* The Ho norab le Jack Z ouhary , U nited States District J udg e for the N orthern District of O hio, sitting by desig nation. 1

NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0081n.06 No. 08-3349 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. MARK J . THORNTON , De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE S O U T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

OPI NI ON

Be fore : MARTI

N and WHI TE, Circuit J udg es; and Z OUHARY, D istrict J udg e. * ZOU HA RY, Di s t ri ct J u d ge I NT RODUC T I ON A jury convicted Ma

rk Thornton of c onspiracy to possess with intent to di stribute coca ine and coc aine ba se (Count 1), possession with intent to dist ribute coc aine ( Count 3), and posse ssion of a f irea rm in further ance of a drug traff icking conspirac y (Count 5)

. Thornton, who had thr ee pr ior drug convictions, was se ntence d to life i mprisonment on Count 1 pursuant to a mandatory minimum sentenc e, as well as consecutive sentences of 264 months imprisonment on Count 3 and 60 months imprisonment on Count 5. Thornton appe als his conviction and sente nce, a sserting a n u m b er of proce dural a

nd constitutional errors. We a ffirm.2 B ACKG ROUND On Octobe r 12, 2005, law e nforc ement off icer s executed a se arc h war ran t for a house on Eastview Avenue in Da

y ton, Ohio. The wa

rra nt was base d on information from c onfidential informants. The office rs s eized approximately 800 g rams of powder ed cocaine, nume rous wra ppers

us e d to pa c ka g e kil og ra

m quanti tie s of co c a ine , dru g -r e la te d tool s, and se ve ra l fir e arm s. Th e ho us e

was re nted by

Nirvana Martin, and Thor

nton was pre sent in t h e house w hen the se arc h occur red. B oth Mart in a nd Th or nto n w e re e ve ntu a lly arr e ste d an d ch arg e d w ithva ri ou s d ru g of fe ns e s. Mart in pled g uilty ; as part of

his plea ag ree ment, he ag ree d to testify ag ainst Thornton. At Thornton’s trial, an individual named Geor g e Cash testified that he introduc ed Thornton and Mar tin to a Mexi can drug supplier in D ay ton dur ing the summer of 2005. Mar tin testified that he and T hornton pooled their money to pur chase a kilog ram or mor e of c ocaine from this Mexi can supplier eve ry

day for se vera l months during the summer a nd fall of 2005. The two would then divid e th e c o c a in e a t o n e o f th e dr u g h o u s e s r e n te d b y M a

rti n , in c lu d in g th e h o u s e o n Eastview Avenue , and re -sell their re spective por tions. Mar t i n al so testified that he a nd Thornton ca

rried firea rms during their drugtransac tions. D I S CUS S I ON Jury Instruction Conf

ere nce Thornton first argues that the district c ourt err ed by excluding him from the jury instruction confe renc e in violation of Fe dera l Criminal Rule 43(a) (2)’ s require ment that a cr iminal defenda nt be pr e se nt a

t “ e ve ry tr ia l sta g e .” Th e Go ve rnme nt c on te nd s that a jur y ins tr uc tio n c on fe re nc e fa lls within the exception of Rule 43(b)(3) for a “conf ere nce or heari n g o n a question of law,” and there fore Thornton’s pre sence was not re quired.3

All circuits that have direc tly addre ssed this issue hold that jury instruction confe renc es do fall within the Rule 43(b)( 3) exception. See, e .g. , Un ite d S tat es v . R iv e ra , 22 F.3d 430, 438 ( 2d Cir. 1 9 9 4 ) ( “ T h e c o n t e n to f

t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o b e g i v e nt o t h e j u r y i s p u r e l y a l e g a l m a tte r. ” ); Un ited Sta te s v . G re go rio , 4 97 F .2 d 125 3, 12 59 (4 th C ir . 1 97 4) , o ve rr ule d o n o the r g ro un ds United States v. Rhode s , 32 F.3d 867, 873 ( 4th Cir. 1999) (“Rule 43 doe s not confer on criminal def

endants the ri g ht [to] atte nd a pure ly le g a l con fe re nc e on jur y ins tr uc tio ns . . . . ” ); United States v. Grav es , 669 F.2d 964, 972 (5th Cir. 1982) (“A def endant doe s not have a

fede ral c onstitut ional or statutory rig ht to attend a confer ence betwee n the trial cour t and counse l conce rned w ith the purely leg al matter of de te rm ini ngwh a t jury

ins tr uc tio ns the tr ia l c ourt

wi ll i ssu e .” ); United States v. She rman , 321 F.2d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987) (“ We hold that a hear ing outside the prese nce of the jury conce rning the selec tion of jury

instructions is a ‘confe renc e or a rg ument upon a question of law ’ . . . .”)

. Howeve r, we need not rea ch the merits of this is sue her e bec ause Thor nton has prese nted no argument that the conf

ere nce r esulted in err oneous jury instructions, and we find no prejudice from his e xc l u s i o n . T h e c o n f e r e n c e w a s h e l d o n t h e r e c o r d , an d T h o r n t o n ’ s a t t o r

n e y w a s p re se nt t o discuss fac tual and leg al issues relating to the instructions. There is no indication that his attorney

wa s n ot f ull y c a pa ble of re pr e se nti ng Th or

nto n’ s inte re sts in t

his re g ard , o r t

hat hi s atto rn e y

c ou ld not consult with Thornton if neede d. The jury was not pre sent, thus Thornton could not have be en prejudice d in that reg ard. A ccor dingly , even if exclusion of Thornton from the conf ere nce w as er

ror, such er ror wa s harmless. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . H arris , 9 F.3d 493, 499 ( 6th Cir. 1993) (re cog nizi ng in the context of ex par

te communication with the jury that “[T] he rule requirin g a d efe ndant’s p re s ence at eve ry

stag e of the trial must be considere d with [ Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure ] 52(a) . . . providing that harmless e rror is to be disreg arde d.”).4

P le a A gr e e m e nt of C ode fend ant Thornton next arg ues the Gove rnment improper ly questioned his codef

endant, Nir

vana Martin, about the de tails of Martin’s plea ag ree men t . Def

endant did not object at trial to this l ine of questioning, so we revie w the admission of such testimony for plain e rror . See U

nited States v. Zid de ll , 323 F.3d 412, 425 ( 6th Cir. 2003). On direc t examination, t he Government questioned Ma rtin about the cha

rg e to which he pled g uil ty , th e statut or

y pe na lti e s and

se nte nc ingg uid e lin e ra

ng e he c on fr on te d, the re a so n f or his

a g re e me nt t o te sti fy

a t tr ia l, a nd the c ha rg e s wh ic h the Go ve rnme nt ha d a g re e d to dis mis s a s a re su lt of his c oo pe ratio n. Th e Go ve rnme nt t he n q ue sti on ed Ma

rt in d ir e c tly

a bo ut h is r e la tio ns hip wi th Thornton. Sever al pag es of Ma rtin’s p l ea ag ree ment wer e published to the jury during the Gover nment’s direc t e x amination. Howeve r, the district c ourt did not admit the ag ree ment itself as evidenc e. Def ense c ounsel did not object to the Government’s questioni ng or publication of the ple a ag ree ment, nor di d defe nse counsel reque st a li miting i nstruction on the permissi ble us e of the plea ag ree ment. Def

ense c ounsel’s sole objec tion was to a question asking whether Martin had a

n understandingwher e the guidelines place d him in the pe rmissible statutory rang e of te n y ear s to life. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, de fe ns e cou ns el a lso qu e sti on e d M art in r e g ard ingthe ple a a g re e me nt, including his potential sente nce. D uring cl o s i n g argument, the Gover nment never

mentioned the plea a g r e e me n t, a n d

d e f e n s e c o u n s e l m e n ti o n e d

it o n ly b r ie f ly in ana tt e mp t t o im

p u g nM a rtin’ s

cre dibilit y . The dist ri ct co u rt instructed the jury that “[e]vidence of . . . pr ior convictions was broug ht to y our attention only as one wa y of helping y ou decide how believa ble [the witnesses’] testimony was. Do not use the evidenc e of the prior convic tions for any other purpose .”5

Th or nto n cla ims tw o for

ms of pr e jud ic e fr om the pr os e c uto r’ s q ue sti on ingof

Ma rt in. F ir st, he ar g ues the jury might have used Martin’s g uilty plea -- a n admission of g uilt already “ac cepte d by the District C ourt” -- as di rec t evidence of Thornton’s ow n g uilt. S econd, T hornton argues that Martin’s testimony about his ow n sentenc e may have confuse d the jury about the sentenc e Thornton was fa cing . These a

rg uments are fore closed by circ uit prece dent. We have pr eviously

ruled that “ a g uilty p l ea of a c odefe ndant may not be re ceive d as substantive evidenc e of a codef endant’ s g uilt, but m ay

proper ly be conside red as evidence of a witness’ cr edibility .” United States v. Christian , 7 8 6 F. 2 d 2 0 3 , 2 1 4 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 8 6 ) ( ci t i n g United Sta te s v . H alb e rt , 640 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1981) ). Moreove r, “under proper i n struction, evidenc e of a

g uilty plea may be elicited by the prosecutor on direc t examination so that the jury may assess the c redibility

of the witnesse s the g overnme nt asks them to believe.” Id. We have e x plained that a ple a a g re e me nt c ou ld b e int e rp re te d a s e ith e r bo ls ter ing or hurt inga wi tne ss’ c re dib ili ty , s o that introd u ct i o n o f t he entire ag ree ment is appropriate to permit the jury “to consider

fully the p o s s i b l e conflicting motivations underly ing the witness’ testimony .” United States v. Tocc o , 200 F. 3 d 4 0 1 , 4 1 6 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Uni t ed States v. Townsend , 796 F.2d 158, 163 ( 6th Cir. 1986)). In addition, “[t] he prosec utor may . . . wish to place the plea be fore the jury so as to blunt defe nse ef

forts at impea chment and di spel the sug g estion that the g overnme nt or its witness has something to hide.” Christ ian , 786 F.2d at 214. He re , the Go ve rnme nt re lie s on thi s la st r a tio na le in d e fe nd ingits us e of

the ple a a g re e me nt d

ur ingdir e c t e xami natio n, and th e legi tim a c y of thi s str a te g y wa s v a lid a te d b y

de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s e ff

or ts t o und e rm ine Mart in’ s c re dibility on c ro ssexamination.6

Moreove r, althoug h “[a] guilty plea enter ed by a codef endant can be espe cially

prejudicia l if the pl ea is made in connec tion with a conspiracy to which the re maining de fenda nts are c harg ed,

. . . much of this potential for prejudice is ne g ated when the pleading codef endant . .

. t es t i fi es reg arding the s pecif

ic fa cts underly

ing the crimes in issue.” Christ ian , 7 8 6 F. 2 d at 2 1 4 (c i t i n g United States v. De

Lucca , 630 F.2d 294, 298 ( 5th Cir. 1980)). I n this case, Ma rtin testified direc tly

about his relationship with Thornton and the drug -re lated ac ts in question. Thus, under the rationale of Christ ian , the potential pre judice of the conspirac y

plea wa s “neg ated.” As to the ri sk of po te nti a l c on fu sio n a bo ut the se nte nc e Th or

nto n wa s fa c ing , s ome discussion of a code f

e n d a nt’ s p otential sentenc e is inevitable if the G overnme nt is allowed to expl ore a code fenda

nt’s motivation for testify ing. F urthermor e, in this case , defe nse counsel also inquired into Martin’s potential sentenc e, so Thornton c annot leg itimately claim this information prejudice d him. I n sum, Martin’s testi mony about hi s plea ag ree ment was permissible in order to a llow the jury to fully assess his cre dibilit y . The Gove rnment did not cite the plea ag ree ment for a

ny improper purpose dur ing c losing a

rg ument. See United States v. Carson , 560 F.3d 566, 575 ( 6th Cir. 2009). Th e c ourt g a ve the jur

y a c a uti on ary ins tr ucti on

on the us e of

pr ior c on vic tio ns . U nd e r t

he se circ umstances, a llowing testimony about the deta ils of Martin’s plea a g ree ment was not er ror. Lif e Sentence Th or nto n n e xt ar g ue s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s se nte nc e of lif e imp ri so nme nt on Count 1 is g ro ssl y dis pr op or tio nate to the c ri me c omm itt e d an d is thus un c on sti tut ion a l un de r t he Ei g hth Am e ndme nt. Thornton’s sente nce w as imposed pursuant to 21 U.S.C

. § 8 4 1 (b )(1) (A), w hich mandate s life“ I f an y p er so n co m

m it s a v io la ti on

o f th is s ub para g ra

pho r of s ec ti on 8 49 , 8 59 , 8 60, or 861 of thi s ti tl e 1 after tw o o r m ore p rior co nv ictions for a felony dru g offen se h av e be com e fi na l , s uch person sha ll be sentenc ed to a m andato ry term of life im prisonm ent w ithout release

. . . .” 21 U .S. C. § 841(b )(1)(A).

7 imprisonment when a de fenda nt has two or more prior fe lony drug convictions. Thornton, who has 1 three prior fe lony

drug convictions, does not contest that he meets the statutory criter ia. Rather, he challeng es the c onstitut ionality of the sente nce a s applied to his particular circ umstances. T h o r n t o n ’ s ar g u m e n ti s f

o r e c l o s e d b y Un ite d Stat es v. H

ill , 30 F.3d 48, 50 ( 6th Cir. 1994), which upheld the constitutionalit y of a mandatory life sentenc e under simil ar fac ts

. I n Hi ll , the de fe nd ant H ic ke y

wa s a thi rd -t ime of

fe nd e r a nd wa s c on vic te d o f a vio la tio n in vo lvi ng17 7. 8 g ra ms of coc aine ba se. In evaluating the c onstitut ionality under the Eig hth Amendment of the ma ndatory life sentenc e, the c ourt applied the “ g rossly d i s p ro p o rt i onate” test announce d by a plura lity

of the Supreme Court. Id. (c i t i n g Harmelin v. M ichigan , 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) ( Kenne dy , J ., concur ring )). Notingthat the def endant in Harmelin “wa s convicted of simple possession and it was his first offense ; while Hickey was convicted of c onspiracy to distribute and it was his third offense ,” Hi ll held that the def

endant’ s mandatory

life sentenc e did not violate the Eig hth Amendment. Fo l l o wi n g Hi ll , th is C ir c uit ha s c on tin

ue d to re je c t E ig hth Am end ment c ha lle ng e s to mandatory life sentenc es in r epeat-offe nder dr ug case s. See, e .g. , United St ates v. Ode neal , 517 F.3d 40 6, 41 4 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 8) (u

ph old inglif

e se nte nc e fo r de fe nd ant c on vic te d o f c on sp ir a c y to d istri bu te and possess with intent to distribute cocaine , when the violation involved 1,088.7 g rams of c ocaine , 37 8. 6 g ra ms o f c oc a ine ba se , 4 8. 5 g ra ms o f h e ro in, and

se ve ra l ki log ra

ms o f m ari

jua na ); Un ited States v. Cave r , 470 F.3d 220, 247 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding l ife sente nce f or def endant c onvicted of co n s p ir a c y to p o s s e s s w it h in te n t to d is tr ib u te mo r e th an 5 0 g r a ms o f c r a c k c o c aine, a ndR

ule 1 1(c)(1) prov ides in

pertin ent p art, “ An attorney for the g ov ernm ent an d the defe ndan t’s attorn ey , o r 2 the d efenda nt w hen proce e di ng pr o s e , m ay discu ss an d rea ch a

plea ag reem ent. The court mus t not participa te in these discuss ions

. ” (E m ph as is a dd ed

. ) Se e ge ne ra ll y U ni te d Stat es v . B arre tt , 9 82 F.2 d 1 93, 194- 95 (6th C ir. 1 992) (notingthe “inheren tly coe rciv e” n ature o f a court’s par t icipation in ple a neg otiations). 8 po sse ssi on wi th int e nt to dist ri bu te 12 .0 4 g ra

ms o f c ra c k c oc a ine ); United States v. Flowal , 163 F.3d 956, 963 (6th Cir. 1988) (re manding for de t er m i n ation whether offe nse involved 5,000 g rams of

coca ine and noting th at , if so, defe ndant’s Eig hth Amendment cha lleng e to life sente nce f or third drug conviction would fa il). Th e c ir c u m s t anc e s o f T ho rn ton ’s c a se (i nc lud ingthe 72 kil og ra ms o f c oc a ine ) a

re in l ine wi th these c ited case s. Acc ording ly , there is no reason to de part fr om our sett l ed prec edent, a nd we conclude that Thornton’s sente nce w as not unconstitutional. P le a N e go ti at ion s I n a supplementa l brief f

iled pr o s e , Thornton next claims the district court violated Fe dera l Criminal Rul e 11(c )(1) by participating in plea neg otiations. Howeve r, because Thornton did not 2 ple a d g uil ty and wa s c on vic te d by a jur y , h e mus t sh ow“ a c tua l pr e jud ic e ” in o rd e r t o b e e nti tle d to

a new trial. See United States v. Elguezabal , 188 F.3d 509, 1999 WL 717978, at *1 (6th Cir. 1999) (u np u b l i s h edt ab l e c as e) (q u o t i n g United States v. Diaz , 138 F.3d 1359, 1362 ( 11th Ci r. 1998)) (noting that when a

defe ndant chooses to go to tria l, a Rule 11 violation “does not ra ise the spec ter of an involuntary

plea” ). Even if

there was a Rule 11 violation, Thornton has not shown actual pr e jud ic e fr om suc h viol a tio n. I nd e e d, if Th or nto n h a d a c c e pte d th e ple a de a l, h is s e nte nc e wo uld have be en sig nificantly

sho rt er tha

n the life sente nce he is curre ntly servingfollowing his jury conviction.9

Se ar c h Wa r r ant I n h is pr o s e brief, Thornton also challeng es the district court’s pre trial ruling that Thornton had no F ourth Amendment standingto challeng e the validity of t he search of the Eastview A venue house. Much of

the phy sical evide nce suppor ting the Gover

nment’s case was seized pursua nt to that

war rant. Prior to trial, Thornton moved to suppre ss the seized evidenc e, ar gu i n g t h ere was no pr ob a ble c a us e to i ssu e the wa

rr ant. Following a hea

ring (at whic h Thornton offe red no e vidence related t o Four th Amendment standing ), the district court g rante d Thornton’s suppression moti on as to ce ll phones and ca sh seized from his person, but de nied the motion as t o the drug s and other obje cts seized from the house . The district court provided two g rounds for de ny ing T hornton’s motion as to the evidenc e found in the house. F irst, Thornton had no re asonable expectation of privac y in the drug house and the ref ore no Four th Amendment standing to challeng e the va lidity of the wa rra nt. He was not the owner

or lessee of th e h o u s e , an d

th e r e w a s n o e v id e n c e T h o r n to no r an y o n e e ls e li v e d

a t t h e h o u s e . Rath e r , the house wa s being used as a commerc ial dru g distribution center. Sec ond, even if Thornton had standin g , th e s e ar c h w ar

r an t w a s s u

p p o rte d b y p r o b a b le c a u s e , b e c a u s e it w a s b a s e d

o ndetailed information from a

n informant that wa s confirme d by law enf orce ment office rs with re cent surveillance of the house. We decline to addre ss T hornton’s argument beca use he cha lleng es only

the district court’s conclusion that he la cked sta nding to c halleng e the warra nt; he does not addre ss the district court’s alternative holding that the w arr ant was suppor ted by probable cause . I ssues ra i s ed i n the district court, but not on appea l, a re considere d abandone d and not r eviewa ble on appea l. United States v. McPhe arson , 4 6 9 F. 3 d 518, 523 (6th Cir. 2006). Ther efor e, any challeng e to the district cour t’s10

holding that ther e wa s probable c ause ha s been w aived, a nd there is no util ity

in addre ssing the standing issue. Suf fi ciency of Evid ence F ina lly , Th or

nto n a rgue s in his pr o s e br ie f t

he re wa s in su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to p ro ve his g uil t on any count. This argument lacks mer it. W hen re viewing sufficie ncy of the e vidence , this Court must determine “w hether , afte r viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, any ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt.” U

n it e d S ta te s v . B la k e n ey , 94 2 F.2d 1 00 1, 10 10 (6 th C ir . 1 99 1) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) (q u o t i n g J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Mor eover , “[a]ll conflicts in the testimony

are resolve d

in f a v o r o f th e g o v e r

n me n t, an d

e v e r y r e a s o n a b le in f e r e n c e is dr aw nin

it s f a v o r .” United States v. Vasque

z , 560 F.3d 461, 469 ( 6th Cir. 2009). Count 1 - Conspir acy to Distribute in Exc ess of Five Kilograms of Cocaine I n o rd e r to pr ov e a dr

ug c on sp ir a c y , the Go ve rnme nt mus t pro ve “ (1 ) t hat an a g re e me nt t o violate th e dr

u g la w s e xis te d ; an d ( 2 ) th a t e a c h c o n s p ir a to r kn e w o f , in te n d e d to jo in, a nd participated in the conspira cy .” Un ite d S tat es v . F orre st , 1 7 F .3 d 9 16 , 9 18 (6 th C ir . 1 99 4) . A t tr ia l, Martin testified that he and Thornton pooled their money to pur chase a kilog ram or mor e of c ocaine from Mexican suppliers eve ry day for at least two months. Martin also testified that he a nd Thornton

wo uld div ide up the c oc a ine and se ll the ir re sp e c tiv e po rt ion s; T ho rn ton wo uld so me tim e s se ll h is portion from out of his ca

r, and sometimes from the drug houses Martin re nted. Martin’s testimony

was c orrobor ated by

evidenc e seized fr om one of the house s, which included not only powder

c oc a ine and

c ra c k b ut a lso wr a

pp ingfr om p a c ka g e s o f c oc a ine , f ir e arm s, and

dr ugpa ra ph e rn a lia

su c h a s sc a le s. Th is i s su ff ic ie nt ev ide nc e fo r a ratio na l jur y to c on c lud e that T ho rn ton and Mart in11

had an a g ree ment to purcha se and distribute c ocaine

. Count 3 - Possession wit h Intent to Distribute 500 grams of Cocaine To prove posse ssion with int ent to distribute, t h e Go v er nment must prove that Thornton

e xer c ise d a c tua l or

c on str uc tiv e po sse ssi on

ov e r t he c on tr oll e d su bs tanc e and that he int e nd e d to distribute that substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). At tria l, the Gover nment prese nted evidenc e that law enf orce ment office rs executing the sear ch war rant found a shoe box containing coca ine upstairs in the house; that the coc aine we ighe d more than 500 g rams; that the box belonged to Thor nton; and that Thornton often store d in such a manne r the c ocaine he intended to sell. This is s ufficie nt evidenc e for

a rational jury

to conclude that Th o rn t o n p o s s essed and intended to distribute the

coca ine. Count 5 - Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime. To prove posse ssion of a fire arm in fur thera nce of a drugtraff

icking crime, the Gover

nment must prove (1) defe ndant committed a drug traff icking crime; (2) defe ndant knowing ly possessed a fire arm; and ( 3) the possession of the firea rm was in fur

thera nce of this drug tr aff

icking crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). L aw e nforc ement office rs seized numerous fire arms duringthe ra id on the drug house used by

Martin and Thor

nton. I n addition, Martin testified that he a nd Thornton ca

rried firea rms to protect themselv es i n t he cour se of de aling with their suppliers. This is sufficient evidenc e for

a rational jury to conclude that Thornton pos sessed a firea rm in further ance of a dr

ug traff icking crime. C ONCL US I ON For these re asons, we AF F IRM Thornton’s convic tion and sentenc e.