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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TERESITA A. CANUTO,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 19-1791 (JEB)

REP. NANCY PELOSI, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiff Teresita Canuto’s Complaint alleges that a “paramilitary of illegal aliens”

repeatedly sexually assaulted her over the course of five years, mainly while she was drugged or 

unconscious. She seeks to hold State and Federal representatives accountable for failing to enact 

legislation that could have — theoretically — sheltered her from the alleged assaults. Because 

the Complaint strings together a series of farfetched allegations, which Defendants’ conduct 

could not have caused, this Court grants the pending Motions to Dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.

I. Background

Plaintiff alleges that, between 2014 and 2019, she was “besieged by illegal aliens with 

sexual assaults and batteries” in her California home while “she and [her] family were put into 

[a] deep sleep or unconscious[ness].” ECF No. 1 (Pl. Statement of Facts), ¶ 1. She claims that a 

“paramilitary of illegal aliens,” id., ¶ 24, that “w[as] affiliated to the group responsible [for] the 

Sri Lanka Bombing of the Catholic Church,” ECF No. 9 (Supplemental Complaint), ¶ 6, 

repeatedly assaulted her on “a scheduled basis.” Pl. SOF, ¶ 14. She believes that the attacks
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must have been an organized effort, as “this type of domestic terrorism . . . would not be possible 

without somebody financing or paying the expenses” of the alleged attacks. Id. Canuto says that

she later “realized . . . that the task of sexual assaults was transferred to illegal aliens who were 

accommodated [and] assisted by [her] neighbors.” Id., ¶ 7.

To support her theory, Plaintiff points to parking patterns around her apartment: “At 

times, the whole parking area inside was full of many cars/trucks . . . [that] stayed for [a] night 

after plaintiff was sexually assaulted [and then] would be gone.” Supp. Compl., ¶ 4. “[O]ther 

illegal aliens that come[] from other states . . . were involved,” as shown by the fact that “there 

were cars that surged in the apartment complex . . . and stayed for days sometimes a week

with . . . plate licenses from other states.” Pl. SOF, ¶ 14. Canuto also alleges that she “was 

stalked . . . by many civilians with stickers of U.S. Army and U.S. Navy . . . at the rear of their 

vehicles.” Id., ¶ 7. Allegedly, this “paramilitary of illegal aliens” “communicate[d] to each other 

through the use of stickers attached at the back of their cars.” Id., ¶ 24.

Plaintiff claims that “many illegal aliens were also follow[ing her] whenever [she] went.” 

Id., ¶ 22. For instance, “after plaintiff was attacked sexually, later plaintiff began to be 

tailgate[d] by a vehicle along th[e] way in the road. Then sexual assault happened again.” Supp. 

Compl., ¶ 6. She was also “intimidated” by “a middle eastern feature[d] male adult . . . 

accompanied [by] . . . a young Hispanic female adult” in a “brand new SUV (Range Rover)” 

after he “wave[d her] on and did a gesture to look up at him. And after [she] looked up at him, 

he began dancing half of []his body and right arm while still driving . . . [and] he gave [her] a 

thumbs up sign and went ahead of [her].” Pl. SOF, ¶ 21.

The specifics of the alleged assaults remain unclear. As evidence that they occurred, 

Canuto cites myriad injuries including that her “left eyebrow [was] shaved” and she had “cuts or 
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laceration[s] in body parts.” ECF No. 1 (Complaint) at 4. Additionally, “the attacker le[ft] 

remnants of his act” after the sexual assaults by “revers[ing her] underwear,” “fix[ing] the 

sheet . . . of her couch,” and “fix[ing] [her] credit or debit cards nicely in her wallet.” Pl. SOF, 

¶ 18. Plaintiff described the in-home assaults thus:

Skills in carpentry w[ere] used as a weapon by illegal aliens in 

penetrating or trespassing the residence of plaintiff. Adult in size 

and height of pygmies are also used to climb the windows, penetrate 

the ceiling and enter[] the vent. Then he would open the main door 

of the apartment to let the attacker come[ ]in and attack[] the 

plaintiff in [a] deep sleep.

Id., ¶ 22. In one instance, Plaintiff alleges that a “man that followed her in the parking lot of 

Vons Supermarket was the suspect” in a specific assault. Id., ¶ 13. As proof, she “enclosed 

evidence of [a] receipt from Vons Supermarket.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that she was unable to 

catch any of her attackers after “put[ting up] a video camera” in her home because “the people 

also involved in the planned attack . . . were able to manipulate the records of video and stopped 

the recording during plaintiff[’s] . . . attack[] at night while in deep sleep.” Supp. Compl., ¶ 3.

As to the named Defendants — members of Congress and State lawmakers — Plaintiff 

claims that they “negligen[tly] . . . allow[ed] illegal aliens” to infringe on U.S. sovereignty “by 

establishing their own paramilitary” in California. See Pl. SOF, ¶ 24. She now seeks 

$20,000,000 in damages for each alleged assault, totaling $1,200,000,000 in relief. See Compl. 

at 6.

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), Plaintiff bears the burden of proving 

that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear her claims. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Harris v. Sebelius, 932 F. Supp. 2d 150, 151 (D.D.C. 2013). A court 

has an “affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional 
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authority.” Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 

2001). Pleadings by pro se plaintiffs are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

III. Analysis

In filing separate Motions to Dismiss, the members of Congress and California Governor 

Gavin Newsom articulate myriad arguments. The Court need look only to subject-matter 

jurisdiction, which it lacks because: (1) Plaintiff’s claims are “patently insubstantial,” (2) she has 

no standing, and (3) even had her claims been pled under the Federal Tort Claims Act, she failed 

to exhaust her administrative remedies.

A. Patently Insubstantial Claims

On rare occasions, a court may dismiss a case sua sponte for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction if a complaint is “‘patently insubstantial,’ presenting no federal question suitable for 

decision.” Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 

U.S. 319, 327 n.6 (1989)). This standard requires that the “claims be flimsier than ‘doubtful or 

questionable’ — they must be ‘essentially fictitious.’” Id. (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 

528, 537–38 (1973)). Claims that fall into this category include “bizarre conspiracy theories, any 

fantastic government manipulations of [the] will or mind, [and] any sort of supernatural 

intervention.” Id. As a general rule, this procedural vehicle is “reserved for complaints resting 

on truly fanciful factual allegations,” while “12(b)(6) dismissals cull legally deficient 

complaints.” Id. at 331 n.5.

Plaintiff’s claims boil down to her belief that a “paramilitary of illegal aliens” funded and 

enforced a systemic regime of sexual assault against her while she was asleep or unconscious. 

See Pl. SOF, ¶¶ 7, 14, 24. Standing alone, such a naked assertion presents many reasons for 
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doubt. Here, moreover, Plaintiff’s evidence claiming to prove the existence of such a regime 

consists of nothing more than day-to-day occurrences — e.g., parking patterns, roadway 

encounters, bumper stickers, and grocery receipts. Id., ¶¶ 5, 13, 14, 21, 22. Because Plaintiff 

relies solely on “fanciful factual allegations” to support her claims, Best, 39 F.3d at 331 n.5, her 

suit presents “no federal question suitable for decision.” Id., at 330.

B. No Standing

Even if her factual assertions were not fantastical, Plaintiff lacks standing. Because 

“standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 

III,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, finding that a plaintiff has standing is a necessary “predicate to any 

exercise of [the Court’s] jurisdiction.” Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). At its “irreducible constitutional minimum,” the 

doctrine requires a plaintiff to prove three elements: (1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship 

between the injury and defendants’ challenged conduct, and (3) the injury’s redressability. 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; see also Ord v. District of Columbia, 587 F.3d 1136, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 

2009) (same). Here, Governor Newsom points out that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the second 

prong — causation. See ECF No. 15 (Def. Newsom MTD) at 3–5. The Court agrees.

For there to be a sufficient causal connection, an injury must be “fairly traceable to

challenged conduct of the defendant.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) 

(emphasis added). An injury that “results from the independent action of some third party not 

before the court” will not suffice. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984) (quoting Simon v. 

E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 36, 42 (1976)). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that any of 

the Defendants assaulted her. Her causal hook is that Defendants “disregarded” that “U.S. 

citizens are [being] killed and raped” and failed to “create[] a remedy that would be favorable to 
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the safety of the people in the United States.” Pl. SOF, ¶ 24. Yet there is no allegation that 

Defendants had any role in assisting the theoretical rapists in, e.g., entering the country illegally. 

In addition, it is “substantially more difficult” to establish standing when the alleged injury arose 

because of the government’s failure to regulate a third party, as is the case here. Lujan, 504 U.S. 

at 562 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 758). Plaintiff’s allegations fall well short of this mark.

C. FTCA

Even if Canuto had named the United States as Defendant, as opposed to individual 

legislators, her tort claims would still not survive the jurisdictional standard set out in the Federal 

Tort Claims Act. “[S]uits for damages against the United States under the common law must be 

brought pursuant to the limited waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA.” Benoit v. USDA, 

608 F.3d 17, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Sovereign immunity “is jurisdictional in nature.” FDIC v. 

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); see also Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 775 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 

(failure to exhaust administrative remedies in FTCA case jurisdictional). In order to obtain a 

waiver of such immunity, a plaintiff must “exhaust[] his administrative remedy before filing 

suit.” Benoit, 608 F.3d at 20.

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a plaintiff must first present her claim to the 

appropriate federal agency within two years of the claim’s accrual. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 

Plaintiff does not assert that she approached any federal agency with her complaints; she has thus

taken no steps towards exhaustion. Even if she had identified the FTCA as the source of this 

Court’s jurisdiction, consequently, she still fails to meet its prerequisites.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.
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/s/ James E. Boasberg

JAMES E. BOASBERG

United States District Judge

Date: December 4, 2019