alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2205 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2205

  To prohibit funding to negotiate a United Nations Arms Trade Treaty 
 that restricts the Second Amendment rights of United States citizens.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 19, 2012

   Mr. Moran introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To prohibit funding to negotiate a United Nations Arms Trade Treaty 
 that restricts the Second Amendment rights of United States citizens.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Second Amendment Sovereignty Act of 
2012''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In October 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham 
        Clinton announced the United States support and participation 
        in negotiating the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, to be 
        finalized in 2012, signaling a shift in United States policy.
            (2) An Arms Trade Treaty that regulates the domestic 
        manufacturer, possession, or purchase of civilian firearms and 
        ammunition would infringe on the rights of United States 
        citizens protected under the second amendment to the 
        Constitution of the United States.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
sovereignty of the United States and the constitutionally protected 
freedoms of American gun owners must be upheld and not be undermined by 
the Arms Trade Treaty.

SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON FUNDING.

    No funds may be obligated or expended to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States, in connection with negotiations for a 
United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, to restrict in any way the rights of 
United States citizens under the second amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, or to otherwise regulate domestic manufacture, 
assembly, possession, use, transfer, or purchase of firearms, 
ammunition, or related items, including small arms, light weapons, or 
related materials.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In  connection  with the  quarterly  report of Sonoma  Valley  Bancorp (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period  ending  September 30, 2006 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  We,
Mel Switzer, Jr., Chief Executive Officer and Mary Dieter Smith, Chief Financial
Officer, of the Company certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, that to the best of
our knowledge:


(1)  the Report fully complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  the information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Dated:  November 8, 2006    /s/ Mel Switzer, Jr.
      ------------------    ---------------------------------------------------
                            Mel Switzer, Jr.
                            President and Chief Executive Officer
                            (Principal Executive Officer)

Dated:  November 8, 2006    /s/ Mary Dieter Smith
      ------------------    ---------------------------------------------------
                            Mary Dieter Smith
                            Executive Vice President and
                            Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer
                            (Principal Financial Officer and
                            Principal Accounting Officer)
522 A.2d 1143

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Clifford B. WILLIAMS, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Nov. 18, 1986.

Filed March 23, 1987.

*502Walter A. Steinbacher, Assistant Public Defender, Williamsport, for appellant.

Brett O. Feese, District Attorney, Kristine L. Waltz, Assistant District Attorney, Williamsport, for Com., appel-lee.

Before WIEAND, MONTEMURO and JOHNSON, JJ.

MONTEMURO, Judge:

Appellant, Clifford B. Williams, challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss. Appellant believes that any attempt to prosecute him in this case violates his right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The Lycom-ing County Court of Common Pleas disagreed and characterized appellant’s double jeopardy argument as “frivolous.” Because this appeal is interlocutory, we must quash for lack of jurisdiction.

The Commonwealth seeks to prosecute appellant for the first of three disturbances in which appellant was involved *503on the night of June 15 and 16, 1985. Appellant pled guilty on August 2, 1985 to a disorderly conduct charge that arose from the second disturbance, and the court on November 18, 1985 dismissed the charges that arose from the third disturbance because of the Commonwealth’s failure to comply with Pa.R.Crim.P. 130(d). In his motion to dismiss the present case, appellant claims that the earlier prosecutions for the second and third disturbances bar prosecution for the first. The trial court nonetheless denied the motion by order of December 23, 1985, and a timely notice of appeal followed. On July 1, 1986, the trial court filed an opinion in support of its order. In this opinion, the court concluded that “the defendant’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is frivolous.”

Our supreme court in *Commonwealth v. Brady,*510 Pa. 336, 346, 508 A.2d 286, 291 (1986), concluded that “an appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds should not be permitted where the hearing court has considered the motion and made written findings that the motion is frivolous.” The court reasoned that immediate appellate review of “obviously frivolous” double jeopardy claims encourages dilatory defense tactics and compromises the interest of the public in “the prompt trial of the criminally accused.” *Brady, supra,*510 Pa. at 346, 508 A.2d at 291. The reasoning and result in *Brady*apply to the present case. As in *Brady,*the trial court’s written finding of frivolousness renders this appeal interlocutory. Appellant therefore must await final judgment before he can seek appellate review of his double jeopardy claim. He can challenge the finding of frivolousness only by requesting a stay directly from the supreme court. *See Commonwealth v. Learn,*356 Pa.Super. 382, 514 A.2d 910 (1986).

For the foregoing reasons, we quash this appeal as interlocutory.

