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52–441 PDF 2009

THE FEDERAL AVIATION 

ADMINISTRATION’S CALL TO 

ACTION ON AIRLINE SAFETY 

AND PILOT TRAINING 

(111–62) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 23, 2009 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

PHIL HARE, Illinois 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

VACANCY 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Babbitt, Hon. Randolph, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration ........ 4 

Brady, Dr. Tim, Past President, Aviation Accreditation Board International ... 4 

Cohen, Roger, President, Regional Airline Association ........................................ 4 

Loftus, John Michael, Father of Madeline Loftus, on behalf of the families 

of Continental Flight 3407 .................................................................................. 4 

May, James C., President and CEO, Air Transport Association ......................... 4 

Prater, Captain John, President, Airline Pilots Association International ........ 4 

Skiles, Jeffrey, Vice President, Coalition of Airline Pilots Association ............... 4 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 96 

Cohen, Hon. Steve, of Tennessee ............................................................................ 97 

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 98 

Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona ....................................................................... 108 

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 109 

Richardson, Hon. Laura, of California ................................................................... 115 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Babbitt, Hon. Randolph ........................................................................................... 117 

Brady, Dr. Tim ......................................................................................................... 126 

Cohen, Roger ............................................................................................................ 146 

Loftus, John Michael ............................................................................................... 157 

May, James C. .......................................................................................................... 172 

Prater, Captain John ............................................................................................... 177 

Skiles, Jeffrey ........................................................................................................... 188 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Babbitt, Hon. Randolph, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration: .......

Response to question from Rep. Richardson, a Representative in Congress from the State of California ............................................................ 36 

Response to request for information from Rep. Richardson, a Representative in Congress from the State of California ....................................... 39 

Brady, Dr. Tim, Past President, Aviation Accreditation Board International, 

rebuttal to Jeffrey Skiles’ testimony ................................................................... 139 

Cohen, Roger, President, Regional Airline Association, responses to questions 

from Rep. Costello, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois .. 152 

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(1) 

HEARING ON THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION’S CALL TO ACTION ON AIRLINE SAFETY AND PILOT TRAINING 

Wednesday, September 23, 2009 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jerry F. Costello 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Subcommittee will come to order. The Chair 

will ask all Members, staff, and everyone to turn electronic devices 

off or on vibrate. 

The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony regarding 

the FAA Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training. I will 

give a brief opening statement and then call on the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for his opening statement or any remarks that he 

may have, and then we will attempt to go directly to our witnesses. 

I welcome everyone to the Aviation Subcommittee hearing on the 

Federal Aviation Administration Call to Action on Airline Safety 

and Pilot Training. I think it is important that as we discuss airline safety and improving pilot training standards that we remember one of the important reasons why we are here today. 

On February 12, 2009, Colgan Air, doing business as Continetal 

Connection Flight 3407, crashed en route to Buffalo Niagara International airport. All 45 passengers and the four crew members 

died, as well as one person on the ground. Mr. Mike Loftus, his 

daughter Madeline was a passenger on Flight 3407. I am pleased 

he is here again with us, joining us today to offer his testimony, 

and the Subcommittee extends our sincere condolences to you, as 

well as other family members and friends who lost loved ones in 

this tragic accident. 

While the NTSB continues to investigate the cause, the 3-day 

public hearing on the accident clearly identified the need to closely 

examine the regulations governing pilot training and rest requirements and the oversight necessary to ensure their compliance with 

a particular focus on regional airlines. 

At the outset I would like to commend you, Administrator Babbitt, for your leadership and your quick response to these safety 

issues. You acknowledged early on that the practices in the regional airline industry are not acceptable, and you acted. Soon 

after our Subcommittee hearing on June 11, an airline safety and 

2 

pilot training call to action was announced to help us gather information from the airlines and labor organizations to determine industry best practices and seek volunteer compliance with a number 

of safety initiatives. I believe that the call to action has helped 

focus the regional air carrier safety discussion in the aviation community, in Congress, and with the public. 

Today’s hearing is the first of many oversight hearings on the 

status of the FAA’s call to action. Over the past several months the 

FAA held 12 regional safety forums around the country. I understand that all were well attended. 

While there are positive indicators that the FAA and the stakeholders have made progress, there is also a lot that we do not know 

about the results of these efforts. One of the reasons we have raw 

and incomplete data is because the FAA did not impose or suggest 

firm deadlines for labor or industry to complete the recommended 

action items. 

On June 24, Administrator Babbitt wrote 105 airlines and eight 

unions asking for commitments to specific action items. Three 

months later less than half have responded to your request. As a 

result, we only have preliminary information regarding what specifically these organizations have committed to do. A response of 

less than 50 percent to the FAA is exactly why we cannot rely on 

voluntary compliance. 

I don’t believe at this point you, Mr. Babbitt, nor the airline industry or the labor groups can tell us with any degree of confidence 

what the substance of the voluntary commitments are. That is why 

Congress must enact comprehensive safety legislation that will increase safety across the board. I know that we are expecting a 

more comprehensive report from the FAA on what progress that 

you have made sometime in December, by the end of the year. And 

the Subcommittee will convene another hearing to review what the 

FAA has proposed in order to measure your progress. 

Meanwhile, we intend to uphold our commitment to the families 

of Flight 3407 and the American public. This Subcommittee will 

continue aggressive oversight to strengthen airline safety and pilot 

training qualification standards. Congress has the ability to improve aviation safety standards, and that is exactly what we intend 

to do with H.R. 3371. 

As you will recall after the June 11 hearing on regional air carriers and pilot work force issues, Chairman Oberstar, Ranking 

Member Mica, Mr. Petri, and I made a commitment that we would 

work together to address many of the safety issues that were 

raised in the hearing. Based upon the input we received, which included ideas from Members of Congress and additional meetings 

with the FAA, the pilots unions, the airlines, and others in the 

aviation community, we introduced bipartisan legislation, H.R. 

3371, in July. We had a specific goal in mind, to raise the bar on 

the minimum level of safety to ensure there is one level of safety 

across the industry. 

To address pilot qualifications the bill increases the minimum 

flight hours required to be hired as an airline pilot. There is a consensus among pilots and many in the aviation community that 250 

flight hours is simply not enough, and that safety would be improved by raising these standards. Under H.R. 3371, all prospective 

3 

airline pilots would be required to obtain an airline transport pilot 

license, which is currently needed to be an airline captain. It requires a minimum of 1,500 flight hours. Our goal is to ensure that 

both the first officer and the captain have the same minimum level 

of experience, training, and skills to transport passengers and crew 

safely. 

The ATP license also requires additional aeronautical knowledge, 

crew resource management training and greater flight proficiency 

testing. Some in the aviation community have expressed concerns 

with the provisions to require an ATP license. I think Administrator Babbitt had it right in his speech to the Airline Pilot Association, and I quote you, Mr. Babbitt, in that speech. If you think 

the safety bar is set too high, then your standards are set too low. 

Our bill is a comprehensive effort to consolidate what we know 

industry wide about aviation safety to improve safety performance 

going forward. That is why the call to action is so important. From 

the airlines, we need to know if they are using FOQA and ASAP 

and if they are working in partnership with the regional partners 

on specific and concrete ways to ensure the regional airlines adopt 

and implement the most effective safety practices. From the pilots, 

we need to know if they established and published a code of ethics 

to set expectations for professional behavior or have professional 

standards and an ethics committee. This is all valuable information 

and data that we need in order to evaluate pilot training and qualification programs. 

Before I recognize Mr. Petri for his opening statement, I would 

ask unanimous consent to allow 2 weeks for all Members to revise 

and extend their remarks and to permit submission of additional 

statements and materials by Members and witnesses. Without objection, so ordered. 

At this time the Chair recognizes the Ranking Member of the 

Subcommittee, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling this important follow-up hearing to our June 11 hearing on air carrier safety. 

Well, as we all know, statistically, U.S. commercial aviation is very 

safe. Accidents remind us that there are improvements that still 

may be made and that there are lessons to be learned in these 

tragic losses. 

With today’s hearing, we continue our focus on the common goal 

of improving that safety record even further. As the families of victims of Flight 3407 remind us, we can and must do everything in 

our power to ensure that what happened on the day that they lost 

their loved ones must never happen again. I believe we are all committed to that shared goal. 

In the aftermath of the tragic loss of Continental Flight 3407 on 

February 12, 2009, this Subcommittee explored many issues relating to safety of the airline system with special emphasis on regional air carriers. In addition, Mr. Mica, Mr. Costello, Mr. Oberstar, and I introduced the bipartisan Airline Safety and Pilot 

Training Improvement Act of 2009 to address the critical safety 

issues considered at our hearing. 

At roughly the same time the FAA launched a call to action on 

air carrier safety, and I would like to join in thanking the Administrator for that effort and for joining us this morning and look forVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:30 Dec 17, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\52441 JASON
4 

ward to hearing his update on the progress of the wide-ranging initiatives concluded in the FAA’s plan. I am interested in learning 

about the ongoing regulatory effort at the FAA to address pilot 

training, record availability, professionalism, and fatigue. Additionally, we will explore what improvements can be put in place to improve air carrier hiring practices and training oversight. 

I would especially like to thank Mr. Loftus, who is with us here 

today testifying on behalf of the families of Continental Flight 

3407. Welcome back. I appreciate you and the other family members’ insights and contributions to the discussion of how to best improve aviation safety. Your efforts here on Capitol Hill have been 

very helpful. 

In three of the five recent fatal regional air carrier accidents, the 

National Transportation Safety Board cited pilot performance as a 

potential contributory factor. In Flight 3407 pilot performance 

seems to have played a role. I look forward to hearing from the Administrator and the pilots union what specific actions they are talking to improve peer auditing and professional conduct. 

Again, I want to thank the witnesses for their participation and 

yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now 

will recognize and introduce the witnesses. The first witness that 

will be testifying is the Honorable Randy Babbitt, who is the Administrator for the Federal Aviation Administration; Mr. John 

Loftus, who is the father of Madeline Loftus, and he is here testifying on behalf of the families of Continental Flight 3407. And I 

know that a number of family members and loved ones are in the 

audience here today at this hearing. Captain John Prater, who is 

the President of the Airline Pilots Association International; Mr. 

Roger Cohen, who is the President of the Regional Airline Association; Mr. James May, who is the President and CEO of the Air 

Transport Association; Dr. Tim Brady, who is the past President, 

Aviation Accreditation Board International; and Mr. Jeffrey Skiles, 

Vice President, Coalition of Airline Pilots Association. 

Gentlemen, I would ask you—we have a 5-minute rule. I would 

ask you to summarize your statements so that we have plenty of 

time for questions and a discussion about many of these issues. So 

the Chair now recognizes Administrator Babbitt. 

STATEMENTS OF THE HON. RANDOLPH BABBITT, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; JOHN MICHAEL LOFTUS, FATHER OF MADELINE LOFTUS, ON BEHALF 

OF THE FAMILIES OF CONTINENTAL FLIGHT 3407; CAPTAIN 

JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT, AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION 

INTERNATIONAL; ROGER COHEN, PRESIDENT, REGIONAL 

AIRLINE ASSOCIATION; JAMES C. MAY, PRESIDENT AND 

CEO, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION; DR. TIM BRADY, PAST 

PRESIDENT, AVIATION ACCREDITATION BOARD INTERNATIONAL; AND JEFFREY SKILES, VICE PRESIDENT, COALITION OF AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION 

Mr. BABBITT. Chairman Costello, and Ranking Member Petri, 

Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here 

today to discuss the FAA’s Call to Action on Airline Safety and 

Pilot Training. As you are aware, on June 15, we made this call 

5 

to action to promote a renewed and robust safety discourse within 

the aviation community. 

History has shown that we can implement safety improvements 

far more quickly and effectively when we work together to identify 

the problems and develop solutions. We have received a wealth of 

information from the call to action, and we are committed to using 

it to make the industry and the traveling public safer. 

To summarize our efforts here, as part of the Call to Action, I 

did send a letter to all part 121 operators and their unions requesting written commitments to adhere to the highest professional 

standards while this discourse was beginning. My letter also 

sought specific comments on several key topics, including pilot 

records, establishment of programs to monitor safety of flight operations and safety, and the development of professional standards 

and ethics committees by labor organizations. 

I can tell you that the responses that we received have had an 

overwhelming willingness shown to make these commitments. And 

while we haven’t heard from everyone at this point, as I told them 

and Members of this Committee, I will use my bully pulpit going 

forward to gain their cooperation. And so I am prepared to make 

those who were unresponsive known to the public by the end of 

September. 

We also have prioritized the creation of new flight and rest rules 

based on fatigue signs as part of our Call to Action. An aviation 

rulemaking committee charged with making recommendations 

began meeting in July and completed its work by our September 

1 deadline. I am extremely pleased that this ARC acted quickly 

and reached consensus on a broad philosophical framework for addressing this critical subject. Our experts are now reviewing the 

ARC’s recommendations, and we have an aggressive timeline for 

completing the NPRM and we are on track. 

Recognizing the urgency of proposals in the call to action, we also 

directed our inspectors to do a focused review of air carrier crew 

member training, qualification, and management oversight. This 

two-part program met its first deadline on July 15 and is on track 

to meet the final deadline set for the end of September. 

We are also moving forward aggressively with our proposed 

changes to the airline safety and pilot training NPRM. We have received over 3,000 pages of comments to this proposed rule, and we 

are reviewing those carefully and anticipate that we will continue 

to meet our deadlines on this project. And although the FAA’s leadership and guidance is critical to safety, the most effective safety 

culture is not one that is merely imposed by orders and notices 

from Washington. No, it is one that encourages buy-in and participation from the entire aviation community. 

And so we took our show on the road, if you would, holding 12 

regional forums across the country during the months of July and 

August. And these forums allowed the FAA to discuss the Call to 

Action and all the initiatives associated with it. The opportunity 

was there for us to receive stakeholders’ feedback, to engage with 

aviation professionals, and to seek new ideas to improve industry 

safety, all of these being equally important. 

In addition to hard work, we have also applied a dose of common 

sense to this Call to Action. As we work through our plan we realVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:30 Dec 17, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\52441 JASON
6 

ize that some of our deadlines might actually shortchange our results. Our original intent was to develop guidance materials for 

conducting comprehensive training reviews by July 31. But we realized that this deadline actually predated the completion of our focused inspection initiative and the conclusion of our regional safety 

forums. With that in mind, we realized that we ought to take those 

two sources of information into account before putting forth any 

recommendations, and also recognizing that our commitment to 

safety can only be served by prioritizing quality results over a rigid 

timeline. 

So with that in mind, I extended the July 31 deadline to December 31. This will give our team time to analyze and incorporate the 

valuable input that we received and continue to receive from the 

aviation community. 

While I am pleased to discuss the important steps that we have 

taken and will be taking, I believe we should also acknowledge the 

biggest factor affecting aviation safety, professionalism in the workplace. No amount of safety procedures, rules or task forces can replace the central role that individual professionalism plays in keeping the skies safe. And whether one has a wrench in his hand or 

her hand or sits at a yoke or carries a clipboard or wears a headset 

or works in the galley, doesn’t make any difference. Safety is everyone’s responsibility. And although professionalism prevails in the 

majority of the work force and throughout the industry, the standards are the same, the training is the same, but unfortunately, the 

mentality is not the same. And this is what we need to change. 

We must develop a culture where the hand of experience guides 

and mentors the inexperienced members of our community. We 

must find a way to nurture a culture where individuals know they 

can speak up about weaknesses in system without punishment. We 

must create a culture where professionalism and individual accountability it demands is both a job requirement and a point of 

pride. Despite the work that remains to be done, we know that 

safety is a shared priority throughout the aviation community and 

because this is true, we are confident that our efforts will succeed. 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Petri, this concludes my remarks. 

I will be happy to answer any questions should we have the time. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Administrator Babbitt. 

And let me say that I am pleased to hear that you are going to 

identify the airlines and anyone who did not respond to your letter, 

that you will publicly address that and make not only the Congress 

but the American people aware of who did not respond. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Loftus. 

Mr. LOFTUS. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, and 

Subcommittee Members, I would like to thank you for inviting me 

to speak today before your Committee. I am here today representing not only my immediate family, but also my new family, 

the families of Continental Flight 3407. My 24-year-old daughter, 

Madeline, was on board 3407 that wintry night outside of Buffalo. 

She, along with 49 others, and an unborn baby, perished that night 

in February. 

This past August 28, my family, gathered at my daughter’s grave 

in the pouring rain to sing happy birthday. Not quite the celebration I would wish on anybody. Since that tragic night in February, 

7 

birthdays, anniversaries, graduations, family events, simple everyday life seems as though they have lost their luster. Nothing for 

us will ever be the same. The only thing we are left with is the 

past, the memories. 

More than any other issue we can spotlight or debate at this 

hearing, I feel the most importance mission for me to accomplish 

today is to keep the oh so painful human side of this accident fresh 

in the minds of the important people, both in our government and 

the aviation industry. I have included at the end of my testimony 

23 impact statements that have been submitted by family members 

of our group letting you know the pain and sadness that we still 

struggle with on a daily basis over 7 months later. 

I would like to share one from Nirmal Sidhu, who lost her son, 

Dipinder, that fateful night. She writes, how can I ever forget those 

Sundays when Dipinder would ask me to stay in bed as he would 

whip up a scrumptious breakfast and serve it with aplomb, or the 

special way he would pick up our 10-year-old shiatsu and cuddle 

him every day upon entering the house after work, or the sound 

of the Wheel of Fortune playing religiously on the TV in the 

evening. I can still here the relentless teasing of my niece, Simmar, 

by my son, who treated her like a younger sister. He was instrumental in getting her admission into India into medical school after 

her graduation. How we missed sharing the joy just a week back 

when Simmar passed the first year of medical school in a new environment with a different educational system with flying colors. I 

can still feel the exuberance in his voice when he talked about the 

girl in whom he felt that he had found a true soul mate. I can still 

see him joking and laughing with his father on most evenings. I 

can visualize his smile when he talked with pride about his sister, 

Natasha. It is all gone forever. If I only knew that I would never 

see, hear or feel all of this, if I just knew that he was just given 

to me for only 28 years, I would never have let him out of my sight 

for a second. How I wish I could hear him just one more time so 

that I could say one more time to him, I love you. We are all here 

with one goal in mind and that is to prevent a tragedy like Continental 3407 from ever happening again. The simple question we 

and everyone else must ask is what measures will make this a reality. 

And that brings me to the FAA’s call to action plan unveiled in 

June. In response to the findings revealed by the NTSB hearings 

in May, I want to acknowledge Administrator Babbitt and his staff 

who have met with the group on multiple occasions keeping us informed of ongoing development and, most importantly, not waiting 

till the NTSB’s final report to move forward on a quest to make 

critical improvements to our aviation system. 

We have a simple message for the FAA. As a former pilot, when 

I look at the initiatives detailed in the call to action, they address 

three critical areas, training, fatigue, and an increased emphasis in 

investment in safety at the regional airline level. Clearly, our accident revealed deficiency in both stall recovery and cold weather 

training in the industry. 

Since 2004 the FAA has been working on a rule making geared 

towards improving the airlines crew training program. The comment period on this proposed rule making closed last month. As we 

8 

reviewed the submissions to the FAA we came across quite a few 

negative comments from the industry. For me, they echoed the all 

too familiar complaints of the changes being too great of an economic burden and a complacent attitude of what we are currently 

doing is sufficient. That mindset is exactly what got us into this 

predicament that we find ourselves in today. 

At the same time, the FAA is moving forward on rule making 

that would lead to a revised flight and duty regulations which 

former pilots like myself and Administrator Babbitt can testify are 

long overdue. This would be an enormous stride toward making 

airline travel safe. 

One area that our group would like to see kept in the spotlight 

is the problematic area of commuting. With pilots flying cross country to report for duty, we cannot continue to look the other way and 

pretend that we do not have issues associated with commuting not 

to be addressed. So, in terms of eliminating deficiencies related to 

training and fatigue, our group challenges Administrator Babbitt 

and the FAA to stand up to the industry, to stick up for our loved 

ones and the flying public, and see these new regulations through 

enactment in the course of the next year. 

Next, I want to touch on the FAA effort to identify industry wide 

best practices and secure voluntary commitments to all part 121 

carriers to implement them. What it really speaks to is the inconsistencies of how regional carriers approach training, safety in all 

phases of their operation. When I flew, when it came to best practices in terms of safety and training, what was good enough for 

Continental was good enough for Continental Express. Sadly, our 

accident revealed that this is no longer the case. Instead we 

watched as Continental does everything to lay the blame for the 

shortcomings at Colgan and at the feet of the FAA for its lack of 

oversight. Instead of looking to shift the blame, we feel that everyone needs to come together to accept responsibility, from the regional carriers to the major carriers to the pilots union to the FAA 

and Congress, to figure out what went wrong and work together to 

fix it. If parent carriers take responsibility for the regional partners, will allow for safer operations, then that is what should happen. 

So for the regional airlines it all comes down to investing in safety and in your pilots and doing everything you can to set them up 

for success. There should be no corner cutting when it comes to 

providing the very best training and the most state of the art safety management tools. Yet, as we look at the operations of Colgan 

this is exactly what was allowed to happen. The FAA has gotten 

the ball rolling in many of these areas with recent summit and regional safety forums, but I know too well from my time in the industry that voluntary commitments to best practices now can certainly go away quickly in the future if the economics change or if 

Administrator Babbitt is not at the helm of the FAA to keep the 

industry honest. 

And so this is where we need you, our representatives in Congress, to come in and mandate some of these changes. There are 

numerous important initiatives that have been put forth by both 

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9 

ization. But I would like to spotlight three that we consider must 

haves. 

First, we must move forward with the comprehensive pilot training record database for use in the hiring process. Let us never have 

another accident where the carrier has the excuse that they did not 

know everything there was to know about the pilot when they 

hired him or her. 

Secondly, we need to lock in mandatory safety management programs, FOQA, ASAP, LOSA, with privacy protections that the pilots are asking for. We cannot leave the regional carriers with any 

temptations to save money at the expense of safety, which we glaringly saw in the case of Colgan. And lastly, we need to achieve one 

of the key provisions put forth in the Subcommittee’s recent introduced legislation; namely, that all commercial pilots must have an 

ATP rating, with the requirement of 1,500 hours prior to being 

hired to fly commercially. The demographics of the pilot work force 

has changed, moving towards a younger, more inexperienced pilot 

while the technology has gotten more advanced. When I was hired 

by Continental Express I had an ATP and 5,000 hours flight time, 

and the captains with whom I flew with had twice as much time 

as me. As I said in my previous testimony before this Committee, 

there is no substitute for experience in the air. As a veteran of the 

industry, I know that this provision will require entry level pilots 

to build up additional hours by flight instructing, cargo hauling 

and crop dusting before they can be hired commercially. Many 

years ago that is exactly the route I took, and all those experiences 

made me a better pilot when I got to Continental Express and had 

human lives in my hand. 

So we ask the regional and major carriers, the pilot unions, and 

flight training schools to support this initiative. It means a lot to 

our group. 

In conclusion, I would like all the key players in this room to 

look at the families here with me today, the Mellets, the Eckerts, 

the Maurers, the Kausners, the Tolsmas and the Pettys, and all 

the other families who were not able to come to Washington but 

are here with us anyway. For us, what matters is not a well crafted 

public relation strategy while our accident is still fresh in the spotlight, what matters to us is implementation and follow-through. 

When it comes to the FAA reauthorization, the call to action, and 

the NTSB final report and safety recommendations, we ask that 

you do everything you can to make sure the tragic mistakes of 

Continetal Flight 3407 are never repeated again. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Loftus, and now recognizes Captain Prater. 

Mr. PRATER. Thank you and good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri, and Members of the Committee. Captain Loftus, 

Captain Babbitt, and you have our commitment to work to prevent 

another Continental 3407. 

You may recall that ALPA testified before this Committee on 

June 11. At that time we described the economic reality that has 

set the stage for many of the safety issues we are discussing here 

today. Code share and fee for departure agreements mean that 

10 

main line carriers exert enormous pressure on regional airlines to 

provide their flight operations as cheaply as possible. 

What do many airlines do to win this race to the bottom? They 

replace experienced pilots with low experienced pilots who fly for 

low paying operators marketed under the main line brand. They 

consider short staffing to be standard practice, and pilot pushing 

it is the result. Fewer pilots flying for days compromises safety. 

With the industry’s intense focus on the lowest possible operating 

cost and the practice of airlines outsourcing their routes to the lowest bidder, I would like to review our observations following the 

FAA’s 12 call to action meetings. 

I led a dozen ALPA representatives to the FAA’s industry summit on June 15, and served as the pilot moderator at the first call 

to action, and participated in the event in St. Louis. ALPA provided 

pilot moderators at six of the meetings, and nearly 70 of our pilots 

participated in those 12 events. I would like to offer examples of 

ALPA’s actions that illustrate our union’s commitment to assist the 

industry and the FAA in recognizing the serious safety issues 

raised during the call to action. 

ALPA’s code of ethics, adopted in 1956, provides standards of 

conduct for airline pilots. I have directed the leaders of our 36 pilot 

groups to work with their managements to do even more to incorporate our code of ethics into initial and recurrent pilot training. 

Nearly all ALPA represented pilot groups have professional 

standards committees charged with maintaining the highest degree 

of professional conduct. Where management supports them, professional standards committees enhance safety. Unfortunately, we 

continue to see managements that refuse to allow their pilots to 

participate in ALPA professional standards and safety efforts. 

Today, ALPA is releasing a new white paper on pilot candidate 

screening, hiring, training, and mentoring. We have asked our 

50,000 members to participate in building those standards. 

Our union has also created a professional development committee to enhance our work with the aviation community, the colleges, the universities to foster professionalism in new pilots. 

On a related issue, nearly all of ALPA airlines have an ASAP 

program, and about half have a FOQA program. ALPA has worked 

to help airlines establish these critical initiatives to detect and resolve safety issues before accidents occur. Sadly, we continue to encounter managements and sometimes even FAA inspectors who remain convinced that the way to deal with safety issues is to punish 

employees for their mistakes. I have said it before, I will say it 

again. ASAP and FOQA programs will fail if they are used as discipline measures rather than as intended to advance safety. 

Based on our extensive participation in the call to action meetings, we believe that they identified some of the best and certainly 

some of the worst practices in our industry. But what has yet 

changed? The action we believe to be absolutely essential from the 

regulated parties and the agency was noticeably absent. Clearly, 

the voluntary programs that are working need to be supported. 

Many of the best practices must be mandated and the worst practices must be eliminated through regulatory or legislative action. 

