UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1881

In Re: ROBERT LEWIS, JR.,

Appellant.

------------------------------------

DENNIS DARNAY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARJORIE K. LYNCH,

Defendant – Appellee,

JAMES B. ANGELL,

Party-in-Interest - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:13-cv-00696-BO)

Submitted: April 28, 2015 Decided: June 9, 2015

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Lewis, Jr., LEWIS LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Brian C. Behr, OFFICE OF THE BANKRUPTCY 
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ADMINISTRATOR, Raleigh, North Carolina; James B. Angell, 

Nicholas C. Brown, HOWARD, STALLINGS, FROM & HUTSON, PA, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Robert Lewis, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order 

affirming the order of the bankruptcy court partially suspending 

him from practicing in the bankruptcy court, ordering the 

disgorgement of undisclosed attorney fees received, and imposing 

a $2500 monetary sanction. He also appeals from the district 

court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s order reinstating 

his bar privileges after an additional term and upon Lewis’ 

compliance with the sanctions order. We affirm.

During the investigation of a debtor in bankruptcy, the 

Bankruptcy Administrator (“BA”) identified several discrepancies 

within the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules and between the 

debtor’s statements and those prepared by his attorney, Robert 

Lewis, particularly with respect to fees paid to Lewis. After 

further investigation, the BA filed a report of Lewis’ alleged 

misconduct and moved for sanctions to be imposed against Lewis

for violating the requirement of full disclosure of fees in 

bankruptcy cases. The BA also asserted numerous other 

violations by Lewis, including the acceptance of more than $6000 

from the debtor, purportedly toward attorney’s fees for 

prepetition civil litigation of which the debtor denied 

knowledge; continuing to represent the debtor without approval 

from the bankruptcy court after conversion of the debtor’s case 

to Chapter 11; violating the rule against “ghost-writing” appeal 
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documents for the debtor; and failing to maintain copies of

filed documents that contain an original signature. The 

Chapter 7 Trustee also moved for sanctions on these same bases. 

After holding hearings on the BA’s and Trustee’s motions 

for sanctions, the bankruptcy court determined that sanctions 

were appropriate and temporarily suspended Lewis from initiating 

new bankruptcy cases on behalf of clients in the Bankruptcy 

Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina until December 

14, 2013. With respect to existing clients, Lewis was 

authorized to continue his representation, but was required to 

submit monthly reports to the court and to the BA, certifying 

that he was the attorney of record and disclosing all 

compensation paid or to be paid to him for his services in 

connection with his pending bankruptcy cases. The court ordered 

Lewis to pay $2500 in sanctions and to disgorge $8400 in fees. 

The court additionally ruled that Lewis’ reinstatement to 

practice was conditioned on his full compliance with the court’s 

order. The court warned Lewis that failure to fully comply will 

result in more severe sanctions. 

During the hearing on Lewis’ reinstatement, the bankruptcy 

court found that Lewis had not fully complied with the sanctions 

order. The court directed that Lewis’ privilege to practice 

before the bankruptcy court would be reinstated on May 19, 2014, 

provided that, before that date, Lewis paid the sanctions and
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disgorged the fee amount, as required by the court’s original 

sanctions order. The court also ordered that the heightened 

reporting requirements imposed on Lewis in the original 

sanctions order would continue for all new bankruptcy cases 

filed by Lewis. 

Lewis appealed from the sanctions order and from the 

reinstatement order. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy 

court’s rulings. Lewis noted his appeal to this court, 

challenging the authority of the bankruptcy court to order 

sanctions, the nature of the sanctions imposed, and the fact 

that the bankruptcy court did not issue findings of fact or 

conclusions of law. He also argued that the district court 

erred by considering the Appellees’ brief filed in the appeal 

from the reinstatement order in deciding the issues in the 

appeal from the sanctions order and erred by affirming the 

bankruptcy court’s disposition without holding oral argument.

Lewis contends that the bankruptcy court lacks authority to 

suspend the bar privileges of attorneys who practice in that 

court, claiming that only the district court has such authority. 

We do not agree.

The bankruptcy court has the inherent power, “incidental to 

all courts” to “discipline attorneys who appear before it.” 

