* Local Rule 47.5 provides:

"The publication of opini ons that have no precedential value and merely decide p articular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-10208 Summary Calendar

BRENDA F. AMOS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

ESMOR MANSFIELD, INC. f/k/a/ ESMOR TEXAS, INC., RON KING, SKYLER BARKER and WILLIAMS KAESLER,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas

(CA H 94 4309 (CR H 91 180 2))

(August 28, 1995)

Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM * :

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW2

Appellant brought this action pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e, alleging that she was discharged by her employer in

retaliation for her complaining about harassment, sexual

har assment, and racism. The district court granted Appellees'

motion for summary judgment. Appellant then filed a timely notice

of appeal.

GROUNDS OF THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Appellees' grounds for summary judgment ruled upon by the

district court were as follows: (1) Appellant failed to timely

file her charge of discrimination as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e); (2) bec ause Appellant failed to include the individual

defendants in her charge of discrimination, Title VII claims

against them are now prohibited; and (3) Appellant is unable to

overcome Appellees' articulated nondiscriminatory reasons for the

discharge.

1. Timeliness of Appellant's Charge of Discrimination

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), a complaining party must

file a charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination. In

order to qualify for the 300-day period mentioned in the statute,

the complaini ng party must institute proceedings with the state

referral agency. B lumberg v. HCA Management Co.
, 848 F.2d 642, 646

(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied

, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989). Appellant

filed her charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

not with the Texas Commission on Human Rights. Moreover, Appellant

failed to come forward with any summary judgment evidence that she

did file her charge with the state agency. Therefore, Appellant3

was required to file her charge within 180 days of the alleged

discrimination. This she did not do. Summary judgment was

appropriate on this basis.

2. Liability of Individual Defendants

Appellant is not entitled to proceed with Title VII claims

against the individual defendants as they were not named in

Appellant's charg e of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1);

Terrell v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.
, 644 F.2d 1112, 1122

(5th Cir. Unit B May 1981), va cated on other grounds sub nom.

International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v.

Terrell

, 456 U.S. 955 (1982), and cert. denied

, 456 U.S. 972

(1982); Ajaz v. Continental Airl ines , 156 F.R.D. 145 (S.D. Tex.

1994). The district court correctly ruled that the individual

defendants were entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

3. O vercoming Articulated Nondiscriminatory Reasons for Discharge

Appellees articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for Appellant's discharge, including insubordination and poor work

pe rformance. Appellant failed to come forward with any summary

judgment evidence to show that these reasons are pretextual. See

Hill v. K-Mart Corp.
, 699 F.2d 776, 779 (5th Cir. 1983). The

district court correctly granted summary judgment on this basis.

Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.