S. HRG. 111–100, PT. 4 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

S. 1390 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 4 

AIRLAND 

JUNE 9 AND 16, 2009 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

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52–623 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 111–100 PT. 4 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

S. 1390 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 4 

AIRLAND 

JUNE 9 AND 16, 2009 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS

JUNE 9, 2009

Page 

Architzel, VADM David, USN, Principal Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) ........................ 3 

Shackelford, Lt. Gen. Mark D., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force For Acquisition ................................................. 17 

Trautman, Lt. Gen. George J., III, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, 

United States Marine Corps ............................................................................... 25 

Gibson, Maj. Gen. Marke F., USAF, Director of Operations, Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Department of the Air 

Force ...................................................................................................................... 26 

Myers, RADM Allen G., USN, Director, Warfare Integration/Senior National 

Representative, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations .................................. 27 

ARMY MODERNIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

PROGRAM

JUNE 16, 2009

Chiarelli, GEN Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army ......................... 83 

Thompson, LTG N. Ross, III, USA, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary 

of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, and Director, Acquisition Career Management .................................................................................. 85 

Ahern, David G., Director, Portfolio Systems Acquisition, Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics ..................... 102 

Francis, Paul L., Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 108 

(III) 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2010 

TUESDAY, JUNE 9, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in room 

SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph Lieberman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, McCaskill, 

Hagan, Begich, Inhofe, Chambliss, and Thune. 

Majority staff member present: Creighton Greene, professional 

staff member. 

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority 

counsel; and Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Mary C. Holloway and Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator 

Hagan; David Ramseur, assistant to Senator Begich; Anthony J. 

Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; and Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The subcommittee will come to order. I 

thank everyone for being here. A special thank you and welcome 

to our witnesses who are here with us today. It is against the backdrop of the continued bravery and exemplary performance of the 

American Military in Iraq and Afghanistan and in fact throughout 

the world that we convene this session of the Airland Subcommittee to discuss the President’s future of aviation programs, 

particularly tactical aviation (TACAIR) programs. This has become 

an annual meeting for the Airland Subcommittee. Every year we’re 

faced with the challenge of balancing a number of competing demands for limited resources including a balance between current 

operations and future modernizations, all of it to fulfill as best we 

can our constitutional responsibility to enable the men and women 

of the American Military to provide for the common defense. BeVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
2 

cause of the pressure on our budget and the pressure on our military this is a particularly difficult year in which we try to strike 

exactly the right balance. 

The subcommittee and the full committee hope to markup, to 

prepare our authorization bill if possible by the end of this month. 

So what we hear today and what we learn today would be of specific and tangible effect on the deliberations of this subcommittee 

as we will report and recommend to our colleagues on this program, so they appreciate the extraordinary group of witnesses we 

have before us. I’m going to abbreviate my statement and just say 

briefly that among the issues that we want to talk about are, of 

course, the F–22A, the F/A–18, structure issues about the Joint 

Strike Fighter (JSF) development progress and the impact of the 

decision on the F–22 and the President’s budget and the increase 

in the pace of development of the JSF, what impact that will have 

on that program, and also the question of the alternate engine for 

the JSF. These are difficult and important questions, but we know 

that the witnesses before us today can help illuminate our path forward and therefore we thank you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN THUNE 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

panelist and join you in welcoming our witnesses here today to discuss TACAIR programs contained within the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2010. The fiscal year 2010 budget is an integral part of a much longer term process that will help insure defense dollars are spent wisely to address the threats that we face 

today and will likely face tomorrow. I understand there are additional issues that must be addressed, which will be informed by a 

number of ongoing reviews including the defense review. The committee looks forward to being briefed on the full range of those 

issues and how they will affect future budget decisions. 

While the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget submission represents a snapshot of the Services’ overall requirements, it also 

raises several questions about our military’s TACAIR programs. 

First, the Navy has vastly expanded its estimate of size of the socalled fighter gap, putting the shortfall of fighter planes at 243 aircraft by 2018. Is the Navy taking appropriate action to mitigate 

that gap and the operational implications of that gap? Can the 

Navy maintain adequate carrier air wings to satisfy the needs of 

11 aircraft carriers? 

Second, during hearings on last year’s budget request, the Air 

Force likewise testified that due to new estimates of the legacy 

fighter force, the current F–22 Raptor and JSF procurement plans 

would likely leave a gap of up to 800 fighter aircrafts by 2024. Is 

the Air Force taking appropriate actions to mitigate that gap? 

Third, given Secretary Gates’ decision to end the F–22 Raptor 

production at 187 aircraft and provide $1 billion for modernization 

of the A–10, F–16 Falcon, and F–15 Eagle strike fighter aircraft, 

is the Air Force effectively institutionalizing and enhancing our capabilities to fight the wars we’re in today and address the scenarios 

we’re most likely to face in the future while hedging against other 

contingencies? 

3 

Fourth, the Secretary’s purposed commitment to the JSF also requires us to confront serious questions about high cost and affordability. The F–35 variants for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 

Force all will cost more to procure than to replace the older tactical 

aircraft. Those costs have increased 47 percent since 2001 from $65 

million to $105 million per aircraft. Given very limited flight testing and production processes and the degree of technology risks in 

the F–35 JSF program, is it wise to accelerate buying those aircraft 

only to have procurement costs increase later? 

Fifth, the Combat Air Force Restructure Plan allows the Air 

Force to bridge to the predominantly fifth general force of the future. Did the Air Force get it right regarding the decision to accelerate the retirement of 250 strike fighters and does the plan properly weigh the benefits of retiring aircraft nearing their expected 

service life against the near-term risk to our national security? 

Finally, the President’s proposal to delay the next generation 

bomber pending the outcome of the nuclear review and in light of 

arms control negotiations. How is the administration’s position on 

the next generation bomber reconciled with prior statements Secretary Gates has made on the military need to continue that program and its decision to move forward on another program, the 

Ohio Submarine Replacement Program, given that both programs 

will be informed by those same documents? 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, Mr. Chairman, on 

each of these issues and others and thanks again to our witnesses 

for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Thune. Let’s 

go right to the witnesses and if we have the order right, we’ll begin 

with Admiral Architzel and then we’ll go to General Shackelford. 

Thanks for being here Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF VADM DAVID ARCHITZEL, USN, PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION) 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it’s an honor to 

appear before you today to discuss the Department of the Navy’s 

TACAIR programs. I would like to submit my statement for the 

record. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Without objection. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The Department of the Navy’s acquisition 

teams develop, test, and acquire the country’s naval aviation weapon systems; balancing performance schedule and cost effectiveness. 

Therefore, our fiscal year 2010 budget supports the Navy and Marine Corps joint forces capable of meeting the wide spectrum of 

threats to our Nation both today and in the future. The Department continues the development and low rate initial production 

(LRIP) of the F–35 Lightning II, the E–2D Advanced Hawkeye, the 

CH–53K Heavy Lift Replacement aircraft, the P–8A Poseidon, unmanned aviation, and new strike weapons capabilities. We will procure our first full rate production EA–18 Growler this year and 

continue procurement of the F/A–18 E/F Hornet, the V–22, T–6B 

Joint Primary Aircraft Training System, UH–1 and AH–1Z helicopters, and MH–60R/S helicopters. In total, Navy and Marine 

4 

Corps aviation will procure 98 tactical and fixed-wing aircraft, 100 

rotary-wing aircraft, and 5 Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VTUAVs) for a total of 203 aircraft for 

this fiscal year 2010 funding. The Navy is committed to funding 

and fielding the JSF as a highly capable fifth-generation multi-mission strike fighter. The JSF is in its 8th year of design, development, and testing. Three system design and development (SDD) 

aircraft are in ground and flight tests. All F–35 variants are projected to meet their respective key performance parameters (KPPs). 

The F135 engine has completed some 11,300-plus test hours and on 

16 different engines through mid-April 2009. 

Systems integration testing continues on plan via flight tests, a 

flying lab, and over 150,000 hours of ground labs testing. A fully 

integrated mission systems jet will fly in 2009. 

The F/A–18 E/F Super Hornet and the EA–18 Growler alliance 

continue delivering a superior capability to the warfighter, on cost 

and on schedule. We have delivered 383 Super Hornets and 11 

Growlers to the fleet and procured 529 of those aircraft total 

through April 2009. 

The program continues to make technological advances in concert 

with the required spiral development plan. Earlier this year, we deployed our first and second F/A–18E/F squadrons with the new 

APG–79 active electronically scanned array radar aboard CVN–76 

and CVN–73 with outstanding results; this concludes a significant 

realized increase in reliability and performance. I’d like to emphasize the good news acquisition story of the EA–18 Growler, built in 

an integral fashion with Lot 30 F/A 18Fs. It became a part of the 

multi-year plan initially with the Hornets and is also in leverage 

in the fiscal year 2010 single year buy of that Hornet. 

With operational tests complete, we have delivered 13 aircraft to 

Whidbey Island and are on track for initial operating capability 

(IOC) later this year. In fiscal year 2010 we will procure 22 production aircraft of Growlers. The E–2D Advanced Hawkeye program 

has completed over 92 percent of the system development and demonstration program and operational assessment and currently has 

two aircrafts in flight test. This program is absolutely critical to 

the Navy in maintaining our continued superiority in TACAIR operations against defense threats. 

Funding reductions resulted in the loss of two aircraft in fiscal 

year 2009 and major perturbations in budget appropriations, as 

was experienced in fiscal year 2009, would not allow the success 

that is demanded by today’s fiscal environment and this committee. 

Another good news story is the P–8A Poseidon acquisition program. We are leveraging the efficiencies of the commercial production product, Boeing 737, to realize a technologically advanced 

product in a shortened acquisition time line. This aircraft will be 

delivered only 9 years after program initiation and will be both capable and affordable. 

In fiscal year 2010 we will procure six LRIP–1 aircraft. The program will commence flight tests later this year and IOC in fiscal 

year 2013. This weapons system fills a critical need, replacing legacy P–3 maritime patrol aircraft in the fleet of tomorrow. 

Lastly, we remain committed to the vision to meld unmanned 

and manned aircraft systems in the future of naval aviation by exVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
5 

ploring, producing, and delivering shore- and sea-based systems 

such as short takeoff unmanned aircraft, vertical takeoff unmanned 

aircraft, and the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Airlift System (BAMS). The VTUAV has completed its shipboard landing tests aboard the USS McInerney, FFG–8, and the BAMS demonstrator has deployed and commenced operations within U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). 

Our current Navy Unmanned Carrier Aviation System demonstration efforts include maturing technologies for actual aircraft 

carrier catapult launches and recoveries in the future, as well as 

operation in carrier-controlled air space. 

I’d like to close by emphasizing our commitment to advancing 

state-of-the-art acquisition excellence. One of the cornerstones of 

our improvement activities is the Department’s six-gate, two-pass 

governance process. We are seeing improvements in our ability to 

assess program risk and status and we are making better decisions 

that will lead to more capable and more affordable weapons systems. 

It is an honor to testify before the subcommittee today and I welcome your questions regarding the Department of Navy’s aviation 

programs. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Architzel, General 

Trautman, and Admiral Myers follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY VADM DAVID ARCHITZEL, USN; LT. GEN. GEORGE

J. TRAUTMAN III, USMC; AND RADM ALLEN G. MYERS, USN 

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Thune, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for providing us with this opportunity to appear before you 

to discuss the Department of the Navy’s aviation programs. Your Navy/Marine 

Corps team remains engaged around the world, and naval aviation is in the fight, 

every day, in support of our forces in harm’s way. For nearly 8 years, we have been 

at an extraordinarily high operational tempo, and we will stay at that tempo as long 

as our Nation requires it. Your naval service is serving honorably and well, and we 

are guided by our tradition and history while we keep an eye on our future. The 

significant accomplishments of those who serve this great Nation are a direct reflection of the tireless efforts and the consistent support of the military by this subcommittee. Thank you for your dedication, and for your oversight. 

NAVAL AVIATION PROGRAMS OVERVIEW

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget implements a recapitalization strategy for 

new capabilities and initiatives, reduced operating costs, and sustainment of legacy 

fleet aircraft that are performing magnificently in current operations. We continue 

to work with industry in seeking ways to reduce costs such as contracting strategies 

on the F/A–18E/F airframe, the H–1 airframe, the F–35, the MH–60R/S, and the 

MV–22. As an example of our dedication to stewardship of the public’s trust and 

funding, we are implementing a ‘prototype’ strategy on the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) to ensure high technology readiness and reduced risk prior to entering 

system development and demonstration (SDD). The Department continues the development and low rate procurement of the F–35, both the B and C models, and 

continues the development of the E–2D Advanced Hawkeye, the EA–18G, the CH– 

53K Heavy Lift Replacement aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, and new strike 

weapons capabilities. In total, with our fiscal year 2010 funding, Navy/Marine Corps 

aviation will procure 98 additional tactical and fixed-wing aircraft, 100 rotary-wing 

aircraft, and 5 VTUAVs for a total of 203 aircraft. 

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT/TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

F–35 Joint Strike Fighter 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $1.7 billion in research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and $4.7 billion in Aircraft Procurement, Navy 

(APN) for 20 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft (16 F–35B and 4 F–35C) and associVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
6 

ated spares. The commonality designed into the joint F–35 program will minimize 

acquisition and operating costs of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft, and 

allow enhanced interoperability with our sister Service, the United States Air Force, 

and the eight partner nations participating in the development of this aircraft. This 

aircraft will give combatant commanders greater flexibility across the range of military operations. A true fifth-generation aircraft, the F–35 will enhance precision 

strike capability through unprecedented stealth, range, sensor fusion, improved 

radar performance, combat identification and electronic attack capabilities compared 

to legacy platforms. It will also add sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities, as 

compared to the legacy platforms it will replace, and will tie together disparate 

units scattered across the battlefield, in real time. The F–35C carrier variant (CV) 

complements the F/A–18E/F Block II and EA–18G in providing survivable, longrange strike capability and persistence over the battlefield. The F–35 will give the 

ESG and CSG commanders a survivable ‘‘Day-One’’ strike capability in a denied

access environment that cannot be accomplished by current legacy aircraft. The

F–35B short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) variant combines the multi-role 

versatility and strike fighter capability of the legacy F/A–18 with the basing flexibility of the AV–8B. Having these capabilities in one aircraft will provide the Joint 

Force Commander and the MAGTF Commander unprecedented strategic and operational agility. 

The Marine Corps’ tactical aviation (TACAIR) fixed-wing platforms, used for direct support to our ground combat marines in the fight, are the AV–8B Harrier, the 

F/A–18 A+/C/D Hornet and the EA–6B Prowler. These aircraft are approaching the 

end of their planned service lives, and the Marine Corps, through careful service 

life extension programs, has managed these legacy platforms to bridge our aviation 

force until future airframes come on line. The Marines’ F–35B will replace both the 

AV–8B and F/A–18 A+/C/D, as well as fill a large portion of the EA–6B mission as 

part of a networked system of systems. The Marine Corps intends to leverage the 

F–35B’s sophisticated sensor suite and very low observable (VLO), fifth-generation 

strike fighter capabilities, particularly in the area of data collection, to support the 

Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) well beyond the abilities of today’s strike 

and EW assets. 

Three SDD jets (AA–1, BF–1, and BF–2) are in flight testing. The remaining SDD 

jets and ground test articles, plus low rate initial production (LRIP) I and LRIP II 

aircraft, are in various stages of production. The SDD jets are setting new standards 

for quality and manufacturing efficiencies that improve with each jet. In flight testing, the initial conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft (AA–1) has demonstrated superb performance and reduced program risk, with 81 sorties (111 flight 

hours) flown through April 20, 2009. BF–1, the first STOVL flight test jet, first flew 

in June 2008, on the schedule established 2 years prior. BF–1 has flown 14 flights 

(13 hours), and is currently on the hover pit, undergoing vertical engine operations. 

BF–2 first flew February 2009 and returned with no flight discrepancies noted. BG– 

1 static test results are favorable. The F135 engine has completed 11,300+ test 

hours on 16 engines through mid-April 2009. Software is 74 percent complete, with 

13 million lines of code released including Block 0.5 mission systems, per the spiral 

development plan/schedule and with record-setting code-writing efficiencies. Software demonstrates stability across multiple mission system subsystems. 

Systems integration testing continues on plan via flight tests, a flying lab and 

over 150,000 hours of ground labs testing. A fully integrated mission systems jet 

will fly later this year. The second production lot contract was signed below the cost 

model prediction. LRIP III contract negotiations are near complete, and LRIP IV advance procurement funding is on contract. All F–35 variants are projected to meet 

their respective key performance parameters. The F–35 plan for incremental blocks 

of capability balances cost, schedule and risk. 

F/A–18 E/F Super Hornet 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $1.1 billion in APN for nine

F/A–18 E/F Block II aircraft. The F/A–18E/F continues to transition into the fleet, 

improving the survivability and strike capability of the carrier air wing. Super Hornets and legacy F/A–18A–D Hornets have conducted more than 80,000 combat missions in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF) 

since September 11, 2001. While deployed both on the ground and at sea aboard 

our aircraft carriers, F/A–18s have dropped 4,600 precision ordnance Joint Direct 

Attack Munitions and more than 19,000 laser-guided munitions, and have shot 

countless rounds of 20mm ammunition during strafing runs. These aircraft continue 

to provide vital overwatch and direct support to our troops on the ground in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

7 

The Super Hornet provides a 40 percent increase in combat radius, 50 percent increase in endurance, and 25 percent increase in weapons payload over our older, legacy Hornets. Over 449 F/A–18E/Fs will have been procured through fiscal year 2009. 

The program is on track to complete procurement of the program of record of 506 

aircraft by 2012. The Super Hornet has used an incremental development approach 

to incorporate new technologies, such as the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, 

Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infra-Red, with shared real-time video, 

Shared Reconnaissance Pod System and Multifunctional Information Distribution 

System data-link. The APG–79 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar 

system, in the Block II aircraft, has completed operational testing, achieved full rate 

production (June 2007) and material support date (December 2008). Four fully operational AESA-equipped F/A–18E/F squadrons have been transitioned and two

squadrons have been deployed with full integrated logistics support. The F/A– 

18E/F fiscal year 2010 budget request also includes $102.0 million in APN to implement commonality, maintain capabilities and improve reliability and structural 

safety. 

F/A–18 A/B/C/D (Legacy) Hornet 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget request is $277.7 million in APN for the 

continuation of the systems upgrade programs for the F/A–18 platform. As the

F/A–18 program transitions to the F/A–18E/F and JSF, today’s inventory of 624 

F/A–18 A/B/C/Ds will continue to comprise half of the Navy’s strike fighter inventory until 2013. Included in this request is the continued procurement of recently 

fielded systems such as the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR), Multi-Function Information Distribution 

System and a Digital Communications System. The Marine Corps continues to upgrade 56 Lot 7–9 F/A–18A models and 30 Lot 10/11 F/A–18C models to a Lot 21 

F/A–18C avionics aircraft capability with digital communications and a tactical data 

link. The Marine Corps anticipates programmed upgrades to enhance the current 

capabilities of the F/A–18C/D with digital communications, tactical data link and 

tactical reconnaissance systems. This upgrade ensures that our F/A–18s remain viable and relevant in support of tactical air integration and expeditionary maneuver 

warfare. 

The Marines are planning for and expect the F/A–18(A+/C/D) to remain in the active inventory until 2023. The Marines are also employing the Litening targeting 

pod on the F/A–18A+/C/D aircraft in expeditionary operations including OIF and 

pending employment in OEF. When combined with data link hardware, the Litening 

pod provides real-time video to ground forces through Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) workstations. Continued analysis of TACAIR inventories 

will continue throughout 2010, in the QDR and beyond to determine the health of 

the legacy F/A–18A–D fleet. 

Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA)/EA–18G Growler 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget request is $55.4 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy (RDT&E,N) for the completion of SDD and 

$1.6 billion in APN for 22 full rate production EA–18G Lot 4 aircraft. The EA–18G 

continues its development as the Navy’s replacement for the EA–6B AEA aircraft. 

The EA–18G will replace carrier-based Navy EA–6B aircraft by 2013. A total quantity of 27 aircraft will be procured in LRIP. The Navy is using the F/A–18E/F single 

year procurement SYP contract to buy the Lot 4 aircraft in fiscal year 2010. The 

program began operational evaluation in fall 2008. The Fleet Replacement Squadron 

(FRS) has achieved ready for training (RFT) and the first deployable EA–18G 

squadron is on schedule for a August 2009 safe for flight, leading to initial operating 

capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2009 and full operating capability (FOC) in fiscal year 

2012. The EA–18G program of record is 88 aircraft. 

Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA)/EA–6B Prowler 

The EA–6B is in near-continuous use in Iraq and Afghanistan today in support 

of our troops on the ground as DOD’s only tactical electronic attack aircraft performing communications jamming and information operation missions. The program’s key issue is current readiness of the EA–6B. The fiscal year 2010 President’s 

budget request is $40.0 million in APN for procurement of critical airborne electronic attack (AEA) products and continuing EA–6B readiness improvements, to increase operational availability and reduce operating cost of this low-density/high-demand aircraft. EA–6B upgrades include procuring 32 low-band transmitters to provide a new jamming capability, replacing aging transmitters to be employed on legacy EA–6B and new EA–18G aircraft. The budget request also provides for operational safety and cost-wise readiness improvement initiatives to ensure availability 

and safety of the aging EA–6B aircraft. 

8 

The Navy and Marine Corps remain fully committed to the EA–6B as we continue 

to enhance our legacy capabilities. The EA–6B continues to maintain an extremely 

high deployment tempo, supporting operations against growing and diverse irregular warfare threats. The EA–6B, when deployed to Iraq, has the highest utilization 

rate of any aircraft in our inventory: five times its peacetime utilization. The fiscal 

year 2010 budget requests $11 million for EA–6B operational sustainment. Ongoing 

structural improvements and the planned Improved Capabilities III upgrades have 

extended the aircraft’s service life, and will deliver increased capability through its 

program of record of 2016. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget request is $128 million of RDT&E, Navy 

(RDT&E,N) for Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) analysis of alternatives and technology maturation. The JSF will leverage this remarkable asset when it comes on 

line. NGJ will begin competitive technology maturation efforts to mature technology 

to system level prototypes in preparation for engineering and manufacturing development phase. NGJ will combat evolving electronic attack communication and radar 

targets, and will adopt an adaptable, modular, and open architecture philosophy to 

enable future growth. 

AV–8B Harrier 

The AV–8B continues to be widely deployed in support of OIF and OEF. Each Marine Expeditionary Unit that sails does so with embarked AV–8Bs. The Harrier recently ended a highly successful 6-year rotation in Iraq, and now are in the vanguard of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade deploying into Afghanistan. We intend 

to make use of its weapons, sensors and basing flexibility in that austere environment. 

Fiscal year 2010 budget requests $20.9 million RDT&E funds to support development of the AV–8 Engine Life Management Plan (ELMP)/Engine Monitoring System, Tactical Moving Map Capability, the Readiness Management Plan (RMP), and 

Digital Improved Triple Ejector Racks (DITER). The DITER effort will increase the 

digital weapons carriage capability of the Harrier to better support combat operations. The fiscal year 2010 budget also requests $35.7 million procurement funding 

for the Open Systems Core Avionics Requirement, ELMP upgrades, and the RMP, 

which addresses aircraft obsolescence and deficiency issues associated with sustaining the current AV–8B fleet. The Litening targeting pod also will be upgraded, 

to better support the Marine Corps’ warfighter on the ground. When combined with 

data link hardware and the Rover ground station, the Litening pod adds a new dimension to precision fires and to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR). Finally, the AV–8B program is upgrading 1 day attack aircraft to a night attack configuration as part of the attrition recovery effort needed to address significant legacy inventory shortfalls until we transition to the F–35B. 

Strike Fighter Trends 

Our aviation plan balances aviation capabilities through cost-wise investments in 

recapitalization, sustainment, and modernization programs. One of the issues we 

will be dealing with in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process is the implications of naval inventory trends. We are updating the inputs to the predictive 

model and will have an updated assessment for evaluation during the QDR. 

F/A–18A/B/C/D aircraft are reaching life limits and will require extensions to 

bridge the gap to JSF. The Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) assessed the 

airframe’s potential for life extension. The SLAP analytical data necessary to determine extension to 10,000 flight hours was released in May 2008. Estimated cost 

data to support the extension was released in November 2008. A budget quality 

rough order of magnitude cost for engineering change proposals is in development 

to support the Service Life Extension Program. 

A combination of addressing variables and mitigating strategies will lead to a solution for this issue. We will continue to optimize and balance our inventory while 

investing in the future. 

FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT

P–8A Poseidon 

The future of the Navy’s maritime patrol force includes plans for sustainment, 

modernization, and re-capitalization of the force. The fiscal year 2010 President’s 

budget request is $1.162 billion for development and $160.5 million for advanced 

procurement of the P–3 replacement aircraft, the P–8 Poseidon. Fiscal year 2010 development funding will support the continued development of the P–8A and associated test. Fiscal year 2010 procurement funding will support the procurement of the 

first six LRIP P–8A aircraft which are scheduled to begin delivery in February 2012 

and advanced procurement for subsequent lots of LRIP. The program is on track for 

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fielding in late fiscal year 2013 when the first squadron will have transitioned and 

be ready to deploy forward in support of the combatant commander. 

The program completed the Interim Program Review in April 2009 and awarded 

the advanced acquisition contract for low rate initial production advanced procurement. Boeing is currently building the fifth of eight test aircraft. These first five test 

articles (three flight test aircraft and two ground test articles) are on schedule for 

delivery in accordance with the revised plan designed to recover from the 2 month 

machinist strike that interrupted progress last fall. The first flight of the first flight 

test article occurred on April 25, 2009, in Seattle, WA. The start of flight testing 

is on-schedule to commence in the fourth quarter of this fiscal year. 

P–3C Orion 

The P–3 is being sustained to keep the aircraft a viable warfighter until it is replaced by P–8. Results of the P–3 Service Life Assessment Program revealed the 

need for an aggressive approach to P–3 airframe sustainment. The accumulation of 

two decades of heavy demand by the combatant commanders, to include OEF and 

OIF, has resulted in advanced fatigue. In fiscal year 2010, $485.2 million is requested to sustain the P–3C until transition to the P–8A Multi-Mission Maritime 

aircraft. More than half of this amount ($349.6 million) is for Special Structural Inspections-Kits (SSI–K), which will allow for airframe sustainment to support the 

CNO’s P–3 Fleet Response Plan, as well as supporting EP–3E requirements which 

are executed within the P–3 SSI–K program. 

In December 2007, ongoing refinement of the model used to calculate wing stress 

indicated that the lower wing surface of the P–3 aircraft had fatigue beyond standards for acceptable risk resulting in the grounding of an additional 39 P–3 aircraft; 

4 more aircraft have since been grounded, 2 in calendar year 2008 and 2 in March 

2009. Key elements of the sustainment approach are strict management of requirements and flight hour use, special structural inspections to keep the aircraft safely 

flying, and increased use of simulators to satisfy training requirements. In fiscal 

year 2010, a systems sustainment and modernization budget of $135.6 million is requested to continue to address a multitude of mission essential efforts to replace obsolete components, integrate open architecture technology, and leverage commonality. 

EP–3 Aries Replacement/Sustainment 

The Navy plans to recapitalize its aging EP–3E fleet with a land-based, manned, 

airborne intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting platform, called 

EP–X, to meet maritime requirements. In fiscal year 2010, the President’s budget 

request is $12.0 million in RDT&E,N funds for this effort to support studies focused 

on capabilities, documentation, and technology development. In fiscal year 2010, the 

President’s budget request is $46.2 million in RDT&E,N and $92.5 million in APN 

to address EP–3E SIGINT sensor and communications equipment obsolescence 

issues that are necessary to keep the EP–3E viable until the replacement platform 

is fielded, and to develop follow-on capabilities that can be migrated to the EP–X. 

This funding supports procurement associated with obsolescence upgrades, and engineering development for JCC Spiral 3 and Recapitalization Capabilities Migration 

(RCM). 

E–2D Advanced Hawkeye 

The E–2D Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) is a critical enabler of transformational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability by providing robust overland 

and littoral detection and tracking of current and future aircraft and cruise missiletype targets. The E–2D Advanced Hawkeye replaces the current E–2C Hawkeye aircraft. The radar for the Advanced Hawkeye will provide enhanced capability in the 

overland and the littoral environment, in addition to the open ocean environment, 

while improving performance against clutter and small targets, adding transformational surveillance and theater air and missile defense capabilities. In fiscal 

year 2009 Congress appropriated $385.7 million in APN–1 for two LRIP Lot I aircraft and advanced procurement for fiscal year 2010 LRIP Lot II aircraft. This funds 

one fewer aircraft than the number requested in the fiscal year 2009 President’s 

budget request and underfunds advanced procurement for fiscal year 2010 LRIP Lot 

II aircraft. An ‘operational assessment’ was completed in first quarter fiscal year 

2009 to support a Milestone C decision in third quarter 2009. Fiscal year 2010 

President’s budget requests $364.557 million in RDT&E,N for continuation of SDD 

and $606.169 million in APN–1 for two LRIP Lot II aircraft and advanced procurement for four fiscal year 2011 LRIP Lot III aircraft. 

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KC–130J Hercules 

The Marine Corps’ KC–130J Hercules aircraft are invaluable workhorses, deployed continuously in support of OIF and OEF. These aircraft primarily provide 

multi-mission tactical aerial refueling, but also provide fixed-wing assault support 

through standard cargo and aerial delivery missions to dispersed units. Soon, these 

aircraft will increase their warfighting contribution with the incorporation of ‘‘Harvest Hawk,’’ which provides support for ground forces through a roll-on/roll-off ISR/ 

weapon system. 

The recent combat introduction of the aerial-refuelable MV–22, combined with the 

retirement of the legacy KC–130F/R fleet last year, requires accelerated procurement of the KC–130J. The Marine Corps is programmed to procure a total of 63 

KC–130J aircraft by the end of fiscal year 2015. To date, 34 new aircraft have been 

delivered and 13 more are either on contract, or in contract negotiations, for a total 

of 47. This is still four aircraft short of the inventory objective of 51 KC–130Js for 

the active force. Ultimately, the Marine Corps will seek to replace our 28 Reserve 

component KC–130T aircraft with KC–130Js, thus necking down our aerial refueling force to a single type/model/series of aircraft. 

The Navy intends to replace its aging C–130T aircraft with 25 KC–130J as the 

most cost effective means for addressing growing obsolescence and supportability 

issues. 

T–6B Joint Primary Air Training System (JPATS) 

The T–6 is the primary flight training aircraft for Navy and Marine Corps pilots 

and naval flight officers, replacing the T–34C. The current requirement is for 315 

aircraft, of which 162 aircraft have been procured and 52 aircraft delivered to date. 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget request includes $266.5 million to procure 

38 aircraft under an Air Force contract. We are also dedicated to sustainment of 

the TH–57, the training helicopter for Navy and Marine Corps helicopter pilots, and 

the T–45, the training jet for our future jet pilots and naval flight officers. 

ROTARY-WING AND TILT-ROTOR AIRCRAFT

V–22 Osprey 

The MV–22B Osprey is now combat-tested and ready for deployment anywhere 

throughout the world. As our premier medium lift assault support platform, the Osprey brings unprecedented range, speed, and survivability to the warfighter, in a 

platform that far exceeds the capabilities of the CH–46E it is replacing. The

MV–22B has been supporting our marines in combat continuously since October 

2007, with the third successive squadron recently completing a highly successful 7 

month rotation in support of OIF just last month. In Iraq, Osprey squadrons have 

logged over 9,000 flight hours, carried over 40,000 passengers, and lifted over 2 million pounds of cargo while flying every mission profile assigned by the Multi-National Force-West Commander. 

As we continue to explore the tremendous capabilities of tilt-rotor aircraft and 

look forward to employing Osprey both aboard ship and in new theaters of operation, we are learning valuable lessons with respect to reliability and maintainability. Like other types of aircraft in the early operational phase of their lifecycles, 

the MV–22 has experienced lower-than-desired reliability of some components and 

therefore higher operations and support costs. With the cooperation and support of 

our industry partners, we are tackling these issues head on, with aggressive logistics and support plans that will increase the durability and availability of the parts 

needed to raise reliability and concurrently lower operating costs of this aircraft. 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget request includes $2.3 billion in APN for 

procurement of 30 MV–22s and continued development of follow-on block upgrades. 

Fiscal year 2010 is the third year of the V–22 MYP contract. Our MYP strategy supports a continued cost reduction and affordability trend, provides a stable basis for 

industry, and best supports the needs of the warfighter. The fiscal year 2010 appropriations will fully fund Lot 14 and procure long-lead items for Lot 15 under the 

V–22 multi-year contract. 

V–22 capability is being increased and fielded over time via a block upgrade acquisition strategy. MV–22B Block A aircraft are now predominantly used in the 

training squadrons. Block B aircraft are being fielded with our operational squadrons and continue to be delivered via the current MYP. Block C aircraft will provide 

additional mission enhancements, primarily in the areas of environmental control 

systems upgrades, weather radar, and mission systems improvements. The targeted 

delivery for Block C aircraft is Lot 14, fiscal year 2012. The CV–22 variant provides 

a capability that will augment the MC–130 in the Air Force/Special Operations 

Command inventory for special operations infiltration, extraction, and resupply misVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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sions. CV–22 Block 0/10 is a CV-unique configuration for Special Operations Capabilities to include multi-mode radar and electronic countermeasures upgrades. 

CV–22 Block 20 will provide an enhanced CV-unique configuration with planned 

communications and aircraft system performance upgrades. The CV–22 program 

has completed IOT&E and a successful trans-Atlantic operational deployment in 

support of an exercise in Africa. 

AH–1Z/UH–1Y 

The H–1 Upgrades Program will replace the Marine Corps’ AH–1W and UH–1N 

helicopters with state-of-the-art AH–1Z and UH–1Y models. The legacy fleet of

AH–1W and UH–1N aircraft have proven enormously effective over decades of 

heavy use, and as these aircraft reach the end of their service lives we look forward 

to expanding utility and attack helicopter capabilities. The new Z and Y model aircraft will begin our process of linking the battlefield into a coherent whole. On the 

future battlefield, the Strikelink system will tie these airframes, their sensors and 

their weapons systems together with ground combat forces and fixed-wing aircraft, 

while weapons systems such as the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II 

(APKWS II) will provide the lethality in support our ground forces need. 

The fiscal year 2010 budget requests $32.8 million in RDT&E,N for continued 

product improvements and $780.4 million in APN for 16 UH–1Y and 12 AH–1Z aircraft. The program is a key modernization effort designed to resolve existing safety 

deficiencies, enhance operational effectiveness, and extend the service life of both 

aircraft. Additionally, the 84 percent commonality between the AH–1Z and UH–1Y 

will significantly reduce life-cycle costs and logistical footprint, while increasing the 

maintainability and deployability of both aircraft. The program will provide the Marine Corps with 226 AH–1Z helicopters and 123 UH–1Y models through a combination of remanufacturing and new production. This represents an increase of 69 aircraft above the previous inventory objective of 280 aircraft. The revised objective is 

driven by the need to increase our active duty light attack helicopter squadrons 

(HMLAs) from six to nine over the next several years as part of the Marine Corps’ 

directed increase in force structure and manning. 

The UH–1Y aircraft achieved initial operational capability in August 2008 and 

full rate production in September 2008. The first three lots of low rate production 

aircraft have been delivered. The final phase of OPEVAL for the UH–1Y was completed and the aircraft was deemed operationally effective and suitable. AH–1Z development is continuing and the final phase of OPEVAL is scheduled to conclude 

in fiscal year 2010. We are developing the capability to fabricate new some of the 

AH–1Z aircraft to reduce the number of AH–1W aircraft removed from service for 

remanufacturing and to support the increased inventory objective which exceeds the 

quantity of existing AH–1W airframes. Fifty eight AH–1Zs will be built new. This 

covers 46 additional aircraft for increasing inventory objective and twelve aircraft 

to cover required routine maintenance inspection cycles along with forecasted airframe lifetime fatigue and attrition rates 

MH–60R and MH–60S 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $943.3 million for 24 MH–60R 

aircraft and $82.0 million in RDT&E,N for continued replacement of the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System MK III SH–60B and carrier-based SH–60F helicopters 

with the MH–60R. The $82.0 million is to continue development of the Ku-band 

data link, automatic radar periscope detection and discrimination program, which 

is a fleet-driven capability upgrade to the APS–147 Radar, and Mode V interrogation capability in its identification friend-or-foe system. The MH–60R is used in both 

the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) with its dipping sonar, sonobouys and torpedoes, 

and the surface warfare (SUW) roles with its electronics surveillance measures system, multimode radar with inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR), FLIR system, 

and Hellfire missiles. It has demonstrated three to seven times the capability in the 

ASW role and significant increases in its SUW capability over legacy systems. The 

MH–60R program is post-Milestone III, having received approval for full-rate production in 2006. The first operational squadron, HSM–71, established in 2007, is deploying in Carrier Strike Group Three with the USS John C Stennis (CVN–74). The 

MH–60R program has just finished installing its first pre-planned product improvement set of upgrades to include Link–16 and the multi-spectral targeting system 

(MTS) FLIR in time to make the first deployment. 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $493.0 million in APN for 18 

MH–60S aircraft and $49.1 million in RDT&E,N funds for the MH–60S, to continue 

development of the organic airborne mine countermeasures (Block II) and the armed 

helicopter (Block III) missions. The MH–60S is the Navy’s primary combat support 

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place four legacy platforms with a new H–60 variant. The basic MH–60S reached 

IOC and full rate production in 2002. Armed helo configuration reached IOC in June 

2007 and AMCM is scheduled to reach IOC in fiscal year 2010. The MH–60S armed 

helicopter configuration is also on its first carrier deployment with the USS Stennis. HSC–8 is currently operating eight helicopters, including six aircraft in the armed 

helo configuration, adding the MTS targeting FLIR, Link-16, self defense equipment, two .50 caliber crew served weapons, and eight Hellfire missiles. 

The Army and Navy are executing a joint platform multi-year contract that includes both the MH–60R and MH–60S airframes along with the Army’s UH–60M. 

The Navy is also executing a multi-year contract for integration of mission systems 

into the MH–60R. 

CH–46E Sea Knight 

The venerable CH–46E continues to perform well, and is poised to maintain operational relevancy through its projected retirement in 2018. The fiscal year 2010 

budget requests $35.9 million targeted at safety enhancements in dynamic components, avionics, and aircraft survivability equipment. These will sustain the health 

of the airframe as the Marine Corps progresses through the transition to the

MV–22 Osprey. This fleet of helicopters will be over 50 years old when they retire, 

yet they are still relevant, still engaged in the fight, and still the workhorse of assault support to the Marine rifleman. 

CH–53K Heavy Lift Replacement Program 

In fiscal year 2010 the President’s budget requests $554.8 million RDT&E,N to 

continue SDD of the CH–53K, which will replace the Marine Corps’ current heavylift helicopters, the CH–53E ‘‘Super Stallion’’ and the CH–53D ‘‘Sea Stallion.’’ In the 

past year the CH–53K program conducted its preliminary design review, has begun 

producing long-lead items in preparation for building test articles under the SDD 

contract, and is scheduled to conduct critical design review in fiscal year 2010. 

The legacy CH–53E was built for sustained shipboard operations, entered service 

in 1981, and continues to demonstrate its value as an expeditionary heavy-lift platform. This aging but very relevant helicopter is in high demand, making significant 

contributions to missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa; and disaster 

relief operations around the world. Expeditionary heavy-lift capabilities will continue to be critical to successful land- and sea-based operations in future anti-access, 

area-denial environments, enabling sea basing and the joint operating concepts of 

force application and focused logistics. 

As a design evolution of the CH–53E, the new-build CH–53K will fulfill land- and 

sea-based heavy-lift requirements not resident in any of today’s platforms, and contribute directly to the increased agility, lethality, and persistent presence of Joint 

Task Forces and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. The CH–53K will transport 

27,000 lbs. external cargo out to a range of 110 nautical miles, nearly tripling the 

CH–53E’s lift capability under similar environmental conditions while fitting under 

the same shipboard footprint. The CH–53K will also provide unparalleled lift capability under high altitude, hot weather conditions similar to those found in Afghanistan, thereby greatly expanding the commander’s operational reach. Maintainability 

and reliability enhancements of the CH–53K will significantly decrease recurring 

operating costs, and will vastly improve aircraft efficiency and operational effectiveness over the current CH–53E. Additionally, survivability and force protection enhancements will increase protection dramatically, for both aircrew and passengers, 

thereby broadening the depth and breadth of heavy lift operational support to the 

JTF Commander. Until fielding begins, we will upgrade and maintain our CH–53D 

and CH–53E fleet for heavy lift support to our warfighters. 

VH–71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Aircraft 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget recommends that the VH–71 program be 

cancelled. The Department of the Navy is developing options for a follow-on program. The fiscal year 2010 budget requests $30.0 million for pre-MS A risk reduction activities, capability based assessments, CONOPS development, trade study 

analysis, specification development, system concept development and threat analysis 

leading to a late fiscal year 2010/early fiscal year 2011 material development decision for a VH–71 follow on program. In addition, the fiscal year 2010 President’s 

budget requests $55.2 million to address fiscal year 2010 VH–71 cancellation costs. 

VH–3D/VH–60N Sustainment 

The fiscal year 2010 budget requests an investment of $42 million to continue programs that will ensure the aging legacy Presidential fleet remains viable until its 

replacement is fielded. These programs include the Lift Improvement for the

VH–3D and the Cockpit Upgrade Program and Structural Enhancement Program 

13 

for the VH–60N. Increased future investment in both aircraft will be required to ensure continued safe and reliable executive transportation until a replacement aircraft is fielded. 

SURVIVABILITY, SUPPORT AND COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures 

Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) Block 3/ALE–55 completed initial operational test and evaluation in December 2008. Based on the requirement to correct deficiencies identified during test, IDECM Block 3 full-rate production decision is now planned for fiscal year 2010 following verification of correction to deficiencies. Additional LRIP awards were approved for fiscal years 2009 and 

2010. The President’s budget requests $25.8 million in Ammunition Procurement for 

401 ALE–55 fiber optic towed decoys (FOTDs) in fiscal year 2010. $40.3 million in 

aircraft procurement (APN–5) is requested for the procurement of 10 ALQ–214 onboard radio frequency jamming systems (IDECM Block 2), 53 electronic frequency 

converters and other associated aircraft hardware for FOTD integration. IDECM 

Block 4 is a modification to the ALQ–214 that will enable its use on F/A–18C/D aircraft, in addition to F/A–18E/F aircraft. IDECM Block 4 will replace the obsolete 

ALQ–126B on-board jammer, currently installed on F/A–18C/D aircraft. The President’s budget requests $65.5 million in RDT&E in fiscal year 2010 for IDECM Block 

4 development and test. 

Aircraft Survivability Equipment 

To prevent current technology from lagging behind the threat, science and technology are developing next-generation helicopter survivability equipment. For fiscal 

year 2010, the Department of the Navy has requested $8.8 million for continued Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) hardware procurement and $64.7 million 

for Joint Allied Threat Awareness System (JATAS) development to provide a stateof-the-art missile warning detection and cueing system. We will thus pace the threat 

of advanced anti-aircraft systems proliferation. Funds obligated to date for DIRCM 

have been used for development and procurement of 64 systems, which began delivery in October 2008. The remaining unfunded portion is for an additional 83 DIRCM 

systems, which equates to 2 years of production capacity, in 2009 and 2010. 

Infrared Countermeasures 

The Navy has a multi-faceted approach to providing aircrew protection against 

current and next generation IR-guided Manportable Air Defenses. The fiscal year 

2010 President’s budget requests $63.7 million in RDT&E,N for the execution of the 

JATAS technology demonstration efforts. 

Joint Precision Approach and Landing Systems 

Joint Precision Approach and Landing Systems (JPALS) is a Global Positioning 

System-based precision approach and landing system that will replace aging and obsolete aircraft landing systems with a family of systems that is more affordable and 

will function in more operational environments, and support all Department of Defense land- and sea-based applications. JPALS will provide this capability by being 

rapidly deployable, survivable and interoperable among the U.S. Services and with 

U.S. allies, as well as with civil aircraft and landing facilities. JPALS will eventually support unmanned and highly automated aircraft, and will be able to operate 

during restricted emission control conditions. Milestone B was achieved third quarter 2008 with a subsequent engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) 

contract awarded. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $139.3 million 

in RDT&E,N in continued support of the EMD phase of the program. 

WEAPONS

In an era of continuing global uncertainty and shifting threats, the Department 

of the Navy is developing and deploying air-to-air and strike weapons to enhance 

our warfighter’s capabilities in an evolving and uncertain security environment. The 

naval aviation fiscal year 2010 President’s budget request for each new weapon or 

weapon system modification program is directed towards deterring potential aggressors, power-projection, sea-control, or other maritime and expeditionary warfare security objectives. Our budget provides resources for weapon systems that directly 

support troops deployed in the field—as well as weapon systems that will shape our 

plans to address potential near-peer competitors. 

The Navy/Marine Corps weapons programs take into account the lessons-learned 

from ongoing combat operations as well as the results of our research, development, 

and test efforts. The resulting fiscal year 2010 weapons budget provides for a portfolio of affordable weapons programs that is balanced between solutions to address 

14 

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) threats and development of new military 

capabilities. 

Tactical Tomahawk BLK IV Cruise Missile 

The Navy supports the continued procurement of this combat-proven, deep-attack 

weapon in order to meet ship-fill loadouts and potential combat requirements. The 

Block IV Tactical Tomahawk missile is in a full-rate production status and in fiscal 

year 2010 the President’s budget requests $283.1 million for an additional 196 Block 

IV weapons and associated support. 

Direct Attack Moving Target Capability 

In response to an urgent requirement identified by the combatant Commander in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of the Navy approved a rapid deployment capability (RDC) in fiscal year 2007 to develop the direct attack moving target capability, known as DAMTC. DAMTC improves our ability to attack and strike moving 

targets by leveraging highly successful, congressionally-supported procurement of 

dual-mode systems. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $46.4 million 

to transition the RDC to a formal acquisition program, support a competitive acquisition strategy, and acquire 2,099 additional weapons from a single source through 

competition at reduced costs. 

Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) 

The combat proven JSOW family of Joint Navy and United States Air Force airto-ground weapons continues on cost and schedule to develop a JSOW–C–1 variant. 

JSOW–C–1 adds a ‘moving target capability’ to the highly successful baseline 

JSOW–C variant with the addition of a data link and guidance software improvements. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $10.0 million for telemetry 

crypto-key modernization and continued JSOW–C–1 development and $145.3 million 

for JSOW–C–1 production totaling 430 all-up-rounds to fill our weapons magazines 

that remain below approved Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirements. 

Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II) 

The Department of the Navy is partnering with the United States Air Force on 

the development of the Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II) program. SDB II provides 

an adverse weather, day or night standoff capability against mobile, moving, and 

fixed targets, and also allows for target prosecution while minimizing collateral 

damage. SDB II is of special interest to the Department as it will be integrated into 

the ‘internal carriage’ of both Navy and Marine Corps variants of the JSF. SDB II 

acquisition consists of a competitive development, risk reduction phase between two 

industry teams with a down-select at Milestone B estimated in early fiscal year 

2010. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $43.9 million of RDT&E for 

the continued development of this joint program. 

Joint Air-to-Ground Missile 

JAGM will become the next-generation, forward firing precision-guided missile capable of being launched from Navy/Marine Corps fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned platforms. The Department of the Navy, in conjunction with the United 

States Army as the executive service, received formal approval from USD(AT&L) to 

proceed with the development of the JAGM in January 2008. The JAGM request 

for proposal was released in March and proposals were received in May. In September 2008, fixed-price incentive contracts were awarded. 

During the 27-month technology development phase, the two competing contractors will carry their design through a system-level preliminary design review (PDR) 

phase and conduct prototype ground launches of their missiles. The intent behind 

this competitive prototyping during the technology development phase is to improve 

the probability of overall program success and reduce program costs. To support this 

critical development program, the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $81.6 

million of RDT&E to implement this acquisition strategy. 

Hellfire Weapon System 

While the Department of the Navy develops JAGM, we are requesting continued 

support for legacy Hellfire weapons. Hellfire continues to be a priority weapon, providing our Navy/Marine Corps warfighters the ability to attack targets in the caves 

of Afghanistan as well as the urban canyons of Baghdad. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $133.1 million for 1,578 weapons with a mix of thermobaric, 

blast/fragmentation, and anti-armor warheads to provide the maximum operational 

flexibility to our warfighters. 

15 

Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) 

The AARGM development program transforms the legacy High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) into an affordable, lethal, and flexible time-sensitive strike 

weapon system. AARGM adds multi-spectral targeting capability with supersonic 

fly-out to destroy sophisticated enemy air defenses and expand upon the traditional 

anti-radiation missile target set. The program has completed all design reviews, 

began its formal test program in fiscal year 2007, was approved for low rate initial 

production (LRIP) in fiscal year 2008, and is scheduled to be deployed on the

F/A–18 Hornet in 2010. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $9.2 million for the development and test program and $48 million for production. 

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) 

The Department of the Navy assumed program authority for the APKWS II on 

September 30, 2008. Congress appropriated funding and approved an above threshold reprogramming request in fiscal year 2008 for the Marine Corps to complete 

SDD. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $5.0 million in RDT&E funding to complete development and testing for subsequent fielding in fiscal year 2011. 

In the past year, we saw successful transfer of the laser-guided 2.75’’ rocket contract 

from the Department of the Army to the Department of the Navy. This initiative 

will provide an unprecedented precision capability to our current unguided (and 

thus less accurate) rockets fired from attack helicopters. Congressional support in 

fiscal year 2008, with both a $6 million addition and approval of a $13 million reprogramming request, provided the $19 million in fiscal year 2009 that will complete development of this critical weapon in anticipation of the procurement’s beginning in 2010. The program is on schedule and on budget, and will meet the needs 

of our warfighters in theater right now. 

Sidewinder AIM–9X Air-to-Air Missile 

The joint Navy/Air Force (Navy led) AIM–9X Sidewinder missile is the newest 

variant in the Sidewinder family. The Sidewinder missile is the only short-range infrared air-to-air missile integrated on USN/USAF strike fighter aircraft. This fifth 

generation–9X weapon incorporates high off-boresight acquisition capability and 

thrust vectoring to achieve superior maneuverability, and provides increased sensitivity through an imaging infrared focal plane array seeker and advanced processing. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $2.3 million for RDT&E efforts, and $56.8 million for production of 161 all-up-rounds, captive air training missiles, and associated hardware. 

Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) AIM–120 

AMRAAM is a joint Navy/Air Force (Air Force led) advanced, medium range missile that counters existing aircraft and cruise missile threats with advanced electronic attack capabilities operating at high/low altitudes from both beyond visual 

range and within visual range. AMRAAM provides an air-to-air first look, first shot, 

first kill capability working within a networked environment in support of the 

Navy’s Sea Power–21 theater air and missile defense mission area. The fiscal year 

2010 President’s budget requests $3.6 million for RDT&E efforts and $145.5 million 

for production of a combined total of 79 all-up-rounds, captive air training missiles 

and associated hardware. 

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

Overseas contingency operations continue to emphasize unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The fiscal year 2010 budget reflects our commitment to a focused array 

of UAS that will support targeting and fires as well as enhance intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions with persistent, distributed, and netted sensors. The naval services have recently adopted the joint categorization of UAS into 

distinct groups that identify systems by weight, speed, and altitude. In addition to 

the five programs of record noted below, a number of small, specialized systems in 

the Group 1 and 2 categories are being supported to meet the urgent needs of the 

warfighter (i.e. Gasoline Micro Air Vehicle, Raven-B, WASP III Micro-UAS, and 

Scan-Eagle). 

Marine Corps Tactical UAS (MCTUAS) 

The Army’s RQ–7B Shadow UAS is a Group 3 system procured as an interim replacement for the RQ–2B Pioneer UAS until a suitable Group 4 UAS can be fielded 

in fiscal year 2015. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $1 million 

RDT&E and $56.8 million APN for continued product improvement and procurement of the RQ–7B. The transition to the RQ–7B Shadow began in fiscal year 2007 

with the procurement of two systems and was augmented in fiscal year 2008 with 

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the procurement of nine Shadow systems (five baseline systems and four global war 

on terror-funded systems). The Marine Corps will procure 13 systems. The Shadow 

UAS provides rapid fielding of a capability that meets urgent Marine Corps operational requirements and brings immediate interoperability and commonality between Army and Marine Corps units operating side by side in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

UAS/Small Tactical Unmanned Air Systems 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $37.4 million in RDT&E ($18.6 million Navy, $18.8 million Marine Corps, with a $6.0 million fiscal year 2010 OCO 

request pending) and $13.8 million in PMC for the UAS/Small Tactical Unmanned 

Air Systems (STUAS) program that will address Marine Corps and Navy targeting 

and ISR capability shortfalls identified in the OCO and currently supported by costly service contracts. The Group–3 UAS will provide persistent, ship- and land-based 

targeting and ISR support for tactical level maneuver decisions and unit level force 

defense/force protection. The Milestone B decision to enter engineering and manufacturing development is scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009 with 

IOC planned in 2012. UAS/STUAS plans to begin source selection fourth quarter fiscal year 2009 for a contract award to coincide with the Milestone B decision. Fiscal 

year 2010 PMC is planned to procure a STUAS/Tier II system as an early operational capability, which consists of four air vehicles and two ground control stations. 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAS 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $465.8 million RDT&E,N to continue SDD of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS. The Milestone 

B decision for the BAMS UAS program occurred on April 18, 2008. The program 

conducted the first major design review, systems requirements review, in January 

2009. The BAMS UAS program will meet the Navy requirement for a persistent ISR 

capability as well as providing a communication relay capability. The BAMS UAS 

is a larger Group–5 system which will be a force multiplier for the Fleet Commander, enhancing situational awareness of the battlespace and shortening the sensor-to-shooter kill chain. BAMS UAS will work as an adjunct to the new P–8A 

Multi-Mission Aircraft (MMA) to provide a more affordable, effective and supportable maritime ISR option than current ISR aircraft provide. The Navy also procured 

two Air Force Global Hawk UASs in fiscal year 2003 for demonstration purposes 

and to perform risk reduction activities for the BAMS Program. One of the two 

Global Hawk UAS, renamed the BAMS-demonstrator (BAMS–D) has been recently 

deployed to the CENTCOM theater of operations. 

Fire Scout UAS 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $25.6 million RDT&E to continue development of the Fire Scout UAS and $77.6 million APN for the production of five 

Fire Scout MQ–8B aircraft and three ship control stations. The Fire Scout is a 

Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) designed 

to operate from all air-capable ships, carry modular mission payloads, and operate 

using the Tactical Control System and Tactical Common Data Link. The Fire Scout 

UAS is a medium-to-large sized Group–4 system that will provide day/night real 

time ISR and targeting as well as communication-relay and battlefield management 

capabilities to support core Littoral Combat Ship mission areas of ASW, MIW and 

ASUW for the Naval forces. The fiscal year 2010 RDT&E budget request included 

funding to integrate a maritime search radar system that will significantly increase 

surveillance capability of the MQ–8B. Due to delays in the Littoral Combat System 

(LCS) program, the Department is certifying the MQ–8B system on the FFG–8 USS 

McInerney in order to meet Fleet requirements to deploy this capability, as planned, 

in fiscal year 2009. An above threshold reprogramming request for $22.8 million to 

the fiscal year 2008 RDT&E budget was approved by Congress to support the Fire 

Scout FFG integration. The Fire Scout Program will continue to support integration 

and testing as a mission module on LCS. Deploying this capability in fiscal year 

2010 on the USS McInerney will provide much needed new capability to operating 

forces and also reduce LCS developmental and operational test risks. Developmental 

testing of Fire Scout with the USS McInerney is in process. The Navy continues to 

cooperate with the Army on their Class IV UAS and with the Coast Guard for their 

ship based UAS planning. The Navy and Army have achieved over 90 percent commonality in the Fire Scout air vehicle. 

Unmanned Combat Air System 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requests $311.2 million of RDT&E budget 

to continue the Navy Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (Navy UCAS) efforts to 

develop a large Group–5, carrier-suitable, long range, low observable, penetrating, 

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persistent, unmanned aircraft system capability to conduct ISR/strike missions in 

denied access environments. The Navy UCAS efforts consist of continuation of the 

UCAS carrier suitability demonstration (UCAS–D) along with the initiation of acquisition planning and associated technology development. The UCAS–D effort will 

mature technologies associated with unmanned carrier-suitability, including launch, 

recovery, and carrier controlled airspace integration, to the technology readiness levels required for a potential follow-on acquisition program. The demonstration will 

include catapult launch and arrested landings aboard an aircraft carrier. Additionally, the program will demonstrate autonomous aerial refueling using the same unmanned systems from the carrier suitability demonstration. The demonstrations will 

be complete in fiscal year 2013 though additional technology maturation will be required before entering a potential follow-on acquisition program. Northrop-Grumman, prime contractor for the UCAS carrier suitability demonstration, is currently 

on track for an early fiscal year 2010 first flight. 

SUMMARY

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget reflects considerable effort in identifying 

solutions to the challenges faced in the Department’s aviation programs through a 

balance between sustaining fielded capabilities, as they are employed in the OCO 

and continued forward presence worldwide, and a substantive recapitalization effort 

that will deliver significantly better capabilities to the war fighter. The naval aviation team continues to work aggressively to identify efficiencies in the development, 

testing, procurement and sustainment of platforms, components, and weapons systems in order to ensure that investments made result in quality products and services provided to the fleet. Since 2001, the Navy and Marine Corps have been fighting shoulder to shoulder overseas, supporting an extremely high operational tempo 

in two theaters while growing our force, introducing new aircraft and systems, and 

looking beyond the current fight to how we will shape the naval aviation structure 

of the future. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, we thank you for the opportunity to testify before your 

subcommittee regarding the Department of the Navy’s aviation procurement programs. We look forward to your questions. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Admiral. I appreciate it. Good beginning. 

Now we’ll go to Lt. Gen. Mark D. Shackelford, USAF, Military 

Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARK D. SHACKELFORD, USAF, MILITARY DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION 

General SHACKELFORD. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Thune, distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for calling this hearing 

and for the opportunity to provide you with an update on Air Force 

modernization efforts. Your Air Force is fully engaged in operations 

across the globe, in overseas contingency operations and providing 

support to the combatant commanders to enable them to successfully execute their missions. 

As we prepare for the upcoming year, we will be assessing how 

the fiscal year 2010 budget aligns with our standing operational requirements, along with the upcoming needs of the entire Air Force. 

We frame our decisions and recommendations using the Secretary 

of the Air Force’s and Chief of Staff of the Air Force’s top five priorities list to ensure we are aligned with the desires of our senior 

leadership. 

We understand your focus today is on the fourth priority, modernizing our air and space inventories, organizations, and training. 

We are prepared to discuss how our rapidly aging aircraft fleet 

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drives our urgent need to find a balance between the acquisition 

of new inventory and the ongoing sustainment of the current fleet. 

The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force have made recapturing acquisition excellence their fifth priority. Last month 

they approved the Air Force acquisition improvement plan. This 

plan focuses our efforts and serves as our strategic framework for 

the critical work of modernizing and recapitalizing our air, space, 

and cyber systems. It builds on lessons learned from past shortfalls 

in our procurement processes. But more importantly, it establishes 

five initiatives that ensure rigor, reliability, and transparency 

across the Air Force acquisition enterprise. 

Those five initiatives are: revitalizing the Air Force acquisition 

workforce, improving the requirements generation process, instilling budget and financial discipline, improving Air Force major systems source selections, and establishing clear lines of authority and 

accountability within acquisition organizations. 

Your Air Force stands ready to win today’s joint fight and plan 

for tomorrow’s challenges. I thank the subcommittee for allowing 

me to appear before you today and for your continued support of 

the Air Force. I request our combined written statement be submitted for the record and I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Shackelford and Major 

General Gibson follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. MARK D. SHACKELFORD, USAF, AND MAJ. 

GEN. MARKE GIBSON, USAF 

I. INTRODUCTION

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Thune, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for calling this hearing, and for the opportunity to provide 

you with an update on the Air Force modernization efforts and other matters that 

are important to our Air Force and to the Nation. Your Air Force is fully engaged 

in operations across the globe, engaged in overseas contingency operations (OCO) 

and providing support to the combatant commanders to enable them to successfully 

execute their missions. As we prepare for the upcoming year, we will be assessing 

how the fiscal year 2010 budget aligns with the standing operational requirements 

along with the upcoming needs of the entire Air Force. We frame our decisions and 

recommendations using the SECAF/CSAF top five priorities list to ensure we are 

aligned with the desires of our senior leadership. We understand your focus today 

is on the fourth priority, which is modernizing our air and space inventories, organizations and training. We are prepared to discuss our rapidly aging aircraft fleet that 

drives our urgent need to find a balance between the acquisition of new inventory 

and the ongoing effort of sustainment of our current fleet. We look forward to a discussion on how best to interlace the requirements and the available resources that 

have been allocated in order to execute the National Military Strategy. 

II. WINNING THE FIGHT

When it comes to winning today’s fight your Air Force is ‘‘All In.’’ When we say 

‘‘All In,’’ that covers a lot of ground. We, along with our sister Services, partner with 

the joint and coalition team to bring airpower wherever it is needed. The current 

operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa highlight over 18 consecutive years of planning, resourcing and executing combat missions. Since OCO began 

in 2001, your Air Force has flown over 80 percent of the coalition’s combat sorties 

in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF). These missions provide the joint and coalition team with global airlift; aeromedical evacuation; air-refueling; command and control; close air support (CAS) to 

ground operations; strike; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and 

electronic warfare. We have flown over 385,000 mobility sorties dedicated to moving 

equipment and troops to and from the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). 

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The total air and space effort takes its toll on our equipment and people as we 

continue to maintain the high operations tempo over time. We currently have over 

208,000 airmen contributing 24/7 to combatant command operations, including 

35,800 airmen who are deployed to locations worldwide. When adding in the noncombat operations including humanitarian relief missions both globally and at 

home, and the air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations, the effects on the Air Force 

assets are tangible and measurable and are reflected in some of the problems we 

see in maintaining the current fleet. In direct support of the ASA mission, your Air 

Force has flown over 54,410 total sorties under Operation Noble Eagle, including 

39,390 fighter sorties, 11,290 air refueling sorties, and 1,826 airborne early warning 

sorties. As a testament to the total force, the Air National Guard has flown more 

than 70 percent of these sorties and currently operates 16 of 18 Air Sovereignty 

Alert sites. 

As we continue to accomplish our current mission sets and plan for future threats, 

we must remain mindful of the increasing age and costs of operating our air fleet. 

When approaching critical budget decisions, we face the same challenge of balancing 

between risk and operational necessity as we do when apportioning sorties. Our Air 

Force leadership is scrutinizing programs and budgets to find acceptable solutions 

to meet growing demands that are competing for limited amounts of funding. 

III. COMBAT AIR FORCES RESTRUCTURE PLAN

The Air Force intends to retire legacy fighters to fund a smaller and more capable 

force and redistribute savings for higher priority missions. Under the combat air 

forces (CAF) restructuring plan, the Air Force will accelerate the retirement of approximately 250 aircraft, which includes 112 F–15s, 134 F–16s, and 3 A–10s, over 

and above the 5 fighters previously scheduled for retirement in fiscal year 2010. The 

CAF restructure will result in cost savings of $355 million in fiscal year 2010 and 

$3.5 billion over the next 5 fiscal years. The savings would fund advanced capability 

modifications to remaining fighters and bombers. Additionally, funds would go toward procuring munitions for joint warfighters, to include the small diameter bomb 

(SDB), hard-target weapons and the AIM–120D and AIM–9X missiles. Remaining 

funds would be dedicated to procuring or sustaining critical intelligence capabilities, 

such as the advanced targeting pod, as well as enabling technologies for tactical air 

controllers and Special Operations Forces. 

The CAF restructuring plan, which will require appropriate environmental analyses, would enable the Air Force to use reassignment and retraining programs to 

move approximately 4,000 manpower authorizations to emerging and priority missions such as manned and unmanned surveillance operations and nuclear deterrence operations. This realignment would include the expansion of MQ–1 Predator, 

MQ–9 Reaper and MC–12 aircrews; the addition of a fourth active-duty B–52 squadron; and the expansion of Distributed Common Ground System and information 

processing, exploitation and dissemination capabilities for continued combatant commander support in Afghanistan and Iraq, among other adjustments. 

IV. STATUS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION

The following information provides updates on Air Force combat aircraft modernization: 

A–10 

The A–10 provides the Joint Force Commander lethal, precise, persistent, and responsive firepower for CAS and combat search and rescue (CSAR). It has performed 

superbly in Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force (OAF), OEF, and OIF. However, 

the age of the A–10 and high operations tempo have taken a toll on the fleet. In 

the Fall of 2006, the Air Force Fleet Viability Board (FVB) recommended that the 

Air Force upgrade 242 thin-skin center wing A–10 aircraft with thick-skinned wing 

replacements; this program is currently designing the new wing and installs will 

begin in fiscal year 2011. Last fall, approximately 240 A–10s were grounded due to 

wing cracks. An inspect and repair program was implemented that has reduced the 

number still grounded to approximately 60; we anticipate these will all return to 

flying by the end of June 2009. Additionally, A–10 landing gear failures have resulted in a program for replacing failure-prone parts. The Air Force is currently upgrading 347 A–10s to the ‘‘C’’ configuration through the Precision Engagement (PE) 

modification and anticipates completion by the end of fiscal year 2011. This modification enables J-Series weapons, such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) 

and Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD); integrates a digital data link 

and advanced targeting pods with video downlink; replaces monochrome cockpit displays with color multi-function displays; installs new pilot throttle and stick conVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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trols; adds a moving map capability and a mass-memory upgrade; and doubles current DC power. Additionally, we have integrated beyond line of sight radios into the 

A–10 for faster communication with ground units, forward controllers, and C2 centers. 

F–15 A–D 

The average age of the F–15 A–D fleet is over 25 years old and the average age 

of the F–15E fleet is over 16 years old. However, analysis suggests that Air Combat 

Command can manage the fleet through scheduled field/depot inspections under an 

individual aircraft tracking program. 

The F–15A–D fleet has returned to flying status after engineering analysis confirmed they are safe for flight. Of the 407 aircraft in the inventory, only 9 were 

grounded due to the longeron crack. The Air Force repaired five, and four were retired due to their proximity to planned retirement. The five aircraft were repaired 

in 2008 at a cost of approximately $235,000 each using organic materials and labor 

at Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center. 

Based on the recommendation of Boeing and depot engineers, the Air Force has 

instituted recurring inspections of F–15 longerons every 400 flight hours to detect 

cracks before they become catastrophic. Analysis confirms that this interval is very 

conservative and will avoid a mishap such as the one that occurred on 2 November 

2007. Additionally, the Air Force will conduct a full-scale fatigue test, aircraft teardown, and improved structural monitoring to help establish the maximum F–15 

service life and more effectively manage structural health of the fleet. We expect 

these efforts to successfully enable the 176 F–15C/D long-term ‘‘Golden Eagles’’ to 

operate safely and effectively through 2025. 

F–15E 

The F–15E fleet, which was not affected by the longeron crack, continues to provide support for ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Like the A–10, the

F–15E performed superbly in Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, OEF, and OIF. 

The Air Force has been working hard to improve the F–15E’s ability to rapidly engage and destroy time sensitive targets by adding secure radios and data links for 

faster communications with ground units and forward controllers; by integrating the 

latest precision weapons that not only hit a target accurately but are designed to 

reduce collateral damage; by adding a helmet mounted cueing system that will reduce the F–15E’s time to engage a target by up to 80 percent; and by adding a stateof-the-art, active electronically scanned array (AESA), radar system that not only 

addresses sustainment issues with the current system but will give the F–15E advanced capabilities to identify and engage targets, share real-time information with 

other aircraft, and protect itself from enemy threats. The Air Force plans for the 

F–15E to be an integral part of the Nation’s force through at least 2035. 

F–16 

Our F–16s, the bulk of the fighter fleet, are undergoing a structural upgrade program to replace known life-limited structural components. Due to the use of more 

stressing mission profiles, this upgrade program is required to maintain the original 

design airframe life of 8,000 flight hours. Wing pylon rib corrosion, a known problem 

with the F–16 aircraft, is an issue we monitor closely. This corrosion can prevent 

the F–16s from carrying pylon-mounted external fuel tanks which limits their effective combat range. We currently inspect F–16 aircraft every 800 hours to monitor 

for this problem. In partnership with industry, the Air Force has recently developed 

and certified an effective repair allowing repair of affected aircraft at the unit in 

a single day instead of requiring a lengthy wing overhaul at the depot. 

As of 15 May 2009, maintainers have repaired 41 wings at 4 units worldwide, restoring those aircraft to full mission capability. We will award a long-term support 

contract within the next 2 months which will further enhance the ability of units 

to obtain repairs for their aircraft. 

In other inspections, maintainers have found bulkhead cracks in approximately 

37.5 percent (149 of 397) of our Block 40/42 F–16 aircraft. Eight-four aircraft have 

been repaired and 5 aircraft have had the bulkheads replaced with 19 more in 

progress. As of 12 May 2009, three Block 40/42 F–16 aircraft were in non-flying status awaiting bulkhead repair or replacement. An additional 57 aircraft continue to 

fly with increased inspection requirements to measure crack growth. We will continue to monitor this situation closely. Similarly to the F–15, the Air Force will start 

conducting a full-scale durability test for the F–16 in fiscal year 2011 to help establish the maximum service life and more effectively manage structural health of the 

fleet. The Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP) is a top F–16 priority and will enable the maintenance of a single operational flight program configuration on the Block 40/42/50/52 F–16s. The Block 50/52 modification is complete and 

21 

the Block 40/42 modification will be complete in fiscal year 2010. It combines several modifications including a new mission computer, color displays, air-to-air interrogator (Block 50/52 only), Link–16, and Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System. The 

F–16 is expected to be a capable element of the fighter force well into 2024. 

Fifth-Generation Fighters 

Fifth-generation fighters like the F–22A and the F–35 are key elements of our Nation’s defense and ability for deterrence. As long as hostile Nations recognize that 

U.S. airpower can strike their vital centers with impunity, all other U.S. Government efforts are enhanced, which reduces the need for military confrontation. This 

is the timeless paradox of deterrence; the best way to avoid war is to demonstrate 

to your enemies, and potential enemies, that you have the ability, the will, and the 

resolve to defeat them. 

Both the F–22A and the F–35 represent our latest generation of fighter aircraft. 

We need both aircraft to maintain the margin of superiority we have come to depend upon, the margin that has granted our forces in the air and on the ground 

freedom to maneuver and to attack. The F–22A and F–35 each possess unique, complementary, and essential capabilities that together provide the synergistic effects 

required to maintain that margin of superiority across the spectrum of conflict. The 

Office of the Secretary of Defense-led 2006 QDR Joint Air Dominance study underscored that our Nation has a critical requirement to recapitalize TACAIR forces. 

Legacy 4th generation aircraft simply cannot survive to operate and achieve the effects necessary to win in an integrated, anti-access environment. 

F–22A Future Capabilities and Modifications 

The F–22A Raptor is the Air Force’s primary air superiority fighter, providing unmatched capabilities for air supremacy, homeland defense and cruise missile defense 

for the Joint team. The multi-role F–22A’s combination of speed, stealth, maneuverability and integrated avionics gives this remarkable aircraft the ability to gain access to, and survive in, high threat environments. Its ability to find, fix, track, and 

target enemy air- and surface-based threats ensures air dominance and freedom of 

maneuver for all joint forces. 

Similar to every other aircraft in the U.S. inventory, there is a plan to regularly 

incorporate upgrades into the F–22A to ensure the Raptor remains the world’s most 

dominant fighter in the decades to come. The F–22A modernization program consists of two major efforts that, together, will ensure every Raptor maintains its maximum combat capability: the Common Configuration program and a pre-planned 

product improvement (P3I) program (Increments 2 and 3). We are currently in year 

6 of the planned 13-year program. 

As of 1 May 2009, the Air Force has accepted 139 F–22A aircraft, out of a programmed delivery of 183. Most of these aircraft include the Increment 2 upgrade, 

which provides the ability to employ Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) at supersonic speeds and enhances the intra-flight data-link (IFDL) to provide 

connectivity with other F–22As. The Air Force will upgrade the F–22A fleet under 

the JROC-approved Increment 3 upgrade designed to enhance both air-to-air and 

precision ground attack capability. Raptors from the production line today are wired 

to accept Increment 3.1, which when equipped, upgrades the APG–77 AESA radar 

to enable synthetic aperture radar ground mapping capability, provides the ability 

to self-target JDAMs using on-board sensors, and allows F–22As to carry and employ eight SDBs. The Air Force will begin to field Increment 3.1 in fiscal year 2011. 

Future F–22As will include the Increment 3.2 upgrade, which features the next generation data-link, improved SDB employment capability, improved targeting using 

multi-ship geo-location, automatic ground collision avoidance system (Auto GCAS) 

and the capability to employ our enhanced air-to-air weapons (AIM–120D and

AIM–9X). Increment 3.2 should begin to field in fiscal year 2015. 

The current F–22A modernization plan will result in 34 Block 20 aircraft used for 

test and training, 63 combat-coded Block 30s fielded with Increment 3.1, 83 combatcoded Block 35s fielded with Increment 3.2, and 3 Edwards AFB-test coded aircraft. 

Consideration is also being given to upgrade the 63 Block 30s to the most capable 

Block 35 configuration. 

F–22A Procurement Plans 

The F–22A production program has delivered 22 ‘‘zero defects’’ aircraft to date 

and is currently delivering Lot 7 aircraft ahead of scheduled contract delivery dates 

at a rate of about two per month. Lot 7 Raptors are the first lot of the 3-year 

multiyear procurement contract awarded in the summer of 2007. The Air Force completed F–22A deliveries to Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB), AK, and we are currently underway with deliveries to Holloman AFB, NM, with expected completion 

in January 2011. 

22 

When the plant delivers the last Lot 9 aircraft in December 2011, we will have 

completed the program of 183 Raptors. The average unit cost for the 60 aircraft in 

the multiyear procurement was $142.6 million. Should Congress decide to fund the 

4 additional Lot 10 Raptors in the Overseas Contingency Operations supplemental 

request, the unit flyaway cost without tail-up costs will be approximately $153.2 

million. The unit flyaway cost is estimated to be $10.6 million higher due to higher 

material costs for a much smaller lot buy, loss of the multiyear procurement savings 

in parts and labor, inflation, and in-line incorporation of pre-planned product improvements, including SDB capability, ability to retarget JDAMs, and the ability to 

map ground targets with the synthetic aperture radar. This average does not include tail-up costs of $147 million. 

F–35 

The F–35 program will develop and deploy a family of highly capable, affordable, 

fifth-generation strike fighter aircraft to meet the operational needs of the Air 

Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and allies with optimum commonality to minimize life 

cycle costs. The F–35 was designed from the bottom-up to be our premier surfaceto-air missile killer and is uniquely equipped for this mission with cutting edge processing power, synthetic aperture radar integration techniques, and advanced target 

recognition. The F–35 also provides ‘‘leap ahead’’ capabilities in its resistance to 

jamming, maintainability, and logistic support. The F–35 is currently in the 8th 

year of a 13-year engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase. 

The F–35 is projected to meet all key performance parameters (KPP) and as of 

10 May 2009, AA–1 has completed 84 test flights, including a deployment to Eglin 

AFB. The first system design and development (SDD) short take-off and vertical 

landing (STOVL) aircraft, BF–1, has completed 14 flights. The second SDD STOVL 

aircraft, BF–2, had its first flight in February 2009. The Cooperative Avionics Test 

Bed (CAT–B) continues to provide unprecedented risk reduction at this stage in a 

major weapon system not seen in any legacy program. In December 2008, the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE)-approved full funding for seven conventional 

take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft and engines, plus sustainment and associated 

equipment as part of the low rate initial production (LRIP) Lot 3 acquisition decision memorandum. In addition, the DAE approved full funding for seven STOVL 

aircraft plus sustainment and associated equipment contingent upon successful completion of the F135 Pratt & Whitney lead engine stress test, flight test engine 6 

proof test and receipt of full STOVL flight clearance, which occurred on 30 January 

2009. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget provided funding for 10 CTOL, 16 

STOVL, and 4 CV aircraft for operational test. 

Joint Strike Fighter Alternative Engine Program 

Presidential budget 10, released earlier this month, did not fund the development 

and procurement of the alternative engine program for the Joint Strike Fighter. The 

Air Force and Navy are executing the funding appropriated by Congress in the 2009 

budget to continue the F136 program. 

The cost to continue F136 engine development is approximately $1.8 billion 

through fiscal year 2015. In addition, the Department of Defense will have to fund 

the production of GE engines to get the suppliers on equal footing in the amount 

of approximately $2.8 billion. Continued funding for the F136 engine carries cost 

penalties to both F135 and F136 engines for reduced production line learning curves 

and inefficient economic order quantities. The department has concluded that maintaining a single engine supplier provides the best balance of cost and risk. Our belief is the risks associated with a single source engine supplier are manageable due 

to improvements in engine technology and do not outweigh the investment required 

to fund a competitive alternate engine. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 

MQ–9A Reaper 

The MQ–9 Reaper is a ‘‘hunter-killer’’ remotely piloted aircraft capable of automatic cueing and prosecuting critical, emerging time-sensitive targets with self-contained hard-kill capability. SDD for the first increment began in fiscal year 2005 

and additional SDD efforts are currently ongoing. An interim combat capability aircraft deployed to CENTCOM in September 2007 and, even though not yet at IOC, 

more have continued to deploy. There are now 12 U.S. and 2 United Kingdom

MQ–9s supporting OEF operations. The MQ–9 has military-standard 1760-based 

stores management capability, an FAA-certified engine and GBU–12/AGM–114 

Hellfire weapon capability now, and an anticipated 500-lb. JDAM (GBU–38) capability in July 2009. As part of the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget, the Air Force 

requests funding to procure 24 MQ–9A Reapers. 

23 

Missile Programs 

Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile 

The Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM) is the Nation’s only stealthy, 

conventional, precision, launch-and-leave, stand-off missile capable of being 

launched from fighter and bomber aircraft. The JASSM achieved an initial operational capability on B–52, B–1, F–16 and B–2 and puts adversary’s center-of-gravity targets at risk even if protected by next-generation air defense systems. 

The Air Force postponed the JASSM fiscal year 2009 production contract due to 

unsatisfactory flight tests of the Lot 5 JASSM production missiles. Of the 10 flight 

tests, we considered 6 to be complete successes. To address issues discovered during 

the JASSM test program to date, we are taking a pause in fiscal year 2010 missile 

production in order to incorporate reliability improvements on Lot 6 missiles, and 

will conduct a 16-shot flight test in the late summer/early fall 2009 timeframe to 

verify JASSM is on track to achieve our established reliability goal of 90 percent. 

As part of the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget, the Air Force is not requesting 

any funds for procurement of missiles, but rather is requesting procurement funds 

only to continue reliability and retrofit activities. 

Legacy Bomber Fleet 

The Air Force bomber fleet exemplifies how we continue to sustain and modernize 

legacy aircraft as they are passed from one generation of crew force to the next. 

B–1 

The B–1 provides the Joint Force Commander massive firepower potential coupled 

with a significant loiter capability perfectly suited for the inconsistent tempo of today’s ongoing operations. Added to this is the B–1’s unique supersonic dash potential which allows a single aircraft to perform as a roving linebacker over large portions of the overall AOR. Once solely a nuclear deterrent, the Air Force has refocused the B–1’s capabilities through modernizing its current conventional 

lethality. 

A perfect example of the B–1’s potential was realized by adding an advanced targeting pod to the platform’s sensor suite. In an exceptional display of acquisition effectiveness, in 2007 the Air Force and our corporate partners responded to 

AFCENT’s highest Urgent Operational Need requirement by energizing a fast-track 

development and procurement timeline. With the help of supplemental funding, by 

June 2008 the 34th Bomb Squadron out of Ellsworth AFB, SD, was able to deploy 

a full complement of Sniper-equipped B–1 bombers to support both OEF and OIF 

operations without a single break in daily combat operations. The program continues in 2009 to outfit the remaining fleet and incorporate laser-guided weapons 

as well as integrating pod data directly into the avionics system, allowing for direct 

machine-to-machine transfer of targeting data. As stated by the Combined Force Air 

Component Commander, ‘‘The Sniper pod on the B–1 Bomber is amazing.’’ 

This new capability means the B–1 is even more in demand for current operational taskings. The non-stop overseas contingency operations are taking a toll on 

the overall fleet. Currently in fiscal year 2009, the Air Force is addressing five different issues which would have meant potentially grounding aircraft if they were 

not addressed. As a baseline to many of these sustainment modifications, the Air 

Force also embarked on its largest cockpit and communications modernization for 

the B–1 since its inception. Begun in 2005, the B–1 Fully Integrated Data Link 

(FIDL) program infuses a tactical Link–16 data link and a Joint Range Extension 

(JRE) Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) data link into an entirely overhauled modern 

cockpit. This system of modifications removes legacy monochrome displays and incorporates a series of color multifunction displays capable of displaying a wide array 

of fused data at all crew stations. Although the B–1 FIDL program has suffered several setbacks, through the continued persistence of Air Force and congressional support the program is now turning the corner and progressing toward completion. This 

upgrade will not only help protect the B–1 parts from obsolescence, it will evolve 

an already capable conventional platform into a networked provider of precision firepower. 

B–2 

The B–2 Spirit advanced technology bomber provides a lethal combination of 

stealth, range, payload, and precision engagement. The B–2 remains the world’s sole 

long-range, low observable bomber, and the only platform capable of delivering 80 

independently targeted GBU–38s. 

B–2 availability has steadily increased over the past 5 years, due in large part 

to focused efforts to enhance low observable maintenance such as the highly successful Alternate High Frequency Material program. However, it still faces increasing 

24 

pressures to upgrade avionics originally designed over 20 years ago. The three-increment Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications and Computer Upgrade 

program (EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade) seeks first, in Increment 1, to upgrade the Spirit’s flight management computers as an enabler for future avionics 

efforts. Increment 2 integrates the Family of Beyond-line-of-sight Terminals

(FAB–T) along with a low observable antenna to provide secure, survivable strategic 

two-way communications, while Increment 3 will connect the B–2 into the global information grid. Increment 1 of EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade is currently 

in EMD and on track to begin procurement in fiscal year 2011 for fleet installation 

beginning at the end of fiscal year 2013. 

The B–2 is also replacing the original radar antenna and upgrading selected radar 

avionics as part of the Radar Modernization Program (RMP) to change the radar 

operating frequency. RMP recently recovered from development challenges and has 

been approved to enter production. The LRIP contract for the first six production 

radar kits was signed on 29 December 2008, with the second and final buy for the 

remaining seven shipsets slated for later this year. Seven radar shipsets were also 

bought during development and are currently being installed in fleet aircraft to 

round out the 20 aircraft B–2 fleet; the developmental units will be retrofitted to 

the final production configuration. Thanks in large part to congressional support, 

the RMP acquisition strategy was modified to include both life-of-type component 

buys to avoid diminishing manufacturing issues during the production run, and advance procurement to recover 5 months of the schedule lost while resolving the RMP 

integration issues during development. 

B–52 

The B–52 Stratofortress is our Nation’s oldest frontline long-range strategic bomber, with the last airframe entering service with the United States Air Force in 1962. 

Given the expected service life of the aircraft, the B–52 airframes will be the longest 

operationally employed powered war machine in history, far surpassing the lifespan 

of any other single model land, sea or air weapon system. For more than 40 years 

B–52s have been the backbone of the strategic bomber force for the U.S. The

B–52 is capable of dropping or launching the widest array of weapons in the U.S. 

inventory, including gravity bombs, cluster bombs, precision guided missiles and 

JDAMs. Updated with modern technology, the B–52 will be capable of delivering the 

full complement of Joint developed weapons and will continue into the 21st century 

as an important element of our Nation’s defenses. 

The Air Force has invested in B–52 modernization programs to keep the platform 

operationally relevant by adding satellite and nuclear survivable and secure wideband high data rate communications; Sniper and Litening advanced targeting pods; 

aircraft computer and data transfer unit upgrades; and integration of smart weapons to improve conventional warfare capability. 

Together with the B–1 and the B–2, the B–52 serves as a key component of the 

U.S.’ long-range bomber force. It has earned respect as a highly capable conventional and nuclear combat platform during the Cold War, the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, OAF, OIF, OEF, and frequently deploys to Guam to provide a 

continuous bomber presence mission in the Pacific. The B–52 continues to serve the 

Nation well as it has during its long and distinguished history, and we have provided significant support across the Future Years Defense Program in recognition 

of its value. 

V. CLOSING

Your Air Force stands ready to win today’s joint fight and plan for tomorrow’s 

challenges. We are committed to working together to determine the right procurement, sustainment and retirement strategy to ensure we are prepared for the current fight as well as posturing for future demands. Dominance of air, space, and 

cyberspace continues to be requisite to the defense of the United States. We appreciate your continued support and look forward to working in concert to ensure our 

decisions enable us to strengthen our Air Force to meet future requirements. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, General. 

Without objection, we’ll submit all the statements for the record. 

General Trautman, do you have a statement? 

25 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. GEORGE J. TRAUTMAN III, USMC, 

DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 

General TRAUTMAN. I do, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Please proceed. 

General TRAUTMAN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune, distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure for me to be here 

as the leader of marine aviation to discuss the President’s 2010 

budget submission. The Commandant and I are extremely grateful 

for the exceptional way this subcommittee and Congress support 

the men and women who volunteer to serve in our Marine Corps 

during this time of war. 

With marines in the fight every day, my focus is on supporting 

our deployed forces by striving for operational excellence while 

managing risk to our air crew and those we support. Our older aircraft have performed well in sustained combat operations and they 

continue to do so, but we are wearing them out. 

While waging the current fight, we in Marine Corps aviation are 

also embarking on significant transitions to new aircraft and our 

family of unmanned aerial systems. These aircraft and systems will 

give us the operational capabilities we need to fulfill our vision of 

a fast, lethal, expeditionary force that is ready for the uncertainties 

of future combat operations, yet has the staying power of engagement in the most austere conditions imaginable. 

Two of our key transition efforts promise to change the way we 

project Marine Corps combat power in the future. First, the

MV–22 Osprey has recently finished three highly successful combat 

rotations to Iraq and last month the fourth Osprey squadron sailed 

toward the fight with the Marine Expeditionary Unit that will be 

deployed for the next 6 to 7 months. 

The Osprey has transformed the way we are fighting in a manner akin to the introduction of the helicopter in the middle of the 

last century. We can now project combat-loaded marines, soldiers, 

or special operators from a sea base or any forward site deep into 

the battle space, at the speed of a KC–130, and we can do it at altitudes above ground level and the threat that resides on the ground 

that has claimed so many helicopters in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

elsewhere. Then we can land that payload anywhere it is needed, 

just like a helicopter. 

With its speed, range, and survivability, the MV–22 is truly a 

game-changer. Another game-changer will be the F–35B short 

takeoff and vertical landing variant of the JSF. In the fall of 2012 

when the Marine Corps stands up its first operational squadron, 

this fifth generation stealth aircraft will begin replacing our

FA–18s, AV–8s, and EA–6Bs with a single platform that will exceed the operational capabilities of any tactical aircraft being flown 

today. 

The JSF gives us the operational agility we need to support the 

joint force in the hybrid battles that loom off our Nation’s bow. 

Most importantly, we intend to leverage the unprecedented sensor 

capability this machine offers for the benefit of the entire marine 

air-ground task force, allowing us to accelerate the decision cycle 

and fight smarter than ever before. 

26 

Just over 3 short years from now, our operational commanders 

will be able to combine the effects of these two machines, the

MV–22 Osprey and the F–35 Lightning II, from a sea or land base 

to unleash a tempo, agility, and speed of action that has never been 

possible in the past. Regardless of the future threats we will face, 

our unwavering mission remains to be the Marine Corps’ aviation 

force in readiness across the full spectrum of combat operations. 

My pride in the accomplishments of our marines past and 

present and the staying power of our military families is only exceeded by my confidence that we are properly poised to meet our 

future challenges. 

Thank you for this opportunity to speak with you today and I 

look forward to answering any questions that you may have. Thank 

you, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, General. 

General Gibson. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MARKE F. GIBSON, USAF, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF THE 

AIR FORCE 

General GIBSON. Yes, sir. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman, 

Ranking Member Thune, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I would also like to thank you for calling this hearing 

and for the opportunity to provide you with an update on Air Force 

operations and other matters that are important to our Air Force 

and to our Nation. 

The current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the Horn of 

Africa highlight over 18 consecutive years of planning, resourcing, 

and executing combat missions. Since 2001 your Air Force has 

flown over 80 percent of the coalition’s combat sorties in support 

of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF). These missions provide the joint coalition team with global 

airlift; air medical evacuation; air refueling; command and control; 

close air support; strike; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and electronic warfare. 

We have flown over 385,000 mobility sorties dedicated to moving 

equipment and troops to and from the CENTCOM AOR. Twentyfour/seven, your Air Force is providing a preponderance of the flying assets supporting the combatant commanders, enabling them to 

successfully execute their missions both in the AOR overseas and 

in homeland defense. 

But this total air, cyber, and space effort takes its toll on our 

equipment and people, and we continue to maintain high operating 

tempo over time. We currently have over 208,000 airmen contributing to the combatant commander operations, including nearly 

36,000 airmen who are deployed to locations worldwide. 

We are fully committed to the joint fight as we continue to transform our Service into a smaller, more flexible and lethal force 

across the spectrum of operations. 

I thank the subcommittee for allowing me to appear before you 

today and for your continued support to our Air Force. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, General. 

27 

Finally, Admiral Myers. Thanks for being here. 

STATEMENT OF RADM ALLEN G. MYERS, USN, DIRECTOR, 

WARFARE INTEGRATION/SENIOR NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Admiral MYERS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Navy aviation. 

I am delighted to share this time with my colleagues from the 

Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps to convey the contributions 

of Navy aircraft in our Armed Forces. Our aviation community, 

comprised of aircraft, ships, and weapons systems, has proven to 

be a stabilizing force with the capacity to span the globe. If we 

could look back to the days following September 11, just 3 weeks 

after the attack, two carriers, the Enterprise and the Carl Vinson, 

were in theater ready to provide continuous strikes and close air 

support. In fact, the Enterprise reversed course while she was 

steaming out of theater. No need to refuel and no need of immediate replenishment; that strike group commander, with the best 

trained crews in the world, ready to respond. The Navy carrierbased F–18s provided the first tactical air strikes in country. 

Our response and support of the events of September 11, OEF, 

continues today. In fact, recently the Chief of Naval Operations 

(CNO) cited a statistic concerning the contributions of our carrier 

fleet that I would like to emphasize, that a single Navy aircraft 

carrier provides 46 percent of the fixed-wing aircraft sorties in Afghanistan. That one carrier provides close air support, airborne reconnaissance, and electronic attack to our troops in contact with 

the enemy. By the way, the response time for those troops in contact with the enemy is often less than 10 minutes. 

Augmenting carrier support to our troops ashore, the Navy also 

deploys land-based airborne electronic attack via the EA–6B. These 

aircraft conduct critical missions that support U.S. forces and support offensive operations. 

Is it really any wonder that in moments of crisis you hear the 

phrase, ‘‘Where are the carriers?′′ Often the first to arrive in response to a crisis, the carrier strike group provides the credible capability, assured access, speed, agility, and persistence needed 

without reliance on infrastructure ashore. 

Sea power provides persistent combat power ashore while facilitating partnerships at sea, as we’ve seen off the Horn of Africa 

with our combined task forces. Sea power is disrupting insurgents 

on land as well as disrupting smuggling and piracy at sea. Our 

fixed- and rotary-wing Navy assets have been engaged in counterpiracy operations around the Horn of Africa. During the Maersk 

Alabama incident, the first U.S. military asset on the scene was a 

Navy P–3 and our helicopters have been integral in the apprehension of a number of pirates by providing the necessary surveillance 

to locate, track, and intercept vessels on behalf of the visit, board, 

search, and seizure teams. 

Our carriers and the ships remain on station around the world, 

providing presence in other places as well: the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, 

28 

and the Red Sea. Our forces provide effects ashore and at sea, 

strengthening relationships and building regional stability. 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget maintains our ability to 

meet wartime needs for today and contend with future security 

challenges. The aircraft that are fighting today’s war are being recapitalized or sustained to ensure relevancy against a full spectrum 

of threats. We’re thankful to our predecessors for investing in programs that we are benefiting from today and those that will meet 

the future security challenges of tomorrow. 

Our budget continues the development of the F–35, the E–2D 

Advanced Hawkeye, the P–8, unmanned aviation, and new strike 

weapons capabilities. The Department of the Navy will produce 98 

additional tactical and fixed-wing aircraft, 100 rotary-wing aircraft, 

and 5 VTUAVs, for a total of 203 aircraft. 

I would like to offer my appreciation to the committee. Without 

this committee’s tireless devotion and significant contributions, the 

great successes of our force would not be possible. We are truly 

grateful. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and 

thank you for your support for what we do today and what we will 

do tomorrow. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Admiral. 

We really have a good turnout of members of the subcommittee 

this afternoon, which is the most tangible expression one could ask 

of the interest in the TACAIR question. So we’ll do 7-minute 

rounds for questioning. 

Admiral Architzel, I want to start with a few overview and future-oriented questions. Last year at the comparable hearing, we 

were told that there was a potential strike fighter shortfall for the 

Navy of 125 aircraft in the 2017 timeframe. But last week at the 

full committee, the CNO said that the Department of the Navy is 

now projecting the shortfall could be as high as 250 aircraft. I wonder if you could describe what happened to lead to that doubling 

of that shortfall, and to comment on the shortfall. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. You’re correct 

that in the Presidential budget 2009 year the strike fighter inventory projections used numbers of 69 for the Navy and 125 for the 

overall Department of the Navy. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Those are based on a model developed at 

Naval Air Systems Command, which projects based on a number 

of factors what the aircraft total would be in the out years. Using 

that model, it peaked, by the way, in 2017 to give you the numbers 

you just quoted, sir. 

In that model at that time there were a number of assumptions 

made. Some of those assumptions assumed that we would continue 

to operate with 10 carrier wings, which we fully expect to do. With 

that comes 40 strike fighter squadrons, and the Navy would have 

35 strike fighter squadrons augmented with 5 from the Marine 

Corps. Marine Corps aviation is essentially 19 strike fighter squadrons and will grow with 2 cadre squadrons to 21. 

Some other assumptions in that model were that, while we would 

have legacy aircraft, we would be able to fly legacy aircraft to 

29 

10,000 hours. That would have been a total of 623 legacy Hornets 

that could reach 10,000 hours. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. It also assumed that we would have full production of the then-projected E and F line of 506 strike fighters. 

We also had a projection of what’s called the high flying hour inspection, which would occur at 8,000 hours, which would allow us 

to take it to 8,600 hours for Hornets without having to do major 

structural, depot-level repairs. 

That high flying hour inspection in that model, in that number, 

was projected to be a 5 percent dropout rate. In other words, of the 

airplanes you inducted into that inspection, which is a 6-month inspection and requires about $474,000 to complete, it would be 

about 5 percent of airplanes that wouldn’t pass that inspection. So 

in other words, the vast majority would. 

Also, we assumed in that model at that time the ramp rate 

would go to 50 aircraft for the Navy per year. 

As we went forward in time, we learned more about the legacy 

airplanes, we learned more about production rates, we learned 

more about the model, and the model gets adjusted and reworked. 

The latest information that would be the most timely that I have 

now would be that that shortfall would still be there. It might be 

slightly different because we’re taking steps to mitigate that shortfall, as you can imagine. 

So what has changed? One thing that would be changed is that 

we believe that the dropout rate to 10,000 hours for the inspection 

is not 5 percent; it would be much higher, more like 95 percent. In 

other words, we won’t get those airplanes to 10,000 hours just by 

inspection. We’re going to have to do some serious level depot work 

to get them there. 

So that number comes down from 623 to around 295 that we believe we could get to 10,000 hours through the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). The other 191 aircraft we would take 

through the high flying hour inspection and expect 8,600 hours on 

them. Keep in mind, if we don’t do a high flying hour inspection 

the airplanes would basically drop off the line at 8,000 hours. 

We do still plan on the full program of record which was established to be 506 E and Fs, and we do expect to be able to press 

forward with that. So it explains why the numbers change slightly 

over the year-to-year or model runs, sir, as you go forward with 

those assumptions that are in there. 

But the Navy is committed to manage our strike fighter inventory through four principal ways: to manage the JSF to make sure 

we get the ramp rate; to make sure absolutely that we get the IOC 

for the Marine Corps in 2012 for the B variant; and for the Navy 

in 2015 for the C. 

We also want to make sure that we maintain program-related 

engineering and logistics to make sure we maintain and sustain 

our airplanes that we have, the legacy Hornets and the E and F 

as well, to get the most utilization out of them. 

We also want to make sure that we go through the Service Life 

Assessment Program (SLAP)-SLEP. SLAP is the assessment; SLEP 

is the actual depot-level maintenance. There is a considerable 

30 

amount of work to be done, and that is programmed to be done between 2012 and 2018 or 2019 to keep our force levels up. 

Finally, as I mentioned, the high flying hour inspection as we get 

from 8,000 to 8,600 hours. 

All this is based on the operation of our Navy and our tactical 

Air Force. I would point to today, while I can’t predict what the future would be, and we will learn more through the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR) about force structure, et cetera, but today 

we have seven carriers operating at sea. Four of them are deployed. 

Two of them are doing workups. George Herbert Walker Bush is off 

the coast doing fleet carrier qualifications (CQ). So you have seven 

aircraft carriers at sea today, with six air wings embarked, and 

also replacement air groups operating off the seventh. 

In the future, we want to be able to maintain and do everything 

we can from an acquisition standpoint, from a technical standpoint, 

in the Naval Air Systems Command to support that fleet in the future. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I think you were ready for that question. 

That was a very thorough answer. 

Let me ask this question. Would you accept the 250 aircraft 

below requirements number? I want you to help us understand, because in all the discussion about spending on defense I think, particularly on these programs, there’s not an appreciation, if one accepts the Department of Defense’s (DOD) definition of what’s required, that we are on a course that is going to put us way below 

requirements. So my question really is, are we going to be capable 

of, in the case of the Navy for instance, maintaining the fleet response plan of being able to surge to 5 or 6 carriers within 30 days 

of notification, followed by another carrier within 90 days, if the 

Navy is 250 aircraft below requirements? 

Admiral MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you don’t mind, I 

think I can address part of your question. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good. 

Admiral MYERS. A year ago I was in front of this committee and 

talked about the challenges of the strike fighter shortfall and that 

we were projecting for the U.S. Navy a 69 aircraft shortfall if we 

were able to get all of the legacy Hornets through SLEP or up to 

10,000 hours. These are 6,000-hour aircraft that have been extended to 8,000 hours. Admiral Architzel just mentioned we have 

a method to get them from 8,000 to 8,600 hours. It’s called the high 

flying hour inspection. It’s heavy on the inspection and meant to 

be light on the maintenance required. Those aircraft we think can 

get from 8,600 hours all the way out to 10,000. 

So the bracket that I briefed last year was 69 aircraft if we could 

get all the aircraft we needed to 10,000 hours. That would be our 

shortfall. If we got none of those aircraft to 10,000 hours, then it 

would be 243. That’s basically the range that we were working in 

a year ago. 

Now, what’s changed since last year? Admiral Architzel mentioned that we have aircraft that are going through the high flying 

hour inspection. We finished our analysis program and we have 38 

aircraft that entered the high flying hour inspections and we have 

the first aircraft just approaching 8,000 hours to try to see how it 

is we’re going to get those to 8,600 hours. 

31 

In that inspection, meant to be about 5 or 6 months worth of 

work in the depot, they looked at 159 focus areas or hot spots. As 

Admiral Architzel also mentioned, the intent or the expectation 

was that we would be able to inspect and we’d have about a 5 percent fallout rate, and then we’d return those to the fleet with another 600 hours. 

What we found is there is an additional 60 hot spots on those 

38 aircraft. Nine of them have completed the inspection, and it’s increased the time to get through that depot from 11,000 man-hours 

to about 24,000 man-hours. So we’re already starting to see that 

it’s going to be a lot of work to get these aircraft at least to the 

8,600 hour point. 

To get beyond 8,600 hours, we’re going to have to do an extension for the aircraft, and we’re in the process of understanding 

where we are on the high flying hour inspection and trying to manage what parts we need so that we can start inducting the right 

aircraft into the service life extension within the next couple years. 

We think we’re going to be SLEP-ing aircraft through about 

2018. 

So what has happened in the last year is we have the analysis 

and a little bit more information and we know that we can get aircraft to 10,000 hours. So our challenge is to make sure that we program enough in Program Objective Memorandum 2012, because 

that’s when we think we’re going to need the money, to actually 

take about half of the legacy Hornets from 8,000 to 8,600 hours to 

10,000 hours. 

Then we would wind up with a strike fighter shortfall for the 

U.S. Navy of about 70 aircraft. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. By which year? 

Admiral MYERS. That peaks in about 2015. It starts in about 

2013. So what we’re discovering by looking at these aircraft in the 

high flying hour inspection is that they’re not passing as quickly, 

so we’re going to have a shortfall a little earlier. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. My time is up. I’d just say briefly, 

your explanation is very thorough and I think the point is that 

we’re pushing you hard and you’re pushing the aircraft that you 

have hard to meet the requirements, because we’re not replenishing rapidly enough. I think at some point therefore it makes it 

very difficult for the Navy to meet the response plans that you 

have to crises that we may confront. 

I’ll come back to this in my next round. Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me direct this to all of our witnesses, but I want to get a general reaction or observation with respect to the 2010 defense budget request, in which the President and Secretary Gates have stated 

that they intend to reshape the priorities of the defense establishment. In so doing, they propose to cut dramatically or cancel various major weapons systems. 

In terms of the TACAIR portfolio, are there any aspects of that 

plan with which you have any difficulty? [No response.] 

Don’t jump. [Laughter.] 

General TRAUTMAN. Well, I’ll start, sir, since I’m probably the 

happiest with it. I think the exact correct thing to do is to accelerate and move forward to the F–35, the JSF. If you look across 

32 

the board at how much is being spent on TACAIR in this time of 

other needs, I think that’s exactly the right thing to do. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. I would say that as we go into the challenges of the future, whether it be irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, or conventional warfare, the carrier capability and its embarked air wings can meet the fight and be able to provide the full 

spectrum availability to meet the challenges that exist that you 

mentioned in all those areas, and believe exists within the carrier 

air wings of today and will in the future. 

So I would answer the same way as I did before about supporting 

the next generation strike fighter, but also ensuring that we maintain our legacy Hornets and air wings as well as we go forward. 

General SHACKELFORD. Senator, if I might, I believe the strategy 

in the new budget largely relies on a re-analysis of what the future 

threat looks like coming from the QDR, which will have whatever 

effect it has on our future weapons systems procurement. In the 

mean time, as we look at what the Air Force is capable of bringing 

to bear in the next 5 to 10 years, we don’t see any risk of shortfall 

there. We do believe, as was stated prior, that ramp-up in production of the F–35 is absolutely critical to recapitalize our Air Force 

capability. 

We have a number of new programs in progress which were unaffected by the new budget, to sustain existing weapons systems. 

We have no major heartburn. 

Senator THUNE. Anybody else care to comment? 

General GIBSON. Senator Thune, I’ll just piggyback on General 

Shackelford’s comment about the view of the strategic risk in the 

relatively near term in what’s termed the combat air forces redux 

within the Air Force, taking some of those savings, I think it’s $355 

million this year and about $3.5 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), to reinvest that into some of our fourth 

generation and improve capabilities both in the aircraft and in 

some of the enhanced weapons that they’ll be able to carry in the 

near term. 

So I think it was a conscious decision to start working that gap 

now. 

Senator THUNE. This I guess I would direct to General 

Shackelford and General Gibson. But what’s your view of the proposal to end the production of the F–22 fighter aircraft at 187? 

General SHACKELFORD. Sir, you’re familiar with the numbers 

that have been presented by our chief and our secretary. We believe that the end of the production of the F–22, as the Secretary 

of Defense has stated, is the end of the program of record. The capability that we get out of those 187 F–22s we believe is sufficient 

for the type of threat that the Secretary of Defense is addressing 

in the future. 

Again, as we look at fifth-generation capability we’re going to 

wind up leveraging the F–35’s capabilities as those numbers build 

in the future. If we had a concern with it, it would lie in the area 

of sustaining the fleet. The 187 F–22s provide excellent combat capability. To sustain that fleet over a long period of time may become a challenge. 

Senator THUNE. How about the proposal to terminate the combat 

search and rescue replacement helicopter (CSAR–X) program? 

33 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. In the case of CSAR–X, the Secretary of Defense was concerned that we didn’t have it right in 

terms of the requirements for that platform, particularly in context 

of the approach we were taking to take what are essentially existing helicopters and spend a large amount of money on development 

to specialize them for the CSAR–X missions. 

Now, he did not cancel the CSAR–X mission. He did cancel the 

program. That gives us an opportunity to work with the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff this summer in a study to 

come back and relook at those requirements and how it might best 

be addressed, given other rotary-wing capabilities and the larger 

body of rotary-wing capability across DOD. 

Senator THUNE. Finally, your view of the proposed suspension of 

the Next Generation Bomber? 

General SHACKELFORD. Similar to the helicopter, sir, the Secretary had concerns about the requirements for the bomber, particularly in the area of nuclear capability and whether or not it 

would be unmanned. Likewise, through the QDR we’re going to go 

back and relook at those requirements and make sure we have 

them right for what he foresees the type of strategic bomber capability he wants DOD to have in the future. Based on the outcome 

of the QDR, we’ll move forward as appropriate with the program. 

Senator THUNE. Let me move back to the fighter gap. Without 

the benefit of the Air Force’s having conducted a service life assessment as the Navy has with regard to its strike fighter capability, 

do you have a sense of what the probable extent of the Air Force’s 

fighter gap is? I think you’ve sort of answered that question in response to Senator Lieberman’s question and in some of your opening statements. 

But I guess my question comes back to the extent to which buying more quantities of some of the legacy aircraft, such as F–16s 

and F–15Es, might help mitigate on a cost-effective basis the shortfall in the Air Force over the intermediate- to long-term. 

General GIBSON. Sir, I think one of the earlier testimonies put 

that gap at nearly 800 at around 2024. With the acceleration proposed with the F–35 buy ramping up to 80 and possibly even higher, we think that that greatly mitigates that risk in the out years. 

We also have a number of aircraft—the legacy aircraft that we 

have now—that in that timeframe are extended on or about those 

dates, that could possibly be extended if required. 

The QDR is currently relooking at what those numbers will need 

to be in future scenarios. So we think at this time it’s manageable, 

and the idea of going back and purchasing more fourth generation 

systems is not seen as buying us into the future capability that 

we’ll require. 

Senator THUNE. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I’ll 

come back in another round. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay, thanks, Senator Thune. 

Senator Begich, thanks for being here. 

Senator BEGICH. Mr. Chairman, I’m going to yield to Ms. 

McCaskill. I know she has to catch a train, so I wanted to give her 

my time for right now. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That’s very gracious of you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Isn’t he nice? 

34 

Senator LIEBERMAN. He is nice. 

Senator BEGICH. I’m making a note of this. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Believe me, that means I owe you one. 

Senator BEGICH. That’s right. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You elicited that testimony from me. I was 

not prepared for it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. There you go. 

Thank you very much, Senator Begich. I appreciate it. 

Let me drill down a little bit on the testimony that I heard as 

I came in. My understanding is, Admiral, that you’re saying that 

our manhours to take the Hornet to 8,600 hours have increased 

from 11,000 to 24,000 manhours, or to get them to 10,000 it’s increased? 

Admiral MYERS. That’s for the high flying hour inspection, 

ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So what you’re saying is that the original 

estimate of when the gap was going to be most acute may have to 

be moved forward because of the number of hours it’s taking to extend? 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, ma’am. What’s happening is, those aircraft 

are pulled out of the inventory so that we can do the inspection before they get to 8,600 hours. What we thought was going to take 

a matter of about 6 to 8 months is now taking upwards of 11 

months in order to get those aircraft back to the fleet. 

Now, I want to caveat that. There’s only 38 aircraft that have 

gone into the high flying hour inspection and only 9 have come out. 

So this is our early snapshot, but based on that insight we’re taking a look at our models and we project that we’re going to have 

a shortfall. We don’t have a shortfall today, but we think that, 

based on the number of aircraft and the rate that they’re flying and 

when they’re going to have to be inspected prior to 8,000 hours, 

that it’ll start to pull them out of the inventory earlier than we anticipated. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We know now that the JSF is 55 percent 

over the 2001 estimate. We know it’s at least 2 years behind schedule. We know that all the technologies on it have not yet matured. 

What I’m trying to get to here is that there seems to be a strong 

factual basis that we’re not going to get to where we want to be 

on the JSF soon enough or at the price that we had hoped, and 

that we have—I think I’m quoting the Admiral—‘‘the backbone of 

our ability to push power ashore, the F–18’’—that is on schedule. 

We keep talking about the QDR, why there isn’t more of an acknowledgment of the cost savings that we would get with the 

multi-year at this point. I think if you had to guess at this point, 

based on where we are with the JSF and where we are with the 

F–18, that the number 70 is wildly optimistic; that in fact it is 

going to be significantly over 70. If we know that, why wouldn’t we 

want to get the billion dollars in savings and do the multi-year? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Let me take it from an acquisition standpoint if I could, Senator. Thank you for the question. First off, to 

understand the strike fighter inventory management, the issue 

we’re talking about is getting the Hornets to fill an area until we 

can get the JSF in numbers to replace. The Navy stands strongly 

35 

behind the JSF program and the capability it brings as a fifth-generation fighter. 

It is projected to make all of its KPPs. As you pointed out, the 

most recent master schedule, whether it’s the A, B, or C variant, 

has some delay. But at the same time, changes to the program are 

not what we have seen on other legacy programs in development. 

We believe it will make the 2012 and 2015 deliveries for the 

Navy. However, we need to manage not just the JSF; we have to 

manage the Hornets, which is not just the legacy Hornets; the E 

and F as well. If we look at the SLEP–SLAP program and we talk 

about what we’re going to do and the time we would need it, it’s 

based on when those airplanes would reach 8,000 hours. That begins in the numbers we’re talking about, where it would make a 

difference to SLEP those aircraft, those are from about 2012 to 

2018. 

The fly rate we project today could change with the QDR, it could 

change with a lot of things, it could change with how we manage 

our force levels. But using what we have today, we would say that 

we’re going to have about 295 aircraft that we would want to 

SLEP, as I mentioned, and we’ll take another 191 aircraft and run 

them through a high flying hour inspection program that would 

allow us to maintain the strike fighters we need as projected at 

that time. 

I believe we’re managing across the inventory both to preserve 

the JSF we need in the future as well as to ensure we have the 

capability of our carrier wings that we’ll need as we bring on the 

JSF. But the Navy stands firmly behind the JSF. 

There have been challenges in the program, as you mentioned. 

This is a critical year for that program. The JSF this year is finishing up the SDD. We’re also increasing ramp rates on the airplane, and we’re also going forward and starting the test profiles 

in earnest on the airplane. So it’s a very stressing time for the program. But the program is moving forward in all variants and we 

have confidence that it will meet the numbers and the performance 

we need out of that aircraft. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I certainly understand that the Navy stands 

behind the JSF and that DOD stands behind the JSF, and that’s 

not really my quarrel. My quarrel is if we know we’re going to have 

a shortfall and we know we need to fill it, why don’t we make sure 

we do it in the most cost effective way for the taxpayer in terms 

of a multi-year procurement of the FA–18? 

Let’s fast forward. Let’s assume that other Senators are sitting 

here 15, 20 years from now. Does anybody have any thought as to 

whether or not it’s a good idea to have only one manufacturer manufacturing tactical aircraft in the United States? Isn’t the F/A–18 

keeping costs down on the JSF? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. We certainly value the industrial base and 

as we go forward, we do competitively build for the JSF. We have 

other manufacturers of aircraft as we go forward. Just as we do in 

the shipbuilding side, we value the industrial base on the aviation 

side as well. 

We also have the programs in place to allow us to manufacture 

the aircraft components, and it’s not just Lockheed Martin, for example, on the JSF or it’s not just Boeing on the F/A–18. You have 

36 

multiple sub-vendors across the United States. So we certainly 

would not be sitting here and saying we didn’t value it. We know 

that if we’re going to need strike fighters in the future we’re going 

to need industry that can build them. If we’re going to need ships 

in the future, we’re going to need a shipbuilding defense industry 

base that can build them as well. 

Senator MCCASKILL. My time has expired. Thank you all very 

much for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and especially thank you, Senator 

Begich, for your consideration. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Chambliss, good afternoon. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service. This is an extremely difficult issue that we’ve been talking about for several years. My criticism of the process is not directed at you, but at those folks that 

were sitting there 15 or 20 years ago making decisions. We’ve been 

very concerned about this road wreck on TACAIR force, and it’s 

here. Each of you have just outlined why this is so critical. 

Senator McCaskill makes a good point there with respect to this 

gap on the part of the Navy. Of course, the Navy is proposing to 

fill that gap in part with F/A–18s. Ramping up the F–35 sounds 

like it makes sense. That’s what the Air Force is doing. But also 

what the Air Force is doing is taking an airplane that still has 

years ahead of it from a research and development (R&D) standpoint, and we know there are going to be problems with it. We absolutely know that. Yet the Air Force is making a decision to ramp 

up purchases of the JSF, which is a great airplane. I fully support 

it. But we’re doing this in a way that we have never done before. 

To me, it makes no sense. I’m just afraid that we’re headed for 

even more of a road wreck several years from now. 

But there’s been conversation here about the strike fighter gap 

on the part of the Navy. I think Senator McCaskill adequately 

dealt with that. It looks like we have somewhere around a shortfall 

of 200. I guess we could argue about that number, but that seems 

to be somewhere in the generally accepted range. 

I also note that the Navy is requesting the purchase of 31 fourth 

generation F/A–18s in the 2010 budget. Now, General Shackelford, 

General Gibson, last year General Hoffman and General Darnell 

appeared before this committee in your place and talked about a 

fighter gap in the Air Force of approximately 800 fighters; General 

Gibson, just what you alluded to. 

Frankly, when we look at the 200 number and look at the 800 

number with the problems both of you alluded to assumptions that 

we have made over the years with respect to previous situations as 

well as the current situation, and those assumptions have proven 

to be false. So we could be looking at higher numbers. Chances are 

they’re going to be higher than they are going to be lower. 

But in any event, and in addition to what we’re planning in the 

Air Force for 800, you now come forward and say we’re going to retire an additional 250 tactical fighters in fiscal year 2010. 

So let me see if I can summarize this. The Air Force has a fighter 

gap that’s five times as big as the Navy’s. The Navy’s buying fourth 

generation fighters that can only fly in a permissive threat environVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
37 

ment, and we’re going to examine additional F/A–18 procurement, 

including a possible multi-year, in the QDR. 

The F–22 is the only proven fifth-generation fighter. Yet the Air 

Force is not buying any more F–22s, even though the Air Force 

leadership, General Schwartz, has said that the military requirement for F–22s is not 187, but it’s 243. 

The Air Force is being told to rely on the F–35 and it is not allowed to buy F–22s. Yet the Navy is thinking about purchasing 

over 100 more F/A–18s, which will inevitably result in them purchasing fewer F–35s. 

I really have a hard time understanding, gentlemen, how this 

makes sense. Now, General Shackelford and General Gibson, your 

chief of staff has stated that the requirement is 243 and he has 

characterized the risk of only 187 F–22s as medium to high. Do either of you disagree with that assessment by General Schwartz? 

General GIBSON. Sir, of course I would agree with the comment 

of my chief. General Shackelford addressed earlier that the term 

now is higher risk, especially when one looks at sustainment of the 

fleet with those lower numbers. But I think his recent terminology 

was, in the light of today’s constrained resources, it was an affordable solution. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. That was my point with Secretary Gates, 

that in spite of what he says with respect to military requirement, 

this is a budget-driven decision, which means that somebody’s 

going to be at risk. We know who’s going to be at risk if we do not 

have the capability of maintaining air superiority. 

Now, General Gibson, you represent the operator. As I understand it, with only 187 F–22s in the fleet, none would be stationed 

in Europe. What kind of deterrent capability do you think the

F–22 provides for countering a potentially hostile country like Iran 

who may seek to hold the U.S. and our allies at risk, who could 

have double-digit surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in the near term? 

General GIBSON. Sir, clearly the F–22, as are all of our tactical 

air assets, is a deployable asset. It can be moved to locations of 

stress, as it is now in the Pacific forward-deployed, covering assets 

that are in today’s fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. So when one 

looks at that and its capability, current basing probably is going to 

be reviewed again in the QDR, but it could be brought forward as 

required. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. So your answer to that is, we’re going to 

look to the QDR and we’re going to decide which part of the world 

we’re going to sacrifice first? We’re either going to sacrifice Asia or 

we’re going to sacrifice Europe, because we simply don’t have 

enough F–22s in the pipe to cover both of them. Is that a fair statement? 

General GIBSON. Sir, I’ll have to stand with the previous comment from my Service Chief and the Secretary that 187 is higher 

risk. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Well, gentlemen, I have raised the issue of 

SAMs in two previous hearings this year and I fully believe that 

it is not the threat of enemy aircraft, but the threat of enemy 

SAMs and their proliferation that represents the true threat to our 

forces today. 

38 

In response to my comment about this at our hearing in May, 

Secretary Gates said: ‘‘The only defense against SAMs is not something that has a pilot in it.’’ 

Now, General Shackelford, General Gibson, you mention in your 

written testimony that the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile 

(JASSM) is designed to be a stealthy missile, but you comment that 

you postponed JASSM production due to unsatisfactory flight tests; 

and you’re not requesting any funds for JASSM procurement in 

your fiscal year 2010 budget. 

In the written statement, the Navy witnesses discuss the Navy’s 

Unmanned Combat Air System (N–UCAS) which is a stealthy unmanned aerial vehicle, and note that the Navy has requested R&D 

funds for N–UCAS in the fiscal year 2010 budget and that you are 

planning for a potential follow-on acquisition program. 

I would add that at the Navy posture hearing last week Admiral 

Roughead noted that he expects N–UCAS to be operational some 

time after 2020. So I’m not exactly sure what Secretary Gates is 

talking about. JASSM and N–UCAS may some day have a capability against SAMs, but it certainly will not be any time soon. The 

only system in the inventory that’s capable of countering advanced 

SAMs now and for the next several years is the F–22, and that’s 

not going to change over the next several years. 

My time is up and I’ll look forward to the next round, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Begich, I want to certify that you’re not only a nice guy; 

you can be very tough when you need to be. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much. Patience is a virtue. 

I just want to put this on the record, but if you want to respond 

to it that’s great. It’s not about tactical aircraft, but related aircraft, and it’s the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA). In Alaska the plan 

was to replace our Sherpas with these. Now there are about 78 aircraft. There hasn’t been a real laid-out plan how this is going to 

happen, especially with our Army Guard that was going to be the 

recipient of these replacements. 

If any of you can answer it, great. If not, maybe you can get it 

to whoever can. I bring it up at every Senate Armed Services Committee hearing as well as subcommittee hearings. I’m looking for 

the list at some point that will define where the JCAs will go and 

what they’ll be replacing and what the list will look like. 

I know the Air Force and DOD have prepared or are in the process of preparing such a list. For Alaska it’s critical. The Sherpas 

are very old and the plan was for replacements. So I don’t know 

if anyone wants to respond to that. If they do that’s great. If not, 

I look forward to a response at some point in writing. 

General SHACKELFORD. Sir, if I could comment on that. Of 

course, the Secretary of Defense moved that program from the 

Army to the Air Force and at the same time reduced the numbers 

from 78 to 38, 38 being roughly the same number as Sherpas, 

though a few less, as you observed. 

We’re in the process of working the details of how that transfer 

will occur now as far as development of the C–27J, as well as the 

testing of it, how it will be managed to make sure that that’s a 

smooth transition. 

39 

Most of these aircraft, based on the concept of operations that 

the Army is after which is time-critical resupply in theater, will 

wind up being forward-deployed. So very few of them we expect 

will be present back in stateside locations, at least for the time 

being. So the actual laydown of home bases is to be determined. If 

you will, we’ll take that for the record and get that back to you as 

soon as we have something. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Air Force, in close coordination with the National Guard Bureau, is working 

the C–27J basing plan and will provide this data once it is available. 

Senator BEGICH. That would be great. Secretary Gates went in 

front of the Senate Armed Services Committee and he indicated 

that decisions had not been formally made or where they’ll end up. 

He did mention the forward theater. 

In Alaska it’s critical, this type of equipment. So I just want to 

see what the long-term plan is. So if you can get that. This is, just 

so you know, I think my third request. So I’ll be patient, as patient 

as I can be. At the next hearing, whoever shows up with a lot of 

brass is going to get the next conversation. So I look forward to it. 

The second thing is on the F136 alternative engines. There’s a 

lot of debate over the 136 or the 135. I know you’ve gone one direction. I just want some discussion from whoever can do this. I know 

GE and Rolls-Royce, the producers of the 136, obviously claim their 

performance is better than the 135. But the Government Accountability Office (GAO) says the same thing. 

So just walk me through how you determined that and is there 

some documentation, cost analysis, that shows why you went with 

the 135? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Let me start and then I’ll turn it over to 

General Shackelford. First, the Navy supports the DOD position 

that in general, while we do support competition, in the case of the 

alternative engine we view that the cost of continuing two development programs on that is not offset by the savings that we would 

see in the future of having those two engines and also having to 

support both engine types. 

The Navy remains supportive of that position of just the 135. We 

have 16 engines that have been in test and a significant number 

of hours on test with that airplane, which obviously has also been 

working with the lift fan in terms of Rolls-Royce. So the 135 includes both Pratt and Whitney and the lift fan hookup, if you will. 

So that would be where we would stand today in terms of the 

alternative engine versus the 135. 

Senator BEGICH. So to make sure I’m clear, I don’t have it with 

me, but the GAO report indicated that the 136 had better efficiency 

and opportunity. But you disagree with that and the 135 is the 

course you’re taking? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. I didn’t say I disagreed with their comment. 

What I said was that the Navy’s position was that while we generally support competition, we in this case believe the cost of continuing to develop a second engine versus being able to use the procurement dollars for aircraft or the costs also to maintain two engines, and the Navy supports DOD in just having the 135 engine. 

Senator BEGICH. Is there a process that you’ll have, because you 

won’t have the competition? What’s the process you’ll do in order 

40 

to make sure that the costs of the one producer, one contractor, as 

time progresses and they get comfortable in the business procurement; as a former mayor, I’ve seen this before. That’s why I’m asking you this. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Senator, we shifted acquisition lead of the 

JSF program to the Air Force, and the Air Force in that process 

is taking steps today, as they come on board both in the airframe 

as well as in the engine. So I’d rather have General Shackelford 

address that, because I think he can be forthright with that answer. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you. 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. Similar to Admiral Architzel’s 

comments about favoring competition, the Air Force is one that favors competition in these kinds of cases, too. In this particular 

case, the analysis that OSD did to look at the costs associated with 

the second engine yielded a bit of a differing result from what the 

GAO reported, which basically says the costs associated with development of a second engine would be something we would consider 

unaffordable in the current timeframe while we would be doing the 

development, and that the benefit of the comparative costs would 

be more of a wash than the more optimistic version of what GAO 

said. So we don’t consider that to be an affordable solution. 

Senator BEGICH. If you have an alternative it will hold down the 

cost. I’ll echo what Senator McCaskill said. My concern is that you 

have a lot of engineering and once you get on that production line 

the contractor has cost creep. They’ll have great justification. You’ll 

be in a box. How do you avoid that, and what guarantees can you 

work into your system, contractual or otherwise, to ensure that 

that doesn’t happen? When you’re building this amount of volume, 

cost creep, they jack it up 2, 3, 4 percent. It doesn’t seem like a 

lot, but in volume it’s big money, and it’s bottom line. 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. Early on in the program while 

we have incentive types of contracts, prior to moving over to a fixed 

price type of environment, which will be a few lots down the road 

in terms of the engines, that allows us to get the cost and the pricing data from the contractor so that we have a good understanding 

of what it actually costs them to build that. 

Senator BEGICH. To produce that and make it. 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. That’s essential to having the 

proper perspective when we then shift into a fixed price environment a few years from now. So once we move to that fixed price 

environment, we no longer have that insight into the specifics of 

the costs, but we have what it was based on to start with. Barring 

some technical change in the engine that warrants a change in 

cost, we have a pretty good handle on what those cost at that point 

in time, and then it becomes a unit cost type of issue based on 

quantity. 

Senator BEGICH. Very good. 

Thank you very much. My time is up. Thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Begich. 

We’ll go on to the second round. I want to continue the questions, 

the topic that Senator Begich has been on. This has been a controversial matter on this committee and before Congress over the 

last couple of sessions, which is whether we should have an alterVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
41 

native engine or alternate engine program for the JSF. I take it, 

Admiral Architzel, that you agree with the President’s recommendation to terminate the alternate engine program in the fiscal year 2010? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Sir, I agree with the President and Secretary Gates on this issue. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General Shackelford, I take it from what you’ve just testified you 

also agree with that decision? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir, I agree. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you, General Shackelford, to go 

into a little bit more detail on the consequences of the decision. I 

know both you and the Admiral have said that, obviously, if we 

build an alternate engine it’s going to cost more money to build two 

than one. What are the estimated costs of the alternate engine program? How much would they add to the buy? 

General SHACKELFORD. Sir, between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal 

year 2015, that second engine is going to cost us $1.8 billion in development and $2.8 billion in production. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General SHACKELFORD. The production figure there is not to 

make the second engine equal in maturity to the first engine. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General SHACKELFORD. It’s to facilitate the industrial base to 

bring them up to the point that they can produce in a competitive 

environment the quantities required, which would be approximately 50 per year out at about Lot 6 or so in terms of the F–35 

production lots. 

In order to facilitate those dollars, the development piece is $463 

million. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Correct. 

General SHACKELFORD. The production piece is $140 million. 

Given the remain within-our-means status of the F–35 program, 

what that would require we estimate is two to four of the aircraft 

in Lot 10 would be required to make payment for that engine in 

fiscal year 2010. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. In other words, you’d have to cut by two to 

four the number of JSFs produced? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. To pay for the alternate engine. 

General SHACKELFORD. Right. The fiscal year 2010 production 

quantity is 30 aircraft, split between the 3 variants. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General SHACKELFORD. We would have to reduce that by two to 

four, depending on which of the variants—— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. In the 1 year. 

General SHACKELFORD. In 1 year, yes, sir. Now, that has a negative effect on the unit cost of the remaining aircraft if you buy 

fewer. It also ripples into the next year’s quantities and costs. Then 

as we take that fiscal year 2010 increment of dollars and extend 

that out through the FYDP, there are equal decrements in terms 

of the numbers of aircraft that we can buy with the remaining dollars. 

42 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So it would be what, 10 to 20 less over the 

5-year period from 2010 to 2015? 

General SHACKELFORD. Over the 5-year period it would be 53. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Fifty-three less? In other words, I’m asking 

what would be the consequences on the buy that you want to make 

of the JSF if the alternate engine program was continued through 

2015? 

General SHACKELFORD. The 513 that would presently be bought 

between now and through fiscal year 2015 would be decremented 

by approximately 50 aircraft. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. By 50 aircraft. What would be the operational consequences of that? 

General SHACKELFORD. As we reduce the number of aircraft, particularly in the near years, those aircraft are destined for either the 

operational test environment or the integrated training center at 

Eglin Air Force Base, some of which will eventually move on to one 

of the operations locations. 

So as we start to decrement the number of aircraft early on, we 

start to push out just from an availability of aircraft to conduct the 

test work necessary, not developmental tests, but operational tests. 

That will then have an effect upon the IOC timeline. At the Integrated Training Center it’ll reduce the pilot throughput, so the 

number of pilots that we have, and potentially the number of maintainers who are trained on the aircraft through the same process, 

will be reduced somewhat. 

So in effect it pushes the capability out to the right. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So this has real consequences. In a normal 

case, of course you’d like to have two programs. But you can’t have 

it all. So if you go for the two engines, we’re going to be 53 planes 

short of what we’d otherwise be within that 5-year period. 

General Trautman, I have a recollection at a previous hearing on 

this particular subject that the Marine representative was very 

passionate about the impact of going with the alternate engine in 

terms of reducing the number of the JSF model that would be 

available to the Marines as quickly as possible. 

I take it you support the President’s budget to eliminate or terminate the alternative engine program? 

General TRAUTMAN. I do, sir, and for the reasons that General 

Shackelford did a very nice job laying out. Our IOC is desired in 

2012. Loss of any airplanes between now and 2012 would put that 

IOC at considerable risk. So the early loss of airplanes, each and 

every one causes us to go back to the drawing board and rescript 

our plan to see if we can make the objective that the Commandant 

and I have in mind. 

Now, we haven’t purchased a TACAIR airplane in over 11 years 

and our legacy fleet of Hornets, AV–8s, and EA–6Bs have been ridden very hard in combat. So we are passionate about keeping the 

JSF on track, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Architzel, why don’t you just take 

a moment and talk about the consequences for the Navy of spending that money on the second engine instead of using it to accelerate the purchase of the JSFs? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Mr. Chairman, I really can’t add much from 

what was said by General Shackelford. The facts that he presented 

43 

I agree with, as well as General Trautman. For the Navy, we just 

have come to the point where this year we get our first four jets 

delivered on the C variant. While initially it may not affect those 

four, it certainly will affect it as we go forward into the FYDP in 

terms of developmental aircraft and then into production. It would 

have an impact on both on our costs. At the same time, we’re talking about ramp rates and managing our strike fighter inventory; 

this would push the IOC out to the right further and also have an 

impact on our strike fighter account. 

So that’s the same argument I think you just heard. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I thank you. I thank you all. 

My own personal conclusion from all of this—and I thank you for 

the case you have made—is that we can’t afford the second engine 

and it will compromise the JSF program. So I hope we stick with 

the President’s recommendation on that one. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Architzel and General Trautman, long-range bombers 

appear to share important attributes with carrier air wings, including not requiring in-theater basing, and thereby offering the potential for prompt strikes in a crisis. But the Department of the 

Navy’s strike fighter gap could be a problem, especially if the JSF 

slips in becoming IOC. 

My question is, to what extent could an increased inventory of 

long-range bombers in some ways make up for the shortfall in 

Navy and Marine Corps strike fighters? I’d like to have you speak, 

if you could, to cost issues and survivability issues. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Speaking on the acquisition side, this question really is more specifically directed at Admiral Myers. I will 

say, having been a carrier commanding officer and operated carriers at sea, I know the value of carrier wings and I know the flexibility and adaptability they bring with them. So I see that today, 

I see that in the future. I don’t see that changing. 

But the answer probably should come from Admiral Myers in 

terms of the requirements, sir. 

Admiral MYERS. The short answer is it doesn’t replace the carrier 

air wing on the flight deck. Just to give you a sense of how we’re 

trying to manage this, if we did nothing in terms of extending the 

life of the current aircraft that we have in our legacy fleet, then 

you would see a 243-aircraft shortfall. It’s clear that we’re going to 

be doing all we can to get those aircraft to 10,000 hours, and we 

only need to get about half of them to 10,000 hours. 

We have a fleet of over 600 legacy F–18s and if we can get about 

295 of those extended, then we will manage a 70-aircraft shortfall. 

It’s the fleet commander’s responsibility and prerogative of where 

he’s going to put that shortfall. 

Just to put it in perspective, Senator, at that time when we see 

these numbers, if we project this correctly, we have about 760 F– 

18s. We’ll be 70 short. So whether the fleet commander takes the 

shortfall in a training unit or in test is his responsibility. Now, we 

have levers to try to mitigate that and to make it even less. We 

have to maintain our JSF wholeness, we have to maintain the legacy fleet. We talked about SLEP and doing everything we can on 

the legacy aircraft. 

44 

Lastly is we need to continue to procure the F–18 Super Hornets. 

We have a hot line. That line stays hot for 4 more years. We’re 

going to continue to assess this in QDR this summer and we have 

options. 

Senator THUNE. But any comment on how a long-range bomber 

might fit into that? 

General MYERS. The effects that you’re talking about from a 

long-range bomber are limited to kinetic. The effects that our carrier air wings today are delivering in Afghanistan in OEF range 

from airborne early surveillance to electronic attack to close air 

support, and then also include kinetic effects. So that would be only 

one piece of what a strike fighter carrier air wing would deliver in 

the course of supporting our troops on the ground. 

General TRAUTMAN. Senator Thune, I think I understand your 

premise and it’s an apt premise. That is, all the parts of the joint 

force need to fit together in some kind of a puzzle, a combination 

of long-range bombers, carriers, with a combination of legacy and 

F–35Cs or Bs, F–22s, unmanned aerial systems, the short-takeoff 

and vertical landing variant—the F–35B. These all have to fit together and provide the joint force the capability set that will do 

what our Nation needs done both now and in the future. 

From my perspective, I haven’t personally studied the long-range 

bomber issue, so I’m not qualified to talk about whether the Secretary and the Chief of the Air Force have it right. But I trust their 

judgment and have to stand by where they are on that decision at 

this point, sir. 

Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, in testimony before the committee, General Schwartz testified regarding 

the decision to accelerate the retirement of 250 strike fighters that, 

‘‘The review weighed the benefits of retiring aircraft nearing their 

expected service life against near-term risks to our national security.’’ When were these aircraft previously planned to be retired? 

General SHACKELFORD. The 250 aircraft that are proposed to be 

retired in fiscal year 2010 were spread between 2010 and 2013. 

The assessment that the chief brought is one that we believe the 

risk in that timeframe is minimal, given the world situation and 

given the depth of fighter capability we have now. The previously 

addressed shortfall in fighters out in 2024 was based on ramping 

the F–35 to 48 per year and based on 187 F–22s, with the remainder of the force timing out between now and the mid-20s. 

So as we move now to ramping the F–35 up to 80 of the Air 

Force variants or possibly to a higher number, it mitigates that 

issue from a total force structure shortfall, if you will. But it brings 

that capability back up. We dip slightly below where we would 

really like to be for 4 or 5 years here and then come right back up 

to it. 

Senator THUNE. How many hours are on the aircraft that are 

going to be retired? 

General SHACKELFORD. The service life for the F–15s right now 

is 8,000 hours, and the F–16s is 8,000 hours. Just a few A–10s in 

those numbers. The A–10s go out to 16,000 hours. 

I don’t know off the top of my head the specific tail numbers in 

terms of the hours that they have. 

45 

Senator THUNE. Is it done by tail number? Is that kind of how 

that was how those decisions were made about which ones are 

going to be retired? 

General SHACKELFORD. I expect we would be very careful in picking and choosing the aircraft that we would be retiring. 

Senator THUNE. Did the combatant commanders sign off on the 

restructuring plan? 

General SHACKELFORD. Sir, I don’t know. 

Senator THUNE. General? 

General GIBSON. Senator, it’s my understanding they were 

briefed on it. Obviously, they needed to understand the impact. 

Some of those discussions are still ongoing. But they were all 

aware. 

Senator THUNE. I know that you sort of explained how the interaction between the retiring planes and the F–35s coming on and 

the existing F–22s. But was the risk quantified? Was there a 

formulaic way that you went about quantifying the risk? 

General GIBSON. Senator, I’m not certain of the particular study 

that was done. We can take that for the record and review it. It’s 

our understanding that it was taken in the context of strategic risk 

in the near-term, as mentioned before, to take that and then reinvest it into both fourth generation fighter capability bomber upgrades as well as weapon upgrades, to use that for investment to 

bring that legacy capability up. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Air Force conducted analysis of the Combat Air Forces Restructuring Plan 

using the Office of the Secretary of Defense-approved analytic baseline military objectives, while identifying the need for key enablers and advanced weapons for both 

the bomber and fighter forces. The resultant force mix presented less warfighting 

risk in fiscal year 2015 and beyond than any course of action that maintained the 

status quo in legacy fighter numbers. In any case, reinvestments must be made in 

modernization, weapons, and other key enablers. 

Senator THUNE. Did you look at joint force capability? Did you 

look at the Navy and Marines in that assessment? 

General GIBSON. Sir, in the context of the combatant command? 

Senator THUNE. Yes. 

General GIBSON. Sir, I can’t say for certain. 

Senator THUNE. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all again very much and thanks for your service. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Begich. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mine’s just kind of a general question and just more of a discussion point. I started this discussion with the Senate Armed Services Committee in the full committee. But can you talk a little bit 

about the future of the unmanned aircraft and the variety? Where 

do you see that and what does that mean for our military as you 

move forward on the next 5 years? 

Can you just have a little discussion on that? I’m not asking any 

specific question in the sense of how many or what cost. I’m more 

interested in how do you see that fitting in. The second part is: 

How do you deal with the conflict with the pilots, who probably 

aren’t very excited about this idea because they may be behind just 

a little stick shift in a room versus in a plane flying around? How 

46 

do you see to overcome that, but also how do you see the unmanned aircraft, in a variety of sources? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Again from an acquisition standpoint, we 

have a number of unmanned aerial vehicle systems, both ashore 

and at sea, as I mentioned on the McInerney, for example, with 

Fire Scout, where we are producing systems and testing them. 

Today it’s doing well, both in day and night testing. To be able to 

deploy that aboard all air-capable ships in the future is a significant step forward in that regard. That’s for reconnaissance, surveillance, and maritime domain awareness. 

We look to the next generation P–8 as we go forward. That airplane is being built around being able to use it with the BAMS aerial system as well, unmanned. That will allow us to use less aircraft. For example, the P–3 squadrons of today are manned at 12 

squadrons. BAMS, the P–8 squadrons of the future, use less numbers of aircraft because some of that role can be taken up with the 

BAMS aircraft to go forward. 

We also have on the land side to support the Marine Corps as 

well, which is Short Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Systems (STUAS), 

as well as unmanned aerial systems on the ship. So again, acquisition-wise we’re in a lot of development and stages on those programs, but also getting to the point of moving out on them. Then 

we have the BAMS demonstrator for the Navy as well, which is actually deployed to CENTCOM in support of forces. 

So I’d like to turn that requirements and operational piece over 

to Admiral Myers. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you. 

Admiral MYERS. Thank you for the question. Our approach is to 

leverage the unmanned vehicles at every opportunity for their capacity and for their capability. Admiral Architzel laid out a couple 

of levels. I’ll talk about four levels. The first is on the surface ships 

we have Scan Eagle, which is going to be replaced with STUAS, 

and that extends the sensors from the surface ships and they’re 

able to use the electrical-optical and infrared sensors. Eventually 

we’ll be taking that kind of sensor and putting an automated information system on it, so it’ll increase the situational awareness and 

it saves wear and tear on helicopters and things like that. 

On the next level is VTUAV. What Admiral Architzel just mentioned is we just finished the development test and evaluation on 

the McInerney, and we’re going to the operational test. 

The VTUAV is going to be on all of our Littoral Combat Ships. 

So what we’re doing is we’re going to deploy our Littoral Combat 

Ships with a helicopter and one or more unmanned helicopters, if 

you will. So it’ll augment the manned helicopter. It’ll serve as communications relay and we have some other electro-optical/infrared 

automated information system and some other growth development 

areas for VTUAV. 

The next level is to complement our P–8s, the 737 variant, and 

to give some persistence in ISR, where we can use the P–8, leverage the capability that the P–8 is going to offer with air-to-surface 

antisubmarine or close-to-kill kind of capability. We can take advantage of the N–UCAS, BAMS, dwell time, and then use the same 

maintenance folks that are launching and recovering the P–8s to 

47 

launch and recover the BAMS and N–UCAS. So we think that 

that’s about the right blend of capability and capacity. 

When it comes to the air wing, we replace about half of our 

strike fighter air wing about every decade. We have 44 strike fighters in our carrier wing and in 1983 we IOC’ed the F–18 A and B. 

In 1987, we IOC’ed the C and D variant. Then a little over a decade later we brought on board the Super Hornet. Then in the teens 

we’re going to bring on board the JSF, and then in later 2020s 

we’re going to replace our F–18 Super Hornets with FA–XX. 

Now, one of our technology maturation and risk mitigators is to 

fly that kind of variant onto a carrier and prove that a tailless, unmanned vehicle can land on a carrier safely and taxi. That’s what 

the N–UCAS demonstration is going to do. We’re going to go to a 

carrier in 2011, and then we’re going to test unmanned air-to-air 

refueling with a probe and drogue in 2013. 

That puts us on a course for FA–XX to make the right decision 

in the 2020s timeframe. But to replace the F–18 E and F Block 2 

Super Hornet, we need a lot of capability. So we have time to replace, to do the right kind of technology maturation to take us into 

the mid to late 2020s so that we can make the right decision. 

But each time we replace half the air wing we always have a 

very capable fighter that can provide the effects for the soldiers 

and the marines on the ground today and have what it takes for 

future security challenges. So that’s why having a hot line for Boeing right now for the F–18 E and F is important to us as we transition to the JSF, which is the Navy’s future for TACAIR on our 

flight decks. 

So we have to have both. Our challenge is to do everything that 

we can to mitigate the risk as we transition to a JSF and F–18 E 

and F Block 2 Super Hornet air wing. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much. 

My time has expired, so I just wanted to quickly summarize. One 

of the pieces in the next 5 years is a lot of testing and demonstration to see the capabilities and capacity and ensure that it cannot 

only take off, land, refuel, but give the coverage that is necessary. 

Is that a fair quick summary? 

Admiral MYERS. Essentially, yes. It’s the takeoff and landing 

piece which we know we can do. We’ve done that with N–UCAS. 

We’ve done that with VTUAV. We know we can take off and land 

and taxi. But it’s the carrier piece and to make sure that we can 

taxi around the carrier, safely launch, and then also to go to the 

next step with the air-to-air refueling with an unmanned vehicle. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much. At another time, I’m 

sure, when we have our Personnel Subcommittee hearing, I’ll talk 

to them about just trying to get a sense of how they make that 

transition with pilots; it will be an experience, I’m sure, for them. 

But I’ll leave it at that. I won’t leave it for you to discuss, but I’ll 

leave it to the Personnel Subcommittee when we meet. 

Thanks. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Begich. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

General Shackelford and General Gibson, please know that I understand you guys are the messenger and that your statements reVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
48 

flect the policy coming out of the Pentagon. But in your written 

statement you make a comment regarding the F–35 being the premier SAM killer. You also commented that the F–35 is uniquely 

equipped for that mission. 

Based on the information that I have, that is not correct. Based 

on the comments before the House Armed Services Committee last 

month, I don’t think General Darnell thinks that statement is correct, either. I’m particularly concerned about this discrepancy since 

it was one of DOD’s justifications for terminating the F–22 program, and that was the need for the additional air-to-ground capability that the F–35 provides and that the F–22 does not provide, 

according to DOD. 

That clearly is just not an accurate characterization. The F–22 

has superior speed and altitude and it has the clear advantage, 

particularly against advanced SAMs, especially when you combine 

advanced SAMs and enemy air. 

So I know we can’t get into all the details here, but I would simply offer to you or to the Air Force otherwise that if you want to 

come in and talk to me about this particular issue and about the 

assets that both the F–35 and the F–22 bring to the table, I would 

welcome that. 

Gentlemen, you refer in your written statement also to the Joint 

Air Dominance (JAD) Study and that this study has been mentioned as a justification for DOD’s TACAIR procurement plan. 

Now, I’ve talked to General Schwartz about this study and I understand that the JAD Study was done by PA&E in 2006 and was 

based on a single major contingency operation. Now, to my knowledge the JAD Study assumed that F–22s had only air-to-air capability and no air-to-ground capability. 

First, as we previously established, the F–22 has always had airto-ground capability, and the newer blocks of the F–22s will even 

have more robust air-to-ground capability. 

Second, regarding the major contingency operation (MCO) scenario, my staff received a briefing from the Air Force last month 

when the Air Force explained that the fundamental difference between DOD’s assessment and the Air Force’s assessment regarding 

how many F–22s are required relates to whether F–22s are required in more than one MCO. The Air Force believes that F–22s 

may be required in more than one MCO, which leads the Air Force 

to the conclusion that a higher number of F–22s are required than 

the 243 F–22s, and therefore that’s how we arrive at the moderate 

risk analysis. 

I agree with that conclusion. I think you’re exactly right. SAMs 

are proliferating right now and, although we can slow them down, 

we’re not going to stop them. I find it perfectly reasonable to believe that a nation aligned against the United States like Iran, 

North Korea, Syria, or even Venezuela may acquire double-digit 

SAMs in the near term. 

Now, I know in your discussions when you’re talking about 

threats you include—and I find it perfectly reasonable—that one of 

those countries may look for a time when we are occupied with another country and take advantage of our preoccupation to threaten 

the United States and our allies. As we’ve established before, only 

49 

the F–22 currently has the ability to take out SAMs for the foreseeable future. 

Now, I’ve said a lot there. I don’t have a question to ask you 

about that. But having said a lot, if you want to make a comment 

or dispute anything I’ve said, gentlemen, please. 

General SHACKELFORD. Senator, if I may. That area of countering 

double digit SAMs is one area where both the F–22 and the F–35 

complement each other very well. You’re correct in observing that 

the F–22’s performance, which is from an altitude and air speed 

perspective greater than the F–35, gives it some advantages in 

some scenarios. 

The F–35 brings a different sensor set. The F–22 sensor set, the 

radar, gets upgrades to better air-to-ground capability in the 3.1 increment that comes along fielding in fiscal year 2011. The F–35 has 

a wider array of sensor capabilities that are more optimized towards air to ground and it has a larger payload capability, with 

similar stealthiness to an F–22. It’s just not as fast in terms of how 

fast it can get in and get out, but it has similar anti-SAM capabilities to the F–22 in that context. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. I don’t disagree with that at all. We’ve had 

this situation before where the Pentagon has come forward with a 

major recommendation like this. In fact, in 2006 we had two scenarios. The Air Force first recommended the termination of the

B–52. Here we are today flying the B–52 in close air support scenarios, and thank goodness Congress overrode that decision from 

the Air Force. 

Second, the Air Force made the recommendation that we terminate the U–2 program. Again, Congress made the decision that we 

should not do that, and today I think you gentlemen would have 

to agree that the right decision was not to retire the B–52 or the 

U–2 because of the significant services that they are providing. So 

we’ll have to see where this goes, I guess. 

I have one more area that I want to cover with General 

Trautman. Unlike in previous years, your fiscal year 2010 budget 

request does not include any KC–130Js. It’s my understanding that 

the Marine Corps may have requested those planes and that DOD 

chose not to support the request. But in any event, they’re not in 

there. 

How is this going to affect the Marine Corps’s ability to execute 

your mission and what is the Marine Corps’s remaining requirement for KC–130Js? 

General TRAUTMAN. Thank you, sir. Our validated requirement 

is 79 KC–130Js. We currently have 47 KC–130Js either on contract 

or soon to be on contract. You’re right, there were zero in fiscal 

year 2010. I think that was just a matter of other priorities resulting in that line being reduced to zero. But in the future we hope 

to get back into the procurement line and continue from 47 up to 

79. 

The generosity of Congress last year probably had something to 

do with this in that we were able to add in the supplemental some 

of the KC–130s that we needed, and that was a very wise measure 

on the part of Congress because it enabled us to take out of service 

our 40- or 50-year-old KC–130 Fs and Rs, and we retired that last 

F and R in Okinawa, Japan, in December 2008. So now our full acVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
50 

tive duty fleet is KC–130Js and we’re very, very pleased with the 

performance of that airplane. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, it’s another scenario we have 

there, where all of these decisions are being budget-driven. I don’t 

know what the answer to it is. I don’t think any of us know that 

answer. But I think we have some serious decisions that we’re 

going to have to make with respect to what I treat as basically recommendations coming out of DOD with respect to these weapons 

systems, and we try to find the money and determine what the priorities should be. 

So I thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree with you, Senator Chambliss. Thank 

you. 

Senator Thune has one more question. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Chairman, I have a question I’ll submit for 

the record, having to do with close air support. But I do want to 

just get your reaction very quickly, if I might; earlier this month 

Defense Secretary Gates told his Japanese counterpart that the 

United States still has no plans to export the F–22s. He reportedly 

said this, and he cited a longstanding congressional prohibition on 

international sales of the F–22. 

But keeping the F–22 line hot may make sense while the verdict 

on whether the first operationally capable F–35 JSF will be delivered on time. So I guess my question for you is, should Congress 

consider lifting that prohibition and allow foreign military sales of 

F–22s to countries like Japan and Australia, which have expressed 

some interest? 

General SHACKELFORD. Senator, of course the Obey amendment 

prohibits foreign military sales of the F–22 and also prohibits us 

from using any dollars to even go look at that right now. Were that 

to change, were it to be taken out of statute, that we could look 

at foreign military sales, we would go into the process dealing within DOD with the policy crowd and the international affairs community, to go look at the potential to put together a foreign military 

sales version of the F–22, and we would do that during our normal 

foreign military sales processes to look at it. 

What would come out of that would be some kind of a plan that 

would, given the rules for foreign military sales, have to be funded 

by the international entity in this case. So there would still be a 

fairly large question of affordability on their part, given the cost of 

the F–22, as to whether that was worthwhile for them to pursue 

or not. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would echo Senator 

Chambliss’ comments about budgetary factors driving a lot of our 

decisionmaking. That’s obviously a concern. There are a lot of 

threats and dangers around the world, and it’s frustrating to have 

budgets driving a lot of decisionmaking with respect to how we respond to some of those threats and where we put our resources. 

But I thank you all. It’s not directed at you. I know you have a 

job to do and I thank you very much for your service to our country. Thanks. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Thune. I agree. I was 

thinking when Senator Chambliss said you were messengers that 

51 

you should be assured that this is a subcommittee where we do not 

kill the messengers. So we appreciate your service very much. 

Just one follow-up on Senator Thune’s question. I understand 

that what’s involved here is the Obey amendment, not the 

Shackelford amendment or the Architzel amendment. But how 

would you describe the rationale for prohibiting foreign sales of the 

F–22, but really encouraging and kind of outreaching on the JSF, 

because we have a bunch of foreign investors and partners in that 

program? 

General SHACKELFORD. Sir, in the case of the F–22, that aircraft 

was designed and built in a timeframe where it was not envisioned 

to be shared in the international community. There are a number 

of very sensitive technologies in the aircraft that are not protected 

in the same manner they’re protected on the F–35, which has been 

built from the ground up with an international sales market in 

mind. 

So the F–22 that the United States flies would not be exactly the 

same F–22 that country X would fly if they had the foreign military 

sales version. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Got you. Thank you. I’m not sure even Congressman Obey could have answered that as well. 

I want to thank the five of you for your presence, you’ve been 

very responsive to our questions, and I’ve been impressed by the 

extent to which you’re right on top of all the information and the 

programs that you oversee. I thank you for that. You’ve helped to 

inform our decisions. We’re making tough and important decisions 

this year. 

We on this committee are always mindful that we’re a Nation at 

war, and obviously the budget has to play some role and resources 

have to play some role. But we also have a role, which I think is 

a superior role, to do everything we possibly can to support your 

effort on our behalf and all those who work with you and under you 

to protect our security. 

So this has been a very productive hearing from the subcommittee’s point of view, I believe, and will help us as we go forward to 

our markup at the end of the month. 

Do either of my colleagues have any final words? [No response.] 

If not, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND BURRIS

STRIKE FIGHTER SHORTFALL

1. Senator BURRIS. Vice Admiral Architzel, a recently released House Appropriations Committee report states that ‘‘the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress 

must seriously come to grips with the looming shortfall’’ of fighters, and a multiyear F/A–18 deal is ‘‘the most cost-effective approach.’’ Likewise, the Senate Appropriations Committee said a multi-year F/A–18 purchase is needed ‘‘to ensure that 

the Navy has sufficient aircraft for the fleet.’’ I would like to hear your thoughts 

about this comment and meeting the shortfall. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Continued procurement of F/A–18E/F is one of four areas 

that the Department of the Navy will continue to assess through this summer’s 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and into the following year’s budget submission. 

The option for continued F/A–18E/F procurement could be exercised in fiscal year 

2011, without a break in Boeing’s production line capability. Other avenues to be 

considered—each in balance with one another—are: (1) maintaining wholeness of 

the JSF program; (2) making a roughly $3.6 billion Program Objective Memorandum (POM)–12 additional investment to extend the service life of approximately 

52 

1 Note: Depending on the Service’s operational requirements, the need for capabilities requirements and obsolescence will vary for individual aircraft. 

295 F/A–18A–D legacy Hornets from 8,600 to 10,000 flight hour service life; and, 

(3) continued funding for support of our legacy fleet aircraft. 

The challenge that leadership is undertaking during the QDR and upcoming 

budget year, is to determine the necessary balance of these options in terms of force 

requirements, as they become evident over this summer’s review. 

2. Senator BURRIS. Vice Admiral Architzel, the Navy is expected to face strike 

fighter shortfalls in the coming years as it begins to modernize their fleet. One solution to meeting this shortfall that has been suggested is raising the service life of 

the F–18 Hornet 10,000 hours—up from 8,000 hours. What are the costs associated 

with extending the service life of this plane, given that it was only designed to meet 

6,000 service hours when it was produced? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. 

• To extend the service life of the hornets from 8,000 to 8,600 hours, the Navy is currently investing an average of $475,000 per aircraft for high flying hour 

inspections. 

• To extend the service life of 295 Hornets from 8,600 to 10,000 flight hours, 

the Navy and Marine Corps will incorporate the repairs and modification improvements from the list below. This will provide a 3.5 to 4.5 year return on 

investment for a 1,400 hour service extension. The most recent Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) cost estimates are: 

• Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) (Depot Level Repair)—$11.5 million per aircraft 

• Sustainment (engineering, logistics, supply support)—$7.1 million per aircraft 

• Obsolescence (parts that are no longer available)—$5.0 million per aircraft 

• Capability Improvements ‘Lot 21 baseline’ capability—$2.6 million per 

aircraft (warfighting improvements to bring A–D Hornets up to Lot 21

E/F like capabilities) 

• Cost Estimate 1—$26.2 million per aircraft 

• The Department currently has $4.1 billion invested for planned maintenance 

and nonrecurring engineering that can be leveraged in any service life extension 

plan for the F/A–18A–D. Given this reality, the Department would need to invest an additional $3.6 billion in POM–12, for a total of $7.7 billion, to SLEP 

the aircraft in time to mitigate the strike fighter shortfall. 

SOLE SOURCE ENGINE

3. Senator BURRIS. Lieutenant General Shackelford, from my understanding, the 

sole source engine for the F–35 was envisioned as a derivative engine of the

F–119—the engine which is used to power the F–22 aircraft. How much has the 

Government spent to date in developing this so-called derivative engine? 

General SHACKELFORD. The Government has spent approximately $7.3 billion developing the Pratt & Whitney F135 propulsion system between fiscal year 1995 and 

fiscal year 2009. 

4. Senator BURRIS. Lieutenant General Shackelford, is the sole source contract a 

fixed-price contract or is it a cost-plus contract? 

General SHACKELFORD. The contract to develop the Pratt & Whitney F135 propulsion system is a cost plus award fee contract. 

AIR SOVEREIGNTY ALERT CAPABILITY

5. Senator BURRIS. Lieutenant General Shackelford, the Air Force has two challenges facing its air sovereignty alert (ASA) capabilities over the long-term. When 

will we see a plan for fully sourcing the crucial ASA mission? 

General SHACKELFORD. Homeland defense is DOD’s first priority and the Air 

Force is committed to the ASA mission. Long-term recapitalization of the fighter 

and tanker fleet requires many years. Within the funding available, the Air Force 

must maximize the life of the existing aircraft until they can be replaced. All of the 

options to ensure the ASA mission remains viable are dependent on the life expectancy of these airframes. 

53 

The Air Force is currently developing plans to ensure that we, in conjunction with 

the rest of the DOD, can meet the combatant commander’s requirements for the defense of the Nation—whether it is with Air National Guard aircraft or in combination with active duty assigned aircraft. There are many moving pieces as we look 

at all the different Air National Guard units around the country to determine the 

best alignment of our limited resources. We are currently waiting for an update 

from the QDR regarding the national requirement, and subsequently, the Air 

Force’s requirement for this critical mission. From there we can come back in late 

fall or early winter with an overarching approach that will cascade throughout the 

Air Force, and that will provide the required guidance to build the Air Force’s fiscal 

year 2012 POM and the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget. 

6. Senator BURRIS. Lieutenant General Shackelford, how does the Air Force plan 

to fill the impending gap of tactical fighters if the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is not 

declared initial operational capability (IOC) by 2013, as current trends indicate? 

General SHACKELFORD. We have invested heavily in the F–35 program and are 

closely tracking developments in order to ensure that it stays on track. Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force General Schwartz has stated on many occasions that the key to 

the Air Force’s fighter recapitalization is the F–35. 

Once we get through the QDR and have a better picture of what the national requirement and the Air Force requirement is, we can look at an updated delivery 

timeline for the F–35. If there is going to be a gap it may be addressed by extending 

the service life of F–15s and F–16s. We are currently fatigue testing the F–15 and 

F–16 fleets. Once these structural tests are complete we will have some sense of 

whether or not we need a SLEP for the legacy fleets and what scope and focus areas 

will be necessary. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN THUNE

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

7. Senator THUNE. Vice Admiral Architzel, Lieutenant General Trautman, Lieutenant General Shackelford, Rear Admiral Myers, and Major General Gibson, until 

the 2009 QDR is completed sometime this summer, the 2006 version of the document (and its associated guidance) is the only framework we have for judging how 

well the DOD’s airpower capabilities meet national requirements. In your view, how 

should Congress consider President Obama’s proposals for the fiscal year 2010 budget and, in particular, those reflecting substantial changes to force structure when 

the only definitive framework we have is the 2006 QDR? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. The Navy is currently committed to an 

11 carrier force structure for the next several decades, and this commitment was 

supported by Secretary Gates during his April budget announcement. The carrier 

force structure, along with the entire battle force, is being considered in the QDR. 

The overall carrier force structure is driven by two primary considerations. First, 

we must have sufficient carrier strength to carry out the Navy’s wartime missions 

and strategic assignments. Second, and equally important, we must have adequate 

force structure to meet the presence demands required by the President and combatant commanders. The 2006 QDR defined the need for 11 CVNs. Navy supports the 

Secretary of Defense’s plan to change the aircraft carrier program to a 5-year build 

cycle. Should the outcome of the 2009 QDR recommend changes in long-term force 

structure, Navy will work with Congress to address any legislation that may be required. 

General TRAUTMAN. DOD’s airpower capabilities will always be consistent with 

national requirements. Similarly, the Marine Corps’ airpower capabilities are tailored to meet Marine Corps’ requirements within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

(MAGTF) construct. 

Once a QDR is complete, our National Defense Strategy and National Military 

Strategy will be developed to meet the National Security Strategy issued by the 

President. In this way, requirements drive capabilities, force structure, and employment of forces. Currently, the only approved framework for such an assessment is 

the 2006 QDR. One possible alternative to the 2006 QDR is to measure our capability relative to our current National Defense Strategy; however, it too will evolve 

due to influence from the ongoing QDR. 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. In response to the dynamic national 

security environment, the Secretary of Defense provided a mid-course update to the 

2006 QDR report in the form of his 2008 Guidance for the Development of the Force 

(GDF). This guidance document established strategic priorities for force developVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
54 

ment planning, as well as a basis for development of the fiscal year 2010 POM submissions from the Services as part of the DOD input to the President’s budget (PB). 

From the Air Force perspective regarding the fiscal year 2010 PB, we used Secretary Gates’ GDF as a baseline to analyze our combat air forces (CAF) fighter force 

structure, and subsequently identified a window of opportunity to take a strategic 

pause and build a smaller, but more flexible, capable, and lethal force as we bridge 

to the fifth-generation-enabled force. This analysis determined that the Air Force is 

faced with aging fighter aircraft during a period in history where we are not directly 

threatened by a near-peer competitor, ultimately assessing the risk as acceptable. 

Any remaining risk is mitigated in the short term through a combination of permanently based and rotational forces. The fiscal year 2010 CAF restructuring plan is 

part of a global resource allocation process to create a more efficient 21st century 

Air Force for the Joint team. 

Admiral MYERS. The Navy is currently committed to an 11 carrier force structure 

for the next several decades, and this commitment was supported by Secretary 

Gates during his April budget announcement. The carrier force structure, along 

with the entire battle force, is being considered in the QDR. The overall carrier force 

structure is driven by two primary considerations. First, we must have sufficient 

carrier strength to carry out the Navy’s wartime missions and strategic assignments. Second, and equally important, we must have adequate force structure to 

meet the presence demands required by the President and combatant commanders. 

The 2006 QDR defined the need for 11 CVNs. Navy supports the Secretary of Defense’s plan to change the aircraft carrier program to a 5-year build cycle. Should 

the outcome of the 2009 QDR recommend changes in long-term force structure, 

Navy will work with Congress to address any legislation that may be required. 

8. Senator THUNE. Vice Admiral Architzel, Lieutenant General Trautman, Lieutenant General Shackelford, Rear Admiral Myers, and Major General Gibson, in 

your view, what would the effect be on airpower capabilities and force structure if 

the 2009 QDR eliminates the longstanding requirement to successfully fight two simultaneous major theater wars? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. The overall carrier structure is driven 

by two primary issues. First, we must have sufficient carrier strength to carry out 

the Navy’s wartime missions and strategic assignments. Second, and equally important, we must have adequate force structure to meet the presence demands required 

by the President and combatant commanders. It is carrier presence demand that ultimately defines the carrier force structure. While major theater war demands are 

significant they tend to impact the desired readiness and response time required for 

surge capability and capacity. As a result, any change in major theater war numbers or sequencing will not necessarily impact the overall carrier requirement. However, it will define the number of carrier strike groups required to be available to 

respond and the timeliness of response. Should this construct change, an entirely 

new detailed analysis would be required in order to answer this question. 

General TRAUTMAN. General Cartwright has laid out a vision of just such a contraction of force structure. The applicable functions of airpower extend well beyond 

the strike and anti-air capabilities traditionally associated with major theater wars. 

Our current and future aviation assets provide a wide array of capabilities that support our Marine forces within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Regardless of the 

types of conflicts we must prepare to conduct simultaneously, Marine aviation will 

always strive to support operations across the full spectrum. 

As part of a forward-deployed naval force and an expeditionary force in readiness, 

the Marine Corps requires an aviation combat element with multirole capability and 

multi-mission aircraft. The effect of eliminating the long-standing requirement to 

fight two simultaneous major theater wars is difficult to determine without identifying what requirements take its place. 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The 2004 National Defense Strategy 

directs a force sized to defend the homeland, deter forward in and from four regions, 

and conduct two, overlapping ‘‘swift defeat’’ campaigns. Even when committed to a 

limited number of lesser contingencies, the force must be able to ‘‘win decisively’’ 

in one of the two campaigns. The most recent National Defense Strategy did not 

specify a requirement to fight two simultaneous major theater wars. The fiscal year 

2010 President’s budget reflects the airpower capabilities and force structure to accomplish the National Defense Strategy. 

Admiral MYERS. The overall carrier structure is driven by two primary issues. 

First, we must have sufficient carrier strength to carry out the Navy’s wartime missions and strategic assignments. Second, and equally important, we must have adequate force structure to meet the presence demands required by the President and 

combatant commanders. It is carrier presence demand that ultimately defines the 

55 

carrier force structure. While major theater war demands are significant they tend 

to impact the desired readiness and response time required for surge capability and 

capacity. As a result, any change in major theater war numbers or sequencing will 

not necessarily impact the overall carrier requirement. However, it will define the 

number of carrier strike groups required to be available to respond and the timeliness of response. Should this construct change, an entirely new detailed analysis 

would be required in order to answer this question. 

AVIATION STRIKE FIGHTER SHORTFALL

9. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel, our Nation’s need for the continued presence of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers to protect and defend the interests of America 

and its allies is self-evident. But the Department of the Navy has identified a naval 

aviation strike fighter shortfall, which it projects to be more than 240 aircraft by 

2018. This shortfall has apparently been caused by delays in the F–35 JSF program 

and the challenges associated with extending the life of older strike fighters. What 

is the Department of the Navy’s current assessment of its aviation strike fighter 

shortfall? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The Department of the Navy’s F/A–18A–D strike fighter 

shortfall is estimated to be 146 aircraft (70 aircraft for the Navy) in 2014. This is 

based on the following assumptions: 

• F–35B IOC of 2012; F–35C IOC of 2015; PB10 delivery ramp and final 

quantities 

• 506 F/A–18E/F program of record through fiscal year 2012 • Current Department of Navy force structure requirements: 

a. U.S. Navy: 10 CVW of 44 strike fighters each at 90 percent productive 

ratio aircraft entitlement—35 total Navy strike fighter squadrons (VFA) 

b. U.S. Marine Corps: 19 Active/1 Reserve strike fighter squadrons; additional stand-up of 2 Active/2 Reserve cadre squadrons with JSF beginning 

in 2012 

• Department of Navy makes a future $3.6 billion investment for service 

life extension of F/A 18A–D from 8,600 to 10,000 flight hours service life. 

• NAVAIR Inventory Forecasting Tool, version 18.0. 

10. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel, how concerned are you about that shortfall 

and its effect on future carrier warfighting capability? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Carrier aviation and our carrier strike group force structure 

are vital to executing our Military Strategy in support of the Nation’s security and 

strategic objectives. During this summer’s QDR, we will have the opportunity to assess the requirement for the essential capability and capacity that carrier aviation 

provides to current and potential conflicts, as well as the valued, continuous contribution that our carrier strike groups provide for preventing conflicts, in balance 

with other DOD requirements and priorities. Based on the outcome of this assessment, there are several factors—providing different opportunities—that will be considered in resourcing the Department of the Navy’s strike fighter requirements, including attaining the IOC of the Department’s JSFs on time and at planned quantities. Additionally, the Department will continue to assess and make determinations on a $3.6 billion additional POM–12 investment in the service life extension 

of up to 295 of our F/A 18A–D legacy Hornets. Finally, through PR–11, the Navy 

preserves the option—if required—to procure additional F/A–18E/F Super Hornets 

beyond the current budgeted quantity. 

11. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel, why isn’t it premature for the Navy to assess the significance of its projected strike fighter shortfall (or its operational impact) before the pending QDR is completed? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. During this summer’s QDR, we will have the opportunity to 

assess the requirement for the essential capability and capacity that carrier aviation 

provides to current and potential conflicts, as well as the valued, continuous contribution that our carrier strike groups provide for preventing conflicts, in balance 

with other DOD requirements and priorities. Based on the outcome of this assessment, there are several factors—providing different opportunities—that will be considered in resourcing the Department of the Navy’s strike fighter requirements, including attaining the IOC of the Department’s JSFs on time and at planned quantities. Additionally, the Department will continue to assess and make determinations on an estimated $3.6 billion additional investment in the service life extension 

of up to 295 of its F/A–18A–D legacy Hornets. Finally, through PR–11, the Navy 

preserves the option—if required—to procure additional F/A–18E/F Super Hornets 

56 

beyond the current budgeted quantity. Each of these options provides opportunity 

that runs concurrent with or that can be acted on, after the completion of this summer’s QDR. 

12. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel, the Department of the Navy has apparently exhausted all options to reduce its projected 240-aircraft strike fighter shortfall. There are no viable plans to speed up production of the carrier version of the 

JSF planned to be fielded on carrier decks around 2015. Some already suggest that 

this date may slip an additional year or 2. Finally, a Navy plan to extend the life 

of the older legacy Hornets may be too costly. Is it a viable solution to consider purchasing additional F/A–18 Super Hornets—the only new strike fighter aircraft in 

production? If not, how will the Navy expect to mitigate the shortfall and the operational risks associated with that shortfall? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Continued procurement of F/A–18E/F is one of four areas 

that the Department of the Navy will continue to assess through this summer’s 

QDR and into the following year’s budget submission. The option for continued

F/A–18E/F procurement could be exercised in fiscal year 2011, without a break in 

Boeing’s production line capability. Other avenues to be considered—each in balance 

with one another—are: (1) maintaining wholeness of the JSF program; (2) investing 

roughly $3.6 billion to extend the service life of approximately 295 F/A–18A–D legacy Hornets from 8,600 to 10,000 flight hour service life; and, (3) continued funding 

for support of our legacy fleet aircraft. 

The challenge that leadership is undertaking during the QDR and upcoming 

budget year, is to determine the necessary balance of these options in terms of force 

requirements, as they become evident over this summer’s review. 

AIR FORCE TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT GAP

13. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, as you of course 

know, in hearings on the Air Force’s fiscal year 2009 budget request, Air Force leaders testified that, due to new estimates of the life of the legacy fighter force, the 

current F–22 Raptor and JSF procurement plans would likely leave a gap of up to 

800 fighter aircraft by 2024. Without the benefit of the Air Force’s having conducted 

a service life assessment, as the Navy has with regard to its strike fighter capability, do you have a sense of what the probable extent of the Air Force’s fighter 

gap is? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. In April 2008, the Air Force estimated its projected fighter shortfall in the mid–2020s at approximately 800 aircraft, 

which assumed a maximum F–35A production rate of 48 aircraft a year beginning 

in 2013. Since that time, several things have changed that influence projected fighter requirements in the coming decade and beyond: the Secretary of Defense published the National Defense Strategy and the attendant force planning construct; 

the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget request included funding to increase the production rate to 80 F–35A aircraft a year beginning in 2015; and the Department 

has begun assessing fighter force requirements as part of the QDR. Following conclusion of the QDR, the Air Force will reassess fighter force structure through 2030. 

14. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, with declining procurement dollars as far as the eyes can see, to what extent could buying more quantities of legacy aircraft such as F–16s and F–15Es help mitigate—on a cost-effective 

basis—a major fighter shortfall in the Air Force over the intermediate- to long-term? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. In a limited defense budget, it is essential we focus our efforts and resources on procuring fifth-generation fighters. The 

F–35 is the aircraft that will allow the Air Force to perform our missions for the 

next 20 to 30 years, to be certain, along with a complementary fleet of F–22s. Therefore, we need to put whatever funding is available to ramp up F–35 production rates 

so that: (1) we can field sufficient numbers of aircraft to effectively manage the 

aging issues of our fighter fleet; and (2) keep the average unit cost affordable to us, 

our fellow Services, and our international partners. Buying legacy aircraft would 

come at the expense of fifth-generation fighters, and would promote a less capable, 

less survivable fighter force. 

15. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Gibson, a March 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the F–35 program raises serious concerns regarding the development schedule for the F–35. According to the GAO report on the F–35 program, ‘‘[T]hree independent defense offices separately concluded 

that . . . the F–35 program development schedule is likely to slip from 12 months 

57 

to 27 months.’’ What impact will a slip in the development schedule of the F–35 

have on the projected strike fighter shortfall? 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps is confident that the current schedule will 

be met. Meeting this schedule will ensure that it will bridge from its legacy aircraft 

to the fifth-generation JSF and not contribute to the strike fighter shortfall. 

General GIBSON. In light of ongoing assessments such as the QDR plus the emerging National Defense Strategy and its attendant force planning construct, the Air 

Force is taking a close look at the projected strike fighter force requirements for the 

coming decade and beyond. The current program of record for the F–35, with its 

programmed build up through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) of production aircraft to reach a plan of 80 aircraft per year by 2015, helps the Air Force 

mitigate risk in the strike fighter mission. Slips in the development schedule will 

impact the level of risk. 

AIR FORCE STRIKE FIGHTER RESTRUCTURING PLAN

16. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, in testimony before 

the committee, General Schwartz testified, regarding the decision to accelerate the 

retirement of 250 strike fighters, that ‘‘[t]he review weighed the benefits of retiring 

aircraft nearing their expected service life, against near-term risk [to our national 

security].’’ When were these aircraft previously planned to be retired? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The aircraft under the proposed fiscal year 2010 CAF restructuring plan would retire in a range from approximately 

3 years early for certain F–16s, approximately 6 years early for certain F–15Cs, to 

about 11 years for the A–10s, all based upon force structure plans and service life 

considerations. The important point to emphasize is in order to comply with OSD’s 

Guidance for the Development of the Force, the Air Force analyzed its fighter force 

structure and determined we have a window of opportunity to take a strategic pause 

and build a smaller, but more flexible, capable, and lethal force as we bridge to the 

fifth-generation-enabled force. 

This analysis determined that the Air Force is faced with aging fighter aircraft 

during a period in history where we are not directly threatened by a near-peer competitor, ultimately assessing the risk as acceptable. Any remaining risk is mitigated 

in the short term through a combination of permanently based and rotational forces. 

The CAF Restructuring plan is part of a global resource allocation process to create 

a more efficient 21st century Air Force for the Joint Team. 

This plan offers your Air Force an opportunity to reinvest significant savings into 

critical modifications for our enduring combat forces fleet, procure preferred air-toair and air-to-ground munitions and critical Air Force and Joint enabling technologies, and redistribute manpower to national priority missions. 

17. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, how many hours 

are on the aircraft you are going to retire? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. Specific aircraft have not been selected, but once a determination is made to pursue a force structure change that 

drives aircraft retirements, the lead command weapon system team, in concert with 

the System Program Office, will review a multitude of data across the fleet. Examples of those are the current operating time (flight hours) on the aircraft and current modifications on the fleet that would lead to targeting aircraft that haven’t 

been modified in order to reduce installation costs and increase quantities of spare 

parts for the remainder of the fleet. Depot induction requirements such as SLEP/ 

scheduled structural inspection will be reviewed in order to potentially recoup depot 

cost by not inputting a retiring aircraft. 

18. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, are you managing 

aircraft retirements by tail numbers? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. Yes. Air Combat Command (ACC), 

the Air Force’s lead command for our combat aircraft, is developing a detailed plan 

for implementing the proposed fighter aircraft retirements in fiscal year 2010. ACC’s 

force programmers and weapons systems teams comprehensively manage each type 

of fighter aircraft as an entire fleet. These teams will select the most appropriate 

aircraft across the fleet for retirement by tail number, based on a variety of factors 

such as total airframe hours, remaining service life, airframe fatigue, maintenance 

history, and completed or required future modifications. The end result is the retirement of aircraft that are generally the oldest and least capable in the fleet of their 

type. This optimizes unit combat capability by retaining the strongest and most capable performing aircraft for training and operational employment. 

58 

19. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, did the combatant 

commanders sign off on your restructuring plan? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. Yes. As we developed the CAF restructuring plan as part of the fiscal year 2010 Air Force POM build, we were successful in balancing planned force reductions across our active duty, Guard, and Reserve components, as well as in the States and overseas locations. We carefully analyzed the missions across our units in all the Air Force components to achieve the 

force mix that made the most strategic sense. The changes in this plan were closely 

coordinated with our Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve partners, as well 

as our Major Commands and affected Combatant Commanders. 

The Air Force Director of Programs (a two-star general), representing the Air 

Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, traveled to all Air 

Force Major Commands and Unified Combatant Commands to personally brief the 

four-star commanders or their designated representatives on the Air Force fiscal 

year 2010 POM submission. Concerns about the program were either addressed directly with Air Force leadership, or the combatant commanders could address their 

concerns with the Secretary of Defense. Ultimately, Secretary Gates approved the 

restructuring plan as part of the DOD submission to the fiscal year 2010 President’s 

budget, announcing on April 6th, 2009 that ‘‘we will retire 250 of the oldest Air 

Force tactical fighter aircraft in fiscal year 2010.’’ 

20. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, how exactly did you 

quantify that risk? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON At the campaign level, the Air Force 

conducted analysis of the CAF restructuring plan using the OSD-approved analytic 

baseline military objectives, while identifying the need for key enablers and advanced weapons for both the bomber and fighter forces. The resultant force mix presented less warfighting risk in fiscal year 2015 and beyond than any course of action 

that maintained the status quo in legacy fighter numbers. In any case, reinvestments must be made in modernization, weapons, and other key enablers. 

21. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, did the risk assessment consider the joint air force capability of all the Services; that is, the Navy and 

Marine Corps also? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. Yes. The assessment considered the 

ability of the force structure to address the Air Force target set which is developed 

in the context of the Joint Campaign. The unified combatant commands were consulted and their respective combatant commanders concurred with the CAF restructuring plan that was ultimately approved by the Secretary of Defense. 

22. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, did the risk assessment include the increased reliance by combatant commanders on aviation assets 

in lieu of the relative unavailability of ground combat units due to decreased readiness rates and commitments to overseas contingency operations? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The Air Force conducted analysis of 

the CAF restructuring plan using the OSD approved analytic baseline military objectives, while identifying the need for key enablers and advanced weapons for both 

the bomber and fighter forces. The resultant force mix presented less warfighting 

risk in fiscal year 2015 and beyond than any course of action that maintained the 

status quo in legacy fighter numbers. In any case, reinvestments must be made in 

modernization, weapons, and other key enablers. 

The Air Force itself did not specifically analyze the risk of increased reliance on 

aviation assets due to unavailability of ground units. However, all of the unified 

combatant commands were consulted and their respective combatant commanders 

concurred with the CAF restructuring plan that was ultimately approved by the 

Secretary of Defense. 

23. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, when do you anticipate that the risk will be mitigated or eliminated? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. To comply with Secretary Gates’ 

2008 Guidance for the Development of the Force, the Air Force analyzed its fighter 

force structure and identified a window of opportunity to take a strategic pause and 

build a smaller, but more flexible, capable, and lethal force as we bridge to the fifthgeneration-enabled force. This analysis determined that the Air Force is faced with 

aging fighter aircraft during a period in history where we are not directly threatened by a near-peer competitor, ultimately assessing the risk as acceptable. Any remaining risk is mitigated in the short term through a combination of permanently 

based and rotational forces, and further reduced in the mid-term as we field greater 

59 

numbers of fifth-generation fighters. The fiscal year 2010 CAF restructuring plan 

is part of a global resource allocation process to create a more efficient 21st century 

Air Force for the joint team. 

24. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, what is the impact 

on current mission capabilities and to the Air Force’s fifth-generation requirements 

in the out years? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. In line with the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s guidance to eliminate excessive overmatch in force structure, the 

Air Force assessed the threat environment and analyzed CAF capabilities. Studies 

show the Air Force has a window of opportunity to: (1) reshape our aging fighter 

force via accelerated retirements, (2) redistribute funding to modernize and equip 

a smaller, more flexible, capable and lethal force, and (3) redistribute manpower to 

support expanding areas of critical national priority missions. Although the fighter 

fleet will be smaller, the effects provided by the newer modifications, preferred munitions, and critical enablers create a capabilities-based bridge from our current 

force to a fifth-generation-enabled fighter fleet. These actions will ensure the proper 

mix of platforms to meet the combatant commanders’ mission requirements. 

25. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, in his testimony before the committee, General Schwartz, the Air Force Chief of Staff, testified that the 

CAF restructure plan would not only fund upgrades to the legacy fighter fleet, but 

also fund improvements to the bomber fleet. Specifically, he mentioned that all 

three bombers will receive radar upgrades. How does the CAF restructure plan benefit the B–1 fleet? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The fighter force restructure plan reinvests savings from accelerating the inevitable retirement of older legacy aircraft 

back into the remaining legacy fighters and bombers, munitions, and other key 

enablers. Specifically, the fiscal year 2010 PB adds funding into the B–1 program 

for gyro stabilization system replacements, inertial navigation system replacements, 

central integrated test system upgrades, an advanced radar electronic warfare test 

system, and nose radome repair capabilities. Fiscal year 2010 PB also continues the 

Radar Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program (RMIP), which addresses reliability and maintainability issues that have the potential to ground fleet 

aircraft as early as fiscal year 2011. Although it does not increase the capability of 

the current system, it will increase aircraft availability through greater reliability 

and ease of maintenance. By accelerating the inevitable retirements of our aging 

fighter force, we are able to reinvest approximately $1.0 billion across the FYDP to 

the bomber fleet as a whole and build a smaller, but more capable and lethal force 

as a bridge to fifth-generation-enabled capabilities. 

26. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, what are the plans 

to upgrade the B–1 bomber’s radar? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The fiscal year 2010 PB provides 

funding for the B–1 Radar RMIP, which addresses reliability and maintainability 

issues that have the potential to ground fleet aircraft as early as fiscal year 2011. 

This modification provides for the upgrade of the B–1 radar (AN/APQ–164) to resolve significant diminishing manufacturing resources, reliability problems with the 

existing dual-string radar, and will allow the B–1 to take advantage of future radar 

improvements. The hardware modification leverages off the already completed F–16 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (V) 9 radar program, and specifically provides two 

modular receiver exciters, two common radar processors, supporting installation cables, and clamps. This line replaceable unit upgrade is a form-fit-function installation. Although it does not increase the capability of the current system it will increase aircraft availability through greater reliability and ease of maintenance. 

LONG-RANGE BOMBERS AND THE STRIKE FIGHTER SHORTFALL

27. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel and General Trautman, long-range bombers appear to share important attributes with carrier air wings, including not requiring in-theater basing and, thereby, offering the potential for prompt strikes in 

a crisis. But, the Department of the Navy’s strike fighter gap could be a problem; 

especially if the JSF slips in becoming IOC. To what extent could an increased inventory of long-range bombers, in some ways, make up for the shortfall in Navy and 

Marine Corp strike fighters? Please speak specifically to cost and survivability. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Increasing the inventory of long-range bombers doesn’t replace the carrier air wing on the flight deck for several reasons—the carrier strike 

60 

wings provide airborne early warning and surveillance, electronic attack and close 

air support along with a kinetic impact (effects that munitions will have on specific 

targets prosecuted) to the troops on the ground. The long-range bomber in this case 

is limited to the kinetic. As part of the Joint Force, the long-range bomber and the 

carrier strike wing work well together both now and in the future. 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps’ warfighting structure is based upon the 

MAGTF. MAGTFs are task organized and can be tailored to a specific threat. While 

long-range bombers are a strategic asset, the Corps views our MAGTFs as an operational asset with forcible entry capability and the ability to operate without longrange bombers. The Marine Corps maintains confidence in the JSF Program Office’s 

ability to maintain schedule and will fund its legacy fleet of Hornets and Harriers 

to mitigate any perceived negative inventory trends in its strike fighters. The best 

option for cost and survivability is to procure the fifth-generation F–35 in all 

variants, especially the short-takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) F–35B variant. 

Fifth generation offers the Nation the best balance of cost, lethality, and survivability. 

F–35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM

28. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Shackelford, the JSF program’s size, its international scope, and its competing objectives for performance, 

cost effectiveness, and commonality make it arguably the most challenging defense 

acquisition program ever. With shortfalls in strike fighter capability, the Air Force, 

Navy, and Marine Corps are relying on the program’s delivering each of those Service’s versions of an IOC aircraft on time. 

In connection with this year’s budget request, the President proposes to increase 

the buy of the F–35 JSF from the 14 aircraft bought in fiscal year 2009 to 30 in 

fiscal year 2010, with corresponding funding increases from $6.8 billion to $11.2 billion. According to the proposal, we would plan to buy 513 F–35s over the 5-year defense plan, and, ultimately, plan to buy 2,443. So, this is a good time for an update 

on the program. 

In terms of quantity and investment over the FYDP, please explain how the 

DOD’s plan to procure JSF aircraft is different now, from what was proposed last 

year. 

General TRAUTMAN. DOD’s plan to procure JSF will meet the Marine Corps’ IOC 

of 2012. The program will manage risk in production quantities in order to maintain 

IOC. 

General SHACKELFORD. When the fiscal year 2009 President’s budget was submitted to Congress, the plan was to procure 485 F–35 aircraft for the Air Force, 

Navy, and Marine Corps through fiscal year 2015. The current plan is to procure 

513 aircraft, an additional 28 aircraft, through fiscal year 2015. The overall quantity 

of aircraft to be procured for the U.S. is 2,443 aircraft. 

General Schwartz, Air Force Chief of Staff, stated that the F–35 is a key capability to ensure U.S. air superiority for the next 20 to 30 years. He has repeatedly 

emphasized the importance of high production rates as a way to manage our aging 

aircraft inventory and keep the average price of the F–35 competitive for not only 

the USAF and DOD, but our allies as well. The fiscal year 2010 budget renews our 

commitment to the F–35 as the backbone of U.S. and allied fighter force structure 

in the years to come. 

29. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Shackelford, with regard to 

each variant, please explain where the program is on developmental testing, where 

it is going, and when it is going to get there. 

General TRAUTMAN. The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) fully identifies 

those sorties necessary to verify all mission systems and life science flights required 

to fully test the air system. The Marine Corps has confidence that the TEMP, as 

currently written, will meet its objective. 

General SHACKELFORD. AA–1, the first conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) 

variant, has flown 87 times. It is currently in flyable storage at Lockheed Martin 

Fort Worth and is scheduled to fly to China Lake later this year to begin live fire 

testing. BF–1, the first STOVL variant, has flown 14 times. BF–1 is scheduled to 

ferry to Patuxent River in August 2009 and conduct its first vertical landing in September 2009. BF–2 has flown once. 

AF–1, the first weight-optimized CTOL variant, is scheduled to begin flight tests 

in September 2009 and ferry to Edwards Air Force Base (AFB) in February 2010. 

CF–1, the first carrier variant, is scheduled to fly in January 2010 and ferry to Patuxent River in June 2010. 

61 

30. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Shackelford, at this point, is 

the program having any difficulty meeting its key performance parameters? 

General TRAUTMAN. JSF program is meeting all key performance parameters. 

General SHACKELFORD. All F–35 variants are projected to meet their respective 

key performance parameters. 

31. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Shackelford, please explain, 

in objective terms, not relative to legacy programs at comparable points, how successful the program is likely to be in terms of retiring risk and design maturity before we get much more into production. 

General TRAUTMAN. The JSF program is following a path of concurrency. The Marine Corps is still developing the program and will enter production. The program 

believes that sufficient simulation and laboratory assets are available to mitigate 

the risk of concurrency. 

General SHACKELFORD. The Department is very pleased with the program’s 

progress in retiring risk and demonstrating design and processes maturity. Extensive use of ground test laboratories, modeling and simulation techniques and flying 

test beds continue to mature designs and burn-down development risk far in advance of flight testing. The first system development and demonstration (SDD) aircraft, AA–1, has been a superb aircraft and valuable pathfinder, incorporating 80 

percent of flight software and aircraft systems that will also be used in the STOVL 

variant. AA–1, BF–1, and BF–2 are all in flight testing, and validating design, manufacturing and test processes, aero performance, vehicle systems performance, control systems and our autonomic logistics global sustainment concepts. These three 

initial SDD jets have returned from sorties as ‘‘Code 1,’’ i.e., ready to fly again, 80 

percent of the time. Actual flight-test data correlation to modeling is outstanding, 

showing the maturity of design tools. AA–1 also greatly contributed to validation of 

design and production processes by demonstrating actual weight within 0.1 percent 

of predicted, no fuel leaks during ground tests (unprecedented), high level of quality 

in manufacturing and assembly, and a high frequency of flights. ‘‘Digital Thread’’ 

technology is a key enabler of the exceptional manufacturing quality we’ve seen on 

AA–1, manifested in dramatically lower defects and scrap rates compared to legacy 

programs, which in turn results in cost avoidance. 

Extensive use of digital design and development tools, ground test laboratories, 

modeling and simulation techniques and flying test beds continue to mature designs 

and burn-down development risk far in advance of flight testing. The remaining 

SDD jets and ground test articles, plus low rate initial production (LRIP) I and 

LRIP II aircraft, are in various stages of production. The SDD jets are taking longer 

to build than planned but setting new standards for quality and manufacturing efficiencies that improve with each jet. Software is 74 percent complete, with 13 million 

lines of code, per the spiral development plan/schedule and with record-setting codewriting efficiencies. Software demonstrates stability (i.e., tens to hundreds of hours 

error-free run times) across multiple mission system subsystems. Challenges remain, but development is on track, and DOD closely monitors program progress on 

technical issues and risk mitigation. 

32. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Shackelford, I understand 

that development is expected to slip from 2 to 9 months. Exactly what caused that 

slip in development, and why won’t this affect the production schedule adversely? 

General TRAUTMAN. Pratt & Whitney experienced some problems during developmental testing. The cause of these problems was quickly identified and mitigation 

plans were put into place. The overall development of the air system has not been 

jeopardized. The Marine Corps expects to meet its steadfast IOC of 2012. 

General SHACKELFORD. The current program status reflects average delays of approximately 3 months, driven by late bit/piece parts which have been driven by late 

configuration changes to accommodate ‘‘make-it-work’’ changes. A variety of mitigation actions are in work to maintain the current status and/or recover schedule. 

These include expediting teams at all critical part suppliers, increased staffing in 

key Lockheed Martin planning and assembly areas, and optimized/integrated work 

plans by ship by work station for each behind schedule aircraft. 

33. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Shackelford, please explain 

how the program intends to mitigate the slip to maintain or recover its schedule. 

General TRAUTMAN. Pratt & Whitney experienced some problems during developmental testing. The cause of these problems was quickly identified and mitigation 

plans were put into place. The overall development of the air system has not been 

jeopardized. The Marine Corps expects to meet its steadfast IOC of 2012. 

62 

General SHACKELFORD. The current program status reflects average delays of approximately 3 months, driven by late bit/piece parts which have been driven by late 

configuration changes to accommodate ‘‘make-it-work’’ changes. A variety of mitigation actions are in work to maintain the current status and/or recover schedule. 

These include expediting teams at all critical part suppliers, increased staffing in 

key Lockheed Martin planning and assembly areas, and optimized/integrated work 

plans by ship by work station for each behind schedule aircraft. 

34. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Shackelford, please explain 

where the program is in terms of its systems integration plan and why the plan, 

and the program’s performance under that plan, will effectively mete out integration 

risk. 

General TRAUTMAN. The JSF Program Office is actively monitoring all aspects of 

integration to include systems integration. The program as currently structured is 

balancing cost, schedule, and performance and the Marine Corps has confidence in 

the Program Executive Officer’s way forward to meet our IOC date of 2012 while 

delivering a Block II air system. 

General SHACKELFORD. As of May 2009, systems integration testing continues on 

plan via flight tests, a flying lab and over 150,000 hours of ground labs testing. A 

fully integrated mission systems jet will fly later this year. All F–35 variants are 

projected to meet their respective key performance parameters. The F–35 plan for 

incremental blocks of capability balances cost, schedule, and risk. 

Extensive use of ground test laboratories, modeling and simulation techniques, 

and flying test beds continue to mature designs and burn-down development risk 

far in advance of flight testing. Deliveries of SDD aircraft are approximately 3 

months on average behind plan, but mitigation plans are in place to maintain or 

recover schedule. Challenges remain, but development is on track, and DOD closely 

monitors program progress on technical issues and risk mitigation. 

The cooperative avionics test bed (CATB), a modified Boeing 737 designed to validate the JSF’s avionics suite, has flown 65 flights and 165 total hours, including 

54 hours of mission systems testing. The nose of this aircraft has been modified to 

replicate the F–35, and a 13-foot canard has been added to emulate the wing. External structures on the aircraft’s top and bottom hold F–35 avionics equipment and 

about 1,500 wiring harnesses to connect and link the various mission system sensors. This aircraft will integrate and validate the performance of all F–35 sensor 

systems before they are flown on F–35 aircraft. CATB recently successfully deployed 

with Block 0.5 software, which will be the operational load in the first LRIP I jet 

deployed to Eglin next year. 

Three SDD jets (AA–1, BF–1 and BF–2) are in flight testing. The remaining SDD 

jets and ground test articles, plus LRIP I and LRIP II aircraft, are in various stages 

of production. The SDD jets are taking longer to build than planned, but setting 

new standards for quality, and manufacturing efficiencies that improve with each 

jet. Software is 74 percent complete, with 13 million lines of code, per the spiral development plan/schedule and with record-setting code-writing efficiencies. Software 

demonstrates stability (i.e., tens to hundreds of hours error-free run times) across 

multiple mission system subsystems. 

35. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Shackelford, I understand 

that the F135 engine has seen considerable cost growth. Please explain how much 

costs have grown in the engine program and what measures will be employed to 

control costs in there. 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps does not manage specific aspects of the 

program to include costs. The Program Office, as the executive agent of the government to industry, is actively managing all aspects of the program with regard to 

cost, schedule, and performance. The Program Executive Officer has taken direct 

measures to manage cost growth in the propulsion system. 

General SHACKELFORD. The F135 SDD contract estimate has increased from $4.8 

billion at contract award in 2001 to $6.7 billion now. Primary drivers of the $1.9 

billion increase were approximately $1 billion for the 2004 F–35 replan to address 

weight-driven aircraft performance issues and $0.8 billion for implementation of 

over target baseline due to cost overruns. 

Cost estimates for production engines have also increased. Much of the final engine cost is associated with Pratt and Whitney suppliers. Pratt is visiting its major 

suppliers to help them improve efficiencies and reduce cost in key areas. Pratt also 

has a robust affordability initiatives process in place that identifies new manufacturing processes and design changes that reduce manufacturing time and costs. A 

board reviews proposed initiatives and implements them if the business case is posiVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
63 

tive. In addition, the program office has implemented a cost control objective award 

fee area to incentivize Pratt and Whitney to focus on cost control. 

36. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Shackelford, at this point, 

where do you see the most significant risk in the program? 

General TRAUTMAN. Interrupting the stable funding profile as submitted in PB10 

would introduce risk to the program. 

General SHACKELFORD. Extensive use of ground test laboratories, modeling and 

simulation techniques and flying test beds continue to mature designs and burndown development risk far in advance of flight testing. All F–35 variants are projected to meet their respective key performance parameters. Deliveries of SDD aircraft are approximately 3 months on average behind plan, but mitigation plans are 

in place to maintain or recover schedule. Challenges remain, but development is on 

track, and DOD closely monitors program progress on technical issues and risk mitigation. A key management focus area now is SDD cost and schedule pressures. The 

key drivers for these challenges are supply chain growing pains, design change traffic and, as with all development aircraft programs, flight test progress. 

37. Senator THUNE. Vice Admiral Architzel, Lieutenant General Trautman, Lieutenant General Shackelford, Rear Admiral Myers, and Major General Gibson, GAO’s 

March 2009 report, ‘‘JSF—Accelerating Procurement before Completing Development Increases the Government’s Financial Risk,’’ notes that ‘‘two recent [DOD] estimates indicate that JSF development will cost more and take longer to complete 

than reported to Congress in April 2008, primarily because of contract cost overruns 

and extended time to complete flight testing.’’ According to GAO, DOD projects that 

JSF developmental costs could increase between $2.4 and $7.4 billion, with the program experiencing schedule delays of up to 3 years. Only last year, DOD’s JSF program-of-record indicated completing development would require $7.4 billion and a 

DOD Joint Estimating Team (JET) estimated the cost at more than $15 billion. The 

JSF Program Office concluded that completion of aircraft development would require $9.8 billion. Of course, these varying estimates stand in stark contrast to 

DOD’s April 2008 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) which seemingly concluded 

that JSF costs were actually decreasing. Needless to say, with an approaching strike 

fighter gap in the Navy and fighter gap in the Air Force, these discrepancies are 

troubling. 

However, under the current budget proposal and despite increasing development 

costs and schedule slips DOD is apparently intending to accelerate JSF procurement. According to GAO, such acceleration could require up to an additional $33.4 

billion over the next 6 years and would expose the Government to additional risk 

of cost growth. GAO estimates that an accelerated plan could have DOD procuring 

360 JSF aircraft costing approximately $57 billion before development flight testing 

is completed. 

Based on your experience over many years, both in and out of government, is it 

your sense that DOD has a good handle on JSF program cost, performance, and 

schedule? If so, why the significant variations in DOD’s own cost/schedule estimates? If not, what steps should DOD and Congress take to get arms around program cost, performance, and schedule? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. As clarification, the Pentagon JET projected a potential $3.6 billion development cost increase (excluding F136 engine continuance), not an additional $15 billion development cost increase. 

The Department constantly monitors the JSF Program’s development through an 

unmatched oversight structure, befitting the largest single acquisition program in 

the Department. The program recently awarded the third LRIP lot for 14 United 

States aircraft with the costs at the Department’s budgeted figure. The costs for the 

engine have increased over the last year and the program is taking steps to work 

with the engine contractor to reduce those costs. In 2008, the Department chartered 

a JET to provide an independent assessment of program cost and schedule. The JET 

identified F–35 development and production risks. Through rigorous reviews, DOD 

and our international partner leaders are tracking those risks and making recommendations on how to appropriately address those risks. In the fiscal year 2010 

budget request, additional development funding was added as a result of these reviews. The development schedule remains on track with some risk to completing the 

test schedule on time. The additional funding budgeted in fiscal year 2010 will help 

address those risks, and the Department will review the progress again in preparation for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. The performance is tracking to projections and meeting all requirements. The test aircraft are exhibiting unmatched 

reliability for this stage of testing. Static and durability testing of ground test aircraft are providing excellent results and the engine performance is providing more 

64 

thrust than required. By the end of fiscal year 2010, we expect to have all of the 

development and LRIP Lot 1 aircraft delivered. 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps has confidence in current leadership of the 

JSF program to manage cost, schedule, and performance. PEO JSF has submitted 

updated cost schedules to OSD and the Marine Corps has confidence that these 

schedules will be met. 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. Yes, DOD has a good handle on the 

cost, schedule, and performance of the JSF Program. The Services have spent considerable time reviewing the program and bringing in independent cost experts to 

develop a joint cost estimate. This joint estimate assessed the overall ability to execute the development program and identified technical and executing constraints. It 

developed cost and schedule estimates reflecting F–35 performance to date and performance of other DOD programs and suggested improvements that address cost 

and schedule issues. Internal JSF Program Office estimates are more optimistic 

based on early, upfront investments made in the program. There are significant program milestones that will take place this year and in fiscal year 2010 which will 

determine how well the program is doing against the current joint estimate. 

38. Senator THUNE. Vice Admiral Architzel, Lieutenant General Trautman, Lieutenant General Shackelford, Rear Admiral Myers, and Major General Gibson, in 

light of the size, scope, cost, and importance of the JSF program, should DOD release copies of the JSF Program Office and DOD JET estimates/reports identified 

by GAO? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. The JET assessment was a DOD 

predecisional, for official use only effort to support the Department’s development 

of the yiscal year 2010 President’s budget and outyear planning. The Department 

provided briefings last fall to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the 

JET’s conclusions and assumptions and the Program Office’s perspectives on the 

same. General TRAUTMAN. The JSF Program Office is managing all cost estimates and 

reports and is treating these documents as FOUO information. The Marine Corps 

has confidence in the JSF program leadership. 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. No, the JET assessment was a DOD 

predecisional, for official use only effort to support the Department’s development 

of the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget and outyear planning. The Department 

provided briefings last fall to GAO on the JET’s conclusions and assumptions and 

the Program Office’s perspectives on the same. 

39. Senator THUNE. Vice Admiral Architzel, Lieutenant General Trautman, Lieutenant General Shackelford, Rear Admiral Myers, and Major General Gibson, does 

there need to be a more open and insightful dialogue or debate on the significant 

challenges confronting the JSF program? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. Various leadership from DOD, Navy, Air 

Force, Marines, and F–35 International Partners routinely convene to review program status, address issues, discuss planning, and provide strategic oversight. 

Standing forums include the following: Joint Executive Steering Board (i.e., Configuration Steering Board); Senior Warfighter Group; Autonomic Logistics Advisory 

Council; CEO Conference; Training Advisory Council; and Interoperability Advisory 

Council. The annual periodic Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) provides a forum for 

Department leadership to scrutinize all aspects of the F–35 program. The Services 

have frequent interaction with the joint program office and prime contractors from 

the working group to senior executive level. In these engagements, the challenges 

of the program are worked with all stakeholders present in a collaborative manner. 

The current level of dialogue and debate both within and external to the Department is both open and effective. 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps is confronting all challenges and looks forward to developing CONOPS for this fifth-generation aircraft. The Marine Corps 

welcome dialogue from both Government and Industry as it bridges forward toward 

the JSF. 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The Department has briefed the 

GAO on the JET’s estimates and the JET briefing has been significantly referenced 

in the GAO report released in March 2009. The challenges facing the JSF program 

are manageable and are overseen by the DOD and the Services on a continuing 

basis. 

40. Senator THUNE. Vice Admiral Architzel, Lieutenant General Trautman, Lieutenant General Shackelford, Rear Admiral Myers, and Major General Gibson, some 

have speculated that the additional funding for JSF announced earlier this month 

65 

by Secretary Gates may reflect in part the restoral of funds that were removed at 

one time from the program in order to manage cost growth. With cost increases and 

schedule slips of this magnitude, do you see any way that this program can or will 

avoid breaching one or more Nunn-McCurdy thresholds? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. Funding announced for the JSF program 

in June was intended to address ramp-rate inefficiencies for the United States and 

international partners, not to restore funds previously removed. The JSF Program 

has declared two breaches since Milestone B in October 2001. The first breach was 

reported to Congress in March 2004, and primarily resulted from cost and schedule 

increases to weight-driven performance issues. The second breach was reported to 

Congress in spring 2006 as a result of new Nunn-McCurdy provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requiring unit cost increases 

to be compared to the current baseline and the original Milestone B baseline. The 

2006 breach primarily reflected the historical cost increases reported in 2004. Department leadership is closely monitoring program cost and schedule challenges and 

mitigations, but is not prepared to speculate on the likelihood of future NunnMcCurdy threshold breaches. 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps believes that JSF program leadership is 

managing cost and schedule to avoid breaching a Nunn-McCurdy threshold. 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. Funding announced for the JSF program in June was intended to address ramp rate inefficiencies for the U.S. and 

international partners, not to restore funds previously removed. The JSF program 

has declared two breaches since Milestone B in October 2001. The first breach was 

reported to Congress in March 2004, and primarily resulted from cost and schedule 

increases to weight-driven performance issues. The second breach was reported to 

Congress in spring 2006 as a result of new Nunn-McCurdy provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requiring unit cost increases 

to be compared to the current baseline and the original Milestone B baseline. The 

2006 breach primarily reflected the historical cost increases reported in 2004. Department leadership is closely monitoring program cost and schedule challenges and 

mitigations, but is not prepared to speculate on the likelihood of future NunnMcCurdy threshold breaches. 

41. Senator THUNE. Vice Admiral Architzel, Lieutenant General Trautman, Lieutenant General Shackelford, Rear Admiral Myers, and Major General Gibson, in 

your opinion does it make sense to increase concurrency between development and 

procurement? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. The Department has not increased program concurrency. By design, the F–35 Program has substantial concurrency of development, test and production built into the schedule, a fact that the Department 

acknowledges and has approved. That concurrency is designed to provide the 

warfighters with a fifth-generation strike fighter to replace aging legacy aircraft as 

quickly as possible, as efficiently as possible, and as affordably as possible. The Department acknowledges the risks and benefits of the concurrency required to acquire 

and deliver this critical capability. The Department believes the program is well 

managed, with the proper amount of oversight, and well positioned to deliver on its 

promise. In summary, the F–35 acquisition strategy of developing and delivering incremental blocks of increasing capability to the warfighter provides the best balance 

of cost, schedule and risk. 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps believes that the proper balance between 

procurement and development is being managed at this time. 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The Department has not increased 

program concurrency. By design, the F–35 program has substantial concurrency of 

development, test and production built into the schedule, a fact that the Department 

acknowledges and has approved. That concurrency is designed to provide the 

warfighters with a fifth-generation strike fighter to replace aging legacy aircraft as 

quickly as possible, as efficiently as possible, and as affordably as possible. The Department acknowledges the risks, and benefits, of the concurrency required to acquire and deliver this critical capability. The Department believes the program is 

well managed, with the proper amount of oversight, and well positioned to deliver 

on its promise. In summary, the F–35 acquisition strategy of developing and delivering incremental blocks of increasing capability to the warfighter provides the best 

balance of cost, schedule and risk. 

42. Senator THUNE. Vice Admiral Architzel, Lieutenant General Trautman, Lieutenant General Shackelford, Rear Admiral Myers, and Major General Gibson, do 

you share GAO’s concerns over the increasing cost risks this program poses for the 

government? 

66 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. The Department is concerned about cost 

and schedule challenges for all acquisition programs and the JSF Program is no exception. In 2008 the Department did charter a Joint Estimate Team to provide an 

independent assessment of the program cost and schedule. The JET identified F– 

35 development and production risks. Through rigorous reviews, DOD leaders (along 

with our international partners) are tracking those risks and crafting mitigation 

strategies. In the fiscal year 2010 budget request, additional development funding 

was added as a result of these reviews. The development schedule remains on track, 

with some risk to completing the test schedule on time. The additional funding 

budgeted in fiscal year 2010 will help address those risks, and the Department will 

review the progress again in preparation for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. 

The performance is tracking to projections and meeting all requirements. The test 

aircraft are exhibiting unmatched reliability for this stage of testing. Static and durability testing of ground test aircraft are providing excellent results and the engine 

performance is providing thrust required to safely conduct flight test. By the end 

of fiscal year 2010, we expect to have all of the development and LRIP Lot 1 aircraft 

delivered. The Department believes the program is well managed, with the proper 

amount of oversight, and well positioned to deliver on its promise. 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps is always concerned with finding the right 

balance between cost, schedule and performance and believes that the right balance 

is being struck between these three variables. 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The Department is concerned about 

cost challenges for all acquisition programs and the JSF program is no exception. 

In 2008 the Department chartered a Joint Estimate Team (JET) to provide an independent assessment of the program cost and schedule. The JET identified F–35 development and production risks. Through rigorous reviews, DOD leaders are tracking those risks and making recommendations on how to appropriately address those 

risks. In the fiscal year 2010 budget request, additional development funding was 

added as a result of these reviews. The development schedule remains on track with 

some risk to completing the test schedule on time. The additional funding budgeted 

in fiscal year 2010 will help address those risks, and the Department will review 

the progress again in preparation for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. 

43. Senator THUNE. Vice Admiral Architzel, Lieutenant General Trautman, Lieutenant General Shackelford, Rear Admiral Myers, and Major General Gibson, any 

thoughts/recommendations on how to better manage this risk? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. The Department constantly monitors the 

JSF Program’s development through an unmatched oversight structure, befitting 

the largest single acquisition program in the Department. Through independent estimates and rigorous reviews, the Department and our international partners manage risk and make recommendations on how to mitigate it. DOD leadership continues to believe that the F–35 acquisition strategy of developing and delivering incremental blocks of increasing capability to the warfighter provides the best balance 

of cost, schedule and risk. The program is well managed, with the proper amount 

of oversight, and well positioned to mitigate risk. 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps has confidence in JSF program leadership 

to manage risk. 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The Department constantly monitors 

the JSF program’s development through an unmatched oversight structure, befitting 

the largest single acquisition program in the Department. Through independent estimates and rigorous reviews, the Department and our international partners manage risk and make recommendations on how to mitigate it. DOD leadership continues to believe that the F–35 acquisition strategy of developing and delivering incremental blocks of increasing capability to the warfighter provides the best balance 

of cost, schedule and risk. The program is well managed, with the proper amount 

of oversight, and well positioned to mitigate risk. 

44. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel, the Services are planning on purchasing 

approximately 2,450 F–35 JSFs at a cost of over $300 billion, a sum that reflects 

a cost growth of nearly 47 percent beyond original 2002 estimates. The Department 

of the Navy is obviously relying on the JSF to close the gap that it sees in strike 

fighter capability over the intermediate term. 

But, GAO recently issued a report on the JSF program that was critical of its past 

cost overruns and schedule slips, and predicted that development will cost more and 

take longer than what has been reported to Congress. In November 2008, a Pentagon JET reportedly said the JSF program would require an additional 2 years of 

testing and would need another $15 billion to cover new development costs. 

67 

If the JSF program costs continue to significantly increase and development does 

not go as well as promised, draining resources from other priority programs that 

are needed by the Department of the Navy, what alternatives may be available to 

the Navy to remedy its projected strike fighter shortfall and preserve its limited procurement base? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The Department has four primary avenues for addressing its 

strike fighter inventory requirements within current force structure and force scheduling requirements. These include: 

• Maintaining wholeness of the JSF program: 2012 F–35B initial operating capability (IOC), 2015 F–35C IOC with targeted procurement ramp 

to 50 aircraft per year; 

• Making an estimated $3.6B additional investment in POM–12 for the 

service life extension of approximately 295 F/A–18A–D Hornets from 8,600 

flight hours to 10,000 flight hours service life; 

• Continued sustainment of legacy aircraft; and 

• Further procurement of F/A–18E/F Super Hornet. 

Each of these management ‘‘levers’’ must be considered in balance of the others. 

With regard to further F/A–18E/F procurement, the Navy preserves the option 

through PR–11—if required—to procure additional Super Hornets beyond the current budgeted quantity without any break to Boeing’s production. 

The challenge that Navy leadership is undertaking during the QDR and upcoming 

budget year, is to determine the necessary balance of these options in terms of force 

requirements, as they become evident over this summer’s review. 

45. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel and General Trautman, if the JSF costs increase further and its schedule continues to slip, is it sound to hedge against further 

delays in fielding this strike fighter by continuing the manufacturing lines of legacy 

aircraft, such as F/A–18s, for example? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Continued procurement of F/A–18E/F is one of four areas 

that the Navy will continue to assess through this summer’s QDR and into the following year’s budget submission. One hedge against further delays in the JSF already exists. The option for continued F/A–18E/F procurement could be exercised in 

fiscal year 2011, without a break in Boeing’s production line capability. Other avenues to all be considered—each in balance with one another—are: (1) maintaining 

wholeness of the JSF program; (2) making a roughly $3.6 billion POM–12 additional 

investment to extend the service life of approximately 295 F/A–18A–D legacy Hornets from 8,600 to 10,000 flight hour service life; and, (3) continued funding for support of our legacy fleet aircraft. 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps has made the decision to bridge to fifthgeneration JSF. It will manage its legacy fleet of Hornets and Harriers in such a 

way to ensure that no gaps in capabilities exist before JSF is fielded. 

46. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel, what is your view of the proposal to commit to the JSF program in light of the development and technology risk still associated with that program? In other words, what are your views regarding the current 

risk to the JSF program schedule during its SDD phase? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The Department’s commitment to the JSF program is steadfast. The development schedule remains on track with some risk to completing the 

test schedule on time. The additional funding budgeted in fiscal year 2010 will help 

address those risks, and the Department will review the progress again in preparation for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. The performance is tracking to projections and meeting all requirements. The test aircraft are exhibiting unmatched 

reliability for this stage of testing. Static and durability testing of ground test aircraft are providing excellent results and the engine performance is providing thrust 

required to safely conduct flight test. The test aircraft are exhibiting unmatched reliability for this stage of testing. By the end of fiscal year 2010, we expect to have 

all of the development and LRIP Lot 1 aircraft delivered. The Department believes 

the program is well managed, with the proper amount of oversight, and well positioned to deliver on its promise. 

47. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, the Marine Corps plans to take initial deliveries of the B Model, Marine Corps, STOVL variant of the JSF beginning in September 2010 at Eglin AFB to support initial joint training for pilots and crews on 

the aircraft. Recently, the Air Force has run into potential problems due to environmental litigation in establishing the Initial Joint Training Site at Eglin as required 

by the 2005 round of Base Realignment and Closing (BRAC). If the Air Force basing 

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action supporting joint training on the JSF at Eglin is delayed, does the Marine 

Corps have a contingency plan? 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps continues to invest in the Integrated 

Training Center at Eglin, AFB. We believe those problems encountered to realize 

the potential of JSF training at Eglin will be resolved in time to meet our training 

requirements. Until then the operations allowed and the associated under the Environmental Impact study Record of Decision meets our initial training requirements 

while we standup our activities over the next few years. We are looking at various 

options in conjunction with the Air Force and Navy if Eglin proves to be unworkable 

but we are not prepared at this early date to give up on our commitment to training 

both pilots and enlisted maintainers at Eglin, AFB. 

48. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, are you aware of any potential production 

problems with the B Model of the JSF that could delay the schedule for standingup the training squadron by September 2010 and the IOC for the first Marine Corps 

operational squadron scheduled for December 2012? 

General TRAUTMAN. At this time we are not aware of any significant problems 

that would delay production. The JSF Program Office, in concert with Lockheed 

Martin, is managing the suppliers as well as the other partners of Northrup Grumman, BAE, and Pratt & Whitney. It is critical that funding remain as programmed 

to maintain the stable production rate that will ensure we receive our training jets 

in 2010 and meet our 2012 IOC. 

49. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, if the B Model is delayed and the December 2012 IOC for the first Marine Corps operational squadron is delayed, what 

would be the impact on the Marine Corps component of the fighter gap? 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps will continue to manage legacy fleets of 

Harriers and Hornets until introduction of STOVL JSF. 

50. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, how much life is left in the legacy Marine 

Corps Hornet fleet composed of A+, C, and D models and what will it take to extend 

those aircraft until the F–35B is delivered to the Marine Corps? 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps has an aggressive program of managing 

the operation life of all of its Harriers and Hornet models while waiting to introduce 

JSF into the operating forces. 

51. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, regarding the acquisition of 420 F–35Bs, 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps recently testified to the committee that the 

Marine Corps ‘‘will reach IOC in 2012 with a standing squadron ready to deploy.’’ 

I am concerned that the Department of the Navy and the prime contractor have 

not yet completed testing for the STOVL variant, which is intended for the Marine 

Corps, and yet the F–35B has the most urgent demand for first deliveries. 

On June 4, 2009, the Commandant of the Marine Corps testified that he understood that there will be a 7- to 9-month delay on the B-variant testing. Against that 

backdrop, I am highly skeptical that the Marine Corps will be able to field a 

deployable squadron in 2012. Please describe fully this slip in schedule. What is 

causing it? What possible assurances do you have that this slip will not extend 

longer than 9 months? 

General TRAUTMAN. While there have been problems encountered with the F135 

engine, these problems have been rectified and all indications show that these engineering changes have been effective. These problems concerned the propulsion system and not the air vehicle. The Marine Corps has confidence that program leadership will meet 2012 IOC. 

52. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, with this slip, why are you not highly 

skeptical that the Marine Corps will be able to field a deployable squadron in 2012? 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps understands the challenges facing the JSF 

program and knows that effective leadership is the key to success. 

53. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, is anything being done to expedite responsibly completion of operational testing on the B variant? 

General TRAUTMAN. The Test & Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) has been verified 

and Marine Aviation has confidence that this plan will deliver a fully operational 

F–35B. 

54. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, when will final data on the unique noise 

and flight characteristics of the STOVL variant be available for incorporation into 

environmental studies and basing plans? 

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General TRAUTMAN. The noise and environmental studies are ongoing and results 

will be published once complete. 

55. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, will there be a need to construct dedicated 

facilities to maintain the low-observable surfaces of the B variant? 

General TRAUTMAN. No. All maintenance performed will be conducted at the organizational or depot level and will not require dedicated facilities. 

56. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, in addition to the slip in testing schedule, 

what other challenges do you face in meeting the Commandant’s requirement for 

an operational squadron in 2012? 

General TRAUTMAN. Maintaining a steady funding profile as put forth in PB10 

will be essential to meeting 2012 IOC. 

57. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, will new range targets, threat emitters, 

and F–35 flight and weapons delivery profiles require updates to the environmental 

impact statements (EISs) supporting Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps use of established range complexes? If so, when will those requirements be developed to support the EISs or environmental analyses needed to upgrade the range complexes to 

support pilot training, pre-deployment training, and weaponry for the F–35? 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps will utilize its existing ranges for the 

STOVL variant. In addition we plan to leverage the advancements in full mission 

simulators. With these simulators and our existing ranges we believe we will be prepared to train to the full capabilities of the JSF. 

It is possible that future Barry M. Goldwater Range (BMGR) upgrades will be 

necessary and the Marine Corps basing EIS will contain programmatic language to 

address any future evolving training needs as the platform matures and requirements are refined. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force operate 

threat emitters on BMGR that may need to be upgraded to support F–35 training. 

Any upgrade required would be functionally independent of F–35A/B basing and 

would be required regardless of any F–35A/B basing decision. However, no requirement to upgrade BMGR threat emitters has been identified at this time. 

U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force have prepared numerous EIS documents 

over the years in support of aviation operations on BMGR. Most of the contentious 

environmental issues involve impacts to endangered species, in particular the 

Sonoran pronghorn. U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force have received Biological 

Opinions for their operations from Federal Wildlife Service (FWS) and are fully compliant with all environmental regulations. 

58. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, will any of the range complexes be used 

for additional flight training, such as an outlying landing field (OLF) or auxiliary 

field (Aux Field), requiring an update to account for the distinct flight characteristics of the F–35 as compared to legacy aircraft? 

General TRAUTMAN. No. JSF will operate at existing OLFs and Auxiliary fields. 

59. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, at this point, will Marine Corps ranges 

be ready to support initial operational training in 2012? 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps will utilize our existing ranges for the 

STOVL variant. In addition we plan to leverage the advancements in full mission 

simulators. With these simulators and our existing ranges we believe we will be prepared to train to the full capabilities of the JSF. 

It is possible that future Barry M. Goldwater Range (BMGR) upgrades will be 

necessary and the Marine Corps basing EIS will contain programmatic language to 

address any future evolving training needs as the platform matures and requirements are refined. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force operate 

threat emitters on BMGR that may need to be upgraded to support F–35 training. 

Any upgrade required would be functionally independent of F–35A/B basing and 

would be required regardless of any F–35A/B basing decision. However, no requirement to upgrade BMGR threat emitters has been identified at this time. 

U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force have prepared numerous EIS documents 

over the years in support of aviation operations on BMGR. Most of the contentious 

environmental issues involve impacts to endangered species, in particular the 

Sonoran pronghorn. U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force have received Biological 

Opinions for their operations from FWS and are fully compliant with all environmental regulations. 

60. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, what is the current program of record for 

the number of F–35s to be stationed at your first operational location? 

70 

General TRAUTMAN. We will stand up our first operational squadrons at MCAS 

Yuma, AZ. We are in the process of conducting our environmental impact studies, 

dependent upon the study findings our preferred option is to base up to 86 STOVL 

aircraft. 

61. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, are you on track with all environmental 

actions and construction activities to be able to meet your deadline? 

General TRAUTMAN. Yes, all environmental impact studies are being conducted 

and funding is in place for military construction. 

62. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, will you have aviation training ranges 

ready to support the full spectrum of F–35 operations? If not, what is the plan for 

the Marine Corps to get ranges ready? 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps will utilize our existing ranges for the 

STOVL variant. In addition we plan to leverage the advancements in full mission 

simulators. With these simulators and our existing ranges we believe we will be prepared to train to the full capabilities of the JSF. 

It is possible that future BMGR upgrades will be necessary and the Marine Corps 

basing EIS will contain programmatic language to address any future evolving 

training needs as the platform matures and requirements are refined. For example, 

the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force operate threat emitters on BMGR that 

may need to be upgraded to support F–35 training. Any upgrade required would be 

functionally independent of F–35A/B basing and would be required regardless of any 

F–35A/B basing decision. However, no requirement to upgrade BMGR threat 

emitters has been identified at this time. 

U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force have prepared numerous EIS documents 

over the years in support of aviation operations on BMGR. Most of the contentious 

environmental issues involve impacts to endangered species, in particular the 

Sonoran pronghorn. U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force have received Biological 

Opinions for their operations from FWS and are fully compliant with all environmental regulations. 

63. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, are you concerned that the establishment 

of a joint pilot training base for the F–35 at Eglin AFB, which is currently delayed 

due to litigation over the EIS, will affect Marine Corps pilot production by 2012? 

If so, what actions are you taking to mitigate the risk? Are these actions fully supported and funded in the budget request for fiscal year 2010? 

General TRAUTMAN. The initial standup of training capabilities at Eglin is on 

track. Currently we are experiencing no delays in the necessary construction of facilities required to commence training activities. We are firmly committed to training aircrew and enlisted maintainers at the Integrated Training Center at Eglin, 

AFB. We believe there are synergies to be gained by training aircrew and maintainers at the same location with our sister services as well as the current U.S. Marine 

Corps pooling agreement with the United Kingdom. 

64. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, could Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) 

Yuma serve as a permanent location for the training of Marine Corps Lightning pilots in case Eglin AFB cannot fully support the Marine Corps requirement? 

General TRAUTMAN. MCAS Yuma will serve as our first operational base as we 

transition our legacy fleet to the STOVL JSF. We are firmly committed to training 

our aircrew and enlisted maintainers at the Integrated Training Center at Eglin, 

AFB. We are looking at options to conduct training elsewhere, if Eglin becomes unavailable, but are awaiting the findings of our West Coast EIS to inform any decision. 

65. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, what efficiencies can the Marine Corps 

gain by combining training and operational squadrons at one location? 

General TRAUTMAN. Any efficiency to combine operational and training squadrons 

will have to be studied extensively before any decisions could be made. Right now 

the Marine Corps is committed to standing up the first Integrated Training Center 

at Eglin, AFB, followed by our stand-up of operational squadrons at MCAS Yuma 

starting in 2012. 

66. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, a few days ago, Air 

Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz signaled that the Air Force’s requirement for 

1,763 F–35 JSFs is being examined during the comprehensive QDR now under way. 

General Schwartz moreover said that the Air Force’s plan to field a total of 2,250 

fighters, both old and new, is also under review. He said, ‘‘it could end up being 

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less,’’ adding, ‘‘if that’s the case, we will still have a predominately F–35 [force].’’ 

Still, General Schwartz said he expects to have well over 1,500 F–35s. Subject to 

the completion of the QDR, what is your assessment of the Air Force’s overall requirement for JSF? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. Since one of the primary outputs of 

the QDR will be a new force sizing construct, it is premature to speculate on the 

total JSF requirement. Based on current joint campaign analysis, General 

Schwartz’s estimate appears to be about right. While the total requirement is being 

evaluated, the Air Force is currently focused on ensuring that the F–35 procurement 

and capabilities are on track to recapitalize our aging fighter force. Optimized for 

global precision attack against ever-evolving and more advanced enemy threat capabilities, the F–35A remains a crucial element of the Air Force’s future fighter force 

structure, and as a decisive addition to the Air Force’s fifth-generation fighter fleet, 

the F–35A will complement the air dominance capabilities of the F–22. 

67. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Gibson, a key tenant of Secretary Gates’ tactical aviation (TACAIR) plan is the F–35 JSF. If the F–35 schedule 

slips or the rate of production is less than assumed, for example, 35 aircraft per 

year versus 50 per year, alternatives for managing the strike fighter shortfall seem 

limited. Can the Air Force continue to extend the service life of its legacy strike 

fighter aircraft, such as A–10 Warthogs, F–16 Falcons, and F–15 Eagles as a bridge 

to fielding the JSF? 

General TRAUTMAN. While the Marine Corps can not comment on the Air Forces 

plans to the extend service life of their fighter aircraft fleet, Marine Aviation is taking direct and critical measures to manage our legacy fleets of Hornets and Harriers. The Marine Corps will manage our legacy fleet through positive steps of 

CONOPS and funding in order to bridge the gap to our fifth-generation STOVL JSF. 

The Marine Corps is confidant we can extend the service lives of legacy while bridging to a true fifth-generation weapon system. 

General GIBSON. Yes, it is possible to extend the service life of the legacy strike 

fighter aircraft. The Air Force Fleet Viability Board (FVB) has assessed the longterm viability of the A–10 and F–15C/D fleet and determined these fleets can be 

sustained beyond the original planned service life with additional investments. In 

addition, modernization upgrades will be required to provide our legacy aircraft improved capability to operate in controlled airspace and against the emerging air and 

ground threats. While the FVB has not yet assessed the F–16 or F–15E fleet, we 

expect similar conclusions for these aircraft. 

68. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Gibson, what other potential 

alternatives do you see for maintaining sufficient strike assets in the face of additional slips in the F–35’s IOC? 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps has confidence and will manage our legacy 

fleets of Hornets and Harriers with funding and CONOPS as we bridge to the fifthgeneration JSF air system. 

General GIBSON. Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Schwartz has stated on 

many occasions that the key to the Air Force’s fighter recapitalization is the F–35. 

We have invested heavily in the F–35 program and are closely tracking developments in order to ensure that it stays on track. General Schwartz believes it is imperative to direct as much funding as possible toward development of the F–35, the 

aircraft designated to replace the F–16 and A–10 for the Air Force. Any delay in 

procurement could increase the cost and further delay the F–35 for the Air Force, 

Navy, and Marine Corps. Until procurement of the F–35 is at full rate, the AF is 

taking steps to further evaluate the sustainability and viability of its legacy fleet, 

a process which may take several years to complete. 

69. Senator THUNE. General Trautman and General Gibson, earlier this month, 

Secretary Gates told his Japanese counterpart that the United States still has no 

plans to export the F–22 Raptor. Secretary Gates reportedly cited a longstanding 

congressional prohibition on international sales of the F–22. But keeping the F–22 

line hot may make sense while the verdict on whether the first operationally capable JSF will be delivered on time. Should Congress consider lifting that prohibition 

and allow FMS of F–22s, for instance to Japan and Australia, which have expressed 

some interest? 

General TRAUTMAN. The Marine Corps has no comment on the question of Congress lifting the ban on sales of the F–22 to FMS customers. The Marine Corps is 

committed to the fifth-generation JSF program and we look forward to bridging the 

gap from our legacy fleet of Hornets and Harriers to the STOVL JSF. 

72 

General GIBSON. Because U.S. law (the Obey Amendment) specifically forbids export of the F–22, the Air Force is prohibited from spending funds on any activity 

related to export of the aircraft. If the law did allow export, the Air Force would 

work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Interagency, and the Congress 

to determine if export is appropriate and to which countries. Exportability issues, 

such as configuration and technology transfer/foreign disclosure, and related political-military matters would need to be addressed before considering F–22 sales to 

Japan, Australia, or any other partner nation. 

F/A–18 SUPER HORNET PROCUREMENT AND INDUSTRIAL BASE

70. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel and Admiral Myers, in an October 2008 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA) report on the U.S. Defense 

industrial base, CSBA concluded the following: 

In stark contrast to the obvious and proactive steps being taken by DOD in an 

effort to preserve a competitive domestic shipbuilding industrial base, DOD appears 

to be taking a very laissez-faire approach to the Nation’s tactical fighter aircraft industrial base; an approach that could, if not addressed, quickly result in the loss 

of a competitive domestic tactical fighter industrial base. 

The Department of the Navy has recognized a tactical fighter shortfall of more 

than 200 aircraft in the years ahead due primarily to delays in the JSF program 

and the rapid aging of older F/A–18 aircraft. However, DOD has not indicated its 

long-term intentions when it comes to the future of the F/A–18E/F program, which 

is in the last year of its second multi-year contract. 

There can be no doubt that the F/A–18E/F is both an operational and an acquisition success story and has been cited by DOD as one of its few model programs. 

Yet, if the Navy does not procure additional F/A–18s, its tactical fighter shortfall 

will persist and the supplier base and production line will shut down. At that point, 

the Nation will be left with only one tactical fighter manufacturer. Please comment 

on the apparent inconsistencies in DOD’s management of the shipbuilding and tactical fighter industrial base issues. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. Continued procurement of F/A–18E/F 

alone will not eliminate the strike fighter shortfall. It is however, an avenue that 

continues to be assessed within current force structure and force scheduling requirements. The Navy’s option for continued F/A–18E/F procurement could be exercised 

in fiscal year 2011, without a break in Boeing’s production line capability. The point 

to be recognized is that the Department of the Navy has opportunity through PR– 

11 to continue to assess F–35B and F–35C testing, delivery and transition into the 

fleet, before critical decisions regarding further Super Hornet procurement must be 

made. This time allows leadership the opportunity to consider the assessments and 

recommendations of this summer’s QDR in order to determine the necessary balance 

between Department of Navy JSF programatics, F/A–18A–D service life extension, 

continued support to legacy aircraft, and possible additional F/A–18E/F procurement. All four avenues the Department of Navy is pursuing to manage its predicted 

strike fighter trend support multiple sectors of the Nation’s fighter production and 

supply base. 

71. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel and Admiral Myers, referring back to the 

CSBA report, do you see DOD’s approach to the tactical fighter industrial base as 

being consistent, thoughtful, long-term, and effective? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. The Department of Navy’s current strike 

fighter inventory trend is due to a combination of factors, including utilization of 

F/A–18A–D Hornets beyond their originally designed 6,000 and extended 8,000 

flight hour service life, as well as past programmatic IOC slips to JSF. Department 

of Navy has made adjustments to these realities and currently preserves the option 

through PR–11—if required—to procure additional F/A–18E/F Super Hornets beyond the current program of record quantity of 506. This has the benefit of mitigating the risk of a potential slide to JSF IOC, but also gives the Department of 

the Navy additional time to thoroughly consider and assess the ramifications of 

completing production of Super Hornets as currently planned, or opting to procure 

more should that be decided upon by Navy leadership during the QDR this summer. 

72. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel and Admiral Myers, should DOD and Congress be concerned with the loss of both design, development, and manufacturing 

skill sets and domestic competition if production of F/A–18s is terminated? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. The Department of the Navy does view 

with concern the Nation’s aviation industrial base as we neck down our hot fighter 

73 

line production to one manufacturer. We are, however, starting the analysis process 

for the next air dominance platform. The Navy will need to replace Super Hornets 

in the 2025 timeframe. What that platform will be remains to be seen, but industry 

will be gearing up to compete for that platform, which we hope will help to sustain 

the industrial base and those critical skill sets you have described. 

73. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel and Admiral Myers, in light of both an 

operational/inventory requirement (i.e., shortfall) and industrial base concerns, do 

you believe it makes sense for DOD to procure additional F/A–18E/Fs over the 

course of the next 3 to 5 years, if not longer? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. Based on this summer’s QDR, which will 

look at essential capability and required capacity that carrier aviation must provide 

in balance with other DOD requirements and priorities, different opportunities will 

be considered in resourcing the Navy’s strike fighter requirements. While the Navy 

preserves the option through PR–11—if required—to procure additional F/A–18E/F 

Super Hornets beyond the current budgeted quantity, three other complementary 

avenues are being assessed in resourcing the Department of Navy’s strike fighter 

requirements. These avenues include attaining the IOC of the Department’s JSFs 

on time (2012 F–35B and 2015 F–35C) and at planned quantities. The Department 

of Navy also continues to assess and make determinations on investing in the service life extension of up to 295 of its F/A–18A–D legacy Hornets. Finally, the Department will continue to invest in the sustainment of legacy aircraft to keep them viable throughout their increased service life. 

None of the four avenues alone solve the Department of Navy’s strike fighter requirements and each carries a unique level of financial commitment over different 

returns on investment that need to be considered with qualities of combat capability. All of the opportunities for resourcing Navy strike fighter requirements are 

interdependent and Department leadership is considering each opportunity carefully 

to achieve the necessary balance of capability and capacity as force requirements 

become evident over this summer’s review. 

74. Senator THUNE. Admiral Architzel and Admiral Myers, based on low pricing 

and projected cost savings, should DOD procure additional F/A–18s under a third 

multi-year procurement contract? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL and Admiral MYERS. Based on this summer’s QDR, which will 

look at essential capability and required capacity that carrier aviation must provide 

in balance with other DOD requirements and priorities, different opportunities will 

be considered in resourcing the Navy’s strike fighter requirements. The Navy preserves the option through PR–11, if required, to procure additional F/A–18E/F Super 

Hornets beyond the current program of record of 506. Three other complementary 

avenues are being assessed in resourcing the Department of Navy’s strike fighter 

requirements. Attaining the IOC of the Department’s JSFs on time (2012 F–35B 

and 2015 F–35C) and at planned quantities is essential. The Department of Navy 

continues to assess investing in the service life extension of up to 295 F/A–18A–D 

legacy Hornets. Finally, the Department will continue to invest in the sustainment 

of legacy aircraft to keep them viable throughout their increased service life. 

None of the four avenues alone solve the Department of Navy’s strike fighter requirements and each carries a unique level of financial commitment over different 

returns on investment that need to be considered with qualities of combat capability. All of the opportunities for resourcing Navy strike fighter requirements are 

interdependent and Department leadership is considering each opportunity carefully 

to achieve the necessary balance of capability and capacity as force requirements 

become evident over this summer’s review. 

Historically the F/A–18 multi-year programs have been the most effective means 

of procuring aircraft because they met the criteria of a multi-year (3–5 years) timeframe and provided the required ‘substantial’ savings. Should the decision to procure additional F/A–18s be made by Navy leadership during this summer’s QDR 

which meet these criteria, then we will look at all appropriate acquisition strategies 

including a potential third multi-year procurement contract. 

PROPOSED PLANS FOR F–22 RAPTOR

75. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, how troubled 

should we be about the President’s proposal to end the production of the F–22 fighter aircraft at 187, representing 183 planes currently in the fleet plus 4 sought in 

the fiscal year 2009 Supplemental? 

74 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The U.S. Air Force continuously reviews the appropriate capabilities and force mix necessary to support the National 

Defense Strategy across the full spectrum of conflict. This activity has increased attention now in the context of the QDR. Because we’re assuming a greater level of 

risk with a reduced F–22 fleet, it will be critical that the U.S. Air Force makes appropriate investments to ensure the remaining F–22 airframes are upgraded with 

increments 3.2 and 3.3 to maximize air-to-air and air-to-ground effectiveness, increase interoperability, and ensure F–22 aircraft flexibility in employment/deployment. The U.S. Air Force can also mitigate risk in the near term by investing in 

upgraded F–15C radar and weapons capabilities (e.g., infrared search and track system and APG–63(v)3 active electronically scanned array radar) to aid in achieving 

air superiority. Outside the FYDP, ensuring that an appropriate number of F–35s 

are procured to fulfill both homeland defense and expeditionary operations, as a 

complement to a reduced F–22 fleet, will also be critical. 

76. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, former Air Force 

leaders have conveyed to the Airland Subcommittee that they believe that the number of F–22s required to conduct operations in two major regional contingencies 

against adversaries capable of contesting our control of the air is 381, not even 243, 

as has been proposed by some incumbent members of Air Force leadership. Are you 

concerned that the proposed cut to this program may result in insufficient capability 

needed to support two major regional contingencies? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. With fewer F–22s, we have acknowledged that the U.S. Air Force will accept higher levels of risk in support of the current National Defense Strategy, especially when viewed in the context of time to 

achieve military objectives. We can mitigate those risks with better intelligence and 

a more flexible force. We can also ensure that our legacy platforms are upgraded 

appropriately to ensure maximum lethality and survivability, and that our pilots are 

given the tools (flight hours, training, and munitions) to retain the critical skills 

necessary to enable our battle plans. Lastly, some contingencies will require the 

unique capabilities of fifth-generation fighters—we will continue to examine the correct mix of our upcoming multi-role F–35 fleet to the reduced air-to-air F–22 fleet. 

77. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, why is the current 

F–22 program-of-record, and other available tactical fighter assets that could be 

brought to the fight, not sufficient to achieve air superiority in two major regional 

contingencies waged by relevant adversaries? What data or analysis supports your 

position? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The Air Force fighter force structure 

has been studied extensively by Major Commands and the Air Staff using campaign 

modeling tools. This body of analysis indicates that, combined with the appropriate 

legacy aircraft modernization in the near term and a successful F–35 procurement 

program for the mid- to long-term, the 187 aircraft F–22 program-of-record is sufficient to achieve air superiority at higher risk in the current National Defense Strategy of two major combat operations against relevant adversaries. 

78. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, are you aware of 

any data or analysis that supports ending the production of F–22s after 187? If so, 

please explain. 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. Extensive Air Force analysis at the 

Air Force and Joint campaign level shows that within the current force planning 

constructs, 243 F–22s represent a moderate level of risk. A smaller fleet size increases warfighting, training, and fleet sustainment risks. Any risk assumes adequate weapons availability, no change to programmed upgrades, and F–35 production remains on track. 

79. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, why shouldn’t we 

conclude that this proposal is only budget driven? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. All weapons system procurements 

are driven by budget considerations and the F–22 is no exception. As Secretary 

Donley and General Schwartz said in a April 13, 2009 Washington Post Op Ed: ‘‘We 

assessed the issue (number of F–22s) from many angles, taking into account competing strategic priorities and complementary programs and alternatives—all balanced within the context of available resources.’’ 

80. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, do you believe that 

the decision on the F–22 program has been subject to sufficient full and open deVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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bate, as one would expect of any other proposed major change to a force-sizing construct? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. As Secretary Donley and General 

Schwartz said in a April 13, 2009 Washington Post Op Ed: ‘‘We assessed the issue 

(number of F–22s) from many angles, taking into account competing strategic priorities and complementary programs and alternatives—all balanced within the context 

of available resources. These assessments have concluded that, over time, a progressively more sophisticated mix of aircraft, weapons and networking capabilities will 

enable us to produce needed combat power with fewer platforms.’’ 

81. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford, Secretary Gates has testified to this 

committee that the Air Force does not need any more F–22 Raptors and that he 

proposes to end the line at 187, the stated requirement. However, Air Force Chief 

of Staff General Schwartz has reportedly maintained that the Air Force needs 243 

F–22 Raptors to maintain air superiority. According to one report, he testified that: 

‘‘243 [F–22s] is the right number and 187 is the affordable force.’’ What is the right 

number? Why do you believe that’s the right number? 

General SHACKELFORD. The 243 F–22s would provide the Joint Force with moderate risk in accordance with Defense Planning Guidance. 187 F–22s will generate 

higher risk but is the affordable number of F–22s. These numbers are consistent 

with AF/A9 Force Structure Analysis. 

82. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford, when the Air Force talks about a strike 

fighter gap are you talking about an Air Force-only strike fighter gap or does your 

analysis capture total joint capability required for air superiority? 

General SHACKELFORD. When analyzing the capabilities required to gain and 

maintain air superiority in support of combatant commanders, total joint capability 

is considered, however, the Air Force-specific requirements are extracted from postulated joint campaign requirements. 

In light of ongoing assessments such as the QDR and its related studies, we are 

taking a close look at the projected fighter force requirements of the coming decade 

and beyond. The emerging National Defense Strategy and its attendant force planning construct will have a direct bearing on establishing the requirement for Air 

Force fighter capabilities. 

AIR FORCE CLOSE-AIR SUPPORT FOR MARINE CORPS IN THEATER

83. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford, recently, the Marine Corps requested 

approval to reprogram funds to develop and field a modified KC–130J tanker that 

will provide it with, among other things, enhanced close-air support in theater. In 

connection with that request, the Marine Corps cited an urgent need for that platform, asserting that ‘‘Marine Corps ground forces have needed, but have not benefitted from, capabilities of aircraft such as the very high demand, low density AC– 

130.’’ I interpret this to mean that the Marine Corps is saying that it has asked 

for, but not received, close-air support from the Air Force in theater. Do you agree 

with that assertion? 

General SHACKELFORD. No. The Air Force hasn’t turned down any ‘‘Request for 

Forces’’ (RFFs) to support Marines on the ground in theater. At the tactical level, 

CAS requests are prioritized and filled daily and there are no requirements we are 

aware of that haven’t been filled. Finally, Allied Forces Central Europe (NATO) 

(AFCENT) has not received any negative feedback from Marine Forces Central 

Command (MARCENT) about the lack of Air Force CAS support. The Marines, as 

well as other components, have a liaison officer (LNO) in the Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC) to coordinate requests or requirements, and maintain a current and relevant picture of the other component operations. LNOs work for their 

respective component commanders and works with the Joint Force Air Component 

Commander (JFACC) and staff. The component liaisons serve as conduits for direct 

coordination between the JFACC and their respective component commanders. The 

liaisons have the responsibility of presenting component perspectives and considerations regarding planning and executing joint air operations. 

84. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford, has the Air Force been turning down requests for forces to support marines on the ground in theater? If so, why? 

General SHACKELFORD. No. The Air Force hasn’t turned down any RFFs to support marines on the ground in theater. At the tactical level, CAS requests are 

prioritized and filled daily and there are no requirements we are aware of that 

haven’t been filled. Finally, AFCENT has not received any negative feedback from 

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MARCENT about the lack of Air Force CAS support. The Marines, as well as other 

components, have a LNO in the CAOC to coordinate requests or requirements, and 

maintain a current and relevant picture of the other component operations. LNOs 

work for their respective component commanders and works with the JFACC and 

staff. The component liaisons serve as conduits for direct coordination between the 

JFACC and their respective component commanders. The liaisons have the responsibility of presenting component perspectives and considerations regarding planning 

and executing joint air operations. 

85. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford, does the Air Force have its own closeair support capability gap? If so, how does your budget request address that gap? 

General SHACKELFORD. No, the Air Force is working extremely closely with senior 

Army and Marine Corps leadership, and we are confident we can provide today’s 

Ground Force Component Commander (GCC) with unmatched responsiveness and 

mission success. The needs of the GCC will be the centerpiece of the direct support 

concept of employment. 

From a force application perspective, the Air Force has doubled the service life 

of 233 A–10s from 8,000 hours to 16,000 hours by procuring new thick-skin wings 

to replace their aging thin-skin wings. This has extended the service life of these 

aircraft beyond 2030 when the F–35 can begin to replace them. The Air Force has 

also increased the number of joint terminal attack controllers to match the growth 

of the new modular Army to 73 Brigade Combat Teams. The Air Force has also 

added five Air Support Operation Centers, aligned them with the Army divisions, 

and merged them with the airspace control elements to provide a Joint Air-Ground 

Integration Cell. Finally, the Air Force has added additional liaisons at the Army 

corps and division level to bolster the expertise of the many new key enablers that 

have become critical to today’s close air support fight. 

In light of ongoing assessments such as the QDR and its related studies, we are 

taking a close look at the projected fighter force requirements of the coming decade 

and beyond. The emerging National Defense Strategy and its attendant force planning construct will have a direct bearing on establishing the requirement for Air 

Force fighter and attack capabilities. 

MV–22 RELIABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY

86. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, the MV–22 program had a troubled procurement history marked by delays and cost overruns, efforts by DOD to cancel the 

program, and early crashes that took the lives of good marines. The MV–22 is now 

operational and full-rate procurement is underway with 90 aircraft delivered on the 

way to a procurement goal of 360. The capabilities of the aircraft in comparison to 

the CH–46 helicopter which it replaces are a quantum-level improvement. Operational squadrons have deployed to Iraq and conditions in Afghanistan with its 

higher elevations and more dispersed units would seem to present precisely the sort 

of conditions for which the MV–22 was designed and created. What have we learned 

about the operational capabilities and reliability and sustainability of the MV–22 

during its operational deployments to Iraq? 

General TRAUTMAN. We have learned that the MV–22 is a tremendously capable 

platform. Its unprecedented speed and range are re-writing the book on assault support operations. In Iraq, our MV–22 squadrons flew almost 10,000 flight hours, carried 45,000 troops and over 2.2 million pounds of cargo, without incident or loss. 

This aircraft is a game changer, and we look forward to getting it in the hands of 

our marines in the protracted landscape of Afghanistan, where its operational characteristics are precisely what we need. 

As to reliability and maintainability, one factor is the manner in which this aircraft has been introduced. The V–22 community has flown 85 percent of its total 

flight hours since 2004, with 50 percent of its total program flight hours in the past 

2 years alone. These numbers are high in themselves; they are even more dramatic 

when one realizes that these hours have been flown in some of the world’s harshest 

environments, in a combat zone, and in response to urgent operational warfighting 

requirements. Most new aircraft—especially innovative technological advances like 

the Osprey—fly their first years at a slow and controlled rate of increasing hours, 

in a peacetime environment, and under highly controlled operational conditions. 

Like other aircraft in the early operational phase of their lifecycles, the MV–22B 

has experienced lower-than-desired reliability of some components and therefore 

higher operations and support costs, but this aircraft has experienced them in an 

acute fashion due to its early employment overseas. In effect, the operations and 

maintenance costs and reliability issues which we are addressing are compressed 

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and seem more intense because they are happening in a shorter time, to fewer airplanes, and in a harsher environment than is normal with new technology. 

With the cooperation and support of our industry partners, we are tackling these 

issues head on with aggressive logistics and support plans that will increase the durability and availability of the parts needed to raise reliability and concurrently 

lower operating costs. 

87. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, do you plan to deploy MV–22 squadrons 

to Afghanistan? 

General TRAUTMAN. Yes. We will deploy the MV–22B to Afghanistan this fall. 

88. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, how has engine life and maintainability 

in the field compared with expectations? 

General TRAUTMAN. As with any aircraft operating in harsh desert climates, the 

MV–22B’s engines have experienced lower time-on-wing than we experience when 

operating from our home bases. However, while operating in the desert, MV–22B 

engine time on wing is comparable to our legacy rotorcraft. We are working diligently with our industry partner Rolls Royce to make improvements to these engines that will raise time on wing. As to maintainability, this engines performance 

is exemplary. With the ‘‘performance-based logistics’’ contract with Rolls Royce, the 

MV–22B fleet has yet to experience a ‘‘bare firewall’’. When its time to replace an 

engine, we don’t have to wait; a new one is ready and waiting. 

89. Senator THUNE. General Trautman, MV–22 squadrons in Iraq have had maintenance provided by a ‘‘power-by-the-hour’’ contract in which the contractor is paid 

to perform maintenance. Will this contractor-performed maintenance continue and 

will adjustments be made to the contract to deal with reliability issues? 

General TRAUTMAN. The contractor is paid to provide new engines and technical 

assistance where necessary. The Marines in the squadron perform all organizational-level maintenance. We are currently working with Rolls Royce to develop a 

follow on, mid-term contract beginning in calendar year 2010 that will carry us 

through the next 5 years in a similarly based performance-based logistics contract, 

under which the vendor will perform all maintenance above the organizational level. 

With respect to engine availability, this construct has served us very well and we 

expect this will continue. However, we do want to see improvements that keep the 

engines on wing longer and ensure our costs are fair and reasonable. These improvements will continue to be made based on lessons learned in both deployed and 

continental United States-based operations. During execution of this mid-term contract, we will continue to gather the data required to determine what the long-term 

propulsion system solution for this aircraft will be. 

TACAIR BASING

90. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, how long has it 

taken the Air Force to conduct an EIS in connection with the decision to possibly 

base F–35 JSFs, gives rise to concern. So, as you might imagine, the Air Force’s recent decision to reassess the criteria it will use to select where the JSF will be 

based, and how much additional time that will require, is also disconcerting. How 

much additional time will this reassessment add to the selection process? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The enterprise-wide look (EWL) will 

not add additional time to the final decisions for F–35 basing. The EWL is being 

developed on a timeline to support near-term F–35 aircraft deliveries and will be 

used to facilitate the scoping of alternatives for the next two, anticipated EISs. 

91. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, why did the Air 

Force decide that the criteria guiding the selection of bases up to the fall of 2008 

was insufficient and needed to be reevaluated? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. Formal criteria involving a corporate 

Air Force review were not used in developing the previous ‘‘roadmap.’’ To ensure the 

Air Force did not miss potential basing opportunities, the Secretary directed the current EWL. 

Prior to fall 2008, the basing process was de-centrally executed by our Major Commands. Bringing the basing decision to the Air Force level improves the decision 

making process in two ways. First, Air Force corporate requirements can be included in the process. Second, for new weapon system basing decisions, the Air 

Force will be able to incorporate new data as the weapon system matures. 

78 

92. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, what changes do 

you expect to make to the criteria? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. F–35 basing criteria are new, and 

consequently we do not expect to change them once they are completed. The Air 

Force Senior Basing Executive Steering Group (SB–ESG) oversees the EWL to ensure an unbiased review of a full range of F–35 basing options for both operational 

and pilot training units, across all Air Force installations. The SB–ESG is working 

with both Air Combat Command and Air Education and Training Command to finish the content and framework for application of the criteria so the development of 

the criteria is open and transparent. The criteria will include consideration for, but 

is not limited to, range and airspace, weather conditions, facility capacity, noise, air 

conformity, encroachment and cost factors. 

93. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, will the criteria for 

the selection of bases for the F–35 be different for training versus operational basing? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. Yes. The criteria will be different for 

selecting operational and training bases. Within the next few weeks, the Air Force 

will brief interested congressional members on the Secretary of the Air Force-approved F–35 basing criteria. 

94. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, this decision to review the criteria has caused a delay in the study of the environmental impact of 

a stationing decision. The Air Force is already struggling to meet the statutory 

BRAC deadline at Eglin AFB for the first F–35 JSF stationing due to a challenge 

to the EIS over noise concern. At the same time, the budget request for the Air 

Force for 2010 includes funds to accelerate the purchase of F–35s. Is there a risk 

that the aircraft will arrive into the Air Force inventory before basing decisions are 

finalized and facilities are constructed? If so, how will you mitigate this risk? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The Air Force Record of Decision for 

Implementing BRAC 2005 decisions for the JSF initial joint training site at Eglin 

AFB was signed on 5 February 2009. This resulted in the decision to beddown 59 

F–35 aircraft at Eglin AFB and conduct a Supplemental EIS to analyze the potential beddown of a total of 107 F–35 aircraft. The first F–35 is scheduled to arrive 

at Eglin AFB in summer 2010 and we expect the facilities to be ready at that time. 

95. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, regarding the decision to establish a joint training base for the F–35 at Eglin AFB, will the Air Force 

meet the statutory deadline to complete the decisions of the 2005 BRAC round by 

September 15, 2011? For how many F–35s? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. The Air Force will meet the statutory 

BRAC 2005, September 15, 2011 deadline to establish a 59-aircraft F–35 JSF initial 

training site at Eglin AFB. 

96. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, will this number be 

enough to meet the total initial training requirement for the Air Force, Navy, and 

Marine Corps? If not, what alternatives are being considered? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. In accordance with the 2005 Base 

Realignment and Closure Commission report, Eglin AFB is designated as the initial 

Integrated Training Center used by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well 

as our JSF partner nations, to conduct F–35 pilot training. Even if Eglin is equipped 

with the previously planned complement of 107 F–35 aircraft, all the Services must 

pursue additional pilot training center (PTC) locations in order to accommodate pilot 

training requirements for the total Department of Defense buy of 2,443 F–35s as 

announced by Secretary Gates. If Eglin is limited to 59 F–35s, the Services will likely have to accelerate their bed down plans for additional PTC locations. 

The Air Force is conducting an EWL at F–35 basing options, to include potential 

locations for additional PTCs. Once the site survey and supplemental Environmental Impact Assessment are completed regarding the basing of additional F–35s 

at Eglin, decisions will be made by Air Force leadership on the requirements and 

timing of additional Air Force PTC locations. 

97. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, the budget request 

for 2010 includes $33 million for the first military construction project to comply 

with a 2005 directive from the previous Secretary of Defense to posture Anderson 

Air Base in Guam as a power hub for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; 

strike; and aerial refueling assets. The total cost for all facilities is estimated to exceed $1 billion. It is my understanding that no aircraft are currently planned to be 

79 

permanently stationed in these new facilities. With all the other budget constraints 

facing the Air Force and the availability of excess facilities resulting from the accelerated retirement of 250 fighter aircraft in 2010, is this plan for Guam viable and 

currently supported in the FYDP being developed as part of the 2010 budget request? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. Yes. Although the Air Force does not 

permanently base aircraft at Andersen AFB, Guam, as part of the continuing force 

posture adjustments to address worldwide requirements, the United States deploys 

forces to Guam as part of the Pacific’s theater security package. Our budget supports continued Air Force operations at Andersen AFB, posturing the Department 

to accomplish the National Defense Strategy. 

98. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Gibson, will you be reviewing this plan as part of the upcoming QDR? 

General SHACKELFORD and General GIBSON. Yes. Global posturing of U.S. forces 

is part of the charter for the QDR. The Air Force has provided inputs to the QDR 

team that continues to emphasize the strategic value of Guam in support of the U.S. 

National Defense Strategy and the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command’s goals and 

objectives. 

99. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Trautman, the Marine 

Corps has also included in the budget request for 2010 funds to carry out the first 

phase of similar military construction work on the north side of the runway at Anderson AFB to support the stationing of aviation assets. It seems to me that the 

Air Force may be investing in infrastructure projects at Anderson AFB that are duplicative to the efforts of the Marine Corps. Does the possibility exist for the Air 

Force and the Marine Corps to share hangars and support facilities? 

General SHACKELFORD. Planned facilities are tailored to meet the maintenance 

and operational throughput for the individual aircraft mission sets of each Service, 

and we do not believe there is any excess capacity in either program. The Air 

Force’s projects are for fixed-wing aircraft and the Marine Corps projects support 

predominantly rotary-wing aircraft. The Air Force projects planned for Andersen 

AFB provide the minimum facility and infrastructure requirements to provide necessary maintenance and operation capabilities to support the current and ongoing 

tanker task force, continuous bomber presence, and theater security package missions. The current and planned Air Force facilities support large airframe aircraft 

operations and maintenance already in the south side of the south runway footprint. 

Facilities identified for the Marine Air Combat Element (ACE) build-up on the 

north side of the north runway are programmed to support predominantly rotarywing aircraft. The north side of the north runway cannot support the Air Force’s 

large airframe bomber and tankers. In addition, as currently configured, the airfield 

is not large enough to support the facilities and aircraft of both the Air Force and 

Marine Corps missions should they be collocated together on the north or south side 

of either runway. 

General TRAUTMAN. While there may be some potential to share some common 

administrative facilities, the operational facilities being developed at the north ramp 

of Anderson AFB (Rotary-Wing/Tilt-Rotor squadron hangars and aviation support 

facilities) are not the types of facilities that can be shared. The hangars and aviation 

support facilities for the proposed permanently assigned tilt-rotor squadron will 

completely fill the hangar currently in design. The near continuous presence of transient rotary-wing and tilt-rotor assets will also require hangar space for maintenance and support. The aviation logistics squadron hangar requested provides core 

maintenance and supply support to the rotary-wing and tilt-rotor assets. Transient 

U.S. Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft may be able to use Air Force hangars being 

built on the South Ramp if the Air Force does not have a permanent presence in 

those facilities. 

Existing Air Force hangers are primarily fixed wing and are not compatible with 

MV–22 requirements. The Navy has one rotary-wing hanger, but it is not large 

enough to accommodate the MV–22 aircraft. 

Lastly, the Marine Corps requirements add capacity to the airfield that cannot 

be accommodated with existing facilities. More aircraft assigned to the installation 

drives the need for more parking apron and hangars. 

100. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Trautman, has the Air 

Force assessed the plans of the Marine Corps to determine whether taxpayer funds 

can be saved by consolidating requirements and efforts? 

General SHACKELFORD. Air Force infrastructure projects were programmed in advance of the decision to base Marine Corps aviation assets on Andersen AFB, are 

80 

sized to support the Air Force facility requirements, and will not have capacity or 

proximity required to support the Marine aviation requirement. Subsequently, in 

the Naval Facilities Engineering Command’s development of the Guam Joint Military Master Plan, all existing and planned Air Force and Marine infrastructure 

were assessed in terms of their ability to support the proposed Marine beddown on 

Guam and to take into account any shared use opportunities. With the exception 

of a combined air embarkation/debarkation operation planned for the south ramp 

of the south runway at Andersen AFB, the plan did not identify any other opportunities for shared use of facilities to support both Marine and Air Force aviation missions. However, we will continue to work through the joint Guam master planning 

construct to look for joint use capabilities and efficiencies. For instance, our planned 

low observable maintenance capabilities could be used by the Marine Corps if in the 

future they look to develop capabilities within their ACE complex to support

the F–35 when fielded in the Pacific. 

General TRAUTMAN. As the Marine Corps refines plans for relocating to Guam, we 

are working closely with Air Force facilities planners and the Joint Region to determine what savings can be made through consolidation and reutilization. Joint Basing guidance will be fundamental in positioning the Marine Corps on Guam in such 

a way as to maximize use of existing facilities and services. 

101. Senator THUNE. General Shackelford and General Trautman, once this is 

done, can you provide a review of that assessment and the reasons for the duplicative request for military construction funds? 

General SHACKELFORD. We do not believe the fiscal year 2010 budget requests are 

duplicative as the programmed projects provide the necessary infrastructure and efficient operational construct to support the very different operational mission set requirements for the Air Force and the Marine Corps. 

General TRAUTMAN. We continue to look at ways to reduce costs on AAFB. However, at this time, we do not foresee any duplicative military construction being programmed. 

[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

(81) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2010 

TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

ARMY MODERNIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS PROGRAM 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in room 

SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph I. 

Lieberman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Inhofe, and 

Thune. 

Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken, professional 

staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff member present: Paul C. Hutton IV, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Brian F. Sebold and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Gerald Thomas, assistant to Senator 

Burris; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; and 

Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The subcommittee will come to order. Good 

afternoon. We particularly welcome General Chiarelli and General 

Thompson. We meet this afternoon for what is our final hearing 

prior to the markup by the Senate Armed Services Committee next 

week of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2010. 

Today’s topic, which is Army modernization, merits particular 

concern because of the many changes that are underway to reorient 

and restructure our national defenses. There are three particular 

challenges we face today as this subcommittee attempts to carry 

out our responsibility to conduct oversight. 

First, Secretary Gates has announced and the fiscal year 2010 

Army budget implements major program changes that restructure 

the Future Combat Systems (FCS), limit the Army’s structural 

growth to 45 instead of 48 combat brigades, start a new ground 

82 

combat vehicle (GCV) program, and direct the integration of mineresistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles into the Army’s force 

structure. 

These changes are reflected in the fiscal year 2010 budget request, but in a manner that I would say is incomplete. The implementation of these decisions will require detailed analysis and 

planning, prioritization, and resource alignment, none of which has 

been done yet. That’s why I hope our witnesses can help us understand the risks that are faced by the Army’s modernization program in the absence of such analysis. 

Second, the fiscal year 2010 Army budget request does not include long-range investment plans ordinarily provided in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). This is not unusual, of 

course, in the first year of a new administration, but it does make 

our subcommittee’s work in Army modernization oversight that 

much more difficult. 

Finally, Secretary Gates has stated that additional major decisions for the fiscal year 2011 budget request are contingent upon 

the conclusions of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 

QDR is not required until February 2010. However, we understand 

that initial insights will be available to Army budget planners as 

early as the end of July, with final budget guidance by the end of 

September. 

Even as they await this guidance, we hope that our witnesses 

this afternoon will discuss to the extent that they’re able longrange modernization plans for the Army, especially for those programs that may be at risk of reduction or restructuring. 

We have two excellent panels of witnesses: the first, General 

Peter Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; and Lieutenant 

General Ross Thompson, the Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, and 

Director of Acquisition Career Management. 

He has a much longer title than you do, General Chiarelli, but 

I know you’re Vice Chief. 

The second panel, immediately following, will include witnesses 

from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics. That panel we will ask to examine the management history of the FCS program and the lessons that we may learn from 

it as we go forward with the Army to future modernization. I look 

forward to the hearing. 

Senator Thune. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN THUNE 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in 

welcoming General Chiarelli and Lieutenant General Thompson 

back to the committee and thank them for their long and distinguished service to our Nation. Modernizing the Army is necessary 

to preserve our technological edge over potential adversaries, deliver better protection for our soldiers, and provide our men and 

women in uniform with improved capabilities to accomplish their 

mission. 

The success or failure of our efforts to modernize and transform 

the force of the future rests on decisions proposed, discussed, and 

83 

implemented today. There is concern among members of the committee, which you will hear, regarding the recent history of Army 

modernization efforts. The challenge of delivering capability amidst 

unrelenting technological change and shifting requirements is indeed a difficult one. We are eager to understand the Army’s vision 

for the future and the strategy to achieve it. 

Last month Secretary Geren and General Casey testified that, 

while the Army remains the best led, trained, and equipped army 

in the world, it is out of balance. General Casey outlined for us his 

plan to bring the Army into balance and he emphasized four imperatives: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. 

The committee has heard testimony from inside and outside the 

Army this year on each of General Casey’s imperatives, and today 

we hope to explore more closely the Army’s plan for transformation 

and modernization. An area of special interest is the uncertain future of the Army’s recently restructured FCS. This multi-year, 

multi-billion dollar program was at the core of the Army’s weapons 

modernization efforts and its successor programs will comprise a 

significant portion of the Army’s research, development, and acquisition program. 

The witnesses will be asked about the way forward in light of restructuring, the implications to current and future planning, and 

continuing technical challenges associated with a networked battlefield. 

Also, the witnesses will be asked how the modernization program 

will meet Army Reserve and National Guard requirements, about 

progress toward resetting all components of the Army, how Army 

transformation plans will impact future requirements for strategic 

and tactical mobility, about the Army’s aviation requirement, the 

proper mix of vehicles in the tactical wheeled fleet, including 

MRAP vehicles, and what type of future vehicle and weapons programs will meet the Army’s needs to conduct full spectrum operations in hybrid warfare. 

In closing, I’d like to emphasize that, while the focus of this hearing may be the weapons systems and processes that support the 

soldier, the center of gravity has and always will be the soldiers 

themselves. Our thanks and gratitude extends to all servicemembers at home and overseas and the families that support them. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening the hearing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Thune. 

Without further ado, General Chiarelli, thank you for being here. 

Thank you for your extraordinary service to our country, and we 

would welcome your testimony now. 

STATEMENT OF GEN PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF 

OF STAFF OF THE ARMY 

General CHIARELLI. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thune, distinguished members of the subcommittee: I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss Army modernization and 

the management of the FCS program in view of the fiscal year 

2010 budget request. This is my first occasion to appear before this 

esteemed subcommittee and I pledge to always provide you with an 

honest and forthright assessment and my best military advice as 

84 

requested. I have submitted a statement for the record and I look 

forward to answering your questions at the conclusion of opening 

remarks. 

As all of you know, it’s been a busy time for our Nation’s military. We are at war, and we have been at war for the past 7-plus 

years. Since the very beginning, this conflict has been in many 

ways different and more complex than past wars. We are dealing 

with less clearly defined and highly savvy adversaries in two theaters. In fact, the only thing we can know for certain in this new 

strategic environment is that the enemy will purposely go where 

we are not. 

Therefore, in order to stay ahead of the threat and to ensure 

there are forces prepared and capable to respond to any contingency, we have consistently made improvements and adjustments 

to our capabilities based upon lessons learned. In every aspect of 

the Army’s modernization strategy, our purpose is to improve soldier survivability and ensure they’re able to maintain a decisive advantage over whatever enemy they face. We are adamant, and I 

know the members of this esteemed subcommittee are equally adamant, that we never want to send our soldiers into a fair fight. 

The Army is currently transitioning to a brigade combat team 

(BCT) modernization strategy focused on building a versatile mix 

of networked BCTs and enablers so we can leverage mobility, protection, information, intelligence, and precision fires in order to 

more effectively operate across the full spectrum of conflict. 

As you all are aware, on April 6, 2009, Secretary Gates recommended the cancellation of the Manned Ground Vehicle (MGV) 

portion of FCS. The Army now is moving forward to analyze operational requirements and lessons learned from 7-plus years of war 

to develop the GCV as a critical capability for the BCT modernization. 

Understandably, this platform has received much of the attention 

and focus in recent days following the Secretary’s recommendation 

and the release of the President’s fiscal year 2010 defense budget. 

Some are of the belief that a majority of the money previously allocated for FCS now should be reallocated elsewhere pending the 

cancellation of the MGV. With all due respect, I must strongly disagree with this position. While the platform was a key piece of FCS 

modernization strategy, I believe the most critical component of the 

new BCT modernization strategy is the network, and I am concerned that cancellation of the MGV has been misunderstood by 

some to mean cancellation of all things FCS, to include the network. 

Today the situation on the battlefield is increasingly complex. Information is collected and shared by various systems across the 

battle space, including platforms, sensors, computers, radios, transmitters, and satellites. In the Army’s new BCT modernization 

strategy, the network will serve as the hub for all these separate 

nodes, connecting leaders and soldiers at all levels and at every 

echelon of command in every formation—Infantry BCTs, Heavy 

BCTs, Stryker BCTs, and ultimately even across the interagency— 

with the right information quickly and seamlessly. 

Simply put, the network is the centerpiece of the Army’s modernization efforts and any shortfall in funding will put that effort 

85 

at risk. I assure the members of this subcommittee that the Army’s 

senior leaders are focused on the Army’s total modernization efforts 

and the management of the FCS program, and we will continue to 

coordinate with senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials and 

Congress to identify the best possible solutions in order to ensure 

we never send our soldiers into a fair fight. 

In conclusion, on behalf of over 1.1 million soldiers serving in the 

Army today, I respectfully request your support of DOD’s fiscal 

year 2010 budget, a budget that in its entirety reflects the resources required to grow the network, field early spinout technologies to BCTs on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, and restart our development of the next GCV. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you again 

for your continued generous support and demonstrated commitment to the outstanding men and women of the United States 

Army and their families. I look forward to your questions. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, General Chiarelli. 

General Thompson. 

STATEMENT OF LTG N. ROSS THOMPSON III, USA, MILITARY 

DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR 

ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY, AND DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION CAREER MANAGEMENT 

General THOMPSON. Chairman Lieberman, Senator Thune, and 

distinguished members of the Airland Subcommittee: I want to 

thank you for this opportunity to discuss Army modernization and 

management of the FCS program in view of the fiscal year 2010 

annual budget. 

With all of our programs and our funding requests, the Army’s 

highest priority remains the protection of our warfighters in an 

operational environment that is increasingly ambiguous, unpredictable, and dangerous. Force protection has taken on an even greater 

importance as we shift major operations from Iraq to Afghanistan. 

We are grateful to the members of this subcommittee for your guidance and your steadfast support. We continue to meet the equipping demands of our soldiers in ongoing overseas contingency operations and in other operations worldwide because of the resources 

and guidance provided by this subcommittee and Congress. We 

constantly strive to be good stewards of those resources. 

The Army’s comprehensive modernization program is the key to 

ensuring that our soldiers maintain a decisive advantage over a diverse array of potential adversaries while continuously improving 

their survivability. In every aspect of our Army modernization programs we leverage lessons learned from soldiers in the current 

fight, speed fielding of enhanced capabilities to the force, and concurrently develop capabilities soldiers will need both today and tomorrow. 

As General Chiarelli stated, our modernization strategy is focused on building a versatile mix of networked BCTs. The most 

critical component of the new BCT modernization strategy is the 

network. By growing the network in regular increments, we will 

provide our soldiers and their leaders with a continually enhanced 

common operating picture of the battle space, which is a significant 

advantage in combat. 

86 

The Army and DOD remain committed to the requirement for a 

manned armed scout helicopter capability and in the need to deliver this capability to our soldiers in a responsible and timely 

manner. 

We are also committed to extending spinouts of our critical warproven enablers to all of our BCTs and working with the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress to field the new combat vehicle as expeditiously as possible, a capability that is long 

overdue. 

In all areas of future commitments, we are planning for continued development of systems and technologies to ensure that our 

soldiers maintain a decisive advantage over potential adversaries. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, your deep and 

abiding commitment to our men and women in uniform is widely 

recognized throughout our ranks. We thank you for your continued 

support of the outstanding men and women of the United States 

Army and their families, as well as your support of the fiscal year 

2010 budget. 

This concludes my opening remarks, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Chiarelli and Lieutenant General Thompson follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, AND LTG N. ROSS

THOMPSON III, USA 

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Thune, distinguished members of the 

Airland Subcommittee. We thank you for the opportunity to discuss Army Modernization and management of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program in view 

of the fiscal year 2010 annual budget and Overseas Contingency Operations supplemental requests. On behalf of Army Secretary, the Honorable Pete Geren and our 

Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey, we would also like to take this opportunity to thank you for your continued, strong support and demonstrated commitment to our soldiers, Army civilians, and family members. 

As all of you know, it has been a busy time for our Nation’s military. We are at 

war; we have been at war for the past 7-plus years, and that has undeniably put 

a strain on our people and equipment. We have had our share of good and bad experiences; and, we are continually making adjustments and improvements to our tactics, training, and equipment based upon the lessons learned. 

Since the very beginning, this war has been in many ways different and more 

complex than past wars. We are dealing with less clearly defined and highly savvy 

adversaries in two theaters. In this new strategic environment, the only thing we 

can know for certain is that the enemy will purposely go where we are not. 

Therefore, we must ensure that our Force is prepared and capable to respond to 

any contingency. As Secretary Gates has said, ‘‘In all, we have to be prepared for 

the wars we are most likely to fight, not just the wars we’ve traditionally been best 

suited to fight or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries who also have 

limited resources.’’ 

In recent years, in order to remain dominant we have had to simultaneously and 

swiftly adapt our doctrine and organizational structure to effectively span the 

breadth of operational environments. It’s all part of a changing strategy we refer 

to in the Army as Full Spectrum Operations (FSO). 

The centerpiece of our efforts has been a shift to a modular construct focused at 

the brigade level that has greatly enhanced our ability to respond to any situation, 

quickly and effectively. We.ve also made corresponding changes to our Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E); and, we’ve expanded our capability by adding 

Civil Affairs, MPs, Special Forces, and other enablers. 

MODERNIZATION

The adage that ‘‘we never want to send our soldiers into a fair fight’’ is at the 

core of the Army Modernization Strategy. Modernization is the key to ensuring our 

soldiers maintain a decisive advantage over whatever enemy they face, while imVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
87 

proving their survivability. We are pursuing a strategy that rapidly fields equipment to the current force; upgrades equipment for soldiers going into combat and 

modernizes select systems; spins-out technologies; and modernizes Brigade Combat 

Teams (BCTs). In every aspect of modernization, we leverage lessons learned from 

soldiers in the current fight to speed fielding of enhanced capabilities to the force, 

and concurrently develop capabilities soldiers need today. 

We are transitioning immediately from a FCS BCT Strategy to a BCT Modernization Strategy. With respect to the FCS program, the fiscal year 2010 President’s 

budget calls for us to: (1) accelerate fielding of spin-outs to all 73 BCTs starting in 

fiscal year 2011; (2) halt the development and procurement of FCS manned ground 

vehicles; and (3) halt the development and procurement of the Non-Line-of-SightCannon. 

We will move from a modernization strategy focused on fielding 15 FCS BCTs and 

spin-outs of FCS systems, as mentioned earlier, to a BCT modernization strategy 

focused on building a versatile mix of networked BCTs and enablers that can leverage mobility, protection, information, precision intelligence and fires to conduct effective FSO across the spectrum of conflict. Such an approach will enable soldiers 

to receive key ‘‘high-payoff’’ systems that are quickly integrated into BCTs. 

This BCT modernization strategy will continue to integrate valuable technological 

and network advances developed over the course of this war (e.g., Ground Soldier 

Ensemble, WIN–T, remote sensors), including those drawn from R&D for the FCS 

program into our modular formations to enhance their full spectrum capabilities. 

To assist us in this regard, the Army recently conducted an after action review 

of the FCS program’s development and acquisition strategy. The valuable information gathered will assist us in our work to develop a ground combat vehicle concept 

that incorporates the lessons of the past 7 years at war and the technological advances from the FCS program. 

An Office of the Secretary of Defense Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) 

is forthcoming that will provide the detailed guidance for the program going forward. The Army plans to halt the current FCS program after the ADM is signed 

and capture the results from the May 2009 System of Systems Preliminary Design 

Review. We plan to field a new ground combat vehicle in 5 to 7 years. 

With regard to existing vehicle upgrades, the Army’s combat platform modernization program is focused on standardizing our Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) 

sets with two variants of the Abrams tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System, two of the Army’s highest priority combat vehicle recapitalization programs, 

along with the supporting fire support modernization with the Paladin (PIM). This 

program will modernize all HBCTs (both Active and Army National Guard), the 3rd 

ACR, Army Prepositioned Stocks, and the Institutional Training Base. 

At present, the Army has nearly completed fielding modularized HBCTs, which 

gives every brigade a common structure. The short-term modernization goal is to 

populate these brigades with only two variants of the Abrams and the Bradley— 

the Abrams M1A2SEPv2 (System Enhancement Package) is being paired with its 

partner the Bradley M2A3 and the Abrams M1A1AIM SA (Abrams Integrated Management Situational Awareness) is being teamed with the Bradley M2A2ODS SA 

(Operation Desert Storm Situational Awareness). This modernization plan aligns 

compatible combat platforms with common modular formations. 

Stryker has planned procurement of 3,616 vehicles with 2,765 having been accepted to date. The Stryker program received a Full Rate Production decision on 8 of 

10 configuration variants, including the Infantry Carrier Vehicle, Reconnaissance 

Vehicle, Commander Vehicle, Mortar Carrier Vehicle, Fire Support Vehicle, Antitank Guided Missile Vehicle, Engineer Squad Vehicle, and Medical Evacuation Vehicle. The remaining variants—the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle and the Mobile Gun System—are in Limited Rate Production. 

The Secretary of Defense authorized, and the Army has funded, the procurement 

and fielding of seven Stryker BCTs to fulfill national security requirements. This 

will equip seven brigade-size units including maintenance floats, a strategic pool of 

ready-to-fight systems, Institutional Training Base, Test Articles, a Depot Repair 

Cycle Float Pool managed by the U.S. Army Materiel Command, other operational 

requirements, Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicles to fill nonStryker BCT armored Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear requirements, 

and vehicles to support theater operations in Afghanistan. 

The M113 Family of Vehicles (FOV) program was terminated in June 2007. At 

present, we have approximately 6,000 vehicles in our inventory that fill several mission roles including fire support, command and control, medical, chemical, mobility/ 

counter mobility, and others. The Army Ground Vehicle Modernization Strategy, 

coupled with force structure and force mix analysis will determine the long term replacement strategy for the M113 FOVs. 

88 

With regard to tactical radio procurement, the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 

is a Department of Defense (DOD) initiative to develop a family of software-programmable tactical radios that provide mobile, interoperable, and networked voice, 

data and video communications at the tactical edge of the battlefield. For the Army, 

JTRS will initially provide a tactical radio communications network for Spin Outs 

as well as Infantry, Heavy, and Stryker BCTs by providing the tactical networking 

transport capability through scalable and modular networked communications. It 

will also provide the current force a mobile, ad hoc networking capability using, new 

advanced waveforms—Soldier Radio Waveform and Wideband Networking Waveform. 

The majority of the radios in the Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) Program and the 

Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Fit Program (HMS) will be procured for the 

Army. GMR will provide the Army a multi-channel (up to four channels) operation, 

allowing full functionality of each legacy radio it replaces. In addition, GMR will include an integrated global positioning system (GPS) capability based on the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module-based GPS receiver with a Precise Time and 

Time Interval output. 

HMS will provide a Scalable and modular Software Communications Architecture 

compliant networked radio frequency communication capability to meet Army 

Handheld, Manpack (Mounted & Dismounted) and Embedded Radio requirements. 

The program will deliver a Handheld (2 Channel) radio, a Manpack (2 Channel) 

radio, and various Small Form Fit radios for various ground sensors/unattended vehicles/unmanned air vehicles. 

Warfighter Information Network—Tactical (WIN–T) is the transformational command and control communications system that provides the backbone wide area tactical network at echelons from theater through company in support of full spectrum 

operations. Following the program’s restructure in 2007, the Army plans to field the 

latest networking capability to our soldiers in four increments, as advanced technologies for enhanced communications becomes available. At present, the Army has 

already fielded Increment 1 to more than 50 percent of the total force giving our 

soldiers a communications network that is largely satellite based, allowing for beyond line-of-sight communications and commercial Internet networking technology. 

Increment 2 brings initial networking on-the-move capabilities embedded in various platforms to allow a fully operational and connected communications networking capability for our soldiers (from brigade down to the company level). Increment 2 features include commercial routers, radios, and antennas that are technologically mature, with waveform technology optimized for high-capacity broadband 

networking and support that enables high throughput while the unit is on-the-move. 

Increment 2 is expected to achieve a low rate initial production decision this August, 

with fielding expected to begin in 2011. Increment 2 is expected to achieve a lowrate initial production decision this October, with fielding expected to begin in 2012. 

Increment 3 capabilities bring the full on-the-move capabilities that feature a single radio combining the line-of-sight and the satellite waveforms from Increment 2 

in a military chassis which includes Global Broadcast Service receive capability. Airtier development work planned under this increment brings even more robust communications, providing three tiers of communications that result in less reliance on 

satellite communications. Network Operations will continue to develop in both Increments 2 and 3 to achieve a fully integrated capability for planning, initializing, 

operating, and managing the entire on-the-move network. 

WIN–T Increment 4 represents the last of the developmental program elements 

and will provide technology insertions to enable enhanced satellite communications 

protection. 

With regard to Army Aviation, it has been 5 years since the Army, with the support of Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, terminated the Comanche helicopter program to allow modernization of the entire Army Aviation fleet. In 

just those few years, we have seen steady and substantial progress. Today, 9 of the 

13 systems identified for funding at Comanche termination are in production. By 

fiscal year 2011, we will have started fielding all the aircraft programs, except the 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. That means 69 percent of all these programs are 

in some form of production today—low, initial, or full rate production, with 54 percent in full rate production. 

These programs will contribute directly to overseas contingency operations by priority fielding to units preparing to deploy to combat operations or currently deployed 

in support of combat operations. We want to emphasize that every one of these programs will be fielded to units next in rotation to the warfight or units now supporting the warfight. Currently operating in combat operations are the CH–47F and 

UH–60M helicopters, the Sky Warrior Alpha, Sky Warrior Block . . ., and Raven 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a pre-production variant of the Micro Air Vehicle 

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spun out of the FCS program. The Light Utility Helicopter has enabled the return 

of UH–60s to the warfighting fleet and has allowed retirement of UH–1 and OH– 

58s in both the active and Reserve Components. 

The UH–60 Black Hawk is the work horse of Army Aviation. The current UH– 

60 fleet is comprised of 1,748 aircraft, including 951 UH–60As (produced between 

1978 and 1989), 689 UH–60Ls (produced since 1989) and 108 new UH–60Ms. The 

Black Hawk helicopter is in its 32nd year of production. To date, the Army has employed seven multi-year, multiservice production contracts. The current contract extends from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2011 and includes Navy H–60 aircraft, as 

well as Foreign Military Sales aircraft. 

The ongoing UH–60A to UH–60L recapitalization program extends the service life 

of the Black Hawk program while providing the improved capability and safety margin of the UH–60L. The Army plans to induct 38 aircraft in fiscal year 2009 and 

228 aircraft between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2015. 

The UH–60M program incorporates a digitized cockpit for improved combat situational awareness, lift, range, and handling characteristics for enhanced maneuverability and safety. These improvements also extend the service life of the aircraft. 

Additionally, the Army has a Common Engine Program shared by the UH–60 

Blackhawk and AH–64 Apache fleets. 

The Army and DOD remain committed to the requirement for a manned Armed 

Scout Helicopter (ASH) capability and the need to deliver this capability to our Soldiers in a responsible and timely manner. 

As a capability bridging strategy, the Secretary of the Army approved a strategy 

to maintain the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) funds within Army aviation and redistribute them into three primary efforts: (1) sustaining and improving 

the OH–58D Kiowa Warrior; (2) modernizing the Army National Guard (ARNG) 

AH–64A Apache fleet; and (3) conducting a competition for and procuring the capabilities associated with the future ASH. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and 

the Army Acquisition Executive jointly signed a Memorandum for the Record codifying this strategy. 

To support the potential procurement effort, the Army is conducting a bottom-up 

review of the armed reconnaissance capability requirement to include a thorough assessment of the specific requirements identified for the initial ARH program, as well 

as initiating a formal ‘‘Analysis of Alternatives.’’ The analysis will cover the entire 

spectrum of options—from the potential use of UAVs to the use of a manned/unmanned aircraft mix to the procurement of a new manned platform. 

Due to the time required to complete these assessments, the Army is currently 

evaluating what additional enhancements and life extension work, if any, will be required to continue to safely sustain the Kiowa Warrior fleet until a replacement is 

procured. 

The U.S. Army Audit Agency completed an official after action review to identify 

lessons learned from the termination of the ARH program. The results are being 

evaluated for assimilation into Army acquisition programs and for use in developing 

an acquisition strategy to meet the manned ARH requirement. 

MODERNIZATION OF OUR RESERVE COMPONENT

Similarly, the ARNG has seen an increase in capabilities through modernization. 

For instance, the UH–1 Huey has long been a work horse of the ARNG. Now, with 

the increased numbers of Black Hawk and fielding of the new Light Utility Helicopter, the last Huey is expected to leave the ARNG by the end of fiscal year 2009. 

Another example is the famous ‘‘deuce and a half,’’ or 21⁄2 ton truck, which has been 

used for decades by the ARNG for a variety of cargo missions. In 2001, the ARNG 

had 16,504, or 62 percent, of these vehicles in the Army. We anticipate that the last 

21⁄2 ton truck will leave the ARNG by fiscal year 2011. 

ACHIEVING TRANSPARENCY

In addition, the Army is diligently working towards transparency. Transparency 

is the process that provides accountability and traceability of a specific piece of 

equipment, from budget submission through funding authorization and on to procurement and delivery to Army users. One would think that this would be a fairly 

straightforward task; it is not. Today, we have individual financial and acquisition 

systems built to control and track funding and contracted amounts. Further, we 

have property accountability systems designed to keep track of property, but are not 

linked to the funding source. The gaps between these disparate systems are wide 

and difficult to link. However, we are on a deliberate path to obtain full transparency. Right now, the Army is collecting data manually and through selected systems to gather the needed information. Our first full set of data is expected to be 

90 

prepared by July 2009. For the long-term, we will adjust automation systems and 

adapt processes to support transparency reporting. The Army is fully committed to 

mastering the challenge of achieving full transparency in the equipping process. 

CLOSING

The Army’s Modernization program is providing our soldiers with leading-edge 

technologies and advanced capabilities to fight the wars we are engaged in today, 

while simultaneously preparing them for future threats. The BCT modernization 

strategy we are moving to will incorporate valuable technological and network advances, developed using lessons learned from the experiences of the past 7-plus 

years of war, into our modular formations. This strategy will significantly enhance 

the full spectrum capability of our Force. 

As we continue this process, we will coordinate with senior DOD officials and Congress to identify both short- and long-term solutions. Your input will continue to be 

very valuable to us. We know that all of you are equally committed to ensuring that 

‘‘we never send our soldiers into a fair fight.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we thank you again for your continued 

and generous support of the outstanding men and women of the United States Army 

and their families. We look forward to your questions. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, General Thompson. 

We’ll have 7-minute rounds of questions. 

Let me say to both of you, who have graciously thanked the subcommittee for our support of the men and women in uniform, in 

the Army in this case particularly, I’m sure I speak for my colleagues here in saying that really it’s our honor, let alone our responsibility, to give whatever support we can to the men and 

women in our armed services, in this case particularly the Army. 

To say that the service of the personnel of the Army has been extraordinary, whatever the phrase is, it seems to me that this is the 

next greatest generation in service of our country, who have been 

drawn into a battle that in many ways its details were hard to 

foresee. With extraordinary leadership, such as represented at the 

table before us, the Army has transformed itself by personal skill, 

courage, and characteristically American goodwill and compassion, 

and has succeeded in Iraq and is on the road to success. Now I 

think I’m confident we’ll turn things around in Afghanistan in a 

way that’s really historic and very consequential for our country. 

So you evoked that by saying thank you. We don’t deserve any 

thanks when I think about what you all are doing. 

Speaking about the service of our troops, General Chiarelli, this 

is about the Army modernization program, but you’ve really given 

great leadership in a host of areas, including as an advocate for 

Army personnel, which ultimately is what the Army is all about. 

There are a lot of us on this committee who are concerned that the 

end strength of the Army now, the statutory end strength, is inadequate to the moment. 

While we talk about a lot of different programs for reducing 

stress on our Army personnel, perhaps the best thing we can do is 

to make sure there are more of them, so that the dwell time they 

have between tours of deployed duty increases instead of decreases. 

I wanted you to know that there will be a serious effort in this subcommittee, I’ve been working with Senator Thune on this and others—as there has been, I noticed, in the House this week, to increase the authorized end strength of the Army by 30,000. 

Do you have a reaction to that? 

General CHIARELLI. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I’m in complete 

agreement with your analysis. As the ranking member said also, 

91 

soldiers are at the heart of our formation. We have this constant 

balancing act between things like modernization and soldiers, because soldiers cost money. At the same time, I’m concerned with 

dwell time and I know that individual dwell is less than unit dwell. 

We have finally been able to model that and show that, and it has 

tremendous significance. 

As I have worked with the Secretary of the Army on suicide prevention and realized this is more about the wellness of the entire 

force and its families, I have come to the point to believe the Army 

is stressed and there may be a requirement for us to have a temporary authorization of additional soldiers to fill some of the holes 

we have in our formations and to take the stress off the force in 

what is going to be a critical 12- to 18-month period. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you for that statement. That’s exactly the terms in which we’re seeing it, which is as a temporary 

increase, because, as General Casey said to us when he testified before the full committee, this dwell time and stress is really a matter of supply and demand. How many troops do we have to supply 

and what’s the demand? We know for a fact that we’re going to be 

increasing our presence in Afghanistan and not drawing down our 

presence in Iraq immediately. So that will mean in the short term 

there will actually be more people deployed, a higher demand. 

To help you increase the dwell time and reduce the stress on individual soldiers—as you said, very important distinction—we’re 

going to work to increase the authorization by 30,000 and hope 

that together we can find the money for the chief and you to do 

that as circumstances require. 

Let me go on to ask you an overall general question on our Army 

modernization. As you look back over the last decade or so, there 

have been a lot of changes in plans and investment priorities and 

even titles, names. We’ve gone from Digitization to Force XXI to 

Army After Next to Interim Force to Objective Force to FCS and 

Modularity. 

I understand that part of this is obviously a reflection of changes 

in the battle. I remember General Shinseki said at one point that 

his aim was to see us get to a stable modernization strategy in 

which there was irreversible momentum in favor of that strategy. 

I wanted to ask you if you’d comment on, as you look back over 

the last 10 years, whether there were too many changes in modernization strategy of the Army and where you see this focus going 

in the chapter ahead of us. 

General CHIARELLI. A majority of the last 10 years for me have 

been spent in the operational Army, deployed with combat forces. 

I watched us over a 3-year period in Iraq move from soft-skinned 

Humvees up to Humvees with frag kit 5 and now today to the 

MRAP vehicle, and thought, thank goodness, we were able to go 

ahead and make those kinds of modernization leaps forward to protect our soldiers. 

I’d just like to remind everyone that the MGV was a portion of 

the FCS program. FCS is spinouts, and we have now spinouts for 

73 brigades. That’s what we’re looking at over time. It is that network, and that network is the key and critical piece that’s going 

to pull this whole thing together and provide that soldier in combat 

the information he needs when he needs it to survive in the fight. 

92 

We are very pleased with the Secretary of Defense’s commitment 

to an Army modernization plan and to a GCV. The chief and the 

Secretary of the Army have charged us with moving ahead rapidly 

and fielding something to our forces, fielding that vehicle within 

the next 5 to 7 years. We are well into the planning to do that right 

now. 

We held a very successful blue ribbon symposium yesterday at 

National Defense University, where we brought in people from 

OSD, from the building, from the think tanks, to get their ideas on 

where we should go. But we are committed to this in a 5- to 7-year 

period. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate your answer. I take from that 

you support the changes in the FCS program as recommended by 

Secretary Gates and ultimately the President. I take it that, based 

on your opening statement, you feel that the most important part 

of FCS, which is the networking capability, is being preserved. 

General CHIARELLI. We must preserve the network, and we must 

preserve what we need to move ourselves to a GCV in a 5- to 7- 

year timeframe. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So we obviously need a new GCV, whether 

we call it MGV or GCV. I know that there’s been a pledge that the 

funding will be preserved to transition to the new GCV. Are you 

worried about the fact that the pots of money that are left unspent 

in short order tend to be very attractive to Members of Congress? 

General CHIARELLI. I support the President’s budget. The President’s budget will get us to where we need to be, and we are hoping that we will not see that money taken away. That money is 

made available to move ahead. We think that’s absolutely critical. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask one final question on this topic 

about ground vehicles. We’ve invested a lot of money, appropriately 

so, and bought a lot of MRAP vehicles to deal with the situation 

our troops were facing in Iraq and now in Afghanistan. What’s the 

role of that particular ground vehicle over the next 5 or 10 years 

or beyond? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army is committed to integrating the 

MRAP vehicles into our formation. General Dempsey is working 

that right now. The MRAP vehicle has saved arms, legs, and lives, 

and I hope one day to be able to show exactly how many it has. 

It’s an absolutely amazing vehicle. 

But it cannot be integrated everywhere in our formation. I know 

you know that there are 16,000 MRAP vehicles, but 200,000 vehicles in the Army inventory. So MRAP vehicles today represent 8 

percent of the total vehicles in the United States Army. They will 

be integrated into our formations, but in places where that vehicle 

is in fact most suited. 

One of the things that came out of our blue ribbon symposium 

yesterday was noncommissioned officers who told us that carrying 

infantry around in an MRAP vehicle is fine and it protects them, 

but they have to wait 9 seconds from the time somebody pushes the 

button to the ramp coming down. They feel very vulnerable in that 

vehicle as that ramp slowly comes down. So it’s those kinds of 

things that make the MRAP vehicles better suited for certain 

places in our formation, and I know General Dempsey and U.S. 

93 

Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) are working to 

determine that now with our force and vehicle mix. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Of course, the MRAP vehicles play a very 

different role or have a different function than either the MGV or 

the oncoming GCV, correct? 

General CHIARELLI. That’s correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to come back to the chairman’s last question there. DOD 

I understand is currently selecting a scaled-down MRAP vehicle 

which by way of greater off-road mobility would be suited for use 

in Afghanistan. I understand that at least 4,500 of these MRAP all 

terrain vehicles (ATVs) would be required for use in theater, mostly 

belonging to the Army. 

The Army has not outlined whether or not or how they plan to 

institutionalize the capability of the thousands of already fielded 

MRAP vehicles. So General Chiarelli, I guess my question would 

be, what does the Army intend to do with the MRAP vehicles that 

are ill-suited for Afghanistan as troops are redeployed from Iraq? 

General CHIARELLI. Senator, we brought some home. We’re using 

them in the training base. As I indicated before, we will, in fact, 

integrate those into our formations in the place they’re best suited. 

We are very, very happy with the MRAP ATV. We think that is 

a great step forward. We’re also very happy that many of the 

MRAP vehicles, the old MRAP vehicles that don’t have the independent off-road suspension, can be retrofitted for that off-road suspension. We expect to do some of that in theater, both the U.S. 

Army and the Marine Corps. 

I think, Ross, you have some information on that. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. One of the things that we’re doing 

with one of the variants of MRAP vehicles that already exist today 

before we go forward with the source selection decision, which is 

within the next several weeks, on the MRAP ATV is to take the 

suspension system that goes with the medium truck for the Marine 

Corps and retrofit some of the existing MRAP vehicles so we get 

that off-road capability to be able to use in Afghanistan and incorporate those vehicles, as well as the MRAP ATVs once we start to 

produce those by the end of the summer and begin fielding them 

in the fall, is the current plan. 

Senator THUNE. Is the Army experiencing other shortfalls in 

other areas when it comes to equipment and trying to meet some 

of the changing dynamics of operations in Afghanistan relative to 

what we’ve been dealing with in Iraq? The MRAP vehicle is a good 

example of how you have to adapt that vehicle, either through retrofitting it or coming up with a new model. Is the Army facing any 

other of those types of issues with regard to the conditions in Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. In fact, one of our main efforts is lightening 

the load for the soldier. We have a brigade out of the 4th Infantry 

Division coming out of Fort Carson that’ll be going into country I 

believe this month, that’s going to be going with a set of gear that, 

depending on the position you hold within that unit, is 14 to 23 

pounds lighter than what soldiers in country have today. 

94 

So this lighten-the-load effort, particularly up in ?????? Commons-East in Afghanistan at the high altitudes, is absolutely critical. It’s something that the field has asked us for, and we are constantly working to figure out ways that we can lighten-the-load for 

the individual soldiers. I think that is a real need. 

Senator THUNE. Coming back to the Future Combat Vehicle, the 

Army has begun working groups to help define the concept for the 

next ground vehicle, which would likely be tracked and armored. 

The Army, as I think you mentioned already, has asserted the requirements and forward planning for that will be done by September. 

Has the Army been given any further guidance by OSD pertaining to the cancellation of the FCS MGV? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I’ll take that question. One of the things 

that we’ve been working with OSD since the fiscal year 2010 budget was submitted is the acquisition decision memorandum, which 

is the formal guidance from the Defense Acquisition Executive on 

that program. We are in the final stages of the wording on that to 

make sure it’s exactly right, it captures the decisions of the Secretary of Defense, and it gives us the flexibility to be able to move 

forward to restructure the program, to cancel the FCS program as 

we know it today, to terminate the MGV portion of that existing 

FCS program, but to keep the other parts of that program that we 

want to move forward with, in particular the network and the spinouts to the Infantry BCTs, the modernization efforts beyond the 

first spinouts to the Infantry BCTs, and then to do the concept 

work with TRADOC through the summer, and then begin a new 

acquisition program for a replacement GCV. 

Senator THUNE. Is there an operational urgency to develop a new 

ground system, General Chiarelli? 

General CHIARELLI. We feel it’s critical that we work to get something that we can begin fielding into our forces, understanding the 

amount of time that it’s going to take to do this within 5 to 7 years. 

We’ve taken on the Secretary’s challenge to look at how we can do 

that. I think you should take great solace in the fact that we are 

working very hard to pull all those things we learned in the FCS 

MGV program, all those technologies that we brought from TR 

level 2, some to 6 and 7 right now. That is not money that has been 

wasted. Those are all things that we will use and look at for integration into the GCV. 

Senator THUNE. In the 2010 budget request, there were requests 

for hundreds of millions of dollars for FCS termination costs. General Thompson, can the Army say with certainly what those termination costs are going to be? Can you quantify that? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I can’t say with certainty. I can give you 

a range, because the actual termination costs that go with this program are to be negotiated with the contractor, who is Boeing, and 

then the subcontractors, and there are 25 tier 2 contractors and 

around 600 contractors below the tier 2 contractors. 

So that will be a negotiated settlement, because we are at the 

government’s convenience restructuring this contract in a major 

way. So there are termination liabilities that are called out for in 

that contract, the guidance from the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the defense supplement to that. I don’t know what that 

95 

exact number is, but it’s fair to say it’s in the hundreds of millions 

of dollars. 

The money that is in the fiscal year 2010 budget we think is 

needed to pay those termination liabilities. If that money is not 

there to pay those termination liabilities, then some piece of the 

work necessary to do the spinouts to the infantry brigades or to do 

the network development will have to be used to pay those termination liabilities, because they are mandatory. That’s work that 

won’t get done and capability that won’t be provided to the soldiers. 

Senator THUNE. Are there lessons, General Thompson, that 

you’ve learned from the FCS experience and the acquisition process 

that can be applied to future developmental programs? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir, there are many lessons to be 

learned. In addition to the blue ribbon panel that we had yesterday 

at the National Defense University, we conducted a full after-action 

review to look not just at the acquisition portion of the FCS program over time, but also to look at the requirements process and 

the modeling and all the work that we’ve done. 

One of the lessons that I take away—and this is a challenge not 

just for the Army, but for DOD—a systems-of-systems acquisition 

program and dealing with the challenge to look at an integrated acquisition approach is hard to do. I don’t think either the Army or 

DOD is well-positioned to be able to deal with complicated systemsof-systems acquisition approaches, which FCS is. 

FCS was groundbreaking in that approach. To the program’s 

credit, we just finished in May a systems-of-systems preliminary 

design review, which is one step on the way to begin to do the final 

integration and the testing and the prototypes. That systems-ofsystems preliminary design review was built on 57 preliminary design reviews of all of the other pieces of the program leading up 

to that, and it shows fairly conclusively that we are where we need 

to be at this point in the program, we have the technologies at the 

right point in the technology level to be able to integrate those and 

to produce the capability. 

It’s not just MGVs. It’s not just network. It’s making all parts of 

the material systems work together to give the soldier an integrated capability and doing that up front, instead of after the fact. 

General CHIARELLI. Just one lesson I have learned from this entire experience of 2 years in Iraq. The deployability and ease of 

deployability, the expeditionary capability, is always more attractive on this side of the next war. But once you get into the next 

war and on the other side of that war, survivability and crew protection are key and critical elements. We’ve seen that happen in 

Iraq, and I think we always have to keep that in mind when we’re 

sitting here in Washington, DC, as opposed to downrange. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start by saying happy birthday, from one Army soldier 

to two others, and the rest of you back there. 

General CHIARELLI. Happy birthday, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. I never looked that good, though. [Laughter.] 

96 

General CHIARELLI. Don’t look a day over 233, sir. [Laughter.] 

Senator INHOFE. First of all, let me say, General Chiarelli, that 

during the years that you were the ground commander in Iraq, I 

have said publicly that there has never been anyone as capable as 

you are and the great job that you’ve done. I think on the other 

side, you probably would say that you saw more of me over there 

in Iraq during the time than you did any other Member. So I’m 

very much concerned about some things, and I think you know one 

of my concerns. 

Most of what I was going to ask has been covered by the chairman and the ranking member, except for the cannon. It just really 

bothers me that since 1995, Mr. Chairman, we’ve been trying to replace the Paladin with something that works. Let’s go back 15 

years ago. Even then, four other countries had a better cannon 

than we had: Germany; Russia; South Africa, of all places; and the 

United Kingdom. 

Now, 15 years later, those four countries still have a better cannon than we do. We can talk about the Abrams, 1970s technology. 

We can talk about the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 1970s technology. 

But the Paladin is 1950s technology. 

We’ve talked about it since 1995. We came up with the Crusader. 

We were going to do something with the Crusader. Then Bush cancelled that program in 2002. I have to say that he did it rather 

abruptly. We were actually, if you’ll remember, Mr. Chairman, in 

our markup at the time they did that. I don’t think anyone on the 

committee had any warning. 

After that took place, we started recognizing again that we’re 

going to have to do something about the Paladin. That’s when General Shinseki talked about FCS, that we need to have the first 

major transformation of ground capability in maybe 30 years. 

So we thought the lead vehicle was going to be that which we 

felt we needed the most, and that is the most antiquated platform 

that we have for ground capability, I believe you would agree, is 

the Paladin. 

So here we are, and now we’re saying that, even though we’ve 

written it into the law—I believe the law says we’re supposed to 

have that fielded and out there by 2010? That’s still in the law, and 

that still has been the request and what we’ve done in the House 

and the Senate. 

So I guess I’d just ask, why is it that we don’t want to send our 

kids out to battle with the better cannon than prospective enemies? 

General CHIARELLI. Senator, I know that you know we are totally 

committed to the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program. 

We plan to correct many of the deficiencies we have in the Paladin 

with that program, spending $181 million from fiscal years 2008 to 

2011, and when the program’s completed in 2021, we will have converted over 600 Paladins. 

I am a believer in indirect fire systems and I am pleased that 

the Army is committed in the way that it is to this program, which 

I think is absolutely critical, particularly given the loss of the MGV 

program and the criticality of having that upgraded system in our 

heavy BCTs. 

Senator INHOFE. Haven’t we gone through about four incarnations now of the Paladin, PIM programs, upgrades? 

97 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I can answer that question. Currently 

the Paladin system that’s out there is version 6. So it has six major 

upgrades. 

Senator INHOFE. Six major upgrades. So now we’re going to do 

another one. It was my understanding that we have 900 of these 

vehicles. We were going to do the PIM program on 600 and then 

on the other 300 we were going to jump ahead in terms of rate of 

fire, in all the things that Paladin would still be deficient in, so 

that we’re going to have better equipment than prospective enemies. 

Wasn’t that it, that 600 of the 900 would be upgraded, but the 

other 300 would be the new system? 

General THOMPSON. Senator, that was the plan with the MGV 

portion and the non-line-of-sight cannon system as a subset of the 

MGV portion. So you’d have the new system of 300 and then the 

other 600. Eventually, when you have a new modern system like 

we’ve done with a lot of our other systems, you begin to replace the 

older ones. 

So I don’t know exactly what we would have done in 2025, but 

I suspect we probably would have made a decision to begin to replace the Paladins with the new system if it was a non-line-of-sight 

cannon. 

Senator INHOFE. What do you propose to do if the law is not 

changed? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, one of the things that OSD has to do is 

work with Congress to determine what do we need to do because 

of the law and adjust the law, because it is in statute right now. 

My professional opinion, though, is if we’re going to terminate the 

MGV, the non-line-of-sight cannon program is highly leveraged and 

intertwined with the MGV program, and it is very, very difficult 

from an acquisition and contracting perspective for us to produce 

the non-line-of-sight cannon system that doesn’t have the MGV 

program wrapped around it. It would be prohibitively expensive for 

us to be able to do that. 

Senator INHOFE. That’s when you look at it from what we’re talking about doing now; I would agree with that. But when we went 

through this change that started when they stopped the Crusader, 

at that time it was all planned out in the future. 

I know I’m a little bit prejudiced, in that Fort Sill is in my State 

of Oklahoma and that’s where they do this stuff. I don’t have a parochial interest in this other than wanting to have the best, because we would be doing the PIM work there anyway. In fact, we’re 

the only place where you can have these capabilities right next to 

a live range, so it’s a logical place to do it. 

But I am concerned about not going forward with a modernization program that would put us in a position where we are—you 

talk about the fair fight. I was coming back from the Air Show and 

I was reading your statement, and I agree with that. The adage 

that we never want to send our soldiers into a fair fight is at the 

core of the Army modernization strategy. 

It seems to me that if we send our soldiers out with equipment 

that is not as good as the prospective enemy, then that’s not a fair 

fight. What am I overlooking? 

98 

General CHIARELLI. You’re not overlooking anything, Senator. We 

are working very, very hard to work the GCV, and that may be an 

individual vehicle, but it could be a series of vehicles. General 

Dempsey and the team are working, and I would not be surprised 

if we didn’t see a family of vehicles that may include a vehicle that 

has an indirect fire capability. 

Senator INHOFE. I would hope that’s the case. Thank you very 

much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Inhofe. 

We’ll do a second round, up to 5 minutes, and then we’ll go on 

to the second panel. 

That was an interesting answer, General Chiarelli, about the follow-on to the MGV, that the GCV might be more than one vehicle. 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, would you do me a favor, because I can’t be here for the second panel? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Senator INHOFE. Would you mind asking a similar question to 

the DOD witness that’s on the second panel? I’ve been pursuing 

this cannon thing. Just so we can get on the record some kind of 

an answer. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Of course, okay. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you so much. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Tell us a little more about that. We may 

have more than one vehicle coming out of that program? 

General CHIARELLI. It’s entirely possible, sir. I don’t want to take 

away any of the options that General Dempsey and TRADOC are 

looking at right now. I haven’t been able to have a readout of exactly what the blue ribbon symposium told us yesterday, but that’s 

entirely a possibility, that it could make a recommendation of this 

vehicle morphing into more than one vehicle. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. We’ll watch that and follow it with a lot of 

interest. 

I know that the fielding target for the GCV is in the 2015 to 

2017 range. I know it’s early, but are you confident that we can do 

that, we can get it ready by then? 

General CHIARELLI. I think we have to. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

General CHIARELLI. I just absolutely believe we have to. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The need is there. 

General CHIARELLI. The need is there. But also, I just think that 

the technology is moving so quickly that we have to find a way, 

like we have done with the MRAP ATV, to be quicker in our fielding of these systems, creating systems that over time may be modified, but provide that key base upon which we will build over time. 

I really believe that’s where we have to go with this particular program. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I couldn’t agree with you more that the 

timeframes for the development of some of the weapons systems 

are so long. It’s part of I think why the costs escalate just over 

time. But obviously the relevance is diminished, as you said, because of advances in technology and even because of changes in the 

threat environment by the time they get ready. 

99 

I know it’s a different kind of vehicle, maybe some would say a 

simpler challenge. But we did show with the MRAP vehicle that, 

under conditions of urgent necessity, the Pentagon, working with 

defense contractors, can turn out an awful lot of a particular piece 

of equipment that is critically necessary to protect our troops. 

Obviously, we’ll stay on top of that as we go along. 

Let me ask you about the Stryker program, either one of you 

really. What can you tell us about the Army’s thinking now with 

respect to the Stryker system and the potential growth in the number of combat brigades and plans to modernize and improve the capabilities of the current fleet? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. The Stryker program has been a 

very successful program for the United States Army. About 3,600 

Stryker vehicles are the requirement. Over 2,700 of them have 

been fielded and are in the inventory to date, 7 Stryker brigades. 

One of the things that the Army is looking at from a force structure 

perspective is do we need more Stryker brigades to provide a balanced force with different capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. What are the factors that you will consider 

in making that decision? 

General THOMPSON. Part of that decision, sir, is going to be made 

as part of the QDR. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General THOMPSON. It’s looking at the force mix of Stryker brigades, heavy brigades, infantry brigades, the enabler brigades, and 

the many other types of the BCTs in the Army; what is the right 

force mix? As we look at a balanced force to handle things across 

the spectrum of conflict, it is a possibility that we would want to 

build more of the Stryker brigades than the seven that we have 

today. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. What kind of reaction do you get from our 

troops to the Stryker system as compared to other systems that 

they’re using? In other words, are the troops happy with the 

Stryker? 

General CHIARELLI. They’re very happy with them. If you run 

into a Stryker crewman, he’s going to brag on his vehicle like any 

Army soldier brags on their vehicle. But they love the Stryker. 

We have some concerns with the current Strykers right now in 

power and in some power and weight issues that we have to work 

our way through. But the Stryker has proven to be an amazing addition and the Stryker BCT an amazing addition to the United 

States Army. We’re on our ninth deployment. We have Strykers in 

Afghanistan today and we’ll have a brigade up and operational in 

Afghanistan this summer. 

So we are looking hard at the Stryker, as General Dempsey 

again wraps his arms around this entire Army modernization piece 

as a force mix issue to determine whether or not we may need additional Stryker BCTs. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So here, as well as in some other key decision areas, you’re really waiting for the QDR to give some guidance 

about where we go from here? Is that correct? 

General CHIARELLI. The QDR is a critical element, Mr. Chairman. But in addition to that, it’s stepping back and relooking at 

100 

this after cancellation of the MGV and looking at where we’re going 

to go. We are working day-in and day-out now, between now and 

Labor Day, and we hope to come out with that plan soon after 

Labor Day that lays out where we’re headed. 

General THOMPSON. Chairman Lieberman, if I could just offer 

some context from my perspective as the senior military acquisition 

officer. But I was also the Army’s programmer for a number of 

years, looking at the balanced investments across all the capabilities. There’s roughly 16,000 combat vehicles in the Army’s inventory. Abrams, Bradleys, 113s, and Strykers dominate those numbers. 

There is a need over time in a portfolio of capabilities to have 

a modernization program. I’ve been associated with armored systems modernization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Then we 

had the Future Scout Cavalry System. We had the Armored Gun 

System. We had the Crusader, and now we have the MGV. Five 

programs, and every one of those programs got to the point where 

they were pretty far along in the development, getting ready to go 

into testing and production of prototypes, and for various reasons 

all of those programs have been terminated or significantly restructured. 

At some point in time, the existing vehicles, even the Strykers, 

as good as they are, will reach their design limits. The 113s we are 

not using at all today in theater because they’re not survivable and 

they don’t have the capabilities. But Bradleys, Strykers, tanks, and 

the Abrams today, as capable as they are, eventually will reach 

their design limits. They reach their design limits in two key areas. 

One of them is survivability because, like the vice chief said, on the 

other side of the deployment you want your soldiers and systems 

that are as survivable as possible. 

We need enough power margin and we need enough electrical energy to be able to put the networked systems on the combat platforms we put our soldiers in. So eventually we’re going to need to 

modernize and replace some of those existing systems. The Army 

needs a stable set of funding across a number of years to be able 

to keep that portfolio of GCVs as capable as possible, so that our 

soldiers are as capable as possible and never in a fair fight. 

We are not there today. It’s been over 20 years since we started 

the armored systems modernization program and we’re now going 

to start our sixth iteration of trying to modernize the GCV capability in the Army. That bothers me greatly. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Me too. Thank you. 

Senator Thune, do you have other questions? 

Senator THUNE. Let me just ask, if I might, Mr. Chairman. As 

you all know, the President signaled his intention to move away 

from the use of supplemental spending bills to deal with overseas 

operations and instead to incorporate these costs into the regular 

budgeting process. 

My question, General Chiarelli, is what challenges does that 

change create for the Army? 

General CHIARELLI. I believe we’ve been consistent in testimony, 

not only I have, the chief has, but those that went before us, indicating that reset is a critical piece that is going to continue in the 

Army. I believe we have $11 billion in this particular Overseas 

101 

Contingency Operations budget for reset. It will continue as long 

as we’re fighting, and it will continue 2 years after we complete 

fighting. 

So it’s our hope that everybody will remember that and the need 

to reset this equipment that is going at operating tempo rates that 

are much higher than they would if they were back here in the 

United States. 

General THOMPSON. Senator, if I could just add to that again, 

what I said earlier about having some responsibility for the Army’s 

programming for a number of years. If supplementals decrease or 

go away, the requirements that are covered by the supplemental 

funding in most cases don’t. So if the supplemental goes away and 

you don’t increase the base program, there are things that won’t 

get done. There are probably fewer soldiers. The modernization 

programs are the first things that people look at to be able to cut. 

So if we just say there’s no more supplementals and you don’t increase the base program, then something has to change. My analogy would be it’s like a two-income family and one of the income 

earners no longer is employed. Your lifestyle’s going to change significantly because you just can’t do the same things that you were 

doing with one income instead of two. Not that the supplementals 

and the base program are equal, but there’s a lot of requirements 

that are covered with supplemental funding, and you just can’t say 

they go away and just do it with the base program without increasing the base program. 

General CHIARELLI. So many of those are Army bills. 

Senator THUNE. Let me ask, the Army is in a financial hole. You estimated over $2 billion in its personnel accounts. Is there a plan 

for closing that gap right now? 

General CHIARELLI. We have a plan. We’re hoping to get all the 

help we possibly can, but we have a plan over the next couple of 

years to go ahead and do that. We will have to do that. As I indicated and you indicated, Senator, people are absolutely critical, and 

thank goodness we have those people. We were able to make 

547,400 and a little bit more right now as we’re rolling that number back, because it’s critical when I have almost 9,000 soldiers in 

Warrior Transition Units, another 10,000 to 11,000 that are currently nondeployable, and then individual augmentees. That adds 

up to a pretty sizable bill that I’m not able to put into my formations as they deploy on a dwell that’s at 1.5 at unit dwell, less on 

individual dwell today. 

Senator THUNE. Can we keep up with all those personnel costs 

and still ensure good recruiting and retention? 

General CHIARELLI. We are blessed right now, Senator. Recruiting and retention are as good as I’ve ever seen in the time that I’ve 

been in the Army. We have to be concerned, though, and we all 

pray that the economy turns around, but for recruiters that’ll make 

life difficult again, I’m sure. But we will have to continue to recruit 

the best for our Nation’s Army and we are totally focused on doing 

that. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen, for your 

great service to our country, and be sure that you convey that same 

appreciation to your families, too, for the sacrifices that they make 

and for your service. Thanks. 

102 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Regarding that last exchange with Senator Thune, we’re in a 

most unusual moment, which is, as you said, recruitment is going 

very well, there is a high level of recruits coming in. We understand part of it may be the economy, but there’s a lot of other factors. Reenlistments are very high. So part of what originally drew 

our attention to trying to increase the Army end strength is not 

only the effect on dwell time, but this, as I understand it, most unusual and unacceptable phenomenon where you may actually have 

to, because you don’t have adequate statutory authorized end 

strength, slow down on recruiting and reenlistment, in fact to let 

some people go, as it were, hoping that attrition brings you down. 

When the demand is so high for personnel in active deployment, we 

ought to protect you from that kind of pressure. 

But anyway, we’re going to pursue that as we go to our markup 

next week. 

I thank you very much for your testimony. You’ve been extremely 

responsive. You’re two impressive people that our country and the 

Army are very fortunate to have in positions of leadership, and I’d 

really put you up against any group of people in any field or corporation or anything else. You represent the best of our country. 

Thank you very much. 

General CHIARELLI. Thank you, Senator. 

General THOMPSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. We’ll call the second panel: Mr. Ahern and 

Mr. Francis. 

As I indicated, David Ahern is the Director of Portfolio Systems 

Acquisition in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Paul Francis is the Managing 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, at the GAO. 

We thank both of you for being here. Mr. Ahern, I would now 

welcome your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. AHERN, DIRECTOR, PORTFOLIO SYSTEMS ACQUISITION, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS 

Mr. AHERN. Good afternoon, Chairman Lieberman, Senator 

Thune, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you to discuss Army modernization and the management of the FCS program as you review the 

fiscal year 2010 budget. I’ll be brief in order to move quickly to the 

panel’s questions. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good. 

Mr. AHERN. In fiscal year 2010, FCS will remain the Army’s largest research and development investment. However, we plan to 

transition from the FCS BCT acquisition program to establish at 

least four acquisition programs that will leverage the FCS investment to date and deliver realistically defined, cost effective, and 

timely capability to modernize the Army’s ground forces. These new 

integrated Army modernization programs will include as a minimum: planned early infantry BCT acquisition, follow-on BCT modernization, GCV modernization, and incremental ground tactical 

network capability. 

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The importance of meeting the Army’s modernization needs and 

the magnitude of the investment dictate that we get these acquisitions right. We must do it expeditiously. By way of background, we 

established the FCS BCT in 2003. The Army contracted Boeing and 

SAIC to develop a system-of-systems design. While the system-ofsystems umbrella for the FCS BCT acquisition provided a unique 

opportunity to optimize capabilities, the complexity involved in applying the system-of-systems approach offered many challenges for 

the acquisition community. 

The FCS investment did, however, provide us with a far better 

understanding of the potential for integrated capability, with insights for early application of this integrated capability across the 

combat brigades. In addition, the technology coming from the FCS 

investment is a game-changer for the Army modernization effort in 

platforms such as unmanned ground and air systems, in sensors 

such as active protection and unattended ground sensors, in vehicles with hybrid electric power trains, and lightweight armor, and 

in the network, with integrated battle command, sensor fusion, and 

enhanced situational awareness. 

All these will transition the Army modernization acquisition as 

we move forward. A key transition relative to knowledge-based acquisition was a decision in 2006 to capitalize on early increments 

of FCS capability for delivery to the current force. We term those 

spinouts. 

We will continue this incremental acquisition philosophy as we 

transition to multiple Army modernization acquisitions in 2010. 

Relative to our reporting requirements on FCS, while the Army 

recently completed the FCS system-of-systems preliminary design 

review, decisions leading up to the fiscal year 2010 President’s 

budget have already addressed the issues identified for the Defense 

Acquisition Board milestone review. However, in satisfaction of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2009 

provisions, we will provide a report that reflects DOD’s FCS decision to the congressional defense committees. 

Regarding the committee’s interest in future contracting relationships, in the short term the FCS contract will be restructured to 

continue the integration and development efforts in network, spinouts, and BCT modernization until the new acquisitions are established. Changes in the FCS contract will address our concerns regarding fee structure to give the government leverage to promote 

cost efficiency. As acquisition plans for the future programs mature, we’ll use contracting strategies that include competition, fee 

structures to incentivize performance, and fixed price contracts 

when appropriate, all leading to better control of contract costs. 

We have learned much from the FCS acquisition program. Our 

acquisition and program management lessons learned are consistent with those learned from other DOD acquisition programs. 

As we move forward with the new modernization program, we will 

seek to match requirements to mature technologies, to estimate 

program costs more realistically, to seek budget stability for the 

programs we initiate, staff government acquisition teams adequately, and provide disciplined and effective oversight. 

In closing, DOD’s fiscal year 2010 budget will facilitate a timely, 

in-stride transition from the previous plan to acquire 15 FCS BCTs 

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to multiple major modernization programs to deliver much-needed 

sensor, networking, and vehicle capability to the Army. We will leverage the FCS development efforts to date and deliver that capability. 

We are grateful for the continued support of Congress, which has 

been critical to ensuring our soldiers are the best trained and best 

equipped in the world. Thank you for this opportunity to testify on 

DOD’s plans to continue to equip them for today’s wars and tomorrow’s challenges. I look forward to answering any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ahern follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DAVID G. AHERN

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune, and members of the committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Army modernization and the management of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program as 

you review the fiscal year 2010 budget requests. 

The FCS program decisions reflected in the President’s fiscal year 2010 defense 

budget address two priorities of the Secretary of Defense: 

• Rebalancing the Department’s programs in order to institutionalize and 

enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios 

we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies. 

• Reforming how and what the Department buys, a fundamental overhaul 

of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting. 

In fiscal year 2010, the FCS budget line will remain the Army’s largest research 

and development investment at three billion dollars as we rebalance the Army modernization priorities. We will accelerate the fielding of early increments of specific 

FCS capabilities that have demonstrated success, such as unmanned ground and air 

vehicles and unattended sensors, to enhance our ability to address counterinsurgency and close quarter combat, such as what we are seeing in operations today. 

We will cancel the FCS manned ground vehicle effort as we fully assess the Department’s ground combat vehicle capability needs for full spectrum operations, informed by operations today and analysis on the appropriate mix of vehicles. 

In 2010, we will transition the single FCS acquisition program (a Major Defense 

Acquisition Program (MDAP)) into multiple acquisitions established on solid capability definition, technology maturity, realistic cost estimates, and sound contracting 

strategies. The Department will implement our full complement of acquisition reform initiatives as the foundation for establishing these new programs. The importance of meeting the Army modernization needs and the magnitude of the investment dictate that we get these acquisitions right—and we must do it expeditiously. 

The Secretary of Defense has directed that these new modernization efforts be 

fully funded in the outyears as we accelerate FCS spin-off capabilities, across the 

Army’s combat brigades. To properly address the questions you asked in your letter 

of invitation, I would like to briefly review the history of the FCS program, describe 

the FCS investment as presented in the fiscal year 2010 budget, briefly discuss how 

we plan to implement those changes, and finally address significant lessons learned 

from the FCS program. 

2003–2009 FCS BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM ACQUISITION

In 2003, the Department approved Milestone B for the FCS Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT) acquisition. This decision approved a baseline for development and procurement of 15 BCTs. The Army contracted with Boeing/SAIC to develop a ‘‘systemof-systems’’ design for the FCS BCT. The current contract relationship with Boeing 

is as a prime contractor for the Systems Design and Development phase of the FCS 

program, whereby Boeing, in some cases, is required to perform lead systems integrator-type functions as defined by the terms and conditions of the contract. Although the FCS contract uses the term ‘‘lead system integrator,’’ Boeing does not 

meet the statutory definition of a Lead System Integrator as defined by section 805 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, (Pub. L. 109–163). 

Boeing performs a substantial portion of the development work for the program by 

providing the System of System Common Operating Environment software and 

Warrior-Machine Interface. 

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The FCS contract is a Cost Plus Fixed Fee/Award/Incentive-type contract to develop manned and unmanned ground vehicles, unmanned air systems, unattended 

ground sensors and to integrate these, and a number of complementary systems— 

such as Joint Tactical Radio System and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical— 

into a BCT that delivers the capability defined by the FCS Operational Requirements Document. 

Over the 6 years of development to date the program has been modified to accommodate changes in the brigade structure (for instance reducing the types of unmanned air systems and removing capability that was not technologically mature 

like the unmanned armed reconnaissance vehicle) and to ‘‘spin-out’’ early increments of FCS capabilities to the current force brigades. 

The FCS Spin-Out is illustrative of how we have utilized a knowledge based process to inform our acquisition decisions. In 2006 the Department approved the 

Army’s approach to initiate actions to field FCS capabilities such as the unattended 

ground sensors, Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System, and an early instantiation of the 

FCS network to other combat brigades. The Spin-Out approach was updated in 

2008, adding unmanned air and ground systems to capabilities ready for consideration for production. The decision was then made to provide the initial increments 

of capability to the Infantry Brigades. A Capabilities Production Document has been 

approved defining the expected performance for this initial increment of capability. 

The systems engineering work, to include Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews, 

testing of prototypes to demonstrate capability, and cost and technology assessments 

are all underway to inform a Milestone C decision for this Spin-Out Early Infantry 

BCT this fall. 

While the system-of-systems umbrella for the FCS BCT acquisition provided a 

unique opportunity to optimize capabilities across the brigade, the complexity involved in applying the system-of-systems approach offered many challenges for acquisition management and oversight. 

The FCS contract, initially capitalizing on the early efforts undertaken by 

DARPA, has undergone major changes yearly. It has transitioned from an Other 

Transactions Authority agreement to a Federal Acquisition Regulation-based contract, modified to support changes in the brigade structure, and also modified to accommodate the ‘‘spin-out’’ of capability to the current force brigades. The means to 

effectively deliver integrated capabilities, particularly in the areas of network and 

battle command, is an area of continued attention for the Service and the Department, to include identifying the correct balance between contractor and government 

responsibilities. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(USD(AT&L)) has reviewed the program at least yearly, providing acquisition direction to keep the program on track to deliver an FCS Brigade capability. Our direction for the FCS BCT focused on continued attention to the capability definition, 

technology maturity, and current cost estimates. Additionally, we have provided our 

expectations for spin-out development, exit criteria, and specified actions to address 

concerns regarding the FCS contract fee structure. 

Section 214 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2007, as amended by section 211 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, required a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 

milestone review of the FCS program and a report on that review. As a result of 

the FCS decisions leading up to the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget we have determined a DAB milestone review is no longer applicable. Nonetheless, in satisfaction of the Fiscal Year 2007 and 2009 Authorization Act provisions, we will provide 

to the congressional defense committees a report that reflects the Department’s FCS 

decision. 

2010 INVESTMENT FOR ARMY MODERNIZATION

In fiscal year 2010, FCS will remain the Army’s largest research and development 

investment; however, we plan to transition from the FCS BCT acquisition program 

to instead establish at least four acquisition programs that will leverage the FCS 

investment to-date and deliver realistically defined, cost effective and timely capability to modernize the Army’s ground forces. These new integrated Army Modernization programs will include, as a minimum, the following: 

- The planned Early-Infantry BCT acquisition 

- Follow-on BCT modernization 

- Ground combat vehicle modernization 

- Incremental ground tactical network capability 

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IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

We will continue efforts to-date to further develop, produce, and field FCS developed capabilities in the form of early spin-outs to seven Infantry BCTs. This MDAP 

will start with a Milestone C decision scheduled in the first quarter of fiscal year 

2010 following a Limited User Test this summer. Input for this decision will be in 

accordance with Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, to include an approved 

Acquisition Strategy, a Capability Production Document, a Technology Readiness 

Assessment, and an Independent Cost Estimate. Robust systems engineering work 

ongoing will support the critical design review and production readiness review we 

need to support a low-rate production decision. Testing will inform us of both the 

maturity of the individual systems (the small unmanned ground vehicle, the class 

I unmanned air vehicle, the unattended ground sensors, and the Non-Line-of-Sight 

Launch System) as well as network components used to integrate these capabilities 

into the brigade. 

Follow-on BCT modernization acquisition program(s) will follow to expand delivery of these capabilities to the remaining Army combat brigades by 2025. The Army 

will develop an acquisition plan to support acquiring these capabilities and present 

that plan for USD(AT&L) review in the fall of 2009. 

The acquisition for ground combat vehicles will proceed subsequent to a capability 

assessment by the Army, working with the Marine Corps. The assessment will include an evaluation of ground combat vehicle missions across the spectrum of operations, a review of the capabilities of the current combat vehicle fleet, identification 

of joint capability gaps, and incorporation of any lessons learned from ongoing operations. This ground combat vehicle capability assessment will support the development of requirements for a new Ground Combat Vehicle program, and we are planning for a Materiel Development Decision in 2010. 

Incremental delivery of ground tactical network capability is another critical element for Army modernization. Initial planning for the continued development and 

delivery of integrated networking and battle command capability is ongoing. 

As we move from a single FCS acquisition to these targeted modernization acquisitions we will focus on buying the right thing, buying it the right way, and managing it effectively. 

Buy the right thing: 

A clear understanding of our capability needs will be a focus area as we move 

forward. We will stop development of the current FCS manned ground vehicles as 

we reevaluate the requirements, technology, and acquisition approach. We will conduct a thorough capability assessment for ground combat vehicles, informed by current operations, full spectrum operational needs, existing available capability, and 

force structure changes. Additionally, the Army will identify the sensor and unmanned capabilities needed for all combat brigades and will define requirements for 

the incremental delivery of battle command network and software. We in the acquisition community will work closely with the Joint Staff to expeditiously establish a 

solid requirements baseline for achievable delivery of capability. 

Buy it the right way: 

In the short term, the FCS contract will be restructured to address concerns with 

the current fee structure and to continue the integration and development efforts 

in the network until the new acquisitions are established. The fundamental issue 

with the FCS contract structure is that there is an insufficient amount of fee associated with objective contract performance. Changes in the FCS contract will address 

the Department’s concerns regarding a fee structure that gives the government little 

leverage to promote cost efficiency. We will make changes to the contract structure 

to more closely tie fee to performance. 

As acquisition plans for the future programs mature, we will employ contracting 

strategies that consider competition, competitive prototyping, and fixed-price development. As the Army expands its contracting and management workforce, government personnel in the program management office will take on an expanded role, 

particularly in contract management and oversight, systems engineering, and integration. All these efforts will contribute to protecting the Government’s interests 

through the effective use of taxpayer funds to deliver to our soldiers the equipment 

they need. 

Details on plans to modify the contract will be developed over the next few 

months as we prepare to implement the decisions reflected in the fiscal year 2010 

budget. The near-term contracting approach for acquiring the early spin-out systems 

will also include competition, fee structures to incentivize performance, and fixed 

price contracts when appropriate. 

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Manage it effectively: 

This fall we will conduct a Defense Acquisition Executive-level review of the FCS 

program restructure to address the implementation of the fiscal year 2010 budget 

decisions and transition to multiple acquisitions. This will ensure we are appropriately leveraging the FCS investment to date. Each new acquisition will be established with a solid capability definition, appropriate technology maturity, realistic 

cost estimates, and sound contracting strategies. We will utilize Configuration 

Steering Boards, Independent Cost Estimates, Technology Readiness Assessments, 

and other management tools to ensure capability is delivered on time and within 

budget. We must continuously challenge our processes to get to timely, supportable 

decisions that deliver needed capability in a timely, cost effective manner. 

LESSONS LEARNED

There are numerous lessons learned from the FCS BCT acquisition—spanning the 

areas of capability definition, system-of-systems integration, acquisition and program management, costing, and contracting. 

Capability definition: 

We must be more disciplined in our desire for more and better capability. Successfully defining achievable expectations for emerging capability requires our continued, focused attention. Capability definition in battle command and control, networking, communications, and sensor integration were not of sufficient fidelity when 

the FCS program started. The FCS network development effort has helped frame 

what capabilities are important in a tactical ground network. To ‘‘buy the right 

thing’’ requires clear understanding on the part of the capability developers of what 

is realistically possible at what cost. As we move forward we in the acquisition community must work closer with the capability developers for a shared understanding 

of requirements in these areas. We will use evolutionary acquisition strategies to 

translate these requirements to grow capability incrementally for the ground tactical network, sensor systems, and vehicles. 

System-of-Systems Integration: 

The investment in the FCS acquisition has provided us with significant advances 

in understanding both the boundaries and potential for integrated capability. The 

recently completed System-of-Systems Preliminary Design Review highlighted two 

significant force multipliers: (1) a reliable, working tactical ground network over 

broad areas of operation; and (2) sensors and systems providing timely and reliable 

information to that network. These findings are consistent with lessons learned in 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These key enablers are the targets of opportunity we will emphasize as we transition to multiple Army Modernization acquisitions. Clearly the significant research and development investments by the FCS program set the stage for fielding a robust integrated capability, beginning with early 

Infantry BCT units. 

Acquisition and Program Management: 

The acquisition and program management lessons learned in FCS are consistent 

with those learned from other Department acquisition programs. These include ensuring our investments are affordable and consistent with warfighter priorities; realizing predictable cost and schedule outcomes by accepting and approving requirements based on mature, demonstrated technologies; and establishing programs with 

realistic cost and schedule estimates. An Acquisition Program Baseline based on 

achievable performance criteria, an Independent Cost Estimate, and a realistic execution schedule are critical to acquisition success. During development, the use of 

rapid prototyping and demonstrations provide early and valuable insights to drive 

effective decision making to keep programs on track. Configuration Steering Boards 

are needed to effectively communicate what capability the acquisition program can 

achieve, limit changes in requirements that drive adverse cost and schedule impacts, and to provide the basis for effective tradeoff decisions. Additionally, as part 

of the Secretary’s initiative to revitalize the acquisition workforce, the Department 

will increase the overall size of the government acquisition workforce by 20,000 

through fiscal year 2015, significantly improving the capability and capacity of the 

Defense acquisition workforce to oversee and execute these important defense programs. The objective is straight forward: ensure the Department has the right acquisition capability to produce best value for the American taxpayer and for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who depend on the weapons, products and services we buy. 

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Costing: 

The independent cost estimates done for the FCS acquisition were invaluable for 

informing decisions. Executable acquisition approaches must be developed to address the cost risks identified in the cost estimate. Significant attention to 

‘‘descoping’’ options is needed for properly informed cost-performance trade-off decisions. The ability of the requirements community to take into account the cost of 

capability is also an area that needs attention—particularly in the network and sensor arenas. 

Contracting: 

Contracting for the development of System-of-Systems capability proved to be 

complex and challenging. In the contracting arena, we will ensure competition and 

appropriately incentivize our contractors to control costs. A thorough, risk-based 

analysis of multiple contracting approaches for delivery of capability will be undertaken prior to approving future contracting strategies. 

With these insights gained from the FCS BCT acquisition, in conjunction with the 

Department’s acquisition reform efforts, we will ensure the Department effectively 

and efficiently acquires the vehicles, unmanned systems, sensors, and networks 

needed for Army combat brigade modernization. 

CONCLUSION

The FCS element of the fiscal year 2010 budget reflects the Secretary’s priorities. 

His decisions were based on a combination of the currency of requirements given 

ongoing operations, the maturity of the development efforts within the FCS acquisition program, modernization priorities, and affordability. The Department’s fiscal 

year 2010 FCS development budget will facilitate a timely, in stride, transition from 

the previous plan to acquire 15 FCS BCTs to multiple major modernization programs. These new modernization acquisitions will deliver much needed sensor, networking, and vehicle capability to the Army, and we are intent on expeditiously 

leveraging the FCS development efforts to date to deliver that capability. 

We are grateful for the continued support of Congress which has been critical to 

ensuring our soldiers are the best trained and best equipped in the world. Thank 

you for this opportunity to testify on the Department’s plans to continue to equip 

them for today’s wars and tomorrow’s challenges. I look forward to answering any 

questions you may have. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Ahern. We look forward to the 

questions. 

Mr. Francis. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL L. FRANCIS, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. FRANCIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Thune. I appreciate 

your inviting me to participate in this discussion of the Army’s 

modernization in a post-FCS context. I’ll say a few words about 

what I think are the positive aspects of FCS that are worth emulating as we go forward, and then talk about some of the difficulties with the program that I think we can learn from. 

So, starting with the positive aspects, I think the Army really did 

break with tradition in thinking through FCS and came up with 

a holistic view of what it thought the future force ought to look 

like. It was able to translate that into a context and an architecture for a family of systems that it would field as an integrated 

force. I think this is a much better approach than developing individual systems and trying to integrate them after the fact. 

I also think the Army was innovative in its managerial approach. 

It wanted to break down its stovepiped organizations and cut 

across organizational lines to field an integrated force. I think it 

was very candid about what its abilities were to manage that and 

contracted with a lead system integrator to try to fill in some of 

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its own shortfalls. So I think that was a courageous approach on 

the Army’s part. 

We do have some concerns with the lead system integrator, but 

I do think the approach the Army used in that approach did give 

it unprecedented insight into subcontractor selection and gave it 

more competition at the subcontractor level. I think that was a 

good idea. 

We heard testimony from the first panel about the network. I 

think it was discerning on the Army’s part to observe that it needed to deliberately develop an information network rather than wait 

for after the fact and try to cobble it together with systems that 

had already been developed. 

A final thing I would say from a positive standpoint on FCS is 

the decision to spin out or harvest technologies and give them to 

the current forces was a really good idea. I think it was even better 

when the Army developed the evaluation task force to vet these 

technologies before they went into the field. So again, a good idea 

worth continuing as we go forward. 

In terms of some problematic aspects with FCS, I think the first 

thing I would say is I believe that the program—and we’ve reported on this—was not really executable within realistic resource 

bounds. The technology, the software, the network, the requirements, and the costs were all on a grand scale and we knew very 

little about them when we got started. 

For example, the MGVs were being developed and their performance and their survivability depended on the network, at the same 

time we were inventing the network. So that concurrent development was I think a bit too much for a single program. 

FCS I think was moving too fast. Originally it was going to be 

a 51⁄2-year program. It eventually stretched out to 10 years, but it 

was still faster than any single revolutionary program had proceeded before, and on FCS we were looking at 14 to 18 programs 

in one. I think if the program did continue on its existing path it 

would have put you in a difficult position, because I think at least 

3 years of production funds would have been requested before we 

had a really meaningful demonstration of FCS capabilities. So it 

was on a really fast pace. 

I think the take-away from that is these risks were knowable 

and I think understood at the beginning, but accepted. So I think 

going forward we have to be very careful about accepting those 

kinds of risks. These were not unexpected discoveries that occurred 

along the way, and I would make that distinction. 

I think from an oversight standpoint the challenges were too 

great. The scope of the program was such that the visibility over 

cost changes and schedule changes were not visible. They were 

very hard to discern. I think the scope of the program was such 

that it overwhelmed some of our key oversight mechanisms. Selected acquisition reports, the earned value management system, 

and even our budget requests weren’t a good fit for a program of 

the size of FCS. 

The Army’s close relationship with the lead system integrator, 

while it had some advantages, we saw some long-term oversight 

concerns with that, in that we thought there was a risk that over 

time the Army would find it difficult to distance itself from the lead 

110 

system integrator and in fact the program itself. We looked to OSD 

to provide that oversight. 

In the early years, OSD didn’t provide that oversight and basically allowed the Army to proceed with the program as planned. So 

it proceeded through the start point with significant immature 

technologies, significantly far afield of OSD’s own policies. OSD had 

independent cost estimates that were much higher than the 

Army’s. Yet they let the Army’s estimate prevail. I think even 

though costs and schedules doubled over these years, there were no 

Nunn-McCurdy breaches reported on the program. 

Now, we’ve seen an improvement in OSD’s oversight in the last 

2 years and maybe Dave Ahern here has a large part in that. So 

we’ve seen that occur, but again OSD oversight early, was really 

an important factor. 

So, going forward, I think we’ll see the Army with at least three 

efforts: spinouts in some form, a network program, and MGVs. I 

think each of these will require some different types of management approaches, but they need to share some common principles. 

That is, they need to be anchored in knowledge and they must adhere to DOD’s current acquisition policy. We have to have realistic 

cost estimates that are informed by independent estimates and we 

need to budget to the most realistic cost. I think that we have to 

have programs that are transparent and accountable for oversight. 

I think we have to realize that a unique contractual arrangement 

or a bold managerial approach are not a substitute for knowledge 

or sound systems engineering. 

So I would say in conclusion, I think there’s no question that the 

Army needs to be well-equipped. I don’t think there’s any debate 

about that. I think the Army needs to be innovative about its approach, but needs to be pragmatic and knowledge-based when it 

comes to individual systems. 

I would ask a broader question. If we accept the Army’s vision 

of the future and how it wants to equip, I think we can all point 

out things that could be done differently than FCS. But I think a 

real challenging question is: how would we do that differently 

today? I think the burden there is a lot more what would have to 

be done prior to the acquisition phase. The question becomes, do 

we have the people, the organizations, the facilities, the transition 

mechanisms, and so forth in place to do that kind of work up front? 

I don’t know that there’s a good answer for that. 

So I’ll conclude with that and be available for any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Francis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY PAUL L. FRANCIS

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today 

to discuss the Department of the Army’s modernization efforts to transform into a 

lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force using a new concept of operations, technologies, and information network. For the past 6 years, the Future 

Combat System (FCS), a revolutionary and expansive program, formed the core of 

Army modernization. Earlier this year, the Secretary of Defense recommended restructuring the FCS program to lower risk and to address more near term needs. 

His recommendation came a few months before the FCS program was scheduled to 

undergo a congressionally-mandated go/no-go review to determine the program’s future. Although the Army has not yet officially implemented the Secretary’s recommendation, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army have begun to make 

conforming programmatic and budgetary adjustments to FCS. 

111 

1Pub. L. No. 109–163, § 211. 

My statement today is based on the work we conducted over the last several years 

in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, which 

requires the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to report annually on the FCS 

program.1 As Congress will be asked to make significant funding commitments for 

Army ground force modernization over the next several years, this statement will 

review: (1) aspects of FCS that should be preserved in future efforts, (2) aspects of 

FCS that were problematic and need re-examination, and (3) considerations for 

shaping future Army ground force modernization. 

BACKGROUND

With FCS, the Army embraced a new warfighting concept designed to replace 

most of its existing combat systems with a family of manned and unmanned vehicles and systems linked by an advanced information network. According to the 

Army, FCS represented the greatest technology and integration challenge it had 

ever undertaken—an FCS-equipped force was to be as lethal and survivable as today’s force, but significantly lighter and thus easier to both move and sustain. The 

Army determined it could not meet the challenges of the FCS scope and schedule 

with its workforce alone and with traditional management approaches. In 2003, the 

Army contracted with the Boeing Company as the lead systems integrator (LSI) to 

assist in defining, developing, and integrating FCS systems. Boeing subcontracted 

with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to assist in performing 

the LSI functions. Over the past several years, Congress, GAO, and other organizations have expressed numerous concerns about the management and acquisition 

strategy for the FCS program, including significant knowledge gaps, questionable 

costs and affordability, the relationship between the Army and the LSI, and the lack 

of oversight by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 

This committee has been influential in overseeing the FCS program and protecting the government’s interests therein. In particular, the committee advocated 

changes to the original contract structure and type to incorporate more Federal Acquisition Regulation provisions, including those related to the Truth-in-Negotiations 

Act and the Procurement Integrity Act. 

This statement is based on work we conducted over the last several years in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

ASPECTS OF FCS THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR INCLUSION IN FUTURE EFFORTS

There is no question the Army needs to ensure its forces are well-equipped. The 

Army has vigorously pursued FCS as the solution, a concept and an approach that 

is unconventional, yet with many good features that should be considered in future 

efforts. These features include a holistic, system-of-systems architectural vision, government insight into subcontractor selection and management, a focus on leveraging 

capabilities through an information network, and establishing organizations to train 

with and evaluate FCS-related spin-out technologies being provided to current 

forces. 

FCS resulted from Army leadership’s vision of how land forces should be organized, equipped, and trained to fight in the future. The decisions to pursue FCS, 

along with modular combat units, became the centerpiece for realizing this vision. 

To the Army’s credit, these decisions were harder than just replacing current combat systems, like the Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle, with new versions. 

Rather, Army leadership saw FCS as breaking with tradition. It was to be a system 

of systems—an overall architecture through which the collective capabilities of individual systems, both manned and unmanned, would be multiplied because of the 

synergistic effect of being linked by an advanced information network. 

Individual systems were to be designed to work within the architecture and the 

network—an improvement over a traditional, system-centric design approach that 

would integrate the systems after the fact. Army leadership also chose to cross its 

own stovepiped combat lines, such as infantry, armor, and fire support. The resultant scope of the FCS program was overly broad for a single acquisition program. 

Nonetheless, such a holistic view, anchored in a vision of how the land force of the 

future needs to fight, should continue to guide the modernization investments the 

Army makes. A context, it should be noted, does not necessarily equate to a program 

or programs. 

112 

While we have reported a number of risks associated with the LSI arrangement 

on FCS (which are discussed later), the insights the Army gained into subcontractors was beneficial. Army leadership set up the FCS program and LSI contract in 

such a way that it would create more competition and have more influence over the 

selection of subcontractors below the LSI. Traditionally, once the Army contracted 

with a prime contractor, that contractor would bring its own supplier chains, and 

the Army was not very involved in the choice of the subcontractors. In FCS, the 

Army called for the LSI to hold a competition for the next tier of contractors. The 

Army had veto power over these selections. The Army also directed that the LSI 

contract with integrators at lower levels in the program, and the Army was involved 

with these selections. These integrators held competitions to select suppliers for 

those systems. This strategy kept the first tier of subcontractors from bringing their 

own supplier chains, and the approach promoted competition and pushed Army visibility down lower into the supplier chain. It was also a means for the Army to ensure commonality of key subsystems across FCS platforms. Enhanced visibility into 

the selection and design decisions of subcontractors appears to have benefited the 

FCS program and warrants consideration in future efforts. 

The Army envisioned an unprecedented information network as the backbone of 

FCS. Inventing such a network while concurrently designing vehicles and other systems dependent on it was too grand an approach. However, the recognition that an 

integrated combat network should be deliberately designed versus derived or cobbled together from other systems was discerning. Since FCS began, the Army has 

achieved an understanding of what the information network needs to be, what may 

be technically feasible, how to build it, and how to demonstrate it. It has also consciously endeavored to develop the FCS network and software over time in a series 

of pre-planned blocks. Although work on such a network needs to be properly situated within the acquisition process and guided by requirements that are technically 

realistic, the deliberate development of an integrated network seems a sound approach. 

The Army initiated spin-out development in 2004, when it embarked on an effort 

to bring selected FCS capabilities, such as the unattended ground sensors and the 

non-line-of-sight launch system, to current forces while core FCS development continued. In 2006, the Army established the Army Evaluation Task Force to use, 

evaluate, and train with the spin-out capabilities, and the Task Force began its testing of the first FCS equipment in early 2008. As noted by both Army and DOD officials, the Task Force has proven quite useful in identifying system issues and suggesting design changes. Accordingly, the Army should continue utilizing the Task 

Force to better understand and improve its systems, spin out and otherwise. 

ASPECTS OF FCS THAT WERE PROBLEMATIC AND NEED RE-EXAMINATION

In our work, we found the greatest obstacle to the Army’s realizing its vision for 

FCS to be that the program was not executable within reasonable bounds of technical, engineering, time, or financial resources. The program was very immature 

when it began, never measuring up to DOD’s own standards for technology and design. Over time, adjustments were made such as adding development time and trading off requirements, but nonetheless, vehicle weights and software code grew substantially, key network systems were delayed, and technologies took longer to mature than planned. By 2009, whether FCS would work as planned remained 

undemonstrated. As we have reported, these difficulties do not necessarily represent 

problems that could have been avoided; rather, they reflect the actual immaturity 

of the program. Yet, to a large extent, these difficulties are foreseeable at the start 

of programs that do not apply the standards embodied in DOD’s own acquisition 

policies. 

Oversight of FCS was extremely challenging given the program’s vast scope and 

the innovative, but close, partner-like relationship between the Army and the LSI. 

OSD did not play an active oversight role, such as stringently applying its own acquisition policies, until about the past 2 years of the program. Congress intervened 

by mandating a go/no-go milestone decision to occur in late 2009. Oversight was further challenged by the pace of the program; the schedule for making decisions outpaced demonstrated knowledge to the extent that major production commitments 

were to be made before basic designs were to be demonstrated. Lessons from this 

experience should be applied to put future modernization efforts on the soundest 

footing possible for execution. 

Strategy to Acquire FCS Was Not Executable Within Projected Resources 

Originally, the Army intended to define thousands of requirements; mature critical technologies; and develop the network, manned and unmanned vehicles, and 

other systems within about 51⁄2 years from development start—much faster than a 

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2Pub. L. No. 109–364, § 214 (2006). 

3GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Decisions Needed to Shape Army’s Combat Systems for the Future, GAO–09–288 (Washington, DC: Mar. 12, 2009). 

single system typically takes. When FCS entered development in 2003, the Army 

had not yet established firm requirements that were matched with mature technologies and preliminary designs. Although the Army lengthened the development 

schedule to 10 years, it did not plan to demonstrate the level of knowledge needed 

at development start until 2009. 

In 2003, only 40 percent of the FCS critical technologies were nearing maturity, 

although DOD’s acquisition policy called for all critical technologies to be mature at 

development start. Originally, the Army officials believed it could mature the remaining technologies in just 3 years. While the Army has made significant progress, 

today it is still conducting evaluations to demonstrate minimum maturity levels for 

several critical technologies. Also, the Army needed capabilities being developed by 

programs outside of FCS to meet network and other requirements. However, these 

programs were immature as well, and synchronizing them with FCS proved elusive. 

In particular, the Joint Tactical Radio System and Warfighter Information NetworkTactical programs, the primary enablers of the network, experienced developmental 

delays that adversely affected the FCS schedule. As technologies, designs, and requirements evolved, key tradeoffs became necessary. For example, the weight of the 

manned ground vehicles grew from 19 tons to 29 tons, and the use of the C–130 

as the main transport aircraft had to be abandoned. 

The Army set forth an ambitious schedule for software development and the program as a whole. Originally, the Army anticipated 33 million lines of software code 

for FCS—which at the time made the program the largest software-intensive acquisition program in DOD history. That estimate has now grown to over 114 million 

lines of software code. The Army approach to managing the software effort has employed disciplined management practices, but these have been impaired by late and 

changing requirements. With such a schedule in mind, the Army allowed the program to proceed through developmental and test events without sufficient knowledge. Similarly, the Army was poised to begin early production without having adequately tested production-representative articles. 

In light of these and other risks, the John Warner National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2007 mandated that the Secretary of Defense carry out a Defense Acquisition Board milestone review of FCS not later than 120 days after the 

system-of-systems preliminary design review, which occurred in May 2009.2 According to the law, the milestone review should include an assessment of: 

1. whether the warfighter’s needs are valid and can be best met with the concept of the program; 

2. whether the concept of the program can be developed and produced within 

existing resources; and 

3. whether the program should 

a. continue as currently structured; 

b. continue in restructured form; or 

c. be terminated. 

In our March 2009 report on FCS, we concluded that the Army would be challenged to convincingly demonstrate the level of knowledge needed to warrant an unqualified commitment to the FCS program at the milestone review.3 We identified 

a number of knowledge gaps that have persisted throughout the development program. Specifically, the FCS program has yet to show that critical technologies are 

mature, design issues have been resolved, requirements and resources are matched, 

performance has been demonstrated versus simulated, and costs are affordable. 

Also, network performance is largely unproven. In summary, we determined that 

the FCS program was not executable within Army cost and schedule projections. 

The pace of the program called for key commitments in advance of needed information. For example, the Army had scheduled only 2 years between the critical design review and the production decision in 2013, leaving little time to gain knowledge between the two events. As a result, FCS was planning to rely on immature 

prototypes for making the decision to proceed into production. Also, by 2009, the 

Army had already spent about 60 percent of its planned development funds and 

schedule but had only proceeded to the preliminary design stage. That would have 

left only 40 percent of its financial and schedule resources left to complete what is 

typically the most challenging and expensive development work ahead. 

The timing of planned commitments to production funding put decision makers 

in the difficult position of making production commitments without knowing if FCS 

would work as intended. Facilitization costs were planned to begin in fiscal year 

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2011, the budget for which would have been presented to Congress in February 

2010, several months prior to the planned FCS critical design review. Further, in 

February 2011, when Congress would have been asked to approve funding for initial 

low-rate production of core FCS systems, the Army would not yet have proven that 

the FCS network and the program concept worked. 

Oversight Challenges Were Too Great 

The relationship between the Army and the LSI was shaped by the ambitious 

scope of the FCS program and limitations in the Army’s ability to manage it. The 

relationship is complex; on one hand, the LSI has played the traditional contractor 

role of developing a product for the Army. On the other hand, the LSI has also acted 

like a partner to the Army, ensuring the design, development, and prototype implementation of the FCS network and systems. The Army believed this relationship 

would offer more real-time, better informed decisions; reduce rework; and provide 

increased flexibility to adjust to new demands. While a close partner-like relationship offers benefits, such as the government and the contractor working together on 

a continual basis to decide what work is to be done, the partner-like relationship 

between the Army and the LSI broke new ground. As such, it posed oversight risks 

such as the government becoming increasingly vested in the results of shared decisions and being less able to provide oversight, especially when the government is 

disadvantaged in terms of workforce and skills. The Institute for Defense Analysis 

has also reported on the risks of the Army and LSI relationship, noting that the 

government cannot expect contractors to act in the best interest of the government 

as that could potentially conflict with their corporate financial interests. The Institute recommended that the Army take steps to ensure that it has, and continually 

uses, a competent internal capability to develop a corporate Army position on key 

FCS issues such as measuring program status and trends as well as independent 

operational testing. 

Part of the Army’s original rationale for using an LSI was to keep the contractor’s 

efforts focused on development, rather than on production. Early on in the FCS program, steps were taken to reinforce this focus, such as strengthening organizational 

conflict of interest provisions. While the original Other Transactions Agreement for 

FCS development and demonstration contained an organizational conflict of interest 

clause that required certain safeguards be put into place if and when Boeing and 

SAIC competed for FCS subcontracts, the 2006 Federal Acquisition Regulationbased contract precluded the Boeing/SAIC team from competing for any FCS subcontract awards. By this time, Boeing already had prime responsibility for two critical software efforts. As the program evolved however, the LSI’s role in production 

grew. In 2007, the Army decided that the LSI should be the prime contractor for 

the first spin outs as well as low-rate production of FCS core systems. This was a 

significant change from the early steps taken to keep the LSI’s focus on development. 

The Army structured the FCS contract consistent with its desire to incentivize development efforts and make it financially rewarding for the LSI to make such efforts. In general, contracts are limited in that they cannot guarantee a successful 

outcome. As with many cost-reimbursable research and development contracts, the 

LSI was responsible to put forth its best effort on the development of the FCS capability. If, given that effort, the FCS capability falls short of needs, the LSI would 

not be responsible, would still be entitled to have its costs reimbursed, and may 

earn its full fee. Specific aspects of the contract could make it even more difficult 

to tie the LSI’s performance to the actual outcomes of the development effort. Under 

the terms of the FCS contract, the LSI could earn over 80 percent of its $2.3 billion 

fee by the time the program’s critical design review is completed in 2011, and the 

Army would have paid out roughly 80 percent of contract costs by that point. Yet 

the actual demonstration of individual FCS prototypes and the system-of-systems 

would have taken place after the design review. Our work on past weapon system 

programs shows that most cost growth—symptomatic of problems—occurs after the 

critical design review. The Army shared responsibility with the LSI for making 

some key FCS decisions and to some extent the Army’s performance could thus affect the performance of the LSI. 

OSD’s oversight did not compensate for these risks early in the program. OSD has 

largely accepted the program and its changes as defined by the Army, even though 

it is at wide variance from the best practices embodied in OSD’s own acquisition 

policies. Until recently, OSD had passed on opportunities to hold the FCS program 

accountable to more knowledge-based acquisition principles. Despite the fact that 

the program did not meet the requisite criteria for starting an acquisition program, 

OSD approved the program’s entrance into system development and demonstration 

in 2003. OSD later reevaluated the decision and decided to hold a follow-on review 

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with a list of action items the program had to complete in order to continue. However, this review never occurred and the FCS program continued as originally 

planned. Furthermore, OSD did not plan to conduct another review and decision 

point until the 2013 production decision, when it would be too late to have a material effect on the course of the program. In addition, OSD has allowed the Army 

to use its own cost estimates rather than independent—and often higher—cost estimates when submitting annual budget requests. 

Over the last couple years, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has taken steps to improve oversight on the FCS program. For 

instance, in 2007, the Under Secretary deemed the non-line-of-sight cannon program 

as being in need of special attention, so he designated the program as special interest and declared that his office would be the decision authority on production. Also, 

in 2008, the Under Secretary issued a directive to pursue alternate arrangements 

for any future FCS contracts. The Under Secretary found that the fixed fee was too 

high and the fee structure allows industry to receive most of the incentive fee dollars prior to demonstrating integrated FCS system-of-systems capability. The Under 

Secretary also directed that the Army conduct a risk-based assessment to examine 

contracting alternatives for FCS capability. This assessment is to evaluate opportunities for procurement breakout of the individual platforms and systems that comprise FCS and how the government’s interests are served by contracting with the 

LSI as compared to contracting directly with the manufacturers of the items. 

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SHAPING FUTURE ARMY GROUND FORCE MODERNIZATION

EFFORTS

In April, the Secretary of Defense announced plans to cancel the FCS manned 

ground vehicle and non-line-of-sight cannon development and initiate a new ground 

combat vehicle program that leverages successful outcomes from FCS investments 

and incorporates lessons learned from current combat operations. Explaining the rationale for his decision, the Secretary noted that FCS vehicle designs did not reflect 

lessons learned from combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and that the contract fee 

structure provided little leverage to promote cost efficiency. 

As the Army proceeds to modernize and ensure its ground forces are well 

equipped for current and future operations, there are several important factors to 

consider, and some questions to answer. While the Army and DOD are in the early 

stages of deciding how to proceed with modernization, it appears likely that rather 

than a single program like FCS going forward, several programs with more targeted 

objectives will emerge. For example, the spin-out program may continue in an accelerated form and a program to develop a new family of manned ground vehicles will 

likely be pursued per the Secretary of Defense’s direction. It is also conceivable that 

a program focused on developing an information network would also be considered. 

Regardless of how the Army’s ground force modernization program is structured 

or managed, some key principles will have to be embodied. These include: 

• Knowledge-based acquisition: any emergent modernization programs 

should be put on the soundest footing possible for success, by following 

DOD’s latest acquisition policy that spans the initial decision to pursue a 

material solution, analysis of alternatives, concept formulation, technology 

maturation, requirements definition, incremental system design and development, production, and fielding. Sound systems engineering practices 

should be the guide throughout these phases. 

• Sound cost estimating: Any emergent program following a knowledgebased approach should be well understood and defined sufficiently to facilitate realistic cost estimates with reasonable levels of confidence. In order 

to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and reliability of these estimates, 

independent cost estimates should be completed and assessed before approval into the product development phases. 

• Transparency and accountability for oversight: The emerging programs 

need to include sufficiently detailed and transparent reporting approaches 

to facilitate oversight. Those should include an acquisition strategy that 

features demonstrations of knowledge before planned commitments to future phases and additional funding; a contracting strategy that features as 

much competition as possible and protections for the government’s interests; complete justification materials to support budget requests; and a 

clear and understandable framework for selected acquisition and earned 

value management reporting. 

Beyond these principles, the Army will have to tailor its approaches to the needs 

of the individual programs that emerge, allowing for the different challenges they 

represent. For example, the current spin-out program is in the late stages of develVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00121 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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opment, approaching production. The Army now plans to field at least some FCS 

equipment and some portion of the FCS network to its current 73 Brigade Combat 

Teams. We have reported that the pace of the spin-out program has been hurried, 

not allowing enough time to test and evaluate production-representative prototypes 

before beginning production. Specifically, it is unclear whether the Army will be 

testing with the specific equipment it plans to produce and use. To date, that has 

not been the case. Testing thus far has employed spin-out systems that are surrogate and non-production representative, and are thus not in the form that will be 

fielded. Using such systems is problematic because it does not conclusively show 

how well the actual systems perform. Additionally, we do not know how the Army 

plans to determine the content and schedule of future FCS spin-out phases. 

Notional plans for the new ground combat vehicle program include a goal of fielding the new vehicles within 5–7 years, with concept development efforts underway. 

This program will likely revert back to a pre-acquisition phase. This effort will involve different organizations, such as those involved with science and technology, 

different strategies, and different contracting approaches than the spin-out program. 

The risks for the ground combat vehicle program will be different and will have to 

be addressed differently. For example, under FCS, vehicles were being designed as 

network-dependent, a risky approach as the network has not yet been developed. 

In addition to the Secretary of Defense’s direction that the new program incorporate 

lessons learned from current operations, the Army may have to consider whether 

the vehicle designs should be network-enhanced versus network-dependent. An incremental approach would allow the vehicle designs to incorporate increasing network capabilities as they became available. 

While we do not know at this point how the Army plans to approach the development of an information network, its acquisition approach may also have to retrench 

to a pre-acquisition phase to reconsider how best to proceed to manage risks in line 

with DOD acquisition policy and to meet the direction of the Secretary of Defense. 

While some elements of the network may be further advanced than some of the vehicle work, the concept itself and how to test and evaluate its performance in large 

scale may present greater challenges than the vehicle program. Again, the network 

may need a different acquisition and contracting approach, as well as involvement 

from different organizations, than either the spin out or manned ground vehicle program. 

In proceeding forward with a different modernization approach, there are several 

questions or issues that will have to be addressed. These include: 

• Closing out or restructuring current contractual arrangements: Depending on what the Army decides to do with the new ground vehicle program, 

it will have to restructure or possibly terminate the existing FCS contract. 

To help in that process, it would be useful for the Army to have a more 

detailed understanding about the factors that influenced the Secretary of 

Defense’s recommendation to cancel the current FCS vehicle development 

effort. Whereas the Secretary’s decision could be interpreted as a determination that the FCS concept would not meet current needs, it is not clear 

at this point what is required to satisfy current military needs. 

• Transferring knowledge from current FCS efforts to emergent programs: 

The Army should carry forward knowledge already gained from the significant investments in FCS systems development. While the Army plans to 

capture and use what has been learned, doing so depends in large part on 

whether that knowledge can be transferred to a follow-on program. For example, the Army and LSI have been jointly managing the development of 

FCS software centrally. That effort included software for the information 

network, manned ground vehicles, and other individual FCS systems. As 

the Army proceeds to structure the multiple programs, it will need to coordinate what may be multiple separate software development and demonstration efforts. 

• Transition of FCS information network to current Army forces: Depending on how the Army proceeds with an information network, there are questions as to how it can be transferred to the current forces. None of the existing equipment in the current forces has been developed with such a network in mind. As part of the spin-out evaluation process, the Army encountered difficulties last year in trying to integrate even a small portion of the 

FCS network. Furthermore, the Abrams and Bradley vehicles have space, 

weight, and power constraints that may limit their ability to be integrated 

with an FCS-like network. Additionally, it is not clear whether the Army 

will be developing and fielding vehicles like the proposed FCS command 

and control vehicle and reconnaissance and surveillance vehicle, which were 

to be key components of the FCS network. 

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• Early emphasis on key development and design considerations: Previously, we have commended the Army’s efforts to break from traditional 

thinking with its early emphasis on key development and design considerations. Specifically, the Army defined the larger context within which it 

wanted its new assets and capabilities to work, emphasizing open system 

designs and interoperability early in development, rather than as an afterthought. Further, we have noted the productive nature of the Army’s early 

consideration and focus on challenging issues like sustainability. As the 

Army ground force modernization effort goes forward, the Army will need 

to find ways to retain this broader focus across multiple programs. 

• Moving from a single program structure to multiple programs: The 

Army’s preliminary plans for the FCS restructuring call for several separate programs, including those for the new ground combat vehicles, the information network, and the FCS spin-out effort. As it shaped the original 

FCS program, the Army made a concerted effort to reduce the influence of 

the various ‘‘stovepipes’’ within its user organization and set up a unitary 

management structure. Separate programs may differ greatly from the centralized structure of the FCS program to date and would have consequences 

that need to be considered. On the one hand, separate structures might 

lend themselves more readily to better oversight within each area. On the 

other hand, multiple programs may require more staffing and might introduce various and competing objectives rather than maintain singular focus 

on interoperability and other key objectives. 

• Balancing investments between future capabilities and keeping fielded 

systems as capable as possible: The Army will have to strike a balance between near-term and long-term needs, realistic funding expectations, and a 

sound execution plan as it moves on the new FCS path forward. The Army’s 

FCS budget material for fiscal year 2010, which includes the new ground 

combat vehicle program, provides little detail and no long-term perspective. 

DOD, Army, and Congress will eventually have to agree on the magnitude 

of funds that can be devoted to ground force modernization and how that 

money should be allocated among near-, mid-, and long-term needs. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Army’s experience with FCS has been productive. Its vision, holistic context, 

recognition of network potential, and penchant for innovative managerial and experimentation techniques, are worthy of emulation. On the other hand, the difficulties in executing and overseeing the program were apparent at the outset of the program—they were not unexpected discoveries made along the way. The key in going 

forward is to take the best from both kinds of lessons and applying them, in a tailored way, to the different modernization efforts that will succeed FCS. The Army 

and DOD should continue to be innovative as to concepts and approaches, but anchored in knowledge-based strategies when it comes to proposing a specific system 

development effort. Differences in the task at hand should warrant different approaches. At one end of the spectrum, spin outs are in late development, where the 

focus should be on testing and production preparations. At the other end of the spectrum are efforts to develop a new family of manned ground vehicles and an information network. These would be in early stages of development, in which informed decisions on technologies and requirements will be key. Even within these two developmental efforts, different technical and managerial approaches may be necessary, 

for more is known about developing and projecting the performance of vehicles than 

is known about a network. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer 

any of your questions. 

CONTACTS AND STAFF ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For future questions about this statement, please contact me on (202) 512–4841 

or francisp@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include 

William R. Graveline, Assistant Director; Marcus C. Ferguson; William C. 

Allbritton; Noah B. Bleicher; Helena Brink; and Tana M. Davis. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Francis. That was very interesting testimony. 

We’re at a point where significant changes are being made in the 

FCS program. One explanation of that is that it is totally the result 

of budgetary constraints. But I would take it that neither of you 

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would agree with that. Am I right? It’s not totally because of budget pressure? 

Mr. AHERN. No, sir, I would not agree with that. No, sir, I don’t 

think that that was the issue at all. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Francis? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Congress had mandated that 

go/no-go decision in 2009, and I don’t think FCS was going to measure up to that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. So this leads us to the conclusion that 

if it wasn’t just the shortage of money that something was wrong 

with the program, at least as it was going forward. Now the Secretary has come in, and the President, with a restructuring of it. 

Mr. Francis gave us some negatives. It’s an interesting question—I made notes on your positives and negatives from the FCS 

experience—whether the negatives were inherent and unavoidable 

in the positives or whether they were avoidable. In other words, if 

you have, on the positive side, a holistic program that’s a breakthrough, where you have an innovative managerial approach, were 

the shortcomings that you then see about the program not being 

executable within resources available, oversight challenges too 

great, et cetera, were those inevitable or was it possible to achieve 

the positives here without incurring the negatives? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think it was, Mr. Chairman. If we look at where 

the program is now, after I think an extraordinary effort to develop 

the requirements, the software, the technologies, and so forth, the 

program’s at the point where the Army could now start a MGV program based on a solid basis of technology where it knows what it 

can and can’t do. 

I think I agree we have to be thinking in terms of systems-ofsystems, but there are different sizes and perhaps that was a bit 

too large to manage. But I think if you took that managerial approach and took a system-of-systems perspective and pushed very 

hard in the pre-acquisition phases, then I think when you came up 

for a decision on whether to start an acquisition program you 

would then allow the requirements to be tempered by what you can 

do technically, be technically realistic. 

So I think the start point was really the problem. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Ahern, let me ask you to respond to 

some of Mr. Francis’s comments, just in terms of lessons learned 

and where we go from here. You made an interesting, I thought 

significant, statement that at different times OSD actually had 

higher cost estimates for the FCS system than the Army did, but 

essentially let the Army go ahead. I think I’ve heard it correctly. 

How do you respond to that? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir, that’s what Mr. Francis said. I was not 

aware of that. There are always program office estimates and OSD 

or Cost Analysis Improvement Group estimates. Typically, we try 

to reconcile the differences between them to get the right cost estimate going forward. I would have to go back in history and ask a 

question about that specifically. I don’t have that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay, good enough. Why did that happen, 

do you think? Why did OSD yield to the Army? 

Mr. AHERN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think there’s a requirement 

that the OSD estimate be adhered to. But I think the big difference 

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was over software and the OSD estimate forecast a much larger 

software effort than the Army had programmed. I’m not sure why 

they deferred to the Army, but I do know that was the main difference between the two estimates. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. How about, Mr. Ahern, the conclusion that 

Mr. Francis presented that the Army had in some senses or cases 

too close a relationship with the lead systems integrator? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. The relationship between Boeing, SAIC, and 

the Army. The Army depended upon Boeing to a greater degree 

going forward. I’m not sure of the characterization as too close a 

relationship with them. It is a government-contracted, Federal Acquisition Regulation-contracted relationship with them, with the 

standard clauses and structure to it. So I’m not sure where he’s referring to. 

I do understand, initially anyway, there was a perception that 

Boeing was undertaking some of what had been government jobs 

or normal government positions. But of late, at least to my knowledge, it’s a standard government and prime relationship between 

Boeing and the government. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you want to flesh out that conclusion 

just a bit, about why did you conclude that in some cases the Army 

was too close to the lead systems integrator? In other words, what 

was the basis of that conclusion? 

Mr. FRANCIS. A few things, Mr. Chairman. One was the immaturity of the program when it started. So requirements were very 

soft, technologies weren’t well-defined. So the lead system integrator was involved in decisions both on what was required as well 

as what the solution was. 

I think a second thing is the level. In this case, the lead system 

integrator, rather than in a traditional prime arrangement, where 

you have, say, a contractor who’s developing a platform and integrating subsystems, in this case you had a contractor developing a 

system-of-systems where the subcontractors had major platforms. 

The third thing was, the lead system integrator was to act as the 

Army’s agent in a lot of these decisions. Initially when the contract 

was set up, the Army was careful and this subcommittee in particular made it emphatic that the lead system integrator was to 

focus on development. There was a pretty high fee on development 

and there was an attempt to keep the lead system integrator financially disinterested in production, so it could focus on the Army’s 

interests. 

Over time that focus was lost and in 2007 the Army decided it 

would allow the lead system integrator to be the prime for the 

spinout production and low rate initial production of FCS core systems. So it did develop a financial interest in production. Given the 

size of the FCS program and it being almost synonymous with the 

future Army, we could see that developing naturally. I’m not saying 

it was necessarily improper, but you did then need another layer 

of oversight to make good decisions about the program, which is 

where we are looking to OSD. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That was not there? 

Mr. FRANCIS. That was not there, yes. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You listed the innovation in the managerial 

approach, which is to say the lead system integrator, as one of the 

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positive take-aways as well. So am I correct in putting these two 

together and saying that you would go with something like that 

again with the lead system integrator, but provide the greater oversight that was not there this time? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I wouldn’t rule it out. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But you apparently don’t favor it, really, on 

balance? 

Mr. FRANCIS. There are a number of risks with it, and it hasn’t 

worked out in other programs. The Coast Guard has tried it with 

the Deep Water Project. There was an attempt in missile defense, 

and I think there are some problems with it on the Secure Border 

Initiatives. So it’s unproven. If we’re going to try it, maybe it needs 

to be tried on a smaller scale. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

FCS as a system of systems was enormously complicated to develop and acquire. What steps has the Army taken to increase the 

capacity of its acquisition workforce to develop and buy these complicated systems? 

Mr. AHERN. The Secretary of Defense has articulated his intent 

to grow the acquisition community over the next couple of years, 

the next FYDP period of, I believe, 20,000 individuals, of which 

5,400 are intended to go to the Army. There’s a split in that. I believe 10,000 are actually growth in strength and the other 10,000 

in round numbers are transition from contractor to government individuals. Again, the Army will be growing 5,400 of those. 

Senator THUNE. In recent years the Army has had difficulty both 

in developing a holistic modernization strategy and in executing 

particular modernization programs. The Comanche, Crusader, 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH), and of course FCS probably come to mind as the most notable examples of programs that 

were cancelled or restructured after large investments of time and 

money. 

You’ve touched on this, Mr. Francis, in your testimony and in response to questions from the chairman. But just if you could again 

lay out what, in your view, are the key principles to improving the 

force modernization programs. 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think as you look back on those you can identify 

flaws in what we would call the business case at the start. I think 

in the case of the Comanche, I worked on that program back in 

1983 when it was called the Light Helicopter Experimental, the 

original concept was for it to be like the Humvee, just a universal 

airframe that you could equip to perform different missions. 

When it exited the requirements process, it became the Next 

Generation Reconnaissance Helicopter Tank Killer. It was actually 

more capable in many ways than the Apache. At that point then, 

the requirements outstripped the technology. So we had to go 

through a significant technology development effort to meet the requirements. 

By the time the program really got on a sound footing, the threat 

had changed, and I think that’s the reason the helicopter was cancelled. So again, I’d look at the business case there. 

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I think on the ARH, it was a little bit different scenario in that 

most of the technologies were mature. So the idea was to take different technologies off the shelf and bundle them together in a single airframe. But in that case the Army didn’t allow enough time 

for the integration and presented a program that was going to 

move really fast. For those of us who were around when the OH– 

58D was equipped with a mast-mounted sight, we knew how long 

that integration effort took. So again, I think the business case for 

the ARH wasn’t a technology issue, but a schedule issue. 

I think in FCS, we’ve seen both. On the one hand why you can 

be a bit frustrated with that, I think these are all take-aways. I 

think really tightening down on what we need to know about requirements and technology and costs and schedule when we launch 

a new system is somewhere where the Army can get real payoff 

here and some real help from OSD. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Ahern, OSD is charged with overseeing 

major defense acquisition programs, including FCS. Yet with all 

that oversight, the recommendation to restructure FCS came very 

abruptly. My question is, should the challenges that were noted by 

Secretary Gates in his recommendation have been addressed sooner by OSD? 

Mr. AHERN. As I noted in my statement, sir, we were beginning 

to move toward the spinouts and focusing on the early spinouts as 

early as 2007 and 2008, and breaking them out with an entire set 

of documentation, the capability production document, an acquisition strategy, and a test and evaluation master plan. So I think we 

were moving in that direction. 

In regards to the networking and the additional BCT modernization the Secretary called for, I think we were on top of that and 

working in that direction. The Secretary’s work on the MGV, his 

concern that it did not address some of the lessons learned and 

that perhaps it needed to, as Mr. Francis indicated a couple of minutes ago, were other areas that he looked at, I think is the way for 

me to say it. 

It wasn’t a question of the need, and the Secretary’s been very 

clear about that. It was whether the Army program was the right 

program at the time going forward, recognizing lessons learned out 

of Iraq and the incorporation of some of the other vehicles, as the 

MRAP vehicle, that had been put into the field. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Francis, how would you characterize OSD’s 

oversight of FCS? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think that early on OSD was rather passive about 

FCS and the program proceeded in 2003 even though it was by any 

measure of DOD’s acquisition policy not ready for a start. Yet it did 

go ahead. There have been a number of occasions, I think, where 

OSD could have stepped in and taken some action. 

For example, after that initial decision in 2003, OSD said in 18 

months it was going to have a second milestone decision to clean 

up the issues that it hadn’t covered in the first one, and then never 

held that milestone decision. So I think early on OSD could have 

done a lot more. We talked about cost estimates before. I was 

thinking about the question that you just asked, about the Secretary of Defense’s intervention. I know this committee had a leadership in the acquisition reform legislation that just went through. 

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I think it’s a question that a taxpayer would ask or anyone here, 

which is, with all the processes that were in place at the time and 

all the policies, why did it take an extraordinary action on the part 

of the Secretary of Defense to right-size the modernization? Why 

didn’t all the standards work? 

I think going forward we have to think in terms of acquisition 

reform, if we don’t stay true to those standards and those reforms 

and allow programs to go through that don’t abide, then we’re actually rewarding programs with money that fly in the face of all the 

hard work on policy. So I think it’s a really good question to ask 

and something that will provide some instruction for going forward. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Ahern, would you agree that the requirements that FCS was developing toward were unrealistic? 

Mr. AHERN. No, sir. Holistically, the requirements they’re working for, no, sir. I think in terms of the system-of-systems, of the 

networking of the sensors that they intend to have, of the vehicles 

that they’re going to be utilizing, the incorporation of those is valid, 

and I think that the recently completed preliminary design review 

indicates that the requirements are stable for the individual capabilities and that as a system-of-systems that they’ve taken it under 

configuration management and that it is a valid set of requirements going forward. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Francis, do you agree? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I don’t think we know if they’re realistic yet. I 

think the requirements were set before we knew what was technically feasible. So I think there’s been a lot of work to rationalize 

or reconcile the requirements and technologies. I would agree on 

the MGVs a lot is understood now, but, for example with the network, the network is quite a revolutionary network. There’s nothing like it today. It’s mobile. It’s ad hoc. It’ll handle a huge volume. 

There are requirements for it that we don’t know whether it will 

meet yet. 

So I think a lot of the feasibility of the requirements is to be determined yet. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen, very much 

for your testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Thune. 

Just one more wrap-up question and then one on behalf of Senator Inhofe. Bottom line, can we say that the taxpayers have gotten 

or will get their money’s worth out of what we’ve invested in the 

FCS? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. I think that the payoff, what we’ve learned, 

the technologies that have been developed, matured, in the 5-year 

period of time that the program has been under way, that will be 

implemented initially in the spinouts and then in the generation to 

follow of the vehicles, there isn’t any question in my mind that, 

with the right discipline in the acquisition system—and that’s what 

I think we’ve been talking about for the last few minutes, the discipline that’s needed as we go forward with the four or five separate programs, whether it’s the network or the vehicles or the sensors—yes, sir, I am sure that we will achieve that capability. 

We’re going to be working to modernize the Army for a number 

of years holistically across it. Yes, sir, I think it was the right apVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:27 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52623.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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proach, the discipline. We will realize the investment that’s been 

made in FCS, as evidenced by the preliminary design review, 

which I take it was quite successful. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Francis, how would you answer that? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Chairman, I’d say the FCS program has been 

very productive. I think what has been accomplished has been phenomenal in terms of understanding the software, the requirements, 

moving all the technologies, developing the concepts for employment, and so forth. 

But the question of value is a very good one, and I don’t know 

quite how to answer that, because I would hypothesize that had we 

attempted to do this, say, in a pre-acquisition phase with a smaller 

workforce, perhaps focusing first on the network to see what we 

could do there and then allow that work to inform what we could 

do on the vehicles, it’s possible we could have been nearly as productive for a smaller investment. I’m hypothesizing there, but I 

think that’s the question. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I hope we’ve all learned. I agree with you, 

we’re going to get a lot out of it, we’ve already gotten a lot out of 

it, some of it quite amazing really in technological advances. Hopefully, we’ve learned a lot about how to better manage a program 

like this. Your word, Mr. Ahern, is a good one: discipline. 

Let me finally, on Senator Inhofe’s behalf, ask you the question. 

I think you were here, but I gather that he wanted me to follow 

on that he has asked Secretary Gates for his comments on DOD’s 

plan or recommendation for accommodating existing law on the 

non-line-of-sight cannon, but has not yet received a reply. What is 

your reply? What is DOD’s plan there? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. As General Thompson said, we’re working 

through the language, the precision to ensure that we get it right, 

to represent the direction that we have as well as the statutory requirements. We will be communicating with Congress—I am confident of that—in order to get it right, straight across the board. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. One thing I’m confident of is that Senator 

Inhofe will stay on this until he gets that answer. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So the sooner the better. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I thank you both. It’s been a very constructive panel and it helps to guide us as we go forward to our markup 

next week, but really more to the point, to guide you and us, DOD 

and Congress, about how better to oversee the expenditure of large 

sums of taxpayer money to achieve the result that we want for our 

soldiers. 

Thank you very much. The record of the hearing will stay open 

until Thursday at 5 p.m. for additional statements or questions, 

and if you get additional questions we hope that you’ll answer 

them as soon as possible. 

Senator Thune, do you want to add anything? 

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Senator THUNE. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you both for your service. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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