GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

CONTINGENCY 

CONTRACTING 

DOD, State, and 

USAID Continue to 

Face Challenges in 

Tracking Contractor 

Personnel and 

Contracts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan 

October 2009 

GAO-10-1 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

October 2009

CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 

DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges

in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in 

Highlights of GAO-10-1, a report to Iraq and Afghanistan 

congressional committees 

The Departments of Defense 

(DOD) and State and the U.S. 

Agency for International 

Development (USAID) have relied 

extensively on contractors to 

provide a range of services in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, but as GAO has 

previously reported, the agencies 

have faced challenges in obtaining 

sufficient information to plan and 

manage their use of contractors. 

As directed by the National 

Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, GAO 

analyzed DOD, State, and USAID 

data for Iraq and Afghanistan for 

FY 2008 and the first half of FY 

2009 on the (1) status of agency 

efforts to track information on 

contracts and contractor 

personnel; (2) number of 

contractor personnel; (3) number 

of killed and wounded contractors; 

and (4) number and value of 

contracts and extent to which they 

were awarded competitively. GAO 

reviewed selected contracts and 

compared personnel data to other 

available sources to assess the 

reliability of agency-reported data. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends the agencies 

implement a plan to, among other 

matters, ensure consistent criteria 

for entering information into SPOT 

and improve its reporting 

capabilities to track statutorily 

required contracting data. DOD and 

State disagreed that a plan is 

needed, citing current coordination 

efforts. A plan with time frames 

would help to translate their 

coordination efforts into actions to 

address the issues GAO identified. 

In response to a statutory requirement to increase contractor oversight, DOD, 

State, and USAID agreed to use the Synchronized Predeployment and 

Operational Tracker (SPOT) system to track information on contracts and 

contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the exception of USAID in 

Afghanistan, the agencies are in the process of implementing the system and 

require contractor personnel in both countries to be entered into SPOT. 

However, the agencies use differing criteria to decide which personnel are 

entered, resulting in some personnel not being entered into the system as 

required. Some agency officials also questioned the need to track detailed 

information on all contractor personnel, particularly local nationals. Further, 

SPOT currently lacks the capability to track all required data elements, such 

as contract dollar value and the number of personnel killed and wounded. As 

a result, the agencies rely on other sources for contract and contractor 

personnel information, such as periodic surveys of contractors. 

DOD, State, and USAID reported nearly 226,500 contractor personnel, 

including about 28,000 performing security functions, in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

as of the second quarter of FY 2009. However due to their limitations, the 

reported data should not be used to identify trends or draw conclusions about 

contractor personnel numbers. Specifically, we found that the data reported 

by the three agencies were incomplete. For example, in one quarterly 

contractor survey DOD did not include 26,000 personnel in Afghanistan, and 

USAID did not provide personnel data for a $91 million contract. The agencies 

depend on contractors to report personnel numbers and acknowledge that 

they cannot validate the reported information. 

USAID and State reported that 64 of their contractors had been killed and 

159 wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. DOD officials 

told us they continue to lack a system to reliably track killed or wounded 

contractor personnel and referred us to the Department of Labor’s Defense 

Base Act (DBA) case data for this information. However, because DBA is a 

worker’s compensation program, Labor’s data include cases such as those 

resulting from occupational injuries and do not provide an appropriate basis 

for determining how many contractor personnel were killed or wounded 

while working on DOD, State, or USAID contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan. 

Nevertheless, the data provide insights into contractor casualties. According 

to Labor, 11,804 DBA cases were filed for contractors killed or injured in Iraq 

and Afghanistan during our review period, including 218 deaths. Based on our 

review of 150 randomly selected cases, we estimate that 11 percent of all 

FY 2008 DBA cases for the two countries resulted from hostile actions. 

DOD, State, and USAID reported obligating $38.6 billion on nearly 

85,000 contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. DOD 

accounted for more than 90 percent of the contracts and obligations. The 

agencies reported that 97 percent of the contracts awarded during our review 

period, accounting for nearly 71 percent of obligations, were competed. 

View GAO-10-1 or key components.

For more information, contact John P. Hutton 

at (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-10-1 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 4 

SPOT Not Yet fully Implemented to Track Contractor Personnel 

and Contracts 6 

DOD, State, and USAID Lack Reliable Data on Contractor 

Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan 9 

Agencies’ Ability to Track Contractor Personnel Killed or Wounded 

in Iraq and Afghanistan Varies 15 

DOD, State, and USAID Obligated Tens of Billions of Dollars on 

Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan 19 

Conclusions 25 

Recommendations for Executive Action 26 

Agency Comments 27 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 31 

 

Appendix II DOD, State, and USAID Contracts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan 36 

 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 45 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 51 

Appendix V Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development 56 

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 60 

 

 Contingency Contracting 
Tables 

Table 1: DOD-Reported Quarterly Data on the Number of 

Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 

2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 10 

Table 2: State-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor 

Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan 12 

Table 3: USAID-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor 

Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and 

the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 13 

Table 4: Numbers of DOD, State, and USAID Contractor Personnel 

in SPOT Compared to Agency-Reported Survey Numbers, 

as of March 31, 2009 15 

Table 5: USAID- and State-Reported Data on Contractor Personnel 

Killed and Wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 

2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 16 

Table 6: Defense Base Act Cases for Deaths and Injuries in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 and the First Half 

of Fiscal Year 2009 18 

Table 7: DOD Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal 

Year 2009 36 

Table 8: DOD New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal 

Year 2009 37 

Table 9: DOD’s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts 

(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the 

First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 38 

Table 10: DOD’s Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and 

Afghanistan Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 

2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 39 

Table 11: State Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal 

Year 2009 40 

Table 12: State New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal 

Year 2009 40 

Table 13: State’s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts 

(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the 

First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 41 

Table 14: State’s Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and 

Afghanistan Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 

2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 42 

Page ii GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Table 15: USAID Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal 

Year 2009 42 

Table 16: USAID New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq 

and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of 

Fiscal Year 2009 43 

Table 17: USAID’s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts 

(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the 

First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 44 

Table 18: USAID’s Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and 

Afghanistan Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 

2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 44 

Figures 

Figure 1: DOD, State, and USAID Obligations on Active Contracts 

for Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First 

Half of Fiscal Year 2009 20 

Figure 2: DOD, State, and USAID Percentage of Contracts and 

Obligations on Awards for Iraq and Afghanistan 21 

Figure 3: Competition for DOD, State, and USAID Iraq and 

Afghanistan Contracts Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and 

the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 23 

Page iii GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Abbreviations 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

DBA Defense Base Act 

DOD Department of Defense 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FPDS-NG Federal Procurement Data System – Next 

Generation 

LOA letter of authorization 

MEJA Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

NDAA for FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008 

SPOT Synchronized Predeployment and Operational 

Tracker 

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

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Page iv GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Page 1 GAO-10-1 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

October 1, 2009 

Congressional Committees 

The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors 

to support troops and civilian personnel and to oversee and carry out 

reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the use of 

contractors to support military operations is not new, the extent to which 

the three agencies are relying on contractors in the two countries is 

unprecedented—both in terms of the number of contractors and the range 

of services they are providing. We and others have reported that the 

agencies have faced challenges in obtaining information on contracts and 

contractor personnel to plan and manage efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.1

Absent complete and accurate information on contractors supporting 

contingency operations, the agencies are limited in their ability to develop 

a complete picture of their reliance on contractors, the tasks being 

performed, and their associated costs. The importance of such information 

is heightened by the evolving U.S. efforts in the two countries as the 

agencies reduce their presence in Iraq while expanding their presence in 

Afghanistan. Reliable and meaningful data on contractors and the services 

they provide are a starting point for agency decisions on when and how to 

effectively use contractors; support contractors in terms of housing, 

transportation, security, and other services; and ensure that contractors 

are properly managed and overseen. 

Congress has taken a number of actions to increase oversight of contracts 

with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Among these, the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA for FY2008) 

directed DOD, State, and USAID to sign a memorandum of understanding 

(MOU) regarding matters relating to contracting in the two countries, 

including maintaining common databases of information on contracts and 

contractor personnel.2

 In their July 2008 MOU, the agencies designated the 

Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) database as 

1

See GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Are Taking Actions to 

Track Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-09-538T 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2009). 

2

Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 861, as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 854 (2008). 

 Contingency Contracting 
 

their system of record for information on contracts and contractor 

personnel working in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Congress directed us to annually review DOD, State, and USAID contracts 

in Iraq and Afghanistan and report on these reviews through 2010.3

 This is 

our second report issued pursuant to that mandate.4

 We are providing the 

results of our analyses of agency-reported data for fiscal year 2008 and the 

first half of fiscal year 2009 regarding (1) the agencies’ implementation of 

SPOT, (2) the number of contractor personnel, including those performing 

security functions,5

 working on DOD, State, and USAID contracts with 

performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, (3) the number of contractor 

personnel killed or wounded, and (4) the number and value of contracts6

 

3

Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 863. While the mandate and our report address DOD, State, and 

USAID contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, other federal agencies such as the Departments 

of Agriculture, Justice, and the Treasury have contracts with performance in Iraq and 

Afghanistan that are not included in the scope of the mandate or our report. 

4

For our first report issued pursuant to the mandate, see GAO, Contingency Contracting: 

DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

GAO-09-19 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2008). 

5

The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 

110-417, § 854(d) amended section 864 of the NDAA for FY2008 to add a definition of 

“contractor personnel” as “any person performing work under contract for the Department 

of Defense, the Department of State, or the United States Agency for International 

Development, in Iraq or Afghanistan, including individuals and subcontractors at any tier.” 

Section 864 of the NDAA for FY2008 defines private security functions as the “guarding of 

personnel, facilities or property of a Federal agency, the contractor or subcontractor, or a 

third party” and “any other activity for which personnel are required to carry weapons in 

the performance of their duties.” 

6

Section 864(a)(2) of the NDAA for FY2008 defines a “contract in Iraq or Afghanistan” as “a 

contract with the Department of Defense, the Department of State, or the United States 

Agency for International Development, a subcontract at any tier issued under such a 

contract, or a task order or delivery order at any tier issued under such a contract 

(including a contract, subcontract, or task order or delivery order issued by another 

Government agency for the Department of Defense, the Department of State, or the United 

States Agency for International Development) if the contract, subcontract, or task order or 

delivery order involves worked [sic] performed in Iraq or Afghanistan for a period longer 

than 14 days.” The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines a subcontract as a 

contract entered into by a subcontractor to furnish supplies or services for performance of 

a prime contract or other subcontracts. The FAR defines a task order as an order for 

services placed against an established contract or government sources. For purposes of 

this report, when we use the term contract, we intend it to refer to a “contract in Iraq or 

Afghanistan” as defined in the NDAA for FY2008. 

Page 2 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

that were active and awarded7 during our 18-month review period and the 

extent of competition for new contract awards. 

