J-A18038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

CYRUS SAM SUKHADIA

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1230 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Suppression Order Entered September 23, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-65-CR-0001889-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

CYRUS SAM SUKHADIA

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1231 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Suppression Order Entered September 23, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-65-CR-0002897-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: November 8, 2023

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals the order granting Cyrus 

Sam Sukhadia’s motion to suppress in two cases. The suppression court found 

that two search warrants for the contents of Sukhadia’s cell phone were 

unconstitutionally overbroad. We affirm.
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Case Posture

This case began in 2014 with an investigation into Sukhadia, who was 

then a police recruit. The suppression court found the following facts leading 

up to the issuance of the first warrant:

On October 17, 2014, Detectives James Simunovic and 

Jeffrey Abraham, of the City of Pittsburgh Police Department, met 

with [Sukhadia] in order to conduct an interview regarding his 

arrest on charges which alleged that [Sukhadia] provided alcohol 

to an underage female and communicated with her through

Tinder, a social media communication application. [Sukhadia] 

was placed in a soundproof interview room. After being 

administered Miranda warnings, [Sukhadia] chose not to speak 

with the officers and the interview was terminated.

Simunovic also took custody of [Sukhadia’s] cellular 

telephone from the arresting officer and placed it on his desk. 

[Sukhadia] did not consent to a search of the phone’s contents. 

Abraham subsequently wrote an application for a search warrant 

to examine the contents of [Sukhadia’s] cellular telephone. The 

Honorable David Cashman of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Allegheny County signed the search warrant at approximately 

11:45 a.m. on October 17, 2014. After the warrant was signed, 

Abraham transferred the phone to another City of Pittsburgh 

police officer to conduct the search.

Suppression Court Opinion, 9/23/22, at 9–10 (record citations and footnotes 

omitted). 

This first search warrant authorized the police to search for and seize

“All electronic data to include but not limited to phone calls, text messages, 

emails, photos, videos, call log, instant messages and correspond[e]nce from 

applications downloaded from [Sukhadia’s phone].” Application for Search 

Warrant and Authorization, 10/17/14 (First Warrant), at 1 (identifying the 

“items to be searched for and seized,” being “as specific as possible”). The 
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warrant confined the location of the search to the following content: “All 

electronic data to include but not limited to phone calls, text messages, 

emails, photos, videos, call log, and instant messages from [Sukhadia’s 

phone].” Id. (describing the “premises . . . to be searched”). It listed two 

crimes: witness intimidation and selling liquor to a minor, with dates of 

“10//2014-10/16/2014” [sic]. Id.; see 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4952, 6310.1.

Attached to (and included with) the first search warrant was the affidavit 

of probable cause. The affidavit provided both detectives’ backgrounds as 

well as the following information in support of probable cause:

The information in this search warrant was [corroborated] 

and relayed to us from a report generated by Detective Brian 

Sellers, who is assigned to the Sex Assault and Family Crimes 

Unit. The report that he prepared, detailed an incident involving 

a female victim named [E.W.], and ACTOR Cyrus Sukhadia.

The report [dictated] that on 10/16/2014, Detective 

Patterson and Detective Sellers received an underage drinking 

report from officers Matthew Mays and Michael Muehlbauer of the 

Point Park University Public Safety Department. The student was 

identified as 18 year old [E.W.] According to the report, [E.W.] 

disclosed that she had obtained the alcohol from a City of 

Pittsburgh Police officer. [E.W.] made a written statement of the 

incidents. Detective Sellers and Detective Patterson received a 

copy of the statement.

[E.W.] knew the officer only as “Cyrus.” Through further 

investigation, it was discovered that a Cyrus Sukhadia was 

currently enrolled with the City of Pittsburgh Police Training 

Academy as a recruit. [E.W.] didn’t know the address of Sukhadia 

but was able to direct Sgt. Black (Point Park University) and Lt. 

