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i 

45–135 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–162] 

THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL’S 

PROGRESS REPORT ON IRAQ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 23, 2008 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, July 23, 2008, The Comptroller General’s Progress Report on 

Iraq ........................................................................................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, July 23, 2008 ....................................................................................... 35 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 2008 

THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL’S PROGRESS REPORT ON IRAQ 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Dodaro, Gene L., Acting Comptroller General of the United States, Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Joseph Christoff, Director, 

International Affairs and Trade, Government Accountability Office .............. 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Dodaro, Gene L. ................................................................................................ 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

GAO Report Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, Progress Report: 

Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed ............................................ 63 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Dr. Gingrey ....................................................................................................... 165 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 161 

Mr. Murphy ....................................................................................................... 167 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 163 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 21 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL’S PROGRESS REPORT 

ON IRAQ 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 23, 2008. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the 

committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Today the Armed Services Committee meets to 

hear from Mr. Gene Dodaro, the Acting Comptroller General of the 

United States. He is going to speak to us about the work recently 

conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the 

GAO assessing progress in Iraq calling for new strategy to govern 

our efforts there. 

Mr. Dodaro is accompanied by Joseph Christoff, who I understand is present to answer questions but will not make an opening 

statement. 

Before I begin, I want to make an administrative announcement. 

The hearing will be followed by a classified briefing on work regarding the joint campaign plan that was conducted by the GAO. 

And that briefing will happen in 2212 Rayburn. And the best guess 

is that it will start around 12:30. It will be at the secret level, so 

9(c) staff are welcome to attend. 

Let me mention this, the GAO has done some excellent work for 

this committee, and I mentioned this to you Mr. Dodaro a few minutes ago. He has done some excellent work for our committee, as 

well as Congress as a whole, on the subject of Iraq over the years. 

And all of us want to thank you for those excellent efforts. 

The most recent report of Iraq continues the tradition of raising 

important questions that Congress as well as the Administration 

should be considering seriously. The recent GAO report comes to a 

simple conclusion that we need to develop a new strategy in Iraq. 

The report makes the case by noting that the New Way Forward 

strategy announced by the President in January 2007 is coming to 

an end with the departure from Iraq of the surge brigades and that 

we should be working on what is next. I posed the what-is-next 

question to General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker when they 

were before this committee back in April. The answer was unclear. 

The next question we should consider, and I hope Mr. Dodaro 

will weigh in on is if we should be undertaking a new strategy in 

Iraq right now. And many, along with I, have long been in favor 
2 

of changing our approach in Iraq. For the good of Iraq and the 

health of our military, we should be finding ways to take advantage of the Iraqi desire to have real sovereignty and hand over 

more responsibility for their security. This, of course, would provide 

a clear path toward redeployment of American combat troops from 

that country. This is what the Iraqis clearly want, and it is what 

the American people clearly want. Any new strategy in Iraq should 

take into account the Iraqi desire for more sovereignty as well as 

the health of the United States’ military. 

We have talked about the readiness and the challenges of readiness in this committee so many times, as well as the competing demands in Afghanistan. It is worth asking, however, if it is the right 

moment for a full interagency effort to write a new strategy document. Iraq is undergoing a political transition. General Petraeus is 

conducting his analysis and evaluation of following the redeployment of the surge brigades. And America and Iraq are also deeply 

involved in negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 

which we will be hearing more about that in this committee very, 

very soon. Iraqi leaders have endorsed goals for the redeployment 

of American troops. I think that is a positive step. 

Ideally the Administration would have conducted a full interagency effort to develop a new strategy well in advance of the end 

of the New Way Forward. Unfortunately, they did not, and we are 

left trying to muddle through the current challenges. But we have 

to answer if pushing for a new strategic document that may well 

be obsolete by the time it is done makes sense, or if we are better 

off waiting for a short period of time. I hope this hearing will help 

clear up that issue. 

I thank Mr. Dodaro and Mr. Christoff again for being with us 

today. 

And I yield now to the gentleman from California, Mr. Duncan 

Hunter. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks for holding this hearing. I want to join you in welcoming our guests. 

And I understand that the GAO undertook this effort on its own 

initiative. And I appreciate the willingness of GAO officials to take 

a hard look at the U.S. Government’s approach to stemming the violence in Iraq and helping the government foster conditions for national reconciliation. 

In January 2007, President Bush outlined to the American people a new strategy for Iraq and called it the New Way Forward. 

Many of us liked this New Way Forward because it rested on the 

three essential pillars: political, military and reconstruction efforts 

to achieve a balanced approach to addressing the conditions in 

Iraq. 

Facts on the field and anecdotes from commanders and civilians 

in the field support recent reports that this strategy has achieved 

remarkable results. For example, by May 2008, overall violence in 

Iraq dropped to its lowest level in 4 years. Despite increases in 
3 

weekly security incidents during March and April, due in large 

part to Iraqi-led operations to Basra, Sadr City and elsewhere, 

overall violence decreased to levels that were last seen consistently 

in April 2004. 

In June 2007, the average number of attacks throughout Iraq 

was over 1,200 per week. In June 2008, that number was 200 per 

week or about an 80 percent reduction in the last year. 

Incidents involving IED’s, improvised explosive devices, have decreased over 70 percent in the last year. From January through 

June 2008, coalition forces found 85 percent more caches than during the same time frame in 2007. Oil revenues have expanded sufficiently, some of which are being used to support development and 

reconciliation programs. Oil production is likely to increase by 10 

percent in 2008. The Iraqi economy is expected to grow by 7 percent in 2008. And lower inflation has boosted Iraqi purchasing 

power and provided a more stable environment for private sector 

development. 

Of the 18 benchmarks identified by the White House and endorsed by the Congress as measures of progress, we have received 

assessments that Iraq’s efforts on 15 of these metrics are satisfactory. Only two, enacting and implementing laws to disarm militias 

and distribute oil revenues, are unsatisfactory. And those of us who 

sit here know full well how difficult it can be to pass contentious 

legislation. 

Clearly, the New Way Forward has helped to change conditions 

in Iraq for the better. The U.S. military surge met with success and 

the efforts by our civilian personnel in Iraq had begun to bear fruit 

in the political and economic arenas. We are on the right path. 

That said, I am sure that both General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker have implemented the necessary tactical and operational course corrections along the way, for example, supporting 

the Sons of Iraq movement, which could not have been foreseen 

when the President unveiled the New Way Forward last year. As 

any good strategy would, it provided an overarching framework 

and enough flexibility to allow for the necessary modifications 

based on changing conditions on the ground. I believe that the 

smart people who are implementing U.S. strategies and policies in 

Iraq could continue to adjust their efforts in support of this strategy as necessary. 

So I wonder, gentlemen, in light of the fact that this strategy has 

worked to date and has provided a good solid framework for people 

in the field to deal with unforeseen changes and that we have had 

this very substantial reduction in violence, 80 percent reduction, 

why does GAO recommend to the United States during the last 6 

months of an Administration that they develop and implement a 

new strategy? Why is it necessary? What greater insight could the 

commanders and civilians on the ground expect to gain from a new 

strategy that they are not getting currently? And finally, I note 

that earlier this year Chairman Skelton and I co-signed a letter to 

GAO asking you to look into U.S. efforts to encourage Iraqi 

progress on the 18 benchmarks. Although your report discusses 

Iraqi progress, it does not outline or analyze the whole of U.S. efforts, aside from mentioning U.S. financial contributions, as we had 

asked. 
4 

And I hope you can provide comments on the efforts of those 

brave Americans who are making such a difference in Iraq. For example, I would like to hear your perspective on the efforts made 

by provincial reconstruction teams, transition teams, diplomats, 

and others to encourage Iraqi progress. So, again, thank you for 

being here. 

I join the Chairman in welcoming our guests. 

And I look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Dodaro, thank you, again, for your work in the GAO, and we 

welcome you, and you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF GENE L. DODARO, ACTING COMPTROLLER 

GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH 

CHRISTOFF, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND 

TRADE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. DODARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning to you, as well as the other members of the committee. We appreciate the opportunity to discuss today GAO’s latest report on progress in Iraq and stabilizing and rebuilding the 

situation. 

In summary, our report notes that some gains have been made 

in implementing the key goals for the New Way Forward. Many 

challenges remain, and an updated strategy is needed. 

On the progress front, violence as measured by enemy-initiated 

attacks is down about 80 percent from June 2007 to June 2008. It 

has gone from about 180 average daily attacks down to 30 in June 

2008, just last month. Additionally, the number of forces, trained 

Iraqi security forces (ISF), has increased substantially from 

323,000 in January 2007 to a figure now approaching 500,000 

trained troops. 

Additionally, some legislation has been passed to return 

Baathists to government service, granting amnesty to detained 

Iraqis and also defining provincial powers. 

Now, much remains yet to be done. Eight of 18 provinces still 

need to be given the lead for security. Ten have been transferred 

so far. More effort needs to be given to training the Iraqi security 

forces so they could operate more independently without as much 

coalition and U.S. support. 

Additional legislative issues need to be attended to. Legislation 

establishing the legal framework for distributing oil revenues, for 

example, needs to be passed, as well as legislation for disarming 

the militias and for holding the provincial elections. While progress 

has been made in many of the sectors in oil and electricity and 

water, for example, much more work needs to be attended to there 

as well. For example, energy production this month in mid-July 

only met about 54 percent of the demand in the country. Additionally, the ministerial capacities of Iraqi’s government structure need 

to continue to be strengthened to enhance their ability to execute 

on capital investment plans that they have forward and make 

those investments come to a reality going forward. 
5 

Now, looking ahead, we think an updated strategy is called for, 

for several reasons. One, many things have changed in Iraq since 

January 2007. We also think there are some limitations in the current plans of the agencies that need attending to. Also, the U.S. is 

negotiating a new agreement in light of the U.N. Mandate expiring 

at the end of this year. And I would point out that that expiration 

of that mandate will occur before a change in our Administration 

going forward. So I think it is important that we have an updated 

strategy that reflects whatever agreement is reached between now 

and then to replace for the U.N. Mandate going forward and also 

continue to address some of our open recommendations for building 

the capacity of the ministries to take on the full range of government services going forward. 

Now, while U.S. strategies have changed over this experience 

that we have had in Iraq, the one thing that has remained constant 

is the dedication and the commitment of U.S. personnel, both military and civilian. And I would want to close my opening remarks 

by just recognizing the extraordinary efforts put forth by our military and civilian personnel there and the many sacrifices that they 

have made. 

And with that, Joe and I would be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dodaro can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

You point out the necessity for a new strategy, and it raises two 

questions: Number one, would now be the time, or should we wait 

for a new administration? And second, what were the elements of 

a new strategy or what should the elements of a new strategy be? 

Would you answer both those questions for us? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

First, we think an updated strategy is essential for a number of 

reasons. One, I mentioned the expiring—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No, first answer my first question. Now or for a 

new administration? 

Mr. DODARO. I am a big believer in stewardship, Mr. Chairman, 

and I think we are committing a lot of resources. I think you need 

one now. And I believe we are committing a lot of resources. We 

have a lot of troops deployed. We need to continue to build upon 

the progress that has been made, as well as address unmet goals 

going forward. And I am a big believer in the fact that we need to 

have continuity in government. And it would be important, from a 

stewardship standpoint, to have the best thinking of the current 

Administration to inform the next administration going forward 

and to assist as possible in the transition. So I think it is essential 

that the update be done now. 

The CHAIRMAN. That answers the first question. 

The second question is, what elements should be involved in the 

new strategy? 

Mr. DODARO. There needs to be an update in terms of the goals 

that are expected to be achieved in terms of performance measures, 

the expected costs that are going to be incurred during this period 

of time, how we are going to measure progress in some of these 

other areas. So a lot of the unmet goals need to be addressed going 
6 

forward. Also, I think that the legislative benchmarks that have 

been set are important for people to follow to make sure that the 

additional steps that are needed for political reconciliation there 

are accomplished during this period of time. 

And I would ask Joe to add if he has any other specifics. But I 

also note that the supplemental that just recently passed has a 

number of details in it in terms of Congress asking for particular 

reports from the Administration. Many of those detailed specifics 

in there is what we would like to see in an updated strategy as 

well. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I think, Mr. Chairman, the updated strategy 

should also take into consideration the continuing progress in the 

security area. We always track the number of enemy-initiated attacks. Mr. Hunter is correct in noting the 80 percent reduction 

since June of 2007. That is an important measure to continue to 

track. The continued training and equipping of Iraqi security forces 

and, more importantly, the numbers that are reaching the highest 

readiness level. Operational readiness level, one, is an important 

measure to track. And then, finally, on the economic fronts. Iraq 

has continuously promised to spend billions of dollars of its own oil 

revenues to reconstruct its country. And we found that over the 

past 3 years, they have spent about 24 percent of what they budgeted. And I think that is a continuing and important measure to 

track as well and to include in an updated strategy. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I agree with you that we want to continue to upgrade 

the Iraqi military forces, the 131 battalions or so for example that 

comprise the Iraqi army, but we are doing that. And we are doing 

that under the leadership of some very capable individuals who 

have seen all the problems and all the mistakes that can be made 

over the last many years in terms of how you train and equip a 

military that is comprised of the personnel who make up that Iraqi 

force. They have seen all the problems, all the hiccups, all the 

bumps, and they have managed to turn out from scratch an Iraqi 

military that is taking hold, that has undertaken initiatives of its 

own, some without American concurrence or support, and carried 

them out fairly effectively. 

So my point is, we have a fairly successful operation now with 

respect to training and equipping the Iraqi military. And no one 

would suggest that we seize that operation. So it is a little unclear 

as to exactly what new elements in this area you would recommend. Do you have any specific elements that you think we are 

not undertaking with respect to the training and equipping of Iraqi 

forces that we should now be embarked upon? 

Mr. DODARO. There are a couple of issues here, a couple of specifics I would offer, Congressman Hunter. One is, there has been 

progress in bringing along the number of trained troops. But one 

thing that hasn’t changed over the past year is that the highest 

operational readiness assessment level one, which is operating 

independently, that percentage hasn’t changed. It has been about 

10 percent over that period of time. 
7 

So one area that we think should be addressed is, what will be 

done to try to move that percentage to a higher percentage to build 

that capacity? The other remaining issue has to do with the Sons 

of Iraq, as you mentioned, and the efforts to try to integrate them 

into the forces. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. But let me just pursue that. To operate independently means that you need some of the what we call enablers 

like Medical Evacuation (MediVac) capability, aerial MediVac capability, fire support, including aerial fire support and artillery fire 

support. If you take other nations in this part of the world, a number of them that have been, are long-established countries don’t 

have what you would call the ability to operate with the same capability that we have inserted in that metric; i.e., a lot of them 

don’t have robust aerial MediVac capability, never have, and probably never will. Nonetheless that doesn’t mean that they don’t have 

an effective military. But my question is, you say we want the Iraqi 

army to be all that it can be. We all agree, and our trainers all 

agree. But what new actions would you recommend for the United 

States to take to improve the army to a degree that is greater than 

what is already taking place, in other words to make the training 

more efficient or to get the army stand up quicker? Because nobody 

disagrees we want to stand up the military. But in fact, that is part 

of the President’s plan and has always been: standing up the military, standing up the country economically, and ensuring that they 

are able to undertake these legislative initiatives, which, as we 

have noted, are very contentious in some cases. And they have undertaken legislative initiatives. But like other bodies, legislative 

bodies we don’t have to mention right now, sometimes contentious 

issues don’t get passed, right, and especially in the middle of a political season. So the question is, what do we—we all agree that we 

want to make the army as effective as possible as quickly as possible. But what things do you think that our military trainers 

aren’t doing right now that they could be doing to achieve that? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, it is not a question of us recommending specific actions. What we are talking about in this particular area, for 

example, is that there are some key reasons why the Iraqi armed 

services aren’t able to operate more independently. One is a unified 

command and control structure. Another is having enough leaders 

to lead the brigades. And what we would offer, and one of the 

things that we are suggesting is, what strategies specifically are 

going to be pursued in order to achieve that and to get to a higher 

operational readiness assessment level? 

So those are the things we are talking about, Congressman. I 

would ask Joe to elaborate if he wants to on that particular point. 

But we are not attempting in our recommendation to give specific 

direction to our military leaders. We think they need and have 

done a good job in this area, but they need to have an update so 

that people can track the progress as to what is expected to be 

achieved over a reasonable period of time. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. But let us go to the military leaders. We 

have been told by our leaders, our military leaders who are in 

charge of training, that one of the inadequacies has always been 

having enough field grade officers and officers and leaders at the 

higher level, along with having the need to establish a good non-
8 

commissioned officer (NCO) corps, right? And they have laid that 

out and said, this is where we have some inadequacies with the 

Iraqi army, we need to press harder and try to develop that officer 

corps and that NCO corps. Having said that, they are doing that. 

And so the real question is, whether we don’t all agree with it, it 

is good to have, when you have got a division, it is nice to have 

a good division commander. And when you have got a brigade, it 

is good to have a good brigade commander. And we didn’t restart 

Saddam Hussein’s army, which had as I recall 11,000 Sunni generals in it, which I think right now would have created a massive 

mess if we had done what a lot of the armchair experts recommended, which was to take that army and maintain it. That 

would have been a disaster, when you had a body that is supposed 

to establish and maintain stability with 11,000 Sunni generals who 

have made their living beating up on Shiites to somehow now be 

a force for stability in a predominantly Shiite nation. 

So I think, although it took a lot of blood, sweat, and tears, I 

think building that army from scratch was the right thing to do. 

And Secretary Rumsfeld, in that case, did the right thing. And the 

armchair experts were wrong on that one. 

But having said that, we are building that officer corps and we 

are building that NCO corps, and we need to do more than simply 

say, you know, we need more good officers, we need more good 

NCOs. We know that. And we have programs and schools through 

which we are developing those folks. And a lot of them incidentally 

are being developed by operations. When you go into an operation 

and you have a captain or a major or a colonel who stands out, who 

leads his men, then that person needs to be promoted based on 

merit. And that is a difficult thing to do, as you may know, with 

regard to the culture. Sometimes these promotions are political. 

And so we are trying to develop a military where promotions are 

based on merit. But I think we are doing that. 

And I didn’t see in this report solid, substantial recommendations as to how you do that better than the way we are doing it 

right now. I guess that is my question. What changes would you 

recommend to our military leadership that will produce more field 

grade officers and more good NCOs in a shorter period of time? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Mr. Hunter, I would talk about the need to plan 

for this enormous increase in the capacity of the Iraqi security 

forces that both the Iraqi Government and the U.S. anticipates 

over the next 18 months. Right now, we are at about 495,000 Iraqi 

security forces that we have trained. The goals of the Iraqi Government is to try to get up to 646,000 over the next 18 months. Couple 

that with both our concerns and the Iraqi’s concerns about having 

the training capacity to accommodate those 646,000 over the next 

18 months and the lack of military academies within Iraq. They 

are certainly growing, and we are helping in that growth. But I 

think there is a concern about that capacity. You then couple it 

with the desire to begin over a longer term to integrate the 105,000 

Sons of Iraq either into the Iraqi security forces or to civilian employment. And then you have the question of these emerging Sons 

of Basra groups that you have in southern Iraq, that you have in 

Sadr City, and how and to what numbers are they going to in-
9 

crease to? How will they be integrated? Who will pay for them is 

still a remaining question as well. 

Mr. HUNTER. So you would recommend, one hard recommendation would be to increase the number of academies turning out officers and NCOs. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. And that is currently what is a goal at least both 

on the part of the U.S. and the Iraqis. It is in the most recent 9010 

report as well, the recognition that it needs to be done. 

Mr. HUNTER. So you are saying that we are in the process of increasing the number of academies. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. We recognize it as a problem, and that was in 

the June 9010 report. 

Mr. HUNTER. That is kind of my point here. Our guys, I think 

General Petraeus understands the need to have more good officers 

and more good enlisted guys. And I think, as a guy who initially 

was charged with and was in charge of the training of Iraqi soldiers, or at least been through the entire gamut starting from 

scratch, what would you have him do that you think he is not 

doing now in terms of expanding academies? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I think it is focusing on trying to develop and anticipate how you are going to accommodate roughly an additional 

150,000 Iraqi security forces (ISF) that have to be trained? How 

are you going to integrate 105,000 Sons of Iraq? How are you going 

to integrate emerging Sons of Basra, as well, if that is a decision 

that needs to be made? 

Mr. HUNTER. Do you know that they are not doing that? Because 

obviously they are sitting there with the current status of forces 

and with the projections of increased accessions into the armed 

services. And they understand that, that they are going to have 

more folks coming in. And they have been doing that since we 

stood up the force as a very small force with just one or two battalions who were really capable of maneuver. So we have gone a long 

way. But do you know that they are not in fact doing that, that 

is preparing for this, the continued expansion? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. One of the challenges that even the Department 

of Defense (DOD) states in its 9010 report is that there is not a 

cohesive plan to try to take into consideration merging the Sons of 

Iraq and future Sons of Basra into the Iraqi security forces. And 

that kind of cohesive and integrated plan still needs to be developed. 

Mr. HUNTER. But how about the expansion up to this 600-some 

thousand? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. One of the interesting challenges that I have 

talked to military officials about is the oftentimes unexpected increases in the number of authorized levels that the Iraqis desire on 

the part of the number of security forces. So, yes, they are aware 

of the 646,000 goal that they want to achieve, but they are also 

aware of how the Iraqi Government oftentimes increases what 

their authorized levels are, and then they have to adjust and plan 

for that. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. 

Well, thank you, and thanks for your testimony. What I would 

like to see is if you have got some hard recommendations, for example, more academies than they have now; having to some way 
10 

get a faster throughput of NCOs; hard recommendations that you 

think would advance the goals. But it looks to me like the goals 

are pretty well-stated in terms of standing up the Iraqi forces, getting them into the fight. They have actually gotten into the fight 

in places where they didn’t consult us about getting into the fight. 

And that to me is a good indicia of a government that is becoming 

more capable and more autonomous. And that military is standing 

and fighting now where in years past they did not stand and fight. 

And so I am still kind of having a difficult time understanding 

what you think General Petraeus and the commanders in the theater aren’t doing in terms of standing up the Iraqi army that they 

could be doing because they all agree with the goal of having a bigger stronger military with more officers and more NCOs. 

Mr. DODARO. Congressman, we would be happy to provide for the 

open record some of our suggestions. And also, this is an area we 

would like to discuss additionally with you in a closed session. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. 

Do you folks have military expertise in GAO? Do you have, for 

example, a counterpart to General Petraeus or some folks in his 

chain of command who are working the training piece? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, we wouldn’t profess to have that caliber of expertise in GAO, but we have a number of people who have experience. And we have a lot of people who understand how to evaluate 

the plans and activities both, in the military and the civilian side. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Because we want to bring them in and say— 

I suspect we would bring them in and say, you guys need more 

NCOs and more officers, and they are going to say we kind of know 

that, and we have been doing it for years, and this is how we do 

it. 

Mr. DODARO. Our only point in all of this is that, and we can talk 

a little bit, it would be better to talk about this in the next session. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 161.] 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. 

Gentlemen, I guess I have become a reluctant supporter of the 

Sons of Iraq policy. I have got to admit being taken back and asking General Petraeus outright, are we bribing these guys not to 

shoot at us? If my memory is right, his answer was, yeah, would 

you rather my kids coming home in body bags, and I said, no. So 

help me with a couple of things. A typical Son of Iraq I am told 

is paid about $300 a month. Is that correct? 

Mr. DODARO. That is correct. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am curious, does that money flow directly from the 

government, or does it normally flow through a tribal sheik? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. My understanding is that there are contracts 

that we have with the tribal sheiks who are then responsible for 

paying the individual members of the Sons of Iraq. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Given just a kind of human tendency for the loyalty 

to follow the money, is anyone actually tracking then where is the 

loyalty? Is it to the Iraqi Government? Is it to that sheik? And I 

guess a fair follow-up is, I am presuming that that money is still 

American money that is paying the sheiks. Has there been any 

plan articulated—and I really think one sign of success will be 
11 

when that Iraqi money starts paying the sheiks not to shoot at us 

and the Iraqi army. Is there a timeline to do that? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. In terms of the Sons of Iraq, those are predominantly Sunnis in Anbar Province. A majority of the money that is 

going to pay for them would be coming out of the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program (CERP). When we go to the closed 

session, I think we can talk about the Sons of Basra and try to get 

at the latter question of who is or is not paying for them. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And I don’t think you are being evasive, but I just 

don’t think you answered my question. My question is, I would 

think one of the mileposts for success would be when the Iraqi Government starts paying the sheiks instead of our Government paying the sheiks. Has there been a proposed timeline to do that? Has 

that discussion even come up? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I am not familiar with a timeline. But there is 

the long-term goal of transitioning these Sons of Iraq—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. A long-term goal is wonderful. It is like me saying 

I will get back to 165 pounds. I am not getting there. 

Mr. DODARO. My understanding from our staff is that we will be 

able to provide you an answer to that in the next session. 

Mr. TAYLOR. A lot of things—some great questions were asked by 

former Chairman Mr. Hunter, but almost everything he talked 

about comes back to money and the need to fund those schools, the 

need to fund those troops, to pay for those officers. I am curious, 

if you have, to what extent you have tracked Iraqi oil revenue and 

how much of the funds—you apparently have tracked how much oil 

is leaving the country. I am curious if you are tracking how much 

money is flowing back to the central government. 

Mr. DODARO. We have an effort right now to outline the increased revenues associated with the oil production. I will ask Joe 

to give a little bit more about the specifics. But we hope to have 

a report out later this month, Congressman, that will illuminate a 

lot of those issues. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I am curious, though, is 80 percent of the 

money making it back to the central government? Is 90 percent of 

the funds that should be making it back? 

Mr. DODARO. We are still doing some of that work so it is a little 

premature for us to be able to answer the questions now. But rest 

assured that we are looking at that issue, and we are going to provide a report. 

Mr. TAYLOR. With all due respect, sir, I think that is the issue. 

I think that as far as paying the sheiks, as far as rebuilding the 

infrastructure, building the schools, the electricity, all the things 

that we know are making an average Iraqi angry at us—the lack 

of electricity, the lack of water, the lack of sewer, the lack of stability—all those things get fixed at a cost. Iraq has the ability, as 

several of the Administration witnesses told us prior to the war, to 

pay for this themselves. They obviously are not. So the key question is, to what extent are we tracking those revenues to see to it 

that they are properly flowing back to the government that they 

should flow back to. 

Mr. DODARO. Let me ask Joe to explain what we are currently 

doing. 
12 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. We are completing work that we are doing on 

our own authority, but that Senator Levin asked us to specifically 

look at, in which we will provide you with all of the Iraqi oil revenues, a tally of how much has been generated from 2004 through 

2008, what have they spent that money on in terms of their expenditures at the national level, the provincial level, what has been 

the accumulated surplus as of the end of December 2007, as well 

as the projected revenues for this year and the projected surplus 

for this year as well. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 163.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Last question is, a long time ago, some friends of 

mine in the Special Forces community pointed out that they 

thought it was a terrible idea for our troops, and in particular our 

senior officers, to have moved into the palaces. They thought from 

the point of view that you start to look like an occupier, that those 

palaces were signs of oppressions, that terrible things happened in 

those palaces when Saddam ran that country, that people were living in poverty, but Saddam was living on a hillside in a palace. So, 

for a lot of reasons, they thought it was just a very bad move for 

our forces to move into those palaces. Has any plan been articulated to get our forces out of those palaces? Is that even being discussed? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I don’t have any details on that, sir, other than 

the gradual move from Saddam’s main palace over to the new U.S. 

embassy. In terms of getting the diplomatic and part of the U.S. 

military forces that are at the main palace over to our new U.S. 

embassy, that transition is occurring. 

Mr. DODARO. Congressman we will look into that issue and provide you an answer for the record. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am told that the Water Palace alone, the citizens 

of the United States have spent $30 million to make it look pretty. 

Again, that is a heck of a lot of money anywhere, and it is particularly a heck of a lot of money back in Bay St. Louis. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 163.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair recognizes Dr. Gingrey. 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. Dodaro and Mr. Christoff, I wanted to get back into the issue 

of the security forces, Iraq security forces, in regard to their level 

of preparedness. And of course, their minister of defense suggested 

in January that he believed they may be able to take responsibility 

for internal security as early as the first quarter of 2009. In your 

view, what would it take to make this a reality? 

Now, let me expand that question a little bit, too, because not 

only do they need to take control of the internal security, but also 

they need to be able to secure their borders with Syria, certainly 

with Iran. And a further extension of the question is, we have 

heard for a long time that the police force particularly was ripe 

with corruption. There were a lot of problems there. And just kind 

of give us an assessment of whether or not you think that the Iraq 

security forces, including the military and police, are at a level that 

they can take control by the first quarter of 2009, given that we 

haven’t seen a lot of assurances that they can control their external 
13 

security, their borders, and that there is in fact a lot of corruption, 

particularly within the police force and touch on the question of the 

infiltration possibly of Iran into the Iraq security forces and what 

problem that will present. 

Mr. DODARO. Let me ask Joe to respond. 

I am not sure that we can give you a prediction. I am not sure 

that we can give you a prediction along the line of your first question. 

I would just note that General Petraeus’s statement before this 

committee and our work both indicate that additional effort is 

going to be needed to make sure that the Iraq security forces can 

operate on their own. And I think that the issues, the second part 

of your question in terms of Iran, I think we would be best answering in the next session of this committee, in the closed session. 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Christoff. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. In terms of the Iraqi security forces and the 

transition, right now, we do have an ongoing review in which we 

are looking at the operational readiness assessments at the battalion level to try to get a better understanding of, within those assessments where are the limitations and where are the capabilities 

in terms of the logistical capabilities, the manpower, the training. 

So that is an ongoing review. 

In terms of transitioning, that remains a goal of both the United 

States and the Iraqi Government, to transition all 18 provincial 

governments so that they are able to control the security situation 

within their own provinces. And that still is—the timeline is still 

for January of 2009 to transition at least all but one. There is one 

in which there is still some disputed territories that have to be resolved before a timeline can be set for that transition. 

Dr. GINGREY. I want to go back to a statistic that you gave us 

in your testimony, Mr. Dodaro, regarding the energy and that I 

think you said maybe 54 percent. Compare that level to the level 

of electricity and other infrastructure needs of the people of Iraq 

under Saddam and also shortly after ‘‘Shock and Awe’’ phase of 

this operation. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Under the former regime, electricity in particular 

was a noticeable disparity where you had most of the electrical 

power that was being provided to the central region, the Sunni-controlled regions, oftentimes at the expense of the Shi’a south and the 

Kurdish north. I don’t have actual numbers on that in terms of the 

statistics. But, right now, you have about 10 hours of electricity 

that is provided in the Baghdad area. You have got more in some 

of the other areas, roughly between 11 and 16 hours of electricity. 

Dr. GINGREY. The reason I bring up the question, because, when 

you throw out a figure like that, it would suggest that things are 

really bad infrastructure wise and that there is not water and not 

electricity and people are suffering. You have to put it in the proper context and say, well, how bad was it before. And if before it was 

30 percent and now it is 54 percent, then we have made some significant progress. Now, granted that we would like for it to be 95 

to 100 percent. But I mean, I ask you that question. I think it is 

very important that you try to give us that information so that we 

are comparing apples to apples. 
14 

Mr. DODARO. Congressman, we would be happy to go back and 

take a look to see what information exists to put it in the proper 

context. But in the context of my opening statement, I mentioned 

it in the context of challenges that lie ahead. And certainly the goal 

was to try to close that gap between demand and supply as much 

as possible. So I was putting it in the prospective area. 

Dr. GINGREY. Right. Not implying then that progress had not 

been made in this area. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 165.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Doctor, there will be a follow-up round. 

The Chair recognizes another doctor, Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning gentlemen. 

I have a couple of questions. You talked about this a little bit, 

but about a year ago or so, I met with someone who, we were being 

a little bit critical of Iraqi elected officials, and he said, lighten up 

on the Iraqi elected officials, we have no idea what they are going 

through, you don’t even know if you or your family will survive 

when you go off to work each day; it is just a very tough environment to work in. Your report showed some sensitivity of the Iraqi 

Government on this issue of their ability to spend the capital budgets. One of the frustrating things for us, and I think the American 

people, is we don’t understand; there seem to be some revenues 

there, substantial amounts of money, but they don’t seem to being 

spent appropriately. I thought in your report you showed some sensitivity in terms of staffing and some others. Would you flesh that 

out a little bit more about why you think there is a delay in spending some of those dollars, and where this is going? 

Mr. DODARO. There are several factors that are influencing that 

Congressman. Number one, over the past several years, there has 

been the security situation itself and being able to get out and initiate projects. The other thing is the infrastructure and the procurement systems and the things that are in place to actually execute on the budget. There is some bureaucratic systems that need 

to be streamlined. But also there is the capability of having enough 

people that are trained and have the expertise to be able to do it 

as well. 

Joe might add to that list, but I know that those are at least 

three things that we have recognized as some of the factors that 

are impeding their ability to execute on their capital budget. 

Dr. SNYDER. I would like you to add to that list, but also talk 

about how that is going to get solved. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. The United States, we have spent probably about 

$450 million on what we term ministry capacity-building efforts 

within Iraq. So this is where we have advisors and contractors that 

are trying to teach the Iraqis how to put together a financial management system, how to do good budgeting procurement, establishing personnel systems. So there are efforts apart of the United 

States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 

State Department and for the Ministries of Interior and Defense, 

our Defense Department, that are working with the different central ministries to try to help them with these kinds of capacity development efforts. 
15 

Mr. DODARO. And one of the things along that line, Congressman, and this goes back to earlier questions, too, about specific recommendations we have advanced for an updated strategy. We do 

have a recommendation in the past of the fact that the U.S. Government needed an integrated strategy in order to build the capacities and the ministries and also to help support the Iraqis in developing an energy plan. And they are beginning to move forward 

on those recommendations, but those need to be fleshed out further 

as well. 

Dr. SNYDER. I think it is fair to say, we obviously are not 100 

percent perfect ourselves in that kind of procurement as we read 

these tragic stories about electrocutions of our personnel, and if it 

is a contracting problem, and some of the other issues that we have 

had that probably Mr. Waxman’s committee has brought out. 

I want to ask, and maybe, Mr. Dodaro, you can spend whatever 

the rest of whatever time I have to talk about the DOD’s response 

to your report, which was they didn’t seem to agree with much in 

it, and then your response to what they had to say, if you would 

talk about those disagreements. 

Mr. DODARO. Sure. There were a couple disagreements with regard to some of the metrics that we were using in the report. For 

example, in the oil production area, we compared it to a U.S. goal 

of three billion barrels per day. They felt that that wasn’t the right 

metric. Our counter to that was, that is the metric that has been 

used in all the U.S. reports, particularly by the Secretary of the 

Army, in comparing oil production over time. We recognize that it 

had improved, but that was the specific goal there. They mentioned 

the electricity area that Congressman Gingrey mentioned. We mentioned, well, that has been the goal, is to try to increase demand, 

or increase supply as a reflection of demand over there in order to 

help foster economic development and growth. So we countered 

their concerns about some of the metrics that we are using. We felt 

the metrics we were using were the proper ones and had been used 

consistently by the U.S. Government of providing these reports before. 

Now, with regard to the updated strategy, they disagreed. They 

thought that they had a good strategy and that they were making 

refinements as necessary going forward and that the joint campaign plan that they had was really the strategy that they were following. We countered that argument by saying, we believe that 

that campaign plan had some limitations that we had discussed in 

a classified report, which we are going to discuss with you all in 

the next session. So we can carry that discussion into that session. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair recognizes Mr. Hayes. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I didn’t know my time had come up. 

Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you again for being here. 

Several months ago, David Walker was here and gave us an update. One of the things that he said was that he evaluated the 

benchmarks that were available, but he felt like there were much 

better benchmarks that would give a better picture of where we 
16 

were progress wise. And unfortunately, Mr. Walker has left to the 

private sector. Certainly a gentleman such as you would respect 

very much. 

Would you pick up that line of questioning and talk to me a 

minute about your own opinion, again based on your experience on 

the ground, as to what additional—and make very clear, I am not 

in any way proposing to criticize the benchmarks that you have 

evaluated—but how can we take this evaluation a little further, 

and are there things that you feel like we ought to be looking at 

and talking about that would give us a clearer picture of where we 

are and what the way forward looks like? 

Mr. DODARO. I will ask Joe to elaborate on this a bit. 

But, first of all, we in this update took a broader view of the situation there by looking broadly at the security area, broadly at the 

legislative field and as well as in the economic and infrastructure 

development that is necessary going forward. 

So we think some of the benchmarks, for example, are rather 

limited in the economic and infrastructure development area. And 

so that is an area where there could be some additional work that 

could be done to set those up. But those again are going to be 

largely driven by the capacity of the Iraqi Government to move forward in those areas. And, therefore, our recommendation to build 

more capacity and that the U.S. help build capacity in those ministries is very important going forward. We think the legislative 

benchmarks that have been tracked are the right benchmarks because they go toward progress and political reconciliation, and so 

we would advocate that those continue to go forward. We do think, 

in the security area, the benchmarks need to focus on building the 

capacity of the Iraqi security forces. And there are some in that 

arena but there could be others along the lines of some of the questions that we were talking about earlier with Congressman Hunter. 

But let me ask Joe if he has any additional thoughts. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you. 

Joe. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I think an interesting discussion that we can 

have in the closed door session, sir, is looking at the joint campaign 

plan. The joint campaign plan is a conditions-based campaign plan. 

And not going into the details of that classified plan, but it does 

offer another venue by which one can measure progress. 

Mr. HAYES. Okay. Carrying the discussion forward a little further, Mr. Hunter very appropriately mentioned the fact that training up of an officer corps is a complicated, complex but very necessary part of the process going forward. And noncommissioned officers is something that was a concept completely foreign to I think 

both the Iraqi Government. And I think Dr. Snyder mentioned the 

fact that our criticism of the Iraqis in light of what they are doing, 

although it may be justified, were there things that you specifically 

saw in terms of Iraqi leadership, both elected and otherwise—in 

this country, we have elected leadership, appointed leadership and 

others as well—what did you see in your evaluation that gave you 

reason to be optimistic about the way forward, aside from the reduction in violence, which I think everybody acknowledges now? 

What did you see in terms of the culture now with elected officials 

that have never had them before, and how do you factor that into 
17 

your evaluation process changing from one guy at the top who says 

who lives and who dies to an elected group of officials who decide 

how they are going to order their lives together? Kind of opine on 

that a little bit for me if you will. 

Mr. DODARO. I think basically, in that arena, obviously, Congressman, it is a huge change and a shift to the government structure that they are now pursuing. I think most of the assessments, 

both in the security area as well as in some of these other areas, 

have all indicated the difficulty associated with making that transition. The areas that we cited as some progress going forward in 

terms of the legislation to at least allow for some return of the 

Baathists to the government was an encouraging sign. The amnesty legislation was an encouraging sign, as well as defining the 

powers in the provinces. 

I think a real test will be getting through this new election law 

to allow for the provincial elections to take place. As you noted, in 

press accounts, there was some movement on that yesterday, but 

there is some question as to whether or not it will indeed be certified to move forward. 

Mr. DODARO. With regard to the security area, I think that the 

increase, the relatively large increase, in the last year in the numbers of trained troops I think provides some basis for encouragement moving forward. 

But in the security area, we would agree with General Petraeus 

and Ambassador Crocker that the situation still remains rather 

fragile and potentially reversible. 

But those are my thoughts on that issue, and I would ask Joe 

if he wants to add anything. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I think that you bring up an interesting context 

point, in terms of looking at how Iraq has moved from a dictatorship, effectively, to a multi-party kind of decision-making structure. 

I mean, even the presidency, the executive branch is split, with a 

Kurdish President and two vice presidents, one Sunni, one Shi’a. 

Then you have this entire new Council of Representatives. You 

have an emerging judiciary; at best we could call it emerging. And 

so that is a very, very different context from what Iraq had prior 

to 2003. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my time is up. 

I wonder if the Iraqis have a GAO equivalent looking at our ability to pass an energy package? 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California, Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for working over these long several years. 

During the course of the hearing, you said several times that we 

are going to have to discuss that in closed session. And that concerns me a little bit because I think that we have a role to play 

in oversight, and I am wondering to what extent some of those 

areas in which we are not able to discuss here today are ones that 

you would have some question about, whether they are not those 

who had fallen in an area that that would be a problem. 

Mr. DODARO. Well, basically, I mean, at the GAO, we do not have 

classification authority. By law, we need to follow the agency classification requirements. And I might add we have an impeccable 
18 

record of adhering to the guidelines that are set for classified and 

other sensitive information. 

So, you know, we just follow what the agencies decide to do because they have a broad picture on this from a foreign policy standpoint, a military operation standpoint. We respect that and adhere 

to it and try to provide the venues. 

We have provided probably more classified reports on this subject 

to the Congress to help it with its oversight capacity as probably 

any other area I can think of in recent times. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are there some areas in this discussion, though—it seems like we do want to know a little bit more 

of those areas. And I understand that you can’t cross those lines. 

But I am, again, just questioning our ability to provide the oversight when there isn’t that opportunity to really tackle it in an 

open fashion. 

Mr. DODARO. Right. Well, what I would suggest, as a course of 

proceeding, is we are happy to spend as much time as we can with 

you in the closed sessions. But it is really up to the Congress to 

then deal with the Administration on what information they think 

should be declassified and could be discussed in an opening setting. 

I mean, we don’t get in the middle of that debate. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

We talked a little bit about what some of those benchmarks 

might be. And one of the areas that you didn’t look at—and I can 

understand that, but I wonder the extent to which you think this 

is something worthwhile—are the number of Iraqis that are returning to Iraq and the situation that they are experiencing in the 

countries in which they have gone to and tried to find work, in 

many cases, not able to do that. 

How are we to evaluate that? And do you think that is a reasonable benchmark to look at and to acknowledge the extent to which 

many professionals and others who are needed so badly in the 

country are beginning to come back and that will hopefully be a 

part of the country in the future? 

Mr. DODARO. You touch on an important dynamic, and I am 

going to ask Joe to explain. We are doing some work looking at the 

refugee issue and some of these other areas, so I will turn it over 

to him. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I think even in the Intelligence Community, 

without going into classified, there is a recognition that internally 

displaced people (IDP) flows and refugee flows are a reflection of 

the security condition in a country. And so, when you have 2.7 million Iraqis that have been internally displaced, 2.2 million that are 

in surrounding countries that have become refugees, that is an important indicator and benchmark of their assessment of the extent 

to which Iraq is secure. 

I spent some time with refugees in Jordan last month, and I am 

going to Syria. Thankfully with the approval of the Syrian Government, we are going in a few weeks to talk to the predominantly 

Shi’a refugees, the poorer refugees that are in Syria. The ones in 

Jordan that we met with were predominantly Sunni, a little more 

well-off but still in dire needs. 

And I agree, and that is the reason why we have an entire review and engagement looking at IDPs and refugees. 
19 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. At this time, what could you share 

with us, in terms of the way in which you might evaluate the security by virtue of the number of people who are interested in flowing 

back? And also their ability to go back to their communities that 

they lived in for so many years? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Sure. One of the key questions that we are going 

to be discussing with the internally displaced coordinator in Baghdad is the opportunities that those Iraqis who do return would be 

able to go to the homes that they left. And also a very recent proposal in the past couple days that the Council of Representatives 

might be providing some kind of a package. I have heard up to 

$8,000 that is in the most recent State Department weekly status 

report, to provide to those families that decide to return to Iraq. 

So those are the kinds of many issues that we are looking at. We 

are also holding discussion groups with a cross-section of refugees 

that the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) 

has put together for us in these groups that we have had, both in 

Jordan and Syria. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. We look forward to hearing from you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One question. You know, when we discuss essential services in 

Iraq and the progress that is being made in delivering these services, there is a lot of talk about the different metrics that we 

should use to evaluate them. I would like to know what your 

thought is about the best metric to do that. 

A lot of times, the metrics we talk about are hours of electricity 

provided, but there needs to be some association, I think, with the 

level of satisfaction that citizens in Iraq have. And that, I think, 

relates back to the legitimacy of the government there. 

Can you let us know what you think the metrics that we are 

using, if they are adequate? Are there other metrics we should be 

using? And then how should Congress be evaluating the progress 

there in Iraq? 

Mr. DODARO. I think some of the metrics that have been used so 

far—you know, clean water supplies, electricity demand, oil production—are the fundamental ones that you would want to start with. 

But they are going to have to become more sophisticated over time 

and really, I think, be set by the Iraqi Government themselves and 

to try for us to help them develop the capacity to set their own 

metrics and to then be accountable to their citizens for delivering 

on those metrics going forward. 

That is why it is real important, though, to get the ministries’ 

capacities developed to able to execute on some fundamentals about 

their capital budget. Because if they can’t execute on the capital 

budget to build the infrastructure and maintain it and keep it up 

to date, they really don’t have too much ability to get more sophisticated in the measures. 

So I think as a starting point they are fine the way they are now, 

but a lot could be done, as you point out. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I am just wondering, too, in the future, should 

Congress be changing our evaluation metric, as far as success in 
20 

Iraq, maybe even before the Iraqis decide to change that? Because, 

ultimately, I think that has a down-the-road effect on our efforts 

there. 

Mr. DODARO. I think that has to be linked to the funding decisions. Right now, we are at the end of the phase where the U.S.- 

funded infrastructure developments are taking place and the Iraqis 

are expected to pick up more of the funding for those infrastructure 

developments. 

So, you know, my feeling would be, as long as the U.S. isn’t funding the infrastructure developments, we ought to be helping the 

Iraqis build the capacity, set their own metrics, and to spend their 

own money to make improvements in those areas. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Back in May, Ambassador Crocker released his assessment of the process, and he utilized about 18 different levels 

of achievement there. I was wondering, did you agree with his assessment? And can you tell us where you might agree or disagree? 

And do you believe that those metrics of achievement are adequate? And where are we in that process, from your viewpoint? 

Mr. DODARO. We really haven’t systematically gone through his 

assessment yet. And we would be happy to do that and provide it 

the record. They really used a different approach than what we 

have used in the past of whether the benchmark has been met or 

not met or partially met and looked at in terms of whether or not 

satisfactory progress has been made or not. So I would be happy 

to provide that for the record. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yeah, I would be interested to know that. Because 

it seems like if we are going to be collectively measuring progress 

in Iraq, we all ought to be on the same page about how we are 

measuring that. It seems to me to be a little disconcerting if Ambassador Crocker is using a different set of criteria and the GAO 

is maybe using something different. 

So I would really like for you all to look into that and make sure 

we are all evaluating based on the same set of criteria. And then 

whatever level of success is being achieved, we can communicate 

that without having five or six different sets of criteria being used 

by different folks that are there in the country doing a variety of 

different things. 

Mr. DODARO. No, that is an excellent point. And it is also why 

we are advocating for an updated strategy, so it is clear what goals 

we are all trying to achieve and how we are going to measure 

progress. And that is one of the areas that I think greater clarity 

could be provided in an updated strategy. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I agree. I think that is critical to the effort. So I 

would urge you, if you can, to take Ambassador Crocker’s 18 goals 

there and at least integrate them into your effort to evaluate. And 

then maybe that can be used as a framework for going forward to 

setting the strategy to evaluate success. 

Mr. DODARO. Some of those are the same ones we are looking at, 

particularly the legislative benchmark areas and some of the security ones and economic ones as well. 

But, I mean, I think the question about how you measure 

progress has been one that has been nettlesome since the beginning here and continues to be so. But I think improvements in the 

clarity of the strategy could help. 
21 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. 

Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Looking at your report, if I had to say what part of the strategy 

needs to be changed the most, I mean, it seems like the biggest 

weaknesses have been in the political arena, in terms of the failure 

to address the big three legislative goals that were set out as a 

benchmark by both the Administration and GAO a year and a half 

ago. 

And I guess the question I have is, in terms of a new strategy 

or a new approach, should we be looking at a different way to move 

these issues forward outside of the Iraq parliament? I mean, is that 

really a process that we can really count on to deal with the issues 

of hydrocarbon law or sharing of oil revenue, you know, dealing 

with the constitutional gaps that still exist in the Iraqi Constitution? 

I mean, obviously, this is a very expensive process that we have 

been going through for the last 18 months, in terms of our country’s resources and troops. And a lot of it hinges on whether or not 

this political institution really is up to it, in terms of resolving 

these issues. 

And, again, you were not very specific in terms of what you 

would recommend as a new strategy for dealing with the political 

stalemate over there. And I was wondering if you wanted to address that. 

Mr. DODARO. You know, basically, the Iraqi Government has 

moved to a self-governing, self-determination process over there, 

and it is really up to them to decide how best to move forward in 

that arena. I think the decisions for the United States is what kind 

of a level of investment are we going to continue to make going forward. 

So we didn’t really make any recommendations in the legislative 

arena, you know, recognizing that it is really an Iraqi Government 

decision that needs to be made for them to move forward in a selfgoverning environment. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, it seems the situation that I always think 

is analogous is northern Ireland. You had a situation where the 

British Government spent 20 years occupying an area where there 

was a sectarian conflict. A lot of the things that we see in Iraq 

today look awful familiar. I mean, a peace wall was in the middle 

of Belfast; we have walls going up in Baghdad. 

But the fundamental issues of power-sharing, again, between two 

sectarian groups was never able to get any traction in the Stormont 

Parliament. There were elections that were held in northern Ireland year-in and year-out, but the political process was not capable 

with dealing with the fundamental issues that were keeping the 

two sides apart. 

And it took an outside strategy of a peace process, the Mitchell 

Commission, to come in and actually force the parties to get serious 

about resolving these issues, which, again, the normal political 
22 

process—again, I mean, they had municipal elections, they were 

sending members to the London Parliament, as well as the Belfast 

Parliament. 

And I just feel that, at this point, we are sort of in a dead-end, 

in terms of expecting a parliament whose own political support was 

questionable to begin with, because of the number of groups that 

were boycotting the elections, is somehow being capable of really 

moving forward on the political benchmarks. 

Mr. DODARO. No, I understand your concern. And we provided 

some examples of where they have moved and where they still 

need to be done. And I guess my belief, I mean, whatever decisions 

are going to be made have to be those types of decisions that are 

going to be accepted by the Iraqi citizens and have the confidence 

in. So I am not sure—you know, that is an area that I think is outside the scope of our normal advice. 

Mr. COURTNEY. But I have to say, I mean, for you to present a 

report that says it is time for a new strategy, it sorts of begs the 

question about, well, what is the strategy? And, to me, it just 

seems that the political aspect of your report, which accurately describes the nonmovement in terms of some of these issues, really 

cries out for some suggestions. 

And, as I said, if the British Government were still relying on 

the Stormont Parliament to resolve the issues that were separating 

the parties over a period of 30 years there, we wouldn’t have the 

Good Friday Peace Accords. I mean, it took a different approach, 

again, using the leverage that outside forces had in northern Ireland to really create real change there. 

And I would hope that GAO would help us in terms of filling in 

the blank about what that new political strategy would be. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Sure, if I could just make some comments. 

In moving forward in trying to articulate a new strategy, or an 

updated strategy, there are other actors that I agree have to be 

factored in. The United Nations (U.N.) is playing some role in Iraq 

right now. It is helping to set up the provincial elections. But there 

are still opportunities, perhaps, where the U.N. could do more. 

I also refer you to the International Compact for Iraq. This was 

a document that the Iraqi Government developed in partnership 

with a whole host of countries, in which Iraq agreed to make 

progress in terms of the political, legislative, and economic areas in 

anticipation of further debt reduction—debt reduction that was offered by the Paris Club. They also have to adhere to bylaws that 

the International Monetary Fund has established to try to control 

inflation within Iraq. 

So I think you do have a host of international actors that have 

played varying roles in the past, that should be considered for either additional or continuing roles in a future and an updated 

strategy—U.N., International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as 

many of the neighboring countries that Iraq still owes most of its 

debt to. 

Mr. COURTNEY. But it still seems we are stuck with the parliament as the key actor, with that answer. 

But I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 
23 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gene and Joe, who asked you to do this report? 

Mr. DODARO. Basically, we have, since the Iraq conflict got started, since we were getting a lot of congressional requests in to be 

able to do the work, we decided that because of the broad interest 

in the work, we would do this under GAO, the Comptroller General’s authority, to initiate evaluations and to provide the reports 

more broadly. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So that the scope restrictions were self-imposed? 

In other words, no reference to Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRTs), no reference to United States Agency for International Development (USAID), no reference to training teams, no reference to 

the new ambassadors that have been appointed. I mean, there 

seems to be some glaring stuff out there that does play a role on 

what you are doing, but you chose to ignore all of that, I guess. 

Mr. DODARO. No, that is not exactly true at all. We have efforts 

under way to look at the provincial reconstruction teams. I will ask 

Joe to explain what we are doing. I mean, we have other efforts 

under way. This was a particular snapshot in a period of time. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. So it is not inclusive? 

Mr. DODARO. No. I mention the work we are going to be issuing 

on the oil—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Sure. This report is a month old. How stale is the 

data you based it on? In other words, when did you finish the field 

work, and then when did you start writing the report? 

Mr. DODARO. We updated the data—for example, the attack data 

I gave you today in my oral statement was as of last month. So I 

attempted to update—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. It is in this report? 

Mr. DODARO. It is in my testimony, yes. It is in the testimony. 

The testimony updated some of the data that was declassified, and 

we were able to include in there, so it is up to date. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. I am a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) 

and constantly get the question, who audits the auditor? Your recommendation is that the State Department and the Defense Department have not, in effect, don’t have a plan, don’t have a strategy for Iraq beyond yesterday afternoon. And yet you are telling us 

this report is not inclusive of the other reports that you are talking 

about going on and the data that might be used to evaluate this. 

What is your benchmark as to—now, obviously, State and Defense told you they do have plans. 

Mr. DODARO. Right. 

Mr. CONAWAY. And you have disagreed with them. 

How do you set your framework up to say, in judgment of the 

folks who were paid to do that, ‘‘No, you are not doing it’’? Help 

us understand how you came to the conclusion that their plan is 

not there. 

Mr. DODARO. Well, a couple of things. I mean, the New Way Forward plan was expected to last for a 12- to 18-month period of 

time, which has not elapsed. So that is one issue. 

The second issue is that the U.N. mandate authorizing the 

United States to be in Iraq expires at the end of this calendar year. 
24 

So, obviously, a new framework needs to be put in place, much of 

which is being debated right now. I mean, so those parameters are 

likely to change. 

And we also have a classified report that we have issued, which 

we are going to discuss with you in the closed sessions, that discusses some of the other limitation that we put in place. 

We also reference there the fact that we had made recommendations to build the ministerial capacity and also to develop an energy plan in prior reports that we have done. We have referenced, 

Congressman, in this report, 140 reports we have issued on Iraq 

since the conflict began, and those inform us going forward. So we 

have done a lot of work in this area. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I mean, a report issued in 2004 on the circumstances then is relevant today? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, in terms of understanding where we were. As 

a CPA, you understand the baseline data and comparing one year 

to the next year in terms of the report. So it is important to have 

the perspective, particularly in terms of some of the strategies that 

were tried during those periods of time that didn’t work. 

One of the reasons that the New Way Forward was put in place 

was to address some of the deficiencies in the prior strategies that 

had been put in place before. And, as we pointed out, some gains 

were made as a result of revising that strategy. 

So I think, absent a revision on the strategies over these past 

few years, you know, there would be questions whether we would 

be having the gains we have had. 

Mr. CONAWAY. We have had gains then? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. How do you assess the change in Administration 

that will happen in January and the impact? I mean, how do you 

put together a comprehensive plan today, knowing that in January 

there is going to be a whole new team? How do you do that? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, there are a couple of perspectives. And this 

happens throughout the Federal Government as part of our system 

of operations. And, to me, the real important points are, number 

one, the U.N. Mandate expires before the Presidential transition 

will take place. It expires at the end of this calendar year. So something is going to have to be decided in that arena going forward. 

We are spending a lot of money. We are talking about several 

months between now and the time that happens. And then the new 

Administration will have to get its team in place and to make decisions. 

So, as part of our system of government, there is always a plan 

to have a smooth transition in the reins of power from one Administration to the other. And a lot depends on the professionalism of 

the people who prepare from a stewardship standpoint to prepare 

that next Administration. And I think it is a responsible thing to 

do. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah, but you wouldn’t expect a dramatic change 

in strategy to be effected now, versus the pretty standard stuff, do 

the status of forces agreement, continue to push on the Iraqis to 

do the legislative stuff, and continue to push on them to develop 

resources on infrastructure, own resources on security, all those 
25 

kinds of things. You wouldn’t expect some sort of dramatic change 

apart from that, would you? 

Mr. DODARO. Our recommendation calls for an updated strategy, 

an updated one. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right, Gene, thank you. 

Yield back. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Texas. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Loebsack. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thanks to both of you for being here today and the report and 

all the work that you put into that. 

I just want to raise again the issue of the Sons of Iraq and then, 

after that, the Sons of Basra, but beginning with the Sons of Iraq. 

Your report does talk about how they have contributed, obviously, to the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and also that 

many of these were members, if not most, members of the Sunni 

insurgency, and that some have not reconciled with the Government of Iraq and could once again become a danger. 

And you mentioned the tribalism issue. There are many folks out 

there now, obviously, and in the past but now, who are concerned 

about a potential resurgence of tribalism, if you will, just sort of 

looking forward, depending on how this goes. 

And I would like you to talk a little bit about, sort of, following 

up on some of the previous questions, sort of, what steps do you 

believe should be taken in developing a strategy going forward to 

ensure that the Sons of Iraq and the Government of Iraq continue 

as partners in security going forward? 

Mr. DODARO. Let me ask Joe. 

Do you want to take that? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I think in terms of the Sons of Iraq, there still 

has to be some decisions about how many do you integrate into the 

Iraqi Security Forces and how many do you integrate into local employment? 

Those are going to be tough questions, predominantly because of 

the fact that you have, quite frankly, a Shi’a government that may 

not be welcoming of additional Sunni forces that, for now, are local 

neighborhood forces in Anbar province. You also have extremely 

high unemployment rates in Anbar province. And so, those are 

going to be difficult but important decisions that are going to have 

to be made in developing what DOD has called for—that is, a cohesive transition plan. 

So, not only for the ones that have been around, the Sons of Iraq, 

but for those that are emerging, the Sons of Basra—are they going 

to be part of the ISF? Local employment? Who is going to pay for 

them up to that point in time? 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Can you flesh that out a little bit more? We were 

talking about a little bit with Congressman Taylor at the outset 

here, but the role of the tribal groups too. Because, obviously, these 

are interlinked. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. That is really an interesting question with the 

tribal groups, because, in many regards, the Sons of Iraq are tied 

to the tribal groups; they are tribal in nature. And they saw their 

tribe as being their predominant motivating factor, more than the 

Sunni ties in general. 
26 

What you are seeing, particularly in Anbar province, is this desire on the part of the tribal leaders to participate in the political 

process, to have representation on the provincial councils right 

now. Right now there isn’t representation. 

So I think it is going to be a very interesting dynamic, not only 

from a security or military point of view in integrating those under 

arms, but the leaders who do want to participate within a political 

process. That is why those provincial elections are important as 

well. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Do you see potential conflict among those tribal 

leaders? Because, obviously, in the past, there has been that conflict. We, obviously, here in America, didn’t pay much attention to 

it in earlier times. But do you have any fear that some of those traditional tribal conflicts that were played out before that were often 

submerged, obviously, by Saddam Hussein in his security system, 

that those may play out again? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I don’t know if we—we really haven’t looked into 

that in detail, but I think you have hit on the issue of it is no 

longer looking at Sunnis, Shi’as, and Kurds; it is looking at the underlying tribes associated with each of those groups. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Right. Right. 

Talk about the Sons of Basra, if you will. Because I think this 

is a relatively new development, is it not? That is not something 

we have heard that much about in this committee. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. You will hear more about that in the closed-door 

session. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay. So, at this point, you are unwilling to talk 

a little bit more about that in open session? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. The vast majority of information that we have is 

classified. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay. All right. Thank you very much. 

And I yield back my time. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Ellsworth. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentleman, for being here. 

When you sit in enough of these hearings, you start reflecting 

back on things you have heard in the other hearings. And I can remember that we talked about that we weren’t going to be rebuilding the country. And I see on the front cover, it says, ‘‘Stabilizing, 

Rebuilding Iraq.’’ And I can remember Secretary Rice sitting there 

at that table one day and saying that we have to teach the Iraqis 

how to spend their money. And I thought, as Mr. Hayes said, I am 

not sure our country is the best one, with a $9 trillion debt. 

But can you talk about—one of the things, when Chairman Taylor and I went to Iraq, one of the issues we jumped into was the 

corruption. And can you tell me—I was noticing here that some of 

the reports, people talking about that 30 percent of the oil production that was going on in Iraq was peeled off and going other 

places than where it should be, and just general corruption. I see 

here on one of the pages it says we made a $2.7 billion U.S. investment in oil production, and yet it is still not up to snuff of what 

they should be producing in our goals and their goals. 
27 

Does GAO have a general sense on where we are going with the 

country? I know we have talked about it with some of the reconstruction teams, that the sheikhs are still demanding a cut when 

they are building a bridge or a road. Any thoughts on that or glimmers of hope in that area, that the country is becoming more fairminded and doing things the way we would normally do them? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. The oil area is a really interesting area. Here is 

an area in which Iraq is sitting on 115 billion barrels of proven reserve—enormous potential in terms of exports. Yet one of the problems that relates to corruption in Iraq in the oil sector is the fact 

that very little is metered. The production sites have no meters. 

There is only one meter that is at the port in southern Iraq that 

tries to keep track of the exports. 

And when you look at the audits that have been done by the 

International Advisory Monitoring and Board, they are actually 

now showing statistics in which are there are three different projections of how much Iraq might have produced, because we lack 

this metering. Our Energy Information Administration has one projection, the State Department uses the Ministry of Oil projections, 

and there is a third projection by the Central Bank of Iraq. And 

they are all different. 

And oftentimes that difference is the result of the poor metering 

or, also, the diversions that you refer to. The State Department 

talks about 10 to 30 percent of oil that is being produced could be 

diverted onto the black market or smuggled out of the Iraq. 

It continues to remain a problem. And the United Nations called 

for meters under the oil-for-food program in 1999, and they still 

haven’t been installed. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Do we know where that is going? The black 

market and other countries—any idea what countries they are talking about? Do we have any idea where that is going? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Your intelligence agencies do. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. You just mentioned the Central Bank of Iraq. 

Is there an existing and functioning Central Bank of Iraq right 

now? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes, there is. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Good. That is good to know. 

Any other comments on just general—with the American dollars 

that are going, like I said, it was disturbing to me to hear that, as 

part of the contracting process, that there was still a lot of challenges in that, that people were expecting to get a cut to build a 

bridge. Are we seeing improvement in that area, or are we still 

having the challenges there? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, we are transitioning now. Probably 90 percent of the billions that you all obligated for construction, 90 percent has been obligated. So for all effective purposes, it is the 

Iraqis’ effort to step up to the plate with a sizable bid of oil revenues that they will get this year. And the report that we are going 

to issue shortly will tell you the rather large surplus that is expected this year as a result of the increase in prices, the world 

market prices, as well as the increase, modest increases in productions that the Iraqi Oil Ministry has been able to achieve this year. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you both. 

Mr. Chairman, I would yield back. 
28 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes an Iraqi war vet, Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for testifying today. We appreciate your 

service to our country. 

I want to kind of piggyback on my colleague from Indiana’s comments and your remarks about the transition and getting Iraqis to 

step up to the plate. 

Your report states that, between 2005 and 2007, Iraq only spent 

24 percent of its budget for its own reconstruction efforts. However, 

we, the United States America, have spent $169 million in 2005 

and 2006, another $395 million in 2007 and 2008 toward helping 

Iraqi ministries stabilize and rebuild Iraq. 

So I know we have said—Mr. Ellsworth and I are Blue Dog 

Democrats. We have said repeatedly in this committee that, you 

know, the Iraqis will not stand up for their country unless Americans stop doing the heavy lifting for them. We need to hold them 

accountable. 

So my question is, how can we best pressure Iraq to spend their 

own money to rebuild their country? I know you advocate a new 

strategy. But in layman’s terms to the American public here and 

to us in this committee, what can we do to best get them off the 

sidelines and, as you said, step up to the plate? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, I think the best approach, Congressman, is 

the approach that has been taken, is to not provide additional 

funding for those activities and to shift the burden to them for 

funding those activities, and to provide technical support and assistance. 

I wouldn’t underestimate moving to a different structure and 

what type of technical capacities that they are going to need to be 

able to do that. We have seen that in other governments around 

the world. 

So I think placing the responsibility with them for funding these 

activities and for the United States to provide technical assistance 

and support to build their infrastructure and the ministries is a 

reasonable approach going forward. 

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have any additional comment, sir? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. No. 

Mr. MURPHY. Okay. I want to turn now to some of the metrics 

they used earlier. I know there was a comment from both sides 

about the metrics that we use and that we use different metrics. 

How about—what I have not seen is, has there been polling, 

whether it is classified or unclassified, that is being done with Government taxpayers’ money in Iraq? 

Mr. DODARO. In Iraq? I believe the Defense 9010 report, the latest one in June, Congressman, had some polling information in it, 

in terms of polling Iraqi citizens’ views on some of services that 

have been provided. We will be happy to provide that for the record 

to you. I don’t have the statistics off the top of my head, but there 

has been some polling done. 

Mr. MURPHY. Okay. And does that polling also describe whether 

or not the Iraqi people want us there? You know, we all understand the political dynamics that are going on right now, with 
29 

Prime Minister Malaki and the 2010 date. We also know it is an 

election time for the Prime Minister. And we also understand that, 

since 2005, when he was running the last time, he said he would 

share oil revenues with the Sunnis, the minorities. He said it in 

2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, and he has yet to do it. So I think a 

lot of us in this committee rightfully are frustrated, and we are demanding some accountability here, and we appreciate your assistance on that. 

Fifty-four percent, in your report—I want to go now to electricity—54 percent of the Iraqi electricity demand is being met. Obviously, electricity is a major quality-of-life issue for the everyday 

Iraqi and their frustration that, because they don’t have electricity, 

they are blaming us. Whether that is rightful or not, they are 

blaming us. 

In your opinion, how important is the inability of the Iraqi Government to provide these basic services, like potable water, like 

electricity, to the Iraqi people? And how much is their inability to 

do these basic services fueling the insurgency against our American 

forces? 

Mr. DODARO. On the first part of your question, I would say, obviously, the inability to provide central basic services reflects poorly 

on the government. Basically, governments exist, as you know, to 

provide those type of services, so it is obviously very important that 

those issues be attended to and appropriate investments be made. 

I would ask Joe if he has any comments on the second part of 

your question, Congressman. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, I clearly agree. Providing essential services 

to the Iraqi people is an indication of whether or not they have 

faith in their government. And if you have been to Iraq and you 

have flown over Baghdad low, for example, in the electricity area, 

you see generators everywhere, you see strings of transmission 

lines. That is Iraqis trying to take things in their own hands, because they, in some regards, have lost faith in the national grid to 

provide them with the kind of basic electricity that they want. 

They want electricity 24 hours a day, not the 8 in Baghdad or the 

10 throughout the rest of the country. 

Mr. MURPHY. I think for the American taxpayer at home and the 

American citizen, I mean, they are looking at, okay, electricity, 

basic services, 54 percent of the need is getting met. There is a 

frustration. You are talking about the faith in your government. 

You are looking at also, at the same time, quoting your study, saying they are only spending less than a quarter of their budget on 

reconstruction that they promised their people and us that they are 

going to spend on. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Right. 

Mr. MURPHY. And so, again, the connection—and I think the 

American people are starting to get, that many of us get here, is 

that because they are not performing, it is affecting the lives of the 

American warfighter that is serving our country over there. And I 

think that is why you are getting a lot of this frustration here. 

You know, we appreciate your time, wrapping your arms around 

this issue and helping guide us on this accountability. But I think 

for the people out there to understand that we are trying to do everything in our power to fight for our American warfighter, wheth-
30 

er it is getting them Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in there this year, or whether it was making sure they got 

the 3.5 percent pay increase, or making sure to put the pressure 

on the Iraqi Government to step up to the plate and stand up for 

the Iraqi people, because it is affecting the lives of our soldiers as 

well. So we appreciate your assistance on that. 

I yield back to the chairman. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 167.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Washington State, 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the GAO from coming and helping us out. I 

know sometimes we can, kind of, get tough with you all because 

your job is sometimes to tell us things we don’t want to hear, and, 

as a result, we get our backs up a little bit because we are not used 

to having people tell us what we don’t want to hear. But that is 

your job, and I appreciate it very much. 

With regards to the security issues and the security forces, Iraq 

security forces, I noted that in your report, page four, in developing 

Iraqi security forces you note some of the numbers about how many 

have been trained versus assigned. And you also note the DOD reports the number of security force units deemed capable of performing operations without coalition assistance has remained at 10 

percent. 

And I apologize for not being here, and if this has been answered 

already, I will ask you to summarize that answer. 

But it seems to me that, for the last five years, we have been 

asking questions about the Iraqi security forces and their ability, 

particularly the military, to be specific, the military, their ability 

to do operations on their own. And even if that number, the total 

number of security forces and military folks are increasing, and 

even if the number of brigades that can operate independently is 

increasing, it still seems to me that we are forgetting something 

very important here. Although they might be in a lead, would they 

know where they were supposed to go to take a military action 

without the logistical and communications and intel support they 

are getting from coalition forces, namely the United States? 

And I am curious if you have looked at that particular question, 

as opposed to just looking at raw numbers of security forces, and 

trying to understand what it really means to operate independently 

or even in the lead. Operating in the lead does not mean you are 

operating by yourself, and I think we confuse that around here and 

give it more credit than it is worth, frankly. 

Mr. DODARO. That is one of the reasons, Congressman—I will 

ask Joe to elaborate—why we focus on the operational readiness 

assessment levels. Because the level one is really the level that is 

judged to operate the most independently, and that hasn’t changed 

over the period of time. 

So the logistical, the intelligence, the air support and other 

things that are being received from the U.S. and the coalition assistance are still very, very important. And unless that number in 
31 

level one changes over a period of time, there are still varying degrees of dependency there. 

And I would ask Joe to elaborate on it. 

So that is why we try to provide both to the Congress, both raw 

numbers of what are available, what are trained, and then what 

DOD’s assessments are. Those are not GAO’s assessments. Those 

are DOD assessments, and properly so. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. And our November 2007 report actually deals 

with this very question. Not only what is the definition of ‘‘independent’’ and their emerging and changing definitions of ‘‘independent,’’ but also the fact that even those forces that are at the 

highest readiness level still, in some respects, are dependent upon 

the United States for logistics, for movement, for command and 

control, and intelligence. 

Mr. LARSEN. Well, I think we were told last week or the week 

before that, perhaps by the middle of next year, there would be 

enough trained Iraqi security forces that would have met that goal. 

And that seemed to be a positive headline. But what I had failed 

to discern from his comments was a repeat of what he said the last 

time he was here, which was really talking about the fact that they 

have basically a hollow military—that is, lots of privates and corporals, a few generals and nothing in between, very little in between. And it might be 5 to 10 years before they achieve that. The 

second point was about logistics, intel and communications, and it 

would be 5 to 10 years before they develop an organic capability 

within their own military. 

Is that something you agree with or disagree with? Have you had 

reports based on those issues? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, we have issued some reports on the dependency there, but also this is an issue that we are planning to discuss 

in the next session with you as well. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. 

Mr. DODARO. So I hope you are able to join us, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah, I have a little bit of time. 

And I see the red light is on, but if I could just make a point. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Larsen, if you notice, there is no one around to 

get mad at you. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, I noticed that. 

So if there is no one else, Mr. Chairman, I will continue. Just 

quickly then, perhaps in the next session. Are we going to that immediately after this? At noon? 

Mr. TAYLOR. 12:30. 

Mr. LARSEN. Perhaps we can talk about the integration of U.S.- 

approved militias into the military, like the Sons of Iraq and discuss that next. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Mr. LARSEN. I just also note, Mr. Chairman—and my last trip to 

Iraq was last year, last September. You noted the various factors 

that have brought down violence, and all those are important factors. Another important factor is the relationship between concrete 

barriers and the security level. I mean, if you put concrete barriers 

10 feet high on every street in Baghdad, security is going to increase. And that is what Baghdad looks like. Again, we tend to talk 

about security in Iraq like things are wide open and people can 
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travel anywhere they want. They can’t. They can’t. There is a direct relationship between the height and number of concrete barriers and the security situation. The test will be when those concrete barriers come down and whether the security holds. That will 

be the test. 

So I am not—I mean, it is great that violence is down. Any time 

there are fewer people getting killed, that is great; I support that. 

But the test will be when those barriers come down, not when they 

are up. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Gentlemen, you touched on a couple of things I 

would like you to follow up on. 

If my memory is right, around Easter of 2005, the Kuwaitis informed our Government that they would no longer supply all the 

fuel for free, and that they started charging us the market price 

for fuel. 

I am curious, and have a very vivid memory of seeing the convoys lining up just before dark leaving Kuwait, hundreds of trucks, 

knowing that those guys had very long drives through very dangerous territory. And although we are grateful for the Kuwaitis’ incredible cooperation, although we want to financially reward them 

for that cooperation by buying fuel from them, to what extent are 

we trying to buy fuel in Iraq from the Iraqis? To what extent do 

we try to buy it at the price that they sell it to their own people 

for? 

And last is one of my colleagues, and I hate to put him on the 

spot, but one of my colleagues has been using the number that the 

number of gallons per GI per day is somewhere in the 20’s. I can’t 

remember if it is 21 gallons a day or 26 gallons a day, but it is a 

fairly substantial price tag just to keep them warm in the winter, 

cool in the summer, getting them from place to place safely. So we 

are talking about a substantial amount of money here. 

So to what extent are we trying to buy fuel in Iraq at the same 

price the Iraqi Government charges their own citizens? 

Mr. DODARO. Mr. Chairman, we can find that out and provide it 

for the record. We are not prepared to address that right now, but 

we can get those answers and provide them to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 163.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. For the record, you raised a great point because obviously someone is metering that oil. That tanker is being 

paid by how much oil he transports. That tanker, when he gets to 

a refinery somewhere in the world, is unloading that and keeping 

very detailed records because at $130 a barrel they are not going 

to be giving that stuff away. 

So to what extent, knowing how important all of this is—it is the 

life boat of Iraq, it is going to fund all of those projects that Mr. 

Murphy and Mr. Hunter said have to happen for this country to 

stand up on their own feet—to what extent have you encountered 

our Government insisting on some form of accountability? 

It is my understanding that somewhere in the neighborhood of 

80 percent of all the Iraqi oil flows through two terminals offshore. 

It is not like you don’t have a—so you do have a very narrow choke 

point to measure it. To what extent are we insisting on that? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I don’t know. Good question. 
33 

Mr. DODARO. Again, that is an excellent question. We will look 

into that and get you an answer. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 163.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, it just strikes me as something pretty simple 

that we ought to be asking. And if the Administration isn’t going 

to come forward and do that, it is something this Congress—if we 

were looking at a timeline, that is something that should absolutely 

ought to have a timeline. 

Mr. DODARO. That is a very reasonable question, Mr. Chairman. 

I agree completely with you. And we will get you an answer. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. What is a reasonable amount of time to expect for an answer on those questions I just asked you? 

Mr. DODARO. Let us do some—we will get back to you with a 

timeline, but as soon as we can. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, how about doing better than that? How about 

giving me a time specific that I can count on? 

Mr. DODARO. We will, within the next two weeks, give you an answer. 

Mr. TAYLOR. That is great. Okay. 

Well, you have about 40 minutes to go eat your lunch, and we 

will see you back at 12:30. 

Mr. DODARO. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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JULY 23, 2008 

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1GAO Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, GAO–08–1021T (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2008). 2GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Should Identify and Prioritize the Conditions Necessary for the 

Continued Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Iraq, GAO–08–700C (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008). 3 In contrast with a strategic plan, a campaign plan is developed at the operational level. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to 

achieve strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating 

actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. The development of 

a campaign plan, according to doctrine, should be based on suitable and feasible national strategic objectives formulated by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff—with appropriate consultation with additional NSC members, other U.S. 

government agencies, and multinational partners. 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. DODARO. In response to your question on what has GAO’s recommended to 

improve U.S. operations and help advance U.S. goals in Iraq? and GAO’s progress 

report on Iraq. 1 Over the past few years, we have made several recommendations 

to improve strategies and plans that guide U.S. Military and civilian efforts in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. 

Update U.S. Strategic Plan for Iraq: In our recent Iraqi progress report, we recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the State Department, in 

conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated strategy for Iraq that 

defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008 and addresses the long-term goal 

of achieving an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself. The desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy are purpose, scope, and methodology; detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threats; the desired goal, objectives, activities, and outcome-related performance measures; description of future costs and resources needed; delineation of U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms; and a description of the strategy’s integration among and with 

other entities. We reaffirm the need for an updated strategy for several reasons. 

• First, much has changed in Iraq since January 2007, including some of the 

assumptions upon which The New Way Forward was based. For example, 

violence in Iraq is down but U.S. susrge brigades have left and over 100,000 

armed Sons of Iraq remain; Iraq did not meet late 2007 target dates to pass 

legislation and assume control over local security; and the United States is 

currently negotiating a status of forces agreement with Iraq to replace 

United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions. 

• Second, The New Way Forward is an incomplete strategic plan because it 

articulates goals and objectives for only the near-term phase that ended in 

July 2008. 

• Third, the goals and objectives of The New Way Forward and the phase 

that follows it are contained in disparate documents such as presidential 

speeches, White House fact sheets, and a National Security Council (NSC) 

PowerPoint presentation, rather than in a strategic planning document 

similar to the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, the prior U.S. strategy 

for Iraq. 

• Fourth, the limited documents that describe the phase after July 2008 do 

not specify the administration’s long-term strategic goals and objectives in 

Iraq or how to achieve them. 

Improve Operational Planning: GAO has also recommended that the administration improve the operational planning for U.S. military and civilian operations in 

Iraq. 

• In a classified report,2 we identified areas in which the Multinational 

Force-Iraq (MNF–I)/U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint Campaign Plan—the 

operational plan that guides all U.S. military and civilian operations in 

Iraq—had limitations with respect to DOD’s joint operation planning doctrine.3 For example, joint doctrine states that effective operational planning 
162 

4GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an 

Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk, GAO–08–117 (Washington, D.C: 

Oct. 1, 2007). 5GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq’s Oil and Electricity Sectors, GAO–07–677 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2007). 6GAO, Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness of US. Ground Forces, GAO–08–497T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2008). 7GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Selection for Commander’s Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in Iraq, GAO–08–736R (Washington, D.C.: June 

23, 2008). 8GAO, Global War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of Defense, GAO– 

08–853R (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2008). 9GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics Activities 

during Operation Iraqi Freedom, GAO-04-305R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003). 10GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items During 

Current and Future Operations, GAO-06-160 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005). 11GAO, Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army 

Truck Armor during Current Wartime Operations, GAO–08–160 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 

2006). 12GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on Equipment Reset Challenges and 

Issues for the Army and Marine Corps, GAO–06–604T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006). 

cannot occur without a clear understanding of the conditions that must 

exist to end military operations and draw down forces. Further, according 

to doctrine, a campaign plan should provide an estimate of the time and 

forces required to reach the conditions for mission success or termination. 

In our classified report, we found that DOD should, among other things, 

identify and prioritize the conditions necessary for the continued drawdown 

of U.S. forces in Iraq. 

• We also identified weaknesses in other U.S. plans for Iraq. For example, 

although multiple U.S. agencies have programs to develop the capacity of 

Iraqi ministries, U.S. efforts lack an integrated strategy. 4 Such strategy 

should include a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; delineation of U.S. 

roles, responsibilities, coordination, and integration; desired goals, objectives, and activities; performance measures; and a description of costs, resources needed, and risk. In addition, although the United States has spent 

billions of dollars to rebuild Iraq’s oil and electricity sectors, Iraq lacks an 

integrated plan for the energy sector. 5 We recommended that State work 

with the Iraqi government to develop integrated plans for ministry capacity 

development and the energy sector, so that they provide clear guidance for 

U.S. efforts, manage risk, and identify needed resources. 

We have also made several recommendations to improve overall U.S. military 

readiness and cost reporting on ongoing operations in support of the Global War on 

Terrorism, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, in order to improve 

military readiness, we recommended that DOD develop an overall plan for rebuilding readiness, including establishing goals and investment priorities. We also recommended that the Army revise and adjust its training strategy to include a plan 

to support full-spectrum training during extended operations, and clarify the capacity needed to support the modular force. 6 Further, DOD should identify mission-essential services provided by contractors and include them in planning, as well as 

develop doctrine to help the services manage contractors supporting deployed forces. 

In order to improve cost reporting and program assessment, we recommended, 

among other things, that DOD require that units that execute Commander’s Emergency Response Program projects provide project monitoring to ensure that contractors have met the contract specifications. 7 Additionally, we recommended that DOD 

revise the cost reporting guidance for the Global War on Terrorism so that large 

amounts of reported obligations are not shown in ‘‘other’’ miscellaneous categories. 8

In addition, we have made numerous recommendations to improve logistical and 

other support to U.S. forces in Iraq. For example, in December 2003 we reported 

on a number of logistical shortfalls during initial military operations 9 and in a subsequent report in April 2005 made recommendations to improve DOD’s and the military service’s efforts to provide needed critical supplies and parts to the troops in 

Iraq.10 We also reported on the lengthy process to field truck armor by the Army 

and Marine Corps and made recommendations to establish a process to document 

and communicate all urgent wartime funding requirements for supplies and equipment at the time they are identified and the disposition of funding decisions.11 We 

also reported on issues related to Army and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment 

and ‘‘reset’’ of equipment 12 and made recommendations to correct weaknesses iden-
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13GAO, Defense Management: Processes to Estimate and Track Equipment Reconstitution 

Costs Can Be Improved, GAO–05–293 (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2005). 14GAO, Defense Management: More Transparency Needed over the Financial and Human Capital Operations of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, GAO–08–342 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2008). 15GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for Reposturing 

of US. Forces from Iraq, GAO–08–930, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2008). 16GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO–07–145 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2006). 17GAO, Defense Logistics: The Army Needs to Implement an Effective Management and Oversight Plan for the Equipment Maintenance Contract in Kuwait, GAO–08–316R (Washington, 

D.C.: Jan. 22, 2008). 18GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and Coordination of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements, GAO–08–966 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008). 19GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures and Surplus, GAO–08– 

1031 (Washington, D.C: Aug. 5, 2008). 

tified in DOD’s equipment reconstitution cost estimating and tracking processes.13

We also reported and made recommendations on the need to improve the management and accountability of DOD efforts to mitigate the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).14 In September 2008, we issued a report on DOD’s planning for 

the reposturing of U.S. forces in Iraq, and made recommendations to DOD to efficiently and effectively retrograde its materiel and equipment from Iraq, as well as 

correct the incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain 

visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in transit.15 In this report, 

we also identified several issues that will affect the development of plans for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq, including 

• guidance for the management of hazardous materials and waste and the 

disposition of property, which could affect the time and cost of closing installations in Iraq; 

• guidance and plans for reposturing of contractors from Iraq; 

• accountability and disposition of contractor-managed government-owned 

property; 

• the possibility of restrictive conditions on the use of facilities in Kuwait and 

other neighboring countries; 

• availability of wash racks and the number of customs inspectors in Kuwait; 

• capacity of military-owned and -operated transports and convoy security assets, including limits on the main supply route; 

• increased demand for access to mental health care providers; 

• infrastructure requirements of returning units; and 

• requirements for training and equipment reset to restore readiness. 

We have also made numerous recommendations to improve the oversight and 

management of DOD service contracts used to support military operations in Iraq. 

For example, we recommended that DOD appoint a high-level focal point within the 

department dedicated to leading DOD’s efforts to improve contract management and 

oversight, develop a database to provide visibility over all contractor support to deployed forces, develop lessons learned, and develop training standards, so that military commanders and other senior leaders who may deploy to locations with contractor support have the knowledge and skills needed to effectively manage contractors.16 We also reviewed a key equipment maintenance contract in Kuwait and 

made recommendations to improve oversight of this contract.17 Finally, we also have 

made recommendations to improve the oversight and coordination of private security contractors in Iraq.18 [See page 10.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR 

Mr. DODARO. In answer to your question what extent has GAO tracked Iraqi oil 

revenue and how much of it is flowing back to the central government? How much 

is leaving the country? 

In August 2008, we reported on Iraq’s revenues and expenditures from 2005 

through 2008 and on Iraq’s budget surplus from 2005 through 2007.19 In summary, 

we found the following: 
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20GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq’s Oil and Electricity Sectors, GAO–07–677 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2007). 

• From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government generated an estimated $96 

billion in cumulative revenues, of which crude oil export sales accounted for 

about $90.2 billion, or 94 percent. For 2008, GAO estimates that Iraq could 

generate between $73.5 billion and $86.2 billion in total revenues, with oil 

exports accounting for between $66.5 billion to $79.2 billion. Projected 2008 

oil revenues could be more than twice the average annual amount Iraq generated from 2005 through 2007. These projections are based on actual sales 

through June 2008 and projections for July to December that assume an 

average export price from $96.88 to $125.29 per barrel and oil export volumes of 1.89 to 2.01 million barrels per day. 

• From 2005 through 2007, the Iraqi government spent an estimated $67 billion on operating and investment activities. Ninety percent was spent on 

operating expenses, such as salaries and goods and services, and the remaining 10 percent on investments, such as structures and vehicles. The 

Iraqi government spent only 1 percent of total expenditures to maintain 

Iraq- and U.S.-funded investments such as buildings, water and electricity 

installations, and weapons. While total expenditures grew from 2005 

through 2007, Iraq was unable to spend all its budgeted funds. In 2007, 

Iraq spent 80 percent of its $29 billion operating budget and 28 percent of 

its $12 billion investment budget. For 2008, GAO estimates that Iraq could 

spend between $35.3 billion and $35.9 billion of its $49.9 billion budget. 

• As of December 31, 2007, the Iraqi government had accumulated financial 

deposits of $29.4 billion, held in the Development Fund for Iraq and central 

government deposits at the Central Bank of Iraq and Iraq’s commercial 

banks. This balance is the result, in part, of an estimated cumulative budget surplus of about $29 billion from 2005 to 2007. For 2008, GAO estimates 

a budget surplus of between $38.2 billion to $50.3 billion. If spent, a proposed Iraqi supplemental budget of $22 billion could reduce this projected 

surplus. [See page 12.] 

Mr. DODARO. Regarding the plans for moving U.S. troops out of Iraqi palaces. 

As of August 2008, the United States was negotiating the return of Iraqi premises 

as part the Status of Forces Agreement, according to the Deputy Chief of Mission, 

U.S. Embassy Baghdad. Some palaces are already being planned for return to the 

Iraqi government. For example, Embassy Baghdad is planning to officially return 

the Presidential Palace in the Green Zone by December 31, 2008. According to the 

Deputy Chief of Mission, because the United States will still have to decommission 

the Palace, it may be several more months before the Iraqis actually occupy these 

premises. [See page 12.] 

Mr. DODARO. Regarding your question to what extent are we trying to buy fuel 

in Iraq at the same price the Iraqi government charges their own citizens? 

Our response to this question is based on information that DOD designated as For 

Official Use Only (FOUO). We submitted our response to your staff in a separate 

correspondence on August 6, 2008. [See page 32.] 

Mr. DODARO. Regarding your question to what extent is the U.S. government insisting on metering at Iraqi oil refineries? 

Metering is needed to achieve financial transparency and accountability over oil 

resources in Iraq. As GAO reported in May 2007,20 an improved metering system 

has been a U.S. and international donor priority since 2004 but has faced delays 

in its implementation. In 1996, the UN first cited the lack of oil metering when Iraq 

was under UN sanctions. In March 2004, the International Advisory and Monitoring 

Board (IAMB), charged with overseeing the Development Fund for Iraq, recommended the expeditious installation of metering equipment, in accordance with 

standard oil industry practices. According to IAMB, in June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority had approved a budget to replace, repair, and calibrate the metering system on Iraq’s oil pipeline network and to contract the metering of Iraq’s 

oil resources. However, the oil metering contract was not completed due to security 

and technical issues. In June 2006, IAMB reported that the Iraqi government had 

entered into an agreement with Shell Oil Company to serve as a consultant for the 

Ministry of Oil on metering and calibrating that would include the establishment, 

within the next 2 years, of a measuring system for the flow of oil, gas, and related 

products within Iraq and in export and import operations. GAO had recommended 

that the State Department work with the Ministry of Oil to set milestones and assign resources to expedite efforts to establish an effective metering system for the 
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21 International Advisory and Monitoring Board for Iraq, Development Fund For Iraq: Statement of Cash Receipts and Payments for the Year Ended 31 December 2007 (Baghdad, July 

2008). 22GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Governance, Essential Services and Oversight Issues, GAO– 

04–902R (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004). 

oil sector. State responded that the Iraqi government, and not the U.S. government, 

was responsible for taking actions on this recommendation. 

In 2008, after we issued our report, IAMB published a report that found that 

Iraqi government progress in installing meters had been slow.21 Some metering had 

been installed at oil terminals; however, there was no metering in the oil fields. Further, some refineries reported that even when they had metering systems, these systems were not utilized because they required calibration or repair. According to 

IAMB’s auditors, these systems needed to be calibrated in accordance with the Committee of Calibration and Measurement. The auditors found that the absence of an 

overall comprehensive system of controls over oil resulted in unreconciled differences between oil extraction, production, export sales, and internal usage. In July 

2008, a State Department oil expert stated that the U.S. government completed its 

metering project at the Al-Basrah oil port in southern Iraq. [See page 33.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. GINGREY 

Mr. DODARO. In response to what progress has the United States made in helping 

Iraq provide electricity to the Iraqi people, as compared with the level of electricity 

under Saddam Hussein’s regime and shortly after the initial phase of the U.S. military operation? 

Since March 2003, the administration has used a number of different metrics for 

determining progress in providing electricity to the Iraqi people. For example, we 

reported that as of May 2004, the available electrical service in Iraq’s provinces— 

as measured in hours of power per day, by province—had not improved substantially from the situation before the war but was more equitably distributed among 

the provinces.22 Although some improvement in service was made earlier in 2004, 

the situation deteriorated due to the worsening security situation and increasing demand as of May 2004. At that time, 8 of Iraq’s 18 provinces had electricity for an 

average of 8 or fewer hours a day, and 9 had electricity for between 9 and 15 hours 

daily (see fig. 1). 
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As of August 2008, the Departments of State and Defense were using the Iraqis’ 

ability to meet demand from the national grid as indicator of progress in the electricity sector. Comparable supply and demand data for March 2003 are not available. Figure 2 illustrates the trend in supply from the national grid and estimated 

demand since January 1, 2004. According to the State Department, daily electricity 

demand for August 25 to August 31 was 7 percent above the same period last year. 

Daily supply from the grid was 2 percent below the year-earlier period and met 47 

percent of demand, compared with 51 percent for the year-earlier period. [See page 

14.] 
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24DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress in Accordance with the 

Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, Section 9010, P.L. 109–289 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 2006). 25GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities, GAO–05–872 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005). 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MURPHY 

Mr. DODARO. Regarding your question has the U.S. Government funded public 

opinion polls—classified or unclassified—in Iraq? 

The U.S. government has funded public opinion polls in Iraq. For example, a November 2006 DOD report contains Multinational Force-Iraq polling data on the Iraqi 

public’s perceptions of security, as well as State Department polling data on the 

Iraqi public’s confidence in the Iraqi government’s ability to improve the situation 

in Iraq.24 Further, in the past, the U.S. Agency for International Development funded Iraq Quality of Life Survey Reports through its Local Governance Program that 

provided important information about the level of access to water and sanitation 

services and Iraqi satisfaction with those services.25 Contractors, working with local 

Iraqis as survey enumerators, surveyed Iraqis about a number of issues, including 

their access to and satisfaction with essential services. Although certain areas could 

not be surveyed due to security constraints, the survey reports provided data for 

each of Iraq’s 18 governorates, as well as nationwide data. [See page 30.] 

Æ