LANDPOWER AND DUAL CONTAINMENT:

RETHINKING AMERICA’S POLICY

IN THE GULF

Stephen C. Pelletiere

November 1999
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ii
Since 1971, when Great Britain formally pulled 

the Persian Gulf, the United States has struggl

maintain stability in this strategic part of the wor

1973, with the Organization of Petroleum Expo

Countries (OPEC) revolution, control of oil shifted 

from the West and a few giant oil companies and becam

exclusive charge of a handful of oil producing state

most important of which were located in the Gulf.

In an attempt to regain some control of this str

commodity, Washington developed special relation

with the two foremost oil producers, Iran (under the 

and Saudi Arabia. In 1979 the Shah was overthrown 

with the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini, Am

became—in the eyes of Iranians—the Great Satan.

By 1991, with the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, Am

was once again the dominant power in the region. B

this study shows, America’s position is hardly secure. 

of the difficulty Washington is experiencing derives 

what the author regards as a poorly conceived policy

Dual Containment, promulgated in 1993, was sup

to constrain the two most powerful area states, Ira

Iraq, by imposing harsh economic sanctions on them

the author contends, the policy has only antago

America’s allies, while Baghdad and Tehran contin

defy Washington and threaten the oil sheikh

Washington is trying to protect.

The Dual Containment policy must be changed

author believes. And foremost, the practice of try

police Iraq by aerial bombing should be abandoned

tactic is counterproductive, according to the author

driving the Iraqis to rally behind the regime of Sa

Hussein, the very outcome Washington is seeki

discourage.

iii
contribute further to the analysis of the critical 

associated with U.S. Middle East policy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Interim Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
DR. STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE has served a

Strategic Studies Institute’s Middle East expert since 

and travels frequently to the region. Prior to 

appointment, he was an intelligence officer in Washi

monitoring the Iran-Iraq war. He has also held positi

journalism and taught at the Universit

California-Berkeley, Ripon College, and Union Colleg

is the author of The Kurds—An Unstable Element 

Gulf and The Iran-Iraq War—Chaos in a Vacuum, 

currently writing a book on Iraq and the internation

system. Dr. Pelletiere’s current research deals 

America’s Dual Containment policy. He holds a B

English from the University of Vermont, and a Ph

Political Science from the University of Califo

Berkeley.

v
RETHINKING AMERICA’S POLICY

 IN THE GULF

The author of this study contends that America’s 

Containment policy has failed. He outlines in what w

thinks that it has, and suggests alternative polices, 

he believes might prove successful, and which wou

destablize the Gulf—the risk that (in the author’s vie

are now running.

By a combination of economic sanctions and 

forcible methods, America has sought, through 

Containment, to make Iran and Iraq ammend behavio

the United States believes it cannot tolerate.

1

 In the 

Iraq, America finds actions of the leadership so abh

that nothing less than a complete regime chan

demanded. The United States wants Iran to give 

alleged support for terrorism.

The policy of Dual Containment was promulgat

February 24, 1994 at a symposium of the Middle East 

Council by Martin Indyk, then the senior director for M

East Affairs of the National Security Council (NSC).

means that the policy is over 5 years old. This is too lo

America to be focused on two states that really should 

of such great importance to it.

Dual Containment failed, the study will argue, be

unlike its namesake—the famous containment pol

George Kennan—it does not respect the princip

power-balancing.

3

 When Kennan devised his contain

policy, he deferred absolutely to the notion of balance

Kennan argued that the Soviet Union and the U

States, inasmuch as both were superpowers

everything to lose and nothing to gain by going to wa

1
interests which they clearly felt they must maintain.

According to Kennan, the United States and R

should respect each other’s spheres of interest. That w

two could get along, building themselves up and deve

their societies. However, they must, under no ci

stances, go to war with each other. To be sure, with tw

diametrically opposed systems, relations would nev

warm, or even, in some instances, cooperative. Howev

long as the two did not try to destroy each other, catast

could be avoided.

What Kennan was expressing was the conce

balancing—the idea that, in the world of interna

politics, a proper balance could be struck between pot

adversaries and this would produce a stable situation 

could be prolonged for an indefinite period.

5

In regard to the Gulf, the author of this study be

U.S. policymakers erred in not following Kennan’s 

They confronted hostile states Iran and Iraq with 

amounted to a dictat—the two either gave in comple

America’s desires—remaking themselves as the U

States required—or Washington would simply keep u

sanctions until they did.

6

Kennan would have regarded such behavi

outlandish. Such a course of action risks creating th

situation the policymakers should to be strivi

avoid—namely, destabilization of the Persian Gulf

study will show how the United States got itself int

untenable situation. In the author’s view, it was done 

ignorance. The policymakers seem not to have unde

the nature of the societies they were setting themselv

to oppose. Nor did they, seemingly, understand the co

in which the societies operate.

2
In political terms, the Persian Gulf has been split 

northern and a southern sector for many years. St

right after World War I, the West, in the form of se

large oil corporations, moved decisively into the sou

Gulf. The companies developed fields in, respect

Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and, in the 1970s, 

and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 7

For years the northern Gulf—even though there 

significant deposits of oil there also—was off limits 

western oil companies. In the north were the two 

states, Iran and Iraq.8 Much more powerful tha

comparatively insignificant sheikhdoms of the sou

Gulf, the northern duo constantly were brawling.

Fortunately for the southerners, Iran and Iraq 

often fought with each other.

9

 This meant they had 

opportunity to interfere in their southern neighbors’ a

As a result, relationships in the south were more o

pacific, while in the north there was constant turmoi

It was this convenient (for the southerners) st

affairs which, the author maintains, Dual Contain

sabotaged. The innovators of the policy decided to co

American resources to repressing Iran and Iraq whe

two were already accomplishing that task on their 

Veteran observers of the Gulf could not fathom the se

the policy, which did seem to be a supererogatory exe

In any event, the United States, once it determin

intervene, immediately got itself into difficulty—not 

the Iranians and Iraqis, both of whom were too weak a

stage to offer much resistence. No, the trouble came f

number of industrialized states, which resented Ame

interfering with their trade policies.

