GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Subcommittee on Air and 

Land Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Strategic Airlift Gap 

Has Been Addressed, 

but Tactical Airlift 

Plans Are Evolving as 

Key Issues Have Not 

Been Resolved 

November 2009 

GAO-10-67 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2009

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Addressed, but 

Tactical Airlift Plans Are Evolving as Key Issues Have 

Highlights of GAO-10-67, a report to Not Been Resolved 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

DOD used nearly 700 aircraft, as 

well as commercial and leased 

aircraft, to carry about 3 million 

troops and 800,000 tons of cargo in 

support of wartime, peacetime, and 

humanitarian efforts in 2008. C-5s 

and C-17s move troops and cargo 

internationally (strategic airlift) 

and C-130s are the primary aircraft 

that moves them within a theater of 

operation (tactical airlift). Over the 

next 4 years, DOD plans to spend 

about $12 billion to modernize and 

procure airlifters and is currently 

studying how many it needs. 

GAO was asked to (1) identify the 

status of DOD’s modernization and 

acquisition efforts and (2) 

determine how well DOD is 

addressing any capability gaps and 

redundancies. In conducting this 

work, GAO identified the cost, 

schedule, and performance of 

airlift programs, as well as DOD’s 

plan for addressing gaps and 

redundancies. GAO also discussed 

mobility study efforts with DOD, 

Institute for Defense Analysis 

(IDA), and RAND officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other 

things, that DOD broaden the scope 

of its portfolio discussions, 

determine if additional C-17s are 

needed, and determine how Army 

direct support requirements will be 

met. DOD partially concurred with 

the recommendations, citing they 

have ongoing plans or processes to 

address the issues raised. As 

discussed in the report, GAO 

believes DOD needs to take 

additional steps to fully respond to 

the recommendations. 

DOD has recently revamped airlift investments due to modernization cost 

increases and requirement changes. For strategic airlift, the number of C-5s 

that will be fully modernized were cut in half because of substantial 

reengining cost increases and C-17 quantities were increased from 180 to 213 

aircraft. These twin changes resulted in a net cost increase of about $3 billion. 

Additional costs and force structure changes are possible pending decisions 

on C-5 retirements, other modifications, the potential need for more C-17s to 

meet tactical airlift needs, and the planned shutdown of C-17 production. For 

tactical airlift, substantial cost increases for modernizing C-130 avionics 

tripled unit costs, delayed its schedule, and resulted in almost 60 percent 

fewer aircraft being modernized. There have been large increases in the C130J quantity to replace older C-130s, but modest increases in unit costs. The 

joint Army-Air Force C-27J program was recently transferred to the Air Force 

and quantities were cut from 78 to 38 aircraft, with an uncertain effect on the 

Army’s airlift missions. The Army and Air Force must also resolve 

fundamental differences in operating requirements and employment strategy 

for the Joint Future Theater Lift (JFTL). 

DOD appears to have addressed its strategic airlift gap, but there is a potential 

future tactical airlift gap for moving medium weight equipment. Also, 

questions regarding how the Air Force will meet the Army’s direct support 

mission have not been resolved. DOD is using $5.5 billion appropriated by 

Congress to procure 23 additional C-17s, which DOD officials believe more 

than offsets the strategic airlift gap associated with the restructured C-5 

modernization program. However, there is a potential gap in the tactical airlift 

of medium weight loads beyond the capability of the C-130s. The C-17 is the 

only aircraft capable of moving this type of Army equipment within a theater 

of operation, although not to austere, short, or unimproved landing areas. The 

JFTL is envisioned to provide this capability, but will not be available for 15 

years or more under the current acquisition strategy. While the various 

mobility studies acknowledge the C-17’s significant dual role, they did not 

comprehensively evaluate the expanded use of the C-17 to transport medium 

weight equipment in theater and how this could impact the force structure, 

the C-17’s service life, and decisions related to when to shut down the 

production line. In addition, questions remain about the number of C-130s and 

C-27Js needed to fulfill Army direct support missions. Two studies reached 

somewhat different conclusions about the cost effectiveness of using C-130Js 

and C-27Js for this mission. The Air Force and Army have not completed a 

plan for meeting Army direct support requirements, which could affect future 

decisions on both the C-27J and the C-130J. DOD’s recently established 

portfolio management structure is supposed to provide a useful forum to 

address the broad range of airlift investment decisions. However, efforts so 

far have primarily focused on new programs rather than addressing gaps and 

making other airlift decisions such as when and how many C-5s to retire or 

the appropriate mix of C-130s and C-27Js needed to perform Army missions. View GAO-10-67 or key components.

For more information, contact Michael J. 

Sullivan (202) 512-4841or 

sullivanm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-10-67 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 2 

Airlift Acquisition and Modernization Programs Have Been 

Restructured to Address Rising Costs and Changes in Airlift 

Needs 4 

Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Addressed, but a Potential Tactical 

Airlift Gap for Moving Medium Weight Equipment and Other 

Questions Have Not Been Resolved 11 

Conclusions 19 

Recommendations for Executive Action 21 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21 

Appendix I A Summary of Strategic and Tactical Airlift Systems—

Ongoing and Future Efforts 26 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 46 

Related GAO Products 49 

Tables 

Table 1: Cost and Quantity Changes for Strategic Airlift Programs 5 

Table 2: Cost and Quantity Remaining for Strategic Airlift Programs 

as of July 2009 6 

Table 3: Cost and Quantity Changes for Tactical Airlift Programs 9 

Table 4: Cost and Quantity Remaining for Tactical Airlift Programs 

as of July 2009 9 

Table 5: Changes in Strategic Airlift Force Structure and 

Capabilities 12 

Table 6: C-5 Funding 31 

Table 7: C-17 Funding 34 

Table 8: Comparison of C-130H, C-130J-30, and C-27J Capabilities 

and Characteristics 35 

Table 9: C-130 Funding 38 

Table 10: C-27J Funding 41 

Table 11: JFTL-Related RDT&E Funding 45 

 Defense Acquisitions 
Figures 

Figure 1: DOD Logistics Portfolio Management Structure 18 

Figure 2: Comparison of C-5 and C-17 Capabilities and 

Characteristics 27 

Figure 3: C-5 Galaxy 28 

Figure 4: C-17 Globemaster 32 

Figure 5: C-130 Hercules 36 

Figure 6: C-27J Spartan 39 

Figure 7: Joint Future Theater Lift 42 

Abbreviations 

AMP Avionics Modernization Program 

DOD Department of Defense 

IDA Institute for Defense Analysis 

JFTL Joint Future Theater Lift 

RAND RAND Corporation 

RERP Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page ii GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Page 1 GAO-10-67 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

November 12, 2009 

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Chairman 

The Honorable Roscoe Bartlett 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Department of Defense (DOD) employs over 700 aircraft to move 

troops and cargo in support of wartime operations, peacetime missions, 

and humanitarian aid efforts. In 2008, these airlifters along with 

commercial and leased aircraft flew more than 160,000 sorties, moving 

about 800,000 tons of cargo and 3 million troops. The Air Force’s C-5s and 

C-17s perform the intertheater movement of troops and cargo, referred to 

as strategic airlift, and its C-130s provide most intratheater transport, 

referred to as tactical airlift. 

The department plans to spend about $12 billion over the next 4 years to 

modernize and recapitalize its airlift fleets. This includes upgrading the 

avionics on C-5s and selected C-130 models, replacing engines on about 

half of the C-5 fleet, and acquiring additional C-17s and C-130Js. DOD is 

also procuring C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft and has begun initial planning 

efforts on the Joint Future Theater Lift (JFTL), both slated for tactical 

airlift. Growing fiscal pressures, however, may cause DOD to reexamine or 

restructure programs that exceed cost and schedule targets. Because of 

the costs, complexities, and interrelationships of airlift programs and the 

need for greater insight, we examined, at your request (1) the cost, 

schedule, and performance status of modernization efforts and new airlift 

programs and (2) how well DOD is managing the airlift portfolio to make 

investment decisions that address any capability gaps and redundancies. 

This report builds and expands upon information reported to you on 

strategic airlift issues in November 20081

 and provides new information on 

tactical airlift programs and issues. 

1

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and Requirements 

Are Needed to Define Optimal Future Strategic Airlift Mix, GAO-09-50 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 21, 2008). 

 Defense Acquisitions 
In conducting our work, we interviewed and obtained documentation from 

officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. 

Transportation Command related to the ongoing Mobility Capabilities and 

Requirements Study 2016 and portfolio management activities. DOD 

officials did not provide a copy of or detailed information about the study 

results because the analysis had not been completed. Instead, officials 

provided status updates and answered questions about potential gaps and 

redundancies. We met with officials from each of the weapon system 

program offices2

 to obtain current cost, schedule, and performance 

information. When appropriate, we discussed reasons for variances from 

cost, schedule, and performance targets and upcoming acquisition, 

modernization, or retirement decisions related to their particular program. 

In addition, we met with Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) and RAND 

Corporation (RAND) officials to discuss the results of their DODsponsored mobility studies. We also relied on our previous reports related 

to portfolio management, DOD mobility studies, and various weapon 

systems for information. A list of these reports is included in the Related 

GAO Products section at the end of this report. We conducted this 

performance audit from January 2009 to November 2009 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. 

DOD uses a variety of aircraft to move weapons, equipment, and troops 

from the United States to and within theaters of operation. C-5s and C-17s 

are used for strategic airlift. They carry weapons and equipment too large 

for any other DOD aircraft from the United States to staging locations 

throughout the world. The family of C-130 aircraft, which includes the 

C-130E, C-130H, and C-130J aircraft, is then the primary asset used to 

move weapons, equipment, and troops within a theater of operation.3

 The 

Background 

 

2

 Program offices we visited included the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program, C-130J, 

C-17, C-27J, and C-5. We also met with science and technology officials that are working on 

the Joint Future Theater Lift. 

3

 DOD began using the C-130Es in 1962 and the C-130Hs, which included more powerful 

engines in 1974. DOD added the C-130J to the C-130 family in 1999. It includes a new 

propeller design and engines. A stretch version, the C-130J-30, which includes a 15-foot 

fuselage extension, has also been introduced. 

Page 2 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
C-17 is dually capable of performing both strategic and tactical airlift 

missions and supplements the C-130 for tactical airlift. All of these aircraft 

are owned and operated by the Air Force and are considered part of the 

common user pool of aircraft that can be used to support any of the 

services’ missions. DOD also relies on the Air Force’s aerial refueling 

tankers (KC-10 and KC-135), commercial aircraft, and leased aircraft to 

supplement airlift capabilities. Officials at the U.S. Transportation 

Command and its Air Force component, the Air Mobility Command, 

decide on how best to use the assets on a daily basis. Often, these aircraft 

are scheduled for departure when they have a full load, to ensure assets 

are used cost-effectively. The services may also use their own airplanes 

and helicopters that are not in the common user pool to move people and 

cargo within a theater of operation. For example, these assets include the 

Army’s C-23 Sherpas and the Marine Corps’ V-22 Osprey aircraft. These 

aircraft are used to perform time-sensitive, mission-critical requirements 

and may take off without full loads since urgency is the primary driver for 

the mission, not efficiency or cost-effectiveness. 

The Air Force is in the process of modernizing its C-5 and C-130H aircraft 

and acquiring C-17s, C-130Js, and C-27Js to meet its future strategic and 

tactical airlift requirements and improve aircraft availability. It plans to 

retire C-130Es from the tactical airlift fleet by 2014. C-5s are being 

modernized in two phases. During the first phase, known as the Avionics 

Modernization Program (AMP), aircraft receive upgraded avionics 

capabilities and an all-weather flight control system. During the second 

phase, known as the Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program 

(RERP), aircraft engines are replaced and electrical, fuel, and other 

subsystems are modified. Together, the two modifications will help 

improve the C-5s wartime mission capable rate. C-130H aircraft are also 

receiving an AMP modification and will undergo a center wing box 

replacement because of severe cracking discovered in that area. 

DOD periodically assesses global threats, the national military strategy, 

and its force structure to determine future airlift requirements and to 

judge the sufficiency of its acquisition and modernization plans. The 

analytical basis for DOD’s current airlift requirements is the Mobility 

Capabilities Study completed in December 2005.4

 Officials used the study 

results to report in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review that 180 C-17s 

and 112 fully modernized C-5s (those that received the AMP and RERP 

 

4

 Other studies were completed in 1992, 1994, and 2001. 

Page 3 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
modifications) would be sufficient to meet the national military strategy 

for strategic airlift with acceptable risk. This could change pending the 

completion of the ongoing DOD Mobility Capabilities and Requirements 

Study 2016, two other DOD-sponsored airlift studies conducted by IDA 

and RAND, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, and potential changes 

in threat assumptions and the national security strategy. The IDA study 

has already been completed and the remaining studies are expected to be 

completed by January 2010. 

Over the last 2 years, DOD has restructured its airlift investments, 

primarily due to sharp cost increases for modernization programs and 

changes in requirements. The Air Force now intends to fully modernize 

less than one-half of the C-5s it originally planned and will procure 

additional C-17s. C-130 avionics modernization quantities were also cut 

more than half and the schedule was delayed due to cost increases. The 

Air Force is procuring more C-130J models than planned, due in part to a 

decision to retire the older C-130E model. Pending decisions on aircraft 

retirements, additional modifications, and new acquisitions could further 

affect future costs and the force structure. Furthermore, changing needs 

and uncertain strategies could lead to cost, schedule and performance 

variances on two new airlift programs, the C-27J and the JFTL. Appendix 1 

contains more in-depth cost, schedule, and performance information on 

the department’s strategic and tactical airlifters that we reviewed. 

Airlift Acquisition and 

Modernization 

Programs Have Been 

Restructured to 

Address Rising Costs 

and Changes in Airlift 

Needs 

Strategic Airlift: DOD Is 

Modernizing Fewer C-5s, 

but Acquiring More C-17s 

DOD has cut its C-5 modernization efforts by more than half and is 

acquiring additional C-17s. Significant cost increases on the C-5 RERP and 

AMP programs drove up unit costs and delayed schedules. These 

problems, along with additional congressional appropriations that DOD is 

using to procure more C-17s, led to a decision to fully modernize only 52 

C-5 aircraft instead of the entire fleet. Congress has provided enough 

funding for DOD to procure 33 more C-17s. The last one will be delivered 

in March 2011. 

Substantial C-17 production line shutdown costs—ranging from about 

$465 million to about $1 billion by Air Force and Boeing estimates, 

respectively—have yet to be determined, but will need to be funded soon. 

Table 1 summarizes changes in cost and quantities from original estimates. 

Page 4 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Table 1: Cost and Quantity Changes for Strategic Airlift Programs 

Total cost 

(then-year dollars in millions) Quantity 

Program acquisition unit cost 

(then-year dollars in millions) 

Initial 

estimate 

Current 

estimate 

(July 2009) 

Percentage 

change 

Initial 

estimate

Current 

estimate

(July 2009)

Percentage 

change

Initial 

estimate 

Current 

estimate

(July 2009)

Percentage 

change

C-17 $39,754 $67,799 71 211 213 1 $188.4 $318.3 69

C-5 RERP $11,094 $7,694 -31 126 52 -59 $88 $148.0 68

C-5 AMP $911 $1,405 54 112 112 0 $8.1 $12.5 54

Total $51,759 $76,898 49 

Source: GAO analysis and DOD selected acquisition and program baseline reports. C-17 data were adjusted to include funding and

quantities included in supplemental budgets. 

Notes: DOD plans to AMP a total of 112 C-5s. One aircraft that had already received the AMP 

modification crashed. 

DOD has nearly completed its C-17 acquisition program and is about 

midway through the C-5 AMP modernization program. According to 

program officials, 24 C-17s are yet to be delivered and 57 C-5s still need the 

AMP modification. The C-5 RERP modernization program is just beginning 

the low rate initial production phase. Only 3 of 52 C-5s have received the 

RERP modification as part of the development program. DOD has already 

spent about $69.2 billion on research, development, test and evaluation 

(RDT&E) and procurement funds on these programs and program officials 

project they will need to invest about $7.7 billion to complete the 

programs as currently planned (see table 2). 

Page 5 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Table 2: Cost and Quantity Remaining for Strategic Airlift Programs as of July 2009 

Investments 

(then-year dollars in millions) Quantity 

Prior To go Delivered To go

C-17 $65,995 $1,804 190 23

C-5 RERP $2,138 $5,557 3 49

C-5 AMP $1,062 $343 55 57

Total $69,195 $7,703 

Source: GAO analysis and DOD selected acquisition reports. 

Note: The C-17 quantity delivered figure includes one aircraft that is dedicated to provide airlift 

capability to a consortium of European nations. 

The department planned to spend about $12 billion to make AMP and 

RERP modifications to the fleet of C-5 aircraft by 2020. However, the Air 

Force declared a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach5

 in the RERP program in 

September 2007, due to increased labor and parts costs. The AMP effort 

required additional software development to address deficiencies found 

during developmental testing. Development costs would have been higher 

except that the Air Force decided not to address 250 deficiencies and 14 

operational requirements in this program. These events resulted in revised 

plans to provide the AMP upgrade to all C-5 aircraft and the RERP 

modification to 52 aircraft. The combined cost for both modifications was 

reduced to $9.1 billion, but now less than one-half of the fleet will be fully 

modernized and at a much higher unit cost than originally estimated—

$160.5 million for both modifications versus $96.1 million. The portion of 

the fleet that does not get both modifications will continue to experience 

mission capable rates of around 50 percent compared to about 75 percent 

for the portion that does get both modifications. The last modifications 

are supposed to be finished in 2015. 

Additional costs and changes in the force structure for the C-5 and C-17 

are possible pending decisions on future modifications and retirements of 

older C-5s. For example, program officials said that many of the 

deficiencies and requirements dropped from the current C-5 AMP effort 

will be addressed in annual AMP software upgrades, the C-5 RERP, or a 

 

5

 10 U.S.C. § 2433 establishes the requirement for unit cost reports. If certain cost 

thresholds are exceeded (known as unit cost or Nunn-McCurdy breaches), DOD is required 

to report to Congress and, in certain circumstances, certify the program to Congress. 

Page 6 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
new block upgrade program that is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2010. 

The C-17 is also addressing modernization through a series of aircraft 

upgrades designed to address emerging issues such as international 

airspace access requirements and critical operational/safety issues. 

Significant C-5 cost growth and further delays are possible if the RERP 

program is not adequately funded. We previously reported that, according 

to the department’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group, the RERP program 

was underfunded by about $294 million, with additional funding needed in 

fiscal years 2012 and 2013. 6 Replacement engines are the costliest portion 

of the RERP upgrade, and DOD officials said if funding is insufficient to 

meet yearly production quantities in existing purchase agreements, 

anticipated price breaks will not occur and could likely result in another 

Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach and program restructure. Department 

officials said the Air Force is committed to fully funding the RERP 

modification of 52 aircraft, but did not provide us with new budget data 

for fiscal years 2011 and beyond. 

Planned quantities of C-17s have fluctuated over the years. C-17 

procurement began in 1988 and the Air Force initially planned to acquire 

210 aircraft. Following a major acquisition review in 1990, the program 

was reduced to 120 aircraft because of technical problems and funding 

shortfalls during the full-scale development program, which resulted in 

higher than expected cost increases and schedule delays.7

 In subsequent 

years, DOD expanded the program from 120 aircraft to 180 aircraft and, in 

the past 3 fiscal years, Congress has provided funding that would allow 

DOD to procure 33 additional aircraft: 10 in fiscal year 2007,8

 15 in fiscal 

 

6 GAO-09-50. 

7

 GAO, Military Airlift: Status of the C-17 Development Program, GAO-T-NSIAD-93-6 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 1993). 

8

 Title III of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007, provided funds for Air 

Force aircraft procurement. Pub. L. No. 109-289. The Conference Report related to this 

legislation reflected $2 billion for the Air Force to procure ten C-17 aircraft. H.R. Conf. Rep. 

No. 109-676, at 372 (2006). 

Page 7 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
year 2008,9

 and 8 in fiscal year 2009.10 This would bring the total number of 

C-17s DOD plans to procure to 213. As of July 2009, DOD had taken 

delivery of 190 aircraft. The program is expected to end with the delivery 

of the 213th aircraft in March 2011, at which time the production line 

could be shut down if Boeing does not receive additional international 

orders for the aircraft. The Air Force’s fiscal year 2010 budget includes 

$91.4 million to fund some of the shutdown costs and a DOD official stated 

that additional funding would be included in future budgets. However, 

final shutdown costs have not been negotiated between the Air Force and 

Boeing, the prime contractor. Last year we reported that the Air Force 

estimated the costs to be around $465 million and Boeing’s estimate was 

about $1 billion.11 

Tactical Airlift: C-130 AMP 

Modernization Program 

Has Been Cut and 

Uncertainty Surrounds 

New Programs 

DOD’s tactical airlift investments have also experienced cost and schedule 

fluctuations and continue to experience significant uncertainty. The AMP 

program to modernize the C-130H fleet has been substantially reduced, 

although officials are examining a possible follow-on effort to include 

more aircraft. Procurement quantities for the C-130J have increased to 

replace retiring C-130E models and plans, quantities, and employment 

strategies for the newest tactical aircraft, the C-27J, have yet to be 

finalized following a decision to transfer the joint program entirely to the 

Air Force. Table 3 summarizes changes in cost and quantity for current 

tactical aircraft. The JFTL, expected to augment the C-130 fleets, is in 

concept development and cost and quantity estimates are unavailable. 

 

9

 Title IX of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, provided funds for Air Force 

aircraft procurement. Pub. L. No. 110-252. The Congressional Record related to this 

legislation reflects that both the House of Representatives and the Senate recommended 

$3.6 billion for the Air Force to procure 15 C-17 aircraft. 154 Cong. Rec. H3953, 3971, 3979, 

3981 (daily ed. May 15, 2008) (statement of Rep. Obey); 154 Cong. Rec. S4302, 4329, 4330 

(daily ed. May 19, 2008) (statement of Sen. Byrd). 

10 Title III of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, provided funds for Air Force 

aircraft procurement. Pub. L. No. 111-32. The Conference Report related to this legislation 

reflected $2.17 billion for the Air Force to procure eight C-17 aircraft. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 

111-151, at 93 (2009). 

11 GAO-09-50. 

Page 8 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Table 3: Cost and Quantity Changes for Tactical Airlift Programs 

Total cost 

(then-year dollars in millions) Quantity 

Program acquisition unit cost 

(then-year dollars in millions) 

Initial 

estimate 

Current 

estimate 

(July 2009) 

Percentage 

change

Initial 

estimate

Current 

estimate

(July 2009)

Percentage 

change

Initial 

estimate 

Current 

estimate

(July 

2009)

Percentage 

change

C-130 AMP $3,965 $5,800 46 519 221 -57 $7.6 $26.3 244

C-130J $840 $15,018 1689 11 168 1,427 $76.3 $89.4 17

C-27J $4,088 $1,912 -53 78 38 -51 $52.4 $50.3 -4

Total $8,893 $22,731 156

Source: GAO analysis of DOD selected acquisition reports for the C-130 AMP program. GAO analysis of selected acquisition reports 

for the initial estimates on the C-130J and C-27J programs and Air Force updates for the current estimates. 

Notes: Numbers may not add due to rounding. C-27J current cost estimate does not include military 

construction funding. 

DOD has not yet begun its C-130 AMP production program and has only 

taken delivery of 2 C-27Js as of July 2009. The department has more than 

half of its C-130J acquisitions—95 aircraft—yet to procure. DOD has 

already spent $10.1 billion in RDT&E and procurement funds on these 

programs. Program officials project it will cost about $12.6 billion to 

complete the programs as currently planned (see table 4). 

Table 4: Cost and Quantity Remaining for Tactical Airlift Programs as of July 2009 

Investments 

(then-year dollars in millions) Quantity 

Prior To go Delivered To go

C-130 AMP $1,796 $4,004 3 218

C-130J $7,739 $7,280 73 95

C-27J $584 $1,329 2 36

Total $10,118 $12,613 

Source: GAO analysis of C-130 AMP selected acquisition reports for investments and quantity information. GAO analysis of C-130J 

and C-27J selected acquisition reports for prior investment and quantity information and Air Force updates for to go investment and 

quantity information. 

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. C-130J quantities include orders for all U.S. 

military customers. 

The C-130 AMP entered system development in 2001, but funding 

instability and problems integrating hardware and software, as well as an 

Air Force decision to exclude C-130E aircraft from the program, triggered 

a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach in February 2007. The program was 

subsequently restructured to include far fewer aircraft—221 instead of 

Page 9 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
519—at a cost $1.8 billion greater than the original program estimate. In 

spite of the restructuring, incomplete production decision documentation 

and software integration problems, as well as senior leadership concerns 

about the acquisition strategy, have delayed a low-rate production 

decision by more than a year from the revised baseline—a slip of more 

than 4 years from the initial estimate. As of July 2009, the program was still 

awaiting approval from the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics to award a production contract. The Air Force is considering 

another program restructure as well as a follow-on effort to modernize 

avionics on additional C-130 aircraft, but officials did not provide us an 

estimate of costs and quantities. 

The department is now procuring more C-130J aircraft than originally 

expected, in part because of a decision to retire C-130Es. Production 

quantities for J-model aircraft have grown significantly over the last 

several years, from an initial baseline of 11 aircraft in 1996 to a current 

estimate of 168 aircraft, but according to program estimates, program unit 

costs have remained relatively stable. Program officials estimate a total 

program cost of $15 billion. As of July 2009, 73 C-130Js have been 

delivered. 

Recently, the department took delivery of the first two C-27J airlifters as 

part of the Joint Cargo Aircraft program to provide direct support for 

Army time-sensitive, mission-critical troop resupply. In June of 2007, the 

Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics approved an 

acquisition program baseline for the joint program of 78 aircraft, with the 

Army planning to buy 54 aircraft, and the Air Force 24. However, as part of 

its fiscal year 2010 budget request, the department transferred the 

program, along with the resupply mission it supports, exclusively to the 

Air Force and reduced the program from 78 to 38 aircraft. Air Force 

operational plans for the fleet and employment concepts for meeting Army 

direct support requirements have not been finalized. 

The Army and the Air Force are jointly pursuing the JFTL to replace the 

C-130H airlifter and augment the rest of the C-130 fleet. The joint concept 

development effort was initiated in January 2008 following a decision by 

the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff to merge requirements for separate 

heavy lift efforts in progress at the time. The JFTL is anticipated to have a 

payload capacity of up to 36 tons, with a combat mission radius of 

500 nautical miles. However, the services have different concepts for the 

aircraft. The Army concept is for a vertical take-off and landing tiltrotor 

that could provide sustainment of forces at the point of need and enable 

the maneuver of a mounted force (i.e., forces deployed with combat 

Page 10 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
vehicles) by air. The Air Force is pursuing a fixed wing concept that would 

address the need to operate on short, soft, or rough airfields and the need 

for greater speed. Officials from both services stated they would like to 

have the JFTL initial capabilities document validated and begin work on 

an analysis of alternatives12 in the late summer of 2009, to help ensure a 

sufficient basis for budget deliberations in March 2010. As of July 2009, 

this had not occurred. Documents provided by these officials indicate that 

system development for whichever concept is selected is not expected to 

begin until at least 2014, with the new system to be fielded beginning 

around 2024. 

Additional funds provided by Congress for C-17 procurement more than 

offset the strategic airlift gaps associated with reduced C-5 modernization 

plans. However, there is a potential future gap in tactical airlift capabilities 

for transporting medium weight Army equipment that cannot fit on C-130 

aircraft. The C-17 fleet, in its dual role of providing both strategic and 

tactical airlift, currently provides this capability and is anticipated to 

continue to do so for many years. The JFTL is envisioned to eventually 

replace the C-130H and perform this and other roles, but will not be 

available for 15 years or more under the current acquisition strategy. While 

the various mobility studies acknowledge the C-17s’ significant dual role, 

they did not comprehensively evaluate an expanded future use of the C-17 

for the transport of medium weight equipment and how this could affect 

the force structure, the C-17s’ service life, and when to shut down the C-17 

production line. For example, the studies do not quantify current and 

anticipated future use of the C-17 for tactical airlift. This is because DOD 

officials do not consider the C-17 to be a suitable substitute for the JFTL. 

In addition, there are differing opinions about the transport of small loads 

in direct support of Army units, which could call into question the quantity 

of C-27Js needed to perform the Army mission. Two studies reached 

somewhat different conclusions about the cost effectiveness of using C130Js and C-27Js for this mission. The Air Force and Army are working on 

a plan for how the Air Force will meet Army direct support requirements, 

but the details have not been finalized. DOD’s recently established 

portfolio management structure is supposed to provide a useful forum to 

Strategic Airlift Gap 

Has Been Addressed, 

but a Potential 

Tactical Airlift Gap for 

Moving Medium 

Weight Equipment 

and Other Questions 

Have Not Been 

Resolved 

 

12 The analysis of alternatives is an analytical study that is intended to compare the 

operational effectiveness, cost, and risks of a number of alternative potential solutions to 

address valid needs. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 

Acquisition System Enclosure 2, section 4(c), paragraphs 5 and 6 (Dec. 8, 2008); Interim 

Defense Acquisition Guidebook chapter 3.3.1 (June 15, 2009). 

Page 11 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
address the broad range of airlift investment decisions. However, efforts 

so far have been primarily focused on new programs rather than 

addressing gaps and redundancies across the current portfolio, as well as 

making other airlift decisions, such as when and how many C-5s to retire 

or the appropriate mix of C-130s and C-27Js needed to perform Army 

missions. 

Acquisition of Additional 

C-17s Addresses Strategic 

Airlift Gap 

Following DOD’s decision to reduce the number of C-5s that will be fully 

modernized from 111 to 52 aircraft, Congress has appropriated around 

$5.5 billion that DOD plans to use to procure up to 23 additional C-17s. 

This would bring the total number of C-17s the Air Force now plans to 

acquire to 213 aircraft. DOD and Air Force officials believe this current 

quantity of C-17s more than adequately addresses their strategic airlift 

requirements in terms of the number of aircraft needed and the collective 

delivery capabilities. Table 5 shows the changes in the strategic airlift mix 

since the time the 2005 Mobility Capabilities Study was completed and the 

impact the different mixes have had on DOD’s ability to meet strategic 

airlift requirements for the timely inter-theater transport of required 

equipment and supplies. 

Table 5: Changes in Strategic Airlift Force Structure and Capabilities 

December 2005 September 2006 February 2008 June 2008 June 2009 

Event Mobility Capability 

Study released 

Congressional 

appropriation for 

additional C-17s 

C-5 RERP program 

is restructured 

Congressional 

appropriation for 

additional C-17s 

Congressional 

appropriation for 

additional C-17s 

Number of C-17s 180 190 190 205 213 

Number of C-5s 112 fully modernized 112 fully modernized 59 avionics only 

52 fully modernized 

59 avionics only 

52 fully modernized 

59 avionics only 

52 fully modernized

Estimated million 

ton-miles per day 

capability 

33.09 33.95 32.17 33.79 34.79 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD budget and program data. 

Note: The million ton-mile measure is a common metric included in prior capability studies that 

describes the daily capacity of a specified fleet of strategic airlifters. 

A recent IDA study concluded that 316 strategic airlifters, which include 

205 C-17s, 52 fully modernized C-5s, and 59 partially modernized C-5s, 

meets DOD’s strategic airlift requirements established in the 2005 Mobility 

Page 12 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Capability Study. 13 Further, if additional airlift capacity is needed above 

what the current mix of aircraft can deliver, it could be achieved without 

procuring additional C-17s or modernizing C-5s. Specifically, IDA found 

that additional capacity could be obtained by 

• using C-5s at Emergency Wartime Planning levels 

• transporting some small oversize as well as bulk cargo using Civil Reserve 

Air Fleet aircraft 

• making use of host nation airlifters to the maximum extent possible and 

• using tankers not involved in tanker missions to carry cargo in theater. 

In the event that even more capacity is needed, the IDA study states that it 

would be more cost-effective to provide the RERP modification to more 

C-5s than to procure additional C-17s because the near-term acquisition 

costs are offset by reduced operation and support costs. IDA also 

concluded that retiring older C-5As to free up funds to buy and operate 

more C-17s would result in a less capable force at comparable overall cost 

and thus would not be cost-effective. 

Potential Tactical Airlift 

Gap Exists in Movement of 

Medium Weight Equipment 

on the Battlefield 

A potential future capability gap exists in the deployment and 

redeployment of Army medium weight weapon systems within a theater of 

combat. The C-17 is the only aircraft currently capable of transporting 

heavier equipment, such as combat configured armored Strykers and Mine 

Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, within a theater of operations as 

these are too large and bulky for C-130s to carry. However, the C-17 

cannot transport this equipment into austere, short, or unimproved landing 

areas. DOD’s long-term plan is to use the JFTL, the planned C-130H 

replacement, to transport these vehicles in theater, including to such 

access-challenged locations. However, it will not be available for at least 

15 years as currently planned. While the various mobility studies 

acknowledge the C-17 can perform both strategic and tactical airlift 

missions, none of the three recently completed or ongoing studies 

comprehensively considered the C-17 in the tactical force structure, even 

though about 20 percent of the tactical sorties flown by the C-17 fleet in 

fiscal year 2007 were for missions where loads were too large for C-130s. 

As such, DOD has not evaluated the impact the increasing tactical heavy 

lift mission will have on future tactical airlift requirements, the C-17’s 

service life, its availability to perform strategic airlift and other tactical 

 

13 Institute for Defense Analyses, Study on Size and Mix of Airlift Force, February 2009. 

Page 13 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
airlift missions, and the impact it could have on C-17 production shutdown 

plans. 

DOD officials do not believe that the C-17 is a suitable substitute for the 

JFTL mission. A DOD official stated that preliminary results of the 

Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 show that in the worst 

case planning scenario there would be enough C-17s to perform its 

primary role as a strategic airlifter, as well as some tactical missions 

through 2016. This is because the study analysis shows the peak demand 

for the C-17 and the C-130 occurs at different times and the C-17 is aging as 

planned. However, officials indicated that none of the current mobility 

studies analyzed the need for the C-17 to perform additional tactical heavy 

lift missions for the 8-year period between 2016 and 2024, when the JFTL 

is expected to be fielded. Furthermore, because we were not granted 

access to the preliminary study information, we could not ascertain the 

extent to which the C-17’s heavy lift mission had been considered in DOD’s 

analysis through 2016. C-17 production is scheduled to end in March 2011. 

As we previously reported a well-reasoned, near-term decision on the final 

C-17 fleet size could help DOD avoid substantial future costs from ending 

production prematurely and later restarting production. 14 For example, the 

Air Force has estimated that restoring the production line could cost $2 

billion. Costs and challenges associated with such a course include hiring 

and training a workforce of nearly 3,100 people, reinstalling and restoring 

production tooling, and identifying suppliers and qualifying their parts and 

processes. 

Although it is too early to comment on JFTL program outcomes, we 

believe DOD officials will need to exercise caution to avoid pitfalls we 

have previously identified in connection with developing new weapon 

systems so the new system will be delivered on time and within cost 

estimates.15 These pitfalls include taking a revolutionary versus an 

evolutionary approach for weapon system development, over promising 

performance capabilities; increasing requirements; and understating 

expected costs, schedules, and risks associated with developing and 

producing the weapon. DOD understands many of the problems that affect 

acquisition programs and has revised its acquisition policy as a foundation 

 

14 GAO-09-50. 

15 GAO, Defense Acquisition: DOD Must Balance Its Needs with Available Resources and 

Follow an Incremental Approach to Acquiring Weapon Systems, GAO-09-431T 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2009). 

Page 14 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
for establishing sound, knowledge-based business cases for individual 

acquisition programs.16 For example, the policy recommends the 

completion of key systems engineering activities before the start of 

development, including a requirement for early prototyping, and 

establishes review boards to evaluate the effect of potential requirements 

changes on ongoing programs. The policy also supports evolutionary 

acquisitions and states that increments should be fully funded, include 

mature technologies, and normally be developed in less than 5 years. 

However, to improve outcomes, DOD must ensure that its policy changes 

are consistently implemented and reflected in decisions on individual 

programs. 

Both Air Force and Army science and technology officials indicated that 

no new technology invention is needed for either of their concepts. 

However, tiltrotor technology has never been applied to a system of the 

size needed to carry all the Army’s ground vehicles (excluding the M-1 

tank). In fact, the Army envisions the JFTL’s payload capacity will be 

nearly 5 times that of the V-22, the world’s first production tiltrotor aircraft 

and nearly 3 times that of the CH-47 Chinook, a heavy lift helicopter used 

to transport ground forces, supplies, and other critical cargo. In addition, 

the Senate Armed Services Committee recently noted that to support the 

JFTL initial operational capability, a prototype would need to be flying by 

2015.17 Yet, the committee could not identify any DOD funds budgeted for 

accomplishing this objective, and further observed that waiting to conduct 

a competitive prototyping effort as part of an acquisition program would 

take years to begin. As such, the committee requested the Under Secretary 

for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to, among other things, assess 

the merits of initiating a low-cost, highly streamlined competitive 

prototyping effort immediately, determine whether cost and performance 

goals can be met, help define requirements, and sustain the industrial base. 

 

16 Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 

2003); Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 

System (Dec. 8, 2008). 

17 S. Rep. No. 111-35, at 52-54 (2009). 

Page 15 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Questions remain about the number of C-130s and C-27Js needed to 

support Army direct support missions. As stated earlier, as part of its 

fiscal year 2010 budget request, the department transferred the C-27J 

program, along with the resupply mission it supports, exclusively to the 

Air Force and reduced the program from 78 to 38 aircraft. In a recent 

hearing, congressional leaders questioned the Secretary of Defense about 

how the Air Force will fulfill this mission with fewer aircraft than initially 

anticipated.18 In response, the Secretary of Defense stated that the 

reduced number of C-27Js was based on the number needed to recapitalize 

the Army’s fleet of C-23 Sherpas and that uncommitted C-130 aircraft can 

be used to complement the C-27Js to fulfill the Army’s mission. In addition, 

he said there needs to be a change in the Air Force’s culture with respect 

to how the direct support mission is accomplished. 

Mix of C-130s and C-27Js 

Needed to Support Army 

Missions Has Not Been 

Determined 

The Air Force and Army are in the process of developing plans on how the 

Air Force intends to fulfill the direct support mission, which would include 

important decisions on employment concepts, basing, and life-cycle 

support. The plans are in various stages of development and are expected 

to be completed by October 2012. However, congressional concerns 

remain regarding the service’s commitment to that mission. This concern 

is based on historical instances in which the Air Force assigned lesser 

priority to direct delivery missions compared with traditional airlift 

operations, most notably during the Vietnam War when the Air Force 

assumed ownership of the Army’s C-7 Caribou aircraft and subsequently 

dropped some missions. It is also unclear what effect this program change 

will have on the Air Force’s C-130 fleet operations. 

In recent studies, IDA and RAND assessed the use and roles of the C-130s 

and C-27Js in performing tactical missions. Although the study parameters 

were different, they both looked at the tactical movement of cargo. IDA’s 

analysis focused on the use of these aircraft within the context of major 

combat operations as well as persistent global involvement in numerous 

smaller operations. IDA found that the tactical fleets they examined were 

equally cost-effective at transporting cargo in major combat operations. 

Whereas C-130s are more cost effective than the C-27Js in specific 

missions that demand full loads, the opposite is true when missions 

require small loads. Further, in non-major combat operations, IDA found 

 

18 Department of Defense Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2010: Hearing Before the H. 

Armed Services Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statements of Rep. Bartlett, Ranking Member, 

H. Armed Services Comm., and Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense). 

Page 16 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
that the global demand for small loads on numbers of aircraft in different 

locations made additional C-27Js more cost-effective than additional C130s. 

According to RAND officials, RAND work on this topic has been underway 

for several years. The first RAND study focused on determining the most 

cost-effective way to recapitalize the C-130 fleet in order to meet the 

official wartime requirement. This study concluded that acquisition of the 

extended version of the C-130J was the most cost effective option to 

perform tactical missions defined in the officially approved wartime 

requirement. The C-27J provides about 40 percent of the cargo capacity 

(in terms of pallets) as the extended C-130J at about two-thirds the cost, 

based on net present value total life cycle costs. In addition, the study also 

concluded that the extended C-130J and the C-27J were equally costeffective at conducting the ongoing resupply missions in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. RAND was then asked to consider the cost-effectiveness of 

the C-27J in eight additional missions that were not part of the official 

requirement. The study concluded that the C-27J was not cost-effective or 

appropriate for five of those missions and was comparable to the C-130J in 

three of the missions. RAND also found that the C-130J and the C-27J have 

comparable performance under operationally consistent circumstances of 

delivering the same amount of cargo at the same distances. 

It should be noted that neither of these studies addressed recent C-27J 

program decisions that resulted in the transfer of the program to the Air 

Force and a reduction in aircraft quantities. Likewise, neither of the 

studies considered the number of C-130s that may be necessary to 

supplement these missions or the impact the missions may have on the 

C-130 fleet. Furthermore, because the C-27J was not initially considered 

part of the common user pool, the ongoing DOD Mobility Capabilities and 

Requirements Study 2016 did not include the C-27J in the common user 

pool in its analysis. Following the restructuring, an Air Force official told 

us that, while the C-27J’s primary use is expected to be for direct support 

of the Army, it would also be available for movement of cargo in the 

common user pool. 

Page 17 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
In September 2008, the department instituted a new process for helping 

senior leaders make investment decisions, including those for airlift. 19 

Known as capability portfolio management, the new process enables the 

department to develop and manage capabilities, as opposed to simply 

individual programs, and enhance the integration and interoperability 

within and across sets of capabilities. Previously we reported that leading 

commercial companies use portfolio management to collectively address 

all of their respective investments from an enterprise level rather than as 

independent and unrelated initiatives.20 This approach, among other 

things, allows the companies to weigh the relative costs, benefits, and 

risks of potential new products and helps the companies balance near- and 

future-term market opportunities. 

New Portfolio 

Management Initiative 

Offers Opportunities to 

Better Manage Airlift 

Investments 

According to DOD officials, airlift issues fall under the purview of the 

logistics portfolio and are included in the deployment and distribution 

subgroup, along with sealift and ground transportation. Figure 1 shows the 

major capability areas included in the logistics portfolio. 

Figure 1: DOD Logistics Portfolio Management Structure 

Source: DOD.

Logistics portfolio

Deployment and 

distribution

Logistic

services Supply Maintain

Installation and 

support

Force health 

protection Engineering Operational contract support

The new capability portfolio management directive states that DOD shall 

use capability portfolio management to advise the Deputy Secretary of 

 

19 Department of Defense Directive 7045.20, Capability Portfolio Management (Sept. 25, 

2008). 

20 GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System 

Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-388 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 30, 2007). 

Page 18 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Defense and the heads of DOD components on how to optimize capability 

investments across the defense enterprise and minimize risk in meeting 

the department’s capability need in support of strategy. The Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the 

Commander of U.S. Transportation Command share responsibilities for 

managing the logistics portfolio. They are expected to identify airlift 

issues, priorities, and capability resources and mismatches (gaps, 

shortfalls, and redundancies). According to officials that assist with 

logistics capability portfolio management activities, logistics portfolio 

managers now have access to the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group that 

they may not have had access to before to discuss unresolved logistics 

issues, including the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

We believe portfolio management offers DOD an opportunity to address 

the full range of airlift issues, but DOD’s implementation thus far has not 

had a big impact on the way airlift assets are managed. Officials we spoke 

with stated that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics and U.S. Transportation Command continue to 

focus on activities they were already performing prior to the establishment 

of the portfolio, mainly concerned with new weapon system programs and 

future capabilities but not as much on modification programs on legacy 

aircraft. For example, the U.S. Transportation Command has been and 

continues to be responsible for developing an integrated priorities list that 

details the top new capabilities needed and identifying capability gaps and 

shortfalls for airlift. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics continues to play an advisory role for addressing 

these gaps and shortfalls. 

Officials stated that to date, the logistics portfolio managers have not 

provided input to recent or upcoming airlift decisions related to the 

appropriate mix of strategic and tactical airlifters, changes in 

modernization programs, C-5 retirements, C-17 production shutdown, and 

changes in the Air Force’s roles and missions for airlift. In addition, no 

airlift issues have been brought to the working group for resolution. Given 

this approach, we believe the department is still at risk of continuing to 

develop and acquire new airlift systems and modernization programs 

without knowing whether adequate resources are available to complete 

programs within cost and schedule estimates. 

Growing fiscal pressures are forcing DOD leaders to look closely at 

weapon system investments. DOD has to make tough investment and Conclusions 

Page 19 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
programmatic decisions regarding strategic and tactical airlift in the near 

future. However, the path forward is not clear because recently completed 

and ongoing mobility studies lack some crucial information that would 

help department officials make sound airlift investment decisions. Namely, 

the studies do not quantitatively account for the increasing tactical role of 

the C-17, especially in light of the fact that C-130s are not capable of 

delivering heavier equipment demanded by our warfighters and that the 

JFTL, which is envisioned to perform this mission, will not be available for 

15 years. Further, the studies do not explore the possible use of C-27Js in a 

common user role or the impact on the fleet and number of C-130s needed 

to support Army time-sensitive, mission-critical requirements. 

While Congress and DOD appear to have addressed the strategic airlift 

capability gap, some fundamental questions remain: Can the Air Force 

adequately fund the C-5 RERP modification program over the next 

5 years? When should C-5s be retired and how many? And how many C-5s 

would need the AMP modification if some of the aircraft are retired? Even 

larger questions exist for tactical airlift: Are 213 C-17s enough to perform 

both strategic and tactical missions? What are the potential impacts on C17 service life, maintenance, and availability from its expected increased 

use in the future for the tactical airlift of heavier and bulkier Army 

equipment? How will the Air Force meet the Army’s time-sensitive 

mission-critical requirements with 40 fewer C-27J aircraft? Will there be a 

fundamental shift in the Air Force’s roles and mission that would require 

the Air Force to assume more Army-specific missions? Can the department 

set technically realistic requirements for the JFTL and follow an 

evolutionary acquisition strategy that includes selecting mature 

technologies, normally developing increments in less than 5 years and fully 

funding each increment? 

More information is needed to help the department address these 

questions and avoid the unnecessary expenditure of billions of dollars on 

redundant capabilities or a potentially premature C-17 production line 

shutdown. The airlift portfolio management team has the requisite 

authority to address these questions and influence budget decisions, but 

greater attention must be paid to all facets of the airlift life cycle—from 

cradle to grave. Making sound modernization and retirement decisions is 

just as important as deciding when and what type of new programs to 

start. Moreover, approaching these decisions from a portfolio perspective 

rather than on a weapon system by weapon system basis and considering 

new roles and missions for the Air Force may help the department strike 

the right balance for its airlift investments. 

Page 20 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
We are making five recommendations to help improve DOD’s management 

of strategic and tactical airlift assets. We recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct 

• the portfolio management team, consisting of U.S. Transportation 

Command and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics, to provide more comprehensive advice to senior leaders on 

the full range of airlift investment decisions, including new program starts, 

modernization efforts, and retirement decisions. This would also include 

identifying alternatives for using existing common user aircraft to meet 

service-specific missions and considering new roles and missions for the 

Air Force; 

• the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation) and Commander, U.S. Transportation Command to develop a 

specific airlift plan that would identify when C-5s will be retired and 

identify the total number of additional C-17s, if any, that would be needed 

to replace C-5s or perform tactical heavy lift missions until the time the 

JFTL is fielded; 

• the Commander, Air Mobility Command, to determine the appropriate mix 

of C-27Js and C-130s that are needed to meet Army time-sensitive, missioncritical requirements and common user pool requirements; 

• the Air Force and Army to reach agreement on plans detailing how Army 

time-sensitive, mission-critical requirements will be addressed and 

prioritized against other Air Force priorities; and 

• the joint Air Force and Army program office to develop a plan to follow an 

evolutionary approach for developing the JFTL based on DOD acquisition 

policy that includes selecting mature technologies, normally developing 

increments in less than 5 years, and fully funding each increment. 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report; these 

are included in appendix II. DOD partially concurred with all five 

recommendations, stating that it either has plans and processes in place or 

ongoing efforts to address our concerns. During the course of our review, 

DOD officials explained the steps they were taking to make strategic and 

tactical airlift decisions, but in some cases did not provide us with 

supporting documentation and, in other cases, the plans were in the initial 

stages of development and there was not yet sufficient detail for us to 

determine the extent to which they addressed our concerns. Despite the 

positive actions DOD described, we believe that the department’s efforts 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 21 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
in some cases still fall short and that our recommendations are warranted 

to help guide subsequent actions and transition plans to effective 

implementation. DOD officials also provided technical comments on our 

draft and we revised our report where appropriate. 

In response to our first recommendation about the portfolio management 

team providing more comprehensive advice to senior leaders on the full 

range of investment decisions, DOD says it has a structured process in 

place for assessing its mobility capabilities and requirements that includes 

strategic and tactical airlift decisions. We understand that DOD has a 

process in place to make airlift decisions, but they are not being made 

from a comprehensive portfolio management perspective, per DOD 

regulation. DOD officials could not provide us with any evidence that the 

portfolio management team had even discussed airlift issues from a 

portfolio perspective, even though the logistics portfolio began as a pilot 

program for portfolio management 2 years ago. We believe DOD portfolio 

managers need to take a broader perspective on airlift issues to ensure 

that the appropriate amount of attention and resources are available to 

address the most pressing issues for new and legacy programs and to 

avoid unnecessary expenditure of funds for modernizations or 

acquisitions. Therefore, we do not believe that DOD’s response adequately 

addresses our recommendation. 

The department agreed with our second recommendation on the need to 

develop a plan for strategic airlift that identifies the number of C-5s that 

will be retired and the number of additional C-17s, if any that might be 

needed. In its comments, DOD stated that the Secretary of the Air Force, 

in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation) and U.S. Transportation Command 

has already developed this plan based on the current level of 

congressional funding for the C-17 and preliminary results of the Mobility 

Capabilities Requirements Study 2016 and the Quadrennial Defense 

Review. Specifically, DOD officials believe an adequate number of C-17s 

have been procured to cover all necessary missions to satisfy the National 

Defense Strategy and will retire some C-5s. We were not provided any 

details about this plan for strategic airlift, the ongoing mobility study or 

the Quadrennial Defense Review to comment on the adequacy of the 

analysis, but believe that a thorough analysis is needed for senior leaders 

to make sound investment decisions. We are concerned about the 

adequacy of the plan because during the course of our review, DOD 

officials told us that the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016 

does not specifically quantify the use of the C-17 in a tactical role or 

evaluate the impact on its service life resulting from the increased use in 

Page 22 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
that regard. In 2007, over 20 percent of the C-17 missions were for tactical 

missions and this could grow given that it is the only aircraft that is 

capable of moving certain types of equipment within a theater of 

operations that are too large or bulky for the C-130. Further, it is unclear 

whether DOD has identified how many C-5s need the AMP modification 

since additional C-17s are being procured or when and how many C-5s will 

be retired. In addition, we previously reported on deficiencies in how DOD 

conducted its previous mobility capabilities study and we do not know if 

DOD has addressed these flaws in the current study.21 As a result, we do 

not know the extent to which the new study will provide clear answers for 

senior leaders regarding strategic and tactical airlift or engender more 

questions. 

DOD commented that it believes it has fulfilled the requirements for our 

third and fourth recommendations by recently tasking the Air Force and 

Army to determine the appropriate mix of C-27Js and C-130s to perform 

Army time-sensitive, mission-critical requirements and common user pool 

requirements, as well as develop plans detailing how Army requirements 

will be prioritized against Air Force priorities. These are good first steps. 

However, the plans are still in development and, according to an Air Force 

briefing to the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group, more work needs to be 

done. Critical details, including a concept for employment, a final basing 

plan, and a decision on the maintenance concept will have to be worked 

out over the next several years. These issues have also generated much 

debate within the department and in Congress concerning aircraft 

quantities and employment strategies. As we stated earlier, the Air Force 

has historically had trouble balancing Army priorities with its own and, 

according to the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force will need to change 

its culture to successfully meet both requirements. In addition to 

completing the plans, we believe DOD may need to exert sustained 

oversight by senior leaders, including the portfolio management team, to 

ensure the Air Force is able to perform these missions over the long-term. 

Finally, DOD believes that it has fulfilled the requirement for our fifth 

recommendation related to using an evolutionary approach for developing 

the JFTL that includes selecting mature technologies, developing 

increments in less than 5 years, and fully funding each increment. DOD 

 

21 GAO, Defense Transportation: Study Limitations Raise Questions about the Adequacy 

and Completeness of the Mobility Capabilities Study and Report, GAO-06-938 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2006). 

Page 23 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
stated that the Air Force and Army are currently engaged in approving a 

JFTL initial capabilities document and commencing with a formal analysis 

of alternatives to consider all viable options for addressing capability gaps. 

We believe these start-up actions are appropriate and, if accomplished 

according to policy, should provide a solid foundation to inform 

subsequent decisions for a new weapon system acquisition program. Our 

recommendation, however, is geared not only to these initial planning 

steps but also looking forward to the smooth transition to system 

development and effective acquisition program management. This 

recommendation will take several steps and years to complete, and we 

believe senior leaders, including the portfolio management team, need to 

ensure that the JFTL program has a solid business case at the start of 

development with mature technologies, adequate funding, and an 

incremental plan for development. Our previous work on many other 

weapon systems programs22 has shown that without these, programs are 

likely to encounter significant cost and schedule growth that will, if 

realized on the JFTL program, impact the department’s ability to move 

medium weight equipment within a theater of operations directly to the 

warfighter. It may also have an impact on the C-17 program as these 

aircraft may be used more frequently than planned for tactical missions. 

We therefore believe that DOD will need to take additional steps to be 

fully responsive to this recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and 

interested congressional committees. The report is also available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, 

please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

 

22 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Charting a Course for Lasting Reform, GAO-09-663T 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2009). 

Page 24 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were Bruce 

Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Cheryl Andrew; Marvin Bonner; Andrew 

Michael Sullivan 

Redd; Kristine Heuwinkel; and Robert Swierczek. 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 25 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: A S

Tacti

Efforts 

ummary of Strategic and 

cal Airlift Systems—Ongoing and Future 

Page 26 GAO-10-67 

Appendix I: A Summary of Strategic and 

Tactical Airlift Systems—Ongoing and Future 

Efforts 

This appendix provides more details on strategic and tactical airlift new 

and modernization programs to expand upon summary information 

provided in the body of this report. We include a brief description of each 

aircraft’s mission, program status, and our observations on upcoming 

program decisions. Where applicable, we highlight our recent work on 

some systems. The appendix also includes a funding table for each 

aircraft. Because the fiscal year 2010 budget did not include funding 

projections beyond fiscal year 2010, we used information from the Fiscal 

Year 2010 Defense Budget for funding data related to fiscal years 2008 

through 2010 and the Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Budget for fiscal years 2011 

through 2013 when possible. Since the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and 

Reengining Program (RERP) and C-27J programs were restructured, we 

relied on information from the Air Force for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 

data. The budget information in each table is expressed in current (then 

year) dollars and the totals may not add exactly because of rounding.

Strategic Airlifters The Department of Defense (DOD) uses a mix of modernized C-5s, which 

were manufactured 30 to 40 years ago, and newer C-17s to complete the 

strategic airlift mission. Both strategic airlifters possess intercontinental 

range with aerial refueling and can carry weapons and equipment too large 

for any other DOD aircraft. Each also has some complementary 

characteristics that favor a mixed fleet. The larger C-5 can carry more 

cargo than the C-17 and is the only aircraft capable of handling some 

equipment, such as the Army’s 74-ton mobile scissors bridge. The C-17 is 

more modern, has a higher mission capable rate,1

 and is more flexible in 

that it also provides tactical airlift to forward-deployed bases. Figure 2 

compares the two strategic airlifters. 

 

1

 DOD uses mission capable rate as a measure of an aircraft’s readiness to perform at least 

one assigned mission. 

 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix I: A Summary of Strategic and 

Tactical Airlift Systems—Ongoing and Future 

Efforts 

Figure 2: Comparison of C-5 and C-17 Capabilities and Characteristics 

C-5 C-17

Loads 270,000 pounds of cargo

(36 pallets)

81 troops

170,900 pounds of cargo

(18 pallets)

102 troops

Wingspan 223 feet 170 feet

Length 247 feet 174 feet

Maximum take-off weight 840,000 pounds 585,000 pounds

Range 6,320 miles (unrefueled)

Unlimited (air refueled)

2,700 miles (unrefueled)

Unlimited (air refueled)

Speed 518 mph 572 mph

Minimum runway length 6,000 feet 3,500 feet

Crew 7 3

Mission capable rate (2008) 52 percent 86 percent

Cost per flying hour (2008) $20,947 $12,014

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data; graphics by Lockheed Martin Corporation.

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C-5 Galaxy Figure 3: C-5 Galaxy 

Source: U.S. Air Force photo/Jason Minto.

Mission The C-5 is one of the largest aircraft in the world and is used by DOD for 

strategic airlift purposes. It can carry outsize and oversize cargo over 

intercontinental ranges and can take off or land in relatively short 

distances. With aerial refueling, the aircraft’s range is limited only by crew 

endurance. The C-5 can carry nearly all of the Army’s combat equipment, 

including large heavy items such as the 74-ton mobile scissors bridge. 

Ground crews can load and off-load the C-5 simultaneously at the front 

and rear cargo openings. The landing gear system permits lowering of the 

parked aircraft so the cargo floor is at truck bed height to facilitate vehicle 

loading and unloading. 

Program Status The Air Force acquired a total of 126 C-5s in two production batches. 

Aircraft designated C-5A were built between 1969 and 1974 and given new 

wings in the 1980s.2

 Aircraft designated C-5B were built in a second 

production run in the 1980s. Since then, the Air Force has retired 14 C-5As 

and 1 C-5B crashed, leaving a total of 111 C-5 aircraft (60 C-5As, 49 C-5Bs, 

and 2 C-5Cs). 

In 1999, the Air Force began modernizing its C-5 aircraft. Modifications are 

intended to improve operational capability while improving flight safety, 

 

2

 Two C-5As were later modified to carry National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

components and other outsized cargo and were re-designated C-5Cs. 

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reliability, and maintainability. The two primary modifications are as 

follows3

• The Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), which upgrades capabilities, 

including Global Air Traffic Management, navigation and safety 

equipment, modern digital equipment, and an all-weather flight control 

system. 

• The Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), which 

replaces engines and modifies over 70 electrical, fuel, and other 

subsystems. 

Together, these two upgrades were expected to improve the fleet’s 

wartime mission capable rate to at least 75 percent, thereby increasing 

payload capability and transportation throughput, and to reduce total 

ownership costs over the life cycle through 2040 by about $14 billion in 

2008 dollars.4

DOD initially expected to spend about $12 billion on the C-5 AMP and 

RERP efforts. However, both modernization efforts experienced cost and 

schedule problems since going into development. AMP development costs 

increased by approximately 20 percent and would have been higher had 

the Air Force not reduced requirements and deferred some development 

activities to other programs. Officials waived 14 operational requirements 

and deferred the correction of 250 deficiencies identified during testing, 

many of which will be addressed and funded in RERP or future efforts. In 

addition, the C-5 RERP experienced a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach. The 

program was restructured and the Air Force now plans to RERP 52 

aircraft—47 C-5 B aircraft, both C-5 Cs, and 3 aircraft that had already 

been modified during system development and demonstration (two C-5Bs 

and one C-5A). While the Air Force is expected to spend $3.4 billion (thenyear dollars) less under the restructured RERP program, ultimately, less 

than one-half of the aircraft will be modernized and at a much higher unit 

cost than originally estimated—$160.5 million for both modifications 

 

3

 Other modifications include replacing Aft crown skins, the on-board monitoring system, 

and floor panels and troop compartments impacted by corrosion; installing the Large 

Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures System and other defensive systems; and updating 

trainer configurations. 

4

 According to DOD, throughput is defined as the amount of work that can be performed or 

the amount of output that can be produced by a system or component in a given period of 

time. For airlifters, it refers to the amount of freight or passengers that can be carried by an 

aircraft during a specified time period. 

Page 29 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
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versus $96.1 million originally estimated in then-year dollars. DOD now 

expects that the C-5 AMP modification of 112 aircraft and the C-5 RERP 

modification of 52 aircraft will reduce total ownership costs over the life 

cycle through 2040 by about $8.9 billion base year 2000 dollars. 

According to program officials, as of July 2009, 55 of the C-5s have 

received the AMP modification. The last B model received the 

modification in August 2009. All focus is now on the A models. Many of 

the deficiencies found during testing have been corrected. Other 

deficiencies and waivers will be addressed in the RERP program or a 

planned block upgrade that is slated to begin in fiscal year 2010. According 

to program officials, only 3 C-5 aircraft used during systems development 

and demonstration have received the RERP modification thus far. The first 

production aircraft will enter modification in August 2009. The Air Force 

has received low rate initial production approval for the first 3 lots, 

totaling 9 aircraft. The full rate production decision is scheduled for 

December 2010. 

GAO Observations It is unclear whether the Air Force is going to adequately fund the 

restructured C-5 RERP program because the fiscal year 2010 budget does 

not include funding details for the program through 2015. Further, 

program officials could only comment on the fiscal year 2010 budget. On 

the basis of the fiscal year 2009 budget however, DOD’s Cost Analysis 

Improvement Group concluded that the restructured C-5 RERP program 

was underfunded by about $294 million then-year dollars across the 

Future Years Defense Plan for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. 

Approximately $250 million then-year dollars less is needed in fiscal years 

2009 through 2011, and $544 million then-year dollars more is needed in 

fiscal years 2012 and 2013. DOD officials stated that if the budget is not 

sufficient to meet agreed-upon quantities, then anticipated price breaks 

would not occur, resulting in increased cost to the program and 

government. 

In June 2009, the Air Force was granted authority by Congress to begin 

retiring C-5A aircraft.5

 Air Mobility Command officials told us that fiscal 

and personnel demands require that the command limit overall fleet size 

once warfighting risk is reduced to a reasonable level. Therefore, the Air 

Mobility Command will consider retiring C-5s, as the law and requirements 

 

5

 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 311 (2009). 

Page 30 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
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allow, on a one-for-one basis after 205 C-17s have been procured, to 

ensure the right combination of aircraft and capability is balanced against 

cost and risk. According to program officials, operational testing for an A 

model will take place between October 2009 and January 2010. The final 

report will be issued in July 2010. A decision on whether and when to 

retire C-5s will not likely be made until after the Mobility Capabilities and 

Requirements Study 2016 has been completed. 

If DOD decides to retire C-5A aircraft, it may not need to provide the AMP 

modification to all of its C-5 fleet. The Air Force plans to have 40 of the 60 

C-5A AMP modification kits on contract by the end of 2009 and at least 8 

C-5A models will have actually received the modification by that time. 

Table 6: C-5 Funding 

Then-year dollars in millions 

FY 2009 budget 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

C-5 AMP 

 RDT&E $10.2 $4.2 $3.9 $0 $0 $0

 Modification $84.4 $94.9 $79.9 $75.3 $77.5 $75.3

 Total C-5 AMP $94.6 $99.1 $83.8 $75.3 $77.5 $75.3

C-5 RERP 

 RDT&E $163.8 $122.9 $71.7 $35.6 $15.6 $0

 Modification $148 $280.1 $502.3 $891.4 $1,154.6 $1242.7

Total C-5 RERP $311.8 $403 $574 $927 $1,170.2 $1,242.7

Other programs $60.5 $126 $101.9 $6.2 $6.4 $6.5

Total $466.8 $628.1 $759.7 $1,008.5 $1,254.1 $1,324.5

Source: For fiscal years 2008-2010, DOD’s Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget; for fiscal years 2011-2013, DOD’s Fiscal Year 2009 

President’s Budget for AMP and Other programs and the June 2008 Selected Acquisition Report for RERP. Numbers may not add due 

to rounding. 

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C-17 Globemaster Figure 4: C-17 Globemaster 

Source: C-17 Program Office.

Mission The C-17 is a multi-engine, turbofan, wide-body aircraft that improves the 

overall capability of the United States Air Force to rapidly project, 

reinforce, and sustain combat forces worldwide. It is used by DOD for 

both strategic and tactical missions. For example, the C-17 is capable of 

rapid strategic delivery of troops and all types of cargo to main operating 

bases or directly to forward bases in the deployment area. The aircraft can 

perform tactical airlift and airdrop missions and can also transport 

ambulatory patients during aeromedical evacuations when required. The 

inherent flexibility and performance of the C-17 force improve the ability 

of the total airlift system to fulfill the worldwide air mobility requirements 

of the United States. 

Program Status The Air Force originally planned to procure 120 C-17s, with the last one 

being delivered in November 2004. The Air Force’s current plans are to 

acquire a total of 213 C-17s for $68 billion, with the last one being 

delivered in March 2011. The Air Force has taken delivery of 190 aircraft 

through July 2009. This includes one aircraft that is dedicated to provide 

airlift capability to a consortium of European nations, effectively setting 

the Air Force’s operational force at 212. 

The Air Force has a number of ongoing improvement efforts for the C-17, 

including 

• improving C-17 airdrop system operations, 

• integrating an advanced situational awareness and countermeasures 

system, 

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Efforts 

• upgrading mission planning by integrating a new joint precision airdrop 

system, 

• replacing the core integrated computer processor, and 

• providing advanced defensive capability. 

GAO Observations In recent years, the two prominent issues surrounding the C-17 program 

have been determining how many C-17s are needed to meet strategic airlift 

requirements as well as determining when to begin shutting down the C-17 

production line. Following a C-5 RERP restructuring in 2008, the U.S. 

Transportation Command identified a need for 205 C-17s, 25 more than 

were authorized at the time the 2005 Mobility Capabilities Study was 

completed. Subsequent to the study, Congress provided additional funding 

that the Air Force used to procure 10 more C-17s in 2007, 15 more in 2008, 

and 8 more in 2009, bringing the total that will now be procured to 213. 

According to Air Mobility Command officials, the command will consider 

retiring C-5s, as the law and requirements allow, on a one-for-one basis 

after 205 C-17s have been procured, to ensure the right combination of 

aircraft and capability is balanced against cost and risk. 

According to program officials, a decision when to shut down the C-17 

production line along with the associated costs has not been finalized. In 

our November 2008 report we reported that plans called for the C-17 

production line to shut down in September 2010.6

 This was based on the 

Air Force acquiring 205 aircraft. Now that the Air Force will be acquiring 

213 aircraft, the last delivery is now expected to be in March 2011. We also 

reported that the total cost to shut down the line has not been determined. 

The Air Force estimated the costs to shut down production to be $465 

million whereas Boeing (the prime contractor) estimated $1 billion. 

Officials reported that while the Air Force and Boeing continue to 

negotiate the final cost to shut down the C-17 production line, the Air 

Force did include $91 million in its fiscal year 2010 President’s budget 

submission to begin these activities. 

According to a DOD official, the C-17s are currently being employed to fill 

a capability gap existing in the department’s ability to airlift mediumweight vehicles within a theater of operations using dedicated tactical 

airlifters. DOD officials do not consider the C-17 to be a viable long-term 

 

6

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and Requirements 

Are Needed to Define Optimal Future Strategic Airlift Mix, GAO-09-50 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 21, 2008). 

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solution as it cannot access short, austere, or unimproved landing areas in 

close proximity to combat operations. The JFTL is expected to provide 

this long-term solution; however, the JFTL is not expected to be available 

until 2024. 

Table 7: C-17 Funding 

Then-year dollars in millions 

FY 2009 budget 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

RDT&E $166.2 $235.4 $161.9 $206.5 $222.6 $223.2

Procurement $244 $317.9 $88.5 $214.1 $216.1 $196.3

Modifications $194.8 $315.4 $469.7 $469.4 $415.8 $628

Supplemental $3,387.9 $2,187.2 $132.3 $0 $0 $0

Total $3,992.9 $3, 055.9 $852.4 $890.0 $854.5 $1,047.5

Source: For fiscal years 2008-2010,DOD’s Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget; fiscal years 2011-2013, DOD’s Fiscal Year 2009 

President’s Budget. 