Appeal quashed.
```
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 149 (Monday, August 4, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 41975]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-20405]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Lodging of Consent Decree Under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act

    In accordance with the policy of the Department of Justice, 28 
C.F.R. Sec. 50.7, and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9622(d)(2)(B), notice is hereby 
given that a proposed Fifth Partial Consent Decree in United States v. 
GSF Energy, L.L.C., Civil Action No. 97-5440 JGD, was lodged on July 
23, 1997, with the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California. That action was brought pursuant to the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
for cleanup and cost recovery at the Operating Industries, Inc. 
Superfund site in Monterey Park, California.
    Pursuant to the Consent Decree, the settling parties, GSF Energy 
and Air Products and Chemicals Inc., will pay $1.762 million to resolve 
their liability for the performance of remedial actions at the 
Operating Industries site, and for reimbursement of costs incurred and 
to be incurred by the United States at the site. Work is ongoing at the 
site to perform the remedial actions by other parties who have settled 
in previous consent decrees for the same matters as this consent 
decree.
    As provided in 28 C.F.R. Sec. 50.7 and 42 U.S.C. 
Sec. 9622(d)(2)(B), the Department of Justice will receive comments 
from persons who are not named as parties to this action relating to 
the proposed Consent Decree for a period of thirty days from the date 
of this publication. Comments should be addressed to the Assistant 
Attorney General of the Environment and Natural Resources Division, 
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530. All comments should 
refer to United States v. GSF Energy, L.L.C., D.J. Ref. 90-11-2-156I.
    The proposed Consent Decree may be examined at the office of the 
United States Attorney, 300 North Los Angeles Street, Los Angeles, 
California 90012, and at the Region IX office of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 75 Hawthorne Street, San Francisco, California 
94105. A copy of the proposed Consent Decree may also be examined at 
the Consent Decree Library, 1120 G Street, N.W. 4th Floor, Washington, 
D.C. 20005 (202) 624-0892. A copy of the proposed Consent Decree may be 
obtained in person or by mail from the Consent Decree Library. In 
requesting a copy, please enclose a check in the amount of $11.00 for a 
copy of the consent decree (25 cents per page reproduction costs) 
payable to ``Consent Decree Library.''
Joel M. Gross,
Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section, Environment and Natural 
Resources Division.
[FR Doc. 97-20405 Filed 8-1-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-15-M
```
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2121 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2121

 To modify the Department of Defense Program Guidance relating to the 
 award of Post-Deployment/Mobilization Respite Absence administrative 
absence days to members of the reserve components to exempt any member 
  whose qualified mobilization commenced before October 1, 2011, and 
   continued on or after that date, from the changes to the program 
                guidance that took effect on that date.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 16, 2012

 Ms. Klobuchar introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
              referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To modify the Department of Defense Program Guidance relating to the 
 award of Post-Deployment/Mobilization Respite Absence administrative 
absence days to members of the reserve components to exempt any member 
  whose qualified mobilization commenced before October 1, 2011, and 
   continued on or after that date, from the changes to the program 
                guidance that took effect on that date.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MODIFICATION OF PROGRAM GUIDANCE RELATING TO THE AWARD OF 
              POST-DEPLOYMENT/MOBILIZATION RESPITE ABSENCE 
              ADMINISTRATIVE ABSENCE DAYS TO MEMBERS OF THE RESERVE 
              COMPONENTS UNDER DOD INSTRUCTION 1327.06.

