CHINA

S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATE

Mark A. Stokes

September 1999
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ISBN 1-58487-004-4

ii
iii

Foreword ...................................

1. Introduction ...............................

2. Foundations of Strategic Modernization ........

3. China’s Quest for Information Dominance ......

4. Dawn of a New Age:

 China’s Long-Range Precision Strike Capabilities 

5. In Defense of its Own:

 China’s Aerospace Defense ...................

6. Conclusion ................................

Appendix I. China Aerospace Corporation

 Organization ..............................

Appendix II. The Legend of Qian Xuesen .........

Appendix III. Space Support for Strategic

 Modernization.............................

Appendix IV. China’s Directed Energy Weapons ...

Appendix V. Commission of Science, Technology,

 and Industry for National Defense.............

Appendix VI. China’s Ministry of Electronics

 Industry (MEI).............................

About the Author.............................
Conventional wisdom portrays the People’s Repu

China (PRC) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a bac

continental force that will not pose a military challeng

neighbors or to the United States well into the 21st ce

PLA writings that demonstrate interest in exploiti

revolution in military affairs (RMA) are dismissed by a 

segment of the PLA-watching community as wistful fan

Major Mark A. Stokes, assistant air attaché in B

from 1992-1995, offers an alternative perspective. I

study, funded by the United States Air Force Institu

National Security Studies, he outlines emerging 

operational concepts and a range of research and develo

projects that appear to have been heavily influenced b

and Russian writings on the RMA. Fulfillment of the 

vision for the 21st century could have signi

repercussions for U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific reg

Major Stokes ventures into facets of PLA modern

that are often ignored. Backed by extensive documen

he argues that the revolutionary modernization of the 

telecommunications infrastructure, a robust space-, ai

ground-based sensor network, and prioritization of ele

attack systems could enable the PLA to gain inform

dominance in future armed conflicts around its peri

Information dominance would be further boosted by C

traditional emphasis on information denial and decept

In discussing the most likely scenario for PLA m

action, Major Stokes postulates that inform

dominance—supported by a new generation of increa

accurate and lethal theater missiles—could give the 

decisive edge in a future conflict in the Taiwan Strait. 

accurate conventional theater missiles would pl

especially critical role in rapid establishment 

superiority by suppressing airbases and neutralizi

defenses. Furthermore, the author argues that the P

v
intervention in a Taiwan crisis.

In his appendices, the author provides an initial g

into PLA military space and directed energy we

development. With extensive foreign technical assis

China is investing in largely dual-use space-based sy

that could provide the PLA with a valued-added boos

overall military capabilities. In addition, China’s de

ment of “new concept” directed energy weapons— inc

high powered microwave and high powered lasers

become a reality in the not-too-distant future.

Stokes argues that, while the PLA faces obstac

fulfilling its modernization objectives, underestim

China’s ability to make revolutionary breakthroughs 

areas could have significant ramifications for U.S. na

security interests.

LARRY M. WORTZEL

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute

vi
INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the last decade, the Ch

defense-industrial complex has initiated a focused st

modernization program to meet the requirements o

century warfare. Chinese leaders, faced with num

perceived national security challenges, have called 

readjustment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) do

requiring the modernization of its space, inform

long-range precision strike, and other strategic dimens

warfare.

This study offers an alternative analytical appro

understanding PLA modernization. Ground force an

who tend to dominate the PLA studies field, naturall

the PLA mostly in terms of field equipment such as 

artillery, basic soldier skills, maneuver, and firepow

force analysts usually focus on aircraft, aircraft prod

and pilot skills. Navy analysts think of the PLA in te

destroyers, frigates, and other sea-based platforms. 

these perspectives, the PLA is viewed as hopelessly back

with little prospect, at least within the next 15-20 ye

becoming a challenge to any power in the region. 

analysts are not necessarily wrong in their conclu

Conventional PLA ground, air, and naval forces are w

inadequate, and it is difficult to believe that they will b

to overcome shortcomings in the short to mid-term.

These traditional approaches, however, often glos

strategic aspects of PLA modernization. There 

influential segment within China’s defense-indu

complex which is concentrating on the developm

doctrine and systems designed to enable target

adversarial strategic and operational centers of gravit

defend its own, in order to pursue limited political obj

with an asymmetrical economy of force. In other word

PLA, as part of its long-range regional security strat

1
forward-based command, control, communica

computers, and intelligence (C

4

I) nodes, airbases, a

carriers and sea-based C

2

 platforms, as well as critical 

in space. Knowing the importance of protecting cen

gravity, Beijing is also prioritizing the fielding of syst

defend its own.

China’s strategic modernization, if successful, will 

the PLA to conduct operations intended to directly a

strategic effects by striking the enemy centers of g

These operations are meant to achieve their obje

without having to necessarily engage the adversary’s 

military forces in extended operations. Strategic 

objectives often include producing effects to demoral

enemy’s leadership, military forces, and population

affecting an adversary’s capability to continue the con

One of the key target systems of strategic attack 

adversary’s command and control system. As Chines

Western analysts have pointed out, disrupting the ab

communicate can be a critical step toward achieving st

paralysis and disunity by cutting off the enemy’s lead

from the civilian populace and fielded military 

Conversely, protecting centers of gravity and the ab

command and control friendly forces are key object

strategic defense modernization.

There is no question the PLA is modernizing its air, 

and ground forces across the board. However, sin

mid-1980s, the PLA has placed special focus on c

enabling technologies which, short of resorting to weap

mass destruction, would allow it to give play to it

strengths and exploit adversarial “Achilles heels

timeframe for these capabilities varies. China’s capabil

ballistic missiles, ground-based radars, and inform

denial are already among the best in the world. Develo

of other competencies are much further down the road a

part of China’s long-range plan beyond 2010.

This research project has numerous objectives, inc

the following:

2
eteg te des bed Cas st

military modernization program;

• Identifing key research academies, institute

factories involved in strategic modernization;

• Tracing developments and programs relat

ballistic and cruise missiles, directed energy we

military space program, and information warfa

• Appraising the level of technology transfer into 

which has contributed to its strategic moderni

goals;

• Examining potential organizational and doc

changes within the PLA to related to new str

systems;

• Assessing obstacles which may inhibit develo

and deployment of future strategic weapons sy

and,

• Analyzing ramifications of China’s stra

modernization program on regional and U.S. na

security.

To meet these objectives, this monograph is divide

four chapters following this introductory chapter. Cha

contains an examination of the foundation for C

military modernization, to include drivers and d

research and development (R&D) strategy. Cha

addresses one of the most critical, and often ignored, asp

PLA modernization—its aspiration for inform

dominance. The monograph then turns, in Chapter 4

examination of systems which could enable the PLA to 

out paralyzing strikes against an adversary’s critical 

drawing attention to R&D into increasingly lethal b

and cruise missiles. Chapter 5 addresses China’s eff

develop a comprehensive air and space defense network 

brings into play many of the developmental efforts dis

3
strategic modernization objectives and implications f

United States.

4
FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGIC

MODERNIZATION

This chapter begins with an introduction of the key p

within China’s defense industrial complex, driving 

behind the strategic modernization program, and an ov

of China’s defense R&D strategy. An analysis of em

PLA capabilities must begin with the technological base 

within the defense industries. The defense industries o

through a mixture of bottom-up initiative from indi

research institutes, and top-down direction from the C

Military Commission (CMC) and State Council. Em

PLA doctrine, various threat perceptions, and bureau

competition are major driving forces for R&D of new w

systems. Understanding approaches to R&D strate

include various developmental phases, provides a 

analytical approach to estimating timelines.

The Defense Industrial Complex.

The foundation of China’s strategic modernization 

defense industrial complex. China has one of the large

most cumbersome defense industrial establishments 

world. However, only certain segments are key play

China’s strategic modernization. Overall responsibili

with the CMC, which is roughly the counterpart of th

National Command Authority. The CMC works closel

the State Council which conducts national economic pla

and provides policy guidance for general R&D and produ

High-level policy related to priority functional R&D 

stems from various state leading groups.

1

Central Special Committee. One other long-sta

organization for policy decisions related to China’s st

modernization is the Politburo’s Central Special Comm

(CSC). The CSC was initially created to oversee C

5
directed by Li Peng, with Liu Huaqing as a deputy, and 

many as 20 members to coordinate, oversee, and make 

decisions at the highest level. Members include mos

premiers and leadership of the military industrial co

Through the years, this organization has been som

referred to with different names, including National D

Industry Special Commission, Sophisticated We

Production Commission, and Central Science and Tech

Special Commission.2

State Science and Technology Commission, COS

and the Defense Industries. The State Council’s State S

and Technology Commission (SSTC) and the 

Commission of Science, Technology, and Indust

National Defense (COSTIND) oversee China’s d

industries.

3

 Directed by Song Jian, the SSTC is respons

China’s overall science and technology (S&T) develo

and manages the S&T budget, which has tripled over t

2 years.

4

 Key industries involved in strategic modern

include China Aerospace Corporation (CASC), 

National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), and Minis

Electronics Industry (MEI). The general manager of e

these state conglomerates, in theory, reports to Song J

administration and civilian production, and to LT

Gangchuan of COSTIND for military contracts.

China Aerospace Corporation. Among the de

industries, the CASC is the most important in C

strategic modernization effort.

5

 CASC oversee

development of ballistic and cruise missiles, air d

systems, and the entire range of space launch vehicl

satellites. CASC is divided into five primary res

academies (yanjiuyuan) which focus on launch vehicl

ballistic missiles (First Academy); air and missile d

systems, and developmental research into anti-sa

technology (Second Academy), anti-ship and land 

cruise missiles (Third Academy); solid propellant tech

(Fourth Academy); and satellites (Fifth Academy). A

academy in Shanghai (Eighth Academy) augment

occasionally competes against the five basic academ

6
(jidi), numbered 061 through 068, located around the c

have a wide range of manufacturing and R&D res

bilities. Originally established to provide Third 

manufacturing services subordinate to the indiv

academies, the bases have become independent R&

manufacturing centers.

6

Drivers of Strategic Modernization.

What drives Chinese strategic modernization? Is 

modernization planning based on a rational top-down 

which assesses fundamental values, interests, and na

security requirements? Do they conduct scenario-ba

threat-based planning? Are requirements subjec

bureaucratic influences between service arms and inf

by industrial magnates? The answers to these questio

all probably yes. The mechanics of Chinese de

modernization planning are complex and opaque, pr

not too different from the Pentagon. A number of f

including emerging doctrine, threat perceptions

bureaucratic politics, influence Chinese strategic pla

indigenous research and development, and acquisition

Doctrine. The most important element driving C

military modernization is an emerging doctrine 

emphasizes strategic attack against the most critical 

targets. A major focus of China’s military modernizatio

gaining the ability to strike strategic targets, thus pres

the prospect of ending a conflict quickly by destroy

enemy’s ability to wage war, or by convincing him to 

without first having to fight and defeat his military 

Ultimately, the objective is to cause enough damage th

enemy will decide to heed Beijing’s will or make it imp

to fight. 

Strategic attacks, which are inherently offensive

comprise the most direct means available to force an en

cease fighting or to make political decisions in lin

Chinese objectives. They are executed to achieve max

destruction of an adversary’s ability to wage war. Su

7
war-making capacity of the enemy unencumbered by s

military operations. As Major General Shen Xuezai, h

the Academy of Military Sciences’ (AMS) Military Sy

Department, states, “Only by controlling the 

battlespace and striking at key points so as to paraly

enemy’s entire operational system and immobilize its 

will it be possible to win a war.”

7

 Strategic attacks r

forcing the enemy into the reactive and defensive mode

retention of the initiative, and reduce threats to fr

units. Strategic campaigns, of course, are only part 

overall war effort and only one means available to th

power who wield national military instruments. Wide

destruction of enemy infrastructure and fielded forces 

necessary. 

Drawing doctrinal lessons from U.S. conduct of th

War, many Chinese strategists view the most critical t

as the national command and control apparatus, to i

leadership, operational command centers, and th

infrastructure. Other classes of targets includ

manufacturing, petroleum storage, and power gene

facilities; transportation infrastructure; population ce

and fielded military forces. Attacking fielded military 

especially reconnaissance and strike assets, may be nec

as more of a defensive measure to protect friendly cen

gravity.

This strategic attack doctrine, one aspect of the 

“limited war under high tech conditions” (jubu zhanzhe

gaojishu tiaojian xia), has a number of characteristics

the PLA’s emerging doctrine continues to adhere 

traditional strategy of “pitting the inferior again

superior” (yilie shengyou), which recognizes techno

inferiority for an indefinite period of time. Re

superiority in selected areas, however, can be applied a

an enemy’s weaknesses. The emerging doctrine is offen

nature. Chinese doctrinal literature indicates that, 

against a technologically superior power breaks o

enemy will likely deploy forces rapidly and then lau

8
window of opportunity exists for a preemptive strike.

8

From the Chinese perspective, this asymme

approach, “gaining the initiative by striking first” (

zhiren), is an effective means to offset technologica

logistical advantages which a more advanced military 

brings to the fight. This approach to warfare ma

significant change from the previous principle of “g

mastery only after the enemy has struck” (houfa zhiren

emerging doctrine requires a high degree of secrecy, mo

a highly accurate concentration of firepower, and su

These principles make possible a quick resolution of co

This does not require annihilation of the enemy or occu

of his territory, only a paralyzing “mortal blow” (zh

daji), “winning victory with one strike” (yizhan, ershen

Other important aspects of PLA’s doctrinal s

recognition of a multidimensional, greatly exp

battlespace, encompassing the electromagnetic spe

land, air, sea, and space. Only a small proportion of the 

total troop strength is necessary to achieve their m

objectives. This principle, “winning victory through 

troops” (jingbing zhisheng), requires only a small num

highly educated troops in order to achieve a quick victor

concept of a swift victory is another principle, “fighting a 

battle to force a quick resolution” (suzhan sujue). A

principle is priority on the “in-depth strike” (zongshen d

hit distant, strategic targets in order to avoid forward 

and hit vital centers of gravity, such as ports, critic

nodes, airbases, and supply centers. Cruise and b

missiles, and other long-range precision strike asse

crucial in conducting these in-depth strikes.10

PLA writings strongly indicate the foundation 

emerging doctrine is the concept of information dom

(zhixinxiquan). Information dominance is generally ac

through command and control warfare, using combinat

airpower, special forces, and strategic missile units to 

an adversary’s C

4

I infrastructure. Interfering w

enemy’s ability to obtain, process, transmit, an

information can paralyze his entire operational system

9
clear indications that emerging PLA doctrine is pushi

development of long-range precision strike and inform

operations. Because of this, the CMC, through COSTIN

granted priority to offensive and defensive inform

systems and to long-range precision strike assets, prima

the form of ballistic and cruise missiles. At the same 

China is emphasizing development of defensive sy

intended to counter enemy information operation

long-range precision strikes against Chinese territory

U.S. and Russian Missile Defense Programs. Since t

1970s, another key driver for China’s strategic modern

has been U.S. and Russian efforts to develop missile d

systems. Preliminary work on the U.S. strategic m

defense program began in the late 1970s and emerged 

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March 1983. Sinc

offshoots of SDI have included Global Protection A

Limited Strike (GPALS), and various National and T

Missile Defense programs. Current and future na

missile defense concepts, including theater high-altitud

defense systems (THAADS) and the experimental 

Based Laser could be deployed as early as the turn 

century. 

Since the late 1970s, the CMC, COSTIND, the S

Artillery, and the space and missile industry have 

extremely concerned about the deployment of U.S

Russian missile defense systems. COSTIND and the 

and missile industry have been especially active in k

appraised of technological and political develop

concerning missile defense and have been deve

technologies which will assure China a second 

capability. Maintenance of a viable nuclear deterre

been the highest priority for Chinese defense planner

the mid-to-late 1950s. This is still true today.

This fear of losing their retaliatory capability 

shortly after the announcement of SDI in 1983, when C

analysts began evaluating potential responses. Th

important paper on SDI and its potential implicatio

China was prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

10
the central leadership tasked several ministries and re

institutes to thoroughly examine the SDI issue a

implications for China. During 1985, the defense ind

complex hosted several conferences on SDI. A pr

conclusion was that Soviet and U.S. development of b

missile defense (BMD) systems had significant implic

for China’s nuclear deterrent. By 1986, Chinese e

generally agreed there were three potential resp

expansion of offensive forces; development of co

measures, such as shielding and spinning of ballistic m

to penetrate BMD systems; and deployment of anti-sa

(ASAT) weapons to destroy space-based BMD systems

COSTIND played a key role in developing the C

response to the “global technical revolution” sparked b

As the MFA was developing its SDI response, COSTIN

a March 1984 meeting on “How to Meet the Global Tec

Revolution Challenge.” In September 1984, COS

delivered a proposal to the CMC suggesting relevan

branches develop defense S&T gameplans out to th

2000. Working in conjunction with the State Co

COSTIND formulated a defense S&T strategy which f

attention on certain key technologies and presented 

November 1985 meeting with CMC leadership. Afterwa

February 1986, COSTIND, with CMC support, sanction

overall long-term development effort and further direct

formation of 18 study groups to focus on designated c

technologies.13

However, some within the defense S&T comm

believed COSTIND’s plan was not sufficient to me

technical challenges posed by SDI. In March 1986, f

China’s most prominent defense engineers presen

petition to the Central Committee on establishing a 

Technology Research and Development Plan Outline.” 

the engineers pushing the new initiative were invol

strategic programs—Wang Daheng, a preeminent 

expert who played a role in China’s space tracking ne

Wang Ganchang, one of the founding fathers of C

nuclear program; Yang Jiachi, a satellite attitude c

11
of the program to develop China’s space tracking ne

The plan, referred to as the 863 Program, was implemen

parallel to COSTIND’s Long Range Plan to Year 2000 a

jointly managed by COSTIND and the SSTC. Th

Program, still a guide and funding source for num

preliminary R&D projects, focuses on some of the 

technologies included in the SDI and Europe’s answer t

the Eureka Program, including space systems, high po

lasers, microelectronics, and automated control system

China’s Gulf War Syndrome. Yet another driv

China’s strategic modernization is U.S. performance 

Gulf War. The 1991 Gulf War was a rude awakening 

CMC and the military-industrial complex. The aw

display of military power showed the Chinese leadersh

how vulnerable their homeland is to attack from a po

enemy. A second important conclusion which the CMC 

from the Gulf War was the preeminence of air powe

long-range precision strike, augmented by information

warfare, in a greatly expanded battlespace. According 

source, in a December 1995 meeting the CMC con

“ground fighting can only enhance the results of battle

targets in warfare are the enemy’s “nervous system 

brain,” rather than its ground targets and fighting 

Another important conclusion was the primacy of off

operations as an essential element of defense.

15

China’s Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). L

drawn from the U.S. experience in the Gulf War are 

augmented by subsequent literature on the potential 

The increased doctrinal emphasis on air power, long

precision strike, information warfare, and paralyzing 

on centers of gravity has been further reinforced by c

grasp concepts associated with the RMA. A num

influential strategists and high ranking members 

defense industrial complex have acknowledged the RM

called on the PLA leadership to meet its challenges o

century warfare. Among the most influential ar

Guangya, COSTIND S&T Committee Chairman, and 

Xuesen, Senior COSTIND Advisor. They advocate p

12
investing in key enabling technologies suc

microelectronics and information systems, raising the l

PLA officer technical understanding, and adopting inno

doctrine and organizational changes.

1 6

 Ch

commentators view the RMA as driving four sphe

warfighting, including information warfare, precision 

strategic maneuver, and space combat.

17

Quest for Great Power Status. Yet another driver 

quest for status and procurement of weapon systems 

earmark a country as a great power. From the C

perspective, there are certain technologies and we

systems which a great power is simply expected to p

The mindset is “whatever the West can do, we can do as 

The resulting technologies or systems, however, m

necessarily be optimal for China’s defense need

example, China’s development of an aircraft carrier co

useful against an regional adversary, but would be o

direct consequence to United States. Its real effect is t

that China is a great power. 

Territorial Defense. China does take a logical and ra

approach to meeting its defense requirements, to i

enforcement of sovereignty claims. Assessments are m

to what the threats are that China will face in the 

medium, and long term, and how China can assu

capability to defend against those threats. PLA stra

believe China may be faced with surprise attacks fro

East and South China Seas early in the next century. In 

to guarantee territorial defense, Chinese policymaker

outlined a defense in-depth approach to national securi

have adopted a strategy to ensure dominance within th

area bounded by the first island chain (diyi daolian), bo

by Japanese home islands, the Ryuku Islands, Taiwa

Philippines, and Borneo. The PLA has also begun to ex

a territorial defense strategy that extends out to the 

island chain (dier daolian), including the Marianas, 

and the Carolines.

18

 The PLA Navy, Air Force, and S

Artillery figure largely in this defense strategy.

13
Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Diaoyu Islands 

East China Sea. Developing an ability to militarily s

Taiwan is an especially important driver in China’s st

modernization. PLA planners, however, fully understa

United States maintains the option to intervene if 

takes military action against Taiwan. From the 

perspective, American intervention in what Beijing b

to be an internal problem serves as the most likely scena

a collision between China and the United States. The

gaining the ability to defeat a superior power, like the U

States, in a clash over Taiwan is a critical factor in C

force planning.

Support for the National Economy. Strategic m

nization requirements must compete, or at least su

China’s overall economic development. China’s overa

objective is economic development, and fostering 

environment conducive to their economic security. Th

plays two roles in supporting the national economy. 

development of systems may be emphasized due to 

dual-use nature. COSTIND may be inclined to sele

design systems which can produce some economic b

Information systems, satellites, and cruise missile

example, are systems which can either support the na

economy or be sold abroad for profit. Projects which 

plausibly wrapped in a civilian facade make it much ea

import high technology items from countries which b

sale of military items. Strategic modernization will b

increasingly important to ensure China’s lines of com

cation are open to the free flow of oil from the Middle Ea

other sources.

Organizational and Bureaucratic Politics with

Defense-Industrial Complex. The drive for organiza

influence and power are as prevalent in China as they 

other countries. There is no doubt various PLA branch

services compete for finite budgets and resources, pr

with the Second Artillery, Navy, and Air Force coming 

top. As China’s missile defense program takes 

(discussed in more detail later), for example, the PL

14
compete for these crucial defense assets. Within the d

industries, competition for contracts, prestige, and 

between and within the space, electronics, aviation

nuclear industries heavily influence program prioriti

investment. The space industry, for example, lobb

advancement of ground-based air defense systems ov

aviation industry’s fighter component. Competition be

the aviation industry’s Nanchang Aircraft Factor

CASC’s Third Academy in development of cruise miss

well-known. Personal connections between industrial l

and the military and civilian leadership are also impo

Examples include electronics industry cliques involving 

Zemin, Zou Jiahua, and Hu Qili; and space and m

industry cliques involving Bo Yibo, Liu Huaqing, 

Aiping, Ding Henggao, Qian Xuesen, and Liu Jiyuan.

Technological Advances. A final driver for str

modernization is the seemingly endless stream of c

technologies flowing into China. Strategic programs 

hold in the 1970s and 1980s due to technical difficultie

been resurrected due to increased access to foreign tech

and expertise. Since 1991, a massive flood of technolo

significantly opened the realm of possibilities, an

influenced program decisions which are based on feas

First, the breakup of the former Soviet Union in 1991 a

economic state of former Soviet defense industries 

resulted in a shopping spree for China’s research inst

Russian and Ukrainian guest lecturers and annual tec

exchanges assist Chinese engineers in solving di

technical problems. The 1994 demise of COCOM and th

of an effective successor regime have loosened up the 

manufacturing, electronics, and materials technology.

A Guiding Light: Defense R&D Strategy.

There is little evidence to suggest that an overa

strategic planning document reflects these disp

influences and drivers and serves as the bible for long

R&D and acquisition. There are, however, a hand

15
China’s defense industry.

The 863 Program. Much of China’s stra

modernization effort is framed within a large scal

designed to establish a technological foundation for th

century. High-level discussions on this strategic mo

zation plan, eventually called the 863 Program, were in

shortly after the announcement of the SDI in March 19

the initiation of Europe’s Eureka Project in 1985. T

Program is roughly comparable to the Eureka Program, 

combined civilian and strategic defense programs.

20

 T

Program, managed by COSTIND and the State Scien

Technology Commission, was established as a mechan

concentrate China’s S&T establishment onto seven key 

for long-term development. These areas include sp

lasers, automation, biotechnology, information sy

energy, and new materials. Within these seven are

major projects were designated. Projects under th

Program are budgeted independently from the 

COSTIND, and SSTC budgets. COSTIND oversees 86

and space programs, while the SSTC manages the oth

areas.

22

China’s defense R&D strategy has its roots in a di

laid out by Nie Rongzhen in the 1960s. The strategy, 

“Three Moves in a Chess Game” (sanbuqi), calls for 

models in the R&D cycle at any one time. Generally, 

defined as having a model in trial manufacturing and t

a follow-on model under design; and preliminary resea

basic technologies associated with a generation-afte

model.

23

 The R&D cycle consists of the three broad ph

preliminary research, model R&D, and production.

Preliminary Research (yuxian yanjiu, or yuyan). C

defense industries stress on advance research serves 

foundation for follow-on stages of development. A 

foundation can significantly shorten design tim

example, one medium-range ballistic missile system too

21 months to design, quite a feat compared to other sy

which have taken up to a decade to design. Short R&D 

16
research. Preliminary research has two categories:

• Generic technologies applicable to multiple sy

i.e., telemetry, aerodynamics, GPS exploit

hypersonics, artificial intelligence, etc;

• Technology applicable to a specific system

instance, a movable spot beam antenna 

COMSAT or a new propulsion system for a mis

Preliminary research, an integral part of a long

plan, is carried out on a contract basis and strives to a

technological breakthroughs. China has focused o

technologies in long-range plans, best exemplified by t

Plan. At the end of the allocated time for the p

approximately 45 percent of advance research projects 

on to the following stage, model R&D, while anoth

percent are used as a foundation for follow-on ad

research projects. Only 14 percent of preliminary re

projects are civilian in nature.

24

Model R&D (xinghao yanzhi). After completion 

preliminary research project, COSTIND may contract 

PLA service branch for further research and develop

weaponization, and eventual deployment. This phase, 

R&D, is lengthy, costly, and is closely monitor

COSTIND. Each model R&D program which emerge

the preliminary research phase requires a new COS

managed contract.

25

 The model R&D phase is divide

four sub-phases:

• General systems design. Chief designer appointe

monitors various subsystem design ef

Assessments of various design options are se

based on modeling and simulation. 

• Prototype. Design is revised after a series of g

tests to ensure the model meets technical spe

tions. 

17
gt odetegoud testg, gt tes

carried out beginning with simple ones

traversing through a series of increasingly co

tests.

• Commission. After successfully completing 

testing, the system will go through a d

certification board, and if approved, will enter 

batch production.

26

Chief Designer System and Dual Command. A 

designer is appointed at the initiation of the systems 

phase to oversee subordinate subsystems design. Subor

designers are often not within his research organization 

of command. The chief designer coordinates efforts 

various research institutes, academies, academic cente

industries. This chief designer organization is paralle

an administrative chain of command, represent

industry, academy, and research institute leadership, 

ensures requirements and timeliness standards of th

are being met. Administrative leadership oversees s

programs at once along with their day-to-day manag

responsibilities. The administrative and technical side

closely together to ensure an economy of effort, tim

standards, manpower, materials, funding, and 

considerations are attended to. The office of the chief de

is usually located within the systems design departm

CASC or the individual academy, with the parallel ad

tration oversight normally residing in the office of one 

deputy directors of CASC or academy. For especially co

projects which significantly draw from resources of v

industries, COSTIND plays a leading administrativ

possibly even technical role.

Systems Engineering Design Departments. The sy

engineering design departments of COSTIND, CASC, a

various academies and bases have a critical role 

development of future weapons systems and projects

engineers work out of these organizations which h

variety of functions. First, with input from subor

information institutes

27

 and other entities, they offer sy

18
COSTIND, State Council, and CMC, and on sy

development issues. They analyze technical options a

industry planners, provide influential recommendati

national level mid- to long-range plans and developm

objectives. The departments also support individua

designer offices within the department. In addition, sy

design departments are responsible for program evalu

and reviews and for overall quality control. The followi

exemplifies organizations responsible for systems eng

ing:

28

• Beijing Institute of Systems Engine

(COSTIND);

• China Academy of Electronics and Inform

Technology, Systems Engineering Depar

(MEI-level);

• China Institute of Astronautical Sys

Engineering (CASC-level);

• First Planning Department (CASC’s First Acad

• Beijing Institute of Electronic Systems Engin

(CASC’s Second Academy);

• Beijing Institute of Electromechnical Sy

Engineering (CASC’s Third Academy);

• 41st Research Institute (CASC’s Fourth Acade

• 501st Research Institute (CASC’s Fifth Academ

• Shanghai Institute of Systems Engineering (C

Shanghai Academy of Space Technology).

19
1. There are at least seven state leading groups which 

interagency policy guidance for such functional ar

telecommunications, space, and lasers.

2. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Strategic Seapow

Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford: S

University Press, 1994, pp. 78-79, 262 (footnote #43), 277 (footno

3. At the time of this writing, SSTC was being transformed 

Ministry of Science and Technology. COSTIND’s military funct

being placed under the purview of the PLA General Arm

Department (zongzhuangbei bu), equal in stature to the Gener

Department. Civilian aspects of the old COSTIND structure ha

melded into a new COSTIND under the State Council.

4. The R&D budget has been increased to 1.5 percent of GD

relatively low, as compared to the United States and Japan (bo

percent of GDP in 1993). See Norman Wingrove, “China Sees Tri

R&D Spending As Key to 21st Century Economic Power,” R

Technology Management, November-December 1995, pp. 2-3.

5. At the time of this writing, CASC was being subordinate

the newly restructured civilian Commission of Science, Technolo

Industry for National Defense (COSTIND).

6. See Appendix I for a detailed outline of the CASC organiz

structure. Since this study was completed, CASC has been divid

two entities: China Aerospace S&T Corporation and China Ae

Electro-mechanical Corporation. The S&T Corporation has a

CALT, the Fourth Academy, CAST, 062 Base, and 067 Ba

Electro-mechanical Corporation has integrated the Second an

Academies and the remaining bases.

7. Major General Shen Xuezai, “The New Military Revolut

Change in Military Organizational Structure,” Zhongguo Junsh

(China Military Science), February 20, 1998, pp. 122-130, in 

Broadcast Information Service, China (henceforth FBIS-CHI)-

Major General Shen, as director of the AMS Military S

Department, is one of the PLA’s most influential figures 

development of strategy and operational doctrine. 

8. Senior Colonel Jiang Lei, Xiandai Yilie Shengyou Z

(Modern Strategy of Pitting the Inferior Against the Supe

Beijing: National Defense University Press, pp. 6-49. Colonel J

20
from AMS. He is currently assigned to AMS Strategic S

Department. On the preemptive strike concept, see Lu 

“Pre-emptive Strikes Endorsed for Limited High Tech War,” Jie

Bao, February 14, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-025.

9. For one of the best overviews of these doctrinal shifts, see 

“The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and 

1985-95: A Chinese Perspective,” in China Quarterly, July 19

443-463. For more detail, see Liu Mingtao and Yang Ch

Gaojishu Zhanzhengzhong de Daodanzhan (Missile War 

High-Tech Conditions), Beijing: National Defense University 

1993, pp. 5-26; also see Li Qingshan, Xin Junshi Geming Yu G

Zhanzheng (New Military Revolution and High Tech Warfare), 

AMS Press, 1995; Liu Senshan and Jiang Fangran, Gaojish

Zhanzheng Tiaojianxia de Zuozhan (Operations Under High Tec

War Conditions), Beijing: AMS Press, 1994, pp. 13-33.; and 

Colonels Huang Xing and Zuo Quandian, “Operational Doct

High Tech Conditions,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China M

Science), November 20, 1996, pp. 49-56, in FBIS-CHI-97-114.

10. Ibid. 

11. Among numerous references, see, for example, Wang 

Xinxi Zhanzheng yu Junshi Geming (Information Warfare a

Military Revolution), Beijing: AMS Press, 1995.

12. Bonnie S. Glaser and Banning N. Garrett, “Chinese Persp

on the Strategic Defense Initiative, Problems of Comm

March-April 1986, pp. 28-44.

13. China Today: Defense Science and Technology, Beijing: N

Defense Industry Press, 1993, pp. 149-150.

14. Ibid, pp. 152-153; also see Richard P. Suttmeier, “China

Technology: Programs, Problems, and Prospects,” China’s Ec

Dilemma, pp. 546-564.

15. Nan Shih-yin, “Inside Story of Enlarged Central Com

Meeting,” Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching, January 16, 1

FBIS-CHI-96-027; also see Jen Hui-wen, “Latest Trends in 

Military Revolution,” Hong Kong Hsin Pao (Hong Kong Ec

Journal), February 9, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-047. For other com

on lessons from the Gulf War, see Ho Po-shih, “The Chinese Mi

Worried About Lagging Behind in Armament,” Tangdai, March 

pp. 17-18.

21
New Revolution in Military Affairs,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 

Military Science), February 20, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-246. 

17. Liang Zhenxing, “New Military Revolution and Infor

Warfare,” Zhongguo Dianzi Bao (China Electronic News), Octo

1997, p. 8, in FBIS-CHI-98-012.

18. Lewis and Xue, pp. 229-230.

19. For a theoretical perspective on organizational and burea

models of policy making, see Graham T. Allison, Essence of D

Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, Brow

Company, 1971.

20. See “China’s Spectacular Plan for tackling Key Scient

Technological Problems,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, May 21, 1

FBIS-CHI, May 30, 1986, p. K17.

21. “Space” in Chinese, “hangtian,” refers to both space sys

well as ballistic, cruise, and surface-to-air missiles.

22. China Today: Defense Science and Technology, pp. 151-1

863 Program was sparked by a petition to the Central Committe

by four prominent Chinese scientists, Wang Daheng, an optics 

Wang Ganchang, one of China’s leading nuclear weapons eng

Yang Jiachi, a control theory expert; and Chen Fangyun, an ele

expert.

23. An example of this approach would be development of th

kilometer range DF-21 ballistic missile. As this system was bein

and deployed in Second Artillery experimental regiments 

mid-1980s and early 1990s, designers within CASC’s First A

were already designing an upgraded variant of the DF-21, the D

At the same time, research institutes were examining more ad

technologies which could be integrated into a follow-on for the DF

24. China Today: Defense Science and Technology, pp 155-1

25. Ibid.

26. R&D phases vary between industries and academi

example, the First Academy divides its phases of missile model 

follows: planning phase (fang’an); initial prototype (chuyang); 

prototype (shiyang); design finalization (dingxing). See Gan Ch

and Liu Jixiang, Dandao Daodan Yu Yunzai Huojian Zong

22
Defense Industry Press, January 1996, p. 42. 

27. Each academy has an institute which is responsible for r

on foreign technology and assessing applications for Chinese s

In a sense, in addition to COSTIND and CASC headquarter

academy has its own intelligence apparatus unique to its own sp

These institutes also serve as advocates for their projects. For e

the Second Academy’s 208th Research Institute publishes te

papers on the U.S. THAAD and KKV ASAT programs for use 

academy’s engineers. These types of technical papers are abstra

China Astronautics and Missilery Abstracts (CAMA) and other jo

The 208th also is CASC’s mouthpiece for advocating further inve

into ground based air defense systems.

28. Information from China Today: Space Industry, B

Astronautic Publishing House, 1992, pp. 430-450.

23
CHINA’S QUEST FOR INFORMATION

DOMINANCE

Beijing’s highest priority for strategic modernizatio

the realm of information. Competition for information i

new concept in China. A review of Sun Tzu’s Art of War r

the Middle Kingdom’s traditional emphasis on inform

dominance. For centuries, Chinese leaders have been m

at collecting, controlling, and manipulating inform

Building upon this traditional core competency, Bei

aggressively absorbing technologies associated wi

on-going information revolution. In fact, the interna

business community views the China market as the lar

world and is devoting considerable attention to meeti

Chinese demand for technology. China’s unpara

revolution in information technology will provid

foundation for its overall strategic military modernizat

fact, China’s information revolution is changin

fundamental character of the PLA, perhaps much 

rapidly than most observers appreciate.

Since the conclusion of the Gulf War, a growing ch

PLA officials have strongly advocated the aggressive p

of information-based warfare doctrine and systems. An

claim the PLA first addressed information warfare 

than the United States or Russia, when, in 1985, a PL

officer named Shen Weiguang wrote a book en

Information Warfare, excerpts of which were published 

PLA’s leading newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao, in 1987. Sin

time, numerous PLA think-tanks and COSTIND 

izations have published articles and held symposiu

information warfare. Some of China’s most influential f

including Qian Xuesen and Zhu Guangya, have cal

full-scale adoption of information-based warfare a

foundation for China’s revolution in military affairs

conduct of the Gulf War impressed a growing num

25
the Third Annual COSTIND S&T Committee meet

March 1994, called for establishment of a national in

tion network and associated technologies.

1

COSTIND sponsored a symposium, “Analysis 

National Defense System and the Military Techno

Revolution” in December 1994 and followed up with a

conference, “The Issue of Military Revolution,” in O

1995. A number of entities have combined to fo

informational warfare research institute, and the

indications China will form an information w

simulation center.

2

Enthusiasm reached a crescendo when China’s l

authorities on strategy and warfare convened in Shijiaz

for a “Forum for Experts on Meeting the Challenges 

World Military Revolution” in December 1995. The con

of the group was to meet the challenges of the inform

driven revolution in military affairs. The more th

high-ranking experts attending the conference called 

development of weapons which can “throw the fin

systems and army command systems of the hegemonis

chaos.” These types of weapons are useful for underdev

countries to use against a nation which is “extremely 

and vulnerable when it fulfills the process of networki

then relies entirely on electronic computers.” China 

abandon the strategy of “catching up” with more adv

powers and “proceed from the brand new information w

and develop our unique technologies and skills, rathe

inlay the old framework with new technologies.” 

observers believe by adopting information-based appr

to warfare, China can effectively leapfrog into th

century as a preeminent military power.3

PLA emphasis on information dominance was f

reinforced when, at a December 1995 COSTIND Na

Directors meeting, Vice Chairman of the Central M

Commission General Liu Huaqing allegedly stated:

Information warfare and electronic warfare are of 

importance, while fighting on the ground can only serve 

26
that as far as the PLA is concerned, a military revolution w

information warfare as the core has reached the stage wh

efforts must be made to catch up with and overtake riva

(emphasis added)

4

There is a growing chorus of opinion propelling 

toward establishing a national strategy for develop

comprehensive information warfare capability. Comp

of this strategy include educating China’s domestic au

and the PLA on the role of information in warfare th

frequent articles in the PLA’s newspaper, Jiefangjun Ba

in academic journals, such as the AMS’ Zhongguo J

Kexue (China Military Science). There is also a push t

establishment of a high-level leading group on na

defense information modernization which can study an

information warfare theory applicable to China’s 

defense requirements, and formulate plans and progra

China’s defense information infrastructure. Ch

observers stress the need to develop “perfect weapons” 

serve as “trump cards” (shashoujian) to exploit an adve

reliance on sophisticated microelectronics.

5

 Other asp

developmental strategy include focusing efforts to a

technical breakthroughs in information technolog

stepping up the education and training of PLA so

airmen, and sailors on information warfare-related sk

This discussion on China’s quest for inform

dominance first examines the most critical aspect of C

information revolution—development of its microelect

capability. The next section addresses Beijing’s incr

capability to field sophisticated ground, air and space

sensors. Subsequent sections examine China’s develo

of its national information infrastructure, Be

information control programs, and China’s ev

information attack capabilities.

Information Warfare Concepts and Doctrine.

The PLA strategic community is working furiou

develop information warfare doctrine and concepts. Ov

27
(NDU), two of the PLA’s leading think-tanks, and COS

have flooded China’s strategy community with writi

information warfare. Chinese commentators d

information warfare in broad terms. For example, COS

defines information warfare as follows:

All types of warfighting activities that involve the exploitat

alteration, and paralysis of the enemy’s information 

information systems, as well as those activities which invo

protecting one’s own information and information systems f

exploitation, alteration, and paralysis by the enemy.

7

There are several common principles includ

discussions of China’s approach to information warfare

and foremost is the concept of information dom

(zhixinxiquan), described as the ability to defend one

information while exploiting and assaulting an oppo

information structure. As some advocates have pointe

The key to gaining the upper hand on the battlefield is no lon

mainly dependent on who has the stronger firepower, 

instead depends on which side discovers its enemy fi

responds faster than the latter, and strikes more precisely t

the latter.

8

Information dominance is generally achieved th

command and control warfare, using combinati

airpower, special forces, and strategic missile units to 

an adversary’s C

4

I infrastructure. Interfering w

enemy’s ability to obtain, process, transmit, an

information can paralyze his entire operational s

Crucial to achieving the paralysis effect is increased an

of the enemy military infrastructure as a system

multiplying effect of intelligence and information lead

almost limitless expansion of combat effectiveness. Acc

to some Chinese observers, warfare in the information e

test of strength between intelligence capabilities of c

forces. Information superiority, say Chinese commenta

not necessarily determined by technological superiori

by new tactics and independent creativity of command

28
integrate information warfare concepts into their train

Another concept is integration (yitihua) and sea

operations (feixianxing zuozhan), defined as tying to

the five dimensions of warfare—air, land, sea, space, a

electromagnetic spectrum, integrating sensors with 

missiles, air, and sea-based forces. Chinese inform

warfare analysts view the battlespace as having been g

expanded with no clear battlelines. Operational emph

on deep strike (zongshen zuozhan) against enemy com

hubs, information processing centers, and supply sy

Sudden and quick (turanxing yu kuaisuxing) strikes 

“vital point” (dianxue) of the enemy’s information and s

systems can paralyze the enemy and destroy his mora

Operational objectives are not the seizing of territo

the killing of enemy military personnel, but rath

destruction of the other side’s willingness or capabi

resist. Over-the-horizon warfare (yuanzhan) has re

close-in fighting, and from the Chinese perspectiv

become the main strike force of the future. Ch

information warfare specialists advocate exploiting 

reliance on complex computers. By destroying an e

computer systems, high-tech weaponry can no longer op

Information warfare specialists also highlight cog

aspects of information warfare. One concept outl

five-part approach to offensive information wa

emphasizing targeting adversarial cognitive sys

jamming, and information manipulation.

11

The Foundation of Its Information Revolution:

China’s Development of Microelectronics.

There is an intimate relationship between inform

dominance and microelectronics. Recognizing this, sinc

China has named the development of indig

microelectronics as a top national security priority. Du

microelectronics and telecommunications equipment s

both economic development and military moderniz

China’s unparalleled revolution in information techno

29
computer systems and software, and art

intelligence—will provide the foundation for its o

strategic military modernization. Over the past d

information technology has been the fastest growing se

of China’s economy, rising at an annual rate of 30 percen

Among these enabling technologies, the Chinese d

industrial complex most recognizes the central r

microelectronics. Priority investments in their inte

circuit R&D and production capability could transla

significant payoffs in the next few years. For example, i

China’s space and missile industry formed a res

academy—equal in stature to those academies which d

cruise missiles and satellites—dedicated towar

development of space-qualified microelectronics. Sin

lifting of international export controls on microelectro

the last few years, the use of foreign integrated circu

production technology, to include U.S., Japanese, and K

is becoming more widespread.

A solid foundation in microelectronics is essent

Beijing’s strategic modernization goals. At the he

China’s indigenously developed information system

guidance platforms is the IC. The Chinese de

establishment recognizes IC chips as the most 

component for their long-term economic health and na

strength. In 1993, China depended on foreign sources fo

80 percent of its ICs. However, by the end of the 8th Fiv

plan in 1995, China was able to meet half of its to

demand with domestically produced ICs. Over the la

years, China’s production of integrated circuits has inc

at a rate greater than 20 percent per year. As a highl

area under the 863 Program, microelectronics has bec

strategic industry. The primary focus is on reducing th

and weight of microelectronics while increasing reli

and survivability.

13

 Increasing emphasis is being pla

development of very large scale integrated circuits (V

which have applications in advanced phased array rada

space systems.

14

30
Formerly known as the 10th Ministry of Machine Bu

Industry, MEI carries out R&D on microelectr

telecommunications, radars, electronic warfare sy

computers, and systems integration software. Direc

political heavyweight Hu Qili, MEI has entered into a n

of joint ventures as a means to raise its technical c

tence.16 Joint venture arrangements often includ

transfer of IC production lines. Shougang-NEC Ele

Company produces 5000 chips a month and is expec

average 8000 chips in 1997. The production line is not 

to mass producing sub-micron ICs, but is moving i

direction.

17 One Sino-Japanese joint venture prod

sub-micron (0.35 micron) integrated circuits is located 

Shangdi Information Industry Base in northwest Beij

Moving beyond sub-micron integrated circuit

Chinese defense industrial complex is placing more em

on microelectromechanical system (MEMS) techn

MEMS is vital for miniaturizing components to reduce w

and volume of military systems, to include satellites, 

reconnaissance systems, and nano-technological w

systems. MEMS applications also include miniature i

measurement units for brilliant munitions; me

information processing with sensors; and for miniatu

cost deformable mirrors to compensate for atmos

distortions when using high-powered lasers. Ther

movement, driven in part by COSTIND, to form a M

state-leading group which will focus fiscal and man

resources to achieve technical breakthroughs.

19

Information Acquisition.

