200 mg for the day. After 

the #1 flight attendant spoke with the physician on call, it was 

decided that we would land in TXKF. We deplaned the father 

and son and, after refueling, we continued to PHL. During 

the TXKF-PHL segment 2 passengers complained of medical 

situations. One with a very swollen leg that we elevated and 

iced. The other did not seem to have an actual problem and 

was determined to just be nervous from all of the sits that 

had occurred on this flight. He was comforted and he relaxed 

and was fine. When we arrived in PHL, we had 5 wheelchair 

passenger, including one non-ambulatory passenger. Only 1 

agent met the flight so the flight attendants assisted the agent 

in getting the passenger into the terminal area. The pilots were 

trying to get off of the aircraft as we were trying to get the 

passenger requiring assistance into their wheelchairs. I made 

the comment that I didn’t know what their hurry was because 

they couldn’t leave without us and we couldn’t deplane until 

all of our passengers were off of the aircraft. When the flight 

attendants arrived at the hotel pick up point (which the paperwork shows 2 locations) we did not see a van. The #1 flight 

attendant called the hotel and found out that the pilots were 

just arriving at the hotel. We were told that the van would be 

sent back for us and it would be about 10 minutes. I called 

crew tracking. I informed him of our sit and our illegality. Our 

original trip had very little room for delays to make the layover 

time legal. Crew tracking said to call when we arrived at the 

hotel for our new sign in time for the following day. When we 

arrived at the hotel, I called tracking and spoke with a woman. 

I told her that I had already spoken with company about our 

situation and, after a moment, she gave us our new sign in 

time. The flight attendants finished checking in and rushed 

to our rooms to get some sleep after our 16 hour day. After 

our emotionally and physically draining day, we did not even 

think to question the sign in time. We could barely stand, let 

alone think. We did know that we had a 12 hour day facing 

us the next day. We finally had a break after the meal service 

the next day and began writing our reports. We realized that 

we were not given our legal break the night before. When 

we pulled up a hard copy of our schedule, we found out that 

indeed we were sent out illegal that morning. Our legal break 

was supposed to be the minimum 10 hour rest break due to 

the over 14 1/2 hour day (ours was 16 hours). We received 

8.27 on paper which equates to about 5 hours of sleep if you 

go to bed immediately. We arrived at the hotel around XA35 

and by the time we arrived in our rooms it was XA50. My 

wake up call was at XF30. The minimum rest break should be 

automatically given. We should not have to fight for it. With 

all of the give backs that we have had to endure, we also have 

to endure inhumane and unfair treatment? A 16 hour day with 

no food provided, no sleep, or respect, and yet we perform our 

jobs with smiling faces and caring hearts. We took care of the 

many sits that occurred on this flight with professionalism and 

compassion. A minimum legal rest break is a minimum legal rest 

break. Crews are not always in the position to fight for it due 

to the fatigue we are now experiencing on many of our trips. 

We were on duty for 28 hours out of the 36 hours away from 

home. How can we be aware, vigilant, and doing the best job 

possible with long duty days and less than minimum rest breaks? 

Synopsis: A flight attendant described a difficult flight segment which required a diversion due to a medical emergency, 

and resulted in the cabin attendant crew being shorted on rest.

611289

Narrative: I went back to my crew rest seat for my crew 

break. I asked passenger to go back to her seat in first class. 

She asked me to sit somewhere else. I repeatedly told her that 

this was my ‘rest seat’ and that she needed to go back to her 

seat. Finally, she did. Shortly after that, her husband came 

back and confronted me how rude I was to his wife. He said 

he was going to write to my air carrier and I said I would be 

writing it up also. He got very angry and said mean things to 

me, then he turned around and walked about 5 rows, turned 

around and said something else to me (he did this 3 times!). 

On the third time, he got about 5 inches from my face and I 

felt (along with another flight attendant) that he was going to 

hit me. I feel that if flight attendants had confidence within 

themselves when a passenger confronts them, that the flight 

attendants would be able to stare them down and the passenger 

would not attack them because they would realize the flight 

attendant has no fear and would not put up with their actions. 

Synopsis: An air carrier flight attendant, attempting to utilize 

the official crew rest seat for her designated break, was obstructed 

by a passenger who refused to move. After repeated requests, 

the passenger moved. The passenger’s husband then confronted 

the reporter and was verbally abusive.
B10

614712

Narrative: I am writing this letter to express my and my 

co-worker’s concern regarding air carrier XXX following current FAA layover minimum guidelines of 8 hours. As it stands 

now, when flying current sequences built with 8 hour layovers 

and 10-13 hours on duty, I and my co-workers are not safe 

flight attendants. Fatigue impairs my ability to function with a 

clear train of thought, coordination, concentration, and sound 

judgment. I find myself acting as if I was under the influence 

of alcohol, essentially I am working drunk! In this day and age 

when I and my co-workers are required to be ever vigilant, 

I find we are not. There are times when I fall asleep on my 

jumpseat during taxi in and out of gates. I forget the easiest of 

tasks, including arming my doors for takeoff and giving safety 

briefings to passenger on an exit row. We are supposed to be 

aware of suspicious behavior and actions from passenger, but 

we are not. We are too fatigued to study and look and scrutinize passenger. When tired, most of us assume that all this has 

been done in the airport, thus leaving more holes in the ‘swiss 

cheese’ theory on security. I am writing to NASA to tell you 

that fatigue is a huge problem that needs to be addressed immediately. The traveling public is not safe in our hands. We are 

not safe in our own hands. Crew fatigue is so widespread, it is 

only a matter of time before an accident or serious injury occurs 

because of tired flight attendants. I hope NASA understands 

how important proper crew rest is, and can/will put pressure 

on the FAA to increase FAA minimum crew layover guidelines. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant advises that routine assignments of 

max duty days coupled with minimum rest periods results in 

unacceptable deterioration in performance of safety related duties.

653386

Narrative: Flight returned to the gate due to a second 

mechanical problem. During that time the flight attendants 

went illegal. The flight was canceled. We were taken to the 

terminal. The agent notified us that crew schedule demanded 

we work the flight back. We explained we could not work after 

being on duty over 16 hours. They did not like the answer. 

The crew personally called tracking and was informed they 

would get their legal rest and deadhead the next day. The 

agents were not cooperative, they were upset that the flight 

had to be canceled. It took us over 2 hours from the time we 

went illegal to the time we were given crew ‘DECS’ to clear 

customs so we could go to the hotel. With 90% of our flights 

having 10 hour layovers and 14 hour days, it is no wonder 

we are constantly fatigued and cancellations have to be made. 

These long duty days with minimal layover have become the 

rule, not the exception. Something needs to be done. We get 

harassed when we call in sick, but with work conditions getting 

worse, these incidents will probably keep happening. Supplemental info from ACN 653387: We called crew tracking and 

were told we did not have to work the flight. The agents were 

upset that the flight canceled so they took their time getting 

our hotel and paperwork together. These incidents would 

not happen if we were scheduled reasonable hours on duty. 

Synopsis: Ground personnel at foreign station demand cabin 

attendants to fly beyond contractual and reasonable duty time 

limits.