We used the following methodologies to develop our findings: 

• To assess SPOT’s implementation, we reviewed DOD, State, and USAID’s 

MOU and interviewed officials responsible for implementing SPOT to 

determine the agencies’ criteria and practices for entering information into 

SPOT and the system’s current and planned capabilities. We reviewed 

agency guidance and policy documents regarding the use of SPOT and 

took training courses designed for personnel who expect to use the 

system. We then compared the uses and capabilities of SPOT to the MOU 

requirements to determine the extent to which SPOT fulfills the terms of 

the MOU. 

• For the number of contractor personnel, we obtained DOD, State, and 

USAID data on the number of U.S., third country, and local nationals 

working on contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan, including those performing 

security functions, during our review period. The agencies provided data 

from surveys of their contractors as well as the SPOT database. We 

assessed the reported data by comparing them to other available sources. 

Based on comparisons of each source, we concluded that the agencyreported data should not be used to draw conclusions about the actual 

number of contractor personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan or trends over time. 

However, we are presenting the reported data along with their limitations 

as they establish a minimum number of contractor personnel during our 

period of review. 

• For contractor personnel killed or wounded during our review period, we 

analyzed State and USAID data; DOD did not collect and could not provide 

these data. We could not independently verify the completeness of the 

data reported by USAID and State. However, we report State’s and 

USAID’s data as they provide insight into the number of contractor 

personnel who were killed or wounded during our review period. In 

addition, we analyzed Department of Labor data on Defense Base Act 

(DBA) cases for incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2008 

and the first half of fiscal year 2009. We determined the DBA data were 

 

7

Since the NDAA for FY2008 did not define what constitutes an “active” contract, we 

considered a contract active if funds were obligated or deobligated on that contract in 

fiscal year 2008 and/or the first half of fiscal year 2009. There were other contracts that had 

performance in Iraq or Afghanistan during that time period but had no obligations or 

deobligations; such contracts were not included in our analyses. Contracts awarded in 

fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009 are a subset of the active contracts. 

Throughout the report, the term award refers to the issuance of a task or delivery order or 

the award of a new contract. 

Page 3 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report based on our prior 

reliability assessments. We also reviewed a random sample of 150 DBA 

case files, from a population of 2,500 cases, for incidents that occurred 

during fiscal year 2008 to determine, for example, whether the case was 

the result of a hostile incident and the severity of the contractor’s injury. 

• For the contracts, we obtained data from DOD, State, and USAID on the 

number of active and awarded contracts with performance in Iraq and 

Afghanistan during our review period, the amount of funds obligated on 

those contracts, and the extent of competition for new contract awards. 

Data were provided from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next 

Generation (FPDS-NG), agency-specific databases, and manually compiled 

lists of contract actions. We determined that the data were sufficiently 

reliable to determine the minimum number of active and awarded 

contracts and obligation amounts, as well as the number of competed 

contracts, based on our prior reliability assessments, interviews with 

agency officials, and verification of some reported data. 

A more detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in 

appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 

through September 2009 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Section 861 of the NDAA for FY2008 directed the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator to sign an MOU related to 

contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The law specified a number of issues 

to be covered in the MOU, including the identification of each agency’s 

roles and responsibilities for matters relating to contracting in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, responsibility for establishing procedures for the movement 

of contractor personnel in the two countries, responsibility for collecting 

and referring information related to violations of the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice (UCMJ) or the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 

(MEJA), and identification of common databases to serve as repositories 

of information on contract and contractor personnel. The NDAA for 

FY2008 requires the databases to track at a minimum: 

Background 

• for each contract, 

• a brief description of the contract, 

• its total value, and 

• whether it was awarded competitively; and 

Page 4 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

• for contractor personnel working under contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan, 

• total number employed, 

• total number performing security functions, and 

• total number who have been killed or wounded. 

DOD, State, and USAID signed the MOU in July 2008.8

 The agencies agreed 

that SPOT, a Web-based system initially designed and used by DOD, would 

be the system of record for the statutorily-required contract and 

contractor personnel information. The MOU specified that SPOT would 

include information on DOD, State, and USAID contracts with more than 

14 days of performance in Iraq or Afghanistan or valued at more than the 

simplified acquisition threshold, which the MOU stated was $100,000, as 

well as information on the personnel working under those contracts. In 

contrast, the NDAA for FY2008 established a 14-day threshold for 

inclusion in the database but did not specify a minimum dollar value. 

As agreed in the MOU, DOD is responsible for all maintenance and 

upgrades to the SPOT database.9

 The agencies further agreed to negotiate 

funding arrangements for any agency-unique requirements and for 

specialized training requirements. Each agency is to ensure that data 

elements related to contractor personnel, such as the number of personnel 

employed on each contract in Iraq or Afghanistan, are entered into SPOT 

and to require its contractors to enter that information accurately. 

Information entered into SPOT is more detailed than the number of 

contractor personnel as it is designed to track individuals by name and 

record information such as the contracts they are working under, 

deployment dates, and next of kin. Data elements, such as contract value 

and whether it was awarded competitively, are to be imported into SPOT 

from FPDS-NG, the federal government’s system for tracking information 

on contracting actions. 

 

8

Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 854 amended section 861 of the NDAA for FY2008 by specifying 

additional matters to be included in the MOU regarding UCMJ and MEJA offenses and 

requiring the agencies to modify their MOU to address these additional matters by 

February 11, 2009. However, according to DOD officials, the required modifications to the 

MOU are still pending final approval. 

9

DOD, as the system owner, currently pays all development and maintenance costs for 

SPOT. However, DOD officials we spoke with said they are exploring options for having 

the agencies that use SPOT pay for some maintenance costs. 

Page 5 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

While implementation of SPOT is still under way, DOD, State, and USAID’s 

criteria for deciding which contractor personnel to enter into the system 

differed from what was agreed to in the MOU and varied by country. This 

has resulted in not all contractor personnel being entered into SPOT as 

agreed to in the MOU. Further, SPOT currently does not have the 

capability to track all of the required contract information or readily 

generate reports on the total number of killed or wounded contractor 

personnel. 

SPOT Not Yet fully 

Implemented to Track 

Contractor Personnel 

and Contracts 

Agency Implementation 

and Criteria for Using 

SPOT Varied 

For the majority of our review period, DOD, State, and USAID were 

phasing in the MOU requirement to use SPOT to track information on 

contracts and the personnel working on them in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 

January 2007, DOD designated SPOT as its primary system for collecting 

data on contractor personnel deployed with U.S. forces and directed 

contractor firms to enter personnel data for contracts performed in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. State started systematically entering information for both 

Iraq and Afghanistan into SPOT in November 2008. In January 2009, 

USAID began requiring contractors in Iraq to enter personnel data into 

SPOT. However, USAID has not yet imposed a similar requirement on its 

contractors in Afghanistan and has no time frame for doing so. 

In implementing SPOT, DOD’s, State’s, and USAID’s criteria for 

determining which contractor personnel are entered into SPOT varied and 

were not consistent with those contained in the MOU, as the following 

illustrate. 

• Regarding contractor personnel in Iraq, DOD, State, and USAID officials 

stated that the primary factor for deciding to enter contractor personnel 

into SPOT was whether a contractor needed a SPOT-generated letter of 

authorization (LOA). Contractor personnel need SPOT-generated LOAs to, 

among other things, enter Iraq, receive military identification cards, travel 

on U.S. military aircraft, or, for security contractors, receive approval to 

carry weapons.10 However, not all contractor personnel, particularly local 

nationals, in Iraq need LOAs and agency officials informed us that such 

personnel were not being entered into SPOT. In contrast, DOD officials 

informed us that individuals needing LOAs were entered into SPOT even if 

their contracts did not meet the MOU’s 14-day or $100,000 thresholds. 

 

10An LOA is a document issued by a government contracting officer or designee that 

authorizes contractor personnel to travel to, from, and within a designated area and to 

identify any additional authorizations, privileges, or government support the contractor is 

entitled to under the contract. 

Page 6 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

• For Afghanistan, DOD offices varied in their treatment of which contractor 

personnel should be entered into SPOT. Officials with one contracting 

office stated that the need for an LOA determined whether someone was 

entered into SPOT. As in Iraq, since local nationals generally do not need 

LOAs, they are not being entered into SPOT. In contrast, DOD officials 

with another contracting office stated that they follow DOD’s 2007 

guidance on the use of SPOT.11 According to the guidance, contractor 

personnel working on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan with more than 

30 days of performance and valued over $25,000 are to be entered into 

SPOT—as opposed to the MOU threshold of 14 days of performance or 

valued over $100,000. 

Agency officials have raised questions about the need to enter detailed 

information into SPOT on all contractor personnel. Some DOD officials we 

spoke with questioned the need to individually track all contractor 

personnel as opposed to their total numbers given the cost of collecting 

these detailed data compared to the benefit of having this information. 

Similarly, USAID officials questioned the need to enter detailed 

information as agreed to because personnel working on its contracts in 

Afghanistan generally do not live or work in close proximity to 

U.S. government personnel and typically do not receive support services 

from the U.S. government. USAID officials also cited security concerns as 

one factor affecting their decision on who should be entered into SPOT. 

USAID officials explained that they have held off entering Iraqi or Afghan 

nationals into SPOT because identifying local nationals who work with the 

U.S. government by name could put those individuals in danger should the 

system be compromised. To help address this concern, DOD officials said 

that they have begun developing a classified version of SPOT. However, 

USAID officials told us the agency would most likely not be able to use a 

classified system due to limited access to classified computers. 

Because of the varying criteria on who should be entered into the system, 

the information in SPOT does not present an accurate picture of the total 

number of contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, 

officials from all three agencies expressed confidence that the SPOT data 

were relatively complete for contractor personnel who need an LOA in 

Iraq. Conversely, agency officials acknowledged that SPOT does not fully 

 

11This guidance was implemented in DOD FAR Supplement section 252.225-7040(g), which 

specified that contractors are to enter information into SPOT for all personnel authorized 

to accompany the U.S. Armed Forces. However, Class Deviation 2007-O0010 excluded 

contracts with performance in the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility that did 

not exceed $25,000 or had less than 30 days of performance. 

Page 7 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

reflect the number of local nationals working on their contracts. Agency 

officials further explained that ensuring that information on local nationals 

is in SPOT is challenging because their numbers tend to fluctuate due to 

the use of day laborers and because local firms do not always keep track 

of the individuals working on their projects. DOD officials also explained 

that they have had to develop workarounds to deal with the fact that SPOT 

requires a first and last name to be entered for each individual along with a 

birth date and unique identification number. The officials noted that many 

Afghan laborers have only one name, do not know their birth dates, and 

lack identification numbers. 

SPOT Not Capable of 

Tracking All Required 

Information 

SPOT currently lacks the capability to track all of the contract data 

elements as agreed to in the MOU. While the MOU specifies that contract 

values, competition information, and descriptions of the services being 

provided would be pulled into SPOT from FPDS-NG, this capability is not 

expected to be available until 2010. In the interim, the DOD officials 

overseeing SPOT’s development told us that SPOT users can manually 

enter competition information and descriptions, but there is no 

requirement for them to do so. Since SPOT is not designed to let users 

enter contract dollar values, the DOD officials stated that SPOT and FPDSNG are being periodically merged to identify contract values. 

Even when the direct link is established, pulling FPDS-NG data into SPOT 

may present challenges because of how data are entered into SPOT. First, 

information from the two systems can only be merged if the contract has 

been entered into SPOT. If no contractor personnel working on a 

particular contract have been entered, then the contract will not appear in 

SPOT and its information cannot be linked with the information in FPDSNG. Second, while contract numbers are the unique identifiers that will be 

used to match records in SPOT to those in FPDS-NG, SPOT users are not 

required to enter contract numbers in a standardized manner. In our 

review of SPOT data, we determined that at least 12 percent of the 

contracts had invalid contract numbers and, therefore, could not be 

matched to records in FPDS-NG.12 Additionally, contract numbers may not 

be sufficient to identify unique contracts. Specific orders placed on task 

order contracts are identified through a combination of the contract 

 

12Contract numbers consist of 13 alphanumeric characters. We considered a contract 

number invalid if the contract number entered into SPOT had a different number of 

characters. 

Page 8 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

number and task order number. However, SPOT users are not required to 

enter task order numbers. For example, one SPOT entry only contained 

the contract number without an order number. In reviewing FPDS-NG 

data, we determined that DOD had placed 12 different orders—ranging 

from a few thousand dollars to over $129 million—against that contract. 

Based on the information in SPOT, DOD would not be able to determine 

which order’s value and competition information should be imported from 

FPDS-NG. 

SPOT, as currently designed, also lacks the capability to readily generate 

reports on the number of killed or wounded contractor personnel. SPOT 

was upgraded in January 2009 to fulfill the NDAA for FY2008 requirement 

to track such information. Contractors can now update the status of their 

personnel in the system, including whether they have been killed or 

wounded, while agencies can run queries to identify the number of 

personnel with a current status of killed or wounded. However, the 

standard queries can only generate a list of personnel currently identified 

as killed or wounded and cannot be used to identify individuals who 

previously had the status of killed or wounded and whose records have 

become inactive or whose injured status changed when they returned to 

work. For example, if an individual has an injured status today and a query 

were run, that individual would be included in the report. If that individual 

then returned to work, the status would change and that individual would 

not appear on any subsequent injury reports, with the agencies having no 

means of determining whether the individual was ever injured. 

DOD, State, and USAID reported to us that there were 226,475 contractor 

personnel, including 27,603 performing security functions, in Iraq and 

Afghanistan as of the second quarter in fiscal year 2009. Over the period of 

our review, DOD reported significantly more contractors than State and 

USAID, most of whom were working in Iraq. For example, as of the second 

quarter in fiscal year 2009, DOD reported over 200,000 contractor 

personnel while State and USAID reported almost 9,000 and over 16,500, 

respectively. However, due to limitations with the reported data, we 

determined the data reported by the agencies should not be used to 

identify trends or draw conclusions about the number of contractor 

personnel in either country. Specifically, we found that personnel 

information reported by the three agencies was incomplete and, for DOD, 

additional factors raise questions about the reported numbers’ reliability. 

Further, the agencies could not verify whether the reported data were 

accurate or complete; although, they indicated that the data for certain 

DOD, State, and 

USAID Lack Reliable 

Data on Contractor 

Personnel in Iraq and 

Afghanistan 

Page 9 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

types of contractors, such as those providing security functions, were 

more complete than other data, such as those for local nationals. 

DOD Contractor Personnel According to DOD officials, the most comprehensive information on the 

number of DOD contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan comes from 

the U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) quarterly census.13 CENTCOM 

initiated its quarterly census of contractor personnel in June 2007 as an 

interim measure until SPOT is fully implemented. The census relies on 

contractor firms to report their personnel data to DOD components, which 

then aggregate the data and report them to CENTCOM at the end of each 

quarter. As shown in table 1, DOD’s reported number of contractor 

personnel for our review period ranged from 200,111 to 231,698, with 

approximately 7 percent performing security functions over the entire 

period, on average. 

Table 1: DOD-Reported Quarterly Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and 

the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

Fiscal year 2008 Fiscal year 2009 

First 

quarter 

Second 

quarter

Third 

quarter

Fourth 

quarter

First 

quarter 

Second 

quarter

Iraq 

All contractors 163,591 149,378 162,428 163,446 148,050 132,610

Contractors providing security 9,952 7,259 7,704 10,446 9,218 12,942

Afghanistan 

All contractors 36,520 52,336 41,232 68,252 71,755 68,197

Contractors providing security 2,998 6,982 3,537 3,847 3,689 4,373

Total all contractors 200,111 201,714 203,660 231,698 219,805 200,807

Total contractors providing 

security 

12,950 14,241 11,241 14,293 12,907 17,315

Source: GAO analysis of CENTCOM census data. 

DOD officials acknowledge that the census numbers represent only a 

rough approximation of the actual number of contractor personnel that 

worked in either country. Specifically, these officials told us that because 

of how the data were collected and reported by the various DOD 

components, it was difficult to compile and obtain an accurate count of 

 

13CENTCOM is one of DOD’s unified combatant commands. It is responsible for overseeing 

U.S. security interests in 20 countries—including Iraq and Afghanistan—that stretch from 

the Arabian Gulf region into Central Asia. 

Page 10 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

contractor personnel. We determined that over the course of our review 

period the following data issues existed. 

• Contractor personnel information was sometimes incomplete. Most 

notably, an Army-wide review of fiscal year 2008 third quarter census data 

determined that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did not include 

approximately 26,000 Afghan nationals working on contracts. However, 

information on these contractors was included in subsequent censuses. As 

a result, comparing third quarter and fourth quarter data would incorrectly 

suggest that there was an increase in the number of contractors in 

Afghanistan, when in fact the increase is attributable to more accurate 

counting of personnel. 

• Contractor personnel were being double counted. For example, the system 

used to record contractor personnel numbers for the Joint Contracting 

Command-Iraq/Afghanistan was found to have duplicates. As a result, 

DOD reported a 10 percent decrease in personnel in Iraq in the first 

quarter of fiscal year 2009 and a 5 percent decrease in contractor 

personnel in Afghanistan in the second quarter of fiscal year 2009 when 

duplicates were removed. 

• The process used to collect data changed. For example, a 3 percent 

decrease in personnel numbers reported in the first quarter of fiscal year 

2009 compared to the previous quarter was attributed to the Joint 

Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan’s decision to begin using a 

monthly data call to contractors to collect personnel numbers. 

• Data submitted by the DOD components were often of poor quality or 

inaccurate, which created challenges for CENTCOM to compile quarterly 

totals. During our review of quarterly census data submissions, we 

identified a DOD component in Afghanistan that provided invalid contract 

numbers for about 30 percent of its contracts in the second quarter for 

fiscal year 2009. Also, it was not possible to determine for some 

submissions how many contractors were working in a specific country. In 

such cases, the CENTCOM official responsible for the census told us he 

would either seek clarification from the DOD component that provided the 

data or use his judgment to determine the correct personnel numbers. 

State Contractor Personnel In response to our request for information on its contractor personnel in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, State officials informed us that prior to fiscal year 

2009 the department did not systematically track contractor personnel. 

Instead, State bureaus conducted periodic surveys of their contractors; 

however, each bureau’s survey covered different time periods. Based on 

these surveys, which at least one bureau supplemented with SPOT data, 

State reported that 8,971 contractor personnel, the majority of whom 

performed security functions, worked on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan 

Page 11 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

during the first half of fiscal year 2009.14 Only one bureau provided 

comparable information for fiscal year 2008, reporting 3,514 personnel 

working on its contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan over the course of the 

year. 

Table 2: State-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq and 

Afghanistan 

First half of fiscal year 2009

Iraq 

All contractors 5,376

Contractors providing security 3,632

Afghanistan 

All contractors 3,595

Contractors providing security 1,559

Total all contractors 8,971

Total contractors providing security 5,191

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: If a bureau provided the results of more than one survey conducted in fiscal year 2009, the 

table includes the results of the most recent survey. Of the five bureaus that provided data, one 

provided data that covered the entire first half of fiscal year 2009 and the other four provided data as 

of a specific date or month. 

Even relying on a combination of periodic surveys and SPOT, which State 

implemented in fiscal year 2009, it appears that State underreported its 

contractor personnel numbers. Specifically, in our analysis of State 

contract and personnel data, we identified a number of contracts with 

performance in Iraq or Afghanistan for which contractor personnel 

numbers were not reported. For example, although State provided 

obligation data on a $3 million contract for operation and maintenance 

services in Iraq as well as a $5.6 million contract for support services in 

Afghanistan, information on the number of personnel working on these 

contracts was not contained in the agency’s periodic surveys or the SPOT 

data we received. 

 

14In addition to the survey and SPOT numbers provided to us, we included individuals 

working on personal services contracts in State’s totals. State is authorized under section 2 

of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended, to contract for personal 

services. 22 U.S.C. § 2669(c) and (n). The FAR defines “personal services contracts” as 

contracts that, by their express terms or as administered, make the contractor personnel 

appear to be, in effect, government employees. 

Page 12 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

For the personnel numbers reported to us, USAID relied entirely on 

periodic surveys of its contractors. USAID provided contractor personnel 

numbers for both Iraq and Afghanistan for all of fiscal year 2008 and the 

first half of fiscal year 2009. The agency reported that 16,697 personnel, 

including 5,097 performing security functions, worked on its contracts in 

Iraq and Afghanistan during the first half of fiscal year 2009.15

USAID Contractor 

Personnel 

Table 3: USAID-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

Fiscal year 2008 First half of fiscal year 2009

Iraq 

All contractors 2,707 2,668

Contractors providing security 901 1,010

Afghanistan 

All contractors 12,955 14,029

Contractors providing security 3,818 4,087

Total all contractors 15,662 16,697

Total contractors providing 

security 

4,719 5,097

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

USAID relied on the results of surveys sent to its contractors in Iraq and 

Afghanistan to respond to our request for contractor personnel 

information.16 However, this information appeared to be incomplete. 

Specifically, agency officials acknowledged the periodic surveys most 

likely underreported the total number of contractor personnel. For 

example, an official in Afghanistan informed us that if a USAID contractor 

firm did not respond to a survey for personnel information, which is 

sometimes the case since there is no contractual requirement to do so, 

then personnel working for that firm were not included in the reported 

numbers. Our analysis of USAID personnel and contract data also 

indicates that USAID’s numbers are incomplete. Specifically, USAID 

provided us with personnel data for about 83 percent of its contracts that 

 

15In addition to the survey numbers provided to us, we included individuals working on 

personal services contracts in USAID’s totals. USAID is authorized under section 636 of the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to contract for personal services. 22 U.S.C. § 

2396(a)(3). 

16USAID officials informed us that in March 2009 its mission in Iraq began requiring 

contractors to provide quarterly personnel updates. 

Page 13 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

were active during the period of our review and had performance in Iraq 

or Afghanistan. We identified a number of contracts for which contractor 

personnel information was not provided, including contracts to refurbish a 

hydroelectric power plant and to develop small and medium enterprises in 

Afghanistan worth at least $6 million and $91 million, respectively. 

Agency-Reported Data Not 

Verified but More 

Complete Than SPOT 

DOD, State, and USAID could not verify the accuracy or completeness of 

the contractor personnel data they provided to us, and officials 

acknowledged that they are likely undercounting the actual number of 

contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan. Officials from the three 

agencies stated they lack the resources to verify the information being 

reported by their contractors, their primary source of data. Officials we 

met with indicated this is particularly true for contracts that involve work 

at remote sites, where security conditions make it difficult for U.S. 

government officials to regularly visit. However, the agency officials stated 

that personnel information on certain types of contractors is likely more 

reliable than others. In particular, officials from DOD, State, and USAID 

told us that the personnel numbers provided for their private security 

contractors are the most accurate and reliable. This is due in part to the 

increased scrutiny these contractors receive. Conversely, these same 

officials told us obtaining accurate information on local nationals is 

especially difficult. For example, one DOD official told us some local 

national contractors hesitate or simply refuse to submit information on 

their personnel because of safety concerns, among others. Further, the 

number of local nationals working on a particular contract on a daily basis 

can vary greatly depending on the type of work being performed. 

Despite the limitations we identified with the agencies’ use of surveys, the 

survey data were more complete than the data in SPOT for our review 

period. For example, as shown in table 4, in the second quarter fiscal year 

2009 census, DOD reported 83,506 more contractor personnel in Iraq and 

Afghanistan than were entered into SPOT. An even smaller portion of 

USAID’s contractor personnel were entered into SPOT because the agency 

did not enter any personnel for any contracts in Afghanistan and was 

generally not entering Iraqis into the system. While the difference between 

SPOT and the surveys was smaller for State, there still were a number of 

contracts for which personnel information was available from State’s 

surveys but was not in SPOT. 

Page 14 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

Table 4: Numbers of DOD, State, and USAID Contractor Personnel in SPOT 

Compared to Agency-Reported Survey Numbers, as of March 31, 2009 

Source of contractor personnel information 

SPOT Surveys 

Differences between

SPOT and surveys

DOD 117,301 200,807 83,506

Statea7,022 8,971b1,949

USAIDb 445a 16,697 16,252

Total 124,768 226,475 101,707

Source: GAO analysis of SPOT and agency-reported data.

a

State’s survey number reflects the number of contractor personnel in SPOT and personnel identified 

through bureau surveys, as well as individuals working on personal services contracts. 

b

USAID’s numbers for SPOT are only for Iraq since the agency did not use SPOT in Afghanistan, 

while the survey numbers reflect personnel in both countries, including those working on personal 

services contracts. 

Although USAID, State, and DOD are required to collect data on the total 

number of contractor personnel who have been killed or wounded while 

working on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, only USAID and State 

tracked this information during our review period. USAID reported 

59 contractor personnel were killed and 61 wounded during fiscal year 

2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009, while State reported that 5 of its 

contractors were killed and 98 more were wounded (see table 5). These 

data were based on reports submitted by contractors and then tracked by 

the agencies. In tracking this information, USAID and State noted in some 

cases, but not all, whether the death or injury was the result of a hostile 

action or an accident. However, due to the lack of other available and 

reliable sources, we could not independently verify whether USAID’s and 

State’s data were accurate. 

Agencies’ Ability to 

Track Contractor 

Personnel Killed or 

Wounded in Iraq and 

Afghanistan Varies 

Page 15 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

Table 5: USAID- and State-Reported Data on Contractor Personnel Killed and 

Wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 

2009 

Iraq Afghanistan 

Fiscal year 

2008

First half of 

fiscal year 

2009

Fiscal year 

2008 

First half of 

fiscal year 

2009 Total

USAID 

Killed 6 2 38 13 59

Wounded 7 0 35 19 61

USAID Total 13 2 73 32 120

State

Killed 3 1 1 0 5

Wounded 68 13 14 3 98

State Total 71 14 15 3 103

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data. 

Note: USAID reported that an additional 12 contractors were kidnapped in Iraq and Afghanistan 

during this period. 

DOD officials informed us that their department continued to lack a 

system for tracking information in a manner that would allow the 

department to provide us with reliable data on killed or wounded 

contractor personnel. Although DOD did not maintain departmentwide 

data, some individual components within the department received reports 

on killed or wounded contractor personnel. However, the components did 

not consistently track these reports in a readily accessible or 

comprehensive manner. For example, officials with the Defense Contract 

Management Agency in Iraq and the Joint Contracting Command – 

Iraq/Afghanistan explained that they received reports when contractor 

personnel were killed or wounded, but this information was not recorded 

in a manner that made it readily retrievable. In addition, an Army Corps of 

Engineers official in Afghanistan told us that he tracked data on contractor 

illnesses and injuries resulting from workplace accidents but did not track 

data on contractor personnel killed or wounded as a result of hostile 

incidents. Absent DOD-wide data and as was the case for our prior 

report,17 DOD officials referred us to Defense Base Act (DBA) case data, 

which are maintained by the Department of Labor, as a means of obtaining 

information on killed and wounded contractor personnel. 

 

17GAO-09-19. 

Page 16 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

Labor’s DBA case data do not provide an appropriate basis for determining 

the number of contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and 

Afghanistan while working on DOD, State, or USAID contracts. Under the 

NDAA for FY2008, Labor—unlike DOD, State, and USAID—has no 

responsibilities for tracking killed or wounded contractor personnel, and 

as such, its data were not designed to do so. Instead, Labor maintains data 

on DBA cases to fulfill its responsibilities for overseeing DBA claims by 

providing workers’ compensation protection to contractor personnel 

killed or injured while working on U.S. government contracts overseas, 

including those in Iraq and Afghanistan.18

Labor DBA Data Are Not a 

Good Proxy for Contractor 

Personnel Killed or 

Wounded 

After analyzing Labor’s DBA data and case files, we determined that DBA 

data are not a good proxy for determining the number of killed and 

wounded contractor personnel. This is, in part, because, as Labor officials 

explained, not all deaths and injuries reported under DBA would be 

regarded as contractors killed or wounded within the context of the NDAA 

for FY2008. Many nonhostile-related deaths and injuries, such as strains, 

sprains, and cases arising from auto accidents and other common 

occupational injuries, are compensable under DBA and are routinely 

reported to Labor. In addition, during our file reviews, we noted that many 

cases, particularly those submitted for injuries, were for medical 

conditions, such as pregnancy, cancer, and appendicitis, determined not to 

be related to the individual’s employment in Iraq or Afghanistan, and 

compensation claims for many of these cases were denied because the 

conditions were not work-related. While employers must notify Labor of 

all work-related contractor deaths and injuries resulting in time lost from 

work, one Labor official told us that some employers report all medicalrelated conditions, regardless of their severity and the nature of the 

incidents that caused them. In addition, some contractor deaths and 

injuries may not be reported to Labor as required. In particular, Labor 

officials have indicated that deaths and injuries to local and third-country 

contractors may be underreported.

 

18Congress enacted the DBA in 1941. The insurance required under the DBA provides 

employees with uniform levels of disability and medical benefits or, in the event of death, 

provides benefits to eligible dependents. Contractors, including subcontractors, are 

required to provide DBA insurance coverage for all of their employees, regardless of their 

nationality, working outside the United States on U.S. military bases or under a contract 

with the U.S. government for public works or national defense. Labor initiates a case when 

it receives a notice of death or injury. Notices include reports filed by employers and 

claims for benefits submitted by injured employees or their survivors. 

Page 17 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

Additionally, because Labor does not track cases by agency or contract, 

DBA data cannot be analyzed to determine how many cases involved 

contractor personnel working specifically on DOD, State, or USAID 

contracts. As a result, the data may include cases for contractor personnel 

working for agencies other than DOD, State, and USAID. During our 

review of 150 DBA case files, we noted that the files did not always 

contain contract information and did not consistently identify the 

contracting agency. While we identified 103 case files for personnel 

working on DOD or State contracts, we did not identify any files for 

USAID contractor personnel. In addition, 1 case file specified an agency 

other than DOD, State, or USAID, while 46 files did not specify which 

agency the contractor worked for. 

Despite their limitations for determining the number of contractor 

personnel killed or wounded, Labor’s DBA case data provide insight into 

contractor personnel deaths and injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

According to Labor, there were 11,804 DBA cases, including 218 cases 

reporting contractor deaths, which resulted from incidents that occurred 

in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal 

year 2009. As shown in table 6, overall both the total number of DBA cases 

and the number of death cases decreased from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal 

year 2008, though the number of death cases in Afghanistan increased. 

Table 6: Defense Base Act Cases for Deaths and Injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 and the First 

Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

Iraq Afghanistan 

Fiscal year 

2007 

Fiscal year 

2008 

First half of fiscal 

year 2009

Fiscal year 

2007

Fiscal year 

2008 

First half of fiscal 

year 2009

Deaths 337 122 31 40 47 18

Injuries 9,148 7,735 2,306 1,962 1,100 445

Total 9,485 7,857 2,337 2,002 1,147 463

Source: GAO analysis of Labor data. 

Note: Cases may be filed for contractor personnel working on contracts with U.S. government 

agencies other than DOD, State, and USAID. 

Based on our review of 150 randomly selected DBA case files, we 

estimated that about 11 percent of the deaths and injuries reported to 

Labor for incidents that occurred in fiscal year 2008 resulted from hostile 

Page 18 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

actions.19 Only 16 of the 150 files we reviewed were for cases related to 

hostile actions.20 Further, about one-third of the 11,586 DBA injury cases 

that occurred during our review period resulted in the affected contractor 

losing time from work. For example, we reviewed a case in which a 

contractor lost time from work after receiving multiple injuries when an 

ammunition pallet fell and wedged him against the side of a container, 

while another contractor suffered fractures and spinal injuries caused by 

an improvised explosive device and small arms fire. 

DOD, State, and USAID reported obligating nearly $39 billion on 84,719 

contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2008 

and the first half of fiscal year 2009 (see fig. 1 for obligation data). DOD 

accounted for the vast majority of both the contracts and obligations. 

Approximately two-thirds of the total number of contracts and obligations 

were for performance in Iraq. Task orders were the most common 

contract vehicle that the agencies used during our review period and 

accounted for most of the obligations. A relatively small number of task 

orders accounted for a large portion of each agency’s obligations. For 

example, during our review period, DOD obligated more than $6.5 billion 

on two task orders that provide food, housing, and other services for U.S. 

military personnel, while more than a third of State’s obligations were on 

three task orders for police training and criminal justice programs in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. See appendix II for detailed information on each 

agencies’ Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and obligations during our review 

period. 

DOD, State, and 

USAID Obligated Tens 

of Billions of Dollars 

on Contracts in Iraq 

and Afghanistan 

 

19This estimate based on our sample is subject to sampling error. We reviewed 150 DBA 

case files for incidents that occurred in fiscal year 2008. The margin of error for the 

percentage of reported deaths and injuries resulting from hostile actions is no more than 

plus or minus 7 percentage points at the 95 percent level of confidence. For more detailed 

information on this file review, see appendix I. 

20While the majority of the 16 case files in our sample that resulted from hostile actions 

were submitted for injuries, as opposed to deaths, we could not reliably estimate for all 

DBA cases the portion of hostile actions that occurred in fiscal year 2008 that resulted in 

injuries compared to the portion that resulted in deaths. 

Page 19 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

Figure 1: DOD, State, and USAID Obligations on Active Contracts for Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

DOD State USAID

Amount of obligations (in millions of dollars)

Agency

Other

Afghanistan

Iraq

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Note: Some contracts included performance in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the 

United States. It was not possible, based on the data reported for us, to isolate which portion of the 

obligations was specific to Iraq and/or Afghanistan. Therefore, if a contract had performance in Iraq 

and other countries (not including Afghanistan), we set the place of performance as Iraq. We set the 

place of performance as Afghanistan for contracts with performance in Afghanistan and other 

countries (not including Iraq). We set the place of performance as “other’” for contracts that were 

reported as having performance in Iraq and Afghanistan or for which the country was not specified in 

the agency-reported data. 

The NDAA for FY2008 mandated that we identify the total number and 

value of all contracts, defined to include prime contracts, task or delivery 

orders, and subcontracts at any tier. While we obtained data on prime 

contracts and orders, DOD, State, and USAID were unable to provide data 

on the number or value of individual subcontracts. Contract files may 

contain information on subcontracts, but none of the agencies 

systematically tracked this information. The value of subcontracts is 

captured in the total value of the prime contract, but the agencies were 

unable to provide us with data on what portion of the total contract value 

went to subcontractors. 

Page 20 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

Of the almost 85,000 contracts, including task and delivery orders, which 

were active during our review period, 97 percent were awarded during 

fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. However, more than a 

third of the funds obligated during our review period were on contracts 

originally awarded before fiscal year 2008. There were some variations 

between the agencies, as shown in figure 2. For example, most of USAID’s 

obligations were on contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008. In 

contrast, most of State’s active contracts were awarded during our period 

of review, but more than half the obligations were on a small portion of 

previously awarded contracts. 

Figure 2: DOD, State, and USAID Percentage of Contracts and Obligations on 

Awards for Iraq and Afghanistan 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Obligations

Contracts

Obligations

Contracts

Obligations

Contracts

Percent

Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008

Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year 2009

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

DOD State USAID

Page 21 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

DOD, State, and USAID reported that they used competitive procedures to 

award nearly all contracts awarded in our review period, with the 

exclusion of task and delivery orders. Generally, contracts should be 

awarded on the basis of full and open competition.21 The agencies reported 

that most of their new contracts were awarded using full and open 

competition, but in some cases the agencies reported a contract as 

competed without indicating whether full and open or limited competition 

occurred. The agencies reported that approximately 3 percent of contracts 

awarded during our period of review, accounting for 29 percent of the 

obligations, were not competed (see fig. 3). 

Majority of New Contract 

Awards Were Competed 

 

21See 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (applicable to DOD) and 41 U.S.C. § 253 (applicable to other 

executive agencies discussed in this report). Section 403(6) of title 41, U.S. Code, defines 

“full and open competition” as when all responsible sources are permitted to submit sealed 

bids or competitive proposals on a procurement. The competition requirements are 

implemented in FAR Part 6 and corresponding agency acquisition regulation supplements. 

Page 22 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

Figure 3: Competition for DOD, State, and USAID Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts 

Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Extent of competition

Contracts

Obligations

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Not competed

Competed

Note: Excludes task and delivery orders. In addition, for less than 1 percent of contracts and 

obligations the agencies did not report whether the contract was competed. 

Most of the 1,143 contracts reported to us as not competed had relatively 

small obligations during our review period.22 Approximately 90 percent of 

them had obligations of less than $100,000 and 80 percent had obligations 

less than $25,000. In contrast, only 27 of the 1,143 contracts reported as 

not competed had over $1 million in obligations.These 27 contracts 

accounted for 99 percent of obligations for contracts that were not 

competed. 

 

22We obtained obligation data for each contract with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan 

in fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. Obligations, however, may not be 

equivalent to the full contract value as contracts may be incrementally funded over 

multiple years. 

Page 23 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

The law authorizes agencies to use limited competition in certain 

situations. There may be circumstances under which full and open 

competition would be impracticable, such as when contracts need to be 

awarded quickly to respond to urgent and compelling needs or when there 

is only one source for the required product or service. In such cases, 

agencies may award contracts without providing for full and open 

competition (e.g., using limited competition or on a sole-source basis) if 

the proposed approach is appropriately justified, approved, and 

documented. Similarly, simplified acquisition procedures allow for limited 

competition when awarding certain contracts, and the use of these 

procedures is determined based on dollar thresholds contained in the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).23 These dollar thresholds vary 

depending on where and for what purpose the contract was awarded and 

performed, its dollar value, and the contracting method used. Additionally, 

contracts valued below the micropurchase threshold, which is $25,000 for 

contracts awarded and performed outside the United States in support of 

contingency operations, may be awarded without soliciting competitive 

quotations if the authorized purchase official considers the price to be 

reasonable. 

To determine the circumstances in which the agencies awarded contracts 

using other than full and open competition, we reviewed 79 DOD and State 

contracts24 awarded in fiscal year 2008 that had more than $100,000 in 

obligations during our review period and were reported as not competed 

or for which no competition information was provided.25 During our 

review, we discovered that 8 of these had actually been awarded after a 

full and open competition and 14 had been awarded after a limited 

competition (i.e., they were not sole-source awards). Of the 71 files we 

 

23Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT). For contracts 

in support of a contingency operation, the SAT during our review period was $1 million for 

contracts awarded and performed outside the United States and $250,000 for contracts 

awarded and performed in the United States. Contracts awarded and performed in the 

United States were not in the scope of our review. Additionally, FAR subpart 13.5 provides 

higher thresholds if the acquisition is for commercial items. For example, the SAT for 

commercial items in support of a contingency operation is $11 million. FAR § 13.500(e). 

24At the time of our contract file review, none of the contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 

that USAID reported as not competed had over $100,000 in obligations during our review 

period. USAID subsequently provided us with additional data in which two contracts met 

our review criteria; these contracts were not included in our file reviews due to when we 

received the data. 

25We did not evaluate whether the justifications that the agencies provided for awarding 

contracts without full and open competition were adequate. 

Page 24 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

reviewed that were not awarded under full and open competition, the 

most common justification for limiting competition or awarding a solesource contract was that only one source could provide the good or 

service being acquired. In some of these cases, the incumbent contractor 

was awarded the new contract. For example, State awarded a sole-source 

contract for communication equipment in Iraq because only one company 

offered radios that were compatible with State’s existing communication 

network. The second most common reason for limiting competition was 

DOD’s enhanced authority to acquire products and services from Iraq and 

Afghanistan.26 Congress granted DOD this authority, which allows DOD to 

limit competition or provide preferences for products and services from 

Iraq or Afghanistan, to provide a stable source of jobs and employment in 

the two countries. According to DOD contracting officials in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, they are increasing their use of this authority. However, 

officials in Afghanistan explained that in doing so they generally have 

some level of competition among local firms as opposed to doing a solesource award. They explained that limited competitions are being 

conducted to not only ensure better prices and products but also to help 

instill Western business practices and develop local business capacity. 

Competition requirements generally do not apply to the process of issuing 

task and delivery orders.27 However, where there were multiple awardees 

under the underlying contract, the FAR requires the contracting officer in 

most instances to provide each awardee a fair opportunity to be 

considered for each order exceeding $3,000. The agencies reported that 

99 percent of the orders issued during our review period were competed. 

Congress has directed DOD, State, and USAID to track specific 

information regarding contractor personnel and contracts with 

performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such data are a starting point for 

providing decision makers with a clearer understanding of the extent to 

which they rely on contractors and for facilitating oversight to improve 

planning and better account for costs. Implementing SPOT, as agreed to in 

Conclusions 

 

26Section 886 of the NDAA for FY2008 authorizes DOD, in certain circumstances, to limit 

competition to products and services from Iraq and Afghanistan, award a contract to a 

particular source or sources from Iraq or Afghanistan using other than competitive 

procedures, or give preference to products and services from Iraq and Afghanistan. Pub. L. 

No. 110-181 § 886. 

27FAR 16.505(b)(1)(ii). 

Page 25 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

the MOU, has the potential of providing the agencies and Congress with 

data on contracts, contractor personnel, and those personnel who have 

been killed or wounded. However, the agencies’ implementation of SPOT 

currently falls short of that potential. Specifically, there is a lack of 

consistency as to which contractor personnel are entered into SPOT. Not 

withstanding the MOU, some agency officials have questioned the need or 

feasibility of entering detailed information on individual contractor 

personnel into SPOT beyond the requirement of the NDAA for FY2008 or 

the MOU. Furthermore, SPOT does not currently have the capability to 

accurately import contract data and its report generating capabilities limit 

the agencies’ access to information that has been entered, particularly 

with respect to killed or wounded contractor personnel. Until SPOT is 

fully implemented, the agencies will continue to rely on multiple 

alternative sources of data, which are also unreliable and incomplete, for 

information related to contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. As a result, the agencies and Congress will continue to be 

without reliable information on contracts and contractor personnel to help 

improve oversight and decision making at a critical juncture as agencies 

draw down their efforts in Iraq and expand them in Afghanistan. 

To ensure that the agencies and Congress have reliable information on 

contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, we 

recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the USAID 

Administrator jointly develop and execute a plan with associated time 

frames for their continued implementation of the NDAA for FY2008 

requirements, specifically 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• ensuring that the agencies’ criteria for entering contracts and contractor 

personnel into SPOT are consistent with the NDAA for FY2008 and with 

the agencies’ respective information needs for overseeing contracts and 

contractor personnel; 

• establishing uniform requirements on how contract numbers are to be 

entered into SPOT so that contract information can accurately be pulled 

from FPDS-NG as agreed to in the MOU; and 

• revising SPOT’s reporting capabilities to ensure that they fulfill statutory 

requirements and agency information needs, such as those related to 

contractor personnel killed or wounded. 

In developing and executing this plan, the agencies may need to revisit their 

MOU to ensure consistency between the plan and what has previously been 

agreed to in the MOU. 

Page 26 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOD, State, and 

USAID. In its written comments, DOD did not agree with our 

recommendation that the agencies jointly develop and execute a plan for 

continued implementation of the NDAA for FY2008. According to DOD, 

the current MOU, existing regulations, and ongoing coordination among 

the agencies should be sufficient to meet legislative mandates. DOD noted 

that additional direction beyond the implementation of the MOU may 

require statutory action. DOD further explained that it is planning 

upgrades to SPOT that may address some of the issues we identified, 

particularly related to the entry of contract numbers and reporting 

features. State, in its written comments, also disagreed with the need for 

the agencies to develop and execute a plan to address the issues we 

identified. Nevertheless, State acknowledged that the agencies need to 

continue meeting to review their progress in complying with the NDAA for 

FY2008, revisit the MOU, address issues to ensure consistency in meeting 

the MOU criteria, and discuss SPOT’s future reporting capability. Similarly, 

while USAID’s written comments did not address our overarching 

recommendation for the agencies to develop and implement a plan or 

indicate whether it agreed with the specific issues to be included in their 

plan, it noted that it plans to continue regularly meeting with DOD and 

State officials concerning the NDAA for FY2008 and the existing MOU. 

Agency Comments 

We agree that coordination among the three agencies is critical, but given 

the findings in this report, coordination alone is not sufficient. Instead, the 

agencies need to take action to resolve the issues we identified in their 

implementation of SPOT. In their comments the agencies recognized the 

importance of having reliable information on contracts and contractor 

personnel and acknowledged that corrective measures are needed. 

However, the agencies did not explain in their comments how they plan to 

translate their coordination efforts and upgrades into actions to resolve 

the issues we identified. By jointly developing and executing a plan with 

time frames, the three agencies can identify the concrete steps they need 

to take and assess their progress in ensuring that the data in SPOT are 

sufficiently reliable to fulfill the requirements of the NDAA for FY2008 and 

their respective agency needs. Further, the extent to which the steps 

necessary to implement the MOU and the recommended plan are 

consistent with the NDAA for FY2008, no additional statutory action 

would be required. 

DOD’s, State’s and USAID’s comments, along with our supplemental 

responses, are reprinted in appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. 

Page 27 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

Additionally, we provided a draft of this report to Labor for its review and 

comment. Labor provided technical comments that we incorporated into 

the final report as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of State, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International 

Development, the Secretary of Labor, and interested congressional 

committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix VI. 

John Hutton 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 28 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

List of Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John F. Kerry 

Chairman 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein 

Chair 

The Honorable Christopher S. Bond 

Vice Chairman 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

Page 29 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
 

The Honorable Edolphus Towns 

Chairman 

The Honorable Darrell Issa 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes 

Chairman 

The Honorable Peter Hoekstra 

Ranking Member 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

House of Representatives 

Page 30 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 31 GAO-10-1 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Section 863 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 

directs GAO to review and report on matters relating to Department of 

Defense (DOD), Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In response to 

this mandate, we analyzed agency-reported data for fiscal year 2008 and 

the first half of fiscal year 2009 regarding (1) the status of the agencies’ 

implementation of the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational 

Tracker (SPOT) database, (2) the number of contractor personnel, 

including those performing security functions, working on DOD, State, and 

USAID contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, (3) the 

number of personnel killed or wounded, and (4) the number and value of 

contracts that were active and awarded during our period of review and 

the extent of competition for new contract awards. 

To address our first objective, we reviewed DOD, State, and USAID’s July 

2008 MOU relating to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan and interviewed 

DOD, State, and USAID officials responsible for implementing SPOT 

regarding the current and planned capabilities of the system. We also 

interviewed agency officials who use SPOT, including officials in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, to determine the criteria the agencies use to determine what 

information is entered into SPOT. We reviewed agency guidance and 

policy documents regarding the use of SPOT and took training courses 

designed for government and contractor personnel who expect to use the 

system. We then compared the information we collected on the use and 

capabilities of SPOT to the requirements identified in the agencies’ MOU 

to determine the extent to which SPOT fulfilled the terms of the MOU. 

Implementation of 

SPOT 

To address our second objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and 

USAID on the number of U.S. nationals, third-country nationals, and local 

nationals working on contracts with performance in Iraq or Afghanistan in 

fiscal year 2008 and/or the first half of fiscal year 2009. These data 

included individuals reported to be performing security functions. 

Contractor Personnel 

• DOD reported data from the U.S. Central Command’s quarterly census and 

SPOT for both fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. Of the 

two sources, DOD officials said that the quarterly census was the most 

complete source of information on contractor personnel. Given that and 

the limitations we identified with SPOT, we used the quarterly census data 

to develop our DOD-related findings for this objective. 

• State reported data gathered from periodic surveys of its contractors for 

fiscal year 2008. For the first half of fiscal year 2009, State reported 

 Contingency Contracting 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

contractor personnel information gathered from SPOT as well as through 

surveys. 

• USAID reported data gathered from periodic surveys of its contractors for 

fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. USAID also reported 

SPOT data for some contracts with performance in Iraq for the first half of 

fiscal year 2009. 

We compared these data to the list of contracts we compiled to address 

our objective on the number and value of agency contracts. Furthermore, 

we interviewed agency officials regarding their methods for collecting data 

to determine the number of contractor personnel, including those 

providing security functions, in Iraq and Afghanistan. We also assessed the 

completeness of the SPOT data that we received from each agency by 

comparing them to data from other sources, such as the agency surveys. 

Based on our analyses and discussions with agency officials, we 

concluded that the agency reported data should not be used to draw 

conclusions about the actual number of contractor personnel in Iraq or 

Afghanistan for any given time period or trends in the number of 

contractor personnel over time. However, we are presenting the reported 

data along with their limitations as they establish a minimum number of 

contractor personnel during our period of review. 

To address our third objective, we analyzed USAID and State data on the 

number of contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan 

during the period of our review. DOD did not collect and could not provide 

such data. USAID provided us with information on deaths and injuries it 

had compiled from its implementing partners, including contractors. 

Similarly, State provided data on contractors who were killed or wounded 

based on reports from its contractors, which were compiled by 

department personnel. Due to the lack of other available and reliable data 

sources, we could not independently verify whether USAID’s and State’s 

data were accurate. Nevertheless, we are providing them as they provide 

insight into the number of contractor personnel who were killed or 

wounded during our period of review. After informing us that they did not 

have a reliable system for tracking killed or wounded personnel, DOD 

officials referred us to use the Department of Labor’s data on Defense 

Base Act (DBA) cases. 

Killed or Wounded 

Contractor Personnel 

We analyzed data from Labor on DBA cases arising from incidents that 

occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of 

fiscal year 2009. We obtained similar DBA data from Labor for our 

previous report, for which we determined that the data were sufficiently 

Page 32 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

reliable, when presented with appropriate caveats, for providing insight 

into the number of contractor personnel killed or wounded.1

 As a result, 

we did not reassess the reliability of the data we received for this report. 

We also selected a random two-stage cluster sample of 150 DBA case files 

from a population of 2,500 cases files submitted to Labor’s 10 district 

offices for incidents that occurred during fiscal year 2008 and resulted in 

the affected contractor losing time from work. Labor provided us with 

DBA case data on all incidents that occurred in fiscal year 2008 through 

February 26, 2009. Because there may be a lag between when an incident 

occurred and when Labor was notified, we limited our sample to cases 

arising from incidents that occurred in fiscal year 2008. As a result, the 

findings from our file review are generalizable only to fiscal year 2008 

cases. Labor provided us with a second data set for fiscal year 2008 and 

the first half of fiscal year 2009 as of July 9, 2009, which included cases 

that were in the first data set. The second data set included an additional 

367 cases resulting from incidents that occurred in fiscal year 2008 that 

were not in the population from which we drew our sample due to a lag in 

when Labor was notified of the incidents. Because these additional cases 

were within the scope of our review, we included them in the total number 

of DBA cases presented in objective three; however, these cases were not 

included in the population of cases from which we drew our random 

sample. 

The first stage of our sample selection was comprised of 5 clusters, 

selected randomly with replacements, which came from 4 of the 10 Labor 

district offices. In the second stage, we randomly selected 30 files from 

each cluster. Thus, our final sample consisted of 150 DBA case files. We 

reviewed these files to determine the circumstances of the incident 

resulting in the death or injury, whether the incident was the result of a 

hostile or nonhostile incident, and the severity of the contractor’s injury, 

where applicable. 

Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, 

our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have 

drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we 

express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results 

as a 95 percent confidence interval (e.g., plus or minus 7 percentage 

points). This is the interval that would contain the actual population value 

for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we are 

 

1

GAO-09-19. 

Page 33 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

95 percent confident that the confidence interval in this report will include 

the true value in the study population. 

To address our fourth objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and 

USAID on the number of active and awarded contracts with performance 

in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal 

year 2009, the amount of funds obligated on those contracts during our 

review period, and the extent to which new contracts were competitively 

awarded. We also interviewed agency officials to discuss the reported 

contract data. The agencies provided data from the Federal Procurement 

Data System – Next Generation (FPDS-NG), agency specific-databases, 

and manually compiled lists of obligations and deobligations. We 

determined that the data each agency reported were sufficiently reliable to 

determine the minimum number of active and awarded contracts and 

obligation amounts, as well as the extent of competition, based on prior 

reliability assessments, interviews with agency officials, and verification of 

some reported data compared to information in contract files. 

Contracts 

We took steps to standardize the agency-reported data and removed 

duplicates and contracts that did not have obligations or deobligations 

during our review period. DOD provided us with 32 separate data sets, 

State provided 7, and USAID provided 9. The reported data included 

multiple numbering conventions for each agency. We reformatted each 

data set and combined them to create a single, uniform list of contracts, 

orders, and modifications for each agency. We excluded the base 

contracts under which task and delivery orders were issued. This was 

done, in part, because such contracts do not have obligations associated 

with them as the obligations are incurred with the issuance of each order. 

We also excluded grants, cooperative agreements, and other contract 

vehicles such as leases, sales contracts, and notices of intent to purchase 

as these instruments do not include performance by contractor personnel 

in Iraq or Afghanistan. For all contracts within our scope, we summed the 

reported obligations for each contract and order for fiscal year 2008 and 

the first half of fiscal year 2009. Some contracts had obligations in both 

fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009, so the number of 

active contracts for the entire 18-month period was lower than the 

combined number of contracts that were active in each fiscal year. 

We reviewed contract files to identify the justification cited by the 

agencies for not awarding the contract using full and open competition for 

a subset of DOD and State contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 that were 

reported as not competed and that had total obligations during our review 

Page 34 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

period greater than $100,000. We did not review the files for all contracts 

that met our criteria, in part, due to the location of some of the files. For 

example, while we reviewed files located in Baghdad, Camp Victory, 

Kabul, and Bagram Air Base, we did not review files for contracts located 

in other areas of Iraq and Afghanistan. In total, we reviewed information 

on 68 DOD contracts and 11 State contracts. At the time of our contract 

file reviews, USAID had not reported any new contracts with obligations 

over $100,000 as not competed. After our file reviews were completed, 

USAID provided us with additional data, including data on two contracts 

with obligations over $100,000 that were not awarded competitively. Due 

to when we received these data, we did not review these two contracts. 

However, we reviewed 12 other USAID contracts to verify the contract 

information reported to us. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 through 

September 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 35 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix

Contracts in Iraq and Af

 II: DOD, State, and USAID 

ghanistan 

Page 36 GAO-10-1 

Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID 

Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan 

Table 7 shows all DOD contracts, along with the associated obligations, 

reported to us as active in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both during fiscal year 

2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. For last year’s review, DOD 

reported obligating $18,996 million on 37,559 contracts in fiscal year 2007. 

DOD Contracts 

Table 7: DOD Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 

2009 

(Dollars in millions) 

Fiscal year 2008 First half of fiscal year 2009 

Fiscal year 2008 and first half of 

fiscal year 2009 

 

Number of active 

contracts 

Obligation 

amount 

Number of active 

contracts

Obligation 

amount 

Number of active 

contracts

Obligation 

amount 

Afghanistan 16,154 $6,646.6 14,354 b $1,817.5 30,353 c $8,464.1

Iraq 30,219 $19,536.4 22,268 b $5,785.7 52,207 c $25,322.1

Other a 272 $798.7 601 b $128.1 870 c $926.8

Total 46,645 $26,981.6 37,223b$7,731.4 83,430 c $34,713.1

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. 

a “Other” represents contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan or contracts that DOD 

reported as having performance in Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which country 

b

One DOD component changed the way it reported its contracts in fiscal year 2009. Orders that had 

been previously combined were reported separately. A DOD official explained that what appeared to 

be an increase in contracts was due to the reporting change rather than an actual increase in the 

number of orders. 

c

Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. As a result, 

the total number of active contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the number 

that was active each year added together. Obligation amounts are unique to each fiscal year so total 

obligations for the entire period are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year. 

Table 8 provides information on the number of contracts awarded by DOD 

and associated obligations made during our review period. The majority of 

DOD’s active contracts were awarded during our review period and 

70 percent of DOD’s obligations were made on the new contract awards. 

 Contingency Contracting 
Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID 

Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan 

Table 8: DOD New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan, 

Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

(Dollars in millions) 

Fiscal year 2008a First half of fiscal year 2009a 

Number of 

awarded 

contracts

Obligation 

amount

Number of 

awarded 

contracts

Obligation 

amount 

Afghanistan 15,724 $5,051.6 14,137 $1,313.3

Iraq 28,941 $15,305.3 21,869 $1,794.1

Other 245 $614.1 596 $110.0

Total 44,910 $20,971.0 36,602 $3,217.4 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. 

a

The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded, not when the obligations occurred 

so some obligations for contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year 

2009. 

Table 9 shows competition information for the DOD contracts (excluding 

task and delivery orders) that were awarded during our review period. 

DOD reported that 97 percent of its contracts were competed, including 

33,143 (93 percent) that were awarded using full and open competition. 

For 74 contracts, DOD either provided no competition information or what 

was provided was not sufficient to determine whether the contract was 

competed. 

Page 37 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID 

Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan 

Table 9: DOD’s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts (Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First 

Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

(Dollars in millions) 

Fiscal year 2008a First half of fiscal year 2009a

Fiscal year 2008 and first half 

of fiscal year 2009 

Number of 

awarded 

contracts 

Obligation 

amount 

Number of 

awarded 

contracts

Obligation 

amount

Number of 

awarded 

contracts

Obligation 

amount 

Competed 28,459 $5,193.3 6,356 $939.5 34,815 $6,132.8 

Not Competed 143 $2,501.7 768 $27.3 911 $2,528.9 

Not Reported 61 $4.4 13 $1.1 74 $5.5 

Total 28,663 $7,699.4 7,137 $967.8 35,800 $8,667.2 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task and delivery orders because 

they are not subject to the same competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we 

excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were issued. This was done, in part, 

because such contracts do not have obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred 

with the issuance of each order. a

The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded, not when the obligations 

occurred; some obligations for contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal 

year 2009. 

As shown in table 10, most of the DOD contracts reported as awarded 

without competition had relatively small obligations during our review 

period. 

Page 38 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID 

Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan 

Table 10: DOD’s Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan Awarded 

without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal 

year 2009 

Contract Value by Obligated Amount 

Number of awarded 

contracts 

Obligation 

amount (in 

millions)

Less than or equal to $25,000 756 $5.3

Greater than $25,000 and less than or 

equal to 100,000 

72 $3.6

Greater than $100,000 and less than or 

equal to $1 million 

60 $16.6

Greater than $1 million 23 $2,503.4

Total 911 $2,528.9

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task and delivery orders because 

they are not subject to the same competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we 

excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were issued. This was done, in part, 

because such contracts do not have obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred 

with the issuance of each order. 

State Contracts Table 11 shows all State contracts, along with the associated obligations, 

reported to us as active in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both during fiscal year 

2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. For last year’s review, State 

reported obligating $1,550.4 million on 773 contracts in fiscal year 2007. 

Page 39 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID 

Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan 

Table 11: State Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 

2009 

(Dollars in millions) 

Fiscal year 2008 First half of fiscal year 2009 

Fiscal year 2008 and first half of 

fiscal year 2009 

 

Number of 

active 

contracts 

Obligation 

amount

Number of 

active 

contracts

Obligation 

amount

Number of 

active 

contracts

Obligation 

amount 

Afghanistan 272 $625.5 11 $92.1 275a$717.6

Iraq 469 $781.8 102 $279.5 544a $1,061.3

Other b 105 $68.4 8 $1.9 112a$70.3

Total 846 $1,475.7 121 $373.5 931a$1,849.2

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. 

a

Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. As a result, 

the total number of active contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the number 

that was active each year added together. Obligation amounts are unique to each fiscal year so total 

obligations for the entire period are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year. 

b

“Other” represents contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan or contracts that State 

reported as having performance in Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which country. 

Table 12 provides information on the number of contracts awarded by 

State and associated obligations made during our review period. The 

majority of State’s active contracts were awarded during our review 

period and 46 percent of State’s obligations were made on the new 

contract awards. 

Table 12: State New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan, 

Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

(Dollars in millions) 

Fiscal year 2008aFirst half of fiscal year 2009a

Number of 

awarded 

contracts

Obligation 

amount 

Number of 

awarded 

contracts

Obligation 

amount

Afghanistan 250 $265.0 2 $0.6

Iraq 419 $559.0 69 $15.1

Other 98 $11.7 4 $0.8

Total 767 $835.8 75 $16.5 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. 

Page 40 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID 

Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan 

a

The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded, not when the obligations 

occurred; some obligations for contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal 

year 2009. 

Table 13 shows competition information for the State contracts (excluding 

task and delivery orders) that were awarded during our review period. 

State reported that 70 percent of its contracts were competed, including 

358 (47 percent) that were awarded using full and open competition. For 

10 contracts, State either provided no competition information or what 

was provided was not sufficient to determine whether the contract was 

competed. 

Table 13: State’s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts (Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First 

Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

(Dollars in millions) 

Fiscal year 2008a First half of fiscal year 2009a

Fiscal year 2008 and first half 

of fiscal year 2009 

Number of 

awarded 

contracts 

Obligation 

amount

Number of 

awarded 

contracts

Obligation 

amount

Number of 

awarded 

contracts

Obligation 

amount

Competed 494 $47.0 41 $1.8 535 $48.9 

Not competed 199 $21.4 20 $1.1 219 $22.4 

Not reported 5 $6.1 5 $1.0 10 $7.1 

Total 698 $74.5 66 $3.8 764 $78.4 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task orders and delivery orders 

because they are not subject to the same competition requirements as other contract vehicles. 

Further, we excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were issued. This was 

done, in part, because such contracts do not have obligations associated with them as the obligations 

are incurred with the issuance of each order. 

a

The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded, not when the obligations 

occurred; some obligations for contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal 

year 2009. 

As shown in table 14, most of the State contracts reported as awarded 

without competition had relatively small obligations during our review 

period. 

Page 41 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID 

Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan 

Table 14: State’s Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan Awarded 

without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009

Contract value by obligated 

amount 

Number of awarded 

contracts 

Obligation amount

 (in millions)

Less than or equal to $25,000 149 $1.2

Greater than $25,000 and less 

than or equal to 100,000 

52 $2.7

Greater than $100,000 and less 

than or equal to $1 million 

14 $4.6

Greater than $1 million 4 $13.9

Total 219 $22.4

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task and delivery orders because 

they are not subject to the same competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we 

excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were issued. This was done, in part, 

because such contracts do not have obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred 

with the issuance of each order. 

USAID Contracts Table 15 shows all USAID contracts, along with the associated obligations, 

reported to us as active in Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal year 2008 and 

the first half of fiscal year 2009. For last year’s review, USAID reported 

obligating $1,194.8 million on 190 contracts in fiscal year 2007. 

Table 15: USAID Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 

2009 

(Dollars in millions) 

Fiscal year 2008 First half of fiscal year 2009 

Fiscal year 2008 and first half of 

fiscal year 2009 

 

Number of 

active contracts 

Obligation 

amount

Number of active 

contracts

Obligation 

amount

Number of 

active contracts

Obligation 

Amount

Afghanistan 149 $1,018.6 71 $328.6 191 a $1,347.2

Iraq 128 $638.1 51 $68.6 167 a $706.7

Total 277 $1,656.7 122 $397.2 358 a $2,053.9

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. 

a Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. As a result, 

the total number of active contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the number 

that was active each year added together. Obligation amounts are unique to each fiscal year so total 

obligations for the entire period are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year. 

Page 42 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID 

Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan 

Table 16 provides information on the number of contracts awarded and 

associated obligations made during our review period. The majority of 

USAID active contracts were awarded prior to our review period and 

obligations on these previously awarded contracts accounted for nearly 

79 percent of USAID’s obligations during fiscal year 2008 and the first half 

of fiscal year 2009. 

Table 16: USAID New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal 

Year 2009 

(Dollars in millions) 

Fiscal year 2008aFirst half of fiscal year 2009a 

Number of awarded 

contracts Obligation amount

Number of awarded 

contracts Obligation amount

Afghanistan 67 $176.1 17 $24.7

Iraq 52 $233.3 29 $4.2

Total 119 $409.4 46 $28.8

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. 

a

The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded, not when the obligations 

occurred; some obligations for contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal 

year 2009. 

Table 17 shows competition information for the USAID contracts 

(excluding task and delivery orders) that were awarded during our review 

period. USAID reported that 90 percent of its contracts were competed, 

including 126 (82 percent) that were awarded using full and open 

competition. For 3 contracts, USAID either provided no competition 

information or what was provided was not sufficient to determine whether 

the contract was competed. 

Page 43 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID 

Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan 

Table 17: USAID’s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts (Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the 

First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

(Dollars in millions) 

Fiscal year 2008a First half of fiscal year 2009a

Fiscal year 2008 and first half 

of fiscal year 2009 

Number of 

awarded 

contracts 

Obligation 

amount 

Number of 

awarded 

contracts

Obligation 

amount

Number of 

awarded 

contracts

Obligation 

amount

Competed 102 $163.1 35 $27.2 137 $190.3 

Not Competed 4 $0.3 9 $0.2 13 $0.6 

Not Reported 3 $12.1 0 $0 3 $12.1 

Total 109 $175.5 44 $27.5 153 $203.0 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task and delivery orders because 

they are not subject to the same competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we 

excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were issued. This was done, in part, 

because such contracts do not have obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred 

with the issuance of each order. 

a

The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded, not when the obligations 

occurred; some obligations for contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal 

year 2009. 

As shown in table 18, there were only 13 contracts that USAID reported as 

awarded without competition and none had obligations greater than $1 

million during our review period. 

Table 18: USAID’s Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan Awarded 

without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 

Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009

Contract value by obligated 

amount 

Number of awarded 

contracts 

Obligation amount 

Less than or equal to $25,000 8 $71,327 

Greater than $25,000 and less 

than or equal to 100,000 

3 $196,146 

Greater than $100,000 and less 

than or equal to $1 million 

2 $286,163 

Greater than $1 million 0 $0 

Total 13 $553,636

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task and delivery orders because 

they are not subject to the same competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we 

excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were issued. This was done, in part, 

because such contracts do not have obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred 

with the issuance of each task order. 

Page 44 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

Page 45 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 

Page 46 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

See comment 3. 

Page 47 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

See comment 4. 

Page 48 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix III: Comments from 

the Department of Defense 

Page 49 GAO-10-1 

The following are GAO’s supplemental comments on the Department of 

Defense's letter dated September 28, 2009. 

1. DOD cites the number of contractor personnel in SPOT for the entire 

CENTCOM area of responsibility, which extends beyond Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Consistent with our mandate, we report 117,301 DOD 

contractor personnel identified in SPOT as being in Iraq or Afghanistan 

as of March 31, 2009. However, we did not use SPOT as our primary 

data source for contractor personnel data. We found that the quarterly 

census was a more comprehensive source—containing approximately 

84,000 personnel more than SPOT as of March 31, 2009 for Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

GAO Comments 

2. In signing the MOU, DOD agreed to track contractor personnel in Iraq 

or Afghanistan if their contract is more than 14 days or over $100,000. 

As described in its comments, however, DOD’s regulations contain 

different thresholds on which contractors should be entered into 

SPOT. In practice, we found that that the need for an LOA—rather 

than the thresholds in the MOU or DOD’s regulations—served as the 

primary determinate as to whether or not a contractor was entered in 

SPOT. These variations reinforce our finding and recommendation that 

the agencies ensure they have consistent criteria—both in policy and 

practice—on which contractor personnel are entered into SPOT. 

3. DOD’s comments recognize the need to develop a standardized 

contract field in SPOT. However, any effort to create a standardized 

field needs to involve DOD, State, and USAID to ensure consistency 

with their contract numbering systems and a common understanding 

of how data must be entered into the system. Further, each agency 

must ensure that the way contract and task order numbers are entered 

into SPOT are identical with how those numbers are entered into 

FPDS-NG. 

4. Our report recognizes that SPOT was upgraded in January 2009 to 

track contractor personnel who have been killed or wounded. As 

discussed in the report, however, this upgrade does not provide 

agencies with the capability to readily generate reports on the total 

number of contractor personnel killed or wounded within a given 

timeframe; instead, the current capability is limited to generating a 

report of personnel identified as killed or wounded on the day the 

report is generated. DOD does not specify in its comments as to 

whether or how the planned November 2009 upgrade would address 

 Contingency Contracting 
Appendix III: Comments from 

the Department of Defense 

this reporting limitation. Also, it is not clear from DOD’s comments as 

to whether this planned upgrade will apply to both the unclassified and 

classified versions of SPOT. State’s comments suggest that based on 

information it received from DOD, the improved reporting features will 

be limited to the classified version. 

Additionally, while DOD notes that the completeness of data on killed 

or wounded personnel is reliant on contractor input, it is the 

responsibility of DOD and the other agencies to ensure that such 

information is tracked as required by the NDAA for FY2008

Page 50 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Appendix IV: Comments from the of State 

Department of State 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

Page 51 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report 

CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to 

Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan

 (GAO-10-01, GAO Code 120790) 

 The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft report titled, “Contingency 

Contracting: DOD, State and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking 

Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan.” 

Recommendation: To ensure that the agencies and Congress have reliable 

information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, we 

recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Administrator of 

USAID jointly develop and execute a plan with associated timeframes for their 

continued implementation of the NDAA for FY2008 requirements, specifically 

x Ensuring that the agencies’ criteria for entering contracts and contractor 

personnel into the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) 

are consistent with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2008 

and with the agencies’ respective information needs for overseeing contracts and 

contractor personnel; 

x Establishing uniform requirements on how contract numbers are to be 

entered into SPOT so that contract information can accurately be pulled from 

FPDS-NG as agreed to in the MOU; and 

x Revising SPOT’s reporting capabilities to ensure that they fulfill statutory 

requirements and agency information needs, such as those related to contractor 

personnel killed or wounded. 

In developing and executing this plan, the agencies may need to revisit their MOU 

to ensure consistency between the plan and what has previously been agreed to in 

the MOU. 

Response: The Bureau of Administration (A) has the lead on agency 

implementation of SPOT and the NDAA. We acknowledge the importance of 

reliable information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan 

reported jointly with the Secretary of Defense (DOD) and the Administrator of 

USAID to implement NDAA FY2008 requirements. We agree that the agencies 

need to continue to meet to review progress and intent of the MOU to comply with 

NDAA FY2008, but do not agree with the recommendation that a new plan needs 

to be developed. We do agree that the current MOU needs to be revisited as well 

Page 52 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

2 

as some issues to ensure consistency meeting the criteria it already contains as 

specified in NDAA 2008, section 861. 

However, we are concerned with the interpretation of certain information in 

the GAO draft report on Contingency Contracting. For example, page 6 states: 

“regarding contractor personnel in Iraq, DOD, State, and USAID officials stated that the 

primary factor for deciding to enter contractor personnel into SPOT was whether a 

contractor needed a SPOT-generated letter of authorization (LOA). Contractor personnel 

need SPOT-generated LOAs to, among other things, enter Iraq, receive military 

identification cards, travel on U.S. military aircraft, or, for security contractors, receive 

approval to carry weapons. However, not all contractor personnel, particularly local 

nationals, in Iraq need LOAs and agency officials informed us that such personnel were 

not being entered into SPOT. In contrast, DOD officials informed us that individuals 

needing LOAs were entered into SPOT even if their contracts did not meet the MOU’s 14 

day or $100,000 thresholds.” 

State personnel advised the GAO during an interview that company 

administrators were told verbally and in writing to enter all United States citizens, 

Third Country Nationals, and Locals Nationals into SPOT. Due to security 

concerns about entering data on Local Nationals, company administrators were 

given a blind identity scheme to aid with accountability of entering the 

information. We continue to urge that actual information be entered on all Local 

Nationals because SPOT would be used for NDAA 1248, repatriation requests. 

Also, the MOU signed by the three agencies stipulate that contracts under 

the simplified acquisitions threshold of $100,000 and 14 working days would not 

be entered into SPOT (Section VII B). The GAO was advised by State personnel 

during the interview that it lacked resources to enter every acquisition into SPOT 

and support the higher threshold. However, there may be confusion because an 

earlier Section II A of the MOU only states “longer than 14 days”. We agree that 

the three agencies need to discuss this issue to determine one standard. 

Another example is on page 8 of the report which states: 

“while contract numbers are the unique identifiers that will be used to match records in 

SPOT to those in FPDS-NG, SPOT users are not required to enter contract numbers in a 

standardized manner. In our review of SPOT data, we identified that at least 12 percent of 

the contracts had invalid contract numbers and, therefore, could not be matched to 

records in FPDS-NG.” 

When implementing SPOT, State used the configuration guidance which 

complies with FPDS-NG given by DOD to enter all contract numbers. The user 

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

Page 53 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

3 

guide posted on the Department’s intranet was shared with GAO; the business 

rules in it state the configuration to be used when entering a contract number into 

SPOT. We contacted DOD on September 9, 2009, and they informed us they are 

already working on a standardized configuration. 

Recently, DOD conducted user acceptance testing for implementation of 

enhanced reporting in SPOT, but we were told it would only be on its secure 

network. However, all the information input to date into SPOT is in an 

unclassified network. The agencies need to discuss future reporting capability for 

non-classified SPOT. 

Page 54 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 55 GAO-10-1 

The following are GAO’s supplemental comments on the Department of 

State’s letter dated September 24, 2009. 

1. Notwithstanding State’s guidance to contractors, we found that not all 

contractor personnel are being entered into SPOT as required. In 

practice, we found that the need for an LOA is the primary determinate 

for whether or not contractor personnel are entered into SPOT. For 

example, a State contracting officer informed us that Iraqis working on 

his contracts are not in SPOT because they do not need LOAs, which is 

not consistent with State’s guidance, the MOU criteria, or the NDAA 

for FY2008. 

GAO Comments 

2. As reflected in our recommendation, we agree that the agencies need 

to determine a single standard on which contracts should be entered 

into SPOT. This is not only due to State’s observation regarding 

inconsistencies in the MOU, but also due to the inconsistencies we 

found between the MOU and NDAA for FY 2008 and the varying 

criteria being used by the agencies. Until there is a single agreed upon 

standard—both in guidance and practice, the agencies will continue 

track data differently and, as a result, the data for all three agencies 

will be incomplete. 

3. Our finding pertained to how data are actually being entered into 

SPOT, which as we report allows users to enter invalid contract 

numbers and does not require the entry of task order numbers. For 

example, we found that none of State’s task orders in SPOT provided 

both the contract and task order numbers. If such data entry issues are 

not resolved in the near future, then the planned connection with 

FPDS-NG may present challenges and prevent contract data from 

being accurately imported into SPOT.

 Contingency Contracting 
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 

for International Development 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

See comment 1. 

Page 56 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development 

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

See comment 4. 

Page 57 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development 

Page 58 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development 

Page 59 GAO-10-1 

The following are GAO’s supplemental comments on USAID’s letter dated 

September 22, 2009. 

1. While building off the lessons learned in Iraq has merit, we note that 

USAID does not provide a time frame for when it will begin requiring 

contractors in Afghanistan to use SPOT to fulfill the requirements of 

the NDAA for FY2008 and what it agreed to in the MOU. 

GAO Comments 

2. Our report explains that the need for the LOA—as opposed to what 

was agreed to in the MOU or contained in the NDAA for FY2008—has 

become the primary factor for determining which contractor personnel 

are entered into SPOT. USAID’s comment that it will explore SPOT’s 

functionality to track personnel who do not need LOAs is consistent 

with our recommendation that the agencies work together to ensure 

that the requirements of the NDAA for FY2008 and their respective 

information needs are fulfilled. 

3. While USAID has a standard contract numbering system, the issue we 

identified pertains to how SPOT allows contract and task order 

numbers to be entered inconsistently. The agencies need to work 

together to ensure that contract and task orders numbers are entered 

into SPOT so that data can be accurately pulled from FPDS-NG. 

4. While DOD is responsible for maintaining and upgrading SPOT, the 

three agencies have a shared responsibility to ensure that the database 

they agreed to use in their MOU fulfills the requirements of the NDAA 

for FY2008. Rather than deferring to DOD as the system owner to 

manage SPOT’s development, USAID should work with the other 

agencies to identify and agree on their information and reporting needs 

and ensure that the necessary upgrades are made to SPOT.

 Contingency Contracting 
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

Acknowledgments 

John Hutton, (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact above, Johana R. Ayers, Assistant Director; Noah 

Bleicher; E. Brandon Booth; Justin Fisher; Art James, Jr.; Christopher 

Kunitz; Jean McSween; Alise Nacson; Jason Pogacnik; Karen Thornton; 

Gabriele Tonsil; and Robert Swierczek made key contributions to this 

report. 

Page 60 GAO-10-1 Contingency Contracting

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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