America’s 

Strategic 

Posture

The Final Report of the 

Congressional Commission 

on the Strategic Posture 

of the United States

William J. Perry, Chairman

James R. Schlesinger, Vice-Chairman

Advance Copy 

Harry Cartland

John Foster

John Glenn 

Morton Halperin

Lee Hamilton

Fred Ikle

Keith Payne

Bruce Tarter

Ellen Williams

James Woolsey
America’s Strategic Posture

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS

Washington, D.C.

America’s

Strategic

Posture

The Final Report of the

Congressional Commission

on the Strategic Posture

of the United States

William J. Perry, Chairman

James R. Schlesinger, Vice-chairman

Harry Cartland Fred Ikle

John Foster Keith Payne

John Glenn Bruce Tarter

Morton Halperin Ellen Williams

Lee Hamilton James Woolsey
The views, findings, and recommendations of this report are those of the 

Commission itself, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United 

States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036-3011

www.usip.org

First published 2009

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of 

American National Standards for Information Science—Permanence of Paper 

for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

ISBN 978-1-60127-045-0
Contents

Letter from the Facilitating Organization vii

Chairman’s Preface ix

Executive Summary xv

Introduction 1

1. On Challenges and Opportunities 3

2. On the Nuclear Posture 19

3. On Missile Defense 31

4. On Declaratory Policy 35

5. On the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 39

6. On the Nuclear Weapons Complex 47

7. On Arms Control 65

8. On Nonproliferation 73

9. On the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 81

10. On Prevention and Protection 89

11. Closing Observations 93

Compilation of Findings and Recommendations 97

Appendices

1. Glossary 109

2. Estimated World Nuclear Warhead Arsenals 111

3. Enabling Legislation 113

4. Interim Report 119

5. Commission Plenary Sessions Schedule 129

6. Consultations 131

7. Expert Working Groups 137

8. Commissioner Biographies 141

9. Commission Support Staff 157

vii

Letter from the

Facilitating Organization

The initiative for a bipartisan, independent, forward-looking assessment of America’s strategic posture came from the U.S. Congress in 2008. The 

United States Institute of Peace has been privileged to serve as the project 

facilitator while the Congressional Commission investigated, discussed, 

and crafted its final report. As a national institution established and funded 

by Congress, it is dedicated to playing an active part in the prevention, 

management, and resolution of threats to international peace. The Institute 

additionally helps to adapt the country’s foreign policy and security practices 

to meet contemporary challenges. Its status as an independent, nonpartisan 

national organization ensures even-handed analysis and the ability to foster 

bipartisan action.

There is no greater global imperative than that of securing the nuclear 

peace of the world. Assessing the appropriate role for nuclear weapons, 

arms control initiatives, and nonproliferation programs are vital to defining 

America’s strategic posture. This report comes at a time when threats have 

changed and the world has moved closer to a proliferation “tipping point.” 

Armed conflicts, ethnic and religious strife, extremism, terrorism, and the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction all pose significant challenges 

to security and development worldwide. The spread of nuclear weapons 

and technologies adds a dangerous dimension to that global environment. 

Implementation of this final report’s recommendations will demand a tremendous amount of political will and cooperation by the Executive and 

Legislative branches of our government, and require public education and 

support for the policies. It is my hope that the United States Institute of Peace 

will continue to provide a forum for expert discussion and a platform for 

public education on these issues.

I am deeply grateful to former Secretaries of Defense William S. Perry and 

James R. Schlesinger for their leadership of this Congressional Commission 

on the Strategic Posture of the United States and to all the commissioners for 

their hard work and dedication to this project: former senator John Glenn, Dr. 

John Foster, former congressman Lee Hamilton, ambassador Jim Woolsey, 

Dr. Mort Halperin, Dr. Keith Payne, Dr. Ellen Williams, Dr. Harry Cartland, 

Dr. Bruce Tarter, and Dr. Fred Ikle.
viii America’s Strategic Position

I also want to thank the staff who worked on the project, and all the experts who contributed knowledge of national security, arms control, nuclear 

technology, and military affairs. In particular, I want to acknowledge the 

work of Paul Hughes, the Commission’s executive director and senior program officer in the Center for Conflict Analyses and Prevention at the Institute. I also want to thank the Institute for Defense Analyses for its excellent 

support of this endeavor.

Reaching agreement on the strategic posture of the United States is no 

easy task. It will now fall to the President, Congress, and the American 

people to demonstrate the wisdom and judgment to carry out the recommendations and ideas expressed in this report. I have no doubt they will 

meet the challenge.

Sincerely,

Richard H. Solomon, President

United States Institute of Peace
ix

Chairman’s Preface

Last year the Congress authorized the formation of a commission to conduct a review of the strategic posture of the United States and to 

make recommendations on how to move forward. Congress then appointed 

a 12-person bipartisan group to conduct this review, and asked me to be 

Chairman and Jim Schlesinger to be Vice-Chairman. This Commission has 

deliberated for the last eleven months and is now prepared to report to the 

administration, to the Congress, and to the American people. Our observations, findings, and recommendations follow. This preface offers some personal observations to frame and help summarize our work. The Commission 

agreed that, as long as other nations have nuclear weapons, the U.S. must 

continue to safeguard its security by maintaining an appropriately effective 

nuclear deterrent force. Safeguarding U.S. security also requires that the 

United States should continue to lead international efforts to prevent the 

proliferation of nuclear weapons, reduce the number of nuclear weapons 

worldwide, and provide better protection for the residual nuclear forces and 

fissile material.

This basic strategy has deep foundations in U.S. policy; nevertheless 

we recognize that it will be difficult to execute. It will require a thoughtful 

analysis of the new security problems we face today in order to arrive at the 

right policy balance between these two different ways of safeguarding our 

security. It will require U.S. leadership abroad, with an emphasis on leadership by example. And it will require bipartisan consensus at home on these 

transcendentally important nuclear issues. The American nuclear posture 

has been, and will continue to be, highly controversial, including among 

commission members. Nevertheless our commission was able to reach consensus language on most of the critical issues related to military capabilities, 

nonproliferation initiatives, and arms control strategies of the United States. 

Commission members came from a broad spectrum of the American political scene, and, not surprisingly, faced major challenges in trying to reach 

consensus. Despite our differences, we were able to find consensus on all 

but one significant policy issue. We hope that the Executive Branch and the 

Congress will also face these critical policy issues with a bipartisan spirit.

I believe that this is a moment of opportunity but also urgency. The opportunity arises from the arrival of the new administration in Washington and 

the top-down reassessment that must now begin of national security strategy 
x America’s Strategic Posture

and of the purposes of U.S. nuclear weapons. The opportunity also arises 

because the Russian government has indicated a readiness to undertake 

a serious dialogue with the United States on strategic issues. The urgency 

arises from the imminent danger of nuclear terrorism if we pass a tipping 

point in nuclear proliferation, and because of an accumulation of difficult 

decisions affecting our nuclear posture.

Nuclear weapons have safeguarded our security for decades during the 

Cold War by deterring an attack on the United States or its allies. We will 

need to maintain this deterrence capability for some years to come. On the 

other hand, if nuclear weapons were to fall into the hands of a terror organization, they could pose an extremely serious threat to our security, and one 

for which deterrence would not be applicable. This is not a theoretical danger. 

Al Qaeda, for example, has declared that obtaining a nuclear weapon is a 

“holy duty” for its members. Fortunately, no terror group is able to build a 

nuclear weapon from scratch, but as new nations achieve a nuclear weapons 

capability, the probability increases that one of these new nuclear powers will 

either sell or lose control of its fissile material or even one of its bombs. This 

is also not a theoretical danger, as illustrated by A. Q. Khan’s black market 

in nuclear materials and technology. Thus, preventing nuclear terrorism is 

closely tied to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But we are in 

danger of losing the battle to stop proliferation. Under the guise of a nuclear 

power program, North Korea has developed a small nuclear arsenal in the 

last few years. Iran appears to be following in its footsteps, and other nations, 

particularly in the Mideast, are starting nuclear power programs using Iran 

as a model. Thus, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissile materials 

is dangerously close to a “tipping point.”

While the programs that maintain our deterrence force are primarily 

national, the programs that prevent proliferation and safeguard nuclear 

weapons and fissile material are primarily international. Indeed, it is clear 

that we cannot meet our goal of reducing the proliferation threat without 

substantial international cooperation, for example in bringing effective global 

economic pressure on Iran and North Korea. But cooperation of other nations increasingly depends on whether these nations perceive that the U.S. 

and Russia are moving to seriously reduce the salience of nuclear weapons 

in their own force posture and are continuing to make significant reductions in their nuclear arsenal. This has been called into question with the 

new nuclear programs and rhetoric in Russia, the debate in the U.S. about 

nuclear weapons being used for tactical roles (nuclear bunker busters) and 

by a perceived stall in formal arms control treaties. Thus U.S. nuclear forces 

must be postured to have the needed deterrence benefits but also to promote 

the international cooperation needed for preventing and rolling back proliferation. In any complex strategy involving multiple goals and policies a 
Chairman’s Preface xi

balance must be struck that promotes complementary effects. But sometimes 

there are tradeoffs and these must be faced squarely. It is possible that the 

different policies to achieve these different security requirements will be in 

conflict. In fact much of the disagreement in our commission arose because 

some commissioners give a priority to dealing with one security need while 

others give a priority to dealing with the other. But throughout the deliberations of the commission, all of our members sought to strike a balance that 

supports to reasonable levels both of these security needs. To a large extent, 

we were able to meet that goal.

The need to strike such a balance has been with us at least since the ending of the Cold War. President Clinton’s nuclear posture spoke of the need to 

“lead but hedge.” That policy called for the United States to lead the world 

in nuclear arms reductions and in programs to prevent the proliferation of 

nuclear weapons, while at the same time maintaining a nuclear deterrent 

force that hedged against adverse geopolitical developments. The leadership 

aspect of this policy was demonstrated most vividly by a cooperative program with Russia, established under the bipartisan Nunn-Lugar Program, 

which was responsible for the dismantlement of more than 4,000 nuclear 

weapons and assisted Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in removing all of 

their nuclear weapons. U.S. leadership was also demonstrated by signing the 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiating with Russia a new 

arms control treaty, neither of which, however, was ratified by the Senate. 

The Bush administration initially took a different view of overall strategic 

priorities, but last year Secretary Gates explicitly reaffirmed that the American nuclear posture would be based on “lead but hedge.”

President Obama has stated that the United States should work towards 

the goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons. But he has also said 

that until that goal is reached, he is committed to maintain a nuclear deterrent that is safe, secure, and reliable. This is, in a sense, the most recent 

formulation of the “lead but hedge” policy. All of the commission members 

believe that reaching the ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would 

require a fundamental change in geopolitics. Indeed, if the vision of nuclear 

elimination is thought of as the “top of the mountain,” it is clear that it cannot 

be seen at this time. But I believe that we should be heading up the mountain 

to a “base camp” that would be safer than where we are today. And I also believe that getting the international political support necessary to move to this 

base camp will be greatly facilitated if the United States is seen as working 

for the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. At the base camp, we would 

have nuclear forces that are safe, secure and can reliably serve the perceived 

need for deterrence and extended deterrence; we would be headed in the direction of nuclear elimination; and our nuclear forces would be stable—that 

is, they should be sustainable even under normal fluctuations in geopolitical 
xii America’s Strategic Posture

conditions. This base camp concept serves as an organizing principle for my 

own thinking about our strategic posture, since it allows the United States 

to both lead and hedge. While some of the commissioners do not accept the 

feasibility or even the desirability of seeking global elimination, all commissioners accept the view that the United States must support programs that 

both lead and hedge. That is, all commissioners support programs that move 

in two parallel paths—one path which reduces nuclear dangers by maintaining our deterrence, and the other which reduces nuclear dangers through 

arms control and international programs to prevent proliferation.

The first path—reducing nuclear dangers through deterrence—includes 

clarifying our declaratory policy by stating that our nuclear forces are intended for deterrence of an attack against the United States or its allies, and 

would be used only as a defensive last resort. This policy would by backed 

up with programs that assure that our nuclear forces are safe, secure, and 

reliable, and in sufficient quantities to perform their deterrent tasks. Our report spells out a number of steps needed to maintain the effectiveness of the 

stockpile as long as it is needed. Foremost among these is providing robust 

support for the technical programs at the weapon laboratories, including 

continuing to push the frontiers of computing and simulation and enhancing 

the laboratories’ experimental capabilities. The weapons labs have achieved 

remarkable success with the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the Life 

Extension Program, but this will become more difficult as the weapons age. 

Moreover, continued success is endangered by recent personnel and funding cuts. We believe that the technical staff of the weapons labs is a unique 

national asset, and that this should be recognized by giving the labs an 

expanded national security role, to include fundamental research, energy 

technologies, and intelligence support. We recommend ways of enabling 

that expanded role. Besides dealing with the intellectual infrastructure of 

the weapons complex, we also make recommendations on how to sustain 

the aging physical infrastructure.

The second path—reducing nuclear dangers by arms control and preventing proliferation—includes negotiating arms reduction treaties with Russia 

that make significant reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of Russia and the 

United States, beginning with a follow-on treaty to replace the Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (START) before it expires at the end of this year. We note 

that follow-on treaties entailing deeper reductions would require finding 

a way of dealing with very difficult problems, to include “tactical” nuclear forces, reserve weapons and bringing in other nuclear powers. We also 

recommend seeking a strategic dialogue with Russia broader than nuclear 

treaties, to include civilian nuclear energy, ballistic missile defenses, space 

systems, and ways of improving warning systems and increasing decision 

time. Although the dialogue with Russia is most important in the nuclear 
Chairman’s Preface xiii

field, we also recommend renewing strategic dialogue with a broad set of 

states interested in strategic stability, including not just Russia and NATO 

allies but also China and U.S. allies and friends in Asia. Diplomatic efforts 

to prevent nuclear proliferation by Iran and to reverse proliferation by North 

Korea should also be reenergized. Commissioners also recommend that we 

seek global cooperation to deal with other potential proliferation concerns 

arising from the anticipated global expansion of civilian nuclear power. We 

agree that the United States should seek an international Fissile Material 

Cutoff Treaty, and prepare carefully for the NPT review conference in 2010. 

However, we have been unable to reach agreement on the ratification of the 

CTBT. My own view is that ratification of the CTBT would substantially 

enhance U.S. security and is an essential step in putting the United States in 

a leadership position in dealing with proliferation problems. However, the 

commission is divided on this issue, with some of the commissioners believing that ratification could endanger our security. In our report, we spell out 

the reasons behind these two conflicting points of view while also making 

some recommendations for the ratification review.

The commissioners know what direction they want to see the world headed. We reject the vision of a world defined over the next decade or two by 

a collapse of the nonproliferation regime, a cascade of proliferation to new 

states, an associated dramatic rise in the risks of nuclear terrorism, and a 

renewal of competition for nuclear advantage among the major powers. As 

pragmatic experts, we embrace a different vision. We see a world in which 

the occasional nonproliferation failure is counter-balanced by the occasional 

rollback of some and the continued restraint by the many. We see a world in 

which the risks of nuclear terrorism are steadily reduced through stronger 

cooperative measures to control their access to materials, technology, and 

expertise. And we see a world of cooperation among the major powers that 

ensures strategic stability and order, and steadily diminishes reliance on 

nuclear weapons to preserve world peace. We believe that implementation 

of the strategy we recommend will help the United States lead the global 

effort to bring this world into being.

xv

Executive Summary

U.S. nuclear strategy begins with the central dilemma that nuclear weapons 

are both the greatest potential threat to our way of life and important guarantors of U.S. security. A breakdown of international nuclear order would 

be a catastrophe for the United States among many others. Preservation of 

that order requires that we work to reduce nuclear dangers by effective deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation.

This is a moment of opportunity to revise and renew U.S. nuclear strategy, but also a moment of urgency. The opportunity arises from the arrival 

of a new administration in Washington and the top-down reassessment 

that must now begin of national security strategy, of approaches to nuclear 

security, and of the purposes of U.S. nuclear weapons and their supporting capabilities. The urgency follows, internationally, from the danger that we may be 

close to a tipping point in nuclear proliferation and, domestically, from an accumulation of delayed decisions about the nuclear 

weapon program.

In addressing the challenges of nuclear 

security for the decades ahead, the United 

States must pursue a comprehensive strategy. 

So long as nuclear dangers remain, it must 

have a strong deterrent that is effective in 

meeting its security needs and those of its 

allies. This is a challenge that has changed 

fundamentally over the last two decades—

and largely for the better. The nuclear deterrent of the United States need 

not play anything like the central role that it did for decades in U.S. military 

policy and national security strategy. But it remains crucial for some important problems.

While deterrence plays an essential role in reducing nuclear dangers, it is 

not the only means for doing so, and accordingly the United States must seek 

additional cooperative measures of a political kind, including for example 

arms control and nonproliferation. This is a time when these approaches can 

be renewed and reenergized.

This is a moment of opportunity to revise and renew U.S. 

nuclear strategy, but also a 

moment of urgency.... The urgency follows, internationally, 

from the danger that we may 

be close to a tipping point in 

nuclear proliferation and, domestically, from an accumulation of delayed decisions 

about the nuclear weapon 

program. 
xvi America’s Strategic Posture

These components of strategy must be integrated into a comprehensive 

approach. They can be mutually complementary and self-reinforcing. But 

sometimes there are conflicts and trade-offs, and these must be clearly identified and hard choices made.

The body of this report includes a total of nearly 100 findings and recommendations. These elaborate constructive steps that can be taken now to 

adapt the components of strategy to the challenges and opportunities in 

front of the nation. The main themes of these findings and recommendations 

are as follows.

On the security environment: Over the last two decades, the security 

environment of the United States has changed considerably and generally 

for the better. The threat of nuclear Armageddon has largely receded. At 

the height of the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal numbered over 32,000 

weapons and the Soviet arsenal over 45,000; today, the United States has 

reduced its arsenal of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 

approximately 2,000 and Russia is not far behind. The two have also withdrawn about 14,000 tactical nuclear weapons from forward deployments. 

But new challenges have emerged, especially the threat of nuclear terrorism and increased proliferation. The opportunities to further engage Russia and China, as well as U.S. allies and other partners, to meet these new 

challenges are rising. President Obama has pledged to work for the global 

elimination of nuclear weapons, but until 

that happens, to maintain a safe, secure, and 

reliable deterrent force. The conditions that 

might make possible the global elimination 

of nuclear weapons are not present today and 

their creation would require a fundamental 

transformation of the world political order. 

But this report spells out many steps that can 

significantly reduce nuclear dangers and that 

are available now.

On the U.S. nuclear posture: The principal functions of the U.S. nuclear 

posture are to create the conditions in which nuclear weapons are never used, 

to assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, and to discourage 

unwelcome competition while encouraging strategic cooperation. Though 

the Cold War calculus to achieve these goals was effective at the time, the 

U.S. nuclear posture needs to change to cope with the new, more complex 

and fluid threat environment. A great deal of change has already occurred. 

The nuclear force of the United States is a small fraction of what it was at the 

end of the Cold War and the U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons in national 

military strategy and national security strategy has been substantially reduced. This process can continue, assuming that Russia is willing to remain 

The nuclear force of the United States is a small fraction of 

what it was at the end of the 

Cold War and the U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons in 

national military strategy and 

national security strategy has 

been reduced. 
Executive Summary xvii

involved in the process. The sizing of U.S. forces remains overwhelmingly 

driven by the requirements of essential equivalence and strategic stability 

with Russia. For the deterrence of attacks by regional aggressors and even 

China, the force structure requirements are relatively modest. The focus 

on Russia is not because the United States and Russia are enemies; they are 

not. No one seriously contemplates a direct Russian attack on the United 

States. Some U.S. allies located closer to Russia, 

however, are fearful of Russia and its tactical 

nuclear forces. The imbalance in non-strategic 

nuclear weapons, which greatly favors Russia, 

is of rising concern and an illustration of the 

new challenges of strategic stability as reductions in strategic weapons proceed. The need to 

reassure U.S. allies and also to hedge against a 

possible turn for the worse in Russia (or China) 

points to the fact that the U.S. nuclear posture must be designed to address 

a very broad set of U.S. objectives, including not just deterrence of enemies 

in time of crisis and war but also assurance of our allies and dissuasion 

of potential adversaries. Indeed, the assurance function of the force is as 

important as ever. The triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems should be 

maintained for the immediate future and this will require some difficult 

investment choices. The same is true for delivery systems of non-strategic 

nuclear weapons.

On missile defense: Missile defenses can play a useful role in supporting 

the basic objectives of deterrence, broadly defined. Defenses that are effective 

against regional aggressors are a valuable component of the U.S. strategic 

posture. The United States should develop and, where appropriate, deploy 

missile defenses against regional nuclear aggressors, including against limited long-range threats. These can also be beneficial for limiting damage if 

deterrence fails. The United States should ensure that its actions do not lead 

Russia or China to take actions that increase the threat to the United States 

and its allies and friends.

On declaratory policy: Declaratory policy is a signal of U.S. intent to 

both friends and prospective enemies and thus an important aspect of the 

overall strategic posture. To be effective, it must be understood to reflect the 

intentions of national leadership. While an element of calculated ambiguity 

remains essential, there should be enough clarity that potential foes will 

be deterred. The United States should underscore that it conceives of and 

prepares for the use of nuclear weapons only for the protection of itself and 

its allies in extreme circumstances.

On the nuclear weapon stockpile: So long as it continues to rely on nuclear deterrence, the United States requires a stockpile of nuclear weapons 

The United States should 

underscore that it conceives 

of and prepares for the use 

of nuclear weapons only for 

the protection of itself and 

its allies in extreme circumstances. 
xviii America’s Strategic Posture

that are safe, secure, and reliable, and whose threatened use in military 

conflict would be credible. The Stockpile Stewardship Program and the Life 

Extension Program have been remarkably successful in refurbishing and 

modernizing the stockpile to meet these criteria, but cannot be counted on 

for the indefinite future. The Commission observes that the debate over the 

proposed Reliable Replacement Warhead revealed a lot of confusion about 

what was intended, what is needed, and what constitutes “new” and believes 

that, as the nation moves forward, it must be clear about what is being initiated (and what is not) as well as what makes a weapon “new” and what 

does not. Alternatives to stockpile stewardship and life extension involve 

to varying degrees the reuse and/or redesign of components and different 

engineering solutions. The decision on which approach is best should be 

made on a type-by-type basis as they age. So long as modernization proceeds 

within the framework of existing U.S. policy, it should encounter minimum 

political difficulty. As a matter of U.S. policy, the United States does not 

produce fissile materials and does not conduct nuclear explosive tests. Also 

the United States does not currently seek new weapons with new military 

characteristics. Within this framework, it should seek the possible benefits 

of improved safety, security, and reliability available to it.

On the nuclear weapons complex: The physical infrastructure is in serious need of transformation. The National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) has a reasonable plan but it lacks the needed funding. The intellectual infrastructure is also in trouble. Redesignating the weapons laboratories 

as national security laboratories and strengthening their cooperation with 

the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security and also the 

intelligence community can help with both of these problems. NNSA has 

not achieved the original intent of the law that created it; it lacks the needed 

autonomy. This requires that the NNSA Act be amended to establish NNSA 

as a separate agency reporting to the President through the Secretary of Energy, along with other provisions aimed at ensuring the needed autonomy.

On arms control: The moment appears ripe for a renewal of arms control 

with Russia, and this bodes well for a continued reduction in the nuclear 

arsenal. The United States and Russia should pursue a step-by-step approach 

and take a modest first step to ensure that there 

is a successor to START I when it expires at the 

end of 2009. Beyond a modest incremental reduction in operationally deployed strategic 

nuclear weapons, the arms control process becomes much more complex as new factors are 

introduced. One of the most important factors 

will be the imbalance of non-strategic nuclear weapons. In support of its 

arms control interests and interest in strategic stability more generally, the 

The moment appears ripe for 

a renewal of arms control 

with Russia, and this bodes 

well for a continued reduction in the nuclear arsenal.
Executive Summary xix

United States should pursue a much broader and more ambitious set of strategic dialogues with not just Russia but also China and U.S. allies in both 

Europe and Asia.

On nonproliferation: This is also an opportune moment to reenergize 

nonproliferation. Success in advancing U.S. nonproliferation interests requires U.S. leadership. Despite the occasional 

failure of nonproliferation, the historical track 

record is good, and there is good reason to 

hope for continued success in the years ahead. 

The risks of a proliferation “tipping point” and 

of nuclear terrorism underscore the urgency of 

acting now. The United States should pursue a 

broad agenda to strengthen the international treaty system and the institutions that support its effective functioning. It is especially important that it 

prepare to play a leadership role at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

On the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): The Commission has 

no agreed position on whether ratification of the CTBT should proceed. But 

recognizing that the President has called for the Senate to reconsider U.S. 

ratification, the Commission recommends a number of steps to enable Senate deliberation, including preparation of a comprehensive net assessment of 

benefits, costs, and risks that updates arguments from a decade ago.

On prevention and protection: Since nonproliferation does not always 

succeed and deterrence is sometimes unreliable, the overall strategy must 

be supplemented with additional steps to prevent nuclear proliferation and 

terrorism and protect ourselves from its consequences. The Commission supports measures such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and also encourages stronger “whole 

of government” approaches to reduce the risks of nuclear smuggling into the 

United States. We note also that the United States has done little to reduce 

its vulnerability to attack with electromagnetic pulse weapons and recommend that current investments in modernizing the national power grid take 

account of this risk.

On visions of the future: The Congress charged the Commission to look 

to the long term in formulating its recommendations about the U.S. strategic 

posture. As we have debated our findings and recommendations, it has become clear that we have very different visions of what might be possible in 

the long term. Fundamentally, this reflects our differences over whether the 

conditions can ever be created that might enable the elimination of nuclear 

weapons. But our debates have also brought home to us that, despite our 

differences over the long term, we share to a very significant degree a vision of the nearer term. And it is a hopeful vision. We reject the notion that 

This is also an opportune moment to reenergize nonproliferation. Success in advancing 

U.S. nonproliferation interests 

requires U.S. leadership. 
xx America’s Strategic Posture

somehow it is inevitable that international nuclear order will collapse. On 

the contrary—the past successes of the United States and its international 

partners in meeting and reducing nuclear dangers make us more hopeful for the future. We 

embrace the possibility that over the next decade 

or two nuclear dangers will be further reduced. 

Despite our many differences of opinion about 

possibilities and priorities, we have come together around a strategy that offers pragmatic 

steps for bringing this vision closer to reality. It is 

firmly grounded in the strategic tradition of the 

United States in balancing deterrence and other 

means, including principally arms control and 

nonproliferation, to reduce nuclear dangers. This 

strategy is also essential to the preservation of the tradition of nuclear nonuse, which is now deeply rooted in six decades of experience and strongly 

serves U.S. interests.

[W]e have come together 

around a strategy that offers pragmatic steps.... It is 

firmly grounded in the strategic tradition of the United 

States in balancing deterrence 

and other means, including 

principally arms control and 

nonproliferation, to reduce 

nuclear dangers.
1

Introduction

The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United 

States was chartered by the Congress to “examine and make recommendations with respect to the long-term strategic posture of the 

United States.” The legislation defined the posture broadly, to include not 

just the nation’s nuclear deterrent. It also asked that the Commission look 

broadly at the elements of national strategy, including both military and 

political instruments. The Commission was charged with drawing conclusions, developing findings, and making recommendations. This final report 

builds upon and extends our interim report of December 2008. We are grateful for this opportunity to serve the nation and look forward to continued 

engagement on these issues.

The Commission organized its work to address the following specific 

questions:

•	 What factors in the external security environment should inform

U.S. policy and strategy?

•	 How has U.S. nuclear and strategic policy evolved since the end of

the Cold War?

•	 What role should nuclear weapons and U.S. strategic military capabilities more generally (including missile defense) play today in U.S. 

military strategy and national security strategy?

•	 How should U.S. forces be postured? How many nuclear weapons

are “enough?”

•	 How can political instruments be used to shape the security environment? What can arms control contribute? How can nonproliferation be strengthened?

•	 What is the most efficient and effective way to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable deterrent?

This final report documents the consensus reached by the Commission. 

Individual commissioners have expressed their support for its general conclusions and specific findings and recommendations, except in a few instances where specific dissents are noted. But the Commission has not sought 

to secure full agreement on the precise wording of each argument and every 

point and thus the views of individual commissioners may not fully align 

with each and every part of the report.
2 America’s Strategic Posture

The report proceeds as follows. It begins with a review of the security 

environment. Chapter 1 describes how that environment has evolved over 

recent decades and highlights the key factors in the current environment that 

should inform U.S. policy and strategy. A key argument developed here is 

that this environment has evolved in distinct phases, each with its own set 

of challenges and opportunities. U.S. policy and strategy must be tailored to 

the specific challenges and opportunities of the current period. A balanced 

approach is needed, one that integrates military and political instruments 

of national power in a comprehensive approach to meet and reduce nuclear 

dangers.

The remainder of the report elaborates how this should be accomplished 

in the years ahead. Chapters 2 through 6 address different aspects of the 

U.S. strategic posture, including the nuclear force structure, missile defense, 

declaratory policy, the stockpile of nuclear weapons, and the weapons complex. Chapters 7 through 9 address different aspects of the political strategy 

supporting U.S. national objectives, including arms control and nonproliferation. This section includes a separate discussion of the Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty. Chapter 10 addresses additional preventive and protection 

measures. The report closes with some observations about the nature of the 

consensus achieved by the Commission. Appendices provide supplemental 

information about the work of the Commission.
3

1

On Challenges and Opportunities

The formulation of policy and strategy should begin with a sound assessment of the international security environment. That assessment must clearly identify the specific dangers posed by nuclear weapons, 

both to the security of the United States and its allies and to international 

security more broadly. It must be specific about the policy challenges associated with those dangers. Such an assessment must also clearly identify the 

specific opportunities to reduce those dangers. As should be expected, these 

challenges and opportunities evolve over time, as international circumstances 

change. A brief historical review helps to bring home how much the international security environment has evolved over recent decades, and with it U.S. 

policy and strategy. It also helps to bring home some important elements of 

continuity in both the security environment and U.S. policy and strategy.

The Cold War

In the immediate aftermath of the U.S. use of nuclear weapons to defeat an 

enemy that had caused very great numbers of casualties in World War II, 

there seemed to be a brief opportunity to avert nuclear competition and to 

create an international control regime for nuclear weapons. But this proved 

elusive as the Soviet Union grew increasingly intent on gaining geopolitical 

advantage in Europe and elsewhere in the late 1940s. Thereafter, the challenges for U.S. nuclear policy seemed many and the opportunities few.

The principal nuclear challenge throughout the Cold War was to ensure 

that deterrence functioned effectively. For decades, the United States and its 

allies faced a threat to their very existence from the Soviet Union and the 

Warsaw Pact. Throughout this period, Soviet and Warsaw Pact advantages 

in conventional military forces in Europe were seen as overwhelming. These 

were eventually reinforced by Soviet production of a massive nuclear arsenal 

and its efforts to gain a position of strategic superiority over the West. Accordingly, the United States fashioned a nuclear deterrent essentially to help 
4 America’s Strategic Posture

keep the Cold War from going hot. The United States built a nuclear force designed primarily to deter an attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact 

allies on Western Europe. Doing so helped make U.S. allies more secure and 

it also helped to counter the pressures on them to acquire nuclear weapons 

of their own. To ensure that its threats to use nuclear weapons were seen as 

credible in Moscow, the United States also had to focus on deterring attacks 

on U.S. nuclear forces stationed in the United States.

Maintenance of the U.S. nuclear deterrent required technologically ambitious national programs to ensure military operational effectiveness. 

The perceived needs of deterrence led to the development of a large and 

diverse arsenal. At its height in 1967, the U.S. arsenal of nuclear weapons 

numbered about 32,000 and included warheads for strategic missiles, tactical air-dropped bombs, nuclear artillery shells, nuclear land mines, nuclear 

torpedoes, and nuclear anti-ballistic missile warheads. The Soviet arsenal 

ultimately numbered over 45,000. Other countries, in particular France, the 

United Kingdom, and China, developed nuclear weapons as well, but in far 

smaller numbers—the low hundreds.

A key challenge of this period was to maintain strategic stability even as 

the two sides modernized their strategic arsenals and as the Soviets strived 

for advantage. The United States sought to constrain the nuclear competition 

while also managing it in a way that would limit its costs and risks. Arms 

control played a role in this period in limiting the arms build up (under the 

Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty).

The primary opportunity of the Cold War period was to create a nonproliferation regime. In the 1950s and 1960s, many states faced choices about 

pursuing national nuclear weapons programs and capabilities of their own 

and chose not to do so. Many states also sought the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear science, including primarily for energy production. But 

they were also concerned about the illicit diversion of nuclear science from 

legitimate, civilian activity to military purposes, and from states to non-state 

actors, including criminals and terrorists. Accordingly, it was possible in 

this period to construct a nonproliferation regime. This was done in phases, 

first in the 1950s with the establishment of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency to promote but also police the civilian use of nuclear science and then 

late in the 1960s with the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT). The NPT recognized five states as nuclear-weapon states by virtue 

of their successful tests of nuclear devices prior to negotiation of the treaty 

(the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China) and they made 

a commitment under Article VI to work to end the arms race and ultimately 

relinquish their nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete 

global disarmament. These states are also the five permanent members of 

the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the P-5).
On Challenges and Opportunities 5

This short review of Cold War history brings home a key point: from its 

earliest foundations, U.S. nuclear strategy has been guided by two key imperatives. The first is to reduce nuclear dangers with a deterrent that is strong 

and effective. The second is to utilize arms control and nonproliferation to 

further reduce those dangers. These objectives are self-reinforcing and the 

steps to achieve them should be complementary to the extent possible.

From 1989 to 2009

The collapse of communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe and 

the demise of the Soviet Union had profound implications for U.S. nuclear 

policy and strategy. The challenges became less demanding, and the opportunities relatively more significant. At the same 

time, some new challenges emerged.

 The challenge of deterring Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional attack obviously disappeared. Dramatic steps were taken both bilaterally and unilaterally to stand down from nuclear 

confrontation, end the arms race, and reduce 

common nuclear dangers. Significant reductions in strategic nuclear forces were agreed in 

1991, under the auspices of the Strategic Arms 

Reductions Treaty (START I), and in 2002, under 

the auspices of the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), also known as the Treaty of Moscow. SORT commits 

the United States and Russia to reduce the number of their operationally 

deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 2,200 and 1,700 by the end 

of 2012. In fact, the United States reduced its forces below the upper limit 

in late 2008. This is the lowest number of weapons deployed by the United 

States since the Eisenhower administration.

The end of the Cold War also brought significant reductions of non-strategic nuclear capabilities. Approximately 14,000 tactical nuclear warheads 

were withdrawn from forward deployments by the United States and Russia under the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) agreed by Presidents 

George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991 and Boris Yeltsin in 1992. 

The United States withdrew nuclear artillery shells and warheads for shortrange ballistic missiles and also all nuclear warheads from naval surface 

ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aviation. These initiatives 

were politically binding commitments but also reciprocal in nature. Russia also promised to withdraw capabilities and to consolidate remaining 

non-strategic nuclear warheads at a smaller number of storage sites. These 

[F]rom its earliest foundations, U.S. nuclear strategy 

has been guided by two key 

imperatives. The first is to 

reduce nuclear dangers with 

a deterrent that is strong and 

effective. The second is to 

utilize arms control and nonproliferation to further reduce 

those dangers.
6 America’s Strategic Posture

initiatives included steps to take some of the standing strategic forces off 

alert and to curtail various modernization programs.

The end of the Cold War also brought important questions about the fate 

of nuclear weapons and associated capabilities in states formerly a part of 

the Soviet Union but now independent—Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. 

Through a carefully orchestrated process of political inducements, security 

assurances, and other measures, these states gave up their nuclear weapons 

capabilities.

The end of the Cold War also opened an opportunity to expand 

cooperation between Washington and Moscow to address the challenges 

of safety and security in the nuclear complex of the former Soviet Union. 

This so-called “loose nukes” problem has required extensive U.S. resources 

under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to safeguard weapons, 

materials, and facilities in Russia and elsewhere. This program has been a 

significant success.

In more general terms, the United States also faced a continuing challenge 

through this period of moving away from nuclear deterrence as the foundation of its relationship with Russia and achieving a fundamental shift in 

security relations. This effort has been complicated by continued uncertainty about whether 

Russia can or will become a stronger partner of 

the West in addressing common international 

security problems. It is further complicated by a 

difference of views about whether formal arms 

control measures help accomplish the political 

objective of deeper partnership or are so cumbersome and adversarial in 

character as to prove counterproductive. Accordingly, the emphasis in U.S. 

policy has shifted increasingly from deterrence to dissuasion, which is to 

say from a focus on preventing war and nuclear use to discouraging a Russian effort to renew nuclear competition in the quest for political advantage. 

But so long as each side must account for the fact that the other retains an 

operational capability that can destroy it, deterrence continues to play some 

role in the bilateral relationship, albeit one distinctly different from that of 

the Cold War.

This period also brought another important opportunity: to strengthen 

the nonproliferation regime. The effort to strengthen the regime was seen 

as especially urgent following revelations about illicit nuclear weapons activities in Iraq and North Korea. The opportunity to do so was underscored 

by the continuing convergence of the views of the major powers that they 

should play a leading role in doing so. The willingness of China and France 

to join the NPT in 1992 was noteworthy. At the NPT review conference of 

1995, states parties were required to make a decision about the future of the 

[The current level is] the lowest number of weapons deployed by the United States 

since the Eisenhower administration. 
On Challenges and Opportunities 7

treaty—about whether to extend it and if so for how long and under what 

conditions. A decision was taken to extend it indefinitely, in the context of 

a commitment to renew efforts by states parties to implement it more effectively. The United States played a leading role in the process leading to 

this decision.

In the period since the end of the Cold War, three significant challenges 

have emerged. Two were challenges throughout the Cold War but have 

gained new prominence over the last two decades: nuclear proliferation and 

nuclear terrorism. The third challenge is the newly unpredictable nature of 

the strategic environment.

During the Cold War, proliferation was 

strongly inhibited by the relationships of extended deterrence established by the United States 

(and also by the Soviet Union) and by creation 

of the nonproliferation regime. As noted above, 

there were even instances of successful proliferation “roll back” during the Cold War, including 

that of South Africa among others. But since the 

end of the Cold War, proliferation has also continued, as demonstrated by 

Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and by nuclear tests by India and Pakistan 

in 1998 and North Korea in 2006. Today, Iran stands at the brink of nuclear 

weapons capability. Such proliferation is troubling for various reasons. It 

calls into question, in the minds of some, the viability of the nonproliferation regime. It stimulates interest in further proliferation among neighboring 

states. It raises questions about the safety and security of the nuclear arsenals and weapons establishments in these countries. It creates new supplier 

networks outside of existing international control mechanisms. Proliferation 

to belligerent states opposed to the United States and/or the regional status 

quo is particularly troubling for various reasons. It could lead some leaders 

to believe that they are able to use nuclear threats to coerce their neighbors 

or to deter the United States and/or international coalitions from protecting 

those neighbors. This could embolden belligerent states to commit acts of 

aggression or domestic transgressions that would require very risky efforts 

to redress. Such proliferation also increases the risk that nuclear weapons 

will end up in the hands of a terror group.

The second important new challenge is nuclear terrorism. As noted 

earlier, the concern about nuclear terrorism is as old as the nuclear era. 

But it has become much more salient over the last decade or so, ever 

since Osama bin Laden clearly stated that he considered it a “holy duty” 

to acquire nuclear weapons. Since then, clear evidence has emerged of 

al Qaeda’s intentions and efforts to do so. Moreover, other groups have 

also shown this interest. This is a very serious threat that is also difficult 

During the Cold War, proliferation was strongly inhibited 

by the relationships of extended deterrence established by 

the United States... and by 

creation of the nonproliferation regime. 
8 America’s Strategic Posture

to calibrate. In the Commission’s view, terrorist use of a nuclear weapon 

against the United States or its friends and allies is more likely than deliberate use by a state. (The term “deliberate” is used to distinguish intentional use by a state from accidental or unauthorized use.) The risks 

of nuclear terrorism would be magnified by the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons to states that sponsor terror and the emergence of supplier networks that are outside of the control of responsible nuclear possessors. 

This is a problem for which deterrence is ill suited, except to the extent 

that the threat of retaliation imposes restraints on state sponsors. (As argued further below, deterrence by denial of success may have some relevance to this problem.) Nuclear terrorism is also a problem requiring 

strong international responses, because it requires preventing terrorist 

access to weapons, materials, and expertise anywhere in the world.

The third important new challenge is the unpredictable nature of the 

security environment. In the Cold War, that environment seemed highly 

predictable. The bipolar order, the high stakes, 

and the enduring ideological confrontation led 

most observers to conclude that this environment would not change rapidly (an expectation 

that finally proved unfounded). Today’s world 

is far more complex. It reflects a mix of trends, 

some positive and others negative. There is profound uncertainty about the future international roles of Russia and China—will they emerge 

as “responsible stakeholders” or as challengers 

to order? There is also uncertainty about the future roles of various “rising 

powers,” including some arming themselves with nuclear weapons and 

missiles. This underscores the need to hedge against the possibility that all 

of these factors might not turn out for the best and that new challenges for 

U.S. nuclear strategy might emerge and, indeed, suddenly so.

In sum, during the period since the end of the Cold War, the United States 

has updated its strategy and policies for reducing nuclear dangers. Indeed, 

the need for a comprehensive and balanced approach was reflected in both 

of the Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) conducted in this period.

In the NPR of 1994, the Clinton administration embraced the term “lead 

but hedge” to encompass this agenda. The commitment to “lead” embodied the efforts to reduce nuclear risks through cooperative measures. The 

commitment to “hedge” embodied the efforts to transform deterrence for 

different circumstances but also to sustain a force that could quickly be reexpanded if the political transition in Russia took a dramatic and sudden 

turn for the worse. The Clinton administration also elaborated a Defense 

Counterproliferation Initiative for the specific purpose of addressing the 

In the Commission’s view, 

terrorist use of a nuclear 

weapon against the United 

States or its friends and allies 

is more likely than deliberate use by a state.... This is a 

problem for which deterrence 

is ill suited.
On Challenges and Opportunities 9

military planning implications of regional aggressors armed with weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD).

In the NPR of 2001, the Bush administration also embraced the “lead 

but hedge” concept, though with language of its own reflecting its own assessment of challenges and opportunities and its own views of the needed 

balance. It viewed Cold War–era arms control negotiations as inherently adversarial in nature and a potential obstacle to improved relations with Russia. 

But the administration was highly motivated by the desire to reduce nuclear 

weapons to the minimum number necessary and to reduce nuclear dangers 

through innovative approaches to deterrence, assurance, and dissuasion. The 

Bush administration expanded on the earlier counterproliferation agenda 

with a strategy for combating WMD through the proactive use of military 

and diplomatic tools, including, for example, efforts to improve international 

responses to illicit trade in and transfer of nuclear weapons materials and 

technologies. It also elaborated a strategy for combating terrorism, including 

specifically WMD terrorism.

Current Challenges and Opportunities

In 2009, a new administration has arrived in Washington that has stated a 

commitment to both elements of policy. In his sole speech as a candidate on 

nuclear policy issues, candidate Obama made two promises. The first was 

to recommit the United States to work to create the conditions that might 

ultimately enable the elimination of nuclear weapons. The second was to 

recommit to the principle that the United States would not disarm unilaterally and would retain a “strong deterrent” so long as nuclear weapons exist. 

This is the latest expression of the twin policy imperatives and the question 

now before the nation, as with each new administration, is how to adapt 

these policies to new circumstances and to achieve the necessary balance 

wherever trade-offs are required. What are the specific challenges in the 

nuclear realm? What opportunities must the nation seize? In the view of this 

Commission, the following five factors stand out.

First, the threat of nuclear terrorism is serious and continues to deserve 

a high level of sustained U.S. effort. Success in meeting this challenge requires a very comprehensive effort with strong international participation, 

as argued further in following sections.

Second, the challenge posed by nuclear proliferation is also serious. It is 

important not to overstate this threat because, as argued above, nonproliferation has been successful on many fronts and can continue to be. But it is 

important also not to understate this threat. If we are unsuccessful in dealing 

with current challenges, we may find ourselves at a tipping point, where 

many additional states conclude that they require nuclear deterrents of their 
10 America’s Strategic Posture

own. If this tipping point is itself mishandled, we may well find ourselves 

faced with a cascade of proliferation.

Third, there is a challenge associated with adapting extended U.S. deterrence policies and programs. The requirements of extended deterrence 

in Europe are evolving, given the changing relationship with Russia, the 

perception of some allies that they are keenly vulnerable to Russian military coercion, and the perception of others of a rising nuclear threat from 

the Middle East. The requirements of extended deterrence in Asia are also 

evolving, as North Korea has crossed the nuclear threshold and China modernizes its strategic forces. In the Middle East, various states depend on the 

United States as a security guarantor and question whether or how it might 

stand up to a nuclear-armed regional power. These concerns require a clear 

and credible response from the United States. Failure to meet their security 

needs could have significant repercussions. A quick survey of the potential 

nuclear candidates in Northeast Asia and the Middle East brings home the 

point that many potential proliferation candidates are friends and even allies 

of the United States. A decision by those friends and allies to seek nuclear 

weapons would be a significant blow to U.S. interests.

Fourth, China is today of rising importance in the U.S. strategic landscape. 

The United States has encouraged China’s emergence from international 

isolation and has worked to promote its increasing prosperity and stability 

for decades. With some success, it has tried to engage China as a “responsible 

stakeholder” in the international system. But China’s increasing wealth has 

brought with it an increase in its military power, with the expectation of 

much more to come over the next decade or two. In the Commission’s view, 

the risks of war with China are low, with the primary potential military 

flashpoint being Taiwan. China and the United States have many differences 

over Taiwan but Beijing and Washington regularly recommit themselves to 

the principle of peaceful reunification and, moreover, an improvement in 

the security situation there is evident. The apparent risks of nuclear war are 

even lower. But there is also profound uncertainty about China’s strategic 

intentions as its power grows and thus a need to manage these military 

risks with care.

China does not release information about the numbers of its strategic delivery systems or nuclear warheads. It is reported to have a total stockpile of 

approximately 400 weapons, of which perhaps fewer than half are operationally deployed. China’s defense white papers report that it maintains nuclear 

warheads for short-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. It currently has approximately 30 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

(ICBMs) capable of striking the continental United States with nuclear weapons and another 10 or so capable of striking Hawaii and Alaska. It deploys a 

larger number of medium- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles capable 
On Challenges and Opportunities 11

of reaching U.S. allies and friends in Asia (and U.S. bases there)—approximately 100 or more missiles. China says it maintains its strategic posture, 

including new nuclear weapons, in order to prevent nuclear coercion by 

others (what it calls “counter deterrence”). It continues to announce a policy 

of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. But some Chinese officials have made 

statements indicating that this commitment may be conditional.

China’s recent defense white papers have made clear the commitment of its 

leadership to modernize China’s military in order to meet the requirements 

of “local war under high-technology conditions” and also under conditions 

of nuclear deterrence. In particular there is a commitment to enhance its 

nuclear forces in order to ensure the credibility of its “self defensive nuclear 

strategy.” China is diversifying its nuclear missile force by fielding a new set 

of road-mobile missiles and a small force of strategic missile submarines. Its 

ICBM force could more than double in the next 15 years. Its lack of transparency about its capabilities and intentions is a source of significant concern, 

for the United States and for its allies and friends in Asia.

The emerging challenge here is roughly analogous to the challenge with 

Russia: to achieve political objectives (i.e., engaging China as a responsible 

stakeholder) while safeguarding U.S. deterrence and also managing the military relationship in a way that promotes stability even as China modernizes, 

diversifies, and builds up its strategic posture.

This brings us back to Russia as the fifth important challenge—and opportunity.

There are good reasons to be disappointed 

by the lack of success in fulfilling the aspirations of two decades ago for a fundamental and 

profoundly positive transformation of Russia’s 

relationship with the West. The anti-American sentiments often heard from 

Russia’s leaders in recent years, its use of force against Georgia, and its program of nuclear renewal and reemphasis all raise questions about whether 

efforts to achieve the desired transformation can succeed. They also underscore the continued uncertainty about the future of Russia’s political relationships with the West and thus the security threat it poses.

In the view of this Commission, the effort to engage Russia remains important. Moreover, it continues to offer some promise. President Medvedev 

appears receptive to the initiative of the Obama administration to “reset” the 

overall bilateral relationship. It is important, moreover, to bear in mind that 

despite our many disappointments, Russia has not returned to the role of 

the Soviet Union as a global challenger to the United States. It is not amassing military forces along its borders in readiness for an invasion of Europe. 

Although Russia is strengthening its nuclear forces, it does not appear to be 

seeking overall nuclear supremacy. Indeed, its focus is largely on its domestic 

In the view of this Commission, the effort to engage 

Russia remains important ... 

[and] continues to offer some 

promise. 
12 America’s Strategic Posture

economic transformation and its near-abroad, where there are many challenges but also some opportunities for cooperation with the West. The risk of 

direct military confrontation between the United States and Russia is much 

lower than during the Cold War. But the risk of nuclear coercion is another 

matter. After all, Russia has used nuclear threats to attempt to coerce some 

of its neighbors, including U.S. allies, and this is a problem for which U.S. 

nuclear strategy and capabilities remain relevant. It is also conceivable that 

these assessments might change for the worse at some future time, and the 

United States needs to hedge against that possibility.

Russia is today engaged in a broad effort to modernize its military forces. 

This will involve a significant further shrinkage in the overall size and structure of its conventional forces and in manpower levels. It will also involve 

modernization of strategic forces. It is important to understand the motives 

driving this effort. One is to replace existing systems becoming obsolete. 

The other is to try to compensate for structural weaknesses in conventional 

forces. We note that Russian ambitions to modernize will be inhibited so 

long as the current collapse of energy prices continues.

The current strategic modernization program includes various elements. 

Russia is at work on a new intercontinental ballistic missile (initially deployed 

with a new single warhead but capable of carrying multiple warheads), a new 

ballistic missile submarine and the associated new missile and warhead, a 

new short-range ballistic missile, and low-yield tactical nuclear weapons 

including an earth penetrator. It is also engaged in continued research and 

development on a hypersonic intercontinental glide missile. If it is successful, this program will result in a more modern version of the existing force 

with some improved capacity for increasing force deployments if deemed 

necessary. Whether or when such success might be achieved is a function of 

resources and political commitment.

As part of its effort to compensate for weaknesses in its conventional 

forces, Russia’s military leaders are putting more emphasis on non-strategic 

nuclear forces (NSNF, particularly weapons intended for tactical use on the 

battlefield). Russia no longer sees itself as capable of defending its vast territory and nearby interests with conventional forces. This reflects a complete 

reversal of the circumstance during the Cold War, when both the United 

States and Soviet Union deployed many thousands of NSNF. At that time, 

the United States and its allies were concerned about offsetting the large 

numerical superiority in conventional forces fielded by the Soviet Union and 

its allies and built a nuclear deterrent in Europe (and Asia) toward that end. 

The Soviet Union originally built NSNF for potential use in a large-scale war 

with NATO and to avoid being seen as inferior in this category of military 

capabilities.
On Challenges and Opportunities 13

As the Cold War ended, and as noted above, these NSNF were reduced 

under the auspices of the PNIs and also the Treaty on Intermediate-range 

Nuclear Forces of 1987. Nonetheless, Russia reportedly retains a very large 

number of such weapons. Senior Russian experts have reported that Russia has 3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads with a large additional 

number in reserve. Some Russian military experts have written about use of 

very low yield nuclear “scalpels” to defeat NATO forces. The combination of 

new warhead designs, the estimated production capability for new nuclear 

warheads, and precision delivery systems such as the Iskander short-range 

tactical ballistic missile (known as the SS-26 in the West), open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence 

regional conflicts.

Like China, Russia has not shown the transparency that its neighbors 

and the United States desire on such matters. It has repeatedly rebuffed U.S. 

proposals for NSNF transparency measures and NATO’s requests for information. And it is no longer in compliance with its PNI commitments.

Even as it works to engage Russia and assure Russia that it need not fear 

encirclement and containment, the United States needs to ensure that deterrence will be effective whenever it is needed. It must also continue to concern 

itself with stability in its strategic military relationship with Russia. It must 

continue to safeguard the interests of its allies as it does so. Their assurance 

that extended deterrence remains credible and effective may require that the 

United States retain numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that it might not 

deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense.

Even as it adapts its nuclear posture to the new relationship with Russia, the United States must recognize also that Russia is a valuable partner 

in reducing global nuclear dangers in various 

ways. Russia plays an important role in supporting the NPT and in ensuring an effective export 

control system in sensitive nuclear technologies 

and materials. Its decisions on the United Nations Security Council are critical to the effort to deal with compliance issues 

raised by the IAEA. It may yet prove to be the indispensable actor in the 

international effort to induce nuclear restraint by Iran.

This review of key factors in the current security environment leaves us 

with two conclusions.

One is that the United States will need to sustain a deterrent for the indefinite future. After all, as this review illustrates, many deterrence challenges 

remain. Obviously they are not as severe as in the Cold War but there is no 

reason to think that these challenges will simply disappear in the next few 

years or that they cannot worsen.

[T]he United States will need 

to sustain a deterrent for the 

indefinite future.
14 America’s Strategic Posture

The other conclusion is that Russia, China, Britain, and France have comprehensive plans to ensure that their deterrents are viable for the challenges 

ahead as they perceive them. To varying degrees, they have put in place 

programs for new delivery systems and warheads. Some of these programs 

are intended to replace existing capabilities (as in the case of the U.K.) while 

others are intended to both replace existing capabilities and create some 

new ones (as in the case of France, China, and Russia). The United States 

has maintained confidence in its nuclear weapons primarily through the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program and Life Extension Program. These programs have been remarkably successful, but many questions are coming due 

about whether or how to invest to sustain deterrence as U.S. delivery systems 

and warheads age. The other four nuclear weapon states have faced these 

circumstances, made difficult decisions, and moved forward.

An Observation on Nuclear Intelligence

The United States relies on information gathered and analyzed by the U.S. 

intelligence community to make assessments of foreign nuclear developments. Policymakers should appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of such 

information. Various commissions have highlighted flaws in WMD intelligence and steps are being taken to implement their recommendations. It is 

important to bear in mind that intelligence is incomplete on other states with 

nuclear weapons or fledgling programs—as well as non-state actors seeking 

nuclear weapons. The United States does not 

know definitively the numbers of nuclear weapons in the Russian arsenal, especially of nonstrategic weapons. Knowledge of possible production rates is also incomplete. There is also 

less than complete understanding of the activities underway at nuclear test sites in Russia, 

China, and elsewhere.

Closing Observations

We stand today at a potential turning point. Further proliferation is possible, 

which would greatly magnify the risks of nuclear terrorism, nuclear intimidation, and perhaps even nuclear employment. The spread of nuclear materials, technology, and expertise for peaceful purposes—energy production—

promises to magnify these risks. A renewal of competition for nuclear advantage among the major powers is not out of the question.

But we can also imagine a far better turn of events. After all, despite many 

challenges, we have so far been effective in preventing nuclear terrorism, 

We stand today at a potential 

turning point.... The world 

must more aggressively pursue the effort to reduce nuclear dangers if it is going to 

continue to succeed at preventing nuclear catastrophe. 
On Challenges and Opportunities 15

slowing proliferation, and ending the arms race among the major powers. 

This is cause for cautious optimism. In meeting those challenges, we have 

learned about the need to be innovative and adaptive, and there is today a 

rising sense of the urgency of both. The world must more aggressively pursue the effort to reduce nuclear dangers if it is going to continue to succeed 

at preventing nuclear catastrophe.

Two imperatives follow from this analysis. First, to reduce nuclear dangers, the United States must continue to ensure that its deterrent is strong 

and effective, including its extended deterrent for allies. Second, the United 

States must seize the opportunity to lead a broad international effort to reduce nuclear dangers through additional political means.

Toward this end, there is a long list of decisions that need to be taken with 

regard to the future of the U.S. strategic posture and supporting military and 

political strategies. We recognize those decisions to be interconnected. They 

have also proven to be politically divisive.

In broad terms, the United States again faces decisions about how to maintain its deterrent forces. It also faces decisions about how best to prevent 

proliferation, reduce the number of existing nuclear weapons to the absolute minimum, and provide better protection of weapons and materials so 

that they are not diverted to proliferators and/or terrorists. Programs to 

maintain the deterrent force are largely national programs, although their 

implementation involves a substantial international component with allies. 

In contrast, arms control and nonproliferation and associated activities are 

inherently international in character and their success requires the broadest 

possible international support. This can become important when there are 

conflicts or trade-offs between the two. For example, a U.S. policy agenda 

that seems to stress unnecessarily our nuclear weapon posture could erode 

international cooperation to reduce nuclear dangers. Conversely, a policy 

agenda that emphasizes unilateral reductions could weaken the deterrence of 

foes and the assurance of allies. It is necessary to strike a balance in meeting 

these two imperatives. In following sections, this report will make recommendations for doing so.

In the formulation of U.S. policy, we recognize and indeed wish to underscore the important role of the Congress in the formulation and implementation of policy. Throughout the Cold War, the executive and legislative 

branches had high-level and sustained interactions on matters of nuclear 

policy and, although the differences were often intense, the result was a large 

measure of continuity and indeed bipartisanship in U.S. nuclear strategy. 

In the period since the end of the Cold War, those interactions have grown 

less frequent but the differences no less intense. Indeed, the differences have 

blocked progress in moving to a nuclear posture and infrastructure for the 

contemporary environment. In order to ensure the continuity of policy that 
16 America’s Strategic Posture

U.S. interests require in the nuclear realm, serious efforts must be made to 

renew executive-legislative dialogue and leadership on these issues and to 

seek a consensus on future steps.

This analysis points to the following findings and recommendations.

Findings

1. Throughout the nuclear era U.S. policy has been shaped by the 

imperative to reduce nuclear dangers with a balanced approach 

involving both deterrence and political measures such as arms 

control and nonproliferation. Although evolving circumstances 

over the six decades of the nuclear era have compelled leaders to 

innovate and adapt, there has been striking continuity in U.S. strategic policy.

2. Since the end of the Cold War, the nuclear security environment of 

the United States has changed considerably. The threat of a nuclear 

Armageddon has largely disappeared. But new threats have taken 

shape and the overall environment has grown more complex and 

in some ways more precarious.

3. The U.S. strategic posture and doctrine have also changed substantially in the intervening period. The U.S. nuclear force is but 

a small fraction of what it was at the end of the Cold War and the 

U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons in national military strategy and 

national security strategy has been sharply reduced.

4. Nuclear terrorism against the United States and other nations is a 

very serious threat. This requires a much more concerted international response, one which the United States must lead.

5. Nuclear and missile proliferation could have a profoundly negative 

impact on the global security environment. The further uncontrolled diffusion of nuclear materials, technology, and expertise 

would likely accelerate the future rate of proliferation. It would 

certainly increase the risks of nuclear terrorism.

6. The opportunities to further engage Russia as a partner in reducing 

nuclear dangers are important and should be seized. The United 

States must also continue to concern itself with issues of deterrence, 

assurance, and stability in the nuclear relationship with Russia.

7. The opportunities to engage China are also significant. But here too 

the United States must balance deterrence and stability concerns 

with the opportunities for strategic cooperation.

8. These developments in major power nuclear relations and proliferation affect U.S. allies and friends at least as much as they affect 

the United States. Their particular views of the requirements of ex-
On Challenges and Opportunities 17

tended deterrence and assurance in an evolving security environment must be understood and addressed by the United States.

9. The conditions that might make the elimination of nuclear weapons 

possible are not present today and establishing such conditions 

would require a fundamental transformation of the world political order. Nonetheless, the Commission recommends a number of 

steps that can reduce nuclear dangers.

10. For the indefinite future, the United States must maintain a viable nuclear deterrent. The other NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon 

states have put in place comprehensive programs to modernize 

their forces to meet new international circumstances.

11. The executive and the Congress need to renew dialogue on these 

issues.

Recommendations

1. The United States should continue to pursue an approach to reducing nuclear dangers that balances deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation. Singular emphasis on one or another element would 

reduce the nuclear security of the United States and its allies.

2. The United States must retain nuclear weapons until such time as the 

international environment may permit their elimination globally.

3. To address the serious risk of nuclear terrorism, the United States 

needs strong intelligence and reenergized international cooperation 

through its deterrence, nonproliferation, and arms control efforts. 

The best defense against nuclear terrorism is to keep nuclear bombs 

and fissile material out of the hands of terrorists.

4. The United States should adapt its strategic posture to the evolving 

requirements of deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance. 

As part of an effort to understand assurance requirements, steps 

to increase allied consultations should be expanded.

5. The United States should reverse the decline of focus and resources 

of the Intelligence Community devoted to foreign nuclear weapons capabilities, programs, and intentions. With some important 

exceptions, this subject has not attracted high-level attention since 

the end of the Cold War. As will be discussed later, the weapons 

laboratories have an important role to play here.

6. The practice and spirit of executive-legislative dialogue on nuclear 

strategy that helped pave the way for bipartisanship and continuity 

in policy should be renewed. The Senate should revive the Arms 

Control Observer Group.

19

2

On the Nuclear Posture

The design of the nuclear posture must follow from an understanding 

of the strategic purposes it is intended to serve. In the prior chapter 

the Commission argued that the international conditions do not now 

exist that might permit the United States and the other nuclear-weapon states 

to relinquish their nuclear arsenals. What purpose then do they serve today? 

And how should an understanding of purpose guide their design?

It is important to begin here with a definition. The nuclear posture consists 

of the following elements:

1. The arsenal of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons.

2. The arsenal of forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons.

3. The triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems (land-based missiles, 

sea-based missiles, and bombers).

4. The delivery systems for forward-deployed systems (including 

both submarine-launched cruise missiles and aircraft equipped to 

carry both conventional and nuclear payloads, called dual-capable 

aircraft).

5. The stockpile of warheads held in operational reserve.

6. A stockpile of fissile material appropriate for use in warheads.

7. The associated command, control, and intelligence systems.

8. The infrastructure associated with the production of all of these 

capabilities, without which the force will not remain viable, both 

physical and human.

9. Declaratory policy specifying the role of nuclear forces in U.S. military and national security strategies.

In addition, both the United States and Russia also possess a large number 

of nuclear weapons awaiting dismantlement.

The nuclear posture is the dominant but not the only element of the 

U.S. strategic military posture, which also includes protection capabilities, 

including missile defenses, and non-nuclear means of strategic strike. The 
20 America’s Strategic Posture

focus of this chapter is on items 1-5 in the above list. We note that the United 

States continues to classify specific numbers associated with items 2 and 

5 on this list.

Defining Criteria

Many of the concepts and criteria guiding the development and operation 

of the U.S. nuclear force can be traced back through the nuclear era. A short 

list of these includes the following:

•	 Nuclear weapons are special weapons and not just more powerful

versions of high-explosive munitions.

•	 Nuclear weapons are for deterrence and would be used only as a

last resort.

•	 U.S. nuclear forces must not be inferior to those of another power.

•	 Nuclear forces support security commitments to key allies.

•	 A triad of strategic nuclearforces is valuable forits resilience, survivability, and flexibility.

•	 The safety, security, and authorized control of nuclear weapons are

essential.

•	 The tradition of non-use serves U.S. interests and should be reinforced by U.S. policy and capabilities.

Updating this approach requires going back to the fundamental question 

about the purposes for which the United States retains nuclear weapons. In 

a basic sense, the principal function of nuclear weapons has not changed 

in decades: deterrence. The United States has these weapons in order to 

create the conditions in which they are never used. But the Commission 

takes a very broad view of the concept of deterrence, encompassing many 

elements.

One crucial element is extended deterrence and the assurance this provides to allies and partners of the United States. As noted in the prior chapter, 

their assurance remains a top U.S. priority in the current security environment and there are some important new challenges to extended deterrence 

associated with Russia, China, and proliferation. Some U.S. allies believe 

that extended deterrence requires little more than stability in the central 

balances of nuclear power among the major powers. But other allies believe 

that their needs can only be met with very specific U.S. nuclear capabilities. 

This point was brought home vividly in our work as a Commission. Some 

allies located near Russia believe that U.S. non-strategic forces in Europe are 

essential to prevent nuclear coercion by Moscow and indeed that modernized U.S./NATO forces are essential for restoring a sense of balance in the 

face of Russia’s nuclear renewal. One particularly important ally has argued 
On the Nuclear Posture 21

to the Commission privately that the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent depends on its specific capabilities to hold a wide variety of targets at 

risk, and to deploy forces in a way that is either visible or stealthy, as circumstances may demand.

Clearly, the U.S. nuclear force posture should 

not be redesigned without substantive and 

high-level consultations with U.S. allies in both 

Europe and Asia and we cannot prejudge the 

conclusions of such consultations here. The 

Commission’s own consultations on this topic have brought home to us 

that U.S. allies and friends in Europe and Asia are not all of a single mind 

concerning the requirements for extended deterrence and assurance. These 

have also brought home the fact that the requirement to extend assurance 

and deterrence to others may well impose on the United States an obligation 

to retain numbers and types of nuclear weapons that it might not otherwise 

deem essential to its own defense.

As part of its strategy to assure its allies, the United States should not 

abandon strategic equivalency with Russia. Overall equivalence is important 

to many U.S. allies in Europe. The United States should not cede to Russia 

a posture of superiority in the name of deemphasizing nuclear weapons in 

U.S. military strategy. There seems no near-term prospect of such a result in 

the balance of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons.

But that balance does not exist in non-strategic nuclear forces, where Russia enjoys a sizeable numerical advantage. As noted above, it stores thousands of these weapons in apparent support of possible military operations 

west of the Urals. The United States deploys a small fraction of that number 

in support of nuclear sharing agreements in NATO. Precise numbers for the 

U.S. deployments are classified but their total is only about five percent of the 

total at the height of the Cold War. Strict U.S.-Russian equivalence in NSNF 

numbers is unnecessary. But the current imbalance is stark and worrisome 

to some U.S. allies in Central Europe. If and as reductions continue in the 

number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, this imbalance 

will become more apparent and allies less assured. This points to the urgency 

of an arms control approach, as discussed further in a following section.

Another element of deterrence, in our broad concept, is dissuasion. In this 

period of uncertainty about Russia and China and their future international 

roles, the United States should be seeking to discourage unwelcome competition while encouraging strategic cooperation. Toward that end, the United 

States should so compose its nuclear force as to discourage Russia and China 

from trying to compete with the United States for some new advantage in 

the nuclear realm. The United States should retain enough capacity, whether 

in its existing delivery systems and supply of reserve warheads or in its inAs part of its strategy to assure 

its allies, the United States 

should not abandon strategic 

equivalency with Russia. 
22 America’s Strategic Posture

frastructure, to impress upon Russian leaders the impossibility of gaining a 

position of nuclear supremacy over the United States by breaking out of an 

arms control agreement. The United States (and Russia) should also retain 

a large enough force of nuclear weapons that China is not tempted to try to 

reach a posture of strategic equivalency with the United States or of strategic 

supremacy in the Asian theater.

This discussion of dissuasion brings us to the related need to hedge. 

Decisions about how to posture forces for the multiple decades in which 

they might be deployed involve judgments about the nature of the security 

environment—judgments that may change over time. The security environment may change for the better, but it may also change for the worse. This is 

a challenge that some characterize as managing 

geopolitical surprise. Hedges are essentially insurance against the possibility that such a surprise, if it occurs, will not fundamentally alter 

U.S. or allied security for the worse.

Hedging involves creating resilience in the 

strategic posture. Hedging in the nuclear force 

structure can be done in a variety of ways. In recent years, the United States has hedged against 

a possible renewal of competition for nuclear 

advantage by Russia by retaining a large number of nuclear weapons in the 

reserve force and a diverse set of options for uploading those onto the existing delivery systems. But hedging is not without its strategic costs, among 

them the inherent danger of stimulating an unwanted arms race as a result 

of inadequate transparency.

With those broader aspects of deterrence in mind, we can return now to 

the narrower question of how to design a nuclear force that can be effective in 

influencing the cost-benefit calculus of the leaders(s) of a state contemplating 

possible challenges to and attacks on U.S. vital interests.

It is important to underscore that deterrence is in the eye of the beholder 

(as is assurance). Whether potential adversaries are deterred (and U.S. allies 

are assured) is a function of their understanding of U.S. capabilities and 

intentions. Those capabilities must be sufficiently visible and sufficiently 

impressive. But deterrence is more than a summary calculation of cumulative 

target kill probabilities. And it is not simply a function of technical characteristics of the nuclear force. It derives also from perceptions of U.S. intent and 

credibility, and the declaratory policy that embodies these factors.

In the Cold War, the deterrence calculus was relatively simple. The president authorized guidance to hold a broad array of targets at risk and the 

military designed systems and operational plans for doing so. The deterrent 

effect was understood to derive from the expected damage that an adverIt is important to underscore 

that deterrence is in the eye of 

the beholder (as is assurance). 

Whether potential adversaries 

are deterred (and U.S. allies 

are assured) is a function of 

their understanding of U.S. 

capabilities and intentions. 
On the Nuclear Posture 23

sary might calculate and his uncertainty that he could bear the cost—or 

even predict it reliably. The United States went to great lengths to ensure 

that its deterrent was perceived as credible and 

effective, including through strong declaratory 

and other policies that in the event would have 

made it very difficult for the United States to 

back away from its deterrent commitments.

In today’s world, this simple approach is difficult to replicate. As the security environment 

has grown more complex and fluid, the United 

States faces a diverse set of potential opponents, 

circumstances, and threats for which nuclear deterrence might be relevant. 

This implies that the United States needs a spectrum of nuclear and nonnuclear force employment options and flexibility in planning along with the 

traditional requirements for forces that are sufficiently lethal and certain of 

their result to threaten an appropriate array of targets credibly. It also underscores the potential challenges of effective deterrence, as it brings with it 

more openings for ignorance, extreme motivations, distorted communications, and a lack of mutual understanding. Essential to the future effective 

functioning of deterrence is that we gain insights into the strategic thinking 

of the nations being deterred, so that we can understand their motivations 

and how to communicate effectively with them in crisis. But even with a careful assessment of the pertinent details and context, deterrence is uncertain. 

All nations, unsurprisingly, seek to protect what they value. And some have 

expended considerable effort to protect assets they highly value, rendering 

them vulnerable only to nuclear threats, if that.

One additional design factor requires discussion here: given that deterrence is uncertain and may prove unreliable, the United States must also 

design its strategic forces with the objective of being able to limit damage 

from an attacker if a war begins. Such damage-limitation capabilities are 

important because of the possibility of accidental or unauthorized launches 

by a state or attacks by terrorists. Damage limitation is achieved not only by 

active defenses, including missile defense, but also by the ability to attack 

forces that might yet be launched against the United States or its allies.

Determining the Size of the Nuclear Force

The Commission was asked to provide a specific number for the correct size 

of the U.S. nuclear force. It cannot do so. The number is a function of many 

variables, including the ones elaborated above as well as those elaborated in 

the discussion of arms control below. The number is also a function of presidential choice.