662357

Narrative: I had a schedule ZZZ-ZZZ1 with a 08:20 departure. My van pick-up time from layover hotel was scheduled for 

06:20. At 06:20, I called van service as the van hadn’t arrived. 

I called my airline’s hotel desk at 06:30 to report same. At 

07:55 and 08:17, I called airline crew scheduling. At 08:21, I 

arrived at ZZZ airport and was given a new assignment with a 

duty time of 13 hours and 24 minutes (ZZZ-ZZZ2 departing 

10:55, ZZZ2-ZZZ3 departing 17:15, arriving ZZZ3 19:37 

local). I asked scheduling to reschedule to a lesser duty time 

as I anticipated inflight fatigue given that I had reported for 

transport at 06:20. The airline schedulers said duty time was 

calculated from 08:17 when I arrived at airport. I chose to 

go on ‘fatigue’ status, in which the airline required me to see 

the company doctor, pilots are not required to see the doctor. 

The company doctor had no criteria for anticipating further 

fatigue, or testing for fatigue, except that I had not yet worked 

a 12 hour duty day, nor did the doctor take into account my 

restless sleep the night before. The company doctor took me 

off ‘fatigue’ status to return to my assignment. I requested that 

I be allowed to go home. I received a disciplinary status for not 

taking my assignment and was subject to company investigation. 

Airlines should not question a fatigue assertion. Recognize that 

flight attendant fatigue exists as a work related factor. Duty 

time should include time spent in scheduled transportation 

to the airport from a layover, and required phone calls. Flight 

attendants should not be intimidated by discipline in denying 

they are fatigued. An airline doctor cannot determine fatigue. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant refuses extended duty due to anticipated fatigue which would result.

662719

Narrative: I was the purser seated at 1l on flight XX. We 

arrived in PHL and taxied to our gate at approximately XA00. 

After the seatbelt sign was turned off, I released my seatbelts, 

turned on the cabin lighting ‘main on’ button and took the 

interphone in hand. I leaned into the 1L door window to view 

the approaching jet way. As I saw the jet bridge aligning with 

the plane door, I made the public address announcement for 

flight attendants to disarm doors. As I leaned into the window, 

I had my left hand near the door handle and inadvertently 

took hold of it and began to pull on it. I moved the handle 

upward approximately 3-4 inches and realized I had initiated 

the door opening while armed. I felt the tug/resistance on the 

door to pull away from the frame, but I held firm and was able 

to grasp the assist handle on the door and secure my footing 

to keep the door from opening further I was then holding 

the assist handle with my left hand and disarmed the door 

with my right hand though the door was out from its frame 

approximately 6-8 inches to where I could see the girt bar. 

My first concern was to hold the door and keep the slide pack 

from falling out from below the door to allow the customer 

service agent time to retract away the jet bridge from the plane. 

The slide pack was not out yet from its housing. Once the jet 

way was clear I considered the positioning of my hold on the 

door, footing and ability to maintain my own safety. I was 

not sure if the slide pack, not having fallen out or inflated yet 

could be salvaged and detached/reattached, so I felt I should 

maintain the hold I had on the door for as long as I could or 

until I felt it was unsafe for me to do so. As XXX was helping 

me to try to secure the door, it kept budging away. Just then I 

heard the slide begin to hiss as the pack had fallen out further 

unbeknownst to me. Mechanics who were on the tarmac at 

a distance were surveying the condition of the slide and its 

position as the first cartridge began to hiss. They immediately 
B11

told me to just let it go. I knew then the slide would have to 

be inflated. I released the door then disarmed door 1R. The 

slide fully inflated and mechanics told me to pull the detach 

cord to drop the inflated slide down to the tarmac. I did so, 

then removing the girt bar from the floor brackets. We began 

to deplane once the jet bridge was brought to abut the plane. 

I was asked to immediately write a statement and was taken 

by XXX to be drug tested. In total I must have held onto the 

door for 20 or more minutes. I arrived at the medical facility 

at about XB10. I left the facility about XB45 and was at my 

layover hotel by XC00. I judge the actual time the slide began 

to inflate at about XA20. Reasons for why I inadvertently 

grabbed hold of the door opening arm as I now think about it 

over and over in my mind may be attributed to the fact that I 

leaned into the window supporting myself with my left-hand 

near the door handle to assess the approach of the jet way as 

we are trained to do. The closest handle using the same motion used to disarm the A319 door is an upward motion. It 

was easily confused in the split second. The familiarity also to 

which the motion of opening the door is linked to looking 

outside the window in the posture to assess the approaching 

jet bridge was newly familiar to me from the many times I had 

both physically practiced and mentally practiced this opening 

procedure in training that I had just completed. Ironic as the 

relative timing of my training is to the event of deploying the 

slide, the mental connection to opening the door was innately 

natural in that split second. I had also been ill the days before the 

trip and somewhat fatigued from this and the early hour of the 

check-in and lengthy duty day. This was my third and final leg 

of a 12 hour duty day containing nearly 8 hours of flight time. 

Synopsis: An A319 flight attendant watching the approaching 

jet bridge forgot which handle he was holding and accidentally 

opened an armed door meaning to disarm it.

673638

Narrative: We got reassigned to fly to ZZZ rather than 

deadhead home. We were exhausted due to a very early checkin time and stressful 2 hour taxi ride to airport. When we got 

notified of the new trip the whole crew decided to call on fatigue 

because we didn’t feel safe and fit to fulfill our duty as safety 

professionals continuing to ZZZ which was another 3 1/2 hour 

flight. Our duty day at this point was already 7 hours. We then 

got sent to medical and had to deal with supervisors and such. 

We were concerned about our safety and our level of fatigue at 

this point. Even though the trip looked legal on paper it sure 

didn’t feel right physically. A report has been filed with our duty 

supervisor. Due to the circumstances of the morning, we simply 

were too tired to feel safe in case of any emergency occurrences. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendants refuse reassignment due to fatigue.

673647

Narrative: I was very tired on the flight from BDL because of lack of sleep. Unfortunately, I failed to arm doors 

1R and 1L before pushback. I did not realize as much until 

we were climbing out of BDL and were already inflight and 

not thinking. Because I panicked, I immediately got up 

and armed the doors. The outcome is doors eventually got 

armed, but not at the correct time. I feel as though because 

of my lack of sleep I was a bit off track and easily distracted. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant fails to arm cabin door until after 

takeoff. States she was tired.

673667

Narrative: Day started at XA00 in New York for a 2 1/2 

hour drive to airport. Arrived at XK20, was working FFA position, watched for jetbridge to come over. Made the disarm for 

arrival announcement. Realized I reached for the wrong handle 

(they’re parallel to one another). I couldn’t stop the door from 

opening. I stepped back and the slide deployed. Contributing 

factors to this incident are: A319/A320 are not my normal 

aircraft (I haven’t flown one in possibly years) and fatigue. 

Synopsis: Tired from an early get-up and lacking recent experience aboard the a319, cabin attendant actuates emergency exit 

door instead of disarming the slide as intended.

