NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MARY C., Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.S., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0149 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD16331 

The Honorable Cari A. Harrison, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Denise L. Carroll Esq., Scottsdale

By Denise L. Carroll

Counsel for Appellant 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Amber E. Pershon

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 10-26-2017
MARY C. v. DCS, J.S. 

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Thomas C. Kleinschmidt1 delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Peter B. Swann joined. 

K L E I N S C H M I D T, Judge:

¶1 Mary C. (Mother) challenges the superior court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her biological son J.S. based on mentalillness and 15-months’ time-in-care. She argues the court erred in finding 

(1) the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) made diligent 

efforts to provide her with appropriate reunification services, and (2) 

termination is in the best interests of the child. Because Mother has shown 

no error, the order is affirmed. 

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 J.S. was born in November 2009. In early 2015, Mother, Father, 

and five-year-old J.S. were homeless.3 The Department of Child Safety 

(DCS) received reports that the family was staying in a drug house, Father 

was abusing substances, and there was domestic violence between Mother 

and Father. DCS interviewed Mother who admitted the family was 

homeless and Father was selling drugs to earn money. She denied either 

parent was abusing substances, but DCS asked her to submit to a urinalysis 

test. She did not comply. 

¶3 DCS took custody of J.S. and filed a petition alleging he was 

dependent as to Mother because she was unable to meet his basic needs, 

 

1 The Honorable Thomas C. Kleinschmidt, retired Judge of the Court 

of Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant 

to Article VI, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution.

2 This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining 

the superior court’s findings. See Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 

Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008). 

3 Father’s parental rights were terminated and he is not a party to this 

appeal.
MARY C. v. DCS, J.S. 

Decision of the Court

3 

had unaddressed mental health and cognitive concerns, and DCS could not 

rule out substance abuse at that time. In March 2015, the court found J.S. 

dependent and set the case plan as family reunification.4 Mother and Father 

moved to Prescott shortly after the proceeding. 

¶4 In April 2015, Mother completed rule-out hair follicle testing 

and urinalysis tests. When these tests returned negative, DCS did not have 

further substance-abuse concerns with Mother. That summer, DCS referred 

Mother for a psychological evaluation which she did not complete. In 

September 2015, Mother began parent-aide services. Mother participated in 

this service without Father because of Father’s prior aggressive behavior. 

At her mid-point evaluation in December, Mother denied neglecting J.S. 

and denied Father presented any safety concerns. Mother unsuccessfully 

closed out of parent-aide in April 2016 because she was not open to 

direction, disagreed with the parent-aide, did not complete the homework, 

and failed to meet the parenting goals which included gaining an 

understanding of domestic violence and substance abuse. DCS did not 

provide a second parent-aide referral because the child was placed out of 

state. Further, DCS does not typically provide second parent-aide referrals 

absent special circumstances. 

¶5 DCS provided Mother a second psychological evaluation 

referral which she completed in January 2016. Mother denied Father’s 

continued substance abuse despite his positive drug tests, denied 

neglecting J.S., and had great difficulty answering basic child care 

questions. Mother was diagnosed with a mild to moderate intellectual 

disability and a rule-out diagnosis of dependent personality disorder. The 

evaluator noted Mother would likely be incapable of raising a child 

independently due to her mental deficiency. 

¶6 Mother and Father participated in couples counseling for 

several months until they were closed out unsuccessfully due to Father’s 

anger issues. Mother told DCS she would not continue counseling without 

Father. DCS provided her information on how to access services in Yavapai 

County and she eventually self-referred to counseling in October 2016. 

¶7 J.S. was moved to an out-of-state placement in June 2016. In 

July 2016, the court changed the case plan to severance and adoption, and 

in August, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the 

mental-illness and fifteen-months out-of-home placement grounds. J.S. 

 

4 Mother was appointed a guardian ad litem during the juvenile court 

proceedings. 
MARY C. v. DCS, J.S. 

Decision of the Court

4 

exhibited aggressive behaviors and was moved to a foster care placement 

in Arizona.

¶8 The juvenile court held a contested severance hearing in 

March 2017. Mother admitted that her relationship with Father was 

emotionally abusive and testified she separated from him in September 

2016. She denied, however, allegations of neglect, domestic violence, and 

Father’s substance abuse. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights on the grounds alleged and found termination was in J.S.’s best 

interests. 

¶9 This court has jurisdiction over Mother’s timey appeal 

pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, Arizona 

Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 8-235(A), 12-2101(A) and 12-120.21(A), 

and Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103 and 104. 

DISCUSSION

¶10 As applicable here, to terminate parental rights, a court must 

find proven by clear and convincing evidence at least one statutory ground 

articulated in A.R.S. § 8-533(B), and must find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child. See Kent K. v. 

Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000). Because the superior court “is in the best 

position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of 

witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” this court will affirm an order 

terminating parental rights as long as it is supported by reasonable 

evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 

2009). 

I. DCS Made Diligent Efforts to Reunify the Family.

¶11 Mother’s only challenge to the juvenile court’s findings 

regarding the statutory grounds of mental illness and time-in-care is that 

DCS did not make a “diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification 

services” after she separated from Father. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). ADES argues 

Mother waived this argument because she did not claim services were 

inadequate until the termination hearing. However, if “at a termination 

hearing, a parent can dispute evidence that ADES claims shows a diligent 

effort to provide appropriate reunification services, including by testifying 

about the services actually provided,” then the argument is properly raised 

for appeal. Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dept. of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178, ¶ 14 

(App. 2014). 
MARY C. v. DCS, J.S. 

Decision of the Court

5 

¶12 The State is constitutionally obligated to make reasonable 

efforts to preserve the family as a necessary predicate to severing parental 

rights. Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 32 (App. 

1999). DCS must provide a parent “with the time and opportunity to 

participate in programs designed to help her become an effective parent.” 

Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). 

However, futile efforts are not required and DCS “is not required to provide 

every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each 

service.” Id. Nor is the court required to “leav[e] the window of opportunity 

for remediation open indefinitely.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 

177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994). 

¶13 Mother argues DCS did not make diligent efforts to provide 

her with reunification services after she separated from Father, primarily 

asserting she was not provided with counseling or a second parent-aide 

referral. We disagree.

¶14 The record indicates Mother participated in some individual 

and joint counseling with Father. After the service closed, she was offered 

an individual referral but refused, stating “there was no need for 

[counseling] and the entire case was a conspiracy and she should have her 

child back.” Nevertheless, DCS provided her with individual counseling 

options in Yavapai County, including instructions on how to contact the 

providers. 

¶15 Mother began participating in self-referred counseling after 

she reportedly left Father in September 2016. Thus, DCS was not required 

to duplicate this service for her. See Pima Cty. Severance Action No. S-2397, 

161 Ariz. 574, 577 (App. 1989) (DCS is not required to provide services that 

were already offered).

¶16 Mother argues DCS should have provided a second 

parent-aide referral after she left Father. However, the record indicates 

parent-aide referrals are only offered a second time under unusual 

circumstances. Additionally, J.S. was in an out-of-state placement until 

approximately three months before the termination proceeding. Thus, a 

second parent-aide referral would have been futile. 

¶17 The record shows DCS provided Mother with numerous 

services including counseling, parent aide, case aide, drug testing, and 

transportation. Mother did not successfully complete many services and 

only showed a willingness to engage after the case plan had changed to 
MARY C. v. DCS, J.S. 

Decision of the Court

6 

termination. The record supports the court’s determination that DCS made 

reasonable efforts to provide Mother reunification services.

II. Mother Has Shown No Error In The Superior Court’s Best 

Interests Finding.

¶18 Mother argues the superior court erred when it found 

termination was in J.S.’s best interests. To support a best interests finding, 

“the court must find either that the child will benefit from termination of 

the relationship or that the child would be harmed by continuation of the 

parental relationship.” Mario G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 282, 286, 

¶ 26 (App. 2011). 

¶19 The evidence in this case supports both alternatives. “One 

factor the court may properly consider in favor of severance is the 

immediate availability of an adoptive placement. Another is whether an 

existing placement is meeting the needs of the child.” Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5 (App. 1998) (citation omitted). The 

superior court properly found that termination would benefit J.S. because

there is a current adoption plan in place with a placement that “is able to 

meet [all of the child’s] needs.” Additionally, J.S. is “considered adoptable 

if the placement were not able to finalize his adoption for any reason.”

¶20 Although Mother has taken some positive steps toward being 

able to care for J.S., including obtaining housing and social security, it is 

unclear how long it would take for her to be in a position where she could 

raise J.S. on her own. The superior court noted “there is a detriment in not 

terminating the Mother’s parental rights as it would result in the child 

lingering in the foster care system for an indeterminate period as Father’s 

rights have been terminated and Mother is not able to care for the child now 

or in the future.” The superior court properly could conclude that affording 

Mother an indeterminate amount of additional time to work on her mental 

health issues was not in J.S.’s best interests. See JS-501568, 177 Ariz. at 577. 

¶21 Mother argues she and J.S. are strongly bonded and he has 

expressed a desire to return to her care. However, 

[t]he existence and effect of a bonded 

relationship between a biological parent and a 

child, although a factor to consider, is not 

dispositive in addressing best interests. Even in 

the face of such a bond, the juvenile court is 

required to evaluate the totality of 
MARY C. v. DCS, J.S. 

Decision of the Court

7 

circumstances and determine whether 

severance is in the best interests of the children.

Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98–99, ¶ 12 (App. 2016) 

(citation omitted). Here, the superior court considered the totality of the 

circumstances in finding that termination was in J.S.’s best interests; 

reasonable evidence in the record supports that finding. 

CONCLUSION

¶22 The superior court’s order terminating the parental rights of 

Mother to J.S. is affirmed.