China’s defense industrial complex is developing 

range of space- and ground-based sensors to cue long

precision strike assets and provide advanced warn

impending attacks on its territory. China is s

progressing toward a redundant, layered, and inte

reconnaissance network. There is a large body of NDU

and defense industrial writings which strongly advoca

China develop a complete reconnaissance network. A 

31
consistent support for the following systems:

20

• electronic reconnaissance satellites;

• electro-optical reconnaissance satellites;

• synthetic aperture radar satellites;

• missile early warning satellites;

• navigational satellites;

• weather satellites;

• strategic and tactical unmanned aerial ve

(UAVs);

• airborne early warning;

• space surveillance;

• counterstealth radars;

• SIGINT sites;

• tactical reconnaissance vehicles and ships; and

• special forces (infiltrated into enemy territory)

Of most significance is that the above list is no

wishful thinking—China has already deployed, or is a

developing every one of these information source

defense industries, primarily the electronics and 

industry, are developing a broad array of ground-

airborne, and space-based sensors which Beijing hop

guarantee battlespace information dominance in any 

conflicts around China’s periphery.

An overview of the PLA’s vast intelligence commu

useful to fully comprehend the important role inform

plays in China’s strategy.

21 The focal point for strateg

32
Defense Intelligence Agency, is the GSD’s Second Depar

(zongcan erbu). The Second Department oversees m

human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, widely ex

open source materials, fuses HUMINT, signals intell

(SIGINT), and imagery intelligence data, and dissem

finished intelligence products to the CMC and 

consumers. Preliminary fusion is carried out by the S

Department’s Analysis Bureau which mans the Na

Watch Center, the focal point for national-level indic

and warning. In-depth analysis is carried out by re

bureaus.

22

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Closely linked 

Second Department is the GSD Third Department a

GSD Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) and 

Department (dianzi duikang yu leida bu), China’s ans

the U.S. National Security Agency. China maintains th

extensive SIGINT network of all the countries 

Asia-Pacific region. SIGINT systems include several 

ground stations, half a dozen ships, truck-mounted sy

and airborne systems. Third Department headquar

located in the vicinity of the GSD First Depar

(Operations Department), AMS, and NDU complex 

hills northwest of the Summer Palace. The Third Depar

(zongcan sanbu) is allegedly manned by approximately 

personnel, with most of their linguists trained at the Lu

Institute of Foreign Languages.23

SIGINT sites for the collection of radio and SATCO

spread throughout China with the net control station si

in Beijing. Beijing also has several other SIGINT stati

well. At one time, a site in Lanzhou was responsi

monitoring Russian signal traffic and for providing str

early warning of a Russian missile attack. The She

station covers signals from Russia, Japan, and Kore

Chengdu SIGINT site controls the Third Depart

operations against India, Pakistan, and Southeast As

Nanjing site monitors Taiwan signal traffic, an

Guangzhou site covers Southeast Asia and the South 

Sea. Other sites are located near the Sino-Russia

33
Several sites are in Northwest China. There are at lea

SIGINT stations in Shanghai.

Outside China, a SIGINT station has been establis

Rocky Island (Shidao), near Woody Island in the Pa

There have been persistent press reports of Chinese elec

surveillance sites in Burma, an ideal location for mon

naval traffic in the Indian Ocean. China has also estab

multiple SIGINT sites in Burma and Laos. The 

Department and the Navy cooperate on shipborne intell

collection platforms. Air Force SIGINT collection is ma

by the PLAAF Sixth Research Institute (konglius

Beijing.

24

The GSD ECM and Radar Department (GSD F

Department) has the electronic intelligence (ELINT) po

within the PLA’s SIGINT apparatus. This departm

responsible for electronic countermeasures, requiring t

collect and maintain data bases on electronic sig

ELINT receivers are the responsibility of the Sou

Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE). Among th

range of SWIEE ELINT products is a new KZ900 ai

ELINT pod. The GSD 54th Research Institute suppo

ECM Department in development of digital ELINT 

processors to analyze parameters of radar pulses.26

To augment its ground-based collection, China m

resurrecting an ELINT satellite program which ha

dormant for over 20 years. The PLA experimented 

ELINT satellites, euphemistically called “tech

experimental satellites” (jishu shiyan weixing), 

mid-1970s under the Shanghai Bureau of Astronauti

Program. The first Chinese ELINT satellite was lau

from Jiuquan in July 1975 on the FB-1 launch vehicle 

was specifically designed to meet the weight and 

accuracy requirements of ELINT platforms. The 

launched two more experimental ELINT satelli

December 1975 and August 1976. For unknown reaso

program was discontinued. Technical writings, ho

provide strong indications that the Shanghai Acade

Spaceflight Technology (SAST), the successor of the Sha

34
intends to field a satellite-borne electronic reconnai

system. The SWIEE may be developing the ELINT rec

At least one SAST design under evaluation is a conste

of small electronic reconnaissance satellites which can e

precise location data and survivability.27

Photoreconnaissance. Another source of intell

information which is increasing in importance is space

photoreconnaissance, euphemistically referred to as r

sensing (yaogan). China is receiving regular sa

intelligence data, building up their digital imagery data

and gaining experience in the managemen

interpretation of satellite imagery data. Imagery for 

China’s intelligence community comes from two so

indigenously developed space photoreconnaissance pla

and imagery acquired from foreign sources.

China has been slow to develop a space-based 

naissance capability. Its first experimental imagery s

was launched in November 1975, and was followed b

more tests. The system reached IOC in September 1987 

the FSW-1 (fanhuishi weixing, or recoverable satellit

launched from Jiuquan Space Launch Center, and retur

earth with its film in Sichuan. The FSW-1 provided fo

area imaging and orbits for 8 days. Four FSW-1 

successfully launched between 1987 and 1992. In 1

problem in its attitude control system resulted in a 

FSW-1 mission.

28

The follow-on FSW-2 satellite carries 2000 meters 

and has a resolution capability of at least 10 meters. Th

FSW-2, also known as the Jianbing-1B, was launc

August 1992, with subsequent launches in 1994 and 

One of the more significant aspects of the FSW-2 

demonstrated maneuvering capability. The FSW-2 orb

15 or 16 days before returning to earth with its im

package.

29

 On October 20, 1996, using the LM-2D 

Jiuquan, China launched another “scientific survey” 

shence) satellite which orbited 15 days before return

earth.

30

 The 1996 FSW-2 launch was expected to be the 

35
system.

31

China’s remote sensing community is working feve

to deploy at least three different electro-optical r

sensing platforms. First, China’s third generation of im

satellite, the FSW-3, is expected to be a recoverable s

with a one meter resolution. China’s Academy of 

Technology (CAST) engineers have also conducted 

work on a tactical imagery system and associated 

ground receiving stations. The system is based on 

satellite technology, uses a charged coupled device 

array, and, when operating in a 700-kilomete

synchronous orbit, is designed to have a five 

resolution.

32

 Another series of reconnaissance sate

jointly developed with Brazil, is known as Ziyuan-1, o

The ZY-1 will have a 2-year lifespan and will incorpo

data transmission system to beam images back to eart

ZY-1, operating at an altitude of 778 kilometers, is expe

have only a 20 meter resolution, but will add to C

experience base in electro-optical imaging systems.

33

The National Remote Sensing Center, directed by 

Lizhong, oversees China’s remote sensing comm

coordinates requirements, and manages the procurem

imagery from foreign sources. The GSD Second Depart

Technology Bureau serves as a PLA representative 

China’s remote sensing community.

34

 The Center’s R

Sensing Ground Station is currently China’s sole im

downlink site, serving over 500 organizations througho

country. The ground station provides 24-hour a 

year-round service and has a reception footprint e

passing 85 percent of China, all of Korea, Taiwan, and J

The National Remote Sensing Center and its g

station have taken advantage of the relaxation of cont

marketing of high resolution imagery and have cont

with numerous foreign entities to receive remote s

data. China has received data from U.S. LANDSA

Russian remote sensing platforms for several years.

ground center has contracted with France’s National 

for Space Studies (CNES) to receive SPOT imagery u

36
kilometers.

36 China is negotiating with or has contra

receive data from Canada’s RADARSAT, the U.S. LAN

7, and Israel’s EROS-A one meter resolution system.

station will also receive downlinked images from th

China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS), sla

launch in 1998. Recent reporting also indicates China m

negotiating with Russia to upgrade its remote se

relationship to include transmission of real-time 

resolution imagery for military purposes.

38

The ground station, working in conjunction 

COSTIND, is rapidly progressing in its capacity and tec

capabilities. During the Spring of 1992, Italy’s Tele

signed an agreement with China’s National Remote S

Center worth $8 million to provide Olivetti image proc

computers and software. In March 1992, Telespazio as

technicians to train Chinese photo interpreters for u

years.

39

 In the coming years, the station will be work

ultra-high-speed data processing, storage, and transm

systems, as well as computer, data compression

networking technology to be able to handle real-time

resolution imagery from multiple satellites. COSTI

installing a real-time image storage system as well 

imagery dissemination system, linked to China’s na

integrated telecommunications network, that will 

subscribers to search and rapidly download images.

40

 In 

COSTIND installed a digitized high resolution im

processing system, the BGC-161.

41

The Institute of Remote Sensing Application (IRSA

primary R&D arm of the National Remote Sensing C

The decision to establish the IRSA was made at the 

National S&T Conference, and doors were opened in 

IRSA employs almost 300 people and has five basic re

departments, three technology research department

two applications departments. IRSA manages the Cen

Airborne Remote Sensing and the Computer Applic

Center. A wide range of recent upgrades to China’s r

sensing capabilities are under Project 724. Under th

Program, IRSA also has worked to establish paramet

37
has already been completed.

42

China is moving toward augmenting its electro-

sensors with synthetic aperture radar satellite systems 

weather, day and night coverage of ground and ma

targets. The PLA and other parts of the state apparatu

radar satellite imagery as critical in China’s ability to a

information dominance. Unlike electro-optical systems

satellites, according to GSD Second Department adv

can see through clouds, rain, and fog in order to detect t

on the ground or underground, and in or under the oce

addition, SAR satellites are extremely useful in tr

moving targets, and can be useful in satisfying m

mapping requirements.

43

 Chinese engineers have 

examining SAR satellites as a means to track e

submarines in shallow waters.

44

 China has already fie

real-time airborne synthetic aperture radar (SAR) s

and is working toward deployment of an indigenous 

based SAR satellite (hecheng kongjing leida weixing).

4

Until an indigenous system can be launched, ho

China has arranged to receive downlinked radar sa

imagery to help establish a foundation for radar sa

imagery exploitation. China’s Remote Sensing G

Station director Fan Xizhe has contracted with RADA

International and the Canadian Space Agency to r

RADARSAT imagery. The Canadian Space Agency ha

working with China on various RADARSAT and 

programs since 1993, under the GlobeSAR pr

Furthermore, COSTIND and CASC are negotiating 

Canada’s Spar Aerospace to construct two RADAR

According to the July 1996 draft contract, the first w

launched within the next 3 years and the second by 200

satellites will incorporate synthetic aperture radars 

can provide all weather, day and night ocean surve

imagery data.

46

Canadian RADARSATs have provided up to a 7-10 

resolution in all weather conditions, operating at an a

of 800 kilometers. In the northern latitudes, the satell

image targets every 3 days. Although its primary use is 

38
ships at sea or large battle groups operating in the Paci

Indian Oceans, detect military construction, and key 

assets for a closer look at militarily significant targets

China’s procurement of a synthetic aperture 

satellite, to include the processing of its images, will l

foundation for development of an indigenous space base

system. Preliminary R&D (yuxian yanjiu) on a space

SAR satellite was initiated in the late 1980s, and mode

(xinghao yanzhi) began in 1991. In May 1995, SST

COSTIND approved the finalized design and wo

associated high speed data transmission is well underw

accordance with the national defense S&T strategy, wh

first generation SAR satellite is in the prototype develo

phase, preliminary research has already begun on the 

generation SAR satellite system. Key institutes invol

the indigenous development of synthetic aperture 

satellites include CAS’ Institute of Electronics, CAST’s 

and 504th Research Institutes (Xian Institute of Space 

Technology), Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineerin

MEI’s 14th Research Institute and the Southwest Insti

Electronic Equipment (SWIEE).

48

To gain a real or near real-time indigenous 

reconnaissance capability, China will need to take one 

potential routes. The primary difficulty is that remote s

satellites must be within line of sight to download im

data. Essential for the efficient processing of down

imagery is data compression technology, which CA

attempting to master.

49 The first route which Ch

working toward is the development of data relay sat

(shuju zhongji weixing). Included in China’s long-rang

for space development, data relay satellites will allow C

space sensing platforms to pass data to a ground s

without being within line of sight of a ground station

second option is establish ground stations abroad. 

signed agreements with France (1993) and Chile (19

joint use of their ground stations.

51

 Seeking to tra

imagery directly to theater and field commanders, C

39
development of mobile remote sensing ground stations

Space Surveillance. China has an extensive spac

missile tracking network. The construction of the ne

known as the 154 Project, took place in the 1960

supported China’s missile testing. Subsequent upg

undertaken to support the launch and control of th

Dongfanghong (DFH) communications satellite, wer

under the 157 Project. Leading figures in this effort in

Chen Fangyun, Shen Rongjun, and Wang Daheng

network has optical, radar, telemetry, and communic

components. Software development and systems integ

work is done at COSTIND’s Luoyang Institute of Tra

Telemetry, and Telecommunications (LITTT).

COSTIND operates the national space and m

tracking command center in Beijing. The satellite tr

and control network is managed from the Xian Sa

Control Center in the eastern edge of the city. The na

satellite control center was formerly located in W

Shaanxi province, but moved to Xian in December 

Tracking stations supporting the national networ

located at Weinan (GEO/LEO), Xiamen (GEO/LEO), Na

(LEO); Kashgar (LEO); Changchun (LEO); and 

(GEO/LEO). China’s Academy of Sciences Na

Observatory does orbital predictions and modeling. 

also operates shipborne missile tracking plat

(Yuanwang), which are capable of operating througho

Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans. In addition, Ch

working to link up with foreign tracking and control net

and has signed agreements for space tracking coope

with Chile, Kiribati, and France. Chinese engineers a

working to establish a space-based component to the

network.53 The current network is primarily to supp

own satellites and has only limited capabilities a

non-cooperative spacecraft. However, it serves a

foundation for future efforts to develop a more robust 

tracking system which can accurately track foreign sy

as well. Beijing may have already received tec

assistance in laser radars used to track image satellit

40
track satellites in low earth orbit.

54

Over-the-Horizon (OTH) Sensors. China began de

ment of HF ground wave OTH sensors in November 1

group led by Deputy Director of the Space and M

Industry Qian Xuesen was assigned the responsibi

developing a ground wave OTH sensor able to detect tar

250 kilometers. The radar was to provide targeting d

their embryonic anti-ship cruise missile program. 

1970s, an experimental ground wave OTH radar, w

antenna length of 2300 meters, was deployed. Foreign 

restrictions, however, prevented China from obt

technology which was needed for further improvement

Since 1985, developments in computing, microelect

and digital signal processing have permitted further ad

in China’s OTH technology. Chinese institutes, such 

Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT), have most re

concentrated on improving the OTH sensor’s E

capabilities and digitizing the radar system. There 

some interest in developing a mobile version of the 

radar. China has also developed an experimental sky

OTH radar which tracks aircraft targets at a range of 

kilometers. Chinese systems engineers believe the 

system can contribute to an integrated air defense syst

1995, HIT tested a new HF radar system capable of det

low altitude and sea-skimming targets as well as 

targets.55

Phased Array Radars. Chinese engineers see inc

opportunities for indigenous development of solid 

phased array radars due to advances in integrated 

technology. The MEI’s 14th Institute, located in Nanj

China’s leading organization for phased array 

development. An integral part of China’s space tr

network includes large phased array radars (LPAR). W

LPARs began in 1970. They were intended to catalogue 

targets and provide for early warning of missile attac

least one radar, positioned on a mountain slope at 1,600 

elevation near Xuanhua, is believed to be manned by S

Artillery forces.

56 The 7010 radar was developed by 

41
1976 and has gained prominence for its tracking of s

satellites. The 7010 radar hands off targets to other tr

sensors, such as the 110 radar. The 110 radar is a 

monopulse precision tracking surveillance radar which 

R&D in 1966. The radar system, enclosed in a 44 me

diameter radome, was commissioned into service in 

Like the 7010 radar, the 110 radar was developed by th

Research Institute in Nanjing.

57

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s). Chinese m

officials have also given priority to the development of 

(wuren jiashi feiji). UAV R&D is centered in BUAA’s In

of Unmanned Flight Vehicle Design Institute and N

Institute of Unmanned Aircraft. One of China’s 

deployed UAV’s is the ASN-206, developed by the Xia

Technology Group. This UAV has a coverage range 

kilometers, can operate both day and night, and can c

variety of sensors, including optical and infrared. Rea

intelligence can be transmitted to a ground control stat

targeting purposes. Maximum altitude of the syst

5,000-6,000 meters, and its flying time is 4-8 hours.

58

 NU

designing a GPS-based navigation system to assist in 

planning and course navigation and a new UAV 

incorporates a low radar cross-section design.

59

 Beijin

also have concluded an agreement with a foreign supp

acquire a high altitude, long endurance UAV, together 

ground control station, and either production or co-prod

rights. This UAV would give China the ability to c

extended imagery reconnaissance and surveillance, E

collection, as well as electronic warfare missions.

60

Development of China’s National

Telecommunications Infrastructure.

The vast amount of data collected by China’s intell

system requires a highly advanced national teleco

nications infrastructure. The Chinese leadership c

recognizes that a modern, survivable C

4

I network 

essential element in modern and future warfare. A 

capacity communications network, capable of ha

42
with strike assets. Over the last 5 years, China has ope

market to the leading telecommunications firms arou

world in what is truly an information revolution. As 

official Bill Warwick stated, “China has the opportu

leapfrog almost overnight into the information age.”

emphasis is on high capacity fiber optics; switching sy

to include highly survivable common channel signaling 

software; satellite communication systems; and sy

integration and data fusion.

China has taken initial steps toward forming a na

integrated C

4

I system. Before 1991, China’s C

4

I syste

disjointed and void of interconnectivity. After the Gul

the State Council and CMC directed the establishme

national information system which will bring to

various communications networks. The Eighth Fiv

Plan (1991-95) marked a dramatic change in China’s a

toward telecommunications, which has become the f

growing sector of China’s dynamic economy. The 

Council directed the formation of an Information Tech

Leading Group which develops policy and coord

information technology development. By the end of 

China had constructed ten of the largest networks 

world. Based on Beijing’s long range telecommunication

to 2050, this rapid modernization is expected to continu

full court press toward informationalization has pro

some to assert that China has the potential to becom

world’s most advanced telecommunications infrastruc

Foreign providers have been key to China’s 

successes in telecommunications development. Le

companies include Alcatel, Ericsson, Siemens, N

Northern Telecom, AT&T, Sprint, and Motorola. Provi

communications satellites and associated technology i

Hughes (primarily very small aperture terminals, or V

Lockheed-Martin, and Loral. 

The military implications of China’s revolutionary 

information capabilities are significant. Recognizing th

for a real-time sensor-to-shooter capability, the P

working closely with the Ministry of Post and Te

43
industry to help establish an integrated high ca

national information infrastructure. Since promulga

the 863 Program, China’s telecommunications comm

has embarked upon a long-term, dual-use program val

$200 billion U.S.

63

China’s telecommunications sector encompasses c

and military organizations. As is the case in the U

States, a national telecommunications network is inhe

dual-use, meaning civilian and military sectors can b

from its use. The MPT, under the leadership of the 

Council, is the preeminent player in China’s te

munications sector. MPT held a monopoly 

telecommunication services until 1994, when the 

Council authorized the formation of a competing ne

United Telecommunications Corporation (Lian

Liantong came into existence through the merging 

electronics, railways, and power industries, and at 

portion of the PLA General Staff Department commun

networks.

64

 MEI’s China Academy of Electronic Inform

Technology also plays a role in developing a national in

tion infrastructure.

65

Development of dedicated PLA communications net

is a top national priority. Since 1992, the capacity o

communication networks has increased 10-fold. Accord

one estimate, the central government allocates approxim

20 percent of the total telecommunications budget t

dedicated PLA communications systems.

66

 Ther

currently at least four military networks—a mi

telephone network, a secure telephone networ

automated command system, and an integrated 

communication network. The automated command s

links ground force units with PLA Air Force and Navy 

Construction began in 1987 and, when completed, will 

to transmit data, imagery, and other types of militarily 

information.

67

 PLA and civilian networks are cur

separate. There are efforts underway, however, to int

PLA telecommunications networks into the p

44
services possible.

68

The PLA is developing its communications infrastr

in accordance with the “six transformations.” These i

moving from analog to digital technology; electrical ca

optical cable; electromechanical switches to pro

controlled switches; single function terminals to 

function terminals; single service networks to net

offering integrated services; and administration bas

human labor to control based on automation an

application of intelligent technology.

69

Two of the leading PLA organizations responsi

development of China’s defense information infrastr

include the GSD’s Telecommunications Departmen

COSTIND’s Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering (

Entities under the Telecommunications Department i

the GSD Information Engineering Academy 

communications-related business endeavor, the 

Electronics Systems Engineering Company (CESEC), 

operates what is commonly known as China’s 

communications network.

70

 BISE works closely with th

Telecommunications Department and civilian entit

integrating various networks into an national system.

communication troops also work with national and pro

MPT authorities, often being tasked to install co

nications links.72 China’s investment into a m

information infrastructure is nothing short of revoluti

Purchasing some of the world’s most advanced teleco

nications technology, China is installing a dizzying a

terrestrial and satellite networks.

China’s telecommunications development will pro

significant boost in the PLA leadership’s ability to com

and control its forces. The central headquarters of th

GSD C

4

I apparatus is located in the Xishan area 

western suburbs of Beijing. It functions as a communic

intelligence, and combat control center. In short, the X

command complex is the operational nerve center of th

ground units, air forces, navies, and strategic missile 

similar in nature to the Pentagon’s National M

45
includes the GSD First Department (known as zo

zuozhan bu, or operations department), key S

Department offices, and the Third Department. The 

Department, under direct control of the GSD director

the Command and Control Headquarters 24 hours a d

All operational orders to PLA units originate fro

Command and Control Headquarters. Mobilization 

usually result from high level meetings held in the X

complex, attended by the CMC Standing Committee

high ranking military officials, and selected civilian le

Orders can be transmitted through a number of m

including secure telephone or landline. The m

command network is a closed network. Orders fro

national command authority can go to the military reg

directly to an individual division.73 There is an 

underway to develop a strategic SATCOM network 

uses very small aperture terminal (VSAT) mobile g

stations with an antenna smaller than three met

diameter. Eventually, all units at the group army-lev

above will be equipped with this capability.

74

The Ground Segment. The mainstay of Ch

communications development is installation of a bac

fiber-optic network, linking all provincial capitals 

Lhasa. With work well underway to connect cities 

prefecture level, installation of fiber-optics has achiev

annual growth rate of 92 percent. The fiber optic ne

augments previously existing microwave and high freq

(HF) networks. 75 To ensure various network

accommodate vast amount of data, MPT, ostensibly bac

the PLA, is investing heavily into synchronized 

hierarchy (SDH), asynchronous transfer mode (

synchronous optical networking (SONET), wave

division multiplexing (WDM), and other technologies 

significantly increase survivability and useable bandwi

China’s national fiber-optic network is an essential 

of China’s quest for information dominance. Fiber-optic

an adversary the ability to intercept communication

there is no transmission of signals through the air. Th

46
penetrate the cable, which can be detected by s

administrators. Fiber-optic networks also complica

ability of overhead photo reconnaissance platforms to 

command and control nodes, which usually have a noti

signature. These types of technologies associated 

fiber-optics are capable of “all optical” operations in tha

are no optical-to-electronic transitions which may 

bottlenecks or limit versatility. These networks ar

rapidly reconfigurable in the case of a sudden su

communications requirements.

77

The Space Segment. COSTIND, MPT, and China’s 

community are making progress in integrating a 

segment into its overall telecommunications infrastru

All four of their first operational generation satellite

DFH-2 series launched in the 1980s, have ceased to fu

After a long delay, CASC and COSTIND have succee

placing the first of their second generation dom

communications satellite, the DFH-3, in orbit. Th

DFH-3, launched in November 1994, failed to reach its 

orbit. However, the second attempt to place a DFH-3 int

in May 1997 was successful.

78

CASC’s satellite R&D and manufacturing arm, CAS

commenced work on the next generation commun

satellite, the DFH-4, a direct broadcasting system whi

transmit data to users without the need for ground s

rebroadcasting.

79

 The fielding of a direct broadcast sa

offers a capability for distributing information to the 

echelon in a battlefield. The term “sensor-to-shoote

become a reality if this technology were adapted to m

applications, potentially transmitting data (maps, pi

and enemy deployments) on demand to small units

using an 18-inch (or smaller) capability to receive orde

situational information. The DFH-4 could feasibly perm

transmission of tailored data to hundreds of 

simultaneously. CAST is also researching measures to 

survivability of their satellite communications, to i

spread spectrum and frequency hopping technology.

80

47
communications satellites, COSTIND and MPT 

contracted to purchase several foreign satellite syste

fill the gap in coverage after the DFH-2 satellites appro

the end of their service life, MPT purchased an i

satellite, CHINASAT-5, in 1993. MPT, COSTIND, and 

also joined in a partnership arrangement with Thai and 

Kong companies to form Asia-Pacific Telecommunic

Company (APT). Their first satellite, APSTAR-1

launched in July 1994 and is expected to have a lifetim

years. APSTAR-2 exploded shortly after launch in Ja

1995. A replacement satellite was launched in April 19

Other satellite procurements included CHINA

which was launched in August 1996, but failed to re

proper orbit. China has contracted for a replacement sa

with 52 transponders (36 C-Band/16 Ku-Band

CHINASAT-8 (Zhongwei-8), which will be launched 

end of 1998.82 In August 1995, China Orient Teleco

nications Satellite Company signed a contract for 

manufactured satellite, designated as the CHINAS

(Zhongxing-1), which will be launched on an LM-3B 

1998. This modern, high capacity system of 38 transp

will provide voice, data, and other services, and will 

lifespan of 15 years. China Orient’s TT&C ground stati

be located within a complex of existing ground stati

Dongbeiwang, northwest of the Beijing’s Summer Pa

COSTIND, CASC, and MPT are also working closel

Germany in the joint development of another genera

communication satellite, SINOSAT-1 (Xinnuo Weixing

first of which is due for launch in 1998. The Germa

Teledix is serving as a subcontractor for the SINOSAT

DFH-3, and other programs, supplying attitude c

systems to orient and stabilize the spacecraft body.

84

China is also participating in international conso

which will provide global mobile telephone services. 

CASC is a shareholder in the Iridium consortium, whi

provide global cellular services via a 66 satellite constel

COSTIND will launch 22 of the satellites. An Iridium ga

in China will interconnect with the public switched ne

48
lines and any other telephone in the world.

85 COSTIN

also given serious consideration to developing its own 

network, the Global Mobile Satellite Information S

(GMSIS). GMSIS, utilizing a small number of satell

medium earth orbit, will provide mobile communic

services to a large number of domestic and re

customers.

86

Finally, COSTIND, CASC, Liantong, and MPT 

signed an agreement with Singapore and Thailand fo

procurement and management of a communications sa

which will offer mobile hand-held phone service

consortium, called Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunic

(APMT) will buy a U.S. satellite for U.S. $640 million. L

of an LM-3B from Xichang is scheduled for mid-199

initial concept for the system called for a Hughes 601 pl

in geostationary orbit off the west coast of Sumatr

system, which will operate in the L and Ku bands, is de

to handle 4,000 calls simultaneously. Chinese require

include multiple beam technology (specifically 3

increased security.

87

 China’s space and ground co

nications segments are being integrated into a na

information infrastructure.

88

Systems Integration. Combining the various networ

equipment into a survivable, integrated network is a na

priority. Concerned about potential effects of an enemy 

against a communications node, China’s telecommunic

community is investing heavily into common ch

signaling number seven switching technology (SS7

software allows for automatic rerouting of traffic should 

C3 node be disabled. Beijing hopes to complete a nation

“intelligent network,” within the current 5-year 

(1996-2000). MPT and the PLA Telecommunic

Department’s Institute of Information Engineering 

developed China’s first domestically produced SS7 inte

network, the CIN-01, and in March 1997, the PLA 

installed an intelligent SS7 network in the Beijing area

side note, much the PLA’s software development for sy

49
Institute of Systems Engineering.90

On the military side, one concept called for estab

and connecting five military networks—command and c

systems, intelligence and reconnaissance, early warnin

detection, communications, and electronic warfare. In t

the formation of a defense information infrastructu

allow operational integration and combined comma

China’s ground, naval, air, and Second Artillery 

Sources indicate the PLA currently does not h

comprehensive C

4

I network, but appears to be adop

step-by-step approach toward forming one.

91

Computing. Dominating the information enviro

requires the computer processing of vast amounts o

High speed computers are also essential for simulatio

modeling, and operation of a wide range of new we

systems. Recognizing the importance of computing, the 

Council formed a state leading group on computeriza

May 1996. The leading group is headed by Zou Jiahu

consists of representatives from MEI, MPT, State Pla

Commission, People’s Bank of China, and 12 

departments. The group will formulate national po

strategies, and mid- to long-range plans for na

computerization.

92

COSTIND and other state R&D organizations 

prioritized development of supercomputing techno

under the 863 Program. The SHUGUANG 1000 p

computer system, an 863 funded program, achieved 2.5 

operations per second in 1985. Projects underway inc

CAS effort to develop a parallel supercomputer syste

DAWN series, capable of speeds up to 300 billion calcu

per second.

93

 China’s defense industry is also work

reduce the size of its microcomputers for missile, 

vehicle, and satellite use. For example, CASC’s 

microcomputer for launch vehicles weighed 50 kilogram

size was reduced to 30 kilograms, and reduced again 

kilograms.

94

50
Useful systems include a new series of Ch

supercomputers, the Yinhe (Galaxy), develop

COSTIND’s National University of Defense Tech

(NUDT) in Changsha, Hunan province. Most recently, 

developed an advanced real-time simulation system 

has been used by CASC and the aviation industry 

development of a new generation of missile control sy

and UAVs.

95

 CASC’s primary simulation facility, the B

Simulation Center, is the largest in Asia. As a side n

April 1997, the Russian Defense Minister ini

cooperative efforts with the Beijing Simulation Cen

computer simulation technology.

96

China is also investing heavily in the developm

artificial intelligence and intelligent computer system

SSTC and COSTIND designated intelligent computin

key area of development under the 863 Program. Na

level coordination of artificial intelligence R&D is 

through the Expert Group for Intelligent Computing 

named 863-306), chaired by Wang Chengwei. Establis

of the National Research Center for Intelligent Com

Systems further reflects growing emphasis on ar

intelligence.

97

 Artificial intelligence systems, such as 

networks, have a wide variety of applications, to i

weapon system design and manufacturing, simu

automatic target recognition (ATR), and decisionmaki

China is poised to become a world leader in adv

computer networking technology. According to 

Chairman Louis Gerstner, “China has the opportun

move more quickly than other countries because i

invested less in traditional systems and practices.” C

across-the-board introduction of state-of-the-art sy

avoids pitfalls other countries are facing, such as inves

making incompatible computer systems talk with 

other.

98

51
A final aspect of China’s quest for information dom

is information attack. PLA strategists see precision tar

of critical command and control nodes, computer warfa

a counterspace capability as means to offset adve

strengths. The development of an effective elect

countermeasures capability is a top priority within th

General Staff Department, specifically the Elec

Countermeasures and Radar Department (dianzi duik

leida bu), and within the R&D community. Inform

warfare advocates are pressing for more sophisticated 

to engage in command and control warfare, including 

jammers and high powered microwave technology.

First, PLA strategists are increasing empha

computer warfare as one means to offset adver

strengths. Chinese observers point out the effectiven

U.S. use of viruses against Iraqi computer systems dur

Gulf War and note the utility of using computer virus

weapon. Engineers have conducted feasibility stud

introducing viruses (bingdu) into adversary’s com

systems from long distances via wireless means. B

serving as a means to attack computer networks, 

studies have been useful in developing countermeasu

enemy attempts to inject viruses into Chinese comput

China’s defense industrial complex is placing a gre

of emphasis on electronic countermeasures (

development. The GSD Electronic Countermeasur

Radar Department (also known as GSD Fourth Depart

established in 1990, has overall responsibility for ele

warfare, including electronic intelligence collectio

maintenance of threat libraries and electronic orders of 

Besides coordinating the PLA electronic warfare doctri

strategy, GSD Fourth Department units provide ele

warfare defense of strategic targets, such as the 

command bunkers in the Western Hills (Xishan) of Beij

The GSD Fourth Department leadership is currently ta

problems associated with command and control of 

operations. Because of the close coordination requir

52
a theater command post.

101 Electronic warfare unit

conducted major joint exercises as recently as March 1

the South China Sea.

102

The research institute most responsible for E

development and radar jammers is the electronic ind

SWIEE (the 29th Research Institute) in Chengdu, S

province. Research and development on communic

jammers is the responsibility of the 36th Research Insti

Hefei, Anhui province. SWIEE is also conducting opera

feasibility studies on using UAVs as electronic w

platforms.

103

 The PLA’s primary academic and tr

institute on electronic warfare appears to be the 

Academy of Electronic Engineering, located in Hefei, 

province.

104

Chinese planners have begun to develop elec

warfare concepts to counter adversarial air and space sy

as well. For example, there are indications the P

preparing to test or deploy a SATCOM jammer.

105

 S

engineers have carried out feasibility studies for jam

synthetic aperture radar reconnaissance satelli

Chinese research institutes are also conducting feas

studies on jamming the U.S. NAVSTAR Global Posit

System.

107 Finally, Chinese engineers are exam

methodologies to enable the PLAAF to jam airborne 

warning platforms and sophisticated networks, such 

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTID

One of the most significant foreign sources of ele

warfare technology is Israel. In the late 1980s/early 

Israel export firms and China’s Ministry of Elect

Industry signed a memorandum of understandi

technological transfer of electronic warfare hardwar

software. Israeli companies such as Elbit, Elisra, Ta

Elop, and Elta entered into cooperative development ve

with Chinese entities such as SWIEE, the Hebei

Communications, Telemetry, and Telecontrol Res

Institute (MEI 54th Research Institute), and the Anhui

East China Research Institute of Electronic Engin

(ECRIEE, or the MEI 36th Research Institute). P

53
and radar jammers.

109

Under COSTIND guidance, China’s R&D commu

also dabbling in even more advanced information 

technology related to high powered microwave (

weapons. China’s most respected advocates of inform

warfare have strongly supported HPM develop

COSTIND subordinated research institutes have a

mastered certain power sources commonly associate

microwave weapons, including flux compression gene

(baoci yasuo fashengqi) and vircators (xuyin jizhen da

Chinese writings have outlined three attack applicati

HPM devices: as a directional microwave air defense s

to damage the electronic systems of attacking aircra

antiradiation missiles (known to Chinese engineers 

electromagnetic missile); an ASAT weapon to de

sensitive satellite electronic systems; and a warhead to 

an opening salvo to shut down adversarial radars a

systems.110

In addition to “soft kill” approaches to inform

dominance, China’s R&D establishment is develop

variety of “hard kill” means to neutralize segments 

enemy’s C

4

I infrastructure. Employment of ballistic, 

and antiradiation missiles against C

2

 center

ground-based early warning sites is one approach. Tar

of airborne early warning platforms is another. The C

defense industrial complex is examining a range of desi

a long-range air-to-air missile to counter high value 

such as airborne early warning platforms, airborne w

and control systems (AWACS), and airborne jam

Development appears to be in the theoretical eval

(lunzheng) phase where various institutes evaluate s

feasibility and performance requirements. Key organiz

in this effort include the Shanghai Academy of 

Technology’s primary missile design institute (Sha

Institute of Electromechanical Engineering) and the P

Eighth Research Institute (Weapon System Evaluati

solid propulsion system and combined passive microwa

infrared imaging seekers are under consideration.

111

54
early warning (AEW) or anti-AWACs system is to 

missile with a jet engine, plus a rocket booster fo

approach to the airborne platform. A missile, preferabl

a low radar cross section, could approach the AEW platf

an extremely low altitude using passive radar, homing 

the aircraft’s radar signal. Once under the AEW platf

would ignite its rocket and home in on the AEW using 

radar or infrared. Such a missile could be quite diffi

avoid, as it might be 20-30 seconds before such a fast m

missile from below connected.

112

CASC is already marketing a surface-to-air anti-rad

missile system. The FT-2000, intended to neutralize ai

jammers and early warning sensors, operates in the 2-1

range and can reach targets out to an advertised range 

kilometers.

113

 A final, less high tech approach to information at

the growing PLA emphasis on special operations 

Chinese writings indicate one of the most important of s

operations missions is to carry out strikes again

adversary’s leadership and command centers.

114

clandestine entry into enemy territory, special oper

troops could strike critical early warning installation

communications landlines running out of command ce

or designate targets for air strikes.

Information Protection.

One of the most important pillars in China’s qu

information dominance is denying an adversary inform

on PLA plans, force deployments, and vulnerabilitie

protecting the PLA’s ability to command and control its 

Secrecy has been a traditional aspect of Chinese strateg

as an authoritarian society, information security is perv

However, China’s entry into the information age pres

new set of problems. The 1992 failure of 12 railroad com

systems due to viruses was a rude awakening for C

leadership. The rise of information warfare has drive

that its growing information infrastructure is vulnera

55
Beijing established a National Key Laboratory of Inform

Security under China’s University of Science and Techn

As a further measure, in 1996, China’s State S

Bureau and the State Council’s Development Re

Center published a strategy for information securit

most significant conclusion was a call for the State Co

Leading Group on Information Technology to de

information security strategy and technology in paralle

China national information infrastructure developmen

report also points out that China’s computer system

largely unprotected, need to enhance their security mea

Other sources indicate China has taken steps to prote

leakage of electronic emissions from computer systems 

can be intercepted and exploited by adversaries. In 

China Academy of Science established the Inform

Security Technology Engineering Research Center wh

State Council began formulation of TEMPEST standard

Chinese leadership and strategic analysts are bec

increasingly concerned about foreign attempts to 

viruses into their information systems. Acutely aware 

havoc which computer viruses can cause to a comman

control system, PLA analysts have advocated measu

protect internal computer networks. These measures i

decreasing dependence on foreign sources of inte

circuits, increasing investment into R&D on com

warfare, strengthening information systems’ ability to 

EMP, and improving computer security management

least one PLA institute dedicated to INFOSEC and com

security is the PLA Academy of Electronic Technol

Zhengzhou, Henan province.

117

In May 1996, Jiefangjun Bao (PLA Daily), publish

article calling for greater attention to emission securit

article was sparked by the April 1996 death of a Ch

separatist leader who was killed when the Russian Air 

plotted his precise location after he used a cellular phon

PLA has also studied the success of U.S. SIGI

monitoring and cataloguing Iraqi electronic transm

before and during the Gulf War. The PLA has 

56
emissions and implement an effective frequency manag

system.

118

Beijing is examining a wide range of technologies to 

vulnerabilities of its communications to intercept

jamming. For example, widespread introduction of fiber 

communications significantly increases its communic

security. Engineers are studying the application of 

spectrum and frequency hopping technology for Be

satellite tracking and control network, as well as more 

satellite communications methodologies.119 China i

stepping up integration of more complex encry

(mimaxue) algorithims. At least one organization invo

cryptography is the Sichuan Institute of Information S

which produces one of China’s leading publications 

subject, entitled “Leading Edge Research in Cryptograp

major conference, CHINACRYPT ‘96, was recently h

discuss the latest advances in encryption.

120

 To augment other information security mea

Chinese engineers and military operators stress concea

camouflage, and deception (CCD) concepts whic

ingrained into traditional Chinese strategic cons

Writings of industry and military officials in

widespread attempts to deny foreign satellite pla

information related to disposition of missile forces and 

strategic assets. Chinese strategists differentiate camo

and concealment by the degree of technology inv

Camouflage includes decoys, netting, radar angle refl

and other means to prevent an adversary from det

forces and weapon systems.

Technology, however, has reduced the effectiven

traditional camouflage measures and has forced Ch

move toward concealment. Concealment is the employm

technology to decrease detection by adversary sa

systems. Concealment measures, integrated into the we

R&D process, include electromagnetic, radar, nois

infrared signature reduction. China emphasizes 

camouflage to avoid detection by foreign optical, infrare

radar satellites. For example, they camouflage their m

57
that camouflage has become more difficult since the ad

radar and infrared satellites. However, Chinese stra

are certain that emerging concealment material

technology can effectively counter foreign survei

systems. One example is infrared suppression, whic

counter heat-seeking precision guidance systems.

12

engineers have also published technical papers on meth

reduce infrared signature of underground facilities.

122

China’s efforts to develop counterstealth systems 

contributed to the development of low observable tech

for aircraft, UAV’s, and cruise missiles. China c

recognizes the advantages of low observable technolog

has stepped up investment into stealth (yinshen) res

achieving what some engineers believe to be techno

breakthroughs.

123

Psychological operations, manipulation, and str

deception aspects of information warfare are deeply ing

in Chinese military doctrine. Traditional Chinese m

history, to include the strategic writings of Sun Tzu, is 

examples of strategic and tactical surprise, and dec

Initial Chinese entry into the Korean War c

characterized as a strategic surprise.

In summary, Chinese military planners appear 

striving for a comparative advantage in the ability to c

collect, process, act upon, and disseminate information, 

the PLA a future edge in conflicts around its peripher

PLA is increasingly viewing information as a str

weapon. Just as possession of nuclear weapons ma

major power in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, inform

technology is characteristic of a major power of th

century. Crucial in this effort is the development of c

communications and information processing techno

such as space-based surveillance, direct broadcast sat

and high speed computers. China’s information tech

community is making necessary investments into corr

shortcomings in Beijing’s ability to integrate co

information systems. At the same time, the PLA is inv

in systems which can disrupt an adversary’s C4I 

58
ability to control forces under his command.

China’s rate of improvement is likely to im

dramatically in the next decade. China’s inform

revolution is driven by technologies available worl

Digitization, computer processing, precise global posit

and systems integration—the technological basis on w

range of new capabilities depends—are available t

country with the money and will to use them systematic

improve military capabilities. Based on its large inves

into sensors, telecommunications, electronic warfar

information protection technologies, China clearly 

exploitation of the information revolution as key 

strategic modernization.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. “Guofang Kegongwei Kejiwei Zhaokai D

Nianhui,”(COSTIND S&T Committee Opens Third Annual Mee

Keji Ribao (S&T Daily), March 14, 1994. Members also ca

prioritizing programs for remote sensing technology, space sh

single-stage-to-orbit space vehicle (SSTO), stealth technology, 

mirrors (lingjing), and materials science. Members present i

Zhu Guangya (COSTIND S&T Committee Chairman, physic

U.S. PhD), Chen Fangyun (tracking and control specialis

designer of China’s national satellite TT&C network, and CO

advisor), Cheng Kaijia (COSTIND advisor, nuclear scientist i

with China’s nuclear bomb development), Chen Nengkuan (CO

S&T Committee Deputy Director, nuclear physicist with U.S. Ph

Zhao Renkai (SLBM scientist).

2. Shen Weiguang, “Xinxizhan: Mengxiang Yu Xi

(“Information Warfare: Dreams and Reality”), Zhongguo Guofa

(China Defense News), February 14, 1997, p. 3; Zhang Feng 

Bingyan, “Historical Mission of Soldiers Straddling the 21st C

Roundup of ‘Forum for Experts on Meeting the Challenges of th

Military Revolution’,” in Jiefangjun Bao (PLA Daily), January 

in FBIS-CHI-96-061; and Shen Weiguang, Zhongguo Guofa

Xinxi, September-December 1996, No. 5/6, pp. 87-89, in 

CHI-98-029.

3. Shen Weiguang, p. 3; Zhang and Li; and Wang Jianghuai 

Dong, “Viewing Our Army’s Quality Building From the Perspe

59
p. 6, in FBIS-CHI-98-072.

4. Jen Hui-wen.

5. Cai Renzhao, “Exploring Ways to Defeat the Enemy T

Information,” in Jiefangjun Bao, March 19, 1996, p

FBIS-CHI-96-100.

6. See, for example, Dai Kouhu, “Accepting the Cha

Reinforcing China’s Defense Information Modernization,” Zh

Dianzi Bao, October 24, 1997, p. 8, in FBIS-CHI-98-012. 

7. Liang Zhenzing, “New Military Revolution and Infor

Warfare,” p. 8. Over the last few years, Liang Zhenzing has eme

one of COSTIND’s most authoritative figures on C

4

I and infor

warfare issues.

8. Wang Jianghuai and Lin Dong, p. 6.

9. Zhang Deyong, Zhang Minghua, and Xu Kejian, “Infor

Attack,” Jiefangjun Bao, March 24, 1998, p. 6, in FBIS-CHI-98

10. Xu Sheng and Gao Jianlin, “Shenyang MR Holds Infor

Warfare Exercise,” Jiefangjun Bao, March 30, 1998, in 

CHI-98-120; for a general PLA overview of information warf

Wang Baocun, “A Preliminary Analysis of Information W

Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, November 1997, in FBIS-CHI-98-093

11. Most prominent among information warfare specialists 

General Wang Pufeng, former Vice-President of the Acad

Military Sciences. See Wang Pufeng, pp. 186-189. For an e

American analysis on Major General Wang’s work, see John A

and Soloman Karmel, “Welcome to the Revolution . . . in C

Military Affairs,” Defense Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 255-270; 

Li Qingshan, Xin Junshi Geming Yu Gaojishu Zhanzhen

Military Revolution and High Tech Warfare); Chen Huan, “M

Aspects of Information Technology Viewed,” in Xiandai 

(CONMILIT), March 11, 1996, pp. 8-10, in FBIS-CHI-96-16

Weiguang, “Focus of Contemporary World Military Revol

Introduction to Information Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao, Nove

1995, p. 6, in FBIS-CHI-95-239; Wang Huyang, “Five Met

Information Warfare,” in Jiefangjun Bao, July 16, 1996, p

FBIS-CHI-96-194; Liu Fengcheng and Yu Shuangquan, “Conc

Forces in New Ways in Modern Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao, Novem

1995, p. 6, in FBIS-CHI-96-017; and Hai Lunh and Chang 

“Chinese Military Studies Information Warfare,” in Kuang Chia

60
FBIS-CHI-96-035. COSTIND’s Deputy Director Huai Guomo 

these basic tenets in a 1996 China Military Science article. Se

Guomo, “On Meeting the Challenge of the New Military Revo

Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), February 20

pp. 22-25, in FBIS-CHI-96-130; also see Wang Xusheng, Su Jinh

Zhang Hong, “Xinxi Geming Yu Guofang Anquan” (“Infor

Revolution and Defense Security”), Jisuanji Shijie 

Computerworld), No. 30, August 11, 1997, p. 21. Wang, Su, and 

are from the PLA Academy of Electronic Technology. Also see 

Deyong, Zhang Minghua, and Xu Kejian, p. 6; and Cai Renzha

Also see Lei Zhuomin, “Information Warfare and Training of 

Commanders,” Jiefangjun Bao, December 26, 1995, p

FBIS-CHI-96-036.

12. Ouyang Wen, “The Gulf War Shows the Importan

Urgency of Strengthening Construction of China’s Electronic Ind

Zhongguo Keji Luntan (Forum on Science and Technology in 

July 18, 1991, pp. 20-21, in JPRS-CST-91-020; Zhang 

“Development of China’s Electronics Industry,” Renmin Ribao, 

5, 1994, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI-94-177; and Zhang Xiaojun, “

National Defense Needs Modern Signal Troops,” Guofang (N

Defense), October 15, 1995, pp. 20-21, in FBIS-CHI-96-035.

13. AMS, for example, believes reducing the cost of microele

is critical. General Mi Zhenyu notes that microelectronics accoun

percent of the cost for an aircraft, 45 percent in a missile, 66 pe

space vehicles, 22 percent in ships, and 24 percent in ground 

vehicles.

14. Zhang Zhizhong, “Tactical Advantages of Quasi-Wi

Phased Array Radar,” Dianzi Xuebao (Acta Electronica Sinica)

1993, pp. 86-91, in JPRS-CST-93-009.

15. At the time of this writing, MEI has been folded into 

Ministry of Information Technology.

16. Hu Qili is a former member of the Politburo St

Committee. As a close associate of Zhao Ziyang, he was remov

his Standing Committee position in 1989. He was rehabilitated 

and appointed to reinvigorate the electronics industry.

17. “Trends in the Electronics Industry in China,” Ele

Association of Japan, April 1994, in JPRS-CST-95-001; a

“Shougang-NEC Electronic Company Goes into Limited Prod

Beijing Ribao, November 23, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-234. 

61
Technology Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 3, June 1996.

19. Han Yuqi, “Nation Faces Challenge of MEMS Technolog

Ribao, November 6, 1996, in FBIS-CST-97-001. Leading fig

political and technical effort include Li Zhijian, Zhou Zhaoying

Daheng, Zhang Wei, Tang Jiuhua, and Ding Henggao. For a

overview of nanotechnology, see Sun Bailin, “Nanotechno

Weapons Will Appear on the Battlefield: Prospects for Military 

Micro-Scale Electromechanical Apparatuses,” Guofang, June 1

pp. 39-40, in FBIS-CHI-96-151. A breakthrough in na

optoelectronic measurement devices applicable to adaptive o

discussed in “New Breakthrough in Nanoscale Optoele

Measurement Technology,” Keji Ribao, March 28, 1997, p

FBIS-CHI-97-010. 

20. See for example, Wang Qingsong, Xiandai Junyong G

(Modern Military-Use High Technology), Beijing: AMS Press, 1

251-254; Li, pp. 92-95; Zhu Youwen, Feng Yi, and Xu Dechi, G

Tiaojianxia de Xinxizhan (Information War Under Hig

Conditions), Beijing: AMS Press, 1994, pp. 99-101, 163-16

270-280; and Wang Pufeng, pp. 113-116. Also see Wan Xuyin

Zhanshu Daodan Weixie Yu Duikang Cuoshi” (“Discussion 

Tactical Missile Threat and Countermeasures”), Zhongguo Ha

November 1992, pp. 30-32.

21. PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Xiong Gu

is a key figure who oversees the PLA’s entire intelligence appara

portfolio also includes oversight of the PLA’s foreign mili

military relationships.

22. Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Oper

Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994, pp. 78-89.

23. Ping Kefu, “Capabilities of The GSD Third Departm

Technical Intelligence,” East Asian Diplomacy and Defense Rev

(5), p. 6.

24. Information on China’s SIGINT apparatus draw

Desmond Ball, “Signals Intelligence in China,” Jane’s Inte

Review, August 1, 1995, pp. 365-375; and Robert Karniol, “Chi

Up Border SIGINT Bases In Laos,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, No

19, 1994, p. 5.

25. Ping Kefu, p. 6.

62
Countermeasure Information Reconnaissance,” Dianzi Duikan

Vol. 2, pp. 9-14, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No.5; the KZ900 ELINT P

marketed in a brochure at the November 1998 Zhuhai Airshow

27. Zhou Enlai directed initiation of the 701 Program and its 

vehicle, the FB-1, on August 14, 1969. The satellites operate

inclination of 69-70 degrees, a perigee of 186 kilometers, an ap

464 kilometers, and a period of 90 minutes. The apogee on 

technical experiment satellite in August 1976 was raised t

kilometers. The August 1976 satellite decayed from orbit on No

25, 1978. China’s technical experiment satellite of the 1970s is t

space platform not discussed in detail in official histories. 

satellite development is likely one of the most sensitive programs 

the defense industry and PLA. One can not rule out the possibil

China has masked or will mask the presence of ELINT pa

piggybacked onto other satellites. See China Today: Space Indus

162-170; “Summary of Launches in China,” Zhongguo Ha

September 1996, p. 29; “Capabilities of The GSD Third Depart

Technical Intelligence,” p. 6; Liao Yuanshou, “Developm

Satellite-borne Precision Direction Finding Antenna Array,” 

Duikang Jishu (Electronic Countermeasure Technology), Marc

pp. 19-26, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 5. Liao is from the Southwest Ins

Electronic Equipment (SWIEE), also known as the 29th R

Institute, China’s premier entity engaged in radar electronic 

measures and ECM equipment; for another SWIEE piece o

ELINT, see Li Yudong, “Satellite-Borne Radar Reconnais

Dianzizhan Xinjishu Yu Qingbao Gaige Wenzhai, October 19

126-133, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6. For specific reference to SWIE

on space-based electronic reconnaissance, see China Today: 

Science and Technology, p. 742. Also see Yuan Xiaokang, “S

Electronic Reconnaissance, Antijamming,” Shanghai Ha

October 9, 1996, pp. 32-37, in FBIS-CST-97-011; and Yuan Xi

“Some Problems of Space Electronic Reconnaissance,” Hangtian 

Duikang, March 1996, pp. 1-5, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 4. Yuan 

engineer involved in a the space ELINT development from th

509th Research Institute (Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engin

Also see Li Ming, “Satellite-Borne Reconnaissance Ant

Hangtian Dianzi Duikang, April 1997, pp. 38-41, in CAMA, Vol. 

Li is from the Nanjing Institute of Electronic Equipment.

28. Jeffery Richelson, “Navy Says China Poised to Close Spa

Gap,” in Defense Week, February 24, 1997, p .9.

29. Ibid.

63
Launches A Satellite”), Zhongguo Hangtian, November 1996, p

31. Bill Gertz, “Crowding In On the High Ground,” Air Forc

1997, pp. 18-22; and Covalt, pp. 22-23.

32. China’s remote sensing program is funded at least in par

863 Program, specifically the 863-308 project. Hong Mei, “

Application Satellite Imagery System,” Hangtian Fanhui Yu 

(Spacecraft Recovery and Remote Sensing), 1995, Vol. 16, No

30-33, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 5. A 700 kilometer optimizes coverag

expense of resolution—a lower orbit naturally will increa

resolution. An advanced imaging system, perhaps the FSW-3, c

launched as early as 1999. See “China To Launch Ten More Sate

2000,” Xinhua, February 22, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-053. 

33. Jean Etienne, “Les Nouveaux Projets de L’Asie Spat

Space News, No. 110, November 4, 1996, at http://www.sat-n

space-news. Also see Chou Kuan-wu, “China’s Reconna

Satellites,” Kuang Chiao Ching, March 16, 1998, pp. 36

FBIS-CHI-98-098.

34. A broad survey of China’s aerospace literature indica

Second Department’s Technology Bureau is a leading PLA propo

photoreconnaissance systems. Leading Technology Bureau 

include Zhang Wanzeng.

35. Brochure, National Remote Sensing Centre of China, 

date.

36. Christian Lardier, “SPOT Image Pursues Changing Mar

Cosmos/Aviation International, February 14, 1997, p. 

FBIS-EST-97-005. A February 1997 Sino-French agreement als

out cooperation in small satellite development, associated 

vehicles, joint development of satellite imagery systems.

37. “Woguo Jiang Zengshou Wuke Weixing de Guance 

(“China Will Receive Five Sources of Surveying Data”), Zh

Hangtian Bao (China Space News), January 5, 1997, p. 1; Fan 

“Future Importance of Information,” in Zhongguo Kexue Bao 

Science News), December 16, 1996, in FBIS-CST-97-003. A

announcement by SSTC Vice Minister Xu Guanhua, Xinhu

Release, in FBIS-CHI-96-247. Even previous LANDSAT and 

imagery, with a resolution of 10-30 meters has significant milita

despite its poor resolution. For example, the U.S. Defense M

Agency used SPOT and LANDSAT imagery during the Gulf 

64
damage assessment.

38. Hiroshi Yuasa, “Russia Offering Spy Satellite Service t

Sankei Shimbun, October 12, 1997, p. 1, in FBIS-EAS-97-286.

39. “China To Use Italian Software to Interpret Imagery,

News, March 2-8, 1992, p. 23. Two other Chinese organizations i

in the project include China’s Research Institute for Surveyi

Mapping and the National Laboratory of Resources and Environ

Information Systems. Peng Yiqi, a senior engineer at the N

Remote Sensing Center, led the Chinese negotiations.

40. “Woguo Jiang Zengshou Wuke Weixing de Guance S

(“China Will Receive Five Sources of Surveying Data”), p. 1; Fan 

“Future Importance of Information,” Zhongguo Kexue Bao, De

16, 1996, in FBIS-CST-97-003. Also see announcement by SST

Minister Xu Guanhua, Xinhua News Release. Twelve subscrib

be able to link into the stored images. Also see Chiu Fangying, “

Remote Sensing Image Digitization Equipment Meets Ad

International Standards,” Keji Ribao, October 26, 1995, p

FBIS-CST-96-002.

41. “Wo Weixing Yaogan Tuxiang Shuzihua Shebei Shijie Li

(“Our Satellite Remote Sensing Digitized Imagery Equipmen

the World”), Zhongguo Hangtian, January 1996, p. 39; also see “

Satellite Remote Sensing Image Digitization Equipment 

Advanced International Standards,” Keji Ribao, October 26, 1

FBIS-CST-96-002.

42. Xu Guanhua and Guo Huadong, “Progress, Mission of 

Sensing Research,” Yaogan Kexue Xin Jinzhan (New Prog

Remote Sensing Science), April 1995, in FBIS-CST-96-002.

43. Long Zhihao, “Leida Weixing de Yingyong” (“Applica

Radar Satellites”), Zhongguo Hangtian, November 1991, pp

Zhang Wanzeng, “Weixing Hecheng Kongjing Chengxiang L

Tedian Jiqi Zai Junshi Zhenchazhong de Yingyong” (“Applicati

Characteristics of Satellite SAR for Military Reconnaiss

Zhongguo Hangtian, November 1993, pp. 20-22. Zhang Wan

assigned to the PLA GSD Second Department’s Techology Bur

44. Huang Weigen, Zhou Changbao, and Wan Zhongling, 

Xingzai SAR Haiyang Yingyong de Xianzhuang yu Xuqiu” (“C

State and Requirements of China’s Satellite-borne SAR for M

Applications”), in Zhongguo Hangtian, December 1997, pp. 5-9

65
can be transmitted real time to a ground station that is wit

kilometers of the aircraft. A tactical ground processing system eq

with a VSAT terminal can then transmit the data to a command 

See “Remote Sensing Technical Systems for Reducing Flood Dis

Yaogan Kexue Xin Jinzhan, April 1995, in FBIS-CST-96-002; 

Guanhua and Guo Huadong.

46. It is not clear if an actual contract has been signed or a Ca

export license issued. Zhong Bu, “Spar Commissions To Build Sa

for China,” China Daily (Business Weekly), July 14-20, 1

FBIS-CHI-96-136; Press releases, “China Signs Radarsa

Reception and Distribution Agreement,” Spar Aerospace Limite

25, 1996; Liu Wei, “Spar Intends to Join Hands With CASC,” Zh

Hangtian, June 1996, in FBIS-CST-96-015; and “Spar Clarifie

Satellite Reports,” Spar Aerospace Limited, July 15, 1996.

47. Steve Berner, “Proliferation of Satellite Imaging Capa

Developments and Implications,” in Fighting Proliferatio

Concerns for the Nineties, Henry Sokolski, ed., Air University 

1996, pp. 95-128.

48. Wang Wei, “State S&T Organs Approve Design of Spa

Synthetic Aperture Radar,” Zhongguo Kexue Bao (China Science 

May 3, 1995, in FBIS-CST-95-010; “Woguo Xingzai Hecheng K

Leida Yingyong Yanjiu Qude Zhongda Jinzhan" (“China’s Satell

Applied Research Achieves Tremendous Advances”), Zh

Hangtian, February 1996, p. 16; “Spaceborne-SAR Modern Infor

Technology Highlighted,” Zhongguo Kexue Bao, September 20, 

4, in FBIS-CST-96-020; Yuan Xiaokang, “High Speed 

Transmission of Satellite-borne SAR,” Zhidao Yu Yinxin (Guida

Detonators), 1995(4), pp. 8-14. (509th RI), in CAMA, Vol. 3, No

see Yuan Xiaokang, “Performance Parameters and 

Requirements of Satellite SAR,” in Shanghai Hangtian, 1996 

12-18; Long Zhihao, p. 29; Li Yudong, pp. 126-133. Li is from 

Dianzi Shebei Yanjiusuo (SWIEE). For comments on preli

research on the second generation SAR satellite, see “C

Microwave-Imaging Radar Systems Engineering Highli

Zhongguo Kexue Bao, September 20, 1996, p. 4, in FBIS-CST-9

49. Chang Jijun, “Remote Sensing Image Data Compression 

Performance Evaluation,” Kongjian Jishu Qingbao Yanjiu, Ju

pp. 37-54, in CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 6.

50. Zhang Wanbin, “Spaceflight Development Strategy: M

Term Development Strategy, Zhongguo Keji Luntan (Forum on 

66
Cheng Yuejin, “Information Transmission System of Data 

Satellites,” Space Technology Information Research, 1993, summ

in CAMA, 1994, Vol. 1, No. 6.

51. Wang Chunyuan, China’s Space Industry and Its Str

International Cooperation, Stanford: Stanford University, July 

4. Lieutenant Colonel Wang serves on the senior staff of COS

foreign affairs bureau.

52. Wang Mingyuan, “Mobile Remote Sensing Ground St

Kongjian Dianzi Jishu (Space Electronic Technology), 1997 

32-37, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 6.

53. Zhang Yinlong, “Xian Satellite Control Center, China S

TT&C Network,” Zhongguo Hangtian, October 1991, pp. 44

JPRS-CST-92-006; deployment of a space based tracking sy

explictly listed in CASC’s long-range development plan. Also se

Guangliang, “A Computing Method for Determining Sate

Satellite Tracking Visual Interval,” Feixingqi Cekong Jishu 

Tracking Technology), February 1994, pp. 20-25, in CAMA, Vol. 1

54. DoD Report to Congress, Pursuant to Section 1226 of th

National Defense Authorization Act.

55. See Zhang Zhe, “Development of Over-the-Horizon 

Technology,” Zhongguo Hangtian, August 1991.

56. This site, allegedly visible on the road from Bei

Zhangjiakou, may be inactive.

57. China Today: Defense Science and Technology, pp. 728-

58. ASN-206 Brochure, Xian Aisheng Jishu Jituan; Li Youh

Yang Changhua, “Development and Successful Flight Test of 

First High Altitude Photographic Surveillance UAV,” unpu

BUAA paper, April 1994; also see Ji Xiumin, “Modern UAVs P

Hangkong Zhishi, October 1997, pp. 41-47, in FBIS-CHI-98-08

59. Wang Yongsheng, “Design and Implementation of a Nav

System for UAVs Using GPS,” Xibei Gongye Daxue Xuebao, 19

14, No. 3, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6; and Zhang Zhong’an and Wa

“Contour Design for a Low Radar Cross-Section Unmanned 

Vehicle,” Yuhang Xuebao (Journal of Astronautics), February 

pp. 43-47, in FBIS-CST-96-017.

67
FY98 National Defense Authorization Act.

61. AT&T News Release, “AT&T Signs Broad Agreeme

Telecom Infrastructure in China,” April 28, 1994.

62. Hao Yunpeng, China’s Telecommunications: Prese

Future, Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms C

June 1997. For China’s long-range plans, see “Xinxi Gaosu Go

Fazhan he Duice Yanjiu,” (“Development and Policy Resea

Information High Speed Highway”), Hangtian Jishu yu Minpin 

Technology and Civil Products), April 1996, pp. 21-26.

63. Wang Shengrong, “The Information Superhighway and M

Communications,” Guofang (National Defense), February 15, 1

FBIS-CHI-95-100; also see Zhang Xiaojun, October 15, 1995.

64. Alexandra Rehak and John Wang, “On the Fast Trac

China Business Review, March-April 1996, pp. 8-13; PLA invol

was reported when news of Liantong’s formation first broke 

1993. Since then, however, Liantong has downplayed PLA involv

See Geoffrey Crothall, ”New Telephone Network Planned,” Sout

Morning Post, February 18, 1993. One other source which com

on PLA communications network being linked into an int

national network is a 1994 interview with Liantong directo

Weichen, in Xie Minggan, “Communications Company 

Interviewed,” Ching Chi Tao Pao (Economic Reporter), August 2

in JPRS-CAR-94-053. 

65. Author’s Fall 1993 visit to CAEIT, also known as 

Electronics Corporation, Systems Engineering General Departm

of 1993, CAEIT was directed by Madame Hu Bangde.

66. “Fiber Optic Communications Technology,” Zhongguo 

Bao, December 1, 1995, p. 3, in FBIS-CST-96-005; Liu Don

“Telecommunications: Greater Sensitivity Achieved,” Jiefangj

September 8, 1997, p. 5, in FBIS-CHI-97-287.

67. Tang Shuhai and Guan Ke, “All-Army Public Data Ex

Network Takes Initial Shape,” Jiefangjun Bao, September 18, 1

FBIS-CHI-95-230; and Liu Dongsheng, “Telecommunications: 

Sensitivity Achieved,” Jiefangjun Bao, September 8, 1997, 

FBIS-CHI-97-287.

68. For example, in the United States, over 95 percent of D

the intelligence community voice and data traffic uses the 

telephone system, and this amount is likely to increase.

68
Interconnects PLA Army, Navy, and Air Force,” Jisuanji Shijie, 

11, 1997, No. 30, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI-97-324.

70. See Dennis Blasko, Ray Lawlor, John Corbett, Mark Stok

Chris Kapellas, China’s Defense-Industrial Trading Organi

Defense Intelligence Reference Document, October 1995; and Fo

Peng, “Dutch Firm Forges Telecom Partnership with PLA Unit

China Morning Post, February 27, 1998, p. 27, inFBIS-CHI-98-0

other two networks include that of MPT and Liantong. CES

recently entered into a joint venture with a Dutch company, K

71. Author’s January 1993 meeting with BISE representativ

Directory of PRC Military Personalities, USDLO Hong Kong, O

1996, p. 13. The GSD Telecommunications Department is dire

Major General Yuan Banggen. Until his recent retireme

individual most involved in COSTIND’s C

4

I systems integratio

was Chang Mengxiong, who has emerged to become a leading a

for full exploitation of the RMA. At least one GSD subordinated r

institute, probably under the Telecommunications Departme

61st Institute, has communications R&D responsibilities.

72. See, for example, “Communications Project Approv

Qinghai Ribao, July 21, 1993, which outlined a joint MPT

Artillery (80306 Unit in Xining) project to install a 480 channe

microwave link between Xining and Golmud.

73. China’s C

2

 apparatus is detailed in Michael D. Swai

Military and Political Succession in China, RAND Corporation

pp. 122-123.

74. You Ji, “High Tech Shift For China’s Military,” Asian 

Journal, September 1995, pp. 4-10; Viacheslav A. Frolov, “

Armed Forces Prepare for High-Tech Warfare,” Defense & 

Affairs: Strategic Policy, January 1998, pp. 12-13; and N

Research of Electronics Technology (NRIET) brochure on 3 

Offset-Fed SATCOM antenna.

75. Hao Yunpeng, China’s Telecommunications: Prese

Future, Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms C

June 1997, p. 1.

76. Wang Boyi, “State 863 Program’s Communications Tec

Area’s Ninth FYP Research Projects Detailed,” Dianxin Jishu, J

1997, pp. 4-6, in FBIS-CST-97-010; Wei Leping, “Higher Speed, 

Wavelength, Multiple Wavelength—Major Trends of Optica

69
nications Construction, July 3, 1996, pp. 20-26, in FBIS-CST-

“Advanced Telecommunications Equipment Joint Venture S

Xinhua, February 2, 1996. Current SDH fiber-optic cable system

transmission rates ranging from 2.5-10 gigabits per second. Afte

according to a DoD 1998 report to Congress on PLA m

capabilities, China’s fiber-optic network will be completely comp

SDH.

77. For background on some of these communications techn

see New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st C

Information Applications Volume, 1995.

78. Xu Dianlong, “Beijing Reports 8 Dec Satellite Launch,” X

December 9, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-349.

79. Zhang Xinzhai, “Achievements, Future Development of 

Space Technology,” Aerospace China, June 1996, in FBIS-CST-

Also see “China To Launch Ten More Satellites by 2000,” X

February 22, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-053.

80. Zhou Quan, “Spread Spectrum Techniques for S

Communications,” Kongjian Dianzi Jishu, 1997, (2), pp. 5-9, in 

Vol. 4, No.6; and Xiao Kai, “Synchronization Concepts for 

Spread Spectrum Receivers,” Kongjian Dianzi Jishu, 1997 

10-15, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 6. Zhou and Xiao are from the Xian I

for Space Radio Technology, the primary organization respons

satellite transponders and remote sensing downlinking techno

 81. “Company Plans Asian Satellite,” Space News, June 1-

COSTIND’s participation as an investor provides the ne

bureaucratic leverage for the PLA to use transponder space sho

need arise. The PLA generally relies on domestic satellites, suc

DFH-3, for its communications requirements.

82. Ji Hongguang, “MPT Buys CHINASAT-8 From Space S

Loral,” Keji Ribao, March 24, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-010.

83. China Orient is paying $100 million for the satellite in

ground support equipment. ”Long March to Launch Satellite,

Daily, August 29, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-169. MPT-run satellit

ground stations in Beijing monitor operating conditions of the sa

However, COSTIND’s Xian Satellite Control Center will e

satellite station keeping responsibilities.

84. Berner, p. 110. The specific device is the DF50 mom

wheel, which can also be used in remote sensing platforms. A 

70
space industry. Attitude control problems lie at the root of 

failures, and, based on author’s June 1998 discussions with 

weather officials, the FY-2 weather satellite system.

85. “The Iridium System,” Iridium Homepage, www.iridium

86. Chen Shupeng, “China: Geomantics, Regional Sust

Development," April 1995, in FBIS-CST-96-02.

87. “Singapore Firms Agree on Satellite Communications,” X

December 28, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-96-002; and Min Chan

“Concepts or China, Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecom Satellite,” Zh

Hangtian, November 1994, in JPRS-CST-95-003.

88. Ma Rushan, “Status and Development of China’s Golden 

Network," Jisuanji Shijie (Computerworld), September 13, 19

195-197, in FBIS-CST-96-001.

89. “National Toll-Telephone Network Intelligent Network 

Gears Up,” Dianxin Jishu, June 1996, p. 48, in FBIS-CST-

“Shanghai Bell’s R&D Budget Reaches 300 Million Yuan,” Zh

Dianzi Bao, September 26, 1995, p. 1, in FBIS-CST-96-001

Guangdong Nortel Sign Contract for Development of Int

Network,” Keji Ribao, May 29, 1996, p. 5, in FBIS-CST-96-0

Jichuan, “China’s Telecommunications Striding Into the 

Five-Year Plan,” Dianxin Jishu, March 27, 1996, “Into the 

Five-Year Plan,” Dianxin Jishu, March 27, 1996, pp. 

FBIS-CST-96-005, Gao Hui, “China’s First Set of High Inte

Network Systems Has Been Tested and Accepted,” Jiefangju

December 5, 1997, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI-97-357; and “China’s Int

Networks,” Keji Ribao, May 29, 1996, p. 5, in Science and Tec

Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 4, August 1996, p. 3-5, in FBIS-CST-

90. A significant proportion of technical writings on m

software development originate from BISE. Examples incl

Xingui, “Activeness of Software and Its Military Application,

Computer Society Meeting Abstracts, May 1994, pp. 1-7, in CAM

1, No. 6; and Liu Shuming, “Quality Measurement Model and Te

Military Software,” China Computer Society Meeting Abstrac

1994, pp. 131-135, in CAMA, Vol. 1, No.6. Both authors are from B

91. Liang Zhenxing, “Information Warfare: Major Influe

China’s Defense Modernization,” in Jisuanji Shijie 

Computerworld), April 8, 1996, in FBIS-CST-96-009; also se

Zhenxing and Lan Guoxing, “Summary of Integrated Ele

71
1997, No. 5, pp. 94-95. Liang Zhenxing is from the Beijing Inst

Systems Engineering, a COSTIND entity which plays a centra

the development of China’s national C

4

I network.

92. Li Guangru, “Zou Jiahua Addresses Information L

Group’s Inaugural,” Xinhua, May 27, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-11

93. Chen Zhujia, “Marching Towards the Commanding H

Science and Technology,” Renmin Ribao, May 29, 19

FBIS-CHI-95-117; and Qin Chun, “Higher Speed Large P

Computer System To Be Built,” Xinhua, January 31, 1

FBIS-CHI-96-024.

94. Qian Weihua, “Institute Develops Advanced Space Comp

Wenhui Bao, February 5, 1991, in FBIS-CHI-91-029. Ins

involved in microcomputer development include the 771st Inst

Lishan and Huadong Computer Technology Institute in Shang

95. Tan Keyang, “YH Super Simulation Computer, YH Int

Computer Systems Certified,” Jisuanji Shijie, October 21, 1996

FBIS-CST-97-002.

96. Caption under picture of Russian Defense Minister T

Beijing Simulation Center, Zhongguo Hangtian Bao, April 23, 

1.

97. Wang Chengwei, “Review and Near Term Prospe

Intelligent Computer Systems,” Scientia Sinica (Science in Chin

38, September 1995, pp. i-iv, in FBIS-CST-96-009.

98. “IBM Chief Says China Poised To Lead in Netw

Technology,” AT&T Homepage, nando.net.

99. Liang Baichuan, “Experimental Studies on Compute

Injecting Technology Through Radiation,” Huoli Yu Zhihui K

(Firepower and Command Control), Vol. 20, No. 4, 1995, in CAM

3, No. 3, 1996. The author conducts research at the Xian Unive

Electronic Science and Technology.

100. There is still a gap in knowledge about the GSD 

Department which is rapidly becoming one of the most significa

entities. One of the first references to outline GSD Fourth Depa

missions is Ping Kefu, p. 6. While the GSD Third Department 

communications intelligence portfolio, the Fourth Departm

responsible for ELINT and ECM operations.

72
Zhidao de Jige Wenti” (”Some Questions Surrounding Theate

Operational Principles"), in Zuozhan Zhihui Yanjiu (Resea

Operational; Command and Control), Beijing: National D

University Press, January 1997, pp. 327-333. Based on his rank

Zhang Youcai is likely director or deputy director of the GSD 

Department.

102. Mei Zhongtang, “Electronics: Building Up the Re

‘Information Great Wall’,” Jiefangjun Bao, September 11, 1997

FBIS-CHI-97-287.

103. Li Yongqiang, “Applications of UAVs in Electronic W

Dianzi Duikang Jishu, February 1995, pp. 15-21, in CAMA, Vol. 

Li is from the Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment (S

also see Li Jiaxiang, “Development of UAVs for Electronic W

Hangtian Dianzi Duikang, March 1994, pp. 43-47, in CAMA, Vo

6. Besides jammers, SWIEE carries out R&D into airbor

space-based radar reconnaissance platforms.

104. Among numerous references, see Zhang Shenghai, “R

on ECM Equipment Science,” Proceedings of New Electronic W

Technology and Intelligence Reform Conference, October 19

18-21, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6.

105. Wu Jinliang, “Range Testing of Satellite Commun

Countermeasures,” Proceedings of New Electronic Warfare Tec

and Intelligence Reform Conference, October 1995, in CAMA, 19

3, No. 6. Wu Jinliang is from the PLA 89823 unit, most 

COSTIND-subordinated entity. The Shijiazhuang Insti

Telecommunications and Tracking Technology (54th Re

Institute) is one entity which has has conducted R&D on SA

jammers. See Zhu Qinghou, “Satellite Communic

Countermeasures in Information Warfare,” Hangtian Dianzi D

1997, Vol. 1, pp. 23-26, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 4; Zhu Qinghou, “R

On Jamming Methodologies of Military Multichannel S

Transponders,” Hangtian Dianzi Duikang, March 1997, pp. 3

CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 2. Zhu is from the Shijiazhuang Inst

Communications, Tracking, and Control Technology.

106. Chen Ning and Zhang Jieru, “Research Into Sy

Aperture Radar Jamming Technology,” Hangtian Dianzi D

April 1997, pp. 45-48, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 2. One May 1998 sou

direct access to commercial SAR imaging services claims t

Chinese may have attempted to jam a foreign SAR satellite as it 

over a 1996 PLA exercise in Fujian province.

73
System,” Shanghai Hangtian, March 1996, pp. 35-40, summa

CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 5; and author’s unpublished study, “PLA S

Modernization: The Role of China’s Space and Missile Ind

September 1995. Two institutes carrying out research in

jammers include Jiangnan Electronic Communications R

Institute in Guizhou province (061 Base) and Xian Unive

Electronic Science and Technology (Xidian).

108. Liang Baichuan, “Technologies for Jamming AW

China’s National Air Defense System,” Shanghai Hangtian

11(3), in CAMA, Vol 1. No. 5; and Liang Baichuan, “Main Lobe Ja

Against Phased Array Airborne Early Warning Radars,” Sh

Hangtian, 1997, 14(6), pp. 12-15, in CAMA, Vol. 5. Liang Baichua

the Xian University of Electronic Science and Technology (Xid

one of China’s most prolific writers on information operations. 

reportedly one of China’s highest level military communi

institutes, has conducted computer simulation on AEW jamme

see Tao Benren, “Ground-based Reconnaissance Syste

Countering Airborne Warning and Jamming Aircraft,” in H

Dianzi Duikang (Space Electronic Countermeasures), 1995, 

40-44, in CAMA, Vol. 2., No. 5. Tao is an electronic warfare sp

from the Shanghai Institute for Electromechanical Engineer

electronic combat against JTIDS, see Xu Xiutao, “Counterm

Against Joint Tactical Information Distribution System,” in 

Duikang, February 1995, pp. 1-7, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 5. Xu is f

Jiangnan Institute of Electronic Communication, the same in

which is carrying out R&D into GPS jammers. 

109. Prasun Sengupta, “Asia-Pacific Enters the Electronic W

Arena,” Aerospace, June 1992, pp. 28-30.

110. A flux compression generator (FCG) is the most 

technology applicable to HPM bomb designs. Lin Zheng, “New Ad

in Electronic Warfare,” in Proceedings of ‘96 Conference Spons

Journal “Huoli Yu Zhihui Congzhi,” October 1996, pp. 16

FBIS-CST-97-012; Zhang Zhenzhou, “Longitudinal Tranmis

Exploding Electromagnetic Waves,” in Xiandai Fangyu Jishu

1995, pp. 47-58, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 5. Also see Qin Zhiyuan

Weapons in Tomorrow’s War,” paper presented at 1997 CO

sponsored international conference on RMA. See Appendix V f

details.

111. Li Guangpu, “Long Range Multipurpose Air-to-Air 

Most Effective Weapon to Strike Radiating High Value A

Assets,” Yuancheng Kongkong Daodan Zhuanji (Long Range Ai

74
Li is from the Shanghai Academy of Space Technology’s primary 

design institute, the Shanghai Institute of Electromech

Engineering (SIEE). Also see Xing Xiaolan (PLAAF 8th R

Institute, responsible for AAM program management), “Develop

Anti-AEW Aircraft Weapon System,” Yuancheng Kongkong 

Zhuanji, June 1996, pp. 14-21, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 2; Zhang D

(Shanghai Institute of Engineering Technology Inform

“Development Trends of Long Range Air-to-Air Missiles,” Yua

Kongkong Daodan Zhuanji, June 1996, pp. 22-43; Tao Benren 

“Characteristics of AWACS and Airborne Jammers,” Yua

Kongkong Daodan Zhuanji, June 1996, pp. 54-57; Zhang Wan

(SIEE), “Guidance and Control Technology of Long Range Ai

Missiles,” Yuancheng Kongkong Daodan Zhuanji, June 1996, pp

Wang Chaoqun (SIEE), “Application of Passive Microwave/I

Imaging Dual Mode Complex Homing Technology For Long 

Multipurpose Air-to-Air Missiles,” Yuancheng Kongkong D

Zhuanji, June 1996, pp. 66-72, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 2; Hu F

(Shanghai Institute of Radio Equipment), “Design of Passive Mic

Seeker,” Yuancheng Kongkong Daodan Zhuanji, June 1996, pp

in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 2; Wu Youliang, “Airborne Passive Mic

Detection Positioning System,” Yuancheng Kongkong Daodan Z

June 1996, pp. pp. 82-94, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 2; M

“Multiple-Start Pulsed Solid Rocket Motor,” Yuancheng Ko

Daodan Zhuanji, June 1996, pp. 95-101, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 2 

from the Shanghai Xinli Power Equipment Institute); 

Wangsheng (SIEE), “Development of Long Range Multip

Air-to-Air Missile: Constitution of A Counterair Operational S

paper presented at China Space Society Conference on 

November 1996, 11 pp.

112. Outlined in James Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers: Evol

High Tech Weaponry and Tomorrow’s Battlefield, New Yo

Martin’s Press, 1996, p. 180.

113. 1998 China Precision Machinery Import and 

Corporation FT-2000 brochure.

114. Kang Hengzhen, “The Rise of Special Operations,” Jie

Bao, August 13, 1996, p. 6, in FBIS-CHI-96-187; and Zhou M

“Uncovering the Secrets of the Chinese Special Forces,” 

Wenzhai, October 5, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-98-037.

115. Dai Shenglong and Shen Fuzhen, Xinxizhan Yu Xinxi A

Zhanlue (Information Warfare and Information Security St

Beijing: Jincheng Publishing House, 1996, pp. 148-164. Also 

75
Zhongguo Dianzi Bao, January 21, 1997, p. 11, in FBIS-CHI-

Dai is Director of the State Secrets Bureau. On the CAS IN

Research Center, see Chen Xiechuan, “CAS Information S

Technology Engineering Research Center,” Zhongguo Kexu

August 30, 1996, p. 1, in FBIS-CST-96-019. On the Nation

Laboratory, see Zhao Zhansheng, “Information Security and th

Golden Projects,” Keji Daobao, April 1995, pp. 29-32, in 

CST-95-010.

116. Chou Hsi, “Exploration and Analysis of Military Co

Security and Virus Protection,” CONMILIT, January 11, 19

34-35, in FBIS-CHI-96-116; Gan Shaowu, “Computer Virus 

Patterns, Methods Viewed,” Jiefangjun Bao, July 30, 1

FBIS-CHI-97-107; Xu Renjun and Chen Xinzheng, “Compute

Weapons,” Guofang, February 15, 1997, pp. 42-44, in FBIS-CHI-

“Expert Suggests Building Information Security System,” Xinhu

release, March 6, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-065; Xiao Zheng, “Sec

Information Vital Next Step for China,” China Daily, March 18, 

4; and Zheng Qianli, “Building a Powerful ‘Information Boun

Interview With Information Warfare Expert,” Keji Ribao, A

1997, p. 2, in FBIS-CST-97-012.

117. Sun Yougui, “A Look at Military Schools,” Military P

April 1998, pp. 31-38.

118. Mao Guanghong, “On Electromagnetic Managemen

Modern Battlefield,” Jiefangjun Bao, May 21, 1996, p. 6, in FBI

96-134.

119. Zhang Jian, “Analysis of ECCM Principles of Spread Sp

Unified Satellite Tracking, Telemetry, and Control Network,” H

Dianzi Duikang, April 1997, pp. 26-30, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 2. Z

from the China Academy of Engineering Physics’ Ele

Engineering Institute. Also see Wei Chenxi, “ECCM Measu

Military Communications Satellites,” Hangtian Dianzi Du

March 1997, pp. 31-34, in CAMA, Vol. 5, Vol. 1.

120. Qin Zhongping and Zhang Huanguo, “ALT: Algorit

Attacking Cryptosystems,” Jisuanji Xuebao, Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 5

in FBIS-CHI-97-311; and Zhou Hong and Ling Xieting, “Encryp

Inverse Chaotic Systems,” Fudan Xuebao, June 1997, Vol. 36, N

301-308, in FBIS-CHI-97-281.

121. Sun Zi’an, “Strategies To Minimize High Tech Edge of E

Xiandai Bingqi (Modern Weaponry), August 8, 1995, pp. 10

76
Concepts,” in Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future W

National Defense University Press, 1997; and Xu Xingju, “Tigao 

Dimian Fangkong Wuqi Dianzizhan Nengli” (“Raising China’s 

Based Air Defense Electronic Warfare Capability”), Xiandai 

August 1995; and Li Chunshan, “Introduction of National M

Standard ‘Camouflage Requirements of Surface-to-Surface 

Systems’,” Hangtian Biaojunhua, May 1994, pp. 12-15, in CAMA

No. 1; and Kang Qing, “Infrared Camouflage Mechanism

Applications,” Hongwai Jishu (Infrared Technology), January 1

25-27, in FBIS-CST-96-016.

122. Kang Qing, “IR Stealth of Buried Targets,” Hongwa

1996, 18 (6), pp. 21-24, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 1. Kang is f

PLA Academy of Logistics Engineering.

123. See, for example, Huang Peikang and Yin Hongcheng, 

Stealth Technique for Flight Vehicles,” Yuhang Xuebao, 1994, 

No. 2.

77
DAWN OF A NEW AGE:

CHINA’S LONG-RANGE PRECISION STR

CAPABILITIES

With a solid base of information, PLA planners 

someday to be able to mate sensors and strike assets 

real-time strategic reconnaissance/strike complex. Th

hopes to develop a range of strike assets with which to 

adversarial vulnerabilities on the ground, on the oce

space, and within the electromagnetic spectrum. C

strategists and planners have priority programs to dev

new generation of lethal, highly accurate, and surv

ballistic and cruise missiles, able to penetrate any the

national missile defense system. Since 1991, the PLA a

space and missile industry have made conventionally 

surface-to-surface missiles and extended range 

missiles key projects in their 15-year developmental p

Shortly after the Gulf War, the PLA expanded the 

its strategic rocket forces, known as the Second Artiller

conventional striking force. The new mission is the 

result of a dramatic increase in the accuracy of its b

missile force. Missiles are rapidly becoming the sole cr

long-range firepower projection asset which the PLA ha

inventory, and this will remain likely true for the fores

future.

1

 This chapter examines selected long-range 

assets which could allow the Chinese to achieve their l

objectives. An examination of China’s cruise missile pr

is first explored, followed by an outline of its ballistic m

research and development, and concluded with an overv

China’s strategic missile force, the Second Artillery.

Cruise Missiles.

Since the Gulf War and the increasing availabi

technology, the Chinese defense industrial comple

79
well-established foundation of air launched, ground lau

and submarine launched anti-ship missile technology, 

is creating a new generation of cruise missiles a

penetrate defenses and strike critical targets with pre

and increased firepower. Fielding of land attack 

missiles will prompt expansion of missions of the 

Second Artillery and Navy.

The heart of China’s aerodynamic missile develo

lies within CASC’s Third Academy (di san yanjiuyu

sanyuan for short), headquartered in Yungang, southw

Beijing. Over 14,500 technicians and workers ply their 

in ten research institutes and two major factories. Each 

ten research institutes focuses on specific subcomponen

cruise missile, such as propulsion, inertial navigation, c

systems, terminal guidance, and launching equipmen

Third Academy’s Third Design Department, consisting 

1,000 technicians, has systems engineering and 

responsibilities.

2

The Third Academy’s cruise missile R&D effort be

the late 1950s. Intended as an anti-ship coastal d

system, Qian Xuesen led the industrial campaign. Ba

an agreement signed in 1959, the Soviet Union pr

prototypes and technical information. R&D and prod

facilities were established under the space and m

industry at Yungang near Beijing, in Hubei provinc

Base) and in Sichuan (062 Base). The aviation in

established an augmenting, and sometimes competing, 

for anti-ship missile production at the Nanchang A

Factory. With Soviet assistance, an anti-ship missile t

complex was established off the coast of Liaoxi, Lia

province. Since 1959, over 10 variants of anti-ship m

have been produced.

3

The Gulf War provided a new impetus for cruise m

development. The PLA and the defense industries were 

by the performance of U.S. and allied land attack 

missiles, especially the Tomahawk. Since then, the 

Academy has flooded the civilian and military leadersh

feasibility studies on air, ground, and sea lau

80
moved beyond the concept of utilizing cruise missi

tactical coastal defense, to a more ambitious goal of fi

missiles which are able to strike strategic land- and sea

targets. 

The defense industrial complex strongly adv

increasing investment into cruise missiles. In an o

defense cost comparison, some believe that develop

arsenal of cruise missiles can have a 9:1 ratio be

developing, deploying, and maintaining cruise missile

the cost of defending against them. As the president 

Third Academy has pointed out, the cost of producing 

missiles is 20-30 percent less in China than it is in 

countries.4 A national program aimed developing 

missiles will further foster technological spin-offs from 

in inertial guidance, terrain matching, scene ma

terminal guidance, turbojet and turbofan en

supercritical bomb wings, electronic warfare

concealment and counterconcealment technology. 

Academy representatives also assert that highly c

cruise missiles can be profitable by marketing their pr

overseas.

5

Third Academy director Wang Jianmin has outline

he considers to be priorities for future cruise m

development. First and foremost is a completel

generation of mid- to long-range cruise missiles inclu

the 2010 long-range plan. He outlined specific techno

such as low smoke solid fueled motors, composite 

engines, IR imaging guidance, active/passive microw

imaging guidance, and IR/laser imaging composite gui

and new forms of ECCM and on board jammers, 

priorities in R&D efforts.

6

Chinese analysts see three applications of cruise m

First, they clearly envision using cruise missiles 

offensive counterair role. Highly accurate missiles can 

an adversary’s superiority in air forces by striking 

assets while they are concentrated on the ground o

carrier. Other potential targets include runway

operations centers, POL facilities, and quarters h

81
sources of information, a high degree of accuracy, and ef

munitions.7 The Third Academy has conducted in

targeting assessments of U.S. aircraft carriers, includin

defense assets, characteristics of radar and in

emissions, and electronic combat capabilities.8

Chinese strategists also discuss cruise missiles 

critical element in their quest for information domi

Cruise missiles are necessary to take out an adversary

and ears. This includes antiradiation missile (ARM) 

against radars, land attack cruise missile attacks a

high value reconnaissance assets on the ground, and 

against C

4

I nodes in order to paralyze command and c

China’s defense industrial complex, specifically the 

Academy with support from the Harbin Instit

Technology, is aggressively pursuing deploymen

long-range antiradiation missile.

9

 An ARM capability 

be a significant leap in the PLA’s ability to hit imp

targets protected by air defense assets. A final utility of 

missiles is nuclear deterrence. There are clear indic

that China will likely have a nuclear warhead sized for 

their cruise missiles and are seriously considering 

another leg to their nuclear force.

10

Hoping to field a viable aerodynamic missile which 

to hit critical targets at sea and on land, the defense ind

complex is focusing resources on a few key areas pote

applicable to all variants under development.

11

 Fir

Third Academy is striving to reduce the radar cross s

(leida jiemian) of its missiles, potentially requiring 

class of cruise missile. Specific methodologies include sh

of the airframe and application of the radar abs

materials.

12

 Reduced cross section is needed to minim

adversary’s ability to detect an incoming missile or a

reduce reaction time.

