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DHS: THE PATH FORWARD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 25, 2009 

Serial No. 111–1 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

VACANCY

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .. 1 

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security ........ 2 

The Honorable Emanuel Cleaver, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Missouri: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

WITNESSES

The Honorable Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Pennsylvania: 

Photo ..................................................................................................................... 22 

The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas: 

Photos .................................................................................................................... 29 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson ................................................. 51 

Questions From Honorable Peter A. DeFazio ....................................................... 52 

Questions From Honorable Henry Cuellar ............................................................ 53 

Questions From Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr. ......................................................... 56 

Questions From Honorable James A. Himes ......................................................... 62 

Questions From Honorable Lamar Smith ............................................................. 62 

Questions From Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis ........................................................ 78 

Questions From Honorable Steve Austria ............................................................. 78 

(1) 

DHS: THE PATH FORWARD 

Wednesday, February 25, 2009 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Thompson, Sanchez, Harman, DeFazio, 

Lofgren, Jackson Lee, Cuellar, Carney, Clarke, Richardson, Kirkpatrick, Luja ́n, Pascrell, Cleaver, Green, Himes, Titus, King, 

Souder, Lungren, Rogers, McCaul, Dent, Bilirakis, Broun, Miller, 

Olson and Cao. 

Chairman THOMPSON. The Committee on Homeland Security will 

come to order. The committee is meeting today to receive testimony 

from Secretary Janet Napolitano on ‘‘DHS: The Path Forward’’. 

I would like to, first of all, welcome Madam Secretary to the 

Homeland Security Committee. We coordinated with your office, as 

you know, this opportunity for our first hearing to get an idea on 

where you see the Department going from this point forward. So 

we appreciate you accommodating the committee and we look forward to your testimony also. 

Although you have been here in office for about a month, you 

made yourself available to me and other Members of this committee to discuss critical issues affecting the Department and we 

thank you. Given the demands on your time, the interest you have 

demonstrated in hearing congressional concerns is commendable. I 

hope this dialog continues throughout your tenure and that you 

tackle the challenges of moving DHS forward. 

However, I would be remiss, Madam Secretary, if I did not point 

out that in the last 2 years, this committee’s oversight work has 

played a major role in developing the public record on the shortcomings of the Department. Those shortcomings were not exposed 

to play a Washington game of gotcha. On the contrary, we raised 

questions about real problems and endeavored to work with DHS 

to develop real solutions. Rest assured, we will continue to have 

questions and look to your leadership for answers. 

We called this hearing this morning ‘‘DHS: The Path Forward’’ 

because this Department cannot afford to remain stuck in the same 

place doing things the same way and somehow expecting a different outcome. But before moving forward, one must first assess 

the condition of the road in one location on the road. You now oversee a Department that has an annual budget of over $40 billion 

and a work force of over 200,000 people. DHS is on the GAO high- 
2 

risk list because of challenges it faces in implementing and transforming 22 separate agencies into 1 fully functional Department. 

The Department’s mission can be summed up as the duty to keep 

dangerous people and dangerous things out of this country. To fulfill this mission, it shoulders the responsibility for a wide range of 

activities, including securing the borders; responding to natural 

disasters and catastrophic events; ensuring the capacity of passengers and cargo that rely on air, surface and maritime transportation; safeguarding critical infrastructure; and administering 

grants. Unlike many Departments, at each step along the way this 

Department must work closely with State and local and tribal governments to accomplish its critical mission. 

Your actions in the last month have indicated that you understand the wide-ranging nature of the Department’s activities and 

the need to map a course to take this Department forward. In your 

short tenure, Madam Secretary, you have ordered an agency-wide 

efficiency review to eliminate wasteful spending and required policy and program reviews in nine key areas, including State and 

local intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, risk analysis, national 

planning scenarios, and Gulf Coast rebuilding efforts. After you 

complete your assessment of DHS’s performance in these three 

areas, I look forward to hearing from you again about the Department’s response plan. 

In closing, while you are in the process of charting a path forward, be mindful that every path has some rough spots and potholes. I hope you keep in mind the only way to achieve progress 

is to keep moving forward despite obstacles. If you forget, this committee will be here to remind you. 

Again, thank you for the hearing here today, and I look forward 

to your testimony. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an opening 

statement. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your courtesy. Thank you for your work with the Secretary to have her here 

this morning. 

Secretary Napolitano, we want to congratulate you on your appointment. We look forward to your service in office. I know when 

I was Chairman of the committee, we had you testifying here on 

border security. You did an outstanding job on that, and I want to 

thank you for the meeting that you and I had. Not that I want to 

get any of the other States or communities jealous, but I want to 

thank you for being in New York last weekend with Mayor 

Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly. It was a very worthwhile 

meeting for them, and I want to thank you for that. 

As the Chairman said, the Department faces many problems. 

This is a Department which is comprised of 22 former departments, 

agencies, and 200,000 employees. I think much has been achieved, 

but obviously more has to be done. I want to assure you that on 

this side of the aisle we will work with you in addressing the issues 

that you confront as you move the Department forward. 

Certainly we have the whole issue of FEMA, how that will be 

run. Most of us on this side would support it staying within the De-
3 

partment. You will be evaluating all of that, and again, we look forward to working with you. 

The issue of border security you have a particular interest in and 

expertise in. That is a major issue which also has to be dealt with. 

It is on-going and will go many years in the future. We also look 

forward to working with you on that. 

On the whole issue regarding terrorism, there is the issue of visa 

waivers which really grows with each year as the list of countries 

expands, also the threat expands. I know Secretary Chertoff had 

concerns about that. Some of us on the committee had maybe more 

concerns—maybe more than Secretary Chertoff did. So we again 

want to work with you on the whole issue of visa waivers. 

The UASI funding and other homeland security funding. I believe the Department has over the last 2 years reached a level 

which I think is consistent with our national needs. Obviously that 

will be reviewed by you, and I just ask that you work with us on 

that. 

We had several bad years with a lot of conflicts between the committee and the Department. I think again over the last 2 years significant progress has been made, but again, I would just ask that 

you work with us on that. In particular, probably the worst problem the Department had on that was when they dramatically 

changed the formula without advising anyone in the Congress, 

without discussing it with us at all. It really created some heated 

hearings, and I thank Chairman Thompson, who at that time was 

the Ranking Member. We worked together on that, and I think we 

were able to bring about considerable progress. 

The issue of Guantanamo, there is obviously different views on 

that. The President has made his decision. I know, speaking for 

myself and most on this side of aisle, we disagree with the decision 

to close Guantanamo, but if it is going to be closed, that is what 

is going to be happening. I know you will be on the review committee, deciding on what is going to be happening, what is going 

to happen with the detainees, how it will be processed. I think it 

is a very significant homeland security issue. We would again ask 

to be able to work with you on that so we can be apprised, have 

our input as it goes along. Especially with you being on that committee, it gives us direct access to a key player in that final decision. 

One final thing. I am not trying to get into semantics, but I do 

notice in your prepared testimony the word ‘‘terrorism’’ is not even 

used. I know your absolute commitment to fighting terrorism, and 

I know the President’s commitment to that, the Chairman’s as 

well. 

One concern I have had, and maybe Congressman Pascrell and 

Congresswoman Clarke, coming from areas which have been hit so 

hard, each day we go past September 11, it resets it into people’s 

memories. The terrible impact of that day, if not forgotten, it is 

pushing it back. 

I think it is important for us in positions of leadership to constantly remind people how real that threat is and how it is an ongoing threat, and if we don’t do it, it is going to be harder to get 

legislative support for the measures that we think have to be 

taken. 
4 

So I would just urge that on you and again assure you, as I assured the President, we will not use this issue for partisan purposes. It is too important. I think the Chairman and I have worked 

very well together. As a committee we want to work together. 

There will be specific differences we will have, but this is one issue 

overall that we agree on, and that is to protect our Nation from terrorism, to do all we can to avert another situation like Katrina that 

becomes a natural disaster, and also to secure our borders. 

With that, Madam Secretary, I thank you for your career in public service, and the best is yet to come. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Other Members of the committee are reminded that under the committee rules, opening statements may 

be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Hon. Cleaver follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EMANUEL CLEAVER

FEBRUARY 25, 2009 

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, subcommittee Chairs, and Ranking 

Members; I would like to begin by expressing my great excitement in joining the 

Committee on Homeland Security. I look forward to working with my colleagues on 

both sides of the aisle as we come together to pursue the admirable goal of protecting our Nation. Today, I am looking forward to hearing the testimony from Secretary Napolitano. Secretary Napolitano has extensive background in the field of 

homeland security, and I believe that her testimony today will give this committee 

the much-needed overview on the direction that the Department of Homeland Security will be taking in this new administration. 

The Department of Homeland Security was formed in 2003 by combining resources from 22 agencies within the Federal Government. Organizational shortcomings have clearly dampened the effectiveness of this Department, and we can 

no longer allow this to occur. I am hopeful that today this committee will have the 

opportunity for a frank discussion with Secretary Napolitano where we can discuss 

the challenges faced by DHS, as well as the steps that the Department is taking 

the fix mistakes of the past. I am eager to hear how her newly issued directives 

will pave the way for the Department’s future, and as a new Member of this committee, I am eager to work with the Secretary to carry out our core mission of keeping Americans safe from harm. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Again I welcome our witness today. Janet 

Napolitano was sworn in on January 21, 2009, as the third Secretary of Department of Homeland Security. Prior to joining the 

Obama administration, Secretary Napolitano was midway through 

her second term as Governor of Arizona. As Governor she implemented one of the first State homeland security strategies in the 

Nation, opened the first State counterterrorism center, and spearheaded efforts to transform immigration enforcement. 

Secretary Napolitano previously served as attorney general of Arizona and U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona. 

Madam Secretary, I thank you for your service, for appearing before the committee today. Without objection, the witness’s full 

statement will be inserted into the record. 

Secretary Napolitano, I now recognize you to summarize your 

statement for 5 minutes, thereabout, but since this is your first 

time, we will allow you to come in your own way. 
5 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANET NAPOLITANO, 

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member King, Members of the committee. I appreciate the invitation to be with you today to share with you my initial thoughts on 

how we take a relatively new Department that you have been an 

integral part of building and supporting and move it forward to 

confront and prepare for threats that face this Nation, be they 

man-caused—and terrorism, Representative King, I believe, falls in 

that category and is central to that category—or be they caused by 

nature. Then if a threat is to develop, how do we respond and recover with efficiency and resiliency? 

Those issues really cover the broad continuum of this Department. It is the protection of our borders. It is the protection of our 

coasts. It is the protection of our infrastructure, with all that entails, from pipelines and electric power grids to the cyber infrastructure of this country. It is the protection of our people, and it 

is the ability to, as I said earlier, respond, recover with the efficiency and resiliency the American people have demonstrated time 

and time again. 

Now, to do that requires lots of subsets and lots of different areas 

of expertise within the Department of Homeland Security. One of 

the things I have overall been pleased with is the quality of the 

men and women who have been serving there. Many of them came 

to the Department because of the events of 9/11, and that is really 

the central motivating factor of the Department every day. What 

I have encouraged our people to do is to say to themselves when 

they wake up in the morning, what are they going to do that day 

to improve the safety and security of Americans, and, when they 

leave work that evening, what did they accomplish that day to improve the safety and security of Americans? 

For my part, what we are doing is kicking the tires, looking at 

some issues fresh, with a fresh set of eyes, and thinking about, as 

you said, Mr. Chairman, as I title my testimony, how we move forward. What should our immigration enforcement policy be, and 

how will we carry it out? How will FEMA interact with first responders, cities and States in the event of a natural disaster? 

By the way, let me just pause there and say one of the things 

we need to do is to remind people that FEMA is not a first responder. I think that is one of the myths perhaps that grew out of 

Katrina-Rita. But emergency response starts with cities, localities 

that have the police and the fire. They bring in States when the 

circumstances require, and then FEMA is there to back up and provide overall support. So lots of issues there. 

Third, intelligence and analysis: A very, very important part of 

the overall work of this Department; how that occurs, and, more 

importantly, how do we make sure that we have an integrated intel 

ability that integrates with State and local officials and that we are 

sharing information adequately and on a real-time basis and getting information back adequately and on a real-time basis. I believe 

that is one area that will be a major focus of my tenure as the Secretary of the Department. 

I could go on. I won’t because I want to invite the time for questions. But those are a few of the things that we are doing. 
6 

Now, let me, if I might, pause with the committee and our relations. My hope is that we have a very strong relationship. I view 

this committee as a committee to help us accomplish these myriad 

goals and the myriad tasks for the protection of our people that the 

Department of Homeland Security is assigned. We will be open. We 

will do everything in human power to be timely, but I hope that 

we can have a relationship that allows us to exchange information, 

ideas, and, as you said, Mr. Chairman, move the Department forward. So that is my goal with respect to congressional relations, as 

it were. So protection of our people; protection of our lands; protection of our property; and the ability to respond with efficiency, resiliency; that is the umbrella goal with many subsets, but that is 

what we in the Department are going to be focused on every day. 

Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I thank you, Madam Secretary, for your 

testimony. 

[The statement of Secretary Napolitano follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANET NAPOLITANO

FEBRUARY 25, 2009 

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the committee: I 

am pleased to appear before the committee for the first time as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and I thank you for this opportunity to discuss how 

DHS will work in the future to keep Americans safe. 

At its core, I believe DHS has a straightforward mission: to protect the American 

people from threats both foreign and domestic, both natural and manmade—to do 

all that we can to prevent threats from materializing, respond to them if they do, 

and recover with resiliency. Government does nothing more fundamental than protecting its citizens. But the execution of this mission can be very complex. 

In a little more than a month as Secretary, I have found a Department facing a 

number of challenges, many of which have been documented by the committee. But 

I have also found a Department filled with committed public servants. DHS faces 

the challenges of a young Department, but this youth is also an advantage in undertaking the changes needed to best achieve the DHS mission. My message to you 

today is that I am confident that DHS—with the support and participation of Congress—can make those changes, meet those challenges, and move down ‘‘the path 

forward’’ to build a more secure Nation. 

ACTION DIRECTIVES

Improving a Department as large and new as DHS requires a broad look at the 

current state of its programs. As you know, the DHS portfolio is extremely diverse. 

During my short term as Secretary, DHS has helped respond to ice storms in the 

Midwest, rescued ice fishermen on Lake Erie, helped secure the Super Bowl, and 

even assisted in capturing pirates off the coast of Somalia—all since January 21. 

In undertaking the leadership of the Department, I am setting priorities that will 

be important to me as Secretary. We need to hold people accountable, uphold professionalism across DHS, and act wisely with taxpayer money. We have to dedicate 

ourselves to doing what works, and frequently reassess the Department to make 

sure that we are responding to threats as best as possible and making the kind of 

progress that Americans expect and deserve. I promise to lead the Department in 

a way that focuses intently on achieving results that make Americans safer. To me, 

the process of producing results begins with a prompt assessment of the state of 

DHS’s programs. 

We are performing that kind of review right now. In the several weeks after I took 

office as Secretary, I issued a series of action directives to assess the current functions of the Department and help target areas for improvement. As part of this process, the different components of DHS are reporting on their current operations and 

detailing ways that we could improve programs in the future. 
7 

1The Committee’s platform items: (1) Improving the governance, functionality, and accountability of the Department of Homeland Security; (2) enhancing security for all modes of transportation; (3) strengthening our Nation: response, resilience, and recovery; (4) shielding the Nation’s critical infrastructure from attacks; (5) securing the homeland and preserving privacy, 

civil rights, and civil liberties; (6) connecting the dots: intelligence, information sharing, and 

interoperability; (7) implementing common-sense border and port security; and (8) inspiring 

minds and developing technology—the future of homeland security. 

The committee and I have similar views of the Nation’s homeland security needs. 

I have reviewed the committee’s eight platform points,1 and the action directives I 

issued address all of those areas. I agree with the need to prioritize each of the 

areas the committee listed, and I see the action directives as the start of a process 

by which the work of DHS and the committee will improve them. 

The action directives required DHS components to report back to me in a short 

time frame, and I want to update the committee on the status of the directives: • Efficiency Review.—Last week, I issued an action directive calling for an Efficiency Review across DHS. In a young Department that combines many processes previously scattered across the Federal Government, this review will be 

critical to improving the governance, functionality, and accountability of DHS. 

Components will provide information on actions they are taking to reduce costs, 

increase transparency, streamline processes, eliminate duplication, and improve 

customer service. • State and Local Intelligence Sharing and Integration.—I issued two action directives concerned with the Department’s partnerships and intelligence-sharing activities with State, local, tribal, and territorial partners. As a result of the directives, the Department is considering a possible future assessment of all intelligence-sharing efforts within DHS with an eye toward reducing duplication. 

DHS is also considering ways to improve intelligence sharing by involving State 

and local partners during the formulation of intelligence-sharing policies and 

programs. The Department is looking to improve the coordination of activities 

involving State and local partners across DHS. I issued a separate action directive on FEMA integration with State and local governments; FEMA presented 

feedback based on 75 recommendations emerging from the candid assessments 

of State and local homeland security and emergency management officials. 

• Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.—I issued an action directive regarding the Department’s continued efforts in recovery from Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane 

Rita. As a result, FEMA will establish and field a senior-level team to identify 

issues related to—and review, assess, and identify—efficiencies that will improve Hurricane Katrina and Rita recovery efforts. FEMA will work to clarify 

and enhance the Government’s role as a more active and engaged facilitator of 

long-term community recovery working across agencies, and will move quickly 

to provide arbitration as an additional dispute resolution mechanism, as per the 

direction of Congress. 

• Border Security, Immigration, Employment Verification, and Enforcement.—I 

issued a number of directives related to border security and immigration. 

Among the directives, I requested an assessment of past border security assistance by National Guard and Department of Defense assets. I issued a directive 

to measure employer compliance and participation with the Department’s EVerify program and ways that DHS has worked both to reduce false negatives 

in order to protect the rights of Americans and to strengthen the system against 

identity fraud. I issued directives to assess the status of the Department’s work 

site enforcement programs, fugitive alien operations, immigration detention facilities, removal programs, and the 287(g) program. I asked for an assessment 

of the situation of widows and widowers of U.S. citizens who had petitioned for 

the alien spouse’s immigration, but whose petitions were not adjudicated before 

the citizen spouse’s death. I issued a directive to assess Department programs 

to combat border violence and drug smuggling, and as a result, DHS is considering ways to better engage partners and increase the effectiveness of these programs. I also issued a directive that assessed our northern border strategy. 

Through that directive, DHS is considering cases where, because of climate and 

geography, some specialized technology may need to be developed or modified 

in order to protect the northern border while mitigating unnecessary impacts 

on our extensive trade with Canada. 

• Transportation Security.—In an effort to assess security across all forms of 

transportation, I directed the review of transportation security in the surface, 

maritime and aviation sectors. The review identified a number of areas where 

risks to transportation security could be reduced. Resources such as explosives 

detection systems and transit, rail, and port security personnel contained in the 
8 

recently passed American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 will enable 

the Department to accelerate the mitigation of risk in these areas. • Critical Infrastructure Protection.—I issued an action directive to assess the status of the Department’s efforts to shield the Nation’s critical infrastructure from 

attacks. The response contained several steps DHS would take to inspect the 

security of chemical plants and efforts DHS would participate in to limit the 

availability of dangerous materials. I issued a separate directive for an assessment of DHS’s critical role in cybersecurity. • Healthcare Surge Capacity.—I issued an action directive that evaluated DHS’s 

role in building capacity for a ‘‘health care surge’’—the increase in people who 

might need medical attention after an incident—including DHS’s supporting 

role in coordinating response to such an incident, and how the Department’s 

preparedness and public communications efforts could better facilitate existing 

health care surge capacities. This directive will help us move forward on a critical element of our Nation’s response capability. • Planning and Risk Management.—I issued an action directive asking for a report on DHS’s lead role in the interagency effort to develop Federal operational 

plans for prevention, protection, response, and recovery activities for the National Planning Scenarios. The report will also discuss how DHS will work with 

law enforcement partners inside and outside the Federal Government in an integrated planning effort. I issued a separate directive to assess DHS’s uses of 

risk analysis. As a result, several steps were identified that will assure DHS 

provides risk-analysis information to a full range of decisionmakers, and assure 

that the Department’s strategies are risk-based. 

In addition to the action directives, I have also begun the process of reaching out 

to new Cabinet officers. I have already met with several of my fellow Cabinet officials about areas where our Departments will cooperate and coordinate. We in the 

Cabinet work in one administration, and we address problems together. In particular, I am conducting this kind of outreach vis-a`-vis the Department’s important 

role in the intelligence community. We are one of several agencies that work together to identify security threats, and the ability to cooperate and coordinate across 

departmental lines is paramount. 

PRIORITIES

The action directives process will help determine many of DHS’s particular priorities as we look to move forward. But there are a few broad areas I can easily identify where DHS should focus in order to better protect Americans. 

State and Local Partnerships 

First among these areas is the Department’s relationship with State and local 

governments. State and local law enforcement agencies are the forces on the ground 

that represent, inhabit, and patrol America’s communities—the communities that 

DHS protects. We need strong relationships with our State and local partners, and 

I am committed to building them. 

Partnerships with State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies affect DHS’s ability 

to identify threats and bolster preparedness before an incident; they also affect our 

ability to work with first responders and assist a community’s recovery after an incident. The information we gather, the funding we grant, and the training and assistance we provide are all more valuable in securing our Nation if DHS’s relationships 

with the involved State and local agencies are strong. 

Information sharing between DHS and State and local governments is particularly critical to our security. Over time, this topic has proven easy to talk about and 

difficult to act upon—but we must move forward on it if we are to strengthen our 

State and local partnerships. The fusion of information between the Federal, State 

and local levels is what makes the intelligence-gathering process critically valuable 

to preventing threats from materializing. Information sharing is also what makes 

response efforts effective. The creation of a seamless network we can use to share 

this information among these levels of government is a critical part of improving 

our partnerships. 

Already in my time as Secretary, I have traveled to four different States and met 

with State, local, and community leaders in each of them about how DHS will continue to work with them. The range of topics we met about—disaster response, community assistance, the development of new technological capabilities for DHS, and 

preparedness—speaks to the extent to which DHS must partner with State and 

local governments to work effectively on any front. 

When considering the action directives and the committee’s eight-point platform, 

it is also clear that many critical priorities—from transit security to border security 

to infrastructure protection—can only be achieved with strong State and local part-
9 

nerships. Building these partnerships will be an on-going priority throughout my 

time as Secretary. 

Science and Technology 

Second, DHS should build on its science and technology portfolio. Better science 

helps us understand emerging threats and how to identify, counter and mitigate 

them. Better technology can expand our capabilities and free our agents to spend 

their time where it is most valuable, while at the same time protecting the interests 

of private citizens by minimizing law enforcement’s impact on lawful activities. 

Technology can also aid us in consequence management, so that we are better prepared to respond to any type of disaster. 

It is difficult to think of an area of DHS operation where a greater use of cuttingedge technology would not improve capabilities. Our border security efforts, port 

screening, transportation security, customs processes, immigration programs, and 

preparedness and interoperability efforts could all benefit from a strong push to develop new technologies and implement them in the field. 

A good example of better technology leading to greater capability is going live this 

week in San Diego. The port of entry at San Ysidro, the largest land port in the 

Nation, is now equipped with radio frequency identification (RFID) infrastructure— 

including software, hardware, and vicinity technology—that allows Customs and 

Border Protection Officers to identify travelers faster than ever. The technology expedites the travel of law-abiding border crossers and allows agents to focus on 

where they are most needed. The high-tech RFID system works in tandem with 

RFID-enabled documents such as passport cards, Customs and Border Protection’s 

trusted traveler programs, and enhanced driver’s licenses. An RFID tag embedded 

in these documents transmits a unique number to a secure CBP database as the 

traveler approaches the border, allowing agents to identify the crosser quickly. The 

high-tech system expands law enforcement capabilities while improving the process 

for Americans. 

Of course, amid the implementation of new technology, we will continue to be diligent in honoring the rights of Americans and addressing concerns raised about privacy. To this end, last week I appointed an experienced new Chief Privacy Officer 

for the Department, who will bolster a Privacy Office already recognized as a leader 

in the Federal Government. homeland security and privacy need not be exclusive, 

and the Department will look to include privacy in everything we do. 

Technologies such as the RFID system at San Ysidro are examples of the potential of science and technology to make a great impact across DHS. Especially as 

DHS works to stay ahead of developing threats, the forward-thinking application of 

new technologies will be critical to enhancing the protection of our country. That 

is a broad-reaching priority I plan to pursue, and I look forward to working with 

the committee on this effort. 

Unifying DHS 

To achieve its mission more effectively, DHS must not just operate better as one 

Department—it must identify as one Department, where many different people contribute in diverse ways to one paramount goal: Securing our Nation. I am committed 

to building a unified DHS that is better able to achieve its mission. 

The unification of the Department is an issue deeply related to DHS’s operational 

capacity. It is important that we develop an identity for DHS that is centered on 

the Department’s mission and that we build a ‘‘one-DHS’’ culture among the different components of the Department. We also must uphold the morale of DHS 

workers, an effort that a unified Department identity would support. Employees 

across the many DHS components perform difficult work that, day in and day out, 

upholds the security of our Nation. DHS employees should be proud of the public 

service they perform, and we should help them in their work by building a strong 

Department to support them. Low morale can lessen the ability of an organization 

to achieve its goals—something that we cannot let happen in homeland security. 

The Department headquarters building will support our unification efforts, and I 

am grateful for the funds for the St. Elizabeths headquarters included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. But ultimately, our Department is not a building; it is the people in the Department who will determine its success. 

Achieving the goal of a unified Department will take time, but I am dedicated to 

making progress on this goal, and I look forward to working with the committee on 

furthering it. 

CONCLUSION

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the committee— 

thank you again for inviting me to testify. I am honored to serve in my new role 
10 

as Secretary. I am eager to become even further immersed in the work of protecting 

our country. And I look forward to a long, productive relationship with the committee as we work together to improve homeland security in our Nation. I am happy 

now to answer any questions you have. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I will remind each Member that he or she 

will have 5 minutes to question the Secretary. I will now recognize 

myself to begin questioning. 

Again, thank you, Madam Secretary, for your testimony. I am 

glad to learn that you requested a review of the continuing hurricane recovery efforts on the Gulf Coast. As you know, many people 

in my home State of Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, and Texas 

are still displaced. Recently FEMA reported to this committee that 

only one-half of the $2.8 billion in Federal disaster funds provided 

to Mississippi had been spent 31⁄2 years after Katrina. 

I would like for you to have your people report back to the committee on why it is taking so long to spend the money for those 

Katrina-affected areas. Some of us think it is a long time. After you 

provide that information, if you can provide to us how you think 

we can do a better job in helping citizens who are impacted with 

any natural disaster, I would appreciate it. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. We would be 

happy to provide that information. But I think as important is how 

we are going to unclog these recovery efforts so that we can begin 

to move those issues forward and close some of the chapters out of 

Katrina/Rita and the Gulf Coast. 

The Secretary of HUD and I are going there next week to do not 

only site visits, but to look at what we need to do to unclog some 

of the issues about housing. I have also directed my staff to give 

me a process by which we can begin to resolve the claims, the public assistance claims, that have been at issue between the Federal 

Government and State and local governments in the Gulf Coast for 

these many years. So that is well under way, and I look forward 

to reporting back to you. Actually I look forward to reporting back 

to you and saying that we have a process to begin closing some of 

these claims out. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

In light of that also, Madam Secretary, there is some concern of 

no-bid contracts and other things that the Department has been 

criticized for. If you can expand that to see how we can limit the 

number of no-bid contracts, that also would be appreciated for the 

committee. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, Mr. Chairman, absolutely. In fact, 

earlier this week President Obama held a fiscal summit. Some of 

you were present. I actually was in the breakout group on procurement, and I don’t know how I got that assignment, but it turns out 

that that is the nuts and bolts of how you make Government more 

competitive, more efficient, how you make sure that every vendor 

has a chance to compete for Federal tax dollars. So that is an area 

of keen interest, and we are looking at that and look forward to 

working with the committee on that. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Border violence. As you know, having been the Governor of a border State, you have firsthand knowledge of so many of the things 

that occur. One of the things we have as a committee and as a Con-
11 

gress been very supportive of is providing resources. Secretary 

Chertoff talked about a surge potential if violence started moving 

in the wrong direction. Can you share with the committee what efforts are under way or you think should be under way to address 

this escalating border violence? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I only have 37 seconds left, but it may take me a little longer. 

