COURT OF APPEALS 

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH 

NO. 02-16-00205-CV 

IN THE MATTER OF J.B., JR. 

 

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FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY 

TRIAL COURT NO. 323-102791-16 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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This is an appeal from a juvenile court’s order committing Appellant J.B., 

Jr. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department after he violated the terms of his 

probation. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05 (West Supp. 2016). J.B., Jr.’s 

court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in 

support of that motion. Counsel states that he has reviewed the record and 

 1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. 
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believes the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the 

requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of 

the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See

386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967); see also In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 

297 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (holding that Anders procedures apply to 

juvenile appeals). J.B., Jr.’s appellate counsel notified J.B., Jr., by mailing him a 

letter in care of his mother, that he had the right to file a pro se response to 

counsel’s Anders brief. We also notified J.B., Jr. and his mother of J.B., Jr.’s 

right to file a response to counsel’s Anders brief. J.B., Jr. has not filed a 

response. The State submitted a letter stating that it would not be filing a brief.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this 

court is obligated to independently examine the record. See Stafford v. State,

813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 

922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). When analyzing whether any 

grounds for appeal exist, we consider the record, the Anders brief, and any pro 

se response. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 

(orig. proceeding). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See 

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). 

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record, and 

we have discovered a clerical error in the commitment order. The order states 

that J.B., Jr. was born on the “2ND day of November, 1901,” but the record 
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reflects that he was born in 2001. Accordingly, we reform the commitment order 

to reflect that J.B., Jr. was born on the “2ND day of November, 2001.” See Bray 

v. State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 726 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (en banc) 

(holding that appellate courts have authority to reform judgments in Anders

appeals and to affirm judgments as reformed); see also Ferguson v. State, 

435 S.W.3d 291, 293–94 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, pet. struck) (collecting cases 

holding same). We otherwise agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly 

frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that arguably might 

support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2005); In re K.B., No. 02-11-00097-CV, 2012 WL 1868518, at *1 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth May 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Accordingly, we affirm the 

trial court’s order as modified. 

Ordinarily, upon finding that the appeal is frivolous, we would grant 

counsel’s motion to withdraw. But in In re P.M., a termination of parental rights 

appeal, our supreme court held––in reliance on family code section 

107.013 providing that appointed counsel continues to serve in that capacity until 

the date all appeals are exhausted or waived––that the mere filing of an Anders

brief in the court of appeals does not warrant the withdrawal of that counsel for 

purposes of proceeding in the supreme court. No. 15-0171, 2016 WL 1274748, 

at *3 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016) (order). The Juvenile Justice Code contains a similar 

provision: when, as in this case, the trial court finds a child’s family indigent and 

appoints counsel, that counsel must continue to represent the child “until the 
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case is terminated, the family retains an attorney, or a new attorney is appointed 

by the juvenile court.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.101 (West Supp. 2016) 

(emphasis added). The record does not show that either of the latter two events 

have occurred here, and under the reasoning of In re P.M., this case has not 

“terminated” because not all appeals have been exhausted. See 2016 WL 

1274748, at *2 & n.5, *3. Accordingly, even though we have affirmed the trial 

court’s order as modified, we nevertheless deny counsel’s motion to withdraw. 

See id. at *3; In re A.C., Nos. 01-15-00931-CV, 01-15-00932-CV, 01-15-00933-

CV, 2016 WL 1658777, at *1 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 26, 2016, no 

pet.) (mem. op.) (citing P.M. in denying counsel’s motion to withdraw in frivolous 

juvenile appeal). 

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr 

ELIZABETH KERR 

JUSTICE 

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; KERR and PITTMAN, JJ. 

DELIVERED: April 27, 2017