United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 19, 2019 Decided May 21, 2019

No. 18-7004

DL, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-01437)

Carolyn Smith Pravlik argued the cause for appellants.

With her on the briefs were Todd A. Gluckman and Cyrus 

Mehri. Margaret A. Kohn entered an appearance. 

Michael T. Kirkpatrick and Allison M. Zieve were on the 

brief for amici curiae Public Citizen, Inc., et al., in support of 

appellants. 

Lucy E. Pittman, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause 

for appellees. With her on the brief were Karl A. Racine, 

Attorney General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General. 

Caroline S. Van Zile, Deputy Solicitor General, entered an 

appearance.
2

Charles W. Scarborough, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for amicus curiae United States of 

America supporting appellees. With him on the brief was Jessie 

K. Liu, U.S. Attorney.

Before: GARLAND,Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge 

SENTELLE.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: When plaintiffs prevail in a civil 

rights case, the law usually entitles them to recover reasonable 

attorney’s fees. Federal district judges, whom Congress has 

tasked with tabulating those fees, frequently find themselves 

whipsawed between two seemingly discordant instructions: 

(1) ascertain the hourly rate for lawyers performing similar 

work “with a fair degree of accuracy” using “specific 

evidence,” National Association of Concerned Veterans v. 

Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982),

but (2) do so without turning fee calculations into “a second 

major litigation,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 

(1983). To reconcile those directives, district courts often turn 

to a fee matrix—that is, a chart averaging rates for attorneys at 

different experience levels. For decades, courts in this circuit 

have relied on some version of what is known as the Laffey

matrix. Created in the 1980s, that matrix is based on a relatively 

small sample of rates charged by sophisticated federal-court

practitioners in the District of Columbia. Litigants have 

updated the matrix for inflation using an assortment of tools.

Recently, however, the United States Attorney’s Office sought

to replace this standby with a new default matrix based on data 
3

for all types of lawyers—not just those who litigate complex 

federal cases—from the entire metropolitan area—not just the 

District of Columbia. 

In this case, after plaintiffs prevailed in a long-running 

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act class action, the 

district court accepted the District of Columbia’s invitation to 

rely on the USAO’s new matrix in awarding fees. But as we 

explain below, the new matrix departs from the statutory 

requirement that reasonable fees be tethered to “rates 

prevailing in the community” for the “kind and quality of 

services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). We therefore

vacate the award and remand for the district court to recalculate 

the hourly rate based on evidence that focuses on fees for 

attorneys practicing complex federal litigation in the District of 

Columbia. 

I.

We begin by reviewing the elementary principles 

governing fee-shifting rate calculations and the genealogy of 

fee matrices in this circuit, and then turn to the history of this 

particular case.

A.

As Congress enacted a growing number of laws securing 

civil rights, it confronted a problem: “enforcement would prove 

difficult” without private lawsuits, and would-be plaintiffs 

needed skilled lawyers to guide them through the obstacle 

course of complex litigation. Newman v. Piggie Park 

Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968). But those plaintiffs 

often lacked financial resources “indispensable” to attracting

“competent counsel” willing and able to take on defendants of 

greater means. Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. 

Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1521 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) 

(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). So Congress 
4

turned to fee-shifting provisions, simultaneously 

“encourag[ing] plaintiffs to bring suit” and allowing those who 

prevail to finance the cost of legal assistance by recovering fees

from the defendant. Mary Frances Derfner & Arthur D. Wolf, 

1 Court Awarded Attorney Fees ¶ 5.03, § 7(a) (2018 ed.);

accord Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402 (“Congress therefore 

enacted the provision for counsel fees . . . to encourage 

individuals injured . . . to seek judicial relief . . . .”). “[O]ver 

100 separate statutes” now provide “for the award of attorney’s 

fees.” In re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Congressional 

Research Service, Report 94-970, Awards of Attorneys’ Fees 

by Federal Courts and Federal Agencies 57–117 (Oct. 22, 

2009) (listing them). 

The basic formula for calculating an attorney fee award 

seems straightforward: multiply “the number of hours 

reasonably exp[e]nded in litigation” by “a reasonable hourly 

rate or ‘lodestar.’” Cumberland Mountains, 857 F.2d at 1517.

The Supreme Court has offered guidance about how to perform 

that calculation, explaining that “reasonable fees” are those 

grounded in rates “prevailing in the community for similar 

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience 

and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 

(1984). The statute at issue here, the Individuals with 

Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), codifies that interpretation 

of “reasonable”: “Fees awarded under [IDEA] shall be based 

on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or 

proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services 

furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C).

Implementing this relatively simple definition has proven 

vexing. See Reed v. District of Columbia, 843 F.3d 517, 521 

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[D]etermining . . . the prevailing market 

rate[] is ‘inherently difficult.’” (quoting Eley v. District of 
5

Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015))). We have 

operationalized it with a burden-shifting framework: To begin, 

“a fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to 

an award . . . and justifying the reasonableness of the rates.” 

Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995). At that point, the claimed fee “is presumed to be the 

reasonable fee contemplated by” the statute, and the burden 

shifts to the defendant to present “equally specific 

countervailing evidence” if it seeks a different (presumably 

lower) rate. Id. at 1109 (internal quotation marks omitted).

For either party, a matrix showing the average hourly price 

tag of comparable lawyers may “provide a useful starting 

point” in calculating market rates. Id. But because such 

“matrices are somewhat crude,” the matrix’s proponent usually 

cannot stop there. Id. Instead, the proponent may point to 

additional evidence, which can include “surveys to update the 

matrix; affidavits reciting the precise fees that attorneys with 

similar qualifications have received from fee-paying clients in 

comparable cases; and evidence of recent fees awarded by the 

courts or through settlement to attorneys with comparable 

qualifications handling similar cases.” Id. No particular type of 

evidence can be considered gospel; “evidence of the prevailing 

market rate can take many forms.” Eley, 793 F.3d at 104 n.5. 

The first and most influential matrix in this circuit debuted 

in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., a 1983 Title VII and Equal 

Pay Act case. 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part, 

Cumberland Mountains, 857 F.2d 1516. In those fledgling 

days—before big data, Google, or a prolific cottage industry 

dedicated to studying the legal profession—the prevailing

plaintiff’s attorney created a fee schedule by “inquir[ing] into 

the billing rates of firms in Washington, D.C., which [were] 

engaged in active litigation practice in the federal courts” and 
6

collecting “affidavits . . . giving specific rate information, 

supporting and substantiating the rates described.” First 

Rezneck Affidavit ¶ 9, Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., No. 

1:70-cv-02111-AER (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 1983), Joint Appendix 

(“J.A.”) 571–72. A star was born. See Eley, 793 F.3d at 100

(describing the Laffey matrix as “[t]he most commonly used fee 

matrix” in this circuit “for lawyers who practice ‘complex 

federal litigation’”).

We endorsed the Laffey matrix in Save Our Cumberland 

Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel. Sitting en banc, we “commend[ed]

its use for the year to which it applie[d]” and suggested “the 

compiling of a similar schedule of prevailing community rates 

for other relevant years.” Cumberland Mountains, 857 F.2d at 

1525. Joseph Yablonski, a Washington, D.C. litigator,

answered that call by speaking “with attorneys from” seven 

major law firms and comparing the rates he “found with the 

rates set forth in two broad-ranging surveys of hourly rates 

published in the National Law Journal.” Yablonski 

Declaration ¶¶ 5–6, Broderick v. Ruder, No. 1:86-cv-01834-

JHP (D.D.C. 1989), J.A. 624–25. Yablonski’s labors updated 

Laffey’s rates through 1989. Somewhat confusingly, litigants 

routinely refer to both the original 1983 matrix and Yablonski’s 

1989 update as the “Laffey matrix.”

In the following decades, hourly rate disputes in this 

circuit often revolved around whether a case was sufficiently 

complex to warrant Laffey rates, see, e.g., Reed, 843 F.3d at 

525–26 (addressing that question in an IDEA case), and, if so, 

how best to update the Laffey matrix for inflation, see Eley, 793 

F.3d at 101 (describing that debate). The USAO maintained 

one version of the matrix, relying on the original 1983 base data

updated through a Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation index

that tracks regional price increases in all goods. Id. Some 

plaintiffs’ attorneys argued that this index failed to capture the 
7

true rate of inflationary change and began advancing a version 

of the 1989 Laffey data updated with a different Bureau of 

Labor Statistics index called the Legal Services Index (LSI), 

which estimates price increases for the legal market 

nationwide. Id. at 101–02. When the two were pitted against 

each other, courts frequently found the LSI Laffey matrix more 

persuasive. See id. (observing that “critics” of the USAO’s 

Laffey matrix had “advocated, to some degree of success, for a 

competing Laffey Matrix . . . that uses the Legal Services 

Index”); see also Salazar v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 58, 

65 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s choice to apply 

the LSI Laffey matrix over the USAO’s). 

Since 2015, however, the USAO has undertaken a major 

effort to replace the Laffey datasets by using a more current rate 

survey as the base for a brand new matrix. For those figures,

the USAO turned to the annual Survey of Law Firm 

Economics, published by ALM Legal Intelligence (“ALM”) in 

conjunction with the National Law Journal. The off-the-rack 

version of that survey publishes hourly rate data for thousands 

of lawyers engaged in all types of practice, all over the country. 

The USAO custom ordered a subset of the 2011 survey’s data 

covering the “Washington, D.C. metro area,” defined by the 

Census Bureau to include portions of Virginia, Maryland, and 

West Virginia. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 84, DL v. District of 

Columbia, 1:05-cv-01437-RCL, ECF No. 566-17 (D.D.C. May 

21, 2017), J.A. 1573. This tailored dataset summarizes 

“standard hourly billing rates” for 350 attorneys, yielding 

average rates hundreds of dollars below those reflected in the 

LSI Laffey matrix. Id. The USAO intends to update ALM’s 

2011 data for inflation using still another index focusing on 

industry-specific price increases nationwide.

B.

This case began almost fifteen years ago when plaintiffs, 
8

parents of several children aged three to six, filed suit “alleging 

a ‘pervasive and systemic’ breakdown in the” District of 

Columbia’s compliance with IDEA resulting from the 

District’s failure “to identify large numbers of disabled 

children and delivering inadequate and delayed [educational] 

services to many others.” DL v. District of Columbia, 860 F.3d 

713, 718 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Following a protracted dispute 

regarding class certification resulting in two separate trips to 

this court, extensive motions practice, and two separate bench 

trials, “the district court issued a 130-page opinion finding the 

District liable” on most counts and ordered sweeping injunctive 

relief. Id. at 719–20. We affirmed “in all respects.” Id. at 717. 

As plaintiffs had prevailed on the majority of their claims, 

fee litigation commenced. Although the parties contested many 

issues in the district court, all but the hourly rate have dropped 

out on appeal. Plaintiffs sought attorney fees based on the LSI 

version of the Laffey matrix. The District offered the new 

USAO matrix as an alternative. Both sides produced a pile of 

evidence purporting to prove that their matrix better reflects the 

relevant rates, including affidavits from economists and 

attorneys; various commercially-available rate surveys; and 

information regarding fees requested, awarded, and settled on 

in other cases.

The district court began by finding that both matrices were 

“presumptively” applicable to “complex federal litigation.” DL 

v. District of Columbia, 267 F. Supp. 3d 55, 69 (D.D.C. 2017).