I have actually found a situation in Mexico, one of the top priority items on my desk. It was on my desk when I was Governor 

of Arizona, but as the Secretary of Homeland Security I see it in 

a much broader way. 

I believe our country has a vital relationship with Mexico, and 

I believe that Mexico right now has issues of violence that are of 

a different degree and level than we have ever seen before. That 

is primarily the product of the President of Mexico and his government going after these large drug cartels so that we never run the 

risk, never run the risk, of Mexico descending into, say, where Colombia was 15 years ago. As those efforts have been on-going, it 

has increased the level of violence within Mexico. Last year there 

were 6,000 drug-related homicides in Mexico; since January, there 

have already been 1,000. They have been targeting in some of those 

homicides public officials, law enforcement officers as a process of 

intimidation. 

We are working to support President Caldero ́n in his efforts. I 

believe this is going to require more than the Department of Homeland Security, so that we are reaching out to the National Security 

Adviser, to the Attorney General and others about how we within 

the United States are making sure we are doing all we can in a 

coordinated way to support the President of Mexico. I have met 

with the Attorney General of Mexico and the Ambassador already. 

One of the things that I particularly am focused on is southbound traffic and guns, specifically assault weapons and cash. They 

are being used to funnel and fund these very, very violent cartels. 

So working with Customs, working with ATF, we are looking at 

ways we can help suppress that traffic. In my view, from a Homeland Security standpoint, this is going to be an issue working with 

Mexico that is going to be of real priority interest over these coming months. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. I want to just put a footnote 

there that the committee has real concern about this issue, and to 

the extent that we can be helpful in addressing it, I want you as 

Secretary to feel free to work with us. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full committee, the 

gentleman from New York, Mr. King for questions. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, Madam Secretary, you said you looked 

forward to working with Congress. I don’t know if you will change 

your opinion over the next few years on that. We do enjoy this level 

of cooperation. I think it is important, though, and this is probably 

more our problem than yours that you could end up testifying before 80, 90, 95 House and Senate committees. So we want to do 

whatever we can to consolidate that. We believe that the Committee on Homeland Security should be the central committee not 

for any position of gaining turf, but because I think it should be 

coordinated similar to the Armed Forces relationship with the De-
12 

fense Department. That will be an on-going issue on Capitol Hill; 

any moral support you can give us in that we would appreciate. 

On the issue of UASI funding, Homeland Security funding, one 

of the main recommendations of the 9/11 Commission is that funding be risk-based. As I mentioned in my opening statement, that 

has been an issue of some controversy over the last several years. 

You have been in office less than 5 weeks. Do you have any 

thoughts as to what can be done to ensure that we do at least as 

good a job, if not a better job, in determining how risk-based funding should be implemented? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. To your first point I asked the question how many hearings the Department had with the House in the 

last session, and the answer, within the last session there were 269 

hearings involving the Department of Homeland Security, 126 involving this committee or its subcommittees, 111 involving other 

authorizing committees, 32 involving Appropriations Committee or 

its subcommittees. So while it would be presumptuous of me to recommend to Congress how it be organized, I think that it is a fact 

that is relevant, and indeed one of the recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission, the only one that hasn’t been acted on, is the 

need to now streamline and focus on the Department of Homeland 

Security from a congressional oversight perspective. 

With respect to UASI and risk base, we have now consolidated 

99 percent of the grants and grant funding. That 99 percent all 

comes under FEMA. What I have said is the way we are approaching it is everywhere in the country has some sort of risk. It can be 

interruption of the food chain supply by an event happening in 

Kansas, it can be interruption of the gasoline supply to the country 

because of the refineries located in the Gulf Coast. It can be, as we 

tragically saw on 9/11, interruption of our markets and stock exchanges by a terrorist act in New York City. So we have all kinds 

of risk. So some base level of funding needs to accommodate that. 

But above and beyond, there are areas of particular risk and 

would have particular broader impacts on the country, and that is 

where I think we need to focus our analysis and sharpen what are 

those risks and what are the impacts to the country if something 

untoward were to happen. So as we move forward, I would be 

happy to work with and inform the committee about this, but that 

is where I believe the analysis of the risk-based work needs to be 

done. It is beyond kind of a base level of risk that every area 

shares, although they are different. There is a base level there. But 

beyond that, we know there are certain areas where if risks were 

to materialize, there would be an undue impact on the rest of the 

country. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Another issue raised by the 9/11 Commission was the sharing of 

intelligence at the Federal level, and, of course, part of your response was to share that down to the local level. At the Federal 

level itself, though, it was my impression the first several years at 

the Department that DHS was sort of excluded, or the other power 

players tried to keep DHS out of the intelligence gathering and 

didn’t share as much as they should have with them. I think when 

Mr. Charlie Allen came on board, that improved somewhat. 
13 

I ask that you do what you can to make sure that DHS does get 

the intelligence it should be getting. You are in a better position 

then to get that to the local governments. If you need assistance, 

we would agree that the Department would have a role to play as 

far as receiving the intelligence gathered from the other intelligence agencies. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. 

I think one of the perhaps advantages I have is that this is the 

first time there has actually been a transition of administrations 

where you have a Department of Homeland Security from Day 1 

and indeed a Secretary from Day 1. I think that helps with some 

of those issues that Secretary Ridge and perhaps Secretary 

Chertoff experienced. 

I believe that the Department right now is fully a partner in intelligence sharing, and if it is not, I will be fighting for that. I think 

at this point the key challenge we have, as I said in my opening 

statement, is how do we better share with State and locals and also 

get their information back, because they have, quite frankly, more 

eyes and ears than the Federal Government will ever have. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair will now recognize other Members for questions they may wish to ask the Secretary. Again I urge 

Members to be mindful of the 5-minute rule and the Secretary’s 

limited time with the committee. In accordance with our committee 

rules, I recognize Members who were present at the start of the 

hearing based on seniority on the committee, alternating between 

Majority and Minority. Those Members coming in later will be recognized in the order of their arrival. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from California for 

5 minutes, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Madam 

Secretary, for being before us. 

I actually really look forward to this change in administration 

and having you head our Department. Why? Because, first of all, 

I am the Vice Chair of this committee, and second, I chair the subcommittee that has much of what has been happening in Homeland, which means that I have had to oversee the TWIC program, 

Project 28, SBInet, Deepwater, US–VISIT, Western Hemisphere, 

all of which have had major, major problems. I look forward to 

talking to you about that and figuring out how to get things under 

way at the Department. 

In addition to that, I have the global counterterrorism or the 

international aspect of all the intelligence gathering and information, and I look forward to talking in a separate meeting with you 

with respect to how we might incorporate that better into the Department of Homeland Security. 

Of course, the border violence, the drug trafficking, I am not 

going to talk much about that, because I have a feeling that my 

Ranking Member Mr. Souder, who has worked on these issues for 

a long time, will probably ask you many questions with respect to 

that. 

Cybersecurity is—as a Californian, I think that will be one of the 

biggest areas that we will have to look at. I also sit on that subcommittee. 
14 

My first question is that in the last Congress I introduced House 

Resolution 6869, which is the Border Security Search Accountability Act. This has to do with being stopped entry into the country and taking people’s laptops and BlackBerrys or what have you 

and not have a good policy with respect to why we take them, how 

long they are gone, will we return them to whomever, et cetera. It 

poses a lot of issues. You can imagine if you had your work on your 

laptop, and you went to a country and they took it away from you 

and might never return it. 

Madam Secretary, during your Department’s review of the Bushera policies, are you open to updating the border search electronic 

seizure policies and working with me to adding accountability to 

that process? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. Let me share with you on the issue 

of laptops and laptop searches. The law here is very straightforward and, quite frankly, very broad that at the border the Federal Government possesses the ability to search. But that doesn’t 

answer the question should it search, and what are the elements 

that should be incorporated into a decision to search, and then 

what do you do after a search is complete with respect to return 

of material? 

We have now appointed a Chief Privacy Officer for the Department, and there are a number of issues that we handle, including 

the laptop issue, that have really key privacy concerns, such as the 

ones you raised, inherent in them. So I look forward—she reports 

to work in a week or 2—to putting her to work and helping us develop further refinement of what we are doing, and, of course, 

working with the committee about what we are doing. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We intend to reintroduce some type of legislation 

with respect to that, so I would like to work with you to ensure 

that we know what we are doing and getting it through the Congress. 

The second issue I have is this April I plan to hold my fourth 

hearing on the Transportation Worker Identification Credential, or 

the TWIC card. What plans do you have in place to help workers 

obtain TWIC cards during these last 7 weeks before the April 15 

deadline? I just have a feeling a lot of people haven’t pulled them; 

there is going to be a mad rush to try to get them. How will you 

ensure that people aren’t out of work after April 15 if they don’t 

have this card to get on the port system, et cetera? Would you consider temporary measures like allowing unescorted access for 30 

days for vehicles who maybe did not get them or maybe had part 

of a background check done? This is a train wreck waiting to happen, I believe. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, here is the status of TWIC right 

now. It has been implemented in all but about seven or eight ports. 

There are about 1.1 million workers who need a TWIC card. 

Around 920,000 already have their cards, or their cards are just 

about ready to be issued. So that process is well under way. The 

ports that are left are some of our larger ports, New York, Houston, 

Los Angeles, Long Beach, and so we want to make very sure that 

the process goes smoothly at all our ports, but particularly those 

that haven’t yet fully implemented TWIC. 
15 

All I can say is that it is not only on our radar, but the subject 

of daily questions from me about how we are doing, who has the 

cards, what problems we are experiencing, how we are resolving 

those problems. But the point of fact is that TWIC card and having 

identify about those who are getting into secure areas at our ports 

I believe is a very important part of homeland security and securing our country. So we want to move this process along and move 

it and enforce it. 

If there need to be exceptions, that is something I prefer not to 

talk about in the committee because I don’t want people thinking 

that the deadline is going to move or something is going to change. 

TWIC is where we are going; it is well under way. The problems 

we have encountered so far have been dealt with, and we are moving forward. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California for 5 

minutes, Mr. Lungren. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Congratulations on your appointment, and it is nice to see another former attorney general making good. 

First of all, let me just say that I was not here serving when Secretary Ridge was heading the Department. I have been here for 4 

years while Secretary Chertoff was here. I happen to think he did 

a very good job in trying to amalgamate all of those agencies and 

departments. I think there was much progress made, but we all 

know a lot more needs to be done, and I appreciate your dedication 

to doing that. 

If I could just follow up on what Mr. King said about us talking 

at least about the issue of terrorism. One of the things that has 

struck me over the last 4-plus years is that it is awfully easy to 

lose our sense of urgency in terms of the public and this Congress. 

As a fellow westerner, since we were so far away from 9/11, sometimes it is difficult to keep that image in the minds of our people 

so that they understand that it could happen anywhere. You and 

I know the potential for an uncontrolled border for soft spots for 

terrorists to come across, so I appreciate your dedication, and I particularly appreciate what you said about Mexico. 

I think there is misunderstanding about Mexico sometimes in 

this body, and that is I think the current administration there is 

doing precisely what we want them to do to fight narcoterrorism. 

The increase in violence is not an indication that they are not 

doing something, it is an indication that the bad guys are pushing 

back, and that could very well spill over into our sovereign territory, and that is why we need to work so closely with that country. 

So I appreciate what you have said, and I think your experience 

as Governor at one of the border States will help us bring that 

issue to the fore even more. So I thank you for that. 

Let me just bring up a couple of things. One is now we are doing 

a number of full-body imaging scans at a number of different airports. I see that some in the privacy community have raised issues. 

So let me throw out a very simple thing, and I happen to be someone who has an artificial hip. It is less an invasion of my privacy 
16 

to go through full-body imaging than it is to have people placing 

their hands on my body all over the place. 

I would say that if you run into a problem with respect to privacy 

questions, think about creating an ‘‘I don’t care’’ line. I happen to 

think—no, I am very serious about this—I think if you had an ‘‘I 

don’t care’’ line, many of us would rather go through that. I think 

you would find some of the privacy issues that might otherwise 

bubble up might be alleviated by making it very clear that you can 

go through that line, you are going to go through a full-body scanner, fully knowing what is happening. I would just hope that you 

would consider that, because I don’t think we should lose that technology. I see some articles coming up about some concerns about 

that. 

Second, cybersecurity. If I were to review all of the areas that we 

have worked on, that is both the Congress and the Department, 

over the last 4 years, the one area I think we have done the least 

in is cybersecurity. I think that is a reflection of our society at 

large. I know that you have indicated that it is one of your concerns or top 12 or 20 or whatever that list was. Could you talk a 

little bit about that and what you think we need to do both as a 

governmental entity and also to work with the private sector in 

that regard? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Certainly. With respect to the full-body 

scans, we are piloting them. We began in Tulsa, I believe, last 

week. There are four or five other airports, Albuquerque, Salt Lake 

City, and so forth. We will be using them as a pilot as well. We 

don’t have an ‘‘I don’t care’’ line. We actually have an ‘‘I care deeply’’ line. There is always an option to use a regular magnetometer 

for a passenger who doesn’t want a full-body scanner. I believe, as 

you do, it is less intrusive to use the full-body scanner. I think the 

key question for us is going to be can we make it more rapid so 

we don’t develop lines at the airports. So that is moving forward, 

and that technology seems to be very, very good, very promising at 

the least. 

In terms of cybersecurity, the National Director of Intelligence 

has begun a 60-day review of what we are doing Federal Government-wide on cyber, and in particular what we are doing to reduce 

portals of entry into the system, what we are doing to respond to 

intrusions, but, more importantly, what we are doing to implement 

technologies that would prevent intrusions. 

I believe, as you do, that the private sector has to be not only 

our partner in that, but they are actually in a way key consumers 

of what we are doing. So while I can’t tell you right now what the 

actual operative structure is going to be to make sure the private 

sector is included, I have instructed our cyber folks to make sure 

that we are reaching out to the various private-sector groups. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I think you will find that the Members of this 

committee want to work very closely with you on that as a priority. 

Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from 

California. It must be a California day today, Ms. Harman. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, every day is a California day. 

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that President Obama has selected 

a good personal friend and an able woman to head the Department, 
17 

and I would just point out to the Secretary that this committee 

wants to be your partner. I know the Chairman said that. We want 

to be your partner, and we have a strong history of bipartisanship 

in this committee. We may be jurisdictionally challenged, but we 

try to punch above our weight. This issue couldn’t be more critical. 

Let me just put out a few things because time is very short and 

invite your comment to all of them. First of all, I applaud the new 

tone of the Department. As I have told you personally, I think your 

role is to prepare, not scare the American public. Yes, terrorism is 

a challenge; yes, we have more to do and much to fear since 9/11. 

But if people are personally prepared for what might come their 

way, first they will know what to look for, but second of all, they 

will have that resilience that you just talked about and not be terrorized. So appreciate what you are doing. 

No. 2, on the intelligence function, which is of keen interest to 

me, I applaud your comment that your challenge is: How do we 

share with the State and locals and get their information back? I 

think that the INA function at Homeland unfortunately, at least up 

to this point, is more of a stovepipe than an information-sharing 

vehicle, and that is why I have urged you and will continue to urge 

you to appoint a cop to be the head of INA, because I think that 

that expertise is critical. 

I don’t think the problem is getting information from the Federal 

Government. I think the problem is forcing that information down 

to the person who will actually uncover and prevent, hopefully, or 

disrupt the next terror attack on our soil. 

Third, the National Application Office, which was stood up by 

your predecessor and, I gather, still operating at some weak level 

inside the Homeland Department, I think it is a mistake to have 

an office at Homeland Security that could task military satellites 

to conduct homeland security functions over the United States. I 

think there is a posse comitatus problem. I think existing law is 

adequate, and that is why Congressman Norm Dicks, a former 

Member of this committee, and I sent you a letter recently urging 

you to shut it down. I really think that would be in our national 

interest. 

Finally, I mentioned we are jurisdictionally challenged here. I 

would just welcome any comments you have and invite them for 

the record about how hard it is for Homeland Security officials, especially the Secretary, to appear at 88 committees and subcommittees in the U.S. Congress, and why it might make more sense to 

put most of the jurisdiction in this committee. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, thank you. 

A few points, on the State and local information sharing. Obviously as a former Governor and State attorney general, I really appreciate that need. I will be giving an address in 2 weeks at the 

National Conference for Fusion Centers. We really need to pump 

up that effort and make them a vital part of our national security 

network in terms of information sharing. So look for those comments. 

With respect to the National Applications Office, that is one of 

the issues that I am reviewing. They do have an appropriation actually from the Congress, and so what I have said is, look, I want 

to know what we are doing, what are the issues impacting privacy 
18 

and expectations of privacy that should be taken into account, and 

I will be happy to report back to you, to the committee and Congressman Dicks as we go forward. So we have lots of issues to work 

on jointly, but I look forward to that partnership. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have 51 seconds remaining, so I 

would invite the Secretary to put on the record how many appearances her predecessor had to make before the Congress, because I 

think it is useful for the audience tuning in to hear about this. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. I should have done that in response to your question. Last session it was 269 hearings in the 

House, 126 before this committee or its subcommittees, 111 from 

other authorizing committees, 32 from the appropriations side. 

I would say Secretary Chertoff was a great partner to work on 

on the transition from one administration to the next on homeland 

security. It is a nonpartisan issue, it is a very functional operational issue, it is nuts and bolts. But I think one of his comments 

and strong feelings was work of the Department was sometimes interrupted, unduly delayed, and lots of hours spent on preparing for 

hearings and so forth, when, in fact, better answers could have 

been prepared if more work could have actually been done prior to 

a hearing. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Madam Secretary, for being here. 

First there is talk in the last couple of years about pulling FEMA 

out of the Department. What are your thoughts? I will be up front; 

I am very opposed to that. This has become a well-organized Department. It has taken several years to get that way. We had some 

real rough spots when initially putting the 22 agencies together, 

and things are starting to work better now. I think it would be very 

disruptive. I am of the opinion of given how well FEMA has performed over the last couple of years, it is evidence that it is working. But what are your thoughts on the effort to remove FEMA 

from the Department? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. Several things. One is I have 

not yet had the opportunity to speak about this with President 

Obama, and should he wish to seek that statutory change, he needs 

the space with which to do that. There are, though, as you know, 

many efficiencies to be encountered where FEMA is now. The 

issue, to me, is one of leadership and operations. If FEMA is working well, responding well, backing up State and locals—and again, 

the expectation that it is a first responder, that is a public perception that is inaccurate, and historically inaccurate. We need some 

help changing that expectation. But if it is doing its job working 

with State and locals in preparing and responding, if there is good 

leadership and management, where it fits in the Federal organizational chart becomes less of an acute issue. 

So right now it is within the Department of Homeland Security, 

it is part of my charter. I look forward to when the President nominates an Administrator, but in the mean time we keep working 

with the men and women in that Department, and again, kind of 
19 

a parallel of the State and local intel sharing I talked about earlier, 

working with our first responders and our State and locals. I will 

be speaking to the national NIMA conference in the future, also an 

important part of FEMA’s work. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. We put quite an effort into raising the 

number of Border Patrol agents from roughly 12,000 to now a little 

over 18,000, which was the goal. I still think it is too few. I think 

we should be over 20,000, but we hit that goal. But I am concerned 

that we haven’t done anything on the ICE side; the number of 

agents has been flat for years. Do you have any opinion as to when 

that is going to change, or have you looked at that? Are you aware 

of any efforts to try to grow the number of ICE agents to be more 

compatible with the growth that we put on Customs? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. We are looking at staffing 

levels across the Department, but also between Departments. Immigration is a system. It begins with the apprehension of someone 

illegal in our country and works not only through DHS, but also 

through the Department of Justice; you have to have marshals to 

transport detainees, because you have to have facilities, you have 

to have courtrooms. So the Attorney General and I have begun if 

I could say almost a joint review of the immigration system and 

what the Federal Government needs to do to support it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Last I have the Center for Domestic Preparedness in my district. It is a wonderful facility, only one like it 

in the world to train first responders from all over the world. It is 

a facility where they offered the training free, they have to come. 

A fireman or -woman or police officer or rescue department, they 

come and spend 2 weeks of training. It is free. 

The problem is my district is very rural, and most of the first responders are volunteers, and they work during the day, and they 

can’t take 2 weeks and go to the center. So I have been an advocate 

for the center to try to package more of that training and take it 

out in increments, 3- and 4-hour training for regional departments 

to come together. I would like to see you push that some more, because most of us, if you look at our districts, most of the first responders are, in fact, volunteers, and their neighborhood will be 

able to take advantage of the state-of-the-art training that we have 

at CDP. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. It is a wonderful facility. I 

look forward to actually doing a site visit at some time. That is an 

interesting idea. Let me pursue it, and we will get back to you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We have some votes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Ten minutes; could I do any of my set of questions? 

Chairman THOMPSON. Just as soon as I finish, I would be happy 

to. The plan is to recess the hearing, take the three votes and come 

back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, welcome. 

When we created the Transportation Security Administration at 

the insistence of the then Republican majority, there was a provi-
20 

sion that at the discretion of the then Secretary, which would have 

been Secretary Mineta, that the employees could be precluded from 

collective bargaining rights and unionization if it was in the national interest. Unfortunately, Secretary Mineta made that decision. 

As you know from the surveys of the employees in Homeland Security, there are morale problems. A lot of it goes to the management of the Bush administration, the misdirection, but some of it 

goes to the fact that they are denied these rights which are made 

commonly available. 

Do you have the authority to reverse that decision by then Secretary Mineta, since it is now under your jurisdiction? I was asked 

by a TSA employee on my way through 2 weeks ago reminding me 

that we may have an administration now that might be receptive 

to restoring their rights. If you don’t have that authority will you 

ask for it from this committee and Congress? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. The answer to your question is that I 

have asked our General Counsel’s Office exactly that question, and 

I don’t have a response yet. But obviously, I appreciate the valuable men and women who work and some of these jobs are very difficult jobs in difficult settings and I appreciate what they are doing. 

So we are looking at this right now from both a legal and a policy 

standpoint. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. They have to deal with grumpy Members of 

Congress and others traveling through their checkpoints. 

The second point would be on the equipment that they are utilizing. I believe that the so-called stimulus package had some 

equipment acquisition in there, and I believe some of it was going 

to be dedicated to replacing the equipment at the checkpoint. Because even though you would not have had to go through it, everyone else in here went through superior equipment that guards our 

buildings and all the other Federal buildings in terms of having 

multidimensional capabilities so they don’t have to say can I take 

your bag and turn it and run it through again, slowing down the 

line and trying to get a look at something suspicious. Is that going 

to happen? Are we going to get them the same equipment that is 

readily available that we have here, or better? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I can’t speak to precisely the equipment 

that is going to be purchased, but the stimulus package did include 

a generous share for TSA. So we will be looking I am sure at a variety of different types of scanning equipment. 

The goal is obviously to be able to identify something that requires a second look and to do it with a lot of speed and accuracy. 

That is what we are asking the scanning—that is what we are 

looking for in our scanning process. So that is what the equipment 

needs to be purchased in order to accomplish. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I am glad that you recognize that. We had trouble 

with the last administration on that issue. 

Switching from aviation over to ports, I think that the greatest 

single threat of a nuclear weapon is not someone launching something at us; it is someone secreting it in a container with a GPS 

or trigger device attached. We put through, over the objections of 

the last administration, shippers, and everybody else, a requirement that by 2012 that everything be screened overseas. The last 
21 

administration made clear to us that they did not think this was 

doable and they weren’t going to really push for it. 

What is the attitude of this administration regarding this threat 

and the possibility of meeting the deadline in 2012 of scanning all 

the containers before they depart foreign ports? The last administration—they assured us they would scan all the containers before 

they left our ports to go to the interior in case they contained 

threats. I guess that made our ports sacrifice zones. I never understood that position. Are we going to do it overseas? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That is something that we have been 

looking at. I must share with the committee my initial view is that 

the 2012 deadline is not going to work and we are going to have 

to work on what we do beyond that. 

To do 100 percent scanning requires, for example, agreements 

with many, many countries. There are lots of issues with that. 

There is a difference between screening and scanning in the lexicon 

of the cargo world. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I know. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I believe that we are close to 100 percent 

screening. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Which sometimes can be meaningless with the C– 

TPAT program deficiencies and others. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That is right. That is something that I 

am looking at right now more deeply. But my initial review is that 

2012 is a deadline that may not be reached under the current state 

of the program. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. We would love—and I think the Chairman 

shares—we would love to discuss this issue further and see if we 

could help move that along. Thank you. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, for 5 minutes and that will be our last questioner for this series, Madam Secretary. We plan to come back 

around 20 minutes. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, thank 

you for coming before this committee today. I would like to start 

by first saying how appreciative I am of your efforts and your 

staff’s efforts and your prompt response to two recent constituent 

inquiries from my office. Thank you for that. 

The first one involved a constituent named George Boujadi, a 

lawful permanent resident of Lebanese descent currently living in 

my district and currently working in Iraq in support of the U.S. 

Government. George is a bilingual security adviser who has worked 

for the United States Department of State for 20 years, most of 

which has been overseas. Specifically he oversaw the protective detail of Ambassador Ryan Crocker in both Lebanon and now in Iraq. 

However, because his Government job requires him to reside overseas it may take him another 5 years to become a U.S. citizen. In 

fact, George has been working 4-month deployments in Iraq with 

20 days respite at home in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania since 2004 as 

a legal permanent resident. I suspect that George’s case may or 

may not be unique but he is certainly deserving of citizenship. 

What processes or procedures does the Department have in place 

to assist or expedite citizenship applications from these patriotic in-
22 

dividuals serving U.S. security interests abroad and in this case in 

a combat zone? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, thank you, and that is something 

that goes to a department called Citizenship and Immigration 

Services. One of the things we need to have the flexibility to do is 

to deal with special cases, perhaps ones such as the gentleman you 

reference. 

So I don’t know that a statutory or procedural change is necessary. I think it needs to be a sensitivity change, if a particular 

case comes forward that we could expedite it. 

Mr. DENT. That would be appreciated. Would you oppose making 

targeted amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act? You 

mentioned statutory changes may or may not be necessary, but I 

would like to at least give you some discretion with respect to citizenship requirements under circumstances like this. In fact, I have 

a letter from Ambassador Crocker urging that this man be made 

a citizen, even stating that on more than a few occasions this individual probably saved his life as well as others. So I would like to 

give you that type of authority. How would you feel about that type 

of discretion? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I am always glad to have discretion, I 

think any Secretary would say the same on any matter but I would 

be glad to work with you on that. 

Mr. DENT. The second case, I recently brought to your Department’s attention, this involved a transportation worker’s identification credential, the TWIC card, and as the new Ranking Member 

on the Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee, this is an issue that I look forward to exploring further 

in this Congress. There is going to be a photo on the screen. I don’t 

see it. There it is. Okay. 

[The information follows:] 
23 

Mr. DENT. I wanted you to see that. It is a boat called the Josiah 

White II, being pulled by Hank and George along a canal. To be 

very clear, Hank and George are the mules. This is part of an exhibit at the National Canal Museum in my district in eastern 

Pennsylvania. Now, Hank and George, while sometimes are ornery, 

they are not terrorists. This much we are certain. However, the 

current TWIC statute requires that the individuals in colonial garb 

have TWIC cards. 

While the photo is funny, the unintended consequences of this 

particular statute are not. I have two questions: First, Madam Secretary, do you believe that the mule tenders in this photograph 

should be required to have terrorist watch list background checks 

and TWIC cards? I know it is sort of facetious but the at same time 

it is serious. They are required. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, let me just say this. Obviously this 

is a picture designed to say, hey, isn’t this absurd that they be required to have TWIC cards. Let’s work with you on this particular 

case if we might. 

Mr. DENT. I would like to work with you on a more commonsense approach to this, a risk-based approach to requiring TWIC 

cards under circumstances like this. It is costly and obviously it is 

common sense. It just does not involve this situation, but it could 

involve a fishing boat and others who are taking a few people off 

the coast for a few hours. 

Finally, one other issue on which I have been working. There are 

139,000 people in this country awaiting removal, they have removal orders against them. They come from about eight countries, 

China, India, Vietnam, Laos, Jamaica and a few others. Those 

countries will not repatriate their citizens. We are trying to send 

them back but they will not accept them. 

I have introduced legislation, and Senator Specter, Mike Castle 

and others, to hold up visas from these countries until those countries repatriate their citizens. Many of these citizens are criminals—a large number of them are criminals but they have removal 

orders against them and we would like to have them sent back. 

Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Madam Secretary, you can hold that. We 

have to vote. The committee stands in recess for about 20 minutes. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman THOMPSON. We would like to reconvene the recessed 

meeting. 

The next person to be recognized, the gentlewoman from Texas, 

Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Again, Madam Secretary, let me welcome you 

and thank you so very much for the breath of fresh air in our committee. I would like to echo some of the comments about jurisdiction. I think it is enormously important. I know it falls a lot to our 

resolution, this Congress. But I think it is enormously important 

for this very important department to have a focused jurisdiction. 

I might offer as well a consideration on FEMA. No, I don’t believe it should be moved. I know the administration is considering 

it. But an option may be if you look at the schematic map of the 

Department, and I am sure you have, you will find FEMA way 

down on the stair steps, maybe two steps from the basement in 
24 

terms of how it is framed. Possibly the opportunity for it to be put 

where it is a direct report to the Secretary at a level somewhat 

similar to the way USAID is in the State Department. I only refer 

that to you for reference. 

But I do believe that although FEMA is not a first responder, as 

you well know, it is a lifeline for communities. It is the direct contact that we have. 

I am just going to put a number of things quickly on the record 

and try and move as quickly as possible. I have been a strong advocate for the rehabilitation of areas because of Hurricane Katrina 

and Rita. We now have Hurricane Ike and we were doubly collapsed because of the economic markets, the attention to that area 

just did not continue. So we have a charity hospital that is now 

closed, University of Texas MB wondering where the money is. We 

have an issue of ineligibility that is one of the highest when our 

applicants have not been able to get FEMA recovery. Our contractors have not been paid. Our housing director has just had a press 

conference yesterday. He can’t get any housing on the ground because of environmental impact statements. 

I would like to invite you to the region. I welcome what you are 

doing in the Gulf region with the Secretary of HUD. I would like 

to welcome you to the region to come with the same package or 

team, because we are desperately in need of a fix. I just want to 

know, can I welcome you to work with me on these issues? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, and with respect to the schematic of 

the Department, you know the Department has seven big operational components, FEMA, TSA, CIS, CBP, ICE, the Secret Service, and the Coast Guard. The schematic, if you actually trace it 

back, they do come right up into the Secretary’s office. I meet with 

the head of those components at least once a week. We are closely 

involved there. 

With respect to your invitation, I look forward to meeting with 

you. I look forward to seeing what FEMA funds have already gone 

into the Ike recovery and what we need to do to move that process 

along. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I appreciate that it may require waivers from 

your office. The housing issue is really at a crisis. We have got the 

manufactured housing on the ground all ready to go and can’t move 

and people don’t have housing. 

Let me quickly put two other questions out. I am excited about 

the Transportation Security Committee that I chair. The importance of critical infrastructure I think is going to be one of our 

greatest challenges, but I do want to just ask the question dealing 

with the chemical facility security program which has been a success. Can we—do you believe the program could include wastewater, water, and I think maritime facilities? I am just going to 

give you these questions. 

Other one is we had a commitment from the administration to 

train our employees, 9/11 included specific training mandates. They 

never made them. So my question is whether we will see security 

training mandates for our rail and bus workers and transit workers, our port workers. Very important issue. I really join in the professional development needs of our TSA employees. 
25 

Last, I visited Guantanamo Bay. I said I was going to keep an 

open mind. I am very glad that you on are the team to review it. 

I believe it can be closed at the same time that we can protect our 

national security. 

If you could answer the questions dealing with training and the 

chemical security issue. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, we are obviously in the process now 

of beginning to issue the categorization of chemical facilities under 

the CFAS rules and that process will continue through this spring. 

We will keep the committee apprised of our progress there. We are 

now looking at the whole issue of waste and wastewater treatment 

facilities with respect to their coverage under the law and what 

needs to be done. 

With respect to training, obviously training is a passion with me. 

I believe for emergency preparedness and response and for people 

just to know what they need to do under any different type of circumstance, training is so very key. So, yes, we are going to be reinvigorating our efforts in that area. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Key issues. My subcommittee and this committee looks forward to really working closely with you on these 

issues. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. I think my time 

has expired. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. We now recognize 

Mrs. Miller for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, we certainly welcome you to the committee as all of my colleagues have said as well. We appreciate your service to your State 

and looking forward to your service now of our entire Nation. We 

certainly need it. It is a very challenging time of course for our Nation and as you are being introduced, your introductory meeting to 

the committee, I am going to take most of my time to tell you a 

little bit about my region of the world and how we look forward to 

working with you if I could. 

I come from Michigan, which is a northern border State. I am not 

minimizing all of the dynamics and the challenges that we face on 

our southern border in our country, but on the northern border we 

have some similar issues and dynamics as well as some unique 

things as well. In my region in southeast Michigan, just as an example, we have the Ambassador Bridge, which is the biggest border crossing on the northern tier. The tunnel from Windsor runs 

under the Detroit River there. Incredibly busy artery as well. 

The Blue Water Bridge in my district, 30 minutes to the north 

of the Ambassador Bridge, is the second busiest border commercial 

crossing on the northern tier, and of the two it is the only one you 

can transit HAZMAT. We have some of those issues. The CN rail 

runs under the St. Clair River. 

I keep holding this up because in Michigan you have the map of 

our State at the end of your arm. Here we have—— 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Which finger is it? 

Mrs. MILLER. The CN rail tunnel is the busiest rail entry into 

the entire Nation. It runs under the St. Clair River there. On the 

other side of the long liquid border that we share with our wonderful neighbors of Canada in the immediate area is something we call 

Chemical Valley, which I believe is if not the largest, the second- 
26 

largest concentration of petrochemical plants in our hemisphere. Of 

course we have the Great Lakes there, one-fifth of the fresh water 

drinking supply of the entire Nation. 

So there has been quite a bit more attention from the previous 

administration and I certainly have followed closely your comments 

about northern border security as we try to sort of beef up. As we 

speak we are standing up with Customs and Border Patrol a northern border wing at our Air National Guard base there. They have 

got additional personnel, air assets, both fixed and some 

Blackhawks—fixed-wing and Blackhawks. They have some water 

assets that are coming there, too. We are looking forward in 2010 

to a UAV mission. I have some questions and maybe we can follow 

up later about that on how that might all work along the northern 

border. We obviously are not going to put a fence around our entire 

Nation, but being able to utilize essentially taxpayer funded offthe-shelf hardware that has worked so well in theater for homeland 

security is a very critical component. 

My area is going to be a pilot program on the northern tier for 

the CDINet. I think in the spring. Hopefully they are right now 

doing—this is sort of what they told us but we are waiting for a 

briefing as well, which would be 24/7 surveillance all the way along 

the St. Clair River from the Blue Water Bridge to Lake St. Clair. 

A number of different towers that they are talking about building 

or utilizing existing towers. Our area just recently got one of the 

Stone Garden grants. Really we look at it as a force multiplier for 

CBP for our local law enforcement, and we are blessed with—as everybody in the Nation is, but we are always parochial about our 

own emergency management teams and how fantastic and professional they are and how they are looking forward to partnering 

with your agency in every way that they possibly can. 

As you might imagine because of our proximity, we have regular 

meetings. On Friday I will be meeting with the three Canadian 

MPs to talk about the border thickening issues, et cetera. So I want 

to lay that out to you. We are obviously just so delighted to have 

you at the helm here and looking forward to working with you on 

all of these issues. 

But since I have 51 seconds left, let me ask you if you could, Secretary, to flesh out a bit some of your initial comments about 

northern border issues and security. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, and thank you. Your district does include some very busy areas for trade and commerce between our 

important neighbors to the north. It is interesting, when I issued 

a request for information about what we were doing on the northern border, that was immediately interpreted as thickening the 

border. 

Mrs. MILLER. It is all they talk about. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. My view is we need to have a security 

strategy—we need have issues or protections at the northern border that make sense for that area, for that topography and the like, 

but fully take into account the balance that always must be struck 

between security and trade and relationships that are on-going. 

But part of what I am doing now is trying to get an analysis. 

What is up there? What is on the drawing board? So what are the 

pilots that are contemplated for the next 6 months to a year? Then 
27 

I do plan myself to go to the border maybe when it is a little warmer. 

Mrs. MILLER. Spring is on the way. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Exactly. Because I think there is nothing 

better than seeing it with your eyes and then talking with local 

mayors, sheriffs, police chiefs, to get their sense, also our CBP and 

other employees who are stationed there, to what is going on there 

and what really works. For both of our borders our goal is a safe 

and secure border that allows us to protect our sovereignty interests as a Nation but also recognizes that we have key trade alliances and family relationships to the north and indeed to the 

south. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you so much. We are delighted to have you 

here and look forward to working with you. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. We now recognize the gentleman from 

Texas for 5 minutes, Mr. Cuellar. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, it is 

a pleasure to be with you. First of all, I congratulate you and second of all, I would ask if you could have your staff whenever you 

all develop your strategic, your performance plans, your mission, 

your goals, your performance measures, I know I asked that when 

I first got on the committee some years ago, I never got it. I would 

appreciate if you could get us your performance and your strategic 

plans for the Department. 

No. 2, and I have a series of questions, one is ports of entry. We 

have done a good job in putting men and women in green, but we 

need men and women in blue. Not only ICE but the ports of entry, 

because the wait lines are pretty long, as you know. We added the $720 million in the stimulus package, a part going 

to you all, a part going to GSA. I would ask you all to streamline 

the process to get that done. Because 88 percent of all the goods 

coming to the United States come through land ports. We have 

done a good job putting money into the airports and the seaports, 

which we need to continue doing, but the land ports, 88 percent of 

all the goods are coming in. In my hometown of Laredo, which I 

am hoping that you will visit us soon, 40 percent of all the trade 

between United States and Mexico comes through the Port of Laredo. We get about 13,500 trucks going north- and southbound, 

1,200 railcars every day. This is just on a daily basis. 

I would ask you to move on those ports’ funding as soon as possible to streamline the process on that. I would appreciate your 

help. 

The other thing I would ask you is—I asked the former Secretary 

and I never got the response, and I think even the Chairman asked 

him also. Could you give us, best case scenario, how many personnel you would need for customs officials to man all the ports 

north and south and what sort of infrastructure needs you need. 

Because we have been estimated about $4.9 billion. We added $720 

million, but if we could get those two responses, because we never 

got it from the other Secretary. I would ask you to provide that to 

us as soon as possible. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. Yes, and if I might speak to 

the issue of the land ports of entry. Those ports are absolutely key. 
28 

I was delighted that the Congress did include $720 million which 

will allow us to accelerate pre-identified projects to enlarge and 

modernize those land ports. Many of them have not been improved 

since the ’70s and the amount of trade that goes back and forth, 

as you know, has exploded in the mean time. 

So what we are doing to streamline actually is we are putting together a joint GSA-Customs planning office for the improvements 

in those ports. So that instead of going sequentially, first Customs 

looks at it and says this is what this port needs and then it goes 

to GSA which puts its imprint on it and this goes back and forth. 

We actually have people in one place—the people that operate the 

port, with the people who have to do the contracting and the construction of the port improvements. I am hoping that we will see 

some streamlining by doing that. 

Then with respect to what our analysis is of manpower and 

building out for the outyears on those ports, we will be happy to 

get information to you. I will say this, however. Part of the manpower needs depends in part about how fast we improve the ports. 

Because as we—theoretically as we add technology to the ports, it 

may help us adjust downward our manpower needs. So there is 

going to be some flexibility there as well. 

Mr. CUELLAR. A couple of quick questions. No. 1, whatever you 

can do to streamline the grants, those grants that go out, if we can 

streamline the paperwork and the time to get them down to our 

firefighters, I would ask you to do that. If you have any proposals 

to streamline the process, I would ask you to do that. One quick 

question and one border question. 

FEMA. Have you talked to—I know the question was asked 

about FEMA, but I believe Chairman Oberstar has filed or will be 

filing the legislation today. Could you give us what the administration’s position is on this? Because maybe if we got some direction 

on this, this will prevent some of the legislation from being filed. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. The answer is no, I have not yet had the 

opportunity to speak with the President about this. So it would be 

premature for me to say what position they will take on that legislation. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Last, I have 22 seconds. We, as you know, the 

fence in Texas has been—Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent 

to enter into the record the document that I am distributing. I 

think Members should have gotten some photographs that reference the border fence project. I believe that has been given out 

to the Members. Staff has talked to both sides. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Without objection. I am not certain they 

have it but we will get it to them. 

[The information follows:] 
29 
30 

Mr. CUELLAR. Madam Secretary, down there in Texas we were 

told—and this is the picture that was used for a fence in the south 

Rio Grande Valley. They said if we put a fence more like a levee, 

as a levee control, it would provide levee protection and this was 

the picture that was given to us, that Secretary Chertoff went 

down there and said this is what we are going to have. 

What we see now is actually this. There is a little difference between what was given to us. I believe in ‘‘truth in fencing,’’ if you 

want to use that. This is the southern part. In other words, we still 

have the levee part of it but instead of having this they put the 

fence on top of that. I sold it to folks down there, our Governor, 

our mayors down there, and I would ask you to look into it. I know 

we don’t have much time. But if somebody is going to say this is 

what you are going to do, and then they provide you that and on 

top of that, there is a little difference on that. 

So I would ask you—I know that I am out of time but please look 

at that, sit down with your staff, and if they said it was in the fine 

print they should have told that to the people when they had the 

public hearings. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, I will do that. Just a question, is the 

airport landing map part of the fence? Is it actually on top of the 

structure or behind it? 

Mr. CUELLAR. It is on top of this. I actually went to go see it myself. Pictures that we took when I was there. This is the top part. 

So we are looking from here that way. So the levee part is there, 

and then they added this. I can understand the response that Border Patrol is going to give, tactical reasons. I know all the buzz 

words. But I wish they would have told us. Because in other words 

there would have been a different type of opposition and they 
31 

agreed—as you know, we agreed to this levee fence but they did 

not tell us that on top of this levee fence, the cement is on the 

other side, they added this huge, huge fence. It is 18 feet tall or 

so. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, I will look into that. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The gentleman from Georgia, 

Mr. Broun. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, congratulations, and we are thankful for your coming here today. In 

your testimony you state that Government does nothing more fundamental than protecting its citizens, and I couldn’t agree with you 

more on that. We have some very serious problems that we have 

either inadequately or failed to address and I am looking forward 

to working with you and the Department on a number of these 

issues, including counterintelligence, radicalization, cybersecurity, 

securing our borders, oversight of MBAT, reevaluating TSA’s large 

aircraft security program, and a whole host of other issues. 

But first I would like you to know how disappointed I am with 

the DHS’s lack of transparency and accountability in the MBAT 

site selection process. We are going to find out whether a truly objective merit-based decision was reached. Today, however, I would 

like to talk with you about counterintelligence and radicalization. 

DHS is not going to be a respected member of the intelligence 

community unless it takes counterintelligence seriously, and I 

know you have been very much involved in that in Arizona. DHS 

is too large of a target for foreign intelligence services and terrorist 

organizations to neglect a vigorous counterintelligence program. I 

would like your assurance that counterintelligence will be a priority for you and the Department. I would like to see a fully implemented and vigorous DHS counterintelligence program. 

Are you working with FBI and counterintelligence to improve 

your partnerships and coordinate your programs on a large scale? 

What can this committee do to help you expand these programs 

and protect your Department from foreign penetration and collection activities? 

Second, we have done a lot to prevent terrorist attacks and protect our homeland, but we are still vulnerable to home grown 

radicalization and violent Islamic extremism. Although not at the 

levels in Europe, we have seen radicalization in prisons, mosques, 

community centers, and even some schools. 

As a leader in protecting the homeland, what do you see as the 

Department’s grand strategy in going forward and how will you coordinate with other agencies? What tactics will you use? Do you 

have any recommendations for our committee on ways that we can 

help prevent or address radicalization on U.S. soil? 

In asking those questions I just want to tell you that in my own 

district there is a community that I have calls about all the time, 

whether these people are becoming radicalized and trying to create 

a problem in Georgia where I live. I see this as a huge problem 

that we face as a Nation. I know there are many other areas like 

this of communes or centers where radicalization may or may not 

be occurring. So I am eager to work with you and the Department 

on that issue as well as the counterintelligence issue. 
32 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, thank you. Yes, counterintelligence 

is a priority. We will be doing some things moving forward I think 

in that area. I have already had very substantive meetings with, 

for example, Director Mueller of the FBI, Admiral Blair from the 

NDI and Mike Leiter from the Counterintelligence Center about 

how we mold our efforts together and make sure that not only are 

we coordinated, which is a word that is thrown around a lot, but 

that the coordination means that we are targeted and not overlapping but yet sharing amongst ourselves, and again with State and 

locals, what is going on. 

With respect to radicalization, I agree with you that this is an 

area where indeed we have some work to do. Again working with 

the Counterterrorism Center, the FBI we actually have a unit 

within the Department that I have tasked with looking at the process of radicalization and then how it could be interrupted and in 

what areas of the country would we best be focusing some of those 

efforts. While I would rather not share some of that in a public setting, it clearly is on my radar screen. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you so much. I encourage you to be very aggressive in this endeavor. I get a lot of calls in my district about 

concerns out there. I am sure other Members do also. 

Back to the intelligence and counterintelligence, I think my perspective is that we need to have a very strong not only intelligence 

community within the Department but a very aggressive counterintelligence community within the Department, and I for one want 

to work with you and for you and I am sure many Members of this 

Congress—of this committee do to make sure that those counterintelligence efforts are very aggressively sought out and promoted 

within the Department. 

So thank you so much. I appreciate it. 

Chairman THOMPSON. For the benefit of those present, it is the 

Chair’s intention to continue the hearing. We have a Member who 

has already gone to vote and will come back. So we will try not to 

interrupt. 

We now have Mr. Carney scheduled for 5 minutes. Other individuals can go and come back if they wish. Mr. Carney for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, as 

you know I chair the Oversight Subcommittee, so all of this is of 

interest to me, soup to nuts. That is my purview. 

I have a question on the discussions you are having with the National Security Adviser on merger or somehow working in parallel 

in terms of the Homeland Security Committee as opposed to the 

National Security Committee. How are those talks coming? Are you 

coming to any conclusions? Any new ideas or arrangements? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, I spoke actually before the Inauguration about this analysis of the National Security Council, the 

Homeland Security Council, and what needs to be done. So what 

we are looking at is what functions are performed and really taking 

a fresh set of eyes at all with the goal of making sure that the 

President has the best advice for security, both internationally and 

domestically, and also in terms of response and recovery. 

That process is under way. We told the President that it would 

not be one of these 2-year study jobs, that we were moving with 
33 

all deliberate speed to get some recommendations to him. We will 

be happy to let you and your staff know where we are headed. 

Mr. CARNEY. Please. It is our concern that the Homeland Security Committee and National Security don’t trip over each other in 

doing these things. We want to make sure that there are efficiencies and streamlining, too. 

I am sure you are very aware of Project 28 down on the border. 

I visited there a couple of times last year and I was disappointed 

to see how progress wasn’t made despite promises from the prior 

team. 

We want to kind of understand what you take as lessons learned 

from Project 28 and how you are going to change the result. You 

know, we are backed up in terms of what we are able to do in the 

SBInet because of this. Various sections, the Niajo section, for example, that is not up to speed and not running the way it was supposed to. It has been years now and millions of dollars. I would 

love to get your views on that, please. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, I am familiar with Project 28 given 

that it was in Arizona. Also given that in my view, a border protection system requires boots on the ground and technology. That is 

key. If we are going to require technology, the technology has to 

work. It has to do what the vendors told us it would do. 

So I think an initial takeaway is what were the initial contract 

representations made as to what this system would do. I think a 

second takeaway is to make sure that in our bidding process and 

our competitive bidding process, we really from the get-go take into 

account the operational needs of the agents who actually have to 

do the apprehension and interdiction. I think that perhaps that 

was late to the table in terms of actually looking at what that technology needed to empower. 

Mr. CARNEY. You are exactly right. In fact, the very people whose 

lives depended on that technology working were not part of the 

process when it was being developed by contract, which is utterly 

ridiculous. So we will see you or your staff a number of times over 

the coming term. I look forward to being a partner with you and 

making sure things work well as are advertised and making sure 

this Nation stays safe and, I thank you for your time today. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I look forward to working with you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Carney. What I would like 

to do is expand that a little bit given your local experience. To what 

extent did your office as Governor, to your knowledge, communicate 

with the Department during Project 28? Was this a stovepiped 

DHS project, to your knowledge, with little or no State and local 

participation? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, I would have to go back. 

I know there was some correspondence back and forth. But I think 

it would be fair to say in terms of overall project design, contract 

requirements, time, you know kind of the length of the contract 

and so forth, that was a Federal job. So the State was not really 

part of the process. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I say that for a couple of reasons. In talking to some of the local law enforcement along the border, we were 

talking about towers being constructed where there was some towers in the area already built that could have been utilized and so 
34 

we felt that the collaboration was essential for State and locals on 

anything along the border if we are to be successful. I think that 

is for going forward as well. 

But I do have a question that I want to get on the record, 

Madam Secretary. I understand that the DNI testified this morning that al Qaeda remains determined to conduct a spectacular attack in the homeland. Given the understanding of that statement, 

have you been fully briefed on the current threat picture? How is 

DHS coordinating with other agencies to meet and mitigate the 

challenge from al Qaeda? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, and, Mr. Chairman, if I might, let 

me just—we talked earlier with the committee about intelligence 

sharing among Federal agencies, but you know I start early each 

morning with a briefing that includes not just the Department of 

Homeland Security Intel Section but also the FBI and the CIA. So 

I get that full daily briefing and then I also receive the President’s 

daily briefing. So from the get-go every morning we have that level 

of exchange at the Federal—at the very, very, very highest level. 

We know, and I know, that there are risks out there. There are 

people out there who quite frankly seek to harm the United States. 

The issue for us always is who are they prepared to do it, in what 

fashion, what are we doing to prevent, to interdict, and the like. 

It is not just al Qaeda, but it can be other groups as well. 

So it is incumbent upon us as the Department of Homeland Security to make sure that we are fully informed and doing what we 

can in a universe where it is impossible to put the entire United 

States under a bubble. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So you are comfortable with the information you are receiving and that entities responsible are in fact sharing and coordinating to your satisfaction? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. Ms. Harman will 

be here shortly so we can continue. I don’t want to impose on you, 

I know you have an awful lot to do to keep us safe. So if I can say 

we will recess no more than 5 minutes, and we will have you complete by 12:45. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The committee stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. HARMAN [presiding.] The hearing will come to order, again. 

Our apologies to the witness for the interruption of votes, but we 

are doing the best we can. 

The Chair will now recognize Ms. Clarke from New York for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Madam Secretary, we find ourselves in a unique moment in 

American history. There are many difficult security challenges before us, but we have strong new leadership at the White House, 

here in Congress, and in you at the helm of the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

As the new Chair of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, Science, and Technology in the 111th Congress, I am 

encouraged that one of your first acts in office you issued an action 
35 

directive on cybersecurity instructing specific offices to gather information, review existing strategies and programs, and to provide 

oral and written reports back to you by mid-February. I look forward to reviewing those reports about the authorities and responsibilities of DHS for the protection of the Government and private 

sector domains, the relationships with other Government agencies, 

especially the Departments of Defense, Treasury, and Energy and 

NSA, and the programs and time frames to achieve the Department’s responsibilities and objectives. I believe that you are asking 

the right questions about DHS’s role in the cybersecurity mission. 

I have a few questions about several issues that are near and 

dear to my heart which are critical in DHS’s mission. I am from 

New York City, Brooklyn, New York, and so much of the quality 

of lives of the people of my town and my district relies on our success in meeting the challenges of your agency head on. Recently, 

the House unanimously passed H.R. 559, a bill I sponsored which 

requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to furnish the comprehensive cleared list to all DHS components and to other Federal 

and State and local and tribal authorities and others that use the 

terrorist watch list to resolve misidentifications. 

This we call the redress act, the fast redress act. Once the bill 

becomes law, what steps will you take to ensure that adequate and 

thorough passenger redress procedures are integrated Departmentwide? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. Obviously, people who are erroneously mistaken for someone on a watch list and the ability to 

get that corrected quickly is part of the on-going evolvement or evolution of the lists. 

But we will work with you on implementation. We have already 

began looking at some things that we can do in the interim. But 

I share your concern, and we want to make sure that that is implemented when it passes. 

Ms. CLARKE. Wonderful. I think at this stage it has become an 

issue of civil liberties for Americans and certainly visitors who 

come to our Nation. It is important that we sort of evolve into a 

more proactive approach, because at a certain point the saturation 

of that list becomes really something that we can’t use as an accurate tool to be able to address our main concern, which is ID’ing 

those terrorists as they move about. So thank you very much. 

The other issue is with regard to immigration. There is a squeeze 

play that is taking place in many communities and communities 

like mine, and this has to do with the backlog that takes place in 

terms of USCIS and the processing of individuals seeking to receive 

their citizenship. They fall into the nebulous area of being undocumented because they are in the process of moving from a permanent—legal permanent resident status to becoming citizens, and at 

the same time they are also vulnerable because, for whatever reason, there are all kinds of raids going on. Many of them are not 

in the workplace, as some of my colleagues may have experienced, 

but in the households in which individuals live. 

It is my hope that as you talk about the immigration system infrastructure and bureaucracy that we will get rid of this antiquated 

system that is not really serving the American people in our civil 

society in a way that it should. I was so happy to hear that you 
36 

are looking at that system, because there are hard-working rankand-file employees working for USCIS, but they don’t have the 

tools available to them to do the processing in an expedient manner. It is costing a lot of individuals who are seeking to adjust their 

status hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars every time there is a 

problem there. So I am going to wrap up and ask if you would just 

address that issue. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. If someone is here, and they are a lawful 

permanent resident, I don’t consider them undocumented. They are 

not naturalized citizens, but they are not undocumented. 

Second, CIS, you are right there are wonderful men and women 

who work there, and they are there because they want to help 

those who have come into our country legally and who seek to become and get the benefits of citizenship to get there. 

We have been involved and they have been involved on a very 

aggressive backlog reduction process. By June the average processing time will be below 5 months, which is 50 percent of what 

it has been. We are looking for other things as well that we can 

do administratively to facilitate the process and make it easier, 

more consumer friendly as it were, to help people who seek to become citizens and enjoy the benefits of citizenship to get there. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Olson of Texas is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. OLSON. I thank the Chair. 

Madam Secretary, welcome. Thank you for coming today. I greatly appreciate your service to the home State of Arizona and our Nation. 

I have a particular question about the recovery from Hurricane 

Ike. In your written testimony you mentioned that you wished 

there was specific action directives in regards to recovery efforts of 

Hurricane Katrina and Rita, and yet made no reference to Hurricane Ike. Ike was the third most destructive hurricane ever to 

make landfall in the United States. Damages of Ike in the U.S. 

coastal and inland areas are estimated to be about $24 billion. 

Ninety-five percent of the constituents in my district lost their 

power for a significant amount of time, and about 112 Americans 

and counting lost their lives in this storm. 

As the recovery costs continue to rise, could you please discuss 

what the Department is doing to help those people who are affected 

by Hurricane Ike? Most importantly, can you ensure that those 

populations affected by Hurricane Ike receive the same attention in 

terms of recovery, funding and assistance that the victims of Hurricane Katrina and Rita received? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, thank you, and I hope you don’t 

take from the fact that I did an action directive on Katrina/Rita to 

mean I was ignoring Ike. Katrina/Rita is over 3 years old. I was 

focusing on what needs to be done to complete or move through 

some of the pending recovery issues. But I have also spent some 

significant time looking at where we stand on Ike. Literally hundreds of millions of dollars actually have been sent from FEMA to 

the State of Texas. I need to understand where those stand in the 

State process in terms of distribution to the actual people in your 

district that need the help for their recovery from Ike. 
37 

With regard to equivalent treatment between Katrina, Rita, and 

Ike and the communities there, I would be happy to meet with and 

have someone to meet with you and your staff about where that 

stands in terms of the measurement of damage and the flow of 

money, but my key concern, I think, is the one implicit in your 

question, which is how to we make sure that the flow of money is 

facilitated, and that claims that are issued are resolved expeditiously for the communities and the individuals who were involved 

in Ike. 

Mr. OLSON. Yes, ma’am. Anything we can do to streamline the 

bureaucracy that is in the Department and get the assistance back 

to the people as quickly as possible. I appreciate your comments. 

We would be greatly appreciative down there. They are still working very, very hard to recover their lives. 

Changing course a little bit. I would just like to briefly talk about 

immigration and the situation on the border down there, particularly what is happening in Mexico. As some of my colleagues alluded to earlier, we have a serious problem happening in that 

country right now. The drug cartels are at war, for lack of a better 

term, with the Federal Government. As you mentioned earlier, 

there is a significant arms flow south out of our country in very 

advanced, very capable arms, including hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades. You being a border Governor understand the great 

concerns that we have in the State of Texas. 

What is the Department doing? Is there a contingency plan if 

things continue to deteriorate in Mexico and we see a massive influx of immigrants running away from a situation down there? Do 

we have a plan to address that and make sure our country is just 

not overrun in a very short time period? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, Congressman. A few things. Secretary Chertoff had developed a contingency plan, and I am looking 

at that and evaluating that, making sure that we can provide resources to State and local law enforcement in those border areas 

should we see that kind of flow-over of the drug war in Mexico at 

that level into the United States. 

One of the things I am doing right now is making sure that we 

are actually physically talking with the sheriffs in those border 

counties. My experience is that the best intel sometimes in a border county is that local sheriff, and I am going to stay in regular 

touch with them to see what is happening on the ground in the 

border communities that may be related to the drug war in Mexico. 

Then, as I said earlier, I think we need to all recognize that within the country of Mexico, the President, the Federal Government 

are really engaged in a serious, serious effort against these drug 

cartels. It is having a big impact on a level of violence within Mexico, and it is something that deserves our immediate attention 

right now. 

Mr. OLSON. I thank you. Mr. Cuellar is not here, my colleague; 

his brother is a sheriff. I assume he would share your opinion of 

the border sheriffs. I just want to extend my invitation as well with 

Congress, my fellow Texans here, we would love to have you come 

down, tour the Ike area and go down to the borders. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Olson. 
38 

Madam Secretary, I understand you have to leave in 15 minutes; 

is that correct? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, you are the committee, but it would 

be helpful. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, if we could extend that just a bit. There are 

seven people who have not asked questions, and we will confine the 

questions and the answers to a strict 5 minutes so that everyone 

gets a turn. Would that work for you? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That would be fine. 

Ms. HARMAN. I appreciate that very much. 

Ms. Richardson, another California woman on the committee, is 

recognized for a strict 5 minutes. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Madam Secretary, I was very encouraged when I read your hearing confirmation, your action directives. One of the things you 

talked about is the risk analysis, and the report says that you view 

determining the national priorities and taking judicious distribution of resources are a major element of the Department’s mission. 

In fact, you said today, although we have many risks, we have to 

focus the broader impact, focus the analysis on risk that would result in an undue impact on this country. 

My concern is, and part of why we have independent bodies and 

legislative separate, is we are going to hear a lot of people. I heard 

discussions today of land ports and all that, and that is fine, but 

there is only one port complex in this country that is No. 1, and 

that is the port complex in Long Beach and Los Angeles. There is 

only one port complex that is No. 3 in the world, and that is the 

San Pedro complex. If we are going to regain the trust and integrity that our President talked about, we have got to see—in your, 

as you call it, judicious distribution of resources, there has got to 

be a bigger difference between 1 and 2 percent of a cargo of a port 

that represents 45 percent of this Nation’s cargo. 

So my question to you is I like what I hear so far, but we really 

need that commitment that the view is not going to be that everything on the Christmas tree is of national significance. It might be 

important, it might be a risk, but it is not necessarily the No. 1. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, as I said, there is risk everywhere, 

risks to life, mass casualties, always something to be taken into account; risk to trade, risk to basic infrastructure; risk to things like 

our gasoline supply system, our food supply chain and all the rest. 

But beyond that we have to be very—I will use the word ‘‘judicious’’ 

because that is what I wrote, but we really have to be very acute 

about risks that if they materialized would cause undue damages 

to lives, casualties, commerce and the like, and the ports. The port 

that you describe is a key critical port for our Nation. I look forward to perhaps coming out to tour the port, the port area with you 

so I can get a better scope of things, but clearly there are some 

things that require more attention than others. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. We appreciate that. 

Very briefly, the background in that port complex alone, if you 

have a dirty bomb that comes in, you talk about losing 3,000 people 

in 9/11, talk about half a million people in minutes? So when we 

talk about the things of the cargo, folks coming in, we have people 

who are coming in who are being smuggled in, and these are being 
39 

identified weekly, monthly. So we appreciate your interest, and we 

look forward to you coming. 

The last part of my question has to do with interoperability. In 

your directives we as a Congress talked about the Office of Emergency Communications, which Congress felt was a focal point to be 

included in your Department. I can tell you right now we don’t 

have local, State, and Federal Government that has a clear interoperable channel so that if a disaster happens, we can effectively 

communicate and effectively work together. 

You do talk about radio technology in your material, but talk 

about your commitment of the Office of Emergency and Communications with interoperability. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, OEC obviously requires a real 

focus, and it is also a key issue with our relationships with State 

and locals. I think we need a fresh look, and that is interoperability 

among whom; is it the police officer and the fire department who 

are responding, is it their commanders, is it higher up? Because I 

think one of the problems has been this paradigm that if everybody 

isn’t interoperable all the time, you don’t have interoperability. 

Who needs to be talking with whom and radio, but we also need 

to be looking at computer interoperability or intersection, so other 

areas as well. 

So I intend to focus on this. This was a key frustration that I 

had as Governor. One of the things that I found was for emergency 

response situations, we had—for example, we used Homeland Security money to purchase vans that could be driven anywhere, and 

they were mobile communication vans, and they were a patch between different responders. I just saw one. I was in Kansas last 

week and saw some of those vans that were moved there, and I 

was in Kentucky and was moved there because Kentucky in its ice 

storms, they lost their telecommunication system. The vans were 

brought up and in hours were set up to provide that sort of coverage. 

So I think we need to really look at some of these other methodologies that are available and say, okay, let’s define what we 

mean by interoperability, and what technologies we can use, and 

whether we can do and get functional interoperability more quickly 

than what we have been given so far. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Madam Secretary. You are a welcome sight. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. McCaul of Texas, Ranking Member on the intelligence subcommittee, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, congratulations to you in your new position. 

I think you bring a wealth of experience to this job. I look forward 

to working with you. 

Being a former U.S. attorney, State attorney general, Governor 

of a border State, I feel like I have something in common with you. 

I was a Federal prosecutor and worked in the AG’s office and 

worked in Texas in a border State, so I think you have an appreciation for a lot of the same issues that we have. 

I appreciate your comments about the intelligence eyes and ears 

on the ground being important, and that information coming back 

to the Federal Government is an important piece. 
40 

Second, last year I was Ranking Member on the cybersecurity 

subcommittee. We issued a report, a recommendation to the 44th 

President Mr. Obama. Let me say the appointment of Melissa 

Hathaway as the Cyber Director was a great choice. We look forward to working with you and her on that issue as well. I hope you 

will give that report that CSIS produced at least a read. 

Two quick issues. Mexico. The Governor of my State just called 

today for 1,000 troops to be dispatched to the border. The violence 

has increased; over 5,000 deaths last year, more than Iraq and Afghanistan combined. It is a state of war. I congratulate, commend 

President Caldero ́n for his efforts to bring the cartels to justice. 

I hope you will consider, along with the merit initiative, also a 

funding on our side of the border for increased Border Patrol, ICE 

and the sheriffs that you alluded to, who I think provide a vital 

role. If you would like to comment on that in your response, I 

would love to hear that. 

Last I would just like to mention Guantanamo. We had the first 

delegation down in Guantanamo since the Executive Order was 

signed to close the base. I know you were on the review committee. 

I want to give you my observations, and I hope you will take those 

to heart as you make this very difficult decision. 

We did go down there. What we saw was, I think, similar to 

what the Pentagon’s report issued pursuant to the President’s 

order, and that was no evidence of torture. They were in compliance with the Geneva Convention, and the facility itself is probably 

better than most Federal prisons I have seen in the United States. 

So having said that, we know in that facility there are some very 

dangerous people. In fact, the top al Qaeda leadership we know are 

down there, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. That gives me 

grave concern as we decide how to go forward with Guantanamo. 

I hope this administration will give careful consideration and exercise caution on the decision as to where to move these individuals. 

I am very concerned as a former prosecutor that some of these individuals could, in fact, get into—if they are moved into the United 

States, and they go through the Federal court system, the Federal 

Rules of Evidence would allow them to get released because of perhaps relying on intelligence information to prosecute or relying on 

confessions may not come into evidence, and then we would be 

stuck with a situation where some of the very dangerous actors 

would be released on to the streets into the United States. That is 

a result I would like to avoid. I know you share that concern, and 

I hope you take that into consideration as you weigh how to deal 

with that challenge. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, yes, thank you, and pursuant to an 

Executive Order by the President, I am part of a review committee 

that is going case by case. As you recognized, there are some difficult decisions that need to be made with respect to the detainees 

in Guantanamo, and with respect to Governor Perry’s call for 

troops, I look forward to speaking with him directly. I read about 

it as well in the clips. 

In terms of what he is anticipating, is he asking for a renewal 

of Operation Jump Start, for example? Are there specific places he 

would like to see those troops placed as a backup to civilian law 

enforcement? We always, with the balance we are striking, and we 
41 

do not want to militarize the border, but what help does he think 

they can provide? So I look forward to talking to Governor Perry 

about that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Kirkpatrick, a new Member from 

Arizona, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and welcome, 

Secretary. 

I know as Governor you made securing our border one of our top 

priorities, providing additional funding and even the help of the 

National Guard to address this issue. However, it seems like that 

has not been enough at the Federal level, and the situation at the 

border is actually getting worse. A recent report says that Arizona 

and other borders are seeing a record number of abductions, including Americans taken right out of their homes. Just last week several publications have reported battles using machine guns and 

grenades are being waged near the border, and that this may push 

north as well. We must do whatever we can to prevent this and 

minimize the threat as best we can. Now that you have the tools 

of the Federal Government at your disposal, how do you see your 

Department addressing this growing concern? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, thank you, and again, it is a grave 

concern. It is at several levels. One is interaction with Mexican law 

enforcement, particularly the Federal Government of Mexico, and 

dealing—really addressing the fact that he has got a drug war on 

his hands, and it is a big one; second, looking Government-wide at 

what we can do to stop the southbound export of weaponry, particularly assault-type weapons and grenades being used in that 

drug war. The third is to stay in constant touch with local law enforcement, sheriffs and the like along that border, and should they 

identify gaps that they have or they see, to identify what we can 

do to help fill those gaps. Fourth is to have a contingency plan to 

deal with worst-case scenarios. 

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Secretary. I look forward to working with you on this committee. 

Ms. HARMAN. I thank the Members for taking less time than is 

allotted. That is appreciated. 

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. We are brief and concise. 

Ms. HARMAN. I appreciate that. 

The very patient Mr. Souder of Indiana is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you for your patience today and for dealing 

with all the committees in Congress. One of the biggest challenges 

that you have is the day-to-day operation of your agency and that 

doesn’t necessarily square with the reason why your agency was 

created. The Coast Guard is trying to get tipped-over sailboats and 

protect fisheries. The immigration is a huge thing to the border 

control and to ICE. FEMA is running around dealing with tornadoes, sometimes floods in my district. Yet the reason FEMA is in 

your agency isn’t because of tornadoes and floods; it is there in case 

we have a catastrophe, because only Homeland could coordinate 

something like. 
42 

Coast Guard is there to interdict terrorists and narcotics and 

things related to terrorism. Border Patrol, and ICE, the same way. 

It is important that in what is perceived as a little bit of a backpedaling on focus on terrorism, that doesn’t turn into wholesale retreat and you are the only person. Even though my district is the 

No. 1 manufacturing district in the United States, each Silverado 

or Sierra pickup has 100 border crossings in Canada. That is the 

No. 1 responsibility of the Department of Commerce. You need to 

work with them, but at the table, if something happens like a 

9/11 incident or something else, they will turn to you and say, what 

happened? 

In our committee we need to make sure we back you up. That 

is the No. 1 reason the Homeland Security Department is to focus 

on terrorism in particular and not lose focus, even if everybody else 

in the whole country starts to lose focus, because it is our responsibility. 

A couple of related issues that I raised some concerns here, and, 

as you heard, I am Ranking Member on Border with Congresswoman Sanchez. I am concerned that counternarcotics is not as 

much in the administration plans or some of the committee plans. 

We had 20,000 to 30,000 a year die because of illegal narcotics in 

the United States, or 160,000 since 9/11. You have the bulk of the 

agents who deal with this, Border Patrol, Coast Guard, and ICE; 

that these things, and meeting with President Caldero ́n last week, 

and talking with him and the Attorney General about the guns and 

the narcotics and the kidnappings and the problems in Phoenix as 

well, Mexicali and over in Texas, these things are very interrelated, 

and counternarcotics is heavily focused in your agency. 

Now, if you don’t get enough time here to address my three questions, I would appreciate a written response of what your philosophy is toward: Are you committed to being even more aggressive 

in counternarcotics, especially since it is the No. 1 border violence 

issue, No. 1 domestic violence issue, and is largely the same groups 

as are doing other financing, terrorism, kidnapping and any kind 

of smuggling, because these different groups of cartels are controlling the different sections of the border? 

Second question. You were supportive of the National Guard as 

Governor. You mentioned Operation Jump Start. We heard about 

Governor Perry’s request. Do you support—because rumor is there 

is a hole here or there along the border, do you support using the 

National Guard along that border? 

Third, the REAL ID Act has been one of the most critical parts 

of the ability to do intel tracking. If you don’t know who the person 

is, if you can’t sort that basic thing out, it is impossible to get good 

identification of who they are hooking up with, who needs to be 

monitored for what risk level. You expressed some concerns about 

the REAL ID Act in the past, and I would be interested in how you 

see that moving forward. Thank you. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. In terms of counternarcotics, 

dealing with these drug cartels as they are organized in Mexico is 

really the organized crime fight of the Southwestern United States. 

That is how I dealt with it as a prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office, and as an attorney general and Governor. You have to go 

after the money. Have to interrupt that chain of money that goes 
43 

in the millions of dollars back and forth with these cartels. You 

have got to go after the traffickers. You have to have the tools to 

work from the low level to the high level and try to interrupt and 

interdict their operations. 

We have a demand-side issue on the United States side. The 

drugs are coming in because of demand for illegal drugs. I look forward to working with ONDCP, among others, to see what we can 

do about that particular problem. It is a supply issue and is also 

a demand issue. 

With respect to the issue of terrorism, there is no one more conscious than I am about the reason for this Department, why it was 

stood up and what our fundamental responsibilities are. It is something that guides our decisions and actions every day. 

With respect to REAL ID, the problems with REAL ID were several-fold. One is it was stood up without adequate consultation 

with Governors who actually deal with the nuts and bolts of how 

you handle driver’s licenses. So there were a lot of just implementation issues. Second, there was no money put behind it, and it was 

budgeted, and it is very expensive to do. So what I am doing is 

working now with a group of the National Governors Association 

to say what can we do and should we do now, with the cooperation 

and consultation of Governors, of both parties I might add, to convert REAL ID into something that actually can happen on the 

ground and can happen on a real-time basis. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

I hate to rush you or our questioners, but I am trying to accommodate. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I will try to answer. 

Ms. HARMAN. Three more people, starting with the very mildmannered Mr. Pascrell of New Jersey for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Good luck to you. You had two good people before 

you, two competent people. The problem is that they very seldom 

presented things within the urgency of the time, and I suspect that 

that was driven by an administration that was not committed to 

the things that this committee was committed to on both sides of 

the aisle. 

I am glad that you are supportive of a bottom-up intelligence, 

and I really support the U.K. model, which I think is important 

and critical, and rather than a top-down situation which we have 

experienced. 

We have a very serious problem on the southern border, and I 

believe, having been to Mexico with the Chairman and dealing with 

these matters, there is no oversight, there is no enforcement, there 

is no urgency, and there are very little resources. It is very interesting that we did have the beginning of resources 2 years ago, and 

they were cutoff when they started to intercept weapons going from 

the States down to Mexico. 

I want you to please think about that. I know we are not supposed to touch that issue on both sides of the aisle now, apparently 

we declared a recess, but people are getting killed, and it is affecting America. If we don’t do something about that situation, then— 

I can picture someday that situation being equal to the murderers 

who are preparing themselves in Pakistan at the epicenter of terror. 
44 

So I want to talk to you about first responders, very close to my 

heart, obviously very close to your heart. Every year the previous 

administration would submit a budget to the Department—for the 

Department of Homeland Security that would literally gut or try 

to zero-out critical programs that deliver Homeland Security grants 

to local and State governments, to our brave first responders. Year 

after year this committee on a bipartisan basis would reject those 

cuts and have indeed increased the budget allocations for these 

grants. I am talking about the State Homeland Security Grant program; the Community-Oriented Police Services, COPS, program; 

the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response, SAFER, 

Act; the grant program; the assistance to the firefighters grant program. I am very familiar with those, and I know you are, too. 

Every year the same situation, every year, without exception. 

So, Madam Secretary, with President’s Obama’s overview budget 

plan coming out tomorrow, the overview of the budget anyway, can 

you commit to this committee right now that this administration 

will not try to gut or eliminate these vital and successful, successful grant programs that go directly to our local communities and 

first responders, circumvent the bureaucracies and anybody trying 

to take off from the top? Can you commit to this committee about 

that today? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. You will find no one more supportive of 

those grants than I am, and I can commit to you that we are operating under that assumption. One of the things I want to do and 

I will be happy to work with you on, I think now, particularly on 

some of the first responder grants that were used, for example, to 

purchase equipment, we need to be looking at what we are doing 

to fund sustainability, replacement, repairs, proper training of people to operate equipment. In other words, all of these efforts need 

to be part and parcel of the web and weave what we do for our 

homeland security not just this year, but moving on forward. Sometimes I fear that grant programs are not written or designed with 

long-term sustainability in mind. So as now the 4-week Secretary 

of Homeland Security, I will share with you that one of the things 

I am looking at is what are we doing to make sure that we are not 

just providing for the beginning of something, but really for its 

long-term success. 

Mr. PASCRELL. In completion, Madam Chair, I wanted to say 

this: Before we spend any money, increase personnel anyplace, that 

we do what I think is suggested before, and that is have concepts 

in place and policy in place so it makes sense. I think this is what 

has gotten us in problems in the past. 

Thank you so much, and good luck to you. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. Cao of Louisiana. 

Mr. CAO. First of all, I would like to thank you, Secretary Napolitano, for being here. I am from the Second District of Louisiana, 

which comprises mainly of New Orleans and part of the west bank, 

and as you know, the district was very much devastated by Hurricane Katrina, and the district remains pretty much devastated 31⁄2

years after Katrina. So one of my main concerns, obviously, is the 

rebuilding of the district. We have delved into the issues of effi-
45 

ciency of FEMA and accountability at FEMA, so I am very much 

encouraged by your statement today about looking at the leadership and the transparency with respect to how FEMA operates. 

We have done some investigations lately with respect to the TRO 

offices down in New Orleans, and we found some very serious problems there, allegations of cronyism, allegations of nepotism, of ethics violations, of significant equal employment opportunity abuses, 

of sexual harassment. I believe all of these issues interfere with the 

rebuilding of the district. I would like to know whether or not you 

are going to implement a system to oversee some of these offices 

and to hold, if these allocations are true, people accountable for 

these allegations. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, I can’t speak to those specific allegations, because that is the first I have heard of some of those, but 

we will obviously follow up. But, yes, my goal is to have a process 

in place by which the Gulf Coast can continue its rebuilding efforts 

by which we facilitate the resolution of disputed claims and by 

which we take and use the opportunity to have a fresh set of eyes 

to look at some of the disputes that have clogged up the system, 

as it were, to see what we can do to expedite people being housed, 

small businesses being restarted, and people’s lives being restored 

to the extent possible. I will be traveling there, as you know, next 

week with the Secretary of HUD in part so that we can not only 

exchange information, but see with our own eyes what needs further to be done. 

Mr. CAO. I would love to accompany you on your trip. 

I have one more question with respect to the Stafford Act. PostKatrina we have learned that the Stafford Act does not adequately 

address the issue of devestations with respect to—at the level of 

Katrina. Obviously maybe the Stafford Act might be adequate for 

smaller disasters, but at the level of Katrina, there are certain inadequacies and limitations to the Stafford Act. Do you have plans 

to review the Stafford Act and look at possible ways to amend the 

act in order to address disasters as large as Katrina? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Once there is a new Administrator of 

FEMA, I think one of the things we would seek to do is not look 

at the Stafford Act, or not just look at the Stafford Act, but regulations, policies and procedures that have been layered up over time 

to carry out the Stafford Act. The goal obviously is to see what 

needs to happen so that—not just for the immediate emergency response, but really where the most complaints are now is in the 

long-term recovery area, and what needs to be done in terms of improving the process, the facilitation of long-term recovery for 

areas—it can be Texas, it can be Galveston, it can be the Gulf 

Coast—other areas that have been devastated by disaster. 

Mr. CAO. Thank you very much. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Himes of Connecticut for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HIMES. Thank you very much for being with us today. A couple of quick questions for you. I am very interested—I come from 

a State that doesn’t have a county government, and so I am very 

interested to hear you expand on your comments about 

intraoperability and communications. It is a very serious issue for 

my first responders, fire, police, et cetera. I appreciated what you 
46 

said about being very precise about who is talking to whom and 

what we really mean when we are talking intraoperability. 

I wonder if you could provide a bit more detail on how you were 

thinking or how the Department is thinking about intraoperability 

as it affects first responders, particularly in the areas of the country that don’t have county or other regional structures. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That is an interesting point. I didn’t recognize that Connecticut didn’t have counties. 

Mr. HIMES. We do have counties, but there is no county government. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. You know, we live in a wonderful country, lots of variations here. Rather than give a premature answer, 

let me just say that as we put forward or really begin looking at, 

relooking at intraoperability, I would be happy to keep you and the 

committee apprised of our efforts. 

Mr. HIMES. Thank you. I appreciate that. It really is sort of particularly sharp when we don’t have regional governmental structures as we don’t in Connecticut. I promise I am coming in under 

5 minutes. 

So my second question, it is my understanding you are reviewing 

the Department’s efforts to implement the 100 percent maritime 

screening recommendations mandated by the implementing resolutions around the 9/11 Commission Act. Can you give us a sense of 

what you have learned so far and what you expect with respect to 

completing your review? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. As I already shared with the committee, I think the 2012 deadline for 100 percent screening is difficult, if not possible to attain given where we are in screening 

right now. There are many issues. For example, there are literally 

hundreds of agreements that would have to be reached with foreign 

countries to get to a 100 percent screening regimen. 

That being the case, what I am doing is really looking at what 

needs to happen, how fast can it happen, and what it is going to 

cost to happen, and what is the value added to our security if it 

happens. How do we protect the lives and the people of the United 

States? I cannot give you a timeline of when that review will be 

complete. What I can tell you, I know it is a key concern of this 

committee, so I have asked a number of people to get involved in 

that so we can move it right along. 

Mr. HIMES. Thank you, I appreciate that. I thank you on behalf 

of the other people in my district for taking this job. It is an enormous challenge, and hats off. 

I yield the balance of my time. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Himes. 

Madam Secretary, let me point out on intraoperability the reason 

we are going through the DTV transition right now—some folks listening in may wonder why this is happening—is to free up analog 

spectrum, the 700 megahertz band, for a national intraoperable 

communications capability. As one from a State that has a lot of 

wildfires, I am not sure that that bridging technology you mentioned, which is the flatbed trucks with the ACU–1000 integrators, 

can get to the scene surrounding these fires in time given all the 

blockages. So we really do need, I believe, some additional bandwidth and some strategies beyond just the switching technology. 
47 

We can pursue it later. I have abused the time of two final Members. So let me first recognize Mr. Luja ́n of New Mexico for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Madam Secretary, it is great to see you again here. I can tell you 

as a Governor who has a certain appreciation for my great State 

of New Mexico, it is great to have you serving in your capacity and 

appreciate your commitment to public service. 

Madam Secretary, I share the concerns of many of my colleagues 

with what is happening down in Mexico with the battles we are 

having with the drug cartels. I would ask you all to do not forget 

some of problems that we are also encountering in some of the 

boundaries of our sovereign nations around the country where they 

are seeing how they can exploit some of the laws to be able to traffic in those areas; and that we remember that when we are looking 

and we are bringing this, the support that we need, to the border, 

that we also include some of the leaders within our sovereign nations around the country as well. 

The passion that my friend and colleague Mr. Pascrell shares for 

our first responders as well, to remember the work that they truly 

do when we make the distinction between FEMA and what our 

first responders do, that we do have the commitment that they get 

the resources they need. They not only keep us safe, but they get 

home safely to their families after they put their lives on the line 

on a daily basis. 

I would like to shift to an area where I know that we have to 

pay some special attention as well with the multiple interdependent infrastructures that we depend on daily. A disruption of 

our transportation, energy, communication, health, or economic 

networks would threaten the stability of other networks around the 

country; of particularly notice, a vulnerability of the smart grid system transmission systems of the country communications and the 

cyber attacks that are seen on a daily basis. 

Los Alamos National Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories 

in my home State have leveraged existing research and development activities to establish the National Infrastructure Simulation 

and Analysis Center. The NISAC utilizes simulation previously 

known, but unknown in some areas, but in a secure, scientific computing environment to discover previously unknown relationships 

to develop insights about possible infrastructure vulnerability. The 

center will also help policy makers like us to prepare for disasters 

or terrorist attacks, but would also help first responders gauge the 

extent of the damage as the incident was on-going. 

We heard today concerns about—concerns that we have with 

areas that are prone to natural disaster and where we can make 

sure that we have some technology that exists today to be able to 

fully deploy it. I was curious, Madam Secretary, if you could comment on your plan about protecting our electric grid from cyber attacks, what we will be doing in a specific area, and if your Department has considered how it plans to implement the NISAC program? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, thank you. New Mexico, of course, is 

the State I grew up in, so I have a lot of fondness for your State 

and your district. 
48 

In terms of the protection of the grid, this goes to the larger 

question of protection of infrastructure, and we saw it in dramatic 

fashion 3 weeks ago in Kentucky where the ice storm took out the 

electric power for almost 50 percent of the population and the total 

communications network because and the towers all buckled under 

the ice. We did use the mobile trucks there, by the way. I wasn’t 

suggesting they be an exclusive solution, but they are part and parcel of what we really need with the broadband. 

One of the things we are working on—and this is where we need 

greater connectivity with the private sector. They own these utilities. We need to work together on a protection plan. Where some 

of this computer modeling is helpful is not just in terms of protection, but in terms of consequence identification and management so 

that we can better prepare our first responders and so forth, because sometimes the consequences themselves are inordinately 

complicated and involved, many layers of the private sector and the 

public sector and the like. That is an area we will very much be 

pursuing. We will pursue it through the National Planning Office 

that you all have helped build in the Department. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. Thank you. Madam Secretary, our time is short, and 

I look forward to hearing you later on this week on some other 

issues that we will have a chance to discuss. I know we have so 

much phenomenal research that is taking place in laboratories 

across the country, some of which is being tested in airports. You 

mentioned Albuquerque, where we have some technology which is 

currently on a trial run which is a scanning machine that adapts 

magnetic resonance imaging techniques to identify concealed liquids and substances. I want to encourage you that we take advantage of this research technology as we work to protect our Nation. 

Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Luja ́n. Just so Members are alerted, votes are coming up in 10 minutes, and we have one more questioner, Ms. Lofgren from California, one of four California women 

on this committee. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Wow. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Welcome, Madam Secretary. I come from Santa 

Clara County. You, I am sure, already know people in Santa Clara 

County are quite thrilled with your appointment. The University of 

Santa Clara is especially proud that you are where you are. I look 

forward to working with you on the many, many issues that the 

Department faces. 

I want to raise one issue today, and I don’t expect that you will 

necessarily know the answer, because I just found out about it, and 

you may not know about it either. Although immigration policy and 

nonborder enforcement are primarily the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee, I want to raise it here today to avoid having another appearance by you or someone else. 

The Constitution and the Immigration Nationality Act, as you 

know, requires that the Government have a reasonable ground to 

suspect that a person is not in the United States legally before that 

person is detained, and there has been concern that that requirement has not always been adhered to in the past number of years. 

Yesterday—and I think this is the first time this has happened 

since the Obama administration—I am advised by reports as well 
49 

as the Seattle Times that ICE agents did raid a small company in 

Bellingham, Washington. Seventy-five ICE agents in riot gear at 9 

a.m. raided the plant and detained 126 workers, most of them 

United States citizens, and held them for a number of hours. 

I am concerned about obviously we need to enforce our laws, no 

one disagrees with that, but there is concern that Americans have 

repeatedly in the past years been held in some cases for 10 and 11 

hours against their will, and it does not seem to comport with the 

requirements of the law or the Constitution. So if you have something to say on that now, I would welcome it. If you want to research it, I would certainly understand, but I would hope to get 

some information about that specific instance and what our efforts 

are going to be to make sure that as we enforce the law, we also 

live within the law. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. I was briefed about that action early 

this morning, and I did not know about it beforehand, so I have 

asked a number of questions about what was the predicate for this. 

Now, there are a lot of different allegations going around: Was it 

70, 40 or 30; what they wearing? There were earlier allegations 

that helicopters were used. They were not. But I want to get to the 

bottom of this as well, so I have already issued those directives to 

ICE to get me some answers. 

Let me just close with this: In my view, we have to do workplace 

enforcement. It needs to be focused on employers who intentionally 

and knowingly exploit the illegal labor market. That has impacts 

on American workers, it has impacts on wage levels. It often has 

undue impacts on the illegal workers themselves. Our ICE efforts 

should be focused on those sorts of things. We should really have 

thought through the prosecutions that are going to result and the 

deportations that will result after any sort of work force action. 

That is the direction we seek to move. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Let me mention quickly two other items—I know 

you have other obligations, and we have a vote coming up—and 

they really have to do with three things; No. 1, the national infrastructure protection. I will tell you now, you don’t have to agree, 

the list is inadequate, and in order to adequately protect our infrastructure, we really need to have a map of what it is and also what 

vulnerabilities there are for cascading failures across that infrastructure. We don’t have it and never had it. 

I am just hoping that as you move forward in this very important 

job, there are tremendous resources mentioned by Mr. Luja ́n in the 

national laboratories to assist, and Lawrence is one of them, as 

well as the lab in New Mexico which has them. I have talked with 

them and worked with them, and they are way ahead of what our 

Department is on some of this and are a wonderful resource. I 

wanted to mention that to you, as well as in the cybersecurity area 

where we have tremendous vulnerabilities, and we, in my judgment, are not nearly where we need to be. 

A final note, I am so concerned, and you mentioned it, about the 

arms flowing south into Mexico. We have met with members of the 

Mexican Congress, with the Attorney General of Mexico. I mean, 

they are at a point where the very existence of civil society and 

government at Mexico is at risk. I think as a priority for our Department—I mean, ICE has jurisdiction also over that. I can’t 
50 

imagine the refugee crisis that will be at our door if we don’t do 

a more effective job of cutting off the flow of arms. So I look forward to working with you on that. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Lofgren. 

I would like to thank Secretary Napolitano for staying an extra 

half-hour to accommodate Member questions and Ms. Titus of Nevada for foregoing her questions in the interests of promptly wrapping up and anticipating the next vote. 

Let me observe, as one Member here said, ‘‘She’s a well-trained 

lawyer, but she can speak to the general public.’’ Those are usually 

inconsistent activities. As a lawyer myself, I would observe that. 

We appreciate the fact that you came ready to answer a range of 

questions and that you have a lot of other issues under review. 

This will be an on-going process. 

Sorry, Mr. Green, we are closing down the hearing. 

But if the committee has additional questions for you, we would 

ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to those questions. I assume that would be fine. 

Having no further business, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
(51) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR THE

HONORABLE JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. This committee has had many discussions with GAO about obstacles 

it faces when it attempts to meet with DHS employees and obtain files and records 

necessary to carry out its oversight mission. Will you examine the policies put in 

place by your predecessor and assure that GAO will be able to have the kind of access it needs? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to creating 

openness in Government to ensure the public trust, and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration. In DHS’ first quarter report to Congress, the Department provided a document to GAO within 20 days on average 79 

percent of the time. For scheduling interviews within 7 days, DHS was 95 percent. 

The Department values its work with GAO and is committed to improving our timeliness and to operate in a transparent manner. The Department will continue to 

work toward improving our performance. 

Question 2. This committee has closely watched the procurement and contracting 

practices at the Department. Can you explain what you will do to increase transparency and accountability in the contractor selection process? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) follows the requirements 

set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) which ensures transparency 

and accountability in the contractor selection process to the maximum extent practicable without jeopardizing proprietary information. DHS uses Federal Business 

Opportunities extensively to disseminate Requests for Information and Draft Requests for Proposals (RFP). The Department solicits industry feedback holding Industry Day seminars and Pre-Proposal Conferences to ensure requirements are communicated early in the process and the criteria for evaluation are articulated clearly 

to all offerors. During the selection process, the Contracting Office ensures the evaluation and selection is conducted in accordance with the established procedures and 

follows the same evaluation criteria presented to the offerors in the RFP. As required by the FAR, both successful and unsuccessful offerors are afforded the opportunity for a debriefing on the strengths and weaknesses of their proposal against 

the evaluation criteria. Finally, in the event a protest is filed, DHS follows the applicable procedures outlined in the FAR to ensure a fair review of the procurement 

and selection process. 

Question 3. While the Department has met its small and disadvantaged business 

goals, reviews by this committee and others have found circumstances that call 

these numbers into question, such as large companies posing as small businesses 

and double-counting small disadvantaged businesses. While this is a Governmentwide problem, have you considered actions at the Department that will not only create more opportunities for small, minority-, and women-owned businesses, but will 

provide more accurate numbers on the actual utilization of these companies? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is aware of the issue, and 

follows the Government-wide guidelines for small business contract reporting as outlined by the Small Business Administration (SBA) which is reflected in the Federal 

Procurement Data System (FPDS) small business goaling report. DHS will continue 

to work with SBA on accurate procurement data for all small business categories. 

The Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) will conduct a special oversight 

review of FPDS data this fiscal year, including an examination of the small business 

data fields. Additionally, the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization 

performs spot checks on FPDS data during the year. The OCPO will continue collaboration with the component contracting activities to identify opportunities for 

small, minority-, and women-owned businesses through acquisition planning, small 

business market research, and cooperation with the SBA. 
52 

Question 4. In January OPM released the results for its 2008 Federal Human 

Capital Survey. The survey showed that the Department is ranked among the ‘‘most 

improved’’ in Leadership and Knowledge Management, Results-Oriented Performance Culture, Talent Management, and Job Satisfaction. While these trends are 

generally heading in a positive direction, there is still much room for improvement. 

For example, a review of the Department’s Equal Employment Opportunity data reveals a lack of minority representation in various civil service categories, especially 

the Senior Executive Service. What measures will you take to improve these numbers to achieve a work force that is more reflective of the American public? 

Answer. Last year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established a 

high-level Diversity Council and issued a Department-wide Diversity Strategy. The 

Council is supported by a multi-component subcouncil, co-chaired by executives from 

the Department’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Office of the 

Chief Human Capital Officer. 

The Human Capital Strategic Plan for Fiscal Year 2009–2013 includes diversity 

as one of four human capital strategic goals. This goal identifies specific actions 

DHS plans to take to enhance the diversity of its work force, as well as accountability for diversity. To that end, all DHS executives’ performance evaluations include a rating as ‘‘Diversity Advocates’’. This is the third rating cycle for this competency, and last year DHS issued illustrative guidance on how to effectively rate 

performance in this area. DHS is currently in the process of identifying diversity 

initiatives, best practices, and challenges across the Department. Later this year, 

we plan to establish a DHS Diversity Advisory Forum composed of external stakeholders to advise the Department on our Diversity plans, initiatives, and efforts. 

As an example, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, in collaboration 

with the established Councils, is working to identify ways to create career paths for 

DHS employees across Components. Through this effort, DHS can provide opportunities for employees to transition from one DHS Component to another, e.g., Transportation Security Officer (TSO) to Customs and Border Patrol Officer (CBPO). 

In the Senior Executive Service (SES), DHS’ strategy is two-fold; recruiting a 

more diverse candidate pool of high performing individuals, and enhancing current 

leadership development programs. In the area of recruitment, DHS is pursuing partnerships with organizations such as the African American Executive Association, 

the National Association of Hispanic Federal Executives, and the Asian American 

Executive Network to augment recruitment efforts. In the area of leadership development, the Department is expanding executive ‘‘feeder’’ programs such as the SES 

Candidate Development Program and the DHS Fellows Program. 

QUESTION FROM THE HONORABLE PETER A. DEFAZIO OF OREGON FOR THE

HONORABLE JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question. I am interested in your views on the TSA prohibited items list, the 

methodology used to determine what is prohibited, and whether you will initiate an 

inquiry into whether the prohibition on pocket utility tools from the passenger areas 

of commercial aircraft remains appropriate. 

Answer. With regard to methodology, the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) periodically reviews the Prohibited Items list based on the evolving aviation 

security environment. Improvements made regarding airline cockpit security and 

other countermeasures enacted since the 9/11 tragedy have provided opportunities 

to adjust the list of threat objects relevant to the current environment. TSA will continue to consider the Prohibited Items list when analyzing changes in the security 

risk and implementing improvements in the layers of security. 

Currently, TSA allows tools 7 inches or smaller on-board aircraft but has continued to prohibit knives of any length, including small knives contained in pocket utility tools. If a passenger has checked baggage, an always-available option is to place 

the pocket utility tool inside the checked baggage, where it is not prohibited. TSA 

continually works with our international partners to ensure that security rules and 

procedures are as consistent as possible. In that light, the International Civil Aviation Organization approved a revision to its guidelines for prohibited items that recommends allowing the carriage of small knives (blades shorter than 6 cm or 2.36 

in.). While the United States is interested in a standardized approach to prohibited 

items with our partners around the world, any changes must be made with the full 

input of our security partners. 

TSA will continue to work with Congress, other Federal agencies, and airline 

flight crew organizations on this issue. TSA will keep Members of Congress and the 

traveling public informed of any changes to the Prohibited Items list. 
53 

QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE HENRY CUELLAR OF TEXAS FOR THE HONORABLE

JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1a. Madame Secretary, it is noted that none of the action directives include the Office of Emergency Communication which Congress created to be the 

focal office responsible for emergency communications in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. 

Can we expect an action directive to address this vital issue? 

Answer. While not its primary focus, my action directive on State, local, Tribal, 

and territorial integration included interoperable emergency communications outreach efforts. Although I have not at this time issued an action directive focused 

specifically on comprehensive emergency communications efforts, as I stated during 

my testimony, I am taking a close look at interoperability, the role of the Office of 

Emergency Communications within the Department, and other key aspects of this 

critical issue. 

Question 1b. Do you have any plans to elevate or move the Office of Emergency 

Communication within the Department to reflect the Department’s commitment to 

improving the emergency communications for the Nation’s first responders? 

Answer. The Office of Emergency Communication is committed to fulfilling its 

statutory mandate to support and promote the ability of emergency response providers and relevant government officials to continue to communicate in the event 

of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. 

Question 2a. Madame Secretary, nearly 8 years have passed since the tragic attacks of 9/11 and 3 years since the devastating storms of Hurricane Katrina. Despite 

efforts made by Congress, I remain very concerned by the various components at 

the Department that have indirect and direct influences on interoperability issues. 

Can you explain to the committee how you intend to streamline interoperable 

emergency communications issues at the Department and within the Federal Government? 

Answer. This question exemplifies why I initiated my Department-wide Efficiency 

Review Initiative. As part of this review, the Department is examining the common 

mission space on emergency communications across a number of Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) components. This review will include an assessment of 

how DHS can better implement Congress’ intent for the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) to coordinate improved interoperable emergency communications 

capabilities Nation-wide. 

OEC is committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate to support and promote the 

ability of emergency response providers and relevant Government officials to continue to communicate in the event of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other 

man-made disasters. The Office works closely with its DHS partners, including the 

National Communications System, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), the Science and Technology Directorate, and the Office of Policy, as well 

as with partners across the Federal Government, to present a unified interoperable 

emergency communications policy. Through the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP), released in July 2008, the Department has identified a clear 

strategic plan to improve emergency communications Nation-wide. The NECP lays 

out 92 specific milestones designed to achieve three overarching goals: 

• Goal 1.—By 2010, 90 percent of all high-risk urban areas designated within the 

Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) are able to demonstrate response-level 

emergency communications within 1 hour for routine events involving multiple 

jurisdictions and agencies. 

• Goal 2.—By 2011, 75 percent of non-UASI jurisdictions are able to demonstrate 

response-level emergency communications within 1 hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies. 

• Goal 3.—By 2013, 75 percent of all jurisdictions are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications within 3 hours, in the event of a significant incident as outlined in national planning scenarios. 

Additionally, I would like to highlight the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC). Congressionally mandated by Title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, this interagency group will be critical to increasing 

coordination and reducing duplication of effort by the 11 Federal departments and 

agencies that are members of the ECPC. The ECPC Charter is currently undergoing 

final leadership review prior to the Center’s stand up. 

Question 2b. Can you detail for the committee your understanding of day-to-day 

and operational interoperable emergency communications means? 

Answer. Interoperability is defined in the National Emergency Communications 

Plan (NECP) as the ability of emergency responders to communicate as needed, on 

demand, and as authorized at all levels of government and across all disciplines. Re-
54 

sponders need this capability for all levels of incidents, from day-to-day/routine incidents (e.g., Customs and Border Protection coordination with local law enforcement 

on an arrest at the border, and local police and emergency medical services personnel responding to a traffic accident) to significant natural or man-made incidents 

(e.g., Federal/State/local response to a major natural disaster or a terrorist incident). 

Although much work remains, through the NECP the Nation has made significant 

progress toward this capability. 

Question 2c. Can you explain your understanding of which component at the Department is in charge of interoperability when the first responder community needs 

technical assistance and guidance from the Federal Government? 

Answer. The Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) provides Nation-wide 

strategic planning and policy, coordination, and technical assistance across all levels 

of government. Additional Departmental components have responsibility for addressing specific aspects of the interoperability challenge, including: 

• Science and Technology Directorate, Office for Interoperability and Compatibility.—Supports emergency communications research, development, testing, 

evaluation and standards. 

• National Communications System.—Ensures resilient, continuous, and secure 

telecommunications for National Security/Emergency Preparedness leadership. 

• Federal Emergency Management Agency.—Provides tactical and operational 

support to temporarily restore communications when commercial and private 

communications systems are impaired during disasters. 

Question 2d. Can you reassure this committee that the Department will honor 

Congress’ intent to elevate the importance of operability and interoperability both 

at DHS and throughout the Federal Government? 

Answer. Yes. I look forward to working with Congress on these key interoperable 

emergency communications policy issues, including the most effective means of 

meeting these challenges within the Department and with our Federal partners. 

STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL COORDINATION

Question 3a. Secretary Napolitano, as former Governor of Arizona you understand 

that all disasters are local. In fact, you stated during your Senate confirmation hearing that, ‘‘the Federal Government can not do homeland security alone.’’ 

Can you explain your philosophy on how the Department intends to better integrate State, local, and tribal governments in preparing for, planning, and response 

to a catastrophic disaster along the Northern and Southern borders? 

Answer. As a former Governor of a Border State, I understand the vital role that 

State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) entities play in preparing for, responding 

to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters—both natural and manmade. 

Successfully integrating SLTT input into the policy process will be imperative for 

improving the cooperative and collaborative partnership between the Department 

and SLTTs. If the Federal Government needs to address a catastrophic incident, 

these partnerships will be essential. 

I issued multiple Action Directives to a number of Department entities specifically 

to gauge how Department programs and components gather SLTT input and determine the status of this effort. I am in the final stages of reviewing the information 

gathered in response to these Action Directives. Once I complete my review, I will 

determine the direction of the Department’s efforts to ensure better integration of 

our State, local, Tribal and territorial partners. 

The Department is currently working on both a Southern and Northern Border 

Strategy. The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is assessing and analyzing the threat Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations pose to the border. I&A 

is working closely with its sister agencies within the Intelligence Community (IC) 

and other Federal, State, local, and tribal partners to share the most current information and analysis. Customs and Border Protection Headquarters and field offices 

are coordinating with the IC and other Federal, State, local, and tribal partners, to 

maintain situational awareness along the U.S. Southwest Border. 

To that end, I have directed the Office of Operations and Planning (OPS) along 

with the Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) and other components to revise the current Contingency Plan for the Southwest Border, which will result in key changes to its critical considerations, assumptions, mission statement, and essential tasks. OPS and the Components will work 

with the Office of Intergovernmental Programs and the Office of State and Local 

Law Enforcement (SLLE) to conduct outreach with the Department’s critical State, 

local, and tribal stakeholders along the Southwest Border. In addition, I’ve sent the 

Assistant Secretary for SLLE, Ted Sexton, down to the border, to go through that 
55 

plan and make sure we have their input. Our outreach will ensure that our State 

and local partners are fully engaged in Southwest Border plans. 

Question 3b. How do you intend for the Office of Emergency Communications to 

implement the Border Interoperability Demonstrations Projects, as authorized in 

Pub. L. 109–295? 

Answer. The Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) is working with Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Commerce, and the Federal Communications Commission to implement the Border Interoperability Demonstration 

Projects. OEC will conduct a competitive application process to select and enter into 

cooperative agreements with a minimum of six border communities to improve 

interoperable communications along the border. 

As a result of the Border Interoperability Demonstration Projects, selected communities will benefit from improved interoperability, and the approaches used will 

serve as repeatable models for other border communities to achieve greater interoperability with domestic and international agencies. OEC will document and share 

lessons learned, best practices, and guidance tools for establishing cross-border 

interoperability. 

Question 3c. What metrics do you plan to implement to assess the effectiveness 

of the homeland security grant dollars are funneled to States, local, and tribal governments? 

Answer. The metrics for building and assessing capabilities—including a communications capability—are set forth by the National Preparedness Guidelines and accompanying Target Capabilities List (TCL). The 37 existing capabilities under the 

TCL cover prevention, protection, response, and recovery mission areas for all hazards. Each capability includes a definition and target outcome, a listing of the major 

capability activities, and a series of tasks and performance measures for each activity. 

Efforts are currently under way to update the TCL to be more measurable, riskbased, and user-friendly. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is 

working closely with the FEMA Disaster Operations Directorate, the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Emergency Communications, and the DHS 

Science and Technology Directorate to update the communications capability and 

measures in accordance with the metrics set forth in the National Emergency Communications Plan. 

The TCL is used to help synchronize the goals and management of the preparedness programs, including grant programs. For example, applicants under the Homeland Security Grant Program are required to indicate in their investment justifications how their requested projects will help achieve one or more of the capabilities. 

Applicants are also required to indicate how requested projects further one or more 

of the eight national priorities set forth in the National Preparedness Guidelines. 

The Cost-to-Capability Analysis Program is currently under development to gain 

a better understanding of how grant dollars are being spent by capability and to 

ascertain the return on investment of grant dollars toward capability goals. The 

Comprehensive Assessment System is also under development to provide a more holistic picture on the state of national preparedness by capability, to include the 

grant investment data supplied by the Cost-to-Capability Analysis program. 

FEMA: IN OR OUT

Question 4a. On February 11, 2009, you received a memo from the Department 

of Homeland Security’s Inspector General that concluded that FEMA should remain 

at DHS. Specifically, Inspector General Skinner noted that ‘‘removing FEMA from 

DHS at this point would cause considerable upheaval, to both FEMA and the department.’’ At your confirmation hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee and then again at the February 25 hearing before 

the House Committee on Homeland Security you testified that you have not yet spoken to the President concerning whether FEMA will remain at the Department. 

When do you plan to meet with the President to specifically discuss FEMA’s future within the Department? (Please provide a date.) 

Question 4b. What is your position on Chairman Obestar’s bill (H.R. 1174) to remove FEMA from the Department? Please detail in your response the impact of removing FEMA from the Department. 

Question 4c. Will the memo from the Inspector General provide some guidance on 

your recommendation to the President? 

Question 4d. What is your assessment of the action directives that you have received to date as it relates to FEMA’s critical role within the Department? 

Question 4e. There are those who continue to argue that FEMA cannot respond 

to both acts of terrorism and natural disasters. Can you explain why FEMA, situ-
56 

ated within the Department, strengthens DHS’ capability to respond to any type of 

catastrophic incident? 

Answer. DHS officially began its operations in March 2003, when 22 Federal 

agencies, including FEMA, were merged. Since this time, FEMA has been positioned 

as a vital component of our homeland security and emergency management infrastructure. The DHS mission is to prevent and deter terrorist attacks, and protect 

against and respond to threats and hazards to the Nation. Our Nation faces threats 

from both natural and man-made sources; therefore DHS takes an all-hazards approach to emergency management that allows us to respond effectively to all emergencies. FEMA is an integral part of the Department’s all hazards response. 

I am currently in the process of reviewing the Inspector General’s memorandum 

on FEMA and the FEMA-related action directive responses I have received to date. 

These sources will inform the discussion I have with the President on the status 

of FEMA. 

QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE BILL PASCRELL, JR. OF NEW JERSEY FOR THE

HONORABLE JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. As a member of both the Ways & Means Committee that handles 

trade and this committee which handles port security I have made it one of my top 

priorities to ensure that not only are our ports secure but that we do not do so at 

the price of strangling commerce—I firmly believe that is a balance we can achieve. 

To that end, I am concerned about the misclassification of goods coming into the 

United States. The need for importers to correctly classify their goods according to 

the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System is essential for revenue, 

regulatory and security compliance, yet the quality of commodity data submitted to 

Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) remains poor. 

According to the CBP, commodity code classification errors result in $1 billion a 

year in lost revenue due to duty underpayments. This is a significant amount—especially in light of our current economic and budgetary situation—but I fear that aside 

from the loss of revenue, the security implications of this are enormous. After all, 

we need to know precisely what is coming into the country—if we do not, we are 

simply putting ourselves at greater risk. 

Unfortunately, we have seen that CBP’s resources devoted to monitoring compliance have declined. In 2007, CBP officers conducted approximately 68,000 postentry compliance examinations, representing just 0.06 percent of the estimated 100 

million import entry lines submitted per year. 

It seems to me that an issue of this magnitude cannot be resolved by simply increasing the numbers of CBP officers. 

Has the CBP looked into specialized technology designed to flag substandard reporting and Commodity Coding errors? My understanding is that such technology 

exists and is being used by other governments to great success. Why not us? The 

misclassification of goods coming into the United States is a serious problem, and 

I would like to know what CBP is doing to remedy this situation. 

Answer. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) estimate of undercollections is 

about $400 million annually, with a trade compliance rate of about 98 percent, as 

estimated by our Entry Summary Compliance Measurement Program. This estimated undercollection represents about 1.09 percent of all duty and tax payments 

made to CBP. Many of these errors are due to misclassification, but this estimate 

also includes many errors related to anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well 

as false claims for trade preference programs. 

CBP would like to clarify that it conducts hundreds of thousands of compliance 

reviews each year, in addition to employing many other tools and programs to address this estimated underpayment such as enforcement analysis and targeting, operations and responses to allegations, hundreds of audits on larger companies, partnerships with trusted importers, and mechanisms such as prior disclosure. These 

functions are performed by many ‘‘revenue’’ positions within CBP including International Trade Specialists, Regulatory Auditors, Account Managers, Import Specialists, and Entry Specialists. CBP applies risk principals to prioritize this work to direct limited resources to the highest risk areas. One of those principles includes the 

identification of trade issues that cause significant revenue loss. Currently, CBP 

concentrates on seven priority trade issues; one of which being revenue. The goal 

of the revenue priority trade issue (PTI) is to maximize collection efforts by ensuring 

strong controls over the revenue process and by focusing on material revenue risks. 

CBP’s strategic approach to trade recognizes the sheer volume of millions of entries 

and the 100 million entry lines transmitted each year, but takes into account an 

annual estimated compliance rate of 98 percent for all import transactions. The balance between facilitating legitimate cargo and focusing enforcement on the areas of 
57 

highest risk through a multilayered approach is the cornerstone of CBP’s trade 

strategy. 

Question 2. Under the new ‘‘10∂2’’ initiative, importers are required to submit 

an HS Code to Customs prior to export so that CBP’s automated targeting systems 

can assess risk. The HS code may be a very good targeting element, but only if you 

can rely on its accuracy. What is Customs doing to insure that the HS codes that 

are being reported under 10∂2 are accurate? 

Answer. The ‘‘Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements’’ Interim Final Rule became effective on January 26, 2009. CBP is currently in a 1- 

year delayed enforcement mode in order to provide the trade sufficient time to adjust to the new requirements and in consideration of the business process changes 

that may be necessary to achieve full compliance. However, since the effective date, 

CBP has already received in excess of 200,000 Importer Security Filings (ISFs) containing more than 600,000 harmonized tariff schedule (HTS) codes. 

CBP chose to require the 6-digit HTS code as one of the security filing elements 

because it more accurately reflects the nature of the items that are being imported 

into the United States versus the data received under the customs manifest requirements. Additionally, the importing community is already legally required to provide 

the HTS code as part of the entry requirements. 

CBP has taken great care to ensure that the HTS codes provided as part of the 

ISF are accurate. When an ISF is submitted, CBP’s automated system checks to see 

if an HTS code has been provided as part of the filing. If an HTS code has not been 

provided, the system will reject the filing. Additionally, CBP’s system also checks 

to see if a provided HTS code is actually valid. If a provided HTS code is invalid, 

the system will reject the filing. • To date, less than 1 percent of the total ISF filings have been rejected due to 

a missing or invalid HTS code. 

Also, the ISF Importers are required to update their ISF filings if more accurate 

information becomes available or there are changes to the information prior to vessel arrival in the United States. • To date, the HTS codes have been changed less than 1 percent of the time. 

As CBP enters the full compliance mode after January 26, 2010, the trade community will have a very strong motivation to provide the correct HTS data as part 

of the ISF. The trade community is aware that CBP will be comparing the ISF data 

with the corresponding manifest and entry data for validation purposes. Data that 

clearly does not match will be flagged for further review, and any number of corrective actions can be taken to ensure future compliance. 

Question 3. Next year, the 2010 Olympics and Paralympics will be held in Vancouver, British Columbia. Given the Games’ proximity to the United States, can you 

tell us what the Department of Homeland Security is doing to ensure safe travel 

and border transit for international visitors and the residents of the Pacific Northwest? Specifically, is the Department investing in coordination, training, and exercise efforts for emergency officials and first responders? Do communities and their 

first responders—both Federal and local—have sufficient interoperable communications equipment to effectively work with one another? How can we help prepare the 

Department, Washington State, and local community officials for the security requirements of this historic event? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has identified several land border ports of entry in the State of Washington which CBP believes will have the most direct impact related to the 2010 

Winter Olympic/Paralympics Games. CBP expects to see an impact and increase in 

vehicular traffic at the ports of Blaine, Lynden, and Sumas. Additional workload increases are also anticipated at the CBP’s Preclearance Ports of Vancouver and Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. 

CBP projects a 25 percent increase in cross-border traffic over typical summer volumes. Temporary duty (TDY) officers/agents will be deployed along the land border 

ports of entry and between the ports of entry identified above and at the 

Preclearance ports of Vancouver and Victoria. These resources will: Supplement existing resources; ensure that anticipated workload challenges and mission critical 

objectives are met; and, assist in mitigating excessive wait times. 

Specifically, CBP plans to temporarily assign staff and personnel to be deployed 

to support primary and secondary processing of vehicles entering the United States 

through specific ports of entry along the border in the State of Washington. CBP 

staff assigned to ports of entry will focus on increasing inbound Privately Owned 

Vehicle (POV) processing capacity and enhancing port of entry security. 

Additionally, CBP is planning to enhance its posture between ports of entry by 

utilizing Border Patrol Tactical (BORTAC) and Border Patrol Search Trauma and 

Rescue (BORSTAR) support for incident response capability and medical support. 
58 

CBP will focus resources on enhanced border enforcement, intelligence and the 

Interagency Border Enforcement/Intelligence Team (IBET/IBIT). 

CBP plans to provide a flexible/responsive aviation law enforcement force during 

the games by the interdiction of low and slow flights of interest perceived as suspect. Additionally, it will provide aviation support to Federal, State, and local partners in tactical airlift, video downlink and maritime patrols. CBP will also provide 

a flexible/responsive marine law enforcement force during the games with the interdiction of maritime suspects and/or non-compliant vessels if encountered. CBP will 

support other Federal, State, local and tribal partners in officer/prisoner transport, 

covert vessel support, surveillance and overt maritime patrols. 

As a key stakeholder, CBP continues to work closely with the Planning and Operations Workgroups within the Olympic Task Force Security Committee to help in 

the development of Standard Operating Procedures for a 2010 Olympic Coordination 

Center (OCC). Located at the CBP facility in Bellingham, Washington, the OCC will 

facilitate the coordination and synchronization of Federal, tribal, State, local, private sector and Canadian security partners and resources in an effort to provide a 

safe, secure Washington State and northern border region in conjunction with the 

2009 World Police and Fire Games and the 2010 Winter Olympics/Paralympics 

Games. DHS will be integrated into the overall USG intelligence and security construct on both sides of the border. 

CBP will use the National Incident Management System’s (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) to enable effective incident management. The OCC will have a 

communications center that will be the gateway for phone and radio communication. 

A Communications Officer will route calls appropriately, monitor radio communication, and significant events. 

The OCC will be staffed and operational immediately prior to the opening ceremonies, through the closing ceremonies of the 2010 Winter Olympic/Paralympics 

Games in Vancouver. The OCC will coordinate the information-sharing, situational 

awareness, and activities of Federal agencies to support State and local agencies 

that may be impacted by the 2010 Winter Olympic/Paralympics Games. The opportunity to test interoperable communications and provide training on various protocols and procedures will be during the 2009 World Police and Fire Games schedule 

in Vancouver, Canada between July 31 and August 9, 2009. 

Due to the proximity of the 2009 World Police and Fire Games venues to the U.S. 

border, serious public safety and security issues may have an impact on the Pacific 

Northwest. It is anticipated that calls for service and emergency notifications will 

continue to be handled by established methods through established protocols unless 

the incident or event expands beyond regional geographic or political boundaries. 

When an Olympic-related event expands beyond CBP boundaries, the OCC will facilitate communications and resource acquisition in order to assist CBP in getting 

what is needed to manage the event or incident. 

CBP has participated in several operations-based exercises to date. Specifically, 

these exercises have given CBP an opportunity to evaluate proposed and current 

concepts, plans, and capabilities for responding to incidents near the Canadian border in Whatcom County, Washington during the 2010 Winter Olympic/Paralympics 

Games. 

Exercise Silver, a functional exercise to rehearse/practice plans and procedures 

was held at Camp Murray, Washington in February 2009. Exercise Silver tested 

and identified gaps in current capabilities and focused efforts on identifying and developing priority capabilities and tasks for the participating entities. The exercise 

provided an opportunity to measure and validate performance of capabilities and associated critical tasks in: 

(1) Planning; 

(2) Communications; 

(3) Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination; 

(4) Information Gathering; 

(5) Incident Management; 

(6) Emergency Operations Center Management; 

(7) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Hazardous Materials Response; 

and, 

(8) Citizen Evacuation/Emergency Public Information and Warning. 

Additionally, CBP participated in a Canadian 2010 Olympic Preparation Exercise 

Series. The Canadian Government, through Public Safety Canada, requested the 

U.S. Government’s assistance to ensure that exercises are realistic and have appropriate meaningful interaction with U.S. counterparts. The FEMA/National Exercise 

Division (NED) briefed the NEP Executive Steering Committee (ESC) on the Canadian request. The NEP ESC approved the establishment of an Interagency Working 

Group (IWG) to plan and organize U.S. exercise support for exercises. 
59 

CBP’s participation as a member of the Interagency Working Group (IWG) to support Canada’s exercise was accomplished through a pool of Subject Matter Experts 

(SMEs). The SMEs were prepared to advise Canadian exercise participants through 

the Department of State on CBP capabilities and procedures for garnering assistance, and policies for employing resources. The primary mission of the SME pool 

provided exercise participants with timely and accurate information on, and awareness of, CBP support/coordination mechanisms, policies and procedures for garnering assistance, and reasonable expectations of CBP response timelines and 

logistical considerations. The secondary mission of the SME pool will be to discuss, 

coordinate, and document U.S. response mechanisms and capabilities for a variety 

of scenarios, some of which the Canadian exercise may not address. The IWG helped 

gain mutual understanding of capabilities and procedures that could be brought to 

bear in the event of a real-world incident. 

CBP has taken measures to assure communication connectivity with Federal, 

State, and local government agencies. CBP continues to develop an Integrated Federal Support Plan for the 2010 Winter Olympic/Paralympics Games designed to ensure a detailed security and public safety concept of operations (CONOPS) is communicated with all stakeholders. 

A CBP Public Affairs Officer (PAO) will maintain contact with OCC staff. The 

PAO will coordinate with agency staff to ensure a coordinated flow of information. 

CBP will take steps to ensure passengers and cargo will be able to cross the U.S./ 

Canadian border with minimal impact due to the 2009 Police and Fire Games as 

well as the 2010 Winter Olympic/Paralympics Games. CBP will continue to assess 

and evaluate plans which clearly define roles and responsibilities to assure interoperability and address the inherent challenges while preparing for the Games. 

In addition, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate’s Command, Control, 

and Interoperability (CCI) Division is preparing to loan prototype Multi-Band Radios (MBR) to the State of Washington and the Province of British Columbia in 

May/June 2009 for an initial testing and evaluation of the radios. The MBR enables 

emergency responders to communicate with partner agencies—regardless of the 

radio band. Also, CCI has initiated coordination with the Washington State Interoperability Executive Committee, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, northwest emergency responders and Canadian government agencies for potential technology pilots in support of security during the games. 

Question 4a. The Department’s procurement and acquisition offices have long 

been understaffed—something not unique to DHS, but a fact of life across the Federal Government. What steps are you taking, or do you envision taking over the 

next 6 months, to improve the procurement processes at both the Department and 

its components? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues improvements to 

the acquisition work force, improvements in managing its programs, and strengthening specific contracting functions. DHS will on-board approximately 50 additional 

interns to the Acquisition Professional Career Program (APCP) during fiscal year 

2009 to bring the enrollment to 100 participants. Improvements in managing our 

programs focus on the implementation of Directive 102–01 (Acquisition Management). This Directive replaces Management Directive 1400, and provides an enterprise framework for consistent and efficient Departmental management, support, review and approval of DHS acquisitions as they progress through the development 

and deployment life cycle. By the end of fiscal year 2009, DHS will conduct more 

than fifteen Acquisition Review Boards for major programs in accordance with the 

new Directive. To administer this Directive, the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) has staffed the Acquisition Program Management Division (APMD) 

and the Cost Analysis Division (CAD) with experienced and highly regarded acquisition professionals from across the Government. During fiscal year 2009, there will 

be an increased emphasis on better planning of acquisitions to ensure DHS defines 

its needs and enters into sound business deals. In addition, the Department will 

continue emphasis on contract pricing, which includes providing training and expert 

consultation in analyzing contractor proposed costs and prices. In addition, the procurement oversight program will be expanded to include special reviews of key areas 

such as Time and Material (T&M) contracts and performance-based contracting. The 

findings of these reviews are anticipated to lead to recommendations that will yield 

savings through better and more efficient contracting processes. 

Question 4b. Are there any specific targeted efforts to bolster the professional program management ranks within DHS and its componenets? 

Answer. DHS is taking multiple steps to bolster the program management ranks 

within the Department and across components. At the entry level, the Acquisition 

Professional Career Program (APCP) is being expanded beyond a contracting focus 

in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009 to include technical disciplines. Approxi-
60 

mately 25 percent of the APCP billets allotted to the program will focus on the other 

acquisition career fields including program management, systems engineering, test 

and evaluation and logistics. 

In order to ensure that the acquisition career fields that comprise the program 

offices have the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to successfully execute the 

DHS mission, the Department is aggressively pursuing the expansion of the definition of the DHS acquisition work force and the development of professional certification programs for each additional career field. From the inception of the Department though fiscal year 2008, the DHS acquisition work force was defined as: contracting specialists, program managers, and contracting officers technical representatives. Beginning in fiscal year 2009, three additional career fields have been established, and efforts are underway to develop professional certification programs for 

the following fields: Test and Evaluation, Logistics, and Business Cost Estimating 

and Financial Management. DHS anticipates the launch of the Systems Engineering 

career field and certification program beginning in fiscal year 2010. 

A third area of focus is the enhancement of the centralized acquisition work force 

training program to target training to those specific competencies associated with 

the technical career fields. DHS is partnering with the Defense Acquisition University to customize currently validated certification training by incorporating DHS 

policies and processes. The centralized acquisition work force training program ensures consistency of training across all of DHS and ensures transferability of professional certifications with Defense counterparts as well as Civilian Agencies. 

The Department has also taken steps to increase the number of experienced Program Management staff in APMD. Once on-board, these additional experts will expand APMD’s ability to provide assistance to DHS programs, in parallel with 

strongly supporting the Department’s governance processes for major acquisitions. 

An additional effort that has been launched is the Coding of Acquisition Billets 

and Certification levels of individuals filling those positions. Knowing how many positions are in the acquisition work force and analyzing the skill sets of personnel 

occupying those billets is the first step in being able to effectively manage the acquisition work force. In partnership with the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, 

OCPO is testing the use of the existing National Finance Center database to code 

and track the acquisition work force and requisite training requirements. 

Question 5. Last summer the Department announced the opening of a new hightech National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, which includes ICE 

and CBP resources to counter the global threat of intellectual property rights violations. Unfortunately, we have not seen much attention generated by the center’s activities. In addition, while thousands of new agents and officers have been added 

and allocated to ICE and CBP, none have been given IP-specific portfolios? Can we 

get a commitment that intellectual property protection—both physical counterfeiting 

and on-line piracy—will be a priority for the Department, ICE, and CBP? Will you 

consider designating agents and officers to specifically deal with intellectual property issues? What type of outreach can we expect to the private sector, especially 

those in industries most impacted by intellectual property violations? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to protecting 

intellectual property rights (IPR) through both criminal and administrative enforcement actions. The National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR 

Center), led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), focuses on criminal cases, while U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), as the agency primarily 

responsible for U.S. border enforcement, maintains a robust administrative IPR enforcement program. 

CBP has a dual mission of improving security and facilitating legitimate trade 

and travel—which includes protecting America’s businesses, consumers and national 

security from the harms of counterfeiting and piracy. IPR enforcement is a top trade 

enforcement priority for CBP. Both the number and value of DHS IPR seizures doubled in the last 5 years. In fiscal year 2008, DHS again achieved record-breaking 

results with 14,992 IPR seizures totaling $272.7 million in domestic value, an increase of 38 percent by value from the previous year. CBP addressed more than 90 

percent of these IPR violations through seizure and destruction of the infringing 

goods and issuance of penalties. CBP refers potential criminal cases to ICE and the 

IPR Center, and CBP staff at the IPR Center provides targeting (selection of shipments for inspection) support for criminal cases. 

Personnel throughout CBP work together in an integrated IPR enforcement process to protect American industries impacted by IPR violations. Within its Office of 

International Trade, CBP has dedicated international trade specialists in the IPR 

Policy and Programs Division and the IPR National Targeting and Analysis Group, 

as well as attorneys in the IPR and Restricted Merchandise Branch. This dedicated 

staff of IPR experts provides expertise and guidance on IPR enforcement to officers 
61 

in ports of entry. Dedicating IPR expert personnel at each port of entry would limit 

CBP’s flexibility to deploy resources and staff to respond to changing threats and 

priorities, and may also result in less IPR enforcement generally as individuals 

ports may focus only dedicated expert personnel to the task of IPR enforcement 

rather than utilizing all CBP officers trained to assist with enforcement efforts. 

Last year, CBP established an IPR subcommittee under the Commercial Operations Advisory Committee (COAC), which provides industries affected by IPR violations a forum for discussing IPR issues and providing advice and recommendations 

on IPR enforcement. CBP is in daily contact with rights owners regarding sharing 

of information to improve interdiction of counterfeit goods and training of officers 

to identify IPR infringing goods. CBP has created web-based tools, e-Recordation 

and e-Allegations, to make it easier for the private sector to provide information on 

protected trademarks and copyrights and to report suspected violations to CBP. 

Since the launch of e-Allegations in June 2008, more than 150 allegations of suspected IPR violations have been reported to CBP. In addition, CBP recently placed 

a link on its web site to assist the private sector in requesting IPR speakers from 

CBP. 

The IPR Center, which was dedicated in July 2008, is a multi-agency partnership 

that brings together core investigatory components to combat intellectual property 

crime. Participating agencies include U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, with the Department of Commerce, 

Health and Human Services’ Food and Drug Administration, the FBI and the U.S. 

Postal Inspection Service. The IPR Center has three units: Operations, Programs, 

and Outreach & Training (OUT). Current staffing consists of 37 ICE special agents, 

criminal research specialists, and related support staff augmented by six special 

agents and officers from ICE’s partner agencies. In addition, although not a formal 

partner, the Department of Justice, through the Computer Crime and Intellectual 

Property Section, has provided substantial support to the IPR Center’s development 

and currently is working with the IPR Center on a number of on-going investigations. ICE plans to increase staffing at the IPR Center by an additional 19 special 

agents and criminal research specialists. These added personnel will bring staffing 

to 56 designated special agents. The dedication of the IPR Center and the increase 

in staff is an acknowledgement by ICE that IPR crime is one of the major threats 

facing the United States and that it has been recognized as a priority for ICE. 

The IPR Center’s OUT is extremely active with both the public and private sectors. Since July 2008, the OUT has, under the auspices of Operation Joint Venture 

(Joint Venture), engaged in partnerships with public and private sectors to combat 

the illegal importation and distribution of hazardous, substandard and counterfeit 

goods, as well as prevent the evasion of lawful duties. Through these partnerships, 

the IPR Center provides information and identifies leads and contacts to foster IPR 

Center enforcement initiatives, IPR and other commercial fraud investigations. 

Through Joint Venture, the OUT has achieved the following milestones related to 

outreach to the private sector: 

• OUT has conducted 172 outreach and training events. 

• In September 2008, OUT trained 24 domestic ICE agents to serve as local Joint 

Venture points of contact and presenters. These agents will serve as a force 

multiplier to augment the OUT’s staff in conducting the various events. 

• The OUT is publishing a quarterly newsletter, the IPR Report, to highlight 

cases, trends, and events being conducted by the IPR Center and its partner 

agencies, and will also include articles submitted by industry and foreign law 

enforcement counterparts. 

• The OUT has developed a new video being used at outreach and training events 

to highlight the IPR Center, its initiatives, and interactions with public and private sectors both domestic and international. 

• The OUT is planning another session to train additional Joint Venture points 

of contacts in both domestic and international ICE offices. This training event 

will include a day of interaction with private industry to update industry on the 

status of the IPR Center and enable the industry representatives to interact 

with the points of contact. 

• The OUT has initiated an advertising campaign, initially targeting three industry sectors, to provide information and contact information for the IPR Center 

to enable information sharing and reporting of alleged infringements. 
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IPR CENTER STATISTICS 

Fiscal 

Year 2007 

Fiscal 

Year 2008 

IPR/Commercial Fraud Cases Initiated .................................... 1,395 1,385 

IPR/Commercial Fraud Arrests (TOTAL) ................................. 416 446 

IPR/Commercial Fraud Indictments ......................................... 241 189 

IPR/Commercial Fraud Convictions .......................................... 232 214 

IPR/Commercial Fraud Seizures (by count) ............................. 1,128 1,290 

Industry Presentations ............................................................... 95 130 

Law Enforcement Training ........................................................ 204 254 

In its field offices, ICE does not assign agents to specific investigative program 

areas. Each Special Agent in Charge (SAC) allocates resources based on the threat 

within their area of responsibility. ICE agents target criminal violators in all ICE 

programmatic areas and strive to levy criminal charges whenever possible in order 

to send a strong message of deterrence. 

We note that within DHS, CBP is specifically responsible for enforcing IPR laws 

on tangible goods crossing U.S. borders while ICE enforces laws related to on-line 

piracy in addition to investigating criminal counterfeiting and piracy of tangible 

goods. 

QUESTION FROM THE HONORABLE JAMES A. HIMES OF CONNECTICUT FOR THE

HONORABLE JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question. Madam Secretary, I am interested in your views on the TSA-prohibited 

items list and the methodology used to determine what is prohibited. Currently, 

TSA allows 7-inch tools, scissors with pointed metal blades up to 4 inches in length 

and knitting needles of all sizes but prohibits small pocket utility tools. Would you 

support ending the ban on small tools? 

Answer. With regard to methodology, the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) periodically reviews the Prohibited Items list based on the evolving aviation 

security environment. Improvements made regarding airline cockpit security and 

other countermeasures enacted since the 9/11 tragedy have provided opportunities 

to adjust the list of threat objects relevant to the current environment. TSA will continue to consider the Prohibited Items list when analyzing changes in the security 

risk and implementing improvements in the layers of security. 

Currently, TSA allows tools 7 inches or smaller on-board aircraft but has continued to prohibit knives of any length, including small knives contained in pocket utility tools. If a passenger has checked baggage, an always available option is to place 

the pocket utility tool inside the checked baggage, where it is not prohibited. TSA 

continually works with our international partners to ensure that security rules and 

procedures are as consistent as possible. In that light, the International Civil Aviation Organization approved a revision to its guidelines for prohibited items that recommends allowing the carriage of small knives (blades shorter than 6 cm or 2.36 

in.). While the United States is interested in a standardized approach to prohibited 

items with our partners around the world, any changes must be made with the full 

input of our security partners. 

TSA will continue to work with Congress, other Federal agencies, and airline 

flight crew organizations on this issue. TSA will keep Members of Congress and the 

traveling public informed of any changes to the Prohibited Items list. 

QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE LAMAR SMITH OF TEXAS FOR THE HONORABLE

JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT

Question 1a. I am extremely concerned about the perceptions that have been created in the aftermath of DHS’s worksite enforcement operation in Washington 

State. The Hill quoted you as telling the Hispanic Caucus that you had ‘‘grave concerns’’ about the manner in which the action was carried out. The pro-amnesty advocacy group FIRM stated that ‘‘the day after the raid, after thousands of calls into 

the White House and meetings on the Hill, Janet Napolitano called for an investigation into the raid . . . We yelled and the administration answered.’’ 

What sort of message does this send to ICE officers simply trying to do their job 

and enforce the immigration law? 

Question 1b. That their bosses in Washington will not support them for doing 

their jobs effectively? 
63 

Answer. Since the formation of the agency in 2003, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has developed a comprehensive work site enforcement 

strategy utilizing all the tools available to disrupt and deter those employers who 

make it their business practice to knowingly hire undocumented workers. This 

strategy has raised employer awareness to the importance of complying with the 

Nation’s immigration laws and serves as an overall deterrence to illegal immigration. 

ICE continues to advance the multifaceted approach that prioritizes those employers connected the Nation’s critical infrastructure. In these cases, ICE seeks to immediately remove unauthorized workers from having access to sensitive facilities and 

then address how the alien gained access to the facility through the investigation 

of the employer. The ICE strategy also focuses on egregious employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers as a business practice. Investigations of egregious 

employers may take weeks, months or years to complete and are complex in nature. 

Also, ICE has issued guidance to all field offices which revised the development of 

an administrative fine investigation and further emphasized its importance as a tool 

against egregious employers of unauthorized workers. 

Question 2a. Since the Washington State enforcement action, how many requests 

for authorization for other worksite enforcement actions have you received from the 

field? 

Question 2b. How many have you approved? 

Question 2c. Why should headquarters have to sign off on every operation? 

Question 2d. Isn’t this micromanagement? 

Question 2e. Doesn’t this send the message that headquarters is discouraging 

worksite enforcement? 

Question 2f. Don’t you run the risk of creating the perception that political factors 

may be influencing law enforcement decisions? 

Answer. Worksite operations, like other law enforcement operations conducted by 

DHS components, are reported to my office. Additionally, ICE policy requires that 

each SAC office report any planned Worksite Enforcement (WSE) operation to ICE 

Headquarters (HQ) prior to the planned activity using an ICE reporting module. 

This report is a notification and not a request for approval. SAC offices are required 

to assess all planned WSE operations to determine if the operation’s scale requires 

coordination at the ICE HQ level through the HQ WSE Unit. Some factors requiring 

HQ coordination include: WSE operations involving suspect employers who have 

multiple worksite locations through the United States; WSE operations involving 

employers involved in critical infrastructure, or who may produce items that affect 

national security or military readiness; and/or WSE operations involving worksites 

with significant economic impact to a geographical area. 

Question 3a. I applaud you for wanting to focus on employers who hire illegal immigrants. Keep in mind, however, that critics of worksite-enforcement operations 

often complain that complicit management officials are too often not arrested. These 

critics fail to understand that illegal workers have to be arrested first and interrogated for the Government to build up sufficient evidence against management officials to sustain their arrests and indictments. Usually, those who knowingly hire 

illegal workers are not charged until after the media frenzy over a worksite raid 

has faded. Many management officials have been criminally charged following up 

on enforcement operations. 

How do you plan on targeting employers if you first don’t build evidence by arresting illegal workers? 

Question 3b. Are you proposing that ICE agents simply ignore the presence of illegal workers and allow them to continue to break the law? 

Answer. Investigations of egregious employers may take weeks, months, or years 

to complete, are complex in nature and often involve undercover activity, surveillance, witness/informant development, enforcement actions, record checks, and subpoena material to establish probable cause and consultation with the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) for plea negotiations and/or trial. 

In some cases, arrested unauthorized/illegal workers provide critical information 

after a worksite enforcement action that is later used to pursue criminal as well as 

civil charges against the employers. Investigative steps and techniques are coordinated with the Department of Justice to ensure sufficient evidence is developed to 

ensure the Government’s burden of proof is met. 

Additionally, ICE agents make arrests and exercise prosecutorial discretion on 

custody conditions, on a case-by-case basis, when they encounter unauthorized 

workers to ensure that evidence from witnesses is obtained and preserved for trial. 

Question 4a. A prime example of the lack of priority given to enforcing the law 

against employing illegal immigrants is that the total hours worked by investigators 
64 

on employer sanctions cases fell from almost 714,000 in 1997 to 135,000 in 2004, 

a drop of 81 percent. 

Has the time DHS puts into these cases since recovered to anywhere near the earlier levels? 

Question 4b. Will the administration’s 2010 budget contain any increase in the 

number of ICE agents dedicated to worksite enforcement? 

Answer. Since 2004, the amount of investigative hours that ICE Office of Investigations has dedicated to enforcing the law against employing illegal immigrants 

has risen each year, with the hours totaling 746,642 in fiscal year 2008. The chart 

below shows the amount of hours performed and the percent increase for each fiscal 

year. 

Since the President’s budget has not been released, it would be premature to comment on the 2010 budget proposal. 

BORDER FENCE

Question 5a. The ‘‘Secure Fence Act’’ required DHS to gain ‘‘operational control’’ 

of the southwest U.S. border. As a means of gaining ‘‘operation control,’’ the bill required over 800 miles of fencing. The rise in border violence makes this fencing 

more important than ever to prevent unauthorized access to the United States. 

Completion of the border fence will help reduce illegal immigration, thus saving 

American jobs for U.S. citizens and legal workers, and will help prevent violent 

Mexican drug cartels from transporting drugs and violence across the border. 

How much pedestrian fencing is currently in place along the southwest U.S. border? What are the locations of that pedestrian fencing? 

Question 5b. How much vehicle fencing is in place along the southwest U.S. border? What are the locations of that vehicle fencing? 

Question 5c. What are your plans to complete the more than 800 miles of southwest border fencing required by the ‘‘Secure Fence Act?’’ 

Answer. As of March 6, 2009, DHS has completed 611 miles of fence along the 

southwest border (301 miles of vehicle fence and 310 miles of primary pedestrian 

fence). The border fencing is located in strategic locations along the southwest border from Imperial Beach, California through Brownsville, Texas. The pedestrian 

fence is located within Border Patrol Sectors San Diego, El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, 

El Paso, Marfa, Del Rio and Laredo and Rio Grande Valley. The vehicle fence is 

located within five Border Patrol Sectors (San Diego, El Centro, Yuma, Tucson and 

El Paso). 

Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 

of 1996, as amended by the Secure Fence Act of 2006 and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 requires DHS to construct—in the most expeditious manner 

possible—the infrastructure necessary to deter and prevent illegal entry on our 
65 

southwest border, including pedestrian and vehicle fencing, roads, and technology. 

As amended, the Act mandates the completion of 700 total miles of fence. It also 

mandates that the Secretary identify priority areas ‘‘where fencing would be the 

most practical and effective in deterring smugglers and aliens attempting to gain 

illegal entry into the United States.’’ As of March 6, 2009, DHS has completed approximately 611 of the 661 miles of fence identified by the Border Patrol as priority 

areas. While fencing remains an important tool in achieving effective control, it is 

only one element of our overall border security strategy that incorporates the proper 

mix of technology personnel, and tactical infrastructure. Currently, there are no immediate funded plans to construct additional fencing. 

Question 6. Some persons and organizations along the border are philosophically 

opposed to a border fence. Should we give veto power over the placement and construction of a border fence serving the national interest to such local persons and 

organizations? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security’s decisionmaking process pertaining to the placement and construction of border fence is directly linked to a comprehensive National Border Patrol Strategy that protects against and prevents terrorist attacks and other transnational crimes between the ports of entry. Border 

fence and related tactical infrastructure is one critical piece of this strategy that 

also requires the right complement of technology and personnel to achieve effective 

control of our Nation’s borders. 

There are four main factors that DHS uses to determine fence location: (1) Initial 

Border Patrol operational assessments; (2) engineering assessments, which include 

the cost to construct; (3) environmental assessments; and (4) input from stakeholders. Initial operational assessments by Border Patrol identify locations where 

fence would provide the ‘‘persistent impedance’’—the continuous and constant ability 

to deter or delay illicit cross-border incursions—necessary to achieve effective control of the border. However, input from local communities and organizations are always considered during the planning process and accommodated when possible 

without jeopardizing operational integrity. These consultations with communities 

and stakeholders and the partnerships with State and local governments work toward minimizing the adverse impacts on the local communities. This type of input 

is critical in the fence placement decision process. 

To ensure threats and vulnerabilities are addressed, Border Patrol Sector Chiefs 

are best qualified to make informed decisions on fence deployment. Local persons 

and organizations do not have awareness of ever-changing law enforcement sensitive threat and vulnerability assessments necessary in resource deployment decisions. Based on the aforementioned, DHS cannot support giving veto power to external entities over the tactical deployment of border fence. 

Question 7. At a Homeland Security Committee hearing last year, Border Patrol 

Chief David Aguilar stated that he was ‘‘absolutely not’’ satisfied with the progress 

of virtual fence construction at the Project 28 site. The ‘‘Secure Fence Act’’ requires 

physical fencing, not virtual fencing. Given the enormous setbacks with the virtual 

fencing at the Project 28 site, isn’t it a waste of American taxpayer dollars to continue to push for virtual fencing? 

Answer. Technology is an important component of border security, and is most 

certainly not a waste of American taxpayer dollars. Although some refer to technology as a ‘‘virtual fence,’’ technology does not have the persistent impedance capability of a real fence. It does, however, provide timely and accurate information that 

allows for more efficient determination for response requirements. Technology includes sensors, command and control systems, and communication resources, and is 

a powerful force multiplier with the capability to provide the situational awareness 

that is a precursor to effective control. Sensors can ‘‘watch’’ the border continuously, 

guided by appropriate command and control systems. These systems can also help 

sort the data coming from sensors in order to provide adequate time for responders 

to quickly access the most critical information. With accurate information to identify 

and classify illicit incursions, agents have many more options regarding how and 

when they will respond to the incursion. Improved communications capability also 

supports U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) response forces by ensuring 

agents can be properly directed and coordinated. 

Pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Secure Fence Act, Public Law 109–367, 120 Stat. 

2638 (October 26, 2006), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has worked 

to meet the requirement of providing ‘‘systematic surveillance of the international 

land and maritime borders of the United States through more effective use of personnel and technology, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based sensors, satellites, radar coverage, and cameras and physical infrastructure enhancements to 

prevent unlawful entry by aliens into the United States... ’’. In accordance with 

this requirement, DHS has adopted a border security strategy that incorporates the 
66 

effective mix of personnel, technology and tactical infrastructure to secure the Nation’s borders. This approach recognizes that the most important border security assets are CBP’s frontline personnel. To assist frontline CBP personnel with their border security mission, force multiplier tools, i.e. technology and infrastructure, are essential to improving the effectiveness and safety of these agents and officers. 

Question 8. So far, only 32 miles of double fencing have been built along the entire 

southern border. How many miles of double-layer fencing will DHS build along the 

border? Hasn’t double-layer fencing been extremely effective at slowing down illegal 

border crossings in San Diego? 

Answer. Currently, DHS has no plans to erect additional double layer (secondary 

fence) along the border. Border Patrol continues to assess all threats and 

vulnerabilities at both the local and national levels. Secondary fence will continue 

to be an enforcement tool option in certain situations and operational environments; 

however, it is not operationally necessary—or effective—in other environments. San 

Diego Sector has experienced operational gains as a result of the deployment of tactical infrastructure, technology, and personnel. These are all components of an enforcement model that provides the U.S. Border Patrol with the capacity to detect, 

identify, classify, respond, and bring events to an acceptable law enforcement resolution. 

E-VERIFY

Question 9a. On June 6, 2008, President Bush signed Executive Order 12989, 

which directed Federal agencies to require that Federal contractors use E-Verify to 

ensure the employment eligibility of their employees. The final rule for implementation was published on November 14, 2008 and was scheduled to take effect on January 15, 2009. Final implementation of Executive Order 12989 has subsequently been 

postponed until May 21, 2009. 

On and after May 21, 2009, will Federal contractors be required to use E-Verify 

to ensure the employment eligibility off their employees? 

Question 9b. Why did President Obama postpone the final implementation of the 

rule implementing Executive Order 12989? 

Question 9c. What, if any, changes are planned to the rule implementing Executive Order 12989? 

Answer. The regulations remain under review within the administration, but currently provide that they will become applicable to Federal contractors on May 21, 

2009. The E-Verify program has invested significant resources in efforts to prepare 

for compliance with the rule. 

The administration wanted an adequate opportunity to review the rule before it 

became applicable to Federal contractors to ensure that the rule provisions are appropriate within the context of the new administration’s procurement and immigration enforcement policies. 

The administration is currently reviewing the rule and will announce any changes 

to the rule once that review is completed. 

Question 10a. I am glad to see that the President’s budget for 2010 calls for dedicating $100 million for E-Verify. 

Does this signal that the new administration’s commitment to the E-Verify program? 

Question 10b. Will you ask the Senate Democrats to allow for a multi-year or permanent extension? 

Question 10c. How can employers engage in long-term planning if they do not 

know if E-Verify will exist a month from now? 

Answer. When I was Governor of Arizona, I signed into law a mandatory requirement for all employers to use E-Verify. Reducing unauthorized employment is crucial for controlling the problem of illicit migration. E-Verify holds real promise as 

a central element in effective immigration enforcement that combines border efforts 

with interior measures. 

On January 30, 2009 I issued an Action Directive on Immigration and Border Security that includes a request for an assessment of the E-Verify program. I am currently reviewing that assessment. 

DHS supports reauthorization of the E-Verify program in its current state. 

With sufficient system improvements to guard against false negatives and false 

positives, to ensure an effective monitoring and compliance unit, to ensure effective 

outreach to the U.S. work force, and to address workplace rights and remedies for 

U.S. citizens and work authorized aliens, and to ensure that the Social Security Administration is funded and staffed to adequately process walk-ins who seek to correct tentative non-confirmations and to make necessary system upgrades, I would 

be open to proposals to require the use of E-Verify by employers throughout the 
67 

United States. I will work with agency leaders to ensure it meets those expectations 

as we work to build a reliable system ensuring that employers hire legal workers. 

Originally set to expire in 2001, E-Verify has been extended four times. Given its 

history, the fact that it is a free and easy-to-use system, and that an average of over 

1,000 new employers sign up to use the system every week, it is probable that EVerify will continue to exist and grow as demand for system use and capabilities 

increases. 

Question 11. What is the status of DHS’s lawsuit against the State of Illinois for 

its statute prohibiting Illinois employers from using the basic pilot program? 

Answer. On March 12, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 

Illinois granted the Federal Government’s motion for summary judgment, declaring 

the Illinois statute invalid on the grounds that it violates the Supremacy Clause of 

the U.S. Constitution. The Court further issued a permanent injunction prohibiting 

the State of Illinois from enforcing its statute. The State of Illinois has 60 days to 

file an appeal. 

DATA SHARING

Question 12. Does it frustrate you that the Social Security Administration and the 

Internal Revenue Service have information at their fingertips that could greatly assist DHS in enforcing our immigration laws and they don’t, or claim that they can’t, 

share it with you? 

Will you urge the administration to rewrite regulations as necessary to allow for 

the sharing of information? 

Answer. 

• The Social Security Administration has been sharing information with DHS to 

support its immigration initiatives through the Basic Pilot (E-Verify) program 

since the program’s inception, as mandated by the statute. DHS is currently 

working with the Social Security Administration to improve this data sharing 

initiative. We recognize that collaboration in data sharing efforts could assist 

the Department in certain immigration programs and other people screening 

purposes. However, we must ensure that data sharing contains appropriate privacy protections and redress procedures. 

• With respect to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) information, USCIS would benefit from having access to certain IRS taxpayer information when making immigration eligibility decisions, e.g., determining whether a U.S. business sponsoring an employment-based immigrant meets the requirements for financial 

feasibility (ability to pay wages) or legitimacy (proof of existence), or whether 

an employer registering for E-Verify is, in fact, a legitimate entity. However, 

under Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS is not authorized to 

disclose taxpayer information to USCIS absent consent from the taxpayer to the 

IRS directly. 

SOCIAL SECURITY NO-MATCH LETTERS

Question 13a. On August 14, 2007, DHS published the final rule regarding a new 

process relating to Social Security no-match letters. The rule proposed, as a ‘‘safe 

harbor’’ for employers, steps to be taken when they receive a no-match letter from 

the Social Security Administration. The rule was to take effect on September 14, 

2007, but litigation by the AFL–CIO and the ACLU stalled the rule’s final implementation. In March 2008, DHS issued a supplemental rule addressing concerns 

raised by the Federal court. 

Is DHS still seeking to have the Federal court injunction against the regulations 

lifted, as was the prior administration? 

Question 13b. Does the administration plan to issue no-match letters to all employers with mismatches in order to alert them that they have submitted Social Security tax withholdings based on Social Security account numbers that do not match 

SSA records as to issued numbers and corresponding names? If so, when does this 

administration plan to start issuing such letters? 

Answer. Because the no-match rule is the subject of on-going litigation, I believe 

it is inappropriate to comment on it at this time. 

DOCUMENTARY REQUIREMENTS TO BOARD AIRPLANES

Question 14. The 9/11 Commission taught us that ‘‘At many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources of identification are 

the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are and to check 

whether they are terrorists.’’ Yet, DHS has not issued regulations setting forth documents acceptable for boarding airplanes, even though the Intelligence Reform and 
68 

Terrorism Prevention Act required DHS to do by July 2005. When will DHS finally 

be issuing the regulations? 

Answer. Effective June 1, 2008, TSA began using a standardized list of acceptable 

identification for airline travel. At the checkpoint, adult passengers (18 and over) 

are required to show a U.S. Federal or State-issued photo ID (or certain forms of 

foreign government, tribal or Registered Traveler identification documents) that contains the following: name, date of birth, gender, expiration date and a tamper-resistant feature. TSA established a Standard Operating Procedure for Transportation Security Officers (TSO) detailing the specific documents acceptable at TSA checkpoints 

for travelers seeking to enter the secure areas of the airport. TSA maintains a public list of acceptable documents on its web site (http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/ 

airtravel/acceptableldocuments.shtm). 

The standardization of acceptable documents complements the layer of aviation 

security created when TSA assumed travel document checking responsibilities from 

airline contractors beginning in 2007. Specially trained TSOs are positioned in front 

of the checkpoint to check passengers’ boarding passes and identification. They use 

black lights and magnifying loupes to examine security features and receive on-line, 

classroom and on-the-job training that teaches them how to recognize unique, fraudprevention features embedded in Government-issued identification documents. The 

training also includes discerning behavioral cues and interview techniques that have 

proven successful in identifying passengers whose behavior warrants additional 

screening. 

Further, as of June 2008, TSA began denying entry into secure areas of airports 

to passengers who willfully refuse to provide identification. The change applies exclusively to individuals who simply refuse to provide any identification or assist 

TSOs in ascertaining their identity. It does not apply to passengers that may have 

misplaced, lost or otherwise do not have ID but are cooperative with officers. Cooperative passengers who cannot present an acceptable ID will have to provide information to the TSO in order to verify their identity. Passengers who are cleared 

through this process may also be subject to additional screening. TSA can deny 

entry in cases where it cannot verify the identity of a traveler. 

287(G) AGREEMENTS AND COOPERATION WITH STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

Question 15. You only have at your disposal a few thousand ICE officers to enforce 

the immigration laws throughout our Nation. Doesn’t the voluntary cooperation of 

State and local law enforcement officers in immigration enforcement serve as a valuable force multiplier for DHS? 

Answer. Yes, the voluntary cooperation and partnerships with State and local law 

enforcement agencies in 287(g) agreements allows for ICE to successfully use State 

and local officers as force multipliers in both detention facilities and task force settings. 

There is a growing interest of individual State and local entities in participating 

in the 287(g) program as well as congressional interest in assisting State and local 

communities in addressing border security and immigration enforcement issues. 

The first 287(g) agreement was signed in 2002, and as of October 2008, participation in the 287(g) program had increased to 67 States and local agencies. 

Question 16. The 287(g) program was created by the Illegal Immigration Reform 

and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. If you look at the legislation, it provides 

that local law enforcement can enter into 287(g) agreements to assist in the ‘‘investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States.’’ There is no statutory requirement that illegal immigrants be ‘‘serious criminals’’ before they can be 

picked up by local law enforcement, is there? Will you agree not to impose such an 

extra-legal requirement on local law enforcement and take this valuable and voluntary tool out of their hands? 

Answer. It is correct that there is no statutory requirement that illegal immigrants be ‘‘serious criminals’’ before they can be picked up by local law enforcement. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) values the assistance from 287(g) 

State and local partners regarding immigration enforcement; however ICE retains 

the discretion to set priorities in order to manage its limited resources and meet 

the agency’s mission requirements. To ensure resources are managed effectively, 

ICE also requires its partnering Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to also manage 

its resources dedicated to 287(g) authority under a Memorandum of Agreement 

(MOA) entered into between ICE and the State or local agency. To that end, the 

following list reflects the categories of aliens that are a priority for arrest and detention with the highest priority being Level 1 criminal aliens. Resources should be 

prioritized to the following levels: 
69 

• Level 1—Individuals who have been convicted of major drug offenses and/or violent offenses such as murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, and kidnapping; 

• Level 2—Individuals who have been convicted of minor drug offenses and/or 

mainly property offenses such as burglary, larceny, fraud, and money laundering; and 

• Level 3—Individuals who have been convicted of other offenses. 

Aliens who do not fall within these levels and are arrested by 287(g) officers in 

the regular course of enforcing State or local law may be issued a Notice to Appear 

(NTA) before an immigration judge and released on their own recognizance or on 

bond if they are not determined to be a threat to safety and security of the community. 

Question 17. I received a letter from DHS stating that since the beginning of 

2007, ICE had received 69 new applications from localities to enter into 287(g) 

agreements. Yet ICE only intended to sign 33 memoranda of understanding because 

of limited funds. Does the administration’s budget for 2010 include enough funding 

to allow DHS to enter into 287(g) agreements with all interested localities? 

Answer. Since the President’s budget for 2010 has not been released, ICE is not 

in a position to comment on any 2010 budget request under consideration. 

The 287(g) program has received adequate funding to support the program to 

date. However, funding is not the only factor when considering a law enforcement 

agency’s (LEA’s) request for participation in the 287(g) program. ICE also must consider a number of other factors. First, a needs assessment must be completed. This 

assessment helps to identify which ICE program would be best suited to address 

the particular needs of an LEA. 

In December 2007, ICE created an Office of State and Local Coordination (OSLC), 

specifically to promote coordination and cooperation between ICE and our many 

State and local partners. With this new office, ICE hopes to develop stronger partnerships with State and local agencies through strategic discussions and efforts in 

order to maximize its mission of interior enforcement. As a result of the widespread 

interest in ICE’s programs, particularly the 287(g) program, ICE has launched the 

Agreement of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security (ACCESS) program. ICE ACCESS provides the vehicle for both ICE and LEA to assess 

which ICE programs will provide the greatest overall benefit to both parties. 

The 287(g) program is not always the program best suited to meet the LEA’s 

needs. In addition to the needs assessment, ICE must consider operational factors 

such as the proximity to an ICE office for oversight, supervision, and support, existing ICE infrastructure, available detention bed space, the type of criminal activity 

occurring in the LEA’s area of responsibility, and the number of anticipated encounters with illegal immigrants. After evaluating the totality of those factors, a final 

determination is made. 

DEPORTATION OF FUGITIVE ALIENS

Question 18a. I am pleased to see that because of ICE’s fugitive enforcement 

teams, the overall number of fugitive aliens has finally begun to decrease. However, 

it is still unacceptable that there are more than half a million alien fugitives who 

have been ordered deported by immigration judges. 

What is the purpose of even having immigration courts if so many deportation orders of the courts are flouted? 

Answer. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of Detention 

and Removal Operations (DRO), established the first Fugitive Operations Team 

(FOT) in 2003 in an effort to reduce a fugitive alien backlog that had been growing 

by 10 percent annually. As the number of FOTs increased to 79 FOTs Nation-wide 

in fiscal year 2007, the agency was able to expand its efforts to locate, arrest, and 

remove ICE fugitive aliens from the United States. Consequently, the first overall 

reduction in the fugitive alien backlog occurred in fiscal year 2007. The backlog has 

continued to decrease each year. This decline reflects not only an elimination of old 

cases, but also includes efforts to remove individuals with newly issued deportation 

orders. ICE continues to explore strategies to reduce the fugitive population. 

Question 18b. The last administration’s goal was to eliminate the backlog of fugitive aliens by 2012. Can you meet this goal? 

Answer. With the establishment of FOTs Nation-wide, the Nation’s fugitive alien 

population declined for the first time in fiscal year 2007 and has continued to decrease as reflected below: 

• At the end of fiscal year 2006, the fugitive alien backlog was 632,726; 

• At the end of fiscal year 2007, the fugitive alien backlog was 594,756; 

• At the end of fiscal year 2008, the fugitive alien backlog was 557,762; 

• As of March 17, 2009, the fugitive backlog was 551,915. 
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Whether the 2012 goal will be met depends on many factors such as the number 

of new fugitives added to the backlog in the coming years, any difficulties in locating 

such fugitives as well as the length of time it takes for a country to agree to accept 

the alien. 

Question 18c. Will you continue to seek the removal of all fugitive aliens with orders of deportation, not just those who have committed additional criminal offenses? 

Answer. Yes. It is ICE/DRO Policy that Fugitive Operation Teams prioritize cases 

according to the following standards: (I) Fugitives that pose a threat to national security; (II) Fugitives that pose a threat to the community; (III) Fugitives convicted 

of violent crimes; (IV) Fugitives with criminal records; and (V) Fugitives that are 

non-criminals. 

The fugitive operation teams enforcement operations are planned according to 

these criteria. 

Question 18d. Will you continue to have ICE arrest, and not simply ignore, illegal 

immigrants with whom they come into contact while searching for fugitive aliens? 

Answer. During the course of targeted operations, FOTs often encounter other 

people in the presence of the ICE fugitive FOTs are attempting to arrest. When appropriate, ICE agents and officers engage these aliens in consensual encounters to 

determine alienage. If ICE takes an enforcement action against a non-fugitive alien, 

ICE officers exercise prosecutorial discretion on a case-by-case basis. 

TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS

Question 19. It has become all too apparent that past administrations have used 

temporary protected status as a de facto amnesty for illegal immigrants from certain 

Central American countries. TPS status was granted to Honduran and Nicaraguan 

nationals at the end of 1998, following Hurricane Mitch. The last administration extended TPS numerous times, long after any temporary dislocations caused by the 

hurricane have long since ended. Will DHS under your leadership continue to abuse 

temporary protected status in this way? 

Answer. Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is a form of immigration relief that 

I have the discretion to apply only insofar as conditions in a country meet the statutory requirements delineated in the Immigration and Nationality Act under § 244. 

I take very seriously Congress’s intent, which is supported by the clear language 

of the statute, for TPS to serve as a temporary immigration status to protect nationals of designated foreign states in the United States who are unable to return to 

their home country in safety. In order to preserve the integrity of TPS as a viable 

form of temporary relief, the designation must only be granted or extended where 

appropriate. 

SANCTUARY CITIES

Question 20. On December 19, 2002, a 42-year-old mother of two was abducted 

and forced by her assailants into a hideout near some railroad tracks in Queens, 

New York. She was brutally raped before being rescued by a New York Police Department canine unit. The NYPD arrested five aliens in connection with that assault. Four of those aliens entered the United States illegally. Three of those four 

had extensive arrest histories in New York City. Despite the criminal histories of 

the aliens, however, the NYPD did not inform the INS about these aliens until after 

the December 19 attack. The only reason that the three illegal immigrants were in 

the United States, despite their extensive arrest histories, was because New York 

police officers had been barred by New York’s ‘‘sanctuary city’’ policy from contacting the INS. Do you believe that sanctuary city policies have enhanced or reduced the safety of American citizens? 

Answer. It is important for Federal, State, and local governments to work together to facilitate effective immigration enforcement and to reinforce the rule of 

law. These are legitimate concerns for both jurisdictions. I look forward to working 

with the White House, other departments and agencies, the Department’s senior 

leaders, Congress, local and State elected officials, and law enforcement officials to 

develop and implement an appropriate division of labor toward these ends, while 

promoting the exchange of information required to ensure that criminal aliens are 

prosecuted and removed from this country, and recognizing that immigration enforcement is a Federal responsibility. 

Question 21. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Enforcement Act 

of 1996 bars State and local officials from prohibiting any of their employees from 

sending to DHS information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any 

individuals. Despite this ban, many ‘‘sanctuary cities’’ in fact prohibit their law enforcement agencies from providing the names of suspected illegal immigrants to 
71 

DHS. Do you believe that these sanctuary cities should be allowed to violate Federal 

law? 

Would you consider denying funding to communities that violate the clear, unambiguous provisions of Federal law? 

Answer. Section 642(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Enforcement Act of 1996, which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a), prohibits a local Government from restricting any entity or official of that local government from communicating with DHS regarding the immigration status of any individual. I am advised 

by the DHS Office of the General Counsel that the Department does not have the 

legal authority to cut off all DHS funds to a city if the city violates Section 642(a) 

or if the Department otherwise disagrees with the city’s policy on immigration. 

ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO NATIONALS OF COUNTRIES THAT DO NOT ACCEPT THE RETURN

OF THEIR NATIONALS

Question 22. DHS cannot deport more than 100,000 deportable aliens, many of 

them criminals, because their countries refuse to take them back. Your own Inspector General acknowledges that this problem has created ‘‘a mini-amnesty program’’ 

and reports that ‘‘thousands of criminal aliens with final orders are released because 

of the unwillingness of some countries to [accept back their nationals]’’. The Immigration and Nationality Act requires the Secretary of State to stop issuing visas to 

all nationals of countries that you determine have refused or delayed the return of 

their deported nationals. Yet, previous Secretaries of Homeland Security have never 

carried out the responsibility under this provision. Do you plan to exercise your authority to enhance Americans’ safety? 

Answer. Discontinuing the issuance of visas to any foreign country is a powerful 

tool with major foreign policy implications. Before considering discontinuance, I 

would consult extensively with the Secretary of State to determine whether there 

are other tools that could overcome repatriation problems more effectively. 

BORDER PATROL

Question 23. It has been alleged that Border Patrol agents are told by their superiors to cease making apprehensions after they have reached a daily quota. Is there 

any truth to these allegations? 

Answer. The United States Border Patrol does not operate under a quota, and 

there are no plans to do so in the future. No set number of apprehensions is mandated. 

DETENTION OF DANGEROUS ALIENS

Question 24. The Supreme Court has ruled that under current law, aliens ordered 

removed cannot be detained for more than 6 months if for some reason they cannot 

be removed. Based on this decision, DHS has had no choice but to release back onto 

the streets many hundreds of criminal aliens. Jonathan Cohn, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, has testified that ‘‘the government is [now] required to release numerous rapists, child molesters, murderers, and other dangerous illegal 

aliens into our streets... [V]icious criminal aliens are now being set free within 

the United States.’’ The House of Representatives twice passed legislation in the 

109th Congress allowing for the continued detention of dangerous aliens and to keep 

them off the streets of our communities. Will you call for Congress to pass such legislation? 

Answer. On January 30, 2009, I issued an Action Directive on immigration and 

border security that requested a review of the Department’s immigration detention 

policies. (Additionally, on February 4, 2009, I announced the appointment of Dora 

Schriro as Special Advisor on Detention and Removal Operations at ICE.) DHS will 

be taking a comprehensive look at all aspects of detention policy, including the issue 

of detention of aliens with final orders of removal, to assess current conditions and 

devise and implement strategies that will bring about substantive improvements to 

the system. 

AFFIDAVITS OF SUPPORT

Question 25. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 

of 1996 requires that U.S. citizens or permanent residents sponsoring family members for immigrant visas sign legally binding affidavits of support enforceable 

against the sponsor for the cost of any means-tested public benefits provided to an 

alien. The Act mandates that ‘‘the appropriate entity of the Federal 

Government... shall request reimbursement by the sponsor.’’ Unfortunately, 

DHS has never set up a mechanism to ensure that American taxpayers are reim-
72 

bursed. American taxpayers continue to be abused by sponsored aliens receiving unreimbursed public benefits. Will you set up the required mechanisms to ensure that 

sponsors are held to their commitments? 

Answer. 

• The Affidavit of Support, Form I–864, submitted by a sponsoring U.S. citizen 

or lawful permanent resident, is a requirement, in most cases, to establish eligibility for a family-based immigrant visa. The sponsor must be able to demonstrate that he or she has income of at least 125 percent of the applicable Federal poverty guidelines. In the event that the sponsor cannot meet such an income requirement, a joint sponsor, who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent 

resident, may also submit an affidavit of support. Section 213A of the Immigration & Nationality Act requires that the affidavit of support be a legally enforceable contract between the sponsor and the foreign national. Also, the Act requires that the affidavit of support be a legally enforceable contract between the 

sponsor and any Federal or State agency that may provide means-tested public 

benefits to the sponsored immigrant. 

• The affidavit of support is a legally binding contract, and the sponsored immigrant and any public agencies dispensing means-tested benefits to the immigrant may sue the sponsor for failure to meet the obligations assumed under 

it. Forms I–864A signed by household members are also legally enforceable contracts, and sponsors can sue to enforce those contracts. Upon notification that 

a sponsored alien has received designated means-tested benefits, the Federal, 

State, or local entity that has provided the public benefit shall request reimbursement from the sponsor for an amount equal to the cost of the benefit. If 

the sponsor does not respond to the request in 45 days, the agency may sue the 

sponsor in a Federal or State court. There is a 10-year limit on actions to obtain 

reimbursement. 

• Since the statute already authorizes public agencies to sue the alien’s sponsor 

for reimbursement of means-tested benefits, DHS does not see a need at this 

time to create additional mechanisms for public agencies to obtain reimbursement. 

IMMIGRATION DETENTION BEDS

Question 26. It is well known that illegal immigrants who are not detained rarely 

show up for their deportation proceedings. The Department of Justice’s Inspector 

General found that the INS was only able to remove 13 percent of nondetained 

aliens with final orders of removal, and only 6 percent of nondetained aliens from 

State sponsors of terrorism who had final removal orders. Your own agency admits 

that it will need over 33,000 detention beds just to detain and remove all criminal 

aliens incarcerated in State and local jails. Congress in the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 authorized an increase in the number of immigration detention beds of 8,000 a year. The past administration never budgeted for anywhere near this number of additional detention beds. 

What increase in immigration detention beds will be in the President’s 2010 budget? 

Answer. Since the President’s budget has not been released, it would be premature to comment on a 2010 budget request. 

Question 27. The DHS Inspector General has reported that the lack of adequate 

detention space limits the effectiveness of the fugitive operations teams. In fact, ‘‘a 

field office director reported ceasing fugitive operations for 6 weeks because of insufficient bed space and another manager reported slowing team operations for the 

same reason... Another supervisor indicated that a lack of adequate detention 

space is the team’s biggest limitation.’’ Isn’t this another reason why all the detention beds authorized in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

should be funded? 

Answer. Neither the Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ (DRO) field offices nor the National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP) have imposed a moratorium on fugitive enforcement activity. The individuals that are targeted for arrest 

by the Fugitive Operations Teams (FOTs) have been ordered removed and most are 

detained in ICE custody until their removal from the United States can be affected. 

Question 28. So-called ‘‘alternatives to detention’’ simply do not work. Do you 

know that even under the highly touted Intensive Supervision Appearance Program’’, one-third of the ‘‘supervised’’ aliens who are ordered deported flout their deportation orders? 

Answer. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations (DRO) created the Alternatives to Detention (ATD) Program in 

fiscal year 2002. The goal of the ATD program is to develop and implement pro-
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grams to improve aliens’ compliance with conditions of release, including their attendance at immigration hearings and compliance with final court orders. These 

programs have already shown tremendous promise in improving accountability for 

aliens in removal proceedings, while helping the agency to use detention space more 

efficiently for aliens who require detention. 

Currently, within the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP) there is 

a maximum participant limit of 6,000. More than 5,700 aliens are actively participating in this program as a condition of release from custody. Since inception, ISAP 

has served over 12,300 participants. 

EXPEDITED REMOVAL

Question 29. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 

of 1996 created the mechanism of ‘‘expedited removal.’’ Because of the success of expedited removal, our international airports are no longer being deluged with aliens 

without documents. The 1996 act provided the administration with the authority to 

utilize expedited removal in the case of any alien who had entered the United States 

illegally and had not been present here for 2 years. Until recently, the INS and DHS 

had never made use of this power. In the last 2 years, however, DHS has taken 

a tentative step toward using expedited removal along the southern border. Will you 

use the full authority given to you by Congress to use expedited removal against 

all aliens who have entered illegally and have been here less than 2 years? 

Answer. Expedited Removal (ER) is currently applied to aliens at ports of entry 

and aliens encountered within 100 miles of the border and within 14 days of their 

unlawful entry. Although Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii), 8 

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1996) provides statutory authority for Nation-wide implementation of ER to all aliens encountered within 2 years of unlawful entry, the initial regulation applying ER in practice limited its scope to arriving aliens only, reserving the right to expand this application through the issuance of further regulations. 62 F.R. § 10312 (March 6, 1997). Two subsequent regulations were issued that 

expand the scope of ER; however, the full scope of statutory authority has not yet 

been implemented. DHS continues to examine the expansion of ER. 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE

Question 30. In 2003, the Immigration Subcommittee held a hearing that examined D.C. sniper John Muhammad’s smuggling activities between the Caribbean 

and the United States. Muhammad was able to make his living by providing bogus 

American identification documents such as driver’s licenses and birth certificates to 

aliens seeking to impersonate U.S. citizens and get through U.S. ports-of-entry. It 

is no wonder that the 9/11 Commission found that ‘‘Americans should not be exempt 

from carrying biometric passports or otherwise enabling their identities to be securely verified when they enter the United States.’’ Do you believe it is important 

that DHS implement the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative by the June 2009 

deadline so that these abuses can no longer take place? 

Answer. The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) Land and Sea requirements will go into effect on June 1, 2009, the earliest day allowed by law. 

WHTI requires U.S. and Canadian citizens to present a single, secure document 

that denotes identity and citizenship. 

WHTI will strengthen border security by improving the ability to confirm identity 

and citizenship while facilitating border crossing for legitimate travelers. The 9/11 

Commission noted that for terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons. By requiring secure documents to enter the United States, the Department of 

Homeland Security will make it harder for people to use fraudulent credentials to 

cross our borders, and we will make it easier for our border officers to separate real 

documents from fake, enhancing our security and ultimately speeding up processing. 

WHTI increases traveler facilitation by requiring certain documents designed for 

land border include vicinity radio frequency identification (RFID) technology. RFID 

technology allows traveler information to be pre-positioned for the border officer and 

queried via law enforcement databases as a vehicle approaches primary inspection 

at land ports of entry. It also facilitates our ability to verify automatically many of 

the documents presented with their issuing agency. Border officers will be able to 

determine if the individual in front of them is the person depicted on the document, 

and if that that is the identity to whom the original document was issued. 

Vicinity RFID technology conforms with DHS’s future vision of the border in a 

way that meets our national security needs, our economic imperatives, and the 

public’s trust. 
74 

2010 CENSUS

Question 31. It has been reported that the Census Bureau will ask DHS to suspend enforcement of the immigration laws in 2010 during the taking of the census. 

Does DHS have any plans to stop enforcing the immigration laws in 2010? 

Answer. DHS is aware of the enormous challenges faced by the Census Bureau, 

particularly in counting non-citizens, both documented and undocumented, residing 

in the United States. DHS plans to consult with the Census Bureau regarding the 

most appropriate ways in which the Department and the Bureau can cooperate to 

make the taking of the 2010 census as efficient and accurate as possible. 

CITIZENSHIP USA

Question 32. Citizenship USA was the Clinton Administration’s politically motivated project to rush through the naturalization of hundreds of thousands of aliens 

in time to vote in the 1996 elections. This program led to a debacle in which about 

180,000 aliens were naturalized without having undergone FBI criminal history 

records checks, resulting in the naturalization of an unknown number of people who 

had potentially disqualifying criminal records. Do you agree that DHS shouldn’t respond to the current naturalization caseload backlog by repeating the sorry history 

of Citizenship USA? 

Answer. 

• In the summer of fiscal year 2007, there was a sudden surge of naturalization 

applications. The fee increase that went into effect in July 2007 was one cause 

of the surge, as some applicants chose to file their applications and petitions 

before the fee increase took effect. Filings of naturalization applications more 

than doubled in June, and in July naturalization filings were about eight times 

normal monthly receipts. 

• USCIS developed a plan to deal with the surge of applications within 2 years, 

by the middle of fiscal year 2010. As a result, during fiscal year 2008 USCIS 

increased the Adjudications Officer work force by 1,199; completed more than 

1.17 million naturalization applications (up more than 50 percent from fiscal 

year 2007); and reduced naturalization application processing times to 9–10 

months, down from the 16–18 months projected after the surge of applications 

in late fiscal year 2007. During fiscal year 2009, USCIS plans to achieve a 5- 

month processing time for naturalization applications (N–400’s). 

• Throughout this process of reduction of processing times all appropriate security 

checks have been and continue to be performed on benefits applicants. Security 

checks will not be compromised for the sake of expediency. Indeed, all required 

security checks noted below must be completed before a naturalization applicant 

is scheduled for an interview. 

• The Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) Name Check—IBIS combines information from multiple agencies, databases and system interfaces to 

compile data relating to national security risks, public safety issues and other 

law enforcement concerns. 

• FBI Fingerprint Check—The FBI fingerprint check provides information relating to criminal background within the United States. Generally, the FBI 

forwards responses to USCIS within 24–48 hours. If there is a record match, 

the FBI forwards an electronic copy of the criminal history to USCIS. In cases 

involving arrests or charges without disposition, USCIS requires the applicant to provide court-certified evidence of the disposition. Even expunged or 

vacated convictions must be reported for immigration purposes. 

• FBI Name Check—The records consulted in the FBI name check process consist of administrative, criminal, personnel and other files compiled by law enforcement. Even after FBI has provided an initial response to USCIS concerning a match, the name check is not complete until full information is obtained and eligibility issues arising from it are resolved. 

REAL ID

Question 33a. The ‘‘REAL ID Act’’ requires that in order for a State’s drivers’ licenses and identification cards to be used for any Federal Government ‘‘official purpose,’’ the cards must comply with the standards set forth in REAL ID. Those standards are designed to prevent fraudulent use of the card including its use for identity 

theft and to establish false identities. 

Final compliance regulations were issued on January 11, 2008. The final rule allows a State to be considered REAL ID compliant if, by May 11, 2008, the State 

has: (1) Requested and obtained an extension of the compliance date from DHS; or 
75 

(2) have been determined by DHS to be in compliance with the REAL ID Act and 

the final rule. 

How many States are currently in compliance with REAL ID? Please list those 

States. 

Question 33b. How many, and which, States have indicated their intention to comply with REAL ID? 

Question 33c. How many, and which, States have indicated their intention not to 

comply with REAL ID? What steps is the administration taking to ensure that the 

States that have not yet indicated plans to comply with REAL ID will comply? 

Answer. All U.S. States and Territories have been granted an extension until December 31, 2009, to meet the material compliance requirements of the REAL ID 

Regulation. Forty-eight jurisdictions sought and received grant funding to assist 

their efforts to improve their driver’s licenses consistent with REAL ID requirements in fiscal year 2008. 

The REAL ID ACT is not a mandatory program; it is a voluntary program. As 

we have not yet reached the material or full compliance deadlines and every State 

has been granted an extension, it is difficult to quantify the number of States that 

will be compliant with the REAL ID ACT by the required compliance deadlines. 

Department of Homeland Security staff are in regular contact with numerous 

States that have publicly stated they are near materially compliant or are working 

to become materially compliant by December 31, 2009. A number of States have 

passed laws prohibiting compliance with the REAL ID Act. Some States have enacted laws authorizing compliance. 

The goal, however, is improvement of the security of driver licenses and identifications. To the end, DHS has provided $140 million in grant funding to assist State 

efforts to improve the integrity and security of their processes consistent with REAL 

ID requirements. Also, DHS allows States to use up to 20 percent of its State Homeland Security Grant Program funds for REAL ID. Further, Congress provided $50 

million in fiscal year 2009 funding to build an information sharing hub that will 

be operated by the States and assist them in meeting the verification requirements 

of the Act. Specifically, this ‘‘hub’’ will allow a State to share data with other States 

as well as verify information against Federal databases. 

Question 34. I know that as Governor of Arizona, you were concerned about the 

cost to States of implementing REAL ID. Will DHS’s 2010 budget include funds to 

help States with the costs of compliance? 

Answer. For fiscal year 2008 and 2009 the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) is providing $140 million in grant funding to assist States’ effort to improve 

the integrity and security of their driver’s license and identification card processes 

to become consistent with REAL ID requirements. An additional $50 million in fiscal year 2009 funding will go toward the development of an information sharing hub 

that will be operated by the States and help them meet the verification requirements of the Act. Specifically, this ‘‘hub’’ will allow a State to share data with other 

States as well as verify information against Federal databases. 

In fiscal year 2008, DHS informed States they could use up to 20 percent of State 

Homeland Security Grant Program funds to implement REAL ID requirements. The 

fiscal year 2010 budget is being refined within the administration. 

Question 35. What statutory changes, if any, do you plan to seek for REAL ID? 

Do you have any intentions of modifying REAL ID to allow States to issue regular 

drivers’ licenses to illegal immigrants? 

Answer. The National Governors Association (NGA) established a working group 

in which the Department of Homeland Security is participating to make legislative 

recommendations for a workable path forward. 

There is nothing in the REAL ID Act that prohibits a State from issuing nonREAL ID compliant driver’s licenses to illegal immigrants. The lawful presence provision only applies to driver’s licenses issued in compliance with the REAL ID Act 

and does not infringe on a States’ right to issue driver’s licenses to individuals they 

determine to be qualified. 

‘‘CATCH AND RELEASE’’ 

Question 36. One of the most important achievements of DHS over the past few 

years has been the elimination of the practice of catch and release of non-Mexicans 

picked up at the southern border. Can you assure me that catch and release will 

not resume? 

Answer. DHS has implemented a number of programs to reduce the flow of undocumented aliens into the United States. 

Since the implementation of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) in November 2005, 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has effectively ended ‘‘catch and 
76 

release’’ for all nationalities along the southern (U.S./Mexico) and northern (U.S./ 

Canada) borders. This was accomplished by increasing efficiencies within the immigration removal process by: 

• Rapidly expanding detention facility capacity; 

• Modifying a U.S. District Court injunction from the 1980’s so that Expedited 

Removal could be fully implemented at the border; 

• Reducing the time required to remove aliens; and, 

• Increasing use of DRO air transportation provided via ICE leases, charters, and 

the Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS). 

Efforts to maximize detention capacity have included working closely with the Department of State and foreign governments to streamline ICE repatriation efforts. 

ICE has made technological advances, such as Video Teleconferencing (VTC) and 

the Electronic Travel Document (eTD) program, available to foreign governments to 

facilitate their issuance of travel document used in the removal process, further increasing the efficiency of this process while minimizing the length of stay in detention. 

Additionally, ICE has created the Detention Operations Coordination Center 

(DOCC). The DOCC transfers detainees from field office jurisdictions with detention 

capacity shortages to jurisdictions with surplus capacity, thus ensuring that aliens 

subject to removal proceedings are not released solely due to lack of bed space. 

ICE has added significant resources in support of the Criminal Alien Program 

(CAP) and the National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP). The CAP, a cooperative effort with the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), within the Department of Justice, and participating Federal and State correctional agencies, ensures that all aliens serving criminal sentences are processed for removal prior to 

their release from Federal, State and local custody. This greatly decreases the detention time criminal aliens are in ICE custody. Important to the success of the CAP 

is EIOR’s ability to complete immigration proceedings for criminal aliens while they 

are still serving their sentences in prison for criminal convictions. The NFOP implements interior enforcement initiatives that apply an organized and methodical approach to the identification, location and arrest of ICE fugitive aliens. 

In addition to these efforts Border Patrol has reported that increased enforcement 

resources have resulted in a decrease in apprehensions of almost 20 percent. This 

administration has resources to continue these programs that are in place today and 

does not foresee the return of ‘‘catch and release’’. 

US–VISIT

Question 37. How can we possibly solve the illegal immigration problem when 

there is no system in place to track whether or not people who enter the country 

on visas ever leave the country when those visas expire? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) respectfully disagrees that 

there is no system in place to track people who enter the United States on visas 

but whose visas have expired before they leave the country (referred to as 

overstays). DHS has invested significantly in the recording and matching of biographic exit information (which covers all aliens departing by air and sea), as well 

as the analysis and determination based on those records of individuals who have 

overstayed the terms of their admission. 

Biographic Exit 

DHS’ US–VISIT program electronically receives biographic information on individuals who have departed the United States from air and sea carrier manifests. This 

information is matched to entry records and changes to immigration status in the 

Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS). After analysis, US–VISIT shares information on alien overstays with the Department of State (DOS), U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for further action concerning visa renewals, future admissibility into the United States, and interior enforcement. 

In fiscal year 2008, US–VISIT provided overstay information to DHS components 

and DOS that assisted: 

• ICE agents in the apprehension of 715 immigration violators (individuals who 

overstayed the terms of their admission); 

• CBP officers in the interception of 891 immigration violators attempting to reenter the country at ports of entry; and, 

• DOS officials in denying visas to 550 visa applicants at U.S. consulates. 

ADIS data are also used to support national security and Federal law enforcement 

agencies for criminal investigations, as well as DOS visa-validation studies and visa 

revocations. 
77 

DHS is also making strides toward implementation of biometric exit. DHS published a notice of proposed rulemaking on April 24, 2008, for the implementation 

of air/sea biometric exit. Pursuant to the direction provided in the fiscal year 2009 

Appropriations Act, DHS will be conducting additional air pilots later this year. In 

addition, DHS also published regulations last year describing an upcoming land border biometric exit pilot for H2 visa holders. The information from these pilots will 

be used to inform the administration’s decisions for how best to proceed toward implementation. We look forward to working with the committee on this important 

issue. 

Question 38. Will your 2010 budget include funds for the implementation of exit 

procedures at land ports of entry? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2010 budget is still being finalized by the administration. 

As soon as the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget is released and provided to Congress, we will be happy to brief you and your staff on the DHS request. 

BOMB PREVENTION OFFICE

Question 39. In February 2009, the House passed H.R. 549, the National Bombing 

Prevention Act of 2009. The Act establishes an Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) 

at DHS and gives it responsibility to combat and respond to terrorist explosive attacks in the United States. The Department of Justice had expressed concerns about 

a previous version of this bill because the responsibilities and efforts of OBP would 

appear to overlap with and duplicate the work of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this area. If 

this bill passes the Senate and becomes law, what steps will DHS take to ensure 

there is no duplication of Federal efforts to combat and prevent the terrorist explosive attacks and to minimize inter-agency jurisdictional disputes? 

Answer. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19 (HSPD–19) establishes that 

it is the policy of the U.S. Government to ‘‘counter the threat of terrorist explosive 

attacks aggressively by coordinating Federal, State, local, territorial, and Tribal government efforts and collaborating with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure and key resources to deter, prevent, detect, protect against, and respond 

to explosive attacks... ’’. HSPD–19 directs that Federal efforts to combat terrorist use of explosives are the responsibility of multiple agencies, while the Directive and its subsequent Implementation Plan lay out the individual responsibilities 

of those agencies to prevent duplication and inter-agency jurisdictional disputes. 

The Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) is part of the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Office of Infrastructure Protection within the National Protection and 

Programs Directorate, and its primary focus area is the protection of the Nation’s 

critical infrastructure and key resources from terrorist explosive attacks. This critical infrastructure protection mission is unique to DHS. OBP has three avenues of 

effort: coordination of DHS and certain national efforts; gap analysis of counter-explosives capabilities; and information sharing with State and local responders, and 

the private sector. OBP works as the national coordinator at DHS to help ensure 

that there is no duplication or inter-agency disputes. OBP staff includes senior 

detailees from both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to assist in daily coordination of 

DHS and DOJ activities. 

AMMONIUM NITRATE REGULATIONS

Question 40. In December 2008, the Department of Homeland Security announced 

new plans to regulate the selling and purchasing of Ammonium Nitrate (AN), which 

can be used as an explosive. Under current Federal law, the Department of Justice 

is authorized to regulate commerce and investigate unlawful activities involving explosives—a duty the Attorney General has delegated to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). Pursuant to that authority, ATF regulates 

and inspects approximately 12,000 explosives licensees and permittees, including 

those entities that use AN as explosives. Considering the role that ATF already 

plays in regulating AN, what step will DHS take to ensure that its new AN regulations will not result in redundant Federal inspection activities, unnecessary expense 

to the taxpayer, and additional burdens to the explosives industry? What steps will 

DHS take to ensure that its new authority is actually useful in preventing AN from 

falling into the wrong hands through theft, diversion, or lawful means at every 

stage of the supply chain? 

Answer. Section 563 of the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (‘‘Section 563’’), 

Congress requires the Department of Homeland Security to ‘‘regulate the sale and 

transfer of ammonium nitrate (AN) by an AN facility . . . to prevent the misappropriation or use of AN in an act of terrorism.’’ To design regulations that effectively 
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accomplish Section 563’s mission, the Department has established an AN Task 

Force to evaluate the various potential approaches to accomplishing the activities 

required by Section 563, such as registration and screening of buyers and sellers 

of AN, and seller verification of identity and authorization to purchase of prospective buyers of AN. 

To help gather information necessary to properly evaluate the pros and cons of 

the various potential approaches, the AN Task Force will continue to work with 

Federal and private-sector security partners and will engage State and local groups 

as well. To date, the AN Task Force has conferred with members of the Department’s Office of Bombing Prevention and the Department’s Screening Coordination 

Office; an explosives expert from the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the U.S. Department of Agriculture; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). In the near future the AN Task Force also plans to engage representatives from numerous State and local agriculture and homeland security offices, and 

representatives from industry associations representing the agricultural and explosives communities. 

The AN Task Force is making a particularly concerted effort to coordinate with 

ATF in light of ATF’s regulatory authority to ensure that the Department’s regulations are complementary to, and not redundant with, ATF regulations. Specifically, 

the Department is working to learn more about specific aspects of ATF’s explosives 

regulatory program (such as inspection protocols, reporting requirements, mixture 

rules, and recordkeeping requirements). This consultation and analysis will inform 

the Department’s decisionmaking process as the regulations are developed, and will 

prevent redundant activities and minimize the burden of any new regulations on the 

explosives industry. 

QUESTION FROM THE HONORABLE GUS M. BILIRAKIS OF FLORIDA FOR THE

HONORABLE JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1a. In your Senate testimony prior to your confirmation, you noted that 

there is a balance that needs to be struck between the security implications of the 

Visa Waiver Program and its potential public diplomacy benefits. 

Would you please elaborate on that statement and share with us your view of 

whether, on balance, you believe VWP helps or hinders our Nation’s security efforts? 

Question 1b. Do you plan to pursue efforts by the previous administration to expand the number of participating countries? 

Answer. The modernized VWP supports U.S. security and law enforcement interests, deepens bilateral cooperation, strengthens the U.S. economy, and contributes 

to a safer international travel environment for our citizens and those of our VWP 

allies. The security and law enforcement implications of permitting foreign nationals 

from selected countries to travel to the United States visa-free remain paramount, 

but DHS properly takes into account both public diplomacy efforts and the overall 

bilateral relationship with a member or aspirant country when making VWP decisions. 

The information-sharing agreements required by the 9/11 Act, in particular, provide U.S. Government personnel with new tools to secure our borders and help prevent terrorist and criminal activities in the United States and in VWP partner nations. Additionally, the Electronic System for Travel Authorization, required of all 

VWP travelers as of January 12, 2009, allows for screening of passengers on an individual basis prior to travel to the United States. DHS is committed to ensuring that 

VWP members meet these enhanced security standards. 

DHS and the Department of State (DOS) work closely together to communicate 

and explain VWP initiatives and requirements to ensure that our foreign partners 

are well informed. DHS, in consultation with DOS, will continue to work with valued allies not currently in the program to determine whether VWP admission is possible in the future. Any decision to expand the program further would be taken after 

a careful and comprehensive analysis of U.S. interests and that country’s ability to 

meet the statutory requirements for membership. There are issues specific to each 

country interested in being included in the Visa Waiver Program, including security 

and policy considerations, that must be addressed on a case-by-case, bilateral basis. 

QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE STEVE AUSTRIA OF OHIO FOR THE HONORABLE

JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. In your testimony, you mentioned your directive for an assessment of 

DHS’s critical role in cybersecurity. The interests of DOD and DHS are closely tied 

when it comes to cybersecurity and each are conducting their own measures in 

fighting this threat. In some instances, their jurisdictions in dealing with cyber 

threats overlap; what are your thoughts on how we ensure that we have effective 
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coordination and don’t allow this overlap to cause a very serious threat to fall between the cracks? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agrees that its interests 

are closely tied to those of the Department of Defense (DOD) when it comes to cybersecurity. DHS’s National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) focuses on cybersecurity with respect to non-national security system sectors of the Federal Government, 

as well as critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) sector networks. In pursuit of its mission, NCSD works with Federal departments and agencies, State and 

local governments, the private sector, academia, and international partners. DOD 

is responsible for securing its own networks and the Federal Government’s classified 

and national security networks. As the Defense Industrial Base’s (DIB) Sector-Specific Agency under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) partnership 

framework, DOD is also responsible for working with DIB private-sector partners 

on cybersecurity and physical security matters. 

In executing their cybersecurity missions, DHS and DOD encounter common 

threats and vulnerabilities to public- and private-sector critical information infrastructure. In addition, both Departments are cognizant of the interdependencies 

among the CIKR sectors upon which government and private-sector operations are 

dependent. DHS and DOD continue to enhance their relationships and continue efforts to maintain sufficient coordination mechanisms designed not only to preclude 

missing cyber threats and vulnerabilities but also to mutually support and enhance 

the cybersecurity of Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, the private sector, and international partners. 

Several cybersecurity policy planning and coordination mechanisms are used by 

DHS and DOD to improve the protection and preparedness of Federal Government 

and CIKR sector networks. DHS and DOD also coordinate on operational matters, 

such as threat and vulnerability information sharing, cyber incident response, and 

the dissemination of mitigation strategies. 

From an operations perspective, NCSD’s United States Computer Emergency 

Readiness Team (US–CERT) has programs and processes in place to facilitate communications with departments and agencies, including DOD (e.g., Government 

Forum for Incident Responders and Security Teams, weekly Federal coordination 

calls, and the National Cyber Alert System). US–CERT leverages information and 

lessons learned to assist agencies in better understanding the current impact of the 

threat against the Federal Government networks on a classified level. The Joint 

Agency Cyber Knowledge Exchange (JACKE) Program promotes sharing and dissemination of knowledge across the entire Federal cybersecurity community. The 

JACKE Program provides a biweekly interactive forum for US–CERT to share classified threat analysis updates and serves as a venue for participating agencies to 

share cyber activity detected within their internal networks. 

Additionally, US–CERT continues to work closely with other DHS and Federal 

Operations Centers. DOD maintains a network of computer emergency response 

centers, which operate at all times and are coordinated by the Joint Task ForceGlobal Network Operations (JTF–GNO) to identify, mitigate, and respond as necessary to cyber attacks. DOD’s U.S. Strategic Command, the National Security 

Agency/Central Security Service Threat Operations Center (NTOC), and JTF–GNO 

also provide continuous intelligence analysis of cyber threats. In addition, the Law 

Enforcement/Counter Intelligence Center, located at JTF–GNO, consolidates DOD’s 

law enforcement and counterintelligence organizations with respect to cyber incidents. US–CERT works closely with the Defense Cyber Crime Center, NSA, and 

JTF–GNO through routine interaction and a liaison exchange program. Moreover, 

US–CERT participates weekly in a telecommunications check with JTF–GNO to ensure that secure communication mechanisms are operational. 

Question 2. In December 2008, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism released its report, World at Risk. 

The Commission determined that unless decisive and urgent action is taken by the 

world community, terrorists will perpetrate an attack with a weapon of mass destruction somewhere in the world by 2013, and the Commission believes this attack 

will most likely be with a biological weapon. The Commission said that addressing 

bioterrorism must become a higher priority for the Department and that prevention 

must also be coupled with a robust system for public health preparedness and response. Do you agree with the Commission’s assessment and how would you recommend the Department move forward in addressing bioterrorism? 

Answer. DHS agrees with many of the WMD Commission’s recommendations to 

address the threat of bioterrorism, and the Department intends to move forward on 

three main priorities: (1) Biosecurity: reviewing and updating existing Biosecurity 

and Bioterrorism prevention measures; (2) Biodefense Readiness: preparing the Nation to respond effectively to a potential attack or incident, especially through engi-
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neering advances in early warning capability; and (3) Biothreat Understanding: pursuing the best understanding of the threat as it stands today as new science, intelligence, or technology emerge. 

1. Biosecurity.—The WMD Commission’s charge was limited to ‘‘prevention’’. DHS 

is an active participant in the Working Groups established by the Executive Order 

13486 on Strengthening Laboratory Biosecurity in the United States. • DHS entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in HHS, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, in USDA, to share select agent information that has enabled DHS 

to begin site vulnerability assessments at select agent registered entities across 

the country, and DHS will make recommendations for improving security at 

these facilities. 

2. Biodefense Readiness.—DHS will move forward in addressing bioterrorism by 

focusing on the most effective efforts to save lives by improving early detection, providing accurate warning and rapid response. • DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) operates biodetection technology in over 30 

cities with zero false positives to date through its BioWatch program. In addition, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) has been funding research to engineer faster, better, and cheaper next-generation biodetection systems that are fully automated. DHS biodetection systems must be rigorously 

tested and have the full support and confidence of our partners in the public 

health community. This is being addressed by OHA and S&T in collaboration 

with our Federal partners. • DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have an effective working relationship to build a robust public health preparedness and response system. DHS also has a robust relationship with the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to coordinate against food and plant and agriculture terrorist 

threats. DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will continue to 

work closely with the State and local responder community to understand their 

needs and capabilities. DHS also solicits input from Homeland Security Advisors and the private sector. The Department needs to pursue a resilient multisectoral response to bioterrorism, as an entire city or region may be impacted 

in the event of an attack. Law enforcement, transportation, utilities, emergency 

management, and many other sectors of society are essential partners in addition to the public health community. • The public also must be a full partner in our efforts. While there have been lessons learned for what to do in case of hurricanes, floods, or earthquakes, most 

Americans have no experience or education on how to protect themselves and 

their families against a bioterrorist attack. DHS will continue to increase resiliency within the civilian population. Working with HHS, DHS will ensure the 

general public is educated, informed, and empowered with clear and understandable guidance. 

3. Biothreat Understanding.—DHS will advance the field of biodefense understanding. 

• DHS is establishing a risk-based tiering of bioterror threats, and fills the scientific knowledge gaps about specific vulnerabilities we face today. 

• DHS is exploring options to address new biothreats, such as a synthetic DNA 

that could be ordered on-line but misused to build a controlled pathogen. 

• DHS is advancing the field of microbial forensics to assist in criminal investigations for possible attribution. 

Question 3. In your testimony, you mention the need for DHS to evaluate its role 

in building capacity for a ‘‘health care surge,’’ including DHS’s supporting role in 

coordinating response to such an incident, and how the Department’s preparedness 

and public communications efforts could better facilitate existing health care surge 

capacities. 

In my district, Wright State University, in close cooperation with Wright Patterson Air Force Base, is developing a self-sustaining, all-hazard, actual conditions 

training environment for civilian and military first responders and first providers 

(nurses, doctors, other medical personnel). Its focus is to develop a Disaster Resilient Healthcare Community based on the four themes of planning, preparation, response, and recovery. 

What are your thoughts on such a project and what are your plans at DHS to 

ensure our communities are capable of dealing with a health care surge caused by 

an attack that involves chemical, biological, radiological, and/or nuclear (CBRN) 

weapons? 

Answer. I appreciate the efforts of Wright State University and our Nation’s many 

other educational and training facilities that provide our first responders and health 

care providers with the skills they need to prepare for, respond to, mitigate the ef-
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fects of, and recover from all hazards. Wright State University should be commended on its proactive approach to fostering an environment of resilience in the 

health care sector. The availability of such training opportunities is a critical element in the ability of our communities to deal with the health and medical consequences of a CBRN event. 

As you know, HHS is the Federal lead for public health emergencies, including 

medical surge capacity after an emergency working with our Federal partners. DHS 

has a number of activities underway to help build medical surge capacity at the regional, State, and local levels. DHS is one of the six Federal department signatories 

to the Federal Education and Training Interagency Group (FETIG). This group, 

formed under the direction from HSPD–21, is directed to provide guidance to the 

National Center for Disaster Medicine and Public Health which will be housed at 

the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences. The group is chartered to 

provide guidance for standardization of training and education for first responders. 

Ultimately, it will engage the public sector, private sector and academia to develop 

suggested guidance by which curricula can be developed and training centers accredited. 

The DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) is working with the Community and Regional Resilience Initiative (CARRI) Program to promote the concept of community 

resiliency to meet the challenges of any health and medical stressor. The CARRI 

project is a regional program that has national implications to promote resilience 

in both human and physical resources to meet the challenges of health care surge. 

OHA is also leading an interagency effort to develop a Clearinghouse of Medical 

and Public Health Preparedness Allocation, Skill Development, and Standards 

(CoMPASS). CoMPASS is a database that will make it easier to find Federal health 

and medical training and exercise opportunities, grant funding, and standards 

through an easy-to-use web-based portal. The data will be aligned by national priorities, target capabilities, and agency-specific preparedness missions. This will allow 

medical and public health communities the ability to locate training and funding opportunities, then connect instantly to the host site. 

OHA has been working to convene a meeting with a number of health care entities, including Wright State University, that have demonstrated similar successes 

as Wright State in order to assemble a consortium of health care systems focused 

on providing hands-on training and education to foster health care resiliency. This 

effort will lead the way for a regional health and medical training approach that 

builds upon successes like Wright State University by promoting such activities 

through various grants and training opportunities for all levels of government. 

Finally, DHS has a number of facilities and resources that focus full-time on providing training opportunities to our communities’ first responders. These include the 

U.S. Fire Academy, Emergency Management Institute, the Center for Domestic Preparedness, and the Noble Training Center, which all have programs aimed at promoting resiliency of the health care community. 

Question 4. There are approximately 70 miles of planned fencing along the southern border yet to be completed. What are your intentions on finishing this span of 

fencing? Additionally, constructing the fence is important, but it is equally critical 

that DHS have plans in place to address maintenance just like with any infrastructure or technology project. How will this be taken care of to ensure that the significant investment made to deploy this physical infrastructure will not be lost in the 

coming years due to lack of a maintenance strategy? 

Answer. As of March 6, 2009, there are approximately 50 miles remaining of the 

661 miles of priority areas identified by the Border Patrol to be constructed along 

the southwest border. Of the 50 miles, 34 are currently under construction, 13 miles 

in Rio Grande Valley are under contract and awaiting real estate clearance and 3 

miles in the Tucson Sector are awaiting formal NEPA documentation required by 

the Tohono O’Odham Nation. Current plans are to complete these fence projects by 

October 2009. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) currently has interim maintenance 

contracts in place to provide tactical infrastructure (TI) operations and maintenance 

(O&M) coverage until a long-term Comprehensive TI Maintenance and Repair 

(CTIMR) contract is awarded. The interim contracts are managed by the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers utilizing their multiple award task order contracts. The longterm CTIMR contract is scheduled to be awarded in the first quarter of calendar 

year 2010. These contracts will cover maintenance and repair for fence and gates, 

roads and bridges, drainage structures and grates, lighting and electrical systems, 

and vegetation and debris removal within the seven Border Patrol sectors. 

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