Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 117 / Friday, June 17, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 35327 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Boeing Model 787 

series airplanes. 

1. Seats with Inflatable Lapbelts. It 

must be shown that the inflatable 

lapbelt will deploy and provide 

protection under crash conditions 

where it is necessary to prevent serious 

head injury. The means of protection 

must take into consideration a range of 

stature from a two year old child to a 

ninety-fifth percentile male. The 

inflatable lapbelt must provide a 

consistent approach to energy 

absorption throughout that range of 

occupants. In addition, the following 

situations must be considered: 

a. The seat occupant is holding an 

infant. 

b. The seat occupant is a child in a 

child restraint device. 

c. The seat occupant is a child not 

using a child restraint device. 

d. The seat occupant is a pregnant 

woman. 

2. The inflatable lapbelt must provide 

adequate protection for each occupant 

regardless of the number of occupants of 

the seat assembly, considering that 

unoccupied seats may have active 

seatbelts. 

3. The design must prevent the 

inflatable lapbelt from being either 

incorrectly buckled or incorrectly 

installed such that the inflatable lapbelt 

would not properly deploy. 

Alternatively, it must be shown that 

such deployment is not hazardous to the 

occupant, and will provide the required 

head injury protection. 

4. It must be shown that the inflatable 

lapbelt system is not susceptible to 

inadvertent deployment as a result of 

wear and tear, or inertial loads resulting 

from in-flight or ground maneuvers 

(including gusts and hard landings), and 

other operating and environmental 

conditions (vibrations, moisture, etc.) 

likely to be experienced in service. 

5. Deployment of the inflatable lapbelt 

must not introduce injury mechanisms 

to the seated occupant, or result in 

injuries that could impede rapid egress. 

This assessment should include an 

occupant who is in the brace position 

when it deploys and an occupant whose 

belt is loosely fastened. 

6. It must be shown that inadvertent 

deployment of the inflatable lapbelt, 

during the most critical part of the 

flight, will either not cause a hazard to 

the airplane or its occupants, or it meets 

the requirement of § 25.1309(b). 

7. It must be shown that the inflatable 

lapbelt will not impede rapid egress of 

occupants 10 seconds after its 

deployment. 

8. The system must be protected from 

lightning and HIRF. The threats 

specified in the certification basis 

regarding lightning, § 25.1316, and HIRF 

(special conditions) for the 787–8 

airplane, are incorporated by reference 

for the purpose of measuring lightning 

and HIRF protection. 

9. Inflatable lap belts, once deployed, 

must not adversely effect the emergency 

lighting system (i.e., block proximity 

lights to the extent that the lights no 

longer meet their intended function). 

10. The inflatable lapbelt must 

function properly after loss of normal 

airplane electrical power, and after a 

transverse separation of the fuselage at 

the most critical location. A separation 

at the location of the lapbelt does not 

have to be considered. 

11. It must be shown that the 

inflatable lapbelt will not release 

hazardous quantities of gas or 

particulate matter into the cabin. 

12. The inflatable lapbelt installation 

must be protected from the effects of fire 

such that no hazard to occupants will 

result. 

13. There must be a means for a 

crewmember to verify the integrity of 

the inflatable lapbelt activation system 

prior to each flight or it must be 

demonstrated to reliably operate 

between inspection intervals. The FAA 

considers the loss of the airbag system 

deployment function alone (i.e., 

independent of the conditional event 

that requires the airbag system 

deployment) is a major failure 

condition. 

14. The inflatable material may not 

have an average burn rate of greater than 

2.5 inches/minute when tested using the 

horizontal flammability test as defined 

in part 25, appendix F, part I, paragraph 

(b)(5). 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 13, 

2011. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service, ANM–100. 

[FR Doc. 2011–15094 Filed 6–16–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–0853; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–116–AD; Amendment 

39–16720; AD 2011–12–13] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, –900, and –900ER Series 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD requires 

repetitive testing of the stabilizer takeoff 

warning switches, and corrective 

actions if necessary. This AD was 

prompted by reports that the warning 

horn did not sound during the takeoff 

warning system test of the S132 ‘‘nose 

up stab takeoff warning switch.’’ We are 

issuing this AD to detect and correct a 

takeoff warning system switch failure, 

which could reduce the ability of the 

flightcrew to maintain the safe flight 

and landing of the airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective July 22, 

2011. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of July 22, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data 

& Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, 

MC 2H–65, Seattle, Washington 98124– 

2207; telephone 206–544–5000, 

extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; e-mail 

me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You 

may review copies of the referenced 

service information at the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. 

For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call 425–227– 

1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

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35328 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 117 / Friday, June 17, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Jeffrey W. Palmer, Aerospace Engineer, 

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM– 

130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification 

Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., 

Renton, Washington 98057–3356; 

phone: 425–917–6472; fax: 425–917– 

6590; e-mail: jeffrey.w.palmer@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an airworthiness 

directive (AD) that would apply to the 

specified products. That NPRM 

published in the Federal Register on 

September 14, 2010 (75 FR 55691). That 

NPRM proposed to require repetitive 

testing of the stabilizer takeoff warning 

switches, and corrective actions if 

necessary. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the proposal and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Support for the NPRM 

Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, 

and the Air Line Pilots Association 

(ALPA), International, support the 

NPRM. 

Requests To Revise Costs of Compliance 

Section of the NPRM 

American Airlines (AA) requested 

that we revise the Cost of Compliance 

section of the NPRM to show a more 

accurate cost to operators. Delta Air 

Lines noted that the actual cost to 

operators will be more than what is 

described in the Costs of Compliance 

section given in the NPRM. 

AA explained that the Costs of 

Compliance estimate provided in the 

NPRM specifies 1 work-hour per 

product at an average labor rate of $85 

per hour. However, AA stated that 

Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, 

dated April 7, 2010, estimates 4.25 

hours to accomplish the test of the 

switches and an additional 2.25 hours 

each to replace the switches. AA 

asserted that Boeing Service Bulletin 

737–27–1289, dated April 7, 2010, 

estimates a cost to operators of $361.25 

to $743.75 per product. 

We agree to provide clarification of 

the Costs of Compliance section in this 

final rule. Since the issuance of the 

NPRM, Boeing has issued Service 

Bulletin Information Notice 737–27– 

1289 IN 02, dated September 27, 2010, 

which provides revised work-hours for 

testing (1 work-hour) and the oncondition replacement (2 work-hours) of 

the switches. We have revised the Costs 

of Compliance section of this final rule 

to reflect the latest cost information 

provided by the manufacturer. 

Request To Add Terminating Action for 

Repetitive Inspections 

ALPA requested that we revise the 

NPRM to include a terminating action 

for the repetitive inspections proposed 

by the NPRM. AA stated that the lack 

of a terminating action for the repetitive 

inspections proposed by the NPRM 

places pressure on the operator because 

it is required to continue the repetitive 

inspections at intervals of 750 flight 

cycles for the affected airplanes. 

We disagree to include a terminating 

action in the final rule. The 

manufacturer has advised that extensive 

modifications would be required to 

eliminate the repetitive inspections. No 

terminating action is currently available. 

However, if a modification that 

addresses the unsafe condition 

addressed by this AD is developed, 

approved, and available, operators 

could request approval of an alternative 

method of compliance (AMOC) to this 

AD for doing that modification. No 

change has been made to the final rule 

in regard to this issue. 

Request To Allow Repair of Switch 

Before Replacing 

AA questioned why operators could 

not attempt to repair a failed switch 

before being required to replace the 

failed switch. AA explained that the 

NPRM and Boeing Service Bulletin 737– 

27–1289, dated April 7, 2010, require 

the switch to be replaced if it fails the 

test. AA reasoned that the switches are 

adjustable per ‘‘AMM 31–51–02— 

Stabilizer Takeoff Warning Switches— 

Adjustment/Test.’’ 

From these statements, we infer that 

AA is requesting that we revise the 

NPRM to allow operators to repair a 

failed switch. We disagree. The intent of 

the test specified in paragraph (g) of the 

final rule is to find and, if necessary, 

replace switches that fail to electrically 

open or close properly regardless of 

adjustment [within the switch’s 

allowable range of adjustment], not 

switches that are simply out of 

adjustment. For switches that are out of 

adjustment, it is acceptable to attempt to 

adjust a switch that fails the test, prior 

to replacing the switch. However, the 

allowable range of adjustment is 

limited. If the switch continues to fail 

the test within the switch’s allowable 

range of adjustment, it must be replaced. 

To preclude test failures due to an outof-adjustment switch, the manufacturer 

recommends doing the test with 

stabilizer trim set at least one unit 

outside the green band. Doing the test 

according to the manufacturer’s 

recommendation will ensure that any 

test failures are due to a malfunctioning 

switch, not due to a switch that is 

simply out of adjustment. No change 

has been made to the final rule in regard 

to this issue. 

Request To Allow Additional 

Replacement Switch 

Delta Air Lines (the commenter) 

requested that we revise the NPRM to 

allow switch part number (P/N) 

35EN27–4 to be an additional 

acceptable replacement switch for failed 

switches. The commenter explained that 

paragraph (h) of the NPRM specifies that 

a stabilizer takeoff warning switch 

which fails the required test must be 

replaced with a new switch prior to 

further flight, in accordance with Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated 

April 7, 2010. The commenter further 

explained that ‘‘Section 3.B ‘Work 

Instructions’ ’’ of this service 

information does not specify 

replacement switches by part number. 

The commenter also explained that 

replacement switch part numbers are 

found in ‘‘Section 2.C.2 ‘Parts and 

Materials Supplied by the Operator’ of 

the SB,’’ and that this section lists only 

three part numbers. The commenter 

expressed that it is aware of an 

additional switch, which is not listed in 

Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, 

dated April 7, 2010. 

We do not agree to allow switch P/N 

35EN27–4 to be an additional 

acceptable replacement switch. This 

part has not been validated as an 

acceptable replacement part at this time. 

The manufacturer is currently assessing 

the acceptability of this part as a 

replacement part and might revise the 

service information at a later time to 

include this part number. If this part 

number is found to be acceptable at a 

later date, its use might be approved as 

an AMOC to this AD. No change has 

been made to the final rule in regard to 

this issue. 

Effect of This AD on AD 88–22–09 

Paragraph (b) (‘‘Affected ADs’’) of this 

AD has been revised to note that this AD 

affects AD 88–22–09, Amendment 39– 

6054 (Docket No. 88–NM–132–AD; 53 

FR 41313, October 21, 1988). In 

addition, we have revised paragraph (g) 

of this AD to state that accomplishment 

of the repetitive tests required by this 

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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 117 / Friday, June 17, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 35329 

AD terminates the operational and 

functional checks of the takeoff 

configuration warning system required 

by paragraph A., required item 3 

(‘‘Elevator out of Green Band switches’’) 

of AD 88–22–09 for the airplanes 

affected by this new AD. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

as proposed. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD would affect 

963 airplanes of U.S. registry. We also 

estimate that it would take about 1 

work-hour per product to comply with 

this AD. The average labor rate is $85 

per work-hour. Based on these figures, 

we estimate the cost of this AD to the 

U.S. operators to be $81,855, or $85 per 

product, per inspection cycle. 

We estimate the following costs to do 

any necessary replacements that would 

be required based on the results of the 

proposed inspection. We have no way of 

determining the number of aircraft that 

might need this replacement: 

ON-CONDITION COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

2 work-hours × $85 per hour = $170 ........................... Replacement ................................................................. $0 $170 

According to the manufacturer, some 

of the costs of this proposed AD may be 

covered under warranty, thereby 

reducing the cost impact on affected 

individuals. We do not control warranty 

coverage for affected individuals. As a 

result, we have included all costs in our 

cost estimate. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2011–12–13 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–16720; Docket No. 

FAA–2010–0853; Directorate Identifier 

2010–NM–116–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This AD is effective July 22, 2011. 

Affected ADs 

(b) This AD affects AD 88–22–09, 

Amendment 39–6054 (Docket No. 88–NM– 

132–AD). This AD does not supersede the 

requirements of AD 88–22–09. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to The Boeing 

Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, –900, and –900ER series airplanes, 

certificated in any category; as identified in 

Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated 

April 7, 2010. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 27: Flight Controls. 

Unsafe Condition 

(e) This AD was prompted by reports that 

the warning horn did not sound during the 

takeoff warning system test of the S132 ‘‘nose 

up stab takeoff warning switch.’’ The Federal 

Aviation Administration is issuing this AD to 

detect and correct a takeoff warning system 

switch failure, which could reduce the ability 

of the flightcrew to maintain the safe flight 

and landing of the airplane. 

Compliance 

(f) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Test 

(g) Within 6 months after the effective date 

of this AD, test the stabilizer takeoff warning 

switches, in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated April 7, 

2010. Repeat the test thereafter at intervals 

not to exceed 750 flight hours. 

Accomplishment of the repetitive tests 

required by paragraph (g) of this AD 

terminates the operational and functional 

checks of the takeoff configuration warning 

system required by paragraph A., required 

item 3 (‘‘Elevator out of Green Band 

switches’’) of AD 88–22–09. 