Kudrav (A/Commander, Zone 2) to the apartment building in the 

Brookline section of the City of Pittsburgh. A silver Toyota Corolla, 

parked on the street in front of the building, was positively 

identified by [E.W.] as Cyrus’ vehicle. A check of the license plate 
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confirmed the owner as Sukhadia. The driver’s license photo was 

an exact match as to a photo on [E.W.’s] cell phone as Sukhadia.

Detective Sellers and Detective Patterson then interviewed 

[E.W.] in SAFC room #263. The following is a summary of the 

interview and is not verbatim unless quoted.

[E.W.] said that she is currently enrolled at Point Park 

University as a freshman. [E.W.] said that she met Sukhadia on 

“Tinder”. She explained that Tinder is a dating website for mobile 

phones. [E.W.] admitted that she put her age as 22 on the 

website and that she “needed booze.” On 10/2/2014, at 1842 

hrs, Sukhadia responded to [E.W.’s] post with “So i hear u want 

some booze.” The following is conversation between Sukhadia 

and [E.W.], as copied from [E.W.’s] cell phone:

[E.W.] - “Yes please.”

Sukhadia - “Lol and whats in it for me :p”

[E.W.] - “Bring me two bottles, I’ll give you head and cash.”

Sukhadia - “Lol sure, what do u want and where am i taking 

it?”

[E.W.] - “First, are you okay with getting head in your car?”

Sukhadia - “Yeah sure” “Actually ur only 3 miles away, we 

could prob head to my place real quick”

By 1925 hrs., Sukhadia texted [E.W.] and said that he’d be 

there in 20 minutes. A short time later, Sukhadia called [E.W.] 

on her phone and told her that he was at the school. Sukhadia 

drove [E.W.] to a liquor store on Shiloh St. where she gave him 

$40.00. Sukhadia returned with a bottle of rum and a bottle of 

vodka. While en route, Sukhadia asked [E.W.] how old she was. 

[E.W.] told Sukhadia that she was 18 years old. She said 

Sukhadia replied “No wonder you asked me to get you alcohol.” 

They then drove to Sukhadia’s apartment. While [E.W.] 

performed oral sex on Sukhadia, she noticed a bandage on 

Sukhadia’s knee. After she was done, she asked Sukhadia how 

he injured himself. Sukhadia told [E.W.] to look in his closet. 

[E.W.] complied and she said that when she opened the doors, 

she immediately saw Pittsburgh Police uniforms. [E.W.] said that 

she felt that she had been “busted.” She said Sukhadia said: “Just 

forget I’m a cop.” Sukhadia drove [E.W.] back to the dorms.

[E.W.] said that the next time she and Sukhadia texted each 

other was on 10/7/2014. Sukhadia agreed to get [E.W.] alcohol. 

He told her that he had to go to a beer distributor because the 
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liquor stores were closed. Sukhadia picked up [E.W.] and took 

her to his house. After the oral sex was completed, Sukhadia 

drove [E.W.] back to the dorms. During the drive back to the 

dorms, Sukhadia asked [E.W.] if any of her friends would have 

oral sex for alcohol or intercourse for drugs. [E.W.] said that she 

didn’t reply. At the dorms, [E.W.] retrieved a 12 pack of [Four 

Loko] out of the trunk. [E.W.] said she paid Sukhadia $26.00. A 

short time later, [E.W.] received a message from Sukhadia 

accusing her of short changing him. [E.W.] said that there was 

no more communication between the two of them until the final 

meeting.

On 10/15/2014, Sukhadia picked up [E.W.] and drove to his 

apartment. [E.W.] said that inside the apartment, she saw a 

pistol, vest and other police items. [E.W.] said Sukhadia 

suggested that she put his “billy club” inside her vagina. [E.W.] 

said she refused. She performed oral sex on Sukhadia. He then 

drove Sukhadia [sic] back to the dorms. While driving [E.W.] back 

to the dorm, Cyrus Sukhadia told her that if she or some of her 

friends wanted drugs, he would get the drugs from the evidence 

locker. Sukhadia said he would get the drugs if [E.W.] or her 

friends would have sex with him.