    Effective as of October 1, 2011, the changes made by the Secretary 
of Defense to the Program Guidance relating to the award of Post-
Deployment/Mobilization Respite Absence administrative absence days to 
members of the reserve components under DOD Instruction 1327.06 shall 
not apply to a member of a reserve component whose qualified 
mobilization (as described in such program guidance) commenced before 
October 1, 2011, and continued on or after that date until the date the 
mobilization is terminated.
                                 <all>
```
# U n i te d S t a te s C o u r t o f A ppe a l s F OR T HE D IS TRICT OF C OLUM BIA C IRCUI T

___ ___ ___ ___ 

## No. 21-5025 September Term, 2020 1: 20-c v -033 54-UNA Filed O n: May25 , 20 21 Dona ld W hite,

App ellant
v . Edward Markey, United Sta tes S ena te, et a l.,

App ellees
ON A PPE A L FROM THE UNITED STA TES DIS TRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BEFORE: Pillard an d W alker, Circuit Ju dges, a nd Sen telle, Sen ior Circuit

Judge J U D G M E N T T his ap pea l w as co nside red o n th e reco rd f rom the United Sta tes District Cou rt for th e District of

Colum bia a nd on the brief an d su pple me nt f iled b y ap pellan t. S ee Fed. R. Ap p. P . 34 (a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 3 4(j). It is ORDERED A ND A DJUDGED tha t th e d istrict court’s o rder en tered Decem ber 22, 20 20, be af

f irmed . A ppe llant h as n ot sh own thatthe district co urt e rred in dism issing the ca se without prejud ice for failure t o co mp ly w ith Fe dera l Rule o f

Civ il Proced ure 8 (a) and for lack o f subject m atte r jurisdiction. Ap pellan t’s com plaintdid not set forth “a sho rt an d p lain sta tem entof the ground s for th e co urt’s jurisdiction ” or “a short and plain stat em entof the claim sho w ing thatthe plea der is e ntitled to relief .” Se e Fed. R. Civ . P. 8(a). Add itiona lly , ap pellan t failed to p lead facts t o e stab lish his stan ding to sue, an d “th e d efect o f stan ding is a d efect in subject m atte r jurisdiction.” Haase v. Session s, 83 5 F.2 d 9 02, 90 6 (D.C. Cir. 19 87). T o e stab lish Article II I stan ding, pla intif

fs m ust a llege an injurytha t is “con crete, pa rticulariz ed, an d a ctua l or imm inen t; fairly

trace able to the cha llenged a ction; an d red ressab le by a favorable ruling.” Clappe r v . Am nest y Int ’l USA, 5 68 U.S. 3 98, 40 9, 1 33 S. Ct. 11 38, 11 47 (201 3) (q uot ing Monsan to Co . v. Geertso n S eed Farm s, 56 1 U.S . 13 9, 1 49– 50 (201 0)). App ellantha s no t dem onst rated w hat , if

an y , injury he su staine d a s a re sult o f the facts a lleged.

# U n i te d S t a te s C o u r t o f A ppe a l s F OR T HE D IS TRICT OF C OLUM BIA C IRCUI T

___ ___ ___ ___ 

## No. 21-5025 September Term, 2020

Pursua nt t o D.C. Circuit Ru le 36 , th is dispo sition will no t be pu blished . T he Clerk is directe d to w ithho ld issua nce of the m and ate he rein u ntil seven d ays af ter reso lution of an y tim ely petition for rehe aring or pe tition for rehe aring en ban c. S ee Fed. R. Ap p. P. 4 1(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41

. Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT: Mark J. La nger, Clerk BY: /s/ Daniel J. Reidy Depu ty Cl erk

Page 2
Exhibit 3.5
                  CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
                           TO THE
                CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
                             OF
                   CALENERGY COMPANY, INC.


     CALENERGY COMPANY, INC., a Delaware corporation (the
"Company"), HEREBY CERTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:

     FIRST:  The name of the Company is CalEnergy Company,
Inc.  The date of the filing of the Company's most recent
Certificate of Amendment to the Restated Certificate of
Incorporation with the Secretary of State of the State of
Delaware was February 23, 1995; provided, however, that such
Restated Certificate of Incorporation was further amended by
a Certificate of Ownership and Merger dated March 22, 1996,
which amended the Company's name.

     SECOND:  That the following resolution was approved and
adopted by the Board of Directors of the Company.

     THIRD:  That the following resolution was approved and
adopted pursuant to authorization by the stockholders of the
Company at the annual meeting of the Company's stockholders
duly called and held on May 15, 1997:

     RESOLVED:  That paragraph A of Article Fourth of the
     Company's Restated Certificate of Incorporation be
     deleted in its entirety and the following be and hereby
     is inserted in lieu thereof:

          FOURTH:   A.   The Corporation is authorized to
     issue two classes of shares of stock, to be designated
     respectively as Preferred Stock shares and as Common
     Stock shares.  The total number of shares of all
     classes of stock which the Corporation shall have
     authority to issue is One Hundred Eighty Two Million
     (182,000,000) shares, and the aggregate par value of
     all shares that are to have a par value is Twelve
     Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
     ($12,150,000).  The number of Preferred Stock shares is
     Two Million (2,000,000) shares, each without par value.
     The number of Common Stock shares that are to have a
     par value is One Hundred Eighty Million (180,000,000),
     and each such Common Stock share is to have a par value
     of Six and Seventy-Five One Hundredths Cents ($0.0675)
     per share.

     FOURTH:  That said amendment herein certified was duly
adopted in accordance with Section 242 of the General
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.

     The effective time of the amendment herein certified