683483

Narrative: As a reserve flight attendant, I was assigned and I 

worked 3 all-night duty periods. After arriving home, I slept 7 

1/2 hours. I was called 8 hours after awakening from the crew 

desk saying that I needed to report to the airport in 6 hours 

for check-in. I went to bed and tried to sleep, but I was unable 

to sleep, as I had just worked 3 all-night trips. I found it very 

difficult to stay awake on my first leg. On the second segment 

of the trip I found myself falling asleep on the 1L jumpseat 

as I was the purser. I would never have scheduled myself to 

work this pattern, but being a reserve flight attendant I had 

no choice. I was very groggy upon arrival, and had to really 

think about what I was doing as I was bordering on being 

fatigued. I forgot to disarm door 1R initially. We took a delay 

on our next and final segment home which allowed me to 

take a 45 minute nap, which helped me make it back home. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant relates repeated reserve assignments 

that resulted in fatigue induced errors due to lack of rest and 

interruption of circadian rhythm.

683534

Narrative: I was off flying for 4 years and have been recalled 

back from voluntary furlough and returned to the London 

base recently. Departing London on Nov/XA/06 was my first 

flight on B767 since I am back to London 2 weeks ago. I have 

a lot of flying experience on B747 and B777 but my flying 

experience on B767 is limited. My previous flight on B767 is 

about 4 years ago. Other than today’s flight, my other physical 

contact and experience with B767 was at my retraining where 

the emphasis was on repeated emergency mode operation at 

the doors of B767. I have been assigned to sit at door 1R and 

work in business class. During boarding, I was busy carrying 

out duties in my assigned cabin until I heard the announcement of preparing doors for departure over the public address. 

I was in the aisle at row 9AB. Once I heard the public address 

announcement, I immediately went to door 1R. The door 

was already armed when I got there. I verified it being armed 

by checking the view ports and the yellow flag was extended. 

Though I verified, I had no physical contact to the door and 

the arming lever. I was distracted by some personal issues 

that I didn’t rest well during the crew rest break. We were 

all tired at the end of the flight. I went back to my jumpseat 

at 1R when the ‘disarm door for arrival’ announcement was 

made. However, when I got to the door, I didn’t stop and 

concentrate on disarming the door. I grab the distinctive but 

wrong handle, which is found just next to the arming lever 

and instinctively, at that moment, pulled the silver handle, 

the same motion I would have done for disarming the door. 

1/2 way in pulling the lever, I realized something was wrong 
B12

and heard the loud noise of the slide. I tried to stop it, but it 

was too late. The doors opened and the slide had deployed. 

With this experience, I learn and realize the importance of 

good thinking before touching the door. It’s important that 

I stop, look and think of the consequences before taking action or touching anything on the door, especially an aircraft 

I don’t fly often. Physical contact to the door is not the same 

as visual checking. It is important and necessary for me to do 

the arming/disarming by myself. Had I armed the door, I am 

sure I would have also in reverse, disarmed the correct lever. 

Synopsis: A flight attendant recently recalled from furlough 

with little B767 experience deployed an emergency exit slide 

during an inattentive postflight moment.

683560

Narrative: This trip combined with the one previous made 

for extremely bad fatigue and I flew without sleep for 48 hours. 

I was so fatigued I believe it was dangerous and I was too afraid 

to call enroute sick list for fatigue because of our stringent 

sick policy. I could barely function which would make for 

evacuating a plane dangerous for passenger and crew. When 

is too much fatigue and concern for safety the time to call 

enroute sick without being threatened by our sick call policy? 

Synopsis: An A320 flight attendant comments that her series 

of trip pairings did not allow sufficient rest and the air carrier’s 

flight attendant sick policy discouraged fatigue sick calls.

683639

Narrative: After working the flight inbound to OGG and 

sitting for 2 hours 28 minutes with change in aircraft and 

working the all-nighter back, we were exhausted and delirious. Working a turn like that has a tremendous effect on the 

body. We all could hardly stay awake. I feel if there was an 

emergency we wouldn’t be 100% effective. We kept checking 

on each other and moving around to keep each other awake. 

I personally almost got into an accident on the way home. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant reports performance decrement as 

a result of fatigue on mainland, Hawaii turns.

699935

Narrative: I was supposed to remain on continuous duty 

overnight. At around XA30 in the morning I received a call 

from our scheduling departure and was going to be extended 

to ZZZ. I didn’t really think anything of it but I know that 

if you work a continuous duty overnight you’re only legal for 

14.5 hours. When we arrived at the airport to continue back 

to CLT, I got another call from scheduling saying they were 

going to extend me once again and put a YYY roundtrip on top 

of the ZZZ roundtrip. I asked the scheduler if this was legal 

because I was on a continuous duty overnight and she said yes. 

I asked them to fax the modified schedule to the CLT crew 

room and I would get it when we returned to CLT. When we 

arrived in CLT and I picked up my schedule, I was going to be 

working until XJ00 and I was only legal to work until XF20. 

I assumed they made a mistake so I called them and informed 

them of the problem and told them that I was not legal to work 

the trip. She kept telling me I was on reduced rest and finally 

transferred me to the scheduling supervisor. She also told me 

I was on reduced rest, and I told her I was never informed. 

Synopsis: Cabin crew member is concerned with the possible 

illegal schedule with regard to the federal aviation regulations.

708952

Narrative: Crew scheduling in their infinite wisdom, sent 

an first officer to our flight even though he was close to being 

illegal to fly, and our flight was delayed. By the time we landed, 

personnel there told me that if we didn’t take off in about 20 

minutes, the first officer was going to become illegal and we 

were going to have to stay there. Furthermore, the other flight 

attendant was on her 6th day working so she was illegal to fly 

the next day. Just imagine the mess. So they practically made 

us rush the boarding process and our safety related duties in 

order to take the flight out on time. These things happen all 

the time because crew scheduling tries to exploit people to 

the max. Even when they have other people that can do the 

flight. As flight attendants we had to rush through our duties, so it’s fair to say that the pilots did so too. Just not safe. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant reports preflight safety duties were 

compromised by rushed departure due to first officer duty 

time limits.

713748

Narrative: I flew a ZZZ all-nighter turn which made me 

so exhausted that during the last hour and a half of the trip I 

became marginally delirious. This work assignment combines 

factors which conspire against the human capacity for endurance: 1) extremely long duty time (14 hours). 2) high flight 

time (over 10 hours). 3) no crew meal (and no place to buy 

one in ZZZ). 4) no rest break (and no crew lounge in ZZZ). 

5) all-nighter component (extended duty period straddles 

2 calendar days, and effectively wipes out an entire night’s 

sleep). I received the assignment on reserve and reported for 

work at XA40. Everything was fine during the first half of the 

assignment, up to and including the deplaning of passenger 

in ZZZ. Because there was no crew lounge, however, my crew 

spent the 2 hour ‘sit’ between ‘blocking in’ and ‘pushing back’ 

waiting on the aircraft. Of this 2 hours, about 1 hour and 30 

minutes were consumed by deplaning the inbound aircraft, 

cleaning and servicing the aircraft, changing the galleys, and 

re-boarding passenger for the return flight. All told, we had 

about 30 minutes to relax in passenger seats in relative calm. 

