No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 1

of military units working at cross-purposes, 

and civil-military coordination challenges are 

even more daunting.

Some opponents of General McChrystal’s 

plan argue for abandoning counterinsurgency in 

favor of less complicated and less costly strikes 

against terrorists in Pakistan. However, the 

review of special operations offered here supports General McChrystal’s view that effective 

kill/capture operations require intelligence and 

political support from indigenous populations. 

They should be based on an indirect approach 

to irregular warfare, which in turn is critically 

dependent upon improved unity of effort. 

The United States is trying to improve 

unified effort, but more needs to be done. The 

recommendations from this research are 

threefold. First, all Operation Enduring Freedom

(OEF) mission forces except SOF special mission units (and their support) should be merged 

into the NATO International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) mission, binding the United States 

and NATO in one common effort. NATO is more 

willing to embrace this option than is commonly 

recognized. Second, key U.S. civil and military 

leaders should be given procedures that clarify 

who has final decision authority in the complex 

and rapidly evolving environment. Finally, steps 

must be taken to ensure that SOF operating 

under the ISAF mission uniformly focus on the 

indirect approach, that any ISAF kill/capture 

missions support counterinsurgency objectives, 

and that special mission units pursuing OEF 

counterterrorist objectives are constrained to 

minimize disrupting the ISAF mission.

The Barack Obama administration is debating alternatives to the population-centric 

counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan 

that it unveiled in March 2009. The reevaluation is prompted by the recent submission of 

supporting civil and military campaign plans 

that indicate substantial additional resources 

are required for success. The resource issue 

is important, but as General Stanley McChrystal, USA, the new commander of U.S. and 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

forces in Afghanistan, argues, the need to 

pursue an “indirect” strategy that is sustainable for the Afghans and implemented with 

unified purpose is more important.1 Lack of 

progress in Afghanistan to date is due more 

to international donors and forces working 

at cross purposes, and unilaterally instead of 

with Afghans, than to insufficient resources.

The current strategy requires an indirect 

military approach that emphasizes working 

by, through, and with indigenous forces and 

populations. So did the strategy of Obama’s 

predecessor, George W. Bush. Nonetheless, 

operations alienating the Afghan public and 

producing civilian casualties increased 

rather than decreased, which crippled 

progress. In 2002, such operations often were 

conducted by conventional forces, but they 

now primarily involve U.S. special operations 

forces (SOF). SOF failure to support counterinsurgency objectives is a cardinal example 

 Strategic Forum No. 248

October 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Unity of Effort: Key to 

Success in Afghanistan

by Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond

The U.S. Government strategy for success 

in Afghanistan unveiled by President Obama 

on March 27, 2009, emphasized a classic population-centric counterinsurgency approach. 

The novelty of this approach can be debated, 

but clearly the emphasis has shifted under 

the Obama administration. Securing the population and reducing civilian casualties are 

now the focus of attention. This approach 

should be more popular with North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, who prefer stabilization operations to offensive operations against insurgents, and with the Afghan 

government, which has vocally objected to 

operations that produce inadvertent civilian casualties. The possibility of greater support from Allies and the Afghan government 

increases the likelihood that the strategy can 

be executed with better unity of effort. The 

architects of the new strategy recognize that 

it puts a premium on better collaboration and 

that they have limited time for demonstrating progress. In these circumstances, taking 

every reasonable step to strengthen unity of 

effort is necessary.

The Obama administration already has 

taken important steps to improve unified effort 

among the diverse actors working to promote 

stability and defeat the Taliban insurgency. 

Even so, more needs to be done. To make the 

case for this assertion, we first review what 

has been done to improve unity of effort. Next, 

we summarize generally why unified effort is 

so important and yet so difficult to achieve. 
2 Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009

We illustrate those points by examining the 

case of special operations in Afghanistan and 

the extent to which they support the indirect 

approach championed by General McChrystal. 

Because they benefit from an authoritative 

chain of command and a common culture 

that values unity of command, military operations should be easier to execute with unified effort than more complex politico-military 

endeavors. However, the record to date demonstrates that special operations serve conflicting 

objectives in Afghanistan. We offer an explanation for this incongruity to underscore just 

how difficult unity of effort is to achieve, and to 

establish some baseline requirements for remedial action. We then make recommendations 

designed to improve unity of effort in military operations, civil-military cooperation, and 

among international and Afghan partners.

New Strategy and 

Leadership Team 

The new strategy had to address the relative priority of dislodging al Qaeda from the 

Afghanistan-Pakistan border region versus 

pursuing broader counterinsurgency objectives in Afghanistan.2

 The tension between 

the two objectives was a point of contention as the strategy was being prepared and 

remains one today as the strategy is being 

reassessed. Some senior leaders focus on 

attacking al Qaeda, while others favor defeating the Taliban as a means of denying al 

Qaeda its sanctuary over the long term.3

When President Obama unveiled the strategy, the stated goal was “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and 

Afghanistan,” as well as “prevent [al Qaeda’s] 

return to either country in the future.” The 

focus on al Qaeda may be interpreted as giving priority to counterterrorism, but the goal 

of denying al Qaeda a future sanctuary from 

which to operate justified a wider counterinsurgency effort to defeat the Taliban in both 

Afghanistan and Pakistan.4

The commitment to pursue counterinsurgency as an indirect means of isolating and weakening al Qaeda was not open 

ended. Thus, Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates’ description of Afghanistan in 2008 

as “the longest campaign of the long war” 

gave way to an informal deadline of 1 year in 

which measurable progress needs to be demonstrated.5

 As Secretary Gates noted, “It’s 

my view—and, I think, the President’s—

that if we can show we are making progress, 

if we’re headed in the right direction, then 

the American people and the Congress will 

sustain this effort. But if in a year or so, it 

appears that we are in a stalemate and we’re 

taking even more casualties, then patience 

will wear thin pretty soon.”6 Secretary Gates’ 

assessment now appears optimistic since the 

administration is currently debating whether 

there is sufficient political support for providing the resources required by the strategy.

Thus, military commanders now understand that “the trend lines better start swinging in our direction or we’re going to lose 

the international community and we’re 

going to lose Washington.”7 With the clock 

ticking, senior leaders such as General 

David Petraeus, commander of U.S. Central 

Command, emphasize that success in implementing the new strategy will require unprecedented unity of effort: “Addressing the 

challenges and threats . . . requires a comprehensive, whole of government approach that 

fully integrates our military and non-military 

efforts and those of our allies and partners. 

This approach puts a premium on unity of 

effort at all levels and with all participants.”8

Better unified effort in turn requires 

clear strategic guidance, which senior military leaders provided when they insisted 

that the population-centric counterinsurgency approach take precedence over counterterrorism operations. General McChrystal 

is unequivocal on this point: “If we win 

this effort it will be because we protected 

the population. . . . Going after the highvalue enemy targets will just be a supporting 

effort to do that.”9 General Petraeus similarly affirms that counterinsurgency is the 

priority, noting that whether Allied forces are 

involved in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, “their actions and operations must 

adhere to basic counter-insurgency principles.” Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl 

Eikenberry also stresses that the new strategy 

“depends upon protecting the Afghan people” 

and requires integrating civilian and military 

strategies and capabilities.10

Thus, absent a major change in strategy, 

those executing operations in Afghanistan 

will follow classic counterinsurgency doctrine, 

which views the population as the key center 

of gravity. The new approach emphasizes the 

need to shape, clear, hold, and build: shape 

the environment through intelligence and 

information operations, clear areas affected 

by insurgent presence, hold the areas cleared 

to ensure that insurgents will not reassert their authority, and build national and 

local institutions that improve living standards.11 Assuming the strategy is reapproved 

and resources are provided by Congress, the 

key to success will be getting all the disparate components of the international effort in 

Afghanistan to work well together in implementing the strategy. This will not be easy.

As a former senior U.S. military commander noted in early 2009, unity of effort is 

the most serious problem in Afghanistan today: 

“It’s not the Taliban. It’s not governance. It’s 

not security. It’s the utter failure in the unity 

of effort department.”12 Getting the multiple 

international organizations, dozens of nations, 

numerous development organizations, myriad U.S. departments and agencies, and even 

diverse U.S. military units to pull in the same 

direction is a monumental challenge.

One common recommendation for 

improving unity of effort is to select compatible personalities for key leadership posiutter failure in the unity 

of effort department is 

the most serious problem 

in Afghanistan today

Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the 

National Defense University. Dr. Martin Cinnamond worked in a number of United Nations positions in 

Afghanistan in 2007–2008. He also trained and co-led the Afghan Special Investigation Team investigating 

assassinations by the Taliban. Comments may be directed to lambc@ndu.edu.
No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 3

tions. Another way is to add command 

structures dedicated to coordination activities. Both these expedients were proposed at 

the April 3, 2009, NATO summit, and were 

subsequently approved. Secretary Gates suggested that the four-star commander of 

NATO’s International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) focus on strategy and highlevel “cooperation between civil and military 

efforts.” Among other key issues, the new 

command could help improve the disjointed 

international aid effort and training of 

Afghan national security forces.13 Secretary 

Gates proposed, and NATO accepted, a new 

subordinate three-star command to oversee the day-to-day battle to ensure that 

all the diverse U.S. (and Allied) forces in 

Afghanistan are in synch. He introduced 

NATO leaders to his handpicked choices for 

the new commands: General McChrystal 

and Lieutenant General David M. Rodriguez, 

USA, respectively. McChrystal and Rodriguez 

are counterinsurgency experts with close 

ties to Secretary Gates, and have a personal 

friendship spanning several decades. General 

McChrystal, perhaps best known for leading the special operations forces14 (SOF) special mission units that tracked down Saddam 

Hussein and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, 

more recently led a Pentagon task force that 

reviewed strategy alternatives in Afghanistan. 

General Rodriguez was selected by Secretary 

Gates as his personal military assistant after 

Rodriguez’s previous tour in Afghanistan was 

widely acknowledged as a model for successful counterinsurgency efforts.15

In another move calculated to improve 

unity of effort, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen invited 

General McChrystal to handpick his subordinates, and McChrystal chose several flag 

officers from the Pentagon. In addition, 

McChrystal is having SOF veteran Brigadier 

General Scott Miller, USA, assemble “a corps 

of 400 officers and soldiers who will rotate 

between the United States and Afghanistan 

for a minimum of three years” to provide deep expertise and continuity. When 

not serving in Afghanistan, officers will fill 

important positions in the Pentagon, which 

should ensure good communication between 

the field and headquarters in Washington.

Secretary Gates gave General McChrystal 

60 days to tour Afghanistan, size up the situation, and make a detailed report on how best 

to implement the new strategy and layered 

commands. McChrystal’s August 30 report 

emphasized the importance of unified effort 

and identified additional ways to improve it. 

To assess whether the urgent, well-conceived, 

and collectively unprecedented reorganization of command structures and leadership 

would ensure unity of effort, it is first necessary to understand why collaboration in 

pursuit of common objectives is such a challenge in irregular warfare in general and in 

Afghanistan specifically.

Unity of Effort in 

Irregular Warfare

Arguments about the need for a wholeof-government approach to counterinsurgency (one form of irregular warfare) are 

commonplace, yet the need is rarely satisfied for several reasons. First, counterinsurgency is a multidimensional enterprise that 

requires the integration of diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other elements of power. Thus, a nation’s multiple 

national security bureaucracies must work 

well together to succeed in counterinsurgency. Second, counterinsurgency strategy 

must be implemented flexibly as evolving circumstances dictate rather than determined 

a priori by the strategy. The situation-dependent nature of counterinsurgency strategy 

implementation substantially increases the 

complexity of operations and the challenge 

for unified effort. Some examples illustrate 

this point.

One strategy objective is to turn over 

military operations to Afghan forces rapidly, but if done too quickly, they may not 

have the capacity to respond effectively to the 

insurgency. Conversely, delaying handover for 

too long and relying on international forces 

(meaning all non-Afghan forces in Operation 

Enduring Freedom [OEF] and ISAF) risk 

alienating a population increasingly critical 

of those forces. Another difficult implementation issue is promoting good governance, not 

only in Kabul but also in the provinces. The 

United States wants to strengthen the legitimacy of the central government and reinforce Afghan national identity by improving 

the government’s capacity to deliver basic 

services to the population. Yet Kabul’s ability to extend its authority and provide services 

across the country is weak, and Afghans often 

attach greater significance to local relationships. Thus, support for the central government must be balanced with support for good 

local governance without alienating Kabul 

and the local populace from one another.

Many other difficult tradeoffs can be 

identified: the timing and extent of political 

reconciliation with insurgents, how boldly to 

attack sanctuaries in Pakistan, how much 

intelligence to share and with whom, which 

areas of the country should receive the main 

focus with a limited number of troops, and 

so forth. Such strategy implementation issues 

must be resolved in complex and shifting 

circumstances—including rapid adaptation 

by the enemy—that vary greatly from one 

province to another. With so many issues to 

coordinate, the entire effort can easily lose 

coherence. When counterinsurgency elements work at cross-purposes, political and 

moral capital is squandered. The population is likely to conclude the government and 

its allies are incompetent, untrustworthy, or 

both. Since the center of gravity is the support of the population, insufficient unity of 

purpose and effort in a fast-moving situation 

is often the critical shortcoming in a counterinsurgency campaign.

The third obstacle to unified effort is the 

sheer number and competing objectives of 

players and activities involved. Currently, over 

40 countries, 3 major international organizations (United Nations [UN], European Union, 

and NATO), and scores of other agencies and 

nongovernmental organizations are working in Afghanistan. Moreover, these diverse 

actors are more or less aligned in support 

of one of two different missions with competing priorities that have evolved over time: 

NATO’s ISAF mission, and the U.S.-led OEF 

mission. ISAF has evolved from a small security force concentrated in Kabul to a country-wide “stabilization” effort driven by classic 

population-centric counterinsurgency objectives, including “the extension of government 

authority across Afghanistan; the development 
4 Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009

rorists and alienate them from sympathizers who otherwise would provide support for 

their activities. In practice, however, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions tend to clash. With their emphasis on 

nighttime raids, counterterrorist operations 

can produce inadvertent civilian casualties 

that anger the population and complicate 

attempts by counterinsurgents to win popular 

support. Resentment runs even higher when 

counterterrorist operations are carried out 

by foreign forces that appear insensitive to 

local communities. Counterinsurgents working with Afghan authorities and forces may 

compromise a counterterrorist operation if 

the Afghan counterparts warn the enemy, or 

if those operations are carried out less skillfully than otherwise would be the case if conducted by international forces.

The tension between the two missions is 

thus a question of priorities: the importance 

of targeting individual enemies relative to 

the risk of incurring civilian casualties and 

damaging relationships with local communities; and the importance of working with 

Afghan authorities and forces relative to the 

risk that doing so will compromise efforts to 

target enemy leaders. Only a clear strategy 

and unified effort can minimize the tension 

between these two missions. Hy Rothstein 

provides a compelling account of how the 

original focus on killing terrorist leaders and 

destroying Taliban forces in 2002 needed to 

shift to counterinsurgency when the Taliban 

adopted insurgent tactics.19 Instead, conventional forces and headquarters pushed aside 

Army Special Forces that had developed close 

working relationships with their Afghan 

counterparts. Unilateral search operations by 

conventional forces caused increasing resentment, particularly in Pashtun communities. 

of the Afghan Government structures necessary to maintain security across the country without the assistance of international 

forces . . . and the promotion by the Afghan 

Government of democracy, human rights and 

the rule of law.”16

However, a core strategic objective of 

the OEF mission is the disruption of terrorist 

activity by killing or capturing al Qaeda leaders.17 OEF operations have expanded to support counterinsurgency by targeting Taliban 

insurgent leaders.18 Each mission involves 

organizations from many nations and the 

international community, and each mission 

can be pursued with more or less emphasis on cooperation with the Afghan forces 

and populace. In addition, the diverse military forces operating in Afghanistan include 

general purpose (or conventional) forces and 

special operations forces that do not always 

cooperate well. 

For all these reasons, unity of effort is 

a critical but difficult challenge in irregular warfare, especially in Afghanistan. Using 

special operations as a cardinal example, we 

can illustrate that unified effort is difficult to 

achieve even when all the organizations pursuing an objective share a common chain of 

command and consider unified effort a core 

organizational value.

SOF in Afghanistan

Special operations forces typically are 

trained specifically for counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency and often approach those 

missions with different tactics than those 

employed by conventional forces. Even within 

the SOF community, units may approach 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions differently for historical and cultural 

reasons. Thus, SOF are in the middle of the 

debate over the relative priority of counterterrorism against al Qaeda and counterinsurgency against the Taliban.

Theoretically, the two missions can 

complement one another. Counterterrorist 

kill/capture operations can disrupt insurgent operations, produce intelligence on the 

insurgency, and buy time for other population-centric counterinsurgency efforts to bear 

fruit. Similarly, counterinsurgency efforts can 

generate good intelligence for targeting terEventually, new U.S. leadership put the effort 

back on track:

Between late 2003 and early 2005, we were 

moving on the right path in Afghanistan. 

Under Ambassador [Zalmay] Khalilzad and 

Lieutenant General David Barno, the United 

States completely overhauled its strategy for 

Afghanistan. We increased the number of 

American forces in the country, expanded 

nonmilitary assistance to the Afghan government and—most importantly—abandoned a counterterrorism-based strategy that 

emphasized seeking out and attacking the 

enemy, in favor of one that emphasized 

counterinsurgency and the protection of the 

population. All of this was overseen by an integrated civil-military command structure, in 

which the Ambassador and the coalition commander worked in the same building, from 

adjoining offices. The result was that, by late 

2004, governance and reconstruction were 

improving. . . . Entrenched warlords were 

being nudged out of power. . . . [N]ational 

elections were conducted successfully [and]

the Taliban showed signs of internal dissention and splintering. Rather than building on these gains, however, we squandered 

them. Beginning in 2005, our integrated civilmilitary command structure was disassembled 

and replaced by a balkanized and dysfunctional 

arrangement. The integrated counterinsurgency strategy was replaced by a patchwork 

of different strategies, depending on the 

location and on which country’s troops were 

doing the fighting.20

U.S. Government policy statements at the 

time emphasized counterinsurgency and close 

cooperation with allies. However, the Embassy 

turned its attention to other matters, and 

General Karl Eikenberry, USA, who succeeded 

General Barno, returned the military emphasis to kill/capture operations. The result was 

an increasing number of incidents producing 

civilian casualties, which led to a steep decline 

in popular support.21 Civilian casualties are 

not the only factor alienating the Afghan population,22 but they are the main one.

This historical overview suggests that 

it will not be easy to ensure that operations 

give priority to protecting the population, 

even though doing so is required by the new 

theoretically, the 

two missions can 

complement one another; 

in practice, however, 

counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency 

missions tend to clash
No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 5

strategy. There are several reasons why this 

is true. The main one is the reliance on air 

support to compensate for the inadequate 

number of U.S., Allied, and properly trained 

Afghan forces. Airstrikes that result in major 

civilian casualties can occur in support of 

conventional forces. However, over the past 

several years, 80 percent of the major civilian casualty incidents where ground forces 

could be identified involved U.S. SOF (see 

table 1). Operating in small teams, SOF often 

make contact with enemy forces, find themselves outnumbered, and require close air 

support that occasionally results in high 

civilian casualties.

Most Afghans’ experience with bombing is “strongly correlated with negative attitudes towards the U.S., towards the Afghan 

central and provincial governments, and 

regarding Afghanistan’s direction.”23 The 

Taliban are working hard to exploit this popular resentment in order to counter the tactical advantage that international forces enjoy. 

Insurgents quickly capitalize on the issue 

of civilian casualties with a more agile and 

dynamic communications capacity than the 

international military forces. They sometimes 

succeed in pressuring local officials to inflate 

estimates of civilian casualties. However, it is 

also evident that international military estimates of civilian casualties can err. Afghan 

public resentment is compounded when international military forces resort to blanket 

statements denying or contesting the number of civilian casualties without an adequate 

investigation. The emergence of video footage showing dead civilians prompted a review 

of initial findings that just seven civilians 

were killed during August 2008 airstrikes in 

Shindand District, Herat Province. The investigation determined that at least 33 civilians 

were killed during the operation.24

Although they receive less media attention, civilian casualties incurred during 

house raids—the vast majority conducted by 

SOF—also cause resentment among Afghans 

(see table 2). Many such operations produce 

benefits never made public for security reasons. Yet their cumulative political effect may 

turn tactical successes into a strategic failure, a point repeatedly highlighted by Afghan 

authorities and increasingly by U.S. military 

officials as well. For example, in December 

Table 1. Major (>10) Civilian Casualty Incidents, 2006–2009

Date Location Estimated Civilian 

Fatalities* Military Forces/Type of Incident**

June 14, 2009 Kirjan District, 

Dai Kundi Province NA/13 International forces†/targeted airstrike

May 4, 2009 Bala Boluk, Farah Province 26/86 U.S. special operations forces (SOF)/troops in 

contact (TIC)

February 17, 2009 Gozara District, Herat Province 13/13 U.S. forces†/unspecified airstrike

November 5, 2008 Shah Wali Kot District, 

Kandahar Province 37/37 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces† and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)/TIC

August 21–22, 2008 Shindand District, Herat 

Province 33/78–92 U.S. SOF/TIC

August 9, 2008 Tagub District, Kapisa Province NA/11–12 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

airstrike/targeted

June 6, 2008 Dela Bala District, 

Nangarhar Province NA/47 OEF airstrike†

May 8, 2008 Sangin District, 

Helmand Province NA/21–80 U.S. SOF/TIC

January 23, 2008 Ghazni Province 11/11 U.S. SOF/TIC

June 26–27, 2007 Greshk District, 

Helmand Province 12/45–65 U.S. forces† and ANSF/TIC

June 22, 2007 Greshk District, 

Helmand Province NA/25 NATO forces†/TIC

May 8, 2007 Sangin District, 

Helmand Province NA/21 U.S. SOF/TIC

May 1, 2007 Maruf District, 

Kandahar Province NA/13 U.S. forces†/TIC

April 29, 2007 Shindand District, 

Herat Province NA/42 U.S. SOF/TIC

March 4, 2007 Jalalabad District, 

Nangarhar Province 16/16 U.S. SOF/road convoy

November 1, 2006 Kandahar Province NA/31 U.S. SOF/TIC

October 26, 2006 Panjwayi District, 

Kandahar Province 12/40 NATO forces†/TIC

October 18, 2006 Greshk District, 

Kandahar Province NA/13 NATO forces†/TIC

May 21, 2006 Panjwayi District, 

Kandahar Province 17/34 U.S. forces†/TIC

Sources: Air Strike Tracker Web site (http://ourbombs.com/striketracker); United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 

(UNAMA) Mid Year Bulletin on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (2009); UNAMA Annual Report on Protection of Civilians 

in Armed Conflict (2008); and Human Rights Watch “Troops in Contact” Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan (2008), 

which include details of specific incidents.

* Casualty figures are often disputed. The first figure is the international military forces estimate; the second figure is either an 

Afghanistan government or a public media estimate. NA: not available.

** Shaded boxes highlight incidents involving SOF troops.

† Indicates military forces involved or type of incident is disputed.
6 Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009

outweighs the value of these raids in fighting the Taliban.” Ominously, 25 percent of 

poll respondents now say attacks on U.S. or 

NATO/ISAF forces can be justified—twice 

the level in 2006.31 Even though international forces are aware of these trends and 

want to avoid civilian casualties, the number 

of civilian casualties produced by coalition 

operations nevertheless continued to climb 

throughout 2008, increasing somewhere 

between 39 and 54 percent.32

Several steps were taken to address the 

civilian casualty issue. First, in a memorandum to Admiral Mullen in October 2008, 

Secretary Gates directed a change in communications posture from “investigate first, 

make amends later” to “make amends 

first, investigate later.”33 The new approach 

includes refraining from making initial statements contesting casualty estimates, responding more quickly to allegations, conducting 

joint investigations with Afghan authorities, 

and apologizing publicly where civilian casualties are confirmed as a result of international military operations.34

Second, in late 2008, General David 

McKiernan, USA, former commander of U.S. 

and ISAF forces, directed that all searches 

and house raids should be led by Afghan 

security forces except when there was a “clear 

and identified danger” coming from a building. McKiernan’s directive did not apply to 

SOF special mission units, and it is unclear 

whether it applied to other SOF. Nevertheless, 

SOF leaders independently suspended special 

mission unit activities for 2 weeks in February 

2009 to review procedures to reduce civilian 

casualties. The problem did not disappear, 

however. In June 2009, in a rare departure from diplomatic protocol, Kai Eide, the 

Norwegian head of the UN Assistance Mission 

to Afghanistan, publicly called for an “urgent 

need to review” SOF activities in Afghanistan, 

asserting the political costs of SOF raids were 

“disproportionate to the military gains.”35

Shortly thereafter, General McChrystal 

issued a tactical directive that curtails the 

use of airstrikes to “very limited situations” 

where forces are in imminent danger. The 

directive emphasizes that “Commanders must 

weigh the gain of using [close air support] 

against the cost of civilian casualties, which 

in the long run make mission success more 

2006, in the aftermath of a SOF operation in 

Khost Province, the U.S. military claimed four 

suspected terrorists had been killed. However, 

then-Governor Arsala Jamal, with whom the 

U.S. military had developed a strong working 

relationship, contested the statement, stating that the raid mistakenly targeted a progovernment village. Four of the five brothers 

living in the compound worked for the government, and Jamal asserted there was “little 

reason to suspect them of being anti-government elements.”25 In March 2008, in response 

to two SOF operations that led to the deaths 

of several Afghan women and children, Jamal 

complained to Richard Holbrooke that “this 

undermines everything we are trying to do 

here.”26 On a subsequent visit to the White 

House in April 2008, he argued to President 

George W. Bush that “special operations is 

the biggest, biggest challenge and [they have 

a] negative impact on the people’s mind in 

regard to coalition forces. There is no single bigger issue than that.”27 President Hamid 

Karzai and Afghan Defense Minister Abdul 

Rahim Wardak also have called for an end to 

uncoordinated SOF raids.

Karzai has long been extremely critical of airstrikes and house raids. In July 

2002, following an American airstrike by a 

SOF AC–130 that killed scores of people celebrating a wedding, Karzai stressed the 

importance of procedures to prevent future 

tragedies. He has repeatedly called for an 

end to airstrikes and to international forces 

entering Afghan homes without permission 

from Afghan authorities, and his rhetoric has 

escalated over the years. He has lamented 

the inability to stop “the coalition from killing our children” and accused foreign forces 

of “extreme” and “disproportionate” use 

of force. In September 2008, Karzai protested the continued killing of Afghan civilians before the UN General Assembly. Shortly 

thereafter, he announced: “This is my first 

demand of the new president of the United 

States—to put an end to civilian casualties.” 

More recently, Karzai has campaigned on the 

promise of bringing international military 

forces under control.

Karzai’s stridency may be calculated to 

garner popular support, but it also reflects 

the public mood. An increasing number of 

mass demonstrations against civilian casualties testify to serious public discontent, and 

evidence suggests civilian casualties are one 

reason some Afghans take up arms against 

international military forces.28 In Herat 

Province in April 2007, villagers reportedly 

took up arms against SOF in response to a 

series of raids that resulted in the deaths of 

several civilians.29 General Barno has summarized the dilemma posed by SOF operations that alienate Afghans:

the tolerance of the Afghan population for 

foreign military forces [can be described as]

a bag of capital that has to be spent very 

slowly. . . . every time we kick down doors 

in the middle of the night, every time we 

create some offense to Afghan cultural sensibilities, we spend that bag of capital—

that toleration for foreign forces—more 

and more quickly. And we’ve been spending that bag of capital at an extraordinarily fearsome rate, here, in the last two 

years, in part because of civilian casualties and in part because of, simply, the tactics that we’ve been using.30

General McChrystal’s recent report on 

the situation in Afghanistan also concluded 

that “civilian casualties and collateral damage to homes and property . . . have severely 

damaged ISAF’s legitimacy in the eyes of the 

Afghan people.” This contention is supported 

by early 2009 polls, which indicate that the 

number of Afghans who say the United States 

has performed well in Afghanistan was cut 

in half, from 68 percent in 2005 to 32 percent—and ratings of NATO/ISAF forces were 

just as bad. Civilian casualties are a key 

irritant: “77% of Afghans call such strikes 

unacceptable, saying the risk to civilians 

“special operations is 

the biggest, biggest 

challenge and [they have 

a] negative impact on the 

people’s mind in regard 

to coalition forces—there 

is no single bigger issue 

than that”
No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 7

difficult and turn the Afghan people against 

us.”36 This approach has not been without 

criticism, but General McChrystal has said 

that he “cannot overstate” his support for 

operating in ways that limit civilian casualties.37 The directive is also consistent with the 

approach some NATO military forces already 

use in Afghanistan, which bodes well for better unified effort within the Alliance.

McChrystal’s directive and his priorities 

reflect the indirect approach to SOF operations historically embraced by Army Special 

Forces, one that gives priority to working by, 

through, and with indigenous forces and populations.38 This means the relationship with 

local forces and population is determined to 

be more important than the effects that U.S. 

forces can achieve against targets unilaterally. For example, in 2001 a Special Forces 

captain routinely deferred to the judgment 

of the Afghan leader he worked with, who 

happened to be Hamid Karzai, the current 

president of Afghanistan: “Hamid was very 

careful. If there was any doubt, we wouldn’t 

bother killing it. I could afford to let a few 

guys go if I wasn’t sure. Hurting the populace 

hurt our own cause.”39

The spirit and challenge of implementing 

the indirect approach was captured recently by 

an Army Special Forces colonel who answered 

his own rhetorical question about which of the 

many overlapping forces in Afghanistan own 

any given battle space: “The correct answer is 

the Afghans own the battle space and we are 

there in support of them. But [the] mentality that we own the battle space in a sovereign 

country . . . can cause us to operate in ways 

that are counterproductive.”40

To reiterate, the new population-centric counterinsurgency strategy requires 

the indirect approach traditionally championed by Army Special Forces. This means it 

is necessary to build the capacity of indigenous forces that know the populace better, even for kill/capture operations. However, 

U.S. forces operating under the OEF mandate 

have focused for years on the direct approach 

to special operations, targeting individual 

enemy leaders unilaterally. This is true not 

only for SOF special mission units that specialize in direct action, but also increasingly for Army Special Forces, who now often 

accord equal or higher priority to unilateral kill/capture operations than the indirect approach.41 Ironically, whereas in 2002 

conventional forces such as the 82d Airborne 

conducted counterinsurgency sweeps that 

damaged relationships carefully cultivated 

by Army Special Forces, today the reverse is 

true. It is now common for SOF kill/capture 

operations to disrupt relationships with local 

Afghans cultivated by conventional force 

commanders who, after 8 years of learning 

in multiple theaters, are increasingly attentive to counterinsurgency principles.

Disunity in Command 

and Control

There is broad agreement among the 

U.S. national security community, the leadership of U.S. Special Operations Command, 

and many individual SOF personnel that 

the indirect approach to counterinsurgency should take precedence over kill/capture operations. However, the opposite has 

occurred. Understanding why is important 

if unity of effort is to be improved. One reason for the undue emphasis on direct action 

is that resources have been disproportionately 

allocated to targeting insurgent and terrorist 

leaders rather than to indirect SOF activities 

in support of counterinsurgency. An explanation for the discrepancy between these operations and national policy was the overlapping 

and ad hoc command and control arrangements extant in Afghanistan to date.42

In OEF, civilian casualties resulting 

from operations may not be viewed as detrimental to the core mission of destroying terrorist organizations. However, civilian 

casualties are a critical issue for ISAF and 

its counterinsurgency mission. Most Afghans 

cannot distinguish between OEF and ISAF 

forces, and relationships painstakingly developed by ISAF are adversely affected when 

OEF kill/capture operations incur civilian casualties. Despite procedures to deconflict missions, lack of coordination between 

SOF and conventional forces is all too common. For example, in Nangarhar Province, 

the Army brigade commander who ostensibly controlled the battle space was aware of 

only 5 of the 30 operations conducted by a 

SOF unit in the area and had no knowledge 

of the one in which 17 civilians were killed 

and 50 injured.43

The problem is exacerbated by the 

fragmentation of SOF command and control. 

Special mission units conducting direct 

action against terrorists do not report to 

the same chain of command as other SOF 

units. From early on in OEF, SOF operated 

under the command of multiple joint task 

forces. Task Force Sword, comprised of SOF 

Table 2. Major (>5) Civilian Casualty Incidents (House Raids), 2006–2009 

Date Location Estimated Civilians Killed* Military Forces**

April 9, 2009 Gurbuz District, Khost Province 4/5 U.S. special operations forces (SOF) 

March 22, 2009 Kunduz Province NA/5 U.S. forces†

March 13, 2009 Charkh District, Logar Province NA/5 U.S. and Afghan SOF

March 6, 2009 Sabari District, Khost Province NA/4 U.S. forces†; Afghan forces present†

February 12, 2009 Uruzgan Province 5/3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Australian forces†

January 23, 2009 Laghman Province NA/16 U.S. SOF

January 19, 2009 Kapisa Province NA/14 U.S. SOF

January 7, 2009 Laghman Province NA/13 U.S. SOF

September 1, 2008 Kabul Province NA/4 International and Afghan forces†

April 28, 2007(?) Nangarhar Province 2/5 U.S. forces†

December 12, 2006 Mandozai District, Khost 

Province 5/5 U.S. SOF 

* In some of these cases, the Department of Defense asserts that combatants and not civilians were killed. The first figure is the 

international military forces estimate; the second figure is either an Afghanistan government or a public media estimate. NA: not 

available.

** Shaded boxes highlight incidents involving SOF troops.

† Indicates military forces involved or type of incident is disputed.
8 Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009

special mission units, reported directly to the 

combatant commander while other SOF such 

as Task Forces Dagger and K-Bar reported to 

a Combined Joint Special Operations Task 

Force (CJSOTF) component commander.44 A 

new SOF headquarters established in February 

2009 layers a one-star command on top of the 

CJSOTF command. Ostensibly, the purpose is 

to enhance coordination between SOF units 

and conventional international military 

forces, but many in Army Special Forces 

worry that the net effect of another layered 

headquarters will be less, rather than more, 

unity of effort.45 In any case, special mission 

unit forces reside outside this command 

structure, so the potential for working at 

cross-purposes remains. The same point 

holds for other U.S. organizations conducting 

kill/capture operations, such as the Drug 

Enforcement Administration. Their operations 

targeting individuals linked to drugs and 

the insurgency are increasing and need to 

be coordinated with military operations, 

so they will not undermine broader 

counterinsurgency objectives.46

The disproportionate emphasis on 

kill/capture operations also can be attributed to organizational culture and reward 

systems that reinforce the different objectives embraced by OEF and ISAF commands. 

Americans in general, the military in particular, and SOF especially are results-oriented. 

The capture or elimination of enemy leaders is a measurable, concrete, and energetic 

activity that is easily rewarded in individual 

and unit performance assessment. Making a 

contribution to population security is passive, 

difficult to measure, often ambiguous, and 

therefore less likely to be rewarded. Within the 

subgroups of SOF, there are different cultural 

propensities toward the indirect approach to 

operations, but in general, the military ethos 

provides all SOF commanders incentives to 

give priority to kill/capture operations instead 

of population security. This is particularly true 

now that SOF units have built up a remarkable capability to conduct such operations frequently and for sustained periods.47

Unity of effort is difficult in irregular 

warfare, even within the military and within 

SOF organizations that embrace unity of 

command as a core value. Unified effort is 

even more difficult among U.S. departments 

and agencies, and between Allies that lack 

common organizational values and do not 

share a single, hierarchical chain of command. Disunity of command within the military, the U.S. Government, and among the 

United States and its Allies unfortunately is 

the norm, not the exception. Yet the architects of the current strategy recognize that it 

requires “clear unity of effort at all levels and 

with all participants.”48 The administration 

therefore needs to take every possible step to 

improve unified purpose and effort.

Observations and 

Recommendations

News reports suggest the Obama 

administration is evaluating the option of 

giving precedence to counterterrorism over 

counterinsurgency, and concentrating on 

relatively low-cost “surgical” strikes.49 While 

this strategy alternative should be evaluated 

in detail, several observations based on the 

research offered here are in order. Effective 

kill/capture operations require political support and intelligence from indigenous populations, which are more easily obtained 

when the population has confidence in the 

government and its forces. For this reason, 

General McChrystal’s indirect approach to 

irregular warfare50 is more likely to produce effective kill/capture operations than 

attempts to strike surgically from afar. In 

addition, a strategy shift to give precedence 

to counterterrorism would not reduce the 

irregular warfare requirement for greater 

unity of effort, as kill/capture operations in 

Iraq demonstrated.51 Whether the emphasis 

is on counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, 

the requirement for improved unity of effort 

is a constant in irregular warfare. 

If the United States does decide to stick 

with its current strategy and provide the 

additional resources it requires, it can and 

should take some more steps to improve 

unity of effort, particularly with NATO allies. 

Eliminating the tension between OEF forces 

targeting enemy leadership and ISAF forces 

pursuing stabilization and population security efforts is the single most important 

requirement for better unified effort. Toward 

this end, almost all of the U.S.-led OEF forces 

should be consolidated under the NATO ISAF 

mission, to include most SOF forces and 

all U.S. training command forces that support Afghan force development and employment programs.52 Only SOF special mission 

units (and their support elements) would 

continue to operate under the OEF mandate. Taking this step would solidify the strategic direction from General Petraeus and 

General McChrystal that nests counterterrorism within a wider counterinsurgency mission.53 More importantly, it would improve 

the legitimacy of the international effort in 

Afghanistan and reinforce European support for the endeavor. The NATO ISAF mission is operating under a UN Security Council 

resolution and has a broader base for popular support than the U.S.-led OEF mission. 

Finally, the consolidation under NATO would 

be consistent with the administration’s focus 

on multilateral solutions.

Merging the two missions is more 

practicable than might be assumed. The 

missions have been converging for several 

years. The OEF counterterrorism focus has 

broadened to include disrupting the Taliban 

insurgency by targeting its leadership. 

More importantly, since 2006 the OEF mission has included a nationbuilding component in the form of the Combined Security 

Transition Command–Afghanistan, which 

is charged with training and equipping 

Afghan National Security Forces. General 

McChrystal’s report indicates the OEF training component command will be subsumed 

under ISAF, a positive step that is consistent 

with the decision announced at the April 

NATO summit to form an Alliance training 

mission and have it led by a single commander who also would control the U.S.-led 

Combined Security Transition Command–

Afghanistan under OEF.54

ironically, whereas 

in 2002 conventional 

forces conducted COIN 

sweeps that damaged 

relationships carefully 

cultivated by SOF, today 

the reverse is true
No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 9

At the same time, the ISAF mission 

has broadened as well. After NATO assumed 

command of ISAF in 2003, the UN Security 

Council authorized the extension of the ISAF 

security and stabilization mission to cover the 

entire country, an expansion that ISAF completed by late 2006. ISAF experienced more 

combat when it moved into the south and 

east where insurgent activity is concentrated. 

In this environment, the practical distinctions 

between “security and stabilization” and 

classic population-centric counterinsurgency 

missions almost disappear. The terminology 

remains politically important because NATO 

does not refer to ISAF’s mission as counterinsurgency but rather prefers the euphemism 

“the comprehensive approach” to emphasize the full range of civil-military activities 

required to stabilize Afghanistan. Some NATO 

forces will continue to avoid offensive operations against the Taliban, but the current 

strategy emphasis on population security and 

the indirect approach underscores the need 

to have Afghan forces take the lead in such 

operations anyway. Thus, this limitation is 

not a severe handicap.

Moreover, past NATO reluctance to consider merging elements of the two missions 

appears to be dissipating. Until 2005, Britain, 

France, and Germany all opposed merging ISAF and OEF because they believed the 

United States wanted to dump the mission on 

NATO and concentrate on Iraq, and because 

they thought the U.S. focus was on fighting 

the Taliban and al Qaeda rather than population security and nationbuilding. Since 

2006, however, some Allies (or particular 

political parties within NATO countries) have 

recommended merging the missions; Italy 

explicitly did so with the rationale that the 

merger would reduce civilian casualties by 

ramping down OEF operations.55 Since the 

ISAF stabilization mission now includes the 

full range of activities necessary to execute 

the new U.S. population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, NATO should be more amenable to seeing the ISAF mission absorb the 

bulk of OEF forces and activities if the United 

States emphatically renews its commitment to 

success in Afghanistan.56

Many observers would be hesitant to give 

the lead to ISAF because European countries 

have demonstrated a marked reluctance to use 

lethal force. But the new U.S. strategy deemphasizes the attrition of insurgent forces, the 

type of operations Europeans could not support.57 In addition, NATO troop-contributing 

states are relaxing their opposition to having their forces involved in combat operations 

when such operations are an unavoidable 

byproduct of stabilization operations.58 The 

French, for example, now express frustration with national caveats that limit combat by NATO troops, and recently, a European 

Parliament report made the argument that 

national caveats are counterproductive. On 

the ground, more nations are finding combat 

unavoidable and a necessary means of pacification.59 Even German forces, with arguably 

the most restrictive national caveats, now routinely are involved in combat.60 ISAF forces 

also can rely more heavily on NATO SOF when 

combat operations are necessary. Many Allies 

have been willing to allow their SOF to conduct combat operations with a low profile.

Where fighting is heaviest, U.S. forces 

and likeminded Allies will have to bear the 

brunt of the operations until Afghan forces 

are ready. However, that is the case today and 

not an argument against rolling OEF activities under ISAF. Any U.S. concerns over the 

future direction of the ISAF NATO mission 

could be assuaged by the provision that the 

commander of ISAF would always be a U.S. 

flag officer, which is entirely reasonable given 

that the United States provides the majority of 

forces and support to the mission.

The second most important requirement 

for better unified effort is improved civil-military collaboration. Since, as argued above, 

successful irregular warfare requires rapid 

resolution of innumerable implementation 

issues, mechanisms for authoritative civilmilitary decisionmaking are imperative. The 

United States must lead the way for NATO 

in this area by ensuring close collaboration 

between General McChrystal and Ambassador 

Eikenberry. In this regard, McChrystal’s plan 

is insufficient. It calls for parallel chains of 

command with coordination at every level. 

Historically, however, the way to ensure civilmilitary cooperation is to formally integrate 

the military and civilian chains of command, as occurred when General Douglas 

MacArthur was given authority over all 

U.S. activities in Japan and when the Civil 

Operations and Revolutionary Development 

Support Program in Vietnam was instituted. 

These rare experiments in formally integrated civil-military chains of command produced good results that more than justify 

their broader use in complex politico-military 

contingencies. The standard practice, however, has been to proclaim the importance of 

civil-military integration while doing nothing 

to facilitate it, which, typically and not surprisingly, produces unsatisfactory results.61

Occasionally, a pair of extraordinary personalities will mesh and develop 

noteworthy rapport, as was the case with 

Ambassador Robert Oakley and Lieutenant 

General Robert Johnston in Somalia (1993); 

Ambassador Khalilzad and Lieutenant 

General Barno in Afghanistan (2003); 

and General Petraeus and Ambassador 

Ryan Crocker in Iraq (2007). The fact that 

Ambassador Eikenberry is a retired Army 

lieutenant general may improve the odds 

that he and General McChrystal will collaborate, but it does not guarantee this 

will be the case. Even if they do, their positive example will not ensure cooperation 

down the line through subordinate levels of organization, as the experience with 

the civil-military Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams in Afghanistan attests.62 Great 

Ambassador–military commander teams 

are the rare exceptions that prove the general rule that such leaders typically respond 

to the demands of their own organizations 

and cultures, as do their subordinates. As a 

recent report from the House Armed Services 

Committee (HASC) concluded, “While senior 

leaders should get along in the interest of 

the standard practice 

has been to proclaim 

the importance of civilmilitary integration 

while doing nothing 

to facilitate it, which, 

typically and not 

surprisingly, produces 

unsatisfactory results
10 Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009

the mission, history is replete with examples 

where they have not. Rather than depending 

exclusively on personalities for success, the 

right interagency structures and processes 

need to be in place and working.”63

The optimum means of ensuring unified effort would be a formal decision to integrate the civilian and military chains of 

command for the purpose of complex contingency operations such as counterinsurgency, but this would require changes to 

laws that mandate a dual civil and military 

chain of command at the country level.64

The more immediate solution would be an 

informal agreement between Eikenberry and 

McChrystal to work collaboratively. Such a 

relationship can be hoped for, but the more 

prudent route would be for the administration to take steps to ensure a collaborative 

relationship.

General McChrystal and Ambassador 

Eikenberry have developed a joint plan for 

Afghanistan,65 as should be the norm in complex civil-military operations. They should 

also exchange key staff members and make 

decisions collaboratively whenever possible, in keeping with the best practices of our 

most accomplished Ambassador-commander 

teams. However, as the HASC recommends, 

they also should be given some procedural 

rules of thumb for collaboration. When diplomatic and military needs sharply conflict—as they must on occasion in irregular 

war—who has the final say should be a 

function of the security situation, which 

could be determined on a province by province basis. Ambassador Eikenberry would 

have the last say for the few contentious 

issues that could not be resolved collaboratively in those provinces where security was 

good enough to allow progress toward political objectives to take priority—generally the 

northern half of the country at the moment. 

In provinces where the security environment is so poor that progress toward security objectives must take precedence before 

political progress can be realized—generally 

the southeast and southern half of the country—General McChrystal would resolve the 

issue at hand.66 Knowing in advance who has 

the final say will minimize the conflict, tardy 

decisions, stalemates, and least common 

denominator solutions that are frequently the 

deleterious results of forcing equal authorities 

with competing mandates to cooperate.

As for unified effort within the military 

and SOF community, General McChrystal’s 

plan calls for improved SOF command and 

control, and it hints that some SOF will be 

realigned under ISAF, as recommended here. 

Improved coordination between OEF and 

ISAF SOF will be provided by enhanced “SOF 

operations and planning staff, SOF advisors, and liaison officers to the Regional 

Command Headquarters.”67 McChrystal has 

the credentials to reorient the SOF focus in 

Afghanistan so that population-centric strategy objectives take precedence over kill/capture operations. He is a veteran of both Army 

Special Forces and special mission units who 

recognizes that decapitation of the enemy 

leadership will not work, but that a focused 

effort to keep the insurgency on the defensive 

is valuable if conducted properly. Offensive 

operations against insurgents must be 

informed by the kind of interagency intelligence fusion McChrystal pioneered in Iraq.68

In-depth knowledge of local personalities and 

politics increases the odds that kill/capture 

operations will improve security and reduces 

the likelihood that local information sources 

might manipulate international forces for 

their own objectives.69 To improve intelligence 

and political awareness, General McChrystal’s 

new command and control guidance for SOF 

should pair Army Special Forces with Afghan 

units that have graduated from basic training and are ready for employment, and with 

local irregular forces generated through the 

Afghan Public Protection Force program (if 

that controversial pilot program continues).70

SOF kill/capture operations should continue, but only in support of counterinsurgency objectives. In some cases, conventional 

units integrate SOF kill/capture operations 

into their counterinsurgency efforts in a way 

that strengthens rather than weakens relationships with local Afghans.71 However, this 

must be done systematically and not be left to 

chance. Layering of headquarters that constrains the latitude SOF traditionally exercise is not the preferred way to achieve this 

objective. Instead, SOF must be subject to the 

culture change on the issue of civilian casualties that General McChrystal is advocating.72 Several steps already taken or currently 

under way should help ensure the change in 

perspective extends to all SOF.

Moving Army Special Forces from OEF 

to the ISAF counterinsurgency mission would 

underscore national mission priorities for 

SOF. SOF collaboration with Afghan army 

units working on counterinsurgency objectives should be the norm, and it is more likely 

to happen if SOF are working under the ISAF 

mission mandate. Making ISAF the main 

effort in Afghanistan would also make it easier to eliminate irregularities that complicate 

unity of effort, such as different OEF/ISAF 

target lists of key enemy leaders.73 General 

McChrystal’s emphatic statements about the 

need to limit civilian casualties and the subordinate importance of targeting enemy leadership effectively communicate commander’s 

intent to all SOF forces, including the special 

mission units he knows so well.74 McChrystal’s 

priorities and plan should also help reinforce 

the traditional Army Special Forces indirect 

approach that emphasizes the critical importance of the Afghan population and forces.

General McChrystal will have to personally attend to setting SOF special mission unit priorities within the OEF mandate. 

They do not formally report to him, and 

they would continue to operate under different rules of engagement than ISAF forces. 

Historically, special mission units report 

directly to combatant commanders. If the 

plan to realign all SOF to the commander of 

ISAF does not include special mission units, 

General McChrystal’s past experience should 

at least allow him to exercise an informal veto over their operations should they 

threaten counterinsurgency objectives. If 

SOF collaboration 

with Afghan army 

units working on 

counterinsurgency 

objectives should be 

the norm, and it is more 

likely to happen if SOF 

are working under the 

ISAF mission mandate
No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 11

this kind of informal oversight relationship 

proves insufficient, SOF special mission units 

could be further constrained to operate in 

a geographically limited area and by a very 

precise list of high-value targets and costbenefit procedures. In the past, the frequency 

of SOF special mission unit operations grew 

without sufficient accountability until they 

were targeting less important leaders and 

with unacceptably higher risks, and the 

same could easily happen in Afghanistan.75

In Iraq, General McChrystal successfully executed high-value human target operations 

in a manner consistent with counterinsurgency principles, so there is reason to believe 

the same can be done in Afghanistan. Once 

he has established the priorities and procedures informally, the informal coordination relationship with special mission units 

should be transferred to General Rodriguez, 

who is going to coordinate the day-to-day 

military operations in Afghanistan. General 

Rodriguez could emulate McChrystal’s success in Iraq and ensure the coordination 

procedures for direct action are not so laborious as to preclude successful kill/capture 

operations with few civilian casualties.

Progress in Afghanistan is not possible 

until the strategic objectives currently under 

debate are resolved and priority is assigned 

to either counterinsurgency or counterterrorism. Paraphrasing the Cheshire Cat’s point in 

Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland: “If you 

don’t know where you are going, any road 

will get you there.” Choosing among competing paths is only relevant in the context 

of clear objectives. But it is equally true that 

“if you can’t stay on the road you choose, 

no road will get you where you want to go.” 

Choosing the best ways to achieve strategic 

objectives is relevant only to the extent that 

we can implement a strategy with unified 

effort. The general U.S. experience with counterinsurgency illustrates this point well. U.S. 

military doctrine often accurately codifies 

rules for winning counterinsurgency warfare, 

but the organizations implementing the doctrine ignore it with comparable regularity.76

The same point holds true for unified effort 

across the government and among allies. We 

know it is critically important, but we seldom 

achieve it. With so much at stake and so little 

time to reverse a deteriorating situation, the 

administration must clarify its strategy and 

then go the extra mile by taking additional 

steps to improve the odds that everyone will 

stay on the same road to success.

Notes

1

 Stanley McChrystal, “COMISAF Initial Assessment,” 

August 30, 2009, available at <http://heraldextra.com/

pdf_99ffd722-a6b3-11de-92e3-001cc4c03286.html>; Bill 

Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” The Washington Times, August 20, 

2009.

2

 Fred Kaplan, “CT or COIN? Obama must choose this 

week between two radically different Afghanistan policies,” 

Slate.com, March 24, 2009.

3

 Bill Gertz, “Afghanistan Debate,” The Washington 

Times, March 26, 2009, B1.

4

 Richard Holbrooke, testimony on Afghanistan/

Pakistan before the House Foreign Relations Committee, May 

5, 2009, available at <www.cfr.org/publication/19322/>.

5

 Jim Hoagland, “Foreign Policy by Deadline,” The 

Washington Post, July 19, 2009, 17.

6

 Jim Garamone, “Gates Says New Command in 

Afghanistan Will Look to NATO,” American Forces Press 

Service, June 11, 2009; see also Julian E. Barnes, “Americans 

won’t accept ‘long slog’ in Afghanistan war, Gates says,” The 

Los Angeles Times, July 19, 2009.

7

 Ann Scott Tyson, “Top U.S. Commander in 

Afghanistan Is Fired,” The Washington Post, May 12, 2009.

8

 David Petraeus, statement before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, April 1, 2009.

9

 “New U.S. general looks to shift tack in Afghanistan,” 

June 12, 2009, available at <www.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUSLC197333._CH_.2400>.

10 Karl W. Eikenberry, testimony before the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee, March 26, 2009, available at <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/

EikenberryTestimony090326a.pdf>.

11 Anthony H. Cordesman, “More Troops, Fewer 

Caveats. Let’s Get Serious,” August 10, 2009, available at 

<www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_

contributors/article6789136.ece>.

12 Greg Bruno, Afghanistan’s National Security 

Forces, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, April 16, 

2009, available at <www.cfr.org/publication/19122/afghanistans_national_security_forces.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpubli

cation%2Fby_type%2Fbackgrounder#2>.

13 David W. Barno, testimony before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, February 26, 2009.

14 In this paper, the term special operations forces

(SOF) refers to all forces under the command of U.S. Special 

Operations Command. When delimiting SOF to subcomponents of the command, they are identified as such (for example, Army Special Forces or special mission units).

15 Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: 

America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: Norton, 2009), 

297ff.

16 ISAF Theatre Strategic Communications Strategy, 

2008. Copy on file with author.

17 “Press Conference with General Tommy Franks,” 

available from <www.centcom.mil/news/press_briefings/

fran1030.html, Internet>.

18 Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Shifting Drones’ Focus to 

Taliban,” The Los Angeles Times, July 30, 2009, 1.

19 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled 

Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: U.S. 

Naval Institute Press, 2006), 7.

20 John McCain, remarks at the American Enterprise 

Institute, February 25, 2009, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/02/john-mccain-winning-the-warin/>. Emphasis added.

21 Pauline Jelinek, “Afghan Civilian Deaths Big 

Problem in War,” Washingtonpost.com, June 18, 2009.

22 Gilles Dorronsoro, The Taliban’s Winning Strategy 

in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, 2009).

23 Greg Sanders, “How Deleterious is the Impact of 

Airstrikes on Popular Opinion in Afghanistan?” Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, March 10, 2009, available at <http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject/?p=901>.

24 “U.S. Probe: Afghan Airstrike Killed at Least 33 

Civilians,” CNN News, October 8, 2008.

25 See Jason Staziuso, “Afghan Mess Up: Crossed signals 

lead each side to mistake the other for the enemy,” Associated 

Press, January 13, 2007.

26 See Richard Holbrooke, “The Longest War,” The 

Washington Post, April 1, 2008.

27 See “U.S. President Gets an Earful from Afghan 

Governors,” Agence France Presse, April 9, 2008.

28 A study by the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies 

cites revenge against international forces as a key motivation 

for joining the insurgency. See Hekmat Karzai, “Is the West 

losing the Pashtuns?” Al Jazeera, January 26, 2009.

29 Carlotta Gall and David E. Sanger, “Civilian Deaths 

Undermine Allies’ War on Taliban,” The New York Times, 

May 13, 2007; Carlotta Gall, “U.S. Faces Resentment in 

Afghan Region,” The New York Times, July 3, 2009.

30 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Focus 

and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War, 

Washington, DC, February 3, 2009, 9.

31 “Frustration with War, Problems in Daily Life Send 

Afghans’ Support for U.S. Efforts Tumbling,” ABC News/BBC/

ARD National Survey of Afghanistan February 9, 2009, available at <http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1083a1A

fghanistan2009.pdf>.

32 Jones, 303.

33 “Response Posture for Noncombatant Civilian 

Casualty Incidents in Afghanistan,” memorandum for the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 29, 2008; see 

also Peter Graff, “New Tactic for U.S., NATO in Afghanistan: 

Say Sorry,” Reuters, April 17, 2009.

34 See “U.S. Deeply Regrets Civilian Deaths in 

Afghanistan: Clinton,” Agence France Presse, May 7, 2009.

35 See Adam B. Ellick, “U.N. Official Calls for Review of 

American Raids,” The New York Times, June 14, 2009.

36 See “NATO/ISAF Tactical Directive (Releasable 

Portions) 6 July 2009”; David Zucchino and Laura King, “U.S. 

to Limit Airstrikes in Afghanistan to Help Reduce Civilian 

Deaths,” The Los Angeles Times, June 23, 2009.

37 General Stanley McChrystal, statement before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee, June 2, 2009.

38 The distinction between the direct and indirect 

approach to special operations is controversial and often 

confused within the special operations community. The 

authors’ usage is drawn from David Tucker and Christopher J. 

Lamb, U.S. Special Operations Forces (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2007).

39 Rothstein, 140.

40 Email exchange with Colonel David Maxwell, USA, 

U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

41 Jones, 265; interviews with Special Forces officers, 

July 22, 2009, July 27, 2009; interview with 0–6 staff officer, 
12 Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009

July 20, 2009. For evidence of the confusion surrounding the 

focus of Special Forces, see Major Darin Blatt and Major Glenn 

Bollinger III, “3d SFG Develops Special Army Forces Combat 

Advisers for Afghanistan,” June 24, 2009, available at <http://

shadowspear.com/special-operations-news/3rd-sfg-developsspecial-forces-combat-advisers-for-afghanistan.html>.

42 Institute for National Strategic Studies roundtable, 

Washington, DC, March 3, 2009.

43 Colonel Ian Hope, Unity of Command in 

Afghanistan: A Foresaken Principle of War, Carlisle Papers 

in Security Strategy (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 

November 2008), note 50.

44 Denis P. Doty, “Command and Control of Special 

Operations Forces for 21st Century Contingency Operations” 

(Master’s thesis, Naval War College, 2003), available at 

<www.fas.org/man/eprint/doty.pdf>.

45 Sean Naylor, “New Special Forces HQ coming to 

Afghanistan. Buildup of forces means need for closer oversight, official says,” The Military Times, January 31, 2009.

46 James Risen, “U.S. to Hunt Down Afghan Drug Lords 

Tied to Taliban,” The New York Times, August 10, 2009; 

Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status 

Report: 2009,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

June 18, 2009.

47 Interview with David W. Barno, July 31, 2009; interview with Special Forces officer, July 22, 2009.

48 Petraeus.

49 Peter Baker and Elisabeth Bumiller, “Obama 

Considers Strategy Shift in Afghan War,” The New York 

Times, September 22, 2009.

50 McChrystal, 1–2, 1–3, 2–1, 2–10, 2–11.

51 Project for National Security Reform (PNSR), 

Forging a New Shield (Washington, DC: PNSR, 2008).

52 For more arguments on the need to merge OEF and 

ISAF, see Ambassador James Dobbins (Ret.), “Obama’s Af/Pak 

Strategy,” a draft chapter from a forthcoming book.

53 Ibid.; McChrystal.

54 Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, “NATO in 

Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance,” 

Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2009.

55 “Italy’s D’Alema Advises U.S. to End ‘Enduring 

Freedom’ Mission in Afghanistan,” Agence France Presse, July 

25, 2007.

56 Victoria Burnett and Rachel Donadio, “Spain is Open 

to Bolstering Forces in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, 

July 29, 2009.

57 For a European take on population-centric counterinsurgency operations that is consistent with the new 

U.S. approach, see Colonel Philippe Coste, “La Phase de 

Stabilisation et la Contre Rebellion,” Doctrine: Revue 

d’etudes Generales no. 17 (July 2009), Centre de Doctrine, 

d’Emploi des Forces, Ministry of Defense, France.

58 We are indebted to Institute for National Strategic 

Studies expert Leo Michel for insights and an assortment of 

articles from European press on this topic.

59 Morelli and Belkin, 11.

60 “German Troops Beef up Fight against Taliban,” 

Spiegel Online International (Germany), July 9, 2009.

61 Bob Killebrew, “The Left-Hand Side of the Spectrum: 

Ambassadors and Advisors in Future U.S. Strategy,” Center for 

a New American Security, 2009.

62 David Kobayashi, “Integrating Civilian and Military 

Efforts in Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” Mini-Case Study 

for the Project on National Security Reform (Washington, 

DC: PNSR, 2009); Henry Nuzum, “Shades of CORDS in the 

Kush: The False Hope of ‘Unity of Effort’” (Master’s thesis, 

The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 

2007); Anna Husarska, “Trampled by the ‘Civilian Surge,’” 

The Washington Post, July 10, 2009.

63 U.S. House of Representatives, House Armed Services 

Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 

“Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to 

Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and 

Afghanistan,” April 2008.

64 PNSR, Forging a New Shield, 473ff; see also 

Franz-Stefan Gady and Rei Tang, “Afghanistan Interagency 

Team Scenario,” Research and Analysis Directorate, PNSR, 

February 2009.

65 Gertz, “Inside the Ring.”

66 This recommendation is consistent with the division of 

labor recommended by General Barno. See Barno, testimony.

67 McChrystal, annex B.

68 Interagency intelligence fusion is difficult but 

can be mastered, as British forces in Northern Ireland and 

McChrystal in Iraq demonstrated. Peter Spiegel, “Commander 

Maps New Course In Afghan War: U.S. Gen. McChrystal 

Departs From Special-Ops World With Focus on Diplomacy; 

‘Decapitation Strategies Don’t Work,’” The Wall Street 

Journal, June 12, 2009, 6.

69 Fisnik Abrashi and Jason Straziuso, “Afghans say 

deadly raid was based on misleading tip,” Associated Press, 

August 28, 2008.

70 We are indebted to Colonel David Maxwell for the 

distinction between remote area operations with irregular 

forces and consolidation operations with host-nation forces, 

both conducted in support of the Foreign Internal Defense 

mission.

71 James Dao, “Neighbors by Day, Soldiers by Night in 

Afghanistan,” The New York Times, August 5, 2009, available 

at <www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/world/asia/05raid.html>.

72 Pauline Jelinek and Anne Gearan, “General Seeks 

New Afghan Approach: He urges ‘cultural shift’ in how troops 

handle civilians,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, August 1, 2009.

73 Interview with Army Special Forces officer, July 27, 

2009.

74 Spiegel, 6; McCain.

75 See Tucker and Lamb.

76 Austin G. Long, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: 

The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960–

1970 and 2003–2006, RAND Counterinsurgency Study 

Paper 6 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008).

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I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Patrick M. Cronin

Eugene B. Rumer Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press