In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 11-0084C

(Filed under Seal: June 19, 2014)

(Reissued: June 24, 2014)

(NOT TO BE PUBLISHED)

____________________________________

)

LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

UNITED STATES, )

)

Defendant. )

____________________________________ )

ORDER 1

LETTOW, Judge.

Pending before the court are four motions in limine filed in anticipation of the scheduled 

trial of this patent case involving the military’s so-called “green bullet.” Two motions were filed 

by the government and the other two were filed by plaintiff Liberty Ammunition, Inc. 

(“Liberty”).

2

 The government’s motions seek to exclude from evidence Non-Disclosure 

Agreements (“NDAs”) signed on behalf of the government by Mr. Thomas Campion and 

Mr. Charles Marsh, and any related testimony regarding those NDAs. Liberty’s first motion 

seeks to exclude any testimony on the independent development by the government of the

allegedly infringing M855A1 EPR and M80A1 EPR rounds. Its second motion seeks to exclude 

any evidence regarding ex parte testing of the prior-art M855 and M855 LFS rounds conducted

on February 7 and 12, 2014, on behalf of the government. For the reasons stated, each of the 

motions is denied.

1

Because this order might have contained confidential or proprietary information within 

the meaning of Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) and the 

protective order entered in this case, ECF No. 27, it was initially filed under seal. The parties 

were requested to review the decision and provide proposed redactions of any confidential or 

proprietary information. No redactions were requested.

2

All four motions were timely filed on May 9, 2014.

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A. The Campion NDA and Related Testimony

The NDA signed on behalf of the government by Mr. Campion (“Campion NDA”) is 

dated June 23, 2005, see Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 581, 584 (2011), 

at a time when Mr. Campion, a government contractor, was serving as the project manager for 

the Program Executive Office for Special Projects at the United States Special Operations 

Command (“SOCOM”), Def.’s Mot. in Limine to Exclude the Non-Disclosure Agreement 

Signed by Thomas Campion and Testimony Relating to the Same (“Def.’s Mot. to Exclude 

Campion NDA”) at 2, ECF No. 52. During that period, he was having discussions with Mr. PJ 

Marx, the inventor, regarding Mr. Marx’s bullet design. Id.; see also Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. 

to Exclude Campion NDA at 2-3, ECF No. 62.3 The government argues that exclusion of the 

Campion NDA is justified because the government cannot be bound by Mr. Campion, who, as a 

government contractor, did not have authority to execute a contract on behalf of the government.

See Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Campion NDA at 5.

Liberty agrees with the concept that government contractors generally are not authorized 

to execute contracts on behalf of the government, but it argues that exceptions apply in this case. 

Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Campion NDA at 6-11. Liberty contends that

Mr. Campion, by nature of his position, possessed express actual authority to contractually bind 

the government. Id. at 6.

4

 In support of this argument, Liberty stresses that the government has 

produced no documentation indicating that Mr. Campion lacked authorization to execute the 

NDA. Id. at 6-7. This contention misplaces the burden to establish such authority. The burden 

to show authority to contract rests on the party seeking to assert that authority exists, in this case, 

Liberty. See Council for Tribal Emp’t Rights v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 231, 243-44 (2013), 

3

An earlier NDA was signed on February 17, 2005 by three individuals, Mr. Marx, thenMajor (now Lt. Colonel) Glenn A. Dean of the United States Army, and John W. Amick. See 

Liberty Ammunition, 101 Fed. Cl. at 584. At the time, Major Dean was Chief of Small Arms 

Division, Directorate of Combat Development, Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia. 

Mr. Amick was his senior contractor-administrator. The government has not filed an in limine 

motion regarding that NDA.

4

Liberty argues, alternatively, that (1) Mr. Campion had implied authority to execute the 

agreement, because non-disclosure agreements were “integral” to Mr. Campion’s duty to protect 

proprietary information disclosed by potential contractors, Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Exclude 

Campion NDA at 7-8 (citing Brunner v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 623, 641-43 (Fed. Cl. 2006)

(“[A]n agent may have an implied authority to contract on behalf of the government, based on a 

consideration of the duties of that agent, and whether the power to contract was appropriate or 

essential to their performance.”)), and (2) SOCOM ratified the Campion NDA by inviting, 

accepting, and reviewing Liberty’s Small Business Innovation Research (“SBIR”) proposal, 

further validating the agreement as a binding contract with the government, id. at 10-11 (citing 

Philadelphia Suburban Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 705, 707 (1978), and City of El 

Centro v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 794, 798 (1989), rev’d, 922 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see 

also Silverman v. United States, 679 F.2d 865, 868-70 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (addressing institutional 

ratification).

2

 

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aff’d, __ Fed. Appx. __, 2014 WL 1910497 (Fed. Cir. May 14, 2014). In this instance, the extent 

of Mr. Campion’s authority, express or implied, and possible governmental ratification of the 

NDA require the court to resolve factual issues. Consequently, it would be inappropriate for the 

court to exclude evidence about the Campion NDA prior to trial.

The government also contends that even if it is bound by the Campion NDA, the AntiAssignment Act, 41 U.S.C. § 6305 (formerly codified as 41 U.S.C. § 15), bars Liberty’s breach 

of contract claim. See Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Campion NDA at 5-8.5 In opposition, Liberty 

argues that the waiver and operation-of-law exceptions to the Anti-Assignment Act apply. See 

Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Campion NDA at 12-17. First, Liberty contends that the 

waiver exception applies because the NDA contained a waiver provision, see Def.’s Mot. to 

Dismiss Ex. C (Campion NDA), ¶ 3.5, ECF No. 9-3, and that provision was satisfied when the 

government was provided with written notice of assignment at the outset of this case. Pl.’s Resp. 

to Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Campion NDA at 13. Second, Liberty argues that the operation-of-law 

exception applies because the shift in the contracting party, from Mr. Marx as a sole 

proprietorship to Liberty Ammunition as a corporation, did not change the nature of the contract 

itself, and no written notice was required for the exception to apply. Id. at 11-13 (citing L-3 

Commc’ns Integrated Sys., L.P. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 768, 777 (Fed. Cl. 2008)). The 

government asserts that neither exception is applicable in this case. Def.’s Mot. to Exclude 

Campion NDA at 5-8.6

The government previously presented this argument to the court in connection with a 

motion to dismiss. As explained in a prior opinion resolving that motion, any decision regarding

whether the Campion NDA is subject to the Anti-Assignment Act turns on disputed issues of fact

5

The Anti-Assignment Act generally forbids a private party from transferring its interest 

in a contract with the federal government. See Liberty Ammunition, 101 Fed. Cl. at 586 & n.3. 

The government asserts that because Mr. Marx, not Liberty, was the signing party to the NDA, 

Liberty has no right to assert a claim under the contract. Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Campion NDA 

at 7.

6

The government also claims that under the Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”), a 

novation agreement must be executed for the government to recognize a successor in interest. 

See Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Campion NDA at 8 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 42.1204). As Liberty points 

out, however, see Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Campion NDA at 16-17, the FAR applies 

only to acquisitions as defined in Part 2 of the FAR:

[T]he acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of 

supplies or services (including construction) by and for the 

use of the federal government through purchase or lease, 

whether the supplies or services are already in existence or 

must be created, developed, demonstrated, and evaluated. 

48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (“Definitions – ‘Acquisition’”). The government fails to explain why FAR 

provisions should apply to the NDA.

3

 

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that should be determined through testimony and evidence at trial. Liberty Ammunition, 101 

Fed. Cl. at 587.7 

B. The Marsh NDA and Related Testimony

A NDA signed by Mr. Marsh on behalf of the government (“Marsh NDA”) is also at 

issue.

8

 See Def.’s Mot. in Limine to Exclude the Non-Disclosure Agreement Signed by Charles 

Marsh and Testimony Relating to the Same (“Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Marsh NDA”) at 1, ECF 

No. 53. Mr. Marsh was and is an employee of the government and is involved with small-caliber 

ammunition for the Army. Id. at 2. He signed a NDA with Mr. Marx on January 11, 2006. See 

Liberty, 101 Fed. Cl. at 584. The government emphasizes that the NDA defines “Confidential 

Information” to mean proprietary information “disclosed by Disclosing Party to Receiving 

Party.” Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Marsh NDA at 4. The government argues that because 

Mr. Marsh did not receive any of the confidential information implicated in the NDA directly 

from Mr. Marx, no breach of the NDA is definitionally possible. Id. Liberty responds that 

Mr. Marsh received proprietary information implicated in the NDA from Mr. Campion and

additionally that Mr. Marsh violated the Marsh NDA by transmitting that information. Pl.’s 

Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Marsh NDA at 5-8, ECF No. 63. In Liberty’s view, the 

government’s attempt to distinguish between a direct disclosure by Mr. Marx and an indirect

disclosure that occurred to Mr. Marsh via Mr. Campion, with Mr. Marx’s permission, is not 

meaningful. Id. at 8. The court agrees that the indirect means of disclosure provide no reason to 

exclude evidence regarding the Marsh NDA.

In addition, the government reiterates an argument based upon the Anti-Assignment Act

that is identical to a contention it makes relating to the Campion NDA. Def.’s Mot. to Exclude 

Marsh NDA at 5. Here also, the court concludes that the questions respecting applicability of the 

Anti-Assignment Act and the exceptions to that Act can only be resolved through trial.

C. Independent Development of M855A1 EPR and M80A1 EPR Rounds

Liberty requests exclusion of all testimony and evidence related to the Army’s purported 

independent development of the allegedly infringing products, the M855A1 EPR and M80A1 

EPR bullets (collectively “the A1 technology”). See Pl.’s Mot. in Limine to Preclude Any and 

All Trial Evidence Offered by Def. Regarding Supposed “Independent Development” of the 

M855A1 EPR & M80A1 EPR Rounds (“Pl.’s Mot. to Exclude Evid. of Indep. Dev.”), ECF No. 

55. As part of its case in chief, Liberty seeks to prove that the government developed the 

M855A1 EPR and M80A1 EPR rounds through misappropriated proprietary information, in 

violation of its NDAs. Id. at 3-4. Liberty puts forward two grounds for its motion to exclude 

7

The court has already determined that the government can waive the Anti-Assignment 

Act preemptively in a contractual provision. Liberty Ammunition, 101 Fed. Cl. at 588-89. There 

is a significant possibility that the government waived the Anti-Assignment Act here, which too

can be addressed at trial.

8

The Marsh and Campion NDAs are identical except for the names of the signing party. 

Liberty, 101 Fed. Cl. at 584.

4

 

Case 1:11-cv-00084-CFL Document 70 Filed 06/24/14 Page 4 of 6
evidence of independent development. First, Liberty cites the absence of any research 

notebooks, required by Army Reg. 27-60, which might serve as corroboration to oral testimony

of such development. Id. at 7-11 & Ex. H (Army Reg. 27-60), ¶ 2-3. Second, Liberty argues 

that Fed. R. Evid. 1002, which sets out requirements for original documentation, precludes 

admission of oral testimony in place of such documentation. Id. at 12-13.9 The government 

counters that it cannot provide or adduce into evidence any laboratory notebooks because they do 

not exist and insists that it has complied with discovery requests and produced over 100,000 

pages of other documentation regarding development of the A1 EPR technology. Def.’s Opp’n. 

to Pl.’s Mot. to Exclude Evid. of Indep. Dev. at 13-14, ECF No. 61. Additionally, the

government argues that the Federal Rules of Evidence provide no basis to exclude oral testimony 

of the independent development of the A1 EPR technology at the pre-trial stage. Id. at 15. 

Liberty’s reliance on Fed. R. Evid. 1002 is unavailing. The rule is intended to be applied 

when the contents of a writing are at issue and to ensure that the writing itself, or a suitable 

duplicate, is produced. See R & R Assocs. v. Visual Scene, Inc., 726 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1984) 

(“No evidentiary rule, however, prohibits a witness from testifying to a fact simply because the 

fact can be supported by written documentation.”). While laboratory notebooks would be 

relevant evidence of independent development, the apparent non-existence of such notebooks 

does not mean that oral testimony on that topic cannot be presented. A witness can testify about 

any relevant and non-prejudicial subject of which he or she has personal knowledge, see Fed. R. 

Evid. 104, 403, and 602, assuming that the other Federal Rules of Evidence are satisfied. 

Notably, however, the court may not look favorably on testimony of independent 

development that lacks corroboration by evidence that would normally be available in a patent 

case. See Medichem, S.A., v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169-73 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that 

oral testimony was not sufficient to corroborate an inventor's claims of reduction to practice of 

an invention). That said, the weight to be accorded a witness’s testimony or the contents of any 

corroborating documents must be resolved during trial. 

D. Ex Parte M855 and M855 LFS Tests

Liberty also seeks to exclude the February 2014 ex parte tests of prior art in the form of 

M855 and M855 LFS projectiles conducted at the direction of one of the government’s experts

after discovery closed and without notice to Liberty. See Pl.’s Mot. in Limine to Exclude Feb.

2014 Ex Parte M855 and M855 LFS Tests by Def. (“Pl.’s Mot. to Exclude Tests”) at 6, ECF No. 

54 (citing In re Newman, 782 F.2d 971, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding a lack of “fundamental 

fairness” in ex parte tests that deviated too greatly from safeguards found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 34)). 

These tests were performed as part of the government’s litigation strategy to generate 

information to be used by its expert witness. See Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Exclude Tests at 

4-6, ECF No. 60. The government apparently seeks to use the results of these tests, along with 

expert testimony, to support its argument that the patent at issue is invalid because it was 

anticipated by the M855 and M855 LFS ammunition, which were both in the prior art. Id.

9

Rule 1002 states that “[a]n original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order 

to prove its content unless these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise.” Fed. R. Evid. 

1002.

5

 

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Liberty argues that the tests should be excluded because of the lack of objectivity of the 

tester and the self-serving nature of the circumstances. Pl.’s Mot. to Exclude Tests at 7 (“Ex 

parte tests are viewed with suspicion ‘because acts that are not observed or corroborated by an 

opposing party may be entirely self-serving.’” (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., No. 

87-2617-Y, 1989 WL 169006, at *64 (D. Mass. Dec. 11, 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 927 

F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991))). Liberty additionally argues that the ex parte tests were prejudicial 

because the government waited to release the results until after the relevant expert reports were 

exchanged. Pl.’s Mot. to Exclude Tests at 7. Alternatively, Liberty maintains that even if the 

tests were to be admitted, any expert testimony relying on them should receive little or negligible 

weight. Id. at 6 (citing Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1176, 1214 (D. 

Kan. 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 772 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).

The government responds by contending that the testing gives rise to an issue of fact that 

should be determined at trial. Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Exclude Tests at 7-8. It argues that 

the tests results are potentially admissible for two reasons. First, ex parte tests that follow proper 

procedural safeguards can be given evidentiary consideration. Id. at 8 (citing Congoleum Indus., 

Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 319 F. Supp. 714, 716 (E.D. Pa. 1970)).10 Second, the government 

argues that its expert will testify at trial, thereby negating Liberty’s reliance on Rosemount, Inc. 

v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1984), in which the Federal Circuit 

excluded testimony regarding ex parte tests where the defendant did not produce an expert to 

clarify the test results at trial. Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Exclude Tests at 9-10. Because 

precedent does not support a blanket exclusion of all ex parte tests, Liberty’s motion to exclude 

the results of the ex parte tests conducted under the direction of one of the government’s experts 

is unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, both of the government’s motions in limine and both of Liberty’s 

motions in limine are DENIED. 

It is so ORDERED.

s/ Charles F. Lettow

Charles F. Lettow

Judge

10In support of this argument, the government points out that Liberty’s expert does not 

question the validity of the ex parte tests but only the repeatability of the tests. Def.’s Opp’n to 

Pl.’s Mot to Exclude Tests at 8 n.5 (citing id. Ex. 7, at 173).

6

 

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