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i 

52–848 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–69] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR ARMY ACQUISITION, RESET AND MODERNIZATION 

PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 21, 2009 
(II) 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

BEN GLERUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, May 21, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for Army Acquisition, Reset and Modernization Programs ..................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, May 21, 2009 .......................................................................................... 39 

THURSDAY, MAY 21, 2009 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR ARMY ACQUISITION, RESET AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 1 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member, 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 6 

WITNESSES 

Ahern, David G., Director, Portfolio Systems Acquisition, Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics ........................... 8 

Speakes, Lt. Gen. Stephen M., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8, U.S. Army .... 12 

Thompson, Lt. Gen. N. Ross III, USA, Military Deputy to the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), and Director, 

Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army .................................................... 10 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Ahern, David G. ................................................................................................ 43 

Thompson, Lt. Gen. N. Ross III ...................................................................... 60 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 85 

Mr. Kissell ......................................................................................................... 85 

Mr. Marshall ..................................................................................................... 85 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 85 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR ARMY ACQUISITION, RESET AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, May 21, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Neil Abercrombie 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Aloha. Good morning, everybody. Thank you 

for being with us. 

We have some old friends here, and new friends, and Mr. Ahern, 

General Thompson, and of course General Speakes. General 

Speakes has been my mentor and chief lecturer for some time now, 

and I am pleased to see him, although I am not sure that he thinks 

I have been a good pupil, that is the only thing. 

The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the 

Army’s acquisition and modernization budget for the fiscal year 

2010, and I want to particularly welcome then, again, Dr. David 

Ahern. 

I said ‘‘mister’’ yesterday and I should have said ‘‘doctor.’’ You 

earned it; you deserve the title. Or it is not so? 

Mr. AHERN. No, sir. I am a graduate of the Naval Academy—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. Thought maybe I had missed it 

in your biography. 

Mr. AHERN. No, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

Nonetheless, you are in charge of the portfolio systems acquisition of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD/AT&L). I am saying some of these 

things not because you don’t know it, but because this is for the 

public record. People are seeing it and they may not be aware at 

all. This may be their first exposure. 

So again, I thank the members and I thank those of us that— 

those of you who are here for indulging me a little bit if I seem 

to go into a lot of detail that many other people here already know. 

It is for the public record and for those who may be observing and 

learning for the first time about a lot of these things. 

General Thompson is the military deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. 
2 

I hope, by the way, General Thompson—to show you we actually 

do read testimony, the word ‘‘friction,’’ I understand is a 

Clausewitzian term, and I hope it is not going to replace ‘‘logistics’’ 

as a phrase of art. Friction, to me, means something working 

against each other, and particularly when it comes to the transportation side and supplying, I think the Army actually has it down 

pretty well. It may be difficult—the logistics may be difficult, but 

I don’t see it as friction in the Clausewitzian sense, okay? We will 

get the theory out of the way. 

And General Speakes was the Deputy Chief of Staff. 

And again, General, thank you for your endless patience with me 

over the years. It is appreciated. 

Although the President’s budget request was finally delivered to 

Congress on May 11th, the full details on several major programs 

remain unclear, pending further analysis by the Army. Nonetheless, the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee markup for the fiscal 

year 2010 is just 21 days from today—3 weeks from today. 

I am emphasizing that to you, gentlemen, this morning, because 

this extremely tight timeline means that the witnesses need to provide answers to members today, and certainly within the next 

three weeks, not some point in the distant future. I know you are 

working every day on this; I am not giving you some kind of a task 

that has not already been assigned to you by the Chief of Staff, let 

alone the Secretary of Defense. I am sure there is a lot of double 

shifts being worked right now, so this is not meant to further burden you so much as it is to indicate that we are ready to receive 

whatever decision and recommendations that you have for us as 

soon as possible. 

To facilitate these answers, then, the subcommittee specifically 

requested that the Army witnesses bring with them subject matter 

experts on all the major programs facing changes in the budget so 

members could not hesitate to ask detailed questions. And so for 

new members that are here, I can assure you that General Thompson and General Speakes can state with authority the answers and 

the observations that they will give to you in response to your 

questions and/or observations. 

While the Army 2010 budget does not include significant—does 

include significant changes to many programs, it is overall—I wish 

to say this at the beginning; I am saying these words with consideration—a solid request that will provide the Army with what it 

needs. And I want to emphasize that, because obviously we may 

have some questions and differences to be resolved with regard to 

individual items or categories within the budget, but I wanted to 

emphasize to you, Mr. Ahern, and to both generals here that I believe it is a solid request and I believe it will provide the Army 

with what it needs. 

The total of $41.1 billion for procurement and research and development demonstrates a commitment, I believe, to adequately 

fund the Army needs while also being prudent about where the 

money is allocated. Put in context, this total of $41-plus billion exceeds the entire budget request of the Department of State, Agriculture, Energy, Homeland Security, and just below the funding request for the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department 

of Education. 
3 

So the emphasis here, I think, is where it needs to be, so that 

we don’t have friction with regard to maintenance and operations 

and deployment. That is what we have to try and avoid, and I 

think you are making a good faith attempt to do that with this 

budget as we have it so far. 

However, despite this large amount of funding, the Army remains under significant pressure to support overseas operations. To 

do so, the readiness of the most nondeploy—of most nondeployed 

units has been severely compromised. While equipment stocks are 

not the only reason many units are not ready for combat, it is a 

major reason in many cases, I think you will agree. 

There is also a large unknown requirement for repair of equipment coming out of Iraq, and I expect the same will—or, this will 

be compounded by operations in Afghanistan without even getting 

into the question of other contingencies that might arise. So there 

is an unknown requirement, then, for repair of equipment and logistics with regard to equipment and deployment of personnel, even 

though, in Iraq, the size of the U.S. force may, in fact, and probably 

is, in fact, going to decline. 

The extent of this unknown cost hangs over all of the Army modernization plans, in my estimation, and may be significantly 

changed as the full cost of the war in Iraq becomes clear, particularly if it goes in the direction I think it might. So we are putting 

this mark together in three weeks, trying to be fully cognizant of 

what I believe to be the fact that the Army may have cost implications that it has to deal with that are not anticipated, or are anticipated to the best it can, given the budget document and the defense bill that we have before us. But I am well aware that we 

have to try to take into account—how can we modernize and still 

take into account what you are going to need to handle the deployments and handle the equipment needs? 

With regard to specific programs, the proposed changes to the 

Future Combat System will have the most impact on the Army’s 

near-term budget needs and long-term modernization plans. The 

House Armed Services Committee, under both Republican and 

Democratic leadership—and I want to pay particular tribute today, 

on the record, to former Chairman Curt Weldon, under whose leadership I had the honor to serve as ranking member. Under his 

leadership, there was the first expressed doubts about the technical 

feasibility, the affordability, and the wisdom of some of the aspects 

of this very complex and expensive program. 

Unfortunately, I believe that leadership all the way around, in 

Congress and in the Pentagon, simply waited too long to address 

the fundamental contradictions for some of its own plans, some of 

the Army’s plans for the Future Combat System, and how these 

plans related to the modernization for the rest of the Army. That 

said, the Army now faces dramatic changes imposed on the Future 

Combat System by the Secretary of Defense that will require 

months of additional analysis, contract negotiations, and leadership 

reviews to straighten out, all the while trying to explain why the 

program still needs almost $3 billion in fiscal year 2010. 

However, the decision by Secretary Gates to terminate the 

manned ground vehicle portions of the Future Combat Systems 
4 

program, I believe, was overdue, and it is the right decision. I am 

not sure, though, that he has gone far enough. 

While many questions remain, some aspects proposed for the reorganization of the Future Combat System appear to be good ones, 

and I want to say what they are: the rapid phase-out of the lead 

systems integrator to manage the program. Again, this is not a 

partisan observation; this goes back to leadership when Republicans were in charge of Congress and in charge of the committee, 

in terms of responsibility. 

New contracts with reasonable fee structures to replace the current fee arrangement that featured hundreds-of-millions-of-dollars 

a year in fees with very few tools for Army program managers to 

hold contractors to account. In other words, I believe that it is a 

step forward for the Army to be more in charge. 

Breaking up the programs into separate elements for vehicles, 

communication network, and spinouts to the current force so that 

the Army can properly manage each of these major efforts. I think 

logistically speaking, that is going to reduce the friction for the 

Army. I think that is a good managerial step forward. 

However, many questions—I know I have a lot of ‘‘howevers’’ in 

here—many questions about the way forward with the Future 

Combat System remain, some of which I hope will be answered 

today and in the three weeks to come before the markup. For example, in what remains of the Future Combat System in the budget, there is a $415 million cost increase for software development 

costs that I am having great difficulty in figuring out the logic, or 

what it is there for, that kind of thing. 

And there is other examples that we needn’t go into right now. 

So it appears that even without the manned vehicle, the Future 

Combat Systems program could face continued cost overruns in the 

future, and this has been predicted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other analysts again and again. 

There is one critical issue regarding the Future Combat Systems 

(FCS) that I want to emphasize today: Trying to go too fast with 

immature technologies and optimistic cost estimates is how the Future Combat System got in trouble in the first place, so it is imperative, in my view, that the Army not repeat all these same mistakes and that Congress not repeat these same mistakes. 

I want to make it clear that this is a critique of the Army program, with regard to Future Combat System, not criticism, as such, 

because there is criticism to go around that can start with the Congress. The Congress has the ultimate responsibility and decisionmaking here, and the Congress did not do its job, in my estimation, 

in terms of oversight and helping the Army to resolve these issues 

in a legislative sense in the defense bill. 

So there is enough sins to atone for to go around. My job, I feel, 

today and in the markup to come, and the job of this subcommittee 

and the committee as a whole is to see to it that we exercise our 

oversight functions in a responsible way and work with you to see 

that the strategic interests of the Nation are met. 

Taking time to get the—in other words, then, taking time to get 

the requirements, the cost estimates, and the technology right is 

absolutely essential to make sure that the Army can proceed with 

a new vehicle program that has the support of Congress and actu-
5 

ally succeeds. That has to be our goal—I say our goal; not yours 

or mine, but ours. 

Beyond the FCS, the 2010 budget request also includes some 

major changes, and I just want to mention them very briefly: the 

Joint Cargo Aircraft program. The subcommittee needs to better 

understand the rationale and the impact of the proposed changes 

to this important program. 

The budget request is also the first Army budget request since 

2003 that does not include funds for Stryker vehicles. Members 

need information regarding the future of the Stryker program, including whether or not the Army is ready to commit to a fleet-wide 

Stryker upgrade program or programs. 

The Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Fleet also faces many challenges, including the future of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle in the Army fleet, modernization for the 

Army’s huge inventory of Humvees, adequate resourcing for the 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program—that really needs 

some close attention—addressing critical shortfalls in the Guard 

and Reserve medium and heavy truck fleets as well as policy with 

regard to the Guard and Reserve. 

There are also significant issues that need to be addressed regarding the Army’s fleet of helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Recent reprogramming in the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request by the Army to fund the upgrade of the Apache and 

the Kiowa Warrior helicopters satisfy, I believe, near-term requirements and address the cancellation of the Armed Reconnaissance 

Helicopter (ARH). Longer-term, however, there needs to be considerable analysis completed to determine the proper mix of helicopters and UAVs and required capabilities to meet warfighter 

needs. 

We don’t have, at least in the presentation that has been made 

to us so far, an idea of where you want to be over the next 5 years 

or 10 years, other than in the most general terms, and we are 

going to need more analysis in that regard. 

Finally, members need to also fully understand the Army’s path 

forward on body armor. I feel like Bill Murray in ‘‘Groundhog Day’’ 

when it comes to body armor, and I feel like I am reading the same 

reports over and over again and the same accusations over and 

over again. 

Media reports continue to indicate that in Afghanistan, soldiers 

may carry loads as high as 130-to-150 pounds for a 3-day mission. 

Much of this is anecdotal, I understand, but we have previously received testimony that personnel can wear only so much armor beyond which their operational effectiveness is inhibited, and that, in 

turn, increases the risk of being injured. And I suspect that that 

should be apparent. We expect to receive updates on immediate efforts to lighten the load on the soldier without sacrificing their 

safety. 

Again, in this area, in my Bill Murray mode, the Army recently 

implemented a new policy decision requiring all body armor tests 

to be conducted in-house at a government laboratory, the Army 

Test Center. Historically, the Army has contracted the Independent 

National Institute of Justice certified laboratories. Those who are 

certified under the National Institute of Justice and are inde-
6 

pendent for first article test and lot acceptance test, so this is a 

change in direction and we need a little bit more information in 

that regard and what the Army’s intent for the long term is. 

We also need to know whether this decision could create delays 

in fielding body armor to the warfighter. And at the request of the 

subcommittee, before the testing policy decision was made by the 

Army, the Government Accountability Office was already observing 

and reviewing the most recent body armor tests being conducted at 

the Army Test Center. 

The GAO is in the process of completing their review. We are 

waiting to review their findings. I am hoping this can be done in 

short order, but if it can’t be done by the time of the defense bill 

markup, I think we may have to deal with this as a separate issue 

down the line. 

In the meantime, then, I encourage the Army and the Department of Defense to standardize test procedures and protocols. That 

would eliminate, I think, a lot of this friction and contention that 

is taking place. 

Again, this has been a lengthy statement. I am generally loath 

to do that, but given the importance of the defense bill coming up, 

and with the change in administrations, I felt it was imperative 

that we have a crystal clear understanding of where we are and 

what we need to address ourselves to. 

So before we move, then, to our witnesses’ opening remarks, 

which don’t necessarily have to be in response to this at all at this 

time, I want to turn to the ranking member of the subcommittee 

and our most valued and trusted friend, Mr. Roscoe Bartlett, for 

his opening remarks. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

To our witnesses, thank you for being here, and thank you very 

much for your service to our country. 

In the recent series of full committee posture hearings a consistent theme has carried through, and I want to echo it here 

today. I feel that there has been an absence of thoughtful debate, 

discussion, and in some cases analysis, to support this budget request. 

The fiscal year 2010 Army top-line request is advertised as being 

a robust 2.1 percent increase over 2009. That assertion is misleading, given that when funding previously included in the supplemental is added, the Army in 2010 will be funded at $4 billion less 

than in 2009. 

Army procurement accounts, not including the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), were funded at 

$37 billion in 2009, yet the request in 2010 totals just $30 billion. 

Army Research and Development (R&D) accounts were funded at 

$12 billion in 2009, yet the 2010 request has been decreased to just 

$10 billion. 

So basically, the Army’s procurement is down; R&D is down. 

Even though the Army’s overall funding is $4 billion less than in 

2009, the Army’s unfunded requirements list is only $900 million, 
7 

which is $3 billion less than last year. I hope our witnesses can 

shed additional light on these concerns. 

I have just a couple of issues I would like to highlight. The first 

issue is in regard to the Joint Cargo Aircraft. 

All of you have heard my thoughts on this over the course of the 

previous hearings. I have asked witnesses from the Army, the Air 

Force, the Guard, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 

what has changed? Why is this mission being moved out of the 

Army and slowly over to the Air Force when not four months ago 

we received the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report 

that stated, ‘‘The option that provided most value to joint force was 

to assign the C–27J to the Air Force and the Army’’? 

None of them have been able to answer the question, but all of 

them stated that there has been no new study or analysis conducted that countered the existing plan or reduced the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-approved requirement for 78 

joint cargo aircraft. I might note that that was just Army aircraft; 

the Air Force needed to add to that the aircraft that they would 

need. 

The second issue I would like to highlight is in reference to the 

Future Combat Systems program. As you know, Mr. Chairman, no 

other committee has provided as much oversight on this program 

as this subcommittee. You can go back to when Mr. Weldon was 

the chairman and find that many of the concerns that Secretary 

Gates recently announced were very similar to the points that this 

subcommittee made back in 2005. 

However, it matters not who was right or who was wrong. What 

matters is, what do we do now? How do we ensure that we are 

looking out for the future of our soldiers? We must get this right. 

The Army must be allowed to modernize. 

To our witnesses, please take this message back to the Pentagon. 

We want to support your efforts as you restructure the Future 

Combat Systems program, but you must figure out a way to make 

us part of the process. 

Along those lines, if I could make an additional point specifically 

in regard to the manned ground vehicles—I realize that you have 

your work cut out for you as you go back and look at requirements 

and move toward a new or modified program. I would ask that as 

you take a closer look at requirements that you include taking another look at your electrical magnetic pulse requirement, EMP. 

I visited Aberdeen Proving Ground a couple of months ago and 

received a classified briefing on Future Combat Systems in regard 

to electromagnetic pulse. This is not the appropriate venue to get 

into a classified discussion, but I can tell you that you need to 

change your requirements. The threat is several times what you 

have designed it to and are testing it to. Please take a look at this 

and follow up with me. 

Finally, I would like to mention a few things about body armor. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, under your leadership this subcommittee 

has provided extensive oversight on this area that is matched by 

no other committee. Body armor is the ultimate last line of defense 

when it comes to protecting our warfighters, and while we have 

made much progress, we must do more. 
8 

The senior Army leadership has testified that they want to provide a high level of protection and reduce waste, but the way we 

currently procure body armor does not support that objective. We 

must not continue to classify body armor under the same category 

as clothing and boots. Not only does it send the wrong message to 

our soldier, but it doesn’t help our industrial base plan for the future. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, our subcommittee tried to make 

some changes last year, but we were unsuccessful during conference. I know we plan on making some changes this year, and I 

fully support such efforts. 

My last point concerns body armor as well. There have been 

some recent press reports regarding the Army’s recent decision to 

conduct all first article testing and lot acceptance testing at a government test lab. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, we sent a letter to the Secretary 

of the Army, and the response did not provide the detail we were 

hoping for. We also requested that the General Accountability Office report back to us in regard to the Army’s efforts to conduct this 

testing. 

I will withhold judgment on this issue pending the final GAO report. However, I will say this: The first article test is very comprehensive, and critical test in terms of qualifying a product. I can 

understand why the Department believes that they need to maintain this capability as a core competency and that it may cost more 

compared to a private test lab. 

But to do so, they must properly staff their test facility and have 

an established and fully vetted set of test procedures and protocols 

that is understood by industry concerning light acceptance testing, 

which is a less rigorous sample test. I continue to have concern regarding the Army’s change in policy and hope to gain more detail 

at today’s hearing. Again, I will await until the final GAO report 

comes out, but I suspect we will be reengaging with the Department of the Army on this decision. 

Thank you for being here. I look forward to your testimony. 

And Mr. Chairman, I would ask leave to be absent for a few minutes to go to testify before a Judiciary subcommittee. Thank you, 

and I yield back. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. 

Before we go to our guests, starting with Mr. Ahern, we will engage in dialogue with our witnesses in reverse order today. Those 

who are the newest members will go first, and in order of those 

who were here at the time the gavel came down, and then who subsequently arrived. 

Mr. Ahern, thank you for your service. Please proceed. And if you 

have a longer statement it will be submitted to the record, without 

objection. Same for both generals. And any remarks at this time 

would be welcome. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. AHERN, DIRECTOR, PORTFOLIO SYSTEMS ACQUISITION, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS 

Mr. AHERN. Thank you, Chairman Abercrombie. 
9 

Distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you to discuss Army modernization 

from the perspective of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I will 

be brief in order to move quickly to the panel’s questions. 

When Secretary Gates introduced the Department’s fiscal year 

2010 budget, he clearly articulated that one of his principal objectives was to rebalance the Department’s programs to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in 

today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years 

ahead while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks 

and contingencies. 

The Secretary’s decisions regarding the Future Combat System 

focused the effort to deliver military useful capability developed in 

FCS to all of the Army’s combat brigades while reevaluating the requirements, technologies, and approaches, then re-launching the 

Army Vehicle Modernization program. 

You asked that I address the Department’s support for both the 

Army’s Aerial Common Sensor and the Navy’s EP-X Aircraft programs. Both the EP-X and the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) capabilities are important to maintain current warfighting capability 

and to improve multi-intelligence based Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) solutions for survivability and mission 

effectiveness. 

At this time, the Department is reviewing service plans for material development decisions and their associated analyses of alternatives. Our goal in the pursuit of both capabilities is to identify 

affordable program solutions that field multi end capabilities as 

soon as possible. 

You also asked about lessons learned from the Comanche and the 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter acquisition programs. While both 

programs share the common objective to replace aging armed reconnaissance aircraft inventories, the technical goals of the two 

programs were nearly opposite. 

Comanche incorporated cutting edge technology for improved performance. ARH objective was to field new aircraft that matched existing capabilities without significant new technology. 

The primary lesson from Comanche relates to assuring technology is mature prior to engineering development. For ARH, 

schedule is a critical goal that the program was unable to achieve. 

We have already incorporated those lessons in the new Department 

of Defense (DOD) instruction. 

The department continues to modernize the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Fleet of some 300,000 vehicles. The sheer magnitude of the 

fleet dictates that modernization must be approached incrementally 

with attention on affordable and achievable solutions. 

In the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, or JLTV, acquisition, the 

Army and Marine Corps selected multiple contractors for competitive prototyping to reduce risk, ensure designs are produceable and 

properly costed. The JLTV will give us increases in reliability, 

maintain ability performance and commonality at a competitive 

price. 

As you know, we have fielded thousands of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to operational forces. The MRAPs are out-
10 

standing vehicles for specific missions, and we will ensure that this 

capability remains part of the force structure. 

In the area of body armor, USD AT&L recognizes Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Army, Navy, and Marine Corps’ science and technology efforts aimed at reducing body 

armor weight while maintaining or enhancing the protection they 

provide. These efforts include work on ballistic fiber technology, ceramics and composites, advanced materials, modular designs, and 

biomechanics as well as longer-term technologies. 

In the small arms area, a Joint Assessment Team (JAT) was established to assess the Department’s approach to satisfying requirements. The JAT’s preliminary findings include insights into 

the importance of training, the challenges in defining measurable, 

effects-based requirements, and the availability of commercial 

products that could meet the Department’s needs. We will share 

the final results with the committee after the JAT completes its 

work and USD AT&L approves the report. 

The final topic you asked me to address is the Persistent Threat 

Detection System (PTDS). The PTDS Tethered Aerostat Program is 

a capability procured and supported specifically for the theater of 

operations. 

There are eight PTDS quick-reaction capability systems currently 

deployed of a requirement for 18 systems. We are awaiting the approval of supplemental funding for up to seven additional systems. 

We are grateful for the continued support of Congress, which has 

been critical to ensuring our soldiers are the best trained and 

equipped Army in the world. Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the Department’s plans to continue to equip them for today’s wars and tomorrow’s challenges. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ahern can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Ahern. I appreciate your comments on the values of competition. I think I will extract those remarks and send them over to the Secretary of Defense about the— 

I think you were inches from a clean getaway. 

General Thompson. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. N. ROSS THOMPSON III, USA, MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

ARMY (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY), U.S. 

ARMY 

General THOMPSON. Chairman Abercrombie, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss 

the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget request and the Army’s acquisition, reset, and modernization programs. With this budget request the Army—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I think your mike may not be on or you need 

to pull it a bit closer, General. 

General THOMPSON. With this budget request, the Army’s highest priority remains the protection of our warfighters in an operational environment that is increasingly unpredictable and dangerous. Force protection has taken on an even greater importance 

as we shift major operations in Iraq to Afghanistan. 
11 

We are grateful to members of this committee for your guidance 

and your steadfast support. We continue to meet the equipping demands of our soldiers in ongoing overseas contingency operations 

and in other operations worldwide because of the resources and the 

guidance provided by this committee and the Congress. We constantly strive to be good stewards of those resources. 

The Army’s comprehensive modernization program is the key to 

ensuring that our soldiers maintain a decisive advantage over a diverse array of potential adversaries while improving their survivability. In every aspect of Army modernization, we leverage lessons 

learned from soldiers in the current fight to speed fielding of enhanced capabilities to the force while we concurrently develop capabilities soldiers will need both today and tomorrow. 

Our plans include transition to a modernization strategy focused 

on building a versatile mix of networked brigade combat teams and 

enablers that can leverage mobility, protection, information, and 

precision intelligence and fires to conduct effective full spectrum 

operations. We also plan to incorporate the valuable technology and 

network advances we have drawn from the Future Combat Systems program as well as the key technologies already in use in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

On a couple of individual programs, the Army and the Department of Defense remain committed to the requirement for a 

manned scout helicopter capability and the need to deliver this capability to our soldiers in a responsible and timely manner. We are 

also committed to working with the Secretary of Defense and the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress to field the new 

ground combat vehicle as soon as possible. 

In other areas of future commitments, we are evaluating proposals for the next evolution of the MRAP, the MRAP All Terrain 

Vehicle (ATV). We are planning for production of the Joint Light 

Tactical Vehicle, competition for a new carbine, and continued development of the Joint Tactical Radio System, the Warfigher Information Network Tactical, Aerial Common Sensor, and other systems, to ensure that our soldiers maintain a decisive advantage 

over potential adversaries. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, your deep and 

abiding commitment to our men and women in uniform is widely 

recognized throughout our ranks. We thank you for your continued 

support of the men and women in uniform, for the United States 

Army, and their families. And this concludes my opening remarks. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Thompson and General 

Speakes can be found in the Appendix on page 60.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, General Thompson. 

General Speakes, I realize that the statement of General Thompson is meant to be a joint statement. However, out of respect for 

your valued input to this subcommittee over the years and to the 

committee as a whole, taking into account fully my shortcomings 

as a pupil with regard to your instruction over the years, if you 

would like to make a statement, even informally, we would be 

pleased to hear it. 
12 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. STEPHEN M. SPEAKES, USA, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF STAFF, G–8, U.S. ARMY 

General SPEAKES. Chairman Abercrombie, sir, it is an honor to 

speak to you, and I speak to you as somebody who is humbly grateful for all that you have done for us for the years that I have been 

associated with this committee, which is now four years. 

And Ranking Member Bartlett and members of the committee, it 

is an honor to be here today to be afforded the chance to talk about 

our Army, an Army that right now is at its peak in terms of soldiers deployed—as we straddle commitments in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as we execute a responsible drawdown, and as we shift 

and now adopt the main effort of this great Nation as we focus on 

Afghanistan. So it is an Army that is under a heavier load than 

ever, and one that merits and receives your support as never before. 

We would like to address some specific areas where the Army 

shifted focus and reflection on the lessons learned of this last period of conflict. It is going to be reflected in both the fiscal year 

2010 budget and our plans to the future. 

First of all, it is an Army that recognizes that we must provide 

and continue to provide the best equipment to soldiers in conflict. 

Much of what General Thompson has already spoken about addresses our recognition that soldiers in conflict today in Afghanistan will be equipped differently than those in Iraq in very important but very subtle ways. 

Such examples as you have already cited is lightening the soldiers’ load. A soldier who operating in Iraq essentially operated in 

close proximity to a up-armored Humvee or an MRAP, or some 

other mounted platform. 

Today’s soldier that is operating in Afghanistan is operating at 

very high altitudes in a long-range dismounted mode of operation 

that puts much greater priority on us to put the equipping strategy 

in a very important new way, and a new light. 

We also recognize that as we begin to execute the withdraw of 

equipment out of Iraq, that we must have a strategy that brings 

that equipment back here and resets it appropriately so that we 

put strategic depth back into this Nation’s Army. 

We would like to draw your attention to the point that getting 

that equipment back is essential to our future readiness. While it 

is not the panacea that will fix our readiness issues, it is important 

that we recognize that there are vital capabilities that right now 

are a part of equipment that is in Iraq, is a part of our theaterprovided equipment—over 30,000 weapons—over 30,000 trucks. 

Those are examples of capabilities that must be brought back so 

that we can do something that is very important to ensure the 

readiness of the Army in the future. There are moves afoot to put 

equipment on a transfer basis into other forces, military, specifically the Iraqi army and police. 

We would simply ask that if that happens that the Army be compensated for that because we certainly must have the equipment 

back in order to ensure the future readiness of the Army. So what 

may make important sense from a national strategy also must reflect the readiness of the Army as a core value for all of us. 
13 

And then finally, what I would also like to do is ensure that we 

have a shared vision of the road ahead. The guidance that we received from the Secretary of Defense as we announced the fiscal 

year 2010 budget is a very, very important signal to us about 

learning lessons from this conflict and thinking very carefully 

about our modernization. 

And we think your comments about how we ensure that we are 

getting value for the future dollars spent and that we have a strategy that is nested with yours is absolutely vital to all of us. So we 

are doing that. 

We have also made important adjustments to our equipping 

strategy, one that reflects the reality now of an Army that is in motion, that won’t be equipped on a static basis with equipment sitting in a unit for the lifetime of that particular piece of equipment, 

but instead, now, an Army that equips units on a mission-specific 

focus recognizing the relative place in the cyclic readiness profile, 

much like the United States Navy has employed for many years. 

So we have adopted that, and we think that what we are going 

to be able to do is show much higher utilization for our equipment, 

improved readiness, and a better ability to focus the best equipment where it needs to be to support soldiers who are headed into 

harm’s way. 

So these are but a few of the important initiatives that we welcome today as an opportunity to engage in dialogue and to explain 

what we are trying to do in pursuit of the Secretary of Defense’s 

strategy. We thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Speakes and General 

Thompson can be found in the Appendix on page 60.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, General Speakes. 

Thank you for your kind remarks, not least of which regarded me, 

and to the subcommittee. Appreciate it. 

We will start with Mr. Kissell, to be followed by Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Generals. My district in North Carolina is immediately adjacent to Fort Bragg, and I had the privilege Monday of 

spending all day with Special Forces and General Mulholland, and 

learning more about the tremendous work that these men and 

women do to help us. 

Mr. Ahern, I think the difficulty in asking the question right now 

is, if we have a lot of specifics about what is taking place as we 

transition towards Afghanistan, potentially away from Iraq, and to 

try to balance the specifics of what is taking place now versus the 

general aspect of modernization. And as we talked about yesterday 

in our subcommittee hearing and the chairman’s aspect of what 

wishes can be, and we know the limitations of what wishes can 

offer to us. 

I would like to ask you about the ground vehicles. As I was reading through the information available to us, it seems like we are 

looking at multipurpose vehicles—light, heavy, medium—but yet 

the ground vehicle for the Future Combat Systems is out. 

So where are we going, in terms of ground vehicles? And more 

importantly to me is, how are we going to know what successes we 

are having in this transition, because it seems like on a lot of 
14 

issues, that we are at a transition point that if the new doesn’t 

happen on time, we are in trouble. 

So if you could give me some ideas on that, I would appreciate 

it. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir, and I would like to collaborate with my 

Army compatriots on answering your question. I think what I 

would say is that as we are moving forward on the Manned Ground 

Vehicle (MGV), on the ground vehicles, that aspect of the Future 

Combat System. The first step is going to be to look at whether or 

not we have that right mix currently of heavy Stryker, of vehicles 

in support of the heavy, the Stryker, and the infantry brigades. 

And depending upon that, how we accomplish those missions in a 

variety of environments. And we need to assess what we need 

going forward in that combination of forces—the task forces that 

we fight in. 

That, anyway, is the way I look at it. And that is what the Army 

is going to be looking at this summer and this fall, is an assessment of the requirements for the right mix of vehicles in the brigades and identify what gaps there are and what capabilities are 

needed toward that reinstitution of the manned ground vehicle development, if that answers your question, while at the same time 

we are well underway on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, which 

will, as it is fielded to the brigades, provide the capability in that 

space. 

Does that begin to answer your question, sir? 

Mr. KISSELL. Yes, sir. And I think one of the important things 

there is you said that we are going to be assessing this and have 

answers in the fall, and I think one of the important things is, we 

have got to know what those answers are so that we can help you 

determine, you know, what is the future of this modernization? 

And another question, and you can get back to me on this, that 

we have had ongoing discussions on the ISR and this procurement 

request in here for C–12s, but yet there were some C–12 Angel 

Fires in Iraq that were being dismantled. 

And so just wondering where we might stand in that process of 

looking at those to see what application they may have in Afghanistan to help our troops over there, because we do know, from previous hearings, that there are a lot of concerns about ISR capacity 

being equal to the surge and our troops being protected. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. Well, one of the leading edge of the Aerial 

Combat System is, in fact, six, if I recall correctly, of the Liberty 

C–12s to be procured, and I will get back to you on where they are 

going, sir, but that is a leading edge of the program and I believe 

it is in the fiscal year 2010 request. 

Mr. KISSELL. And be sure and look at—we do have some from 

Iraq that were being dismantled, and you are requesting new ones 

when there were others available. That was a great concern to a 

lot of people on this committee. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you. 

Mr. AHERN. I will take that question. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Kissell. 
15 

I should have reminded everybody, we are on the 5-minute clock, 

and that worked out just right. No, no, you are right on the—as 

they say in Hawaii, right on the Kupopo. Don’t worry about it. 

And I know Mr. Wilson will do it, too. 

Mr. WILSON. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. He is going to truncate his introduction and 

get right to his question. 

Mr. WILSON. I sure am. 

I want to thank all of you for your protecting our warfighters. I 

particularly appreciate it as a member of the Armed Services Committee, a 31-year veteran of the Army National Guard, son of a veteran, but particularly, I have three sons serving in the military, so 

I have a keen interest in what you are doing. 

And specifically, General Thompson, competing for the next contract for the M4, what is the status of the competition? When do 

you anticipate issuing a solicitation? Do you plan to make an 

award to one company or will the contract be divided in multiple 

awards to different companies? And how much has been budgeted 

for the M4? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I will take your question into three 

parts. We now, after many years, have the government purchase 

rights to the technical data package for the existing M4 Carbine, 

and we are in the process of putting the solicitation package out 

to compete that M4 Carbine tech data package, and I expect that 

request for proposal to be out within the next four to six weeks. 

In addition to that, we have also looked at the broader requirement for small arms, in particular the carbine, and the Army is 

about ready to update that requirement and pass that requirement, 

which has been jointly developed, to the Joint Requirement Oversight Council to go into that broader requirements process. 

So we will complete the existing carbine design at the same time 

we are updating the requirement for a potential future carbine or 

small arms capability that will go into the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council process. 

I will look up the answer to the question on how much is in the 

budget. I don’t have that at the tip of my fingers, but I have got 

it somewhere in my material here. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

And to the question of, will we go with one or more—— 

Mr. WILSON. Companies—— 

General THOMPSON [continuing]. Companies as we do the award, 

I don’t know the exact acquisition strategy, but my recollection is 

that it is just with one winner as a result of a competition. If that 

is incorrect I will come back and correct that for the record. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. And additionally, I understand that the Army issues a solicitation for an MRAP that is the 

responsibility of the original equipment manufacturer to select the 

door for the vehicle. This results in the MRAP vehicles with different doors. Would it be wise for the Army to specify the safety 

and survivability of the door? 

General THOMPSON. For all of the equipment manufacturers that 

have produced MRAPs to date, they have designed the doors par-
16 

ticular to that vehicle variant. We have continued to improve the 

doors from a couple of standpoints. 

We identify in the testing that the doors don’t stay shut properly 

when they are subject to blasts; we have made those adjustments 

on all the vehicle variants. We have also made adjustments to the 

individual designs to make sure that the soldiers inside once that 

vehicle is hit are able to get that door open and get out of the vehicle. 

We have not standardized the design on doors. We did not think 

that was something that we needed to do because we have optimized the design with each individual manufacturer. But we have 

continued to take the lessons learned from theater and adjust the 

door designs for the two key categories I talked about—making 

sure they stay shut when they need to stay shut and making sure 

they are easily able to be opened when the soldiers inside need to 

get out of the vehicles, especially after they have been hit. 

Mr. WILSON. And I was honored to be with Congresswoman 

Tsongas to see some of the new MRAPs, and the doors—and you 

have really identified some of the concerns I have. But as we consider specifications for the doors, would it be possible that the 

power door system have a sensing device to prevent injuries to the 

operator while closing the door? 

When a blast disables the vehicle, the power door system must 

assist quick egress, relying on a self-contained separate power system. The power door system should also assist in egress on an uphill side when a blast or accident rolls the vehicle to its side. Are 

these specifications that—and you really hit on some of them a few 

minutes ago—a few seconds ago. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, those are all things that, as we look at 

the MRAP All Terrain Vehicle with five companies that are in the 

process of source selection and testing right now, and then, as I 

said before, is looking at the existing fielded MRAPs—primarily the 

ones that have been fielded to Iraq—making adjustments to those 

door designs. 

I will take your question back in detail and get back with the 

Joint Program Office, which is, you know, led by the Department 

of the Navy, but certainly large participant of the Department of 

the Army, and make sure that we are addressing those particular 

issues that you addressed. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, and I appreciate your answers. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Marshall, to be followed by Mr. Miller. 

You are next after Mr. Marshall, Jeff. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The ATV MRAPs—when do you think we are going to see them 

in theater? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, right now we just are in the second 

phase of the—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. When are your—— 

General THOMPSON [continuing]. Source selection evaluation 

process. We will make a source selection decision at the end of 
17 

June, as we continue the evaluation. And the expectation is the 

first of those will—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Can you pull the mike a touch closer, please, 

General? 

General THOMPSON. The first of those vehicles will be fielded in 

the fall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. During the fall of this year? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Been to Afghanistan a bunch of times, and you 

are out on some of the special forces installations, and what you 

will see is MRAPs parked and gathering dust. They just won’t use 

them. You give them to them, they won’t use them, and for good 

reason. They roll over. 

Your unfunded requirements makes reference to—well, pardon 

me. In response to an inquiry by the ranking member, General 

Casey gave us a list of unfunded requirements, and included in 

that list is Army test sets, diagnostic equipment, and test infrastructure. What does that refer to? Do you know offhand? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, I would like to just give you a quick explanation of what we tried to do with the unfunded requirements list. 

I would like to take the specifics of that—— 

Mr. MARSHALL [continuing]. I would rather not take too much 

time on this. I would like a specific response to that inquiry, so 

maybe you could do that for the record. And the force provider— 

could you get some detail there, you know, what that is, why you 

want that? 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

Joint Cargo Aircraft—Mr. Bartlett has already noted that in the 

Quadrennial Roles and Mission Report of January 2009 the department indicated that it is appropriate to have JCA, C–27 in both the 

Army and the Air Force. The Institute for Defense Analyses came 

out with a report done at our request on March 13th, and in that 

report it seems to be—the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) 

seems to be saying that for low-intensity conflicts like those that 

we are engaged in in Afghanistan, for example, that the best airlift 

mix includes as much, if I recall correctly, as 98. That is most effective for the least cost—98 C–27s. 

How do we get—let us say it is Army that really needs the C– 

27s and Army is convinced that this is a very useful platform to 

meet operational needs in, say, Afghanistan. And yet, the program 

is assigned to the Air Force. How do we get more C–27s? 

Does Army pay for it? It is an Army need. The Air Force actually 

is going to own it, buy it, operate it, service the Army. Is it in the 

Army budget or is it in the Air Force budget as we move forward? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, the intent of the guidance that we received as we announced the fiscal year 2010 budget decisions is 

that this program moves to the Air Force, and—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. We have got that part of it. 

General SPEAKES [continuing]. We are in the process now of an 

orderly transition of funding, program administration, and future 

support all to transfer to the Air Force to include the training of 

the aviators, everything else associated with it. The concept, then, 
18 

would be that from our perspective as a user on the battlefield, we 

will look to the Air Force to provide that support. 

And the specific work that is going on right now with the vice 

chairman with the two service vices is to ensure that we have a 

plan to enable the Army to achieve the kind of quick support for 

the last tactical mile that has been the shortcoming that was addressed in the requirement—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. Do you offhand know whether or not it will be 

in the Army budget or the Air Force budget? 

General SPEAKES. It will be in the Air Force budget, sir. 

Mr. MARSHALL. So the Air Force will have to ask, in its budget, 

for resources needed by the Army? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, in the same context that all fixed-wing assets, essentially, that provide that kind of support are an Air Force 

asset, so this is a concept now of who is providing support to the 

tactical commander on the battlefield. We would be the customer; 

the Air Force would be the sole source provider. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I think this is a terrific opportunity for the Air 

Force. I have no problem with the idea of the Air Force managing 

the acquisition, modernization, maintenance. Got a very different 

concept than the Army does with regard to those things, and I 

think in the long run a better one as far as saving taxpayer dollars 

is concerned. 

I am just kind of worried that—we, none of us, want to see a repeat of the Caribou history. We want this to work. 

I think it is a terrific opportunity for jointness, et cetera, but 

where Caribou was concerned, what got in the way was money as 

much as anything else. It is, ‘‘Oh, gosh, is this coming—you know, 

is this trip coming out of my budget? Is this plane coming out of 

my budget? I don’t really need it that much. You know, I am more 

worried about some other things.’’ So I am hoping that that coordination works out well. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Mr. Miller, to be followed by Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thanks for being here today and your testimony. I 

would like to talk a little bit about body armor, if we can. 

Chairman, I think you were right on the mark. We keep hearing 

it over, and over, and over again. 

I was reading, I think, Mr. Ahern, in your remarks, and correct 

me if I am interpreting this incorrectly, but it says that the Joint 

Clothing and Textile Governance board, which was mandated by 

DOD, dated August 20 of 2008, and then I look down and I see 

that—and the director is supposed to chair—of Defense Logistics 

Agency (DLA)—is supposed to chair that board. 

And then I look down, in the next paragraph it says DLA is in 

the process of formalizing this board to include drafting a charter, 

identifying membership, and creating a governance structure. Are 

we talking about a year-long process to set this board up? Is that 

what happens? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. I think that the DLA involvement—the 

board that I am describing is a sustainment board. I will defer, 

again, to General Thompson for the specifics. I think it is a looking 
19 

forward effort; it is not affecting the fielding, the development, the 

fielding, the procurement of the body armor currently for the Army, 

but it is looking forward toward the sustainment of the body armor 

capability in the years to come. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, if I could just add to that, just a minute, 

the services develop requirements for equipment and develop requirements for body armor. There is a lot of work going on right 

now to develop more joint requirements on body armor. 

The services also do the development and the procurement of the 

new equipment; DLA does the sustainment. So this board that is 

being set up, as I understand it, is to get better collaboration on 

how do we do the sustainment of the fielded items—clothing and 

equipment—body armor being one of those items. 

Mr. MILLER. All right. Since we are talking about fielding the 

equipment, can you tell me where we are now with fielding body 

armor and the testing? What changes have taken place in the testing process of the body armor? 

My understanding is that maybe some of the requirements have 

changed. Tests have been done. Body armor that passed and was 

acquired in the past now doesn’t meet specs. Can you elaborate on 

that? 

General THOMPSON. There has been a lot of questions raised 

about body armor testing, so let me try to answer most of them and 

then take some specifics. As a result of a series of audits and Inspector General (I.G.) reports, we pulled the body armor testing 

back in with a policy statement that said we were primarily going 

to do the testing in-house at government facilities, because we do 

have the government facilities that we need to fully leverage. 

So that doesn’t mean we are going to do all of the testing inside 

the government facilities, but the intent right now—and we are 

balancing this between what we do in house and what we do with 

the commercial industry—is to do the first article testing, which, 

as has been pointed out in the opening statements, the more comprehensive testing in order to qualify a design to go in production. 

We have an industry day set up with the commercial testing laboratories in June to be able to get their input to see what is the 

right balance between government testing and commercial testing 

for the long haul. 

We are in the process right now of increasing the capacity of the 

Army Test and Evaluation Command, in particular to the facilities 

at Aberdeen, in order to do that testing. The director of operational 

tests and evaluation has got oversight responsibility for the testing 

of body armor, and they are in the process of standardizing the test 

protocols for the Department of Defense, which have been different 

between the services and with United States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), and the expectation there is they will publish a Department of Defense instruction, which codifies the standard test protocols, by the end of this summer, probably in September. 

Mr. MILLER. Has this move—and I think there was a National 

Institute of Justice or something that was mentioned earlier; I 

wasn’t able to write down. Was that one of the testing groups in 

the past, or did I misinterpret their comment? 
20 

General THOMPSON. Sir, the National Institute of Justice standard is a certification standard, like an International Organization 

for Standardization (ISO). The commercial labs have chosen to 

have the National Institute of Justice come in and certify their 

processes and procedures, which is an indication of their focus on 

quality. And so it is good for us to use those commercial labs that 

have the National Institute of Justice standard. 

Mr. MILLER. Has pulling—I apologize, my time is expired. Just 

a very quick question. Has pulling the testing in house caused any 

of the suppliers to no longer meet the requirements? 

General THOMPSON. This is a very complicated area, but it is possible to qualify a design with first article testing, and then the individual lots that are produced to not pass testing, because we test 

not just the qualification of the design, we also do testing every lot 

that an individual body armor manufacturer produces to make sure 

that they are still adhering to the standards. 

So it is possible to have a first article test pass, pass a number 

of lot acceptance tests, and then fail one, and then pass a subsequent one. So it really depends on the manufacturing process, the 

materials, et cetera, but that is part of a quality control check. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

And I have some follow-up questions, Mr. Chairman, I would 

like—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Sure. 

Mr. MILLER [continuing]. To submit for the record. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Miller will send you those, and if you can 

reply to him and to us we would be grateful. 

Mr. Marshall has a very brief follow up on Mr. Miller’s inquiry. 

Mr. MARSHALL. When you are doing your follow-up testing, your 

lot testing, and you discover that there is a fault with a particular 

lot, do you have a regime where, if it happens once or twice or 

three times, that manufacturer is out, so that the manufacturers 

are encouraged not to try and—— 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. In the contract specifications for 

body armor now, if you fail two lots in a row you have to go back 

and requalify that design, or if you fail three lots out of 100 you 

have to go back and requalify the design. So you have to go back 

and do the comprehensive first article testing again, and that is 

what is in the contract specifications for body armor today. 

So you can’t fail more than two lots in a row and then pass one 

and have us accept that body armor and field it. And whenever a 

lot is failed, we do not accept that lot of equipment. It is rejected, 

as you would expect it to be. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson, to be followed by Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this hearing, or holding this hearing. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for coming. It is, indeed, our honor 

to be in your presence, and I personally want to thank you for your 

service to the Nation. 

