No. 246, September 2009 Strategic Forum 1

lowing that visit, on the instructions of the minister, the Vietnamese defense ministry entered 

into a long series of technical discussions with 

U.S. Pacific Fleet representatives that, in late 

2003, enabled the first U.S. Navy ship port call 

in Vietnam. President Bill Clinton’s November 

2003 visit to Vietnam sustained that momentum, 

focused on the successes of demining cooperation, and legitimized high-level discussions 

aimed at managing wartime legacy issues in a 

more effective fashion.

The bilateral defense relationship with 

Vietnam developed in three phases. The first 

phase, from initial contacts during which 

the notion of defense normalization was 

broached in 1995–1996 to the preparations 

for the March 2000 visit of then–Secretary of 

Defense William Cohen, was characterized by 

Vietnamese caution regarding U.S. intentions, 

and matching reservations in Washington 

plus a concern regarding the importance of 

preserving the prisoner of war/missing in 

action (POW/MIA) priority focus.

In the second phase, from 2000 to 

2004, the United States took the first efforts 

to modestly expand the scope and pace of 

defense engagement. The Vietnamese clarified the more rigid aspects of their position on 

enhanced defense relations, dug in their heels, 

and resisted anything beyond the most symbolic forward movement in defense relations.

In the third phase, from 2005 to 2007, 

the United States began to look for ways to 

broaden defense interaction with Vietnam, 

Normal defense relations between the 

United States and Vietnam emerged from 

discussions conducted from mid-1995 to late 

1996. The first years of interaction between the 

American and Vietnamese defense establishments revolved around learning about one 

another, developing a common language, 

becoming accustomed to the differences in how 

the respective ministries managed policy and 

exercised authority, and learning to work with 

the personalities on both sides who were the 

mainstay of the relationship. At the outset, the 

Vietnamese were suspicious, conservative, and 

not inclined to move beyond argument about the 

“legacy issues,” such as the effects of Agent 

Orange and alleged U.S. Government support to 

antiregime organizations.

In 2000–2004, the United States made the 

first efforts to modestly expand the scope and 

pace of defense engagement. Vietnamese 

military reluctance to ratchet up activities that 

smacked of close defense cooperation did not 

altogether preclude defense ministry officials 

from recognizing the dividends that could derive 

from the relationship with the U.S. military, and 

organizing for at least gradual shifts in views 

that enabled new types of engagement in the 

early 2000s. During his March 2000 visit to 

Hanoi, Defense Secretary William Cohen and 

Defense Minister Pham Van Tra agreed that ship 

visits would be a positive aspect of a gradually 

expanding plan for military engagement. Fol-

 Strategic Forum No. 246

September 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

U.S.-Vietnam Defense Relations: 

Deepening Ties, Adding Relevance

by Lewis M. Stern

believing that new activities could be easily integrated into the existing plan, and 

that shared concerns for the well being of 

Southeast Asia and a common approach to 

broad transnational issues in the region suggested a natural basis for strategic community between Hanoi and Vietnam. The 

Vietnamese defense establishment began to 

explore steps that could enhance the relationship, take military-to-military engagement to 

the next level, and infuse some real strategic 

content into the defense relationship.

First Overtures

Discussions conducted between mid1995 and late 1996 produced a foundation for 

normal defense relations between the United 

States and Vietnam. Formal military-to-military relations were initiated in November 

1996, a year after government-to-government 

normalization, though Hanoi had taken some 

earlier steps toward rapprochement including the accreditation of a U.S. Defense Attaché 

in December 1995. The first real steps toward 

military-to-military relations were halting, 

modest, and cautious, revolving around mutually agreed initiatives that were constrained in 

scope and deliberately low key in nature.1

In the first phase, Vietnam’s defense 

ministry was reluctant to be drawn into activities that regional observers could interpret as a firm and warm embrace of the 

fledgling defense relationship, and the U.S. 
2 Strategic Forum No. 246, September 2009

Government focused tightly on economic, 

trade, consular, and diplomatic normalization. The Vietnamese defense ministry was 

perfectly content to keep the pace constrained 

and scope modest, and the Department of 

Defense (DOD) was prepared to stick with an 

exploratory approach that fixed on benign, 

uncontroversial areas of focus as the starting 

point for bilateral military engagement.

The first years of interaction between 

the Vietnamese and U.S. defense establishments revolved around learning about one 

another, developing a common language, 

becoming accustomed to the differences in 

how the respective ministries managed policy 

and exercised authority, and learning to work 

with the personalities on both sides who were 

the mainstay of the relationship. The startup 

U.S.-Vietnamese defense relationship in 1997 

consisted of three types of activities: U.S. 

Pacific Command (USPACOM)-hosted, Title 

10–funded multilateral conferences and seminars; senior-level military visits; and practical bilateral cooperation in areas such as 

search and rescue, military medicine, environmental security, and demining.

The parameters of this relationship 

were defined early. In 1996–1997, the United 

States offered the Vietnamese defense ministry a range of starting points for a program of military engagement and adduced 

a series of simple precepts for defense relations: POW/MIA remained the national priority; all activities had to be transparent and 

not aimed at impacting the equities of other 

bilateral defense relations; the relationship 

was to unfold in a carefully calibrated manner intended as slow and deliberate; and the 

relationship was to be a “two-way street.” The 

Vietnamese reacted in early 1997 with a parallel set of starting points that emphasized 

sovereignty, independence, national dignity, 

and the importance of a cautious, modest 

pace for the process of normalization. The 

decision during the tenure of the 9th Central 

Committee of the Communist Party of 

Vietnam to retain an extremely modest focus 

on military medicine, military scientific and 

technological cooperation, and disaster relief/

humanitarian projects guided the relationship from the earliest joint activities in 1997 

through at least 2000–2001.2

Officers from the defense ministry’s 

External Relations Department (ERD) were 

suspicious, conservative, and not inclined to 

move beyond argument about the “legacy 

issues,” such as the effects of Agent Orange 

and alleged U.S. Government support to antiregime organizations. Senior defense ministry officials found it difficult to understand 

U.S. intentions and presumed that military-to-military relations were just one more 

means by which Washington could manipulate the POW/MIA issue. While the United 

States referred to “defense relations,” the 

Vietnamese spoke of “military-to-military 

contacts,” implying a relationship that was 

orders of magnitude more confined and modest than a defense relationship. Eventually, as 

the relationship became routine and sought a 

consistent level of communication, the phrase 

military-to-military became much less of 

a means of drawing a distinction between 

the DOD term of art and the preferred ERD 

nomenclature.

In this period, both sides fixed their 

attention on fulfilling a light schedule of 

low-profile annual plans that began with the 

first postnormalization visit of the U.S. commander of Pacific Forces to Hanoi, an initial orientation visit to the United States by a 

group of ERD senior colonels, the opening of 

the Vietnamese defense attaché office in the 

Vietnamese embassy in Washington, and visits 

to Vietnam by U.S. military officers from the 

National War College and Air War College for 

area familiarization. The primary channel of 

communication evolved between working level 

representatives of the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Affairs (ISA) and the ERD. These activities 

became frequent set piece actions between 

directorate level officials representing organizations with singularly different mandates 

and vastly different levels of policy authority 

that were ultimately responsible for shaping 

an annual plan of activities in the bilateral 

defense relationship.

While the ERD was the defense ministry’s eyes and ears on U.S.-Vietnamese relations, senior officers manning key positions 

had decidedly less maneuvering room at the 

negotiating table. They were less inclined to 

make judgments about the acceptability of 

recommended activities than were ISA representatives. They were more directly responsible to the defense ministry and more inclined 

to defer decisions until explicit instructions arrived from that quarter, whereas ISA 

functioned on the basis of broad instructions and had more of an ability to innovate 

at negotiating sessions without requesting 

additional guidance from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD). In fact, following 

the first few steps in the original November 

1996 plan, including the visit to Hanoi by 

the commander of USPACOM and the visit to 

the United States by the defense ministry’s 

senior colonels’ delegation, in April 1997 the 

Vietnamese ERD unceremoniously postponed 

the remainder of planned activity for the 

year, including the visits by the U.S. National 

Defense University (NDU) and Air War College 

study groups. The reason given for the postponement was the upcoming National 

Assembly elections, which would require 

senior leaders to set aside other activities so 

as to ensure successful election to the legislature of a predetermined number of People’s 

Army of Vietnam (PAVN) candidates.3

Nevertheless, a number of achievements 

in the relationship were chalked up from 

1996 to 1999, including the visit of the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and 

Pacific Affairs in November 1996 that kicked 

the Vietnamese reacted in 

early 1997 with a parallel 

set of starting points that 

emphasized sovereignty, 

independence, national 

dignity, and the 

importance of a cautious, 

modest pace for the 

process of normalization

Lewis M. Stern is a Visiting Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the 

National Defense University.
No. 246, September 2009 Strategic Forum 3

off the defense relationship, the February 

1997 trip to Hanoi by the commander of 

USPACOM, and the arrival of Vietnam’s first 

defense attaché in March 1997.

In late 1997, the legacy issues of Agent 

Orange and Vietnam’s MIAs became central in all ISA and ERD dialogue on military relations. In October 1998, Deputy 

Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Nguyen 

Manh Cam visited the Pentagon, followed 

by Deputy Defense Minister Tran Hanh’s 

trip to the United States in the same month. 

ISA–ERD planning meetings in 1999, a successful Air War College study group visit to 

Vietnam (including the first flight line visit 

to Nha Trang Pilot’s School), and an April 

1999 visit by U.S. military engineers that 

initiated the important demining training program for Vietnam were followed by 

lengthy discussions that culminated in the 

March 2000 visit to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 

City by Secretary Cohen.

Circumspect Courtship

In 2000–2004, the United States took the 

first efforts to modestly expand the scope and 

pace of defense engagement. The Vietnamese 

clarified the more rigid aspects of their position on enhanced defense relations, dug in 

their heels, and resisted anything beyond the 

most symbolic forward movement in defense 

relations. For example, through the late 1990s 

and early 2000s, the Vietnamese claimed a 

longstanding aversion to anything involving 

U.S. special forces, but managed to overcome 

that reluctance when they became convinced 

of the attractiveness of demining-focused 

activities and events involving U.S. Special 

Operations Command Pacific.

During this “courtship” period, the 

Vietnamese continuously asserted their 

clear objections to anything that smacked 

of explicitly military education. DOD could 

often press beyond standard objections 

and concerns by describing and defining 

proposed initiatives without using “redlined” words. However, a potentially insurmountable hurdle involved the “vetting” of 

Vietnamese participants nominated for an 

activity as free of any prior involvement in 

acts against human rights. The U.S. side 

described the legislatively mandated vetting 

requirement as the most effective means of 

identifying professional military officers who 

would profit from participation in proposed 

events. Often, that satisfied Vietnamese concerns and gave the defense ministry enough 

of a comfort level to authorize PAVN participation in USPACOM-hosted, Title 10–funded 

seminars, multilateral conferences, and 

other educational opportunities.

Throughout the tenure of three defense 

ministers, the Vietnamese military made 

clear that Hanoi would never put troops in 

the field with uniformed U.S. forces for the 

purposes of joint activities or training on 

Vietnamese soil. Over time, training possibilities took on new and unique shapes, 

including multilateral options and training in peacekeeping methods, and the U.S. 

Government explored those possibilities with 

the Vietnamese. Still, the Vietnamese were 

slow to show any inclination to get past their 

own rhetoric. The generation of Soviet- and 

Chinese-trained troops and engineers might 

have to pass from the scene or become so 

overwhelmingly helpless in the face of new 

technologies before the Vietnamese would 

become more receptive to working with the 

U.S. military.

However, pronounced Vietnamese military reluctance to ratchet up activities that 

smacked of close defense cooperation did not 

altogether preclude the possibility of defense 

ministry officials recognizing the dividends 

that could derive from the relationship with 

the U.S. military, and organizing for at least 

gradual shifts in views that enabled new types 

of engagement in the early 2000s. For example, during 3 years’ worth of working level 

discussions, the U.S. side made clear the DOD 

view regarding the utility and positive contribution ship visits could make to global 

naval diplomacy. The Vietnamese stuck to 

their stated disinterest in port calls, noting 

that this decision would have to come from 

the top and could not be driven by inspired 

discussions at planning sessions. During his 

March 2000 visit to Hanoi, Secretary Cohen 

and Defense Minister Pham Van Tra agreed 

that ship visits would be a positive aspect 

of a gradually expanding plan for military engagement. Following that visit, on the 

instructions of the minister, the Vietnamese 

defense ministry entered into a long series of 

technical discussions with U.S. Pacific Fleet 

representatives that, in late 2003, enabled 

the first U.S. Navy ship port call in Vietnam. 

President Bill Clinton’s November 2003 

visit to Vietnam sustained that momentum, 

focused on the successes of demining cooperation, and legitimized high-level discussions 

aimed at managing wartime legacy issues in 

a more effective fashion.

Nudging Things Forward 

In 2002–2003, OSD Policy began to look 

for new ways to realize the great potential of 

this bilateral defense relationship, reasoning 

that new activities could be easily integrated 

into the existing plan, and that shared concerns for the well-being of Southeast Asia and 

a common approach to broad transnational 

issues in the region suggested a natural basis 

for strategic communication between Hanoi 

and Washington. Senior DOD leaders cited 

the clear similarities in strategic viewpoints 

between Hanoi and Washington as the basis 

for their argument that the United States 

should be able to build on existing relationships, recent positive precedent-setting meetings, and a generally positive predisposition 

in favor of the bilateral defense relationship. 

The trajectory of the relationship was sustained by:

■ continued bilateral cooperation on 

matters such as demining, search and rescue, 

humanitarian assistance, and environmental security

the Vietnamese military 

made clear that Hanoi 

would never put 

troops in the field with 

uniformed U.S. forces 

for the purposes of joint 

activities or training on 

Vietnamese soil
4 Strategic Forum No. 246, September 2009

Vietnamese began considering expanding 

the levels of activity to include meteorological and hydrographic studies, and capacitybuilding in humanitarian disaster relief.

In 2005–2007, the defense ministry 

began to more seriously explore strategic 

objectives in the relationship, such as formal interaction focused on building disaster response capabilities for the People’s 

Army, and a more effective means of working 

together on search and rescue operations and 

exercises. In that time frame, the Vietnamese, 

though still guarded in their statements, 

were inclined to support informal discussions 

about steps that could enhance the relationship, take military-to-military engagement 

to the next level, and infuse some real strategic content into the defense relationship. The 

Vietnamese entertained possibilities of peacekeeping training, simple joint naval exercises 

(such as a passing exercise), an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, a strategic dialogue between the defense ministry 

and OSD, hydrographic cooperation and joint 

studies of the strategic impact of meteorological shifts and sea level changes, and continuing routine operational level interaction 

with USPACOM planners in the form of the 

Bilateral Defense Dialogue aimed at planning 

the annual calendar for the relationship.

Though these were significant and 

noticeable breakthroughs in the relationship, the Vietnamese defense ministry did not commit to these steps until it 

■ slow but steady expansion of the areas 

in which the two militaries conducted practical bilateral cooperation

■ an enhanced level of visits and formal discussions including successes in the 

USPACOM–defense ministry planning talks 

(the Bilateral Defense Dialogues) and policylevel discussions that led to the first PoliticalMilitary Dialogue in October 2008.

Defense Minister Tra’s November 2003 

visit to the United States and the first U.S. 

Navy ship visit in the same month jumpstarted a series of successes that fueled progress in developing normal military relations 

through 2008–2009. The relationship took 

on positive momentum beginning with the 

meeting between Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld and Prime Minister Phan Van Khai 

in mid-2005, to Secretary Rumsfeld’s visit to 

Hanoi in mid-2006, to the unprecedented visit 

to the Pentagon by Prime Minister Nguyen 

Tan Dung in June 2008. During 2005–

2008, the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship grew 

steadily, expanding in scope in measured but 

noticeable ways:

■ In 2005, Hanoi signed the end-user 

agreement that was the prerequisite for starting International Military Education Training 

(IMET) and foreign military sales.

■ In 2006, International Traffic in Arms 

Regulations restrictions were modified to 

enable some constrained arms sales.

■ Five years after laying out the plan for 

port calls by U.S. Navy vessels, the Vietnamese 

side yielded slightly on the “one ship per 

year” rule, allowing a hydrographic vessel and later a humanitarian ship to enter 

Vietnamese waters in 2007–2008, even 

though a gray hull had already taken the single allotted slot.

■ The number of high-level visits, also 

the subject of early Vietnamese efforts to 

control the pace and scope of relations by 

restricting the number of senior DOD visitors, 

became a matter of what the traffic would 

bear.

■ Practical bilateral cooperation in 

search and rescue, environmental security, 

and demining remained consistently highquality engagements involving well-thoughtout interactions at the specialist level. The 

had sufficient assurances that the pace and 

scope of developing defense relations with 

Washington would not throw its equities in 

regional relations out of balance. The ministry worked hard to make sure its commitment to enhanced military engagement with 

the United States was not perceived as a tilt in 

overall foreign policy objectives toward a onesided reliance on a single friendship.

The Vietnamese defense ministry did 

not signal its readiness to sign the end-user 

agreement, subscribe to rules governing 

IMET (including mandatory human rights 

vetting), or proceed with an annual schedule 

of ship visits on the basis of a strategic calculation that closer defense and security cooperation was the answer to its security concerns. 

Indeed, the ministry did not agree to an 

accelerated schedule of DOD leadership visits or entertain the possibility of expert level 

consultations on possible future topics for 

bilateral cooperation until there were assurances that these decisions would not have 

a strategic impact on the relationships the 

Vietnamese remained most concerned about: 

bilateral links with China, multilateral links 

with Southeast Asian neighbors, and organized interaction with the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

That is, senior defense ministry officials 

decided to press forward on initiatives meant 

to enhance bilateral defense relations between 

Hanoi and Washington during 2005 and 2006 

once it became clear there would be no fundamentally costly strategic consequences for 

proceeding. The ministry had long required 

some quiet signal that there would be no consequential blowback from China on anything 

in the U.S.-Vietnam defense relationship.

Building Relations

During 2008–2009, the bilateral defense 

relationship started to focus on building capabilities and developing new skill sets in specialized areas: peacekeeping, environmental 

security, multilateral search and rescue coordination, and regional disaster response. The 

Vietnamese defense and foreign ministries 

mastered the nuances and details of the programs and understood the funding realities 

and recoiled less in the face of a newly proposed U.S. initiative. The Vietnamese were 

senior Vietnamese 

defense ministry officials 

decided to press forward 

on initiatives meant to 

enhance bilateral defense 

relations between Hanoi 

and Washington once 

it became clear 

there would be no 

fundamentally costly 

strategic consequences
No. 246, September 2009 Strategic Forum 5

prepared to discuss issues surrounding the 

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)—

including their concerns with seizure actions 

and the views of the United Nations (UN), as 

well as the compatibility of PSI with existing 

national law—in ways that suggested recognition of new possibilities in bilateral defense 

cooperation and more confidence in their 

regional and global role and the requirements 

necessary to fulfill those responsibilities.

There was an increasingly important multilateral dimension to U.S.-Vietnam interaction, and a heightened interest in cooperating 

with the United States to meet transnational 

challenges. Vietnam staked out a role for itself 

in the region and on the global stage, and it 

intended to make the most of its term as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council. 

Senior Vietnamese representatives reinforced 

this intent by focusing on the multiplier effect 

that bilateral defense and security cooperation with the United States had on Vietnam’s 

ability to play meaningful leadership roles in 

the region and by taking foreign policy positions that stressed the need for Washington to 

do better at managing its relations with ASEAN. 

Vietnam applauded the Obama administration’s movement in the direction of acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as 

an important step, and argued that the U.S. 

Government could make a real difference by 

committing to a U.S.–ASEAN summit before 

the end of 2009. Hanoi also made the case that 

the United States should take a higher profile 

position on South China Sea issues, perhaps 

moving out in front of an ASEAN consensus 

(if one could ever be developed) by cautioning 

China of the potential political consequences 

of continuing its trajectory on this issue in the 

face of a united ASEAN.

Bilateral issues still abounded. Vietnam 

remained chagrined in 2008–2009 that 

Congress kept passing punitive legislation that spoke to Vietnam’s human rights 

record, and that the administration had not 

been actively speaking against these legislative initiatives. Agent Orange was, in 

effect, Vietnam’s POW/MIA issue, one that 

galvanized broad popular sentiment, generated activism within specific constituencies, and promised to remain a domestic 

issue with significant foreign policy consequences. However, such issues no longer 

were show-stoppers. They were integrated 

into a bilateral dialogue that tested possibilities, explored new avenues of cooperation, 

reviewed existing programs, and allowed 

venting on sensitive issues.

During 2006–2008, the defense ministry made a real effort to bring to the table 

several levels of representation beyond its 

External Relations Department, including the Institute for Military Strategy, a relatively new organization subordinate to the 

Office of the Minister of Defense. The level 

of ministry participation in bilateral meetings and events showed a broadening interest in the relationship and also demonstrated 

the increasing depth of expertise in Vietnam 

about the United States. The ministry was 

positive about the idea of a military-to-military policy-level dialogue, something that 

was discussed briefly at the meeting between 

Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Prime 

Minister Dung in June 2008, and had earlier 

been an agenda item in exploratory private 

discussions with senior and midlevel defense 

ministry officials. This suggested an interest 

in pushing the relationship toward bilateral 

discussions on regional defense issues, strategic thinking, plans and intentions regarding 

defense relations in the region, and defense 

modernization and requirements.

In the same time frame, the Vietnamese 

foreign ministry resumed a more active role 

in defense and security relations, returning to 

a level of involvement it had during the first 

working level discussions of the modalities of 

military-to-military normalization from 1994 

to 1995. In June 2008, during the prime minister’s visit to Washington, which featured a 

meeting with President George W. Bush and 

a separate visit to the Pentagon for talks with 

the Secretary of Defense, the Vietnamese 

agreed to a Political-Military Dialogue led 

by the State Department and foreign ministry, which took place in early October 2008. 

Vietnamese embassy efforts in Washington to 

invigorate lines of communication with DOD 

and its think tanks continued this trend. In 

2008 and 2009, embassy officials encouraged informal discussions between visiting Vietnamese strategic thinkers and NDU, 

and entertained the possibility of sending 

Vietnamese officials to the university as participants in the International Fellows program. Foreign ministry officials and embassy 

senior staff embraced in principle a proposal 

to expand and upgrade the annual delegations of U.S. National War College students to 

include representatives of NDU, and conduct a 

dialogue with the defense ministry’s National 

Defense Academy and the foreign ministry’s Diplomatic Academy. The Vietnamese 

ambassador in Washington took the initiative 

following his 2007 arrival to revive the practice of a quarterly meeting with the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and 

Southeast Asia, expanding that format to 

include both the Defense Attaché and a representative of the Political Section.

In 2008, DOD leadership focused again 

on how the United States could be doing more 

and how the department should shape efforts 

to heighten the tempo and spectrum of cooperation. Senior OSD Policy officials felt the 

need for a new organizing concept that went 

beyond the idea that the relationship should 

proceed cautiously and incrementally for the 

foreseeable future. The idea of regional sensitivities to increasing proximity between 

Hanoi and Washington struck many as an 

old notion that did not recognize the extent 

to which the region itself considered the 

enhanced relationship as a development that 

resonated positively with regional goals.

The defense ministry, perhaps at the urging of the office of the prime minister and the 

foreign ministry, had moved forward slightly 

beginning in 2005 by agreeing to look at 

capacity-building in narrow areas such as 

disaster response, humanitarian crisis coordination, and military medicine. Certainly, 

Hanoi did not plunge into these areas of cooperation by embracing initiatives, subscribing 

to assistance programs, or agreeing to launch 

there was an increasingly 

important multilateral 

dimension to U.S.-

Vietnam interaction, and 

a heightened interest 

in cooperating with the 

United States to meet 

transnational challenges
6 Strategic Forum No. 246, September 2009

cooperation, the act of translating that idea 

into an instruction can be agonizingly long 

and incredibly frustrating.

