Th is c a se ha s a c omp lic a te d p ro c e dura l hi sto ry . In o ur op ini on tod ay , w e dis c us s o nly 1 that po rt ion

of the pr oc e dura l hi sto ry

that is re le va

nt t o th e iss ue pr e se ntl y

be fo re us . T ho se wanting a complete proce dural history will find it i n the opinion of the cour t of appe als. See (continued...) 

## IN THE COUR T OF CRIMINA L APPEALS

OF TEX AS
N o. P D - 0144- 08

JUST I N A M A D O R , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON THE ST ATE’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW I N CA USE NO . 0 9 - 0 4 - 5 0 7 - CR FRO M THE NI NTH C OU RT OF APPE ALS M ON TGO M ERY CO UNTY

H O L C O MB , J ., de liv ere d t he opi nio n of t he Co ur t, in whic h K ELLER , P .J ., and P RI CE , W OM ACK , K EASLER , H ERV EY , and C OCH RAN , JJ., joined. J OHN S ON , J., concurre d in the re sult. M E YE RS , J ., diss e nt e d.

Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls h e ld t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in de nying a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss. We reve rse. TheCon tro v e rsy 1AMADOR-- 2

(...continued) 1 Am ad or v . S tate , 242 S.W .3d 95 (Tex.App.–Be aumont 2007). Te xas P e na l Co de § 4 9. 04 (a ) p ro vid e s: “ A p e rs on c omm its an o ff

e ns e if the pe rs on

is 2 intox icated while operating a motor vehicle in a

public place .” Te x as Penal Code § 49.01( 2)(A) , in turn, provides: “‘I

ntox icated’ means not havingthe normal use of mental or phy sical fa culties by rea son of the introduction of a lcohol, a contr olled substance, a drug , a dang erous dr

ug , a combination of two or more of those substance s, or any other substanc e in the body .” Appellant’s motion to suppress did not identify what evide nce he wanted suppr essed, 3 nor, as f ar a s we c an disce rn fr om the rec ord, wa s such evidenc e identified at the suppression hear ing. T his is troubli ng . As Professor L aF ave ha s pointed out, a motion to suppress “must . . . identify the items which the de fenda nt seeks to suppress.” W. L aF ave, Search and Se izure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendme nt § 11.2(a) at 35 (4th ed. 2004) . I n the abse nce of such identification, the State a

nd the trial cour

t are left unaw are of how the de fenda nt was har

med by the alleg edly

illega l gove rnment ac tivity . I t could be ar g ued that, under such circ umstances, the trial court c ould properly

deny the motion to suppress as inadequate. See O ’Neal v. United States , 2 22 F .2 d 4 11 , 4 12 (D .C. Cir . 1 95 5) ; Sta te v . B e ll , 832 S.W .2d 583, 587 (Tenn.Crim.App. 19 91 ); Nor

ma n v . S tate , 3 02 So. 2d

25 4, 25 7 ( Mis s. 19 74 ). I n th e ins tant c a se , h ow e ve r, the State ha s n ot m a de su c h a

n a rgume nt, and

we did no t g ra nt r e vie w t o c on sid e r i t. Evidence obtained in violation of the F ourth Amendment may not be introduce d at trial 4 for the pur

pose of pr oving the defe ndant’s guilt. Ma pp v . O hio , 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). On J une 24, 2003, an a ssistant dist ri ct att orney in Montgomer

y County prese nted an information in the trial cour t char g ing a

ppellant with misdemeanor driving while intox icated ( DWI ). The infor mation alleg ed that, on or a bout J une 3, 2003, appe llant operated a motor veh i cl e i n a public place while he “ did not have the nor mal use of [hi s] mental and phy sical fa culties by rea son of the introduction of a lcohol . . . into [ his] body .” 2 On J anuar

y 6 , 2 0 0 4 , a

p p e ll an t f il e d a w r itte nmo ti o n

to s u p p r e s s “ an y

an d a ll e v id ence ” obtained as a result of an illega l, w arr antless arr est “made without probable c ause to be lieve [he] was

e ng a g e d in

c ri min a l a c tiv ity .” I n s up po rt of his mot ion , ap pe lla nt ci te d the F ourt

h Ame ndme nt t o 3 the Con sti tut ion

of the Un ite d St a te s. 4 On May 7, 20 04 , the tr ia l court he ld a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ngon

a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss.AMADOR-- 3

The videota

pe, which is in the re cord, w as appa rently shot by a video c amer a mounted 5 on F ounta in’ s p a tr ol c ar, wh ic h w a s p ark e d a sh or t di sta nc e be hin d a

pp e lla nt’ s c ar. Th e a

ud io and video qua lity

of the tape is mediocre. Th e re c or d d oe s n ot r e fl e c t w he the r F ou nta in a sk e d a

pp e lla nt t o p e rf or m th e fi e ld 6 sobriety tests or whethe r she or dere d him to do so. At that he ari ng , a

pp e lla nt c a lle d to the witn ess stan d th e arr e sti ngof fi c e r, De pa

rtme nt o f P ub lic Safety (DPS) Trooper

Ang ela C. F ountain, and play ed for the court a portion of Founta in’s patrol-c ar videotape. The State c ross-examined Founta in but presented no evidenc e of its own. Acc ording

5 to Fountain’s testimony , on the ea rly morning of June 3, 2003, she “wor k[ed] rada

r” in he r patrol c ar

on I nte rs ta te Hi g hw ay

45 . At ap pr oximate ly

2:3 0 a .m. , s he ob se rv e d a pp e lla nt’ s c ar t ra ve lin g on to the Interstate “ at a hig h rate of spee d,” in excess of the posted speed limit

. She followed him on the I n t er s t ate a

bout a quar

ter-mile, until the next ex it, where they both turned off

. She then ac tivated her patrol car ’s over

head e merg ency

lights. Appe llant pulled i n to a par king lot and stoppe d, and Fountain stopped be hind him. Fountain then exit ed her patrol car, approac hed appellant’s ca r, and asked him for

his driver’s license and proof of insurance . He “ was e x tremely slow” in responding to her re quests. “He fumbled throug h [hi s wallet] and passed over hi s driver’ s license on more than

o n e o c c a s i o n , an d

i tt o o k s o m e t i m e f

o r h i m t o p r o v i d e . . . h i s dr i v e r ’ s l i c e n s e an d i n s u r an c e . ” In addition, “his speec h was mumbled, re al under his breath and mumbled.” F ountain returne d to her patrol ca r brief ly to c heck for outstanding war rants, afte r which she a g ain appr oache d appellant’ s car and aske d him to st ep ou t
. Ap pellant complied but “wa s slower than nor mal” in doing so. Once

a pp e lla nt w a s o ut o f h is c ar, F ounta in “ sme lle d th e od or of a lc oh oli c bev erage c omi ngfr om h is br e a th. ” She the n h a d a

pp e lla nt p e rf or m th re e fi e ld so br ie ty te sts , tho se te sts be ing the ho ri zon ta lg aze-ny stag mus (HGN) test, the walk-a nd-turn test, and the one-leg -stand test. On the basis of 6AMADOR-- 4

Fountain did not explain the nature of the field sobrie ty

tests in question, nor did she 7 state e xplic itl y

ho w a pp e lla nt p e rf or me d o n th e m. H e r t e sti mony c on c e rn ingthe fi e ld s ob ri e ty te sts and he r s ub se qu e nt a

rr e st o f a pp e lla nt w a s f oll ow s: Q: Ba sed on those thre e thing s, the mumbled speec h, the slowness at g etting the license, a nd the alcohol, what did y ou decide to do? A: Ife lt I ne e de d to inv e sti g a te fu

rt he r b y pe rf or min g [sic ] sta

nd ard ize d f

ie ld so br ie ty te sts
. Q: An d d id you

pe rf or m [sic ] tho se te sts ? A: Yes, ma’ am, I

did. Q: What tests did y ou have him do? A: Did the horizontal ga ze ny stag mus, the walk and turn, a nd the one legstand. Q: And on the basis of a ll those tests and how [appellant] performed, what did y ou decide to do? A: Iplace d him under ar

rest for driving while intox icated. See Te x. Tr ans p. Cod e § 5 43 .0 04 (a )( 1) (“ [a]n of fi c e r s ha ll i ssu e a

wr itt e n n oti c e to 8 appea r if the of fense char g ed is speeding ”). appellant’ s perf

ormanc e on the tests, F ountain arr ested him for dr iving while intoxicated. 7 Fountain testified f

urther that she did not have a war rant for appellant’ s arr est, that “spee ding [was] not an ar

restable offe nse” in this state, that she had bee n “tra ined in administering standard 8 fi e ld s ob ri e ty

te sts ,” and

that sh e ha d v ide ota

pe d h e r e nc ounte r w itha

pp e lla nt. The portion of the patrol-car videotape that appellant play ed for the t rial court corrobor ated Fountain’ s testimony

about how appe llant turned off the Interstate a nd pulled into a parkinglot, and about how he w as slow in exit ing his ve hicle whe n asked to do so. B ut, the port ion of the tape play ed for the court did not depict Fountain’s admini stration of t he field sobriety tests or the manne r in whi ch appe llant located his driver ’s license and proof of insuranc e and g ave the m to Fountain.AMADOR-- 5

But see footnote three , su pra (audio qua lity

of videotape is mediocre)

. 9 Th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls c omm e nte d th a t “ [t]he vid e ota pe . . . r e fl e c ts that [a

pp e lla nt] 10 possibly mumbled only

his curre nt addre ss.” Am ad or v . S tate , 242 S.W .3d 95, 97 (Tex.App.–Be aumont 2007). No r d id t he vid e ota

pe c or ro bo rate F ounta in’ s te sti mony that a pp e lla nt’ s sp e e c h wa s “ re a l un de r h is breath and mumbled.” Indeed, f rom what o n e co u l d hear by listening to the tape , it seemed that

a pp e lla nt’ s sp e e c h w a s f

a ir ly no rm a l. On the other

hand, the por

tion of the tape pla

y ed for the 9,10

c ourt re ve a le d f

a c ts a bo ut w hic h F ounta in h a d n ot t e sti fi e d, to w it: On c e a pp e lla nt e xite d h is v e hic le and wa s standing ne x t to Fountain, she a s k ed him how much he ha d had to drink that nig ht. He responde d by

denying that he had ha d any thing to drink that night. She then aske d him whether the re

was a ny rea son she could smell a lcoholic beve rag e “c oming f rom [his ] breath.” He ag ain re sponded by denying that he had ha d any thing to drink. At the close of

the evidenc e at the suppr ession hear ing, de fense counsel argued to the court that it should gra

nt appellant’s motion to suppr ess beca use he had been arr ested without a wa rra nt

and wi tho ut p ro ba

ble c a us e . D e fe ns e c ouns e l c omp la ine d in pa rt ic ula r t hat: “[T] he State fa iled to show y ou other than in c onclusory terms that [appellant] failed [t he] f ield sobriety tests. They are undescr ibed field sobriety tests. H ow he did on those tests was not desc ribed to you. I t wasn’t my burden. It’s [t he State’s] burden. All y ou hear d was that he did – she did a n HGN, a walk and tur

n test, and a one leg stand. You never even hear d he failed them. Iknow y ou didn’t hear why he fa iled them.” Th e State argue d to the c ourt that it sh ou ld not g ra

nt ap pe lla nt’ s motio n to supp re ss b e c a us e Fountain ha d probable cause to arre st appellant for driving while intox icated: “[Appellant] was speeding . The off icer stopped him for suspicion of spee ding . . . When she asked him f

or his dr iver’s license, he was slow in pr oducing it. His speec h was mumbled. She aske d him to st ep out of the c ar. H e had an odor of alcohol on his be ve ra g e [sic ]. B a se d o n th a t, s he ha d him pe rf or m fie ld sob ri e ty

te sts , a nd a s aAMADOR-- 6

As we note d previously , Fountain’ s patrol-c ar vide otape c orrobor ated he r testimony 11 that appellant wa s slow in ex iting his vehicle

. result of that, she ha d probable cause to arre st [ him] for dr iving while intoxicated.” At the c los e of

the part ies ’ argum e nts , th e tr ia l c ourt too k a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss under a dvisement. On June 16, 2004, the tr ial court infor med the par

ties by letter that it had de nied appellant’ s motion t o suppress. The trial court did not issue any finding s of fa ct or c onclusions of law. On September

29, 2004, appellant filed a written motion asking the trial court to re consider its denial of his motion to suppress. On October 12, 2004, the trial court hear d appellant’ s motion to rec onsider. At that time, appe llant argued: “[T] he cour

t review ed the videota

pe, which w as p l ac ed b efor e this court in the hear ing. A nd there is no mumbled speec h on the t ape. T here is no slow reac tion. [11] So, no matter what [Fountain] said she observe d or hea rd, it just wasn’t there .” The State a

rg ued in re sponse: “[ Fou nt ain] sai d [a

pp e lla nt] w a s sl owto r e sp on d, se e me d to be fumbl ingfo r h is license, a nd I think that coupled with what she pe rce ived that eve ning [was] slurred speec h. Now, did we he ar it on the video? Ican’ t rec all if we did or not, but the quality of the video is not as good as her ears r ight ther e that nig ht when she sa id she perc eived f

umbling with the li cense , slurred spe ech. She sa id when she w as handing [hi s driver’ s license a

nd proof of

insurance ] t o him, she smelled alcohol.” After hear ing the se ar g uments, the trial cour t denied appe llant ’s m otion to reconsider

. I mme diate ly

the re a ft e r, a

pp e lla nt ple d g uil ty , pur su ant to a ple a ba rg a in, to t he mis de me ano r o ff

e ns e of driving while i n t o x i ca t ed , as cha rg ed in the information. The trial cour t assessed a

ppellant’s punishment at confineme nt in the county jail for 180 day s, probated f or one y ear , and a f

ine of $600. On direct app eal , a

pp e lla nt a rgue d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in ov e rr uli nghis mot ion

to suppress. With re spect to that c laim, both a ppellant and the State r eiterated the ar g uments that theyAMADOR-- 7

ma de in t he tr ia l c ourt
. Th e c ourt of a

pp e a ls ac c e pte d ap pe lla

nt’ s ar g ume nt, re ve rs e d th e jud g me nt o f t he tr ia l c ourt , an d rema

nded the c ase f

or fur ther proc eeding s. Am ad or v . S tate , 2 4 2 S. W. 3 d

95, 102 (Tex.App.–Be aumont 2007). The c ourt of appe als, without citing a ny rele vant authority , explained its de c isi on

a s f oll ow s: “At the suppression hear ing, the trial court hear d the testimony of Tr o oper Fountain a

nd viewed a portion of the vide otape. The videotape vie wed by the cour t depicts the stop, but does not inc lude the field sobrie ty test [s ic]. W e have revie wed the pe rt ine nt por

tio n of the vid e ota

pe , an d fin d that Ama do r’ s beh a vio r d e pic te d in it i s in su ff

ic ie nt t o d e mon str a te pr ob a ble c a us e fo r A ma do r’ s a

rr e st. “ T h u s , th e is s u e in th is c a s e b e c o me s w h e th e r th e St a te me t it s b u r d e nof p r o o f thr o u g h T r o o p e r

F o u n ta in ’ s te s ti mo n y

a b o u t A ma d o r ’ s f

ie ld s o b r ie ty te s t [ s ic ]. * * *
“ Tr oo pe r F ounta in d id n ot e xpre ssl y tes tif y that A ma do r f

a ile d th e fi e ld sobriety test [s ic]. The State argues that we should infer that he failed the tests from Trooper Fountain’ s statement that she de cided to ar rest Amador

for DWI . But, to do so would require that we speculate that the field sobriety test [s ic] revea led clues that tended to show that Ama dor wa s intox icated. We de cline to do so. “The testimony

elicited by the par

ties at the hea

ring fails to demonstrate that Trooper Fountain ha d rea sonable fa cts to support her de cision t o arr est Amador. Deter mining whe ther a rea sonable poli ce office r would conclude that Amador was intox icated w ould likely

require the trooper

to articulate at least some of the re levant d e ta il s a b o u t A ma d o r ’ s p e r f

o r ma n c e o nth e f

ie ld s o b r ie ty te s t [ s ic ]. * * * “We conc lude that the rec ord fr om Amador’s suppr ession hear ing doe s not c on ta in su ff

ic ie nt fa c ts to de mon str a te pr ob a ble c a us e fo r his wa

rr antl e ss arr e st. Th is rec ord contains neither the trooper’ s statement of an opini on that Amador f ailed the field sobriety tests, nor articula ble fac ts to demonstrate how, in the office r’s judgme nt, the driver f

ailed the test [sic]. I n our opinion, the rec ord must contain such fa cts to su sta in t

he State ’s burd e n w he n th e de fe nd ant’ s a rr e st w a s ma de wi tho ut a war rant.” Id . at 100 & 102. The S tate later filed a petition for discr etionary revie w, which we g rante d. See Tex. R. App. Proc. 66.3(c ). I n i t s brief to this Court, the State argues that, g iven Founta in’s testimony at the

su pp re ssi on he ari ng, th e tria l c ourt

c ou ld h a ve re a so na

bly inf e rr e d th a t a

pp e lla nt f a ile d th e fi e ldAMADOR-- 8

sobriety tests on the morning in que stion. The State argues in the alternative that, “in the totality of the circ umstances, Tr ooper F ountain had proba ble ca use to a rre st Appellant for D WI even w ithout the field sobrie ty

tests.” In h i s re p l y

b ri ef , ap p el l an t , ci t i n g Fo rd

v . S tate , 1 5 8 S. W. 3 d

4 8 8 ( T e x. Cr im

. A p p . 2 005), argues that “[a] trial court may not r ationally infer

. . . that a per son failed f ield sobriety

tests without evidenc e that the tests we re f ailed, and the mere fac t that a person was a rre sted is no basis for such an infe renc e.” Appellant argues further that “spec ific fac ts a re nece ssary to satisfy

the constitutional require ments for . . . proba ble ca use.” The Relev ant Law The F ourth Amendment to the Constituti on of t he United States g uara ntees that “ [t ]he right of the pe opl e to be se cure in their persons . . . a g ainst unrea sonable . . . seizures, sha ll not be violated.” This gu ar an t ee wa s made a pplicable to the state s by the Due Proc ess Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt. Ma

pp v . O hio , 367 U. S. 643 , 650 (1 96 1) . U nd e r t he F ourt h A me ndme nt,

a wa rra ntless arr est for an offe nse committed in the offic er’ s prese nce is re asonable if the off icer has probable cause . United States v. W atson , 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976).

“ Pr ob a ble c a us e ” fo r a wa rr antl e ss a

rr e st e xists if

, at th e mom e nt t

he arr e st is m a de , th e fa c ts

and c ir c ums tanc e s w ith in t

he arr e sti ngof

fi c e r’ s k no wl e dg e and

of wh ic h h e ha s r e a so na

bly trustworthy

information ar e suff

icient to war

rant a prudent man in believing that the person a rre sted had committed or wa s committing an of fense

. Be c k

v . O hio , 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The test for probable cause is an objective one , unrelated t o the s ubjective beliefs of the ar resting office r, id . at 97, and it re quires a c onsideration of the totality of the c ircumstance s fac ing the arr esting office r, Ma ry lan d v. Pr ing le , 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). A f inding of probable cause require s “more tha nAMADOR-- 9

Th e Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me Court

ha s n e ve r s pe c if

ie d w hat de g re e of

pr ob a bil ity is 12 require d for pr obable c ause to a rre st. See W. L aF ave, Search and Se izure: A Treatise on the Fo ur th A me nd

me nt § 3.2(e) (4th ed. 2004). Th e State ha s n e ve r d isp ute d th a t F ounta in h a d n o w arr ant f or he r a rr e st o f a pp e lla nt. 13 bare suspicion” but “less than

. . . would justify

. . . conviction.” Brinegar v. United States , 3 38 U. S. 160, 175 (1949). 12 “An of fense is deemed to have oc curr ed within the pre sence . . . of an of fice r whe n any

of h i s senses af

ford him an a

war eness of

its occurr ence .” State v. Stee lman , 9 3 S. W.3d 102, 107 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). A def endant who a lleg es a se izure, such as a n arr est, in violation of the Four th Amendment ha s th e burd e n o f p ro du c ingso me e vid e nc e that r e bu ts t he pr e sumpt ion

of pr op e r po li ce co nd

uc t. Ru sse ll v . S

tate , 717 S.W .2d 7, 9 (Tex.CrimApp. 1986). A defendant may car ry this ini tial burden by establishing that the seizure occ urre d without a war rant. Ib id

. I f this showing is made , then the

13 burden shifts to the State to prove that the seizure wa s nonetheless re asonable

. Id . at 10. The trial court is the sole fa ctfinder at a suppre ssion hearing , and it may believe or

disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony

. Sta te v . R os s , 32 S.W .3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Mo re ov e r, a t a

su pp re ssi on he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt , li ke any fa c tfin der, may

make re a so na

ble infere nces f

rom t h e evide nce pr esente d. Sta te v . G ar c ia- Can tu , 253 S.W .3d 236, 241 (T e x.Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ); Ke lly v . S tate , 163 S.W. 3d

72 2, 72 6 ( Te x.Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Fa rm ah v . S tate , 883 S.W .2d 674, 678 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994); 22A C.J .S. Criminal L aw § 1081 (2006). A trial cour

t’s ruling on a mot ion to suppress, like any ruling on the admission of evidenc e, is su b ject to re view on appe al for a buse of discr etion. State v. Dixon , 206 S.W .3d 587, 590 (T e x.Cr im. Ap p. 20 06). “ I n o the r w or ds , th e tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g wi ll b e up he ld i f i t is re a so na blyAMADOR-- 10

supported by

the re cord a

nd is corre ct under

any theory of l aw applicable to the c ase.” Ramos v. Sta te , 245 S.W .3d 410, 417-18 (Te x .Crim.App. 2008). An aly sis I n the instant case , the trial cour t, without issuing any finding s of fact or c onclusions of law, denied a ppell ant’s mot ion to suppress g rounded on the Four th Amendment. Thus, the trial c ourt implicitl y conclude d that the State ca rried its burde n of provingthat, un d er t h e t otality of the

c ir c ums tanc e s, F ounta in’ s warr antl e ss a rr e st o f a pp e lla nt w a s r e a so na

ble , i. e ., su

pp or te d b y pr ob a ble

c a us e fo r a n o ff e ns e c omm itt e d in

he r p re se nc e . O ur

ta sk is t o de te rm ine wh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt , in so concluding , abused its discre tion. Gi ve n th e e vid e nc e a dd

uc e d at th e su

pp re ssi on he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt c ou ld h a ve re a so na bly fo un d, a t the ve ry le a st, the fo llo wi ng ba sic fa c ts: F ir st, a t the tim e and pla c e in q

ue sti on , F ounta in saw appellant operate a motor vehicle on a public roadw ay

at a hig h rate of spee d, in excess of the posted speed limit. Second, when Fountain aske d appellant f or his driver’ s license a

nd proof of insurance , he fumbled throug h his wallet, passing over his drive r’s lice n s e m u l t i p l e ti mes, and he was unusually slow in pr oviding the items r equeste d. Third, when F ountain asked a ppellant to step out of his car , he wa s, ag ain, unusually slow in responding to her re quest. Four th, when appe llant stood nex t to Fountain, s h e s m el l ed the odor of alcoholic be vera g e on his breath. Fifth, whe n Fountain a sked appe llant how m uch he ha d had to drink that nig ht, he denied ha ving ha d any

thing to dr ink that nig ht. Sixth, F ounta in wa s tra ine d in how to ad min ist e r sta

nd ard fi e ld s ob ri e ty

te sts
. Se ve nth , s he ha d a

pp e lla nt p e rf or m th re e of

tho se sta nd ard fi e ld sob ri e ty te sts . Eig hth , o n th e ba sis of appe llant’s perf

ormanc e on those tests, F ountain arr ested him for dr iving while intoxicated. Fr om those basic fa cts, taken as a whole, the trial court c ould have r easona bly inferr ed theAMADOR-- 11

following fac ts: First, on the night in question, appellant consumed a quantity of alc oholic bever ag e. Se c on d, his c on sumpt ion of that a lc oh oli c bev erage imp a ir e d h is m e nta l f a c ult ie s a nd le d to his dr ivi ngon

the I nte rs tate a t an u

ns a fe rate of

sp e e d a nd , late r, his ina

bil ity to q uickl y lo cat e his driver’ s license within his wallet. Third, his consumption of the alcoholic bever ag e also impaired his phy sical fa culties and led to h i s s l o wn ess of movement when locating his driver ’s license and pr oo f o f i ns ur anc e and

wh e n e xitin g his ve hic le . F ourt h, a ppella nt l ie d to F ounta in a

bo ut h is dr ink ingon

the nig ht in qu est ion , s ug g e sti ngan atte mpt to d e c e ive and

a c on sc iou sn e ss o f guil t. Fifth, F ountain proper ly

admi nistered the thr ee sta ndard f ield sobriety

tests in question. S ix th, appellant’ s perf

ormanc e on those tests, whatever it was, was less than ide al. On the ba sis of

the e vid e nc e a t th e su

pp re ssi on he ari ngand

re a so na ble inf e re nc e s th e re fr om, dis c us se d a

bo ve , th e tr ia l c ourt

c ou ld h a ve re a so na

bly c on c lud e d th a t, at th e ti me and pla c e in question, Fountain had fac ts a nd circ umstances within he r knowledg e sufficie nt to warra nt a prude nt pe rs on in b e lie vin g that a

pp e lla nt h a d c omm itt e d, in h e r p re se nc e , th e off ens e of dr ivi ngwh ile intox icated. I

n other words, the rec ord re asonably supports the trial cour

t’s implicit conclusion that the State c arr ie d its burd e n o f p ro vin g that F ounta in’ s w arr antl e ss a rr e st o f a pp e lla nt w a s p ro pe rl y supported by

probable cause . Thus, we disce rn no abuse of discre tion on the par t of the trial cour

t in i ts d e nia l of

a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss. The c ourt of appe als err ed in foc using on the evidenc e of F ountain’s administration of the field sobriety tests and appellant’s performanc e thereon, rather than considering the totality of the circ umstances f

acingFountain. The court of appea ls f urther err ed in c oncluding that “[d] eter mining wh e the r a

re a so na ble po lic e of

fi c e r w ou ld c onclu de tha t A ma do r w a s in toxic a te d w ou ld l ike ly require the trooper

to a rticulate at least some of the rele vant details about Ama dor’s pe rfor mance onAMADOR-- 12

the field sobrie ty

test [s ic].” A m a d

o r v . Sta te , 242 S.W .3d at 102. The r ecor d contains abunda nt

e vid e nc e , d isc us se d a

bo ve , f ro m w hic h th e tr ia l c ourt c ou ld h a ve re a so na

bly det erm in ed tha t a

rea sonable police office r could have conc luded that appe llant was intox icated. Appellant’s r eliance on our dec ision in Fo rd v . S tate , 158 S.W .3d 488, is mispl ace d. I n that

case , Depa

rtment of Public Safety

Trooper Andre w Peavy

temporar ily detained Matthew For d for

an a lle g e d tr a ff

ic vio latio n a

nd , in the c ours e of that te mpo ra ry de te nti on , d isc ov e re d c on tr a ba nd in F or d’ s v e hic le . F ord, w ho wa s late r i nd ic te d f or po sse ssi on

of the c on tr a

ba nd , f ile d a mot ion to suppress, ar g uing that Peavy did not have rea sonable suspi cion t o justify the t empora ry detention. A t th e s u p p r e s s io n h e ar in g , th e o n ly e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d c o n c e r n in g th e r e a s o n a

b le n e s s o f

the temporar y detention was Pea

vy ’s testimony that he st opped Ford’s vehicle bec ause it wa s “following too close behind” the vehicle in fro n t of it. The trial c ourt denied the motion to s uppress, a nd the court of a ppeals upheld that denial. We reve rsed, holding t hat P eavy ’s t estimony was nothing more than “a conclusory

statement that For d [had] violate[d] a traff ic law” and was, ther efor e, insuffic ient to rea sonably

support a fi nding of

rea sonable suspicion. Id . at 49 3- 94 . In th e ins tant c a se , in

co n t ra s t , t h e r ec o rdco n t ai n s ab u n d an tn o n -c o n cl u s o ry ev i d en ce , d i s cu s s edab o v e, s u p p o rt i n g a finding of proba

ble ca use. Thus, Fo rd

is d ist inguis ha

ble on its fa c ts. We r e ve rs e the jud g me nt o f t he c ourt of a pp e a ls and a ff

ir m the jud g me nt of

the tr ia l c ourt
.

DEL I VERED JANUARY 14, 2009 PUB L I SH