Replacement and Re-test 

(h) If any stabilizer takeoff warning switch 

fails the test required in paragraph (g) or (h) 

of this AD, replace the stabilizer takeoff 

warning switch with a new switch and test 

the new switch before further flight, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 737– 

27–1289, dated April 7, 2010. Within 750 

flight hours after replacement of any switch, 

test the replaced switch, in accordance with 

the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated April 7, 

2010; and repeat this test on the replaced 

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35330 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 117 / Friday, June 17, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

switch thereafter at intervals not to exceed 

750 flight hours. 

Special Flight Permit 

(i) Special flight permits, as described in 

Section 21.197 and Section 21.199 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 

and 21.199), are not allowed. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(j)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in the 

Related Information section of this AD. 

Information may be e-mailed to: 9-ANMSeattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

Related Information 

(k) For more information about this AD, 

contact Jeffrey W. Palmer, Aerospace 

Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, 

ANM–130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057– 

3356; phone: 425–917–6472; fax: 425–917– 

6590; e-mail: jeffrey.w.palmer@faa.gov. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(l) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin 

737–27–1289, dated April 7, 2010, to do the 

actions required by this AD, unless the AD 

specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated 

April 7, 2010, under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 

CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207; phone: 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax: 206–766– 

5680; e-mail: me.boecom@boeing.com; 

Internet: https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at an NARA facility, call 202–741– 

6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/

federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 3, 

2011. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–14344 Filed 6–16–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–0588; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–SW–074–AD; Amendment 

39–16717; AD 2011–12–10] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Robinson 

Helicopter Company Model (Robinson) 

R22, R22 Alpha, R22 Beta, R22 Mariner, 

R44, and R44 II Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration, DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes 

an existing airworthiness directive (AD) 

for the specified Robinson model 

helicopters that currently requires a 

visual inspection for skin separation 

along the leading edge of blade skin aft 

of the skin-to-spar bond line on the 

lower surface of each main rotor blade 

(blade) and in the tip cap area. The 

existing AD also requires a ‘‘tap test’’ for 

detecting a separation or void in both 

bonded areas and repainting any 

exposed area of the blades. If any 

separation or void is detected, the AD 

requires, before further flight, replacing 

the blade. Thereafter, before each flight, 

the existing AD also requires checking 

for any exposed (bare) metal along the 

skin-to-spar bond line on the lower 

surface of each blade near the tip. If any 

bare metal is found, that AD requires an 

inspection by a qualified mechanic. 

This amendment contains the same 

requirements but expands the 

applicability to include all serialnumbered model helicopters and limits 

the applicability to specific blade part 

numbers. This amendment also requires 

a repetitive inspection of the blade and 

any necessary rework. This amendment 

is prompted by a fatal accident in Israel. 

We have also included responses to 

comments objecting to the recording 

requirements in the current AD relating 

to the pilot checks before each flight and 

to comments that the burden of the 

before-each-flight pilot check exceeds 

the benefit. We have concluded that a 

check before the first flight of each day 

is sufficient for aviation safety. The 

actions specified by this AD are 

intended to provide more specific AD 

actions, to relieve the burdens 

associated with the before-each-flight 

check by changing it to a daily check, 

to detect blade skin debond, and to 

prevent blade failure and subsequent 

loss of control of the helicopter. 

DATES: Effective July 5, 2011. 

The incorporation by reference of 

certain publications listed in the 

regulations is approved by the Director 

of the Federal Register as of July 5, 2011. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by August 16, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to comment on this AD. 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

You may get the service information 

identified in this AD from Robinson 

Helicopter Company, 2901 Airport 

Drive, Torrance, CA 90505, telephone 

(310) 539–0508, fax (310) 539–5198, or 

at http://www.robinsonheli.com/ 

servelib.htm. 

Examining the Docket: You may 

examine the docket that contains the 

AD, any comments, and other 

information on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov, or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The Docket 

Operations office (telephone (800) 647– 

5527) is located in Room W12–140 on 

the ground floor of the West Building at 

the street address stated in the 

ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 

available in the AD docket shortly after 

receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric 

D. Schrieber, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

telephone (562) 627–5348, fax (562) 

627–5210 (regarding Model R22 

helicopters), or Fred Guerin, Aviation 

Safety Engineer, telephone (562) 627– 

5232, fax (562) 627–5210 (regarding 

Model R44 helicopters). 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On 

December 17, 2007, we issued AD 2007– 

26–12, Amendment 39–15314 (73 FR 

397, January 3, 2008). That AD requires 

a one-time visual inspection for skin 

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