As they got closer to the school, Sukhadia and [E.W.] 

observed a heavy presence of police in the area (due to a movie 

being filmed in the area). Sukhadia told [E.W.] that if she gets 

caught, not to tell police she got the alcohol from him. [E.W.] 

asked Sukhadia why and he said: “I’d plant enough cocaine on 

you to get you in jail for 20 years.” [The police asked E.W.] how 

she felt about that statement. She said that she was scared and 

thought, “He could actually do that.”

Based on this information, Detective Patterson obtained an 

arrest warrant for Sukhadia.

On 10/17/14 Sukhadia reported to the Pittsburgh Bureau of 

Police Training Academy and was placed into custody by Sgt. 

Epler. [During a search] incident to arrest, Sgt. Epler recovered 

the white Iphone as described in the application for the search 

warrant.

Based on the victim’s statement’s about correspond[e]nce 

VIA the cellular phone messaging between [E.W.] and Sukhadia, 

I am respectfully requesting a search warrant for all electronic 

data to include but not limited to phone calls, text messages, 

emails, photos, videos, call log, instant messages and 
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correspond[e]nce from applications downloaded from a cellular 

phone recovered from Cyrus Sukhadia. The description of the 

cellular phone is white Apple Iphone [with specific descriptors].

First Warrant, at 2–4.

The suppression court found the following facts about the execution of 

the first warrant:

Detective Timothy Cole is employed by the Computer 

Crimes Unit of the City of Pittsburgh Police Department and is 

tasked with processing and analyzing digital evidence, including 

conducting forensic examinations of cellular telephones. Cole was 

assigned to analyze data obtained from [Sukhadia’s] phone. Cole 

was not provided with a copy of the search warrant prior to 

conducting the search of the phone’s contents; but, rather, he was 

advised by other detectives of the information set forth in the 

affidavit of probable cause concerning conversations between 

[Sukhadia] and an underage female regarding [Sukhadia’s] 

provision of alcohol to her in exchange for sexual activity.

The passcode to access the phone was deduced from 

[Sukhadia’s] badge number. Once access to the phone’s contents 

was obtained, Cole extracted all of the phone’s electronic data, 

referred to as a data “dump,” and entered it into a program to be 

decoded into a viewable file which is then searched and analyzed. 

Cole testified that he was required to review all of the downloaded 

messages and catalogs in order to locate those communications 

between [Sukhadia] and E.W. because detectives did not know 

the name that [Sukhadia] entered into his phone to identify E.W. 

or the name that E.W. used to identify herself on Tinder.[SCO n.8] 

As described by Cole, “We just had to look through it and see 

when we found a conversation relevant to the case.” In 

conducting this search, Cole viewed actual conversations along 

with phone numbers, profile names, and timestamps.

SCO n.8 Cole explained that he could not just ask E.W. for the 

name she used to identify her Tinder account because, 

“Even if they are cooperating witnesses, we don’t trust what 

they are saying is true. We have to look at all of the data.” 

[The suppression court] views this explanation as rather 

disingenuous in that the probable cause in [the first 

warrant] was largely based on information provided by E.W. 
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who appeared to be represented in the affidavit as a credible 

source. 

In his testimony, Cole acknowledged that it is possible to 

limit the search parameters. Cole testified, however, that he 

understood [the first warrant] to allow a general search of the 

entire phone and all of its contents and did not limit his search to 

any specific terms or boundaries, choosing instead to review all of 

the phone’s contents without limitation as to dates or names. It 

was while generally reading through [Sukhadia’s] chat messages 

that Cole discovered a message between [Sukhadia] and a person 

identifying themself as a fifteen-year-old female. Cole stopped 

his investigation and reported this new information to Detective 

[Aprill-Noelle ]Campbell. Based on this information extracted by 

Cole from [Sukhadia’s] phone and Campbell’s own search of 

[Sukhadia’s] phone using the additional information provided by 

Cole as a search term, Campbell secured a second search warrant.

Suppression Court Opinion, 9/23/22, at 9–12 (footnotes and record citations 

omitted).

The second warrant authorized police to search Sukhadia’s phone and 

seize “The contents of the Apple iPhone including pictures, videos, chat 

messages, app content/data, MMS and SMS messages, contacts, call logs, and 

website history.” Application for Search Warrant and Authorization, 10/23/14

(Second Warrant), at 1. The affidavit of probable cause described Detective 

Campbell’s training and experience and then provided specific facts from the 

investigation:

SPECIFIC PROBABLE CAUSE

On 10/18/14 I, Detective Campbell, received a phone call 

from Lt. Herrmann of Major Crimes. Lt. Herrmann informed me 

that a Pittsburgh Police Recruit had been arrested for furnishing 

alcohol to a minor and during that investigation the Recruit’s 

(Cyrus Sukhadia) cell phone (white Apple iPhone) was seized and 

a search warrant was obtained for [its] contents. When [Detective 

Cole] began to forensically examine the contents of the phone for 
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evidence pertaining to messages that Sukhadia and the victim 

sent to each other through a mobile app, he saw a string of 

messages to a person who went by the user name and screen 

names of “Bob Marie” and “goatlover98”. The messages were 

sexual in nature, even though she told Sukhadia that she was 15 

years old. Det. Cole also saw pictures of Sukhadia exposing 

himself and of unknown females’ naked stomachs and of a group 

sex act. Lt. Herrmann requested that I follow up with the 

investigation in regards to Unlawful Contact with Minors.

On 10/19/14 the R/Det. went to the Computer Crimes Unit 

and accessed the Cellebrite examination results to look for the 

chats between the suspect and “Bob Marie”. The R/Det. found the 

chat string and confirmed that on 9/2/14 at approximately 2245 

hrs. Bob Marie told Sukhadia that she was 15 years old. Sukhadia 

at first, said she was too young, but then he asked, “I will, r u a 

virgin haha”, then they continued with Sukhadia asking about 

having sex and when they could meet. When the R/Det. observed 

these messages[, the affiant] stopped the exam and on 10/20/14 

[the affiant] instructed Det. Cole to continue with his examination 

of the phone but to limit his analysis to potential evidence 

concerning the original victim and that [the affiant would] be 

obtaining a new search warrant for evidence of Unlawful Contact 

with Minors.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above information the Affiant believes there is 

probable cause showing that PA Title 18 § 6318, has been 

violated. This Affiant requests authority to search the Apple 

iPhone forensically for potential evidence.

Id. at 2–3.

The suppression court found the following facts about the investigation 

once police obtained the second warrant:

Cole did not complete his analysis of the information 

extracted pursuant to [the first warrant]. After securing [the 

second warrant], Campbell assumed the task of completing the 

search pursuant to [the first warrant] which had been started by 

Cole, taking over from the point where Cole had left off. Campbell 

searched for conversations between [Sukhadia] and E.W. without 

looking at messages with the newly identified victim which was 
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the basis for [the second warrant]. Campbell first carried out a 

search for keywords, but did not find anything. She then 

extracted text messages from the Tinder database on 

[Sukhadia’s] phone and discovered the messages between 

[Sukhadia] and E.W.

Suppression Court Opinion, 9/23/22, at 12 (record citations omitted).

Sukhadia was ultimately charged at two docket numbers with different 

offenses against E.W. and others. On November 30, 2018, Sukhadia moved 

to suppress all evidence derived from the searches of his phone. Relevant 

here, he argued that the first warrant was overbroad and that any evidence 

from the examination under the second warrant was fruit of the poisonous 

tree. Motion to Suppress Evidence, 11/30/18, at 9–11, 15–16.

Suppression Ruling

The suppression court heard Sukhadia’s motion on February 28, 2019,

and December 3, 2021. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of 

Detectives Simunovic, Abraham, and Cole. Sukhadia testified on his own 

behalf and called James Swauger as an expert in digital forensic examination.