For just one example, look to recent news headlines exposing onerous sick leave and fatigue policies at some of our regional airVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:30 Dec 17, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\52441 JASON
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lines. Despite the hearings earlier this year substantiating this 

egregious behavior, our members continue to present evidence that 

some of these companies haven’t changed. They continue to punish 

pilots who call in too sick or too fatigued to fly. In fact, approximately one-third of the pilots at one airline are reprimanded for 

sick leave or fatigue related absences annually. 

This shocking number illustrates the flaws in the staffing and 

scheduling practices at too many airlines and demonstrates the urgent need to update the archaic flight and duty time regulations 

that continue to allow these unsafe practices to exist. 

Main line management often refuses to intervene, despite the 

fact that these other airlines carry their passengers, the managements at the name brand airlines that sell the tickets to the traveling public and should be held responsible refuse to intervene, 

saying that these vendor airlines meet FAA standards. 

As part of my commitment to the Administrator’s call to action, 

I am reaching out to every CEO of main line and regional airlines 

where we represent the pilots to ask if each will work with ALPA 

to address the safety issues raised by the call to action. Safety requires the investment of both time and money. The race to the bottom fails to deliver the safest possible service across an entire airline network. 

We urge Congress to act swiftly to pass this Committee’s bill, 

H.R. 3371, into law. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Captain Prater, and now 

recognizes Mr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, and 

Members of the Subcommittee, our thoughts and prayers continue 

for the families of Continental 3407 as we focus all of our efforts 

to doing everything possible to make sure that an accident like that 

never happens again. 

Regional airlines have become vital to the Nation. We fly more 

than 50 percent of the scheduled passenger flights and 75 percent 

of the Nation’s communities are served exclusively by regional airlines. But most importantly, regional airlines are committed to 

safety. I am proud to announce today that virtually all of RAA’s 

members, airlines that transport 98 percent of the passengers carried by our member airlines, either have established or have committed to establishing in the near term a FOQA, Flight Operations 

Quality Assurance Program. For ASAP the results are similar. Virtually all of our members have implemented this valuable safety 

tool for their pilots, some of them having done so up to a decade 

ago. 

In June, we responded immediately to the FAA call to action. 

And for the record, all the RAA member airlines responded in writing to the Administrator’s June 24 letter. On short notice, seven 

RAA member airlines were invited to attend that first meeting. 

Every one sent its senior executives, including six CEOs, demonstrating what Chairman Oberstar has commented, that safety 

begins in the boardroom. That meeting featured a candid discussion of critical issues leading to a safety agenda that included a 

dozen similar town hall meetings across the U.S. Each of those 

meetings was cochaired by a regional airline executive. 

12 

RAA also played a key role in the 9-week flight duty and rest 

ARC. And let me state, the members of the Regional Airline Association are committed to this rulemaking, to adopting the new 

science-based regulations that arise from the process, and doing so 

in a prompt and timely manner. 

In addition to being participants actively in the FAA efforts, RAA 

has embarked on our own strategic safety initiative that aligns 

with the FAA’s efforts and the goals of this Committee. Our initiative includes, number one, forming a task force comprised of regional airline safety directors and operations officials to review all 

of the procedures and NTSB recommendations that could help prevent accidents. 

Number two, we will be working with the Washington State University Sleep and Performance Research Center. We will study the 

fatigue risks associated with regional airline pilot operations. 

Third, we will be working with the Flight Safety Foundation and 

will study the feasibility and practicality of developing an industry 

fatigue risk management system. And these elements, the following 

elements I am going to may require some legislative or regulatory 

action, and we look forward to working Congress and the FAA to 

identify these needed safety tools. 

These include establishing a single database of pilot records, extending the background check time frame to 10 years; third, improving the tracking and analysis of check runs; fourth, exploring 

the use of random fatigue tests for pilots; and fifth, considering the 

use of cockpit voice recorders for accident prevention. 

Please let me also address commuting. The ARC did not deal 

with commuting, so we do not expect the rulemaking to address it. 

But commuting must be conducted in a responsible manner. Each 

of our member carriers has a nonpunitive policy in place and reserve crews on call to allow a pilot to drop a trip if that pilot feels 

incapable of flying alertly. 

Mr. Chairman, safety is a never ending effort and one that necessitates collaboration and cooperation among all stakeholders, the 

airlines, our employees, and the government. We in regional aviation are committed to ensuring that the U.S. air transportation system remains the safest mode of travel. 

Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity, and we welcome any 

questions you might have. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Cohen, and now recognizes Mr. May. 

Mr. MAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri. 

While it is no consolation to the families devastated by the Colgan 

Air tragedy, our members are taking action to make our aviation 

system, which is already the safest in the world, even safer. Before 

I discuss some of those initiatives, I would like to emphasize three 

points in particular. 

First, I think we all need to accept that until the NTSB concludes its investigation of the Buffalo accident we are not going to 

have a complete understanding of that accident. 

Second, safety improvements today result from careful collaborative evaluation of operational data and practices. Safe aviation 

has an empirical disciplined approach to safety. 

13 

Third, the bedrock principle in civil aviation is that the entity to 

which the FAA has issued a certificate is ultimately responsible 

and solely responsible for its activities. Whether that entity is an 

air carrier, an airman or a dispatcher, that responsibility can’t be 

delegated or assumed by others. 

That principle avoids confusion about who is ultimately responsible, an absolutely essential consideration in promoting one level 

of safety. One level of safety, one level of enforcement. While this 

principle of individual accountability is critical, improving safety is 

a shared commitment. 

We work closely with other aviation community members, including our regional partners in this never ending collective effort. For 

that reason, we welcome the FAA’s June 15 call to action meeting. 

And at that meeting the FAA worked with our carriers and regional carriers and pilots to develop common strategies for reducing 

risks. We also welcome the opportunity to join with regional airlines, labor representatives, and the FAA in a series of 12 regional 

forums around the country to communicate the results of that call 

to action meeting. 

With the indispensable leadership of Administrator Babbitt, several important initiatives have already been undertaken. They include creation of an aviation rulemaking committee to develop recommendations to revise flight and duty time regulations for flight 

crew members. Our industry representatives were very active main 

participants in that process. These recommendations, I think, are 

importantly science-based to accommodate various operating models, align with international guidelines, and reflect the vast and 

varied operating experience of U.S. carriers. 

Number two, our commitment to adopting what labor and management have identified as most effective practices for improved 

safety. Those commitments were reflected in the air carrier letters 

to the administration. And like my partner from the regional airlines, I can assure you that every single ATA carrier has, in fact, 

replied in depth to administrator. And we covered the following 

topics: Asking pilots to voluntarily disclose their FAA records, including adverse actions. If not already using flight operations quality assurance, FOQA, and Aviation Safety Action Programs, ASAP 

programs, to establish them. I want to underscore that all of our 

ATA members already have those programs, have had them in 

place for many, many years, along with a number of other safety 

related and training programs like AQP; holding periodic meetings 

between main line carriers and their regional codes share airlines 

to review safety programs, share safety information and share most 

effective practices. 

Number three, FAA’s focused training inspection initiative in 

which the FAA is reviewing flight crew member training programs. 

As we all know, our union partners are crucial to any effort to improve safety. Labor organizations have committed to several initiatives focused on ensuring professional behavior and further 

strengthening voluntary safety programs such as ASAP and FOQA. 

I certainly agree with Captain Prater, they can’t be used in a punitive way. Equally important, the industry recognizes the importance of mentoring, transferring experience from seasoned flight 

crew members to those with less experience. 

14 

We also believe that the Inspector General’s review of FAA safety 

oversight of regional airlines is going to provide significant insights. The IG is focusing on three essential issues, pilot certification, training and qualifications, as well as commuting and compensation issues. 

And finally, I want to reiterate the creation of a central pilot 

database would significantly improve airlines ability to vet pilot applicants. 

In closing, we commit to continue to work diligently with other 

stakeholders and to follow through with the various commitments 

during the FAA call to action. We also look forward to evaluating 

and responding to the results of the NTSB investigation and to the 

IG’s assessment of FAA regulatory oversight. Those actions are already taken. Those are underway, and those yet defined are and 

must continue to be driven by expert analysis of facts and data. It 

is in this informed context that further action to improve safety 

should be examined. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. May, and now recognizes Dr. Brady. 

Mr. BRADY. Chairman Costello, Members of the House Aviation 

Subcommittee, thank you for allowing the aviation educators of the 

Aviation Accreditation Board International and the University 

Aviation Association the opportunity to be heard. If I were to place 

a caption on this testimony I would title it, quality, not quantity. 

This I hope will become clear as my testimony progresses. 

The combined institutional membership of both AABI and the 

UAA is 115 colleges and universities who represent almost 11,000 

students involved in academic preparation to become professional 

pilots and to create a significant percentage of the professional 

pilot work force. A single member institution alone provides one in 

four of the professional pilots flying air carrier aircraft today in the 

United States. One in four. These numbers are not insignificant. 

We applaud the Committee, the Subcommittee for focusing on 

the safety of the airline industry. We, the aviation educators, have 

studied H.R. 3371 and find that most of its provisions are sound 

and will likely achieve the objective of improving air safety. There 

is one requirement, however, that causes us deep concerns. I am 

referring to the Airline Transport Pilot, ATP-only provision described in section 10 requiring a pilot to achieve an ATP before 

being allowed to enter the cockpit of a part 121 air carrier. For a 

pilot to acquire the ATP, he or she must be at least 23 years of 

age and have flown at least 1,500 hours. Graduates from colleges 

and university programs typically have earned the private commercial instrument multi-engine and perhaps a certified flight instructor qualifications, have about 250 to 350 hours of flying time, and 

may not yet be 23 years of age. This bill would require these graduates to spend an unnecessary number of years building their 

flight time so as to qualify for an entry level first officer position. 

The ATP requirement is a quantity driven requirement that requires little improvement in skills. Quantity, not quality. 

So what do we know about quality? A 2008 pilot yield study examined the performance of all 452 new hire first officers for a large 

regional airline who started air carrier training during 2006 and 

15 

2007. The results were eye opening. The first officer new hires that 

performed best were those who had 500 hours of flight time or less 

and were graduates from AABI accredited institutions. Committee 

Members, that is quality. We have identified it and we know what 

it is. 

Further, I submit that there is a direct relationship between 

quality and safety. The higher the quality of the entering pilot 

work force the higher the level of safety. But the ATP-only provision in this bill would close the cockpit doors to these high quality 

entry level first officers. So we are asking you today to remove this 

provision from the bill or to modify it so that graduates of high 

quality programs that meet AABI outcomes are able to enter the 

cockpit as entry level first officers at a much lower flight time requirement than the ATP requirement of 1,500 hours. 

What are the results if you allow the ATP only provision to remain unchanged in the bill? The quantity driven ATP requirement 

would cause potential students who would normally enter a high 

quality university program to now seek the shortest route to the 

first officer’s seat. Why would they spend 4 years at a college or 

a university paying tuition and flight fees, when at graduation they 

still need to fly for another 2 years to be qualified to enter the air 

carrier as a first officer trainee? They probably wouldn’t. They 

would seek out local flight training providers, acquire the necessary 

ratings and spend the next year or two flying cheap, 30-year old 

single engine airplanes to build their flight time. They would repeat the same flying hour 1,000 times over and add little value to 

the scant knowledge they gained from the earlier training. At the 

end of it, the pilot would take the ATP written and flight exams 

and be eligible to enter the air carrier training program. These are 

the types of pilots who scored the worst on the pilot yield study. 

On the other hand, graduates from AABI university programs who 

enter the air carrier cockpit as first officers at say 500 hours, total 

time, and spend the next 1,000 hours being mentored by a seasoned captain flying the line are learning more each day. At the 

1,500 hour point these first officers are superbly prepared air carrier professionals and are far superior to those who simply built 

flight time by flying nonproductive hours just to get to the magic 

number. 

This ATP-only provision will fill the cockpits of air carriers with 

poor quality first officers and decimate the robust high quality 

flight education programs found at universities all across the country. For example, the aviation degree program at St. Cloud State 

University in Minnesota would cease to exist, just as the program 

at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale would. Half the students at Embry-Riddle at its campuses in Florida and Arizona 

would disappear. Auburn’s program would close, as would the one 

at Kent State in Ohio, the program at Central Texas College also. 

The excellent program at Middle Tennessee State University would 

go away, and so would those at Western Michigan University and 

Eastern Kentucky University. 

These are just a few examples. In total, the programs at colleges 

and universities across this great country which now enroll 11,000 

students in flight education programs would close or would suffer. 

We aviation educators know this. We are the ones closest to the fuVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:30 Dec 17, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\52441 JASON
16 

ture of aviation education in this country, and we are sounding the 

alarm. Please don’t kill the source of the highest qualified entry 

level first officer pilots entering the air carrier work force. To do 

so by retaining the ATP-only provision in this bill will diminish the 

safety of the entire system, cripple aviation higher education, and 

achieve the exact opposite of the intended outcomes of this bill. 

Thank you, Chairman Costello and Committee Members, and I 

am prepared to answer any questions you might have. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Dr. Brady, and now recognizes Mr. Skiles. 

Mr. SKILES. Thank you. I would like to thank Chairman Costello, 

Ranking Member Petri, and the Members of the House Aviation 

Subcommittee for accepting my testimony here today. 

First, let me acknowledge the tremendous loss suffered by the 

families of the Continental Connection Flight 3407. I cannot begin 

to imagine the pain and loss suffered by the victims’ families, and 

I know that my fellow pilots will keep them in their thoughts. 

It is good to reflect on the reasons why we are all here today. 

On February 12 of this year, Continental Connection Flight 3407 

crashed into a Buffalo, New York neighborhood, causing the terrible loss of all onboard. In the aftermath the spotlight has been 

placed on pilot experience, pilot fatigue, and industry compensation 

levels. It is apparent from the available information at the NTSB 

hearing that the actions of the Continental connection pilots during 

the performance of their normal duty led to this tragedy. 

But I would submit that they were as much victims of the state 

of the Nation’s airline industry as the passengers who entrusted 

their lives to Continental Airlines. They were simply asked to fly 

a sophisticated aircraft in challenging conditions for which their 

limited experience had not prepared them for. 

Over the past several years, there has been a dramatic drop in 

the experience levels of new hire pilots in our Nation’s cockpits as 

our airlines sacrifice experience for the bottom line. The first officer 

of Continental Connection Flight 3407 drew an annual salary of 

$16,200 a year. In an effort to attract pilots at poverty level wages, 

minimum hiring qualifications have dropped to the lowest bar possible. Many of our Nation’s experienced pilots are now unwilling to 

accept employment for such wages and regional airlines need to fill 

their cockpit seats with lesser qualified pilots. 

The Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act of 2009 

calls for all airline transport pilots to possess an airline transport 

pilot’s license. The ATP would increase the experience base of U.S. 

commercial pilots as it would require flight experience commensurate with the responsibilities of the position. Today every major airline recognizes the value of experience by requiring, at a minimum, 

1,500 to 3,000 hours of flight experience. Yet, in a few short years, 

regional airlines, who now fly over 50 percent of our domestic 

flights, have lowered their requirements to the absolute minimum 

in an effort to fill their cockpit seats at the lowest possible cost. 

The experience level of the Continental connection pilots is an example of this negative trend. 

Experience matters. The flight hours that the FAA requires to 

qualify for an airline transport pilot’s license allows the pilot the 

opportunity to develop judgment and critical decision making skills 

17 

that simply aren’t possible in a tightly controlled training environment. Airmanship skills are only developed from exposure to challenging conditions and honed over time. Architect, engineers, CPAs 

and even real estate brokers are all examples of careers that have 

experienced level requirements before attaining full recognition or 

licensing. The responsibilities of an airplane pilot should demand 

no less. 

My testimony would not be complete without addressing pilot fatigue. This is an issue that has long been a contributing factor in 

aviation accidents, and the NTSB has recommended changes in 

flight duty time rules for 2 decades. 

This summer, Administrator Babbitt called for an aviation rulemaking committee to discuss changes in current regulations. While 

Administrator Babbitt has promised changes in regulation, the current discussion at the ARC is trending towards increasing the 

number of hours a pilot can fly in a duty period. We need prompt 

action to lower, not increase the amount of time a pilot can fly and 

a reduction to the 16-hour workday currently permitted by FAA 

regulations. We don’t fix the pilot fatigue problem by allowing airlines to schedule more flight hours in a day, nor do we fix the pilot 

experience program by allowing any inexperienced pilots in our Nation’s cockpits. 

While Administrator Babbitt has shown a willingness to attack 

these problems, history shows that the FAA has never been an 

agent for change. We fully endorse H.R. 3371. It is a positive first 

step that puts in place a timeline for solutions and enhances the 

pilot experience level in our Nation’s transport category aircraft. 

Pilot leaders of ALPA, CAPA, and the IBT, representing 90,000 

front line pilots, came before this Subcommittee in July as a united 

front in support of the airline transport pilot’s license as the minimum standard in the cockpits of our Nation’s airliners. Administrator Babbitt was instrumental in improving safety 20 years ago 

when he advocated that all scheduled transport be conducted under 

FAR part 121 regulations. He did this to create, in his words, one 

level of safety. We ask him to continue advocating for one level of 

safety by supporting the initiatives of H.R. 3371. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Skiles. 

Captain Prater, as you know from roundtable discussions with 

many of the people on the—witnesses on the panel, our goal in 

H.R. 3371 was to—one of the goals was to raise the minimum 

standards so that you would have the first officer and the captain 

at the same minimum level of experience and training, and that, 

of course, would require an ATP license. But in addition to the ATP 

license requiring 1500 hours in the cockpit, there is also aeronautical knowledge, crew research, management training, a lot of 

other training that goes along with it. 

I would ask you, Dr. Brady has raised an interesting question 

and feels that both the 4-year institutions that are accredited— 

there are 26 I understand. I have two in my congressional district 

in southern Illinois, University in Carbondale, and St. Louis at 

Parks Airport, and of course, Dr. Brady, who offers his testimony 

today. 

18 

Do you believe that these institutions are at a disadvantage if in 

fact we require that the first officer receive an ATP license as opposed to just a commercial pilot’s license. 

Mr. PRATER. I do not believe that they will be disadvantaged. In 

fact, I agree with them that they are producing very good pilots 

who can go out and become airline pilots, but the problem is the 

airlines have become the introductory spot. It used to be the final 

spot for an aviator, you went out and you earned your time before 

you became an airline; now it is a transitionary job. You go to work 

for an airline and fly the public around so that you can get a good 

job with a corporation, or you can get a good job with one of the 

freight operators that pay. 

Think about that. We are taking young aviators who have got a 

good education, some have gone through the university program, 

their first job as a commercial pilot is hauling 50, 70, 90 passengers; that is what is unacceptable. So we support the foundations of the airline transport pilot to be hired. 

Now the bill that we have seen and looked at and support allows 

for some breathing room in here. We certainly have a time for the 

breathing room. We can work with the FAA’s and the schools to 

find a way to ensure that that level is brought up. 

But I agree with all the pilots at this table, that you cannot replace time in the air. That is what earns you experience. Experience is learning what you don’t know, recognizing what you don’t 

know. We can’t take these young pilots with just 250 hours and 

turn them into airline pilots unless the airlines are willing to give 

the amount of training that say the military gives. Look at the vast 

difference. The military gives about a year of intense training. The 

airlines give currently 6 weeks of training to take that 250 or 300- 

hour pilot to become an airline pilot you had better be prepared to 

dedicate more resources to training. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Dr. Brady, would you like to respond. 

Mr. BRADY. I would disagree that all of the pilots seated here 

agree with that statement he just made. I happen to be a pilot myself with the ATP, so I certainly don’t agree with that. 

I think in terms of who is entering the cockpit, as I mentioned, 

it is the quality issue that is important that we certainly think 

there are flight training providers throughout who are turning out 

pilots of lesser quality, but the quality of the pilots being turned 

out by the university is significantly higher than anything else in 

the country. And I would add that the statement made a moment 

ago was that the military provides excellent training for air carrier 

pilots, which is true. But in the pilot yield study, the military pilots 

who had come from the military and into the regional carrier were, 

although they scored very well in terms of being able to accommodate training for the air carrier, they didn’t score as well as a 500- 

hour pilots coming out of college and universities. 

So I think there needs to be some measure of quality of the product coming into the air carriers and not just say some magic number that is going to bless everyone and paint them with the same 

brush. The quality of training is not the same throughout the system. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Skiles, would you like to comment? 

19 

Mr. SKILES. Yes, I would. I did see what was submitted from the 

AABI, and I would like to comment, first of all, that is not an independent appraisal; it was done by Embry-Riddle University. Secondly, it is not a complete transcript of the study; they were carefully culled conclusions to support their positions. The leap in logic 

they came to illustrate that the ATP pilots require extra training 

is particularly disturbing, but let me tell you. 

I have 33 years of experience, 20,500 flying hours and ATP three 

type ratings and I have been through many, many initial and recent training events, and I have never failed a check ride and I 

have never required even one period of additional training. 

When the airlines used to hire qualified pilots that was the 

norm. According to its own study, some 30 percent of AABI graduates require extra training events right out of the box, right out 

of school at their first initial—at their new airline, and they are 

bragging about that fact in the study. 

The AOPA Nall report identifies some issues relevant to the continental connection crash. The Nall report stated that commercial 

pilots are three times more likely to be in an accident than a pilot 

that is possessing an ATP. That is three times the accident rate. 

I think the American people demand more. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Administrator Babbitt, would you want to comment? 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes, sir. Thank you. I would only make the observation, I may well have begun to accelerate this debate if the Subcommittee and the members of the panel will recall, before there 

was ever a move to suggest we should have this rating. We were 

already proceeding with preparations for an Advanced Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking that acknowledged the fact that we felt within the FAA that there was a need for additional training and an 

additional rating, if you would, and had suggested that that would 

be rating would be required to become a first officer. 

So the distinction would be that if a commercial pilot wanted to 

go to work for an airline, you would have to have an additional 

skills and additional training that would be applicable to the mission. And one of the things that I point out to people, and I agree 

with Dr. Brady in one sense, the actual accumulation of more flight 

time, while it is experience, we don’t know what kind of experience 

it is. 

I was hired with a pilot that had 7000 hours, but he was a SAC 

(Strategic Air Command) pilot, and he flew 12-hour legs with four 

pilots, which meant every 40 hours he got one landing. That was 

not the kind of experience you want in a high traffic area with high 

exposure to approaches. I would point out that the two Air Florida 

pilots in a terrible tragedy that happened right here in Washington, were military-trained. Both of them had thousands of 

hours, but the first officer had never seen an airplane deiced before. 

So I am suggesting to you that perhaps we should consolidate 

some of our thinking here and make certain that we don’t just accept that quality is thrown out or quantity is the only answer. I 

think a meld of the two, which is what we expect to propose in our 

Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking might be a better solution. So those are my observations. 

20 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Loftus. 

Mr. LOFTUS. Again, I’ll state it one more time there is no substitute for experience in the air. However, I agree that I have flown 

with many entry-level pilots and university educated pilots and 

they turn out to be very good pilots eventually, but the airlines are 

not entry level position. I go back and say that again, they need 

to earn their way up to it. It is not an entry level. They shouldn’t 

be flying people in the back as their first job. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Administrator Babbitt, you heard Mr. Cohen’s 

testimony that all of his member airlines have responded to your 

letter. Is that a correct statement? 

Mr. BABBITT. I can’t—I won’t fault him. I want to be straightforward here and be candid. I think in the request that we made 

to the carriers, and I’ll take some responsibility for this, we weren’t 

crystal clear as to the vehicle as to how to respond, and I am of 

the belief that several people attempted to respond to us to different locations, some by U.S. mail and so forth. I am comfortable 

that we had a much larger percentage. I have some numbers here. 

They are a lot closer to what Mr. Cohen’s suggested than what we 

originally gave you a few weeks ago. 

We have gone back, we have checked with the airlines; we have 

reached out to the unions and asked that if they did send something please resend it to us. We should have updated numbers for 

you. But I think the responses have been very positive. I think 

we’ll take some of the blame for not being clear as to where and 

how they should have responded to us. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Again, by the end of September, though, you will 

release those who have not responded. 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes, sir they will fall into one of three categories. 

They will have responded that they, in fact, have an ASAP or 

FOQA program, explain their willingness to adopt a program. If 

they don’t, and those who didn’t respond at all. I would make note 

for the record there are some cases, we have carriers that have operated under a 121 certificate because they operate a large aircraft. 

There is no point in asking someone to have a FOQA program of 

one airplane. The logbook is the data. So we do have to recognize 

that there will be some cases that it is perfectly okay not so are 

have FOQA program if you had just the minimum number of aircraft. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. Mr. May, you heard Mr. Cohen’s testimony, and as I am looking at his testimony now he says that our 

commitment to the value of this safety program is demonstrated by 

the fact that more than twice as many RAA members have ASAP 

programs for their flight attendants as do the main line carriers. 

Is that a correct statement that you would like to comment? 

Mr. MAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t, I don’t have specifics of how many have, how many have his regional carriers have 

flight attendant ASAP programs. I do have some data on our carriers and their ASAP programs. They are 171 in place and the vast 

majority of our carriers and I say that because we have got some 

small cargo operators in our membership, but all of our passenger 

carriers have extensive ASAP programs with their pilots, their 

flight attendants, their dispatchers, some of them have them with 

21 

ground maintenance and others. So I can’t give you a qualified answer comparing one to the other. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Cohen, you believe that is an accurate statement? And how do you—what do you base that on? 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman, the FAA keeps a database of ASAP 

programs, and I believe that the most recent figure was 7 and 3 

for flight attendant ASAP programs. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You also say, Mr. Cohen, in your testimony, and 

I quote, it is the professional responsibility of every professional 

pilot, if he or she does not feel sufficiently well rested, to say so 

and not fly. Each of our member carriers has a nonpunitive policy 

in place to allow a pilot to drop a trip if the pilot feels incapable 

of flying alertly. You heard Captain Prater’s testimony that punitive actions have been taken with the regional carriers for those 

who have either refused to fly or did not want to fly. Do you want 

to comment, are you ware of any regional carrier that is taken punitive action against one of their pilots for not accepting a flight or 

refusing to fly. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman I am not aware of any specific instances. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Captain Prater, you want to comment? 

Mr. PRATER. Yes, sir. I would hate to go down the list right now 

and I tried to keep it generic, but the managements at Pinnacle 

and Colgan have not changed their ways; the management at 

Trans States Airlines have not changed their ways. Do I need to 

go further? I have got a big book. I have been asking our pilots to 

report the type of pressures that management has placed on them 

threatening their job, giving them discipline, giving them time off 

for not just fatigue or sick calls but for basic things that call in to 

a captain’s decision to write up an airplane, a maintenance item. 

Those are the worst practices that we have identified, and yet some 

managements are still insisting that they are going to beat their 

pilots into submission. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you and now recognizes the 

Ranking Member, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. I wonder if could provide Dr. Brady with 

the chance to respond or comment on the different comments on 

your testimony. There seems to be a difference between quantity 

and quality or quality hours as opposed to sterile hours. And clearly you want to have quality hours and maybe lots of them. So could 

you comment on all this. 

Mr. BRADY. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the opportunity to comment. 

I think that the—and all the aviation educators feel that the 

quality issue of a degree program and all that rests behind each 

of the flight hour is very important to providing someone with an 

appropriate level of experience. It is experience in the classroom 

but it prepares them for greater responsibilities, and if someone 

just went out to a local operator fixed base operator and achieved 

all of their certificates and ratings. That is the point that we are 

making is that the students that are graduates of these college programs are very structure they get a lot of background way beyond 

the FARs, Federal Aviation Regulations, in terms of what the reVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:30 Dec 17, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\52441 JASON
22 

quirements are for, what say, even for an ATP. They get way beyond that in the classroom. 

So the pilots who are coming out of collegiate programs are very 

capable of handling the responsibilities of the right seat, and they 

are mentored in the right seat. And after a time, they become 

much more capable than officers—first officers who not have gone 

through that type of training. 

I think it is interesting, too, that many of us sitting here at the 

table were products of the military system that provided us the 

proper training, and our government felt comfortable in placing us 

in command of an aircraft at less than 1,000 hours. I know in my 

case, I was being mentored at 350 hours on the right seat of a 

cargo aircraft in combat, and when the time came for me to upgrade to aircraft commander, I did it at 1,000 hours. 

So I don’t think that the time is the issue. It is how the time is 

spent, and I still maintain that the type of level of education that 

is being provided through AABI is a peer review process where we 

bring and industry to help create what the criteria are that these 

programs have to meet and then we go out and visit these institutions and make sure they are maintaining the standards that they 

say they have. So the pilots coming out of these very highly regulated institutions are very high quality. 

Mr. PETRI. We have been hearing a lot of talk about the restructuring of the airline industry and the pressure on wages and entry 

level wages, the feeder airlines and the wealth of the very low 

wages that they are paying. Has this affected the college programs? 

You think people are partly leaving training because of looking at 

job prospects, and if they are going to make $20,000 a year working 

for a feeder airline, why would they pay $120,000 to go to Purdue 

or something like that. 

Mr. BRADY. The passion to fly is, is very compelling, sir, and the 

pilots who are coming into these programs have that passion, that 

is what they want their profession to be. I wish that it were different. I wish that entering first officers and the regional air carriers were paid $40,000 a year. Unfortunately that is not the way 

it is and our graduates have to react to that reality. They have 

debts they have that they have to pay off. At some point, they will 

begin to move and start to make some money, but I agree that the 

wages are way too low in the air carrier industry. I am just not 

sure what can be done to affect that in terms of what a congressional activity might be. 

The pilots that are in our programs understand that they are 

going to start out in some fairly low wage situations. In fact, some 

of our instructor pilots, when they go into an air carrier, take a pay 

cut. So they understand that and are willing to—are willing to still 

take that job. They would be a lot more willing if it was 40,000 instead of 16,000, but still, they are willing to take those jobs because 

they know in the long run that the higher paying jobs are there 

once they get beyond first years with the air carrier. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Skiles, could you comment on that? In your testimony, you say that airline flying is not a desirable career for experienced professional pilots. You certainly are such, and I wonder if 

you could just elaborate on that comment and explain what has 

been happening. I know in my own State, and you are familiar, too, 

23 

Midwest airline has been taken over and a lot of the experienced 

pilots are experiencing layoffs and having to go into second carriers 

as truck drivers and things of that sort. So could you comment on 

what is happening? 

Mr. SKILES. Yes, I would like to comment on that. You know, in 

our industry, what we are finding is that as Captain Prater alluded 

to the airline pilot position is now an entry level position in the industry. What happens is people are gaining experience and then 

they are going to fly commuters—not commuters—they are going 

to fly for corporate, for fractionals, for any of the other possibilities 

out there in the aviation world, or they are simply leaving the industry all together. And that is a real problem that we are finding 

with retaining people in our industry, retaining experienced people 

in our industry. If you could fix that part, you would fix the experience problem. 

For instance, I read a book of a man named Peter Buffington, 

who wrote a book about his experiences trying to survive on 

$12,000 a year as a regional first officer. He eventually left the industry. He now is an engineer with Garmin in Kansas. I called him 

up. And he said if he could make a living wage to support his family, he would be back flying airplanes because as Dr. Brady alluded 

to, that was his first love. Not only that, but he could give the eight 

names of people just like him who would be back in the industry, 

experienced professional pilots with ATP licenses. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Carnahan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

the panel for their insights and testimony today. I want to add my 

condolences to the families and friends that were lost in flight 

3407. It is indeed another tragic reminder that more must be done 

to strengthen the safety in our aviation system, that we must have 

one level of safety throughout the industry and I want to thank 

Chairman Costello for his leadership in promoting the bill to do 

just that. 

It is also clear from listening to you that experience matters, that 

fatigue matters and that standards matter. And all of us need to 

be working in that direction. 

I want to start with a couple of questions first to Administrator 

Babbitt. One of the things you mentioned with regard to experience 

that was the most important, but also challenge was setting up 

these mentoring programs and I would like you to really expand 

upon that in terms of how we can address some of those challenges 

to actually get those programs in place. 

Mr. BABBITT. Based on our regional safety forums that we conducted around the country we have a tremendous amount of feedback and throughout that several uniform elements came clear, 

thoughts on better training, scenario based training for example. 

Experience is certainly good, but experiences that actually enhance 

your decision making are very important to put forward before a 

pilot. 

And so the idea was we should be thinking about modifying our 

training scenarios where pilots are exposed more not to check items 

where you go through prescribed procedures, but instead put pilots 

in scenarios that they have not been exposed to before. Let them 

24 

gain the experience, let me see what happens in a nonvolatile environment where nobody is going to get hurt. But you are going to 

learn in these and we have the robust capabilities for simulation 

today to do that. 

We also have incredibly experienced pilots that are available and 

we have new pilots coming into the industry. How do we arrange 

for that experience transfer? What forum do we create so that 

someone with Captain Prater’s experience, or Jeffrey Skiles who is 

an incredible display of professionalism with the landing in the 

Hudson can impart that experience to a young pilot? I don’t care 

if that pilot has 1500 hours, 2500 hours. They haven’t seen the 

things that some of the pilots at this table have seen. 

So where do we create these forums? One of the thoughts was 

that at major carriers we would have a forum bringing together the 

leadership from all of the code sharing partners: the pilots, the 

chief pilots, the safety folks from the unions. Bring them together, 

let them have quarterly reviews; let them design these scenarios 

for experienced transfer. There is nothing we can do to regulate it. 

There is just no way to get there. So those are the some of the 

things we are looking at, and I want to applaud everyone who contributed to these, the APA certainly participated, all of the unions 

participated. We have gotten a great deal of information out of 

these forums. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Let me ask Captain Prater to comment on that 

as well. 

Mr. PRATER. Thank you, Congressman Carnahan, I agree with 

Administrator Babbitt, but there is one more basic problem. The 

pilot seniority list is a tool to allow experience to be gained before 

you advance into the captain’s position. At every main line airline, 

there is one seniority list. If I were to get hired at Continental Airlines tomorrow or U.S. Airways tomorrow or United Airways tomorrow, I would fly the first officer for a good 8 to 10 to 12 years 

before I assumed command. I would fly with hundreds of experienced captains. I would probably have 8 or 10 years of experience 

to be hired, but each one of those main line carriers operate, if you 

will, or control what goes on in another 6, 8, or 10 regional carriers, and they move the flying from one to the other. As we negotiate a standard or a decent contract, they take the flying away and 

give it to somebody else who will run it cheaper. We have another 

eight or 10 seniority lists, so what happens is if they give to it the 

cheapest operator and they have got two hundred pilots and overnight they have got four hundred pilots the least experienced copilot who has been flying for maybe a year is now captain. We have 

got the address that situation of moving that flying back and forth 

because the experience is never gained and all of the sudden you 

are sitting there in the left seat making decisions thank you. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Chair thanks the gentleman from Missouri now 

recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got several questions, but Mr. Babbitt, in all these many materials we were given, 

there was one mention that you gave a speech a couple weeks ago 

in which you said you are not seeing consistent professionalism 

25 

among aviation workers. What did you mean by that? I am a little 

curious. 

Mr. BABBITT. What I meant by that, and thank you Congressman. Nice to see you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Nice to see you, too. 

Mr. BABBITT. What I meant by that was I am quite proud and 

I think the industry should be quite proud of the high level of professionalism but what we have, anytime we have one person not 

living up to the standards, not producing the professionalism that 

is expected across the industry that is a potential point of risk. 

That is where the system breaks down and when we look across 

the industry—I have had several instances—they are not all pilots. 

I had reason recently to listen to an exchange of a controller who 

was very disappointing the lack of professionalism that I heard, 

contrast that against the controller in the Hudson accident that 

First Officer Skiles was aboard, that was one of the most professional handlings from everybody involved. That was professionalism. It was personified right there. 

But we just can’t tolerate any gap and so what we are looking 

to do is ferret out those areas, the weak areas. If you have, I mean 

the classic chain, 99 strong links and one weak one, that is where 

the chain breaks we have got to find those weak links. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay, thank you very much. I would like to ask 

Mr. Cohen and/or Mr. May, first of all, are most of your airlines 

hiring pilots at this time, and do they hire, are they hiring many 

people that have just the minimum 250 hours or are you finding 

many of them, people who are leaving the military or other people 

with experience, are there a lot of experienced pilots out there that 

you are hiring? And secondly, another question on this, do you 

think the fatigue rules right now are sufficient or is that, do you 

see that as a problem? I know on the 121 operations, pilots are limited to 30 hours a week in any 7 consecutive days. Do most of your 

pilots fly that much in a 7-day period? I am just curious about 

those kinds of things. Mr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Duncan, so that most of our carriers right now are not hiring, and think that is industrywide, I 

think it is reflective. This industry once had overall 600,000, more 

than 600,000 employees. It is 300 and something now. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. 

Mr. COHEN. Very, very difficult time and—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. That is what I assumed. 

Mr. COHEN. —most are not hiring now. And most of the carriers 

right now are member airlines. To my knowledge, I don’t believe 

anybody is at a 250 level. Most are at 500,000, or 1500 maybe 

even. 

Mr. DUNCAN. That is sort of what I assumed, that because there 

are so many employees or potential employees out there that generally you can find people with a lot of experience, is that correct? 

Mr. COHEN. I think the other witnesses have, have characterized 

a very significant and long term problem, that the qualifications for 

all aviation professionals going forward in a very, very difficult industry. I know Mr. May can speak extensively to the kind of disruptions that the industry has always gone through, and maybe as 

26 

bad as ever now and again, just a number of employees right 

across all levels, this is all true. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. May. 

Mr. MAY. Congressman, we are very proud of the qualifications 

of our pilots and our crews. We think we have some of the finest 

people in the world flying our aircraft. The vast majority of our pilots are ATP qualified. We have advanced qualification programs 

that are in place at the majority of our carriers. We continue to 

work to upgrade the professionalism of our pilots. We have mentoring programs that are currently aggressively in place for pilots 

and so we think the world of the professionalism and. 

Mr. DUNCAN. What about the fatigue question, is there, do you 

see that as much of a problem? 

Mr. MAY. We participated actively in the ARC that the administrator called. There were a series of recommendations made to the 

ARC. I think I am safe to say that the vast majority of those recommendations were those that Captain Prater’s outfit and our 

team agreed upon. In some instances, they were longer duty days 

where they made sense, some much shorter where it made sense, 

but the key is they were all science-based and that is what is important. So I know that the administrator intends to come out with 

a rulemaking following the ARC, and we will all look forward to 

participating in that rulemaking process. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Thank you very much. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Chair thanks the gentleman and I might add on 

the issue of fatigue if my notes are correct, and Mr. Cohen, I will 

get to this later, but you make a statement in your written statement that commuting is a lifestyle choice, not a necessity dictated 

by economics. Regional airlines have crew bases in dozen attractive 

communities throughout the country, and it is kind of an incredible 

statement to me that it is lifestyle choice. 

And when I look at First Officer Shaw on the Colgan crash, she 

left Seattle on February the 11th at 10 o’clock eastern time, arrived 

in Memphis after getting on a FedEx flight, a jump flight, and arrived at 2:30 eastern time in the morning, a.m., left Memphis for 

Newark at 4:18 eastern time in the morning, a.m. Arrived in Newark at 6:23 a.m. Eastern time, and then the flight left Newark at 

9:19 p.m. Eastern time, 24 hours later. She was commuting most 

of that time. 

It is hard for me to believe that that is a lifestyle choice and it’s 

not driven by economics. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady 

from Texas, Ms. Johnson. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize 

for being a little late. I had a markup in another Committee. 

I met Monday with about 50 or 60 pilots and I was personally 

a little concerned about what they consider to be their highest priorities. I was talking about outdated technology and they were 

talking about the human kind, what the pilots have concerns about 

as relates to safety and I want to make some of these statements 

that I wrote here, and I would like all of you to comment on them. 

For overseas travel especially, they desire to have marshals, but 

there has not been any change in the funding, so therefore, many 

times if they want them, the pilot has to pay for them himself from 

personal funds and they feel that they are having to use vacation 

27 

time for their training because they are not given time off for that, 

time to train. 

And the 8 hours that they are limited to flying continually ends 

up being sometimes 12 to 14 hours actually because they have to 

leave one place, go to another one, wait 3 or 4 hours, and then fly 

that 8 hours and over water flying can be very tiring for international travel. 

But they usually have to leave late in the evening and they are 

headed for Heathrow, which is the busiest airport, I think, in the 

world. After trying to sleep all day they are very, very tired by the 

time they get that flight to Heathrow. There is concern about extending this time and they feel that if they are going to move it 

at all it needs to be reduced. 

This one I didn’t really understand, so clearly, it is my writing. 

There is a loophole called the deadhead that is causing many hours 

and then deregulation of airlines on—gave them no deregulation. 

They have been much more regulated. That concerns me. Let me 

tell you why. I have flown from Washington to Dallas and Dallas 

to Washington for 17 years just about every weekend. I have been 

very, very proud of the record of the pilots that are on those airlines. So I am very concerned about not only their training, but 

also their rest. Could you comment on any attention that might be 

given to these concerns? Yes. 

Mr. BABBITT. Absolutely, let me—your questions essentially fall 

into two categories as I heard them, and please correct me if I misunderstood. The first I think has to do with Federal Flight Deck 

Officers and their ability to carry weapons on board aircraft. That 

is a little different area for us-- that is a voluntary program. I 

think Captain Prater could probably speak to that better than I, 

so I will let him. 

The second category of issues you raised has to do with the onduty times, and flight times, and we do need to make a distinction. 

There are two limits. One is the amount of time that a flight pilot 

can be on duty, that means go to work, maybe fly, maybe not fly; 

just be on duty, prepared to fly. Sometimes maintenance delays 

occur, so we track that time. There is maximum amount of time 

that you can be on duty. The second limit is the amount of time 

you can actually fly the aircraft. Today’s current rules limit that 

to 8 hours of flying. Can that be extended? The actual 8 hours cannot under a normal circumstances unless obviously you are in the 

air and en route and delays occur then you would have to go over. 

But let me tell you where we are going, at least what the ARC 

as reported to us. The aviation rulemaking committee has addressed some of these things. Number one, duty time in the future, 

in fact, counts—I am sorry, deadheading time would count as duty 

time so that it is recognized. That is important. 

Secondly, science comes into this. Flying 8 hours with one landing is one scenario. Flying 6 hours with eight landings all of them 

approaches to 200 feet is an entirely different scenario. We now 

recognize that. Currently, there is only one duty period of time. It 

has a maximum. It doesn’t matter whether you show up at midnight or at noon, it is the same. 

The new recommendations recognize that people have circadian 

rhythms, and it takes into account when you go to work. When norVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:30 Dec 17, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\52441 JASON
28 

mal people go to work, 8 or 9 o’clock in the morning you are well 

rested, that is fine. Go to work at midnight. Would you be prepared 

to stay on duty for 15 hours? Of course not. So the new recommendation takes into account all of these things, hopefully, to 

address them. 

I would note for the record there were 18 people, 18 inputs to 

this Committee from a variety of cross sections in the industry, including scientists and doctors who have made fatigue studies, that 

I know essentially came to consensus with few exceptions. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Any other comments? 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentlelady, and now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Dr. Ehlers. 

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and this has been very 

interesting and useful hearing. 

I would like to get back to Dr. Brady and some of the comments 

he made. And also relate that to some of my experiences. First of 

all, how many of the students that go through your university 

wash out or try to go through your university actually wash out because there is a judgment made that they simply will not be able 

to make the grade to commercial pilot? 

Mr. BRADY. Yes, sir, our attrition is about 40 percent on this particular professional pilot degree for the entire 4 years. 

Mr. EHLERS. 40 percent. 

Mr. BRADY. 40 percent of the entering class yes, sir. 

Mr. EHLERS. Is that typical for all the other universities? 

Mr. BRADY. That is pretty typical because it is a self-select coming into the program so the process that they go through to determine whether or not and we determine whether or not they are a 

good professional pilot material is a process that takes time. It 

takes them to interact with the curriculum and then determine, 

and we determine whether or not they can successfully do that. So 

it is about 40 percent, and that is pretty standard for a 4-year degree. 

Mr. EHLERS. And for what reason do they typically wash out? Is 

it lack of intellectual ability to make the types of calculations that 

pilots have to make? Conceptual difficulties, or is it a matter of 

physical inability to manage controls and so forth? 

Mr. BRADY. If you ask them, they usually relate some personal 

issue, but many cases it is because of funds because they have 

don’t have the funds to continue in a professional pilot program. 

The flying costs a good deal of money to get all of those ratings. 

So many of them wash, they wash themselves out because they 

move into another program simply because they run out of funds, 

but we have students that are simply incapable of mastering the 

curriculum and those of course we have to move out of the program. 

Mr. EHLERS. And what about physical ability? 

Mr. BRADY. Not too often no, sir, because coming into the program they have to have—be able to pass an FAA—what is called 

an FAA class 2 medical. So if they can’t do that, they can’t enter 

the program even though that is not required at that point later 

on, they are going to have be able to pass that. So we use that as 

an entry requirement, and many of our—and I am speaking now 

from my own university—that many of the universities have that 

29 

same issue. They come in with an appropriate medical qualification 

before they enter the program or they don’t enter the program. 

Mr. EHLERS. Well, I would, frankly, I would have been delighted 

had I been able to attend your university or one of the others as 

instead over a period of quite a few years of taking flying lessons 

from a number of different instructors and different locations 

across the country, and I have been really struck by the variability 

in the ability of the instructors to communicate to a student and 

also to train a student properly. So frankly, I would feel rather uncomfortable hiring pilots who don’t experience a good curriculum, 

but just take pot luck with whatever instructors they might get. 

That is just a side comment, and Mr. Babbitt, you can take it for 

what it is worth. 

Turning to you, Mr. Babbitt, are you satisfied that the FAA can 

set standards that can assure that the pilots that are flying are capable pilots and how does this system work? If you have a number 

of pilots who take lessons from different instructors and just gradually work their way in, do you have any good measures of their 

ability to fly? Do you have standards that are easily quantified beyond argument so that you can make good judgments as to whether or not this person is safe to fly? 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes, sir, I think we do. We are focusing here on a 

tragedy, but I would note that today we are going to have 70,000 

operations in the air and you will have the same thing again tomorrow. Every day we are going to carry 800 million people. For 

29 months we were without an accident and then we had a tragedy. If we never had another one that would be fine with me. One 

is too many. But the standards I think have shown themselves to 

be awfully good and while we can argue about some criteria, what 

I think is wholesome in this debate that you are hearing right here 

at this panel is we are trying to find the best way. Is it more curriculum? Is it more academia? Is it more actual experience? Is it 

checking? Is it better simulation and training? 

But at the end of the day we have standards and those standards 

are reinforced over and over again. Then you think about what an 

airline pilot does once they have risen to the level where they are 

flying passengers for a living. They take several check rides a year, 

they take line checks, they fly with other pilots, they have professional standards programs, FAA inspectors make spot checks all 

the time. Air carrier inspectors can arrive and ride the jump seat 

and do so. So these are unannounced random tests. No other profession—I literally would defy you to find another profession that 

has professionals that are as well checked as the airline pilots that 

fly the passengers of this country, and I think the product of that 

is an incredible safety record. 

Mr. EHLERS. I was impressed in reading all the materials and 

listening to some of the transcripts of the flight and of the accident 

in Buffalo and I was just appalled. I wondered how these individuals ever got into a cockpit. That is why I asked the question, are 

the standards tight enough to detect this at some point? 

Mr. BABBITT. Well, your observation is a good one and I made a 

challenge at a recent safety forum where I told every pilot in the 

room and there were 600 of them, that if any of them listened to 

30 

that transcript and didn’t just hang their head, they didn’t deserve 

to be professional pilots. 

Mr. EHLERS. Yeah, I agree with that. Well just one last comment. 

In the good old days before 9/11, members of this Committee were 

allowed to fly in the jump seat. I found that extremely useful for 

my work here on this Committee because having never flown anything with more than one engine and not a very powerful engine 

at that. I was also struck in doing that at how some pilots were 

absolute—absolutely magnificent in their control of the airplane. 

They seemed to be at one with the airplane and they knew what 

was happening before the airplane even knew what was happening. 

It was just astounding and I saw what a high standard they had. 

Not all of them were in that category but the others that were 

there were certainly competent. Some people just seemed to have 

the magic touch. As I say they really become one with the airplane 

and that is really what you are looking for I think, someone with 

that capability, not just intellectual knowledge, but the coordination that is necessary to handle an airplane. And it is just very impressive. It was very impressive for me to fly there and see the 

quality of the pilots that operate the airplanes in this country. 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Michigan, 

and now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Boccieri. 

Mr. BOCCIERI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening this meeting today and for the panel assembled. Let me just 

first start by saying that I agree with the belief that experience 

does matter and Mr. Brady suggested in his testimony and his further subsequent remarks that time doesn’t constitute quality, that 

time in the airplane doesn’t constitute quality, but my argument is 

how to you obtain that quality? How do you obtain that quality I 

know from my military training, as well as those who have gone 

through military training that the most intensive part of your 

training happens before you even put hands on the airplane, 

through simulator, through the instruction that you received on the 

ground, and we find that that has been a robust part of our training. 

However, what is missing from this discussion right now, we are 

talking about fatigue and we are talking about number of hours, 

but we are not talking about the training that these individuals received because the combination of suspect training and low hours 

leads to tragic consequences like we are realizing right now. 

If you will indulge me, Mr. Chairman, just to read a couple of 

quips from the NTSB report, the FDR indicates that the crew 

moved the flaps to 10 degrees. Two seconds later, the stall warning 

stick shaker activated. The autopilot disconnected the same time 

the stick shaker activated. The crew added power to 75 percent 

torque. The airplane began a sharp pitch motion up accompanied 

by a left flow, followed by the stick pusher being activated. 

In that NTSB report, they suggest that Colgan pilots who are 

trained on the Q 400s, those that were interviewed, had received 

a pusher demonstration or instruction in the Q 400. Some asked 

for that, but Q-4 check pilots interviewed that demonstrational instruction of the aircraft pusher system is not part of the training 

syllabus or recurrent training on the Q 400. 

31 

So you are telling me that these pilots that climbed in that airplane on that fatal day were not trained how to recover from a full 

stall, from a full stall and we are talking about hours. You could 

take the most, you could take the most qualified pilot with thousands of hours and put him in an airplane, not adequately trained, 

and I would argue that they would not be able to recover from that 

sort of scenario. So we need to include in this discussion the type 

of training that these individuals are receiving prior to climbing 

into a cockpit and flying so many folks around. 

Now I want to be clear about this, the NTSB, since 1978, has 

been pushing the FAA to include in their training not only stall 

recognition, but stall recovery procedures and forcing airlines and 

their respective companies to incorporate this kind of training syllabus in their training and they have not done that. The NTSB 

says because of these examples, the NTSB advises that training in 

stall recovery should go beyond the approach to a stall and include 

training in the recovery from a full stall condition. These folks on 

that day did not know how to recover from a full stall condition, 

and that is unacceptable, in my opinion. And this panel today, I 

want Mr. Babbitt to commit to me and to the members of the 

panel, I know you just got here, sir, but I want you to commit to 

me that you are going to listen to the NTSB’s recommendations 

and force these air carriers that are taking low houred pilots, low 

houred aviators and putting them in training conditions that are 

suspect and we are going to incorporate that into this discussion. 

Mr. BABBITT. Thank you for your observations and I certainly 

have that commitment. We certainly move forward on that commitment. I think you may have missed some of the dialogue here earlier, but we have a proposed revision to training today. There are 

a couple of things if I could, you don’t get a private pilot’s license 

without having demonstrated the ability to recover from a stall and 

you don’t get a private pilot’s license without recognizing an approach to a stall. A commercial license requires the same thing. It 

actually requires complicated recovery from a complicated stall. 

Every airline teaches approach to stall and recovery. What went 

wrong in 3407, is that they failed to recover from the warning of 

a stall. So a lot was missed here. 

The shortcoming here was a lack of actual simulation in training 

and that was a shortcoming, one that needs to be overcome. We 

need to revise the training so that anything that can possibly happen in an airplane, the pilot has seen before, has been demonstrated to him over and they understand the techniques to recovery and the path way back to safe flight. 

So yes, we are addressing those issues. They are complicated and 

as I indicate in my testimony earlier, our training revisions received some 3,000 pages of comments which we have to digest in 

by our Federal procedures rules, but we will. 

Mr. BOCCIERI. Thank you, Mr. Babbitt. There was a series of 

complications that led to this. They were flying at air speeds that 

were not indicative of flying into icy conditions, almost 34 knots 

below what the book recommended they fly. That could have been 

a part of experience or quality perhaps and arguably, but this—just 

the aircraft pusher system is not part of the training syllabus for 

Colgan, and I just want to be clear about that, that this is not even 

32 

part of their training syllabus, how to recover from a full stall. Of 

course they should have never gotten into a stick shaker condition 

which is a stall first indication of a stall recognition that you are 

going to approach a stall, but after they misapplied the procedures 

or they didn’t do this correctly, there was no training beyond that. 

So once they crossed their line, that line of the stick shaker in my 

opinion they were in uncharted area. 

Mr. BABBITT. I don’t disagree. Starting with situational awareness there was an incredible lack of situational awareness in that 

accident. The professionalism lapsed--that we discussed. There isn’t 

a pilot on this panel that if the stick shaker went off, I can tell you 

the only thing that would have stopped those paddles for me was 

the firewall, and I think that is true all the way across the board. 

Why full power wasn’t applied is a question that looms with every 

professional pilot, but the fact remains we learn from this now and 

we make sure that this never happens again. 

Mr. BOCCIERI. Just to close, Mr. Chairman, there were 5,623 flying hours on that airplane that day. That seems to me like that 

is a very experienced crew, but without the proper training. Without the proper training it doesn’t matter how many hours you have 

and that has got to be a part of this discussion. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Ohio. And 

he knows and we want you to know that in H.R. 3371, the safety 

bill that we had discussed earlier and introduced many of these 

issues have been addressed and even since the legislation was introduced they have been strengthened and worked out at the staff 

level. When we go to the floor, they will be contained in the safety 

bill, and we thank you not only for your comments and questions, 

but for your contribution to putting the bill together as well. 

Chair now then recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. 

Boozman. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Babbitt, the sterile cockpit rule violations have been notable factors in both the 

Lexington and the Buffalo plane crashes. I guess the question for 

us is very difficult. How is the FAA going to step up enforcement 

of the rule? How do you actually enforce that rule? 

Mr. BABBITT. The sterile cockpit rule and for clarification, that 

is from the, you know, the time of taxi out until 10,000 feet, and 

then returning, all conversation in that zone is limited to operational conversations only. That is a very difficult for us to enforce. 

Currently we do not monitor, however we do have several vehicles 

today, as I indicated, airlines have check pilots that ride. They 

make spot checks. Every pilot gets several line checks a year. The 

FAA itself again, air carrier inspectors ride. If a bad habit is noticed, they are going to bring it to their attention. But again, there 

are so many things that you simply can’t legislate. It does go back 

to the call I have made to the industry and to the pilot unions to 

revisit professionalism. The way we are going the monitor that is 

when one pilot begins talking at 8000 feet, the other pilot says we 

are in a sterile environment, I am sorry, we are going to talk about 

this on the ground. That is the way we are going to enforce it. 

33 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Let me ask you, Captain Prater, would you guys 

support the development of an audit system for pilot professionalism on the flight deck? 

Mr. PRATER. I missed the first part of the question, sir. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Would you all support the development of an 

audit system for pilot professionalism on the flight deck? In other 

words, would you support something in that nature to help with 

this problem? 

Mr. PRATER. Well, I am not exactly sure what the proposal would 

be, but we believe that—— 

Mr. BOOZMAN. I guess that is up for grabs in a sense that, as Mr. 

Babbitt said, you know, how do you do that? We do have the—we 

have the regulation now, so it is easy to regulate these things, but 

the enforcement. How do, how do you develop a system so that that 

the co-pilot or the pilot does say that? 

Mr. PRATER. Well, that is basically the system that we do have 

today. Now does that system break down? Do the human failings 

of two aviators come out at the wrong time? It is possible. We saw 

it in 3407. But I am going to back up just a second if I may, sir. 

Those airmen, those aviators were certified by the FAA. They had 

passed every check ride given by their company check airman. The 

result of that flight was, yes, on their shoulders and they bore the 

brunt of it, but they did pass the systems check rides. They had 

been certified. 

Their time in the cockpit, unfortunately, did not come together 

as the highest in professionalism. We can monitor each other and 

that is what you normally see. If somebody gets out of line on the 

cockpit, the other guy, and it may not be the captain, it may be 

the first officer say, let’s get back to business here. You break the 

chain that leads to an accident. We refer to it all the time. I am 

saying it happens 99 percent of the time, unfortunately, the consequences of that 1 percent is brutal. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. How about you, Mr. Skiles? 

Mr. SKILES. I would echo Captain Prater’s comments on that, but 

I would also like to add that once again, it is matter of professionalism in the cockpit. If you get professional, trained qualified 

aviators who understand the value of their training, of rules such 

as this, the sterile cockpit below 10,000 feet, you solve all of these 

problems that we are finding in the industry today. It is a matter 

of getting professionals back in the cockpit. Thank you. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thanks. I agree, you know you have professionals 

playing football and you have professionals playing, you know, basketball and whatever but you do, even though they are very professional, they have gotten to a very high degree of skill, they break 

the rules and you have a referee to call them down and you move 

on. So I guess, you know, the question is, you know, how do we, 

working together, not, we have already got the mandate there, but 

working together we do see a situation where in two cases it broke 

down, you know, that that was going on when it shouldn’t have 

gone on. So again, hopefully we can work together and do a little 

bit better job of enforcing that. So thank you very much. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. [Presiding.] The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman 

from California, Ms. Richardson. 

34 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman my first question is 

for Mr. Babbitt. Mr. Babbitt, in Mr. May’s testimony on page 4, he 

lays out several recommendations. In Mr. Cohen’s testimony in section four he lays out five recommendations and then again also on 

Mr. Cohen’s testimony on page two. Have you read their testimony, 

are you familiar with the recommendations that they have provided? 

Mr. BABBITT. Thank you. I did, in fact. However, I don’t have 

them in front of me and I don’t recall the specific recommendations. 

Were they operational? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes. And first of all, sir, I have got 4-1/2 minutes, and I need to ask several questions so we have got to go 

quick. You are acknowledging, yes, you have them. Have you read 

them and what are you going to do to implement them? 

Mr. BABBITT. Well, I have read their testimony. I don’t have 

them in front of me, I am sorry. If you could be specific with just 

a general quick recap of the recommendations. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. We have limited time. On page 4 of Mr. May’s 

testimony, at the very top, it talks about implementing a policy of 

asking pilot applicants to voluntarily disclose FAA records and so 

on. In Mr. Cohen’s testimony, recommendations to Congress, he 

lays out four or five key points. Let me just suffice to say we would 

ask of this Committee that you would take into account the testimony that is been provided and address the recommendations. 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes, and we have. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. And if you could get a response back to this 

Committee. 

Mr. BABBITT. Okay. We will certainly do that. Currently we have 

already suggested to every carrier that they ask that question of 

any future hire; and secondly, that they would essentially give a 

raised eyebrow to anyone who refused to offer that access because 

of the Privacy Act you can’t demand that however if the pilot won’t 

give you the authority to check his pilot records that should raise 

a question in and of itself. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay, but Mr. Babbitt, what I am asking is in 

the testimony today you have several members here who have supplied you with very good recommendations of things that should be 

considered. Do we have your commitment to read them, to follow 

up with them with this Committee of the responses of what is 

going to be done? 

Mr. BABBITT. You absolutely do. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay, thank you, sir. Also it says that there 

was a meeting, and Mr. Cohen’s testimony said they worked closely 

with the major airplanes, the FAA, the labor organizations, to discuss openly and candidly the safety issues most affecting our industry and to set a near term safety agenda. Are you familiar with 

that agenda? 

Mr. BABBITT. I am. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Can you give it to this Committee? 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes. We set forth in the Call to Action a series of 

steps which included FAA inspections of training, which we laid 

out in a two-step scenario. We had other safety initiatives and the 

Call to Action brought together a number of groups across the Nation. We have started an aviation rulemaking committee to study 

35 

the flight time and duty time issues and fatigue. I would suggest 

to you that in the Olympics of regulatory procedures we just set a 

3-minute mile. That Aviation Rulemaking Committee has come 

back to us with a draft. We will get our rule out for its executive 

review probably as quickly as any rule that has come out of the 

FAA in recent history. So we have a number of initiatives underway we will continue to work with the industry, and of course, welcome your input and the committee’s input. 

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Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. My input would be, Mr. Babbitt, that we 

need things to be done now. And when you say, you know, record 

of FAA, that doesn’t seem very positive to me. We have people like 

myself and many people here in this room that are traveling every 

single day. So as far as I am concerned, it is things that need to 

be done now, not, you know, as we are working through it. So that 

would be my feedback. 

Mr. BABBITT. I wouldn’t disagree. However, I am bound by the 

Administrative Procedures Act, and as much as I wish I could 

make rules instantaneously, there are rules and procedures that 

require us to go through a number of steps in the regulatory process, and we are working as quickly as we can within that framework. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Are you saying, sir, that the procedures do not 

allow, if you know that we have lost lives and things have occurred, you don’t have a process in place of where you can move 

forward to expedite to get this stuff done? 

Mr. BABBITT. We took the steps that we could as quickly as we 

could in terms of advisories, and we have the capability of putting 

out safety action items for operators. We have taken advantage of 

those where we could. That is why the call to action was made. 

However, to change a rule there are constraints on that that I do 

not have the ability to override. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Could you supply to this Congress what 

those constraints are? 

Mr. BABBITT. Surely. 

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Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you. Captain Prater, we have programs, 

aviation safety action programs, flight operations quality assurance 

programs that provide invaluable opportunities to uncover mistakes and to avoid catastrophes that might happen. What could we 

do to encourage greater participation, and how can we better help 

you? 

Mr. PRATER. Actually, I believe that the focus that this Committee, the Subcommittee, as well as the FAA is actually motivating the industry to get on board and see the value of this. We 

have seen some positive changes from some of our operators who 

want to make these programs work, and our commitment, the commitment I have made to the CEOs is we will make those programs 

work. We will get the information from pilots, from mechanics, and 

we will apply it to the system. That is our commitment. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, sir. My time is expired. I will submit one other question into the record for Mr. May and a final one 

for Mr. Babbitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank the gentlelady. Mr. Schauer. 

Mr. SCHAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to 

thank Chairman Costello for his leadership. First, Mr. Loftus, I 

would ask you to accept from my constituents in the Michigan seventh district on behalf of all of the families of Flight 3407 our sympathies and best wishes. My district, my hometown is Battle Creek, 

Michigan. It is the home of Western Michigan University’s College 

of Aviation. Mr. Brady mentioned that in his testimony. I want to 

focus on quality. And Dr. Brady, I would like to ask you some follow-up questions to your testimony. I couldn’t be more pleased and 

agree more that a focus in all of our training programs should be 

on quality. 

You cite that a very high percentage of commercial airline pilots 

come from collegiate programs. That is what I know in my hometown. I see the Bronco aircraft flying around our skies regularly. 

I have sat in their flight simulator, and they really do a fabulous 

job. And I think we are here to talk about preparation for industry. 

And so I have read your testimony and studied it and I guess I 

want to ask you about whether there is a difference between meeting the educational goals for accreditation versus meeting the rigors of commercial airline operations. Specifically, the transfer of 

knowledge in high tech aircraft is something that Western Michigan University’s program is focused on. I know they feel that they 

can meet that technologically advanced aircraft or TAA standard 

which is required by the airline industry. I understand it isn’t necessarily required for accreditation or for completion of collegiate 

programs. Can you talk about that difference and whether you 

agree that collegiate programs should meet that industry standard? 

Mr. BRADY. Yes, sir, I do. I do agree with that, that those programs should have those kind of systems and processes. I would 

like to also compliment Western Michigan on its performance in 

the National Intercollegiate Flying Association Meet. They did very 

well. Most of our programs that are accredited have some form of 

high tech environments that the pilots are able to interact with. 

Many of them have aircraft that are equipped with glass cockpits, 

for example. Many of them have simulators that, if the actual aircraft doesn’t have it, many of them have simulators that are 

89 

equipped with glass cockpit procedures. And all of them will go way 

beyond what the FAA requires in terms of a minimum set of performance criteria in meeting their curriculum outcomes. 

The whole process of AABI accreditation goes way beyond what 

the FAA would require as minimums. And all of the programs that 

are accredited have access, and most of them have high tech glass 

cockpit opportunities. So the pilots that are coming out of these 

programs are very highly skilled. And that is part of my issue here 

is that the ATP-only requirement is a one size fits all, and it 

doesn’t work. 

One size doesn’t fit all because there are different levels of quality coming out of flight education programs from an FBO all the 

way up to, and I say up because that is the way it is, up to institutions of higher learning that produce professional pilots. 

Mr. SCHAUER. Thank you. Would anyone else on the panel like 

to comment? 

Mr. PRATER. I will take just a brief shot at it. I believe that the 

universities are producing very good, basic commercial airline pilots. But they are not making them into an airline pilot. We are 

missing a step for that lack of experience. And I think that is 

where Administrator Babbitt has focused on. That is where we are 

focusing on. What is that next step to turn somebody who has had 

that basic 200 hours worth of training into somebody who can face 

the rigors of real life scheduled flying service? 

Mr. SCHAUER. Captain, in follow-up, would training in technologically advanced aircraft, TAA, help address that shortcoming? 

Mr. PRATER. I don’t believe so. It is not all about technology. It 

is about basic airmanship. Until you have seen what a mammatus 

cloud looks like or a lenticular cloud from the air, because you are 

not going to see that in the simulator, you are not going to know 

what it is until you see it. Hopefully you will see it with a more 

experienced aviator who will mentor you and say we are not going 

that way, we are going that way. That is the value of experience. 

Mr. SCHAUER. Great. Captain, thank you. Thanks to the panel. 

I will take those comments back to Dean David Powell at Western 

Michigan University. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. [Presiding.] The Chair thanks the gentleman, and 

now recognizes the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to refer particularly to Captain Prater’s testimony. And it causes tremendous concern. Mainline airlines are frequently faced with pressures on their 

marketing plan resulting in the use of regional feed codesharing 

partners further down. Codesharing that will result in the mainline 

carrier exerting a great deal of pressure on the regional airlines to 

provide their service at the lowest possible price. The regional carriers have to reduce their costs to prevent being replaced by another air line at the end of their contract. Now we have larger regional carriers subcontracting with smaller regional airlines, and 

then you go on say, in some extreme cases airlines have outsourced 

the majority of their routes to regional airlines with pilots having 

as little as 250 hours of experience because a main line carrier furloughed its own pilots with more than a decade of experience. Another cost cutting tactic used by regional vendor airlines is endemic 

short staffing which leads to pilot pushing, fewer pilots flying more 

90 

and more hours per month and a resultant reduction in safety. And 

then finally, it is not uncommon for training at such carriers to be 

conducted only to FAA required minimums. This raises a number 

of extraordinary issues, issues that I have been raising on this 

Committee for well more than a decade, and that would be the low 

minimums required by the FAA, which I believe leads to a lowest 

common denominator mentality, which leads to subcontracting or 

contracting with regional airlines who subcontract with other regional airlines, and at every step along the way, the people get paid 

less, they have less experience, and there is less integrity to the 

training programs of those extremely small, low budget carriers. 

Additionally, there is the issue of pay, or the ‘‘lifestyle choice’’ as 

we heard one of the witnesses refer to it. A woman living with her 

mother as an adult because she can’t afford an apartment on her 

own. It is a ‘‘lifestyle choice’’. Yeah, the lifestyle choice is she wanted to fly an airplane and she isn’t being paid anywhere near a living wage. I don’t call that a lifestyle choice. I call it exploitation 

by a profit making entity. And then finally, the whole issue of the 

minimums. Here is a question. What if we raise the minimums? 

Now, wouldn’t that resolve at least some of these issues of you 

know, chasing the least experienced person who will work for the 

lowest wage? Captain Prater? 

Mr. PRATER. We believe that it would be a start on the system. 

We have identified what we consider the marketplace or systemic 

problems of outsourcing and its effect on having experience in the 

cockpit. In this specific accident, the fact that Continental Airlines 

had laid off their main line pilots, people who had 10 or 12 years 

of experience who could have been flying that airplane, the fact if 

there weren’t so many vendors working off so many different seniority systems, this specific crew, with their level of experience 

and training, would have never flown together. The captain would 

have had 6 or 8 years of experience. That experience is out there. 

But here is the economic fix. 

We have asked the main line carriers. They are charging $25 for 

your bag, they are charging $50 for your second bag or $100, to 

take 5 minutes to change your reservation. For $1 an hour, per 

passenger, we can fix these economic problems. So if you are going 

from here to St. Louis, if you would pay $2 for the captain and $2 

for the copilot, we could pay a decent wage. We can’t get that out 

of the main line carriers. And the regional partners, their managements have no control over revenue. All the decisions are made by 

the main line managers. And that is what it would take to fix those 

problems, so you wouldn’t have to live with your parents when you 

are 30 years old. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So $1 per hour. That means I fly weekly to the 

West coast, 4-1/2, 5-hour flight, depending on weather conditions, 

let’s say it was 4-1/5 yesterday. So it would have cost me an extra 

$9 to have the most experienced best trained pilots. Do you think 

there is anybody up there who wouldn’t pay an extra 9 bucks flying 

across the country or 2 bucks or 4 bucks for a short flight to get 

there alive? I don’t. Now, the question is, how do we break this vicious cycle, the lowest common denominator? What happens is we 

have some very responsible regional carriers who are doing a great 

job. But their problem is they are competing so-called with these 

91 

low budget folks. I think the way to solve that is to raise the minimums and raise them dramatically. Administrator Babbitt, what 

do you say to that? 

Mr. BABBITT. When we talk about raising the minimum, I am 

presuming you are talking about the requirements to be hired as 

a first officer. And that is the subject of an advanced notice of proposed rule making that we are considering and we may suggest 

just that. Before this debate started and so forth, we came out and 

recognized that there needed to be some additional or at least in 

the FAA’s belief, there needed to be some additional qualifications, 

training and experience and what our proposal would do would be 

to add all three of those components. The panel, in some discussion 

here, has taken some exception. Some of them believe experience 

should carry a higher value. Others, quality. That is why we have 

proposed rule makings. That is why we put out those notices and 

that is why we will take their input and craft a rule. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But Administrator Babbitt, didn’t you testify to the 

same issue back in the mid nineties, when you were in a position 

with the airline pilots association? And it has been more than a 

decade and now we have an advanced notice of a proposed rule 

making. How long is that going to take? 

Mr. BABBITT. Well, hopefully not long. During that interim time 

I wasn’t the administrator. Now that I am involved, we are proposing a change in the flight time and duty time rules. That one 

has languished for 35 years. We are going to have a rule by the 

end of the year. So we are really aggressively trying to move some 

of these issues forward. We haven’t touched the commercial pilot 

rating and ATP rating rules. The only difference was to add 300 

hours. I got mine when I had 1,200 hours. That was the requirement in 1968. It changed from 1,200 to 1,500. That is the only 

change that has been made in 40 years. 

So while people might take a little exception that it is taking a 

little too long, the fact is we are moving it and I will accelerate it 

as quickly as I can. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. I turn then now to Mr. May who was preceded some time ago by a guy named Bolger, and I had the same 

conversation with Mr. Bolger back in the early 1990s. And at that 

point he represented that, you know, he didn’t think that we wanted to incur these costs in the system. And I said, well, sir, I think 

that you have a large and diverse group of airlines you represent. 

But aren’t you putting the better ones who have higher standards 

at a disadvantage if you are representing the views of the ones who 

are the most cost competitive, or we might say cost cutting, or we 

might say some of the things we talked about earlier in the terms 

of the problems they are causing. 

What if we had a level playing field where we raised the bar a 

little bit? And yeah, we have heard how expensive it would be. Are 

you telling me there is that much price sensitivity, that someone 

won’t fly, pay an extra buck to have, you know, an experienced 

pilot and another buck for an experienced copilot? I just, I don’t 

buy it. If you are going to say, gee, any upward price pressure, as 

opposed to this relentless downward price pressure, is going to be 

detrimental to the industry when everybody has to play by the 

same rules, so no one is going to be at a competitive disadvantage. 

92 

You are bringing up the bottom. The people who are already 

above them are now in actually a stronger position, and the ones 

at the bottom, yeah, they are going to have to suck it up a little 

bit and do better. 

Mr. MAY. Mr. DeFazio, I would put the qualifications of our main 

line carrier pilots and crews, copilots, up against any in the world. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Sure. I got that. But they are driving the system 

and they are using more and more regionals, and some of the 

regionals are now using more and more sub regionals. They are 

driving that system with their code sharing arrangements. So yes, 

certainly they have very qualified pilots, and that is not what I am 

talking about here. I am talking about the system we have set up 

which they are facilitating, which is becoming more and more the 

public is flying on one regional carriers than they are on the mainline carriers. 

Mr. MAY. And I think Administrator Babbitt has talked about a 

number of rulemaking procedures that are underway to significantly elevate the qualifications. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Great. Will the Association support those? 

Mr. MAY. Yes, we will, and we have. We participated in the ARC 

and made a series of recommendations, some of which have been 

referred to here today. And look, we are all in favor of having the 

opportunity to maintain what is still the safest system in the 

world. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. But the one time when it doesn’t work right 

is unfortunate, it is catastrophic and we want to prevent that if 

possible. 

Mr. MAY. I don’t think any of us—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And I see a bad trend here. It reminds me of the 

trend we had when Value Jet had outsourced and outsourced the 

outsourcing of their maintenance, and you got to a level where 

some people didn’t know that mixing oxygen canisters and tires in 

the hull of the aircraft was a bad idea. And I worry that the system 

is driving that way now with the way these regional and subregional contracts are going out. I am pleased to hear the Association supports the higher standards, and I look forward to Administrator Babbitt expediting it so I am not back here in 16 more years 

talking to yet a future administrator about the same issue. I hope 

not to be here and I hope we have resolved the issue by then. 

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair would say to my friend from Oregon 

that we are not going to wait on rulemaking. That is the reason 

that we have introduced H.R. 3371 and we are going to proceed. 

There are things that we can do that we can put into law that, we 

can pass through the House and hopefully through the Senate, and 

we will work with the FAA along the way. But we know what has 

happened in the past as far as rulemaking is concerned. It takes 

a long period of time. 

I would join others in commending Administrator Babbitt in expediting some things already since he has been in his position, and 

I trust that he will continue to move forward with this issue. 

I have a final question for some of the members of the panel. We 

have talked about, as Dr. Brady indicated, his concern about the 

disadvantage of the 26 accredited schools versus the flight training 

93 

schools. Let me talk a little bit or ask a little bit about the value 

of classroom time versus time in the cockpit, time in the cockpit 

versus time in the simulator, time in the classroom versus time in 

the cockpit versus being in the cockpit over in the southern California airspace or the New York airspace. And I want to start with 

Mr. Skiles, and then I will work my way through the panel. If you 

would comment, the value of time in the classroom versus time in 

the cockpit versus time in the simulator. 

Mr. SKILES. Well, I would like to first of all say that we are very 

happy, we think that the AABI accredited schools do a great job 

of training our future airline pilots. But we argue that education 

is only part of what makes a complete airline pilot. While gaining 

the experience to qualify for an ATP, a pilot is exposed to challenging and unpredictable circumstances which are just not possible in a classroom. This gives them the opportunity to develop 

airmanship skills we call them. And I would like to define that for 

you a little bit. 

You know, flying is as much a skill as it is just knowledge. You 

don’t become a virtuoso on a cello after a few lessons. Even adept 

training can’t prepare a pilot for everyday line flying. You take 

away the auto pilot, the glide slope, the auto throttles and you are 

left with basic flying skills that you have developed, the ability to 

plan a descent to a certain point and be there at a certain altitude, 

the ability to fly a perfect glide profile by eye alone, the ability to 

judge wind drift on a base leg and adjust your bank angle to roll 

out perfectly aligned with the runway. These are airmanship skills. 

And this is what we find is, I think, sorely lacking in our industry 

today. They can only be achieved by experience in the cockpit. 

So once again, we think that education is part of the equation. 

But once again, you need the experience that you are going to attain as you are getting the requirements for the ATP license to develop those critical airmanship skills that are going to come to play 

in circumstances that you encounter in your everyday airline flying 

career. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. So the bottom line is you strongly support the 

ATP? 

Mr. SKILES. Absolutely. The ATP requirement is the absolute 

minimum requirement that we should be seeing for admittance to 

our airline cockpits. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Captain Prater. 

Mr. PRATER. I would concur, but go just a little bit further. I 

think there are different ways of gaining valuable experience. I do 

think that there should be a more intense focus on the educational 

aspects, the ground school, if you will, provisions of becoming a 

pilot. We do support the requirement for the ATP. However, we 

also feel that there are some interim steps that can bridge the gap 

of just flight time experience. There is very little bad flight time 

experience. It all adds to one’s total amount of experience. And it 

is not just in a training environment. You have to go out there and 

sometimes do it to get better. 

So we would like to see an increase in ground school, whether 

it is in the basic airmanship, private, commercial instrument ratings, and we would like to see it go beyond that. There is no real 

94 

ground school for ATP. You can take—you can buy a $5 Acme 

exam and learn the answers. I would like to get around that. I 

would like to increase those requirements to get an ATP. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Captain Prater. Mr. Loftus. 

Mr. LOFTUS. Again, I will agree with both of the pilots, professional pilots here at the table. I agree that there is no experience, 

other than the experience in the air there is no substitute for what 

you learn in the classroom, or the other way around. The classroom 

is a needed environment. The pilots that come out of the colleges 

and the universities are extremely good pilots. They turn out to be 

very good first officers and captains. 

But, again, the airlines are not an entry level position, I don’t believe. I think that it has got to be earned. There is knowledge there 

that can’t be taught in a classroom. It can only be learned in a 

plane and a simulator. I think the simulators are an important 

part of the training process. But, again, there is no replacement for 

that, all the classroom learning you can have, but until you fly the 

airplane you don’t know how to land it. You can talk about it all 

day. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Loftus. Finally, Dr. Brady, if you 

would like to comment. 

Mr. BRADY. Thank you, Mr. Costello. All of these things are important, blended together, to produce the ideal professional pilot. 

There is a level of classroom that is needed, and we believe that 

the academic experience in a college or university is the best means 

to attain those levels. The simulator, integrated with the aircraft, 

if it is the right kind of simulator, if it simulates the aircraft and 

there is a transfer of training between the two, we fully support. 

At my institution, for example, we train under what is called 

part 142, which allows simulation, the maximum amount of simulation, and we actually have very high level simulators for the 

Cessna 172 and the Seminole and the Canadair regional jets, so 

our pilots get trained on all of those boxes and all those opportunities. And you can do things in a simulator you can’t do in an aircraft. So we very much support that. 

As far as the ATP is concerned, we don’t believe that one size fits 

all. We believe there needs to be some modification of that so that 

the high quality programs are not disadvantaged by the low quality 

programs. We believe there needs to be some measure taken so 

that the ATP is not the determinant, is not the determining item 

to put the pilot into the cockpit of a part 121 carrier. We believe 

it is an inappropriate measure. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you. And I thank all of our witnesses for participating and testifying in our hearing today. As I 

said from the outset, this Subcommittee intends to uphold our commitment not only to the families of Flight 3407, but to the American people, that we will continue aggressive oversight. We will 

pursue bringing our safety bill to the floor of the House of Representatives to move it through so that we can—and we will be 

working with Administrator Babbitt and our stakeholders in the 

process. 

We think we have a good bill. We think it does many things that 

we learned from our hearing in June and again from meeting with 

95 

many of the stakeholders represented here today. So we look forward to continuing to work with you. And as I said, we are committed to aggressive oversight to make certain that we improve the 

safety standards for the future. 

With that, the Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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