As I understand it, the average soldier deployed over a 3-day 

mission is carrying up to 150 pounds of gear, and of course, you 

are seeking to lighten that load. However, two to three pounds 
21 

lighter for the body armor is what we have now. And is there any 

reason why we should not be able to get that down substantially 

more, and—while at the same time preserving the coverage and 

even expanding the coverage of the body armor? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I will take that question. We are always 

looking to improve the capability and lighten the load on the soldier. An example today is that we have fielded to a battalion at 

Fort Carson that is getting ready to deploy to Afghanistan a series 

of lighter equipment, and we will evaluate that battalion and its 

performance when it goes to Afghanistan to see how the soldiers 

perform with that lighter load. 

The program executive officer soldier has done a number of significant things over the last five and six years to lighten the load 

not just in body armor, but in the optics that are on the weapons 

and the clothing that the soldiers wear. That is a constant focus 

for us to be able to lighten the load on the soldier in every category 

of equipment that the individual soldier carries. 

We just finished, this week, an evaluation—back to body armor— 

on plate carriers. We evaluated six different categories of plate carriers that take weight off of the soldier, in particular looking towards the operational environment in Afghanistan where it is more 

of a dismounted operation, and so we have evaluated the capability 

of that plate carrier. 

So it is the same plate—it is the same Enhanced Small Arms 

Protective Insert (ESAPI) plate that we field today in a plate carrier that doesn’t cover as much, but that is part of the risk tradeoff. 

And what we have done is, we have characterized what that coverage is and we have given that commander the ability to use that 

plate carrier with the full-up ceramic plates that we field to all the 

soldiers to give them that option when they are going on a mission 

that requires them to reduce some of the weight that the soldiers 

carry. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Right. Thank you. 

And with respect to our men and women serving in the Reserves 

and the National Guard, and also their families, your budget request shrinks the amount of money for the National Guard, as I 

understand it, and for the Naval Reserve components. And, you 

know, you already talked about—well, you haven’t talked about 

this during the hearing, and I would like you to talk about it— 

equipment shortfalls that are projected to occur despite the budget 

request. 

And so I would like to know, why is it that we are decreasing 

that part of your budget as opposed to increasing it? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, I would like to take the question. Since I 

have been in Army G–8 over four years now, properly equipping 

the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve—the two elements of our reserve component—has been a critical Army priority. 

To put it in perspective, in fiscal year 2001 the Army National 

Guard was given $1 billion to equip the force. Now, over the course 

of the period from 2002 through 2013, the average has been $3.9 

billion per year. So what you see is almost by a factor of four that 

we have made a sustained, long-term commitment to ensure that 

both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are properly 

equipped. 
22 

That strategy has involved several key elements. First, we had 

to address the fact that we had to put them on the same basis for 

equipping, so they now have the same structure, the same Table 

of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), as their active component 

counterparts. So we have one standard to measure equipping levels 

at. 

The second thing we had to do was recognize that as we filled 

the organizations, we wanted to give them modernized equipment 

and not castoff equipment. You will recollect that in decades past 

what we did is equip the active force and then we took the used 

equipment from the active force and moved it to the reserve component. Those days are past. Now the Army National Guard and the 

Army Reserve get equipment that is new, right off the production 

line, the same way as their active component brethren. 

So what we have been able to do is do two things: fill holes, but 

secondly, raise the level of modernization. So we will continue this 

effort now through the current planning focus, which in our case 

is out through fiscal year 2015, and what we are going to be able 

to do is approach the same levels of equipment on hand and, probably as importantly, the same levels of modernization, which is 

really important to soldiers so they don’t have something that is 10 

or 20 years old, in terms of technology; they have the same thing 

as their active component brethren. 

The intent being, then, so that when they are deployed they have 

the same compatible equipment that provides high survivability, 

and secondly, we also recognize the importance of homeland defense. We are managing, now, separately visibility on what we call 

the homeland defense items, which are essentially about 250 items 

of equipment that have particular utility when we are going homeland defense functions in support, particularly, of our state governors. 

Those items are also continuing to improve over time. So this is 

a long-term commitment. We are going to sustain this commitment 

through the period of planning that we have been accountable for 

now, which is out through 2015, in draft terms. And at this point, 

I can offer you our sincere commitment that you have a sea change, 

in terms of the actual equipping levels of our reserve component 

now, and that that will continue for the foreseeable future. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Oh, I am sorry. There has been some concern, and 

certainly I share the concern, that this Nation has been engaged 

in counterinsurgency and nation-building since post-9/11 and that 

we have gutted our conventional capability at the expense of counterinsurgency and nation-building. And I wonder if you can speak 

to that in this budget? 

And also, I wondered if you could also speak to, in the budget, 

the status of armor and the status of field artillery? Please comment. 

General SPEAKES. Sir, I think you correctly identify a very important issue for all of us in the Army, and it is an issue of balance. 

We certainly understand the Secretary of Defense’s guidance, and 

his guidance, essentially, is this: that we have to have a formation 
23 

that is relevant to the lessons learned from the current conflict, but 

also let us prepare for what we regard as the likelihood and kind 

of potential conflict that we face in the future. 

So what we use is the term ‘‘full spectrum capability.’’ What it 

means, then, is both our formations in terms of their design, the 

soldiers and leaders who man them, and the equipment that we 

use for those formations has got to be able to function across the 

spectrum of conflict. 

And as you well know, the artillery piece that we are using today 

with an Excalibur Precision Round can be used right now to take 

out a terrorist room that we would find in a building in Baghdad, 

or it can be used in the event that we need the mass precision fires 

against some kind of a major operation that would involve mass 

formation. So we are committed right now to ensuring that the rest 

of our formation, which specifically would be the heavy formation 

that has heavy brigades as its core, is modernized along with the 

other elements of our formation to give us a ability to move across 

the spectrum. 

So specifically, in the case of artillery, we have the Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) (fuel cell demonstration) program, which 

is the concept by which we continue to apply state-of-the-art capabilities to our Howitzers. We are also continuing the same kind of 

modernization to our Abrams and our Bradley formations, continuing a vigorous research and development program so that we 

could continue to apply capabilities to those vehicles as we see the 

lessons learned at war tell us we need to move to improvements. 

Let me defer to General Thompson for additional—— 

General THOMPSON. Sir, the only thing I would really add to that 

is that the big change for us in this budget is the fact that we are 

going to look at the requirements and begin again, anew, on the 

ground combat vehicle program. So there is a need for us to modernize the ground combat vehicles. That is the replacements for the 

tanks, and the Bradleys, and the 113s that are out there in the 

force today. 

Until we do that, you would expect us to look at those opportunities to upgrade and modernize the existing fleet that is out there, 

and we do that. And there is a balance. There is a balance in how 

much you invest in today’s systems versus trying to go to modernize for the future, and it is no different than replacing your old 

car one day, or it is no different than the other services replacing 

Joint Strike Fighter aircraft with the existing aircraft that are in 

the inventory today. 

And so you can’t just stop. You have got to always be looking to 

the future. And there does become a point where it doesn’t make 

operational sense, or fiscal sense, to continue to modernize an older 

set of equipment because it has outlived its useful life. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, thank you. 

For the record, I want to express my concern about maintaining 

our conventional warfighting capability, because I think it is very 

easy for the Department of Defense and the Congress to say, ‘‘You 

know, these—nation-building and counterinsurgency is really the 

future threat. We don’t have to focus on conventional threats.’’ 

And it is much cheaper, quite frankly, from the standpoint of 

modernization or looking at weapons platforms, to focus on coun-
24 

terinsurgency and nation-building than it is to focus on conventional warfighting capabilities. 

Last question is, can you tell me about the status of the 

Humvee? I know that initially, earlier on in Iraq they were, you 

know, sticking extra metal on those things for up-armored 

Humvees, and the transmission, I know, wouldn’t support—you 

know, they were wearing those vehicles out prematurely. Can you 

tell me what the status of the Humvees are right now? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, we have sequentially upgraded the protection capability on the Humvees through a series of fragmentation kits, and right now we are on our sixth iteration of fragmentation kits to increase the protection levels. And so we have done 

that to the Humvee fleet. 

You know, we see, from a requirements perspective, that we 

won’t have any thin-skinned vehicles in the future, that we know 

we need to be able to put the right level of armor protection on the 

entire Humvee fleet that goes in harm’s way, and that is part of 

the tactical wheeled vehicle strategy. As we look to modernize the 

light tactical vehicle fleet, which the Humvee is part of, that is 

what the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle Program is about. 

And again, back to the question of balance, it is what is the right 

level of investment to continue to sustain the roughly 140,000 

Humvees that we have got in the inventory, many of them up-armored today as we go to the future and begin to produce the Joint 

Light Tactical Vehicle, which, as Mr. Ahern pointed out earlier, is 

a competitively-awarded development program that is one day 

going to be the replacement for the Humvee. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could—— 

Is it the Army’s objective that there be no more thin-skinned 

Humvees, that all Humvees are of the same up-armored capability? 

General THOMPSON. There will continue to be, you know, thinskinned Humvees in the inventory. The ones that are in the inventory will primarily be used in a training area, but they are not the 

ones that will be used in the operational environment that we see 

today in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Tsongas, to be followed by Mr. Hunter. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you for your testimony and for your service 

in very difficult times. You have heard a lot of questions about 

body armor today, and I, too, share that concern, both with the information we have received on the numbers of orthopedic injuries, 

some attributable to the weight of the armor, the numbers of those 

who are not deployable. And in testimony here, we also heard a 

young soldier testify of the temptation to take it off when in the 

field because it is so heavy. 

So given all that we have heard here, my question is, wouldn’t 

it make sense to put together a—rather than dealing with this in 

a piece-by-piece fashion, put together a task force, much as we did 

around the MRAPs, to sort of deal with this in a holistic way, a 

concerted effort around research and development and then fielding 

whatever body armor makes the most sense? And I welcome your 

thoughts from all of you. 
25 

General THOMPSON. Ma’am, we have, today, in the Program Executive Office Soldier, which does all of the soldier systems, a task 

force on soldier protection that is looking at the holistic items for 

soldier protection. The joint work that is going on in both the requirements and the testing area around body armor is essentially 

doing that without calling it a task force. 

And so I think we are doing that from a requirements and from 

a testing perspective when I addressed the testing standardization 

that the director of operational tests and evaluation is leading us 

through right now. 

We have a number of other forums—the Army-Marine Corps 

Board at multiple rank levels, all the way up to the Vice Chief of 

Staff and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps—look at 

those opportunities between the two primary ground forces to look 

at areas of standardization on all soldier protection equipment. 

One of the things that I have talked about with a number of the 

staffers is, we do think that there is a need to have, in the base 

program, not in the supplemental, a dedicated research and development line for body armor and soldier protection. That money has 

been in the supplemental funding for the last couple of years, and 

we recognize that need, and that is something we need to work 

with the Congress on in both the 2010 and 2011 budget, and then 

putting the proper amount of money in there so that we have a 

steady state level of investment to continually improve the body 

armor for the soldiers. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, ma’am. I would agree with everything General 

Thompson said. And as we were preparing for this hearing, the 

issue of the sustaining R&D came up, and that is something that 

I would like to say we are considering going forward. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I would say that is the great shortfall, and even 

as you sort of deal with this in a piecemeal fashion, it seems to me 

we need a more concerted effort around that, so thank you for your 

testimony, and I yield back. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Mr. Hunter, followed by Ms. Fallin. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

Mr. Ahern, good to see you again, sir. 

And first question is about brownout technology. There is nothing in the budget at all for any brownout technology for Black 

Hawks or any other rotary wing aircraft. Just wanted to get a—— 

The Black Hawk pilots that I have talked to have a really hard 

time. Their gunners have a really hard time. You know, a lot of 

Black Hawks bouncing off the ground as they try to land, in Afghanistan especially. So why wouldn’t there be money in here even 

for R&D for Black Hawk brownout technology? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I don’t have a specific answer to that 

question. I do know, from a collaboration standpoint, that we do a 

lot of joint work with the Air Force on brownout technology. But 

I guess I would have to take that one for the record and get back 

with you on specifically what is in the budget. It may not be explicitly called out, but I know we do research and development in that 

area; I just don’t know what line it is in. 
26 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

Mr. HUNTER. Do they have anything right now on Black Hawks 

that—any kind of debris in the air? 

General THOMPSON. Yes. The information that they just handed 

me that the UH–60 Mike upgrade testing that is underway right 

now has both cockpit and stabilization technology being evaluated. 

Mr. HUNTER. And that is brownout stuff? 

General THOMPSON. It deals with the brownout challenge. 

Mr. HUNTER. Does it use radar to do it, or does it use—— 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I don’t know. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. 

General THOMPSON. I don’t know the technical details. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. 

That is all I had. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Ms. Fallin. 

We have three votes—15 and two 5—so we have some time, and 

we will come back. If you can stay, I am sorry. It will probably be 

roughly half an hour. Probably less than that—20 minutes or so. 

But we have time now. 

Ms. FALLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our Nation. I have 

a question about the National Guard, and it is indicated that 31 

percent of the Guard units have their family medium tactical vehicles requirement on hand. And in my state in Oklahoma, our National Guard tells me they have 40 percent of their required vehicles and 20 percent of their trailers on hand. 

And I am just a little concerned about the readiness implications 

of not supplying the Guard units with the equipment that they 

need for both deployment and even the ability to effectively respond to emergencies in our home state. So my question is, what 

is the plan to help with the inventory—equipment inventory—that 

our Guard units need and in our individual states, and are there 

any changes coming down that will help them have a better operation role? 

General SPEAKES. Ma’am, let me start of by explaining that we 

are measuring, right now, two items that are a concern to everybody. First is overall Guard equipping levels. The second is where 

we are on the homeland defense items that you are, for example, 

focusing. 

And as a part of that, what we are focused on specifically is addressing critical shortfalls in modernized tactical wheeled vehicles 

with a focus on light and medium trucks, because those are the 

ones that are a critical shortfall right now. Over the course of the 

next several years, what we will be able to do is raise our items 

of homeland defense and aggregate to over 80 percent, to about 82 

percent on hand as we look at our strategy between now and fiscal 

year 2015. 

This is vital because what we are going to be able to do is ensure 

that we have the right amount of equipment on hand in a state to 

address their particular capabilities associated with the units they 

have. And then through the formation of regional compact, which 

is a part of the director of the Army National Guard’s strategy, to 
27 

be able to max capabilities in the event that we have a particular 

need in the state. 

Let me get back to you with the specifics of what the plan is for 

Oklahoma and the Guard equipping within that state. 

Ms. FALLIN. I would like to know, also, the timeframe we are 

looking at. Are we looking at two, three years, five years—I mean, 

I hope it is as quick as possible. 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. Yes, ma’am. In this case the issue, or 

the focus is, now to 2015 is where we have a specific plan with an 

investment strategy that is designed, for example, to take the ancient 21⁄2 ton truck, which has been with the Army and the Army 

National Guard in disproportionate levels for the last 30 years, and 

we will have it out of the inventory completely by fiscal year 2011. 

So this is the strategy that puts enormous amounts of capability 

in the hands of soldiers and units in the Army National Guard 

here in the next several years. Essentially, the investments that 

were funded by the Congress two years ago in supplemental funding are now coming as a tidal wave of capability that is beginning 

to make a wholesale change in terms of Guard equipping. 

Ms. FALLIN. Okay. 

And I have one other question, Mr. Chairman, if I can. 

This question is related—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Two minutes. 

Ms. FALLIN. Okay. Thank you. 

We had a hearing yesterday—a readiness hearing—and I had the 

chance to ask General Chiarelli about the Army artillery’s capacity 

considering the cancellation of the FCS manned ground vehicle system, and specifically the Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) cannon. And 

the general testified that the Army is committed to using the gains 

that have been made through the technology though the manned 

ground vehicle program into the new combat system. 

And I appreciate that they are trying to use that technology, but 

in your estimation, how much of the development that has already 

been done in this program will be salvageable, because we have 

spent a lot of money on this, and specifically, will there be any new 

technologies required for the new ground combat vehicles? 

General THOMPSON. Ma’am, I will take that question. We just 

finished, last week, the systems of systems preliminary design review on the FCS program. That was the culmination of the work 

that has been done in the development of the FCS capabilities, 

which includes the manned ground vehicle, and in particular, the 

cannon capabilities, over the last five years. 

That was a very successful meeting. It demonstrated that this 

program has made significant progress in the technology. All of the 

key technologies in the program—all 44 technologies—are at the 

right technology readiness level. 

And as we go forward, here, with the Future Combat Systems 

program, we will harvest the investment that we have made to the 

extent that we can, and use that technology as we go forward and 

update the requirements in the new Ground Combat Vehicle program, which I can’t imagine not including a new Howitzer, because 

there is a need for precision fires, all-weather, line-of-sight, beyondline-of-sight capability, which is what a cannon is. 
28 

And so the smart business thing for us to do is to make sure that the $15 billion that has been spent on FCS to date is fully leveraged as we go forward. And that is clearly something that we know 

we have to do, and we are in the process of doing that. And it will 

take us the next three or four months to be able to do that with 

all of the contractors that we have got working on this program. 

Ms. FALLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Ms. FALLIN. I appreciate your commitment on that. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We will go to Mr. Bartlett, and then I think 

it will be about 20 minutes. It will be before noon, but we do want 

to get on the record with some of these things, so I regret I have 

to ask you to stay. But we are very appreciative of your patience. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

And noting the trust that we have, I will not be able to return, 

and I have implicit trust in my colleague that he will not lead this 

committee astray in my absence. 

I want to use the few moments we have to use the Joint Cargo 

Aircraft as an example of the consternation and confusion that we 

have here as a result of the fact that we were not included in any 

of the discussions that led up to the submission of the budget. 

Several years ago, the Army determined that in the low-intensity 

conflict kind of a war that we were in now that they needed a new 

cargo aircraft. That was comparative, by the way, by the Institute 

for Defense Analyses, which just recently released a study looking 

at the movement of cargo by C–5s, C–17s, C–130s, and the Joint 

Cargo Aircraft, and they concluded that in the kind of a conflict 

that we are involved in now, that as a matter of fact we needed 

between 90 and 100 Joint Cargo Aircraft. 

This was initially an Army program, and since the Air Force was 

involved in these same conflicts and would logically need a similar 

kind of aircraft, the DOD decided that the Air Force ought to be 

a partner in the procurement with the Army. The Air Force very 

reluctantly became a partner; they were kind of, as some might 

say, dragged kicking and screaming into this relationship. 

So here we are now, after the initial Army study, which indicated 

that the Army needed 78 of these aircraft. Institute for Defense 

Analyses said it was really in the upper nineties that was needed. 

And here we are now with a budget that says that the program is 

going to the Air Force, which didn’t want to be a part of the program in the beginning, and that we now only need 38 aircraft. 

We have asked three or four set of witnesses that have come to 

us before, was there any study that indicated that the need had, 

in fact, dropped from the 90-some indicated by IDA or the 78 that 

was the confirmed—the JROC confirmed that this was the need for 

the Army. By the way, the Air Force need was never added to that 

78, so the total number would have gone up. Perhaps that is the 

90-odd that was indicated by IDA. 

So here we are with a budget that says that the program is going 

to move from the Army to the Air Force, that the need is only 38 

aircraft, and just recently, just less than 4 months ago, the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report says—and this comes 

from the same organization that now presents us with this budget—that the option that provided most value to joint force was to 
29 

assign the Joint Cargo Aircraft, the C–27J, to the Air Force and 

the Army. 

So I hope that you can understand our consternation and our 

confusion, because we were not a part of any of the discussions 

that led to this. Indeed, I think that many in the building were not 

involved—in the Pentagon were not involved in this, because every 

panel that has come to us before says that we are going to buy at 

least 38 of these, that this is a discussion matter within the military, that probably the initial number we got was not very well vetted. 

Mr. Chairman, I won’t ask for a comment to that because I know 

it is late and we need to go to our votes, but thank you very much 

for holding this hearing. 

And thank you all very much for coming, for your testimony, for 

your service to our country. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. We are going to recess now, and then reconvene as soon as possible. 

But perhaps during that time you can reconnoiter with one another and come back with an answer whether Mr. Bartlett is here 

or not. Let us start with your response to Mr. Bartlett when we reconvene, and then we will probably conclude the hearing relatively 

quickly after that, depending on the answers. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you for your patience. I regret we had 

an unanticipated privileged resolution offered on the floor, and it 

took up the better part of half an hour for that, in addition to the 

other votes. That was the reason; we weren’t being desultory or 

anything, or casual in trying to get back. 

And again, I express my thanks to you all. 

We will start again. When we left I had indicated that if it was 

possible to have some response for Mr. Bartlett—— 

Mr. Ahern, perhaps you could take it, or anybody else, just for 

purposes of dealing with that. I don’t have the question precisely 

in front of me, but it concerns his observations about the Joint 

Cargo Aircraft and the rationale both for the transfer to exclusive 

jurisdiction, I think is probably the right phrase, to the Air Force, 

and the question of changing the numbers that would be sought 

given the context that had been established about strategic necessity. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir—excuse me. Yes, sir. And this came up, of 

course, at the hearing yesterday, as you certainly recall. And I did 

look at it a little bit more yesterday afternoon and this morning, 

and in regards to the budget, what that reflects is 38 JCA or 38 

C–27s to recapitalize the 38 Sherpa and recognition of the capacity 

of a C–130 fleet would be sufficient until the department has 

time—which would be done in the Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR)—to do a full analysis of the intratheater lift requirements. 

But in regard to the QDR Roles and Missions that Representative Bartlett—Ranking Member Bartlett mentioned yesterday and 

again today, there is an additional thought in there that I wanted 

to mention, sir, and that additional thought really has to do with 

recognizing the lessons learned from the ongoing operations in theater, that there could be areas for improvement, and by changing— 
30 

looking at policy, looking at doctrine, looking at con ops, that there 

might be an improvement to intratheater airlift. 

And so, again, in conjunction with that QDR as well as a transition of the responsibility from the Army to the Air Force and the 

planning that they are doing on that, there is an opportunity to improve effectiveness, joint synergy, and minimize a duplication of effort, were the two thoughts that I wanted to say. One, addressing 

the budget for this year, and one, the going forward, the opportunity recognized in the Roles and Missions, that there are opportunities for improvement. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Anyone else? It is not necessary. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Ahern, I want to move to a Future Combat System, and 

some little bit more general inquiry. What specific FCS—or, if you 

can tell me at this stage, I would like to know what specific FCS 

contracts or subcontracts are going to be terminated as the Army 

carries out Secretary Gates’ instructions and when might that 

occur? That is to say, either the decision about it, or if the decisions 

have been made or are presently contemplated, what is the timeframe? 

We are asking the question because it helps us determine what 

we are going to try and do with regard to the recommendations to 

the full committee. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. The major contract—and I will certainly 

defer to General Thompson to amplify it—is the FCS contract, and 

I believe the way forward—and I expect the Army is working on 

it hard now—is in restructuring in that contract, where certain elements of the contract will be restructured, certain elements of it 

will be terminated. 

I cannot give you a time scale for that, but what I believe the 

direction was after the systems of systems Preliminary Design Review (PDR) was completed would be the time that the Army will 

begin to address the restructuring of the contract and the termination. And as General Thompson said earlier today, that systems 

of systems preliminary design review was completed, I think, in 

this month, recently. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. Could you address, perhaps more specific, say, below the system of systems—— 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. Idea, then what contract or subcontracts are you looking at at the moment? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, as we go forward the first step is—there 

was two trigger events that needed to happen for us to begin the 

work forward on the contract. One was the completion of the systems of systems preliminary design review, which I mentioned happened last week, and so we will gather from that the technology 

advances that have been done in the program to date. 

The second trigger point is the official guidance to the program 

that comes from the new defense acquisition executive, Dr. Carter, 

in the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), which is in the 

final stages of being put together right now with staffing comments 

coming from OSD and the Army. And I would expect that within 

a matter of days, for that to be done. And so that is the official 

guidance on where we go forward with the program. 
31 

We will then look at—the large contract that the Army has got 

is with Boeing, who has got subordinate contracts with, I believe 

the number is 22, second-level contractors. We will restructure that 

major contract, and it will take us between now until the end of 

the summer to be able to do that because there are so many second 

and third order effects with that major restructure of the contract. 

Part of that will be to—once the ADM is signed and consistent 

with the guidance that comes in the Defense Acquisition Executive, 

will be to halt the work on the manned ground vehicle portion of 

that, and then work to harvest the technology out of that. And then 

we will restructure the contract to redefine the relationship with 

Boeing, and then we will subsequently redefine the relationship 

with their subordinate contractors, in particular, General Dynamics 

and BAE, who have got the subordinate contracts on the manned 

ground vehicle. There is going to be a re-discussion and a restructure of that contract between those two and Boeing. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So you would be modifying the fee structure 

in the course of those discussions? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. And I have had conversations with 

the senior executives in Boeing and SAIC who co-lead that effort, 

and they know fully it is our intent to renegotiate that fee structure and are expecting to do that with us. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. What is the relationship, then, of the 

Army Ground Combat Vehicle program as it is now re-evolving, if 

you will, in relation to the DOD acquisition policy, this new acquisition policy that you mentioned in a bit more general terms of immediate needs and et cetera? Because inevitably, then, I would 

think that would, as you just indicated, probably involve—going to 

involve multiple contracts to develop prototype vehicles. 

So what I want to know is, are you doing this—do you have a 

clear idea—does the Army have a clear idea of what the Army 

Ground Combat Vehicle program will look like in the context of the 

emerging acquisition policy, or is the acquisition policy too—still at 

too vague a stage for you to do that with clarity? 

See, you understand the reason why I am asking the question? 

You are being asked to do a very specific thing here pretty quickly, 

and I am not entirely sure that the acquisition policy of the DOD 

is as clear as your new mission. 

Does that get you in trouble commenting on that? It is not meant 

to be a—no, it is not. It is not meant to be a critique of your bosses 

or anything. I am trying to reflect on what we are going to—I am 

trying to get an answer on this, if I can, in the next—if not today, 

in the next two weeks, because I am sure you would agree, this is 

a key element in trying to figure out what we are going to recommend. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. And believe me, I understand your 

question. And so, if the Acquisition Decision Memorandum is 

signed within the next few days, as we would expect, then we will 

be able to come back over and talk to you individually or to the 

staffers—Mr. Bush or whoever you want us to talk to—to explain 

the details. 

But the path forward on the requirements side is to reevaluate 

and to look with the Training and Doctrine Command and with full 

participation with OSD to relook at the requirement for the ground 
32 

combat vehicles, and the direction that we are going to follow is to 

make sure that we have captured all the lessons learned from the 

war effort—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is fine with me. You will not have to go 

into any detail, as such. I certainly don’t require anything like that. 

But what I will need to know is, what is the cost of that? Because 

a lot of—you know, or what—not just in dollar terms, but how do 

you plan for that? How can we set the foundation dollar-wise for 

our in that so we can fit it in to all the other demands that are 

being made? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. And subsequently—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In other words, we want to fund you correctly. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. And we will be able—it is in the 

budget right now on what we think that needs in fiscal year 2010 

to be able to go forward, and as we look at the acquisition approach—the best competitive acquisition approach on the ground 

combat vehicle—we will come back and lay that out as well. We 

won’t know the specifics of that acquisition approach until the fall, 

after we renegotiate the restructure contract with Boeing. 

What we do know is that the large major defense acquisition program that was heretofore known as FCS will probably devolve into 

three major programs—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

General THOMPSON [continuing]. One to ground combat vehicles, 

one a major defense acquisition program that talks about the spinouts and the systems that are in those spinouts, and the third 

major defense acquisition program will be the network and the 

software, and then the subordinate program elements that go with 

that. So you will see the one large—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Got it. 

General THOMPSON [continuing]. Devolve into three. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. And, you know, on paper that looks fine 

to me, and I think I said that in my opening remarks. I understand 

that. 

But it does raise a logistical question—not a friction question, 

but a logistical question. If you are going to be restructuring the, 

if you will, the master contract to accomplish this trifurcation that 

you have annunciated there, how are you going to keep the spinout 

one activities on schedule? Or is that part of the negotiation—I presume it is part of the negotiations, because I am sure you don’t 

want to slip on that if you can avoid it. 

General THOMPSON. We don’t want to avoid—we don’t want to 

have a slip in the schedule if we can avoid it, but—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. On the spinout? 

General THOMPSON. On the spinouts. We think we have put the 

appropriate amount of dollars in the 2010 budget to do that, but 

I will be perfectly honest here as I have been perfectly honest inside the Defense Department: It is going to be very, very difficult 

for us to keep to the schedule for the spinouts, which we had intended to field the first one, the first brigade, in fiscal year 2011, 

because of the massive nature of the work to restructure this large 

contract. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. And if that happens then that happens. 

I mean, I meant it in my remarks, and I think you could hear it 
33 

from some—in the remarks of some of the other members: It is better to have a realistic understanding of what that is than to try 

and jam something into a calendar number because it would make 

us all feel better if we thought that was going to happen. 

You don’t have to try and make me feel good. I just want to feel 

confident. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. And my basic approach is, I always 

go to the people that have to execute the work and ask them, 

‘‘What is a realistic expectation for you to be able to get this done?’’ 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

General THOMPSON. My assessment right now, you know, it could 

be in fiscal year 2011, as we planned, but if it is it is going to be 

very, very late in fiscal year 2011. But my realistic expectation is 

it is probably going to slip a little bit. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. In fact, I wouldn’t even use the word 

‘‘slip.’’ It is going to be changed, that is all. 

I mean, ‘‘slip’’ has at least some implication that things have 

been messed up or, you know, that kind of thing, and that is not— 

I don’t have that attitude toward it at all. I just think we are getting more realistic about what we can do, either both in time and 

money, then that is helpful to everybody, it seems to me. Okay. 

Well, do you have any idea, then—maybe Mr. Ahern has this— 

what the termination cost would be to cancel the manned ground 

vehicle aspects of the program? I am just thinking about the termination now. Are there some ballpark numbers for that? 

Mr. AHERN. Excuse me, no, sir. I don’t have any ballpark numbers for that at all, not at this time. Maybe General Thompson—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. There wasn’t some understanding of what 

that might be should that occur? I mean, that is always implied. 

It is not like somebody can come in and say, ‘‘Oh, I am shocked. 

You know, there is gambling upstairs.’’ 

Somebody can’t come in and say, ‘‘Oh, I am shocked. We are having to restructure the fee here,’’ or if something gets cancelled we 

have to have a termination for—you must have a formula there. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, we do. We have a government estimate 

right now on what that termination liability might be. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Has that been shared with us? 

General THOMPSON. No, it hasn’t. The specific number will be as 

a result of—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You can do that in the staff level. 

General THOMPSON. At the staff level, but I can say that the termination liability on this major restructure is going to be in the 

hundreds-of-millions of dollars. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand that. The main thing to be understood here in turn is, we are trying—we have got to work together on this. 

General THOMPSON. Sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. This bill has to be a cooperative and collaborative endeavor that is going to advance the interests of the Nation, and the Army in particular. 

So I think you folks, for those—maybe there is some here who 

are new to this—those of you who have known me for a long time, 

I always thought the Army was on the short side, particularly because we never resolved the procurement and the research and de-
34 

velopment side versus maintenance and operation and deployment 

costs. We never dealt forthrightly with the question of—the acquisition of capital assets, a capital budget and an operating budget. 

And what has happened now is, the warnings that have been out 

there for a long time that the procurement side of things was going 

to swallow everything, and not just undermine, but I think almost 

eviscerate the capacity to have a sensible operational and deployment maintenance and management side of things—operational 

side, so things be funded correctly. 

So I understand what is going to happen with this. But it has 

got to be an incentive to us to get an acquisition policy that takes 

into account getting a capital budget operation of some kind—a 

capital budget structure, I should say, of some kind. Maybe the 

new acquisition bill we just passed and sent to the President can 

help bring that about. 

But we do need to know that cost. Because I have got to be able 

to figure that, and I know I am going to get asked right away, 

‘‘Well, how much is it going to cost to terminate this,’’ because that 

immediately impacts everything else that we are dealing with. So 

if you can come up with either a guesstimate or a good faith figure 

in the next 21⁄2 weeks, I would be grateful. 

Now, if you go to the termination cost estimate for the entire program or anything associated and ancillary to the manned ground 

vehicle aspect, is it likely, then, that the vehicle portion is less than 

that amount? The estimate that we have right now is around $1 

billion. From the budget materials we have so far and our quick 

analysis of it, we think that it is going to be in the neighborhood 

of $1 billion all together, and I am presuming, then that the vehicle 

portion would be less than that, or would it be a major portion of 

it? 

General THOMPSON. The vehicle portion would be the major portion of it, Congressman Abercrombie. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Well, you see where I am going. I just 

need to have a clear idea so that I can tell my colleagues and the 

chairman what is likely here. 

General THOMPSON. We believe that in the 2010 budget we calculated in what we think our—what would be the appropriate termination liability cost, but again, the specifics will be the actual 

discussion with the contractors. But we think we have got it right, 

and we will get the breakout between what is ground combat vehicles and the rest of the FCS—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Once we have that then everything else can 

follow, in terms of where you want to get to. We need to get that 

off the table so that we have—then the path is clear as to where 

we want to go. 

Finally, then, you have mentioned as recently as just a comment 

or two ago, and I hope you heard when I made my opening remarks, talking about the network software and hardware element 

and the $415 million increase. I extrapolated out of it something— 

the National Security Agency information assurance requirements, 

and I am not sure what that means. 

Am I correct that the $415 million is related to the ‘‘National Security Agency information assurance requirements?’’ Are you familiar with what I am speaking about? 
35 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir, I am. I don’t know at the tip of my 

fingertips here whether all of that increase in the software cost is 

related to information assurance requirements, but that is certainly a portion of it, because—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What are those requirements? I am not familiar with any, then. I thought I was paying close attention. 

General THOMPSON. It is the protection requirements for the software to make sure that they are not—the software is not compromised and the computer network—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Why are you having to deal with National Security Agency requirements? Is that the rule? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir, it is. For the Defense Department, 

the National Security Agency (NSA) sets the requirements for how 

to protect the networks not just in the Army but across the Defense 

Department. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But those networks don’t exist right now. 

General THOMPSON. As we develop the future—there is the network today, and as we develop the increments of capability for the 

future networks, we have got to comply with the requirements to 

make sure those networks are protected against—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Why would they be coming up this year? Why 

wouldn’t that have been built into the requests that were around 

the network before? 

General THOMPSON. They were in the previous request, Congressman. I just don’t know how they were—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Were they not differentiated, do you know, 

General Speakes? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, I do not know. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

Mr. Ahern. 

Mr. AHERN. No, sir. I do not know, but I do recognize exactly 

what General Thompson is saying. As we develop the new networks there are—I can’t think of the right word; it is not certification—but there is testing for, as he said, information assurance 

for the networks that NSA provides that oversight. So I think we 

could get back to you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. That is helpful—— 

General THOMPSON. Congressman, what I would—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is helpful. I mean, you understand 

where—I have got—the communication networks I am skeptical 

about, again time and—it is not that I am trying to argue that you 

shouldn’t do it. But this is my tenth term. I have been hearing 

about this even before the Future Combat System, about the network and communications and interoperability, and et cetera, for 

so long, and then that has never appeared, as such. 

And so when I see something like this, I mean, you know, that 

is a considerable sum of money. It is almost half a billion dollars. 

And I am not quite sure what it is connected to. 

And when I am looking at trying to assist you with where you 

want to go now and the various dollar figures that are going to be 

required, naturally I am going to look into, can we reallocate funds 

that we really don’t need right now into things that you do need 

right now to accomplish what you—the direction you are going. 
36 

General THOMPSON. And so what we will do, Congressman, in 

the next couple of weeks, we will come up and see the staff and 

show them what is the subordinate elements of the—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

General THOMPSON [continuing]. Costs that are in the budget—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Fair enough. And can you be prepared, then, 

to take a look at this whole network communication projection and 

see what—again, let us be realistic about what we are doing and 

not doing. 

Thank you. 

I want to conclude—is there anything you care to add? Any 

thoughts that you have as a result of everything we have done so 

far? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I have got just a couple of quick things 

on some of—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is fine. 

General THOMPSON [continuing]. To the members that are no 

long here. 

Congressman Wilson asked a question about the power assist on 

MRAP doors, and every MRAP variant and the doors on those 

variants has a cylinder to assist on each door now, and we haven’t 

received any reports to improve the current capability. So as I said 

in my previous comments, we adjusted the power assist for those 

doors and I can report you that every MRAP—has those power assists on the doors today. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Fine. 

In that context, before you go on, I had mentioned to Mr. Ahern 

yesterday in discussing or responding about the idea of a business 

plan, or what made business sense, and so on, I think the MRAP, 

as it has unfolded, and the way you have handled it, is a good example of why what constitutes good business practice for the military isn’t necessarily the same thing—I was going to say, like for 

General Motors, but we can see how great they are doing—how is 

that going? 

It may be small comfort to the Pentagon to finally be able to say, 

when somebody criticizes you for spending money, how come you 

can’t run it like a business. You would be well within your rights 

to look out there and say, ‘‘Well, what business do you have in 

mind that we can compare it to?’’ My point being is that you are 

dealing, by definition, with a business that isn’t necessarily going 

to comport with what the standard model of corporate manufacturing, and so on. 

And I think the way you have handled the MRAP approach is 

a good example of the right way to do things. You have multiple 

vehicles done with different companies. They are all in competition, 

if you will, with one another, and they have come up with different 

approaches that are suitable for one context and maybe not as good 

in another, and you are trying to differentiate those. 

And they are all being manufactured and brought online for specific purposes, I think in very rapid fashion and with excellent results, whosever been overseeing the programs—and for multiple 

services. 
37 

So I think this is a good example of where you have multiple requirements, fierce competition, and excellent oversight by having 

the mission clearly in mind, and that the Army was pretty much 

in control. You didn’t subcontract out your own responsibilities, and 

such. At least this is my perception of the way this has worked. 

So just being able to do what you say here, you have got different 

kinds of vehicles, but you had a common problem you had to deal 

with in different vehicles, and you oversaw a solution and it got 

done in rapid order. Is that a fair summary of what has happened? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. It is a fair summary. So just a couple of points: One is that it has been a joint effort—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

General THOMPSON [continuing]. Joint Program Office led by the 

Navy and the Marine Corps, with significant Army participation, 

so—— 

And I would say that the MRAP is a great model for how to use 

the flexibility in the acquisition system, and it is my full expectation, as we work together with OSD, would use the same flexibilities we use with the MRAP program as we would both develop the 

requirements through the joint requirements process, and the acquisition of the ground combat vehicle so it doesn’t take us a decade to get the ground combat vehicle out there, which is a—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

General THOMPSON [continuing]. Capability. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, and maybe we can just use what is already working. There is no law against it. You don’t have to invent 

this particular wheel—bad analogy, but—— 

Okay. Then—excuse me, you weren’t finished, though. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, the question from Congressman Hunter 

about the brownout issues: The UH–60 Mike Black Hawk upgrade 

that we have right now on the advanced handling system is going 

to give us a capability, once we finish the development, to do automatic takeoff and landing in brownout or whiteout conditions, and 

I just wanted to get that on the record right now, because of some 

of the technology that we are going to put in there, particularly the 

fly-by—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We will get that to Mr. Hunter. 

General THOMPSON. And we will follow up in more detail on that. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

General THOMPSON. And the last one for clarification was a question asked by Congressman Wilson on the carbine. We will have 

the rights—the technical data rights to the M–4 Carbine beginning 

in July. 

We are going to have a performance-based competition for the 

Carbine. The new Carbine requirement is in staffing, as I indicated, that will go to the joint staffing process here very quickly. 

And we anticipate approval on the requirement by the end of the 

summer and the Request for Proposal (RFP) release in late summer, which is a few months later than I indicated earlier. And I 

just wanted to clarify that for the record. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. Excellent. 

Any final thoughts, General Speakes? Okay. 

Mr. Ahern, I am pleased that you were able to be at both of these 

hearings, because in a certain sense I am going to rely on our and 
38 

our new acquaintanceship for what this subcommittee has as its 

primary jurisdiction, and that is the Army and the Air Force. 

And I hope that you can see from some of the questions and observations made by the members over the last two days that I have 

my own friction issues to deal with—not necessarily because different interests are rubbing up against one another and causing 

difficulty, but the politics of defense on the legislative side requires 

people who are in a position of responsibility to make recommendations to the subcommittee and the full committee to be aware of 

them, to be cognizant of them, and to be cognizant of the merits— 

not just the demerits, but the merits of the various positions. 

Some of them can seem parochial to those on the outside, but 

they are also the responsibility of individual members—they happen to be in their districts or something, so be it. That just means 

they are that much more familiar with it, from my point of view. 

So my point here is that, the reason that I am asking so many 

of these questions and pushing you and the services with regard 

to how we allocate the funds within the policies established, is that 

there is competition that I have to take into account, whether it is 

the Joint Cargo Aircraft, whether it is the F–35, whether it is the 

F–22s, what is to be done or not done, the Strykers, the various 

elements of the Future Combat System, et cetera. 

I am now charged with the responsibility of blending these requirements and necessities to meet our strategic interests, and at 

the same time recognize that I have got to have a balance in there 

that is acceptable enough to get the votes, to make it acceptable 

to those who have the responsibility of that little plaque out in the 

anteroom there that says the Congress shall provide for the armies 

and navies, et cetera. 

So I am just putting that on the record, not because I don’t think 

you know it, but rather to make it crystal clear that it is foremost 

in my mind, and so that both the questions and observations that 

come from me and the others are entirely based upon, how can we 

put this together in a way that will satisfy the Nation that we are, 

in fact, defending the Nation’s interests with the maximum possible effort and focus, and understanding of what they are, and 

meeting the practical responsibilities of putting a defense bill together that can sustain itself in the appropriations process. 

So your aid and assistance over the next couple weeks in accomplishing that would be most gratefully received. 

Mr. AHERN. Absolutely. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And acknowledged. 

Mr. AHERN. Absolutely, sir, and I welcome the opportunity—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Good. Thank you all very much. Again, I 

apologize for the length of time that you had to spend waiting to 

complete this, but I assure you the efforts made here today will be 

closely attended to when we make our decisions. 

[Whereupon, at 1:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MAY 21, 2009 

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MAY 21, 2009 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MAY 21, 2009 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

General THOMPSON. The M4 carbine has $20.5 million budgeted in FY10. [See 

page 15.] 

General THOMPSON. Soldier protection is our number one priority. The M-ATV requirement for safety and survivability regarding the doors is defined by the Soldier’s 

ability to ingress/egress the vehicle when the vehicle is without power. A complete 

safety assessment and human factors study was performed to ensure the vehicle 

met the ingress/egress requirement. The results were confirmed by independent test 

and evaluation. The tests concluded that the M-ATV base vehicle met the requirement without an additional power assist system for the doors. However, when the 

add-on armor used to protect against Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) was 

installed, the EFP-armored vehicle did not meet the ingress/egress requirement. 

Consequently, the EFP armor kit provides a door equipped with a power assist to 

meet this requirement. The power assist door incorporates several safety mechanisms including sensing devices to prevent injuries to Soldiers while closing the 

door. The power assist door also contains a dedicated battery for operation of the 

system which is not dependent on the base vehicle but is recharged during operations of the vehicle. The power assist can open the doors, even when the vehicle 

is on its side, as long as the doors are not combat locked, blocked, or jammed. The 

doors can be opened 50-60 times before requiring a battery charge. [See page 16.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MARSHALL 

General SPEAKES. The Army’s unfunded requirements list included two items that 

fall under the categories of test sets and diagnostic equipment, and test infrastructure items. The Army requires $47 million in Other Procurement, Army (OPA), 

under Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment for the life cycle replacement 

of 2,412 Maintenance Support Devices. These man-portable general purpose automatic testers are used to verify the operational status of weapon systems and to isolate faults within the systems. Within the category of Army Test Infrastructure, $31 

million in OPA is required to accelerate new capabilities to the warfighter and reset 

the accelerated wear of test infrastructure. [See page 17.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL 

Mr. AHERN. The Marine Corp’s four ‘‘Angel Fire’’ capable C-12s returned from the 

Iraqi Area of Responsibility to CONUS in April 2009. The platform carrying the 

‘‘wide area persistent surveillance’’ capability was an unpressurized King Air A90; 

one of the oldest King Air versions in service today. All four Angel Fire platforms 

returned to CONUS and were dissembled in April 2009 based on a January 2009 

Marine Corps Central Command message stating the capability was no longer required in theater. Angel Fire is 2007 vintage technology and is being replaced by 

newer capabilities integrated onto more capable platforms, such as the King Air 

350. One such capability is the Army’s ‘‘Constant Hawk,’’ which will have the latest 

wide area persistent surveillance technology available and will deploy to Afghanistan in 2QFY 2010. Beyond that the Air Force continues to procure and deploy Liberty Extended Range King Air 350s (C-12s) to provide rapid ISR capability. [See 

page 14.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

General THOMPSON. The Army concluded a functional solutions analysis for safe 

operations in degraded vision environments (DVE) and complex urban terrain. The 

functional solutions analysis report recommends multiple materiel and non-materiel 

solutions to this problem. 

Training tasks that capitalize on current modernized aircraft equipment, upgrades to existing equipment, and new materiel approaches to the DVE challenge 
86 

are identified to resolve many gaps in DVE flight profiles. This report provides the 

analysis to establish capabilities requirements documents for DVE solutions. 

The Army Research and Development program has a technology effort under development in Program Element 0603710A, Night Vision Advanced Technology, to 

support helicopter pilots during landing and take-off operations while in brownout 

conditions. In fiscal year 2010 the effort is funded at $4.3 million dollars. This effort 

employs a number of multispectral sensors distributed around a UH-60/CH-47, providing imagery to both pilots and crew members via an optical head tracked display. 

These head tracked infrared sensors will allow multiple pilots and crew members 

to view imagery all around the aircraft providing multiple sets of eyes the ability 

to track aircraft position relative to the ground and other objects that may require 

avoidance and also the ability to see through dust. This enhances crew coordination 

in degraded visual environments (e.g., one pilot can focus on front left objects say 

a rock or tree, while the other pilots can focus on front right side scenery, and crew 

members in the rear cabin can concentrate on the trail wheel and objects directly 

underneath the aircraft, while all can be communicating with each other as to the 

relative closing rate of the aircraft with objects in their area). Everyone can also 

view what the others are seeing if need be. 

Sensor tests schedule: Ground and flight testing will be conducted before this calendar year 2009 ends. (November 2009 and December 2009). [See page 26.] 

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