With respect to the 3 hour time change, we did not leave ZZZ 

until XJ21. Nevertheless, most of the flight went smoothly for 

me until about an hour and a half prior to arriving in ZZZ1 

(approximately XM40). I began to feel giddy and remarked 

to one of my flying partners that features of the aircraft cabin 

seemed fake, more like a ‘mock up’ than an actual aircraft 

interior. On one hand I was fully aware that we were at work, 

on a ‘real’ airplane and so forth, but my impression was that 

we could just as easily have been on an amusement park ride at 

that moment. My flying partner responded by joking with me 

that I needed to get some rest. We then dropped the subject. 

As far as I know, I continued to perform my duties as a flight 

attendant with proficiency throughout the remainder of the 

duty period. However, given my apparent state of exhaustion 

I cannot be entirely sure whether my effectiveness was significantly diminished due to fatigue, sleep deprivation and lack of 

food, and I could have been performing well below my own 

personal standards. After landing and ‘blocking-in’ from my 

reserve assignment I drove home and came closer to falling 

asleep at the wheel than I have since a particularly grueling 

series of reserve assignments in 1998. By the time I reached 

home I had been awake for nearly 24 hours, and could not 

function for the remainder of the day. I slept on and off and 
B13

attempted to get myself prepared for my next work assignment. Looking back, I am sure that my ability to execute the 

many flight attendant responsibilities which are the hallmark 

of my profession, and which now include the additional role of 

‘cabin security professional,’ were certainly challenged beyond 

reasonable limits by this particularly arduous work assignment. 

No single factor made this trip especially hazardous, not the 

14-hour duty period, the all-nighter component, the 10+ flight 

hours or the lack of food or rest. Taken separately, any of these 

factors can be managed with grace. Indeed, I flew all-nighter 

transcontinental trips during the entire previous month, and 

experienced no ill effects whatsoever. Furthermore, I flew a 

regular ZZZ2 turn as purser -- arguably the most demanding 

work assignment, the week prior and was ‘exhausted’ by the end, 

but not ‘delirious.’ my professional opinion as a 10-year veteran 

flight attendant is that the all-nighter ZZZ turn should be 

eliminated: it’s a dangerous cocktail of fatigue-inducing stressors. 

Synopsis: A B757-200 flight attendant explains the mental 

alterations that occurred on an all night round trip with a 14 

hour duty period and 10 flight hours without food or rest.

713749

Narrative: Pilots announced ‘prepare for landing’ on descent. 

The ‘fasten seat belt sign’ was not on. It took about 5 minutes 

of confusion in my head before I could figure out whether 

or not to call the cockpit and ask them to turn the sign on. 

Nothing was making sense to me. Do I break sterile cockpit? 

Is this an emergency? Should I just prepare the cabin anyway? 

What should I do? Why are we still so high? This was very 

simple but it took forever for me to figure out what to do as I 

was tired and confused. If it had been an emergency prep type 

situation, I don’t believe I would have been able to react any 

better. I am a line-holder and I knowingly picked this trip up 

by choice ensuring to get plenty of sleep and rest before the 

duty period began. I also consider myself to be a ‘night person’ 

and I performed very poorly on the flight home. Our load was 

not full in either direction but I also observed the rest of the 

crew to be sluggish and not sharp. I thought it was only me. 

This is a concern as the safety on board was compromised due 

to everyone’s dull witted and slow demeanor on the return leg 

home. I fly all-nighters routinely but never with a long continuous duty day with no rest in between legs or at some point 

during the duty period such as inflight. This trip sequence is 

dangerous to the company, the passenger it carries and to the 

safety of its operation for the following reasons: less reaction 

time to spot fires or other onboard emergencies such as heart 

attacks, less vigilance and awareness for potential terrorist type 

behavior or actions, less ability to adequately handle an evacuate. 

Synopsis: Flight attendant reports being excessively tired on 

round trip from west coast to Hawaii.

714422

Narrative: This is a request of an interpretation of 14 CFR

91.13(a) with regard to an actual sleep opportunity received for 

a flight attendant or a pilot in order to stave off potential fatigue 

and the possibility of careless or reckless operation of aircraft 

contrary to 14 CFR 91.13(a). This request is prompted by the 

following scenario that occurred. Although several examples 

could be provided, for brevity, one will be illustrated. The 

flight crew reported at XA00 pm local time. A charter flight 

was conducted from ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ2. After flying on the 

‘back side of the clock,’ the crew arrived at their respective hotel 

room at XK34 am local time. The flight attendants departed the 

hotel on a XG00 pm van to the airport. Total time spent at the 

hotel was 7 hours 26 minutes. Probable sleep received was 5.5 

hours, which assumes a 1 hour awake time off -- pre and post 

sleep. Concluding, an 8 hour sleep opportunity was not actually 

received, even though the literal language of the duty and rest 

requirements for the flight attendants were received. Contrary 

to the flight attendants rest period, the pilot’s rest period was 

adequate, with a duty period beginning later in the afternoon 

at 10 pm local time. Question posed: Is an air carrier required 

to comply with written notification from a flight attendant or 

pilot to the air carrier of his or her desire to have a minimum 

of a 10 hour non-reducible rest period, thereby allowing an 

8 hour sleep opportunity to stave off potential fatigue and 

the possibility of careless or reckless operation of the aircraft 

contrary to 14 CFR 91.13(a)? Note: the 10 hour rest period 

assumes it exceeds the federal aviation regulation rest required 

for most common scheduling situations, as air carrier operates 

mostly domestic flights, and one flag rule route under flight 

and duty time regulations of: 121.467, 121.471, 121.481, 

and 121.505. In the event greater than 10 hours or rest was 

required by the federal aviation regulation’s, the more restrictive 

applicable federal aviation regulation would obviously apply. 

Flight attendant does not have any legal protection, without 

adverse employment action, for requesting a non-reducible 10 

hour rest period to provide an 8 hour sleep opportunity for 

all rest periods because such protections should be considered 

in the general rule making process. But it appears the FAA 

believes otherwise. The FAA has a concept called aeronautical 

decision making, the theory behind the practice, which is a 

systematic approach to the mental process used by all involved 

in aviation to consistently determine the best course of action 

in response to a given set of circumstances. Please review the 

following FAA produced powerpoint presentation. http://www.

FAA.gov/about/office_org/field_offices/fsdo/orl/local_more/

media/ppt/adm1.ppt. Note the caption on slide 23: ‘the effects 

of stress and fatigue.’ presumably, the FAA expects all pilots and 

flight attendants to act responsibly by planning for and getting 

sufficient pre-duty sleep. A rested pilot and flight attendant is 

in the public’s best interest. For example, a pilot needs a high 

level of alertness to respond correctly to an unexpected engine 

failure on the takeoff roll, and a flight attendant needs a high 

level of alertness to provide the leadership role as a safety professional in the event of an unexpected evacuate of passenger. 

Additionally, if a crew member’s physiological makeup needs 

8 hours of sleep a day for a high level of alertness, but obtains 

less than 6, is the crew member legal? Or, does a low level of 

alertness provide an equivalent level of safety? With a combined total of approximately 1500 flight attendants and pilots 

operating air carrier part 121 flights, it should be known that 

at least some individuals function at a far lower level of alertness after sleeping 6 hours than a typical 8 hour sleep period, 

even if the duty period is of short duration. Currently some 

flight combinations are scheduled with a 9 hour rest period, 

thus realistically, affording a 7 hour sleep opportunity if the 

flight is on time, and less if the flight is late. If an air carrier 

is not required to comply with a requested non-reducible 10 

hour rest period, then what objective criteria (6 hours sleep? 5 

hours sleep? 4 hours sleep?) And standards does the FAA utilize 

in issuing a violation of federal aviation regulation 91.13(a) 

to a certificate holder for a fatigued pilot or flight attendant? 

Additional info: From the attached letter, written by assistant 
B14

chief counsel, regulations division, dated Apr/Mon/05: ‘Please 

note that the duty period limitations and rest requirements 

for flight attendants do not necessarily guard against all forms 

of fatigue that may occur due to actions or inactions by the 

flight attendant, the certificate holder, or others. A combination of a change in schedule by a certificate holder and a flight 

attendant’s schedule during non-duty time may combine to 

create a fatigued flight attendant. Though such fatigue causing 

circumstances may comply with the literal language of the duty 

and rest requirements for flight attendants, such fatigue must 

be considered in determining whether a certificate holder’s 

operation is careless and reckless contrary to 14 CFR 91.13(a).’ 

Synopsis: Air carrier flight attendant requests clarification of 

crew rest requirements.

714730

Narrative: Flight #1, 10 hours 17 minutes flight time, zero 

minute of crew rest between deplaning and boarding. Flight 

#2, 9 hours 49 minutes flight time, 28 minutes of crew rest 

between deplaning and boarding. Flight #3, 10 hours 2 minutes 

flight time, zero minute of crew rest between deplaning and 

boarding. Something must be done to change or eliminate 

the Hawaiian island turns, especially the all night turns. My 

concerns are not regarding violations or legalities, but rather the 

ill effects of fatigue, how it relates to safety, and the possibility 

of life threatening consequences in the event of an emergency 

or crisis. Although the flight schedules are within the parameters outlined in the union agreement, I emphatically consider 

them unsafe. These assignments should either require a layover 

or, at the very least, 90 minutes of scheduled rest between or 

during the flights. Air carrier continues to proclaim that ‘safety 

is our #1 priority’ but these types of flight schedules reflect 

otherwise. The passenger trust their lives with the crews, and 

the crews depend on each other, but the fact is that fatigue is 

affecting alertness, response, situational awareness, and good 

health. Considering that the security threat level has also been 

elevated in the past few days, flight attendants must be even 

more alert, aware, and vigilant, difficult when fatigued. On 

1 schedule, I was on evening stand-by when assigned the all 

night flight schedule. I worked as the purser on the flight with 

intentions to create a positive work environment under less 

than ideal conditions. I was fortunate to be staffed with an 

amazing crew dedicated to teamwork, professionalism, and 

customer satisfaction, however we were all exhausted beyond 

fatigue, especially apparent during our return flight. We were 

less alert, slower to respond, and I was concerned about our 

safety, not only on the aircraft but, off duty, traveling home. It 

is disturbing to think that the company will not even consider 

a change until an actual incident occurs. I pray that it will not 

be at the expense of a life. It is common knowledge that the 

senior line holders desire these island turns because of the ratio 

between the number of flight schedule and days off, but the 

fact is that they seldom fly the entire line for the month. On 

any given day, ‘open flying’ reflects a number of their island 

turns. The remaining island turns are therefore assigned to 

the reserves, those who fly all month long with stand-by assignments, international assignments, and multiple domestic 

assignments containing short layover periods. In comparison, 

the reserve does not have the same amount of rest as these 

senior line holders. They are not prepared physically or mentally, especially when on stand-by, for an all night assignment 

consisting of a 12-14 hour duty period, 10 hours of flight time, 

layover time consisting of only deplaning and boarding, and no 

crew rest. The company has found an international loophole in 

the union agreement that allows for long duty periods with no 

crew rest while keeping within the legal parameters for these 

flight schedules. These flight schedules may not technically 

qualify as a ‘non-stop international segment,’ but as with my 

last 3 ZZZ1 turns, the flight times are comparable to a ‘nonstop international segment,’ when one considers that there 

was no layover or rest time between flights. Supplemental info 

from ACN 714721: This is a scheduled flight schedule that is 

unsafe in that the flight attendants are on duty for too many 

hours and into the night. Checking in at XA00 to get back at 

XM00 is too tiring for the crew. I felt that the crew, including 

myself, was too tired when arriving to ensure all doors were 

disarmed. I believe this flight schedule is unsafe and should 

be evaluated as to whether it should continue as scheduled. 

Synopsis: Flight attendants describe scheduling practices that 

are legal but may be causing undue fatigue among the crews.

718718

Narrative: I became ill while delivering the all-nighter 

snack service. I was dizzy, I had a headache and an upset 

stomach and was very disoriented. I had to sit down and rest 

numerous times throughout the flight. When I stood up and 

tried to move through the cabin, I became very dizzy. After 

sleeping about 6 hours at home I felt a whole lot better. As 

to why I felt this way, I believe it was due to being assigned a 

transoceanic all-nighter turn after working another all-nighter. 

I was on reserve. I was assigned standby and then deadheaded 

to work the first all-nighter. I had a daytime layover and then 

worked back that night I was checking in for the next turn. I 

flew 22 hours which included 2 all-nighters. I was completely 

exhausted. I know that these trips are legal but our bodies 

(body clock) do not respond well to this type of assignment. 

It is very difficult to get the proper rest when sleeping during 

the day. I think we should either not be flying transoceanic 

all-nighter turns or consideration on our bodies need to be 

taken into account when assigning back-to-back trips. I was 

very concerned about my capability to evacuate the aircraft in 

an emergency and also of disarming my door on arrival. Not 

to mention the difficult time I had driving home. I felt that 

my exhaustion and dizziness affected my inflight performance 

and that I wasn’t going to be able to react properly to a safety, 

medical, or security issue on the plane if one happened. Just 

because an assignment is legal on paper or might be acceptable 

during the day, special consideration needs to be taken into 

account when working all-nighters on a consecutive basis. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant is concerned with fatigue due to 

multiple flights.

720304

Narrative: Upon approach into ZZZ about ‘10’ before 

preparation for landing I was picking up trash for the economy 

cabin and was nearing the first aft lavatory with the bags and 

papers in hand when severe turbulence hit. I was able to throw 

the trash in the lavatory (directly behind the last row of seats 

ABC) but was thrown violently against the wall opposite the 

lavatory then back to the floor and subsequently back and forth 

against the armrests before I could properly grab hold of seat 

35C. I was in a fetal position and holding tightly as I could as 

the plane pitched back and forth, up and down. As the plane 

pitched and dropped the lower half of my body (twisting my 
B15

spine) flopped up and down. I tried in vain to search for an 

empty seat/seatbelt and since the back jumpseats were taken, 

I took a real beating from the aircraft. A flight attendant was 

able to turn the corner to ask my condition and I was able 

to tell her that I was just able to hang on. Once there was a 

brief intermission from the severe turbulence I was able to run 

toward the mid jumpseat (door 2) to secure myself. We then 

had to hold approximately 1 hour before finding out that we 

had no more fuel to land in ZZZ and proceeded to ZZZ1. We 

landed and taxied to a remote part of the airport near a cargo 

hangar and held with no air whatsoever for about 3 1/2 hours. 

We finally got an ‘air start’ after waiting for fuelers to be able 

to access us due to lightning then taxied to finally produce air. 

Several of the passenger as well as a flight attendant had to take 

oxygen due to lightheadedness. I also felt this but was able to 

have the cockpit open the windows for ventilation. We finally 

were cleared to go to ZZZ after the ground stop and being on 

the same aircraft for 8 hours 10 minutes according to ours (as 

well as the passenger calculations) they seemed to give us ‘1 

minute’ layover in ZZZ1 and tried to make us continue on to 

ZZZ2 two hours later. Fortunately, we were able to convince 

a scheduler of our legality but with definite resistance. Why is 

our company giving us a ‘1 minute’ layover to make us legal 

for the next flight? To go illegal in the air?’ the crew schedulers 

need to think about the safety and security of the passenger 

in these irregular situations and not about how much ‘work’ 

they will have to do in order to re-crew the flight. Not to 

mention I am extremely hurt and told them of my injuries. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant injured when the B757-200 encounters severe turbulence and extended holding on arrival to 

ZZZ. Divert to ZZZ1 where they are unable to park and flight 

crew, cabin crew, and passenger remain on board until fueled 

at a remote location for the return flight to ZZZ.

720317

Narrative: During our flight to ZZZ the pilots received an 

automatics communications addressing & reporting system 

stating that, 1) flight attendants should contact scheduling 

when we arrive and, 2) that flight attendants will now work 

outbound flight ABCD back to ZZZ2. This would make our 

original 3-day trip into an overnight turn. The entire crew was 

exhausted and if we took the flight back to ZZZ2 we would 

have been up for over 24 hours. This is a safety issue. I contacted 

scheduling. He notified me that we were now being sent back 

to ZZZ2 because the crew was arriving late to ZZZ. I advised 

him of our situation and that we would not be able to work 

that flight. That we will be doing fatigue. Scheduling stated 

that we would have to report to the hospital if we intend on 

doing fatigue. I responded that it would not be a problem. 

Scheduling said that he would set it up and call me back. In 

the meantime, the outgoing pilots to ZZZ2 arrived and heard 

what was going on. Captain stated that he would not fly the 

plane back to ZZZ2 if we were working it. Short time later, 

airport paramedics and police arrived to the airplane. Paramedics wanted to know the situation. We explained what was 

happening. The lead paramedic stated that he could not treat 

us unless we were ill. He said that there was nothing he could 

do for us except give us a pillow and tell us to go to bed. He 

clearly stated that they do not get involved in employee relation 

issues. Scheduling said that the paramedics would take us to 

the hospital. The lead paramedic said he was not a taxi service. 

I contacted again and he said that he could go to plan B and 

call me back. Once again, he called me back and said that a van 

service would now take us to the hospital. We were sent to the 

hospital. We were admitted to the emergency room, after receiving funny looks from the emergency room staff. After falling 

asleep in our hospital beds, the doctor arrived. He asked what 

was wrong. I explained the situation to the doctor. He responded 

‘so you are not sick?’ I said no, just tired and fatigued. He then 

responded, ‘this is idiotic that your company sent you to the 

emergency room and wasted my time when I could be seeing 

patients that really need my attention.’ we were released from 

the hospital to get rest in our hotel room. We continued to the 

hotel. We finally checked into the hotel. We deadheaded back 

to ZZZ2 on our original flight that we were supposed to work. 

Synopsis: An A319 flight attendant crew reports refusing to fly 

an unscheduled transcontinental return flight because of fatigue

720333

Narrative: While setting up galley for flight, captain told 

us to stop, we were doing a plane change due to a mechanical. 

While setting up new galley, cleaning crew excitedly pulled me 

outside to see massive quantities of liquid pouring out of left 

wing. I ran forward yelling, ‘captain look at the left wing...’ no 

passenger onboard. Captain began yelling everyone get off the 

plane, get off (jetbridge still intact). We stood for some time 

watching jet fuel gush from left wing. Hazmat was called out 

to clean up and mechanics determined problem. As cleanup 

was going on, I had to go back into the airplane to get my 

jacket as it was very cold in the terminal. Smell was awful. 

After more time passed I had to go back onto airplane to 

get wallet so I could get some food from machine for myself 

and another flight attendant. Odor still very bad. Mechanics 

found two other problems with the aircraft, now going on a 

3 hour delay. At some point captain asked us if we wanted to 

call fatigue and cancel flight. We all discussed it and all felt 

fine and really wanted to get these people to their destination. I could not stay on plane due to smell. I was in gate area 

most of time helping agents go from plane to plane looking 

for blankets for the people. Eventually, I hit the wall and felt 

ill. I had a sore throat and nauseous stomach. Called crew 

desk to tell them. They asked if I was calling fatigue. I said, 

‘I don’t know what to tell you.’ (I did not really understand 

what fatigue was). I told them I was sick and had to go to a 

hotel or home if I could get there. They said if I was calling 

fatigue I had to go to hospital now. I said I had to get to bed 

as soon as possible and would go to the hospital the next day. 

I made it home, slept for 7 or 8 hours then went to urgent 

care, got a shot of vitamin B. Dr said I had the beginnings 

of something but should be ok if I went back home to rest. 

Synopsis: After extended exposure, cabin attendant reports 

fumes from large fuel spill during fueling of her A320 which 

resulted in nausea and illness. As a result, reporter is unable 

to fly the trip and calls in sick.

720346

Narrative: Due to fatigue, I failed to arm doors 1L and 1R

prior to takeoff. I realized once we were in the air that they 

weren’t armed. My action was of course to immediately arm 

the doors. This is the second time due to fatigue I’ve had a 

door incident. I wrote a report a few months ago after doing a 

ZZZ1 turn where I nearly opened an armed door. How are the 

ZZZ1 turns legal, without a crew rest break? Anyway, since last 

month was my vacation month and we are now paid so little for 
B16

vacation, I was forced to fly 115 hours in November to make 

up for it. We are being pushed beyond our limits! In my entire 

career, prior to air carrier’s gouging of safety regulations and 

pay, post 911, I never came close to an incident. I feel that with 

the way the trips/duty days and minimum rests are it’s only a 

matter of time. I also would like to say, that for every reported 

incident, there are at least 2 or 3 that go unreported! I hope that 

there is someone who reads this who actually cares, because the 

supposed leaders at our company do not give that impression. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant reports failure to arm doors prior 

to takeoff. Cites fatigue stemming from long duty days and 

the reduction and elimination of on duty restrictions and extra 

work necessary to make up for pay cuts by the airline.