As the security environment 

has grown more complex and 

fluid, the United States faces 

a diverse set of potential opponents, circumstances, and 

threats for which nuclear deterrence might be relevant. 
24 America’s Strategic Posture

The size and attributes of the nuclear arsenal are matters to be determined 

by the President in close consultation with his political and military advisers. He provides overall guidance with respect to deterrence but the specific 

selection of types of targets to hold at risk and at what level of confidence is 

a technical decision that would benefit from extensive interaction between 

the President and the Department of Defense. These decisions must reflect 

high-level political assessments of deterrence goals and requirements, the 

circumstances that might lead a U.S. president to threaten to use nuclear 

weapons, and the outcomes that such threatened use might be intended to 

create. They must also reflect choices about the objectives of national security 

strategy and the types of strategic relationships the United States wishes to 

have with other states, whether allies or others.

Based on the advice of the Department of Defense with regard to necessary targets, the President provides guidance on what principles should 

guide targeting strategy and the sizing of the stockpile. Such decisions 

should also be informed by assessments of what is needed for extended 

deterrence, assurance, and dissuasion. Over the years, presidents have periodically adjusted this guidance to account for changing political and military 

circumstances. While assurance and dissuasion have been important factors, 

there does not appear to be any widely accepted methodology for reaching a 

decision on how many weapons are needed for these purposes. Consulting 

more closely with allies regarding their views on what is required for their 

assurance is an important first step.

The required size of the overall stockpile depends on the number of 

deployed weapons as well as a determination of the necessary ratio of deployed to non-deployed weapons, and the responsiveness of the infrastructure. Once the President determines the size of the deployed stockpile, he 

will need to decide if he wants to maintain a hedge in the form of a triad 

and a stockpile of non-deployed weapons that can quickly be uploaded in 

the event of a rapid deterioration of the international situation. His decision 

on that issue will determine in significant part how large the total stockpile 

needs to be.

The Commission’s basic assessment is that the sizing of U.S. forces remains overwhelmingly driven by Russia. This is not because we see it as 

an enemy; it is because some of our allies see Russia as a potential threat 

and also because it retains the ability to destroy the United States. For the 

deterrence of attacks by regional nuclear powers or terrorists, the weapons 

requirements are relatively modest. Even for deterrence of China, the requirements are not large. Currently, no one seriously contemplates a direct 

Russian attack on the United States. Some U.S. allies are fearful of Russia, and 

look to the United States for reassurance. With an eye on balance and equity 

in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, it is important to look beyond the 
On the Nuclear Posture 25

balance of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Russian nonstrategic nuclear forces must be accounted for in the overall calculus, not 

least because of their evidently rising value in Russian military doctrine 

and national security strategy and because of clear allied concern about this 

development. We need not, however, seek numerical equality to Russia in 

non-strategic nuclear forces, as Russia is attempting to offset their perceived 

conventional disadvantages. We must bear in mind that the ultimate goal 

for the strategic posture on both sides is to maintain a strategic balance—as 

Russians regularly and insistently remind us.

What does this imply for additional reductions? Substantial stockpile reductions need to be done bilaterally with the Russians, and at some level of 

reductions, with other nuclear powers. But some potential reductions in nondeployed weapons need not await Russia. The United States could reduce 

its reliance on, and thus supply of, reserve warheads if it were to refurbish 

the nuclear infrastructure.

On Delivery Systems

In the years ahead, U.S. policymakers will face difficult and expensive decisions about how to maintain the delivery systems for nuclear weapons.

Should the triad of strategic delivery systems be maintained? This triad 

came together at significant expense through 

the Cold War and over the next several decades 

all of it will come due for recapitalization and 

replacement. Limited life extension programs 

have already begun. Long lead times dictate 

that replacement programs start a decade or 

more before the first replacement systems 

come on line.

Given that the triad was designed for a Cold War that has now well receded into history, does the United States need to maintain it? Might a dyad 

be preferable? The Commission has reviewed arguments in favor of a dyad 

but recommends retention of the current triad. Each leg of the triad has its 

own value:

•	 The bomberforce is valuable particularly for extending deterrence in

time of crisis, as their deployment is visible and signals U.S. commitment. Bombers also impose a significant cost burden on potential adversaries in terms of the need to invest in advanced air defenses.

•	 The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force imposes on a prospective aggressor the need to contemplate attacking only with very 

large number of nuclear weapons, substantially depleting its forces 

In the years ahead, U.S. 

policymakers will face difficult and expensive decisions 

about how to maintain the 

delivery systems for nuclear 

weapons.
26 America’s Strategic Posture

while ensuring a devastating response by the United States. The 

force is also immediately responsive in a highly controlled manner. 

And for the foreseeable future, there is no prospect that a significant 

portion of the ICBM force can be destroyed by a preemptive strike 

on the United States by small nuclear powers, including China.

•	 The Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) force is currently

the most survivable, meaning that no attacker could contemplate 

a nuclear attack on the United States without expecting U.S. 

retaliation.

Resilience and flexibility of the triad have proven valuable as the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons has declined. They 

promise to become even more important as systems age and if back-up systems within each leg of the triad are reduced. If one leg of the triad were to 

go out of service as a result of a technical problem in the delivery system or 

warhead, the other two legs could still provide credible deterrence.

Should delivery systems for non-strategic nuclear weapons be maintained? 

These are of two types: dual-capable aircraft and cruise missiles. The former 

are primarily relevant to extended deterrence to allies in Europe whereas the 

latter are primarily relevant to extended deterrence to allies in Asia.

In Europe, the current fleet of dual-capable aircraft is slated for retirement within the next decade. A future variant of the advanced fighter, the 

F-35 or Joint Strike Fighter, is intended to be a replacement for the current 

dual-capable aircraft beginning in 2016. NATO allies are committed to the 

modernization of dual-capable aircraft and the United States should proceed 

in partnership with them. The current defense budget includes no funding 

for commencing the promised production.

In Asia, extended deterrence relies heavily on the deployment of nuclear 

cruise missiles on some Los Angeles class attack submarines—the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N). This capability will be retired in 2013 unless steps are taken to maintain it. U.S. allies in Asia are not 

integrated in the same way into nuclear planning and have not been asked 

to make commitments to delivery systems. In our work as a Commission it 

has become clear to us that some U.S. allies in Asia would be very concerned 

by TLAM/N retirement.

In this review of the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, it is important to 

recall also the serious concerns raised in previous reports about the ability of 

the Department of Defense to perform its nuclear deterrence responsibilities 

and the commitment of its leadership to do so. Significant problems with 

the overall management of the Department’s nuclear responsibilities were 

revealed and discussed in the 2008 Report of the Secretary of Defense Task 

Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management. The September 2008 Defense 

Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills was similarly critical. 
On the Nuclear Posture 27

The Commission endorses the thrust of both reports, commends them to 

the Congress, and urges the Secretary of Defense to act promptly on their 

recommendations.

As the United States considers the long-term future of its nuclear 

triad, it must also address a set of problems associated with industrial 

infrastructure.

The infrastructure that supports two thirds of the strategic deterrent 

triad—the SLBMs and ICBMs—is not being sustained. There are no new 

missile production programs planned for more than a decade and decisions 

on follow-on ICBMs and SLBMs have not been made. In the interim, the 

United States has no other missile development programs utilizing solid 

fuels (currently, its space launch capabilities utilize liquid fuels, with the exception of the soon-to-be retired space shuttle). Assuming the United States 

is not ready to abandon these kinds of missile systems, it needs to preserve 

the option to replace them when required. While both Navy and Air Force 

missile delivery systems are now undergoing life extension programs, these 

efforts do not significantly exercise design and system engineering. Further, 

with the possible exception of missile motors, production will soon come to 

a close. Industry uniformly and understandably emphasizes that expertise 

can only be maintained with active programs. The skills being exercised 

today for nuclear deterrent forces are almost exclusively related to the less 

demanding sustainment of systems first deployed many years ago.

The need for special efforts to sustain key components of the large diameter ballistic missile infrastructure has been repeatedly recognized since 1990. 

On the present path, in the not too distant future, the infrastructure unique to 

strategic missiles will not be available for any new programs or to respond to 

major problems, should they develop, in deployed systems. Any reconstitution of capability (both facilities and people) will take many years.

The solution to this problem will involve programs to transfer critical 

skills to early career personnel in industry, funding of advanced development to support next-generation system development, and programs to 

support critical areas not fully supportable by advanced development. The 

Commission stresses the need for sustaining this capability. A decision to 

preserve the unique technologies critical to infrastructure sustainment will 

require the funding of development programs, but not a commitment to 

full-scale production.

There is an infrastructure issue with the dual-capable aircraft as well. 

F-35 contractors are not now funded to engage in technical discussions with 

NNSA’s laboratories to evaluate the impact of adding nuclear capability to the 

F-35. As a result, the current B61 nuclear bomb Life Extension Program study 

will go forward with limited communications with the designers of the only 

non-strategic aircraft that would remain to carry it. In addition, consideration 
28 America’s Strategic Posture

of new approaches for incorporating nuclear surety (ensuring that aircraft 

carrying nuclear weapons meet the necessary safety, security, and control 

requirements) will be delayed. Historically, adding nuclear surety after basic 

design of a delivery system has incurred large, often prohibitive costs. Today, 

modern digital technology may allow nuclear surety to be “added” to an otherwise non-nuclear capable aircraft platform at reasonable cost. The concepts 

behind this vision cannot be developed without exploring implementation 

on a real system. Such a prospect was in the offing with the simultaneous undertaking of engineering nuclear capability for the F-35 and the B61 nuclear 

bomb Life Extension Program study. Delaying nuclear funding for the F-35 

will preclude exploring this new concept and increase costs.

As the United States begins to plan its strategic forces for the future, it 

should take steps to strengthen the associated planning and design processes with an eye to addressing these concerns about infrastructure and 

deterrence skills. A competitive assessment process should underpin the 

planning and design efforts. Each element of the deterrent would benefit 

from rigorous assessment by competing teams of analysts. The organization 

of such competitive assessments should be the responsibility of U.S. Strategic 

Command and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). But 

they should involve project offices, major systems contractors, and experts 

from NNSA and elsewhere. These teams should evaluate design, production, 

integration, flight tests, and field operations. The ultimate objective should 

be to perform an integrated competitive review of each component of the 

U.S. nuclear deterrent.

The Commission has not reviewed command, control, and communications. These are important elements of the U.S. deterrent. But they are also 

the subject of a separate commission.

Findings

1. The U.S. nuclear posture consists of many elements, including operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons; forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons; the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems; 

the delivery systems for forward-deployed weapons; the stockpile of 

warheads held in operational reserve; a stockpile of fissile material 

appropriate for use in warheads; the associated command, control, 

and intelligence systems; and the infrastructure associated with the 

production of all of these capabilities.

2. There is no right number of weapons needed for the U.S. strategic 

posture other than one that is derived from a complex decisionmaking process, originating with the president. To determine that 

number, the strategic context must be assessed. Political judgment 
On the Nuclear Posture 29

from the highest level of the government is required. Numbers associated with different force sizes must be set in a strategic context.

3. In formulating an overall posture, the United States should employ 

a broad concept of deterrence. Extended deterrence and dissuasion 

and the need to hedge against uncertainty have design implications 

for the posture.

4. The sizing of U.S. forces remains overwhelmingly driven by Russia. For the deterrence of attacks by regional powers or terrorists, 

the weapons requirements are relatively modest. Even deterrence of 

China does not require large numbers. Currently, no one seriously 

contemplates a direct Russian attack on the United States. Some U.S. 

allies located closer to Russia are fearful of Russia and look to the 

United States for reassurance.

5. The United States could maintain its security while reducing its 

reliance on nuclear weapons and making further reductions in the 

size of its stockpile, if this were done while also preserving the resilience and survivability of U.S. forces. Substantial stockpile reductions would need to be done bilaterally with the Russians, and at 

some level of reductions, with other nuclear powers. But some potential reductions in non-deployed weapons need not await Russia. 

The United States could reduce its reliance on, and thus supply of, 

reserve warheads if it were to refurbish the nuclear infrastructure.

Recommendations

1. The force structure should be sized (and shaped) to meet a diverse 

set of national objectives. This requires a high-level assessment of 

strategic context. Reductions in deployed forces should be made on 

the basis of bilateral agreement with Russia.

2. Deterrence considerations, broadly defined, should inform the development of the next U.S. strategic posture.

3. The triad of strategic delivery systems continues to have value. Each 

leg of the nuclear triad provides unique contributions to stability. 

As the overall force shrinks, their unique values become more 

prominent.

4. The United States should also retain capabilities for the delivery of 

non-strategic nuclear weapons and proceed in close consultation 

with allies in Europe and Asia in doing so.

5. Force posture design and arms control should keep stability and 

U.S. credibility as their central objectives.

6. Steps should be taken to ensure the continued viability of the infrastructure supporting delivery systems.

31

3

On Missile Defense

Missile defenses are an integral part of the strategic posture of the 

United States after the Cold War. Such defenses were essentially 

impractical before, given the massive arsenal of multi-range Soviet 

missiles. In the past, they have also been counterproductive in that they drove 

the expansion of offensive capabilities. Today, the missile threats of most immediate concern originate from countries such as North Korea and Iran which 

have deployed short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, and are developing 

long-range missiles. For example, Iran has several hundred mobile short and 

medium-range missiles that could threaten U.S. allies and bases, and the 

recent launch of its Safir-2 Space Launch Vehicle demonstrated some technologies necessary for the development of a crude long-range missile. North 

Korea has hundreds of mobile short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, 

and has under development liquid-fueled rockets that could serve as a space 

launch vehicle for a satellite or as a first-generation long-range missile.

Ballistic missile defense capabilities can play a useful role in support of 

the basic objectives of deterrence, broadly defined, and damage limitation 

against limited threats, as set out in the previous chapter. These capabilities 

may contribute to deterrence by raising doubts in a potential aggressor’s mind 

about the prospects of success in attempts to coerce or attack others. They 

may contribute to assurance of allies, by increasing their protection and also 

reducing the risks that the United States would face in protecting them against 

a regional aggressor. Defenses against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles are seen by some U.S. allies as increasingly important to their security. 

Israel and Japan have demonstrated the value they ascribe to missile defense 

by joining in cooperative programs with the United States. The Commission 

strongly supports continued missile defense cooperation with allies. It lowers 

costs for all and strengthens the potential for collective defense.

The United States has fielded a ballistic missile defense system capable 

of defending against these short- to medium-range missiles. U.S. missile 

defense systems in development and deployment, including the Terminal 
32 America’s Strategic Posture

High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, Patriot Advanced Capability 

(PAC) 3, and the Aegis Combat System, have had numerous successful 

flight tests. The United States currently plans to complete deployment 

of 96 THAAD and 133 Standard Missile 3 interceptors. These numbers 

should be reviewed if the threat from North Korean or Iranian missiles 

increases.

The United States has also fielded a ground-based system intended to 

defend against small numbers of long-range missiles. This system has demonstrated some capability against unsophisticated threats and should undergo additional system testing to determine its effectiveness against more 

complex threats that include technologies intended to help in-coming missiles penetrate the defense (so-called penetration aids). Further development 

and deployment of these long-range defense interceptors should depend on 

results of these tests and on developments in the ICBM threats facing the 

United States and its allies. Research and development should continue on 

responses to counter limited but more complex threats.

For more than a decade the development of U.S. ballistic missile defenses 

has been guided by the principles of (1) protecting against limited strikes 

while (2) taking into account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China 

about strategic stability. These remain sound guiding principles. Defenses 

sufficient to sow doubts in Moscow or Beijing 

about the viability of their deterrents could lead 

them to take actions that increase the threat to 

the United States and its allies and friends. Both 

Russia and China have expressed concerns. 

Current U.S. plans for missile defense should 

not call into question the viability of Russia’s 

nuclear deterrent. China sees its concerns as 

more immediate, given the much smaller size of 

its nuclear force. U.S. assessments indicate that 

a significant operational impact on the Chinese 

deterrent would require a larger and more capable defense than the United States has plans 

to construct, but China may already be increasing the size of its ICBM force 

in response to its assessment of the U.S. missile defense program.

The Commission supports a substantial role for defenses against short- to 

medium-range missiles. Defenses against longer range missiles should be 

based on their demonstrated effectiveness and the projected threat from 

North Korea and Iran. Defenses against these limited threats should be designed to avoid giving Russia or China a reason to increase their strategic 

threat to the United States or its allies. But these defenses should become caFor more than a decade the 

development of U.S. ballistic missile defenses has been 

guided by the principles of 

(1) protecting against limited strikes while (2) taking 

into account the legitimate 

concerns of Russia and China about strategic stability. 

These remain sound guiding 

principles. 
On Missile Defense 33

pable against more complex limited threats as they mature. As noted above, 

this long-range missile defense system is now incapable of defending against 

complex threats.

The Commission recommends that the United States strengthen cooperation with Russia and China to restrict transfers to others of advanced missile 

technology, including the countermeasures to such defenses. Cooperative 

missile defense efforts with allies should be strengthened and opportunities 

for missile defense cooperation with Russia should be further explored.

Finding

1. Missile defenses effective against regional nuclear aggressors, including against limited long-range threats, are a valuable component 

of the U.S. strategic posture.

Recommendations

1. The United States should develop and, where appropriate, deploy 

missile defenses against regional nuclear aggressors, including 

against limited long-range threats. It should also develop effective capabilities to defend against increasingly complex missile 

threats.

2. While the missile threats posed by potential regional aggressors are 

countered, the United States should ensure that its actions do not 

lead Russia or China to take actions that increase the threat to the 

United States and its allies and friends.

3. The United States should strengthen international cooperation for 

missile defense, including with allies, but also with Russia.

4. The United States should also work with Russia and China to control 

advanced missile technology transfer.

35

4

On Declaratory Policy

Declaratory policy is a signal of U.S. intent. As such, it plays an essential role in reinforcing deterrence, as broadly defined to encompass also assurance and dissuasion. U.S. intent can be expressed in a 

variety of ways. It can be expressed as a matter of standing national policy 

in documents such as the National Security Strategy or the Nuclear Posture 

Review. It can be expressed in time of crisis, as for example in the letter provided by Secretary of State James Baker to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz 

in 1990 clarifying the commitment of the United States to react strongly if 

Iraq crossed certain red lines. It can also be expressed in formal statements 

at the United Nations Security Council.

The United States has joined the other P-5 states in issuing politically binding negative security assurances to the non-nuclear weapons states party to 

the NPT. As formulated in 1995, these assurances state: “The United States 

reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon 

States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which 

it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclearweapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.”

The P-5 also issued positive security assurances in 1995 prior to the NPT 

Review Conference. They are contained in UNSCR 984, which states that 

the UN Security Council “[r]ecognizes the legitimate interest of non-nuclear

-weapon State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons to receive assurances that the Security Council, and above all its 

nuclear-weapon State permanent members, will act immediately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in 

the event that such States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, 

aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”

Some qualifications have been added to these assurances in order to accommodate the competing demands of discouraging nuclear proliferation 
36 America’s Strategic Posture

and also deterring the use of chemical and biological weapons. For example, 

the United States added that it “will continue to make clear that it reserves 

the right to respond with overwhelming force—including through resort to 

all of our options—to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces 

abroad, and friends and allies.” This was justified in part on the principle of 

“belligerent reprisal,” a rule of international law under which the illegal action of an aggressor (such as violation of its commitments under the Geneva 

Protocol of 1925 not to use chemical or biological weapons) permits the victim 

to carry out, within limits, retaliation otherwise contrary to its international 

obligations. This was echoed in 2002 by a State Department statement as follows: “We will do whatever is necessary to deter the use of weapons of mass 

destruction against the United States, it allies and its interests. If a weapon 

of mass destruction is used against the United States or its allies, we will not 

rule out any specific type of military response.”

The Commission wishes to make five main points on declaratory policy.

First, to be effective, such policy must be understood to reflect the intentions 

of national leadership. The president must make clear his intent, and it must 

echo through the words and deeds of the appropriate cabinet officers.

Second, the United States should retain calculated ambiguity as an element of its nuclear declaratory policy. Potential aggressors should have 

to worry about the possibility that the United States might respond by 

overwhelming means at a time and in a manner of its choosing. Calculated ambiguity may not be wise in every instance, as deterrence in crisis 

may be better served by being explicit. But calculated ambiguity creates 

uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor about just how the United 

States might respond to an act of aggression, and this ought to reinforce 

restraint and caution on the part of that potential aggressor. The threat to 

impose unacceptable consequences on an aggressor by any means of U.S. 

choosing remains credible.

The Commission has considered whether the United States should adopt 

a policy of no-first-use, whereby the United States would foreswear the use 

of nuclear weapons for any purpose other than in retaliation for attack by 

nuclear means on itself or its allies. But such a 

policy would be unsettling to some U.S. allies. 

It would also undermine the potential contributions of nuclear weapons to the deterrence of 

attack by biological weapons. The Commission 

recognizes that, so long as the United States 

maintains adequately strong conventional forces, it no longer needs to rely on nuclear weapons 

to deter the threat of a major conventional attack. But long-term U.S. superiority in the conventional military domain cannot be taken for granted and 

[I]t is important that the United States signal in its declaratory policy the fact that it relies less than ever on nuclear 

weapons for political and 

military purposes. 
On Declaratory Policy 37

requires continuing attention and investment. This too argues that calculated 

ambiguity continue as a key element of U.S. declaratory policy.

Third, declaratory policy must reflect the central fact that the United States 

retains nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence—to help to create the 

conditions in which they are never used or even threatened. As argued in a 

prior chapter, the Commission conceives of deterrence in very broad terms, to 

include also assurance and dissuasion. Although the contemporary demands 

of deterrence are much different from those of the Cold War (and reliance 

on nuclear weapons has been appropriately reduced), the deterrence role of 

nuclear weapons remains crucial.

Fourth, it is important that the United States signal in its declaratory policy 

the fact that it relies less than ever on nuclear weapons for political and 

military purposes. The United States should underscore that it conceives 

of and prepares for the use of nuclear weapons only for protection of itself 

and its allies in extreme circumstances. The Commission believes that any 

president of the United States would avoid pushing a confrontation to the 

point of nuclear exchange.

Fifth, the implicit tension between U.S. declaratory policy and its commitments under the NPT to negative and positive security assurances is 

long-lived and remains.

Finding

1. Effective deterrence and assurance requires that U.S. declaratory 

policy be understood to reflect the intentions of national 

leadership.

Recommendations

1. The United States should reaffirm that the purpose of its nuclear 

force is deterrence, as broadly defined to include also assurance of 

its allies and dissuasion of potential adversaries.

2. It should not abandon calculated ambiguity by adopting a policy of 

no-first-use.

3. The United States should make clear that it conceives of and prepares for the employment of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances.

4. The United States should reiterate its commitments to NPT parties 

as stated in the agreed positive and negative security assurances, as 

they were qualified by both the Clinton and Bush administrations.

39

5

On the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

n essential component of the nuclear force is the stockpile of nuclear 

weapons. So long as the nation continues to require a nuclear deterrent, these weapons should meet the highest standards of safety, 

security, and reliability. The threat to use these weapons must also be seen 

as credible, meaning (in part) that they must be operationally effective for 

the intended military purpose.

The number of nuclear weapons in the 

deployed and reserve stockpile has come down 

very substantially over the last two decades 

(with an associated increase in the number of 

inactive weapons awaiting dismantlement). 

Presently, the United States retains a large 

stockpile of reserve weapons as a hedge against 

surprise, whether of a geopolitical or a technical kind. A geopolitical 

surprise, meaning, for example, a sudden change in leadership intent in 

some major country that could pose a threat to the United States, might 

drive the United States to reload reserve weapons on available delivery 

systems. A technical surprise, meaning for example a sudden discovery of 

a technical problem that results in the decertification of an entire class of 

warheads, might drive the United States to replace one warhead type with 

another. To hedge against technical surprise, the United States currently 

retains two warhead types for each major delivery system. This approach 

to hedging requires retention of seven different types of warheads and 

a significant number of non-deployed warheads. As the reductions have 

proceeded over the period since the end of the Cold War, the potential to 

deal with technical surprise has been reduced, as the diversity of types of 

weapons in the stockpile has shrunk. Future decisions about the size of 

the stockpile of non-deployed weapons and about warhead retention are 

going to have a direct impact on this approach to hedging and may require 

new approaches.

So long as the nation continues to require a nuclear 

deterrent, these weapons 

should meet the highest 

standards of safety, security, 

and reliability. 
40 America’s Strategic Posture

The directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories are responsible for making an annual certification with regard to the safety, security, and reliability 

of these weapons. Maintaining a stockpile of nuclear weapons that are safe, 

secure, and reliable as they age beyond their intended design life is a significant technical challenge. The challenge is magnified in a policy context that 

requires no nuclear yield from any weapon test. The path ahead involves a 

number of critical—and also politically sensitive—questions.

On Reliability

The technical health of the stockpile is monitored under a continuing program 

of warhead surveillance. When problems are identified, Significant Finding 

Investigations (SFI) are initiated. In the absence of nuclear testing, these are 

among the best indicators of the technical health of the stockpile. Over the 

past 50 years, there have been 1,000 such findings. Over 400 of these have 

required significant corrective action. The bulk of these have been in nonnuclear components of nuclear weapons. Many result from design flaws or 

early production problems, although as the stockpile ages, an increasing fraction is attributable to the aging process. Over time, the number of SFIs related 

to problems of warhead aging is expected to increase. There is also the possibility of new problems being introduced through the Life Extension Program 

or other modification processes. Accordingly, the Commission supports implementation of an enhanced surveillance and assessment program focusing 

on lessons learned to help discover and anticipate future vulnerabilities. As 

part of this program, the SFI metric should be tracked more effectively.

Approaches to Refurbishment and Modernization

The United States has not adopted the approach of Russia or China to 

modernization of its arsenal. It has committed to extend the life of existing 

weapons by selective parts replacement and recertification. This Life 

Extension Program involves remanufacturing with rigid adherence to the 

original design. In the remanufacturing process, the only changes allowed 

to the warhead are as needed to accommodate the dictates of modern 

environmental regulation and material availability (some materials used 

in the original production of these warheads are no longer available). This 

approach has been used successfully. Currently the W76 warhead for the 

SLBM is undergoing life extension.

The possibility of using this approach to extend the life of the current 

arsenal of weapons indefinitely is limited. It might have been possible to do 

so had the United States designed differently the weapons it produced in the 

1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. But it chose to optimize the design of the weapons for 
On the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 41

various purposes, for example, to maximize the yield of the weapon relative 

to its size and weight. It did not design them for remanufacture. This approach also requires that the United States utilize or replicate some materials 

or technologies that are no longer available. Designs constraints also prevent 

the utilization of advanced safety and security technologies.

The process of remanufacturing now underway introduces some uncertainty about the expected operational reliability of the weapons. So far at 

least, the directors of the weapons laboratories have been able to certify that 

they retain confidence in the remanufactured (and other stockpiled) weapons. But there are increasing concerns about how long such confidence will 

remain as the process of reinspecting and remanufacturing these weapons 

continues. Indeed, laboratory directors have testified that uncertainties are 

increasing.

This has led to a search for alternatives. A new, as yet untried approach 

is to redesign an existing weapon to optimize the design with larger performance margins, high performance predictability, and further improved 

safety and security features rather than maximum yield-to-weight. Such 

redesign can be done without introducing new military characteristics while 

improving safety and security, etc.

There are no examples of actually implementing this approach. The now 

cancelled Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program was intended to 

do so. The Congress decided not to support RRW in part because of concerns that an untested design might lead to a future need for nuclear testing and that warhead modernization would undermine U.S. credibility on 

nonproliferation. Congress denied funding for this effort pending a review 

of U.S. nuclear policy to be conducted this year. In March 2009, the Obama 

administration formally terminated the RRW program.

The Commission observes continuing confusion about the now cancelled 

program—confusion that seems to be a barrier to making the next choices 

about how to proceed to ensure that the nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, 

and reliable. The term “RRW” is used in different ways by different people. 

Some use it to refer to a specific warhead design that would replace a portion of the existing W76 warheads on Trident submarine launched ballistic 

missiles. Others use it to describe an overall approach to the entire U.S. 

stockpile, a process that would introduce improved performance margins 

and enhanced safety and security across the board. Some have conceived of 

RRW as a means of transforming the nuclear weapons production complex, 

whereby warhead production would be simplified and the use of hazardous materials curtailed. There is also some confusion about whether the 

warhead would have been “new.” In some senses, it would have been new. 

It would have incorporated some new design features to enhance safety and 

security and to increase performance margins. But it would not have been 
42 America’s Strategic Posture

new insofar as it would not have provided any new military capabilities. This 

short review illustrates that, as the nation moves forward, it must be clear 

about what is being initiated (and what is not) and what makes a weapon 

“new” and what not.

The two basic approaches to refurbishment and modernization are, in 

fact, not stark alternatives. Rather, they are options along a spectrum. That 

spectrum is defined at its two ends by the pure remanufacturing of existing 

warheads with existing components at one end 

and complete redesign and new production of 

all system components at the other. In between 

are various options to utilize existing components and design solutions while mixing in new 

components and solutions as needed. Different 

warheads may lend themselves to different solutions along this spectrum.

The decision on which approach is best 

should be made on a case-by-case basis as the 

existing stockpile of warheads ages. The Commission notes that several systems, including the 

W78 ICBM warhead, the W80 cruise missile warhead, and the B61 bomb, will 

require refurbishment or life extension in the next decade or so. Whichever 

approach to warhead refurbishment is adopted, the process is inherently 

complex and expensive. Orderly planning for refurbishment can help to 

reduce costs and realize other efficiencies.

The commission recommends that Congress authorize the NNSA to conduct a cost and feasibility study of incorporating enhanced safety, security, 

and reliability features in the second half of the planned W76 life extension 

program. This authorization should permit the design of specific components, including both pits and secondaries, as appropriate. The objective 

would be to make the W76 safer and more secure and to provide more diversity of design and reliability for this leg of the triad. Diversity in the W76 

is an important hedge against technical failures in the current design, which 

constitutes a large majority of the force.

Similar design work in support of the life extension of the B61 could follow. These life extension and modernization programs should be guided by 

the principle of finding the optimum approach for each weapon, ranging 

from simple life extension through component redesign and replacement 

through full redesign. As a general principle for subsequent life extensions, 

the Commission recommends that the NNSA select the approach that makes 

the greatest technical and strategic sense. Final implementation of the modernization approach for any particular weapon would be subject to Congressional review through the normal budget process.

The two basic approaches 

to refurbishment a nd 

modernization are, in fact, 

not stark alternatives. Rather, 

they are options along a 

spectrum.... The decision on 

which approach is best should 

be made on a case-by-case 

basis as the existing stockpile 

of warheads ages. 
On the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 43

As the United States proceeds with stockpile refurbishment and modernization, it must ensure that the design, assessment, and engineering processes remain sufficiently intellectually competitive to result in a stockpile of 

weapons that meet the highest standards of safety, security, and reliability. 

Toward this end, it would be useful to make increased use of “red-teaming” 

approaches. How so?

The Significant Finding Investigations noted above have revealed problems originating in all phases from design to field operations—problems that 

generally have not been identified until many years after a weapon has been 

produced. The fact that many findings identify problems originating in the 

design phase of the weapon indicates that original design processes were 

not sufficiently robust. This underscores the need to maintain proficiency in 

physics design, component engineering, production engineering, and test 

engineering. Toward this end, the best approach may be competitive design. 

For extensive refurbishments or expanded Life Extension Programs, there 

should be a formal design competition between two teams, a California team 

of Lawrence Livermore and Sandia Livermore and a New Mexico team of 

Los Alamos and Sandia Albuquerque. Once designs have been completed, 

each team should do a “no holds barred” critique of the other design. Production engineering personnel from the production complex should also 

be involved. This approach was used in the first phase of the RRW design 

competition three years ago. It significantly strengthened both competing 

designs, while also improving the capability and proficiency of both the 

design and production teams.

The concept of competitive design might be complemented by competitive 

annual assessments. As noted above, each year every warhead type must be 

reviewed to determine if it can be certified as safe, secure, and reliable by the 

director of the laboratory that designed it. While it is important that a single 

director be accountable for these conclusions, each director should have the 

benefit of a competitive review by the other laboratory. Similarly, Sandia 

(which assesses non-nuclear components of all warheads) would benefit from 

a formal competitive internal assessment procedure.

Before closing this section, the Commission wishes to address three further topics.

The first relates to the Significant Finding Investigations (SFI). The discovery of technical problems needing correction, and the process of making 

those corrections, are treated as routine within the NNSA. But the SFI process 

does not receive the funding it needs and, as a result, various forms of surveillance have been reduced, including flight tests and drop tests. This is a 

mistake. In the absence of nuclear testing, SFIs are one of the best indicators 

of the technical health of the stockpile, and dealing with SFIs is one of the 

best ways to maintain technical capabilities. Senior leadership, including in 
44 America’s Strategic Posture

Congress, should track this metric and should increase the priority, rate, and 

funding of both warhead surveillance and corrective actions.

The second relates to certification of the stockpile. No responsibility of the 

directors of the weapons laboratories is as important as the annual certification process. Despite this, the existing laboratory fee and evaluation structure 

takes no notice of certification or its importance. the NNSA should find an 

appropriate, formal way to recognize the importance of the process. This 

should not involve assigning fee to certification, however. Doing so could 

appear to be a government evaluation of the directors’ certification, which 

would compromise the essential independence of the process.

Let us return to two of the concerns that were cited as reasons for the Congress not to support the RRW: concern that an untested design might lead 

to a future need for nuclear testing and that any 

modernization of the U.S. arsenal might undermine U.S. credibility on nonproliferation. The 

Commission is satisfied that the risks of a return 

to nuclear testing to support the refurbishment 

and modernization program could be made 

minimal. In fact, they probably could be made 

lower than in a program of refurbishment that 

permits only life extension. The Commission 

also recognizes the tension between modernization and nonproliferation. But so long as such 

modernization proceeds within the framework 

of existing U.S. policy, it should not raise substantial political difficulty. As a matter of U.S. 

policy, the United States does not produce fissile materials and does not 

conduct nuclear explosive tests. Also the United States does not currently 

seek new weapons with new military characteristics. Within this framework, 

it should seek all of the possible benefits of improved safety, security, and 

reliability available to it. Moreover, modernization is essential to the nonproliferation benefits derived from the extended deterrent.

The third concern is about secrecy. The United States maintains an unneeded degree of secrecy with regard to the number of nuclear weapons in 

its arsenal (including not just deployed weapons but also weapons in the inactive stockpile and those awaiting dismantlement). Secrecy policies should 

be reviewed with an eye toward providing appropriate public disclosure of 

stockpile information.

As a matter of U.S. policy, the 

United States does not produce fissile materials, does 

not conduct nuclear explosive tests.... [and] does not 

currently seek new weapons 

with new military characteristics. Within this framework, 

it should seek all of the possible benefits of improved 

safety, security, and reliability 

available to it.
On the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 45

Findings

1. The United States requires a stockpile of nuclear weapons that is 

safe, secure, and reliable, and whose threatened use in military conflict would be credible.

2. The reliability of existing warheads is reviewed for certification on 

an annual basis by the directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories. 

Maintaining the reliability of the warheads as they age is an increasing challenge.

3. The Life Extension Program has to date been effective in dealing with 

the problem of modernizing the arsenal. But it is becoming increasingly difficult to continue within the constraints of a rigid adherence 

to original materials and design as the stockpile continues to age.

4. Alternatives to this approach exist and involve, to varying degrees, 

the reuse and/or redesign of components and different engineering 

solutions.

5. The debate over the Reliable Replacement Warhead revealed a lot 

of confusion about what was intended, what is needed, and what 

constitutes “new.”

6. So long as modernization proceeds within the framework of existing 

U.S. policy, it should encounter minimum political difficulty. As a 

matter of U.S. policy, the United States does not produce fissile materials and does not conduct nuclear explosive tests. Also the United States does not currently seek new weapons with new military 

characteristics. Within this framework, it should seek the possible 

benefits of improved safety, security, and reliability available to it.

Recommendations

1. The decision on which approach to refurbishing and modernizing 

the nuclear stockpile is best should be made on a type-by-type basis 

as the existing stockpile of warheads ages.

