DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

EDGAR ZUNIGA-MEJIA,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D2023-1001

June 21, 2024

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for

Hillsborough County; Michelle D. Sisco, Judge.

Edgar Zuniga-Mejia, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David Campbell, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

SMITH, Judge.

Edgar Zuniga-Mejia appeals the order summarily dismissing his 

motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 with 

prejudice for failure to comply with an order of the postconviction court. 

Because the dismissal was not authorized by rule 3.850, we reverse and 

remand for further proceedings.
2

In 2005, a jury found Mr. Zuniga-Mejia guilty of two drug offenses

and the trial court sentenced him to prison. Since this court per curiam 

affirmed his convictions and sentences, see ZunigaMejia v. State, 929 So. 

2d 1068 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (table decision),

1 Mr. Zuniga-Mejia has filed 

several unsuccessful postconviction motions. In response to the rule 

3.850 motion he filed in December 2022, the postconviction court on 

January 24, 2023, issued its Order for Defendant to Acknowledge 

Warnings and Order for Defendant to Respond. The January 24 order 

warned Mr. Zuniga-Mejia of the ramifications of filing for postconviction 

relief under rule 3.850 and ordered him to acknowledge the 

postconviction court's warnings. Specifically, the postconviction court 

ordered him to acknowledge that the State was not obligated to renew or 

extend any previous plea offers if his motion was successful, that there 

was a possibility that he would receive a harsher sentence if his 

conviction was set aside, that he had no legal right to gain time while in 

county jail, and that the postconviction court could impose sanctions for 

prohibited conduct under rule 3.850(n)(3). The January 24 order gave 

Mr. Zuniga-Mejia thirty days to acknowledge these warnings and provide 

written verification that he still wished to proceed with his postconviction 

motion, failing which his motion would be dismissed with prejudice.

Mr. Zuniga-Mejia did not respond to the January 24 order, and on 

April 10, 2023, the postconviction court summarily dismissed his motion

with prejudice, stating as the sole basis for the dismissal: "Over (60) days 

has passed and Defendant failed to comply with the Court's [January 24]

order."

In this appeal, Mr. Zuniga-Mejia argues that the postconviction 

1 Mr. Zuniga-Mejia's name was listed without the hyphen in his 

direct appeal. 
3

court had no authority to issue the January 24 order and, thus, no

authority to dismiss his motion. The State responds that Mr. 

Zuniga-Mejia's motion was successive and that the postconviction court 

was authorized under rule 3.850(n)(3) to dismiss it as an abuse of 

process and for failure to comply with the rules. We find no merit in the 

State's argument because the postconviction court did not dismiss Mr. 

Zuniga-Mejia's motion as successive, but instead expressly dismissed the 

motion for failure to comply with the January 24 order. 

Rule 3.850(f) provides explicit direction to postconviction courts 

about how to dispose of a motion filed thereunder, mandating that 

"[d]isposition of the motion shall be in accordance with the following 

procedures, which are intended to result in a single, final, appealable 

order that disposes of all claims raised in the motion." (Emphasis 

added.) Mr. Zuniga-Mejia's failure to file a written verification not 

prescribed by the rule simply does not fall within the available 

dispositions—including the expressly provided for grounds for dismissal. 

See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f), (h), (m), (n). 

We are mindful of the postconviction court's intent to warn Mr. 

Zuniga-Mejia of the potential unintended consequences that attend the 

filing of a postconviction motion. And while nothing prohibits a 

postconviction court from advising a movant of the ramifications of a 

successful postconviction motion or warning a movant of the 

postconviction court's authority to impose sanctions under rule 

3.850(n)(3), the rule simply does not allow for dismissal, let alone 

dismissal with prejudice, should a movant not expressly acknowledge 

that there may be adverse consequences to prevailing on his motion.2 

2 We acknowledge that rule 3.850(n) does allow for sanctions, 

including dismissal with prejudice, if the defendant engages in prohibited 
4

We note that there is no additional requirement under rule 3.850(n) that 

a defendant verify or otherwise certify anything other than the initial

motion itself. See Fla. Crim. R. P. Rule 3.850(n) ("Certification of 

Defendant; Sanctions. No motion may be filed pursuant to this rule 

unless it is filed in good faith and with a reasonable belief that it is 

timely, has potential merit, and does not duplicate previous motions that 

have been disposed of by the court.").

Accordingly, because the dismissal with prejudice of Mr. 

Zuniga-Mejia's postconviction motion was unauthorized, we reverse and 

remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

MORRIS and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.

conduct under the rule, which explicitly includes "the abuse of the legal 

process or procedures governed by this rule." We further acknowledge 

that the failure to respond to an order of the postconviction court could 

qualify as "abuse of the legal process or procedures governed by [the]

rule." However, the rule expressly provides that before imposing any 

sanction,

[t]he court shall issue an order setting forth the facts 

indicating that the defendant has or may have engaged in 

prohibited conduct. The order shall direct the defendant to 

show cause, within a reasonable time limit set by the court, 

why the court should not find that the defendant has engaged 

in prohibited conduct under this rule and impose an 

appropriate sanction. Following the issuance of the order to 

show cause and the filing of any response by the defendant, 

and after such further hearing as the court may deem 

appropriate, the court shall make a final determination of 

whether the defendant engaged in prohibited conduct under 

this subdivision. 

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(n). 

Here, there is no question the postconviction court did not comply 

with the requirements of rule 3.850(n) prior to dismissing Mr. 

Zuniga-Mejia's motion with prejudice. 
5

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.