2020 IL App (4th) 190305-U 

NO. 4-19-0305 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

 

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

HENRY ERIC McNEIL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JOHN BALDWIN, in His Official Capacity as the Acting 

Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections; and 

CRAIG FINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Chairman 

of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board,

Defendants-Appellees. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Sangamon County 

No. 18MR798 

Honorable 

Rudolph M. Braud Jr., 

Judge Presiding. 

 

 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court held plaintiff’s request for mandamus relief is moot. Plaintiff 

completed his term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) and the Illinois

Department of Corrections (DOC) discharged him from its custody. 

¶ 2 Plaintiff, Henry Eric McNeil, appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his petition 

seeking mandamus relief against defendants, John Baldwin, in his official capacity as the Acting 

Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections and Craig Findley, in his official capacity as 

Chairman of the Prisoner Review Board (Board). For the following reasons, we dismiss 

plaintiff’s appeal as moot. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On November 6, 2015, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one year

imprisonment and four years’ MSR for domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2014)).

FILED

June 15, 2020 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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On January 15, 2016, plaintiff completed his term of imprisonment and began serving his MSR 

term. 

¶ 5 On October 1, 2016, DOC issued a parole violation report, stating plaintiff 

received positive drug screens on February 2, 2016, and June 18, 2016, and “fled the day 

reporting center after testing positive for THC and PCP” on August 31, 2016. Plaintiff’s 

whereabouts remained unknown until he was arrested in Arizona on October 21, 2016. 

¶ 6 In January, March, and June 2017, the Board entered a series of orders and found 

plaintiff in violation of certain conditions of his MSR on February 2, 2016, and August 31, 2016. 

The Board ultimately continued plaintiff’s MSR. Plaintiff received day-for-day good-conduct 

credit while serving his MSR term in confinement and completed his MSR term at Lawrence 

Correctional Center because he did not have an approved host site. On October 13, 2018, DOC 

discharged plaintiff from its custody. 

¶ 7 On October 15, 2018, plaintiff, pro se, filed a petition seeking mandamus relief, 

alleging defendants improperly denied him additional earned good-conduct credit for time spent 

on MSR and electronic home monitoring. Plaintiff argued defendants incorrectly calculated his 

remaining sentence based on the February 2016 violation date—stating that violation led only to 

a “verbal warning”—instead of the August 2016 violation date. “As a result of defendants and 

their agents[’] actions,” by refusing to apply the additional sentencing credit, plaintiff asserted he 

would suffer “irreparable damages and be subjected to spending 0 to 41⁄4 months extra time 

incarcerated.” 

¶ 8 On February 1, 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition

pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)) and a 

memorandum in support of the motion. Defendants argued the petition was moot and should be 
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dismissed as plaintiff had been discharged and “there is no sentence remaining to which 

additional credits can be applied.” 

¶ 9 On February 21, 2019, the trial court entered a written order granting defendants’ 

motion to dismiss stating, “The claim is moot pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-619, as Plaintiff has 

been fully discharged from the custody of [DOC].”

¶ 10 On March 15, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s 

dismissal of his mandamus petition, which the court denied. 

¶ 11 This appeal followed. 

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, plaintiff claims the trial court erred in dismissing his mandamus 

petition in which he requested 259 days of additional sentencing credit. In his mandamus 

petition, plaintiff claimed he was entitled to having his projected discharge date changed from 

October 13, 2018, to June 4, 2018. Defendants argue this appeal is moot because both dates have 

long since passed and plaintiff has failed to argue any exception to the mootness doctrine applies. 

According to defendants, plaintiff’s appeal should be dismissed because “it is undisputed that 

[plaintiff] completed his entire sentence.” 

¶ 14 Appellate jurisdiction requires an actual controversy. Reviewing courts will 

generally not hear abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions. In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148, 

156, 802 N.E.2d 782, 787 (2003). “A case is moot if the issues involved in the trial court have 

ceased to exist because intervening events have made it impossible for the reviewing court to 

grant effectual relief to the complaining party.” People v. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430, 435, 819 

N.E.2d 761, 764 (2004). Thus, a claim for additional sentence credit is moot when a defendant 

has completed serving his sentence. Id.
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¶ 15 A reviewing court may examine an otherwise moot issue when “ ‘the magnitude 

or immediacy of the interests involved warrant[s] action by the court.’ ” People v. Jackson, 231 

Ill. 2d 223, 227-28, 897 N.E.2d 752, 755 (2008) (quoting People ex rel. Black v. Dukes, 96 Ill. 2d 

273, 277, 449 N.E.2d 856, 858 (1983)). The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine 

requires (1) the existence of a question of public importance, (2) the desirability of an 

authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers in the performance of their 

duties, and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur. Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d at 156. This 

exception is construed narrowly and requires a clear showing of each element before it may be 

applied. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d at 436. 

¶ 16 Here, there is no question plaintiff completed his term of imprisonment on 

January 15, 2016, and completed MSR on October 13, 2018. Thus, it is impossible to provide 

plaintiff his requested relief as he has completed serving his entire sentence. As stated, plaintiff 

fails to argue any exception to the mootness doctrine applies, and given the law as set forth 

above, no public interest is served by addressing the merits of the petition. Because no effectual 

relief can be granted, we conclude this appeal is moot. 

¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we dismiss this appeal as moot. 

¶ 19 Dismissed.