2. The Commission recommends that Congress authorize the NNSA 

to conduct a cost and feasibility study of incorporating enhanced 

safety, security, and reliability features in the second half of the 

planned W76 life extension program. This authorization should 

permit the design of specific components, including both pits and 

secondaries, as appropriate.

3. Similar design work in support of the life extension of the B61 should 

be considered if appropriate, as well as for other warheads as they 

come due for modernization.
46 America’s Strategic Posture

4. Red-teaming should be used to ensure an intellectually competitive 

process that results in a stockpile of weapons meeting the highest 

standards of safety, security, and reliability.

5. The Significant Findings Investigations flowing from on-going surveillance of the stockpile should be utilized by leadership, including 

in the Congress, to monitor the technical health of the stockpile.

6. The United States maintains an unneeded degree of secrecy with 

regard to the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal (including 

not just deployed weapons but also weapons in the inactive stockpile 

and those awaiting dismantlement). Secrecy policies should be reviewed with an eye toward providing appropriate public disclosure 

of stockpile information.
47

6

On The Nuclear Weapons Complex

Per the request of the Congress, the Commission has reviewed carefully the state of the weapons complex that supports the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This review has generated three primary concerns, each 

addressed in turn below. First, the physical infrastructure is in serious need 

of transformation and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 

has a reasonable plan to do so but it lacks the needed funding. Second, the 

intellectual infrastructure is in more serious trouble and significant steps 

must be taken to remedy the situation. Third, the governance structure of 

the NNSA is not delivering the needed results and should be changed.

The Physical Infrastructure

The weapons complex includes the following:

•	 The three laboratories: Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and

Sandia

•	 Four production plants

•	 The Nevada test site

All of these facilities are owned by the government and operated by various contractors.

The three laboratories are often called national laboratories or weapons 

laboratories (in the latter case to distinguish them from other DOE national 

laboratories). They are each multi-purpose, multi-disciplinary facilities with 

strong general science and engineering components. Each laboratory houses 

major supercomputing facilities and has unique, large and expensive research tools. These capabilities are utilized to support the stockpile efforts 

described in the previous chapter. They are also utilized by the Department 

of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and intelligence agencies in 

support of various other national priorities. (Note that Sandia operates two 

facilities, one in New Mexico and one in California.)
48 America’s Strategic Posture

Each of the four production plants has a distinct function. Weapons are 

disassembled and reassembled at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas. Retired weapons are dismantled and uranium components remanufactured 

at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. This facility 

also stores highly enriched uranium, for both the weapons program and 

for naval reactors. Non-nuclear weapons components are manufactured at 

the Kansas City Plant in Kansas City, Missouri. Tritium is produced at the 

Savannah River Site, in Aiken, South Carolina.

The Nevada test site is maintained in accordance with U.S. policy to have 

the capacity to resume nuclear testing as a condition of sustaining the nuclear 

test moratorium and possible entry into force of the CTBT. The policy reflects 

an assessment that the prohibition of testing carries some risks, however 

slight. Although it is unlikely that a problem will arise requiring nuclear 

testing, the emergence of such a problem with the deterrent would be a matter of major significance. The NNSA says it can 

resume testing in 24 months. But test readiness 

tends to be a low priority for both NNSA and 

the laboratories

The Commission’s Interim Report noted 

that “The Stockpile Stewardship Program has 

been a remarkable success, much more than 

originally expected.” This is true but incomplete. The program has enabled the weapons 

laboratories to develop some of the capabilities 

needed to ensure the long-term technical health 

of the stockpile, including some important new research tools enabling an 

understanding of the fundamental physical phenomena involving nuclear 

weapons. But it has generated no comparable improvements in the production complex. Indeed, the production complex suffered a significant period of 

neglect in basic maintenance. Most of the sites and many of the facilities date 

back to the Manhattan Project over sixty years ago. The production complex 

requires significant modernization and refurbishment.

In considering options for addressing this concern, the Commission believes it is necessary to take a long view. Physical infrastructure is unique in 

the long time scale involved in making changes to it. Although nuclear policy 

can be altered overnight and force levels can be decreased or increased (to 

a limited extent) in months or a few years, decisions on infrastructure can 

take years if not a decade or more to reach fruition.

The Commission considered arguments about establishing an analogue 

of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) utilized by the 

Department of Defense to consolidate the complex of aging military bases. 

The Commission sees such an approach as unwise. There is a simple reason: 

[T]he production complex suffered a significant period of 

neglect in basic maintenance. 

Most of the sites and many of 

the facilities date back to the 

Manhattan Project over sixty 

years ago [and] ... requires 

significant modernization and 

refurbishment.
On The Nuclear Weapons Complex 49

NNSA sites are all one of a kind. Accordingly, any consolidation would require reconstituting existing capability in some new place and this would 

add cost, not reduce it. The specific recommendation has been made by some to close either 

Los Alamos or Livermore and fold needed capabilities into the remaining facility. The Commission rejects this suggestion, and not just for the 

reason that it would be prohibitively expensive. 

The preservation of two laboratories provides 

competitive peer review in the one area—the 

physics package—that cannot be tested as a 

matter of national policy and where theoretical 

understanding remains incomplete.

The Commission considered a variety of studies from recent years about 

how to update the complex. It is apparent that, for various reasons, none of 

these has achieved sustained political support.

In December 2008, the NNSA issued its own plan for complex transformation. More specifically, it issued a formal record of decision adopting plans to 

modify the weapons complex according to a “preferred alternative” which 

has been subject to extensive review and public comment. This plan would 

maintain all of the existing sites but would consolidate certain functions, 

especially at the weapons laboratories, to avoid duplication. Both Los Alamos 

and Livermore would retain nuclear design and engineering responsibilities 

in order to provide for competitive peer review. The production complex 

would be modernized in place, with significant consolidation within sites, 

especially at the Y-12 facility in Tennessee. Two major replacement facilities 

would be built. One at Los Alamos would replace a plutonium research and 

diagnostics facility that is already well past the end of its planned life; this 

new facility would be called the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR). The other would replace the Uranium Processing Facility 

(UPF) at Y-12. The current facility was constructed as part of the Manhattan 

Project in World War II and the many problems and high cost of keeping 

it running are a testimonial to the failure over the years to make needed 

investments in the production complex.

The NNSA’s plan has merit and should be seriously considered by the 

Congress. The Congress should not, however, expect that implementation 

of the complex transformation plan will result in major cost savings. This 

is unrealistic. Indeed, there may be no significant costs savings. The NNSA 

proposes to pay for modernization in part with management improvements. 

But efficiencies may not materialize. Indeed, most projected savings are relatively small in dollar terms. It hopes also to generate increasing income from 

external customers. But this too will not solve the problem. Moreover, the 

The preservation of two laboratories provides competitive 

peer review in the one area—

the physics package—that 

cannot be tested as a matter 

of national policy and where 

theoretical understanding remains incomplete. 
50 America’s Strategic Posture

costs of transformation will almost certainly rise. The history of nuclear facility construction shows major cost growth. These are sometimes aggravated 

by Congressional funding decisions that create unpredictability.

In the past, rising facility costs have been borne by taking funds from 

other activities of the laboratories, usually from the scientific base. As argued 

further below, this has had a very deleterious impact on the labs and the 

practice should cease.

The two planned replacement facilities will be very expensive at well 

over $1 billion each. Given the NNSA’s historical problems in cost and schedule management of nuclear facility construction, any current cost estimates 

should be considered extremely uncertain. Even at currently estimated costs, 

these two projects would be among the largest construction projects attempted by the nuclear weapons program in the past 25 years.

This raises an obvious question about whether these two replacement 

programs might proceed in sequence rather than concurrently. There are 

strong arguments for moving forward concurrently. Existing facilities are 

genuinely decrepit and are maintained in a safe and secure manner only at 

high cost. Moreover, the improved production capabilities they promise are 

integral to the program of refurbishment and modernization described in the 

preceding chapter. If funding can be found for both, this would best serve 

the national interest in maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of 

weapons in the most effective and efficient manner.

But if funding cannot be found, what choice should be made? Four factors 

should be considered:

•	 There are safety issues with both existing facilities, primarily due to

their age. The safety concerns at the Los Alamos plutonium facility 

are at least as serious as those at the Y-12 uranium facility. But a shortterm loss of plutonium capabilities may hurt the weapon program 

more than a short-term loss of enriched uranium capabilities.

•	 The Los Alamos plutonium facility makes a direct contribution to

maintaining intellectual infrastructure that is in immediate danger 

of attrition (as argued further below). It assures that there is a complete long-term capability for Los Alamos and Livermore to conduct 

plutonium research.

•	 Because the future size of the stockpile is uncertain, projects that

are relatively independent of stockpile size should take priority. The 

uranium production facility’s size is influenced by stockpile size (the 

greater the stockpile size, the larger the needed production capacity). The Los Alamos plutonium facility is required independent of 

stockpile size.

•	 The Los Alamos facility has the more mature design.
On The Nuclear Weapons Complex 51

These considerations lead the commission to the conclusion that, if priority must be given, the Los Alamos plutonium facility should receive it. A 

delay in construction of the Y-12 uranium processing facility may also allow 

some redesign to tailor the plan to new arms control agreements and their 

implications for long-term stockpile requirements. The time might also be 

used to find ways to minimize the facility’s size and cost, and to learn more 

about secondary reuse.

A critical question in the overall plan is how much capacity should be in 

place to produce new weapons pits. The original pit-production facility at 

Rocky Flats was closed more than a decade ago. A capability to produce pits 

has been reestablished at Los Alamos in the TA-55/PF-4 facility. The facility 

has demonstrated that it can produce certifiable pits and the NNSA plans that 

it will be the permanent pit production facility with production of 20 pits per 

year and surge capabilities up to 50 and 80 pits per year. Given the new understanding of pit lifetimes, these rates ought to be sufficient to support the present 

stockpile or a reduced stockpile if arms control produces such a result.

The Commission notes also a chronic unwillingness of the Congress to 

support the programs needed to maintain test readiness. This is an essential 

safeguard of the no-test policy and should be supported. The Commission 

has also received evidence that some allies interpret the apparent lack of test 

readiness as a symptom of reduced U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. 

The Commission supports the principle of maintaining readiness to resume 

underground nuclear testing and recommends that the program be funded 

to maintain the 24-month timeline.

The Intellectual Infrastructure

The Commission’s second main concern about the nuclear weapons complex 

is that the intellectual infrastructure there is in serious trouble—perhaps 

more so than the physical complex itself. It 

strongly recommends that significant steps be 

taken to remedy the situation.

It is important to understand the weapons 

laboratories are more than a complex of facilities 

and instruments. The foundation of their work 

in support of the national deterrent is a unique 

scientific and engineering capability. Although nuclear weapons have existed 

for over sixty years, weapons science was largely an empirical science for 

much of that period. Nuclear weapons are exceptionally complex, involving 

temperatures as high as the sun and times measured in nanoseconds. Understanding these weapons from first principles requires a broad, diverse and 

deep set of scientific skills, along with complex experimental tools and some 

The Commission’s second 

main concern about the nuclear weapons complex is that 

the intellectual infrastructure 

there is in serious trouble.... 
52 America’s Strategic Posture

of the fastest and most powerful computers in the world. The weapons laboratories also play an important role in maintaining U.S. scientific leadership, 

especially in nuclear and plasma physics and in material sciences, including 

shock physics. Academic research cannot operate on the scale comparable to 

the weapons laboratories and industry has largely abandoned basic research 

in the physical sciences.

It is also important to note that the laboratories make important contributions to national security challenges other than weapons science. Their 

unique expertise and experimental and computational tools enable work 

on many other high national priorities, including nonproliferation, nuclear 

threat reduction, nuclear forensics, countering bioterrorism, ballistic missile defense, countering improvised explosive devices, nuclear energy and 

alternative energy sources, and assistance to the intelligence community 

with advanced technology and analysis of foreign programs.

For decades, the laboratories were places that easily attracted the nation’s 

top talent and expertise in these disciplines. But retention and recruitment of 

such personnel has grown more difficult recently. With growing frequency, 

the best of the younger staff are seeking employment elsewhere, and some 

of the best of the older staff are taking early retirement. Morale and, with 

it, capability have declined and seem likely to drop further unless steps are 

taken to remedy the situation.

This problem is aggravated by the need to reduce budgets for science and 

engineering in order to support the physical infrastructure. The NNSA expects to reduce the number of laboratory personnel funded by the weapons 

program by 20–30 percent. It is doing so without any understanding of what 

types of expertise to seek to retain or reduce. It does not know whether the 

results will be a weapons program too large or too small to meet its required 

purposes. This poses several risks. The United States could inadvertently 

reduce laboratory capabilities below some tipping point, after which it would 

be necessary to redevelop the capability to design and produce nuclear weapons if there is a future requirement to do so, or where it would be difficult to 

continue to maintain an effective stockpile stewardship program. Conversely, 

in seeking to avoid this outcome, the United States could maintain more 

capability than needed, thus diverting resources from other areas. Moreover, not having some standard for what is required leaves the NNSA and 

the laboratories vulnerable to the charge that they simply seek the largest 

laboratory complex they can get. A (justifiable) reaction to this belief could be 

for Congress to reduce laboratory funding in an uncoordinated fashion that 

would have the unintended consequence of endangering the deterrent.

The situation is complicated because it is not simply the number of people 

associated with the weapons program that matters, but the maintenance of 

specific critical skills in a variety of disciplines. The Commission believes that 
On The Nuclear Weapons Complex 53

it is important to conduct a rigorous assessment of the numbers of scientists 

and technicians needed by discipline to maintain and support the weapons 

program. There are several approaches, including one set forth in the September 2008 Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills. 

This effort must provide some foundational analysis on which the Congress 

and the administration can agree.

Once core capabilities are established, the Congress should require that 

annual NNSA budget submissions include an assessment of whether the 

budget as proposed will maintain these capabilities. To monitor progress, the 

NNSA and the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should 

establish a formal mechanism for tracking funding sources for the weapons 

laboratories, without additional administrative burden on the laboratories.

The assessment of needed expertise, its recruitment, and its retention are 

necessary but not sufficient preconditions for maintaining proficiency. Those 

skills must be exercised. This is true of scientists as well as development and 

production engineers. This requires that the NNSA maintain a clear and 

sustained mission of the meaningful work to maintain the stockpile. This 

must involve the entire nuclear weapons complex, both the laboratories and 

the production plants. If further production engineering capabilities are lost, 

years or decades will be required to replace them.

In addition, laboratory scientists and engineers must work with the actual materials to be incorporated into their designs, in particular plutonium 

and uranium, to maintain proficiency. Capabilities are not maintained with 

computers and calculations alone. All examinations of the nuclear enterprise 

have concluded that there is no substitute for work that exercises the capabilities needed to maintain the U.S. deterrent.

In short, the steps needed to renew the intellectual infrastructure are well 

understood. The laboratories must be able to provide challenging research 

on important national problems. They must be able to invest in a sustained 

and predictable way in maintaining laboratory capability. They must be able 

to conduct a stable program of work that exercises the full range of laboratory skills. In the weapons area, this includes projects that exercise design 

skills. Above all, laboratory staff must understand that their work is valued 

as contributing directly to important national interests.

Recalling the point above about the expanding contributions of the laboratories to activities outside of stockpile stewardship, an additional step might 

be taken to bolster intellectual infrastructure. In defining the future mission 

of the laboratories, the NNSA rightly argued in a June 2008 press release,

“[T]heir future mission is not limited solely to the historic nuclear 

weapons core mission, but rather is one encompassing the full 

spectrum of national security interests. The broad range of research and 

development activities at the NNSA laboratories, which include sensor 
54 America’s Strategic Posture

and detection technology, high-performance computing, microsystems, 

chemical and biological technology, and explosives science, will continue 

to ensure that the nation is equipped to deal with technological surprises 

and anticipate new ... threats.”

The Commission has considered various recommendations to formally 

recognize this fact. It recommends designating Los Alamos, Livermore, and 

Sandia as “national security” rather than “nuclear weapons” laboratories.

To reinforce this designation, the Commission recommends that the President issue an Executive Order formally assigning the Secretaries of Defense, 

Energy, State, and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence joint responsibility for the health of these laboratories. The White 

House should establish an interagency process to accomplish this and ensure 

that work in defense, homeland security, and intelligence is assigned to the 

national laboratories, building on work already in progress.

Such a step is needed because that work already in progress has brought 

home an essential lesson: elements of the federal government outside DOE 

are keen to utilize the capabilities of these laboratories but they are not keen 

to invest in the underlying science and engineering that generates those capabilities. As one expert has put it, the rest of the government is anxious to 

buy wine by the glass, but no one wishes to invest in the vineyard (Frances 

Fragos Townsend in remarks at the Nuclear Deterrence Summit, December 

3, 2008). The Commission believes that this diversification of support is the 

most—and perhaps the only—effective way to maintain the excellence of 

the laboratories. But much more buy-in is needed from outside DOE. What 

is required is not a series of small projects but a few, large, sustained efforts 

that will support capability building. To accomplish this objective would require strong, high level support and, so far, this 

has been lacking. The directors of the weapons 

laboratories have established the following criteria for support from a broader range of agencies: 

projects should be synergistic with the Laboratory mission, of national importance, and done 

with excellence using unique Laboratory capabilities. The Commission endorses these criteria.

The relationship between the laboratories and the intelligence community 

merits particular attention here. For decades, the laboratories have provided 

unique insights into foreign weapons programs because of their ability to 

bring weapons design expertise to the study of such programs. As concern 

about nuclear proliferation and terrorism has grown over the last two decades, this expertise has been in rising demand. But in recent years, funding 

for this work has been significantly reduced. The Commission recommends 

that it be restored. It also recommends that the Congress express a commitThe relationship between 

the laboratories and the intelligence community merits 

particular attention.
On The Nuclear Weapons Complex 55

ment to sustain that funding for the foreseeable future, as its fluctuating 

character over recent years has been a significant programmatic problem. 

The Commission also recommends that the Director of National Intelligence 

review and assess the potential contributions of the laboratories to the national intelligence mission and advocate for the needed allocation of resources.

A particularly sensitive question is whether the laboratories should be permitted to do weapons design work in support of this intelligence mission. At 

issue is whether the United States should seek to improve its understanding 

of the feasibility of the weapons design efforts of others by replicating those 

designs in U.S. laboratories. In this Commission’s view, this is possible and 

this work should be permitted. At a time of rising concern about efforts by 

proliferators to develop and improve their nuclear weapons, and of nuclear 

terrorism, such work is indeed critical. Such work would not involve the 

design of new weapons with new military characteristics for deployment by 

the United States. It can and should be done in accordance with U.S. policies 

not to produce fissile materials and not to conduct nuclear explosive tests. It 

would be limited to assessing whether adversarial efforts in development 

of new nuclear weapons will result in operational capabilities, and what 

technical, military, political, and other consequences might follow from the 

potential new capabilities. Working with partners in the intelligence community, the laboratories should be in a position to advise national leadership 

on foreign nuclear weapons activities bearing on the interests of the United 

States and its allies. In short, the Commission recommends that the laboratories be allowed to design, simulate, and experimentally assess foreign 

nuclear weapon designs for the purposes of defensive analysis.

The Future of NNSA

The Commission’s third main concern about the weapons complex is that 

the governance structure of the NNSA is not delivering the needed results. 

This governance structure should be changed.

The complexity of the weapons infrastructure and the importance of the nuclear mission 

demand the highest standards of management 

and oversight from the Federal government. 

Despite the efforts of thousands of dedicated 

and competent civil servants, Federal oversight 

of the weapons enterprise needs significant improvement. Key to that improvement is reconsidering the role and performance of the NNSA.

The NNSA was formed to improve management of the weapons program 

and to shelter that program from what was perceived as a welter of confusing 

and contradictory DOE directives, policies, and procedures. Despite some 

Despite some success, NNSA 

has failed to meet the hopes 

of its founders. Indeed, it 

may have become part of the 

problem.
56 America’s Strategic Posture

success, the NNSA has failed to meet the hopes of its founders. Indeed, it 

may have become part of the problem, adopting the same micromanagement 

and unnecessary and obtrusive oversight that it was created to eliminate. 

For example, in 2005, a Defense Science Board Task Force concluded that 

excessive regulation originating outside the NNSA but within a risk-averse 

DOE was raising cost and hampering production at Pantex. An internal 

review by NNSA leadership concluded that some of the problem lay within 

the NNSA itself. More recently, there are complaints of NNSA micro management of the new contract at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 

Outside assessments have concluded that the heavily bureaucratic approach 

of the DOE/NNSA is inconsistent with the effective operation of a research 

and development organization. See for example a March 2009 report of the 

Henry L. Stimson Center entitled Leveraging Science for Security: A Strategy 

for the Nuclear Weapons Laboratories in the 21st Century.

The leadership of all three weapons laboratories believes that the regulatory burden is excessive, a view endorsed by the Commission. That burden 

imposes a significant cost and less heavy-handed oversight would bring real 

benefits. This conclusion is backed up by some real data. One recent external assessment of NNSA laboratories (performed by the Hackett Group in 

2006) found a very high cost of compliance with federal safety and security 

requirements—approximately 15 times as much as for companies of similar 

complexity (recognizing also some important differences in some of the functions of those companies). Some other data is available from a pilot program 

conducted by the NNSA at the Kansas City plant in 2006 and 2007. Under 

this program, the plant was exempted from essentially all DOE regulations 

and additional oversight management changes were made. An external audit 

documented significant cost savings. Extending this approach throughout 

the complex is feasible.

Two broad attitudes are often cited as contributing to excessive regulation. 

The first is the failure of the NNSA and DOE to distinguish between what to 

do (a government function) and how to do it (a contractor responsibility). This 

attitude leads to overly prescriptive requirements in DOE regulations and 

plant and laboratory management and in operations contracts. The second 

unhelpful attitude is the tendency of the government to respond to problems 

by imposing new rules that will “guarantee” that the problem does not recur. 

This is particularly noticeable in the area of security.

In principle, as the Kansas City pilot demonstrates, it should be possible to 

reduce micromanagement within the existing structure. The NNSA Administrator has, in theory, broad authority over all areas of operation, including 

the power to exempt the NNSA from DOE regulations and to substitute 

NNSA-specific procedures. In practice, however, using this flexibility has 

proven difficult. Some illustrations:
On The Nuclear Weapons Complex 57

•	 During the first term of the Bush administration, the DOE General

Counsel effectively prevented any NNSA actions exempting the 

NNSA from any DOE regulations, arguing any such action required 

DOE staff concurrence.

•	 In 2005, a Defense Science Board Task Force examined production at

the Pantex plant and concluded that excessive regulation originating 

outside the NNSA in a risk-averse DOE was raising costs and hampering production. Although the Task Force specifically attributed 

the problem to non-NNSA DOE staff, the department limited its 

response to an intensive review of NNSA procedures.

•	 The Kansas City pilot described above was delayed because of concerns of non-NNSA offices over exempting the plant from regulations 

for which they had responsibility. Although the initial intention was 

to extend the pilot to other NNSA sites if successful, it now appears 

this will not happen because of objections from non-NNSA offices.

It should also be noted that the regulatory burden on NNSA facilities is 

increased significantly by the on-going audits and reviews by the DOE Inspector General and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board—and also 

the Government Accountability Office. These burdens are not under the 

control of either the Secretary of Energy or the NNSA Administrator.

Despite excellent working relationships in some areas, efforts to implement the NNSA Act and to maintain even limited NNSA autonomy have 

resulted in a large and continuing measure of bureaucratic conflict. This has 

been a major distraction at a time when the NNSA might have been consolidating gains and realizing efficiencies. Some observers have concluded that 

the NNSA approach has failed and that some entirely new approach must be 

found. The Commission has come to a different conclusion. In its view, the 

original intent of the legislation creating the NNSA has not been realized. 

The desired autonomy has not come into being. It is time to consider fundamental changes. Organizational changes may not be sufficient for reducing 

the regulatory burden, but they are clearly necessary.

In considering a recommendation for making organizational changes, the 

Commission considered a broad set of options:

1. Strengthen the NNSA within DOE through legislation

2. Make the NNSA a Defense Agency

3. Transfer the production complex to DoD while retaining the weapons laboratories and the Nevada Test Site within the NNSA

4. Establish the NNSA as an independent agency reporting to the 

President through the Secretary of Energy

5. Establish the NNSA as an independent agency reporting to the 

President with a “Board of Directors” composed of the Secretaries 
58 America’s Strategic Posture

of Energy, Defense, State, and Homeland Security plus Director of 

National Intelligence

Option 1 cannot be effective in the long term. The record of recent years 

points to no other conclusion.

Options 2 and 3 also cannot be effective. The interest of DoD leadership 

in nuclear weapons and in the weapons complex is, at best, episodic. Placing 

the nuclear weapons enterprise within the DoD budget may make it too easy 

to slight long term needs and to use the weapons program as a bill payer. In 

addition, some observers question DoD’s ability to properly operate broad 

multipurpose laboratories such as these weapons laboratories. Finally, this 

option eliminates the independent voices in the process of annual stockpile 

certification that come from involving multiple agencies. The Defense Science Board considered and rejected such approaches in its December 2006 

report of its task force on nuclear capabilities. The Commission, with some 

dissent, concurs.

Option 5 is the most appealing as a reflection of the broader national mission of the laboratories. It is also the option that comes closest to the model 

that worked for decades: the Atomic Energy Commission. From 1946 to 1975, 

the AEC provided a clear reporting line: the laboratories and plants reported 

to the Commission and the chairman reported to the President. It was disestablished when priority was given to the energy crisis of the early 1970s. But 

option 5 does not appear to be politically practical at this time.

Thus, the Commission recommends option 4. Autonomous agencies reporting through a cabinet secretary to the president are not without precedent and successful models have included the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Agency for International Development. Within DOE 

there is the example of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which 

is independent from the department; the Secretary of Energy is in a position 

to comment on but not disprove the FERC budget. To make this approach 

work, the NNSA, as an independent agency, should have a budget separate 

from any other entity. The Commission also recommends that this budget be 

reviewed by the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees of the House and 

Senate. Taking this step would be important because it would allow proper 

oversight of the broad national security functions of the weapons complex 

as described in a previous section.

Consistent with its earlier recommendation that the President issue a directive designating Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia as national security 

laboratories, the Commission recommends that legislation establishing the 

new independent agency should provide a formal mechanism for the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, State, and Homeland Security and the Director of 

National Intelligence to approve the NNSA strategic plan and to comment on 
On The Nuclear Weapons Complex 59

its budget in broad detail before it is submitted to the Office of Management 

and Budget. This mechanism could also allow the various members to carry 

out their joint responsibility for the health of the laboratories, as discussed 

earlier in this report.

The NNSA’s problems will not vanish simply by implementing a new 

reporting structure. A major driver of micromanagement and excessive regulation is the attitude of the Federal workforce reflected in both unreasonable 

regulations and excessive oversight in implementing them. Moving NNSA 

can only be effective if the NNSA leadership and the Administrator are committed to reducing micromanagement. In addition, the NNSA Administrator must have the flexibility to issue regulations. However, the commission 

recommends that the Administrator should issue no regulations concerning 

occupational health and safety but should depend on the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for both regulations and oversight. 

The Kansas City pilot shows this is feasible. Also, the Administrator should 

manage a transition over a three-year period to full nuclear regulation by 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Jurisdiction of the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board and NNSA oversight of nuclear safety should cease 

at that point. Under this approach, the NNSA would retain oversight of 

security (since there is no logical external body to provide such oversight), 

contracting, and construction management.

Those NNSA employees who transfer to the revised organization should 

be selected, in part, based on their understanding and acceptance of the 

need to reduce Federal micromanagement and on their commitment to the 

distinction between the government’s duty to determine what is to be done 

and contractor responsibility to decide how to do it. Changing the culture of 

detailed regulation will require a strong, experienced, and committed NNSA 

Administrator. Organizational changes can aid and empower leadership but 

cannot substitute for it. But success could make a major improvement in the 

effectiveness of the nuclear weapons complex and there is no better time to 

make these changes than at the start of a new Administration.

In summary, the Commission recommends that the President should 

designate the nuclear weapons laboratories as national security laboratories. He should assign formal responsibility to the Secretaries of Energy, 

Defense, and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence 

for the programmatic and budgetary health of the laboratories. In crafting 

the needed legislation, the Congress should include the following additional 

provisions:

•	 That DOE regulations will not apply to the NNSA and that the Administrator should issue appropriate regulations without external 

approval.
60 America’s Strategic Posture

•	 That the Administrator should issue no regulations concerning occupational safety and health but should depend on the Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for both regulations and 

oversight.

•	 That NNSA will be responsible for all environmental management,

including legacy remediation, at NNSA sites.

•	 That the NNSA budget will be administered completely separately

from the budget for any other agency. To implement this separation, 

the NNSA budget should be considered by the defense appropriations 

subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, 

thus ensuring both expertise and concern for defense issues.

•	 That the NNSA Administrator and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will jointly prepare and implement a plan for a three year transition to NRC regulation throughout the NNSA weapons complex.

•	 That once the Administrator and the Commission certify to the

Congress that this transition is complete, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board jurisdiction over the NNSA will cease.

•	 That the DOE Inspector General have jurisdiction over the NNSA.

Except for this IG support, that the NNSA not depend for services 

or support on the rest of DOE.

•	 That the NNSA should have direct access to the Intelligence Community.

•	 That the Secretary of Energy retain his responsibility in stockpile

certification.

•	 That after three years, GAO evaluate whether the appropriate independence from DOE has been achieved.

•	 These changes should not apply to Naval Reactors, which should

retain the current procedures set forth in the existing NNSA Act.

Whatever its governance structure, the NNSA needs the resources to 

perform its assigned missions. The Commission has already made various 

recommendations with regard to the funding of stockpile stewardship, complex transformation, and interagency support. But a higher-level view of 

the funding situation is needed. The weapons complex faces some difficult 

budget choices. If its funding does not increase, the NNSA is not going to be 

able to realize its plan for complex transformation while doing the needed 

life extension work and sustaining the scientific capacities that are the basis 

for not just the nuclear weapons enterprise but the other, rising demands 

from across the U.S. government for laboratory expertise. On the basis of 

current budgets, the NNSA is (as noted above) already planning to reduce 

laboratory budgets by 20-30 percent, regardless of the impact on scientific 

capacities (and, indeed, without having studied that impact).
On The Nuclear Weapons Complex 61

A significant new cost driver is security. Costs to protect nuclear weapons 

and material have dramatically increased over the past few years. Today, 

security costs at NNSA sites consume one out of every five dollars appropriated 

for the weapons program or approximately 

$1 billion per year. Some increase was 

inevitable in the aftermath of the attacks of 

September 11, 2001. But in the view of the 

Commission, some of the increase is not 

warranted. Both the Congress and the 

Department of Energy have been reluctant to take actions that might be 

interpreted as a lessening of security. As a result, the security program has 

become unbalanced, with few incentives for reducing costs and a tendency to 

apply standard procedures even when illogical. As an example, in planning 

for security protection, the Nevada Test Site security force is not allowed to 

take advantage of the fact that it is surrounded by the Nellis Air Force Base 

bombing and gunnery range, which has a robust security perimeter. The 

Commission did not investigate the security costs associated with sites now 

awaiting remediation, such as Hanford, but it understands them to be high. 

It expresses the hope that the clean-up of these sites can be accelerated in 

order to relieve their high security costs.

The NNSA has recognized this problem and taken a step to remedy it. A 

new policy for protection of nuclear weapons and materials was issued in 

August 2008. Officially called the “graded security protection policy,” this 

replaces what was called the “design basis threat” approach. This latter approach was a classified standard threat, which defined an attacker’s capabilities in an extremely conservative manner; sites were required to demonstrate 

their ability meet this threat. The new approach is more in line with the policies for protection of nuclear weapons used by the Department of Defense 

and also by the United Kingdom. The Commission supports this decision, 

although it is too early to tell how effective the change will be in addressing 

the cost issue. Costs for security are inordinately high in part because of the 

incentive structure. There are no incentives to do more then simply comply 

with existing standards and, instead, to use good judgment in the service of 

innovation. Conditional probability metrics are not being used as the basis 

for defining the necessary security protection at the sites. A more coherent 

approach to security will require strong and consistent support from both 

Congress and the Executive branch.

The Commission recommends that the Congress consider increasing 

weapons program funding to accommodate a faster pace for complex transformation without adversely impacting funding for the science program. It 

recognizes that the final decision will need to take account of other funding 

needs within the DOE budget and beyond.

Today, security costs at NNSA 

sites consume one out of every five dollars appropriated 

for the weapons program....
62 America’s Strategic Posture

The Commission also recommends the Congress take steps to make future funding as predictable as possible within the system of annual budgets. 

Historically, much cost growth at NNSA facilities is the result of funding 

inconsistency.

This analysis leads us to the following findings and recommendations:

Findings

1. The physical infrastructure is in serious need of transformation. 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has a reasonable plan for doing so that should be reviewed seriously by the 

Congress. But it lacks the needed funding.

2. Once the plutonium pit production facility at Los Alamos (TA55/

PF-4) is fully operational, it should be sufficient for expected U.S. 

needs.

3. The intellectual infrastructure is also in serious trouble. A major 

cause is the recent (and projected) decline in resources. A significant additional factor is the excessively bureaucratic management 

approach of the NNSA, which is antithetical to effective research 

and development.

4. Attracting and retaining the top national talent and expertise requires that the laboratories conduct challenging research on important national problems. This program of work must be sustained 

and predictable and exercise the full range of laboratory skills, 

including nuclear weapon design skills. Exercising these design 

skills is necessary to maintain design and production engineering 

capabilities. Skills that are not exercised will atrophy.

5. Elements of the federal government outside DOE are keen to utilize 

the capabilities of the weapons laboratories but they are not keen 

to invest in the underlying science and engineering that generates 

those capabilities.

6. The relationship between the laboratories and the intelligence 

community merits particular attention, given its importance and 

sensitivity. Some recent budgetary decisions have significantly 

weakened their collaboration.

7. The governance structure of the NNSA is not delivering the needed 

results. Despite some success, the NNSA has failed to meet the 

hopes of its founders. It lacks the needed autonomy. This structure 

should be changed.

8. The NNSA’s problems will not vanish simply by implementing a 

new reporting structure. The regulatory burden on the laboratories 

is excessive and should be rationalized.
On The Nuclear Weapons Complex 63

9. The NNSA needs the resources to perform its assigned missions. 

Although the NNSA decision to modernize in place is the right 

decision, the budget risk appears extremely high. The hope that 

consolidation would save money is unwarranted. Other important 

laboratory activities may pay a significant price. To juggle all of 

its competing commitments the NNSA would have to reduce its 

base of scientific activity by 20-30 percent even in a flat budget and 

this would have a significant impact on the science and engineering base. The NNSA does not know how large the core laboratory 

weapons programs need to be to maintain the deterrent.

10. Future infrastructure requirements must be assessed in light of the 

results of arms control negotiations now underway. Depending on 

progress in U.S.-Russian arms reductions, some down sizing may 

be possible.

Recommendations

1. Congress should reject the application of the BRAC concept to the 

NNSA. There would be no cost savings and no other efficiencies. 

Congress should fund the NNSA complex transformation plan 

while also ensuring that the needed scientific and engineering base 

is maintained. The plan will not be realized without a one-time 

infusion of funding above current spending levels and this should 

be done.

2. If complex transformation must proceed without such an infusion, 

either complex transformation will be significantly delayed or the 

intellectual infrastructure will be seriously damaged. If the two 

major proposed construction projects must be prioritized, give priority to the Los Alamos plutonium facility. In a flat or declining 

budget scenario, strong oversight must ensure that schedule and 

workforce issues are balanced in a way that does not substantially 

cripple current enterprise capabilities.

3. As part of the effort to protect the scientific and engineering basis, 

the NNSA should adopt a management approach consistent with 

the requirements of the effectiveness of research and development 

organizations. A less bureaucratic approach is required. Useful reforms include a realignment of DOE, NNSA, NRC, and DNFSB 

roles and responsibilities as elaborated in the text of the chapter.

4. The Congress should fund the test readiness program in order 

to maintain the national policy of readiness to test within 24 

months.
64 America’s Strategic Posture

5. The NNSA should conduct a study of the core competencies needed 

in the weapons complex, and the Congress and Office of Management and Budget should use these as a tool for determining how 

to fund the NNSA.

6. The President should designate the nuclear weapons laboratories 

as National Security Laboratories. This would recognize the fact 

that they already contribute to the missions of the Departments of 

Defense and Homeland Security and the intelligence community 

in addition to those of DOE. The president should assign formal 

responsibility to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, State, and 

Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence for 

the programmatic and budgetary health of the laboratories.

7. Congress should amend the NNSA Act to establish the NNSA as 

a separate agency reporting to the President though the Secretary 

of Energy. The legislation should include the additional specific 

provisions identified in this chapter.

8. The Director of National Intelligence should review and assess 

the potential contributions of the laboratories to the national intelligence mission and advocate for the needed allocation of resources. 

Congress should provide sustained support.

9. Congress and the Administration should also create a formal mechanism (not involving awarding fee) to recognize the importance of 

the involvement of the directors of the weapons laboratories in the 

annual certification process.

10. The NNSA should adopt a more coherent approach to security that 

utilizes tools such as conditional probability metrics to set standards and that creates incentives that are as responsive to success 

as they are to failure.
65

7

On Arms Control

This is an appropriate moment to revisit the potential contributions of 

arms control to U.S. national security and international stability. There 

is an apparent convergence of thinking among U.S. and Russian leaders about renewing formal arms control processes and working together in 

pursuit of deeper nuclear reductions and other initiatives to reduce nuclear 

dangers. It is time to consider how next steps might best be linked in a coherent strategy.

The Potential Role of Arms Control Today

Following decades of debate about the values of arms control, it is useful to 

begin here with a clear vision of what arms control can contribute. Two 

decades after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States are certainly not enemies but neither are they allies. The picture is a bit more complex. The two are strategic partners on some important international questions, but strategic competitors on others. Realism requires that we recognize 

the existence of potential military flashpoints as Russia has become more 

assertive in its use of military force in what Russia’s leaders call the “near 

abroad”. But realism also requires that we recognize that leaders in both 

countries have expressed an intent to increase cooperation on the basis of 

mutual interests, shared responsibilities, and mutual respect. In this context, 

the strategic military relationship can be an irritant, with new forms of competition eroding the will to cooperate politically. At the same time, political 

differences are a cause of military competition. Successful efforts to manage 

political and military relations can pay important dividends. In this context, 

the potential contributions of arms control are relatively straightforward. It 

may provide assurances to each side about the intentions driving modernization programs. It may lend predictability to the future of the bilateral relationship, a benefit of value to the United States but also its allies and friends. 

U.S.-Russian arms control can also reinforce the NPT.
66 America’s Strategic Posture

Moreover, at a time when the United States is considering how to reduce 

nuclear dangers globally, it is essential that it pursue cooperative, binding 

measures with others. In view of the prospective START negotiations and 

the U.S. role in extending deterrence to others, 

substantial unilateral reductions in operationally 

deployed strategic nuclear warheads would not 

be wise. The Commission does not believe that 

unilateral nuclear reductions by the United 

States would have any positive impact on 

countries like North Korea and Iran. But some 

other nations may not show the nuclear restraint 

the United States desires or support nonproliferation efforts if the nuclear 

weapon states take no further agreed steps to decrease their reliance on 

nuclear arms.

It is essential also to remember that the arms control process is not synonymous with arms reduction. Control occurs at agreed levels, deemed stable 

by parties to an agreement after careful analytical work. Any reductions 

require such work and it has preceded every important reduction so far accomplished. Numbers are not the main point—stability, security, verification, 

and compliance are.

Possible Measures

In the effort to renew the U.S.-Russian arms control process, the first step 

should be modest and straightforward. It is more important to reinvigorate 

the strategic arms control process than to strive for bold new initiatives. 

Toward this end, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed in early April 

2009 to negotiate a new arms control treaty before the expiration of 

START I at the end of 2009. A mutual reduction of operationally deployed 

strategic nuclear weapons in some increment should be achievable. This first 

reduction could be a modest one, but the objective should be to do what can 

be done in the short term to rejuvenate the process and ensure that strategic 

arms control survives the end of START I at the end of 2009.

Recalling that reductions in nuclear forces should proceed only through 

bilateral agreements, the United States and Russia should address limits on 

both launchers and warheads and discuss how to adapt the comprehensive 

START verification measures to any new commitments. Success in taking 

this first step would help create the political will to proceed to follow-on 

steps on the basis of effective verification.

The United States and Russia should also begin at an early stage to explore the challenges of deeper nuclear reductions. They are numerous. As 

the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons shrinks in 

[A]t a time when the United 

States is considering how to 

reduce nuclear dangers globally, it is essential that it pursue cooperative, binding measures with others.
On Arms Control 67

proportion of the rest of the strategic posture, features other than numbers 

become more important. The challenges of finding stabilizing, balanced 

postures will become only more pronounced as deeper reductions require 

the participation of additional states. Among the challenges that must be 

explored are the following:

•	 How should non-strategic nuclear weapons be accounted for? The

imbalance favoring Russia is worrisome, including for allies, and it 

will become more worrisome as the number of strategic weapons is 

decreased. Dealing with this imbalance is urgent and, indeed, some 

commissioners would give priority to this over taking further steps 

to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear 

weapons.

•	 How should the non-nuclear strike capabilities be accounted for? Under START counting rules, strategic systems are counted as nuclear, 

whether or not they carry nuclear payloads. This approach could 

become less viable as nuclear numbers decline.

•	 How will the theaterforce balances between Russia and China (and

others, potentially) be accounted for? Russia is already seeking relief 

from the constraints of the INF treaty on the argument that it is 

unilaterally constrained from addressing the imbalance created by 

the build-ups of medium- and intermediate-range missiles in states 

around its periphery, but any renewed Russian deployment of such 

systems would alarm U.S. allies and friends in Europe and Asia.

•	 How will the different defensive capabilities of the United States,

Russia, and China affect strategic balances and stability? The United 

States is pursuing a limited defense against limited missile attack 

and Russia retains an area missile defense system with nucleararmed interceptors ringing Moscow.

•	 How will it be possible to verify compliance with warhead

reductions?

•	 What types of hedges will different nations consider necessary and

how can they be balanced so that no one perceives a potential disadvantage if competition for strategic advantage should be renewed 

by another actor?

Simple answers to most of these questions do not exist. But answers to at 

least some of these questions must be found for substantial additional reductions in nuclear weapons to become possible. Simple numerical objectives 

cannot substitute for the type of rigorous analysis of the requirements of 

security and stability that should, as we have argued in a previous chapter, 

guide the design of the strategic force.
68 America’s Strategic Posture

Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces

To address the challenges of bringing non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF)

into the overall balance, the United States must deal with a number of arms 

control issues. A first priority is to ensure that 

the INF treaty does not collapse. For many 

Americans, this treaty is largely an historical 

footnote. Agreed in 1987, it led to the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched 

cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. 

The elimination of these weapons was completed years ago. The INF treaty 

is far more prominent in Russia’s arms control debate. Russian concerns 

about the treaty crested in 2007 with a series of high-level statements threatening to withdraw. The Bush administration was able to persuade Russia to 

agree to a renewed effort to globalize the treaty. The Obama administration 

has signaled its commitment to this globalization effort. Diplomatic efforts 

have been made to expand INF membership to all countries with missiles 

of the specified ranges. But this seems highly unpromising, as it would 

require states as varied as Israel, Iran, Pakistan, India, North Korea, and 

China to relinquish such capabilities. The fate of the treaty is a matter of 

considerable importance to U.S. allies in both Europe and Asia, among many 

others.

The United States will need to consider additional initiatives on those 

NSNF not constrained by the INF treaty—i.e., tactical nuclear weapons. U.S. 

policy should be guided by two principles. First, the United States should 

seek substantial reductions in the large force of Russian NSNF. Second, no 

changes to the U.S. force posture should be made without comprehensive 

consultations with all U.S. allies (and within NATO as such). All allies 

depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella should be assured that any changes 

in its forces do not imply a weakening of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence 

guarantees. They could perceive a weakening if the United States (and NATO) 

does not maintain other features of the current extended nuclear deterrence 

arrangement than the day-to-day presence of U.S. nuclear bombs. Some allies 

have made it clear to the Commission that such consultations would play a 

positive role in renewing confidence in U.S. security assurances.

On Arms Control in Outer Space and for “De-Alerting”

As part of its work, the Commission surveyed other arms control issues. Two 

further proposed measures require discussion here.

The first is arms control in space. Russia and China are keenly interested 

in such control, not least because they hope that such measures can be used 

A first priority is to ensure 

that the INF treaty does not 

collapse.
On Arms Control 69

to limit U.S. missile defenses. The Bush administration took a strong stance 

against it. This is an issue that will not disappear. The strong dependence 

of U.S. conventional military forces on space-based communications and 

sensors makes this an issue of great and continuing importance. There are 

other serious civilian issues such as space situational awareness, space debris, and space traffic management that could be used to develop 

international discussion and working relationships. The actual promise of space arms control 

is unclear. In the Commission’s view, the United 

States should seriously study these issues and 

prepare to lead an international debate about 

how to craft a control regime in space that serves 

its national security interests and the broader interests of the international community.

The second is de-alerting. Some in the arms control community have 

pressed enthusiastically for new types of agreements that take U.S. and Russian forces off of so-called “hair trigger” alert. This is simply an erroneous 

characterization of the issue. The alert postures of both countries are in fact 

highly stable. They are subject to multiple layers of control, ensuring clear 

civilian and indeed presidential decision-making. The proper focus really 

should be on increasing the decision time and information available to the 

U.S. president—and also to the Russian president—before he might authorize a retaliatory strike. There were a number of incidents during the Cold 

War when we or the Russians received misleading indications that could 

have triggered an accidental nuclear war. With the greatly reduced tensions 

of today, such risks now seem relatively low. The obvious way to further 

reduce such risks is to increase decision time for the two presidents. The 

President should ask the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command to give 

him an analysis of factors affecting the decision time available to him as 

well as recommendations on how to avoid being put in a position where he 

has to make hasty decisions. It is important that any changes in the decision 

process preserve and indeed enhance crisis stability.

While increasing decision time for the U.S. president is desirable, we are 

even more concerned about the possibility that the president of Russia might 

authorize a launch as a result of decision made in haste that is deliberate 

but mistaken. The best approach to this problem has been and remains to 

improve Russian warning systems; the moribund effort to establish a joint 

U.S.-Russia warning center attempted to help fill this need and should be 

revived as part of a broader coordinated missile defense effort with Russia. 

Toward this end, steps should also be taken to revive the crisis hot line.

[A]rms control in space ... is 

an issue that will not disappear. The strong dependence 

of U.S. conventional military 

forces on space-based communications and sensors 

makes this an issue of great 

and continuing importance.
70 America’s Strategic Posture

Requirements of the Arms Reduction Process

Successful pursuit of this broad arms control strategy requires the following.

First, the process of strategic dialogue must become far more robust. This 

is most obvious in the U.S.-Russian relationship, where renewed dialogue 

seems now well launched. But U.S. allies must also be consulted along the 

way, and not merely provided advance notification of decisions reached privately by Washington and Moscow. In particular, now is the time to establish 

a much more extensive dialogue with Japan on nuclear issues, limited only 

by the desires of the Japanese government. Such 

a dialogue with Japan would also increase the 

credibility of extended deterrence. There must 

also be robust dialogues with other parties interested in strategic stability, including especially 

Beijing and Delhi.

Second, the United States and Russia need to 

come to an understanding on missile defense, 

if possible. The United States should explore more fully Russian concerns. 

The two should define measures that can help build needed confidence. This 

might facilitate and include genuine and mutually beneficial technical and 

operational collaboration in this area.

Third, the United States and Russia should increase transparency on NSNF 

and identify an appropriate framework for discussion. This process should 

include close consultation with U.S. allies and recognition of their concerns 

regarding assurance.

Fourth, a renewal of arms control requires a renewal of institutional capacity. For decades, the United States pursued arms control with the Soviet 

Union by drawing on deep institutional resources in the Departments of 

Defense and State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the 

Intelligence Community. Those resources have been substantially reduced 

and should be expanded. The Congress too needs a mechanism to support 

its effective participation in this process, akin to the former Senate Arms 

Control Observer Group.

Findings

1. Arms control should and can play an important role in reducing 

nuclear dangers.

2. In both Washington and Moscow, the moment appears ripe to renew 

the arms control process.

[A] renewal of arms control 

requires a renewal of (U.S.) 

institutional capacity. Those 

resources have been substantially reduced and should be 

expanded.
On Arms Control 71

3. The imbalance of non-strategic nuclear weapons will become more 

prominent and worrisome as strategic reductions continue and will 

require new arms control approaches that are also assuring to U.S. 

allies.

4. For the United States to reduce its deployed nuclear forces, it is essential to move by agreement with Russia.

Recommendations

1. Pursue a step-by-step approach with Russia on arms control. This 

is a process that will play out over years and decades.

2. Make the first step on U.S.-Russian arms control modest and straightforward in order to rejuvenate the process and ensure that there is 

a successor to the START I agreement before it expires at the end 

of 2009. The United States and Russia should not over-reach for innovative approaches.

3. Begin to characterize and study the numerous challenges that would 

come with any further reductions in the number of operationally 

deployed strategic nuclear weapons.

4. Sustain the commitment to the INF treaty and commit to new efforts 

to work in partnership with Russia and NATO allies to negotiate 

reductions in non-strategic nuclear forces.

5. Develop and pursue options for advancing U.S. interests in stability 

in outer space and in increasing warning and decision-time. The 

options should include the possibility of negotiated measures.

6. Take the lead in renewing strategic dialogue with a broad set of 

states interested in strategic stability, including not just Russia and 

China but also U.S. allies in both Europe and Asia.

7. Work to come to an understanding with Moscow on missile defense, 

if possible. The United States should explore more fully Russian concerns. The two should define measures that can help build needed 

confidence. Pursue possible technical and operational collaboration 

in this area where mutually beneficial. Revive the moribund effort 

to establish a joint warning center.

8. Reinvest in the institutional capacities needed to define and implement effective arms control strategies. The pattern of underinvestment over the last two decades must be reversed.

73

8

On Nonproliferation

J

ust as this is an opportune moment to renew U.S.-Russian arms control, 

this moment is ripe for efforts to reenergize the global nonproliferation 

effort. Concern about a potential proliferation tipping point has mounted 

sharply and the 2010 NPT review conference 

looms as a significant potential turning point. 

The sense of urgency is only magnified by the 

clear risk that further proliferation increases the 

likelihood of nuclear terrorism through theft, 

diversion, or out-right transfer or even sale of 

nuclear weapons materials, technologies, or 

weapons themselves to terrorists. As argued in 

chapter 1, the Commission sees both U.S. extended deterrence guarantees 

and the global treaty regime as integral to the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

The key message from the Commission on nonproliferation is that U.S. 

leadership is imperative. Some have characterized the effort to bring order 

to the global nuclear challenge as “America’s special project.” The continued 

American commitment to leadership of the nonproliferation effort has been 

questioned by some in recent years. There should be no doubt on this point 

whatsoever. That leadership must come from the top. The President should 

use his “bully pulpit” to lay out an agenda, just as he should use that “pulpit” to lay out an agenda to support the deterrent. His early conversations 

with President Medvedev and his speech in Prague, on April 5, 2009, are 

first steps in this direction. President Obama should continue to invest this 

agenda with the political capital of his administration and return periodically to the issues to demonstrate continuity of commitment. He should also 

ensure that his administration pursues a coherent and balanced approach 

to the entire strategy for nuclear security. Good leadership requires setting 

the example.

[T]he Commission sees both 

U.S. extended deterrence 

guarantees and the global 

treaty regime as integral to 

the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives.
74 America’s Strategic Posture

Defining an Agenda

The opportunities are numerous for seizing leadership and include the 

following:

•	 Renew multifaceted diplomatic activity and engagement.

•	 Strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency.

•	 Lead a global initiative on transparency, addressing both warheads

and stockpiles, with the United States leading by example.

•	 Seek a treaty that ends the production of fissile material for weapons

purposes.

•	 Augment funding for threat reduction activities that strengthen

controls and eliminates materials at vulnerable nuclear sites.

•	 Develop international approaches to future nuclear energy production that minimize proliferation risks.

•	 Prepare to play a leadership role at the 2010 NPT review conference.

Renew Multifaceted Diplomatic Activity and Engagement

The advent of a new administration in Washington brings with it the opportunity to reprioritize and refocus diplomatic activity. In particular, the Obama 

administration has arrived with a commitment to engage directly with both 

North Korea and Iran on the premise that such action may terminate their 

nuclear weapons activities. If these efforts fail, we might then have reached 

a point where the nonproliferation regime is substantially if not fatally 

injured. If they succeed, this would have a very positive impact on global 

perceptions of the future proliferation dynamic. While engaging with Iran 

and North Korea, the United States must coordinate with its friends and 

allies, other governments, and international 

institutions to craft the proper mix of incentives 

and disincentives to positively influence Iranian 

and North Korean decision making.

With regard to North Korea, it is urgent to 

complete the disablement phase of the six-party 

agreement and then move to the effort to dismantle the existing reactor. But the United States 

should also maintain the goal of the talks on 

denuclearization of the entire peninsula and do nothing that seems to accept 

North Korea’s status as a nuclear power.

With regard to Iran, the United States should become fully engaged with 

international partners in talks seeking a political agreement that is acceptable 

to all parties. The EU and Russia are essential to this challenge, and China 

[T]he United States should 

also maintain the goal of the 

talks on denuclearization of 

the entire [Korean] peninsula 

and do nothing that seems to 

accept North Korea’s status as 

a nuclear power.
On Nonproliferation 75

could also play a constructive role. The United States and its partners and 

allies must also prepare for the possibility that such an agreement will not 

prove possible.

Diplomatic reengagement should not be limited to North Korea and Iran, 

however. The nonproliferation regime encompasses a large set of agreements, 

processes, and institutions, and they all deserve sustained and high-level 

attention from the United States. We should also recognize the role that U.S. 

foreign policy more broadly speaking plays in helping to create the conditions that might ultimately enable the global elimination of nuclear weapons. 

Without a fundamental transformation of international politics there will 

be no elimination of the conditions that cause some states and terrorists to 

seek nuclear weapons.

Diplomatic efforts can also help to counter proliferation where efforts to 

prevent it have proven unsuccessful. Efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism are 

political activities among states that help to prevent smuggling and increase 

capacities for other forms of protection. These measures complement the 

NPT by increasing the risks that would-be proliferators might be exposed 

and unsuccessful.

Strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA is the world’s watchdog against the diversion of peaceful nuclear 

technologies and material for illicit weapons purposes. Yet the agency’s safeguards budget is less than that of the police budget of Vienna, Austria, where 

the IAEA is headquartered. The current disparity between the agency’s 

resources and workload must be remedied. This disparity will only grow if 

nuclear power usage grows as some predict. One panel of IAEA-commissioned experts last year recommended a one-time injection of approximately 

$100 million to the agency’s Safeguards Analytical Laboratory and Incident 

and Emergency Response Center. Such funding would help the agency bolster its technical and human capital. That panel also urged annual budget 

increases equivalent to roughly $60 million, from its current base of approximately $385 million. The United States should lead the effort to make this 

so. The United States should persuade the IAEA Board of Governors to 

increase funding for the agency. It should also make adherence to the Additional Protocol (which provides for strengthened safeguards) a condition of 

nuclear supply to recipients. The IAEA should also be authorized to identify 

nuclear security weaknesses and illegal weapons activities inside countries 

and charged with responsibility to create an international nuclear materials 

database. The United States should encourage proposals by other interested 

parties to strengthen the IAEA and especially the process by which it coor-
76 America’s Strategic Posture

dinates its actions with the United Nations Security Council to deal with 

concerns about compliance.

Lead a Global Initiative on Transparency

As the two countries with the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, 

and with large nuclear weapons complexes, the United States and Russia have 

a shared responsibility to increase nuclear transparency and to set a high 

standard in their own postures. Transparency will be essential to continued 

progress in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, as new forms will be 

needed to address both delivery systems and warheads. The United States 

should pursue reciprocal nuclear transparency and accounting mechanisms 

on nuclear warheads and fissile materials, whatever the verification measures 

agreed with Russia for a START follow-on treaty. The United States could 

start by securing an agreement with Russia to report regularly on their nuclear 

inventories and total annual nuclear weapons spending, and then invite the 

other nuclear weapon states to do the same. It would be desirable to resume 

reporting on yearly warhead dismantlements, suspended after 1999, which 

could aid U.S. diplomacy to validate its NPT Article VI progress.

Seek a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

Negotiation and entry into force of a ban on the production of fissile material 

for weapons purposes would be a valuable addition to the global nonproliferation regime. The amount of fissile material available globally for weapons 

is enormous and any further growth is adverse 

to U.S. security interests. The countries known 

to be currently producing fissile material for 

weapons are India and Pakistan; Israel too may 

be producing such material. France, Russia, 

the United Kingdom, and the United States have 

all publicly declared voluntary moratoria, while 

China has reportedly intimated that it has 

stopped such production. A well crafted Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty 

(FMCT) would impose few burdens on the United States, solidify China’s 

stated moratorium, and rein in worrisome arms production in South 

Asia. Verification would be difficult. But the United States should explore a 

treaty with strong verification mechanisms. India and Pakistan, and perhaps also Israel, may be reluctant in the near term to join an FMCT and this 

could delay its entry into force. The United States should take the lead in 

codifying the existing voluntary moratoria until a formal treaty can be 

brought into force.

Negotiation and entry into 

force of a ban on the production of fissile material for 

weapons purposes would be a 

valuable addition to the global nonproliferation regime.
On Nonproliferation 77

Augment Funding for Threat Reduction Activities

The surest way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to deny terrorist acquisitions 

of nuclear weapons or fissile materials. In some countries these are stored at 

sites that are vulnerable to intrusion by terrorists or special operations forces. 

There may also be vulnerabilities to criminal diversion. An accelerated campaign to close or secure the world’s most vulnerable nuclear sites as quickly as possible should 

be a top national priority. This would build on 

and expand the important foundation of work 

begun under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 

Threat Reduction Program. Stopping proliferation at its source promises to be more effective than relying on efforts to 

interdict it in transit. By one estimate, an investment of $5 billion could 

remove or secure all fissile material at vulnerable sites worldwide in four 

years. If this is true, it is a small investment for dramatically decreasing the 

prospects of terrorist nuclear acquisition. Aside from increased financial 

assistance and political will, the effort to deny terrorists nuclear weapons or 

materials would be aided by the international establishment of priorities and 

physical security standards. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 

obligates all countries to adopt and enforce “appropriate effective” measures 

to account for and secure fissile materials but no agreement exists on what 

constitutes “appropriate effective.” The United States should take the lead 

on this issue and redouble efforts to provide support for implementation of 

UNSCR 1540 around the world.

Develop Approaches to Nuclear Energy that Limit 

Proliferation Risks

Nuclear power stations are now in construction in a dozen countries and 

other governments are considering the nuclear energy option. Growing reliance on nuclear energy will bring with it a sharp rise in the number of 

facilities using and producing fissile materials, a much broader trade in the 

associated technologies, and a further globalization of nuclear expertise. This 

will inevitably increase the risks of possible diversion to illicit purposes. 

Steps are urgently needed to ensure that these new facilities and materials 

are safely controlled, with the hope that this will minimize risks. Proposals 

to establish an international fuel bank, provide fuel-supply assurances, and 

create multinational enrichment and reprocessing facilities attracted strong 

interest internationally, while also encountering resistance in some quarters. 

They may need to be reconsidered in the context of an integrated solution to 

the challenge of reconciling nuclear energy and nonproliferation objectives. 

The surest way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to deny terrorist acquisitions of nuclear 

weapons or fissile materials.
78 America’s Strategic Posture

The United States needs to revitalize this effort. This should be guided by 

the following principles. Governments should agree to limit access to enrichment and reprocessing technologies, and the facilities that employ them, to 

the maximum extent possible. They should find means to assure a guaranteed supply of cradle-to-grave fuel services to all governments that comply 

with international nonproliferation norms, so that nations have an incentive 

to forego enrichment and reprocessing facilities.

Prepare to Play a Leadership Role at the 2010 NPT 

Review Conference

This review conference could prove to be a turning point in the global nonproliferation effort. It may be a turning point to renewal. But it may also be 

a turning point to collapse. Collapse would significantly impair the ability of the United States 

to pursue the agenda reflected in this report for 

reducing nuclear dangers and would likely create new nuclear dangers to the United States 

and its allies and friends. Given the U.S. stake 

in the outcome, a serious, high-level effort is 

needed to ensure that the conference becomes 

a stepping stone to renewal. Toward this end, the United States can take a 

number of useful steps beyond those already elaborated here.

First and foremost, the United States needs to identify practical means for 

improving the effectiveness of the treaty and Security Council in dealing 

with noncompliance by states parties.

Second, the United States should reaffirm its Article IV commitment to 

facilitate material and technical support for the nuclear programs of other 

countries, while clearly stating that the right to such technology is expressly 

conditioned to be confined to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Third, the United States should address Article VI directly and forcefully. 

Doing so involves making two basic points. The United States should reaffirm its commitment to end the arms race and work to create the conditions 

that might enable nuclear disarmament in the context of general and complete disarmament. It should also clearly articulate its progress in implementing this commitment by ending the Cold War arms race, reducing the size 

of its nuclear forces and also its reliance on them, working to prevent and 

roll back proliferation, and otherwise to promote the resolution of conflicts. 

It is also true that the United States and Russia still account for an estimated 

95 percent of nuclear weapons worldwide. A way forward on START is needed and would be politically useful prior to expiration of START I and to the 

NPT review conference, as this would be a signal of a shared commitment 

The United States should 

reaffirm its commitment to 

end the arms race and work 

to create the conditions 

that might enable nuclear 

disarmament.
On Nonproliferation 79

by Washington and Moscow to continue the reductions process in a predictable and verifiable way.

Fourth, the United States and Russia should lead an effort to increase 

global nuclear transparency. As argued above, this should begin with a bilateral agreement on increased transparency about their own deployed and 

reserve warheads.

Fifth, the United States should define an agenda of specific actions that 

can be taken at this time and over the next five years (in anticipation of the 

2015 NPT review conference) to strengthen the regime. That agenda should 

encompass unilateral actions to strengthen nonproliferation, bilateral measures with Russia, multilateral actions that may not be entirely global, and 

actions by all states parties to the regime. The building blocks of such an 

agenda are evident throughout this report.

The Commission is divided over the value of reengaging directly on the 

practical steps toward disarmament agreed at the 2000 NPT review conference. With an eye toward reiterating and updating their Article VI commitments, in May 2000 the nuclear-weapon states agreed to a 13-point program 

of action. These steps did not gain the political support of the Bush administration on the argument that they were not practical or not desirable from 

the perspective of U.S. national security. Today, some of the “practical steps” 

are outdated, such as the commitment to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile 

Treaty or to conclude a FMCT by 2005. Others have been implemented, such 

as continuation of the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions. Still 

others have proven impossible to achieve, such as the engagement of all 

nuclear weapon states in the arms control process.

The Commission particularly endorses renewed efforts in support of further development of verification capabilities that will be required to provide 

assurance of compliance with arms control. It recommends that the United 

States provide significant new R&D funding of approximately $100 million 

per year on verification.

The first of the agreed practical steps at the 2000 NPT review conference 

was ratification and entry into force of the CTBT. This is the focus of the following chapter of this report.

Findings

1. This is an opportune moment to reenergize nonproliferation. Both 

domestic and international conditions are favorable.

2. Despite the occasional failure of nonproliferation, the historical track 

record is good and we hope to find continued success in the years 

ahead. But the stakes are rising and we may be on the brink of a 
80 America’s Strategic Posture

new cascade of proliferation. This underscores the urgency of acting 

now.

3. Success in advancing U.S. nonproliferation interests requires U.S. 

leadership. Leadership requires leading by example.

4. Growing reliance on nuclear energy will bring with it a sharp rise 

in the number of facilities using and producing fissile materials, a 

much broader trade in the associated technologies, and a further 

globalization of nuclear expertise. This will inevitably increase the 

risks of possible diversion to illicit purposes.

Recommendations

1. Renew multifaceted diplomatic activity and engagement.

2. Strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency. Stronger financial, technical, and political support for the IAEA by the United 

States and from its Board of Governors could enhance its ability to 

perform its unique and important mission.

3. Working in partnership with Russia, the United States should lead 

a global initiative on transparency, addressing both warheads and 

stockpiles.

4. Seek a treaty that ends the production of fissile material for weapons 

purposes and pursue verification provisions that enable its effective 

implementation.

5. Augment funding for threat reduction activities that strengthen 

controls at vulnerable nuclear sites.

6. Develop international approaches to future nuclear energy production that minimize proliferation risks.

7. Prepare to play a leadership role at the 2010 NPT review conference.

8. Publicize more effectively the steps the United States has already 

taken to meet its Article VI commitments.
81

9

On the Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty

The Commission is divided over whether the United States should 

ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When the U.S. Senate first 

considered ratification of the treaty a decade ago, individual members 

of this Commission expressed different views of the treaty, and these remain. 

Our differences come down to different perspectives on the benefits, costs, 

and risks of the treaty. The accompanying boxed text lays out the key arguments of supporters and opponents of U.S. ratification of the CTBT.

The Case Made By Supporters of CTBT Ratification

Those on the Commission advocating CTBT ratification believe passage 

of the treaty will enhance U.S. security and increase the effectiveness of 

efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and use. In support of 

this view, these Commissioners make the following main arguments.

First, knowledge gained from past nuclear tests and the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program ensure that the United States can maintain a safe, 

secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile without additional testing. Indeed, U.S. policy is not to test, so CTBT ratification would not 

affect current or planned stockpile work. The Stockpile Stewardship 

Program’s extensive computational, experimental, and diagnostic tools 

will ensure the stockpile under the CTBT, just as we are now confident 

that it can support modifications of existing weapons to increase their 

safety, security, and reliability without resuming testing. The role of 

nuclear weapons in U.S. policy, as described in this report, does not 

require developing new types of weapons that might require testing.

Continued >
82 America’s Strategic Posture

Second, strong support of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the 

nuclear complex as a whole is necessary and sufficient to ensure that warhead safety and reliability can be maintained under the CTBT. A key component of that assurance is constant, vigilant assessment of the stockpile’s 

health through the stewardship measures endorsed by the Commission 

to ensure timely detection and resolution of any potential problems.

The CTBT has a withdrawal option. The United States would leave 

the treaty if testing were required to maintain U.S. warhead safety and 

reliability.

Third, foreign nuclear programs would pose far greater threats to U.S. 

security without a CTBT than with a CTBT. Absent the treaty, other states 

could develop and test new or improved weapons without constraints. A 

National Academy of Sciences panel in 2002 concluded as follows:

“The worst-case scenario under a no-CTBT regime poses far bigger 

threats to U.S. security—sophisticated nuclear weapons in the 

hands of many more adversaries—than the worst-case scenario of 

clandestine testing in a CTBT regime, within the constraints posed 

by the monitoring system.”

Fourth, the CTBT is effectively verifiable. Concerns about militarily 

significant tests that might elude detection are overstated. Verification 

capabilities, including those of the International Monitoring System, are 

improving and superior to when the Senate in October 1999 previously 

considered ratification. Potential violators could extract only limited, if 

any, military value from clandestine testing at undetectable levels. While 

obtaining P-5 agreement on prohibited activities is important, CTBT entry 

into force would provide additional authority and measures, such as possible on-site inspections, to clarify and investigate suspicious events.

Fifth, CTBT ratification would greatly enhance essential U.S. leadership 

in preserving and strengthening the NPT by demonstrating our commitment to the NPT Article VI obligation to end the nuclear arms race.

Sixth, other CTBT holdouts likely would be influenced by U.S. ratification, especially if there was a major diplomatic effort to secure additional 

ratifications. China maintains it supports the treaty and, as a result, we 

believe China is likely to follow the U.S. lead and ratify. Pressure would 

increase on India and Pakistan to not test and to join the treaty. Such 

developments would contribute to global nonproliferation efforts even if 

the CTBT did not come into force quickly
On the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty 83

The Case Made by Opponents of CTBT Ratification

Those on the Commission opposing CTBT ratification believe passage 

of the treaty would confer no substantive benefits for the country’s 

nuclear posture and would pose security risks. In support of this view, 

these Commissioners make the following main arguments.

First, there is no demonstrated linkage between the absence of U.S. 

testing and non-proliferation. Indeed, South Africa and several other 

countries gave up nuclear weapons when the United States was testing, 

while India, Pakistan and North Korea proceeded with nuclear weapons programs after we ceased. Ratification would not dampen North 

Korea’s or Iran’s nuclear programs, and the CTBT would not prevent 

other countries from developing basic nuclear weapons because testing 

is unnecessary.

Second, the United States would follow the letter of CTBT restrictions, 

although the treaty is unlikely ever to take effect. Entry into force would 

require many other countries to sign and ratify, including North Korea, 

Iran, Pakistan, India, China, Israel, and Egypt—the probability of which 

is near zero. Consequently, the U.S. would be bound by restrictions that 

other key countries could ignore.

Third, the treaty remarkably does not define a nuclear test. In practice 

this allows different interpretations of its prohibitions and asymmetrical 

restrictions. The strict U.S. interpretation precludes tests that produce 

nuclear yield. However, other countries with different interpretations 

could conduct tests with hundreds of tons of nuclear yield—allowing 

them to develop or advance nuclear capabilities with low-yield, enhanced 

radiation, and electro-magnetic-pulse. Apparently Russia and possibly 

China are conducting low yield tests. This is quite serious because Russian and Chinese doctrine highlights tactical nuclear warfighting. With 

no agreed definition, U.S. relative understanding of these capabilities 

would fall further behind over time and undermine our capability to 

deter tactical threats against allies.

Fourth, the CTBT’s problems cannot be fixed by an agreement that 

all parties follow a zero-yield prohibition because it would be wholly 

unverifiable. Countries could still undertake significant undetected testing. The National Academy of Sciences concluded that underground 

nuclear explosions with yields up to 1 or 2 kilotons may be hidden. 

Consequently, even a “zero-yield” CTBT could not prevent countries 

from testing to develop new nuclear warfighting capabilities or improve 

existing capabilities.

Continue. >
84 America’s Strategic Posture

Fifth, the CTBT’s on-site verification provisions cannot fix these problems. Instead, they seem designed to preclude the possibility of inspections by requiring the approval of 30 members of the Executive Council 

when only 10 of its 51 members would be from North America and 

Western Europe. Worse yet, the CTBT allows each country to declare 

numerous sites with a total of 50 square kilometers out of bounds to 

on-site inspection.

Sixth, maintaining a safe, reliable nuclear stockpile in the absence 

of testing entails real technical risks that cannot be eliminated by even 

the most sophisticated science-based program because full validation 

of these programs is likely to require testing over time. With nuclear 

arms reductions our confidence in each weapon becomes paramount, 

but CTBT ratification would foreclose means to that confidence.

In short, under the CTBT, opponents could make improvements in 

their nuclear capabilities while U.S. ratification would preclude the testing that could help preserve the U.S. capability to deter them. Given 

these serious problems and very dubious benefits, the CTBT should not 

be ratified.

[T]he administration must 

be able to assure the Senate and the American public 

that there is an agreed understanding with the other 

nuclear weapon states about 

the specific testing activities 

banned and permitted under 

the treaty. 

Despite this division of opinion, the Commission of course recognizes that 

President Obama has expressed a commitment 

to “immediately and aggressively” pursue CTBT 

ratification. In anticipation of Senate review, the 

Commission wishes to make the following specific recommendations.

First, the Obama administration should help to 

frame a broad national and international debate 

about the CTBT by conducting a broad net assessment of the benefits, costs, and risks of ratification and entry into force of the CTBT. The test ban 

has been a matter of intense, passionate debate 

for over 50 years and national debate would be very well served by a comprehensive, realistic view of the strengths and weaknesses of the treaty and 

the trade-offs between them. Especially useful would be an explanation of 

how such assessments have been shaped by developments since the Senate 

first considered the treaty.

Second, the administration must be able to assure the Senate and the 

American public that there is an agreed understanding with the other nu-
On the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty 85

[T]he United States must 

commit to some process of 

periodic review of the national security consequences 

of continued adherence to the 

CTBT, even if not ratified ....

clear weapon states about the specific testing activities banned and permitted 

under the treaty. At present, the United States and Russia (and China) seem 

to have different interpretations and, if so, this could put the United States 

at a disadvantage. The treaty itself states that it bans “any nuclear weapon 

test explosion or other nuclear explosion.” Equity must be demonstrated 

by an agreement of the P-5. An agreed definition of permitted and banned 

activities must also be verifiable.

Third, although U.S. ratification of the CTBT could produce significant 

diplomatic benefits, it will not bring the treaty into force. Therefore the U.S. 

should have a credible diplomatic strategy for 

moving from U.S. ratification to actual entry 

into force of the treaty and to persuade others 

not to test. The agreed entry into force provisions of the CTBT dictate that it not enter into 

force until 44 states have deposited instruments 

of ratification. In addition to the United States, 

those states so far not choosing to ratify include 

Egypt, Israel, Iran, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and China. A U.S. decision 

to proceed with ratification might be influential in motivating some of these 

states to follow suit, but U.S. ratification alone is unlikely to bring entry into 

force of the CTBT.

Fourth, the United States must commit to some process of periodic review 

of the national security consequences of continued adherence to the CTBT, 

even if not ratified, including whether the treaty has entered into force and 

whether testing is needed to maintain a safe and secure stockpile. The United 

States must be ready to withdraw from the CTBT and resume testing if the 

national interest requires.

Fifth, the administration and the Congress must demonstrate that they will 

follow through on the safeguards program. The record of U.S. follow through 

over the period since signing the CTBT has been mixed. As a general matter, 

safeguards are a hedge against the risks accepted in arms control treaties. A 

central risk of the CTBT is that, in the absence of testing, the United States 

might find it impossible to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of 

the U.S. nuclear arsenal. As a general matter, safeguards are proposed by 

the administration and, often after significant discussion, are then included 

in the Senate resolution providing advice and consent to ratification. In essence, the Senate makes its approval contingent on continued implementation of safeguards, although in practice there is no remedy short of treaty 

withdrawal if safeguards are not consistently and effectively implemented 

over the duration of the treaty. Moreover, the safeguards require budgetary support by the House of Representatives which is not involved in the 
86 America’s Strategic Posture

treaty ratification process. There are six such safeguards from 1997, lettered 

A through F. The CTBT is conditioned on:

A. The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program 

to insure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of 

nuclear weapons in the active stockpile, including the conduct of a 

broad range of effective and continuing experimental programs.

B. The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will 

attract, retain, and ensure the continued application of our human 

scientific resources to those programs on which continued progress 

in nuclear technology depends.

C. The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be 

bound to adhere to this treaty.

D. Continuation of a comprehensive research and development program 

to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations.

E. The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and 

comprehensive information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear 

weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs.

F. The understanding that if the President of the United States is 

informed by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy —

advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE’s 

nuclear weapons laboratories, and the Commander of the U.S. 

Strategic Command—that a high level of confidence in the safety 

or reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two Secretaries 

consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be 

certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be 

prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard ”supreme 

national interests” clause in order to conduct whatever testing might 

be required.

In the decade since the CTBT was considered by the Senate, there have 

been some important safeguards successes. In particular, the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program has had some remarkable achievements. But in recent 

years, the level of funding provided to support these safeguards has been 

inadequate. Moreover, as noted in a previous chapter, the Life Extension 

Program will become increasingly difficult as the stockpile continues to age. 

Simulations may be helpful in reducing uncertainties but cannot eliminate 

them. We will need to get back to the funding support that brought about 

the successes of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
On the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty 87

Finding

1. The Commission has no agreed position on whether ratification of 

the CTBT should proceed.

Recommendations

1. To prepare the way for Senate re-review of the CTBT, the administration should prepare a comprehensive net assessment of benefits, 

costs, and risks; secure P-5 agreement on a clear and precise definition of banned and permitted test activity; define a diplomatic 

strategy for entry into force; and prepare a budget that adequately 

funds the safeguards program.

2. If the Senate consents to CTBT ratification, and acknowledging the 

expected long delay in actual entry into force of the treaty, the United 

States should secure agreement among the P-5 to implement CTBT 

verification provisions without waiting for entry into force of the 

treaty and to agree to an effective process among the P-5 to permit 

on-site inspections.

89

10

On Prevention and Protection

rior chapters of this report have addressed the challenge of reducing 

nuclear dangers through a mix of political tools of national policy and 

an effective deterrent. This chapter highlights some additional steps 

needed to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism and also to 

protect the United States and its allies and partners from the consequences 

of acts not prevented. Three forms of protection are discussed here:

•	 Counterproliferation measures, principally those focused on interdicting the shipment of weapons or materials to proliferators and 

terrorists.

•	 Homeland Defense measures, principally those focused on preventing the transit into the United States of smuggled nuclear weapons 

or materials.

•	 Protection against the effects of attack with nuclear weapons designed to have catastrophic electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects.

Counterproliferation measures emerged as an important adjunct to national nuclear strategy in the 1990s, when it became clear that sometimes nonproliferation efforts would fail and the United States would have to contain 

and possibly defeat WMD-armed adversaries and to suppress illicit trade 

among them. Like the Cooperative Threat Reduction program described in a 

previous chapter, counterproliferation measures were intended to apply new 

policy tools to new challenges. Over the last decade the counterproliferation 

effort has burgeoned into a significant international effort under the auspices 

of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and similar bilateral and other 

activities. Sometimes seen as a threat to the nonproliferation regime because 

they operate outside it, these activities are in fact reinforcing, as they signal 

the commitment of states to police activities within their territories and in 

international spaces to ensure that illicit activities are detected and punished. 

The Commission recommends that such international cooperation to counter 

proliferation continue.

P
90 America’s Strategic Posture

A parallel activity also merits mention here: the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. This is a program of activity jointly led by the United 

States and Russia and aimed at enhancing the capacity of all countries to 

cope with nuclear terrorism. Partners in this activity share expertise and 

knowledge about all aspects of countering nuclear terrorism, whether in detecting smuggling, interdicting trade routes, investigating incidents, or treating victims. The Commission recommends that this too continue. The United 

States has also undertaken significant efforts over the last decade to protect 

the homeland against nuclear smuggling. This 

involves improved monitoring of ports where 

cargo moves in large volume, both in the United 

States and overseas, and of transportation corridors. Such efforts to protect against nuclear 

terrorism require strong international cooperation. They also require an improved “whole of 

government” approach to ensure that the different executive agencies of the U.S. government are engaged in mutually 

supportive activities. Improved coordination is needed.

These forms of prevention and protection are particularly important to 

reducing the risks of nuclear terrorism. They are necessary because deterrence seems to have relatively little to contribute to this effort, in contrast 

to its significant potential impact on state actors. Direct deterrence of terrorists seems impractical with threats of retaliation. After all, terrorists are 

elusive (and thus they are difficult to target with retaliatory actions) and it 

has proven difficult to discern what they hold of value or to hold it at risk 

(and thus they are difficult to restrain through the fear of punishment). 

To the extent it is practical, deterrence would seem to require an ability 

to deny terrorists their goals, impede their planning and movement, and 

attribute the sources of nuclear terrorist attacks. The ability to attribute 

nuclear terrorist attacks to their sources may also provide some leverage 

over states whose leaders sponsor terrorism. Policymakers must have a 

realistic understanding of the difficulties of attribution. Nonetheless, the 

United States should continue to make efforts to improve the forensic capabilities that can help to evaluate the possible origins of the fissile material 

in any nuclear detonation.

The Threat from Electromagnetic Pulse Weapons

Lastly, the United States should take steps to reduce the vulnerability of the 

nation and the military to attacks with weapons designed to produce electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects. We make this recommendation although 

the Commission is divided over how imminent a threat this is. Some com-

... efforts to protect against 

nuclear terrorism require 

strong international cooperation. They also require an 

improved “whole of government” approach ....
On Prevention and Protection 91

missioners believe it to be a high priority threat, given foreign activities and 

terrorist intentions. Others see it as a serious potential threat, given the high 

level of vulnerability. Those vulnerabilities are of many kinds. U.S. power 

projection forces might be subjected to an EMP attack by an enemy calculating—mistakenly—that such an attack would not involve risks of U.S. nuclear 

retaliation. The homeland might be attacked by terrorists or even state actors 

with an eye to crippling the U.S. economy and American society. From a 

technical perspective, it is possible that such attacks could have catastrophic 

consequences. For example, successful attacks could shut down the electrical 

system, disable the internet and computers and the economic activity on 

which they depend, incapacitate transportation systems (and thus the delivery of food and other goods), etc.

Prior commissions have investigated U.S. vulnerabilities and found little 

activity under way to address them. Some limited defensive measures have 

been ordered by the Department of Defense to give some protection to important operational communications. But EMP vulnerabilities have not yet 

been addressed effectively by the Department of Homeland Security. Doing 

so could take several years. The EMP commission has recommended numerous measures that would mitigate the damage that might be wrought by an 

EMP attack. The Stimulus Bill of February 9, 2009, allocates $11 billion to DOE 

for “for smart grid activities, including to modernize the electric grid.” Unless such improvements in the electric grid are focused in part on reducing 

EMP vulnerabilities, vulnerability might well increase.

Findings

1. Counterproliferation activities have emerged since the end of the 

Cold War as a new focus of international cooperation to prevent 

proliferation and terrorism and they are a useful adjunct to nonproliferation measures.

2. Stronger “whole of government” approaches are needed to reduce 

the risks of nuclear smuggling into the United States.

3. The United States is highly vulnerable to attack with weapons designed to produce electromagnetic pulse effects.

Recommendations

1. The Proliferation Security Initiative and Global Initiative to Combat 

Nuclear Terrorism should be sustained and additional international 
92 America’s Strategic Posture

cooperative measures developed to prevent and protect against proliferation and terrorism.

2. Improved integration of national and international responses is 

needed to protect the homeland against nuclear smuggling. The 

U.S. government should accelerate the development of sensors to 

detect nuclear smuggling and deploy them when effective.

3. EMP vulnerabilities should be reduced as the United States modernizes its electric power grid.
93

11

Closing Observations

s the Commission has debated its findings and recommendations, it 

has become clear that we have very different visions of what might 

be possible in the long term. Fundamentally, this reflects our differences over whether the conditions can ever be created that might enable 

the elimination of nuclear weapons. But our debates have also brought home 

to us that we share, to a very significant degree, a vision of the nearer term.

Looking ahead over the next decade or two, we reject the notion that 

somehow it is inevitable that international nuclear order will collapse. Despite the many challenges in the international security environment, there is 

no reason to accept as inevitable the collapse of the nonproliferation regime, 

a cascade of proliferation to new states, an associated dramatic rise in the 

risks of nuclear terrorism, and a return of competition for nuclear advantage 

among the major powers.

On the contrary—the past successes of the 

United States and its international partners in 

meeting and reducing nuclear dangers make us 

more hopeful for the future. We embrace the possibility that over the next decade or two nuclear 

dangers will be further reduced. The risks of nuclear terrorism can be reduced through stronger 

cooperative measures to control their access to materials, technology, and 

expertise. The major powers can cooperate more effectively in service of 

nonproliferation, strategic stability among themselves, and steadily diminishing reliance on nuclear weapons. While the United States may not be able 

to prevent all proliferation, there may be some rollback of current programs 

and capabilities and also continued restraint by most. The United States and 

its allies and friends can be made to feel more secure and the pressures on 

others to seek nuclear weapons diminished.

Despite our many differences of opinion, we have come together around 

a strategy that offers pragmatic steps for bringing this vision closer to real-

[T]he past successes of the 

United States and its international partners in meeting 

and reducing nuclear dangers 

make us more hopeful for the 

future. 
94 America’s Strategic Posture

ity. It is firmly grounded in the strategic tradition of the United States and 

the twin imperatives to meet nuclear dangers with effective deterrence and 

to reduce them where possible with additional political means, including 

principally arms control and nonproliferation.

Many of us see one component of strategy as more important than the 

other. But none of us would endorse a strategy that emphasizes one approach 

to the near exclusion of the other. These two components of strategy should 

be mutually reinforcing. Extended deterrence, for example, reinforces nonproliferation, by assuring U.S. allies and friends that they need not create 

independent nuclear deterrents of their own to be secure. Conversely, nonproliferation regimes help create the political conditions to allow enforcement actions against dangerous states.

Of course, in any comprehensive strategy policies associated with one 

component might sometimes conflict with those associated with the other. 

Such potential conflicts must be recognized and, where possible, resolved 

so that the components of policy can be brought into balance. If the United 

States puts too much or too little emphasis on nuclear weapons, this could 

undermine arms control and nonproliferation. If it pursues an arms control 

strategy that reduces needed nuclear forces unilaterally, this could undermine deterrence and assurance, in turn undermining nonproliferation. Balance is needed and we believe that our recommendations strike the needed 

balance.

While so heavy an emphasis on nuclear deterrence is not needed today, 

an awareness of its critical role needs to be restored in the United States and 

this too must be emphasized by our national leaders. We have delineated 

a strategy for deterrence that ensures a strong and effective deterrent so 

long as it is needed, but we have aligned our recommendations with the 

need for balance through changes to declaratory policy and force structure. 

We have also delineated a strategy for arms control and nonproliferation 

that promises to significantly reduce nuclear dangers, but this too has been 

aligned with the need for balance through the 

commitment to maintaining a safe, secure, and 

reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons. We recognize that critics on both sides of this debate 

will find fault with the compromises we have 

proposed. But a lop-sided approach will not improve U.S. security and a balanced approach to 

reducing nuclear dangers is essential.

In surveying more than six decades of nuclear

 history, we are struck by the fact that nuclear 

weapons have not been used since 1945. It is clear that a tradition against 

the use of nuclear weapons has taken hold. The United States must strive to 

In surveying more than six 

decades of nuclear history, 

we are struck by the fact that 

nuclear weapons have not 

been used since 1945. It is 

clear that a tradition against 

the use of nuclear weapons 

has taken hold.
Closing Observations 95

maintain this tradition and urge all other nuclear armed nations to adhere 

to it. At the end of World War II, the United States tried to establish an international authority to restrict nuclear technology exclusively to peaceful 

purposes, called the Baruch plan; however, the plan failed. Since very few 

nuclear weapons existed at that time, this concept might have succeeded 

had the Soviet Union been ruled by a Gorbachev and not by Stalin. Yet the 

tradition of non-use has now lasted more than six decades. In at least four 

wars a nuclear-armed power accepted defeat or stalemate fighting an enemy 

that did not have a single nuclear bomb: the Korean war, the U.S. war in 

Vietnam, the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan, and China’s cross-border 

attack on Vietnam.

Any future use of nuclear weapons is likely to be the beginning of a 

catastrophic change in the world order. Those nations able to strengthen 

their nuclear forces, or to start to acquire nuclear weapons of their own, 

would likely do so. Thus, nuclear proliferation would be accelerated, and 

the 63-year-old dividing line between conventional and nuclear could be 

erased. To survive in such a violent world would be particularly difficult 

for democracies. It would change the world order in fundamental ways and 

would risk a highly unstable nuclear disorder. Dictatorship might benefit 

from the worldwide nuclear violence. Clearly, preserving this tradition of 

non-use is essential.

97

Compilation of Findings and 

Recommendations

Chapter One: On Challenges and Opportunities

Findings

1. Throughout the nuclear era U.S. policy has been shaped by the imperative to reduce nuclear dangers with a balanced approach involving both deterrence and political measures such as arms control 

and nonproliferation. Although evolving circumstances over the six 

decades of the nuclear era have compelled leaders to innovate and 

adapt, there has been striking continuity in U.S. strategic policy.

2. Since the end of the Cold War, the nuclear security environment of 

the United States has changed considerably. The threat of a nuclear 

Armageddon has largely disappeared. But new threats have taken 

shape and the overall environment has grown more complex and 

in some ways more precarious.

3. The U.S. strategic posture and doctrine have also changed substantially in the intervening period. The U.S. nuclear force is but a small 

fraction of what it was at the end of the Cold War and the U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons in national military strategy and national 

security strategy has been sharply reduced.

4. Nuclear terrorism against the United States and other nations is a 

very serious threat. This requires a much more concerted international response, one which the United States must lead.

5. Nuclear and missile proliferation could have a profoundly negative impact on the global security environment. The further uncontrolled diffusion of nuclear materials, technology, and expertise 

would likely accelerate the future rate of proliferation. It would certainly increase the risks of nuclear terrorism.

6. The opportunities to further engage Russia as a partner in reducing 

nuclear dangers are important and should be seized. The United 

States must also continue to concern itself with issues of deterrence, 

assurance, and stability in the nuclear relationship with Russia.
98 America’s Strategic Posture

7. The opportunities to engage China are also significant. But here too 

the United States must balance deterrence and stability concerns 

with the opportunities for strategic cooperation.

8. These developments in major power nuclear relations and proliferation affect U.S. allies and friends at least as much as they affect the 

United States. Their particular views of the requirements of extended

deterrence and assurance in an evolving security environment must 

be understood and addressed by the United States.

9. The conditions that might make the elimination of nuclear weapons possible are not present today and establishing such conditions 

would require a fundamental transformation of the world political 

order. Nonetheless, the Commission recommends a number of steps 

that can reduce nuclear dangers.

10. For the indefinite future, the United States must maintain a viable 

nuclear deterrent. The other NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states 

have put in place comprehensive programs to modernize their forces to meet new international circumstances.

11. The executive and the Congress need to renew dialogue on these 

issues.

Recommendations

1. The United States should continue to pursue an approach to reducing nuclear dangers that balances deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation. Singular emphasis on one or another element would 

reduce the nuclear security of the United States and its allies.

2. The United States must retain nuclear weapons until such time 

as the international environment may permit their elimination 

globally.

3. To address the serious risk of nuclear terrorism, the United States 

needs strong intelligence and reenergized international cooperation through its deterrence, nonproliferation, and arms control efforts. The best defense against nuclear terrorism is to keep nuclear 

bombs and fissile material out of the hands of terrorists.

4. The United States should adapt its strategic posture to the evolving 

requirements of deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance. 

As part of an effort to understand assurance requirements, steps 

to increase allied consultations should be expanded.

5. The United States should reverse the decline of focus and resources 

of the Intelligence Community devoted to foreign nuclear weapons capabilities, programs, and intentions. With some important

exceptions, this subject has not attracted high-level attention since 
Compilation of Findings and Recommendations 99

the end of the Cold War. As will be discussed later, the weapons 

laboratories have an important role to play here.

6. The practice and spirit of executive-legislative dialogue on nuclear 

strategy that helped pave the way for bipartisanship and continuity 

in policy should be renewed. The Senate should revive the Arms 

Control Observer Group.

Chapter Two: On the Nuclear Posture

Findings

1. The U.S. nuclear posture consists of many elements, including operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons; forward-deployed 

tactical nuclear weapons; the triad of strategic nuclear delivery 

systems; the delivery systems for forward-deployed weapons; the 

stockpile of warheads held in operational reserve; a stockpile of 

fissile material appropriate for use in warheads; the associated command, control, and intelligence systems; and the infrastructure associated with the production of all of these capabilities.

2. There is no right number of weapons needed for the U.S. strategic 

posture other than one that is derived from a complex decisionmaking process, originating with the president. To determine that 

number, the strategic context must be assessed. Political judgment 

from the highest level of the government is required. Numbers 

associated with different force sizes must be set in a strategic context.

3. In formulating an overall posture, the United States should employ 

a broad concept of deterrence. Extended deterrence and dissuasion 

and the need to hedge against uncertainty have design implications 

for the posture.

4. The sizing of U.S. forces remains overwhelmingly driven by Russia. 

For the deterrence of attacks by regional powers or terrorists, the 

weapons requirements are relatively modest. Even deterrence of 

China does not require large numbers. Currently, no one seriously 

contemplates a direct Russian attack on the United States. Some 

U.S. allies located closer to Russia are fearful of Russia and look to 

the United States for reassurance.

5. The United States could maintain its security while reducing its 

reliance on nuclear weapons and making further reductions in 

the size of its stockpile, if this were done while also preserving 

the resilience and survivability of U.S. forces. Substantial stockpile reductions would need to be done bilaterally with the Rus-
100 America’s Strategic Posture

sians, and at some level of reductions, with other nuclear powers. 

But some potential reductions in non-deployed weapons need not 

await Russia. The United States could reduce its reliance on, and 

thus supply of, reserve warheads if it were to refurbish the nuclear 

infrastructure.

Recommendations

1. The force structure should be sized (and shaped) to meet a diverse 

set of national objectives. This requires a high-level assessment of 

strategic context. Reductions in deployed forces should be made 

on the basis of bilateral agreement with Russia.

2. Deterrence considerations, broadly defined, should inform the 

development of the next U.S. strategic posture.

3. The triad of strategic delivery systems continues to have value. Each 

leg of the nuclear triad provides unique contributions to stability. 

As the overall force shrinks, their unique values become more 

prominent.

4. The United States should also retain capabilities for the delivery of 

non-strategic nuclear weapons and proceed in close consultation 

with allies in Europe and Asia in doing so.

5. Force posture design and arms control should keep stability and 

U.S. credibility as their central objectives.

6. Steps should be taken to ensure the continued viability of the 

infrastructure supporting delivery systems.

Chapter Three: On Missile Defense

Findings

1. Missile defenses effective against regional nuclear aggressors, including against limited long-range threats, are a valuable component 

of the U.S. strategic posture.

Recommendations

1. The United States should develop and, where appropriate, deploy 

missile defenses against regional nuclear aggressors, including 

against limited long-range threats. It should also develop effective 

capabilities to defend against increasingly complex missile 

threats.

2. While the missile threats posed by potential regional aggressors 

are countered, the United States should ensure that its actions do 
Compilation of Findings and Recommendations 101

not lead Russia or China to take actions that increase the threat to 

the United States and its allies and friends.

3. The United States should strengthen international cooperation for 

missile defense, including with allies, but also with Russia.

4. The United States should also work with Russia and China to 

control advanced missile technology transfer.

Chapter Four: On Declaratory Policy

Finding

1. Effective deterrence and assurance requires that U.S. declaratory 

policy be understood to reflect the intentions of national 

leadership.

Recommendations

1. The United States should reaffirm that the purpose of its nuclear 

force is deterrence, as broadly defined to include also assurance of 

its allies and dissuasion of potential adversaries.

2. It should not abandon calculated ambiguity by adopting a policy 

of no-first-use.

3. The United States should make clear that it conceives of and 

prepares for the employment of nuclear weapons only in extreme 

circumstances.

4. The United States should reiterate its commitments to NPT 

parties as stated in the agreed positive and negative security 

assurances, as they were qualified by both the Clinton and Bush 

administrations.

Chapter Five: On the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

Findings

1. The United States requires a stockpile of nuclear weapons that is 

safe, secure, and reliable, and whose threatened use in military 

conflict would be credible.

2. The reliability of existing warheads is reviewed for certification 

on an annual basis by the directors of the nuclear weapons 

laboratories. Maintaining the reliability of the warheads as they 

age is an increasing challenge.

3. The Life Extension Program has to date been effective in dealing 

with the problem of modernizing the arsenal. But it is becoming 
102 America’s Strategic Posture

increasingly difficult to continue within the constraints of a 

rigid adherence to original materials and design as the stockpile 

continues to age.

4. Alternatives to this approach exist and involve, to varying degrees, 

the reuse and/or redesign of components and different engineering 

solutions.

5. The debate over the Reliable Replacement Warhead revealed a lot 

of confusion about what was intended, what is needed, and what 

constitutes “new.”

6. So long as modernization proceeds within the framework of 

existing U.S. policy, it should encounter the minimum political 

difficulty. As a matter of U.S. policy, the United States does not 

produce fissile materials and does not conduct nuclear explosive 

tests. Also, the United States does not currently seek new weapons 

with new military characteristics. Within this framework, it 

should seek the possible benefits of improved safety, security, and 

reliability available to it.

Recommendations

1. The decision on which approach to refurbishing and modernizing 

the nuclear stockpile is best should be made on a type-by-type basis 

as the existing stockpile of warheads ages.

2. The Commission recommends that Congress authorize the NNSA 

to conduct a cost and feasibility study of incorporating enhanced 

safety, security, and reliability features in the second half of the 

planned W76 life extension program. This authorization should 

permit the design of specific components, including both pits and 

secondaries, as appropriate.

3. Similar design work in support of the life extension of the B61 

should be considered if appropriate, as well as for other warheads 

as they come due for modernization.

4. Red-teaming should be used to ensure an intellectually competitive 

process that results in a stockpile of weapons meeting the highest 

standards of safety, security, and reliability.

5. The Significant Findings Investigations flowing from on-going surveillance of the stockpile should be utilized by leadership, including 

in the Congress, to monitor the technical health of the stockpile.

6. The United States maintains an unneeded degree of secrecy with 

regard to the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal (including 

not just deployed weapons but also weapons in the inactive stockpile and those awaiting dismantlement). Secrecy policies should be 
Compilation of Findings and Recommendations 103

reviewed with an eye toward providing appropriate public disclosure of stockpile information.

Chapter Six: On the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Findings

1. The physical infrastructure is in serious need of transformation. 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has a reasonable plan for doing so that should be reviewed seriously by the 

Congress. But it lacks the needed funding.

2. Once the plutonium pit production facility at Los Alamos (TA55/

PF-4) is fully operational, it should be sufficient for expected U.S. 

needs.

3. The intellectual infrastructure is also in serious trouble. A major 

cause is the recent (and projected) decline in resources. A significant additional factor is the excessively bureaucratic management 

approach of NNSA, which is antithetical to effective research and 

development.

4. Attracting and retaining the top national talent and expertise requires that the laboratories conduct challenging research on important national problems. This program of work must be sustained 

and predictable and exercise the full range of laboratory skills, 

including nuclear weapon design skills. Exercising these design 

skills is necessary to maintain design and production engineering 

capabilities. Skills that are not exercised will atrophy.

5. Elements of the federal government outside DOE are keen to utilize 

the capabilities of the weapons laboratories but they are not keen 

to invest in the underlying science and engineering that generates 

those capabilities.

6. The relationship between the laboratories and the intelligence 

community merits particular attention, given its importance and 

sensitivity. Some recent budgetary decisions have significantly 

weakened their collaboration.

7. The governance structure of the NNSA is not delivering the needed 

results. Despite some success, NNSA has failed to meet the hopes 

of its founders. It lacks the needed autonomy. This structure should 

be changed.

8. NNSA’s problems will not vanish simply by implementing a new 

reporting structure. The regulatory burden on the laboratories is 

excessive and should be rationalized.
104 America’s Strategic Posture

9. NNSA needs the resources to perform its assigned missions. 

Although the NNSA decision to modernize in place is the right 

decision, the budget risk appears extremely high. The hope that 

consolidation would save money is unwarranted. Other important 

laboratory activities may pay a significant price. To juggle all of its 

competing commitments NNSA would have to reduce its base of 

scientific activity by 20-30 percent even in a flat budget and this 

would have a significant impact on the science and engineering 

base. NNSA does not know how large the core laboratory weapons 

programs need to be to maintain the deterrent.

10. Future infrastructure requirements must be assessed in light of the 

results of arms control negotiations now underway. Depending on 

progress in U.S.-Russian arms reductions, some down sizing may 

be possible.

Recommendations

1. Congress should reject the application of the BRAC concept to 

NNSA. There would be no cost savings and no other efficiencies. 

Congress should fund the NNSA complex transformation plan 

while also ensuring that the needed scientific and engineering base 

is maintained. The plan will not be realized without a one-time 

infusion of funding above current spending levels and this should 

be done.

2. If complex transformation must proceed without such an infusion, 

either complex transformation will be significantly delayed or the 

intellectual infrastructure will be seriously damaged. If the two 

major proposed construction projects must be prioritized, give priority to the Los Alamos plutonium facility. In a flat or declining 

budget scenario, strong oversight must ensure that schedule and 

workforce issues are balanced in a way that does not substantially 

cripple current enterprise capabilities.

3. As part of the effort to protect the scientific and engineering basis, NNSA should adopt a management approach consistent with 

the requirements of the effectiveness of research and development 

organizations. A less bureaucratic approach is required. Useful reforms include a realignment of DOE, NNSA, NRC, and DNFSB 

roles and responsibilities as elaborated in the text of the chapter.

4. The Congress should fund the test readiness program in order 

to maintain the national policy of readiness to test within 24 

months.

5. NNSA should conduct a study of the core competencies needed in 

the weapons complex, and the Congress and Office of Management 
Compilation of Findings and Recommendations 105

and Budget should use these as a tool for determining how to fund 

NNSA.

6. The President should designate the nuclear weapons laboratories 

as National Security Laboratories. This would recognize the fact 

that they already contribute to the missions of the Departments of 

Defense and Homeland Security and the intelligence community 

in addition to those of DOE. The president should assign formal 

responsibility to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, State, and 

Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence for 

the programmatic and budgetary health of the laboratories.

7. Congress should amend the NNSA Act to establish NNSA as a 

separate agency reporting to the President though the Secretary 

of Energy. The legislation should include the additional specific 

provisions identified in this chapter.

8. The Director of National Intelligence should review and assess 

the potential contributions of the laboratories to the national intelligence mission and advocate for the needed allocation of resources. 

Congress should provide sustained support.

9. Congress and the Administration should also create a formal mechanism (not involving awarding fee) to recognize the importance of 

the involvement of the directors of the weapons laboratories in the 

annual certification process.

10. NNSA should adopt a more coherent approach to security that utilizes tools such as conditional probability metrics to set standards 

and that creates incentives that are as responsive to success as they 

are to failure.

Chapter Seven: On Arms Control

Findings

1. Arms control should and can play an important role in reducing 

nuclear dangers.

2. In both Washington and Moscow, the moment appears ripe to renew 

the arms control process.

3. The imbalance of non-strategic nuclear weapons will become more 

prominent and worrisome as strategic reductions continue and will 

require new arms control approaches that are also assuring to U.S. 

allies.

4. For the United States to reduce its deployed nuclear forces, it is essential to move by agreement with Russia.
106 America’s Strategic Posture

Recommendations

1. Pursue a step-by-step approach with Russia on arms control. This 

is a process that will play out over years and decades.

2. Make the first step on U.S.-Russian arms control modest and straightforward in order to rejuvenate the process and ensure that there is 

a successor to the START I agreement before it expires at the end 

of 2009. The United States and Russia should not over-reach for innovative approaches.

3. Begin to characterize and study the numerous challenges that would 

come with any further reductions in the number of operationally 

deployed strategic nuclear weapons.

4. Sustain the commitment to the INF treaty and commit to new efforts 

to work in partnership with Russia and NATO allies to negotiate 

reductions in non-strategic nuclear forces.

5. Develop and pursue options for advancing U.S. interests in stability 

in outer space and in increasing warning and decision-time. The 

options should include the possibility of negotiated measures.

6. Take the lead in renewing strategic dialogue with a broad set of 

states interested in strategic stability, including not just Russia and 

China but also U.S. allies in both Europe and Asia.

7. Work to come to an understanding with Moscow on missile defense, 

if possible. The United States should explore more fully Russian concerns. The two should define measures that can help build needed 

confidence. Pursue possible technical and operational collaboration 

in this area where mutually beneficial. Revive the moribund effort 

to establish a joint warning center.

8. Reinvest in the institutional capacities needed to define and implement effective arms control strategies. The pattern of underinvestment over the last two decades must be reversed.

Chapter Eight: On Nonproliferation

Findings

1. This is an opportune moment to reenergize nonproliferation. Both 

domestic and international conditions are favorable.

2. Despite the occasional failure of nonproliferation, the historical track 

record is good and we hope to find continued success in the years 

ahead. But the stakes are rising and we may be on the brink of a 
Compilation of Findings and Recommendations 107

new cascade of proliferation. This underscores the urgency of acting now.

3. Success in advancing U.S. nonproliferation interests requires U.S. 

leadership. Leadership requires leading by example.

4. Growing reliance on nuclear energy will bring with it a sharp rise 

in the number of facilities using and producing fissile materials, a 

much broader trade in the associated technologies, and a further 

globalization of nuclear expertise. This will inevitably increase the 

risks of possible diversion to illicit purposes.

Recommendations

1. Renew multifaceted diplomatic activity and engagement.

2. Strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency. Stronger financial, technical, and political support for the IAEA by the United 

States and from its Board of Governors could enhance its ability to 

perform its unique and important mission.

3. Working in partnership with Russia, the United States should lead 

a global initiative on transparency, addressing both warheads and 

stockpiles.

4. Seek a treaty that ends the production of fissile material for weapons 

purposes and pursue verification provisions that enable its effective 

implementation.

5. Augment funding for threat reduction activities that strengthen 

controls at vulnerable nuclear sites.

6. Develop international approaches to future nuclear energy production that minimize proliferation risks.

7. Prepare to play a leadership role at the 2010 NPT review conference.

8. Publicize more effectively the steps the United States has already 

taken to meet its Article VI commitments.

Chapter Nine: On the CTBT

Finding

1. The Commission has no agreed position on whether ratification of 

the CTBT should proceed.
108 America’s Strategic Posture

Recommendations

1. To prepare the way for Senate re-review of the CTBT, the administration should prepare a comprehensive net assessment of benefits, 

costs, and risks; secure P-5 agreement on a clear and precise definition of banned and permitted test activity; define a diplomatic 

strategy for entry into force; and prepare a budget that adequately 

funds the safeguards program.

2. If the Senate consents to CTBT ratification, and acknowledging 

the expected long delay in actual entry into force of the treaty, the 

United States should secure agreement among the P-5 to implement 

CTBT verification provisions without waiting for entry into force 

of the treaty, and also to have more effective means to get on-site 

inspections.

Chapter Ten: On Prevention and Protection

Findings

1. Counterproliferation activities have emerged since the end of the 

Cold War as a new focus of international cooperation to prevent 

proliferation and terrorism and they are a useful adjunct to nonproliferation measures.

2. Stronger “whole of government” approaches are needed to reduce 

the risks of nuclear smuggling into the United States.

3. The United States is highly vulnerable to attack with weapons designed to produce electromagnetic pulse effects.

Recommendations

1. The Proliferation Security Initiative and Global Initiative to Combat 

Nuclear Terrorism should be sustained and additional international 

cooperative measures developed to prevent and protect against proliferation and terrorism.

2. Improved integration of national and international responses is 

needed to protect the homeland against nuclear smuggling. The 

U.S. government should accelerate the development of sensors to 

detect nuclear smuggling and deploy them when effective.

3. EMP vulnerabilities should be reduced as the United States modernizes its electric power grid.
109

Appendix 1

Glossary

AEC Atomic Energy Commission

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure Commission

CMRR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DNFSB Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

DoD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

EMP electromagnetic pulse

EU European Union

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

GAO Government Accountability Office

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

IG inspector general

INF Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
110 America’s Strategic Posture

NPR Nuclear Posture Review

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSNF non-strategic nuclear forces

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

P-5 United Nations Security Council permanent members

PAC-3 Patriot Advanced Capability-3

PNI Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

R&D research and development

RRW Reliable Replacement Warhead

SFI Significant Findings Investigation

SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile

SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

START Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty

THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

TLAM/N Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

UPF Uranium Processing Facility

WMD weapons of mass destruction
111

Appendix 2

Estimated World Nuclear 

Warhead Arsenals(a)

Estimated Nuclear Warhead Inventories

U.S. Russia

Peak number of weapons (year) 32,000 (1967) 40,000 (USSR; 1986)

Current weapons (total) 9,400 13,000 

Strategic operational 4,700 4,100

Non-strategic operational < 500 3,800

Reserve and awaiting 

dismantlement

4,200 5,100

The United States has reduced its warhead total by about a factor of four since 

the end of the Cold War, and Russia has reduced by almost a factor of four.

—National Nuclear Security Administration

March 16, 2009

Other Nuclear Countries Today

Country Number of Weapons

China 400

France 300

United Kingdom < 200

Israel 100-200

India 50-60

Pakistan 60

North Korea “a few,” <10

Sources: Nuclear Threat Initiative; Dr. Sig Hecker; Federation of American Scientists

(a): note that more precise numbers are generally classified; these numbers, particularly for 

Russia, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, should be considered as approximate.

113

Appendix 3

Enabling Legislation and Joint 

Explanatory Statements

National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008

(P.L. 110-181)

SEC. 1062. CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC 

POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is hereby established a commission to be 

known as the ‘‘Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of 

the United States’’. The purpose of the commission is to examine and 

make recommendations with respect to the long-term strategic posture 

of the United States.

(b) COMPOSITION.—

(1) MEMBERSHIP.—The commission shall be composed of 12 members appointed as follows:

(A) Three by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services 

of the House of Representatives.

(B) Three by the ranking minority member of the Committee on 

Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(C) Three by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services 

of the Senate.

(D) Three by the ranking minority member of the Committee on 

Armed Services of the Senate.

 (2) CHAIRMAN; VICE CHAIRMAN.—

(A) CHAIRMAN.—The chairman of the Committee on Armed 

Services of the House of Representatives and the chairman of 

the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate shall jointly 

designate one member of the commission to serve as chairman 

of the commission.

(B) VICE CHAIRMAN.—The ranking minority member of the 

Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 

and the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed 

Services of the Senate shall jointly designate one member of 

the commission to serve as vice chairman of the commission.
114 America’s Strategic Posture

 (3) PERIOD OF APPOINTMENT; VACANCIES.—Members shall 

be appointed for the life of the commission. Any vacancy in the 

commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original 

appointment.

(c) DUTIES.—

 (1) REVIEW.—The commission shall conduct a review of the strategic posture of the United States, including a strategic threat 

assessment and a detailed review of nuclear weapons policy, 

strategy, and force structure.

 (2) ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.—

(A) ASSESSMENT.—The commission shall assess the benefits and 

risks associated with the current strategic posture and nuclear 

weapons policies of the United States.

(B) RECOMMENDATIONS.—The commission shall make recommendations as to the most appropriate strategic posture and 

most effective nuclear weapons strategy.

(d) COOPERATION FROM GOVERNMENT.—

 (1) COOPERATION.—In carrying out its duties, the commission 

shall receive the full and timely cooperation of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, the 

Director of National Intelligence, and any other United States 

Government official in providing the commission with analyses, 

briefings, and other information necessary for the fulfillment of 

its responsibilities.

 (2) LIAISON.—The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, 

the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence 

shall each designate at least one officer or employee of the 

Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of State, and the intelligence community, respectively, to 

serve as a liaison officer between the department (or the intelligence community, as the case may be) and the commission.

(e) REPORT.—Not later than December 1, 2008, the commission shall submit 

to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the 

Secretary of State, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and 

the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a 

report on the commission’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations. 

The report shall identify the strategic posture and nuclear weapons strategy recommended under subsection (c)(2)(B) and shall include—

 (1) the military capabilities and force structure necessary to support 

the strategy, including both nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities 

that might support the strategy;
Appendix 3: Enabling Legislation and Joint Explanatory Statements 115

 (2) the number of nuclear weapons required to support the strategy, 

including the number of replacement warheads required, if 

any;

 (3) the appropriate qualitative analysis, including force-onforce 

exchange modeling, to calculate the effectiveness of the strategy 

under various scenarios;

 (4) the nuclear infrastructure (that is, the size of the nuclear complex) required to support the strategy;

 (5) an assessment of the role of missile defenses in the strategy;

 (6) an assessment of the role of nonproliferation programs in the 

strategy;

 (7) the political and military implications of the strategy for the 

United States and its allies; and

 (8) any other information or recommendations relating to the strategy (or to the strategic posture) that the commission considers 

appropriate.

(f) FUNDING.—Of the amounts appropriated or otherwise made available 

pursuant to this Act to the Department of Defense, $5,000,000 is available 

to fund the activities of the commission.

(g) TERMINATION.— The commission shall terminate on June 1, 2009.

Joint Explanatory Statement to accompany the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008

Congressional commission on the strategic posture of the United 

States (sec. 1062)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1046) that would establish a 12 

member congressional commission on the strategic posture of the United 

States to examine and make recommendations with respect to the long-term 

strategic posture of the United States. The review and assessment to be conducted by the commission would include a threat assessment, a detailed 

review of nuclear weapons policy and strategy of the United States, and 

recommendations as to the most appropriate strategic posture and most 

effective nuclear weapons strategy. The commission’s report would be due 

to Congress and the Executive Branch no later than December 1, 2008. The 

term of the commission would expire on June 1, 2009. In addition, the provision would repeal section 1051 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109–163).

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.
116 America’s Strategic Posture

The Senate recedes with an amendment that would clarify that the vice 

chairman of the commission would be jointly appointed by the ranking 

minority members of the Committees on Armed Services of the House of 

Representatives and the Senate. In addition, the amendment would clarify 

that the commission should look at non-nuclear alternatives to nuclear weapons and systems in making recommendations with respect to the most appropriate strategic posture and most effective nuclear weapons policies of 

the United States.

The conferees urge the commission to look at the strategic posture of 

the United States in the broadest sense. Strategic policy and posture is not 

synonymous with nuclear policy. Conventional force structures, as well as 

nuclear force structures, must be included in the overall review and assessment of the strategic posture of the United States.

In addition, the conferees believe that many of the nuclear missions of the 

United States could be served by non-nuclear, conventional systems. In their 

examination of the strategic posture of the United States, the conferees expect 

the commission to look not only at nuclear capabilities, but at the full array 

of non-nuclear capabilities, including kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities.

The conferees have included a separate provision addressing the repeal of 

section 1051 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 

elsewhere in this Act.

National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009

(P.L. 110-417)

SEC. 1060. EXTENSION OF CERTAIN DATES FOR CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED 

STATES.

(a) EXTENSION OF DATES.—Section 1062 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) is amended— (1) 

in subsection (e), by striking ‘‘December 1, 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘April 1, 

2009’’; and (2) in subsection (g), by striking ‘‘June 1, 2009’’ and inserting 

‘‘September 30, 2009’’.

(b) INTERIM REPORT.—Not later than December 1, 2008, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States shall 

submit to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, 

the Secretary of State, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, 

and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 

an interim report on the commission’s initial findings, conclusions, and 

recommendations. To the extent practicable, the interim report shall 
Appendix 3: Enabling Legislation and Joint Explanatory Statements 117

address the matters required to be included in the report under subsection (e) of such section 1062.

Joint Explanatory Statement to accompany the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009

Extension of certain dates for Congressional Commission on the 

Strategic Posture of the United States (sec. 1060)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1032) that would extend the due 

date for the final report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic 

Posture of the United States from December 1, 2008 to March 1, 2009, and the 

sunset date for the Commission from June 1, 2009, to September 30, 2009. The 

provision would also direct the Commission to submit an interim report no 

later than December 1, 2009. The Senate bill contained no similar provision. 

The agreement includes the House provision with an amendment that that 

would extend the due date of the final report to April 1, 2009. The Commission should be prepared to brief Congress on the results of the interim report 

when it becomes available.

National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009

(P.L. 110-417)

SEC. 1060. EXTENSION OF CERTAIN DATES FOR CONGRESSIONAL 

COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED 

STATES.

(a) EXTENSION OF DATES.—Section 1062 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) is amended— (1) 

in subsection (e), by striking ‘‘December 1, 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘April 1, 

2009’’; and (2) in subsection (g), by striking ‘‘June 1, 2009’’ and inserting 

‘‘September 30, 2009’’.

(b) INTERIM REPORT.—Not later than December 1, 2008, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States shall 

submit to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, 

the Secretary of State, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, 

and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 

an interim report on the commission’s initial findings, conclusions, and 

recommendations. To the extent practicable, the interim report shall 

address the matters required to be included in the report under subsection (e) of such section 1062.
118 America’s Strategic Posture

Joint Explanatory Statement to accompany the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009

Extension of certain dates for Congressional Commission on the

Strategic Posture of the United States (sec. 1060)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1032) that would extend the due 

date for the final report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic 

Posture of the United States from December 1, 2008 to March 1, 2009, and the 

sunset date for the Commission from June 1, 2009, to September 30, 2009. The 

provision would also direct the Commission to submit an interim report no 

later than December 1, 2009. The Senate bill contained no similar provision. 

The agreement includes the House provision with an amendment that that 

would extend the due date of the final report to April 1, 2009. The Commission should be prepared to brief Congress on the results of the interim report 

when it becomes available.
119

Appendix 4

Interim Report of the 

Congressional Commission

on the Strategic Posture of

the United States

December 11, 2008

1. Charge to the Commission and Interim Activities

Pursuant to the responsibilities assigned to it in the FY08 National Defense 

Authorization Act, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture 

of the United States began its work in spring 2008. A delay in securing funding for the commission meant that the first commission meeting occurred 

in July. Accordingly, and by agreement with the Congressional sponsors of 

the legislation, delivery of the Commissionís final report has been postponed 

from December 1, 2008 until April 1, 2009. This document serves as the 

requested interim report on the work of the Commission to date.

The Commission was chartered to provide findings, conclusions, and 

recommendations. At this time it would be premature to offer recommendations. Rather, our purpose with this interim report is to review briefly the 

progress of our efforts and to offer interim findings on some of the relevant 

issues.

The Commission has convened approximately monthly to hear the views 

of others with information and expertise germane to our task.

Our first priority was to meet with interested members of the Congress, 

and we have heard from various individuals from both houses and both parties. From these meetings, we took many away several important messages. 

Perhaps the most important was the Congressional desire to better understand the key ideas on which a sufficient measure of political consensus can 

be built to enable effective long-term implementation of national strategy.

We have also met with administration representatives to gain a better understanding of its policies and programs and of the key concepts 

underpinning them. From the Department of Defense, we have learned 

about the halting efforts to implement the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review 

and the more recent effort to make a joint cabinet-level statement on 

nuclear policy. From the National Nuclear Security Administration and 
120 America’s Strategic Posture

the nuclear laboratories we have learned about the efforts to create an 

enhanced Stockpile Stewardship Program and to adapt to evolving planning and programming requirements. In general, we have gained an 

improved appreciation of the efforts of the current leadership of the US 

nuclear enterprise, who are working under the difficult circumstances of 

a lack of national consensus. Both the DOD and NNSA have been fully 

cooperative and exceptionally helpful.

We have also devoted considerable time and energy to interacting with 

representatives of foreign governments interested in the outcome of this 

effort and also of the next US Nuclear Posture Review. We have gained important new insights into the perspectives of US allies on the requirements 

of extended deterrence and assurance and also of the expectations of many 

other states for US leadership.

To study the many questions of policy and strategy within the Commissionís purview, we formed five working groups of experts drawn from 

across the political spectrum. They are exploring issues of strategic policy 

and strategy, force structure and deterrence, countering proliferation, infrastructure, and the evolving security environment. We tasked these groups 

with specific questions, but also asked them to bring issues before us they 

deem important. This has helped to deepen and broaden our understanding 

of key issues.

We have had timely and substantive assistance from the cognizant federal 

agencies, including the intelligence community, among others.

In conducting our work, we have adopted a broad definition of the strategic posture. We are looking not just at the traditional issues within the 

purview of a Nuclear Posture Review, such as the size and shape of the 

nuclear force and its associated roles and missions. Rather, we defined 

the scope of our work to include all uses of nuclear weapons and all tools 

to counter the nuclear threat, including for example missile defense and 

countering nuclear proliferation. But we also defined some limits to our 

inquiry. For example, we have chosen not to expand our scope of work to 

encompass the problems associated with all weapons of mass destruction, though we have included in our review the question of whether and 

how nuclear weapons have a role in deterring attacks with chemical and 

biological weapons.

We are also taking a broad view of the elements of strategy by looking 

beyond the military domain. The legislation poses a series of broad questions about US strategy and how the tools of policy can be integrated to 

achieve US objectives. We are looking broadly at political, economic, and 

military tools, and expect to craft a report that addresses all three. We note, 

however, that the legislation clearly puts emphasis on the military tools and 
Appendix 4: Interim Report 121

especially nuclear questions. We understand that the lack of consensus about 

the future of the US nuclear deterrent is a key motivator of the charge to the 

Commission.

As we continue our work, we welcome further interaction with interested members of Congress. We look forward to submission of our report 

on April 1 and the ensuing dialogue about needed improvements to the 

US strategic posture.

2. Dealing with the Changing Strategic Challenge

During the Cold War the Soviet Union posed an existential threat to the 

United States. In response to this threat, successive presidents consistently 

increased the effectiveness of our nuclear weapon systems, with deployments 

of more than 10,000 nuclear warheads in American strategic forces by 1980. 

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War, the 

danger of an existential threat dramatically decreased. This has permitted 

the United States to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons and substantially 

reduce our nuclear forces. The current superiority of US conventional capabilities has reinforced this process. (Ironically, our edge in conventional capabilities has induced the Russians, now feeling their conventional deficiencies, 

to increase their reliance on both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.)

Although the existential threat to the United States has dramatically decreased, the fact that other states possess nuclear weapons continues to affect 

decisions about the needed US strategic posture. The size of our nuclear deterrent continues to be driven in part by the size of Russian nuclear forcesóas 

well as Russiaís doctrinal embrace of greater reliance on tactical as well as 

strategic nuclear weapons. China in this connection remains a lesser consideration. Proliferation is also an important factor, not least for the demands it 

places on a credible US extended deterrent.

As the existential threat has waned, a new threat has come to the foreóthat 

of catastrophic terrorism. 9-11 demonstrated all too clearly that Al Qaeda and 

other terror groups wished to inflict mass casualties on Americans. And we 

know that Al Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons to achieve that end. But a 

terror group cannot make a nuclear bomb from scratch, so the best defense 

against this threat is to prevent terror groups from acquiring a nuclear bomb 

or the fissile material from which they could perhaps make a bomb.

Achieving that defense leads to four security imperatives:

•	 To reduce and provide better protection for existing nuclear stockpiles of weapons and fissile material;

•	 To keep new nations from going nuclear;
122 America’s Strategic Posture

•	 To provide effective protection for the fissile material generated by

enrichment activities, reprocessing facilities, and commercial nuclear 

reactors; and

•	 To improve ourtools to detect clandestine delivery of nuclear weapons and to disable and otherwise defend against them.

None of these imperatives can be achieved unilaterally. We can reduce 

and protect our own stockpiles, but we need cooperation from other nations, especially Russia, to be sure that their stockpiles do not leak to terror 

groups. Since the early 90s we have worked cooperatively with Russia in the 

reduction and protection of stockpiles, but today cooperation with Russia is 

increasingly in question because of the generally strained geopolitical relations between the United States and Russia.

The efforts to keep other nations from going nuclear are obviously multinational. The 6-party talks have had limited success to date in dealing with 

North Korea but may ultimately be successful. However, there is no similarly 

comprehensive diplomatic approach to Iran, which has constructed a major 

facility for enriching uranium.

It appears that we are at a “tipping point” in proliferation. If Iran and 

North Korea proceed unchecked to build nuclear arsenals, there is a serious 

possibility of a cascade of proliferation following. And as each new nuclear 

power is added the probability of a terror group getting a nuclear bomb 

increases.

Even if a terror group is not able to acquire a weapon from a nuclear state, 

it could build a crude nuclear device if it were able to acquire the necessary 

fissile material. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has proposed strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards 

to provide far better protection of fissile material, but to date is not getting 

the needed support for its proposals.

Thus dealing with the increasingly dangerous threat of proliferation requires us to find a way of cooperating with many other nations, including, 

but not limited to, all of the nuclear powers. And it requires working effectively with the IAEA. What we do in our own nuclear weapon program 

has a significant effect on (but does not guarantee) our ability to get that 

cooperation. In particular, this cooperation will be affected by what we do 

in our weapons laboratories, what we do in our deployed nuclear forces, 

what kind of nuclear policies we articulate, and what we do regarding arms 

control treaties (e.g., START and CTBT). It is not clear that actions we take on 

our nuclear program affect the nuclear calculus of North Korea or Iran, or 

necessarily others, but they do affect the actions of nations whose cooperation we need to deal with North Korea and Iran, as well as other proliferation 

problems. In short, if the US by its actions indicates to other nations that we 
Appendix 4: Interim Report 123

are moving seriously to decrease the importance and role of nuclear weapons, we increase our chance of getting the kind of cooperation we need to 

deal effectively with the dangers of proliferation.

But some actions that might promote cooperation could be in conflict 

with the actions needed to maintain the reliability, safety and security of 

our nuclear forces. So, as long as we need to maintain such forces, our challenge is to define a nuclear program that contributes to decreasing the global 

dangers of proliferation, including maintaining the needed reliability, safety 

and security of our nuclear weapons and maintaining the role they play in 

overall stability and the reassurance of allies. Given the uncertainties in the 

factors affecting global security today, the need for deterrence (and extended 

deterrence) could extend for an indefinite future.

Since the ending of the Cold War, we have embarked on a number of critical programs to enhance the reliability, safety and security of our nuclear 

stockpile. Specifically, the Stockpile Stewardship Program was initiated at our 

nuclear labs in the early 1990s. This program has engaged some of the best 

scientists and best scientific facilities in the world and has been remarkably 

successful. The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), as originally intended, 

has provided greater confidence in our nuclear weapons without explosive 

testing. But support for this program is at risk and needs to be renewedóas 

our weapons get older they require continuing fiscal and political support. 

The SSP was established in part to give the US confidence in the reliability of 

the stockpile and thus to renounce nuclear testingóand sign the CTBT. Maintaining a robust SSP would be a prerequisite for ratification of the treaty.

Critical to maintaining confidence in our stockpile is the Life Extension 

Program, which assesses the capability of existing warheads and makes 

component modifications as needed to maintain their capability. As we get 

farther from the date those weapons were designed, this program becomes 

more difficult to execute. A few years ago the administration proposed to 

deal with this problem by designing new warheads, which it called Reliable 

Replacement Warheads (RRW). After a lengthy debate, Congress did not 

authorize the development of RRW but did authorize work on Advanced 

Certification. In considering future life extension programs, DoD and NNSA 

are exploring opportunities to make more significant changes in the weapons 

than has occurred in previous refurbishment programs. These changes include “mining” existing components from non-deployed weapons to assure 

long-term reliability and increased safety and security of weapons kept in 

the force. Also fundamental to the continuing effectiveness of the stockpile is 

the long-term stability of plutonium, which was unknown at the time of the 

signing of the CTBT. In the last few years, scientists at the labs and a group 

of university scientists (JASON) have concluded that the plutonium pits in 

our stockpile will remain viable for 85 years or longer.
124 America’s Strategic Posture

High confidence in stockpile reliability not only is important for maintaining deterrence, it is also vital for making substantial reductions in the size of 

our stockpile. In particular, high confidence in the reliability of the stockpile 

could allow us to consider giving up thousands of weapons we keep in reserve. And for the same reason, it could allow us to enter into negotiations 

with Russia to make further reductions in the number of deployed nuclear 

weapons, reserve weapons, and nuclear delivery systems.

So the political environment has changed in fundamental ways since the 

Cold War, calling for a new assessment of the role nuclear weapons should 

play in our security. The security of the US no longer depends on maintaining the large number of nuclear weapons needed during the Cold War. 

Indeed, major reductions already have been made in the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles. Both the US and Russia believe, however, that their 

security will depend on maintaining a deterrence force of some size for the 

foreseeable future. As long as that is true, it will be necessary for the US to 

maintain the reliability, security and safety of the residual nuclear force; 

the smaller the size of the stockpile, the more important it will be to have 

confidence in its reliability.

As the political environment has changed, so also has our technological 

understanding of nuclear weapons advanced, allowing us to maintain confidence in our stockpile even as our weapons age. But those technological 

advances have resulted from extraordinary achievements by the scientists of 

our weapons labs under a well-funded SSP and Life Extension Program. And 

they have depended on human capital that is in increasingly short supply. 

Sustaining support for those scientists and those programs is a prerequisite 

to maintaining continuing confidence in the reliability of the stockpile. And 

the smaller the stockpile becomes, the more important it will be to sustain 

the labsí scientific expertise.

3. Some Interim Findings

The Commission continues to gather information for analysis with the intention of identifying relevant findings and crafting recommendations that will 

be contained in the final report. That said, we have noted several findings 

that are consistent with the information gathered to date:

Nuclear terrorism poses a growing nuclear threat to the nation. The best 

defense against such terrorism is keeping the nuclear bombs and fissile material out of the hands of terror groups. Such a non-proliferation strategy, to be 

effective, would require intense cooperation with other nations, especially 

other nuclear powers, and with the IAEA.

The proliferation threat is also growing. Unless the Iranian program is 

halted short of a weapons capability and the North Korean program reversed 
Appendix 4: Interim Report 125

and its arsenal dismantled, there is likely to be a proliferation cascade that 

would greatly increase the risks of nuclear use and terrorism.

Although Russia and China do not pose a nuclear threat to the US, they 

do have an extensive nuclear capability that could do grievous damage to 

us (as we to them). Given uncertainty about their political direction and international roles, the United States cannot afford to ignore the requirements 

of deterrence.

While the Nation should continue to commit to reducing its reliance on 

nuclear weapons and act transparently on that commitment, the US must 

also continue to maintain a nuclear deterrent appropriate to existing threats 

until such time as verifiable international agreements are in place that could 

set the conditions for the final abolition of nuclear and other weapons of mass 

destruction. As long as the US depends on nuclear deterrence, national policies must ensure that this deterrence is reliable, safe and secure.

Effective deterrence (and assurance) requires clear declaratory policy from 

the United States. To be effective, such policy must be understood to reflect 

the intentions of national leadership.

Deterrence of non-state actors is much more problematic. To the extent 

it is practical, it would seem to require an ability to attribute the sources of 

nuclear terrorist attacks. The US must have a realistic understanding of the 

difficulties of attribution. But it should also continue to make efforts to improve the forensic capabilities that can help to evaluate the possible origins 

of the fissile material in any nuclear detonation.

Our non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon US extended 

deterrence strategy as one of its pillars. Our military capabilities, both nuclear 

and conventional, underwrite US security guarantees to our allies, without 

which many of them would feel enormous pressures to create their own 

nuclear arsenals. So long as the United States maintains adequately strong 

conventional forces, it does not necessarily need to rely on nuclear weapons 

to deter the threat of a major conventional attack. But long-term US superiority in the conventional military domain cannot be taken for granted and 

requires continuing attention and investment. Moreover, it is not adequate for 

deterring nuclear attack. The US deterrent must be both visible and credible, 

not only to our possible adversaries, but to our allies as well.

Four senior statesmen have urged that the nation work towards the global 

elimination of nuclear weapons. It is clear that the goal of zero nuclear weapons is extremely difficult to attain and would require a fundamental transformation of the world political order. If, however, the new administration 

accepts their proposal as a long-term goal, there are steps that could be taken 

in the next few years that would be consistent with such a goal and, at the 

same time, consistent with maintaining and even increasing our security. 

Some of our recommendations will deal with such steps.
126 America’s Strategic Posture

 The US could maintain its security while reducing its reliance on nuclear 

weapons and making further reductions in the size of its stockpile, if this 

is done appropriately. Substantial stockpile reductions would need to be 

done bilaterally with the Russians, and at some level of reductions, with 

other nuclear powers. But some types of reductions need not await Russia, 

especially if the US nuclear infrastructure is refurbished, allowing the US 

to reduce its reliance on and supply of reserve warheads.

There is little likelihood of other nations eliminating their nuclear arsenals 

just because the United States does so. Potential proliferant nations may be 

drawn to consider acquiring nuclear capabilities not because of US nuclear 

strength, but as a way for them to address our substantial conventional force 

superiority to which they can feel vulnerable. Such nations believe their 

nuclear weapons serve as their “equalizer.”

The threat of nuclear terrorism is strongly reinforced by any proliferation 

and the possibility that nuclear weapons might deliberately be passed on to 

terrorists or stolen by them.

The Stockpile Stewardship Program has been a remarkable success, much 

more than originally expected. However, the program may be in danger of 

losing the support needed to adequately fund it.

Although the Life Extension Program has been successful to date, it will 

face increasing challenges as components age and more changes are made. 

In our final report we intend to define the most efficient and effective way 

to maintain a credible, safe, secure, and reliable deterrent for the long term. 

We recognize also that broader infrastructure issues must be addressed in 

any such program.

The NPT has long provided the essential legal framework for preventing 

proliferation. But it is not sufficient for this purposeóand was never intended 

to be. It must be supplemented with other tools of policy. Its effectiveness 

has been undermined by errors in how it has been interpreted and by failures of enforcement by the UN Security Council. The 2010 Review Conference provides an opportunity to renew international efforts to address these 

problems with the legal framework. The US ought to begin now to set the 

stage by engaging with friends and allies on those issues related to desired 

improvements.

While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may not always 

act as we would wish, it continues to play an indispensable role and to support critical US interests. Stronger financial, technical, and political support 

for the IAEA by the United States could enhance its ability to perform its 

unique and important mission.

Missile defenses appropriate to defend against a rogue nuclear nation 

could serve a damage-limiting and stabilizing role in the US strategic posture, assuming such defenses are perceived as being effective enough to at 
Appendix 4: Interim Report 127

least sow doubts in the minds of potential attackers that such an attack would 

succeed. On the other hand, levels of defenses sizable enough to sow such 

doubts in the minds of Russia or China could lead them to take actions that 

increase the threat to the US and its allies and friends.

The advent of a new administration creates the opportunity to open a new 

strategic dialogue with Russia. One objective of this dialogue could be a new 

arms treaty that provides for further significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two countries. The Commission is prepared strongly to endorse 

negotiations with Russia in order to proceed jointly to further reductions in 

our nuclear forces, as part of a cooperative effort to stabilize relations, stop 

proliferation, and promote predictability and transparency. The large Russian 

arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons must be considered in this regard. However, any negotiated reduction between Russia and the US should not be carried 

out in a manner that might incentivize the Chinese to undertake a program to 

increase their nuclear capabilities in an effort to compete with us.

The United States has not conducted an explosive nuclear test since 1992. 

Since that time the SSP, through the use of analytical simulation, laboratory 

experiments, and the Life Extension Programs, has maintained the stockpile 

without nuclear testing. The new administration may consider resubmitting 

the CTBT to the Senate for ratification. A negotiated agreement defining and 

banning such testing could offer important benefits compared to an informal 

moratorium. Before submission the DOE and DoD should receive from the 

labs and STRATCOM clear statements describing the future capabilities and 

flexibility required to minimize the risks of maintaining a credible, safe, and 

reliable nuclear deterrent without nuclear explosive testing.

The Department of Energy’s laboratory system provides invaluable support to the nation in three ways. First, it actively maintains the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of the stockpile over the long term. Second, 

the system is the wellspring of the talent and tools needed to address a 

multitude of national problems, such as nonproliferation research, nuclear 

threat reduction, nuclear forensics, bioterrorism defense, missile defense, 

countering improvised explosive devices, nuclear energy, and alternative 

energy options. Finally, the system plays an important role in maintaining 

the intellectual scientific leadership of the United States.

4. Next Steps

The Commission recognizes that its mandate covers several other issues. 

Defining an appropriate strategic posture requires our developing a concept 

of “strategic posture” from which will devolve force structure and arsenal 

requirements. However, in keeping with the intent of Congress to broaden 

the scope of our work beyond the traditional focus on nuclear strategy and 
weapons, we will develop the relationship between our force structure/capabilities and both our arms control and non-proliferation strategies. The 

combination of these three will produce for Congress a workable construct 

of ìstrategic posture.î The final report will contain our analysis, findings, 

conclusions and recommendations related to this concept.

To that end, the Commission will undertake the following:

•	 Conduct a qualitative analysis of our national capabilities with

emphasis on maintaining a strategic posture appropriate to the requirements of contemporary national goals such as deterrence and 

assurance (including nuclear force structure and delivery systems, 

etc.) and on countering proliferation and countering nuclear terrorism.

•	 Examine the current state of arms control and how to integrate it

with the other two broad components of strategic posture. Consideration will be given to potential new objectives for re-engaging 

Russia in a strategic dialogue.

•	 Study the development of an integrated nonproliferation strategy

combining regional and global diplomatic initiatives closely coupled 

to unilateral policies and programs.

•	 Continue an assessment of the nuclear complex infrastructure

through on-site visits.

•	 Address the importance of the six-decade-long record of non-use of

nuclear weapons and the danger for the world order if this pattern 

were broken. We will explore the importance for the US and all nations of maintaining this de facto moratoriumó and the means of 

doing so.
129

Appendix 5

Commission Plenary

Sessions Schedule

May 19, 2008 (Commission Organization meeting)

June 17, 2008 (First full plenary meeting)

July 14-15, 2008

September 16, 2008 (Congressional meetings on Capitol Hill)

September 29-30, 2008 (Trip to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)

October 8-9, 2008

November 7, 2008

December 1-2, 2008

January 7-9, 2009 (Plenary and trip to Oak Ridge, TN)

February 24-25, 2009

March 16-17, 2009

April 1-2, 2009

131

Appendix 6

Consultations

Members of Congress

United States Senate

Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) Ranking Member, Armed Services Committee

Sub-Committee on Strategic Forces

Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) Minority Whip

Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL) Chairman, Armed Services Committee

Sub-Committee on Strategic Forces

United States House of Representatives

Representative Ellen O. Tauscher (D-CA) Chairman, Armed Services Committee Sub-Committee on Strategic Forces

Representative Terry Everett (R-AL) Ranking Member, Armed Services Committee Sub-Committee on Strategic Forces

Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) Ranking Member, Armed

Services Committee

Representative Peter Visclosky (D-IN) Chairman, Appropriations Committee 

Sub-Committee on Energy and Water

Representative Peter Hoekstra (R-MI) Ranking Member, Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence

Representative David Hobson (R-OH) Ranking Member, Appropriations 

Committee Sub-Committee on Energy and Water

Representative Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) Chairman, Permanent Select Committee 

on Intelligence
132 America’s Strategic Posture

Current U.S. Administration Officials

Department of State

John Rood—Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and

International Security

Department of Defense/Military

Civilian:

Robert Gates—Secretary of Defense

Fred Celic—Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters)

Michael O. Wheeler—Director, Advanced Systems and Concepts

Office, DTRA

S. Steve Henry—Director, Office of Nuclear Matters

David J. Stein—Director, Office of Strategic Strike Options

Military:

General James E. Cartwright—Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Kevin P. Chilton—Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly—Director, Missile Defense Agency

Department of Energy

Samuel W. Bodman—Secretary of Energy (2005-2009)

Thomas D’Agostino—Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administrator

George H. Miller—Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Michael R. Anastasio—Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory

Thomas O. Hunter—Director, Sandia National Laboratories

Daniel P. Kohlhorst—President and General Manager, Y-12 National

Security Complex

Theodore Sherry—Manager, Y-12 Site Office
Appendix 6: Consultations 133

Greg Meyer—General Manager, B&W Pantex Plant

Chris Gentile—Vice President, Savannah River Site

Carl Beard—Associate Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory

Bob Jensen—Vice President, Kansas City Plant

Director of National Intelligence

John M. McConnell—Director of National Intelligence (2007-2009)

Arms Control Groups

David Albright—Institute for Science and International Security

Jack Mendelsohn—Arms Control Association

John Issacs—Council for a Livable World

Ivan Oelrich—Federation of American Scientists

David Culp—Friends Committee on National Legislation

Christopher Paine—Natural Resources Defense Council

Stephen Young—Union of Concerned Scientists

James Leonard—British American Security Information Council

Jeffrey Lewis—New America Foundation

Jeff Kueter—The Marshall Institute

Baker Spring—The Heritage Foundation

Daniel Goure—The Lexington Institute

Sam Nunn—Nuclear Threat Initiative

Joan Rohlfing—Nuclear Threat Initiative

Ilan Berman—American Foreign Policy Council

Peter Huessy—National Defense University Foundation
134 America’s Strategic Posture

Foreign Officials

Takeo Akiba—Minister, Head of Political Section, Embassy of Japan (2009)

Masafumi Ishii—Minister, Head of Political Section, Embassy of Japan (2008)

Hidetoshi Iijima—First Secretary, Political Section, Embassy of Japan

Masaaki Kanai—First Secretary, Political Section, Embassy of Japan

Friis Arne Petersen—Ambassador, Embassy of Denmark

Nabi Sensoy—Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Ihsan Kiziltan—Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Klaus Scharioth—Ambassador, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

Hans-Peter Hinrichsen—Counselor, Embassy of the Federal Republic

of Germany

Jacques Audibert—Director for Strategic Affairs, International Security and 

Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

Martin Briens—Deputy Director for Nuclear Nonproliferation and

Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

Nicolas Roche—Counselor, Embassy of France

Sallai Meridor—Ambassador, Embassy of Israel

Amir Maimon—Minister Counselor, Embassy of Israel

Wegger Chr. Strommen—Ambassador, The Royal Norwegian Embassy

Odd-Inge Kvalheim—Minister Counsellor, The Royal Norwegian Embassy

Lee Tae-sik—Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Korea

Hyoung Z. Kim—Minister Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of Korea

Chang-ho Yoo—First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Korea

Sergey I. Kislyak—Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the

United States

Vassily V. Boriak—Senior Counselor, Embassy of the Russian Federation
Consultations Appendix 6: Consultations 135

Dennis Richardson—Ambassador, Embassy of Australia

Peter Sawczak—Political Counsellor, Embassy of Australia

Celia Perkins—Defence Counsellor, Embassy of Australia

Scott Furssedonn—First Secretary, Strategic Threats, British Embassy

Clare Bloomfield—Foreign and Security Policy Office, British Embassy

Other Experts

Richard Garwin—IBM Fellow Emeritus, Thomas J. Watson Research Center

Michael Quinlan—International Institute for Strategic Studies (deceased)

137

Appendix 7

Expert Working Groups

National Security Strategy and Policies

Ashton Carter, (Chairman) Harvard University (Resigned Jan. 2009)

James Miller, (Chairman) Center for a New American Strategy

Elbridge Colby, RAND Corporation

J.D. Crouch, National Institute for Public Policy

James F. Dobbins, RAND Corporation

William Fallon, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Michele A. Flournoy, Center for a New American Strategy (Resigned Jan. 