722535

Narrative: The 2 day/all nighter Hawaii turns are completely unsafe. I was given this trip on reserve, and was beyond 

exhausted. As if the day Hawaii turns were bad enough, this 

adds additional insult to a duty period. On the return flight I 

was falling asleep, making careless actions (such as difficulty 

in closing the B757 cockpit barrier -- a task which is easy 

when fully rested, my hands were trembling when holding a 

coffee cup/saucer, I nearly forgot to disarm my door, I could 

barely think straight when making preparation for landing 

and welcome announcements). These are all simple actions 

which under normal well rested circumstances would never 

be compromised. The duty day is that of an international trip, 

however without a rest break. It is simply not human to work 

these hours during the night, and the fatigue we are submitted 

to is an enormous risk to the crew and passenger’s safety. In 

addition to feeling unsafe in the workplace, it was completely 

unsafe driving home. I was nodding off behind the wheel, and 

experiencing great difficulty keeping my eyes open. My vision 

was blurry, and I was frightened for my safety. Air carrier is 

putting us at great risk on many levels. These Hawaii all nighter 

turns (as well as day turns) need to be reevaluated. They may 

‘look good on paper,’ but the safety and fatigue related risks 

are too great. Pilots cannot fly them -- so why should we? 

Synopsis: B757 cabin attendant concerned with length of 

flight and fatigue issues.

726607

Narrative: What happened: going from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and 

then back on the all-nighter is not safe. As I sat in my jumpseat 

upon landing, I had a very hard time keeping my eyes open. 

After landing and disembarking the plane, I could not even 

remember if I disarmed my door. I went back to do a double 

check and it was disarmed. Thank goodness I did not have to 

drive when we landed. I probably would have fallen asleep at 

the wheel. I am glad there was not a medical emergency. I don’t 

feel I would have been able to handle it at 100%. Why: Due to 

fatigue. What action was taken: I wrote this report. What was 

the outcome: Hopefully this type of trip will become illegal. 

It really is not safe. It would not be so bad, but the 2 hour sit 

while in ZZZ1 is the killer. Also if you are on reserve and cannot plan accordingly for this type of trip it is even more unsafe. 

Synopsis: Flight attendant reports debilitating fatigue experienced during all night flight to ZZZ1 and return to ZZZ.

734261

Narrative: Company is scheduling its cabin crew members to 

work all night turns to the Hawaiian Islands from mid-afternoon 

to early am PST/PDT following day. These trips go against a 

flight attendant’s body rhythms and in my opinion push the 

boundaries of a built-in safety cushion. Upon the return flight 

two of my colleagues displayed visible signs of fatigue as their 

eyes were severely blood-shot. Additionally, approximately 1.5 

hours prior to our arrival in ZZZ I began to see wavy lines 

(blurred vision) as I was attempting to keep my eyes open. 

Company provides no crew rest on these all night Hawaii turns. 

The cockpit crew, due to FAA duty-time standards, do not 

have to endure flying an island turn. Because of safety of flight 

concerns they (the cockpit crew) work one leg (flight segment) 

to the islands and requires a layover. My personal feeling, from 

my experience, is that the scheduling of all night Hawaii turns 

from the west-coast push the parameters of an adequate safety 

cushion. Situational awareness is greatly diminished because of 

cabin crew member fatigue and I believe that reaction time is 

significantly compromised on the part of working flight attendants should an inflight medical emergency occur or events that 

would necessitate an evacuate or preparation for a water ditching. 

Synopsis: A flight attendant describes crew members showing 

fatigue during round trip assignments to the Hawaiian Islands.

736520

Narrative: We were scheduled for an XA50 pick-up giving 

us less than 8 hours at the hotel. I did not get sufficient sleep 

after working all night and was very tired as were my flying 

partners and this was my 5th consecutive day of flying. At 

XA45 the crew desk called to notify us of a 50 minute delay 

but I was already in uniform and could not go back to sleep. 

We worked the flight to DEN and upon arrival at the gate 

I looked out of the window and saw the agent bringing the 

jetbridge to door 1L. I made an announcement to disarm 

doors, then I disarmed door 1L and cracked it. I then went to 

door 1R and disarmed and cracked that door. When I turned 

back to door 1L the agent was opening it. He opened it a few 

inches and stopped because the slide pack was coming out 

of the door casing and the girt bar was engaged. The agent 

backed away from the door and I quickly disengaged it and 

notified the pilots. A mechanic came and removed the slide 

pack and opened the door. Everything happened very fast. 

Synopsis: Beset with fatigue due to long duty days and five 

consecutive days of flying, cabin attendant fails to disconnect 

slide girt bar on B737-300 prior to cracking door to signify it 

was safe to be opened.

753781

Narrative: We arrived late into our rest period due to 

operational difficulties. We were scheduled for a 9 hour 53 

minute rest period, reducible to 9 hours. When we reached our 

scheduling dept via phone, we were told we would be taken 

down to 8 hours and the pilots would be released after a round 

trip to ZZZ for crew rest. As flight attendant, I was told I would 

complete the entire trip, which was scheduled for 11 hours 

and 53 minutes of duty time and 7 hours and 45 minutes of 

flight time. I informed scheduling that I would also be fatigued 

and would like to be released after the ZZZ trip, but was told 

I had no time limits. I repeated that I would be too fatigued 

to fly nearly 8 hours and a nearly 12 hour duty day on 5 1/2 

hour sleep. I was told that if I was refusing to complete the 

trip, I would be charged with an ‘occurrence’ which is a step 

in the disciplinary process, and have my pay reduced for that 

trip. I elected to complete the trip, under these threats, but 
B17

experienced considerable fatigue including, but not limited to, 

lack of concentration, short term memory difficulty, and speech 

problems. I feel I was forced to act as a crew member under duress 

while fatigued created a dangerous situation. This is a common 

practice with our crew scheduling dept and should be addressed. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant is threatened with disciplinary 

action for requesting removal from a flight sequence after a 

layover shortened due to operational problems.

758114

Narrative: I was working in the back. I had just disarmed 

my door at 2R at the back of the airbus. I was gathering 

my belongings when the phone rang from the front. The 

purser told me that she had accidentally deployed a slide at 

1L because she pulled the open handle thinking it was the 

disarm lever. We had just worked the all-nighter to ZZZ. 

Synopsis: Cabin attendant deploys escape slide vice disarming 

it upon arrival following all night flight.

758117

Narrative: When crew boarded the entire aircraft was warm 

but the back of the aircraft was over 90 degrees and the bunk 

room was 109 degrees. The day was in the mid 70’s but the 

aircraft sits in the hot sun on the remote with no cooling for 

hours. None of the window shades had been shut or the vents 

opened for cooling of the aircraft. This flight departs at XA45. 

Hot aircraft have been a consistent issue in ZZZ. A hot aircraft 

defeats everything that I do as a flight attendant to combat 

fatigue. My body is using up all its reserve fuel to keep my body 

cool thus the effects of fatigue hit early. This is a 13 1/2 hour duty 

day and starting it off with a hot aircraft is unsafe and unhealthy. 

