2022 IL App (1st) 210791-U

No. 1-21-0791 

June 21, 2022

FIRST DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in 

the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

IN RE THE ADOPTION OF 

P.Y.Y.Y.

BRETT RANJEL, Appellant, 

 v. 

HUSBAND and WIFE, 

Appellees. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County.

No. 2002 D 10403

Honorable 

LaGuina Clay-Herron, 

Judge presiding.

JUSTICE WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Pucinski and Coghlan concurred in the judgment.

 ORDER

Held: Where a putative father failed to file a parentage petition within 30 days of registering 

as a putative father, and he met none of the other criteria of section 8(b)(1)(B) of the 

Adoption Act, the mother’s consent alone validated the adoption, and the putative father had 

no standing to object to the adoption.
No. 1-21-0791 

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¶ 1 The trial court found that P.Y.Y.Y.’s biological father, Brett Ranjel, lacked standing to 

object to a petition for adoption of P.Y.Y.Y. because Ranjel failed to file a parentage petition 

within 30 days of registering as P.Y.Y.Y.’s putative father. Ranjel contends the Adoption Act 

(Act) (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2020)) makes his consent to the adoption indispensable. 

We find the trial court correctly interpreted section 8(b)(1) of the Act, which makes the 

mother’s consent to the adoption, without the father’s consent, sufficient to support the 

adoption when the father does not meet any of the criteria listed in section 8(b)(1)(B). 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In April 2020, Anna Yordy told Ranjel that he had impregnated her. She stated that the 

baby might be placed for adoption. Yordy worked with an adoption counselor from September 

through December 2020. The counselor called Ranjel in October 2020. Ranjel told the 

counselor he did not consent to the adoption. In November 2020, Ranjel registered with the 

Illinois Putative Father Registry. The form he filled out stated: 

“I understand that filing with the Putative Father Registry is only the first step in 

protecting my interests in being considered the legal father of the child and that I 

will have the right to object to an adoption only if I start legal proceedings to 

establish that I am the father. It is called a parentage action and must be completed 

wit[hi]n 30 days of the date of my registration with the Putative Father Registry. 

For assistance with starting a parentage action, I must contact the Illinois 

Department of Public Aid.”

¶ 4 Yordy gave birth to P.Y.Y.Y. on December 2, 2020, and she signed a consent to adoption 

on December 22, 2020. On January 11, 2021, Petitioners, a couple who seek anonymity in this 

appeal, filed in Cook County a petition to adopt P.Y.Y.Y. They served Ranjel with the adoption 
No. 1-21-0791 

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petition on January 21, 2021, and on February 3, 2021, Ranjel filed a parentage petition. He 

filed the petition in Whiteside County, where he and Yordy lived. The Whiteside court entered 

an order naming Ranjel as P.Y.Y.Y.’s father.

¶ 5 In the adoption case, Ranjel then filed a motion to change the venue to Whiteside County. 

The Cook County court denied the motion, and petitioners filed a motion asking the court to 

find that Ranjel had no standing to object to the adoption.

¶ 6 The Cook County court heard Petitioners’ motion challenging Ranjel’s standing in May 

2021. The adoption counselor testified about her work on the case, and Ranjel testified about 

his objection to the adoption. Ranjel admitted that he did not file a parentage action within 30 

days of adding his name to the Illinois Putative Father Registry. He explained that he tried to 

hire an attorney to help him with the filing, but he could not afford the retainer the attorney 

sought. He showed the court a letter he sent to several relatives and friends, seeking funds to 

pay for an attorney.

¶ 7 The trial court held Ranjel lacked standing to object to the adoption. Ranjel now appeals. 

Because the trial court’s order effectively extinguishes Ranjel’s interest in the adoption, we 

have jurisdiction over the appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 307(a)(6) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal, Ranjel contends that the Act makes his consent a prerequisite for the adoption 

of P.Y.Y.Y. He also argues the trial court’s order deprives him of due process and equal 

protection. Because the case turns on the interpretation of a statute, we review the trial court’s 

ruling de novo. Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 

IL 116023, ¶ 16. The parties agree that the adoption in this case requires consent. We decide 
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only whether the mother’s consent alone suffices for the adoption. Section 8(b) of the Act 

provides: 

“Where consents are required in the case of an adoption of a minor child, 

the consents of the following persons shall be sufficient: 

(1) (A) The mother of the minor child; and 

 (B) The father of the minor child, if the father: 

 (i) was married to the mother on the date of birth of the child

 *** 

 (ii) is the father of the child under 

 *** an order of parentage ***; or

 (iii) in the case of a child placed with the 

 

adopting parents less than 6 months after birth, openly lived 

with the child, the child's biological mother, or both, and held 

himself out to be the child's biological father during the first 30 

days following the birth of the child; or

*** 

(vii) has timely registered with Putative 

 

Father Registry, as provided in Section 12.1 of this Act, and 

prior to the expiration of 30 days from the date of such 

registration, commenced legal proceedings to establish 

paternity.” 750 ILCS 50/8(b) (West 2020). 

¶ 24 Ranjel admits that when Petitioners filed their adoption petition, he did not meet any of the 

criteria in section 8(b) to qualify as a father whose consent, along with the mother’s consent, 
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would suffice for an adoption. Despite the warning on the form that he filed with the Illinois 

Putative Father Registry, Ranjel did not file a parentage action within 30 days of registering as 

a putative father.

¶ 25 Our supreme court stated: “a father may provide or withhold consent to the adoption if he 

has ‘timely registered with [the] Putative Father Registry ***, and prior to the expiration of 30 

days from the date of such registration, commenced legal proceedings to establish paternity.’” 

J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill. 2d 182, 201, 863 N.E.2d 236 (2007) (quoting 750 ILCS 50/8(b) (West 

1998)). “[T]he statute protects those putative fathers who have taken certain specified actions 

to preserve their rights. [Citations.] If the putative father has not so acted within the time limits 

provided by statute, the child's right to a stable environment and finality becomes paramount; 

and the putative father loses all right to intervene in adoption proceedings.” Petition of K.J.R., 

293 Ill. App. 3d 49, 55, 687 N.E.2d 113 (1997). A commentator explained:

“[The Act] require[es] unwed fathers to register with the state within thirty days of 

the child's birth in order to preserve standing for the purposes of subsequent 

adoption proceedings. ***

*** [T]he father's participation in the Putative Father Registry merely guarantees 

his right to take part in a ‘best interests’ hearing for the child and not to withhold 

consent to the adoption.” Gerald Huston, Born to Lose: The Illinois "Baby Richard" 

Case--How Examining His Father's Pre-Birth Conduct Might Have Led to a 

Different Ending for Richard, 16 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 543 (1996); see also Diane S. 

Kaplan, The Baby Richard Amendments and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 

22 Child. Legal Rts. J. 2 (2002-03).

¶ 26 The Senate sponsor of the bill that included section 8 of the Act explained its purpose: 
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“[T]he intent of this bill is to provide some measure of security for adoptive parents 

in the State of Illinois. We would like to lay out a procedure that is predictable, that 

is known[.] *** [l]f these procedures are adhered to, and notices are sent, and 

fathers who wish to assert their rights follow the proper procedures, *** they can 

secure [their rights], and if they don't, their rights are terminated, and therefore, 

adoptive parents are secure in their relationship with *** their adopted children.” 

88th General Assembly, Senate Proceedings, July 1, 1994, at 8 (statement of Senator 

Cronin). 

¶ 27 Ranjel contends that under section 8(a) of the Act he retained his right to object to the 

adoption, and the 30-day limit for filing parentage actions applies only if the putative father 

receives a section 12a notice. Section 8(a) provides:

“Except as hereinafter provided in this Section consents or surrenders shall be 

required in all cases, unless the person whose consent or surrender would otherwise 

be required shall be found by the court:

*** 

 (3) to have waived his parental rights to the child under Section 12a or 12.1 

or subsection S of Section 10 of this Act." 750 ILCS 50/8(a) (West 2020).

¶ 28 Section 12a provides that any party may serve notice of intent to adopt on a putative father. 

Section 12a requires that the notice must inform the putative father:

“If you wish to retain your rights with respect to the child, you must file ***, within 

30 days after the date of receipt of this notice, the declaration of paternity enclosed 

herewith stating that you are, in fact, the father of the child and that you intend to 

retain your legal rights with respect to the child, or request to be notified of any 
No. 1-21-0791 

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further proceedings with respect to custody or adoption of the child. 

 If you do not file such a declaration of paternity, or a request for notice, then 

whatever legal rights you have with respect to the child, including the right to notice 

of any future proceedings for the adoption of the child, may be terminated without 

any further notice to you. When your legal rights with respect to the child are so 

terminated, you will not be entitled to notice of any proceeding instituted for the 

adoption of the child.”

¶ 29 Ranjel contends he did not waive his rights under section 12a because Petitioners never 

sent him a section 12a notice. They sent him only notice of the adoption proceedings, without 

the warning that echoes the warning he received from the Illinois Putative Fathers Registry 

about the termination of his parental rights.

¶ 30 We find that section 8(a) does not affect the sufficiency of the mother’s consent as 

established by section 8(b). Section 8(b)(1) governs adoptions by consent of the parents, setting 

both the necessary and sufficient conditions for such adoptions. The section requires consent 

of the mother without qualification, but it requires consent of the father only if the father meets 

the requirements of section 8(b)(1)(B). Under section 8(b)(1)(B), in accord with the warning 

Ranjel received when he registered as a putative father, Ranjel waived his parental rights when 

he failed to file a parentage action within 30 days of adding his name to the registry.

¶ 31 Ranjel contends that the court’s order deprives him of due process and equal protection 

because his lack of funds prevented him from hiring an attorney to file a timely parentage 

petition. “The fundamental requirements of due process are notice of the procedure and the 

opportunity to present any objection or rebuttal.” People v. Deleon, 2020 IL 124744, ¶ 7. The 

Illinois Putative Father Registry notified Ranjel of his rights and afforded the opportunity to 
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take the steps necessary to protect those rights. The Constitution does not guarantee the right 

to litigate without expense, but simply protects individuals from the imposition of terms that

unreasonably and injuriously interfere with their “right to a remedy in the law or impede the 

due administration of justice.” Ali v. Danaher, 47 Ill. 2d 231, 236 (1970). The due process 

clause does not require the suspension of adoption proceedings for an indefinite period while 

the putative father gathers funds to retain counsel. We find no violation of Ranjel’s right to due 

process.

¶ 32 “The essential test of equal protection is whether government deals with similarly situated 

individuals in a similar manner.” In re Adoption of K.L.P., 198 Ill. 2d 448, 466, 763 N.E.2d 

741, 752 (2002). Ranjel does not make explicit his argument as to how the Act impermissibly 

classifies litigants and deprives his class of equal protection. The Act requires all putative 

fathers to file parentage actions within 30 days of adding their names to the registry if they 

seek to protect their right to object to adoption. All putative fathers, regardless of income or 

wealth, waive their rights if they fail to file parentage actions within the statutory 30-day 

period. We find no classification that violates Ranjel’s right to equal protection of the law.

¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34 The trial court correctly held that Ranjel lacked standing because he waived his right to 

object to the adoption when he failed to file a parentage action within 30 days after registering 

with the Illinois Putative Fathers Registry. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 35 Affirmed.