alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 15

- 00119

- CV

City of Carrollton, Texas

v.

Milan Hamrla, Petra Chudejova,
Michael and Laura Brewer, Dalia Chavarria, Diane and Gene Hines,

and Keith Effert §

§

§

§

§ From the 442nd Distr ict Court

of Denton County (2012

- 70581

- 431)

January 7, 2016

Opinion by Justice Walker



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the

trial court is revers ed and we rend er a judgment granting the City of Carrollton’ s

plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Appellees’ claims.

It is further ordered that Appellees Milan Hamr la, Petra Chudejova,

Michael and Laura Brewer, Dalia Chavarria, Diane and Gene Hines, and Keith

Effert shall pay all of the costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By

__ /s/ Sue Walker

___________________ Justice Sue Walker
EXHIBIT
32.1





SECTION
1350 CERTIFICATION





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Sunnyside Acres Mobile Estates (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2009, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Hui Peng Cheng, President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
knowledge:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.





Date:
August 14, 2009




By:
                      /s/
      Hui Peng ChengHui
      Peng ChengPresident
      and Chief Financial Officer
HWGC DRONE PRE-FLIGHT

CHECKLIST

1. BEFORE YOU LEAVE THE OFFICE 

☐ Notify Job Site you are coming. 

☐ Check weather. 

☐ Check No-Fly Zones for the area. 

☐ Determine if any special exemptions are required to fly in the area. 

☐ Check condition of all equipment. 

☐ Make sure all batteries are fully charged – both aircraft and transmitter. 

2. WHEN YOU ARRIVE AT JOB SITE 

☐ Check that all appropriate signage is posted. 

☐ Conduct Pre-Flight Conference with Project Team. 

☐ Determine and secure appropriate take-off and landing area. 

☐ Inform all personnel on site of the drone operations. 

☐ Review flight path and any special views / photos that are required. 

☐ Review Weather 

3. PRE-FLIGHT CHECK 

☐ Check condition of all equipment and batteries (must be fully charged). 

☐ Verify Prop installation and rotation are correct and secure. 

☐ Communication to Visual Observer (VO) the flight plan and expectations. 

☐ Disengage Camera Lock and Remove Lens cover. 

☐ Turn on Transmitter. 

☐ Check channel availability. 

☐ Turn on Drone. 

☐ Calibrate Drone. 

☐ Start and check motors. 

☐ Visually check area before take-off. 

☐ Take-off and hover 5’ AGL, verify controls and stability. 
Page 2 

4. FLIGHT RULES 

☐ Use caution, don’t fly over people. 

☐ Keep Drone in Line of Sight at all Times. 

☐ Stay within verbal communication distance of VO at all times. 

☐ Monitor airspace restrictions and battery life. 

☐ Only fly during Daylight hours. 

☐ Don’t take unnecessary risk. 

5. POST FLIGHT

☐ Disconnect Drone Battery. 

☐ Turn off transmitter. 

☐ Check for Damage. 

☐ Inform Job Site that flight operations are complete. 

☐ Fill out Aircraft and Pilot Log.
#### Erich S. Herrmann, Inc. v. United States

No. 7887.

Entry No. 719903.

(Decided September 28, 1950)

*John D. Bode*for the plaintiff.

*David N. Edelstein,*Assistant Attorney General *(Chauncey E. Wilowski,*special, attorney), for the defendant.

Rao, Judge:

The merchandise involved in this appeal was the-subject of reappraisement 157019-A which was submitted for decision upon a stipulation of fact wherein it was agreed that the issues, were the same in all material respects as those the subject of decision in the case of *United States*v. *Wrn. S. Pitcairn Corp.,*33 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 183, C. A. D. 334, which involved the so-called British, purchase tax. Accordingly, on November 22, 1946, this court held, in *E. S. Herrmann, Inc., et al.*v. *United States,*17 Cust. Ct. 429, Reap. *437Dec. 6544, that export value, as defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, was the proper basis for the determination of the value ■of the instant merchandise and that such values were the appraised values, less the addition made by the importer on entry because of ¡advances by the appraiser in similar cases. There was no appeal from the judgment entered in conformity with said decision.

This appeal is before me at this time by reason of the fact that on •January 17, 1949, the collector sent the importer another notice of appraisement by which the importer was notified that the appraised value exceeded the entered value.

When the instant appeal was called for hearing, counsel for both parties moved for a dismissal thereof. In support of said motion, ■counsel for plaintiff asserted that:

> Now, it is the contention of the importer first, that the, question of the dutiable value of this merchandise is res adjudicata, there having been a decision and judgment of this court already made. Second, that this second notice of .appraisement from which the instant appeal was filed was erroneously issued and is illegal and void and should be cancelled or withdrawn. Third, that since it was an illegal notice, the instant appeal should also be dismissed, and fourth, that the ■entry should proceed to liquidation where any dispute as to the amount of the appraised value can be raised by protest.

The motion of counsel for the Government was predicated upon the sole ground that the case has been previously decided.

In view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss this appeal is granted. Judgment will be entered accordingly.
#### In the Matter of Carlton E., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Respondent.

[611 NYS2d 531]

—Order of the Family Court, New York County (Jeffry Gallet, J.), entered January 13, 1993, which granted a motion by the respondent, Carlton E., to dismiss, without prejudice, the juvenile delinquency petition against him, is unanimously reversed, on the law and facts, and the petition is reinstated and remanded for further proceedings, without costs or disbursements.

The Family Court, in this matter, committed reversible error when it dismissed the petition charging respondent with the attempted rape and sexual abuse of two nine year old children based upon the Presentment Agency’s purported failure to timely proceed with the fact-finding hearing.

*109Section 340.1 of the Family Court Act sets forth the "speedy hearing” provisions governing juveniles before the court in delinquency proceedings. A non-detained respondent, as here, must be brought before a fact-finding hearing within 60 days of his initial appearance (Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]). That date in this case was November 6, 1992, the date specified in the order of removal to the Family Court by the New York County Supreme Court (Family Ct Act § 340.1 [3]). The section further provides that the Family Court may adjourn the hearing for up to 30 days on its own motion (Family Ct Act § 340.1 [4] [a]), or upon a showing of "good cause”, on motion of the Presentment Agency (Family Ct Act § 340.1 [4] [a]) or the respondent (Family Ct Act § 340.1 [4] [b]). In addition, further adjournments may be granted upon a showing of "special circumstances” (Family Ct Act § 340.1 [6]).

It is true that the adjourned hearing date of January 13, 1993 was the 68th day, rather than the mandated 60th day from the date of respondent’s initial appearance. However, the record shows that at the December 15, 1992, fact-finding hearing, the respondent’s law guardian expressly waived his right to a speedy hearing under the Family Court Act and the subsequent adjournment was ordered by the Family Court upon mutual consent of the parties *(see, Matter of Hiram D.,*189 AD2d 730, 732). The Family Court inexplicably chose to overlook this prior adjournment, further delay caused by the law guardian’s unexplained absence on December 14, 1992, when the matter was scheduled for hearing, as well as the law guardian’s subsequent lateness for the fact-finding hearing on January 13, 1993. Instead, again inexplicably, it chose to deny the Presentment Agency’s request for a minimal one-hour adjournment to confer with the two nine year old witnesses who had arrived late on the morning in question, before they testified to the very serious charges of attempted rape and sexual abuse. The Presentment Agency demonstrated the requisite "good cause” and "special circumstances” for the minimal one-hour adjournment requested, and the Court abused its discretion in denying such adjournment and dismissing the petition *(see, Matter of Carlos T.,*187 AD2d 38). Concur—Carro, J. P., Kupferman, Asch, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAY 11 2004 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIAN K. BURKHOLDER,

Petitioner-Appellant,
v. L.E. BRUCE; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF KANSAS, Respondents-Appellees. No. 03-3259 (D.C. No. 02-CV-3275-JWL)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , ANDERSON , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Petitioner-appellant, proceeding pro se , appeals the district court’s order denying his petition for habeas corpus relief under28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted a certificate of appealability to con sider whether the state trial court had violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights (1 ) by denying petitioner’s motion to substitute counsel the day before his tri al for burglary and theft, or (2) by denying his motion in the alternative to proceed pro se in that trial. Petitioner alleges that the state trial court abuse d its discretion by finding his request to substitute counsel on the eve of tri al untimely and by not making further inquiry into why he had requested new couns el. Petitioner also asserts that the district court committed reversible error when it determined that he was not competent to represent himself because he was i lliterate and admitted that he did not understand the charges against him. We aff irm the denial of petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus for substantia lly the reasons stated by the district court. We review a district court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact, if any, for clear error. LaFevers v. Gibson , 182 F.3d 705, 711 (10th Cir. 1999). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2), no writ o f habeas corpus shall issue unless the decision of the state court either was “ contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Fe deral law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or . . . was ba sed on an unreasonable-3-

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Having reviewed the briefs, the record, and the standards applicable to petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, we hold thatpetitioner has raised no ground for a writ to issue in this case. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the denial of a writ of habeas corpus for substantially the reasons stated by the district court.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson Circuit Judge
Before the Second Division,

February 20, 1940

No. 43247.

#### Protest 958830-G of Greenberg & Josefsberg (New York).

Opinion by

Kincheloe, J.

It was stipulated that the coverings in question are usual containers similar to those the subject of Abstract 39013. The protest was therefore sustained.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 6740** 

JEROID J. PRICE , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v.
WAYNE MCCABE, Warden , Respondent

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Aiken
. J. Michelle Childs , District Judge. ( 1:11

- cv - 01172

- JMC )

Submitted : July 19, 2012 Decided: July 26, 2012

Before DUNCAN , AGEE, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Jeroid J. Price , Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka , Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 P ER CURIAM: Jeroid J. Price s eeks to appeal the district court’s order a ccepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and de nying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (A) (2006) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitution al right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debat able, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that P rice has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certif icate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2128 

To amend the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 

to clarify that all veterans programs are exempt from sequestration, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 17, 2012 

Mr. TESTER (for himself, Mr. BEGICH, and Mrs. SHAHEEN) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the 

Budget 

A BILL 

To amend the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 to clarify that all veterans programs 

are exempt from sequestration, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protecting the Health 

5 Care of Veterans Act of 2012’’. 

6 SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FOR ALL VET7 ERANS PROGRAMS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 256(e)(2) of the Balanced 

9 Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2128 IS

1 U.S.C. 906(e)(2)) is amended by striking subparagraph 

2 (E) (relating to veterans’ medical care). 

3 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The subsection head4 ing of section 256(e) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 906(e)) is 

5 amended by striking ‘‘, INDIAN HEALTH SERVICES AND

6 FACILITIES, AND VETERANS’ MEDICAL CARE’’ and insert7 ing ‘‘AND INDIAN HEALTH SERVICES AND FACILITIES’’. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.1

                        CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of  2002,  each of the  undersigned  officers  GS  AgriFuels
Corporation (the "Company"), certifies that:

     1.   The  Quarterly  Report  on Form  10-QSB of the  Company  for the three
          months  ended June 30, 2006 (the  "Report")  fully  complies  with the
          requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act
          of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

     2.   The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.




            /S/  Kevin Kreisler
            -------------------------------------
                 Kevin Kreisler
                 Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

Date:            August 21, 2006


This  certification  is made solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C.  Section  1350,
subject  to the  knowledge  standard  contained  therein,  and not for any other
purpose.
# C_2012343EN.01001603.xml

| 10.11.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 343/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 343/16

---

Action brought on 20 August 2012 — Brouwerij Van Honsebrouck v OHIM — Beverage Trademark (KASTEEL)

(Case T-375/12)

2012/C 343/28

Language in which the application was lodged: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Brouwerij Van Honsebrouck (Ingelmunster, Belgium) (represented by: P. Maeyaert, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Beverage Trademark Co. Ltd BTM (Tortola, British Virgin Islands)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | annul in its entirety the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 8 June 2012 in Case R 652/2011-2; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul in its entirety the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 8 June 2012 in Case R 652/2011-2;

| — | order OHIM and Beverage Trademark Co. Ltd BTM to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order OHIM and Beverage Trademark Co. Ltd BTM to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for the Community trade mark: The applicant

Applicant for the Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: The international word mark ‘KASTEEL’ for goods in Class 32 — International registration No W 975 634

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: Beverage Trademark Co. Ltd BTM

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: National trade mark ‘CASTEL BEER’ for goods in Class 32

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Opposition upheld

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Appeal dismissed

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law:

Pleas in law:

| — | Breach of Article 76(1) of Regulation No 207/2009; |
| --- | --- |

—

Breach of Article 76(1) of Regulation No 207/2009;

| — | Breach of Article 42 of Regulation No 207/2009; |
| --- | --- |

—

Breach of Article 42 of Regulation No 207/2009;

| — | Breach of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. |
| --- | --- |

—

Breach of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.

---
A98A2296.

#### In the Interest of M. C. J. et al., children.

(511 SE2d 533)

Johnson, Chief Judge.

The mother of M. C. J. and R. A. J. filed a petition in juvenile court to terminate the parental rights of the children’s biological father. The mother has physical custody of the children, and the father recently began serving a 40-year prison sentence in connection with the shooting of a man.

In her petition, the mother alleges that the children are deprived because of the father’s misconduct or inability. She requests, among other things, that the children be placed in her permanent custody. After a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights. The father filed a notice of appeal from the judgment. He and the children’s guardian ad litem filed separate but nearly identical enumerations of error and briefs.

1. The father and guardian ad litem argue that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. We agree that the mother was required to file the case in superior court and therefore vacate the juvenile court’s judgment.

In *Lewis v. Winzenreid,*263 Ga. 459 (435 SE2d 602) (1993), the Supreme Court held that the juvenile courts of this state should not entertain deprivation proceedings brought between parents to obtain custody. Thereafter, this Court has interpreted *Lewis*as meaning “that when the dispute is between parents, it is *prima facie a custody matter.*The superior court may determine the proceeding is a valid deprivation petition, and it can transfer the case to juvenile court as any court would do on finding it does not have jurisdiction.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) *In the Interest of W.W.W.,*213 Ga. App. 732, 734 (445 SE2d 832) (1994).

This Court reached the same result in *In the Interest of M. A.,*218 Ga. App. 433, 434 (461 SE2d 600) (1995), where we stated that all deprivation proceedings between parents must be brought in *226superior court; only the superior court may decide that a deprivation proceeding between parents is not a custody dispute.

Decided January 21, 1999

Reconsideration denied February 4, 1999

*Charles E. Day, Ann N. Garner,*for appellant.

*McNally, Edwards, Bailey & Lander, Kenneth J. Lander,*for appellees.

We recognize that *Lewis*and *In the Interest of W. W. W.,*unlike this case, involve non-custodial parents attempting to obtain custody. And, in our opinion, the instant case appears to be an actual deprivation case rather than a custody case. Nonetheless, the authority is clear: a deprivation petition brought between parents must be filed initially in superior court for a determination that it is indeed a valid deprivation case. In this case, there was no such determination. Because the juvenile court in these circumstances did not have proper subject matter jurisdiction, the judgment must be vacated. See *In the Interest of M. A.,*supra.

2. In light of the foregoing, we need not address the remaining enumerations of error.

*Judgment vacated.*

*Smith and Barnes, JJ, concur.*
EXHIBIT 99.1



                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I certify, pursuant to U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for
the quarter ended June 30, 2003, fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information
contained in such Quarterly Report fairly presents in all material respect the
financial condition and results of operations of Ashcroft Homes Corporation.

Date:    September 16, 2003           By:  /s/ Richard O. Dean
       ---------------------               --------------------------
                                           Richard O. Dean,
                                           Chairman of the Board and
                                           Chief Executive Officer



<PAGE>