The suppression court granted Sukhadia’s motion to suppress. As to 

the first warrant, the court concluded that the attached affidavit established

probable cause to search for these specific pieces of digital evidence relating 

to Sukhadia’s interactions with E.W.:

[Sukhadia’s] communications using the Tinder application 

between the dates of October 2, 2014, and October 15, 2014, to 

gather evidence of his contacts with E.W.[; Sukhadia’s] text 

messages from that same time period to gather evidence of his 

contacts with E.W.; [Sukhadia’s] GPS location data from that 

same time period to gather evidence of his contacts with E.W.; 

[Sukhadia’s] call history and call logs from that same time period 
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to gather evidence of his contacts with E.W.; and the phone list of 

[Sukhadia’s] contacts to gather evidence of his contacts with E.W.

Suppression Court Opinion, 9/23/22, at 21. The court found, however, that 

nothing in the affidavit supplied probable cause to search for photographs and 

videos. Id. at 21 n.13.

The suppression court then compared the items for which there was 

probable cause with the items that the warrant allowed the police to seize. 

The court read the warrant to authorize the police to search “all electronic 

data on [Sukhadia’s phone] for the time period of October 2, 2014, through 

October 16, 2014, for communications and contacts between [Sukhadia] and 

E.W.” Id. at 22. The suppression court interpreted the introductory phrase 

“All electronic data to include but not limited to” to permit the police to search 

the phone’s contents without limits. Id.

Therefore, the suppression court concluded that the first warrant lacked 

particularity and was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 23. The 

suppression court reasoned that the first warrant authorized a “sweeping 

examination of [Sukhadia’s] phone into areas beyond those which were 

supported by probable cause.” Id. For example, the court identified other

content on Sukhadia’s phone that the warrant allowed police to search without 

having established probable cause:

In addition to those areas for which a search was supported by 

probable cause, the warrant authorized a search through 

[Sukhadia’s] internet browsing history and websites visited[;] all 

web communication applications such as Instagram, Kik, Whisper, 

instant messaging, and FaceTime accessed and utilized through 

[Sukhadia’s] phone[;] any notes written and recorded on 
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[Sukhadia’s] phone[;] and a search of all emails which could be 

accessed through [Sukhadia’s] phone.

Id.

In further support of its conclusion that the first warrant was overbroad, 

the suppression court cited the executing officers’ testimony that they 

understood the warrant to allow a “general search of the phone and all of its 

contents.” Id.1 Detective Cole began his search pursuant to the first warrant 

(which he had not read) without limiting the parameters by dates, names, or 

keywords. Id. The court credited James Swauger’s testimony that the 

software available at the time of the search could filter content by dates, 

names, and keywords. Id. The court thus noted that the police shared its 

view that the first warrant allowed a “general search.” Id. 

As to the second warrant, the suppression court concluded that it was 

unconstitutional due to issues from the first search. Id. at 25. Initially, the 

court concluded that the first search was illegal because it was conducted 

pursuant to an overbroad warrant. Id. Alternatively, the court reasoned that

Detective Cole had exceeded the limits of the first warrant by searching 

Sukhadia’s messages from outside the time period covered by the warrant

(October 2, 2014, through October 16, 2014). Id. The suppression court 

____________________________________________

1 Detective Cole agreed on redirect examination that he thought it was “a 

general search for specific information related to this investigation.” N.T., 

2/28/19, at 100. “I was looking for that specific conversation. But you are 

going through and seeing other conversations that have to do with the same 

thing and you have to read the conversation and figure out who the 

conversation is with, what is going on.” Id.
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therefore ruled that the facts supporting the second warrant came from an 

illegal search. Id.

In the alternative, the suppression court reasoned that the second 

warrant itself was unconstitutionally overbroad. The court found that the 

affidavit provided probable cause to “support[] a search of photographs, 

videos and communications on September 2, 2014, between [Sukhadia] and 

the minor female over an unidentified communication service.” Id. at 24. By 

contrast, the suppression court found the warrant to authorize a search for 

“pictures, videos, chat messages, content and dat[a] derived from 

applications, MMS and SMS messages, call logs, contacts, and website history 

found on [Sukhadia’s] phone.” Id. at 24–25. As with the first warrant, the 

court concluded that the second warrant was overbroad because it authorized 

the seizure of digital items unsupported by probable cause. Id. at 25.

The suppression court thus granted Sukhadia’s motion to suppress. The 

Commonwealth timely appealed, certifying that the suppression order would 

terminate or substantially handicap its prosecution. The Commonwealth and 

the suppression court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

1925.

The Commonwealth presents one question for our review: “Did the 

suppression court err in finding the search warrants for [Sukhadia’s] cell 

phone text messages overbroad?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
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Analysis

This Court reviews an appeal of an order granting suppression according 

to the following standard and scope:

We review trial court suppression orders to determine whether the 

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are bound by 

the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they are 

supported by the record. In reviewing an appeal by the 

Commonwealth of a suppression order, we may consider only the 

evidence from the defendant’s witnesses along with the 

Commonwealth’s evidence which remains uncontroverted. Our 

scope of review of suppression court factual findings is limited to 

the suppression hearing record. We, however, are not bound by 

a suppression court’s conclusions of law; rather, when reviewing 

questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary.

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 276 A.3d 282, 292 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en 

banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 39 (Pa. 2021)) 

(brackets omitted).

All individuals have a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable 

searches and seizures by the police. The Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 

be seized.

U.S. Const. amend IV.

Additionally, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

provides: 
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The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 

possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no 

warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall 

issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without 

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by 

the affiant.

Pa. Const. Art. I § 8.

Both provisions require search warrants to “specifically list the things to 

be seized.” Commonwealth v. Grossman, 555 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. 1989) 

(citation omitted). Under Article I, Section 8, that description must be “as 

particular as reasonably possible.” Id. “The requirement that warrants shall 

particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under 

them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant 

describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left [to] the discretion 

of the officer executing the warrant.” Id. (quoting Marron v. United States, 

275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)).

A search warrant is overbroad if it authorizes police to search for and 

seize items without establishing probable cause to search for and seize those 

items. Commonwealth v. Green, 265 A.3d 541, 550 (Pa. 2021). Thus, an 

overbreadth analysis involves first determining “for what items probable cause 

existed” and then measuring the “sufficiency of the description against those 

items.” Grossman, 555 A.2d at 900. Suppression is required if there is an 

“unreasonable discrepancy” between the items for which there is probable 

cause and the description of the items the warrant authorizes police to seize. 

Id.; see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 240 A.3d 575, 584–85 (Pa. 2020).
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Recognizing the “fact-dependent nature of such claims,” our Supreme 

Court has cautioned:

[S]earch warrants should be read in a common sense fashion and 

should not be invalidated by hypertechnical interpretations. This 

may mean, for instance, that when an exact description of a 

particular item is not possible, a generic description will suffice.

In that vein, we have held that where the items to be seized are 

as precisely identified as the nature of the activity permits and an 

exact description is virtually impossible, the searching officer is 

only required to describe the general class of the item he is 

seeking.

Green, 265 A.3d at 550 (quotations and citations omitted).

In Pennsylvania, the same overbreadth standard applies to a search of 

a digital device as for a physical space. Id. at 553–54. We thus recount

several cases involving both physical and electronic searches.

In Grossman, a search warrant affidavit established probable cause to 

search for files relating to three clients of an insurance agent, who had over 

2000 clients. Grossman, 555 A.2d at 900. The warrant, however, authorized 

the police to seize “All insurance files, payment records, receipt records, copies 

of insurance applications and policies, [and] canceled checks.” Id. at 897. 

Because the warrant allowed police to search for and seize all of the insurance 

agent’s files, rather than just the files for the three clients described in the 

affidavit, the warrant was overbroad. Id. at 900.

By contrast, there was no defect in the warrant in Commonwealth v. 

