alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Case No. 8,735.

#### McCORMICK v. SEYMOUR.

Patents — Abandonment — Forfeiture —Invention — Unsuccessful Experiments — New Combination — Reaping Machine.

1. Those who rely upon the ground that a party has forfeited a legal right, secured to him in due form of law, for the purpose of defeating his enjoyment of that right, must make out the point clearly and satisfactorily, beyond any reasonable doubt or hesitation, because the law does not favor an abandonment, and throws upon a party who seeks to obtain the benefit of a forfeiture the burden of proving it beyond all reasonable question.

2. In order to entitle a person to the character of an inventor, and his invention to become the subject of a patent, he must not stop at unsuccessful experiments, but continue until he has brought out a machine producing a useful result; and without this his invention will be worthless to the community, and undeserving the protection of the law.

3. Invention, as it respects machines is any new arrangement or combination, whether of old or now parts or materials, producing in its arrangement and combination a useful result.

4. The improvement was not simply putting a seat on a machine for the raker, but was the arrangement and combination of the parts of the machine so that the patentee was enabled to obtain room on the machine for the raker, and that he might have the free use of his body and limbs in raking off the grain, avoiding the labor and fatigue and inconvenience of walking. The seat or position of the raker on the. machine was the object had in view, and was the result of his new-*1322arrangement and combination of the different parts of the machine.

[0*+"-1 in law's Dig. 301. 314. 420. 443. 472. 544, to the points stated above. Nowhere reported; opinion not now accessible.)
No. 44418.

#### Protests 28649-K, etc., of Ampol, Inc., et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel and on the authority of *Stokby*v. *United States*(4 Cust. Ct. 343, C. D. 358) it was held that 10 percent allowance should have been made for the weight of the gelatinous material in question.
Exhibit 99.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of ITSA Ltd. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q/A for the quarter ended March 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Carlos Andre Studart
Lins de Albuquerque, Acting Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.





/s/ Carlos Andre Studart Lins de Albuquerque


Carlos Andre Studart Lins de Albuquerque
Acting Chief Financial Officer
February 21, 2003
June 9, 2015

Mr. David D. Speace
President DZP Video/Multimedia, Inc.
200 Bethlehem Dr. Suite 108 Morgantown, PA 19543

Dear Mr. Speace:

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption from §§ 21 subpart H; 45.23(b); 61.113(a) and (b); 91.7(a); 91.9(b)(2); 91.103; 91.109; 91.119(c); 91.121; 91.151(a); 91.203 (a) and (b); 91.405 (a); 91.407 (a) (1); 91.409 (a)(1) and (2); 91.417(a) and (b) of Title 14, Code of Federa l Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we can not process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can Not Process Your Request

We entered your February 20, 2015, exemption request on behalf of DZP Video/Multimedia, Inc. into the public docket (No. FAA-2015-0432), but we are unable to process your request any further. The information you sent does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following:

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would benefit the public as a whole.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.2

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677.

Sincerely,
/s/
Brenda Robeson Program Analyst, Airmen and Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
```

[Federal Register: July 30, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 146)]
[Notices]               
[Page 44941]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr30jy10-33]                         

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION

 
Sunshine Act Meetings

TIME AND DATE: Wednesday, August 4, 2010; 2 p.m.-4 p.m.

PLACE: Room 410, Bethesda Towers, 4330 East West Highway, Bethesda, 
Maryland.

STATUS: Closed to the Public.

Matters To Be Considered

Compliance Status Report

    The Commission staff will brief the Commission on the status of 
compliance matters.
    For a recorded message containing the latest agenda information, 
call (301) 504-7948.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Todd A. Stevenson, Office of the 
Secretary, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 4330 East West 
Highway, Bethesda, MD 20814, (301) 504-7923.

    Dated: July 27, 2010.
Todd A. Stevenson,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-18910 Filed 7-28-10; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6355-01-P
```
# C_2013141EN.01000902.xml

| 18.5.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 141/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.5.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 141/9

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku (Poland) lodged on 25 January 2013 — Małgorzata Nierodzik v Samodzielny Publiczny Psychiatryczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej im. dr Stanisława Deresza w Choroszczy

(Case C-38/13)

2013/C 141/15

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Małgorzata Nierodzik

Applicant:

Defendant: Samodzielny Publiczny Psychiatryczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej im. dr Stanisława Deresza w Choroszczy

Defendant:

Question referred

Question referred

Must Article 1 of Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, (1) clause 1 of the annex to Directive 1999/70/EC, clause 4 of the annex to Directive 1999/70/EC and the general principle of European Union law prohibiting discrimination based on the type of employment contract be construed as meaning that they preclude provisions of national law establishing rules for determining the length of the notice period for the termination of fixed-term employment contracts concluded for a period exceeding six months which are different (less favourable for workers employed on fixed-term contracts) from the rules determining the length of the notice period for the termination of open-ended employment contracts; more specifically, do they preclude provisions of national law (Article 33 of the Law relating to the Labour Code of 26 June 1974 — Dz. U. 1998, No 21, Position 94, as subsequently amended) which, irrespective of a worker’s length of service, establish a fixed two-week notice period for the termination of fixed-term contracts concluded for a period exceeding six months, whereas the length of the notice period for the termination of open-ended contracts is dependent on the worker’s length of service and may range from two weeks to up to three months (Article 36(1) of the Law relating to the Labour Code)?

1

---

(1)  OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43.

1

---
#### TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant, v. Michelle Renee WHITEFIELD, Appellee.

No. 10-98-214-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco.

June 9, 1999.

Steve Dennis, Texas Dept, of Public Safety, Bryan, Kevin M. Givens, Texas Dept, of Public Safety, Austin, James Ku-vet, Hearings Atty., Tex. Dept, of Public Safety, McAllen, James M. Kuboviak, County Atty., Bryan, for appellant.

Norbert C. Mahnke, O’Connor *&*Associates, Bryan, for appellee.

*887Before Chief Justice DAVIS, Justice VANCE, and Justice GRAY.

OPINION

BILL VANCE, Justice.

Michelle Whitefield was arrested on November 20, 1997, for driving while intoxicated. Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 49.04 (Vernon 1994 & Supp.1999). She submitted to a breath test which indicated a blood-alcohol level greater than .10. Whitefield was notified that her driver’s license would be suspended due to her blood-alcohol level. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 524.011-.015 (Vernon 1999). She timely requested a hearing before the administrative law judge (“ALJ”), and a hearing was held on January 7, 1998. *Id.*§§ 524.031, 524.035 (Vernon 1999). The ALJ sustained the suspension. Whitefield appealed to the County Court at Law No. 1 in Brazos County, which reversed the ALJ decision. *Id.*§ 524.041 (Vernon 1999).

DPS seeks to appeal the judgment of the county court at law. We have recently held that we do not have jurisdiction over license-suspension appeals resulting from the refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test. *Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Barlow,*992 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.App. — Waco 1999); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. ch. 724 (Vernon 1999). Appeals of the ALJ decision under chapter 724 are governed by the procedures in chapter 524. Tex. TraNSp. Code Ann. § 724.047; *Barlow,*at 734 n. 1. Thus, our reasoning in *Barlow*applies equally to appeals arising under Chapter 524.

As in *Barlow,*this licence-suspension appeal arises from a judgment of a county court at law. The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provides for appeals from judgments of only the district court. *Barlow,*at 734-35, 741; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.901 (Vernon 1999). Nor does the record reveal that the “amount in controversy” requirement for civil appeals generally has been satisfied. *Barlow,*at 738-34, 741; Tex. Civ. PraC. *&*Rem.Code Am § 51.012 (Vernon 1997).

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Ex 10.6 NSE 3Q 2007 FORM 10-Q






August 2, 2007 



Re: Larry MacFarlane 



Dear Larry: 



        This
letter sets forward a draft of our current thinking regarding your leaving Nu Skin. This
letter sets forth the proposed conditions and agreements that apply to your termination of
employment. 



        From
July 23, 2007 until October 31, 2007 you will report to Dan Chard, as an internal
consultant regarding Distributor Success (DS) technology strategy and organization. 



	•	  	Stock
 -- Your stock options will continue to vest through October 31.  






        On
October 31, 2007 your employment with Nu Skin Enterprises, Inc. will end. 



	• 	  	Severance  






        On
the effective date of your Settlement and Release Agreement, you will receive a lump sum
severance benefit of $250,000 less federal and state withholding taxes and other
applicable deductions made up of the following components: 



               	a. 	  	
                    As of September 30, 2007 your Deferred Compensation balance, including the
                    Company portion, will be 100% vested. Payout of your Deferred Compensation
                    account will be as previously elected by you in the amount of $84,150. 



                    



               	b. 	  	
                    A lump sum cash payment of $165,850. 



                    



        Restricted
stock and stock option vesting will stop at your termination date, and you will have
90-days to exercise any vested options under the terms of your stock options. 



	•	  	Non-Compete
Agreement  






        Paragraph
10 (Non-Competition) of the Key-Employment Covenants signed by you on September 10,
2003 is hereby amended as follows: 



	  	
In
exchange for the severance benefit outlines above, Employee (Larry MacFarlane) shall not
accept employment with, engage in or participate, directly or indirectly, individually or
as an officer, director, employee, shareholder, consultant, partner, joint venture, agent,
equity owner, distributor or in any other capacity whatsoever, with any direct sales or
multi-level marketing company that competes with the business of the Company whether for
market share of products or for independent distributors in a territory in which the
Company is doing business. The restrictions set forth in this paragraph shall remain in
effect during a period of one year following the Employee’s termination of
Employment. 






        All
other terms of your Key-Employee Covenants Agreement remain unchanged as outlined therein. 



Sincerely, 



	  	/s/ Claire H. Averett

Claire
H. Averett
 Nu Skin International, Inc. 






Acknowledged:




/s/ Larry MacFarlane
Larry MacFarlane
 



Dated:__________________________
(Reap. Dec. 9131)

#### Fed. Tele. & Radio Co. *v.*United States

Entry No. 722450, etc.

(Decided April 18, 1958)

*Barnes, Richardson & Colburn*for the plaintiff.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Lawrence, Judge:

The appeals for a reappraisement enumerated in schedule “A,” attached to and made part of the decision herein, present the question of the proper dutiable value of certain telephone equipment exported from Belgium.

*796By stipulation of the parties, it has been agreed that on or about the date of exportation such or similar merchandise was not freely offered for sale in Belgium either for consumption or for export to the United States, nor was such or similar merchandise freely offered for sale for domestic consumption in the United States, and that the cost of production of said merchandise, as such value is defined in section 402 (f) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1402 (f)), is the invoice unit values, less 1.11 per centum.

Upon the agreed facts of record, I find and hold that cost of production, as that value is defined in said section 402 (f), is the proper basis of value for the merchandise in issue and that said value is the invoice unit values, less 1.11 per centum.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
FOR PUBLICATION



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAULETTE SMITH, individually and

as Successor in Interest to Albert Dorsey, deceased,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

,

v.

EDWARD AGDEPPA, an individual,

Defendant

-

Appellant

,

and

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal entity; DOES, 1 through 10,

Defendants

. No. 20

- 56254

D.C. No.

2:19

- cv

- 05370

- CAS

- JC

ORDER

Filed March 1, 2024

Before: Consuelo M. Callahan, Morgan Christen, and

Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges.

Order2 S MITH V

. A GDEPPA

ORDER

Judge Callahan and Judge Bress voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc. Judge Christen voted to grant the petition for rehearing en banc. The full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en banc. A judge requested a

vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. The matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). Appellee’s petition for rehearing en banc, Dkt. 65

, is DENIED.
#### Frank, Admr., *v.*Bayuk, Appellant.

Argued April 28, 1936.

Before Kephart, C. J., Schaffer, Maxey, Drew, Linn and Barnes, JJ.

*283*S. S. Herman,*of *Herman & Harris,*for appellant.

*Robert M. Bernstein,*with him *Albert J. Bader,*for appellee.

June 26, 1936:

Per Curiam,

This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial. An award of a retrial is an inherent power of the court of common pleas and entirely discretionary: *Graham v. Graham,*1 S. & R. 330. Such order will not be reversed unless there is clear error of law or palpable abuse of discretion: *Duaine v. Gulf Refining Co.,*285 Pa. 81; *Alianell v. Schreiner,*274 Pa. 152; *Hess v. Gusdorff,*274 Pa. 123; *Class & Nachod Brewing Co. v. Giacobello,*277 Pa. 530.

The court below assigned several reasons for allowing appellee’s motion. The principal one was improper admission of opinion testimony by a witness not qualified as an expert upon a matter which the jury was competent to determine. Another incidental ground was the ■introduction by the insurance carrier, which had assumed the defense, of a charge of collusion between appellant and appellee which tended to obscure the real issue and prejudice appellee’s position. The court believed justice necessitated another trial. The reasons assigned were not erroneous as a matter of law, and involved a proper exercise of discretion. Even if the verdict should appear correct to us, we will not reverse unless the court below commits manifest error in awarding a new trial. There are many incidents of a trial, includ*284ing the manner of its conduct, which a judge may feel are productive of prejudice.

Appellant cites *Walters v. Federal Life Ins. Co.,*320 Pa. *588; Petkov v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,*321 Pa. 14; *Fornelli v. P. R. R. Co.,*309 Pa. 365. The scope of our review is no greater by reason of these decisions. The cases referred to hold that where binding instructions should have been given as a matter of law for the party in whose favor the verdict is rendered, it is error to award a new trial. Here the question of negligence and contributory negligence was for the jury; a directed verdict could not be had.

Without prolonged discussion we dismiss appellant’s contention that the court below was not a properly constituted court en banc. It is important for the trial judge to sit with the other members of the court to hear argument on such motions, but his absence does not deprive the others of the power to act: *Dobson et ux. v. Crafton Boro.,*315 Pa. 52. While all the members of the court should be present, this is not always possible. Consequently, it has been stated that a court en banc is properly constituted if a majority of the available judges take part: *McCormick’s Contested Election,*281 Pa. 281; *Zimmerman v. P. R. R. Co.,*293 Pa. 264. The order of the two judges properly decided appellee’s motion.

Appeal dismissed with a procedendo.
No. 74-5943.

#### Abney *v.*United States.

C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Before the Third Division,

April 8, 1942

No. 47057.

#### Protest 957533-G of Hoover Co. (Cleveland).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

At the trial the traffic manager of the plaintiff company testified that the merchandise in question contained identifying serial numbers which were checked from the invoices upon return to the United States and found to be the same as the numbers on the merchandise shipped; that the merchandise was returned in the same cases in which shipped without having been unpacked; and that the 6 eases in question were out of a shipment of 19 cases of aluminum ■castings on which no drawback was claimed or received when shipped to Canada. A copy of the notice of intent to, export was admitted in evidence from which it appears that drawback: was not claimed on 19 cases of aluminum castings, but that drawback was received upon part of 31 cases of rough aluminum castings noted; that none of said 31 cases and only 6 of the 19 cases were returned to the United States. The liquidator at the port of Cleveland testified that he had •handled the liquidation of the entry in question and that a drawback was allowed on a portion of the 31-case lot but that there was none claimed or paid upon the 19-case lot. From the evidence presented the court was of the opinion ■that the plaintiff has sustained the burden of proving that the 6 cases of aluminum ■castings in question were exported without the benefit of drawback and were *487returned to the exporter without being improved in condition or advanced in value. The collector was therefore directed to reliquidate the entry and make refund of all duties taken on the 6 cases in question.
# C_2013147EN.01000302.xml

| 25.5.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 147/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.5.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 147/3

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale ordinario di Aosta (Italy) lodged on 30 January 2013 — Rocco Papalia v Comune di Aosta

(Case C-50/13)

2013/C 147/06

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Referring court

Tribunale ordinario di Aosta

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Rocco Papalia

Applicant:

Defendant: Comune di Aosta

Defendant:

Question referred

Question referred

Must Directive 1999/70/EC (1) (Article 1, along with Clause 5 of the annexed framework agreement, as well as any other provision in any way connected or linked) be interpreted as permitting a situation in which a worker who has been recruited by a public body on a fixed-term contract, without the requirements laid down by the above Community rules being satisfied, is entitled to compensation in respect of damage only if he proves that such damage actually exists, and thus only if he provides positive, including presumptive, evidence, but at any rate specific evidence, that he has had to forgo other, better, employment opportunities?

1

---

(1)  OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43.

1

---
#### Orlando Leighton *versus*William W. Colby.

By virtue of R. S., c. 82, §§ 94 and 108, a plaintiff shall recover costs in an action of debt, by trustee process commenced in good faith, on a judgment on which an execution might have issued when such action was commenced, although the alleged trustee be discharged on motion, by reason of defective service on him.

On Exceptions to the ruling of Goddard, J., in the Superior Court.

Debt, by trustee process, on a judgment recovered in the S. J. Court, Jan., 1868. The writ was dated July 13,1868, on which the officer returned that he had " summoned the within named corporation as trustees, by leaving at the last and usual place of abode of H. P. Storer, treasurer of said corporation, a true and attested copy of this writ.”

*80At the return term, of the action, the alleged trustees appeared and seasonably moved to be discharged because H. P. Storer was not their treasurer when the writ was served upon him; whereupon they were discharged, and subsequently the defendant was defaulted, to be heard in costs.

At a hearing in costs, before the clerk, no costs were allowed the plaintiff, whereupon the plaintiff appealed to the Judge who overruled the decision of the clerk and allowed costs to the plaintiff; and to this ruling the defendant alleged exceptions.

*Howard <3 Oledves,*for the defendant.

*J. W. /Symonds,*for the plaintiff. •

Appleton, C. J.

— ByR. S., c. 82, § 94, "in all actions, the party prevailing shall recover costs, unless otherwise specially provided.”

By § 108, "a plaintiff shall not be allowed costs in an action on a judgment of any tribunal, on which an execution could issue when such suit was commenced, except in trustee process.” In other words, he shall recover costs in trustee process in an action on a judgment in which an execution might have issued when such suit was commenced. This was a trustee process, commenced in good faith and with no design to make unnecessary'costs. The officer made a return of service on the trustee. The trustee appeared and was discharged. The general rule is to allow costs to the prevailing party. The defendant does not bring himself within the special exemption from cost. He certainly is not within the language, nor is he within the spirit of § -108. The exemption from costs is not made to depend upon whether the trustee is charged or not. Thq suit does not cease to be a trustee process, because the trustee is discharged. *Exceptions overruled.*

Kent, Walton, Dickerson, Barrows and Daneortii, JJ., concurred.