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S. HRG. 111–254 

CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS 

TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 10, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE

UNITED STATES

MARCH 10, 2009

Page 

Blair, Hon. Dennis C., Director, National Intelligence ......................................... 6 

Maples, LTG Michael D., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency .............. 41 

(III) 

(1) 

CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE 

THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF 

THE UNITED STATES 

TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 2009 

U.S. SENATE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, 

Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Graham, Thune, Martinez, Wicker, Vitter, and Collins. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Mary 

J. Kyle, legislative clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton 

Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional 

staff member; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; 

William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional 

staff member; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; and 

William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Adam J. Barker, research assistant; William M. 

Caniano, professional staff member; Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., deputy Republican staff director; and Paul C. Hutton IV, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L. Kingston, 

and Ali Z. Pasha. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman, assistant to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator 

Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant 

to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator 

Udall; David Ramseur, assistant to Senator Begich; Anthony J. 

Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Adam G. Brake, assistant 

to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; 

2 

Brian W. Walsh and Erskine W. Wells III, assistants to Senator 

Martinez; and Chip Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. I’d like to welcome 

our witnesses for today’s hearing on current and longer-term 

threats and challenges around the world. We’re delighted to have 

the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Dennis Blair, for his 

first appearance before us as DNI; and the Defense Intelligence 

Agency (DIA) Director, General Michael Maples, for his final appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 

General Maples, on behalf of the committee, thank you for your 

great service to the Nation, and for your appearances before this 

committee. 

General MAPLES. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. This committee has a special responsibility to 

the men and women of our Armed Forces to be vigilant on intelligence programs, because decisions on whether or not to use military force, the planning for military operations, and carrying them 

out successfully depend so heavily on accurate intelligence. 

I want to focus my remarks this morning on a few major challenges to our security. The situation in Afghanistan has been deteriorating for several years and is now a serious problem, necessitating the dispatch of additional U.S. forces even before the new 

administration completes its strategic review of the region and 

while it’s working on a comprehensive regional approach to the 

problem. This situation is the result of: (1) years of large commitment of U.S. military troops in Iraq; (2) a disorganized and 

underresourced international effort in Afghanistan; (3) the disappointing performance by the Government of Afghanistan; and (4) 

a resurgent Taliban enjoying sanctuary in Pakistan across a border 

that the U.S. commander in that region, Brigadier General John 

Nicholson, says is ‘‘wide open.’’ 

Indeed, the Afghan-Taliban forces under Mullah Omar operate 

with impunity from Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, crossing unhampered into southern Afghanistan. Other large Pakistan militant forces now dominate major portions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the Northwest Frontier Province. It 

is in these regions that al Qaeda is based and from which attacks 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan itself are launched. 

The militant strongholds in Pakistan, however, are not simply a 

threat to Afghanistan. They have also become a clear threat to 

Pakistan’s security and the source of major global terrorist threat 

from al Qaeda. The United States and our allies have to develop 

alternatives to address Pakistan’s security concerns and persuade 

Pakistan to make a fundamental break with its past policies. I do 

not underestimate the challenge that this could present to Pakistan. I have doubts, however, as to whether Pakistan has the will 

or the capacity to make significant changes in the near term. 

Achieving a basic change in Pakistan’s strategic security policy will 

take time, but we cannot make progress in Afghanistan or the defense of America against an al Qaeda attack dependent on a hopedfor change in Pakistan’s calculus and capabilities. 

3 

There are many things that we and our allies can do in Afghanistan to protect the population, help them establish the rule of law, 

and improve their lives, while seeking ways to end the Pakistan 

safe havens. Can we fully succeed with an open border and safe havens in Pakistan? No. But progress in Afghanistan cannot await 

changes in Pakistan. 

Relative to Iraq, the President has announced a timetable for reducing force levels in Iraq and reorienting our mission there. I look 

forward to the witnesses’ estimates about likely Iraqi political developments, including the prospects for reconciliation and the 

peaceful settlement of the political and territorial issues in the 

north. 

Turning to Iran, the Obama administration has initiated a new 

diplomatic approach to persuade Tehran to stop its uranium enrichment program, forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and 

behave more constructively in the region. Director Blair’s statement today indicates that the Intelligence Community (IC) continues to believe that some combination of international scrutiny, 

pressure, and incentives might persuade Tehran to forego a nuclear 

weapon capability, but achieving this would be ‘‘difficult.’’ 

Secretary Clinton’s invitation to Iran to participate in a conference on Afghanistan at the end of the month is an important 

test of whether Iran is willing to explore ways to begin a less 

confrontational relationship. 

The Obama administration is trying to reset relations with Russia for multiple reasons. We have many common security interests 

with Russia and our mutual security will be best served if we cooperate to address our common security challenges. One important 

opportunity is the exploration of the possibility of cooperating with 

Russia on missile defense capabilities to provide protection against 

Iran’s ballistic missile systems. A nuclear-armed Iran with ballistic 

missiles would be a common threat to which Russia cannot be indifferent. U.S.-Russia cooperation on missile defense would send a 

powerful signal to Iran, perhaps helping to dissuade Iran from continuing to violate U.N. resolutions. 

Secretary Gates recently indicated that he thinks there is interest in Russia on cooperation, and I look forward to learning the 

views of the IC on this question as well this morning. 

Clarity on the status of Iran’s nuclear program is also crucial. Director Blair’s testimony last month is consistent with the last National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which concluded that, while 

Iran had halted its efforts to seek a nuclear warhead, Iran is continuing its uranium enrichment program and ballistic missile development efforts. Moreover, Iran has sufficient low-enriched uranium (LEU) to produce a nuclear weapon if it chooses to further 

enrich that material to weapons-grade levels. It would be useful for 

our witnesses to clarify the IC’s view of Iran’s current activities 

and its intent. 

The other primary nuclear and missile proliferation challenge remains North Korea. North Korea rejected the verification protocol 

proposed in the Six-Party Talks in December and has since made 

a number of belligerent threats and appears to be preparing another attempt to launch a satellite with a system that could demonstrate many aspects of a long-range ballistic missile capability. 

4 

The question is whether North Korea will agree to acceptable 

verification of its declaration, including the issue of a suspected 

uranium enrichment program, and what that would mean for U.S. 

policy. North Korea has a habit of issuing dire threats when it does 

not get its way. To what lengths will the regime go to try to extract 

concessions and attempt to get us to re-engage on their terms? 

The challenges confronting the U.S. Africa Command 

(AFRICOM) are vast and complex: ungoverned or undergoverned 

areas that offer potential havens and recruiting grounds for terrorist extremists and nations immersed in or emerging from conflict, where peace is elusive or fragile and international forces are 

required to provide much of the security and stability. Our 

thoughts are with all of the personnel of the aid agencies and the 

nongovernmental organizations being expelled from Sudan and the 

people they serve following the International Criminal Court’s 

(ICC) arrest warrant for the president of Sudan. I look forward to 

hearing our witnesses’ assessment of the implications of this decision by the ICC. 

The challenges within our own hemisphere are complex. The violence in Mexico is becoming reminiscent of the situation in Colombia a decade ago. The root cause of the violence in Mexico is the 

same as Colombia: trafficking and profiting from illegal narcotics. 

The source of the vast majority of these drugs remains Colombia, 

but the problems created from the trafficking of these narcotics run 

from Panama City to Tijuana and includes the Pacific and Atlantic 

Oceans. 

I would also appreciate it if you could add to your presentations 

this morning any information that you can provide us relative to 

the Chinese Government’s intent and motive in the maneuvers of 

their ships against the USNS Impeccable, a Navy ship which was 

in the South China Sea and in international waters. 

We are going to have a closed session following this session and 

will have a briefer from the Navy who is ready to brief the committee during our closed session on this matter in the China Sea. 

We’ve arranged, as I said, for that session and it’s going to be in 

Hart 219 following this open session. 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in 

welcoming our witnesses today. 

Director Blair, I’d like to acknowledge and appreciate your willingness to return to government service and assume one of the 

most important and difficult positions in the executive branch. 

General Maples, this is likely and on your part hopefully your 

last appearance before the committee as the Director of DIA. I 

know you will relinquish the directorship of DIA later this month 

and retire later this year. Thank you for your leadership of the DIA 

and for 38 years of distinguished service in the United States 

Army. 

This is an important hearing on the committee’s annual calendar. The committee has a special responsibility to look closely at 

our Nation’s intelligence analysis, the nature of the threats we face 

today, and the intelligence programs that support those in harm’s 

5 

way. We hope you’ll describe the complex nature of today’s international environment and identify those areas of risk, concern, and 

opportunity that are critical to our national security. 

I hope we will be able to discuss and you’re prepared to discuss 

security trends and prospects in Iraq and Afghanistan, the capabilities and intent of al Qaeda, including threats to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests worldwide, and the outlook for Pakistan, especially progress against extremism in its FATAs and the possibility 

of an outbreak in military hostilities with India. 

In addition, Iran’s nuclear ambitions pose a large and enduring 

problem to our interests, and there are also ongoing developments 

with respect to Russia, China, and North Korea. 

Closer to home, there’s a widening drug war on Mexico’s border 

with the United States and our Department of Justice has identified Mexican gangs as ‘‘the biggest organized crime threat to the 

United States.’’ We’d benefit from your views on these issues. 

The committee is also interested in your estimates about the destabilizing impact of the global economic crisis on our allies and adversaries, the domestic and international impact of global climate 

change on our national security, and the threats to the U.S. information infrastructure posed by both state and non-state actors. 

Our forces around the world, and especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, put a premium on the intelligence support they receive, especially those conducting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. The committee is interested in the state of our human intelligence capability, linguist resources, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capacities. 

I thank the witnesses for their appearance today and I also am 

interested in any public statements prior to our closed hearing that 

you might make on the apparent confrontation at sea with Chinese 

naval forces. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Mr Chairman, thank you. 

I join you in welcoming our witnesses today. 

Director Blair, I would also like to acknowledge your willingness to return to government service and to assume one of the most important and difficult positions in 

the executive branch. 

General Maples, this likely is your last appearance before the committee as the 

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). I know you will relinquish the 

directorship of DIA later this month and retire later in the year. Thank you for your 

leadership at DIA and for your years of distinguished service in the United States 

Army. 

This is an important hearing in the committee’s annual calendar. The committee 

has a special responsibility to look closely at our nation’s intelligence analysis, the 

nature of the threats we face today, and the intelligence programs that support 

those in harm’s way. 

We expect you to describe the complex nature of today’s international environment and identify those areas of risk, concern, and opportunity that are critical to 

our national security. 

In that regard, we hope that you are prepared to discuss security trends and prospects in Iraq and Afghanistan; the capabilities and intent of al Qaeda, including 

threats to the U.S. Homeland and U.S. interests worldwide; and the outlook for 

Pakistan, especially progress against extremism in its Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the possibility of an outbreak in military hostilities with India. 

In addition, Iran’s nuclear ambitions pose a large and enduring problem to our 

interests, and there are ongoing developments with respect to Russia, China, and 

6 

North Korea. Closer to home, there is a broadening drug war on Mexico’s border 

with the United States and our Justice Department has identified Mexican gangs 

as the ‘‘biggest organized crime threat to the United States.’’ We would benefit from 

your views on these issues. 

The committee is also interested in your estimates about the destabilizing impact 

of the global economic crisis on our allies and adversaries, the domestic and international impact of global climate change on our national security and the threats 

to the U.S. information infrastructure posed by both state and non-state actors. 

Our forces around the world, and especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, put a premium on the intelligence support that they receive, especially those conducting 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. The committee is interested in 

the state of our human intelligence capability; linguist resources; and intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance capacities. 

Mr Chairman, thank you and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator McCain. 

Director Blair. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS C. BLAIR, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE 

Director BLAIR. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, 

members of the committee, this morning General Maples and I represent thousands of patriotic, highly skilled professionals, the 

world’s finest intelligence team. All these intelligence agencies participated in compiling the information and analysis that I’m reporting on this morning and the longer statements for the record which 

we submitted. 

My report is not simply of threats, but also of opportunities and 

a tour of the complex and dynamic national security landscape with 

which the United States must deal. Let me start with the global 

economic crisis. 

It already looms as the most serious one in decades. You may 

have seen yesterday’s World Bank estimates that both world gross 

domestic product (GDP) and trade are declining at unprecedented 

rates. Since September of last year, 10 nations have committed to 

new International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs and, unlike the 

1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, no country or region can export 

its way out of this one. 

The stakes are high. Mexico, with its close trade links to the 

United States, is vulnerable to a prolonged U.S. recession. Europe 

and the former Soviet bloc have experienced anti-state demonstrations. Much of Eurasia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa 

lack sufficient cash reserves and access to international aid. 

Economic crises increase the risk of regime-threatening instability if they are prolonged 1 or 2 years, and we’re watching this 

closely. Instability can loosen the fragile hold that many developing 

countries have on law and order. 

There are some silver linings. With low oil prices, Venezuela will 

face fiscal constraints this year. Iran’s president faces less than 

certain prospects for reelection in June. However, a serious energy 

supply crunch may happen in the longer range future if sustained 

low prices lead to major cuts or delays in new investments in the 

near term. 

This crisis presents challenges for the United States, who is generally held to be responsible for it. The November G–20 summit 

elevated the influence of emerging market nations, but the United 

States also has opportunities to demonstrate increased leadership. 

7 

Our openness, development, skills, leadership skills, the mobility of 

our workforce, puts us in a better position to re-invent ourselves. 

Washington will have the opportunity to fashion new global structures that can benefit all nations. 

Turning to terrorism, importantly, we have seen progress in 

Muslim opinion turning against terrorist groups. Over the last 18 

months, al Qaeda has faced public criticism from prominent religious leaders and even from fellow extremists. In 2008, these terrorists did not achieve their goal of conducting another major attack on the United States and no major country is at immediate 

risk of collapse from extreme terrorist groups. 

Replacing the loss of key leaders since 2008 in Pakistan’s FATAs 

has proved difficult for al Qaeda. Al Qaeda in Iraq continues to be 

squeezed. Saudi Arabia’s aggressive counterterrorism efforts have 

rendered the Kingdom a harsh operating environment for al Qaeda. 

But despite these setbacks, al Qaeda remains dangerous. Yemen 

is reemerging as a jihadist battleground. The capabilities of terrorist groups in East Africa will increase in the next year and we 

remain concerned about the potential for home-grown American extremists inspired by al Qaeda’s militant ideology to plan attacks in 

this country. 

There are many challenges in that region that stretches from the 

Middle East to South Asia, and these challenges exist despite the 

progress I outlined in countering violent extremism. The United 

States has strong tools from military force to diplomacy and good 

relations with the vast majority of these nations and we will need 

all these tools in order to help forge a durable structure for peace 

and prosperity. 

The revival of Iran as a regional power, the deepening of ethnic, 

sectarian, and economic divisions across much of the region, the 

looming leadership succession among U.S. allies, all these factors 

are shaping the strategic landscape. Hezbollah and Hamas, with 

support from Iran, champion armed resistance to Israel, a development that complicates efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and undercuts the legitimacy of moderate Arab states that 

support negotiated settlements. Battlelines are increasingly drawn 

in that part of the world, not just between Israel and Arab countries, but also between secular Arab nationalists and ascendant Islamic nationalist movements inside moderate states. 

The Iranian regime views the United States as its principal 

enemy and a threat to Iran. A more assertive regional Iranian foreign policy coupled with its dogged development of a uranium enrichment capability alarms most governments in the region from 

Riyadh to Tel Aviv. 

The Levant is the key focal point for these strategic shifts. Recent fighting between Israel and Hamas on the Gaza Strip has 

deepened Palestinian political divisions. It’s also widened the rift 

between regional moderates, led by Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 

and hard-liners, including Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria. With Hamas 

controlling Gaza and Hezbollah growing stronger in Lebanon, 

progress on a Palestinian-Israeli accord is much more difficult. 

With Iran pursuing uranium enrichment and Israel determined not 

to allow it to develop a nuclear weapon capability, there is potential for an Iran-Israeli confrontation or crisis. Moderate Arab states 

8 

fear a nuclear-armed Iran, but without progress on a Palestinian 

settlement they are harder put to defend their ties to the United 

States. 

In Iraq, coalition and Iraqi operations and dwindling popular tolerance for violence have helped to sideline extremists. Fewer Iraqis 

are dying at the hands of their countrymen than at any time in the 

last 2 years. Nevertheless, disputed internal boundaries, perceptions of government repression, or increased foreign support to insurgent or militia groups could reverse political and security 

progress, and Baghdad also will be coping with declining oil revenues. 

In Afghanistan, the Taliban-dominated insurgency forces have 

demonstrated greater aggressiveness. Improved governance and extended development were hampered in 2008 by a lack of security. 

Afghan leaders must tackle endemic corruption and an extensive 

drug trade. Progress has been made in expanding and fielding the 

Afghan National Army, but many factors hamper efforts to make 

the units capable of independent action. The upcoming 2009 presidential election will present a greater security challenge than the 

election of 2004 and insurgents will probably make a concerted effort to disrupt it. 

Improvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s taking control of 

their border areas, improving governance, and creating economic 

and educational opportunities throughout the country are linked. I 

agree, Chairman Levin, that that doesn’t mean that you can’t do 

anything in Afghanistan without solving Pakistan, but there is a 

linkage between these two that we have to address in making our 

policy. 

In 2008, Islamabad intensified counterinsurgency efforts, but its 

record in dealing with militants has been mixed. It balances conflicting internal and counterterrorist priorities. The government is 

losing authority in the north and the west and even in the more 

developed parts of the country mounting economic hardships and 

frustration over poor governance have given rise to greater 

radicalization. 

The time when only a few states had access to the most dangerous technologies is long over. Often dual use, they circulate easily in our globalized economy, as does the scientific expertise. It is 

difficult for the United States and its partners to track efforts to 

acquire components and production technologies that are widely 

available. Traditional deterrence and diplomacy constraints may 

not prevent terrorist groups from using mass effect weapons, and 

one of the biggest security challenges facing the United States is 

fashioning a more effective nonproliferation strategy along with our 

partners. 

As the chairman mentioned, the assessments in our 2000 NIE 

about Iran’s nuclear weapons programs are generally still valid. 

Iran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop deliverable nuclear weapons. The halt since 2003 in nuclear weapons design and weaponization was primarily in response to increasing 

international scrutiny, and we assess that some combination of 

threats and intensified international attention and pressures, along 

with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security goals, might 

9 

prompt Iran to extend this halt to some nuclear weapons-related 

activities. 

Let me turn to Asia, rapidly becoming the long-term locus of 

power in the world. Japan remains the world’s second largest global economy and a strong ally of the United States, but the global 

downturn is exacting a heavy toll on Japan’s economy. To realize 

its aspirations to play a stronger regional and perhaps global role 

will require political leadership and difficult decisions by Japan. 

The rising giants, China and India, are playing increasing regional roles economically, politically, and militarily. China tries to 

assure access to markets, commodities, and energy supplies needed 

to sustain domestic economic growth. Chinese diplomacy seeks to 

maintain favorable relations with other powers, especially the 

United States. The global downturn, however, threatens China’s 

domestic stability and Chinese leaders are taking both economic 

and security steps to deal with it. 

Taiwan as an area of tension in U.S.-China relations has substantially relaxed. Taiwan President Ma, inaugurated in May, has 

resumed dialogue with Beijing, and leaders on both sides of the 

Straits are cautiously optimistic about less confrontational relations. Nonetheless, preparations for a Taiwan conflict drive the 

modernization goals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 

But in addition to that, China’s security interests are broadening. A full civilian and military space capability, and formidable 

capabilities in cyberspace are rapidly developing. China will attempt to develop at least a limited naval projection capability, 

which is already reflected in anti-piracy operations off the coast of 

Somalia, and we can talk about the incident that happened recently in the South China Sea. 

Like China, India’s expanding economy will lead New Delhi to 

pursue new trade partners, to gain access to vital energy markets, 

and to develop other resources that sustain rapid growth. India’s 

growth rate will slow this coming year, but ample reserves and a 

sound banking system will help ensure relative stability. 

Determined efforts by Indian and Pakistani leaders to improve 

relations could unravel unless Islamabad takes meaningful steps to 

cut support to anti-Indian militant groups and New Delhi for its 

part makes credible efforts to allay Pakistan’s security concerns. 

The increase in violent attacks within India is a cause of great concern to its government, as is instability in neighboring countries in 

South Asia, and I think the attacks in Islamabad on cricket teams 

was the latest instance of that. 

On the global stage, Indian leaders will continue to follow an 

independent course. That we are both democracies does not guarantee congruence of our interests. Nonetheless, good relations with 

the United States will be important for India to realize its global 

ambitions. 

Although the Middle East and Asia have the highest call on our 

attention, our concerns are broader. Russia is actively cultivating 

relations with regional powers, including China, Iran, and Venezuela. Moscow also is trying to maintain control over energy networks to Europe and to East Asia. Russian leaders have spoken 

positively about the possibilities for a change in the U.S.-Russian 

dynamic, but the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
10 

largement, the conflict over Georgia’s separatist region, and missile 

defense could pose difficulties because of the combination of overlapping and conflicting interests there. 

In Latin America, populist, often autocratic, regimes pose challenges to the region’s long-term success. Basic law and order 

issues, including rising violent crime, powerful drug trafficking organizations, confront key hemispheric nations, as do uneven governance and institution-building efforts in confronting chronic corruption. The corruptive influence and increasing violence of Mexican drug cartels impedes Mexico City’s ability to govern parts of its 

territory. Unless the United States is able to deliver market access 

on a permanent and meaningful basis, its traditionally privileged 

position in the region could erode, with a concomitant decline in political influence. 

In addition, the United States has an opportunity to partner with 

Mexico in promoting our common interests in the region, including 

working against the drug cartels, stopping weapons moving generally south along the border, and working on other common 

issues. 

Africa has made substantial economic and political progress over 

the past decade and the level of open warfare has declined significantly, especially in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Ivory Coast. 

However, the drop in commodity prices and global recession will 

test the durability of the region’s recent positive growth trend. 

Even before the current crisis, the 6 percent GDP growth rate in 

Africa, although impressive, was not able to bring the necessary 

structural changes to reduce poverty and a number of intractable 

conflicts persist in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, 

Sudan, and Somalia. 

In Darfur, peace talks remain stymied, the larger peacekeeping 

force is slow in deploying, and the recent actions that the chairman 

referred to have made progress there even more difficult. 

Let me finish with the long-term challenge of environmental security and the threats to our information technology infrastructure. 

Adding more than a billion people to the world’s population by 

2025 will put pressure on clean energy sources and food and water 

supplies. Most of the world’s population will move from rural to 

urban areas. They’re seeking economic opportunity and many, particularly in Asia, will achieve advanced lifestyles with greater per 

capita consumption and greater generation per capita of pollution. 

According to the United Nations (U.N.) International Panel on 

Climate Change, physical effects of climate change will worsen in 

coming years. Multilateral policymaking on climate change is likely 

to be substantial and will be a growing priority among traditional 

security affairs. The world sees the United States in a pivotal leadership role. 

As effects of climate change mount, the United States will come 

under increasing pressure to help the international community set 

goals for emissions reductions and to help others through technological progress. 

Finally, threats to our information technology infrastructure. It 

is becoming both indispensable to the functioning of our society and 

vulnerable to catastrophic disruptions in a way that the old decentralized analog systems were not. Cybersystems are being targeted 

11 

for exploitation and potentially for disruption or destruction, and 

it’s being done by an increasing array of both non-state and state 

adversaries. 

Network defense technologies are widely available to mitigate 

threats, but they have not been uniformly adopted. A number of 

nations, including Russia and China, can disrupt elements of our 

information infrastructure. We must take proactive measures to detect and prevent intrusions before they cause significant damage. 

We must recognize that cyber defense is not a one-time fix. It requires a continual investment in hardware, software, and cyber defenses. 

In conclusion, the international security environment is complex. 

The global financial crisis has exacerbated what was already a 

growing set of political and economic uncertainties. We’re nevertheless in a strong position to shape a world reflecting universal aspirations and the values that have motivated Americans since 1776: 

human rights, the rule of law, liberal market economics, and social 

justice. Whether we can succeed will depend on actions we take 

here at home, restoring strong economic growth and maintaining 

our scientific and technological edge, and defending ourselves at 

reasonable cost, while preserving our civil liberties. 

It will also depend on actions abroad, not only how we deal with 

individual regions, individual regimes, individual crises, but also on 

how we develop a new multilateral system, formal or informal, for 

effective international cooperation in areas like trade and finance, 

in neutralizing extremist groups using terrorism, in controlling the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in developing 

codes of conduct for cyberspace and space, and in mitigating and 

slowing global climate change. 

Mr. Chairman, subject to your questions, that concludes the prepared remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Director Blair follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DENNIS C. BLAIR

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the committee, thank 

you for the invitation to offer my assessment of threats to U.S. national security. 

I am pleased to be joined by my colleague, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, the 

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and I am proud to lead the 

world’s best Intelligence Community (IC). In addition to this unclassified statement 

for the record, I have also submitted a classified statement for the record. 

FAR-REACHING IMPACT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

The primary near-term security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications. The crisis has been ongoing for over 

a year, and economists are divided over whether and when we could hit bottom. 

Some even fear that the recession could further deepen and reach the level of the 

Great Depression. Of course, all of us recall the dramatic political consequences 

wrought by the economic turmoil of the 1920s and 1930s in Europe, the instability, 

and high levels of violent extremism. Though we do not know its eventual scale, it 

already looms as the most serious global economic and financial crisis in decades. 

Forecasts differ significantly over the depth of the downturn. Industrialized countries are already in recession, and growth in emerging market countries, previously 

thought to be immune from an industrialized country financial crisis, has also faltered, and many are in recession as well. Even China and India have seen their dynamic growth engines take a hit as they grapple with falling demand for their exports and a slowdown in foreign direct and portfolio investments. Governments 

worldwide are initiating monetary and fiscal stimulus programs designed to stabilize and recapitalize their financial sectors, cushion the impact of stalling economic activity, and eventually jumpstart a recovery, perhaps as early as late 2009. 

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The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which recently released its revised forecast 

for 2009 projecting an anemic 0.5 percent increase in the global economy, warns 

that the risks to the global economy are on the downside. 

The financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic 

crises in emerging market nations over the next year, prompting additional countries to request IMF or other multilateral or bilateral support. Since September 

2008, 10 nations committed to new IMF programs intended to provide balance of 

payments support. All face the task of tackling economic problems in a less benign 

global economic environment. Unlike the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, the 

globally synchronized nature of this slowdown means that countries will not be able 

to export their way out of this recession. Indeed, policies designed to promote domestic export industries—so-called beggar-thy-neighbor policies such as competitive 

currency devaluations, import tariffs, and/or export subsidies—risk unleashing a 

wave of destructive protectionism. 

Time is probably our greatest threat. The longer it takes for the recovery to begin, 

the greater the likelihood of serious damage to U.S. strategic interests. Roughly a 

quarter of the countries in the world have already experienced low-level instability 

such as government changes because of the current slowdown. Europe and the 

former Soviet Union have experienced the bulk of the anti-state demonstrations. Although two-thirds of countries in the world have sufficient financial or other means 

to limit the impact for the moment, much of Latin America, former Soviet Union 

states and sub-Saharan Africa lack sufficient cash reserves, access to international 

aid or credit, or other coping mechanism. Statistical modeling shows that economic 

crises increase the risk of regime-threatening instability if they persist over a 1- to 

2-year period. Besides increased economic nationalism, the most likely political fallout for U.S. interests will involve allies and friends not being able to fully meet 

their defense and humanitarian obligations. Potential refugee flows from the Caribbean could also impact homeland security. 

The dramatic decline in oil prices—more than a two-thirds decline from the July 

peak of $147 per barrel—is partially a result of the market betting on a deep and 

perhaps protracted global recession. A serious supply crunch is possible down the 

road if sustained low prices lead to major cuts or delays in investment by national 

and international oil companies, especially high cost unconventional oil sources like 

oil sands. Nevertheless, lower prices benefit consumers, and declining revenues may 

put the squeeze on the adventurism of producers like Iran and Venezuela. 

The crisis presents many challenges for the United States. It started in the 

United States, quickly spread to other industrial economies and then, more recently, 

to emerging markets. The widely held perception that excesses in U.S. financial 

markets and inadequate regulation were responsible has increased criticism about 

free market policies, which may make it difficult to achieve long-time U.S. objectives, such as the opening of national capital markets and increasing domestic demand in Asia. It already has increased questioning of U.S. stewardship of the global 

economy and the international financial structure. 

The November G–20 financial summit in Washington also elevated the influence 

of large, emerging market nations. As was the case in the Asian financial crisis, 

China has an opportunity to increase its prestige if Beijing can exert a stabilizing 

influence by maintaining strong import growth and not letting its currency slide. 

But the United States also has opportunities to demonstrate increased leadership 

domestically, bilaterally, and in multilateral organizations such as the World Trade 

Organization, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations. Recessions are a relative game, and historically the United States 

has proven more adroit at responding to them than most. The U.S. tradition of 

openness, developed skills, and mobility probably puts it in a better position to reinvent itself. Moreover, in potentially leading recovery efforts in coordination with 

the G–20, Washington will have the opportunity to fashion new international global 

structures that can benefit all. Global coordination and cooperation on many fronts 

will be required to rebuild trust in the global financial system and to ensure that 

the economic and financial crises do not spiral into broader geopolitical tensions. 

TURNING THE CORNER ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM

I next want to focus on extremist groups that use terrorism. The groups with the 

greatest capability to threaten are extremist Muslim groups. In 2008 terrorists did 

not achieve their goal of conducting another major attack in the U.S. Homeland. We 

have seen notable progress in Muslim opinion turning against terrorist groups like 

al Qaeda. Over the last year and a half, al Qaeda has faced significant public criticism from prominent religious leaders and fellow extremists primarily regarding the 

use of brutal and indiscriminate tactics—particularly those employed by al Qaeda 

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in Iraq (AQI) and al Qaeda in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—that have 

resulted in the deaths of Muslim civilians. Given the increased pressure posed by 

these criticisms, al Qaeda leaders increasingly have highlighted enduring support 

for the Taliban and the fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in other regions 

where they portray the west being at war with Islam and al Qaeda as the vanguard 

of the global terrorist movement. A broad array of Muslim countries is nevertheless 

having success in stemming the rise of extremism and attractiveness of terrorist 

groups. No major country is at immediate risk of collapse at the hands of extremist, 

terrorist groups, although a number—such as Pakistan and Afghanistan—have to 

work hard to repulse a still serious threat. In the next section I will discuss at 

length the challenges facing us in Pakistan and Afghanistan where militant have 

gained some traction despite the successes against al Qaeda. 

Because of the pressure we and our allies have put on al Qaeda’s core leadership 

in Pakistan and the continued decline of al Qaeda’s most prominent regional affiliate in Iraq, al Qaeda today is less capable and effective than it was a year ago. 

In Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), al Qaeda lost significant parts of its command structure since 2008 in a succession of blows as damaging 

to the group as any since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. Key leaders killed 

over the past year include Khalid Habib, al Qaeda’s military chief and the fourth 

man in its chain of command; Abu Layth al-Libi, who directed cross-border attacks 

against our forces in Afghanistan and was a rising star in the organization; Abu 

Khabab al-Masri, the group’s leading expert on explosives and chemical attacks and 

a driving force behind its terrorist plotting against the U.S. Homeland and Europe; 

and Usama al-Kini who was involved in the bombings of our Embassies in East Africa in 1998 and later became the chief planner of al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks in 

Pakistan. 

• The loss of these and many other leaders in quick succession has made 

it more difficult for al Qaeda to identify replacements, and in some cases 

the group has had to promote more junior figures considerably less skilled 

and respected than the individuals they are replacing. 

Sustained pressure against al Qaeda in the FATA has the potential to further degrade its organizational cohesion and diminish the threat it poses. If forced to vacate the FATA and locate elsewhere, the group would be vulnerable to U.S. or hostcountry security crackdowns as well as local resistance, and probably would be 

forced to adopt an even more dispersed, clandestine structure, making training and 

operational coordination more difficult. Without access to its FATA safe haven, al 

Qaeda also undoubtedly would have greater difficulty supporting the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. It is conceivable al Qaeda could relocate elsewhere in South 

Asia, the Gulf, or parts of Africa where it could exploit a weak central government 

and close proximity to established recruitment, fundraising, and facilitation networks, but we judge none of these locations would be as conducive to their operational needs as their location in the FATA. 

In Iraq, we judge the maturation of the Awakening movement, Iraqi Security 

Forces (ISF) gains, and the subsequent spread of Sons of Iraq groups, in combination with coalition operations against AQI leaders, have reduced AQI’s operational 

capabilities and restricted the group’s freedom of movement and sanctuaries. Nevertheless, we judge the group is likely to retain a residual capacity to undertake terrorist operations for years to come. I will focus on AQI in greater detail when I discuss Iraq. 

Saudi Arabia’s aggressive counterterrorism efforts since 2003 have rendered the 

Kingdom a harsh operating environment for al Qaeda, but Riyadh is now facing new 

external threats from al Qaeda elements in the region, particularly from Yemen. 

Senior al Qaeda leaders are focused on resurrecting an operational presence due to 

Saudi security actions over the past 5 years that have resulted in the death or capture of most identified Saudi-based al Qaeda senior leaders and operatives. Senior 

al Qaeda leaders view the Kingdom as a strategic target owing to Bin Ladin’s longstanding objective of unseating the al-Saud family and the symbolic value of attacking Western and Saudi targets in the land of the two holy mosques. 

The Saudi Government counterterrorism approach includes law enforcement efforts coupled with a complementary long-term program to stem radicalization. 

Riyadh’s multi-faceted ‘‘counter-radicalization’’ and ‘‘de-radicalization’’ strategy uses 

detainee rehabilitation programs, the media, and religious scholars to combat terrorism and build public support for its strong security posture. 

Counterterrorism efforts by Indonesia, in some cases with U.S. assistance, have 

led to the arrests and deaths of hundreds of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) operatives, including top leaders and key operatives. In November, Indonesia executed three JI 

terrorists—Imam Samudra, Mukhlas, and Amrozi—for their role in the 2002 Bali 

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bombings. While the IC continues to assess that JI in Indonesia and the Abu Sayyaf 

Group in the Philippines are the two terrorist groups posing threats to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, efforts by Southeast Asian Governments against both groups 

in the past few years have degraded their attack capabilities. 

The primary threat from Europe-based extremists stems from al Qaeda and Sunni 

affiliates who return from training in Pakistan to conduct attacks in Europe or the 

United States. We have had limited visibility into European plotting, but we assess 

that al Qaeda is continuing to plan attacks in Europe and the west. Al Qaeda has 

used Europe as a launching point for external operations against the Homeland on 

several occasions since September 11, and we believe that the group continues to 

view Europe as a viable launching point. Al Qaeda most recently targeted Denmark 

and the U.K., and we assess these countries remain viable targets. Al Qaeda leaders 

have also prominently mentioned France, most likely in reprisal for the 2004 

headscarf ban. 

The social, political, and economic integration of Western Europe’s 15 to 20 million Muslims is progressing slowly, creating opportunities for extremist propagandists and recruiters. The highly diverse Muslim population in Europe already 

faces much higher poverty and unemployment rates than the general population, 

and the current economic crisis almost certainly will disproportionately affect the 

region’s Muslims. Numerous worldwide and European Islamic groups are actively 

encouraging Muslims in Europe to reject assimilation and support militant versions 

of Islam. Successful social integration would give most ordinary Muslims a stronger 

political and economic stake in their countries of residence, even though better educational and economic opportunities do not preclude radicalization among a minority. Visible progress toward an Arab-Israeli settlement, along with stability in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, would help undercut radicals’ appeal to Muslim foreign policy 

grievances. 

European governments are undertaking a wide range of policies to promote Muslim social integration and counter radicalization. In addition to pursuing socioeconomic initiatives aimed at all immigrants, France, Germany, Italy, and several 

smaller European countries have established various types of religious-based consultative councils composed of leading Muslim groups. Additionally, the United 

Kingdom has established the most diversified and energetic official outreach program to Muslims, largely reflecting concern about homegrown terrorism since the 

July 2005 London attacks. Among other initiatives, the U.K. Government has promoted the creation of an advisory board on mosque governance, a committee of Muslim theologians, and consultative bodies of Muslim women and youth. It also has 

held multiple high profile conferences with Islamic scholars and government representatives from the Muslim world. British police have made a conscious decision 

to seek the cooperation of non-violent radicals even while political authorities have 

encouraged former radicals and Sufis to speak out against hardline political Islam. 

Core al Qaeda 

Despite these successes, al Qaeda and its affiliates and allies remain dangerous 

and adaptive enemies, and the threat they could inspire or orchestrate an attack 

on the United States or European countries. Under the strategic direction of Usama 

Bin Ladin and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda remains intent on attacking U.S. interests worldwide, including the U.S. Homeland. Although al Qaeda’s 

core organization in the tribal areas of Pakistan is under greater pressure now than 

it was a year ago, we assess that it remains the most dangerous component of the 

larger al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda leaders still use the tribal areas as a base from 

which they can avoid capture, produce propaganda, communicate with operational 

cells abroad, and provide training and indoctrination to new terrorist operatives. 

• We lack insight into specific details, timing, and intended targets of potential, current U.S. Homeland plots, although we assess al Qaeda continues to pursue plans for Homeland attacks and is likely focusing on 

prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets designed to 

produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic 

aftershocks, and/or fear among the population. 

• Increased security measures at home and abroad have caused al Qaeda 

to view the West, especially the United States, as a harder target than in 

the past, but we remain concerned about an influx of Western recruits into 

the tribal areas since mid–2006. 

• Al Qaeda and its extremist sympathizers in Pakistan have waged a campaign of deadly and destabilizing suicide attacks throughout Pakistan, including the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September, 

which killed 60 people and wounded hundreds. 

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AQIM 

Al Qaeda’s other robust affiliate, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb 

(AQIM), is the most active terrorist group in northwestern Africa and, in our assessment, represents a significant threat to U.S. and western interests in the region. 

AQIM has continued to focus primarily on Algerian Government targets, but since 

its merger with al Qaeda in September 2006 the group has expanded its target set 

to include U.S., U.N., and other western interests and has launched progressively 

more sophisticated attacks, employing vehicle-borne improvised explosive device 

(VBIEDs), near-simultaneous bombings, and suicide bombings. 

• AQIM has conducted nearly a dozen attacks against Western targets to 

include a nearsimultaneous VBIED attack against United Nations facilities 

and the Algerian Constitutional Court in Algiers in December 2007, killing 

at least 47 and wounding more than 100. AQIM associates also attacked 

the Israeli Embassy in Mauritania in February 2008. 

• AQIM Europe-based cells act as financial support and facilitation nodes, 

but these cells could possibly become operational at the direction of AQIM 

leadership. 

We assess that over the next year AQIM will continue to demonstrate its increased capability and commitment to senior al Qaeda leadership by attacking local 

and Western interests throughout North Africa and the Sahel. AQIM traditionally 

has operated in Algeria and northern Mali and has recruited and trained an unknown number of extremists from Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria, Mauritania, Libya, and 

other countries. We assess some of these trainees may have returned to their home 

countries to plot attacks against local and western interests. 

Al Qaeda in Yemen 

Yemen is reemerging as a jihadist battleground and potential regional base of operations for al Qaeda to plan internal and external attacks, train terrorists, and facilitate the movement of operatives. Al Qaeda leaders could use al Qaeda in Yemen 

and the growing presence of foreign jihadists there to supplement its external operations agenda, promote turmoil in Saudi Arabia, and weaken the Salih regime. 

• Al Qaeda in Yemen on 17 September 2008 conducted an attack against 

the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a. The coordinated attack used two explosivesladen vehicles, suicide bombers, and small-arms fire and killed six guards 

and four civilians. As of September 2008, the group had conducted 20 attacks against U.S., Western, and Yemeni targets, most carried out by the 

splinter faction, Jund al-Yemen. 

East Africa 

We judge the terrorist threat to U.S. interests in East Africa, primarily from al 

Qaeda and al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic extremists in Somalia and Kenya, will increase in the next year as al Qaeda’s East Africa network continues to plot operations against U.S., Western, and local targets and the influence of the Somaliabased terrorist group al-Shabaab grows. Given the high-profile U.S. role in the region and its perceived direction—in the minds of al Qaeda and local extremists— 

of foreign intervention in Somalia, we assess U.S. counterterrorism efforts will be 

challenged not only by the al Qaeda operatives in the Horn, but also by Somali extremists and increasing numbers of foreign fighters supporting al-Shabaab’s efforts. 

The Homegrown Threat 

We judge any homegrown extremists in the United States do not yet rise to the 

numerical level or exhibit the operational tempo or proficiency we have seen in 

Western Europe. A range of factors inside the United States may contribute to a 

lower incidence of homegrown cells developing. Nevertheless, we remain concerned 

about the potential for homegrown extremists inspired by al Qaeda’s militant ideology to plan attacks inside the United States, Europe, and elsewhere without operational direction from the group itself. In this regard, over the next year we will 

remain focused on identifying any ties between U.S.-based individuals and extremist 

networks overseas. Though difficult to measure, the spread of radical Salafi Internet 

sites that provide religious justification for attacks; aggressive and violent antiWestern rhetoric; and signs that self-generating cells in the United States identify 

with Bin Laden’s violent objectives all point to the likelihood that a small but violent number of cells may develop here. 

• Al Qaeda’s propaganda efforts include messages in English and those 

aimed specifically at an American audience either in translated form or directly by al Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, such as with 

his November 2008 video message following the U.S. presidential elections. 

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U.S.-born al Qaeda members such as Adam Gadahn, who was indicted by 

a U.S. grand jury in October 2006 on charges of treason, providing material 

support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, and aiding and abetting terrorists, also participated in making these English-language propaganda messages. 

The Threat from Lebanese Hizballah 

Lebanese Hizballah continues to be a formidable terrorist adversary with an ability to attack the U.S. Homeland and U.S. interests abroad. Hizballah is a multifaceted, disciplined organization that combines political, social, paramilitary, and 

terrorist elements, and we assess that any decision by the group to resort to arms 

or terrorist tactics is carefully calibrated. At the same time, we judge armed struggle, particularly against Israel, remains central to Hizballah’s ideology and strategy. 

We assess Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-U.S. attacks overseas in 

the past, may consider attacking U.S. interests should it perceive a direct U.S. 

threat to the group’s survival, leadership, or infrastructure or to Iran. However, we 

judge Hizballah would carefully weigh the decision to take any action against the 

United States. Hizballah probably continues to support proxy groups and individuals, which could provide the group plausible deniability for possible attacks against 

the West or Israel. 

We assess Hizballah anticipates a future conflict with Israel and probably continues to implement lessons learned from the conflict in the summer of 2006. In a 

potential future conflict, Hizballah is likely to be better prepared and more capable 

than in 2006. 

THE ‘‘ARC OF INSTABILITY’’ 

The large region from the Middle East to South Asia is the locus for many of the 

challenges facing the United States in the 21st century. While we are making 

progress countering terrorism, the roots and the issues related to the many problems in this region go deeper and are very complicated. The United States has 

strong tools—from military force to diplomacy in the region and good relationships 

with the vast majority of states. There is almost universal recognition that the 

United States is vital to any solutions, and these can be brought to bear in ways 

that benefit the United States and the region. I will begin with looking at individual 

states, but the IC analysis I present here emphasizes the regional linkages exacerbating problems and providing opportunities that are available for tackling the 

problems. 

The Changing Geopolitical Landscape in the Middle East 

In the Middle East, the revival of Iran as a regional power, the deepening of ethnic, sectarian, and economic divisions across much of the region, and looming leadership succession among U.S. allies are shaping the strategic landscape. Hizballah 

and Hamas have successfully seized the mantle of resistance to Israel from moderate regimes with secular Arab nationalists being discredited in the popular mind. 

Battle lines are increasingly drawn not just between Israel and Arab countries but 

also between secular Arab nationalists and ascendant Islamic nationalist movements inside moderate Arab states. Iran’s influence in Iraq, its enduring strategic 

ties to Syria, pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and the success of Tehran’s 

allies—Hamas and Hizballah—are fueling Iran’s aspirations for regional preeminence. Arab Sunni leaders are struggling to limit Iran’s gains; Saudi Arabia’s 

more activist regional diplomacy falls short of significantly constraining Iran’s freedom of maneuver. Iran’s ambitions combined with unresolved conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories represent the principal flashpoints for intensified conflict in the region. 

Iran’s longstanding foreign policy goals are to preserve the Islamic regime, safeguard Iran’s sovereignty, defend its nuclear ambitions, and expand its influence in 

the region and the Islamic world. Iranian leaders perceive that regional developments—including the removal of Saddam and the Taliban, challenges facing the 

United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, the increased influence of Hamas and 

Hizballah, and, until recently, higher oil revenues—have given Tehran more opportunities and freedom to pursue its objective of becoming a regional power. This perception has produced a more assertive Iranian foreign policy in which Tehran has 

focused on expanding ties in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Levant to better influence 

and exploit regional political, economic, and security developments. Iran’s pursuit of 

nuclear weapon capability is another element in its more assertive foreign policy— 

an aspect that I will discuss later. 

In Tehran, Iran’s conservative faction continues to dominate the government. Supreme Leader Khamenei has consolidated political power in his office, but his reliVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ance on hardline conservative elements—the IRGC, war veterans turned politicians 

such as President Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad, and selected clerics—to bolster his authority has upset the earlier factional balance in Iranian politics. 

• Although the regime still comprises many competing factions, only those 

that support the concept of a powerful Supreme Leader and advocate revolutionary values now have a significant voice in decisionmaking. 

President Ahmadi-Nejad faces less than certain prospects for reelection in June 

because his management of the economy and aggressive foreign policy rhetoric have 

become sources of significant domestic criticism and political friction. AhmadiNejad’s economic policies have reduced unemployment marginally, but have fueled 

significant inflation, providing his critics ample ammunition to question his competence. The sharp fall in global oil prices will add to Iran’s economic problems, but 

Tehran has a substantial cushion of foreign reserves to support social and other 

spending priorities. Less energy revenues may also help to dampen its foreign policy 

adventurism. 

We expect Khamenei will attempt to manipulate the presidential election, largely 

by limiting the range of candidates. As he has in past elections, the Supreme Leader 

probably will attempt to influence the decisions of individuals to run, monitor the 

vetting and approval of candidates, and influence media coverage of the campaign. 

• We do not know if Khamenei will actively support Ahmadi-Nejad’s reelection. The Supreme Leader publicly has expressed support for AhmadiNejad’s administration, but we judge his statements are intended more to 

minimize criticisms of the regime than to endorse the President. 

• Although we expect that whoever is elected will be a strong supporter of 

the Islamic Republic, we note that the election of a more pragmatic figure 

may, over time, produce some moderation of Iranian behavior by introducing into the decisionmaking process a wider range of options than those 

presented under Ahmadi-Nejad. 

Militarily, Iran continues to strengthen the three pillars of its strategic deterrence: surface-to-surface missiles, long-range rockets and aircraft for retaliation; 

naval forces to disrupt maritime traffic through key waterways; and unconventional 

forces and surrogates to conduct worldwide lethal operations. Although many of 

their statements are exaggerations, Iranian officials throughout the past year have 

repeatedly claimed both greater ballistic missile capabilities that could threaten 

U.S. and allied interests and the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz using unconventional small boat operations, anti-ship cruise missiles, and other naval systems. 

Some officials, such as Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari-Najafabadi, have hinted that Iran would have a hand in 

attacks on ‘‘America’s interests even in far away places,’’ suggesting Iran has contingency plans for unconventional warfare and terrorism against the United States and 

its allies. 

Iran’s goals in Iraq include preventing the emergence of a threat from Iraqi territory, either from the Government of Iraq itself, or from the United States. To 

achieve this, Iran probably seeks a Government in Baghdad in which Tehran’s Shiite allies hold the majority of political, economic, and security power. Iran also has 

sought to make the United States suffer political, economic, and human costs in 

order to limit U.S. engagement in the region and to ensure that Washington does 

not maintain a permanent military presence in Iraq or use its military to pressure 

or attack Iran. 

• Iranian efforts to secure influence in Iraq encompass a wide range of activities, including using propaganda, providing humanitarian assistance, 

building commercial and economic ties, and supporting Shiite elements 

fighting the coalition. Iran has provided a variety of Shia militants with lethal support including weapons, funding, training, logistical and operational 

support, and intelligence training. 

• We judge Iran will continue to calibrate its lethal aid to Iraqi Shiite militants based on the threat it perceives from U.S. forces in Iraq, the state 

of U.S.-Iran relations, Tehran’s fear of a Bathist resurgence, Tehran’s desire to help defend Iraqi Shiite against sectarian violence, and to maintain 

the ability to play a spoiler role in Iraq if Iran perceives the Government 

of Iraq has become a strategic threat. 

• Despite Tehran’s efforts, we judge Iraqi nationalism and the growing capabilities of the Iraqi Government will limit Iranian influence in Iraq. 

Baghdad, for example, signed the U.S.-Iraq security agreement despite Iranian opposition. 

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In Afghanistan, Iran has focused on promoting a friendly central government in 

Kabul and limiting western power and influence. Iran’s policy in Afghanistan follows multiple tracks, including providing political and economic support to the 

Karzai Government and developing relationships with actors across the political 

spectrum. 

• Iran has opposed Afghan reconciliation talks with the Taliban as risking 

an increase in the group’s influence and legitimacy. 

• We judge Iran distrusts the Taliban and opposes its return to power but 

uses the provision of lethal aid as a way to pressure western forces, gather 

intelligence, and build ties that could protect Iran’s interests if the Taliban 

regains control of the country. 

In the Levant, Tehran is focused on building influence in Lebanon and expanding 

the capability of key allies. Tehran continues to support groups such as Hizballah, 

Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which it views as integral to its efforts 

to challenge Israeli and Western influence in the Middle East. 

• Hizballah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial aid, training, and 

weaponry, and Iran’s senior leadership has cited Hizballah as a model for 

other militant groups. We assess Tehran has continued to provide 

Hizballah with significant amounts of funding, training, and weapons since 

the 2006 conflict with Israel, increasing the group’s capabilities to pressure 

other Lebanese factions and to threaten Israel. 

• Iran’s provision of training, weapons, and money to Hamas since the 2006 

Palestinian elections has bolstered the group’s ability to strike Israel and 

oppose the Palestinian Authority (PA). 

Worsening Conflict in the Levant 

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon are two places where the multifaceted 

connections of which I spoke are most pronounced in this arc of instability. Two 

non-state actors, Hamas and Hizballah, play prominent roles, while individual 

states that oppose U.S. interests, such as Iran and Syria, also are prominent. In 

both these countries, we worry about worsening conflict and the potential for growing violent extremism. 

Fighting between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip subsided in mid-January, 

leaving in its wake hardened attitudes among Israelis and Palestinians, deepened 

Palestinian political divisions, and a widened rift between regional moderates—led 

by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan—and hardliners, including Iran, Hizballah, and 

Syria. A key challenge for U.S. policy in the coming year will be finding ways to 

strengthen moderates and renew the potential for peace negotiations, lest post-conflict division and anger in the region further diminish prospects for peace. 

With Hamas in control of Gaza and Hizballah growing stronger in Lebanon, 

progress on a Palestinian-Israeli accord is growing more difficult. With Iran developing a nuclear weapon capability and Israel determined not to allow it, there is 

potential for an Iran-Israeli confrontation or crisis on that issue as well. Moderate 

Arab states fear a nuclear-armed Iran, want progress on Palestinian settlement— 

the absence of which deprives U.S. Arab allies of crucial political capital to defend 

strategic ties to the United States and wish to sustain a moderate, statecentered 

politics for the region. Progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace track would increase opportunities for the United States to broaden its engagement with Arab 

publics, including those aligning with the growing ideology of Islamic nationalism. 

• The Israeli public appears broadly supportive of Israel’s military action 

and believes Israel must act decisively to prevent attacks from Palestiniancontrolled territory. At the same time, Israel’s military actions in Gaza have 

deepened Palestinian anger towards Israel, both in the Gaza Strip and in 

the West Bank, and sparked outrage and protests throughout the Arab and 

Muslim world. 

• Hamas and the PA are engaged in an intense competition, with both 

sides seeking to emerge from the conflict in a stronger political position, but 

relations between the two organizations have been further embittered by 

the crisis. The PA accused Hamas of needlessly provoking an Israeli attack 

and Hamas, which has argued it ‘‘won’’ by surviving the operation and continuing its control of Gaza, accused the PA of essentially collaborating with 

the Israeli assault. 

• The moderate Arab states and regional hardliners are competing to shape 

the regional developments and public attitudes in the aftermath of the 

Gaza crisis. The moderates seek a reconciliation of the Palestinian factions 

and the resumption of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, 

while hardliners are encouraging Hamas to retain its uncompromising 

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stance toward Israel. These opposing regional blocs are competing to take 

the lead in delivering humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza. Moderate 

states support U.S. efforts to establish a ceasefire and border security regime that will prevent the rearming of Hamas, while Iran is likely to lead 

an effort to provide weapons to Hamas to build the group’s military capabilities. 

Tensions between Hamas and Fatah have been elevated since Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, and efforts to achieve reconciliation have failed. 

Both factions continue to attack, harass, and detain members of the other group in 

the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, deepening mutual resentment and making an 

accord between them difficult. Reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas 

scheduled for November in Cairo did not occur because Hamas refused to attend the 

meetings, in part to protest ongoing PA security measures in the West Bank targeting its members. 

• Disagreement between Fatah and Hamas about a range of issues such as 

the timing of national elections and formation of a unity government could 

lead Hamas to challenge the legitimacy of Abbas’s government and will remain obstacles to Fatah-Hamas reconciliation. 

In 2008, longstanding tensions worsened between anti-democratic Fatah elements, 

mostly but not exclusively the so-called ‘‘old-guard’’ and typically younger elements 

demanding internal reforms within the faction, worsened in 2008 amid discussions 

over the location of and attendance at Fatah’s long-delayed sixth General Congress. 

These internal conflicts threaten to fracture the party and damage its prospects in 

the run-up to PA presidential and legislative elections in 2009 or early 2010. There 

is no consensus among Fatah officials regarding a replacement for President Abbas, 

who has not groomed a successor, and no potential leader has gained Fatah’s full 

support. 

In Lebanon, after a long stalemate, the political process showed some movement 

last year that reasserted a fragile consensus giving Hizballah and the opposition 

veto power in the Lebanese Government. The Doha Accord in May ended armed 

clashes between Hizballah and Lebanese civilians and 18 months of political stalemate. The accord also paved the way for the election of former Lebanese Armed 

Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sulayman as President on May 25, 2008. 

Sulayman has positioned himself as a consensus-builder between the March 14 coalition and the Hizballah-led opposition and has made progress on some issues, including forming the national unity cabinet, drafting the cabinet statement, and reforming the electoral law. 

• The Lebanese political scene has enjoyed a period of relative calm and 

reconciliation since May, probably because all Lebanese parties are focused 

on preparing and forging alliances for the National Assembly election in 

June 2009. Lebanese Christian voters, divided between the two political 

camps, will be decisive in determining who wins a majority in the election. 

The security situation remains fragile in Lebanon, especially in the north, which 

saw fighting between the Sunni and Alawi communities last summer. The 

Hizballah-initiated violence in May has left all sectarian groups—the Sunnis in particular—concerned about their security. The LAF’s limited response and the 

Hizballah-led opposition’s military strength have reinforced the view that sectarian 

communities must defend themselves. All sides are working to develop sectarianbased militia forces. Hizballah continues to bolster its military strength; since the 

2006 war, the group has rearmed and trained additional personnel in preparation 

for possible future conflict with Israel. 

Hizballah’s attempts to reconcile with other Lebanese parties are an effort to 

show the group’s commitment to a Lebanese nationalist agenda in preparation for 

the election. They are also meant to reduce the damage done to Hizballah’s image 

by its armed takeover of parts of Beirut in May. 

Since becoming President of Syria in June 2000, Bashar al-Asad has strengthened 

his hold on power in Syria. Asad’s standing has been augmented by his perceived 

success in weathering regional crises and international pressure and by the regime’s 

ability to highlight Syria’s relative insulation from violence in Iraq and Lebanon. 

Within Syria, Asad has preserved the pillars of regime control established by his 

father while gradually using personnel turnover to appoint loyalists and expand his 

power base. 

• Syrian leaders continue to exploit ‘‘resistance’’ to Israel and rejection of 

U.S. pressure to unify Syrians in support of the regime, despite broad dissatisfaction with economic conditions, some disappointment at the lack of 

20 

political reforms, and quiet resentment by some Sunnis at domination by 

the Alawi minority. 

Damascus continues efforts to cement its influence in Lebanon by providing economic and other support to its allies in the Lebanese opposition. Syria has exploited 

its role in helping secure the May 2008 Doha agreement, which ended Lebanon’s 

political violence last spring and ushered in a unity government, to improve relations with Europe and moderate Arab states. Syria is poised to appoint an ambassador to Lebanon, and we judge Syria will continue to interfere in Lebanese affairs 

in pursuit of its own interests. 

Syrian military cooperation with Iran, including trilateral cooperation with 

Hizballah, has increased during the past year. Syria views its links to Iran as a 

means to press and deter adversaries, particularly Israel, and create leverage for 

achieving its major goals of a lead role in the Arab world, maintaining influence in 

Lebanon, and regaining the Golan Heights. For Syria’s part, Iran has proven over 

the last quarter century to be Syria’s most reliable ally. Shared interests over the 

past few years—support for Lebanese Hizballah, sustaining Palestinian terrorists, 

and countering U.S. regional intentions—have drawn Iran and Syria toward a closer 

alliance. Syrian military support to Hizballah has increased substantially over the 

past 5 years, especially since the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war. Damascus also supports 

Palestinian rejectionist groups, such as Hamas, which base their external leadership 

in Syria. 

Syria probably will adjust its approach to the Iraq insurgency as Iraq’s situation 

evolves. As the United States withdraws, we assess Damascus will seek improved 

political and economic ties to Baghdad and is likely to support oppositionists opposed to a long-term U.S. presence in Iraq. Syria will remain the primary gateway 

for foreign fighters entering Iraq. Syria condemned the October 26, 2008, U.S. raid 

that targeted AQI foreign fighter facilitator Abu Ghadiyah and staged a temporary 

removal of some border guard forces. Damascus also closed U.S. institutions in 

Syria, including the Damascus Community School and the American Cultural Center. 

A More Stable Iraq as Counterbalance 

The positive security trends over the past year have endured and expanded, and 

a more stable Iraq could counterbalance other negative trends in the region. Extremists in Iraq have been largely sidelined by coalition and Iraqi operations and 

dwindling popular tolerance for violence, and their attacks are no longer a major 

catalyst for sectarian violence. Iraqis now are less inclined to resolve their differences through unsanctioned violence, and fewer Iraqis are dying at the hands of 

their countrymen than at any time in the past 2 years. Indeed, communal violence 

is now at the lowest sustained levels since Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s Government came to power. Improving security conditions in Iraq have given the Prime 

Minister an opportunity to assert authority in previously denied areas of the country. Meanwhile, the maturation of the Awakening movement, ISF gains, and the 

subsequent spread of Sons of Iraq groups, in combination with coalition operations 

against AQI leaders, have weakened AQI by largely forcing it out of strongholds 

such as Al Anbar and much of greater Baghdad. 

The main factors that have contributed to these positive trends are as follows: 

• First, coalition operations and population security measures have been 

critical to reducing violence in Iraq. We judge Coalition support in the form 

of a credible, politically neutral security guarantor also has facilitated the 

ISF’s ability to deal with ethnosectarian issues. 

• Second, the Sunni insurgency has continued to wane. Most Iraqi-led 

Sunni insurgent groups have largely suspended operations against the coalition, favoring engagement with the United States to protect their communities, to oppose AQI, or protect against feared domination by the Iraqi 

Government, although many are hedging by maintaining their organizational structures and access to weapons. 

• Third, the threat from AQI has continued to diminish. AQI, although still 

dangerous, has experienced the defection of members, lost key mobilization 

areas, suffered disruption of support infrastructure and funding, and been 

forced to change targeting priorities. Indeed, the pace of suicide bombings 

countrywide, which we consider one indicator of AQI’s operational capability, fell significantly during the last year. 

• Fourth, the threat of violence from most Shiite militants has declined. 

Many Shiite who looked upon Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in early 2008 

as defenders against Sunni extremists eventually came to see the JAM as 

pariahs, leading Muqtada al-Sadr to announce last summer that most of his 

thousands-strong militia would set aside their weapons to become a cultural 

21 

organization and a counterweight to Western influence. Some Shiite militant groups such as Sadrist-affiliated groups and Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) 

probably will continue anti-coalition attacks and may engage in sporadic violence against Iraqi Government targets. 

• Lastly, the capabilities of the ISF have continued to improve. The ISF’s 

increasing professionalism and improvements in warfighting skills have allowed it to assume more responsibility for Iraq’s internal security, as demonstrated by the successful operations against Shiite militants in Al 

Basrah, Sadr City, and Al ‘Amarah, and against Sunni extremists in Diyala 

and Mosul. Despite these improvements, the ISF remains dependent on the 

United States for enabling capabilities such as logistics, fire support, and 

intelligence. 

We assess political and security progress could be halted or even reversed by a 

number of factors, particularly if these challenges occur in combination. 

• Disputed internal boundaries. Resolving disputed boundaries, primarily 

in northern Iraq, probably will be the most fiercely contested political issue 

to face Iraq in the next several years and poses the greatest threat to government stability. 

• Perceptions of Iraqi Government repression. Policies or actions of the 

Iraqi Government perceived by segments of Iraq’s ethnosectarian population to represent a broad and enduring campaign of repression could lead 

to widespread violence. 

• Increased foreign support to insurgent or militia groups. We judge a large 

infusion of foreign support could deepen and intensify the ensuing conflict 

if Iraqi militants and insurgents sought external assistance to challenge or 

destabilize the Iraqi Government. 

In addition to these challenges, Baghdad will confront more difficult choices about 

spending priorities as a result of declining oil revenues as it simultaneously grapples with security force modernization, infrastructure investment, and expanding 

public payrolls. Iraq’s economy will continue to depend heavily on hydrocarbon exports, government spending, and continued security improvements. 

We judge Iran will expand political and economic ties to Baghdad and will continue to supply weapons and training to Shiite militants to counter a Sunni resurgence, maintain leverage in Iraq, and keep pressure on U.S. forces. Iraqi nationalism, however, acts as a check on Iran’s ability to project power in Iraq. Syria will 

focus on improving relations with Baghdad and seek increased trade and energy exports but also will continue to support Baathists and other non-AQI Sunni 

oppositionists to try to gain leverage in Iraq. Turkey will continue to focus on countering the Kurdistan People’s Congress, a Kurdish terrorist group based in northern 

Iraq. The Turkish military continues to conduct cross-border air and artillery strikes 

in northern Iraq against the Kurdistan People’s Congress (KGK, formerly PKK), a 

Kurdish terrorist organization waging armed conflict against Turkey. The KGK appears to retain the desire to attack Turkish targets. In early October 2008, the KGK 

launched an attack on a Turkish military outpost that left 17 Turkish troops dead. 

• Turkish officials met with Kurdistan Regional Government President 

Barzani in October 2008, opening the prospect of closer ties between Turkey 

and the KRG. Like the rest of Europe, the Turkish economy is feeling the 

effects of the global financial crisis. In mid-November, Standard and Poor’s 

downgraded Turkey’s credit outlook from stable to negative. 

Iraq’s Sunni Arab neighbors are starting to reestablish an Arab presence in Baghdad, but Arab engagement is likely to be slow and halting over the next year. Jordan’s King Abdallah in August became the first Arab head of state to travel to 

Baghdad since the fall of Saddam; he dispatched an Ambassador to Iraq in October. 

Afghan-Pakistani Linkages 

In the past year, Afghanistan’s Taliban-dominated insurgency has increased the 

geographic scope and frequency of attacks. Taliban reaction to expanded Afghan and 

North Atlantic Treaty Operations (NATO) account for some of the increase in violence, but insurgents also have demonstrated greater aggressiveness and more lethal tactics. Efforts to improve governance and extend development were hampered 

in 2008 by a lack of security in many areas and a general lack of government capacity and competency. The ability of the Afghan Government, NATO, and the United 

States to push back the Taliban and deliver security, basic governance, and economic development will determine the continued support of the Afghan people for 

the government and the international community. Afghan leaders also must tackle 

endemic corruption and an extensive drug trade, which erode the capacity of the 

government while diminishing public confidence in its already fragile institutions. 

22 

Specifically, the security situation has deteriorated in many eastern areas of the 

country and in the south and northwest. Taliban and affiliated insurgent groups 

have expanded operations into previously peaceful areas of the west and around 

Kabul. The Taliban-dominated insurgency has expanded in scope despite International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom military operations targeting insurgent command and control networks. 

Continued progress has been made in expanding and fielding the Afghan National 

Army, but the shortage of international trainers in the field, high operational tempo, 

attrition, and absenteeism hamper efforts to make units capable of independent action. The Afghan National Police remains a largely untrained force with high rates 

of corruption and absenteeism. Limitations to training, mentoring, and equipping 

combined with an ineffective Ministry of Interior and large parts of the country that 

have not been effectively ‘‘cleared’’ hinder the progress and effectiveness of the policy. 

Kabul in 2009 must work closely with the national legislature and provincial and 

tribal leaders to establish and extend the capacity of the central and provincial government. The country faces a chronic shortage of resources and of qualified and motivated government officials at the national and local level. In addition, continued 

attacks undercut the national government’s image as a viable guarantor of security, 

persuading tribal and other influential nonstate actors to either remain neutral or 

back insurgents. The 2009 presidential election will present a greater security challenge than the 2004 election, and the insurgents probably will make a concerted effort to disrupt it. 

Kabul’s inability to build effective, honest, and loyal provincial and district level 

institutions capable of providing basic services and sustainable, licit livelihoods 

erodes its popular legitimacy and increases the influence of local warlords and the 

Taliban. The Afghan Government has launched some initiatives, such as the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, to address governance shortcomings, but 

corruption has exceeded culturally tolerable levels and is eroding the legitimacy of 

the government. Both law enforcement and judicial capacity, although somewhat 

improved, remain limited, and Kabul remains constrained in its ability to deploy 

programs at the provincial and local levels. 

The Afghan Government has no coherent tribal engagement strategy, but where 

Pashtun tribal and government interests intersect, gains in local security, stability, 

and development are possible. At the provincial level, governors who have proven 

themselves effective mediators of local disputes among tribes and other local groups 

in their respective jurisdictions garner support from Afghan audiences and the 

donor community. 

The Afghan drug trade is a major source of revenue for corrupt officials, the 

Taliban and other insurgent groups operating in the country and is one of the greatest long-term challenges facing Afghanistan. The insidious effects of drug-related 

criminality continue to undercut the government’s ability to assert its authority outside of Kabul, to develop a strong, rule-of-law based system, and to rebuild the economy. Despite decreases in poppy cultivation in 2008, opium production in Afghanistan remains historically high, and the country produces over 90 percent of the 

world’s supply with 95 percent of the crop grown in five contiguous provinces of 

southwestern Afghanistan and over 60 percent in one province alone, Helmand. In 

2008, farmers grew 157,300 hectares of poppy, potentially producing an estimated 

7,700 metric tons of opium. Almost every province outside the southwest was either 

poppy-free or had a dramatic decrease in cultivation, due to a combination of effective local anti-poppy campaigns, better security unfavorable weather, and decreased 

opium prices relative to other crops, and improved governance and security in key 

provinces. The United Nations estimates that the total value to agricultural producers of Afghan opium in 2008 was $730 million—although the gap in profitability 

has narrowed. No improvement in the security in Afghanistan is possible without 

progress in Pakistan. 

No improvement in Afghanistan is possible without Pakistan taking control of its 

border areas and improving governance, creating economic and educational opportunities throughout the country. The government is losing authority in parts of the 

North-West Frontier Province and has less control of its semi-autonomous tribal 

areas: even in the more developed parts of the country, mounting economic hardships and frustration over poor governance have given rise to greater radicalization. 

In 2008 Islamabad intensified counterinsurgency efforts, but Islamabad’s record 

in dealing with militants has been mixed as it navigates conflicting internal and 

counterterrorist priorities. Pakistan’s leaders are facing enormous socio-economic 

challenges. Economic hardships are intense, and the country is now facing a major 

balance of payments challenge. Islamabad needs to make painful reforms to improve 

overall macroeconomic stability. Pakistan’s law-and-order situation is dismal, affectVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ing even Pakistani elites, and violence between various sectarian, ethnic, and political groups threatens to escalate. Pakistan’s population is growing rapidly at a rate 

of about 2 percent a year, and roughly half of the country’s 172 million residents 

are illiterate, under the age of 20, and live near or below the poverty line. Among 

the needed reforms are measures to improve the transparency of government expenditures and impose taxes on wealthy landowners. Such reforms would reduce the 

opportunities for corruption among Pakistani political leaders, help to establish a 

more level political playing field, and help build the confidence of average Pakistanis in their government. 

The Pakistani Government’s current plans will require intensified and sustained 

efforts to orchestrate the administrative, economic, educational, legal, and social reforms required to create an environment that discourages Islamic extremism and 

encourages the development of human capital. This, in turn, requires effective political leadership focused on improving the capabilities of Pakistani institutions for effective governance. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Exacerbating Prospects for Middle East 

The ongoing efforts of nation-states to develop and/or acquire dangerous weapons 

and delivery systems in the Middle East and elsewhere constitute another major 

threat to the safety of our Nation, our deployed troops, and our allies. (The threat 

posed by North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program is assessed 

below, in the section on Asia.) We are most concerned about the threat and destabilizing effect of nuclear proliferation. The threat from the proliferation of materials 

and technologies that could contribute to both existing and prospective biological 

and chemical weapons programs also is real. Most of the international community 

shares these concerns. 

WMD use by most nation states traditionally has been constrained by the logic 

of deterrence and by diplomacy, but these constraints may be of less utility in preventing the use of mass-effect weapons by terrorist groups. Moreover, the time when 

only a few states had access to the most dangerous technologies is long over. Technologies, often dual-use, circulate easily in our globalized economy, as do the personnel with scientific expertise who design and use them. Therefore, it is difficult 

for the United States and its partners to track efforts to acquire components and 

production technologies that are widely available. 

We assess countries that are still pursuing WMD programs will continue to try 

to improve their capabilities and level of self-sufficiency over the next decade. Nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons or the production technologies and materials necessary to produce them may also be acquired by states that do not now 

have such programs; and/or by terrorist or insurgent organizations; and by criminal 

organizations, acting alone or through middlemen. 

Iranian Nuclear and Missile Programs 

The Iranian regime continues to flout U.N. Security Council restrictions on its nuclear programs. There is a real risk that its nuclear program will prompt other 

countries in the Middle East region to pursue nuclear options conducive to the development of nuclear weapons, and the advent of additional nuclear weapons programs might lead countries in other regions to reassess their nuclear options. 

I want to be very clear in characterizing the Iranian nuclear program. First, there 

are three key parts to an effective nuclear weapons capability: 

(1) Production of fissile material; 

(2) Effective means for weapon delivery; and 

(3) Design, weaponization, and testing of the warhead itself. 

We assessed in our 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on this subject that 

Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work was halted in fall 2003, along 

with its covert uranium conversion and enrichment-related activities. Declared uranium enrichment efforts were suspended in 2003 but resumed in January 2006 and 

will enable Iran to produce weapons-usable fissile material if it chooses to do so. 

Development of medium-range ballistic missiles, inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons, has continued unabated. 

We assess Iranian military entities were working under government direction to 

develop nuclear weapons until fall 2003. Iranian entities are continuing to develop 

a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, 

if a decision were made to do so. 

• Iran continues its efforts to develop uranium enrichment technology, 

which can be used both to produce low-enriched uranium for power reactor 

fuel and to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. 

• As noted, Iran continues to deploy and improve ballistic missiles inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons. 

24 

• We assess Iran since fall 2003 has conducted research and development 

projects with commercial and conventional military applications, some of 

which would be of limited use for nuclear weapons. 

We judge in fall 2003 Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and 

weaponization activities and that the halt lasted at least several years. We assess 

Tehran had not restarted these activities as of at least mid-2007. Although we do 

not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, we assess 

Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them. 

We judge the halt was directed primarily in response to increasing international 

scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work. This indicates Iran may be more susceptible to influence on the issue 

than we had judged in the 2005 NIE. 

We do not have sufficient intelligence reporting to judge confidently whether 

Tehran is willing to maintain indefinitely the halt of its previously enumerated nuclear weapons-related activities while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart those activities. We assess Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity eventually 

to produce nuclear weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to 

abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible. I reiterate 

that two activities of the three relevant to a nuclear weapons capability continue: 

development of uranium enrichment technology that will enable production of fissile 

material, if Iran chooses to do so, and development of nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems. 

We assess convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of 

nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership see 

between nuclear weapons and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to 

develop such weapons. Our analysis suggests that some combination of threats of 

intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran 

to achieve its security and goals might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible— 

prompt Tehran to extend the halt to the above nuclear weapons-related activities. 

It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be. 

We continue to assess Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon. We continue to assess Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material but still judge it has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot 

rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad or will acquire in the future a nuclear 

weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran 

wants to have nuclear weapons it would need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile 

material indigenously. We judge it has not yet done so. 

Iran made significant progress in 2007 and 2008 installing and operating centrifuges at its main centrifuge enrichment plant, Natanz. We judge Iran probably 

would be technically capable of producing enough highly-enriched uranium for a 

weapon sometime during the 2010–2015 timeframe. INR judges Iran is unlikely to 

achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems. 

Iranian Missile Threat 

Beyond its WMD potential, Iranian conventional military power threatens Persian 

Gulf states and challenges U.S. interests. Iran is enhancing its ability to project its 

military power, primarily with ballistic missiles and naval power, with the goal of 

dominating the Gulf region and deterring potential adversaries. It seeks a capacity 

to disrupt the operations and reinforcement of U.S. forces based in the region, potentially intimidating regional allies into withholding support for U.S. policy, and 

raising the political, financial, and human costs to the United States and our allies 

of our presence. 

• Iran’s growing inventory of ballistic missiles—it already has the largest 

inventory in the Middle East—and its acquisition of anti-ship cruise missiles provide capabilities to enhance its power projection. Tehran views its 

conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter 

and if necessary retaliate against forces in the region, including U.S. forces. 

Its ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD and if so 

armed would fit into this same strategy. 

The Terrorist Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Threat 

Over the coming years, we will continue to face a substantial threat, including in 

the U.S. Homeland, from terrorists attempting to acquire biological, chemical, and 

possibly nuclear weapons and use them to conduct large-scale attacks. Conventional 

25 

weapons and explosives will continue to be the most often used instruments of destruction in terrorist attacks; however, terrorists who are determined to develop 

CBRN capabilities will have increasing opportunities to do so, owing to the spread 

of relevant technological knowledge and the ability to work with CBRN materials 

and designs in safe havens. 

• Most terrorist groups that have shown some interest, intent, or capability 

to conduct CBRN attacks have pursued only limited, technically simple approaches that have not yet caused large numbers of casualties. 

In particular, we assess the terrorist use of biological agents represents a growing 

threat as the barriers to obtaining many suitable starter cultures are eroding and 

open source technical literature and basic laboratory equipment can facilitate production. Terrorist chemical attacks also represent a substantial threat. Small-scale 

chemical attacks using industrial toxins have been the most frequent type of CBRN 

attack to date. The chlorine attacks in Iraq from October 2006 through the summer 

of 2007 highlighted terrorist interest in using commercial and easily available toxic 

industrial chemicals as weapons. 

Al Qaeda is the terrorist group that historically has sought the broadest range 

of CBRN attack capabilities, and we assess that it would use any CBRN capability 

it acquires in an anti-U.S. attack, preferably against the Homeland. There also is 

a threat of biological or chemical attacks in the U.S. Homeland by lone individuals. 

RISING ASIA

As the terrorism and proliferation threats persist across the ‘‘arc of instability,’’ 

East and South Asia are poised to become the long-term power center of the world. 

China and India are restoring the positions they held in the 18th century when 

China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s 

wealth. These two countries are likely to surpass the gross domestic product (GDP) 

of all other economies except the United States and Japan by 2025, although the 

current financial crisis may somewhat slow the momentum. Japan remains the second largest global economy and a strong U.S. ally in the region, but the global economic slowdown is exacting a heavy toll on Japan’s economy. To realize its aspirations to play increased regional and global roles will require strong leadership and 

politically difficult decisions. All together—Japan, the ‘‘tiger’’ economies like South 

Korea and Taiwan as well as the rising giants of China and India point to the ‘‘rise 

of Asia’’ as a defining characteristic of the 21st century. China’s reemergence as a 

major power with global impact is especially affecting the regional balance of power. 

As in the Middle East, the United States has strong relationships in East Asia— 

a network of alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and close partnerships with other countries—and a longstanding forward 

military presence. Countries in the region look to the United States for leadership 

and for ways to encourage China to become a constructive and responsible player 

in the regional and global communities. Although China will have ample opportunity to play a positive role, it also poses a potential challenge if it chooses to use 

its growing power and influence in ways counter to U.S. or broader international 

interests. 

China’s Transformation 

China is 30 years into a fundamental transformation that will take many more 

decades to complete. Although there have been moments when the government’s effort to maintain control seemed on the verge of failure—notably the crisis on 

Tiananmen Square in 1989—the government has been remarkably successful in 

guiding reform. China has avoided the fate of most other socialist countries, suffering neither the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union nor the stagnation of Cuba and North Korea. 

We judge China’s international behavior is driven by a combination of domestic 

priorities, primarily maintaining economic prosperity and domestic stability, and a 

longstanding ambition to see China play the role of a great power in East Asia and 

globally. Chinese leaders view preserving domestic stability as one of their most important internal security challenges. Their greatest concerns are separatist unrest 

and the possibility that local protests could merge into a coordinated national movement demanding fundamental political reforms or an end to Party rule. Security 

forces move quickly and sometimes forcefully to end demonstrations. The March 

2008 protests in Tibet highlighted the danger of separatist unrest and prompted 

Beijing to deploy paramilitary and military assets to end the demonstrations. 

These same domestic priorities are central to Chinese foreign policy. China’s desire to secure access to the markets, commodities, and energy supplies needed to 

sustain domestic economic growth significantly influences its foreign engagement. 

26 

Chinese diplomacy seeks to maintain favorable relations with other major powers, 

particularly the United States, which Beijing perceives as vital to China’s economic 

success and to achieving its other strategic objectives. But Beijing is also seeking 

to build its global image and influence in order to advance its broader interests and 

to resist what it perceives as external challenges to those interests or to China’s security and territorial integrity. 

Taiwan as an area of tension in U.S.-China relations has substantially relaxed 

since the 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou. The new Taiwanese President inaugurated 

in May has resumed dialogue with Beijing after a 9-year hiatus, and leaders on both 

sides of the Taiwan Strait are now cautiously optimistic that a new period of less 

confrontational relations has begun. Many outstanding challenges remain, however, 

and the two sides eventually will need to confront issues such as Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. Beijing has not renounced the use of force 

against the island, and China’s leaders see maintaining the goal of unification as 

vital to regime legitimacy. 

PLA Modernization 

Preparations for a possible Taiwan conflict continue to drive the modernization 

goals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese defense-industrial complex. It will likely remain the primary factor as long as the Taiwan situation is unresolved. 

At the same time, we judge that China over the past several years has begun a 

substantially new phase in its military development by beginning to articulate roles 

and missions for the PLA that go well beyond China’s immediate territorial interests. 

• For example, China’s leaders may decide to contribute combat forces to 

peacekeeping operations, in addition to expanding the current level of command and logistic support. 

• China’s national security interests are broadening. This will likely lead 

China to attempt to develop at least a limited naval power projection capability extending beyond the South China Sea. This already has been reflected in Beijing’s decision in December to participate in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. 

Missile Capability 

China continues to develop and field conventional theater-range ballistic and 

cruise missile capabilities that can reach U.S. forces and regional bases throughout 

the Western Pacific and Asia, including Guam. China also is developing conventionally armed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with terminally guided maneuverable warheads that could be used to attack U.S. naval forces and airbases. 

In addition, counter-command, control, and sensor systems, to include communications satellite jammers, are among Beijing’s highest military priorities. 

Counterspace Systems 

China continues to pursue a long-term program to develop a capability to disrupt 

and damage critical foreign space systems. Counterspace systems, including antisatellite weapons, also rank among the country’s highest military priorities. 

Nuclear Capability 

On the nuclear side, we judge Beijing seeks to modernize China’s strategic forces 

in order to address concerns about the survivability of those systems in the face of 

foreign, particularly US, advances in strategic reconnaissance, precision strike, and 

missile defenses. We assess China’s nuclear capabilities will increase over the next 

10 years. 

Indian Pragmatism 

Like China, India’s expanding economy will lead New Delhi to pursue new trade 

partners, gain access to vital energy markets, and generate the other resources required to sustain rapid economic growth. To sustain rapid growth, Indian governments also must maintain the political support for economic reforms needed to drive 

the expanding economy. 

On the global stage, Indian leaders will continue to follow an independent course 

characterized by economic and political pragmatism. New Delhi will not automatically support or oppose positions favored by the United States or any other major 

power. Nonetheless, good relations with the United States will be essential for India 

to realize its global ambitions. Indian leaders will seek benefits from American influence, trade, and technology. Strong ties to Washington also will give India more 

confidence in dealing with China and in mitigating the dangers posed by its longtime adversary, Pakistan. However, Indian leaders often will adopt positions conVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
27 

trary to those favored by Washington. India will be concerned about China during 

the coming decade because of Beijing’s political and economic power and its ability 

to project military force regionally, but Indian leaders will strive to avoid confrontation with China. 

Indian-Pakistan Relations 

Within South Asia, one of the world’s least integrated regions, India will strive 

to manage tensions with Pakistan, transnational terrorism, and spillover from instability in small neighboring states. Determined efforts by Indian and Pakistani leaders to improve relations through the so-called Composite Dialogue over the last 4 

years could unravel unless Islamabad takes sustained, concrete, meaningful steps 

to allay Indian concerns about Islamabad’s support to anti-Indian militant groups. 

This is the case particularly in light of the November 2008 terrorist attack in 

Mumbai. The attack has convinced many Indians that Pakistani military leaders, 

in an effort to undercut India’s emerging international stature, now favor a strategy 

of allowing Pakistan-based groups to attack targets that symbolize New Delhi’s 

growing prominence on the global stage or that could undermine India’s prominence 

by provoking religious violence in the country. In the absence of a military response 

against Islamabad, the Indian public will look for visible signs that Pakistan is actively working to punish those involved and eliminate its domestic terrorist organizations. Pakistan-based groups could carry out additional attacks against India and 

run the risk of provoking an India-Pakistan conflict. In addition, India, which has 

endured a series of major terrorist attacks without major military response since 

2003, is under domestic pressure to make rapid and significant improvements in its 

counterterrorism capabilities. 

India also will look for ways to safeguard its interests in light of the concluding 

civil war in Sri Lanka and political uncertainty in Bangladesh and Nepal, which 

have experienced dramatic transformations in government during the past year. 

New Delhi generally will be supportive of democratic forces in its smaller neighbors, 

while also being sensitive to the opinions of the Tamil and Bengali communities 

within India. 

North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions 

In addition to a possible India-Pakistan conflict, Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions 

and proliferation behavior threaten to destabilize East Asia. The North’s October 

2006 nuclear test is consistent with our longstanding assessment that it had produced a nuclear device. Prior to the test, we assessed that North Korea produced 

enough plutonium for at least a half dozen nuclear weapons. The IC continues to 

assess North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past. Some 

in the IC have increasing concerns that North Korea has an ongoing covert uranium 

enrichment program. 

Pyongyang probably views its nuclear weapons as being more for deterrence, 

international prestige, and coercive diplomacy than for warfighting and would consider using nuclear weapons only under certain narrow circumstances. We also assess Pyongyang probably would not attempt to use nuclear weapons against U.S. 

forces or territory unless it perceived the regime to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable loss of control. 

Progress was made, albeit painstakingly, last year in Six-Party Talks; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has shut down three core facilities at 

Yongbyon and has completed 8 of the 11 disablement steps. However, much work 

remains. At the latest round of talks held in December in Beijing, the DPRK refused 

to agree to a Six Party verification protocol needed to verify the completeness and 

correctness of its nuclear declaration. Since then, Pyongyang has issued hardline 

statements suggesting further challenges to denuclearization. 

On the proliferation side, North Korea has sold ballistic missiles and associated 

materials to several Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, and, in our assessment, assisted Syria with the construction of a nuclear reactor. We remain concerned North Korea could again export nuclear technology. In the October 3 Second 

Phase Actions agreement, the DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how. We assess Pyongyang is less likely to risk 

selling nuclear weapons or weapons-quantities of fissile material than nuclear technology or less sensitive equipment to other countries or non-state actors, in part because it needs its limited fissile material for its own deterrent. Pyongyang probably 

also perceives that it would risk a regime-ending military confrontation with the 

United States if the nuclear material was used by another country or group in a 

nuclear strike or terrorist attacks and the United States could trace the material 

back to North Korea. It is possible, however, that the North might find a nuclear 

weapons or fissile material transfer more appealing if its own stockpile grows larger 

28 

and/or it faces an extreme economic crisis where the potentially huge revenue from 

such a sale could help the country survive. 

We assess that poor economic conditions are fueling systemic vulnerability within 

North Korea. Public statements by the regime emphasize the need for adequate food 

supplies. A relatively good fall harvest in 2008, combined with the delivery of substantial U.S. food aid—500,000 tons of grain have been promised and about onethird of this has been delivered—probably will prevent deterioration in the food security situation during the next few months. However, we assess North Korea is 

still failing to come to grips with the economic downturn that began in the early 

1990s and that prospects for economic recovery remain slight. In addition to food, 

shortages in fertilizer and energy continue to plague the economy. Investment 

spending appears is negligible, trade remains weak, and we see little progress toward economic reforms. Pyongyang has long been in default on a relatively large 

foreign debt and we assess that badly needed foreign investment will not take place 

unless the North comes to terms with its international creditors and conforms to 

internationally accepted trade and financial norms, badly needed foreign investment 

will not take place. 

• Pyongyang’s strategic posture is not helping its economy. Trade with 

Japan has fallen precipitously since the nuclear and missile tests of 2006, 

and, while commercial trade with South Korea rose in 2008, South Korean 

aid and tourism to the north declined due to increased north-south tensions. 

Despite this poor economic performance and the many privations of the North Korean public, we see no organized opposition to Kim Jong Il’s rule and only occasional 

incidents of social disorder. Kim probably suffered a stroke in August that incapacitated him for several weeks, hindering his ability to operate as actively as he did 

before the stroke. However, his recent public activities suggest his health has improved significantly, and we assess he is making key decisions. The state’s control 

apparatus by all accounts remains strong, sustaining the dismal condition of human 

rights in North Korea. 

GROWING CHALLENGES IN RUSSIA AND EURASIA

Russian challenges to U.S. interests now spring more from Moscow’s perceived 

strengths than from the state weaknesses characteristic of the 1990s. U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and general anti-Americanism have created openings 

for Russia to build alternative arrangements to the U.S.-led international political 

and economic institutional order. Russia is actively cultivating relations with regional powers, including China, Iran, and Venezuela to increase its ability to influence events. Moscow also is trying to maintain control over energy supply and transportation networks to Europe to East Asia, and protect and further enhance its market share in Europe through new bilateral energy partnerships and organizing a gas 

cartel with other major exporters. Russia appears to believe the continued heavy dependence of European countries and former Soviet states on Russia’s state gas monopoly, Gazprom, provides Moscow with political and economic leverage. 

Russia continues to rely on its nuclear deterrent and retaliatory capability to 

counter the perceived threat from the United States and NATO. Moscow for the past 

several years has also been strengthening its conventional military force to make 

it a credible foreign policy instrument, both to signal its political resurgence and to 

assert its dominance over neighboring states, like Georgia. Moscow has actively engaged in foreign military cooperation with countries such as China and Venezuela, 

in part to remind the United States and others of Russia’s global military relevance. 

Despite persistent challenges, including a long-term decline in the numbers and 

quality of recruits and difficulties in keeping pace with the demands of weapons 

modernization, the Russian military defeated the Georgian military last August. 

Russian leaders recently have spoken positively about the possibilities for change 

in the U.S.-Russia dynamic, but issues such as NATO enlargement, the conflict over 

Georgia’s separatist regions, and Missile Defense will continue to pose difficulties 

for the relationship and underscore the challenges of finding ways to engage with 

Russia. Even as it seeks to negotiate a robust post-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

agreement, Moscow consistently stresses that the accession to NATO of Georgia and 

Ukraine would put existing arms control regimes and negotiations at risk and could 

prompt Russian military countermeasures as well as increased pressure against 

Tbilisi and Kyiv. Russia’s strong engagement with countries like Iran and Syria, including advanced weapons sales, also has implications for U.S. nonproliferation interests. 

29 

Eurasia/Caucasus/Central Asia 

Six months after the fighting between Russia and Georgia over Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia last August, the separatist regions remain potential flashpoints. Moscow’s expanded military presence in and political-economic ties to these regions, 

along with continuing violence increase the risk of provocation, overreaction, or miscalculation leading to a resumption of fighting. Although the political situation in 

Georgia has stabilized, President Saakashvili faces increasing criticism from the domestic opposition, and his reaction to that will either enhance or set back Georgia’s 

democratic development. 

The continued difficulty of bridging fundamental differences between Azerbaijan 

and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh will also keep tensions high in the Caucasus. 

Azerbaijan fears isolation in the wake of Kosovo’s independence, Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and signs of improved Armenian-Turkish relations. Armenia is concerned about Baku’s military buildup and does not want to become dependent on Russia. Both countries face the dual challenges of overcoming 

inertia in democratic reforms and battling endemic corruption in the face of an economic downturn. 

An increasingly assertive Russia and the fallout from the global financial crisis 

will combine to amplify the challenges facing Ukraine as it heads for a presidential 

election in the winter of 2009–2010. Ukraine has moved toward democracy and 

western integration despite numerous political tests since independence. Progress 

will be difficult because of weak political institutions, ongoing conflicts with Russia 

over gas pricing and contracts and the new exigencies of the global financial crisis, 

which has dramatically revealed the underlying weaknesses of the Ukrainian economy and potentially Ukraine’s stability. 

In Belarus, the Lukashenko regime appears willing to cooperate with Russian efforts to counter U.S. missile defense plans with Prague and Warsaw. However, Russia’s continuing efforts to control key Belarusian economic sectors could prompt 

Minsk to improve ties with the West to balance Moscow. Lukashenko maintains an 

authoritarian grip on power and could return to repressive measures if public discontent over the worsening economy turns to protest. 

The five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 

and Turkmenistan—with their highly-personalized politics, weak institutions, and 

growing inequalities are ill-equipped to deal with the challenges posed by Islamic 

violent extremism, poor economic development, and problems associated with energy 

water and food distribution. Energy helped make Kazakhstan a regional economic 

force, but any sustained decline in oil prices would affect revenues, could lead to 

societal discontent, and will derail the momentum for domestic reforms. Tajikistan 

and Kyrgyzstan have heavily depended on migrant worker remittances from both 

Russia and Kazakhstan for a significant portion of their gross domestic product— 

up to 45 percent in the case of Tajikistan—and will be severely affected by the financial crisis. Tajikistan, in particular, faces increased threats to internal stability 

from the loss of these critical revenue streams. Ultimately, these challenges to regional stability could threaten the security of critical U.S. and NATO lines of communication to Afghanistan through Central Asia. 

The Balkans 

Events in the Balkans will again pose the greatest threat of instability in Europe 

in 2009, despite positive developments in the last year that included Kosovo’s peaceful declaration of independence from Serbia, the election of pro-EU leaders in Serbia, and offers of NATO membership to Croatia and Albania. The principal challenges to stability will come from the unresolved political status of the Serb minority in Kosovo, particularly in northern Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s (BiH) continuing uneasy inter-ethnic condominium. 

More than 50 nations, including 22 of 27 EU members, have recognized the new 

state of Kosovo. In the coming years Pristina will depend on the international community for economic and development assistance and to ensure Kosovo’s territorial 

integrity. Belgrade openly supports parallel Kosovo Serb institutions. It has used 

political and legal means to challenge and undermine Pristina’s sovereignty and to 

limit the mandate of the EU’s Rule of Law mission (EULEX) in Kosovo, which is 

meant to help Kosovo authorities build multi-ethnic police, judiciary, and customs 

systems. This has reinforced the de facto separation of Kosovo into an Albanian-majority south and a Serb-majority north and frustrated the Kosovo Albanians. Kosovo 

Force’s (KFOR) presence will help deter widespread violence, however. Serbia’s leaders espouse a European future, and President Tadic desires quick progress toward 

EU membership, but they are unwilling to abandon Belgrade’s stake in Kosovo to 

achieve that end. Belgrade still looks for Moscow’s diplomatic support on this issue 

30 

and recently concluded a significant energy deal with Moscow, including sale of a 

majority stake in its state oil refinery. 

Bosnia’s future as a multi-ethnic state remains in doubt, although neither widespread violence nor a formal split is imminent. Ethnic agendas still dominate the 

political process, and wrangling among the three main ethnic groups over the past 

18 months has stalled the process of building a central government capable of taking the country into NATO and the EU. Threats of secession by Bosnian Serb leaders and calls by some Bosniak leaders to eliminate the Bosnian Serb entity have 

increased inter-ethnic tensions to perhaps the highest level in years. 

TESTING TIMES FOR LATIN AMERICA

Latin American economies, following 5 consecutive years of solid performance, are 

feeling the repercussions from the global financial crisis. We expect the region’s 

growth rate will fall substantially this year to about 1 percent from 4 percent for 

2008. Exports from the region have averaged 20 percent growth for 5 years, but falling commodity prices and slowdowns in major industrial markets have sharply reduced export growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 and into 2009. Foreign direct investment flows through mid-year 2008 were on pace to reach the record level of 

$110 billion in 2007, but are likely to have diminished in late 2008 and probably 

will continue to do so in 2009. Finally, after 10 years of worker remittances growing 

at an average annual rate of better than 15 percent, remittances grew just 7 percent 

in 2007 and grew only 1 to 2 percent in 2008. 

Democracy in much of Latin America has established impressive roots over the 

past decade or so. In countries that comprise the bulk of the region’s GDP and population—like Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru—pro-market policies have 

yielded important economic dividends that help fortify democratic gains. Brazil is 

becoming a leading regional power and, along with others like Argentina and Chile, 

is trying to promote greater South American integration. 

Developments in the last year, however, underscore the challenge that populist, 

often autocratic regimes still pose in the region. Venezuela attracts substantial, if 

declining, regional popular support, but its influence is likely to diminish as its economic problems mount. Cuba, though an economic basket case, can still influence 

the Latin American left because of its so-called ‘‘anti-imperialist’’ stance. Others like 

Bolivia, and to a lesser extent Argentina and Ecuador, have embraced populist policies and are likely to also lag behind. Some, such as Haiti, have become even poorer 

and still less governable. Basic law-and-order issues, to include rising violent crime 

and powerful drug trafficking organizations also confront key hemispheric nations, 

as do uneven governance and institution-building efforts and performance in confronting chronic corruption. To maintain our political and economic influence in the 

region, the United States will be called upon to help the region’s governments address their growing security problems and to deliver greater market access. Our use 

of bilateral trade agreements, and foreign aid through the Millennium Challenge Account to less developed countries, helps cement sound economic policies and more 

effective governance. 

As in Africa (see below), China has increased its outreach to Latin America in recent years, primarily in pursuit of access to markets and resources to fuel its economic development and growth. This is boosting Chinese economic and diplomatic 

influence in the region, and generating questions about Beijing’s long-term intention 

in the developing world—potentially as an alternative development model. Beijing’s 

military engagement in the region—while secondary to its economic and political engagement efforts—also facilitates access to strategic natural resources. People’s Liberation Army outreach activities in Latin America have included high-level strategic 

dialogue, personnel exchanges, and sales of weapons and equipment. Nonetheless, 

Beijing has made few arms sales to the region, outside of Venezuela, nor developed 

significant military-to-military ties with any countries. For its part, Tehran has 

made some progress over the last few years in improving commercial ties and establishing embassies and cultural centers in Latin America, with an aim to reducing 

Iran’s international isolation. Hizballah has long maintained a presence in the triborder region between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, a notorious region for narcotics and arms trafficking. 

Mexico 

Mexico’s sound fiscal and monetary policies will probably provide some insulation 

from the current global economic volatility. With 80 percent of its exports destined 

for U.S. consumers and low international oil prices, however, Mexico would take a 

strong hit from a prolonged U.S. recession. Mexico’s Finance Secretariat cut growth 

estimates for 2008 to 1.5 percent, and Finance Minister Carstens has openly acknowledged growth might contract by a percentage point this year. Mexico last exVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
31 

perienced a fall in GDP in 2001. Unemployment late last year was almost 4.5 percent, up a point from 2007 and underemployment is even higher. Employment in 

the construction sector dropped more than 4 percent in the same time period, according to Mexico’s National Statistics Institute. 

The sharp economic downturn as yet shows no sign of hurting Mexico’s debt posture or spurring northward migration. Mexico’s National Statistics Institute late 

last year indicated that Mexican emigration had dropped 42 percent since 2006, 

probably due to the decreased demand for labor in the United States. That trend 

probably will lead to declines in remittances, the second largest source of foreign 

currency after oil exports, and increase pressure on the government to create jobs. 

Mexico remains the most important conduit for illicit drugs reaching the United 

States. As much as 90 percent of that cocaine known to be directed toward the 

United States, and some Colombian heroin, eventually transits Mexico before entering the United States. Despite recent successful efforts to counter precursor chemical diversion and drug trafficking, Mexico is the chief foreign supplier of methamphetamine and marijuana to the U.S. market and produces most of the heroin 

consumed west of the Mississippi River. The corruptive influence and increasing violence of Mexican drug cartels, which are among the most powerful organized crime 

groups in the world, impede Mexico City’s ability to govern parts of its territory and 

build effective democratic institutions. 

Nearly 5,500 people—mostly cartel operatives and to a lesser degree local police— 

were murdered in 2008 in cartel-related violence, far exceeding the record of about 

2,700 drug-related murders in 2007. Also, the cartels have shown their willingness 

and capacity to strike Mexican Government officials, its leadership, and the military. Nevertheless, sustained government pressure has disrupted established 

transnational cocaine supply chains, interfered with day-to-day cartel operations, 

and has started to fragment Mexico’s powerful drug cartels. We assess that significantly more cocaine is diverting to Central America before moving into Mexico, a 

shift that, in our judgment, mitigates some risks drug traffickers faced in Mexico 

but that also complicates trafficking operations. 

As trafficking networks have come under increasing strain from President 

Calderon’s counternarcotics efforts, elements of Mexico’s most powerful cartels have 

become more aggressive. The assassination of the national police commissioner last 

May, the grenade attack in a crowded plaza in Michoacan State last September and 

the execution of Brigadier General marco Enrique Tello Quinonez this month indicate cartel elements are increasingly willing to kill high-level Mexican officials, retaliate against soldiers, and tolerate more collateral damage among civilians not directly involved in the drug trade. 

Calderon has demonstrated his determination to address the problem of narcoticsrelated corruption at all levels of the government by launching Operation Cleanup. 

Most notably, this has led to the arrest of a former Deputy Attorney General and 

the head of Interpol in Mexico. In addition, Calderon won approval in November of 

the 2009 Federal budget, which increased outlays in real terms to the Public Security Secretariat and the Attorney General’s Office by 69 percent and 29 percent, respectively. 

Colombia 

President Uribe is committed to an all-out effort to defeat the Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) by the time his term ends in 2010. His public 

statements indicate he is determined to use Colombia’s security forces to maintain 

the systematic military pressure that has kept the FARC on the run, caused the 

FARC to lose territory, and degraded FARC command and control. Among the major 

successes in 2008 were the deaths of key FARC leaders, including members of the 

ruling Secretariat, a continued high number of FARC desertions, and the 2 July rescue of 15 hostages, including 3 U.S. citizens. 

Despite these reverses, the FARC leadership has shown no signs it seeks to end 

hostilities or participate in serious peace talks. The group has a record of resilience, 

and its chances for surviving as a viable insurgent force over the next several years 

will be aided by a still-cohesive leadership structure, substantial drug revenues, and 

cross-border sanctuaries in Venezuela and Ecuador. 

Although the FARC is unlikely to make a sustained comeback, it will still be able 

to conduct small-scale guerrilla and terrorist attacks nationwide. Official and nonofficial U.S. citizens remain at risk. 

The government’s successes have contributed to a dramatic drop in crime, terrorist acts, massacres, and kidnappings. Bogota has made progress on providing better protection for labor unionists and instituting policies to educate the security 

services on human rights standards. Bogota needs to follow through, however, with 

32 

its proposals to strengthen the judiciary and prosecute the murders of union members and human rights workers. 

Bogota’s counterdrug successes—including capture and extradition of the leaders 

of the North Valley Cartel, the last remaining large-scale drug cartel (besides the 

FARC), the targeting of mid-level leaders, a strong security force presence in key 

drug transit and coca growing zones, and its U.S.-backed coca eradication program— 

have hampered FARC drug trafficking operations. Bogota’s strides in tackling corruption also have led to high-profile trafficker takedowns. Bogota arrested or killed 

important traffickers such as the Mejia Munera brothers, known as ‘‘los Mellizos,’’ 

in 2008 after the officials protecting them were removed from office. Colombian 

interdiction efforts resulted in an increase in seizures in 2008. Still, Colombia remains the world’s leading producer of cocaine and a key supplier of heroin to the 

U.S. market. The U.S. Government’s 2007 imagery-based survey indicates 167,000 

hectares in Colombia were planted with coca, as compared to 157,200 in 2006, a statistically insignificant increase. Although the total area under cultivation remained 

nearly constant, aerial eradication reduced yield per hectare by killing some plants 

inside of areas counted as fully under cultivation and causing some farmers to lose 

harvests before they could rehabilitate the field. This resulted in a reduction in potential cocaine production from 550 metric tons in 2006 to 535 in 2007. Area under 

cultivation in 2007 was slightly less than in 2001, the year when Plan Colombia 

support began to take hold, but potential production is about one quarter less, due 

to the effects of aerial eradication on yield. We are still compiling and assessing the 

data from 2008. 

Venezuela 

President Hugo Chavez is focusing on shoring up public support at home after his 

opponents won five key states and the capital in November gubernatorial and mayoral elections. Chavez also must deal with growing public concern about violent 

crime and worsening economic conditions. Nevertheless, Chavez remains Venezuela’s most popular politician, according to a reputable local polling company, and 

controls the country’s key institutions. To consolidate his socialist ‘‘revolution,’’ Chavez has ordered a referendum for February aimed at allowing indefinite reelection 

for all elected officials. His push probably reflects concern over dwindling oil profits 

undercutting his ability to maintain popular domestic programs. 

Chavez probably will struggle to maintain economic growth in the coming years 

as oil prices fall from their record highs. He has been unable to control high inflation and his statist economic policies have reduced drastically private-sector growth. 

Chavez also has failed to make sufficient investments in infrastructure, especially 

in the vital oil sector, necessary for sustained growth. 

• Venezuela’s crude oil output of about 2.3 million b/d and its exports to 

the United States are slowly declining; prospects for a significant turnaround are limited unless Caracas changes its current oil policies. 

• If the price of West Texas Intermediate oil stays below $50 per barrel for 

most of 2009, Chavez probably will be forced to make major cuts in domestic and foreign spending or to devalue the Venezuelan currency and draw 

down government hard currency reserves to avoid a major economic crisis. 

Chavez is likely to face new constraints in 2009 as he attempts to expand his influence in Latin America. His willingness to spend oil revenue on foreign aid and 

his unstinting populist message have paid some dividends, but repeated spats with 

foreign leaders have tarnished his image and falling oil prices could further undermine his ability to buy friends. Chavez’s approval rating has been decreasing regionally, according to the 2008 Latinbarometer, a highly regarded regional survey. Chavez has provided significant financial and political support to Evo Morales in Bolivia 

and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. 

Public disclosure of Chavez’s close ties with the FARC, which were reflected in 

documents from the hard drives captured after the death of a FARC Secretariat 

member in March, have forced Chavez, at least rhetorically, to improve relations 

with Bogota. We assess Chavez is likely to maintain his decade-long ties to the 

FARC by providing them safe haven because of his ideological affinity to the group 

and his interest in influencing Colombian politics. 

• The United States in September designated two senior Venezuelan Government officials and one former official under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for materially assisting the narcotics trafficking activities of the FARC. 

Chavez’s efforts to expand his reach beyond Latin America continue to give priority to Iran, Russia, and China. The personal relationship between Iran’s President 

Ahmadi-Nejad and Chavez drives strengthening bilateral economic and military 

33 

ties, although the two countries are still struggling to overcome bureaucratic and 

linguistic obstacles to implementing accords. Venezuela also is serving as a bridge 

to help Iran build relations with other Latin American countries. Chavez has given 

special attention in recent months to deepening political, economic, and military ties 

to Russia. In late 2008, he announced his plans to build a nuclear power plant in 

Venezuela with Russian assistance. 

Despite Caracas’s stated interest in purchasing more Russian, Chinese, and Spanish armaments, worsening economic conditions probably will force Chavez to slow 

such acquisitions. His $5.3 billion in military purchases since 2005 have attracted 

notice within the region, although Venezuela’s overall military capabilities remain 

plagued by logistic, maintenance and transportation shortfalls. Notable purchases 

from Russia include 24 Su–30MK2 fighters, helicopters, and assault rifles. 

Chavez’s growing ties to Iran, coupled with Venezuela’s lax financial laws and 

border controls, and widespread corruption have created a permissive environment 

for Hizballah to exploit. In June 2008, two Venezuelan-based individuals, one a Venezuelan diplomat, were designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as supporters 

of terrorism for reportedly providing logistical and financial support to Hizballah 

members. 

Venezuela is second only to Colombia as the most important cocaine departure 

country in South America, and it is the leading departure country of air smuggling 

to world markets. Venezuela’s share of the cocaine departing South America has tripled from 5 percent in 2004 to 15 percent through the third quarter of 2008. Counternarcotics cooperation has sunk to an all-time low in the wake of the expulsion 

of the U.S. Ambassador by Chavez and his refusal to grant visas to new Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials to work in Venezuela. 

Cuba 

President Raul Castro’s record since formally taking power in February 2008 indicates his primary objective in the coming year will be to make Cuba’s dysfunctional 

socialist economy more efficient. His task has been made more difficult, however, 

by the extensive damage to the country’s already weak agricultural sector and infrastructure by three major and successive hurricanes last year. The global economic 

downturn will further slow growth, diminishing the regime’s options for addressing 

public dissatisfaction with living conditions. 

Havana’s competent and immediate response to the hurricanes underscores the effectiveness of regime controls and indicates that it remains capable of preventing 

a spontaneous mass migration. Nevertheless, we judge that at a minimum the annual flow of Cuban migrants to the United States will stay at the same high levels 

of about 35,000 legal and illegal migrants annually that have prevailed over the 

past several years. 

Raul almost certainly will continue to proceed cautiously on any reforms to the 

economy in order to maintain elite consensus and avoid raising public expectations 

beyond what he is able or willing to deliver. We have seen no indication in the modest changes he has implemented that he intends to abandon core Communist economic principles, such as state ownership of production. On the political front, all 

indications are that Raul will continue to deny elements of civil society and pro-democracy dissidents the exercise of free expression. 

Venezuela’s preferential terms for oil sales and payments for Cuban medical personnel and other technical specialists will remain Cuba’s economic lifeline, despite 

Cuba’s efforts to attract other sources of foreign investment from countries such as 

China and Russia. President Chavez probably will prioritize aid to Havana over 

other foreign policy commitments. 

We assess Raul will continue his efforts to bolster Havana’s international legitimacy by projecting a more moderate political image. Nevertheless, Cuba almost certainly will remain heavily involved behind-the-scenes in counseling and supporting 

authoritarian populist governments in Latin America and otherwise seeking to undermine U.S. influence across the region. 

Bolivia 

After nearly a year of sporadic unrest and rising tensions, President Evo Morales 

and opposition legislators last October reached a compromise to allow a referendum 

in late January on a draft constitution that encapsulates much of Morales’ social 

and economic reform agenda. The compromise eased tensions following a string of 

violent protests last fall, but some leaders in eastern departments rejected the compromise. Nevertheless, the referendum passed by a comfortable margin. The draft 

constitution leaves many contentious issues vague, which several government and 

opposition leaders have acknowledged probably will lead to further disputes over implementation in the run-up to new presidential elections in December 2009. 

34 

Although the risk of violence against U.S. citizens has been reduced for the time 

being, Morales consistently has accused official U.S. organizations—the U.S. Embassy, DEA, and U.S. Agency for International Development—of conspiring against 

him. Morales in September expelled the U.S. Ambassador and in November expelled 

DEA personnel. Morales in January publicly threatened to close Congress and pass 

bills implementing the new Constitution by decree if legislators refused to cooperate. 

Chavez promised to protect Morales’s government and provided La Paz important financial assistance. Since 2006, Venezuela has provided Bolivia more than $95 million in direct financial aid. 

AFRICA: FALLING FURTHER BEHIND

Africa has made substantial economic and political progress over the past decade. 

However, the durability of the region’s recent positive growth trend, particularly 

among countries dependent on commodity exports and foreign capital inflows, will 

be tested by the drop in commodity prices and recessions in the United States and 

Europe. Even before the financial crisis hit, the 6 percent GDP growth rate—although impressive—was insufficient to bring about necessary structural changes in 

the continent’s economy. Africa’s economic growth is led by a small number of oilproducing countries, but even those countries without oil resources have experienced 

GDP growth rates far above their historical rates. Agriculture, the foundation of 

most African economies, is far from achieving self-sufficiency, but technical solutions 

and infrastructure enhancement have demonstrated their ability to boost production 

in Mali, Malawi, and Zambia. Further transformations remain uncertain in light of 

the EU’s continuing ban on genetically modified foodstuffs. 

In addition to fallout from the global financial crisis, Africa faces other economic, 

societal and security challenges. Sub-Saharan Africa is confronting a shortage of 

skilled medical personnel, deteriorating health systems, and inadequate budgets to 

deal with diseases like HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Transnational crime, 

especially the transshipment of illegal drugs to Europe, and corruption are growing 

in various parts of Africa, weighing down the continent’s economic growth, reducing 

government efficiency, and undermining the security services of African states. 

China’s presence has grown substantially over the past decade. Total bilateral trade between China and the continent has increased from less than $4 billion in 

1995 to $100 billion in 2008, but the EU and the United States still remain far larger economic partners for the region. China’s objectives are to secure access to African markets and natural resources, isolate Taiwan, and enhance its international 

stature, all of which it has made progress on. Nevertheless, China’s role has generated local resentment as Chinese firms are seen as undercutting African competitors in securing commercial contracts and falling short of standard local labor practices. Moreover, there is little discernible evidence of Chinese investments being 

used to incorporate Africa into the industrial ‘‘global value production chains’’ that 

are becoming the hallmark of integrative trade and foreign direct investment flows, 

especially in manufacturing in other regions of the world. 

The most serious problem confronting Africa is the continuation of a number of 

serious and seemingly intractable conflicts in three of Africa’s largest and most important states: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Sudan. The conflicts in the Congo and Sudan have spilled across their borders and have at times 

taken on a regional dimension. In the Horn of Africa, the ongoing conflict in Somalia 

and the collapse of the country’s economy have given rise to a piracy epidemic in 

the Gulf of Aden and have created a terrorist safe haven in southern Somalia. 

Although African Governments’ political commitment to peacekeeping has increased significantly over the last 10 years, the capacities of the African Union (AU), 

regional organization, and individual African states to conduct peacekeeping operations have been stretched to the limit. Major troop contributing countries are becoming more wary and less capable of deploying peacekeepers to potentially dangerous operations whose mandates and missions are unclear. 

The Democratic Republic of the Congo 

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), President Joseph Kabila has been 

unable to consolidate his control over the turbulent eastern border region. In that 

area, rebel groups, undisciplined soldiers, and ethnic militia have operated inside 

and outside of the DRC largely with impunity for many years and have been responsible for numerous acts of violence and human rights abuses. The trouble has persisted, even with the help of the largest U.N. peacekeeping operation in the world. 

Recently, however, Kabila has agreed to conduct joint military operations with nearby countries in an effort to root out some of these groups. As a result, Rwanda and 

Uganda have each sent forces into different parts of the border region, Rwanda into 

the North and South Kivu Provinces and Uganda into the extreme northeastern reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
35 

gion. In the Kivus, Kinshasa and Kigali are both concerned about the remnant of 

the 1994 Hutu-led Force for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). While 

not a military threat to the Tutsi-led government in Kigali at this time, the force 

is a threat to local Congolese communities. With Kinshasa’s approval, Rwanda sent 

several thousand soldiers into the area to defeat, demobilize, or repatriate the 

FDLR. In return for Kinshasa’s cooperation, Kigali appears to have dropped its support for a Congolese Tutsi rebel leader, General Laurent Nkunda. The Rwandans 

have arrested Nkunda and have him in custody. Moreover, his forces have divided, 

some joining up with Congolese government troops. In the northeast, the Ugandanled military operation (with both Congolese and Sudanese support) has so far been 

unsuccessful. Its objective is to eliminate the threat posed by the Ugandan rebel 

group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony. Congolese 

forces, in the near term, probably will not be able to reassert sufficient control over 

territory occupied by the LRA and other rebels groups or to stop sporadic outbreaks 

of violence. 

Nigeria 

Nigeria’s oil-rich Delta region, which supplies 10 percent of U.S. oil imports and 

accounts for America’s largest investment in Sub-Saharan Africa, has been engulfed 

in civil strife for nearly two decades. Widespread violence, criminality, and corruption have continued to disrupt Nigeria’s oil and gas production, costing the country 

millions of dollars in lost revenue. Inadequate governance and a total lack of accountability has put billions of dollars in the pockets of corrupt leaders rather than 

in much needed development and infrastructure projects. Opportunistic militants, 

many of whom are beholden to local political leaders who have armed them in the 

run-up to Nigeria’s last three national elections, have attacked oil facilities, kidnapped Nigerian and foreign oil workers, and left much of the Delta lawless and 

economically ravaged. As result of the violence and criminal activity, Nigerian oil 

production declined about 10 percent in 2008. Unstable political conditions and the 

fall in the price of crude oil probably will slow or deter additional foreign investment 

in the Delta, contributing to further production drop-offs in the future. A turnaround in the current security environment is unlikely soon. 

Sudan 

Tensions are mounting between North and South Sudan as they approach key 

milestones laid out by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), while 

Darfur remains plagued by violence. The National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement publicly have said they intend to proceed with 

national elections required to be held under CPA by July 2009. Recent military 

clashes on the North-South border highlight the slippage of other CPA deadlines, 

including border demarcation, troop redeployment, and integration of joint military 

units. Potential election delays are unlikely to trigger a violent collapse of the CPA, 

because both parties have strong incentives to maintain the status quo until at least 

2011 when the south will vote on a referendum for independence, but small skirmishes are likely to continue. 

• The Darfur conflict has become increasingly complicated over the course 

of the past 5 years and is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. While 

bureaucratic and logistic constraints in New York and Sudan continue to 

delay full deployment of a 26,000-person U.N. peacekeeping force, the U.N. 

mediator’s attempt to hold inclusive peace talks remains stymied by rebel 

disunity and ongoing fighting, which, to date, has displaced some 2.5 million people. Chadian-backed rebels based in Darfur have advanced on the 

Sudanese capital in the past year, risking an escalated proxy war between 

Khartoum and N’Djamena. 

• The International Criminal Court (ICC) is likely to issue a warrant to arrest Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir on charges of war crimes, 

crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide on March 4, heightening 

Khartoum’s distrust of western intentions. Several other NCP members’ 

vulnerability to ICC charges is likely to keep them at Bashir’s side. 

Somalia 

Somalia has not had a stable, central government for 17 years and continues to 

be mired in conflict. A U.N.-brokered agreement between the Somali Transitional 

Federal Government (TFG) and key opposition leaders in mid–2008 is unlikely to 

bring peace to Somalia in the near term. Ethiopia has withdrawn the troops it deployed to protect the TFG and oust the Council of Islamic Courts in late 2006 and 

resurgent Islamic extremists are expanding their operations throughout the country. 

The new unity government is facing multiple challenges, including the continued 

36 

dominance of clan politics and lack of a viable security force. While the withdrawal 

of Ethiopian troops removed a key rallying point for the extremist opposition group 

al-Shabaab al Islamiyah, Islamic militants have shifted their focus toward attacking 

a modest AU peacekeeping force charged with protecting the TFG. Worsening violence as militias compete for territory is likely to displace thousands of additional 

Somalis, adding to this humanitarian crisis. 

Lawlessness in Somalia already has prompted a surge in piracy in the Gulf of 

Aden. The number of successful pirate attacks has increased almost fourfold since 

2007 after the pirates received several multi-million dollar ransom payments in 

early 2008. Local authorities’ unwillingness or inability to stem piracy also has 

fueled the proliferation of hijackings. The growing number and sophistication of Somali pirate attacks threaten to restrict the options for countering them, and they 

could take root in Somali society if left unchecked. 

Zimbabwe 

Zimbabwe continues to deteriorate under the brutal and corrupt rule of President 

Robert Mugabe. Over half the population is food insecure and public health facilities 

and schools have been almost completely shut down. With over 60,000 infected, the 

recent cholera epidemic is dramatic evidence of how far living conditions have plummeted in this once-prosperous and relatively well-developed country. Zimbabwe’s 

sharp decline has generated problems throughout southern Africa as millions of refugees have fled to South Africa, Botswana, and Mozambique and as the region’s 

well-publicized economic and security concerns have frightened foreign investors 

away. To date, Mugabe retains the support of his senior military officers and appears to be using his recently implemented power-sharing deal with the Movement 

for Democratic Change (MDC) to co-opt the opposition and to reduce Western pressure on his regime. Mugabe also has managed to hold on to the backing of South 

Africa, a key regional player. Pretoria, which brokered the coalition agreement between Mugabe and the opposition MDC, remains unwilling, despite growing criticism at home and abroad, to apply stronger pressure on Mugabe to step aside or 

to undertake fundamental political and economic reforms. Mugabe and his ruling 

elite are likely to remain in power until he loses the support of the security forces, 

South Africa steps up its pressure, or social and economic conditions in Zimbabwe 

become substantially worse. With both political parties signing on to the recent 

power-sharing agreement, it will be up to South Africa, the Southern African Development Community, and the AU to carefully watch Mugabe’s actions and ensure 

that power is in fact shared and the MDC is allowed to lead. 

Drug Trafficking in West Africa 

Drug trafficking has become a major problem in West Africa, and the emergence 

of Guinea-Bissau as Africa’s first narco-state highlights the scope of the problem 

and what may be in store for other states in the region. Away from the scrutiny 

of local and international law enforcement, drug traffickers, often departing from 

Venezuela by air and sea, have transported large quantities of drugs, predominantly 

cocaine, from Latin America to European markets through the porous borders of 

more than a half dozen West African countries. Traffickers have successfully coopted government and law enforcement officials in these countries, further undermining weak and economically impoverished governments who lack adequate law 

enforcement and judicial capacity. The Economic Community of West African States 

sponsored a conference in Cape Verde in late 2008 to address this issue and the 

Governments of Great Britain and France have conducted limited law enforcement 

and counternarcotics training in the region, but drug trafficking in West Africa 

probably will continue to expand in volume and scope in the absence of a concerted 

international effort to stop it. 

THE GROWING CYBER AND ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT

Threats to the U.S. Information Technology Infrastructure 

The U.S. information infrastructure, including telecommunications and computer 

networks and systems, and the data that reside on them, is critical to virtually 

every aspect of modern life. Threats to our information technology infrastructure are 

an important focus of the IC. As government, private sector, and personal activities 

continue to move to networked operations, as our digital systems add ever more capabilities, as wireless systems become even more ubiquitous, and as the design, 

manufacture, and service of information technology have moved overseas, the threat 

will continue to grow. 

This information and communications revolution also is enabling an unprecedented ability to spread ideas and influence large numbers of people. Nation-states 

and non-state groups are taking an increasing interest in the role of mass media 

37 

in shaping international opinions. Terrorists will continue to be motivated to conduct spectacular attacks in part by the desire to achieve maximum media exposure 

for their cause. Increasing global connectivity is enabling radical groups to recruit 

and train new members, proliferate extremist ideologies, manage their finances, manipulate public opinion, and coordinate attacks. In the recent conflict in Gaza, for 

example, the media played an important role for both sides in shaping public perceptions of the conflict. We can expect future adversaries to similarly employ mass 

media in an attempt to constrain U.S. courses of actions in a future crisis or conflict. 

Further, the growing connectivity between information systems, the Internet, and 

other infrastructures creates opportunities for attackers to disrupt telecommunications, electrical power, energy pipelines, refineries, financial networks, and other 

critical infrastructures. Over the past several years we have seen cyber attacks 

against critical infrastructures abroad, and many of our own infrastructures are as 

vulnerable as their foreign counterparts. 

• A successful cyber attack against a major financial service provider could 

severely impact the national economy, while cyber attacks against physical 

infrastructure computer systems such as those that control power grids or 

oil refineries have the potential to disrupt services for hours to weeks. 

Network defense technologies are widely available to mitigate threats but have 

not been uniformly adopted due to associated costs, perceived need, operational requirements, and regulatory constraints. This slow rate of adoption has allowed cyber 

attackers to keep up with many defensive advances. Meanwhile, advances in digital 

communications technology, such as the growth in wireless connectivity and the acceleration of network convergence with a variety data increasingly digitized and 

transmitted over the Internet, are creating new vulnerabilities in our networks and 

new avenues for cyber attacks. 

Malicious activity on the Internet also is rapidly increasing: spam—unsolicited 

email that can contain malicious software—now accounts for 81 percent of all email 

according to Message Labs (Symantec); the Georgia Tech Information Security Center projects a ten-fold increase in malicious software targeting data in the coming 

year; and botnets—networks of hijacked computers used to deliver spam or launch 

distributed denial of service attacks—are expected to compose 15 percent of all online computers in 2009. Ferris Research estimates that the total cost of spam and 

all of the types of fraud that take advantage of spam’s impact is $42 billion in the 

United States and $140 billion worldwide last year, while McAfee estimates that 

global companies may have lost over $1 trillion worth of intellectual property to 

data theft in 2008. 

State and Non-State Threats 

A growing array of state and non-state adversaries are increasingly targeting— 

for exploitation and potentially disruption or destruction—our information infrastructure, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, 

and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries. Over the past year, 

cyber exploitation activity has grown more sophisticated, more targeted, and more 

serious. The IC expects these trends to continue in the coming year. 

We assess that a number of nations, including Russia and China, have the technical capabilities to target and disrupt elements of the U.S. information infrastructure and for intelligence collection. Nation states and criminals target our government and private sector information networks to gain competitive advantage in the 

commercial sector. Terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hizballah, 

have expressed the desire to use cyber means to target the United States. Criminal 

elements continue to show growing sophistication in technical capability and targeting and today operate a pervasive, mature on-line service economy in illicit cyber 

capabilities and services available to anyone willing to pay. Each of these actors has 

different levels of skill and different intentions; therefore, we must develop flexible 

capabilities to counter each. We must take proactive measures to detect and prevent 

intrusions from whatever source, as they happen, and before they can do significant 

damage. 

We expect disruptive cyber activities to be the norm in future political or military 

conflicts. The Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and Web defacements 

that targeted Georgia in 2008 and Estonia in 2007 disrupted government, media, 

and banking Web sites. DDoS attacks and Web defacements targeted Georgian government Web sites, including that of Georgian President Saakishvili, intermittently 

disrupting online access to the official Georgian perspective of the conflict and some 

Georgian Government functions but did not affect military action. Such attacks have 

been a common outlet for hackers during political disputes over the past decade, including Israel’s military conflicts with Hizballah and Hamas in 2006 and 2008, the 

aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last year, the publication of cartoons 

38 

caricaturing the Prophet Mohammed in 2005, and the Chinese downing of a U.S. 

Navy aircraft in 2001. 

The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative 

In January 2008, the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) 

was adopted as national policy as part of National Security Presidential Directive 

54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD–54/HSPD–23). With bipartisan support, Congress appropriated the vast majority of the CNCI funding request 

in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations 

Act of 2009. 

The CNCI addresses current cybersecurity threats, anticipates future threats and 

technologies, and develops a framework for creating in partnership with the private 

sector an environment that no longer favors cyber intruders over defenders. The 

CNCI includes defensive, offensive, education, research and development, and counterintelligence elements, while remaining sensitive throughout to the requirements 

of protecting the privacy rights and civil liberties of U.S. citizens. The CNCI is now 

making considerable progress in building a better understanding of the cyber threat, 

developing concrete solutions, and approving detailed courses of action. The 

Adminstration is now reviewing CNCI, to ensure it is consistent with its own 

cybersecurity policy. 

To be sure, significant work remains in order to protect, defend, and respond to 

the cyber threat in a manner that markedly improves our Nation’s overall security. 

Yet there is reason to be hopeful. We are witnessing an unprecedented unity of effort across a broad coalition of government agencies, Members of Congress, and 

leaders of industry. To succeed, however, the CNCI must remain a long-term national priority. With sustained momentum and continued national resolve we can 

and will build an enduring security framework capable of protecting our vital national security, economic, and public health interests. 

We cannot afford to discover successful cyber intrusions after-the-fact, accept disastrous losses, and then seek merely to contain them. It requires a broad alliance 

of departments, agencies, and industry leaders to focus on countering the threat, 

mitigating vulnerabilities, and enhancing resiliency in order to preserve our national security, national economy, and public welfare. 

Growing Transnational Organized Crime Threat 

Most organized criminal activities increasingly involve either networks of interconnected criminal groups sharing expertise, skills, and resources in joint criminal 

ventures that transcend national boundaries or powerful, well-organized crime 

groups seeking to legitimize their image by investing in the global marketplace. Organized criminals and groups will increasingly pose a threat to U.S. national security interests by enhancing the capabilities of terrorists and hostile governments. 

Some organized crime networks, groups, and individuals also have invested in energy and mineral markets in an effort to diversify and legitimize their business activities. Criminals’ coercive tactics, underhanded business practices, opaque motives, 

and self-serving loyalties can undermine the normal workings and integrity of these 

global markets. The most powerful, highprofile Eurasian criminal groups often form 

strategic alliances with senior political leaders and business tycoons and can operate 

from a relative safe haven status with little to fear of international arrest and prosecution. The leaders of many of these groups go to great lengths to portray themselves as legitimate businessmen and use front companies that give them more market access and leverage. They also employ some of the world’s best accountants, lawyers, bankers, and lobbyists to deflect and frustrate the efforts of authorities. 

The change in the structure and types of activities conducted by transnational 

criminal groups is making it increasingly difficult to identify and attack them. In 

particular, the increasing prevalence of loosely knit networks, the use of cyberspace 

and global financial systems, and political corruption have made it easier for them 

to hide their involvement, to thwart law enforcement efforts, and to create images 

of legitimacy. 

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

Climate change, energy, global health, and environmental security are often intertwined, and while not traditionally viewed as ‘‘threats’’ to U.S. national security, 

they will affect Americans in major ways. The IC has increased its focus on these 

three critical issues as a result of unprecedented developments in the last year. 

Access to relatively secure and clean energy sources and management of chronic 

food and water shortages will assume increasing importance for a growing number 

of countries. Adding well over a billion people to the world’s population by 2025 will 

itself put pressure on these vital resources. An increasing percentage of the world’s 

39 

population will be moving from rural areas to urban and developed ones to seek 

greater personal security and economic opportunity. Many, particularly in Asia, will 

be joining the middle class and will be seeking to emulate western lifestyles, which 

involves greater per capita consumption of all these resources. 

The already stressed resource sector will be further complicated and, in most 

cases, exacerbated by climate change, whose physical effects will worsen throughout 

this period. Continued escalation of energy demand will hasten the impacts of climate change. On the other hand, forcibly cutting back on fossil fuel use before substitutes are widely available could threaten continued economic development, particularly for countries like China, whose industries have not yet achieved high levels 

of energy efficiency. 

Food and water also are intertwined with climate change, energy, and demography. Rising energy prices increase the cost for consumers and the environment of 

industrial-scale agriculture and application of petrochemical fertilizers. A switch 

from use of arable land for food to fuel crops provides a limited solution and could 

exacerbate both the energy and food situations. Climatically, rainfall anomalies and 

constricted seasonal flows of snow and glacial melts are aggravating water scarcities, harming agriculture in many parts of the globe. Energy and climate dynamics 

also combine to amplify a number of other ills such as health problems, agricultural 

losses to pests, and storm damage. The greatest danger may arise from the convergence and interaction of many stresses simultaneously. Such a complex and unprecedented syndrome of problems could cause outright state failure, or weaken important pivotal states counted on to act as anchors of regional stability. 

Six to 9 months ago we were worried about the implications of increasing high 

oil prices: the situation has reversed sharply with oil prices falling to close to a third 

of their July 2008 peak of $147 per barrel in response to the sudden drop in world 

oil demand growth and slower economic growth resulting from the global financial 

crisis. Although we believe the longer-term trend is toward high oil prices, the current lower oil prices reduce pressures on the global economy. Emerging economies 

previously concerned about busting their budgets on fuel and food subsidies are 

breathing a sigh of relief now that prices have fallen substantially over the last 6 

months. Most forecasters expect global oil demand and oil prices to remain depressed through 2009 as the financial turmoil continues to unwind. The decline in 

price may, however, lead to delayed or cancelled investments in the upstream oil 

and gas sectors, creating the conditions for another spike in oil prices once global 

oil demand recovers. We also are concerned that lower oil prices may weaken momentum toward energy efficiency and the development of alternative sources of energy that are important for both energy and environmental security. The fall in energy prices also has had the side benefit of undercutting the economic positions of 

some of the more troublesome producers. 

Assessing the Impact of Climate Change 

According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 

(IPCC), a failure to act to reduce green house gas emissions risks severe damage 

to the planet by the end of this century and even greater risk in coming centuries. 

In a fossil-intensive scenario that IPCC examined (A1F1), global average temperatures increase by almost 4 degrees centigrade. In such a scenario, water stored in 

glaciers and snow cover would decline significantly, reducing water availability in 

regions supplied by melt water from major mountain ranges, where more than onesixth of the world population currently lives. Sea-level rise could be up to 59 centimeters by the end of the century and would cause substantial flooding. Individuals 

in densely populated and low-lying areas, especially the mega deltas of Asian and 

Africa, where adaptive capacity is relatively low, and which already face other challenges such as tropical storms or local coastal subsidence, are especially at risk. At 

a four-degree rise, according to the IPCC, up to 30 percent of plant and animal species would be at risk of extinction, global productivity in cereals would decline, intensity of tropical cyclones would increase, and extreme drought areas would rise 

from 1 percent land area to 30 percent. 

The IC recently completed a National Intelligence Assessment on the national security impacts of global climate change to 2030. The IC judges global climate change 

will have important and extensive implications for U.S. national security interests 

over the next 20 years. Although the United States itself could be less affected and 

is better equipped than most nations to deal with climate change and may even see 

a benefit in the near term owing to increases in agriculture productivity, infrastructure repair and replacement will be costly. We judge the most significant impact for 

the United States will be indirect and result from climate-driven effects on many 

other countries and their potential to seriously affect U.S. national security interests. We assess climate change alone is unlikely to trigger state failure in any state 

40 

out to 2030, but the impacts will worsen existing problems such as poverty, social 

tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership, and weak political institutions. Climate change could threaten domestic stability in some states, potentially 

contributing to intra- or, less likely, interstate conflict, particularly over access to 

increasingly scarce water resources. We judge economic migrants will perceive additional reasons to migrate because of harsh climates, both within nations and from 

disadvantaged to richer countries. 

From a national security perspective, climate change affects lives (for example, 

through food and water shortages, increased health problems including the spread 

of disease, and increased potential for conflict), property (for example through 

ground subsidence, flooding, coastal erosion, and extreme weather events), and 

other security interests. The United States depends on a smooth-functioning international system ensuring the flow of trade and market access to critical raw materials such as oil and gas, and security for its allies and partners. Climate change 

could affect all of these—domestic stability in a number of key states, the opening 

of new sea lanes and access to raw materials, and the global economy more broadly—with significant geopolitical consequences. 

In addition, anticipated impacts to the Homeland—including warming temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns, and possible increases in the severity of 

storms in the Gulf, increased demand for energy resources, disruptions in U.S. and 

Arctic infrastructure, and increases in immigration from resource-scarce regions of 

the world—are expected to be costly. Government, business, and public efforts to develop mitigation and adaptation strategies to deal with climate change—from policies to reduce greenhouse gasses to plans to reduce exposure to climate change or 

capitalize on potential impacts—may affect U.S. national security interests even 

more than the physical impacts of climate change itself. 

Multilateral policymaking on climate change is likely to be highly visible and a 

growing priority among traditional security affairs in the coming decades. We observe the United States is seen by the world as occupying a potentially pivotal leadership role between Europe, which is committed to long-term and dramatic reduction in carbon emissions, and a heterogeneous group of developing states wary of 

committing to greenhouse gas emissions reductions, which they believe would slow 

their economic growth. As effects of climate change begin to mount, the United 

States will come under increasing pressure to join the international community in 

setting meaningful long-term goals for emissions reductions, to reduce its own emissions, and to help others mitigate and adapt to climate change through technological 

progress and financial assistance. 

Global Health 

Considerable empirical and theoretical studies have demonstrated the links between the health of a population and economic growth and development. Highly 

publicized virulent infectious diseases—including HIV/AIDS, a potential influenza 

pandemic, and ‘‘mystery’’ illnesses such as the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome—remain the most direct health-related threats to the United 

States. The most pressing transnational health challenge for the United States is 

still the potential for emergence of a severe pandemic, with the primary candidate 

being a highly lethal influenza virus. The World Bank estimates that if the next 

pandemic virus is similar to the one that caused the 1918 pandemic, it could kill 

71 million people worldwide and cause a major global recession with global costs exceeding $3 trillion. Other estimates, applying the 2.5 percent fatality rate from the 

1918 pandemic to today’s population, reach 180 million deaths worldwide. Current 

threats include H5N1 influenza, a virus that, while primarily a poultry disease, continues to evolve and expand its geographic range. 

Infectious diseases are not the only health indicators with strategic significance. 

Chronic, non-communicable diseases; neglected tropical diseases; maternal and child 

mortality; malnutrition; sanitation and access to clean water; and availability of 

basic health care also affect the U.S. national interest through their impacts on the 

economies, governments, and militaries of key countries and regions. 

• Terrorists and warlords have gained local and international stature and 

even power by providing health services governments could not. Widespread 

ill health in the youth cohort may reduce a country’s pool of healthy and 

capable military recruits, a phenomenon that is currently playing out in 

Russia and North Korea. 

Looking at specific states, the inability of the central government of Afghanistan 

to provide health-care and other services has helped to undermine its credibility 

while boosting support for a resurgent and increasingly sophisticated Taliban. Wide 

incidence of traumatic births, malnutrition, and disease put children there at high 

risk of impaired development, undermining their prospects of attending school, enVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
41 

gaging more productively in critical labor such as agricultural production, and participating in other economic activity. In Iraq, a degraded health sector, shortages 

of medical personnel, and infections stemming from deficient sanitary conditions 

and lack of clean drinking water have undermined the credibility of the central government. 

Russia has the overall worst health indicators of any industrialized country. Poor 

health of Russian children and young people combined with falling birthrates 

threatens Russian military readiness with a projected halving of eligible military recruits between 2005 and 2018. China’s high incidence of chronic disease stemming 

in great part from heavy tobacco use threatens to slow economic growth by incapacitating workers and incurring heavy health-care costs. The health effects of environmental degradation are an increasing source of discontent in China. 

Venezuela and Cuba have been particularly adept at parlaying provision of charitable medical services to nationals of other countries into support in international 

forums such as the United Nations. Hizballah’s provision of health and social services in Lebanon over the past 20 years has helped to legitimize the organization as 

a political force in that country, while Hamas’s delivery of similar services was a 

factor in its legislative electoral success in the Palestinian territories. 

Turning to U.S. Homeland health security issues, existing international resources 

and regulations will be inadequate to control transnational disease spread at least 

through the next decade. Movement of people, animals, and products through mass 

transportation, smuggling, and commerce will continue to homogenize the already 

global environment. Incidents involving chemical or bacterial contamination of imported food or trade goods, whether accidental or intentional, are likely to increase 

as China and other developing countries struggle to implement effective monitoring 

systems. A similar challenge involves ensuring the safety of imported therapeutic 

drugs and precursor products, as contaminated and counterfeit pharmaceuticals continue to be a worldwide public health threat. 

CONCLUSION

The international security environment is complex. No dominant adversary faces 

the United States that threatens our existence with military force, but the global 

financial crises has exacerbated what was already a growing set of political and economic uncertainties. We are nevertheless in a strong position to shape a world reflecting universal aspirations and values that have motivated Americans since 1776: 

human rights; the rule of law; liberal market economics and social justice. Whether 

we can succeed will depend on actions we take here at home—restoring strong economic growth and maintaining our scientific and technological edge and defending 

ourselves at reasonable cost in dollars without violating our civil liberties. It will 

also depend on our actions abroad, not only in how we deal with regions, regimes 

and crises, but also in developing new multilateral systems, formal or informal, for 

effective international cooperation in trade and finance, in neutralizing extremist 

groups using terrorism, in controlling the proliferation of WMD, developing codes of 

conduct for cyberspace and space, and in mitigating and slowing global climate 

change. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Director Blair. 

General Maples. 

STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA, DIRECTOR, 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General MAPLES. Senator Levin, Senator McCain, members of 

the committee: First of all, thank you for this opportunity to appear 

with Director Blair today. I have submitted a statement for the 

record and I will summarize my remarks, focusing primarily on ongoing operations and military developments. But before I do, I just 

want to thank the members of the committee for your support of 

our service men and women around the world, and in particular for 

the support that you have provided to DIA and to our defense intelligence professionals, who support all of our men and women in 

uniform who are engaged in conflict around the world. Your support and what you have done for us to enable us to support them 

truly has been remarkable and I thank you for that. 

42 

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you. 

General MAPLES. First of all, let me start with Iraq. The security 

situation in Iraq does continue to improve. Overall violence across 

the country declined in the last 6 months of 2008 and by January 

2009 attacks were 60 percent lower than in January 2008. While 

Iraqi leaders have reached accommodation on a range of key issues, 

many of Iraq’s underlying problems, such as lingering ethno-sectarian rivalries, a weakened insurgency, a still developing central 

government, and a lack of a shared national vision, will continue 

to challenge Iraqis over the next year and beyond. 

Iraqi security forces (ISF) improved their overall capabilities in 

2008, demonstrating an increased ability to plan, prepare, and execute independent counterinsurgency operations. The ISF continues 

to rely on coalition support for key enabling capabilities, including 

close air support, intelligence, and logistics. A rapid degradation of 

the security situation is unlikely in 2009, although the failure of 

the Iraqi government to address key issues may erode security over 

time. Control of disputed areas, particularly in Ninewah and 

Kirkuk, may be the greatest potential flashpoint in Iraq for 2008. 

The security situation in Afghanistan continued to worsen in 

2008, driven by an increasingly proficient insurgency, government 

inability to deliver basic services to portions of the country, and insurgent access to safe havens in western Pakistan. Although the 

Taliban lost several key commanders in 2008 and have not demonstrated an ability to conduct sustained conventional operations, 

it has increased attacks. Enemy-initiated violence in 2008 grew by 

55 percent over levels in 2007. Statistics also show increases in suicide bombings, the use of improvised explosive devices, and small 

arms attacks. 

The AFA has grown from 49,000 to approximately 80,000 over 

the last year, fielding 6 new commando battalions which are specifically trained to handle counterinsurgency operations. Half of Afghan’s combat arms units can lead combat operations, albeit with 

coalition support. 

Afghan National Police (ANP) forces still require considerable 

training and coalition support to fulfil their mission. The ANP has 

reportedly grown from 75,000 to approximately 80,000 over the last 

year. The Afghan Government has initiated a program to improve 

police performance. 

Over the next year, the Afghan Government will remain vulnerable to insurgent violence, the narcotics trade, foreign influences, 

and disruptive political maneuvering ahead of the 2009 Afghan 

presidential election. Afghan popular discontent could worsen, especially in areas where tribes remain disenfranchised and basic 

employment opportunities are not provided. 

In Pakistan, some senior Pakistani leaders have publicly acknowledged that extremism has replaced India as Pakistan’s preeminent national security threat. India, however, remains a high 

priority long-term concern. Strategic rivalry with India continues to 

drive Pakistan’s development of an expanding array of delivery systems. 

In the FATA, al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and Pakistan-based 

extremist groups continue to have vital sanctuary. The area is used 

to recruit and train operatives, plan and prepare regional and 

43 

transnational attacks, disseminate propaganda, and obtain equipment and supplies. 

Pakistan’s military has expanded its paramilitary forces and deployed additional troops to the area in an effort to contain the 

threat. Although U.S. efforts to address Pakistani counterinsurgency deficiencies are underway, it will take years before meaningful capabilities are likely to be developed. 

Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand 

nuclear weapons stockpiles, and seek more advanced warheads and 

delivery systems. Pakistan has taken important steps to safeguard 

its nuclear weapons, although vulnerabilities still exist. 

Al Qaeda is committed to imposing its own interpretation of Islamic rule upon the Muslim world and is the biggest terrorist 

threat to U.S. interests worldwide. Al Qaeda retains the operational capability to plan, support, and direct transnational attacks, despite the deaths of multiple senior-level operatives. Al 

Qaeda continues efforts to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, 

or nuclear materials and would not hesitate to use such weapons 

if the group develops sufficient capabilities. 

Al Qaeda also continues to further relationships with compatible 

regional terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb and al Qaeda in East Africa, to extend the organization’s financial and operational reach. 

Now I’ll turn to military developments in regions of interest. In 

Iran, Iran’s military is designed principally to defend against external threats from more advanced adversaries and threats posed by 

internal opponents. However, Iran has the capability to conduct 

limited offensive operations with its ballistic missile and naval 

forces. Iran continues to develop and acquire ballistic missiles that 

can range Israel and Central Europe, including Iranian claims of 

an extended range variant of the Shahab-3 and a 2,000-kilometer 

medium-range ballistic missile, the Ashura. 

Iran’s February 2, 2009, launch of the Safir space launch vehicle 

shows progress in mastering the technology needed to produce 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Iran has boosted the 

lethality and effectiveness of existing missile systems with accuracy 

improvements and new submunition payloads. 

Ongoing naval modernization is focused on equipment such as 

fast missile patrol boats as well as anti-ship cruise missiles and 

naval mines. Iran continues to invest heavily in advanced air defenses. Iran has deployed advanced SA–15 tactical surface-to-air 

missile systems and continues to express interest in acquiring the 

long-range SA–20. 

With the rest of the IC, DIA judges Iran halted its nuclear 

weaponization and covert uranium conversion and enrichment-related work in 2003, but we assess that Tehran is keeping open the 

option to develop nuclear weapons. 

China is strengthening its ability to conduct military operations 

along its periphery on its own terms. That would include the claims 

to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) where the recent incident occurred. It is building and fielding sophisticated weapons systems 

and testing new doctrines that it believes will allow it to prevail 

in regional conflicts. The navy operates a large surface fleet, an increasingly modern submarine fleet, and appears likely to pursue an 

44 

aircraft carrier development program. The air force is developing 

an extended range land attack cruise missile-capable bomber. China’s nuclear force is becoming more survivable with the deployment 

of the DF–31 and DF–31 Alpha road-mobile ICBMs and the eventual deployment of the JL–2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. 

China is also expanding its space capabilities, counterspace, cyber 

warfare, and electronic warfare capabilities. 

In North Korea, North Korea’s large forward positioned, but 

poorly equipped and poorly trained military is not well suited to 

sustain major military operations against the south. As a result of 

its limitations, North Korea is emphasizing its nuclear capabilities 

and ballistic missiles as a means to assure its sovereignty and to 

deter technologically superior opponents. The long-range artillery 

the North has positioned near the demilitarized zone is complemented by a substantial mobile ballistic missile force with an 

array of warhead options, to include WMD, that can range U.S. 

forces and our allies in the Republic of Korea and Japan. 

After a failed July 2006 test launch, North Korea has continued 

development of the Taepo Dong 2, which could be used for space 

launch or as an ICBM. North Korea announced in late February 

they intend to launch a communications satellite, Kwangmyongsong 2. North Korea also continues to work on an intermediate 

range ballistic missile. 

North Korea could have stockpiled several nuclear weapons from 

plutonium produced at Yongbyon and it likely sought a uranium 

enrichment capability for nuclear weapons, at least in the past. 

Russia is trying to reestablish military power that it believes 

commensurate with its economic strength and general political 

competence, although the current global economic downturn may 

limit Moscow’s ability to achieve its goals. Russian conventional 

force capabilities continue to grow at a measured pace. Readiness 

improvements are seen primarily among the conventional permanent ready forces. Development and production of advanced strategic weapons continues, particularly on the SS–27 ICBM and the 

Bulava SS-NX–32 submarine-launched ballistic missile that is still 

undergoing testing. 

Russia’s widely publicized strategic missile launches and increased out of area activities are meant to signal a continued global 

reach and relevance. 

Under a comprehensive set of reforms announced in September 

2008, the Russian armed forces will be significantly reduced and 

remaining units modernized and brought up to permanent ready 

status by 2020. Emphasis reportedly will be given to precision munitions, intelligence assets, submarines, and elements of an aerospace defense system. These reforms, if carried out, would improve 

Russian capability to respond to limited regional threats, but reduce their capability for large-scale conventional war. 

Turning to global military trends of concern, the proliferation 

and potential use of WMDs, often linked with delivery system enhancements, remains a grave, enduring, and evolving threat. Terrorist organizations will continue to try to acquire and employ 

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials. 

The threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is likely to 

increase over the next decade. Ballistic missile systems with adVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
45 

vanced liquid or solid propellent propulsion systems are becoming 

more mobile, survivable, reliable, accurate, and possess greater 

range. 

Cyber attacks on our information systems are a significant concern. Nation- and non-state terrorist and criminal groups are developing and refining their abilities to exploit and attack computer 

networks in support of their military, intelligence, or criminal 

goals. The scope and sophistication of malicious targeting against 

U.S. networks has steadily increased and is of particular concern 

because of the pronounced military advantages that the United 

States has traditionally derived from information networks. 

The international proliferation of space-related expertise and 

technology is also increasing, largely through commercial enterprises, and is helping nations acquire space and space-related capabilities, including some with direct military applications. Included 

are more capable communications, reconnaissance, navigation, and 

targeting capabilities. 

At the same time, countries such as Russia and China are developing systems and technologies capable of interfering with or disabling vital U.S. space-based navigation, communication, and intelligence collection capabilities. In addition to direct ascent, anti-satellite missile capabilities such as satellite tracking, jamming, and 

laser blinding are also under development. 

The global economic crisis to date has not led to widespread defense spending cuts, with the exception of some Central and Eastern European nations. China’s defense spending growth in 2009 is 

supported by continued economic growth and large international 

Reserves. China will likely continue to downsize forces, freeing 

funds needed to meet modernization and reform goals. 

Russia’s defense spending will continue to increase despite recent 

declines in oil prices and domestic economic problems. Iran will see 

government revenues decline in 2009 as oil prices remain at low 

levels. Defense spending will have to be balanced with social programs. North Korea will continue to divert economic and aid resources to higher priority military projects in spite of critical public 

welfare needs. 

I appreciate this opportunity to share with you the tremendous 

work done by thousands of defense intelligence professionals who 

work very closely with their national intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement colleagues. On their behalf, thank you 

for your strong support and your continued confidence in our work. 

[The prepared statement of General Maples follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA 

Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the 

committee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify today and for your continued 

support to the dedicated men and women of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 

many of whom are forward-deployed directly supporting our military forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and around the world. 

Our Nation faces an unusually complex threat environment—one marked by an 

accelerating operational pace and a broad spectrum of dissimilar challenges and potential threats from nation-states and non-state, transnational terrorist networks. 

This testimony reflects DIA’s analytical assessments, worldwide human intelligence, technical intelligence, counterintelligence, and document and media exploitation collection efforts along with intelligence drawn from our close partners 

throughout the Intelligence Community (IC), international allies, and open sources. 

46 

ONGOING CONFLICTS

Iraq 

The security situation in Iraq continues to improve. With coalition assistance, 

communal violence has reached its lowest sustained levels since Prime Minister 

Nuri al-Maliki’s government came to power in 2006 and Iraqi leaders have reached 

accommodation on a range of key issues. However, many of Iraqis underlying problems, such as lingering ethno-sectarian rivalries, a weakened insurgency, a still-developing central government, and lack of a shared national vision, will continue to 

challenge Iraqis over the next year and beyond. A rapid degradation of the security 

situation is unlikely in 2009, though the failure of the Iraqi Government to address 

key issues may erode security over time. 

Overall violence across the country declined in the last 6 months of 2008; by January 2009, attacks were 60 percent lower than in January 2008. In the last quarter 

of 2008, the percentage of attacks which targeted Iraqi politicians, security officials, 

and civilians increased while the proportion of attacks targeting coalition forces declined to their lowest level. Key strategic areas are now under Iraqi Government 

control. This is largely the combined result of coalition and Iraqi operations, more 

capable and assertive Iraqi leadership and growing popular support for the Iraqi 

Government and security forces. 

The Sadrist movement’s influence has declined over the past year. Muqtada alSadr’s decision to cease Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militant activity against government 

forces combined with aggressive Iraqi security force (ISF) operations against JAM 

have reduced the Sadrist’s ability to use force to control and influence the population. In addition, over the past year the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) 

and the Dawa Party have successfully undermined the Sadrist movement, limiting 

its ability to influence government decisions. In June, Sadr announced his intention 

to prioritize his organization’s cultural, religious, and socioeconomic outreach while 

reducing its emphasis on political and militant activity, likely in an effort to regain 

popular support. This effort has been relatively successful enabling the Sadrists to 

gain sufficient representation in Shiite-dominated provinces to be a key partner in 

ruling coalitions in most southern provincial councils. As a result, the Sadrists will 

likely increase their influence at the local and national levels, which could bolster 

their efforts to gain concessions on detainee releases and amnesty for exiled 

Sadrists. The majority of JAM members appear to be complying with Sadr’s 

ceasefire orders, although some will seek other means to violently oppose the coalition’s presence in Iraq. JAM Special Groups and other Shiite extremists continue 

to receive lethal support from Iran. 

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other active Sunni Arab insurgents continue to exploit 

anti-government and anti-Kurdish sentiment in northern Iraq despite ongoing security operations in the region; however, the group is increasingly forced to maintain 

a lower profile to avoid further losses. Particularly in northern Iraq, like-minded 

Sunni insurgent groups maintain a presence, leveraging AQI’s infrastructure, exploiting Sunni fears of Kurdish expansion and destabilizing the region. The most notable of these groups is Ansar al-Islam, which changed its name from Ansar alSunna in 2008 and has close relations with AQI in the north. 

AQI remains the most active terrorist group in Iraq. It continues to target the 

Iraqi Government and coalition forces while also trying to reignite sectarian violence, encouraging its most active and ideologically committed members to remain 

steadfast. Active opposition to AQI has grown since 2006 as backlash to the group’s 

heavy-handed tactics. Coalition efforts to reinforce indigenous resistance to AQI 

have given the Iraqi opposition to AQI room to flourish. While AQI has the capability to regenerate if given an opportunity to do so, its operational tempo has steadily declined from 2006 levels with the attrition of mid- and senior level operatives. 

As a result, AQI is currently not able to achieve its strategic goals, and is instead 

focused on mitigating the effects of these losses to maintain viability. However, 

AQI’s diminished operational tempo does not preclude it from conducting sporadic, 

yet effective, attacks that have lasting effects within Iraq. With its continued commitment to external attack planning, AQI remains a threat beyond Iraq. 

Attacks by Sunni insurgent groups have declined significantly, although most violence remains attributable to the Sunni insurgency. The Sunni Awakening and Sons 

of Iraq (SOI) local security movements have limited the operational environment for 

Sunni insurgent groups in central Iraq and forced them to explore new approaches, 

such as participation in the political process. The operating environment is more 

permissive for insurgent groups in northern Iraq. Across Iraq, insurgents retain the 

capability for violence, making the insurgency a long-term threat to the Iraqi Government unless it counters the underlying motivations for insurgent activity, includVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
47 

ing employment, provision of services, and security. Sunni insurgents currently operate primarily at a local level. 

SOI groups have proven themselves a critical force multiplier for coalition and 

ISF. They provide vital intelligence and security presence in many areas formerly 

dominated by extremists or militias. The SOI initiatives have begun to bridge sectarian divides between the Sunni and Shiite population, as groups embrace mutual 

cooperation to improve security. The transition of Baghdad’s SOI programs to government control late last year proceeded smoothly. Twenty-percent of the SOI will 

transition into the ISF, and 80 percent into other employment. The transfer of responsibility for the SOI programs is a key step toward reinforcing Government of 

Iraq (GOI) security responsibility and Iraqi sovereignty. 

Sunni Arab relations with coalition forces have greatly improved, as have those 

between local Sunni security groups and the GOI despite lingering mutual mistrust. 

Prime Minister Maliki’s operations against Shiite militants demonstrated to many 

Sunni Arab leaders that he was willing to act in national—not sectarian—interests. 

Tawafuq, the main Sunni Arab political coalition, returned to the Iraqi Government 

last July. Iraq’s Arab neighbors are establishing a diplomatic presence in Baghdad 

for the first time since the fall of Saddam’s regime. Provincial elections were a key 

step to maintaining Sunni Arab engagement, although the long-term provision of 

services to and economic development of stabilized Sunni areas by the Iraqi Government will be a more significant driver of reconciliation. Sunni Arabs widely boycotted the 2005 provincial elections and as a result are underrepresented in many 

provinces, including Ninawa, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. Following the largely credible and legitimate provincial elections in January 2009, Sunni Arabs have achieved 

a more equitable political representation. Results generally reflected the provincial 

ethno-sectarian demographics, which will likely help build Sunni confidence in 

Baghdad. Sunnis may tolerate some political setbacks provided they see improvements in their living conditions. 

Provincial elections have changed the balance of power between Shiite parties in 

Iraq. ISCI has lost its prominence and is unlikely to have high level positions in 

provincial governments. The Dawa Party, which led the State of Law coalition, has 

emerged as a stronger force in local and national politics and will be able to use 

its control of government resources to further its parliamentary election campaign 

efforts in late 2009. The Sadrist Trend, largely marginalized in 2008, will probably 

regain some influence due to a likely partnership in several provinces with the State 

of Law coalition. 

The ISF improved their overall capabilities in 2008, reaching tactical proficiency 

in providing security as demonstrated by an increased ability to plan, prepare, and 

execute independent counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. At the direction of Prime 

Minister Maliki in March, the ISF began a series of complex, large-scale COIN operations throughout Iraq. These high profile operations have been effective in regaining Iraqi Government control over previously contested areas. They also highlighted 

the relative progress of the ISF maneuver elements over the past year as they have 

expanded in size, capability, and ability to deploy. 

The ISF still suffers from deficiencies in combat support and service support to 

sustain large-scale operations. The ISF continues to rely on coalition support for key 

enabling capabilities including close air support, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), logistics, transportation, medevac, legal and finance support, 

civil-military affairs and engineering, as well as counterterrorism and force protection assets. The greatest obstacles to ISF development continue to be a shortage of 

qualified leaders, a lack of vehicles and basic equipment and immature logistics and 

sustainment capability. Moreover, the spontaneous creation of new units exacerbates existing shortages of personnel and equipment. In addition, budget shortfalls 

will likely affect the ISF adversely unless the Prime Minister and the legislature 

can find salient ways to fund it. 

The sectarian composition of the ISF will continue to hinder operational effectiveness. The National Police, which will take on increasing responsibility for internal 

security, is estimated to be heavily staffed—maybe upwards of 75 percent—by Shiite. The Ministry of Interior reorganized the National Police and the coalition provided extensive retraining in an effort to counter corruption and abuses, but many 

Sunni Arabs still associate the organization with targeting Sunni Arabs during the 

sectarian violence that marked 2006 and early 2007. As a result, the prospect of National Police deployments has increased tension within Sunni majority provinces. Incorporating more Sunni officer recruits into National Police units in Mosul and 

Anbar provinces is helping to dispel some of the perceptions of the National Police 

being a strictly Shiite-dominated force. In addition, as the National Police continues 

to expand, the ethnosectarian composition of the force is expected to be more representative of the population. 

48 

The Kurdish presence and claims across northern Iraq’s disputed territories is 

fueling ethnic tensions and potential violence between Kurds and Arabs. The constitutional process for resolving disputed territories outlined in Article 140 of the 

Iraqi Constitution has stalled, and the U.N.’s three-phase plan to facilitate the Article 140 process has not achieved measurable progress. Political tensions increased 

last August when Prime Minister Maliki challenged Kurdish control of Khanaqin in 

northern Diyala province. Also, in early December, Iraqi Army movements around 

Kirkuk—territory also claimed by the Kurds—further increased tensions. Coalition 

engagement helped diffuse the situation, but both GOI and Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) military forces remain deployed around the cities. Prime Minister 

Maliki’s assertiveness, combined with increasing opposition to Kurdish territorial 

claims within the Iraqi parliament, will likely force the Kurds to adjust their strategy for incorporating disputed territories, including Kirkuk, into the KRG. The 

Kurds see their political leverage on this issue diminishing and as a result, fear the 

GoI will attempt to seize control of disputed areas the Kurds currently hold—especially in Ninawa and Kirkuk governorates. This may be the greatest potential 

flashpoint in Iraq for 2009. 

Turkey remains concerned about Kurdish separatism as well as the threat posed 

by the Kurdish terrorist group, the Kongra Gel (KGK). However, historic talks last 

October between KRG President Masoud Barzani and senior Turkish leaders may 

represent a thaw in Turkey’s hard-line stance and a growing recognition that longterm resolution to the KGK issue will come through diplomatic efforts in addition 

to military action. KRG action on Turkish demands will be critical to continued diplomatic developments. 

Iran continues to provide money, weapons and training to some Iraqi Shiite militants despite pledges by senior Iranian officials to stop such support. The weapons 

include Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) with radio-controlled, remote arming and passive infrared detonators, mortars, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and 

launchers, small arms ammunition and explosives. 

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is part of the Iranian government 

and has a central role in carrying out Iran’s policies in Iraq through its special operations command—the Qods Force. The IRGC-Qods Force holds the Iraq portfolio 

within the Iranian regime and posts officers in Iran’s diplomatic missions throughout Iraq, including Iran’s current Ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, who 

is a Qods Force officer. The IRGC-Qods Force covertly trains, funds, and arms Iraqi 

insurgents and militias. It also offers strategic and operational guidance aimed at 

undermining U.S. interests in Iraq. The IRGC-Qods Force junior partner, the Lebanese Hizballah, has trained Iraqi insurgents in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon. The Lebanese Hizballah provides insurgents with the training, tactics, and technology to conduct kidnappings, small unit tactical operations and employ sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), incorporating lessons learned from operations in 

southern Lebanon. 

Iran is training Shiite militants in use of IEDs and EFPs and efforts to defeat 

these weapons and the networks that design, build, emplace, and fund them draw 

persistent counterresponses. The flow of new IED technologies and highly creative 

emplacement and employment methods underscore the enemy’s ability to adapt and 

react quickly and efficiently. Although there is a coercive aspect to Iranian policy 

in Iraq—with Iran seeking to use all sources of national power to secure greater influence in Iraq—Tehran and Baghdad generally enjoy a positive relationship and 

there is no evidence that the Iranians are seeking to topple Maliki’s Government. 

The flow of foreign terrorists into Iraq and the number of associated suicide attacks have declined, due in large part to increased security measures and disruptions to the AQI network. At the same time, the nations where foreign fighters originate or transit have increased their counterterrorism efforts, especially targeting 

foreign fighter transport networks. 

Afghanistan and Pakistan 

The security situation in Afghanistan continued to worsen in 2008, driven by an 

increasingly proficient insurgency, government inability to deliver basic services to 

portions of the country and insurgent access to safe havens in western Pakistan. 

Through its use of violence and intimidation, the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan continued to undermine confidence in the government’s ability to provide security and justice. While the insurgency remains concentrated in the Pashtun-dominated south and east, it continued to expand over the past year to some western 

areas that lack effective security and government presence. As Afghanistan prepares 

for presidential elections in 2009, these factors will contribute to a more challenging 

environment than in 2008. Across the border, Pakistan also faces simultaneous economic, political, and security challenges. The government faces an expanded miliVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
49 

tancy, which finds sanctuary in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 

and an economy beset by falling foreign exchange reserves, a depreciating currency, 

and high inflation. Despite an international economic aid package, the economy will 

continue to struggle in 2009. 

Although the Taliban have not demonstrated an ability to conduct sustained conventional operations, it has increased attacks every year since 2002. Enemy-initiated violence in 2008 grew by 55 percent over levels in 2007. Statistics also show 

a 21 percent increase in suicide bombings, a 106 percent increase in the use of IEDs, 

and a 33 percent increase in small arms attacks. Some of these trends reflect the 

International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) increased activities in expanded 

operational areas. 

Insurgents in Afghanistan have expanded their use of tactics and techniques, such 

as kidnappings and suicide attacks, demonstrating the adaptive nature of the 

threat. Despite pledges by some local Afghan tribes to restrict border transit, insurgents continue to cross the porous Afghan-Pakistani border to safe havens in western Pakistan. Along Afghanistan’s eastern border, Iran has sought to expand its influence in Afghanistan. Iran advances its goals through legitimate business and humanitarian efforts along with weapon shipments that include EFPs, rocket propelled 

grenades, mortars, rockets, small arms ammunition, and explosives. 

While the Taliban lost several key commanders in 2008, steady access to local 

Pashtun and foreign fighters has allowed them to sustain operations. Al Qaeda’s 

presence in Afghanistan has increased to levels unseen since 2001–2002. Al Qaeda 

collaborates closely with the Taliban and other insurgent elements and supports the 

insurgency with personnel, training and resources, particularly in Afghanistan’s 

south and east. Taliban and al Qaeda use of information operations have played to 

both domestic and international audiences, raising the profile of the insurgency and 

encouraging additional financial and personnel support. 

Afghanistan’s army and police forces continue to slowly increase in size and effectiveness, but this growth has not kept pace with the Taliban’s ability to exploit a 

lack of security presence. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has grown from 49,000 

to approximately 80,000 over the last year, fielding 6 new commando battalions 

which are specifically trained to handle counterinsurgency operations. Half of Afghanistan’s combat arms units can lead combat operations, albeit with coalition support. The Afghan people generally view the army as one of the most trusted Afghan 

institutions. In contrast, Afghan National Police (ANP) forces still require considerable training and coalition support to fulfill their mission. The ANP has reportedly 

grown from 75,000 to approximately 80,000 over the last year. The Afghan Government has subsequently initiated a program to improve police performance. As of 

January, police from 52 of the most violent districts in Afghanistan have participated in training. Despite measured progress, the government continues to struggle 

against violence, corruption, and narcotics trade. 

Over the next year, the Afghan Government will remain vulnerable to insurgent 

violence, the narcotics trade, foreign influences and disruptive political maneuvering 

ahead of the 2009 Afghan presidential election. Without significant improvements 

in the government’s ability to deliver basic services and provide increased security, 

Afghan popular discontent will persist and could worsen especially in areas where 

corruption persists, select Pashtun tribes remain disenfranchised and the economy 

does not provide basic employment opportunities. 

In Pakistan, the FATA continues to provide vital sanctuary to al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and a number of foreign and Pakistan-based extremist groups. Al 

Qaeda exploits the permissive operating environment to support the Afghan insurgency while also planning attacks against the U.S. and western interests in Pakistan and worldwide. Together with the Afghan Taliban and other extremist groups, 

al Qaeda uses this sanctuary to train and recruit operatives, plan and prepare regional and transnational attacks, disseminate propaganda and obtain equipment 

and supplies. All these groups consider U.S. and western interests, as well as Pakistan’s army and other Pakistani Government interests as legitimate targets, as 

demonstrated by the attacks against the Danish Embassy and Marriott Hotel in 

Islamabad. 

Pakistan’s military has expanded paramilitary forces and deployed additional 

troops to the area in an effort to contain the threat. Pakistani military operations 

in Bajaur Agency have been met with fierce resistance by militants. While militants 

previously have been unable to sustain attacks in the face of a military response, 

militants in Bajaur maintain extensive networks and reinforcements, helping them 

remain entrenched. In the Swat Valley, a ‘‘settled’’ district of the Northwest Frontier 

Province, the government recently agreed to militant demands to impose Shari’a law 

in the district, a move that could embolden militant organizations in other parts of 

the country. 

50 

Pakistani leaders stress the importance of national sovereignty and condemn 

cross-border military actions from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, while Pakistan has allowed limited U.S. assistance in counterinsurgency training, it is much more receptive to increased intelligence sharing, technical cooperation, and equipment and armaments to improve its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities. Although U.S. efforts to address Pakistani counterinsurgency deficiencies are underway, it will take years before meaningful capabilities are likely to be developed. 

While some Pakistani senior leaders have publicly acknowledged that extremism 

has replaced India as Pakistan’s preeminent national security threat, India remains 

a high-priority, long-term concern. On matters of external defense, Pakistan seeks 

stability and a balance of power deterrent across the region through continued improvements to its nuclear and conventional forces, although the economic decline 

will likely slow progress in these areas. 

Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapon 

stockpiles and seek more advanced warheads and delivery systems. Pakistan has 

taken important steps to safeguard its nuclear weapons, though vulnerabilities 

exist. 

Strategic rivalry with India continues to drive Pakistan’s development of an expanding array of delivery systems. Islamabad is developing cruise missiles such as 

the Babur for ground-launch and the Ra’ad for air-launch. Pakistan may pursue 

other launch platforms and missions for these missiles. 

Meanwhile, Pakistan continues to develop the Abdali short-range and the 

Shaheen II medium-range ballistic missiles. Significant progress was made last year 

in the Shaheen II’s development and when deployed it would become Pakistan’s 

longest ranged ballistic missile, capable of reaching targets out to 2,000 kilometers. 

These two missiles will join a missile inventory that already includes nuclear- and 

conventionally-armed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. 

Transnational Terrorist Threat 

Al Qaeda is committed to imposing its own interpretation of Islamic rule upon the 

Muslim world and is the most significant terrorist threat to U.S. interests worldwide. 

Al Qaeda retains the operational capability to plan, support, and direct 

transnational attacks despite the deaths of multiple senior level operatives. The operating environment in the FATA—along with supportive indigenous elements in 

Pakistan—not only allows al Qaeda to support the Afghan insurgency, conduct attacks in Pakistan, and prepare transnational attacks against the west, it also provides the time and space needed to train and develop the next generation of al 

Qaeda leadership. 

Al Qaeda continues to recruit and train operatives who can travel easily, without 

drawing scrutiny from security services. In addition to being a target in its own 

right, Europe could be used as a platform from which attacks against the United 

States could be initiated. 

Al Qaeda continues efforts to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 

(CBRN) materials and would not hesitate to use such weapons if the group develops 

sufficient capabilities. CBRN-related information is widely available on the internet 

and, in many cases, small scale or crude agents are easy to construct. Al Qaeda and 

its associates are most likely to use low-level CBRN agents such as ricin, botulinum 

toxin or toxic industrial chemicals such as cyanide and chlorine. 

In 2008, Osama bin Ladin issued 4 statements and al-Zawahiri issued 10. Each 

has issued one statement thus far in 2009. The continued release of statements by 

the group’s leaders and senior operatives who have not previously appeared in propaganda, is an attempt to convey health, a robust leadership core, and influence over 

the movement. The wide array of speakers is likely meant to signal that al Qaeda’s 

viability transcends bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri. The messages are designed to encourage donors, enlist recruits, guide the movement, and drive a wedge between the 

United States and its allies. 

Al Qaeda increasingly lost operatives, including senior planners and trainers, to 

counterterrorism operations in Pakistan. Mid-level operatives rise to advance plans 

and operations; however, sustained counterterrorism operations strain the group’s 

ability to recuperate from leadership losses, degrade transnational attack capabilities, and disrupt regional attack planning. Nevertheless, capable al Qaeda 

operatives remain. 

Al Qaeda continued to further relationships with compatible regional terrorist 

groups to extend the organization’s financial and operational reach. Al Qaeda uses 

such mergers to foster public perceptions of its worldwide influence, pursue its 

transnational agenda and to strike U.S. and western interests in new areas. As 

51 

these mergers multiply, the threat may increase as new franchises adopt al Qaeda’s 

targeting priorities, against U.S. and western interests. 

Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to expand its 

operational activities outside Algeria with several attacks against western interests 

in both Mauritania and Tunisia. Despite increased counterterrorism efforts by North 

African governments, AQIM continues to improve its ability to conduct sophisticated 

large-scale attacks in North Africa and the Sahel. 

East Africa remains an environment conducive to large, casualty-producing attacks such as the 1998 embassy bombings. Despite regional counterterrorism operations since late 2006, senior East Africa-based al Qaeda operatives remain at large 

and likely continue attack planning against U.S. and western interests in the region. 

Recent propaganda from both al Qaeda and the Somalia-based terrorist group alShabaab highlighting their shared ideology suggests a formal merger announcement 

is forthcoming. Al-Shabaab has conducted near-daily attacks against regional government and security forces in Somalia, including suicide vehicle born IED attacks 

in Puntland and Somaliland. Cooperation among al Qaeda inspired extremists 

throughout the region strengthens al Qaeda’s foothold in Africa. 

In South Asia, the November 2008 attack in Mumbai highlighted the increasing 

ability of terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyiba to direct and execute terrorist attacks inside India. Besides raising India-Pakistan tensions, the targeting of foreign 

nationals and Jewish interests, as well as the coordination and complexity of the 

operation, marked a departure from previous attacks and raised concerns in the region. 

In Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) are 

the terrorist groups that pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests. The JI, which 

is based mainly in Indonesia, works regionally with other Islamic terrorist and separatist groups, including with the ASG, based in the Philippines, to achieve its goal 

of establishing a regional caliphate. Two JI operatives were arrested in Malaysia, 

but other senior operatives remain at large. While JI has not carried out a largescale attack in Indonesia since the 2005 attack in Bali, raids and arrests by Indonesian authorities in mid–2008 revealed caches of bombs and explosives—clear 

signs that the group maintains the interest and capability to conduct attacks. 

A comprehensive peace accord remains elusive in the Philippines, where the Moro 

Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Philippine government continue to discuss conditions for resuming peace talks. The breakdown in negotiations spurred MILF 

bombings in Mindanao; violence likely will continue until both sides can agree on 

terms to resume negotiations. While Philippine counterterrorism efforts have disrupted some attacks, ASG and other terrorists retain the capability to conduct operations. 

Following the February 2008 killing of Hizballah terrorist leader Imad 

Mughniyah, Hizballah publicly threatened retaliation. Reprisals against those 

Hizballah believe responsible remains likely. 

REGIONAL ISSUES AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

Iran 

Iran’s military is designed principally to defend against external threats from 

more modern adversaries and threats posed by internal opponents. However, Iran 

could conduct limited offensive operations with its ballistic missile and naval forces. 

Diplomacy, economic leverage and active sponsorship of terrorist and paramilitary 

groups are the tools Iran uses to drive its aggressive foreign policy. In particular, 

terrorism is used to pressure or intimidate other countries, and, more broadly, to 

serve as a strategic deterrent. Iran assesses that its use of terrorism provides benefits with few costs and risks. Iran continues to provide lethal aid to Iraqi Shi’a militants and Afghan insurgents while simultaneously providing weapons, training and 

money to Lebanese Hizballah, its strategic partner. 

Within the country’s borders, modernization of Iran’s conventional military inventory has traditionally favored naval and air defense forces over ground and air 

units, while all Services have worked to improve their doctrine and tactics. Ongoing 

naval modernization is focused on equipment such as fast missile patrol boats as 

well as anti-ship cruise missiles and naval mines. Iranian broadcasts claim that Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have monitored U.S. aircraft carrier operations in the Persian Gulf. All naval elements have also developed and practiced 

methods intended to counter U.S. technical superiority. 

Iran continues to invest heavily in advanced air defenses, reversing decades of neglect in this arena. Iran has deployed the advanced SA–15 tactical surface-to-air 

missile (SAM) systems and continues to express interest in acquiring the long-range 

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SA–20. Iran’s procurement of modern SAMs with automated command, control and 

communications systems will improve its ability to protect senior leadership and key 

nuclear and industrial facilities. 

While not investing in major new ground systems since at least early 2005, Iran 

is building an asymmetric capability to counter more advanced, adversary ground 

forces, including enhancements to its Basij volunteer forces, which would play a 

large role in an asymmetric fight. IRGC ground forces are reorganizing to improve 

coordination in preparing for and countering internal and external threats. Regular 

ground forces may be included in that consolidation, and all ground forces continue 

training to better defend against potential invaders. 

Regular Iranian ballistic missile training continues throughout the country. Iran 

continues to develop and acquire ballistic missiles that can range Israel and central 

Europe, including Iranian claims of an extended-range variant of the Shahab-3 and 

a 2,000-km medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Ashura. Iran’s February 2, 

2009, launch of the Safir Space Launch Vehicle shows progress in some technologies 

relevant to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Beyond the steady growth in 

its missile and rocket inventories, Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness 

of existing systems with accuracy improvements and new submunition payloads. 

With the rest of the IC, we judge that Iran halted its nuclear weaponization and 

covert uranium conversion and enrichment-related work in 2003, but we assess that 

Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. Iran 

continues to develop its overt enrichment program in defiance of U.N. Security 

Council resolutions. Iran is producing uranium enrichment feed material at 

Esfahan, claims to be enriching uranium in 5,000 centrifuges at Natanz and is 

working on more advanced centrifuges. It also continues to build a heavy water reactor at Arak which will be capable of producing plutonium that could be processed 

for use in a weapon if required facilities are developed. 

DIA judges Iran’s biological warfare (BW) efforts may have evolved beyond agent 

research and development, and we believe Iran likely has the capability to produce 

small quantities of BW agents but may only have a limited ability to weaponize 

them. Iran continues to engage in dual-use research and seek biotechnical materials, equipment and expertise, which have legitimate uses but could also enable ongoing BW efforts. 

We assess that Iran maintains dual-use facilities intended to produce chemical 

warfare agents in times of need and conducts research that could have offensive applications. 

Syria 

Syria is trying to balance a complex mix of objectives throughout the region, particularly in Lebanon and Iraq, to both pursue its interests and protect itself in the 

volatile regional environment. Syria likely sees its foreign policies as successful, especially in Lebanon, as it has engaged with a steady stream of world leaders since 

it helped end Lebanon’s political crisis in May. 

Syria seeks improved relations with the Iraqi Government, in particular lucrative 

renewed economic cooperation, while at the same time harboring Iraqis with ties to 

insurgents and other oppositionists in Iraq. 

Syria in recent weeks took steps to normalize relations with Lebanon, and in midOctober formally established diplomatic ties for the first time ever and took initial 

steps toward opening an embassy in Beirut. Yet Syria still seeks to strengthen its 

influence in Lebanon through its continuing support to Hizballah and other pro-Syrian allies. We judge that Syria will seek to expand its influence over the Lebanese 

government, especially in the upcoming 2009 elections, so that it can secure a role 

for itself in any wider Middle East diplomatic efforts and continue to stymie any 

legislation that threatens its interests, such as the United Nations’ investigation 

into former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination. 

Internally, the regime is trying to counter Islamic extremists that pose a threat 

to Syria, as highlighted by a car bombing in Damascus in September that killed 17 

people. Partly in response to western pressure and in an effort to curb extremist 

threats to the regime, some foreign terrorist movements from Syria into Iraq are 

blocked. Nonetheless, Syria remains the primary gateway for Iraq-bound foreign 

fighters and numerous terrorist groups operate from Syrian territory. 

With regard to its external defense, Syria’s military remains in a defensive posture and inferior to Israel’s forces, but it is upgrading its missile, rocket, anti-tank, 

aircraft and air defense inventories. We judge it is likely giving anti-tank guided 

missiles to Hizballah as Syria remains committed to providing high levels of support 

to the organization. Syria increasingly perceives Hizballah as an extension of its 

own defense capabilities against Israel in potential future conflicts. 

53 

Significant air defense related deliveries include at least two SA–22 self-propelled 

short-range gun and missile air defense systems from Russia in June 2008, out of 

a contract for several dozen. Recent Syrian contracts with Russia for future delivery 

include new MiG–31 and MiG–29M/M2 fighter aircraft, and the SA–X–17 mediumrange SAM system. 

Syria’s chemical warfare program is well established with a stockpile of nerve 

agent, which it can deliver by aircraft or ballistic missiles. During the past several 

years, Syria has continued to seek chemical warfare-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources. Syria has the facilities and the expertise to domestically 

produce, store and deliver chemical agents. Syria will continue to improve its chemical warfare capability for the foreseeable future to counter regional adversaries. 

Based on the duration of Syria’s longstanding BW program, we judge some elements of the program may have advanced beyond the research and development 

stage and may be capable of limited agent production. Syria is not known to have 

successfully weaponized biological agents in an effective delivery system, but it possesses a number of conventional and chemical weapon systems that could easily be 

modified for biological agent delivery. 

Syria’s ballistic missile inventory is designed to offset shortfalls in the country’s 

conventional forces. It includes older Russian built SS–21s as well as SCUD B, 

SCUD C, and SCUD D missiles. Syria continues to flight test ballistic missiles 

which it views as a strategic deterrent against Israel. 

Levant 

The Levant remains tense with the potential for renewed conflict. Israel, 

Hizballah and Syria are internalizing lessons learned from the summer 2006 conflict 

in preparation for potential future conflict. While none appear to want fighting to 

resume now, they all view its likelihood over the medium term. The period of high 

tension between Israel and Syria during the summer of 2007 has subsided. Nevertheless, Israel remains concerned over Syria’s military posture. Similarly, Syria 

fears an Israeli attack. 

Senior Israel Defense Force leaders are driving an intense effort to fix shortcomings in readiness, training, logistics, and combined arms operations identified 

following the summer 2006 war. 

Iran and Syria jointly continue to support anti-Israel terrorist and militant groups 

in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. However, the alliance between secular 

Arab Syria and theocratic Persian Iran is not a natural one, and may erode if Syria 

is accommodated significantly in any diplomatic agreement with Israel. 

Israel’s recent Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ rise to power in 

Gaza, the resultant bifurcation of control of the Palestinian territories and the ongoing rivalry between Hamas and Fatah complicate Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking 

efforts. Operation Cast Lead, which took place 27 December—18 January, aimed at 

reducing Hamas rocket fire into Israel and weapon smuggling into the Gaza Strip 

and sought to deter future Hamas attacks on Israel. The resulting ceasefire, details 

of which are still being negotiated by Egypt, is likely to result in a period of calm 

over the next year or so but will not address the long-term problems of Hamas control of the Gaza Strip. Unless a political solution to the intra-Palestinian division 

and Hamas’ rejection of peace with Israel is found, another round of fighting in the 

Gaza Strip is likely in the mid-term future. Hamas will attempt to use the ceasefire 

to rebuild and improve its military capability while seeking to control reconstruction 

of the Gaza Strip. Increased international cooperation against Hamas and Iranian 

arms smuggling efforts will hamper Hamas’ rearmament but will not affect Hamas’ 

ability to maintain control in Gaza. 

After 18 months of political stalemate, former Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman became Lebanon’s President on May 25, 2008. Sleiman’s 

election followed the armed mid-May takeover of West Beirut by Lebanese 

Hizballah and the subsequent May 21, 2008, Doha agreement which quelled intraLebanese political in-fighting and ended the political impasse over the election of 

a new President. Currently Lebanese leaders are focused on the upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7, 2009. However, significant destabilizing 

influences remain: the rearming of militias and Syria’s effort to maintain its influence in Lebanon, as well as the status of Hizballah’s arms and its role, if any, in 

a Lebanese national defense strategy. 

Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups have tried to develop support and 

operate in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. They have, however, encountered obstacles in attaining these goals. 

54 

China 

China is strengthening its ability to conduct military operations along its periphery on its own terms. It is building and fielding sophisticated weapon systems and 

testing new doctrines that it believes will allow it to prevail in regional conflicts and 

also counter traditional U.S. military advantages. 

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is increasingly building its own sophisticated 

aircraft, surface combatants, submarines and weapon systems while still purchasing 

select systems from overseas. As an example, to improve its air defenses China is 

producing the 4th Generation F–10 fighter aircraft along with the PL–12 air-to-air 

missile, yet has continued to import SA–20 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) from Russia. China has developed and begun to deploy indigenous SAM systems which, together with SAMs imported from Russia, provide a modern, layered, ground-based 

air defense capability to defend important assets. China bought a total of 16 SA– 

20 air defense battalions, 8 of which have an increased engagement range from 150 

to 200 km. China is developing a layered maritime capability with medium-range 

anti-ship ballistic missiles, submarines, maritime strike aircraft and surface combatants armed with increasingly sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles. 

The PLA has achieved moderate success in introducing these new weapons. Additional integration probably will accelerate as the PLA explores the full potential of 

new weapons. 

China is looking beyond a potential Taiwan contingency and is pursuing capabilities needed to become a major regional power. The navy already operates a large 

surface fleet, an increasingly modern submarine fleet, and increasingly appears likely to pursue an aircraft carrier development program. The air force is developing 

an extended-range, land-attack cruise-missile-capable bomber. However, China must 

still integrate new doctrinal concepts and it also lacks the overseas bases needed 

for extended operations. China will most likely increase maritime patrols of disputed oil fields and its Exclusive Economic Zone, although not achieve a true regional power projection capability in the next decade. 

Moving away from its historical reliance upon mass conscription, China is trying 

to build a more professional military workforce—one able to engage successfully in 

modern warfare. The PLA seeks to rejuvenate its officer corps, strengthen military 

education, reform its noncommissioned officer corps, improve military quality of life 

and combat corruption. 

China’s deployed missile inventory includes nuclear-armed intercontinental, 

intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles, conventional medium- and shortrange ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. China’s nuclear force is becoming more 

survivable with the deployment of DF–31 and DF–31A road-mobile ICBMs and the 

eventual deployment of the JL–2 submarine launched ballistic missile. China currently has less than 50 ICBMs capable of targeting the United States; however the 

number of ICBM warheads capable of reaching the United States could more than 

double in the next 15 years, especially if multiple, independently-targeted reentry 

vehicles (MIRVs) are employed. China has also fielded over 1,000 CSS–6 and CSS– 

7 conventional short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan. It also is developing 

more capable medium- and intermediate-range conventional missiles able to range 

U.S. and allied military installations in the region. 

China’s nuclear weapon stockpile likely will grow over the next 10 years as new 

ballistic missiles are activated and older ones are upgraded. China likely has produced enough weapon-grade fissile material to meet its needs for the immediate future. In addition, China likely retains the capability to produce biological and chemical weapons. 

China’s security strategy emphasizes strategic defense, which integrates diplomacy, economics and information operations with conventional military forces. However, growing capabilities in counterspace, cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and 

long-range precision strike could enable China to achieve strategic surprise 

While Chinese security strategy favors the defense, its operational doctrine does 

emphasize seizing the initiative through offensive action, including possible preemptive action. China does not view an offensive operational doctrine within the context 

of a strategic defense as contradictory. China’s total military-related spending for 2008 could be as much as $120 to $175 

billion. China has made marginal improvements in military budget transparency, 

but the PLA’s disclosed budget still does not include major categories of expenditures. China’s accounting opacity is inconsistent with international standards for reporting military spending. China also remains reluctant to share details about its 

growing counterspace capabilities. 

China maintains an active presence in the South and East China Seas. Chinese 

operations in the South China Sea, covering areas such as the Spratly and Paracel 

islands, include reconnaissance patrols, training and island defense, air defense and 

55 

service support exercises. China also has conducted operations in the East China 

Sea area, including patrols to protect its maritime interests and claimed oil and gas 

resources. 

In late December, China deployed naval combatants to the Gulf of Aden to conduct counterpiracy operations. Since December, the navy has escorted several Chinese merchant vessels through the Gulf of Aden. While the duration of the deployment is expected to last approximately 3 months, Chinese press reporting indicates 

that replacement warships could be made available to continue operations. This is 

the first time the Chinese Navy has deployed conducting operations outside of East 

Asian waters. 

North Korea 

North Korea’s main goals are to preserve its current system of government while 

improving its economic situation, albeit at a pace it believes will not threaten internal stability. Pyongyang does not view its nuclear ambitions, a large Active-Duty 

Force of about 1.2 million, and improved relations with the United States, as mutually exclusive. Rather they are the means Pyongyang uses to realize its goals. 

North Korea’s large, forward-positioned, but poorly-equipped and poorly-trained 

military is not well-suited to sustain major military operations against the south. 

We believe as a result of its comparative limitations, North Korea is emphasizing 

improvements in its deterrent capability and its ability to defend against technologically superior forces. The long-range artillery the north has positioned near the 

demilitarized zone is complemented by a substantial mobile ballistic missile force 

with an array of warhead options to include weapons of mass destruction that can 

range U.S. forces and our allies in the Republic of Korea and Japan. North Korea 

relies upon these capabilities to ensure its sovereignty and independence and occasionally to remind the United States and neighboring countries of its military capabilities in order to have its positions and demands taken seriously. 

After a failed July 2006 test launch, North Korea has continued development of 

the Taepo Dong 2 which could be used for space launch or as an ICBM. North Korea 

announced in late February that they intend to launch a communications satellite, 

the Kwangmyongsong-2. North Korea also continues work on an intermediate range 

ballistic missile. 

Last year, progress in the Six-Party Talks was sporadic. In June North Korea provided its overdue nuclear declaration of plutonium activities and publicly demolished the Yongbyon cooling tower, but began reversing disablement measures in August in response to its continued presence on the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism 

List. Although North Korea resumed disablement of its nuclear program following 

its removal from the list in October, should the Six-Party Talks break down, the 

North is likely to respond with resumed production of fissile material at Yongbyon 

while also increasing rhetoric intended to encourage a return to dialogue on the 

North’s terms. In such a scenario, additional missile or nuclear tests could occur. 

North Korea could have stockpiled several nuclear weapons from plutonium produced at Yongbyon and it likely sought a uranium enrichment capability for nuclear 

weapons at least in the past. It has proliferated nuclear weapons-related technology 

abroad. North Korea may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile. 

North Korea has had a longstanding chemical warfare program and we believe 

North Korea’s chemical warfare capabilities probably includes the ability to produce 

bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood agents. We believe Pyongyang 

possesses a sizeable stockpile of agents. 

North Korea is believed to have a longstanding BW program that could support 

the production of BW agents. North Korea is party to the Biological and Toxin 

Weapons Convention, but has submitted only one confidence-building measure declaration and has admitted to no offensive BW activities. 

Kim Jong Il reportedly suffered a stroke in August 2008 but appears to have 

largely recovered, making frequent media appearences that are likely meant to show 

international and domestic audiences that he remains firmly in control. Leadership 

succession, should it occur due to Kim’s sudden death, is likely to progress smoothly 

in the near term but, because the regime is structured around one-man rule, becomes problematic in the longer term as key individuals and factions compete for 

control. 

Russia 

Russia continues on the more assertive path set by former President Putin, who 

passed the presidency to Dmitriy Medvedev in May but continues to wield significant authority as prime minister. Russia is trying to re-establish a degree of military power that it believes is commensurate with its economic strength and general 

56 

political confidence—although the current global economic downturn may limit Moscow’s ability to achieve its goals. Perceived Western encroachment into its claimed 

areas of interest and Islamic or insurgent threats along its periphery are driving 

Russia’s current military activities and modernization efforts. 

Russia’s widely publicized strategic missile launches and increased out-of-area activity are meant to signal Moscow’s continued global reach and relevance to domestic and international audiences. Recent examples are the deployment of two Tu–160/ 

Blackjack strategic bombers to Venezuela in September, the Pyotr Velikiy cruiser 

strike group’s deployment to the Mediterranean during Russia’s major exercise ‘‘Stability-2008’’ and to the Caribbean in November. 

Russia opposes closer integration of former Soviet countries with the West and 

wants to continue its presence in the so-called ‘‘frozen conflict’’ areas. Russian peacekeeping forces in Moldova continue to be a major source of friction. In August, the 

Russian military defeated Georgian forces in operations around Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia and remain stationed in those separatist areas. During the Georgia conflict, 

Russia demonstrated the ability to quickly mobilize and respond with large numbers 

of ground and air forces. However, Russia also experienced several significant weaknesses in its execution such as a lack of air and ground coordination, the lack of 

precision weapons and navigation aids, the inability to suppress Georgian air defense forces, and a lack of UAVs. 

Russian conventional force capabilities continue to grow, albeit at a measured 

pace. Readiness improvements are seen primarily among the conventional Permanently Ready Forces (PRF), such as those used in Georgia. Russia has increased 

training and readiness levels in these units above the lowest points of the mid1990s. However, Russia is finding it hard to improve training quality and modernize 

equipment while also increasing recruitment and retention rates for the volunteers 

needed in the PRF and the noncommissioned officer cadre. 

In September 2008, Moscow announced a comprehensive set of reforms for its 

Armed Forces, which, if carried out, would be among the most extensive and farreaching of any instituted since World War II. While publicly connected with lessons 

learned from the August conflict with Georgia, these reforms also reflect a much 

broader and long-term set of evolving Russian threat perceptions and demographic 

and financial considerations. Under these plans, by 2020 the Russian Armed Forces 

will be reduced to 1,000,000 personnel, the number of officers slashed from 355,000 

to 150,000, military education facilities consolidated, size of the general staff reduced, most if not all cadre units disbanded and remaining units brought up to permanently-ready status, and those permanently ready units reorganized, streamlined 

and modernized. While Russia has begun implementing some of these reforms, their 

ultimate success is problematic. Russia’s worsening economy, manning shortfalls, resource constraints, and potential re-think of the reforms’ impact on military capabilities will likely slow or even stall some elements. 

As part of the announced reforms, Russia plans to speed up the modernization 

of its active forces. Emphasis reportedly will be given to precision munitions, intelligence assets, submarines, and elements of an aerospace defense system. Russia 

has made a major commitment of almost 5 trillion rubles ($200 billion) to its 2007– 

2015 State Armaments Program to develop and build new conventional and nuclear 

weapon systems, with priority on maintenance and modernization of the latter. 

Even after recently announced cuts to its proposed 2009 defense budget, Russia 

plans to allocate nearly 1.1 trillion rubles ($45 billion) for the military in 2009. Adjusted for inflation, this represents a 10 percent increase from 2008. However, a significant percentage of this funding will likely be lost to the defense budget due to 

corruption, mismanagement, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. 

These reforms, if largely carried out, would improve Russian capability to respond 

to limited, regional threats, but reduce their capability for large-scale conventional 

war. Making all residual forces permanently-ready and establishing the brigade as 

the basic ground unit would facilitate rapid mobilization and deployment of these 

relatively compact units to threatened areas. The decision to disband division and 

army-level formations also may reflect a belief that any conflict that PRF cannot 

handle would by necessity, escalate to nuclear. Russian operational plans do provide 

for the first use of nuclear weapons. 

Development and production of advanced strategic weapons continues, particularly on the Bulava SS–NX–32 submarine launched ballistic missile, still undergoing testing despite several publicized failures, and the SS–27 ICBM. Russia deployed six SS–27s in 2008, in addition to the six already placed on alert in December 2006 and 2007. Russian Strategic Rocket Forces also deployed two more SS–27s 

in silos, increasing the total to 50. Russian media reports say Russia flight-tested 

its developmental RS–24, a MIRVed version of the SS–27, twice in 2007 and once 

57 

in 2008, and expects to deploy it in December 2009 after more testing. Russia claims 

the MIRVed SS–27 can penetrate any missile defense. 

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is scheduled to expire on December 5, 2009. Russian officials are eager to continue discussions to replace the treaty 

with a new legally-binding agreement in order to maintain strategic stability. Russia retains a relatively large stockpile of non-strategic nuclear warheads. Nuclear 

material diversion remains a concern despite increased security measures. Some nuclear facilities and research reactors remain vulnerable to internal theft, sabotage 

or a well-executed terrorist attack. 

Russia continues research and development efforts that could support its offensive 

chemical and BW programs. Russia signed more than $10 billion in arms sales agreements in 2007, marking 

a second consecutive year of high sales. Russia recently signed large contracts with 

Algeria, India, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela, while new agreements with China have 

declined. Pending sales include advanced weapons such as multi-role fighter aircraft, transport aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, jet trainers, transport helicopters, 

armored infantry fighting vehicles, main battle tanks, and advanced surface-to-air 

missile systems. 

Russia will continue to produce advanced fighter aircraft for export to countries 

such as India, Malaysia, and Indonesia while also seeking additional warplane sales 

to South America and the Middle East. Moscow also continues to aggressively market its air defense systems, short-range ballistic missile systems and related automated command and control systems to Syria, Iran, Venezuela, China, and other 

countries. Defense industry officials, however, have expressed concern that the effects of the global economic crisis on many of Russia’s arms customers may result 

in declining exports. In the coming year at least, Russia’s defense industries will become more reliant on domestic orders. 

Turkey-Iraq 

The Turkish Government has conducted numerous limited military operations 

over the last several months, primarily involving air and artillery strikes, against 

Kurdish terrorists in northern Iraq in an effort to disrupt their activities and degrade their capabilities. The KGK continues to strike targets throughout southeast 

Turkey to include a October 3, 2008, attack on a military outpost that killed 17 

Turkish soldiers. The 3 October attack generated intense media and public pressure 

for additional military actions against KGK bases in northern Iraq, which could lead 

to a small to medium-scale ground operation this winter or early spring. A largescale Turkish operation would run the risk of upsetting stability in northern Iraq. 

Balkans 

In Kosovo, the security situation remains unsettled. February 17 marked the first 

anniversary of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. Over the past year 

a constitution has been put in place and in December the European Union’s Rule 

of Law Mission (EULEX) deployed to Kosovo. While modest progress is being made, 

EULEX will continue to face challenges, especially in asserting authority in the 

Serb areas of northern Kosovo. Pristina will continue to look to the United States 

and leading European countries for reassurance and support, to include calls for 

maintaining a robust international military and police presence. In Bosnia, a political crisis is brewing, as Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik is challenging the country’s state-central authorities, seeking greater autonomy and possibly independence. This represents the most significant crisis since the signing of 

the Dayton Accords of 1995. Dodik’s challenge to the central state and the international community could spark violent incidents, but the prospects for widespread 

violence in Bosnia remain low. 

Africa 

Beyond the threat of terrorism, the United States faces no major military threat 

in Africa, although there are serious challenges to our interests. 

Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta will continue to be plagued by violence as the root 

causes of the crisis—high levels of poverty, ethnic tensions, and rampant corruption—persist. Militant attacks are likely to expand beyond the immediate Delta region to affect neighboring Nigerian states as well as offshore hydrocarbon facilities. 

In Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government will likely continue to weaken, 

resulting in a further erosion of order. Largely ineffective, the Somali government 

is incapable of addressing the social and economic causes contributing to the ongoing piracy threat off the Somali coast. Unaddressed, piracy threatens to disrupt the 

flow of humanitarian supplies as well as commercial traffic transiting off the Somali 

coast. Warships from over a dozen nations currently conduct anti-pirate patrols in 

regional waters and have apprehended over 40 suspected pirates this year; most 

58 

have since been transferred to Somali and Yemeni authorities for prosecution. Despite this, attacks continue, but at rates lower than the peak of pirate activity in 

late 2008. 

In Sudan, the slow deployment of peacekeeping forces and stalled negotiations 

will continue to threaten the already desperate humanitarian situation in Darfur. 

Meanwhile, difficulties surrounding the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive 

Peace Agreement will remain a source of tension between north and south Sudan 

and could lead to incidents of localized confrontation between the former civil war 

rivals. 

Latin America 

While the United States presently faces no major conventional military threats 

across Latin America, a number of concerns endure. 

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, energized by his win in the February 15 national referendum that lifted presidential term limits, vowed to continue efforts to 

advance his agenda and confront U.S. regional influence. He has announced he will 

seek another 6-year term in 2012. The significant drop in world oil prices will delay 

Venezuelan plans to procure submarines, transport aircraft, and a strategic air defense system. Nonetheless, Venezuela has already purchased advanced fighters, attack helicopters, and assault rifles. 

Colombian counterinsurgency operations have degraded Revolutionary Armed 

Forces of Colombia (FARC) field units and operations, which has led to a significant 

increase in desertions. The FARC, and other drug trafficking organizations, have, 

however, maintained their dominant position in the global cocaine trade. Since 

2002, President Uribe’s national security strategy has dramatically bolstered the security forces’ capabilities to counter operations of illegal armed groups nationwide. 

This security force buildup includes adoption and implementation of a joint command doctrine, which has allowed the police and military to decrease the FARC’s 

manpower and capabilities significantly. Moreover, over the past 6 years, government security forces have removed numerous mid- and senior-level FARC leaders 

leaving the insurgent organization demoralized and in its most precarious state in 

the past 10 years. 

Bolivian President Morales continues to consolidate power with Venezuelan and 

Cuban assistance. He also won the January 25 vote on a draft constitution. However, the fact that the constitution was approved by a smaller margin than expected 

signaled that his popularity may have dropped which has emboldened the political 

opposition. The opposition continues to resist dialogue on key issues such as greater 

autonomy for some provinces as well as the sharing of hydro-carbon profits, and 

their efforts will challenge and perhaps destabilize his government. 

The broad support that Cuban President Raul Castro receives from the military, 

security services and the Communist Party will likely enable him to maintain stability, security, and his own position. The Cuban military’s support for Raul Castro 

shows no signs of reversing. Recent cabinet changes tend to support this assessment. At present there are no indications that a mass migration is imminent. 

Growing strains on Mexican drug cartels from the Calderon government’s successes is increasing the threat against civilian, military and law enforcement officials and, perhaps, against U.S. counternarcotics personnel in country. Despite recent successes against the Mexican drug cartels, drug-related violence continues to 

rise with 2008’s drug-related murders almost double the 2007 figures. Approximately 45,000 Mexican military personnel have been deployed nationwide as the 

lead counterdrug force while the government implements law enforcement and judicial reforms. 

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES OF CONCERN

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Systems 

The proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 

ballistic missiles against U.S. forces, the American people, our allies and interests 

remains a grave, enduring, and evolving threat. 

Qualitative and quantitative improvements in state nuclear programs—often 

linked with delivery system enhancements, further enhances the potential risk. 

Moreover, concerns remain regarding the safety and security of nuclear weapons 

and materials worldwide, and the potential diversion of fissile and radiological materials. 

As technology progresses and becomes increasingly available in a globalized world 

environment, the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons could become 

more diverse and technically sophisticated. 

59 

Terrorist organizations will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials in attacks while nation-states expand their 

WMD capabilities and the survivability, accuracy, and range of the associated delivery systems. 

Since mid-2006, numerous U.N. Security Council Resolutions have authorized 

sanctions against Iranian and North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs. 

While these actions have impeded some acquisition and support efforts, they have 

not stopped the programs themselves. Further frustrating sanction efforts is the inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of the resolutions by several key nations. 

While some countries such as Russia and China continue to market fully assembled Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-compliant short range ballistic 

missiles, entities in China and North Korea, motivated by economic and strategic 

interests, continue to supply controlled technologies, components and raw materials 

in support of WMD and missile programs, especially across the Middle East and 

South Asia. 

While some of these transfers are proscribed under various WMD-related control 

regimes, many others are dual-use with legitimate industrial applications. Examples 

include multi-axis computer numerically controlled machine tools that have applications in nuclear and missile programs, but are also commonly used throughout legitimate industry. Specialty metals such as 7000-series aluminum used in nuclear 

and missile programs are also commonly used in aircraft and other industries. Some 

chemicals used in fertilizer production are also controlled chemical weapon precursors and much of the glass-lined equipment used in pharmaceutical production is 

controlled due to its applicability to chemical and biological weapons programs. 

These last examples potentially could allow a state to embed an offensive chemical 

or biological weapons mobilization capability within its existing commercial infrastructure. 

Since 1999, Russia has adopted stronger export control laws and amended its 

criminal code to permit stricter punishment for illegal WMD-related exports. Similarly, China has also moved to enact export control laws to restrict proliferation of 

WMD-related materials. However, both have been inconsistent in applying these 

regulations, particularly regarding the sale of dual-use technology. 

Nongovernmental entities and individual entrepreneurs also remain a great concern. These organizations and the proliferation networks they tie into are often able 

to sidestep or outpace international detection and export control regimes. By regularly changing the names of the front companies they use, exploiting locations in 

countries with more permissive environments or lax enforcement and avoiding international financial institutions, these organizations are able to continue supplying 

WMD and ballistic missile-related and technology to countries of concern. 

Most state programs now emphasize self-sufficiency to reduce reliance upon external suppliers, which also limits their vulnerability to detection and interdiction. For 

example, Iranian weapon makers now advertise their ability to manufacture guidance and control components, such as dynamically tuned gyros. Instead of importing 

ballistic missile systems, Tehran now produces the SCUD B and C, Shahab-3 and 

Fateh-110 even though it still depends on outside sources for many of the related 

dual-use raw materials and components. 

While these indigenous capabilities are not always a good substitute for foreign 

imports, particularly for more advanced technologies, they prove adequate in many 

cases. Consequently, as some countries forego imports in favor of indigenous WMDrelated production, they position themselves anew as potential secondary 

proliferators. 

Even though most advanced nations cooperate against WMD proliferation, a number of trends beyond direct government control still fuel the threat. They include 

commercial scientific advances, the availability of relevant dual-use studies and information, scientists’ enthusiasm for sharing their research and the availability of 

dual-use training and education. 

Overall, the threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is likely to increase 

while growing more complex over the next decade. Current trends indicate that adversary ballistic missile systems, with advanced liquid- or solid-propellant propulsion systems, are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable and accurate 

and possess greater range. Pre-launch survivability is also likely to increase as potential adversaries strengthen their denial and deception measures and increasingly 

base their missiles on mobile sea- and land-based platforms. Adversary nations are 

increasingly adopting technical and operational countermeasures to defeat missile 

defenses. For example, China, Iran, and North Korea exercise near simultaneous 

salvo firings from multiple locations to defeat these defenses. 

60 

Computer Network Threats 

The U.S. information infrastructure, which includes telecommunications, computer networks and systems, and the data that resides on them, is critical to most 

aspects of modern life in the United States, Russia, and China posses the most experienced, well-resourced and capable computer network operations (CNO) capabilities that could threaten the United States, but they are not the only foreign entities 

that do. Other nations and non-state terrorist and criminal groups are also developing and refining their abilities to exploit and attack computer networks in support 

of their military, intelligence or criminal goals. 

The scope and sophistication of malicious CNO targeting against U.S. networks 

has steadily increased over the last 5 years. This is of particular concern because 

of the pronounced military advantages that the United States has traditionally derived from information networks. Potential adversaries that cannot compete directly 

against the United States may view CNO as a preferred asymmetric strategy to exploit our weakness while minimizing or degrading our traditional strengths. In particular, overseas production of information technology components provides opportunities for potentially hostile actors to access targeted systems by exploiting the supply chain at its origin. 

Russia and China have the technical, educational and operational ability to conduct CNO against targeted networks. Russia remains the most capable cyber-threat 

to the United States. Several high-ranking Russian military officials have promoted 

CNO’s potential against future adversaries. Since 2005 China has been incorporating offensive CNO into their military exercises, primarily in first strikes 

against enemy networks. 

Recent hacking activities emanating from China underscore concerns about potential hostile CNO intelligence collection activities. Several foreign governments, to include Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and South Korea, have publicly alleged 

government and corporate network intrusions by actors in China. 

Foreign Intelligence 

Our peer competitors, traditional adversaries and today, terrorist organizations 

pose a significant challenge to the United States and in particular our military, as 

they attempt to steal our secrets, deter our global military operations and influence 

our national policy. We face a wide range of threats from the activities of foreign 

intelligence services and terrorist groups which employ classic intelligence tools and 

tradecraft to collect against U.S. military, diplomatic, and economic interests at 

home and abroad. Some terrorist groups are capable of conducting fairly sophisticated intelligence operations, to include the conduct of pre-operational surveillance. 

Foreign intelligence services directly and indirectly collect unclassified and classified information on key U.S. technologies, particularly military and dual-use, exportcontrolled items with military application. Several of our traditional adversaries 

pose a serious and persistent challenge; they have demonstrated exceptional patience and skill in pursuing priority U.S. and military targets. Industrial espionage 

has a profound impact which negates the effectiveness of our weapons systems and 

puts our military forces at risk. 

The threat to our infrastructure, especially our computer networks, remains a lucrative target to not only our adversaries’ intelligence services, but also to organized 

criminal groups and individuals whose sole objective is to penetrate our network defenses. 

Underground Facilities 

We are witnessing the emergence of a new warfighting domain—the subsurface 

domain. Changes in warfare have dictated that nations to a much greater extent 

are constructing and relying on deep underground facilities to conceal and protect 

their most vital national security functions and activities. Two key factors driving 

these changes are increased overhead reconnaissance capabilities and greater 

lethality, range, and accuracy of precision-guided munitions. 

In the past year, our potential adversaries have constructed dozens of deep underground facilities for their ballistic missile forces, including theater and ICBMs. The 

use of underground facilities complicates the IC’s ability to monitor ballistic missile 

activities, and it improves the survivability of these weapons. 

Iran and North Korea protect major elements of their nuclear programs in underground facilities. In the 2006 conflict with Lebanon, Hizballah complicated Israeli 

targeting by using underground facilities to store weapons, conduct operations, and 

launch rockets; construction of underground havens by terrorist organizations is 

continuing. 

Contributing to a large increase in underground facility construction are recent 

and rapid advances in commercially available western tunneling technology. As poVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
61 

tential adversaries improve their ability to build underground facilities, the U.S will 

find it harder to locate and successfully target these critical facilities. 

Space and Counterspace 

The international proliferation of space-related expertise and technology is increasing, largely through commercial enterprises, and is helping other nations acquire space and space-related capabilities, including some with direct military applications. 

Because most space technologies have both civilian and military uses, this trend 

is providing a growing list of countries and non-state groups with more capable communications, reconnaissance, navigation, and targeting capabilities. Insurgents in 

Iraq, for example, have been captured in possession of commercial satellite imagery. 

Russia and China are developing systems and technologies capable of interfering 

with or disabling vital U.S. space-based navigation, communication and intelligence 

collection capabilities. Other countries have already deployed systems with inherent 

capabilities to support or conduct anti-satellite (ASAT) engagements, such as satellite-tracking, systems capable of jamming satellite communications, and laser 

range-finding devices. However, these technologies are costly and most countries 

that want them are not expected to buy them soon. Aside from Russia and China, 

countries and non-state actors interested in acquiring counterspace capabilities will 

likely develop denial and deception techniques to defeat space-based imagery collection, conduct electronic warfare or signal jamming, and conduct physical attacks on 

ground-based space assets. 

China’s space and counterspace capabilities have significant implications for U.S. 

space-based communications, ISR operations. China operates communications, ISR, 

navigation and Earth resource systems with military applications and will continue 

to deploy more advanced satellites through the next decade. In addition to its direct 

ascent ASAT program successfully tested in January 2007, China is developing 

jammers and kinetic and directed-energy weapons for ASAT missions. By adapting 

technologies from its manned and lunar space programs, China is improving its 

ability to track and identify satellites—a prerequisite for anti-satellite attacks. 

Russia is making progress modernizing its already formidable space and 

counterspace capabilities. Efforts are underway to improve Russian navigation, communications, ballistic missile launch detection, and intelligence-gathering satellites. 

Russia also is enhancing its extensive space surveillance and tracking systems, and 

maintains a number of systems, such as exoatmospheric antiballistic missiles and 

satellite-tracking laser range-finding systems, with inherent counterspace applications, and continues to research or expand directed-energy and signal jamming capabilities that could target satellites. 

Advanced and Improvised Weapons 

Improvised weapons and advanced weapons such as IEDs, long-range rockets, and 

highly accurate guided missiles give non-state actors the capability to inflict losses 

against technologically superior opponents at a relatively low cost and with little 

training. The use of these weapons can produce operational and strategic-level effects beyond the battlefield when used to their maximum effect at the tactical level 

and publicized through the media or internet. This exposure provides terrorist and 

insurgent groups with a magnified politico-military potential that exceeds their historical norm. 

For example, Hizballah inflicted significant Israeli casualties and challenged 

Israeli ground operations and plans while using scores of advanced anti-tank guided 

missiles against Israeli ground forces during the summer 2006 Lebanon conflict. 

Hizballah also heavily damaged an Israeli warship with an anti-ship cruise missile, 

a military capability once limited to nation-states that Hizballah was not known to 

possess prior to the conflict. 

Advanced shoulder-launched anti-tank missiles and manportable air defense systems are increasingly available to non-state actors through uncontrolled exports, falsified end-user statements, gray market transfers, ransacked armories and/or direct 

supply from sympathetic regimes. Of concern, these weapons are easy to conceal, 

transport, and use; therefore, are ideal terrorist weapons. These weapons can be 

used singly or in combination with other asymmetric warfare tactics against highvalue and lightly-defended targets such as distinguished personnel, critical infrastructure, and civil transportation. 

The threat posed by IEDs is significant. The September 2008 attack on the U.S. 

Embassy in Yemen combined small arms fire with multiple suicide bombers and suicide vehicle-borne IEDs. The IED threat is a function of the relatively low technological barrier for constructing them, the relative ease in acquiring or manufacturing the explosives, and the growing number of readily available training manuals 

62 

that demonstrate how to build and effectively deploy them. Terrorist and insurgent 

groups regularly modify their tactics, techniques, and procedures in an attempt to 

mitigate counter-IED efforts as well as to avoid previous operational mistakes. 

Terrorist and insurgent groups no longer are limited to using stolen commercial 

explosives or military ordnance for building IEDs. Many groups are using homemade explosives that are manufactured from commercially available chemicals. Several terrorist groups are capable of producing homemade explosive mixtures that 

equal or exceed the power of military-grade explosives. 

CONCLUSION

While combat operations and operations against transnational terrorists continue, 

other potential threats endure and evolve. Today’s focus against the terrorist threat 

does not preclude the potential for conflict among major nation-states which could 

intersect vital U.S. interests. In response, defense intelligence must remain able to 

provide timely and actionable intelligence across the entire threat spectrum to policymakers and military decision-makers so they can maximize our Nation’s opportunities while minimizing risks. 

In close cooperation with the broader IC, DIA continues to implement important 

structural and procedural reforms to strengthen analysis and collection while also 

expanding information sharing across intelligence disciplines, agencies and with our 

closest allies. 

During this critical period of conflict and change, your continuing support is vital. 

On behalf of the men and women of DIA and across the defense intelligence enterprise, thank you for your continuing confidence. 

Our people take great pride in their work. They understand it is an honor and 

a unique responsibility to conduct such sensitive work on behalf of the American 

people. It is a privilege for me to serve with them and to have this opportunity to 

represent their work to you today. 

Thank you. I would be pleased to answer your questions at this time. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General. Again, thank you 

for your great service to this country. This will be your last visit 

to us, but we will long remember that service. We very much appreciate it. 

General MAPLES. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let’s try an 8-minute first round. 

There has been some confusion and I think some apparent inconsistencies in our assessment of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities and their intent. It’s my understanding that uranium for civil 

nuclear power production has to be enriched from 2 to 4 percent, 

but that highly enriched uranium (HEU) which is necessary for a 

nuclear bomb or warhead needs to be enriched to about 90 percent. 

Let me ask you first, Director: Does the IC believe that as of this 

time Iran has any HEU? 

Director BLAIR. We assess now that Iran does not have any HEU. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, on March—is your mike on, by the way? 

Director BLAIR. It is now. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thanks. 

On March 1, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, 

was asked if Iran has enough fissile material to make a bomb and 

he said: ‘‘We think they do.’’ Now, that seems to be different from 

what you just said the IC thinks, which is that you believe they 

do not. Have you talked to Admiral Mullen or what is the explanation for that apparent difference? 

Director BLAIR. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Mullen later issued a 

clarification that he was referring to LEU, not HEU. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, does the IC assess that Iran currently 

has made the decision to produce HEU for a warhead or a bomb? 

Director BLAIR. We assess that Iran has not yet made that decision. 

63 

Chairman LEVIN. In 2007, the NIE on Iran said that ‘‘The IC 

judges with high confidence that in the fall of 2003 Tehran halted 

its nuclear weapons program.’’ Is the position of the IC the same 

as it was back in October 2007? Has that changed? 

Director BLAIR. Mr. Chairman, the nuclear weapons program is 

one of the three components required for a deliverable system, including a delivery system and the uranium. But as for the nuclear 

weapons program, the current position of the IC is the same, that 

Iran has stopped its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities in 2003 and has not started them again, at least as of mid2007. 

Chairman LEVIN. In 2007 that NIE said the following: ‘‘That we 

judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date that 

Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a 

weapon is late 2009, but that is very unlikely.’’ 

Now, if your position is the same as it was in 2007, does the 2009 

now become 2011? 

Director BLAIR. Our current estimate is that the minimum time 

at which Iran could technically produce the amount of HEU for a 

single weapon is 2010 to 2015. There are differences among the IC; 

2010 to 2015 brackets that uncertainty. 

Chairman LEVIN. Relative to the Russian view of Iran, you indicated that Iran’s neighbors are threatened or would be threatened 

by a nuclear-armed Iran. Russia is one of those neighbors. Is it the 

assessment of the IC that Russia would be concerned by a nucleararmed Iran? 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir, Russia would be concerned. It has a 

number of other interests with Iran that are also at play, but it 

would be concerned about a nuclear-armed Iran. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you have an assessment as to whether or 

not Russia has an interest in cooperating with us on missile defense? 

Director BLAIR. Russia has an interest in cooperating with missile defense, we assess, Mr. Chairman. But they also have an incentive to limit that cooperation on nuclear defense. So I believe it 

will be a—— 

Chairman LEVIN. On missile defense or—I’m sorry? 

Director BLAIR. Is that what you asked about, sir? 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. 

Director BLAIR. Missile defense? 

Chairman LEVIN. You said ‘‘nuclear defense.’’ 

Director BLAIR. I’m sorry. Missile defense. They have some positive incentives to cooperate with us. They have some ways they’d 

like to limit our missile defenses and their cooperation. So it would 

be a complex negotiation, but I think it’s one worth exploring. 

Chairman LEVIN. General, here’s a question for you. I think you 

both have indicated that the greatest threat to Afghanistan’s security comes from the Afghan Taliban and other militant forces that 

reside in sanctuaries on the Pakistan side of the border, from 

which they are free to command operations against coalition forces. 

First of all, would you agree with our commander’s assessment that 

the AFA is motivated, capable of fighting, and generally respected 

by the Afghans? 

64 

General MAPLES. Sir, I would agree with that. In fact, they’re one 

of the most respected institutions in Afghanistan. 

Chairman LEVIN. Could the Afghan Army be effective in countering the threat of cross-border incursions from Pakistan? 

General MAPLES. Yes, sir, they could. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can you tell us what the reasoning is why that 

army is not yet more focused on the border to stop those incursions, given that it’s the greatest threat to Afghanistan—excuse 

me—yes, to Afghanistan, and given the apparent situation that the 

border police are not an effective force? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I believe there are a couple of factors that 

are involved in that. The first is the operational priority that is 

given to security in the populated areas of Afghanistan and the fact 

that the ANP are not at the point where they can provide the kind 

of security in the cities that is needed. So I think the prioritization 

of the effort is a part of that decision. 

I think the second part of it is simply the number of trained AFA 

troops that are in place. I think eventually we will reach that point 

where an operational decision will be made to employ the AFA in 

a different way. 

Chairman LEVIN. How soon can we reach that point of making 

that decision? 

General MAPLES. I know the decision has been made to expand 

the size of the AFA to 134,000 and that a great effort is going to 

be put into that to expedite it. I don’t know the timeframe that the 

134,000 will be reached. 

Chairman LEVIN. I guess this would be for you, Director, or either one actually could answer this. Is it the IC’s assessment that 

the Afghan Taliban council, or Shura, operates openly in Quetta, 

Pakistan, without interference from the government? If so, why has 

the government or population so far failed to take action to eliminate the activities and the safe haven enjoyed by that Quetta 

Shura? 

Director, let me start with you. I think either one of you might 

want to comment on that. 

Director BLAIR. It’s true that the Taliban governing bodies operate quite freely in Pakistan. The Pakistan approach to handling 

that threat is a combination of lack of capability, their overall approach in which they believe that there needs to be compromise 

and cooperation with some groups in that area, and their assessment of the threat of that group to Pakistan as opposed to Afghanistan. 

Chairman LEVIN. General, do you have any answer to the question, why Pakistan has not taken action against a terrorist group 

that’s operating openly in Quetta? 

General MAPLES. Sir, the Quetta Shura is operating openly in 

Quetta. I believe it is more in relation to the effect on the Pakistani 

population, in particular the Pashtun population in Pakistan, that 

causes the Pakistani government to move at a slower pace, and 

they have not taken action against that Quetta Shura. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

65 

I thank the witnesses. Director Blair, on March 9, a Washington 

Post report says that the United States probably will not pull any 

more forces from Iraq this year beyond those announced over the 

weekend, the number two U.S. general in Iraq said Monday. About 

12,000 U.S. soldiers will leave Iraq by September. ‘‘What we have 

right now is what we plan on having for the foreseeable future,’’ 

General Austin said. 

Is that accurate? 

Director BLAIR. I don’t have additional information on that, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Surely you were consulted as to whether that’s 

a fact or not? 

Director BLAIR. The announcement of, the President’s announcement set a level of 10 to 12 brigades that were remaining, and I 

have not been in discussions on whether that will be 10 or 12 and 

just what the drawdown plans are in the future. I’m sure that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) has—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, please get briefed up and tell us. It’s kind 

of an important item as to what our troop levels will be for the rest 

of this year. I don’t think it’s a minor item. 

Director BLAIR. No, sir. It’s a very important item. 

It’s just not in my area of responsibility. It’s the Secretary of Defense—— 

Senator MCCAIN. You are the DNI. 

Director BLAIR. I am. 

Senator MCCAIN. So you would be informed as to our troop levels 

in Iraq and our plans for troop levels in Iraq? 

Director BLAIR. I’m asked to assess the effects of different troop 

levels on the level of security in Iraq. 

Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, please get back to me, would 

you please, on that issue? 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. I’d be very interested. I think most Americans 

are interested in troop levels in Iraq as well. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Senator MCCAIN. Last month Iran successfully launched its first 

satellite into orbit and President Ahmadinejad proclaimed in a televised speech ‘‘The official presence of the Islamic Republic was registered in space.’’ Last Sunday, Iran tested a precision air-to-surface missile with a 70-mile range. Does that lead one to the conclusion that it’s very likely that Iran will be developing a nuclear 

weapon to go along with the development of delivery vehicles? 

Director BLAIR. I don’t think those missile developments, Senator 

McCain, prejudice the nuclear weapons decision one way or the 

other. I believe those are separate decisions. The same missiles can 

launch vehicles into space, they can launch warheads, either conventional or nuclear, onto land targets, and Iran is pursuing those 

for those multiple purposes. Whether they develop a nuclear weapon which could then be put in that warhead I believe is a separate 

decision which Iran has not made yet. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Maples, do you have an opinion on 

that? 

66 

General MAPLES. Sir, I would agree that the development of the 

nuclear weapon tied to the missile launch and testing are not necessarily related. I would say, though, that the Safir launch does advance their knowledge and their ability to develop an ICBM. The 

second test that you mentioned most likely, that was in the press, 

most likely an air-to-ship missile that was being tested. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Maples, do you believe that it is Iran’s 

intention to develop nuclear weapons? 

General MAPLES. I believe they are holding open that option, sir. 

I don’t believe they’ve yet made that decision. 

Senator MCCAIN. You don’t believe that they have made the decision as to whether to develop nuclear weapons or not? 

General MAPLES. No, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Could I turn to Pakistan—Afghanistan with 

you for a moment. Maybe you can clear up a little confusion. 

What’s the difference between and the commonality between 

Taliban activity and al Qaeda activity in Afghanistan? 

General MAPLES. Sir, there is al Qaeda activity in Afghanistan. 

Generally al Qaeda from a central standpoint has recruits that 

come into their training camps in Pakistan. Often they will introduce al Qaeda individuals to provide supportive activity in Afghanistan, but not directly linked to al Qaeda activity. 

There is a direct link between al Qaeda, the Quetta Shura, the 

Haqqani, and the Miramshah Shura in particular with al Qaeda in 

Pakistan. So there is an exchange of information, of training, of expertise, and a sharing of capabilities in producing trained individuals that later conduct attacks in Afghanistan. 

Senator MCCAIN. So are they working more closely together? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I believe they are working closely together 

and I believe al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan is more significant, although still at a relatively minor scale, than we have seen 

in the past. 

Senator MCCAIN. What kind of activity are you seeing on the 

part of the Iranians in Afghanistan? 

General MAPLES. Sir, the Iranians’ primary activity is in the 

western part of Afghanistan. There’s a great deal of economic investment that is pretty open in the western part, around Herat and 

elsewhere in Afghanistan. We have seen shipments of munitions 

that have been intercepted coming from Iran into Afghanistan that 

have contained small arms, some explosive devices coming in. However, that has been very limited in nature. I believe that Iran is 

keeping open their options in Afghanistan. They don’t want to see 

a Taliban-dominated Afghanistan, but they do want to have a presence and ensure that their interests are represented. 

We are seeing some increased activity between Iran and the 

Haqqani network that we have not seen in the past. So they’re 

there, they’re present, and they’re trying to influence the future. 

Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, is it a true statement to say 

that in Afghanistan, since we are not winning, the nature of warfare and counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is that we are 

losing? 

Director BLAIR. I think it’s important to look at the degree of government control over the various parts of the country as a really 

67 

key indicator towards that question, and the amount of government 

control has been decreasing over the past year, so it’s a bad trend. 

Senator MCCAIN. So we really do not have control over the southern part of the country of Afghanistan? 

Director BLAIR. The reason for the deployment of the two brigades that the President announced a short time ago was in order 

to precisely stabilize that part of the country where the trends 

were the most negative and the stakes were the highest, with an 

eye towards the elections that are going to be taking place in August. So the trends were negative and the deployment was designed to stabilize the situation. 

Senator MCCAIN. You and the administration are in the process 

of developing an overall strategy for Afghanistan? 

Director BLAIR. For Afghanistan and Pakistan, yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. I know it’s a difficult process you’re going 

through. Do you have any idea as to when we would probably get 

an indication what that strategy is? 

Director BLAIR. I can only say, Senator McCain, that the President is more impatient than you are. 

Senator MCCAIN. I just would like to say that I believe that a 

minimalist approach may be the most attractive one. I also think 

it may be the most dangerous one. I think we proved in Iraq that 

not only do you need a change in strategy, but you need a robust 

military capability to first secure areas before you make progress 

in the other aspects of counterinsurgency. 

I hope that we will not view this as simply an exercise in 

counterterrorism, because it is a counterinsurgency. Many argue 

that it’s the most difficult situation we’ve ever faced. I don’t think 

it’s as difficult as we faced in Iraq at its worst point before the 

surge. The government was on the verge of collapse. The casualties 

were incredibly higher than they are today. So I think that it 

would be a mistake to take a minimalist approach without a strategy designed along the lines of those strategies that have succeeded 

in other parts of the world, and we should pay attention to those 

that have succeeded and not repeat the mistakes of those that 

failed. 

I certainly look forward to working with you and to developing 

a strategy that will succeed. But I think also the American people 

need to be told that this is going to be a very difficult process, at 

least in the short term, and we should be prepared for a very difficult time, at least for a period of time in the near future. 

Do you have any response to that, Director? 

Director BLAIR. I couldn’t have outlined it better myself, Senator. 

I think what we’re involved with now is trying to think through not 

just the initial phase, but, as the President clearly said, the brigade 

deployments were an interim stabilizing action pending the development of the long-term strategy, and that long-term strategy has 

to look all the way out to an extended period of time in order to 

achieve success and victory. That kind of thinking is going on now, 

and I think you captured many of the important elements of it, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Director. 

Again, General, thank you for your outstanding service to the 

country. We’re very proud of you. 

General MAPLES. Thank you, sir. 

68 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Director Blair. Thanks, General Maples. You’ve been 

really a straight shooter all the way for us and we value your service and really respect your credibility a great deal. 

Director Blair, at the beginning of your testimony here today you 

said something that I think a lot of people will find surprising, but 

I think we all ought to take it seriously: ‘‘The primary near-term 

security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis 

and its geopolitical implications.’’ 

A little further down you say: ‘‘Of course, all of us recall the dramatic political consequences wrought by the economic turmoil of 

the 1920s and 1930s in Europe, the instability and high levels of 

violent extremism.’’ 

Down a little bit further you say: ‘‘Europe and the former Soviet 

Union have experienced the bulk of the anti-state demonstrations.’’ 

I would add, so far. 

Those are serious words and we ought to take them seriously. I 

wanted to ask you if you would go from them to what some of your 

specific concerns are. In other words, are there particular regions 

of the world, for instance some of the newly independent nations 

of the former Soviet Union, where you fear that the global economic recession could cause instability, perhaps violent extremism, 

or in that case a reassertion of Russian dominance over some of 

those countries? 

Director BLAIR. Senator, I think there are at least three important categories of effects of this global recession that will become 

more dire if it continues. The first are those countries that are just 

holding on, barely providing economic goods to their people, and 

they’re quite vulnerable to economic uncertainties undermining the 

thin progress they have made recently, with all of the bad consequences that can come out of that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Give us a couple of examples of that? 

Director BLAIR. I’d rather save it for closed session, Senator, if 

I could. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Are they centered in one part of the world? 

Director BLAIR. They’re generally in that arc from the eastern 

Mediterranean across to Southeast Asia, in that area. 

The second category I think are the ones that you referred to in 

your question, are the countries which have fairly recently emerged 

from authoritarian governments. The former Warsaw Pact now 

have uneven levels of government in commitment to representative 

government, and they’re under heavy strain from the Baltics all 

the way down to the Black Sea. As mentioned in testimony and as 

you’ve seen, there have been riots there. Governments have actually fallen in the Baltics. Countries with IMF loans like Ukraine 

are scrambling to maintain the conditions that gave them those. 

With the fairly recent democracies in those, one is worried about 

the fallout in terms of political gains and extremist groups who 

promise simple solutions of the type we’ve seen in the past. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. From an intelligence perspective, based particularly on what I would at least call some of the economic aggressiveness or even bullying of the Russian government, do we have 

69 

concerns that this economic vulnerability in some of the newly 

independent nations of Central and Eastern Europe might provide 

a further opportunity for the Russian Government to extend its influence, this time economically? 

Director BLAIR. Absolutely. It’s quite clear that the Russians 

have used oil and gas deliveries in the past for that purpose. It’s 

quite clear that they believe that they would like greater control 

of what they call ‘‘the Near Abroad.’’ 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Director BLAIR. This is an opportunity. So yes, sir, that’s definitely a concern there. 

Then the third category are our traditional strong partners 

around the world who are under strain. None of us have any fear 

that there will be catastrophic consequences in those countries. Democracies change governments and we’ve seen that in places like 

Iceland most recently. But the economic times make it difficult in 

countries from Japan to the U.K. to expend resources on overseas 

development aid. We saw that when the European nations met just 

10 days ago, that they were reluctant to help the Eastern European 

and Central European countries right away. They held back there. 

Japan is somewhat constrained in what it can do. 

So in both economic assistance and certainly in helping with deployed military power, we’re soon going to be testing that in the 

NATO summit concerning Afghanistan. When your budget is under 

pressure, it makes it even more difficult to pony up to deployable 

supportable forces overseas. 

So I’d say those three categories are what we’re looking at. But 

what concerns us is we’re not sure if the feet have touched the bottom of the swimming pool yet. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Correct. 

Director BLAIR. That makes it a more difficult pattern. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree. I appreciate the answer. I share 

your concerns. I think from a geopolitical, geostrategic point of 

view, unfortunately we may have to start thinking about threats to 

our security and to stability in different critical regions of the 

world which we may have to take action in as a result of the instability caused by the economic recession. 

I’m going to leave that there. I’m going to go to a different kind 

of question, Director. There’s been a lot of controversy about your 

selection of Ambassador Charles Freeman to be the Chairman of 

the National Intelligence Council. Seven of our colleagues on the 

Senate Select Intelligence Committee (SSCI) wrote yesterday expressing their concern. I’m concerned. 

The concern is based, to state it briefly, on two points. One I 

think is a question about some previous business associations that 

the ambassador has had that may raise questions about his independence of analysis. The second are statements that he’s made 

that appear either to be inclined to lean against Israel or too much 

in favor of China. In fact, I gather yesterday or in the last few days 

some of the leaders of the 1989 protests that led to the Chinese 

government’s massacre at Tiananmen Square wrote President 

Obama to convey ‘‘our intense dismay at your selection of Mr. Freeman.’’ 

70 

So I wanted to ask you for the public record this morning, were 

you aware of these comments and associations by Ambassador 

Freeman before you chose him for this position? The concern here 

is that it suggests that he’s more an advocate than an analyst, 

which is what we want in that position. Second, what are you 

doing about the concerns that have been expressed by people about 

the selection? 

Director BLAIR. Let me just make a couple of points about my selection of Ambassador Freeman. First, as far as the effects of business associations and the ethics rules, Ambassador Freeman is 

going through the vetting that is done with anybody joining the executive branch in terms of financial and past associations. In addition, because of a letter from some Members of Congress, the Inspector General is taking a closer look at those associations than 

is normally done with a Federal employee. So that’s one piece of 

it. 

As far as the statements of Ambassador Freeman that have appeared in the press, I would say that those have all been out of 

context and I urge everyone to look at the full context of what he 

was saying. 

Two other things, though. A mutual friend said about Ambassador Freeman, who I’ve known for a number of years: There is no 

one whose intellect I respect more and with whom I agree less than 

Ambassador Freeman. Those of us who know him find him to be 

a person of strong views, of an inventive mind from the analytical 

point of view. I’m not talking about policy. When we go back and 

forth with him, a better understanding comes out of those interactions, and that’s primarily the value that I think he will bring. 

On the effect that he might have on policy, I think that some 

misunderstand the role of the development of analysis which supports policy. Number one, neither I nor anyone who works for me 

makes policy. Our job is to inform it. We’ve found over time that 

the best way to inform policy is to have strong views held within 

the IC and then out of those we come out with the best ideas. Ambassador Freeman, with his long experience, his inventive mind, 

will add to that strongly. 

So that is the view that I had when I asked him to serve and 

that’s how I feel about it. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate your answer. My time is up, 

but I will say this. Obviously, the IC is not a policymaker; you’re 

analysts and providers of intelligence information. 

The concern about Ambassador Freeman is that he has such 

strong policy views, and those are not only his right, but his responsibility to express, that this position may not be the best for 

him because he will have to separate his policy views from the 

analysis. 

I just want to say to you, I don’t have a particular course to recommend, but having been around Congress for a while my own 

sense is that this controversy is not going to go away until you or 

Ambassador Freeman find a way to resolve it. I’ll go back and look 

at the statements that are on the record. I’ve read some at length 

and they are very decisive even in the context. So whether I disagree or agree with him, he’s very opinionated, and it’s a question 

of whether—I suppose in the end—and my time is up; I have to 

71 

end—that this puts a greater burden on you to filter out opinions 

from analysis to make sure that you’re giving the President and 

the other leaders of our country unfiltered intelligence information, 

not biased by previous policy points of view. 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir; I think I can do a better job if I’m getting strong analytical viewpoints to sort out and pass on to you and 

to the President than if I’m getting pre-cooked pablum judgments 

that don’t really challenge. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. I guess I would say, to be continued. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first make the comment about General Maples. Of course, 

I’ve felt closer to you than an awful lot of the rest of them because 

of your service at Fort Sill, and you are still talked about at Fort 

Sill and as soon as you retire you’ll become a legend. I suppose that 

happens. But it’s been great working with you and I appreciate all 

that you have done. 

My questions are going to be around the continent of Africa. But 

before doing that, let me just ask you, probably you, Director Blair. 

I have often felt for quite some time that our assessment of North 

Korea has not been quite as strong as I think it should be. I recall 

back from this meeting right here, from this committee, in August, 

it was August 24, 1998, we were talking about what their capability was in terms of their nuclear capability and their delivery 

systems. 

At that time I asked the question, or we asked the question as 

a committee, of the administration at that time, how long it would 

be before North Korea had a multi-stage capability. The answer 

was at that time—I think it might have been a NIE or it may have 

just been a letter from the administration—somewhere between 8 

and 10 years. Seven days later on August 31, 1998, they fired one. 

Do you think that our assessment of their capability and their 

threat is accurate today? 

Director BLAIR. Senator Inhofe, I think we’ve learned since those 

days—and I was in an Active-Duty role having to do with the Pacific at that time, so I’m familiar with the issues you raise. I think 

that we have learned that North Korea is willing to field and deploy with less testing than almost any other country in the world 

would think is required. So I think that our estimates at that time 

probably gave the Koreans—or thought that the Koreans would go 

through more of these steps required to verify the weapons than 

in fact has proved the case. So our timelines are much shorter now. 

Senator INHOFE. I was one who had very strong feelings about 

AFRICOM. To me, as significant as the continent is, it didn’t make 

any sense to have it in three different commands. I think it’s working quite well. General Wald did a great job, and General Ward 

now is doing a tremendous job. 

But things are happening there that we don’t talk about as much 

as we do as some of the other areas of threat. I have been concerned about it for some time, and I wonder if you feel that adequate resources are—first of all, it seems to me it would make a 

lot more sense if we had had the command actually located in AfriVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
72 

ca somewhere. I know the problems that are out there right now. 

Most of the presidents would say, yes, we would prefer that; we 

can’t sell that to our people, though. 

Do you think that they have adequate resources now to take care 

of the real serious problems in terms of transportation and other 

resources in that command? 

Director BLAIR. Senator, I am pretty familiar with the establishment of AFRICOM and the desire to make it an integrated, not 

only militarily, but also military-diplomatic construct. I think the 

problem was that the Africans, with their history of colonialism 

and so on, did not see it the same way and frankly to this day do 

not see AFRICOM, which I think was very smart for all the reasons that you state—many African countries are looking for a hidden agenda there in terms of growing American military power. I 

think that is the biggest problem that we have. 

We started out behind the eight ball as we did. We have to sort 

of win it back an engagement at a time. 

Senator INHOFE. Don’t you think the successes in the Economic 

Community of West African States are somewhat indicative that 

parts of certainly West Africa are coming around? My experience 

is when you talk to the presidents of any of these countries they 

all agree that it would have been better that way, but, as you point 

out, the threat of colonialism and all that was an obstacle. 

Now, getting to some specific areas, you mentioned in your written statement about Zimbabwe, Mugabe, and some of the problems 

that are down there. When you go there and you remember that 

Zimbabwe was the breadbasket of sub-Saharan Africa for so many 

years, and how this guy has just brought it down to nothing—do 

you feel that, because of the economic problems and the political 

problems that are there—and everybody recognizes it. I talked to 

President Kikwete of Tanzania back when he was the head of the 

African Union. They all understand that that’s a problem. 

But it seems like there is a fear there to get in there and correct 

the problem. Part of that is the relationship, I guess, with South 

Africa that Zimbabwe has. What obstacles do you think we can 

overcome, will be trying to overcome? My feeling is that in 

Zimbabwe, as bad as their condition is right now, that that’s a 

magnet for terrorist activity. What is your thought? 

Director BLAIR. Senator, I think the larger magnet right now is 

Somalia rather than Zimbabwe. In Somalia, the governance and 

law and order problems are even worse than they are in Zimbabwe. 

There’s also terrorist activity up in the Maghreb with al Qaeda in 

Maghreb group. So it’s really those two areas that we’re more worried about from a terrorist point of view than we are—— 

Senator INHOFE. I’m really thinking about in the future, though. 

I know right now that that’s not the problem. I know Somalia is 

a problem. 

Let’s move to Somalia, then. In your statement you talk a little 

bit about Ethiopia and the fact that they’ve withdrawn. As I recall, 

when they first went down there and they were on our side, very 

helpful at that time and joining forces with us, that it was really 

there for a limited period of time. They had limited capabilities and 

they said that, we’re going to go down, we’re going to help, but we 

73 

won’t be able to stay for a long period of time. Now, maybe my 

memory doesn’t serve me correctly, but that’s what I recall. 

The reason I bring this up is that there is a movement in both 

the House and the Senate that is somewhat punitive in nature in 

terms of Ethiopia, Prime Minister Meles, and others. Most of it’s 

around social programs. Would you evaluate just the willingness of 

the Ethiopians to help us? Do you consider them to be a real ally? 

Director BLAIR. I think in their action in Somalia, Senator, the 

important thing was that the Somalis didn’t consider it, or a large 

portion of Somalis, didn’t consider it to be helpful. They attacked 

the Ethiopians, including some Somali Americans who went back 

and became suicide bombers against Ethiopia. So whatever Ethiopia’s own mixture of motives in actually making that intervention, 

it was not supported by important groups within Somalia. 

Senator INHOFE. A lot of that was because of Eritrea and their 

problems, too. 

One last thing I’d like to observe in Africa is the problem of 

China. As you go through Africa and particularly in the oil states, 

Nigeria and the rest of them, anything that is new and shiny was 

given to them by China everywhere you go there. I know a lot of 

that is their quest for energy, for oil, and they’ve made their deals. 

But also, China has not been our friend in Somalia, or in Sudan 

and some of the other areas. I would just hope that our IC could 

be watching very carefully the activities of China on the continent 

of Africa. 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir. We are doing so and we will continue 

to do so. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Bayh. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Chairman Levin. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country. 

Director, I was struck by your opening comments. I’ve been on 

this committee, been privileged to be here for many years, and I 

served on SSCI even longer, and I quite frankly can’t recall a presentation from someone in your position that began with words like 

‘‘trade,’’ ‘‘GDP growth,’’ or ‘‘IMF reports.’’ Then after a discussion 

of the global economic situation, you used the phrase ‘‘turning to 

terrorism.’’ 

I think that showed very clearly how economic and financial matters are inextricably related to national security matters. The same 

could be said for our energy dependency, our growing fiscal dependency and growing debt to other countries. I hope this is not just a 

manifestation of the current economic crisis we face, but represents 

an integration of our thinking about all aspects of national security. So I commend you for that perspective and hope you will continue to share with us on this committee when you’re before us. I 

thought it was rather striking. 

You’ve been asked about North Korea a couple of times. The reports about the upcoming launch that they say is ostensibly for satellite delivery, there have also been indications that that may tell 

us something about their capability of reaching Alaska, for example, with a missile. What do you expect? 

74 

Director BLAIR. If it is a space launch vehicle that North Korea 

launches, the technology is indistinguishable from an ICBM. If a 

three-stage space launch vehicle works, then that could reach not 

only Alaska and Hawaii, but also part of the west coast of the 

United States, what the Hawaiians call the mainland and what the 

Alaskans call the Lower 48. 

Senator BAYH. Are you expecting that that’s what they’ll test? 

Director BLAIR. I tend to believe that the North Koreans announced that they were going to do a space launch and I believe 

that that’s what they intend. I could be wrong, but that would be 

my estimate. 

Senator BAYH. It could affect the priority we place on missile defenses against such a threat. 

I’d like to ask you about Iran, something that Senator Lieberman 

and I have focused on together, and that is, as you well described, 

the clock is ticking with regard to their nuclear capabilities. When 

you look back at the past history of these things, whether it’s India 

or Pakistan or other situations, you have to say that perhaps the 

clock will chime sooner rather than later. 

One of the few leverage points we have on them is their vulnerability to imports into Iran of refined petroleum products. I would 

appreciate your assessment about that vulnerability and if we had 

a serious and sustained effort to try and impact that, what, if any, 

impact that could have on their decisionmaking? 

Director BLAIR. Senator Bayh, beyond the sort of general discussion of a mixture of pressures and attention to Iran, I’d rather wait 

for a closed session if we could talk about individual things, sir. 

Senator BAYH. Okay. The reason for my asking—that’s fine, Director. The reason for my asking is that time may be of the essence 

here and so we need to think about what matters might actually 

impact their calculus, and this seems to be one of the ones at our 

disposal and something we perhaps should get serious about sooner 

rather than later. 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir. I agree, it’s one of them I’d just rather 

discuss in a closed session. 

Senator BAYH. That’s fine. 

Also focused on Iran, Senator McCain mentioned the recent test, 

I think it was the 70-mile missile. What is the status, if you can 

tell us—perhaps this has to wait for the closed session as well. But 

there have been published reports about Russia’s intention to deliver even more advanced systems, General, than the one you mentioned that they have deployed around Tehran. Can you give us 

any update on the Russians, they signed the contract, but they 

haven’t delivered them. Can you give us any update? Obviously, if 

they were to receive even more advanced air defense systems that 

would complicate the situation and might give us some insight into 

the willingness of the Russians to truly cooperate with us in trying 

to resolve this effort. 

General MAPLES. Sir, I can give you a specific in the closed session where we think they are. But we believe that Iran still desires 

to obtain the SA–20s. 

Senator BAYH. Let me ask you about this. Maybe you can answer 

this in open session. If they were to deliver such a weapons system, 

would that give either of you any insight into how cooperative the 

75 

Russians are really willing to be with us in trying to contain this 

threat? 

General MAPLES. Yes, sir, I believe it would. 

Senator BAYH. That insight would be that perhaps they are not 

as willing to be as cooperative as some might like to think? 

Director BLAIR. I would tend to say, Senator, that it’s going to 

be a bargain and that’s one of the chips, and it’s hard to say which 

chip will be more powerful than the other. 

General MAPLES. I think also that, with respect to Russia and 

their defense industry, Russia is spending an awful lot of time trying to market their products around the world in order to keep 

their production lines open. That’s a very important factor to Russia right now. 

Senator BAYH. They do have commercial interests there. 

With regard to Pakistan, Director—thank you, General. Back to 

you. Can you give us—is it still your assessment that the most likely threat to our Homeland would emanate from the FATAs there 

in Pakistan? We’d heard that previously from your predecessor? 

Director BLAIR. I would say that the planning for such a mission 

would most likely emanate from al Qaeda, the leadership of which 

is there. Which foot soldiers they would use to actually make the 

delivery I think might widen the area. 

Senator BAYH. But the central nervous system for the planning 

would emanate from that place? 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir. 

Senator BAYH. Or perhaps Quetta, which we previously discussed. 

Well, with that in mind and with the current political turmoil in 

Pakistan being all too apparent, how would you assess their capabilities for actually exerting some control in those areas? Are their 

capabilities improving? Are they static? Are they declining because 

of the political instability? How would you assess that? 

Director BLAIR. Let me start. General Maples has also been 

studying it closely. 

You see in the Pakistani approach to these different areas along 

their northwest and southern border different approaches. Sometimes it’s troops going in to pacify areas. Other times it’s deals 

being cut, as was true recently in the Swat Valley. Other times it’s 

neglect which they hope is benign. 

I think that when I talked with the Pakistani leadership they are 

not satisfied with the capability of their armed forces to conduct 

those sorts of operations. But I do sense that they feel that it would 

be some combination of military, economic, and bargaining that 

would achieve their goals towards the area. So I don’t see a big 

change in fundamental approach when I talk to them. 

General MAPLES. I believe that there is a change in view, particularly among the senior military leadership, of the importance of 

military engagement in that region, in the FATA and in the Northwest Provinces. I think we have seen an increase in capability 

somewhat in terms of the capabilities of the Frontier Corps. 

Most of Pakistan’s military capabilities, though, remain conventional. They are just starting on the path of developing counterinsurgency kinds of forces and it’s going to be quite some time before those forces are developed and able to make a difference in the 

76 

area. But I do think that there is a will, and I think there is a desire, to do the best they can with what they have. 

Senator BAYH. Let me ask you this, and I’ll try and word it in 

a way that perhaps you can be able to answer it, because there 

have been numerous published reports about this. But there seems 

to be some divergence in opinion between their leadership and ours 

about direct action against al Qaeda elements in the FATAs. They 

seem to think that if those kind of activities take place it destabilizes the situation more than it helps, and if those activities take 

place, some others think that it’s what we need to do to try and 

disrupt them operationally. 

Do you have an assessment about these published reports? 

Director BLAIR. I think they draw distinctions between groups 

and there are some that they believe have to be hit and that we 

should cooperate on hitting, and there are others that they think 

don’t constitute as much of a threat to them and that they think 

are best left alone. So when you discuss it with them, Senator 

Bayh, it’s really almost tribe by tribe, warlord by warlord. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you again, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Bayh. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just to follow up on that, Director Blair, that’s probably the 

way—whether we agree or not with Pakistan’s specific recommendations, tribe by tribe, area by area, is probably the only 

way we can deal in that tribal area that’s never been controlled by 

a central government before. Isn’t that right? 

Director BLAIR. No one I’ve talked to has come up with a grand 

strategy for that area that seems to me to be very realistic, yes, 

sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Gates here expressed a real commitment to making sure that we have an Afghan face on the difficulties in Afghanistan. Of course, when we add 15,000 troops I think 

that makes that a bit more difficult. What plans do we have to utilize our forces effectively or to bring along more rapidly the Afghan 

military and eventually to extract ourselves from that effort? Can 

you give me any thoughts on where you see we’re heading in that 

direction? 

Our ultimate goal, I think, is for a decent government to be in 

place, that stands on its own, and that presents no threat to the 

United States. 

Director BLAIR. Senator, I think you express the objectives that 

we all share quite clearly. From the American point of view, of 

course, that kind of an Afghanistan would be an Afghanistan that’s 

not a haven for al Qaeda and other groups who use it to come 

against the United States the way they did in 2001. 

I think the difficulties that the current review is wrestling with 

are how do you do that and what sort of resources and periods of 

time are needed to do that, although it is the responsibility of Afghanistan, they themselves say, and we feel that they need some 

help in order to get there. I think one thing that’s important is that 

the intelligence capabilities to support that help are also pretty important. I know those of you who have visited the region know that 

the commanders say that the intelligence support provided in Iraq 

77 

has been an absolute key to being able to make the sort of very 

precise, almost person by person kinds of operations that have been 

the key to success in separating a relatively small group of these 

violent extremists from the bulk of the population. 

If we are to be able to provide that sort of intelligence to support 

not only military operations, but also how do you support the political and the social programs that are going to be necessary to root 

out corruption, to get basic services to Afghanis, which will provide 

support for the government which is essential to reaching that 

goal? That’s going to be pretty detailed, pretty intense intelligence 

support. 

Senator SESSIONS. Are you suggesting that you believe we could 

do better in intelligence in Afghanistan—obviously, I’m sure we 

could anywhere—and that you need additional resources and any 

other structural changes to do a better job of obtaining intelligence? 

Director BLAIR. I think we have to increase our intelligence effort 

on Afghanistan, yes, sir. Some of that may involve a shift of resources from elsewhere. Some of it may require additional resources. I think it’s essential to—— 

Senator SESSIONS. On a cost effective basis, your analysis would 

be, and I think most commanders would believe, that good intelligence can reduce the need for manpower? 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir. If you have to catch them first and sort 

them out later, it’s a lot more expensive than sorting them out first 

and catching only the ones you need to. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Maples? 

General MAPLES. Senator, on the defense intelligence side we’re 

already accelerating additional intelligence personnel into the theater to provide analytic support to General McKiernan on the 

ground and establish a greater analytic presence, particularly in 

Kandahar in the southern part of the country. The ISR task force 

the Department has had in place is already moving on providing 

additional ISR capability to the theater to support General 

McKiernan as well. We have a very extensive dialogue going on on 

the structure, the intelligence structure that we’re going to have in 

place with the additional forces that are going into Afghanistan. 

It’s critically important for us that we have that intelligence because we’re into intelligence-driven operations. 

Senator SESSIONS. Would you express the tension that I think 

tends to exist between increasing troop levels and increasing the 

Iraqi face on the situation—an Afghan face? 

General MAPLES. Senator, there is a tension there simply by a 

larger presence of U.S. forces. But the intent to have a larger Afghan face is absolutely what we need to do and where we should 

be going. U.S. forces, as we have done elsewhere, can improve the 

security situation, just as the latest arrivals into country in the 

areas to the west and southwest of Kabul are already making a difference in terms of the security of that region. Of course, that’s a 

great line of communications and movement into the Kabul area. 

So if we can help in that regard and then free up ANA forces in 

order to do other things in the country and put them in the lead, 

it will help lead to success, I think. 

Senator SESSIONS. I once did a calculation on the cost of an Iraqi 

troop versus an American soldier and it was about 20 to 1. You 

78 

could field about 20 Iraqi soldiers for the cost of one American soldier in Iraq. I think we learned in al-Anbar that local people, motivated and supported, can have more effect than the American military in many instances. 

General MAPLES. To the point of your question to the Director, 

a part of what we have to do—and it is part of the planning process 

right now—is to increase the number of trainers that we have in 

country who are dedicated to increasing the capabilities of the Afghan National Army. 

Senator SESSIONS. I thank you for that. 

Director Blair, you indicated that the support in the Muslim 

world for terrorism appears to be declining, more hostility to that. 

Are there things that we can do to evidence a respect for the people 

in the Muslim world and that could help accelerate that? I don’t 

think we have an ability to direct them in any way, but are there 

actions that we could take that could help eliminate or reduce the 

support for terrorism? 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir, there are actions we could take. Partly 

it has to do with showing respect to the religion itself and distinguishing between the religion and those who misuse it. We have 

to keep in mind that this is something that Islam has to figure out 

for itself, and you don’t sit there on the outside and try to manipulate it, not only because you can’t, but also because that very action 

would probably be counterproductive in terms of the resentment of 

those looking at it. 

So on the overall scale that’s important. When we look at polling 

data and we talk to people, another factor is the Israeli-Palestinian 

confrontation, which gives support to those who take the more radical view, the insurgent view, versus the peaceful view in that context. 

So that’s sort of at the overall international level. 

Also at the local level, it’s extremely important, of course, that 

by a combination of intelligence and basic training and cultural 

awareness that we act in the right way on the local level in order 

to help the people who are trying to live normal lives and make 

sure that it’s clear that we’re only going against those who are trying to disrupt that. 

Senator SESSIONS. Hundreds of millions of Muslims go to the 

mosque and are faithful, loyal, decent citizens in their country, 

obey the law, don’t participate in terrorism, and we all ought to always remember that. 

Briefly, General Maples, very briefly, the status of the elections 

in Afghanistan, how serious of a dispute is that, whether they 

should be held or delayed some? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I think most everybody has reached the 

conclusion that the election should be held in August of this year. 

The real question for us now is what happens to President Karzai 

when his term of office ends in May, in that period of time between 

when his constitutional term in office ends and the elections are 

held. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

79 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

Senator Sessions was talking about the importance of intelligence, particularly as it relates to Afghanistan. I’m wondering, in 

Iraq when we were trying to determine how we were doing—we 

had people saying we’re losing, people saying we’re winning, looking at the same set of facts at the same point in time. Logically 

they couldn’t both be right. To move beyond the discussion about 

winning and losing in Iraq, we went to benchmarks to be able to 

establish a metric as to how we were progressing, to what degree, 

or not progressing on certain things in Iraq. I think we moved to 

a better dialogue about what was happening and not happening. 

I’ve suggested this before and I’ve written to the Secretaries of 

Defense and State suggesting that we establish benchmarks. But 

I wonder if actionable intelligence measuring our capabilities to see 

if we’re increasing our capabilities or whether we’re at a standstill 

in establishing actionable intelligence, I wonder if that wouldn’t be 

the kind of a benchmark that would help us to know what we’ve 

achieved and what remains to be achieved. 

I’ll ask either of you to respond. 

General MAPLES. Senator, let me just start on more of an operational level and the fulfillment of the intelligence requirements 

that were provided from the commander, because I think you’re exactly right. As we look at the intelligence requirements from the 

commanders, we develop our collection strategies. But we have to 

have a process at the end of that that is an assessment of how well 

are we doing, are we actually meeting the need or are we just producing information, and are we producing the right kinds of information that are enabling our commanders to make the right kinds 

of decisions and our forces on the ground to take the right kinds 

of action. 

So I think that process on the IC side is absolutely essential. 

We recently had a National Intelligence Board, and I’ll mention 

it for Director Blair, but I think he has already adopted the idea 

of intelligence metrics. That is, understanding what the objectives 

are we’re trying to achieve and then using the systems that we 

have and our own assessments to do periodic assessments and see 

how well we are doing and where we are, and to provide the necessary updates to commanders and to policymakers as well. I think 

it’s very important for us to do that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Director Blair? 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir. I think that the whole business of the 

role of intelligence and telling truth to power and all of that revolves around two processes within an administration. One is in 

the initial stages when the administration, like this one, is looking 

at policies to determine what it’s going to do going forward, we 

have to lay out the situation on the ground so it’s clearly understood what we’re dealing with. 

We’re often asked if-then questions. If the United States does 

this, then what will happen? We use different tools to do that. One 

that we’ve used quite well recently was sort of a tabletop seminar 

of playing out some possible policy options by the United States 

with members, knowledgeable members of the IC playing the roles 

of both adversaries and friends, and to try to see how this all 

shakes out. So that’s sort of the role we’re in now. 

80 

Then once a policy is set, then I think the job of intelligence is 

to tell in a clear-eyed fashion to the policymakers, how is it doing, 

how is it working? We’ve talked about Iraq. Iraq was based on a 

set of intelligence assumptions about things going generally in a secure direction if things happened on the Iraqi side and on the coalition, the American side, and some possible dangers that might trip 

us up if they developed in a certain way. 

So our responsibility is to look at that, and we have a formal 

process of reporting periodically were the judgments we made correct, are the things that we predicted to happen happening, or have 

things happened—and were supposed to be an early warning indicator and certainly a current warning indicator of whether things 

are working out as they were anticipated. I think that’s the big role 

at the policy level. 

Then of course down at the—once you put diplomats, troops, the 

Central Intelligence Agency agents, and aid workers into the field, 

then we need to provide the information that they need to get their 

job done. Your feedback on that one is pretty quick. You have a dissatisfied customer who’s saying, I went out to this area, you told 

me this was going to happen, and something else happened. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That would be the case with basic services. 

For example, if your objective is to establish basic services, you 

could measure to what extent that is accomplished and how much 

more you have to do. The same thing I think would perhaps be the 

case in taking over the southern region: how much of it have you 

taken over, the major population centers, or are there some that remain to be taken over? 

Let me switch a little bit and go to cyber, because it’s an everexpanding asymmetric threat to the United States. In every aspect 

of our American life, and perhaps even in the world, cyber is critically important. Do we have the capabilities of deciding if something is an intrusion into our cyberspace here, whether it’s a criminal act or an act of war? 

Director BLAIR. We do not have the absolutely unerring capability to determine that. It often takes weeks and sometimes 

months of subsequent investigation. We call that process attribution, who did it. The attribution process, if you’re lucky, can be 

quick. Most of the time it’s very slow and painstaking, and even 

at the end of very long investigations you’re not quite sure. So it’s 

not a ‘‘we know who did it.’’ 

Senator BEN NELSON. Are we working to try to improve the 

speed with which we can establish that attribution? 

Director BLAIR. Absolutely, yes, sir. I think as important as attribution is having defenses up fast. We need to be able to detect a 

type of attack coming in and be able instantly to spread that information across a broad number of networks, not just the military 

and intelligence networks that we use for our business, but wider 

government, the ones that you all use for your communications 

here in the Legislative Branch, and then critical infrastructure. 

That can only be done by some very fast automated systems. 

Senator BEN NELSON. So it’s better to be a defense against the 

intrusion than try to deal with it after the fact. But that obviously 

is a tall order. 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir, but we’re working on it. 

81 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Martinez. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Maples, let me add my word of thanks for your service 

and wish you the very best in your future endeavors. 

I want to shift to another area of the world, Latin America, 

which is close to the State of Florida and important to us in many 

respects. Director Blair, I wanted to ask if you would assess for us 

Venezuela’s current situation given the international crisis, economic crisis, as well as the decline in oil revenues that we have 

seen to governments like Venezuela as a result of the declining oil 

prices. 

Do you see that dramatic decline in oil revenues to the Venezuelan government as becoming a factor and impacting the politics or the policies internally and externally of Venezuela’s government? 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir, externally it certainly affects it. We 

project that Venezuela will not be able to spread around its oil 

wealth abroad for the various projects that we all know about. Internally it’s also having somewhat of an effect since these oil revenues are being used to prop up Chavez’s populist approach. At 

least originally, it doesn’t seem to make him any more modest 

about his goals of trying to become a ruler for longer than his constitution currently allows. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Along those lines, do you see, as he retrenches in some of his international ambitions—what are his goals 

really in the region? He was a big purchaser of arms from Russia 

and others. Obviously—and perhaps, General Maples, you might 

want to comment on this. Has that curtailed the purchases of arms 

and his high ambitions, to include submarines, attack jet fighters, 

all kinds of things, including a facility to build AK–47s? 

Anyway, where are we on all of those issues? Has any curtailment occurred? 

General MAPLES. We’re starting to see some decisions taken that 

would delay the purchase of some parts of that equation, and in 

particular you mentioned the submarines. The larger purchases, 

we are starting to see decisionmaking that would say they are 

going to delay that. 

The earlier purchases for arms manufacturing, AK–47s, put the 

plant in place, 200,000 weapons that they were bringing in, the 

fighters that he was bringing in, we still believe they are on track, 

and we believe that he is getting some credits, in particular from 

his major supplier, from Russia. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Now, those arms are obviously not just for internal consumption, but I know that they find their way into other 

venues. Particularly I know that the Venezuelan government 

seems to have been complicit for a long time, and made public last 

year, with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Do 

you see any lessening of Venezuela’s cooperation in providing sanctuaries as well as Ecuador’s participation in providing sanctuaries 

for the FARC, and how do you assess the FARC’s current situation 

given the major setbacks that they suffered last year? 

82 

General MAPLES. Let me begin with your last point because I 

think the FARC has suffered some major setbacks. From a military 

standpoint, that’s resulted in a great number of desertions, both of 

members of the FARC and leaders of the FARC. Nevertheless, 

they’re continuing on in their narcotics effort, which is a part of 

what they do. But their activities are less than they have been in 

the past. 

President Chavez is still supportive of the FARC, but less so 

than we saw a year ago. No real response in terms of Ecuador at 

this point, probably because there’s less activity of the FARC crossing the borders to the south. 

In terms of the weapons, we have not seen Venezuela supplying 

weapons. Don’t know what the purpose of their purchase is, so 

they’re making investments that we are watching because we don’t 

know exactly what the intent is of President Chavez for the use of 

those. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Now, the Venezuelan government I understand has been complicit in the cocaine flow through its territory 

both in the direction of West Africa, but also perhaps directly into 

Europe. Are you able to shed any light on this in terms of the Venezuelan government being complicit in drug trafficking? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I don’t have any information on that, on 

the drug trafficking. 

Senator MARTINEZ. The same with you, Director Blair? 

Director BLAIR. Yes. 

Senator MARTINEZ. We know that Venezuela is pretty much 

Cuba’s benefactor and as a result of their largesse through oil and 

other assistance provides Cuba with pretty much the ability to remain afloat in what is pretty much an economic basket case I think 

generally acknowledged. Any change in that relationship in addition to the fact that Cuba appears to have some 40,000 Cubans operating in Venezuela, many of them I’ve read reports are involved 

in providing personal protection to Mr. Chavez, as well as obviously 

providing training to local police? Obviously, Cuba’s police is not a 

democratic police force, but it’s more a force of repression. 

Any light you can shed on those kinds of activities, both the reciprocal relationship, Venezuela’s assistance to Cuba and Cuba’s 

participation in Venezuela’s increasingly autocratic government? 

Director BLAIR. General Maples mentioned Venezuela pulling 

back its support a little bit because of the price of oil going the way 

it is. It seems that its cooperation with Cuba, both its supply of 

economic support to Cuba and the reciprocal flow of Cubans into 

Venezuela, is the last thing that would go. It considers it more important. So we have not seen the effects on that that we’ve seen 

on some of these other areas we’ve talked about. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Focusing on Cuba, a week ago today there 

were some pretty dramatic changes to the Cuban hierarchy. In fact, 

for the last couple of years many have claimed that Raul Castro 

in fact wants to present a moderate image and would be a harbinger of significant change. Last week Carlos Lage, who by many 

has been viewed as the reformer within the system and many 

viewed as a potential successor to Raul, was not only relieved of 

his responsibilities, but in a Stalinist kind of action, he and Felipe 

Perez Roque, the former foreign minister, both signed letters of 

83 

confession admitting to their mistakes and resigning from all political posts. It’s sort of reminiscent of Stalin in the late 1930s. 

But anyway, can you shed any light on what the IC makes of 

these changes, as well as the perception of Raul Castro as a moderate when in fact over the last 2 years anecdotal reporting of increasing repression within Cuba and absolutely no change in any 

respect, with this new purge, which has included bringing into the 

government now more military and continuing an aging leadership 

that seems to be essentially closing ranks rather than filtering any 

new air into the room. 

Director BLAIR. I think there are different explanations going 

back in personal relations and policy positions that the IC is debating about those personnel actions that you described. But a move 

toward political moderation is not one of the explanations that anybody thinks is a reason for it. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you very 

much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To set the table for my questions, gentlemen, I assume that in 

this economic climate internationally the use of our resources in 

terms of our money flowing to these various nations that are so important to our national security becomes even more important. I assume that there wouldn’t be any disagreement about that. 

Director BLAIR. I’m sorry? Which kind of money flowing to these 

countries? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Any kind of cash that we’re giving to these 

countries directly from the American Government. I’m assuming 

that is a pretty strategic, important resource for us to be spreading 

around right now? 

Director BLAIR. It’s more important in hard times than it is in 

other times, yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. Relating to that, I know that we have 

given Pakistan over $12 billion and I would like to focus my questions on Lashkar-e-Taiba, the homegrown terrorist organization in 

Pakistan, and find out whatever we can find out in this forum, how 

confident you are of the cooperation of the Pakistani government 

with Lashkar-e-Taiba, if in fact they have been obstructionist in 

terms of our investigations, if you agree that Lashkar-e-Taiba is indicated in terms of involvement with not only Mumbai, but the 

cricket team deaths, obviously the subway killings in London, the 

international flights from Europe to the United States, the plots to 

blow those up, and your take on how we attack this issue of, while 

we are giving them billions of dollars, they’re refusing to even provide basic cooperation in our investigations of this international 

terrorist organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba. 

Director BLAIR. I think many of the details ought to be saved for 

a closed session, Senator McCaskill. But in general, I don’t think 

the picture with Pakistan’s cooperation is quite as bleak as you 

portrayed. In fact, the action after the Mumbai bombing in particular has been greater from Pakistan’s point of view than many 

previous ones. 

84 

Leaders of Lashkar-e-Taiba were arrested and Pakistan has undertaken to prosecute them. It has asked for India to provide the 

evidence that could be used in such a prosecution. The United 

States is involved in trying to work with both sides in order to 

make that happen. 

So I think that particular trend is positive. But it has a ways to 

go and it’s not a simple progress. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me ask about visa-free waivers as it relates to disaffected Pakistanis and their ability to travel, and 

whether or not there are any concerns about that. Also, if either 

one of you have any ability to share with us whether or not—I 

know there is a significantly influential American-Pakistani community. A lot of professionals and leaders in every community in 

this country are from Pakistan and wonderful, loyal, patriotic 

American citizens. To what extent have we utilized that resource 

in trying to identify any cells of disaffected Pakistanis that maybe, 

unfortunately, have more leeway to travel than someone, for example, that’s Iranian? 

Director BLAIR. I think we’ll have to get back to you on that, Senator McCaskill. I do know that, in working with ethnic-American 

groups, whether they be Pakistani Americans or others, we get a 

great deal of cooperation on the very precise issues like the ones 

you mentioned. But I think on the particulars related to PakistaniAmericans and visa-free waivers we’ll have to get back to you. 

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Senator MCCASKILL. Let me also ask you, where are we in terms 

of our challenges of our language ability in the IC and the ability 

of our resources to speak fluently and indigenously in terms of 

gathering the most valuable kind of intelligence that we can get? 

General MAPLES. I can talk from my own perspective there, and 

I think it’s true across the whole community. We have all been focused on recruiting individuals who have native, near-native language skills, cultural understanding, bringing them into the organizations. I know in my organization we have more than doubled 

the number of individuals that have the kinds of language and cultural skills that we’re looking for, and they are being used right 

now both in our analytic arena to give us the cultural understanding that goes beyond knowledge, so that we really understand 

events as they’re happening on the ground, and then forward in 

our human intelligence collection as well. Having those individuals 

who have the right background and have near-native language 

skills proves to make a huge difference for us in human intelligence-gathering. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is there anything else we can do to be helpful in that regard? As a former prosecutor, I know where we got 

the best information and it wasn’t from tough interrogations. It 

was from our ability to infiltrate and integrate into certain criminal 

organizations people who could give us real-time information. 

Obviously, in this area, when prevention is so important, I just 

want to make sure we’re doing everything we can to give you everything you need to get that kind of capability that we have been 

so concerned about. 

Director BLAIR. That’s a very kind offer, Senator. But I think it’s 

not a lack of resources or effort at this point. It’s the difficulty of 

it. I was just, for instance, last week at a meeting of what’s called 

the Heritage Council, which is the heads of many ethnic American 

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This is the third meeting with that group, and I’m told by both my 

people and the representatives in that group that it’s taken almost 

that long to get the trust of the IC, for these leaders to realize that 

patriotic Burmese or Afghan Americans who went to serve their 

country and bring invaluable skills, it’s okay, you are doing important work and you know all of the misperceptions and televisionbased rumors that are there. 

So we are making progress in that area. But I’m not sure we 

could have speeded up that program with more money or more effort. It’s a high focus and I think we’re making good inroads. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think that the comment you made, Director Blair, about the recognition in our country that it’s not the 

Muslim faith that’s the problem, it’s terrorists who inappropriately 

mask their terror in a religious connotation. So many of these leaders in America, wonderful—and it’s not just the American Pakistani community I’m referring to. We have, as you say, so many 

Americans that still have family in Iraq and Iran, so many Americans who have family throughout this region. 

I just think they have suffered greatly because they are profiled, 

they are looked at suspiciously when they travel as American citizens. I think they are anxious to be helpful in so many ways, and 

I just hope it’s a resource we continue to try to expand upon, because I think it could be very, very effective, not just in terms of 

our diplomatic efforts, but also in our intelligence efforts. 

Director BLAIR. I think you’re right. In my background—and I’m 

sure General Maples knows it—the most highly decorated military 

unit in American history was the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, 

Asian Americans, many of whose parents and grandparents were 

in detention camps at the time that they went to Italy, and won 

more medals than any other unit in action. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think there’s some recruiting to be done 

there. 

Director BLAIR. I think there is. 

General MAPLES. You’re exactly right, and these are Americans 

who want to serve our Nation. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Absolutely. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. I may be about to ask 

you to parse words, but I want to follow up on the chairman’s question about Iran’s nuclear aspirations. Director Blair, in your printed testimony you speak about Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons as 

one of the goals that fuels Iran’s aspirations for regional preeminence. You go on to mention Iran’s goal of defending its nuclear 

ambitions. 

Yet in your answer to the chairman’s questions, you agree with 

the rest of the IC that Iran has halted its nuclear weaponization 

program in 2003 and not resumed it. Explain their pursuit of nuclear weapons capability and defense of its nuclear ambitions in 

light of your answer to the chairman’s question? 

Then I’d like to ask both of you if you are in complete agreement, 

if your agencies are in complete agreement with each other on the 

92 

extent to which Iran has abandoned its nuclear weaponization 

goals. 

Director BLAIR. Senator Wicker, there are three components to 

Iran’s nuclear weapons program. One is the fissionable material, 

HEU—their current supply of LEU under the International Atomic 

Energy Agency supervision, which could be the feedstock to HEU, 

which could result in having enough for a weapon by some time 

2010 to 2015, and there’s a difference of opinion among the intelligence groups within that range. 

Senator WICKER. 2010 to 2015? 

Director BLAIR. 2015, yes, sir. 

So that’s the HEU which forms the payload of the bomb. Then 

there’s the weaponization track of it, which has to do with developing the ability to take the HEU, put it with high explosives into 

a weapon that can go on a warhead. It was the work on that track 

that was suspended in mid-2003 and as of at least mid-2007 had 

not been resumed. So that’s at a pause as far as late 2007. 

Then the third track is the delivery capability, which the delivery 

weapon of choice in that part, in most of the world, is a ballistic 

missile. Space launch technology is no different from military technology, and the Safir launch last month shows that Iran is mastering the use of ballistic weapons. 

So it takes all three of those to build a capability. The overall situation—and the IC agrees on this—is that Iran has not decided to 

press forward on all three tracks, to have a nuclear weapon on top 

of a ballistic missile. 

Senator WICKER. Are they proceeding on the first track? 

Director BLAIR. They’re proceeding on the first. They’re proceeding on the LEU track. They have not gone to a HEU track. 

Senator WICKER. It’s your assessment that they are not producing HEU at this point? 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir, that’s the assessment. 

Senator WICKER. General Maples, are you and the Director in 

complete agreement on this assessment? 

General MAPLES. We are in agreement on this. In fact, across the 

IC we’re in fundamental agreement on the assessment. I think between the agencies there may be some difference in the level of 

confidence, but we’re in fundamental agreement on where they are. 

Senator WICKER. Is it fair to say that the Israelis disagree with 

that assessment? 

Director BLAIR. The Israelis are far more concerned about it and 

they take more of a worst case approach to these things from their 

point of view. 

Senator WICKER. Naturally they would be far more concerned. 

But in their assessment of the facts as they exist, do our friends 

in Israel assess the facts differently? 

Director BLAIR. The facts are the same. The interpretation of 

what they mean, Israel takes a—— 

Senator WICKER. So it’s a matter of interpretation? 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Let me move if I might, Mr. Chairman, to Mexico in the remaining time I have. The testimony talks about, the assessment that I 

have, talks about President Calderon’s success leading to the inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
93 

creased violence. How serious of a problem is this for us? To what 

extent is our success in Colombia causing the drug trade to move 

to Mexico? Is there a connection there? 

Are there lessons we can learn from Plan Colombia? Is it time 

for the United States to consider a similar plan for Mexico, Plan 

Mexico, to fully devote our efforts toward this problem, which appears from these reports to be very, very serious? 

Director BLAIR. I think that the violence that we’re seeing in 

Mexico, the drug-related violence which resulted in some 6,000 

deaths last year, is directly the result of President Calderon taking 

on the drug cartel. So in a sense it’s the consequence of a positive 

development. I would emphasize that President Calderon’s initiative is not just against drugs per se, as bad as they are, but he is 

motivated by seeing that the lock that the money and influence of 

drug cartels have on his country is a fundamental problem, on the 

judiciary system, on the police system, on the political system in 

many cases. 

So he came to the conclusion that unless he went after the drug 

cartels he was not attacking fundamental challenges of Mexico, and 

he’s taken them on and it’s been an amazing and admirable initiative on his part. 

I believe, the President believes, that it is important to support 

President Calderon on his initiative in many ways as we can, from 

the Merida Initiative which began under the previous administration and will be carried forward, to the things that we can do on 

an agency to agency basis, whether it’s the Department of Justice 

(DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) within DOJ, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or us in the IC who can assist the Mexican intelligence authorities on this goal which is in 

both of our interests. 

Senator WICKER. You see President Calderon’s program as successful if he stays the course, even though the immediate result 

has been this huge spike in deaths and violence? 

Director BLAIR. Absolutely. 

Senator WICKER. I certainly hope so. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope we’ll be willing to be a teammate with 

them, with our North American neighbor in this regard, because it 

certainly at this point appears to be a sort of surprising and very, 

very serious problem. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Actually I wasn’t going to start here, but let me express my concurrence with what Senator Wicker just said. 

When we look at this violence that is going on principally along 

the border—it’s not simply along the border and it’s not totally because of what the Mexicans are doing, although I certainly would 

express my appreciation for their taking that on. These cartels 

make $25 billion a year in profit. They have highly sophisticated 

military people working for them, people in some cases who were 

trained by our own special operations schools. They use automatic 

weapons, rocket-propelled grenades and grenades. 

94 

They are already in our country. The Mexican cartels have operations in 230 cities in the United States. There was an article in 

The Economist about a year ago that said that, as I recall, twothirds of the outdoor marijuana plantations in California are run 

by the Mexican drug cartels, and marijuana has replaced wine as 

the number one agricultural product of California. 

So I would begin—actually, I wasn’t going to begin, but I would 

begin by requesting that you take a hard look at the threat to our 

national security that these transnational syndicates are bringing. 

It’s not just the Mexican drug cartels. Fairfax County, Virginia, 

right across the river here, has several thousand gang members, 

principally MS–13, who are involved in a lot of violence and a lot 

of trafficking. 

That being said—I wanted to say it before Senator Wicker took 

off—the first thing I would say, Mr. Chairman, is for the record I’d 

like to point out that Director Blair, Admiral Mullen, and I are all 

from the same Naval Academy class. I’ve known Director Blair 

since I was 18. I think there are few people in this country who 

have developed the expertise that he did early on in his career with 

respect to Russia. In fact, I took Russian with Director Blair when 

I was a plebe. We got to the third class period, I was still trying 

to figure out the alphabet and he announced that he could now 

think in Russian. He’s a pretty smart guy. 

Director BLAIR. Simple thoughts. [Laughter.] 

Senator WEBB. I welcome him back to serving our country. 

I also would like to say that I appreciate the context in which 

you answered the question with respect to Ambassador Freeman. 

I was one of those who was very skeptical about the creation of the 

position that you now hold, and we corresponded about that. There 

is an inherent danger when you centralize intelligence, and we saw 

that with respect to the lack of divergence of opinions in terms of 

the run-up to Iraq. We simply didn’t have enough contrary and 

meaningful discussion in the IC before we went in. 

So I think that the idea of having informed divergent views is 

very vital to how our decision processes work, and I appreciate that 

point of view. 

General, a question was asked to you about the relationship between Iran and Afghanistan. Is it not true that Iran is now also 

allowing NATO cargo shipments to pass through Iran into Afghanistan? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I’m not familiar with that. 

Senator WEBB. We have been briefed to that effect. So you’re not 

aware that that’s going on? 

General MAPLES. No, sir. I’ll have to get back to you on that, sir. 

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Senator WEBB. All right. 

With respect to the testimony about China, Director Blair, I’ve 

had a long concern about the incrementalism with respect to 

China. You do mention in your testimony that China over the past 

several decades has begun a substantially new phase in its military 

development by beginning to articulate roles and missions that go 

beyond its immediate territorial interests. 

95 

I actually wrote a piece for the New York Times about that in 

1995 when they changed their doctrine from pure defense into 

power projection. I’m very concerned. It ties in with the incident 

that we saw with the naval ship. They have been expanding their 

military. In many cases it’s understandable as you’re expanding 

your economy, but in other cases it should give us concern, particularly with respect to the South China Sea. They claim Taiwan, obviously. They claim the Shinkaku Islands, which are between Taiwan and Japan. Japan also has sovereignty over those at this moment. They claim the Paracels, which Vietnam claims. They claim 

the Spratlys, which Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia claim. They claim lost territories basically wherever you can 

find a piece of Chinese porcelain from 500 years ago. 

There have been a number of incidents with respect to all of 

those areas that I just mentioned over the past 4 or 5 years. They 

have been known to build facilities in Indian Ocean areas. Burma 

is a good example. 

So how are you seeing all this in terms of how that fits together 

for the position of the United States in that region? 

Director BLAIR. Senator, you’ve been I know following Southeast 

Asia very closely for a number of years. I think the Chinese trajectory there has changed in a somewhat more aggressive way in the 

past several years from what we had seen earlier. You will recall 

that when the code of conduct was agreed to with a lot of Association of Southeast Asian Nations pressure on China, it seemed that 

perhaps China was taking a diplomatic approach there. It settled 

its boundaries with Vietnam, agreed to the code of conduct. 

In the past several years they have become more aggressive in 

asserting the claims for the EEZ which, as you pointed out, sir, are 

excessive under almost any international code, and this latest incident with fishing vessels and a PLA Navy vessel involved is the 

most serious that we’ve seen since 2001, the EP–3 incident. 

So I would agree with you that as far as the South China Sea 

activities of China, they seem to be more military, aggressive, forward-pushing than we saw a couple of years before. The buildup 

in the South Fleet out of Hainan has been larger than other parts 

of the fleet. So I think that is a trend that we are seeing. 

The other big development, of course, is the Chinese deployment 

of a couple of ships to take part in anti-piracy patrols near Somalia. On that face it seems to be a good positive use of Chinese military forces as part of a group who are seeking common goals. 

So I think the debate is still on in China as to whether as their 

military power increases it will be used for good or for pushing people around. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Blair, in your testimony you stated that the primary 

near-term security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis. That isn’t usually how a DNI begins testimony to us, 

so it has caught all of our attention. 

A cyber attack on our financial institutions would obviously 

greatly exacerbate that crisis. What is your assessment of the capaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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bilities of terrorists to launch a catastrophic cyber attack on our financial system? 

Director BLAIR. We know that terrorists are interested in using 

cyber weapons just the way they’re interested in using most any 

weapon that they can use against us. We know that they believe 

that our economic strength is one of the targets that they would 

most like to attack. That’s partly why they chose the World Trade 

Center, in addition to the symbolic reasons. 

We currently assess that their capability does not match their 

ambitions in that area, although that’s something we have to work 

on all the time because as things become more widespread, terrorists can find hackers to work with them. So it is a concern. But 

right now I’d say their capability is low. 

In addition, I think the more spectacular attacks that kill a lot 

of people very publicly is what they are looking for also. 

Senator COLLINS. The Federal Government’s Director of Cyber 

Security resigned this week and he cited a lack of support and 

funding as well as an overreliance on the National Security Agency 

(NSA) for combating threats to our Nation’s computer systems. I 

know that you have not been DNI for that long, but what is your 

assessment of the adequacy of our efforts to combat cyber attacks? 

Director BLAIR. Senator Collins, I’m familiar with the remarks of 

the Director of the DHS Cyber Center as he left. The NSA is the 

repository of the most technical skill in the area of cyber defense, 

based in large measure on its ability to do cyber attack, which 

gives it an understanding of what the tools are so it knows what 

can be used against us. So I’m a strong advocate of the NSA making its technical skill available for defending other networks, both 

in the government and in the country. 

I’m also aware that this very much has to be done in a way that 

those who supervise us here in Congress and American citizens in 

general feel that that’s being done under strict controls with oversight, so that we are protecting the right information and not gathering information that abridges civil liberties and privacy of Americans. 

I think unless we can work out that way to use the capabilities 

of the intelligence agencies for the right purposes, with confidence 

from those of you in Congress and the American people that we’re 

not using them for the wrong purposes, we’re not going to make the 

progress we need to on defending the country against those kind 

of attacks. 

I think we can do it technically. We have to do it in a way that 

everyone has confidence in. There’s a review going on right now on 

that very subject, being led out of the White House, to try to build 

that structure and to get that support. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Blair, thank you again for returning to active service. 

But I particularly want to thank and commend General Maples for 

his extraordinary service to the Army and to the Nation. 

97 

I associate my comments with Chairman Levin and Ranking 

Member McCain, but I want to make one augmentation to the 

record. Senator McCain said 38 years of service and I have firsthand evidence that you joined the United States Army on July 3, 

1967, which makes it 42. So thank you, General, for your service 

and your friendship. 

General MAPLES. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. You’re even older than Senator McCain 

thought. [Laughter.] 

Senator REED. I can’t say anything because he looks younger 

than me and we’re classmates. So I have to be very careful about 

this. 

Let me return to a topic that I think was broached, and that is 

the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba. It’s operating in Pakistan. It 

was in my recollection essentially a creature of Interservices Intelligence (ISI) to conduct operations in Kashmir, so its relationship 

to the Pakistan Intelligence Service is very disturbing. It conducted 

the operations in Mumbai, but some have suggested that it poses 

a much, much broader threat because of its ability to operate locally in Pakistan, because of its connections to many Pakistani nationals who reside outside of Pakistan in Europe and even in the 

United States. 

Can you give an assessment, is this the group that is beginning 

to fill up the operational space being denied to al-Qaeda? 

Director BLAIR. Senator Reed, Lashkar-e-Taiba and its affiliate, 

which I believe is called JUN, J-U-N—this is the widows and orphans humanitarian wing of it. There is a typical arrangement 

often between extremist groups and—— 

Senator REED. The Hamas model. 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir, which is well established. 

You’re quite right, its long ties as being a means to hit India over 

the Kashmir issue give it strong roots. The Pakistan Government 

has changed its policy towards Lashkar-e-Taiba partially, but it 

has not become a force for good in Pakistan or in the region. 

I don’t assess that it is replacing al Qaeda as a worldwide terrorist directed against western, American interests or shares the al 

Qaeda messianic ideology of a greater pan-Islamic state and driving conservative Muslim governments from power. I think it’s 

much more directed than that. But it certainly has the capability 

and can still carry out acts which are against American interests. 

Senator REED. General Maples, you have comments? 

General MAPLES. I would just comment that Sayyed, who is the 

leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba, does have a belief in the establishment 

of a fundamentalist Islamic state. Lashkar-e-Taiba has been very 

involved in Afghanistan with that as an intended purpose. So while 

there is still the focus on Kashmir, a focus on India, there’s also 

a focus in the other region. I think that fundamentalism is an issue 

that makes Lashkar-e-Taiba a real concern to us, because I think 

they do have ambitions beyond that. 

I don’t know that they have reached the level of another al 

Qaeda or a replacement for al Qaeda, but I think that their beliefs 

are very similar in nature. I also believe that the Pakistani government, as the Director has said, has distanced themselves from 

98 

Lashkar-e-Taiba and has taken some very significant actions in the 

recent past towards the organization. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Let me switch to a different topic. We are in the process now of 

redeploying our forces from Iraq to Afghanistan. One of the key 

issues that both General Odierno and General McKiernan have is 

their force multipliers, their intelligence platforms, their special operations forces, those things that allow you to build up the effort 

in Afghanistan, but also as an economy of force measure in Iraq to 

continue to keep the pressure. 

Can you give me from your perspective, Director Blair and then 

General Maples, sort of, do we have sufficient resources in this 

area, the intelligence platforms, the analysts, not the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) intelligence but those things that make the BCTs 

work well, for the effort that is before us? 

Director BLAIR. We had a meeting on that exact topic, Senator 

Reed, of the executive committee of the IC about 2 weeks ago, in 

which we went through that analysis. The short answer to your 

question is that we believe we have the facilities that could be 

brought to bear. We have it largely, but not entirely. I’m confident 

that we will be able to put adequate support in to support the level 

of engagement that we decide on. 

The heart of it from the military point of view is the ISR joint 

task force, which now covers both Afghanistan and Iraq. General 

Maples is intimately involved in staffing that up. 

Senator REED. General Maples? 

General MAPLES. Sir, the answer to your question is yes, I believe we have the resources to do what is necessary from a defense 

intelligence standpoint in both locations. We are working right now 

with Multi-National Force-Iraq on the plan for the intelligence 

structure that will remain as we go through the drawdown. Our belief is that our intelligence structure, with the exception of those 

capabilities that are organic to the BCTs, will remain in place. The 

only adjustments we’re going to make is based on capacity and demand for the tasks that we’re going to be performing. But we are 

not dependent on those resources in order to build the capabilities 

that we need in Afghanistan. 

That said, for me as we drawdown in Iraq there’s still the issue 

of how do we cover those areas that the BCTs have been operating 

in from an intelligence standpoint, how do we do the handoff of the 

sources, how do we provide insight and knowledge of what’s going 

on in those areas. We’re working through that plan. 

A big part of that, as the Director says, is going to be the plusup that the Secretary of Defense has directed in terms of ISR capability going into Iraq. In Afghanistan, we are structuring for the 

buildup of forces and we’ve already started that process, putting 

more analysts in place in Afghanistan, more ISR capability that is 

going into the country now. 

The real issue for us is the duration and our ability to sustain 

the kinds of deployments and the expertise that we need for Afghanistan. We’re having to build additional capability so that we 

can sustain that over time. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

99 

My time has expired, but let me once again conclude by thanking 

you, General, for your service to the countless soldiers you’ve led 

and inspired, and thank you so much. 

General MAPLES. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, Director, my thanks also to you for your many years of 

service and for your continued service to our country. We appreciate all that you do to keep our country safe and secure. 

Let me, if I might, Director Blair, direct a question to you regarding a hearing last month in front of the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, in which Congressman Miller asked you 

to address a potential security threat of relocating the Guantanamo 

Bay detainees to facilities in the United States, specifically the possibility that holding detainees here in facilities stateside may encourage an attack on a facility to free detainees. 

As you perhaps know, last year the Senate passed a Senate resolution by a vote of 94 to 3 expressing the Senate’s view that detainees at Guantanamo should not be transferred stateside into facilities in American communities and neighborhoods. The President’s 

January 22, executive order to close Guantanamo and determine 

the disposition of individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay within 

a year requires that those individuals detained at Guantanamo be 

‘‘returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third 

country, or transferred to another United States detention facility 

in a manner consistent with law and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States,’’ and that’s a quote. 

That same executive order requires you, as the DNI, along with 

other senior administration officials, to identify and consider legal, 

logistical, and security issues relating to the potential transfer of 

individuals currently detained at Guantanamo to facilities within 

the United States, and that you and other participants in the review work with Congress on any legislation that may be appropriate. 

You had told, I think, Congressman Miller at that hearing you’d 

have to go back and see if the possibility that holding detainees 

here in facilities statewide warranted a threat. I guess my question 

has to do with that follow-up. Have you or your staff identified and 

considered those legal, logistical, and security issues relating to the 

potential transfer of individuals currently held at Guantanamo to 

facilities within the United States? 

Director BLAIR. Senator Thune, I was at a meeting yesterday in 

which, at the senior level, we reviewed the work that’s being done 

by the working groups on those exact questions. All of the things 

that you mentioned are very much at the heart of the interlocking 

set of decisions that have to be made. I can also say, as was specified in the executive order, that there is a commitment to consult 

with Congress as these tough decisions are reached. 

I can say that if there’d been any neat and tidy ways to handle 

these conflicting goods that Senator Graham and others are right 

in the midst of from both a legal and a policy point of view, it 

would have been found. It’s going to be a series of tough decisions 

100 

and it’ll require Congress as well as the executive branch to help 

make them. 

Senator THUNE. Have you made any conclusions or assessments 

about the threat yet or identified any of the security issues that are 

associated with that? 

Director BLAIR. Sir, I think that it does somewhat raise the 

threat level when a prison contains foreign terrorists as well as 

others. I don’t think that that threat level rises to the level of the 

ambitions of al Qaeda and similar groups to try to conduct a spectacular attack that would be as great as or even greater than September 11 on the United States or other countries. But it does raise 

that concern somewhat. 

Senator THUNE. My assumption is too that the resolution passed 

by the Senate last year would figure into those deliberations and 

send a statement with regard to having some of these detainees in 

American communities and neighborhoods. It affects the deliberations, my guess is? 

Director BLAIR. Yes, sir. It has not passed unnoticed. Several 

members of the meeting that I was in yesterday reminded us that 

the Senate is very sensitive on that score. 

Senator THUNE. Let me shift gears for just a minute. There was 

an article written by Secretary of Defense Gates and published in 

the Foreign Affairs Journal in January of this year, in which he 

wrote: ‘‘Both Russia and China have increased their defense spending and modernization programs, to include air defense and fighter 

capabilities that in some cases approach the United States’ own.’’ 

He goes on to explain that, with respect to China, improved air 

defenses, coupled with investments in other asymmetric capabilities such as cyber warfare, anti-satellite warfare, and anti-ship 

weaponry, all threaten the way that the United States projects 

power. Secretary Gates wrote that ‘‘These asymmetric capabilities 

will require a shift to long-range, over the horizon systems such as 

the next-generation bomber.’’ 

My question is, do you agree with the Secretary of Defense’s assessment that in some aspects Russia and China’s air defense and 

fighter capabilities approach our own, and is it your conclusion that 

they are proliferating some of these advanced capabilities? General? 

General MAPLES. I do agree with that. In particular, China from 

the air defense standpoint has developed a very modern, layered 

air defense capability in depth and is seeking additional air defense 

capabilities that will project even out to a range of 400 kilometers, 

that significantly affects potential U.S. operations in that region. 

Russia, quite frankly, is the developer of most of those systems 

and is exporting those systems both to China and to other countries in the world. 

Senator THUNE. What’s your general view right now about our 

capabilities in terms of long-range strike, and does the next-generation bomber figure into our ability to project power on a long-range 

basis, I mean going forward? What’s your overall assessment, because that’s a big debate about whether or not, in terms of procurement and some of the weapons systems that we’re developing for 

the future? The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) said we 

needed a next-generation bomber by 2018. There are reports, of 

101 

course, that that is being scaled back or perhaps eliminated entirely as a requirement. 

What’s your overall assessment? Shouldn’t we be pursuing upgrades in our long-range strike capabilities? 

Director BLAIR. Senator Thune, the question of whether the 

bomber is the exact right system for the threat is really a DOD decision to make. But I would point out that there has to be a balance between your strike capability and your intelligence capability. I am personally as concerned about our ability to find the 

right thing to hit as I am about the ability to hit it. Advances in 

cover and deception, advances in potential adversaries’ knowledge 

of how we go about our business, and in understanding have made 

it much more difficult to be able to feed those target points to the 

weapons deliverers, whether they’re firing missiles or cruiser bombers or, down at a lower level, whether they’re a special forces team 

trying to snatch somebody who’s out to hurt us. 

So I think that, while you’re absolutely right to be worried about 

long-range strike systems, I really am frankly more concerned 

about being able to tell them what to strike. 

Senator THUNE. General? 

General MAPLES. Sir, with respect to the capabilities, that’s the 

dialogue that’s going on in the Department right now as to the capabilities that we’ll require for the future. It’ll be a part of the QDR 

process this year. 

I agree with the Director, what we have to clearly explain is how 

those modernization efforts fit together and the impact that that is 

going to have on the systems that we field and the systems that 

we require. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you both very much, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Burris. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I too want to extend my congratulations and thanks for all the 

service you gentlemen have given to this country. May God continue to bless you. 

Last Wednesday, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for the Sudanese President Al-Bashir for directing the genocide in Darfur. 

Shortly after the ICC announcement, President Bashir moved to 

expel foreign aid groups that provided food, water, medicine, and 

other crucial supports to more than 1 million displaced people from 

the Darfur region. 

General Maples and Director Blair, can you give us an assessment of what is happening on the ground today and what the IC 

is assessing as may happen in the coming weeks and months for 

this region? 

Director BLAIR. Senator Burris, we are aware of those actions 

that you mentioned by the ICC and then President Bashir’s reaction. We have moved to try to assess more closely the humanitarian impact of the withdrawal of the food aid and so on. It really 

is a matter of how long it’s sustained, and what the subsequent 

events are. Those are pretty much based on President Bashir’s actions. 

102 

The ranges of what might happen could go from another humanitarian crisis because of continued denial of food supplies, continued 

lawlessness in the camps that would cause great suffering and 

deaths, down to a relatively mild worsening to what’s already a bad 

situation if they were of a short duration and the relief organizations were back in. So it’s something we’re looking at and it’s hard 

to make a call right now. 

Senator BURRIS. General Maples? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I have nothing to add to that. I agree. 

Senator BURRIS. What is the situation then with the U.N. and 

whether or not they’re going to be able to get some peacekeeping 

troops in there? Do we have any information on what the United 

Nations and Sudan are working on? Chad is in there and they’re 

already up to the border, or Khartoum. I’m wondering whether or 

not that’s going to escalate. What intelligence do we have of what’s 

happening there? 

Director BLAIR. Senator, a United Nations-blessed largely African 

force has been negotiating with the Khartoum government for the 

conditions under which it can increase its presence in the area. 

Certainly the U.N. has intensified its efforts recently. But the indictment and President Bashir’s reaction have made him less cooperative than he was before on that score. 

Senator BURRIS. Do you think this will extend the problem with 

the U.N. trying to move in? 

Director BLAIR. I think it will make it harder, yes, sir. 

Senator BURRIS. Let me shift gears, gentlemen, for one moment. 

You heard Senator Wicker raise a question about the drug cartel— 

I think it was Senator Wicker—in Mexico. There is a report this 

morning indicating that a local police chief and a handful of officers 

in Mexico were killed in a blazing attack by the drug cartels. This 

seems to be a reoccurring story in recent weeks and months. 

Gentlemen, can you discuss the capability gap of the Mexicans 

in their fight against the drug cartel? Given the recent statement 

by Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates with regard to the military 

assistance—I’m particularly interested in the gap within their military—can they be able to handle this situation? 

Director BLAIR. Senator, I believe that they can handle the situation, given the determination that President Calderon has showed. 

The resources that he has put against it, he has increased the 

number of troops he’s committing. He’s increased the resources he 

has made available to those, both to his army forces that are involved in that and to the other law enforcement bodies. 

He is moving to remove corrupt officials. He’s taken a full range 

of actions which are necessary to do it. I think he can succeed. I 

think we have the responsibility as being on the other side of that 

same border and, as Senator Webb, Senator Wicker, and others 

pointed out, sharing the bad effects of those cartels in our country, 

to help him. 

I believe there’s a strong commitment out of President Obama 

and his administration, and I sense just from talking on Capitol 

Hill that there’s a very strong commitment here in the Senate and 

elsewhere to support that. I’m very optimistic we can take these 

guys if we put the resources in and work together. 

103 

General MAPLES. Sir, one comment on that. The chairman just 

returned from Mexico and a visit to the region. On his return, the 

Joint Staff has taken his report back and is working up some recommendations on how we could provide some assistance to the 

Mexican military. 

I know that on the intelligence side, personally I’ve had interaction with my counterpart in Mexico, which is pretty significant 

in terms of the relationship between the militaries, in looking for 

ways that we can share information. The Navy has recently signed 

an agreement that will enable a sharing of information, and I think 

the other services are very close to having that done in the near 

term as well. So we are looking for ways that we can support the 

Mexican military in their effort. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Burris. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, both for your service to our country past, 

present, and future. 

Along the lines of military assistance to Mexico, it seems to be 

just from listening to the news that the threats are growing. Would 

a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle assistance program be beneficial, Director, General? 

Director BLAIR. Right now we’re talking with the Mexican Government on many different levels, Senator Graham. I’m not aware 

of all of the eaches of what we’ve done, sir, and I hesitate to shoot 

off the top of my head about something like that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Fair enough. 

Director Blair, a nuclear-armed Iran in terms of destabilizing the 

Mideast and making the world a more dangerous place. If that 

event occurred, how would you rate it in terms of 1 being not so 

much and 10 being very destabilizing? 

Director BLAIR. It would be up on the 8-to-10 scale, Senator 

Graham. The countries in the region would react. They would react 

I think by looking to their own defenses, by looking for more involvement and protection from the United States, and there would 

be a spin in the region which would not make it any safer than it 

is now, quite the opposite. 

Senator GRAHAM. Potentially terrorist organizations might benefit from that technology? Would that be a concern? 

Director BLAIR. The more nuclear material, the more nuclear 

weapons technology around, the greater the chances of it getting 

into the wrong hands. 

Senator GRAHAM. I read your report about Iraq. Do you think it 

would be in our long-term national security interest to consider an 

enduring relationship with the Iraqi government and people after 

2011? 

Director BLAIR. I hope all of the effort we put on Iraq results in 

a long-term relationship and not just a [indicating] ‘‘done that, get 

out of there.’’ 

Senator GRAHAM. I agree. 

104 

Director BLAIR. There’s been a lot of blood shed by Iraqis and by 

Americans there, and I’d hate to think that we didn’t turn that into 

something positive for the long-term. 

Senator GRAHAM. From the strategic point of view, it sits between Syria and Iran. It’s pretty good to have a friend right there. 

It would allow—Turkey’s been a good ally, so I think it would have 

some benefit. I appreciate that answer. I think we need to think 

in terms of long-term security interests and Iraq could become a 

very stable partner in the future. That’s the hope, and I appreciate 

that answer. 

Pakistan. I just read in the news, so I don’t know any details, 

this deal that was done or being proposed between the Pakistan 

government and Taliban type organizations in the Swat region 

about sharia law being applied, what’s your take on that and how 

do you feel about that proposal? 

General MAPLES. Sir, an agreement reached by the governor of 

the Northwest Province with the militants in the Swat Valley has 

both some pluses and minuses to it. From a judicial standpoint, the 

application of sharia law in some form—of course, there are many 

forms of sharia law—provides a more responsive approach to the 

citizens in the valley, and that’s how the Pakistanis see it. 

There are some conditions of the Pakistan government that go 

along with this. 

Senator GRAHAM. If you were a woman in Pakistan, would that 

be unnerving to you? 

General MAPLES. Absolutely, sir, it would. It is also unnerving to 

us from the standpoint of what that means to other militants—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

General MAPLES. —in the region. 

Senator GRAHAM. Exactly. 

General MAPLES. We’re very concerned about that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it just a practical accommodation because of 

weakness or is this in the mind of the governor of the region a winwin? What would make one engage in such an agreement? 

General MAPLES. I believe it was, at least initially, was a belief 

that he could reduce violence by giving in to that. The reality is 

it hasn’t changed the activities of the militants. 

Senator GRAHAM. As a matter of fact, to me it is a very disturbing event that could really send the wrong signal to the wrong 

people at the wrong time. 

General MAPLES. Absolutely. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, when it comes to budgets, Director Blair, 

I think you’re well positioned to guide this Nation through some 

very difficult times, both of you gentlemen. The President’s budget 

proposes a decrease in defense spending. We’re at 3.6 percent of 

GDP, I believe is the accurate number in terms of defense spending 

to GDP, and over time that budget would go down to 3 percent. Is 

that a wise move? What effect would it have, if any, on the ability 

to defend our Nation? 

Director BLAIR. I haven’t sorted out the consequences from that 

point of view, from an intelligence point of view. I can comment 

that, at least in the budget negotiations that have to do with the 

intelligence part of it, the national intelligence program, there 

seems to be a strong understanding of the importance for intelVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
105 

ligence, and I’ll be up here testifying about the adequacy of that 

soon. 

Senator GRAHAM. The reason I asked that question is we envision growing the Army and the Marine Corps, which I think is a 

good move, but the highest cost of DOD is personnel costs. So if 

you’re going to increase the number of people and that’s your highest cost already, something has to give somewhere. I would like if 

you could look at it and see what would give, and does that make 

us weaker or stronger? 

When it comes to Yemen—I saw your evaluation—do you believe 

it would be a wise idea to release any detainee at Guantanamo Bay 

back into Yemen? 

Director BLAIR. That would have to be decided on a case by case 

basis. But the initial experience that has been had with detainees 

that have been released to Saudi Arabia and then have gone to 

Yemen has been really, really mixed. Some of them have taken 

part and returned to the fold. Some of them have made a move and 

then come back again. So it doesn’t inspire confidence. 

Senator GRAHAM. General Maples, have you reviewed the detainee operations in Afghanistan? If you have, could you give us a 

brief assessment of detainee operations? It is my opinion that the 

number of detainees will likely grow as we engage in more fighting. 

What is the disposition plan for foreign fighters held in Bagram Air 

Base in Afghanistan, or do we know yet? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I don’t know yet. We have had discussions 

about the issue that you just raised, and that is as we introduce 

more U.S. forces, particularly in southern Afghanistan, that there 

may be a need to provide for additional detainees that we would 

expect to come in. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you both. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

We’re now going to adjourn to Hart 219 for a classified session. 

We’ll meet there in 5 minutes. I expect it will be fairly brief, but 

let’s see if we can all get there in 5 minutes. 

We stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA ON MISSILE DEFENSE

1. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, in your prepared testimony you indicate that 

‘‘some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, 

along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security and goals might . . . 

prompt Tehran to extend the halt to [its] nuclear weapons-related activities.’’ As I 

mentioned in my opening statement, there may be an important opportunity now 

to explore cooperation with Russia on missile defense as a new element of our efforts to dissuade Iran from such activities. 

If the United States and Russia could agree to pursue cooperation on missile defense, could it help to dissuade Iran from taking the nuclear weapons path? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

2. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, given previous United States-Russian discussions on possible missile defense cooperation, if Russia is interested in improving 

its security relations with the United States, do you believe Russia would have an 

interest in cooperating with us on missile defense? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

106 

RECONCILIATION WITH TALIBAN

3. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, it has been reported that President Obama suggested a willingness to consider reconciling with 

more moderate elements of the Taliban, similar to the way General Petraeus was 

able to improve security in Iraq by reaching out to local Sunni tribesmen who rejected the violent tactics of al Qaeda in Iraq. In your view, is the Taliban in Afghanistan a monolithic group? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

4. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and General Maples, are there different factions 

or tribes within the Taliban that could provide an opportunity to achieve reconciliation without returning to a situation in which al Qaeda and associated extremists 

are able to find safe haven in regions of Afghanistan? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

AN AFGHANISTAN VERSION OF SONS OF IRAQ

5. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, a major new initiative in Afghanistan is the Afghan Public Protection Program. The program works 

through community ‘‘shuras,’’ or councils, to select local members of the Afghan Public Protection Force, who will serve neighborhood watch-like functions in their home 

communities. The program will be accountable to the Minister of the Interior. Some 

see the program as an important program for improving security in tribal areas, 

while others have expressed concern the program risks renewing or supporting warlords. Is the approach of paying local tribes to maintain security in their communities, along the model of the Sons of Iraq, applicable in Afghanistan, or are the 

conditions in Afghanistan too different for this model to work? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

6. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, significant attention has been focused on the lines of communication (LOCs) used to supply the 

United States and other international forces in Afghanistan. The ground LOCs 

through Pakistan have come under attack by insurgents, and the Government of 

Kyrgyzstan has decided to close the Manas air base used by United States forces. 

United States officials have emphasized the need to establish and preserve multiple 

options, and progress has apparently been made in exploring some northern routes, 

several of which would reportedly involve the Russian Federation. How willing is 

Russia to support the overall international effort in Afghanistan? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

7. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, how much of a 

liability might reliance on Russia prove to be, bearing in mind that any transit 

agreements offer host nations ongoing potential leverage? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

COOPERATION ON COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS WITH IRAN

8. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, according to the 

International Narcotics Control Board, illicit opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan dropped from its record level in 2007 and the number of provinces free of 

opium poppy also increased, from 13 to 18. Despite these improvements, Afghanistan continues to account for by far the largest share of the world’s illicit opium 

poppy cultivation. Some reports suggest that much of this opium is trafficking to 

and through Iran. Does the Iranian government have concerns about the presence 

of the drug trade and drug use in its country and are they undertaking any law 

enforcement or military operations to counter the threat of narcotics in their country? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

107 

9. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, as the administration continues to review its policy vis-a-vis Iran, in your assessment, are there 

opportunities for cooperation between the United States and Iran on counternarcotics activities? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

AL QAEDA IN PAKISTAN

10. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, your prepared statement asserts that al Qaeda 

has been badly damaged by the air strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. You proceed to speculate about what would happen to 

al Qaeda ‘‘if forced to vacate the FATA and locate elsewhere.’’ The implication seems 

to be that you believe the air strikes are making al Qaeda’s situation in Pakistan 

untenable and that they may be thinking of relocating. Are you in fact implying that 

al Qaeda is being hit so hard in Pakistan that it may decide to quit the region? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

11. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, do you have evidence for this? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

12. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, what probability is assigned to this? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS

13. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, many experts believe that Pakistan seeks to 

dominate the Afghanistan Government, by sponsoring militant groups like the 

Taliban, in part because of Pakistan’s belief that India seeks to annihilate the Pakistan state. In this view, Pakistan believes it must have a friendly regime in Afghanistan so that Afghanistan can serve as a ‘‘strategic rear’’ for Pakistan’s confrontation 

in the east against India. Pakistan also sponsors violent extremist groups as proxies 

against India in the dispute over Kashmir. These experts conclude that Pakistan is 

very unlikely to adopt a more cooperative stance on Afghanistan unless the IndiaPakistan relationship is fundamentally changed. 

The Composite Dialogue between Pakistan and India has made considerable 

progress in recent years. Moreover, it was recently revealed that India and Pakistan 

pursued a very serious, secret backchannel negotiation over Kashmir since 1999 

under President Musharraf that reached a high degree of maturity before being deferred due to the political decline of Musharraf. Does the Intelligence Community 

(IC) share the view that the Pakistan-India relationship is key to altering Pakistan’s 

behavior towards Afghanistan? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

14. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, does the IC believe that a breakthrough in 

India-Pakistan security relations is possible, given what has been achieved in the 

Composite Dialogue and in the backchannel negotiations? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

15. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, is Pakistan politically ready to resolve its strategic differences with India? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

16. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, how should the militant attacks on the Indian 

embassy in Kabul and Mumbai be interpreted in light of the revelation about the 

backchannel Kashmir negotiations? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

17. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, the Iraqi Government must still enact important legislation to achieve meaningful and lasting political reconciliation and stability. What is your assessment of the prospects that the 

Government of Iraq will be able to enact legislation this year that will settle the 

internal boundary issues in northern Iraq with respect to the Iraqi Arabs, Turkmen, 

and Kurds; establish authorities for the control and management of the Iraqi oil and 

gas industry and the fair distribution of revenues; and continue the resolution of 

108 

constitutional issues regarding the powers of the central and provincial governments? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

FRAGILITY OR STABILITY OF GAINS

18. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, diplomatic and 

military leaders in Iraq have cautioned that security gains over the last year are 

fragile and subject to reversal. What is your assessment of the stability of security 

gains and reduced violence? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

19. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, what, in your 

assessment, are the greatest threats to these gains and what are the prospects of 

these threats materializing? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

20. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, General 

Odierno, the Commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq, has indicated that if Iraq 

can peacefully and successfully get through the district and parliamentary elections 

scheduled through 2009, then political, economic, and security gains will have taken 

root. What is your assessment of Iraqi elections as indicators of increasing or decreasing stability and security in Iraq? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

21. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, are there other 

indicators that are better barometers of improving or deteriorating stability conditions? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

POTENTIAL OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

22. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, an important 

aspect of the improved security conditions in Iraq is the improved capability of the 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). What is your assessment of the overall capability and 

reliability of the ISF? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

23. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, in your view, 

what are the enduring challenges or threats to the establishment of a reliably professional and capable ISF? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

24. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, what is your 

assessment of security conditions in those provinces where ISF have already assumed responsibility for maintaining security? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

25. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, what is your 

assessment of the infiltration or the risk of infiltration of ISF by sectarian militias, 

al Qaeda-in-Iraq, and Iranian agents? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

MUQTADA AL-SADR

26. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, in your statement you indicate that Shiite militant groups affiliated with cleric Muqtada al-Sadr are adapting their objectives and 

tactics away from violence to become ‘‘cultural organizations and a counterweight 

109 

to Western influence.’’ You acknowledge, however, that some Sadrist groups remain 

dangerous and may engage in sporadic attacks. What is your assessment of 

Muqtada al-Sadr’s intentions and capabilities through the rest of this year, especially with respect to the district and parliamentary elections? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

27. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, what do you expect Muqtada al-Sadr and his 

affiliated groups will do to respond to or take advantage of the withdrawal of United 

States combat forces through August 2010? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

STRENGTH OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE

28. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, how would you 

characterize the degree of influence Iran exercises over the government, Shiite organizations, and the Shiite population as a whole in Iraq? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

29. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, is this influence growing or shrinking? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

IRANIAN NUCLEAR INTENTIONS

30. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, on page 20 of your prepared statement, you 

write that ‘‘we do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.’’ However, on page 9 of your statement, twice you remark about Iran’s ‘‘pursuit 

of a nuclear weapons capability.’’ Are these statements contradictory? What distinction do you draw between the intention to ‘‘develop nuclear weapons’’ and ‘‘pursue 

a nuclear weapons capability’’? 

Director BLAIR. The full sentence from page 20 of the prepared Unclassified Statement for the Record was ‘‘Although we do not know whether Iran currently intends 

to develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the 

option to develop them.’’ To ‘‘pursue a nuclear weapons capability’’ is consistent with 

Iran ‘‘keeping open the option to develop’’ nuclear weapons. In particular, as noted 

on pages 19–20 of that statement, ‘‘Iranian entities are continuing to develop a 

range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, 

if a decision were made to do so. 

a. (U) Iran continues its efforts to develop uranium enrichment technology, 

which can be used both to produce low-enriched uranium for power reactor 

fuel and to produce highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. 

b. (U) As noted, Iran continues to deploy and improve ballistic missiles inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons. 

c. (U) We assess Iran since fall 2003 has conducted research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications, some 

of which would be of limited use for nuclear weapons.’’ 

SYRIA-ISRAELI PEACE PROSPECTS

31. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, Syria and 

Israel, with the assistance of Turkey, have been meeting to discuss a possible peace 

agreement. Does the IC believe that Syria would be willing to give up its strategic 

alliance with Iran in exchange for regaining the Golan Heights? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

SYRIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR

32. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, your prepared statement indicates that the IC 

believes that the structure Israel destroyed in Syria was a nuclear reactor supplied 

by North Korea. 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

110 

33. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair, do you believe that this reactor was intended 

to support a Syrian nuclear initiative, or was it in fact intended to support Iran’s 

nuclear program? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

EGYPT-GAZA BORDER—ROCKET/MISSILE SMUGGLING

34. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, in bringing an 

end to the Israeli invasion of Gaza a few months ago, it was clear Israel’s number 

one decisionmaking factor was whether the Egyptian government had the will and 

fortitude to attack aggressively the tunnels along the border with Gaza and the 

smuggling network throughout Egypt that enables weapons to enter Gaza. In recent 

months, we have seen the Egyptians undertake a number of efforts along the border 

to identify and counter the tunneling threat. However, we have not heard reports 

of an aggressive counter-smuggling effort. What is the IC’s assessment of the current counter-tunneling effort along the Egypt-Gaza border? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

35. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, what is the 

IC’s assessment of Egyptian efforts to attack the smuggling operations throughout 

Egypt, particularly along its border with Sudan? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

36. Senator LEVIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, if the Israelis 

do not view the Egyptian’s activities as adequate, do we believe the Israelis will attack unilaterally? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

37. Senator AKAKA. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, if history has 

taught us nothing else, it is that significance can develop from unpredictable sources 

that had previously received little or no attention before it was too late. What geographic region of the world or subset of space/cyberspace threats not identified during the hearing has the biggest potential to be a future challenge to United States 

national security? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

CYBER ATTACKS

38. Senator AKAKA. Lieutenant General Maples, for decades the United States has 

maintained full spectrum dominance in the sea, land, air, and space domains. Due 

to the scope and sophistication of malicious attacks to our computer networks, we 

must pay equal attention to the cyberspace domain. What is your assessment of the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) organization and integration of its cyber forces 

across the DOD? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

IRAQ

39. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, on February 27, President Obama announced 

his withdrawal plan for Iraq. I believe the President’s plan is reasonable, but it is 

not without risk. We will need to be cautious as we withdraw troops so as not to 

jeopardize these achievements, and listen closely to the commanders on the ground 

as the administration determines the pace of withdrawals. I was pleased that the 

President was willing to reconsider a plan based upon conditions on the ground. Did 

the IC participate in the Obama administration policy review leading to the decision 

to withdraw troops from Iraq? If so, how? 

111 

Director BLAIR. The Intelligence Community provided key findings and analytic 

assessments on Iraq to a series of policymaker meetings on troop drawdown options 

leading up to the President’s policy announcement. 

40. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, what does 

the IC assess are the potential flashpoints in Iraq that could still flare and possibly 

require an adjustment to the plan and did the IC convey this to the White House? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

41. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and General Maples, does the IC have the resources necessary to adequately support the withdrawal plan for Iraq while simultaneously increasing operations in Afghanistan? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

VIOLENCE IN MEXICO

42. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, as a result of increasing pressure from the 

Calderon government on the well-armed and capable Mexican drug cartels, we have 

seen a marked increase in violence, abductions, and arms smuggling near the 

United States-Mexico border. Last week, Secretary Gates labeled the situation as 

a ‘‘serious problem’’ and signaled a willingness to provide increased assistance to the 

Mexican government in the form of military hardware, training, and intelligence 

support. Former Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Hayden stated recently the violence in Mexico will pose the second greatest threat to United States 

security this year, right after al Qaeda. Do you agree with former Director Hayden’s 

and Secretary Gates’ assessments about violence along the Mexican border? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

43. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, will that emerge as the second greatest 

threat to United States security? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

44. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, please describe in what ways the IC is working with the Mexican government to contain this growing threat? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

45. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, a recent report stated that a large percentage 

of the weapons used by these drug cartels originate in the United States. Secretary 

Napolitano stated last week that the drug-related violence in Mexico was a ‘‘top priority’’ for her Department and pledged to work closely with other United States 

agencies to confront the weapons trafficking largely responsible for this growing 

threat. What steps have been taken to integrate the efforts of the IC and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to track and combat the trafficking of such 

weaponry and related hardware? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

AL QAEDA AND THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS

46. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, in your statement you say that sustained 

pressure against al Qaeda in the FATA has the potential to further degrade its organizational cohesion and diminish the threat it poses. What do you think will happen to al Qaeda in the FATA if pressure there were relaxed or halted? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

47. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, do you believe that the al Qaeda leadership 

could establish the network’s headquarters elsewhere? If so, where? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

48. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, are there any members inside al Qaeda that 

could effectively replace Bin Laden or Zawahiri? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

49. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, absent a safe haven and/or the demise of its 

principal leaders, what happens to the movement? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

112 

50. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, currently, which al Qaeda affiliate or affiliates pose the most significant threat to the United States Homeland and United 

States interests worldwide? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

51. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, do you believe our European allies are adequately concerned and focused on the threat posed by al Qaeda? If not, why not? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

PAKISTAN

52. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, Afghanistan’s problems exist, of course, in a 

regional context, and we must increasingly view them as such. A special focus of 

our regional strategy must be Pakistan. For too long we have viewed Pakistan as 

important because of our goals in Afghanistan. Yet Pakistan is not simply important 

because of Afghanistan; Pakistan is important because of Pakistan. We cannot simply subordinate our Pakistan strategy to our Afghanistan policy. What is your current assessment of the future of Pakistan? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

53. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, what are the chances that the state will fall 

further and further under the control of Islamic extremists? If it does, what are the 

consequences? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

54. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, can you describe the economic situation in 

Pakistan and how it may impact stability in Pakistan? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

55. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, how do we address Pakistan’s border concerns or insecurities? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

56. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, what role can India play in stabilizing Afghanistan and how are we engaging them? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

57. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, do you believe that while some of Pakistan’s 

civilian and military leaders recognize the threat that growing militancy poses, 

many government leaders tolerate or employ militant groups as important policy instruments for maintaining stability in western Pakistan or exerting pressure on 

Kabul or New Delhi? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

58. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, do believe the new government in Pakistan 

and its military leaders are preoccupied about a potential war with India? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

59. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, do you believe Pakistan’s insecurities about 

India can be reduced? If so, how? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

KURD-ARAB FRICTION IN IRAQ

60. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, the Kurdish presence and 

claims across northern Iraq’s disputed territories are fueling ethnic tensions and potential violence between Kurds and Arabs. The constitutional process for resolving 

disputed territories outlined in Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution has stalled, and 

the United Nation’s three-phase plan to facilitate the Article 140 process has not 

achieved measurable progress. How would you assess the current level of tension 

between Arabs and Kurds? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

61. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, is it increasing, decreasing, or 

staying the same? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

113 

62. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, is Kurdish political leverage diminishing? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

63. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, is this troubling to the future 

stability of Iraq? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

IRANIAN ACTIVITY IN IRAQ

64. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, the Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps (IRGC) is part of the Iranian government and has a central role in 

carrying out Iran’s policies in Iraq through its special operations command—the 

Qods Force. What do you assess to be Iran’s objectives in Iraq now? Have they 

changed? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

65. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, do you anticipate Iranian meddling during Iraq’s upcoming elections? If so, what do you expect? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

66. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, does the IRGC-Qods Force continue to covertly train, fund, and arm Iraqi insurgents and militias? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

67. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, will this activity continue as we 

withdraw? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

68. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, will the Qods Force target our 

withdrawing forces? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

69. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, do you have any evidence that 

there are more or fewer Iranian-made weapons or explosively former penetrator 

components going into Iraq? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

CYBER SECURITY AND CYBER THREATS

70. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, the United States depends on the cyber infrastructure heavily, possibly more than any other nation. Our Nation’s security and 

economic prosperity depend on the security and stability of our communications and 

information networks. On February 9, President Obama ordered a 60-day review of 

the Nation’s cyber security to examine a Federal organizational construct to address 

issues related to United States and global information and communications infrastructure and capabilities. 

What do you think the greatest threats to the United States are in terms of cyber 

security and communications infrastructure? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

71. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, at the threat hearing before the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence on February 12 you said, ‘‘I don’t think the combination 

of terrorists and cyber is a nexus that we are most worried about.’’ In an age dominated by asymmetric warfare I would not necessarily like to rule anything out. If 

a terrorist organization had the capability to damage or attack our communications 

networks or its supporting infrastructure, would they do it? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

72. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, are there currently any indications that any 

terrorist group has the intent or capability to launch a cyber attack against the 

United States or our worldwide interests? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

73. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, how is the IC currently organized to address 

cyber threats? Is that structure adequate to address the threat? Last month, you 

told the House Intelligence Committee that the National Security Agency (NSA), not 

114 

the DHS, should be put in charge of network defense. Why is the NSA best suited 

to lead this effort? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

NEGOTIATING WITH THE TALIBAN

74. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, in late 2008 

discussion about ‘‘reconciliation’’ with the Taliban and other insurgents gained momentum. Last week, President Obama stated in an interview that the United States 

was not winning the war in Afghanistan and opened the door to a reconciliation 

process in which the American military would reach out to elements of the Taliban. 

President Obama told the New York Times, ‘‘If you talk to General Petraeus, I think 

he would argue that part of the success in Iraq involved reaching out to people that 

we would consider being Islamic fundamentalists, but who were willing to work 

with us because they had been completely alienated by the tactics of al Qaeda in 

Iraq.’’ Is it valid to consider the Sunni tribes in Anbar to be ‘‘Islamic fundamentalists’’ and to view them in a similar way to the Taliban? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

75. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, the situation 

in Afghanistan is more complex than Iraq. What are the risks associated with opening negotiations with the Taliban at this time? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

76. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, do you believe we are actually in a position to begin constructive dialogue with elements of 

the Taliban now? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

77. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, to begin 

these talks we will need to have at least moderate confidence in our intelligence 

about whom we are about to open negotiations. Are we there yet? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

KARZAI AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN

78. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, few would 

argue that the central government’s limited writ and perceived corruption are helping sustain a Taliban insurgency, and feeding pessimism about the Afghanistan stabilization effort. President Karzai recently called for early elections in Afghanistan. 

Afghanistan’s independent election commission subsequently rejected Karzai’s call 

for the election to be held by April, and instead formally confirmed August 20 as 

the voting date. The commission cited security problems as an important factor in 

its decision, saying it hoped the Taliban insurgency raging in much of the countryside might be better controlled by August. Is Karzai disconnected from what is going 

on inside Afghanistan? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

79. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, will there be 

an effective electoral opposition? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

80. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, do you assess 

that Karzai will be able to address the issues of corruption and narcotics in Afghanistan? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

81. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, does Karzai 

have constructive relationships with his regional neighbors? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

115 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

82. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, can you describe relations between the governments in Kabul and Islamabad now that 

Musharraf has left the political scene? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

IRANIAN ACTIVITY IN AFGHANISTAN

83. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, Iran is trying to restore some 

of its traditional sway in eastern, central, and northern Afghanistan where Persianspeaking Afghans predominate, while also gaining leverage over the United States 

and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) there. Although the government in 

Teheran has a long history of opposing Taliban rule, should we view Iran’s role in 

Afghanistan with suspicion? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

84. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, what can you tell us of the role 

the Qods Forces are playing in Afghanistan? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

DRUG TRADE AND COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

85. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, one of the thorniest problems 

in Afghanistan is its flourishing drug trade, which accounts for an estimated 90 percent of the world’s heroin supply. In October 2008, NATO defense ministers decided 

to allow International Security Assistance Forces to take on the drug traffickers who 

are fueling the insurgency, destabilizing Afghanistan, and killing our troops. Can 

you outline the general pattern of how money and drugs are used to finance the 

counterinsurgency? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

86. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, do you believe Afghanistan is 

a narco-state, or approaching one? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

87. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, what immediate and mid-term 

actions do you believe could be taken, by both the Government of Afghanistan and 

NATO, against the drug trade in Afghanistan that could assist in achievement of 

United States and NATO objectives? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

88. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, what role, if any, does the IC play in supporting military efforts to target and interdict drug lords and labs in Afghanistan? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

89. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, how does the IC interface with drug enforcement organizations in this effort? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

SUICIDE BOMBERS

90. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, Professor Robert Pape, in his book Dying to 

Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, argues that foreign occupation is the 

key driving factor behind suicide terrorist attacks. ‘‘The data show,’’ he writes, ‘‘that 

there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or 

any one of the world’s religions. . . . Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to 

be their homeland.’’ Professor Pape wrote his book before the increase of foreign 

troops in Iraq during 2007 led to a reduction in the number of suicide attacks inside 

that country. What is your assessment of his thesis and how the surge in Iraq affects it? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

116 

91. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, how does the presence of foreign military 

forces rank among the drivers of terrorism when compared to, for example, the 

widespread availability of extremist education, internal repression and lack of economic opportunity, and perceived injustices in policy? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

RUSSIA

92. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, where do you assess that Medvedev and 

Putin are taking the country? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

93. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, do you assess that Russia can become a partner in counterproliferation and counterterrorism? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

94. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Maples, what is the state of Russian 

military modernization? 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

BELARUS

95. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, numerous press accounts have reported that 

the Government of Belarus has commenced a strategic outreach to the West, including a large release of political prisoners, in an effort to develop an alternative to 

its close ties with Russia. The European Union has responded positively. How do 

you assess this reported shift in orientation? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

CHINA

96. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, China has been steadily building up its strategic and conventional capabilities since the 1990s. China publically says its 2008 

defense budget was $61 billion, though the Pentagon has historically challenged Beijing’s reported figures as being low. All that spending has built a capable submarine 

fleet, an air force stocked with Russian warplanes, improved ballistic missiles, as 

well as satellite surveillance, radar, and interception capabilities. While China continues to stress that its military modernization is in line with its peaceful rise in 

the world, what do you assess China’s long-term security objectives to be? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

97. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, what are its objectives vis-a-vis Taiwan and 

other territorial claims? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

TERRORIST GROUPS IN SOUTH AMERICA’S TRI-BORDER AREA

98. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, the lawless tri-border area (TBA) of Brazil, 

Argentina, and Paraguay is a haven for drug smugglers and other radical groups, 

including sympathizers of Hamas and Hezbollah according to the 2008 State Department Country Report on Terrorism. The ability of these groups to organize, 

train, and raise money with near impunity should be of serious concern not only 

to these countries, but also to the United States. To what extent have these violent 

groups been able to solidify local support in the TBA? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

99. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, in your view, are the Governments of Brazil, 

Argentina, and Paraguay equipped to combat the threat posed by these violent 

groups and break up their operational capabilities? If not, where are their shortfalls? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

100. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, what can the IC do to assist this effort? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

117 

IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

101. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, in January, Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates stated that he is ‘‘concerned about the level of subversive activity that the 

Iranians are carrying on in a number of places in Latin America, particularly South 

and Central America.’’ Do you share in the Secretary’s concern? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

102. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, what steps can be taken to counter Iranian 

influence in the region? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

103. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, through the 

Cold War, we largely emphasized space and signals intelligence and deemphasized 

human intelligence (HUMINT). On April 14, 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told the 9/11 Commission that it will take ‘‘5 more years to 

rebuild the clandestine service.’’ As we approach the fifth anniversary of that prognostication, what is your assessment of the current state of our HUMINT capabilities? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND COOPERATION

104. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, before the attacks of September 11, there 

were institutional impediments to intelligence sharing and cooperation both between 

the IC and law enforcement; within the IC of the United States itself; and with our 

allies and partners around the world. You’ve been on the job a little over a month 

and a half now. Do you have any initial impressions of the analytic capabilities of 

the IC? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

105. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, how would you evaluate the current state 

of exchange between the agencies of the IC? With law enforcement? With our allies? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

106. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, what impediments, if any, still exist and 

how would you propose remedying them? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

107. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, what can 

you tell us about the presence of IC analysts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the value 

any such analytic presence brings to the time-sensitive needs of our Armed Forces? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

CONTRACTORS

108. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, do you have an estimate on the number of 

private contractors that are used by the intelligence agencies to perform intelligence 

activities? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

109. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, do you believe that these private contractors 

require rigorous oversight from the intelligence agencies? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

110. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, do you believe the intelligence agencies have 

personnel trained and resourced to ensure that rigorous oversight is provided? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

111. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, do you believe there are any intelligence activities that are too sensitive or too important to be conducted by contractors? If so, 

please identify them. 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

118 

RELATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

112. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, at your confirmation hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 22, you said ‘‘I think we need to 

get rid of this artificial division in this global campaign against terrorists when the 

tools that are available in the DOD and the intelligence agency are both applicable 

and both need to be put together to get the job done. I find that operational effectiveness is in fact distorted by the way the authorities which are written for a different era come down. So I very much think we need to fix that problem.’’ How are 

your relations with the Secretary of Defense? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

113. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, how serious are the divisions you discussed 

between the DOD and the IC? What would you propose to fix them? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

114. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, how do your organizations make major joint 

acquisition decisions? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

115. Senator MCCAIN. Director Blair, are you satisfied with the current process? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS

IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

116. Senator COLLINS. Director Blair, the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) recently issued a report on the Iranian nuclear program asserting Iran now 

has more than 1,000 kilograms of Low Enriched Uranium—which if further enriched to weapons-grade—would be enough for a single nuclear weapon. In the past 

3 months, Iran has completed the installation of nearly 1,500 new centrifuges—an 

increase of more than 40 percent and now has more than 5,000 operating. IAEA inspectors lack sufficient access to key Iranian nuclear facilities, and Iran continues 

to refuse IAEA requests for design information or access to additional locations related to many aspects of their nuclear program. 

Israel’s military intelligence chief said recently that Iran has ‘‘crossed the technological threshold,’’ and its attainment of nuclear military capability is now a matter 

of ‘‘incorporating the goal of producing an atomic bomb into its strategy.’’ Your assessment is different from that of the Israelis, correct? Please explain. 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

PAKISTAN

117. Senator COLLINS. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, the political 

instability in Pakistan, the recent concessions to the Taliban, the assassination of 

former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and the near constant tensions between 

India and Pakistan highlight the volatile security concerns in Pakistan and of its 

nuclear weapons. Do you believe that Pakistan’s nuclear inventory is at risk of falling into the hands of terrorists? 

Director BLAIR. [Deleted.] 

Lieutenant General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

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