Walston, 724 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1998). Police were told that a man was growing 

marijuana in the basement of a house, and they obtained a warrant to search 

the entire house for marijuana and items related to drug trafficking. Id. at 
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290. Because these items could be found anywhere in the house, the warrant 

authorizing a search of the entire house was not overbroad. Id. at 293.

[W]here a search warrant adequately describes the place to be 

searched and the items to be seized[,] the scope of the search 

extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may 

be found and properly includes the opening and inspection of 

containers and other receptacles where the object may be 

secreted.

Id. at 292 (quotation and citation omitted).

A search of a cell phone was at issue in Green, 265 A.3d 541. There,

the affidavit gave police probable cause to seize evidence that a suspect was 

sharing child pornography online. Id. at 554. The warrant authorized police 

to search for and seize all computer hardware in the suspect’s home, including 

cellular devices, and it stated: “These items will be seized and then later 

searched for evidence relating to the production and/or distribution of child 

pornography.” Id. at 546 (emphasis removed). Regarding the search of the 

seized devices, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that this limiting 

language was adequate to prevent the police from generally rummaging for 

evidence of a crime. Id. at 554–55. The high court noted that this 

overbreadth issue differs from the scope of access to a digital device. Id. at 

555 n.7. 

We similarly found no overbreadth in Commonwealth v. Moser, 283 

A.3d 850 (Pa. Super. 2022). There, police had probable cause to search for 

and seize cell phone data relating to an alleged rape. Id. at 857–58. After 
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seizing the suspect’s cell phone, they obtained a warrant to search for and 

seize the following from the contents of the cell phone:

Any and all calls/messages/conversations/photos/videos that 

establish or provide details regarding the nature of the 

relationship between [the suspect] and the [complainant] relating 

to violations of Title 18: Section 3121 A(1) – Rape by forcible 

Compulsion and Title 18: Section 6301A(1)(i) – corruption of a 

minor and other related charges.

Id. at 854. Because of this limiting language, we held that the warrant was 

not overbroad. Id. at 858. There was no “unreasonable discrepancy” 

between the files the police were authorized to seize and the files for which 

there was probable cause; although the police could search the entire cell 

phone, they could only seize files related to the relationship between the 

suspect and the complainant as related to the listed crimes. Id. at 857–58.

By contrast, we held warrants to search two cell phones to be overbroad 

in Commonwealth v. Young, 287 A.3d 907 (Pa. Super. 2022). There, the 

affidavits established probable cause to search the cell phones for specific 

evidence regarding a fraternity party. See id. at 926. The affidavits

concluded with a request to forensically recover that evidence. Id. at 925. 

However, the warrants authorized police to search for and seize the cell 

phones and all the data stored on them, without expressly limiting the search 

and seizure to evidence from the fraternity party. Id. at 913. This Court 

declined to impose the limiting language from the affidavits onto the warrants 

authorizing the seizure of all the data on each phone. Id. at 927–31. Because 

the warrants on their face authorized police to search for and seize every file 
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on the phones, including files without probable cause, the warrants were 

overbroad. Id. at 931.

Here, with respect to the first warrant, the affidavit established probable 

cause to search for and seize certain files relating to Sukhadia’s interactions 

with E.W. However, the warrant authorized police to search for and seize “All 

electronic data” from Sukhadia’s phone. We agree with the suppression 

court—the first warrant would not prevent the police from seizing any file from 

Sukhadia’s phone, regardless of its connection to Sukhadia’s interactions with 

E.W. Unlike in Green and Moser, there was no language to limit the object 

of the search to the data for which there was probable cause. Rather, as in 

Grossman and Young, the first warrant authorized the police to search for 

and seize a vast amount of data unrelated to the crimes for which there was 

probable cause. Therefore, the warrant was overbroad.

The Commonwealth alleges several analytical errors by the suppression 

court, which we address in turn. Primarily, it asserts that, given the nature of 

digital information on a cell phone, it was reasonable to search Sukhadia’s 

entire phone for evidence of his interactions with E.W. Cf. Walston, supra

(allowing a search of an entire house for drug items). This misses the mark. 

The first warrant was overbroad because of what the police could search for, 

not where they could search for it. See Green, 265 A.3d at 555 n.7. Because 

the warrant authorized the seizure of all the files in Sukhadia’s phone, it is of 

no moment where on Sukhadia’s phone they could search for those files.
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The Commonwealth also argues that the suppression court should have 

considered the language in the affidavit as limiting the files that the police 

could search for and seize. It offers multiple reasons why this Court in Young

erred by refusing to consider an affidavit in defining the items to be searched 

for and seized. We need not opine whether Young was correct2 because the 

affidavit attached to the first search warrant in this case did not limit the 

requested content to those files for which there was probable cause:

Based on the victim’s statement’s about correspond[e]nce 

VIA the cellular phone messaging between [E.W.] and Sukhadia, 

I am respectfully requesting a search warrant for all electronic 

data to include but not limited to phone calls, text messages, 

emails, photos, videos, call log, instant messages and 

correspond[e]nce from applications downloaded from a cellular 

phone recovered from Cyrus Sukhadia. The description of the 

cellular phone is white Apple Iphone [with specific descriptors].

First Warrant, at 4 (emphasis added).3 Like the face of the warrant, the 

affidavit of probable cause anticipates a search to seize all electronic data on 

Sukhadia’s phone. Therefore, even if a reviewing court considered the 

affidavit, it would not cure the unreasonable discrepancy between the object 

of the search and the files for which there was probable cause.

Relatedly, the Commonwealth criticizes the suppression court’s use of

Detective Cole’s testimony that he conducted a general search of Sukhadia’s 

____________________________________________

2 Furthermore, a three-judge panel of this Court cannot overrule an opinion 

from another three-judge panel of this Court. Commonwealth v. Beck, 78 

A.3d 656, 659 (Pa. Super. 2013).

3 By contrast, the affidavit in Young differed significantly from the description 

of the items to be searched for and seized. See Young, 287 A.3d at 925.
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phone. Because review of a search warrant is limited to the four corners of 

the document, the Commonwealth suggests that Detective Cole’s description 

of his search was not relevant. We observe that Detective Cole did not read 

the search warrant and that he believed he was searching only for evidence 

of Sukhadia’s interactions with E.W. Regardless, Detective Cole’s testimony 

was not essential to the suppression court’s conclusion or ours. Based on the 

language of the first search warrant, the police were authorized to search for 

and seize all electronic data from Sukhadia’s phone, rather than just the data 

for which probable cause existed. Therefore, the Commonwealth’s challenges 

fail, and the first warrant was overbroad.

With respect to the second warrant, the suppression court provided 

three independent grounds for suppression: (1) the second warrant was the 

fruit of an unconstitutionally overbroad first warrant, (2) the second warrant 

stemmed from a search that exceeded the scope of the first warrant, and (3) 

the second warrant itself was overbroad. The Commonwealth limits its 

argument against the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine to contending that 

the first warrant was not overbroad. Because the first warrant was overbroad, 

the Commonwealth’s argument fails. As this is a sufficient basis to sustain 

the suppression court’s ruling, we do not reach the Commonwealth’s 

challenges to the alternative grounds for suppression of the second warrant.
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Conclusion

Police had probable cause to search for certain communications between 

Sukhadia and E.W. among the contents of Sukhadia’s cell phone. They 

obtained a warrant that, based on its plain language, authorized them to 

search the entire phone and seize everything on it, with no limiting language. 

The suppression court properly concluded that this warrant was overbroad.

The second search warrant resulted from a search conducted to the first 

warrant. Because the first warrant was overbroad, the suppression court 

properly granted suppression with respect to the second warrant. Therefore, 

we will affirm the order granting Sukhadia’s motion to suppress evidence 

obtained from both searches of his cell phone.

Affirmed.

DATE: 11/8/2023