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50–308 2009

S. HRG. 110–905 

THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT’S REPORT TO 

CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND 

EXCHANGE RATE POLICY (IEERP) AND THE 

U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC ECONOMIC DIALOGUE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

REVIEWING DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND THE 

EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES OF OUR KEY TRADING PARTNERS WITH 

AN EMPHASIS ON THE U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC ECONOMIC DIALOGUE 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

( 

Available at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate05sh.html 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut, Chairman 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

ROBERT P. CASEY, Pennsylvania 

JON TESTER, Montana 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

SHAWN MAHER, Staff Director 

WILLIAM D. DUHNKE, Republican Staff Director and Counsel 

AARON D. KLEIN, Economist 

ROGER M. HOLLINGSWORTH, Professional Staff 

MARK OSTERLE, Republican Counsel 

PEGGY R. KUHN, Republican Senior Financial Economist 

JOSEPH R. KOLINSKI, Chief Clerk and Computer Systems Administrator 

GEORGE WHITTLE, Editor 


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(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2007 

Page 

Opening statement of Chairman Dodd .................................................................. 1 

Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of: 

Senator Shelby .................................................................................................. 4 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 14 

Senator Sununu ................................................................................................ 17 

Senator Bayh .................................................................................................... 19 

Senator Bunning ............................................................................................... 23 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 24 

Senator Bennett ................................................................................................ 27 

Senator Reed ..................................................................................................... 30 

Senator Allard ................................................................................................... 32 

WITNESSES 

Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Secretary, Department of the Treasury ......................... 6 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 56 

Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies, December 2006 ...................................................................................... 59 

Richard Trumka, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL–CIO ................................................ 39 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 91 

Michael Campbell, Vice Chairman, National Association of Manufacturers ...... 41 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 98 

Albert Keidel, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 43 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 111 

Fred Bergsten, Director, Peterson Institute for International Economics .......... 46 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 126 


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(1) 

THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT’S REPORT TO 

CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 

AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY (IEERP) AND 

THE U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC ECONOMIC DIALOGUE 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met at 10:05 a.m. in room SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Christopher J. Dodd (Chairman of the 

Committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD 

Chairman DODD. Good morning. The Committee will come to 

order. I want to thank all of you for being here. Let me thank our 

witnesses for participating this morning in the first hearing with 

Secretary Paulson, and with the second panel of very distinguished 

witnesses as well. 

Let me inform my colleagues on the Committee that as soon as 

we get a quorum here, I will interrupt the proceedings and adopt 

the rules and lay out the structure very quickly for Subcommittee 

assignments and the like. That could happen as soon as the clerk 

and others will let me know when we achieve that critical mass 

here. I will apologize in advance to the Secretary or any of the 

other witnesses who may be testifying when that occurs, and we 

will interrupt knowing that that can be a fleeting moment. Members may disappear again, and I may not have a chance to reconvene the Committee. So if that happens here, we will take care of 

that business. I want to thank Senator Shelby in advance for his 

cooperation and work on those issues when we come to it. 

This morning, the Committee meets to consider the Treasury Department’s Report on the International Economic and Exchange 

Rate Policy and the first meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue. We are pleased to have our Nation’s 74th Treasury 

Secretary, Henry Paulson, as our first witness. And, Mr. Secretary, 

welcome and thank you for being here. 

In each of the past 5 years, this Committee, pursuant to statute, 

has received exchange rate reports and taken testimony from the 

Treasury Secretary. I want to take a moment to commend Senator 

Shelby and Senator Sarbanes for hearings and for their excellent 

oversight on the issue of exchange rates. This is a critical issue for 

millions of Americans who run businesses, work at jobs that deVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:36 Nov 24, 2009 Jkt 050308 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A308.XXX A308

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pend on a level playing field in the global marketplace. This is the 

only report to the Congress that addresses international economics, 

exchange rate policy, and currency manipulation, and it requires 

testimony requested from the Treasury Secretary to the Congress. 

As America’s economic fortunes becomes more entwined with the 

global marketplace, I think we all agree that this report serves a 

very important role in allowing this Committee to discharge its 

oversight responsibilities. More importantly, it allows us to have a 

very frank, candid, and hopefully constructive conversation about 

how we can foster freer, fair, and more transparent, and more dynamic markets where America’s businesses and workers can compete successfully. That conversation must begin with an assessment of how our National Government is doing in securing opportunity and prosperity for working Americans. 

The record, in this Senator’s view, over the past 6 years leaves 

much to be desired. Policies put in place well before Secretary 

Paulson’s confirmation have helped to turn record surpluses into 

deficits. Those deficits mean that today we are underinvesting in 

our most important priorities, such things as health care, schools, 

our Nation’s infrastructure, and targeted tax relief. I would point 

out that just the interest payments alone exceed the entire expenditures in education, the environment, energy policy, unemployment 

compensation, and job training. I think most Americans, most people would be concerned, given the expenditure of those dollars in 

interest payments, considering the other things where investments 

could be made, either in tax relief or support for critical investments in our Nation. And while the economy has produced great 

results for some, and while we can all be encouraged by some recent positive signs, the fact remains that the median family income 

has declined by $1,300. 

Now, the Secretary and I had a great conversation informally 

here before the hearing began, with the reports on this morning’s 

GDP growth rate, which are encouraging and need to be cited here. 

This is welcome news. After 6 months of sub-par growth, the economy is again growing at a healthy rate. A very large component of 

this economic growth has come from international trade. Without 

the growth in trade, I think our economic growth would have been 

under 2 percent, and the Secretary may want to comment on this 

in his remarks. Much of that improvement in our trade situation 

I think came from a decline in the price of oil, which reduced our 

imports, and the fall in the value of the dollar, which helped increase our exports, obviously. It just demonstrates how critically 

important it is that we not only be allowed to be ready to adjust 

against all currencies, making the point further along here. 

At any rate, we have seen over the last 2 years the decline in 

the earning power of Americans. More than 3 million manufacturing jobs have been lost since 2001, which is the steepest and 

most prolonged loss since the Great Depression. About 1 million of 

those manufacturing jobs have been in critical defense-related industries. I would point out that this Committee has jurisdiction 

over the Defense Production Act, which is subject to reauthorization, and we will be looking at defense production issues, Mr. Secretary, at the appropriate time in the Committee. And obviously a 


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loss of a million jobs in defense-related areas is an economic issue, 

but it also raises some very significant national security issues. 

This is the first economic recovery, I would add, that we have 

ever seen in which the manufacturing jobs that were lost have not 

come back. In a sense, for millions of Americans, the recession has 

not ended but goes on. In addition to this historic dislocation of 

America’s manufacturing base, we have also outsourced the capacity to produce items of vital importance to our national security. 

Just to take one example, every smart bomb is guided by a special kind of magnet, as we know. These magnets used to be produced in two plants in Indiana, which our colleague from Indiana, 

Senator Bayh, is all too familiar with. Today these magnets are 

manufactured in China. What would be the consequences if these 

essential items ceased flowing to our military? The mere question 

supports what I believe to be an unmistakable and inescapable fact 

that significant changes are urgently needed to adequately secure 

America’s future, both economically and militarily. 

One such change—namely, the exchange rate policy—is the subject of today’s hearing. If the global marketplace is going to be truly 

free and fair, then currencies must be equally subject to the discipline of that marketplace. China’s continued resistance to allow 

its currency to move to where the market would value it has had 

a distorting effect on global markets and a detrimental effect, I believe, on U.S. companies and workers. 

I have already spoken about the loss of manufacturing jobs. China’s currency, which credible analysts say is devalued by anywhere 

from 15 to 40 percent, is not the sole cause of these job losses. But 

many experts believe it is a significant factor for that result. Likewise, it is a significant contribution to our Nation’s record trade 

deficit. By now, the deficit is projected to be over $750 billion for 

the year 2006. Nearly one-third of that deficit, $230 billion, consists 

of U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China. The Treasury’s International Economic and Exchange Rate Report requires the administration to examine whether any of our trading partners are manipulating their currency to gain an unfair trade advantage. Previous administrations, including that of former George H.W. Bush, 

have found several countries to be manipulating their currency 

under the rules of the report, including China. Many leading economic experts have said for some time that China and other Asian 

countries are manipulating their currencies to gain an unfair trade 

advantage. 

When he was in China as part of a delegation led by Secretary 

Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke talked about the 

distortions that result from, and I am quoting him, ‘‘an effective 

subsidy that an undervalued currency provides for Chinese firms 

that focus on exporting.’’ 

When the administration’s Exchange Rate Report was released, 

Senator Shelby and I issued a joint statement expressing our disappointment that the report failed to recognize what is obvious to 

most, and that is that China continues to manipulate its currency. 

As I said a moment ago, exchange rate policy between the U.S. 

and China, as well as other countries, is but one of many challenges that our Nation faces in order to secure a prosperous future 


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for our people. But it is a vital challenge. It is critically important 

that we have a level playing field in the global economy. 

One of the issues that the Secretary has made a priority is the 

importance of ensuring the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets 

in the global marketplace. I strongly support, by the way, the need 

to ensure a level playing field for U.S. companies, and I applaud 

your interest, Mr. Secretary, in that subject matter. But we also 

need to make sure that we have a level playing field for U.S. companies when they compete against China and other nations in Asia. 

With a level playing field, I believe the American worker and the 

American entrepreneurial spirit can compete with anyone in the 

world. 

I want to thank the Secretary for testifying this morning. I believe that this is not only his first appearance before the Congress 

since returning from China, but it is also his first testimony to the 

Congress since being confirmed last July. It is especially fitting 

that Secretary Paulson’s first hearing is on the Treasury Department’s report on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policy 

and the first meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue. In his previous career at Goldman Sachs, Secretary Paulson 

worked extensively with Chinese officials. I don’t know of anyone 

in this administration who is as knowledgeable, I might add, about 

China and the Pacific Rim as the Secretary of the Treasury. In 

fact, I cannot think of anyone in recent past history at this level 

that brings as much talent and ability and knowledge about the 

Pacific Rim and the importance of it as Secretary Paulson does. 

And I applaud your strong interest in it, your knowledge of it, and 

we hope this morning as a result of talking about this policy, you 

can also share with us some additional insights and thoughts as to 

the importance of this relationship and how we can manipulate or 

work it better in the coming years. Your skills will be needed if the 

administration is to achieve better results than it has so far, in my 

view. Given your impressive experience and ability, Mr. Secretary, 

I believe you are uniquely qualified to help create a global marketplace where America’s work ethic and ingenuity will win the day. 

So I am very pleased that you have taken the time to be with 

us here this morning, and I look forward to hearing your testimony. I am also pleased that we will have a second panel of witnesses to share their knowledge and concerns as well about the 

conclusions of this report. 

Senator Shelby, my colleague, I would ask if you have an opening 

statement, and then with the permission of my colleagues, in order 

to move along, I am going to go right to the Secretary’s testimony 

and then use the time available for members to raise their own 

opening comments, and I will include every comment you have as 

part of the opening statements for the record. But to move this 

along so we can get to the question-and-answer period, I am going 

to limit the opening comments to the Ranking Member. 

Senator Shelby. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Paulson, we are pleased, as Senator Dodd has indicated, to have you before the Committee. The Omnibus Trade and 


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Competitiveness Act of 1988 requires you as the Secretary to provide a semiannual written report on international economic policy, 

including exchange rate policy, to the Senate Banking Committee 

and to the House Financial Services Committee. This morning, we 

will focus on the most recent report which the Committee received 

on December 19th of this past year. We also look forward to hearing more about our ongoing Strategic Economic Dialogue with 

China. We are interested in both the results of the first meeting 

and your plans and expectations for the coming meeting in May. 

Secretary Paulson, your first Exchange Rate Report indicates 

that no major trading partner of the United States met the technical requirements for currency manipulation during the first half 

of 2006. Your findings, although consistent with your predecessors, 

are not consistent with my own views. Maybe you have information 

that we do not have here, and if you do, I hope you will share it. 

I believe myself that China is manipulating its currency as part 

of an export-driven growth strategy. The continued imbalance of 

trade with China is of significant concern to us, and I know it is 

to you. The U.S. reported a nearly $23 billion trade deficit with 

China in November, by far its largest with any country. According 

to the Commerce Department, Mr. Secretary, the November data 

shows a year-to-date deficit with China of almost $214 billion, and 

I am sure it is more. The 2005 full-year deficit was slightly more 

than $201 billion. 

As our trade deficit grows, China continues to accumulate significant foreign exchange reserves. In fact, China recently overtook 

Japan as the largest reserve holder. The value of China’s reserves 

are now estimated, Mr. Secretary, to exceed US$1 trillion, the majority of which is invested in dollar-denominated assets. The 

growth in China’s foreign exchange reserves has slowed in recent 

months, but the pace remains quite rapid. This continued growth 

raises troubling questions as to the sustainability of China’s enviable economic growth rate and its ability to control credit and inflation within its domestic economy. 

Because the international trade and financial markets are truly 

global, the pace of China’s actions toward greater currency flexibility are critical, I believe, to both China’s continued strong domestic economy and to the world economy. The Chinese currency 

has appreciated roughly 6 or 7 percent since July of 2005 when 

China first announced plans to move toward flexibility. However, 

as your report points out, that pace toward greater flexibility has 

not been fast enough. As a result, we have seen no reduction of the 

current account surplus of foreign reserve accumulation. 

While some may argue, Mr. Secretary, that these numbers are a 

natural outgrowth of globalized financial markets, the numbers 

also raise questions about whether world trade has been conducted 

on a level playing field. 

Secretary Paulson, I am interested in hearing about the specific 

steps today that the administration is taking through our Strategic 

Economic Dialogue to move China toward a more flexible rate policy. I would also hope to hear more about how international bodies 

such as the G-97, the International Monetary Fund, and perhaps 

the Asian Development Bank can also play a role in facilitating increased flexibility. 


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Over the long term, both the U.S. and the global economy will 

benefit from the continued pursuit of free trade and flexible exchange rate policies. And I believe the most desirable way to reduce our current account deficit will be through stronger growth 

abroad and more open trading markets and policies. I look forward 

to hearing from you this morning. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. Why don’t you 

bring that microphone right down close to you. 

STATEMENT OF HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., SECRETARY, 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Secretary PAULSON. I have it. OK. This is my maiden voyage. 

Chairman DODD. Yes, and we are one member away from having 

a quorum, so why don’t you get going here. But if someone walks 

in the door, we will take a break for 2 minutes. 

Secretary PAULSON. OK. Mr. Chairman, Senator Shelby, and 

Members of the Committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to have this dialog with you today on an issue of vital importance to American workers and the American economy. As you 

know, the Foreign Exchange Report recently issued by the Treasury reviews developments in international economics and the exchange rate policies of a number of our key trading partners. 

Let me first take a few minutes to talk about the important and 

multifaceted relationship we have with China. Getting it right is 

vitally important to the citizens of both our nations and the world 

and will be so for many years to come. 

Since the economic relationship between our two countries is an 

important part of our overall relationship, I have focused intensely 

on China from the day I was confirmed. It is my job to press for 

opportunities for American businesses and American workers. The 

successful management of our economic relationship with China 

will benefit the United States and China greatly. 

The United States and China share many strategic interests. 

These range from national security to economic growth and trade 

to the health of our environment. As a growing leader on the world 

stage, China must be a full participant in the rules-based world 

economy. Recognizing this, the President and Chinese President 

Hu established a Strategic Economic Dialogue to manage the economic relationship between our two nations on a long-term basis. 

The SED should help us make progress on fundamental longterm structural economic issues as well as on very pressing shortterm issues. It is not a scripted ceremony. It is a serious, focused 

discussion of the economic issues that matter most. 

The SED provides a mechanism through which, for the first time 

in our relationship, our Government can speak with a single voice 

on economic issues to the highest levels of the Chinese Government 

and do so on a regular basis. The dialog is goals based and designed to keep both sides moving forward on goals that we establish. By meeting regularly, we can actively monitor the progress we 

are making. By making progress on critical immediate issues such 

as currency reform, we will build the confidence to deal with the 

important longer-term economic issues, such as the structural challenges China faces. 


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China’s currency policy is a key factor in our economic relationship. China does not yet have the currency policy we want it to 

have and that it needs. Treasury’s Foreign Exchange Report clearly 

states that China’s cautious approach to exchange rate reform exacerbates distortions in its domestic economy and impedes the adjustment of international imbalances. I look forward to discussing 

the report with you during this hearing. 

We are actively pressing the Chinese to introduce greater currency flexibility and to undertake wider market reform. We are 

seeing some results. China abandoned its pegged exchange rate in 

July of 2005 and began to introduce some flexibility. Since last 

July, the pace of appreciation has been more than three times as 

fast as it had been in the first year after the initial renminbi reform. Foreign currency trading, once conducted entirely by the Chinese Government, is now conducted almost entirely by commercial 

banks. 

China has introduced financial instruments to hedge foreign exchange risk, and the Chinese Government has begun to allow increased fluctuations in the currency. This is welcome progress, but 

we need to see much more. Although China is moving faster, it is 

still not moving fast enough. Nor is currency flexibility enough. A 

major objective of my 2 remaining years as Treasury Secretary will 

be pressing the Chinese Government to advance toward the goal of 

renminbi whose value is freely set in a competitive marketplace 

based upon economic fundamentals. 

I will work with the Chinese Government to develop the market 

infrastructure they need for a freely floating currency. This involves several key steps. 

First, the government should progressively widen the band that 

limits the daily movements of the exchange rate. Widening the 

band will help businesses and financial institutions learn to operate with a fluctuating currency. 

Second, the central bank should progressively reduce its intervention in foreign exchange markets. 

Third, China must develop the fundamental components of a capital market, a bond market and a yield curve, to absorb inflows and 

outflows of foreign exchange and provide ways to hedge against exchange risk. 

And, fourth, China’s central bank must set clear policy targets to 

avoid inflation and thereby provide confidence in the value of the 

Chinese currency. 

I want to be clear. Increased flexibility in the short run is absolutely necessary, but it is not sufficient. My goal is to make significant progress toward a fully market-determined floating Chinese 

currency. The message I delivered to Chinese decisionmakers in 

the first meeting of our Strategic Economic Dialogue in December 

is that they are not moving quickly enough to make their currency 

more flexible. While they agreed they need to increase currency 

flexibility and move to a floating exchange rate, they are not moving quickly enough for the United States or the rest of the global 

community, and they are not moving quickly enough for their own 

good. The Chinese leaders believe there is risk in moving too quickly when, in fact, as I argued to them, the greater risk is in moving 

too slowly. China may be in some respects a developing country, 


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but it is also a large and powerful country. The international community will run out of patience with China unless the pace of its 

reform accelerates. 

Reform of China’s currency policy is a crucial issue for China and 

the United States, and, Mr. Chairman, the need for reform in the 

Chinese economy goes beyond currency. Currency movement alone 

will not eliminate the distortions in the Chinese economy, nor significantly reduce its trade surplus. China needs to restructure its 

economy so that household consumption—rather than exports and 

excess investment—powers growth. This is the only way that China 

can grow without generating huge trade surpluses. 

To do this, Chinese policy must address the reasons why Chinese 

households feel compelled to save so much and spend so little. Only 

20 percent of 800 million people who live in rural areas in China 

have health insurance. The basic government pension covered only 

17 percent of Chinese workers in 2005. And only 14 percent of the 

population is covered by unemployment insurance. China must invest in its people by strengthening its health care system and the 

social safety net, and Chinese households need financial products 

that insure against risk and finance major expenditures. The Strategic Economic Dialogue addresses all of these issues. 

I believe that the openness of the U.S. economy to competition 

and our participation in international trade are key to economic 

growth, higher wages, and increased opportunities for U.S. workers. We saw the importance of trade for U.S. workers, as the Chairman just mentioned, in this morning’s strong GDP data. GDP 

growth in the fourth quarter was 3.5 percent, and inflation was 

moderate at 1.5 percent. Trade contributed more than 1.6 percentage points to growth, with double-digit exports gains accounting for 

more than 1 percentage point. 

We have reached a crossover point at which American exports 

are now growing faster than imports and have been doing so for 

four consecutive quarters. We are pressing China to follow our example of openness, and I am working to ensure that China’s 

growth and expanding market create maximum opportunities for 

the United States. China must live up to its WTO commitments. 

It must protect and vigorously enforce intellectual property rights. 

It must increasingly open its markets to foreign competition for its 

own good as well as ours. And it must introduce greater transparency in regulation and observe the rule of law. Through the 

Strategic Economic Dialogue and through the various economic dialogs we have with China, the administration will continue to press 

very hard in all of these areas. 

Mr. Chairman, America’s economy and workers benefit significantly from our trade with China. China is our fourth largest export market. Our exports to China have increased more than 350 

percent over the last decade, 6 times the growth of our exports to 

the rest of the world. And nearly half of our exports to China are 

capital goods, including high-value-added goods such as civilian aircraft, electrical machinery, and medical devices. 

I believe strongly that a healthy Chinese economy, growing without large external imbalances, is of vital interest to the people of 

the United States, to the people of China, and to the global economy as a whole. More constant flexibility in the short term and a 


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fully market-determined floating renminbi in the intermediate 

term are essential to accomplish this goal. So is restructuring the 

Chinese economy so that the domestic consumption demand, not 

exports, fuels Chinese growth. Broad structural changes are necessary to have a major impact on our trade deficit with China. 

The next round of the SED will take place here in Washington 

in May. I understand that all of your constituents are very concerned about the impact of our relationship with China on their 

jobs and on their livelihoods. China is a big and important part of 

the world economy. It needs a currency whose value is determined 

in an open, competitive marketplace and an economy that supports 

more balanced, stable growth. 

I look forward to working with the Members of this distinguished 

Committee on the many important issues we have before us, and 

I now welcome your questions. Thank you. 

Chairman DODD. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and 

we have a quorum here present. In fact, come on in, Jack. You can 

add to it here this morning. So I am going to move the Committee 

into executive session, if I can. We will briefly interrupt here the 

flow of this. 

[Whereupon, at 10:29 a.m., the Committee proceeded to other 

business and reconvened at 10:32 a.m.] 

Chairman DODD. Let me begin, and I am going to ask that the 

clock run for 7 minutes. We have a good turnout here this morning, 

and that is not a great deal of time to get into great length. But 

so that everyone gets a chance to engage in the discussion, I think 

it is going to be important that we follow the early bird rules that 

have applied in the past here, which the exception, obviously, of 

the Ranking Member. 

Mr. Secretary, again, thanks for being here, and we appreciate 

your comments. I was looking at this report also sent to Congress— 

this was in November of 2006—on the U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, which I presume you may be familiar 

with. Their report here, which is a rather lengthy report, goes on 

at some length, and they concluded, on a 12–0 vote, by the way— 

not actually a divided vote—that China is manipulating its currency and engaging in other unfair trade practices. They are worried about it. As I said, they voted 12–0 that China is engaged in 

currency manipulation as defined by the statute. 

They wanted to point out, by the way, and you made the case 

about the difficulties China has in serving its large population—unemployment insurance, health insurance, and the like. But I think 

it is also worthy of note here that China has increased its military 

budget by double-digit growth over the last 10 years. The U.S.- 

China Economic and Security Review Commission warned, and I 

quote them here, ‘‘The People’s Liberation Army is developing antisatellite capabilities and space warfare weapons that impede U.S. 

command and control. Two weeks ago, China launched the first 

anti-satellite weapon in 20 years.’’ 

So while we understand they have got a lot of work to do in providing for the needs of their people, they are not finding any difficulty in providing for what they perceive to be their national security needs, investing some massive amounts into a defense structure at the expense of serving the people of China, who deserve a 


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lot better than they are getting. So here is one Commission that 

reaches a conclusion on a 12–0 vote that, in fact, China is manipulating its currency. 

Now, putting aside, if I may ask you here, the technicalities of 

the statute here, let me ask you very directly at the outset: What 

is your personal view about this matter? You have spoken eloquently this morning about what is going on. Is China manipulating its currency in your view? 

Secretary PAULSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say I share 

everybody’s—— 

Chairman DODD. Is your mike on, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary PAULSON. Is it on? 

Chairman DODD. You have got to—— 

Secretary PAULSON. OK, I have got you. I will get the hang of 

this in a minute or two. I share the views of everyone who is frustrated about the currency because I would like to see China showing much more flexibility, and I am going to be frustrated until 

they do so. 

Now, let me also say that I did not wait for this report to come 

out. I was not holding my breath for this report to come out to take 

action. So from the day I was confirmed as Treasury Secretary, I 

started focusing on China. Shortly thereafter, I was pressing the 

Chinese on the matter of currency flexibility, and pressing them 

hard. 

They now embrace currency flexibility as a policy. It is a stated 

policy. It is a goal. And so as you have pointed out, intent is what 

we look at because the law calls for intent. But what I think is important is action. Even if China had been named as a manipulator 

in this report, the remedy under the law is to negotiate with them 

directly on currency and to negotiate through the IMF. That is 

what we have been doing. 

To me, it is not just about currency flexibility in the short term. 

As I said in my testimony, the Chinese need to make progress over 

the next couple of years so that they will be in a position in the 

intermediate term where we will not be having this discussion because they will have a currency where there is no argument about 

it because the value is determined in a competitive, open marketplace. 

Chairman DODD. Let me ask you this: Your predecessor, Secretary Snow, in the 2005 report—and I am quoting from it here— 

found the following: He says, ‘‘If current trends continue’’—speaking of China. ‘‘If current trends continue without substantial alteration, China’s policies will likely meet the technical requirements 

of the statute for designation as a currency manipulator.’’ He went 

on to say, ‘‘This adjustment has to be material and has to be significant, has to be something that would significantly close the gap 

between current value and an appropriate, more appropriate 

value.’’ 

I guess the question I would ask you in light of that, Secretary 

Snow made that statement that China has significantly—or, rather, Secretary Snow made the statement that China has significantly closed the gap, or do you agree with his interpretation of the 

statute in this sense? I mean, this is your report. It seems to me 


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the language here that at least looking at the predecessor’s comments here, it is not materially changing its direction. 

Secretary PAULSON. I do not know what was in my predecessor’s 

mind, but as I have said, I have been focused on results and putting a process in place where we can speak with one voice to the 

top decisionmakers and indeed get movement and get action. As I 

testified, I have said the way we looked at this I am just like John 

Snow. I read John Snow’s testimony, and he said repeatedly to 

Members of this Committee that he was in heated agreement with 

you. And I am in agreement. We need more movement on the currency. 

I am not satisfied, I know what my job is, and I know I need to 

get results. And it is not just flexibility in the short term because, 

if we do not do something about some of the structural reforms 

they need and have them move forward on the path of reform, we 

will still have these trade imbalances because we will need broader 

structural reform in addition to the short-term movement in the 

currency. 

Chairman DODD. Well, I agree with you about action. I think action is important. And this conversation is important, except if you 

are the guy out there who has just lost his job in the manufacturing sector because of the disadvantages here, the subsidies that 

the Chairman of the Federal Reserve talked about on the trip that 

you all took there. And this is a boiling concern of people across 

the country to watch this manipulation and to watch the disadvantage and to watch the hardship it imposes on people who work very 

hard. And losing 3 million jobs in the manufacturing sector, losing 

1 million of them in the defense-related areas, while you are watching the country who is sort of dawdling along here having doubledigit increases in its defense spending at the expense of its own 

people’s needs raises concerns about whether or not we are going 

to stand up and insist upon some real concrete action before sort 

of going along year after year sort of tolerating this behavior at the 

expense of jobs here and our own economic security in the future. 

You point out the action stuff. I am looking—and I know you 

care about this. In your testimony, you talk about building components of a strong capital market structure, a bond market and a 

yield curve, which will enable the country to get to the point where 

it can freely float its currency. And yet only modest concessions 

have been made as China continues to set barriers intended to prevent foreign financial services—something you were very familiar 

with obviously in your previous incarnation, the difficulty this critical component of our economy, the financial service sector, has in 

accessing the markets in China, the barriers they put up to us, and 

how critical a component that is for getting to the point where they 

are no longer manipulating their currency. And yet here is action 

they could be taking that they refuse to take. 

How do you square that in a sense? 

Secretary PAULSON. Well, let me say, Mr. Chairman, first of all, 

I really share your concern about people who are losing their jobs 

in this country. That is what drives me and one of the major reasons I took this assignment on. And I agree with you on the capital 

markets. I look at the capital markets, and I cannot think of any 

country in the world that has an economy that works properly and 


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allocates capital efficiently and has a currency where the values 

are really set in a broad, deep, competitive market that does not 

also have strong capital markets. And I cannot find any country 

that has strong capital markets that has not opened itself up to foreign competition and taken off investment caps. 

This is one of the things that we are going to be pressing on in 

the Strategic Economic Dialogue opening up capital markets to the 

banks and investment banks, and a multitude of other service industries, because a lot of what the Strategic Economic Dialogue is 

about is the path of reform that China has and the pace of reform 

post-WTO, opening up their economy to our goods and our services. 

And so that is very closely related. I am pleased you see that relationship between that and currency. 

Chairman DODD. Absolutely. 

Secretary PAULSON. Because the two go together. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much. 

Senator Shelby. 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, I just have some technical questions, but I was 

wondering what would you say to someone who had been working 

in the steel or foundry business, like in Birmingham, Alabama, my 

home State, for the third generation and finally at 55 years of age, 

laid off, had good jobs always, because obviously they see the manufacturing jobs gone. And these are good jobs. They sustain families, they sustain communities a long time. We have to face our 

constituents like this and explain what is going on with the manipulation of currency, what is going on in the imbalance of trade, and 

so forth. 

What would you say to someone if they would confront you like 

they confront us, our constituents? 

Secretary PAULSON. Let me tell you, when I have met—and I notice you are going to have the NAM here later, and so I have had 

some very explicit conversations, and let me say that is a very, 

very tough situation because what I would say to someone is that 

I am going to do everything I can to represent you and represent 

our country in opening up markets and ensuring that we have fair 

trade; but that, unfortunately, we do not always have a level playing field. And although the benefits of trade benefit a whole society 

and benefit a country by raising the standard of living, the immediate losses we see from time to time are very, very painful. 

Senator SHELBY. Do you believe we have a level playing field in 

our trade relationship with China? 

Secretary PAULSON. I clearly do not believe that the American 

people believe the benefits are shared equally. I know that. And I 

do believe that our trade with China right now benefits both of our 

countries, but I want to fight to get it to benefit U.S. workers to 

a greater extent. 

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary, getting into some technical stuff, 

about a week ago Premier Wen gave a speech, and in that speech 

he noted, and I will quote, ‘‘Management of reserves should be improved and the channels through which they are invested diversified.’’ 

How do you interpret this comment and the general theme of his 

remarks focusing on expanding the use of the reserves? And how 


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do you believe global financial markets and currency traders are 

reacting to these comments? 

Secretary PAULSON. OK. You almost hate to speculate on what 

someone else has in mind and what he meant, but let me—— 

Senator SHELBY. Well, obviously, he meant something, didn’t he? 

Secretary PAULSON. Yes, he did. He sure did. 

Senator SHELBY. OK. 

Secretary PAULSON. And so let me speculate a bit about what he 

might have meant, and let me talk a little bit about China’s reserves. 

I believe that it would be very healthy for China to diversify 

their investment policy as it relates to reserves and see more direct 

investment in certain areas in China and direct investment in 

other areas of the world. 

Now, as I look at their reserves—and let me say to you that I 

am concerned about a lot of things. I am concerned about the question you raised about people losing their jobs. 

Senator SHELBY. Absolutely. 

Secretary PAULSON. I am concerned about the income of the average worker. I am concerned about the trade deficit. I am concerned 

about the Chinese currency. I am concerned about rebalancing the 

Chinese economy. 

The thing that concerns me the least of all of these things is 

when I look at their reserves and how those reserves are invested. 

The comment I get most frequently, as I go around and talk with 

people, is, ‘‘Aren’t you concerned that they own too much in the 

way of the U.S. treasuries? Aren’t we somewhat’’—— 

Senator SHELBY. Our debt, in other words. 

Secretary PAULSON. Yes, hostage, our debt. Our debt, our Treasury debt. And I look at it and say that they currently own somewhat less than $350 billion of U.S. Treasury debt by our estimates. 

Our public Treasury debt outstanding is over $4 trillion. Our 

Treasury securities trade $500 billion in a day, so there is more 

Treasury trading in a day than the Chinese own. They also own 

other U.S. dollar-denominated securities debt of private parties, 

non-government debt. And I believe that the Chinese own dollar 

debt because it gives them the best risk-adjusted rate of return, 

and the key for us is keeping the confidence up in our economy and 

have economic policies that do that. 

So when I looked at the Premier’s comments, and, again, I do not 

know exactly what he had in mind, but certainly any country has 

to think carefully about how they manage their reserves. I think 

it is a healthy sign. 

Senator SHELBY. But $1 trillion of hard currency reserve, that is 

a lot of money—is it not?—by anybody’s reckoning. 

Secretary PAULSON. It sure is. 

Senator SHELBY. What dialog, Mr. Secretary, have you or other 

officials had with the Chinese officials to determine what direction 

any change in reserve strategy might take? I know you do not want 

to be left in the corner on this. Are there any potential negative 

repercussions to the U.S. from various alternatives that they would 

pursue? 

Secretary PAULSON. When I was in Beijing in December, Chairman Bernanke and I sat down and we had lunch with Zhou 


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Xiaochuan, who runs the central bank, and the Minister of Finance, and the woman who chairs SAFE, which manages reserves. 

We had a general conversation, as you would expect us to do, as 

we would with any other nation in the world that has big reserves—and none of us on our side had any real concern. 

As I have said, I take all the things I mentioned to you before 

very seriously, and we obviously take this seriously. But, again, 

given the size of our debt outstanding and the way it trades and 

the diversity and so on, that is not at the top of the list of—— 

Senator SHELBY. Do they own about 8 percent of our total debt, 

something like that? 

Secretary PAULSON. I would say they own about 8 percent of our 

treasuries. The Japanese own more than any other Government. 

The Japanese—— 

Senator SHELBY. What would that be? 

Secretary PAULSON. What? 

Senator SHELBY. What percentage would that be, larger than 8 

percent, that the Japanese—— 

Secretary PAULSON. I do not have the exact number, but if the 

Chinese own about $350 billion of our Treasury securities, the Japanese own something over $600 billion. 

Senator SHELBY. OK, twice that. Mr. Secretary, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you, Senator Shelby. 

Senator Carper. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMAS R. CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Chairman, thanks. Mr. Secretary, welcome. 

It is good to be here on your maiden voyage, and I just want you 

to know I appreciate very much a number of the things you said, 

but especially when you said, ‘‘I am focused on results.’’ And you 

have been focused on results with respect to another issue that you 

know I have talked a lot about in the last couple of months, and 

that is, trying to make sure we have a strong independent regulator for our Government-sponsored enterprises. 

Just take, if you will, just maybe 30 seconds and give us an update on what is going on there. I know there are negotiations between you and your staff and some folks, some of our colleagues 

in the House side. 

Secretary PAULSON. The question, Senator—the Senator is very 

interested in, as I know the Chairman and Senator Shelby and 

Senator Bennett and a number of other people are, in GSE reform. 

And I would just simply say that the Administration and I personally feel very strongly that we do need a strong, independent regulator. I was encouraged by some of the progress late last year that 

we made, and we are going to continue to work toward that goal. 

So far the conversations have been very constructive, but we have 

got a lot further to go. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. 

In your testimony, Mr. Secretary, you go through about four or 

so key steps that the Chinese need to take, and it is about halfway 

through your testimony. I will not read them all, but there are one, 

two, three, four. And let me just ask, I presume that the way we 


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measure progress is to look at what is happening with respect to 

those four key items. Is that correct? 

Secretary PAULSON. That would be one way to measure progress. 

Senator CARPER. I always like to say that we measure the things 

that we do best, and in terms of—what are we measuring here? 

Secretary PAULSON. I think that is—well, let me give you a little 

bit of a longer answer because that is something I have been focused on from literally the first month after confirmation. I thought 

a lot about how to engage with China to discuss their economic reform. Currency is very important, but more broadly on economic reform, how do we engage? Because this is so important. What hit 

me was that the U.S. Government and the Chinese Government 

were agreeing on the principles and the directions. There was 

broad agreement but big disagreement on the pace of reform, the 

speed. And we felt very strongly that they needed to move quicker. 

And so I took a look at how we were working with China, and 

I saw that at the top, President Bush and President Hu had a very 

good dialog. Below that, in the economic arena, we had some effective dialogs in the JCCT and the JEC, all the things you are aware 

of. But it seemed to me that we were not organized as effectively 

as we needed to be. We were a bit siloed, and so what we needed 

to do was to come up with a process where we could speak with 

one voice to the key decisionmakers and a broad range of decisionmakers at the top. We needed to organize multiple long meetings 

during the year so we can measure our progress. 

Now, what you are getting at is what are the things we want to 

measure. On the currency, you mentioned four of the things. But, 

again, as the Chairman and Senator Shelby both said, actions are 

what matter, and with regard to the currency, I would summarize 

it to say we definitely need more flexibility. No matter what they 

do to give it to us, we need more flexibility in the short term. And 

then we need those actions in the medium term that are going to 

get us to the point—get them to the point, actually, where they 

have a currency that trades in the marketplace. 

Now, part of that is going to be—— 

Senator CARPER. I would ask you to wrap it up because I have 

one more question. 

Secretary PAULSON. OK. Then here is how I will wrap it up, because this will be opening up their economy to products and services going beyond WTO, and doing some things to make their capital market stronger, opening to our competition, international 

competition, and, again, doing some things that are going to help 

them bring more balance to their economy. But we will be establishing those benchmarks. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. 

One question that I would ask you for the record and just submit 

in writing a response, if you will. Somewhere in your testimony, 

you talked, I believe, about a sixfold increase in the amount of exports from the U.S. to China. What I am going to ask you to answer for the record is: What is the increase in exports from the 

Chinese to us during that—don’t answer it now. 

Secretary PAULSON. I tell you—— 

Senator CARPER. No, I have another question I want to ask you 

and I want you to answer right here. 


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Secretary PAULSON. OK. I would like to just tell you, because the 

estimate—— 

Senator BUNNING. Your microphone is off. 

Secretary PAULSON. Sorry. This last year, we had a very important crossover point. We had a very important change in the export-import balance with China. According to the latest estimate 

that I am looking at, it looks like our exports will have gone up 

about a third to China, 33 percent, to about the $56 billion level, 

and imports will have increased 19 percent. 

Senator CARPER. OK. I appreciate that, but the question I want 

you to answer for the record is: For the period of time that you 

cited for our exports to the Chinese were up by, I think, six-fold, 

what was the increase, the similar increase for them? 

Secretary PAULSON. Right. 

Senator CARPER. And also, for the same timeframe, what was the 

growth in their purchase of our debt over the same timeframe? 

Secretary PAULSON. All right. 

Senator CARPER. A hundred percent, 200 percent, whatever. Here 

is my question that I want you to quickly answer. You met, along 

with the President, with the heads of GM, DaimlerChrysler, and 

Ford a month and a half or so ago at the White House. Among the 

issues that they raised were investments in battery technology and 

also the issue of Japanese currency manipulation. You and I have 

discussed it a little bit. They still feel very strongly that something 

is going on. Could you just speak to why you think that is not the 

case? 

Secretary PAULSON. OK. I will be as quick as I can, and let me 

say I have been watching the Japanese currency very, very carefully. I talked with the Finance Minister several weeks ago. I will 

see him when I am in Germany, in Essen, at the end of next week. 

The yen is close to—don’t hold me exactly to this—a 20-year low 

on a trade-related basis. 

What I said to the auto manufacturers is that there has been no 

intervention in the yen since March of 2004. I do not believe there 

has been—although I could be wrong on this, because I cannot read 

every quote, but I do not think there has been verbal intervention 

for almost a year. I do not like verbal intervention. I do not think 

it determines where markets trade. 

I think what is going on in the Japanese currency is this: Japan 

is the second largest economy in the world. All through the 1990’s 

and a couple years, in this century, the Japanese economy was not 

growing. There was deflation. There was a huge drag on the global 

economy. They have turned this around now. It is a big reason that 

the global economy is doing as well as it is. This is an economy 

where there has been weak growth, where there has been deflation, 

and so interest rates are very low. I think it is those economic fundamentals that are driving it. And then, of course at any one time, 

who knows why markets trade the way they do? I am watching it 

carefully, but the things that concern me are exchange rates—excuse me, currencies where the value is not determined in a competitive marketplace, and the yen has a broad, deep, competitive 

marketplace. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, and I would just urge you to stay 

focused on that. Thank you. 


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Secretary PAULSON. OK. 

Chairman DODD. Senator Sununu. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN E. SUNUNU 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Paulson, last year, Under Secretary Quarles testified 

on insurance, and a number of other Treasury officials commented 

in the hearings we had about the potential benefits and, in fact, 

the need to modernize the insurance industry, in particular, insurance regulation. I have been working on this issue for a couple of 

years with Senator Johnson, and we have developed legislation together. And most recently Senator Schumer and Mayor Bloomberg 

worked with a group of financial service industry representatives 

about the competitiveness of the U.S. financial services industry. 

One of the conclusions of their report was that we need to reform 

the insurance regulatory system, and they recommended an optional Federal charter approach to that reform. I would like to get 

your view on the current State-based regulatory system for insurance and whether or not you think that modernization can contribute to some of the competitiveness issues you have been discussing in recent speeches around the country. 

Secretary PAULSON. OK. Senator, thank you very much, and 

thank you for your concern and knowledge and interest in this 

area. I would also say I was very impressed with the BloombergSchumer report and the issues it raised. 

Let me also say that one thing that we are going to be looking 

at carefully at Treasury is competitiveness in the insurance industry and the impact of regulation on that and, you know, the advantages of an optional charter. As you know, this is not an easy issue 

given how insurance companies are regulated, and there are strong 

views on both sides, and it is one that I very much look forward 

to getting involved in. 

I think although we don’t have a clear position yet on the optional Federal charter, I personally think it has got a lot of merit, 

and we are going to be thinking this issue through very carefully. 

Senator SUNUNU. Do you feel that in such an approach, if we 

were to take such an approach, do you feel confident in the ability 

of a Federal regulator to adequately address safety and soundness 

issues? 

Secretary PAULSON. Well, you are taking it beyond where we are 

to date, and we are going to be spending a fair amount of time on 

this. We are going to have a conference at Treasury in March, and 

as we look at competitiveness, one of the key issues we are going 

to look at is the regulatory structure in the U.S. So it will take us 

a while—— 

Senator SUNUNU. Are you suggesting to me you want to get back 

to the easy questions about Chinese currency manipulation? 

[Laughter.] 

Secretary PAULSON. There is no important question that is easy. 

And this is a very important issue, and it is one that we are going 

to be thinking very carefully about. 

Senator SUNUNU. And I appreciate that, and I know this is not 

an issue that you have to discuss or testify on here, but I certainly 

want to compliment the work of your staff in approaching this 


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issue in a very constructive way, and the testimony we received 

last year was extremely helpful. 

The regulatory issue in the financial services industry is one that 

has come up recently. There was an article in the Post about it recently. A few people have visited me on the issue, and that is the 

10-percent cap, the statutory limit that we have on banking deposits, limiting total deposits for any bank in the United States to 10 

percent of the aggregate. And a very specific concern that has been 

raised is that that would make it more likely that U.S. banks are 

acquired by foreign banks because those foreign banks are not necessarily subject to those growth constraints. And so if a U.S. bank 

gets to a particular level, they really cannot grow through acquisition any longer, and it makes them a little bit less competitive 

around the world, and they could potentially be acquired. 

Do you sort of agree with that view that an arbitrary cap, in this 

case of 10 percent, could make a foreign acquisition a little bit 

more likely? 

Secretary PAULSON. Senator, this is, a complex issue that touches 

on competitiveness from two different angles. This is something 

that I am sure will receive some discussion, but, again, let’s remember what the reason for the 10-percent cap was to begin with, 

which was, concern about competition in our markets. 

Senator SUNUNU. I appreciate that viewpoint. Although, as I understand it, I certainly wasn’t here. It was a negotiated tradeoff, 

shall we say, a compromise that was reached between different 

constituent groups weighing in on both sides of a piece of legislation, and they decided to set the cap at 10 percent. I don’t know 

that it necessarily had a great deal of economic validity to it, but 

it certainly has served to maintain a much more fragmented market, which could have some strengths, but also could have drawbacks. 

All right. I will keep skipping down then. The last question gets 

back to something raised by Senator Shelby, who I think asked a 

very good question about the diversification statements of the Chinese leadership, and you gave a very good answer as well. But I 

am curious about a specific concern or potential concern, which 

would be, How would you respond if the Chinese Government announced that as part of that diversification strategy they were 

going to start purchasing U.S. equities, and in particular, let us say 

for the sake of discussion, they made a tender offer to purchase 

Ford auto manufacturer? How would the Secretary of the Treasury 

respond? 

Secretary PAULSON. Let me say one thing I have learned is that 

as Secretary of Treasury, I should not be responding to 

hypotheticals. So—— 

Senator SUNUNU. I thought it was only United States Senators 

that were not supposed to respond to hypotheticals. 

Secretary PAULSON. Let me just leave it there. Thank you. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SUNUNU. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, I tried. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman DODD. Mr. Secretary, I told you there is no germaneness rule in these hearings. 

[Laughter.] 


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Chairman DODD. As I told the Senator the other day, when he 

asked what the subject matters would be, I said the subject matter 

is the exchange rate policy, but the subject matters my colleagues 

may raise might digress a bit from that subject matter, and Senator Sununu certainly has every right to raise the questions he did 

here this morning, and I appreciate it. 

Senator Bayh. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR EVAN BAYH 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Senator Bayh, I talked about your State a little 

bit. I mentioned the companies in Indiana that closed their doors 

that produced those magnets in the smart bombs. 

Senator BAYH. That is exactly right. A subject for another day, 

perhaps, Mr. Secretary. It is a matter of national security when the 

manufacturers of important defense systems are acquired or moved 

to another country. But that is not the subject matter at this hearing. 

I want to thank you for your presence today and for your public 

service, and some of the questions that you are getting, including 

some of my own relate to, shall we say, legacy policies that you 

have inherited from your successors and that have been part of the 

administration’s record for some years. And I know you are trying 

to grapple with this, so I hope you take that into consideration 

when you field our question. 

I listened with some interest to Senator Shelby’s comments and 

the Chairman’s comments, and I would like to follow up on that a 

little bit. And you alluded to it yourself, Mr. Secretary, when you 

said ultimately it is not what we say but what we do that matters. 

That applies to other countries as well. 

As you know, the Chinese have a history of saying many of the 

right things, and I am glad that in your private conversations they 

understand that it is in their best interest to begin to allow their 

currency to float and to protect intellectual property and to reform 

their banking system and those kinds of things. 

We have been saying for some time that we have been frustrated. 

You said that this morning as well. And so here is my question. 

When asked by my colleagues what we intended to do, you mentioned regular meetings and further dialogs and those sorts of 

things. But it might strike many of us that that is, in fact, what 

we have had in the past. 

Are there any specific steps that we intend to take if they do not 

show material progress toward moving in a better direction, other 

than meetings and dialog and consultation? 

Secretary PAULSON. Well, Senator, as I said earlier, the process 

that we have, which I would not characterize as just dialog, because we are now going to be speaking with a single voice to the 

key decisionmakers. We are going to be doing it very regularly, and 

we are going to be following it up, and we are going to be holding 

ourselves and holding them accountable. 

But having said that, let me say what you said very nicely, and 

what I have had a number of other Senators say to me in private. 

I have talked with Senator Schumer and Lindsey Graham and so 

on, and they have said when you do this, is that going to get reVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:36 Nov 24, 2009 Jkt 050308 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A308.XXX A308

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sults? And if it does not get results, what are you going to do? And 

what kind of leverage do you have and so on? 

What I have said is that we are dealing with a sovereign state 

in China, a sovereign nation. It has got its own public to deal with; 

that I really do believe what we have put in place gives us the best 

chance to get some progress. I do not mean to sound naive because 

it very well may be that after we have worked hard, I will be dissatisfied, you will be dissatisfied with the progress, and the American people will be dissatisfied. But I still believe that we will get 

more progress with the course we have adopted than we will going 

any other way. 

And what I need to do is make a very, very strong case as to why 

it is in their best interest and how strongly the American public 

feels about it and how strongly you all feel about it, and be there 

and be at the table continually pressing and pounding on these 

issues. 

Senator BAYH. Well, I have you are right, Mr. Secretary, and I 

know you are sincere. As you can appreciate, the issues for many 

who observe this process, and my staff compiled a list of the statements on behalf of our own Government in consultation and meeting with the Chinese urging them to take these steps, and then the 

Chinese respond that they intend to pursue the necessary reforms. 

Ultimately, when a period of years passes, it is a question of credibility on their part. You know, they are saying the right things, but 

what do they really intend? Are they just sort of placating us but 

continuing to pursue their own interests? And then ultimately our 

own credibility, we say the right things, but what do we intend to 

do to back up our words with actions? 

And so many of us are looking for some more material steps, 

both on their part and on our part. 

Secretary PAULSON. Senator, I would also say when it comes to 

compliance with the WTO, Susan Schwab, our Trade Representative, is quite aggressive. You saw the auto parts case, the other 

things we have in our arsenal. 

So I don’t think I would characterize it as being passive about 

this. This is very important. It is a very, very important relationship to all of us, and managing it properly and making sure we get 

some progress. 

Senator BAYH. Well, that is what the steelworker that Senator 

Shelby referred to or the autoworker in Indiana, quite frankly, is 

looking for. You mentioned that the playing field is not always 

level. What they want to know, to use the colloquialism they would 

use to me, is: ‘‘What the hell do you intend to do about it?’’ 

Secretary PAULSON. Right. 

Senator BAYH. And I think that is what we are all looking for, 

backing up our intentions with actions if there is not material 

progress, because at the end of the day, this global trading system 

that we all embrace has to be one of mutual interest, not unfairly 

weighted on one side or the other. Otherwise, it is not sustainable, 

and that is not in our interest or China’s interest or in anyone’s 

interest. 

If I could just shift subject matter for a second, this is a matter 

of not only financial policy but, frankly, my own concerns about our 

national security interests, and it relates again to the currency 


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issue and that sort of thing. I was interested in your comments, I 

think it was with regard to Senator Shelby, about the size of Chinese reserves compared to the daily volume of trading in U.S. securities and that sort of thing. And I gathered from your comments 

that you did not feel that they could really have a material impact 

upon the value of the dollar, regardless of the policy of the Chinese 

Government. 

But my thoughts went back to—and I am sure you will remember this well—a couple of years ago when a rumor went through 

Seoul that the South Koreans were thinking about diversifying 

their own holdings and set off a free fall in the dollar temporarily 

until an official of their treasury came out and said that that is not 

true. 

A couple months after that, there was a misstatement, I think 

by the Japanese Prime Minister, along the same lines. It set off a 

similar trading pattern in the—so my only—my question to you, 

Mr. Secretary, is: It seems, at least in those two instances, the 

marketplace seemed to disagree with your assessment. And so my 

question to you is—my concern is this: As a great country, we cannot really afford to put ourselves in a position of vulnerability 

where another nation can affect something materially as profoundly important to us as the value of our money. And so I get 

back to your question. Did I understand your opinion correctly that 

they cannot, even if they wanted to, if they chose to diversify to the 

dollar, affect the value of the dollar? And if so, how do you explain 

the incidents in Korea and Japan? 

Secretary PAULSON. Let me, because what I was addressing was 

our Treasury and the market for our treasuries and the impact on 

interest rates and on Treasury securities. Because I made the point 

that what they own in treasuries, $350 billion, that $500 billion 

trade in 1 day. And I made the further point that the key thing 

is the confidence in our economy and in our country, which is why 

people hold treasuries. 

Now, let me say that I think you all know my very, very strong 

view on how important a strong dollar is to this country. It is clearly in our Nation’s interest, and so that is something I feel very 

strongly about. 

But your comment—— 

Senator BAYH. My time is—— 

Secretary PAULSON. Let me just simply say, as someone who has 

been around markets my whole life, I watch people say things. I 

have watched the Treasury Secretary just say something wrong or 

misspeak and markets move and I see all kinds of rumors move 

markets. What I am talking about is long-term fundamental movement, because I am a big believer in markets. And you can get gyrations, and they can be mis-valued at any point in time. But the 

key to our situation is going to be to have academic policies that 

drive productivity, keep this economy strong, and that is really 

where our confidence should come from. 

Senator BAYH. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. If I could 

just make one comment, Mr. Secretary. Your statement that a 

strong dollar is in the best interest of the United States is absolutely right. My concern is if another country has the ability to maVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:36 Nov 24, 2009 Jkt 050308 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A308.XXX A308

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nipulate the value of that dollar in a way that is adverse to us. And 

given the trade imbalances, I am concerned about that. 

Secretary PAULSON. Right, and my point was just to not—I do 

not mean to trivialize the comment because I will tell you I received—I probably get that question as much as any question since 

I have been in this job. But again, as I tell you, the confidence in 

our economy is the big driver, and in our economic policies. If we 

keep this country strong, we keep our economy strong, and people 

invest in dollar currencies. They invest in treasuries because they 

believe they get the best risk-adjusted return, and that is key. 

My only point with regard to the Chinese holding of treasuries 

is that it is not as big as you may think when you look at it in 

terms of how broad—excuse me—like what our securities are and 

how diverse the holdings are. 

Senator BAYH. Normally it is the microphones you cannot see 

that get you in trouble, Mr. Chairman. In this place—— 

[Laughter.] 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate it. 

Chairman DODD. Before I turn to Senator Bunning, I hope, Senator Bunning, just to make the point, Senator Bayh, I was looking 

at the quotes and statements from Paul Volcker and Warren 

Buffett and the IMF. All have raised the same concerns that Senator Bayh has raised here about this issue. You get the IMF saying 

the other day that a large current account deficit, 6.4 percent of 

GDP last year, makes the United States vulnerable to a swing in 

investor sentiment that could put downward pressure on the dollar 

and see a spike in long-term interest rates. No one less than Warren Buffett has expressed similar language, and Paul Volcker. 

I am going to turn to Senator Bunning, but I would just make 

the point there are a lot of people out there very worried about this 

issue, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary PAULSON. I would say that is a—what you are doing, 

to me, they are related. But, you know, I guess there is some relationship in the amount of treasuries that China holds and the imbalances. But with regard to the imbalances, a lot of people have 

spoken about the imbalances, and it is important enough. I will 

just take a minute and say a word about this. As long as we have 

an economy where we are not saving and we are growing and 

China has an economy where they are saving at 50 percent, and 

they don’t have domestic-driven consumption, and we don’t have 

the kind of growth that we would like with our trading partners 

in their economy. Japan has begun to grow but it is still growing 

fairly slow, and we don’t have the kind of robust growth—and I am 

very encouraged by what we are seeing here, but not the kind of 

robust growth we would like to see—we are going to have those imbalances unless we all work on those together. 

We have all got our things that we need to do to deal with the 

imbalances, and that is what Warren Buffett happened to be talking about. But I think that is a different question than the question 

that Senator Bayh was asking. 

Chairman DODD. Senator Bunning. 


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STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM BUNNING 

Senator BUNNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. I am going to read a quote by 

Chairman Bernanke, and I want you to respond to it. This was a 

quote that he gave before the Social Science Academy of China on 

December 15, 2006. ‘‘Greater scope for market forces to determine 

the value of the yuan would also reduce an important distortion in 

the Chinese economy, namely, the effective subsidy that an undervalued currency provides for Chinese firms that focus on exporting 

rather than producing for the domestic market.’’ When this speech 

was delivered, however, the term ‘‘subsidy’’ was not mentioned. 

Why did the Fed Chairman only refer to the undervalued currency in his written remarks? Did Treasury or any other Department ask him to omit the term ‘‘subsidy’’? 

Secretary PAULSON. I was sitting in the audience. I heard the 

speech the way he gave it. I never even knew that there was the 

line that you are referring to in the original. So, no, I never had 

any conversation with the Fed Chairman about this. 

Senator BUNNING. Thank you. 

Now, all the wonderful things that you have said today that you 

and the administration and the Trade Representative and all those 

wonderful conversations you have had with the Chinese and their 

compliance with WTO regulations or their noncompliance, and you 

talking back and forth and back and forth—the Chinese do not get 

it. The people up here make the laws, not you. You can talk about 

them. You can complain about them. But when you come as an administration to these Senators and ask for support for a policy that 

we violently disagree with, then who is going to sell it? The Chinese Government whom we are fighting like heck every day on 

their undervalued currency? 

Mr. Secretary, there is an imbalance here. The Chinese will not 

listen and refused to meet with certain Senators when they went 

to Beijing to talk trade. I use that as an example because five of 

our Senators from the Trade Subcommittee of our good Finance 

Committee went over to talk about it. They will talk to you. They 

will talk to people who raise the devil, and that is, Senator Schumer and Senator Graham. But the people that make the policy 

they do not want to deal with. And, therefore, all the jawboning 

and talking that you are doing with the Chinese is not going to affect one iota that steelworker in Bessemer, Alabama, or that worker in Indiana, who are complaining to us about the unfair practices 

of the Chinese regulated government in relationship to our open 

government. 

There is a difference, and until you get it, and until you are able 

to express it forcefully to the Chinese hierarchy that you are dealing with, you are going to have difficulty with the Senators and the 

Members of the House who pass on whether we want to expand 

most-favored-nation status for China or regular trade relationship 

with China. 

So I want an answer to the question: When will the Chinese Government listen to the people who make policy, not the people who 

are supposed to influence policy but the people who actually make 

it? 


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Secretary PAULSON. Senator, I thank you very much for that 

comment. We will have a senior delegation from China here in May 

for the Strategic Economic Dialogue, and I will encourage them to 

meet directly with you, and I can use plenty of help in delivering 

the message. But I appreciate your comment. 

Senator BUNNING. But we gave permanent trade relations with 

China in 1993 or 1994, and we helped them to ascend to WTO, and 

they have all the rules and laws in place, but they never enforce 

them. And if you walk the Beijing streets, you can buy anything 

you want that is illegitimate, that is a knock-off of something that 

is produced under patent or restrictions here in the United States. 

And that is never going to be solved just by talk. 

Secretary PAULSON. I appreciate how strongly you feel about intellectual property. Some of the companies I worked with in my 

previous job that sold products that were counterfeited in China 

felt equally strongly. And this is something that this administration has focused on, and it is something—— 

Senator BUNNING. That is the problem—— 

Secretary PAULSON. This is something the USTR, something Sue 

Schwab and Carlos Gutierrez are very, very engaged in. 

Senator BUNNING. They will engage you, talk to you, talk to you 

until you are blue in the face, but we are not getting any results. 

We are not getting anything done. The yuan has floated very 

slightly since we first put it in legislation to market to 27-percent 

reduction. And I can tell you this: We feel very strongly that that 

is going to have to be done because all the talking and all the wonderful things that you are doing are not getting it done. 

Thank you. 

Secretary PAULSON. Well, I would just say this, Senator. I very 

much appreciate your comments. I have been here a short time—— 

Senator BUNNING. Well, I am tired of talking. 

Secretary PAULSON. We had our first dialog in December. We are 

going to work very hard to get results. When the Chinese are here 

in May, I will welcome the opportunity to arrange for you to have 

a meeting with them. 

Senator BUNNING. Thank you. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Senator Bunning. 

And do you have a sense here, Mr. Secretary, of the bipartisanship up here on some of these questions. 

Secretary PAULSON. Yes. 

Chairman DODD. Senator Brown. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR SHERROD BROWN 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to follow up on Senator Bunning’s comments about talk 

and little action for the last decade, decade and a half, from your 

administration and from the administration before that. I came to 

the House in 1993. That year—1992 I was elected. That year, we 

had a bilateral trade deficit with China of barely into the double 

digits. In 2006, it will perhaps exceed $250 billion. In 1992, when 

I was elected to Congress, to the House, we had a $38 billion trade 

deficit with the entire world. Today it will exceed 800-who-knowwhat for 2006. 


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I hear your comment—Senator Bunning’s comments and your response, and I look back at the opportunities we have had as a Government in the last 5 years to actually respond tangibly. And I 

would just like to sort of lay out those opportunities and kind of 

wonder what happened. Back 5 years ago, the national AFL–CIO, 

with others, filed a Section 301 petition calling on China—calling 

on our Government to petition WTO—that is the process, you 

know, with NAFTA it can go directly to the Tribunal. Under other 

trade law, we have got to get the Government to do it on behalf 

of our country, whether it is an intellectual property issue or a 

labor issue or anything in between. But they filed a Section 301 petition saying China had failed to enforce its own labor, minimum 

wage, health and safety laws, environmental laws, that they had 

not even enforced their own laws, which amounted to about a 75- 

percent subsidy, they claimed, a reduction in the cost of production. 

The administration out of hand just dismissed it, did not even entertain the thought of it. 

Then a couple of years later, in 2004, the China Currency Coalition, a group representing several dozen U.S. industrial service, agriculture, and labor organizations, did the same, filed a Section 301 

petition alleging that China’s currency manipulation was an unfair 

trade practice, did that in September of 2004. The administration 

again summarily dismissed it. In fact, the petitioners believed because it was done within a few hours of the filing, the rejection of 

the petition, not even to read it and hand it on to the WTO and 

advocate for these industrial, agriculture, and labor organizations 

in our country representing tens of millions of people. 

Apparently, they believe—and I think it is hard to prove otherwise—that they did not take the time—the administration did not 

even take the time to read the several hundred pages of analysis, 

documentation, statistics, and tables. 

Then 35 Senators and Representatives, we filed a petition in 

April of the following year, 2005, to have it rejected summarily, 

just dismissed out of hand again. 

So we have these tools that we at least ought to get a hearing 

in the World Trade Organization, yet our Government is not interested enough to pursue on currency, on labor standards, on the environment, on health and welfare. Why not? Why can’t we, Mr. Secretary, at least try something specific? This is not jawboning. This 

is not just talking. This is following the legal channels of a Section 

301 petition, going directly to the WTO on behalf of tens of millions 

of Americans, many of whom you say are very concerned—I believe 

you—many of whom have lost their jobs or have tremendous anxiety that they are about to lose their jobs. Why don’t we do that, 

and will we do it in the future? 

Secretary PAULSON. Senator, I am a big believer in using the dispute resolution procedures of the WTO. That is one of the real 

strengths of the WTO. We have rules and we have enforcement 

measures. 

This is something, I can tell you, as I have talked with my colleagues, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Secretary of Commerce, and others who are involved—we all feel the same way. I 

think the key will be, and I do not know the details of the cases 

you have cited, but I know one of the things I have looked at is 


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if we cannot get recourse and we cannot get more effective recourse 

directly, then is it worth going to the WTO? They say, ‘‘Is it a case 

where we can win? What are the merits of the case?’’ 

So I do not—I cannot—— 

Senator BROWN. With all due respect, Mr. Secretary, they did not 

look at it, can we win, because they summarily dismissed the petition within a day or a few hours. 

Secretary PAULSON. Well, I cannot—— 

Senator BROWN. I am not saying it was your decision. 

Secretary PAULSON. I cannot even debate the merits because I 

don’t know that that is true. But what I can tell you is that I want 

and this administration wants a level playing field and we want 

compliance with the WTO rules. 

Senator BROWN. OK. I guess I would ask you to commit to this 

Committee, commit to those of us who are passionate about this, 

as everybody on this Committee—Senator Shelby’s comments, Senator Bunning’s, Senator Dodd’s, Senator Bayh’s—that these petitions will get a fair hearing. I mean, they—it is almost—a cynic 

would say about this that this administration does not care a whole 

lot about labor and environmental standards in the United States. 

Why would they care about labor and environmental standards 

internationally? 

I will put that cynicism aside and just implore you—it is a new 

team. It is a different USTR today. It is a different Secretary of the 

Treasury. But I ask you that you will at least give it—at least take 

a little while, make us think you looked at it, so that we really, 

in fact, are satisfied that—we have got to do something other than 

jawboning and other than saying let’s play a little with the currency and get a 2-percent adjustment. This is an average that is 

legal—this is trade law that gives us those opportunities and dispute resolution. 

Secretary PAULSON. I am a big believer in trade law and dispute 

resolution opportunities. I will pass your comments along to our 

colleagues, and I welcome the opportunity to talk with you more 

about it. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. One more thing. Mr. Secretary, as I mentioned, the trade deficit, $38 billion the 

year I was elected to Congress 141⁄2 years ago, today $800 billion 

plus. The President is in—I think Wall Street today, yesterday was 

in Peoria, exhorting the benefits of free trade. All of us think there 

are terrific benefits from trade if it is conducted on a more level 

playing field and it really is fair trade. 

What is curious about this is the Treasury Department in both 

parties—it is not a partisan thing, as Senator Bunning knows. The 

administration has exhorted us to pass these trade agreements saying things are going to get better. Every couple of years, the Treasury Secretary, the Chamber of Commerce, the newspaper publishers all exhort us to pass more free trade agreements with weak 

or non-existent or unenforceable labor and environmental standards. 

Now the President is doing it again. He is saying he wants Trade 

Promotion Authority. He is going to call for that today. So we have 

got a $38 billion deficit that went to 200, then 400, then 600, now 

to $800 billion, and the answer is let’s do more of the same. 


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How do I explain that to a steelworker in Lorain or a textile 

worker in southeast Ohio? 

Secretary PAULSON. Well, Senator, it is going to be very hard to 

explain anything about trade to someone who has just lost a job. 

But what I would say to you is that trade is benefiting this economy to a large extent. You heard—I do not know if you were here 

when I made my comment about the GDP number this year—I 

mean this quarter, the fourth quarter. It was announced 3.5 percent. A big reason for that was the component that came from 

trade and the fact that our exports are now growing faster than 

our imports. 

Senator BROWN. We know all that, but you also know, Mr. Secretary, that if you look at economic growth from the post-war years 

until 1973, our society across the board fared in that economic 

growth by a decent distribution of wages that—everybody pretty 

much saw their wages go up. Since 1973, the day we went from 

trade surplus to trade deficit in this country, a persistent trade deficit, the people on the bottom have not done well. You know the 

kind of salaries where you came from, the kind of salaries that just 

kept going up and up and up. And GDP has gone up, but most people in this country are not sharing in that, and part of that is trade 

policy, that the distribution—you said yourself you know that some 

are hurt, some are helped. Just I hope you think that through, that 

part of the reason for this huge chasm in wages has been because 

of our trade policies, inability to distribute benefits even close to 

equally. 

Secretary PAULSON. Well, I would say to you, Senator, that the 

widening gap in income distribution is something that I am focused 

a lot on. 

I want to come back to the one thing that you said that I do disagree with, which is equating a trade deficit with workers not 

doing well. And, frankly, what we would tell you is that growth is 

important. Some of the times when you look where we have a trade 

surplus, it will be when the economy is not doing well or there is 

a recession. I think the important thing for our workers is to keep 

the economy growing. I really do believe if we keep productivity up, 

and keep the economy growing, you are going to see the benefits 

pass through to the average worker. That is what we have seen 

now in this last year, and the last couple months in particular. 

So I think there are some positive signs, but I understand your 

concerns. 

Senator BROWN. Well, 1 year out of six does not convince me, but 

I am hopeful that you are right. Thank you. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you, Senator Brown. 

I would just point out that trade has been a drag on growth. In 

9 of the last 12 quarters—and the drop in oil prices I think maybe 

had more to do with these numbers. We welcome the numbers, but 

I think realistically why they have come down—— 

Secretary PAULSON. The exports added significantly this quarter, 

also. 

Chairman DODD. Senator Bennett. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 


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I came here a little late because I was at the hearing of the Joint 

Economic Committee that was talking about the issue of the disparity in income gap, and I presented some charts there that I 

probably should have brought here, not realizing we were going to 

get into this. But if you look solely at wages, the income gap between the top quintile and the bottom quintile is 14 times. And 

then when you start making adjustments in the real world, it is 

three times. 

By this, I mean the top quintile is paying taxes; the bottom quintile is getting an earned income tax credit. The top quintile has 

larger families, so if you take the household members and adjust 

them for the number of individuals, the bottom quintile, which includes a large number of retired people, one or two people in the 

household, it adjusts. 

When you adjust for hours worked, because the top quintile is 

employed and a large percentage of the bottom quintile is not, it 

adjusts. 

And as you make those adjustments all the way down, you find 

that the disparity, instead of being 14 times between the top quintile and the bottom quintile, it is three times. And I would be 

happy to supply those charts for the information of the Committee 

and that part of my testimony or my comments before the Joint 

Economic Committee. 

I want to focus on several things. First, with respect to the loss 

of jobs, I have seen it in my State. Everybody has seen it. But I 

would just take two figures to illustrate one of the things that we 

tend to ignore. We had a steel mill in the State of Utah that was 

put there in the 1940s in an effort to keep it away from the Pacific 

coast so the Japanese could not bomb it. It was really a stupid 

place to put a steel mill, but, nonetheless, in the World War II 

mentality, that was what they did. At the time it employed 4,500 

people. The steel mill finally closed in 1990. It was under competitive pressure from around the world. And they were producing 

something like three or four times as much steel as they had produced in the 1940s, and their employment was 1,500. 

The loss of 3,000 jobs did not come from the Chinese. It came 

from a place called ‘‘productivity.’’ We must recognize that we have 

been losing manufacturing jobs for the last 50 years because of increased productivity, and the economy and the level of productivity 

and the impact of the Information Age today means that our economy has no more resemblance to the 1973 economy than the 1973 

economy had to the days when we were an agricultural economy. 

If this hearing had been held a hundred years ago, we would say 

over 60 percent of Americans work on the farm. And a hundred 

years later, in 2006, that number will be two. And what are we 

going to do about those 67 percent of Americans that are going to 

lose their jobs? 

Well, the 2 percent that work on the farm produce something 

like five times as much food and fiber as the 67, 68, 69 percent that 

worked on the farm a hundred years ago. And as we have these 

discussions, we need to understand that the whole world has 

changed and the economy has changed in a dramatic fashion. 

Now, to get to the Chinese, with that in mind, I would like your 

response to this. I remember when the bugaboo was Japan. HollyVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:36 Nov 24, 2009 Jkt 050308 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A308.XXX A308

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wood was producing movies. There were novels. The Japanese were 

going to take over everything. And downtown real estate in Tokyo 

had a higher appraised value than the entire State of California. 

And then something happened. The economic reality began to intrude on the bubble that occurred in Japan. I owned a business in 

Japan at the time, and bank balance sheets became readjusted to 

reality. They were putting appraised values of real estate on their 

balance sheets as if they were real assets, and all of those kinds 

of things happened. 

I look at China, and I see the following things that tell me that 

China is not going to be what some commentators are telling us it 

is. 

No. 1, the United States GDP has grown more in the last 5 years 

than the entire Chinese GDP is. Our GDP growth in the last 5 

years, cumulative, was about $2.7 trillion. Don’t hold me to the 

exact amount, but it is close to that. The total Chinese GDP is 

about $2.3 trillion. That is not something that causes me to quiver 

at night by comparison that they are going to take us over. 

No. 2, their statistics are not that reliable. Any country that 

issues their GDP growth statements for the year on the 31st of December, it says, Wait a minute, some of these numbers were cooked 

in advance. 

The banking system is a disaster. An editorial in the Wall Street 

Journal that appeared on the 29th talks about that and the things 

they need to do to shore up their banking system. 

But, finally, the last time I was in Beijing, I looked at all these 

fabulous buildings and asked the obvious question: Who is building 

them? The U.S. Ambassador told me that question was put to the 

Chinese officials, and the answer was, ‘‘Speculators.’’ 

So the next question is: ‘‘Who lives in them?’’ And the answer 

was, ‘‘Corrupt government officials.’’ Sooner or later, they are going 

to run out of corrupt government officials to fill all those buildings. 

Would you comment on what China’s long-term prospects are 

with these kinds of structural problems and how that affects all of 

these things as opposed to just a narrow conversation on currency 

rates? 

Secretary PAULSON. Senator, I think it is a very good question, 

and I have been very impressed with the capability of the Chinese 

leadership and no one can argue the success they have had with 

their reform program. But I also have learned that when something looks too good to be true, it generally is. No one is going to 

defy economic gravity. There are going to be bumps along the road 

in every economy. 

And so the point that I have made when talking about China is 

they are now partway between a market-driven economy and an 

economy with administrative controls. As they become bigger and 

bigger and more complex and they become increasingly integrated 

into the world economy, the greater the risk to China and to all 

of us. Frankly—and I will get to that in a minute—if they don’t 

move quickly enough and they hit some big bumps in the road, because I do believe that many people who worry about China worry 

about the wrong thing. They are worried that China is going to 

greatly overtake the United States and it poses some huge threat. 


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And, frankly, what we should be concerned about is that we—it is 

in all of our interests to have China keep doing well. 

China has been, right along with the U.S., one of the engines for 

growth in the global economy for a good period of time, and a bump 

in the road, a serious bump in the road would have repercussions 

for all of us. And so I really think that is a concern. 

I feel also what you feel about the U.S. economy. It is a very interesting thing, because before taking this job, I thought about it 

this way: I have traveled all around the world, and we can focus 

on our problems, and we have got meaningful problems to focus on. 

But our problems are so much less than any other nation’s problems, and we have such great competitive strengths, if we just continued to make the changes we need to make to keep our economy 

competitive. 

And so I do agree with you, it is an interesting point and part 

of the reason why it is so easy for me to push the Chinese very 

hard on currency and other reforms is that reforms are not only 

necessary to make sure that we have a level playing field and that 

our workers share in the benefits, but it is going to help them 

much more. If they do not open their markets to competition and 

they do not move more quickly to market-driven forces, there are 

real problems that they will hit, more than a small bump. 

But I would say to date they have managed magnificently well 

and they have very strong leadership, and I would like to believe 

they will do the things they need to do to keep their economy moving forward, which would be good for all of us, not just good for 

them. It is a win-win. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you. I appreciate that, and just a quick 

comment, Mr. Chairman. One of the reasons they have done well 

is they have basically ignored the advice of the IMF. Thank you. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you, Senator Bennett. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Secretary. A lot of the discussion today is focusing on our continuing negotiations and discussions with the Chinese, but let me 

ask a simple question. What is our leverage against the Chinese in 

these negotiations? If we do not have any, then it is a long discussion without results. So how would you classify or what would you 

point to as our leverage against them in these negotiations? 

Secretary PAULSON. Whenever you are—and I found this in business also. Whenever you are negotiating with a strong 

counterparty—in this case we are negotiating with a sovereign nation that is accountable to their people, and it has got strong public 

sentiment—leverage is a difficult thing. But you need leverage. 

And what I can say to you is we have thought about this. Obviously, we have got the leverage if they do not comply with WTO, 

all those enforcement mechanisms and dispute resolution procedures. So you have got that. We have got the force of law in our 

country and the force of law in the WTO. 

But in terms of the kinds of things that I am talking to the Chinese about, I think their leverage comes from having very direct 

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makers, and I need to advocate very effectively why this is not only 

important to them, but how strongly all of you feel and how strongly the American public feels. And, again, I know that is not—I 

know you want to hear more than that, and all I can tell you is 

I think the plan we have has the best chance of getting progress, 

and it will get more progress than going other routes. And other 

things that have been suggested from time to time I think are 

counterproductive. So that is—— 

Senator REED. Well, in what way—well, let me go back to Senator Brown’s questioning, which I thought was very interesting. 

You have already suggested you have legal means, that there are 

at least initial claims that could be made—they might not be favorably decided, but they are certainly at least—I mean, they are credible claims. Why wouldn’t you invoke those legal mechanisms as a 

way, if not to secure final judgment, simply to communicate our seriousness and also to give you more strength in your discussions? 

Secretary PAULSON. I would say when we get to what we do, if 

there is noncompliance with the WTO, that is a topic that Sue 

Schwab, and a number of people in this administration are focused 

on, and I am interested in also. 

In terms of the kinds of things we are talking about here, which 

are currency and the path of reform, I believe that the path we 

have chosen is the way we will get the most results. If we do other 

things it could be—it is just my judgment this is the best way to 

go as opposed to getting into a situation where the Chinese get 

locked into defending their current policies. 

Senator REED. How long will you let this process go forward, Mr. 

Secretary? 

Secretary PAULSON. I will tell you something. I have 2 years and 

you have me for 2 years being a very strong advocate of the policy 

that I think has the best chance of getting results over that 2-year 

period of time. 

Now, a lot of these issues are going to take much longer than 2 

years to resolve when we talk about some of the fundamental reforms. But I will be very disappointed if we do not make some 

progress over this period. 

Senator REED. Well, I think, Mr. Secretary, you bring extraordinary talent to this job, and dedication, but this seems to have 

been the constant refrain not only of yourself but your predecessors 

of the last at 6 years about, well, we talk to them, et cetera. And 

I think Senator Brown made an excellent case about the legal 

grounds we have to pursue, and if we do not pursue those grounds, 

I think the Chinese assume, as I would, as you would if you were, 

I think, in a similar position, that this is important to us but it is 

not the most important thing. 

Secretary PAULSON. Senator, let me just make the one obvious 

point. What we are doing with the Strategic Economic Dialogue 

does not determine what legal grounds we are going to pursue with 

all of the other mechanisms we have in place. What we are doing 

here, in all due respect, is a different level of dialog, because being 

able to speak with one voice regularly to all the top decisionmakers—two major meetings a year, frequent smaller meetings, 

tracking progress—I argue is a different plan. 


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Senator REED. I appreciate your point, Mr. Secretary. You know, 

those of us who did support—and I think many here, if not all— 

admission of China to the WTO did so on the assumption that the 

rules would be available to the international community to use 

against China. That was the understanding the Chinese had when 

they entered the WTO. And yet we are very reluctant to use those 

rules. I will just make that point. 

Another point, a final point that you might comment on if you 

want, is that one of the problems I think we have is that our relationship with China is not strictly one dimensional in terms of the 

economy. And let’s be realistic. I mean, we are asking the Chinese 

right now to be immensely helpful to us with respect to the North 

Koreans. We are asking them to be helpful to us with respect to 

the Iranians because they have great equities. And I get the sensation—again, you could comment or not—that many times when you 

take up these economic issues, particularly at the Presidential 

level, they are third, fourth, fifth, sixth on the list because when 

you talk about North Korea breaking out, testing nuclear weapons, 

when you talk about the Iranians doing the same thing or attempting to do the same thing, and China plays a critical role in the Security Council and just as a force in the world, that many times 

because of the strategic situation we find ourselves in—and I think 

some of that is the result of decisions that this administration has 

made—that we are sacrificing some of our economic—what is the 

right word? Our economic issues with respect to other issues. 

Secretary PAULSON. Senator, the economic issues are very important to us. They are very important to China. Very, very important 

to China. And I do believe that we are going to get more leverage 

because we are no longer siloed. We are now coordinating what we 

are doing economically, and we are speaking with one voice. And 

I think that gives us great leverage. 

The other thing I would say to you is that rather than being a 

hindrance, I think that the stronger the economic relationships are 

between any two countries, the more shared interests they have, 

and the greater interest they have in peace, prosperity, the more 

harmful disruptions are. So, again, I really believe if the economic 

dialog is handled properly, it will not hurt any of the other dialogs, 

and, in fact, it will help it and will complement them. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Allard. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD 

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to express 

my view on free trade since we have gotten into that issue. 

This country practiced a lot of trade restrictions first in the 

1900’s, and it simply did not serve us well. When we look at those 

times when our economy was most depressed, that is when our 

trade balance was most favorable. So we had a more favorable 

trade balance during the Depression, and in the late 1970’s when 

we had the Misery Index, our trade balance was most favorable. 

Now, the last four Presidential administrations basically had a 

free trade policy, both Democrat and Republican, and it served this 


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country well. I hope that we do not get ourselves in a position 

where we get into trade wars, because they are not going to serve 

our economy well. That is my view. 

Now, I have a State with big portions of its economy in agriculture and high-tech. In fact, we have the highest percentage of 

high-tech jobs in the country. It is not commonly known. Senator 

Bennett next door in Utah, also has a very prosperous high-tech industry. We rely on the Far East—China and Japan and others— 

to trade with because we have a lot of high-tech. I am curious to 

know your perspective. We have heard from the manufacturing aspect of the economy, and I agree with Senator Bennett. The loss 

of jobs in that sector has more to do with high-technology where 

we are more efficient, we get more done with less. 

So I would like to hear your comments on the agricultural industry and also the high-tech industry, because those are two very important aspects of the economy that I have in the State of Colorado. 

I would also point out that Colorado has benefited as much as 

any State on our trade agreements. I would just like to hear you 

talk a little bit about the high-tech and the agricultural aspect of 

the economy. 

Secretary PAULSON. Well, let me say in terms of trade with 

China, you have hit two of the big areas where we export products: 

high-tech, medical devices, aircraft, and, of course, agriculture has 

been an important part of that trade. 

I wonder whether I might make, if you would allow me, a comment—you triggered something when you talked about the trade 

balance. If I could just take a minute and explain one thing that 

I think is important to understand, and this is not to say that the 

trade deficit with China is not too large, and it does not say we do 

not care about it a lot. But it is fascinating what happens. It is 

happening in Asia, because what happens as you look at production 

patterns, we have had sort of an integrated production system develop in Asia where China imports components and raw materials 

from this country also, but largely from other countries in Asia, 

and then they are the last point of assembly and so China is the 

exporter of record. 

But when you look at what has happened and going back to 1999 

to the present, what you see is that China’s share of our trade deficit has gone up and the rest of Eastern Asia’s has gone down. If 

you look at China and Asia together, their share of the trade deficit 

was 46 percent in 1999 and it was—excuse me, it was 53 percent 

in 1999 and 46 percent today, so it has gone down. 

It is really very dramatic in a number of products. For instance, 

if you look at footwear, big imports. In 1999, 9 percent of our footwear imports came from China. In 2004, 70 percent came from 

China. But if you looked at the rest of Asia, in 1999, 51 percent 

came from the rest of East Asia, and in 2004 it was 1 percent. 

So you see what is going on, and then your point, Senator, on 

high-tech, if you look at China’s trade deficit with the U.S., there 

is a Stanford study that showed that for every $1,000 of imports 

China made to the U.S., they were going out and they were paying 

$614 to import products or components from other countries. So 

there was a little bit more than $380 of value added for Chinese 

employees and manufacturers. But our exports, on the other hand, 


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were high-value-added exports where there was $843. So this is not 

for me to say this is not important, because it is very important. 

We need to reduce that deficit. We need to open up the economy. 

But the reason I give that example is because it is very misleading 

to look at the trade deficit bilaterally. We need to focus on it with 

China, but we need to focus on it overall for the U.S. And we need 

to increase our exports, and we are getting some very positive 

growth both in our exports to China and globally. 

Senator ALLARD. Now, one area, if I could be critical of the administration, is when they put trade restrictions on lumber. Because they put high tariffs on lumber, the cost of lumbers goes up, 

and it impacts every American family. It impacts the price of our 

homes. For those people who are building new homes, it raises the 

cost of that home substantially. This leads me into the subject of 

the housing market. Senator Bunning and myself last fall had a 

joint Subcommittee hearing, Subcommittees of this Banking Committee, to examine the state of the housing market and its impact 

on the U.S. economy. 

Your report notes that the U.S. housing market has had international impacts. Now, I know the trade has had an impact on 

housing, but I am trying to figure out how U.S. housing has an 

international impact. 

Could you elaborate on that? 

Secretary PAULSON. Well, I would just say I cannot tell you exactly what those who made that comment had in mind. I can just 

say to you that this was a significant correction in our housing 

market, a very, very significant correction. We were growing at an 

unsustainable level. And I think as the recent numbers have 

shown, we are making the transition to a more sustainable level 

of growth, and the economy is so strong and diverse that we are 

getting through it. 

But the U.S. economy is so important to the world and such an 

important engine for growth that anything that has a material impact on our growth has an international impact. I would say to you 

that when I would travel around the world and talk at G–7 meetings, meet with the G–7, with leaders at the World Bank meeting, 

international economists, and international Finance Ministers, one 

of the first questions they ask me is: What is going on in the housing market? Because they care a lot about our economy, and I 

think that is probably what they had in mind. 

Senator ALLARD. Thank you. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Shelby has a point he wanted to raise, and I have a closing comment, and then, Mr. Secretary, we are going to let you depart. 

Secretary PAULSON. OK. 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Chairman Dodd. 

Mr. Secretary, we all know that economies constantly change, 

and they do not remain static. They always have. But there is a 

lot of concern by all of us in America about the erosion of our manufacturing base, of jobs, good jobs. I alluded to it earlier dealing 

with the steel and foundry business, but this is just part of it. It 

not only affects a lot of the people in the Birmingham, Alabama, 


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area but Pittsburgh, Cleveland, you name it. And I think that goes 

on. 

I think we have to concede the basics that trade is good. Trade 

should be fair. We are taught trade should be free. Free trade. Economics. That is a principle of economics. But I am not sure that 

it is, and that concerns me in a big way. And I see the erosion of 

the working middle class in America, as you do. 

Sure, we benefit from high-tech. We have a high-tech area in 

Huntsville, Alabama, big time. And we appreciate all that. But everybody—there are 300 million people—will not be involved in 

high-tech. We have benefited over the years in America with the 

manufacturing base, and I think we are losing that, and there has 

got to be a reason. 

I think we are competitive. This is a great economy. It is a great 

Nation. But, you know, if the roof is leaking, we better fix it. I 

think the roof is leaking as far as the imbalance of trade. It is just 

too much. 

We have talked about this before, and you have got 2 years left 

as the Treasury Secretary. You did not come down here to just be 

here. You came down here to make a difference. I know you and 

I believe that is why you are here. 

Do you believe—I know there is always hope. And I hope but I 

do not believe that there will be much change in our imbalance of 

trade with China 2 years from now. I think it will keep growing, 

the deficit will keep growing, to our detriment overall. And that is 

a real concern. 

I do not want to build walls around this country. That is the 

worst thing we could ever do. But we have got to do something. I 

don’t know. Somebody asked about leverage. We know they are a 

sovereign nation. They are an important trading partner and an 

important nation in the world, and they have many facets—in fact, 

there are many facets of our relationship: trade, international diplomacy, and you name it. 

But do you really believe that 2 years from now when you will 

be gone as Secretary of the Treasury that there will be a balance 

of trade with China? Or will we be working toward a significant 

goal, I mean, progress, benchmark toward making that imbalance 

close to even, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary PAULSON. Senator, you ask the right questions, and I 

would say to you that I can think of very few big important issues 

that can be solved in 2 years’ time. As I said in my testimony, currency flexibility is essential. We need it. China needs it. We need 

a currency whose value is determined in the competitive marketplace. But the primary driver of the trade imbalance with China 

has to do with structural issues that we have talked about today. 

And do I believe that those structural issues can be resolved in 2 

years? No way. 

Senator SHELBY. Well, at least—— 

Secretary PAULSON. But do I believe we can make progress and 

benchmarks to doing some things we can look at as progress along 

the way? Yes, I do. And if I did not think we could make progress, 

I would not be working as hard at it as I am. 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you. 


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Chairman DODD. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much as well, 

and I am going to pick up on that point because I think you have— 

I was sitting here, and I was trying to imagine if I were listening 

to this or watching the hearing this morning, what I would come 

away with if I were a steelworker in Birmingham or that autoworker in Indiana or a small manufacturer in Connecticut. What 

do I get out of this? 

I am concerned that—and I appreciate your last statement. It is 

a strong statement, the very last response you made here. But if 

you look back over it, we have been through this so many times 

on this over the last number of years, and it is hard to find any 

consistency in this. Again, I am not talking about this was on your 

watch per se, but what has come before. I was looking back at what 

happened under George Bush 41’s watch when these numbers were 

substantially less than the numbers we are talking about today, 

but that I presume make up the determination of intent. So you 

look at a bunch of these factors. It isn’t you listen to someone give 

a speech about intent but, rather, what is the hard evidence that 

exists in this relationship that draws us to the conclusion that the 

intent is what you have suggested here today as opposed to being 

a different set of judgments. 

Obviously, in previous administrations they drew different conclusions, and it is hard today to wonder why we are not sort of following a similar set of conclusions given the multiples of the numbers that they relied upon to decide that not only China but Taiwan and I think it was—China, Korea, as well as Taiwan were all 

currency manipulators, going back to Bush 41’s Presidency, the 

Treasury Department drawing its conclusions in 1992. And I will 

not go into the numbers and so forth, but we have talked a lot 

about this already, the reserves and so forth. 

And so I am worried in a sense that we are not—if you are sitting here watching this, you would say it sounds like more of the 

same in a sense. What are we really going to be doing here? And 

you made a point earlier that I think we did not bring up enough 

here today that the lack of currency flexibility has not only been 

disadvantageous to China and certainly to us and the people who 

paid a price for it in this country, but China’s neighbors in the Pacific Rim. It disadvantages them tremendously as they try to compete for markets and for services and goods. 

So the implications of China’s actions I suggest certainly are bad 

for them in the long term, and not only bad for us in many ways 

because of what is occurring here, but also from a global perspective, this is having a huge negative impact. 

So I would like you to give some consideration, if you could, on 

this watch of yours. And I agree with you the likelihood we are 

going to dramatically change all of this in 2 years is pretty small. 

But it seems to me on your watch we could maybe change— 

maybe we ought to look at this law again. Are the criteria for intent—but we can get far more consistency out of this. We can set 

some real benchmarks. I think it is important that China understand what we care about and that we watch this carefully. We are 

a very attractive market to them. We are in a buyer’s market in 

a sense. They want to be here. They want this relationship. That 

is our leverage point to a large extent. 


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So how do we leverage that point to set up a good set of criteria 

that have a degree of predictability to it so that we can get the 

kind of responses that we would all like to have in a far more expeditious way than certainly has been the pattern over the last number of years? And I would invite your knowledge and expertise. 

What I said at the outset was not just a gratuitous comment. There 

are very few people I have ever met in Government in my 26 years 

who bring as much knowledge about this relationship as you do. 

And so you are a valuable asset in this moment of time we have 

here to figure out how to do a better job of this, because that person out there watching this hearing today is going to wonder if we 

are just going to be back here again next year or the year after 

with the same kind of conclusions, no one really wants to take this 

on, their jobs disappear, the problems get worse, the balances grow 

higher, and they wonder if there is going to ever be light at the 

end of the tunnel. And then the day arrives where we find ourselves behind the eight ball, and we wonder, What were we thinking of that we did not take stronger action, more clarity in our relationship with this country, with China, than we should have at the 

outset of the 21st century? 

So I raise that for you for a quick comment, if you would, about 

whether or not we might think about restructuring something here 

that gives us a higher degree of predictability. 

Secretary PAULSON. Well, first of all, Mr. Chairman, I thank you 

very much for the opportunity to be here today. I thank you for 

your comment. 

To your specific question, I think one thing is clear. We all have 

the same goal. Clearly, we have got to—— 

Chairman DODD. We all agree with the same result, despite the 

language here. 

Secretary PAULSON. Now the question is we say—— 

Chairman DODD. We also agree with the same conclusion today 

despite—they are still manipulating this currency. 

Secretary PAULSON. Well—— 

Chairman DODD. I understand you have got a position and I—— 

Secretary PAULSON. Well, I would say we have got the same goal. 

We are talking about tactics as to how to get there. I think what 

you are saying is, what specific target do you put out there and, 

again, I am very open to talking to you about it, any option. 

I would just say to you that having thought about it very carefully, I don’t think a specific target, a specific public target will 

help us make more progress, or I would have suggested that. I really do believe—and I know it is frustrating for some people, but I 

do believe we have come up with a plan in place that gives us the 

best chance of making progress. That could actually be true, and 

we could still be frustrated because we would like to see more 

progress. 

But I think we are going to get progress, but, again, I welcome 

continuing this conversation. 

Chairman DODD. I thank you for that. And I would just add, having been in this body and on this Committee for 26 years, I have 

the same warning. Events are going to overtake, and all this other 

goes back, and my colleagues here—you listen to Senator Bunning. 

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licans and Democrats. This is about people who go home every 

weekend in these times off, and we meet our constituents, and they 

are livid. They are livid, Mr. Secretary. And the Congress is not 

going to wait necessarily for us to get some sort of vague definition 

of how this is kind of progressing when they watch 3 million manufacturing jobs leave this country, when they watch a country that 

is investing heavily in armaments and not investing in its own people, and then complaining they cannot do this quickly enough because of their problems with unemployment insurance, and yet the 

tenfold increase in defense spending, people are going, ‘‘What are 

you people thinking of up there?’’ And you are going to get blown 

by with this problem if we do not get a better handle on this. And 

that is why this is important to recognize the moment is now to 

start to think this thing through so we don’t have the inconsistencies in it. 

I thank you very much, and I apologize to our second panel. We 

will get to you right away. But this has been tremendously valuable. I hope you have enjoyed your first appearance here. [Laughter.] 

Secretary PAULSON. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Chairman DODD. We hope you come back more often, and thank 

you very much for being here. 

We will move right to the second panel, if we can. Thank you, 

Mr. Secretary, very, very much. 

Let me introduce the second panel and thank my colleagues as 

well, on this very important hearing. 

As the Secretary and his team are leaving, I will do the introductions and people can make their way to the table here. 

The committee is very pleased with our second panel of witnesses: Richard Trumka, a good friend of mine. I must say we have 

known each other many, many years. Mr. Trumka is the SecretaryTreasurer of the AFL–CIO, a position he has held for 10 years. Previously, he was the President of the United Mine Workers. 

In fact, I recall that you testified before this committee about 5 

years ago on the very same subject. So we welcome you back. You 

know a lot about it. 

I am also delighted that we have Mr. Michael Campbell who is 

testifying today as both Vice Chairman of the National Association 

of Manufacturers, the NAM, and as President and CEO of Arch 

Chemicals. Politics is always local. It is nice to have a constituent 

here. Mr. Campbell thank you, and congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the NAM, an organization we deal 

with quite frequently here, as well. 

I know that Mr. Campbell will be able to discuss these issues in 

great depth. We should note that he is going to be taking over from 

Chuck Bunch, who has served his 29-year term as the Chairman. 

Albert Keidel is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace. Before joining the Carnegie in September 

2004, Dr. Keidel served as the Deputy Director in the Office of East 

Asian Nations at the Treasury Department. That experience has 

provided him a very useful perspective on the subjects we have before us today. Doctor, we thank you for being with us. 

And Dr. Fred Bergsten, who is no stranger at all to this committee. We thank you for coming back. He is the Director of the 


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Peterson Institute for International Economics. He has been a Director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics since 

its creation in 1981. He served as the Assistant Secretary of International Affairs at Treasury during the Carter Administration, and 

also testified before this committee and many other committees on 

this and related issues. 

We will ask you to submit your testimony in full, and I would 

like you, if you could, to try to keep your comments to five or 6 

minutes. I am not going to hold you to that too tightly, but if you 

keep the idea in mind we can get through here. And I promise, all 

of your documents and supporting material that you think would 

be valuable to the record will be included in the record. 

Richard, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD TRUMKA, SECRETARY-TREASURER, 

AFL–CIO 

Mr. TRUMKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. 

I am delighted to have the opportunity to testify today on behalf 

of the 10 million working men and women of the AFL–CIO. 

I am also the co-chair of the China Currency Coalition. 

As you know, the issues you are discussing today go right to the 

heart of the economic challenges facing America’s working families 

and our middle class. 

We, in the labor movement, feel a certain amount of urgency to 

develop and implement concrete solutions sooner rather than later. 

Unfortunately, it often appears that this Administration does not 

share our sense of urgency. We hope that Congress will step into 

the void left by the Administration’s failure to act, and we welcome 

this hearing as a crucial first step in that direction. 

In December, the Treasury Department issued its 2006 Report to 

Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policy. 

The report finds no currency manipulation on the part of any of our 

trading partners. 

Yet the same report also finds that China’s current account surplus rose to around 8 percent of GDP in the first half of 2006. That 

is a 500 percent increase since 2001. China’s foreign exchange reserve reached $1 trillion in October. That is $200 billion more in 

1 year. The U.S. trade deficit with China will reach about $230 billion in 2006. That is a 15 percent increase in 1 year. And the Economic Policy Institute estimates that the growing bilateral deficit 

with China has displaced more than 1.5 million jobs. 

Now either there is something wrong with the criteria Treasury 

is using to determine currency manipulation, or there is something 

wrong with the Treasury Department’s math. 

Josh Bivens and Rob Scott of the Economic Policy Institute laid 

out three very clear criteria for determining whether or not a country is manipulating its currency. First, does it have a high and rising bilateral trade surplus with the United States? Second, is the 

global current account surplus high and rising? Third, does it possess a high and rising accumulation of international reserves? 

Table 1 in my testimony compares China’s current position to 

nine past instances when Treasury Department found that nations 

were manipulating the value of their currency vis-a-vis the dollar 


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for competitive gain. On each front, the current position of China 

well exceeds the previous threshold that led to a finding of manipulation. 

Many respected academic experts have also weighed in on this 

issue. As you noted, the bipartisan U.S.-China Commission found 

that China’s currency manipulation harms American competitiveness and is also a factor encouraging the relocation of U.S. manufacturing overseas while discouraging investments in U.S. exporting industries. 

Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve wrote recently 

that China’s undervalued currency provides an effective subsidy for 

Chinese firms that focus on exporting rather than producing for the 

domestic market. 

Mr. Chairman, Japan has also intervened aggressively and repeatedly in their currency markets to gain an unfair trade advantage, spending nearly $450 billion to keep the yen undervalued 

since the year 2000. That is according to the Automotive Trade Policy Council. 

And not only did the Treasury Department fail to cite Japan as 

a currency manipulator during that time but, according to John 

Taylor’s recent book, Treasury officials implicitly sanctioned the 

Japanese interventions. We find that extremely troubling. 

I know the Treasury Secretary is no longer here, but we would 

like to ask Secretary Paulson and his staff exactly what it would 

take for Treasury to find that a country had, in fact, manipulated 

its currency. Perhaps more important, what it would take to move 

beyond yet another round of endless diplomacy and strategic dialog 

to concrete action and results. 

This is not an academic exercise for the union members that I 

represent. The difference between currency manipulation and market equilibrium exchange rate is the difference between having the 

job and watching your factory shut its gates. It is the difference between having health insurance for your kids or not having it. And 

for our country, it may be the difference between having a healthy 

middle class or sitting back and watching as economic divisions 

tear us apart. 

Giving the soaring U.S. trade deficit with China and the burgeoning Chinese foreign exchange reserves, we are bitterly disappointed that Treasury found no manipulation again this year, 

and we were underwhelmed by the announcement of the Strategic 

Economic Dialogue as a response to the global imbalances that the 

report did concede. On paper, the SED promises a forum for addressing critical economic issues and planning for long-term cooperation. The SED offers too little, too late. 

The proposed forum, dialog and cooperation are grossly inadequate given the magnitude of the economic problems that we face 

with respect to China. And the SED does not even begin to address 

a separate and equally serious economic concern, and that is the 

egregious and widespread repression of workers’ rights in China. 

Violation of workers’ rights is just as much an economic issue as 

currency manipulation, violation of intellectual property rights, or 

illegal subsidies. We estimate that hundreds of thousands of U.S. 

jobs are lost because the Chinese government brutally suppresses 


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the rights of Chinese workers to form independent unions and bargain collectively for their fair share of the wealth that they create. 

I do not mean to sound cynical, but I am starting to feel like Bill 

Murray in the movie Groundhog Day. Every year, I come up and 

testify on the importance of these economic issues, the effect that 

they have on workers throughout this country. Every year the 

trade deficit worsens, more jobs are lost, and the economic pressure 

on workers and the middle class continues to grow. And every year, 

someone from the administration comes up here, agrees completely 

with everything that we say, responds with pledges of increased dialog, engagement and cooperation. 

Now my written testimony lists quote after quote from administrative officials over the last several years offering more meetings, 

more reports, more dialog. The time for talking is past. The Administration needs to move beyond consultation and dialog. The Congress cannot wait for this administration to act. 

We urge Congress to give immediate consideration to the Fair 

Currency Act, which we expect to be introduced shortly. I would 

like to thank Senator Bunning for his leadership in addressing this 

important issue. The Fair Currency Act is a crucial first step in addressing the urgent economic problems that we face today. 

The thing I would like to end with is I listened to the Secretary’s 

testimony. And I listened to him say that he would do everything 

that he could to help that steel worker in Alabama that got laid 

off, the same people that I see every day. Or a coal miner somewhere, or an auto worker, or a teacher or anything else. 

And I would like to ask him if he is willing to take any action 

and use all of the tools? If taking every action he can to help them 

includes using all the tools at his disposal? That is what needs to 

be done, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Richard. I appreciate 

very much your testimony and your caring of the issue, too. It has 

been very impressive over the years. And I could not agree more 

with you about running out of patience here, with these conversations about dialog and conversations. 

Mr. Campbell, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CAMPBELL, VICE CHAIRMAN, 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman 

The National Association of Manufacturers seeks a positive and 

mutually productive trading relationship with China. China’s emergence as a leading world economy has meant significant new opportunities for many of our members, including increased exports and 

investment opportunities. 

However, as we all know, China is also posing great challenges 

for other of our NAM members. Some of our members see prices 

of Chinese products so low, sometimes even lower than the cost of 

raw materials, that it becomes virtually impossible for them to see 

how they can compete. And others are seeing their customers move 

to China and cannot find new ones to replace them. 

NAM’s concerns with China cover a range of issues, including 

protecting intellectual property rights, maintaining a currency 


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value that reflects the strength of the Chinese economy, and ending 

prohibited trade subsidies. 

We are also concerned by a growing Chinese industrial policy 

that favors domestic producers, making it more difficult for foreign 

firms from the United States to participate in China’s economy. 

On the issue of China’s currency, manufacturers large and small 

are united. We may come from different points of view, but we 

have all agreed that the Chinese government needs to allow much 

greater flexibility in the valuation of their currency. Our goal is to 

see the currency moving closer to what a market value would likely 

be, with the eventual goal of a free-floating currency set by market 

forces. 

The need for the yuan to appreciate has been recognized by the 

International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, many finance ministers, most economists and, even recently, Chinese leaders. It is no 

longer a matter of if but when and how rapidly. 

But this matter of timing is very important as frustration is 

growing, evidenced by the last speaker, as it has negative effects 

on support for free trade if it does not contribute to a sense of fairness in global free trade. If we point out that the Chinese currency 

is undervalued, say they must do something about it. But if they 

do not, we cannot or will not respond. We must respond. 

I do note that there has been a 6.5 percent appreciation since 

July 2005, but that is not enough progress. More needs to be 

achieved. Without more progress, we risk seeing action that could 

do serious damage, not just to our bilateral relationship but also 

to our own economy, and the world’s as well. 

Would a considerably stronger Chinese yuan have beneficial effects? Unmistakably yes. Yes for U.S. manufacturing, yes for adjusting global imbalances, and yes for the Chinese economy itself. 

Not infrequently, companies have told NAM staff that even a 15 

percent shift could change their competitive situation dramatically. 

Much reference has been made to the Treasury’s Report to Congress, and that report can play an important role in the process. 

NAM has consistently called on the Treasury Department to cite 

China for currency manipulation, as discussions have seemed to 

have borne very little fruit. 

NAM understands that citing a country for currency manipulation would not, in and of itself, compel change. But it would provide a strong and highly visible signal that the U.S. Government 

believes it important for the currency to move. 

Citation under the Report is also an important signal to the 

International Monetary Fund, as IMF officials have already noted 

that it would be incongruent for them to cite China for currency 

manipulation if the U.S. Treasury is not willing to do so. 

I will say that we did not criticize the Administration when the 

last Treasury report came out in December and was silent on 

China. Secretary Paulson asked for time to let the efforts made at 

the new Strategic Economic Dialogue work, and we agreed to support him in that effort. We will certainly be following progress on 

this issue and we will revisit it at mid-year. 

The Strategic Economic Dialogue is, we believe, an excellent 

idea. We hope that the SED will help shift the balance from those 

within the Chinese government who feel that China must move 


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more slowly on its currency to those who understand a more rapid 

appreciation is necessary to achieve both internal domestic goals as 

well as international goals. 

In September of last year Secretary Paulson addressed our board 

of directors and indicated that the Chinese currency issue was a 

top priority in the SED. At that meeting, the NAM board considered whether or not to support legislation that would make currency manipulation subject to U.S. countervailing duty laws. The 

majority of board members, after discussion, decided not to support 

the legislation. 

The board instead called for the creation of a board level U.S.- 

China Task Force to work with the Administration on SED issues, 

especially currency. I chair this task force with executives from 

large and small companies that span the whole spectrum of views 

on China’s currency. 

We met with Secretaries Paulson and Gutierrez and U.S. Trade 

Representative Ambassador Schwab prior to their trip to Beijing 

for the first SED meeting. In our extensive meeting with Secretary 

Paulson, we made it very clear that manufacturers want to see significant progress in the appreciation of the yuan or we risked actions that could do serious damage with our bilateral relationship. 

We have seen some progress but we are looking for much, much 

more. 

In conclusion, I would like to point out that we, as American 

manufacturers, must take advantage of opportunities offered by the 

large and emerging market in China, as well as constantly improve 

our own competitiveness. However, it is important that there be 

confidence that our Government will insist on our trading partners 

living up to their commitments, including commitments regarding 

currency. 

I applaud the committee’s interest in China’s currency issue and 

in seeing that all major currencies are market determined. 

The NAM thanks you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important 

hearing and we look forward to working closely with you and other 

members of the committee and your excellent staff. 

Thank you. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Campbell. We appreciate your testimony very much and again, congratulations. 

Dr. Keidel, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF ALBERT KEIDEL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. KEIDEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for the opportunity to testify. 

In my comments today on the Treasury Department’s currency 

report, I want to pull out and amplify some of its findings, especially the muted criticism of Germany and Japan. At the same 

time, I want to question and criticize other of the report’s findings, 

especially its characterization of China. 

I also want to emphasize how important the Treasury Department’s new dialog with China could be for American competitiveness. But if the dialog is going to play this important role, we have 

to use it wisely and avoid squandering its potential. 


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Let me start with the Treasury report’s coverage of global imbalances. The key statistic here is trade in goods and services, not the 

current account balance which the report uses. As a share of the 

U.S. trade deficit, global trade surpluses by Germany, Japan, and 

the rest of non-China Asia have been large for many years, continue to be large. In contrast, until 2 years ago, China’s trade surplus was quite small. I will come back to China in a minute. 

In this score, let me give you what I call a user’s warning alert. 

When the U.S. Commerce Department reports each month how big 

the U.S. trade deficit is and says which countries make up what 

share of that deficit, you should ignore the latter part of that information. It is meaningless. A country could have a surplus with the 

United States and a deficit with the rest of the world. 

The bilateral two-way balance for the U.S. says nothing by itself 

about how much a country contributes to our deficit. This is especially true of China, which processes and repackages exports from 

other countries for final shipment to the U.S. 

America has a large deficit with a global supply chain. Other 

countries have surpluses with the global supply chain. If we look 

at which rich countries are running large, long-term surpluses with 

the global supply chain, the list includes Germany, Japan, and 

other non-China Asian countries. 

Let me point out a second lesson on the U.S. trade deficit. We 

may think it is a problem. But the U.S. trade deficit is essential 

for the global economy. Poor countries need markets so that they 

can develop and become eventually markets for the U.S. exports. 

America wants to promote healthy growth, but not with foreign aid 

and not with subsidized loans, but with trade. Somebody has to 

buy their products. America plays that role in the world. 

Other major industrialized countries are not helping, especially 

Germany and Japan. Germany and Japan, to put it not too politely, 

are slackers. Instead of running modest deficits and sharing the 

burden with America, Germany and Japan are feeding off our deficit themselves. They should not need to do that. They have per 

capita GDP 20 times China. 

We need to pressure them to get with the program. They should 

spur their own domestic demand, especially consumption. This is 

an important message, and it is one stressed in the Treasury report. But the report’s position is kind of muffled. It is polite. I do 

not think it should be so muffled or polite. 

People say but Germany and Japan have foreign exchange markets. Their currencies must be at the right levels. This misses the 

point. Exchange rates will not fix this problem. Germany and 

Japan run surpluses because they have structured their economies 

and their finances to save rather than consume. Exchange rates 

will not fix this. Germany and Japan need to change this structures and America needs to strongly encourage them to do so. 

Yes, I know, Germany and Japan host our troops and military 

bases on their soil. But that should not be a Treasury report concern. From the prospective of global economic leadership, Germany 

and Japan are, as I say, slackers and have been for a long time. 

Now let us turn to China. Until 2 years ago, China’s global surplus was 8 percent of America’s deficit. Only 8 percent. The Netherlands had the same surplus size. The European currency areas, 


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the euro area surplus that year was 27 percent of the U.S. deficit. 

And non-China Asia had an even larger surplus. 

China’s surplus was only 8 percent then. In 2005–2006, yes, its 

surplus jumped. What happened? It is not an exchange rate shift. 

China, over the last 5 years, has joined the WTO, a wrenching 

change to its trade relations with the world that has nothing to do 

with its exchange rate. 

And then the multi-fiber agreement ended. In the short term, the 

repercussions of these changes are certain to be unstable, and they 

have been. These are huge adjustments compared to any exchange 

rate effect. 

China’s global surplus really took off with the domestic credit 

tightening that slowed imports in 2004–2005 to let them grow less 

quickly. In 2005, China’s surplus was slightly less than Germany’s 

17 percent instead of Germany’s 20 percent. 

In the first half of last year, 2006, China’s surplus was slightly 

more than Germany’s, 20 percent instead of 19 percent. This 

change over two short years did not reflect a sudden shift in China’s exchange rate. At this preliminary state in China’s WTO adjustments, so many parameters are changing so fast that I think 

it would be foolish to insist that they are caused by exchange rates. 

Let me repeat that point. China’s global trade surplus has grown 

suddenly larger, putting it on a par with Germany’s, but not because of exchange rate shifting. 

Will China’s WTO accession process eventually shake out to a 

more balanced trade pattern? We have to wait and see. WTO requirements that China open more to imports, for example by enabling foreign retail branches, have not really matured. They came 

online with a delay, with a lag. If we want to pressure China, this 

is the place to do it, on our exports’ access to the Chinese market, 

not the exchange rate. 

I have a second quick warning. Do not look at China’s foreign exchange reserves for evidence of exchange rate manipulation. There 

is a speculation game going on out there and the U.S. Congress 

may be an unwitting participant. When a speculator hears the U.S. 

Government criticism of China’s reserve levels, they are encouraged to think America will force China to revalue, so they speculate more. And China’s reserves go up as a result. And then there 

is more criticism and then more speculative floats. And then higher 

reserves, and so on. 

This all could have a bad ending for the speculators, but it is not 

a sign of exchange rate manipulation. 

My most important point for this hearing is that China is a legitimate commercial competitor. Its success does not rely on currency manipulation. And China will continue to be a legitimate 

commercial competitor. America’s strategy has to be focused here 

at home. Strengthen our own fundamental competitiveness, education, labor force mobility, pension mobility, health care, and safe 

cities as attractive places to work so we can compete in the global 

market for technical and managerial talent. Visa reform would 

help. 

Instead, if we pretend that our problems are because China’s exchange rate or China’s banking system or China’s low wages, that 

is like sticking our heads in the sand. 


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Treasury’s China dialog is a chance to move away from this 

misperception of our challenge. It is a terrific opportunity, and I 

was in Treasury when we worked on this. We tried long and hard 

to elevate our access to Chinese leaders, and we mistargeted. Now 

we have succeeded. Let’s use it well. It has taken many years. Let’s 

not waste it on what I consider to be dead end, feel good distractions like exchange rates. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much, Doctor. 

Mr. Bergsten. 

STATEMENT OF FRED BERGSTEN, DIRECTOR, PETERSON 

INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 

Mr. BERGSTEN. Mr. Chairman, my written statement tries to provide a succinct but comprehensive statement of the current account 

problem and China’s role in it. The bottom line is the problem is 

even worse than you have been describing today. And I just mention two points. 

Because of our huge current account deficit and our own foreign investments, the United States now has to attract $8 billion of foreign capital inflow every working day to keep our economy afloat. 

If we do not get $8 billion of happy foreign investment coming in 

every working day, we will see our interest rates shoot up, our equity and housing markets tank, and the economy could even go into 

recession, depending on how rapidly it happens. 

So the problem is huge. I am talking our global current account 

deficit. I regard it as the single biggest threat to the prosperity and 

stability of the American economy because if that $8 billion 

dropped to only $4 billion or $5 billion a day huge as that would 

still be, we could go into a dollar collapse which would cause significant adverse effects to our economy. 

Second, the role of China. I agree with Dr. Keidel that we should 

not focus on bilateral imbalances. But the truth is the global imbalances tell the exact same story. China is now running a global current account surplus in excess of $250 billion per year. It has risen 

in an almost vertical line for the last 5 years. It is now exceeding 

10 percent of China’s own GDP. It has accounted for between a 

quarter and a third of all China’s growth over the last several 

years. 

In short, the global pattern with China’s massive and rapidly 

soaring surplus tells the same story as the bilateral imbalance. So 

in this case, the message is the same. 

I want to mention two or three analytical points that came up 

in the discussion and then spend most of my time answering your 

frustrations and the issue of what to do about it. Just two or three 

quick analytical points. 

Several people, including the Secretary have said the renminbi 

at least has gone up 5 or 6 percent over the last 18 months. Yes, 

but no. It has gone up 5 or 6 percent against the dollar. But the 

fact that the Chinese still essentially peg to the dollar, and the fact 

that the dollar has gone down against everything else, means that 

the average exchange rate of the renminbi has not gone up a whit. 

The stunning conclusion, in fact, is that the average exchange 

rate of the Chinese currency is weaker today than it was in 2001, 


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when their current account surplus was 1 percent of their GDP, 

and today it is 10 percent. That increasing undervaluation of the 

renminbi is indeed a major factor why their trading surplus and 

current account surplus has soared. 

Second, a very important distinction has to be made among the 

terms that are used as to what we want from the Chinese. The Secretary and many of you have used the term greater flexibility and 

then gone on to say in a second stage we want a freely floating currency. 

He is right to say that in the short run they cannot float freely, 

for reasons of weakness of their financial market. But the key 

thing to us should not be a more flexible renminbi. It should be a 

stronger renminbi. What we want, at least in the short run, is not 

for them to go to a more flexible currency. They are going to manage their currency. There is no doubt that they are going to manage it day to day, minute to minute, whatever they call their regime. 

What matters to us is the price of their currency. It should be 

much stronger. Our estimates are that to eliminate China’s surplus, which they have said is their goal, would require a revaluation of about 20 percent in the trade weighted average of the 

renminbi which, as I said, is flat over the last 6 years. And that 

would imply a rise of about 40 percent against the dollar. Because 

if the Chinese currency goes up, other Asian currencies will go up 

with it. Their average will not rise as much as all of their currency 

values against the dollar. 

But the key thing is that what counts to us is the price relationship between the Chinese currency and ours. Better if they did it 

in a one-step revaluation. 

Now they will not go 20 or 40 percent overnight, but they could 

do it in a series of step level moves, like the 2 percent they did in 

the summer of 2005, only much bigger. It is very important to keep 

in mind what we want. 

When we say to the Chinese we want a more flexible currency, 

it is easy for them to say well, the forums are asking us for a floating exchange rate, we cannot do that. And they are correct. So we 

have to be very clear on that point. 

The third thing I want to mention is the Secretary’s comment 

that what really is at stake here is the structural underlying feature of the Chinese economy. He is right, of course. We want to see 

better capital markets, improved economic reform across a wide 

range of issues in China. 

But make no mistake. The reason the exchange rate is so weak 

is massive, blatant intervention, $15 billion to $20 billion per 

month over the last 3 years, as documented in the Treasury’s own 

report. That is very clearly what is holding the renminbi down. 

Any other currency in the world, with that kind of capital inflow, 

would have already risen probably the 20 percent or more that we 

need. It is blatant intervention, call it manipulation, which is in 

fact the source of the huge currency imbalance. 

Finally, everyone has expressed frustration, including the Secretary, including all of you, including all of us who watch this 

closely and have worked on it a lot. And your question, quite rightVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:36 Nov 24, 2009 Jkt 050308 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A308.XXX A308

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ly, is what to do about it. On pages eight to the end of my statement, I suggest a five-part strategy. 

First, the Treasury should tell the Chinese quietly that they will 

be designated a manipulator in the next report unless they make 

a significant down payment on the needed rise in the value of their 

currency. I would suggest 10 to 15 percent. This should be done before the next SED in May and before the next Treasury report in 

May or June. 

But I would go to the Chinese and tell them very quietly, privately, that I am going to have to designate you unless you begin 

to play by the rules of the game. That, I think, would give the Chinese then a chance to take the requisite action without losing face, 

without seeming to capitulate to the foreign pressure, et cetera, et 

cetera. So I would do it that way. 

Now, if they do not comply, then of course China should be labeled a manipulator. You have said it, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Shelby, you have all said it. It is a manipulation. If it walks like 

a duck, call it a duck. The Chinese should be indicated on it. 

Incidentally, I was struck that Secretary Paulson said I am negotiating the currency issue with the Chinese anyway. And the implication was so why designate them, which requires a negotiation? 

I guess I would reach the opposite conclusion. If he is negotiating 

with them anyway over currency, as he obviously is, why not tell 

the truth, indicate that they are manipulating, strengthen his position by having put out on the table the facts and the reality, be 

in league with this committee and the Congress instead of fighting 

them politely but still on opposite sides. If he is negotiating anyway, why not say they are manipulating and the law calls for a negotiation. 

I do not see how it can hurt his negotiating position. I can only 

believe it would help it. 

But my point one is go to them quietly, tell them you are going 

to have to do it. You cannot defend them anymore for their indefensible practices against this committee or the Congress more broadly, or the public. Please take action and I can stay on your side. 

Second, the Administration should also tell the IMF and its other 

G–7 partners that it is going to label China a manipulator next 

time around and escalate this issue. That, I think, would significantly improve the support that we would get from the IMF and 

from the G–7 and other key countries. 

The Secretary failed to mention something I think is very important. There are IMF rules. He stressed the WTO rules. There are 

IMF rules against competitive currency undervaluation, against 

manipulation. The criteria are stated very clearly: a country shall 

not conduct large-scale, protracted, one-way intervention of currency markets. The Chinese have violated all three. 

Now those IMF rules have not been implemented with great 

force in the past. They have on some occasion. They should be done 

again. My point is, mobilize multilateral support. 

Third, and very quickly, we should also go multilateral to the 

WTO. My Institute has published an analysis of the proposed subsidy case against currency undervaluation. It is uncharted terrain. 

We are not sure it would win. We might even lose. But we should 

certainly pursue the case. We should make every effort to pursue 


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the multilateral approaches on both finance through the IMF and 

on trade through the WTO to try to resolve the issue in the most 

cooperative multilateral way possible. 

And then finally, if none of that works, you could say well, what 

should we do? There are certainly a couple of things we can do. 

One is on finance itself. The Treasury has the right and all the ammunition necessary to enter the foreign currency markets itself and 

buy the foreign currency that needs to rise in value. We did it at 

the Plaza. We did it on the yen, as recently as 1998. We have always in the past done it in cooperation with the other country, and 

we certainly seek their agreement to do it. 

But the Treasury has huge amounts of resources with which it 

could do that. Nobody could say it is protectionist. The Chinese are 

buying hundreds of billions of dollars of our currency to keep theirs 

from rising in value. If we bought a little tiny amount to try to 

push it in the other direction and to approximate a market outcome 

no one could say it is protectionist. So I think we ought to pursue 

that approach, if all else fails. 

Then finally, as somebody said in the last discussion, the ultimate U.S. leverage is Chinese access to our market. I would hate 

to see us go down the road from blocking that, but frankly, I think 

this issue is so important that we might come to that if all else 

fails. And there, the Congress might have to take the bit in its 

mouth. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you very much. Thank all of you. Appreciate your cooperation. 

Senator Schumer was tied up in chairing the Joint Economic 

Committee and has a strong interest in this subject and will have 

some questions, I think, for several of you here. 

Let me pick up on Dr. Bergsten’s recommendations here. I guess 

we could call it a Plaza II, or an Asian Plaza, the proposal here. 

Would any of you like to comment on the suggestions and recommendations that Dr. Bergsten made? 

Richard, you talked about taking some action and moving beyond 

this. I do not know if you had a chance to look at Dr. Bergsten’s 

testimony, but do you have any reaction to it? 

Mr. TRUMKA. I have not had a chance to look at it carefully, but 

anything that has a chance of working I think we ought to do it 

simultaneously. What we have been doing is doing nothing but dialog. When I collectively bargain, I look at all the leverage I have 

and I employ several different avenues at the same time, hoping 

to get an agreement before you have to use the ultimate weapon, 

which in our case is labor. As a result, I like a lot of the things 

he said. We would agree with all of that. 

But we also ought to be taking other action to let them know 

that we are willing to go forward because—I think you mentioned 

it, Mr. Chairman, early on—by our continuous talking to them, our 

continuous idle threats at them and then taking no action, they 

look at us like a paper tiger right now. I think this is a country 

that understands and reads what you say and interprets it about 

what you are going to do, and they do not think we are serious 

right now. 


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If we have not called them a manipulator over the last 3 years, 

I would like to see what a manipulator is. Because everybody on 

the face of the earth that looks at it knows that they are manipulating their currency. 

Chairman DODD. Dr. Trumka, I meant to ask—I read your testimony and the question is, what would constitute manipulation? It 

is a good question to ask the Treasury in a hypothetical—I really 

do not like hypotheticals, but what sort of thing should we be looking to as an indication of whether or not this is occurring? 

Mr. Campbell, you talked about this. I raised it but you have 

raised it as well, and that is the credibility. Beyond everything 

else—and Richard Trumka just talked about the sense here. So 

talk about that point of view, because that just becomes just a very 

major point, not just in terms of your bilateral relationship with 

China, but others around the world, it seems to me as well. The 

United States has got to be—I am not looking for purity on this 

point, but that consistency where your credibility becomes eroded 

and it has a ripple effect with so many other things you engage in. 

Dr. Keidel, I am going to ask you to respond as well on that point 

of whether or not—I know you do not want the emphasis on this 

point. I heard your testimony. But to what extent, because this is 

the subject matter and so to what extent are you concerned at all 

about the credibility of the United States in these efforts that we 

make around the world as a result of what looks like inconsistent 

reactions here from administration to administration? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would agree that it does call into question our 

credibility around the world. But I also believe that it calls into 

question our credibility right here in the United States, because 

your constituents, your members, my members, if they do not see 

action, if they do not see progress on this—as I said in my statement, we say we believe in free trade. We believe that China is manipulating its currency which is causing an unlevel playing field. 

We ask them to stop. They do not stop, and we do not do anything 

as we get to the end of that process. 

That destroys our credibility both globally but also here in the 

United States. My concern is that it will precipitate a frustrated reaction that will be very harmful, not just to the bilateral relationship but to global trade patterns generally. 

Chairman DODD. Would you, by the way, before I ask Dr. Keidel 

to respond to that question as well, would you respond to Dr. 

Bergsten’s suggestions from the NAM’s perspective? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. I have not had a chance to read them but 

I will read them with great interest. I will say that his first suggestion, which to me is just using whatever leverage we can to try to 

convince the Chinese that we are serious and they need to take action, and that is to quietly tell them that we will designate them 

a manipulator if we do not see significant progress before the SED 

in May. I think that that is a very credible suggestion. 

His second and third suggestions basically were to approach this 

problem in a more multilateral fashion, involving the G–7 and involving the IMF. We too agree that more can be done by bringing 

in Europe, Japan, the International Monetary Fund to help us on 

this problem. 


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His other suggestions about going into the marketplace and buying the RMB is something I would not like to comment on. We believe very much in market forces. The Government going in there 

and playing in that market causes me some concerns, but I would 

like an opportunity to study it. 

Chairman DODD. Yes, and the point that he raised as well on 

this, instead of focusing all our efforts on the exchange rate policy, 

let us talk about price. That is a different approach on this. That 

is really what we are talking about here is price. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. 

Chairman DODD. In trading, they can play that game but there 

is always that, market forces ought to work now and I will give you 

10 percent NOW and fool around with it next time. So I hear what 

you are saying. I like it in the short term, but it worries me in the 

longer term that you are letting them off the hook on the larger 

question. 

Do you have any comment on that? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. I think that you are correct in that and that, 

as I say, I think playing a harder ballgame with them is what is 

important, and getting them to understand the benefits to their 

own economy from making this change. It is not that we are asking 

them to put themselves into disadvantage in the long term. We are 

asking them to advantage their economy, our economy and global 

trade in general. I think that that is what the focus of the discussions have been and have to continue to be. 

Chairman DODD. Dr. Keidel, if you would just respond to those 

points. I raised the issue of the defense issue, the tenfold increase 

in defense spending at the expense of a lot of other things that they 

could be doing to help their own people, and does that concern you 

at all? The fact that what we are talking about here is basically 

subsidizing the ability of the Chinese to be able to have an economy that allows them to invest that multiple in increasing defense. 

Mr. KEIDEL. Thank you very much. Let me just quickly reply to 

Dr. Bergsten’s comments and then answer your questions. 

First, as to the strength of the U.S., I would emphasize, the U.S. 

Federal Reserve System is more than robust enough to deal with 

the needs of the American economy and where interest rates will 

go in terms of reacting to the U.S. capital source. 

I would emphasize using trade in goods and services. Dr. 

Bergsten continues to stress capital—the current account balance. 

The current account balance in China’s case is use to longer—a lot 

of capital inflows, so you get a much bigger picture. 

But my point is still the same. If you look at the global picture 

it has changed only in the last 2 years, and that is part of a huge 

instability in China’s non-price, non-exchange rate system, and 

non-tariff barriers, which are clearly changing in the other direction as well. So we need to look at how that shakes out. 

On IMF rules, I have heard that before. If you read those IMF 

rules very carefully about sustained, long term manipulation or 

intervention, that is not a criterion for saying that a country is manipulating its currency. That is a sign that you might want to look 

to see what a country is manipulating its currency or not. It is a 

different point. It says, if there is a long term intervention, go take 

a look. But you do not use that to decide whether a country is maVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:36 Nov 24, 2009 Jkt 050308 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A308.XXX A308

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nipulating or not. So the Treasury report is right on the mark in 

how it is using the economics of this whole issue to decide what is 

right and what is not right for China. 

In terms of buying the RMB and a market focus, I think that 

would not begin to work. The Chinese are sterilizing because they 

need stability. They could just sterilize whatever we wanted to do 

about it. And besides, we really do not yet have access to that market. It is not a real currency market at all. So I think that is dead 

on arrival. 

I would also comment on something the Secretary said about 

four steps to getting to what we want, to allow the currency to be 

market based. He omitted one. He omitted an important fifth one, 

which is opening their short term capital accounts. China now regulates its short term capital flows dramatically. Without those free 

flows we do not have a market test. The pressures for appreciation 

now are false indicators of where that currency would go in a truly 

free market environment. 

So we really need to be careful—those five steps, and I emphasize the fifth one in particular, we need to be very careful how we 

evaluate whether the exchange rate itself is really what is going on 

here. 

What is a manipulator? A clear case of manipulation is that you 

have a dual exchange rate. You provide one exchange for some 

companies and some ministries, and you provide a different one for 

another. That is what China had before 1994, and that is when the 

Treasury rightly cited it for manipulating its currency. China unified its currency in 1994 and it has been unified ever since, and 

the IMF rules make a peg on legitimate currency. So we need to 

look at that. Yes, there can be manipulation, but the kind of thing 

that China is doing now is not one. 

I would also comment on idea that markets here—that exchange 

rates can really determine the trade flows. That is like walking 

into a hospital and telling a doctor that the only thing he needs to 

cure about an immune system is white blood cell count. It is much 

more complicated than that. So to say that it is only currency, it 

is kind of like the Maine fisherman who when he eats sausage 

says, smells good, taste good, but once you clean it, there ain’t 

nothing to it. It is much more complicated and a much more powerful force is in play than the exchange rate in determining the trade 

balance. 

The credibility of the U.S. hinges just on this point. People 

around the world know what really is functioning here. It is structural shifts, structural changes. They look at the United States and 

see us focusing on the exchange rate and we lose credibility. We 

certainly lose it with the Chinese. 

When we talk about what would be good for the Chinese economy, we lose credibility if we tell them they just need to privatize 

their banks, they need to open up their whole exchange rate system. 

That is the kind of thing that caused the Asian financial crisis. 

South Korea and Thailand opened their short term capital accounts 

prematurely, and eventually those foreign loans at loan interest 

rates look pretty good because they do not have foreign exchange 

risk premium on them. And when they start going south you do not 


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have the regulatory capacity to keep people from making those bad 

decisions. You are in trouble. China does not want to go there. 

So the credibility issue for us is to deal with this issue in a balanced, complex way that does justice to the phenomenon that we 

are facing. The benefits to the Chinese economy, the financial sector, I have mentioned, to their money supply. Fred raises this point 

very well. We talk about—Dr. Bergsten, excuse me—the idea about 

flexibility as opposed to appreciation. Why do we do that? Because 

any really serious or most really serious economists are very leery 

of saying where a currency should be. That is really tough. And the 

Treasury report has an appendix that points out just exactly why 

that is a very dicey thing to try to do. 

All economists, all good economists agree that if you are going to 

open your capital account and have a fixed exchange rate, you are 

in trouble. So if you open your capital account, you better get flexibility. So we are all very comfortable saying, China ought to have 

flexibility, because it deals with capital account. It is not dealing 

with trade. It is not the appreciation issue, but it sounds like it. 

It sounds good. If you can get through a briefing, you can get 

through a hearing, but why they are—they keep their union card, 

if you will excuse the expression, as an economist is by talking 

about flexibility, not about appreciation. 

On defense spending, my organization, the Carnegie Endowment, 

is holding a debate here next week on PLA modernization, the People’s Liberation Army modernization—a debate. We have two people from different sides of the respectable, sort of credible, view on 

whether PLA modernization is a threat to the U.S. So I invite all 

of you to come and hear that. 

But the notion that China’s defense spending has gone up tenfold, we are talking about percentage increases from a small number. When you consider how Chinese defense spending and its commitment to defense really declined and suffered throughout a lot of 

the 1980’s and early 1990’s, then you know that their defense 

spending as a share of GDP, and in particular as a share of our 

spending, not to mention the accumulated military firepower or 

force projection capability that the U.S. because of its aircraft carrier task forces, which were not built in a year, because of its basing agreements around the world, then this notion that China has 

suddenly increased its defense spending would be put in perspective. 

So those are my quick answers. Some of it is done in more detail 

in my written statement. 

Chairman DODD. Thank you all very, very much. As I said, there 

may be some submitted questions on the part of the panel. 

Let me turn to Senator Shelby. I want to make sure I give my 

colleague a chance—— 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Campbell, you represent the National Association of Manufacturers. You represent so many of the big manufacturers in this 

country who provide a lot of industrial jobs. Have you in your last 

20 or 30 years of economic history, seen anywhere before recently, 

the erosion of jobs like we have seen in the industrial base in the 

last say 10 years? 


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54 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Senator, I do not want to minimize the loss of 

manufacturing jobs because I too understand that these are very 

good, well-paying jobs that provide great stability to us economically and socially. But you have to look at also some of the other 

factors going on. Productivity is one of the biggest issues. The average labor cost for an output of manufactured goods today is below 

10 percent. That is an extraordinary testament to the productivity 

of American manufacturing. 

The erosion of jobs is not so much a function of what has happened with China as it is a reduction in our ability to export, because our export profile has not been as robust as it needs to be. 

Senator SHELBY. Why? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. There are a variety of factors. For example, the 

cost of energy and the availability of natural gas has profoundly affected the chemical industry, which is the industry that I am from. 

That has caused us to shut plants here in the United States and 

relocate them to areas where energy costs are less and natural gas 

is more readily available. 

Senator SHELBY. Will that have an impact on fertilizer? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, it will. That is why we were so pleased that 

Congress did pass legislation in the last Congress regarding exploration in the outer continental shelf to get us greater access to natural gas. 

So it is a very broad set of policies that have to be looked at in 

regard to manufacturing, not just the imbalance of trade with 

China. We have got to get our energy—— 

Senator SHELBY. You cannot blame it on one thing. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. No, sir; it is too complex. 

Senator SHELBY. But trade has got to have something to do with 

it. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. It does. It absolutely does. But it is a very, very 

complex situation. 

Senator SHELBY. Dr. Bergsten, if we go along like we are doing 

and we continue to have these trade imbalances with China and 

others, the current account, nothing happens, not in 2 years, 4 

years, 5 years, what is that going to do to our economy? 

Mr. BERGSTEN. It will do three or four things. One is that our foreign debt will continue to pile up. It is already in excess of $3 

trillion and it is rising rapidly. We have to service that debt. More 

and more of our national income will be paid to foreigners. We will 

be a poorer country. 

Senator SHELBY. That means an erosion in our standard of living. 

Mr. BERGSTEN. Exactly. Our national income will be lower than 

it otherwise would be. 

Second, the eventual adjustment will have to come because we 

cannot keep borrowing $8 billion a day, the nine, then ten. And 

even if it is a gradual adjustment, the higher base from which it 

comes means the more we have to cut back on our domestic spending in order to make room to improve that. 

Third, and in a way most critical, we are bound to run into a crisis. We are already way beyond the typical crisis threshold. The 

U.S. current account deficit now is more than double the previous 

record back in the middle of 1980, after which the dollar dropped 


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55 

50 percent in the next 3 years. No one can say exactly when it will 

happen or what will trigger it, but unless all economic history is 

repealed, as long as we stay on this path, the numbers keep rising, 

the foreign financing requirement continues to grow, the net foreign debt continues to soar, there will be a crisis. 

Finally—and this is a point that came up actually from Mr. 

Campbell—erosion of our ability to maintain an open trade policy. 

I am a very strong supporter of free trade, as all of you know. My 

studies over 40 years suggest that the most erosive element in 

being able to maintain an open trade policy in this country is when 

we run a hugely overvalued currency and a massive deficit, because then the domestic politics of trade policy shifts dramatically. 

As Mr. Campbell said, it would be hard for the NAM to keep supporting free trade measures if the deficit keeps soaring and they 

are priced out of their national competition by a misaligned currency. 

So unless we bring that back into trade, there is no way I think 

we are going to be able to maintain an open trade policy. So the 

cost will be huge if we do not really get at it. 

Senator SHELBY. Irreparable damage. 

Mr. BERGSTEN. Irreparable damage, even potential crises, with 

pervasive effects on the global financial and trade systems as well 

as on our own economy; yes, sir. 

Senator SHELBY. Senator Dodd, I have a number of questions for 

this panel that I would like to submit for the record. 

Chairman DODD. Absolutely, we will do that. 

We have kept you a long time and I apologize. But it is tremendously valuable to have your testimony. You are very knowledgeable and I am very impressed at how much knowledge you bring 

to a complex subject that we all recognize and are aware of that. 

But clarity on this subject matter is something that people are 

screaming for. 

To make your point again, Richard, people are out there paying 

a price and are very worried about what the future means to this 

country if we do not begin to do something about it. 

So we thank you very, very much, all of you, for being here. I 

thank Senator Shelby and the other members of the Committee. 

This Committee will stand adjourned until further call of the 

chair. 

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Prepared statements supplied for the record follows:] 


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