Aircraft at door 5 stayed at 90 degrees for over an hour into the 

flight. Again there were 3 breaks on this flight and although it 

was a day flight the hot aircraft that we boarded along with the 

turbulence that we encountered during all 3 breaks hindered 

the ability for crew to get sufficient rest. Without sufficient 

rest the crew is put at risk for fatigue. After this trip I took a 5 

hour nap at home and still was able to sleep through the entire 

night. I have never slept that much after a trip and contributed 

it to the lack of rest created by 3 breaks and the hot cabin. 

Synopsis:Hot cabin, turbulence and ineffective cabin attendant 

rest schedule result in fatigue.

760707

Narrative: Crew called in fatigue prior to show time 

because of insufficient rest. Company threatened termination of cabin crew if they did not operate. Cabin crew felt 

they were unsafe for flight operation, but operated out of 

fear of job termination by upper management. If emergency 

would have arisen, crew not sure they could have responded, 

could not stay awake to monitor cabin during flight. Asleep 

on jumpseat during flight and upon taxi out and landing. 

Synopsis: A B757-200 flight attendant was forced under threat 

of termination to fly a long two-legged flight after refusing to 

fly fatigued because of insufficient rest after previous flight.

763300

Narrative: We were scheduled to work flight XX from ZZZ 

to ZZZ1 then layover for over 28 hours. We were drafted to 

work flight XY directly back from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 as soon as 

we were able to deplane our passenger. We had absolutely no 

rest break at any time during the 11 hours 12 minutes of actual 

flight time or the 13 hours 22 minutes of duty time as we immediately began boarding the new flight. Our total flight time 

for that duty day went from scheduled 606 to 1112. All three 

of us were unprepared to work so long. We had not taken naps 

or slept in late. If we had an emergency situation we would 

not have been at out best. I believe it was an unsafe situation 

and one that could have been prevented. Supplemental info 

from ACN 763301: Not having planned for this kind of ‘turn’ 

(getting proper rest before a trip and also expecting to go on 

a layover) resulted in exhaustion and not feeling that I would 

be able to execute my safety responsibilities clear headed if 

necessary. With the hours involved here and over 11 hours of 

flight time without a moment’s rest seemed to surpass safety 

at all costs. Callback conversation with reporter ACN 763300 

revealed the following info: the reporter stated that the second 

flight to which she was assigned had diverted earlier and when 

it finally reached its destination 3 of the 5 flight attendants were 

illegal to proceed on the return flight. Since the reporter’s crew 

was legal the air carrier ordered 3 of them to join the other 

crew on its trip. The reporter was not prepared for such a long 

duty day: did not rest prior to check in, was not given a rest 

period on the first flight, and would not be given a rest on the 

next flight. Both aircraft in this event were full B757-200’s. 

Synopsis: A flight attendant reports a schedule change after 

arrival at their RON destination required an immediate departure and a total duty day of 13+22 hours with no break.

763302

Narrative: I was the purser and after reaching the gate 

I announced for the flight attendants to disarm their doors 

and simultaneously turned on the cabin lights. I stared at my 

door. I think I looked at it 3 times and just as customer service 

approached to knock on the window, I realized the door was 

still armed! I quickly disarmed it and stood there shaking as 

I realized what could have happened! I had taken first break, 

which I normally don’t do. By the end of third break I didn’t 

feel very alert at all. In fact I could barely keep my eyes open. 

This amount of fatigue is scary and this was a real eye opener. 

Supplemental info from ACN 763298: Air carrier’s directive 

of requiring 3 crew rest breaks on an all night non stop flight 

of such long duration is creating an unsafe work environment 

for both working crews and our passenger. Our entire crew was 

exhausted on arrival in ZZZZ and in the event of an emergency 

I dare say would not and could not have responded as quickly 

as we have been trained to do due to extreme fatigue. I personally was so overtired due to a short crew rest break and having 

been in first break that I felt dizzy and almost delirious. I had 

to check, double check, and triple check that my door was 

disarmed and that my flying partner’s door was disarmed. Two 

of us had to perform post flight safety to be certain all doors 

were disarmed, lavatories unoccupied and opened and that all 

passenger were off the aircraft. Upon arrival at the hotel I was 

also so overtired I was unable to sleep, even though that’s all I 

wanted and needed to do. I have flown this trip for years and I 

have never felt this physically exhausted. I had napped during 

the day of the trip and felt fine at briefing. Furthermore, in 

our flight attendant operation manual the paragraph following 

the break directive is a flight attendant coverage ratio. Doing 

two breaks from ZZZ to ZZZZ exceeds that coverage ratio. 

We do our best to make our passenger have an enjoyable flight 

but more importantly we need to ensure a safe flight staffed by 

alert and ready for any situation flight attendants. Situational 
B18

awareness is an important part of our jobs, these days one of 

the most important parts of our jobs. Supplemental info from 

ACN 763327: Passenger reported to flight attendants upon 

deplaning that a female passenger had fallen and needed assistance. Flight attendants quickly provided oxygen, emotional 

support and a ready AED. Ground staff called for emergency 

medical professionals from the front door as the cockpit 

crew had already left the cockpit. My question is: Should air 

carrier discipline flight attendants for taking two rest breaks 

instead of three rest breaks given that we are first responders 

for all medical emergencies while on duty? Flight time is 14.5 

hours. Callback conversation with reporter 763298 revealed 

the following info: Reporter stated that the current air carrier 

rest policy being enforced is 3 3.25 hours breaks. The flight 

attendants were scheduling their own breaks at a 2 4.5 hour 

break rotation but the air carrier is demanding the three shorter 

breaks for passenger service reasons. The flight is essentially 

all night so many people are asleep anyway. Fifteen flight attendants are now a normal crew complement for a 17.5 hour 

duty day that starts at night and ends at night. The cumulative 

fatigue leaves all crew members feeling ineffectual at the flight’s 

termination. Adding a problem to the mix, such as a passenger 

medical emergency in this case, makes the situation even worse. 

Synopsis: Flight attendants question an air carrier’s inflight 

rest policy requiring 3 short breaks vs. 2 longer breaks on long 

flights. The crew feels more rested and safe with 2 breaks.

763303

Narrative: Augmented staffing for entire trip required 6 

flight attendants due to long duty time. Purser on the flight 

advised crew scheduler that only 5 flight attendants were on 

board for the trip and that we were not legally staffed according to the flight manual. After a lengthy discussion with the 

purser other flight attendants and scheduler, we were advised 

by the scheduler that we would have to work the flight with 

5 flight attendants. The scheduler was asked if she was giving us a direct order. She said yes and so we advised her that 

we would work under protest and that we were understaffed 

according to the flight manual. We did not have access to a 

computer at the time but upon return from the trip I pulled 

up requirements and the print up under comments stated ‘augmented staffing required: flight XX needs: 6 flight attendants.’ 

Synopsis: A flight attendant reports the air carrier forced the 

flight attendant crew to depart one flight attendant short of 

the required number on a long duty time flight.