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i 

52–113 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–65] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE MILITARY 

SERVICES’ OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDING 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 20, 2009 
(II) 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

MEGAN PUTNAM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, May 20, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for the Military Services’ Operation and Maintenance 

Funding ................................................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, May 20, 2009 ....................................................................................... 35 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE MILITARY SERVICES’ OPERATION AND 

MAINTENANCE FUNDING 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, 

Readiness Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 2 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Readiness 

Subcommittee ....................................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps ...... 8 

Chiarelli, Gen. Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ........................... 4 

Fraser, Gen. William M., III, USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force ........... 7 

Walsh, Adm. Patrick M., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy ...... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Amos, Gen. James F. ........................................................................................ 104 

Chiarelli, Gen. Peter W. ................................................................................... 43 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 41 

Fraser, Gen. William M., III ............................................................................ 86 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P. ..................................................................................... 39 

Walsh, Adm. Patrick M. ................................................................................... 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Chief of Naval Operations memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 

dated May 14, 2009, detailing Navy’s Fiscal Year 2010 (FY10) Unfunded Program List ..................................................................................... 123 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Fallin .......................................................................................................... 128 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 127 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 128 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 128 

Ms. Shea-Porter ................................................................................................ 127 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 135 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 137 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 131 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE MILITARY 

SERVICES’ OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDING 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 20, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ORTIZ. The subcommittee will come to order, but before we 

move any further I would like to recognize my good friend from the 

great state of Georgia for an introduction. He was so impressed 

that he said, ‘‘I have got to do it this morning.’’ 

Marshall, go ahead. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We have with us members of the German Bundestag. In fact, 

they are members of the Defense Committee of the German Bundestag. And I would like the chairlady of the Defense Committee 

to rise, Mrs. Merten. 

[Applause.] 

Mr. MARSHALL. We all know that Germany is a very, very important ally of ours on a number of different fronts, and certainly military is one. And to the extent that we can increase our coordination 

development with our sister country, we are interested in doing 

that. And we appreciate you visiting with us today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

And welcome. And if anything gets out of order, call Mr. Marshall. 

Today the Readiness Subcommittee meets to hear testimony on 

the military services’ fiscal year 2010 operation and maintenance 

(O&M) budget request. I want to thank our distinguished witnesses 

from each of the military services for appearing before this subcommittee today to discuss funding for the services’ readiness programs. 

The operation and maintenance account is the single most largest component of the Department of Defense (DOD) annual budget 

request. The military services’ O&M accounts provide funding for 

such readiness areas as operating forces, mobilization, training, 

and recruiting, and administration and service-wide activities. 
2 

For fiscal year 2010 the O&M portion of the budget request comprises $185.7 billion, or 35 percent of the Department of Defense’s 

total $533.8 billion baseline request. The fiscal year 2010 request 

increases the O&M account by 3.7 percent, or $6.6 billion over fiscal year 2009. 

However, increases in the defense health account for $3 billion, 

or nearly half of the overall O&M funding increases in fiscal year 

2010. Additionally, the Department has requested another $74.1 

billion for O&M in overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding 

for fiscal year 2010. 

O&M is the largest portion of the OCO request, at 57 percent, 

for military operations, subsistence and logistics, including 

predeployment, deployment, and redeployment. The fiscal year 

2010 O&M budget request basically leaves training at a steady 

state, signaling that the Department would remain focused on the 

counterinsurgency mission vice resourcing full-spectrum training. 

The fiscal year 2010 budget request relies on the OCO funding 

to achieve air, ground, and sea training at levels required to maintain military standards. The fiscal year 2010 budget request decreases tank training miles to 550 from a high of 608 in the fiscal 

year 2009 budget request, but keeps them above the low of 459 in 

fiscal year 2008. 

Flying hours slightly increase for the Navy in the base budget 

from 17.2, in fiscal year 2009, to 19.0 in fiscal year 2010, and with 

the OCO funding climb to 22. The Air Force flying hour program 

has been reduced in the fiscal year 2010 base budget by $67 million, but Air Force budget documents state the budget fully funds 

the flying hour program at 1.4 million hours due to the retirement 

of the roughly, about 250 aircraft. Additionally, the Navy will rely 

upon the OCO funding to achieve 58 ship steaming days per quarter, compared to a steady state level of 45 days in the base budget, 

putting it above the deployed force goal of 51 days per quarter. 

What the subcommittee needs to hear from our witnesses today 

is where each of your services is taking risks in the budget request 

and how this budget request improves readiness. And we are very 

fortunate to have our witnesses today, distinguished military leaders, General Peter Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Patrick M. Walsh, Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and General 

James F. Amos, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps; and 

General William M. Fraser, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

And we want to thank you so much for joining us today. And now 

I would like to recognize the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, the ranking member, Mr. Forbes, for any remarks that he 

would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the 

time today for us to examine the budget request from the services 

as it pertains to readiness. 
3 

I would like to welcome each of our witnesses. And gentlemen, 

we first of all thank you all for being here today, but also thank 

you for your service to our Nation. 

As the chairman mentioned, the operations and maintenance budget accounts for over a third of the $534 billion defense budget 

request. And if you factor in the additional $91 billion in operations 

and maintenance requested for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

that percentage rises even further. 

The amount of funding in this budget request demonstrates the 

considerable oversight responsibility this subcommittee has, particularly when your Federal Government is spending beyond its 

means and when our economy is struggling. American taxpayers 

expect that every dollar we direct toward defense is spent in the 

most effective way to protect the Nation. 

But the dollars are not the only component in this budget request. The strategic risks we accept in this proposal are equally important because there is no bailout or stimulus that will help us 

recover if our Nation is tested in battle and we discover that we 

have not provided the equipment, training, or resources that our 

men and women in uniform need for victory. 

So we need you to help us understand what risks we are accepting in the proposed budget, particularly this year, when one, the 

budget was formulated in an accelerated manner; two, when the 

budget proposes major changes to force structure a year before the 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR); three, when the details of the 

budget were released just a couple of weeks ago; and four, when 

we have access to only the first year of the five-year budget. Your 

professional input is critical to understanding the consequences of 

this budget request. 

When Secretary Gates testified last week he said that everyone 

who signed the nondisclosure agreement was free of its restrictions. 

And he assured us that we could expect candor in the witnesses 

that came over and testify on the budget. And we look forward to 

a robust dialogue between the witnesses and the members of this 

panel today. 

What is particularly concerning to me in this year’s budget cycle 

is this: Over the next few years the Federal budget will be in desperate and obvious need of savings because of the current expected 

cost of the bailout and stimulus packages. And at a time when adequate defense investment is most vulnerable, we are receiving less 

and less information on the status of our forces and the plans for 

the future from the new administration. 

We have not yet been given a 30-year shipbuilding plan in this 

year’s budget even though it is required by law. We have not been 

given a naval aviation plan even though that is also required by 

law. And we cannot discuss the results of Navy ships readiness reports even though they were unclassified through the entire Cold 

War. 

While I understand the Navy’s concern that the detailed information contained in those reports could be useful to those wishing to 

do us harm, I can assure you that the American people would be 

surprised to know the state of repair of our surface Navy. 

The American people rightfully expect that when it comes to our 

national security members of this committee and officials in the 
4 

Pentagon will keep them informed of the threats we face and what 

we are doing to prepare for those threats. And so it is our obligation to share with the American people not only what is in this 

budget to keep us safe, but what is not in the budget that presents 

risks that we are assuming as a Nation. 

As my good friend from Texas, the chairman, Mr. Ortiz, likes to 

say, we want to help you and we can’t help you if you don’t—if we 

don’t know what you need. 

So Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for holding this hearing, for 

your leadership, and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

You know, all of us here—we are in the same boat. We work for 

the same government, and I see ourselves, even though we are sitting up here, we are part of your team. And we appreciate what 

you have done, not only yourselves—putting yourselves in harm’s 

way—but our young men and women who serve our country. So 

thank you so much. 

And now, we will begin with General Chiarelli. 

Your testimony, sir, whenever you are ready to begin. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF 

OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General CHIARELLI. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Forbes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss the current readiness of 

U.S. ground forces. This is my first occasion to appear before this 

esteemed subcommittee, and I pledge always to provide you with 

honest and forthright assessment and my best military advice, as 

requested. I submitted a statement for the record, and I look forward to answering your questions at the conclusion of my opening 

remarks. 

As all of you know, it has been a busy time for our Nation’s military. We are at war. We have been at war for the past seven-plus 

years. During this period, demand has continued to grow and the 

Army’s level of responsibility has expanded considerably. 

At the same time, our force has become smaller in terms of the 

number of available personnel. The combined effect has been increased deployments, shorter dwell, and insufficient recovery time 

for our soldiers and sometimes our equipment. 

Today, it has been previously reported to this subcommittee, the 

Army remains out of balance, and overall we are consuming our 

readiness as fast as we are building it. Unfortunately, the Army 

cannot influence demand, and the current level does not appear 

likely to improve significantly for the foreseeable future. 

The Army is expecting to gain some savings over the next couple 

of years, as the last of the units deployed for 15 months as part 

of the surge return in September 2009, and as we begin the drawdown of forces in Iraq in 2010. If executed as planned, these reductions in demand will help to increase dwell times for many of our 

soldiers. 
5 

However, if these plans are delayed or postponed due to unforeseen events or a resurgence of tensions in hot spots around the 

world, we will have to find other ways to relieve the strain on the 

force. In the meantime, it remains a top priority for the Army’s 

senior leaders, including me, to do everything we can to help alleviate some of the stress on soldiers and family members. 

In particular, we are committed to improving and expanding 

available behavior health and mental health services. Equally important is removing the prevailing stigma associated with seeking 

and receiving help. 

This is going to take time. In the interim, we are trying to make 

it easier for soldiers and family members to take advantage of the 

resources and services that are available as discreetly as they deem 

necessary. 

These are challenging times for our Nation and for our military, 

and with the support of Congress we have deployed the best 

manned, equipped, trained, and led forces in the history of the 

United States Army. I am sure of that. 

It is my personal opinion that if the demand does not go down 

or if expected savings from Iraq are not realized, we simply cannot 

continue to meet the current high level of demand and sustain the 

force, including soldiers and equipment, without making some 

course-mining adjustments. I assure the members of the subcommittee that is what the Army’s senior leaders are focused on 

right now; we are working through these issues and determining 

the needs of the Army for the future, and we will continue to coordinate with senior DOD officials and Congress to identify both 

short- and long-term solutions. 

Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you again for 

your continued and generous support and demonstrated commitment to the outstanding men and women of the United States 

Army and their families. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli can be found in the 

Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, General. 

The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Walsh. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. PATRICK M. WALSH, USN, VICE CHIEF 

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral WALSH. Chairman Ortiz, Congressman Forbes, and distinguished members of the readiness subcommittee, I have submitted my written remarks and request your consideration to enter 

them into the record. 

It is a privilege to appear before you today, sir, to testify on the 

readiness of our naval forces. The talented men and women, sailors 

and civilians, of the United States Navy continue to perform exceptionally well under demanding conditions. Your support has been 

and continues to be fundamental to their success. 

The Navy provides our country a global expeditionary force committed to preserving the security and prosperity of the Nation, but 

today 45 percent of the Navy is underway. Our sailors are operating with the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Coast Guard, and Maritime Coalition partners. 
6 

Additionally, over 13,000 serve ashore in the Central Command 

(CENTCOM) area of responsibility. The Navy is agile, it is flexible, 

it is capable, it is competent to do what no other navy in the world 

can do. 

Combatant commanders want a full-spectrum and responsive 

naval force, and the demand for those forces remains high. The 

Navy is in a forward-deployed posture to represent the enduring 

national interest in the world stage. It deters aggression, assures 

allies, and fosters cooperative relationships to enhance global security. 

Our charge is to act as the Nation directs in whatever role, in 

whatever place, at whatever time, whether it is to serve as a first 

responder or as a full-spectrum strategic reserve force. Our operating assumption is that we must sustain this posture to ensure 

freedom of access and freedom of action on, under, and above the 

seas to present true options for national leadership. 

Therefore, we need continual, critical self-assessments to review 

the balance of issues that affect our ability to sustain a forwarddeployed full-spectrum force. Today we see the risk in warfighting 

readiness, personnel, and force structure programs as increasing, 

which requires our focus, attention, and priority resourcing. While 

the fiscal year 2010 budget aligns with the goals of our maritime 

strategy, we are assuming an increasing level of risk because of 

challenges associated with fleet capacity, increasing operational requirements, and growing manpower, maintenance, and infrastructure costs. 

The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) optimizes our ability to provide 

forces to support the maritime strategy by maximizing availability, 

return on investment, and flexibility of missions. Specifically, the 

plan for fiscal year 2010 will enable us to deploy three carrier 

strike groups continuously, surge an additional carrier strike group 

in 30 days, and if required, have another ready for deployment in 

90 days. 

This year’s budget allows us to maintain continued forward presence, but as we balance priorities, we have had to adjust the overall capacity of our forces in reserve and their readiness to surge. 

It is an adjustment from previous force levels, but this adjustment 

demonstrates the flexibility of the Fleet Response Plan because we 

can tailor our surge response capacity and timing for the levels of 

risk acceptable to the combatant commanders, consistent with the 

prevailing threat and geopolitical environment. 

A substantial percentage of the future force is in service today— 

69 percent. The foundation of the Navy’s plan for a forward-deployed, surge-ready naval force is our ability to reach the expected 

service life for each of our ships. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 

is committed to executing the technically-determined required 

maintenance necessary to ensure all platforms reach their expected 

service life. 

We conduct a board of inspection and survey (INSURV) material 

inspection of our ships. These inspections, by design, are rigorous, 

critical, candid, direct, and conducted to determine the health of 

our fleet. I would be concerned with the rigor of our inspection regime if we did not see discrepancies identified. I echo the CNO’s 
7 

commitment to provide this committee the annual report that 

comes from the board of inspection and survey. 

Our people continue to deliver on their commitment to the Nation. Retention rates continue to rise across the force. In the officer 

corps, we continue to pay special attention to the medical and 

naval nuclear propulsion communities. While incentives and bonuses have contributed to increased retention, selective sub-specialties continue to require attention. 

In the enlisted force we are exceeding retention goals and continue to see a significant reduction in attrition. Your Navy remains 

ready and capable of meeting challenges today, but the stress on 

the force, our ships, and aircraft is increasing. 

While we can meet operational demands today, we have pressurized and stretched the respective resource accounts. Achieving the 

right balance of discipline within our resources is essential, otherwise we will not be able to meet our responsibilities to respond to 

additional operational demand, take care of our people, conduct essential platform maintenance, ensure our fleet reaches its full service life, and procure the fleet for tomorrow. 

Thank you for your continued support of our Navy, and I look 

forward to your questions, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Walsh can be found in the 

Appendix on page 51.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Admiral. 

Now, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General William 

Fraser. 

Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, VICE 

CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General FRASER. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Forbes, distinguished members of this committee, it is indeed a privilege to appear here this morning and to share with you the state of your Air 

Force’s readiness. 

In today’s national security environment, with challenges across 

the spectrum of conflict, your Air Force has put readiness first. I 

am proud to report this morning that the over 660,000 men and 

women of America’s Air Force are all in. We are ready to do whatever it takes to fight and win America’s wars. 

Despite a continuous high operations tempo and sustained deployments for almost two decades now, our Air Force stands ready 

to execute its missions with precision and reliability. Now, and into 

the foreseeable future, we will continue to face a wide range of 

threats to our Nation’s security. These threats require new solutions, innovative military capabilities, and the unwavering resolve 

of our airmen. 

From advancing our work in irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations to sustaining and maintaining our Nation’s nuclear deterrent capabilities, we have continued to answer the Nation’s call. And yet, these challenges have brought new stresses on 

the readiness of our systems, including our most important weapons system, our airmen. 

Prioritization readiness means organizing—prioritizing readiness 

means organizing, training, and equipping a force capable of meet-
8 

ing our commitments. Through your support, we have been able to 

recruit and retain the individuals necessary to meet these sustained and emerging missions, a collective force that is properly developed and trained to execute the mission, and one that is provided the support programs that they and their families so richly 

need and deserve. 

Our platforms are exhibiting signs of stress, evidence of the uncertainties we face by operating them beyond their normal service 

lives. While we continue to extend the service life and work to better understand the implications of these extensions on the systems, 

the groundings of multiple aircraft in recent years illustrate the 

need for both continued recapitalization and modernization programs. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Forbes, members of this committee, we are 

grateful for your steadfast support of our efforts to organize, train, 

and equip the total force. We have stood ready throughout our rich 

history; we proudly stand ready today. And through the continued 

support of this committee and the incredible resilience of America’s 

airmen, we will stand ready in the future to deliver the capabilities 

in air, space, and cyberspace that our joint and coalition partners 

expect and that our Nation deserves. 

Thank you again for your time this morning, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in the 

Appendix on page 86.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, General. 

Now the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General 

Amos. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General AMOS. Thank you, Chairman Ortiz, Representative 

Forbes, and distinguished members of this subcommittee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to talk to you a little bit about the readiness of your Marine Corps. 

As we sit in this hearing room today, there are more than 30,000 

Marines deployed across the globe supporting exercises, security cooperation activities, and overseas contingency operations. Within 

the CENTCOM theater of operations alone there are 16,000 Marines still left in Iraq and another 6,000, going up to 10,000, establishing a presence in Afghanistan. 

Despite high operational tempo, your Marines are resilient, they 

are motivated, they are a happy lot, and they are performing superbly in missions across the globe. For the past seven years they 

have been fully engaged in winning in combat. This sustained effort and performance has not come without cost to the institution, 

to our equipment, to our strategic programs, and most importantly, 

to our Marines and their families. 

Our forward-deployed units are manned, trained, and equipped 

to accomplish their assigned missions, and they report the highest 

levels of readiness. We have taxed, though, our nondeployed forces 

and strategic programs to be the bill-payers for that forward-deployed high readiness. 
9 

The majority of our nondeployed forces are reporting, as a result, 

degraded readiness. Because our equipment, personnel, and training priorities have been necessarily focused on counterinsurgency 

operations, we have experienced degradation in some of our six traditional core competencies. 

Although the current security environment has justified the 

tradeoffs, we must maintain a balanced force capable of responding 

to crises across the globe and across the full range of military operations. These operations are supported by the fiscal year 2010 

baseline and OCO budget request. The $26.5 million in baseline request and $5.7 billion, which pays for operations and maintenance 

activities, supports equipment repair, family support programs, 

and all the day-to-day activities of your Marine Corps. 

The $3.8 billion in O&M funding in our fiscal year 2010 OCO request will support both our drawdown in Iraq and our increasing 

operations in Afghanistan. It will support transportation costs, repair of equipment, reset, and the day-to-day operating costs. 

With your continued and consistent support, we will no doubt 

succeed in current operations, take care of our Marines and their 

families, reset and remodernize our equipment, and train the Marine Air Ground Task Force for the future security operations. 

Sir, I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Amos can be found in the 

Appendix on page 104.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

One of my questions this morning is going to be, if you all, the 

witnesses, could describe the specific areas in your fiscal year 2010 

budget request where you have knowingly taken risks and why you 

believe it was acceptable to take risks in those areas. Now, we are 

not here to, you know, point fingers at anybody, but I know that 

sometimes you have to make some very, very hard decisions. 

But if you would like to tell us why you have to take those risks, 

maybe we, the committee and my good friend, Mr. Forbes, and I, 

and the rest of the members of the committee could be in a position 

to, you know, really help you. We can start with General Chiarelli. 

General CHIARELLI. Mr. Chairman, if I had to look at where I 

feel we are taking the most risk, I would have to say that it is on 

the assumption that demand will go down. That is my biggest concern. 

We are planning on a drawdown from Iraq, which, if it happens 

as planned, will take pressure off the force. I often say that my job 

is to worry about things, and my—and when I worry about things, 

what I worry about is that for some reason that will not occur, and 

that might be if we take forces out of Iraq, but there may be something else that occurs, either additional requirement for forces in 

Afghanistan or some other hot spot, which puts us in a situation 

where we have to maintain the minimum amount of dwell we are 

maintaining right now for our forces, and that concerns me the 

most. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Admiral Walsh. 

Admiral WALSH. Sir, the lesson that we learned on 9/11 was that 

we did not have a fleet that was available to deploy. So the Fleet 

Response Plan that we put together since then is one that gives na-
10 

tional leadership a construct in which we present forces that are 

prepared and ready across a full spectrum of capabilities. 

The tension that I see is the pressure to drive into the baseline, 

now, effectively, predictions on something that describes a world 

that we just can’t predict. And so, the risk that we have to begin 

with, before I get into the specifics, is shooting behind the target 

before 10 ever becomes executable. 

So the challenge that we have is now trying to articulate for national leaders what the operating tempo of the new normal is for 

the fleet. In earlier remarks we heard references to steaming days, 

and frankly, the steaming days is a construct that we used to have, 

but the Fleet Response Plan really presents to national leadership 

an availability of forces that are either deployed or are surge ready. 

Where you will see us take risks, specifically in the 2010 budget, 

is how much capacity we hold in reserve. What we have looked at 

when we have reviewed the utilization of that construct since 2003 

and 2004, when we first introduced it, is that the predominant use 

of forces is for deployed forces who are already underway. 

Now, this doesn’t fit into a neat accounting scheme, in terms of 

whether or not we are actually operating in support of a war or 

not, so trying to describe routine in this kind of world that we are 

in since 9/11 becomes especially problematic for those who are trying to exert discipline in the baseline as well as trying to define, 

now, in the maritime sphere, what the wartime overseas contingency operations really involve. So the accounting can sometimes 

get in the way of actually being responsive as the construct that 

we presented to national leadership. 

We think, when we look at the use of the FRP over time, that 

on several occasions, both Katrina or in non-combatant evacuation 

operation (NEO) operations in support of Lebanon, we have relied 

on a cold start for ships that were in this surge capacity. Predominantly, we will use forces that are already underway and extend 

those forces as required in order to meet new national demand. 

So what you are seeing now is a reflection of cutting back on 

some of the surge capacity that we have. To Representative Forbes’ 

comments earlier about concerns about overall ship maintenance, 

I see this as an opportunity to get time, which is not very well articulated in any of this other than that we have an operating capacity of about 45 percent underway today. And I do think this will 

allow us time to do the deep sort of maintenance work and inspections that are required in order to reassess, again, where we are 

today in terms of the overall health of the fleet. 

Mr. ORTIZ. General Amos. 

General AMOS. Mr. Chairman, we have successfully, as a Nation, 

misjudged what the future holds almost consistently. Our record— 

our track record—for many, many years, not through lack of effort 

or through lack of skilled Americans trying to determine what the 

future holds, we have nonetheless misjudged it more often than 

not. 

My point is, we don’t know what the future holds. Specifically, 

in the Marine Corps we have worked hard in the last couple of 

years to try to push as much into the baseline and make those 

hard decisions—for instance, manpower, cost of manpower, and 

those types of things—and we have worked hard at that. So the 
11 

risk for this year in 2010 is—and really the 2009 and 2010 OCO— 

resides in the supplemental and the reset, the reconstitution, of 

your Marine Corps forces. 

We have a significant amount of money hinged in the OCO requirements for deeper level maintenance for all that equipment 

that is in the process of retrograding out of Iraq now and will continue to be over the next 12 to 15 months. That equipment has to 

be rebuilt. It has to be triaged; it has to be redistributed. And that 

that is cost-ineffective, we will disregard it. We will get rid of it. 

But we have a significant amount of money in the supplemental for 

2010 and 2009 that deals with modernization. 

The other point I would make that we are taking risk in, sir, is, 

because we are singularly focused, as an institution, on counterinsurgency operations, we, as a Marine Corps for you, are taking 

risks in these other core competencies that we—that you expect, 

and in some cases by law task the Marine Corps to be able to do— 

forcible entry operations, other operations that we would call fullspectrum. So all that is kind of tied with this thing called the current fight that we are in. We are not grousing about it, and as I 

said in my opening statement, we are performing well in it. 

But the reset of the Marine Corps is hinged almost exclusively 

on the supplementals. And we are taking risks there, should the 

supplemental not find its way into our coffers. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. General Fraser. 

General FRASER. Thank you, sir. 

As an institution, I think the biggest challenge that we have had 

is trying to come up with the right balance—the right balance 

across all the core competencies that we, as an institution, provide 

for this Nation. And as my colleagues have already stated here, it 

is not being able to predict what the future is going to hold is to 

make sure that we stay focused on today’s fight and do everything 

that we can with the capabilities that we have, while bringing on 

new capabilities as we see them evolve, bring them into the baseline. 

But we can’t take our eye off the future, and we don’t want to 

sacrifice the future for today. So finding that right balance is something that is very important for us. 

The other thing that I would say is, we are finding out more and 

more about our aircraft as the fleet continues to age. And so, we 

have had to do some things that we had not anticipated with our 

aircraft fleet as they do get closer to a service life extension program—establishing a fleet viability board, where we can better understand the stresses upon the aircraft that we have, and then 

what is that right balance, from a technical standpoint, to either 

go for recapitalization or modernization of a particular fleet. 

We think there is an opportunity here that we can take, a bit of 

a strategic pause and some additional risk, which is why you will 

see in our budget we have recommended for a combat air forces reduction so that we can utilize those savings, both in dollars and in 

manpower, for both emerging missions, but yet, setting ourselves 

on what we think is the right path for the future. 

So it is the challenge of striking that right balance across the 

myriad of missions and our core competencies that we have, and 
12 

then bringing that into the base budget as we look to the future 

is our biggest challenge right now. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Well, thank you so much for being candid with you— 

with us, because this is the only way we can help you. And I know 

there is a lot of problems out there, but we want to see what we 

can do to help you. 

Now I yield to my good friend for questions. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for being here today and for your expertise. 

I want to begin by telling you something I think you already know, 

and that is the tremendous amount of respect that the members of 

this subcommittee have for one another, the tremendous amount of 

respect we have for each of you. 

But we each have to come here each time we have a meeting and 

we have to wrestle with the difficulty of asking tough questions 

and then going back and saying, ‘‘Was that question embarrassing? 

Did I ask it too harshly?’’ 

Or, we walk back and say, ‘‘Did I not ask a question that could 

have impacted the national defense of this country?’’ So this morning the questions that I ask you—if I ask anything that catches you 

off guard or is embarrassing or whatever, you don’t have to answer 

it. Just tell me, ‘‘I don’t want to answer it,’’ and maybe come back 

and get it for the record for us, because that is not our intention; 

it is just our intention to try to get at facts that are there. 

Admiral Walsh, I want to first of all thank you for your testimony, and I want to preface this by saying, when Secretary Gates 

was here he told us that we could rely on you being able to say 

whatever any of you felt was the correct answer. You didn’t have 

to come in here with the Department position or service position— 

that we could ask you your opinions. 

And so all of my questions this morning to all four of you are for 

your opinions, because we have enormous confidence in you and in 

your integrity and what you are saying to us. 

Admiral, I am concerned because, as you know, the law requires 

that when the budget is sent over to us that the Secretary must 

send a shipbuilding plan over. And he also then needs to give a certification. That certification needs to be that the budget that is sent 

over will meet the plan, so that the Chairman, and I, and other 

Members of Congress can say, ‘‘This is our plan. We have got a 

plan, and we know that the Secretary believes that this budget will 

meet the plan.’’ 

If it won’t meet the plan, he has to submit to us the risks that 

we are taking for not fully funding that budget that will meet the 

plan. As you know, the Secretary has not submitted that plan. 

Based on the testimony that we have, he doesn’t intend to submit 

that plan until next year. 

I would like to ask you—and again, if you can’t answer today, 

please come back to the record—what legal right does the statute 

provide to simply not comply with that statute? 

Admiral WALSH. I wouldn’t pretend to be a lawyer, nor could I 

be able to offer you a legal interpretation. I will give you a common 

sense answer, sir, if that is okay. 

Mr. FORBES. Sure. 
13 

Admiral WALSH. First of all, there is a new team on board. The 

new team has, in my view, placed greater emphasis on a QDR that 

is far sooner than I would have expected with the new administration. So in terms of following the Secretary’s guidance, it seems to 

me one of the challenges that we have and the rule set that we are 

given, in terms of presentation of a budget, is that we don’t have 

an understanding of what the out years look like largely because 

of the unanswered questions and insights derived from the Quadrennial Defense Review. That is a priority established by our national leadership, and we can simply—I don’t see how we have any 

room for interpretation on that. 

The challenge with the 30-year shipbuilding plan historically has 

been the lack of stability and predictability for those in the ship 

building industry to have some reliable document to refer to, so 

when they make their plans for their labor force, for the skills and 

when they work with sub-vendors, that they have got an understanding of what the future looks like. If we were to go forward 

with a presentation of a 30-year shipbuilding plan without having 

an understanding of what fiscal year 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 look 

like, then I run the risk of creating further problems for the industry. 

So the stability at the industry is part of the covenant that we 

have in order to be able to come before the committee, and I think 

we would do more harm than good to try and submit something 

without the full understanding of what the administration and the 

team want to do in the out years for the Department of the Navy. 

I simply do not have those insights. 

I acknowledge the requirement by law. I don’t think there is an 

intent here to work around the law. I do think there are some practical implications of where we are today with a new team that is 

on board that is still trying to find where it wants to go in terms 

of overall national security strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, 

and other documents here that are critically important to the overall alignment of resources and the direction that the country wants 

to go in. 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, I would just ask if you would, after 

looking at this, maybe respond back for the record on anything else 

that comes before you. But if you look at that statute, it covers exactly the situation that you have raised, and it says until we get 

a new shipbuilding plan, we are to use the existing shipbuilding 

plan that is in effect. 

So what the law required was that the Secretary submit to us 

the existing shipbuilding plan. If he wants to change it, that is 

okay—change it down the road, okay. But then, at least to say, 

‘‘This budget will not meet that shipbuilding plan, and here are the 

risks that we take.’’ 

It isn’t just for the industry. It is for us to be able to see it too, 

because if we don’t have a plan and we just hear goals of 113 ships 

but we don’t have a plan to link it up, we don’t have a clue whether 

we are getting there or not. 

So I would ask, as you go back, if you could look at that and perhaps give us whatever the Navy’s justification is for not submitting 

that, other than just, ‘‘We don’t want to do it.’’ 
14 

And please don’t take that offensively, because I don’t mean it 

that way. It is just, I don’t see the option in the statute for the Secretary just to come in and say, ‘‘We are just not going to do it for 

a year,’’ even if he wants to change that. 

Second thing I would like to ask, and then I will move on, we 

are told that—not just told; I have a letter here from the Secretary 

to each of the Chiefs stating that on unfunded requirements for 

2010, that he expects them to first inform him of a determination 

of what they are before they are to meet with Congress and let 

Congress know. 

Are you aware of that letter? 

Admiral WALSH. I am aware of what Navy’s unfunded requirements are. I can speak to those. I don’t know that I have seen, necessarily, that letter. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. And I am going to ask each of you all the 

same thing, but the letter was dated—we have a copy of it from 

April 30, 2009, and it is basically, from the Secretary, saying that 

before you give this to Congress that he says, ‘‘I expect you to first 

inform me of such a determination so we can schedule the opportunity for you to brief me on the details.’’ 

So the question I would ask is, on that unfunded mandates list, 

are you aware of whether any such meeting took place with the 

Secretary when the Navy carried its unfunded mandates list to 

him? 

Admiral WALSH. My understanding was that CNO had an opportunity to discuss this with the Secretary. 

Mr. FORBES. Was there a difference between the unfunded mandates list submitted to the Secretary and the one that has been 

submitted to Congress now? 

Admiral WALSH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you tell us what that difference was? 

Admiral WALSH. Yes, sir. Back to your previous question, I understand your question and will get back to you, sir, on the 30-year 

shipbuilding plan. 

And to this question in particular, what we have found recently 

is a review of cost estimates associated with the P3 red stripe. In 

particular, what we have learned is that we had gone with the contractor’s estimate, which was a very conservative estimate that 

suggested a much more thorough level of maintenance was required for the re-winging of P3s affected by a red stripe issue. 

Once we got inside the wings and took another look at it, we did 

not find the fatigue level or cracks in the wing box that the contractor had previously recommended that we review. So you are 

seeing a difference of about $465 million between the original request that went into the office of the Secretary and what actually 

came out. 

There is an internal memo from us to the Secretary that requests 

to delete that. So that was initiated on our part because we can 

take care of the P3 maintenance issue through authorized and appropriated funds. 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, I would just ask you, if you don’t 

mind, if you could submit that for the record so we can see the difference. 
15 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 123.] 

Mr. FORBES. And then the last question I would like to ask you 

is this: Last year the Navy had a $4.6 billion unfunded mandate 

request. This year we have a $395 million request—less than $0.5 

billion. That is over $4 billion different. Was that unfunded mandate list changed based on risk assessment or budgetary needs? 

Admiral WALSH. I don’t know that I witnessed any particular 

conversation that took place between comparing the unfunded list 

in 2009 to the unfunded list submitted in 2010, nor do I get a sense 

of an effort by outside forces to reduce that list from what the service actually asked for. Instead what I see is a recognition that a 

substantial amount of the national budget is tied up in debt and 

that the services are really taking a very disciplined approach 

about how to sustain themselves. 

The idea that we can go forward in 2010 and still receive aircraft, ships, submarines is critically important to the future of the 

Navy, and also recognizes the commitment that this committee and 

others have given on behalf of us. So I think the effort going in now 

is to sustain the service life of those accounts, particularly in aviation and shipboard maintenance. And what you are seeing is an 

unfunded list that will bring that level to 100 percent funding. 

If the CNO was given an extra dollar that is exactly where it 

would go. It would go into the maintenance accounts rather than 

for additional procurement, at this point, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, I would just close my questions with 

you by just asking if you could submit for the record an explanation of how we got from $4.6 billion of needs last year to $395 

million of unfunded needs this year, because I don’t think our risk 

has changed markedly, and second, I know we didn’t fund enough 

to make up that differentiation. So if you could give us that for the 

record, I would appreciate it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Admiral WALSH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And General, same question for you. I know that 

the Army must have had an unfunded mandate list that it carried 

in to the Secretary. I am assuming it complied with this letter as 

well. 

If you could, at some point in time, just let us know if there were 

any differences between what the Army submitted as its unfunded 

mandates list and what it then submitted to Congress, between the 

meeting with the Secretary and the meeting here. But then the second thing I would ask: If you can tell us, last year we had $4 billion of unfunded mandate requests—unfunded lists, I am sorry— 

from the Army; this year less than $1 billion. How did we go from 

$4 billion to $1 billion? 

General CHIARELLI. I guess I would have to agree with General— 

Admiral Walsh on this. I think all the services are looking very, 

very hard, given the economic situation in the country, to see if we 

can’t do our best to make those lists as small as possible. 

I had the opportunity to be in the meeting with the Secretary of 

defense and represent the Chief, and I will tell you, our list went 
16 

up. The list that I am told the Chief submitted last night went up 

by, I believe, about $600 million. 

Mr. FORBES. I am sorry, General, went up from what? 

General CHIARELLI. It went up from our original list that we had submitted, which was just over, if I remember right, $300 million. 

So we went to just short of $1 billion in the list that was submitted, I am told, last night. 

Mr. FORBES. General, did anyone give any direction to reduce 

those sums down based on budgetary concerns? 

General CHIARELLI. No. I think it is just the understanding of all 

of us that as we watch the economy of the country and see what 

we, as a Nation, are going through right now, that we, the services, 

need to do everything we possibly can to control those costs. 

Mr. FORBES. And General, again—and each of you, please understand, I am trying to ask these as respectfully as I can just to get 

the answers, so this is nothing with you—I fear that we have shifted from our strategy driving our budget to our budget driving our 

strategy. 

And the question I am looking at is, last year we had $4 billion 

of unfunded requests. Undoubtedly, that was based on a risk assessment that you were looking at and needs that you felt the 

Army needed to meet that risk assessment. My question for you is, 

is that reduction from $4 billion to less than $1 billion based on 

a reduced risk assessment that you feel, or was it driven by budgetary concerns? 

General CHIARELLI. I believe it was driven by what the Chief 

thinks is really needed. I think he has been quite clear, in working 

the Army toward an enterprise approach to everything we are 

doing, that we have got to control costs. And this has been a focus 

of his; it is a focus of all of ours to look at ways that we can, in 

fact, control costs. 

Mr. FORBES. And the last question I would just ask you, then, 

if you would submit for the record for me why the Army felt they 

needed $4 billion in unfunded requests last year but have now determined that they really didn’t need those requests, and submit 

that for the record so that we can look at that, General, I would 

appreciate that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

General CHIARELLI. I will do that, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And then, General, if I could ask you on the Air 

Force the same thing: We had $18.4 billion of unfunded requests 

last year; we are down to $1.9 billion this year. Are you aware of 

a list that—of unfunded requests that went to the Secretary that 

is different from the one coming to Congress? 

General FRASER. Sir, I am aware of the list that went in, the discussion that was held, and there were not changes, based on what 

I was told, that came out of that meeting and what was actually 

submitted. 

Mr. FORBES. And if that is the answer—and I am sure you are 

telling the absolute truth—can you tell us whether the reduction 

from $18.4 billion last year to $1.9 billion this year was a result 

of a change in risk assessment, or was it driven by budgetary concerns? 
17 

General FRASER. Sir, we looked at the requests that came over 

for an unfunded list. We wanted to go into that realizing that we 

needed to be fiscally responsible. We wanted to focus on today’s 

fights and what was underfunded as we built the 2010 budget. 

Mr. FORBES. And General, without interrupting, I just need to 

ask you—I would assume that you had that same concern last 

year, that you wanted to be fiscally responsible last year as well. 

Wouldn’t that be a fair statement to stay? 

General FRASER. Yes, sir. Not being in this position at that time, 

I—— 

Mr. FORBES. Whoever was in that position, I am sure would have 

had that same end? 

General FRASER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you feel that they were not fiscally responsible 

last Congress when they submitted the $18.4 billion request? 

General FRASER. No, sir. It would be inappropriate for me to 

comment. I was not a part of that at that particular time. 

But I know the guidance that we gave as we looked at 2010, we 

wanted to fix the items that we felt like were underfunded and 

that we needed to take care of for this fight nowadays. We also 

wanted to accelerate some capabilities into the fight to have a positive impact, so that was another area that we wanted to focus on, 

which was something that we certainly took a look at. 

The other guidance that we had given was, no new starts. And 

so that is why I say we wanted to take a look, and the guidance 

that we gave to the staff as they were bringing this forward was 

to fix the things that were underfunded and then accelerate capabilities to today’s fight, realizing, sir, that as we go to 2011 we are 

going to be informed, though, by the results of the Quadrennial Defense Review. We have other studies and analyses that are going 

on and that we will utilize that to then better inform us on what 

we build in the out years. 

Mr. FORBES. And General, last question I have is for you. Same thing with the Marines, we were $3 billion unfunded needs last 

year; we are $188 million this year. If you could submit for the 

record the difference between what the Marines submitted to the 

Secretary and what was ultimately submitted to Congress, and 

also, if you could tell us if that reduction was based on a change 

in risk assessment or if it was based on budgetary concerns. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

General AMOS. Sir, I will do that gladly. 

If I could make a anecdotal comment, I also was present, along 

with General Chiarelli, and presented the Marines’ unfunded list 

to Secretary of Defense, and it was very enlightening when the Secretary said—and I don’t want to—I guess I am speaking for him, 

so to speak, but he looked at the service Chiefs and those of us that 

were representing our service Chief, and the thrust of his argument—not argument—the thrust of his statement was not how 

much or how little this list can be. 

Quite honestly, it was just the opposite. His intentions were honorable. He looked at all of us and said: As you submit these lists, 

is there—my question for you, as service Chiefs, is there anything 

that is on this unfunded priority list that you did not know about 
18 

when you submitted the program objective memorandum (POM) 10 

bill, when we submitted the budget. 

And if you remember, sir, we began building that budget early 

last summer and really submitted the final up to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) probably around October or November 

timeframe. So his question was: What has happened, or is there 

anything that has happened, that now makes these things on the 

unfunded priority list—in our case $188.3—more exigent than 

those things that you submitted in the fiscal year 2010? 

And his thrust was, if there are then maybe we should go back 

and modify the 2010 budget. In other words, let us pay for those 

things. Let us be good stewards of those things. So to be honest with you, sir, we submitted our list of $188.3 million and didn’t even bat an eye, but I came away from that meeting 

thinking, ‘‘Boy, his intentions were absolutely honorable on this, 

and he wants to make sure that we get what we need.’’ 

Mr. FORBES. And General, I just want to close by—want to apologize unto the subcommittee for taking this much time, but I think 

this is one of the most important things we will do this year in asking these questions. 

Second, I want you to know, I do not question anybody’s intent 

or their honor in doing any of this. And we all know that at some 

point in time you do have to balance the resources you have 

against the risks that you have. The only question I would say to 

all four of you, and I open this up for you to submit it to the record: 

We are trusting you. We trust your integrity that you are going to 

tell us what the risks are that we are facing, because ultimately 

this committee doesn’t challenge at all anybody’s integrity or their 

honor. But we need to know what the risks are. And when we see 

budgets coming over to us we are assuming you are telling us, 

‘‘This is the risk and we are meeting the risk.’’ 

If you tell us the risk is greater, and you need more resources, 

and we don’t get it, that is on our shoulders. But if you come over 

here and tell us, ‘‘This is all we need,’’ and we supply that, and we 

find out later on that that was driven by budgets and not by the 

actual risk assessment, then that is something we all have to carry 

on our shoulders. And that is why we are giving you this opportunity to put that in the record. So if we come back down here a 

year from now or whenever, we can say we at least knew the risk, 

and we made the decision not to fund this risk adequately. 

But thank you all for, again, your service and being patient with 

me in asking questions. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And gentlemen, thanks for being here this morning. We welcome 

you and we thank you for your service, and certainly know that 

you have been wrestling with some very tough issues with the limitation on budget. 

General Chiarelli, I wanted to start with you because you and I 

have talked in the past about the stress on the troops and also 

their families, and the hope that we have that we are seeing the 

troop levels in Iraq hopefully start coming down. But at the same 
19 

time, we know we have got the challenge in Afghanistan, so we are 

potentially, if things go according to plan, are going to trade deployments in Iraq for deployments in Afghanistan. 

There have been a number of incidents where—one in my district 

at Fort Bliss and one recently in Iraq—where the stress has led to 

unfortunate incidents. My concern, and I would ask you to address 

this, is in the face of these deployments and continuing deployments, I think perhaps for the next decade, and the dwell time limitations on troops coming out of combat theater, how do we justify 

going from 48 to 45 Army brigade combat teams? 

And then the second part is, what are we doing to help with— 

because I know this is a personal interest to you—to help with 

military families coping with the stress of constant deployments? 

In my visits to our soldiers there in Fort Bliss, we have got, on a 

pretty common, regular basis, we have got troops going back for a 

fifth deployment. So that is just, from my perspective, an indicator 

that we don’t have enough troops, that the operational tempo is too 

high, and yet we are going from 48 to 45 combat brigades. 

General CHIARELLI. Sir, as you well know, we have the soldiers 

on board to build those brigades today. I think that is important 

to understand. We have 549,000 soldiers in the active component 

force. And in fact, we have got to take it down to 547,400 to get 

within our end strength. 

The three brigades that were going to be built were going to be 

built in fiscal year 2011. That is after we should see savings from 

the Iraq drawdown. And those soldiers that are on board today, at 

549,000, that delta of 10,300 soldiers are being used to thicken the 

formations that are going out today. I think the Secretary explained that in his decision to go from 48 to 45, and I have got to 

tell you, to me that makes sense. 

He also indicated that if demand does not go down and we get 

further into this he would reconsider the decision to go from 48 to 

45. And that is something we are going to look very, very hard at, 

because as you well know, that is my biggest concern. If you want 

me to tell you where I think we are taking risks, that is what concerns me. 

And that leads into your next question, and that is on families 

and stress. I recently went on a trip to take a look at seven installations in eight days, and I went out to look at suicide prevention 

programs, since the Secretary of the Army has put me in charge 

of the Army’s efforts to try to lower the number of suicides. 

When I was at my fourth installation, I came to the realization 

that this isn’t about suicide prevention programs; this is about 

helping soldiers and families—and I really emphasize families—improve their mental wellness, their mental health. And this has to 

be a multidisciplinary program. 

We tend to concentrate on mental health care providers, and we 

need more. If you were to ask me how many more we need, I could 

not tell you. I can’t tell you because I am trying to determine, after 

seven years of war with the stress that this force has been put on, 

how many do you really know? What I know now is I don’t have 

enough. 

But this is bigger than mental health care workers. It is supporting our chaplain’s programs, his strong bonds programs, where 
20 

he takes both deploying and redeploying soldiers’ families on a 

marriage retreat where they talk about some of the issues that 

they have had or are going to have going into that deployment or 

coming out of that deployment. 

It is substance abuse counselors. We have got an issue that we 

have to work. I need more substance abuse counselors, and we are 

taking action now to hire more substance abuse counselors. 

Again, it is hard for me to tell how many more I need. I just 

know the demand is not being met today. 

So I am looking at this thing holistically, but the number one 

thing that I need to get this under control is to increase dwell. I 

have got to increase dwell. I know that when that happens many 

of the issues that we are seeing today will—not being eliminated, 

will decrease. 

I would just leave you with one quick story. I was briefed yesterday on the number of nondeployables that are in upcoming brigades that are going out to the United States Army. And I saw 

those nondeployable numbers up in the vicinity—very, very high, 

except for one single brigade, which was very, very low—less than 

4 percent of his formation was nondeployable as compared to 12 to 

14 percent in some of these other brigades. 

And I asked a question: What is this guy doing right that the 

others aren’t? And what I found out is that he is on the Global Response Force, has been in the country for 2–1/2 years, has got the 

longest amount of dwell time of any unit in the United States 

Army, and his nondeployable rate is down under 4 percent. I think 

that is illustrative of the fact that time at home is what we need 

so that both soldiers and families can repair themselves. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have talked to Chairman Skelton about the issues that the General mentions in terms of doing 

everything we can to support the family structure as well as the 

soldier. This may be an issue that we might want to have an additional hearing on. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. And we know that we are facing a lot of decisions 

that we have to make soon, and I agree with Chairman Reyes. We 

might be able to maybe have a separate hearing to dwell on this 

specific issue. But with what you have got, we appreciate what you 

have done. We really have. 

And now I yield to my good friend, Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank all of you for being here and for your service 

to our country. 

General Chiarelli, in looking at the baseline budget for 2010 and 

the supplemental, I notice there is an $87.4 billion has been requested, and that is just a 0.7 percent increase over fiscal year 

2009, less than 1 percent. Can you talk a little bit about how this 

flat-lining of operation and maintenance funding will affect the active Army? 

It seems inconsistent with the degradation that I know General 

Amos talked about in his opening comments, and I am sure you 

have got that in your equipment as a result of this seven years in 

two theaters of war. It seems like that is an inconsistent number 

with the growing amount of maintenance that we are having on 
21 

our equipment. Could you talk to me about how that is going to 

affect your ability to maintain your equipment? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, as you well know, sir, our reset 

amount—what we are taking to reset the force—which is a critical 

piece of what we are doing with maintenance of equipment coming 

out of the force right now, is all in our OCO. And that is—— 

Mr. ROGERS. It is on what? Is your microphone on? I can’t hear 

you very well. 

General CHIARELLI. I am sorry. It is on. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

General CHIARELLI. It is in the OCO—the O-C-O—overseas contingency operations portion of the budget. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

General CHIARELLI. That is a total of $11 billion. That has gone 

down. It was a high in fiscal year 2007 of $16.4 billion. It has gone 

down to $11 billion. 

But we see that as significant—as the amount of money that we 

need to reset the forces that are coming back, that we know are 

coming back in the fiscal year 2010 period. I would expect that portion of the budget to go up in fiscal year 2011, and I would because 

we are going to be—if we, in fact, have the forces flow out of Iraq 

like we are planning on having them flow out, that reset money 

will probably go up because of those forces returning to the United 

States. 

I will remind you that the Army has been consistent in its position as saying that if hostilities were to end today, we have still 

got a two-year period that we feel that we are going to need to have 

to reset the force. That will be bills for two additional years in 

order to reset the force. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you, sir. 

General Fraser, the KC-X program will replace the KC–135s, 

hopefully in my lifetime—not been looking good so far. They are already an average of 47 years old. Given the delays in the KC-X and 

the fact that the KC–135 will remain in service for maybe 30 more 

years, keeping these airplanes available to support combat operations around the world is obviously an important objective. 

Currently, the KC–135 program depot maintenance is performed 

organically as well as by outside contractors. I understand that in 

fiscal year 2010 the Air Force is planning to increase the number 

of aircraft inducted into programmed depot maintenance (PDM) organically from 48 to 54 and reduce those done by outside contractors from 29 to 23. Can you talk a little bit about how you are 

going to be able to handle that organic increase in work? 

General FRASER. Thank you, sir. I will get back to you on the 

specifics of that. I know there are some adjustments that are being 

made within the schedule as we take a look to ensure that those 

aircraft meet the depot schedule, and so I would like to provide 

that detail schedule to you and what that actually looks like. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 128.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

General FRASER. Now, I know there are some reductions that we 

had planned on with respect to the depot maintenance, and that 

is specifically related to the planned retirement and approved re-
22 

tirement of some of the KC–135Es. They are not necessary to go 

into the depot, so we are able to take that out, so that is one reason 

that you see some of the reduction, but the actual specifics of that, 

I would like to provide that to you. 

Mr. ROGERS. I would appreciate that. 

And then just one statement for the record, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all of you and, as Mr. Forbes said, respect your judgment. 

We do count on you to give us your unvarnished military opinion 

when we ask for it. 

Unfortunately, in the last several terms that I have been here, 

we saw the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld very heavy-handed with 

general officers, and they were controlling their comments to this 

committee, to the Secretary of Defense and his—in deference to 

him, with concerns over career. And this committee and the full 

committee, in my opinion—I was a part of it—we didn’t do a good 

enough job of getting on top of that sooner. 

I fear we are starting to see some of that from the current Secretary of Defense. I hope that is not the case, and if any of you 

don’t want to give an unvarnished opinion when it is asked here, 

I hope you will talk to us privately and let us know what you need. 

Because as Randy has said, we can’t fix it if we don’t know about 

it, and you know a whole lot more than we do. 

So if it is in a private meeting or if it is somewhere else, let us 

know if you are getting pressure to make cuts or do things separate 

and apart from what you really believe your military opinion is. I 

know that oftentimes when you come before us you have got to 

click your heels and salute to what your Chief told you to say, but 

we want to hear what you have got to say, because we do respect 

you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for what you do and for what all of those 

you lead do on behalf of our country. 

General Chiarelli, you know, to sort of add to your list of reasons 

why the reduction in BCTs might be reconsidered is the fact that 

a number of different communities have relied upon what in essence is a promise from DOD to prepare for receiving those brigade 

combat teams (BCTs). Creating schools, building housing, you 

know, all of the other attendant things that are necessary in order 

to adequately take care of an extra 5,000 people and their families 

is a significant investment for the communities that have been 

asked to do that. 

Fort Stewart, specifically, I think was the community that was 

going to receive the next BCT, and assuming it does, that is fine, 

but if it doesn’t, so far to date the investment is in excess of $450 

million. That may not be a lot of money from the Department of 

Defense’s perspective. It is a huge sum of money for those communities and governments, et cetera, down in the Fort Stewart area. 

And it is a matter of just sort of abiding by your word. I mean, 

if our word is not good, then what communities in the future are 

going to rely upon our promise that this is coming, would you 

please prepare? They just won’t prepare, and then we will show up 

and families won’t be served, et cetera. So I just add that. You 
23 

know, everybody knows we enlist a soldier and then we reenlist the 

families. 

General Fraser, Secretary Young, not too long ago, suggested 

that modernization not be taken into account as core work for 

depot maintenance purposes, and that caused a flurry of consternation here because as we have gone through the process year after 

year after year of considering that question, you know, adjusting 

to 50–50, that sort of thing, we have always contemplated that 

modernization was part of the mix. What is Air Force’s current 

view? 

General FRASER. Sir, modernization is a part of that, and we 

have got an ongoing stake for new weapons systems that we are 

bringing online, and we are actually—that will wind up within the 

depots, so that is ongoing. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Because of this little brush with the Secretary’s 

suggestion of perhaps it is not, we might put clarifying language 

in this year’s bill. Be happy to work with you on that clarifying language. 

General FRASER. Yes, sir. We would like to work with you. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)—Secretary has proposed—well actually, by agreement between the two Chiefs, looks 

like JCA will be transferred to Air Force. I have never been troubled at all by the notion that Air Force would manage acquisition, 

sustainment, modernization, maintenance. 

I suspect thus far the understanding between the contractor and 

the Army, since the Army has sort of led the way in acquisition 

thus far, hadn’t really taken into account the kinds of concerns that 

Air Force would have if Air Force is going to be doing long-term 

maintenance, sustainment, modernization, you know, data rights 

acquisition, and then some discussion concerning how are we going 

to transition this stuff from contractor control to—well, actually it 

should right away be Air Force control, but then contractor maintenance, sustainment, modernization to depot sustainment, modernization. 

I am convinced we are going to acquire more of these things. We 

are not stopping at 38. The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) 

analysis that was published on March 13th says that for low-intensity conflicts like we are engaged in at the moment and for the 

foreseeable future seem to be the kind of conflicts we are going to 

be engaged in are the most cost effective platform—platform mix 

includes 98 of these JCAs. 

And so it seems to me that in—as we consider further sales as 

we prepare to—buys, pardon me—as we prepare for more buys, Air 

Force really needs to focus on this long-term issue and the deal 

with the contractor can be modified. A question is, what sort of coordination has gone on between Air Force and Army right now on 

JCA and the needs of the Army? 

Where the Caribou is concerned, something similar was done 

during the Vietnam era, and it didn’t work out very well. The Air 

Force really wasn’t able to meet the needs of the Army as far as 

the actual utilization of the platform Caribou, in this instance, was 

concerned, and I would be pleased to hear from General Fraser and 

General Chiarelli about what sort of things are going on as be-
24 

tween the two branches to discuss—in trying to figure out how we 

are going to actually meet the Army needs. 

General FRASER. Sir, thank you. We are committed to this mission of direct support for the Army. We have a team that is put 

together already that is taking a look at this to ensure that the 

program of record that we have on track right now stays on track, 

working with the program office to include the development, the 

testing, and everything else that is going to go with that. So we are 

integrating our people in with the Army and with the System Program Office (SPO) right now. 

The other thing that we are doing is focused with the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard, so General McKinley 

is a part of that. In fact, General Chiarelli, myself, and General 

McKinley have held several meetings already as we provide direction and guidance to that team of individuals that is taking a look 

at this entire program. And so we have charged them by the end 

of the month to take a look at this, to periodically report back, seek 

guidance. 

There was recently a meeting that was held at our mobility command. General Light, out there, was the host of that meeting, and 

they had some very good discussions with respect to the program 

and the mission and how this is going to be accomplished. 

The other thing that is ongoing is discussions downrange and 

what this would look like as it actually gets employed. So there is 

a coordination group that is going on right now to ensure that this 

stays on track. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Are you heading in the direction of putting in 

writing what the Army’s expectations are of Air Force to bring to 

meet those expectations? Army actually is going to develop the list, 

and hopefully it will be a very thorough list, and guidance can be 

taken from the experience with the Caribou, trying to figure out, 

well, where would it break down in the past? 

General Chiarelli, I am sorry to—— 

General CHIARELLI. That is, in fact, exactly what General Fraser 

and I are doing. We just can’t talk direct support because direct 

support is absolutely key and critical for us, and the Air Force is 

fully signed up for direct support. We are down, now, into the 

weeds of, you know, when the Army defines direct support for this 

particular aircraft, what exactly does that mean? 

And that, to us, is key, and I know it is to General Fraser, and 

the Air Force has said all along that they will provide the Army 

this aircraft and the capabilities of this aircraft in a direct support 

role. We are ensuring that we go into that with our eyes open on 

exactly what that means to both of us. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The chair recognizes Ms. Fallin, from Oklahoma. 

Go ahead. 

Ms. FALLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I just want to say how much I appreciate Ranking Member 

Forbes’ comments about trusting you with the decisions and what 

we need to be doing with our military operations and maintenance, 

and we appreciate your service to our Nation. I have a couple of 

questions. 
25 

One deals with the memo that we have about the 2010 Air Force 

operation and maintenance baseline budget, and in it we reduce 

the organic KC–135 aircraft program depot maintenance by $68.1 

million, and it will result in 10 fewer depot inductions. And I have 

a very specific question about how will this programming change 

affect the KC–135 depot at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma? 

General FRASER. Thank you, madam, I appreciate that. I will 

provide the detailed schedule, as I mentioned before, with respect 

to that. I know that that reduction was as a result of the KC–135E 

and the not needing to input those aircraft within the depot maintenance because they are approved and scheduled for retirement. 

We are still on track to ensure that the KC–135Rs continue to 

meet their 5-year depot maintenance plan, and we are definitely 

committed to ensuring the 50–50 split, as is mandated too. So we 

will get you the detailed schedule. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 128.] 

Ms. FALLIN. Okay. Thank you very much. 

And I have another question for General Chiarelli. I would like 

to ask you a couple of questions about the artillery capacities of the 

Army, and I know that the Army and Congress are both very committed to developing—have been committed, I should say, in the 

past, to developing a Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) cannon—NLOS 

cannon—and as part of the future combat systems (FCS), and there 

were significant developments that were made in that. But now we 

are in a restructuring of the FCS, and I want to make sure that 

the Army and our soldiers have the very best capacity and advantage on the battlefield. 

So my question is, with the current Paladin system approaching 

nearly 50 years of age, can you tell us how the Army will continue 

to modernize the Army’s artillery capacity, and is the Army’s commitment to the Paladin more critical, given the changes in the FCS 

system programming? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, we are totally committed to the Paladin 10 program, which will go a long ways in extending the life 

of the Paladin. In addition, I know you know that we are working 

and moving out very, very sharply what we are calling ground combat vehicle and looking to be able to deliver something in five to 

seven years. 

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is working through, 

at this time, whether that will be a single vehicle or a family of 

vehicles, but I can assure you that everyone in the Army is committed toward some type of capability to provide indirect fires. We 

think the Paladin 10 program, in the interim, will do an excellent 

job of operating the Paladin. 

Ms. FALLIN. Well, in light of the Army working toward modernizing the artillery capacities, how will you use those developments 

that have already been accomplished through the work outside the 

production of the NLOS cannon? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, that is absolutely critical to us. There 

is a lot to be gained from the Manned Ground Vehicle (MGV) program, not just the NLOS cannon but also the entire MGV program. 

And our plan is to harvest those technologies, those things that we 
26 

are able to use and apply if they apply to this new ground combat 

vehicle. 

So we see this as an investment that is not wasted, but one that 

will allow us to look at those technologies that have matured and 

consider them for incorporation into our new ground combat vehicles. 

Ms. FALLIN. And the other thing, Mr. Chairman, I just want to 

mention that I know there has been a tremendous amount of investment put into these technologies, and now the program is 

changing, so I want to make sure that the investments that we 

spent are going to be used wisely in whatever type of systems that 

we put forth in the future with that technology. 

General CHIARELLI. We are committed to that. 

Ms. FALLIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Heinrich? 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would certainly want to thank the four of you for joining us 

here today. I also want to commend the work of our service members for all that they do. I know we are asking a great deal of them 

at the current time, and I want to direct my question today to General Fraser. 

General it was good to hear you in Albuquerque a couple of 

weeks ago. I very much enjoyed your speech and I know the audience enjoyed your interest in our city. In the last two hearings with 

Secretary Gates and Secretary Donnelly I made no secret of my 

concerns for the proposed accelerated retirements of fighter aircraft. And with the Quadrennial Defense Review underway, I believe that any decision to shut down entire fighter wings is premature. 

But what is incredibly troubling to me is that the Combat Air 

Force Restructuring Report that was released on May 15 lists 23 

bases across the country, all having future missions declared with 

the exception of one, that being the 150th at Kirtland Air Force 

Base, which has been selected to lose its entire flying force without 

a follow-up mission being determined. 

General Fraser, yesterday I asked about the specific criteria that 

were used in determining which wings were selected for retirement. General Schwartz said that a business case analysis was 

used. To me it is still a little bit unclear as to what the specific 

criteria of that analysis were, and I was hoping that you might be 

able to elaborate on the criteria that were used to select these 

wings for retirement, specifically the 150th Fighter Wing in 

Kirtland. 

General FRASER. Thank you, sir. We see the opportunities there 

with other activities that go on in the Kirtland area as opportunities for a total force initiative. So as we were looking across the entire spectrum of our combat air forces and trying to find that right 

balance and where opportunities presented themselves for the total 

force initiatives, that was one of the areas that we felt like was certainly prime to participate in one of those total force initiatives, 

with, say, the 150th. 

In fact, we are in negotiations and discussions with them about 

potential opportunities. We have got special forces training that go 
27 

on right there, as you know, sir, at Kirtland, which is something 

that is a particular area of great interest to us as we continue to 

increase that capacity and capability to provide it to the joint fight. 

There are other opportunities that we have also talked about 

with other emerging weapons systems as they come online, because 

as we provide other capabilities, such as intelligent surveillance 

and reconnaissance to today’s fight, we need other units that are 

willing to participate and want to participate in those total force 

initiatives. And so we have had great opportunities in a number of 

the other states, too, where they have taken on these new missions. 

And so we felt like that that was one area, as we modernized and 

upgraded across the Combat Air Forces (CAF) and took this particular step with the CAF Reductions (Redux) to look at those units 

where there were other opportunities, and we felt like that that 

was one of those units that was certainly viable because there are 

needs out there for our Air Force, which would add great capability 

to the joint fight. 

Mr. HEINRICH. I hope you understand my trepidation regarding 

a report where that mission has not yet been designated or determined for the 150th. Would you be willing to comment a little bit, 

once again, on the criteria that were used in terms of figuring out 

who was going to be retired where and what, and specifically 

whether or not the—some of the things were taken into account, 

such as, I know 10 of the 21 aircraft in the 150th had already just 

recently gone through the upgrades that extend their service life 

for another 8,000 hours on top of their remaining service—or, I am 

sorry, 2,000 hours on top of their remaining service life. 

General FRASER. Sir, we would be happy to come over and hold 

some discussions, and get into further details. As we looked at all 

the different units and as we went across that, we would love to 

come over and spend some time and talk to you about that. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Are you able to comment at all on what the cost 

difference is between an active duty F–16 wing and a Guard unit? 

I know I have seen some figures thrown around that suggest that 

Air National Guard units maintain combat ready status at approximately a third the cost of an equivalent active duty force. Is that 

an accurate statement, or do you know what the ratio there is? 

General FRASER. Sir, I will get the specifics, but I too have seen 

these same figures. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 128.] 

Mr. HEINRICH. Okay. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Ms. Shea-Porter. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you very much. 

These questions are for Admiral Walsh, please, and General Fraser. I have read reports that the Navy and the Air Force have cut 

back on the flying hours for pilots to train, which could produce a 

problem of proficiency and leave an impact on readiness. 

In fact, according to the Navy Times article entitled, ‘‘P3 Mishap, 

Two Pilots Short on Flight Hours,’’ the Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG) manual investigation of the mishaps found that lack of 

flying hours was a contributing factor. Two of the pilots failed to 

meet the proficiency minimums and serve the required 10 hours 
28 

per month. One pilot had 3.8 hours and the other one had 3.3 

hours—less than a third of the requirement. 

Some of the reduction can be replaced by flight simulators, but 

surely not all. How concerned are you both about the impact of the 

flying hour reductions on readiness, and what steps have you taken 

to deal with this problem, if you see it as one? 

Admiral WALSH. I can start. I am not familiar with the JAG 

manual investigation on the P3. I suspect this is a investigation of 

a mishap that took place in Afghanistan a while ago and involved 

proficiency issues associated with the crew. And the question that 

would come up right to mind is whether or not we mandated that 

minimum in terms of flying hour proficiency, or was that something that was determined by local commanders as adequate 

enough, and I don’t have the answer to that. 

But in terms of resourcing fiscal year 2010 and how we look at 

the flight hour program, we continue to work toward a T-rating at 

2.5, which has proven adequate in combat. In fact, we are over-executing our flying hour program in Central Command area responsibility today, and it is forcing some mitigations in fiscal year 2009 

that affect the rest of the fleet, in terms of operating costs and 

steps that we are having to take in the execution. 

But the plan for fiscal year 2010 is to continue to fund this. This 

is an area that we don’t take for granted, that we continue to selfassess, and we do have statistical data that will prove out that 

when we have less than a certain minimum flight hours per month 

we will, in fact, see a causal relationship to accidents. That is 

something that, at the headquarters level, we are very much aware 

of and we are trying to avoid with resources. But I can dig further 

and find out, in fact, whether or not those were local decisions or 

decisions that they inherited from us. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. And I also would like to say that—well, 

we will let that go and I will let General Fraser answer, and then 

I will make a comment. 

General FRASER. Yes, ma’am. Our flying hour program for 2010 

is fully funded. What you are saying with respect to the reductions 

that are in there are directly related to a restructure and some 

changes with respect to our undergraduate pilot training program 

and the syllabus changes that have been made there. 

The other place that we have managed to have some savings 

within the flying hour program, and therefore a reduction this time 

that you are specifically talking about, is directly associated with 

the CAF Redux. By removing 250 of the older aircraft as we modernize and change that force structure there, we get some savings. 

We ensure that the experience and inexperience level of our aviators continues to stay up, and assure that that is fully funded. 

The other thing that we have done with the flying hour program 

is, we have ensured that we have brought the air sovereignty mission into the baseline. 

This is a change. We see it as an enduring mission, and so that 

has also negated any further reductions with respect to that. So as 

we continue to do that to support the combatant commander of the 

air sovereignty mission, we ensure that that was also brought in 

there. So that is what you are seeing, as far as our changes go. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, thank you. 
29 

And I was referencing the article in the Navy Times, and it was 

Sunday, March 1, 2009, if anybody wants to read this: ‘‘PC Mishap, 

Two Pilots Short on Flight Hours.’’ 

General FRASER. Yes, ma’am. Thank you. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. All right. Thank you. 

And my other question has to do with whistleblowers. This is a 

big issue for me, and I want to thank the DOD Inspectors General 

for their efforts to protect whistleblowers, but I did want to talk 

about the hotline that they have been using. 

I understand that fewer than 2,000—to be exact, 1,956 calls out 

of more than 13,000 resulted in any investigation, and I just wanted to ask, why such a low rate? Do you have enough resources? 

What steps are being taken to improve this so that whistleblowers 

who call will feel comfortable utilizing this service and knowing 

that there will be some kind of a response? 

General FRASER. I am going to have to take that one for the 

record and get back to you on that, ma’am. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, thank you. I mean, I really admire the 

work that they are doing. I know it is critical, and I appreciate the 

fact there is a hotline, but it is important to actually be able to follow up on the calls once they come in. 

So thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

You know, one of the things that I am very concerned with, that 

when we talk about dwelling, dwell time, equipment age, getting 

old, the losses that we have had on the equipment on the battlefield, I always worry about another conflict. And if there was to be 

another conflict, how are we going to be able to sustain those 

troops if we were to send—and I ask that question because I was 

in Korea, and when I asked the question of sustainment, they told 

me that it would only be a few days. 

And because of the prepositioning stock and a lot of issues that 

we have, how were we going to respond? I know we are involved 

in two conflicts now—two wars—but if there was to be another conflict, how are we going to be able to sustain those troops. 

I mean, can we manage it somehow, to be able to sustain in case 

we have to deploy troops to another conflict someplace else? I 

mean, we have got our hands full, but this always worries me. Any 

one of you who would like—respond to that question. 

Admiral WALSH. This is precisely what we are concerned about, 

why we present ourselves as a full-spectrum force, because in large 

measure in our history we have been caught by surprise. And so 

when we are forward-deployed and really, in many respects, alone 

operating at sea, we have to take a very suspect approach, in terms 

of how we approach our concept of operations so that as we approach traffic in the area, we have no idea whether these are vessels in distress, legitimate traffic, or another USS Cole that is 

about to happen. 

So our experience has taught us, and that is one of the reasons 

why the full-spectrum capability has been redlined from my service 

for many years, and why we argued before the Supreme Court how 
30 

important it was to be able to have that full-spectrum training to 

include undersea warfare. 

The committee’s support for our readiness and our ranges is critically important to us, and one of the reviews that is underway 

right now is, how valuable and how appropriate is simulation 

training. Because it cannot replace the hands-on execution and experience, whether it is in the flight hour program or the actual execution of undersea warfare operations. 

That cannot be simulated to the point that we can do away with 

training rangers, but continued support in that area is very valuable to us, and that is exactly the reason why we approach our 

business the way we do and why we have described redlines in 

training the way we have. Thank you, sir. 

General CHIARELLI. I would add that our operational ready rates, 

quite frankly, astound me every time I look at them, both in theater and back here. I think nowhere do you see it more than in 

Army aviation and the ability of our low decisions, through use of 

some contract maintenance for sure, that provide us unparalleled 

operational readiness rates not only across our aircraft, but even 

the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs), where we 

took—in our attempt to try to get them to the field as early as we 

did and as quickly as we did, we took some risks with the 

sustainment packages. But both in Iraq and Afghanistan we have 

seen those numbers extremely high—over 90 percent. 

There is no doubt that what we call the enablers—the logisticians that are conducting this work brilliantly—are stressed. They 

are a big portion of our force’s stress today. However, their ability 

to support us, as they have in two theaters, I think is unparalleled 

in modern warfare. And I suspect there is still capability left to do 

that, should another contingency require us to do so, as long as it 

was not too large. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Anybody else? 

General AMOS. Chairman, right now, with 30,000 Marines tied 

up and the balance shifting, now, from the left foot in Iraq to the 

right foot in Afghanistan, there is no question that, as I said in my 

opening statement, that the—not only is the readiness forward-deployed very high, but the readiness at home station has been the 

bill-payer for that. And that gets to the crux of your question of— 

if we assume that we are going to be tied up in the theater that 

we are in two fronts, what else could we do around the world? 

And the answer, from the Marine Corps’ perspective is, we 

would—it would be difficult. We would cobble together the equipment that we have back at home station. We would empty out our 

maritime preposition squadrons. 

As you and I talked yesterday, we are running—we have got 

three squadron’s worth of ships, each one roughly five ships, and 

some of those are sitting at about 100 percent, some are sitting at 

about 80 percent. We have got caves in Norway that are just a little over 50 percent of that prepositioned equipment. We would 

empty that out to go fight someplace else in the world, and we 

would cobble together the Marines just as we did in Korea when 

we brought six Marines together from almost a cadre status and 

flowed them in—— 
31 

So it would be difficult; it would be challenging. It can be done. 

The sustainment piece, though, is—it would be the hard part. It 

would fall on the shoulders of industry and this Congress to help 

put that together for us to be able to sustain the fight someplace 

else in the world. But I don’t think there is any question it would 

end up with some give and take on both theaters. 

Mr. ORTIZ. General Fraser. 

General FRASER. Sir, I would echo a number of those remarks, 

too, in that in order to maintain the full spectrum, it takes time 

to come back and then get those individuals who have been deployed in theater back up to their full-spectrum capability. So it 

takes additional training, additional time to reset themselves, because we have seen, as time has gone on, that our deployment 

rates have gone up while yet the time has also gone up that the 

individuals are deployed. 

Back in 2004, 120-day or less deployments—we were only in the 

12 to 14 percent of the force. Now we are upwards of 54 percent 

of our deployers are over 120 days, and we have even larger numbers that are picking up the 365s. So naturally, that adds stress 

back to those home units to ensure that they maintain the capabilities should something else arise someplace else. 

The other thing that we see that we are able to do is continue 

to deploy in other areas. While there is nearly 40,000 airmen that 

are deployed—that may be deployed forward, but yet we have over 

200,000 that are engaged in the day-to-day fight 

Because of the way that we are able to do business back here 

with our intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets for the 

PED piece for the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of the 

intelligence, a lot of people are able to do that back here. And so 

we have got a lot of people that are deployed in garrison—in 

place—and actually performing the mission today and providing a 

valuable contribution. So it is all of that that is stressed out there 

that we need to take a look at. 

We also have several specialty codes that are stressed. The leveling off of the manpower at 330,000—332,000—is going to help us. 

So we have focused that additional manpower into, yes, some of 

those stressed career fields, but into those added capabilities that 

we continue to bring on to provide for today’s fight. 

We are still doing other deployments in the Pacific. Today we 

have F–22s that are deployed at Anderson, and in Guam, and we 

are going to do another deployment to Kadena here, so there are 

other weapons systems that are still picking up and other areas of 

the world that continue to be able to deter, dissuade, and assure 

our allies and friends that we will be there, but it will be stressful. 

Mr. ORTIZ. When I came to the Congress back in the 1980’s, I 

can remember the reduction of the forces, and I can remember 

young men and women calling that had been in the military 12, 14 

years, but they were being forced out because we had to reduce the 

force. And I guess when I came here we had Army—something like 

900,000 troops. It was reduced drastically. Not only the Army, but 

all branches of the military. 

And I hope we can learn from the lessons that have stressed our 

armed forces in the past. And now, of course, recruitment is doing 

fine at this moment, but we have lost sergeants, we have lost a lot 
32 

of key personnel, and I know that all of you are doing your best 

and you are trying hard, otherwise you wouldn’t be where you are 

at, and your loyalty and your dedication to our country. We appreciate that, and when we say—Mr. Forbes and I, and members of 

the committee—we really want to help, and we do not mean to harass anybody or to point fingers at anybody; we just want to know 

so that we can be in a position to help you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Chairman, just one question. 

First of all, General, thank you for your comment about logistics. 

I think really that probably when all the stories are ultimately 

written, they are the true unsung heroes of everything we have 

seen, and what they have done has been just simply fantastic, and 

we owe them a great deal in all four areas. 

But there was an article on May 14th in the USA Today that 

highlighted the number of soldiers in the Army—some 30,000 to 

35,000—who are not available for deployment because they are recovering from wounds or injuries or because they are supporting 

the Wounded Warrior program. And I also understand from the 

data provided by the committee—to the committee by the Army— 

that up to an additional 50,000 military personnel in the active 

Army, Army Guard, and Army Reserve may be nondeployable because they have permanent profiles of three and four as a result 

of medical or other conditions. 

According to what the Army provided us, the number of people 

with these permanent P3 and P4 profiles in the active Army was 

19,300, and the Army Guard 20,770, and in the Army Reserve 

11,150. My question to you is, what effect are these large number 

of nondeployable personnel having on the Army’s ability to fully 

man deploying units? And none of us are advocating a decrease in 

the support for the Wounded Warrior program, but what is the 

Army doing to address the numbers of nondeployables in that program? 

And among the personnel with P3, P4 profiles, particularly what 

can Congress do to assist the Army in increasing the number of soldiers who are deployable? For example, would temporarily exempting the numbers of people in the warrior transition units from 

counting against Army end strength assist the Army to increase 

the number of deployable personnel? 

General CHIARELLI. There is no doubt that this unavailable force 

creates a problem for us. That is a problem we are facing today. 

In the active component force I have in the vicinity of—I saw a report yesterday of 21,000 folks who are nondeployable. I have just 

over 9,100 who are in WTUs—warrior transition units—and the 

rest are nondeployables who reside in units. 

We are seeing an increase in how many soldiers we are having 

to assign to units before they deploy in order to get them out the 

door at the acceptable strength of over 90 percent. We are seeing 

that number go up from 9 percent to over 12 percent, and we are 

concerned because this is cumulative over time. 

We have seen an increase in the number of soldiers who have 

mental health profiles. There is no surprise, I don’t think, for anybody that that would be the case. And when you don’t have the required dwell time back home to allow folks to heal from muscular- 
33 

skeletal issues that they have, humping a rucksack at 10,000 to 

12,000 feet in Afghanistan, you will see those numbers grow, and 

we are seeing those numbers grow. 

What it requires us to do is it requires us to take units down to 

a lower percentage than we would like to when they go through 

reset and build them up over time. But the problem you have there 

is that we—as we get ready for our capstone exercise in the trained 

and ready portion of that train-up to go, many times we don’t have 

upwards of 70 to 80 percent of the unit available for that training 

exercise at that particular time. 

So it is creating some great challenges for us. But at the same 

time, I can tell you, when those forces got into country they are 

trained and ready and the best fighting force that we have ever 

had. 

Mr. FORBES. And you all do a wonderful job in dealing with the 

resources you have, but if there is anything you can see that we 

can do to assist you with that concern, please let us know, because 

we understand it is a difficulty. 

General CHIARELLI. Appreciate that. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I just thank our witnesses and yield 

back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to return to the C–27 and the coordination between 

Army and Air Force. I was in Afghanistan a year and a half ago, 

and from my perspective, fortunately, Army couldn’t get me out of 

Chamkani, so I stayed there for about three days, and it wound up 

being a better trip as a result of that. 

The reason Army couldn’t was because Army didn’t have the air 

assets that it needed in order to deal with the tempo and also move 

some Congressmen. So I just said, ‘‘I am last in line here. Can’t 

have soldiers be last in line.’’ 

And so I wonder what the range of possible options might be 

with regard to the coordination between Air Force and Army. General Fraser, for example, is it conceivable that you could wind up 

with Air Force simply providing the platform to the Army and everything else is relatively the same from the Army’s perspective— 

Army warrant officers, Army chain of command, Army complete 

control—although Army would not be saying, ‘‘Here is how we are 

going to be maintaining this, sustaining it, et cetera.’’ 

That would be one extreme, and I suppose the other extreme, 

General Chiarelli, would be that Air Force is providing absolutely 

everything and it is totally in control and Army has to actually go 

through Air Force channels in order to access the asset hour by 

hour, day by day. And then somehow there is something that is in 

between that maybe works. From Army’s perspective, obviously, 

you would rather have the asset and then all your people—chain 

of command, et cetera—and I am not sure what Air Force would 

prefer to have. 

Are both of those extremes, at this point, possible, or are you 

much narrower than that? 

General FRASER. Sir, that is why we have a group that involves 

the Guard, the active duty Army, and active duty Air Force that 

are coordinating on this and working with the theater, working 
34 

with everyone involved to ensure that we understand the concepts 

of employment. And as we mentioned earlier, that we will get that 

down in writing. 

We see this as—as we step into this this is not going to be allin-all one day turned over, let us say, to the Air Force. There will 

be a transition period, and that is why we are working together 

with respect to the acquisition program to make sure that there is 

a smooth transition. 

So there is a number of items that are on the table. We have a 

task to do out to report back, and we will do so in the timeframe 

that is allotted to us. There is a number of things that are being 

talked about. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, with respect, sir, is the outer range that I 

described possible? Could this group that is this task force that is 

meeting—could this task force conclude that the best way to go 

about this is to simply give the asset to the Army and let Army 

National Guard, Army whoever, manage the asset? 

General FRASER. Sir, we are looking at this as, the mission has 

been given to the Air Force, and that we are going to pick up this 

mission. And that is how we are approaching this, and to ensure 

that we get this capability to the theater as fast as we can. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Would Army personnel migrate—the Army personnel, perhaps, who would otherwise have been accomplishing a 

mission—would they migrate to the Air Force somehow? Would Air 

Force take Army Warrant Officer pilots, for example, or will Air 

Force be providing its own pilots? 

General FRASER. Sir, I think here in the beginning what you are 

going to see is there is certainly a mix, and I would not discount 

any of that. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. This has been a very productive 

hearing that we have had, and our country and us, we appreciate 

your service. We are grateful for what you have done, putting you, 

yourself in harm’s way and the sacrifices that not only you but that 

your families go through. So we are very appreciative. 

Hearing no other questions, this hearing stands adjourned. And 

again, thank you so much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MAY 20, 2009 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MAY 20, 2009 

(123) 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MAY 20, 2009 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Admiral WALSH. The reduction in dollar value of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2009 (FY09) Unfunded Program List of $4.6 billion to the FY10 submission of $395 million is a recognition that a substantial amount of the national budget is tied up in 

debt, and that the Navy is taking a very disciplined approach about how to sustain 

itself. 

The idea that we can go forward in 2010 and still procure aircraft, ships, and submarines is critically important to the future of the Navy, and recognizes the Congress’ commitment to the Navy. 

The effort now is to sustain the service life of those assets, particularly in aviation 

and shipboard maintenance. The Navy’s unfunded submission will bring that level 

to 100 percent of requirement. 

If the CNO was given an extra dollar that is exactly where it would go. It would 

go into the maintenance accounts rather than for additional procurement. [See page 

15.] 

General CHIARELLI. There are many factors that led to the Army leadership’s deci- sion to forward $1 billion in unfunded requirements to Congress. They focused on 

Readiness and the programs where funding above the PB10 submission would provide the greatest impact to readiness for the operational and institutional force, including $200 million that carried over from the FY09 requirements list. Additionally, requirements change over time and the Army continues to refine and adjust 

its requirements as it goes through the budget cycle. [See page 16.] 

General AMOS. There was no difference between the FY10 Unfunded Programs 

List that the Marine Corps submitted to the Secretary of Defense for review and 

the list the Marine Corps submitted to Congress. Our list was internally tailored 

to focus on warfighter equipment, continued modernization, and improved reset 

enablers to highlight the top priorities of our unfunded programs. [See page 17.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER 

General FRASER. Answer 1a. The Air Force IG’s at all levels of the department 

(i.e., installation, Numbered Air Force, MAJCOM, and HAF) are capable/available 

to assist Air Force personnel. Part of their duties is to receive complaints from Airmen. However, not all complaints are of reprisal. Complaints in any given year run 

the full gamut from pay issues to reprisal. The IG process calls for the IG to clarify 

(with the complainant) the problem and then analyze the complaint to determine 

the best way to resolve it. The Air Force IG has four ways to resolve complaints: 

ASSIST, REFER, INVESTIGATE and DISMISS. 

In many cases the best way to resolve the complaint is to assist the member to 

solve the problem for themselves (e.g., the IG will call the local finance office to help 

the member resolve his/her pay issue directly). Other complaints are best resolved 

by referring the complainant to another agency. In these cases the IG will send the 

member to a more appropriate agency such as Equal Opportunity Office if the complainant is alleging sexual harassment. For the cases that warrant an IG investigation, then the IG will submit a letter of appointment to his/her commander and an 

investigation into the alleged wrongdoing will be conducted (reprisal complaints are 

investigated through the IG investigative process). Finally, if the complaint is analyzed and no evidence of wrongdoing is discovered the Air Force will recommend to 

DOD, IG the case be dismissed. DOD IG is the final approval authority for reprisal 

complaints. 

In calendar year 2008, the Air Force closed 8,904 complaints: 5,123 through ASSIST; 2,351 through REFERRAL, 78 through INVESTIGATION, and 1,352 through 

DISMISSAL. [See page 29.] 

Answer 1b. Yes. The Air Force, in recent years, has been undergoing a transformation and the Inspector General has not been immune to this transformation. 

To that end, the Inspector General is currently working several initiatives that will 

make the process more timely and efficient. One initiative the AF is working on is 

the One Base—One IG concept that will allow one installation IG to be responsible 

for and respond to all personnel on a base. To complement this initiative we have 
128 

started the process of streamlining the initial investigative phase for reprisal to 

allow the individual IG’s to quickly assess the facts in a reprisal complaint during 

the complaint clarification phase and quickly move to the investigation phase on the 

cases that warrant investigation. These changes will allow the Air Force to provide 

better resolution products quicker, thus keeping our Airmen focused on their mission. [See page 29.] 

Answer 1c. Air Force leadership shares the same concerns as you do regarding 

whistleblower rights. To that end, the identity of all whistleblowers is closely guarded, disclosing it only to those who need it to resolve the issue. Additionally, Air 

Force IGs continually educate commanders, Airmen, and civilian members on the 

requirements associated with whistleblower rights and protections. Finally, for individuals who still feel uncomfortable, the Air Force allows anonymous reporting. [See 

page 29.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

General FRASER. In order to accommodate the planned increase in KC-135 PDMs 

at Tinker AFB, an additional 105 maintenance personnel will be hired under a 

phased approach. Current Tinker AFB facilities are adequate to support the 

planned increased workload. The execution of the organic plan is underway to increase PDM capacity from 48 to 54 aircraft in FY10. [See page 21.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. FALLIN 

General FRASER. Despite the overall reduction of 10 KC-135 PDMs in FY10, the 

planned workload at Tinker AFB will increase from 48 in FY09 to 54 in FY10. [See 

page 25.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

General FRASER. The Air National Guard (ANG) plays a critical role for the Department of Defense, providing a rapidly responsive force to meet national security 

requirements. It is true that some metrics indicate an apparently large cost advantage for ANG units compared to active units. One such metric is ‘‘operational cost 

per total aircraft inventory,’’ which shows ANG unit costs to be ∼33% lower than 

active units. This metric does not take into account important differences between 

ANG and active units and how they calculate costs. For example, ANG units typically leverage the infrastructure of active duty or commercial facilities through Joint 

Use Agreements, yielding efficiencies that are not available to active duty units. Additionally, lower costs expressed in this metric are also due to differences in manning (part-time versus full-time) and significant differences in the number of flight 

hours flown by the respective units. As a result, it is difficult to use this metric to 

accurately compare costs of active duty and Air National Guard (ANG) units. 

Another metric, ‘‘operational cost per flight hour’’ (CPFH), includes all military 

personnel and Operations and Maintenance costs. CPFH is a more appropriate metric to compare costs between flying units because it scales for differing levels of 

operational activity. CPFH data in the Air Force Total Ownership Cost database 

permits a comparison of the F-16C and F-16D for ANG and active units from 1996 

through 2006. During this period, Air National Guard CPFH for the F-16C was 

5.2% lower than the active duty costs in the three Air Force major commands (Air 

Combat Command, Pacific Air Forces, and US Air Forces Europe) that operate the 

F-16C. 

For the F-16D, ANG costs were 11.7% lower than active units. [See page 27.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MAY 20, 2009 

(131) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

Mr. ORTIZ. Army combat units are under significant stress and soldiers are spending little time at home between combat deployments. This is especially true for the 

Combat Service and Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) units. These units, whose 

duties range from medical to maintenance, have been heavily taxed due to their 

unique missions and limited depth. As troop levels are reduced in Iraq there will 

be a greater need for the CS/CSS soldiers. At the same time, operations in Afghanistan are increasing, and the austere nature of that theater will require more CS/ 

CSS troops instead of the contractors that provided so much support for our forces 

in Iraq. What are you doing to increase the number and availability of CS/CSS 

units? Will the Army rebalance itself to increase the mix of support to combat 

troops? How will stopping the growth of the Army’s Brigade Combat Teams at 45 

improve or exacerbate the stress on CS/CSS troops? How does this budget request 

address this urgent requirement? 

General CHIARELLI. In 2007, the administration recognized that Army resources 

were insufficient to meet current operational demand and that continued stress on 

the force would lead to unacceptable strategic risk. The President, authorized by 

Congress, approved an end strength increase of 74.2K across all three components 

(65K AC, 8.2K ARNG, 1K USAR). Implementation of the end strength increase, in 

conjunction with the rebalancing and right-sizing of structure across and within 

components into needed Operating Force capabilities, was intended to increase Brigade Combat Team (BCT) surge capacity; expand capabilities for missile defense, 

Military Police (MP), Engineer, Improvised Explosive Device threat mitigation, force 

protection, intelligence, and communications; and provide key CS/CSS enablers to 

mitigate persistent shortfalls. The rebalancing of Army structure is a continuous effort requiring frequent review and adjustment to meet projected operational demand 

within authorized resources. Force structure change is not immediate, requiring 

time and resources. Some examples of programmed growth from FY06 to FY15 include 47 MP Combat Support Companies, 9 Air Ambulance Companies, 12 Explosive 

Ordnance Disposal Companies, 117 Civil Affairs Companies, and 107 Psychological 

Operations (PSYOP) Detachments. Stopping the growth of the Army’s BCTs at 45 

while maintaining programmed end strength (a key point), will address CS/CSS unit 

stress by reducing force structure demand on the Army’s end strength, improving 

unit manning levels, and eliminating the routine use of stop loss. 

The President’s Budget Request for fiscal year 2010 adds additional Army Force 

Structure for Echelons above Brigade, with over 100 new Army units of various 

sizes (detachments to full-size battalions). These new units are part of the phased 

implementation of Grow the Army and other force structure initiatives. They provide the Army with operational depth needed to sustain enduring levels of force deployment to meet global commitments. Included are many high-demand engineer, 

military police, signal, intelligence, air defense, and transportation units. This 

growth will help reduce the stress for these high-demand units. In addition, this 

budget provides increased home station training funding to support the modular 

force design which will bring the Army closer to a balanced training program for 

the entire Force. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The budget request includes funding for 550 tank training miles in 

FY10. This represents a decrease in miles from the FY09 budgeted level of 608 

miles. Tank miles are a vital part of the training required to restore the Army’s 

ability to conduct full-spectrum combat operations. How do you justify a decrease 

in training miles considering the current readiness shortfalls and the need to restore full-spectrum combat capability? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army’s FY09 budget request for 608 miles was reduced 

to 547 miles in the FY09 Appropriations bill. The FY10 budget level of 550 miles 

acknowledges prior year Congressional actions and recognizes the associated level 

of risk inherent in this highly dynamic period of rotational deployments. The principal challenges impacting Army training and readiness are a function of current 

demand for forces exceeding supply. This high demand shortens dwell time for units 

and requires mission-specific focused training which increases readiness to meet directed missions at the expense of core unit and individual tasks. The Army will 
132 

evaluate unit training requirements during the execution years to reassess and mitigate risks to readiness as necessary. The Army remains committed to achieving a 

balanced force capable of executing a broad range of requirements encompassing 

operational themes of peace operations, peacetime military engagement, limited 

intervention, irregular warfare and major combat operations. 

Mr. ORTIZ. A key tenet of the Navy’s ability to maintain forward-deployed and 

surge-ready naval forces is the proper resourcing, planning and execution of maintenance needed to prepare and sustain its ships. The Fleet Response Plan, when fully 

funded, should enable the Navy to continuously deploy three Carrier Strike Groups 

to points around the globe, surge three more in 30 days and deploy a seventh in 

90 days. What happens when sufficient resources are not found and accounts are 

not fully funded? What level of strategic risk is Navy asking the Nation to accept 

by not fully funding Navy O&M requirements? 

Admiral WALSH. When fully resourced, the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) enables us 

to deploy three Carrier Strike Groups, surge three more in 30 days, and deploy a 

7th in 90 days. When sufficient resources are not found, the Navy must strike a 

balance between risk to our future readiness and current operational requirements. 

The Navy’s baseline budget does not deliver an adequate FRP posture for FY 2010 

projected security requirements, requiring the Navy to rely on baseline and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to meet COCOM requirements. While 

the Department’s FY 2010 baseline and OCO funding will meet the projected Navy 

Presence Requirements of three Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), it assumes risk in 

the FRP Surge required to meet emergent COCOM requirements and Major Combat 

Operation (MCO) timelines with the required assets. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Operational tempo for Navy surface combatants has increased 19% 

since 2000. While maintenance and ship operating budgets also have increased, the 

focus of those additional maintenance dollars were aimed at near-term ship readiness, making the surface fleet much more susceptible to changes in operational 

tempo. Is the Navy funding the maintenance it needs or doing the maintenance it 

has funding for? When you look at the sharp rise in operational tempo and the 

slight rise in maintenance funding, are we funding short-term readiness gains in 

operational availability at the expense of maintenance required to fund long-term 

readiness? 

Admiral WALSH. The Navy makes every effort to fund the maintenance it needs. 

In FY10, fiscal constraints and competing requirements resulted in a budget request 

that included a $200 million unfunded requirement in the ship depot maintenance 

account. The Navy is completing the maintenance necessary to support operational 

tasking. However, there are early signs that surface ship material readiness is being 

impacted by three things: the lack of refined and technically validated Integrated 

Class Maintenance Plans (ICMP) to define the 100% maintenance requirement for 

meeting expected service life, the current process for executing maintenance, and 

the amount of surface ship maintenance funding. PB10 ship maintenance funding 

is reliant on baseline budget and OCO funding to meet the surface ship maintenance requirements for FY10. 

In the last several years, the Navy and Surface Warfare Enterprise have taken 

specific steps to address these issues. The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 

has allocated more technical resources to surface ships and is working to establish 

technical redlines for our surface ships that will help establish the foundation for 

each ship class ICMP. NAVSEA has also chartered the standup of SEA 21 with assigned responsibilities as the full-spectrum life cycle manager for surface ships. SEA 

21 is leading the effort to conduct a bottom up review of each ICMP and provide 

work package development and oversight similar to what we have today on our submarines and aircraft carriers. SEA 21 has also established the Surface Ship Life 

Cycle Management (SSLCM) activity to manage work package development and 

ICMP. 

Finally, from a resource perspective, ship maintenance must be part of a balanced 

approach within our operating accounts to ensure COCOM demand is being met, 

with acceptable risk, while at the same time ensuring that critical maintenance necessary to ensure future readiness is being accomplished. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How would failure to achieve the 11-carrier waiver affect the Navy’s 

ship maintenance cost and schedule? 

Admiral WALSH. The extension of CVN 65 until 2015 would also result in a domino effect of delays in scheduled ship maintenance and docking periods and reduce 

overall aircraft carrier availability while providing only one additional deployment 

for CVN 65. 

Navy has requested a legislative waiver to temporarily decrease the number of 

active duty aircraft carriers from 11 to 10 between the planned November 2012 inactivation of CVN 65 (USS Enterprise) and the September 2015 delivery of CVN 78 
133 

(USS Gerald R. Ford). If the legislation is not approved, a minimum of $2.8B in 

funding, which includes Operations and Maintenance, Navy (OMN), Military Personnel, Navy (MPN), and Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN), would be required to extend CVN 65 until 2015. If additional funding is not provided, the Navy 

would allocate OMN, MPN and SCN funds from other requirements impacting the 

Navy’s ability to meet operational demands. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How long will it take the Marine Corps to recover key core warfighting 

capabilities following cessation of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General AMOS. Once operations are concluded in Iraq and Afghanistan, we estimate it would take about 36 months to fully reset our equipment assets and reconstitute full-spectrum Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) training readiness. 

This projection assumes that adequate resources will be provided and sustained to 

continue our RESET and modernization plans which are key to restoring current 

and future warfighting capabilities. We anticipate the Marine Corps restoration of 

training readiness to include: 6–18 months for unit training; concurrently 24–36 

months for integrated combined arms training; and concurrently 36 months for initial amphibious training. In addition, large-scale Command and Control training 

and joint/combined exercises are also critical to regaining our full-spectrum capability. We are committed to maintaining our expeditionary capability as the Nation’s 

force in readiness, and with your continued support we can achieve these timelines. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Where in the continental United States does the Marine Corps have 

the ability to bring brigade-size force together for a live-fire training exercise? How 

important is the 29 Palms facility to retention of the Marine Corps’ warfighting capabilities? 

General AMOS. The capability for the Marine Corps to bring together a brigadesized force for a live-fire exercise does not currently exist. As captured in detail in 

the Marine Corps’ response to similar questions contained in Section 2829 of National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, geographical and 

fiscal constraints preclude the Marine Corps from addressing existing training space 

shortfalls. Currently, major deficits in the Marine Corps’ ability to train to the many 

missions that it faces; the largest gaps in training capability include: 

The inability to exercise a large-scale (brigade level) MAGTF in a ‘‘live’’ training 

scenario. The reach of modern weapon systems and tactical doctrine require a much 

larger land and airspace area than the Marine Corps currently has available. Only 

the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC)/Marine Air Ground Task 

Force Training Command (MAGTFTC) at Twenty-nine Palms, California comes 

close but given its many other missions and its limited size relative to the area required for Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) training, it cannot fully accommodate a MEB-size unit. 

The USMC has an ongoing project to expand the MCAGCC in order to enable a 

large-scale, live-fire and maneuver training exercise capable of supporting MEB 

training sufficient to allow 48 to 72 hours of live-fire and maneuver by three battalions converging on a single MEB-level objective. 

As stated in the Marine Corps’ response to questions contained in Section 2829 

of NDAA FY08, MCAGCC Twenty-nine Palms is critical to the retention of Marine 

Corps warfighting capabilities. Today, the Combat Center, as headquarters to the 

Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command (MAGTFTC), provides (1) the 

principal venue for advanced, Service-level core capability/core competency training, 

Service-level live-fire/fire and maneuver ranges, and training for deploying Marine 

Corps forces; (2) the center of excellence for developing and executing combined 

arms live-fire training of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF); and (3) multiple ranges replicating the urban environment. Additionally, Twenty-nine Palms is 

home station to ground combat, aviation, and logistics units. The development of 

this premiere training installation has been driven primarily by the need to support 

the evolving training requirements of the MAGTF resulting from new doctrine, tactics, weapons systems, and missions. These have steadily expanded the operational 

pace and required maneuver space of modern warfare. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Marine Corps has accepted considerable risk in its fiscal year 

2010 depot maintenance accounts. How important is reset to the Marine Corps’ ability to sustain equipment for current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and to provide for ongoing training of non-deployed and next-to-deploy units? What is the 

O&M funding profile for reset in the fiscal year 2010 budget request? 

General AMOS. The funding profile for reset in the USMC FY2010 Overseas Contingency Operations budget includes $950M in organization, intermediate and depot 

level maintenance, as well as contractor logistics support. Reset funding is critical 

for mission accomplishment. USMC will always ensure that deploying units have 

the best equipment available at the expense of home station inventory if the availability of a specific piece of gear is limited. (Reset funding is not included in our 
134 

operations and maintenance baseline funding request.) Depot maintenance for aviation is captured in the Navy’s operations and maintenance budgets. 

Mr. ORTIZ. If the Congress were to impede the retirement of fighter aircraft as 

proposed in the FY10 budget request, what would the impact be on the Air Force’s 

O&M account? 

General FRASER. The impact of not allowing the Air Force to retire ∼250 fighter aircraft in FY10 would result in adding back $328M for 32,183 O&M flying hours; 

$17M in other O&M support costs for squadron operations; and realigning ∼4K positions from critical skills and new and emerging Air Force missions back to their 

original career field. Total O&M funding impact in FY10 is $345M. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How do readiness rates for deployed units compare to those within 

CONUS? What impact are these readiness rates having on your ability to train your 

forces when not deployed? 

General FRASER. AF training and exercises are aligned with our AEF rotations 

and deployments to ensure we deploy mission-ready units from CONUS. USAF 

units remain fully ready for their deployed missions while in the AOR; however, 

some units’ full-spectrum mission readiness erodes while deployed. 

Upon return to CONUS from deployment, this erosion causes many units to require additional training to get them back to their fully mission-ready status. This 

creates additional demands on training resources. The overall impact is a ‘‘time-lag’’ 

in regaining a unit’s full-spectrum readiness as a result of balancing their training 

requirements against the requirement to ensure a unit preparing to deploy is fully 

mission-ready in time for their AEF rotation. 

Mr. ORTIZ. In March, Chairman Skelton and Chairman Ortiz requested that the 

Department and the military services halt any pending A-76 studies and conduct 

a thorough review of the program. What is the Air Force doing to comply with that 

request? Have you received any guidance from OSD on the matter? Will a halt on 

A-76 activities impact your fiscal year 2010 budget request? 

General FRASER. In accordance with the FY09 Omnibus Appropriations Act, we 

have not initiated any new public-private competitions this fiscal year. We are also 

currently reviewing three ongoing Air Force A-76 studies to determine if we should 

proceed or request OSD cancellation. Our internal review of these competitions 

should be completed by 31 July 2009. 

We have received no additional guidance regarding A-76 other than the OSD Acquisition, Technology and Logistics’ 15 April 2009 response to Chairman Skelton 

and Chairman Ortiz stating DOD will not announce any new A-76 competitions this 

fiscal year and is reviewing all ongoing competitions. 

Halting A-76 activity would not impact fiscal year 2010 budget requests as A-76 

programming is performed at the conclusion of the competition. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Secretary Gates has moved aggressively to convert many contract positions to DOD civilian billets. In your fiscal year 2010 budget request, it appears that 

you are planning to in-source 4,000 positions during the course of the year. How 

did you arrive at this number? Was any analysis done to determine which billets 

would be converted or were the conversions merely levied across the Department? 

General FRASER. OSD levied conversion targets on the Service Components and 

subsequently removed contract dollars from the Air Force. As a result, they assumed a 40% savings and the remaining dollars were used to fund civilian manpower authorizations for in-sourcing. The Air Force is in the process of identifying 

specific in-sourcing candidates based on mission requirements, Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activities Review, and individual business case analysis. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Although I support the Secretary’s efforts to reshape the DOD workforce to ensure we have the proper skill sets and capabilities in that workforce, I’m 

concerned that you may be implementing it in a manner that is counter-productive 

and could have a long-term negative impact. As we saw with the A-76 program, 

measuring the services against mandatory out-sourcing targets resulted in the execution of A-76 activities that may not have been in the best interest of the service 

or the Department. How can we be assured that this in-sourcing initiative will be 

executed appropriately and not just in response to random goals and budget reductions levied on the services by OSD? 

General FRASER. Both public-private competitions and in-sourcing, when selectively applied, are useful tools for ensuring workload is performed by the most costeffective means. In-sourcing candidates will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Insourcing decisions will be based on Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activity Review, mission requirements and business case analysis as appropriate. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Air Force has proposed to defer investments in facilities 

sustainment and restoration. The Air Force is requesting funds necessary to support 

only 59% of the required facility recapitalization. Why did the Air Force elect to take 

risk in the facility accounts and delay critical restoration and modernization activi-
135 

ties? What is the long-term effect of a delay in funding restoration and modernization activities? 

General FRASER. Modernizing the Air Force’s aging aircraft fleet is our toughest 

challenge; in order to recapitalize and modernize, the Air Force must take risk in 

some areas. Because the Air Force invested heavily in infrastructure in the past 

(with the outstanding support of Congress), we decided taking risk in our facility 

accounts was acceptable for a short duration. 

The Air Force views installations as critical war-fighting platforms that provide 

a core AF expeditionary combat capability. We will ensure our risk taken in our facilities and infrastructure will not jeopardize our ability to conduct critical operations from our installation weapon systems. We intend to mitigate potential shortfalls in MILCON and facility maintenance funding by bolstering our restoration and 

modernization programs as much as possible. Using an enterprise portfolio perspective, we intend to focus our limited resources only on the most critical physical plant 

components, by applying demolition and space utilization strategies to reduce our 

footprint, aggressively pursuing energy initiatives, continuing to privatize family 

housing and modernizing dormitories to improve quality of life for our Airmen. 

We really appreciate the efforts of Congress with the recent passing of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. This legislation will help us reduce 

our facility restoration, modernization, and recapitalization backlog of over $16B by 

$1.5B. To date, we awarded over $600M worth of these projects and expect to have 

the most of the remainder awarded by the end of September 2009. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. Secretary Gates has moved aggressively to convert many contract positions to DOD civilian billets. How did you arrive at the number of billets to be 

outsourced in fiscal year 2010? Was any analysis done to determine which billets 

would be converted or were the conversions merely levied across the Department? 

Do you have any concerns that the ‘‘cost savings’’ anticipated with this in-sourcing 

activity as reflected in your FY2010 budget request may not be realized? 

General CHIARELLI. The in-sourcing target was levied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and not developed by the Army. Although the Army had started 

to implement a review of its contractor inventory established pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 in January 2009, prior to the 

levying of these targets in May 2009, this review did not inform the initial targets 

established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, 8,379 of the 9,913 

positions programmed and budgeted for in-sourcing from FY10–15 were subsequently validated as of June 26, 2009, by the contractor inventory review process 

as implicating acquisition functions, functions closely associated with inherently 

governmental functions, inherently governmental functions, and unauthorized personal services. (As of August 15, 2009, the contractor inventory review process identified 9,471 out of 11,084 positions programmed and budgeted for in-sourcing from 

FY10–15 as involving acquisition functions, inherently governmental functions, 

closely associated with inherently governmental functions, and unauthorized personal services.) Reprogramming may be required to align initial funding targets to 

positions where contractor inventory reviews support in-sourcing. Based on prior 

Army experience with in-sourcing about 1162 positions, the savings varied based on 

function and location and averaged at 33 percent and not the 40 percent assumed 

in the budget request. 

Mr. FORBES. Although I support the Secretary’s efforts to reshape the DOD workforce to ensure we have the proper skill sets and capabilities in that workforce, I’m 

concerned that you may be implementing it in a manner that is counter-productive 

and could have a long-term negative impact. As we saw with the A-76 program, 

measuring the services against mandatory out-sourcing targets resulted in the execution of A-76 activities that may not have been in the best interest of the service 

or the Department. How can we be assured that this in-sourcing initiative will be 

executed appropriately and not just in response to random goals and budget reductions levied on the services by OSD? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army established the contractor inventory prescribed by 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and completed as of 

June 26, 2009, a thorough review of 52 percent of the activities on that inventory 

to identify 1,085 inherently governmental functions, 12,895 closely associated with 

inherently governmental functions and 40 unauthorized personal services. This review involved detailed analysis of how commands performed contracted functions 

within its organizations, looking at the total manpower mix of military, civilian employee and contractor within that organization. A comprehensive checklist compiled 
136 

from the relevant statutory definitions and criteria for in-sourcing was used by the 

Commands when performing this analysis (see checklist at http:// 

www.asamra.army.mil/insourcing). In addition, Army contracting activities will not 

process an action for contract services absent a certification from the requiring activity with this checklist attached. The Army Audit Agency is in the process of auditing the application of this checklist throughout the Army. Based on the above reviews completed as of June 26, 2009, 8,379 of the 9,913 positions programmed and 

budgeted for in-sourcing from FY10-15 were subsequently validated by the contractor inventory review process as implicating acquisition functions, functions 

closely associated with inherently governmental functions, inherently governmental 

functions, and unauthorized personal services. (As of August 15, 2009, the contractor inventory review process identified 9,471 out of 11,084 positions programmed 

and budgeted for in-sourcing from FY10-15 as involving acquisition functions, inherently governmental functions, closely associated with inherently governmental functions, and unauthorized personal services.) Reprogramming may be required to align 

initial funding targets to positions where contractor inventory reviews support insourcing. We have made the case that any future in-sourcing candidates should be 

identified based on this deliberative process and expect that our recommendations 

may be followed. 

Mr. FORBES. Secretary Gates has moved aggressively to convert may contract positions to DOD civilian billets. How did you arrive at the number of billets to be 

outsourced in fiscal year 2010? Was any analysis done to determine which billets 

would be converted or were the conversions merely levied across the Department? 

Do you have any concerns that the ‘‘cost savings’’ anticipated with this in-sourcing 

activity as reflected in your FY2010 budget request may not be realized? 

Admiral WALSH. The number of billets to be in-sourced in FY2010 were passed 

from OSD to the components as goals. Navy is working to solidify a comprehensive 

plan to meet our goal. The Budget Submitting Offices are currently assisting in the 

analysis to identify specific functions as in sourcing candidates. Once the analysis 

is complete we will have a better understanding of how to achieve the potential 

‘‘cost savings.’’ 

Mr. FORBES. Although I support the Secretary’s efforts to reshape the DOD workforce to ensure we have the proper skill sets and capabilities in that workforce, I’m 

concerned that you may be implementing it in a manner that is counter-productive 

and could have a long-term negative impact. As we saw with the A-76 program, 

measuring the services against mandatory out-sourcing targets resulted the execution of A-76 activities that may not have been in the best interest of the service or 

the Department. How can we be assured that this in-sourcing initiative will be executed appropriately and not just in response to random goals and budget reductions 

levied on the services by OSD? 

Admiral WALSH. As we move forward toward implementing requirements of DOD 

directed resource management adjustments and Sec 324 FY2008 NDAA, Navy is 

looking at the workforce from a Total Force perspective. We are reviewing our core 

capabilities and skill sets necessary to meet emerging requirements. In-sourcing 

provides us an additional avenue to shape the workforce properly to meet these requirements and maximizes our ability to carry out the mission with the most costeffective workforce. 

Navy views in-sourcing as an opportunity. As we look at the workforce from a 

Total Force perspective, there are core capabilities and skill sets required for emerging capabilities. In-sourcing provides us an additional avenue to shape the workforce 

properly to meet these requirements. 

Mr. FORBES. How did you arrive at the number of billets to be outsourced in fiscal 

year 2010? Was any analysis done to determine which billets would be converted 

or were the conversions merely levied across the Department? Do you have any concerns that the ‘‘cost savings’’ anticipated with this in-sourcing activity as reflected 

in your FY2010 budget request may not be realized? 

General AMOS. Working with the assigned OSD civilian hire targets, the Marine 

Corps has convened a working group consisting of headquarters activities, contracting officers, HR community, financial managers and the field to determine 

where in-sourcing makes sense and establish the permanent civilian billet requirements to be added, contracts re-scoped for cost savings or eliminated in FY 2010. 

The realignments of funding and civilian labor in FY 2010 were based on the dollar 

value of contracts identified in budget justification material. Those numbers were 

adjusted to reflect a rebalancing of contracts versus in-house labor that corresponds 

with our pre-war levels of funding and manning. The notional targets distributed 

by OSD were based on this premise. Currently, we believe the personnel goals are 

attainable in FY 2010 but remain concerned about the savings targets. 
137 

Mr. FORBES. Although I support the Secretary’s efforts to reshape the DOD workforce to ensure we have the proper skill sets and capabilities in that workforce, I’m 

concerned that you may be implementing it in a manner that is counter-productive 

and could have a long-term negative impact. As we saw with the A-76 program, 

measuring the services against mandatory out-sourcing targets resulted the execution of A-76 activities that may not have been in the best interest of the service or 

the Department. How can we be assured that this in-sourcing initiative will be executed appropriately and not just in response to random goals and budget reductions 

levied on the services by OSD? 

General AMOS. The execution plan for Marine Corps has three phases. First, we 

will tackle FY10, then FY11 and finally, the third phase will focus on FY12-15 adjustments. The first phase will focus on professional administrative and management support product services contracts. FY11 and out considerations will include 

all types of contracts. 

USMC will work with the Navy and OSD to realign funding as necessary during 

the year of execution if problems arise with in-sourcing execution. OSD continues 

to work with the services to prepare for the manpower and funding shift and has 

highlighted the need for a prudent civilian/contractor balance that takes into consideration pay, training and facilities needed to support the increased civilian workforce. A critical component to overall execution will be the ability of the Department 

of Navy human resources community and individual managers to handle the volume 

of personnel actions necessary to bring a large number of civilians on board. 

Mr. FORBES. Secretary Gates has moved aggressively to convert may contract positions to DOD civilian billets. How did you arrive at the number of billets to be 

outsourced in fiscal year 2010? Was any analysis done to determine which billets 

would be converted or were the conversions merely levied across the Department? 

Do you have any concerns that the ‘‘cost savings’’ anticipated with this in-sourcing 

activity as reflected in your FY2010 budget request may not be realized? 

General FRASER. OSD levied conversion targets on the Service Components and 

subsequently removed contract dollars from the Air Force. As a result, they assumed a 40% savings and the remaining dollars were used to fund civilian manpower authorizations for in-sourcing. The Air Force is in the process of identifying 

specific in-sourcing candidates based on mission requirements, Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activities Review and individual business case analysis. 

Our preliminary findings are that 40% savings are possible. 

Mr. FORBES. Although I support the Secretary’s efforts to reshape the DOD workforce to ensure we have the proper skill sets and capabilities in that workforce, I’m 

concerned that you may be implementing it in a manner that is counter-productive 

and could have a long-term negative impact. As we saw with the A-76 program, 

measuring the services against mandatory out-sourcing targets resulted the execution of A-76 activities that may not have been in the best interest of the service or 

the Department. How can we be assured that this in-sourcing initiative will be executed appropriately and not just in response to random goals and budget reductions 

levied on the services by OSD? 

General FRASER. Both public-private competitions and in-sourcing, when selectively applied, are useful tools for ensuring workload is performed by the most cost 

effective means. In-sourcing candidates will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Insourcing decisions will be based on Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activity Review, mission requirements and business case analysis as appropriate. InSourcing candidates will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In-Sourcing decisions 

will be based on Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activity Review, mission 

requirements, and business case analysis as appropriate. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

Ms. GIFFORDS. We recently learned from a press release sent by the Utah delegation that Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah was selected as the site to establish the 

Army’s Rapid Integration and Acceptance Center for UAS’s. I have not, however, 

seen this in a formal Army announcement. The press release states that the Rapid 

Integration and Acceptance Center would integrate systems and conduct testing on 

the Hunter, Shadow and Sky Warrior Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS’s). Currently 

a portion of this mission is conducted at Fort Huachuca and Yuma Proving Grounds 

in Arizona. Moving these missions to Dugway will force more than 200 hard-working employees near Fort Huachuca alone out of a job. It is my understanding that 

the original plan for the UAS Program Manager was to conduct a series of final visits and site assessments. From these visits they were to make an informed decision 

about where this mission should be established based on the requirements and 
138 

available assets at the location. PM UAS subsequently canceled their scheduled visits to Ft. Huachuca and Yuma just prior to the announcement by the Utah Delegation. In light of these canceled site surveys, please explain what criteria were used 

to make this decision? 

General CHIARELLI. Program Manager-UAS has no current activities being conducted at Yuma Proving Ground (YPG). Yuma was one of the sites being surveyed. 

The Warrior-class UAS test activities are currently being conducted at El Mirage, 

outside of Victorville, CA. AAI (Shadow) has about 75 personnel and Northrop 

Grumman (Hunter) has about 15 personnel supporting their respective programs in 

the Fort Huachuca area. The final survey trip was cancelled after Dugway Proving 

Ground (DPG) was selected as the site for the RIAC. The last surveys were for final 

confirmation of information that had already been gathered during previous surveys. This data was already obtained from the respective staffs at the surveyed locations. The selection criteria used to make the decision included: 

(1) Maximum amount of restricted airspace available to fly unmanned aircraft 

without requiring a Certificate of Authorization (COA) from the Federal Aviation Administration. A COA requires a chase plane for UAS operations, which 

causes additional costs to the program. 

(2) A very clean frequency spectrum, not only for current needs, but for future 

data and video links and payloads. 

(3) Ability to launch and deploy external stores and weapons. 

(4) Ability to support large-scale joint interoperability testing with multiple aircraft and control stations. 

(5) Available facilities or ability to expand with new facilities to support current 

and future growth. 

(6) High priority with maximum flexibility to fly unimpeded when needed. 

(7) The ability to consolidate all the activities at one location. 

(8) During the original analysis of the three most likely locations (Fort Huachuca, 

YPG, and DPG), Dugway was the clear lead in every criteria. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Fort Huachuca owns a significant piece of restricted airspace that 

only they control, free of commercial and general air traffic. It is also home to the 

Electronic Proving Grounds, free of excessive electromagnetic interference, ideal for 

testing communications systems. How does Dugway’s airspace, shared with Salt 

Lake International Airport and Hill Air Force Base and with a busy electromagnetic 

spectrum give it an operational advantage? 

General CHIARELLI. Dugway’s airspace is restricted and controlled by the U.S. 

Army and not shared by Salt Lake International Airport. Dugway’s airspace is as 

large as that at Fort Huachuca, but substantially less congested, not having to deal 

with the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Training Center, as well as manned and 

unmanned traffic (border patrol missions and other training activities) at Libby 

Army Airfield. Additionally, with prior coordination, additional restricted airspace 

controlled by the U.S. Air Force could be made available if needed for weapons firing and long-range datalink testing. Due to all the UAS efforts (and being home to 

substantial electronics testing at the Electronic Proving Grounds) at Fort Huachuca, 

the frequency spectrum is challenging with shared frequencies within the operating 

bands of UAS programs. According to the Department of Defense frequency database, all frequencies required for current needs and future plans are available at 

Dugway with minimal interference. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. While consolidating the mission at one location may be more economical, with a lack of final surveys do you think your staff fully considered the 

costs of this move to Dugway? 

General CHIARELLI. Surveys were started in March 2008 through April 2009. The 

final survey was scheduled to validate previous survey results. Costs were considered during the surveys. In fact, every location surveyed required additional infrastructure and associated costs. Fort Huachuca was the most costly due to limited 

facilities available for consolidated activities due to its current and planned missions 

as indicated by the Garrison staff. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. There are already substantial facilities at Fort Huachuca for the 

UAS Mission and more facilities under construction and to begin construction shortly. There are also well embedded and deeply rooted industry partners in the areas 

performing the production and testing prior to final acceptance. Are there similar 

substantial and robust facilities and contractor presence at Dugway? 

General CHIARELLI. There were no existing facilities available at Fort Huachuca 

for consolidation of Army UAS activities at that location. Fort Huachuca RIAC ac-
139 

tivities would be in three different locations unless they were to build an entirely 

new complex, including runways, office and hangar space, etc. 

Dugway offers an airfield that allows for at least three simultaneous UAS flight 

activities to occur, one from a 13,000 foot long runway that has minimal air traffic, 

one from a taxiway over 8,000 feet long, and another from taxiway of over 2,000 

feet. Dugway also has a 20,000 square foot hangar, almost half of which is being 

made available until suitable maintenance buildings can be built. Additionally, 

Dugway offers an expansive area for any new facilities needed, all adjacent to the 

existing ramp and accessible to the runways. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. What are the plans for relocating the skilled workers with unique 

experience on the Shadow and Hunter UAS systems from Fort Huachuca to Dugway 

and how many of these employees are expected to actually relocate to Dugway? How 

will this potential loss of skilled employees impact the mission? 

General CHIARELLI. Each prime contractor has developed their own incentive 

packages for moving their existing personnel to Dugway. In early June 2009, AAI 

expected more than 50 percent of their Shadow workforce to move in early June 

2009. Subsequently, AAI offered an incentive package, so the number of AAI personnel who will actually move will not be known until July 31, 2009. Several of the 

AAI employees at Fort Huachuca will most likely accept positions with the Unmanned Aircraft System Training Brigade (UASTB) located at Fort Huachuca thereby minimizing the impact to the families that choose to stay at Fort Huachuca 

versus moving to Dugway. Fort Huachuca’s current mission will be minimally impacted based on the phased approach to standing up the activities at Dugway. Northrop Grumman is also moving in a phased approach, although there are substantially fewer personnel to be moved. It is expected that over 50 percent of the Northrop Grumman employees will move to Dugway. There is no expected impact to 

the Hunter mission due to the move. The role of the UASTB will increase with the 

addition of training for the Extended Range Multi-purpose (ERMP) UAS that begins 

this fall with ERMP Quick Reaction Capability-2, allowing further employment opportunities for AAI and Northrop Grumman personnel currently located at Fort 

Huachuca. We are attempting to mitigate the impact to Fort Huachuca by pursuing 

a phased approach to standing up activities at Dugway. 

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