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). This inherent 

power includes the power to suspend or disbar attorneys from 
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practicing before the court. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 

(1985). Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the 

bankruptcy court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that 

is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of 

[Title 11] or to prevent an abuse of process.” 11 U.S.C. 

§ 105(a) (2012); see In re Walters, 868 F.2d 665, 669 (4th Cir.

1989) (upholding under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), contempt sanctions 

based on attorney’s failure to disclose fees, disgorge 

unauthorized fees, and obtain authority to represent debtor). 

We conclude that the bankruptcy court appropriately determined 

that it had the authority to sanction Lewis for his misconduct.

See In re Johnson, 921 F.2d 85, 586 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating 

that bankruptcy courts “have both the statutory and inherent 

authority to deny attorneys and others the privilege of 

practicing before that bar”).

Lewis contends that, pursuant to Stern v. Marshall, 131 

S. Ct. 2594 (2011), bankruptcy courts lack authority over 

attorney disciplinary matters. In Stern, the Court held that 

Congress exceeded the limitation of Article III by identifying 

as a “core matter” a state-law counterclaim by a debtor in 

bankruptcy against a creditor who had not consented to the 

jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 2620. Because the 

counterclaim was “in no way derived from or dependent upon 

bankruptcy law,” the Supreme Court determined that the 
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bankruptcy court could not, in compliance with the Constitution, 

enter a final order on that claim. Id. at 2618.

We think Lewis’ situation is distinguishable. The basis 

upon which the bankruptcy court imposed sanctions was Lewis’ 

violation of bankruptcy law and procedures and his misconduct in 

the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court clearly had 

jurisdiction over this matter based on the fact that Lewis

voluntarily presented himself in the bankruptcy court as an 

attorney and officer of the court, and because, unlike the 

counterclaim in Stern, the bases upon which the sanctions were 

imposed arose from, and were dependent upon, the bankruptcy 

proceeding. Lewis next argues that the sanctions imposed were 

in the nature of punishment and therefore amounted to criminal 

contempt and were imposed in violation of his due process 

rights. We disagree. A contempt sanction is criminal if “it is 

imposed retrospectively for a ‘completed act of disobedience’.” 

Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 

821, 829 (1994). Contempt sanctions are civil in nature if the 

purpose is to coerce compliance with a court order or to 

compensate another party for losses sustained. Id. Suspension 

of an attorney from the practice of law is generally deemed a 

civil penalty, imposed to coerce compliance with the rules of 

the court. See Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1883); In re 

Liotti, 667 F.3d 419, 430-31 (4th Cir. 2011). We conclude that 
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the sanctions imposed on Lewis were within the bankruptcy 

court’s authority and that the court appropriately imposed civil 

sanctions partially suspending him from practicing in the 

bankruptcy court, requiring the disgorgement of unauthorized 

fees, imposing a monetary sanction, and conditioning his 

reinstatement upon fulfilling the sanction order. See Bagwell, 

512 U.S. at 829.

We also do not think the district court erred in its 

consideration of Lewis’ appeal. First, Lewis’ contention that 

the district court erred on appeal by not hearing oral argument

is belied by the record, which evidences that the court held a 

hearing and Lewis presented argument. Second, we find no abuse 

of discretion in the district court’s consideration of the 

Appellees’ brief in the reinstatement appeal to resolve issues 

in the sanctions appeal. See In re Haberman, 516 F.3d 1207, 

1208 n.* (10th Cir. 2008) (allowing consideration of 

noncompliant briefs at court’s discretion, provided that 

opposing party is not prejudiced); Price v. Digital Equip. 

Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).

Lastly, Lewis contends that the district court erred by 

upholding the bankruptcy court’s ruling where the bankruptcy 

court did not expressly state findings of fact and conclusions 

of law. Because Lewis failed to raise this argument in the 

district court, it is waived on appeal. See In re Wallace & 
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Gale Co., 385 F.3d 820, 835 (4th Cir. 2004) (on appeal from 

bankruptcy court’s ruling, failure to raise argument before 

district court results in waiver of argument on appeal “absent 

exceptional circumstances”).

In sum, we find no reversible error by either the 

bankruptcy court or the district court. Accordingly, we affirm 

the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED