UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1936

LESLIE PATTERSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DENISE LAWHORN,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:15-cv-00477-LMB-JFA)

Submitted: March 29, 2017 Decided: April 21, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James J. O’Keeffe, IV, JOHNSON, ROSEN & O’KEEFFE, LLC, Roanoke, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of 

Virginia, Rhodes B. Ritenour, Deputy Attorney General, Nicholas 

F. Simopoulos, Senior Assistant Attorney General, John G. Butler 

III, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Leslie Patterson appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to a former criminal investigator for the 

Virginia Department of Taxation, Denise Lawhorn. Lawhorn swore 

out six felony complaints and seven misdemeanor complaints 

against Patterson for violating Virginia Code provisions. The 

felony complaints alleged that Patterson underreported his 

income on his 2007 through 2010 tax returns and took credit for 

2007 and 2008 employee withholding taxes that he did not pay to 

the Commonwealth of Virginia. The misdemeanor complaints 

alleged that Patterson, as president of his church, failed to 

pay the church’s 2009 and 2010 quarterly withholding taxes. The 

Commonwealth later entered orders of nolle prosequi for all 13 

complaints. Patterson then sued Lawhorn for malicious 

prosecution under Virginia law and for a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The district court 

granted summary judgment to Lawhorn on both grounds, and 

Patterson appealed.

We review a district court’s award of summary judgment de 

novo, viewing the facts and inferences reasonably drawn from 

those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Core 

Commc’ns, Inc. v. Verizon Md. LLC, 744 F.3d 310, 320 (4th Cir. 

2014). Summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine 

dispute of material fact remains and the record shows that the 
3

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a).

We begin with the malicious prosecution claim. Where, as 

here, such a claim arises from criminal proceedings, Virginia 

law generally disfavors it. Reilly v. Shepherd, 643 S.E.2d 216, 

218 (Va. 2007). To prove malicious prosecution, a plaintiff 

must show that the prosecutor: (1) lacked probable cause, (2) 

possessed malice, (3) caused the case to be brought against the 

plaintiff or cooperated in that effort, and (4) terminated the 

prosecution in a manner favorable to the plaintiff. Id.

We conclude that the district court properly granted

summary judgment to Lawhorn on this claim because Patterson has 

failed to show Lawhorn lacked probable cause for either the 

felony or misdemeanor complaints. In this context, probable 

cause means that the prosecutor had “knowledge of such a state 

of facts and circumstances as excite the belief in a reasonable 

mind, acting on such facts and circumstances, that the plaintiff

[wa]s guilty of the crime of which he [wa]s suspected.” See id.

at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on 

conversations with church personnel and a review of Patterson’s 

accounts, Lawhorn had probable cause for all the complaints. 

Contrary to Patterson’s argument on appeal, Lawhorn did not need 

to consider Patterson’s innocent explanations for his tax 

discrepancies because any such self-serving statements could be 
4

disbelieved when compared to contrary documentary evidence. 

Because Patterson has not met his burden to show that Lawhorn 

lacked probable cause, his malicious prosecution claim must 

fail.

For the same reason, Patterson’s § 1983 claim also fails. 

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove a person, acting 

under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a 

constitutional right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Patterson alleges that 

Lawhorn deprived him of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, 

which requires warrants to be based on probable cause and for 

seizures to be reasonable. U.S. Const., amend. IV. As 

described above, the record shows that Lawhorn had probable 

cause, meaning that she had “enough evidence to warrant the 

belief of a reasonable [prosecutor] that an offense has been or 

is being committed.” Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68

(2002). Because the record supports a finding of probable cause 

regardless of any deficiencies in the information set forth in

the warrants, the district court properly granted summary 

judgment to Lawhorn on the § 1983 claim.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED