Filed 1/29/14 P. v. Dixon CA2/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

PARIS DIXON, III, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B250016 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BA409103) 

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge. Affirmed. 

 California Appellate Project, Jonathan B. Steiner, Executive Director and 

Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 No appearance for Respondent. 
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In the underlying action, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to one count of 

making criminal threats pursuant to a plea agreement, and was sentenced in 

accordance with the terms of that agreement. His court-appointed counsel has filed 

an opening brief raising no issues. Following our independent examination of the 

entire record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we 

conclude that no arguable issues exist. Accordingly, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On June 13, 2013, an amended information was filed, charging appellant 

Paris Dixon, III, in count one with corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 

§ 273.5, subd. (a)), in count two with making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, 

subd. (a)), in count three with kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a)), and in 

count four with evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)). 

Accompanying the charges were allegations that appellant had suffered a strike 

under the Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. 

(a)-(d)), and seven prior felony convictions for which he had served a prison term 

(Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). In addition, accompanying counts two and three 

was an allegation that he had suffered a prior felony conviction constituting a 

serious felony (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)). 

 On June 19, 2013, after appellant’s jury trial had begun, he entered into a 

plea agreement under which he was to be given a total term of 10 years in state 

prison. In accordance with the agreement, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to 

the charge of making criminal threats (count two), and admitted the prior strike 

under the Three Strikes law, as well as four prior felony convictions for which he 

had served prison terms. As provided in the plea agreement, the trial court 

imposed the three-year upper term for making criminal threats, doubled that term 

pursuant to the Three Strikes law, and added four one-year enhancements for the 
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prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The remaining counts in the 

amended information were dismissed. This appeal followed. 

FACTS1

In the early morning hours of March 17, 2013, appellant attended a night 

club in Inglewood with Ana P., with whom appellant lived. Later, California 

Highway Patrol and Los Angeles Police Department officers responded to a call 

regarding an altercation near a freeway off ramp, and tried to stop an SUV driven 

by appellant. At the officers’ direction, appellant pulled his SUV over, but drove 

away when they walked toward it. When the officers finally stopped the SUV, 

appellant fled on foot. 

Inside the SUV, the officers discovered Ana, whose face displayed injuries. 

She told the officers that after she and appellant left the nightclub, they argued, and 

she tried to walk away. Appellant followed Ana in his SUV, parked it, and struck 

her so hard that she lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness, she 

found herself inside the SUV, where appellant choked her and said, “I am going to 

kill you.” Appellant then drove the SUV onto a freeway. As he approached a 

freeway off ramp, Ana attempted to flee from the SUV, but he dragged her back 

inside it. 

DISCUSSION 

 After an examination of the record, appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed 

an opening brief raising no issues and requested this court to review the record 

independently pursuant to Wende. In addition, counsel advised appellant of his 

1 Because the trial had not been completed when appellant entered into the plea 

agreement, the facts are based on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. 
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right to submit by supplemental brief any contentions or argument he wished the 

court to consider. Appellant has presented no such brief. 

 Appellant’s plea of nolo contendere restricts the scope of the appeal before 

us. The notice of appeal seeks to challenge the validity of the plea, and also asserts 

that the appeal “is based on the sentence or other matters that occurred after the 

plea . . . .” In requesting a certificate of probable cause to attack the validity of the 

plea, appellant stated that he wished to withdraw his plea because his 10-year 

sentence was too harsh, in view of the evidence likely to be presented at trial. 

 Because the trial court denied appellant’s request for a certificate of probable 

cause, his appeal is limited to “postplea claims, including sentencing issues, that do 

not challenge the validity of the plea.” (People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 

379.) Under this principle, “‘“[w]hen a guilty [or nolo contendere] plea is entered 

in exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an 

agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the 

terms of the agreement.”’” (Id. at p. 383, quoting People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 

Cal.4th 68, 80.) As appellant’s sentence was imposed in accordance with the plea 

agreement, our review of the record discloses no potential error within the scope of 

the appeal. We therefore conclude that appellant’s counsel has fully complied with 

his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at 

p. 441.) 
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DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 MANELLA, J. 

We concur: 

EPSTEIN, P. J. 

WILLHITE, J.