Comparing the two, however, the court was more persuaded by 

the USAO’s new matrix, especially its statistically significant 

sample size and “more narrowly defined” experience 

categories. Id. at 69–70. Thus, despite plaintiffs’ objection that 

the data underlying the USAO’s new matrix incorporates rates 

for non-litigators outside the District, the court ordered 

plaintiffs to recalculate their fees using the USAO’s rates. Id.
9

at 72. Largely as a result of that order (in conjunction with a 

few minor adjustments unchallenged on appeal), the requested 

$9.76 million fee dropped to a $6.96 million award. Plaintiffs 

appeal.

II.

Simply stated, the question before us is whether the district 

court abused its discretion in determining that the hourly rates

in the USAO’s matrix are “reasonable.” Recall that IDEA 

makes express a requirement that inheres in any statutory 

provision for “reasonable attorney’s fees”: such fees must be 

calculated using “rates prevailing in the community in which 

the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of 

services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C); accord Blum, 

465 U.S. at 895 n.11 (explaining that this is part of what it 

means to be “reasonable”). Recall also that once “a fee 

applicant” has met the preliminary burden of “justifying the 

reasonableness of the rates,” those rates are “presumed to 

be . . . reasonable” unless and until the defendant offers 

“equally specific countervailing evidence” supporting another 

rate. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107, 1109 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). We will reverse a district court’s determination 

that certain hourly rates are reasonable when there has been a 

“clear misapplication of legal principles, arbitrary fact finding, 

or unprincipled disregard for the record evidence.” Kattan ex 

rel. Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. 

Cir. 1993), as amended (June 30, 1993); see also Koon v. 

United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A district court by 

definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of 

law.”). 

A.

We begin with the District’s argument that plaintiffs failed 

to meet their initial burden to support with specific evidence 
10

their claim that the LSI Laffey rates satisfy the statute’s

command. Our recent opinion in Salazar v. District of 

Columbia, however, all but compels the conclusion that 

plaintiffs cleared that bar. The Salazar plaintiffs relied on the 

same types of evidence in essentially the same level of detail to 

support the same rate matrix (for a slightly earlier year). 809 

F.3d at 64–65. That evidence, we concluded, was more than 

enough to pass the burden onto the District. Id. at 65 (“With 

these numbers and submissions in the record, the district 

court’s point that the LSI-adjusted matrix is probably a 

conservative estimate of the actual cost of legal services in this 

area, does not appear illogical.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). The District has given us no reason to reach a 

different conclusion on such a similar record. 

B.

The meatier question, then, is whether the District satisfied 

its rebuttal burden. The USAO’s new matrix formed the 

cornerstone of the rebuttal case, and the district court treated 

that matrix as “presumptively” applicable. DL, 267 F. Supp. 3d 

at 69. We are at a loss to understand the basis of that 

presumption, given that this court had yet to review the new 

matrix. The proper inquiry, under the applicable legal 

principles, was whether the District supported its matrix with

“equally specific countervailing evidence.” Covington, 57 F.3d 

at 1109 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The District contends that the USAO’s more recent raw 

data and statistically significant sample size make its matrix

superior to plaintiffs’ favored LSI Laffey matrix. Crucially, 

however, those traits matter only if the data surveys the 

relevant population. As plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Michael 

Kavanaugh, put it, “comparable prices are found by observing 

comparable goods.” Second Kavanaugh Declaration ¶ 8, DL v. 

District of Columbia, 1:05-cv-01437-RCL, ECF No. 566-11
11

(Apr. 26, 2017), J.A. 1380. For example, for someone house 

hunting in Memphis, a survey of real estate prices in Seattle—

even one with a perfect response rate updated daily—would be

of no use. The same is true here. The USAO’s matrix is helpful 

only if it canvasses the relevant type of lawyer, which it does 

not.

To begin with, the USAO’s matrix incorporates rates for

the wrong types of practitioner. The parties and the district 

court agree that this case qualifies as “complex federal 

litigation.” DL, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 69. Yet rather than confine 

its data to rates charged by attorneys practicing that genre of 

litigation—or even just litigators in general—the survey that 

the USAO drew from incorporates rates from all types of 

lawyers. Respondents include real estate lawyers, family 

lawyers, and insurance lawyers—lawyers manifestly not 

offering “the kind and quality of services furnished” by these 

plaintiffs’ attorneys, as the statute requires of comparators. 20 

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C); accord Eley, 793 F.3d at 105 (fee 

analysis should focus on “lawyers . . . doing the same type of 

litigation” (emphasis omitted)). It is obvious that the rates 

charged for, say, simple wills are lower than those for complex 

federal litigation. Worse still, nothing in the record reveals

what percentage of respondents in the USAO’s custom crosssection of the ALM data were litigators. For all we know, the 

number could be anywhere from zero to all 350.

Compounding this first error, the USAO’s custom-ordered 

dataset surveys lawyers far beyond the “community in which 

th[is] action . . . arose.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(C)(3). Plaintiffs 

brought this case on behalf of District of Columbia residents 

regarding District of Columbia schools against the District of 

Columbia. Yet the USAO matrix draws from lawyers who 

practice in the entire “metro area” as defined by the United 

States Census Bureau. The phrase “metro area” suggests 
12

proximity, but—according to the Census Bureau’s definition—

that area stretches well beyond the District to cover thousands

of square miles over three states, from rural Madison County, 

Virginia, to the eastern shore of Maryland, back to the foothills 

of Jefferson County, West Virginia. Needless to say, this case

has no connection to most of those areas. Our court has held 

that ordinarily “the relevant community is the one in which the 

district court sits.” Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 251 

(D.C. Cir. 1982). Accordingly, our decisions refer to the 

relevant community as the District of Columbia. See, e.g., 

Salazar, 809 F.3d at 64 (discussing “prices for legal services in 

Washington, D.C.”); Covington, 57 F.3d at 1104 (discussing 

evidence of rates “in the District of Columbia”). That general 

rule fits comfortably with the facts of this case. Yet here, more 

than half the data in the USAO’s customized dataset comes 

from outside the District of Columbia, see Appellant’s Br. 20, 

and District counsel acknowledges that it includes data from 

throughout the three neighboring states, see Oral Arg. Rec. 

28:04–28:22. Again, it is obvious, as District counsel 

recognizes, that fees are lower in rural areas than in the District. 

See Oral Arg. Rec. 31:04–31:30. Indeed, the District’s own 

evidence shows that rates for legal services in the District of 

Columbia are among the highest anywhere. National Law 

Journal & ALM Legal Intelligence, The Survey of Law Firm 

Economics, 139–41 (2011 ed.), J.A. 1485–87.

Confronted with these two flaws, the district court said 

nothing about them, resting exclusively on its statement that 

the USAO’s matrix was “presumptively applicable.” DL, 267 

F. Supp. 3d at 69. In doing so, the court abused its discretion 

twice over. First, by failing to determine whether the USAO’s 

matrix satisfies Congress’s statutory baseline, the court

committed a “clear misapplication of legal principles.” Kattan, 

995 F.2d at 278; see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 100. And second, 
13

it “disregard[ed] . . . record evidence” that its chosen matrix 

failed to achieve that baseline. Kattan, 995 F.2d at 278.

Calling in reinforcements, the District points to a growing 

consensus among the district judges in this circuit that the 

USAO matrix is superior to Laffey. See, e.g., Lewis v. District 

of Columbia, No. 1:15-cv-521-JEB, 2018 WL 6308722, at *8 

(D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2018) (collecting cases). Many of those cases 

repeat the district court’s fundamental error here: none finds, 

based on record evidence, that the new matrix is based on rates 

for complex federal litigators in the District. See id. at *9 (no 

response to the plaintiff’s objection that the new USAO matrix 

“reflects all types of legal services”); Gatore v. United States 

Department of Homeland Security, 286 F. Supp. 3d 25, 42–43 

(D.D.C. 2017) (no response to observation that the USAO’s 

survey may be “over-inclusive”); Electronic Privacy 

Information Center v. United States Drug Enforcement 

Administration, 266 F. Supp. 3d 162, 170–71 (D.D.C. 2017) 

(no discussion of survey composition); Clemente v. Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, No. 1:08-cv-1252-BJR, 2017 WL 

3669617, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2017) (merely describing the 

new USAO matrix as “measur[ing] rates in the legal services 

industry”). Others apparently lacked the benefit of any briefing 

on the new matrix’s flaws. See, e.g., Wadelton v. Department 

of State, No. 1:13-cv-412-TSC, 2018 WL 4705793, at *12 

(D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2018) (adopting new USAO matrix sua 

sponte “[a]lthough the parties ha[d] not briefed” it); National 

Security Counselors v. Central Intelligence Agency, No. 1:11-

cv-444-BAH, 2017 WL 5633091, at *17 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 

2017) (employing the new USAO matrix after plaintiffs offered 

“no analysis of the USAO’s newest methodology”). So, even 

sympathizing with the district court’s appetite for more recent 

data, we are unpersuaded by its decision to embrace newer but 

irrelevant figures.
14

Despite the evidentiary defects in the record, the District 

offers an alternative basis for affirming: its supplemental proof 

demonstrates that the USAO’s matrix accurately reflects 

complex litigation rates in the District of Columbia. But the 

district court made no findings about the evidence the District 

uses to back up that claim, and some of that data appears to be 

of dubious value. For example, the District’s primary redoubt 

comprises two sets of nationwide data from the 2014 ALM 

survey. But it is not at all obvious that these nationwide datasets

are useful comparators for rates in the District. See National 

Law Journal & ALM Legal Intelligence, The Survey of Law 

Firm Economics 139–41 (2011 ed.), J.A. 1485–87 (showing 

that rates in the District substantially exceed those in most other 

jurisdictions). Nonetheless, mindful of the district court’s 

primary factfinding role, we leave it for that court to assess on 

remand the impact, if any, of the District’s remaining market 

evidence and to take further evidence if necessary to arrive at a 

“reasonable rate.”

C.

The District argues that “even if” we reject the USAO’s 

new matrix—as we now have—“that does not mean that 

[plaintiffs] were entitled to rates under the LSI [Laffey] 

Matrix.” Appellee’s Br. 25. But it offers one and only one 

argument for rates in between the two: that this court has held 

that attorneys in IDEA cases should not be compensated at 

Laffey rates. Id. That argument mischaracterizes our precedent. 

True, we have held that IDEA cases sometimes fall within a 

submarket characterized by below-Laffey rates. Reed, 843 F.3d 

at 525. But such cases involved individual IDEA plaintiffs 

litigating non-complex cases primarily before an 

administrative body. See id. (noting individual “IDEA litigants 

may not have discovery and pre-trial exchanges of the sort 

found in other federal litigation”); Eley, 793 F.3d at 105 n.6 

(discussing “representation in IDEA administrative due 
15

process hearings” (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord

Second Kohn Affidavit ¶¶ 9–17, No. 1:05-cv-01437-RCL, 

ECF No. 566-5 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2017), J.A. 1359–61 

(describing typical IDEA case and noting that, “in an even 

unusually complex individual IDEA case appealed to the 

district court,” the “full record . . . would typically fit into two 

banker’s boxes”). Indeed, we have always left open “the 

possibility that . . . fee applicants may be able to demonstrate 

that IDEA cases are ‘complex federal litigation’ to which the 

Laffey Matrix presumptively applies.” Reed, 843 F.3d at 525.

And here the district court found that this case qualifies as 

“complex federal litigation,” DL, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 69, a 

finding the District has not challenged, see Appellee’s Br. 22 

n.8. It therefore may not claim that fees from individualized 

IDEA actions are appropriate comparators. 

To be sure, the district court identified other concerns 

regarding the LSI Laffey matrix, including (1) the age of the

raw data; (2) whether it captures a truly representative sample 

of complex federal litigators; and (3) the grouping of attorneys 

into just five experience bands. DL, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 69–70.

These observations suggest that as time passes, the Laffey

matrix may well—like shoulder pads, eight-tracks, and other 

’80s fads before it—be losing its shine. In this particular case, 

however, the District raised no argument that these issues 

justify rates somewhere between the two matrices. See

Appellee’s Br. 25. Therefore, it has forfeited any such 

contention. Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 

2019) (“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in his 

opening brief.”). 

D.

One last issue remains: the rates for plaintiffs’ only lawyer 

who regularly bills fee-paying clients, Cyrus Mehri. We see no 

reason why the rates that apply to the rest of plaintiffs’ lawyers
16

would yield inadequate compensation for Mehri’s services.

Plaintiffs contend that Mehri is instead entitled to his usual 

billing rate, but his sparse affidavit tells little about whether his 

relatively minimal contributions to the case differ sufficiently 

from his colleagues’ to warrant a different methodology. Mehri 

Affidavit, No. 1:05-cv-01437-RCL, ECF No. 537-17 (Sept. 26, 

2016), J.A. 428–29 (asserting he “did work related to class 

certification” and tried to “broker a resolution to this case”). As 

Eley instructs, the focus is properly on the market rate “charged 

by for-profit lawyers” for “the same type of litigation.” 793 

F.3d at 105. And although stating in his affidavit that he 

charges the same rate no matter what type of work he performs, 

Mehri nowhere represents that a client on the market would 

hire him at that rate for the types of services he performed in

this case. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by compensating Mehri using the same method as 

his co-counsel. 

III.

Not so long ago, the prevailing belief was that parties 

would often be able to agree on reasonable attorney’s fees. See 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (“Ideally, of course, litigants will 

settle the amount of a fee.”). We regret that this prophecy has 

gone unfulfilled and fervently hope that practitioners in this 

circuit—on both the plaintiff and defense sides of the bar—will 

work together and think creatively about how to produce a 

reliable assessment of fees charged for complex federal 

litigation in the District. In the meantime, however, we must 

discharge our duty to ensure that the adversarial alternative 

produces results that respect Congress’s mandates. Because the 

fee award in this case falls short of that goal, we vacate it and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered.
SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: Ambrose

Bierce defined a lawyer as “[o]ne skilled in circumvention of the

law.” Ambrose Bierce, The Unabridged Devil’s Dictionary 147

(Univ. of Georgia Press 2000). Though I do not suggest that this

is an accurate description, I nonetheless would observe that the

jurisprudence of IDEA litigation attorney-fee awards well

establishes that lawyers and jurists are professionals skilled in

complicating the law. The jurisprudential odyssey on this sea

began with a rather straightforward mandate from Congress in

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3), a subsection headed “Jurisdiction of

district courts; attorney fees.” (Emphasis added.) 

More specifically, Congress provided that, “[i]n any action

or proceeding brought [under the IDEA provision providing

judicial relief], the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable

attorneys’ fees as part of the costs.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). While the following subsections provide

some limitations and directions for the computation of the

award, the basic task created by Congress and placed within the

jurisdiction of the district court is a factual determination of the

reasonableness of attorneys’ fees to be awarded as part of the

costs in IDEA actions. The congressional language would seem

to rather straightforwardly call for findings of fact, concerning

the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees to be awarded. The district

court in the present controversy made such findings which we

are now called upon to review. 

“[T]he standard governing appellate review of a district

court’s finding of [facts] is that set forth in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 52(a).” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,

573 (1985). Rule 52(a) provides that “[f]indings of fact,

whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside

unless clearly erroneous . . . .” Not only would it seem apparent

that this is the standard of review we should be applying to the

issues before us, it seems especially appropriate where the

question is expressly described as within the “jurisdiction of
2

district courts” in the enactment creating the right to such a

finding. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). 

Indeed, we have expressly held in previous IDEA class

litigation that “[w]e review the district court’s fee award for

abuse of discretion, and will not upset its hourly rate

determination absent clear misapplication of legal principles,

arbitrary factfinding, or unprincipled disregard for the record

evidence.” Eley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 103 (D.C.

Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and

citations deleted). In spite of this standard, in the present case,

the majority reviews the district court’s determination of the

factual questions before us, not for compliance with Rule 52(a),

nor for abuse of discretion, but as if it were a question of law. 

The majority asks not whether the district court committed

a clear misapplication of legal principles, or arbitrary

factfinding, or unprincipled disregard for record evidence, but

rather whether the district court’s findings of fact fit within a

detailed grid, the Laffey Matrix, which might be construed as a

proffer by the prevailing party for findings of fact, but more

closely resembles a detailed regulation adopted by some

government agency after an appropriate period of notice and

comment.

The district court found another matrix to be more factually

appropriate. The making of that factual determination, under the

law in general and under the governing statute in particular, is

the district court’s province. I grant that we as an appellate

reviewing court have participated in the establishment of this

legislation-like matrix. I further realize that we have the

authority to establish precedent binding upon district courts and

upon panels of this court such as this one. LaShawn A. v. Barry,

87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). Nonetheless, I
3

have always understood our authority to make binding

precedents to govern matters of law, not findings of fact. The 

present controversy concerns a matter of fact. This, under the

binding precedent of both this circuit and the Supreme Court and

the Rules of Civil Procedure is within the discretion of the

district court, subject only to the limited review described above.

While not necessary to my dissent, I further note that

appellants proffered nothing to convince me that the LSI Matrix

preferred by them is inherentlymore appropriate for the findings

required by the district court in this case than the USAO Matrix

relied upon in the district court’s findings. Appellants’

argument rests on the proposition that the award should have

been based on fees determined by survey of a specific

subcategory of attorneys out of the several set forth in their

preferred matrix: specifically, practitioners in complex federal

litigation in Washington, D.C. The matrix employed by the

district court instead considered the rates of a broader sampling

of attorneys from a broader geographic area, including not only

the District of Columbia, but also adjacent portions of three

states. It is not apparent how this was an abuse of discretion of

the sort that would make the court’s determination reversible

under the standard set forth in the rules and blessed in Anderson

v. Bessemer City, and a multitude of other cases. 

Appellants seem to argue that the district court’s

determination was inconsistent with Congress’s instructions in

section 1415(i)(3)(C). That section mandates that an IDEA fee

award “shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in

which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of

services furnished.” It does not mandate that the community

should be limited to a “community” defined as only the largest

municipality in a region, or to the highest priced professional

practicing in that limited community. 
4

As the purpose of Congress in setting forth the general

limitations of subsection (C) appears to encourage the

determination of a market for assessing the reasonableness of

fees, it would seem that an analysis of the fitness of either

matrix to that determination could, without violating the

standard under which we review factfinding, include reflecting

on the reasonableness of persons obtaining legal representation

in such a hypothetical market. It might be that those persons

would choose the most expensive professionals for the most

expensive part of the market. While such conduct might not be

unreasonable, neither is it inherently unreasonable that they

might choose a less imposing or less expensive attorney who is

nonetheless trusted and competent to do the work in the case. It

may shock counsel before us to learn, but it is not necessary in

every case to have the most specialized or the most expensive

counsel in order to receive competent legal services. In any

event, it is not arbitrary fact finding for the judge to conduct an

analysis of the evidence that is consistent with such supposition. 

In short, I find no abuse of discretion or other reversible error.

My colleagues disagree. I respectfully dissent.