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100% AIR CARGO SCREENING: 

CAN WE SECURE AMERICA’S SKIES? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY 

AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 18, 2009 

Serial No. 111–10 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

VACANCY

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas, Chairwoman 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

PETER T. KING, NEW YORK (Ex Officio) 

MICHAEL BELAND, Staff Director 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

JOSEPH VEALENCIS, Minority Subcommittee Lead 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security 

and Infrastructure Protection ............................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Pennsylvania, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection ................................................... 8 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .. 9 

The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts ........................................................................................ 10 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. Edward Kelly, General Manager, Air Cargo, Transportation Security 

Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Mr. Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19 

PANEL II 

Mr. Andre ́ L. Johnson, Chief Executive Officer, FreightScan: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 42 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 43 

Mr. Jack Boisen, Chairman, The International Air Cargo Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 45 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 46 

Mr. Brandon Fried, Executive Director, Airforwarders Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 49 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 51 

Mr. James C. May, President and Chief Executive Officer, Air Transport 

Association of America, Inc.: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 53 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 54 

FOR THE RECORD

Mr. John Costanzo, President, Express Delivery and Logistics Association 

(XLA): 

Letter, Submitted by Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee .................................... 4 

Mr. Michael Whatley, Air Cargo Security Alliance: 

Letter, Submitted by Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee .................................... 4 

Mr. Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security: 

Letter, Submitted by Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee .................................... 67 

(1) 

100 PERCENT AIR CARGO SCREENING: 

CAN WE SECURE AMERICA’S SKIES? 

Wednesday, March 18, 2009 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee 

[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, DeFazio, Luja ́n, Cleaver, 

Massa, Thompson (ex-officio), and Dent. 

Also present: Representative Markey. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The subcommittee will come to order, and I 

thank you for your indulgence. 

It is interesting that this happens to be a full calendar day. A 

number of committees are meeting, which include committees that 

I participate in; and it seems like it is timely because we are listening to testimony of Mr. Liddy in one committee and discussing legislation regarding no more greed. You would wonder why this is a 

timely hearing because all of them are operating with the, if you 

will, somewhat shock of the Congress that laws that we have 

passed or that statements that we have made have not been, if you 

will, adhered to. 

We now are in a hearing where instructions have been given by 

this full committee and subcommittee on the issue of cargo screening; and it has come to our attention that the full impact, full action on our instructions have not been pursued. It raises an issue 

of security to the crisis level of great concern. So this hearing is 

about fixing it, about the instructive oversight that we should have 

on these issues and about fixing it; and this subcommittee intends 

to work diligently to do so. 

Also, we will look forward to our hearings in the future being on 

a Tuesday, which will help all of us in terms of the schedule. So 

I thank all of you for your indulgence. 

I am delighted to acknowledge the presence of the Ranking Member, Mr. Dent; the presence of the full committee Chairman, Mr. 

Thompson; Members of the subcommittee, Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Luja ́n, 

and Mr. Cleaver—we thank you for your presence—and our guest, 

a former Member of the Homeland Security Committee and this 

subcommittee, Mr. Markey. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on ‘‘100 

Percent Air Cargo Screening: Can We Secure America’s Skies?’’ 
2 

Our witnesses today will testify about TSA and industry’s progress 

and challenges to meet the 9/11 Act requirement to screen 100 percent of all passenger plane cargo by August, 2010. 

Before I begin my opening statement, I would like to welcome 

the gentleman from Massachusetts, a former Member of the subcommittee and a champion of cargo security, Mr. Markey. Without 

objection, it will be our privilege to authorize Mr. Markey to sit on 

the dais, provide an opening statement and question our witnesses 

during the hearing today. 

Mr. DENT. Madam Chair, I have no objections. I just wanted to 

ask the Chair’s consideration should a Member of the minority 

party wish to make an address to this committee or a 5-minute 

opening, I would hope that you would receive that request favorably. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

Today, this subcommittee will continue its commitment to robust 

oversight of one of the most important issues addressed by Congress in the 9/11 Act, the screening of cargo on commercial passenger aircraft. This is my second hearing on this issue as Chairwoman of the subcommittee which has jurisdiction over aviation security, and we will continue to monitor TSA’s progress in screening 

cargo during the 111th Congress. 

I look forward to engaging with my colleagues on the subcommittee and learning from our witnesses about how TSA and industry are working together to achieve the cargo screening mandate. This mandate is a critical step toward securing aviation. 

Might I add, as I started out, it is important when Congress issues 

mandates to note that they are for the betterment of the American 

people; and we will work diligently to comply. 

The subcommittee is determined to work with the new administration and conduct thoughtful oversight to make sure we can move 

forward and complete implementation of this essential element of 

the 9/11 Act. 

The logic is clear. If we screen passengers and their checked baggage, we must screen the other cargo on-board the same aircraft. 

It is my intent to view a number of airports and to really see in 

action whether or not we are utilizing officers or, in fact, at these 

major airports, what are we doing to comply with the 100 percent 

screening. 

Section 1602 of the 9/11 Act established two deadlines: the first 

required screening of 50 percent of cargo on passenger planes by 

February 3, 2009—already passed—the second requires 100 percent screening by August 3, 2010. 

The February deadline has passed, as I indicated. Aside from receiving an e-mail from TSA stating that it had begun to enforce the 

50 percent screening requirement on air carriers, this subcommittee has not received any further, more detailed confirmation 

that this requirement is being satisfied. Today, we are more than 

a month past the deadline; and I was concerned when I read GAO’s 

testimony which states that TSA cannot verify that screening is 

being done at the mandated 50 percent level. 

Now, let me at least say to the two witnesses here, this is not 

an attempt to excoriate either one of you. We hope you will present 

us with very forthright testimony. It is an attempt to express, 
3 

again, the word of the day, ‘‘outrage.’’ It fits quite squarely with actions of financial markets and what is happening here in this security area. Which means that the word ‘‘verify’’—just as there could 

be no explanation of Saturday night bonuses given out, there seems 

to be no explanation. You cannot ‘‘verify.’’ That is the word for me. 

This is not to say that TSA has not been working with industry 

stakeholders to fulfill the Section 1602 requirements. I know it has 

made progress in this endeavor, but the question remains can TSA 

positively verify that 50 percent of cargo on passenger planes are 

being screened and can this be formally reported to Congress? That 

is our large question here today. 

Still, the most important thing is to achieve 100 percent screening by August, 2010, and we therefore need to be able to verify the 

50 percent so that we can move forward to fulfill the 100 percent 

by August, 2010. 

This afternoon, we will also examine whether TSA is on track 

again to meet the 2010 deadline. The scope of this hearing includes 

reviewing the programs and regulations that have been put in 

place in its efforts to achieve 100 percent screening by TSA on 

cargo screening on passenger aircraft, exploring TSA compliance 

and verification standards for ensuring that screening is taking 

place, and evaluating DHS progress in certifying new and effective 

screening technologies. 

In addition, we want to know whether TSA has adequate resources and personnel to accomplish this mission. We want to know 

what kind of oversight and initiatives or new legislative action 

needed are to be taken by this subcommittee to draw upon the seriousness of our mission along with the full committee. 

As we review TSA’s efforts to meet the screening deadlines, we 

also want to review the impact this is having on our industry partners, including air carriers, freight forwarders, and manufacturers 

who must make significant investments who have the greatest 

stake in an effective and efficient implementation process. 

The importance of achieving 100 percent cargo screening cannot 

be understated. As such, and based on what we will learn here 

today, I will be asking GAO to conduct a follow-up assessment for 

the subcommittee to keep us informed about how the implementation process is progressing and alert us to any new hurdles that 

may arrive. I hope that the Ranking Member, Mr. Dent, will join 

me in making this request so we can proceed in a bipartisan manner. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for coming today and presenting to us what I hope will be helpful in shedding light on this 

critical endeavor. I know that much work has been done, but there 

is still a lot more to be accomplished in order to achieve 100 percent screening by next summer. 

We are always reminded that we have not had a terrorist act on 

our soil since 2001. One, it gives us comfort, but then it gives those 

who believe that we focus too much on security and the securing 

of our homeland or that we shouldn’t worry about it or why are you 

getting so excited, it gives them, I guess, the extra fodder for their 

belief. 

But I am always mindful of our good Boy Scouts, and that is to 

make your camp better than you found it and to be prepared. We 
4 

are not prepared. If we cannot verify 50 percent, then we are certainly not prepared; and any moment a small package of any kind 

sent by anyone who endeavors to do this Nation harm can again 

create the atmosphere for a terrorist act on our soil. 

It is well-known from hearings that we have had that we have 

decentralized terrorism. They can be found anywhere. So I am delighted that we have the opportunity to show that we mean business. All of the witnesses today are experienced, knowledgeable 

veterans of the aviation industry; and I look forward to hearing 

from all of you and working with you to make our skies secure. 

I would like to enter into the record two statements, the first is 

by the Express Delivery and Logistics Association and the second 

is from the Air Cargo Security Alliance. 

Is there any objection? 

Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY JOHN COSTANZO, PRESIDENT, EXPRESS

DELIVERY AND LOGISTICS ASSOCIATION (XLA) 

The Express Delivery and Logistics Association (XLA) understands that the Air 

Cargo Security Alliance is a coalition that was started to combat the 100% screening 

mandate. The alliance was established with the singular intent of charging the 

Transportation Security Administration and the Department of Homeland Security 

with screening at the airports much in the way that they have taken over passenger 

screening. In order to cover the resources required by TSA and DHS, the alliance 

is proposing to add a $0.05 surcharge per pound on cargo to be borne by customers 

of Indirect Air Carriers. 

Following discussions with our Government Affairs Committee and the security 

subcommittee as well as XLA members at large, the XLA Board of Directors has 

taken a position not to support or join the ACSA initiative. XLA will continue to 

endorse Certified Cargo Security Program (CCSP) and TSA’s current implementation plan that is well underway. Our membership has embraced CCSP with many 

members certified or in the process of being certified, some with considerable investments in the project. Consequently we have recommended to our members that, 

should they be approached, they not lend their name or any other form of support 

to this effort. 

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY MICHAEL WHATLEY, AIR CARGO

SECURITY ALLIANCE

MARCH 18, 2009 

INTRODUCTION

The Air Cargo Security Alliance would like to thank Chairwoman Jackson Lee, 

Ranking Member Dent and the other Members of the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection for the opportunity to submit testimony for today’s hearing. 

Today’s hearing topic—whether we can secure America’s skies with a 100% air 

cargo screening mandate—is timely and critical to both our national security and 

the air cargo industry. My testimony focuses on TSA implementation of the 100% 

screening mandate and its impact on the thousands of small and mid-size freight 

forwarders whose very existence depends on reliable access to passenger aircraft for 

shipping cargo. 

The Air Cargo Security Alliance (ACSA) is an alliance of over 225 indirect air carriers, direct shippers, airlines, airport authorities, customs brokers, and affiliated 

businesses Nation-wide that represent every part of the air cargo industry. Formed 

in 2008, ACSA is dedicated to developing and implementing an air cargo screening 

program that will meet our homeland security needs and allow all members of the 

air cargo industry to continue providing world-class service to their customers. 

ACSA’s mission is ensure a level playing field for the entire air cargo industry 

through the development of a multi-layered air cargo screening program that relies 

on two very important components: First, voluntary screening by members of the 
5 

1Transportation Security Administration, Air Cargo Strategic Plan, November 2003. 

2GAO, Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and Other Challenges in 

Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on Private Planes, Testimony before the 

Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, July 2008. 

air cargo industry and, second, a robust Federal screening program physically located at America’s airports. Any program that fails to include both of these elements 

will create economic and logistical obstacles to effective screening and fair competition. 

BACKGROUND

The air cargo industry is made up of over 4,200 registered indirect air carriers 

(IACs), which operate at over 10,000 separate facilities and utilize over 450 airports 

Nation-wide, as well as dozens of airlines which carry air cargo and millions of companies that rely on IACs (also known as freight forwarders) to move their goods 

through the air cargo supply chain. The volume of cargo that is shipped via commercial airplanes is immense—more than 50,000 tons a day, with over 12 million 

pounds moving on commercial passenger planes daily. 

Air cargo can range from very small packages to loads that weigh several tons. 

On any typical day the cargo shipped on passenger planes will include anything 

from perishable foods and flowers to machinery and equipment. The cargo can be 

shipped in numerous forms including individually wrapped packages, wooden crates, 

assembled pallets, and large containers called unit-loading devices. 

The companies that make up the air cargo industry are as diverse as the freight 

that they move. Obviously, there are several very large companies such as integrators, which own their own planes, trucks, and warehouses (such as FedEx, UPS, and 

DHL). However, the vast majority of the companies that make up the industry are 

small companies that do not own or operate aircraft, own limited (or no) warehouse 

space and contract with trucking companies for their trucking needs rather than 

own fleets of trucks. 

Typically, when a small or mid-size IAC gets an order to move cargo from one 

city to another on a specific, time-sensitive schedule, the company will make arrangements with a commercial air carrier to transport the cargo and contract with 

a trucking company to deliver the cargo from its origination point to the airport for 

loading on the passenger plane. They will also contract with another company to 

pick the freight up at the airport following the flight and deliver it to its final destination. At no point during this transaction does the cargo go to a warehouse or 

central clearing station owned or operated by the IAC. 

The consequences of the 100% air cargo screening mandate apply equally to every 

participant in the air cargo industry; from the shipper, trucker, and IAC to the airline and the ultimate consignee. It is vitally important to the existence of all of 

these companies that the mandate be implemented in a manner that takes into consideration their unique needs and business model. 

9/11 ACT AND BUSH ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for securing the 

air cargo transportation system without unduly impeding the flow of commerce.1 In 

order to carry out this mission, TSA is responsible for establishing security requirements governing all domestic-originating flights (whether on domestic or foreign 

passenger air carriers) that transport cargo, overseeing the implementation of air 

cargo security requirements by air carriers and freight forwarders, and conducting 

research and development of air cargo security technologies.2

In order to meet these security requirements, TSA developed a multilayered, riskbased system that requires airlines to screen a percentage of cargo transported on 

passenger aircraft, requires IACS to screen (or provide to TSA for screening) all 

cargo that meets certain high-risk criteria and includes TSA screening of all cargo 

at Category II–IV airports. 

Pursuant to the language enacted in the Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (‘‘the 9/11 Act’’), TSA is also required to establish a 

system to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on domestically originated 

passenger aircraft. 

Section 1602 of the 9/11 Act requires this system to provide a level of security 

commensurate with the level of security for the screening of passenger checked baggage, requires that 50% of all cargo be screened by February 2009, and require 

100% of all cargo be screened by August 2010. The 9/11 Act also provides TSA with 

the authority to develop additional methods to ensure that cargo does not pose a 
6 

3PJ Crowley and Bruce Butterworth, Keeping Bombs Off Planes, Center for American 

Progress, May 2007. 4Testimony of Cindy Allen, National Customs Broker and Forwarders Association of America, 

before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, July 15, 

2008. 

threat to transportation security—including the development of a program to certify 

the security methods used by shippers. 

The 9/11 Act defines the term ‘‘screening’’ to mean ‘‘a physical examination or 

non-intrusive method of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation security.’’ Examples of such methods include X-ray systems, EDS, ETD, explosives detection canine teams, and a physical search with manifest verification. 

The costs of meeting the 100% screening mandate will be significant—in a 2007 

study, the Center for American Progress estimated the total costs of screening 100% 

of the cargo tendered on passenger planes will be at least $600 million annually.3

In response to the enactment of the screening requirements set forth in the 9/11 

Act, the Bush administration announced that TSA would not conduct any screening 

of air cargo, but would instead develop a two-pronged approach that will rely on 

screening by air carriers and the development of the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). 

The CCSP is designed to allow the screening of air cargo to take place at various 

points throughout the air cargo supply chain. Participants in the CCSP, including 

freight forwarders, direct shippers, manufacturing facilities, and perishable shippers, will be designated at Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSFs) upon meeting security requirements established by TSA. In order to prove the validity of the 

CCSP approach, TSA has initiated a pilot program, in which TSA has purchased 

screening equipment for a limited number of large IACs in 18 major cities. 

In addition to the development of the CCSP, TSA implemented regulations which 

require 100% of all cargo transported on narrow-bodied planes (airplanes that have 

only one aisle) to be screened. Due to the fact that the CCSP has not yet been fully 

implemented, compliance with this rule, which became effective on October 1, 2008, 

has fallen largely on the shoulders of air carriers. 

Airline compliance with the Narrow-Body Rule, as well as industry participation 

in the CCSP Pilot Program are expected to achieve the 50% screening mandate set 

forth in the 9/11 Act. 

IMPACTS OF THE CURRENT TSA APPROACH

The Air Cargo Security Alliance applauds TSA’s commitment to a multi-layered 

approach to air cargo security and the creation of the CCSP program. However, 

ACSA believes that CCSP must be a complement to—rather than a substitute for— 

a Federal air cargo screening program at America’s airports. 

In order to participate in the CCSP, a freight forwarder will be required to purchase screening equipment, acquire (or already own) warehouse space to facilitate 

the screening, and hire and train employees to conduct the cargo screening. 

As discussed above, the small and mid-sized companies that make up the vast 

majority of freight forwarding industry have very limited warehouse space—and operate at many airports where they do not have any warehouses at all. Unlike the 

integrators, who move all of their cargo through their own warehouses located at 

the airports prior to placing it on their planes, freight forwarders rely on a Nationwide network of trucking companies to route their cargo directly from the original 

pick-up point to the airport for tender with the airline for the vast majority of their 

shipments. 

Given the business model that freight forwarders use, the costs of securing warehouse space, acquiring screening equipment, hiring employees to conduct the screening and training those employees in order to participate in the CCSP can be simply 

overwhelming. The purchase of the screening equipment alone will cost between 

$150,000 and $500,000 or more per facility.4 For a typical freight forwarder or customs broker, this will add up to an investment of several million dollars merely to 

continue servicing existing clients and accounts. 

Although there are some companies which can afford these types of investments, 

there is simply no way that the vast majority of the 4,200 IACs Nation-wide have 

the financial resources to participate in such a program. In order to remain competitive with the multi-national freight forwarders or integrators who can afford the investment in screening equipment, small and medium-sized IACs are forced to make 

a tough choice—they can either purchase the screening equipment (provided that 

lenders are able to extend them credit), or they face a continuing loss of business 

and are forced to downsize their operations. Considering the current economic con-
7 

traction, the burden of making such a tremendous investment could not be placed 

on small business owners at a worse time. 

In addition to the direct costs, the air cargo industry will also face reduced air 

cargo service because airlines have been forced to invest millions in cargo screening 

equipment in order to continue providing air cargo services. Given the volume of air 

cargo traffic, airlines are likely to make these investments at major hub-airports. 

However, airlines are simply not economically capable of making the substantial investments required to continue servicing all non-hub airports that are currently 

used by IACs. 

In fact, over the last 6 months, air carriers have announced reduced or eliminated 

air cargo service to several regional airports including Colorado Springs, Anchorage, 

Palm Springs, and Buffalo. As airlines are faced with the costs of purchasing screening equipment, it is reasonable to assume that airlines will scale back air cargo 

services to hub airports only. This pull-back in cargo service will essentially force 

IACs and their customers to rely solely on hub-airports—and will likely force many 

to lay off workers and close their doors. 

The impact that TSA’s reliance on CCSP and airline screening to meet the 100% 

screening mandate will have on the air cargo industry will be devastating. 

In addition to forcing airlines to restrict air cargo services to hub-airports only, 

denying them much-needed cargo revenues, it will: 

• Force airlines them to spend millions of dollars in screening equipment at a 

time when they are least able to make such investments, 

• Significantly reduce (or completely eliminate) cargo volumes at hundreds of regional airports Nation-wide, 

• Force IACS to choose between spending millions to participate in the CCSP program or face restricted (and more expensive) access to passenger fleets for air 

cargo service, 

• Significantly drive up shipping costs for businesses that rely on the air cargo 

industry to move their goods on an expedited basis, and 

• Cause job losses as both regional airports and small to mid-size IACs lose air 

cargo volume. 

A FEDERAL AIR CARGO SCREENING PROGRAM—A BETTER APPROACH

The Air Cargo Security Alliance believes that there is a better way to achieve the 

100% screening mandate. In the 9/11 Act, Congress instructed TSA to establish an 

air cargo screening program ‘‘commensurate with’’ the checked baggage screening 

program already run by TSA. 

In order to comply with the clear Congressional intent in the 9/11 Act, and in 

order to ensure that the thousands of small companies that make up an integral 

part of the air cargo industry are not significantly or unfairly disadvantaged, we recommend that TSA establish a Federal air cargo screening program that will operate 

at all American airports. 

In order to be a fair and effective, a Federal screening program would ideally: 

• Be funded by a $0.05 per pound security surcharge modeled on the passenger 

screening program currently operated by TSA, 

• Provide screening at all American airports, 

• Allow the screened cargo to go onto any airline that provides air cargo services, 

• Reimburse any airline that conducts screening for the costs of such screening, 

and 

• Work in conjunction with the CCSP program. 

Such a program would preserve hundreds of thousands of jobs in the air cargo 

industry, enhance air cargo security, ensure that the entire air cargo industry would 

retain the ability to service their customers and maximize the flow of cargo at all 

American airports. 

In addition to protecting hundreds of thousands of high-paying jobs in the air 

cargo industry, this Federal screening program would: 

• Create thousands of new jobs without raising taxes or adding to the Federal 

deficit, 

• Allow non-CCSP participants to continue to drop cargo at the airport, 

• Allow non-CCSP participants to ship cargo on any airline, 

• Allow companies to choose whether they want to participate in CCSP or not, 

and 

• Effectively set a ceiling on screening charges. 

Furthermore, where the individual IAC operating as a CCSF will screen only a 

limited amount of cargo, the Federal screening program would screen cargo received 

from multiple IACs, providing a much better return on investment. 
8 

CONCLUSION

The air cargo industry is as diverse as the shipping community it services. The 

companies that make up this industry come in all sizes and offer ‘‘niche’’ services 

as well as a full menu of offerings from managed global transportation to 

warehousing, distribution, trade compliance, and even financial services. The small 

to mid-size forwarder with an entrepreneurial bent can provide equally competitive 

service offerings as multi-national companies given a level playing field. 

However, TSA’s current cargo screening regime will take away that level playing 

field and force the small to mid-size IACS to face insurmountable costs and 

logistical hurdles in order to remain in the market-place. For many, a 100% screening mandate without a Federal screening program operating at all American airports is a threat to their very existence. 

The Air Cargo Security Alliance calls upon Congress and the Obama administration to fulfill the clear Congressional intent of the 9/11 Act and protect the air cargo 

industry by creating a Federal air cargo screening program that will operate at all 

American airports. As a Nation committed to both homeland security and economic 

growth, we must allow IACs to continue to serve their clients and provide essential 

services that create hundreds of thousands of jobs, ensure the timely delivery of essential goods worldwide and bolster the American economy. 

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony to the subcommittee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, for an opening 

statement. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Today, we plan on discussing the Transportation Security Administration’s attempt to meet a congressionally mandated 100 percent air cargo screening requirement included in the Implementing 

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. This law requires, 

‘‘Not later than 3 years after the date of enactment the Secretary 

of Homeland Security shall establish a system to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft operated by an air 

carrier.’’ 

At the outset, let me compliment the TSA on their hard work. 

The men and women of the TSA labor tirelessly to ensure the security of our traveling public; and, quite frankly, air cargo security 

has not always received the time, attention, or funding it deserves. 

So, further, the Congress has seen fit to place upon you unrealistic 

mandates in order to score political points. 

While 100 percent screening never equals 100 percent security, 

I did vote for the passage of the 9/11 Commission Act; and, despite 

these unrealistic 100 percent mandates, I will require the Department to meet the mandates of the law. I am therefore disappointed 

with what I perceive as the Department’s intention to provide the 

appearance of meeting its security mandate without actually meeting, at least in my mind, the actual mandate. The TSA’s use of 

fuzzy math to artificially inflate its aviation screening statistics is 

intellectually dishonest, and I look forward to hearing our first 

panel on this matter. 

I am also disappointed that, with the 2010 deadline just a year 

off, the TSA is unable to tell me what consequences an in-bound 

aircraft might be subject to if it is determined to possess a piece 

of freight that has not already been screened. If it were an international flight bound for the United States, would it be diverted to 

another country? Would a domestic flight be required to land? 

What are the consequences of failing to comply with the law? 
9 

Ultimately, I hope for an honest and open discussion about what 

challenges the TSA expects to encounter in implementing the air 

cargo screening requirements over the next 17 months. 

The TSA has a relatively small number of certified cargo screening facilities and relatively few transportation security inspectors 

authorized to inspect and enroll these facilities. Perhaps the biggest hurdle is that TSA has no clear way ahead in managing foreign air carriers bound for the United States with cargo. Much like 

the 100 percent screening requirement for maritime containerized 

cargo, screening air cargo overseas requires significant levels of 

international cooperation, which dramatically complicates the 

TSA’s efforts to meet its congressional mandate. So I look forward 

to hearing from both panels on these many challenges and the way 

ahead for the TSA as it tries to meet this congressional mandate. 

I think this is a very important discussion to have; and I thank 

you, Madam Chairwoman, for having this hearing today. 

At this time, I would yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Dent. 

The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the full committee, 

the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an opening 

statement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, for 

convening this important hearing today. 

I also welcome our panel of witnesses, both the first and second, 

for bringing their important testimony to us. 

This afternoon’s hearing will evaluate progress made by TSA in 

implementing the 9/11 Act’s requirement to screen 100 percent of 

all cargo aboard passenger aircraft. Section 1602 of the 9/11 Act 

also requires TSA to screen 50 percent of all cargo aboard passenger aircraft by February, 2009. 

I would like to take this opportunity to applaud the efforts of my 

colleagues on this subcommittee and the full committee and champion this important mandate in ensuring that we take all necessary 

steps toward enhancing the Nation’s aviation security. After all, 

the 9/11 Commission Report recommended that TSA intensify its 

efforts to identify, track, and appropriately screen potentially dangerous cargo in aviation. In an effort to fulfill this recommendation, 

Congress has provided TSA with the necessary tools and a great 

deal of flexibility. 

Today, I would like to know if TSA can verify that it has met 

the 50 percent deadline and whether it will be able to meet the 100 

percent deadline next year. 

Mr. Kelly, I am particularly looking forward to your testimony, 

not because this is your first time on the Hill, but I want to hear 

what you have to say. I am interested in TSA’s perspective on the 

challenges it faces in meeting the 100 percent deadline. 

As you know, I am also interested in hearing about DHS’s 

progress in exploring innovative technologies that can be applied to 

fulfill the requirements of this law. 

It is important to evaluate any existing research and coordinating efforts between TSA and industry. We need to ensure that 

the work in progress made by industry relevant to screening can 

be leveraged by TSA to effectively screen and detect explosives hidden in air cargo. 
10 

Today, we will also hear from stakeholders who have concerns 

about TSA’s plan to implement this mandate. This hearing is not 

just about TSA checking the box. It is about strengthening aviation 

security and protecting the traveling public. 

This hearing is also being hosted well in advance of the August, 

2010, deadline so that we can address the concerns of Government 

and industry stakeholders early in the process and remedy or avert 

potential obstacles to implementation. 

Again, I thank the Chairwoman for hosting this important hearing and thank the witnesses again for appearing before us today. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman of the full committee 

for his insightful remarks. 

I am noting that the Ranking Member of the full committee is 

held up in another committee. 

We will recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey, for a statement of 5 minutes. 

Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentlelady for extending this courtesy 

to me. This is the first time in 7 years that I have not been a Member of the Homeland Security Committee, and it is a great honor 

and privilege that you have extended to me to participate in today’s 

hearing. 

As you know, on 9/11, there were two planes hijacked up in Boston that had 150 people on those two planes that were then flown 

into the World Trade Center. Obviously, that is still at the heart 

of my concern about these issues. Those two planes still and all of 

those people and their families who I knew who died that day still 

live on with me in terms of making sure that we not see another 

recurrence of that. 

In 2007, when Congress passed the landmark legislation to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, it included 

the mandate to screen 100 percent of the air cargo carried on passenger planes within 3 years and 50 percent of cargo screened 

within 18 months. Now that last month’s statutory deadline to 

screen 50 percent of cargo on passenger planes has passed, today’s 

hearing, Madam Chairwoman, is particularly timely and important. 

A year ago, Chairman Thompson and I requested that the GAO 

assess TSA’s progress in implementing the cargo screening mandate to ensure that the agency’s approach is consistent with congressional intent. I am pleased that today, Mr. Lord, you will provide GAO’s preliminary findings and recommendations in this area. 

GAO’s testimony raises several important questions about 

whether the system that the Bush administration developed to fulfill the 100 percent screening mandate will meet the requirements 

of the law. 

Specifically, GAO’s testimony notes that: 

No. 1, TSA cannot verify that it has met the February, 2009 

deadline, for screening 50 percent of cargo on passenger planes as 

required by law. 

No. 2, TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of 

in-bound air cargo, that is, cargo on passenger planes entering the 

United States from overseas, by the mandated deadline of August 

2010. In-bound cargo is almost half of the total volume of cargo on 
11 

passenger planes, accounting for 44 percent of the total, or 3.3 billion pounds of cargo each year. 

No. 3, the system developed by TSA relies heavily on shippers, 

freight forwarders, and others in the supply chain to screen cargo 

before it reaches the airport. However, as GAO has noted, there is 

a real risk that if these private-sector firms decide not to participate in TSA’s system, it would make it difficult, if not impossible, 

to meet the 100 percent mandate. 

These are critically important shortcomings in the implementation of this law that the Obama administration has inherited but 

which it needs to move quickly to correct. TSA has a duty to ensure 

that the 100 percent screening mandate is met and that the level 

of security that is applied to air cargo is commensurate with the 

level of security applied to passengers’ checked bags pursuant to 

the law. 

Again, it is my great honor, Madam Chairwoman, and I thank 

you, Mr. Dent, for the opportunity to testify. I have invested 7 

years of my career in this provision; and it means a lot to me that 

the two of you, along with Chairman Thompson and the rest of the 

committee Members, have allowed me to participate. 

Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We thank you for your testimony, Mr. Markey. We thank you for your on-going interest on this very vital 

issue. 

Let me also acknowledge a Member of our committee, Mr. 

Massa’s, presence here today; and we thank him so very much. 

We look forward to engagement of all of our Members. 

Again, I welcome our panel of witnesses. 

Our first witness is Mr. Edward Kelly, General Manager for 

Cargo at TSA. Mr. Kelly joined TSA in September 2006 and brings 

with him a wealth of knowledge and over 30 years of experience 

in the supply chain in the cargo industry. In his current capacity 

as general manager, he manages a $70 million budget, with a staff 

of 55 transportation security experts, program managers, and contractors. 

Our second witness, Stephen Lord, is a Director of GAO Homeland Security in the Justice Issues Division and is responsible for 

directing numerous GAO engagements on aviation and surface 

transportation issues. Mr. Lord was a key member of the 2007 Iraq 

Benchmarks Assessment Team that received a GAO integrity 

award for exceptional analysis of the Iraq governance progress for 

meeting 18 legislative, security, and economic benchmarks, which 

I believe would make him quite appropriately trained for the challenge we have before us. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

in the record. 

I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Kelly, we thank you for your service for this Nation. We 

thank you for the 30 years that you bring to the Department of 

Homeland Security in serving the Nation, and we look forward to 

the concept of fixing our problems together. 

You are recognized, Mr. Kelly, for 5 minutes. 
12 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD KELLY, GENERAL MANAGER, AIR 

CARGO, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. KELLY. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking 

Member Dent, Chairman Thompson, Mr. Markey, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here 

today to discuss progress by the Transportation Security Administration on the air cargo requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The 9/11 Act 

gives TSA the responsibility to ensure that the airline industry 

screens 100 percent of the cargo on passenger aircraft by August, 

2010, with an interim milestone of 50 percent by February 2009. 

First, I want to assure the subcommittee that all indications are 

that the cargo industry has met the February deadline. This week, 

TSA began receiving from the airlines February’s cargo screening 

data; and we will validate that the 50 percent screening milestone 

was, in fact, achieved. We will share the results with you by midApril. 

Thank you for your patience. 

To achieve this milestone, TSA and our industry partners put in 

a great deal of effort to creatively rethink the logistics of air cargo 

security. Together, we have dramatically changed air cargo operation. 

The key elements to TSA’s approach is the Certified Cargo 

Screening Program. This program screens cargo at the most efficient and effective point in the supply chain. It provides optimal security with minimal economic disruption. TSA recognizes that air 

cargo is a vital part of our economy, and this approach to security 

supports the financial health of the airline industry. 

Another step in achieving 100 percent screening is the requirement for all airlines operating narrow-bodied passenger aircraft 

from U.S. airports to screen 100 percent of the cargo transported 

on this aircraft. I am pleased to report that TSA achieved this 

milestone in October 2008, a full 22 months before the deadline. 

One hundred percent of the cargo on 96 percent of the flights originating in the United States is now screened. This point is worth 

emphasizing: 85 percent of the passengers flying each day from 

U.S. airports are on planes where all of the cargo has been fully 

screened. We have improved security significantly. 

A number of challenges remain as we move toward the goal of 

100 percent screening. The characteristics of cargo are vastly different than those of checked baggage. For example, 75 percent of 

air cargo is tendered on skids that cannot be screened with existing 

TSA-approved equipment. TSA is working with the DHS Science 

and Technology Directorate to develop technology adapted to the 

cargo screening environment. We are testing technologies now previously used to screen cargo for explosives such as metal detectors, 

vapor trace detectors, radio wave devices, and hand-held detection 

equipment. 

Another challenge is to develop screening requirements for air 

cargo in-bound from foreign countries. To date, industry has accomplished 50 percent system-wide screening for international inbound air cargo. However, TSA cannot implement a security regimen in a foreign country without extensive cooperative planning 

with and acceptance by our international partners. 
13 

Given these challenges, TSA does not expect that a 100 percent 

screening will be available for in-bound cargo on passenger aircraft 

by August 2010. Nonetheless, significant efforts toward reaching 

the 100 percent mark are on-going. 

Through bilateral and multi-lateral arrangements, a proposed 

amendment to the International Civil Aviation Organization standards and partnering with CBP to use its automated tracking system, we are improving security on in-bound cargo. With the cooperation of the entire air cargo community, we are well on our 

way to achieving the 100 percent air cargo screening mandate of 

the 9/11 Act for domestic cargo. 

We appreciate the important oversight of Congress and notably 

the support of this subcommittee. We will continue to work closely 

with the Government Accountability Office represented here today. 

We will continue to be transparent and to keep you informed of our 

progress. 

Finally, I would like to recognize the efforts of the industry and 

the TSA employees who have worked tirelessly on developing innovative solutions to a daunting task. 

I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD KELLY

MARCH 18, 2009 

Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is my pleasure to appear today to discuss 

the progress the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is making toward 

fulfilling the air cargo security requirements of the Implementing Recommendations 

of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act), Pub. L. 110–53. These requirements 

mandate the screening of 50 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft by 

February 2009 and 100 percent by August 2010. 

I am happy to report that while much remains to be done to fulfill this requirement, we are confident that the industry is currently screening at least 50 percent 

of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft on flights originating in the United 

States and we anticipate that the 100 percent screening requirement will be met 

by August 2010 for domestic cargo through our Certified Cargo Screening Program 

(CCSP). The requirement in the 9/11 Act to screen 100 percent of inbound air cargo 

continues to present significant challenges. Although it is unlikely that we can meet 

the ambitious timetable set by Congress, we are working with our international 

partners to address the many challenges and expect to continue to see significant 

improvements in the level of security for in-bound air cargo on passenger aircraft 

as we move forward. 

COLLABORATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSPARENCY OF PROCESS

As TSA has previously noted in testimony and reports, the only means of meeting 

the 100 percent cargo screening requirement without a significant negative impact 

on commerce is through creative and dedicated collaboration throughout the air 

cargo community. Our involvement of stakeholders has been broad and inclusive in 

the planning stages and will continue as we implement the program. Since September 2007, we have reached out to more than 2,500 stakeholders in virtually all 

industry segments that are potentially affected by the screening mandate, including 

both individual entities and associations of air carriers, cargo forwarders, and shippers. Beyond meeting with stakeholders, we have brought into TSA a number of individuals with significant industry experience to provide key practical expertise to 

our program development and execution. 

We have also reached out to other countries in an effort to draw on the lessons 

learned from air cargo security programs throughout the world, and to our Federal 

partners, particularly United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which 

also has responsibilities with respect to the security of in-bound air cargo. As I will 
14 

discuss below, this work will serve us well as we address the special issues of securing in-bound international cargo. 

Throughout the development and implementation of TSA’s air cargo security program we have been, and remain, dedicated to providing transparency. We appreciate the important oversight responsibilities of Congress and its various committees—and notably this subcommittee. We also continue to work closely with the 

Government Accountability Office so that they can fulfill their role to independently 

inform Congress on our air cargo security program. We will continue to brief you 

periodically and to facilitate field visits to key air cargo industry sectors to assure 

that you get both reports of our progress and an opportunity to see first-hand how 

the program is designed and implemented as it proceeds. 

50 PERCENT MILESTONE REACHED

As noted above, I am confident that the industry is currently screening 50 percent 

of air cargo transported by passenger aircraft. Our confidence is based on numerous 

discussions with regulated parties and industry associations, coupled with the historically solid record of compliance with TSA security programs industry-wide. We 

are currently receiving hard data from airlines for the month of February. We are 

aggressively working to summarize this data and report back to you in mid-April. 

We will keep the subcommittee informed of our progress in that regard. We also understand that the 50 percent target is not a static figure, and we anticipate a continual increase as we move toward the August 2010 date for 100 percent screening. 

A key component of achieving this milestone is the requirement, developed in coordination with air carriers and other stakeholders, that 100 percent of cargo transported on narrow-body (single-aisle) aircraft be screened. This requirement went 

into effect in October 2008. 

The passenger security impact of this screening is significant: although these aircraft carry only 25 percent of domestic air cargo on passenger aircraft, they account 

for the majority—approximately 95 percent—of domestic passenger flights. More importantly, these flights carry more than 80 percent of all passengers on flights originating in the United States. Thus, even at the statutory deadline for screening 50 

percent of air cargo aboard passenger aircraft, we are effectively protecting the vast 

majority of the flying public. 

SUPPLY CHAIN APPROACH TO SECURING AIR CARGO

The dramatic shift in the air cargo security legal requirement—the addition of a 

100 percent physical screening requirement to our otherwise layered, risk-based security regimen—has required a creative re-thinking of the logistics of security. The 

practical problems with physically screening all cargo on-site at airports throughout 

the Nation are formidable. Simply put, there is neither adequate space at airports 

to accommodate such an operation nor sufficient time at that point in the journey 

of cargo to accomplish 100 percent screening without crippling the flow of commerce. 

As we discussed in testimony before this subcommittee on July 15, 2008, we have 

designed and are implementing a total supply chain approach to air cargo security, 

the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). Under this program, the responsibility for screening is distributed throughout the supply chain to improve security 

while minimizing the potential negative impact on the integrity and movement of 

commerce. 

This supply chain approach allows cargo screening at the most efficient and effective point in the supply chain for optimal security and minimal economic disruption. 

For example, screening might be performed at a shipper’s facility before packing or 

at the facility of an indirect air carrier (IAC), or a freight forwarder, before consolidation and transport to an airport. Furthermore, sensitive commodities—such as 

foodstuffs and other perishable items and fragile goods—can be screened by the 

shipper or manufacturer and not have to be reopened at the airport, thus minimizing the potential for damage. 

The CCSP is a voluntary program—facilities that seek approval as certified cargo 

screening facilities (CCSF) will be required to meet a variety of rigorous security 

standards and will be regulated by TSA. For example, a CCSF would be required 

to submit to security threat assessments of personnel, adhere to specified physical 

security standards, and maintain a strict chain of custody for cargo they screen and 

forward to the air carrier as a condition of its acceptance as screened cargo by the 

air carrier. A key characteristic of the system will be rigorous tracking of the chain 

of custody, including the use of tamper-evident technology to assure that, once 

screened, cargo remains secured in transit to the aircraft. Under the CCSP the air 

carrier will continue to have ultimate responsibility for ensuring that cargo has been 
15 

screened prior to flight; if the air carrier cannot verify that cargo has been screened, 

the carrier must screen it before allowing it to be transported. 

CCSP shippers will benefit from participation in several ways. By screening their 

own shipments, shippers can significantly reduce the possibility that their cargo 

may be physically opened, and they can still tender full skids of cargo without having them taken apart to be screened. Additionally, they can bypass the expected 

delays that could occur if all screening is performed only by carriers. Similarly, IACs 

benefit by these same measures, and may also continue to take advantage of typical 

airline reduced rates for cargo tendered in bulk configurations. 

As discussed above, we have effectively addressed screening for narrow-body aircraft with a 100 percent screening requirement. To address the broader task, we 

have concentrated our efforts by piloting the CCSP at the 18 U.S. airports that 

originate 96 percent of cargo transported on wide-body passenger aircraft, or more 

than 65 percent of cargo transported on all passenger aircraft. By focusing outreach 

in the pilots on IACs and shippers using the airports with the highest volume of 

cargo transported on wide-body passenger aircraft, we have been able to maximize 

the impact of the pilots. To date we have validated over 200 facilities in the pilot 

program and plan to ultimately roll out the program Nation-wide. 

CHALLENGES OF CARGO TECHNOLOGY

As we address the security of the entire air cargo supply chain, we are simultaneously turning our attention to the development of appropriate technology for the 

screening of air cargo. One of the challenges we face is the limitations of the currently available technology—specifically, the effectiveness of existing technology for 

detecting explosives in cargo, its operational feasibility, and its general availability 

for deployment to the industry to meet the mandate of the 9/11 Act. Until recently 

the focus of research and development of explosives detection technology has been 

on the development of screening technology for checked baggage, not cargo. This has 

been dictated in no small measure by the fact that Congress imposed comprehensive 

checked baggage screening requirements on an aggressive time-table when it created TSA in 2001, while the comprehensive screening requirement for air cargo is 

relatively new. 

The characteristics of checked baggage are vastly different from those of cargo— 

in size, weight, variety of content, and configuration. Consequently the technology 

designed to screen one is not automatically suitable to screen the other. Because 

checked baggage screening technology (for example, Explosives Detection Systems 

(EDS), Explosives Trace Detection (ETD), and X-Ray) is available, however, TSA is 

working with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) to explore ways 

in which checked baggage screening technology can be adapted to the cargo screening environment. To this end, TSA has created a list of approved technologies to 

screen cargo based on checked baggage screening technologies. To ascertain the effectiveness of baggage technologies on screening cargo, we are conducting a voluntary pilot program with certain IACs participating in the CCSP pilot. To participate in this technology pilot, an IAC must agree to purchase specified technologies 

to screen cargo and report to TSA on its effectiveness. TSA is partially funding this 

research and the IACs are responsible for the remainder of the costs. 

On a parallel front, we are partnering with S&T to test technologies that have 

not been previously used to screen cargo for explosives. These include types of metal 

detectors, vapor trace detectors, radio wave devices, and hand-held ETD equipment. 

American Airlines has agreed to allow S&T to set up test sites at two of its cargo 

facilities (New York and Miami) in order to test the effectiveness of some of these 

technologies in a real environment. 

TSA has also deployed its proprietary canine teams at the 18 high-volume airports participating in the CCSP pilot. All of the 85 teams funded through the U.S. 

Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. 110–28, will have graduated by the end of 2009. These 

teams dedicate 100 percent of their time to cargo screening functions. We foresee 

a greater use of these valuable assets in the air cargo screening environment as 

their experience base expands. In addition, we will continue to evaluate the appropriate number of proprietary canine teams devoted to air cargo screening. 

Among other things, cost, effectiveness, and feasibility are all being weighed to 

determine the right mix of resources to accomplish this task, given the multitude 

of types and the configurations of commodities tendered as air cargo. 

IN-BOUND AIR CARGO

Meeting the screening requirements with respect to air cargo in-bound from foreign countries presents unique challenges. As noted earlier, collaboration with all 
16 

involved stakeholders is critical to implementation of a mandate as ambitious as 100 

percent cargo screening. Nowhere is collaboration more critical to success than in 

the international arena. As is true domestically, the physical space at foreign airports is often constrained; moreover, screening is regulated and often conducted by 

a variety of State authorities, each with its own requirements. Domestically, TSA 

is addressing this issue through the CCSP. As a practical matter, however, TSA 

cannot implement a security regimen such as CCSP in a foreign country absent extensive cooperative planning with and acceptance by our international partners. 

TSA has the legal authority to require that a given percentage of in-bound cargo 

be screened before it reaches the United States. Given the physical limitations of 

many airports, however, requiring U.S. and foreign air carriers to screen 100 percent of in-bound cargo by a given date would significantly impede the flow of commerce into the United States. For example, a unilateral mandate of 100 percent 

screening would cause significant delays at origin airports because, as is the case 

in the United States, carriers are not equipped to perform this level of screening. 

Where all-cargo flights exist as an alternative, shippers would be forced to divert 

business away from passenger airlines, which rely on cargo as a major generator 

of revenue and profit. Such a reduction in volume would most likely be reflected in 

higher passenger ticket prices. Additionally, taking a unilateral approach would significantly undermine TSA’s long-term efforts to develop common platforms and 

standards for air cargo security with our international partners, including work toward the development of commensurate systems of security partners cooperatively 

to enhance the security of civil aviation globally; our efforts in this regard are discussed below. 

Another major complexity of the international environment is the sheer number 

of entities across a broad geographic span that handle and ship cargo to the United 

States and the nearly infinite points of origin for each cargo supply chain. In 2006, 

more than 2.4 million unique shippers and manufacturers shipped cargo to the 

United States on passenger aircraft. Moreover, TSA’s assessment of the risks associated with the international environment indicates that the risks vary by location 

and demography. These risks begin well beyond our borders and are compounded 

by the fact that security practices vary with the foreign location. 

Given these challenges, at this time TSA does not expect that 100 percent screening will be attainable for in-bound cargo on passenger aircraft by August 2010. This 

is a complex, long-term process. Nonetheless, significant efforts toward reaching the 

100 percent mark are on-going. First, TSA has revised its security programs to improve the screening of cargo imported into the United States and we believe we 

have accomplished system-wide screening at 50 percent for international in-bound 

cargo. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, and Israel have programs similar to our CCSP. Through bilateral and quadrilateral arrangements, TSA 

is working with a number of countries to introduce the supply chain approach to 

securing air cargo into their programs and regulations. Our foreign partners involved in these arrangements are Canada, Australia, and the 27 Member States of 

the European Union. 

In 2007, a total of 98 countries imported cargo to the United States on passenger 

flights. These countries all implement the Standards and Recommended Practices 

set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the associated air carriers are required 

to carry out the measures set forth in our security programs. TSA will be recommending an amendment to the Annex 17 standards on securing air cargo that would 

introduce the supply chain screening paradigm. A similar recommendation (called 

Secure Freight) is being submitted by the International Air Transport Association 

(IATA). This will undoubtedly be a long-term process, but if ICAO adopts this approach in Annex 17, all 190 Contracting States would be encouraged and obligated 

to implement a supply chain approach to screening. 

CBP currently assesses the risk of the presence of illegal contraband, including 

explosives, in in-bound international air cargo as part of its supply-chain security 

programs and advance cargo requirements, and TSA and CBP are actively working 

on better integrating those processes to ensure air travel safety and security. For 

example, an opportunity we are actively exploring is using CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS) to assess risk on in-bound freight. ATS is a proven system for 

evaluating certain risks associated with in-bound cargo based on information provided by airlines. We are proposing an enhancement to the system to perform an 

evaluation of risk for explosives in cargo shipments. If we find that this is an effective tool, we will work with CBP to have the information supplied early enough to 

assure that evaluations could be done prior to a flight’s departure. 
17 

COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

TSA has a robust compliance and enforcement regimen to support the implementation of air cargo security requirements. Since 2008, TSA has been authorized a 

total of 450 cargo inspectors dedicated exclusively to the oversight of air cargo. Over 

420 inspectors have been trained and deployed to date. Our air cargo inspectors receive specific instruction on the security requirements of the CCSP as well as cargo 

screening technology and improvised explosive device (IED) recognition. 

Our inspectors regularly assess all air carriers, freight forwarders, and their authorized representatives; those entities that have had previous compliance issues 

are inspected more frequently and thoroughly. The TSA-led canine teams discussed 

earlier are an integral part of our inspection program. 

CONCLUSION

With the cooperation of the entire air cargo community, we are well on our way 

to achieving the 100 percent air cargo screening mandate of the 9/11 Act. We are 

comfortable that the 50 percent screening requirement has been met overall and, 

when fully developed, our CCSP promises to provide the framework for timely 

achieving 100 percent screening domestically. We will continue to work with our 

international partners to find a path to overcoming the considerable challenges of 

achieving the same mark with respect to in-bound international air cargo. 

As always, TSA appreciates this subcommittee’s support of our efforts as we move 

ahead with this important aviation security program. We look forward to our continued work together in finding the optimal path to full implementation of this important security mandate. 

I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me recognize Mr. Lord to summarize his 

statement for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Lord, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. LORD. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Dent, Members of the subcommittee, Chairman Thompson. I 

am pleased to be here today to discuss TSA’s efforts to meet the 

congressional mandate for screening air cargo. This is an important 

issue as each year over 7 billion pounds of air cargo is flown on 

U.S. passenger flights. 

As you know, Congress has mandated the establishment of a system to screen 50 percent of cargo by February, 2009, and 100 percent by August, 2010. Since TSA is addressing this mandate 

through two separate systems, my testimony will discuss TSA’s efforts to meet the screening mandate for domestic and in-bound 

cargo separately. 

Today, I would like to discuss two issues: first, TSA’s progress in 

meeting the screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo; second, the challenges that TSA and industry stakeholders may face 

in meeting the mandate, including challenges related to in-bound 

cargo. 

To its credit, TSA has taken several important steps to meet the 

screening mandate. 

First, TSA established a new screening requirement for air carriers. For example, effective October, 2008, and several months before the first mandated deadline, TSA required 100 percent screening of cargo carried on narrow-bodied passenger aircraft, such as 

Boeing 737s. These narrow bodies carry about 26 percent of the 

cargo and most of the passengers on domestic flights, as Mr. Kelly 

mentioned in his testimony. 
18 

Second, TSA revised or eliminated most of its screening exemptions for domestic but not in-bound air cargo. 

Third, TSA created a voluntary program known as the Certified 

Cargo Streaming Program to allow screening to take place by 

freight forwarders, shippers, and others before it was consolidated 

and delivered to the airport. 

Finally, among other steps, TSA established a technology pilot to 

allow industry participants to test approved screening technology. 

In our recent discussions, TSA officials stated they are confident 

that the 50 percent screening mandate, as it applies to domestic air 

cargo, has been achieved based on feedback they received from industry stakeholders. However, it is important to note that TSA 

does currently not have an empirical basis for verifying that these 

mandated screening levels have been met. According to TSA, air 

carriers will provide the first set of screening data this month, and 

by next month TSA will be in a position to determine whether the 

mandated screening levels are being met. Until it completes this 

important analysis, TSA cannot verify that the mandated screening 

levels established by Congress are, in fact, being achieved. 

A related question concerns TSA’s current screening process. 

While the details of its screening requirements are considered sensitive security information, the implications are not. Thus, I am 

hoping that today’s hearing will help us better understand how 

TSA’s efforts to meet the screening mandate may result in variations in the percentage of cargo screened on individual passenger 

flights. 

I will now discuss the potential challenges that TSA faces in 

meeting the screening mandate. 

First, although voluntary industry participation in the certified 

screening program is vital to its success, it is unclear whether TSA 

will be able to attract the necessary industry participation. This is 

an important issue as TSA estimates that freight forwarders and 

shippers will conduct the majority of screening by the August, 

2010, deadline. 

Second, TSA faces a number of challenges related to technology. 

For example, TSA is evaluating the effectiveness of several technologies at the same time that screening entities are using these 

technologies to screen air cargo. 

Third, TSA also faces challenges overseeing the Certified Cargo 

Screening Program due to the size of the inspection workforce and 

the thousands of newly regulated entities that may join the program. 

Finally, with respect to in-bound cargo, TSA does not expect—I 

repeat—does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of inbound air cargo by the mandated deadline of August, 2010. This is 

due in part to existing in-bound screening exemptions and to challenges TSA faces in harmonizing air cargo standards with those of 

other foreign nations. 

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I look forward to answering any questions that you or other Members of the 

committee may have and thank you for giving me the opportunity 

for to appear before your subcommittee today. 

[The statement of Mr. Lord follows:] 
19 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD

MARCH 18, 2009 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–09–422T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Committee on Homeland Security, 

House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 mandates the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a system to physically screen 50 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft by February 2009 

and 100 percent of such cargo by August 2010. This testimony provides preliminary 

observations on the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) progress in 

meeting the mandate to screen cargo on passenger aircraft and the challenges TSA 

and industry stakeholders may face in screening such cargo. GAO’s testimony is 

based on products issued from October 2005 through August 2008, and its on-going 

review of air cargo security. GAO reviewed TSA’s air cargo security programs, interviewed program officials and industry representatives, and visited two large U.S. 

airports. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO has made recommendations to DHS and TSA in prior reports to increase the 

security of air cargo, including completing vulnerability assessments and re-examining existing screening exemptions. DHS generally agreed with these recommendations and plans to address them. GAO discussed the preliminary observations in 

this statement with TSA officials. TSA agreed with GAO’s findings. 

AVIATION SECURITY.—PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON TSA’S PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN MEETING THE STATUTORY MANDATE FOR SCREENING AIR CARGO ON PASSENGER AIRCRAFT

What GAO Found 

TSA has made progress in meeting the air cargo screening mandate as it applies 

to domestic cargo. TSA has taken steps that will allow screening responsibilities to 

be shared across the air cargo supply chain—including TSA, air carriers, freight forwarders (which consolidate cargo from shippers and take it to air carriers for transport), and shippers—although air carriers have the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that they transport cargo screened at the requisite levels. TSA has taken several 

key steps to meet the mandate, including establishing a new requirement for 100 

percent screening of cargo transported on narrow-body aircraft; revising or eliminating most screening exemptions for domestic cargo; creating the Certified Cargo 

Screening Program (CCSP) to allow screening to take place at various points in the 

air cargo supply chain; and establishing a screening technology pilot. Although TSA 

estimates that it achieved the mandated 50 percent screening level by February 

2009 as it applies to domestic cargo, the agency cannot yet verify that the requisite 

levels of cargo are being screened. It is working to establish a system to do so by 

April 2009. Also, TSA’s screening approach could result in variable percentages of 

screened cargo on passenger flights. 

TSA and industry stakeholders may face a number of challenges in meeting the 

screening mandate, including attracting participants to the CCSP, and technology, 

oversight, and in-bound cargo challenges. TSA’s approach relies on the voluntary 

participation of shippers and freight forwarders, but it is unclear whether the facilities needed to meet TSA’s screening estimates will join the CCSP. In addition, TSA 

has taken some steps to develop and test technologies for screening air cargo, but 

the agency has not yet completed assessments of these technologies and cannot be 

assured that they are effective in the cargo environment. TSA’s limited inspection 

resources may also hamper its ability to oversee the thousands of additional entities 

that it expects to participate in the CCSP. Finally, TSA does not expect to meet the 

mandated 100 percent screening deadline as it applies to in-bound air cargo, in part 

due to existing in-bound screening exemptions and challenges it faces in harmonizing security standards with other nations. 
20 

1For the purposes of this statement, domestic air cargo refers to cargo transported by air 

within the United States and from the United States to a foreign location by both U.S. and foreign-based air carriers, and in-bound cargo refers to cargo transported by air from a foreign location to the United States. 2Pub. L. No. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

3Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1602, 121 Stat. 266, 477–80 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)). 4GAO, Review of the Transportation Security Administration’s Air Cargo Screening Exemptions Report, (Washington, DC: August 15, 2008); Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and Other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All 

Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft, (Washington, DC: July 15, 2008); Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments 

in Key Aviation and Surface Transportation Security Programs, but More Work Remains, (Washington, DC: May 13, 2008); Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo 

Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, (Washington, DC: April 30, 2007); and Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, (Washington, 

DC: October 17, 2005). 

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the security of the air cargo transportation system. In 2007, about 7.6 billion pounds of cargo was transported on U.S. 

passenger flights—56 percent of which was transported domestically and 44 percent 

of which was transported on flights to the United States (in-bound cargo).1 In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) was enacted in November 2001.2 ATSA created the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and required it to provide for the 

screening of all passengers and property, including cargo, U.S. mail, and carry-on 

and checked baggage that is transported on passenger aircraft. Recognizing the need 

to strengthen the security of air cargo, Congress passed, and the President signed 

into law, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

(9/11 Commission Act), which mandates the establishment of a system to physically 

screen 50 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft—including the domestic and inbound flights of foreign and U.S. passenger operations—by February 2009, and 100 

percent of such cargo by August 2010.3

The 9/11 Commission Act establishes minimum standards for screening air cargo, 

and requires that such standards provide a level of security commensurate with the 

level of security for the screening of checked baggage. Although the mandate is applicable to both domestic and in-bound air cargo, TSA stated that it will address 

the mandate for domestic and in-bound cargo through two separate systems. For example, while TSA interprets these standards to mean that all cargo, with certain 

exceptions, must be screened by TSA-approved methods, the exceptions vary greatly 

between domestic and in-bound cargo. This testimony will therefore address efforts 

to meet the screening mandate as it applies to domestic and in-bound cargo separately. 

My testimony today includes preliminary observations on: (1) TSA’s progress in 

meeting the 9/11 Commission Act mandate to screen air cargo transported on passenger aircraft as it applies to domestic cargo, and (2) the challenges TSA and industry stakeholders may face in screening such cargo, including challenges TSA 

may face in meeting the mandate as it applies to in-bound cargo. My comments are 

based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from October 2005 through August 

2008 addressing the security of the air cargo transportation system.4 More detailed 

information on our scope and methodology appears in our published reports. 
21 

5There are about 450 commercial airports in the United States. TSA classifies airports into 

one of five categories (X, I, II, III, and IV) based on various factors, such as the total number 

of takeoffs and landings annually, the extent to which passengers are screened at the airport, 

and other special security considerations. In general, category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest. 6 Narrow-body aircraft, such as B–737s and A–320s, are defined by fuselage diameter, and 

most narrow-body aircraft have only one aisle. Narrow-body aircraft that fly in the United 

States do not carry any consolidated pallets or unit loading devices (ULD) that allow packages 

to be consolidated in one container. Wide-body aircraft are also defined by fuselage diameter, 

and can carry consolidated pallets or ULDs. 7Details on TSA’s screening exemptions are Sensitive Security Information and are not discussed in this statement. 

This statement also includes information from our on-going review of air cargo security requested by the Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, 

Bennie G. Thompson, and Congressman Edward J. Markey. The results of this review will be issued later this year. To determine the progress TSA has made in 

meeting the 9/11 Commission Act mandate, and to identify any on-going challenges, 

we reviewed TSA’s air cargo security programs, and interviewed TSA air cargo program officials and representatives from various air cargo industry associations. We 

also conducted site visits to two large U.S. commercial airports that process domestic and in-bound air cargo to observe screening operations and technologies, and 

interviewed local TSA officials and representatives from air carriers, freight forwarders, and shippers to obtain their views on TSA’s system to implement the 

screening mandate.5 Our site visits and interviews with industry stakeholders were 

based on a judgmental sample and are not generalizable to the entire air cargo industry. 

We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

SUMMARY

TSA has taken several key steps to meet the air cargo screening mandate of the 

9/11 Commission Act. These include the following: • Requiring that each air carrier ensure that 100 percent of domestic cargo transported on its narrow-body passenger aircraft is screened as of October 1, 2008, 

and that each air carrier ensure that 50 percent of domestic cargo transported 

on its entire passenger aircraft fleet is screened as of February 1, 2009.6 Effective February 2009, TSA also revised or eliminated most of its screening exemptions for domestic, but not in-bound, cargo;7

• Creating the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) to allow screening to 

take place earlier in the shipping process and at various points in the air cargo 

supply chain; • Conducting outreach to inform air cargo industry stakeholders about the new 

industry requirements and the CCSP; • Establishing the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot to allow freight forwarders and shippers to operationally test approved screening technology; and: • Expanding its explosives detection canine program to include 85 canine teams 

dedicated to screening air cargo at 20 major airports. 

However, while TSA estimates that it achieved the February 2009 50 percent 

screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, the agency cannot yet verify that 

requisite screening levels are being met. In addition, although TSA believes its current screening approach enables it to meet the statutory screening mandate as it 

applies to domestic cargo, some of the ways in which TSA has defined the terms 

for screening cargo could result in variable percentages of screened cargo on passenger flights. 

TSA faces several challenges in meeting the air cargo screening mandate. For example, it is unclear whether the facilities needed to meet TSA’s screening estimates 

will join its new CCSP, in part because the costs could be prohibitive. Moreover, 

TSA faces a number of challenges related to technology—for instance, TSA has not 

yet completed assessments of the technologies it plans to allow air carriers and 

CCSP participants to use to meet the 100 percent cargo screening mandate. TSA 

also faces challenges overseeing compliance with the CCSP due to the size of its current transportation security inspector (TSI) workforce. In addition, with respect to 

in-bound cargo, TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of in-bound 

air cargo by the mandated deadline of August 2010. This is due, in part, to existing 
22 

8The term harmonization is used to describe countries’ efforts to coordinate their security 

practices to enhance security and increase efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort. Harmonization efforts can include countries mutually recognizing and accepting each other’s existing 

practices—which could represent somewhat different approaches to achieve the same outcome, 

as well as working to develop mutually acceptable uniform standards. 9For the purposes of this statement, the term freight forwarders only includes those freight 

forwarders that are regulated by TSA, also referred to as indirect air carriers. 10See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)(5). 11 EDS uses computer-aided tomography X-rays to examine objects inside baggage and identify 

the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. ETD requires human operators to collect samples of items to be screened with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces 

in-bound screening exemptions, and to challenges TSA faces in harmonizing the 

agency’s air cargo security standards with those of other nations.8

GAO has made recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

and TSA in prior reports to increase the security of air cargo, including completing 

vulnerability assessments and re-examining existing screening exemptions. DHS 

generally agreed with these recommendations and plans to address them. We discussed the preliminary observations that are contained in this statement related to 

our on-going work with officials from TSA. TSA officials agreed with our findings. 

TSA also provided us with technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

BACKGROUND

Air cargo ranges in size from 1 pound to several tons, and in type from perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic equipment, automobile 

parts, clothing, medical supplies, fresh produce, and human remains. Cargo can be 

shipped in various forms, including large containers known as unit loading devices 

(ULD) that allow many packages to be consolidated into one container that can be 

loaded onto an aircraft, wooden crates, consolidated pallets, or individually wrapped/ 

boxed pieces, known as loose or bulk cargo. Participants in the air cargo shipping 

process include shippers, such as individuals and manufacturers; freight forwarders; 

air cargo handling agents, who process and load cargo onto aircraft on behalf of air 

carriers; and air carriers that load and transport cargo.9 A shipper may take or send 

its packages to a freight forwarder who in turn consolidates cargo from many shippers onto a master air waybill—a manifest of the consolidated shipment—and delivers it to air carriers for transport. A shipper may also send freight by directly packaging and delivering it to an air carrier’s ticket counter or sorting center, where the 

air carrier or a cargo handling agent will sort and load cargo onto the aircraft. 

According to TSA, the mission of its air cargo security program is to secure the 

air cargo transportation system while not unduly impeding the flow of commerce. 

TSA’s responsibilities for securing air cargo include, among other things, establishing security requirements governing domestic and foreign passenger air carriers 

that transport cargo and domestic freight forwarders. TSA is also responsible for 

overseeing the implementation of air cargo security requirements by air carriers and 

freight forwarders through compliance inspections, and, in coordination with DHS’s 

Directorate for Science and Technology (S&T Directorate), for conducting research 

and development of air cargo security technologies. Of the nearly $4.8 billion appropriated to TSA for aviation security in fiscal year 2009, approximately $123 million 

is directed for air cargo security activities. TSA was further directed to use $18 million of this amount to expand technology pilots and for auditing participants in the 

CCSP. 

Air carriers and freight forwarders are responsible for implementing TSA security 

requirements. To do this, they utilize TSA-approved security programs that describe 

the security policies, procedures, and systems they will implement and maintain to 

comply with TSA security requirements. These requirements include measures related to the acceptance, handling, and screening of cargo; training of employees in 

security and cargo screening procedures; testing for employee proficiency in cargo 

screening; and access to cargo areas and aircraft. Air carriers and freight forwarders 

must also abide by security requirements imposed by TSA through security directives and amendments to security programs. 

The 9/11 Commission Act defines screening for purposes of the air cargo screening 

mandate as a physical examination or nonintrusive methods of assessing whether 

cargo poses a threat to transportation security.10 The act specifies that screening 

methods include X-ray systems, explosives detection systems (EDS), explosives trace 

detection (ETD), explosives detection canine teams certified by TSA, physical search 

together with manifest verification, and any additional methods approved by the 

TSA Administrator.11 For example, TSA also recognizes the use of decompression 
23 

of explosives material. Certified explosives detection canine teams have been evaluated by TSA 

and shown to effectively detect explosive devices. Physical search together with manifest 

verification entails comparisons between air waybills and cargo contents to ensure that the contents of the cargo shipment matches the cargo identified in documents filed by the shipper. 12Decompression chambers simulate atmospheric pressures affecting aircraft by simulating 

flight conditions, which can cause explosives that are attached to barometric fuses to detonate. 13 According to TSA officials, narrow-body aircraft make up most domestic passenger flights, 

and transport most passengers traveling on domestic passenger flights. 14Other facilities that can become CCSFs are manufacturing facilities, third-party logistics 

providers, warehouse/distribution centers, and independent cargo screening facilities. 

chambers as an approved screening method.12 However, solely performing a review 

of information about the contents of cargo or verifying the identity of the cargo’s 

shipper does not constitute screening for purposes of satisfying the mandate. 

TSA HAS MADE PROGRESS IN MEETING THE SCREENING MANDATE AS IT APPLIES TO DO- MESTIC CARGO; HOWEVER, TSA CANNOT YET VERIFY WHETHER THE MANDATED LEVEL

IS BEING MET

TSA Has Made Progress in Meeting the 50 Percent and 100 Percent Mandated 

Screening Levels as They Apply to Domestic Cargo 

TSA has taken several key steps to meet the 9/11 Commission Act air cargo 

screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo. TSA’s approach involves multiple 

air cargo industry stakeholders sharing screening responsibilities across the air 

cargo supply chain. TSA, air carriers, freight forwarders, shippers, and other entities each play an important role in the screening of cargo, although TSA has determined that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that screening takes place at 

mandated levels lies with the air carriers. According to TSA officials, this decentralized approach is expected to minimize carrier delays, cargo backlogs, and potential 

increases in cargo transit time, which would likely result if screening were conducted primarily by air carriers at the airport. Moreover, because much cargo is currently delivered to air carriers in a consolidated form, the requirement to screen individual pieces of cargo will necessitate screening earlier in the air cargo supply 

chain—before cargo is consolidated. The specific steps that TSA has taken to address the air cargo screening mandate are discussed below. 

TSA revised air carrier security programs. Effective October 1, 2008, several 

months prior to the first mandated deadline, TSA established a new requirement 

for 100 percent screening of nonexempt cargo transported on narrow-body passenger 

aircraft. Narrow-body flights transport about 26 percent of all cargo on domestic 

passenger flights.13 According to TSA officials, air carriers reported that they are 

currently meeting this requirement. Effective February 1, 2009, TSA also required 

air carriers to ensure the screening of 50 percent of all nonexempt air cargo transported on all passenger aircraft. Although screening may be conducted by various 

entities, each air carrier must ensure that the screening requirements are fulfilled. 

Furthermore, effective February 2009, TSA revised or eliminated most of its screening exemptions for domestic cargo. As a result, most domestic cargo is now subject 

to TSA screening requirements. 

TSA created the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). TSA also created a 

program, known as the CCSP, to allow screening to take place earlier in the shipping process and at various points in the air cargo supply chain. In this program, 

air cargo industry stakeholders—such as freight forwarders and shippers—voluntarily apply to become Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSF).14 This program 

allows cargo to be screened before it is consolidated and transported to the airport, 

which helps address concerns about the time-intensive process of breaking down 

consolidated cargo at airports for screening purposes. TSA plans to inspect the 

CCSFs in order to ensure they are screening cargo as required. TSA initiated the 

CCSP at 18 major airports that, according to TSA officials, account for 65 percent 

of domestic cargo on passenger aircraft. TSA expects to expand the CCSP Nationwide at a date yet to be determined. CCSFs in the program were required to begin 

screening cargo as of February 1, 2009. 

While participation in the CCSP is voluntary, once an entity is certified by TSA 

to participate it must adhere to TSA screening and security requirements and be 

subject to annual inspections by TSIs. To become certified and to maintain certification, TSA requires each CCSF to demonstrate compliance with increased security 

standards to include facility, personnel, procedural, perimeter, and information technology security. As part of the program, and using TSA-approved screening methods, freight forwarders must screen 50 percent of cargo being delivered to wide-body 

passenger aircraft and 100 percent of cargo being delivered to narrow-body passenger aircraft, while shippers must screen 100 percent of all cargo being delivered 
24 

15 Initially, the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot was limited to freight forwarders. However, in November 2008, TSA issued a second announcement seeking additional freight forwarders and independent cargo screening facilities to apply for the pilot. Entities that are not 

part of the technology pilot must still report screening volumes to TSA, but not the screening 

technology data. Moreover, entities that do not participate in the pilot will not receive TSA funding to purchase screening technology. 16GAO–06–76; GAO–07–660. 

to any passenger aircraft. Each CCSF must deliver the screened cargo to air carriers 

while maintaining a secure chain of custody to prevent tampering with the cargo 

after it is screened. 

TSA conducted outreach efforts to air cargo industry stakeholders. In January 

2008, TSA initiated its outreach phase of the CCSP in three cities and subsequently 

expanded its outreach to freight forwarders and other air cargo industry stakeholders in the 18 major airports. TSA established a team of nine TSA field staff to 

conduct outreach, educate potential CCSP applicants on the program requirements, 

and validate CCSFs. According to TSA officials, in February 2009, the agency also 

began using its cargo TSIs in the field to conduct outreach. In our preliminary discussions with several freight forwarders and shippers, industry stakeholders reported that TSA staff have been responsive and helpful in answering questions 

about the program and providing information on CCSP requirements. 

TSA established the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot and is conducting additional technology pilots. To operationally test ETD and X-ray technology among 

CCSFs, TSA created the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot in January 2008, and 

selected some of the largest freight forwarders to use the technologies and report 

on their experiences. TSA’s objectives for the pilot are to determine CCSFs’ ability 

to screen high volumes of cargo, test chain of custody procedures, and measure the 

effectiveness of screening technology on various commodity classes. TSA will provide 

each CCSF participating in the pilot with up to $375,000 for purchasing technology. 

As of February 26, 2009, 12 freight forwarders in 48 locations are participating in 

the pilot.15 The screening they perform as part of the operational testing also counts 

toward meeting the air cargo screening mandate. 

TSA expanded its explosives detection canine program. To assist air carriers in 

screening consolidated pallets and unit loading devices, TSA is taking steps to expand the use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams. TSA has 37 canine 

teams dedicated to air cargo screening—operating in 20 major airports—and is in 

the process of adding 48 additional dedicated canine teams. TSA is working with 

the air carriers to identify their peak cargo delivery times, during which canines 

would be most helpful for screening. 

In addition, we reported in October 2005 and April 2007 that TSA, working with 

DHS’s S&T Directorate, was developing and pilot testing a number of technologies 

to screen and secure air cargo with minimal effect on the flow of commerce.16 These 

pilot programs seek to enhance the security of cargo by improving the effectiveness 

of screening for explosives through increased detection rates and reduced false 

alarm rates. A description of several of these pilot programs and their status is included in table 1. 
25 

17Details on TSA’s reporting requirements are Sensitive Security Information and are not discussed in this statement. 

TABLE 1.—TSA AND DHS DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

PILOT PROGRAMS TO TEST TECHNOLOGIES TO SCREEN AND SECURE 

AIR CARGO 

Pilot Program Description Status 

Air cargo explosives detection pilot program.Tests the use of explosives detection systems, explosives 

trace detectors, standard Xray machines, canine teams, 

technologies that can locate a 

stowaway through detection 

of a heartbeat or increased 

carbon dioxide levels in 

cargo, and manual screening 

of air cargo.

Consistent with the conference 

report accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, 

DHS’s S&T Directorate is required to report on the initial 

results of the pilots every 6 

months after initiation of the 

first pilot.* DHS last submitted a report dated July 

2008. According to DHS officials, the final report is currently undergoing DHS executive review and DHS plans 

to provide this report to Congress in March 2009. 

Explosives detection systems (EDS).Tests the use of computer-aided 

tomography to compare the 

densities of objects to locate 

explosives in air cargo and to 

determine the long-term feasibility of using EDS equipment as a total screening 

process for bulk air cargo.

TSA planned to complete this 

pilot program in May 2008. 

In February 2009, TSA officials stated that the pilot was 

completed in December 2008, 

and the final report should 

be available in July 2009. 

Air cargo security seals.Explores the viability of potential security countermeasures, such as tamperevident security seals, for use 

during transport of screened 

cargo.

In February 2009, TSA officials 

stated that the agency is 

waiting for vendors to 

produce technology that it 

can test and evaluate. TSA 

then plans to issue operational requirements to industry. In March 2009, TSA 

officials stated that the agency has not set time frames 

for this process. 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by TSA. 

* H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109–241, at 53 (2005) (accompanying Pub. L. No. 109–90, 119 Stat. 

2064 (2005)). 

TSA Cannot Yet Verify that Screening Is Being Conducted Domestically at the Mandated Level, and TSA’s Current Approach Could Result in Variable Percentages 

of Screened Cargo 

TSA estimates that it achieved the mandate for screening 50 percent of domestic 

cargo transported on passenger aircraft by February 2009, based on feedback from 

air cargo industry stakeholders responsible for conducting screening. However, TSA 

cannot yet verify that screening is being conducted at the mandated level. The agency is working to establish a system to collect data from screening entities to verify 

that requisite screening levels for domestic cargo are being met. Effective February 

2009, TSA adjusted air carrier reporting requirements and added CCSF reporting 

requirements to include monthly screening reports on the number of shipments 

screened at 50 and 100 percent.17 According to TSA officials, air carriers will provide to TSA the first set of screening data by mid-March 2009. By April 2009, TSA 

officials expect to have processed and analyzed available screening data, which 

would allow the agency to determine whether the screening mandate has been met. 

Thus, while TSA asserts that it has met the mandated February 2009, 50 percent 

screening deadline, until the agency analyzes required screening data, TSA cannot 

verify that the mandated screening levels are being achieved. 
26 

18Details on TSA’s screening approach are Sensitive Security Information and are not discussed in this statement. 19Details on TSA’s approved screening methods are Sensitive Security Information and are 

not discussed in this statement. 20 An independent cargo screening facility is a facility that will accept cargo from freight forwarders and shippers, and screen it for a fee, according to CCSP guidelines. 

In addition, although TSA believes its current screening approach enables it to 

meet the statutory screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, this approach 

could result in variable percentages of screened cargo on passenger flights.18 This 

variability is most likely for domestic air carriers that have a mixed-size fleet of aircraft because a portion of their 50 percent screening requirement may be accomplished through the more stringent screening requirements for narrow-body aircraft, 

thus allowing them more flexibility in the amount of cargo to screen on wide-body 

aircraft. According to TSA, although this variability is possible, it is not a significant 

concern because of the small amount of cargo transported on narrow-body flights by 

air carriers with mixed-size fleets. However, the approach could result in variable 

percentages of screened cargo on passenger flights regardless of the composition of 

the fleet. As explained earlier, TSA is in the process of developing a data reporting 

system that may help to assess whether some passenger flights are transporting 

variable percentages of screened cargo. This issue regarding TSA’s current air cargo 

security approach will be further explored during our on-going review. 

Lastly, TSA officials reported that cargo that has already been transported on one 

passenger flight may be subsequently transferred to another passenger flight without undergoing additional screening. According to TSA officials, the agency has determined that this is an approved screening method because an actual flight mimics 

one of TSA’s approved screening methods.19 For example, cargo exempt from TSA 

screening requirements that is transported on an in-bound flight an be transferred 

to a domestic aircraft without additional screening, because it is considered to have 

been screened in accordance with TSA screening requirements. According to TSA, 

this scenario occurs infrequently, but the agency has not been able to provide us 

with data that allows us to assess how frequently this occurs. TSA reported that 

it is exploring ways to enhance the security of cargo transferred to another flight, 

including using canine teams to screen such cargo. This issue regarding TSA’s current air cargo security approach will be further explored during our on-going review. 

TSA FACES PARTICIPATION, TECHNOLOGY, OVERSIGHT, AND IN-BOUND CARGO

CHALLENGES IN MEETING THE SCREENING MANDATE

It Is Unclear Whether TSA Will Be Able to Attract the Voluntary Participants Needed 

to Meet the 100 Percent Screening Mandate 

Although industry participation in the CCSP is vital to TSA’s approach to spread 

screening responsibilities across the supply chain, it is unclear whether the number 

and types of facilities needed to meet TSA’s screening estimates will join the CCSP. 

Although TSA is relying on the voluntary participation of freight forwarders and 

shippers to meet the screening goals of the CCSP, officials did not have precise estimates of the number of participants that would be required to join the program to 

achieve 100 percent screening by August 2010. As of February 26, 2009, TSA had 

certified 172 freight forwarder CCSFs, 14 shipper CCSFs, and 17 independent cargo 

screening facilities (ICSF).20

TSA estimates that freight forwarders and shippers will complete the majority of 

air cargo screening at the August 2010 deadline, with shippers experiencing the 

largest anticipated increase when this mandate goes into effect. According to estimates reported by TSA in November 2008, as shown in figure 1, the screening conducted by freight forwarders was expected to increase from 14 percent to 25 percent 

of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft from February 2009 to August 2010, 

while the screening conducted by shippers was expected to increase from 2 percent 

to 35 percent. For this reason, increasing shipper participation in the CCSP is necessary to meet the 100 percent screening mandate. 
27 

21TSA expects air carriers operating wide-body aircraft to screen approximately 5 percent of 

cargo as of February 2009, and 9 percent when the 100 percent mandate goes into effect in August 2010. 22 A freight forwarder’s size is determined by its annual sales. For example, a freight forwarder with $5 million or less in annual sales is considered to be small. 

As highlighted in figure 1, TSA estimated that, as of February 2009, screening 

of cargo delivered for transport on narrow-body aircraft would account for half of 

the mandated 50 percent screening level and 25 percent of all cargo transported on 

passenger aircraft. TSA expected screening conducted on cargo delivered for transport on narrow-body passenger aircraft to remain stable at 25 percent when the 

mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft goes into 

effect.21 TSA anticipated that its own screening responsibilities would grow by the 

time the 100 percent mandate goes into effect. Specifically, TSA anticipated that its 

canine teams and transportation security officers would screen 6 percent of cargo 

in August 2010, up from 4 percent in February 2009. It is important to note that 

these estimates—which TSA officials said are subject to change—are dependent on 

the voluntary participation of freight forwarders, shippers, and other screening entities in the CCSP. If these entities do not volunteer to participate in the CCSP at 

the levels TSA anticipates, air carriers or TSA may be required to screen more cargo 

than was projected. 

Participation in the CCSP may appeal to a number of freight forwarders and shippers, but industry participants we interviewed expressed concern about potential 

program costs. In preliminary discussions with freight forwarders, shippers, and industry associations, stakeholders told us that they would prefer to join the CCSP 

and screen their own cargo in order to limit the number of entities that handle and 

open their cargo. This is particularly true for certain types of delicate cargo, including fresh produce. Screening cargo in the CCSP also allows freight forwarders and 

shippers to continue to consolidate their shipments before delivering them to air carriers, which results in reduced shipping rates and less potential loss and damage. 

However, TSA and industry officials with whom we spoke agreed that the majority 

of small freight forwarders—which make up approximately 80 percent of the freight 

forwarder industry—would likely find prohibitive the costs of joining the CCSP, including acquiring expensive technology, hiring additional personnel, conducting additional training, and making facility improvements.22 TSA has not yet finalized 

cost estimates for industry participation in air cargo screening, but is in the process 

of developing these estimates and is planning to report them later this year. As of 

February 26, 2009, 12 freight forwarders in 48 locations have joined TSA’s Air 

Cargo Screening Technology pilot and are thus eligible to receive reimbursement for 
28 

23Technologies that successfully pass lab assessments and independent testing and evaluation 

become eligible to undergo additional operational testing and evaluation in an operational environment. Technologies that successfully pass independent and operational evaluation will be 

added to a list of qualified products. 24Decompression chambers are also approved for use by air carriers. 

the technology they have purchased. However pilot participants, to date, have been 

limited primarily to large freight forwarders. TSA indicated that it targeted highvolume facilities for the pilot in order to have the greatest effect in helping industry 

achieve screening requirements. 

In response to stakeholder concerns about potential program costs, TSA is allowing independent cargo screening facilities to join the CCSP and screen cargo on behalf of freight forwarders or shippers. However, it is unclear how many of these facilities will join. Moreover, according to industry stakeholders, this arrangement 

could result in freight forwarders being required to deliver loose freight to screening 

facilities for screening. This could reduce the benefit to freight forwarders of consolidating freight before delivering it to air carriers, a central part of the freight forwarder business model. 

TSA Has Taken Some Steps to Develop and Test Technologies for Screening Air 

Cargo, but Has Not Yet Completed Assessments to Ensure Their Effectiveness 

TSA has taken some steps to develop and test technologies for screening and securing air cargo, but has not yet completed assessments of the technologies it plans 

to allow air carriers and program participants to use in meeting the August 2010 

screening mandate.23 To date, TSA has approved specific models of three screening 

technologies for use by air carriers and CCSFs until August 3, 2010—ETD, EDS, 

and X-ray.24 TSA chose these technologies based on its subject matter expertise and 

the performance of these technologies in the checkpoint and checked baggage environments. According to TSA officials, the agency has conducted preliminary assessments, but has not completed laboratory or operational testing of these technologies 

in the air cargo environment. 

After the technology pilot programs and other testing are complete, TSA will determine which technologies will be qualified for screening cargo and whether these 

technologies will be approved for use after August 3, 2010. However, TSA is proceeding with operational testing and evaluations to determine which of these technologies is effective at the same time that screening entities are using these technologies to meet air cargo screening requirements. For example, according to TSA, 

ETD technology, which most air carriers and CCSFs plan to use, has not yet begun 

the qualification process. However, it is currently being used to screen air cargo as 

part of the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot and by air carriers and other 

CCSFs. Although TSA’s acquisition guidance recommends testing the operational effectiveness and suitability of technologies prior to deploying them, and TSA agrees 

that simultaneous testing and deployment of technology is not ideal, TSA officials 

reported that this was necessary to meet the screening deadlines mandated by the 

9/11 Commission Act. While we recognize TSA’s time constraints, the agency cannot 

be assured that the technologies it is currently using to screen cargo are effective 

in the cargo environment, because they are still being tested and evaluated. We will 

continue to assess TSA’s technology issues as part of our on-going review of TSA’s 

efforts to meet the mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger 

aircraft. 

Although TSA is in the process of assessing screening technologies, according to 

TSA officials, there is no single technology capable of efficiently and effectively 

screening all types of air cargo for the full range of potential terrorist threats. Moreover, according to industry stakeholders, technology to screen cargo that has already 

been consolidated and loaded onto a pallet or ULD may be critical to meet the 100 

percent screening mandate. Although TSA has not approved any technologies that 

are capable of screening consolidated pallets or ULDs containing various commodities, according to TSA, it is currently beginning to assess such technology. TSA officials reported that they do not expect to qualify such technology prior to the August 

2010 deadline. 

Air cargo industry stakeholders we interviewed also expressed some concerns regarding the cost of purchasing and maintaining screening equipment for CCSP participants. Cost is a particular concern for the CCSP participants that do not participate in the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot and will receive no funding for 

technology or other related costs; this includes the majority of CCSFs. Because the 

technology qualification process could result in modifications to TSA’s approved 

technologies, industry stakeholders expressed concerns about purchasing technology 

that is not guaranteed to be acceptable for use after August 3, 2010. We will con-
29 

25GAO, Aviation Security: Status of Transportation Security Inspector Workforce, GAO–09– 

123R (Washington DC: February 6, 2009). 

tinue to assess this issue as part of our on-going review of TSA’s efforts to meet 

the mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. 

In addition to the importance of screening technology, TSA officials noted that an 

area of concern in the transportation of air cargo is the chain of custody between 

the various entities that handle and screen cargo shipments prior to its loading onto 

an aircraft. Officials stated that the agency has taken steps to analyze the chain 

of custody under the CCSP, and has issued cargo procedures to all entities involved 

in the CCSP to ensure that the chain of custody of the cargo is secure. This includes 

guidance on when and how to secure cargo with tamper-evident technology. TSA officials noted that they plan to test and evaluate such technology and issue recommendations to the industry, but have not set any time frames for doing so. Until 

TSA completes this testing, however, the agency lacks assurances that existing tamper-evident technology is of sufficient quality to deter tampering and that the air 

cargo supply chain is effectively secured. We will continue to assess this issue as 

part of our on-going review of TSA’s efforts to meet the mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. 

Limited Staffing Resources May Hamper TSA’s Ability to Effectively Oversee the 

Thousands of Additional Entities Involved in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening 

Mandate 

Although the actual number of cargo TSIs increased each fiscal year from 2005 

to 2009, TSA still faces challenges overseeing compliance with the CCSP due to the 

size of its current TSI workforce. To ensure that existing air cargo security requirements are being implemented as required, TSIs perform compliance inspections of 

regulated entities, such as air carriers and freight forwarders. Under the CCSP, 

TSIs will also perform compliance inspections of new regulated entities, such as 

shippers and manufacturers, who voluntarily become CCSFs. These compliance inspections range from an annual review of the implementation of all air cargo security requirements to a more frequent review of at least one security requirement. 

According to TSA, the number of cargo TSIs grew from 160 in fiscal year 2005 to 

about 500 in fiscal year 2009. However, cargo TSI numbers remained below levels 

authorized by TSA in each fiscal year from 2005 through 2009, which, in part, led 

to the agency not meeting cargo inspection goals in fiscal year 2007. As highlighted 

in our February 2009 report, TSA officials stated that the agency is still actively 

recruiting to fill vacant positions but could not provide documentation explaining 

why vacant positions remained unfilled.25 Additionally, TSA officials have stated 

that there may not be enough TSIs to conduct compliance inspections of all the potential entities under the CCSP, which TSA officials told us could number in the 

thousands, once the program is fully implemented by August 2010. TSA officials 

also indicated plans to request additional cargo TSIs in the future, although the 

exact number has yet to be formulated. According to TSA officials, TSA does not 

have a human capital or other workforce plan for the TSI program, but the agency 

has plans to conduct a staffing study in fiscal year 2009 to identify the optimal 

workforce size to address its current and future program needs. Until TSA completes its staffing study, TSA may not be able to determine whether it has the necessary staffing resources to ensure that entities involved in the CCSP are meeting 

TSA requirements to screen and secure air cargo. We will continue to assess this 

issue as part of our on-going review of TSA’s efforts to meet the mandate to screen 

100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. 

TSA Has Taken Some Steps to Meet the Screening Mandate as It Applies to In-bound 

Cargo but Does Not Expect to Achieve 100 Percent Screening of In-bound Cargo 

by the August 2010 Deadline 

To meet the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate as it applies to in-bound 

cargo, TSA revised its requirements for foreign and U.S.-based air carrier security 

programs and began harmonization of security standards with other nations. The 

security program revisions generally require carriers to screen 50 percent of nonexempt in-bound cargo. TSA officials estimate that this requirement has been met, 

though the agency is not collecting screening data from air carriers to verify that 

the mandated screening levels are being achieved. TSA has taken several steps toward harmonization with other nations. For example, TSA is working with foreign 

governments to improve the level of screening of air cargo, including working bilaterally with the European Commission (EC) and Canada, and quadrilaterally with 

the EC, Canada, and Australia. As part of these efforts, TSA plans to recommend 

to the United Nations’ International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that the 
30 

26 ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations with the primary objective to provide 

for the safe, orderly, and efficient development of international civil aviation. 27 IATA is an industry association that represents about 230 air carriers constituting 93 percent of international scheduled air traffic. 28Details on TSA’s screening exemptions are Sensitive Security Information and are not discussed in this statement. 29GAO–07–660. 30GAO–07–660. 

next revision of Annex 17 to the Convention of International Civil Aviation (due for 

release in 2009) include an approach that would allow screening to take place at 

various points in the air cargo supply chain.26 TSA also plans to work with the 

International Air Transport Association (IATA), which is promoting an approach to 

screening cargo to its member airlines.27 Finally, TSA continues to work with U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to leverage an existing CBP system to identify and target high-risk air cargo. 

However, TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of in-bound air 

cargo by the August 2010 screening deadline. This is due, in part, to TSA’s in-bound 

screening exemptions, and to challenges TSA faces in harmonizing its air cargo security standards with those of other nations. TSA requirements continue to allow 

screening exemptions for certain types of in-bound air cargo transported on passenger aircraft.28 TSA could not provide an estimate of what percentage of in-bound 

cargo is exempt from screening. In April 2007, we reported that TSA’s screening exemptions on in-bound cargo could pose a risk to the air cargo supply chain and recommended that TSA assess whether these exemptions pose an unacceptable vulnerability and, if necessary, address these vulnerabilities.29 TSA agreed with our recommendation, but has not yet reviewed, revised, or eliminated any screening exemptions for cargo transported on in-bound passenger flights, and could not provide a 

time frame for doing so. Furthermore, similar to changes for domestic cargo requirements discussed earlier, TSA’s revisions to in-bound requirements could result in 

variable percentages of screened cargo on passenger flights to the United States. We 

will continue to assess this issue as part of our on-going review of TSA’s efforts to 

meet the mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. 

Achieving harmonization with foreign governments may be challenging, because 

these efforts are voluntary and some foreign countries do not share the United 

States’ view regarding air cargo security threats and risks. Although TSA acknowledges it has broad authority to set standards for aviation security, including the authority to require that a given percentage of in-bound cargo be screened before it 

departs for the United States, TSA officials caution that if TSA were to impose a 

strict cargo screening standard on all in-bound cargo, many nations likely would be 

unable to meet such standards in the near term. This raises the prospect of substantially reducing the flow of cargo on passenger aircraft or possibly eliminating it altogether. According to TSA, the effect of imposing such screening standards in the 

near future would be, at minimum, increased costs for international passenger travel and for imported goods, and possible reduction in passenger traffic and foreign 

imports. According to TSA officials, this could also undermine TSA’s on-going cooperative efforts to develop commensurate security systems with international partners. 

TSA agreed that assessing the risk associated with the in-bound air cargo transportation system will facilitate its efforts to harmonize security standards with 

other nations. Accordingly, TSA has identified the primary threats associated with 

in-bound air cargo, but has not yet assessed which areas of in-bound air cargo are 

most vulnerable to attack and which in-bound air cargo assets are deemed most critical to protect. Although TSA agreed with our previous recommendation to assess 

in-bound air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets, it has not yet established a 

methodology or time frame for how and when these assessments will be completed. 

We continue to believe that the completion of these assessments is important to the 

security of in-bound air cargo. 

Finally, the amount of resources TSA devotes to in-bound compliance is disproportionate to the resources for domestic compliance. In April 2007, we reported that 

TSA inspects air carriers at foreign airports to assess whether they are complying 

with air cargo security requirements, but does not inspect all air carriers transporting cargo into the United States.30 Furthermore, in fiscal year 2008, in-bound 

cargo inspections were performed by a cadre of 9 International TSIs with limited 

resources, compared to the 475 TSIs that performed domestic cargo inspections. By 

mid-fiscal year 2008, international compliance inspections accounted for a small percentage of all compliance inspections performed by TSA, although in-bound cargo 

made up more than 40 percent of all cargo on passenger aircraft in 2007. Regarding 
31 

31GAO–08–487T. 

in-bound cargo, we reported in May 2008 that TSA lacks an inspection plan with 

performance goals and measures for its international inspection efforts, and recommended that TSA develop such a plan.31 TSA officials stated in February 2009 

that they are in the process of completing a plan to provide guidance for inspectors 

conducting compliance inspections at foreign airports, and intend to implement the 

plan during fiscal year 2009. Finally TSA officials stated that the number of international TSIs needs to be increased. 

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I look forward to answering 

any questions that you or other Members of the subcommittee may have at this 

time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank both gentlemen for their testimony. 

I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to 

question the panel. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

When I make that statement, I think there is probably an appropriate sigh that might come after that before I even enter into the 

questions, because we are all here to try to make Government 

work, and I mentioned the word ‘‘verify,’’ Mr. Lord, quite frequently 

in my testimony. So I really think I am going to go directly to you. 

The verifying question gives me pause, the formula for verifying 

gives me added pause, and I would like to have you restate your 

concerns about verification, whether or not it is the approach, the 

formula that is being used, the cooperation of our aviation industry. So I have given you three points there. 

Then I want to go to a point that was raised in a letter that we 

received from TSA that talks about commensurate—were you able 

to determine what kind—what level of screening does it equate to? 

Passenger luggage? Or are we at a lesser level than that? Did your 

research or your investigation take you to that level? If it did not, 

then I think I am going to add another aspect to our inquiry when 

we seek to ask you for more review. 

Mr. Lord. 

Mr. LORD. I would be glad to respond to that. 

In the first phase of our assignment, we focused on what data 

the agency had in place to verify compliance with the legislative 

mandate. We spent a lot of time trying to understand the system; 

and, to its credit, TSA is putting in place a system that they expect 

will help answer that question next month. 

The broader issue of whether the entire process provides a level 

of security commensurate with checked baggage, that is something 

we are looking at. We are consulting closely with TSA, our counsel’s office, their counsel’s office. I understand that is the overall—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So we don’t have an answer at this time. Is 

the data that you looked at, is that a degree of software that you 

find adequate for this review? 

Mr. LORD. Excuse me? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The data that you looked at, does that include 

software that you think is adequate for this review? 

Mr. LORD. They have designed a system. They have initial reports streaming in and out. It is up to them to, No. 1, judge whether the data is reliable, scrub the data, and then analyze it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Where does the data come from? Is this submission by airline companies? 
32 

Mr. LORD. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What about the question about verifying? 

Where are we in that? That was a question that you raised in your 

testimony or in your report. 

Mr. LORD. That is our job. We help this committee conduct oversight, and we typically focus on the data. We are trained to study 

the data, trends in data. Our position is we haven’t seen the data. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You were also saying you question whether 

TSA can verify what is going on, that they are doing 50 percent. 

Mr. LORD. That is true. We typically look at the system, the 

agencies that put into place, to judge performance. That is the 

basic point of our testimony. They are in the process of putting into 

place a system. So even though they are confident they have met 

the threshold, there is no analytical basis to determine that at this 

point. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We thank you. 

Mr. Kelly, why don’t you tell me about your assessment as to 

whether TSA will be able to meet the 100 percent screening mandate—which, in essence, I am sort of putting the cart before the 

horse, but where are you now specifically with respect to the 50 

percent deadline that was on—that just passed in February? 

Mr. KELLY. Madam Chairwoman, in order to ascertain whether 

the airlines have achieved the requirement of 50 percent screening, 

what we have done is we have done polls of the airlines, we have 

talked to each of the airline security—the people at the security 

part of the airlines to discuss with them what their airlines are 

doing and are they achieving the goal. No. 2, we have our inspectors—our cargo inspectors out at the airline facility spot checking 

each of the individual airlines to make sure that they are complying with the—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is this manual? Airlines are giving you written pieces of paper or somebody is standing there standing in front 

of your inspector and giving them information? 

Mr. KELLY. It is both. The airlines feed to us the data which we 

have asked them to furnish to us, which is the screening data, 

which we will take and we are putting it into a system to accumulate it by airport, by airline; and we are also sending our inspectors 

out to observe what is being done at each of the facilities that they 

are inspecting. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Kelly, I know that you have just come on 

in the last 2 or 3 years. You have an Office of Science and Technology. There have been a lot of small businesses that have offered 

new technology that would have led up to being prepared for this 

challenge. Has anyone put on your desk new technologies that 

small businesses, such as one that we will have as a witness, but, 

in any event, that has come to your attention that could help utilize or help airlines utilize to help so this process can move forward? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, we have been coordinating with the Science and 

Technology Director to look at what I would consider non-standard 

screening technologies. It is not X-ray. It doesn’t have to be X-ray 

or EDS. What we are looking at are things such as metal detectors 

to screen cargo, produce. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Are any of those in place now? 
33 

Mr. KELLY. No, there are none in place. We have them at the 

science and technology facilities. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would appreciate that if you could gather 

that and provide this committee with a list of what you are looking 

at and the progress of their being able to be utilized. 

Mr. KELLY. Absolutely, yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me finish in my question here. I am still 

trying to hear, of the 50 percent deadline verification that was due 

this past February, where exactly is TSA in that ability to verify? 

Mr. KELLY. We are in the process today or this week of receiving 

the data from the airlines, and we are putting it into a system, and 

we will analyze the output of that system and then report it to you 

by mid-April of this year. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is your airline selective, or are all of the airlines flying in the Nation’s skies today? 

Mr. KELLY. It is every airline in every airport by month. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We will probably have another inquiry to get 

that list in some format, and I am going to try to formulate the 

question. 

Let me now recognize the distinguish Ranking Member, Mr. 

Dent of Pennsylvania, for his 5 minutes of questioning. 

Mr. DENT. Mr. Kelly, in your written statement you indicate that 

the industry is, ‘‘currently screening at least 50 percent of air cargo 

transport on passenger aircraft on flights originating in the United 

States.’’ When compared to the actual language of the 9/11 Act, 

your statement includes some qualification that I wish to explore 

further here today. 

Why does your statement include qualifications such as ‘‘originating in the United States’’? Does the TSA not include in its calculations air cargo transported by international flights? 

Mr. KELLY. We do, and we state that we have met the 50 percent 

requirement for both in-bound international freight and in freight 

originating in flights out-bound from the U.S. airports. 

Mr. DENT. Based on TSA’s statistics, 50,000 tons of air cargo are 

transported daily. Of these, 7,500 tons are carried on passenger 

aircraft. How much is carried on in-bound foreign air carriers? 

Mr. KELLY. Those numbers you are referencing are out-bound 

U.S. originated cargo. The total cargo moving on passenger airplanes is about 7 billion bounds a year. Four billion of that is outbound from the United States; 3 billion is in-bound to the United 

States. 

Mr. DENT. So 3 billion in-bound? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes. 

Mr. DENT. When TSA provides the Congress its statistics for the 

amount of cargo screened, do you include this exempted cargo, or 

do you take that off the top and not include it in your calculations? 

Mr. KELLY. We include all cargo, including cargo that is subject 

to alternate means. 

Mr. DENT. So the TSA is required to provide an inspection regime commensurate with that covering passenger baggage. How 

does TSA propose to ensure that foreign air carriers bound for the 

United States provide this commensurate level of security for inbound cargo? 
34 

Mr. KELLY. TSA is working with our foreign partners to harmonize our programs so that their level of screening is equal to 

ours. Until they get to that, what they have to follow is our model 

security program, which we verified through our international inspection force. 

Mr. DENT. I would like to get to the issue of harmonization here 

in a second. I will turn to Mr. Lord on that subject. 

I am concerned that no matter what the Herculean efforts that 

TSA may apply, the statutory requirements for TSA’s mandate to 

truly screen 100 percent of air cargo will not and cannot be 

achieved for many years because of the need for significant international discussions or harmonization. Would you agree that TSA 

will not meet its statutory requirement for the screening of 100 

percent of all air cargo? 

Mr. KELLY. I would have to agree. 

Mr. DENT. I would have to ask Mr. Lord. 

Mr. LORD. Yes. TSA has already informed us as part of our ongoing engagement they don’t plan to meet the 100 percent deadline. 

Mr. DENT. Do you agree that TSA’s most significant hurdle to 

meeting the congressional mandate for 100 percent of all air cargo 

will be the necessary cooperation with foreign governments? 

Mr. KELLY. We identified two issues, addressing the exemption 

issues and harmonization standards with other nations. They are 

both very important issues that need to be addressed before we will 

be able to achieve the 100 percent. 

Mr. DENT. So the TSA has been throwing around percentages, 

but these have included a series of qualifiers. They use words like 

‘‘domestic’’ or ‘‘out-bound.’’ Do these qualifiers mask the actual percentages being reached by the industry? 

Mr. KELLY. Could you repeat the question again, sir? 

Mr. DENT. I was talking about these qualifiers, that the TSA has 

been throwing around percentages, and they have these various series of qualifiers that use words like ‘‘domestic’’ or ‘‘out-bound’’. Do 

these qualifiers mask the actual percentage being reached by the 

industry? 

Mr. KELLY. I don’t think those two qualifiers do. Out-bound, they 

basically segregate the data: domestic, which includes flights originating in the United States flying out of the country, then inbound. But they have—it is a separate set of issues for both. But 

those are commonly understood terms, as I understand it. 

I think the issue is, though, to what extent the in-bound cargo 

traffic is exempt from screening. You have to understand the significance of these exemptions to really understand whether they 

are going to be able to achieve the 100 percent on the in-bound. 

Mr. DENT. How much cargo is being exempted, and how much is 

being screened by means other than what is listed in the 9/11 Act? 

Mr. LORD. That is a great question. We asked TSA what—for example, regarding the in-bound, what percent of the cargo was currently exempted from screening; and they reported to us they 

weren’t—they didn’t have the data at their disposal to answer that. 

Even if they did, I would caution that is considered sensitive security information, the exact percentages. We wouldn’t be able to dis-
35 

cuss that in an open forum anyway, the significance of the exemptions. 

Mr. DENT. Mr. Kelly, did you want to address that last question 

on how much is being exempted and how much is being screened? 

Mr. KELLY. Like Mr. Lord said, that is sensitive information. We 

would be happy to talk about it off-line. 

Mr. DENT. I would love to have that opportunity, Madam Chairwoman. I realize my time has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We will engage with TSA in a briefing along 

with other security organizations with this issue. 

It is now my privilege to recognize the full committee Chairman, 

Mr. Thompson, for 5 minutes of questioning. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mr. Kelly, you mentioned that with the Narrow Body Amendment TSA is screening cargo on flights carrying 85 percent of the 

public. Can you tell me what lessons learned, if any, the Department has obtained from that? 

Mr. KELLY. Well, I think what it has done is, No. 1, we have 

learned a lesson that we could make a small step in the process 

and make a huge step in securing the traveling public. I think that 

is one of the key lessons that we have learned. 

The other lesson is that, while this may be low-hanging fruit, it 

is probably not—it doesn’t foretell the level of complexity and difficulty that is going to be encountered by the air cargo industry in 

getting from the 50 percent to the 100 percent. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Since you raised the 50 percent, please tell the 

committee why did TSA miss the February deadline? 

Mr. KELLY. Well, Mr. Thompson, I would argue that we didn’t 

miss the deadline. We have missed the ability to report on it. But 

we consider, and all indications are, is that the airline did, in 

fact—the airlines have, in fact, accomplished the 50 percent screening. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Lord, do you agree with what Mr. Kelly just 

said? 

Mr. LORD. I have a lot of respect for Mr. Kelly and what he said 

was—it may turn out to be accurate. But, at this time, since I am 

from GAO and we are trained to look at the data, my simple retort 

is, ‘‘show me the data.’’ 

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you see anything? 

Mr. LORD. We know they are in the process of gathering it and 

analyzing it, but as of yet have they met the threshold or not? We 

simply don’t know. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So I take it, Mr. Kelly, that you disagree with 

Mr. Lord? 

Mr. KELLY. I would never disagree with Mr. Lord. 

No. Really, as I said, we feel that the industry has accomplished 

the milestone; and we will be able to verify that to the committee 

by mid-April. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So in the absence of submitting the information 

in a timely manner, you will stipulate that you missed the congressional-mandated February deadline? 

Mr. KELLY. So stipulated. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 
36 

From the standpoint of technology, what has been your experience within TSA for how long it takes new ideas to get through the 

system and implement it? 

Mr. KELLY. I don’t know if I have been around long enough to 

really answer that question accurately, but I find that most of the 

research that has been done for screening has been centered 

around the efforts of screening baggage and passengers at the 

checkpoints. There has been very little time and money devoted to 

screening of cargo. 

Now, in the last 6 months, we have had a lot of discussions with 

the science and technology group and our own technology force internally to TSA, and they recognize where the shortfalls are, and 

they are making a concerted effort to try to find technologies that 

will fill the gaps that we have in the cargo screening theater. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Are you involved in that process at all? 

Mr. KELLY. Absolutely. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Even though you haven’t been around a long 

time and you know that this mandate for screening is upon you, 

can you give the committee a guesstimate of how long it takes for 

new technology to get through TSA’s system of review? 

Mr. KELLY. Honestly, I can’t. I don’t have that information. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Okay. Can you then tell me, is it an issue that 

you don’t have the money to do it or you don’t have the staff or 

both of—why you can’t provide that? 

Mr. KELLY. I think, as I said, TSA was more focused on baggage 

screening than they were on cargo screening; and that has now 

shifted with the introduction of the 9/11 Act. That emphasis has 

shifted, and they are now looking at the issues related to screening 

of air cargo. I think what we have tried to encourage with the 

Science and Technology Directorate is to look outside the box and 

look for innovative ways of screening cargo. I think they are right 

now doing that; and, hopefully, we will find technologies that are 

good. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I beg the indulgence of the committee, 

Madam Chairwoman. 

Can you provide the committee with whatever those new ideas 

or new technologies are that you presently have under review? 

Mr. KELLY. Absolutely, yes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman. I think we have asked 

the same questions, so I hope that we will be able to put that in 

writing so that you can understand it appropriately. 

I think we have enough time to yield again. So let me indicate 

the Chair will now recognize other Members for questions they 

may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with our committee 

rules and practice, I will recognize Members who were present at 

the start of the hearing based on the starting of the subcommittee, 

alternating between the majority and minority. Those coming in 

later will be recognized as they arrive. 

We will now recognize Mr. Luja ́n for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

My questions fall exactly in line with where Chairman Thompson 

left off and talking specifically about the technology and some of 
37 

the advantages that we could be using to assist you in meeting 

these goals. 

In your testimony, Mr. Lord, it clearly states, as you point out, 

that TSA faces a number of challenges related to technology. You 

highlighted the effectiveness while TSA contractors are utilizing 

technologies before standards have been met, in utilizing technology and creating these standards with technological advances 

with other nations as we move forward. 

My question specifically, I guess, Mr. Kelly, is what can be done 

to be able to utilize the technology that we are using here in the 

United States to be able to create these standards and formalize 

these standards with other nations? 

Mr. KELLY. Well, one thing we are doing in working with the 

science and technology group is we have set up I guess what I 

would call live labs at airline facilities—one in New York and one 

in Miami—where we are actually placing the technologies that we 

hope will work with screening cargo in these facilities so that we 

can test it on a live environment, rather than do it in a lab. 

We find that if you are working in a lab, people wearing white 

coats and white gloves, there is no dirt around, and whereas if you 

can put it in a cargo facility, it is going to be what is actually going 

to happen with the equipment, and we get a better result on the 

effectiveness of that equipment. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. Okay. Mr. Lord, again, your testimony points out 

that the 9/11 Act defines screening for the purposes of the air cargo 

screening mandate as a physical examination or nonintrusive 

methods for assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation security with examples of various technologies. 

I would go back, Mr. Kelly, to maybe embrace some of the work 

that is being done with some of the labs and in the lab environment. 

Los Alamos National Labs, which is a national laboratory in my 

district, is developing a variety of technologies that could make air 

cargo screening more effective and more affordable. The national 

labs are developing technologies that will improve the safety and 

affordability of air cargo screening and air travel in general. 

For example, the Magvid scanner is capable of identifying liquids 

and gels within sealed cargo or baggage using technology similar 

to the magnetic resonance imaging systems. 

They are also developing the advanced active interrogation systems and advanced spectroscopic portal monitors, which are capable of detecting nuclear and radiological materials and can be 

adapted for cargo screening. 

My specific question is, how are—and this would be to both of 

you—how, specifically, is TSA or other organizations incorporating 

the new innovative technologies being developed by national laboratories across the country in its protection of air passengers? 

Mr. KELLY. Well, I can’t speak for the S&T Directorate, but I 

know that they are very heavily involved with the various laboratories throughout the United States in what they are developing at 

those laboratories. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. Madam Chairwoman, what I would like to do, if at 

all possible, is submit to the committee, and maybe we can submit 

it to TSA as a recommendation, various technologies that are being 
38 

explored by national laboratories around the country that maybe 

can assist us in meeting these goals. 

I know we are short on time, Madam Chairwoman, so, with that, 

I yield back. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We would be happy to receive that from the 

gentleman. I am not sure if he has a list now that he would like 

to submit into the record? 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. Later. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So the gentleman will submit it later. 

Let me yield to the distinguished gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 

Cleaver. 

Mr. Cleaver, we are trying to get you in and allow these gentlemen to depart. You are yielded at this time. Thank you, Mr. 

Cleaver. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mr. Kelly, my concern is that we, I mean, we have so many challenges, it seems, still before us. We are told that there are not 

enough inspectors. Is that accurate? 

Mr. KELLY. Well, I think presently we have enough inspectors to 

do at the level of screening that we are at today. But, as the system grows, as the Certified Cargo Screening system grows, we will 

probably have to re-evaluate the needs of our inspectors, and staff 

accordingly. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Now, if we don’t have the sophisticated screening 

equipment that would allow us to actually screen crates with cargo 

over 10 feet long, then it means—this is a question—it means that 

we would have to do it manually, that we would have to actually 

open up crates and screen the material; is that accurate? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, it is. But also, if the facility that crated the 

goods was a Certified Cargo Screening facility, then they would 

screen it before they closed up the crate, and it would be considered 

screened at that point. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Okay. But how do we—I mean, it seems like we 

are going to have a traffic jam, you know, as we move toward fulfilling the congressional mandate that—I mean, you are saying you 

have enough people at this moment to do the work, but we are 

talking just another year. You know, I am frustrated now in my 

questioning because I know we have to go vote, and I am not able 

to get into the depths of this whole issue. 

Mr. KELLY. Well, if you want, we could meet with you and talk 

to you. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Yeah, I am very much interested in the problems, 

or apparent problems, of lack of inspectors, and particularly in 

light of the fact that you have a short timeline. 

Mr. KELLY. Well, the TSA inspectors don’t screen cargo. What 

they do is they are inspectors to make sure that the airlines or the 

screening facilities comply with the regulation. So they are not 

physically screening the cargo. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Then who is? 

Mr. KELLY. The airlines will do it, the freight forwarders will do 

it, the shippers will do it, manufacturers. 

Mr. CLEAVER. We are just estimating that we are at 50 percent? 

Mr. KELLY. No. 

Mr. CLEAVER. We know? 
39 

Mr. KELLY. Well, we will verify that and advise you mid-April as 

to the status of where we are. 

Mr. CLEAVER. But it won’t be an estimate? 

Mr. KELLY. It won’t be an estimate, no. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Okay. 

Madam Chairwoman, thank you. I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Can I ask one really quick question? You can leave 

and I will take over as temporary Chair if you are worried about 

the time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman. Two 

of us have clarifying questions, and we are trying to dismiss them. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. I just want to express a concern. I would 

love to follow up with Mr. Kelly. That is all. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The gentleman from Oregon is recognized. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I would love to follow up with you. It is a particular parochial concern; all politics are local. It has to do with 

cherries and the, sort of, improbabilities and possibilities of how we 

are going to screen the 2 months’ worth of intense cherry exports 

we have by air freight every year, a very valuable commodity. I 

just need to follow up with you and see if there is some way we 

can deal with this, because right now we don’t think it is going to 

work. 

Mr. KELLY. All right. Fine. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I will have my staff follow up. 

Mr. KELLY. Okay. We have had a lot of discussions—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yeah, and we will point to what we think are still 

some problems. Your one person—your one person—out there in 

the whole Northwest is doing a great job, but he probably needs 

to be cloned, duplicated, replicated. 

Mr. KELLY. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. DeFazio, let’s get his name, he or she, 

that is doing a great job. We want to make sure we do clone him. 

I have a clarifying question, and then we will dash—thank you 

very much, Mr. DeFazio—we will dash and be able to dismiss this 

particular panel. So I yield myself just a brief moment. 

Mr. Kelly, let me understand, have you conceded or admitted 

that you missed the deadline of February 9, No. 1? No. 2, you are 

not verifying 50 percent? Have you conceded to both of those 

points? 

Mr. KELLY. No—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You missed the deadline of February 9 to 

meet 50 percent, and you also say you are not able to verify 50 percent cargo inspection. Is that what you are saying to us today? 

Mr. KELLY. We are in the process of verifying the 50 percent 

cargo—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But right now, today, you cannot verify that. 

Mr. KELLY. Right now we cannot verify it, no. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Lord, what did you say? You are agreeing 

that they can’t verify it. Do you expect they will ever be able to 

verify it? 

Mr. LORD. I indicated they are in the process of verifying; they 

can’t do it today. 
40 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Pardon me? 

Mr. LORD. I indicated they are in the process of verifying, but, 

as of today, they can’t tell you whether they have met it or not. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. 

Last point, Mr. Kelly, on airlines, are you saying airlines are cooperating, giving you information, or you are getting information 

from them? 

Mr. KELLY. They are cooperating, and they are feeding the information to us. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. I would like to get, again—I think I 

asked the question—a list of the airlines, and we will pursue that 

at a later time. 

I yield to the gentleman, Mr. Dent of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Very quickly, Mr. Kelly, do you consider exempted cargo when 

conducting your statistical analysis? 

Mr. KELLY. We include all cargo in the base of what we are— 

to how we get to the 50 percent, we include all cargo. 

Mr. DENT. Including exempted cargo? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes. 

Mr. DENT. Okay. Then, without going into detail, do you right 

now know the amount of cargo you exempted in 2008 from screening, yes or no? 

Mr. KELLY. No. 

Mr. DENT. So I guess the question then is, how is that possible? 

Mr. KELLY. Well, I mean, I don’t know, and I don’t know if I can 

find out. But I could look to see. 

Mr. DENT. Okay. I would appreciate your following up. We have 

to go run to vote, so thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Dent. 

There being no further questions for our first panel, I thank the 

witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. Again, they 

are great public servants. We appreciate that. 

The Members of the subcommittee may have additional questions 

for you, and we ask that you respond to them expeditiously in writing. 

We now will ask that you graciously accept the fact that this 

committee is in recess. When we return, we will start with our second panel. 

The committee now stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. This hearing will now be reconvened, and let 

me thank all of you for your patience. 

I thought I would acknowledge the Ranking Member for both his 

diligence and his support for the product in his district. He has 

wanted to emphasize the bipartisanship of this particular subcommittee, and you will see it as we go forward. These are Peeps 

marshmallow chicks that he has graced the Chairwoman with. It 

will suggest to you that if we do not see you before the holidays 

are approaching, we wish you wonderfully blessed holidays. If 

someone starts failing physically, we will be willing to share one 

of the marshmallow chicks with you. 

Thank you, Mr. Dent. 
41 

Mr. DENT. Madam Chairwoman, you are most welcome. I would 

be happy to make sure that we provide it to the Chairman of the 

full committee some Easter Peeps, as well, for when he needs a little sugar. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. He is on the Agriculture Committee, and I 

think he might take great interest in this. 

Mr. DENT. The name of the company is Just Born, Bethlehem, 

Pennsylvania. There you go. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Oh, my goodness. Thank you for your kindness, Mr. Dent. 

I welcome our second panel of witnesses. 

Our first witness is Mr. Andre ́ Johnson, who is responsible for 

strategic direction as well as financial and overall management of 

FreightScan. FreightScan, a California-based company, is a leader 

in the development and deployment of customer-driven technology. 

As well, it is a company that has evidenced its interest in the area 

that we are discussing. These solutions for the freight and logistics 

industry are the basis of the customer-driven technology solutions 

that this company is engaged in. Mr. Johnson has practical knowledge and experience in all sizes of business, from entrepreneurial 

to Fortune 100 companies. 

Welcome, Mr. Johnson. 

Our second witness is Mr. Jack Boisen, who recently retired as 

the head of Continental Airlines Cargo. After an auspicious 14-year 

career leading global operations, sales, marketing, customer service, and postal affairs, he continues his role as the chairman of the 

International Air Cargo Association. Mr. Boisen has spent more 

than 40 years in the airline industry, handling positions of increasing stature and responsibility. He served Houston-based Continental as vice president of the cargo division since 1994. I will not 

be biased toward Mr. Boisen because of his former affiliation with 

my hometown airline. 

But thank you and welcome, Mr. Boisen. 

Our third witness is Mr. Brandon Fried. Mr. Fried was appointed 

to serve as the executive director of the Airforwarders Association 

in November 2005. Mr. Fried has more than 25 years of experience 

in the air freight industry. He started his career as a sales representative in Los Angeles and then moved to Washington, DC, 

where he founded, owned, and operated the Washington office of 

Adcom Worldwide, a global freight forwarder specializing in timedefinite air cargo transportation. 

We welcome you, as well, Mr. Fried, to the panel. 

Our fourth witness is Mr. James May, president and CEO of the 

Air Transport Association of America, the Nation’s oldest and largest air trade association. He joined ATA in February 2003 and has 

lead the association through an especially challenging time in its 

history. Prior to joining ATA, Mr. May served as an executive vice 

president of the National Association of Broadcasters, vice president for public affairs for the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of New 

York, and directed Government relations for PepsiCo, and served 

as vice president for public affairs for the Grocery Manufacturers 

of America. 

We welcome you, Mr. May. 
42 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his statement 

for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Johnson. 

Welcome, Mr. Johnson. 

STATEMENT OF ANDRE ́ L. JOHNSON, CEO, FREIGHTSCAN 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. My name is 

Andre ́ Johnson, the CEO of FreightScan. We are a company that 

provides innovative technology solutions for transportation companies. FreightScan is a trustee member of the International Air 

Cargo Association, member of the Air Forwarders Association also. 

Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and Members 

of the distinguished subcommittee, let me extend my sincere appreciation and gratitude for your inviting me to provide this testimony 

this afternoon. 

Chairman Thompson, thank you for coming also. 

I am here to speak on behalf of the small entrepreneurial companies that are at the forefront of developing new technology to solve 

problems for both the private and public sector. Can we secure 

American skies? I believe we can. The story of FreightScan illustrates how small companies can play a significant role, meeting the 

air cargo screening requirements mandated by Congress in the 

9/11 Act. 

FreightScan was formed several years ago with a mission to offer 

business solutions for the freight industry, with an initial focus on 

air cargo. The first problem we set out to solve was how to automatically capture dimensions and images of cargo without disrupting workflow. Solving this problem will enable air carriers to 

accurately charge for large, light-weight shipments, generating 

hundreds of millions of dollars in profits. FreightScan developed 

and deployed a solution, and in late 2007 we introduced the FS100. 

As our team traveled around the world promoting the FS100, we 

kept hearing the same question: If this technology can capture dimensions and images, can we use it to screen cargo? FreightScan 

has always taken great pride in being customer-focused, and we 

committed to developing a screening solution that would not slow 

the flow of commerce. The result is CargoVizion, a system which 

will detect potential threat objects in cargo during the standard acceptance process of shipments. 

Our next step was to get CargoVizion validated and tested for inclusion on the Qualified Product List, or QPL. Our initial entree to 

the QPL process was frustrating. The roadmap to presenting our 

technology was not clear, and we couldn’t get specifications for 

what threats we had to detect or various other critical pieces of information we needed to complete our development. 

We fully support and understand the need to protect sensitive information; however, a defined QPL process, without classified data, 

would have accelerated our ability to get details about our technology to TSA for evaluation. We could not afford any more delays, 

so we eventually validated the technology internally and presented 

the information to the TSA in the hopes it was a format that they 

could accept. 

That said, let me be clear: This is in no way a criticism or indictment of the TSA and its related agencies. Our initial point of con-
43 

tact at TSA made it clear the agency was besieged by companies 

large and small claiming to have solutions. We always believed 

that the TSA wanted to find a screening solution as much as we 

wanted to deliver one. 

The proof of the TSA’s commitment to finding and validating potential solutions for 100 percent screening could be proven where 

we are today. Just a few short weeks after we convinced the TSA 

that we have a potentially viable solution, the pace has picked up 

significantly. Since then, we have had number of positive, constructive calls and e-mails with the TSA and the TSL lab in Atlantic 

City, and we are finalizing a cooperative research and development 

agreement to test and validate our technology. 

There are many positive outcomes for FreightScan’s journey. We 

were able to obtain private funding and develop our screening solution in record time without burdening the U.S. Government for resources or funding. We have demonstrated the solution in industry 

events, and there are several companies waiting to implement 

CargoVizion immediately after being added to the QPL. We have 

hired 20 additional employees in the last 12 months, in spite of the 

current economic downturn, all of whom enjoy a safe working environment, full health insurance for them and their families, and 

many other benefits. 

Securing American skies is a difficult task, and, therefore, the 

ability to validate related technology is also very difficult. My hope 

is that FreightScan’s story will inspire other small companies and 

also encourage the hard-working men and women at TSA to make 

the QPL process transparent for both large and small companies. 

This will encourage others to attempt the demanding but important duty of securing America. I understand that TSA is working 

on this, and we applaud them for their efforts. 

In conclusion, let me thank industry leaders like Jack Boisen and 

Brandon Fried and also the TSA leadership for their encouragement and communication. FreightScan is one example of a company that had the determination to navigate the very challenging 

process. The reward is a working partnership with the TSA that 

will certainly contribute to everyone’s goal of securing American 

skies. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

It would be my honor to return before this distinguished subcommittee before the August recess, and it is my hope I will be 

able to report that our solution is in use, as I believe CargoVizion 

can make a significant contribution to meeting the August 2010 

deadline for screening 100 percent of cargo. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANDRE ́ L. JOHNSON

MARCH 18, 2009 

Good afternoon. My name is Andre ́ Johnson. I am the Chief Executive Officer of 

FreightScan, a company that provides innovative technology solutions for transportation companies. FreightScan is a trustee member of The International Air Cargo 

Association, as well as a member of the Air Forwarders Association. 

To Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and the Members of this 

distinguished subcommittee, let me extend my sincere appreciation and gratitude to 

you for inviting me to provide testimony this afternoon. 
44 

I am here today to speak on behalf of the small, entrepreneurial companies that 

are at the forefront of developing new technology to solve problems for both the private and public sector. Can we secure American Skies? I believe we can, and the 

story of FreightScan illustrates how small companies can play a significant role 

meeting the air cargo screening requirements mandated by Congress in the 9/11 

Act. 

FreightScan was formed several years ago with a mission to offer business solutions for the freight industry with an initial focus on air cargo. The first problem 

we set out to solve was how to automatically capture dimensions and images of 

cargo without disrupting workflow. Solving this problem would enable air carriers 

to accurately charge for large lightweight shipments, generating hundreds of millions of dollars in profits. FreightScan developed a solution, and in late 2007 we introduced the FS100, an automated dimensioning system that captures dimensions 

of cargo in four seconds. 

As our team traveled the United States and around the world promoting the 

FS100, we kept hearing the same question: If this technology can capture dimensions and images, can we use it to screen cargo? 

FreightScan has always taken great pride in being a small, agile company that 

is customer-focused and we committed to developing a solution that would screen 

cargo without slowing the flow of commerce. The result is CargoVizion, a system 

which will automatically detect potential threat objects in cargo during the standard 

acceptance process of shipments. Our next step was to get CargoVizion validated 

and tested for inclusion on the Qualified Product List, or QPL, and we set out to 

introduce our company and technology to the authorizing Federal agencies. 

Our initial entree to the QPL process was frustrating. The roadmap to presenting 

our technology to the TSA was not clear, and we couldn’t get specifications for what 

threats we had to detect, or various other critical pieces of information we needed 

to complete our development. 

We fully support and understand the need to protect sensitive information. However, a defined QPL process, without classified data, would have accelerated our 

ability to get details about our technology to TSA for evaluation and our efforts to 

bring CargoVizion to the cargo industry. We eventually decided that we could not 

afford any more delays, and so we validated the technology internally and presented 

that information to the TSA in the hopes it was in a format they could accept. 

That said, let me be clear, this is in no way a criticism nor indictment of TSA 

and its related agencies. Our initial point of contact at TSA made it clear the agency 

was besieged by companies large and small claiming to have solutions, and they 

were doing what they could to respond. We recognized the enormity of the task and 

at no time did we take the obstacles to progress personally. To the contrary, we always believed that the TSA wanted to find a screening solution as much as we 

wanted to deliver one. The proof of TSA’s commitment to finding solutions for 100% 

air cargo screening can be seen in where we are today. 

Just a few short weeks ago, after we convinced the TSA that we have a potentially viable solution, the pace picked up significantly. Since then, we have had a 

number of very constructive calls with the TSA and the TSL, and we are finalizing 

a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement to test and validate the equipment. TSA and TSL representatives have been responsive and helpful, and I believe 

we are very close now to being in a position to offer the freight industry a new 

method for screening cargo transported on passenger planes in an efficient and practical manner. 

There are many positive outcomes from FreightScan’s journey. In our pursuit to 

gain the attention of TSA, we were able to obtain private funding and develop an 

innovative screening solution in record time without burdening the U.S. Government for resources or funding. We have demonstrated the solution at industry 

events, resulting in a list of airlines and freight forwarders who waiting to implement CargoVizion immediately after being added to the QPL. We have hired 20 additional employees in the last 12 months in spite of the current economic downturn, 

all of whom enjoy a safe working environment, health insurance for their families, 

and many other benefits such as sharing in the pride of knowing that they are participating in making our great country stronger and safer for all. 

Securing American skies is a difficult task; and therefore the ability to validate 

related technology is also difficult. My hope is that FreightScan’s story will inspire 

other small companies to work through the process, and also encourage the hardworking men and women at TSA to make the QPL process transparent for both 

large and small innovative companies. This will encourage others to attempt the demanding but important duty of securing America. I understand that the TSA is 

working on this, and we applaud them for their efforts. 
45 

In conclusion, let me thank industry leaders like Jack Boisen and Brandon Fried, 

and also the TSA leadership for their encouragement and communication. 

FreightScan is one example of a company that had the determination to navigate 

a very challenging process. The reward is a working partnership with the TSA that 

will most certainly contribute to everyone’s goal of securing American skies. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. It would be my 

honor to return before this distinguished subcommittee before the August recess. It 

is my hope that I will be able to report that our solution is in use, as I believe 

CargoVizion can make a significant contribution to meeting the August 2010 deadline for screening 100% of cargo. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Johnson, for your testimony. 

I now recognize Mr. Boisen to summarize his statement for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JACK BOISEN, CHAIRMAN, THE 

INTERNATIONAL AIR CARGO ASSOCIATION 

Mr. BOISEN. Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, 

Chairman Thompson, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, it is my pleasure to testify today on behalf of the The 

International Air Cargo Association, or TIACA, for which I serve as 

chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to present our views in 

one of the most important issues facing the air cargo sector: the 

screening mandates established by so-called 9/11 Act. 

First, allow me to introduce TIACA. We represent all major segments of the air cargo supply chain, including airlines, forwarders, 

airports, ground handlers, all cargo carriers, road carriers, customs 

brokers, third-party logistics companies, integrators, shippers, and 

aircraft manufacturers. Because of the diversity of our membership, TIACA members are affected by all of TSA’s security protocols. Our members are committed to ensuring the safety and security of air cargo while maintaining the viability of the air cargo 

supply system. 

In assessing current and future air cargo screening and the question of whether we can secure America’s skies, it is important to 

understand that it is not possible to design a one-size-fits-all approach to air cargo security. Operating realities are different for 

each segment of the industry, and security policies need to take 

these distinctions into account. TIACA commends TSA for its sensitivity to this fact. 

TSA has determined that, because of the realities of the air cargo 

supply chain, the best way to implement the 9/11 air cargo screening mandates is to spread the screening responsibilities throughout 

the supply chain via the Certified Cargo Screening Program, or 

CCSP. TIACA agrees with this approach. We do not believe that 

screening can be the sole responsibility of the airlines, nor do we 

support the efforts of some entities to Federalize all air cargo 

screening. 

We believe Federalization of airline-only screening would unduly 

crowd this function onto airport grounds, potentially creating significant bottlenecks to impose a one-size-fits-all approach to air 

cargo screening. While this might work in certain locales, it would 

likely produce commercial gridlock at many U.S. airports. The 

flexibility allowed under CCSP is a better fit with the diverse needs 

of the air cargo supply chain. 

While TIACA supports the general concept of CCSP, we have 

several concerns about implementation of the air cargo screening 
46 

mandates. I would like to highlight a few of them in my testimony 

today. 

First, TIACA is concerned about the cost likely to be incurred by 

its members due to the new screening obligations. Those companies 

that become certified screeners will need to acquire costly equipment. There will be other costs incurred, as well, including facility 

security improvements, training, et cetera. We hope the U.S. Congress can consider providing some relief to these companies, perhaps through tax incentives. 

Second, we are quite concerned that much of the equipment currently certified for use is most appropriate for the passenger 

screening environment and not to the air cargo environment, where 

palletized or other consolidated shipments are the norm. We believe TSA should expedite this review of technologies geared toward the air cargo environment. 

Third, we are unclear on how TSA will be verifying compliance 

with the February 2009 and August 2010 screening standards and 

how potential stoppages due to noncompliance will be handled. 

Fourth, there is confusion within the air cargo sector about how 

the air cargo screening standards will be applied to flights originating from foreign airports. At this point, we do not know the extent to which foreign security protocols may have to change to meet 

the August 2010 100 percent screening standard or what the impact might be on airlines, forwarders, shippers, and others. 

Fifth, TIACA is also concerned that there is occasionally a breakdown between TSA headquarters’ interpretation of policy and the 

actions that are taken by inspectors in the field. 

Sixth, TIACA believe the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, 

known as ASAC, and its vital Air Cargo Working Group should be 

resuscitated as quickly as possible. We believe both would serve as 

vital conduits for industry-Government discussion of the implementation issues as we move toward the 100 percent air cargo screening. 

Seventh, TIACA believes it is essential that the Department of 

Homeland Security better leverage the security programs of TSA 

and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP, with a view toward 

increasing efficiency and eliminating redundancies. 

In summary, many challenges remain as we move toward August 

2010 and the 100 percent air cargo screening mandate. TIACA 

commends the subcommittee for its strong leadership on this issue 

and hopes to continue working with you and with the TSA to address these challenges and ensure viable implementation of the 

new air cargo screening standards and the security of America’s 

skies. 

I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

[The statement of Mr. Boisen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACK BOISEN

MARCH 18, 2009 

Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished Members of 

the subcommittee, it is my pleasure to testify today on behalf of The International 

Air Cargo Association, or TIACA, which I serve as chairman. I am also a veteran 

of more than 40 years in the air cargo industry, having served most recently as Vice 

President of Continental Airlines’ Cargo Division for 14 years. 
47 

Thank you for the opportunity to present our views on one of the most important 

issues facing the air cargo sector, the screening mandates established by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The law requires 

that 50% of all air cargo on passenger aircraft be screened as of February 2009 and 

that all such cargo be screened as of August 2010. Obviously, we are currently operating in an environment where the 50% standard is applicable and are less than 

17 months away from the comprehensive requirement. 

First, allow me to introduce TIACA. We represent all major segments of the air 

cargo supply chain, including airlines, forwarders, airports, ground handlers, allcargo carriers, road carriers, customs brokers, third-party logistics companies, integrators, shippers, aircraft manufacturers, and educational institutions. Because of 

the diversity of our membership, TIACA members are affected by all of TSA’s security protocols. As a result, we actively engage with TSA on a wide range of air cargo 

security issues, and implementation of the 9/11 Act’s air cargo screening mandates 

is one of our top priorities. Our members are committed to ensuring the safety and 

security of air cargo while maintaining the viability of the air cargo supply chain. 

In assessing current and future air cargo screening, and the question of whether 

we can secure America’s skies, it is important to understand that, because of the 

many different entities in the air cargo supply chain, it is impossible to design a 

one-size-fits-all approach to air cargo security. Operating realities are different for 

passenger airlines, all-cargo airlines, express operators, air freight forwarders (or indirect air carriers), ground transportation providers, and shippers. Different airports 

have distinct footprints, and tend to handle different types of cargo. Security policies 

need to take these distinctions into account if they are to offer workable approaches. 

TIACA commends TSA for its sensitivity to the diverse range of operators in the 

air cargo supply chain, and for its recognition of the need to maintain flexible policies because of that diversity. 

TSA has determined that, because of the realities of the air cargo supply chain, 

the best way to implement the 9/11 Act’s 50% and 100% air cargo screening mandates is to spread screening responsibilities throughout the supply chain via the 

Certified Cargo Screening Program, or CCSP. Fundamentally, TIACA agrees with 

this approach. We do not believe that screening can be the sole responsibility of the 

airlines, nor do we support the efforts of some entities to federalize all air cargo 

screening, making it a TSA function and locating it solely on airport grounds. We 

believe federalization or airline-only screening would unduly crowd this function 

onto airport grounds, potentially creating significant bottlenecks, and would impose 

a one-size-fits-all approach to air cargo screening. While this approach might work 

in certain locales, it would likely produce commercial gridlock at many U.S. airports. 

The flexibility allowed under CCSP is a better fit with the diverse needs of the air 

cargo supply chain. 

While TIACA supports the general concept of CCSP, we have several concerns 

about implementation of the air cargo screening mandates. I’d like to highlight a 

few of the issues that are particularly important for TIACA members in my testimony today. 

First, TIACA is concerned about the costs likely to be incurred by its members 

due to the new screening obligations. Those companies that become certified screeners will need to acquire costly equipment for each of their certified facilities. Passenger airlines may face additional equipment acquisition costs as well. This is significant, particularly given the current economic downturn which has reduced air 

cargo volumes by roughly 25%, threatening the viability of many companies. We 

hope the U.S. Congress can consider providing some relief to companies that incur 

the substantial cost of screening equipment acquisition. For example, establishing 

tax incentives or credits for such companies could provide significant financial relief. 

Second, we are quite concerned that much of the equipment currently certified for 

use is most appropriate for the passenger screening environment and is ill-suited 

to the air cargo environment where palletized or other consolidated shipments are 

the norm. We believe TSA should expedite its review of technologies geared towards 

the air cargo environment. Given the looming August 2010 deadline, it is essential 

that new technological options be made available very soon. Without new equipment 

capable of screening consolidated shipments, we may face considerable disruption to 

air cargo commercial flows in a 100% screening environment. In this regard, TIACA 

strongly supports increased funding for and use of canine screening teams for air 

cargo and believes expanded use of canines could help ensure smoother implementation of the comprehensive screening mandate. 

Third, we are unclear about how TSA will be verifying compliance with the February 2009 and August 2010 screening standards. TIACA members have advised 

that they are in compliance with the reporting requirements TSA has placed on 

them with respect to the February 2009 screening standard, and report they are 
48 

meeting the 50% standard. However, we are unclear about how TSA is processing 

and validating that information, individually and across the entire supply chain. We 

are also unsure whether there might be future disruptions to trade based on TSA 

determinations of cases where the 50% standard may not be met, and how that information will be communicated to others in the supply chain. Furthermore, once 

the 100% standard is in place, the potential for unforeseen stoppages in trade may 

increase. We do not know what sort of notification there will be in such instances, 

nor how difficult it may be for shippers, forwarders, or airlines to adjust their schedules to ensure service. 

Fourth, there is confusion within the air cargo sector about how the air cargo 

screening standards will be applied to flights originating from foreign airports. Up 

until recently, TSA had maintained that the 9/11 Act’s screening mandates applied 

only to flights originating from U.S. airports. Under this interpretation, non-U.S. 

airlines would be required to meet the 9/11 Act’s screening standards for flights they 

operated out of U.S. airports, just as would U.S. airlines. However, neither U.S. nor 

foreign airlines would be required to meet the screening thresholds for flights originating from foreign airports. Instead, those flights would be subject to the security 

protocols in the country of departure. 

Roughly 6 months ago, TSA modified its interpretation and concluded the 9/11 Act 

mandates also apply to foreign-origin flights. At this point, we do not know the extent to which foreign security protocols may have to change to meet the August 

2010 100% screening standard, how TSA will factor in-bound cargo into its calculations of whether the threshold is met, or what the impact might be on screening 

methods, technologies, certified cargo programs, etc.—let alone what all this will 

mean for airlines, forwarders, shippers, and others. 

In this uncertain environment, it is critical that TSA and its counterpart agencies 

in other countries work closely with industry groups to ensure timely communication to those in the air cargo supply chain so that widespread commercial disruption 

is avoided. We simply cannot afford commercial bottlenecks due to confusion over 

security regimes, on top of the damage already caused by the global economic crisis. 

TIACA stands ready to do its part by addressing member concerns and questions 

to TSA, liaising with security authorities, and conveying key information to its 

members. We urge all parties to cooperate in an effort to ensure that security standards are met and commercial chaos is avoided. 

Fifth, TIACA is also concerned that there is occasionally a breakdown between 

TSA headquarters’ interpretation of policy and the actions that are taken by inspectors in the field. We will continue to raise issues of inconsistency with TSA and urge 

the agency to ensure coordination between headquarters and the field through better education and communication. 

Sixth, TIACA believes the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) should 

be reinvigorated as quickly as possible. In the past, this body served as a vital conduit for industry-government collaboration on issues critical to air cargo, but it has 

been shut down for well over a year due to issues related to its re-chartering. The 

former ASAC created an Air Cargo Working Group, which fostered a highly productive dialogue between TSA and all elements of the air cargo industry. Without the 

ASAC umbrella, there is no formal mechanism for reactivating that dialogue and 

resuming the valuable work of that group. Unfortunately, that means that now, during the critical months leading up to the August 2010 deadline, this vital means of 

communication is silenced. 

We understand that new ASAC members have been selected, but the re-chartered 

ASAC has yet to meet. We believe it is particularly important to reactivate the dialogue of the Air Cargo Working Group so it can address implementation issues related to the 100% screening mandate, and we encourage this subcommittee to do 

what it can to ensure that the ASAC and this critical working group are resuscitated. 

Seventh, TIACA believes it is essential that the Department of Homeland Security better leverage the security programs of TSA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or CBP. Both agencies operate extensive national security programs, and 

both are part of the same department—yet industry partners are generally unable 

to leverage participation in one agency’s programs with those of the other agency. 

DHS should more aggressively explore synergies between TSA and CBP cargo 

screening programs, including use of automation, risk-based assessment, personnel, 

and Government-industry partnerships such as the Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism (or C–TPAT) and the CCSP, with a view towards increasing efficiency and eliminating redundancies. 

Finally, on a related matter, TIACA is closely monitoring CBP’s implementation 

of the so-called 10∂2, or Importer Security Filing, regulation. While this initiative 

currently applies solely to maritime shipments, CBP has indicated at various times 
49 

that it might consider rolling it out to other modes. TIACA believes that, if such 

a rollout were to occur, CBP must take into account the unique aspects of each 

mode of transportation and differentiate the requirements based on the realities of 

each mode. In particular, if CBP were to consider an importer security filing for air, 

it would need to articulate why such an approach is warranted in light of the fact 

that 100% screening, by TSA, would already be applicable as of August 2010. This 

is in stark contrast to the maritime environment, where CBP has specifically advocated 10∂2 as a preferable alternative to 100% scanning of maritime shipments. 

In summary, many challenges remain as we move towards August 2010 and the 

100% air cargo screening mandate. TIACA commends this subcommittee for its 

strong leadership on this issue, and hopes to continue working with you and with 

TSA to address these challenges and ensure viable implementation of the new air 

cargo screening standards and the security of America’s skies. 

I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr. 

Boisen. 

I now recognize Mr. Fried to summarize his statement for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF BRANDON FRIED, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

AIRFORWARDERS ASSOCIATION 

Mr. FRIED. Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, 

Chairman Thompson, and Members of the committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before the House Committee on 

Homeland Security to discuss the challenges in meeting the first 

screening deadline, as well as the challenges we anticipate the next 

50 percent. 

As you are aware, the air freight industry has been working hard 

to meet the 100 percent passenger air cargo screening mandate. 

The Airforwarders Association is committed to facilitating compliance and remains confident that the 100 percent benchmark will 

be met. We urge Congress and the TSA to maintain the CCSP 

against calls for Federalization, provide funding mechanisms for 

participants to reduce the barrier to participation, and resist any 

further moves away from a risk-based approach to cargo security. 

More than a quarter of the facilities currently certified to screen 

cargo are Airforwarders Association members. It seems that, for 

the vast majority of the industry, reaching the 50 percent benchmark has not been particularly problematic. While the economic 

environment has had the effect of lowering cargo volume, remarkable progress made by TSA, forwarders, air carriers, and shippers 

deserves most of the credit. The ease of attaining the first portion 

of the screening mandate should be both a sign of encouragement 

and caution. Let me outline the remaining challenges with the remainder of my time. 

Last year, I had the privilege of addressing this subcommittee 

and outlined the concerns forwarders have about meeting the 100 

percent mandate. Unfortunately, some of the more serious issues 

have yet to be resolved. The following three elements need to be 

resolved in order for CCSP to be a viable security program: No. 1, 

the appropriation and availability of additional Federal funding or 

incentives for eligible participants; No. 2, the encouragement of all 

entities involved in the supply chain as full participants in the act 

of screening; and, No. 3, the availability of efficient and cost-effective solutions to screening for all TSA-certified Indirect Air Carriers and other qualified participants. 
50 

In the absence of certified technology, the focus will be on examining pallets and containers. Each pallet or unit load device contains nearly 200 pieces of varying size, shape, and commodities. 

The space and time involved in breaking up cargo poses an increased level of risk of theft or tampering, as idle cargo is a security concern. 

The Air Forwarders Association has been working with carriers, 

shippers, and forwarders to ensure that there are many options 

available to forwarders of all sizes. As such, we believe that market 

competition and innovation, rather than the TSA screening operation at each airport facility, is the best way to provide efficient 

and effective options for all in the supply chain. 

Encouraging TSA’s screening to the maximum extent possible removes the supply chain’s experience and problem-solving skills for 

a system with delays, higher costs, and less accountability. We 

urge TSA to continue to work with their Science and Technology 

Office, as well as vendors, to identify, test, and approve equipment 

that can effectively and efficiently screen palletized cargo. In the 

absence of that, we urge Congress to allocate additional funds for 

the canine program. 

Even as advancements are made with technology, the significant 

amount of capital required to purchase technology is a barrier for 

participation. Forwarders participating in CCSP must purchase 

technology for which the cost may range from $50,000 to $500,000 

per facility, a price tag that cannot be met by many forwarders, 

particularly smaller forwarding businesses. As a result, they may 

face market disadvantages and longer lines at the air carrier if alternate options are not available. This lost revenue in the current 

economic environment could force forwarders out of business. 

For those in the pilot program, this need was addressed by a 

TSA-funded grant. We ask Congress and TSA to provide funding 

to ensure that thousands of jobs in the air freight industry are not 

lost and the American economy does not face more harm due to 

delay and market shrinkage. 

Finally, as we face the future, it is critical to look back on the 

mission of the Department of Homeland Security and TSA, which 

is not only to secure the Nation’s borders but also to maintain an 

efficient flow of commerce. I agree that aviation security is critically important, but we must not abandon all consideration of 

international trade, economic security, and our supply chain, particularly in these troubled times. 

For that reason, the Airforwarders Association has been working 

with the Safe Commerce Coalition to assess the most effective way 

to secure cargo for the future. Noted experts, including the Government Accounting Office, have stated that abandoning a risk-based 

security program may actually make the Nation less safe. Forwarders know it is an unwise use of finite resources to treat each 

piece of cargo as if it has the same threat level. The industry has 

already demonstrated its willingness to comply with the law and 

will continue. However, without a vigilant eye on the actual impact 

of our actions, I fear we may have achieved a mandate without 

achieving its goals. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and address this 

important topic, and I look forward to your questions. 
51 

[The statement of Mr. Fried follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRANDON FRIED

MARCH 18, 2009 

INTRODUCTION

Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent and Members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before the House Committee on Homeland 

Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection to 

discuss the challenges the forwarding industry has addressed in meeting the first 

screening deadline, as well as the challenges we anticipate with the next 50 percent. 

I ask that my full statement be entered into the record. 

As you are aware, the air freight industry has been working hard with the administration to meet the 100 percent passenger air cargo screening mandate. It is our 

firm belief that the full implementation of the Certified Cargo Screening Program 

(CCSP) is the most efficient and only realistic method of attaining the mandate. The 

Airforwarders Association is committed to facilitating compliance across the forwarding industry, and remains optimistic that the 100 percent mandate as defined 

by TSA will be met. We urge Congress and the TSA to maintain the CCSP, provide 

funding mechanisms for participants to reduce the barrier to participation and resist any further moves away from a risk-based approach to cargo security. 

BACKGROUND

My name is Brandon Fried and I am the executive director of the Airforwarders 

Association. It is a pleasure to address this distinguished panel today on the important issue of air cargo security. 

I was appointed to serve as the Executive Director of the Airforwarders Association in November 2005 and have over 25 years of experience as a forwarder myself. 

In my position as Executive Director, I represent the Association on all security 

matters and currently serve on the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) 

working group in counsel to the Transportation Security Administration. 

The Airforwarders Association is an alliance of Indirect Air Carriers, Cargo Airlines, and affiliated businesses located throughout the United States that play a 

vital role in ensuring the continuous movement of global commerce. There are over 

4,000 registered indirect air carriers who are responsible for the planning, oversight, 

and transporting of companies’ goods and products—anything from flowers and seafood to pallets of humanitarian supplies. The parameters of this service include 

steps such as pick-up of goods, customs clearance, transportation, warehousing, regulatory compliance and delivery; we work from one end of the supply chain to the 

other. 

DISCUSSION

Products such as automobile assembly line parts, high-tech electronics, pharmaceuticals, and vital consumer goods are transported in the cargo holds of passenger 

planes on virtually every flight. During the cold winter, our families enjoy fresh 

vegetables flown from the warm west coast and South America on passenger flights. 

As we speak, thousands of pounds of seafood are in flight to be served tonight in 

restaurants in places like Albuquerque, Minneapolis, Omaha, and St. Louis. In some 

cases our members help save lives by assisting medical companies and hospitals 

ship urgently needed heart valves, blood samples, and human organs across the 

country to waiting doctors and patients. 

It is the urgent need or ‘‘just in time’’ nature of cargo, coupled with the variance 

in the products shipped and the sensitivity to excessive handling or delay, that 

makes the task of screening so challenging. It is also the reason that the supply 

chain, from shippers of pharmaceuticals that cannot have their packages opened by 

a screener due to product integrity issues, to the forwarder whose business depends 

on meeting a deadline and even the air carriers all support CCSP and screening 

throughout the supply chain. 

However, we believe that the following three elements need to be put in place in 

order for CCSP to be a viable security program: The appropriation and availability 

of additional Federal funding or incentives (e.g. tax relief on privately purchased 

screening equipment) for eligible participants; the encouragement of all entities involved in the supply chain as full participants in the act of screening; and the availability of efficient and cost-effective solutions to screening for all TSA-certified Indirect Air Carriers (IACs) and other qualified participants. 
52 

Support for CCSP 

Complex supply-chain dynamics and the broad range of facility and cargo screening capabilities at our airports prevent a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ solution to the complex 

cargo screening dilemma. This complexity has motivated us to work cooperatively 

to ensure that many solutions are available to the commercial concerns that participate in the supply chain to meet air cargo screening mandates. Screening a high 

percentage of air cargo upstream is a critical part of the solution, especially where 

U.S. manufacturing and supply chain logistics involve secure bulk packaging that 

must be maintained for the integrity of the product. 

Another part of the solution is some airport screening by airlines and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The Airforwarders Association supports a 

system of cargo screening that offers forwarders multiple options as to where and 

how to screen cargo, but those options must work. We remain concerned that a system other than CCSP that would screen the bulk of air cargo at a single facility 

at the airport does not work and will most assuredly lead to significant delays, bottlenecks, and increased costs and ultimately will jeopardize the economic stability 

of the air transportation sector without providing greater assurance of cargo safety. 

Although it is a voluntary program, CCSP is a key part of the risk-based multilayered approach to air cargo security that strengthens security throughout the 

global supply chain and balances the need for increased security while also meeting 

the needs of the shipping public. We believe the strength of CCSP is that it provides 

for multiple options throughout the supply chain, including the use of centralized 

third-party screening centers, third-party logistics providers, shipper or exporters, 

and freight-forwarder screening facilities, which will lead to robust competition and, 

ultimately, the reduction of screening costs. Additionally, all members of the supply 

chain have a vested business interest in a strong chain of custody to maintain the 

integrity of cargo. As a result, relying on the shippers, forwarders and airlines that 

have a strong record of safety and security to handle the delicate screening operations for the wide spectrum of cargo will increase cargo security in an effective 

manner. 

Lessons Learned From the First 50 Percent 

More than a quarter of the facilities currently certified to screen cargo are 

Airforwarders Association members. Based on an informal poll, it seems that for the 

vast majority of the industry, reaching the 50 percent benchmark has not been particularly problematic. Of the problems experienced, most were relatively minor misunderstandings about paperwork and tendering screened shipments to air carriers. 

These did not have a substantial impact on cut-off times to deliver cargo, or result 

in delays in shipment. While the economic environment has had the effect of lowering cargo volume and therefore probably helped ease the burden, remarkable 

progress made by TSA, forwarders, air carriers, and shippers deserves most of the 

credit. 

TSA began certifying participants in December and has been working diligently 

to expand the number of certified participant facilities. Dialogue has improved, as 

has information sharing, and TSA, despite the transition to a new administration, 

has remained steady in its guidance to industry. I believe participants in the pilot 

have learned that they do have a trusted partner in TSA, and the learning curve 

will continue to improve as we move closer to the 100 percent deadline. 

Additionally, forwarders have found that their other partners in the supply 

chain—shippers and air carriers—are actively responding to the screening mandate 

as well. As more shippers come into the program, the burden on forwarders to be 

the primary screener will decrease. Additionally, air carriers have rapidly deployed 

technology and trained employees to screen freight and are doing so in an efficient 

and effective manner. 

The ease of attaining the first portion of the screening mandate should be both 

a sign of encouragement and caution. It proves that our industry and its airline 

partners can collectively rise to any challenge and implement effective solutions. It 

also means that the road ahead may be rough and lessons learned today will be well 

used as tomorrow unfolds. 

Concerns About the Next 50 Percent 

Last year, I had the privilege of addressing this subcommittee and outlined the 

concerns forwarders have about meeting the 100 percent mandate. Unfortunately, 

some of the more serious issues have yet to be resolved. Specifically, those are the 

lack of approved pallet screening technology, on-going financial barriers to participation, and the future of air cargo security policy in general. 

In the absence of certified technology, the focus will be on examining pallets and 

containers, each needing to be unpacked to meet the piece-level screening require-
53 

ment. This poses serious logistical and security concerns. Each pallet or unit load 

device (ULD) contains nearly 200 pieces of varying size, shape, and commodity. 

Breaking up the shipment of that size will require facility space large enough to accommodate multiple unpacked pallets, a resource not all airports have. Additionally, 

breaking up cargo poses an increased level of risk of theft or tampering, as idle 

cargo is a security concern. 

We urge TSA to continue to work with their Science and Technology office, as well 

as vendors, to identify, test, and approve equipment that can effectively and efficiently screen palletized cargo. In the absence of that, we urge Congress to allocate 

additional funds for the canine program, as it is an effective stop-gap solution. 

Even as advancements are made with technology, the significant amount of capital required to purchase technology and adapt business practices is a barrier to participation. Forwarders participating in CCSP must purchase technology for which 

the cost may range from $50,000 to $500,000 per facility—a price tag that cannot 

be met by many forwarders, particularly smaller forwarding businesses. As a result, 

they will face delays at the airport for cargo screening, causing them to miss flights 

and lose revenue. This lost revenue, in the current economic environment with high 

fuel surcharges and razor-thin profit margins, could force forwarders out of business. This consolidation of the market, with the resulting impact on competition, is 

bad for forwarders, manufacturers, and the American consumer. 

For those who were selected, based on size or commodity, to participate in the 

pilot program, this need was recognized and addressed by a TSA-funded grant for 

the purchase of technology. The Airforwarders Association calls on Congress and 

TSA to provide funding to ensure the hundreds of thousands of jobs in the air 

freight industry are not lost and the American economy does not face serious harm 

due to delays in goods and products being delivered. The Airforwarders Association 

supports grants to fund CCSP as well as additional funding or reallocation of TSA’s 

budget to provide funding for equipment and personnel devoted to cargo screening. 

We also support expanded funding for canine detection units for use for large consolidations and possibly also in other facets. 

Finally, as we face the future of air cargo screening, it is critical to look back on 

the mission of the Department of Homeland Security and TSA, which is not only 

to secure the Nation’s borders but also to maintain an efficient flow of commerce. 

As a frequent flier, I understand and agree that aviation security is critically important but we must not abandon all consideration of international trade, economic security and our supply chain, particularly in these troubled economic times. For that 

reason, the Airforwarders Association has been working with the Safe Commerce 

Coalition to assess the most effective way to secure cargo for the future. 

Noted experts, including the GAO, have stated that abandoning a risk-based security program in favor of screening may actually make the Nation less safe. Forwarders know that TSA has limited resources, both financially and in terms of personnel, and it is an unwise use of those finite dollars and employees to treat each 

piece of cargo as if it has the same threat level. The industry has already demonstrated its willingness to comply with the law, and will continue to do so. However, without a vigilant eye on the actual impact of our actions, I fear we may have 

achieved a mandate without achieving its goals. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to address this important topic and 

look forward to your questions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Fried, for your testimony. 

Now I recognize Mr. May to summarize his statement for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES C. MAY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC. 

Mr. MAY. Madam Chairwoman, it is a pleasure to be here. I will 

truly summarize my statement for you. 

No. 1, we are pleased to announce that we have met the initial 

target of 50 percent across our membership. 

No. 2, by definition, some of our carriers are narrow-body carriers exclusively, so they are already at 100 percent of the cargo 

they are carrying. We recognize that getting to that 100 percent 
54 

target for all cargo, for all passenger aircraft is going to be a real 

challenge. 

The challenge is that we are going to wide bodies. As has been 

stated here already, going to wide bodies means that we are going 

to have palletized loads. Why is that a problem? No. 1, we don’t 

have current technology; can’t handle big portal. We may have 

some—Mr. Johnson’s technology may prove out to be the exception 

to the rule. 

No. 2, we have a lot of shippers, in particular those who have 

high-value products, that are not interested in having us tear those 

palletized loads down. There could be as many as 200 individual 

pieces. It takes an average of 75 minutes to tear down and repack, 

and that doesn’t include the screening time. So what do we do? We 

rely on dogs. I would suggest to Mr. DeFazio, as I will tomorrow, 

that his cherry problem will probably be solved by dogs, because 

they are the least intrusive, least expensive, most efficient explosives-detecting technology available to us today. 

We will work very hard to make the full 100 percent target. We 

have every reason to think it can be done. But we know that there 

are three or four things that need to happen. No. 1, we have to 

have the continuing cooperation between our friends in the freight 

forwarder community, the TSA, and ourselves. 

No. 2, we have to rely on upstream checking, which is part of 

this CCSP program that you have heard a lot about today already. 

It is critical for all of us that that work effectively. No. 3, because 

it is a very expensive proposition, the committee and the Congress 

needs to look at ways to help offset those expensive costs for our 

friends that are doing that screening upstream for us. 

Finally, you really need to think hard about providing the funding to further expand canine technology. As I said a minute ago— 

I have told Chairman Thompson this a number of times—it is simply the single best solution to be used from a cost perspective, a 

coverage perspective, speed, and all the other principal elements. 

I am delighted to be here to answer your questions. Thank you 

for your time. 

[The statement of Mr. May follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES C. MAY

MARCH 18, 2009 

We appreciate the opportunity to inform you of the airline industry’s progress in 

achieving 100 percent screening of cargo transported on passenger-carrying aircraft 

by August 2010. The Air Transport Association members are committed to do their 

part in meeting that key requirement of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations 

Act. 

I am pleased to report that the airline industry has fulfilled the interim requirement that 50 percent of such cargo be screened by February 2009. This impressive 

achievement reflects hard work; this was not an easy task. That experience has 

taught us an important lesson: Achieving the 100 percent level will be difficult and 

will require the continued close collaboration of the airlines, the Transportation Security Administration, freight forwarders and shippers. 

The biggest challenge in meeting the August 2010 deadline is the lack of TSAcertified screening technology to inspect large air cargo pallets. Most pieces of cargo 

transported on wide-body aircraft are consolidated into large shipments and 75 percent of cargo is transported on wide-body aircraft. That fact gives you an idea of 

the magnitude of the challenge that we face. 

Shippers and freight forwarders typically create these pallet-size shipments before 

they are tendered to an airline. The dilemma is that screening is required at the 
55 

piece level but existing technology cannot screen large consolidated shipments. The 

nature of our business and available screening equipment are, at least for the time 

being, badly mismatched. 

Breaking down consolidated shipments at an airport cargo facility is not practical. 

Shipment size, time constraints, and facility limitations are the main difficulties. A 

pallet can have as many as 200 pieces on it. Dismantling it and screening each piece 

is labor-intensive and time-consuming. To place this in some perspective, it can take 

75 minutes for two employees to break down and reassemble a pallet. In addition, 

airport cargo facilities were never designed to be high-volume disassembly and reassembly locations. They are not big enough to perform that role, especially at peak 

times. 

We therefore need to be very careful that airport cargo facilities do not become 

choke points. Screening each piece from a consolidated shipment at those facilities 

would undercut what air cargo service is supposed to be all about: speedy movement 

of freight. Complicating this situation is the fact that shippers of high-value items, 

such as electronics and pharmaceuticals, for their own security reasons do not want 

their consolidated shipments to be broken down. 

Canine screening is the only easily-applied screening method that does not require pallets to be disassembled. Because of that, for the foreseeable future they will 

be the most effective and least costly screening method for all types and configurations of cargo. Unfortunately, there are not enough canines deployed at airports to 

screen such shipments on every wide-body passenger flight. This means that alternative screening measures that are both effective and efficient need to be implemented. 

The Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) is such a measure. This program 

enables a high percentage of air cargo screening to be performed ‘‘upstream’’ in the 

supply chain. Upstream security measures—avoiding the airport cargo facility—are 

essential in the current environment. Under CCSP, screening occurs at the shippers’ 

or freight forwarders’ premises, where the cargo can be screened at the piece level 

as TSA requires. These are known as Certified Cargo Screening Facilities. This procedure is a very practical but expensive solution. Freight forwarders and other supply-chain participants must purchase equipment and train employees to carry out 

the program. This has imposed an additional financial burden on the forwarder industry. Nevertheless, if applied widely, it is a workable solution. 

The Department of Homeland Security is to be complimented for its high-tempo 

implementation of the CCSP. Its performance has been admirable. Going forward, 

it cannot falter in maintaining that tempo. The CCSP is an indispensable tool in 

meeting the August 2010 deadline. If enough shippers and forwarders are not certified, attaining that deadline will be at risk. 

While we very much appreciate the Department’s efforts, it needs to act immediately in three areas to assure timely achievement of the 100 percent screening 

mandate: 

1. Enlarge rapidly the number of Certified Cargo Screening Facilities at large 

shippers, manufacturers, freight forwarders and other TSA-certified Indirect Air 

Carriers. 

2. Expand as swiftly as possible the use of TSA-certified explosive-detection canines to screen large air cargo consolidations, and direct additional funding to 

the TSA proprietary canine cargo screening program. 

3. Provide for additional Federal funding or incentives (e.g., tax relief for privately purchased screening equipment) for all TSA-certified indirect air carriers 

and other qualified CCSP participants. This will enable small and medium-size 

companies to participate in the CCSP and enable large companies to continue 

to invest in screening equipment. 

We are committed to achieving the 100 percent screening mandate. The three initiatives described above will enable that statutory mandate to be realized on time 

and in a way that will minimize adverse effects on the shipping public. We ask that 

you support us in this endeavor. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank you very much for your testimony. 

I will, at this time, yield myself 5 minutes. As I do so, I would 

like to remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to 

question the panel. I will begin. 

Mr. Johnson, why don’t you tell us how long ago or how long a 

period of time did you begin this process of trying to reach DHS 
56 

and thinking that you had a contribution to make with respect to 

air cargo security? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We originally contacted TSA about May 2006. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So, technically, we can say 3 years. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yeah. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you give us an abbreviated recitation 

of what that encounter was like and how you have been processed 

or engaging since that time? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, in the beginning, it was a matter of just trying to explain what are we trying to solve. As engineers and as 

small companies, we have to decide what is the problem to solve 

and the best way to solve it first. We had heard from what the industry had and what they wanted to know, and we were curious 

as to what the TSA side of it was. 

We just couldn’t get the answers in the beginning, all the way 

until 2007, when we officially met with the TSA here in Washington about what can be done. We wrote a proposal, an unsolicited 

proposal at the time, asking for—release the technology, what do 

we have to find? That took about 5 months. We heard a resounding 

‘‘not interested’’ at that time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me stop you. So you, sort of, followed regular order, you got your materials in or your research or your proposal in, and you were doing this in the backdrop of understanding 

that we had these deadlines? Were you aware, as a business person, that we had a 2009 and 2010 deadline? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you saw the sense of urgency. 

Mr. JOHNSON. We saw it as a sense of urgency. With a mandate 

like that, we just want a chance to complete. We never said we 

were the best solution or the only solution, but we felt that there 

might—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You are a small business, but you might also 

be counted as a minority business? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you think, without a self-serving comment, 

that if the technology that you offered, or maybe there were some 

competitors of yours, but if they had been processed, would we 

have been further along with the issues that we are addressing 

today about 50 percent and then 100 percent by 2010? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think we would be further along. Secondarily, I 

think if process is defined, it makes it easy to fund, from the capital markets perspective. It is much easier to go to the private investors in the private sector looking for funding when you know the 

solution you are trying to solve. Because if you can prove it to investors, you can usually raise the capital that is needed to prove 

it to the Government. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think the key, however, is that this technology could have been—and that is up to the selection process of 

TSA—but it could have been part of the solution, not part of the 

problem. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, absolutely. I am biased about that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I understand. 

Mr. Boisen, you mentioned that you had difficulty in understanding what kind of technology would be required of your con-
57 

stituents, the companies that you represent. What was your encounter with TSA? Do you have a private-sector response as to why 

TSA has not been able to verify 50 percent? 

Mr. BOISEN. Well, I believe part of it is in the timing issue, having been on the other side of it as a carrier. The carriers all report 

on a day-to-day basis within their own system during the month 

of February and collect data. Some carriers have that data automated, and some receive a written document, whether it is an email or such, from every single location. Then it takes a few days 

to accumulate those numbers. Those are sent, I believe, to TSA. 

They are in the process of trying to, I guess, organize those numbers. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But your membership, have they developed 

the kind of equipment that they would like to use? Have they submitted it in? Do they know what TSA expect of them? What is your 

issue? What is keeping your constituents from complying or helping 

to comply? 

Mr. BOISEN. Well, many of ours are in compliance with the 50 

percent, I believe. We are all in compliance. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. If you are, would you provide us with 

that list, those who are in compliance of up to 50 percent? 

Mr. BOISEN. I believe I can acquire that from our membership. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So do you have equipment? Has it been certified? Are people using their own equipment that they have been 

using in the past? 

Mr. BOISEN. I think it is a variety. A number of our members, 

our airlines, are also members of ATA. Having been on that side 

of it, we have acquired equipment some time ago, generally tracedetection equipment. I know one carrier that I am very close to had 

met the 50 percent months and months and months ago. If it is 

there, it is very, very feasible if you focus and commit yourself to 

do it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So what would help you get better than where 

you are today? 

Mr. BOISEN. As it has been mentioned before, it is that cargo 

that is very difficult to measure and to monitor in today’s environment, the containers. 

Now, TSA, in the past, has tried to find some technology and, 

frankly, spent a lot of money on fast-pulse neutron devices, that 

type of thing, that sits in Houston today gathering dust, without 

ever going through that step of developing something for the industry without any input back from the industry. You know, they 

spent, I understand, some $6 million on a device that has never 

worked, and this output would have been six containers an hour, 

which is totally almost useless. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is this designed by the industry, or this was 

given to you by TSA? 

Mr. BOISEN. No. This was TSA. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So it has never worked. 

Mr. BOISEN. It has never worked. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So these are some of the obstacles: Getting the 

right technology? 

Mr. BOISEN. Getting the right technology. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Getting it certified by TSA? 
58 

Mr. BOISEN. Yes. And working with the industry to say, ‘‘What 

do you want?’’ and working together. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you will know what to purchase or move 

in what direction. 

Mr. BOISEN. In partnership, we believe. We have volunteered for 

a number of pilot projects, whether it is on technology or whether 

it is on software, over the years. We are the first to say, ‘‘Try us. 

We will try. We will work with anybody.’’ 

But, frankly, I think, as Mr. Johnson has indicated, the focus 

was not on cargo, from the technology standpoint. It just wasn’t 

there. Fortunately, we had the dogs, which, as Mr. May indicated— 

I have been a dog advocate for years. They are wonderful. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But you don’t have enough. 

Mr. BOISEN. But we don’t have enough, and they have a tough 

union. You know, you can only work them 30 minutes, you have 

to scratch them behind the ears and feed them, you know. There 

aren’t enough of them. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have seen that happen. Thank you, Mr. 

Boisen. 

Let me just quickly, Mr. May, this is just a quick question. I 

thank you for testifying. I noticed that your, again, your membership is not here, but you are here representing them. 

What is the greatest difficulty for airlines to be part of the compliance of 100 percent, 50 percent now in February 2009, and then 

2010? Compliance with cargo inspections. 

Mr. MAY. We are in compliance for the 50 percent. We were by 

the deadline in February. I think the whole issue there is making 

sure that TSA has the forms from us that they can aggregate and 

then report back to you and others to prove that point. But I have 

no doubt in my mind that we are at 50 percent right now. 

Some of our carriers—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you would be willing to give us a list of 

the airlines that represent that they are at 50 percent. 

Mr. MAY. Sure, sure. We are happy—it is the ATA membership. 

I am happy to give it to you. By definition, some of our carriers are 

at 100 percent because they are exclusive wide-body carriers. 

Southwest Airlines is a good example, from your home State. 

So the real challenge going forward, as I said in my oral, No. 1, 

we now have to tackle wide bodies. Wide bodies take palletized 

loads. Palletized loads are difficult to trace because of their size, so 

you have to break them down, unless that screening is done upstream. That is where our friends from the freight forwarder community come in. They have to be certified, they have to have the 

technology. 

So the real challenge, it is a 25/75 formula right now, just to put 

it in perspective, 25 percent of cargo goes on narrow bodies, 75 percent goes on wide bodies. So the hurdle, you know, has just jumped 

up a few feet, and that becomes the real challenge. 

We don’t have enough dogs. We don’t have any wide-portal technology. We need to get more people certified upstream. That is expensive, and there needs to be some accommodation for those folks 

buying that technology upstream. So those are the challenges. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, you have laid out the top of the mountain for us. We thank you for your testimony. 
59 

Mr. Dent is recognized for his questioning. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Following up, I guess, with Mr. May, as you know, we have this 

100 percent goal here. Do you think we can meet that 100 percent 

goal given the issues you just outlined with the wide-bodied planes 

and other issues, you know, too, in terms of how we are going to 

get foreign governments to collaborate with us as it relates to the 

in-bound and out-going foreign cargo? 

I mean, I understand how we can get this up to 85 percent, but 

how do you get to 100 percent? Do you think we can actually get 

to 100 percent realistically? 

Mr. MAY. I don’t think you can get to 100 percent as many would 

define it, which is 100 percent of every piece of cargo carried on 

every commercial passenger aircraft, because some of that cargo is 

coming in from overseas, and it may not be screened to the same 

levels of technology that you demand here. 

I can tell you that we are going to make every effort for all domestic and out-bound to comply with the law when it is time for 

it to be 100 percent. We are going to work our tails off to make 

sure that happens. 

Assuming that we have a good partnership with TSA, assuming 

that they get the funding for additional canine teams, assuming 

that Mr. Johnson and his competitors continue to work on wideportal screening technology that can be efficient, effective, quick— 

it can’t be six pallets an hour, as Jack points out; we have to have 

something that really moves—and if we have a good upstream program, I think making 100 percent for domestic and out-bound is 

very doable. 

If you want to be pure and have an absolute 100 percent of everything, then I think it is going to be a challenge because of the 

problems working out internationally. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

I would like to follow up with Mr. Fried, if I could. I would be 

happy to hear you address that same issue. But, also, I wanted to 

make a comment, too, that your comments regarding the future of 

air cargo screening were of real interest to me. TSA, as you know, 

must balance its security missions with the need to ensure the efficient flow of commerce. 

How do you think TSA could better manage its resources to ensure it addresses the highest risks to air cargo while not impeding 

the safe flow of low-risk cargo? 

Mr. FRIED. Well, I think it is important not to abandon this targeted risk-based approach. I mean, I know we are screening every 

single piece of cargo, but I think that the agency needs to be mindful of making sure that risks, specific risks, are addressed in the 

screening of cargo itself. I think that, if we continue to use that approach going forward, the agency will be effective. 

I also think this is, as Mr. May has said, this is a question of 

resources, and TSA needs as many resources as possible to continue to expand the CCSP program. So it is a question of finances. 

Mr. DENT. I guess my next question to you, Mr. Fried, is this: 

How are freight-forwarding employees vetted and investigated to 

ensure that they are trustworthy employees? 
60 

Mr. FRIED. Currently, the TSA has a security threat assessment 

program that is instituted on anyone in the air cargo and, I believe, 

airline industry, as well. 

Mr. DENT. Are your facilities currently regulated with respect to 

facility security minimum standards? Would those in the CCSP be 

regulated by TSA? 

Mr. FRIED. Yes and yes. The TSA is a constant visitor to all of 

our facilities. Of course, all Certified Cargo Screening Program participants are, in fact, vetted, validated, and then subsequently audited by TSA. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

Then to Mr. Johnson, your frustrations with TSA’s Qualified 

Product List are heard loud and clear. Navigating any bureaucracy, 

as you know, is difficult, but there are few more difficult, perhaps, 

than at the Department of Homeland Security. So it must have 

been particularly challenging for you as a smaller business. 

When you first sought to enter the Qualified Product List program with TSA, how did you know where to look? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Actually, I had met Mr. Kelly at an industry conference and asked him the best way to start, and he referred me 

to someone on his staff. That is how we started. 

Mr. DENT. That is interesting. Is there any Web site or any form 

or any handout explaining the process in an easy-to-understand 

formats? Or is this just all word of mouth, like through Mr. Kelly? 

Mr. JOHNSON. There probably is a Web site or a place, but I saw 

the guy at the top 10 feet away from me, so I went there. 

Mr. DENT. That works. What was it that finally enabled you to 

break through the ceiling? I guess it was just that, going through 

Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think what really changed things is we had been 

talking to the science group at the TSA, and the way we explained 

our technology didn’t make sense to them. The challenge we had 

as a small business is the information they were asking us and the 

things they wanted us to deploy to them were the core of our technology. If I told them that, now it is a matter of public record and 

it could interfere with my patent ability. So we had this Catch-22 

of, if we tell you how it works, you will get excited about it, but 

what is to say it is not now a matter of public record or somebody 

else doesn’t get the same technology? 

So we took a chance very recently and just said, ‘‘This is how it 

works. This is why it works.’’ We got everybody to start nodding 

their heads, saying, ‘‘Okay, this actually looks like it could work.’’ 

What we didn’t know is that someone had told a very similar 

story. I think that has been the challenge, is TSA has heard it a 

hundred times from a hundred people saying, ‘‘We can do it,’’ and 

it never really comes out. You know, build the passive neutron system or do something else. 

Going back to the point, we tried to come up with a business solution first: What is the process, as it sits today? How do we add 

the screening process to it without interfering with the workflow? 

Since all we focus on is cargo, we spend all of our time in warehouses, we heard it from the ground up, so it made us a lot easier 

for us. We just needed the TSA to validate the technology. 
61 

Mr. DENT. By the way, congratulations on your additional hires. 

I know that has to be pretty tough in these times. But just a real 

quick question: How many employees does your company currently 

have? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thirty-three. 

Mr. DENT. Thirty-three. Okay, thank you. 

I will yield back my time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentleman for his questions. 

Right now I am pleased to yield 5 minutes for questioning to the 

full committee Chairman, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi. 

Thank you, Mr. Dent. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

I appreciate the honesty of the witnesses. 

I want to briefly paint a picture before I offer my question to the 

panel. One of the challenges we have is to try to protect the good 

people of America. Congress has tried to say, given the vulnerability that exists in this space we are talking about today, that we 

have to do something about it. Now, whether or not the 100 percent target we have set is valid, we have to have some idea of what 

is coming to our shores, we have to have some idea of what is traveling on passenger planes. 

We believe and hope that nothing bad will happen. But the problem is, if we don’t do our duties and something bad happens, 

shame on us. So, to that end, we are trying to get us to a point 

where we can, with a reasonable assurance, give the traveling public and others confidence that our systems work. 

Now, the systems might be dogs, it might be men, it might be 

technology, but aggregate that and we have a system that is 100 

percent. 

So, if the challenge for industry is, ‘‘Well, if you give 100 percent, 

we can’t get cargo to our markets fast enough, and that delay costs 

money,’’ sure. But if we create a process that provides all the assurances and gets goods to market in that period of time, then I 

think we all succeed. 

So, to that end, Congress tried to set these time tables. Granted, 

if we have to push them back, so be it. But our goal still has to 

be the 100 percent. To the extent that we can accomplish that 

within a period of time, we have to do it. 

So I guess my issue for you, Mr. Johnson, is, your solution that 

you have offered is a different approach to what we are talking 

about getting us there. What makes yours different from X-ray? 

Mr. JOHNSON. From a pure technology perspective, we don’t use 

any radiation, so it is a safe working environment. We actually use 

a microwave, so we don’t require any shielding, and it doesn’t require—it is not heavy, it can be deployed very easily. 

Secondarily, I think the biggest difference is we try to do it in 

the standard flow of commerce in the process. So our technology is 

deployed at the scale or on the floor where the cargo is already naturally being stopped to be weighed or measured, and that is where 

we try to do the screening. 

So, from a technology perspective, we are safer, in my opinion. 

Then secondarily, we are automatically inserted in the process, so 

it is not an extra step, it is not another place you have to go, or 

another part. 
62 

We make it so that you don’t have to check an image and say, 

‘‘Is this image something suspicious?’’ It is a simple red light/green 

light approach. You put the cargo on the scale, it takes the weight, 

our system takes the measurements, it takes the digital picture, 

and it screens the cargo in seconds, all in one step. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Boisen, you heard the panel of witnesses before, especially our TSA representative. Given that testimony and 

what your experience is being with TSA, do you have an idea of 

whether they are moving on the front of a proven technology at a 

pace where it does not impede commerce? Or the 100 percent mandate, coupled with the ebb and flow of technology, might be a problem, based on your observation? 

Mr. BOISEN. Well, my current observations are limited to Mr. 

Johnson, and I have known his technology for some time. But, 

without a doubt, there seems to be—the pace is picking up. There 

seems to be greater attention to it. 

I am concerned that—you know, some 5 years ago, I was involved with another conference, involved with a lot of smart people, 

Sandia Labs and Livermore Labs, et cetera, talking about technology and that it was just 5 years away. That was 5 years ago. 

A lot of it—we have not heard anything promising coming out of 

those sources again. 

So I think it is one thing to say, we need technology. It is another to actually find it. How do you get it out of the lab? How do 

you make it functional into a pretty harsh environment? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Fried, do you want to comment on that? 

Mr. FRIED. Yeah. You know, TSA tells us that the technology for 

screening pallets and containers with multiple commodities is a few 

years away. While we hear some tales of promising machines over 

in Europe, they say that the false alarm rates, the false positive 

rates, as they are referred to, are too high to be accepted by TSA. 

So, you know, we do our best to encourage the agency to look at 

as many different technologies out there as possible, including, of 

course, Mr. Johnson’s. You know, our opinion is that they just can’t 

roll it out fast enough. But, you know, of course, it has to meet 

TSA’s standards. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yeah. 

I guess, Madam Chairwoman, I could not get a time frame from 

TSA on any of what we are talking about. I think, from a business 

perspective, if I wanted to do business in this space, I would like 

to have some idea of how long we are talking about to either say 

yea or nay, but I don’t really want to just be drawn out over a period of time, because time is money, and if I am doing research and 

development, that is a challenge. 

Mr. May, I agree with you. Dogs, canines, clearly, at this point, 

is the immediate issue for us to have, to do this. But if we know 

that the notion of having dogs in enough quantity to get things 

done is almost impossible, then I think we have to look to technology. If we can assure, you know, your membership that should 

this technology come forth it would not impede commerce, do you 

see your membership being supportive of that effort? 

Mr. MAY. Mr. Chairman, if I understand your question correctly, 

I will give you an answer. 
63 

We are all in favor of new technology. We just want it to be— 

we want it to work. That is to say, it has to meet the TSA’s standards. It has to have low false positives and so forth. It has to do 

what it is purported to do. It, No. 2, has to be quick and efficient. 

No. 3, there has to be a discussion about cost-benefit, who is paying 

for this equipment, who is going to run it, where is it going to be, 

and that sort of thing. 

But nobody is opposed to new technology. The problem is—you 

and I have had the conversation about how long it takes to train 

dog teams. Unfortunately, it seems to me like technology has taken 

a whole lot longer than that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, you are absolutely correct. I don’t think we 

got the answer from the Department today that we are looking for, 

because we are trying to encourage them to move along and get it 

done. It just appears that, until recently, the effort and energy to 

make that happen was not taking place. 

So, again, we are going to have to get that. As a Member of Congress, somebody who chairs this committee, I would not want something to happen that can be put at the door of an imperfect screening system as to the reason it occurred. If that happens—and we 

all agree that if you think the AIG furor over bonuses is something, 

you can imagine what the public furor over something happening 

with this would be. 

So we are all prepared to work together to try to come up with 

a solution. I just wanted to let you know that the time table is an 

issue, and we will have to continue to pursue it. 

Mr. MAY. We fully concur with you, Mr. Chairman. I would just 

reiterate that the CCSP program is going to become a major component of our success in reaching 100 percent, especially with widebodied palletized loads. So we need to make sure that they have 

the resources to get going to it. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I asked that resource question of the first 

panel. I wanted to make sure that if the Department needs additional money, we can give it to them. Whatever it is to get us to 

where we need to be, we are prepared to make it happen. 

Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CLEAVER [presiding]. Thank you. 

The Chair will return shortly. I will yield myself 5 minutes. 

This morning we were called to votes, and so I was not able to 

get in depth with those who were on the first panel. 

But, Mr. Johnson, one of the issues I raised this morning was the 

GAO report, which said that screening cannot be done to crates 10 

feet and larger. I am interested in and concerned about what we 

do to that. What do you foresee in terms of technology, emerging 

technologies, that would allow that to happen? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think for us, in particular, we see a lot 

more cargo on a pallet, a 48-by-40-inch wooden pallet, than we do 

necessarily in the, what we would call a cookie sheet, the 10-footby-10-foot. That cargo goes on a lot of all-cargo carriers who are 

technically part of this regulation. I think if we could screen at the 

palletized level, along with the CCSP, we could definitely solve the 

100 percent screening. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Why can’t we? 
64 

Mr. JOHNSON. Right now? The technology that it would take to— 

the power you need to get through that dense of cargo is not safe 

for humans. It is just very difficult to stand by it. The technology 

we are trying to deploy—and there are other people out there trying to deploy solutions that require low power that have great penetration to tell you if that pallet is safe or not at a piece level. 

You have 20 pieces on the pallet; each one of those pieces are 

safe and, therefore, can be put on the plane. That is the solution 

we are out trying to solve, without stopping the flow of commerce 

and during the natural process of accepting the cargo. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Okay. You know, if I have a business in my district, Gates Bar-B-Q, they want to ship slabs of short ends or, you 

know, some beef sandwiches, frozen beef sandwiches, they are a 

small business, is the cost prohibitive for small businesses? 

Mr. FRIED. To participate in the Certified Cargo Screening Program? 

Mr. CLEAVER. Yes. Yes. 

Mr. FRIED. No. In that case, absolutely not. Most of the businesses would not have to buy technology, because they are doing 

their own packing of their boxes. Their people would have to be 

certified. They would be security-threat-assessed by the TSA. They 

would have to provide a sterile area for preparation for packing. 

But I would tell you, generally speaking, no. 

Mr. CLEAVER. So they could do that in their own little plant? 

Mr. FRIED. Absolutely. 

Mr. CLEAVER. The cost would be minimal. 

Mr. FRIED. Minimal cost. They have to just make sure that their 

perimeter—they have controlled access to their environment. But, 

generally speaking, I would say no. 

Mr. CLEAVER. So if we said that right now, in the middle of this 

reinvestment and recovery—I am the only one saying it; we fail to 

get everybody to say that. Everybody wants to say ‘‘stimulus,’’ but 

it is the Recovery and Reinvestment Act. One of the big concerns 

we have, of course, in this bill that we approved is, how do we help 

small businesses? 

So, one of the issues that small businesses are concerned about 

is, you know, in order for them to expand, they are going to have 

to expand their markets, and that means, you know, transatlantic 

business deals. My concern was—and I think you have answered 

the question—that they are not going to be put through any expense that they could not bear. 

Mr. FRIED. Right. The actual shippers, the people giving us the 

boxes, that is correct. 

Mr. CLEAVER. One final question. Maybe this is not the—I mean, 

the panel, I let them escape, because the bell saved them this 

morning, because I wanted to know how we are doing business 

with small and minority businesses. 

I am pleased, Mr. Johnson, to see you here, but, I mean, that 

was a question I wanted to raise with them. But, I mean, your 

presence, I guess, would suggest that there is at least some level 

of openness and sensitivity. You didn’t have any unusual challenges, other than the challenges that people normally have as a 

business person? 
65 

Mr. JOHNSON. I would agree that it is more defined by the bureaucracy of the process. I didn’t think that I was treated any different or slighted because we were a small business. The challenge 

was just getting in front of them and telling our story. Since then, 

it has gone really fast. 

I would say the TSA has helped us find a solution. They want 

to solve the problem just as bad as we want to give one to the industry. I don’t think they care if it is small, large, or medium, as 

long as it makes sense for the industry and it can hit the 100 percent screening mark. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Sounds like the coach from Alabama, Bear Bryant, 

said he didn’t want black players until Southern Cal had a running 

back named Bam Morris, ran about 3 million yards on him. Then 

he said, you know, I don’t have any problems with having those— 

I don’t want to use the word he used—but having those on my 

team. So I guess, you know, if you have something to offer people, 

they want to get it. 

One of the other questions that I wanted to ask—incidentally, 

the Chairwoman will be back shortly—do you think that, Nationwide, region to region, TSA is focusing in the right places and the 

right points in the supply chain to meet the 100 percent screening 

mandate, congressional mandate? 

Mr. FRIED. I would say yes. I mean, the Certified Cargo Screening Program is a smart solution. Spread the security task into the 

supply chain is—it is a smart way to make sure that we reach this 

mandate in the absence of certified technology. 

Get the shippers involved. Make sure that TSA is well-funded so 

that it has adequate personnel on hand to actually carry out the 

vetting and the audit function over the shippers, and I think that 

we will achieve this mandate without hesitation. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Do all of you think that we are going to meet the 

congressional mandate? If you would just go down from Mr. Johnson all the way down to Mr. May. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I would qualify it the same way Mr. May did. I 

would say domestic and out-going, absolutely. But I have spent 

enough time internationally, and the harmonization challenge you 

have is that most in many countries believe that their security 

standard is superior to the TSA’s. So when the TSA is trying to enforce upon them a standard that they believe they are superior to, 

it is very difficult to call it harmonization. 

Mr. CLEAVER. But have we looked at any international—any 

other international systems? I mean, for example, El Al is at least 

spoken of as the superior system on the planet. Have we had any 

contact with or involvement with El Al? 

Mr. FRIED. Yes, I spent a week over in Tel Aviv back in May. 

I can tell you that, from what my experience was with the Israelis, 

is that cargo is a conundrum to them, as well. One of the solutions 

they have is to hold cargo for 2 days prior to shipment. 

Mr. Boisen’s airline had service in and out of Tel Aviv, so he 

could probably tell his personal experiences, but—— 

Mr. CLEAVER. I have had personal experiences. You can’t take a 

beef sandwich on El Al. 
66 

Mr. KELLY. Right. As a passenger, if you plan on committing a 

malicious act, obviously that is not the place to do it. But, you 

know, cargo has its challenges. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Yes. 

Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [presiding]. We call this a cooperative spirit. 

I thank Mr. Cleaver from Missouri. He has come to be a valued 

Member of this committee, and I look forward to us working to 

solve these problems. 

Let me thank the members of this panel. I think you have enlightened us as to the private sector’s involvement but also the concerns that you have expressed. 

I do want to add to the record, to reinforce its addition to the 

record, an October 30, 2008, letter from the Transportation Security Administration to Chairman Thompson and the committee 

that defines transportation, as to what the transportation system 

means, what ‘‘commensurate’’ means, which I think is going to be 

important to future legislation. 

I ask unanimous consent to submit it into the record. Hearing no 

objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 
67 
68 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield myself just a minute just to ask Mr. 

Johnson, what is your latest encounter—and I ask this generically 

for small businesses—but what is your encounter with TSA? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Actually, we spoke this morning with the TSL 

about setting a date to start the screening process. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just say this broadly. I have asked, I 

think, Mr. Kelly to provide us with a list, maybe extensive, of small 

businesses similarly situated and the status of the technology that 

they may be offering. 

Let me say on behalf of the committee, we hope that that meeting that you are having, as well as others who are in line to answer 

the question of Mr. Boisen and Mr. Fried and Mr. May on technology, moves quickly. I am also going to write a letter to TSA to 
69 

ask for them to give us their process of moving technology and assessing that technology. 

I do think there is a gaping hole of consciousness between the 

urgency that Congress puts into legislation like the 9/11 legislation, 

giving specific dates of 2009 and 2010, and there is a disconnect 

between the kind of technology that needs to be in place for the job 

to get done. 

Mr. Boisen, on behalf of your constituents, we are going to ask 

for some understanding of the process of certification and providing 

information to your constituents to be able to now have you assess 

which technology you can use and the determination of whether or 

not the equipment that some of your clients, customers, constituents are using is adequate. 

Also, I had to rush away because I gave testimony to the Budget 

Committee. I will be revising my statement to include issues regarding transit and air cargo and asking for funding that will answer some of the concerns about staffing and some of the concerns 

about funding as it relates to the full screening of cargo by 2010 

and certainly to maintain the 50 percent that we have at this 

point. 

I think I asked Mr. Boisen to give me a list of his constituents, 

in terms of their compliance or representing that they are at 50 or 

100 percent, and I would like you to designate who is at 100. 

Mr. May, likewise, I would like you to do so, as well. 

I would like to ask my staff, staff director, Mr. Beland, that we 

have a briefing with airlines. We understand their hesitancy to be 

at a hearing, but we hope that we will have full attendance at a 

briefing so that we can be informed and be working effectively on 

this issue. We may call upon those of you who are here again. 

With that, I believe I have come to a conclusion. I think I will 

just simply say, no, we have not met the test, and the test is to 

secure America. Frankly, I hope that this hearing will set a wakeup call for us to do so. 

I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. 

The Members of the subcommittee may have additional questions 

for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond to them expeditiously in writing. 

In addition, I think this hearing has generated what I believe is 

necessity for further legislation on this matter to clarify, but also 

instructions to the industry and to TSA. We look forward to introducing that legislation. 

Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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