Engineers are also working on better propulsion sy

which can increase the lethal range or speed of the 

missile. Faster cruise missiles reduce an adversary’s re

time. In one of China’s most significant aerospace pro

COSTIND and the Third Academy are designing a supe

82
fadongji) which can propel a missile at hypersonic spe

between Mach 4-10.13 Engineers are also working t

more efficient turbojet and turbofan engines and mo

order to significantly extend the range of its cruise m

The current range of China’s antiship missiles is lim

around 200 kilometers. To be able to hit targets in Japan 

a ground launched system, for instance, the Third Ac

would have to produce a missile with an approxim

1,250-1,500 kilometer range (750 kilometers for Okinaw

The Third Academy is also capitalizing on many av

technologies in order to improve the accuracy of its m

force. At least one of the Third Academy’s require

driving the next generation of cruise missiles is the ab

strike airfield runways with conventional munitions, 

which requires tremendous accuracy. China’s rapid 

computing capabilities and growing availabil

commercial satellite imagery provides increased oppor

to integrate terrain command guidance (TERCOM

digital scene matching area correlator (DSMAC) into 

navigation and guidance systems. The Third Academ

been conducting preliminary research into TERCOM (

pipei zhidao) since at least 1988, and, in 1991, publi

thorough internal analysis of the Tomahawk’s performa

the Gulf War.

15

TERCOM capability is based on preprogrammin

missile with digital maps. During flight, the missile’s 

system matches the terrain surveyed to the comput

maps to ensure its course. This requires highly sophist

digital mapping systems and powerful computers whi

allow very accurate targeting. DSMAC uses a dig

satellite image of the target stored in the missile’s com

system. In flight, the missile matches the stored imag

images detected in flight. In general, the better resolu

the stored image, the more accurate the missile. Chi

already made great strides in development of digital ma

To correct for en route navigation errors, Third Ac

engineers are attempting to integrate GPS receiver

their inertial navigation units and TERCOM systems

83
less than 16 meters. Mid-course corrections thro

combined GPS/INS system can further reduce the accu

cruise missiles to 10 meters.16 There is some indication 

is examining integrating combined GPS/GLONASS re

on board their missiles as well.

17

Other terminal sensor technologies under develo

include passive imaging infrared, CO

2

 laser radar, mill

wave, and synthetic aperture radar terminal sensors, a

as various composite systems. R&D into passive im

infrared sensors is focused on matching a stored comput

image with a real infrared image detected by the mi

Third Academy engineers have already laid the tec

foundation for a CO

2

 laser guidance system, to inclu

target recognition components.

19

 Chinese aero

engineers believe synthetic aperture radar, millimete

radar, infrared imaging, and laser radar guidance can 

in an accuracy of one to three meters.

20

There are other technologies the Chinese are resea

to mask launch sites and enhance the ability of their m

to penetrate defenses. Engineers are attempting to redu

signature on cruise missile propellants, and conceal lo

of mobile land based strategic and tactical cruise mis

To further increase the penetration capability, the 

Academy is examining the technical prospects of integ

electronic and optical countermeasures onto cruise miss

order to complicate adversarial detection, tracking

discrimination systems.

22 The PLA Navy has cond

modeling of various anti-ship cruise missiles to ev

performance against the SM-2 air defense missile syst

The Third Academy is working with other d

industries to develop warheads which can effectively d

strategically important targets. Most significant is w

mastering submunition (zidantou) and guided dis

(zhidao busanqi) technology. Submunitions can kno

aircraft in the open, crater runways to temporarily p

aircraft from taking off and landing, or lay mines to 

runway repair more difficult. They are also furthering 

on more lethal unitary warheads for precision strikes a

84
intend to arm at least a portion of their cruise m

inventory with nuclear warheads. Engineers ar

laudatory of cruise missiles equipped with high po

microwave (dagonglu weibo) warheads. If they are a

move beyond preliminary R&D on high powered micr

technology, such a directed energy warhead wou

especially lethal against shipborne or airbased ele

systems.25

The Third Academy has upgraded its ability to desi

manufacture highly complex cruise missiles. The

integrating the use of virtual reality (xuni xianshi) in 

missile development, and are using increasingly sophist

supercomputers to design the missiles. Third Ac

manufacturing centers have imported some of the w

most advanced engineering workstations, and three, fou

five-axis computer numerically controlled machine t

CASC’s world-class simulation facility in western Beijin

aids cruise missile development by theoretically re

testing requirements by 40-60 percent and shortening o

development time by 30-40 percent.

27

A new generation of low observable, extended 

faster, and more lethal missiles will probably be adap

multiple platforms. Cruise missiles launched from ai

(H-6 or H-7) or naval platforms will result in signifi

extended range. Perhaps more dangerous would be an 

to launch from a submerged submarine, which the 

Academy is closely examining.

28 It is believed that th

naval platform capable of submerged launching of 

missiles will be the Song-class submarine, produced 

Wuhan shipyard.

29

Extension of the range and target set of its cruise m

will likely require a shift in organizational responsib

Conventional and nuclear air-launched land attack 

missiles will most likely be subordinated to the PLA Air 

Tactical and strategic attacks against sea platform

continue to be a PLA Navy mission. The PLA Nav

expand its mission to include conventional and nuclear 

missile strikes against land-based targets.30 The gr

85
Second Artillery’s mission to include strategic g

launched land attack with cruise missiles equipped wit

nuclear and conventional warheads. In support of th

mission, the Second Artillery’s Fourth Research Institu

been modeling the ability of cruise missiles to penetr

defense systems.

31

The Third Academy approach is to develop variat

existing shorter-range airframes which encompass 

advanced technologies. The Third Academy is believed t

advanced to model R&D and testing of some of these 

variants. First, the PLA has allegedly ordere

acceleration of a ground launched land attack version 

YJ-8A (C-802). This 135-kilometer range system would 

first to incorporate GPS-assisted navigation and TE

guidance. Some sources believe GPS aided navigation 

result in cruise missiles like the YJ-8 to achieve accura

up to 10 meters. GPS-aided guidance could be augmen

terrain contour matching.

32

Until they are able to field their next generation of 

missiles, China may enter into an agreement with Rus

the purchase of antiship missiles. The sale of two R

guided missile destroyers was discussed during Li Peng

to Moscow on December 28, 1996. The destroyers inclu

SS-N-22, designed to counter Aegis ships, and alleged

cruise missile the U.S. Navy fears most because 

supersonic speed, maneuverability, and large warh

Russia’s Raduga Design Bureau has also assisted the 

Academy in application of stealth technology 

unidentified air launched cruise missile.

34

 Russia ha

sent specialists to the Third Academy’s 8359th Instit

overcome various technical obstacles in the developm

new launch platforms.

35

Ballistic Missile Research and Development.

In addition to cruise missiles, CASC is making 

advances in increasing the survivability and letha

ballistic missiles. China began its ballistic missile re

86
returned from the United States, Qian Xuesen subm

proposal for missile development in 1956. The CMC app

the proposal but had to turn to the Soviet Union for tec

assistance. Under the 1957 Sino-Soviet technical acco

Soviet Union provided rudimentary missiles, asso

launching equipment, and technical assistance. By 

however, the Sino-Soviet relationship deteriorated a

Soviet technicians returned to Moscow. Despite this se

China test launched its first domestically produced m

the DF-2A, in 1965. Over the course of the next 20 ye

series of liquid-fueled missiles were designed and tes

allow the PLA to strike U.S. bases in Japan (DF-2

Philippines (DF-3), Guam (DF-4), and continental U

States (DF-5). In the 1960s, China’s missile industry 

development of a solid-fueled sea launched ballistic m

the JL-1. In the late 1970s, work began on a land

version of the JL-1, the 1,800 kilometer range D

Subsequent solid fueled missile development has focu

shorter range systems equipped with conventional pa

and longer range counterparts to the DF-4 and DF-5 ICB

China’s preeminent organization for ballistic m

development is the CASC First Academy (diyi yanjiuyu

yiyuan). The First Academy, also known as the 

Academy of Launch Technology (CALT), consists of an o

design and systems integration department, and 13 re

institutes and seven factories which are responsib

engines, control technology, inertial systems, war

materials, testing, and launchers. With more than 

personnel, the First Academy is the largest R&D organi

within CASC. Leveraging its expertise in ballistic m

the First Academy, headquartered in the southern B

suburb of Nanyuan, has developed a range of satellite 

vehicles. In its work on solid systems, the First Ac

depends upon the Fourth Academy in Hohhot, 

Mongolia, for its solid motors. CALT is also suppor

institutes and factories subordinated to various base

inside China. One of these bases, the Sanjiang Space Gr

Hubei province, has developed its own complete b

87
M-11).37

Today, the First Academy’s research and develo

resources are devoted toward ensuring its nuclear b

missile force remains a viable deterrent in the f

emerging missile defenses. Since the initiation of work 

Strategic Defense Initiative in the late 1970s, Chinese m

engineers have been busily working to ensure their m

force retains its vitality.

38

 In addition, the PLA, dr

profound lessons from the Gulf War, views conven

ballistic missiles as a crucial aspect of China’s emergin

attack (zongshen) capability.

39 To meet these objectiv

First Academy’s research and development resource

focused on increasing the range of its solid fueled b

missiles, and increasing the survivability, accuracy

lethality of its existing tactical, campaign or theater (zh

and strategic short range missiles.40

China’s program to modernize their nu

intercontinental ballistic missile forces is well-docum

To briefly summarize, however, China’s current ICBM

to strike targets throughout the United States, are 

fueled. To offset vulnerabilities in their small ICBM for

space and missile community is developing a new gene

of mobile, solid fueled ICBMs. These include the DF-31 

kilometer range) and DF-41 (12,000 kilometer range) I

and the sea-based version of the DF-31, the JL-2. The n

tipped DF-31 will probably be deployed in experim

regiments around the turn of the century, and will ha

ability to strike targets as far away as Guam and H

After successfully testing the DF-31, the space and m

industry will likely move the DF-41 to the next developm

stage.

41

As CALT proceeds in its DF-31/DF-41 develop

another top R&D priority is ensuring its current and 

products are able to penetrate potential missile defens

survive any counterattack. Probably the most well-

program is the development of multiple warhead techn

This includes multiple warheads against a single targe

multiple warheads against multiple targets with the op

88
January 1996, CALT was in midst of developing m

warheads, each with its own guidance system 

maneuvering capability.

42

R&D on multiple independent reentry vehicles (M

was initiated as early as 1970. Technical difficulties, ho

have stalled the program. The First Academy renewed 

in 1983, shortly after the SDI was announced in March 

The DF-5A, able to strike targets in the continental U

States (CONUS), was the designated recipient of the M

although there is no evidence that they have been dep

Critical to this effort is the miniaturization of warhe

possible objective of tests at Lop Nur over the last few 

According to Chinese missile designers, real and 

warheads (jia dantou) can be mixed using multiple wa

technology. Real warheads can be painted with 

absorbing materials that will weaken radar retu

maximize similarities between real and decoy warhea

CALT is developing maneuverable (jidong bia

reentry vehicles to complicate missile defense tracking. 

vehicles can maneuver at any time during flight, C

engineers see most utility in programming a reentry veh

maneuver in its terminal phase, 20-30 seconds before st

its target. A reentry vehicle has the ability to man

within a lateral range of 556-900 kilometers. A

maneuvering option discussed is to send the warhead 

higher altitude after separation from the missile, 

descending in a glide for a very long distance, and then 

diving toward the target. Chinese engineers ar

addressing problems associated with maintaining ac

after exo-atmospheric maneuvering.

44

Another option Chinese designers have recently dis

is a fractional orbiting missile (bufen guidao daodan) in 

a warhead is placed into a low earth orbit. When th

comes to attack a target, an engine can be fired to bri

warhead to bear against a target, creating great difficul

an adversary’s missile defense.

45

 China conduc

feasibility study on a fractional orbital bombardment s

(FOBS) in 1966. This system launches a missile into ve

89
of first orbit, a retro-rocket retards the speed of the wa

which hits the target with only a few minutes warn

1965, China had learned from an American report th

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was develo

forward operations base (FOB); this report was 

confirmed. They explored launching a missile over Ant

and penetrating the weakest point in the U.S. w

network.

46

The Chinese have devoted resources toward coun

potential deployment of air- and space-based high po

laser systems. First, Chinese engineers have carried ou

into spinning their ballistic missiles to prevent concent

of a high powered laser on a single spot.

47 Another m

under consideration as an explicit countermeasure to 

phase intercepters is fast burn booster (suran z

technology for China’s next generation of solid fueled str

ballistic missiles. Chinese engineers, however, c

designers about potential quality control problems rela

stage separation and accuracy, and suggest this tech

should be divided into three stages based on the pace of f

missile defense developments.

48

Missile analysts view depressed trajectories (yadi g

as another option to counter space-based and exoatmos

upper-tier missile defense systems. Intercontinental b

missiles (ICBMs) often reach altitudes of 2,000 kilome

a normal trajectory. However, launching a missile 

depressed trajectory could allow the missile to achieve 

100 kilometer altitude which complicates some space

systems’ ability to penetrate the atmosphere. Testin

modeling has been done on the DF-3, which normally 

range of 2,780 kilometers, with a maximum altitude 

kilometers. With depressed trajectory, the DF-3 travels 

kilometers at 100 kilometers altitude.49

Jammers can also increase the ability of miss

penetrate missile defenses and strike their targets. P

jamming includes the use of chaff (jinshu botiao) to c

enemy sensors, and tests have shown that 122 kilogr

chaff can affect an area 320 kilometers wide an

90
electronic and infrared countermeasures on board r

vehicles, as well as carrying out hard kills against 

theater missile defense (TMD) radars through the 

anti-radiation missiles.

50

Finally, the Second Artillery and CASC have con

modeling exercises and simulations to test China’s ab

break though the wide range of projected U.S. 

deployments. This includes developing a capability to 

airborne missile defense platforms as well. Modelin

focused on using combinations of surface-to-su

air-to-surface, and sea-to-surface missile systems.

51 

computer simulations and modeling exercises, CA

confident that its maneuverable theater ballistic m

re-entry vehicles can defeat opposing PAC-2+ systems

Protection against attack, or survivability, is a

important aspect of ballistic missile moderniz

Survivability measures include silo hardening, m

(road/rail); scattered and camouflaged launch sites.53 C

R&D into camouflage technology is explicitly inten

counter U.S. air and space-based reconnaissance platfo

CALT officials have evaluated various deploymen

launching modes for their strategic missile survivabilit

many have concluded China’s future interests can b

served through a mix of silo-based and mobile launcher

an emphasis on rail-launched systems. Also emphasiz

integration of decoys and concealment technology in 

missile development and deployment.

55

Another vital aspect of ballistic missile moderniza

accuracy. The First Academy is striving to increa

precision of their ballistic missiles through a variety of m

First, the First Academy is developing better gyro

inertial measurement units. With assistance from R

CALT is working on applying beryllium technology t

inertial measurement units to decrease the weight o

guidance sets.

56

 Reducing the weight of attitude contr

guidance sets is crucial for development of multiple wa

on a single missile, with each reentry vehicle equipped w

own guidance system.

91
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) constella

satellites. With a receiver installed onto the missile

GPS satellites provide en route updates to the control s

to correct trajectory errors. Some estimates indicat

assistance can help achieve an accuracy of 100 met

better.

57

 At least two tests of an on-board GPS traj

reference system had been conducted as of 1995.

58

 Acc

to one authoritative estimate, GPS-aiding of ballistic m

can improve overall ballistic missile accuracy by 

percent.

59

 Engineers have also developed an inte

NAVSTAR GPS and GLONASS receiver.

60

 If mounte

missile, the benefits of such a receiver are great. Sho

adversary jam or turn off GPS, the missile system can st

on the GLONASS updates. The First Academy is integ

GPS onto their mobile launchers to further enhance the 

reference point and increase accuracy.

61

 Engineers hav

carried out applied research into applications of diffe

GPS (chafen quanqiu dingwei xitong) as another meas

further increase the accuracy of ballistic missiles.62

To improve accuracy even further, the space and m

industry is carrying out preliminary R&D on digital 

matching terminal guidance (jingxiang quyue xianggu

which uses on-board computers to correlate stored i

with landmarks. First Academy engineers believe 

scene matching can result in a 5-12 meter accuracy fo

ballistic missiles.63 The Second Artillery has exp

support in scene matching terminal guidance, which 

require the manueverable reentry vehicle prev

discussed.

64

The First Academy, in conjunction with COSTIND a

Second Artillery, is examining a wide range of warhe

order to make its missiles more lethal and able to 

weaknesses in foreign TMD systems now under develop

The First Academy’s warhead design institute (13th Re

Institute, or Beijing Institute of Special Electromechan

carrying design work on runway penetrators to s

offensive counterair missions.

65 Indications exist th

13th Research Institute is working to overcome pro

92
cause damage over a significantly greater area than a u

warhead. Other warheads under development repo

include mine-laying payloads, an electromagnetic 

warhead (i.e., HPM) to take out enemy C

4

I equipmen

penetration warheads to target fortifications deep 

ground. Some reporting indicates the 600 kilometer 

DF-15 could feasibly achieve an accuracy of 30-45 met

Second Artillery.

The PLA’s primary arm for strategic attack is the S

Artillery (erpao). Its traditional realm has been in n

strategic missiles. However, since the conclusion of th

War, Chinese planners have seen value in expanding t

Artillery’s mission to include conventional strikes a

high value strategic targets. The Second Artillery, w

estimated 90,000 personnel, consists of headqu

elements, six launch bases, four research institute

command academies, and possibly an early warning 

The headquarters is located in Qinghe, a suburb to the 

of Beijing. Commanded by LTG Yang Guoliang, the S

Artillery headquarters complex consists of headqu

political, logistics, and equipment technology depart

each headed by a PLA major general. The headqu

complex maintains contact with subordinate units thro

own communications regiment. Three deputy comma

assist Lieutenant General Yang Guoliang i

responsibilities. The Second Artillery maintains l

offices within the China Academy of Engineering P

CASC’s First Academy’s liquid fueled logistic vehicl

integration factory (211 Factory) and CASC’s 307 F

(solid fueled system integration).

68

The Second Artillery headquarters complex overse

launch bases which are division-sized elements

commanded by a major general. A base headqu

structure mirrors that of the national headquarters in Q

with Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipme

Technology Departments (Bu). Base-level equipmen

technology departments (zhuangji bu) oversee launc

93
and launch repair facilities.

Each base has two or three subordinate brigades (l

regiment-level special departments (chu) responsib

chemical defense, communications, training, securit

weather. Each brigade, commanded by a colonel, has 

four launch battalions (fashe ying). Missile brigad

generally structured by type of missiles. In other word

brigade only has one type of missile, thus facili

maintenance and specialization. There are least 13 br

in the Second Artillery. In addition, each base has tr

(jiaodaodui) and nuclear warhead (euphemistically re

to special equipment) maintenance units. Each b

directly subordinate to the Second Artillery comman

Qinghe, although they do receive support from the m

regions. The total number of nuclear warheads maintai

the Second Artillery is unknown.

69

80301 Unit. The 80301 Unit is headquarter

Shenyang, Liaoning province, and consists of three 

brigades, each with up to three launch battalions. Its 

and DF-3 IRBMs cover the Korean peninsula and Jap

include Okinawa. At least one of the brigades, equippe

1,800 kilometer range DF-21s (CSS-5), is concentrated 

area of Tonghua, approximately 80 kilometers north 

North Korean border. R&D on the DF-21 began in 19

had its first successful test in 1985. Shortly thereaft

DF-21 was deployed into an experimental regimen

DF-21 follow-on, the DF-21A, is expected to have a 

kilometer range, with a 600 kilogram warhead.

70

80302 Unit. The 80302 Unit, also known as 52 B

headquartered in the mountain resort town of Huan

Jiangxi province, and is the Second Artillery’s most imp

unit for conventional long-range precision strikes a

Taiwan. The Huangshan base has at least two, but pr

three brigades. The 52 Base’s most well-known brigad

815th, garrisoned in Leping, Jiangxi province, is eq

with the newest addition to the Second Artillery’s inve

the DF-15. The 600-kilometer range DF-15s gained no

during the March 1996 missile exercises off the co

94
missiles scatter to pre-surveyed launch sites (zhen

Fujian province in order to range the entire island of T

China’s total DF-15 inventory is estimated as being fro

hundred to several hundred missiles. Rail is the usual 

moving missiles from garrison to field deployments.

71

80303 Unit. The 80303 Unit, headquartered in the e

suburbs of Kunming, Yunnan province, has two brigade

of the brigades, equipped with DF-21s, is located in Chu

approximately 100 kilometers west of Kunming, wh

other is located at Jianshui, south of Kunming. These m

are in range of several targets in India and Southeast As

80304 Unit. The 80304 Unit, headquartered in Lu

Henan province, has three brigades. At least one br

located in the area of Luoning, is equipped with the 

kilometer DF-5 ICBM, able to strike targets througho

United States and Europe. One other brigade is locate

Sundian.

73

80305 Unit. Headquartered in the remote western H

provincial city of Huaihua, the 80305 Unit is the 

command equipped with ICBMs. Its two subordinate br

are located south of Huaihua, near the town of Tongda

80306 Unit. The 80306 Unit, headquartered in X

Qinghai province, has three brigades, including one po

experimental regiment, concentrated in the Da

Delingha, and Da Qaidam areas. Indications exist th

80306 Unit may upgrade to the DF-21. The 80306 Unit 

to target sites in the former Soviet Union and India.75

Institutes and Colleges. The Second Artillery also h

engineering design academy and four research institu

solve problems associated with operations, trans

erector launchers (TELs), and logistics (First Inst

command automation, targeting, and mapping 

Institute), and missile and warhead engineering desig

Second Artillery’s Command College in Wuhan pr

officers for leadership positions within headqu

elements and launch brigades. The Engineering Coll

Xian educates technicians largely associated with equi

95
field units. The Second Artillery’s Academy of Engin

Design works closely with CASC in evaluating overall 

work.

76

Doctrine. The 2nd Artillery has separate doctrines 

nuclear and conventional missile forces. First, ba

missiles are the key to providing strategic nuclear deter

In the past, the Second Artillery is thought to have foll

doctrine which required only a small number of wa

necessary to cause unacceptable damage on a hand

enemy cities. This minimal deterrence doctrine, ho

appears to be evolving toward a limited nuclear dete

(youxian weishe) approach. Limited nuclear deterrence 

from minimal deterrence in that the latter relies on 

countervalue strikes. Very few warheads are nece

Limited deterrence doctrine has counterforce and warfi

elements with intended targets including enemy m

bases, C

4

I centers, and strategic warning assets. L

deterrence requires a greater number of smaller, 

accurate, survivable, and penetrable ICBMs an

launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); a ballistic m

defense capability to protect its limited deterrent forc

ASAT assets to hit enemy satellites. According to n

weapon strategists, a space-based early warning capab

needed to speed up reaction time.

77

 China’s str

modernization R&D support this shift toward a l

warfighting approach to nuclear warfare.

The Second Artillery’s conventional mission cur

provides China its only reliable means of long-range 

against an enemy’s high value targets. A growing secto

PLA believes ballistic missile strikes against strategic t

are the best way to even out the playing field when fi

against a technologically superior force. Increasingly ac

ballistic missiles, aerospace engineers assert, can be ta

against enemy air defense nodes and even against a

carriers. Chinese analysts view a large arsenal of b

missiles as a relatively cheap means to saturate an exp

theater missile defense architecture.78 According 

estimate, the Second Artillery’s missile supplier, CAS

96
within the next decade.

79

Over the horizon missile strikes against critical nod

paralyze an enemy’s combat capacity. Strikes a

important targets also drive up the human and materia

and put psychological pressure on enemy troops and do

constituency. Targets in a campaign include C

3

I 

weapon control centers, high value air assets on the g

logistics bases, and important sea combat platforms. S

against air bases can enhance the PLAAF’s ability to g

superiority by temporarily degrading an enemy’s ab

generate sorties. Other important targets include lo

bases.

80

Missile strikes would likely be conducted as soon 

Chinese leadership believes war is inevitable. Abs

lessons learned from the Gulf War, the PLA believes an 

such as the United States is most vulnerable whe

deploying forces and logistics to the area of operati

preemptive strike during this phase, many PLA stra

believe, will significantly offset the an enemy’s techno

advantages.81

The Second Artillery clearly understands the implic

of counterstrikes after missile attacks. Chinese engine

devising means to reduce the time a missile launc

exposed at a pre-surveyed launch site. In one co

adjustments are made to the TEL which allows for the m

erection within one minute and retraction within a m

Reductions in TEL weight will increase mobility and 

transport over lower classes of roads and bridges

increase accuracy of their missiles, TELs are being eq

with GPS receivers.

83

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. “China Replacing Nuclear Warheads on Some Missiles,

Defense Weekly, January 27, 1994.

2. See Appendix I on CASC organization for details on 

Academy.

97
Vol. 2, Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1993, pp. 50

4. Wang Jianmin and Zhang Zuocheng, “Jiasu Jibenxing X

Jincheng Nuli Fazhan Woguo Feihang Daodan Shiye” (“Rapid P

in Series Development of China’s Cruise Missile Industry”), Zh

Hangtian, September 1996, pp. 12-17.

5. Xu Ande, “Significance and Economic Benefits of Devel

Modern Cruise Missile for China,” Xiandaihua (Modernization)

No. 4, April 1992, in JPRS-CST-92-013.

6. Wang Jianmin and Zhang Zuocheng, pp. 12-17.

7. See Zheng Wanqian, “Xunhang Daodan Wuqi Xitong de G

Jishu” (“Key Technologies of Cruise Missile Weapon Sys

Zhongguo Hangtian, July 1996, pp. 42-45.

8. Yu Wenman and Liu Chunbao, “Sea Target Charac

Study,” Hangtian Qingbao Yanjiu Baogao Xilie Wenzhai, Octobe

pp. 252-259.

9. Si Xicai, “Research on Long Range Antiradiation Missile 

Radar Seeker Technology,” Zhanshu Daodan Jishu (Tactical 

Technology), 1995, Vol. 2, pp. 42-52, in CAMA, 1995, Vol. 2, No. 5

studies on specific approaches to ARM technology includ

Huayuan, “Study on Superwideband High Accuracy Microw

System,” Daojian yu Zhidao Xuebao, February 1995, pp. 7-12, in 

Vol. 2, No. 5. There are also strong indications that SAST’s 

engineering organization, the Shanghai Institute of Electro-Mec

Engineering, is carrying out preliminary R&D on a long-range a

antiradiation missile for targeting airborne early warning pla

such as the U.S. E-3 AWACS or Taiwan’s E-2C’s. Engineers note 

technologies for development of a long-range ARM include a 

seeker with a sensitivity of greater than 100dB, as well as mo

microwave (danpian weibo), gallium arsenide, very large scale, a

high speed integrated circuits (MMIC, GAAS, VLSIC, VHSIC

seeker makes up for greater than 50 percent of the R&D and pro

costs for an ARM. At least one Second Academy entity wh

conducted work on antiradiation missile seeker technology 

Beijing Institute of Remote Sensing Equipment (probably the 

25th Research Institute).

10. China’s nuclear-tipped cruise missile R&D is discussed 

DoD report which warns too much of SDIO’s effort is focu

countering ballistic missiles, ignoring an increasing cruise 

98
Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 1, 1993, pp. 26-2

11. For a good overview of the Third Academy’s direction in 

missile development, see Zheng Wanqian, “Xunhang Daoda

Xitong de Guanjian Jishu” (“Key Technologies of Cruise Missile W

Systems”), Zhongguo Hangtian, July 1996, pp. 42-45.

12. 3rd Academy’s Zhu Yubao, “Study of LRCS Contour De

Conventional Cruise Missiles, Zhanshu Daodan Jishu (Tactical 

Technology), Vol. 3, 1994, pp. 1-11; and Huan Shengguo, “Applic

Stealth Technology in Missiles,” Shanghai Hangtian, June 19

57-59, in FBIS-CST-97-002.

13. Long Yuzhen, “Characteristics and Design Schedule of S

Engine For Hypersonic Cruise Missile,” Feihang Daodan, Augu

pp. 29-37, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 6; Shang Aidong, “A Sup

Combustion Ramjet Missile,” Feihang Daodan, June 1996, pp. 4

CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 5; Dong Yuejuan, “Technical Path for Devel

Scramjet Engine Propulsion System,” Feihang Daodan, Vol. 1, 1

42-50; Si Tuming, “Performance Analysis of Waverider Hyp

Cruise Missile With Integrated Scramjet Engine,” in Zhanshu 

Jishu (Tactical Missile Technology), 1996 (1) pp. 45-50; and Si T

“Supersonic Cruise Missile and Ramjet Engines,” in Feihang D

Vol 1, 1996, pp. 35-41. Long Yuzhen and Si Tuming are from t

Institute (Beijing Institute of Power Machinery) of the Third Ac

the primary entity responsible for R&D of cruise missile pro

systems. Feihang Daodan is the Third Academy’s most well

technical journal and China’s most authoritative voice for cruise 

development. Also see Huang Zhicheng and Qiu Qianghua, “Pr

for Hypersonic Flight,” Liuti Lixue Shiyan Yu Celiang (Experime

Measurements in Fluid Mechanics), 1997, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 

CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 4; and Huang Zhicheng, Qiu Qianghua, an

Shengxue, “Background, Recent Status, and Missions of Sup

Combustion Research,” paper presented at the Novembe

National Aerospace Aerodynamics Society Meeting, in CAMA

Vol. 4, No. 5. Technical writings indicate COSTIND’s Beijing In

of Systems Engineering, specifically Huang Zhicheng a

Qianghua, also plays a major role in hypersonic vehicle R&D, es

as part of China’s aerospace plane program.

14. If the Chinese are looking to develop a 1,500 kilometer 

the Russian 1,500 kilometer range AS-15 could be used as a 

Some modifications would have to made to enable it to launch f

ground. The Tomahawk has a 450 kilometer range, while t

AGM-86B has a 3,000 kilometer range.

99
Zai Xunhang Daodanzhong de Yingyong,” (“Application of Co

Navigation Systems on Cruise Missiles”) in Hangtian Qingbao 

(China Information Research), 1993 (3), pp. 432-445. Zhong is f

Third Academy’s 8357 Research Institute, responsible for cruise 

control systems. For an example of research on runway penetrat

Yang Bingwei, “Structural Design Problems and Test Met

Anti-Runway Penetrators,” Hangtian Keji Qingbao Yanjiu Baog

5, May 1995, pp. 288-303, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6.

16. Zheng Wanqian, p. 43. TERCOM requires highly sophi

digital mapping systems and powerful computers. COSTIND 

Second Artillery have made significant achievements in both ar

Wang Yongming, “Introduction to Military Electronic Maps,” X

Weixing Jisuanji Xitong, (Mini-Micro Computer Systems), 

1995, pp. 12-18, in FBIS-CST-96-001. Wuhan Technical Unive

Surveying and Mapping is one institute involved in digital m

Also see Jing Shaoguang, “GPS/SINS Integrated Navigation Sys

Cruise Missiles,” Xibei Gongye Daxue Xuebao, 1997, Vol. 15 

79-83, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 6.

17. Guan Dexin, “The Investigation of Compatible Receiver F

and GLONASS,” Xitong Gongcheng Yu Dianzi Jishu, 1996, Vol. 

7, pp. 69-74, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6; and Sheng Jie, “Demonstr

Navigation Performance of GLONASS/GPS Composite Rec

Weixing Yingyong, February 1994, pp. 56-59, in CAMA, 1994, Vo

5.

18. See Wang Jianmin, “Work Hard to Develop Cruise 

Industry,” Zhongguo Hangtian, September 1996, pp. 12-1

Qingguang, “Study on Laser Imaging Guidance,” Feihang D

March 1995, pp. 46-50, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 3; Liu Yongchang, “I

Imaging Precision Seeker Technology,” Hongwai Yu Jiguan

(Infrared and Laser Technology), 1996, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 4

CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6; Zhao Jun, “Applied Research Into Laser I

Guidance Technology Development,” Hangtian Qingbao Y

HQ-96039, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 2; and Li Jin, “Develop

Infrared Focal Plane Array Imaging Technology,” in Feihang 

Qingbao Yanjiu Baogao Wenzhai (Cruise Missile Information R

Reports), December 1996, pp. 190-209, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 6. L

the infrared imaging effort is the Third Academy’s Tianjin J

Technical Physics Institute. 

19. Sun Qingguang, “Jiguang Chengxiang Zhidao ji Ganrao 

de Yanjiu” (“Research Into Laser Imaging Guidance and Jamm

Hangtian Qingbao Yanjiu, HQ-93017, pp. 228-241. 

100
21. Zhang Haixiong, “ADN: Oxidizer for A Low Sig

Propellant,” in Feihang Daodan, July 1996, pp. 35-38, in CAMA

Vol. 3, No. 6; and Lu Xiaohong, “Camouflage and Conce

Technology of Mobile Missile Launchers and Ground Equi

Harbin Institute of Technology Journal, December 1996, pp. 266

CAMA, Vol. 4. Lu is from the Third Academy’s Beijing Inst

Special Machinery, responsible for cruise missile launchers.

22. Zhou Yunwu, “Jamming Techniques for Cruise 

Penetration,” New Electronic Warfare Technology and Inte

Reform Abstracts, 1995 (10), pp. 143-147, in CAMA 1996, Vol 3

Zhou is from the Third Academy’s Beijing Institute of E

mechanical Engineering.

23. Xu Cheng, “Research on Optimal Penetration Mod

Chinese Anti-ship Missile,” paper presented at Novembe

conference of National Missile Designers Information N

Conference, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 3.

24. Dong Yuejuan, “Zhidao Busanqi Jiqi Yingyong Fenxi” (“

Analysis of Guided Dispensors”), Hangtian Qingbao Yanjiu, HQ

pp. 214-227.

25. High-powered microwave weapons are discussed in mor

in Chapter 5 of this study. See Zheng Wanqian, p. 43.

26. Tian Baolong and Li Wengang, “Feihang Daodan CAM 

Danyuan Xitong” (“Cruise Missile CAM Workshop Unit Sy

Zhongguo Hangtian, April 1993, pp. 44-46; Xu Haijiang, “

Reality and Its Application in Development of Cruise Miss

Feihang Daodan, 1996 (8), pp. 1-9; Wang Zhenhua, “P

Computation on Supercomputers for Axisymmetric Interaction 

Yuhang Xuebao (Journal of Astronautics), January 1995, pp. 4

JPRS-CST-95-005.

27. Li Weiliang, “Jiang Zemin dao Beijing Fangzhen Zh

Zhouyan” (“Jiang Zemin Inspects Beijing Simulation Ce

Zhongguo Hangtian Bao, January 17, 1994, p.1; Li Li, “C

Simulation Technology Among Leaders Worldwide,” Lia

Zhoukan, August 16, 1993, pp. 4-5, in JPRS-CST-93-017. Am

aerospace representatives who have been allowed acces

remarked that the CASC Beijing Simulation Center is very 

capabilities to Western simulation facilities.

101
Container Launching Technology,” Hangtian Fashe Jishu 

Launch Technology), January 1996, pp. 1-8, CAMA, 1996, Vol 3

Zhang is from the Beijing Institute of Special Machinery 

Tezhong Jixie Yanjiusuo).

29. Jane’s Navy International, April 1, 1997, p. 14.

30. Liu Kejun, “Information Warfare Challenge Faced By 

Zhongguo Dianzi Bao, October 24, 1997, p. 8, in FBIS-CHI-98-

31. One Taiwan source explicitly asserts land attack cruise m

will be assigned to the Second Artillery. See “Mainland Acquis

Russian Weapons Viewed,” Lien-Ho Pao, April 29, 1996, in 

CHI-96-086; also see Sun Xiangdong and Qin Xiaobo, “Oper

Efficiency Analysis of SAMs Against Cruise Missiles,” 

Gongcheng Yu Dianzi Jishu (Systems Engineering and Elect

October 1996, pp. 59-63, in FBIS-CST-97-013.

32. Jason Glashow and Theresa Hitchens, “China 

Development of Missile With Taiwan Range,” Defense News, 

4-10, 1996, p. 1.

33. Bill Gertz, “U.S. Not Against Russia-China Deal,” Was

Times, January 11, 1997, p. A4.

34. “Russian Missile Assistance to China,” Flight Intern

August 31, 1995. As a side note, Raduga is also working on hyp

standoff cruise missiles.

35. “BasanWuJiu Suo Yu E’luosi Zhuanjia Jinxing Jishu 

(“The 8359 Institute and Russian Experts Carry Out Te

Exchanges”), Zhongguo Hangtian Bao, July 7, 1994, p. 2. The 

also known as the Beijing Institute of Special Machinery, is resp

for development of cruise missile launching equipment, to incl

ship, submerged submachine, and ground equipment.

36. For a complete history, see China Today: Defense Scie

Technology, pp. 256-311; China Today: Space Industry, pp. 

Lewis and Xue; and Lewis and Hua, pp. 5-40.

37. See Appendix I for a complete organizational breakout. 

number of Sanjiang’s M-11s are thought by many to have been 

Pakistan in the early 1990s.

38. For an example of a study done in response to the U.S. B

Pebbles project, see Chen Jianxiang, “Threat Area of Brilliant 

102
16, No. 8, pp. 69-80, in CAMA, 1994, Vol. 1, No. 5.

39. Liu and Yang, pp. 4-26; and Wang Jixiang, “Inspira

Chinese Ballistic Missile Development From the Gulf War,” H

Keji Qingbao Yanjiu Baogao Xilie Wenzhai, April 1994, pp. 4

CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6.

40. CALT defines tactical missiles as having a range of 

kilometers (i.e., the DF-11), campaign missiles as having a r

300-1,000 kilometers (i.e., the DF-15), and strategic shor

missiles as having a range of 1,000-2,000 kilometers (i.e., the 

See Gan and Liu, p. 30.

41. The best account of China’s ballistic missile modern

program is Lewis and Hua.

42. Gan and Liu, p. 42.

43. Ibid., p. 46; Gui Yongfeng, “Penetration of Tactical B

Missile’s Decoy,” Hubei Hangtian Keji (Aerospace Hubei), Fe

1994, pp. 36-38, in CAMA, 1995, Vol. 2, No. 1; and Li Hong, 

Characteristics of Atmospheric Reentry Ballistic Missile Warhe

Their Applications To Heavy Decoy Design,” Jiangnan Hangt

(Jiangnan Space Technology), 1997 (1), pp. 26-30, in CAMA, 19

4, No. 3.

44. Gan and Liu, p. 43. Also see Cai Yuanli, “Research on Tr

Recovery in Exo-Atmospheric Flight,” Daodan Yu Hangtian 

Jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), March 1995, pp. 10-15, in 

Vol. 2, No. 5; and Zhao Hanyuan, “Simulation, Anal

Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles,” Yuhang Xuebao, January 1, 1

96-99, in FBIS-CST-97-012. Zhao is from the National Unive

Defense Technology.

45. Gan and Liu, p. 44.

46. Lewis and Hua, p. 17.

47. Meng Daikui, “Simulation of Control and Guidance of S

Missiles,” Xitong Gongcheng yu Dianzi Jishu, 1994, Vol. 5, 

summarized in CAMA, 1995, Vol. 2, No. 1; Wan Chunxiong an

Xiaolong, “Identification of Flight Disturbances on Spinning M

Zhanshu Daodan Jishu (Tactical Missile Technology), March 1

1-8, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 3. For a general assessment on method

to protect missile systems against high-powered lasers, see Ji 

“Protection of Missiles Against Lasers,” Daodan yu Hangtian 

103
concentrated on the effects of high-owered lasers on a va

materials and opto-electronic systems.

48. Wang Jixiang, “Fast Burn Boost Strategic Ballistic 

Technology,” Aerospace S&T Intelligence Studies Abstracts (2), 

(4), pp. 68-78, in CAMA-96, Vol 3, No. 6. Wang is from the 

Institute of Space Systems Engineering (Beijing Yuhang 

Gongcheng Yanjiusuo); also see Qin Guangming, “Application of 

Tubular Grain in Fast Burn Solid Motors,” Bingong Xuebao (Or

Journal), 1996, Vol. 18, No.2, pp. 41-43, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6

from the Xian Institute of Modern Chemistry.

49. Du Xiangwan, “Ballistic Missile Defense and Space We

in Quanguo Gaojishu Zhongdian Tushu, Jiguang Jishu L

(National High Technology Key Reference— Laser Technology 

Beijing: National Defense University Press, undated, p. 285. 

50. Gan and Liu, p. 45. Also see Zhang Demin, “St

Penetration Techniques on New Generation Ballistic Mi

Xinjunshi Gemingzhong Daodan Wuqi Fazhan Qianjing, No

1996, pp. 18-24, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 2.

51. Jin Weixin, “Mathematical Modeling of Tactical Sur

Surface Missiles Against TMD,” Systems Engineering and El

Technology, 1995, Vol. 17 (3), pp. 63-68, in CAMA 1995, Vol 2, 

52. Zhang Demin and Hou Shiming, “”Simulation Rese

Offensive and Defensive Capability of Conventional Manu

Reentry Missile,” Xitong Gongcheng Yu Dianzi Jishu, 1997, Vol

pp. 45-49, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 5. Full translation in 

CHI-97-272. Zhang is from the Beijing Electromechanical Engi

Design Department, also known as the CASC Fourth Systems 

Department. According to one evaluation, PAC-2 has a proba

kill of 10-25 percent against an unidentified tactical ballistic 

See Zhao Yuping, “Probability of PAC-2 Intercepting a Certain T

Ballistic Missile,” paper presented at November 1997 confer

National Missile Designers Specialist Network, inCAMA, Vol. 5

53. Gan and Liu, pp. 42-45.

54. Lu Xiaohong, “Camouflage and Concealment Techno

Mobile Launchers and Ground Equipment of Strategic and T

Missiles,” Aerospace Industry Press, HQ-96034, 1996, in CAMA

No. 2. The key institute for CCD technology related to missile la

104
Institute). 

55. Wen Longzhi, “Evaluation of the Strategic M

Survivability,” Aerospace Science Intelligence Studies Report Ab

No. 5, 1995, pp. 353-368, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6. 

56. See for example, Chen Zhaoxi, “Manufacturing Techn

Beryllium Inertial Measuring Units,” Hangtian Gongyi, Marc

pp. 39-41, in CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 5. Chen is from the Beijing Inst

Control Instruments (Beijing Kongzhi Yibiao Yanjiusuo). The 

States has used beryllium in its strategic missile guidance sets s

1960s.

57. Wang Chiung-hua, “The Military of Communist China P

Use Global Positioning System to Improve Precision of M

Chung-Yang Jih-Pao, December 24, 1997, p. 10, in FBIS-CHI-9

58. For a summary of test results, see Sun Mei, “GPS For Eva

Inertial Measurement Unit Errors,” Hangtian Congzhi (Ae

Control), 1995, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 69-75, summarized in CAMA

Vol. 2, No. 4. Also see Wang Shuren, “Principles of Onboa

Navigation Transponders,” Hangkong Dianzi Jishu, undat

20-23, in CAMA, 1994, Vol. 1, No. 5. Wang is from the Second Ar

Academy of Engineering.

59. Scott Pace, Gerald Frost, Irving Lachow, David Fr

Donna Fossum, Donald Wassem, and Monica Pinto, The 

Positioning System: Assessing National Policies, RAND: 

Technologies Institute, p. 68.

60 “GNSS=GPS+GLONASS,” Zhongguo Hangtian Bao, No

6, 1996, p. 4. The receiver exploits a total of 48 GPS and GL

satellites to achieve a 0.5 CEP for differential positioning accur

seven meter CEP for no differential. Differential positioning 

includes a reference station within 100-200 kilometers of the 

site. Also see Sheng Jie, “Performance Demonstration of Co

GLONASS/GPS Receivers,” Weixing Yingyong (Satellite Applic

February 1994, pp. 56-59, in CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 5. There is n

evidence China has integrated these receivers on a missile sys

that China has a differential positioning station within 200 kil

of the missile launch site. However, there are indications China 

differential GPS system in support of its space launch program

61. Zhang Hu, “Application of GPS in Missile Maneu

Positioning,” Zhongguo Yuhang Xuehui Fashe Gongcheng Yu 

105
Ground Equipment Abstracts), November 1993, in CAMA, Vol. 1

62. Li Yonghong, “Ballistic Trajectory Determination Us

Differential Global Positioning System,” Binggong Xuebao, 19

18 (4), pp. 372-374, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 2.

63. It is not clear how far engineers have gone in their preli

research in this type of ballistic missile terminal guidance. See G

Liu, pp. 68-69. TERCOM is only effective over land where lan

are used as reference points.

64. Wang Honglei, “Optical Image Guidance Technology,” 

yu Yinxin, January 1995, pp. 34-37, in CAMA. Vol. 2, No. 3. Wang 

the Second Artillery. There has been some Western open 

reporting on China’s research into optical terminal guidance 

missiles. Russia’s SS-X-26 utilizes a similar system.

65. Yang Bingwei, “Structural Design Problems and Test M

of Anti-Runway Penetrators,” Aerospace S&T Intelligence 

Report Series Abstracts (5), 1995, pp. 288-303, CAMA, Vol. 3, No

Liu Jiaqi, “Penetration Technology for Tactical Missile War

Aerospace S&T Intelligence Studies Abstracts (5), Vol. 95 (5), 

1996, Vol. 3, No. 6. Yang is from the Beijing Institute of 

Electromachinery (Beijing Teshu Jidian Yanjiusuo).

66. Huang Tung, “M-Series Missiles and New 

Equipment—New Weapons in Taiwan Strait Exercises,” Kuan

Ching, April 16, 1996, pp. 22-25, in FBIS-CHI-96-097. The repo

the EMP warhead is consistent with R&D underway on a HPM 

intended to target enemy electronic systems. For discuss

negating hardened targets, see Xu Xiaocheng, “Research on Pene

Depth of Projectiles Into Thick Concrete Targets,” Qiang

Huanjing, 1996 (4), pp. 1-7, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 3. Xu 

CALT’s 13th Research Institute. For a study addressing subm

dispersal problems, see Yan Dongsheng, “Technical Means for R

Dispersal of Mini-Warheads,” paper presented at the Octob

Annual Conference on Flight Mechanics, inCAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, 

67. General Second Artillery organizational information 

from numerous sources, to include open source Chinese publ

and from discussions while assigned as the assistant air att

Beijing, China from 1992-1995. Also see PLA Directory of Person

USDLO Hong Kong, 1996, pp. 48-51; Bill Gertz, “New Chinese M

Target All of East Asia,” Washington Times, July 10, 1997, p. 1; 

Fujii, “Facts Concerning China’s Nuclear Forces,” Gunji K

106
Flying Eagle (Changying), November 1993; “Outstanding 

Flying Eagle, May 1992; Lewis and Xue, p. 213 footnote; and 

Weapons Database, Vol. 5, pp. 324. Among sources, Flying Eagl

a handful of Second Artillery-associated publications, is most u

piecing together the organizational structure.

68. Ibid. The tall white Second Artillery Headquarters b

which has the roman number “two” written on its surrounding w

clearly visible to the west when driving from Beijing through Qi

the way to the Great Wall at Badaling.

69. Ibid. Estimates vary wildly, ranging from 450 to 1200

closely guards the size of its arsenal of warheads and missiles, a

estimate is only an educated guess. The 450 number is deriv

Nuclear Weapons Database, Vol. 5, p. 324.

70. Ibid. This unit may also be known as the 51 Base. Base n

(i.e., 51 Base) and types of missiles assigned are depicted in 

Heritage Foundation graphic outlining regional missile threa

details on DF-21, see Gertz, p. A16.

71. Ibid. Also see Richard D. Fisher, “China’s Missiles O

Taiwan Strait: A Political and Military Assessment,” paper prese

September 1996 Coolfont Conference on the PLA, pp. 1-30. Hua

is also known as Tunxi.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. For information on Third Institute research into mapp

Wang Yongming article in Xiaoxing Weixing Jisuanji Xitong, 

1995, in FBIS-CST-96-001. For a Third Institute targeting stu

Yuan Zaijiang, “Optimum Modeling Study and Algorithm of Ta

Selection,” Huoli yu Zhihui Kongzhi, 1998, Vol. 23 (1), pp. 3

CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 3. 

77. This theory on the shift in Chinese nuclear doctrine is out

Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking:’ The Con

Limited Deterrence,” International Security, Winter 1995/19

5-42.

107
Xiandai Bingqi, (Modern Weaponry), August 8, 1995, in FBI

96-036; on the use of ballistic missiles against aircraft carriers, 

Bao, “Discussion of Technical Means to Attack Aircraft Carrie

Tactical Ballistic Missiles,” Hubei Hangtian Keji, 1997 (1), pp. 4

CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 4. Zhu is from the 066 Base Inst

Precision Machinery.

79. “Selected Military Capabilities of the PRC,” Departm

Defense, April 1997, quoted in Timothy W. Maier, “U.S. Is Fin

China’s War Plan,” Insight, May 12, 1997, p. 8.

80. Yu Guohua, “National Defense University Officer on 

Force Achieving Victory in Local War," Zhongguo Junshi Kex

20, 1996, pp. 100-104, in FBIS-CHI-96-252. For studies on 

missiles against airfields, see Yu Renshun, “Research on Ter

Guided Submunitions For Blocking Airfield Runways,” paper pr

at November 1997 conference of National Missile Designers Netw

CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 3.

81. Lu Linzhi, “Preemptive Strikes Crucial in Limited Hig

Wars,” Jiefangjun Bao, February 14, 1996, p. 6, in FBIS-CHI-9

82. Gu Baonan and Cai Xudong, “Rapid Maneuvering and E

Concept for Missile Launch Vehicles,” Space Launch Technolo

92 (2), pp. 16-19.

83. Zhang Hu, “Application of GPS in Mobile Missile Posit

Beijing Institute of Special Engineering Machinery paper prese

1993 Conference on Launch Engineering and Ground Equ

abstracted in CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 5.

108
IN DEFENSE OF ITS OWN:

CHINA’S AEROSPACE DEFENSE

China’s quest for information dominance and gr

competency in long-range precision strike is intim

related to its overall aerospace defense modernization 

The PLA has long suffered from an antiquated air d

intelligence network, command and control, and capa

defense weapon systems. Specifically, the PLAAF has 

decent early warning radars, early warning satellite

automated intelligence handling and transmission faci

However, since the Gulf War, Chinese policymakers 

placed a high priority on upgrading their overall air d

capability in order to protect strategically critical points

China’s space and missile industry leading the w

comprehensive air defense network is being desig

counter air and missile attacks. The network is comp

numerous segments, including early warning, comman

control, air defense weapons, and offensive countera

counterspace weapons systems.

A national air defense reconnaissance network com

of a variety of sensors is a top priority. Chinese st

analysts have consistently outlined the most imp

sensors for development. In addition to strategic HU

missile early warning, photoreconnaissance, and S

systems, priorities include airborne early warning plat

bipolar/multipolar (shuang/duodi) radars, over-the-h

sensors, ultrawideband (UWB), impulse (cho

microwave, laser, millimeter, inverse synthetic apertur

acoustic radars. A common theme throughout the litera

an outstanding requirement for an ability to counter st

aircraft and missiles.

2

 China, especially the PLAAF, is 

concerned about the effect of stealth weapons, such 

F-117A, on its air defense systems and is attempt

enhance its existing air defense system.3 Crucial to its e

109
data from multiple sensors, introducing widespread 

netting of sensors in order to reduce the value of s

Several institutes are engaged in working this problem

First, China is working to indigenously devel

airborne radar. In the meantime, however, the Chines

contracted with Great Britain’s Racal and Israel’s IAI 

purchase of AEW radars. Racal will supply six to eigh

Searchwater surveillance radars to the PLA Navy

through Shaul Eisenberg’s UDI office in Beiji

negotiating the sale of the Phalcon radar which will be 

into the Russian A-50 (IL-76 derivative). The cont

valued at 250 million U.S. dollars.

5

 Aerostats are anoth

of airborne sensor being closely examined by the PL

Force and Navy. An aerostat (qiqiu) network, help

detection of low flying cruise missiles, would consist of a 

of large inflated dirigibles hoisted above China’s coast

China’s development of ultrawideband (UWB) 

technology is focused on counterstealth (fan yin

Proponents claim UWB (chaokuandai) systems can de

radar cost, detect small, stealthy targets, defeat 

jamming, and minimize the size of radars. UWB radar

repetitive transmissions of a single powerful pulse of 

wide bandwidth. Chinese experimental tests have 

conducted against coated targets. UWB radars com

have a bandwidth of up to one gigahertz and can 

hundreds of targets.

7

There are numerous other sensor programs und

such as bistatic and multistatic radar developme

well-known counterstealth system, bistatic and mult

radars use different sites for transmission and return o

pulses.

8

 Laser radars are another priority ar

development. The Chinese are experimenting with rad

devices called lidars, which use the laser light reflecte

targets and received by an optical lens to locate the tar

deliberately widened beam is first used to acquire a targ

then reduced to a pencil beam in order to improve 

calculations. Chinese researchers have emphasize

lasers in particular. The Chinese have also cond

110
“Firepond,” which has space tracking capabilities.

9

 Eng

are also carrying out R&D into gigawatt-level high po

microwave as a counterstealth measure.

10

China is also stepping up investment into develop

ability to counter antiradiation missiles through the use 

probability of intercept radars (di zaihuo gailu leida), p

array radars, and radar networking. The low probab

intercept (LPI) radar technology is concentrating on low 

power transmission and spread spectrum (guan

technologies. In addition, when radars of the same freq

form a net, they can cause deviation errors in the 

guidance set. Signal adjustments can be made to ensu

signals operating on the same frequency do not interfer

each other. Widespread use of decoys and traps (youp

deceive ARM sensors is another option under close scrut

These sensors are critical for cueing kinetic and di

energy weaponry for air defense. Like many deve

nations, China’s air defense architecture is dominated 

ground based segment. PLAAF fixed wing assets rema

weak link in guarding China’s airspace.12 With the S

Academy in the lead, China is aggressively moderniz

surface-to-air missile capability by upgrading cu

systems; fielding new generation SAMs; and pro

foreign systems. Standard scenarios drawn up by C

analysts include initial launches of foreign tactical b

and cruise missiles against weak points in China’s air d

structure, destroying air defense assets located along k

routes. Then an adversary, under an ECM shield, is ex

to launch ARMs and precision air-to-ground munitions 

combinations of aircraft and cruise missiles to atta

superiority.

13

To counter an enemy air and missile campaign

strategists and Second Academy analysts believe they 

develop multicapable air defense systems able to en

variety of missiles and aircraft at low to high altitudes

systems must use advanced search, discrimination, tra

and guidance technology; advanced mobile equipmen

quality materials, and powerful propulsion and fire c

111
software. Chinese analysts stress the importance of 

defense “firepower network,” comprised of SAMs, 

electromagnetic shells (diancipao), and air defense las

In its SAM development, the Second Academy is s

for ever faster speeds and more effective guidance sy

Among other achievements, the Second Academy b

they have made significant advances in developing a p

long-wave infrared imaging terminal guidance seeker, 

can be used in all weather conditions and is highly resis

electronic countermeasures.

14 Engineers are pressi

completion of preliminary research into millimeter wa

infrared integrated seeker for hypervelocity missiles, s

to the U.S. ERINT system. Borrowing from foreign 

riences, Chinese engineers are attempting to correct pro

they have encountered.

15

 In order to ensure the ab

future SAMs to operate in a the face of heavy jamming, 

has designed digital simulators to allow operators to tra

dense electronic combat environment.

16

China is taking advantage of every opportun

incorporate foreign technology in order to h

developmental objectives. Chinese clandestine acquisi

Patriot technology after the Gulf War, and the purch

Russian S-300PMU (SA-10B) and S-300/PMU-1 (SA

SAM systems have made important contributions 

Second Academy’s ability to develop a highly ca

indigenous SAM. One candidate for incorporating S-30

PAC-2 Patriot technology is the HQ-9, which may 

rudimentary missile defense capabilities, including d

against cruise missiles.

17

 The Second Academy is pr

most interested in phased array radar and missile gu

technology used in both the PAC-2/PAC-3 and S-300. 

and Russian negotiators have also recently sign

agreement on the sale of TOR-M1 (SA-15) SAM system

The Second Academy is carrying R&D into more adv

air defense technologies. For example, their sy

engineering department has examined the utility of 

weapons as an air defense weapon both to jam or d

incoming aircraft.

19

 Some call HPM weapons a “n

112
and an “electronic trump card” (dianzi shashou), which 

used as counterstealth as well as an antiradiation weap

Possibly related to HPM technology, more exo

defense concepts under development includ

electromagnetic missile (dianci daodan). This “missil

burst of radio frequency (RF) energy which can se

disrupt the electronic systems of an attacking airc

missile. Both the Second Academy and the Univer

Electronic Science and Technology of China have 

electromagnetic missile programs which also have 

properties for counterstealth and long-range co

nications.

21

Another relatively mature technology under develo

is the electromagnetic and electrothermal gun. China

experimental railgun (daoguipao), developed by the 

Academy of Engineering Physics, was tested in 1986, w

0.34 gram object was hurled at 1.68 kilometers a s

China’s first electrothermal gun (dianrepao) was tes

1991 and achieved a velocity of 1.86 kilometers a s

CAS’s Institute of Particle Physics also developed a rail

1988 which propelled a 50 gram shell at 3 kilometers a s

The same institute tested a coilgun (dianquanpao), cap

projecting a 44 kilogram object 14 meters per second, in 

CAEP developed its own electrothermal gun in 1991 an

a 20 gram projectile at 1.85 kilometers a second.

22

Finally, analysts advocate upgrading China’s ex

antiaircraft artillery (AAA) to meet challenges pos

enemy missiles, especially to counter the cruise m

threat. Modeling has been conducted against the BGM

Tomahawk, and the results gave 37mm AAA a kill rate 

percent. The air defense system was able to detect the 

missile at a range of 43 kilometers and was able to track 

range of 9.1 kilometers.

23

Chinese strategists also stress limiting an adve

information. Advocates urge adopting measures su

camouflage, deception, dispersal, mobility, and secre

great importance is physical destruction of an adve

113
intercept radars and communications equipment, deplo

of baits and false targets, and reduction the radar 

section (RCS) of air defense weapon systems. Wh

employed in combat, weapon systems must be hidd

bunkers or covered with camouflage netting, and emi

must be controlled and frequencies kept secret. Under c

conditions, air defense operators will theoretically plu

C

3

I systems for targeting data and rapidly change pos

and be on guard against enemy special forces.

25

Chinese operational concepts, however, indicat

Beijing believes it must never get to the point where ene

assets are crossing into Chinese airspace. In a p

approach to air defense, first and most important is to d

opposing force’s air and missile assets before they lea

ground. According to aerospace analysts, the top prio

emerging air defense doctrine are preemptive strikes (

zhiren) against adversarial air assets on the g

especially high value assets such as airborne warnin

control, and electronic reconnaissance platforms. 

accurate ballistic and cruise missiles are cruci

preemptive strikes against airfields and supportin

assets. Chinese writings have specifically noted the th

UAVs and have strongly advocated striking out at 

within the UAV C

3

I system.

26

After reducing the punch an adversary can d

Chinese analysts believe they must prepare key target

as C

3

 centers, ports, airfields, missile sites, and UAV ba

counter enemy attacks. Attacking aircraft and cruise m

must be identified as soon as possible. When outside 

kilometers, fighter aircraft and long-range SAMs m

employed. Between 10-100 kilometers, mid- to short

SAMs, railguns, and air defense lasers must be act

Once inside 10 kilometers, air defenders must re

short-range and ultrashort-range SAMs and A

Formation of composite air defense units is a key s

seamless air defense operations.

28

Missile Defense. China’s air defense concepts i

protection against cruise and ballistic missiles as we

114
Technology are leading the way in China’s TMD 

Western open source reporting and Chinese tec

journals provide clear indication that the CMC has ap

funding for a 10-year developmental program for a t

missile defense system, to include satellites for missile 

warning. The PLAAF and CASC have advocated a 15

three-phase approach to TMD development, first by fie

“Patriot-like” system, such as the HQ-9; initiating mode

on an extended range anti-theater ballistic missile mode

the U.S. PAC-3 interceptor; and carrying out prelim

research on a THAAD-class system.

29

Studies indicate the Second Academy has a

initiated programs to develop means to counter tact

well as medium-range ballistic missiles, focusing on in

seeker development, and on combined infrare

millimeter-wave seekers. China is modeling and cond

computer simulation of a theater missile defense syste

can counter missiles with a range of 2,500 kilometers

successfully developing a missile defense system, 

concepts indicate they would cover major citie

operational centers of gravity, to include key ballistic m

units, and would also be organic assets of certain 

armies.

30

Chinese strategists and engineers recognize t

space-based early warning capability is essential to a 

missile defense architecture. China has a well-estab

technology base in infrared sensors, which, when pla

satellites, can detect a missile almost immediately 

launch by detecting the infrared radiation from its eng

motor plume.

31

 Technical writings indicate the space in

is working to master specific technologies associated 

missile early warning satellites. In a potentially r

program, CAST has primary responsibility for providi

satellite bus for the infrared telescope which, accord

design outlines, will be placed in a geosychronous orbit s

after the turn of the century.

32

Command and Control. China understands the pro

of orchestrating an air defense campaign whic

115
components. An integrated national air defense system 

long-term objective. The PLA Air Force has responsibi

air defense of Chinese territorial air space. Offices of th

Air Force leadership are located in the PLA Air 

headquarters complex in western Beijing. Similar to i

counterparts, the headquarters oversees the organi

training, and equipping of the PLAAF. Headquarters, P

also manages a command center which uses a 

automated C

2

 system to monitor airspace inside C

territorial airspace and maintain links with PLAAF 

throughout the country. However, as a GSD servic

PLAAF operational orders originate from the 

Operations Department complex in the Western Hills.

The next echelon resides at the military region lev

various Military Region Air Force (MRAF) headqu

support PLA Military Region commanders by provid

defense and air support to ground operations. Each 

oversees one or more air corps or command posts whic

operational command over aviation and air defense 

Each command post/air corps is responsible for air defe

its particular area of operations.

33

In a wartime situation, the Sector Operations C

(SOC) is C

2

 authority over defense counterair assets wit

area of responsibility. The SOC is being designed to r

data from over the horizon and missile early warning r

and other sensors. It has authority to direct PLAAF and 

air defense fighters, SAMs, AAA, and air defense jam

The SOC also maintains control over any mobile tacti

defense systems which control radars, air defense fig

SAMs, and AAA. The SOC reports to the regional Air D

Operations Center.

34

The key entity responsible for R&D and sy

engineering design of China’s automated C

2

 systems 

Ministry of Electronics 28th Research Institute in Na

The 28th Research Institute was a key player 

development of China’s area air defense network, 

acquires, processes, and represents the air situation 

area under its command. Naturally, the 28th Institute 

116
control network.

35

Counterspace. Another important aspect of C

aerospace defense program is found within the ru

counterspace. Chinese writings have long given lip ser

the need to gain the upper hand in space as a prerequ

battlespace dominance. However, since the Gulf W

growing body of literature from the Academy of M

Sciences (AMS), COSTIND, and China Aero

Corporation (CASC) has advocated the developmen

counterspace capability, and indicates ongoing progra

master enabling technologies.

Counterspace operations are viewed as an inev

aspect of future warfare and as part of an overall inform

denial doctrine. AMS writings note that the United 

relies on satellite platforms for 70 percent 

communications (90 percent for navy communications

90 percent of its intelligence.36 Chinese strategist

engineers perceive U.S. reliance on communica

reconnaissance, and navigation satellites as a po

“Achilles’ heel.” COSTIND advocates believe China 

develop space combat systems which are a fundam

aspect of the revolution in military affairs and a new sp

warfighting.

37

The PLA and the defense industries have implemen

are examining a broad range of passive and 

counterspace measures. The PLA currently stresses p

counterspace measures in an attempt to deny f

reconnaissance satellites with information on its disp

of forces and R&D programs. For example, in 1992 COS

and CASC established camouflage standards for m

development in order to counter foreign optical, infrare

radar satellite systems.

38

 Active measures 

consideration include kinetic kill vehicles, ground

lasers, and satellite jammers. CASC is among the str

advocates for an antisatellite (ASAT) development pro

arguing that an ASAT (fanweixing) capability is nee

deter potential adversaries from attacking China’

satellites. They also believe that an ASAT capability is 

117
components of the two systems are intimately related.

Preliminary research (yuxian yanjiu) on ASATs ha

carried out since the 1980s, at least partly funded und

863 Program for High Technology Development. Ho

R&D on fundamental technologies applicable to an 

weapons system have been ongoing since the 1960s. 

the 640 Program, the space and missile industry’s S

Academy, traditionally responsible for SAM developme

out to field a viable antimissile system, consisting of a 

kill vehicle, high powered laser, space early warnin

target discrimination system components. Whil

program was abandoned in 1980, engineers associate

this effort are still active. For example, the 640 Program 

designer, Song Jian, is chairman of the State Scien

Technology Commission.40

Chinese strategists recognize the importance of a 

tracking network in counterspace operations. COSTI

modernizing and expanding its space tracking network

network, operated by COSTIND’s China Launc

Tracking Control (CLTC), will be necessary for trackin

control of a projected increase in China’s domestic sat

and its international satellite launch business. COST

adding overseas links in Chile and the South Pacific is

Kiribati, and has contracted with France for access t

from its space tracking network.

41 China Academy of Sc

astronomical observatories in Nanjing and Kunming fe

the CLTC network, providing orbital prediction da

CLTC. CAS and CLTC are upgrading their network o

resolution telescopes, augmented by laser tracking d

China’s space community claims an ability to detect obj

space down to 10 inches.42 While the network is design

cooperative targets, it does provide the framewo

improvements against non-cooperative targets.

CASC researchers, primarily concentrated with

Second Academy, are leading China’s preliminary and 

R&D of counterspace systems. Several articles have ap

in the Second Academy’s journal, Systems Engineerin

Electronics, which indicate they are tackling some s

118
with terminal guidance problems with a homing kill v

Specific systems under evaluation and simulation i

infrared, radar, and impulse radar terminal guida

Chinese engineers have also conducted studies to c

satellite decoys as well.44

Other entities associated with CASC have support

overall R&D effort. Harbin Institute of Technolog

Beijing University of Astronautics and Aeronauti

example, have carried out modeling and simulation of v

space intercept control and terminal guidance system

control concept involved the use of several small solid m

for orbital control stabilization.

45

 CASC analysts with

Third Academy have conducted assessments of air lau

ASAT missiles and have noted this approach as the 

inexpensive ASAT option. Supporting assessments 

focused on solid fueled motors for the air-launched min

homing vehicle.46

Chinese aerospace analysts view ground-

high-powered lasers, able to degrade or destroy satell

all altitudes, including medium and geosynchronous orb

an alternative to kinetic kill vehicles. Directed energy 

weapons are touted as the wave of the future.

47

 China h

basic technologies needed to move to more advanced 

stages of a ground-based laser (GBL) ASAT system. One 

most capable lasers under development is a free electro

(FEL). COSTIND’s China Academy of Engineering P

(CAEP) began FEL (ziyou dianzi jiguang) developm

1985 and activated their first experimental system

Shuguang-1, in May 1993. The experimental Shugu

developed by CAEP’s Southwest Institute of Fluid P

achieved a power output of 140 megawatts during a 

1994. CAEP is working to reduce FEL size as a me

increase mobility. In addition to a FEL system, CAE

CAS have made significant achievements in chemic

solid state lasers.48 PLA-affiliated publications asser

while the Chinese do not yet possess the capability to d

satellites with high-powered lasers, they are capa

damaging optical reconnaissance satellites.

49

119
China has placed high priority on development of ad

optics and deformable mirrors. Adaptive optics, whi

numerous electronic devices to shape a mirror for o

beam pattern, are necessary to compensate for atmos

absorption, scattering, and thermal blooming. Duri

1994 COSTIND S&T Committee Meeting, “flexible m

(lingjing) were singled out as a critical technolo

increased emphasis. Concentrated effort into adaptive 

began in 1980 when the CAS formed an adaptive 

research group and laboratory within its Instit

Optoelectronics in Beijing. Since then, other CAS inst

including Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mec

and Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics, hav

China’s adaptive optics R&D.

50

 CAEP’s Institute of A

Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM

supported the effort through modeling work on atmos

effects on ground based high-powered laser weapons.

5

One other directed energy concept which the S

Academy has evaluated, and advocates, is the use of 

weapons in a counterspace role.

52

 AMS and COS

analysts believe HPM weapons will serve a useful purp

the 21st century and strongly advocate their develop

CAEP’s Institute of Applied Electronics, Univers

Electronic Science and Technology of China, an

Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology in Xian are 

of the most important organizations engaged in the res

design, and testing of Chinese HPM devices.

53

There have been other ASAT concepts alleged to be 

consideration as part of an overall aerospace defense s

References, albeit dubious in nature, outline simple 

measures including an antisatellite satellite 

counter-orbit which releases 30 gram steel balls in or

penetrate the satellite shell. This option, called 

spreading flowers” (xiannu san hua), is low cost and eff

Another option specifically directed against space-base

platforms calls for the application of powder, paint, or d

cover reflectors in order to prevent laser weapons 

120
attack from enemy satellites.

54

One final counterspace measure under examinatio

electronic countermeasure directed against enemy sat

COSTIND and CASC are conducting feasibility stud

various satellite jammers intended to complicate 

communication satellites and NAVSTAR GPS.

55

measures would deny an adversary use of a satellite, b

destroy the platform itself, perhaps avoiding escalation 

conflict.

There are some within China who are more circum

about ASAT development and the militarization of 

Arms control experts, such as Du Xiangwan, have 

called for a international ban on ASATs and establishm

an international regime for oversight and control of m

satellites. He is critical of certain missile defense sy

such as the space based laser, which has the capabi

attack satellites as well as missiles.

56 Other Chinese 

control advocates see the development of ASATs as inev

due to the growing importance of satellites for m

operations. Therefore, limitations are required on m

satellites as well as on ASAT development.

57

The development and deployment of an a

counterspace weapon system would require a decision 

highest level of the PLA leadership. The literature do

provide any clear indication that the CMC has direct

defense industrial complex to move toward ASAT tes

production stages. Technical writings do, however, 

point to conceptual assessments on various ASAT sy

and related technologies. AMS writings provide the do

framework. The literature suggests China’s ASAT prog

beyond preliminary research and has moved into the 

definition stage of R&D. These studies could form the b

any joint CMC-State Council decision to proceed to th

step in the R&D cycle.

Cost would be a major factor in deciding whether or 

deploy an ASAT system. According to some estimates

space sensors, facilities, and manpower would run a fix

121
million) and the missile ($1 million) would add up to a va

cost of around $2 million. If a facility launched 10 interc

its fixed and variable costs would be about equal, and th

cost per launch would be about $4-6 million per inter

Against a high performance satellite valued at $1 billion

an interceptor would have a cost effectiveness ratio of 

200:1. In short, development of an ASAT capability co

determined to be an economically sound decision.58

There are a number of detractors, however, whic

discourage the PLA from attempting to deploy a ground

launcher (GBL) ASAT. First is the technical difficu

atmospheric absorption, scattering and thermal bloom

the high-power laser. Further development of adaptive 

and choice of laser will help to mitigate this pr

Deuterium fluoride and free electron lasers can oper

wavelengths which minimize atmospheric problems. Ba

GBL on a high mountain, above cloud cover, can also 

the amount of atmosphere through which a laser must 

Basing a GBL in a relatively arid region, such as G

Qinghai, or Xinjiang would help reduce weather probl

Another detractor is the infrequency in which a low 

orbit reconnaissance satellite would pass within view 

GBL site. Deployment of a larger number of GBLs 

increase opportunities, but would also drive up the cost

other factor is the vulnerability of a GBL. A static GBL 

away inside a mountain could be concealed, especi

potential adversaries were not looking for it. However

its use on a satellite, the GBL would become a primary 

for adversarial strikes.

Absent from discussions of active counterspace sy

are clues as to the type of launcher which could be u

deliver a homing vehicle to its designated target. C

writings indicate that the former Soviet Union utiliz

SS-9, which could counter recon, navigation, and w

satellites, as well as the space shuttle. They also de

unidentified U.S. three-stage ground launched solid 

ascent ASAT (zhijie shenggao fanweixing) an

air-launched ASAT missile. Analysts, however, are cri

122
satellite maneuverability, radiation and laser hardenin

advanced warning systems; as well as the 2,000 kilo

altitude limitations of the Russian coorbital 

(gongguishi fanweixing) system, and amount of time (a

3 hours) it would take to reach its target. CASC analy

also critical of the Russian system, citing the requirem

be tied to satellite launch centers. On the other hand, a 

armed with an ASAT missile is praised for its flexibili

mobility.

59

China’s defense industrial complex clearly has 

sights on an integrated national air defense system, to

with a counterspace capability, that would be able to 

any would be attacker. The Second Academy’s r

planning, doctrinal development, and systems R

significant should not be underestimated. The adversar

for its threat based planning, aquisition, and developm

clearly the United States. The Second Academy, COS

and other PLA entities carefully studied how the U

States decimated the Iraqi air defense system and are 

steps to ensure China is capable enough to not suffer a s

fate.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. PLAAF deficiencies are discussed at length in Kenneth W

Glenn Krumel, and Jonathon Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters 

Century, RAND Project Air Force study, 1995, pp. 112-113.

2. The Chinese believe this combination of sensors will be es

useful against cruise missile attacks. Key research institutes i

in radar development include the electronics industry’s 14th R

Institute in Nanjing and CASC Second Academy’s 23rd R

Institute in Beijing. See Xu Xingci, “Xunhang Daodan Fangyu 

(“Cruise Missile Defense Measures”), Zhongguo Hangtian, Apr

pp. 36-39. For a good comprehensive look at future directions in C

air defense, see Xu Xingju, “Tigao Woguo Dimian Fangkon

Dianzizhan Nengli” (“Raising China’s Ground based Air D

Electronic Warfare Capability”), Xiandai Bingqi (Modern Wea

August 1995. Xu, who has written widely on air and missile 

topics, is from the CASC’s Second Academy Information Group. A

“Counterstealth Ground Radars,” Hangtian (Spaceflight), Marc

123
an inverse SAR system which can image aircraft, warshi

satellites; and the second, the J-231, developed by the 

Academy’s 23rd Research Institute, can detect and track tar

30,000 meters. Both supposedly have an effective counter

capability. 

3. Wang Xuichun, “Threat of Stealth Weapons to Mod

Defense,” Xiandai Zhanshu Fangkong Jishu Wenzhai (Modern T

Air Defense Technology Abstracts), October 1994, pp. 42-47, in 

Vol. 3, No. 6; Hu Jian, “Research on Counterstealth Technology 

HQ-2 Surface-to-Air Missile System,” Air Force Missile A

Journal, 1994, Vol. 16, No. 3, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 5. Promine

advocates of stealth technology are skeptical that China, or an

country, would ever be able to counter the U.S. lead in 

technology.

4. Wu Ji, “Multisensor Data Fusion Technology a

Application,” Kongjian Dianzi Jishu, February 1994, pp. 1-6, in 

1994, Vol. 1, No. 5; Yu Wenxian, “Comments on Mult

Information Fusion,” Guofang Keji Daxue Xuebao, 1994, Vol. 16

in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 1. Yu is from NUDT. Zhang Saijin, “Mult

Data Fusion for Target Detection, Recognition, and Tracking,” H

Yu Jiguang Gongcheng, 1996, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 21-26, in CAMA

No. 4.

5. Amnon Barzilay, “Russia About To Decide on Ilyus

IAI-PRC Deal,” Ha’aretz, September 24, 1996, p. A1, in 

NES-96-186.

6. PLAAF S&T Department representatives were dis

aerostat options with foreign producers in 1993. Current s

unknown. One could surmise that since signing an AEW contra

Israeli and Russian firms, the interest in an aerostat system cou

diminished. 

7. He Jianguo, Lu Zhongliang, and Liu Kecheng, “Counte

Mechanism of UWB Radar,” Guofang Keji Daxue Xuebao (Jou

National University of Defense Technology), February 1997, Vol

1, pp. 71-76, in FBIS-CST-97-014.

8. Among numerous references, see, for example, He W

“Position Method and Precision Analysis for Bistatic Radars 

Network System,” Fourth Annual Exchange of the China A

Society, May 1992, pp. 42-47, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 2; Liu Qi a

Zhongkang, “Analysis of Detection Range in Air-Ground 

124
FBIS-CHI-98-007; Wu Xielun, “Development of Multistatic 

Networking Technology and Its Application Against Stealth Ve

Xiandai Fangyu Jishu, January 1995, pp. 8-20, in CAMA, Vol. 2

and Wu Peilun, “Development and Application of Bistatic/Mu

Radar Network,” Astronautics Research Information Report 

Second Academy, Vol. 2, November 1995, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 

9. Sun Baoju and Chen Gang, “CO2 Jiguang Leid

Yingyong”(“Applications of CO2 Laser Radar”), Zhongguo Ha

February 1993, pp. 44-46; Mao Guo’an, “Angular Tracking Sy

Coherent CO

2

 Laser Radar,” Xitong Gongcheng Yu Dianzi Jish

Vol. 18, Vol. 3, pp. 47-54, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 4; and Zhu D

“Super-Long Range Doppler Laser Radar,” Hongwai Yu J

Gongcheng, 1996, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 8-15, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No

10. Liang Baichuan, “Research on Active Stealth Techn

Shanghai Hangtian, September 29, 1997, pp. 12-16, in FBI

97-272.

11. Zhang Running and Chen Guangfei, “Counter-ARM Sig

Its Doppler Phase Compensation,” Dianzi Kexue Xuekan (Jou

Electronics), January 1, 1997, in FBIS-CST-97-012; Shi Zhen, 

Simulation Study on Deception Technology For Coun

Antiradiation Missiles," Danjian Yu Zhidao Xuebao (Jou

Projectiles, Rockets and Guidance), February 1996, pp. 22-30, in 

Vol. 3, No. 6. Shi is from Harbin Institute of Technology; and 

Weilun, “Research on Spread Spectrum and Bistatic Radar Sy

Zhongguo Hangkong Xuehui Leida Yu Zhidao Jishu Wenzhai 

Aviation Society Radar and Guidance Technology Abstracts), Ma

7 pp., in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 1; and Chen Zongfei, “Alarm of Antira

Missile Directed Against Tracking Radars,” Shanghai Hangtia

Vol. 12, No. 3, in CAMA, 1995, Vol. 2, No. 5. Chen is from the Sh

Institute of Electromechanical Engineering. Also see Sh

“Simulation Research on Defense Against Anti-Radiation Mis

Phased Array Radars,” Daojian Yu Zhidao Xuebao, 1997 (1), pp

in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 3.

12. For an overview of these problems, see Kenneth Allen

Krumel, and Jonathon Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters t

Century, RAND: Santa Monica, 1995.

13. Xu Xingju; and Zang Jize, “Developmental Direction of 

Ground-Based Air Defense Systems” (“Wo Guo Dimian Fangkon

Xitong de Fazhan Fangxiang”), Xiandai Wuqi, 1995.

125
emitted from targets as their detection mechanism. They diff

simple infrared sensors in that they build up a pixelated imag

scene and match it with a digitized template of the target. S

Jinzhou, “Signal Processing System for Infrared Imaging Se

Hongwai Yu Jiguang Gongcheng,” August 1996, pp. 12

FBIS-CST-97-005. The Second Academy’s 25th Research Inst

leading the effort with assistance from COSTIND’s National Un

of Defense Technology and MEI’s 11th and 13th Research Ins

Also see Li Qunzheng, “Xunsu Fazhan de Hongwai Chengxiang J

Zhidao Jishu” (Rapid Development of Infrared Imaging Pr

Guidance Technology), Zhongguo Hangtian, February 1991. En

are most confident about their mercury cadmium telluride (H

long wave infrared (LWIR) detectors, developed by the North 

Research Institute of Electro-Optics (NCRIEO).

15. He Liping, “Research on Millimeter Wave/Infrared Co

Seeker in Hypervelocity Missile,” unpublished paper by the Ae

Institute on S&T Information, CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 3. Publi

Hongwai yu Jiguang Gongcheng, 1996, Vol. 25 (4), pp. 56-65, in 

Vol 3, No. 6; Liu Yongchang, “Analysis of IR/MMW Combined S

Hongwai Jishu, 1994, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 1-8, in CAMA, Vol. 2, 

16. Zhou Shuigeng, “Design of Digital Simulator of Ja

Environment of a Surface-to-Air Missile System,” Shanghai Ha

1995, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 10-14, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 2.

17. David Fulghum, “China Exploiting U.S. Patriot S

Aviation Week & Space Technology Review, January 18, 1993, 

18. ”Moscow Expects to Increase Military Cooperation With 

Moscow Interfax, June 27, 1997.

19. Zhang Hongqi, “High Powered Microwave Weapons,” X

Fangyu Jishu, April 1995, pp. 38-46, in CAMA, 1995, Vol. 2

Zhang is from Second Academy’s Beijing Institute of Electronic S

Engineering. HPM technology is discussed in greater detail i

areas of this report.

20. Gong Jinheng, “High Powered Microwave Weapons: 

Concept in Electronic Warfare,” Dianzi Duikang Jishu, Februar

pp. 1-9, in CAMA, 1995, Vol. 2, No. 5. Gong is from the Sou

Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE), China’s premier el

warfare research entity.

126
Astronautics Publishing House paper HQ-94029, 1994. Zhu is f

Second Academy’s 207th Research Institute; also see “Prel

Experimental Study of Electromagnetic Missiles Conducted,” 

Keji Daxue Xuebao, February 1992, in JPRS-CST-92-013; and “S

Backscattering of Electromagnetic Missiles,” Dianzi Xueba

1992, in JPRS-CST-92-023. As a side note, one of China’s fo

experts on HPM devices is Lin Weigan, who earned his PhD fr

Berkley in 1950.

22. Wang Ying and Xiao Feng, Dianpao Yuanli (Electron

Principles), Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1993, p

23. Zhu Jin and Tan Jianjun, “Simulation Research on 37-m

Antiaircraft Gun System to Intercept Cruise Missiles,” H

Kongzhi, September 1996, pp. 24-31, in FBIS-CST-97-002; an

Jize, “Wo Guo Dimian Fangkong Wuqi Xitong de Fazhan Fan

(“Developmental Direction of China’s Ground-Based Air D

Systems”), Xiandai Wuqi, 1995.

24. There are clear indications CASC, with PLAAF sup

designing an anti-AEW air-to-air missile. Key institutes incl

Shanghai Institute of Electromechancial Engineering and the P

8th Research Institute. Xing Xiaolan, “Development of Anti-

Weapon System,” Yuancheng Kongkong Daodan, June 1996, pp

in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 2; Li Guangpu, “Long Range Multi-use Ai

Missile: Primary System for Attacking Radiating High 

Targets,”Yuancheng Kongkong Daodan, June 1996, pp. 1-13, in 

Vol. 4, No. 2; and Zhang Wangsheng, “Development of Long 

Multipurpose Air-to-air Missile and Construction of An Air D

System,” paper presented at the November 1996 China Astro

Committee, Annual Meeting of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Spe

CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 4.

25. Xu Xingju, p. 27.

26. Liu Xuejun and Zhang Changliu, “Study of Measures to C

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Guoji Hangkong, March 1, 1996, pp

in FBIS-CHI-96-176; and Xu Xingju, p. 17.

27. See Xu Xingci, “Xunhang Daodan Fangyu Cuoshi,” pp

and Xu Xingju, “Tigao Woguo Dimian Fangkong Wuqi Dian

Nengli.” 

127
Missile Troops in Air Defense of Strategic Area,” Air Force 

Academy Journal, 1994, Vol. 16, No. 3, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 5.

29. Such an approach is consistent with the space and 

industry’s “Three Moves on A Chessboard” development stra

have three systems in the R&D and production cycle at the sam

Gao Fuli, “Development Strategy and Serial Research of Anti-T

Ballistic Missiles,” Foreign Missile Technology Development i

October 1994, pp. 48-59, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 4. The three 

approach (sanbuzou) for China’s TMD development is also discu

Yang Chunfu and Liu Xiao’en, “Research Study on U.S. Ballistic 

Development Plan,” Aerospace Information Paper HQ-96009, 1

CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 2. A PAC-3-class interceptor would likely re

millimeter wave, track-via-missile capability.

30. “Source on Developing Multistage Air Defense System,” 

Shimbun, May 30, 1996, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI-96-107; and Zhu Zhe

Huang Peikang, “TBM IR Radiant Signature, Selection of O

Operating Band for Anti-Missile Defenses,” Xitong Gongch

Dianzi Jishu (Systems Engineering and Electronics), January 1

9-17. Zhu and Huang are from the Second Academy’s 207th R

Institute. Also see Wen Xianqiao, “Parameter Modeling of 

Countermeasures for Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles,” Xiandai 

Jishu (Modern Defense Technology), April 1996, pp. 11-23, in 

Vol. 3, No. 6; and Chen Jianxiang, “Research on Counter-

Interception of Tactical Ballistic Missiles,” Xitong Gongcheng Yu 

Jishu, 1998, Vol. 20(4), pp. 18-22, in CAMA Vol. 5, No. 5. Wen X

and Chen Jianxiang are from the Second Academy’s Beijing Ins

Electronic Systems Engineering. Also see Li Guangpu, “Arm

Antitactical Ballistic Missile System,” Shanghai Hangtian, Fe

1994, pp. 36-38, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 1. Li is from Shanghai Ins

Electromechanical Engineering. For a discussion on endoatmo

TMD development, see Wu Guanghua, Liu Yongchang, and Gu Y

“Dual-Mode Millimeter-Wave/IR Seeker for Endoatmos

Interception,” Danjian Jishu (Projectile and Rocket Technology

Vol. 9, No. 3, in FBIS-CHI-97-261. Wu, Liu, and Gu are from t

Qinghua Electromechanical Technology Institute.

31. AMS and defense industry officials consistently advocate 

early warning satellites in concepts for a national reconna

network. Leading institutes for infrared detector R&D include 

Institute of Remote Sensing Equipment, Shanghai Insti

Technical Physics, North China Research Institute of Optoelec

Kunming Institute of Physics, and Shanghai Xinyue Instr

Factory. CAST’s Lanzhou Institute of Physics is a key prov

128
“Hongwai Qijian Guoneiwai Fazhan Dongtai” (Develop

Prospects of Chinese and Foreign Infrared Devices), Zh

Hangtian, March 1992, pp. 41-45; and Wu Runchou, “Hangtian L

Hongwai Jishu de Fazhan” (Development of Space In

Technology), Zhongguo Hangtian, March 1993, pp. 19-23. Fo

references to China’s space-based infrared/ultraviolet te

designs, see Chen Longzhi, “New Developments in Space Cr

Optics,” Diwen Gongcheng (Cyrogenic Engineering), March 19

9-13, in CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 5; and Ma Pinzhong, “Woguo K

Wangyuanjing Fazhan” (Development of China’s Space Tel

Zhongguo Hangtian, July 1994, pp. 29-32. To give China the be

the doubt, the above references do not explicitly state these i

sensors will be used for missile early warning. Space-based i

sensors could plausibly be used for scientific or meteorological pu

However, China, like many other countries, downplays military 

satellites, and would be expected to mask any early warning s

behind the facade of a scientific platform.

32. The former Soviet space-based early warning system, com

in 1982, used a constellation of satellites in highly elliptical M

orbits. The first U.S. missile early warning system, MIDA

launched in the early 1960s and was followed by Defense S

Program (DSP) satellites in the early 1970s. DSP satellites use i

telescopes, backed by an optical component, in a geosynchronou

For information on Chinese missile early warning system

associated technology, see Lu Mingyu, Yi Kui, Yang Junfa, an

Ruzhen, “Development of Signal Source for Real-Time Infrare

Sensor,” Zhongguo Kongjian Kexue Jishu, June 1996, pp. 6

FBIS-CST-96-016; and Qiu Yulun, “Staring Focal Plane Array I

for Missile Early Warning,” Kongjian Jishu Qingbao Yanjiu, Ma

pp. 150-160, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 2.

33. Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathon P

China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century, RAND Project Ai

study, 1995.

34. This concept, part of an advertised Theater Air Defense 

(TADS), is outlined in an undated brochure from the 28th R

Institute, Nanjing, obtained during author’s January 1996 visi

35. Ibid.

36. Zhu Youwen and Feng Yi, Gaojishu Tiaojianxia de Xin

(Information Warfare Under High Technology Conditions), 

Academy of Military Science Press, 1994, p. 316. The U.S. N

129
mission from peacetime forward presence to war at sea.

37. Liang Zhenxing, “New Military Revolution and Infor

Warfare,” p. 8.

38. Li Chunshan, “Introduction and Explanation of the N

Military Standard ‘Camouflage Requirements for Surface-to-

Missile Weapon Systems’,” Hangtian Biaozhunhua 

Standardization), 1994, Vol. 5, pp. 12-15, summarized in CAMA

Vol. 2, No. 1. Li is from the Beijing Space Systems Engineering 

Department.

39. Yang Chunfu and Liu Xiao’en, “Fanweixing Wuqi 

Fazhan Qianjing de Yanjiu” (“Study on the Developmental Prosp

ASAT Weapons”), Aerospace Information Research, HQ-93005

707 Institute.

40. See Lewis and Xue for information on the 640 program. A

note, leading U.S. experts have noted that ABM systems genera

inherent capabilities as ASATs, but the converse is not always 

41. Wang Chunyuan, China’s Space Industry and Its Str

International Cooperation, Stanford: Stanford University, Ce

International Security and Arms Control, July 1996, p. 4; 

Building Satellite Tracking Station on Tarawa,” Asian Defense J

March 1997, p. 66; and “Satellite Command Station Operat

Kiribati,” Zhongguo Xinwenshe, October 14, 1997, inFBIS-CHI-

42. Trip report, NASA visit to China, June 12-22, 19

example, China plans to develop a 500-meter aperture radi

telescope for deep space exploration. With a price of approxima

million dollars, the system, which will be based in Guizhou P

will primarily support civilian academic research, but could also 

to supplement China’s space surveillance network. CAST and th

Academy of Sciences are involved. See “Beijing Plans to Deve

Meter Radio Telescope,” Xinhua, April 9, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-9

43. Examples include Yin Xingliang and Chen Ding

“Guidance and Control in Terminal Homing Phase of a 

Interceptor,” Xitong Gongcheng yu Dianzi Jishu (Systems Engi

and Electronics), 1995, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 1-9, summarized in 

1995, Vol. 2, No. 5; Yin Xingliang, Chen Dingchang, and Ko

“TESOC Method Based on Estimated Value Theory For a 

Interceptor in Terminal Homing,” Xitong Gongcheng yu Dianz

1995, Vol. 17, No. 8, pp. 1-14; Yin Xingliang, Chen Dingxiang, an

130
Acceleration of Space Interceptor,” Xitong Gongcheng yu Dianz

1995, Vol. 17 (5), pp. 1-10, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 4; and Shi Xi

Wang Zicai, and Ke Qihong, Acta Aeronautica et Astronautica 

1995, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 291-298. Also see Chen Haixin, “Lo

Infrared Automated Target Recognition System For Space 

Seekers,” Hongwai yu Jiguang Gongcheng (Infrared and 

Engineering), 1996, Vol. 25 (3); Li Fengchun, “Summation 

Micro-Orbital Control Rocket Motor For the Miniature H

Interceptor,” Guti Huojian Jishu (Solid Motor Technology), 19

18, No. 2, pp.1-7, in CAMA, Vol. 1, No.5; and Zhou Hongjia

Yongjun, and Wu Ruilin, “Application of PWPF Modulator in 

Interceptor Side Force Control,” Xitong Gongcheng yu Dianz

April 1997, pp. 9-12, in FBIS-CHI-97-272. For reference to i

terminal guidance, see Shi Xiaoping, “Estimation of the Range B

the Intercepter and Target During Infrared Terminal Guid

Space Interception,” Hangkong Xuebao, 1995, Vol. 16, No. 

281-298, in CAMA, 1996, Vol. 3, No. 5. Chen Dingchang, obviou

involved in evolving ASAT technology, is director of the CASC 

Academy and editor-in-chief of Systems Engineering and Elec

Impulse radar is also known as ultrawideband radar, which C

engineers see as one of several approaches to counter 

technology. Some of these references could be refer

exoatmospheric intercept of ballistic missiles.

44. Xu Hui and Sun Zhongkang, “Temperature Differences B

Satellites and Satellite Decoys,” NUDT Journal, 1994, Vol. 16

also see Li Hong, “Identification of Satellites and Its Decoys 

Multisensor Data Fusion,” Xiandai Fangyu Jishu, June 1997, pp

in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 1. Li is from the NUDT Electronic Tec

Department.

45. For references to control problems, see Deng Zichen, “P

in High Precision Computation for Nonlinear Control of 

Interceptors,” Feixing Lixue, 1998, Vol. 16 (1), pp. 85-89, in CAM

5, No. 5. Yang Yingbo, “Control Research on a Space Intercepto

Terminal Guidance Phase,” unpublished BUAA paper, May 19

Xiaoing, “Study on Pulse Guidance Law for Space Intercept

Zhidao yu Yinxin, 1994, (4), pp. 1-4, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 3. Shi 

the Harbin Institute of Technology’s Simulation Center. Deng 

Northwest Polytechnical University. For other studies, 

Zhongying, “Study on Mid-Course Guidance for Aerodynamic Co

Anti-Missile Defense,” unpublished paper (BH-B4774), 

University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA), May 1

CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 5; and Li Zhongying, “Approximative Estim

Optimal Guidance for Frontal Ballistic Missile Intercepts,” unpu

131
“Mathematical Modeling of Optimal Guidance for Anti-T

Ballistic Missiles,” unpublished BUAA paper (BH-B4854), May 

CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 5.

46. Yang Qunfu and Liu Xiao’en, “Fanweixing Wuqi Xitong 

Qianjing de Yanjiu” (“Study on the Developmental Prospects fo

Weapon Systems”), Hangtian Qingbao Yanjiu (Aerospace Infor

Research), March 1993. According to one footnote, the Third Aca

Cheng Delin was responsible for an assessment of an air launche

system. The footnote was associated with a portion of the pape

addressed China’s domestic ASAT program. Unfortunately, 

omitted this part of the study. Also see Li Fengchun, “Summatio

the Miniature Homing Interceptor and Its Micro Orbital Contr

Motors,” in Journal of Solid Rocket Motor Technology, 1994, Vo

in CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 5. 

47. Yang and Liu, p. 77. See Appendix IV for more on 

directed energy weapons program.

48. Hui Zongxi, “Research, Design of SG-1 Free Electron 

Qiang Jiguang yu Lizishu, August 1990, in JPRS-CST-

“COSTIND Minister on Aerospace, Laser Advances,” Renmin 

April 3, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-082-96; and “SG-1 FEL Amplifier 

Reaches 140MW,” Qiang Jiguang yu Lizishu, December 1

JPRS-CST-94-019. On FEL miniaturization, see “High Perfo

Short Period FEL Wiggler,” Qiang Jiguang yu Lizishu, May 1

JPRS-CST-92-019. The output power probably does not repres

actual amount of energy which would be delivered to the targe

49. Chou Kuan-wu, “China’s Reconnaissance Satellites,” 

Chiao Ching, March 16, 1998, pp. 36-40, in FBIS-CHI-98-098. 

Chiao Ching, or Wide Angle, is a Hong Kong-based publicati

close ties to the PRC military establishment. Official U.S. Gove

reports are consistent with this assessment. The 1998 Re

Congress on PRC Military Capabilities (pursuant to Section 122

FY98 National Defense Authorization Act) states “China alrea

possess the capability to damage, under specific conditions, 

sensors on satellites that are very vulnerable to damage by 

However, given China’s current interest in laser technolog

reasonable to assume that Beijing would develop a weapon tha

destroy satellites in the future.”

50. See “Qian Xuesen at COSTIND S&T Committee Meetin

Ribao, March 14, 1994, p. 1; “Nation’s Adaptive Optics Techn

World’s Front Ranks,” Zhongguo Kexue Bao, May 21, 1

132
Ribao, October 30, 1992, in JPRS-CST-92-025; “Effects of Defo

Mirror/COAT System Finite Subaperature Size on Compe

Efficiency,” Zhongguo Jiguang (Chinese Journal of Lasers), F

1992, in JPRS-CST-92-010; and “Demonstration of U

Illumination on Target Focusing High Power Laser Bea

Guangxue Xuebao (Acta Optica Sinica), March 1992, in 

CST-92-013.

51. “Methods for Investigating Near-Field Power in Ground

High Power Laser Weapon Testing,” Zhongguo Jiguang (C

Journal of Lasers), December 1992, in JPRS-CST-93-008.

52. Li Hui and Wang Zibin, “Development of High P

Microwave Weapons and Their Applications for Counterspace 

Defense,” Zhidao yu Yinxin, 1995 (1), pp. 3-15, in CAMA, 1995

No. 3. This article has also appeared as an Aerospace Infor

Research article, HQ-94030. China’s HPM program is discussed 

detail in another part of this study.

53. Zhu Youwen and Feng Yi, Gaojishu Tiaojianxia de Xin

(Information Warfare Under High Technology Conditions), Aca

Military Science Press, 1994, pp. 308-310; ”Beam Energy We

Powerful as Thunder and Lightening,” Jiefangjun Bao, Decem

1995, in FBIS-CHI-96-039; “Outlook for 21st Century Infor

Warfare,” Guoji Hangkong, (International Aviation), March 5, 

FBIS-CHI-95-114; “Microwave Pulse Generation,” Qiang Jigu

Lizishu, May 1994, in JPRS-CST-94-014. Most writings o

development come from these three organizations.

54. Wang Yongkui, “Can China Successfully Protect The 

Gorges Dam?,” Tangtai, October 15, 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-208

55. Wu Jinliang, “Range Testing of Satellite Commun

Countermeasures,” Electronic Countermeasure Technolo

Intelligence Reform Abstracts, November 1995, pp. 96-101, in 

1996, Vol. 3, No. 6. Reference to a Chinese study on a GPS jam

included in author’s unpublished report, China’s Space and 

Industry, June 1995.

56. Du Xiangwan, “Analysis and Discussion of Arms Co

Space,” paper presented at the bilateral meeting between the C

People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament and the U.S. N

Academy of Sciences, October 16-18, 1992 in Beijing. Du Xia

Deputy Director of the Institute of Applied Physics and Compu

Mathematics, is China’s leading expert on arms control issues.

133
the same bilateral conference cited in the previous footnote. L

arms control expert from CASC’s China Academy of L

Technology.

58. This assessment is outlined in detail in New World Vis

and Space Power for the 21st Century, (Space Applications Volu

56.

59. Yang and Liu, p. 76.

134
CONCLUSION

China’s military industrial complex—driven 

evolving doctrine which emphasizes information domi

preemptive, long-range precision strikes against c

nodes, and a highly capable air defense—is cond

preliminary and applied R&D into a dizzying ar

technologies and weapons systems. China’s success, ho

in achieving technological breakthroughs and fieldi

kind of reconnaissance/strike complex discussed i

monograph is not assured. Yet even modest breakth

could advance the PLA’s ability to achieve its na

security objectives, including forceful integration of T

into the PRC, and deny the United States an abi

intervene. 

Obstacles in PLA Strategic Modernization.

There are a number of obstacles which will com

China’s ability to modernize the PLA. First, defense R&

production must compete with other economic prio

Advance research, at least compared to model R&D, t

and production, is relatively cheap and can produce 

spin-offs for the civilian sector. However, the costs o

programs would likely rise significantly the closer they 

toward production. Therefore, China’s defense industri

afford to do theoretical evaluation on a variety of system

technologies, but will be forced to selectively choose sy

for further development.

There is a widespread perception that the techno

level of the Chinese defense industrial complex, to i

quality control, is just too far behind to ever produce wea

which could challenge U.S. supremacy. However, most 

the PLA believe matching the technological level of the U

States is not necessary to complicate U.S. power projec

135
and that which was advocated by Deng Xiaoping, i

selective emphasis into a few “pockets of excellen

enough.

Since the demise of the USSR and dissolution of any 

international export control regime, some of the world’

advanced technology has flooded into China. It is com

argued that the rate of technology introduction is simpl

than the defense industries can handle. China ha

difficulties translating theory and design success into r

weapon systems. Beijing is painfully aware o

shortcoming, and has taken steps to improve manufac

through the widespread introduction of computer 

manufacturing, highly precise machine tooling equip

and added emphasis on integrating research and produc

China’s defense industries have been purchasing a 

range of foreign high tech equipment without much th

as to how to integrate various components into a s

Examples include their air traffic control and na

telecommunications infrastructure modernization. Aw

their shortcomings, the defense industrial complex is s

out international systems integration consultants. Se

considerations and bureaucratic in-fighting, how

continue to slow progress.

Strategic Modernization

and the Cross-Strait Military Balance.

Despite these obstacles, it is dangerous to underes

China’s ability to make significant leaps in capability ov

next decade or two. Mistakes in assessing PLA modern

could be extremely costly to U.S. regional interests an

in U.S. lives. Nowhere is this more true than assessi

balance in the Taiwan Strait and the effect U.S. interv

could have.

China’s strategic modernization has the poten

significantly alter the military equation in Taiwan 

early in the next century. Emphasis on preem

long-range precision strikes, information domin

136
could enable the PLA to defang Taiwan’s ability to c

military operations. While Beijing has a range of other o

available, such as seizing an off-shore island or cond

missile exercises similar to those of March 1996, paral

the Taiwan military can allow Beijing to achieve its obj

with relatively few casualties and without wides

destruction of the island.

The following discussion provides one scenario 

could bring into play the doctrine and strategy 

discussion as well as systems under development. In 20

example, should the CMC decide to settle the Taiwan qu

once and for all, doctrinal writings and systems 

development indicate the PLA’s first objective could 

conduct parallel operations against Taiwan’s early w

radar sites, SIGINT facilities, power plants, nationa

command centers, and communications nodes in or

paralyze Taiwan’s military command and control appa

PLA operations would require coordinated use of ele

warfare assets, anti-radiation missiles, land attack 

missiles, ballistic missiles, special forces, and conventio

strikes. Preparation and coordination for such a co

operation would have to go undetected by Taiwan an

intelligence. This would require strict emission securi

passive counterspace measures, such as transmiss

satellite warning messages, concealment, camouflag

deception.

PLA electronic warfare operations would be di

against Taiwan’s approximately 25 early warning rada

Through the GSD Fourth Department ELINT collectio

PLA likely has a library of the operating parameters o

radars, which can be used to program ship and airborne 

jammers. Without sophisticated ECCM, the performa

Taiwan’s early warning radar network would lik

degraded. If radars are still operating, air-lau

antiradiation missile strikes could either destroy the 

or at least force the operators to turn them off. Low flyin

attack helicopters, if fielded by 2010, could be emplo

well. Special operations forces could not only strike se

137
connecting the radar sites to air defense command ce

The PLA would also likely attempt to jam, or if availa

2010, use long-range antiradiation air-to-air missiles to 

Taiwan’s E-2T AEW platforms should they be airborn

Taiwan’s surface-to-air missile sites, especially M

Air Defense System (MADS) and Tien-kung I and II, wo

also primary targets. Air defense radars and tactical C

would be the focus of jamming operations, antiradiatio

attack cruise, and ballistic missile strikes. Like the 

warning radars, the threat of antiradiation missile s

could force operators to shut them down. 

PLA doctrinal writings on command and control w

strongly indicate they would target strategic com

control, communications, and intelligence centers a

Major SIGINT facilities which would be monitoring som

activities would be targeted with ballistic and cruise m

strikes. Special forces could target antennas an

communications links to command centers. Minis

National Defense and Taiwan Air Force (TAF) com

centers would also likely be attacked. Hardened com

centers, however, are not easy to destroy. PLA oper

therefore, would likely be directed agains

communications links, to include fiber-optic c

connecting the command centers to the outside world. 

same time, PLA information operations would attempt 

down Taiwan’s military and civilian power and tra

tation computer systems through the insertion of viru

In parallel with strikes against Taiwan’

infrastructure, the PLA Second Artillery may target Ta

eight primary airfields. Ballistic and cruise missile s

against airfields would likely focus on runways

facilities, and barracks housing pilots. Airfields hosting 

F-16s, and any electronic combat aircraft would likel

priority. If their missiles are indeed able to achie

accuracy of 30-45 meters or better, the PLA would 

attempt to target specific taxiways as well as entrances 

underground aircraft storage facilities.

138
off the ground, PLA air defense modernization and 

programs could severely limit successful counter

counterforce operations. One option for Taiwan to coun

ballistic and high performance cruise missile threat is t

out offensive missions against the PLA bases, ship

submarines which are carrying out the strikes. Howeve

if able to generate sorties in between missile or air s

finding and then reaching mobile Second Artillery laun

missile garrisons, and command and control facilitie

dense air defense environment could be a daunting tas

The cumulative effect of simultaneous strikes a

critical nodes in Taiwan’s C

4

I infrastructure, SAM site

airfields could be systemic paralysis. A temporary brea

of Taiwan’s early warning apparatus, command and c

structure, major SAM sites, and airfields would allow 

window of opportunity for the conduct of convention

strikes against the same set of targets, as well as a b

range of targets. Ballistic and cruise missile strikes pr

would not be able to completely shut down an a

However, missile strikes, combined with an inform

vacuum caused by heavy jamming and disrupt

communications, could be enough to seriously complica

TAF’s ability to generate sorties. 

This, in theory, provides a brief window for the PLA

follow up with second wave of strikes, this time using P

assets with precision guided bombs. Through the 

ballistic, land attack cruise, and antiradiation missile

force multipliers such as electronic warfare and com

attacks, the PLAAF can offset any disadvantages it 

comparision to the TAF. The end result of these fir

waves—the first using a combination of jam

antiradiation, cruise, and ballistic missiles, and s

operations forces and the second employing conventio

strikes—would be enough to effectively suppress Ta

information infrastructure and air defense system. 

Beijing-based analysts believe air superiority over T

could be acheived in 45 minutes or less.

1

139
numerous options available. Beijing could simply esta

no-fly-zone in order to pressure Taiwan authorities to 

to their demands. If further hostilities are necessary, th

could leverage its air superiority to then achieve domin

the waters around Taiwan. If occupying the isla

necessary, a final step, after air and naval superior

established, would be to transport PLA ground forces 

the Strait. Owning the skies above and the waters a

Taiwan, PLAAF and PLA(N) assets would provid

necessary firepower to ensure Taiwan ground force resi

would be minimal. PLA preparation of the battle

through long-range precision strikes and inform

operations threatens Taiwan’s ability to command and c

its forces, and significantly reduces its costs of achiev

superiority—even with the PLA’s backward air force. In 

emphasis on information dominance, missile forces, a

defense could decisively tip the cross-Strait military b

in Beijing’s favor. 

PLA Strategic Modernization and the United

States.

The PLA’s strategic modernization has implicatio

the United States. An increasingly capable PLA do

necessarily mean China is an emerging threat. C

strategy is based on developing a military that is rela

cheap, does not require a large infrastructure to mainta

that nevertheless could complicate U.S. power proj

ability should interests collide. There are signs that 

within China believe that armed conflict with the U

States is inevitable in the long term, especially over T

In the short to mid term, though, China must main

peaceful environment—and good relations with the U

States—in order to develop its economy, S&T bas

military force.

2

 While there is modernization underway 

the board, only certain areas, such as C

4

I and missiles

been granted special attention. Successful fielding of 

handful of key systems could significantly hampe

operations in the region.

140
involvement. One could, however, be devised. Open 

writings and R&D efforts indicate that PLA plann

consider the possibility of U.S. intervention. In the sc

above, the PLA would conduct spasmodic, preemptive s

to quickly establish information dominance an

superiority over the skies of Taiwan. U.S. aircraft 

battle groups and USAF assets operating out of Ok

Japan and Guam may attempt to prevent or remove the 

air superiority.

China is devoting considerable resources t

preparing for potential conflict with the United S

especially over Taiwan. Despite its overwhelming vict

the Gulf War, Chinese analysts have concluded th

military has vulnerabilities which can be exploite

example, the United States continues to rely on a few 

bases from which to project power into the region 

contingency situation. Heavy concentrations of a

flowing into bases will become increasingly easy to iden

will aircraft carrier battle groups operating within th

island chain. C

4

I assets, to include critical nodes in 

would be monitored as well.

The PLA is placing a premium on denying the U

States and other potential adversaries inform

dominance. Fiber-optics, communications and opera

security practices, and increasingly sophisticated 

measures will make it difficult to correctly identify and 

operational centers of gravity. In the unfortunate eve

major war, Beijing’s investment into a highly capa

defense system, with emphasis on counterstealth, 

significantly raise the human and material costs of att

targets on the mainland, even if critical nodes c

identified. U.S. logistical bases and prepo facilitie

become more vulnerable as well.

China’s defense industrial establishment is invest

the development of components of a sensor network 

within the the next 15 years, could enable the PLA to 

identify, and track ships operating around its peri

Successful deployment of electronic reconnaissance and 

141
ELINT and radar satellites could work well together to 

identify, and track U.S. carrier battle groups and other v

of interest. The combination is effective because they wo

complementary and redundant. If the ship being tracke

silent, the passive electronic reconnaissance satellite w

be able to pick it up but the SAR satellite will still regis

position. If the ship attempts to jam the radar, the E

platform can easily pick it up. Using the spacecr

combination, therefore, makes it extremely difficult f

enemy ships to hide, especially if linked to PLA ground

SIGINT, surface wave over-the-horizon radars, subma

and ostensibly civilian sentry vessels operating in th

ocean.

Chinese publications are already assessing th

United States could not sustain combat operations in d

of Taiwan. Analysts are carefully evaluating vulnera

in U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. Shortcomings of a

carriers, some have concluded, include their prom

signature, tendency for bad weather to degrade oper

reliance on complex logistics, poor ASW and ant

capability, and difficulties in rapidly repairing damaged 

decks. Ways to counter aircraft carriers include mine 

submarine operations, electronic warfare, atta

carrier-borne AEW assets, employment of large num

UAVs, and night operations. Aircraft carrier battle g

say Beijing-based publications, are too reliant on 

vulnerable logistics ships and disruption of supply lin

force withdrawal of the carriers.

The PLA does not limit vulnerability assessments 

U.S. Navy. Assuming Japanese permission is granted, 

operations out of Okinawa’s Kadena Airbase, Chinese w

say, would be hampered by the distance beween Okinaw

Taiwan. Deploying USAF assets to Taiwan would open 

up to attack by highly accurate ballistic and cruise m

Resuppling Taiwan by air or ship would also be vulner

attack. Analysts have also examined employment of ba

missiles against carriers.

3

 In short, China’s force mo

zation, to a certain degree, appears to be geared t

142
This anti-access strategy is centered on targeting opera

centers of gravity, including C

2

 centers, airbases, and a

carrier battle groups located around the periphery of Ch

China and the Revolution in Military Affairs.

Chinese open source writings often discuss inform

dominance, long-range precision strike, and asymm

warfare within the context of a revolution in military 

(RMA) with Chinese characteristics. In fact, Chinese an

have pointed out that the RMA could favor a count

China more than the United States. Ironically, one rea

the U.S. experience in the Gulf War conflict:

It is the U.S. victory in the Gulf War that can hinder t

further development of the U.S. military . . . the U.S. milita

has already become excessively reluctant to part from 

existing military power and concepts—it is very possi

future enemies will use this weakness and in the new RMA p

forth more advanced thinking than the US.

4

Another reason is the proliferation of inform

technology. Chinese observers believe that U.S. superio

technology associated with information warfare is r

fading. To a great extent, some of the world’s most adv

information technology is widely available on the comm

market. Strategists point out that the United 

overestimates its ability to gain information superiority 

face of a determined adversary that has a well-estab

program to deny U.S. sensors its intelligence objective

The RMA’s highly precise weaponry, efficient ar

sensors, and modern, survivable telecommunic

infrastructure may be more conducive to denying th

power projection than in making power projection th

peace action which many military leaders expect. Littl

technology gives the United States the capability to 

decisive force half-way around the world without large 

and platforms. The RMA shows no signs of reducin

dependence on a few fixed air bases, ports, and ca

143
will be far more difficult than being a regional defende

China, operating from its own territory, is growing 

ability to disperse assets, set decoys, confuse sensor

distribute supplies well in advance. These technical ch

will make offensive military action much more diffic

well-prepared regional power like China can hid

disperse its forces much better than the United State

clear that the RMA, which stems from precise we

powerful sensors, and increased communications capa

could shift the balance of power to a country like 

despite clear U.S. superiority and what most analysts 

still call a backward PLA.

Asymmetrical advantages which the PLA may a

over time have political implications. As it be

increasingly clear that power projection will become 

costly, both in terms of lives and material, the United 

may find that interests it previously judged vital will no 

warrant intervention. Thus, China may well defea

strategy without actual combat, the essence of Sun Tz

no coincidence that as China develops an ability to com

power projection, it is also beginning to use political r

against the U.S. system of bilateral alliances an

maintenance of U.S. forward deployed forces in the reg

In the long term, China may hope to cha

unquestioned U.S. supremacy in space. Cooperation in 

technology with former Soviet states, France, and Ge

increases the chances of Chinese success in this area. C

rise in space comes at a time when Russia’s space prog

shriveling up due to a lack of funding. At one time, R

leaders considered abandoning their manned space pr

and stated that orbiting Russian communication sat

may cease to exist at any time. The Russian space pr

has a severe shortage of launch vehicles as well.

6

There are no easy solutions to potential challenges 

by PLA modernization. The first problem lies in ana

approaches to evaluating PLA modernization. Most 

the U.S.-based PLA watching community are skept

144
would be a shift from concentration on the PLA’s 

shortcomings to a careful, sober examination of what th

could do now and in the future. The first step is recog

that the PLA intentionally masks its capabilities 

fundamental approach to deterrence. While the 

purposefully displays its capabilities to effect deter

China hides its strengths and weaknesses as a means to 

uncertainty into the minds of potential adversaries.

Greater effort must be made to convince China that b

cooperative and transparent member of the interna

community is in China’s interests. We must conti

expand our network of contacts with the PLA in order to 

understand their long-range objectives and guide 

toward responsible behavior within the region. I

relationship with the PLA, though, we must be reali

anticipating how far the PLA will go in opening their d

outside observers. Transparency is anathema to 

doctrinal emphasis on concealment and dece

Nevertheless, maintaining a wide ranging dialogue wil

building confidence and reducing suspicions. In short, 

which is able to complicate U.S. power projection th

asymmetrical means does not automatically mean Chi

threat to the United States if the relationship is 

managed. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. For an assessment of Taiwan vulnerabilities and PLA 

strategies using combination of ballistic and cruise missiles, el

warfare, and aircraft, see Yuan Lin, “The Taiwan Strait is No L

Barrier—PLA Strategies for Attacking Taiwan,” Kuang Chiao 

(Wide Angle), April 16, 1996, No. 283, pp. 14-19. Wide Angle is 

Kong-based publication with close links to the PLA. For an i

mainland discussion on use of ballistic missiles against airfields

Xinyi, “On the Air Supremacy and Air Defense of Taiwan and C

Taiwan an ‘Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier’?,” Taiwan de Junbei (

Military Preparations), July 1, 1996, pp. 11-18, in FBIS-CHI-97

is the analyst who asserts the Taiwan Air Force would be broug

knees in about 45 minutes. 

145
United States Will Eventually Go To War,” Cheng Ming, May 1

15-16, in FBIS-CHI-97-126.

3. Ying Nan, “Hangmu de Biduan Ji Fanhangmu Zu

(“Shortcomings of Aircraft Carriers and Anti-Carrier Opera

Xiandai Junshi, January 1998, pp. 13-15; Zhu Bao, “Discus

Technical Means to Attack Aircraft Carriers With Tactical B

Missiles,” Hubei Hangtian Keji, 1997 (1), pp. 46-49, in CAMA, 19

4, No. 4. Zhu is from the 066 Base Institute of Precision Mac

Employment of ballistic missiles against aircraft carriers cou

reality if the First Academy is able to master maneuvering r

vehicles and terminal guidance technologies. Also see Chan

“Analysis of the Defense System of American Aircraft Carriers

presented during November 1997 conference of National 

Designers Network, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 3. Chang is from the 

Institute of Space Systems Engineering, CASC’s primary 

systems design institute. In addition, see “U.S. Military Interve

Cross-Strait Conflict Seen As Unlikely,” Taiwan de Junbei, 

1996, pp. 76-79, in FBIS-CHI-97-302; and Su Qi, “Interven

Taiwan Question Seen As Harmful to U.S. Interests,” Tai

Junbei, July 1, 1996, pp. 72-75, in FBIS-CHI-97-302.

4. Zhu Xiaoli and Zhao Xiaozhuo, Mei’E Xin Junshi Gemi

United States and Russia in the New Military Revolution), Beijin

Press, 1996, pp. 40-45.

5. Ibid.

6. “Russia Official Says Finances Threaten Nation’s Space 

Boston Globe, December 20, 1996.

146
CHINA AEROSPACE CORPORATION

ORGANIZATION

Director: Liu Jiyuan. Russian educated, former 

president of CALT.

Vice-Directors: 

• Wang Liheng. Former Third Academy vice-pres

• Luan Enjie. Navigation and control expert.

• Bai Bai’er. Educated at Harbin Institu

Technology.

• Xia Guohong. PhD from University of Californ

Total Number of CASC Employees: 270,000

Direct Reporting Elements:

• General Office. Manages daily duties of 

headquarters.

• Comprehensive Planning Department. Dev

long-range developmental strategies and polic

• Scientific Research and Production Depart

Manages fiscal year planning for commercial 

launches and military and civil production.

• S&T Department. Oversees basic research pro

• International Cooperation Department. Respo

for international exchanges and negotiations.

147
Secuty epatetSaeguads oat

China’s space and missile R&D and production

• China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CG

Markets a wide range of items, to include sa

launch services and a broad range of civil and m

products. China Precision Machinery Import/E

Corporation (CPMIEC), a subordinate entity 

CGWIC, has dominated the missile sales realm

701st Research Institute Beijing Institute of

Aerodynamics. Conducts

windtunnel testing for CAS

systems. 

707th Research Institute Institute for Astronautics

Information. Collects, analy

and distributes information 

use throughout the aerospa

community.

708th Research Institute Institute of Space Standard

ization

710th Research Institute Institute of Computer Syst

307 Factory Nanjing Chenguang Machi

Factory. Final assembly for 

fueled missile systems. Em

7,800 people.

• Science and Technology Committee.

• China Resource Satellite Application Center.Di

by Wu Meirong. Conducts liaison with oth

remote sensing community.

• Beijing Simulation Center. Asia’s largest simu

facility.

• Beijing Space Technology Test Center

148
Seyag guag yac acey Co

• Shenyang Xinle Precision Machinery Compan

• Xinyang Company

1st ACADEMY

CHINA ACADEMY OF LAUNCH TECHNOLOG

Director: Shen Xinshun

Vice-Director: Xu Dazhe

Location: Nanyuan, adjacent to PLAAF Nanyuan A

in southern suburbs of Beijing.

Mission: R&D and production of launch vehicles; 

fueled surface-to-surface missiles; and solid-f

surface-to-surface and submarine launched mi

Employs over 27,000 personnel. Business name of B

Wanyuan Industry Corporation. Organized in

research institutes and seven factories.

Important departments, institutes, and factori

1st Planning Department Beijing Institute of Astrona

Systems Engineering (Liqu

Systems)

4th Planning Department Beijing Institute of Electro

mechanical Systems Engin

(Solid systems engineering)

11th Research Institute Beijing Institute of Liquid 

Engines. Also known as Be

Fengyuan Machinery Comp

Directed by Liu Guoqiu and

employs over 900 people.

Operates 067 Base liaison o

and test site in southwest

suburbs of Beijing.

149
Control. Colocated with 2nd

Academy facilities on Yong

Road in western Beijing. O

800 personnel assigned.

Established in 1958. Engag

R&D of missile related guid

technology to include GPS 

exploitation. Directed by D

Ruohuan.

13th Research Institute Beijing Institute of Control

Devices. R&D of inertial

instrument technology such 

gyros and accelerometers. O

700 assigned. Ding Hengga

served as deputy director.

Current director is Sun

Zhaorong.

14th Research Institute Beijing Special

Electromechanical Institut

Warhead development. Clo

associated with CAEP in ef

miniaturize warheads. Emp

800 personnel and directed 

Wu Zhaozong.

15th Research Institute Beijing Institute of Special

Engineering Machinery. Gr

equipment, to include laun

control and missile launche

survivability. Directed by B

Yuanji.

702nd Research Institute Beijing Institute of Structu

Environmental Engineerin

Directed by Yang Yongxin.

703rd Research Institute Beijing Research Institute 

Materials and Technology.

Directed by Mao Huamin.

150
Telemetry (BRIT). Since 19

engaged in exploitation of G

Employs over 1000 personn

Li Bingchang.

200 Factory Guanghua Radio Factory.

Control system electronic

components.

210 Factory Beijing Jianhua Electronic 

Instrument Factory. Inertia

components. More than 120

employees. Close associatio

with 13th Research Institu

Located in Nanyuan.

211 Factory Capital Space Machinery 

Corporation. General Assem

Plant (Liquid systems).

Located in Nanyuan compl

230 Factory Beijing Xinghua Machinery

Factory. Located on Yongdi

Road.

7107 Factory Inertial Devices Factory. L

in Baoji. Associated with 23

Factory.

Beijing Experimental Electronic hydrolic servo

Factory systems. Located in Muxid

West Beijing.

Beijing Wanyuan Sealing

Factory

2nd ACADEMY

CHANGFENG ELECTROMECHANICAL

TECHNOLOGY DESIGN ACADEMY

Director: Chen Dingchang. Replaced Liu Congjun.

151
Mission: R&D and production of air and missile de

ASAT, and associated radar systems. 

Number of personnel: 12,800

Important departments, institutes, and factori

2nd Planning Department Beijing Institute of Electron

Systems Engineering.

Department-level institute

responsible for air/missile

defense and ASAT systems

engineering. Employs over 

700 engineers. Directed by 

Qi.

17th Research Institute Beijing Institute of Control 

Electronic Technology. Loca

in Muxidi, West Beijing.

23rd Research Institute Beijing Institute of Radio

Measurement. R&D of rada

systems. More than 1300 p

Located on Yongding Road 

directed by Huang Huai.

25th Research Institute Beijing Institute of Remote

Sensing Equipment. Radar 

optical terminal guidance

systems. Directed by Sun

Zhaoxin. 

203rd Research Institute Beijing Institute of Radio

Metrology and Measureme

More than 250 engineers.

Directed by Miao Fuquan.

204th Research Institute Beijing Institute of Comput

Applications and Simulatio

Technology. Computer softw

and simulation technology.

152
Equipment (Jixie Shebei).

Launchers and other groun

equipment. Employs 570 pe

Directed by Qin Ye.

207th Research Institute Beijing Institute of

Environmental Features. R

into target characteristics.

Microwave, optical, and las

environmental engineering

Manages microwave 

anechoic chamber and lase

laboratory. Space observati

Directed by Zhao Ji.

208th Research Institute Information Center and

publisher of 2nd Academy’s

journal, Systems Engineeri

and Electronics Technology

210th Research Institute Xian Changfeng

Electromechanical Institut

Electromechanical systems

engineering. Employs over

1500 personnel. R&D on

telemetry, dynamic strengt

heat/cold testing. Directed 

Huang Wangsheng.

706th Research Institute Computer development

112 Factory Xinfeng Machinery Factory

Final assembly plant for SA

etc.

123 Factory Air Defense Missile Warhe

283 Factory Ground Control Systems

284 Factory Control Systems Manufactu

Xinjian Power Machinery P

Located on Yongding Road.

153
Plant

3rd ACADEMY

HAIYING ACADEMY OF ELECTROMECHANIC

TECHNOLOGY

Director: Wang Jianmin

Location: Yungang, in southwestern suburbs of Be

Number of personnel: 14,500 in 10 research ins

and two factories.

Mission: R&D and production of anti-ship and land 

cruise missiles and associated systems. Establish

1961. S&T Commission headed by Yao Shaofu.

3rd Design Department Beijing Institute of

Electromechanical Enginee

Responsible for anti-ship/la

attack cruise missile design 

systems engineering. Direc

Li Huiting. Over 1200 pers

assigned.

31st Research Institute Power Machinery Research

Institute. Develops cruise m

propulsion systems. Emplo

more than 1,300 personnel

Established in 1957, predat

establishment of 3rd Acade

Directed by Zhang Zhenjia.

33rd Research Institute Beijing Institute of Automa

Control Equipment. Cruise

missile autopilot and inerti

naval systems. Located in

Yungang.

154
Measurement. Located in

Hepingli, Beijing.

310th Research Institute Information collection, ana

and dissemination. Produce

advocacy papers on cruise m

systems.

8357th Research Institute Jinhang Institute of Compu

Technology. Control system

on-board computer systems

Located in Tianjin. 470

personnel.

8358th Research Institute Jinhang Institute of Techn

guidance. Located in Tianji

Publishes technical journal

Infrared and Laser Enginee

8359th Research Institute Beijing Special Machinery

(Tezhong Jixie) Institute. C

missile launching equipme

(tube, air, etc). Russian

exchanges.

119 Factory Autopilot systems

159 Factory Xinghang Electromechanic

Factory. Located in Yungan

239 Factory Beijing Hangxing Machine

Building Factory. Located o

Hepingli Street in Beijing.

General assembly of cruise

missiles. Led by Hu Zongyi

over 3000 assigned.

558 Factory Autopilot and altimeter

production. 

781 Factory Terminal Guidance System 

786 Factory Ground Tracking Radar Fa

155
4th ACADEMY

Director: Ye Dingyou

Number of personnel: 3500

Mission: R&D and production of solid fueled moto

ballistic missiles and satellite kick motors. Found

1965. Fourth Academy corporate name of Hexi Ch

Machinery Company.

41st Research Institute Shaanxi Institute of Power

Machinery. Solid rocket mo

design. Located near Hohh

Directed by Wang Desheng

42nd Research Institute Red Star Chemical Institut

Hubei

43th Research Institute Shaanxi Institute of

Non-Metallic

Materials and Technology.

Filament winding machine

44th Research Institute Shaanxi Institute of Electro

46th Research Institute Hexi 

47th Research Institute Xiangyang Chemical Mach

Corporation

7414 Factory Shaanxi Hongchuan Machi

Factory

7416 Factory Shaanxi Changhong Chem

Plant. Assembly factory.

7422 Factory Xian Space Lanling Factory

7424 Factory

156
Hexi Corporation

• Synthetic Chemical Engineering Institute

• Inner Mongolia Hongguang Machinery Plant

• Inner Mongolia Hongxia Chemical Plant

• Inner Mongolia Power Machinery Plant

5th ACADEMY

CHINA ACADEMY OF SPACE TECHNOLOG

Director: Xu Fuxiang (recently replaced Qi Faren 

series of satellite failures)

Vice-Directors: Zhang Guofu, Yuan Jiajun, an

Xingrui

Location: Haidian district of northeastern Beijin

Baishiqiao Road.

Mission: R&D and production of communica

space-based ISR systems, and weather satellites. L

groundwork for future navigation satellites; data 

satellites; space shuttle; and space station. Estab

1968. With 10,000 personnel, oversees 14 res

institutes and factories. Current capability to produ

satellites per year.

501st Research Institute Beijing Institute of Spacecr

Systems Engineering

(Department-level entity).

Established in 1968. Respo

for satellite systems engine

502nd Research Institute Beijing Institute of Control

Engineering. R&D of attitu

control systems. Establishe

157
1400.

503rd Research Institute Beijing Institute of Satellit

Information Engineering. R

satellite applications and

communications technology

including ground segments 

FY-2 weather satellite and 

receivers. Involved in Chin

indigenous effort to develop

satellite nagivation system

(RDSS). Established 1986.

Employs more than 300

personnel.

504th Research Institute Xian Institute of Space Rad

Engineering. R&D of space

communications, remote se

and spacecraft TT&C. Prod

space electronic systems,

including TWTs, CCD cam

and microwave data links,

and antennas. Personnel to

1200.

508th Research Institute Beijing Institute of Space

Machinery and Electronic

Engineering. Located adjac

1st Academy facilities

in Nanyuan. R&D of remot

sensing and recoverable ve

technology.

510th Research Institute Lanzhou Institute of Physi

Conducts research into opt

cryogenics, microgravity, a

radiation effects.

511th Research Institute Beijing Institute of

Environmental Test

Engineering.

Facilities in Beijing and Hu

158
Institute

529 Factory Beijing Orient Scientific

InstrumentFactory. Final

assembly for satellite syste

1200 personnel.

8th ACADEMY

SHANGHAI ACADEMY OF SPACE TECHNOLO

Director: Zhang Wenzhong

Mission: Created in 1961, employs 30,000 personne

institutes and 11 factories. SAST supplies the fir

stages of the LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 and Fen

meteorological satellites.

• Shanghai Institute of Electromechanical Engin

(8th Design Department). Directed b

Zhuanglong. Employs 478 personnel.

• Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering 

Research Institute). SAST’s key unit for sa

systems engineering and environmental te

Established in 1969 and employs more tha

people. Directed by Lu Zili. Primary products i

FY-1 and FY-2 satellites. (CAST brochure ha

institute under CAST)

• Shanghai Precision Machinery Research Instit

• Shanghai Institute of Power Machinery

• Shanghai Institute of Radio Equipment (

Institute). SAM guidance and fuzes.

• Shanghai Institute of Precision Instrum

Guidance systems. Xinyue Institute.

159
Sagasttute oectoc Couc

Equipment Engineering

• Shanghai Institute of Electromechanical Equi

• Shanghai Xinfeng Chemical Engineering Ins

Propellant technology.

• Shanghai Institute of S&T Informatio

Electromechanical Engineering

• Shanghai Institute of Precision Metrology an

Engineering

• Shanghai Xinwei Electronic Equipment Res

Institute (809th Institute). LV and tactical we

computer automation launch control systems d

and satellite control computers. Established 19

• Shanghai Xinli Institute of Power Equip

Engines and motors.

• Shanghai Institute of Space Power Sources

• Shanghai Spaceflight Automatic Control Equi

Research Institute

• Shanghai Institute of Spaceflight Telemetry, Co

& Telecommunications Engineering

• Shanghai Institute of Video & Telecommunic

Equipment Engineering

• Shanghai Spaceflight Architecture Design Inst

• Shanghai Xinzhonghua Machinery Factory

• Shanghai Xinjiang Machinery Factory

• Shanghai Xinxin Machinery Factory

160
Sagaua ado actoy

• Shanghai Xinya Radio Factory

• Shanghai Xinguang Telecommunications Facto

• Shanghai Xinyu Power Supply Factory

• Shanghai Xinli Machinery Factory

• Shanghai Broadcast Equipment Factory

• Shanghai Instrument Factory

• Shanghai Wire Communication Factory

9th ACADEMY

CHINA ACADEMY OF SPACE ELECTRONIC

TECHNOLOGY

Director: Tao Jiaqu

Location: Headquartered in Beijing’s Haidian dist

Fucheng Road), sites in Nanyuan and near 

Established in 1993.

Mission: Development of specialized computers, inte

circuits, and other microelectronic devices in supp

CASC projects.

Number of employees: More than 10,000 in 9 inst

10 manufacturing plants, and 5 technical centers.

Important institutes and factories:

771st Research Institute Lishan Microelectronics

Institute.

Established 1960s. R&D an

manufacturing of missile

satellite-related computers 

161
personnel.

165 Factory

061 BASE

CHINA JIANGNAN SPACE INDUSTRY GROU

Director: Li Guozhong

Mission: Development of systems associated 

surface-to-air missiles.

Scope: 35 institutes, factories, and companies

Number of personnel: 6400

Location: Zunyi and Kaishan, Guizhou Province

• 302nd Research Institute (General Instit

Military Products)

• Jiangnan Electromechanical Design Institute

• 38th Research Institute

• 303rd Research Institute

• Wujiang Machinery Factory

• Nanfeng Factory

• Xinfeng Instrument Manufacturing Corpor

Tracking and control systems.

• Qunjian Machinery Factory

• Chaohui Electromechanical Factory

• Meiling Factory

• Honggang Electromechanical Factory

162
Guou Gaoyuaacey actoy

launchers.

062 BASE

SICHUAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION

Director: Yu Ruihua

Number of Personnel: More than 20,000

Headquarters: Chengdu, Sichuan province

Mission: Development of systems associated 

liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, launch vehicles

anti-ship missiles.

• Chongqing Aerospace Electromechanical D

Institute (800 personnel)

• Sichuan Changzheng Mechanical Factory. Loca

Wanyuan, in northern Sichuan (5,000 personn

• Chongqing Bashan Instrument Factory. Tele

equipment. 

• Fenghuo Machinery Factory. Servo-mech

devices.

• Liaoyuan Radio Factory. Space flight con

Located in Xuanhua, Sichuan province.

• Tongjiang Machinery Factory. Metals processi

• Mingjiang Machinery Factory. Located in Dac

• Pingjiang Instrument Factory. Control sys

Located in Dachuan.

• Chuannan Machinery Factory. Missile s

ignitors. 

163
SANJIANG SPACE GROUP

Director: Cao Lijia

Number of personnel: 17,000.

Headquarters: Xiaogan, north of Wuhan. Prod

centered in Yuan’an, in western Hubei province. Mai

office in Wuhan. 

Mission: R&D of solid-fueled tactical ballistic missil

stealth/counterstealth technology. Base 066 establis

August 1969 as Third Line production base fo

Academy anti-ship missiles. In 1975, began indepe

R&D of M-11 missile, designed by Wang Zhenhua

completed system R&D in 1984.

• Sanjiang Space Group Design Institute

• Hubei Redstar (Hongxing) Chemical Institute

Research Institute, located in Xiangfan, 

province.

• Hubei Hongfeng Machinery Plant. Established 

Electromechanical integration. Located in Yua

• Wanshan Special Vehicle Machinery Fa

Located in Yuan’an.

• Hubei Jianghe Chemical Factory. Locat

Yuan’an

• Xianfeng Machinery Factory. Located in Yuan

• Wanli Radio Factory. Located in Yuan’an.

• Honglin Machinery Factory. Located in Xiaog

• Hubei Hongyang Machinery Factory. Loca

Yuan’an.

164
Jagbeacey actoyocated ua

• Wanfeng Factory. Located in Yuan’an.

067 BASE

SHAANXI LINGNAN MACHINERY CORPORAT

Director: Hu Hongfu

Mission: R&D base for liquid engines and inertial gu

systems for launch vehicles. Oversees five res

institutes and four factories.

Number of personnel: More than 1,100

• Shaanxi Engine Design Institute

• Beijing Fengyuan Machinery Institute

• Shaanxi Institute of Power Test Technology

• Xian Changda Precision Electromachinery Ins

• Shaanxi Hongguang Machinery Factory

• Shaanxi Cangsong Machinery Factory

• 16th Research Institute

• 165 Research Institute

• 204 Factory

• 710 Factory

• 7103 Factory (Hongguang)

• 7107 Factory

• 7171 Factory. Inertial devices.

165
HUNAN SPACE AGENCY

Director: Hu Zhigang

Mission: Aerospace electromechanical equip

associated with surface-to-air missiles, and R&D of s

materials. Oversees one research institute an

factories.

Location: Changsha, Hunan province

Important research institutes and factories:

• 7801 Research Institute. Directed by Yan Ha

Located in Changsha, Hunan province.

• 7803 Factory. Directed by Huang Yaoyue, pro

superhard materials (chaoying cailiao). H

Taishan Machinery Factory. 

• 804 Factory

• 861 Factory

• Hunan Zhujiang Instrument Factory

• Hunan Electromechanical Instrument Factory

YUNNAN SPACE GROUP

Director: Wang Shirong

Mission: Formerly tied to 3rd Academy. Established 

Formerly a Third Line unit within Yunnan province, 

to Kunming in 1987. Current responsibilities un

Manages six factories and eight companies.

Number of Personnel: 3,500

166
Academy of Astronautics

Academy of Material Science and Engineering

Department of Astronautics and Physics

Department of Applied Chemistry

Department of Applied Physics

Department of Communications Engineering

Department of Computer Science and Engineering

Department of Control Engineering

Department of Electrical Engineering

Department of Mathematics

Department of Mechanical Engineering

Department of Power Engineering

Department of Precision Instrumentation

Department of Radio Engineering

Department of Space and Opto-Electronic Engineeri

Robotics Research Institute

Plating Research Center

Analysis and Measurement Center

Inertial Navigation Test Equipment Center

Simulation Center

Sources: Zhongguo Hangtian (China Space News) (weekly

1992-June 1995 and July 1996-January 1997; China Today: 

Science and Technology, 1993; John Lewis and Xue Litai, 

Strategic Seapower, 1993; brochures from 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5

8th Academies, and various research institutes; China Astro

and Missilery Abstracts (selected issues); John Lewis and H

China’s Ballistic Missile Development; and A Survey of China’

S&T Industry, 1994, Beijing: CASC.

167
THE LEGEND OF QIAN XUESEN

The father of China’s space and missile industry i

Xuesen. Sent to the United States on scholarship in 

Qian was educated at Massachusetts Institute of Tech

and CalTec and became one of the initial cadre of t

Propulsion Laboratory. As one of the world’s foremost e

in propulsion and aerodynamics, Qian worked on a num

advanced aircraft and missile projects. In 1944, G

Henry Arnold recruited Qian to work as a scientific cons

to the Army Air Corps’ Scientific Advisory Group. The

was to search nationwide and abroad for developmen

would make American air power the very best in the 

Given an Air Force officer commission, Qian tra

throughout the country and drafted a report, Future Tr

Development of Military Aircraft, one of the U.S. Air F

first long-range studies. At the conclusion of World W

Qian and the Scientific Advisory Group traveled to Ge

to interview German rocket scientists, including Wern

Braun. 

Upon his return, Qian played a major role in the Sci

Advisory Group’s production of Toward New Horizon

blueprint for the long-range development of the U.

Force. Qian led writing of aspects of the report which 

with aerodynamics, pulsed engines, ramjet engines, sol

liquid rockets, and jet-propelled supersonic wing m

Between 1945 and 1950, as a member of the Sci

Advisory Board, he authored futuristic concepts inc

nuclear powered aircraft propulsion, manned space 

and rocket powered transcontinental aerospace vehicle

travel at speeds in excess of 10,000 mph.

Qian Xuesen’s promising career as a leading U.S. sc

and visionary was cut short, however, in the mania 

McCarthy era. Accused of being a communist, he was st

of his security clearances. Under a cloud of suspicion

169
of other scientists and engineers who had returned to 

after the establishment of the People’s Republic of 

(PRC) in 1949. Bent on extracting revenge on the U

States, Qian quickly gained the confidence of Mao Zedo

Zhou Enlai and passionately accepted the responsib

leading the development of China’s aerospace capability

was obsessed with the belief that China could do an

that the United States and the West could do, and he in

this view in the cadre of engineers around him.

Qian’s first task was to assemble a team of foreign-t

engineers and establish an aerospace researc

development organization. In 1956 Qian shaped a pla

bears a striking resemblance to the U.S. Air Force’s T

New Horizons, which prompted China to adopt a long

perspective in its weapons development. The plan 

emphasis on atomic energy, missiles, computer sc

semiconductors, electronics, and automation techn

Qian also emphasized the exploitation of foreign—esp

U.S.—technical materials to use as guides for indig

development. Most importantly, Qian convinced the C

government that missile development should take prece

over aircraft development.

Based on a February 1956 proposal of Qian’s, Zhou 

approved the establishment of the Fifth Academy 

Ministry of National Defense. Qian and the Fifth Ac

lacked even the most fundamental resources, such as r

and tools to accomplish their objectives. In 1957, Qian 

military delegation to Moscow to lay the foundation 

Sino-Russian technical relationship. The relatio

involved hundreds of Soviet engineers working in C

research institutes, Chinese students studying in the U

Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the trans

technical designs to China. In all, the Soviets and the C

were engaged in 343 contracts and 257 technical proje

August 1960, however, the relationship was abruptly 

During the next two decades, Qian guide

development of a family of ballistic and cruise m

aerodynamic testing facilities, satellites, and a TTC ne

170
harassed during the Cultural Revolution but was a 

factor in the Central Committee’s declaration of the spa

missile industry as a top priority and therefore immun

the ravages of the Cultural Revolution.

In the years that followed, Qian became identified w

conservative factions of the government. In 1977 Qian 

out against Deng Xiaoping and his supporters, inc

Commission of Science and Technology for National D

Director Zhang Aiping. Qian’s opposition to Deng a

dabbling in the supernatural resulted in a loss in cred

among China’s scientific and technological elite.

Qian, however, regained status after supporting 

Xiaoping’s actions in cracking down on anti-gover

protests in 1989. Qian’s protégé, Song Jian, was appoin

State Science and Technology (S&T) Committee cha

and Qian again became active in scientific circles. Qia

showered with awards and accolades in 1991. Qian’

recent influence was felt during the March 1994 COS

S&T Committee Meeting when he pressed the C

leadership and COSTIND to adopt a visionary outloo

establish technologies and systems such as remote s

satellites, hypersonic aerospace planes, adaptive optic

communications systems as national priorities. 

currently serves as special advisor to COSTIND’s 

Committee.

In sum, Qian’s legacy still exists to this day. First 

Qian legacies is the confidence that China can match th

in technological development. The desire to develop an

systems simply for status sake is a driving force 

China’s research and development strategy. Another le

Qian’s preference of missiles over aircraft. In effe

influenced the Chinese leadership to place strategic n

and missile industries first in the defense indu

hierarchy, including greater funding and prestig

historically lower status plagues the aviation industry 

day. Qian also instilled a forward looking approach to d

S&T strategy. He imbued a generation of China’s sci

171
engineering ambitions.

172
SPACE SUPPORT FOR STRATEGIC

MODERNIZATION

Development of a viable space force is a vital as

China’s strategic modernization. There appears to be 

long-range path to support an emerging doctrine which 

space as an arena for competition. The basic building b

China’s future capability in space is their launch vehic

until the last few years, Chinese launch vehicles had one 

best success rates in the world, opening the do

international launch services. A recent spate of fa

however, has reduced foreign confidence. Domestic conf

has continued, though, and they are proceeding with 

space transportation programs, to include a manned 

capsule, a space shuttle, and preliminary research into 

stage-to-orbit transatmospheric vehicles. China’s p

space research and development entity, the China Acad

Space Technology (CAST) under CASC, is also develo

spectrum of new generation satellites.

China’s Space Leading Group, under the State C

oversees and coordinates all space activities in Chin

group is composed of six members: COSTIND director

Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) deputy di

vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), d

director of the State Planning Commission, and the dire

CASC. The Space Leading Group coordinates among v

industries and agencies.1

China has several approaches to developing a 

capability to meet the demands of 21st century warfare

is development of smaller boosters able to launch satel

a moment’s notice in a contingency. Solid-fueled l

vehicles would probably be a natural transition after f

the next generation of solid-fueled missiles around the 

the century. Second is a movement toward va

constellations of small satellites, which are more resis

173
large numbers. China is already investing in the U.S. I

program, a constellation of 66 small satellites, and is pre

to invest in their own indigenous answer to Iridium. C

also working with others in the region to jointly dev

smallsat constellation of imaging satellites. The next 

counterspace. Open source literature strongly su

China’s ASAT program is in the model development 

where the space industry is identifying various 

proposals for seekers and propulsion systems.

CASC has a huge, bloated space infrastructure wai

be filled to capacity. CAST’s 529 Factory and SAST

Factory currently only manufacture a few satellites a 

China Academy of Launch Technology’s (CALT) 211 F

only assembles a few launch vehicles, but, as of 1994, h

capacity to produce up to 10 vehicles a year. COSTIND’s 

tracking network provides tracking, telemetry and c

(TT&C) services to a handful of domestic satellites.

2

Space Transportation.

Essential to China’s future in space is its launch v

infrastructure and systems. COSTIND has opera

network of space launch bases since their space pr

began in the 1970s. Launch centers include the follow

• Xichang Space Launch Center (XSLC). Xich

China’s primary site for the launch of space ve

intended for geosynchronous orbit. The s

equipped with two launch pads, one for 

launches and the other for LM-2E, LM-3A

LM-3B vehicles.

• Jiuquan Space Launch Center. Jiuquan is us

the launch of remote sensing and scientific sate

and will be center for China’s manned space pro

Primary LVs include LM-2C and LM-1D.

174
ayuaSpace aucCeteayuas us

polar orbit satellites and plays a major r

launching the Iridium satellite constellation. 

To augment COSTIND’s three main launch ce

Chinese engineers are examining alternative launch 

for the 21st century. Concepts under consideration inc

small solid-fueled launch vehicle which is air-launc

sea-based launch platform; and a compressed-air l

system. These new approaches to space launches are v

as simple, mobile, and capable of accommodating heavy 

The lead COSTIND organization for exploring future l

modes is Beijing Academy of Special Engineering Des

There is a large volume of literature which ou

China’s current family of launch vehicles, which in

several variants of the Long March (LM)-1, LM-2, LM

LM-4. Their heaviest lift launch vehicle is the LM-3B 

integrates a cryogenic third stage engine. All launch ve

are manufactured by the CASC First Academy (CAL

Eighth Academy in Shanghai. Current efforts are aim

producing a small launch vehicle which can send 

satellites into low and medium orbits. Critical to the 

effort is microelectronics technology, new materials, a

power loss electronic devices.

4

CALT is also striving to further increase the ca

capacity of their heavy launch vehicles. The launch v

which will carry China’s manned space capsule wil

variant of the LM-2E, likely designated as the LM-2E

will be launched from Jiuquan Space Launch Center an

to lift 12 tons to low earth orbit. CALT is looking at deve

a nontoxic propellant launch vehicle with a single engin

100 tons and a vehicle whose single cryogenic 

oxygen/liquid hydrogen engine is capable of 50 tons of th

China is working to develop a new Ariane V class hea

booster which utilizes cryogenic oxygen/hydrogen eng

the first stage. CALT currently utilizes a cryogenic third 

on the LM-3A and LM-3B launch vehicles. CALT 

researching large kerosene/oxygen engines, building 

engines purchased from Russia in 1993. China hopes to 

175
20 tons into low earth orbit. This vehicle will serve as th

for China’s lunar and planetary exploration.

6

The Shanghai Academy of Space Technology’s LM

have the ability to launch dual payloads and is slated t

the new FY-1C and an 880-pound magnetosphere re

satellite in late 1998. Other modifications include a new 

stage which will give the vehicle the capability to loft m

sized (2,200-3,300 pounds) payloads into highly ell

orbits. The new stage will also have a restart capabilit

Launch Business.

China has made the launching of satellites a 

making venture. Since the first commercial laun

ASIASAT 1, COSTIND and CASC have launched s

more, each bringing in an average of $40-70 m

COSTIND and CASC are expected to increase the 

launch services to bring them on a par with western 

providers. Recent launches include a Philippine sa

Mabuhay, which was launched by a LM-3B, during su

1997.

8

Revenues from the commercial launch aren

significant. Since 1991, COSTIND and CASC have g

approximately $500 million in U.S. dollars (10 lau

average 50 million each). With the cost of a launch v

estimated at five to ten million U.S. dollars, the comm

launch business is extremely profitable. In fac

commercial launch matches the entire annual 

investment into dual-use space technology. Revenu

shared between COSTIND and CASC, with the prop

varying based on the specific contract. Within CASC, 

are shared between CALT entities involved in manufac

the launch vehicle; China Great Wall Industry Corpo

the marketing and contracting agent; and CASC 

quarters.

9

Despite a recent spate of failures, China’s launch bu

will increase in the future. COSTIND and CASC 

contracted to launch 12 U.S. manufactured Glob

176
on 11 LM-2C vehicles. CGWIC and Hughes Spac

Communications Company have struck a long-term 

under which China will launch 10 satellites through the 

2006.

10

 Assuming no serious rash of failures, the num

planned Chinese commercial launches total 27 in the 

years, approximately $1.35 billion in revenue.11

Other Space Transportation Programs.

COSTIND and CASC will need this cash flow to au

budgets for a wide variety of planned space program

decision to proceed in R&D into manned space platform

reusable space vehicles was made in formulating the S

Mid- to Long-Term S&T Development Program.12

• Space Capsule (Feichuan). China has 

conducting research into manned space fligh

1970s. Under Project 921, China is planning to l

two astronauts into space in 1999 for 5 d

celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding 

communist state. The initial test of the KM-6 

capsule, roughly comparable to the two-man 

Gemini spacecraft, will be launched in 1998, pro

from Jiuquan Space Launch Center in G

province. The launch vehicle will most likely 

variant of the LM-2E. Under a 1995 contrac

CAST, Russia’s Yuri Gagarin Center near Mos

providing training for 70-80 Chinese astro

engineers, and managers in 1997-98. Ru

Krunichev Space Center and Energia Compan

the Ukrainian space agency are assisting 

development of the capsule and booster capa

lifting 20 tons.

13 China’s domestic astronaut tr

has been underway at COSTIND’s Beijing Insti

Space Medical Engineering (507th Res

Institute) since 1968. A new astronaut tra

facility, the Beijing Space Technology Exper

Center, was opened in 1995 in northwestern B

177
at least 1000 hours of flying time.

14

• Space Shuttle (Hangtian Feiji). Since 1989, Chi

embarked upon a serious effort to deploy a 

shuttle. With COSTIND and CASC in the 

Chinese aerospace engineers are abso

technologies and lessons learned from the Sovi

U.S. experiences with space shuttles. In fact, Ru

granting significant assistance to China’s 

shuttle.

15

 Space shuttle designs are som

alarming. According to one U.S. analysis, a 

design was meant to optimize transfer be

coplanar orbits, essential for military related 

activities to include ASAT operations. Other C

studies confirm interest in coplanar transfers.

16 

observers note that the first experimental l

could occur as early as 2005. The project is val

RMB 11 billion (approximately $1.35 billion i

dollars), weighs 22 tons, carries a payload of up 

tons, and is operated by a crew of three. The s

will have a service life of 30 missions, with a t

mission length being 3-5 days. 17

• Aerospace Plane (Kongtian Feiji). Taking 

shuttle concepts a step further, COSTIND is dir

an effort to master technologies associated w

hypersonic single stage-to-orbit (SSTO, or 

rugui) aerospace plane. COSTIND’s Beijing Ins

of Systems Engineering (BISE), with tec

assistance from the launch vehicle/ballistic m

and cruise missile industries (CASC’s First and 

Academies), is responsible for the aerospace p

systems design, which will incorporate scr

engine (chaoran chongya fadongji) technology.

1

Academy President Li Jianzhong indicate

design concept weighs 2,000 tons and will 

manned and unmanned versions.

19

 Possi

preparation for testing, COSTIND’s C

178
upgraded its hypersonic wind tunnel comp

Mianyang, outside of Chengdu, Sichuan pro

The wind tunnel will be able to test various sy

traveling at Mach 5-10.

20 The First Academy 

Research Institute), Shanghai Academy of 

Technology (Institute of Power Machinery), a

Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astron

have also proposed other aerospace launch v

concepts.

21

• Tethered Satellites (Xisheng weixing). Chin

initiated R&D into space tether technolo

generating power and in the repositioni

satellites. A tether system reels out what is in e

small satellite which can generate a large amo

electricity. Tethers have generally been used o

space shuttle systems.

22

• Space Station. China is laying the groundwork 

space station around the year 2020.

23

• Moon Missions, Mars Probes, and Deep 

Exploration. China’s space community is 

planning to launch a scientific satellite to orb

moon around the year 2000. This scientific sa

will serve as the initial step in a long-range pr

in lunar exploration. Specific approach

exploration of the moon includes an unmanned 

surveyer as well as landing a man on the 

China’s space community is evaluating feasibil

Mars probe, and also intends to field a initial 

satellites for scientific exploration of deep spac

Satellite Development.

Since the 1970s China has fielded seven COMSAT

METSATs, 17 retrievable photoreconnaissance satellite

12 other scientific systems. One of China’s objective

eliminate reliance on foreign communications, we

179
example, as of June 1996, China depended on f

satellites for up to 80 percent of its satellite communic

Besides reducing vulnerabilities related to fo

dependence, COSTIND, CASC, and MPT view marke

communications and other satellites as an extraor

source of revenue. Besides renting transponder space, 

is formulating plans to sell satellites by 2000.

25

The general direction of China’s satellite developme

reduce the number of components and reduce the we

their satellite systems. Power supplies make up to 40 p

of the weight, satellite structure around 30 percen

attitude control system around 20 percent.

26 CAST is s

to develop larger antennas, multiple beams, on

processing, and more capable power sources. For 

satellite control, the Fifth Academy (CAST) has inte

GPS onto their satellite platforms. After init

preliminary research in 1991 and model R&D in 199

503rd Research Institute tested its first GPS system on 

China’s 17th remote sensing satellite launched in O

1996.

27

To expand the lifespan of their space systems, the PL

the space and nuclear industry have advocated u

nuclear generator to power satellites and other platfo

space. Some preliminary research had been done a

between 1970-78 when the Institute of Atomic Energ

COSTIND jointly carried out research on space react

May 1994, 50 military and civilian experts from v

entities participated in a space nuclear power tech

seminar. At the conclusion, participants petitioned the 

Council to allocate increased funding for nuclear po

satellites in order to place a trial nuclear powered sa

into orbit within 10 years. The group strongly argu

cooperating with foreign space industries.

28

 Since 

China has been carrying out research into arcjet sa

engines which provide an efficient manner of ut

propellant.29

In their satellite development, China is working t

launching their second generation communication sat

180
infrastructure. With General Staff Department (GSD

COSTIND guidance, the space industry is working t

fielding a full constellation of reconnaissance sy

including high resolution EO, radar, and infrared sy

which, in the outyears, could give them a near rea

imaging and missile early warning capability. The 

industry is also working to field their second gene

weather satellite and first generation navigational sate

CAST has had significant problems, however, 

satellite development. The satellite R&D cycle is usua

years long, and operating lives of less than 4 years a

short; resolution of remote sensing platforms is low

capacity of communications satellites are low. Only 

one-third of the space industry is devoted to adv

research, design selection studies; and engine

management.

China’s communications and remote sensing satelli

discussed in detail in the main body of this report. B

communications, scientific, and remote sensing plat

CASC is also working on fielding a sophisticated w

satellite. The new generation weather satellit

Fengyun-2 (FY-2), exploded at the Xichang Space L

Center. After completion and launch of a replacement, 

expects to complete the FY-3 follow-on. FY-2 will be posi

in a geosynchronous orbit over Singapore (105 degrees e

Weather satellites are essential for the conduct of a var

military operations.

CASC is also carrying out R&D on navigation sat

Chinese exploitation of GLONASS and NAVSTAR G

well-documented. China, however, loathe to be depend

any foreign system, is busy developing its own navi

satellite constellations. The initial design, the Tw

(shuangxing) Rapid Positioning System, is an RDSS 

with two satellites in geosynchronous orbit, due for 

around the year 2000. The follow-on system under 

consists of four satellites also in a geosynchronous orb

181
geosynchronous systems will only provide regional navi

services, and will probably not provide enough precis

use on missile systems. CASC, however, has been inst

to proceed with design of a more complex global navi

system. CAST’s systems engineering design institu

forwarded two conceptual designs which would provide 

coverage. One design employs a constellation of five sa

in five orbital planes at an inclination of 43.7 degre

alternative calls for seven satellites in seven orbital pla

a 61.8 degree inclination.

32

CAST is also engaged in preliminary R&D into eve

advanced satellite systems. For example, CAST has an 

R&D program for a data relay satellite, crucial for a 

near real-time imaging capability. They are also cond

conceptual studies on a space-based satellite tracking s

which would serve as a potentially important compon

any ASAT system.

33

Satellite Miniaturization. 

China has embarked on a program to develop a fa

small satellites as a measure to reduce costs, increase 

rates, and increase survivability. General classificat

these satellites include small satellites (100-500 kilog

microsatellites (10-100 kilograms); and nanosatellite

than 10 kilograms). Critical steps in developing 

satellites include smaller, more efficient power so

smaller on-board computers and attitude control system

reduced structure size.

34

The Chinese clearly recognize the military implicat

small satellites. Chinese defense officials advocate 

satellite development in order to reduce vulnerability o

launch sites. Chinese engineers are examining the ut

using mobile, solid-fueled launch vehicles, such as a mo

DF-21, or future variants of the DF-31 and DF-41. Th

also interested in satellite launches from transport airc

Reduced size and complexity allows for faster R&

manufacturing time, and production in significant nu

182
imagery satellites can be launched on demand. Mobile l

platforms allow for increased survivability. As seen by C

Globalstar contract, multiple small satellites can be lau

on a single launch vehicle. Furthermore, ASAT atta

small satellite constellations will encounter greater tar

difficulties and be costly. Destruction of one satellite wi

minimal effect on the overall functioning of the con

tion.

36

Preliminary research has been conducted on 

satellite photo-reconnaissance and electronic reconnai

constellations. CAST is also examining future gene

small satellite communications, satellite constellations 

are put into low earth, sun synchronous orbit, transmi

digital storage and forward system, incorporate s

spectrum, and other secure methodologies.

37

One of the first family of small satellites is the Shijia

series. The SJ-4 was a small satellite experiment 

included a package of various scientific experiments. W

Program funding and COSTIND oversight, the SJ-4 w

400 kilograms and, after launch by a LM-3A, was plac

200-36000 kilometer geosynchronous transfer orbit. 

provided the bus while CAS’s Space Science and Appl

Research Center provided the payload. The follow-o

system is expected to be the common bus for China

generation of small satellite constellations. SJ-4 w

fourth in a series of scientific platforms. SJ-1 was launc

March 1971, while SJ-2, SJ-2A, and SJ-2B were three 

physics satellites launched on a single launch veh

September 1981. SJ-3 was designed but aborted.

38

Foreign Assistance.

Beijing clearly understands China cannot develop a 

space capability without significant foreign tec

assistance. After establishing a relationship with Ge

and France in the 1980s, CASC has expanded its contac

a number of countries, including the former Soviet 

Brazil, and the United States.

183
program is from countries of the former Soviet Union. 

cooperation between China and Russia has been form

into a series of agreements between CASC and the R

space agencies. Representatives from Chinese and 

space industries signed an initial agreement in Mos

May 1990 on 10 cooperative projects, the first of 

addressed joint efforts to develop a GLONASS

compatible receiver. A formal contract was signed 2 

later. The relationship was solidified when, on Decem

1992, CASC and the Russian Space Agency signed an 

protocol for the sharing of space technology. This agre

was formalized during President Yeltsin’s visit to B

where he also signed a no-first-use pledge with the Chin

A follow-on agreement, signed by CASC Vice-d

Wang Liheng and the head of the Russian Space A

outlined at least ten areas of space cooperation inc

exchanges in satellite navigation, space surveil

propulsion, satellite communications, joint design e

materials, intelligence sharing, scientific pers

exchanges, and space systems testing.

40

 For pr

management, the two sides agreed to annual meeti

review the various cooperative programs. In addition, 

Russia, and Ukraine’s space community have held a

exchange conferences attended by as many as 250 eng

The fourth annual trilateral conference was h

September 1996 in Kiev, Ukraine.

41

 Space coope

agreements have also been concluded with Ukraine (

1994), Belarus (June 1994), and Kazakhstan (May 

Areas of cooperation with Ukraine include remote se

satellite communications, and aerospace material re

and development.

42

Much of the Sino-Russian and Sino-Ukrainian coope

is centered on China’s manned space program and supp

launch vehicles. Russia and Ukraine have pro

assistance to China in developing cryogenic upper sta

launch vehicles. Russia sold three RD-120 cryogenic 

stage engines, the same as that used on the Zenit space 

vehicle, to China.

43

 A formal agreement for Ru

184
signed during Li Peng’s visit to Moscow in May 1995 or 

Yeltsin’s late 1995 visit to Beijing. China is allegedly 

“billions of dollars” for Russian assistance in its manned 

program, although a small proportion can be paid in ba

goods. Items of special interest include emergency r

thermal control, and space docking.

44

China has not limited its international cooperation 

former Soviet Union. Building upon a foundation estab

in the 1980s, recent contacts between French and C

space communities were initiated during June 1994 

industry negotiations between France’s National Cen

Space Studies (CNES) and COSTIND and CASC. S

areas of discussion included small launch vehicle tech

and R&D of small satellites. Two follow-up meeting

held in September 1994 and November 1995. Since 19

least 10 Chinese space delegations have visited French 

industry facilities. Besides small launch vehicle and sa

technology, cooperation focuses on GPS/GLO

exploitation, satellite attitude control systems, co

nication satellites, and meteorological satellite techno

China will work with France in developing the Proteus 

satellite bus.

46

The space relationship between China and Ge

started in the early 1980s, culminating in a contract be

the CASC and DASA in 1987 on the DFH-3. A fol

agreement between CASC and Deutsche Aerospace A

signed in November 1993 which directed the establishm

a joint venture between EuraSpace and CASC called S

Sinosat’s first satellite is Nahuel, a communications sa

scheduled for launch in 1997.47 Other areas of coope

include SATCOM transponder technology, solar pane

orbital control systems.

48 China is also working 

Germany on a two ton solar telescope which will orbit a

the moon about 2002.

49

185
Chinese strategists have grasped the concept of 

dominance. Writings and speeches by the PLA lead

acknowledge space as an essential dimension of re

warfare. Space systems, under the responsibility of C

CAST, are emphasized in China’s 863 program and the 

15-year plans. These systems include a new genera

COMSATs, data relay satellites, remote sensing platfo

navigation satellite constellation, weather satellites, 

shuttle, and space station. Chinese space advocates 

special emphasis on small satellite technology.

Chinese writings indicate a significant inter

anti-satellite warfare, an issue usually shrouded in ext

secrecy.50 When discussing ASAT principles, in

writings omit sections which address China’s do

programs. However, a number of systems now 

development could be used in an ASAT role. First, Chi

an extensive satellite tracking network which m

upgraded to provide precision tracking for space inte

Sites are located throughout the country, and COSTIN

approached a number of foreign countries, including 

and Brazil, to jointly build and use space tracking fac

Besides tracking and controlling satellites, these sites 

receive downlinked imagery for transmittal to Beijing

With some modification, China’s solid fueled m

systems, the DF-21 or DF-31, could be used in a direct 

ASAT role. One Chinese article referred to the potentia

an older launch vehicle, the Long March-1, in an ASAT 

Warheads would most likely rely on kinetic or RF energ

successful development of a ballistic missile defense s

will give the Chinese an inherent ASAT capability as w

Other ASAT concepts which have appeared in C

writings include a satellite which can spread steel balls 

an enemy satellite’s path or spread dust on satellite refl

Finally, COSTIND has acknowledged research into the 

enhanced radiation weapons, which could be most usef

nuclear pumped laser system. China probably ha

technological capability to jam satellite uplinks or dow

186
for opto-electronic countermeasures.

Chinese strategists are thinking about satellite defe

well. Satellite hardening measures, such as thermal shi

or armor, are likely being examined by COSTIND and 

Deception or hiding measures could be employed as we

use of small satellites, as CASC analysts have acknowl

will reduce satellite vulnerability. The use of gallium ar

(GAAS) integrated circuits will provide additional resi

against space EMP weapons. China’s most r

photoreconnaissance satellite, the FSW-2, displayed 

in-orbit maneuvering ability. As a side note, one 

dismiss the possibility that Russian institutes have pr

some results from previous Soviet ASAT tests.

51

Finally, China’s increasing reliance on internat

shared space platforms could complicate attempts to 

access to or destroy space systems used by the Chinese. 

and Brazil have a joint project to deploy two remote s

satellites. Beijing utilizes transponder space on the 

Kong controlled Asia-Pacific Telecommunications sa

Besides complicating ASAT efforts, the joint developme

use of satellites reduces the cost of the wide range of sa

development programs.

Who should oversee China’s fledgling space forc

subject of internal debate.

52

 The most likely candid

running a space organization is COSTIND’s China L

and Tracking Control (CLTC). CLTC oversees China’s 

main launch centers and its satellite tracking and c

network. There have been discussions within the 

leadership on splitting off CLTC into a independent 

command, or under control of the PLAAF, but there ha

no concrete action to date.

53

In summary, China has a wide variety of programs 

indicate it intends to become a major player in space 

21st century. China’s emphasis is on dual use systems 

could provide significant value added benefits to futur

operations. PLA strategists understand that with

presence in space, national security cannot be as

187
besides providing an important source of revenue, serve 

foundation of their future in space. A broad family of sa

systems will provide critical C

4

I services for their em

reconnaissance/strike complex. For greater 

survivability, greater production capacity, and lower 

China is emphasizing small satellite development. F

extensive R&D is being carried out on a counte

capability in order to potentially deny future adver

access to their own space systems.

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX III

1. Wang Chunyuan, China’s Space Industry and Its Stra

International Cooperation, Stanford University Center for I

tional Security and Arms Control, July 1996, p. 16.

2. Author’s 1994 visit to 211 Factory, Weinan Satellite Cont

and Xian Satellite Control Center; Zhang Rufan, “Developme

Prospects for China’s Space Technology,” Zhongguo Hangtia

1994, pp. 6-10, in JPRS-CST-94-019.

3. Chang Yuyan, “New Launch Forms for Spacecraft,

presented at the China Astronautics Society Conference on 

Engineering and Ground Equipment, July 1994, 5 pp.

4. Zhang Xinzhai, “Achievements and Future Developm

China’s Space Technology,” Zhongguo Hangtian, June 96, in 

Broadcast Information Service-CST (hereafter FBIS-CST)-96-0

5. Ibid. Also see Chen Lan, “Chinese Manned Space Progr

Dragon in Space, an internet site managed out of Singapore, A

1998.

6. Craig Covalt, “Chinese Manned Flight Set for 1999 

Aviation Week and Space Technology Review, October 21, 19

22-23. “Ambitious Space Program Gears Up for Competitive E

Xinhua, October 31, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-215; and “Scientis

Developing Large Launch Vehicles,” Xinhua, March 22, 1

FBIS-CHI-98-081.

7. Covalt, pp. 22-23.

8. Chen Chunmei, “Long March Booked For Two More Sat

China Daily, in FBIS-CHI-96-146, July 29, 1996, p. 1.

188
space officials, 1992-95. CASC’s annual expenditure dual us

R&D and production amounts to RMB 400 million, at an exchan

of 8.5, which equals U.S. $47 million. Total state space budget is 

$100 million (0.035 percent of overall Gross National Produ

average, a launch vehicle or missile costs between 3.5 and 10 

U.S. dollars, and a satellite costs between 5 and 12 million. Se

Enjie Fuzongjingli Tan Hangtian Zhiliang,” Zhongguo Hangti

March 21, 1994, p.1; and author’s unpublished report, “The 

China’s Space and Missile Industry in PLA Strategic Moderni

May 1995.

10. “China to Launch 10 Satellites For Hughes Through 

Xinhua News Release, June 21, 1997.

11. Total based on a conservative average of $5,000 U.S. dol

launch. See Wang Chunyuan, p. 21.

12. Si Liang, “Only the East Wind is Lacking,” Zhongguo T

She, August 11, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-158.

13. Craig Covalt, “Chinese Manned Flight Set for 1999 

Aviation Week and Space Technology Review, October 21, 19

22-23; and “Chinese Cosmonauts To Train at Gagarin Space C

Interfax, December 27, 1996, in Foreign Broadcast Infor

Service-Soviet Union (hereafter FBIS-SOV)-96-250. For indica

Jiuquan serving as the base for China’s manned launch program

Kejun, “Safety Support of Space Launching For Astronauts,” 

Shiyan Jishu, 1997 (1), in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 5, pp. 1-9.

14. China Today: Defense Science and Technology, Beijing: N

Defense Industry Press, 1993, pp. 386-390; and “Astronauts Tra

Chinese Manned Spacecraft,” Zhongguo Tongxun She, March 2

in FBIS-CHI-95-062.

15. “China Dedicates Itself to the Research of Space Shuttle, 

Men Into Space in the Next Few Years,” Wen Wei Po, Septem

1994, p. A1, in FBIS-CHI-94-204.

16. For a technical analysis of one of China’s space shuttle co

see Philip A. Smith, “The Chinese Space Shuttle: A Grea

Forward,” unpublished Naval War College paper, June 1996; an

Xiaojun, “Study on Minimum-fuel Low Thrust Multiple Burn T

Between Coplanar Circular Orbits,” Yuhang Xuebao, 1996, Vol. 

3, in CAMA, 1996, Vol. 3, No. 6.

189
Tech Warfare,” Defense and Foreign Affairs: Strategic Policy, J

1998, pp. 12-13. The 2005 timeframe appears overly ambitious

18. See Liu Xingzhou, “Chongya Fadongji de Fazhan He Yin

(Development and Applications of Pulsed Engines), Zh

Hangtian, Vol. 3, 1993, pp. 34-37; Huang Zhicheng, “Real Gas Ef

the Aerospace Plane,” Aerodynamic Experiment and Measu

Control,” Vol. 8, No. 2, 1994, pp. 1-9; also see Huang Zh

“Aerodynamic Design of Nozzles for the Aerospace Plane, “Aerod

Experiment and Measurement Control,” Vol. 7, No. 4, 1994, pp. 

Qianghua and Huang Zhicheng, “Aerodynamic Design Of Singl

to Orbit Winged Rocket,” Liuti Lixue Shiyan Yu Celiang, 1997

pp. 19-25, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No.6; Wang Yali, “Hybrid Pro

System for a Single-Stage-To-Orbit Engine,” Huojin Tuijin, 1997

pp. 39-49, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 6; and Yue Jialing, “Preliminary 

of a Hydrocarbon-Fueled Dual Mode Scramjet Engine for a Hyp

Vehicle,” Liuti Lixue Shiyan yu Celiang, 1997, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 

CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 6. China’s interest in an aerospace plan

unusual. Almost all the major powers, including the United 

Europe, Japan, and India, have active hypersonic vehicle progr

19. Presentation delivered at 47th International Astron

Federation, March 1996, Beijing, China.

20. Liu Xiaojun and Liu Jun, “Nation’s Largest Hyperson

Tunnel Gets Facelift,” Keji Ribao, July 24, 1996, p. 2, in 

CST-96-017.

21. Qi Feng, “Preliminary Analysis on Single Stage to Orbit 

Vehicle,” Tuijin Jishu (Propulsion Technology), 1996 17 (4), in 

Vol. 3, No. 6; Zhang Xuehe, “Investigation of Propulsion Syste

SSTO Rocket Engines,” Hangtian Qingbao Yanjiu, HQ-96

CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 2; and Nan Ying, “Optimal Ascent Traj

for Horizontal Take Off and Landing Two-Stage-to-Orbit Ae

Plane,” paper presented at the 7th Meeting of the National Sp

Launch Vehicle Control Technology Society, September 1996, in 

1997, Vol. 4, No. 3; and Nan Ying, “Optimum Trajectory and Pro

Chacteristics of An Aerospace Plane,” Feixing Lixue, 1997, Vol. 

2, pp. 27-32, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 6. 

22. Zhu Renzhang, “On the Use of Tethers for Re-entry o

Capsules,” Yuhang Xuebao (Journal of Astronautics), 1994, Vol. 

4, pp. 24-30, in CAMA, 1995, Vol. 2, No.1; Lin Huabao, “Devel

and Application of Space Tether Technology,” Kongjian Jishu Q

Yanjiu, July 1994, pp. 314-341, in CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 6; Gou 

190
Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 34-42, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 3; and Cui N

“Calculation of Orbital Elements For Released Tethered Sa

Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology, April 1997, Vol

126-130, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 6; and Yu Shaohua, “Periodic Mo

Tethered Satellite System,” Yuhang Xuebao, 1997, Vol. 18, No

51-58, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 6.

23. “China Preparing for Manned Space Program,” Nei

Ribao, July 28, 1995, p. 2, in FBIS-CST-95-015.

24. “Beijing Preparing for Moon Mission,” Xinhua, Janu

1995; Chen Jianxiang, “Approaches to Earth-to-Moon Trajec

Kongjian Kexue Xuebao, 1997, 17 (1), pp. 90-96, in CAMA, 1997

No. 2; Chen Ji and Li Xiguang, “PRC Scientist on Lunar, Mar

Feasibility Studies,” Xinhua, March 20, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-

Chen Ji and Li Xiguang, “China Considers Venturing Into 

Exploration, Xinhua, March 20, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-082; an

Guoqiang, “Study on Soft Landing Orbit of Lunar Detector,” G

Keji Daxue Xuebao, 1996, 18 (4), pp. 40-43, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 

As expected, COSTIND appears to have the lead in R&D on 

lunar exploration program.

25. Ding Henggao, “Speeding Up Development of Space Indu

Meet New Challenges,” Zhongguo Hangtian, June 19

FBIS-CST-96-015; Zhang Rufan, “Prospects and Developm

China’s Space Technology”; and “Official On Plans to Export Sa

by Year 2000,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, November 16, 1

FBIS-CHI-96-223.

26. Zhang Xinzhai, “Achievements and Developments of 

Space Technology,” Zhongguo Hangtian, June 1996, in 

CST-96-015. 

27. Liu Zhen, “Gaodongtai GPS Jieshouji Zai Weixingshan

Chenggong”(GPS Receiver Carried on Satellite Successful), Zh

Hangtian Bao, November 16, 1996, p. 1.

28. Russia is the obviously best candidate for foreign coop

See Yang Qifa, “Research and Applications of Space Nuclear 

Hangtianqi Gongcheng (Spacecraft Engineering), Vol. 4, No. 4

also see “Experts Urge Research on Space Nuclear Power S

Zhongguo Tongxun She, June 17, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-138 

Huailin, “Chinese Research on Space Nuclear Reactors Highl

Keji Ribao, August 29, 1996, p. 7, in FBIS-CST-96-017.

191
Investigation of Arcjet Engines,” Zhongguo Kongjian, August 1

41-48, in FBIS-CHI-98-111. State funding began in 1992.

30. Zhang Xinzhai, “Achievements, Future Development of 

Space Technology,” Zhongguo Hangtian, June 1996, in 

CST-96-015.

31. Zhong Xiaojun, “Synchronous Satellite Navigation on th

Regional Earth Surface and in the Near-Earth Space,” Kongjia

Qingbao Yanjiu, July 1994, pp. 243-253, in CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 6. Z

from the Lanzhou Institute of Physics.

32. Yu Mingsheng and Dai Chao, “Design of Sa

Constellations,” paper presented at the China Space Society

Meeting of Space Surveying, November 1996, in CAMA, 1997

No. 3. The satellites are inserted into orbit at 72 degrees a

degrees. 

33. Cheng Yuejin, “Information Transmission System of Dat

Satellites,” Kongjian Jishu Qingbao Yanjiu, July 1994, pp. 185

CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 6. Cheng is from the Xian Institute o

Technology. Also see Tan Liying, “Selection of Wavelength Re

Optical Intersatellite Communication,” Haerbin Gongye Daxue X

1994, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 24-27, in CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 6; Chen Da

“Frequency and Orbit of Data Relay Satellites,” in Zhongguo K

Kexue Jishu, 1996, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 26-31, in CAMA, Vol. 3, N

34. Wang Jingquan, “Xiaoweixing Jiang Yinqi Kongjian 

Fazhan de Yichang Geming,” (Revolution in Small Satellite in 

Technology Development), Zhongguo Hangtian, September 19

31-33; Zhang Guofu, “Xiaoxing Weixing Qishilu” (Accomplishm

Small Satellites), Zhongguo Hangtian, June 1992, pp. 23-27.

35. These concepts has been closely examined and s

advocated by the space and missile industry. See Zhang D

“Guowai Xiaoxing Weixing de Guti Huojian Tuijin Xitong” (Solid 

Propulsion Systems for Foreign Small Satellites), in Hangtian Q

Yanjiu, HQ-93011, pp. 139-155; Wang Zheng, “Screening Stud

Technology for All-Solid Space Launch Vehicles,” Guti H

Fadongji Sheji Yu Yanjiu (Solid Rocket Engine Design and Re

April 1996, pp. 63-73, in CAMA, 1996, Vol. 3, No. 6; Zhang Song, 

and Optimization of Solid Launch Vehicle Trajectory,” Guti H

Jishu, 1997, 20 (1), pp. 1-5; and Zhang Dexiong, “China’s Devel

Concept for Small Solid Launch Vehicles,” CASC Fourth A

192
1-11, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 2.

36. Mao Genwang and Wang Liang, “Weixing de Junshi Y

Tedian, Fazhan Xianshi yu Yingyong Qianjing” (Key Applica

Microsatellites and Prospects for Development), Zhongguo Ha

May 1992, pp. 33-53.

37. Wang Mingyuan, “Digital Storage and Forward Commun

Small Satellite,” Kongjian Dianzi Jishu (Space Electronics Tech

February 1996, pp. 23-36, in CAMA, 1996, Vol. 3, No. 6. The ELI

remote sensing constellations are discussed in the main report

38. “Ambitious Space Program Gears Up for Competitive Ed

Zhu Yilin, “China’s Shijian-4 Satellite,” unpublished paper.

39. Wang Chunyuan, China’s Space Industry and Its Stra

International Cooperation , Stanford University Cen

International Security and Arms Control, July 1996, p. 4; 

Abulkhatin, “Official on Prospects for Space Cooperation,” Ita

October 10, 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-198.

40. “Wang Liheng Fujuzhang Lutuan Fangwen E’Wu Lia

(CASC Deputy Director Wang Liheng Leads Delegation to Rus

Ukraine), Zhongguo Hangtian Bao, April 11, 1994, p. 1.

41. Chen Chang, “Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Say

Are Broad Prospects for Ukrainian-Chinese Cooperation,” X

September 17, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-182.

42. “Zhong, E, Wu, Disanjie Yuhang Keji Dahui Zai X

Zhaokai” (China, Russia, Ukraine, Open the Third Space 

Meeting at Northwest Polytechnical University), Zhongguo H

Bao, October 3, 1994, p. 1. The 1994 meeting was held from Sep

17-20. Sun Jiadong chaired the Chinese team for the Sino-Kaz

43. “Russia Sells Launch Vehicle Technology,” Military 

August 21, 1995.

44. Andrey Kirillov, “China to Buy Russian Equipment for M

Space Missions,” Itar-Tass, March 14, 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-0

45. Christian Lardier, “Chinese Space Industry Ambitions

Cosmos/Aviation International, October 25, 1996, in 

CST-96-020; and author’s unpublished report, “The Role of 

Space and Missile Industry in Strategic Modernization,” May 1

193
January 29, 1997, p. 11, in FBIS-CHI-97-020.

47. Liu Jiyuan, “Strengthening Space Cooperation, L

Forward to the 21st Century,” Zhongguo Hangtian, June 1996, 

in FBIS-CST-96-015.

48. “Zhongguo Hangtian Kaizhan Quanfangwei Guoji 

(China Space Opens Comprehensive International Coop

Meeting), Zhongguo Hangtian Bao, October 3, 1994, p. 1.

49. “Ambitious Space Program Gears Up for Competitive E

50. ASAT development is discussed in detail in the main bod

report.

51. For a discussion of the increased need for space system d

see Ping Fan and Li Qi, “A Theoretical Discussion of Several M

Involved in the Development of Military Space Forces,” Zh

Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), May 20, 1997, pp. 127-13

and Li are from COSTIND’s Command Technology Academy.

52. For an overview of the debate, see Ping Fan and Li Qi ar

development of space forces.

53. Frolov, p. 13.

194
CHINA’S DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPON

China is examining and testing the critical engin

technologies needed to develop a host of directed 

weapons (DEW). The world, including China, has lon

fascinated with the notion of projecting energy at the s

light in the pursuit of warfare. American and former 

Union DEW programs are well-known. Very little, howe

publicly known about research and development (R&

DEW in China. However, the number of papers on d

energy weapon-related technology is in itself an indica

the amount of work done in this field. DEW are part of a 

class of weapons known to the Chinese as “new c

weapons” (xin gainian wuqi), which include high 

lasers, high power microwaves, railguns, coil guns, p

beam weapons, etc.

Organization of China’s DEW Program.

The two most important organizations involved in R

DEW are the China Academy of Sciences and the Comm

of Science, Technology, and Industry for National D

(COSTIND). 

China Academy of Sciences (CAS). CAS is China’s l

institute for basic research into the basic sciences. Ins

involved in DEW affiliated research include the follow

• Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mec

(solid state lasers; adaptive optics)

• Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mech

(adaptive optics)

• Institute of Optoelectronics (adaptive optics)

• Dalian Institute of Chemistry and Physics (CO

195
an outgrowth of the nuclear industry’s 9th Aca

(Northwest Nuclear Weapons Research and Design Aca

which has developed and tested China’s nuclear war

The 9th Academy, subordinate to COSTIND, was prev

located in Haiyan, Qinghai Province, but moved to Mia

Sichuan province in the late 1960s. With its headquar

Sichuan, CAEP has offices and research entities in Sha

and Beijing.

1

 CAEP’s traditional purview has bee

development of nuclear weaponry, and R&D efforts into 

systems reflect a significant diversification of its m

Subordinate research institutes include the following:

• Southwest Institute of Applied Electronics (HP

• Southwest Institute of Fluid Physics (accele

and HPM drivers)

• Southwest Institute of Nuclear Physic

Chemistry (X-ray lasers)

• Southwest Institute of Nuclear Physics

• Institute of Computer Applications

Chinese Lasers and Other Directed Energy

Weapons Under Development.

One area receiving a substantial amount of emph

lasers. Work on lasers has been going on since the 1960s

Mao Zedong approved the 640 Plan, an advanced w

development project focused on missile defense. Th

powered laser portion was designated as Project 640

was intended to counter high altitude bomber

reconnaissance platforms, such as the SR-71 which wa

under development. Primary responsibility was awar

the China Academy of Sciences’ Shanghai Institute of 

and Fine Mechanics. Research was focused in two dire

laser nuclear fusion under the leadership of Deng Ximin

laser weapons under the leadership of Wang Zhijiang.

196
R&D, COSTIND’s Sun Wanlin successfully convinc

Central Military Commission to maintain the pace an

raise the priority of laser development, and then repre

the laser community in the formulation of the 863 Pro

Today, lasers, together with space, are key COS

managed programs.

4

 The Chinese recognize the role 

will play in 21st century warfare and are layin

foundation for eventual weaponization of wide ra

systems. The Chinese defense industrial complex, 

management of COSTIND, are carrying out R&D on a v

of lasers. China’s research into lasers began in the 196

estimated 10,000 people, including approximately 

engineers, in 300 organizations are involved in China’

program. Almost 40 percent of China’s laser R&D 

military purposes.

5

Solid-State Lasers. Solid state lasers make use of ar

crystals. China is a world leader in crystal growth 

expected to further improve its capabilities through the 

parallel processing computers which allow for co

calculations for analysis of crystalline materials.6 

developed one of its first high powered solid laser devic

Shenguang-1 (Magic Light) in 1986. This high e

Nd:glass laser system, also known as LF-12, was develo

CAS’s Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mec

(SIOFM) reportedly has an output power of one terawat

Shenguang-II Nd:Glass laser has an output power 

terawatts, and will be a major facility for China’s i

confined fusion program.

8

 China Academy of Sc

Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (S

has developed an Nd:YAG laser with an output power 

MW.

9

 An Nd:Glass laser, the Xingguang-II, has als

developed and tested. SIOFM, together with C

University of Science and Technology, developed a t

titanium-sapphire laser with an output power of 650M

Free Electron Laser (FEL). Chinese defense 

community views free electron lasers (ziyou dianzi jigua

having a number of advantages, including their adju

wavelength and bandwidth and their potential range o

197
development in 1985. China’s first FEL, the Shuguang

activated in May 1993 and achieved a power of 140 M

July 1994, with a theoretical maximum output of 10GW

Shuguang-1 was developed by CAEP’s Southwest Insti

Fluid Physics (SWIFP).

11 The size of FEL systems cur

limit deployment options. However, MEI’s Sout

Institute of Electronic Engineering is working to redu

size of FEL systems through the miniaturization of ele

devices.12 A second FEL facility located in Beijin

developed by the China Academy of Sciences Institute o

Energy Physics.

13

 Chinese FEL systems, including R

Compton, electromagnetic wave pumped, and Cher

lasers, have been modeled and simulated by an organz

with close links to CAEP, the Institute of Applied Phys

Computational Mathematics (IAPCM).

14

X-ray Laser. X-ray lasers, in principle, can d

electrical circuitry, possibly trigger some types of mun

set off nuclear weapons, and make humans sick or wors

preferred energy source is a small nuclear expl

However, China, which claims certain aspects of its 

laser program to be the most advanced in the world, a

to be focusing on using high powered lasers to produce 

lasing.15 China Academy of Engineering Physics (CA

China’s leading institute on the development of X-ray 

systems. At least one prototype X-ray driver, the Shengu

device, was tested as early as 1988.

16

 CAEP’s Instit

Nuclear Physics and Chemistry is also working o

Xingguang-II laser to support its ICF and X-ray 

programs.

17

Gas Lasers. China’s Tianguang-1 excimer lase

probably drive CAEP’s inertial confinement fusion 

program.

18 CAEP’s Southwest Institute of Nuclear P

and Chemistry has developed and tested a fast 

reactor-pumped xenon laser.

19

 China Institute of A

Energy has experimented a krypton-flouride excimer l

CAEP’s Southwest Institute of Nuclear Physic

Chemistry and SIOFM have tested a nuclear pu

helium-argon-xenon laser, using their China Fast 

198
peak power of 926MW.

21

Chemical Oxygen-Iodine Laser (COIL). CAS’ D

Institute of Chemistry and Physics (DICP) is responsi

China’s COIL development program, which they acknow

has the potential to be an effective DEW. COIL resea

Dalian began in the early 1980s and was formally accep

an 863 project in April 1991. Progress has been made in

pulsed and CW modes. DICP scientists claim they are 

the world’s leaders in COIL research.22 In May 1995, 

conducted one of its first tests of a COIL against a ta

140 meters, achieving a power of 10 kilowatts with an o

energy of 40-50 kilojoules for 3-4 seconds.

23

KrF Laser. China National Nuclear Corpora

Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE) has developed a k

flouride (KrF) excimer laser. IAE began its laser develo

program in 1982 and on the KrF laser, named Heav

1986. The laser, a potential candidate for an ICF drive

tested in 1991 and achieved an output power of 20GW

Carbon Dioxide (CO

2

) Laser. China’s CO2 

development program has been led by SIOFM whic

developed a 3.2 GW system.

25

 Researchers have test

effects a CO

2

 laser can have on certain composite mat

such as fiberglass epoxy.26

Semiconductor Laser. R&D into semiconductor lase

major program supported by the Ninth Five Year Pla

2010 Long Range Plan. Semiconductor lasers have a n

of advantages over conventional laser systems that 

them ideal for many military applications. They are 

efficient (i.e., greater than 60 percent, as compared 

percent or less for conventional lasers); are scalable to 

powers; are microelectronics-based which means they 

mass produced, resulting in low cost; require low vo

therefore, can be battery operated; are compact; and b

they are solid state, they are reliable. Semiconducter 

are also wavelength agile. A new CAS subordinated f

dedicated to the development of semiconductor lasers is 

199
Semiconductor General Plant will lead the project.

27

Optics. China’s ability to generate high powered la

well-established. However, a high powered laser is not e

to make a weapon system. First, optics must focus th

energy onto a target. Generally, the larger the mi

relative to the wavelength, the smaller the focal sp

higher the energy density. Optics must compensa

atmospheric turbulence through the use of adaptive m

which use numerous electronic devices to shape and a

the optimal beam pattern. These mirrors must also be 

withstand tremendous heat generated by the laser.

28

China has placed high priority on development of ad

optics and deformable mirrors to support its DEW pro

During an annual COSTIND science and technology 

meeting, one of China’s most prominent scientist

COSTIND advisor, Qian Xuesen, recognized the critica

this technology and asserted that adaptive optics, or 

mirrors,” are one of China’s most critical technologies i

of further development.

29

Some progress in the development of adaptive opt

already been made. Concentrated efforts into adaptive 

began in 1980 when CAS formed an adaptive optics re

group and laboratory within its Institute of Optoele

Technology.30 CAS certified an adaptive optics sy

developed by its Institute of Optoelectronics, whic

believe has made China a world leader—third behi

United States and Germany—in adaptive optics.

31

SIOFM and Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechan

leading organizations responsible for developm

deformable mirrors and adaptive optics.

32

 Beijing’s In

of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IA

has conducted modeling work on atmospheric effe

ground based high power laser weapons.

33 To further bo

capabilities in optics, China is seeking assista

laser-related optics technology from former Soviet stat

High Powered Microwave (HPM) Weapons. HPM we

are one of the world’s most sought after tools of inform

200
microelectronics packed into modern military plat

HPM weapons can degrade computer systems used i

processing systems, displays, signal processors, ele

flight controls, receivers, radars, electronic w

equipment, satellite ground stations, and a wide ra

communication systems. China—like the United S

Russia, and France—has a national program aim

exploring the feasibility of HPM weapons. Prot

measures against nuclear related EMP effects genera

not perform well against HPM weapons.

35

China’s technology base which could be applied to de

an HPM device is diverse and, in many areas, seemingl

mature. HPM weapons are generally envisioned as par

air defense system or, if successfully miniaturized

air-delivered munition, or a cruise or ballistic m

warhead. As an air defense system, HPM weapons h

number of advantages. First, there are virtually no 

acquisition, pointing, or tracking requirements in any 

employment scenario. The radiation, traveling at the sp

light, can envelop a large volume and engage multiple t

at once. It may be possible to design a system that acts a

a radar and weapon, which first tracks the target an

increases the power and engages the target.

CAEP’s Institute of Applied Electronics an

Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology in Xian a

organizations engaged in research, design, and test

HPM devices.

36

 COSTIND’s National University of D

Technology has also conducted theoretical analysis of 

generators, as has the Southwest Institute of Elec

Equipment.

37

Chinese military strategists, COSTIND analyst

electronic warfare specialists believe HPM weapons wil

a useful purpose in the 21st century and strongly ad

their weaponization. HPM systems, called the “supers

directed energy weapons, can be used as “superjam

which focus microwave energy onto a wide range of po

targets. HPM weapons are praised as being able to c

stealthy air targets and antiradiation missiles, and 

201
praised include plasma guns, high energy ultrasonic we

and subsonic wave weapons which affect the cog

processes of a enemy pilots or soldiers. Besides HPM we

these include particle beam “death ray” weapons wit

power of a thunderbolt” which can carry out both hard a

kills against ground and air targets. Space-based n

particle beam weapons can engage missiles during all 

of flight.

38

China’s HPM program is the outgrowth of researc

the effects nuclear EMP would have on its elec

equipment in a general war. Since 1964, Chinese eng

have developed a series of EMP devices to simulate g

low altitude, and high altitude nuclear bursts. 

simulators have been used to test EMP resistance of r

C

2

 centers, missile sites, underground command bunke

other large fixed facilities.

39

Several power sources could drive such a weapo

example, energy from China’s FEL could be converte

powerful electromagnetic beam.

40

 Other potential gene

include gyrotrons, explosively-driven magneto-cumu

generators (MCGs), magneto-hydrodynamic (

generators, flux compression generators (FCG), vir

klystons, magnetrons, or beam plasma devices, as w

backward wave oscillators. An HPM weapon could a

generated through a high explosive charge used to cr

short pulse of RF energy. The explosive charge co

carried by an artillery shell, or as a warhead 

surface-to-surface or cruise missile.

41

Numerous entities within China’s defense indu

complex are conducting R&D into the most critical segm

an HPM weapon system, its power source. For ex

University of Electronic Science and Technology of 

(UESTC), supported by CAEP’s Southwest Instit

Applied Electronics, has been conducting developmenta

on a backward wave oscillator (BWO) as an HPM sourc

at least 1989 and acknowledges the BWO as a le

candidate for a mobile HPM system.

42

 UESTC ha

developed a high-powered microwave source in supp

202
electron beam-plasma interaction with an HPM system 

increases the operating efficiency and power.

44

 U

directed by Liu Shenggang, has also developed gyrotr

an HPM source, while CAS’ Institute of Electronics ha

conducting R&D into broadband megawatt-class klystr

an HPM source since 1992.

45

 CAEP’s SWIFP and IAPC

carrying out R&D into a magnetic flux compr

generator.

46

Also under development at UESTC is an HPM v

known as an electromagnetic missile (dianci da

characterized by burst of RF energy which attenuate

slowly (manshuaijian). As a jammer, the electroma

missile (EMM) covers a broad frequency range from 1-4

and has a longer range than more conventional jammer

radar, an EMM has strong ECCM properties due to it

bandwidth, and can effectively counter antiradiation m

Chinese engineers also tout its counterstealth capab

and ability to detect low flying targets. EMM system

function as a most desirable means of communication 

their high capacity, long-range, ECCM properties. 

boosted by a small nuclear explosion, Chinese engineer

out, an EMM can also conduct hard kills against a ra

targets.47

One of China’s first experiments in HPM weapon re

was the Flash-I system which utilized a vircator as a 

source. CAEP began development of the Flash-I in 1975

completion in 1983, the Flash-I operated at approxima

GhZ and had a microwave power of 1GW.

48

 The Nor

Institute of Nuclear Technology (NWINT) has develop

Flash-II (Shanguang) electron beam accelerator w

maximum power of 1 terawatt. After a feasibility st

1982, the Flash-II project, designed to aid C

electromagnetic simulation and HPM weapons res

began in 1983 and was first tested in 1990.

49

 NWINT h

conducted developmental work on vircators as an HPM 

source and is a strong proponent for their use.

50

 Final

2nd Academy has also done technical assessme

directional transmissions of EMP bursts.

51

203
military technical revolution by sharply limitin

battlespace use of advanced electronics and se

interrupting enemy communications without the 

nuclear weapons. Russia’s Institute of Applied Physi

Lebedev Physics Institute are currently believed to 

world leaders in some of the basic technology involved in 

and RF weapons.52 In light of the large number of R

scientists assisting China’s conventional and str

military modernization, one cannot ignore the possibili

Russian engineers are providing assistance to China’s 

program.

There is no proof or strong indication that developm

HPM or RF weapons is in a more advanced stage in 

than in the United States. Chinese engineers are pr

working hard along the same lines as U.S. engine

strategic and tactical applications of laser technology.

CAEP has done significant work on particle acce

technology. Besides serving as a key component of a

system, accelerator technology can be used as a particle 

source, a driver for an ICF program, or to simulate a n

explosion. SWIFP’s 3.3 MeV linear induction acce

drives the SG-1 FEL.

53

Potential Applications.

The PLA is placing greater emphasis on lasers an

potential military applications. The Academy of M

Science, the PLA’s leading think-tank on future w

believes lasers will be an integral aspect of 21st centur

Strategists note a wide range of military applicati

lasers, including ranging, laser radars, communica

reconnaissance, high power directed energy weapons, n

fusion and neutron bombs, laser gyroscopes, and 

computing. At the same time, strategists highlig

importance of countering an enemy’s use of lasers.

54

Air and Missile Defense. China’s defense indu

complex is researching potential applications of a t

laser system to counter aircraft; ballistic, cruise

204
guidance munitions. As an air defense weapon, lasers 

highly effective against pilots and vulnerable parts 

aircraft itself, including the wing root, radar, and engin

chemical, FEL, and X-ray laser systems have been exa

as potential candidates. Research has, in large part

budgeted under the 863 program.

55

Satellite Tracking. For more than a decade, Chin

used lasers to track satellites in space. Laser range find

located at space observatories in Wuhan, Nanjing, B

Kunming, Lintong, and Shanghai. Anhui Institute of 

and Fine Mechanics plays a large role in the developm

these systems, as well as excimer lasers and the atmos

effects on laser transmission. China’s satellite laser 

finders, which have an accuracy of 3-4 centimeters, as

satellite orbit calculations and real-time trackin

adjustment in support of COSTIND’s China Launc

Tracking Control (CLTC). The lasers can track satell

both low earth and geosynchronous orbit.56 While appa

not operationally subordinated to CLTC, the laser 

finders are most likely tied into their space tracking ne

The laser ranging systems can support China’s do

satellite tracking requirements and, if upgraded, any 

ASAT campaign.

Anti-Satellite (ASAT). Chinese engineers have con

at least theoretical research into the use of high po

lasers and other directed energy weapons against sat

and have closely studied U.S. and former Soviet 

systems, including the U.S. MIRACL, COIL, EM

projects, and former Soviet DEW systems at Sary Sa

Satellites as currently constructed are partic

susceptible to laser attack. Typical antisatellite concept

a 100 second engagement time, which is the exposure ti

low earth orbit satellite to a ground station.

Laser Radar. Chinese engineers strongly advoca

development of CO

2

 laser radars (lidar), especia

countering a potential adversary’s cruise missiles. Sup

by the 863 Program, Anhui Institute of Optics and 

Mechanics has developed one of China’s first lidars, whi

205
applications include GEO satellite tracking, target tra

fire control, and terrain following for helicopters and 

missiles.

58 One study noted the utility of CO2

 laser r

combined with other sensors, in countering stealthy 

missiles and aircraft.

59

In summary, directed energy weapons are an in

component of China’s strategic modernization program

programs include a variety of high powered lasers an

powered microwave weapons. Chinese analysts see d

energy technology as important for China’s air defen

counterspace efforts. DEW efforts also reflect a diversif

of China’s nuclear weapons industry.

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX IV

1. Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. V.

2. Huang He, “A Dust-Laden Secret: Review and Prosp

China’s Optical Instruments and Laser Weapons,” Ch’ua

Fang-wei Tsa-chih (Defense International), April 1, 1998, pp. 1

3. “Achievements of the 863 Program Celebrated,” Jiefangj

April 5, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-089.

4. Of the seven areas in the 863 Program, COSTIND view

and lasers as two of the most important. See “COSTIND Min

Aerospace, Laser Advances,” Renmin Ribao, April 3, 1

FBIS-CHI-96-082.

5. “Situation, Development of Laser Industry in China,” Y

Jiguang (Applied Laser Technology), June 1990, JPRS-CST-90

6. “CAS High Performance Parallel Computing Initiat

FBIS-CST-96-025. 

7. “China Scores Marked Results in Laser Technology Res

Jiefangjun Bao, February 13, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-038. Also se

X-ray Laser Experiments With LF-12 (Shenguang) App

Described,” Renmin Ribao, May 3, 1991, JPRS-CST-91-019. Th

was developed by SIOFM’s Deng Ximing, Yu Wenyan, Fan Dia

Hu Shaoyi, and Huang Zhenjiang.

206
April 5, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-089. As part of the ICF and X-ra

program, CAEP opened up a lab within SIOFM.

9. “LD-Pumped Nd:YAG Microchip Laser with 62.5MW CW 

Power, Zhongguo Jiguang (Chinese Journal of Lasers), May 3, 

JPRS-CST-94-007.

10. “Ti-Sapphire Laser Attains CW Output Power of 65

Zhongguo Jiguang (Chinese Journal of Lasers), December 1

JPRS-CST-95-004.

11. Hui Zhongxi, “Research, Design of SG-1 Free Electron 

Qiang Jiguang Yu Lizishu, August 1990, JPRS-CST-9

“COSTIND Minister on Aerospace, Laser Advances,” Renmin 

April 3, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-082; and “SG-1 FEL Amplifier 

Reaches 140MW,” Qiang Jiguang yu Lizishu, December 1

JPRS-CST-94-019; Also see “SG-1 FEL, BFEL Certified; Asia

IR-Spectrum FEL Light Generated,” Keji Ribao, June 8

JPRS-CST-93-013. Performance Improvements of 3.3 MeV LIA,

Jiguang yu Lizishu, May 1994, in JPRS-CST-94-014.

12. “High Performance Short-Period FEL Wiggler,” Qiang J

Yu Lizishu, May 1992, in JPRS-CST-92-019. SWIEE is devel

“microwiggler” as one means to reduce the FEL’s overall size.

13. “SG-1 FEL, BFEL Certified; Asia’s First IR-Spectrum FE

Generated,” Keji Ribao, June 8, 1993, JPRS-CST-93-013.

14. Du Xiangwan, Dong Zhiwei, and Gao Tieda, “Recent Pro

FEL Research in China - Experiment and Simulation,” paper pr

at Modeling and Simulation of Laser Systems III Conferen

Angeles, January 24-25, 1994.

15. “China Scores Marked Results in Laser Technology Res

Jiefangjun Bao, February 13, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-038. A

“Bipulse Drive Generated High Gain X-Ray Laser Expe

Successful,” Qiang Jiguang Yu Lizishu, February 19

JPRS-CST-94-008.

16. “China: 863 Program Achievements in High-Power 

Research Highlighted,” Keji Ribao, February 13, 19

FBIS-CST-96-013; and “COSTIND Minister on Aerospace

Advances,” Renmin Ribao, April 3, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-0

follow-on laser for use in China’s ICF program will be a neod

glass laser, the Shenguang-2.

207
Experiments,” Zhongguo Kexue Bao, November 6, 19

FBIS-CST-96-003.

18. “China Scores Marked Results in Laser Technology Res

Jiefangjun Bao, February 13, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-038.

19. “Laser Cell for Reactor Pumped He-Ar-Xe Laser Experi

Qiang Jiguang Yu Lizishu, August 1994, in JPRS-CST-94-019

20. “Experimental Investigation of a Large-area Di

Hundred-Joule KrF Laser,” Qiang Jiguang yu Lizishu, May 1

JPRS-CST-94-014.

21. “Principle Tests of Reactor Pumped Laser of He-Ar-Xe S

Qiang Jiguang Yu Lizishu, August 1994, JPRS-CST-94-019.

22. “Novel High Power COIL Described,” Wuli (Physics), Ju

in JPRS-CST-92-025; “Kilowatt-Class CW Oxygen-Iodine C

Laser Developed,” Zhongguo Kexue Bao (China Science 

September 1, 1993, JPRS-CST-93-017. The chemical oxygen 

laser is the basis of the USAF’s Airborne Laser which is slated 

around 2005.

23. Xie Ping, “Dalian Laser Achievements,” Qiang Jigu

Lizishu, August 1995, Vol. 7, No. 3, back cover, in FBIS-CST-9

24. “100J KrF Laser Pumped by Intense Electron Beam,

Jiguang Yu Lizishu, November 1991, JPRS-CST-92-008. Leade

IAE effort include Wang Ganchang and Wang Naiyan.

25. “A GW Power Level High Power CO

2

 Laser System,” Zh

Jiguang, June 1990, JPRS-CST-90-029.

26. Wang Lijun, “Experimental Study on CO

2

 Laser on Fib

Epoxy,” Hongwai Yu Jiguang Gongcheng, 1996, Vol. 25, No. 2, in 

Vol. 3, No. 4.

27. “Shandong Gets Nation’s Largest Semiconductor 

Facility,” Zhongguo Dianzi Bao , March 18, 1997, p

FBIS-CST-97-010; and Han Lixin, “Shandon Builds Semico

Laser Production Base,” Keji Ribao, January 16, 1997, p

FBIS-CST-97-005. 

28. For details, see Major General Bengt Anderberg and Dr

Wolbarsht, Laser Weapons: The Dawn of a New Military Age, Ne

Plenum Press, 1992, p. 130.

208
30. “Nation’s Adaptive Optics Technology in World’s Front 

Zhongguo Kexue Bao, May 21, 1991, JPRS-CST-91-015. The r

group was led by Jiang Wenhan.

31. “Adaptive Optics Technology Is World-Class,” Keji 

October 30, 1992, in JPRS-CST-92-025. The adaptive optics sys

also identify space targets, such as satellites.

32. “Effects of Deformable-Mirror/COAT System 

Subaperature Size on Compensation Efficiency,” Zhongguo J

(Chinese Journal of Lasers), February 1992, in JPRS-CST-92-0

“Deomonstration of Uniform Illumination on Target by Focusin

Power Laser Beam,” Guangxue Xuebao (Acta Optica Sinica), 

1992, in JPRS-CST-92-013.

33. “Methods for Investigating Near-Field Power in Ground

High Power Laser Weapons Testing,” Zhongguo Jiguang (

Journals of Lasers), December 1992, JPRS-CST-93-008.

34. One particular laser optics facility with which China h

cooperate is subordinated to the AGAT R&D establishment in B

Chi Haotian visited AGAT in early June 1997. See “Prime Minist

Meets Chinese Defense Minister,” Moscow Interfax, June 3, 1

FBIS-SOV-97-154.

35. For a comprehensive overview of the technologies ass

with HPM weapons, see Carlo Kopp, “The E-Bomb—A We

Electrical Mass Destruction,” in Winn Schwartau, Infor

Warfare, New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994, pp. 296-297. A

J. Swegle and J. Benford, “State of the Art in High Power Micr

An Overview,” paper presented at the Lasers 1993 Intern

Conference on Lasers and Applications, Lake Tahoe, Nevada, De

6-10, 1993. Swegle and Benford point out that the United 

Russia, France, and the United Kingdom have HPM progr

addition to China.

36. Most technical papers on HPM are published by enginee

these three organizations. See, for example, “Numerical Simula

Propagation of Intense Microwave Pulses,” Qiang Jiguang yu 

(High Power Laser and Particle Beams), November 19

JPRS-CST-95-006; and “Microwave Pulse Generation,” Qiang J

yu Lizishu, May 1994, in JPRS-CST-94-014.

37. “Theoretical Analysis of Dual-REB Microwave Gene

Qiang Jiguang Yu Lizi Shu, February 1992, in JPRS-CST-92-0

209
Directed Energy System,” Dianzi Duikang Jishu, May 1996, pp

CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 2.

38. “Beam Energy Weaponry: Powerful as Thund

Lightening,” Jiefangjun Bao, December 25, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-

Also see “Outlook for 21st Century Information Warfare,

Hangkong (International Aviation), March 5, 19

FBIS-CHI-95-114. The author, Chang Mengxiong, is from COS

Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering and is a leading advo

China’s rapid pursuit of information warfare capabilities, to 

HPM weapons. He is widely regarded as China’s foremost ex

national C

4

I issues. Also see Gong Jinxuan, “High Powered Mic

Weapons: A New Concept for Electronic Warfare Weaponry,” 

Duikang Jishu, February 1995, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 5. Gong is f

Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE), China’s 

radar ECM research institute; and Zhang Hongqi, “High 

Microwaves and Weaponry,” Xiandai Fangyu Jishu, April 19

38-46, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 5. Zhang is also from SWIEE.

39. Peng Guixin, “Development of Electromagnetic

Simulators,” Shijie Daodan Yu Hangtian (Missiles and Spac

November 1990, in JPRS-CST-91-010. The paper was sponsore

Beijing Institute of Electronic Engineering. Designators for th

simulators have been the DM-140, DM-1200, and DMF-600.

40. See Henry Freund and Robert Parker, “Free Electron L

Scientific American, April 1989, p. 84, for the technological expla

41. Neil Munro, The Quick and the Dead: Electronic Comb

Modern Warfare, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991, p. 50. A

David Shukman, Tommorrow’s War: The Threat of High-Tec

Weapons, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996, p. 207. Accor

Shukman, the United States has not fielded such a HPM warhe

could within 3 years at a cost of $20 million.

42. “3-cm Relativistic Backward Wave Oscillator,” Qiang J

Yu Lizishu, May 1992, in JPRS-CST-92-019.

43. “More on Completion of First Domestic EMW-Pump

Experimental System,” Keji Ribao, September 9, 19

JPRS-CST-92-018.

44. “High Power Microwave Radiation From Beam-

Interaction,” Qiang Jiguang Yu Lizishu, May 19

JPRS-CST-92-016; and Wu Jianqiang, Liu Shenggang, a

210
yu Lizishu, February 1997, pp. 51-58, in FBIS-CST-97-012.

45. Tang Changjian, Yang Zhonghai, and Liu Shenggang, Sc

China, Vol. 36, September 1993; Yan Yang, Li Hongfu, Du Pin

and Liu Shenggang, “Numerical Modeling of Large 

Magnetron-Type Gyrotron Through Self-Consistent Nonlinear T

in IEEE Transactions on Plasma Science, Vol 22, No. 6, Decemb

pp. 1010-1014; Li Jiayin, Xiong Xiangzheng, Liu Shen

“Experimental Study of Relativistic Magentron,” Qiang Jigu

Lizishu, November 1997, pp. 563-567, in FBIS-CHI-98-128; an

Yaogen and Peng Jun, “Multibeam Klystron—New Type of High 

Microwave Amplifier,” Dianzi Kexue Xuekan, January 1996, pp

in FBIS-CST-96-008.

46. Yu Chuan, Li Liangzhong, Yan Chengli, Zeng Fanqun

Yingshi, Cai Mingliang, Sun Chengwei, Xie Weiping, “Exper

Study of MFCG Explosive Tube,” Qiang Jiguang yu Lizishu, No

1997, pp. 578-580, in FBIS-CHI-98-058. Specific SWIFP entit

the FCG development is the Shock Wave and Detonation 

Laboratory. Also see Dong Zhiwei, Wang Guirong, and Tian S

“Performance Analysis of Helical Explosively- Driven MFCG,

Jiguang yu Lizishu, August 1997, pp. 353-358, in FBIS-CHI-

and Yang Libing and Gao Shunshou, “Numerical Simula

High-Voltage Pulsed Power Conditioning Systems,” Qiang Jigu

Lizishu, August 1996, pp. 400-406, in FBIS-CHI-97-003. Yang a

are from SWIFP.

47. For an overview, see Wang Ying and Ma Fuxue, Xin G

Wuqi Yuanli (Principles of New Concept Weaponry), Beijing: Or

Industry Press, 1997, pp. 276-295; “Preliminary Experimental S

Electromagnetic Missiles Conducted,” Dianzi Keji Daxue X

February 1992, in JPRS-CST-92-013; “Study of Backscatte

Electromagnetic Missiles,” Dianzi Xuebao, June 19

JPRS-CST-92-023; Ruan Chengli and Lin Weigan, “Electrom

Missiles and Counterstealth Technology,” Xiandai Leida, No. 

China’s leading experts on electromagnetic missiles includ

Chengli, Shen Haoming, Wu Dacun (T. T. Wu), and Lin Weig

earned his Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkley in 19

authored one of the world’s first studies on this subject in 1985; 

Tai Tsun, “Electromagnetic Missiles,” Journal of Applied Physic

Vol. 57 (7), pp. 2370-2373. Also see Ruan Chengli, Dianci 

Gailun (Concepts of Electromagnetic Missiles), Beijing: MPT 

1994; and Zhou Shuigeng, Dianci Daodan Jiqi Dui Weilai Dian

de Yingxiang, (“Effect of Electromagnetic Missiles on Future El

Warfare”) Shanghai Hangtian, 1994 (1), pp. 33-37.

211
Jiguang Yu Lizishu, August 1991, JPRS-CST-92-001.

49. “Flash-II: China’s Accelerator Reaches World Level,” Z

Ribao, July 3, 1993, JPRS-CST-93-015; “Flash-II: Rela

Electron-Beam Accelerator,” Qiang Jiguang Yu Lizishu, Augu

JPRS-CST-92-001; “Flash-II Pulsed IREB Accelerator Cer

Renmin Ribao, July 3, 1993, JPRS-CST-93-013. One of 

developers of the Flash-II at NWINT is Qiu Aici.

50. “Numerical Simulation of Vircator Oscillation fo

Generation,” Qiang Jiguang Yu Lizishu, August 

JPRS-CST-93-002.

51. Zhang Zhenzhou, “Directional Transmission of EMP 

Xiandai Fangyu Jishu, April 1994, pp. 47-58, in CAMA, Vol. 2

Selected source of EMP burst is FCG and vircator. Zhang is f

Second Academy’s Beijing Institute of Electronic Engineering.

52. Neil Munro, The Quick and the Dead: Electronic Com

Modern Warfare, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991, p. 49.

53. “Performance Improvements of 3.3 MeV LIA,” Qiang J

Yu Lizishu, May 1994, JPRS-CST-94-014.

54. Wang Qingsong, ed., Xiandai Junyong Gaojishu (Contem

Military Use of High Technology), Beijing: AMS Press, 19

139-152.

55. Ji Shifan, “Domestic and Foreign Development of Tact

Defense Lasers,” Zhongguo Hangtian, December 1991. The pa

sponsored by the Beijing Institute of Electronic Engineering. A

Wan Xuying, “Lun Zhanshu Daodan Weixie yu Duikang 

(Discussion of the Tactical Missile Threat and Countermea

Zhongguo Hangtian, November 1992. COSTIND oversees la

space areas of the 863 Programs. The other five 863 Program ar

managed by the State Science and Technology Commission.

56. Tong B. Tang, Science and Technology in China, L

Longman, 1984, p. 184. Also see Xia Zhihong, Ye Wenwei, a

Qingfu, “New Progress of Ranging Technology at Wuhan Satellit

Ranging Station,” Conference Paper for the Eighth Intern

Workshop on Laser Ranging Instrumentation at the Goddar

Flight Center, June 1993.

57. Yang Qunfu and Liu Xiaoen, “Fanweixing Wuqi Xiting 

Qianjing de Yanjiu” (Study on the Development Prospects fo

212
March 1993. The U.S. MIRACL is a U.S. Navy program for sh

cruise missiles. During one test at White Sands, the laser achie

power with a 3800 nanometer wavelength.

58. Sun Baoju and Chen Gang, “CO

2

 Radar Applications,” Z

(Aerospace China), February 1993.

59. The study was sponsored by China Aerospace Corp

Aerospace Group, also known as 066 Base. Liu Shiliang, “Deve

Counterstealth Technology,” Zhongguo Hangtian, September 1

lidar, see “Nation’s First UV Differential Absorption Lidar Sy

Keji Ribao, February 18, 1997, in FBIS-CST-97-008.

213
COMMISSION OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLO

AND INDUSTRY FOR NATIONAL DEFEN

The focal point for coordinating People’s Liberation 

(PLA) requirements with the SSTC is the Commiss

Science, Technology, and Industry for National D

(COSTIND). COSTIND is directed by Lieutenant G

Cao Gangchuan, who transfered from his previous posi

director of the GSD Equipment Department. Cao has a

four deputy directors who each hold different port

COSTIND senior advisors include Qian Xuesen, the fa

China’s space and missile development (see Appendix 

Chen Fangyun, an electronics expert who in the 196

1970s organized the effort to develop a space tra

network. Important departments, committees, and ins

include the following:

• S&T Committee. COSTIND’s S&T Comm

directed by Zhu Guangya, is made up of so

China’s most talented engineers, who pr

consultative guidance for the COSTIND leader

• Comprehensive Planning Departm

COSTIND’s Comprehensive Planning Depar

(zonghe jihua bu) is a key organization responsi

long-range planning for developing of cr

enabling technologies and weapons systems.

2

• S&T Department. Directed by Major General 

Laigen, the S&T Department likely ove

preliminary and model R&D efforts of the v

COSTIND and defense industry research instit

COSTIND also oversees the development and opera

China’s space facilities and a series of engineering an

bases.4

215
ase 0JuquaSatete aucCete(J

located in Gobi desert, is China’s earliest and l

satellite launch center. From here, CLTC con

medium and low earth orbit satellite launches a

inclinations. More than 20 satellites, m

photoreconnaissance platforms, have launched 

Jiuquan. Beijing has TT&C station under XSC

• Base 21. Nuclear weapons testing in Xinjiang

the town of Lop Nur.

• Base 22. SAM testing near Jiuquan, Gansu pro

• Base 23. Naval Test area SLBM testing; an

missiles at Huludao, Liaoning province. Estab

in 1957 for joint Sino-Soviet anti-ship missile te

• Base 25. Taiyuan Space Launch Center, in no

Shanxi province in the area of Kelan, Wuzha

Xingxian counties, one of China’s primary sa

launch and missile testing sites. Command

Major General Jiang Xuefu.

• Base 26. Xian Satellite Control Center is direc

Major General Li Hengxing, who recently re

Major General Shangguan Shipan.

• Base 27. Xichang Space Launch Center, direc

Major General Hu Shixiang.

• Base 29. China Aerodynamic Research 

Development Center (CARDC) in Mianyang, Si

province.

• Base 31. Baicheng Conventional Weapons T

Center.

China Launch and Tracking Control Ge

(CLTC). CLTC (Weixing Fashe Cekong Xitong Zongb

departmental level entity which functions as an opera

216
Yuanzheng, is roughly analagous to U.S. Space Com

With over 5000 engineers and technicians, CLTC ov

three satellite launch centers and China’s vast tra

telemetry, and control (TT&C) network. CLTC headqu

which occupies a large facility on Beijing’s North Thir

Road, is made up of a planning department, develo

department, tracking and control department, lo

department and liaison department. Two research ins

under CLTC include the Luoyang Institute of Tra

Telecommunications, Technology (LITTT) and the B

Special Engineering and Design Research Institute (BS

The COSTIND entity responsible for constructing laun

tracking sites and testing facilities is the Beijing S

Engineering and Design Research Institute (BSEDI).6

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX V

1. Deputy Directors include Lieutenant General Zhang X

Lieutenant General Shen Rongjun, Lieutenant General Huai 

Lieutenant General Shen Chunnian, Major General Chen Daz

Major General Wang Tongye. Portfolios include conventional s

R&D and testing; space and missile systems R&D (Shen Ro

telecommunications (Wang Tongye); nuclear issues; and d

conversion (Huai Guomo). At the time of this writing, m

COSTIND was being placed under a new general departme

General Armaments Department, co-equal to the GSD, GPD, and 

2. At least since 1991, the Comprehensive Planning Depa

has been directed by Major General Chen Dazhi. Chen, howev

been recently promoted to become a deputy director of COSTIN

Xinhua press release, March 31, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-091. 

3. Organizational information drawn from “Directory 

Military Personalities,” Defense Liaison Office, U.S. Co

General, Hong Kong, October 1996, pp. 25-27. For an excellent o

of COSTIND, see Shirley A. Kan, China: Commission of 

Technology, and Industry for National Defense, Congressional R

Service Report for Congress, November 7, 1996.

4. Lewis and Xue, pp. 85, 189, 191, and 279 endnote 6

“Directory of PRC Military Personalities,” pp. 25-27. Bases 

China’s military industrial complex can be divided into ser

example, the 20 and 30 series are COSTIND bases for space lau

217
bases. The 60 series are subordinate to China Aerospace Corp

China’s space and missile industry.

5. Undated CLTC brochure; “Directory of PRC M

Personalties,” Defense Liaison Office, U.S. Consulate Genera

Kong, October 1996, pp. 25-27.

6. Undated BSEDI brochure. Founded in 1958, BSEDI has o

personnel.

218
CHINA’S MINISTRY OF ELECTRONIC

INDUSTRY (MEI)

Minister: Hu Qili

Vice-ministers: Liu Jianfeng (dual-hatted as Chairm

Liantong. Next in line to replace Hu 

Zhang Jinqiang

Lu Xinkui

Chief Engineer: Yu Zhongyu

China Academy of Electronics and Inform

Technology (CAEIT). General systems design d

ment. Heavily involved in formation of national inform

infrastructure. Works closely with COSTIND’s B

Institute of Systems Engineering (BISE) in deve

China’s national C

4

I infrastructure.

Research Institutes.

2nd Research Institute Taiyuan

5th Research Institute Associated with environme

testing.

6th Research Institute Computer systems enginee

Also known as Huasun

Computer Company.

7th Research Institute Guangzhou Communicatio

Research Institute. Has

conducted R&D on field mo

communications systems, s

digital mobile communicati

system.

8th Research Institute Anhui Fiber Optical Fiber

Research Institute.

219
Electronics Technology (SW

Located in Chengdu. Involv

a range of defense-related

programs including UHF,

microwave, and millimeter

communications and radar

equipment.

11th Research Institute R&D into solid state laser

systems, to include laser ra

finders.

12th Research Institute TACAN systems.

13th Research Institute Located in Shijiazhuang.

Involved in development of

integrated circuits and 

solid state lasers. Best know

work in gallium arsenide

integrated circuits. Importi

advanced French technolog

14th Research Institute Leading radar institute, loc

in Nanjing. Involved in

development of early warni

phased array, HF, and

space tracking radars.

15th Research Institute North China Computer Ins

Located in Beijing and kno

Taiji.

18th Research Institute Tianjin Institute of Power

Sources.

20th Research Institute China’s primary navigation

research institute located i

Xian. 

21st Research Institute Located in Shanghai.

22nd Research Institute China Institute of Radiowa

Propagation. Involved in ti

220
with Shaanxi Astronautica

Observatory Timing Statio

25th Research Institute R&D on signal processing

systems. Working on long w

infrared (LWIR) imaging se

26th Research Institute Located in Chongqing. R&D 

surface acoustic wave (SAW

devices, piezoelectronic

acousto-optics, electronic

ceramics, and crystals.

28th Research Institute Nanjing Research Institute 

Electrical Engineering.

Responsible for C

4

I system

integration for air defense

and air traffic control syste

29th Research Institute Southwest Institute of Elec

Engineering (SWIEE). Loca

Chengdu. Responsible for r

reconnaissance and electro

countermeasures.

30th Research Institute R&D on switching systems

to include advanced commo

channel signalling seven (S

software.

33rd Research Institute Located in Taiyuan.

34th Research Institute Guilin Institute of Optical

Communications. One of C

principle entities engaged i

R&D on fiber optics. JV wit

Nokia.

36th Research Institute Responsible for communica

electronic countermeasures

38th Research Institute East China Institute of

Electronic Engineering

221
early warning and artillery

radars. Located in Hefei.

39th Research Institute Northwest Institute of Elec

Equipment (NWIEE). Deve

SATCOM ground stations,

microwave relays, and miss

range equipment.

40th Research Institute Responsible for connectors 

relays. Located in Bengbu.

41st Research Institute R&D into signal generators 

test equipment for infrared 

plane arrays.

43rd Research Institute Hengli Electronics Develop

Corporation. Located in He

44th Research Institute Chongqing Institute of

Optoelectronics. R&D into

charged couple devices (CC

infrared focal plane arrays, 

fiber optics.

45th Research Institute R&D into integrated circuit

production technology, i.e.,

steppers. Located in Pinglia

Gansu province.

46th Research Institute Located in Tianjin. R&D an

testing of silicon and galliu

arsenide materials.

47th Research Institute R&D into reduced instructi

computing (RISC) integrati

circuits.

49th Research Institute Northeast Institute of Sens

Technology. Located in Har

Develops vibration and oth

sensors. 

222
Technology. Has worked on

automated command system

SAM units.

51st Research Institute Conducts R&D on radar rec

naissance and jamming.

53rd Research Institute Institute of Applied Infrare

Technology. Located in Lia

Engaged in passive jammin

optoelectronics.

54th Research Institute Communications Technolog

Institute. Located in

Shijiazhuang. Major player 

wide range of military syste

55th Research Institute R&D on semiconductors. 

Factories.

605th Factory Fiber optic cable.

701 Factory Radios

707 Factory Chenxing Radio Factory

710 Factory Zhongyuan Radio Factory.

Located in Wuhan. Engage

production of civilian and

military telecommunication

equipment.

711 Factory Shipborne UHF systems.

712 Factory Airborne UHF systems. Lo

in Tianjin.

713 Factory unknown

714 Factory Panda Electronics Factory. 

and airborne UHF systems

716 Factory Digital communications

equipment

223
720 Factory One China’s primary radar

factories. Works closely wit

14th Research Institute in

Nanjing.

722 Factory ECM plant. Works closely w

29th Research Institute. 

730 Factory Submarine cable

734 Factory Fiber optic cable and wirele

equipment

738 Factory Computers. Works closely w

15th Research Institute.

741 Factory Optoelectronics and infrare

systems.

750 Factory Guangdong Radio Group

Telecommuications Compa

HF SSB.

754 Factory Located in Tianjin.

756 Factory Aviation navigation equipm

760 Fatory Troposcatter systems

761 Factory Beijing Broadcast Factory. 

powered VLF systems.

764 Factory Tianjin Broadcasting Equip

Company. Aviation navigat

equipment

765 Factory Aviation navigation equipm

Located in Baoji.

769 Factory Airborne UHF systems

780 Factory Airborne radar countermea

781 Factory ECM plant and bombing co

radars

224
ponders. Located in Baoji.

783 Factory Fujiang Machinery Factory

Also known as Sichuan Jiu

Electronic Factory. Produce

secondary radars and IFF

transponders. Located in

Mianyang.

784 Factory Jinjiang Electronic Machin

Factory. Located in Chengd

Produces surveillance rada

785 Factory Produces optoelectronics

equipment and SAM guida

radars, and AAA computer

786 Factory SAM guidance radars. Loca

Xian.

789 Factory AAA computers

834 Factory Tactical communications

equipment

913 Factory ECM plant. Works closely w

36th Research Institute.

914 Factory Lanxin Radio Factory. Loca

Lanzhou.

924 Factory Radar reconnaissance and j

ming equipment. Works clo

with 29th Research Institu

4500 Factory Computer systems

4508 Factory Located in Tianjin.

6909 Factory ECM plant

225
Nanjing Radio Factory Tactical communications

systems.

Nanhai Machinery Airborne navigation radars

Factory

Huajing Electronics Working on submicron

Group integrated circuits under 90

project. Located in Wuxi. Jo

venture with AT&T.

Huadong Computer Developed China’s first

Technology Institute minisupercomputer.

Great Wall Computer Largest computer firm in C

Group

Beijing Institute of Developed Internet firewal

Electronic Technology system.

Applications 

North China Research Works on sub-systems for l

Institute of Opto- system. Develops infrared

Electronics materials and devices.

Zhongchen Electronics Engaged in systems

Industry Development engineering. JV with US Lo

Corporation Corporation.

Zhongruan Corporation Computer software. 

China’s Top Integrated Circuit Producers:

Shougang-NEC

Tianjin-Motorola

Huajing Microelectronics Group

Shanghai Beijing Microelectronics Company

Shanghai Advanced Semiconductor Corporation

Shaoxing Huayue Microelectronics

226
reports, 1995-present; China Today: Defense Science and Tech

Vol. II, pp. 719-764; author’s unpublished study, Ministry of Ele

Research Institutes and Factories: Organizations Engaged in R

and Development of Command, Control, Communication

Intelligence (C

3

I), U.S. Defense Attache Office, Beijing, May 19

Lynn Crisanti, Report on Ministry of Electronics Industry R

Institutes and Factories, Kamsky Associates, 1998. 

227
MARK A. STOKES is Country Director for the PR

Taiwan within the Office of the Secretary of De

International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA). Major Stok

previous assignments as a signals intelligence and ele

combat support officer in the Philippines and West Ber

served as assistant air attaché at the U.S. Defense A

Office in Beijing, China, from 1992-95. Before assignm

OSD/ISA, he was the Asia-Pacific regional planner with

HQ USAF Operations and Plans Directorate from 19

He holds graduate degrees in International Relation

Asian Studies from Boston University and the 

Postgraduate School. He received his formal C

Mandarin language training from the Defense Lan

Institute in Monterey, California, and the Diplo

Language Services in Rosslyn, Virginia.

229
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Larry M. Wortzel

Acting Director of Research

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Author

Major Mark A. Stokes, USAF

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler