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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN 

AND PAKISTAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 7, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

APRIL 7, 2009

Page 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le A., Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy ................... 5 

Petraeus, GEN David H. USA, Commander, United States Central Command 12 

Olson, ADM Eric T., USN, Commander, United States Special Operations 

Command .............................................................................................................. 34 

(III) 

(1) 

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD 

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 1, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:27 a.m. in room SD– 

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, 

Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, 

Graham, Thune, Martinez, and Collins. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; 

Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff 

member; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; Russell L. 

Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., deputy Republican staff director; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional 

staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; David 

M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional 

staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. 

White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L. Kingston, 

Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant 

to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Vance 

Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant 

to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator 

Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer 

Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant 

to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants 

to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 

Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason 

Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant 

to Senator Martinez; Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator 

2 

Burr; and Rob Epplin and Chip Kennett, assistants to Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee receives testimony this morning on the new strategy for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan announced by President Obama last Friday. Our witnesses this morning each have contributed to developing that strategy. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Miche`le Flournoy, who 

will be with us in a few minutes, was one of three administration 

officials who led the interagency panel that examined U.S. policy 

towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their review drew on and benefited from a number of earlier policy reviews, including one by 

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) led by Commander General 

David Petraeus, who also joins us this morning. We have with us 

Admiral Eric Olson, Commander, Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM). 

Ms. Flournoy, General Petraeus, and Admiral Olson will play a 

central role in implementing the President’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our thanks go to each of them for their 

service and for their being with us this morning. On behalf of the 

committee, please thank the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines 

serving in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). America 

owes them a debt of gratitude for their willingness to serve in 

harm’s way and for the sacrifices which they and their families 

make on a daily basis. General and Admiral, I hope that you will 

pass along that appreciation to the troops. 

The President’s strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the 

right track. The American people recognize that Afghanistan is the 

place where al Qaeda laid the plans for the attacks of September 

11 on our homeland and where the training took place for those attacks. We must do all we can to make sure that this region never 

again provides a safe haven or a training ground for extremists 

plotting the next attack. 

In formulating this new strategy, the administration has consulted closely with our Afghanistan and Pakistan partners. Pakistan President Zardari has called the administration’s new approach a positive change. Afghan President Karzai has welcomed 

the administration’s plans, saying it is ‘‘what the Afghan people 

were hoping for.’’ This support and buy-in is important because ultimately it will be the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who will 

be the ones who decide to reject and defeat the hopeless future that 

al Qaeda and the Taliban offer them and the world. 

I very much support the President’s commitment to greatly accelerate the expansion of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the 

Afghan National Police. It is important to build up the Afghan security forces far more quickly than has been the case up to now so 

Afghanistan can provide for its own security. 

As Afghan Defense Minister Wardak told me, Afghan soldiers 

want to provide for their country’s security, and our commanders 

say that Afghan soldiers have the will to fight and are respected 

throughout Afghanistan and the Afghan army has the recruits to 

build their forces. 

3 

For too long, as Admiral Mullen said some months ago, in Iraq 

we do what we must, while in Afghanistan we only do what we 

can. With the new strategy, this will no longer be the case. 

This committee has heard from witnesses over the last few weeks 

that the expansion of the Afghan army has been slowed by a lack 

of training teams to work with Afghan units and delays in getting 

the basic equipment that Afghan units need to train and to fight. 

The President’s decision to deploy an additional brigade of 4,000 

soldiers with the almost exclusive mission of training the Afghan 

security forces is a major step in the right direction to moving more 

quickly to building up the Afghan army. By helping the Afghan 

forces as they take the lead in the fight, we avoid the perception 

that we are occupiers. Instead, we’ll be supporting them in their 

struggle for a better future for their country. 

I also welcome President Obama’s decision to match this increase 

in military forces with an increase in our civilian resources in Afghanistan. The fielding of up to 500 additional civilian experts from 

the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), Agriculture, Justice, and other civilian government agencies will bring all instruments of U.S. power to the task of ensuring 

that Afghanistan doesn’t serve again as a safe haven for terrorists. 

The large majority of these civilians will be posted at provincial 

reconstruction teams and elsewhere in the countryside to promote 

economic development and good governance at the provincial and 

district level. We need to support programs that empower Afghan 

communities to set their own priorities and to take ownership of 

local development projects. 

I hope our witnesses will comment on the Afghan National Solidarity Program. The National Solidarity Program has funded thousands of small development projects in nearly every corner of Afghanistan by providing modest grants of money directly to locally 

elected community development councils which plan, implement, 

and oversee development projects that they decide are the most 

beneficial for their local communities. 

The decision to establish benchmarks and metrics to assess 

progress towards meeting our objectives is a wise one. Some indicators of security, such as the number of violent incidents, roadside 

bombs, and suicide attacks, have gotten worse in 2008. At the same 

time, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General recently told the Security Council that he is beginning to see positive 

trends emerging in Afghanistan in government competence, in police reform, private sector development, and counternarcotics. 

CENTCOM data on Defense Department-funded reconstruction efforts indicates that since October 2005 the Defense Department 

has constructed 96 schools and other education centers throughout 

Afghanistan and roughly 6.2 million students were enrolled last 

year, up from 800,000 students in 2001. Since January 2007, the 

Defense Department has completed almost 200 health care construction projects, funded almost 300 water and sanitation projects, 

and funded 115 electricity-related projects, including microhydro 

and other generators and solar lighting systems. 

We need metrics and we need benchmarks to measure progress 

to report to the American people and, importantly, to hold people 

accountable. It’s about time the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

4 

(NATO) establishes some benchmarks for itself. Thus far NATO’s 

performance has been woefully inadequate, except for some very 

notable exceptions of some countries. It is long past time for our 

NATO allies, friends, and other stakeholders in the region to step 

up and do their part. Our NATO allies need to provide the troops, 

equipment, and trainers that they agreed to provide for the NATO 

mission in Afghanistan and eliminate national caveats on the use 

of these forces. Those who can’t provide military resources should 

contribute financially to Afghanistan’s economic development or to 

help build the Afghan security forces, for example through fully 

funding the NATO Afghan Army Trust Fund. So far, the commitment to provide a billion Euros to that fund has fallen short by 90 

percent. In addition, countries can share their civilian expertise to 

promote good governance and the rule of law. 

I welcome President Obama’s commitment to robustly fund the 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, to prevent waste and fraud in reconstruction programs. 

Relative to Pakistan, the United States should assist Pakistan in 

confronting terrorists within its borders and in building its democratic and economic institutions. Over the weekend, President 

Zardari stated that the conflict in the Afghan-Pakistan border region was Pakistan’s fight, not America’s. He said Pakistanis ‘‘are 

fighting militancy and extremism for our own sake.’’ I sincerely 

hope that that is the case. 

Pakistani leaders at all levels should need no convincing from us 

that extremist groups pose the greatest threat to Pakistan’s survival. If Pakistan’s goals are attacking militants and extremists for 

the sake of their own stability and the benefit of the Pakistani people, then we can and should support their goals. But we can’t buy 

Pakistan’s support for our goals, rather than supporting their 

goals. If we are perceived as trying to do that, it will send the 

wrong message to the Pakistani people and to the extremists, who 

will use it against the Pakistan leadership and against our interests. 

Finally, I do not agree with statements by some in the administration that we cannot make progress in Afghanistan without success on the Pakistan side of the border. We should not tie Afghanistan’s future totally to the success of efforts in Pakistan or to Pakistan’s governmental decisions. Obviously, progress in Afghanistan 

is impeded by the failure of Pakistan to stop the flow of violent extremists into Afghanistan. But I remain skeptical that Pakistan 

has either the will or the capability to secure their border, particularly between Baluchistan and southern Afghanistan. 

U.S. Brigadier General John Nicholson in Regional Command 

South said that that stretch of border is ‘‘wide open’’ for Afghan 

Taliban fighters streaming across to attack U.S. and NATO forces. 

Pakistan leaders have failed to date to take on the Afghan Taliban 

in Baluchistan, whose leadership, or shura, meets openly in the 

city of Quetta and from there commands attacks into Afghanistan. 

News articles reported last week that operatives in one wing of 

Pakistan’s intelligence service have been providing direct support, 

in terms of money, military supplies, and strategic planning guidance, to the Taliban’s campaign in southern Afghanistan. I hope 

our witnesses will address those news reports. 

5 

But even though obviously far more difficult, unless Pakistan 

stops the flow of violent extremists coming across the border, an 

expanding Afghan army with our help can make progress in providing for Afghan security, including at the border. 

The road ahead is going to be long and costly. I believe we now 

have the right strategy. We all look forward to hearing from our 

witnesses about the challenges that lie ahead in implementing the 

administration’s new approach. 

Senator McCain is going to join us a little bit later and he will 

have an opening statement at that time. So let me start with our 

witnesses. We welcome you, Secretary Flournoy. We know that you 

were very necessarily detained, as a matter of fact, at another very 

important function, and you have your priorities exactly right. You 

might just spend a few moments, if you would, telling us why 

you’re late because I know you’re very proud of the fact. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHE` LE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, thank you very much for allowing me to do 

this. My husband is next door as the administration’s nominee to 

be Deputy Secretary of the Veterans Administration and I wanted 

to be there at least for his introduction to that committee and show 

my support for him. But I also didn’t want to let you all down and 

fail to appear here. So I appreciate you letting me be 15 minutes 

late so I could join you as well. 

Chairman LEVIN. Well, we thank you for getting here. We know 

how proud you are of your husband. 

Since a quorum is present, let me now interrupt the flow of the 

hearing to ask the committee to consider 3 civilian nominations 

and a list of 3,952 pending military nominations. 

First, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of Ashton 

Carter to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Is there a motion to favorably report Dr. 

Carter’s nomination to the Senate? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

Senator INHOFE. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor say aye? 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Opposed, nay. 

[No response.] 

The motion carries. 

Second, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of Dr. 

James Miller, Jr., to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Is there a motion to favorably report Dr. Miller’s nomination? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

Senator REED. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor say aye? 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Opposed, nay. 

[No response.] 

The motion carries. 

6 

Next, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of Ambassador Alexander Vershbow to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs. Is there a motion to report? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

Senator INHOFE. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor say aye? 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Any nays? 

[No response.] 

The motion carries. 

Finally, I ask the committee to consider a list of 3,952 pending 

military nominations. Of these nominations, 289 are 1 day short of 

our 7-day requirement. However, we’ve checked and there’s no objection that has been raised to these nominations because of that 

technical shortfall, and I recommend to the committee that we 

waive the 7-day rule in order to permit the confirmation of the 

nominations of these 289 officers prior to the coming recess. 

Is there a motion to favorably report the 3,952 nominations? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

Senator COLLINS. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor say aye? 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Any nays? 

[No response.] 

The motion carries. 

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION ON APRIL 1, 2009. 

1. In the Navy Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of captain (Scott 

D. Shiver) (Reference No. 55). 

2. MG Michael C. Gould, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Superintendent, 

U.S. Air Force Academy (Reference No. 74). 

3. BG Vincent K. Brooks, USA, to be major general (Reference No. 93). 

4. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Kathy L. Fullerton) (Reference No. 94). 

5. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Emil B. Kabban) (Reference No. 95). 

6. In the Air Force, there are 29 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins 

with Brian D. Anderson) (Reference No. 96). 

7. In the Air Force, there are 21 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins 

with Mark T. Allison) (Reference No. 97). 

8. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Tina M. Barbermatthew) (Reference No. 98). 

9. In the Air Force, there are 32 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(list begins with James J. Baldock IV) (Reference No. 99). 

10. In the Air Force, there are 67 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Lisa L. Adams) (Reference No. 100). 

11. In the Air Force, there are 1,179 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Ariel O. Acebal) (Reference No. 101). 

12. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Peter 

C. Gould) (Reference No. 102). 

13. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Garrett 

S. Yee) (Reference No. 103). 

14. In the Army Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Roy L. Bourne) (Reference No. 104). 

15. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Steven A. Khalil) (Reference No. 107). 

7 

16. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain (Miguel Gonzalez) (Reference No. 108). 

17. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander (David M. 

Dromsky) (Reference No. 109). 

18. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(list begins with Jed R. Espiritu) (Reference No. 110). 

19. In the Navy, there are 27 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(list begins with Charles C. Adkison) (Reference No. 111). 

20. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are five appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with David G. Antonik) (Reference No. 112). 

21. In the Marine Corps, there are 132 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Kelly P. Alexander) (Reference No. 113). 

22. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(Jonathon V. Lammers) (Reference No. 118). 

23. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Gary A. Foskey) (Reference No. 119). 

24. In the Air Force, there are seven appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Bryson D. Borg) (Reference No. 120). 

25. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Frank 

Rodriguez, Jr.) (Reference No. 121). 

26. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Edward E. Turski) (Reference No. 122). 

27. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Joseph R. 

Krupa) (Reference No. 123). 

28. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Kathleen P. 

Naiman) (Reference No. 124). 

29. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Juan G. Esteva) (Reference No. 125). 

30. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Robert F. Donnelly) (Reference No. 126). 

31. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Richard H. Dahlman) (Reference No. 127). 

32. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

and below (list begins with Julie S. Akiyama) (Reference No. 128). 

33. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

and below (list begins with Michael L. Nippert) (Reference No. 129). 

34. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Martin L. Badegian) (Reference No. 130). 

35. In the Army Reserve, there are five appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Debra H. Burton) (Reference No. 131). 

36. In the Army Reserve, there are 10 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Paul P. Bryant) (Reference No. 132). 

37. In the Army, there are 77 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with 

Robert J. Abbott) (Reference No. 133). 

38. In the Army, there are 22 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins 

with Vanessa A. Berry) (Reference No. 134). 

39. In the Army, there are eight appointments to the grade of colonel and below 

(list begins with Efren E. Recto) (Reference No. 135). 

40. In the Army Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Suzanne D. Adkinson) (Reference No. 136). 

41. In the Marine Corps, there are 773 appointments to the grade of major (list 

begins with Derek M. Abbey) (Reference No. 137). 

42. In the Marine Corps, there are 464 appointments to the grade of lieutenant 

colonel (list begins with Harald Aagaard) (Reference No. 138). 

43. Col. Debra A. Scullary, USAFR, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 142). 

44. In the Air Force Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of major 

general (list begins with Roger A. Binder) (Reference No. 143). 

45. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 14 appointments to the grade of brigadier 

general (list begins with William B. Binger) (Reference No. 144). 

46. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with Paul W. Brier) (Reference No. 145). 

47. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

and below (list begins with George B. Gosting) (Reference No. 155). 

48. In the Army Reserve, there are seven appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with Thomas M. Carden, Jr.) (Reference No. 156). 

49. In the Air Force, there are 51 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins 

with Richard D. Baker) (Reference No. 158). 

8 

50. In the Air Force, there are 15 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins 

with Jeffrey L. Andrus) (Reference No. 159). 

51. In the Air Force, there are 16 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(list begins with Federico C. Aquino, Jr.) (Reference No. 160). 

52. In the Air Force, there are 148 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(list begins with Joselita M. Abeleda) (Reference No. 161). 

53. In the Air Force, there are 40 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Thomas J. Bauer) (Reference No. 162). 

54. In the Air Force, there are 286 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Amanda J. Adams) (Reference No. 163). 

55. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Gregory G. Galyo) (Reference No. 164). 

56. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Xavier A. Nguyen) (Reference No. 192). 

57. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of major (list begins with John M. Beene II) (Reference No. 193). 

58. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Laura K. Lester) 

(Reference No. 194). 

59. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Brigitte 

Belanger) (Reference No. 195). 

60. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Mitzi A. Rivera) 

(Reference No. 196). 

61. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Catherine B. 

Evans) (Reference No. 197). 

62. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Victor G. Kelly) 

(Reference No. 198). 

63. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Ryan T. Choate) 

(Reference No. 199). 

64. In the Army, there are nine appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

and below (list begins with Rafael A. Cabrera) (Reference No. 200). 

65. In the Army, there are 43 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list 

begins with Robert A. Borcherding) (Reference No. 201). 

66. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major general (list 

begins with James K. Gilman) (Reference No. 218). 

67. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list 

begins with William B. Gamble) (Reference No. 219). 

68. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Ryan G. 

McPherson) (Reference No. 234). 

69. In the Air Force Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel 

(Mark J. Ivey) (Reference No. 235). 

70. In the Air Force, there are 37 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(list begins with Christopher B. Bennett) (Reference No. 238). 

71. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Victor J. TorresFernandez) (Reference No. 241). 

72. In the Army, there are 86 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and 

below (list begins with Joseph Angerer) (Reference No. 242). 

73. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Ted R. Bates) (Reference No. 243). 

74. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with John M. Diaz) (Reference No. 244). 

75. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Luisa Santiago) (Reference No. 245). 

76. In the Army, there are 124 appointments to the grade of colonel and below 

(list begins with Randall W. Cowell) (Reference No. 246). 

77. In the Army Reserve, there are 16 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Albert J. Adkinson) (Reference No. 247). 

78. In the Navy, there are 12 appointments to the grade of commander and below 

(list begins with Christopher G. Cunningham) (Reference No. 248). 

79. In the Navy, there are three appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Janet L. Jackson) (Reference No. 249). 

Total: 3,952. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now we will start with you, Madam Secretary. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you very much, sir, and thank you to the 

committee for taking the—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me interrupt you one more time. 

9 

Let me remind everybody, since we do have a good attendance 

here, that we will mark up the bill tomorrow which is a very significant bill, Senate Bill 454, which is the Acquisition Reform Act. 

We’re going to be marking this bill up. We need good attendance 

for that. It’ll be at 9 o’clock in this room. 

Madam Secretary. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Let me add my word of thanks to you for taking 

the time to have those committee votes. I know that Secretary 

Gates is very much looking forward to having some of his team arrive to help him. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee, thank 

you very much for asking me and giving me the opportunity to testify before you today on the Obama administration’s new strategy 

for Afghanistan and Pakistan. As the President stated last Friday, 

I think very eloquently, we have a very clear goal. This strategy 

really went back to first principles about our interests and our objectives, and we clarified our goal in this region as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies. To do so, 

we must eliminate their safe haven in Pakistan and ensure that 

such a safe haven does not return to Afghanistan. 

Preventing future terrorist threats to the American people and 

on our allies is absolutely vital to our national interests. We have 

learned in the past, at too high a price, the danger of allowing al 

Qaeda and its extremist supporters to have safe havens and access 

to resources to plan their attacks. This is why we have troops in 

Afghanistan and why we are going to heavily engage and intensify 

our efforts in Pakistan. 

To achieve our goals, we need a smarter and more comprehensive 

strategy, one that uses all the instruments of our national power 

and those of our allies. We need to devote the necessary resources 

to implement it. A critical aspect of this new strategy is the recognition that Afghanistan and Pakistan, while two countries, are a 

single theater for our diplomacy. Al Qaeda and its extremist allies 

have moved across the border into Pakistan, where they are planning attacks and supporting operations that undermine the stability of both countries. 

Special Representative Holbrooke will lead a number of bilateral 

and trilateral and regional diplomatic efforts, and from the Defense 

side we will be working to build the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities of both countries, so that they can more effectively combat terrorists and insurgents. 

Pakistan’s ability to dismantle the safe havens on its territory 

and defeat the terror and insurgent networks within its borders are 

absolutely critical to the security and stability of that nucleararmed state. It is in America’s long-term interests to support Pakistan’s restored democracy by investing in its people and in their 

economic wellbeing. We seek a strategic partnership with Pakistan 

that will encourage and enable it to shift its focus from conventional war preparations to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 

preparations. 

So we will be urging Congress to support a forthcoming proposal 

such as the Kerry-Lugar legislation that will authorize civilian and 

economic assistance as well as the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund to develop a more effective military that can defeat 

10 

insurgent networks. This support, both military and economic, will 

be limited if we do not see improvements in Pakistani performance. 

We must also develop a lasting partnership with Afghanistan. 

Like Pakistan, Afghanistan suffers from severe socioeconomic crises that exacerbate its own political situation. These are the root 

causes of the insurgency that al Qaeda and the Taliban are seeking 

to exploit. Building Afghan capacity to address these causes, while 

simultaneously taking the fight to the enemy, are important components of our efforts going forward. 

So the U.S., along with our Afghan partners, and our international allies, is fully committed to resourcing an integrated 

counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy aims to do several 

things: 

First, to reverse Taliban gains and secure the population, the 

heart of counterinsurgency, in the troubled south and east of the 

country; 

Second, to build the capacity of the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF), both the army and the police, to be able eventually 

to take the lead in providing the security for the population in the 

country. Building the ANSF should enable us over time to transition from an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-led effort to an Afghan-led counterinsurgency effort. To do so, we have 

to meet the requirements of our commanders on the ground, particularly for trainers, and the deployment that the President announced of an additional 4,000 troops focused as trainers will be 

the first time that this critical need has been addressed or fully 

met in several years. 

But beyond a strengthened military mission, we will intensify 

our civilian assistance and our efforts to better integrate that assistance to promote more effective governance and development. 

Working with the U.N. and our allies, we will seek to improve coordination and coherence in these efforts in support of Afghan development priorities. Ensuring a free and fair and secure election 

will also be an immediate and consequential task. 

We will also complement efforts at assistance at the national 

level focused on building capacities in the ministries with a much 

more bottom-up set of initiatives designed to build capacity at the 

district and provincial levels, where most Afghans have their direct 

experience with Afghan institutions and government. Combatting 

corruption will reinforce efforts to strengthen these institutions, 

and these methods will address, we hope, the root causes of the insurgency, build accountability, and ultimately give the Afghan people more reason to support their government. 

Defeating the insurgency will also require breaking links with 

the narcotics industry. We will work very hard to build more effective Afghan law enforcement, develop alternative livelihoods to 

deny the insurgency lucrative sources of funding, and reform the 

agricultural sector on which so much of the Afghan population depends. 

As we regain the initiative in Afghanistan, we will support an 

Afghan-led reconciliation process that’s designed to essentially flip 

the foot soldiers, to bring low and mid-level leaders to the side of 

the government. If this process is successful, the senior leaders, the 

11 

irreconcilables, should be more easily isolated and we should be 

better able to target them. 

Our men and women in uniform and our allies have fought 

bravely for several years now in Afghanistan. Nearly 700 of our soldiers and marines have made the ultimate sacrifice and over 2,500 

have been wounded. We believe that the best way to honor them 

is to improve our strategy and to commit the necessary resources 

to bring this war to a successful conclusion. I would urge all of you 

on this key committee to provide your full support. 

The strategy aims not to solve the problem with the U.S. and the 

international community alone, but, more importantly, to build a 

bridge to Afghan self-reliance. Even as our forces transition their 

responsibility to our Afghan partners, we will want to be continuing to help Afghanistan with security and economic assistance 

to build their nation over time. I would argue that our vital interests demand no less. 

Although we have not finalized our budget requests for the 2009 

supplemental or for the 2010 base budget, I can just tell you that 

we will be coming back to you to ask for your assistance in several 

areas, certainly funding our additional troop deployments, accelerating the growth of the ANSF, continuing to support counternarcotics funding, increasing the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding available to our commanders, and 

continuing humanitarian assistance support in Afghanistan. 

In Pakistan, we will be coming to discuss with you in more detail 

the security development plan, which will include funding for the 

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, counternarcotics 

funding, continued coalition support funds, 1206, et cetera. So this 

is the beginning of our work together and, while I don’t have budgetary details today, we will definitely be coming back to you to 

work with you to provide the necessary resources for this strategy. 

I would also encourage you to urge your counterparts on other committees to support the civilian aspects of this strategy, which will 

be critical to its success. 

Let me just conclude by saying we understand that this cannot 

be an American-only effort. Defeating al Qaeda and its extremist 

allies is a goal and a responsibility for the international community. You will be seeing not only the President, but others in the 

administration, engaging our allies, as we already have been doing 

in The Hague, now in the coming days at the NATO summit, at 

future donors conferences, to make sure that our allies are alongside with us, putting on the table what they can provide to make 

this effort successful. 

We believe that keeping the American homeland and the American people safe is the bottom line goal of this effort and this is a 

challenge that we all must meet together. 

Thank you all very much for letting me have the opportunity to 

testify this morning. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

General Petraeus. 

12 

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, 

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of 

the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update 

on the situation in the U.S. CENTCOM AOR and to discuss the 

way ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan together with Under Secretary Flournoy and the Commander of the Special Operations 

Forces that are so critical to all that we do in our AOR, Admiral 

Eric Olson. 

As Under Secretary Flournoy noted in her statement and as 

President Obama explained this past Friday, the United States has 

vital national interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These countries contain the most pressing trans-national extremist threats in 

the world, and in view of that they pose the most urgent problem 

set in the CENTCOM AOR. 

Disrupting and ultimately defeating al Qaeda and the other extremist elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan and reversing the 

downward security spiral seen in key parts of these countries will 

require sustained, substantial commitment. The strategy described 

last Friday constitutes such commitment. 

Although the additional resources will be applied in different 

ways on either side of the Durand Line, Afghanistan and Pakistan 

comprise a single theater that requires comprehensive, whole of 

governments approaches that are closely coordinated. To achieve 

that level of coordination, Ambassador Holbrooke and I will work 

closely with our ambassadors and our counterparts from other 

countries and the host nations. 

This morning I’ll briefly discuss the military aspects of the new 

strategy, noting, however, that while additional military forces 

clearly are necessary in Afghanistan, they will not by themselves 

be sufficient to achieve our objectives. It is important that the civilian requirements for Afghanistan and Pakistan be fully met as 

well. To that end, it is essential that the respective Departments, 

State, and USAID foremost among them, be provided the resources 

necessary to implement the strategy. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, on the value of the Afghan National Solidarity Program as 

well. 

Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan requires a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach and that is what General David 

McKiernan and ISAF are endeavoring to execute with the additional resources being committed. The additional forces will provide 

an increased capability to secure and serve the people, to pursue 

the extremists, to support the development of host nation security 

forces, to reduce the illegal narcotics industry, and to help develop 

the Afghan capabilities needed to increase the legitimacy of national and local Afghan governance. 

These forces will also, together with the additional NATO elements committed for the election security force, work with Afghan 

elements to help secure the national elections in late August and 

to help ensure that those elections are seen as free, fair, and legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan people. 

As was the case in Iraq, the additional forces will only be of 

value if they are employed properly. It is vital that they be seen 

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13 

ors, as formidable warriors who also do all possible to avoid civilian 

casualties in the course of combat operations. As additional elements deploy, it will also be essential that our commanders and 

elements strive for unity of effort at all levels and integrate our security efforts into the broader plans to promote Afghan political 

and economic development. 

We recognize the sacrifices of the Afghan people over the past 

decades and we will continue working with our Afghan partners to 

help them earn the trust of the people and with security to provide 

them with new opportunities. 

These concepts and others are captured in the counterinsurgency 

guidance recently issued by General McKiernan. I commend this 

guidance to the committee and have provided a copy for you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

14 


401ful1.eps
15 


401ful2.eps
16 

General PETRAEUS. The situation in Pakistan is, of course, closely linked to that in Afghanistan. Although there has been progress 


401ful3.eps
17 

in some areas as Pakistan’s newly established democracy has 

evolved, significant security challenges have also emerged. The extremists that have established sanctuaries in the rugged border 

areas not only contribute to the deterioration of security in eastern 

and southern Afghanistan, they also pose an ever more serious 

threat to Pakistan’s very existence. In addition, they have carried 

out terrorist attacks in India and Afghanistan and in various other 

countries around the region, as well as in the United Kingdom, and 

they have continued efforts to carry out attacks in our homeland. 

Suicide bombings and other attacks have increased in Pakistan 

over the past 3 years, killing thousands of innocent Pakistani civilians, security personnel, and government officials, including of 

course former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and damaging Pakistan’s infrastructure and economy as well. 

To be sure, the extremists have sustained losses, and in response 

to the increased concern over extremist activity the Pakistan military has stepped up operations against militants in parts of the 

Tribal Areas. However, considerable further work is required. It is 

in Pakistan that al Qaeda senior leadership and other trans-national extremist elements are located. Thus operations there are 

imperative and we need to provide the support and assistance to 

the Pakistani military that can enable them to confront the extremists, who pose a truly existential threat to their country. 

Given our relationship with Pakistan and its military over the 

years, it is important that the United States be seen as a reliable 

ally. The Pakistani military has been fighting a tough battle 

against extremists for more than 7 years. They have sacrificed 

much in this campaign and they need our continued support. 

The U.S. military thus will focus on two main areas. First, we 

will expand our partnership with the Pakistani military and help 

build its counterinsurgency capabilities by providing training, 

equipment, and assistance. We will also expand our exchange programs to build stronger relationships with Pakistani leaders at all 

levels. Second, we will help promote closer cooperation across the 

Afghan-Pakistan border by providing, equipment, facilities, and intelligence capabilities, and by bringing together Afghan and Pakistani military officers to enable coordination between the forces on 

either side of the border. These efforts will support timely sharing 

of intelligence information and help to coordinate the operations of 

the two forces. 

Within the counterinsurgency construct we have laid out for Afghanistan and Pakistan, we will of course continue to support the 

targeting, disruption, and pursuit of the leadership bases and support networks of al Qaeda and other transnational extremist 

groups operating in the region. We will also work with our partners 

to challenge the legitimacy of the terrorist methods, practices, and 

ideologies, helping our partners address legitimate grievances to 

win over reconcilable elements of the population and supporting 

promotion of the broadbased economic and governmental development that is a necessary part of such an effort. 

As we increase our focus on and efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must not lose sight of other important missions in the 

CENTCOM AOR. There has, for example, been substantial 

progress in Iraq, but numerous challenges still confront its leaders 

18 

and its people. Although al Qaeda and other extremist elements in 

Iraq have been reduced significantly, they pose a continued threat 

to security and stability. Beyond that, lingering ethnic and sectarian mistrust, tensions between political parties, the return of 

displaced persons, large detainee releases, new budget challenges, 

the integration of the Sons of Iraq, and other issues indicate that 

the progress there is still fragile and reversible, though less so than 

when I left Iraq last fall, especially given the successful conduct of 

provincial elections earlier this year. 

Despite the many challenges, the progress in Iraq, especially the 

steady development of the Iraqi security forces, has enabled the 

continued transition of security responsibilities to Iraqi elements, 

further reductions of coalition forces, and steady withdrawal of our 

units from urban areas. We are thus on track in implementing the 

security agreement with the Government of Iraq and in executing 

the strategy laid out by the President at Camp Lejeune. 

A vital element in our effort in Iraq has been Congressional support for a variety of equipment and resource needs, and I want to 

take this opportunity to thank you for that. In particular, your support for the rapid fielding of Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected 

(MRAP) vehicles and various types of unmanned aerial vehicles, as 

well as for important individual equipment and the CERP has been 

of enormous importance to our troopers. 

With respect to CERP, we have taken a number of steps to ensure proper expenditure and oversight of the funds allocated 

through this important program, including procedural guides, instruction of leaders, and an audit by the Army Audit Agency at my 

request when I was the Multinational Force Iraq commander in 

2008. 

Iran remains a major concern in the CENTCOM AOR. It continues to carry out destabilizing activities in the region, including 

the training, funding, and arming of militant proxies active in Lebanon, Gaza, and Iraq. It also continues its development of nuclear 

capabilities and missile systems that many assess are connected to 

the pursuit of nuclear weapons and delivery means. 

In response, we are working with partner states in the region to 

build their capabilities and to strengthen cooperative security arrangements, especially in the areas of shared early warning, air 

and missile defense, and establishment of a common operational 

picture. Iran’s actions and rhetoric have in fact prompted our partners in the Gulf to seek closer relationships with us than we have 

had with them in some decades. 

We are also helping to bolster the capabilities of the security 

forces in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, the Gulf States, and the 

Central Asian states, to help them deal with threats to their security, which range from al Qaeda to robust militia and organized 

criminal elements. In addition, we are working with partner nations to counter piracy, combat illegal narcotics production and 

trafficking, and interdict arms smuggling, activities that threaten 

stability and the rule of law and often provide funding for extremists. 

Much of this work is performed through an expanding network 

of bilateral and multilateral cooperative arrangements established 

to address common challenges and pursued shared objectives. As 

19 

we strengthen this network, we strive to provide our partners responsive security assistance, technical expertise, and resources for 

training, educating and equipping their forces and improving security facilities and infrastructure. We believe significant gains result 

from these activities and we appreciate your support for them as 

well. 

Finally, in all of these endeavors we seek to foster comprehensive 

approaches by ensuring that military efforts are fully integrated 

with broader diplomatic, economic, and developmental efforts. We 

are working closely with former Senator Mitchell and Ambassador 

Ross as they undertake important responsibilities as special envoys, in the same way that we are working with Ambassador 

Holbrooke and the U.S. ambassadors in the region. 

In conclusion, there will be nothing easy about the way ahead in 

Afghanistan or Pakistan, or in many of the other tasks in the 

CENTCOM area. Much hard work lies before us. But it is clear 

that achieving the objectives of these missions is vital, and it is 

equally clear that these endeavors will require a sustained, substantial commitment and unity of effort among all involved. 

There are currently over 215,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen serving in the CENTCOM AOR. Together with our many civilian partners, they have been the central 

element in the progress we have made in Iraq and in several other 

areas, and they will be the key to achieving progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in the other locations where serious work 

is being done. 

These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers around the 

world constitute the most capable military in the history of our Nation. They have soldiered magnificently against tough enemies during challenging operations, in punishing terrain, and extreme 

weather. They and their families have made great sacrifices since 

September 11. 

Nothing means more to these great Americans than the sense 

that those back home appreciate their service and sacrifice. In view 

of that, I want to conclude this morning by thanking the American 

people for their extraordinary support of our men and women and 

their families and by thanking the members of this committee for 

your unflagging support and abiding concern for our troopers and 

their families as well. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA 

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, the United 

States Central Command (CENTCOM) is now in its eighth consecutive year of combat operations in an area of the world critical to the interests of the United States, 

its allies, and its partners. CENTCOM seeks to promote cooperation, to respond to 

crises, to deter aggression, and, when necessary, to defeat our adversaries in order 

to promote security, stability, and prosperity in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Typically, achieving U.S. national goals and objectives in the 

CENTCOM AOR involves more than just the traditional application of military 

power. In many cases, a whole of government approach is required, one that integrates all tools available to international and interagency partners to secure hostnation populations, to conduct comprehensive counterinsurgency and security operations, to help reform, and in some cases build, governmental and institutional capacity, and to promote economic development. 

20 

These are challenging missions, and the conditions and dynamics shaping the region’s security environment are constantly evolving. Major changes in just this past 

year include: increased violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan; transition of authority 

to elected civilian leadership in Pakistan; progress against extremists in Iraq; expiration of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1790; damage to still resilient al Qaeda 

and other extremist elements; continued Iranian intransigence over its nuclear program and continued support to proxy extremist elements; increased piracy in the 

Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia; and the global financial crisis and accompanying decline in oil prices. These developments, as well as recent events on the 

borders of our AOR, particularly in Gaza, India, and Somalia, demonstrate that the 

dynamics shaping regional security will continue to evolve, presenting both challenges and opportunities as we seek to address insecurity and extremism in the 

AOR. 

Following conversations with our coalition partners and a recent comprehensive 

review of our AOR by members of CENTCOM, interagency partners, and academic 

experts, we have identified the following priority tasks for the coming year: 

• Helping to reverse the downward cycles of violence in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan; 

• Countering transnational terrorist and extremist organizations that 

threaten the security of the United States and our allies; 

• Helping our Iraqi partners build on the progress in their country while 

reducing U.S. forces there but sustaining hard-won security gains; 

• Countering malign Iranian activities and policies; • Bolstering the capabilities of partner security forces in the region; • Working with our partners to counter piracy, illegal narcotics trafficking, 

arms smuggling, and proliferation of the components of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD); 

• Working with the U.S. military Services to reduce the strain on our forces 

and the cost of our operations; and 

• Supporting new policy initiatives, such as the establishment of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and efforts to reinvigorate 

the Middle East Peace Process. 

The intent of the remainder of this posture statement is to address these priorities and the broader, long-term solutions they support by providing a more detailed 

overview of the AOR, assessments of the situation in each of its major sub-regions, 

brief descriptions of the approaches and techniques for improving security and preserving our national interests, and comments on the programs and systems needed 

to implement and to support these approaches. 

OVERVIEW OF THE CENTCOM AOR

Nature of the AOR 

The lands and waters of the CENTCOM AOR span several critical and distinct 

regions. Stretching across more than 4.6 million square miles and 20 countries, the 

AOR contains vital transportation and trade routes, including the Red Sea, the 

Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf, as well as strategic maritime choke 

points at the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. (With the 

establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the realignment of the 

Unified Command Plan, on 1 October 2008, AFRICOM assumed responsibility for 

U.S. operations in the six countries of the Horn of Africa and the Seychelles, countries previously in the CENTCOM AOR.) The CENTCOM AOR encompasses the 

world’s most energy-rich region, with the Arabian Gulf region and Central Asia together accounting for at least 64 percent of the world’s petroleum reserves, 34 percent of its crude oil production, and 46 percent of its natural gas reserves. 

Social, political, and economic conditions vary greatly throughout the region. The 

region is home to some of the world’s wealthiest and poorest states, with per capita 

incomes ranging from $800 to over $100,000. Despite scattered pockets of affluence, 

many of the more than 530 million people living in the AOR suffer from inadequate 

governance, underdeveloped civil institutions, unsettling corruption, and high unemployment. 

As a result of this diversity, many people in the AOR struggle to balance modern 

influences with traditional social and cultural authorities and to manage change at 

a pace that reinforces stability rather than erodes it. For the past century, the subregions of the AOR have been torn by conflict as new states and old societies have 

struggled to erect a new order in the wake of the collapse of traditional empires. 

These conflicts have intensified in the past three decades with the emergence of extremist movements, nuclear weapons, and enormous wealth derived from oil. Today 

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21 

listic missile and nuclear weapons expertise, ethno-sectarian violence, and 

insurgencies and substate militias, as well as horrific acts of terrorism and extremist violence. 

Most Significant Threats to U.S. Interests 

The most serious threats to the United States, its allies, and its interests in the 

CENTCOM AOR lie at the nexus of transnational extremists, hostile states, and 

WMD. Across the AOR, al Qaeda, and its extremist allies are fueling insurgency to 

reduce U.S. influence and to destabilize the existing political, social, and economic 

order. Meanwhile, some countries in the AOR play a dangerous game of allowing 

or accepting extremist networks and terrorist facilitators to operate from or through 

their territory, believing that their own people and governments will be immune 

from the threat. Efforts designed to develop or acquire WMD and delivery systems 

magnify the potential dangers of the marriage between some states and their extremist proxies. Indeed, the acquisition of WMD by hostile states or terrorist organizations would constitute a grave threat to the United States, our allies, and the 

countries of the region, and it likely would spark a destabilizing arms race. In the 

near term, the greatest potential for such a threat to arise is found in the instability 

in South Asia and the activities and policies of the Iranian regime. 

• Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan pose 

the most urgent problem set in the CENTCOM AOR. Destabilization of the 

nuclear-armed Pakistani state would present an enormous challenge to the 

United States, its allies, and our interests. Pakistani state failure would 

provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations an 

opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to 

plan and launch attacks. The Pakistani state faces a rising—indeed, an existential—threat from Islamist extremists such as al Qaeda and other 

transnational terrorists organizations, which have developed in safe havens 

and support bases in ungoverned spaces in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions. Nevertheless, many Pakistani leaders remain focused on India 

as Pakistan’s principal threat, and some may even continue to regard 

Islamist extremist groups as a potential strategic asset against India. 

Meanwhile, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other insurgent groups operating 

from the border region are engaged in an increasingly violent campaign 

against Afghan and coalition forces and the developing Afghan state. 

• Iranian Activities and Policies. Iranian activities and policies constitute 

the major state-based threat to regional stability. Despite U.N. Security 

Council resolutions, international sanctions, and diplomatic efforts through 

the P5+1, Iran is assessed by many to be continuing its pursuit of a nuclear 

weapons capability, which would destabilize the region and likely spur a regional arms race. Iran employs surrogates and violent proxies to weaken 

competitor states, perpetuate conflict with Israel, gain regional influence, 

and obstruct the Middle East Peace Process. Iran also uses some of these 

groups to train and equip militants in direct conflict with U.S. forces. Syria, 

Iran’s key ally, facilitates the Iranian regime’s reach into the Levant and 

the Arab world by serving as the key link in an Iran-Syria-HizballahHamas alliance and allows extremists (albeit in smaller numbers than in 

the past) to operate in Damascus and to facilitate travel into Iraq. 

The situation in Iraq, lingering Arab-Israeli tensions, and arms smuggling 

and piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast also pose significant 

challenges to the interests of the United States, its allies, and partners. 

• Iraq. The situation in Iraq has improved significantly since the peak of 

violence in mid-2007, but the gains there remain fragile and reversible, 

though less so than last fall. In Iraq, a number of factors continue to pose 

serious risks to U.S. interests and have the potential to undermine regional 

stability, international access to strategic resources, and efforts to deny terrorist safe havens and support bases. Internally, fundamental issues such 

as the distribution of political power and resources remain to be settled. 

The Iraqi state is still developing, and various issues pose serious impediments to development. Integration of the Sons of Iraq and the return of refugees and internally displaced Iraqis will strain governmental capacity. Externally, Iraq’s position with its neighbors is still in flux, with some playing 

a negative role in Iraq. Ethnic and sectarian tensions persist, and if largescale communal conflict were to return to Iraq, violence could ‘‘spill over’’ 

into other states. Such violence could also enable terrorist and insurgent 

groups to reestablish control over portions of the country, which would destabilize Iraq and the surrounding region. To further complicate matters, 

the decline in oil prices and the resulting cut in the Iraqi budget are likely 

22 

to delay Iraqi security force modernization and security initiatives, programs for the revitalization of the oil and electricity sectors, and improvements in the provision of government services. 

• The Arab-Israeli conflict. The enduring Arab-Israeli conflict presents distinct challenges to our ability to advance our interests in the AOR. IsraeliPalestinian tensions often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations. The conflict has created a deep reservoir of anti-American sentiment, based on the perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel. Arab anger 

over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of U.S. partnerships with governments and peoples in the AOR and threatens the continued viability of moderate regimes in the Arab world. Extremist groups exploit that anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran influence 

in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas. The 

attention to this issue in recent months and the appointment of Senator 

Mitchell have generated positive reactions. 

Other Challenges to Security and Stability 

While this statement will describe in greater detail the dynamics and challenges 

in the subregions of the AOR, there are a number of crosscutting issues that serve 

as major drivers of instability, inter-state tensions, and conflicts. These factors can 

serve as root causes of instability or as obstacles to security. 

• Extremist ideological movements and militant groups. The CENTCOM 

AOR is home, of course, to important transnational terrorist networks and 

violent extremist organizations that exploit local conflicts and foster instability through the use of terrorism and indiscriminate violence. The most 

significant of these is al Qaeda, which, along with its associated extremist 

groups, seeks to undermine regional governments, challenge U.S. and western influence in the region, foster instability, and impose extremist, oppressive practices on the people through indiscriminate violence and intimidation. 

• Proliferation of WMD. The AOR contains states and terrorists organizations which actively seek WMD capabilities and have previously proliferated WMD technology outside established international monitoring regimes. 

• Ungoverned, poorly governed, and alternatively governed spaces. Weak 

civil and security institutions and the inability of certain governments in 

the region to exert full control over their territories are conditions extremists exploit to create physical safe havens in which they can plan, train for, 

and launch terrorist operations or pursue narco-criminal activities. Increasingly we are seeing the development of what might be termed substates, 

particularly in Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Palestinian territories, which 

are part of an extremist strategy to ‘‘hold’’ territory and challenge the legitimacy and authority of the central government. 

• Significant source of terrorist financing and facilitation. The AOR, particularly the Arabian Peninsula, remains a prime source of funding and facilitation for global terrorist organizations. This terrorist financing is transmitted through a variety of formal and informal networks throughout the 

region. 

• Piracy. The state collapse of Somalia has enabled the emergence of piracy 

in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. Since the August 2008 

spike in piracy acts, we have worked in close cooperation with the international community to counter this trend by focusing on increasing international naval presence, assisting the shipping industry with improving defensive measures, and establishing a sound international legal framework 

for resolving piracy cases. With United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 

resolution authorities, over twenty countries have since deployed naval 

ships to conduct counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. In January 

2009, we stood up a Combined Task Force (CTF–151) for the specific purpose of conducting and coordinating counter piracy operations. 

• Ethnic, tribal, and sectarian rivalries. Within certain countries, the 

politicization of ethnicity, tribal affiliation, and religious sect serves to disrupt the development of national civil institutions and social cohesion, at 

times to the point of violence. Between countries in the region, such rivalries can heighten political tension and serve as catalysts for conflict and insurgency. 

• Disputed borders and access to vital resources. Unresolved issues of border demarcation and disagreements over the sharing of vital resources, 

23 

such as water, serve as sources of tension and conflict between and within 

states in the region. 

• Weapons and narcotics trafficking. The trafficking and smuggling of 

weapons and narcotics and associated criminal activities undermine state 

security, spur corruption, and inhibit legitimate economic activity and good 

governance throughout the AOR. 

• Uneven economic development and lack of employment opportunities. Despite substantial economic growth rates throughout much of the region over 

the past few years, significant segments of the population in the region remain economically disenfranchised, uneducated, and without sufficient opportunity. The recent economic downturn has heightened these problems. 

Without sustained, broadbased economic development, increased employment opportunities are unlikely given the growing proportions of young people relative to overall populations. 

• Lack of regional and global economic integration. The AOR is characterized by low levels of trade and commerce between and among countries, 

which diminish prospects for long term economic growth, as well as opportunities to deepen interdependence through private sector, social, and political ties between countries. 

MAJOR OPERATING CONCEPTS

Implementing Comprehensive Approaches and Strengthening Unity of Effort 

Addressing the challenges and threats in the AOR requires a comprehensive, 

whole-of-government approach that fully integrates our military and nonmilitary efforts and those of our allies and partners. This approach puts a premium on unity 

of effort at all levels and with all participants. At the combatant command level, 

this means working with our interagency and international partners to develop joint 

action or campaign plans that establish appropriate missions and objectives for our 

subordinate elements, from major commands such as Multi-National Force-Iraq 

(MNF–I) to country-based offices of military cooperation. To effectively carry out 

these plans, the military elements must be coordinated carefully with the corresponding State Department envoy or ambassador. 

CENTCOM also strives to help subordinate command efforts and to address areas 

and functions not assigned to subordinate units or that are crosscutting, such as 

combating the flow of foreign fighters. 

Nesting Counterterrorism within a Counterinsurgency Approach 

Success against the extremist networks in the CENTCOM AOR—whether in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Lebanon, or elsewhere—requires all forces and 

means at our disposal employed in a strategic approach grounded in the principles 

of counterinsurgency. Our counterterror efforts, which seek to dismantle the extremist networks and their leadership, often through the use of military force, are critical. However, it is also important to eliminate these networks’ sources of support. 

Often this support comes from sympathetic populations who provide financial support and physical safe haven or who simply turn a blind eye to extremist activities. 

At other times, support comes from populations directly subjected to extremist intimidation and extortion. Eroding this support, eliminating these safe havens, and 

ultimately preventing networks from reconstituting themselves requires protecting 

populations, delegitimizing the terrorists’ methods and ideologies, addressing legitimate grievances to win over reconcilable elements of the population, and promoting 

broadbased economic and governmental development. Defeating extremist groups 

thus requires the application of basic counterinsurgency concepts. We cannot be just 

‘‘hard’’ or just ‘‘soft’’—we must be both. 

This does not imply, however, that U.S. forces must conduct counterinsurgency 

operations everywhere in the AOR where there are extremist groups. Rather, this 

demands an approach in which the U.S. primarily provides support to our partners 

in their own counterterror and counterinsurgency efforts. We should help nations 

develop their own capacity to secure their people and to govern fairly and effectively, and we should build effective partnerships and engage with the people, leaders, and security forces in the AOR. Whichever forces are involved, ours or our partners’, their actions and operations must adhere to basic counterinsurgency principles, with the specifics of the operations tailored to the circumstances on the 

ground. 

Strengthening and Expanding the Regional Security Network 

A new architecture for cooperative security is emerging in the region from what 

in the past has been a relatively loose collection of security relationships and bilateral programs. Conflicts in recent decades have demonstrated that previous security 

24 

paradigms and architectures for the region, those which focused on balancing regional blocs of power or solely on combating terrorism, have been insufficient to ensure regional stability and security in the globalized, post-Cold War environment. 

From these unsatisfactory paradigms, we are now seeing that a model characterized by a focus on common interests, inclusivity, and capacity-building can best advance security and stability in the region. This network of cooperation is both effective and sustainable because it creates synergies and, as it grows, strengthens relationships. Each cooperative endeavor is a link connecting countries in the region, 

and each adds to the collective strength of the network. The mechanisms put in 

place to coordinate efforts in one area, such as piracy, smuggling, or littoral security, can often be leveraged to generate action in other areas, such as a rapid response to a major oil spill in the Gulf or in the aftermath of a typhoon or earthquake. Moreover, progress made in generating cooperation in a set of issues can 

serve as an opening for engagement on other issues, thereby promoting greater 

interdependence. As a result, a growing network not only works to improve interoperability and overall effectiveness in providing security; it also builds trust and 

confidence among neighbors and partners. 

The foundation of this network consists of a focus on common interests, an atmosphere of inclusivity, and efforts to build security capacity and infrastructure. 

• Common interests. The security challenges we face together can be a unifying force for focusing regional attention and increasing cooperation. We 

all have an interest in preventing terrorism, reducing illegal drug production and trafficking, responding to environmental disasters, halting the proliferation of WMD and related technology, countering piracy, and deterring 

aggression. However, no nation can protect itself from these threats without 

cooperation from others. Collective action and comprehensive approaches 

are required to address these issues. Therefore, nations must work to build 

the trust and confidence required to pursue these common interests. 

• Inclusivity. An atmosphere of broad inclusivity expands the pool of resources for security issues and allows partnerships to leverage each country’s comparative advantages, from expertise and facilities to information or 

even geography. The network is not an alliance or bloc, and countries link 

into this network to address issues as they desire. This suggests that there 

may be room for cooperation between countries inside and outside the region and even some who may have been seen as competitors. Security initiatives start out as bilateral partnerships and then expand to multilateral 

ones as cooperation improves. Ultimately, broad participation in the network is an important means to promote security and stability in the region. 

• Capacity building. Improving the overall effectiveness of our security efforts requires strengthening each country’s ability to maintain security inside its own borders and to participate in joint endeavors. This capacity 

building includes collective and individual training programs, educational 

exchanges, and the development of security-related facilities and infrastructure, as well as equipment modernization efforts. These programs benefit 

from the talents and resources each partner brings to the network, and 

they can be tailored to the nature of each country’s participation. In addition to military programs, this also will require increasing the civilian capacity in the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID). 

Already, there is great breadth and depth to the cooperative activity that is underway, and there is more design and coherence to this network than is commonly 

understood. In addition to our ongoing partnerships with the Iraqi security forces 

and the Afghan National Security Forces, numerous multilateral counterterrorism, 

maritime, and coastal security initiatives are ongoing in the region. Additionally, 

many countries participate in an extensive array of combined ground, maritime, 

aviation, and special operations exercises, each designed to respond to different 

types of threats. There are partnerships in the region for improving coordination 

and information sharing through, for example, air and missile defense initiatives 

with several Gulf countries and border cooperation programs with Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. Lastly, many countries are working together to fund or provide military 

equipment to underdeveloped security forces, with our own Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) and Foreign Military Funding (FMF) programs playing a large role in these 

efforts. 

CRITICAL SUBREGIONS IN THE CENTCOM AOR

The complexity and uniqueness of local conditions in the CENTCOM AOR defy 

attempts to formulate an aggregated estimate of the situation that can address, 

25 

with complete satisfaction, all of the pertinent issues. The boundaries of the AOR 

are a U.S. organizational construct that does not encompass a cohesive social, cultural, political, and economic region. Thus, the best way to approach the challenges 

in the AOR is through a disaggregation of the problem sets into six sub-regions, described as follows: 

• Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (though India is not within the boundaries of the CENTCOM AOR) 

• Iran • Iraq • The Arabian Peninsula, comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 

Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Yemen 

• Egypt and the Levant, comprised of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan (as well 

as Israel and the Palestinian territories which are not within the 

CENTCOM AOR) 

• Central Asia, comprised of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, 

Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan 

Afghanistan and Pakistan 

The United States has a vital national security interest in the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan pose the most urgent problem set in 

the CENTCOM AOR. The Taliban and other insurgent groups are growing in 

strength and waging an increasingly violent campaign against coalition forces and 

the Afghan state. 

Pakistan, too, faces an existential threat from Islamist extremist groups such as 

al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, which enjoy the benefit of safe havens and support 

bases in Pakistan, particularly in the rugged region along the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border. Additionally, the possibility, however remote, of serious instability in a nuclear-armed Pakistan would pose a serious danger to the United States, its allies, 

and its interests. 

Reversing the cycle of violence, defeating the extremist insurgencies in these 

countries, and eliminating safe havens for al Qaeda and other trans-national extremist organizations require a sustained, substantial commitment. Afghanistan and 

Pakistan have unique internal dynamics and problems, but the two are linked by 

tribal affiliations and a porous border that permits terrorists and insurgents to 

move relatively freely to and from their safe havens. Although our presence, activities, and rules of engagement differ on each side of the Durand Line, Afghanistan 

and Pakistan represent a single theater of operations that requires complementary 

and integrated civil-military, whole of government, approaches. 

In accordance with the administration’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, we are substantially increasing our forces in Afghanistan. However it is important to note that military forces are necessary but, by themselves, are not sufficient 

to achieve our objectives. We will foster comprehensive approaches by ensuring our 

military efforts reinforce U.S. policy goals and are fully integrated with broader diplomatic and development efforts. In fact, it is critical that the complementary efforts 

of other departments and agencies receive the necessary support, manning, and 

other resources. The United States must have robust and substantial civilian capacity to effectively complement our military efforts. 

Afghanistan 

In parts of Afghanistan, the situation is deteriorating. The Afghan insurgency has 

expanded its strength and influence—particularly in the south and east—and the 

2009 levels of violence are significantly higher than those of last year. The Taliban 

have been resilient, and their activities are fueled by revenues from narcotics-trafficking, the freedom of movement they enjoy in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the ineffective governance and services in parts of the country, as well as by contributions from groups outside the Afghanistan/Pakistan area. 

Indeed, insurgent successes correlate directly to the Afghan people’s growing disenchantment with their government due to its incapacity to serve the population 

and due to their doubts regarding the competence and honesty of public officials. 

In order to address the situation in Afghanistan, we will implement a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach that works to defeat existing insurgent groups, develops the institutions required to address the root causes of the conflict, maintains 

relentless pressure on terrorist organizations affiliated with the insurgency, dismantles illegal drug networks, and prevents the emergence of safe havens for those 

transnational extremist groups. 

This campaign has several components, but first and foremost is a commitment 

to protecting and serving the people. We and our Afghan partners must focus on 

securing the Afghan people and building their trust. As part of this focus, we will 

26 

take a residential approach and, in a culturally acceptable way, live among the people, understand their neighborhoods, and invest in relationships. The recent commitment of additional forces by the President will allow us to implement this strategy more effectively, because we will be able to expand the security presence further 

into the provinces and villages. With these additional forces we will be better able 

to hold areas cleared of insurgent groups and to build a new level of Afghan governmental control. We recognize the sacrifices of the Afghan people over the past decades, and we will continue working to build the trust of the people and, with security, to provide them with new opportunities. 

As a part of this approach, we will also invigorate efforts to develop the capabilities of the Afghanistan National Security Force, including the Afghan National 

Army, the Afghan Police, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, the Afghan Border 

Forces, specialized counter narcotics units, and other security forces. We recognize 

the fact that international forces must eventually transfer security responsibility to 

Afghan security forces. To do this we must significantly expand the size and capacity of the Afghan forces so they are more able to meet their country’s security needs. 

A properly sized, trained, and equipped Afghanistan National Security Force is a 

prerequisite for any eventual drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan. 

In addition, we will bolster the capabilities and the legitimacy of the other elements of the Afghan Government—an effort in which, in much of Afghanistan, we 

will be building not rebuilding. We will do this through our support to the Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams and through civil-military and ministerial capacity building 

efforts, empowering Afghans to solve Afghan problems and promoting local reconciliation where possible. Moreover, we will support the Afghan Government and help 

provide security for the Presidential elections later this year to ensure those elections are free, fair, and legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan people. 

Another major component of our strategy is to disrupt narcotics trafficking, which 

has provided significant funding to the Taliban insurgency. This drug money has 

been the ‘‘oxygen in the air’’ that allows these groups to operate. With the recent 

extension of authority granted to U.S. forces to conduct counternarcotics operations, 

we are better able to work with the Afghan Government more closely to eradicate 

illicit crops, shut down drug labs, and disrupt trafficking networks. To complement 

these efforts, we will also promote viable agricultural alternatives, build Afghan law 

enforcement capacity, and develop the infrastructure to help Afghan farmers get 

their products to market. 

Executing this strategy will require clear unity of effort at all levels and with all 

participants. Our senior commanders in Afghanistan will be closely linked with Ambassador Holbrooke, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, and the Afghan leadership. Our security efforts will be integrated into the broader plan to promote political and economic development, with our security activities supporting these other 

efforts. Additionally, we will continue to work with our coalition partners and allies 

to achieve progress, in part by refining our command and control structures to coordinate more effectively the actions of U.S. forces working for NATO ISAF and 

with Afghan forces. These cooperative relationships have proven extremely helpful, 

and we have benefitted from the Central Asian States’ recognition of the importance 

of international success in Afghanistan and their granting us overflight and transit 

rights to support our operations there. 

Pakistan 

Pakistan is facing its own insurgency from militants and extremists operating 

from the country’s tribal areas. As in Afghanistan, violent incidents in Pakistan, 

particularly bombings and suicide attacks, have increased over the past 3 years. 

Most of these have targeted security personnel and government officials, but some 

have intended a more public impact, as we saw with the tragic assassination of 

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the more recent attacks in Mumbai. In response 

to this extremist activity, the Pakistani military has stepped up operations against 

militants in parts of the tribal areas, expanding a campaign that the Pakistani military has been prosecuting against extremists for more than 7 years. The Pakistani 

military has sacrificed much during this campaign, and we will support their efforts 

in two ways. 

First, we will expand our partnership with the Pakistani military and Frontier 

Corps. We will provide increased U.S. military assistance for helicopters to provide 

air mobility, night vision equipment, and training and equipment—specifically for 

Pakistani Special Operations Forces and their Frontier Corps to make them a more 

effective counterinsurgency force. We will also expand our outreach and exchange 

programs to build stronger relationships with the Pakistani leadership. 

Second, we will help promote cooperation across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border 

by providing training, equipment, facilities, and intelligence. These efforts will proVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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mote sharing of timely intelligence information, help to deconflict and coordinate security operations on both sides of the border, and limit the flow of extremists between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Within the counterinsurgency construct we have laid out for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, we will of course continue to target, disrupt, and pursue the leadership, 

bases, and support networks of al Qaeda and other transnational extremist groups 

operating in the region. We will do this aggressively and relentlessly. We will also 

help our partners work to prevent networks from reconstituting themselves, assisting them with delegitimizing the terrorists’ methods and their ideology, addressing 

legitimate grievances to win over reconcilable elements of the population, and promoting broadbased economic and governmental development. 

Iran 

The Iranian regime pursues its foreign policies in ways that contribute to insecurity and frustrate U.S. goals in the CENTCOM AOR. It continues to insert itself 

into the Israeli-Palestinian situation by providing material, financial, and political 

support to Hamas and Hizballah; it remains in violation of three U.N. Security 

Council Resolutions regarding its nuclear program; and it still provides arms and 

training to militias and insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Iran continues to use Hizballah as a proxy to assert its influence in the region 

and to undermine the prospects for peace in the Levant. Despite Hizballah’s participation in the government, the group continues to undermine the Lebanese state’s 

authority and remains a threat to Israel. Hizballah’s military support from Iran 

moves mainly through Syria, and thus is dependent on a continuation of the SyriaIran alliance. 

Iran’s nuclear program is widely believed to be a part of the regime’s broader effort to expand its influence in the region. Although the regime has stated that the 

purpose of its nuclear program is for peaceful, civilian use, Iranian officials have 

consistently failed to provide the assurances and transparency necessary for international acceptance and for the verification required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory. The regime’s obstinacy and obfuscation 

have forced Iran’s neighbors and the international community to conclude the worst 

about the regime’s intentions. As a result, other regional powers have announced 

their intentions to develop nuclear programs. This poses a clear challenge to international non-proliferation interests, in particular due to the potential threat of such 

technologies being transferred to extremist groups. Moreover, the Israeli Government may ultimately see itself so threatened by the prospect of an Iranian nuclear 

weapon that it would take preemptive military action to derail or delay it. 

The Iranian regime has also attempted to thwart U.S. and international efforts 

to bring stability to Iraq and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Iran appears to have 

hedged its longstanding public support for the Karzai Government by providing opportunistic support to the Taliban. In Iraq, however, the Iranian regime has experienced a recent setback. Iraqi and coalition forces have succeeded in degrading Iranian proxies operating in southern Iraq, and, during January’s provincial elections, 

the Iraqi people voiced a broad rejection of Iranian influence in Iraqi politics. 

Pursuing our longstanding regional goals and improving key relationships within 

and outside the AOR help to limit the negative impact of Iran’s policies. A credible 

U.S. effort on Arab-Israeli issues that provides regional governments and populations a way to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the disputes would undercut 

the idea of militant ‘‘resistance,’’ which the Iranian regime and extremists organizations have been free to exploit. Additionally, progress on the Syrian track of the 

peace process could disrupt Iran’s lines of support to Hamas and Hizballah. Moreover, our cooperative efforts with the Arab Gulf states, which include hardening and 

protecting their critical infrastructure and developing a regional network of air and 

missile defense systems, can help dissuade aggressive Iranian behavior. In all of 

these initiatives, our military activities will support our broader diplomatic efforts. 

Iraq 

The situation in Iraq has improved dramatically in the past year. Where security 

incidents once averaged well over 1,500 per week in the early summer of 2007 when 

sectarian violence raged at its peak, there have been less than 150 incidents per 

week for the past 5 months, including criminal violence. These improvements in security and the increasing capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces have allowed for 

a drawdown to 14 Brigade Combat Teams, with 2 more to be reduced this year 

along with thousands of ‘‘enabler’’ forces. We remain on track to end our combat 

mission in Iraq by the end of August 2010. 

After almost 6 years of war, the fundamental causes of instability and violence 

have diminished, and they are now kept largely in check by a number of factors. 

28 

The security effort in Iraq has put an end to large-scale violence, while increasingly 

capable and trusted Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have taken on an expanded role. 

The Iraqi Government’s moves toward reconciliation have helped lessen some of the 

tensions in Iraq’s communal struggle for power and resources, as formerly warring 

groups have turned increasingly to political participation rather than violence as a 

means of achieving their goals. Moreover, the results of the January 2009 provincial 

elections indicate a rejection of the Islamist parties seen as the most under the influence of Iran. 

Though the trends in Iraq have been largely positive, progress has been uneven, 

and the situation still remains fragile and reversible. A return to violence remains 

an option for those who have set aside their arms. Enemy organizations, especially 

al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Iranian-backed Shi’a extremist groups, remain committed to narrow sectarian agendas and the expulsion of U.S. influence from Iraq. 

These enemy organizations will undoubtedly attempt to disrupt or derail several key 

events during the next year, including the national elections scheduled for December. However, the most difficult and potentially violent problem may be the ArabKurd-Turkmen competition in disputed Iraqi territories. Beginning this spring, 

Iraqis will take up the long-deferred, contentious question of Iraq’s internal boundaries, which has fundamental implications for the role of the Kurds in the future 

Iraqi state and for the likelihood of Sunni Arab and Turkmen insurgent groups returning to large-scale violence. 

The central questions for the United States as these events develop are how to 

help the Iraqis preserve hard-won security gains as U.S. forces withdraw and how 

to further develop U.S.-Iraq relations that best enable regional stability. The fact 

that the 2009 provincial elections were conducted successfully showed that the 

checks and balances of the Iraqi constitution and professionalism of the ISF act as 

a brake upon any party’s ambitions to control the Iraqi state. However, the Iraqi 

Government has much work to do to develop the essential services the Iraqi people 

expect and to perform the functions necessary to achieve full support over time. The 

Iraqi Government in 2009–2010 will be under great popular pressure as the Iraqi 

electorate’s expectations will be high after electing new provincial and national governments. 

U.S. forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams are still an element that helps 

hold the security, governance, and development effort together. In some areas, U.S. 

military and civilian officials are still important mediators in local conflicts or disputes and key interlocutors between local communities and higher levels of the Iraqi 

Government. Prior to disengaging from those roles, U.S. forces and civilian officials 

must ensure certain conditions prevail, including: 

• A security force capable of coping with current and intensified enemy action; 

• An Iraqi Government capable of meeting basic needs and expectations 

and delivering services on a nonsectarian, non-ethnic basis; and 

• Adequate rule of law and sufficiently stable civil institutions. 

The Arabian Peninsula 

The Arabian Peninsula commands significant U.S. attention and focus because of 

its importance to our interests and the potential for insecurity. These Arab states 

on the Peninsula are the nations of the AOR most politically and commercially connected to the U.S. and Europe. They are more developed economically and collectively wield defense forces far larger than any of their neighbors, and they are major 

providers of the world’s energy resources. However, many Gulf Arabs suffer from 

degrees of disenfranchisement and economic inequity, and some areas of the Peninsula contain extremist sentiment and proselytizing. As a result, the Peninsula has 

been a significant source of funding and manpower for extremist groups and foreign 

fighters. These internal troubles are often aggravated and intensified by external 

factors, such as the Iranian regime’s destabilizing behavior, instability in the Palestinian territories and southern Lebanon, the conflict in Iraq, and weapons proliferation. 

Because of the Peninsula’s importance and its numerous common security challenges, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula are key partners in the developing 

regional security network described above. CENTCOM ground, air, maritime, and 

Special Operations Forces participate in numerous operations and training events, 

bilateral and multilateral, with our partners from the Peninsula. We help develop 

indigenous capabilities for counterterrorism; border, maritime, and critical infrastructure security; and deterring Iranian aggression. As a part of all this, our FMS 

and FMF programs are helping to improve the capabilities and interoperability of 

our partners’ forces. We are also working toward an integrated air and missile defense network for the Gulf. All of these cooperative efforts are facilitated by the critVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
29 

ical base and port facilities that Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and others provide for U.S. forces. 

Yemen stands out from its neighbors on the Peninsula. The inability of the Yemeni Government to secure and exercise control over all of its territory offers terrorist 

and insurgent groups in the region, particularly al Qaeda, a safe haven in which 

to plan, organize, and support terrorist operations. It is important that this problem 

be addressed, and CENTCOM is working to do that. Were extremist cells in Yemen 

to grow, Yemen’s strategic location would facilitate terrorist freedom of movement 

in the region and allow terrorist organizations to threaten Yemen’s neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States. In view of this, we are expanding 

our security cooperation efforts with Yemen to help build the Nation’s security, 

counterinsurgency, and counterterror capabilities. 

Egypt and the Levant 

The Levant and Egypt subregion is the traditional political, social, and intellectual heart of the Arab world and has historically been the primary battleground between rival ideologies. The dynamics of this subregion, particularly with regard to 

Israel and extremist organizations, have a significant impact on the internal and 

external politics of states outside the region as well. In addition, U.S. policy and actions in the Levant affect the strength of our relationships with partners in the 

AOR. As such, progress toward resolving the political disputes in the Levant, not 

to mention the prevention of conflict, is a major concern for CENTCOM. 

Egypt remains a leading Arab state, a stabilizing influence in the Middle East, 

and a key actor in the Middle East Peace Process. In recent years, however, the 

Egyptian Government has had to deal with serious economic challenges and an internal extremist threat; as such, U.S. foreign aid has been a critical reinforcement 

to the Egyptian Government. At the same time, Egypt has played a pivotal role in 

the international effort to address worsening instability in Gaza. CENTCOM continues to work closely with the Egyptian security forces to interdict illicit arms shipments to extremists in Gaza and to prevent the spread of Gaza’s instability into 

Egypt and beyond. 

In Lebanon, Lebanese Hizballah continues to undermine security throughout the 

Levant by undermining the authority of the Lebanese Government, threatening 

Israel, and providing training and support to extremist groups outside Lebanon. 

Syria and Iran continue to violate U.N. Security Council resolutions and provide 

support to Hizballah—support which allowed Hizballah to instigate and wage a war 

against Israel in 2006 and reconstitute its armaments afterward. Stabilizing Lebanon requires ending Syria and Iran’s illegal support to Hizballah, building the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and assisting the Lebanese Government 

in developing a comprehensive national defense strategy through which the government can exercise its sovereignty, free of interventions from Hizballah, Syria, and 

Iran. 

The al-Asad regime in Syria continues to play the dangerous game of allowing or 

accepting extremist networks and terrorist facilitators to operate from and through 

Syrian territory, believing incorrectly that their people and government will be immune from the threat. Whether hosting Hamas leadership, supporting the shipment 

of armaments to Hizballah, or cooperating with AQI operatives, the al-Asad regime 

has used its support for its neighbors’ opposition movements as strategic leverage. 

However, unlike Iran, Syria’s motives probably stem from short-sighted calculations 

rather than ideology. It is possible that over time Syria could emerge as a partner 

in promoting security in the Levant and in the region. 

Jordan continues to be a key partner and to play a positive role in the region. 

Jordan participates in many regional security initiatives and has placed itself at the 

forefront of police and military training for regional security forces. In addition to 

its regular participation in multi-lateral training exercises, Jordan promotes regional cooperation and builds partner security capacity through its King Abdullah 

Special Operations Training Center, Peace Operations Training Center, International Police Training Center, and Cooperative Management Center. These efforts 

will likely prove critical in the continued development of legitimate security forces 

in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories and, as a consequence, in the long-term 

viability of the peace process. 

Through capacity building programs, joint and combined training exercises, information sharing, and other engagement opportunities, we will work with our partners in Egypt and the Levant to build the capabilities of legitimate security forces, 

defeat extremist networks and substate militant groups, and disrupt illegal arms 

smuggling. In addition, we will work to develop the mechanisms of security and confidence building to support the Middle East Peace Process. 

30 

Central Asia 

Though Central Asia has received relatively less attention than other subregions 

in the AOR, the U.S. maintains a strong interest in establishing long-term, cooperative relationships with the Central Asian countries and other major regional powers 

to create a positive security environment. Central Asia constitutes a pivotal location 

on the Eurasian continent between Russia, China, and South Asia; it thus serves 

as a major transit route for regional and international commerce and for supplies 

supporting Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Ensuring stability in Central Asia requires abandoning the outdated, zero-sum paradigms of international politics associated with the so-called ‘‘Great Game,’’ as well as the adoption of cooperative approaches to combat the common enemies of extremism and illegal narcotics trafficking. The United States, Russia, and China need not court or coerce the Central 

Asian Governments at the expense of one another. Instead, there are numerous opportunities for cooperation to advance the interests of the all parties involved. 

However, public and civic institutions in Central Asia are still developing after 

decades of Soviet rule, and they present challenges to efforts to promote security, 

development, and cooperation. Although there is interdependence across a broad 

range of social, economic, and security matters, these nations have not yet established a productive regional modus vivendi. Overcoming these challenges requires 

gradual, incremental approaches that focus on the alleviation of near-term needs, 

better governance, the integration of markets for energy and other commercial activity, and grassroots economic development. 

As a part of a broader U.S. effort to promote development and build partnerships 

in Central Asia, CENTCOM works to build the capabilities of indigenous security 

forces as well as the mechanisms for regional cooperation. Besides providing training, equipment, and facilities for various Army, National Guard, and border security 

forces through our Building Partnership Capacity programs, we also work with the 

national level organizations to facilitate dialogue on security and emergency response issues. For example, in February 2008 and again this past March, 

CENTCOM hosted Conferences for the Chiefs of Defense from the Central Asian 

States to discuss regional security issues. CENTCOM also co-hosts the annual Regional Cooperation Exercise, which is designed to improve regional coordination on 

issues such as counter-terrorism and security and humanitarian crisis response. 

CENTCOM is also working to ensure continued access to Afghanistan through 

Central Asia. With great support from the U.S. Transportation Command, we have 

established a Northern Distribution Network through several Central Asian States 

to help reduce costs of transporting non-military supplies to support NATO, U.S., 

and Afghan security operations, while decreasing our exposure to risks associated 

with our supply lines running through Pakistan. On a related note, we are also pursuing alternatives to the use of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. A decision by the 

Krygyz Government to restrict U.S. and Allied access to the base would be disappointing but would not constitute a serious impediment to coalition operations in 

Afghanistan. 

CRITICAL MISSION ENABLERS

Success in our ongoing missions and maintaining a credible, responsive contingency capacity in the AOR require the support of several key mission enablers. The 

impacts of these capabilities range from the tactical to the strategic, and CENTCOM 

fully supports their continuation, expansion, and improvement. 

Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) 

Our security cooperation and security assistance efforts are critical to improving 

security and stability in the region. They help strengthen our relationships and 

build the security capabilities of our partners in the AOR. Increases to global train 

and equip resources, coalition support funds, and the State Department’s foreign 

military sales (FMS) and counternarcotics security assistance and reimbursements 

programs are essential in generating comprehensive and cooperative solutions to defeat insurgent and extremist groups. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and FMS 

remain our mainstay security assistance tools and are reasonably successful in 

meeting needs in a peacetime environment. The International Military Education 

and Training program is also an important contributor to developing partner nation 

capabilities and enduring ties. However, in the face of enduring, persistent irregular 

warfare, we look to expanded special authorities and multi-year appropriations to 

quickly meet the emerging needs of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and Foreign Internal Defense operations. Multi-year programs of record that provide training, equipment, and infrastructure for our partner security forces enabled our sucVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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cesses in Iraq and are of prime importance if we are to achieve comparable progress 

in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Yemen. 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 

CERP continues to be a vital counterinsurgency tool for our commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Small CERP projects can be the most efficient and effective 

means to address a local community’s needs, and where security is lacking, it is 

often the only immediate means for addressing those needs. CERP spending is not 

intended to replace USAID-sponsored projects but rather to complement and potentially serve as a catalyst for these projects. For this reason, CENTCOM fully supports expanded CERP authorities for its use in other parts of the CENTCOM AOR. 

CENTCOM has established control mechanisms that exceed those mandated by 

Congress, to include having the Army Audit Agency review programs in Iraq and 

a command review to ensure CERP funds projects that advance U.S. goals and are 

of the most benefit to the targeted populations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will 

continue to seek innovative mechanisms and authorities to create similar counterinsurgency tools for use by coalition and host nation partners. These tools should 

allow for a variety of funding sources, to include contributions from nongovernmental organizations, international government organizations, and partner governments. 

Adaptable Command, Control, and Communications Systems 

Continued operations across a dispersed AOR call for a robust, interoperable, 

high-volume Theater Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Infrastructure. CENTCOM currently utilizes available bandwidth to capacity, and theater fiber networks are vulnerable to single points of failure in the global information grid. Military Satellite Communications capabilities are critical to theater operations, and the acceleration of transformational upgrades to these systems would reduce our reliance on commercial providers. 

We aggressively pursue means to extend Joint Theater Expeditionary Command, 

Control, and Communications support and services to disadvantaged users throughout the AOR. Some of these include Radio over Internet Protocol Routed Network, 

which provides critical radio retransmission services to remote users on the move; 

the Joint Airborne Communications System, which provides a flexible aerial platform-based radio retransmission solution that can be shifted to extend services to 

disadvantaged users; and the Distributed Tactical Communications System, which 

leverages new technologies to deliver reliable, critical communications capabilities 

to the most remote users. Overall, we require a fully integrated space and terrestrial communications network and infrastructure that support all Joint and potential partner nation users. 

Intelligence and ISR 

We continue to refine our techniques, procedures, and systems to optimize our Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) efforts and to improve our battle 

space awareness, seeking greater specificity, detail, and timeliness of intelligence 

whenever possible. We aggressively seek out ways to execute the entire Find, Fix, 

Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate intelligence cycle. However, this requires 

improved imagery intelligence, wide area coverage, sensor integration, signals intelligence, moving target indicators, layered ISR architecture and management tools, 

biometrics, counterintelligence, and human collectors. In particular, the acceleration 

of ISR Unmanned Aerial Systems procurement is crucial to our success. There is 

also a requirement for greater sea-based ISR. CENTCOM also supports DOD’s 

planned growth in intelligence specialists, interrogators, counterintelligence, and 

human intelligence personnel capabilities. Moreover, we have learned the critical 

importance of a host of other specialized capabilities that have been developed outside traditional military specialties, such as terrorist threat finance analysts, human 

terrain teams, and document exploitation specialists. 

Joint and Multinational Logistics 

The primary focus of our logistics efforts is the timely deployment, equipping, and 

sustainment of units engaged in combat operations. Working with our multinational 

partners, we have instituted an efficient and effective logistics architecture that supports our forces and operations, while constantly reducing costs. Our logistics posture consists of prepositioned inventories, strategic air and sealift capabilities, and 

access to bases with critical infrastructure, all of which are key logistics components 

that support operational flexibility. Our logistics processes center on the Global 

Combat Support System-Joint portal, which provides a theater level logistics common operational picture and supports theater-wide logistics unity of effort. 

32 

A significant asset recently added to CENTCOM’s logistics capabilities has been 

the Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan, which supports 

CENTCOM, MNF–I, and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan by providing responsive contracting of supplies, services, and construction, and which also supports capacity 

building efforts within Iraqi and Afghan Ministries. The Joint Contracting Command recently established the infrastructure to transition from a manual to an 

automated contract writing system and to a Standard Procurement System across 

Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, in fiscal year 2008, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan was able to execute over 41,000 contract actions and obligate a total of $7.5 billion, and over 45 percent of this funding went to Iraqi and 

Afghan firms. The Joint Contracting Command also teams with Task Force Business Stability Operations (TFBSO) and provides contracting support executing Congressional resources to revitalize Iraqi State Owned Enterprises. We estimate that 

TFBSO’s $100 million total in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 revitalization efforts generated employment for 24,500 Iraqis. 

Our logisticians are also focusing on other key initiatives supporting our forces 

and operations, while minimizing costs. We are now moving an increasing amount 

of non-military supplies into Afghanistan via a Northern Distribution Network 

across the Central Asian States, with the cooperation of Russia and other European 

participants. As mentioned above, these new lines of communication (LOCs) will 

help reduce costs while decreasing our exposure to risks associated with our supply 

lines running through Pakistan. Reliance on these LOCs will be further reduced by 

our Afghan first initiative, which increases our use of Afghan producers and vendors 

for products such as bottled water. 

Force Protection and Countering Improvised Explosive Devices 

Initiatives focused on countering the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices 

(IEDs) are of paramount importance to our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

IEDs continue to be the number-one threat to ground forces, and efforts to expedite 

the fielding of personal protective equipment, IED jammers, route clearance vehicles 

and equipment, and most recently, the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) 

vehicle have saved countless lives. Because of the MRAP’s importance, we have 

more than tripled our MRAP fielding capacity and more than doubled the number 

of MRAPs in Afghanistan over the past 8 months. Because we expect IEDs to remain a key weapon in the arsenals of terrorists and insurgents for years to come, 

CENTCOM urges continued support for the Joint IED Defeat Organization; the 

Services’ baseline sustainment for MRAPs, base defense initiatives, and C–IED efforts; and Research, Development, Test, and Experimentation funding and procurement to counter IED tactics and networks. 

Overseas Basing and Theater Posture 

CENTCOM’s overseas basing strategy and its associated overseas military construction projects at the Office of the Secretary of Defense-approved Forward Operating Sites and Cooperative Security Locations are developing the infrastructure 

necessary for global access, projection, sustainment, and protection of our combined 

forces in the AOR. Fully functional sites are essential to our ability to conduct the 

full spectrum of military operations, engage with and enable partner nations, and 

act promptly and decisively. Prepositioned stocks and reset equipment provide critical support to this strategy but require reconstitution and modernization after having been partially expended to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Even with global war-on-terror budgets, military construction timelines are too 

long to respond to changes in a combat environment. Major events such as the approval of the Strategic Partnership Agreement with Iraq and the recent decision to 

send additional forces to Afghanistan show how rapidly basing requirements can 

change. Expanded Contingency Construction Authorities made available across the 

entire CENTCOM AOR can serve as partial, interim solutions because they push 

construction decisionmaking authority to our engaged commanders in the field. Increasing the Operations and Maintenance construction threshold for minor construction in support of combat operations across the AOR would also increase the ability 

of our commanders to quickly meet mission requirements and fully support and protect our deployed forces. 

Adaptive Requirements, Acquisition, and Technology Processes 

The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) has proven important to addressing noncounter-IED rapid acquisition needs for our operations, and we will continue to use 

the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) process to support our warfighters. 

However, because the JUON process requires execution year reprogramming by the 

Services, we found in the past that the Rapid Acquisition Fund (RAF) was a useful 

JRAC tool for supporting immediate needs. When the authority existed, the JRAC 

33 

used the RAF to field capabilities such as radio systems used for Afghanistan-Pakistan cross-border communications, which were procured in less than 4 months from 

the initial identification of the need. The JRAC has also used RAF funding to initiate the fielding of critical biometrics equipment until the JUON process could further source the program, significantly reducing the time required to deploying the 

technology. Reinstating RAF funding and using it as a complement to the JUON 

process would allow CENTCOM to more quickly resolve warfighter needs. In addition to the JUON process, CENTCOM leverages Department of Defense programs 

like Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) to rapidly field capability 

for the warfighter. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, intelligence collection and analysis 

tools, and limited collateral damage weapons are examples of recent JCTD successes. Additionally, DOD currently has authority to spend up to $500,000 in Operations 

and Maintenance funds for procurement investment line items to meet the operational requirements of a Combatant Command engaged in contingency operations 

overseas. Our immediate mission requirements frequently call for equipment which 

exceeds this cost threshold, such as water filtration equipment, generators, information technology/fusion systems, and heavy lift equipment. An increase of this threshold and a delegation of authority down to at least the theater level would allow commanders to address critical equipment shortfalls using commercially available systems, which in many cases are essential for mission accomplishment. 

Personnel 

Having sufficient and appropriate personnel for our commands and Joint Task 

Forces is critical to accomplishing our assigned missions and achieving our theater 

objectives. This is true at both the operational and strategic levels. Our headquarters require permanent, rather than augmentation, manpower for our enduring 

missions, as well as mechanisms for quickly generating temporary manpower for 

contingency operations. At the unit level, there continue to be shortfalls in many 

skill categories and enabling force structures that are low density and high demand. 

Intelligence specialists, counterintelligence and human intelligence collectors, interrogators, document exploitation specialists, detainee operations specialists, engineers, and military police are just a few of the enablers needed in greater number 

for current and future operations. As operations continue in Afghanistan, we also 

see critical need for Public Affairs and Information Operations personnel to improve 

our Strategic Communications capabilities. Similarly, as we draw down combat 

forces from Iraq, we will need enablers beyond the typical high-density/low-demand 

organizations, including such elements as leaders to augment advisory assistance 

brigades, counterterrorist threat finance cells, and critical logistics units. At the 

same time, I would also request that Congress recognize the vital importance of increasing civilian capacity, particularly in the Department of State and the USAID. 

Quality of life, family support, and retention programs remain vital to our operations in the AOR. The Rest and Recuperation program continues to be a success, 

having served more than 135,000 troopers in 2008 and over 710,000 since its inception in September 2003. We also depend heavily on entitlement programs such as 

Combat Zone Tax Relief, Imminent Danger Pay, and Special Leave Accrual for deployed servicemembers. 

CONCLUSION

There are currently over 215,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and Coast 

Guardsmen serving in the CENTCOM region. Together with our many civilian partners, they have been the central element in the progress we have made in Iraq and 

several other areas, and they will be the key to achieving progress in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan and the other locations where serious work is being done. These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers around the world constitute the most capable military in the history of our Nation. They have soldiered magnificently 

against tough enemies during challenging operations in punishing terrain and extreme weather. They and their families have made great sacrifices since September 

11. 

Nothing means more to these great Americans than the sense that those back 

home appreciate their service and sacrifice. 

In view of that, I want to conclude by thanking the American people for their extraordinary support of our military men and women and their families—and by 

thanking the members of this committee for your unflagging support and abiding 

concern for our troopers and their families as well. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General. Thank you again 

for your tremendous leadership. 

34 

Admiral Olson. 

STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, 

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

Admiral OLSON. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator 

McCain, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you 

for the invitation to appear before this committee and to represent 

the United States SOCOM. I’ll focus on the roles of our headquarters and joint special operations forces in addressing the current and potential threats posed by extremists and their allies and 

networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I’m pleased to join Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus here this morning. 

The situation in this region is increasingly dire. Al Qaeda’s surviving leaders have proven adept at hiding, communicating, and inspiring. Operating in and from remote sites in both Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, al Qaeda remains a draw for local and foreign fighters who subscribe to its extremist ideology and criminality. 

The Taliban, although not militarily strong, is pervasive and brutal. Operating in the guise of both nationalists and keepers of the 

faith, but behaving in the manner of street gangs and mafias, they 

have forced and intimidated a mostly benign populace to bend to 

their will. Their methods run the relatively narrow range from malicious to evil. 

The President’s strategy announced last week is one we fully 

support. We have contributed to the review of the past several 

months and are pleased to see that the strategy includes a clear 

focus on al Qaeda as the enemy and that a whole-of-government 

approach is directed. 

We know well that progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be 

neither quick nor easy. We as a Nation and the international community must be prepared for an extended campaign, a campaign 

that must go well beyond traditional military activities. Increasing 

the presence and capacity of civilian agencies and international organizations, to include sufficient funding and training, is essential 

to help develop and implement the basic functions of credible government in Afghanistan and to assist Pakistan’s efforts to dismantle safe havens and displace extremists in its border provinces. 

Also essential is robust support to the military, law enforcement, 

border security, and intelligence organizations of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan themselves, as it is ultimately they who must succeed in 

their lands. 

United States SOCOM has a major role as a force provider and 

the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces it trains, 

equips, deploys, and supports have key roles and missions in this 

campaign. With a long history of counterterror, counterinsurgency, 

and unconventional warfare operations in many of the Earth’s crisis and tension spots, the capabilities, culture, and ethos of Special 

Operations Forces are well suited to many of the more demanding 

aspects of our mission in Afghanistan and to our increasing interaction with Pakistan’s military and Frontier Corps forces. 

Right now in Afghanistan, as for the last 7 years, special operations activities range from high-tech manhunting to providing veterinary services for tribal livestock. The direct action missions are 

urgent and necessary as they provide the time and space needed 

35 

for the more indirect counterinsurgency operations to have their 

decisive effects. Undertaken in proper balance, these actions address immediate security threats while also engaging the underlying instability in the region. 

In Pakistan, we continue to work with security forces at the scale 

and pace set by them, and we are prepared to do more. With our 

Pakistani partners, Special Operations Forces are currently helping 

to train Pakistani trainers in order to enhance their counterinsurgency operations. While we share much with them, our forces 

are in turn learning much about our common adversaries and the 

social complexities of the region. We stand ready to continue to 

work with Pakistani forces and to stand by Pakistani forces for the 

long term. 

While certain units of the Special Operations Force are leading 

high-tech, high-end efforts to find and capture or kill the top terrorist and extremist targets in Afghanistan, fundamental to most 

of the deployed Special Operations Force is our enduring partnership with our Afghan counterparts. Under a program that began 

over 3 years ago, United States Special Forces at the 12-man team 

level have trained Afghan commandos in the classrooms and on the 

firing ranges and then moved with them to their assigned regions 

across the country. Living remotely with them on small camps, continuing the training and mentoring, and integrating with them on 

day and night combat operations has had great effect. Supporting 

their local development and assistance efforts has had perhaps 

even a more powerful impact. 

This program was recently expanded to formally partner United 

States Special Operations Forces with noncommando Afghan battalions, a program that will consume most of the additional Special 

Operations Force that will be deployed as part of the 21,000 troop 

increase. 

The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps component commands of United States SOCOM use authorities and a budget 

granted by legislation to the United States SOCOM Commander to 

organize, equip, train, and provide their forces to support operational commanders globally. When outside the United States, all 

Special Operations Forces are under the operational control of the 

appropriate geographic combatant commander. 

United States SOCOM’s budget, which is historically slightly 

under 2 percent of the total defense budget, is intended to fund materials, services, equipment, research, training, and operations that 

are peculiar to the Special Operations Force. It primarily enables 

modification of service common equipment and procurement of specialized items for the conduct of missions that are specifically and 

appropriately Special Operations Force’s to perform. In general, 

this has been robust enough to provide for rapid response to a 

broad set of crises. But we rely on each of the services to provide 

for our long-term sustainment in wartime environments and to develop and sustain the enabling capabilities, and we rely on operational commanders to assign these capabilities to their special operations task forces. 

We can serve in both supported and supporting roles at the operational level and special operations effects are actually core elements around which key parts of a strategy can be based. 

36 

While more than 10,000 members of our Special Operations 

Forces are now under the command of General Petraeus in the 

CENTCOM AOR and around 100 more are working in Afghanistan 

under NATO’s ISAF command structure, about 2,000 others are in 

65 countries on an average day. Their activities, fully approved and 

coordinated, cover the broad spectrum of traditional military activities, well beyond the stereotypical one-dimensional gunslinger, to 

encompass the three-dimensional warrior, adept at defense, development, and diplomacy. Special Operations Forces bring soft power 

with a hard edge. 

The employment of Special Operations Forces will actually not 

change much as a result of a revised overall strategy. Our units 

have been conducting both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 

for several years. 

We will continue to provide our broad capabilities to our fullest 

capacity in order to meet the needs of our elected and appointed 

civilian leaders and our military operational commanders. 

Our strategy in Afghanistan must secure the primary urban 

areas and main routes so that life and legitimate business can 

begin a return to normalcy. But Afghanistan is not Iraq. Most of 

the population is not urban. Security must be felt in the hinterland, provided by Afghan forces supported by small teams of U.S. 

and NATO troops, and enhanced by civilian agencies in a manner 

that improves local life by local standards. I am encouraged by the 

prioritization of this approach in the new strategy. 

Inherent to our success and to the defeat of our enemies is the 

realization that this is a real fight as long as al Qaeda, the Taliban, 

and associated extremists want it to be. Civilian casualties are 

mostly the result of their tactics, not ours. The operational commanders I hear from are doing all they can to minimize the number of noncombatant deaths because they both abhor the reality of 

civilian casualties and they understand the negative strategic impact of such deaths. They know that as long as our enemies force 

noncombatant women, children, and others to support their operations or remain on targeted facilities after warnings have been 

issued, some will die. They also know that the conditions, numbers, 

and severity of the casualties will be highly exaggerated and quickly communicated. We must acknowledge the seriousness of this 

challenge and find ways to mitigate its effects, especially as we increase our troop presence in the coming months. 

I will conclude with a simple statement of pride in the Special 

Operations Force that I am honored to command. Created by a 

proactive Congress and nurtured by your strong support over the 

last 22 years, United States SOCOM headquarters has brought together units from all four Services to develop and sustain a truly 

magnificent joint capability. Special operations forces are contributing globally, well beyond what their percentage of the total force 

would indicate, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan under General 

Petraeus’s operational command they are well known for their effectiveness. 

I stand ready for your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson follows:] 

37 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN 

Good morning. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the 

committee. 

Thank you for the invitation to appear before this committee to represent the 

United States Special Operations Command. I will focus on the roles of our headquarters and joint special operations forces in addressing the current and potential 

threats posed by extremists and their allies and networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

The situation in this region is increasingly dire. Al Qaeda’s surviving leaders have 

proven adept at hiding, communicating and inspiring. Operating in and from remote 

sites in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, al Qaeda remains a draw for local and foreign fighters who subscribe to its extremist ideology and criminality. 

The Taliban, although not militarily strong, is pervasive and brutal. Operating in 

the guise of both nationalists and keepers of the faith, but behaving in the manner 

of street gangs and mafias, they have forced and intimidated a mostly benign populace to bend to their will. Their methods run the relatively narrow range from malicious to evil. 

The President’s strategy announced last week is one we fully support. We have 

contributed to the review of the past several months and are pleased to see that 

the strategy includes a clear focus on al Qaeda as the enemy and that a whole-ofgovernment approach is directed. 

We know well that progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be neither quick 

nor easy. We, as a Nation and international community, must be prepared for an 

extended campaign—a campaign that must go well beyond traditional military activities. Increasing the presence and capacity of civilian agencies and international 

organizations, to include sufficient funding and training, are essential to help develop and implement the basic functions of credible government in Afghanistan, and 

to assist Pakistan’s efforts to dismantle safe havens and displace extremists in its 

border provinces. Also essential is robust support to the military, law enforcement, 

border security and intelligence organizations of Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves—as it is ultimately they who must succeed in their lands. 

United States Special Operations Command and the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps forces it trains, equips, deploys and supports have key roles and missions 

within this campaign. With a long history of counterterror, counterinsurgency, and 

unconventional warfare operations in many of Earth’s crisis and tension spots, the 

culture and ethos of Special Operations Forces are well suited to many of the more 

demanding aspects of our mission in Afghanistan and to our increasing interaction 

with Pakistan’s military and Frontier Corps forces. 

Right now in Afghanistan, as for the last 7 years, Special Operations activities 

range from high-tech man-hunting to providing veterinary services for tribal livestock. The direct action missions are urgent and necessary, as they provide the time 

and space needed for the more indirect counterinsurgency operations to have their 

decisive effect. Undertaken in proper balance, these actions address immediate security threats while also engaging the underlying instability in the region. 

In Pakistan, we continue to work with security forces at the scale and pace set 

by them, and we are prepared to do more. With our Pakistani partners, Special Operations Forces are currently helping train Pakistani trainers in the North-West 

Frontier Province in order to enhance their counterinsurgency operations. While we 

share much with them, our forces are in turn learning much about our common adversaries and the social complexities of the region. We stand ready to continue to 

work with Pakistani forces, and to stand by them for the long term. 

While certain units of the Special Operations Force are leading high-tech, highend efforts to find and capture or kill the top terrorist and extremist targets in Afghanistan, fundamental to most of the deployed special operations force is our enduring partnership with our Afghan counterparts. Under a program that began over 

3 years ago, U.S. Special Forces, at the 12-man team level, have trained Afghan 

Commandos in the classrooms and on the firing ranges, and then moved with them 

to their assigned regions across the country. Living remotely with them on small 

camps, continuing the training and mentoring, and integrating with them on day 

and night combat operations has had great effect. Supporting their local development and assistance efforts has had perhaps even a more powerful impact. This program was recently expanded to formally partner U.S. Special Forces with non-Commando Afghan battalions—a program that will consume most of the additional special operations force that will be deployed as part of the 17,000 troop increase. 

The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps component commands of United 

States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) use authorities and a budget 

granted by legislation to me as the USSOCOM commander to organize, equip, train 

38 

and provide their forces to support operational commanders globally. When outside 

the United States, all Special Operations Forces are under the operational control 

of the appropriate Geographic Combatant Commander. 

USSOCOM’s budget, which is historically slightly under 2 percent of the total Defense budget, is intended to fund materials, services, equipment, research, training, 

and operations that are peculiar to Special Operations Forces. It primarily enables 

modification of Service-common equipment and procurement of specialized items for 

the conduct of missions that are specifically and appropriately Special Operations 

Forces’ missions to perform. 

In general, the SOCOM budget has been robust enough to provide for rapid response to a broad set of crises. We rely on each of the Services to provide for our 

long-term sustainment in wartime environments and to develop and sustain the enabling capabilities, and on operational commanders to assign it to their Special Operations Task Forces. We can serve in both supporting and supported roles at the 

operational level. Special operations’ effects are actually core elements around which 

key parts of a strategy can be based. 

While more than 10,000 members of our Special Operation Forces are now under 

the command of General Petraeus in the Central Command area of responsibility 

and around 100 more are working in Afghanistan under NATO’s ISAF command 

structure; about 2,000 others are in about 65 countries on an average day. Their 

activities, fully approved and coordinated, cover the broad spectrum of traditional 

military activities—well beyond the stereotypical one-dimensional gunslinger to encompass the Three-Dimensional warrior, equally adept at defense, development and 

diplomacy. Special operations bring soft power with a hard edge. 

The employment of special operations forces will actually not change much as a 

result of a revised overall strategy—our units have been conducting both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency for several years. We will continue to provide our 

broad capabilities to our fullest capacity in order to meet the needs of our elected 

and appointed civilian leaders and our military operational commanders. 

Our strategy in Afghanistan must secure the primary urban areas and main 

routes so that life and legitimate business can begin a return to normalcy. But Afghanistan is not Iraq, and most of the population is not urban. Security must be 

felt in the hinterland, provided by Afghan forces supported by small teams of U.S. 

and NATO troops and enhanced by civilian agencies in a manner that improves 

local life by local standards. I am encouraged by the prioritization of this approach 

in the new strategy. 

Inherent to our success, and to the defeat of our enemies, is the realization that 

this is a real fight as long as al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated extremists want 

it to be. Civilian casualties are mostly a result of their tactics, not ours. The operational commanders I hear from are doing all they can to minimize the number of 

noncombatant deaths because they both abhor the reality of civilian casualties and 

they understand the negative strategic impact of such deaths. They also know that, 

as long as our enemies force noncombatant women, children and others to support 

their operations or remain on targeted facilities after warnings have been issued, 

some will die. They also know the conditions, numbers and severity of the casualties 

will be highly exaggerated and quickly communicated. We must acknowledge the seriousness of this challenge and find ways to mitigate its effects, especially as we increase our troop presence in the coming months. 

I will conclude with a simple statement of pride in the Special Operations Force 

that I am honored to command. Created by a proactive Congress and nurtured by 

your strong support over the last 22 years, United States Special Operations Command headquarters has brought together units from all four Services to develop and 

sustain a truly magnificent joint capability. Special Operations Forces are contributing globally well beyond what its percentage of the total force would indicate, and 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan they are well known for their effectiveness. 

I stand ready for your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

We’ll try a 6-minute round for our first round. 

First, as I indicated in my opening statement, I’m concerned 

about statements by some administration officials that success in 

Afghanistan is not possible, to use the word of Admiral Blair, unless we solve the challenges in western Pakistan. Now, there’s obviously a link between the failure of the Pakistan Government to 

take on religious extremists, particularly those that are crossing 

the border into Afghanistan, and the situation in Afghanistan. No 

39 

one denies that link. The problem that I have is that to make the 

kind of statement that Ambassador Holbrooke made over the weekend that ‘‘You can’t succeed in Afghanistan if you don’t solve the 

problem of western Pakistan’’ puts the future of Afghanistan too 

much in the hands of events in Pakistan and decisions in Pakistan. 

Let me start with you perhaps, General. I’m wondering whether 

or not you would agree that you can make some progress in Afghanistan even though Pakistan does not succeed in addressing 

their religious extremist problem; it’s much more difficult, but that 

you can make progress and the Afghans can make progress? 

General PETRAEUS. I do agree with that, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. The Afghan-Pakistan strategy did not include 

a new target end strength for the ANA. It remained at 134,000, 

and that’s even though Defense Minister Wardak of Afghanistan 

has recommended that the Afghan army go to somewhere between 

200,000 and 250,000. I’m just wondering why we did not change 

that end strength goal for the Afghan army, Secretary Flournoy? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, we certainly wanted to start by going 

after the near-term goal of accelerating the growth of the ANSF by 

bringing the target dates forward to 2011. We also left open the notion of assessing whether we need a larger ANSF. We did not feel 

that the analysis had been done to really arrive at a number of 

what that larger force should look like. So we wanted to take some 

time to look at this with the commanders on the ground, with the 

Afghans, in greater detail. But the door is definitely open to the 

idea of a larger force over time. 

Chairman LEVIN. The long poles in the tent to get a larger Afghan Army faster have been identified as the following. One is lack 

of trainers. We’re sending namely 4,000 additional trainers. That 

should address that problem or that challenge. 

Second is the lack of equipment, and I would think that we ought 

to make a crash effort to get some additional equipment to Afghanistan. Perhaps for the record, because of the time shortage here, 

you could identify, either one of you, what we’re doing in that regard. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

We are providing equipment quickly to Afghanistan to help accelerate Afghan National Army growth to 134,000 soldiers by December 2011. Multiple communications 

avenues keep all stakeholders engaged in the dynamic support of the Afghan forces. 

For example, the biannual top to bottom program management reviews hosted by 

general officers and senior executive service representatives from the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 

and the United States Army Security Assistance Command ensure all commands 

are inline with current Afghan fielding priorities. Also, Security cooperation community members meet weekly via secure video teleconference and unsecure teleconference. In addition, an Office of the Secretary of Defense-led tiger team is applying 

Lean-Six Sigma principles to the program to streamline equipment acquisition and 

delivery to the Afghan National Army. These are just a few of the examples of the 

proactive engagement all levels are applying to this critical arena. This has enabled 

us to project shipment of all critical rolling stock by December 2010. Other initiatives such as the transfer of M1151 Uparmored Highly Mobile Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicles displaced by U.S. forces receiving Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles in January 2010 to the Afghans will ensure the Afghan Army has 

the right equipment to fight the insurgency. 

I believe, General, that you have indicated to me personally that 

developing the Afghan leadership among officers and noncommisVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
40 

sioned officers is also a major challenge in accelerating the expansion of the Afghan army. Could you just briefly comment on that? 

General PETRAEUS. In fact, we had a session here this past Saturday, Mr. Chairman, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral 

Mullen, General McKiernan, General Craddock, the Supreme Allied Commander, NATO Commander, and myself, with some staff 

officers, and walked through again what are the critical paths, if 

you will, to accelerating the growth of the ANA in particular. 

In fact, the critical factor in General McKiernan’s mind is the development of those leaders. We can train recruits. They have even 

now have not just the Afghan version of West Point, but the Afghan version of Sandhurst or Officer Candidate School. Even young 

leaders they can produce. The challenge is finding and developing 

those company commanders, battalion commanders, and brigade 

commanders, and their staffs to support them, and those are very 

challenging to find. 

Frankly, this is the same experience that we had in Iraq, as 

you’ll recall, and some of this just flat takes time. I agree with 

General McKiernan very much on that, that that is the big limiting 

factor. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, General Petraeus’s prepared statement 

and his oral testimony here said that ‘‘Iranian activities and policies constitute the major state-based threat to regional security.’’ I 

don’t know of too many people would disagree with that. I surely 

fully agree with that. You indicated also that pursuing our longstanding regional goals and improving key relationships within and 

outside the AOR helped to limit the impact of Iran’s policies. 

Let me ask both of you whether or not, if we could work with 

Russia on missile defense against an Iranian missile threat, whether or not that cooperation between the United States and Russia 

could contribute to our security? Madam Secretary, let me start 

with you. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Absolutely, Senator. I think this is one of the topics that President Obama will be engaging with his Russian counterpart on, actually today. 

Chairman LEVIN. He’ll be exploring that possibility? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, absolutely. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s good. 

General, do you agree with that? 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, I do think that’s worth exploring. There are a number of areas in which, if there were Russian cooperation with respect to the Central Asian states and Afghanistan and the effort there, with respect to activities surrounding Iran, and even others, where Russian cooperation could 

make the situation much more doable, if you will, and would help 

enormously. 

Chairman LEVIN. On the economic side, the National Solidarity 

Program inside of Afghanistan has established community development councils in about 21,000 villages throughout every province. 

I have spoken to both of you—and I don’t know, Admiral, if I’ve 

ever asked you about this, but I’ve spoken to both Secretary 

Flournoy and General Petraeus about the National Solidarity Program and you both have expressed to me your belief that it is one 

of the real success stories in the economic development inside of AfVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
41 

ghanistan. I want to ask a question about that, but I don’t want 

to misstate anything. Is that true, that you both feel that that is 

a success story? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I do. I think it’s one of the examples of the kind 

of bottom-up approach that we need to be doing more of in the Afghan context. 

General PETRAEUS. It is, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Then my question, General, is to you. It has to 

do with the wonderful capability that’s provided to us with these 

CERP funds. I agree with you very much in terms of what you said 

about those funds, those commanders’ funds that are basically in 

the authority of commanders to spend, but with great flexibility 

and speed, a lot of them being for economic development purposes. 

Could and should that funding be coordinated, at least, with 

these community development councils, so that they at least have 

a voice, suggestion perhaps, as to where these CERP funds are 

used for economic development, as to what would be the most effective use? I’m not giving them a veto. I’m not suggesting they control. Obviously, these are going to be commander-controlled. But 

would it be worthwhile to have an input from those councils? 

General PETRAEUS. Our experience, Mr. Chairman, has always 

been that the more that you can get locals involved in the decisionmaking process within reason—and there are limits, but within 

reason—that that is absolutely what we want to do. What of course 

we’re trying to do is build their capacity and capability, and that 

is one way of doing that. 

We did, in fact, do that extensively over time in Iraq as we were 

able to transition from us funding programs over time to Iraqis 

funding programs. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, and I’ll now call on Senator 

McCain. 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Mr. Chairman, thank you and I join you in welcoming our witnesses here today. 

Last week, I welcomed the President’s announcement of a long overdue change 

of course in Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan is one that we can win and that 

we must win, but for years now we have been fighting without a clear strategy and 

with insufficient resources. 

The approach outlined by the President last week has the potential to be the first 

step on the right path in what will be a difficult and costly effort in Afghanistan. 

The broad components of this new strategy—including an emphasis on counterinsurgency and population security, a significant increase in our military and civilian resources, and an acknowledgement that we must view the complex nature of 

the mission in Afghanistan through a regional context appear sound. 

It is, however, only one step. The announcement of the new strategy must be 

quickly followed by the development of an integrated civil-military campaign plan 

for all of Afghanistan, which does not exist today. I hope that we will hear from 

our witnesses today that the administration is committed to write just such a detailed campaign plan, and the timeframe they envision for its development. We will 

also be interested in learning how the administration intends to mobilize greater 

support from the non-military departments and agencies of the Federal government. 

A critical component of this new strategy is to increase the target end strength 

of the Afghan National Army and accelerate progress toward that goal. While the 

target currently remains 134,000, I believe that we should significantly increase our 

goal to approximately 250,000 and accelerate progress toward that goal. The deployment of approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to train Afghan security forces is a welcome step, as is the commitment to ensure that every American unit in Afghanistan 

partners with an Afghan unit. The committee will want to know, however, if the 

42 

witnesses believe this commitment is sufficient, if we will request additional trainers from our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in order to ensure 

that every Afghan unit has a coalition partner unit, and whether plans and processes to provide equipment to the Afghan security forces are adequate. In addition, 

while we train the military, we must not do so at the expense of the police, which 

remain poorly paid and trained. There is a desperate and immediate need to employ 

more police trainers in Afghanistan. 

The members of this committee should know that the additional troop deployments announced by the President thus far are unlikely to be the last. General 

McKiernan, the ground commander, has already requested three additional brigades, or approximately 10,000 troops, that would deploy to Afghanistan in 2010. 

I believe the President should have used the opportunity last week to commit to the 

commander’s request. We cannot fail in Afghanistan due to a lack of troops. The 

American people need to understand the scale of our required commitment. The 

committee will want to know how and when this request will be evaluated by the 

Department of Defense, as well as any plans for periodic reviews of the strategy as 

a whole, and of how well matched our troop levels are to the mission. 

The mission in Afghanistan is a crucial test for NATO and the international community. For several years, our Government has made a significant effort to gain 

greater contributions from our allies. Our efforts to build a shared understanding 

among our allies and the international community of what is at stake in Afghanistan have had only mixed success. I encourage the witnesses to speak about how 

the administration’s new strategy intends to address the need to mobilize greater 

international support for our objectives in Afghanistan, including support to training and other non-combat areas. 

I share the President’s conviction that the war in Afghanistan is one we can and 

must win. I also believe that the President and other political leaders must tell the 

American people, today and in the future, that the path to success will be long and 

arduous, that the violence is likely to worsen before it improves, and that this war 

will entail greater expenditures of American blood and treasure. The stakes are 

enormous, and we must do everything we can to ensure that the public stands firmly behind the courageous efforts of our fighting men and women. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses 

today. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the 

witnesses. I’d like to repeat again, I believe that the strategy that 

the President and his team have developed for addressing the enormous challenge of Afghanistan is a good one and I think it has 

every chance of success, and I’m very pleased with the leadership 

that we have, like General Petraeus and General McKiernan and 

others. 

General Petraeus, just for a second, are you worried about the 

continuing level of violence in Diyallah Province in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. Certainly there are concerns in Diyallah 

Province and in Ninewah Province as well, Senator McCain. There 

are other concerns. Frankly, there are latent capabilities. We see 

some activity by Iran to continue to develop again proxies, now 

called Khataib Hezbollah, Asaib-al-haq, Promise Day Brigade. We 

have to keep a very close eye—— 

Senator MCCAIN. So the Iranians continue to try to meddle and 

interfere and harm our efforts in Iraq, including taking American 

lives? 

General PETRAEUS. They do, and there is a continued residual 

Sunni extremist element as well. Certainly al Qaeda worldwide if 

they could would try to provide additional reinforcements to that. 

Having said that, the level of violence is significantly lower, 

somewhere between 10 and 15 attacks per day compared with say 

180 attacks per day back in the late spring of 2007. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Secretary Flournoy, as I said, I support the strategy. I think it 

would be far, far better to announce that we will have the addiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
43 

tional 10,000 dispatched. They will clearly be needed. It is obvious 

that the Afghan army would have to be around 250,000. It’s a big 

country. We know that that was a vital element to our success in 

Iraq, and to dribble out these decisions I think can create the impression of incrementalism. 

We all know what’s needed. I would have made these announcements at the time. 

General Petraeus, we’ve seen now in Mumbai and now in the attack on the police academy a change in tactics on the part of al 

Qaeda or Taliban in this case. Instead of just walking into a place 

with a suicide vest on, they have teams of well-trained, professional, well-armed people who go in and kill a hell of a lot of people 

before they either surrender or kill themselves. 

Two questions. One is, isn’t that basically true in this change in 

tactics that they’re employing? Is it of great concern, should it be 

of great concern to us, that the Taliban’s reach has now extended 

to the police academy in Pakistan? 

General PETRAEUS. It is of big concern. It underscores the fact 

that the extremist threat inside Pakistan is indeed the existential 

threat, the most important existential threat to that country, we 

believe more than the traditional enemy of Pakistan, India. There 

appears to be a growing attraction among the extremist elements 

for Mumbai-like attacks. They saw the impact that that had. They 

saw the degree of coverage, the sensational aspects to that. 

There is some positive aspect to the attack in Lahore in that indeed the Pakistani security forces did respond and over time did 

kill or capture what appear to be a substantial number of those 

that carried out the attack on the police academy. 

Senator MCCAIN. It took a heck of a long time as you well know. 

General PETRAEUS. It did. 

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, Pakistan obviously is very 

critical. I don’t think it’s the determinant, but we can discuss that 

at a later time. Pakistan concluded an agreement with some 

Taliban elements in the Swat Valley that allowed for full adoption 

of sharia law. Do you believe that this arrangement supports our 

objectives in the region? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I do not, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you think that the government—and this is 

the conundrum of Pakistan—and the military are so closely tied to 

ISI that it prevents us from having the degree of effectiveness and 

cooperation from the Pakistani Government that we need? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I think parts of ISI are certainly a problem 

to be dealt with. But I think we have a new democratic government 

and I think you have strong parts of the military who see the extremist threat, who want to deal with that extremist threat. Part 

of our policy challenge is to empower them to be more effective in 

doing that. 

Senator MCCAIN. So you see progress in trying to reduce the cooperation that exists between the Pakistani military and the ISI, 

which has been significant and deep? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I don’t see adequate progress at this point. 

But I think one of the things we’re trying to do with the strategy 

is provide additional incentives for that progress to take place. 

44 

Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, an individual who is I understand a young Taliban leader named Mahsoud—is that the—— 

General PETRAEUS. Baitullah Mahsud, a Pakistani Taliban leader. 

Senator MCCAIN. He said that he would orchestrate, or arrange 

an attack on Washington, DC. How seriously do you take that 

threat? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think any time there is any threat 

that could be against the homeland I think you have to take it seriously. We are doing what the intelligence circles call a deep dive 

to determine the possibility of that, if you will. There are some 

questions about capacity of that organization in terms of trans-national activities, but I can assure you—and I just talked to a senior 

member of the National Security Council staff this morning about 

that, and obviously everyone is quite riveted on analyzing that and 

seeing what further we can find out about that. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, we certainly wouldn’t want to call it a 

global war on terror. 

I thank you. I thank the witnesses. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to the three of you for your service and for the service 

of all those who work under your leadership. It’s really quite extraordinary. 

I appreciated very much the President’s announcement of policy 

with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan on Friday. I think particularly our effort in Afghanistan has really been under-resourced 

for too long, and the commitment of additional resources, both military and civilian, is very significant to our success there. Just as 

importantly, I think, was the President’s unambiguous political 

commitment to defeat the Islamist extremists of South Asia and to 

relate that to our security. 

Secretary Flournoy, I wanted to ask you first, as the representative of the civilian side of the Pentagon and the administration, to 

answer a question about South Asia that was once asked not so 

long ago about Iraq, and that I suspect some Americans are asking 

now and maybe more will ask as we send more of our troops there, 

our best, and they suffer more casualties, which is: What is the relationship between what is happening in Afghanistan and Pakistan 

and the security of the American people, the security of the United 

States of America? 

In other words, is it necessary to succeed in Afghanistan for 

America to remain safe in the world and here at home? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The short answer is yes. But I believe the link 

is that in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region you have continued safe haven for al Qaeda and other extremists who we know are 

actively plotting against American interests, American allies, and 

the American homeland. So this is a matter of vital national interest. It is something that we must deal with effectively. It’s going 

to take time. As General Petraeus said, it’s not going to be easy. 

But I think part of the strategy review was refocusing on that objective and on the core interests that are at stake in this campaign. 

45 

Senator LIEBERMAN. General Petraeus, is it fair to say that we’re 

focused clearly on al Qaeda, but that the success or failure of allied 

groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as the Taliban and the 

Mehsud group and others, Haqqani, is also relevant to our security 

in the world and the stability of the region on which we depend? 

General PETRAEUS. It is, Senator. In fact, I think a good way to 

describe the extremists is a term that General McKiernan uses. He 

calls them ‘‘the syndicate.’’ It’s al Qaeda and the syndicate of elements, plus of course the Afghan Taliban. All of them together represent a threat, not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but certainly 

a regional extremist threat, and in certain cases a truly global extremist threat. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. One of my impressions on both visits to the 

region and talking to people from Afghanistan and Pakistan here 

is that there is an unsettling perception in Afghanistan and Pakistan that the U.S. is not in this for the long haul, that we are making a temporary commitment to them. Unfortunately this is based 

on some history not so long ago—that we will leave before the job 

is done. No one wants to stay there forever, but the question is will 

we leave before the job is done. 

That perception has really counterproductive effects and a lot of 

hedging behavior in both countries, the worst being the excuse 

given—that being given as an excuse for ISI-terrorist linkages. 

So I want to know if you agree with that concern and whether 

you feel that we’re turning it around now, most significantly by the 

announcement by President Obama last Friday of our new commitment? 

General PETRAEUS. I strongly agree with that, Senator. In fact, 

that’s why I’ve repeatedly used the term ‘‘sustained substantial 

commitment.’’ In fact, it’s important in both countries. There is history there. Pakistan will quote that history to you in the first paragraph of any conversation. There is a 12-year period where Pakistani officers, for example, did not come to the United States. 

There are some understandable reasons for this, but the fact is 

that there’s a lost generation and the entire military remembers 

the very much up and down relationship that we have had over the 

years. 

If I could, the Kerry-Lugar bill that is I think being considered 

by the Senate represents the kind of sustained substantial commitment that we’re talking about—I think it’s 5 years, $1.5 billion— 

as do some of the DOD requests that will be coming up with the 

budget. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you a different kind of question, 

about the command structure in Afghanistan. In Iraq it seemed to 

me that you helped to put together and we had a superb command 

structure, with yourself as the four-star in strategic command in 

Multi-National Forces-Iraq, and then a three-star operational commander, previously General Odierno under you—now he’s obviously 

a four-star—and General Austin doing an extraordinary job, both 

of them as three-star. I think that worked and I assume you agree, 

and continues to work. 

In Afghanistan, we have the four-star in General McKiernan, but 

no three-star operational commander. It sure looks to me anyway 

from here that underneath General McKiernan we have an unforVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
46 

tunately balkanized structure, with regional commanders and not 

the kind of line of authority that we’d like. 

I will tell you that we had some witnesses before this committee 

in the last couple of months who made clear that as we increase 

our resources in Afghanistan it would be a mistake not to tighten 

up the command structure and add a three-star operational commander. I wanted to ask you what you think about that idea and 

my assessment of where we are currently? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, the first step, frankly, to achieve greater unity of effort and a cleaner command structure, if you will, was 

the step that we took a few months ago to dual-hat General 

McKiernan as the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as well 

as the NATO ISAF commander. That was very important. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree. 

General PETRAEUS. We have then begun the process of building 

a pretty substantial U.S. Forces Afghanistan staff to support him 

and to take the burden off what currently is the Combined Joint 

Task Force 101, that’s typically the division that has been in Regional Command East, which has also had a command line that 

used to go directly from CENTCOM to them directly to CSTC–A, 

directly to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force and 

some other elements. We have now cleaned that up. It all now goes 

through General McKiernan, supported by this growing U.S. Forces 

Afghanistan staff, which is also a place that we can build up the 

strategic communications, information operations task force, and a 

host of other activities that can support him in a way not quite like 

the operational headquarters certainly in operational terms, but in 

some of, if you will, the important additional enabler duties. 

We talked about in this past Saturday’s session that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs hosted here with General McKiernan, the 

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and myself, we talked about 

the wisdom of an operational headquarters. For the time being, 

that is not something that we’re going to recommend or go forward 

with, but it’s something that we’ll certainly continue to assess as 

we go along. 

There are other areas as well, Senator, if I could, in which we 

need to make some additional changes. We think we need to 

achieve greater unity of effort in the special operations arena, and 

in fact Admiral Olson provided us a brigadier general on the U.S. 

side that we think over time perhaps could be joined together with 

the NATO SOF. That would also help. There’s a thought of making 

CSTC–A also perhaps a NATO element, and there are some other 

measures in the counter-improvised explosive device (IED) world 

and others that we can clean this up and improve it over time, and 

we’re intent on doing that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I thank you very much for that answer. 

My time is up. I just want to read one sentence from your statement that I think we all should think about, which is: ‘‘Iran’s actions and rhetoric have in fact prompted our partners in the Gulf 

to seek closer relationships than we have had with some of these 

nations in some decades.’’ So threats often strengthen alliances and 

in that sense can help us strengthen our own security, and I thank 

you for pointing that out. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

47 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Sometimes in these hearings we get bogged down in a lot of details that are very, very significant and we need to get into them. 

But I know when I go back to Oklahoma and other places the first 

question always is: Why is it we’re not as successful as we should 

be in getting NATO to come up? I notice this morning in the Early 

Bird, and I think this came out of today’s New York Times, it 

makes an issue of the fact that France will send 150 paramilitary 

police officers to Afghanistan as a part of—and it goes on and on— 

and then some of these other NATO countries that are talking 

about this, as if that’s a great contribution. 

Well, first of all, anything further that you haven’t already stated 

in terms of what we might do on this side of the dais or what you 

might do to encourage more of an involvement of NATO over there? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I would just let you know, we spent a 

lot of time in the development of the strategy consulting with allies 

to try to create a sense of ownership on their part. One of the 

things we’ve done is to broaden the nature of our requests, not only 

for military troops and capabilities where they can provide them, 

but to things like police trainers, where a number of our European 

allies have national police forces—gendarmerie, carabinieri, et 

cetera—who are actually quite good at police training. We don’t 

have a national police force. That’s not an area of particular 

strength for us. So we’re asking them to step up on trainers for the 

army, trainers for the police, contributions to the ANA Trust Fund, 

the Law and Order Trust Fund, sending civilian advisers, civilian 

assistance, and so forth. 

So we’ve tried to broaden the aperture, with the expectation that 

everyone will step up in some meaningful way to support a comprehensive approach. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, as part of the consultation phase of 

this, as the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review was launched, I 

went to the Munich security conference, to NATO headquarters, 

EU, addressed all the EU delegates, and also went to London, 

Brussels, and Paris and talked with each of them. There have been 

and there will be some more contributions made. We’ll see what 

happens at the summit in the coming days. There are some that 

still may be forthcoming that people are reticent to talk about right 

now. 

I would stand very much with what Secretary Gates has noted 

about NATO contributions and his concerns about NATO being almost also a two-tier alliance in which some will fight and others 

may not. So this is a challenge for the alliance without question. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, and I agree with all that. 

Madam Secretary, I appreciate your phrase, ‘‘create a sense of 

ownership.’’ That seems to be what needs to be done. 

Each one of you—General Petraeus, you mentioned the CERP 

program, and of course Secretary Flournoy mentioned the 1206. Of 

course, I always try to get on the record on these just briefly the 

value of the International Military and Education Training (IMET) 

program, the CERP program, the Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund (CCIF) program, and in your case, Admiral Olson, the 

48 

1208 program. Do you have any comments to make on those programs? 

General PETRAEUS. With respect to CERP, again I think it’s of 

enormous importance. Actually, I would support very strongly 

1206, 1207, and 1208. Again, I don’t want to get ahead of a budget 

submission, and with the next one there is something out there 

that you may hear—may have heard about, we’ve discussed with 

the chairman and Senator McCain, called the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. This will be coming along with this 

package. It is something that we believe in CENTCOM is of enormous importance, to be able to target assistance that will help 

them develop the capabilities for those who are truly conducting 

counterinsurgency operations. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I would just echo that. These tools are generally very important throughout the AOR and globally in many 

cases, but they are absolutely critical to the success of the strategy. 

If we don’t back up the troops we’re deploying with these additional 

authorities and funding streams, we can’t reach our goals. They’re 

absolutely critical to the success of the strategy. 

Senator INHOFE. Admiral Olson, you would agree with that with 

1208? 

Admiral OLSON. Absolutely, sir. I have more responsibility for 

1208, but the Special Operations Forces are also customers of 1206, 

IMET, and some others. I think we can point to many examples of 

progress that was enabled by those programs. 

Senator INHOFE. Seeing Senator Ben Nelson here, I had the occasion to talk to some of the Nebraska Guard on what they’re doing 

up on the Pakistani border. They’re up there now and we had an 

opportunity to talk to them, and the value of that program, crop 

substitution and this type of thing, working with them. It happens 

the Oklahoma Guard will be going up to relieve them, I think in 

October some time. Would you make any comments about that program? 

General PETRAEUS. I can’t say enough about that program. Actually, this is a case where the National Guard, individual States, 

have pulled together agriculture teams, and these are individuals 

of course that are serving in the National Guard, but either are 

farmers or farm experts, agriculture experts. They’ve even been 

doing the rotation system themselves. Frankly, the more of those 

that we could get the better at this stage, as we expand the areas 

in which our forces are operating, and we’ve conveyed that to the 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 

Senator INHOFE. They seem to be getting good results. 

General PETRAEUS. They get very good results. They have all the 

attributes of soldiers in terms of being able to secure themselves, 

communicate, move, shoot, and communicate; and yet they’re also 

experts in agriculture. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. I was going to get into 

this, and there’s not time, but just very briefly on the fact that I 

didn’t learn until this morning that the solution has come from the 

supreme court over there in terms of Karzai’s term ending in May 

and then of course the elections in August. But I guess that’s resolved now by the supreme court, is my understanding, that he will 

remain there during this timeframe? 

49 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, we hope so. We’ve thought at many points 

that this was resolved before. But we’ll hope that this interim arrangement will stick. Our interest is having secure, free, fair elections. We’re not backing any one candidate. 

Senator INHOFE. I understand. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We just want to make sure a peaceful and legitimate process moves forward. 

Senator INHOFE. My time is up, but lastly, Admiral Olson, you 

mentioned just a few minutes ago that you represented 2 percent 

of the budget. I have read your background and some of the great 

heroic things that happened in Special Operations. I would just 

have to ask you, if this is the right forum to get a response, do you 

think that 2 percent is adequate? 

Admiral OLSON. I obviously don’t want to get ahead of the budget 

discussions that are taking place now, but I do want to fully credit 

the investment that the Services each make in Special Operations 

capability. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. 

Admiral OLSON. We depend heavily on them, and each of the 

Services carves out a portion of their budget to pile on top of that 

2 percent that’s peculiar to the Special Operations. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, you’re doing great work. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning. Admiral, the MRAP vehicle is not necessarily well 

adapted to the terrain in Afghanistan. What would you like for 

your special forces troops over there in developing a vehicle for that 

terrain? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, the laws of physics work against us in Afghanistan. Protection requires mass and mass doesn’t work well in 

the bridges and the roads and the terrain of especially the mountainous regions of Afghanistan. So I support the full range of vehicle development activities that are occurring across the services. 

We are tied into all of them, I believe, contributing our particular 

needs to the development process. 

I don’t know what the outcome of that will be, but certainly a 

more agile protective vehicle is something that we all are striving 

for. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, if I could on that—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. Please. 

General PETRAEUS. There is in fact a very urgent effort ongoing 

to let a contract for what’s called currently I think a light MRAP. 

In the mean time, what we have done is we have sent the lightest 

of the existing MRAPs to Afghanistan. We’ve diverted some, in fact, 

from the flow into Iraq and from Iraq. Those work much better on 

the roads, but they defy the laws of physics on some of these roads, 

as my swim buddy pointed out. 

But there is an urgent effort in this light MRAP arena, and I 

think the contract is literally to be let within a month or so, was 

the latest that I saw on this. We appreciate—I believe that’s something that was very strongly supported up here, because it was 

again a very significant effort. 

50 

Senator BILL NELSON. Last week the President stated: ‘‘Going 

forward, we will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set 

clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable.’’ 

He was talking about Afghanistan. So, General, what metrics do 

you want to see that we will use to evaluate our progress? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, in fact there’s an effort, actually an 

interagency effort that even includes the intelligence agencies right 

now, and obviously those who are out in the field, in the embassy 

and the military forces, to develop those kinds of metrics. There are 

the existing metrics, frankly, right now that exist, that show attacks by region, by day, by type, that capture a host of the kind 

of data points that the chairman mentioned during his opening 

statement. 

But over time we have to expand these more and more into the 

development of the—that capture the legitimacy of the government, 

the development of capability and capacity by Afghan authorities, 

and so forth. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Are those metrics—you mentioned the Intelligence Community (IC). Are these metrics such that we’ll be 

able to discuss them in public? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I think we are in the process of developing 

them to complement the sort of tactical metrics the commanders on 

the ground are using, a strategic set of metrics that we can use in 

an ongoing assessment process. We do want to be able to make as 

many of those public as possible, and we’d like to actually have a 

conversation with you, getting your input on what meaningful 

metrics would look like. 

There’s a real commitment to continue to reevaluate the situation, evolve the strategy, build on what’s working, correct when 

something’s not working. So it’s going to be a dynamic process 

going forward. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, let me follow up on the essential question that 

Senator Nelson just asked you. He’s really asking a fundamental 

question and that is: How will we assess whether the new strategy 

is working? How will we know if we’re winning? 

It seems to me that prior to going forward with the commitment 

of additional troops, that the administration should have already 

established specific benchmarks that it’s going to use to measure 

whether or not the new strategy is successful. So I want to press 

you further on the question that Senator Nelson asked you: How 

will you know whether or not this new strategy is working? It 

seems to me that you need a set of clear benchmarks, clear metrics, 

going in and that we should not be committing additional troops 

until we have a means of measuring whether or not this strategy 

is successful. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I would just say that I think we have 

some very broad metrics on the Pakistani side looking at measures 

of their cooperation on the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 

fight, as well as in terms of support for other common objectives. 

I think on the Afghan side there are a whole host—a much more 

51 

developed set of inherited metrics, given that we’ve been conducting these operations for a long time. 

What we’re trying to do is sort through those more carefully. 

Some of them are more input-related and what we’re really trying 

to focus on is outcomes and actual impact. So we aren’t starting 

with a blank sheet, but we are in the process of refining the 

metrics that have been being used in Afghanistan. 

The decision to deploy the additional forces was driven—there 

was a sense of urgency by our commanders on the ground that, 

with the fighting season coming, the need to reverse momentum, 

the need to get in there and begin protecting the population and 

secure things for the elections, and not lose ground. There was a 

sense of urgency that we needed to go forward even as we were refining our metrics, and so forth. 

But I can promise you we will in a very short amount of time 

be able to come back and talk to you in detail about metrics. I just 

don’t want to get out ahead of my interagency colleagues and make 

sure that we’re all willing to back the same—or sing off the same 

sheet of music, before I come back and talk to you. 

Senator COLLINS. General, I testified this morning that it is in 

Pakistan that al Qaeda’s senior leadership and other trans-national 

extremist elements are located. Similarly, Ambassador Holbrooke 

has said that western Pakistan and the Swat region is the chief 

concern, and I agree with both of those statements. 

To address this threat, you’ve testified that the United States 

will provide additional intelligence capabilities to the Pakistanis. 

However, there have been numerous reports that the Pakistani 

military officers have very close and troubling ties with the Taliban 

both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That’s some military officers in 

Pakistan and the ISI. 

Isn’t there a considerable risk that if we provide increased intelligence capabilities to the Pakistan military that those capabilities 

will fall into the hands of the wrong individuals and end up actually helping the Taliban to avoid attacks? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, the effort in Pakistan, Senator, 

absolutely has to be one that they take forward and one that we 

do everything we can to enable to assist, and indeed to provide intelligence capabilities as part of all of that. How we do that has to 

be done very carefully, and we will have to go through a process, 

I think, where we literally do build some of the trust, because there 

are both troubling events in the past and there are troubling accusations out there. 

Some of these, frankly, when you dig into them are a bit more 

ambiguous than they seem to be on the surface, although some are 

not. It is difficult in some cases to sort out what is an intelligence 

agency contact that is trying to develop a source or on the other 

hand what is an intelligence agency contact that is warning them 

of an impending operation. There have been examples of the latter. 

Those are troubling. We have discussed those with the head of Pakistani intelligence, of the ISI, Lieutenant General Pasha. I have 

done that, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, others. Ambassador 

Holbrooke and I had a session with him together. 

The Pakistani military, again we have had these same conversations with them. There is going to have to be a process of building 

52 

trust. This starts, frankly—all of this in Pakistan begins with them 

embracing the idea that the biggest threat to their country’s very 

existence is the internal extremist threat, rather than the threat 

to their east. That is a recognition that they have stated verbally. 

The chairman quoted it in his opening statement. We have heard 

it privately. 

We now need to help them operationalize that, to watch them. 

Among, again, the metrics need to be measures of their commitment to truly go after this threat that could literally take down 

their state if it’s allowed to creep out and to grow, and certainly 

to cause bigger problems regionally and potentially globally. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Let me now call on a Senator who’s had the foresight and persistence for many, many years of focusing on the importance of 

milestones and metrics, Senator Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. I am encouraged by the suggestion, Madam Secretary, that you would be willing to work with Congress in establishing the benchmarks that could be transparent. I suspect that 

it’s true that there are some pieces of the mission that would require classification because of the very sensitive nature of the operation. But I would hope that most of the benchmarks could be public, transparent metrics to measure progress. 

I assume that they could range from measuring our capabilities 

in intelligence-gathering on the ground. It could be how the country 

is doing economically. I would hope that we might have a metric, 

which might be difficult in some respects, but not certainly in the 

contributions to the trust fund, of how the NATO countries are 

doing in terms of their response. 

I was saddened by how small the contributions were by comparison to what our expectations were recently, when some numbers 

were shown. I would hope that the effort that you’ve made, General, will result in perhaps the better response than we’d received 

at that time. 

In establishing the benchmarks, what it truly enables us to do, 

and the American people, is to gauge how we are doing in our efforts. In the past it’s been somebody from one party, the same 

party, somebody saying we’re willing, others saying we’re losing, 

and anecdotal responses of that type are not particularly helpful. 

As a matter of fact, they’re confusing to the American public. I 

think they confuse Congress as well if we’re not able to be on the 

same page with the same approach. We may question whether it’s 

20 percent or 30 percent, but we wouldn’t be questioning whether 

it’s 0 or 100, I would hope. 

I also want to thank my friend from Oklahoma for mentioning 

the Nebraska Guard and the efforts that they’re undertaking. We 

have the agribusiness development team, 52 members, stationed at 

Bagram. Probably it’s not surprising that there would be people 

from Nebraska that would understand agriculture, given the fact 

that we’re the Cornhusker State. But we’re very pleased and we’re 

very proud of this team that’s there and with the work that they’re 

doing, because overcoming narco-terrorism is critically important 

and probably not much better a way to start than directing away 

53 

from the production of poppies, poppy crops, to legitimate agriculture that can help feed and in some instances clothe and perhaps even ultimately power with biofuels their operation, improve 

their economy. 

My question is: In looking at the ability of Pakistan to deal with 

the Swat, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that are 

under attack, I guess the basic question is: Is there a general willingness from the top to deal with the insurgents in that area? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, let me start, and I know that General 

Petraeus may want to weigh in on this as well. I think the leadership in Pakistan is not a monolith. I think there are some who do 

understand—many who understand the problem and who want to 

get after it. Pakistan has been a victim of terror and these extremists in many ways. Recent attacks attest to that. There are many 

who want to do the right thing. 

I think part of the equation here is reassuring them that they 

have a strategic partner, they have someone who’s trying to reduce 

other threats that they’re concerned about. They have a partner 

that will help them gain capability to be more effective when they 

do take on these extremists and so forth. 

So I think we need to lean forward and try to provide that reassurance and those capability enhancements, but then we also need 

to expect performance, and we need to measure performance and 

we need to follow up on that, to see if they are doing their part 

of this important work. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In that regard, former Ambassador and 

former National Security Adviser to the Pakistan Government, Mr. 

Durrani, told me some time ago, on at least one occasion, that the 

difficulty that they had in being able to deal with the largely unregulated and ungoverned area is that they didn’t have the equipment. They had gotten money from us, but they didn’t have the 

equipment to do the kind of job that they wanted to do. 

So, General Petraeus, I know I’ve communicated that to Admiral 

Mullen and I wondered if we’re not going to turn over all of our 

best equipment and our trade secrets and what have you to somebody else, but are we in a position and have we begun to give them 

the kind of equipment that we would expect them to use to be successful in that area? 

General PETRAEUS. We have begun that, Senator. But this is why 

the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund is so important. 

Their military operations at the end of the day come down to will 

and skill. In the will category, the will is growing, but the will is 

also helped enormously by a sense that we are going to be with 

them, because if they don’t sense that they will cut another deal. 

They’ll have a short-term perspective that says, let’s get no car 

bombs for a few months and that’s worth another deal, but then 

the deal allows the insurgents to expand their area of control. 

When it comes to skill or capability, there is some, certainly, resident. Admiral Olson’s special operators are doing a terrific job, but 

in small numbers. As he noted, we are doing as much as they in 

a sense will allow us or facilitate us in doing. That is gradually 

growing and in truth it is growing based on trust at small units 

going all the way up to the level of the Frontier Corps and the 11th 

54 

Corps out in western Pakistan. Again, this is where that resource 

provision is so important. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your service, particularly Admiral Olson and 

General Petraeus. All those under your command have done a 

great job, and I do appreciate what the administration’s trying to 

do in Afghanistan. I think you’re generally on target and want to 

give you all the support I can to continue to win this fight. 

Admiral Olson, the likelihood of fighting going up in Afghanistan 

this summer and spring is great, is that correct? There’ll be more 

fighting? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. The likelihood of foreign fighters coming to Afghanistan, is that going to increase also? 

Admiral OLSON. There is potential for that, yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Would you consider someone captured 

on the battlefield in Afghanistan an enemy combatant to be held 

by our forces, if we capture somebody involved in the insurgency? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, it depends on who that is and what he was 

doing in Afghanistan. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, he’s over there trying to kill us. 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. If he’s a lawful combatant and a declared hostile person, then certainly, yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. General Petraeus, we have foreign fighters in 

detention now in Afghanistan, is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. It is. 

Senator GRAHAM. What are we going to do with these people? 

General PETRAEUS. I am not sure about that right now. I’d like 

some policy guidance here, if I may. 

Senator GRAHAM. Madam Secretary. Is that still a work in 

progress, I take it? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, Senator. I think the record has been that 

many of these we have to turn over within a certain period of time 

to the Afghans. Some of those are further detained, some of them 

are prosecuted, some of them have been released. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, and we have also returned some to 

their home country, when you’re talking about international fighters. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I’m sorry, I thought you were talking about Afghans. 

General PETRAEUS. But the challenge is what to do about those 

who—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Who are not going to be turned over, right. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, or who we can’t return to a foreign 

country because the country doesn’t treat them humanely. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. With the closure or the planned closure of Guantanamo Bay, I think the administration’s in the process of figuring 

out exactly what do we need to do with those who are too dangerous—— 

55 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I think that this committee 

could be helpful. We need to get ahead of this problem. There are 

some that will not be repatriated to their country. There are some 

that we’re not going to turn over to the Afghan legal system because that would be a disaster, and we need to find out as a Nation 

what to do with these folks because I think they’re very dangerous 

just to let them go. 

From the 30,000 foot level here, General Petraeus, due to the 

success in Iraq would you now consider Afghanistan the central 

front in the war on terror? 

General PETRAEUS. I think you’d have to take Afghanistan and 

Pakistan together. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, those two together. 

General PETRAEUS. But as a problem set, those two together, yes, 

sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you consider that now the central front? 

General PETRAEUS. In fact, our focus is truly shifting to that 

front. 

Senator GRAHAM. The Kerry-Lugar legislation, how empowering 

would that be to our efforts in Pakistan if Congress would pass 

that? 

General PETRAEUS. It will be of enormous importance, not just 

because of the tangible resources that it provides to Pakistan, but 

also because of the sense of commitment that stands behind it as 

well and the sustained nature of it. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe we should pass that as soon as 

possible? 

General PETRAEUS. I hate to intrude in your affairs, sir, but—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I ask you to. 

General PETRAEUS. If you’re asking my best professional military 

advice—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, I am, I am. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, that’s correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. But it would help the effort? 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, Madam Secretary? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. This idea of repatriating or absorbing some 

Taliban members back into the Afghan society, do you support that 

generally as a policy, General Petraeus? 

General PETRAEUS. I do. Again, it’s one that has to be applied— 

in fact, as you recall in the Munich security speech, it is something 

that has to be applied with a very nuanced, thorough understanding of local situations. This is the case of trying to identify 

and separate from the population those who truly are irreconcilable, who have to be killed or captured or run off, and then allowing those who are reconcilable to rejoin society, if you will, and to 

become part of the solution instead of a continuing part of the problem. 

Senator GRAHAM. In a recent poll, 42 percent of Americans surveyed on that particular day said it was a mistake for the United 

States to have gone into Afghanistan. What would you say to those 

Americans who believe that, General Petraeus? 

56 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think it’s very important to remember 

where all of this started, and it started with al Qaeda, trans-national extremists who were based in Afghanistan, and of course 

who carried out the September 11 attacks. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe it’s in our national interest not 

only to defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but to make 

sure that the Taliban do not come back in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely, Senator. The Taliban were in 

power when al Qaeda was allowed and invited in to establish the 

sanctuaries in Afghanistan from which the September 11 attacks 

were launched. 

Senator GRAHAM. When it comes to Iran, what role are they playing, if any, regarding our efforts in Afghanistan? Are they supporting the Taliban insurgency, al Qaeda elements? 

General PETRAEUS. There is a very small level of support that 

has been provided over the years by Iran to the Taliban that we 

have seen. There was a period a couple of years ago where they 

provided some explosively formed projectiles and others. We think 

there’s a case recently where they provided a small amount of 

arms, ammunition, and explosives as well, but it has not been a 

significant or a strategic factor in Afghanistan. 

They are also working to increase their influence, some of that 

understandably, in Afghanistan, to establish relationships with the 

leadership of the Afghan Government, and also of course locally out 

in Herat in the western portions of the country as well. 

Senator GRAHAM. One final question. Is it fair to say, General 

Petraeus, that the American public can expect casualties to go up 

this year in Afghanistan, that there will be more fighting? Madam 

Secretary, can American taxpayers expect that the expense of operations in Afghanistan will dramatically increase in terms of dollars 

to be appropriated? To both of you, is it worth the cost of injured 

American military members, lives lost, and money spent? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I think that Vice President Biden 

had it exactly right when, after his last trip to Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, he said that this is going to get harder before it gets easier. That is correct. That is our assessment, and it is worth seeing 

this through to conclusion. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I would say there will be higher human 

costs and higher financial costs to this effort. Those facts were considered very carefully before the President made his decision, and 

we’re going forward with the strategy because we believe that it’s 

vital to the safety and security of the American people. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Good morning, General. Good morning, Madam 

Secretary. Good morning, Admiral. 

General, I read with real interest that David Kilcullen has written a book about his experiences and insights, and he draws a 

number of conclusions I think would be useful to us as we move 

forward. One comment that he makes is that we should be careful 

about lecturing Islamic countries and countries in other spheres 

about terrorism and about the dangers of it. It piqued my interest 

and curiosity. 

57 

In that spirit, I heard you and I think Madam Secretary say that 

you believe the Pakistani Government now does really see the 

Taliban as their enemy. I also hear you say that we need to give 

them a clear sense that we will stay until the job is done. Furthermore, in that spirit—and I wonder what Rudyard Kipling would 

write in this era, probably much of what he wrote over 100 years 

ago—much of Pakistan’s focus is to the east and to Kashmir. Is 

there any discussion about urging India and Pakistan to continue 

finding a way forward on Kashmir? Perhaps all three of you might 

comment. 

General PETRAEUS. If I could just start with that, Senator. Together with my great diplomatic wingman Ambassador Richard 

Holbrooke, this effort actually has started. I met together with him 

with the Indian national security adviser, for example, at Munich. 

We had what we thought was a very good talk. That was followed 

up when the foreign minister of India came to Washington recently. When Ambassador Holbrooke went out on his maiden trip 

through the area, my deputy went with him and they were joined 

by the Pacific Command deputy for a swing into India as well, after 

having been in Pakistan. 

It would be of enormous importance were the tensions to be reduced sufficiently between the two countries to where intellectually 

as well as physically Pakistan could focus more on what we again 

see as a much more important existential threat to Pakistan in the 

internal extremists than continuing to have that massive face-off 

against India to their east. 

One of the many tragedies of the Mumbai attacks, which of 

course were a September 11 moment not just for India, but even 

for Pakistan, I would argue, was that the Pakistani military once 

again focused on India for a period, and that continues to some degree. There has been again a diminution of the tension between the 

two countries over time, but it literally took their eye off the ball, 

one that they were really starting to focus on with the operations 

in the FATA and Bajaur and Mohmand and others developing, and 

even actually shifted forces. Only about 6,000 or so, not hugely significant in their number, but it was almost the intellectual shift of 

focus that was as concerning to many of us as was the physical 

shift. 

Senator UDALL. Madam Secretary? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I think you put your finger on a really 

critical matter. This is the issue, one of the issues that really drives 

a more regional approach in our strategy, that part of helping Pakistan to shift its attention and its resources and its efforts is reducing the tensions it has with India. If you look historically about 

why Pakistan helped to fund some of these militant groups who 

have now become extremists or terrorists in their orientation, part 

of it was to try to drive the Soviets out of their neighborhood, but 

part of it was also as a hedge against India. 

So I think to the extent we can reduce those tensions, we will 

help shift their attention and resources towards the really urgent 

threat, which is the extremist threat from within. 

Senator UDALL. Admiral, do you care to comment? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I think I would just agree that it’s very important to recognize the impact of India on the Pakistani psyche. 

58 

It’s important to recognize that the capabilities of the Pakistani 

military were built to address the threat they felt from India. 

That’s primarily a conventional army focused to the east. In order 

to reorient that army to a more counterinsurgency army focused to 

the west, any reduction of the tensions on the Indian border would 

be very helpful. 

Senator UDALL. There are certainly parallels between the shift 

we’ve had to make and other militaries have had to make. The 

preparations we made for the Fulda Gap scenario, of course, we’ve 

had to now set aside and actually face the 21st century as it presents itself to us. 

General, you talked about the greater military-to-military contacts between the Pakistani and Afghani militaries. Do you see a 

similar dynamic emerging—and this would also be directed to the 

Secretary—between the civilian leadership in those two countries? 

Because of course you have to mirror those contacts for them to be 

effective overall. 

General PETRAEUS. In fact, as President Zardari assumed office 

there was really an unprecedented number of backs and forths between the heads of government and some of their ministers. As you 

may know, Senator, we hosted here in Washington 3 weeks ago it 

was, now I think perhaps 4 weeks, what was called the Tripartite. 

It was delegations from Afghanistan and Pakistan led by their foreign ministers, with other ministers present as well, and then very 

high level on this side as well with the Secretary of State in the 

lead. 

There will be further tripartite meetings like that, so that will 

continue to foster the growing relationships between those two 

countries. Candidly, we have to do a great deal of work in the intelligence arena. The relationship between the intelligence services of 

Afghanistan and Pakistan is—it would be an understatement to 

say that it is not cooperative. There is an enormous amount of suspicion and really outright enmity that’s built up over the years. 

So we have a lot of work to do there. The efforts to build the joint 

coordination center at Torkum Gate at the western edge of the 

Khyber Pass are among a variety of different initiatives that are 

being taken at the military level, as well as again there’s a military 

tripartite group that meets also. 

Senator UDALL. Madam Secretary, I see my time’s run out, but 

if you could answer shortly that would be good. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would just add, the trilaterals will continue. 

One of the most important byproducts that we’ve seen from that 

process is that it’s encouraged a host of interim bilateral meetings 

between the Afghans and the Pakistanis and their various counterparts that are ongoing between the trilateral meetings. So I think 

the level of dialogue and constructive interaction is increasing. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Chambliss, to be followed by Senator Webb. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank all of our witnesses again for your great service, 

be it military or public service. We appreciate you very much. 

General Petraeus, there has been some comments coming out of 

the administration over the last several days with respect to the 

59 

so-called new strategy in Afghanistan that have been a little bit 

troubling to me. The statements concern the fact that it’s being 

said that we have been operating in Afghanistan on the cheap. Obviously, it’s of concern to all of us as policymakers that we provide 

our military with whatever they ask for. Now, I understand you obviously were the commander in the Iraqi theater and you’ve only 

been at CENTCOM now for a few months. But are you aware of 

anything that has been asked for by either CENTCOM or by General McNeil or General Eikenberry or anybody else in Afghanistan 

that has not been given to them in the way of resources or commitments on the part of the Pentagon to that theater? 

General PETRAEUS. Throughout 2008, all the way out through 

2009, the requests that were made by General McKiernan that I 

supported and sent forward have all been approved. There are requests that are still out there and, frankly, we think it’s prudent 

to do some assessments, see how this moves forward. There’s certainly no need for decisions on that right now. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. I understand going forward, but I’m talking 

about previous requests that may have come from former commanders in theater or commanders at CENTCOM that weren’t 

positively addressed. 

General PETRAEUS. I can only talk about the period in which I’ve 

been in command since October 31 of last year, I’m afraid, Senator. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. Secretary Flournoy, do you have any 

comment on that? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I do believe that there have been some requests that have not been fulfilled, and the one that we looked at 

very closely in the review was the one for trainers. We were over 

I think 1,300 short for trainers for the ANA, over a thousand short 

for trainers for the police. That’s one of the reasons why the President agreed to deploy the additional brigade, and that request for 

forces had not been fulfilled for quite some time. As we put greater 

emphasis on building the Afghan forces, we felt it was very important to fully resource that request, which had been on the books 

for a while. 

So I think there are some examples that we found, looking at it 

from an historical perspective. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Flournoy, General Petraeus made 

a statement, and I want to make sure I’m quoting you right, General, so if I say anything incorrect please correct me. But in talking 

about what’s going on in Iraq in response to Senator McCain, you 

said that the Iranians are still aiding our enemies in Iraq with respect to providing munitions or whatever to those who are attacking American soldiers. They are still part of the process that’s 

being addressed in Iraq today. 

What concerns me, Secretary Flournoy, is that we have the Iranians, who we know have provided munitions to our enemy in Iraq 

and who have—that enemy has sought to do harm to American soldiers on a daily basis, and yet beginning yesterday at The Hague 

we have invited the Iranians to sit down at the table and discuss 

Afghanistan and the way forward in Afghanistan. 

So what’s puzzling to me and what concerns me is, are we engaging the Iranians with respect to just Afghanistan or are we going 

to talk to them about Iraq and try to move the peace process forVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
60 

ward in that respect? Or is this just with relation to Afghanistan 

this discussion is taking place right now? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The meeting at The Hague was really to bring 

them into the discussion of Afghanistan, because they have been 

part of the problem in Afghanistan and we believe that they actually have interest in Afghanistan becoming stable over time and we 

want them to change their behavior and become more a part of the 

solution by ceasing some of the more troublesome activities they’ve 

exhibited there. 

I do think that over time we want to make clear to Iran the full 

range of behaviors that we find problematic, that we would like to 

see change. I know that in Iraq in the mean time we’ve continued 

to put military pressure on them where possible to try to prevent 

them from continuing those unhelpful activities. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Picking up again on Senator Graham’s question with relation to the prisoners in Afghanistan that are there 

today and ones that may be taken over the next several weeks or 

months or whatever period of time we may be there, General 

Petraeus, is it the intention now to keep those prisoners in Afghanistan for some indefinite period of time or is that part of the policy 

decision that is outside your realm that you mentioned? 

General PETRAEUS. That is part of the review that’s ongoing, sir. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. If we should pick up a high-value target in 

Afghanistan, what would happen to that high-value target? Where 

would they go? 

General PETRAEUS. They would go to the theater internment facility at Bagram. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Flournoy, is there any potential 

for any of those prisoners to be transferred to U.S. soil? Is that 

under contemplation? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I know this is a policy that is under review 

and I am not aware of the details of where this is coming out, but 

I can get back to you on that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

In accordance with the January 22, 2009 Executive orders, the Department of Defense is working with departments and agencies across the U.S. Government to conduct a comprehensive review of our detention policy. The Attorney General heads 

these efforts, which are currently ongoing, and is considering all relevant courses 

of action. At this time, no formal decisions have been made, but the Department 

will keep Congress informed of developments. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Flournoy, let me start by asking you a question. First 

I would say that I appreciate what the President was saying when 

he talked about focusing this strategy more directly toward countering insurgency and eliminating the presence of the Taliban. At 

the same time, I’m a little concerned with how we’re going to pull 

this off with respect to cooperation of Pakistan, whether there really is a true incentive at the right levels in the Pakistani Government and military to strongly cooperate with NATO in this effort. 

I think Arnaud de Borchgrave is probably the most comprehensive, does the most comprehensive reporting in terms of the situaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
61 

tion in Pakistan. He has a piece actually this morning on this, 

pointing out that Pakistani intelligence inspired and nurtured the 

Taliban movement with a view of taking over Afghanistan in the 

wake of the Soviet defeat in 1989; that there are currently, according to Mr. de Borchgrave, Pakistani intelligence agents operating 

in Afghanistan to support the Taliban. 

How are we going to address that situation? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I think it is an open question. I think 

we need to test the proposition. I think one of the things that is 

changing in the Pakistan context is the degree to which the threat 

is manifesting itself within Pakistan at a level that is really affecting public attitudes, that is affecting leadership attitudes, et cetera. 

So I think we need to test the proposition—and the way we do that 

is to put a substantial offer of assistance and a substantial commitment to work with them to take this on, to reduce tensions elsewhere in the region so they can refocus and take this on. 

I think we need to test the proposition, but I also think this is 

where the metrics become very important. We need to monitor 

their performance, their actual track record in implementing the 

necessary steps. I think that’s the point where we are and that’s 

what the strategy recommends going forward. 

Senator WEBB. I would also submit that there should be ways to 

try to measure the true incentive, not simply from the current top 

leadership in Pakistan, but from other elements that have considerable power in Pakistan. This is a situation that we have been 

monitoring for some time at a committee level rather than at an 

operational level, but there’s been considerable reporting that, for 

instance, the Pakistani military operating in these tribal areas has 

had a fairly soft hand when it comes to the Taliban, as opposed to 

al Qaeda, the apprehensions that they’ve made and the operations 

that they’ve conducted. 

So I think this clearly should be on our radar screen in terms 

of truly measuring the incentives and the intentions in Pakistan. 

How are we going to know when our national task is finished? 

I would ask Secretary Flournoy to answer that and then, General 

or Admiral, if you’d like to add. How are we going to know? What 

is the end point? Actually, I think General Petraeus is kind of famous for having asked this question at the very beginning of the 

Iraq war to a reporter: How are we going to know when this is 

over? How does this end? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I’ll give you my answer and then let the person who asked the question try to give his. I think that a key point 

of defining success is when both the Afghans and the Pakistanis 

have both the capability and the will to deal with the remaining 

threat themselves; that the period of extraordinary intervention 

and assistance comes to a transition point and we go to a more 

long-term, normal development assistance relationship with both 

countries. 

To me, it is when we have reduced the threat and built that capacity locally to the point where they can be much more self-reliant 

in managing this problem. 

Senator WEBB. That puts us sort of at the mercy of their policies. 

General, can you give me a more practical response—or maybe 

more mechanical? Basically, how are we going to know? 

62 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think again, frankly, in Iraq we have 

known when we were able to transition responsibilities to not just 

the Iraqi security forces, but to other institutions of the Iraqi Government. Now, Afghanistan’s a very different country. It does not 

have some of the blessings certainly that Iraq has when it comes 

to oil and revenue. But nonetheless, the task will be for them to 

shoulder the responsibilities of their own security and other responsibilities of governance. 

Senator WEBB. When is the last time that Afghanistan had an 

actual functioning national army that could clearly be said to be in 

control of operations inside its own country? 

General PETRAEUS. Probably more than 30 years ago, I think, 

Senator. 

Senator WEBB. At least, if then. 

General PETRAEUS. In the 1970s, in that period, and certainly it 

was a combination of security arrangements. But I think that, as 

a student of history as well, that you would agree that between the 

period most recently, for example, of say 1900 and again in the 

1970s, that there was in Afghanistan, there was a conception of a 

nation state and that there was the exercise of governance within 

an Afghan model that did exist. Of course, it’s been the intervening 

more than 3 decades of war that have done so much to damage all 

that. 

Senator WEBB. I would say perhaps a brief period more than 30 

years ago, for about 30 years, you could say that there was some 

sort of a functioning national army in Afghanistan, not previous to 

that and not since. It’s a little bit different in terms of the challenge even that we were facing in Iraq. 

My time is up, but I would like to ask one other question that 

goes along with this. When you’re talking about this policy of living 

among the people, holding areas that have been cleared, who do we 

anticipate are actually going to hold these areas? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, it will literally vary from location to location. The options of course are local police, their version of national police, the national civil order police can assist with that, 

and then the ANA, as well as now the Afghan public protection 

force, which is a pilot program just concluded the first iteration of 

this. About 240 or so members graduated. They’ll be partnered 

with special forces. We’ll learn undoubtedly some hard lessons from 

this effort and apply them as we carry out subsequent of these. 

This is not quite a Sons of Iraq. In fact, it’s actually a more institutionalized and frankly more rigorous Sons of Iraq program, because it included weeks of training, specific equipping, and then a 

specific partner force. But that is how we would see that. 

If I could also, Senator, there is also a difference in the way we 

literally live with the people in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, where we 

plunked ourselves down, as you know and your son did, that is not 

as likely here, given the much greater rural population than urban 

population. It will be probably even more likely that, in coordination with tribal elders and the local mullahs, that we’ll actually occupy on the edge of a community, not literally right in the center 

of it. 

Senator WEBB. So it largely will depend on the competence and 

the willpower of the local Afghanis? 

63 

General PETRAEUS. Exactly. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus, I asked Secretary Gates about what kind of 

unease he had about moving this additional troop level there in 

light of his strong comment that we wanted an Afghan face on the 

situation. Would you just share with us the tension between greater American involvement, greater activity, and the need to have 

the Afghan army and police and government be the force that 

saves that country? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, the concern there is that, taking 

into account Afghanistan’s history and a people who have never 

looked kindly on those who are seen as invaders or would-be conquerors, that the additional forces have to be seen by them to be 

there for them, to help secure them, to serve them, to be good 

guests, good neighbors, good partners. That’s why I mentioned that 

piece in my statement and pointed out the counterinsurgency guidance that General McKiernan has published that gets at the heart 

of this as well. 

The additional forces can’t be seen as coming in and taking over 

a country that has never accepted that kind of activity. It has to 

be seen as a force that is coming in to be their partners and to help 

them against a common threat. 

Senator SESSIONS. You’re satisfied that’s given enough attention 

in your plans? 

General PETRAEUS. I am. It is something we will need to continue to work on, as with civilian casualties, as with a number of 

other activities. 

Senator SESSIONS. We do have this shortage of trainers still, do 

we not, to reach the level of training the Afghan army that we’d 

like it to reach? 

General PETRAEUS. We do, and I actually made a note that I 

want to see what that will be when we project out with the addition of the 4th Brigade of the 82nd, the elements that will provide 

the additional trainers and advisers. I should point out that there 

really has been a shift, that General McKiernan has asked that all 

of the additional forces that are provided—and it actually started 

with the marines that went into the Regional Command South 

area—that they be dual-capable or dual-missioned, if you will; that 

they could partner with Afghan forces and provide advisory and assistance tasks in that regard, even as they are also conducting 

their own operations. 

This is a shift that we’re also going to make in Iraq over time 

as we move away from combat brigades and to advisory and assistance brigades. That’s the concept. This will be the biggest force 

that we have sent in by far that will have that capability, but we’ve 

already been experimenting with this with the initial elements of 

the marines, and the other marine units that go in will have this 

same kind of capability and preparation. Again, we’ll keep learning 

about this as we do it. 

64 

Senator SESSIONS. We learn as we go. I think the reason we have 

to learn and change is because the enemy does not desire to be defeated, captured, or killed, and they change. As soon as you confront one of their tactics, they will develop another one. Wouldn’t 

you suggest that for all of us and the American people to understand that when tactics change it’s because often the enemies’ 

agenda has changed? 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely, Senator. You’ll recall in the 

counterinsurgency guidance that you read that we had in Iraq that 

the final bullet on there was: Learn and adapt. The enemy does 

change. This is a thinking, intelligent enemy, and we must adapt. 

Ideally, you try to get ahead of the enemy, of course, in what it is 

we’re doing. 

But what works today won’t necessarily work tomorrow and 

what works today in one place won’t work necessarily in the other. 

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, I won’t repeat questions 

about the Pakistan situation, but Pakistan has been a long-time 

ally of the United States. This is a very important nation. It has 

a history of democratic leadership. It waffles back and forth over 

time, but we can hope it would continue to maintain its democratic 

traditions. I just believe we need to be respectful of them, not lecture them, and see if we can’t find common interests that represent 

their interests and to acknowledge some of the difficulties they may 

be facing internally on some of these issues. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I couldn’t agree more, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. Sometimes I hear our talking heads and our 

politicians talk about Pakistan like we can order them around. This 

is a sovereign nation and an important nation and I hope that we 

can all remember that. 

I would share that I think Senator Webb’s comments about the 

difficulty of creating a fully functional government in Afghanistan 

are correct. This is a long time and they’ve never really had that 

to any sophisticated degree, and we don’t need to be too optimistic 

in our abilities. 

Admiral Olson, the Special Operating Forces were the key to the 

fall of the Taliban originally. How many forces did we have in Afghanistan when the Taliban collapsed, when we partnered with the 

Northern Alliance, and how many of those were Special Operations 

Forces? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I’ll ask those who have a better knowledge 

of the total count to weigh in if they disagree. But I believe the 

total number of U.S. forces the day that the Taliban abandoned 

Kabul was on the order of 8 to 10,000. About 2,000 of those had 

been provided by United States SOCOM. It was essentially a Special Forces group of operational detachments of Green Berets that 

was the core of that. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, they did a fabulous job. 2,000 are not 

able to run the whole country of Afghanistan or help it be secure. 

But I do hope that your budget is sufficient to meet the needs for 

the future of the Special Operating Forces within the entire military defense establishment that we have. Are you comfortable you 

have enough there? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, again I’m not going to get ahead of the 

budget discussions in this forum quite yet. But as I said earlier, we 

65 

are robust enough to meet the requirement to respond to crises, but 

we depend heavily on the services, on each of the armed services. 

Senator SESSIONS. Do you feel that your people are stressed to 

a level that they can’t sustain now? Of course, one would hope 

there was some reduction in deployments, but what is your basic 

feeling to us today about the stress level of your fabulous troops? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I think we’re operating at a pace that we 

can sustain. There is unmet demand for special operations capability around the world, but we are settled into a sustainable pace 

at this point with the force we have. 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s good. 

General Petraeus, I would just say thank you to your soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, marines. I know that I remember so vividly when 

President Bush had to ask them to extend their tour. Some of them 

had already reached Germany and they said ‘‘Yes, sir,’’ and they 

went back and served their country. Things were dark in those 

days, and it’s improved so much. I just think we need to thank the 

men and women in uniform who made that happen. They are the 

key people. 

General PETRAEUS. I agree, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus or Secretary Flournoy, either one, can you give 

me an estimate of how many contracting personnel you’re going to 

expect in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. I cannot, Senator. We can do a scrub of that 

and see what the projection is, but I cannot give that to you right 

now. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think you probably understand, Secretary 

Flournoy, why I’m concerned. As we moved into Iraq, if somebody 

would have told us in the early days of that conflict that we were 

going to end up with 140,000—well, even worse, that we weren’t 

really sure ever at any given time exactly how many contracting 

personnel we had engaged in the conflict—I want to make sure 

that we’re not going down this same road without having a very 

clear view of what the contracting needs are going to be, how many 

people are going to be involved, and what it’s going to cost. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I can assure you Secretary Gates has 

asked the same question. He wants to understand what the contractor support footprint is going to look like for this larger force. 

I think the other thing that we’re looking at is not only the numbers and the costs, but also the composition. Can we place an emphasis on indigenous contractors, so that when we do have to rely 

on contractors, we’re actually contributing to the Afghan economy 

and creating job possibilities for Afghans? So there’s at least an additional benefit there when we do have to rely on contractors. 

I do think that historically that has been more the case in Afghanistan. There has been a higher percentage of the contractors 

that we have used that have been indigenous. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is there an operational plan for the new 

strategy? 

General PETRAEUS. There is an existing military campaign plan, 

Senator, that incorporates already these forces, because these reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
66 

quests were made and have been approved over time. So that strategy exists. We are obviously working very hard to establish the infrastructure in terms of bases, logistical support systems, command 

and control structures, communications, and all of the rest. That is 

ongoing. 

A substantial amount of that work certainly is being done by contractors. The creation a few years back of the Joint Contracting 

Command for Iraq and Afghanistan has improved, we believe very 

strongly, the conduct of these different contracts and so forth. 

I should also add that we have certainly all tried to learn lessons 

from the findings of the Special Inspector General in Iraq and the 

establishment of former General Fields as Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction is a very good move in our 

view, as are the other oversight mechanisms that the Secretary 

and the President mentioned. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would like to deprive him of as much work 

as possible. 

General PETRAEUS. So would we. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would like us not to have 400 or 500 different reports on how badly we have handled contracting in Afghanistan, like we do, candidly, with what happened in Iraq. I just 

want to emphasize that the time to deal with this is now, the time 

to get on this and have a very good view, because here’s what our 

military does so well, better than anybody on the planet, and that 

is going after the mission. With honor, integrity, and leadership, 

we go after the mission, and contracting has been an afterthought, 

and we can’t afford it. 

I don’t want to cut you off, Secretary Flournoy, but I do want to 

get to one other area, and then we can come back to what you 

wanted to say. That is how we’re transitioning out of Iraq with contracting personnel. I do have a very clear organizational chart now, 

General, about the contracting command in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

But the most recent report from the Government Accountability Office says that there is no unified structure that exists to coordinate 

the teams and units engaged in efforts to manage and execute the 

return of material and equipment from Iraq. We’re talking about 

170,000 pieces of equipment, worth $16.5 billion, and of that $3.5 

billion is within the control of our contractors. 

I am worried that we are not paying enough attention on that 

front as we transition out of Iraq and into Afghanistan, and that 

there’s not any unified effort coordinating these two entities as to 

all this equipment and material and contractors. Are they just disbanding? Are we drawing contracts to a close? 

We know the men and women are moving out in some kind of 

timetable for that. But we don’t really know much about the contractors. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, we actually have a plan that 

is to bring down the numbers of contractors, and I can share that 

slide with you, in fact, because we’ve put a great deal of emphasis 

on this. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Central Command and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF–I) are developing plans 

for the drawdown of forces which includes the reduction of contractors. In fact, since 

December 2008, the contractor footprint decreased by approximately 19,000 contracVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
67 

tors. The current ratio of contractors to military in Iraq is approximately 1:1. Until 

approval of the force reduction plan, MNF–I’s target is a 5 percent monthly reduction of contractors. This is represented by the trend line on the slide below. The 

planning guidance is to reduce the number of U.S. and Third Country National contractors, while increasing the reliance on Iraqi contractors-Local Nationals. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That would be terrific. 

General PETRAEUS. Also, to a point that the Secretary made, we 

have had an effort ongoing for some time to give Iraqis a shot at 

the contracts. There was a period, frankly, where we lacked trust 

in our own ability to vet and so forth, so we used a very large number of third country nationals in addition to the smaller number of 

U.S. contractors. So the Iraqi First effort has gone quite well, actually, and so with the Iraqi transportation network and a whole host 

of other initiatives. 

But those numbers literally are coming down. As that does happen, there is a process to account for the equipment that contractors have that was purchased for tasks they’re performing on our 

behalf or on behalf of other U.S. Government agencies there, to get 

a handle on that and then to bring that out with us as well or to 

dispose of it in some other manner that is legal and appropriate. 

But also, our logisticians are doing a tremendous amount of 

work, not just to build up the infrastructure and so forth for an effort that more than doubles what we’re doing in Afghanistan. The 

surge in Iraq logistically was a miracle of modern military activities, but it was a surge that was only 30,000-plus on top of what 

was already 133 or something thousand, in a country that had a 

great deal of infrastructure. In Afghanistan we’re pushing over 

30,000 in, more than doubling, in a country that does not have the 

infrastructure. So the absorption is a big challenge, and that is one 


401ful4.eps
68 

reason that we have to space this out and we have to build this 

up. 

But your points are very well taken about getting a grip on that. 

In fact, the Joint Contracting Command Iraq and Afghanistan has 

helped a great deal. So also has Congress’ and the Department’s 

focus on increasing literally the number of contractors that we had 

in uniform. There was a period where the Army had no general officers in the contracting ranks whatsoever. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

General PETRAEUS. I think there are now going to be five, but 

I don’t want to speak for the Army on that. But again, all of these 

efforts are hugely important, given the reliance on contractors that 

we have had, we think in general for good reasons, although there 

are also going to be some initiatives I think coming out of the Department in this area. But I don’t want to get ahead of the Secretary on that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Flournoy? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think actually General Petraeus covered a lot 

of the ground I was just going to add. But the one thing I will say 

on the issue of revising the operational plan or the campaign plan, 

if we are successful in really plussing up the civilian side of the effort I think the President will be asking the ambassador, the new 

ambassador and General McKiernan to put their staffs together, to 

come up with a civil-military, sort of whole-of-government campaign plan, and to work that very closely with the U.N. and with 

other international partners, to really get more synergy in our civilmilitary efforts. 

General PETRAEUS. If I could add to that, Senator. In fact, there 

is an existing military campaign plan, but the piece that very much 

needs to be added now is a much more robust and complete joint 

campaign plan along the lines of what Ambassador Crocker and I 

were able to do there in Iraq. That is the full intention. In fact, 

Ambassador Holbrooke has some instructions for that as the new 

team goes into the embassy in addition. 

For what it’s worth, in a few weeks from now he and I are going 

to host an onsite, actually in Washington on a Saturday, to bring 

together civil and military and to talk about the kinds of policy 

guidance that is needed to help that effort move forward. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, in the contracting area particularly, 

we had a little bit of this always going on. 

USAID said, ‘‘well, they aren’t letting us do enough,’’ and State 

said, ‘‘well, the military took it away, and the military said, ‘‘well, 

we have to have more CERP funds.’’ Then meanwhile we had the 

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) going to heights 

that no one ever anticipated that LOGCAP would go to in terms 

of the amount of money the American taxpayer spent. 

So cautionary warning that some of us are paying very close attention to how we do contracting in Afghanistan to see if we’ve 

learned any lessons. 

Thank you all very much for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Martinez. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

69 

Welcome, Admiral Olson, Secretary, and General Petraeus. I 

wanted to thank you for hosting me on Monday at CENTCOM. 

General PETRAEUS. Great to have you, sir. 

Senator MARTINEZ. General Hood and General Allen were very 

kind and we had a very good briefing, and I appreciate that very 

much. We continue to be very proud to have CENTCOM in the 

State of Florida. 

General PETRAEUS. Proud to be there, Senator. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Glad to have you, sir. 

I know that some of this has perhaps been asked, but I wanted 

to just go a little bit more into the area of fully resourcing the effort in Afghanistan and whether or not, in addition to those I guess 

17 plus 4, 21,000 troops that are moving into the theater or have 

begun to move into the theater, the additional 10,000 I guess which 

have been talked about by General McKiernan—and I realize that 

those might not be immediately needed. 

I wanted to ask, when will we know where we are in the fully 

resourcing of that additional 10,000? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, the way this was presented to the President 

was sort of on a time line of when decisions would have to be made 

in order for troops to deploy to meet the requirement. My understanding is that the remaining brigade decision and the headquarters decision are for troop arrivals in 2010. So those decisions 

will have to be made some time in the fall. 

At the same time, because we are redoubling our effort in Afghanistan and we expect to be making progress throughout this 

year, we also expect the commander to be reassessing his needs 

over time, and we expect that new or different requests may be put 

on the table over time. So that’s part of this commitment to continuing to measure progress, continuing to evaluate how we’re 

doing to see that. 

But I think that the President made every decision that he needed to make at this point in time, and I think those other decisions 

will be made at the appropriate time when the commander needs 

to know. 

Senator MARTINEZ. I guess what I’m trying to understand is the 

level of commitment. If the troops were needed, would they be 

sent? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think this President has demonstrated with not 

only the troops you mentioned—there are also some additional 

enablers. We’ve gone from a posture of about 38,000 to now projected 68,000. I would never have used the phrase 

‘‘incrementalism’’ to describe this. This is a very strong commitment on the military side and on the civilian side and the economic 

side by this President to try to make this mission successful. 

Senator MARTINEZ. I don’t underestimate the importance of the 

civilian and economic side, which I think are tremendously important in this effort, as they have been in Iraq as well, here even 

more so because, as I think is very clear, we’re not talking about 

a rebuilding effort in many instances. It’s building in the first instance, which I think is very dramatically different. 

With regards to our NATO partners, the words of Secretary 

Gates continue to haunt me about the two-tier alliance, those that 

might fight and those that might not, and the continuing caveats 

70 

with the NATO partners. How and when will we be approaching 

NATO? Do we continue to be committed to their participation in 

the fight, as opposed to just civilian and support participation? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, we have been in consultation with NATO 

and with many of our NATO allies bilaterally in the development 

of the strategy. I will be going, on behalf of Secretary Gates, to the 

summit along with the President on Friday and Saturday to really 

try to secure those commitments, and then following on in April we 

will have donors, further donors conferences, one for Pakistan, and 

we’re hoping to schedule one for Afghanistan, to try to actually nail 

down exactly. 

But I think many of our allies have been waiting to be able to 

come to the summit with their commitment as a deliverable for 

what they’ve promised to do. So I expect by next week we should 

have a much better sense of who is going to step up with what type 

of contribution. 

Senator MARTINEZ. That’s great. Good luck on that, and I appreciate your efforts in that regard. 

General Petraeus, I was going to ask you regarding Iran. There 

seem to have been some statements as recent as the last day by 

Iran indicating some willingness to combat drug trafficking and developing and some reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. Do 

you perceive that there’s opportunity for Iran to become a more 

helpful partner in the Afghanistan effort, understanding that they 

share a long border and that the issues of drugs as well as refugees 

are of internal interest to them? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, there certainly are some shared concerns, Senator. In the beginning they did play a part in the process. They also do not want to see the Taliban return to control Afghanistan. As a Shia nation, the last thing they want to see is a 

Sunni ultra-fundamentalist group that allows extremists to have 

sanctuaries on their soil. 

So there are some very good reasons why they should want to see 

the effort in Afghanistan succeed. But there are times when it appears that they are conflicted in their views of Afghanistan because 

there’s a sense at times that they don’t want an enterprise that 

we’re part of to succeed. So you have that dynamic. 

Of course, you also have overshadowing that some pretty serious 

differences over other issues as we look to the other side of the 

CENTCOM AOR, into some of their activities in the nuclear realm. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Right, understand. 

I suppose we don’t have a really clear indication. It’s always difficult to read where they may be coming from, and I guess that 

continues to be part of the haze that we have that relates to Iran 

and their intentions. 

One last question in the moment I have left. Madam Secretary, 

China’s participation. I’m intrigued as to how we’re approaching 

China as perhaps of some help in the Afghanistani theater, their 

economic participation in the country, and how do you view the potential for that to develop over the months ahead? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think it’s a very important development that 

we’re engaging them, we’re bringing them to the table. They have 

a longstanding historical relationship with Pakistan. They have 

71 

longstanding interests in the region. I think they are coming to the 

table sort of open to exploring ways that they can be helpful. 

Obviously, they’re going to do it in ways that try to safeguard 

their interests, but I think where we can find common interests we 

should explore that as fully as possible. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just in closing, General Petraeus, say a word of thanks 

to you and your leadership, as well as your troops for the tremendous success, I know fragile and I know reversible. But I continue 

to believe that it is hopefully a lasting success in the Iraqi situation, and you deserve great credit and congratulations on that. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator MARTINEZ. I guess, Admiral Olson, I shouldn’t overlook 

the very great contribution of the special forces to this effort as 

well. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez. 

Senator Begich. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I echo those comments that the Senator just said and I really appreciate the work you all have done. 

It’s been actually an interesting couple hours here listening to all 

the questions. The good news is most of my questions were answered, so you’re lucky about that. But I do have some very specific 

ones, and I want to kind of rapid fire if I can. 

First, General, in regards to Iraq. As we start to draw down and 

turn efforts over to the Iraqi Government, are there any one or two 

things that really stand out that could become show-stoppers or 

issues that we just have to keep our eye on as this process starts? 

General PETRAEUS. Actually, there are several, Senator. The residual capacity that, as I mentioned, Iran does continue to provide 

support for in terms of what essentially are proxy extremist elements. We still see those. By the way, the Iraqi Government is 

watching that very carefully and in fact their security forces will 

go after them when they have the intelligence to do that. I should 

note that our Special Operations Forces have trained those individuals and still do provide a variety of support and assistance, although the Iraqi forces take the lead against the former militia and 

the other elements that used to be called the special groups. 

There are residual al Qaeda, and it’s more than residual. It’s still 

a force to be reckoned with. It is the al Qaeda and other extremist 

allies that continue to carry out the suicide attacks that we have 

seen periodically. Touch wood, those have generally been spaced 

out farther, but we have seen some very tough ones in recent 

weeks nonetheless. Again, Iraqi forces very much going after those 

as well, but they do require continued assistance in certain areas, 

as we discussed, Diyallah and Ninewah Province in particular and 

certain parts of Baghdad. 

Of big concern is the bundle of issues that is wrapped up in 

what’s called the disputed boundaries issues. Some of these are 

Arab-Kurdish issues. Some are Sunni-Shia issues. They are potentially very dangerous and we’re quite worried about the developments in some of these areas, although the United Nations element 

72 

there is about to make an announcement we hope that will start 

the ball moving forward in resolving, at least for the near term, 

some of these different issues. 

Then you have a host of other issues wrapped up in politics. Interestingly, the constitution as it has played out has an enormous 

amount of safeguards. You actually see the council of representatives, their congress, executing its prerogatives and checks and balances on the power of the executive branch. You see this play back 

and forth, efforts by one to centralize, by others to hold that in 

check. But some of that can result in actual security challenges and 

that’s something else that we have to keep an eye on. 

Finally, the budget pressures because of the reduction in the 

price of oil have dramatically reduced the size of the budget that 

they have available to them, the revenues available for them for 

this year. That has caused some very painful decisions for them. 

They’re working their way through that. A related one of those is 

the integration of the Sons of Iraq. It truly is an oversight. We do 

believe that that money was moved and then came off the plate. 

It’s back on the plate, and they keep finding short-term solutions 

to what could be a long-term problem if not resolved properly over 

time. But the vast majority of the Sons of Iraq are now being paid 

by the Government of Iraq, although each monthly payroll has certain degrees of emotion and tension connected with them. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much. 

I have another quick one, a follow-up to Senator McCaskill’s 

question regarding the contractors and the equipment they maintain and handle and how that gets transferred to you. Do you feel 

confident that you are resourced enough to handle that process? 

When I mean ‘‘resource,’’ dollars supporting your staff and other 

activities to make sure that that process goes forward in a way 

that has limited missing equipment and other types of things. 

General PETRAEUS. I believe that we are. We have learned some 

tough lessons in this arena, and in other accountability arenas, 

frankly, over the years. We believe that we have implemented safeguards and properly resourced. I do believe that there is still 

progress required in terms of increasing our capability broadly in 

the field of contracting in general. That process has begun, and it’s 

a little bit like training leaders or developing leaders for the ANSF. 

You just don’t have those to pull off the bench and throw in at 

more senior levels. 

But the momentum has shifted in that regard and I think that’s 

a positive direction. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much. 

I’m going to shift now if I can to Afghanistan, and I’d like toward 

any one of you, but I’ll start with you, General. I’m going to read 

a comment. We did some analysis, but according to the Field Manual 3–24, which I know you had some involvement in developing 

and authoring that, it talks about the density that you need to 

have and the ratio of 20 to 25 per thousand. When you look at Iraq, 

which again I want to echo the comments throughout the day here 

that have talked about the work that you have done there and the 

success that we have had there, the ratio when you look at that 

is 28 to 1,000 based on our troops, coalition, Iraqi security forces, 

the army. With all those pieces all added in, it’s about 28 to 1,000. 

73 

When you look at Afghanistan and where we are today and 

where we will be in 2011 based on the numbers, as well as again 

the same kind of analysis, apples to apples, today we’re about 7 to 

1,000 and in 2011 we’ll be at 9 to 1,000—dramatically—it’s half of 

what the manual talks about. 

So I’d be interested in your comment. This is one area of concern 

to me. I recognize that we may reevaluate in 2011, but in 2011 

we’re still at 9 to 1,000, based on all the training that we do for 

their troops and other activities. 

General PETRAEUS. It is a concern, Senator. For what it’s worth, 

not only did I obviously oversee the production of that manual and 

actually got into some serious editing, I personally made the decision to put that ratio in there, because there was a dispute about 

whether it should go in and so forth. I have heard about it at almost every hearing that I’ve had since then. But I stand by that 

because I think intellectually it was absolutely the right thing to 

do in terms of integrity that we require that. 

Now, one area where, believe it or not, we actually have to get 

some more work by the IC is literally how large is Afghanistan, because there is a dispute right now as to whether it is 30 million 

or perhaps even as low as 23 or 25 million, and the IC is working 

on that. That affects, of course, the ratio. 

But the bottom line is your point is exactly right, that even at 

the end of the additional coalition forces, the accelerated development of the ANA and the other ANSF, that certainly according to 

that ratio, if you assume that there’s an insurgency throughout the 

country, which is not necessarily the case, and that’s another important factor, that you need more forces. 

Again, I think that’s something that as the assessment goes forward—and I’d defer to the Under Secretary on that. 

Senator BEGICH. Madam Secretary? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, this actually, there were several faithful 

students of General Petraeus’ Counterinsurgency manual involved 

in the strategy review. 

General PETRAEUS. She was present at the very first seminar we 

had to develop that manual. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We actually had several discussions on this very 

issue, and what I will tell you is we asked the IC to give us their 

best assessment of where the sort of insurgency had its deepest 

roots, where it was really focused and concentrated geographically 

in the country. While there are pockets in the north and west that 

are important, the concentration really is in the south and up into 

the east. 

So when we were looking at the troops required on our side, by 

our allies, the Afghan troops, Afghan police, Afghan local security 

forces, the sum total of all, we were trying to concentrate our efforts in that sort of insurgency belt in the south and the west, to 

try to get to those kinds of ratios in those geographic areas where 

the insurgency is strongest. 

So we actually did take that into account, not so much in a countrywide fashion, but focused on the areas where the insurgency 

really has taken root. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you. 

74 

My time is up but let me ask you if I could if you could prepare 

or share at whatever level you can how those ratios look in those 

areas of concentration? As a former mayor, I always had my police 

department tell me what the ratio should be and then we had to 

manage based on situations throughout the city. So we always had 

a ratio. But I want to make sure that’s the one area—and to be 

very frank with you, I want to make sure you’re resourced properly 

here and be aggressive about it, so we’re not kind of three-quarters 

of the way in. 

So let me end there. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the 

opportunity to ask some questions. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Consistent with historical experience, FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, calls for a 

force density ratio of 20–25 counterinsurgents per 1,000 people, or 1:50. The necessary force density ratio, however, remains very dependent upon the situation on 

the ground (FM 3–24, paragraph 1–67). 

Estimates of Afghanistan’s national population vary widely, ranging from about 

24–32 million people. There are perhaps 10–14 million people in the Pashtun belt 

where the insurgency is most concentrated. 

Current force-to-population ratios (Afghan national security forces (ANSF) plus 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)) in the Pashtun areas of Regional 

Command-East and Regional Command-South range from 1:150 to 1:110 (depending 

on the population estimate used). 

If all additional planned ANSF (including ongoing increases in Army and police) 

and ISAFs go to these areas, the ratios could improve to a range of about 1:80 to 

1:60 by 2011. This is much closer to the historically-derived ratio of 1:50. Whether 

this force ratio will be adequate will depend on a number of factors including the 

quality of ANSF training and the degree of progress in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Monitoring the situation and making necessary adjustments is a top priority 

for the Department. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Begich. 

We’ll just have a 3- or 4-minute second round. There’s only a few 

of us here, so hopefully you’ll be able to get some lunch before your 

next appearance. 

First on this 10,000 troop request, is there a pending request 

that is unfilled at this point for those 10,000 additional troops? 

General PETRAEUS. There is a request for forces for those elements, Senator. It did move through me. My understanding is that 

it has not been sent beyond the Pentagon at this time. 

Chairman LEVIN. I should look to you, Secretary Flournoy. Has 

that been sent by Secretary Gates? Has that request been made by 

Secretary Gates? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The request was laid out along with all of the 

others on a time line, and what the President was told is that that 

request is out there, but he doesn’t have to make it until—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Make the decision? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Make the decision, until the fall, so that the 

troops would arrive as planned in 2010. So that—I think the President was focused on making every request he needed to be made 

in the current timeframe, and I think he wanted to reassess where 

we are at the time the decision has to be made. 

Chairman LEVIN. So that decision will be made in a timely way 

so that the troops, if the President so determines, can get there on 

the time line that General McKiernan has requested them; is that 

a fair statement? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree with that, General Petraeus? 

75 

Ms. FLOURNOY. But they also may be changing. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, that’s certainly our hope. Again, 

it’s up to them to make the decision, so to speak. 

Chairman LEVIN. I said that. The President will decide whether 

or not to do it. 

General PETRAEUS. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. If he decides in the fall to approve those 

10,000, they would then arrive in a timely fashion, according to a 

timetable which General McKiernan, more importantly I guess 

you—you’re the Commander, CENTCOM—have approved? 

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. So it’s not like it’s rejected or deferred. 

It’s just that the decision will be made in a timely way one way 

or the other, and if it’s made in a positive way in the fall that 

would then respond positively to the current request for 10,000? 

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Just one, sort of a comment and a question on this aid for Pakistan, the money which has been or will be 

requested. I guess it’s called Kerry-Lugar money. My own feeling 

is that I’m willing to support that if I think it will be effective. 

Whether it’s going to be effective will depend on whether or not the 

Pakistanis have adopted the goals of dealing with the religious extremists in their midst and to do forcefully, where necessary. We 

have ambivalent evidence as to whether or not they’re committed 

to that goal. 

So I need to, as far as this one vote is concerned, to believe that 

those goals not only are at the top, but have sufficiently permeated 

the down-below elements of the Pakistani Government and military so that the aid would be effective. Would you think that’s a 

fair position to take? Maybe that’s an unfair way to state it, but 

do you think that that is a fair view to take on my part? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I think we’re all looking for those indications that the intent of the assistance would be met. What I can 

tell you in this intensive dialogue and trialogue we’ve been having 

in the development of the strategy is that the Red Mosque attack, 

the assassination of Bhutto, the attack on the cricket team, the attack on the police station, these are really starting to have an impact on both average Pakistanis, but also the leadership. 

The problem is making itself very much felt. So I do think we 

are at a different moment of opportunity now. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, could I just note, by the way, that 

comments similar to that were in the newspaper, I think it was 

yesterday, the comments that you made. I shared those with— 

there’s a senior Pakistani officer here right now, in fact for a conference. In fact, the Under Secretary addressed all the Central and 

South Asian chiefs of defense staff and other senior officers. I will 

also share those with the Pakistani ambassador, who I’m meeting 

tomorrow night. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, finally, it’s a different aspect of the same 

problem. We cannot appear to be buying support for our policies. 

It has to be that we are supporting Pakistan policies, because if we 

appear to be buying something they otherwise would not pursue it 

is counterproductive in terms of the reaction of the Pakistan people, who want to believe that we’re supporting their goals, not that 

76 

we’re buying something they otherwise wouldn’t do, because that 

is a domineering kind of a position to take if we’re buying something. 

Money can be used for two different purposes. One, you go to the 

store and you buy something; or you can use money to support 

something, like something you believe in, like your family’s goals. 

It’s a subtle difference in a way because it’s still money, but it’s a 

critical difference. It may be too nuanced for public consumption, 

I don’t know. But it’s a critically important difference, I believe. 

How then, if there is a difference, if you accept that difference, 

could we make it clear that it is our goal to support a Pakistan 

Government which has the goals of a stable Pakistan without religious extremists dominating or controlling things, without the 

down side possibility that it would look like we’re trying to persuade them to do something they otherwise wouldn’t do? 

If you can follow that distinction, how would we pursue it? 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, in fact in all of the recent 

studies there has been a recognition of the importance of moving 

from what we have termed a transactional relationship with Pakistan to a partnership. I think that captures exactly what you are 

getting at. 

But as you also rightly note, there is nothing easy about this. 

This is about relationships. It’s about building of trust and confidence. It’s about their recognition of the existential threat, that 

it’s a threat to them, not just a threat to us and the rest of the 

world, and all the rest of that. 

Admiral OLSON. Senator Levin, I think a point worth making is 

that as we strive for an increased and enhanced relationship, partnership with Pakistan, that we do recognize the sacrifices and contributions that they’ve made to date. They have been a strong ally 

and I think the forces that I provide feel that because they have 

been working one on one at a unit level in a training relationship 

with Pakistani forces, who have captured thousands, killed hundreds, and lost numerous lives in the border region, and they’ve 

fought—there was a serious fight in Bajaur before a successful outcome there, and there was a serious fight in Swat before an unsuccessful outcome there that they still hope to reverse. 

So at the unit level and where I’ve been able to visit the Americans and the Pakistanis working together in a training relationship, there is a solid statement of partnership. I know we’re looking 

for a much more overt demonstration of commitment by the Pakistani Government, but I would like to be on record as saying that 

the soldiers themselves, many of them have fought hard in the 

western regions of Pakistan. 

General PETRAEUS. I would echo that, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to all of you. I want to make two quick statements and 

ask one question. The first statement is to thank you for the exchange that you had with Senator Levin about that pending request for 10,000 additional troops and the answer that the door is 

essentially open and a decision has not been made at the highest 

levels of our Government. 

77 

I say that for the obvious reason, one of the lessons we learned 

painfully in Iraq is that numbers matter. It’s not numbers alone of 

troops. As you always remind us, General Petraeus, it’s how they’re 

used; and also that military strength is a necessary but not sufficient basis for achieving our objectives. 

But the lesson that I think should be with all of us from the 

time, the resources, the lives that were lost over a period of time 

when we inadequately resourced that war is that sometimes those 

short-range decisions really cost you in the long run. I appreciate 

the fact that the request is pending and that the administration 

has not made a decision on it and is open to it this fall. 

Second, it may sound a little odd, but I want to say a word on 

behalf of the Afghan people. There were some questions raised that 

I think you’ve answered well, General Petraeus. This is a remarkable people, with a remarkable history. I’m not closing my eyes to 

any of the problems we have now, but they have survived a lot in 

their history. They have a real sense of nationhood. One might 

argue in fact that, though there are Pashtuns and Tajiks there, 

that the divisions between them are actually much less than we 

found in Iraq between the Shias and the Sunnis and the Kurds. 

The comparisons are not exact. 

As we know and as you know greater than I—two things. One 

is their fighters are really committed, most of them. They’ve now 

held an election and the people have showed in great numbers that 

they want a better future. Some of the people—a lot of the people 

at the top of that government are really quite impressive. 

They seem quite supportive, comparatively speaking, of our presence there and what we’re trying to do for them. 

So I understand all the problems, but I think not only do we 

have a security interest in how this comes out, ends in Afghanistan; the people want it to end well. Why wouldn’t they? Look at, 

every time there’s a poll there the Taliban comes out about at the 

bottom, lower even than numbers Congress had a short while ago. 

That’s how bad the Taliban is doing in Afghanistan. 

Okay, now to my question—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Your time is up. [Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN. My question is this. I thought the President 

spoke very eloquently on Friday about the fact that there hadn’t 

been adequate civil-military cooperation, partnership, in Afghanistan, about the need to make that happen. So I wanted to—and of 

course, we know during a period of time, particularly when Ambassador Khalilzad and General Barno was there, it certainly seemed 

like their offices were together. They were working together. The 

model that you built in Iraq with Ambassador Crocker. 

So what are we doing to try to create that here? I know some 

people laugh at plans, but is there a coordinated civil-military plan 

being written for the war in Afghanistan? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would just say we’re working it at multiple levels. At the sort of operational level, if you will, or the strategic 

operational level, General Petraeus and Ambassador Holbrooke are 

leading the effort that he mentioned. We will be tasking our current commander and the new ambassador to put together a campaign plan that’s truly joint at their level. 

78 

But even more important or as important, we are engaged in discussions with Kai Eide, the U.N. representative, and our allies to 

try to ensure that we have an overarching sense of priorities and 

what we’re doing, but that we’ve really encouraged Mr. Eide to 

move the U.N. presence into a provincial presence, so that province 

by province we have a much more coordinated effort on the part 

of the international community working hand in hand with the 

ISAF forces. 

So it’s complicated, but we’re trying to work the problem at multiple levels that are interconnected. 

I don’t know if you want to add. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. General? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, in fact there was direction already 

given to Karl Eikenberry, General Eikenberry right now, who I 

think was reported out of committee yesterday. There is every intention to do just that. In fact, even the new DCM who goes in may 

start that process with General McKiernan. It was a topic that we 

talked about on Saturday as well. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Excellent, very encouraging. Thank you all. 

I will tell you that the three of you, the testimony has been really 

excellent, and really the three of you operate at such a high level 

that it should give all of us confidence. 

Admiral Olson, you were asked a few less questions, probably inherent in the nature of your covert special operations. You stayed 

relatively covert this morning. But I appreciated your opening 

statement. You said really quite directly that the enemy—the behavior of the enemy we’re facing in Afghanistan ranges from malicious to evil, and it’s because I agree with you that I’m so grateful 

that we have three people of your caliber leading the effort. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think you’ve heard here this morning a great 

deal of support for the President’s direction and strategy. It’s cohesive, it’s strong, it’s clear. Its goals are important goals. I hope 

you’re all reassured by what you’ve heard from this side, but we’re 

reassured from what we heard from you. Your testimony was very, 

very helpful. It was important for the American people that the 

kind of questions which were asked be asked. You gave answers 

which I consider to be highly reassuring, and we will now stand adjourned with our thanks. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

AFGHANISTAN STRATEGIES

1. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, in your testimony, you state, ‘‘our strategic 

goal is very clear: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies. To do so, we must eliminate their safe haven in Pakistan and prevent their 

re-emergence in Afghanistan.’’ This statement is clear on the ‘‘what’’ that needs to 

be done, but very weak on the ‘‘how’’ of accomplishing this goal. This and other 

goals also seem to be predicated on very tenuous political, diplomatic, and economic 

strategies. Does the administration intend to develop tactics to achieve these strategies that are as rigorous and as urgent as those developed to achieve military goals? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes, our new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan recognizes the need to increase dramatically our civilian efforts in Afghanistan and facilitate efforts in Pakistan. As our strategy stated: 

‘‘By increasing civilian capacity we will strengthen the relationship between the Afghan people and their government. A dramatic increase in AfVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
79 

ghan civilian expertise is needed to facilitate the development of systems 

and institutions particularly at the provincial and local levels, provide basic 

infrastructure, and create economic alternatives to the insurgency at all 

levels of Afghan society, particularly in agriculture. The United States 

should play an important part in providing that expertise, but responding 

effectively to Afghanistan’s needs will require that allies, partners, the U.N. 

and other international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations 

significantly increase their involvement in Afghanistan.’’ 

Although the Department of Defense (DOD) is not the lead for these efforts, we 

strongly support the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. departments and agencies in their political, diplomatic, and economic development programs within our means and capabilities. 

Currently, the administration is examining options to increase the number of civilians in Afghanistan, as part of our whole-of-government approach to stabilizing 

and securing Afghanistan. The DOD will coordinate closely with other U.S. departments and agencies to support these efforts. 

PAKISTAN STRATEGIES

2. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, the United States cannot currently commit 

U.S. forces in Afghanistan to attack ‘‘al Qaeda and its extremist allies’’ in their safe 

havens in Pakistan, where they plan terrorist attacks and support operations that 

undermine the stability of both countries. What is the likelihood of being able to 

negotiate access or to get Pakistan to address this threat? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Pakistan is a sovereign nation that already is committing 

more than 100,000 military and paramilitary forces to its western border regions 

where they are conducting operations against al Qaeda and its extremist allies. We 

are working closely with the Government of Pakistan to enhance the capability of 

its security forces in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. The U.S. 

Government is engaging with the Government of Pakistan at the highest levels regarding the existential threat that extremist and insurgent networks pose to Pakistan. Many of Pakistan’s leaders recognize this threat, but addressing it effectively 

will require greater Pakistani will and capability, as well as support from the U.S. 

and international partners. 

3. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, what is the status of negotiations? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The United States is working closely with the Government 

of Pakistan to assist it to combat extremists in its territory. These efforts include 

train-and-equip programs with the Pakistani military to enhance its capacity to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. 

4. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, do Pakistani Government and security 

forces view the presence of al Qaeda and the Taliban as a serious threat to their 

national security? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Pakistan’s efforts and sacrifices to engage extremist 

groups—including more than 3,000 security forces killed or wounded in action since 

2001—demonstrate a willingness to engage extremist groups that pose a threat to 

Pakistan. Nevertheless, the Pakistan military continues to view India as its most 

significant enemy. The United States is engaging with the Government of Pakistan 

to convey our sense of the dire threat Pakistan faces, and is working with Pakistan’s 

security forces to strengthen their ability to face that threat. 

5. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, according to your testimony, ‘‘Pakistan’s 

ability to dismantle the safe havens on its territory and defeat the terror and insurgent networks within its borders is critical to its own security and stability. Pakistan faces a severe socio-economic crisis that enables these extremist groups to 

flourish and pose a great threat to this nuclear armed state.’’ Describe your concerns 

regarding how the political situation in Pakistan might affect their view of the 

threat and their willingness to take effective action against it. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The United States is committed to empowering civilian leaders in Pakistan to take effective action against extremist groups; however, political 

infighting and instability within Pakistan are distractions. Strong civilian leadership is needed to address the threat posed by militant groups and to support the 

military in taking decisive action. The United States is very concerned about recent 

peace agreements between the Government of Pakistan and militant groups in Swat 

and elsewhere, which are a by-product of political weakness. 

80 

6. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, you state that initiatives pursued in the 

context of a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan should be limited if we 

do not see improvements in Pakistani performance. If the United States limits those 

initiatives, however, what is the impact to efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 

al Qaeda and its extremist allies and avoid the further radicalizing of a nucleararmed Pakistan? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. It is critical that U.S. assistance to Pakistan be tied to 

measures of effectiveness, particularly with regard to transparency and accountability; however, these measures should be based on the President’s strategy for the 

region, rather than on legislation. U.S. provision of additional assistance will require improved Pakistani performance in transparency and accountability. At the 

same time, the United States needs to move away from its past transactional relationship with Pakistan. We need to develop a relationship that is based on more 

than counterterrorism and instead focuses on the people of Pakistan by providing 

economic, developmental, and educational support. Pakistan’s growing confidence in 

the long-term support of the United States is vital to providing an alternative to 

extremists and defeating extremist groups. 

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICY

7. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, efforts by the United States and its allies 

to build Afghanistan’s economy dramatically lag behind efforts to train and field soldiers and police. Further, many European nations that have pledged contributions 

to donor funds have not satisfied those pledges. What, if anything, is being planned 

that has the potential of creating an economy in Afghanistan that is capable of sustaining the military, police, and civilian bureaucracies? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The United States is pursuing numerous initiatives to increase economic growth in Afghanistan within the framework of the Afghanistan 

National Development Strategy (ANDS). The ANDS was approved by the Afghan 

Government in June 2008. It lays out a long-term vision for the country and specific 

goals along key lines of operation (Security; Governance, Rule of Law and Human 

Rights; and Economic and Social Development). With time and continued focus and 

effort on the part of the United States, the international community, and the Government of Afghanistan, the Afghan economy should reach the point where it can 

provide the domestic revenue to support the Afghan Government, including the security forces. In the meantime, it will be necessary for the United States and our 

international partners to continue our support to Afghanistan. 

8. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, is there a unified international plan to accomplish this goal? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes, the United States and the international community 

pursue their economic reconstruction initiatives in Afghanistan under the framework provided in the ANDS. 

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

9. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, do the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) and the United Nations (U.N.) share the same view and the same goals in 

the region? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. We work in full partnership with NATO and the United Nations as well as regional stakeholders in both organizations. These partnerships are 

critical for success. It is important to distinguish the role of the U.N. in coordinating 

international civilian activities from NATO’s military role. It is also important to 

highlight the need to improve collaboration between U.N. civilian and military efforts and NATO’s efforts. Securing such collaboration among NATO’s International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and 

the Afghan Government in order to implement an ‘‘integrated approach,’’ will improve the focus of collective efforts and also strengthen synchronized civilian and 

military efforts in the country. 

10. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, how do their views differ from those of the 

United States? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. As the NATO declaration at the April 2009 Summit attests, 

our Allies largely share our views and objectives with respect to Afghanistan. However, the United States and its Allies take on different roles and missions within 

the larger effort to achieve those shared objectives. Like the United States, many 

of our allies and partners (including the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, 

81 

and Australia) have demonstrated their willingness and ability to take on combat 

missions. Other Allies and partners emphasize peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and still others have focused resources on building Afghan capacity in the 

security sector and civilian government. The United States and its allies and partners agree that each of these areas is a necessary part of a comprehensive civilianmilitary strategy. 

BENCHMARKS

11. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, as noted by the President in his speech on 

this matter, metrics or benchmarks are necessary to assess performance of efforts. 

After more than 7 years of committing ‘‘blood and treasure’’ in this region, U.S. taxpayers deserve to know what progress is being made in return for their investment. 

When can Congress expect to receive a set of performance metrics from the administration? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The administration is working to define measures of effectiveness to monitor progress towards achieving the objectives of the U.S. strategy 

in Afghanistan. The administration will work with Congress to ensure that our 

measures of effectiveness are a useful tool for gauging our progress over time, and 

enable us to identify areas where policy and resource adjustments may be needed. 

12. Senator BYRD. Secretary Flournoy, will Congress receive regular reports on 

progress being made in achieving these metrics? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes, the Department provides Congress a report on progress 

in Afghanistan on a semiannual basis titled: Progress toward Security and Stability 

in Afghanistan. Once defined, the measures of effectiveness will be an integral part 

of this report. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

13. Senator BYRD. Admiral Olson, you state that ‘‘. . . the situation in this region 

is increasingly dire. Al Qaeda’s surviving leaders have proven adept at hiding, communicating, and inspiring. The Taliban, although not militarily strong, is pervasive 

and brutal.’’ To what extent is Special Operations Command (SOCOM) limited in 

accomplishing the strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda 

and its extremist allies in the Swat Valley and Baluchistan in Pakistan as a result 

of the inability to commit special operations forces in this area? 

Admiral OLSON. [Deleted.] 

14. Senator BYRD. Admiral Olson, part of your mission in Afghanistan involves 

increasing interaction with Pakistan’s military and Frontier Corps forces. What is 

the nature of that mission? 

Admiral OLSON. Our enemy is an enemy that knows no boundaries, borders, and 

conducts operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Pakistan, U.S. Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) conducts a variety of Foreign Internal Defense, Joint Combined Exchange Training events and counternarcotics training with Pakistan MIL 

and Pakistan SOF in support of counterinsurgency operations. 

U.S. SOF support is a component of the U.S./Pakistan Security Development Plan 

(SDP). SDP is a combined U.S. DOD/Pakistan MoD security plan coordinated with 

U.S. Government interagency efforts and programmed over 5 years. Its main effort 

is to enhance and expand the FC, Pakistan Army, and Special Service Group capabilities. U.S. SOF is the lead U.S. force in this effort. 

U.S. SOF overall efforts in Pakistan, especially those training opportunities with 

the FC, directly impact and support U.S./ISAF objectives in Afghanistan. 

15. Senator BYRD. Admiral Olson, please provide some examples of successes. 

Admiral OLSON. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LINDSEY GRAHAM

NEW STRATEGY

16. Senator GRAHAM. Secretary Flournoy, the President announced, and you testified, that this new strategy is designed to defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Iraq. 

Given that definition, how does this strategy fit into the global strategy to defeat 

al Qaeda and who specifically is the lead for the global strategy to defeat al Qaeda? 

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Secretary FLOURNOY. Due to our efforts in Afghanistan, al Qaeda senior leaders 

have moved their safe havens into the tribal areas of Pakistan. The new strategy 

for the region emphasizes a single theater construct for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

In Afghanistan, our counterinsurgency campaign emphasizes protecting the population while developing the Afghan National Security forces and building Afghan 

governance and economic capacity. These efforts, in full partnership with the Afghans and our coalition partners, are designed to defeat the insurgency and to ensure al Qaeda leadership cannot re-establish a safe haven in that country. 

In Pakistan, we must assist the Pakistani Government and security forces in dealing with the existential threat from al Qaeda and the insurgents they support or 

inspire. Strengthening Pakistani will and capability are central parts of our diplomacy and military assistance. The Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund 

and initiatives such as the Kerry-Lugar legislation are designed to enable the Pakistanis to defeat al Qaeda in the tribal areas. 

Within DOD, U.S. SOCOM has been designated as the military supported command to plan and synchronize operations to implement the global strategy to defeat 

al Qaeda, and the geographic combatant commands execute the strategy within 

their respective areas of responsibility. 

At the interagency level, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is responsible for conducting strategic operational planning. The NCTC has developed the 

National Implementation Plan to combat terrorism, including plans to defeat al 

Qaeda. 

CIVILIAN RESOURCES

17. Senator GRAHAM. Secretary Flournoy, you have been quoted in the press saying that the new Defense budget will include ‘‘a substantial request for resources 

on the civilian side’’ of the Federal Government. Can you elaborate on how you will 

resource Rule of Law efforts and to what extent that will be part of the civilian resources? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Assisting foreign governments with establishing, re-establishing, or strengthening the Rule of Law in their sovereign territory is often a key 

component of U.S. Government stability operations. It is DOD policy, however, that 

this component of stability operations is best implemented by other Departments 

and Agencies with core competencies and expertise in Rule of Law concepts and 

issues. As a result, DOD prefers to support, rather than lead, whole-of-government 

approaches to Rule of Law issues, which are considered part of stability operations 

and utilize the entire interagency team. If other Departments and Agencies are unable to lead these types of efforts, DOD will use its available assets and broad experience to support U.S. Government national security goals and objectives. To make 

the need for DOD to take a leading role less likely, DOD will continue to advocate 

for significantly increasing the capacity of other Departments and Agencies to lead 

and conduct these types of operations in an expeditionary environment. The Civilian 

Stabilization Initiative (CSI) under development by the Department of State’s Office 

of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization shows promise to provide the 

whole-of-government stability operations capability that DOD supports. The CSI includes a Civilian Response Corps composed of personnel from eight different U.S. 

Government civilian departments and agencies and is designed to conduct stability 

operations in order to foster foreign nations’ self-governance, social and economic development, and security before, during, or after conflict. DOD will continue to support the CSI and encourages Congress to fund the effort fully. Finally, DOD is 

teamed with the Department of State and the USAID on mutual policy for Security 

Sector Reform (SSR). Although DOD’s SSR role is focused on supporting the reform, 

restructuring, or re-establishment of a foreign nation’s defense sector, this work is 

done in coordination with USAID’s role in supporting Rule of Law programs (along 

with other SSR programs) aimed at building civilian capacity to manage, oversee, 

and provide security and justice. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

FORCE SIZE

18. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Flournoy, please provide details regarding what 

requests were made by U.S. commanders in Afghanistan for U.S. forces (number 

and type of forces) from 2002 to the present. 

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Secretary FLOURNOY. The decision to deploy U.S. military forces is a deliberative 

process, and internal to the DOD. The Department is unable to share such information in the level of detail requested. 

The Secretary of Defense carefully considers the advice and recommendations of 

his military commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Military Departments and Services before making a decision to order the deployment of U.S. forces. 

Most recently, the President and the Secretary approved the deployment of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (BCT), a training BCT, special operations forces, and various enablers that were requested by 

General David McKiernan. The approval of these requests was consistent with General McKiernan’s timeline for when these forces were needed. Based on an assessment of progress in the coming months, the Department will review requirements 

for any additional military forces. 

19. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Flournoy, were these requests met? If not, why? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. As stated previously, the Department is unable to share the 

details of all requests for forces from 2002 onward. The President and the Secretary 

recently approved the deployment of an MEB, a BCT, a training BCT, Special Operations Forces, and various enablers that were requested by General David 

McKiernan. The approval of these requests was consistent with General 

McKiernan’s timeline for when these forces were needed. Based on an assessment 

of progress in the coming months, the Department will review requirements for any 

additional military forces. 

20. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Flournoy, what requests currently exist from 

U.S. Commanders in Afghanistan for U.S. forces? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. General McKiernan has requested additional forces for the 

mission in Afghanistan, including maneuver forces and headquarters personnel. 

This request is not for immediate deployment. The decision on whether or not to 

meet these requests will be taken at a later time. When appropriate, the Secretary 

of Defense will consider these requests, in consultation with military commanders, 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Services. 

21. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Flournoy, have these requests been met? If not, 

why? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. As stated previously, the request for maneuver forces and 

headquarters staff is not for immediate deployment and the decision on whether or 

not to meet the requests will be taken at a later time. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ECONOMIC STRATEGY

22. Senator VITTER. General Petraeus, I want to first thank you for your tremendous leadership and service, and the United States is fortunate to have you serve 

in our military. I agree with your assessment that a contributing factor to insecurity 

in Pakistan and Afghanistan was the uneven economic development and lack of employment opportunities that contribute to the population remaining ‘‘economically 

disenfranchised, uneducated, and without sufficient opportunity.’’ With some success 

in Iraq in implanting economic development strategies to help quell the counter insurgency, how optimistic are you that an economic strategy in Pakistan and Afghanistan can be successful? 

General PETRAEUS. There is no question that a sole military solution does not 

exist for either Pakistan or Afghanistan; both require a comprehensive, whole-ofgovernment approach. 

Pakistan is still recovering from a November 2008 balance of payments crisis. Its 

economy is showing signs of progress as a result of timely assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF recently met with Pakistan officials and 

was pleased with their economic performance in meeting benchmarks. That effort 

won a vote of confidence from the World Bank. Even small increases of economic 

recovery can go a long way in offsetting the challenges that currently confront the 

Pakistani Government. 

Afghanistan is in the process of making the transition from an economy dominated by illegal poppy to a legal and more diversified economy. Frankly, our eradication efforts have not been wholly effective. In the past year, however, we have 

seen farmers voluntarily switch to wheat cultivation based on the increased value 

of wheat (and a decline in poppy prices) and on initial alternative livelihood proVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Jan 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54355.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
84 

grams. I think this alternative livelihood program shows some promise and with the 

help of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) we can begin to expand it. Taking action with the USDA while wheat is profitable is an opportunity 

that doesn’t come around often. There is no doubt that Afghanistan’s economic strategy needs improvement. We are working closely with the Afghan Government to increase its revenue collection. Our goal is for Afghanistan’s operating budget to be 

more fiscally sustainable and I believe we are making progress. Another top economic issue is privatizing the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The good news is 

we have strong support from the Afghan Central Bank and Finance Ministry to improve revenue collection and privatize the SOEs. The challenge will be in the sustained execution. 

NARCOTICS

23. Senator VITTER. General Petraeus, considering that Afghanistan is one of the 

biggest narcotic states in the world, is it reasonable to think that viable agricultural 

alternatives, improved infrastructure, and better Afghan law enforcement will be 

able to realistically move past their narcotics trade that has been imbedded in their 

history? 

General PETRAEUS. Prior to the nearly three decades of war and domestic turmoil, 

Afghanistan was widely known for its trade in fruits and nuts and for their rich 

mineral deposits. In the past 5 years, the resurgence of the Taliban has been accompanied by a fundamental increase in the scope of poppy cultivation and narcotics 

trafficking. Improving the quality of the Afghan people’s lives through a return to 

viable, licit methods of earning a living coupled with access to better roads and new 

markets in a secure environment where the rule of law is uniformly enforced are 

essential elements for Afghanistan’s success. 

The United States Government’s five-pillar counternarcotics strategy incorporates 

all these concepts. The five pillars are a public information campaign to inform and 

educate the population about the dangers of poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking; an alternative development effort to establish economic alternatives to 

poppy cultivation; an elimination and eradication program to provide credible disincentives to growing poppy; an interdiction arm to help the Government of Afghanistan build its capacity to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking operations; and reform Afghan law enforcement and justice institutions. The United States Special 

Envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, has initiated 

a review of the current strategy to build on lessons learned and rebalance our efforts in these five strategic areas. 

In those areas of Afghanistan where the Afghan Government provides security, 

rule of law, and has extended governance, this approach is working. In north and 

central Afghanistan where the Afghan Government is providing some level of security and governance, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime certified 18 

poppy-free provinces in 2008. Their winter opium assessment report also indicates 

an additional four provinces in north and central Afghanistan could be poppy free 

in 2009. 

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, there is a clear distinction in Afghanistan between those areas that do not grow poppy and those that 

do. Farmers have voluntarily given up poppy cultivation where effective governance 

and developmental assistance exists. Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is almost exclusively confined to seven provinces in the south and southwest. The provinces of 

Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Daykundi, Zabul, Farah, and Nimruz account for 98 

percent of all poppy grown in Afghanistan. Not coincidentally, this is the area where 

the insurgency is strongest. 

24. Senator VITTER. General Petraeus, what lessons from our efforts fighting 

FARC in Columbia do you feel will be useful in our shared interest of combating 

the drug trade in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. The foremost lesson learned from Columbia is that success 

will take time and patience. Active since the early 1960s, the FARC began as a 

Marxist-Leninist terrorist group which transformed into one of the largest narcoterrorist organizations in the world. United States Southern Command’s recent 

counterinsurgency conference in Bogota, Colombia, discussed the Colombian experience and what elements made it successful. The three elements ascribed as most 

critical to success are: counterinsurgency approach containing the elements of 

‘‘Clear, Hold, Build’’; strategic communications; and a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach. 

85 

A counterinsurgency strategy of ‘‘Clear, Hold, Build’’ was critical to Columbia 

gradually taking back territory and keeping it under government control. The U.S. 

and ISAF-Afghanistan forces employ this counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. It is imperative that when we push the insurgents and drug traffickers out 

of an area, we also bring in those elements of the Afghan Government and other 

coalition support to provide some meaningful level of services, security and rule of 

law. If this is not done, insurgents and drug traffickers will return when we leave. 

Next, it is important to employ effective strategic communications to counter the 

lies and propaganda employed by the insurgents and drug trafficking organizations. 

Winning the contest of information and ideas is paramount to success while always 

maintaining our values and respect for the truth. The people must understand the 

objectives and activities of the Afghan Government, coalition, and U.S. and believe 

that these are in their best interests. The perceptions created by the insurgents and 

drug traffickers, if left unchecked, often become reality for the population. This is 

an area that must be proactive in and closely synchronized with ongoing activities 

as they relate to the U.S. Government’s counternarcotics strategy. 

As was done in Columbia, taking a comprehensive government approach to all activity in Afghanistan requires the United States Government to leverage best practices to improve agriculture and trade, stimulate economic development, engender 

reliable law enforcement, establish rule of law, develop financial regulation and expand education. The current U.S. Government’s counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan is a comprehensive approach that leverages the best expertise from: Department of State for poppy elimination and strategic communications; USAID assistance with licit trade/livelihood alternatives for the Afghan people; Drug Enforcement Agency for illicit drug interdiction; Department of Justice to develop law enforcement and criminal justice systems; Department of Homeland Security for improved border security; and DOD assistance in the development of the Afghan security forces. 

EUROPEAN ALLIES

25. Senator VITTER. General Petraeus, do you think that the European coalition 

will be more involved in Pakistan and Afghanistan both economically and militarily, 

and what specific, realistic European involvement should the United States expect 

from the Europeans? 

General PETRAEUS. European nations have been, and will continue to be, heavily 

involved in supporting operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

In Afghanistan 32 European nations currently contribute troops, equipment and/ 

or financial aid to the ISAF and 6 European nations are in direct support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Of the five Regional Commands in Afghanistan, four are 

led by European nations. 

Seven European nations committed assistance to Pakistan by pledging $618.4 million in fiscal donor aid at the recent Friends of Democratic Pakistan and Donors 

Conference held in Tokyo, Japan. Additionally, the European Commission pledged 

$320 million. The Donor’s Conference pledged a total of $5.2 billion in aid over the 

next 2 years to Pakistan. 

In addition to NATO-led efforts to counter violent extremism and rebuild the Nation of Afghanistan, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe initiated efforts last year to strengthen their support. European nations continue to 

make significant contributions to Afghanistan via ISAF and donor conferences. As 

of May 2009, 29 European nations had pledges of significant contributions for Afghanistan in many areas including personnel, aircraft, election funding, medical 

teams, construction teams and funding for the Afghanistan National Army. We fully 

expect these contributions to be fulfilled and/or maintained so Afghanistan’s nation 

building may continue. 

European nations were instrumental in assisting the Government of the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan develop the Afghan National Development Strategy which 

encompasses long range economic, social, and governmental development as well as 

critical reforms in these disciplines. This strategy will require U.S., European and 

international support in the foreseeable future. Afghanistan aid requests, such as 

personnel for governance and development programs, information technology experts, special operations forces and police trainers are being socialized with the Governments of European nations via our Department of State. To date, 35 European 

nations and the European Union itself have been requested to fill specific economic 

and military needs in Afghanistan via the ‘‘Asks List,’’ with 29 European nations 

having pledged contributions. 

86 

ISRAELI CONFLICT

26. Senator VITTER. General Petraeus, a longstanding battle cry for al Qaeda and 

other Islamic extremists is that the United States has not been a true neutral partner in the Arab and Israeli conflict. You mentioned during your testimony that the 

United States needs to be ‘‘credible’’ in this conflict. Could you please provide your 

definition of what ‘‘credible’’ means for the United States in the conflict? 

General PETRAEUS. I would define credible as being perceived as a partner that 

can be trusted, a partner that is consistently fair and honest in all relationships 

with allies and partners. However, we will work with partners that have different 

views and function as a moderator or negotiator in brokering peace and stability in 

the region. A major obstacle is the perception of United States credibility in the region. A recent Saban Center survey of civilians in seven Middle East nations revealed that the United States is not perceived as a credible, neutral broker. The 

worst news out of this survey is that Hezbollah leadership is perceived more positively than any other leadership in the Middle East. The President’s recent address 

in Cairo, Egypt has been well-received, but there is an anticipation in the Middle 

East that it be followed up with sustained and substantial actions. 

It should come as no surprise that Israel is a close friend and ally. The United 

States will remain committed to Israel’s security and simultaneously honor United 

Nations resolutions to this end. We will continue to advance the cause of peace and 

stability in the Middle East and to move the Israeli-Palestinian parties in the direction of a two-state solution. However, our adversaries in the region have successfully 

parried and marginalized the goodwill of the billions of dollars that Congress has 

authorized to support Palestinians needs and humanitarian requirements. The resulting perception has damaged our credibility within the Middle East communities. 

The bottom line is the United States remains committed to seeking a lasting peace 

between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 

[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

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