2009)

Andy Krepinevich, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Richard Mies, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Steve Rosen, Harvard University

William Schneider, Defense Science Board

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Stanford University (Resigned Jan. 2009)

Philip D. Zelikow, University of Virginia

Deterrent Force Posture

Dennis C. Blair (Chairman), National Bureau of Asian Research 

(Resigned Jan. 2009)

Thomas Scheber (Chairman), National Institute for Public Policy

Barry Blechman, Henry L. Stimson Center
138 America’s Strategic Posture

Elaine Bunn, National Defense University

John Hillen, Global Strategies Group, LLC

Ronald F. Lehman, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Frank Miller, The Cohen Group

Clark Murdock, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Janne E. Nolan, Georgetown University and University of Pittsburgh

Harold Palmer Smith, Jr., University of California, Berkeley

Nuclear Infrastructure

Linton Brooks, (Chairman) former NNSA Administrator

Robert Barker, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Retired)

Everett Beckner, Consultant

Henry Chiles, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Steve Guidice, Independent Consultant

John Gordon, General, U.S. Air Force (Retired)

Burgess Laird, Institute for Defense Analyses

Ernest Moniz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

C. Paul Robinson, Sandia National Laboratory (Retired)

Harold Smith, University of California, Berkeley

Troy Wade, Former Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs

Earl Whiteman, National Nuclear Security Administration (Retired)

Countering Proliferation

Arnold Kanter, (Chairman) The Scowcroft Group

Daniel Poneman, (Vice Chairman) The Scowcroft Group
Appendix 7: Expert Working Groups Expert Working Groups 139 139

Kathleen C. Bailey, National Institute for Public Policy

Joseph Cirincione, Ploughshares Fund

Lewis A. Dunn, Science Applications International Corporation

Robert Einhorn, Center for Strategic and International Studies

James E. Goodby, Stanford University

Siegfried Hecker, Stanford University

Rebecca Hersman, National Defense University

Susan Koch, U.S. Department of State

Mitchell Reiss, William and Mary School of Law

Scott Sagan, Stanford University

Henry Sokolski, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

External Conditions and Trends

Gordon Oehler, (Chairman) The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Richard Kerr, MITRE Corporation

John McLaughlin, Johns Hopkins University

Joseph Nye, Harvard University

Michelle Van Cleve, National Defense University

141

Appendix 8

Commissioner Biographies

William J. Perry—Chairman

William Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford 

University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) 

and the School of Engineering. He is a senior fellow at FSI and serves as codirector of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard Universities.

He is an expert in U.S. foreign policy, national security and arms control. 

He was the co-director of Center for International Security and Cooperation 

from 1988 to 1993, during which time he was also a professor (half time) at 

Stanford. He was a part-time lecturer in the Department of Mathematics at 

Santa Clara University from 1971 to 1977.

Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense for the United States, serving 

from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as deputy secretary of defense (1993-1994) and as under secretary of defense for research 

and engineering (1977-1981). He is on the board of directors of LGS Bell Labs 

Innovations and several emerging high-tech companies and is chairman of 

Global Technology Partners.

His previous business experience includes serving as a laboratory director for General Telephone and Electronics (1954-1964); founder and president 

of ESL Inc. (1964-1977); executive vice-president of Hambrecht & Quist Inc. 

(1981-1985); and founder and chairman of Technology Strategies & Alliances 

(1985-1993). He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a 

fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted soldier in the Army Corps of 

Engineers, and served in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joined the 

Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenant in the 

Army Reserves from 1950 to 1955. He has received a number of awards, 

including the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1997), the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and 1981), and Outstanding Civilian 

Service Medals from the Army (1962 and 1997), the Air Force (1997), the Navy 

(1997), the Defense Intelligence Agency (1977 and 1997), NASA (1981) and the 

Coast Guard (1997). He received the American Electronic Association’s Medal 

of Achievement (1980), the Eisenhower Award (1996), the Marshall Award 
142 America’s Strategic Posture

(1997), the Forrestal Medal (1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal (1994). The 

National Academy of Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche Medal 

in 1996. He has received awards from the enlisted personnel of the Army, 

Navy, and the Air Force.

He has received decorations from the governments of Albania, Bahrain, 

France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine, and the 

United Kingdom. He received a BS and MS from Stanford University and a 

PhD from Penn State, all in mathematics.

James R. Schlesinger—Vice Chairman

James R. Schlesinger currently divides his time between MITRE, where he 

serves as Chairman of the Board, and the investment banking firm of Barclays Capital, where he serves as senior advisor. He is also a consultant to 

the Departments of Defense and State, and a member of the Defense Policy 

Board and the International Security Advisory Board.

Schlesinger is a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration 

and a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy. He is a director for 

Evergreen Energy and Sandia National Corporation. He is also a counselor 

and trustee of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a 

trustee at the Atlantic Council, the Nixon Center, the National Cryptologic 

Museum Foundation, the Center for Global Energy Studies, and the Henry 

M. Jackson Foundation.

Schlesinger was the nation’s first secretary of energy, taking the oath of 

office one day after President Carter signed the legislation creating the new 

department. He served in this position from August 5, 1977 until 1979. In 

the previous year, President-elect Carter had asked Schlesinger to become 

assistant to the president, charged with the responsibility of drafting a plan 

for the establishment of the Department of Energy and a national energy 

policy.

From July 1973 to November 1975 Schlesinger was secretary of defense. 

Immediately prior to this appointment, he served as director of central intelligence. In August 1971 he was selected by President Nixon to become chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, a position he held until February 

1973.

Schlesinger began his government service in 1969 as assistant director of 

the U.S. Bureau of the Budget (later the Office of Management and Budget), 

where he also served as acting deputy director.

He was a senior staff member at the RAND Corporation from 1963 to 1967, 

and RAND’s director of strategic studies from 1967 to 1969. He also served 

as consultant to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 

to the Bureau of the Budget.
Appendix 8: Commissioner Biographies 143

From 1955 to 1963 he was assistant and then associate professor of economics at the University of Virginia.

Schlesinger has also served on many government commissions and advisory groups. Recently, he served as Chairman of the Secretary’s Task Force 

on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management. He is also Vice Chairman of the 

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. 

From 1999 to 2003 he was a member of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, 

Safety, and Security of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, and from 1998 to 2001 he 

was a member of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 

(Hart-Rudman Commission). He recently served as co-chair of Defense Science Board Task Force on the Future of the Global Positioning System. He 

also served on an independent team reviewing the Global Positioning System 

for the U.S. Air Force. He was vice chairman of the President’s Blue Ribbon 

Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management (1984–1985), and 

served on the Governor’s Commission on Virginia’s Future (1982–1984) and 

the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces (1982–1983).

Schlesinger has been awarded eleven honorary doctorates. He is the recipient of the National Security Medal, as well as five departmental and agency 

medals. He is the recipient of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Distinguished Service Medal, the George Catlett Marshall Medal, the H. H. Arnold Award, 

the Navy League’s National Meritorious Citation, the Distinguished Service 

Award of the Military Order of the Carabao, the Jimmy Doolittle Award, the 

Military Order of the World Wars Distinguished Service Award, the Henry 

M. Jackson Award for Distinguished Public Service, and the William Oliver 

Baker Award.

Schlesinger is the author of The Political Economy of National Security, 1960, 

America at Century’s End, 1989, and numerous articles.

In 1950 Schlesinger received a bachelor of arts degree summa cum laude

from Harvard College, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and was 

selected for the Frederick Sheldon Prize Fellowship. He received his master of arts and doctoral degrees from Harvard University in 1952 and 1956, 

respectively.

Harry E. Cartland—Member

Harry Cartland is an independent technical consultant and entrepreneur in 

such areas as defense, space launch, and renewable energy. Most recently, 

Cartland served as a senior member of the personal staff for Congressman 

Duncan Hunter. In this capacity, he managed defense and border security 

related issues for California’s 52nd District and the Ranking Member of the 

House Committee on Armed Services. From June 2005 to January 2007, Cartland was a senior member of the professional staff for the House Committee 
144 America’s Strategic Posture

on Armed Services. During this time he led a special oversight team for the 

full committee chairman as well as managed the staff of the Projection Forces 

Subcommittee.

From July 2004 to May 2005, Cartland was as an independent consultant 

on technical projects and public policy issues, particularly in the area of 

missile defense. For three years, starting in June 2001 Cartland served as a 

member of the professional staff of the House Committee on Armed Services, managing the staff of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces after its 

establishment in 2003. He contributed technical expertise to the committee 

staff across a wide range of national security issues.

Beginning in April 1993, Cartland served as project leader and physicist 

for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, CA. He worked 

as a special projects leader for the engineering department at Livermore and 

organized a response to congressional inquiry regarding the National Laboratories’ capabilities to assist the Department of Defense with their theater 

and national missile defense programs.

From September 1992 until March 1993, Cartland was a visiting scholar at 

Duke University in the physics department and a consultant at the US Army 

Research Office in North Carolina. In this capacity, he provided technical 

advice to the ARO, including in the emerging area of nanotechnology. Cartland had previously served on active duty in the US Army, with assignments 

to the faculty of the United States Military Academy and the staff of the US 

Army Ballistic Research Laboratory.

Cartland has published scientific articles and papers on a range of topics, including in the Journal of Physical Chemistry, the Journal of Applied 

Physics, Chemical Physics Letters, and the Johns Hopkins APL Technical 

Digest.

Cartland has received a number of awards and distinctions over the 

years, including the Walter G. Berl Award from Johns Hopkins University 

APL (1999), and the Scientific Achievement Medallion at the Army Science 

Conference (1992, 1990), and was a distinguished graduate of the US Army 

Chemical School (1991, 1985). He is a member of the American Physical Society, the American Chemical Society and the American Association for the 

Advancement of Science.

Born in Fort Knox, Kentucky in 1958, Cartland graduated with a BA in 

Chemistry from Cornell University in 1980, where he was elected to Phi Beta 

Kappa. In 1985, Cartland completed his PhD in Physical Chemistry at the 

University of California, Berkeley.
Appendix 8: Commissioner Biographies 145

John S. Foster—Member

John S. Foster, Jr. is Chairman of the Board of GKN Aerospace Transparency 

Systems, Co-Chairman Nuclear Strategy Forum, member of the board of 

Wackenhut Services, Inc., and consultant to Northrop Grumman Corp., 

Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., Intellectual Ventures, and Defense Group Inc.

He retired from TRW as Vice President, Science & Technology, in 1988 and 

continued to serve on the Board of Directors of TRW from 1988 to 1994.

Foster began his career at the Radio Research Laboratory of Harvard University in 1942. He spent 1943 and 1944 as an advisor to the 15th Air Force on 

radar and radar countermeasures in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and the summers of 1946 and 1947 with the National Research Council 

of Chalk River, Ontario.

In 1952, Foster participated in the start-up of the Lawrence Livermore 

Laboratory and designed nuclear explosives. He became a division leader 

at the laboratory and he was promoted to Associate Director in 1958, and 

served as Director of the Livermore Laboratory and Associate Director of 

the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory from 1961 to 1965.

Foster was Director of Defense Research and Engineering for the Department of Defense, serving for eight years (1965–1973) under both Democratic 

and Republican administrations.

Foster served on the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board until 1956. He 

then served on the Army Scientific Advisory Panel until 1958 and was a 

member of the Ballistic Missile Defense Advisory Committee, Advanced 

Research Projects Agency in 1965. He has served on and off as a panel consultant to the President’s Science Advisory Committee. From 1973 until 1990, 

he was a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 

He is a Senior Fellow member of the Defense Science Board and served as 

Chairman of the DSB from January 1990 to June 1993. He currently serves on 

the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 

and on the Advisory Committee to the Director of DARPA.

Foster was born September 18, 1922 in New Haven, Connecticut. He received his bachelor’s of science degree from McGill University, Montreal, in 

1948. He received his doctorate in physics from the University of California, 

Berkeley in 1952.

Among his numerous honors are the Department of Defense Eugene 

Fubini Award (1998), the Founders Award from the National Academy of 

Engineering (1989) and the 1992 Enrico Fermi Award. In 1979 he received an 

honorary Doctor of Science from the University of Missouri. Other awards include: The Ernest Orlando Lawrence Memorial Award of the Atomic Energy 

Commission (1960), the Defense Department’s Distinguished Public Service 

Medals (1969, 1973, 1993), election of the National Academy of Engineering 
146 America’s Strategic Posture

(1969), the James Forrestal Memorial Award (1969), the HH Arnold Trophy 

(1971), the Crowell Medal (1972), the WEMA Award (1973) and the Knight 

Commander’s Cross (Badge and Star) of the Order of Merit of the Federal 

Republic of Germany (1974). Foster is a commander, Legion of Honor, Republic of France.

He is a member of the American Defense Preparedness Association, National Advisory Board of the American Security Council, National Security 

Industrial Association and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

John Glenn—Member

John H. Glenn was born on July 18, 1921, in Cambridge, Ohio. During his 

early childhood, the family moved to New Concord, Ohio, where Glenn 

attended primary and secondary school. Following graduation from New 

Concord High School, Glenn enrolled in Muskingum College and began 

flying lessons at the New Philadelphia airport, earning his pilot’s license in 

1941. Following Pearl Harbor, he left college and enlisted in the Naval Aviation Cadet Program. He was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1943. 

Glenn was awarded a bachelor of science in engineering from Muskingum 

in 1962.

During his World War II service, Glenn flew 59 combat missions in the 

South Pacific. Following the war, he remained in the military as a Marine 

pilot and served as an instructor in advanced flight training. During the 

Korean conflict, he flew 63 missions with Marine Fighter Squadron 311 and 

27 missions as an exchange pilot with the Air Force.

He holds the Air Medal with 18 Clusters for his combat service and has 

been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross on six occasions. He is the recipient of numerous other honors, including the Congressional Space Medal 

of Honor.

In 1954, Glenn won an assignment as a Marine test pilot and, in 1957, 

set a transcontinental speed record for the first flight to average supersonic 

speeds from Los Angeles to New York. In 1959, he was selected to be one of 

seven NASA Mercury astronauts from an original pool of 508. Three years 

later, on February 20, 1962, he made history as the first American to orbit 

the earth, completing three orbits in a five-hour flight and returning to a 

hero’s welcome.

Glenn retired from the Marine Corps as a colonel in 1965, becoming a 

business executive with Royal Crown and serving first as a member of the 

board of directors and then as president of Royal Crown International. During this time, he took an active part in Democratic politics and early environmental protection efforts in Ohio.
Appendix 8: Commissioner Biographies 147

In 1974, he was elected to the U.S. Senate, carrying all 88 counties in Ohio. 

He was reelected in 1980 with the largest margin of votes in Ohio history. 

Ohioans returned him to the Senate for the third time in 1986, and, in 1992, 

he again made history by being the first popularly elected senator from Ohio 

to win four consecutive terms. He retired from the Senate in 1998.

Glenn returned to space from October 29 to November 7, 1998, as 

a member of NASA’s Shuttle STS-95 Discovery mission during which 

the crew supported 83 research payloads and investigations on space 

flight and aging. He is the oldest person to have flown in space. During 

that mission, Glenn made 134 Earth orbits in 213 hours and 44 minutes.

 In October 1997, Glenn announced that his papers, documenting his full 

career, would be archived at The Ohio State University. In September 1998, 

Ohio State announced the establishment of the John Glenn Institute for Public Service and Public Policy at the university and in July of 2006, the Institute 

merged with Ohio State’s School of Public Policy & Management to form the 

John Glenn School of Public Affairs.

Glenn has been married to Anna (Annie) Margaret Castor since 1943. They 

have a son, Dave, and a daughter, Lyn, and two grandchildren.

Morton H. Halperin—Member

Morton H. Halperin is a consultant to the Open Society Institute and the 

Open Society Policy Center. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Center for 

American Progress.

Halperin served in the federal government in the Clinton, Nixon, and 

Johnson administrations and was involved in nuclear policy and arms control issues in all three administrations. From December 1998 to January 2001 

he was Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State. From 

February 1994 to March 1996, he was a Special Assistant to the President and 

Senior Director for Democracy at the National Security Council. In 1993, he 

was a consultant to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy and was nominated by the President for the position of 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping. In 1969, 

he was a Senior Staff member of the National Security Council staff with 

responsibility for National Security Planning. From July 1966 to January 

1969, he worked in the Department of Defense where he served as Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), responsible 

for political-military planning and arms control.

Halperin was a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations from 

January 2001 to June 2003 (directing a project on nuclear policy) and from 

March 1996 to December 1998. From July 1997 through December 1998, he 

was Senior Vice President of The Century Foundation/Twentieth Century 
148 America’s Strategic Posture

Fund. From November 1992 to February 1994, Halperin was a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In 1974, he directed 

a project on government secrecy for the Twentieth Century Fund. From 

September 1969 to December 1973, he was a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy 

Studies of the Brookings Institution.

In addition to his involvement in nuclear policy, arms control and other 

foreign policy issues, Halperin worked for many years for the American Civil 

Liberties Union (ACLU). He served as Director of the Center for National Security Studies from 1975 to 1992. From 1984 to 1992, he was also the Director 

of the Washington Office of the ACLU.

From 1960 to 1966, Halperin was associated with Harvard University 

where he was an Assistant Professor of Government, a Research Associate 

of the Center for International Affairs and Executive Director of the HarvardMIT Arms Control Seminar. Halperin has taught as a visiting professor at a 

number of universities, including Columbia, Harvard, MIT, George Washington, Johns Hopkins, and Yale.

Halperin has authored, coauthored and edited more than a dozen books 

many of them on issues related to nuclear policy and arms control. These 

include Strategy and Arms Control (1961, with Thomas C. Schelling), Limited 

War in the Nuclear Age, (1963), China and the Bomb (1965), Contemporary Military 

Strategy (1967), Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (1974), and Nuclear Fallacy (1987). He has also authored monographs on nuclear policy issues for 

IDA and IISS among others and contributed articles to a number of book 

collections, newspapers, magazines, and journals, including The New York 

Times, The Washington Post, The New Republic, Harpers, Foreign Affairs, 

and Foreign Policy.

Born in Brooklyn, New York in 1938, Halperin received a BA from Columbia College in 1958 and a Ph.D. in International Relations from Yale University in 1961. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the 

American Civil Liberties Union.

Lee H. Hamilton—Member

Lee H. Hamilton became president and director of the Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars in January 1999. Prior to becoming president 

and director of the Wilson Center Mr. Hamilton served for thirty-four years 

as a United States Congressman from Indiana. During his tenure he served 

as Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Committee on Foreign 

Affairs (now the Committee on International Relations), and chaired the 

Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East from the early 1970s until 

1993. Mr. Hamilton also served as chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Appendix 8: Commissioner Biographies 149

Transactions with Iran. Mr. Hamilton established himself as a leading congressional voice on foreign affairs, with particular interests in promoting 

democracy and market reform in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 

Europe, promoting peace and stability in the Middle East, expanding U.S. 

markets and trade overseas, and overhauling U.S. export and foreign aid 

policies.

Mr. Hamilton has also been a leading figure on economic policy and 

congressional organization. As chairman of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress and a member of the House Standards of Official 

Conduct Committee, he was a primary draftsman of several House ethics 

reforms, and worked to promote the integrity and efficiency of Congress as 

an institution.

In his home state of Indiana, Mr. Hamilton worked hard to improve education, job training, and infrastructure. He established The Center on Congress 

at Indiana University, serving as director.

Mr. Hamilton remains an important and active voice on matters of international relations and American national security. He served as a commissioner on the United States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission), and was co-chair with former senator 

Howard Baker of the Baker-Hamilton Commission to Investigate Certain 

Security Issues at Los Alamos. He was named vice-chairman of the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), which issued its report in July 2004, then co-chaired with Governor 

Tom Kean the 9/11 Public Discourse Project. In March 2006 he was named 

co-chairman of the Iraq Study Group. In February 2007 he was appointed 

to the National War Powers Commission, a private, bipartisan panel led by 

former Secretaries of State James A. Baker III and Warren Christopher.

Mr. Hamilton’s distinguished service in government has been honored 

through numerous awards in public service and human rights as well as 

honorary degrees. He is the author of A Creative Tension—The Foreign Policy 

Roles of the President and Congress (2002) and How Congress Works and Why You 

Should Care (2004), and coauthor of Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 

9/11 Commission (2006) and The Iraq Study Group Report (2006).

Born in Daytona Beach Florida, Mr. Hamilton’s family relocated to Tennessee and then Evansville, Indiana. Mr. Hamilton is a graduate of DePauw University and Indiana University law school, and studied for a year 

at Goethe University in Germany. A former high school and college basketball star, he has been inducted into the Indiana basketball Hall of Fame. 

Before his election to Congress, he practiced law in Chicago, Illinois, and 

Columbus, Indiana.

Lee and his wife, the former Nancy Ann Nelson, have three children: 

Tracy Lynn Souza, Deborah Hamilton Kremer, and Douglas Nelson Hamil-
150 Appendix 8: Commissioner Biographies America’s Strategic Posture

ton, and five grandchildren: Christina, Maria, McLouis, and Patricia Souza, 

and Lina Ying Kremer.

Fred Charles Iklé—Member

Fred C. Iklé is a Distinguished Scholar at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies. He is currently engaged in studies about the impact 

of technology on national security, and on the prospects for democracy. He 

is a member of the Defense Policy Board, a governor of the Smith Richardson 

Foundation, a Director of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North 

Korea, and an advisory board member of the American Foreign Policy 

Council.

Prior to joining CSIS in 1988, Iklé was Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 

during the first and second Reagan administrations. In 1987, he co-chaired 

the bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, which published Discriminate Deterrence. Iklé received the highest civilian award of the 

Department of Defense, the Distinguished Public Service Medal in 1987, and 

in 1988 he was awarded the Bronze Palm.

From 1973 to 1977, Iklé served Presidents Nixon and Ford as director of 

the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. From 1977 to 1978, he was 

chairman of the Republican National Committee’s Advisory Council on International Security and, from 1979 to 1980, coordinator of Governor Ronald 

Reagan’s foreign policy advisers.

Iklé served for nine years as a director of the National Endowment for 

Democracy, and in 1999-2000 served as Commissioner on the National Commission on Terrorism. He was director and chairman of Telos Corporation, 

and director of the advisory board of Zurich Financial Services. From 1968 

to 1972, Iklé was head of the Social Science Department of the RAND Corporation. From 1964 to 1967, he was professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He held positions with the Center for 

International Affairs at Harvard University (1962-1963), the RAND Corporation (1954-1961), and the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia 

University (1950-1953).

Iklé is the author of The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction (University of 

Oklahoma Press, 1958); How Nations Negotiate (Harper & Row, 1964; reissued by Praeger, and again by Kraus Reprint, 1976); and Every War Must End

(Columbia University Press, 1970; reissued with new preface in 1991; second 

reissue with new preface in 2005); and Annihilation From Within (New York: 

Columbia University Press, 2006). Iklé has published many articles in Foreign 

Affairs, Fortune, The National Interest, and op-eds in leading newspapers.
Appendix 8: Commissioner Biographies 151

Keith B. Payne—Member

Keith Payne is President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public 

Policy, a nonprofit research center located in Fairfax, Virginia. At National 

Institute, he directs and participates in studies on U.S. strategic policy and 

force posture issues, arms control, BMD, and Russian foreign policy. Payne 

also is Head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, 

Missouri State University (Washington Campus), and in 2005 was awarded 

the Vicennial Medal for his twenty-one years of teaching at Georgetown 

University.

On leave from National Institute in 2002 and 2003, Payne served in the 

Department of Defense as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Forces Policy. He received the Distinguished Public Service Medal from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and the Forces Policy office Payne led received 

a Joint Meritorious Unit Award. In this position, Payne was the head of U.S. 

delegation in numerous allied consultations and in “Working Group Two” 

negotiations on BMD cooperation with the Russian Federation.

Payne is the editor-in-chief of Comparative Strategy: An International Journal, 

Chairman of the Strategic Command’s Senior Advisory Group Policy Panel, 

co-chair of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, and a member of the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board. He has served as a participant or leader of numerous governmental and private studies, including 

White House studies of U.S.-Russian cooperation, Defense Department studies of missile defense, arms control, and proliferation, and as co-chairman 

of the Department of Defense’s Deterrence Concepts Advisory Group. He 

also has served as a consultant to the White House Office of Science and 

Technology Policy, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and 

participated in the 1998 “Rumsfeld Study” of missile proliferation.

Payne testifies frequently before Congressional Committees, and has lectured on defense and foreign policy issues at numerous colleges and universities in North America, Europe, and Asia. He is the author or co-author 

of over 100 published articles and sixteen books and monographs. His most 

recent book is entitled, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Policy and Theory 

from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century.

Payne’s articles have appeared in major U.S., European and Japanese professional journals, including, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Orbis, Europäische 

Sicherheit, Policy Review, Strategic Review, Washington Quarterly, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Militare Spectator, Air University Review, Comparative Strategy, 

Air Force Magazine, Issues In Science and Technology, Military Review, Parameters, Harper’s, The Wall Street Journal, The Christian Science Monitor, and USA 

Today.
152 America’s Strategic Posture

Payne received an A.B. (honors) in political science from the University 

of California at Berkeley in 1976, studied in Heidelberg, Germany, and in 

1981 received a Ph.D. (with distinction) in international relations from the 

University of Southern California.

C. Bruce Tarter—Member

C. Bruce Tarter is Director Emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory, University of California and was the eighth director to lead the 

Laboratory since it was founded in 1952. A theoretical physicist by training 

and experience, he spent most of his career at the Laboratory. As director, he 

led the Laboratory in its mission to ensure national security and apply science and technology to the important problems of our time. The Laboratory 

is a principal contributor to the Department of Energy’s programs to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and to reduce the international dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction.

Tarter received a bachelor’s degree in physics from the Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology and a Ph.D. from Cornell University. His career at 

the Livermore Laboratory began in 1967 as a staff member in the Theoretical 

Physics Division. His research concentrated on supercomputer calculations 

of the properties of matter at high temperatures and densities, with applications to nuclear weapons, fusion, energy, and astrophysics. He became head 

of Theoretical Physics in 1978.

During the 1980s, Tarter became a Laboratory leader in establishing stronger ties with the University of California. He served on a number of institutional committees and task forces, and he helped formulate the Laboratory’s 

strategic direction as a member of the Long-Range Planning Committee. 

In 1988, he joined the ranks of senior management as associate director for 

Physics, a position that he expanded to include weapons physics, space technology leading to the Clementine mission to the Moon, and a broadly based 

program in global climate and other environmental research.

Tarter was selected as director in 1994, after serving briefly as deputy 

director and acting director. He led the Laboratory through the transition 

to a post–Cold War nuclear weapons world, helping to set the foundation 

for current programs in stewardship of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. He also 

worked to build the programs in nonproliferation and counter-terrorism, and 

in energy, environment, and bioscience. He served as Director through the 

first half of 2002, then spent a year and a half as Associate Director at Large 

until his retirement in early 2004.

In addition to his Laboratory activities, Tarter has served in a number of 

outside professional capacities. These include a six-year period with the Army 

Science Board, service as an adjunct professor at the University of California 
Appendix 8: Commissioner Biographies 153

at Davis, and membership on the California Council on Science and Technology, the Laboratory Operations Board (Secretary of Energy Advisory Board), 

Pacific Council on International Policy, Nuclear Energy Research Advisory 

Committee, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Defense Science Board, and 

the Corporation and Board of Directors of the Draper Laboratory.

He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the California Council on Science 

and Technology, and received the Roosevelts Gold Medal Award for Science 

(1998), NNSA Gold Medal for Distinguished Service (2002), the US Department of Energy Exceptional Public Service Award (2002), and the US Department of Energy Secretary’s Gold Award (2004).

Ellen D. Williams—Member

Born in Oshkosh, Wisconsin in 1953, Ellen D. Williams grew up in Livonia, 

Michigan, received her Bachelor of Science from Michigan State University 

in 1976 and her Ph.D from California Institute of Technology in 1981. She 

then joined the University of Maryland Physics Department where she established an experimental program designed to push the limits of understanding electronic materials to the atomic level. With funding from the Department of Defense and National Science Foundation, her group pioneered the 

application of scanning tunneling microscopy to the quantitative determination and interpretation of structural fluctuations, and now applies this 

approach to the development of novel electronic materials for nanoelectronics applications. Her work has been presented in over 180 refereed publications and has been recognized by numerous awards, including the NSF 

Presidential Young Investigator award, 1984-89; Office of Naval Research 

Young Investigator award, 1986-89; American Physical Society - Maria Goeppert-Mayer Award, 1990; Fellow of the American Physical Society, 1993; Fellow of the American Vacuum Society, 1993; University of Maryland Outstanding Woman of the Year, 1996; E.W. Mueller Award, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 1996; Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Fellow, 

1996; University of Maryland Distinguished Faculty Research Fellow, 1996-98; 

American Physical Society David Adler Lectureship Award, 2001; Materials 

Research Society Turnbull Lectureship, 2003. She was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2003 and the National Academy of 

Sciences in 2005.

In 1995, Williams established the NSF-supported Materials Research and 

Engineering Center at the University of Maryland, which supports collaborative research programs and an extensive program of outreach programs 

designed to encourage and support pre-college students in pursuing careers 

in science, technology, engineering and mathematical fields. She continues 
154 America’s Strategic Posture

to serve as director of the center, and is also active in professional service 

including professional committees, review and advisory panels, and editorial boards, which have included American Physical Society prize selection 

committees (2008, 1998, 1996), Board of Reviewing Editors for Science Magazine (2003-present), Editorial board for Nano Letters (2001-present) and Annual Review of Condensed Matter Physics (2008-present), External advisory 

committees (Stanford NSCE 2007, U. Chicago MRSEC 1997-present, Harvard 

NSEC 2003, Cornell NSEC 2003), APS Policy Committee (2005-7), Materials 

Research Society meeting chair (1999) and Board of Directors (2006-7), external review committees (DOE-BES Materials Science programs 2008, NCSU 

Physics 2007, LBL Materials Science Division 2003, Rutgers Physics Dept. 

2002), member of the Solid State Sciences Committee of the NAS (2001-4), 

Co-organizer of the National Nanotechnology Initiative Grand Challenges 

Workshop on Energy 2004).

In 1993, Williams joined the JASONs, an independent government advisory group, and has worked on technical problems covering a wide range of 

programs including stockpile stewardship, energy sources, nanotechnology, 

conventional prompt global strike, human performance and phased-array 

radar systems. Correlated public service activities have included the National 

Security Panel of University of California President’s Council (2000-2007), 

NNSA Advisory Committee (2001-2), NRC Committee on Nanotechnology 

for the Intelligence Community (2003-4), AAAS Nuclear Weapons Complex 

Assessment Committee (2006-7), NRC Committee on Conventional Prompt 

Global Strike Capability (2007-8), NRC Board on Army Science and Technology (2007-9).

R. James Woolsey—Member

R. James Woolsey is a Venture Partner with VantagePoint Venture Partners 

of San Bruno, California.

Woolsey also currently is the Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at 

the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; chairs the Strategic Advisory 

Group of the Washington, D.C. private equity fund, Paladin Capital Group; 

is a Senior Executive Advisor to the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton; 

and is Of Counsel to the Washington, D.C., office of the Boston-based law 

firm, Goodwin Procter. In the above capacities he specializes in a range of 

alternative energy and security issues.

Woolsey previously served in the U.S. Government on five different occasions where he held Presidential appointments in two Republican and two 

Democratic administrations, most recently (1993-95) as Director of Central 

Intelligence. From July 2002 to March 2008 Woolsey was a Vice President 

and officer of Booz Allen Hamilton. He was also previously a partner at the 
Appendix 8: Commissioner Biographies 155

law firm of Shea & Gardner in Washington, D.C., now Goodwin Procter, 

where he practiced for 22 years in the fields of civil litigation, arbitration, 

and mediation.

During his 12 years of government service, in addition to heading the CIA 

and the Intelligence Community, Woolsey was Ambassador to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Vienna, 1989–1991; 

Under Secretary of the Navy, 1977–1979; and General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1970–1973. He was also appointed by the 

President to serve on a part-time basis in Geneva, Switzerland, 1983–1986, as 

Delegate at Large to the U.S.–Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) 

and Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST). As an officer in the U.S. Army, he 

was an adviser on the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

(SALT I), Helsinki and Vienna, 1969–1970.

Woolsey serves on a range of government, corporate, and nonprofit advisory boards and chairs several, including that of the Washington firm, 

ExecutiveAction LLC. He serves on the National Commission on Energy 

Policy. He is currently Co-Chairman (with former Secretary of State George 

Shultz) of the Committee on the Present Danger. He is Chairman of the 

Advisory Boards of the Clean Fuels Foundation and the New Uses Council, 

and a Trustee of the Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments. Previously he was Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Board of Regents 

of The Smithsonian Institution, and a trustee of Stanford University. He has 

also been a member of The National Commission on Terrorism, 1999–2000; 

The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S. (Rumsfeld 

Commission), 1998; The President’s Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform, 1989; The President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission), 1985–1986; and The President’s Commission 

on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission), 1983.

Woolsey has served in the past as a member of boards of directors of a 

number of publicly and privately held companies, generally in fields related 

to technology and security, including Martin Marietta; British Aerospace, 

Inc.; Fairchild Industries; and Yurie Systems, Inc.

Woolsey was born in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and attended Tulsa public schools, 

graduating from Tulsa Central High School. He received his B.A. degree from 

Stanford University (1963, With Great Distinction, Phi Beta Kappa), an M.A. 

from Oxford University (Rhodes Scholar 1963–1965), and an LL.B from Yale 

Law School (1968, Managing Editor of the Yale Law Journal).

Woolsey is a frequent contributor of articles to major publications, and 

from time to time gives public speeches and media interviews on the subjects 

of foreign affairs, defense, energy, and intelligence. He is married to Suzanne 

Haley Woolsey and they have three sons, Robert, Daniel, and Benjamin.

157

Appendix 9

Support Staff

Commission

Paul D. Hughes

Commission Executive Director

Bruce W. MacDonald

Senior Director

Bradley H. Roberts

Senior Researcher and Lead Writer, Institute for

Defense Analyses

Victor A. Utgoff

Senior Researcher, Institute for Defense Analyses

Taylor A. Bolz

Assistant to the Commission

Brian W. Rose

Assistant to the Commission

Markell Miller

Assistant to the Commission, Institute for Defense Analyses

Assistants to the Commissioners

Deborah C. Gordon Carol Padgett

Liz Kurzeila June Halstead

Mary Jane Veno Nora Coulter

Helen Lawing Denise Steele

Nancy Bonomo Peter Pry

Kingston Reif Wade Boese

Jennifer Knepper Stephanie Koeshall

Alicia Godsberg
158 America’s Strategic Posture

U.S. Government Liaison Officers

Dr. John R. Harvey

National Nuclear Security Administration,

Department of Energy

David J. Stein

Dr. Frank Dellerman

Office of the Secretary of Defense,

Department of Defense

Dr. Kerry M. Kartchner

Brandon Buttrick

International Security Advisory Board, Department of State

Donald M. Hodge

National Intelligence Council

Assistants to the Expert Working Groups

Jonathan S. Lachman, National Security Strategy and Policies

Chantell L. Murph, Deterrent Force Structure

Matthew J. Squeri, Nuclear Infrastructure

Lisa Andivahis, Countering Proliferation
ow to secure the nuclear peace remains one of the most profound 

questions of the modern era. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War 

and with the arrival of a new administration in Washington, it is time to 

think through fundamental questions about the purposes of nuclear deterrence 

and the character of the U.S. strategic posture. While the existential threat to 

the United States has decreased, the rising threat of catastrophic terrorism, 

the possession and spread of nuclear weapons by other states, and a general 

worldwide nuclear renaissance continue to influence decisions about America’s 

strategic posture. 

Recognizing the changing character of these threats, Congress formed a 

commission in 2008 to examine the United States’ long-term strategic posture 

and make recommendations. For more than eleven months this bipartisan 

commission of leading experts on national security, arms control, and nuclear 

technology met with Congressional leaders, military officers, high-level officials 

of several countries, arms control groups, and technical experts to assess the 

appropriate roles for nuclear weapons, nonproliferation programs, and missile 

defenses. This official edition contains a discussion of key questions and issues 

as well as the Commission’s findings and recommendations for tailoring U.S. 

strategic posture to new and emerging requirements as the world moves closer 

to a proliferation tipping point. 

United States

Institute of Peace Press

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

America’s Strategic Posture

Title: America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission 

on the Strategic Posture of the United States

Publication month: May 2009

ISBN 978-1-60127-045-0

Media queries should be directed to: 

Lauren Sucher

lsucher@usip.org

Tel: 202-429-3822