UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ WALTER TRUSTRUM ARMSTRONG, III, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant - Appellee. No. 14-1144 (D.C. No. 1:13-CV-02930-RBJ) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , GORSUCH , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Walter Trustrum Armstrong, III, appeals from the distri ct court’s dismissal of his declaratory-judgment and quiet-title claims against JPMorgan Chase Bank National Association (“JPMorg an Chase”). Exercising juri sdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This or der and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 14, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I Armstrong obtained a mortgage loan fro m Stewart Mortgage Services (“SMS”) in 2007 that was evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a deed of trust on the financed house. According to JPMo rgan Chase, SMS assigned the note to AmTrust Bank by means of an allonge, 1 after which AmTrust Bank endorsed the allonge in blank and negotiate d the note to JPMorgan Chase. The beneficiary of the deed of trust was Mortgage Electronic Re gistration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as SMS’s nominee. In 2012, MERS assigned the deed of trust to JPMorgan Chase. Armstrong defaulted on the note in Janua ry 2010. Chase Home Finance, LLC, initiated a foreclosure proceeding. Arms trong filed suit in Colorado state court against Chase Home Finance and MERS, seek ing a declaratory judgment that neither defendant held a legal interest in the note or deed of trust and an injunction prohibiting them from foreclosing on his house. Six days later, while his state action was pending, Armstrong filed a voluntary Ch apter 7 bankruptcy case, in which he made a number of assertions under penalty of perjury german e to this case: (1) the only proceeding he was party to was the foreclosure pr oceeding; (2) he had no contingent or liquidated clai ms of any kind; (3) the am ount due on his mortgage was a secured claim held by Chase Manhattan Mort gage; and (4) he intended to retain the property and reaffirm the debt to Chase Manhattan Mortgage.

1 Although Armstrong conte nds that SMS assigned only the servicing rights to AmTrust, this factual dis pute is immaterial to our disposition of this appeal.3 The bankruptcy trustee moved to dismiss the case because Armstrong’s disposable income was higher than Armstr ong had estimated. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, which Armstrong did not oppose, and closed th e case in August 2011. In December 2011, th e state court dismissed Arms trong’s action because he failed to serve necessary pa rties and because Chase Home Finance had withdrawn the foreclosure proceeding se veral months earlier. JPMorgan Chase th en initiated a foreclosure pr oceeding and filed a Colo. R. Civ. P. 120 motion in Colo rado state court, seeking au thorization for the public trustee to sell the encumbered property. Concluding th at JPMorgan Chase did not meet its burden to prove it held an enfo rceable note, the state court denied the Rule 120 motion. More specifically, the c ourt found that JPMorgan Chase did not provide any competent evidence to show the authenticity and authority of a signature on the allonge to the note purportedly assigni ng SMS’s interest, and held that the allonge was not sufficiently affixed to th e note to qualify as an endorsement under Colorado law. Armstrong then filed the present action in state cour t, seeking a declaration that JPMorgan Chase had no interest in the note and could not maintain any claim against the secured property. He also sought to quiet title to the property. JPMorgan Chase removed the case to fede ral court and moved to dism iss. The district court granted JPMorgan Chase’s motion on altern ative grounds. First, it held that Armstrong lost the right to enforce his cl aims by failing to disclose them in his bankruptcy proceeding. Second, the cour t concluded that the judicial-admission4 doctrine barred Armstrong from seeking a decl aration against JPMorgan Chase based on Armstrong’s sworn statements in th e bankruptcy case that Chase Manhattan Mortgage was the undisputed secured creditor on the note. 2 The court also ruled that the quiet title claim failed be cause Armstrong did not allege any facts establishing he held superior title to the prope rty. This appeal followed.
II “We review the district court’s gran t of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion de novo, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lane v. Si mon, 495 F.3d 1182, 118 6 (10th Cir. 2007). We reject Armstrong’s argument that th e district court improperly considered documents from his bankruptcy case without giving Armstrong an opportunity to present materials relevant to a summary judgment motion. A court may consider facts subject to judicial notice—including facts that ar e a matter of public record, such as documents filed in other litiga tion—without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Pa ce v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067, 1072-73 (10th Cir. 2008). We also reject Armstrong’s contenti on that the district court’s order contravened the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from entertai ning “cases brought by state-c ourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

2 Armstrong has not taken issue with th e district court’s finding that Chase Manhattan Mortgage is a subsid iary of JPMorgan Chase.5 proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). But the state court’s denial of the Rule 120 motion was not a judgment that falls within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Colo. R. Ci v. P. 120(d) (“Neither the granting nor the denial of a motion under th is Rule shall constitute an appealable order or judgment.”); Miller v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr ust Co. (In re Miller), 666 F.3d 1255, 1262 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that “no fi nal judgment is entered in Rule 120 proceedings” and rejecting notio n that Rooker-Feldman applied). Armstrong’s argument conflate s Rooker-Feldman with precl usion law. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (explaini ng that Rooker-Feldman is not simply issue preclusion). And a Rule 120 decision has no preclusive effect. See Colo. R. Civ. P. 120(d) (“The granting of any [Rule 120] motion shall be without prejudice to the right of any person aggrieved to seek in junctive or other relief in any court of competent jurisdiction, and the denial of any such motion shall be without prejudice to any right or remedy of the moving pa rty.”); Miller, 666 F.3d at 1262 (holding that “the rulings of the court in [Rule 120] pr oceedings do not have preclusive effect”). 3

3 Because the Rule 120 decision lacked preclusive value under Colorado law, the district court’s decision in this case did not, as Arms trong maintains, contravene Colorado law or the state court’s finding th at JPMorgan Chase failed to meet its burden to show it held an enforceable note under Colorado law. Nor was the district court required to afford full faith and cred it to the Rule 120 ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. See Nichols v. Bd. of Cty. Co mm’rs, 506 F.3d 962, 96 7 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that § 1738 requires federal courts to give a state court ruling only the preclusive effect it has under the law of the state where it was rendered).6 Turning to the merits, we need not parse Armstrong’s arguments on each of the district court’s alterna tive rulings because we affirm its conc lusions as to the judicial-admission doctrine. “A judicial admission is a fo rmal, deliberate declaration which a party or his attorn ey makes in a judicial pr oceeding for the purpose of dispensing with proof of formal matters or of facts about wh ich there is no real dispute.” Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P. 2d 1274, 1279 (Colo. 1986). If unequivocal, “[j]udicial admissions are binding on the party who makes them, are evidence against such party, and may furnish the basis for a verdict.” Salazar v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 5 P.3d 357, 365 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). Armstrong’s only argument that the court erred in this respect is that relying on his admissi ons in the bankruptcy case overlooks the state court’s de cision in the Rule 120 proceedi ng. But as we have just explained, that decision was made wit hout prejudice to the parties and lacks preclusive effect. 4

4 Under Colorado law, the judicial-adm ission doctrine applies only to factual matters. People v. McKimmy, 338 P.3d 333, 338 (Colo. 2014). Armstrong has not presented any argument that his bankruptc y admissions concerned anything other than factual matters. No r has he argued the district court erred in using his bankruptcy admissions in this case. Accordingly, he has fo rfeited appellate review of those issues. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he omission of an issue in an opening brief gene rally forfeits appell ate consideration of that issue.”).7 III The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

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Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge