J-A05019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANTWAN JOVAN WASHINGTON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 575 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 4, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003985-2018.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MARCH 31, 2023

Antwan Jovan Washington appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his pleas to murder of the third degree and two counts of 

aggravated assault,

1 an aggregate term of 27 to 55 years of imprisonment. 

He challenges the discretionary aspects of sentencing. We affirm.

The sentencing court summarized the facts of this case:

On July 31, 2018, several officers with the Allentown Police 

Department responded to a report of a shooting inside a residence 

located [in Allentown]. Inside the residence, police located 

Britney Garland (31), [C.M.] (16), and Adrien Welch (19), the 

victims, who were suffering from gunshot wounds. They were

transported by ambulance to Lehigh Valley Hospital. [C.M.] was 

shot eight separate times, including five times in her torso, once 

in her right arm, and twice in [her] left arm. She was pronounced 

dead by physicians at the emergency room. Britney Garland was 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 2702(a)(1).
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shot multiple times in her legs and she suffered from a fracture to 

her right femur. Adrien Welch was shot once in his right leg.

Investigating officers subsequently learned that 

[Washington] lived at the residence with Ms. Garland and her two 

children. They ended their relationship earlier that week. 

[Washington] left to go to New York and told her to sell his car. 

He subsequently returned to the residence. Upon his return, he 

found Ms. Garland cooking a meal for Mr. Welch and [C.M.]. Mr. 

Welch and Ms. Garland were dating one another.

[Washington] interacted with Ms. Garland and/or Mr. Welch, 

after which he proceeded up to the second floor. He procured a 

handgun from a bedroom, returned to the first floor, and began 

shooting, striking all three victims. [Washington] fled from the 

residence. He surrendered himself to the police at his former 

attorney’s office on August 2, 2018. The gun was recovered from 

a drop-down ceiling at [Washington’s sister’s apartment].

Sentencing Court Opinion, 4/13/22, at 2–3.

Police charged Washington with criminal homicide and two counts each 

of attempted homicide and aggravated assault. On August 19, 2021, 

Washington entered guilty pleas to murder of the third degree and two counts 

of aggravated assault. The only agreement was that his sentences for the two 

counts of aggravated assault would run concurrently. The court scheduled 

sentencing and ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report 

(PSI).

On February 4, 2022, the sentencing court imposed sentence in this 

case. At Count 1, murder of the third degree, the court sentenced Washington 

to 20 to 40 years of imprisonment. At Count 4, aggravated assault, the court 

sentenced Washington to 7 to 15 years of imprisonment. At Count 5, 

aggravated assault, the court sentenced Washington to 54 months to 10 years 

of imprisonment. The court ordered that Washington’s sentences at Counts 1 
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and 4 would run consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 27 to 55 

years of imprisonment.

Washington moved to reconsider or modify his sentence on February 

14, 2022. The sentencing court denied Washington’s motion the next day. 

Washington timely appealed. Washington and the sentencing court complied 

with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

Washington presents one issue for our review:

Whether the lower court abused its discretion in imposing 

manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentences when the court 

failed to consider any significant mitigating factors, failed to apply 

and review all the necessary factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9721(b) and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c) and (d) or otherwise failed 

to set forth appropriate reasons for its decision other than those 

already considered in the definition of the offenses?

Washington’s Brief at 6.

Because Washington challenges the discretionary aspects of sentencing, 

he must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by meeting four requirements:

(1) filing a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserving the 

issue at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify the 

sentence; (3) complying with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a 

separate section of the brief setting forth a concise statement of 

the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence; and (4) presenting a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b), or 

sentencing norms.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 275 A.3d 530, 534 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015)). Here, 

Washington filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his issue, and included 
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a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. Furthermore, he raised a substantial 

question by claiming that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence

and did not consider mitigating factors. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 

117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 

A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014)). Therefore, Washington has invoked our

jurisdiction over his claim.

Turning to the merits, we review a challenge to the sentencing court’s 

exercise of discretion for an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. 

Aulisio, 253 A.3d 338, 344 (Pa. Super. 2021).

An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of judgment; 

thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its discretion unless 

the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. 

In more expansive terms, our Court recently offered: An abuse of 

discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court 

might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of 

manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.

The rationale behind such broad discretion and the 

concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the 

sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper 

penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the 

individual circumstances before it.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169–170 (Pa. Super. 

2010)).

In imposing sentence, a court is obligated to consider factors including 

“the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the 

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative 

needs of the defendant,” as well as the sentencing guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 
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§ 9721(b). A court that imposes a sentence outside the standard range of the 

guidelines must state its reasons for doing so on the record. Id.; see

Commonwealth v. Mrozik, 213 A.3d 273, 278 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing 204 

Pa. Code § 303.13(c)). 

When this Court reviews a sentence within the sentencing guidelines, 

we must affirm unless “the case involves circumstances where the application 

of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2). 

For a sentence outside the guidelines, we must affirm unless “the sentence is 

unreasonable.” Id. § 9781(c)(3). We have concluded that a sentence is not 

unreasonable where the sentencing court fully considered the factors before 

it, even if the defendant disputes the weight given to those factors. 

Commonwealth v. Velez, 273 A.3d 6, 12 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Here, Washington argues that the sentencing court abused its discretion 

by considering only the crime and impact on the victims, ignoring mitigating 

factors such as his clean prior record and rehabilitative needs. He also 

contends that the court’s stated reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines 

for his aggravated assault conviction are inadequate. He disputes the 

sentencing court’s perception of the “benefit” of his agreement to plead to 

murder of the third degree.

At sentencing, the court explained its reasoning as follows:

All right. The record shall reflect the Court has thoroughly 

reviewed the pre-sentence investigation report along with all the 

attachments to that report which included the letters from the 

various family members on behalf of [C.M.], as well as the other 

accompanying documents including a mental health evaluation 
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which was completed sometime last year, doesn’t seem to have a 

date on it, but it was completed while [Washington] was in 

custody. I have also reviewed the letters which have been 

introduced as exhibits D-1 today, which were forwarded to me 

earlier, as well as the other photographs offered by the defense in 

exhibit D-2, and the photograph of [C.M.] as Commonwealth 

Exhibit 1.

[Every day,] sad cases come before this Court and today is 

no different. The tragedy suffered from both sides cannot be 

doubted. It is very likely that you did not have any ill will toward 

[C.M.], Mr. Washington. But you, of course, are here and she is 

not. A number of your family members expressed the concern 

that you had been characterized as a monster, either in the media, 

which frankly I don’t ever recall seeing, or by other individuals. 

And you are not a monster, you are a living person who is here 

and [C.M.] is not. You will be able to have a relationship with your 

children. [C.M. will] not.

There does seem to be some misunderstanding by some 

individuals, perhaps on both sides of this case, about the level of 

malevolence that the law requires to sustain a conviction of 

murder in the third-degree. Just to clarify for both sides, for 

murder of the third-degree—I am reading from the standard jury 

instruction, 15.2502C—[“]for murder of the third-degree a killing 

is with malice. If the perpetrator’s actions show his or [her 

wanton] and willful disregard of, and unjustified, extremely high 

risk that his or her conduct would result in death or serious bodily 

injury to another.

[“]In this form of malice, the Commonwealth need not prove 

that the perpetrator specifically intended to kill another. The 

Commonwealth must prove however, that the perpetrator took 

action while consciously, that is knowingly disregarding, the most 

serious risk he or she was creating. By his or her disregard of that 

risk, the perpetrator demonstrated his or her extreme indifference 

to the value of human life.[”] The second alternative for 

paragraph three in that instruction reads, “For murder of the thirddegree, a killing is with malice [if] the perpetrator acts with a 

wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness 

of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty indicating 

an unjustified disregard for the probability of death, or great 

bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the value of human 

life.”
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In large part Mr. Washington, you received the benefit of 

the plea bargain because your case was pled as murder of the 

third-degree, instead as originally charged as murder of the firstdegree, where you could have faced life in prison without parole. 

Your actions by sparing [C.M.’s] family of a trial to go through the 

ordeal of hearing that testimony are captured within that plea 

bargain. The injuries that you inflicted on Ms. Garland and Mr. 

Welch were obviously not as serious, still demonstrated at the 

very least a recklessness on your part toward their safety. Twice 

in the PSI you were quoted as saying, “You’d be speaking to the 

Court to explain those circumstances on that date.” I’m not sure 

I heard a complete explanation. But I understand that it was a 

confusing day for you. There may have been a variety of things 

that were affecting you on that date. And perhaps Ms. Garland 

was closest in saying the devil himself had some influence.

The facts, even though as described as Ms. Garland would 

indicate, that even if Mr. Welch had a gun, after he fled you 

continued to fire. Both wounding Ms. Garland and killing [C.M.] I 

will take into account the admirable role you played for members 

of your family and other individuals in society in fashioning this 

sentence, but I also have to address the clear record of the 

repeated shots that wounded [C.M.], ultimately taking her life, 

that you inflicted.

N.T., Sentencing, 2/4/22, at 105–109.

Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion. The sentencing court’s 

statements indicate that it considered Washington’s evidence in mitigation and 

all required sentencing factors. Washington’s sentence for murder of the third 

degree, while at the statutory maximum, was within the standard range. We 

affirm this sentence because we do not find the application of the guidelines 

to be clearly unreasonable. As to Washington’s sentence for one count of 

aggravated assault, the sentencing court stated that it based its deviation 

from the standard range on the severe wounds that Washington caused by 

repeated gunshots. We conclude that this was an adequate basis to impose 
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a 7-to-15-year sentence, and the sentence is not unreasonable. We therefore 

affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/31/2023