3
Both Iran and Iraq are potentially quite rich coun

They both have oil, to which the Europeans, among o

would like to gain access.10 As it turned out, the Euro

were ammenable to boycotting Iraq, but they would, 

no circumstances, cooperate where Iran was concerne

Europeans accused the Americans of engagi

extraterritoriality, i.e., trying to meddle in their in

affairs.

11

For a time, the United States maintained the pre

on the Europeans, threatening them with va

punishments if they broke either of the emba

Evidently, Washington assumed the Europeans even

would come around; they did not. In fact, one state, F

was so determined to have its way on the issue, i

extraordinary measures. Anticipating Washing

adverse reaction to a contempated oil deal with Iran, 

shut down a number of commercial ventures in the U

States, making it difficult for Washington to ret

against it.

12

Had it been France alone that America had to confr

probably would not have yielded. But Washington 

itself simultaneously assailed on several fronts. Even s

long-standing ally as Canada showed itself 

disaffected.

13 Consequently, by mid-1998, Washi

began to back away from the Iranian fight; but no s

had it done so than trouble erupted from another, 

unexpected quarter.

The Balance Again.

America’s plan to let up on Iran while keeping pre

on Iraq proved unsettling to the oil sheikhs.

14

 The 

states of the Gulf long have suffered the expans

ambitions of the Iranians. First the Shah sought to tu

Gulf into an Iranian lake; later Khomeini tried to expo

4
was Iraq that stepped in to block Iranian moves. 16

Now, the sheikhs were upset. For, as they reasoned

allow the clerics to consolidate their position, 

Iraq—Iran’s traditional enemy—is suppressed? D

America’s insistence on enforcing what it conside

sound policy, the sheikhs either gave support grudgin

balked at so doing.

17

 This complicated matters, since 

this time much of America’s military expenses in the 

had been subsidized by the sheikhs.

Then, in late 1998, America appeared to have fo

way out of its dilemma. The Iranians held elections in 

the liberal cleric Mohammad Khatemi became pres

The elections were seen as an opening by Iran to the 

and also could have been viewed as repudiation 

anti-western radical clerics by the Iranians.

18

Washington embraced the poll result as a w

finessing objections to its Dual Containment policy

idea was that if Iran, under Khatemi, moved int

western camp, effective checks on its behavior cou

developed, and Iraq could continue to be constrained

Evidently, the sheikhs went along with this, be

when, shortly afterward, Washington resumed press

Iraq, the sheikhs raised no objections. Along with tha

Saudis and Americans both began making overt gestu

reconciliation towards Khatemi.

19

This was the drift of events until earlier this year. 

in April, Israel leaked information that 13 Iranian Jew

been arrested in the Iranian city of Qum and charged 

espionage for the “Zionists.” Immediately, Israel, supp

by the United States, registered strong objec

demanding the release of the prisoners.

20

This perhaps precipitous move caused resentme

Iran, where the leadership (Khatemi included) point

that charges barely had been filed against the 13; ther

not even an enquiry as yet. To abort the process would 

5
concede.

21

In July, the second shoe dropped, so to speak. A

demonstration by Iranian students protesting 

censorship, Iranian police—accompanied by para-m

elements tied to the conservative clerics—entered T

University to restore order. In the course of doing s

militiamen apparently killed a student by throwing hi

of a dormitory window. 22

After this, the demonstrations escalated and went 

several days. It appeared that the situation was 

control. At least the western media saw it so. Journ

began to speculate on the possibility of an overthr

Iran’s conservative government; in other words, perh

“pro-democracy revolution” was about to take place.

2

Then, on July 13 the leading conservative c

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, announced a cou

demonstration in support of the government (an

implication to protest against the actions o

pro-Khatemi forces). That demonstration drew upwa

100 thousand people. It was not, however, the sheer nu

of participants that was so impressive; it wa

composition of the crowd. Whereas the pro-Khatemi ac

was conducted mostly by students, the pro-Khamen

involved sizeable numbers of workers and peasants

could be seen as a vote of confidence in the rad

anti-Western—wing of Iran’s government. 24

Shortly thereafter, order was restored. Bu

anti-western forces clearly had come out on top i

showdown. To demonstrate their strength, they pro

conducted a roundup of students, and placed a num

jail, three of whom they subsequently condemned to d

Meanwhile, Khamenei charged that “hidden hands

the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]) were involved 

outbreaks. Anti-American sentiment in Iran, whic

seemed on the wane, reerupted, and is as virulent as ev

6
From the standpoint of American interests, the cu

situation in the Gulf is clearly not optimal. Tehra

renewed its anti-American stance. Iraq, which was 

extraordinary pressure, has now obtained some reli

for the sheikhs, they are not reassured. Short of a 

American attempt to overthrow the Iraqi leadership, 

is scant hope that it will be changed any time soon.

Under the circumstances, Washington mig

expected to entertain a policy shift. Evidently, this is n

intent. Asked recently about America’s future cou

action, a high official of the government claimed 

Washington would keep on doing what it was doin

particular, it would continue patrolling the skies over 

and targeting its defense installations. Asked 

embargo would not be eased, since it appears to be ca

great distress among the Iraqis, the official answered, 

This attitude is hard to comprehend, because the cu

U.S. policy does not seem to be working, the proof bein

the targeted regimes are surviving. Moreover, it is 

they will continue to do so for some time. Those who 

the two regimes are aware that there are constraints 

into both that make them extremely resilient.

The Structural Constraints.

The regimes in Iran and Iraq came to power foll

great national upheaveals, and in a large part they 

been able to preserve themselves because of this.

2

regimes have strong constituencies among the l

elements of the population, and it is to these that they 

to during times of crisis. 

Iraq’s was a classic revolution in the mold of the Fr

one in which the ancien regime was completely dest

Then, (as occurred in the case of the French Revolutio

revolutionary forces fought each other for over a de

Thus the revolution passed through numerous b

7
rulers, the Ba’th Party.

28

The Ba’th succeeded where others had failed beca

proved itself to be more ruthless. Comprising mainly 

class elements, the party did not heed much b

power—getting and holding on to it was the only conce

Moreover, because of the intense intracomm

struggle that had gone on in Iraq, when the Ba’th f

took control most Iraqis were relieved—if only becau

anarchy ceased. Westerners have a difficult 

comprehending that the Ba’th initially presented its

Iraqis as the party of order.

Further, again as had occurred with the F

Revolution, once the anarchy had ceased the middle 

emerged as the most powerful element in the society. 

to 1968 there had not been much middle class in Iraq

Ba’thists promoted its emergence by, among other t

nationalizing the Iraq Petroleum Co. (IPC). 30 Th

enormous revenues into the government’s hands wh

dispensed, initially to private Iraqi contractors.

3

contractors formed the nucleus of the new middle cla

Ultimately, under the Ba’th party, Iraqis experien

spectacular rise in their standards of living. Na

income doubled in the space of a single year, and t

within the next two years. Gross domestic product (

and per capita income increased at a comparable 

implying a similar rapid rise in demand for consumer 

and the expansion of the home market.

32

This upsurge in wealth, of and by itself, might 

ensured the Ba’th’s hold on power. However, the part

no chances. It began an extensive overhaul of Iraq’s se

services. Under the guidance of the present ruler, Sa

Hussein, Iraq developed the most efficient policing se

the Middle East.

Saddam did this by inviting the East German STA

remake the Mukhabarat (Iraq’s premier security forc

8
commanded respect because, with agents sp

everywhere in the community, little went on in 

Germany that passed official notice. In the same w

Iraq, the security forces soon became omnipresent.

Statistics on the security apparat are unobtainab

Slugglett has pointed out that in 1977 Iraq’s In

Ministry employed 151,000 people, some 22.8 percent 

total bureaucracy. 34 From this it would appear t

considerable percentage of Iraqis were involv

conducting internal surveillance for the security side

Under Saddam, Iraq became a totalitarian state, 

the only effective such entity in the Middle East

distinguishing mark of such systems is their obs

concern with elite recruitment, and that certainly w

way in Iraq. Anyone who is anyone there belongs 

Ba’th Party and is probably—in one way or other—inv

with the Mukhabarat. 

The fact of so many being complicit with the r

bears on America’s design of overthrowing the leaders

It is a safe bet that no coup can succeed in Iraq that do

attract support from the army. At the same time, how

since all military officers of the grade of colonel and 

are Ba’thists, all must fear retribution at the hands 

United States.

Washington’s publicly stated policy of punishin

regime leaders as criminals is an effective inhibi

internal revolt. The military will not cooperate 

American-sponsored coup attempts, fearing that th

place them personally at risk.

That is one structural constraint operating again

overthrow of the government. Another involve

composition of the regime the United States would l

install, should the coup prove successful. Washingto

tapped Ahmed Chalabi, a member of the ancien regi

the new head of state to replace Saddam Hussein. 37

9
He was out of the country during the Iran-Iraq War, 

creates an immense gulf between him and the publi

war was the defining experience for Iraqis; anyone 

missed it has very little standing in the participants

Moreover, the old elite, of which Chalabi is a part, intr

against successive republican regimes. Since the Iraq

nothing if not republicans, this is another count ag

him. 

Along with Chalabi, Washington would like to se

Kurdish parties in the new government—the Ku

Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Uni

Kurdistan (PUK). These two fought on the side of Iran 

“great” war, and hence are viewed as quislings t

Iraqis.

38

The Iraqi army officers are particularly hostile 

Kurdish groups, having fought against them in camp

going back to 1961.

39

 Washington’s insistence that, 

replacement government, the army officers share 

with the KDP and PUK sets the officers’ teeth on edg

Finally, a new adherant to the opposition front 

so-called Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution i

(SCIRI). This group also fought on Iran’s side in the w

fact, the leadership of SCIRI, which is entirely compo

clerics, would like to convert Iraq into a theocracy o

Iranian model.

40

Washington seems not to know, or care, that the S

group claims as its spiritual mentor the Iranian cler

Akbar Montashemi, who while serving as I

ambassador in Damascus in the 1980s, directed ter

operations against the American Embassy and the M

Corps barracks in Beirut where 243 U.S. servicemen 

killed.

41

And finally the American-sponsored opposition 

claims the Iraqi Communist Party as a member. 

difficult to comprehend why the U.S. Congress 

10
organizations as SCIRI and the Communists.

42

To be fair to the administration, it appears to 

qualms about this, as it has been extremely chary 

operationalizing the opposition; and the United S

Central Command (CENTCOM) has publicly stated 

not work with the group, as it does not consider it 

reliable.

 43

The Case of Iran. 

Iran’s situation is similar to that of Iraq. Here

popular forces made the revolution. In Iran, however, 

was no party to direct the revolt, rather a popular 

movement developed which rallied behind Aya

Ruhollah Khomeini.

Although he had little organized support when h

power, the ayatollah overcame this circumstance on

became established. He created a number of pow

institutions, among the most important of which we

so-called foundations. Agencies like the Foundation 

Oppressed formed the ayatollah’s powerbase.

These foundations were/are welfare systems. Th

them, the clerical regime looks out for the people’s 

basic requirements. If an Iranian needs medical trea

or a job, let us say, he goes to the foundations. Assu

that he is in good standing with the regime, he is take

of. In this, the foundations are little different from po

machines in the United States.

It does not take much effort of imagination to see ho

foundations keep control of the populace. Indeed, th

shown by the recent clashes at Tehran University. Aft

students had rioted, the anti-Western forces (as ind

above) called for demonstrations of support. The ca

answered by an enormous outpouring, as was only 

expected—not to have turned out, for many Iranians, w

have meant jeopardizing their stipends.

11
through paramilitary organizations like the Revoluti

Guard and baseej.