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Tactical Airlifters As of April 2009, DOD’s tactical airlift fleet consisted of 92 C-130E aircraft, 

268 C-130Hs, 53 C-130Js, and 2 C-27Js—a total of 415 aircraft. DOD plans 

to retire its aging C-130E fleet by the end of fiscal year 2014, and according 

to its Air Mobility Master Plan, looks to meet its tactical airlift needs with a 

mix of approximately 406 C-130H and C-130J airlifters through the end of 

the next decade. The Army and Air Force are working on concepts for the 

Joint Future Theater Lift (JFTL)—an eventual replacement for the C-130H 

that is projected to be capable of carrying most of the Army’s large 

vehicles into forward operating locations, which C-130s currently cannot 

do. Additionally, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has validated 

the Army’s time-sensitive, mission-critical resupply requirements that 

provide the basis for the Joint Cargo Aircraft program to procure 38 

C-27Js. These missions are comprised of relatively small payloads that are 

needed in forward locations within tight time frames. Table 8 compares 

the capabilities of the C-130H, C-130J-30, and C-27J airlifters. 

Table 8: Comparison of C-130H, C-130J-30, and C-27J Capabilities and 

Characteristics 

C-130H C-130J-30 C-27J 

Loads 42,000 pounds 

6 pallets, or 

92 combat troops 

44,000 pounds 

8 pallets, or 

128 combat troops 

14,190 pounds 

3 pallets, or 

46 combat troops 

Wingspan 133 feet 133 feet 94 feet 

Length 98 feet 113 feet 75 feet 

Maximum take-off weight 155,000 pounds 164,000 pounds 67,241 pounds 

Rangea1,720 miles 2,780 miles 2,645 miles 

Average speed 345 mph 368 mph 288 mph 

Minimum runway length 3000 ft. 3,000 ft. 2,000 ft. 

Crew 5 3 3 

Mission capable rate (2008) 74 80bNot availablec

Cost per flying hour (2008) $7,500 $5,000b$3,871c

Source: GAO analysis and DOD data. 

Notes: All values are rounded to the nearest whole number. Cost per flying hour includes fuel costs. 

The C-130J-30 has an additional 15 feet of fuselage length compared to the base C-130J. Most 

combat delivery aircraft the Air Force is procuring will be this extended model. 

a Range is based on a 35,000 pound payload for the C-130H and C-130J-30 and a 13,000 pound 

payload for the C-27J, based on contractor data. 

b

 Figure includes rates/costs for C-130J fleet, which includes both base C-130J as well as C-130J-30 

models. 

c

 Only 2 C-27J aircraft have been delivered thus far and are being used for training and 

developmental testing. Average cost per flying hour is the 2008 estimate. 

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C-130 Hercules Figure 5: C-130 Hercules 

Source: C-130J Program Office.

Mission The C-130 is the principal combat delivery aircraft for the U.S. military and 

is employed primarily as a tactical airlift aircraft for the transport of cargo 

and personnel within a theater of operation. C-130s also have the 

capability to augment strategic airlift forces, as well as support 

humanitarian, peacekeeping, and disaster relief operations. The C-130J is 

the latest addition to DOD’s fleet of C-130 aircraft, providing performance 

improvements over legacy aircraft in the series. Variants of the C-130J are 

being acquired by the Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and several 

foreign militaries to perform their respective missions. 

Program Status The C-130E and C-130H fleets are nearly 30 years old and have serious 

reliability, maintainability, and supportability issues, and some are 

reaching the end of their service life. For example, aircraft maintainers 

discovered severe cracking in the center wing box on some aircraft early 

in fiscal year 2005. The program office recommended retiring or grounding 

aircraft with more than 45,000 flying hours, and restricting aircraft with 

more than 38,000 hours from flying with cargo or performing tactical 

maneuvers. In response to these recommendations, the Air Force is using 

some operations and maintenance funding to extend the service life of 

some C-130 aircraft by 3 to 5 years, including part of the C-130E fleet, 

which the Air Force plans to retire by the end of fiscal year 2014. In 

addition, the Air Force is currently funding the replacement of the center 

wing box on older C-130 aircraft, and plans to replace the wing structure 

on the remainder of the C-130H fleet in a later phase of the program. The 

cost of the replacement is approximately $6.5 million per aircraft, and 

according to Air Force officials, the program is meeting all cost, schedule, 

and performance goals. 

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The Air Force also has several other modification efforts underway for the 

C-130H fleet that will address known capability shortfalls. Efforts include 

a Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures program, a Surface-to-Air Fire 

Look-out Capability modification, and a number of communications 

upgrades. The largest modernization effort is the Avionics Modernization 

Program (AMP) to standardize cockpit configurations and avionics, as 

well as provide for increased reliability, maintainability, and sustainability. 

Initially, the Air Force planned to upgrade all C-130E and C-130H aircraft, 

including special operations aircraft. However, after the program entered 

system development in 2001, it experienced funding instability and 

hardware and software integration issues. These problems, as well as an 

Air Force decision to retire C-130E aircraft, triggered a Nunn-McCurdy 

cost breach in February 2007. The program was subsequently restructured 

to include far fewer aircraft—221 instead of 519—and assume less 

developmental risk. Under the revised plan, only a portion of the C-130H 

fleet would receive the modification. Since that time, the program’s 

production decision has been delayed 13 months because of 

documentation and software integration problems and senior leadership 

concerns about the program’s acquisition strategy. A low rate production 

decision has not been scheduled as the department is considering another 

program restructure. Program officials further stated that a second phase 

of the AMP is now being considered that will modernize C-130s not 

included in the first phase. 

DOD is in the process of procuring 168 C-130J airlifters to replace the 

retiring C-130E fleet. According to program officials, as of July 2009, 73 

C-130J aircraft have been delivered of 117 on contract.7

 One program 

official said all C-130J aircraft currently being purchased by the Air 

Mobility Command are the C-130J-30 model which, compared to the base 

model, has an extended fuselage and is capable of carrying 2 additional 

cargo pallets, for a total of 8 pallets. The C-130J fleet is also receiving a 

number of upgrades to meet communications, navigation, and 

surveillance, as well as air traffic management requirements. These efforts 

are being funded and developed in partnership with other countries as part 

of the International Cooperative Block Upgrade Program.8

 A C-130J 

program official reports that aircraft availability rates continue to exceed 

the fleet standard and are better than rates for C-130H models. 

 

7

 The program of record includes orders for all U.S. military customers. 

8

 Partner nations include Italy, Denmark, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Norway. 

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GAO Observations Recently, the Secretary of Defense testified that DOD could use 

“uncommitted” C-130 aircraft to complement C-27Js in order to fulfill 

Army time-sensitive, mission-critical requirements. However, according to 

an Air Force official, the impact to the C-130 fleet of supplementing C-27Js 

in direct support missions is not clear, including how it would affect C-130 

availability for other missions. The Air Force has drafted a concept of 

employment for direct support of Army time-sensitive, mission-critical 

missions that addresses a number of coordination issues between the 

services, but the potential impact of these missions on the C-130 fleet has 

not been assessed, such as fuel costs, maintenance to address potential 

wear on landing gear and other components, and addressing flight 

restrictions for runway length. 

Table 9: C-130 Funding 

Then-year dollars in millions 

FY 2009 budget 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

C-130 budget 

 RDT&E $233.3 $179.3 $201.3 $47.5 $12.9 $9.9

 Modifications $216.9 $434.6 $354.5 $471.7 $412.7 $429.2

 Supplemental $140.7 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

Total $590.9 $613.9 $555.8 $519.2 $425.6 $439.1

C-130J 

 RDT&E $62.1 $27.3 $30.0 $59.9 $59.9 $58.3

 Procurement $681.4 $120.7 $393.6 $632.9 $637.5 $557.8

 Modifications $58.3 $34.3 $13.6 $115.8 $129.3 $105.7

 Supplemental $1,100.7 $9 $72 $0 $0 $0

Total $1,902.5 $191.3 $509.3 $808.6 $826.7 $721.8

Source: For fiscal years 2008-2010, DOD’s Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget and Fiscal Year 2009 Overseas Contingency 

Operations Supplemental; fiscal years 2011-2013, DOD’s Fiscal Year 2009 President’s Budget.

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C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft Figure 6: C-27J Spartan 

Source: L-3 Communications.

Mission The C-27J Spartan is a mid-range, multifunctional aircraft. Its primary 

mission is to provide on-demand transport of time-sensitive, missioncritical supplies and key personnel to forward deployed Army units, 

including those in remote and austere locations. It can also be used for 

humanitarian relief and homeland security efforts. The aircraft is capable 

of carrying up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles and 

heavy, dense loads such as aircraft engines and ammunition. 

Program Status The Joint Cargo Aircraft program began in late 2005 when the Under 

Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed the Army and 

Air Force to merge their requirements for small intra-theater airlifters.9

 In 

June 2007 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum certifying the 

program with approval to proceed to low rate initial production. This 

memorandum set the acquisition program baseline at 78 aircraft: 54 for the 

Army and 24 for the Air Force. The Army primarily viewed the C-27J as oncall airlift directly tied to the tactical needs of ground commanders, 

sometimes referred to as transporting cargo the “last tactical mile.” The 

Air Force planned to use its C-27J assets to provide “general support” 

airlift for all users, but also views the delivery of time-sensitive, missioncritical Army cargo as its role. 

The joint Army/Air Force program office selected the C-27J as the Joint 

Cargo Aircraft in a full and open competition and awarded a firm-fixed 

 

9

 These similar Army and Air Force efforts were designated the Future Cargo Aircraft and 

Light Cargo Aircraft, respectively. 

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price contract to L-3 Communications, Integrated Systems in June 2007. 

Two aircraft of a total of 13 the Army has ordered through fiscal year 2009 

have been delivered and according to program officials are being used to 

conduct training and developmental testing. In May 2009, as part of 

budget deliberations, the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff agreed to 

transfer responsibility for the C-27J program to the Air Force, along with 

the task of fulfilling the Army’s time-sensitive, mission-critical resupply 

mission. As part of this restructuring, program quantities were reduced by 

about 50 percent, from 78 to 38 aircraft. The 13 ordered aircraft, including 

the 2 already delivered, will be transferred to the Air Force, who will 

procure an additional 25 aircraft between 2010 and 2012. 

C-27J aircraft are currently built in Turin, Italy. Manufacturer Alenia 

Aeronautica (primary sub contractor to L-3 Communications, Integrated 

Systems) had planned to break ground on a manufacturing facility in 

Jacksonville, Florida, in April 2009, but according to an Alenia Aeronautica 

official, this decision has been presently postponed. According to program 

officials, Alenia Aeronautica had planned to assemble C-27J aircraft 16 

through 78 at the Jacksonville facility, in addition to those ordered by 

foreign customers. With DOD’s decision to procure fewer aircraft, it is 

unclear whether Alenia will proceed with construction of the facility. 

GAO Observations The Air Force has offered some insight into how it will meet the Army’s 

time-sensitive, mission-critical resupply requirement and is in the process 

of further developing concepts of operation and employment for the C-27J. 

Although the service is buying only 38 C-27J aircraft, it is investigating 

possibilities for fulfilling the direct support mission requirement at least in 

part from a common user pool fleet construct. For example, an Air Force 

official said C-130s are already used for some time-sensitive, missioncritical operations. The Secretary of Defense has indicated that the 38 C27Js can be complemented by any of about 200 “uncommitted” C-130s, 

which he noted can access 99 percent of the landing strips that C-27Js can 

access.10 However, it is unclear if or how such an approach will affect the 

number of C-130Js the service plans to buy, or the availability of C-130 

aircraft to meet other requirements associated with major combat 

operations. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 may 

help shed light on this issue. 

 

10 Army officials said this statement assumed that if the C-130J could access an airfield 

within 50 nautical miles of the point of need, then this was sufficient, even if there were 

landing zones or surfaces accessible by the C-27J closer to the point of need. 

Page 40 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: A Summary of Strategic and 

Tactical Airlift Systems—Ongoing and Future 

Efforts 

There is also concern about the Air Force’s commitment to direct support 

of the time-sensitive, mission-critical requirement. Over the past several 

decades, the Air Force has retired its direct support assets, including the 

Vietnam-era C-7 Caribou and an earlier version of the C-27. At issue are 

basic roles and missions philosophies which DOD recognizes need to be 

updated to reflect lessons learned in ongoing combat operations. The 

Secretary of Defense testified in May 2009 that there needs to be a change 

in the Air Force’s culture with respect to how the direct support mission is 

accomplished. Similarly, the department’s Quadrennial Roles and Missions 

Review Report for January 2009 notes that the services need to 

standardize the airlift process by sharing aircraft employment and 

availability data and adjust concepts of operations to allow traditionally 

general support assets to be used for direct support and vice versa. 

However, the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report also 

determined that the service responsibilities for intratheater airlift 

operations were appropriately aligned and the option that provided the 

most value to the joint force was to assign the C-27J to both the Air Force 

and the Army. An Air Force official said the service has drafted a platformneutral concept of employment for direct support of the time-sensitive, 

mission-critical mission. The vision is to use the capabilities of the entire 

mobility airlift fleet (i.e., C-130, C-17, C-5, Operational Support Airlift) to 

supplement the 38 C-27Js as required in time-sensitive, mission-critical 

operations abroad. 

While the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 and other 

studies consider tactical airlift requirements into the future, officials 

involved with the study have not indicated that they address the impact of 

potential departures from traditional roles and missions constructs—such 

as changing how the services will approach time-sensitive, mission-critical 

resupply. As such, it is not known how these changes may affect overall 

requirements for tactical airlifters. Moreover, there is speculation that the 

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review will establish priorities based on one 

major combat operation, rather than two simultaneous ones. Considered 

together, these points raise the question of how many C-27Js DOD needs. 

Table 10: C-27J Funding 

Then-year dollars in millions 

FY 2009 Budget 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

 RDT&E $26.8 $19.7 $9.4 $26.5 $19.2 $6.8

 Procurement $156.0 $263.4 $319.1 $371.3 $576.5 $0

Total $182.8 $283.1 $328.4 $397.8 $595.7 $6.8

Source: For fiscal years 2008-2010, DOD’s fiscal year 2010 President’s Budget; for fiscal years 2011-2013, Air Force revised program 

estimates. 

Page 41 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: A Summary of Strategic and 

Tactical Airlift Systems—Ongoing and Future 

Efforts 

Joint Future Theater Lift Figure 7: Joint Future Theater Lift 

Source: Contractor’s rendering, Lockheed Martin. Source: Contractor’s rendering © 2008 Karem Aircraft/

Lockheed Martin.

Mission DOD plans to replace C-130H aircraft and augment the remaining C-130s 

with the Joint Future Theater Lift (JFTL). Currently, it is still at the 

conceptual stage and is not yet a formal acquisition program. The Army 

and Air Force have independently engaged in laboratory efforts to develop 

competitive technology solutions including a large tiltrotor, vertical 

takeoff and landing aircraft, and a versatile fixed wing, short takeoff and 

landing aircraft, respectively.11 A draft Initial Capabilities Document notes 

that the JFTL must be capable of transporting current and future mediumweight armored vehicles into austere locations with unprepared landing 

areas. According to an Army official, another capability under 

investigation is the ability to operate from naval vessels (seabasing) to 

enhance access to remote areas and to reduce predictability. The JFTL is 

anticipated to have a payload capacity of 20 to 36 tons and a combat 

mission radius of 500 nautical miles. The Air Force Air Mobility Command 

expects the JFTL to be fielded sometime around 2024. 

Program Status JFTL concept development became a joint effort in January 2008 following 

a decision by the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff to merge 

requirements for separate heavy lift efforts in progress at the time.12 The 

 

11 The Army is partnered with the Navy, Special Operations Command, Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. A 

tiltrotor aircraft, such as the V-22, is one that operates as a helicopter for takeoffs and 

landings and, once airborne, converts to a turboprop aircraft. 

12 The Army and Air Force programs were known as Joint Heavy Lift and Advanced Joint 

Air Combat System, respectively. 

Page 42 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: A Summary of Strategic and 

Tactical Airlift Systems—Ongoing and Future 

Efforts 

Air Force was designated as the administrative lead for the development 

of the Initial Capabilities Document for the JFTL, and submitted a draft 

into DOD’s Joint Capability Integration and Development System earlier 

this year; however, the Army did not agree with the draft, citing critical 

disagreements. According to an Army program official, a recent general 

officer meeting between the two services appears to have resolved the 

Army’s remaining critical comments, and the services could potentially 

seek approval of the Initial Capabilities Document at the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council by late summer 2009. Both Army and Air 

Force officials stated they would like to have the Initial Capabilities 

Document validated and begin work on the analysis of alternatives in the 

summer of 2009, to provide a sufficient basis for budget deliberations in 

March 2010. 

Disparate views on requirements are at the heart of the disagreement 

between the services. According to an Army official, there were 

foundational differences in anticipated usage of the aircraft that led to 

initial disagreements between the services. The land component (i.e., the 

Army, Marine Corps, and special operations forces) saw a critical need for 

an airlift capability that would enable expeditionary, mounted (i.e. forces 

deployed with combat vehicles) ground operations into access-challenged 

environments. The airlift community was pursuing a larger, longer range 

transport to better meet the current set of traditional airlift missions. The 

Army official said the two perspectives resulted in different technologies 

and system investigations. The land component, led by the Army, has been 

pursuing vertical takeoff and landing concepts that are less infrastructureconstrained, allow faster force buildup, and can more easily sustain 

maneuvering forces from either land or sea bases. The Air Force has been 

pursuing advanced lift system technology for turbofan fixed wing aircraft 

to improve operations on short, soft, or rough airfields while increasing 

cruise speed over current tactical transports. However, the Army official 

said development of the JFTL Initial Capabilities Document has combined 

these perspectives into one requirements document and served to 

converge the services into a more cohesive vision of future operations. 

Both the Army and Air Force have continued to fund technology 

development efforts that support their previously separate programs. 

Army technology development efforts are focused on a high-efficiency 

tiltrotor concept that could become a candidate for the JFTL once 

requirements are established. According to an Army lab official, the 

aircraft would be nearly as aerodynamically efficient as a fixed wing 

aircraft and would have about the same fuel efficiency as a C-130J. While 

the concept is still “all on paper,” the official said no new inventions are 

Page 43 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: A Summary of Strategic and 

Tactical Airlift Systems—Ongoing and Future 

Efforts 

needed—that the component technologies all have an existing lineage and 

could be practically implemented on an aircraft of the size anticipated (the 

maximum payload would be 36 tons). The Army has three contractors or 

contractor teams working on different tiltrotor configurations that could 

potentially meet the joint capability needs. A number of technology 

development/risk reduction efforts, including a tiltrotor test rig and a 

number of specialized studies, have been funded by the Army, Special 

Operations Command, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and Office of Naval 

Research. 

An Air Force official said the service’s technology development efforts are 

focused on a fixed wing concept that combines speed and agility to 

provide enhanced lift for short takeoffs. According to the Air Force 

official, three contractors have done work on this speed agile concept, 

with one—Lockheed Martin—on contract to develop a demonstrator 

model. The Air Force Research Laboratory has also, in partnership with 

Lockheed Martin, developed the Advanced Composite Cargo Aircraft, 

which utilizes composite materials in the fuselage and tail, and which 

completed a successful test flight in June 2009. An Air Force Research Lab 

official said this technology significantly reduces the number of parts 

needed, as well as tooling and touch labor needs in the manufacturing 

process. He said these processes and materials could potentially be used 

for the JFTL. 

GAO Observations A potential capability gap exists in the department’s ability to airlift 

medium-weight vehicles to access-challenged areas within a theater of 

operations using dedicated tactical airlifters. C-17 aircraft have been 

employed to transport medium weight vehicles in theater, but cannot 

access austere, short, or unimproved landing areas. In 2007 C-17s flew 

15,436 tactical sorties, 3,102 of which—approximately 20 percent—

involved carrying objects too large for a C-130 to carry. Nevertheless, DOD 

officials do not consider the C-17 to be a viable long-term solution given 

access issues noted above. JFTL is expected to provide this long-term 

solution. 

We believe the JFTL effort presents the department an opportunity to 

address a critical capability gap using the evolutionary, knowledge-based 

approach outlined in DOD acquisition policy. However, DOD officials will 

need to exercise caution to avoid pitfalls we have identified in connection 

with developing new weapon systems, including taking a revolutionary 

versus an evolutionary approach for weapon system development; 

Page 44 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: A Summary of Strategic and 

Tactical Airlift Systems—Ongoing and Future 

Efforts 

overpromising performance capabilities; and understating expected costs, 

schedules, and risks associated with developing and producing the 

weapon. 

Fielding the new capability may be a challenge for two reasons. First, 

although the services have reached agreement on operational 

requirements in developing the Initial Capabilities Document, the potential 

exists for future disagreements that could adversely affect program 

outcomes. The Army would like a tiltrotor aircraft that can be used in 

direct support of its maneuver and sustainment operations, and the Air 

Force favors a fixed wing aircraft to support common-user needs as well 

as the Army’s direct support mission. An Army official said the decision to 

pursue a tiltrotor or a fixed wing aircraft will be made during the analysis 

of alternatives, and that he expected a more cooperative relationship 

between the services once that is decided. However, we feel that if such a 

relationship does not emerge or continue throughout system development, 

program outcomes could be jeopardized. Our previous work has found 

that unstable requirements in conjunction with long development cycles 

can lead to considerable cost growth and schedule delays. 

Second, the JFTL was intended to transport medium-weight vehicles, 

including Future Combat Systems vehicles; however, DOD recently 

cancelled the manned ground vehicle portion of the program with plans to 

re-launch a new vehicle modernization program incorporating lessons 

learned in recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We believe the design 

of the new vehicles, including size and weight, could be an important 

factor in determining the type of aircraft best suited for the JFTL mission, 

primarily because the Army’s tiltrotor concept already envisions a 

rotorcraft much larger than any ever produced. However it could be 

several years before the Army has a good understanding of the size and 

weight of the new vehicles. 

Table 11: JFTL-Related RDT&E Funding 

Then-year dollars in millions 

Fiscal year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Air Force $38.5 $22.6 $26.0 $49.0 $44.0 $40.2

Army $22.5 $24.5 n/a n/a n/a n/a

Total $61.0 $47.1

Source: For the Air Force, figures for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 represent funding that has been obligated on contract; figures for 

fiscal years 2010 through 2013 represent burdened dollars—funds that include personnel and other programmatic elements—as 

projected in the fiscal year 2009 President’s Budget request. For the Army, funds are a combination of Army, Special Operations

Command, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Navy, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration funding applied 

directly to Joint Heavy Lift activities. 

Page 45 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 46 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 47 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 48 GAO-10-67 Defense Acquisitions
Related GAO Products 

Page 49 GAO-10-67 

Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquisitions: Charting a Course for Lasting Reform.

GAO-09-663T. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-09-326SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and 

Requirements Are Needed to Define Optimal Future Strategic Airlift 

Mix. GAO-09-50. Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2008. 

Defense Transportation: DOD Should Ensure that the Final Size and 

Mix of Airlift Force Study Plan Includes Sufficient Detail to Meet the 

Terms of the Law and Inform Decision Makers. GAO-08-704R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2008. 

Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon 

System Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes. 

GAO-07-388. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007. 

Defense Transportation: Study Limitations Raise Questions about the 

Adequacy and Completeness of the Mobility Capabilities Study and 

Report. GAO-06-938. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2006. 

(120800) Defense Acquisitions 
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