North American Plan 

For Avian & Pandemic Influenza

Developed as Part of the 

Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America

A u g u s t 2 0 0 7
North American Plan 

For Avian & Pandemic Influenza

Developed as Part of the 

Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America

A u g u s t 2 0 0 7



List Of Acronyms ........................................................................................................ IV

Executive Summary..................................................................................................... VI

Chapter 1: Introduction............................................................................................ 1

The Avian And Pandemic Influenza Threat........................................................................... 1

North American Cooperation To Address The Threat........................................................... 1

Principles For Cooperation .............................................................................................. 2

A Comprehensive Approach............................................................................................. 2

Chapter 2: Emergency Coordination And Communications.................. 5

Overview Of Federal Emergency Management Structures.................................................... 5

Canada....................................................................................................................... 6

Mexico....................................................................................................................... 6

United States............................................................................................................... 7

International Legal Framework............................................................................................ 8

North American Coordination............................................................................................. 9

Joint Exercises And Training ................................................................................................ 9

Avian And Pandemic Influenza Communications................................................................ 9

Coordinated Communications ......................................................................................... 10

Chapter 3: Avian Influenza.................................................................................... 13

Notifiable Avian Influenza ................................................................................................... 13

Zoning And Compartmentalization..................................................................................... 13

Surveillance/Epidemiology................................................................................................... 14

Poultry Surveillance....................................................................................................... 15

Wild Bird Surveillance.................................................................................................... 15

Table of Contents

Table of Contents
II

Border Control Measures Associated With Notifiable Avian Influenza............................... 15

Laboratory Practices............................................................................................................ 16

Avian Influenza Vaccines...................................................................................................... 16

Personnel............................................................................................................................. 16

Avian Health Information Sharing And Notification........................................................... 17

Avian And Human Health Interface .................................................................................... 17

Chapter 4: Pandemic Influenza........................................................................... 19

Surveillance, Epidemiology And Laboratory Practices........................................................ 19

Surveillance And Epidemiology......................................................................................... 19

Laboratory Practices...................................................................................................... 20

Pandemic Influenza Vaccines And Antivirals....................................................................... 20

Research And Development............................................................................................. 20

Regulatory Issues.......................................................................................................... 20

Personnel And Materials...................................................................................................... 21

Mutual Assistance......................................................................................................... 21

Personnel Exchange....................................................................................................... 21

Stockpiles................................................................................................................... 21

Public Health Measures....................................................................................................... 22

Chapter 5: Border Monitoring And Control Measures Associated 

With Pandemic Influenza....................................................................................... 23

Air Travel............................................................................................................................. 23

Pre-departure Measures For Flights From Affected Countries To North America ............................ 24

Pre-departure Measures For Flights From North America To Affected Countries 

When Disease Does Not Exist In North America................................................................... 24

Pre-departure Measures For Flights From North America When Disease Exists In North America....... 24

En Route Measures....................................................................................................... 24

Arrival Measures........................................................................................................... 24

Maritime Travel................................................................................................................... 25

Land Borders....................................................................................................................... 25

Information Sharing............................................................................................................ 25

Table of Contents
III

Chapter 6: Critical Infrastructure Protection.................................................. 27

The SPP Framework ............................................................................................................. 27

Critical Infrastructure Sectors.............................................................................................. 28

United States............................................................................................................... 28

Canada....................................................................................................................... 29

Mexico....................................................................................................................... 29

Improving Critical Infrastructure Resiliency........................................................................ 30

Critical Infrastructure Pandemic Preparedness And Response Management........................ 31

Annex 1 – Major Tasks.............................................................................................. 33

Annex 2 – Terms Of Reference For The Coordinating Body..................... 39

Annex 3 – Chief Veterinary Officers Agreement............................................. 41

Table of Contents
IV

Ai Avian Influenza

Cfia Canadian Food Inspection Agency

Ci/kr Critical Infrastructure/key Resource

Cip Critical Infrastructure Protection

Cipg Critical Infrastructure Protection Group

Cisen Center For Investigation And National Security (Mexico)

Conop Concept Of Operations

Dfait Department Of Foreign Affairs And International Trade 

(Canada)

Dhs Department Of Homeland Security (U.S.)

Dod Department Of Defense (U.S.)

Dos Department Of State (U.S.)

Dot Department Of Transportation (U.S.)

Eoc Emergency Operations Center

Fao Food And Agriculture Organization

Gccp General Coordination For Civil Protection (Mexico)

Gdp Gross Domestic Product

Goc Government Operations Centre (Canada)

HA Hemagglutinin

Hhs Department Of Health And Human Services (U.S.)

Hpai Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

Hpnai Highly Pathogenic Notifiable Avian Influenza

Hspd Homeland Security Presidential Directive (U.S.)

Icao International Civil Aviation Organization

Ihr International Health Regulation

Ivpi Intravenous Pathogenicity Index

Lpai Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza

Lpnai Low Pathogenic Notifiable Avian Influenza

Moa Ministry Of Agriculture (Mexico)

Mofa Ministry Of Foreign Affairs

Moh Ministry Of Health (Mexico)

Moi Ministry Of Interior (Mexico)

Nafta North American Free Trade Agreement

Nai Notifiable Avian Influenza

Nchs National Committee For Health Security (Mexico)

Ngo Non-governmental Organization

Noc National Operations Center (U.S.)

Nrp National Response Plan (U.S.)

Oie World Organization For Animal Health

Phac Public Health Agency Of Canada

Ps Public Safety Canada

Spp Security And Prosperity Partnership Of North America

Un United Nations

Usd U.S. Dollars

Usda United States Department Of Agriculture

Usg United States Government

Who World Health Organization

Wto World Trade Organization

List Of Acronyms

List of Acronyms
Canada, Mexico and the United States face a growing 

threat posed by the spread of avian influenza and the 

potential emergence of a human influenza pandemic. 

The highly pathogenic (HPAI) H5N1 avian influenza 

virus, which re-emerged in Asia in late 2003, has already 

spread to Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Although 

the virus has not yet reached North America, Canada, 

Mexico and the United States must be prepared for 

the day when it—or some other highly contagious 

virus—does. 

At the March 2006 Security and Prosperity Partnership 

of North America (SPP) summit in Cancun, the leaders 

of Canada, Mexico and the United States committed 

to developing a comprehensive, coordinated and science-based North American approach to prepare for and 

manage avian and pandemic influenza. 

The North American Plan for Avian and Pandemic Influenza outlines how Canada, Mexico and the United States 

intend to work together to combat an outbreak of avian 

influenza or an influenza pandemic in North America. 

The Plan complements national emergency management 

plans and builds upon the core principles of the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, the 

standards and guidelines of the World Organization for 

Animal Health (OIE), the World Health Organization 

(WHO)—including the revised International Health 

Regulations, as well as the rules and provisions of the 

World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North 

American Free Trade Agreement.

The North American Plan 

will enhance collaboration in 

order to:

• detect, contain and control an avian influenza 

outbreak and prevent transmission to humans;

• prevent or slow the entry of a novel strain of 

human influenza to North America;

• minimize illness and deaths; and

• sustain infrastructure and mitigate the impact to 

the economy and the functioning of society.

This Plan outlines a collaborative North American 

approach that recognizes controlling the spread of avian 

influenza or a novel strain of human influenza, with 

minimal economic disruption, is in the best interest 

of all three countries. Coordination among Canada, 

Mexico and the United States will be critical in the 

event of an avian influenza outbreak or pandemic. The 

Plan, therefore, describes the organizational emergency 

management frameworks in each of the three countries 

and how they intend to coordinate their activities. In 

particular, the three countries recognize the importance 

of communicating effectively with the public about 

avian and pandemic influenza in a cooperative and 

coordinated matter.

Both animal and public health issues are addressed in the 

Plan, including notification, zoning and compartmentalization, surveillance, epidemiology, laboratory practices, 

vaccines and antivirals, personnel, stockpiles and public 

health measures. 

The Plan also addresses border and transportation issues, 

including containment measures for air travel, maritime 

travel and land border crossings. A series of layered, 

collaborative measures among the three countries could 

slow the spread of a novel strain of influenza, providing valuable time to mobilize resources, coordinate 

responses, and mitigate morbidity and mortality.

Maintaining critical infrastructure and services will be 

essential during a pandemic. While influenza cannot 

physically damage critical infrastructure, a pandemic 

could weaken it by diverting essential resources or 

removing essential personnel from the workplace. This 

Plan, therefore, extends beyond the health sector to 

include a coordinated approach to critical infrastructure 

protection, including the importance of business continuity planning and recognition of interdependencies 

among sectors.

Taken together, the measures outlined in this Plan to 

address both avian and pandemic influenza, as well 

as related border and critical infrastructure issues, are 

intended to provide a comprehensive, coordinated North 

American approach to managing avian and pandemic 

influenza.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary
VI
Canada, Mexico and the United States face a growing 

threat posed by the spread of avian influenza and the 

potential emergence of a human influenza pandemic. 

The highly pathogenic H5N1 virus, which re-emerged 

in Asia in late 2003, has already spread to Europe, the 

Middle East and Africa. While the virus has not yet 

reached North America, the three countries must be 

prepared for the day when it—or some other highly 

contagious virus—does. 

The North American Plan for Avian and Pandemic 

Influenza (Plan) outlines a collaborative North American 

approach that recognizes that controlling the spread of 

avian influenza or a novel strain of human influenza, 

with minimal economic disruption, is in the best interest 

of all three countries. It outlines how Canada, Mexico 

and the United States intend to work together to prepare 

for and manage avian and pandemic influenza.

The Avian And Pandemic 

Influenza Threat

An influenza pandemic occurs when a new influenza 

virus emerges against which the majority of the human 

population has no immunity. It spreads easily from person to person, causes serious illness, and can sweep across 

the country and around the world in a very short time.

Although a pandemic influenza virus, by definition, 

causes disease in humans, it can arise from mutations in 

an animal virus, such as avian influenza. Wild waterfowl 

are the natural reservoir for influenza A viruses, which 

generally do not cause disease in the birds that are 

infected. When these viruses are passed to domestic 

chicken and turkey populations, however, they may 

mutate and become more pathogenic. 

The H5N1 Eurasian strain of the influenza A virus has 

infected birds in over 59 countries and jurisdictions and 

has resulted in the deaths, through illness and culling, 

of over 240 million birds. The virus is now endemic in 

parts of Southeast Asia, present in long-range migratory 

birds, and unlikely to be eradicated in the short term. 

The H5N1 virus is capable of infecting a wide range of 

hosts, including humans. Although the virus has not yet 

shown an ability to transmit efficiently among humans, 

there is concern that it will acquire this capability 

through genetic mutation or exchange of genetic material with a human influenza virus. If this does not happen with the currently circulating H5N1 viruses, history 

suggests that another novel influenza virus will emerge 

and cause the next influenza pandemic.

Influenza pandemics have occurred intermittently over 

the centuries. The last three influenza pandemics, in 

1918, 1957 and 1968, killed approximately 40 million, 

two million and one million people worldwide, respectively. Although the timing of an influenza pandemic 

cannot be predicted, history and science suggest that 

the world will face at least one influenza pandemic this 

century. A worldwide outbreak of a new influenza virus 

could result in hundreds of thousands of deaths, millions 

of hospitalizations, and hundreds of billions of dollars in 

direct and indirect costs to North American economies.1

North American Cooperation 

To Address The Threat

In March 2006, the leaders of Canada, Mexico and 

the United States agreed to advance the agenda of the 

Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America 

(SPP)2 by addressing the threat of avian and pandemic 

influenza. Cooperation on avian and pandemic influenza 

is one of five major priorities outlined by the leaders to 

be addressed within the SPP. 

Since the social and economic health of the three 

countries is closely intertwined, political leadership and 

cooperation at all levels is needed. The security and 

1 U.S. National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, November 2005

 In March 2005, the Prime Minister of Canada, the President of Mexico and the President of the United States announced the establishment 

of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) to 

increase security and enhance prosperity among the three countries 

through greater cooperation and information sharing. The leaders met 

again in March 2006 to assess the progress of the SPP and to reaffirm 

their commitment to enhancing the security, prosperity and quality of 

life of citizens within North America. The SPP continues to establish 

leader-level priorities for trilateral and bilateral initiatives, give existing 

efforts additional momentum, and create new programs and initiatives 

where necessary and appropriate. 

Chapter 1: 

 Introduction

Chapter 1: Introduction
prosperity of the three countries are interdependent and 

complementary.

While recognizing the differences in respective legal and 

governmental frameworks among the three countries, 

their governments acknowledge the need to work collaboratively and with all levels of government, the private 

sector and among non-governmental organizations to 

combat avian and pandemic influenza.

The three leaders set out a framework for cooperation 

on avian and pandemic influenza, which includes a 

series of principles to guide collaboration. The leaders 

also announced their intent to establish an avian and 

pandemic influenza Coordinating Body to follow up on 

commitments. The development and implementation 

of the North American Plan works in conjunction with 

other trilateral mechanisms and ongoing efforts under 

the SPP to fulfill the vision set out by the leaders. 

Principles for Cooperation

At the March 2006 meeting in Cancun, Mexico, 

the leaders of Canada, Mexico and the United States 

determined that the following principles are to guide collaboration on all stages of avian or pandemic influenza 

management:

• Share information among our governments in an 

open, timely and transparent manner; 

• Adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach 

that incorporates animal and public health aspects 

in managing avian influenza outbreaks and influenza pandemics; 

• Ensure coordination within our respective national 

governments on all aspects of emergency management for an avian influenza outbreak or a human 

influenza pandemic, by building on existing 

mechanisms of cooperation and strengthening 

these mechanisms as required;

• Coordinate actions and leverage our respective 

capacities to ensure that rapid and effective steps 

are taken to deal with avian influenza outbreaks or 

a human influenza pandemic in North America; 

• Advise one another in advance of making any decision that could seriously affect the other countries;

• Base our actions on the best available science and 

evidence-based decision making;

• Agree that the imposition and removal of veterinary or public health measures on the movement 

of people, animals and goods, under our national 

laws and international obligations, will not be 

more restrictive or maintained for a longer period 

than necessary to achieve the veterinary or public 

health objective, so as to avoid unnecessary interference with the movement of people and goods 

within North America;

• Ensure that the business continuity plans of our 

respective governments consider the highly interconnected nature of our economies; and

• Strive to utilize clear and consistent messaging to 

the public and international organizations that is 

proactive, timely and accurate.

A Comprehensive Approach 

Given the broad health, social and economic impacts 

of an avian influenza outbreak or influenza pandemic, 

the three countries recognize that their approach must 

be comprehensive. Preparing for such an emergency 

requires coordinated action nationally, internationally 

and by all segments of society. The purpose of this Plan 

is to enhance collaboration among Canada, Mexico and 

the United States in order to:

• Detect, contain and control an avian influenza 

outbreak and prevent transmission to humans;

• Prevent or slow the entry of a novel strain of 

human influenza to North America; 

• Minimize illness and deaths; and

• Sustain infrastructure and mitigate the impact to 

the economy and the functioning of society.

Although influenza will not physically damage critical 

infrastructure, systems may be weakened by the absence 

of essential personnel in the workplace or the diversion 

of resources. This Plan, therefore, extends beyond the 

health and medical sectors to include provisions in relation to critical infrastructure and the movement of goods 

and services across our borders. 

Chapter 1: Introduction
The North American Plan for Avian and Pandemic 

Influenza provides a framework for: 

• The basic structure and mechanisms for trilateral 

emergency coordination and communication; 

• Collaboration on the prevention, control and 

eradication of highly pathogenic strains of avian 

influenza; 

• Collaboration on a North American approach to 

pandemic influenza preparedness and response, 

including border monitoring and control measures 

to stop or slow the spread of a novel human influenza virus; and 

• Collaboration on a North American approach to 

keeping critical infrastructure and essential systems 

functioning properly in the event of an influenza 

pandemic. 

The Plan recognizes and builds upon the core principles of the International Partnership on Avian and 

Pandemic Influenza (International Partnership), the 

standards and guidelines of the World Organization 

for Animal Health (OIE), the World Health Organization (WHO)—including the International Health 

Regulations (IHRs) as well as the rules and provisions 

of the World Trade Organization (WTO)—and the 

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It 

also considers the role of the United Nations Food 

and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in coordinating global strategies for the control and eradication 

of highly pathogenic avian influenza, as well as the 

role of the United Nations (UN) System Influenza 

Coordinator in ensuring cooperation and coordination within the UN system on initiatives to address 

the avian influenza epidemic and threat of a human 

pandemic.

The International Partnership was launched at the UN 

General Assembly in September 2005. The goals of the 

partnership include:

• Elevating the avian influenza issue on national 

agendas;

• Coordinating efforts among donor and affected 

nations;

• Mobilizing and leveraging resources;

• Increasing transparency in disease reporting and 

improving surveillance; and

• Building local capacity to identify, contain and 

respond to an influenza pandemic.

The WHO has developed international guidance on 

pandemic preparedness and response, including a series 

of six pandemic phases.3 The WHO efforts are intended 

to improve international coordination, transparency and 

management of risk in responding to such threats. The 

WHO’s international guidance formed much of the basis 

for the three countries’ planning for North American 

pandemic preparedness and response.

OIE provides guidelines, advice and standards to 

prevent, diagnose and respond to outbreaks of notifiable 

avian influenza (NAI) within the Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code (2006) and the Manual of Diagnostic Tests 

and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals (2004). These documents also provide standards and guidelines outlining 

how countries should provide international notification 

and continue to trade in poultry and poultry products 

prior to, during and following an outbreak. 

Similarly, the FAO’s role in combating highly pathogenic 

avian influenza is to facilitate direct technical and 

resource assistance to help national governments align 

their prevention, control and response efforts with OIE 

guidelines. The FAO channels support to infected 

countries to assist their efforts to control the disease and 

provides assistance to countries at risk of introduction of 

the disease. These efforts are now augmented by a rapid 

response capability through the newly established FAOOIE Crisis Management Center.

This Plan is not intended to replace existing arrangements or agreements. As such, each country’s laws are 

to be respected and this Plan is to be subordinate and 

complementary to domestic response plans, existing 

arrangements and bilateral or multilateral agreements. 

3 http://www. who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO_

CDS_CSR_GIP_2005_5/en/index.html

Chapter 1: Introduction

Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to coordinate their emergency management activities, including 

public communications. The three countries share a 

common approach based on the four pillars of emergency 

management: prevention and mitigation, preparedness, 

response and recovery. Canada, Mexico and the United 

States intend to work collaboratively in each of these areas 

to manage the threat of avian and pandemic influenza.

• Prevention and mitigation activities are directed 

at minimizing the effects of an avian or pandemic 

influenza, including direct outcomes (e.g., illness 

and death) and indirect associated effects (e.g., 

economic and social impacts). The three countries 

intend to implement these activities in a series of 

steps that would be coordinated to the greatest 

extent possible. 

• Preparedness requires that national contingency 

plans be in place for activities associated with an 

outbreak, including surveillance, detection, containment and response efforts. Training and regular 

joint exercises with stakeholders to practice and test 

these plans are essential.

• Response activities will depend on the characteristics of the avian or pandemic virus (virulence, 

attack rate, groups at highest risk, patterns of transmission), which cannot be known in advance. If 

necessary, the three countries intend to implement 

activities such as animal or public health measures, 

information sharing and non-pharmaceutical interventions (hand washing, isolation of the sick, etc.) 

apply them consistently and regularly, and assess 

their efficacy to determine whether adjustments to a 

planned response are necessary.

• Recovery activities enable the restoration of 

“normal” or pre-pandemic service levels. The three 

countries intend to initiate these post-event activities as soon as possible, recognizing that they may 

start at different times across the continent as the 

pandemic waves move through geographic areas.

Overview of Federal Emergency 

Management Structures

Canada, Mexico and the United States each have designated organizations, plans and facilities in place, consistent with their governmental structures and authorities, 

to manage these activities during an outbreak of avian 

influenza or an influenza pandemic.

Canada

Emergency management responsibilities in Canada 

are shared by federal, provincial and territorial governments and their partners, including individual citizens 

who have a responsibility to be prepared for disasters. 

Provincial and territorial governments have responsibility for emergency management within their respective 

jurisdictions. The federal government exercises leadership 

at the national level relating to emergency management 

responsibilities in its exclusive fields of jurisdictions and 

on lands and properties under federal responsibility.

Key Federal Organizations

• Public Safety Canada is the federal department 

that coordinates the overall federal government’s 

domestic response efforts and provides support to 

government and key national players in responding 

to events of national significance. Within Public 

Safety Canada, the Government Operations Centre 

(GOC) operates around the clock as a mechanism to 

communicate and coordinate with federal, provincial and territorial emergency operations centers.

• The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA)

is mandated to take the lead role in responding to 

animal health emergencies and has developed many 

detailed plans and procedures in collaboration with 

the Public Health Agency of Canada, WHO and 

others. The CFIA is the primary agency responsible 

for prevention, preparation and response to an 

avian influenza outbreak, supported by Public SafeChapter 2: Emergency Coordination & Communications

Chapter 2: Emergency Coordination and Comminications
ty Canada. The CFIA has collaborative agreements 

with federal and provincial government partners 

that outline roles and responsibilities prior to and 

during an avian influenza outbreak.

• The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC)

monitors the international and domestic influenza situation and has developed The Canadian 

Pandemic Influenza Plan for the Health Sector in 

collaboration with provincial/territorial representatives. PHAC is the primary federal agency addressing pandemic influenza preparedness and response, 

supported by Public Safety Canada and Health 

Canada.

• Health Canada engages and coordinates efforts 

among domestic and international health partners. 

The department is also responsible for supporting 

preparedness and response efforts in First Nations 

on reserve and Inuit communities; ensuring regulatory preparedness, including accelerated approval 

of a pandemic influenza vaccine; and spearheading 

federal workplace health initiatives. 

• The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is responsible for the 

coordination of Canada’s international response, 

including international efforts to contain the 

spread of a pandemic virus; communicating with 

foreign governments and international organizations; and managing foreign offers of assistance. 

DFAIT is also responsible for providing travel 

advice and responding to the consular needs of 

Canadians in distress.

Emergency Plans

The Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan for the Health 

Sector. The aim of this guidance document is to support 

health sector planning at the facility, local, regional, 

provincial/territorial and federal level. It covers prevention, 

preparedness and response activities including surveillance, 

vaccine programs, use of antivirals, health services, public 

health measures and communications.

Notifiable Avian Influenza Hazard Specific Plan.

This plan outlines the response to be undertaken by the 

Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) when there 

is suspicion of a developing outbreak of notifiable avian 

influenza (NAI) or when an outbreak occurs.

The Government of Canada Coordination Contingency 

Plan for Avian and Pandemic Influenza. The aim of this 

“whole of government” plan is to coordinate responsibilities across the federal government and other agencies.

An Emergency Management Framework for Canada.

The aim of this framework document is to enable consolidation of federal, provincial and territorial collaborative 

work and ensure more coherent, complementary action 

among the different federal, provincial and territorial 

government initiatives.

Mexico

Key Organizations

• The Ministry of Health of Mexico (MoH), as 

the head of the National Committee for Health 

Security (NCHS), is the lead agency for coordinating national preparedness and response activities 

related to public health emergencies such as an 

influenza pandemic, supporting the development 

and implementation of plans at the federal, state 

and local levels. The NCHS includes all the federal 

areas of responsibility relevant to the response to 

a pandemic (civil Protection, health sector, armed 

forces, agriculture, environment, communications 

and transportation, law enforcement). The MoH

directly carries out epidemiological surveillance 

and laboratory confirmation, as well as health care 

services organization, regulation and provision. The 

preparedness and response activities to an influenza 

pandemic are stated in the National Preparedness 

and Response Plan for Pandemic Influenza, first 

published in September 2005.

• Emergency management of any kind in Mexico is 

coordinated by the General Coordination for Civil 

Protection (GCCP) of the Ministry of the Interior.

The GCCP distributes available resources for 

emergency response and operates through a network 

of municipal and state civil protection agencies. In 

case of an influenza pandemic, the NCHS and the 

National Committee for Civil Protection will work 

together for addressing the threat.

• Since 1996, Mexico has had a strong avian influenza eradication campaign led by the Ministry of 

Agriculture (MoA), which is the federal agency 

Chapter 2: Emergency Coordination and Comminications
responsible for protecting poultry production in 

the country. The MoA works closely with the Ministry of the Environment (MoE), which is responsible for monitoring disease activity in migratory 

and other wild bird species that could endanger the 

poultry industry. Disease surveillance, laboratory 

diagnosis, inspection of farms and other facilities, 

and regulation of importation and exportation are 

among MoA activities.

• The Secretariat of Foreign Affairs will be responsible for coordinating interactions of Mexico with 

other foreign governments and international organizations at senior levels, and will also direct the 

overall flow of international cooperative efforts. 

Furthermore, it will make assistance and guidance 

available to ensure consular protection to the 

Mexican population living or travelling abroad 

during a pandemic.

Emergency Plans

The National Preparedness and Response Plan for Pandemic 

Influenza establishes the general principles for mitigating 

the impact of a pandemic in the country and serves 

as guidelines for the development of state, local and 

institutional preparedness plans. It includes activities to 

be carried out by the institutions of the NCHS in six 

lines of action: health promotion and risk communications, coordination, epidemiological surveillance and 

laboratory, health care provision, strategic stockpile, and 

research and development. 

United States

Key Organizations

• The Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) is responsible for the coordination of the 

federal government’s operations and resources, 

the establishment of reporting requirements and 

the conduct of ongoing communications for 

domestic incident management. In the context of 

a pandemic, as with any other domestic incident 

in which more than one department is involved, 

the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible 

for providing overall coordination as the Principal 

Federal Official, in accordance with the National 

Response Plan. DHS will coordinate actions 

with regard to overall non-medical support and 

response. DHS will also ensure necessary support 

to public health and medical emergency response 

efforts coordinated by the Department of Health 

and Human Services. Within DHS, the National 

Operations Center (NOC), a standing 24-hour, 

seven-days-per-week interagency organization 

that fuses law enforcement, national intelligence, 

emergency response and private sector reporting, 

is the primary national hub for domestic incident 

management, operational coordination and situational awareness. The NOC facilitates homeland 

security information sharing and operational coordination with other federal state, local, tribal and 

non-governmental emergency operations centers.

• The Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) will lead federal efforts with regard to 

public health and medical response efforts to a 

pandemic influenza. The HHS Secretary will be 

the principal federal spokesperson for public health 

and medical issues, coordinating closely with DHS 

on public messaging pertaining to the pandemic. 

HHS published a Pandemic Influenza Plan in 

November 2005 and the HHS Pandemic Influenza 

Implementation Plan in November 2006, both of 

which serve as blueprints for HHS pandemic influenza preparedness planning and response activities.

• The Department of State (DOS) coordinates the 

federal government’s international engagement 

to promote development of global capacity to 

address pandemic influenza. DOS also coordinates 

the federal government’s international efforts to 

prepare for and respond to a pandemic, including 

facilitating the interagency process to identify 

countries requiring U.S. assistance, identifying 

priority activities and ensuring federal government 

assistance reflects those priorities.

• The Department of Defense (DOD) will support primary federal departments (DHS, HHS, 

and DOS) and state governments in limiting the 

impact of pandemic influenza and sustaining 

critical infrastructure functionality. DOD will 

work with the Canadian Department of National 

Defence and the Mexican Ministry of Defense and 

military organizations to ensure a cooperative effort 

in applying military resources to prepare for and 

Chapter 2: Emergency Coordination and Comminications
contain a pandemic influenza. DOD will respond 

to requests for assistance from the United States 

Government and will apply available resources 

with approval of the Secretary of Defense.

• The Department of Agriculture (USDA)

works together with federal, state and industry 

partners to protect the United States against the 

rapid spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian 

influenza. Safeguards include trade restrictions; 

wild bird monitoring; federal, state and industry 

testing of poultry; federal inspection procedures at 

slaughter and processing plants; and rapid response 

plans. USDA also participates in coordinated overseas efforts to slow the spread of avian influenza in 

poultry.

• The Department of Transportation (DOT), in 

cooperation with other key domestic (e.g., HHS, 

DHS and DOS) and international partners (e.g., 

Mexico’s Secretariat of Communications and 

Transportation), is responsible for the coordinated 

development and implementation of transportation-focused plans to slow the spread of an 

avian influenza outbreak or influenza pandemic. 

DOT also works with these key stakeholders on 

preparedness, prevention, response, mitigation 

and recovery efforts intended to sustain the U.S. 

transportation system, as well as counterpart systems in partner countries. Recognizing the special 

challenges posed by the global aviation system, 

DOT’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is 

particularly active in working with its domestic 

partners, as well as with its Canadian and Mexican 

counterparts, on the above efforts.

Emergency Plans

• The White House released the National Strategy for 

Pandemic Influenza and subsequently the Implementation Plan for the strategy. These documents 

guide the U.S. Government’s efforts to prepare for 

and respond to avian and pandemic influenza. 

• The National Response Plan (NRP), administered 

by DHS, is the core plan for managing domestic 

incidents. It details the federal coordinating 

structures and processes used during incidents of 

national significance, including the federal pandemic response. It also defines federal departmental 

responsibilities for sector-specific responses and 

provides the structure and mechanisms for effective 

coordination among federal, state, local and tribal 

authorities, the private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

International Legal Framework

Canada, Mexico and the United States are States Parties 

to the International Health Regulations (2005)1, or 

IHRs, and, as member countries of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), observe the guidelines 

and standards provided in the OIE Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code (2006).

In the event of an outbreak of avian influenza, each country 

would advise the OIE on confirmation of the isolation and 

identification of a virus described in the Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code as notifiable avian influenza, and implement 

contingency plans to control and/or eradicate the virus from 

domestic poultry operations.

In the event of an influenza pandemic, the IHRs provide a 

legal framework under which States Parties and the WHO

secretariat are to work together to protect against and 

control the international spread of disease while avoiding 

unnecessary interference with international traffic and 

trade. The IHRs establish a transparent process to be 

followed by the WHO and IHR States Parties in response 

to public health emergencies of international concern. 

Provisions in the IHRs obligate States Parties to:

• Notify the WHO of all potential public health 

emergencies of international concern that occur 

within their territories;

• Develop, strengthen, and maintain core capacity for 

surveillance, reporting, and response; and

• Establish a national focal point as the contact 

point for the WHO on all IHR matters. 

1 Prior to the IHRs’ entry into force, the WHO’s 59th World Health Assembly in 2006 adopted a resolution that called upon WHO Member 

States to “comply immediately, on a voluntary basis, with provisions 

of the International Health Regulations (2005) considered relevant to 

the risk posed by avian influenza and pandemic influenza.” Canada, 

Mexico and the United States voluntarily implemented relevant provisions of the IHRs. 

Chapter 2: Emergency Coordination and Comminications
North American Coordination

Canada, Mexico and the United States have established 

the senior level Coordinating Body on Avian and Pandemic Influenza2

 to facilitate planning and preparedness 

within North America for a possible outbreak of avian 

and/or human pandemic influenza. This Coordinating 

Body is to serve as the contact group in the event of an 

outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza or a novel 

strain of human influenza. It is to convene to support 

rapid and coordinated decision making, facilitate information sharing and address other coordination issues.

Because the trilateral Coordinating Body includes senior 

officials from most of the key agencies that would be 

involved in supporting the response to an avian influenza 

outbreak or pandemic influenza, it is intended to play 

a significant role in promoting coordination among the 

three countries at senior official levels.

Each country intends to use existing emergency management structures for decision making at the national level. 

Canada, Mexico and the United States are to review existing 

emergency coordination and communication mechanisms 

and enhance the exchange of detailed operations plans.

Emergency Response Assistance 

The provisions according to which Canada, Mexico 

or the United States may request emergency response 

assistance of one another include: 

• When national human or material resources are 

overextended;

• When an avian or pandemic influenza event in any 

of the three countries poses a potential threat to 

either of the other two countries; or 

• When an avian or pandemic influenza outbreak 

requires robust coordination of the North 

American response in order to minimize the risk 

to animal and public health, minimize damage, 

and provide the basis for long-term social and 

economic recovery. 

2 The Terms of Reference for the Coordinating Body on Avian and 

Pandemic Influenza can be found in Annex 2

Joint Exercises And Training 

Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to work to 

enhance the interface among their respective emergency 

management/response structures through joint exercises 

and training. The three countries should make every 

effort to:

• Implement multilateral, scenario-driven exercises 

involving internal and external stakeholders to test 

planning actions;

• Continually assess preparedness activities to adjust 

objectives, effects and actions based upon changes 

in the economic and social environments; and

• Continuously assess planned response and recovery 

actions so that they remain the best projected 

actions to achieve success.

Specifically, the authorities of Canada, Mexico and the 

United States intend to conduct trilateral or bilateral 

exercises to assess and strengthen their emergency response 

and contingency plans. In addition, each country intends 

to design and deliver training to maximize the effectiveness 

of its respective emergency response and contingency 

plans. Wherever possible, training and exercises should be 

designed to maximize stakeholder involvement. 

Avian and Pandemic Influenza 

Communications

Accurate and timely information before and during an 

outbreak of avian or pandemic influenza will be critical to 

the successful management of the situation. The public, 

governments and their key stakeholders need appropriate 

information to make effective and timely decisions. 

This purposeful exchange of information among 

governments, the public and stakeholders, designed to 

prompt appropriate action, is generally referred to as 

“risk communications.” A common understanding of 

and approach to the subject of risk communications can 

help reduce the consequences of an outbreak of disease, 

including loss of life, serious illness, and social and 

economic disruption.

Chapter 2: Emergency Coordination and Comminications
10

Coordinated risk communications planning should:

• Create strong communications networks (nationally and internationally);

• Define clear expectations of what governments 

will communicate during an outbreak of avian or 

pandemic influenza; and

• Develop consistent and coordinated messages.

Effective communications to manage a potential risk 

involve more than the sharing of information in response 

to an outbreak of disease. Individuals require information in advance of an event to develop an understanding 

of the potential effects of an outbreak in either humans 

or birds and to take appropriate action. Once an outbreak has begun, individuals may have limited ability to 

absorb and respond to new information.

The three countries, therefore, recognize the importance 

of risk communications and believe they should be 

incorporated in avian and pandemic preparedness planning as a key mitigation strategy. 

Risk communications activities that the three countries 

may pursue include:

• Consulting with key organizations to solicit input 

and advice;

• Gauging the level of knowledge and concern 

among individuals and groups and the barriers to 

adopting appropriate behavior; and

• Disseminating information advising how people 

can protect themselves if an outbreak of avian or 

pandemic influenza were to occur, (e.g., information on personal protective measures).

Coordinated Communications

Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to communicate effectively about avian and pandemic influenza in a 

cooperative and coordinated manner, as described below:

• All three countries recognize that collaboration on 

communications efforts at all stages of avian and 

pandemic influenza management will minimize the 

possibility of conflicting information or contradictory messages; 

• Every effort should be made to cooperate and communicate openly in order to help instill confidence 

in the North American response and recovery 

strategies and activities;

• Each country recognizes that the challenges to be 

faced will differ in each stage of response to avian 

or pandemic influenza. The three countries intend 

to work together to focus on common elements for 

informed decision making and actions; 

• The objectives of each country’s communications 

efforts should focus on coordinating actions and 

pursuing common approaches to achieve proactive, 

timely and accurate communications.

To achieve these goals, the three countries intend to:

• Meet regularly on communications issues and seek 

opportunities to work together on communications planning and messaging;

• Establish procedures and pathways to exchange 

pre-release information during the event; 

• Identify appropriate communications point 

persons from each country to maintain regular 

contact, share information, and identify and 

address emerging issues;

• Develop plans for communications coordination 

during the actual event of an outbreak of avian or 

pandemic influenza;

• Undertake the development of risk communications strategies to provide stakeholders with information on disease prevention, disease recognition, 

bio-security procedures and their responsibilities 

in the event of an incursion of avian or pandemic 

influenza; 

• Pursue the development of risk communications 

strategies in relation to pandemic influenza to 

help decision makers and individuals make wellinformed decisions and take appropriate actions on 

health risk issues to help reduce mortality, morbidity and socio-economic disruption;

• Develop key messages related to avian and pandemic 

influenza for the specific use of senior officials;

Chapter 2: Emergency Coordination and Comminications
11

• Pursue the development of communications messages for avian influenza and both pre-pandemic 

and pandemic periods. Messages would focus on 

core themes such as efforts to control spread of 

avian influenza, import/export measures, border 

measure, etc.;

• Share best practices and identify gaps in behavioral 

research;

• Develop a research agenda based on this information;

• Develop procedures and pathways for how communications networks will operate during the 

event (e.g., regular conference calls, etc.); and 

• Commit to developing opportunities to exercise 

the planned response. 

Chapter 2: Emergency Coordination and Comminications

13

Avian influenza (AI) is an infectious and contagious 

viral infection affecting most species of wild and 

domestic birds. Infrequently, the virus has been 

found to cross into and cause disease in unrelated 

species including pigs, cats, dogs, ferrets, martens 

and humans. Transmission of the virus from one bird 

to another occurs primarily through direct contact 

– typically through contact with respiratory secretions 

or feces. Airborne transmission may occur if birds are 

in close proximity and with appropriate air movement. 

Infection with the virus may result in asymptomatic 

birds , as is found in many waterfowl and shorebird 

species, or a diversity of disease manifestations, as seen 

in domestic poultry, varying from sub-clinical disease, 

mild respiratory disease and loss of egg production 

to an acute and highly fatal disease. Most AI viruses 

found in birds do not appear to pose any significant 

health risk to humans.

Since 1955, virtually all highly pathogenic outbreaks 

in domestic poultry have been attributed to viruses of 

the H5 and H7 subtypes. These subtypes have repeatedly demonstrated the tendency to mutate from low 

pathogenicity strains to highly pathogenic forms while 

circulating within poultry populations.

Since 2003, trade in domestic poultry and the movement of migratory birds has resulted in the spread of 

the H5N1 Eurasian strains to numerous countries in 

Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Although 

the number of human infections remains low, the 

mortality rate in those infected is high. To date, there 

has been no sustained, efficient human-to-human 

transmission of the H5N1 Eurasian strains, so direct 

contact with infected birds (mainly poultry) remains 

the greatest risk of human infection. Of particular 

concern is the possibility of re-assortment of genetic 

material between human and avian influenza viruses 

when they simultaneously infect the same swine or 

human host. This re-assortment could result in the 

formation of a new influenza virus subtype with pandemic potential.

The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 

sets international standards for the prevention, control 

and eradication of animal diseases of significance. It 

manages the “world animal health information system” 

based on the commitment of member countries to 

notify the OIE of listed “notifiable” diseases. Canada, 

Mexico and the United States are OIE member 

countries. Consistent with OIE guidelines under 

the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, each country has 

a legal framework that requires the suspicion of a 

notifiable avian influenza (NAI) virus to be reported 

immediately to the competent veterinary authority. 

Veterinary infrastructure should be sufficient so that 

the competent veterinary authority can isolate and 

characterize the avian influenza virus, immediately 

investigate the suspicion of disease and respond to, 

control or eradicate the disease. The basis of response 

to any detection of NAI in poultry is contained within 

the OIE’s Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

Notifiable Avian Influenza

The conditions under which avian influenza viruses 

are subject to OIE notification are set out in Chapter 

2.7.12 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

The competent veterinary authority of a country may 

choose to include more AI virus subtypes within its 

domestic notification protocols, but is encouraged to 

follow the OIE notification conditions in its dealings 

with its North American trading partners.

The competent veterinary authority of each country 

should notify its counterparts of any new NAI infections using pre-established contacts in the respective 

governments. 

Zoning And 

Compartmentalization

In the event of an incursion of NAI virus into North 

American poultry, the three countries, as WTO Members, must comply with Article 6 of the Agreement on 

the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 

(WTO SPS Agreement), including Article 6.2 which 

requires that WTO Members “shall, in particular, 

recognize the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas 

and areas of low pest or disease prevalence.” This could 

Chapter 3: 

 Avian Influenza

Chapter 3: Avian Influenza
14

entail the implementation of “zoning” or “compartmentalization,”1

 per OIE guidelines.

When establishing a zone or compartment, the competent veterinary authority of the affected country should 

clearly define and document the basis for its claim that 

the subpopulation is a distinct zone or compartment. 

It should provide for sufficient human and financial 

resources for the maintenance of such a zone or compartment and see that the veterinary and industry infrastructures have the required technical capacity. The birds 

belonging to a zone or compartment should be clearly 

recognizable as such and measures taken for the identification of the subpopulation should be documented in 

detail. Confirmation of the disease-free status of a zone 

or compartment should be maintained through effective 

monitoring as well as active and passive surveillance.

Where zoning or compartmentalization has been 

established for the purposes of maintaining international 

trade, the competent veterinary authority of the exporting country should provide the importing country with 

the necessary documentation to confirm that the zone 

or compartment is epidemiologically closed and that 

an appropriate surveillance and monitoring system is 

in place to verify its disease-free status. The competent 

veterinary authority of the importing country may then 

conduct a science-based risk assessment based on the 

information provided by the exporting country and 

provide, within a reasonable period of time, written 

notification to the exporting country of its recognition of 

the zone/compartment, a request for further information 

or its rejection of the zone/compartment.

The following commercial poultry compartments have 

been identified in Canada and the United States. The 

commercial poultry compartments for Mexico are 

pending signature of the Chief Veterinary Officers’ 

Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Compartmentalization:

1 As stated in the current Chapter 1.3.5 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal 

Health Code – 2006, ‘Compartment’ means one or more establishments under a common biosecurity management system containing 

an animal sub-population with a distinct health status with respect to 

a specific disease or specific diseases for which required surveillance, 

control and biosecurity measures have been applied for the purpose 

of international trade. ‘Zone/region’ means a clearly defined part of a 

country containing an animal sub-population with a distinct health 

status with respect to a specific disease for which required surveillance, 

control and biosecurity measures have been applied for the purpose of 

international trade. (http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_1.1.1.htm#terme_compartiment)

• Broiler, turkey or layer breeder production flocks; 

• Duck breeder and upland game breeder flocks; 

• Commercial (grow out) broiler and turkey flocks 

(meat-type birds);

• Commercial duck and goose meat-type production 

flocks;

• Pullet production flocks; 

• Commercial layer (table egg) flocks; and 

• Commercial poultry flocks used for the production 

of other commercial products such as feathers 

(down) and foie gras.

Surveillance/Epidemiology

Surveillance for NAI should be aimed at demonstrating 

the absence of NAI virus in the poultry sectors while 

also acting as an early detection system for incursions of 

NAI in poultry and highly pathogenic NAI (HPNAI) 

incursions in wild waterfowl. The competent veterinary 

authority of a country may choose to expand its surveillance program to include the identification of more 

AI virus subtypes than required by the OIE. The data 

collected should support the risk assessment process and 

substantiate the rationale for all biosecurity measures 

in place. The surveillance system should be under the 

direction of the competent veterinary authority in each 

country.

The competent veterinary authority of each country 

should promote the establishment of a formal and 

ongoing system for detecting and investigating suspected 

NAI infection. Procedures should be established so that 

all suspected cases of NAI are sampled rapidly, that the 

samples collected are appropriate for the species under 

investigation, that there is a mechanism in place to 

rapidly transport the samples to an approved NAI diagnostic laboratory and that the integrity of the samples 

is maintained at all times. The competent veterinary 

authority should promote the establishment of an effective system in place for the recording, managing and 

analyzing of diagnostic and surveillance data. Access to 

real-time data is of particular importance in an outbreak 

situation, since it will drive the control and prevention 

strategies. Methodologies used should be based on the 

best available information that is in accordance with curChapter 3: Avian Influenza
15

rent scientific thinking and should be fully documented, 

referenced to the scientific literature and supported by 

expert opinion. All processes should be transparent for 

the purpose of fairness, the rationality and consistency 

of decision making, and to facilitate ease of understanding. The surveillance systems used should be subject to 

periodic auditing so that all of the systems’ components 

are functioning according to the design criteria. 

Surveillance programs should include imported poultry 

and birds for the pet trade, as well as birds for research 

and zoological display purposes. 

Poultry Surveillance

The surveillance program for poultry should include 

both active and passive data collection for all levels of 

the production, marketing and processing chain, and all 

compartments within the poultry population. Ideally, it 

should include all susceptible poultry species but may 

be targeted to poultry populations at specific risk due 

to types of production, contact with wild birds, trade 

patterns or other significant factors. Active surveillance 

should occur at a frequency of at least six months, or 

according to recognized and established national surveillance program requirements, e.g., USDA’s National 

Poultry Improvement Plan. Surveillance methods should 

include both random and targeted approaches using 

virological, serological and clinical methods with known 

and validated sensitivity and specificity. 

In countries, zones or compartments where vaccination 

has been used to prevent the spread of HPNAI, surveillance programs should utilize virological and serological 

testing regimens that verify the absence of AI virus circulation as set out in Article 3.8.9.7 of the OIE Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code.

Wild Bird Surveillance

Effective wild bird surveillance provides an early warning 

system for potential or real threats that may exist in the 

wild bird population. Surveillance would allow an appreciation of changes in the types of AI viruses circulating 

in wild birds and detect any H5/H7 subtypes present 

that could result in the emergence of a highly pathogenic 

strain in domestic poultry. Advance warning would 

enable the poultry sector to adopt enhanced biosecurity 

measures and allow poultry surveillance programs to 

be targeted to those populations or compartments at 

increased risk.

The competent veterinary authority should collaborate 

with wildlife agencies, universities and others to increase 

surveillance of wild birds, with an emphasis on waterfowl and shorebirds migrating from other mainland 

continents. Wild bird surveillance should be conducted 

at least annually during the periods when the movement 

or entry of migratory wild birds may pose an increased 

risk to domestic poultry. Wild bird surveillance programs 

should include active and passive methodologies and 

should include live and dead bird sampling.

Border Control Measures Associated With Notifiable Avian 

Influenza

Each country should apply proper and proportional 

import health measures when NAI is confirmed and 

reported. These measures are intended to maintain the 

animal health status of the importing country while 

minimizing the impact on the trade of poultry, poultry 

products and other products from avian species among 

Canada, Mexico and the United States. Import measures 

applicable to NAI should be based on the OIE Terrestrial 

Animal Health Code, including chapters on NAI and 

Zoning and Compartmentalization, and consistent 

with the WTO Agreements, particularly the WTO SPS 

Agreement and the NAFTA, particularly Chapter Seven, 

Part B (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures).

To enable a common approach that is both consistent 

and uniform among the countries, Canada, Mexico and 

the United States recognize that conditions for regional 

trade should be established to minimize unnecessary 

trade disruptions among the three countries. This 

is reflected in the understanding entitled Agreement 

Between the Chief Veterinary Officers (CVO) of the United 

States and Canada For Reporting and Applying Measures 

When Notifiable Avian Influenza Is Confirmed in Each 

Respective Country (2006), contained in Annex 3. Mexico 

and the United States are developing a similar understanding based on OIE guidelines. Mexico’s measures are 

pending trilateral discussion on the CVO’s Memorandum of Understanding. 

The competent veterinary authorities in each country 

should establish links with their respective border control 

Chapter 3: Avian Influenza
16

agencies to develop procedures to control legal imports 

and to detect illicit imports.

When a highly pathogenic variety of avian influenza 

exists outside North America, each of the three countries 

should enhance inspection methods to detect illicit 

trade in animals and commodities from the affected 

countries. Regulatory enforcement information related 

to the detection of illegal trade should be shared among 

Canada, Mexico and the United States.

Laboratory Practices

The laboratories conducting testing for the avian 

influenza virus should be authorized or certified by the 

country’s Reference Laboratory to perform these test 

methods, and should follow the tests and procedures 

recommended in the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and 

Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals. These include serological 

tests, virus identification/isolation and virus characterization. Reporting to OIE should be based on the “recognized standard,” which includes virus isolation, complete 

subtyping of any H5/H7, the genetic sequencing of 

the hemagglutinin (HA) cleavage site and Intravenous 

Pathogenicity Index (IVPI) testing in chickens. All viral 

isolations and characterizations should be confirmed at a 

Reference Laboratory.

Procedures should be developed so that adequate supplies of diagnostic materials/reagents are available in 

the event of an NAI outbreak. These procedures should 

include provisions for the import/export of diagnostic 

materials/reagents among Canada, Mexico and the 

United States, as well as contingencies for the rapid 

cross-border movement of diagnostic specimens and 

isolates.

Contacts should be established among animal health, 

avian-influenza-virus testing laboratories in the three 

countries to recognize the methodologies, proficiency 

and equivalence of methods used for the diagnosis of 

avian influenza. Linkages should be established/strengthened between the animal health and the public health 

laboratory systems in each country to improve the 

exchange of information and to enhance public health 

surveillance. Information technologies should be examined to identify opportunities that would enhance rapid 

data transfer. 

Avian Influenza Vaccines

Vaccination is recognized as a valuable tool and as part 

of an overall comprehensive management strategy to 

control and eradicate avian influenza in the affected and 

at-risk avian populations. Although vaccination has been 

shown to increase resistance to infection and reduce virus 

shedding, it is understood that the virus is still able to 

infect and replicate in clinically healthy vaccinated birds. 

Countries employing vaccination should be able to differentiate infected from vaccinated animals, or determine 

the absence of NAI virus through comprehensive surveillance programs that include environmental sampling, in 

accordance with the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and 

Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals.

Each country should develop and implement a vaccination strategy that is effective within the scope of 

its disease control methodologies. This strategy should 

include a reliable system of monitoring and surveillance 

to identify rapidly any serious problems arising from the 

use of vaccines.

The competent veterinary authorities of the three 

countries intend to develop protocols to harmonize the 

circumstances under which vaccines would be employed. 

International arrangements or agreements should be 

developed to provide for an adequate supply of avian 

influenza vaccine in the event of a North American outbreak, including a mechanism for the rapid cross-border 

movement of vaccines.

Personnel

The three countries should regularly assess the capacity 

of their operational and laboratory systems to provide 

for sufficient capacity for the performance of routine 

surveillance as well as of expanded surveillance during 

an NAI isolation in domestic poultry or wild birds. The 

competent veterinary authority should have emergency 

disease response contingency plans in place and the 

capacity to deploy properly trained staff to manage and 

direct disease eradication and control measures when 

required. 

The three countries may seek the assistance of staff 

with skills and experience from international sources to 

respond to an avian influenza outbreak. Contingency 

plans to expand the available resource base should be in 

Chapter 3: Avian Influenza
17

place in the event that current resources are exceeded, 

and should be shared among Canadian, Mexican and 

U.S. veterinary authorities. Procedures that would allow 

rapid entry and deployment of emergency responders 

across international, provincial and state jurisdictional 

boundaries should be considered within the contingency plans of each country. The competent veterinary 

authorities should identify and address barriers to 

the movement of animal health/veterinary personnel 

across international, provincial and state jurisdictional 

boundaries. Countries should have well-developed health 

and safety protocols for personnel that may be exposed 

to the virus, including the use of influenza vaccines and 

antiviral medications where necessary. Contingencies 

should include the possibility of exposure to NAI strains, 

which have the potential to result in human-to-human 

transmission.

Avian Health Information 

Sharing and Notification 

The three countries should strive for open communication and sharing of information regarding the occurrence of NAI virus in domestic poultry so that proper, 

responsible and proportional import health measures can 

be applied by each country when NAI virus is confirmed 

and reported. When requested, Canada, Mexico and 

the United States intend to share with one another 

information on their isolates of NAI virus in poultry and 

highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus in wild 

birds, and in birds other than poultry. Confirmation of 

NAI should include virus isolation, H5/H7 complete 

subtyping and genetic sequencing of the HA cleavage 

site of the HA protein. Notifications of any NAI should 

follow OIE guidelines as well as chief-veterinary-officerto-chief-veterinary-officer agreements, and should occur 

between the corresponding import/export staff of each 

country. These notifications should minimize the impact 

such measures would have on the trade of poultry, 

poultry products and other products from avian species 

among the countries.

Avian and Human Health 

Interface

The emergence of the highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses 

has demonstrated the potential zoonotic impacts of 

certain strains of HPAI viruses given a coincident combination of epidemiologic factors – susceptible host, agent 

and environment – according to the principles of the 

epidemiological triad. Two of the most effective methods 

of protecting human populations from exposure to 

NAIs are by prevention and control of any exposure to 

domestic poultry of NAIs and by rapid containment and 

eradication of NAI-infected birds should an introduction 

occur. Prevention of domestic poultry exposure can be 

best achieved through the implementation of comprehensive surveillance programs, biosecurity protocols 

and adoption of effective import controls. Prevention 

of human exposure can be best achieved by adopting 

procedures to protect the health of individuals working 

in environments where HPAI virus may be found and by 

organizing public education programs on the importance 

of good hygiene and sanitation practices. Human health 

authorities should develop contingency plans that identify the risk to human health of low pathogenicity and 

highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in wild and 

domestic birds, and should adopt appropriate response 

measures to manage the potential risks for the human 

population at risk.2

Human health authorities in Canada, Mexico and the 

United States should share best practices in occupational 

health, infection control and personal protective measures to reduce potential risk to human populations.

The competent veterinary authorities in the three countries should establish the appropriate contacts within 

their respective public health sectors for the purpose of 

consistency in the approach to public communications. 

Regular meetings should be held to review the communications framework, to identify emerging issues and to 

share communication products, where appropriate. 

2 The Public Health Agency of Canada has developed guidelines 

entitled “Human Health Issues Related to Avian Influenza in Canada,” 

available at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/daio-enia/pdf/nat-aiguide-2006_e.pdf

Chapter 3: Avian Influenza

19

Canada, Mexico, and the United States recognize that 

controlling the spread of a novel strain of human influenza 

with minimal economic disruption is in the mutual best 

interest of all three countries. This chapter, therefore, 

assumes that a focus on preventing or delaying the spread 

of a novel strain of human influenza or mitigating the 

impacts of pandemic influenza must serve public health, 

social and economic goals. Likewise, this chapter and 

any resulting measures that may ensue are to be based on 

sound science and recognize that decision making on public health questions also needs to reflect cultural, ethical, 

legal, economic, logistical and political considerations.

Recognizing the mutual benefits of a coordinated response 

to an outbreak of pandemic influenza, the three countries 

intend to assist one another in domestic and international 

pandemic influenza preparedness efforts. They intend also 

to work together to implement appropriate public health 

measures at the shared borders. Health officials from the 

three countries intend to meet regularly to:

• Identify new areas and build on existing areas of 

collaboration;

• Identify challenges to the implementation of the 

North American Plan; 

• Identify areas where the three countries need 

additional assistance; and

• Identify opportunities to exercise pandemic influenza preparedness and response planning.

Surveillance, Epidemiology And 

Laboratory Practices

Objectives for strengthening surveillance, epidemiology 

and laboratory practices among the three countries 

include the following:

• Enhancing epidemiological, surveillance and 

laboratory capabilities;

• Improving rapid detection of infection with influenza strains that have pandemic potential; 

• Promoting collaboration on the epidemiological 

and laboratory assessment of infection with influenza strains that have pandemic potential; and

• Enhancing timely communication on surveillance, 

epidemiological and laboratory data.

Surveillance and Epidemiology

Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to share 

non-nominal epidemiological and surveillance data 

and information as appropriate. To this end, the three 

countries intend to: 

• Develop operating procedures/processes for the 

sharing of human influenza epidemiological and 

surveillance information before and during an 

emergency, including:

Examining information technologies to 

identify opportunities that would enhance 

rapid data transfer, and

Sharing surveillance protocols and data 

interpretations;

• Establish and test mechanisms for communication 

among institutions according to specific functions 

for exchanging epidemiological information;

• Align with the WHO case definitions;

• Share regular situation reports with essential epidemiological data, in the event of a pandemic;

• Identify areas of technical assistance needed for 

laboratory, surveillance and outbreak response;

• Provide technical assistance through cross-border 

projects to bolster surveillance efforts for seasonal 

and pandemic influenza; and

• Establish approaches to collaborating on North 

American outbreak investigations, and collaborate 

on investigations and response efforts, as feasible and 

appropriate.

*

*

Chapter 4: 

 Pandemic Influenza

Chapter 4: Pandemic Influenza
20

Laboratory Practices

The cross-border transport of specimens and isolates 

by federal, provincial and state laboratories in the three 

countries before and during a pandemic can facilitate 

diagnosis and contribute to the development and/or 

evaluation of reagents, tests, vaccines and antiviral drugs. 

The three countries should review and improve procedures to permit these materials to cross their borders 

without delay or payment of customs duties or fees. The 

three countries should continue to develop and exercise 

mechanisms for border security officials to facilitate the 

rapid exchange of laboratory samples, reagents, supplies 

and specimens. They should also improve chain-ofcustody protocols for the proper and safe handling of 

the sample and reagents. The three countries should 

share existing procedures so that adequate supplies of 

diagnostic materials/reagents are available in the event of 

a pandemic influenza outbreak. 

Building on the existing capacity, Canada, Mexico and 

the United States intend to collaborate on the following 

activities: 

• Continue technical review and the sharing of assay 

methods, reagents and virologic data related to 

human cases of influenza; and 

• Strengthen operating procedures/processes for the 

sharing of laboratory information before and during an emergency, including:

Examining information technologies to 

identify opportunities that would enhance 

rapid data transfer;

Sharing data, data analyses, and data interpretations;

Enhancing laboratory-to-laboratory communication; and

Assessing the need for and providing additional training in laboratory diagnostics.

Pandemic Influenza Vaccines 

And Antivirals

Objectives related to pandemic influenza vaccines and 

antivirals include: 

*

*

*

*

• Establishing information exchange on pandemic 

influenza vaccine and antiviral research; and

• Identifying regulatory issues that affect the assessment and approval of a pandemic vaccine and 

antiviral drugs.

Research and Development 

Each SPP country recognizes the need for improving 

the capacity to produce pandemic influenza vaccines. 

As such, experts from the three countries should share 

their strategies for securing supply, including building 

domestic vaccine production capacity. In addition, 

these experts should also establish linkages and share 

information on research and development related to 

human influenza vaccines. To the extent possible, the 

three countries intend to use existing international fora 

for these discussions. 

To the extent possible, the three countries should do the 

following:

• Support basic and applied research on influenza 

vaccines and antivirals;

• Communicate future research needs and areas 

of interest specific to seasonal and pandemic 

influenza;

• Provide the scientific community with access to 

information including genome sequence information; 

• Share information with the research community 

through presentations, scientific publications, and 

discussions at international scientific meetings and 

workshops; and

• Share information, as appropriate, regarding clinical trials of vaccines and therapeutics for influenza.

Regulatory Issues

To the extent possible, the three countries intend to 

work to develop compatible regulatory approaches for 

developing and approving pandemic influenza vaccines, 

through existing international efforts. 

Chapter 4: Pandemic Influenza
21

Personnel And Materials

The extent to which the three countries would be able 

to share personnel and materials across borders during 

a pandemic depends on unknown factors, such as the 

severity, phase and duration of a pandemic. The three 

countries intend to work domestically with appropriate 

jurisdictions as well as together to facilitate the rapid 

exchange of epidemiological, laboratory and medical 

personnel during a pandemic. In the case of medical 

personnel exchange, licensure issues should be addressed. 

SPP objectives related to the sharing of personnel and 

materials in a public health emergency include the 

following:

• Facilitating the ability to provide personnel assistance in a pandemic;

• Establishing public health liaisons; and 

• Enhancing information sharing on stockpile 

planning.

Mutual Assistance

In accordance with SPP deliverables and throughout the 

North American Plan, Canada, Mexico and the United 

States intend to plan for and provide personnel and 

material assistance, to the extent possible. The countries 

intend to continue to:

• Identify the roles of federal, state/province and local 

governments during a public health emergency;

• Identify legal and regulatory challenges to the 

exchange of medical personnel, countermeasures 

and supplies in the event of a public health emergency; and

• Identify possible federal solutions to allow the three 

countries to more effectively and efficiently assist one 

another during a public health emergency, where 

state, provincial and local jurisdiction is limited.

Personnel Exchange 

It is possible that a state or province will request 

additional health care personnel through its national 

government to respond to an emergency. Because each 

state or province in the United States and Canada, 

respectively, controls the licensure of health professionals, the national government should encourage its states 

or provinces to develop procedures for the exchange of 

licensed personnel that may include the temporary, rapid 

recognition of existing licenses or certificates. In the case 

of the Mexican states, the Federal Labor Law governs 

licensure. Thus, movement of personnel among and 

within the Mexican states and municipalities requires no 

additional procedures. Issues such as liability, indemnification and proper documentation necessary to work in 

the other countries should be addressed through relevant 

national, state or provincial authorities.

Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to 

establish protocols for the exchange of appropriate public 

health liaison officers. Each country, at the request of 

one of the other countries, should deploy a liaison officer 

to the public health department/agency of that country 

on an ongoing basis. The public health liaison officer 

should act as a liaison for the other national public 

health department/agency, facilitate communications 

among emergency operations centers (EOCs) and be a 

point of contact for the officer’s particular national public health agency. The countries intend that the public 

health liaison officer do the following:

• Facilitate the exchange of comprehensive descriptions of response systems within their federal 

governments, including key functions and updated 

lists of key contact personnel for each country’s 

public health emergency management teams; and

• Share information, including surveillance and epidemiology data, and standard operating procedures 

for the response to pandemic influenza. 

Stockpiles

While the three countries may have different goals for 

their respective pandemic influenza medical stockpiles, 

they should work together to do the following:

• Share information on their strategies to stockpile 

materials related to pandemic influenza, in 

particular:

Share their publicly available stockpiling 

goals for pandemic influenza countermeasures and other pandemic influenza medical 

materials, and

*

Chapter 4: Pandemic Influenza
22

Where possible, share their planning and/or 

modeling assumptions used when determining the contents of their pandemic influenza 

medical stockpiles; 

• Cooperate with one another in the development 

of their stockpiles of material related to pandemic 

influenza:

 Identify areas in which they need technical 

assistance in the development of national 

stockpiles, and 

Meet annually to identify areas in which 

they need additional cooperation;

• Share shelf-life extension strategies;

• Share strategies on the mass distribution of stockpile material: 

Share their methods for distributing stockpile material, and

 Identify distribution challenges and alternative distribution strategies; and

• Share best practices on the current use of, and 

issues related to, stockpiles:

Share allocation strategies for the use of a 

pandemic influenza vaccine and antivirals, as 

developed and updated, and

Share antiviral strategies for containing an 

initial focus of novel influenza virus of pandemic potential, as developed and updated.

Public Health Measures 

Canada, Mexico and the United States will attempt to 

contain a novel strain of human influenza at its source, 

slow its spread to and reduce its impact in North America. These efforts should allow the appropriate movement 

of people and cargo across mutual land borders and 

ports of entry in a way to achieve the public health 

objective with minimal social and economic impact. 

Each country should gauge the severity of the influenza 

pandemic and implement public health measures and/or 

community-based interventions accordingly. 

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

In the absence of scientific efficacy data for many of the 

potential public health measures, this Plan is intended 

to help facilitate a coordinated approach to community 

disease control. This should reduce the need to explain 

and justify divergent approaches at the time of a pandemic 

and may also optimize public confidence at a time of 

much uncertainty. Many of the recommendations are 

contingent upon local triggers; therefore, the timing of 

their implementation would not necessarily be simultaneous across the countries. Ideally, however, the types of 

measures and public health messages should be consistent. 

In general, the three countries concur that when persons 

infected with a novel virus first appear, aggressive measures 

may be valuable in slowing its spread, attenuating the 

impact or possibly containing an evolving pandemic. 

Once the virus is widespread in North America, mitigation measures may be modified based on considerations 

with respect to any benefit they may have.

The three countries recognize that issues of feasibility, 

logistics, impact, acceptability and compliance in implementing public health measures are shaped by the context 

in which they would be implemented. 

To the extent possible, and in the context of local epidemiology, the countries intend to use the WHO phases 

as “triggers” to inform implementation of public health 

measures. The countries intend to share information on 

their planned approaches to public health measures such 

as the following:

• Public education (e.g. on hand washing, staying 

home from work, workplace infection control);

• The use of antivirals and vaccines;

• The use of personal protective equipment (e.g. 

masks and personal respirators);

• Social distancing measures, including school closures 

and the prohibition of community gatherings; 

• Travel and border public health measures; and 

• Isolation and quarantine.

Travel and border public health measures should be 

compatible with the revised IHRs (2005), should be 

tailored to the status of pandemic disease within North 

America and the level of public health risk associated with 

cross-border movement, and should recognize the mutual 

benefits of ongoing trade and economic activity. 

Chapter 4: Pandemic Influenza
23

If a novel strain of human influenza emerges outside 

North America, the three countries intend to work 

together to slow the introduction of the virus to the 

continent by preventing infected individuals from entering Canada, Mexico or the United States. There will also 

be a WHO containment effort to contain the spread of 

the virus at its source. Emphasizing a North American 

approach, rather than individualized approaches among 

Canada, Mexico and the United States, may be the 

best way to slow the spread of a novel strain of human 

influenza into our respective countries. Strong disease 

surveillance systems coupled with appropriate screening 

at all North American airports, seaports and regional 

perimeters may further delay the entry of a novel strain 

of human influenza. 

Because the specifics of how a novel strain of human 

influenza will enter North America and how an epidemic 

will actually play out are unknown, the implementation 

of a North American response must remain flexible and 

adaptable to a pandemic as it unfolds. Nevertheless, 

certain unifying principles regarding a North American 

strategy on border protection are evident. Canada, 

Mexico and the United States intend to develop cooperative measures to 1) slow the entry of a novel strain of 

human influenza to North America; 2) mitigate disease, 

suffering and death; 3) coordinate appropriate border 

measures that will give due consideration to free trade; 

and 4) mitigate impacts to the economy and the functioning of our societies.

All countries have the sovereign right to control the 

movement of people and goods across their borders. 

However, in the event of a widespread pandemic, highly 

restrictive measures to control the movement of people 

and goods might initially delay but would not stop the 

eventual spread of a novel strain of human influenza 

to North America, and could have significant negative 

social, economic and foreign policy consequences. Less 

restrictive measures could potentially provide similar 

control benefits with fewer significant negative consequences. Such measures include appropriate restrictions 

on air, land and maritime passenger travel; restrictions 

on trade in animals and animal products that may carry 

the influenza virus; and other similar measures.

Individual traveler screening for influenza-like illness and 

risk of exposure to a novel strain of human influenza of 

all persons entering North America may help slow the 

arrival of pandemic disease to the continent. However, 

such screening may not detect asymptomatic infected 

individuals, and individuals with influenza-like illness 

may not be infected with a pandemic strain. Because some 

asymptomatic travelers who are incubating influenza may 

become symptomatic while en route, overall screening 

effectiveness may be improved by adopting a layered 

approach that includes pre-departure, en route and arrival 

screening measures, with appropriate isolation and quarantine measures for individuals suspected of being infected 

and contacts who may have been exposed.

Air Travel

Pre-Departure Measures for Flights from Affected 

Countries to North America 

Effective host-country health screening of all individuals 

prior to departure may reduce the risk of infected travelers exposing fellow travelers, aircraft and vessel crews, 

and others upon arrival. This is consistent with WHO

guidance and with the newly revised IHRs (2005). 

• It is expected that travelers departing for North 

America from affected countries will be screened 

prior to departure in accordance with guidance 

Chapter 5: 

 Border Monitoring & Control Measures

 Associated with Pandemic Influenza 

Chapter 5: Border Monitoring And Control Measures Associated With Pandemic Influenza
24

from WHO and the International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO).1

• Canada, Mexico and the United States intend 

to coordinate travel restrictions from affected countries with the collective understanding that many 

factors would drive the decision to implement such 

restrictions, including case fatality rates, transmission characteristics of the virus and the efficacy of a 

source country’s exit-screening program.

• Canada, Mexico and the United States intend 

to pursue cooperative arrangements with the 

international community to encourage voluntary 

travel restrictions for non-essential travel from any 

affected country.

Pre-Departure Measures for Flights from North 

America to Affected Countries When Disease Does 

Not Exist in North America

Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to 

coordinate public messaging to travelers departing North 

America for affected countries. Messaging should be 

consistent among the three countries and may include 

information such as location of outbreaks, steps to reduce 

one’s risk of infection and public health measures that may 

be performed on flights arriving from affected countries.

Pre-Departure Measures for Flights from North 

America When Disease Exists in North America

Exit screening of travelers departing North America 

should employ a risk-based approach2 and be performed 

in accordance with WHO and ICAO guidance. Per the 

IHRs, the countries should be responsible for 

performing exit screening on departing passengers once 

community-wide outbreaks of pandemic influenza 

are prevalent within their borders. The three countries 

expect affected countries to implement exit screening 

1 ICAO recently adopted guidelines regarding communicable disease/

avian influenza that include provisions for exit screening of international travelers from affected areas. These guidelines can be found at 

http://www.icao.int/icao/en/med/guidelines.htm.

2 Measures that are applied to individual travelers to determine the 

likelihood of infection with a pandemic influenza virus and that may 

include assessment of signs/symptoms of illness and potential exposure 

(travel and activity history).

measures until WHO determines that exit screening is 

no longer effective at slowing the international spread of 

pandemic disease.

En Route Measures

Given the short incubation period of influenza and the 

length of some international flights, one can assume 

that some travelers with influenza will develop their first 

symptoms during the journey. It is possible that additional training of flight and cabin crews to detect and 

manage ill travelers may decrease the risk for others on 

board, as well as at the point of arrival in North America.

When combined with pre-departure exit screening, 

appropriate application of existing en route screening 

measures may help detect those who have developed 

signs of illness en route. 

• Canada, Mexico and the United States intend 

to coordinate to determine best practices for the 

in-flight management of ill travelers based on 

symptoms and existing reporting requirements.

• All three countries intend to coordinate efforts and 

engage the international community and industry 

to establish protocols and minimum requirements 

for en route screening and reporting on flights 

bound for North America. 

• Canada, Mexico and the United States are developing protocols, through the North American 

Aviation Trilateral3, to coordinate the dynamic 

management of inbound international flights in 

high-risk situations. 

Arrival Measures

Arrival or entry screening of passengers should serve as 

an important supplement to host country exit screening. 

Travelers with influenza-like illness should be isolated 

and required to undergo appropriate public health3 The North American Aviation Trilateral established a common 

concept of operations (CONOPS) to enhance shared situational 

awareness and operational coordination among the three countries 

on containment efforts related to pandemic influenza that involve the 

North American aviation system. The CONOPS outlines common 

objectives, principles, communication mechanisms and protocols, and 

coordination requirements and processes that have been developed in 

accordance with Canadian, Mexican and U.S. national pandemic influenza plans, as well as guidance from ICAO and WHO. 

Chapter 5: Border Monitoring And Control Measures Associated With Pandemic Influenza
25

related diagnostic testing, while travelers who could 

potentially have been exposed to pandemic influenza 

may be quarantined, as appropriate.

Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to employ 

a risk-based approach to screening and intend to collaboratively establish common criteria and protocols 

for entry screening of all travelers on flights bound for 

North America during a pandemic. The three countries 

intend to minimize arrival screening measures and maintain existing pre-clearance arrangements employed for air 

travelers within North America to the extent practicable.

Maritime Travel 

Although maritime crew and passenger transport today 

represents a small fraction of total entries to North 

America, and longer transit times in the maritime 

environment may help to clarify public health risk when 

compared with air and land border environments, there 

are features of maritime travel that are important to 

consider. Maritime spread has been significant in past 

pandemics, and the close contact that occurs on board 

ships creates an epidemiological setting where influenza 

outbreaks may occur. Overall, reducing risk in a maritime setting is an important component of comprehensive efforts to delay a pandemic in North America. 

• Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to 

apply a risk-based approach to the screening of passengers and crew in the maritime environment.

• All three countries intend to coordinate to establish 

criteria and protocols similar to those used in 

aviation for exit, en route and entry screening for 

all travelers (passengers and crew) on ships bound 

for North America, as well as exit screening, when 

appropriate, for ships departing North America.

Land Borders

Once disease exists in one North American country, the 

others will likely experience outbreaks soon thereafter. 

Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to coordinate on land border issues to enhance the North American approach and best serve their respective populations: 

• Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to 

employ a risk-based approach to the screening of 

travelers entering the North American region by 

land, consistent with entry screening in the aviation and maritime environments.

• Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to 

share and coordinate common triggers, criteria and 

protocols for screening of travelers at land borders 

when certain conditions are met. These triggers, 

criteria and protocols should be balanced against 

the necessity to maintain the flow of persons, cargo 

and trade across North American borders.

• Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to 

coordinate public messaging to be employed at 

land border crossings once disease exists in North 

America. Messaging should be consistent among 

the three countries and may include information 

such as location of outbreaks, steps to reduce one’s 

risk of infection and public health measures that 

may be performed at ports of entry:

• Once pandemic disease is common in all three 

North American countries, Canada, Mexico and 

the United States mutually understand that exit 

screening at our shared land borders may no longer 

be necessary. In accordance with WHO guidance 

and the IHRs, exit screening should continue, 

however, at all airports, seaports and ground crossings along North American regional borders.

Information Sharing 

As discussed in Chapter 2, robust emergency coordination between Canada, Mexico and the United States 

will be critical during a pandemic. A successful North 

America border-containment strategy will benefit from 

efficient information sharing among SPP member 

countries. This coordination is especially relevant to 

monitoring and surveillance, as well as to collaborative 

land-border public health measures. 

Chapter 5: Border Monitoring And Control Measures Associated With Pandemic Influenza

27

Canada, Mexico and the United States share much of 

their critical infrastructure. Although a pandemic threatens the health of workers, as opposed to causing physical 

damage to systems, worker absenteeism could disrupt the 

efficient flow of critical goods and services. For example, 

critical workers sustain the flow of electricity as well 

as natural gas and petroleum. These critical goods and 

services are part of a vast, interconnected system serving 

all of North America. Beyond energy and power, other 

critical infrastructure and key resource (hereafter, critical 

infrastructure) sectors, from manufacturing operations 

to transport, banking systems to food delivery service, 

could also be affected. Moreover, a pandemic could 

significantly interrupt the ability of private and government-owned businesses to sustain critical infrastructure.

To reduce the negative effects of a pandemic on North 

American critical infrastructure, Canada, Mexico and 

the United States intend to make every reasonable effort 

to coordinate before, during and after a pandemic; to 

establish a mutually supportive operating environment; 

and to assist one another in improving the resiliency of 

critical infrastructure in the face of the pandemic threat. 

Once established, this operational framework is intended 

to be applicable to critical infrastructure sectors, as well 

as to all publicly and state-owned businesses in general.

Business continuity planning is recognized internationally as a key method of providing for the continuous 

delivery of essential services and products during disruptions and is vital to the building of resilient infrastructure. All critical infrastructure sectors, and indeed all 

enterprises, large and small, public and private, including 

government institutions, should strive to maintain 

critical operations during an influenza pandemic. The 

three countries intend to promote business continuity 

planning in their public and private sectors as a key 

method of mitigating the impacts of pandemic influenza, 

providing for continuous service delivery and laying the 

groundwork for rapid recovery. 

While the potential impacts of an avian influenza 

outbreak may not be on the same scale as pandemic 

influenza, contingency plans should be developed to 

minimize and limit the economic consequences. The 

ability to control animal movement, eliminate infected 

and exposed susceptible populations and do more effective general surveillance allows authorities responsible for 

animal health to respond more effectively to disease outbreaks and minimize the risk to the human population.

The SPP Framework

A collaborative North American approach emphasizing 

and supporting critical infrastructure planning, preparedness, response and recovery processes is fundamental to the proper functioning of these essential systems 

within and across borders during a pandemic. This Plan 

is intended to be consistent with the efforts undertaken 

as part of the North American emergency management 

framework “to develop a common approach to critical 

infrastructure protection, [and] to coordinate responses 

to cross-border incidents.”1

Major interdependencies among Canada, Mexico and 

the United States include the following:

• Canada and the United States are each other’s 

largest trading partners, moving over $1.9 billion 

(USD) worth of goods and services across the 

border every day;2

• Mexico is the United States’ third-largest trading 

partner, with nearly $300 billion in bilateral trade 

between the two countries;3

• Every year, the United States supplies Mexico with 

millions of gallons of water from the Colorado 

1 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060331.html or 

http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1085

2 http://geo.international.gc.ca/can-am/washington/trade_and_investment/trade_partnership-en.asp

3 www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html#2006 and http://

mexico.usembassy.gov/mexico/trade_info.html 

Chapter 6: 

 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Chapter 6: Chapter 6: Critical Infrastructure Protection
28

River and the Rio Grande, while Mexico provides 

the United States with water from six Mexican 

tributaries to the Rio Grande;4

• Canada provides approximately 85 percent of U.S. 

net natural gas imports5, and the United States and United States and

Canada supply nearly all of each other’s electricity 

imports, and;6

• U.S. imports of Canadian agricultural/food 

products total more than 20 percent of total U.S. 

agricultural/food imports, while Canadian imports 

of U.S. agri-food products account for more than 

70 percent of Canadian agri-food imports.

Critical Infrastructure Sectors

Critical infrastructure encompasses those systems and 

assets so vital to a country that interruption or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national 

security, economic security, and/or national public 

health, safety or collective morale. Critical infrastructure 

protection entails all the activities, including prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, 

directed at enhancing the resilience of people, systems 

and physical infrastructure associated with the operations 

of those critical infrastructure sectors and their provision of essential goods and services. As federal states, 

each country organizes its infrastructure and its critical 

infrastructure sectors differently, and each therefore has 

a unique relationship with the privately and government-owned critical infrastructure businesses within 

these sectors. The United States has formally detailed 

the identification and protection of what it refers to as 

critical infrastructure and key resource (CI/KR) sectors. 

Currently, Canada and Mexico are finalizing similar 

approaches. Identification of critical infrastructure sectors is based on a practical understanding of how these 

systems work and their critical importance to a given 

country’s national economic and social stability.

United States

In the United States, the private sector owns and operates 

an estimated 85 percent of the country’s critical infrastructure. Therefore, sustaining the operations of critical 

4 www.ibwc.state.gov/html/colorado_river.html

5 http://geo.international.gc.ca/can-am/main/right_nav/natural_gas-en.asp

6 http://geo.international.gc.ca/can-am/main/right_nav/electricity-en.asp

infrastructure during a pandemic, as well as the operations 

of those businesses that support the nation’s CI/KR, will 

depend largely on each individual organization’s development and implementation of business continuity plans tailored to pandemic-related impacts, including potentially 

severe staffing shortages, supply-chain disruptions and the 

degradation of essential services. 

The U.S. Government7 identifies 13 critical infrastructure sectors and four key resource sectors, 17 CI/KR 

sectors in all, that are essential to U.S. security as well as 

to economic and social stability: 

Critical Infrastructure

Banking & Finance

Chemical & Hazardous Materials

Defense Industrial Base

Emergency Services

Energy

Food & Agriculture

Information Technology 

National Monuments & Icons

Postal & Shipping

Public Health and Healthcare

Telecommunications

Transportation

Water

Key Resources

Commercial Facilities

Dams

Government Facilities

Nuclear Power Plants

7 As part of the U.S. Government’s pandemic preparedness strategy, the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) helps support the public 

and private CI/KR sectors in developing and implementing their essential pandemic contingency plans. The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and 

Key Resources was developed to assist business owner-operators and 

their contingency planners with enhancing their pandemic planning. 

The primary purpose of this CI/KR guide is to encourage the U.S. 

private sector to act now. With this CI/KR guide, DHS has provided a 

comprehensive tool for the 17 CI/KR sectors in the United States, and 

for business and industry in general. 

Chapter 6: Critical Infrastructure Protection
29

Canada

Canada’s critical infrastructure consists of the physical 

and information technology facilities, networks, services 

and assets essential to the health, safety, security or 

economic well-being of Canadians, or to the effective 

functioning of government. Disruptions of these critical 

infrastructures could result in catastrophic loss of life, 

adverse economic effects and significant harm to public 

confidence. As in the United States, most of Canada’s 

critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the 

private sector, which therefore bears primary responsibility for the development and implementation of business 

continuity plans tailored to pandemic-related impacts, 

including potentially severe staffing shortages, supplychain disruptions and the degradation of essential services. The provinces and territories also have a significant 

jurisdictional role in critical infrastructure protection 

and emergency management, as well as a role as owners 

and regulators of critical infrastructure. 

As the approach to critical infrastructure protection 

varies across federal/provincial/territorial jurisdictions 

with respect to the laws and plans that are in place, so 

too does the classification of critical infrastructure by sector. While recognizing that each province and territory 

structures its critical infrastructure program as it deems 

appropriate, Canada classifies critical infrastructure 

within 10 sectors. This approach allows critical infrastructure partners to have a stronger awareness of risks 

and interdependencies, which will lead to better risk 

management. Critical infrastructure partners are able to 

collectively respond to risks and target limited resources 

to the highest priority areas.

The 10 sectors are as follows: 

• Energy and Utilities (e.g., electrical power, natural 

gas, oil production/transmission)

• Information and Communications Technology

(e.g., telecommunications, broadcasting systems, 

software, hardware and networks including the 

Internet)

• Finance (e.g., large-value payments system, securities clearing and settlement systems)

• Health Care (e.g., hospitals, blood-supply facilities 

and pharmaceutical manufacturers)

• Food (e.g., safety, distribution, agriculture and 

food industry)

• Water (e.g., drinking water and wastewater management)

• Transportation (e.g., road, rail, marine, and aviation)

• Safety (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological and 

nuclear safety, dangerous goods, search and rescue, 

emergency services and dams) 

• Government (e.g., services, facilities, information 

networks and key national monuments)

• Manufacturing (e.g., defense industrial base, 

chemical industry) 

Mexico

The U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership Declaration, signed 

on March 22, 2002, in Monterrey, Mexico, provided 

both countries with the basis to develop the Framework 

of Cooperation for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP).

Under this framework, the governments of Mexico and 

the United States share the commitment to protect their 

populations and critical infrastructure from terrorist 

attacks, natural disasters and any another eventuality 

that may compromise their integrity and operation. The 

protection of the critical infrastructure network on the 

border – taking into consideration the interdependency 

between the two countries, and vulnerabilities – represents challenges and opportunities for both countries. 

Even though Mexico and Canada do not share a 

border, these two countries recognize that critical infrastructure protection is important in a North American 

context. For this reason, both countries will explore 

opportunities for collaboration through the MexicoCanada Working Group.

For the purposes of the Plan, Mexico defines critical 

infrastructure as those assets, services and networks that 

are indispensable to the support and maintenance of 

the well-being of the Mexican population. Following 

the concept stated by the U.S.-Mexico CIP, Mexico 

has established sectoral working groups to evaluate and 

improve the protection of critical infrastructure within 

its territory. 

Chapter 6: Critical Infrastructure Protection
30

In this context, Mexico’s approach includes eight 

sectoral working groups: Energy, Telecommunications, 

Transportation, Water and Dams, Public Health, Food 

& Agriculture, Cyber Security and Strategic Facilities. 

To protect its critical infrastructure and with an eye to 

taking advantage of existing programs and resources, the 

eight sectoral working groups correspond to each CIP 

sector identified.

• Energy (e.g., Storage and Generating Facilities & 

Distribution Networks)

• Telecommunications (e.g., Telecommunication 

Networks)

• Transportation (e.g., Ports of Entry)

• Water and Dams (e.g., Hydraulic Infrastructure 

and Bridges)

• Public Health (e.g., Epidemiological Surveillance)

• Food & Agriculture (e.g., Animal Health & 

Epidemiological Surveillance)

• Cybernetic Security (e.g., Communication and 

Information Networks)

• Strategic Facilities (e.g., Physical Protection of 

Strategic Facilities)

Improving Critical 

Infrastructure Resiliency

Sustaining interdependent critical infrastructure 

operations demands commitment, mutual support and 

collaboration from all relevant public and private sector 

critical infrastructure protection partners. The input of 

the private sector will be vital in Canada and the United 

States, where up to 85 percent of critical infrastructure 

is owned and operated by the private sector. While 

businesses and local communities are at the forefront of 

the response to and recovery from a pandemic, governments should maintain situational awareness of critical 

infrastructure to identify potential problems. Where 

appropriate, governments should coordinate timely 

national, regional and local support among appropriate 

public and private sector resources.

Canada, Mexico and the United States are to endeavor 

over the medium term and within the context of current 

resources to accomplish the following objectives. Reasonable efforts should be made to include the expertise of 

private sector infrastructure owners and state/provincial/

territorial governments.

Joint Assessments of Risks and 

Interdependencies

In each country, critical infrastructure sectors depend 

on one another for sustaining the flow of essential 

goods and services. For example, the U.S. water sector 

is indispensable to most, if not all, other sectors, but 

it, too, relies entirely on the energy sector to power 

its equipment operations, the transportation sector to 

deliver critical supplies and the chemical sector to treat 

the water supply. Given these interdependencies, disruptions to critical infrastructure lead to cascading consequences that may rapidly escalate within a sector (e.g., 

the August 2003 North American blackout8) and may 

cause significant cross-sector disruptions. In a pandemic 

situation, understanding these critical infrastructures and 

interdependencies among sectors will be fundamental to 

providing a coordinated cross-sector response.

The countries intend to develop mutually acceptable 

risk, vulnerability and interdependency assessment 

procedures and methodologies. The countries also intend 

to undertake joint and/or coordinated risk assessments. 

An important output of these assessments would be the 

identifications of interdependencies, potential chokepoints and potential single-point failures within and 

across critical infrastructure sectors. Occurring within 

individual businesses or small numbers of like businesses, 

single-point failures can be triggered when a component 

on which a system or an operation depends fails and has 

no alternate component to back it up or take its place. 

Any number of vulnerabilities, including those caused by 

interdependencies and single-points of failure, may increase 

the probability for cascading consequences across sectors. 

To the greatest extent possible, any joint risk, vulnerability 

and interdependency assessment should occur prior to a 

pandemic outbreak to enhance compatibility and to share 

knowledge of differences in each country’s approach to critical infrastructure protection. 

8 The 2003 North American Electrical Blackout: An Accidental Experiment in Atmospheric Chemistry, www.atmos.umd.edu/~russ/BlackoutFinal.pdf

Chapter 6: Critical Infrastructure Protection
31

Publicly And Privately Owned Businesses 

With International Operations

The countries are to make every reasonable effort to 

examine essential North American critical infrastructure 

businesses with international operations. With the 

enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement 

(NAFTA),9 the three countries formed a free-trade area 

with a total gross domestic product (GDP) of more than 

$11 trillion (USD) in 2004. NAFTA has also resulted 

in growing numbers of companies located in the United 

States,10 Canada and Mexico operating key facilities 

within the borders of one of the other two countries. 

These North American businesses increasingly function 

as a “borderless” North American commercial network. 

They represent another element of strength and vulnerability, since disruptions of these businesses could lead to 

cascading effects across each country.

Borders 

The three countries are to make reasonable efforts to 

coordinate border actions to sustain critical infrastructure. Borders represent a significant vulnerability to the 

countries’ interdependent critical infrastructure sectors 

because where cross-border movement is restricted, supply chain and personnel movements can be significantly 

disrupted. Thus, they may represent chokepoints that 

may negatively affect international commerce. Given the 

significant degree of North American integration, the 

agri-food sector is particularly vulnerable to disruptions 

in cross-border trade, as there is significant cross-border 

movement in key farm inputs, intermediate agricultural 

products and final food products. 

Impact of Disease versus Impact of 

Border Disruptions

The three countries’ border actions should be well coordinated and communicated with critical infrastructure businesses, and should be carefully managed for the health and 

safety of citizens while minimizing economic disruption 

to the extent possible, given legal requirements relating to 

animal health, plant health and food safety.

9 NAFTA: www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/Sec- NAFTA: www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/Section_Index.html

10 NAFTA: A Decade of Strengthening a Dynamic Relationship, www.

ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/asset_upload_

file606_3595.pdf

Critical Infrastructure 

Pandemic Preparedness and 

Response Management

The following are priority measures necessary to 

establish a mutually supportive environment and to 

improve the resiliency of the three countries’ publicly 

and privately owned critical infrastructure businesses 

during a pandemic: 

• Critical Infrastructure Pandemic Preparedness and Planning: Canada, Mexico and the 

United States should promote the development, 

implementation and sharing of planning processes 

to bolster critical infrastructure resiliency and preparedness among all critical infrastructure sectors, 

as well as among the appropriate public and private 

sector businesses that support these sectors.

• Pandemic Contact Lists: The countries should 

develop contact lists of all appropriate key critical 

infrastructure public and private sector partners in 

order to improve coordination among all partners 

domestically and internationally during a pandemic. 

These lists should be updated regularly, perhaps 

annually, and should also include clearly established 

communications roles and responsibilities. 

• Shared Pandemic Risk Communications: The 

three countries should facilitate the coordination 

of shared pandemic risk communications strategies among all public and private sector critical 

infrastructure security partners within their own 

countries. The need for timely, accurate, credible 

and consistent information that is tailored to 

specific audiences is extremely important and is 

described more fully in Chapter 2.

• Collaborative Monitoring and Information 

Sharing for Pandemics: The three countries 

should carry out appropriate actions for collaborative monitoring and effective information sharing 

for pandemics. Government officials and business 

leaders cannot now effectively predict or quickly 

identify the options to prevent single-point failures 

or cascading consequences. Canada, Mexico and 

the United States should explore the existing information-sharing mechanisms and develop a new 

collaborative system to monitor the most critical 

Chapter 6: Critical Infrastructure Protection
32

elements of the critical infrastructure. To protect 

sensitive information, the three countries intend 

to seek proper information-sharing protocols that 

respect existing protocols and legislative provisions. 

• Shared Pandemic Exercises and Training: To 

the best of their abilities, the three countries are 

to endeavor to include an array of relevant public 

and private sector critical infrastructure partners 

and appropriate public health officials in their pandemic preparedness training and exercises to help 

uncover potential weaknesses in established systems 

and to forge bonds among personnel. The SPP 

countries are to make reasonable efforts to conduct 

bilateral and trilateral training and exercises related 

to pandemic preparedness and response with representatives of critical infrastructure sectors.

Chapter 6: Critical Infrastructure Protection
33

ANNEX 1: 

 Major Tasks

In accordance with the North American Plan for Avian and Pandemic Influenza and in furtherance of the 

goals set forth therein, the governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States intend to continue to 

work together to accomplish the following actions within the timeframes indicated below. While not an 

exhaustive list, this annex will help decision-makers such as the SPP Coordinating Body for Avian and 

Pandemic Influenza follow up on efforts to put the Plan into action.

Tasks Target 

Date

Lead Agency 

(Canada, U.S., Mexico)

Chapter 2: Emergency Coordination and Communications

A

Review existing emergency coordination and communication mechanisms and enhance the exchange of 

detailed operations plans. 

December

2007

PS 

HHS 

MoH, MoA

B

Conduct trilateral or bilateral exercises to assess and 

strengthen their emergency response and contingency 

plans. 

December 2008

PS, 

HHS, DHS 

MoFA, MoH, MoA

C

Develop plans for communications coordination during 

the actual event of an outbreak of avian or pandemic 

influenza. 

September 2007 PS 

HHS 

MoH

D

Undertake the development of risk communications 

strategies to provide stakeholders with information 

on disease prevention, disease recognition, biosecurity 

procedures and their responsibilities in the event of an 

incursion of avian or pandemic influenza.

October 2007

CFIA, PHAC 

HHS 

MoH, MoA

E Develop key messages related to avian and pandemic 

influenza for the specific use of senior officials. October 2007

PS 

HHS 

MoH, MoA 

F

Pursue the development of communications messages for 

avian influenza and both pre-pandemic and pandemic 

periods. 

September 2007

PS 

HHS 

MoH, MoA

G Share best practices regarding risk communications and 

identify gaps in behavioral research. September 2007

PS 

HHS 

MoH

H Establish procedures and pathways to exchange prerelease information during an event. [ September 2007

PS 

HHS 

MoH

I

Develop procedures and pathways for how communications networks will operate during an event (regular 

conference calls, etc.). 

June 2007

PS 

DHS 

MoH

J Develop opportunities to exercise the planned response. 

[p.15] November 2007

PS, PHAC, CFIA 

HHS 

MoH, GCCP
34

Tasks Target 

Date

Lead Agency 

(Canada, U.S., Mexico)

Chapter 3: Avian Influenza

A

Develop international arrangements or agreements 

to provide for an adequate supply of avian influenza 

vaccine in the event of a North American outbreak, 

including a mechanism for the rapid cross-border movement of vaccines. 

October 2007

CFIA 

USDA 

MoA 

B

Put in place and share contingency plans to expand the 

available personnel resource base in the event a nation’s 

current personnel resources are exceeded. 

October 2007

CFIA 

USDA 

MoA, MoH

C

Share best practices in occupational health, infection 

control and personal protective measures to reduce 

potential risk to human populations. 

September 2007

CFIA, PHAC, HC 

HHS 

MoA, MoH, MoA

Annex 1: Major Tasks
35

Tasks Target 

Date

Lead Agency 

(Canada, U.S., Mexico)

Chapter 4: Pandemic Influenza

A Identify opportunities to exercise pandemic influenza 

preparedness and response planning. September 2007

PHAC 

DHS, HHS

MoH

B Identify areas of technical assistance needed for laboratory, surveillance and outbreak response. September 2007

PHAC 

HHS 

MoH

C

Establish and test mechanisms for communication 

among institutions according to specific functions for 

exchanging epidemiological information. 

September 2007

PHAC 

HHS 

MoH

D

Provide technical assistance through cross-border 

projects to bolster surveillance efforts for seasonal and 

pandemic influenza. 

December 2007

PHAC 

HHS 

MoH

E

Establish approaches to collaborating on North 

American outbreak investigations, and collaborate 

on investigations and response efforts, as feasible and 

appropriate. 

December 2007

PHAC 

HHS 

MoH

F

Strengthen operating procedures/processes for the 

sharing of laboratory information before and during an 

emergency.

December 2007

PHAC 

HHS 

MoH

G Facilitate the ability to provide personnel assistance in a 

pandemic. September 2007

PHAC 

HHS 

MoH, MoFA

H Establish public health liaisons. December 2007

PHAC 

HHS 

MoH, MoFA

I Enhance information sharing on stockpile planning. December 2007

PHAC 

HHS 

MoH, MoFA

Annex 1: Major Tasks
36

Tasks Target 

Date

Lead Agency 

(Canada, U.S., Mexico)

Chapter 5: Border Monitoring and Control Measures 

Associated with Pandemic Influenza 

A

Determine best practices for the in-flight management of ill travelers based on symptoms and existing 

reporting requirements. 

December 2007

PHAC 

DHS 

MoFA, MoH, 

B

Engage the international community and industry to 

establish protocols and minimum requirements for 

en route screening and reporting on flights bound for 

North America.

December 2007

PHAC 

DOS, DHS 

MoH, MoFA, MoT

C

Establish common criteria and protocols for entry 

screening of all travelers on flights bound for North 

American during a pandemic. 

June 2008

PHAC 

DHS 

MoH, MoFA, MoT

D

Establish criteria and protocols similar to those used 

in aviation for exit, en route and entry screening for 

all travelers (passengers and crew) on ships bound 

for North America, as well as exit screening, when 

appropriate, for ships departing North America. 

June 2008

PHAC, CBSA 

DHS 

MoFA, MoT, MoH

E

Share and coordinate common triggers, criteria and 

protocols for screening of travelers at land borders 

when certain conditions are met. 

June 2008

PHAC 

DHS 

MoH, MoFA, MoT

F Coordinate public messaging to be employed at land 

border crossings once disease exists in North America. January 2008 PHAC, CBSA MoFA, MoT, MoH

Annex 1: Major Tasks
37

Actions Target 

Date

Lead Agency

(Canada, U.S., Mexico)

Chapter 6: Critical Infrastructure Protection

A Develop mutually acceptable risk, vulnerability and interdependency assessment procedures and methodologies. 

December 

2009

PS

DHS

CISEN 

B Undertake joint and/or coordinated risk assessments. December 

2009

PS

DHS

CISEN

C Develop contact lists of all appropriate key critical infrastructure public and private sector partners. June 2008

PS

DHS

CISEN

Annex 1: Major Tasks

39

Overview

Canada, the United States and Mexico have established a 

senior level Coordinating Body to facilitate the effective 

planning and preparedness within North America for 

a possible outbreak of avian and/or human pandemic 

influenza under the Security and Prosperity Partnership 

(SPP). This Coordinating Body will serve as the senior 

level contact group in the event of an outbreak of highly 

pathogenic avian influenza or a novel strain of human 

influenza outbreak and, as such, could be used as a 

model for regional collaboration. 

Mandate

The Coordinating Body will support and facilitate the 

coordination of SPP-related activities in North America 

with a bearing on planning and preparedness for avian and 

pandemic influenza, much of which will be incorporated 

into the North American Plan for Avian and Pandemic 

Influenza including:

• Ensuring the development and implementation of a 

comprehensive, coordinated and science-based North 

American approach to plan for and manage the threat 

of an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza 

and/or human pandemic influenza;

• Ensuring the development and implementation of 

standard operating procedures (SOPs) to strengthen 

North America’s ability to prevent and mitigate, 

prepare for, respond to and recover from an outbreak 

of highly pathogenic avian influenza or a human 

pandemic influenza;

• Ensuring that previous tasks related to avian 

influenza and human pandemic influenza, SOPs, 

policies, protocols and any subsequent actions 

reflect the principles outlined in the North American Cooperation on Avian and Pandemic Influenza 

agreement and the principles agreed to by the 

leaders in the March 2006 Cancun Summit;

• Ensuring the completion in a timely manner of 

all tasks agreed to by leaders in Cancun and any 

subsequent tasks;

• Identifying and prioritizing additional activities, 

gaps or areas of collaboration required to ensure 

North American preparedness; 

• Promoting cross-sectoral integration of preparedness activities (e.g. human health, animal health, 

transportation, borders, communications, surveillance, emergency response, etc.); 

• Encouraging the exchange of information on each 

government’s avian and pandemic influenza plans 

and intentions; and 

• Encouraging the development of comprehensive, 

multi-sectoral business continuity plans that 

address North American considerations.

Chairs

• The chair of the SPP Coordinating Body will rotate 

between each national authority on a yearly basis. 

Membership

• Membership will include senior officials from the 

following departments and agencies:

Canada: 

• Public Safety Canada 

• Department of Foreign Affairs and International 

Trade

• Public Health Agency of Canada

• Canadian Food Inspection Agency

ANNEX 2: 

 Terms of Reference for the Coordinating Body On Avian and Pandemic Influenza

Annex 2: Terms of Reference for the Coordinating Body
40

United States: 

• U.S. Department of State

• U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

• U.S. Department of Homeland Security

• U.S. Department of Agriculture

Mexico:

• Ministry of Agriculture

• Ministry of Health

• Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Representatives from other agencies/departments can 

join future discussions in accordance with the agenda. 

Working Groups

• Where possible, existing SPP working groups, 

governmental structures or trilateral/bilateral 

mechanisms will conduct the analysis and develop 

policies and procedures that inform all levels 

of government in their ability to deal with the 

North American, cross-sectoral impacts of avian 

and pandemic influenza, avoiding where possible 

duplicating efforts 

Administrative Support

• Administrative and logistical support for the SPP 

Coordinating Body is the responsibility of each 

national authority. 

Frequency of Meetings

• Quarterly or as called by the chairs; in person or by 

teleconference. 

Annex 2: Terms of Reference for the Coordinating Body
41

ANNEX 3: 

 Chief Veterinary 

Officers Agreement

Annex 3: Chief Veterinary Officers Agreement
42 Annex 3: Chief Veterinary Officers Agreement
Annex 3: Chief Veterinary Officers Agreement 43
44 Annex 3: Chief Veterinary Officers Agreement