BRUCE VINCENT FELDER, 				                   Appellant,

THE STATE OF TEXAS,						           Appellee.

On appeal from the 22nd District Court 

of Hays County, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

	A jury found appellant, Bruce Vincent Felder, guilty of criminal mischief, a state-jailfelony.  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.03(a)(1), (b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2007).  The trialcourt sentenced him to one year in a state-jail facility and ordered him to pay $3,000 inrestitution.  By two issues, Felder challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of theevidence to support the verdict.  We affirm.

I.  Background

	On January 27, 2006, Opal Jones drove to a Wal-Mart store in San Marcos.  In theWal-Mart parking lot, she spotted a car which was about to leave a parking space.  Afterthe car pulled out of the space, she pulled into and parked her car in the spot.  As sheparked her car, she heard someone honk at her.  Then, a car parked directly behind her,blocking her car in the spot.  Jones testified that an "agitated" man, whom she identifiedat trial as Felder, got out of the car, approached her car "angrily," and banged on herwindow.  She opened her window to hear Felder, who was yelling and using profanity,claiming she had taken his parking spot.  She told him "that was not what happened" androlled up her window.  Felder left, and he and a woman, who was waiting in his car, wentinto the Wal-Mart, leaving Jones's car blocked.  Jones waited for them to enter the storebefore she got out of her car.  She went inside the store to find someone to help herbecause she was frightened.  As she was explaining the situation to a Wal-Mart employee,Felder approached them and, speaking loudly and using profane words, accused her oftrying to "tell on" him.  When Jones asked the employee to call a security guard, Felderyelled at her, and called her an "ugly name."  Felder told Jones that he was "parked rightbehind you, so you're going to have to talk to me if you want to go."  He then left the store. The employee suggested that Jones finish her grocery shopping, and, if Felder was still inthe parking lot when she finished, someone would escort her to her car.  After Jonesfinished grocery shopping, she went to the manager's office and asked someone to escorther to her car.  An employee walked with her to her car; Felder's car was no longerblocking her vehicle.  However, after she placed the groceries in the back of her car, shesaw numerous key marks on the driver's side door of her car.  The key marks were notthere when she arrived at the Wal-Mart.  She returned to the store, notified employees ofthe damage, and the police were called.  A police officer arrived, took Jones's statement,and requested to see Wal-Mart's video footage of the parking lot during the time inquestion.

	A Wal-Mart employee testified Felder "was upset" and "had words" with Jones  inthe front of the store.  The employee identified Felder as "Deidra's husband." (1)  The officerasked if Deidra's husband's name was Bruce, and the employee confirmed it was.  Theofficer reviewed the videotape and recognized Felder as the man who was driving the carthat  blocked Jones's car in the parking space.  The videotape showed Felder parking hiscar behind Jones's, getting out and approaching the driver's side door of her car, goingback to his vehicle, leaving his vehicle parked behind Jones's, then entering the Wal-Martwith his wife.  The videotape also showed Felder leaving the Wal-Mart, approaching hisvehicle, taking a right before he entered in his vehicle, and then getting into his car anddriving to the front doors of the Wal-Mart.  The videotape did not show Felder actuallycausing damage to Jones's car.  The amount of damage was estimated at over $3,000.

	Felder testified that he did not damage Jones's vehicle.  He testified, "I didn't gonear her car except for when the gentleman in the white shirt called me to explain to methat he witnessed what had happened."

	On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Felder:

	Q. And this is the video of you leaving the [Wal-Mart] store.  And I want youto look.  On your right-hand side as you walk out of the store, we see anobject.

	A. Yeah.

 	Q. What is that that you're carrying?

	A. Those are my keys.

	* * *

	Q. So it's your testimony that you go behind the van not to key the victim'scar at this point but to talk to the guy in the white T-shirt?

	A. Yeah, the gentleman that called me . . . .

	Q. What's that gentleman's name?

	A. I have no idea.  He's a customer.

	In issues one and two, Felder challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of theevidence to support his conviction.  In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence tosupport a conviction, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict inorder to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essentialelements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319(1979); Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  This standardgives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony,to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimatefacts.  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.  The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight andcredibility of the evidence.  See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979);Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  Thus, when performinga legal-sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidenceand thereby substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.  Dewberry v. State, 4S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).  We must resolve any inconsistencies in theevidence in favor of the verdict.  Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App.2000). 

	When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence ina neutral light, favoring neither party.  See Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex.Crim. App. 2006); Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  We willset aside the verdict only if:  (1) the evidence supporting the conviction, although legallysufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the fact-finder's determination is clearly wrong andmanifestly unjust; or (2) the verdict though legally sufficient, is against the great weight andpreponderance of the evidence.  Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15; Johnson v. State, 23S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  We cannot conclude a conviction is "clearly wrong"or "manifestly unjust" simply because we would have voted to acquit.  See Watson, 204S.W.3d at 417.  In other words, we may not simply substitute our judgment for the fact-finder's judgment.  Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 12; Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim. App. 1997).  To reverse for factual sufficiency, we must determine, with someobjective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of the evidencecontradicts the verdict.  Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417.  In examining a factual sufficiencychallenge, we defer to the fact-finder's determination of the credibility of the evidence. Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

A. Elements of Criminal Mischief

	As charged in this case, a person commits the offense of criminal mischief if, withoutthe consent of the owner, he or she intentionally or knowingly damages or destroys thetangible property of the owner.  Tex. Penal. Code Ann. § 28.03(a)(1).  Criminal mischiefincludes, as an element, the value of the injury inflicted.  See id. § 28.03(b); Gallardo v.State, 167 Tex. Crim. 511, 321 S.W.2d 581, 581 (1959).  The amount of pecuniary lossdetermines the punishment range for the offense.  See id.

	Circumstantial evidence, by itself, may be enough to support a jury's verdict. Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Smith v. State, 965S.W.2d 509, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).  It is not necessary that every fact point directlyand independently to the defendant's guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is warranted bythe combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances.  Barnes v. State,876 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186(Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

B. Application of Law to Facts

	In this case, a rational jury could have determined the following from the evidence: (1) Felder parked his car behind Jones's car, got out and approached the driver's side doorof Jones's car, then went back to his vehicle, leaving his vehicle parked behind Jones'scar, then entered the Wal-Mart with his wife; (2) Felder left the Wal-Mart carrying his keys;(3) Felder was angry at Jones, claiming she took his parking spot; (4) the videotapeshowed Felder leaving the store, approaching his vehicle, taking a right before he enteredin his vehicle, and then getting into his car and driving to the front  doors of the store; (5)Felder admitted to going near Jones's car; (6) when Jones returned to her car, she saw thedamage to her car's door; (7) the damage was not there when she arrived at the Wal-Martstore; and (8) the amount of damage to Jones's car was estimated at over $3,000.

	The evidence favorable to Felder was that:  (1) he denied damaging Jones's car;(2) he went near Jones's car to talk to the man in a white shirt; (3) the videotape did notshow him damaging Jones's vehicle; and (4) no witness saw Felder damage Jones's car.

	Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the jury'sconclusion was warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminatingcircumstances.  See Barnes, 876 S.W.2d at 321.  Accordingly, we conclude the evidenceis legally sufficient for a rational jury to find Felder guilty of criminal mischief; that is heintentionally or knowingly damaged Jones's vehicle without her consent in an amountgreater than $1,500 but less than $20,000 beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Tex. PenalCode Ann. § 28.03(a)(1), (b)(4).  We also conclude the evidence supporting the convictionis not so weak that the fact-finder's determination is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust,or that the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.  Issuesone and two are overruled.

III.  Conclusion

	We affirm the trial court's judgment.

							ROSE VELA	

							Justice

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this 3rd day of July, 2008.

1. Deidra was identified as a Wal-Mart employee.