shall be immediately upon filing.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, CALENERGY COMPANY, INC. has caused
this Certificate to be executed and attested by the
undersigned, this 19th day of May, 1997.

                         CALENERGY COMPANY, INC.


                         By:  /s/  Steven A. McArthur
                         Name:     Steven A. McArthur
                         Title:    Secretary

ATTEST:


By:  /s/  Douglas L. Anderson
Name:     Douglas L. Anderson
Title:    Assistant Secretary
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2193 

To require the Food and Drug Administration to include devices in the 

postmarket risk identification and analysis system, to expedite the implementation of the unique device identification system for medical devices, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 15, 2012 

Mr. MERKLEY (for himself, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. BENNET, and Mr. KOHL) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To require the Food and Drug Administration to include 

devices in the postmarket risk identification and analysis 

system, to expedite the implementation of the unique 

device identification system for medical devices, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ensuring Safe Medical 

5 Devices for Patients’’. 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2193 IS

1 SEC. 2. ACTIVE POSTMARKET RISK IDENTIFICATION AND 

2 ANALYSIS. 

3 (a) RECORDS AND REPORTS ON DEVICES.—Section 

4 519 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 

5 U.S.C. 360i) is amended by inserting after subsection (c) 

6 the following: 

7 ‘‘(d) INCLUSION OF DEVICES IN THE POSTMARKET

8 RISK IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM.—Not 

9 later than 90 days after the date of enactment of the En10 suring Safe Medical Devices for Patients, the Secretary 

11 shall amend the procedures established and maintained 

12 under section 505(k)(3)(C) in order to expand the 

13 postmarket risk identification and analysis system estab14 lished under such section to include and apply to devices 

15 in a comparable manner as such system includes and ap16 plies to drugs. The Secretary shall ensure that such 

17 amendments to the procedures shall give priority for inclu18 sion in the postmarket risk identification and analysis sys19 tem to class III and class II devices that are implantable, 

20 life-supporting or life-sustaining, or pose significant risk 

21 to users.’’. 

22 (b) UNIQUE DEVICE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM.— 

23 Section 519(f) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 

24 Act (21 U.S.C. 360i(f)) is amended— 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 2193 IS

1 (1) by striking ‘‘The Secretary shall promul2 gate’’ and inserting ‘‘Not later than December 31, 

3 2012, the Secretary shall issue final’’; and 

4 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

5 ‘‘The Secretary shall implement the unique device identi6 fication system under this subsection not later than 1 year 

7 after the date on which the final regulations are issued.’’. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
No. 6178.

#### JOHN L. FLETTRICH vs. BARTHELEMY MARPHIS.

Syllabus.

Questions of fact only are involved.

Appeal from the Civil District Court, for the Parish of Orleans, Division “A,” No. 101,817. Hon. T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.

Stafford & Robinson, for plaintiff and appellee.

Legier, Gleason and Ritayik, for defendant and appellant.

His Honor, EMILE GODCHAUX,

rendered the opinion and decree of the Court, as follows:

Plaintiff sues for $150.00, the price at which defendant sold a horse for his account.

The defendant for answer asserts that the proceeds of this sale, namely, $150.00, were, with plaintiff’s consent, applied to the partial payment of the price of another horse sold by defendant to plaintiff for $215.00; and that plaintiff having failed and refused without cause to pay the balance of the price of this second sale, is liable in re-convention to defendant for same. Plaintiff had judgment as prayed for and the reconventional demand was dismissed.

The issue presented is one of fact alone, that is, if whether or not, as set up in the answer, defendant did sell to plaintiff a second horse for $215.00, to the partial payment of which $150.00 claimed by plaintiff was applied.

Plaintiff’s version of the transaction is that he took the second horse on trial; that when he used it, it shied, *360balked and proved unsatisfactory, and that he promptly returned it to defendant, who thereupon promised to immediately pay to him the $150.00, the proceeds of the sale of the first horse, which plaintiff had meanwhile permitted him to retain with the understanding that it was to be applied to the partial payment-of the price of the second horse in the event only that the latter proved satisfactory.

Opinion and decree, June 26th, 1914.

Defendant asserts, however, that the second horse was sold outright to plaintiff after inspection, unconditionally and without right of trial. But his testimony to that effect stands alone and is uncorroborated; while on the other hand plaintiff’s testimony to the effect that it was a conditional sale, is corroborated not only by that of his son, but also by the admitted fact that plaintiff had previously purchased of defendant' another horse that had to be disposed of at a loss because it proved unsuited to plaintiff’s purpose; as well as by the further conceded fact that the second horse was promptly returned to defendant after plaintiff .had used and tried it but an hour. Moreover, the trial Judge resolved the conflict in the testimony in plaintiff’s favor and we find no reason to disturb his conclusions.

The judgment is accordingly affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.