■ All appreciable advances in the relationship have been cultured first in an 

“informational exchange” period, where the 

United States and Vietnam have agreed to 

a formal interim step involving a substantive exchange of data as a means of building confidence, raising levels of knowledge, 

and buying time for determining intentions, 

exploring ulterior motives, and maneuvering 

to achieve perceived advantages en route to a 

final commitment to a program, an event, or 

a process.

■ The existing mechanisms for managing the defense relationship will govern 

the possibilities for the near term, and those 

mechanisms will seek to relate proposals to 

existing forms of interaction, familiar events 

and activities, and already functioning routines and practices.

This means the Vietnamese will regard 

with suspicion proposals for events that do not 

conform to expectations. The defense ministry will look at new initiatives as exceeding 

existing agreements. The office of the prime 

minister will be more than happy to allow the 

defense ministry to manage the relationship, 

confident that it will not get ahead of the 

consensus regarding what is politically possible in defense relations.

It is therefore best to think in terms of small 

and incremental advances, rely on already existing forms and routines, defer to existing channels of communication, and exercise patience.

The Vietnamese defense ministry may 

seem as though it is ready for something new, 

but it will not so readily embrace significant 

departures from existing forms and commitments. The prime minister clothed his points 

to Secretary Gates during the June 2008 

meeting in the most conservative vocabulary 

possible, and the defense ministry is likely 

to react to the position that defense relations 

can and should be expanded in slow, measured, and exceedingly cautious ways. This 

is a system that does not quickly embrace 

change, even when it senses opportunities 

and commits to altered trajectories and new 

policy goals. The way to work within these 

confines: start by identifying familiar forms 

tailored initiatives. However, in 2007 and 

2008, the Vietnamese defense establishment 

was more open to the argument that the initial constraining parameters that helped define 

the modest pace and scope of early defense 

relations could be modified. There was still 

no Vietnamese military support for discarding 

restraint and plunging into active cooperation 

on a strategic level, looking at possible joint 

training and exercising opportunities, or ratcheting up cooperation in areas such as resource 

management reform, military professionalization, or doctrinal modernization.

Both sides had by 2009 experienced 

slightly more than 12 formal years of military-to-military engagement. The United 

States had placed a succession of four Defense 

Attachés in Hanoi since December 1995. 

Vietnam had assigned four similarly talented senior colonels to Washington since 

March 1997. Vietnamese officers involved during the earliest days of the defense relationship had been promoted in rank and elevated 

in assignments. A former Vietnamese defense 

attaché in Washington had become the deputy director of the Military Strategy Institute 

in 2006. Junior PAVN officers who served as 

staff functionaries supporting ERD negotiations with ISA from 1997 to 2001 had been 

elevated to key jobs in the leadership suite 

of the ERD. Similarly, former U.S. Defense 

Attachés had returned to Washington and 

taken teaching positions in critical professional military education institutions and 

assumed leadership roles with the Joint Staff 

and with the Defense Language Institute. 

The Vietnamese defense ministry leadership 

responsible for the startup discussions regarding military relations in 1996 had retired, a 

pattern replicated among U.S. counterparts 

responsible for policy issues in the earliest 

years of the defense relationship, suggesting 

that the policy of improving defense relations 

was now generational.

There were new institutional actors 

on both sides, including Vietnam’s Military 

Strategy Institute, and the subordinate 

Institute for Foreign Defense Relations, 

as well as the new Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific 

Security Affairs on the U.S. side of the equation, established in late 2007 to replace the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs.

Both sides had become more knowledgeable about one another, better equipped to 

react to opportunities and determine the most 

effective use of resources to improve practical 

interaction, and more inclined to frank and 

straightforward dialogue. This was a relationship that was growing, flourishing, and showing promise beyond the expectations that 

greeted the idea of military-to-military normalization in 1995–1996. However, a range of 

hard problems revolving around attitudes and 

issues that are artifacts of the war, Vietnam’s 

commitment to the principles of nonalignment, a hypersensitivity to matters of sovereignty, hesitancy about embracing certain 

aspects of practical bilateral defense cooperation such as training and exercises, and 

Hanoi’s concerns regarding the consequences 

of increasing proximity to Washington suggest that this relationship will continue to 

progress in measured ways.

Where to Go from Here?

How will the United States move the relationship from where it is today? How can we 

press beyond the current parameters? And how 

can we best nudge the Vietnamese toward a 

much more direct military cooperation?

Three variables need to be factored into 

planning next steps in the defense relationship with Vietnam:

■ High-level buy-in to a concept of 

enhanced defense relationships does not 

translate readily into anything more than 

a commitment to make a commitment. 

Though the prime minister endorsed the idea 

of more profound dialogue, heightened interaction, and accelerated practical bilateral 

both sides had become 

more knowledgeable 

about one another, better 

equipped to react to 

opportunities, and more 

inclined to frank and 

straightforward dialogue
No. 246, September 2009 Strategic Forum 7

of interaction as the means of introducing 

new ideas; utilize existing mechanisms of 

communication as the way to socialize new 

initiatives; and identify the least dramatic 

way of accomplishing a new activity. Some 

basic guidelines for conducting the U.S.-

Vietnam defense relationship include:

■ frame advances in the vocabulary of 

the existing relationship

■ utilize informational exchanges as the 

means to introduce new ideas

■ stick to formulas that enshrine the 

reciprocal dimension to the relationship

■ treat Vietnam as a strategic equal

■ deliver the humanitarian assistance 

necessary to grease the cogs

■ confront the domestic legal and political realities of the Agent Orange issue

■ minimize rhetoric that proclaims 

every success as a net loss for China

■ synchronize new bilateral developments with ASEAN-approved activities

■ recognize Vietnam’s concern with 

being left behind as the region thrives

■ build slowly and carefully on existing 

bilateral activities

■ give Vietnam the level of attention it 

craves

■ build on Vietnam’s regional interests 

and global concerns.

In program-focused terms, the United 

States should press the Vietnamese toward 

using IMET for much more strictly mainstream military education opportunities. The 

U.S. Government should move employment of 

IMET resources from the agreed upon areas 

of use—military medicine, military scientific 

and technological cooperation, and humanitarian cooperation—to areas of real military 

training, perhaps beginning with some modest Mobile Training Teams focused on airport safety, armored personnel carrier (APC) 

maintenance, and other areas that have 

been at the core of “theoretical” discussions 

with the Vietnamese of what might be possible in the future. Enrolling Vietnamese military officers in more expanded IMET courses 

focused on professionalism and civil-military 

relations would be an important means of 

developing a comfort level with the notion of 

selling hardware and systems to Vietnam.

The United States should continue to urge 

the Vietnamese to sign on to the Proliferation 

Security Initiative, whose principals represent 

common ground. Hanoi continues to fret about 

the international law involved, level of commitment required, and consequences for its 

nonaligned status. Between the desire within 

DOD to define an inventive means of bringing the uncommitted and undecided along and 

Vietnam’s own continuing inquisitiveness about 

this program, Washington should be able to 

find a way to move things along in a manner 

that satisfies Vietnam’s concerns and serves U.S. 

interest by getting Hanoi married to regional 

counterproliferation activities.

The United States should see Vietnam’s 

decision to sign a letter of request (LOR) for 

price and availability information regarding long-discussed helicopter parts as a positive step, even if that process has stalled as 

Vietnam’s military takes another look at the 

requirement. Vietnam’s agreement to take 

the first step in that process with an eye to 

acquiring spare parts and possible repairs 

or restorations for the UH–1s that remain in 

country, followed by a similar LOR involving 

APC parts, opens up a new set of opportunities for advancing practical military relations. 

The foreign military sales process is lengthy 

and legally complex, but in the end it is a 

positive step toward cooperation on ways that 

can benefit the PAVN, develop existing capabilities, enhance professionalism, and help 

identify common ground on which the United 

States and Vietnam can cooperate.

The United States should urge Vietnam 

to agree to more than one U.S. Navy gray hull 

ship visit a year and should consider a decision to diversify these activities. DOD encourages refueling stops and passing exercise–type 

activities that would enhance Vietnam’s maritime safety procedures, and in early 2009, 

DOD accomplished a flyout to the USS Stennis, 

overcoming an early and overwhelming reluctance on the part of Vietnamese defense policy leaders to engage with the United States in 

a fashion that would put Vietnamese in proximity with American warmaking capabilities, 

advanced technology, aircraft carriers, and 

other significant modern platforms. These are 

activities that should be encouraged because 

they would nudge Vietnam toward opportunities to derive training value from activities with 

the U.S. military.

Vietnam should sign an acquisition 

cross-servicing agreement, a bilateral agreement that facilitates the exchange of logistics 

support, supplies, and services during ship 

visits, exercises, training, or emergency situations. Hanoi’s concern with this agreement 

is that it could involve providing services for 

U.S. military assets deploying in ways that 

are not supported by the Vietnamese government. The United States should focus on the 

bilateral advantages of being able to pay in 

kind in a fashion that facilitates ship visits to Vietnam, or enabling the use of local 

resources in the context of bilateral training and exercise events, as a means of selling 

the practical, operational advantages of an 

acquisition cross-servicing arrangement.

The United States has worked with 

Vietnam to engender an interest in enhancing 

its peacekeeping and search and rescue capabilities, so that Vietnam is prepared to utilize existing U.S. programs to develop those 

niche abilities. Hanoi’s willingness to assume 

increased obligations in the region and on 

the global stage as a leader and catalyst for 

transnational cooperation has made it slightly 

more comfortable with the notion of engaging in multilateral activities, informational 

exchanges, and regional educational opportunities in which the United States is involved, 

and even bankrolling such exercises. Vietnam 

has committed to participate in the U.S. 

Government’s Global Peacekeeping Operations 

Initiative, though the highest levels continue 

to add caveats suggesting some residual reluctance to embrace this opportunity entirely. 

Washington should be 

able to find a way to 

move things along in 

a manner that satisfies 

Vietnam’s concerns 

and serves U.S. interest 

by getting Hanoi 

married to regional 

counterproliferation 

activities
8 Strategic Forum No. 246, September 2009

The United States needs to identify the additional effort necessary to achieve unconditional Vietnamese comfort with the initiative 

in a way that will make cooperation on other 

regional challenges—maritime security, for 

example—that much easier to broach when 

the time comes.

The key to moving ahead on defense 

cooperation, the critical step necessary to take 

the relationship to the next level, is a willingness to press beyond existing parameters 

and policies and to chip away at longstanding 

ceilings and limits on activities. There are 

several mutually accepted limits that have 

been a part of the relationship since 1997, 

including the ceiling on the number of highlevel visits per year, annual ship visits, and 

monthly activities in the defense relationship. 

The United States understands that there 

are operational limits to Vietnam’s ability 

to take advantage of opportunities. However, 

these ought not to be limiting factors, especially when opportunities that can contribute 

in a positive way to improving cooperation 

and understanding are at stake. These limits no longer serve the relationship. The result 

is the inability to take advantage of even the 

most tantalizing and logical of chances for 

enhanced bilateral cooperation on security 

and defense issues of mutual interest.

It is important to help the Vietnamese 

get accustomed to the notion that as the 

bilateral defense relationship begins to focus 

on building capabilities and developing new 

skill sets in specialized areas—peacekeeping, environmental security, search and rescue, and regional disaster response—our 

two defense establishments eventually will 

have to turn attention to defense reform, professional military education, standards of 

conduct, and civil-military relations. These 

issues will have to become as much of a part 

of the bilateral dialogue as the more management-focused efforts to keep the calendar 

of events in the defense relationship organized and compelling, not only because of 

the legislative requirements, end-user obligations that are explicitly a part of IMET and 

foreign military financing, but also because 

of the trajectory the bilateral dialogue should 

take. The U.S.-Vietnam relationship will benefit by developing from practical cooperation on programs to a much more strategic 

approach to developing defense establishment resources and capabilities. The DOD 

dialogue with the Philippines involves a 

mutual investment in Philippines Defense 

Reform. The U.S. defense relationship with 

Indonesia has taken on a similar dimension. And the U.S. defense relationship with 

Thailand also involves a commitment to 

defense resource management reforms. This 

might be down the road for Vietnam, but 

the United States needs to acknowledge that 

a real partnership will also end up having 

the two sides speaking to one another about 

growing the military relationship in a way 

that focuses on these responsibilities.

The idea of a “policy dialogue” between 

the Department of Defense and the ministry 

of defense, mentioned during Prime Minister 

Dung’s mid-2008 meetings with Secretary 

Gates, will bring real dividends for both sides 

by elevating the dialogue from program management and issues of practical cooperation to enduring defense and security issues 

regional and global in scope, to envisioning 

the strategic future of U.S.-Vietnam defense 

and security cooperation, and to wide-ranging discussions of future trends and challenges in a transforming world.

Notes

1

 A long history of humanitarian activities in Vietnam 

predated normalization. Since the late 1980s, civic action 

work by U.S. Pacific Command focused on schoolhouse construction, medical civil action programs, and flood relief, 

associated in the period from 1988 through 1994 with prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) activities. When 

Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy developed the entry 

level program that led to normalization of military relations 

in November 1996, the Pentagon sought to utilize the kind 

of confidence-building activities that had paved the way for 

increased access in the context of the POW/MIA program during 1987–1990.

2

 During Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman’s 

visit to Hanoi in summer 2005, Defense Minister Pham Van 

Tra articulated this trilogy of interests, clearly indicating 

that this approach continued to define the maximum feasible 

parameters for bilateral defense cooperation.

3

 See Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler, “Paint-byNumbers Democracy: The Stakes, Structure, and Results of 

the 2007 Vietnamese National Assembly Election,” Journal of 

Vietnamese Studies 4, no. 1, 1–48. At the time, the External 

Relations Department’s explanation of its abrupt departure 

from the agreed-upon plan of action was regarded as a cover 

for enduring defense ministry tentativeness about the proposed work toward defense relations with the United States.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by 

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in national security affairs from this country and abroad. The 

opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect 

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The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

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I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Patrick M. Cronin

Eugene B. Rumer Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press