GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

July 8, 2009 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Howard McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Defense Logistics: Observations on Army’s Implementation of the Logistics 

Modernization Program

This letter formally transmits the enclosed briefing in response to House Report No. 

110-652, which accompanied the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2009 (Pub. L. No. 110-417). The House report directed the Secretary of 

the Army to submit a report on Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) 

implementation at Army depots and the expected end-state capabilities of LMP to the 

Senate Committee on Armed Services, the House Committee on Armed Services, and 

GAO by January 31, 2009. The House report also directed us to review the report 

submitted by the Secretary of the Army for completeness and to provide a report to 

the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on Armed 

Services by March 31, 2009. On March 31, 2009, we provided the enclosed briefing to 

staff of your committees to satisfy this mandate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees. We 

are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and the 

Secretary of the Army. This report will also be available at no charge on our Web site 

at http://www.gao.gov. 
Please contact William M. Solis at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov, Asif A. Khan at 

(202) 512-9859 or khana@gao.gov, or Nabajyoti Barkakati at (202) 512-4499 or 

barkakatin@gao.gov if you or your staff have questions on matters discussed in this 

report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 

may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were J. 

Chris Martin, Senior Technologist; David Schmitt, Assistant Director; Evelyn Logue; 

Darby Smith; and Jim Melton. 

William M. Solis 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Asif A. Khan 

Director, Financial Management and Assurance 

Nabajyoti Barkakati 

Chief Technologist 

Applied Research and Methods 

Center for Technology and Engineering 

Enclosure 

Page 2 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Army’s Implementation of the 

Logistics Modernization 

Program

Congressional Briefing

March 31, 2009

Page 3 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Introduction

hIn February 1998, the Army Materiel Command began the Logistics 

Modernization Program (LMP) to replace its existing material 

management systems—the Commodity Command Standard 

System and the Standard Depot System. These systems have 

been in operation for more than 30 years.

hLMP is intended to transform logistics operations in six core 

processes: order fulfillment, demand and supply planning, 

procurement, asset management, material management, and 

financial management.

hWhen fully implemented, LMP is expected to manage goods and 

services valued at about $40 billion, including 6 million Army 

inventory items.

Page 4 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Introduction (continued)

hGAO has previously reported on problems the Army has encountered in its 

efforts to implement LMP.1 The specific problems related to

3⁄4 data conversion errors that resulted in LMP containing inaccurate 

unit prices or units of issue for certain materials,

3⁄4 billing and collection errors whereby some customers were not 

billed for costs that should have been included in their bills and other 

customers were overbilled, 

3⁄4 requirements management and testing process did not comply with 

best practices, and

3⁄4 a lack of an independent verification and validation process.

1GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Billions Continue to Be Invested with Inadequate Management Oversight and Accountability, GAO-04-615 (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2004); Army Depot Maintenance: Ineffective Oversight of Depot Maintenance Operations and System Implementation Efforts, GAO-05-441 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005); and DOD Business Transformation: Lack of an Integrated Strategy Puts the Army’s Asset Visibility System Investments at Risk, GAO-07-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2007).

Page 5 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Introduction (continued)

hHouse Report 110-652 directed the Secretary of the 

Army to report to the House and Senate Armed 

Services Committees and GAO by January 31, 2009, on 

the Army’s efforts to implement LMP. The Army 

submitted its report to the House and Senate Armed 

Services Committees and GAO on October 21, 2008. In 

addition, the House report

3⁄4 stipulated that the Army’s report on LMP address nine specific 

areas and

3⁄4 directed GAO to review the Army’s report for completeness and 

to report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees 

by March 31, 2009.

Page 6 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Introduction (continued)

The nine specific areas that the Army was to report upon were

1) expected LMP capabilities at the levels of depot production, business operations 

and financial management, and Headquarters Army Materiel Command;

2) specific LMP capabilities implemented at each depot;

3) date of expected implementation at each depot;

4) description of how LMP will forecast future maintenance capacity and drive 

budgetary decisions;

5) percentage of workforce at each depot expected to be proficient on the system;

6) strategy to educate and train depot employees on system capabilities and the new 

business approach to resource planning and supply chain management as a result 

of LMP implementation;

7) detailed plan for ensuring that 100 percent of each depot’s operating files are 

loaded by the planned date of implementation at each depot;

8) leveraging of lessons learned from previous implementations; and

9) detailed risk-mitigation strategy to support current production in the event that LMP 

implementation is not as successful as planned.

Page 7 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objectives

Our objectives were as follows:

1. Determine the extent to which the Army’s report addressed the 

nine specific areas identified in the House committee report. 

2. Ascertain the specific actions the Army has taken, has under 

way, or has planned to address GAO’s prior recommendations 

pertaining to the Army’s implementation of LMP.

3. Evaluate the management processes and controls that the 

Army established to assess the feasibility of future LMP 

deployments.

Page 8 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Summary of Observations

hOur review and analysis of the Army’s October 21, 2008, report to 

the House and Senate Armed Services Committees found that the 

report provided the required information to address each of the nine 

specified areas and thereby satisfied the reporting requirement.

(See page 10.)

hThe Army has begun to implement virtually all of GAO’s prior 

recommendations related to LMP to address issues related to data

conversion, billing and collection, requirements management and 

testing, and independent verification and validation. The effective 

implementation of these recommendations should help the Army to 

reduce its risk to acceptable levels. (See pages 11-15.)

Page 9 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Summary of Observations

(continued)

h The Army has management processes and controls in place to assess the 

feasibility of future LMP deployments, enabling it to understand the risks 

associated with making a deployment decision and evaluate whether those 

risks are acceptable. (See pages 16-28.)

3⁄4 The Army recognizes that deploying a system such as LMP can never 

be a risk-free proposition and that problems will arise after deployment 

regardless of the actions taken prior to deployment. 

• Ability to go back to the legacy systems if needed

3⁄4 The Army has a risk management approach in place to minimize the

effects of those problems to provide reasonable assurance that depot 

operations in support of the warfighter are not significantly disrupted. 

• Enhanced help desk support to understand the “root cause” of 

problems identified by users and help those users immediately 

where possible

Page 10 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Background

hThe Army began efforts to implement LMP in 1999, with the intent

of having the system fully deployed by June 2004.

3⁄4 LMP began operations in July 2003 at Tobyhanna Army Depot, 

the Communications-Electronics Command, the Army Materiel 

Command, and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. 

No additional sites have been added since that time.

3⁄4 The Army will decide in April 2009 whether to have additional 

deployments of LMP. 

hAs of September 2008, the Army has obligated approximately 

$880 million for the development and implementation of LMP.

Page 11 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 1 Observations–Mandated Army 

Report Provided Required Information

hOur review and analysis of the Army’s October 21, 2008, report to 

the House and Senate Armed Services Committees found that the 

report provided the required information to address each of the nine 

specified areas and thereby satisfied the reporting requirement.

hThe Army’s report provided details on (1) expected LMP 

capabilities, (2) LMP capabilities implemented at depots, (3) date of 

expected implementation, (4) how LMP will forecast maintenance 

capacity and drive budgetary decisions, (5) percentage of workforce 

expected to be proficient, (6) strategy to educate employees on 

LMP capabilities, (7) a plan to ensure the depot’s operating files are 

loaded into LMP, (8) leveraging of lessons learned, and (9) a 

detailed risk-mitigation strategy in the event that LMP 

implementation is not successful. 

Page 12 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 2 Observations–Prior GAO 

Recommendations

hThe Army has acted to implement virtually all of GAO’s prior 

recommendations related to LMP. The effective implementation of 

these recommendations should help the Army reduce its risk to 

acceptable levels.

hGAO made recommendations regarding problems we identified in 

the following areas:

3⁄4 Data conversion 

3⁄4 Billing and collection

3⁄4 Requirements management and testing

3⁄4 Independent verification and validation

Page 13 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 2 Observations–Prior GAO 

Recommendations (continued)

h Data conversion 

3⁄4 We previously reported that during the first deployment, LMP contained 

inaccurate unit price or unit of issue data for certain materials, resulting in 

excess material being ordered and incorrect prices being charged. Because of 

the inaccurate data, the Army received quantities of parts and supplies for use 

in repairing military assets that were far greater than intended.

3⁄4 When Tobyhanna converted from its legacy system to LMP in July 2003, the 

June 30, 2003, ending account balances in the legacy system did not reconcile 

to the beginning account balances in LMP. Accurate account balances are 

essential for financial reporting and preparation of future budgets.

3⁄4 The Army has since implemented a program to address the data conversion 

problems caused during the first deployment, and also has a process to 

evaluate whether its data conversion activities have reduced the risks 

associated with this critical factor to acceptable levels.

Page 14 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 2 Observations–Prior GAO 

Recommendations (continued)

h Billing and collection

3⁄4 We previously reported that shortly after LMP was implemented, Tobyhanna Army Depot 

began experiencing difficulty in accurately billing customers and recognizing revenue. 

3⁄4 LMP’s billing problems resulted in (1) customers not being billed for costs incurred that 

should have been billed and (2) customers being billed too much.

• As noted in a prior GAO report (GAO-07-860), 146 customer orders valued at approximately $5.4 million were not billed during the January 31, 2007, billing cycle.

• Similarly, during the January 31, 2007, billing cycle about 308 customer orders 

amounting to about $5.8 million were shown as being over billed, and a credit should 

have been issued to the customer.

• It is essential that revenue is properly recognized and customers are billed for work 

performed because these are the means by which the depots finance their day-to-day 

operations. Moreover, credits from the depots to the customers can be used by the 

customers to meet other funding demands.

3⁄4 In addition to improving its data conversion processes, the Army implemented technical 

and process improvements in December 2007. The Army reported that these 

improvements reduced the number of incorrect bills from 40 per cycle to zero. Because of 

time constraints, we did not independently verify these reported results.

Page 15 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
14

Objective 2 Observations–Prior GAO 

Recommendations (continued)

h Requirements management and testing

3⁄4 We previously reported that the Army did not have an adequate process for managing LMP 

requirements that complied with best practices. In 2007, we reported (in GAO-07-860) that 

the Army revised and improved this process.

3⁄4 We previously reported that the Army did not have an adequate testing process for LMP 

because the tests conducted by the Army were not tied to specific requirements, were not 

“end-to-end,” and were not performed by users of the system and because test results 

were neither properly documented nor verified and validated by an independent reviewer in 

accordance with best practices.

3⁄4 The Army has since revised its testing process, which we were unable to fully assess 

because of time constraints. However, we found that (1) users were conducting the test; 

(2) detailed test scripts were being used; (3) an automated system was capturing test 

results; and (4) test results were being evaluated daily by a group that consisted of users, 

the LMP program office, and an independent contractor, which increased the assurance 

that identified problems were properly evaluated.

Page 16 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 2 Observations–Prior GAO 

Recommendations (continued)

hIndependent verification and validation

3⁄4 The Army has implemented an independent verification and 

validation process, which should help to identify to 

management the issues or weaknesses that increase the risks 

associated with the project.

Page 17 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 3 Observations–Improved 

Management Processes

hThe Army has implemented critical project management processes 

and controls to identify and understand the risks associated with 

making a deployment decision and evaluate whether those risks 

are acceptable before deploying LMP at Corpus Christi, 

Letterkenny, and Redstone Arsenal. These key processes were 

absent during the first deployment at Tobyhanna. 

3⁄4 Improved training to address human capital needs

3⁄4 Data conversion processes developed to provide reasonable 

assurance that critical data are properly converted

3⁄4 Quantitative metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of the revised project 

management process have been developed

3⁄4 “Go Live” processes developed to rapidly evaluate and respond to

potential issues that will invariably arise during the second deployment

Page 18 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 3 Observations–Improved 

Management Processes–Training

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Notes: On March 19, 2009, LMP estimated that its total training hours would be greater than the amount shown in the above chart. This 

difference was caused by LMP reevaluating its course offerings and employee training assignments, primarily at Corpus Christi Army Depot. 

The LMP project office expects that the revised data will be loaded into the training system during the week ending April 3, 2009, and that the 

total number of employee training hours associated with the second deployment will be about 195,000 employee training hours.

Employee Training Hours as of March 26, 2009

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

Actual Future Total

Hours

Redstone Arsenal

Letterkenny Army Depot

Corpus Christi Army

Depot

Page 19 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
18

Objective 3 Observations–Improved 

Management Processes–Training (continued)

hThe majority of training (about 92 percent of the total 

employee hours) is expected to be delivered prior to 

deployment.

hSome training (e.g., budget stratification reporting) will 

occur at Redstone after deployment since the users will 

not be performing the functions designed to be 

addressed by the training until deployment has 

occurred, and Army officials explained that it is more 

effective to train an individual when he or she is close to 

performing the expected function. 

Page 20 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 3 Observations–Improved 

Management Processes–Training (continued)

h Training process includes a means to evaluate the effectiveness of the 

training program in delivering the expected skills.

3⁄4 Participants are tested and must achieve a 70 percent score to be 

considered as passing the class.

3⁄4 If a person does not achieve a 70 percent score, he or she may take 

other actions, such as taking the class again to achieve a passing 

score.

• One-on-one help is also offered if the participant continues to experience problems.

3⁄4 Participants also provide feedback on whether they believe that the 

course has helped them do their jobs.

• According to the Army, overall the participants have rated the training program as a 4.1 out of 5, with 5 being the highest score.

Page 21 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 3 Observations–Improved 

Management Processes—Data Conversion

hLMP has conducted three data migration trial loads to 

identify issues associated with migrating data from the 

legacy systems to LMP. 

3⁄4 At the end of February 2009, more than 95 percent, or about 

12.5 million of the 13.1 million records, could be loaded into 

LMP without issue.

3⁄4 As of March 27, 2009, about 96 percent of the records loaded 

into LMP successfully processed without issue. For the 

remaining records, Army officials stated that they will either 

resolve the issues before deployment or take actions to mitigate

any adverse effects.

Page 22 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 3 Observations–Improved Management 

Processes–Data Conversion (continued)

h The Army recognizes that not all legacy data will be successfully loaded into LMP 

prior to deployment.

3⁄4 Historical data are needed for planning or other purposes.

• A data warehouse is being created that contains the data in the legacy 

system that are not being converted--this is the same approach used at the 

initial deployment site and it has served the mission needs.

• The legacy systems will remain available in an inactive state as long as the 

Army considers it necessary.

3⁄4 A review was made to determine which records were associated with work that 

is not expected to be performed at deployment locations during the next 3 

years, and data conversion of these records will occur after deployment, if the 

need arises.

Page 23 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 3 Observations–Improved Management 

Processes–Data Conversion (continued)

3⁄4 Data needed to support various LMP processes (commonly referred to 

as master data) are being carefully reviewed.

• Preventive measures have been implemented to ensure that all 

master data items being loaded into the system have correct base

unit of measure (BUOM) values.

– In the initial deployment, items were loaded into LMP with 

incorrect BUOM values. For example, part numbers were 

loaded into the system with a BUOM with a qualitative measure 

such as “box” rather than a quantitative measure such as 

“each.”

Page 24 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 3 Observations–Improved Management 

Processes–Data Conversion (continued)

• The Army developed a manual work-around process to provide reasonable 

assurance that items already contained in LMP with incorrect BUOM will not 

cause problems at the second deployment locations.

– LMP currently has about 329 items in its records that contain incorrect 

BUOM values. These errors caused reordering and billing problems at 

Tobyhanna. 

* 121 of these items are used by Corpus Christi and Letterkenny

* 72 are only used by Letterkenny

* 25 are only used by Corpus Christi

– Manual work-around processes developed at Tobyhanna have 

addressed the problems and will be used at the second deployment

locations until a long-term system fix can be implemented.

Page 25 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 3 Observations–Improved 

Management Processes–Quantitative Metrics

hThe Army has defined the critical business processes that must be 

completed prior to making a decision on whether the deployment 

should “Go Live,” and has developed quantitative metrics to 

evaluate whether this has occurred.

3⁄4 Examples of quantitative measures that are used include the 

following:

• Validate that the critical business process testing has been 

completed and that any problems that have not been 

addressed have agreed-upon mitigation strategies.

• Validate that the expert users can successfully execute the 

applicable processes--100 percent of the selected expert users are able to successfully execute their respective tasks.

Page 26 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 3 Observations – Improved Management 

Processes – Quantitative Metrics (continued)

• Validate that end users have completed 90 percent of the required 

training courses. 

• Validate that the overall data accuracy rate is 95 percent, with each 

deployment location having accuracy of at least 90 percent.

• Validate the interoperability, availability, and responsiveness of 

LMP.

– Failures associated with exchanging data with other systems 

are less than 2 percent, with an objective of 1 percent

– Availability is at least 99.5 percent

– Average response time is less than 2 seconds for 80 percent of 

the transactions, with an objective of 2 seconds or less for 95 

percent of the transactions

Page 27 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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Objective 3 Observations–Improved Management 

Processes –“Post-Go Live” Processes

h The Army recognizes that deploying a system such as LMP can never be a 

risk-free proposition and that problems will arise after deployment 

regardless of the actions taken prior to deployment. The Army has 

implemented processes designed to reduce the adverse impacts 

associated with those problems to acceptable levels.

3⁄4 End users experiencing problems will contact expert users at their 

location to help determine whether they are experiencing system 

problems or whether the users need help understanding how to 

perform a given task.

• Help tickets are generated, regardless of the reason, to help the 

Army determine if additional training is needed or if the training 

needs to be modified.

• When the training is modified, all users who have taken the course 

are notified of the changes.

Page 28 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
27

Objective 3 Observations–Improved Management 

Processes–“Post-Go Live” Processes (continued)

h The Army has enhanced its help desk support to understand the “root cause” of problems 

identified by users and help those users immediately where possible. The Army is following best 

practices and will use a three-tier help desk system to address problems that cannot be 

addressed by the expert users at the deployment locations.

3⁄4 Tier 1 

• Provides a single point of contact for end users

• Gathers the necessary data to assess the reported problem

• Determines if the problem can be resolved or escalates the problem to the next level;

for example, the Tier 1 Help Desk (1) may be aware of a specific problem and can 

provide the user with the “work-around” that has been developed to address the 

problem or (2) can determine whether the system is operating as designed and provide 

the user with instructions on how to accomplish a specific transaction

• Verifies user satisfaction with the help desk process

Page 29 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
28

Objective 3 Observations–Improved Management 

Processes–“Post-Go Live” Processes (continued)

3⁄4 Tier 2 has more knowledgeable support personnel and 

determines if the problem can be resolved or escalates the 

problem to the next level.

• May recommend changes to LMP based on the change 

management processes used by the program

3⁄4 Tier 3 support is used for complex problems that cannot be 

addressed by the Tier 2 support or problems associated with 

vendor-supplied hardware and software.

Page 30 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
29

Agency Views

hWe provided a draft of these briefing slides to the 

Departments of Defense and the Army for their official 

review and comments.

hOn March 30, 2009, we met with officials from the 

Defense Business Transformation Agency, the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense for Supply Policy, the LMP 

Program Office, and the Department of the Army to 

discuss our observations and obtain their comments on 

the briefing slides. The participants agreed with our 

observations and the information in the briefing slides.

Page 31 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
30

Methodology

h To determine if the Army’s report addressed the nine specific areas 

identified in the House committee report, we reviewed the Army’s report 

and supporting documentation and compared them against the 

requirements. 

h To ascertain the specific actions that the Army has taken to address GAO’s 

prior recommendations on the implementation of LMP, we reviewed past 

GAO reports related to LMP implementation. We also met with Army

officials at the LMP Program Office to discuss the actions they either have 

implemented or have under way to address each recommendation, and we 

reviewed Army plans and policies that govern implementation. We also 

traveled to an Army depot to determine if the actions were being taken.

Page 32 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
31

Methodology (continued)

h To evaluate the management processes and controls that the Army has in 

place to ascertain if LMP should be deployed, we met with Army officials at 

the LMP Program Office and Corpus Christi Army Depot to determine the 

processes and controls they have in place. We also observed a training 

class being conducted for LMP users, and we analyzed Army data related 

to training.

h We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to March 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

(351347) 

Page 33 GAO-09-852R Defense Logistics 
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