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i 

51–109 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–42] 

AIR SOVEREIGNTY ALERT OPERATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 22, 2009 
(II) 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

CATHY GARMAN, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

MEGAN PUTNAM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 22, 2009, Air Sovereignty Alert Operations ............................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 22, 2009 ..................................................................................... 29 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2009 

AIR SOVEREIGNTY ALERT OPERATIONS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, 

Readiness Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 3 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Readiness 

Subcommittee ....................................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

D’Agostino, Davi M., Director, Homeland Defense and Emerging Threats and 

Warfare, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 4 

Darnell, Lt. Gen. Daniel J., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space 

and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force .......... 8 

Verga, Peter F., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Integration 

and Chief of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense ................................................ 6 

Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III, USAF, Director, U.S. Air National Guard ......... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

D’Agostino, Davi M. .......................................................................................... 39 

Darnell, Lt. Gen. Daniel J. .............................................................................. 58 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 37 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P. ..................................................................................... 33 

Verga, Peter F. .................................................................................................. 54 

Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III .......................................................................... 63 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

GAO Report, Homeland Defense—Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace ......... 71 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 129 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bright ......................................................................................................... 134 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 133 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 133 

(1) 

AIR SOVEREIGNTY ALERT OPERATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 22, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ORTIZ. Good morning. And welcome to the hearing on air 

sovereignty alert (ASA) operations. 

During the Cold War we had planes standing alert to protect us 

from potential air threats from the former Soviet Union. The Cold 

War ended, we felt safe, and we no longer really needed the ASA 

mission. 

Our comfortable security suddenly changed on September 11, 

2001. Following the tragic day, that tragic day, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) initiated Operation Noble Eagle. Now protection of 

our airspace from internal threats is our number one defense priority. 

The Department issued several policy memos and gave the responsibility for carrying out the new ASA mission to the North 

American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD. Although neither DOD nor NORAD ever specified which service should support 

the ASA mission, the Air Force currently provides 100 percent of 

the fighter aircraft. The mission is conducted at 18 ASA sites 

across the United States with the Air National Guard operating 

out of 16 of those sites. 

The basic crews involved in the ASA mission have been tested 

several times, most recently when a plane was stolen in Canada 

and flown across the border into the United States. The plane was 

intercepted and finally landed on a Missouri—Missourah, I have to 

follow Chairman Skelton’s pronunciation—highway. The pilot was 

caught after he tried to flee the scene. 

All this should make us feel somewhat secure knowing that our 

space is well protected. So why are we here this morning? We are 

here because appearances are not always reality. This is a high-priority mission for which the Air Guard has volunteered, but the 

funding, which comes from active duty Air Force accounts, historically has not been allocated on a timely basis. This raises serious 

challenges for the Guard related to hiring personnel and providing 
2 

the necessary training to ensure the readiness of the crew supporting this mission. 

Last year, because of our concern that this mission was being ignored by the active duty Air Force, the committee proposed language to address the funding and personnel situation. Section 354 

of the fiscal year 2009—the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act requires the Secretary of Defense to provide in the 

Air Force budget justification documenting information on funding 

requirements for the mission and associated command and control 

elements, including military personnel costs and flying hours. 

I would be interested to hear from our Air Force witness General 

Darnell this morning how the Air Force is complying with that 

mandate. I recognize that because the full budget has not been sent 

up here yet, we will not be able to discuss specifics on funding and 

aircraft availability. We will have those details for a later posture 

hearing. But I do expect to hear that the Air Force is on track to 

comply with that statutory language. And I am sure that General 

Wyatt, Director of the Air Guard, will have a few things to say 

about this, too. 

With that congressional action, we believed we had fixed all the 

problems associated with the ASA mission. We soon found out we 

only scratched the surface. Congress has asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to do a review of the ASA mission. Their 

report which was issued in January was very troubling. I will let 

the GAO speak for itself and tell us in detail what they found, but 

I would like to highlight a few findings that bothered me the most. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 71.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mission document statements do not include the ASA 

responsibility for the Air Guard. Since this is ignored in the mission statements, the readiness of the units for the ASA mission is 

not adequately considered. NORAD does not conduct routine operation risk assessments, so we do not have a good idea in terms of 

what is really needed in terms of personnel, aircraft and types of 

units to perform the mission. The Air Force has not implemented 

ASA operations as a steady-state mission because they felt it would 

not be a lasting mission. 

I am also concerned that the Department’s responses to the 

GAO’s findings and recommendations were noncommittal. It is my 

understanding that NORAD and the Air Force provided comments 

to the Department on actions that they intended to take, but that 

those comments were not included in the DOD response. That 

might explain why the DOD response was unsatisfactory. According to DOD policy, the ASA mission is our number one priority. Mr. 

Verga can provide us a better explanation than what the Department gave to GAO on how the DOD intends to maintain ASA as 

DOD’s number one priority mission. 

Now I would like to turn to my good friend from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Randy Forbes, for an opening statement. Mr. 

Forbes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just want to say 

that I share your concerns regarding this issue. And I would like 

to thank all of our witnesses for being here today and for sharing 

your expertise with us and for your service to our country. 

As the Chairman mentioned, we learned a lot of lessons on September 11, 2001. We learned that a small group of nonstate actors 

could take thousands of American lives by attacking us from the 

skies above our homeland when they took a routine commercial 

flight operation and turned it into an extremely effective weapon. 

According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), there 

were nearly 680 million passengers on domestic flights last year 

and another 154 million flying between the U.S. and the rest of the 

world. To put it in perspective, that is more than the total populations of the United States, Japan, Russia, Mexico, Canada and 

the United Kingdom combined. And this number does not include 

nearly 28 million air hours flown by the fleet of more than 234,000 

general aviation aircraft owned by private pilots and flight schools 

around the country. 

Mr. Chairman, I raise this point because I think it is important 

that we all understand the scope of the problem and the enormous 

security challenges that we face. Although the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and their international counterparts have taken 

great strides to increase aviation security, it is imprudent to believe that their actions will completely mitigate the risk should 

someone attempt to do us harm. With over 830 million commercial 

passengers flying annually in and around the United States, the 

scope of the problem is too large, and the consequences are too 

great. 

You mentioned the incident last week involving the general aviation aircraft that was stolen from Canada and flown into U.S. airspace. I certainly want to applaud all those involved in the response and the resolution of that situation. 

I also want to highlight that just this Monday, a Canadian passenger jet with 159 passengers and 8 crew members on board was 

hijacked by a lone gunman who, according to initial press reports, 

somehow made it past security. Fortunately the police were able to 

gain control of that situation while the plane was still on the 

ground. 

Although neither of these events appear to be linked to any terrorist organization, they do highlight that current security measures are not impenetrable. Our skies and our citizens are still vulnerable to those wishing to do us harm. 

With that said, I find the issues at the heart of today’s hearing 

concerning. The findings in the GAO report and the lackluster response from the Department of Defense require our attention. And 

I am thankful to you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I am 

hopeful that we have got the right set of witnesses here to address 

the issues, and I would like to welcome once again each of them 

to the committee today. 
4 

Today’s hearing focuses on the policy and resourcing shortcomings between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the 

Air Force and the Air National Guard. But I know, Mr. Chairman, 

that we both agree that NORAD and Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM) also play a critical role in the execution of the air 

sovereignty alert mission. As we go through the course of the hearing today, we may find that we will also need to have a direct discussion about the air sovereignty mission with them as well. 

Several of our subcommittee members have worked hard in this 

area, and we recognize their contributions. I thank Mr. LoBiondo 

for his work in this area. And we look forward to their continuing 

efforts. And, Mr. Chairman, I now look forward to hearing from our 

witnesses, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. I would like to welcome our witnesses, 

and thank you for taking the time to appear this morning. Today 

we have with us Ms. Davi M. D’Agostino, Director of Homeland Defense and Emerging Threats and Warfare, Defense Capabilities 

and Management Team, United States Government Accountability 

Office. Thank you very much for joining us. 

Mr. Peter F. Verga, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. Thank 

you, Mr. Verga. 

Lieutenant General Daniel J. Darnell, United States Air Force, 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space and Information Operations, 

Plans and Requirements. Thank you, sir, for joining us. 

And Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt, United States Air 

Force, Director of the United States Air National Guard. 

Welcome, Ms. D’Agostino. Whenever you are ready, you can 

begin your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DAVI M. D’AGOSTINO, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

DEFENSE AND EMERGING THREATS AND WARFARE, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Forbes and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here before you this morning to discuss GAO’s January 2009 report on opportunities to improve management of North American Aerospace Defense Command’s, or 

NORAD, and Department of Defense’s, or DOD, air sovereignty 

alert operations. We will be calling them ASA going forward. 

NORAD and DOD have fueled and armed fighter aircraft and 

trained personnel on constant alert at 18 sites across the United 

States. Given the continued air threat, it is crucial for this capability to function at a high level of readiness. 

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, currently the Air Force provides 

NORAD with personnel and equipment for these operations, including F–16 and F–15 aircraft. Air sovereignty alert units are 

tasked to conduct and train for both their overseas and homeland 

operations. ASA operations are ground operations that take place 

before the aircraft go airborne. These operations support multiple 

missions, including the Joint Staff’s Operation Noble Eagle, in addition to NORAD’s homeland defense contingency plans. 
5 

Today I will address the following three questions. First, does 

NORAD routinely conduct risk assessments to determine its ASA 

operational requirements? Second, has the Air Force implemented 

ASA operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with 

NORAD, DOD and Air Force guidance? Third, has the Air Force 

developed a plan to address the potential aircraft shortfalls to sustain ASA operations for the future? 

First, NORAD had performed three risk assessments in response 

to individual DOD leadership requests about ASA operations, but 

the last one was done in 2006. Such risk assessments, if done on 

a routine basis, could help NORAD determine the appropriate levels and types of resources for the mission, and particularly, this is 

important, in a resource-constrained environment. 

Second, at the time of our review, the Air Force had not implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission. Because it is not 

treated as such, the Air Force programmed money for ASA operations in two-year increments. This has been the case even though 

DOD in December 2003 directed the Air Force to program money 

across the six-year future years defense program submissions. 

This incremental funding, the two years versus a six-year approach, apparently has created several challenges for the ASA 

units. Unit commanders we interviewed identified funding, personnel and dual tasking of responsibilities as the top three factors 

affecting their ability to perform these operations. Seventeen of the 

twenty units that we talked to said that personnel issues were a 

moderate or great concern, and that recruiting, retention and promotion limitations were the primary issues due to the two-year 

funding approach. Some commanders even told us that they had 

lost some of their most experienced personnel due to job instability 

caused by the two-year funding approach. 

Finally, a key consequence of not being a steady-state mission 

was that the readiness of the units to conduct these operations is 

not being fully assessed. NORAD partially assessed readiness 

through individual inspections that they do about every 20 months, 

but the Air Force, which is a force provider, is not monitoring readiness for these operations on an ongoing basis. And what is fundamentally important, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, this mission is 

not on the mission Designed Operational Capability (DOC) statements for the units, and therefore it is not being measured in the 

readiness system, or Status of Resources and Training System 

(SORTS). 

Finally, at the time of our review, the Air Force did not have a 

plan to manage potential aircraft shortfalls to sustain ASA operations for the future. We identified a potential shortfall in the 

number of available aircraft that could affect units performing ASA 

operations. Our analysis does have some assumptions based on information that DOD provided us and assumes the Air Force would 

provide F–35s to all the Air National Guard units doing ASA operations. I would point out, though, we recently reported that the F– 

35 acquisition program may face schedule slippage risks because of 

this production schedule. Until we see Air Force plans for managing this difficult situation with the competing demands for the 

new aircraft, it is unclear to us whether replacement aircraft will 
6 

be available to mitigate the potential fighter shortfall for conducting ASA in the homeland. 

I would like to just mention that we made several recommendations, which you went through briefly, sir, and even though DOD 

agreed or partially agreed with our report’s recommendations, we 

couldn’t tell what actions they were going to take. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, this concludes my 

prepared statement. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. D’Agostino can be found in the 

Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. Mr. Verga. 

STATEMENT OF PETER F. VERGA, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY INTEGRATION AND CHIEF OF 

STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. VERGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Ortiz, Congressman Forbes, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today on 

the Department of Defense protection of the air sovereignty of the 

United States. As reflected in the National Defense Strategy, the 

core responsibility of the Department of Defense is to defend the 

United States from attack upon its territory at home and to secure 

its interests abroad. The U.S. Armed Forces protect the physical integrity of the country through an active layer of defense. They also 

deter attacks upon it directly and indirectly through deployments 

at sea, in the air, on land and in space. 

Within the Department of Defense, our responsibility to defend 

the United States is assigned to the binational U.S.-Canada North 

American Aerospace Defense Command. NORAD provides aerospace warning, aerospace control, including air sovereignty, and 

maritime warning for all of North America. Consistent with the 

law, the Secretary of Defense assigns forces to the United States 

Element of NORAD to perform its assigned mission, and ensures 

that such assignments are consistent with the force structure prescribed by the President. 

During the Cold War NORAD focused its defense of the United 

States on air threats, originating from nation states. Although the 

probability of a nation state air attack has greatly lessened, the 

Secretary of Defense has said, quote, the United States still has to 

contend with the security challenges posed by the military forces 

of other countries, from those actively hostile to those at strategic 

crossroads, and the United States military must be able to dissuade, deter and, if necessary, respond to challenges across the 

spectrum, including the armed forces of other nations. 

Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, when terrorists hijacked civilian airliners and used them as weapons against innocent civilians, NORAD’s focus has expanded to include terrorist air 

threats originating from within as well as outside the United 

States. Terrorists remain the preeminent air threat to the United 

States. As observed by President Obama during his Inaugural Address, our Nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. NORAD’s vigilance against potential attacks 

from within and from outside the United States is a critical distinction between our air defense posture pre-9/11 and post-9/11. 
7 

Collectively the interagency of the Government of the United 

States provides 20 layers of security to enhance the security in the 

aviation domain. And while no system is fail-safe, collectively these 

security measures have created multiple barriers, thereby reducing 

the likelihood of a successful attack using the air domain. 

Through Operation Noble Eagle, NORAD defends the United 

States by surveilling U.S. airspace and the Nation’s air approaches, 

and by positioning air defense alert fighters throughout the country. These alert fighters, whose numbers may be adjusted to meet 

changing threat levels, are capable of reaching targets threatening 

our Nation’s major population centers and national critical infrastructure within minutes to dissuade, deter and, if necessary, defeat air threats. Supporting and complementing these alert fighters 

are defense and Federal Aviation Administration surveillance radars, airborne early warning aircraft and supporting tanker aircraft. 

In addition, in defense of the National Capital Region, the seat 

of our government, Operation Noble Eagle conducts air patrols; 

maintains a dedicated 24-hour, 7-days-a-week alert fighter response at Andrews Air Force Base; and operates a dedicated 

around-the-clock ground-based air defense missile system. In addition, the United States Coast Guard supports NORAD with alert 

helicopters to intercept low- and slow-flying aircraft should they 

penetrate the National Capital Region air defense zone. 

In 2005, DOD employed a unique visual warning system in the 

National Capital Region to supplement traditional radio communications to warn wayward pilots to contact FAA air traffic controllers immediately and to exit National Capital Region restricted airspace they may have violated. 

Currently, to facilitate interagency cooperation, DOD maintains 

liaison officers in the TSA-hosted National Capital Region Coordination Center on a full-time basis and provides key interagency operation centers and the National Capital Region Coordination Center access to DOD’s classified conferencing capability, which is used 

for DOD coordination and decisionmaking during their response to 

domestic air threats. 

Operation Noble Eagle is a joint operation managed under the 

Global Force Management Plan to provide timely, risk-balanced 

resourcing to NORAD requirements for capabilities and forces. 

DOD ensures that the air sovereignty force furnishes capabilities 

consistent with U.S. national security objectives and a long established risk management system in conjunction with the Global 

Force Management Plan. Although the Global Force Management 

Plan currently directs the U.S. Air Force to support the Operation 

Noble Eagle mission, the majority of which is currently provided by 

the Air National Guard, the Department may draw upon capabilities of active duty Air Force or any other DOD component to fill 

the Operation Noble Eagle air sovereignty mission with U.S. Navy 

E–2 Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning aircraft or U.S. Marine 

Corps F/A–18s. 

DOD will also continue to refine its risk management approach 

to ensure that military capabilities and resources are available to 

carry out its core responsibility to defend the United States. As 

stated in the National Defense Strategy, the challenges before us 
8 

will require resourcefulness and an integrated approach that wisely 

balances risks and assets, and that recognizes where we must improve. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

We appreciate your leadership, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

subcommittee, and your continued support for the Department of 

Defense, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Verga can be found in the Appendix on page 54.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir. General Darnell. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DANIEL J. DARNELL, USAF, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF STAFF FOR AIR, SPACE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General DARNELL. Good morning, Chairman Ortiz, Ranking 

Member Forbes and distinguished members of the committee. 

Thank you for calling this hearing and for the opportunity to discuss Air Force air sovereignty operations. 

The January 2009 Government Accountability Office report focuses on a vital mission area that has been a part of the Air Force 

and Air National Guard for over 50 years. The GAO report provides useful recommendations the Air Force can take to better support ASA operations. We have analyzed the GAO findings and are 

working to comply with the recommended actions. The Air Force 

stands ready to win today’s joint fight and plan for tomorrow’s 

challenges. 

I thank the subcommittee for allowing me to appear before you 

today and for your continued support of the Air Force. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Darnell can be found in the 

Appendix on page 58.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. General Wyatt. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HARRY M. WYATT III, USAF, 

DIRECTOR, U.S. AIR NATIONAL GUARD 

General WYATT. Thank you, Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member 

Forbes and members of the committee. 

Secretary Gates wrote in the 2008 National Defense Strategy, 

and I quote, a core responsibility of the U.S. Government is to protect the American people, in the words of the framers of our Constitution, to provide for the common defense, closed quote. As we 

sit here today, nearly 3,000 men and women of the Air National 

Guard are protecting the skies over our heads. This includes Air 

Guard members manning first Air Force and its air defense sectors 

and operation centers; and the air crews, maintenance personnel 

and other support personnel at 16 of the 18 U.S. air sovereignty 

alert sites throughout the United States. 

The January GAO report focused on the air sovereignty alert, 

those sites that were conducting steady-state ASA operations up 

through September of 2008. I would like to put a face to some of 

the Air National Guard challenges associated with ASA. 

As, Mr. Chairman, you indicated, at 2:55 p.m. On April 6th, a 

Cessna 172 was stolen from an airport in Thunder Bay, Ontario, 

Canada. It entered U.S. airspace over Michigan’s Upper Peninsula 
9 

at 4:23, and at 4:43 it was intercepted by two F–16s from the 148th 

Fighter Wing, Duluth, Minnesota, Air National Guard. I would 

point out to the committee that the first responding aircraft are the 

oldest aircraft and the first aircraft to age out, which we anticipate 

will happen in fiscal year 2015. 

As the pilot flew over Minnesota south through Wisconsin, Illinois and Missouri, escort duty was then handed off to the 115th 

Fighter Wing, Wisconsin Air National Guard. And we have a member of that unit with me today. Seated behind me is Staff Sergeant 

West Chadwick. He was a member of the air sovereignty alert 

team that performed that mission. And I will tell you more about 

Staff Sergeant Chadwick here in just a second. 

Subsequent to the Wisconsin Air National Guard, the Louisiana 

Air National Guard F–15 picked up the mission, and throughout 

the mission tanker support, in-flight refueling was provided by the 

117th Air Refueling Wing, Alabama Air National Guard. By the 

way, they were flying a 50-year-old aircraft. 

While this incident ended well, it demonstrates several important points that the Chairman has already recognized: First, that 

the threat to U.S. sovereignty from the air has moved beyond Soviet bombers to include aircraft on domestic flights, as we learned 

on September 11, and slow-flying, low-altitude planes, such as the 

Cessna 172. What is next? Perhaps Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

(UAVs), cruise missiles launched from offshore, and surely the 

maritime threat. 

We must not again underestimate the ingenuity and technological capability of our adversary. As the September 11th Commission aptly noted, beware the failure of imagination. These threats 

require different defensive capabilities, including modernizing and 

recapitalizing both our fighter and aerial refueling aircraft fleets, 

and rethinking about how this mission is sustained in the terms 

of funding and personnel. 

I would submit to you that ASA is a system of systems, including 

surveillance radar, early warning systems, command and control 

and communication systems, certainly the fighters, which get a lot 

of the attention, but the tanker fleet also and the Airborne Warning and Control (AWAC) System. But I submit to you that the most 

important part of this system are the dedicated professionals, the 

people, that accomplish this mission. 

You are well aware of the challenges that the U.S. Air Force has 

in modernizing and recapitalizing both its fighter and refueling 

fleets. We have been working closely with the Air Force and their 

planning, but to date there are no firm plans to replace the Air National Guard F–15 and F–16 fleet currently protecting our skies. 

The ASA fleet in the Air National Guard is among the oldest and 

therefore the most at-risk force that we have. 

Over the last several years Congress has been very helpful in 

funding Air National Guard’s ASA radar modernization program. 

This program requires continued attention if we are to meet today’s 

threats and bridge capabilities to the next generation of fighter aircraft. ASA is essential to improve both capability and sustainment. 

For example, if the Cessna had entered U.S. airspace in a hightraffic area such as New York, it would have been very difficult for 
10 

the older F–16s to find, identify and track it with the older radar 

systems that they had. 

The aging KC–135 fleet, as you are well aware, is especially critical for the Air National Guard not just for the ASA mission, but 

for the fight overseas. The ASA mission is dependent upon air refueling, and the Air National Guard has some of the oldest KC– 

135s in the total force fleet. Example: The 117th that performed in 

this mission with a 50-year-old aircraft. 

The most important part of ASA, as I indicated, is our people. 

On an average day there are more than 1,600 Air National Guard 

men and women performing the ASA mission in Title 32 status. 

That includes not only fighter pilots, but aircraft weapons maintenance, life support specialists, intel specialists, security forces, and 

avionic specialists such as Staff Sergeant Chadwick. 

The GAO report states the Air Force has not implemented ASA 

operations as a steady-state, ongoing and definite mission. For the 

Air National Guard this translates into two primary issues, the 

first, funding a lack of consistent predictable funding; and second, 

the equipment part that we mentioned earlier. 

Funding affects our people in various ways. Many of those manning the alert sites are on temporary Active Guard and Reserve 

tours. Two-year funding means that these people are on two-year 

contracts that end at the end of September. The next one will be 

this September. They do not know if they will have a job after their 

contract ends. They don’t know what to tell their civilian employers; are they returning to work, or are they not? In fiscal year 

2008, only 772 of our required 922 Air Guard Reserve (AGR) positions were funded. The difference is filled with traditional guardsmen on mandates, and they are caught in that same predicament: 

Do they have a job, or do they not? 

Staff Sergeant West Chadwick has joined me here today. He is 

an avionic specialist with the 115th Fighter Wing, Wisconsin Air 

National Guard. I would ask that he stand as I relate to you his 

personnel situation, but it is a situation that is echoed throughout 

the gallant people that are performing this mission. He helped prep 

and launch the alert birds that intercepted the aircraft intruder on 

6 April. He is an example of the outstanding guardsmen who are 

personally impacted by the lack of consistent funding and planning 

for this mission. 

From October 2005 to September 2007, Sergeant Chadwick 

worked ASA at Truex Field as a temporary AGR on Title 32 orders, 

but he didn’t know if his job was going to continue past September 

31st of that year because of a lack of funding. He therefore volunteered for his wing’s Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotation 

in the theater. And that is a key point, because these ASA alert 

sites flying F–16s and F–15s are also involved in the United States 

Air Force AEF rotation. It is not only an ASA fleet strictly, it is 

one that we use in the AEF rotations also. 

But he volunteered to go to Balad in January through March of 

2008. In the meantime, from October of 2007 to January of 2008, 

he entered college; no income, no health coverage, and he married 

in December of 2008. He returned from Iraq in April and was offered another temporary AGR tour from May through September of 

2008, when the funding ended again. His orders were late arriving, 
11 

so he didn’t go on duty until June 5th, so he went for two months 

without pay. He eventually received some back pay, but he lost 

TRICARE coverage during that period of time. He has deployed one 

other time on an AEF rotation, and, as he sits here today, has volunteered yet for a third time. Because his unit must sustain ASA 

even as the rest of the unit deploys for their AEF rotation, the unit 

must first find a volunteer to replace Staff Sergeant Chadwick in 

his ASA job. 

I would like to personally thank Sergeant Chadwick for his dedicated service and perseverance. Thank you very much. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would submit that the homeland 

defense mission is the primary mission of the Department of Defense. ASA is a primary component of that homeland defense mission, but we in the Department of Defense need to work together 

to better ensure the long-term viability of the capability. 

The United States Air Force today has the power and the ability 

to fix both of these problems, first by funding within the Future 

Years Defense Plan (FYDP), and, second, assisting in the recapitalization of the Air National Guard early, but not late. Recapitalization of ASA is recapitalization of the United States Air Force. It 

should not be viewed as competitive, but rather complementary to 

the recapitalization of the Air Force, because when you recapitalize 

the ASA fleet, you are recapitalizing those same jets that perform 

the AEF mission. The Air Force can have its cake and eat it, too, 

with early recapitalization of the Air National Guard. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you for 

your time and support. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in the 

Appendix on page 63.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, General. Thank you so much for your 

dedication and your commitment. We are proud of you and other 

members of the Air Force, the National Guard and the Air Force, 

for doing a tremendous job in keeping our country free from an attack. 

This reminds me. I come from Corpus Christi, and we are prone 

to hurricanes, and they can strike with a devastating force. But 

then after it strikes, there is a calm until the backside of the eye 

of the storm hits you again. And thank God that we have been— 

I guess because of the work that you have done—that we have not 

been attacked again. 

But as I was listening to this mower cut the grass, I thought 

somebody was intruding into our airspace. But thank you so much 

for your testimony. 

Now, I would like, beginning with Secretary Verga, to ask questions about how is the Air Force intending to comply with section 

354 of the fiscal year 2009 and the double A? 

Mr. VERGA. Well, Mr. Chairman, I know that it was our understanding that the Air Force was, in fact, preparing the necessary 

budget display materials to allow the committee the information 

that it required. I am actually not personally prepared to say what 

the Air Force is doing. I would ask that the General address that 

specifically. But that is what we need to do is to give you the information that is necessary. 

Mr. ORTIZ. General Darnell. 
12 

General DARNELL. Mr. Chairman, we have read the language. 

Our intent is to comply. You should see the information broken out 

in the documents that come over for the budget, and we feel like 

it is exactly what the committee is looking for. 

So as I said before, the intent is to comply. It is our first attempt 

to ensure you have got the information you need. We will certainly 

work with your staff if there is any other visibility that is required. 

Mr. ORTIZ. And this very important to us. This committee has a 

huge responsibility, number one, to provide what you all need to 

defend our country, our skies, and be ready to dispose of anybody 

who might be trying to attack. 

Let me ask GAO a question. Unless, General, do you have any 

comments? The GAO, I want to ask them a question to see do you 

believe DOD’s comments to your report were responsive to your 

findings and recommendations? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Chairman, we noted that DOD did concur 

or partially concur with each recommendation, which we always 

appreciate. But normally when they really do concur, they tell us 

what they plan to do to implement the recommendation and when 

they plan to do it by. In this case we did not have a lot of that kind 

of response in the discussion or the narrative of the comments. 

Mr. ORTIZ. And I wonder why there was not adequate response 

to the question from GAO. 

Mr. VERGA. As Ms. D’Agostino said, we did—the primary office 

with responsibility for this bureaucratically in the Department of 

Defense is the Office of the Inspector General handles the staffing 

of GAO reports, and then it goes down to an office that has a substantive expertise on it. In this case it is the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security 

Affairs. That is the office that did, in fact, concur or partially concur in the recommendations, agreeing with the needs as stated by 

the GAO, but not necessarily the specific courses of action that 

were recommended. 

We have, in fact, responded to a bunch of follow-up questions 

that we had with the GAO, trying to work together with them. My 

understanding is to date we have not had the sort of back-and-forth 

on those responses to the additional questions. But I assure you 

that when we concur with a recommendation or partially concur, 

partially concur meaning we agree with what you said but not necessarily the remedy that you suggested, that we will, in fact, follow 

up on them. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I would like to ask GAO do you agree? It is not that 

I am trying to put anybody or picking on you guys. This is not our 

intent. But what we are trying to do is to get to the bottom of this 

so that we can give you what you need and so that we—and you 

all to comply with the direction of what the Congress gave you. So, 

ma’am, if you could. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. If I could just draw on a specific example to explain. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Could you get closer to the mike? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Sure. 

If I could just draw on a specific example of the DOD comments 

to one of our recommendations that was a little confounding for us. 

We recommended that the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) direct 
13 

the Secretary of the Air Force to formally assign the air sovereignty alert mission to the units that are performing those operations at steady-state sites and then ensure that their readiness is 

measured. The DOD response was, we partially concur; we are furnishing clear direction through the Operation Noble Eagle execution order. And they indicated they might review the execution 

order at some later date. But our situation was you don’t have to 

review the execution order to have the Air Force assign the mission 

to the unit. 

So it was confounding to us, very confusing, in terms of why they 

brought up the execution order for Operation Noble Eagle, which 

isn’t the only foundation for the ASA operations, as you know. And 

so it was very confusing to us, and it remains so today. So we just 

wanted somebody to direct the Air Force to assign the mission, it 

was pretty straightforward, and measure the readiness, and then 

we got this execute order (ex-ord) discussion, which doesn’t really 

apply to the recommendation, because you can fix the problem 

without changing the execute order, okay? Does that help? 

Mr. ORTIZ. That helped. But let me just ask one more question, 

and then I would like to allow some of our Members who have 

other important questions. 

What concrete actions would the Air Force take after today’s 

hearing to ensure that the ASA operations are implemented as a 

steady-state mission? 

General Darnell. 

General DARNELL. Mr. Chairman, I will answer that question. 

Ms. D’Agostino’s point—and when you talk about ex-ord and the 

fact that she didn’t feel like it really gave her the detail that she 

needed—what we really need to do is to assign the mission via 

DOC statements in the squadrons, which we are in the process of 

doing. Just talking with my staff this morning, Air Combat Command (ACC) has been working with the Air National Guard. All 

but two of the ASA units have submitted their recommendations 

for DOC statement tasking. We should have that wrapped up, we 

hope, by late summer, early fall. 

But when you have a DOC statement that assigns a mission, 

then lots of other things fall in place. You are inspected on a regular basis. You are trained and organized and funded and 

resourced according to your DOC statements. This speaks to General Wyatt’s point, frankly, about the funding not being long term. 

And I agree with his statement; I agree with the GAO’s finding as 

well. So I already talked to the resource managers in the Air Force. 

We are already working to make this a long-term funding mission 

for the Air Force versus the two-year construct that we have right 

now. 

Mr. ORTIZ. And we want to help. Anything that we can do to 

help, whether it is a personnel matter, is it equipment, let us 

know, because we want to work with you. We want to do everything we can to protect our country. 

And with that, now I would like to yield to my good friend Mr. 

Forbes for any further questions that he might have. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, first of all, let me start with Sergeant Chadwick. The Chairman and I both want to thank you for your service, and we appre-
14 

ciate your attendance here today, and we owe you better than we 

have been giving you. And as the Chairman mentioned, we are not 

here to point fingers at anybody. We are here just to make sure 

that Sergeant Chadwick and the other people serving our country 

don’t fall between these gaps sometime when we are trying to provide for resourcing them. 

The other thing that sometimes frustrates us as we watch is we 

are in negotiations with China from time to time, and they always 

come in every time, and it is the same thing. They spend a long 

period of time just denying something happened, and then all of a 

sudden they start agreeing it happened, but we never see them 

change. And so what we are trying to do here in as friendly a way 

as we can is to say how do we just move this ball to make sure 

it happens? 

And, General Darnell, your statement is probably the best statement that we will have here all day. If we can get that mission 

statement assigned, I think this hearing would have had a huge 

importance, because as I look at it, the bottom line is prior to September 11th, I think we had about 4 sites operable, and then after 

9/11 we got, as you testified, about 18 sites going. 

There is no question that this is a mission that is going to be ongoing, and eight years is probably long enough for us to get that 

picture and to assign it, because the three things we are concerned 

about you mentioned, General: the training, the inspection, but 

also the capitalization. I think if we can just assign those missions, 

the others will probably flow through. And so I am just optimistic 

of hearing that. And that was going to be my whole line of questioning, but you have answered that. 

The one question I would have for Mr. Verga, just to clear up for 

me, you indicated, if I didn’t understand you, that Operation Noble 

Eagle is managed under the Global Force Management Plan. I 

think that is a Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)-administered program; is it, or is it not? 

Mr. VERGA. The Global Force Management Plan is the dynamic 

process by which the Secretary of Defense, advised by the Chairman of the Joint Staff, allocates forces to all the worldwide combatant commanders for the missions that are assigned to them. That 

is a process that is ongoing; when we decide to do more in Afghanistan, drawdown in Iraq, when we decide we have greater air 

threats against the United States, all of the forces worldwide are 

managed dynamically in terms of those which are assigned to the 

combatant commanders who bear responsibility for those various 

missions. 

Mr. FORBES. Help me with the connectivity here, because, and I 

could be wrong, but as I understand it, when the airmen are on 

alert, they are in Title 32 status, which basically are under the 

States. How do we know that they are there? I mean, is this something we just kind of hope for, is it something that we kind of guess 

that they are going to be? How do we connect those dots to make 

sure that that is part of your plan if they are sitting in a Title 32 

status? 

Mr. VERGA. I will defer the specific answers to that, though. The 

Secretary holds the combatant commander who has responsibility 

for the mission responsible for the readiness and the ability of the 
15 

forces to do that mission. He then turns to the force providers, either the United States Air Force or the Air National Guard component of the Air Force, to organize, train and equip those forces for 

the missions that they may be assigned to do. 

The dynamic nature of the Air National Guard providing ready 

day-to-day forces and this Title 32 while you are on alert and Title 

10 as soon as you take off in the air is a process that has worked, 

to my understanding, very effectively over the years. It has never 

been brought to my attention that we have ever had a problem 

with being assured on the readiness. We see reports every day on 

the numbers of fighters and all those things like that, but I will 

turn to the general to give me the specifics. 

General WYATT. Mr. Forbes, this may help a little bit. I think the 

root of the problem goes back as far as the Global Force Management (GFM). Global Force Management goes back to the issue with 

the DOC statements. The management of personnel through GFM 

relies heavily upon DOC statements for resourcing of the people. If 

you have a DOC statement, that is the beginning document that 

results in the assignment of manpower, assignment of equipment, 

determination of minimum essential task listings that the unit has 

to do, unit tasking codes; that sets up a reporting system that allows the commander then to report sometimes in a classified manner the status of forces as it relates to the DOC statement. 

The problem in the past has been that these units have not had 

DOC statements. They have for their general purpose, but not for 

ASA. ASA has been an additional duty, if you will, kind of a pickup game. And so without the DOC statement and the resulting 

support systems that flow from the Department of Defense and the 

United States Air Force, the manning of ASA when a unit goes 

AEF is basically left up to the Air National Guard and the Air 

Force and Air Combat Command to work their deals, if you will. 

And it is kind of an ad hoc system that, thanks to the great volunteerism that we have in the Air National Guard, we have not 

missed a lick, but we rely upon great support from the United 

States Air Force to continue that mission. 

It would seem to me that the appropriate thing to do—and, as 

General Darnell indicated, we have already started writing those 

DOC statements. It is not anything that I can push up through the 

system. He can pull, I can push, and we can get these DOC statements done and then have the Air Force corporate system take a 

look at the importance of the mission. These units do not go 

unevaluated. NORAD does do AFE, alert flight evaluations, to 

make sure that they are trained, ready and capable to do the mission. 

But I think the key is—I am from Oklahoma, and actions speak 

a whole lot louder than words. And when I hear comments about 

the mission not competing well against other missions that DOD 

or the Air Force may have, I kind of scratch my head. And I think 

that is reflected in the status that we currently have. But I kind 

of scratch my head, and I ask myself, what is more important than 

defense of the United States of America? And when we can match 

up the priorities that the Department of Defense and the United 

States Air Force give defense of the homeland with the resourcing, 

with the tasking, then I think we, no kidding, can step back and 
16 

say we are resourcing the number one mission for this country adequately. 

Mr. FORBES. Should the assigned alert personnel be in Title 10 

status, or do you think Title 32 status is adequate? 

General WYATT. Title 32 works very well. It allows us to field a 

capability. As soon as that aircraft is launched, they go into a Title 

10 status. This situation has worked very well for us in the past. 

It allows the type of flexibility that the local commanders need to 

man the mission, but yet it allows the pilots to be in the appropriate Title upon execution of the mission. It has worked very well 

for us in the past, and I would urge that it be continued. 

Mr. FORBES. I want to just echo what the Chairman said, and 

that is if there is anything this subcommittee can do to help move 

that process along, we want to be here to do it. 

Secondly, to also echo what he said in terms of thanking you for 

keeping us safe. Regardless of what blemishes, warts, remedies 

that we need to do, you have done a fantastic job from September 

11th on. If you hadn’t, people would have been in here pointing fingers. So we want to make sure we just take this opportunity to 

thank you. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. And this is what is good about this panel. 

We put you together, GAO, Air Force, so that we can get to the bottom of what we need to do to correct anything that needs to be corrected. 

Now Ms. Giffords. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Forbes, as well for this hearing. And I truly believe, just like General Wyatt talked about, this is the number one mission of the 

United States Government, of representatives of the United States 

Government, and it is the number one mission of our military. 

The job of protecting our homeland, General, falls squarely on 

your shoulders; it falls squarely on the Guard, and certainly on 

Staff Sergeant Chadwick and your colleagues, because the responsibility really lies within your parameters. And since 9/11, you have 

stood 24-hours-a-day alert for the last 397 weeks. 

I believe that your mission is unquestionable. But the future of 

this mission, Mr. Chairman, I think is in question. And this hearing is so important because I am certainly not hearing the answers 

that I think are necessary for the people that we represent. I believe that the Air Force and the Department of Defense has failed 

to plan for the future of the ASA. And by failing to adequately 

study legitimate options for resourcing the mission, I believe that 

we are talking about a virtual reality and not about a real-case situation. I think our Air Force has generated report after report assuring us that serious consideration has been given to the issue, 

yet we have not seen specific planning, and certainly we have not 

seen the action necessary. 

The Air Guard’s largest fighter wing, the 162nd, is in Tucson, 

and Tucson is my hometown. It is responsible for the overflights of 

Phoenix, the fifth largest city in the country. Ensuring their viability is vital to more than four million people in the metro area. During the recent NORAD review of the 162nd, the inspection team 

lead said of our alert detachment, the 162nd, it is the best F–16 
17 

maintenance in NORAD. But unfortunately, when you look at the 

current glide slope—and I urge Members to really study this, and 

I will be passing it on to other Members that don’t serve on the 

subcommittee or even the committee—unfortunately the 162nd will 

have no flyable aircraft in just six years, and Tucson is just the tip 

of the iceberg. 

Our Arizona experience is indicative of Guard facilities across the 

country who face an uncertain future. As the Air Force continues 

to look over the horizon, they are ignoring the rapidly approaching 

fighter shortfall at home. In eight years, 80 percent of our Air National Guard aircraft will be unfit to fly. This is a hard fact that 

will result in a serious gap in domestic air sovereignty. On any 

scale measured by any metric, an 80 percent loss is simply unacceptable. When those aircraft are removed from service, our 

guardsmen, our pilots, our maintenance crews, our support crews 

in Tucson and across the country will principally be out of a job. 

So we have to take this opportunity to prevent a dangerous and 

irreversible shortfall. This is going to require earnest leadership 

from the Air Force and from the Department to choose the right 

option based on the facts. To shore up our Air Guard’s ability to 

secure the homeland, I believe that we have to choose to invest in 

more of the legacy aircraft that our guardsmen already know how 

to fly and to fix. We should reject service life extension programs 

that are penny-wise and pound-foolish. And while fifth-generation 

aircraft are undoubtedly the future for many units, relying solely 

on that aircraft that to this day only flies in the world of 

PowerPoint is equally shortsighted. These aircraft are not expected 

to be delivered to the Guard for more than a decade, and we simply 

can’t wait that long. 

My guard unit, my constituents, this committee, the people that 

they represent, the American people, deserve to have the answers 

that we have repeatedly requested from the Department and the 

Air Force. We are not simply concerned about force size. We have 

to sustain a balance in total force structure. 

So with that I have some questions for General Wyatt. Specifically, when you look at the chart showing that the fighter waterfall 

will hit the Air Guard over the next 8 years, can you please address the consequences of an 80 percent reduction in capability and 

its negative impact on our national military strategy? 

General WYATT. Yes ma’am, I would be happy to, and thank you 

for the question. 

You are exactly correct. We have about—of the 16 fighter units 

in the Air National Guard that are pulling alert, 11 of those are 

F–16 units, and of those 11, 8 are scheduled to reach the service 

life of their aircraft in the fiscal year 2015 through 2017 year period, Tucson being one of those. 

We have made some progress recently in working with Air Combat Command in addressing the recapitalization of those aging aircraft. We have not seen a flight plan yet for recapitalization that 

takes care of that problem. There have been statements made that 

the Air National Guard is written into the beddown of the F–22 

and the F–35, and those statements are correct. But the timing of 

the beddown is what concerns me more than the numbers of the 

aircraft right now, because the only plan that I have seen that has 
18 

been published to date has the Air National Guard getting into 

these weapon systems, as you say, about 10 years late to need. So 

we have been working with Air Combat Command to push forward 

or accelerate the fielding of the F–35 and F–22 into Air National 

Guard units early, and we are making some progress there. 

But the thing to consider is that the Air Force has other competing missions that they must weigh. And this goes back to my 

previous statement, that as we weigh and balance the importance 

of all of these very important missions, I have a hard time understanding why defense of the homeland is not the number one and 

should be focused on for early capitalization. If the Air National 

Guard could get into the earlier fielding of these weapon systems, 

this problem would be solved. If it is not solved, then some other 

force will have to pick up that mission, and it detracts from the 

Navy’s mission, the Marine Corps’ mission and the overseas fight 

that the United States Air Force has. 

So I share your concern, and that is one of the three main issues 

that I think the GAO report and this committee should rightly be 

interested in. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, but I would 

just like to emphasize that if we lose these guardsmen and 

guardswomen, we will not get them back. Right now we have a 

force that functions very well, highly trained, highly competent; obviously, as we heard from Staff Sergeant Chadwick’s biography, 

very committed to the cause. But I think that we are headed in the 

wrong direction by changing course and not supplying our units 

with what they need. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. And if necessary, we will have 

a second round of questions. 

My good friend Mr. LoBiondo from New Jersey. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for holding 

the hearing. I also would like to thank my colleague, Congresswoman Giffords from Arizona, for joining in with me in trying to 

raise the level of attention, should we say. And the level of frustration, at least from my part, and I think from some of my colleagues, is really growing. We for years now have been hearing 

that a plan will be unveiled, a plan will be developed, solutions will 

be laid on the table. And, Mr. Chairman, I don’t know how long we 

wait on this, but the clock ticks. 

We have heard what is going to happen in 8 years with 80 percent of our force. I represent the 177th Fighter Wing out of Atlantic 

City, arguably one of the most strategically located homeland security bases in the Nation by virtue of their proximity to New York 

City and Washington, D.C., and we have all of the same concerns 

without getting any of the answers. 

Mr. Verga, would you say that protecting the homeland from direct attack is the number one priority as outlined by the National 

Defense Strategy as we know it? 

Mr. VERGA. Yes, sir. I would agree with that. It also enjoys a 

very high priority in what is called the guidance for the employment of the force, which is what we do. We tell the services and 

combatant commanders how to actually employ the force. 

I would say that I am a little bit disturbed—is probably the word 

I would use—about a direction I think I see some of the comments 
19 

going in, and that is the sort of fencing and dedicating of this mission to the Air National Guard. While we have traditionally employed the Air National Guard part of the total force to do this mission, I do think we must keep in mind that it is a mission broadly 

for the Department, not necessarily a mission limited to any single 

component of the Department. I personally do not think we are 

going to suffer a gap in the air defense of the United States any 

time in the foreseeable future due to the priorities that this is afforded. 

I would separate that in my mind from the equipping and recapitalization of the aircraft currently assigned to the Air National 

Guard for their support of the total force mission. So that is just 

a comment I think I would like to make. The mission is not going 

to suffer. 

Now can I say authoritatively that the fighter wings that you are 

concerned about are going to be first up for getting replacement 

aircraft? No, I can’t say that. That is a master plan that the Air 

Force will have. But the assignment of sufficient forces to accomplish the mission of defending the air space of the United States 

and maintaining air sovereignty is unquestioned. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I am thrilled to hear that but maybe it is just 

my mind or maybe some of my colleagues can help me out or the 

chairman, if the mission is protected and guaranteed, then there 

has to be some ability to articulate how that is going to happen. 

Because unless the Air Force is going to dramatically increase its 

numbers, and we don’t know what the tempo is going to be in Afghanistan or even maybe what it will be in Iraq or some other location around the world, and clearly the assets that the Air Guard 

is using are running to the end of their useful life, so we can say, 

well, okay, maybe we don’t need Air Guard units, but in my mind, 

if an Air Guard unit goes away, it goes away. You can’t flip a 

switch and bring it back. These folks are the best bang for the buck 

I think we have in the military. And part of my frustration is that 

we don’t have an understanding of how the protection of the mission will be accomplished. 

General Darnell, do you believe that we are going to have a problem in 6, 8, 10 years with the fleet reaching the end of its useful 

service? 

General DARNELL. Congressman, we will ensure that there is no 

problem, and our dilemma at this point right today is we have a 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) discussion coming up. We have 

to wait until we get on the back side of that to be able to definitively give you something as of today to say exactly where we will 

be at. But as General Wyatt said, we have been working very closely with the Guard, ACC has, and this is not something we are ignoring. We are trying obviously to ensure that the Nation has the 

safety and defense that it requires. 

As Mr. Verga said, we will ensure, whether it be through the Air 

Force or a combination of forces, that this Nation is defended. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, General. But Congresswoman Giffords has a chart that is easily understood. And what we would like 

to see is that what you are telling us about basically don’t worry, 

we are going to have a plan and it is all going to be okay, we would 

sort of like to see that. I think the chairman has articulated he 
20 

would like to see it. I think GAO talked about that a little bit. And 

I would feel a whole lot better if you could come to the full committee or to this committee and be able to articulate why it is that 

we shouldn’t be concerned. Because if you look at the chart and you 

look at the aircraft that are coming offline, and you look at the 

challenges that the Air Force has, at least to me, as just an average Member of Congress, I can’t connect the dots in my mind. 

I know I am running tight on time, but General Wyatt, one question for you. Do you have an opinion as to what the solution would 

be for this fighter gap problem? If you had your ability to make 

your choice, not worrying about what somebody else was going to 

say, what would you say the choice would be to fix this problem? 

General WYATT. Thank you for the question, sir, and let me try 

my best to answer that. And Mr. Verga makes a good point that 

this mission should not necessarily be fenced to the Air National 

Guard, although I would maybe counter that with the fact that the 

Department of Defense has sought willing participants for this mission from across the services, and the best resolution, primarily for 

expense purposes that you pointed out, the most efficient force is 

the Air National Guard. That is the solution in my mind that 

works the best. 

I tried to make the point that recapitalizing the Air National 

Guard fleet should not be considered as competitive to recapitalizing the United States Air Force because these same units are rotated in and out of theater in the AEF rotation. So it is not strictly 

a fencing or dedication argument, as has been proposed, but rather 

a recapitalization of the United States Air Force, a portion of that 

recognizing the importance of mission number one and recognizing 

the unique ability and cost efficiencies of the Air National Guard 

in performing that mission. My preferences would be that when we 

recapitalize, ‘‘we’’ being the United States Air Force, that we recapitalize as a total United States Air Force, and we field these capabilities concurrently and proportionately between the active 

duty, the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard. And if we 

do that, we can take care of the issue that you have pointed out 

with the waterfall charts. We can do this through the concept of 

associations and recognizing that there is great benefit, especially 

in the ASA mission, of the distribution of locations offered by the 

Air National Guard. We are strategically located, as you pointed 

out, in Atlantic City, New Jersey, from your constituency, but if 

you take a look at the locations of all the ASA sites in the Air National Guard, they are located where they can quickly react to a 

threat that may come from any of the 360 degrees of air space that 

we protect. But through the construct, not only recapitalization, 

but construct of associations where we mesh active duty and Air 

National Guard and in some cases Air Force Reserve, I think that 

is an answer, too, in addition to the recapitalization issues that we 

have talked about. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I thank you, General. And I am in complete concurrence with your answer. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope you will found ways to continue to keep 

the heat turned up on getting some of these additional answers. 

Thank you. 
21 

Mr. ORTIZ. I think that the gentleman has raised some very important points. We would like to see the replacement of these fighters that are getting old. We would like to see a budget. We would 

like to see the training. We would like to see what the National 

Guard is going to do. I think that you are raising some very important issues here. 

Ms. Shea-Porter. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. Mr. Verga, you said that the mission is not going to suffer. And I grew up in a very large family. 

And we had work lists every single day twice a day because my 

mother knew the mission of that Shea household would suffer if we 

didn’t all know who was doing what. And so I just wanted to take 

a little bit of the comments that were in the GAO report and perhaps Ms. D’Agostino will talk about it, but I am concerned NORAD 

had not conducted routine risk assessments to determine ASA 

operational requirements, including the appropriate level and types 

of unit personnel and aircraft for the mission, and that the Air National Guard units that are performing the ASA mission do not 

have the mission included in the designated operational capability 

statement. Is that so, Ms. D’Agostino? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, ma’am. Yes, it is. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And does that worry you, like it worries us? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. It concerned us. Let me clarify that. NORAD 

did do three assessments in response to individual requests from 

the leadership at the Department largely looking to save money. 

And each time they did these risk-based assessments, the current 

number of units and assignment of aircraft, et cetera, and personnel were apparently validated. So that there was no reduction 

and no change from the 18-unit, the current configuration. 

I guess our only concern is that you know things change and the 

threats are asymmetric, that it makes a lot of sense to do risk assessments on a routine basis and also in light of the current fiscal 

constraints that we are facing as a nation, it makes sense to take 

a good hard look at your requirements. And we think the best way 

to do this is through a risk-based assessment process, and that 

would consider threats, vulnerability, criticality, and then you have 

to consider resources as well and you would prioritize your needs 

or your requirements and then resource those highest priority requirements. 

So that is why we suggested that they do a routine risk assessment process to determine their requirements and so they have 

valid justification for what they request. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Are you also concerned about a diffusion of responsibility when so many different groups have a piece of it? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. We were very concerned that the air sovereignty alert mission was not on the DOC statements of these 

units and because of that, it really created, I don’t want to use the 

‘‘waterfall’’ thing, but it has a number of rolling consequences for 

the units in terms of, you know, their readiness, that is not put 

into the readiness system, they are not measured, their training 

isn’t checked up on. So as an Air Force responsibility, we thought 

that they needed to formally assign the mission to those units, and 

that is why we recommended that. 
22 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Obviously I concur. And I would like to associate myself with the Congresswoman’s comments. I have the same 

concern. I think the American public would be horrified to know, 

let me make sure I have the count right, but that in 2001 we had 

14 aircraft designated for this mission, is that correct? And now we 

have 54. 

So let me ask the next question, please. And I don’t know if it 

makes any sense or not, but knowing that we are facing a problem 

with a shortage of aircraft and knowing the other circumstances, 

does it make any sense to have more active duty wings at Air National Guard bases? Would that in any way help alleviate some of 

the pressure at least for the planes themselves and maybe for some 

of the personnel? 

I have absolutely no idea if that is a reasonable question or not 

but it occurred to me. 

General WYATT. I think one way to answer your question would 

be to go back to a previous comment I made about associations. As 

the number of fighter aircraft available for the defense of the country and execution of all of our missions, including those overseas, 

I think it makes sense to look at ways to become more efficient in 

the recapitalization, in the placement location of those capabilities 

and in the different components, strengths and weaknesses as we 

try to figure out a better way to proceed forward. 

The days of unconstrained capability are long gone. And I am 

very appreciative of the financial concerns that the country is experiencing right now. And I think one of the ways to make sure that 

we most efficiently meet the taskings of this mission, but all of our 

missions overseas, is to place a great importance upon the association construct that considers location and some of the ideal locations that the Air National Guard provides for these particular 

missions, but we also need to recognize that there are some ideal 

locations where the active duty Air Force can provide for these 

types of missions. And so I think location should not be determined 

based upon whether it is Air National Guard or United States Air 

Force but where the location best serves the interest of the country. 

And then as we put those units together because we have fewer air 

frames to fly but we need to maintain the pilot proficiency, the 

maintenance proficiencies, and we need to, especially in the Guard, 

we need to provide this country with a surge capability—I mean 

that is what makes the Air National Guard the most efficient 

force—is that not only do we handle the day-to-day ASA and our 

share of the AEF rotations, but we are also available for that surge 

capability. If we have limited numbers of airplanes, you nevertheless need a surge capability because pilots and maintainers cannot 

work 24 hours a day. If you have to deploy or you have a situation 

in the United States of America that requires 24-hour-a-day operations at a much greater level than the current steady state, you 

need to have access to that surge capability. 

And I think the association construct, whether it is what we call 

active associations where the active duty comes to a Guard location 

or whether it is the classic association where Guard members go 

to the active duty, we need to do the smart thing. We need to do 

both of those in locations that make sense for air sovereignty alert, 
23 

but also makes sense for some of the other missions that the Air 

Force does. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. I know my time has run out but 

I would also like to thank the men and the women of the National 

Guard. We are still working on trying to make things right for 

their service. Thank you and I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Wyatt, one 

issue I want to raise, a Colorado specific issue, is Buckley Air Force 

Base, which was a former National Guard facility, but it has our— 

we have the wing component or the F–16 component of the Air National Guard there. They are hopefully going to go to F–35 at some 

point. There is some concern, my district has the eastern edge of 

that coming up to the base and I think there is concern about encroachment onto, in and around the base where we might lose that 

flying mission. I wonder if you might comment on any efforts made 

there to preserve the flying mission there relative to development 

around the facility. 

General WYATT. Congressman, as you are aware, the Colorado 

unit is one of those units that performs ASA. My good friend Mike 

Edwards, the Adjutant General of Colorado, himself a fighter pilot, 

is very attuned to the issues and challenges and in fact he contributes greatly to the expertise within the Air National Guard that 

addresses these issues. 

You speak of encroachment. I have been to Buckley several 

times. I hate to admit the first time I was ever in an F–100, flown 

A–7s in there, been there on a number of different aircraft, and I 

remember the days when Buckley was kind of out there on its own. 

And you are right, there are encroachment activities. And that is 

true of some Air National Guard bases. It is also true of active duty 

bases. And I think we need to be cognizant of that as we look forward to forward basing. 

But in talking to General Edwards, I am aware of some significant efforts by your leadership and the leadership, the local leadership in Colorado, to be cognizant of the encroachment issue and do 

what can be done to make sure that that does not adversely affect 

the possibilities of the Colorado Air National Guard in this recapitalization effort. 

I hope that answers your question. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Wyatt, just another comment. I have introduced House Resolution 1879, the National Guard Employment 

Act of 2009. And it takes into account the folks that are called up 

within the United States as well as dealing with the five-year limit. 

I wonder if you might be able to comment on that. 

General WYATT. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. And thank you 

very much for your interest in that particular area because it demonstrates sometimes what unintended consequences of some really 

good intentions to begin with. We talked about the status that 

guardsmen are in when they perform the ASA mission, and up 

until about 2005 it was Title 10 status for not only the pilots when 

they launch but also as they sat alert and for some of our maintenance crews and supporting personnel. In 2005, because Title 32 

status gives the wing commanders a little more flexibility in providing manpower for that mission and handling their other 
24 

taskings, the law allowed Title 32 people to do that mission, converting to Title 10 when the mission was launched, which I think 

is the proper way to do that. 

The provision in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) that you talked about has a fiveyear limitation. The USERRA protection is only available for five 

years unless—there are some exceptions to that—unless you were 

called to Title 10 service or to serve in OCO, Overseas Contingency 

Operations, or any other similarly situated wars. When we went to 

the Title 32 status, that same protection was inadvertently, I think 

in my mind inadvertently not provided for our Title 32 folks, so 

that as they do the same mission they were doing in Title 10 but 

now simply because of their conversion to a Title 32 status, they 

lose that exception, and now after 5 years of doing ASA, they have 

no reemployment rights. I don’t think that was the intention of the 

original legislation, but your legislation fixes that problem and provides that same sort of relief that we thought was the right thing 

to do under Title 10 for doing that same mission to Title 32 folks 

that are doing the ASA mission. 

So I thank you very much for your attention to that problem and 

helping fixing it. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, General Wyatt. 

Any other comments by the panel? Mr. Chairman, I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General, very quickly, before I yield my time to Ms. 

Giffords, we had the unfortunate death of a National Guardsman 

the night of Katrina. Because he died while under Title 32 status, 

his widow and children received a smaller death benefit than had 

he died under Title 10. Now with the help of General Blum and 

General Casey, we were able to fix that. I am just curious. Is that 

still the norm, if one of your pilots dies on a training mission, is 

married, is his widow still, would his widow receive a smaller 

death benefit than if he died under Title 10 status? 

General WYATT. Congressman, there still are differences in the 

benefits that are available under the varying different statutes, you 

know, active duty in support of operations, State active duty, Title 

32 and Title 10. We are making some progress in equalizing those 

or making those more equitable. I think you will find guardsmen 

understand the difference that they are not full-time active duty 

members serving in Title 10 status, and certainly there will be 

some differences between the benefits that are available under the 

different statutes. But I think what they are looking for is an equitable treatment. 

The particular issue that you point at is one of those areas where 

they—there needs to be equity because when a person gives their 

life regardless of the status, we as a country, in my opinion, need 

to take care of the survivors of that airman, soldier, sailor or Marine. 

Mr. TAYLOR. If you feel free to do so, I am requesting you to put 

that statement in writing. I would like to have it. I think it is one 

of the things we ought to try to address this year in the defense 

authorization bill. 
25 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission I am going to yield the remainder of my time to Ms. Giffords. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 129.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Ms. Giffords is recognized. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Congressman Taylor. 

General Wyatt, given the Department’s strategy in terms of closing the F–22 production line and reports of the Test and Evaluation Directorate, specifically for the delays in the Joint Strike 

Fighter program, can you please discuss in the limited time we 

have left the bridging strategy to continue to use the fourth generation aircraft until fifth generation solutions are available to the 

Guard? 

General WYATT. I will be happy to give it a shot, Congresswoman. The question sometimes asked, you know, what platform 

is, would be good for this mission? And I have recognized that we 

are in a fiscally constrained situation. I am interested in capabilities. I am interested in being able to do the mission. The Air National Guard is going to do this mission with whatever platform 

Congress decides is the appropriate platform, because after all the 

Constitution provides that Congress raises and equips armies and 

air forces. And I appreciate that fact. I also appreciate the fact that 

sometimes what we would ideally like to have may not be affordable. I caution against having a separate platform for ASA from 

United States Air Force for the reasons that I previously discussed 

in that these units also perform AEF rotations and they need to— 

whatever platform is finally decided or whatever options are finally 

decided upon by Congress I would hope takes into consideration 

that these units also perform AEF rotations and need to be able 

to fuse with and use the same capabilities as any other unit in the 

United States Air Force or the Department of Defense. 

As far as options, you mentioned some of those. We are looking 

at fifth generation fighters. I think the decision needs to be made, 

where does air defense and defense of the country range on the 

scale of priorities of the missions that the Air Force will be required to perform? And I think our decision on that should be driven by the importance of the mission. 

In the fiscally constrained situation that we are in, if that is not 

possible, certainly there are fourth generation, 4.5 generation options out there. There is also service life extension options out 

there. Each one has their advantages over the other. Each one has 

disadvantages. And I prefer not, you know, there are a lot of different scenarios that we can get into, what if this happens or what 

if this happens. But my concern is that the capability is available 

for the country for the long term and that it not end in fiscal year 

2015, 2016, or 2017. 

So I think whatever options that Congress decides is the right 

thing to do, and I have every confidence that Congress, in its wisdom, will decide what is the right thing to do, that capability 

should be applied towards this mission set, whether it is the Air 

National Guard, United States Air Force, Navy or Marine Corps 

doing the mission. It needs to be a capability that the country expects for the number one mission for our military services. 
26 

Ms. GIFFORDS. General Wyatt, do you think upgraded models of 

fourth generation aircraft like the Block 50 F–16s have the sufficient capability to conduct the ASA now and also for the years 

ahead? 

General WYATT. I think what you have to look at is the rising 

threats that we see out there with the maritime threat, with cruise 

missiles, with UAVs, whether they are sea base launched or 

launched within our borders or without our borders, with some of 

the capabilities of weapons of mass destruction that can approach 

the United States from any sector. This mission, this defense, is a 

lot different than an offensive mission overseas. Because if we have 

the option overseas, we decide the time, the place, and the method 

and the weapons systems of choice. We don’t have that luxury in 

defense of the United States. We have to be ready 24 hours a day, 

365. We have to defend from all axes of attack. We have to use our 

imagination, if you will, to think of platforms that, or capabilities 

that may be used to attack the United States. So as we try to answer that question, does fourth generation, 4.5 generation, have 

the capabilities to provide the defense we need, we must first of all 

look and try to analyze what sort of threat we are talking about. 

The use of radar, I mentioned that in my opening statement, is extremely important because it is a leap in technology that allows us 

to meet some of those challenges that I just talked about. 

Again, if you consider, and I know cost is going to be a consideration, but if we are in the situation where Congress decides that 

we simply can’t afford fifth generation airplanes, then we need to 

take a look at the capabilities necessary to meet those threats that 

I just talked about, and whether that be fourth generation, third 

generation fighters, whatever is the best answer, looking at the 

whole problem, not just ASA, but our other continuing missions, 

whatever answer Congress gives us will be what we use to defend 

the country in this its number one mission. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. My friend, Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I was excited when I heard General Darnell’s comment about the mission 

statement and including that for the Guard, and then, Mr. Verga, 

I heard your comments and I just want to clarify the two. I understand about not being fenced in. But I hope your statements were 

not to be interpreted to mean that you disagreed with General 

Darnell’s position that the mission statement would be written to 

include that for the Guard because I don’t know how else we would 

get the training, inspection and capitalization. I just wanted to 

clarify that if I could. 

Mr. VERGA. Absolutely not. We fully support the Air Force’s efforts in doing that. Their mission of organized training and equipping forces to provide to the combatant commander to carry out the 

missions that are assigned from the President through the Secretary to that commander is extremely important. My only point 

was that we need to not lose sight of the fact that it is a mission 

for the total forces of the Department of Defense of the United 

States, not any particular subcomponent of it. And I just wanted 

to make sure that we don’t lose sight of that. 
27 

Mr. FORBES. And the last thing I will say is really more of a comment than a question. From the outset of this year we have been 

asking this question to try to get into the mindset of Department 

of Defense as to how you are setting your priorities so that we can 

know. General Wyatt said something incredibly important when he 

said that they would use whatever platforms Congress deemed to 

be appropriate in their wisdom in making those decisions. I have 

an enormous fear right now that we have had a sea change, and 

the big concern that I have, General Darnell had mentioned that 

you wanted to get on the back side basically of QDR when you are 

doing this planning. I fear that we have shifted now. Instead of 

having a strategy that is driving our budget, I think we are looking 

at our budget driving our strategy. And one of the things that I am 

very frightened when I see these gag orders coming out to the Department of Defense for this cone of silence where the people that 

are making this information and have the information, General 

Wyatt, that we need to make those decisions, and they can’t even 

talk to us, that they are barred from doing that, I think that is an 

unconscionable action to take place. I think it is a dangerous action. It is one that I hope we will all stand up and say we can’t 

afford to not get this information. And just one other thing, and the 

chairman of Seapower Subcommittee knows far more about this 

than I do, but when we begin to do things like moving the Inspection and Survey (INSURV) inspections and classifying those, the 

danger with that is that that information—we can get that communicated to us but we can’t communicate it to the general public or 

to the press or anybody else. And I think that is a dangerous avenue for us to go down because, General, I think it keeps us from 

making the wisest decisions and getting those appropriate platforms. 

And Mr. Chairman, with that, I will yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just real quick, General Wyatt, prior to 2003, when we were flying combat air patrol, when the Guard, many Guard units were flying combat air patrol in Iraq in the no-fly zones, it obviously took 

a lot of resources relative to flying the ASA, I am assuming relative 

to flying the ASA mission, I assume we had more units deployed 

in Iraq than doing the ASA. I wonder if you can comment on that 

and then comment on our capability. It seems that in Iraq and Afghanistan right now that our fixed wing missions are not as robust 

as they normally would be in a conventional versus a counterinsurgency conflict. I am just wondering if we got engaged in a conventional conflict, does the Guard have the capability of performing 

both missions, ASA and a conventional mission, with the Air 

Force? 

General WYATT. Thank you for the question, Congressman. The 

answer to your question is that our units do the ASA mission not 

as part of their DOC statement but as part of the mission assignment and we have addressed actions that we, as an Air Force and 

the Department of Defense, will take to correct that. But these 

units that pull ASA do do the AEF rotations. We are always striving to modernize the Air National Guard equipment that we have 

because, as you know, sometimes the Air National Guard doesn’t 
28 

have what I call the front line capability that the active duty Air 

Force has. We try through our modernization programs and working with the Air Force to provide the capability that allows our systems to fuse with and become a relevant partner with the active 

duty force in these overseas rotations. 

The best example I can give you would be out of my personal experience as a wing commander and as a young pilot that my leaders decided that it was important for the Air National Guard—we 

were in A–7s at the time converting to F–16s, and the Air National 

Guard had no precision guided targeting capability at that point in 

time. The Air Force recognized that as a requirement, but because 

of their budget limitations could not fund targeting pod acquisition 

for the Air National Guard. So thanks to Congress’ insight in the 

need, relevant need for that capability, through the National Guard 

and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) we were able to acquire 

targeting pods and have continued to do so through today’s date 

that allows our systems and our capabilities to more fully mesh 

with and be a part of the total force as we engage in combat. 

We continue to do that today, and I would hope that one of these 

days we will get to that point where a capability may be funded 

across all three of the components proportionately and concurrently. That is what I am pressing for. But in the interim period 

of time we will continue our efforts—and it is not just the fighter 

fleet, it is the large aircraft fleet with the LAIRCM, the large aircraft infrared countermeasure systems. We are using NGREA 

funds to help these self-protective systems in these airplanes so 

they are more relevant in the warfight overseas. And we will continue those efforts with the help and support of Congress. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. I think that we had a very, very 

good hearing today. And you know, sometimes Congress makes up 

committees and they play a very important role. And sometimes in 

this case we do have a check and balance system and because we 

are all seeing it from the same page as you. There are some weaknesses on one side maybe the other side can correct it. But I want 

to thank all of you for being with us today. And we do have a good 

check and balance system. And thank you for being candid with us. 

Remember, we are all singing from the same page and if it is a 

budget problem, if it is an equipment problem, whatever you need, 

let us know. We are here to work with you. But you know we have 

huge responsibilities. We see the big, big picture being ready to defend this country. At times we see that air fighter has been grounded. Whether they are Navy, Air Force, or whatever, they are 

grounded. We want to be sure that we have the right equipment, 

the right personnel to defend this country. 

One of our key members of this committee, Chairman Reyes, who 

is chairman of the Intelligence Committee, couldn’t be here with us 

today. He had a death in the family. And his mother-in-law passed 

away, and this committee offers our condolences to Chairman 

Reyes. 

Being no further business, this committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 22, 2009 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR 

General WYATT. Federal entitlements for Air National Guard members who die 

on Active Duty (Title 10) or Active Duty for training (Title 32) are equal. In addition, many States offer additional death benefits for their guard members who die 

in the performance of their duty. These benefits vary greatly from State to State. 

Every Air National Guard base has a Casualty Assistance Representative assigned. This individual works with the Air Force Casualty or the Air Reserve Personnel Center Casualty office (depending on the status of the member at the time 

of death) and provides benefit counseling to survivors. 

Thank you for your inquiry regarding Title 10 vs. Title 32 death benefits for members of the Air National Guard. We appreciate that the Congress continues to recognize the sacrifice of our members and that regardless of status, when a service 

member gives their life, we as a country, take care of the survivors of that Airman, 

Soldier, Sailor, Coast Guardsman, or Marine. [See page 24.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 22, 2009 

(133) 

1The number of ASA sites that could be without viable aircraft varies depending on the assumptions that are made. Our January 2009 report entitled, Homeland Defense: Management 

Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace (GAO-09-184), identifies the assumptions we made while analyzing the Air Force and Air 

National Guard data.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

Ms. GIFFORDS. The GAO report states that ‘‘the Air Force faces two challenges 

to sustaining its ASA capabilities over the long-term—(1) replacing or extending the 

service life of aging fighter aircraft and (2) replacing ASA units with equipment and 

training personnel when they deploy.’’ 

In your review, how would you say the Air Force has performed and is performing 

on those two key challenges? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. We found that the Air Force did not have plans to manage or 

deal with either of these challenges even though they could adversely affect the 

long-term sustainability of ASA operations. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. At this rate, what impacts will affect the Air Guard and the ASA 

mission? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Until the Air Force develops plans to address the availability of 

fighter aircraft to conduct ASA operations, our analysis of Air Force and Air National Guard data (as of April 2009) reflects that there will be a number of ASA 

sites, including those supported by Air National Guard units, that will not have 

enough viable aircraft to train and conduct both ASA operations and expeditionary 

missions (e.g. military operations in Iraq). 1 Additionally, unless the Air Force develops a process to replace ASA units with equipment and trained personnel when they 

deploy and as they transition to different aircraft, the voluntary process that ASA 

commanders currently use to find replacements may continue to be inefficient and 

burdensome. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Do the current projections for Air National Guard capabilities meet 

our nation’s ASA mission requirements? 

General WYATT. The current projections for the Air National Guard capabilities 

meet the nation’s near-term ASA requirements. The Air National Guard and the Air 

Force are working together to ensure there is no gap in mid-term capability and solutions are in place for the long-term capability. The solution to ensure the availability of aircraft for the United States’ requirements in the long term will require 

a combination of effective legacy fleet management, force shaping, and recapitalization with a Total Force approach. We are working with the Air Force to produce 

this solution and ensure the strategic requirements of the United States are met.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. General Darnell, in reading the GAO report and testimony one 

would think ASA operations and locations are not routinely assessed to include personnel capability to perform the mission, training, equipment, and mission responsiveness. I was under the impression these units do receive regular oversight in the 

form of readiness inspections. Can you please discuss briefly what these readiness 

inspections include, how they assess the unit’s mission and your level of confidence 

in their results as they pertain to unit’s ability to conduct the ASA mission? 

General DARNELL. The Inspector General (IG) for the North American Aerospace 

Defense Command (NORAD) performs inspections and evaluations that provide a 

comprehensive assessment of the units’ readiness to perform the Operation NOBLE 

EAGLE (ONE) mission. Specifically for ONE, the NORAD IG is the only entity that 

evaluates unit readiness. However, all Air Force Major Command (MAJCOM) 

gained units which participate in ONE (Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, and Pacific Air Forces) have their primary missions evaluated by their respective MAJCOM IGs during Phase I and Phase II Operational Readiness Inspections (ORIs). 

Mr. FRANKS. General Darnell, the GAO report talks at length about the service 

life of our existing F-16 and F-15 aircraft and the impact that will have on the ASA 
134 

mission and homeland defense. General Renuart mentioned in his testimony to the 

SASC last month the Air Force was working on a plan to bridge capacities of our 

existing F-15 and F-16 fleet as the F-22 and F-35 become operational. Can you 

please discuss for a moment some of the options that are on the table? What concerns do you currently have with the transition or any potential gaps that may exist 

over the next 5, 10, 15 years? In addition, can you please discuss the role of tanker 

(air-refueling) aircraft in the ASA mission? Considering fighter operations are pretty 

dependent on tanker aircraft availability, do we currently have, or do you foresee, 

a problem with tanker aircraft support over the next 5-10 years? 

General DARNELL. Homeland defense is DoD’s first priority and the Air Force is 

committed to the ASA mission now through the long term. As you know, long term 

recapitalization of the fighter and tanker fleet requires many years. Within the 

funding available, the Air Force must maximize the life of the existing aircraft until 

they can be replaced. All of the options to ensure the ASA mission remains viable 

are dependent on the life expectancy of these airframes. 

The Air Force, in conjuction with DoD, is currently developing plans to ensure we 

can meet the combatant commander’s requirements for the defense of the Nation— 

whether it is with Air National Guard aircraft or in combination with active duty 

assigned aircraft. There are many moving pieces as we look at all the different Air 

National Guard units around the country to determine the best alignment of our 

limited resources. We anticipate an update from the Quadrennial Defense Review 

regarding national requirement, and subsequently, the Air Force’s requirement for 

this critical mission. 

Tanker aircraft are a critical force multiplier for the Air Sovereignty Alert mission 

through ground alerts, scheduled air refueling, and airborne orbits. Assuming that 

the number of tankers required by Combatant Commanders does not increase and 

unforeseen reliability or availability problems do not arise, the Air Force does not 

foresee any shortfalls in tanker support for the ASA mission today or in the next 

5-10 years. However in larger context of meeting National Military Strategy, Mobility Capability Study 05 identified a required tanker force of between 520-640 tanker 

aircraft. Currently, there are 474 legacy tankers (415 KC-135RT, 59 KC-10A) in the 

Air Force fleet. The Air Force is taking action to minimize risk by modernization 

of the current tanker fleet and recapitalization through the KC-X program to fill 

tanker fleet requirements. 

Mr. FRANKS. General Wyatt, there has been a great deal of discussion on aircraft 

availability and long term sustainment of the ASA mission, however GAO sited 

‘‘Personnel Issues’’ and ‘‘Funding’’ as the two highest factors identified by ASA Commanders as ‘‘Moderately or Greatly Impacting Units’ Ability to Conduct ASA Operations.’’ Can you please discuss for a moment some of the Personnel Issues that are 

driving these Commanders to list this as one of the highest factors of concern? 

General WYATT. The ‘‘Funding’’ and ‘‘Personnel Issues’’ identified in the GAO report highlight the historical need to utilize various funding sources for the part time 

guard members that were put on full time status to perform the ASA mission for 

the United States. The full time manpower used to execute the ASA mission at ANG 

units is now funded every two years in the POM cycle. Previously, the Air Force 

corporate structure did not fund the requirement at 100%, which meant that various 

other sources of funding were required to cover the difference in execution year 

funding. This funding often occurred last minute and would occasionally require 

members to change types of orders, sometimes even in mid-fiscal year. This instability in funding causes members to experience interruptions in medical benefits, 

monthly pay, leave tracking, and concern about their future employment. The current ASA requirement for the full time manpower is funded at 100% in the FY10 

PB. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIGHT 

Mr. BRIGHT. According to the National Guard posture statement, 80% of Air National Guard F-16s will begin to reach the end of their service life in 8 years. Unfortunately, the F16s we fly at Dannelly Field are part of that situation with service 

lives ending generally between 2017 and 2020. It is my understanding that new 

F22s and F35s will be provided to the Air Guard at some point later than that so 

it appears that there will be a ‘‘fighter gap.’’ If Air Guard fighter units have no 

planes to fly, I can’t imagine the units will survive. This is of deep concern to me 

because we fly F16s in the Air Guard in my state. Does the Air Force have a plan 

to address this ‘‘fighter gap’’ in Air National Guard F16 units like mine in Alabama? 

General WYATT. The Air Force is concerned about F-16s nearing the end of their 

service life. The AF will sustain the F-16 Block 30 aircraft to ensure they meet the 
135 

programmed 8,000 hour service life. The AF also has plans to transition some ANG 

units currently flying F-16s to other fighters such as the newer block F-16s, A-10s 

and F-15s. These transitions will enable us to bridge the gap between the F-16 and 

its fifth generation fighter replacement. 

With the current fiscal constraints on our fifth generation fighter procurement 

schedule, some units currently flying fighter aircraft will transition to other relevant 

AF missions. Several ANG units have already transitioned to emerging mission sets 

that are vital to our national defense such as the unmanned aerospace system, and 

direct command and control support for our combatant commanders. These missions 

are critical to today’s war efforts, homeland defense, and wartime readiness. These 

new mission sets have kept these units relevant to today’s mission requirements 

and the future needs of our nation’s defense. 

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