44

 These outfits go back to the or

revolution; they were among the first to support Khom

Such groups always spring up when revolutions take 

but they usually disappear soon after. Not so in Iran

The Guards hung on because they perform a real se

They constitute the shock troops of the clerics, go

controlling subversive elements, such as, for exa

university students.45

One of the salient characteristics of the Guard

related outfits is that they are all assertively lower cla

this respect they ape the Iraqi Ba’th Party). In today’s 

class anatgonism is exploited to constrain middle and 

class elements (what few of the latter are still presen

The Revolutionary Guards, the baseej, the milit

who belong to Hizbollah, and a goodly proportion 

petty officials serving in Iran’s bureaucracy have no lo

middle-class Iranians, and most certainly not if the

disposed to the West. Moreover, they are extremely h

to Iranians who fled the country after the Is

Revolution. 

Enormous numbers of middle- and upper-class Ira

left because they could not accomodate themselves 

dirigiste economic system the clerics imposed.

46

 We

Khatemi forces to gain power, they would almost cer

try to bring back these people, seeing them as a pot

resource. After all, they have skills which the Kh

supporters will need if they try to modernize the stat

The expatriates, then, would gain by having Kh

defeat the conservatives; the Guards, and their ilk, 

only lose by it. Knowing that this is the case, all thos

oppose modernization will do everything in their pow

maintain the status quo. The surest way of doing thi

frustrating the reforms that Khatemi is trying to instit

12
to keep the present leadership in place. In the author’s 

this practically guarantees that nothing much will c

there—Iran will go on regarding the United States 

suspicion, if not outright hostility.

In fact, the author would go so far as to say that, a

the leadership, a moderate party does not exist. A

leadership is anti-American. There are some cleric

want to strengthen the state, and others who want to s

the revolution. But statists and revolutionaries 

support the line of Khomeini, and thus hate the W

general and the United States in particular.

The two sides will not allow a break between 

because that would provide openings for the 

secularists. Indeed, if one examines Khatemi’s behav

the recent student riots, this one fact comes out shar

The Surrogates.

Given the facts as stated above, it is hard to see how 

policymakers can justify sustaining Dual Containme

adhering to it, they condemn the United States to a d

out test of strength with parties, neither of which is as 

as they are being made out to be, and both of whic

deploy assets little appreciated in the United States. 

One could argue that none of this matters; that sin

United States is the world’s only superpower, i

overcome any sort of opposition. To be sure, it probabl

But that is not what is important here. We must be sen

to the position of our friends in the area. The longe

standoff in the Gulf continues, the more the credibi

allies like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is underm

for the following reasons.

Dual Containment cannot operate without the su

of surrogates Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The S

and Kuwaitis have for some time been helping to defr

costs of U.S. operations in the Gulf. They also provide 

13
carries enormous moral authority among the Arab sta

practically single-handedly keeps the others on track 

our policy. At the same time, however, the surrogat

vulnerable to pressures from within the region, pressu

which, ironically, we have subjected them.

America has for some time been trying to involv

surrogates in the peace process. Egypt neede

encouragement for this, but the Saudis and Kuwaitis 

only brought into play reluctantly. America’s feelin

been that the surrogates, with their enormous wealt

prestige, could facilitate the process. Whenever it has g

into difficulty, Washington has called on the surroga

intervene.

One of Washington’s standard arguments (as to 

Middle Easterners should support the process) is th

region’s economy will revive, once peace is establ

Washington has indicated it will help out in this area

during the tenure of the former Labor Party leader 

Rabin it promoted an agenda for economic re

Washington proposed a kind of Marshall Plan for the r

Meetings were held involving, not just the Arab

Israelis, but potential donors from Europe, the U

States and Japan. This generated a lot of optimism 

region. But once Rabin was assassinated the project 

and nothing has come forth to replace it.

The Deteriorating Economy. 

It is a fact that for a number of years the eco

situation of the Arab Middle East has been deteriorati

the past 10 years, per capita income in the region has 

2 percent a year—the largest decline of any developin

(this is from a 1995 study of the World Bank). F

exporting countries, the fall in output per capita 

percent, which parallels the drop in oil prices. N

exporters grew less than one percent, because oil rev

have a ripple effect. Investment in the area dec

14
that productivity is falling.

48

As long as America’s approach of uplifting the eco

through getting the war over with seemed achievabl

Arabs were willing to work for a peaceable—and j

solution to the conflict. But after Rabin’s death, and th

of Netanyahu and the Likud to power in Israel, all 

died. The Arabs are by now fairly cynical about the 

business.

Thus, the surrogates are on the firing line, so to s

They invested their prestige in the peace process

promised that once the process had succeeded, good t

would start to flow. What now? No Arab leader see

have an answer to that question, and so the cynicism 

natives is growing.

If it were simply a case of the Arabs giving u

washing their hands of further involvement in 

making, that would be bad enough. But there is a g

concern. If peace fails, a number of outstanding issue

be left hanging, as it were. For example, there is the m

of Jerusalem.

Jerusalem.

The Arabs expect that, as a part of any peace 

Jerusalem, or a portion of it, will be turned over to M

control. This almost certainly is not about to happen

hard to envision the Israelis giving way on this point. 

the Arabs are going to either have to adapt to the 

irrevocable loss, or—what?

There are well over 200 million Muslims in the M

East. They have until now left it to their leaders to r

this problem; that is, the disposition of the third holie

of Islam. If the leaders, because they feel they ha

alternative, opt to abandon the city, there is no telling 

the popular reaction will be.

49

15
exploit the situation. Iraq, being an avowedly secular 

has no real interest in Jerusalem (although Sa

Hussein has kept up a pretense lately of being a d

Muslim). But Iran is certainly concerned with the 

fate—it is, after all, a theocracy.

Both states, then, can be counted on to agitate 

this, and, in the author’s view, both will take the sam

of blaming Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, starti

1979—after the Grand Mosque seizure—began s

themselves as the Guardians of the Holy Places

claiming legitimacy on the basis that they would defe

faith, using among other things their immense oil rich

Three places are of special importance for Musl

Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. The first two are 

danger, but Jerusalem almost certainly is going 

lost—at least if its recovery is up to the peace proces

Israelis hold far too many cards to give way on this 

which they have indicated over and over is not negot

Popular Unrest. 

This means that germinating away among the M

Eastern masses is this potentially quite explosive issu

just the Arab Muslims, but Iranians and Turks as we

vitally interested in the city’s fate. They suspect, beca

their leaders’ performance to date, that they are going 

let down in this department, and, although there 

much unrest at present, it could break out at any tim

It is the author’s view that if the peace process conc

without resolving the Jerusalem issue, hostility will 

enflamed by agitators from the fundamentalist comm

Once that occurs, America’s surrogates—Egypt, 

Arabia, Kuwait—will certainly abandon us. They w

themselves on guard against unwanted association wi

West.

16
Dual Containment is difficult enough to implement a

Without active support from the surrogates, it w

impossible. 

Back to Kennan.

Dual Containment should be scrapped, and a comp

different policy adopted for the Gulf. Remove the san

on Iraq and Iran, discontinue the no-fly zones ove

former, and allow the balance of power to come into pl

so doing, we will be acting in the spirit of Kennan’s or

containment policy.

Kennan recognized that, in America’s contest wi

Soviet Union, it was inappropriate for the United Sta

seek the Soviets’ total defeat (as American policym

now appear to be doing with Iraq).

51

 Rather, Kennan a

that Moscow had space to which it was entitled. And t

made sense to concentrate on Russia’s periphery. 

areas which were vital to U.S. interests—those, and 

those, should be defended, Kennan believed.

America should make a similar determination in r

to the northern Gulf region. Do we need the oil of eithe

and Iraq? Obviously not—when we have access t

prodigious fields in the lower portion. Then, by all m

we should cut our losses in this troublesome s

withdraw to the south, while the conditions there re

congenial. 

A withdrawal need not disturb us overly. A

certainly our enemies in the north, Iran and Iraq, will 

to their mutual hostility once we have departed. If th

any doubt of this, consider their behavior of late. 

One would have expected, since Iran and Iraq both 

the United States, that they would long ago have com

their differences and turned to face their common fo

that has not happened.

17
with Washington to provide a launching ground f

armed aggression against it.

52 Iran just prior to tha

rockets into Iraqi territory, claiming that Baghda

established a camp there for the People’s Muhajad

anti-Iranian guerrilla group.

53

Does it make sense that America has intervened i

feud? If these two states are seeking to destroy each 

why not let them do it? Under Dual Containment, Am

must commit resources to what is, essentially, as s

above, a supererogatory exercise.

One more point needs to be addressed, and that in

the military component of America’s Dual Contain

policy.

Bombs Away.

At present, the United States is using bases in 

Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey to stage air attacks ag

targets inside Iraq. Washington has imposed two se

zones, one in the north of that country, one in the s

where, according to U.S. dictat, no Iraqi planes can fly

aircraft caught in either of the two zones are shot 

Moreover, if Iraqi air defenses attempt to protect the p

they are targeted.

Obviously, in the process of doing this, some destr

is wrought, not only to military sites but to civilia

well.

54

 This, in some measure is due to the Iraqis’ refu

respect the zones. They regard them as violations of 

sovereignty, and provoke engagements which produ

destruction. 

For the United States, the air campaign is not a 

priority; Washington is barely preoccupied with keep

going. Indeed, the campaign has been going on for s

now, it practically runs itself. As long as there a

American casualties (i.e., planes shot down), Washing

unlikely to alter its present stance of harrassing the Ir

18
effect on the Iraqi people. Indeed, it is engendering in

hatred of the United States; not simply because the bom

has gone on for so long, but because it was ever under

in the first place.

Of all the tactics America could have chosen t

against Iraq, this one was by the far the most ill-conc

To understand why, one must know something o

history of the country.

It was against the Iraqis that the first known use 

power as a policing instrument was recorded.

55

 The B

introduced the practice there in the 1920s when the

the mandate over the country. (This was before the It

employed aerial attacks against the Ethiopia

Abyssinia, or the Germans against the Spani

Guernica.) 

At the time, bombing civilians was regarded—

among upper class Englishmen—as a “barbaric pract

Not only did the British strafe and bomb Iraqi tribe

they deliberately burnt their crops using incendiary d

dropped from planes.

57

Such was the international outcry over this 

Churchill, then Britain’s Foreign secretary, was for

defend the bombing policy. He said,

Aerial action is a legitimate means of quelling disturban

and of enforcing the maintenance of order but it should und

no circumstances be employed in support of pur

administrative measures such as the collection of revenue 

(A reference to the fact that the R.A.F. was bombing Iraqis a

way of softening them up before the tax collectors appeared.

 Over the years (and the British did not leave Iraq 

1958), thousands of Iraqis quit their farms in the sout

the area hardest hit by the bombing, to gather in s

towns in the capital of Baghdad and in other large citie

19
in time became a menace to public order. At the sli

provocation, the shurugis would erupt. Any demonst

in the capital—by students, labor union

whomever—would draw out the shurugis, who woul

indulge in an orgy of violent destruction.

60

When, in 1958, the Iraqi army pulled a coup

shurugis erupted and effectively took it over; 

precipitated the horrendous revolution (as ment

earlier). As specialists on Iraq can testify, the cou

history from 1958 to 1968 is replete with instances o

violence, perpetrated by the lower class elemen

Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk.

61

The descendents of the shurugis (and indeed many 

original members of the class are still living) rememb

British imposed air campaign with loathing. It is pro

not an exaggeration to say that it has become part of 

national myth—the heroic defiance by the Iraqis 

inhuman British aerial attacks.

The United States, by replicating this precise met

control, has transferred all of that hostility to itself. In

the author would argue that this has converted 

Containment from a static to a dynamic policy

dynamism of breakdown and, ultimately, of v

confrontation.

It is the author’s view that, if this tactic is continue

hatred against us will grow to such a degree that, even 

we to succeed in overthrowing the regime, we would 

be able to influence the Iraqis, even were we to occup

country.

The Oil Factor.

We are now ready to relook at our Iraq involvem

light of the arguments cited above. It seems a safe pred

that, in 2 years, the situation in the Middle East wil

20
which the mass of Arabs can approve, or even live wi

In the Gulf, neither the Ba’thists nor the anti-We

clerics will have departed the scene. Both in the Gulf a

of it, the condition of the poorest Arabs and Iranians w

have improved economically. And most dangerou

incompetance (or incapacity) of the surrogate Arab re

will have become a rallying cry for extremists.

On top of everything else, America will find 

more—not less—dependent on Persian Gulf oil. Th

dependency will be critical. It was not too long ago th

the minds of many, the Gulf was assumed to be 

marginally important.

62

 New oil fields were in the pro

being opened up in the Caucuses and Central Asia. In 

it was predicted, these would take precedence over the 

the latter would become, if not a backwater, then certa

region of secondary importance.

But how have things turned out? Last year the 

experienced the Asia meltdown, which caused a preci

decrease in demand for oil, and that in turn sent the 

plummeting.

63 Companies that were on the po

investing in exploration in the lands of the former 

Union backed away.

64

 (Development when oil was sel

$18 a barrel makes sense; not when it is going for $1

lower.)

Moreover, a related problem developed—much 

area in which the Russian fields are located is distu

There are active rebellions going on by Islamic tribe

among others.

65

 Given this extraordinary insta

successful oil extraction is hardly feasible.

Contrast that with the situation in the Gulf. The 

there were developed almost a century ago. The Sau

facilities are the most sophisticated in the world. The

easily produce up to 10 million barrels a day; and, 

with that, production can be calibrated, moving it qu

up and down at will.

66

21
easy to extract, and therefore costs are negligible. In

oil from there is cheaper than anywhere else.

One further statistic of importance. Since rough

1970s, U.S. oil production has been on the decline. Sin

1980s, the production in Russia seems to have peak

well. These two countries accounted for 40 percent of 

oil production in the post-World War II period.

67

Thus it seems inevitable that, for the foreseeable f

(and perhaps well into the 21st century), the world w

its oil from the Gulf. America will not, under 

circumstances, be able to ignore the region. More than 

we will be intensely involved there for quite some tim

Going It Alone.

Ever since the time of Nixon, the United State

fostered its interests in the Middle East through surro

Initially, this was Israel and Iran (under the Shah)

Saudi Arabia and Egypt. And, for a time, Iraq function

a U.S. surrogate. 69

As long as the Cold War was in full flood, 

surrogates probably made sense. The United States an

Soviet Union viewed their relations as a zero sum ga

plus for one was a debit for the other. Thus, it cou

argued that, by recruiting allies, Washington reduce

threat of states going communist. But once the Cold 

ended, depending on surrogates ceased to be produ

After all, who were the surrogates protecting us agai

 Surrogates Israel and Egypt, and to a lesser degr

Palestinian National Authority (PNA), are totally inv

with the peace process. This, of course, is necessary u

final settlement is reached. But, being consumed b

process, America’s surrogates cannot help out in the 

and the Gulf involvement, in the author’s view, is by f

most important for America’s security.

22
it was so in 1973, and it remains the case today. And, 

the fact that the world is unlikely to power itself witho

for as far into the future as anyone would care to p

now is the time to confront this basic proposition.

According to Kennan, it is sensible to take care of w

truly important, letting everything else go by the boar

as the author believes, the really important thing 

Middle East is oil, then we should be devoting all 

planning to safeguarding the area where it is to be fou

abundance, viz. the Gulf.

It would be ideal were we to be able to have a perm

base in the area. Almost certainly this is not possible, 

the hostility that this would engender. Lacking this o

we should undertake a robust program of military exe

and other contacts in the lower Gulf, the aim being to a

ourselves of many of the advantages of forward pre

without much of the risk.

Moreover, in addition to military maneuvers, we s

seek military-to-military contacts, stepped up fo

military sales, and we should try to engage in mi

activities that complement diplomatic initiatives. We 

even want to engage in the sharing of military technol

licensing of lower Gulf states to produce U.S.-des

military equipment.

The idea of all this would be to accustom the nor

states, Iran and Iraq, to an American presence; how

one which was not immediately confrontational. 

Further, in the exercise field, we should stress 

units. In the Middle East, over the centuries, nothin

land forces have ever been able to keep order—n

power, not sea power; just land units. Armies have be

tool for pressing as well as containing regional aggre

In addition, as the author has tried to show, cont

use of air power as a policing agent is wrecking wha

standing we have left in the region. Recently 

23
and the UAE—have begun speaking out agains

continued bombing of Iraqi targets.

This protest by Iraq’s neighbors was occasioned 

step-up in America’s air campaign. We are now, appar

hitting targets outside the exclusion zones in Iraq

would never have been done had our strategy 

working.

70

 We cannot escalate this air battle much fu

other than to deliberately target Baghdad, which 

author’s view would be completely counter-productiv

One could object that the states of the lower Gulf w

cooperate on a program of land exercises. The autho

not accept that. If the maneuvers were presented 

alternative to the current bombing campaign, I think 

would jump at it. Moreover, we do not have to re

ourselves to only working with Saudi Arabia and Ku

there is also Oman, Yemen, or the UAE.

71

 It would be i

we could exercise in Saudi Arabia, but again this 

feasible, because of religious sensibilities.

In fact, America need only be concerned 

establishing itself in situ—in other words, it is enoug

physically present in the Gulf. Call it a tripwire, ca

demonstration of resolve, call it whatever one wishe

idea should be that American troops in the area s

America’s continuing interest in the region.

Effectively what the author is suggesting is tha

way or the other, America will enter the Gulf w

significant land force. It will either do so in the m

suggested above, or it will go in in strength, having 

forced once again to wage a large land war to r

stability to the region once the surrogate relationships 

broken down.

ENDNOTES

1. Among the forcible methods are routine overflights 

territory to prevent Iraqi planes from flying in certain corrido

24
has been imposed unilaterally by Britain and the United State

2. Indyk has since become the State Department’s As

Secretary for Middle East Affairs.

3. Kennan originally laid out his containment policy in the 

“long telegram” from Moscow, where he was then serving as num

in the U.S. embassy. This was in early 1946. He later expanded 

of the ideas in the policy in a Council on Foreign Relations publ

On Dealing With theCommunist World, New York, NY: Harper 

1964. For a discussion of the telegram and excerpts from it, see 

May, ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, 

MA, Bedford Books, 1993; further material on Kennan and conta

can be found in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 

Oxford University Press, 1982, and David Horowitz, ed., Conta

and Revolution, Boston, MA: Beacon, 1967; and Stephen Ambro

to Globalism, London: Penguin, 1984.

4. For a discussion of balance of power theory, see Kenneth 

Man, the State and War, New York, NY: Columbia University 

1959.

5. The era of balance was prior to World War I and imme

after. With World War II and the emergence of two super

balancing was thought to have ended. Kenneth Waltz (see end

argued fairly successfully that two states could balance as 

several. Thus was born the concept of balance a deux. 

6. The whole basis of balancing theory is that nations m

allowed to compromise, and must never—as has occurred wi

Containment in respect to Iraq—be presented with an ultim

change or perish.

7. For the history of this movement, see the staff report 

Federal Trade Commission of the Subcommittee on Monopoly 

Select Committee on Small Business of the United States Senat

The International Petroleum Cartel, Washington, DC: U.S. Gove

Printing Office, 1952.

8. The oil deposits of these two originally were developed 

British, who retained the countries as part of their sphere of influ

9. In the modern period, these fights start in the 1950s, wh

became a republic and accepted arms from Russia. Iran, which w

ruled by the Shah, found this objectionable and throughout th

25
Iraq, with the intent of destabilizing the regime in Baghdad. T

course, in the 1980s came the Iran-Iraq War, which ended wi

victory.

10. France, in particular, has been keen to acquire oil conc

from either of the two countries for a period of years going back 

after World War I.

11. See “Trade Boycott of Iran by U.S. Appears Unlikely to Su

The New York Times, May 2, 1995; “Trade Ban Is Seen to Af

Services and Farmers Most,”The New York Times, May 2, 1995; 

Signs Contract With Iran To Develop Persian Gulf Oilfield,” T

York Times, March 7, 1995; “Avoiding total war,” The Financia

October 3, 1997; “US pressed on Helms-Burton,” The Financia

October 20, 1997; “US Rethinking Stance on Economic Sanction

Washington Post, January 26, 1998; “Demands for Oil Influenc

in the Gulf,” The Wall Street Journal, February 23, 1998.

12. See “U.S. Fails to Enlist European Allies in Iranian 

Embargo,” The New York Times, May 3, 1995; also “Demands 

Influence Policy in Gulf,” op cit.

13. “Canadians in Iraq Oil Deal,” The Financial Times, De

16, 1997.

14. By the sheikhs, I refer to the six countries of th

Gulf—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the Unite

Emirates (UAE), and Oman. All are monarchies, all have 

populations, and at least three—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, a

UAE—have substantial oil reserves.

15. The Shah’s period of expansionist advance into the Gu

between the late 1960s, when he intervened in civil war in Om

1977, when he had lodged irridentist claims to Bahrain, the 

States (later the United Arab Emirates), and had actually seize

small islands in the Strait of Hormuz from one of the Trucial 

emirates. Khomeini, of course, began his push into the Gulf al

soon as he took power. His most flagrant act was an atte

overthrow the government in Bahrain in 1981.

16. The Iraqis opposed the Shah in Oman; as part of a p

peace settlement with Khomeini, they stipulated Iran must ret

three small islands in the Strait, and in 1980, Baghdad issued a

Charter, under which the security of the Gulf would be safegua

the littoral states. All the sheikhdoms, with the exception o

26
Charter, even though they did not feel they could sign.

17. For strains in the sheikhs’ relations with the United Sta

the Gulf, see Stephen C. Pelletiere, “Regional State Competito

Case of Iraq,” in Challenging the United States Symmetrica

Asymmetrically, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998

18. Khatami pulled both the youth and women’s vote with p

to open Iranian society.

19. See “Saudi Paper Denounces Saddam Husayn’s Iran T

Mecca Al Nadwah, August 9, 1999, Foreign Broadcast Info

Service, FTS199990811001200.

20. “Editor Discusses US-Saudi-Iranian ‘Scheme’,” Bagh

Thawrah, May 23, 1999, Foreign Broadcast Information 

FTS19990528001262; “Overtures From Iran Ignite a Bitter 

Among Arab States,” The New York Times, June 9, 1999, and 

Department Drops Iran as Terrorist Leader,”The New York Tim

1, 1999.

21. See “US Said to Reject Requested UN Debate on Iranian 

Jerusalem QolYisra’l, July 22, 1999, Foreign Broadcasting Info

Service, FTS19990722000027; “Story of Arrested Jews,” T

Ha’aretz, August 19, 1999, Foreign Broadcast Information 

FTS199908119000927.

22. “Iran Protests Spread to 18 Cities, Police Crack D

University,” The New York Times, July 13, 1999.

23. See “Reform’s genie escapes,” The Financial Times, J

1999.

24. See “Turning Tables In Iran, Crowds Back Old Line,” T

York Times, July 15, 1999.

25. See “Iran’s secret police . . .,” The Wall Street Journal, p

20, 1999.

26. See “Iran: US Role Charged in Unrest,” The New York 

July 31, 1999, and “Ayatollah cites U.S. meddling,” The Phila

Inquirer, July 31, 1999.

27. Iraq’s revolution came in 1958 with the destruction 

British-backed Hashemite regime; Iran’s Islamic Republic was 

in 1979 after America’s ally, the Shah of Iran, was overthrown

27
The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements 

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978.

29. The best account of the composition of the early Ba’th is 

Baram, “The Ruling Political Elite in Ba’thi Iraq, 1968

International Journal ofMiddle East Studies, No. 21, 1989, pp. 4

30. See Daniel Yergin, The Prize, New York: Simon & Sc

1991.

31. See Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk Sluglett, Iraq Sin

London: I.B. Tauris, 1990, p. 227 f.

32. Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 231.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Slugletts, Iraq Since 1958, p. 248.

36. See “U.S. to Start Flow of Aid to Iraqi Oppositio

Washington Post, May 25, 1999.

37. See “Congress’s Candidate to Overthrow Saddam Husse

Washington Post, April 21, 1999.

38. The Kurds are not a semitic people, which, of course, se

even farther apart from the bulk of the population.

39. For an account of this, see Stephen C. Pelletiere, The Ir

War: Chaos in a Vacuum, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.

40. SCIRI was led by the Hakim family, one of whose memb

been an ayatollah in Iraq before the war.

41. For recent contacts between Sciri and Hizbullah, see 

Delegation Meets Hizballah’s Nasrallah,” Beirut Al-Mus

November 10, 1999, Foreign Broadcast Information Servi

1999111000352. 

42. Khatemi rebuked his student supporters for attack

putative enemy, Khamanei, claiming this would only weak

revolution. 

28
forces backed by the Congress, and, when called on by Cong

commit funds to the groups, held back. The head of the 

Command (CENTCOM) General Anthony Zinni has also said 

could not rely on this outfit. See “Iran: Mohtashami on ‘Unjust’ 

East Peace Plan,” Qazvin Velayat-e Qazvin, May 25, 1999, 

Broadcast Information Service, FTS199908050000661. 

44. The baseej were originally 21-man units, mobilized from 

the people during the hostage crisis. The clerics, fearing an Am

invasion after the U.S. Embassy hostages were seized at the o

the Islamic Revolution, mobilized these local defense forces an

incorporated them into the military.

45. Mohsen Reza’i is the former Defense Minister of Iran, a

of the Revolutionary Guards. Today he is secretary of the p

Expediency Council. See “Reza’i Says ‘Zionists’ To Stop Iran’s Pr

Tehran IRNA, June 25 1999, Foreign Broadcast Information 

FTS19990625001241.

46. Interestingly, many settled in the United States, most no

Los Angeles.

47. Even though the students came out into the streets in su

his government, Khatemi refused to endorse the protests, and ur

students to call them off.

48. See Claiming the Future, publication of the World Bank

49. One day after Mubarak presided as Arafat and Barak sig

interim accord, an Egyptian tried to assassinate the President. T

Arabs, the accord was viewed as a sell out of the Palestinia

Mubarak was faulted for having played such a conspicuous 

bringing it about. See “Egyptian Leader Is Assaulted But Unhu

Washington Post, September 7, 1999.

50. Large numbers of Muslims stormed the Grand Mosque in 

in 1979 and held it for several days, until they were finally roote

French commandos. This incident badly shook the Saudi lead

and caused it to try to improve its image with the Muslim r

community.

51. This seems a reasonable assumption, since Washing

consistently refused to reward Iraq for any compliance with t

imposed restrictions.

29
Republic of Iraq Radio Network, August 16, 1999, Foreign Br

Information Service, FTS199990816000545, also “Iraqi 

Questions Iranian ‘Hostile’ Policy,” Baghdad Babil, August 9

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FTS19990812001219.

53. See “MKO on ‘Sporadic’ Clashes between Muhajadin, G

Iran-e-Azad WWW, August 4, 1999, Foreign Broadcast Info

Service, FTS19990806001140.

54. See “In Intense but Little-Noticed Fight, Allies Have B

Iraq All Year,” The New York Times, August 13, 1999; “Eigh

Killed in 19 Jul Air Raids,” Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio N

July 29, 1999, Foreign Broadcast Information S

FTS19990729001058.

55. The best treatment of this episode is found in Peter S

Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932, London: Ithaca Press, 1976, p. 259 

56. See Sluglett, Britain in Iraq.

57. Sluglett cites as a typical raid one which was carried ou

2-week period in 1923 and which resulted in 144 people being ki

an unspecified number wounded. Sluglett, Britain in Iraq.

58. Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, p. 264.

59. For details on this period, see Hanna Batatu, The Old 

Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 190

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Evidence of this is the latest iteration of the National S

Strategy, (A National Security Strategy For a New Century, O

1998) which makes a point of saying that America is decrea

dependence on Middle East oil. America was never dependent 

was always its allies—the Europeans and Japanese—who were 

dependent on oil both from the Gulf and the Maghreb. The new s

however, argues that, even this dependence of the Europeans on 

will decrease as new fields open in the Caspian and southern 

The author disputes that this will ever occur.

30
in the pipeline,” The Financial Times, September 7, 1998, and “C

oil bonanza dreams turn sour as persistently low prices sap profi

Financial Times, February 24, 1999.

64. The Financial Times, “Caspian oil bonanza dreams turn 

persistently low prices sap profits.”

65. The most recent area of disturbance being Daghestan.

66. This means that production from Saudi fields can be adju

compensate for oil gluts and shortages. This is the means wher

price can be stabilized, and no other oil area—not the Nor

nowhere—has this capability.

67. J.E. Hartshorn, Oil Trade: Politics and Prospects, Cam

Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 14.

68. The bulk of Gulf oil flows to Europe and Asia, but, st

America’s ability to safeguard the region that enhances its worl

position.

69. While it was holding the Islamic Revolution at bay in the 

70. “In Intense but Little Noticed Fight, Allies Have Bomb

All Year,” op. cit.

71. Each of these would present a problem. Oman has very c

to the British, Yemen is an object of mistrust for the Saudis, 

UAE has, of all the sheikhdoms, the closest ties to Iran. Still, o

not know what anyone of them would do if the United States m

offer, meaningfully, to develop a base there. One also tends t

that, although the Saudis are extremely opposed to having a 

their territory, this mainly relates to Washington’s closeness to 

America built the Dharan base in Saudi Arabia during World 

and there were no religious scruples expressed at the time.

31
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Interim Director

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Author

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler