Filed 9/3/13 In re Ruben C. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re RUBEN C. at al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B245932

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK59723)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VERNA C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

Amy M. Pellman, Judge. Affirmed.

Pamela Rae Tripp for Defendant and Appellant.

John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, 

Peter Ferrera, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________________________________
2

Verna C. appeals from a juvenile court order denying her request for de facto 

parent status and rejecting her attempt to compel the return of two foster children to her 

care. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

FACTS

Ruben C. (born in 2004) and Brandon M. (born in 2006) were detained by the 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in July 2010, along with two sisters 

ages one and eight months. The children‟s 22-year-old mother Daisy C. (Mother) was 

pregnant with her fifth child. The father of the three younger children, Andy M., was 

arrested on outstanding warrants, after the police found drug paraphernalia in the family‟s 

motel room. He disclosed a criminal history dating to age 11. Mother admitted to using 

methamphetamine and cocaine during her current pregnancy.

In an interview, Connie H.—who is either a relative or a close family friend—

stated that Mother previously lived with her to have a stable home for Ruben when he 

was a baby.1 Two years later, Mother became pregnant with Brandon, despite Ms. H.‟s 

efforts to encourage Mother to complete her schooling. Mother moved out of Ms. H.‟s 

home. Since then, Mother has been “bouncing around” and repeatedly getting pregnant. 

Ruben is six years old, but Mother never enrolled him in school. Ms. H. described the 

children as “out of control” when they are with Mother. Ms. H. had Brandon in her home 

on weekends, and they became very attached. She tried to teach Ruben some boundaries. 

Ms. H. indicated that Mother admitted using drugs while pregnant. Ms. H. urged Mother 

to enter a drug rehabilitation program, but Mother insisted that she could overcome drugs 

on her own. 

Ms. H. noted that the parents set no boundaries for the children. Ruben, Brandon 

and their eight-month-old sister “were observed to have bite marks on their body, 

presumably due to aggressive behaviors among the children,” and Ruben has facial scars 

 

1 Ms. H. told the court “I am an extended relative, aunt.” Ruben was made a 

dependent of the juvenile court in 2005, when Mother was shot while associating with 

known gang members and made no provisions for his care and supervision. 
3

from Brandon‟s scratches. The children choke each other. DCFS believed that the 

children are developmentally delayed or neglected: Ruben does not speak in full 

sentences and has a limited vocabulary; his 22-month-old sister does not speak full 

words; and the baby has “gross motor delay,” suggesting the possibility of pre-birth 

exposure to drugs or alcohol.

All four children were initially placed with a maternal great-great aunt A few 

weeks later, she informed DCFS that she was unable to provide a home for four children. 

Ruben and Brandon were placed in foster care. In an assessment report, DCFS noted that 

Ruben and Brandon “appear to have established bonds with close family friend, Connie 

[H.], who Ruben refers to as his aunt and who Brandon refers to as Nana.” Ms. H. 

maintains regular contact with the boys by telephone, expressed interest in visiting them, 

and wished to care for them if Mother failed to reunify. In September 2010, Mother gave 

birth to a son, who was removed from her at the hospital and placed in foster care. She 

admitted using drugs a few days before giving birth.

On October 25, 2010, the juvenile court sustained allegations that the parents have 

a history of substance abuse and currently abuse methamphetamine. The parents‟ drug 

use renders them incapable of providing regular child care and supervision, and poses a 

risk to the children‟s physical and emotional health. The court ordered DCFS to assess 

whether Ruben could be placed with appellant Verna C., the mother of Ruben‟s alleged

father, Victor C. Victor C. has been incarcerated since 2004, has never had face-to-face 

contact with Ruben, and does not provide his son with the necessities of life. Appellant 

expressed an interest in having Ruben placed with her. Apart from her possible tie to 

Ruben, appellant is not related to the other children involved in the proceeding. 

In a pre-release investigative report, DCFS stated that because appellant‟s adopted 

son Victor is an alleged father only and will be incarcerated for 20 years, he was not 

offered reunification services. Appellant has a lengthy history with DCFS: from 1998 to 

2006, there were nine substantiated referrals against her for general and severe neglect 

involving four children, including Victor C., as well as one inconclusive referral. 

Appellant received family reunification services. She was detained by police for child 
4

cruelty. Two adult children currently live with her. Her home was adequately sized, 

though the living/dining room was filled with boxes, clothing and other items. Appellant 

intended to convert it into a bedroom for Ruben. Ruben told the social worker that he 

likes Verna C. but does not really know her. He could not recall the last time he saw her. 

Ruben was silent when asked if would like to live with appellant, but emphatically agreed 

that he wished to continue living with his brother Brandon. Mother indicated that she did 

not want the two boys separated as they support each other. Appellant and her adult 

daughter Elizabeth were “extremely clear that they cannot take Brandon as well. They 

are only able to provide a home for Ruben.” A four-year-old like Brandon “wouldn‟t fit 

into their lifestyle and they absolutely will not and cannot take care of him.”

Appellant stated that most of her past problems with DCFS arose from 

“housekeeping issues.” She “has not had much of a significant relationship with Ruben 

since his birth. She has seen him at a few family functions, but neither she nor her 

children have had a significant connection or relationship with Ruben. She stated that 

Ruben recognizes her and he will interact with her when they see each other, but the 

relationship is limited.” Appellant felt able to provide a safe, secure and stable 

environment for Ruben, is willing to meet all his needs, would comply with court orders 

and facilitate visitation, and is willing to pursue adoption if reunification fails. DCFS 

recommended that Ruben remain in foster care due to appellant‟s criminal and DCFS 

history, the importance of keeping Ruben and Brandon together, and the limited 

relationship between appellant and Ruben. In December 2010, the court kept the boys in 

their current foster home.

In April 2011, DCFS reported that the children were thriving with their caregivers 

and doing well in school. Appellant informed the court that she is now willing to take 

care of both Ruben and Brandon, having spent time with them every weekend since 

January 15. Appellant intended to place the boys in after-school care during her work 

hours. The court directed DCFS to reassess the appropriateness of appellant‟s home for 

Ruben and Brandon.
5

In a May 2011 report, DCFS noted that appellant “has multiple investigations 

alleging and finding neglect due to having a „home in disarray, cluttered and 

inappropriate living conditions.‟” The boys answered affirmatively when asked if they 

would like to live together with appellant. Appellant‟s daughter Elizabeth “was 

extremely clear that she is not willing to take responsibility of the boys as she is very 

concerned about the mental health issues Ruben will have due to the abuse by the 

parents.” Appellant stated that “she and the boys are beginning to develop a 

relationship.” DCFS recommended that the boys remain in their current placement due to 

concerns about appellant‟s ability to properly care for two young children (as 

demonstrated by appellant‟s history of child neglect referrals) and Elizabeth‟s 

unwillingness to care for the children. 

In June 2011, appellant informed the court that she was hiring house cleaners, 

purchasing beds for the boys, and locating schools. Over the objections of DCFS, the 

court released the boys to appellant. In October 2011, DCFS reported that the five 

children are thriving in their placements. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine 

while pregnant with a sixth child. DCFS asked the court to terminate reunification 

services with a plan of legal guardianship with appellant for Ruben and Brandon, and 

adoption for the younger children.

In November 2011, DCFS reported that Mother‟s newborn child Brian was 

detained at the hospital on November 1, after testing positive for methamphetamine, and 

placed with Ms. H. DCFS filed a first amended petition for Brian. Andy M. was 

incarcerated for an assault and battery on Mother. He had completed a drug rehab 

program, but relapsed when he started associating with Mother. Mother admitted using 

methamphetamine several times a week during the last two months before giving birth.

Appellant applied to adopt Ruben and Brandon. The court terminated 

reunification services for the parents on November 29, 2011, set a permanent placement 

hearing, and identified adoption as the goal for the children. 

Appellant was assessed as a prospective adoptive parent for Ruben and Brandon in 

March 2012. Appellant, a 62-year-old widow with a full-time job, expressed a desire to 
6

provide the boys with a permanent, stable and safe home. She views Brandon as her 

grandson, though she is not related to him. The boys attend an after-school program and 

she picks them up at 5:00 p.m. The boys enjoy spending time with their newest sibling, 

Brian. During a visit, the adoption social worker observed that appellant‟s home is 

cluttered, and appellant‟s daughter Elizabeth expressed opposition to the adoption and 

refuses to undergo an assessment. Appellant described herself as being in good health 

and feels capable of caring for two young boys. She and her late husband previously 

adopted three children through DCFS and she understands her legal responsibilities. 

Ruben and Brandon would like to remain where they are if unable to reunify with their 

parents, but “they also expressed interest in residing with the prospective adoptive 

parent/caregiver of their sibling, Brian,” Ms. H.

The report describes appellant as “very bonded to the children as they are to her.” 

The boys “have adjusted well and continue to thrive” in appellant‟s home. Appellant‟s 

two biological children are concerned about the adoption because of appellant‟s age, and 

they fear that “the boys will take negative routes” as did appellant‟s adopted son Victor. 

Appellant dismissed these concerns, pointing to the example of one of her adopted 

children, who has two college degrees. She feels confident of her ability to provide 

permanency for the boys.

At a hearing on May 22, 2012, the children‟s attorney asked the court to direct 

DCFS to begin a home study for Ruben and Brandon with Ms. H., citing as a “roadblock” 

to adoption the opposition of appellant‟s adult children. The attorney for Ruben‟s alleged 

father Victor C. opposed removing the children from appellant because “she‟s doing an 

excellent job, and there‟s no reason to consider any other placement.” The children‟s 

attorney responded that her clients Ruben and Brandon are “torn” because “part of them 

wants to move [to Ms. H.] with their little brother, Brian.” Appellant was unable to say if 

her adult children would come to accept the boys, and “we need to have a road of 

permanency here.” The court ordered concurrent adoptive home studies for appellant and 

Ms. H., “and then the court will look to see what would be in the best interest of the 

children after there is further review.”
7

In a status review report for June 2012, DCFS wrote that the boys are still with 

appellant. Ruben was doing well, but Brandon has behavioral issues and struggles 

academically. They spend weekends in the home of Ms. H. without incident, and she is 

willing to provide them with a permanent home. Three social workers agreed that the 

best interests of the children would be served by placing them in Ms. H.‟s home because 

she “would be able to provide a suitable placement for the children and their growing 

needs.” Appellant expressed affection for Ms. H., who has the ability to care for the 

children, but felt it would be detrimental to remove the boys from her care as she is 

providing them with a stable home. Appellant acknowledged the opposition of her adult 

children, but stated that she would “deal with” them.

The adoption social worker met with appellant and her adult children. Appellant 

stated that she wished to adopt Ruben and Brandon because they are her grandchildren 

and she would like to provide them with a permanent home. The social worker spoke 

privately with appellant‟s daughter Elizabeth, who stated “that she agreed to live scan 

under the condition that her mother would buy her a new vehicle. She stated . . . that she 

„bribed‟ her mother” and that they frequently argue. “She does not believe that her home 

is appropriate for Ruben and Brandon, as a result of the ongoing chaos.” 

The adoption social worker met with Ms. H., who is 46 years old. She stated that 

“she loves Ruben and Brandon and considers them to be her own family. The children 

are extended relatives of her two adult sons.” Ms. H. had relocated to a bigger home to 

prepare for the possible placement of Ruben and Brandon. Ms. H. expressed concern 

“about ongoing family conflict in [appellant‟s] home and believes that she is able to 

provide a more stable, loving and nurturing home environment for the children. Ms. H. 

also expressed concern about [appellant‟s] health condition, stress level and lack of social 

support.” The social worker observed that Ms. H. is “extremely attached to the children. 

She helps to care for them and takes them to her home for the day on a regular basis. Ms. 

H. is adopting the children‟s younger sibling, Brian, and wishes for the three siblings to 

have the opportunity to be raised together. Further, she visits with [the boys‟ sisters] 

approximately three times a week and thus, the children would be allowed the 
8

opportunity to have a close relationship with their sisters as well.” By contrast, appellant 

“has a difficult time confirming her attendance to the sibling visits and appears unhappy 

when confirming.” Ruben and Brandon like where they are but also expressed interest in 

residing with Ms. H.

On July 25, 2012, DCFS filed a supplemental petition alleging that appellant 

“established an endangering and detrimental home environment” for Ruben by allowing 

Elizabeth “to act in a demeaning manner towards the child‟s sibling Brandon” thereby 

placing Ruben at risk of harm. Further, appellant failed to comply with court orders. 

DCFS moved the children to the home of Ms. H. 

In a detention report, the social worker stated that she saw Elizabeth speak to 

Brandon in a negative way. This provoked an argument between appellant and Elizabeth, 

and “Brandon got very upset and stormed out of the home. [Appellant] attempted to calm 

the child down and had very little effect on him.” The social worker heard Elizabeth say 

that “she did not care if the social worker was in the home and that [appellant] was not 

providing the children with structure and that they did not know how to behave.” The 

social worker was able to calm Brandon, who was still having a tantrum. “Brandon 

indicated that he was upset and tired of the way that Elizabeth talks to him.” Following a 

meeting between three social workers, DCFS decided to remove Ruben and Brandon 

because they had concerns that appellant‟s adult children were having a major impact on 

appellant, adding stress and affecting her ability to care for Ruben and Brandon. The 

court found a prima facie case for detaining the boys because a substantial risk exists if 

they remain in appellant‟s care.

DCFS noted that Ms. H. has known Mother since childhood and helped care for 

Mother‟s children before DCFS became involved. Ms. H. has a good relationship with 

family members who are fostering the boys‟ siblings. Ruben and Brandon have a strong 

bond with Ms. H., like her home, and would like to live with her if unable to reside with 

appellant. Ms. H.‟s adult son supports adoption for all three children. In private, Ruben 

told the social worker that he loves appellant and will miss her and his school, “but that 

he was also content with the idea of residing with Ms. H. given that he has a great 
9

relationship with Ms. H. and her adult son that resides in the home.” Ruben said that he 

was fine with the social worker‟s decision to move him to Ms. H.‟s home. DCFS also 

noted that appellant “screams at the boys constantly to the point that the boys are totally 

tuning her out.” Elizabeth also screams and fights with appellant. Elizabeth was angry 

that the tattoo business she ran from appellant‟s home was destroyed when the boys were 

placed there, and appellant‟s son Donovan is equally unhappy with the presence of the 

boys. Appellant failed to complete court-ordered classes to learn coping skills.

In August 2012, the social worker met with Ruben and Brandon in their new 

home. They are happy and comfortable there, and stated that they “would like to live 

either there or with [appellant]. The children were observed to have a strong bond with 

Ms. H. and her adult son and vice versa.”

In an interview in September 2012, Ruben expressed ambivalence when asked 

where he wanted to live. He described heated arguments between appellant and 

Elizabeth, who sometimes shouted at the boys as well. There were fights between 

Elizabeth and Donovan, using bad words. One time, he saw Donovan smack Brandon on 

the bottom. In an interview, appellant explained that Elizabeth is “strict” because she 

does not want the boys to grow up to be gang members like Ruben‟s father. Appellant 

admitted that Elizabeth “spoke harshly” to appellant in the presence of a social worker, 

and caused Brandon to have a tantrum.

Elizabeth denied demeaning the children, and only cusses at appellant and 

Donovan. Elizabeth believed that the boys would only live in appellant‟s home for a 

year, and “is not thrilled” about appellant adopting because appellant cannot give the 

children everything they need. The boys do not obey appellant or Elizabeth. Elizabeth 

only agreed to take part in the adoption process so that she could get a car from appellant. 

Elizabeth plans to move from appellant‟s home in the very near future. Donovan 

indicated that appellant raises her voice at the children, but Elizabeth would yell, causing 

the boys to cry. This was an increasing problem over the last five months. Donovan 

agreed that Elizabeth spoke in a demeaning way to the children, and cussed at him and 

appellant. Appellant told Elizabeth to move out if she did not change her behavior. 
10

Donovan stated that he and appellant were upset when the boys were removed because 

the children were happy and appellant “loves them to death.” 

Ms. H. observed that appellant relies upon Donovan to discipline Ruben, rather 

than doing it herself. Elizabeth was never happy about the boys being in appellant‟s 

home, giving rise to conflict between Elizabeth, appellant and the boys. Appellant 

informed Ruben‟s counselor that the boy is disruptive, argumentative and does not follow 

rules. He does not listen and acts out when he does not get his way. He has difficulty 

managing stress and becomes depressed and anxious easily.

After DCFS asked the court to dismiss the petition it filed against appellant, the 

attorney representing Victor C. demanded that DCFS place the boys back in appellant‟s 

care because neither child is at risk. At a hearing in September 2012, after hearing 

extensive argument, the court found that it did not previously make a specific placement 

order for Ruben and Brandon because there were concerns about the suitability of 

appellant‟s home. As a result of those concerns, visitation began with Ms. H., which 

went well. The court concluded that since there is only a general placement order, 

appellant had to file a motion to have the children move back to her home.

On October 22, 2012, appellant sought de facto parent status, asserting that she 

cared for Ruben on a daily basis and provided for all of his needs.2 In an addendum, 

DCFS noted that Ms. H. is willing to adopt Ruben, Brandon and Brian, keeping the 

siblings in one home. Appellant and Victor C. filed motions to compel DCFS to return 

Ruben and Brandon to appellant‟s care.

DCFS opposed appellant‟s request for de facto parent status, arguing that the bond 

is stronger for appellant than it is for the two boys. Appellant does not possess 

information about the children that is unique from other participants in the proceeding, 

and is only using the de facto parent procedure to try to wrest custody from Ms. H. 

Mother and Brian‟s attorney concurred with DCFS that appellant should not receive de 

 

2 No de facto parent request form for Brandon appears in the record. 
11

facto status because it would delay permanency and Ms. H. is taking appropriate care of 

Brian, Ruben and Brandon. Appellant contended that she has unique knowledge, 

especially as to Ruben, relating to his family history.

On November 15, 2012, the court acknowledged a likely psychological bond 

between appellant and the children. However, the standard is, does appellant have 

special knowledge or information and would it be in the best interest of the children to 

have someone at the counsel table to make sure that the special information is shared. 

The court believed that appellant‟s request for de facto parent status was a backdoor way 

to regain custody. Appellant did not seek de facto status before the children were 

removed. Any special information can be given to DCFS. The boys have been with Ms. 

H. for nearly five months, without a problem. Nothing appellant said in her request about 

the children‟s routines is particularly unique or helpful. The court denied appellant‟s 

request for de facto parent status and found that she lacks standing to compel DCFS to 

transfer custody of the children to her. 

DISCUSSION

Appellant filed two notices of appeal, one from the order denying her de facto 

parent status, and the other challenging the court‟s ruling that she has no standing to 

compel DCFS to act.

1. Denial of De Facto Parent Status

A person applying for de facto parent status has the burden of proving the issue. 

(In re Hirenia C. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 504, 514.) “[A] finding of de facto parent status 

is dependent upon the facts of each individual case,” with the court examining such 

factors as the child‟s psychological bond with the adult; whether the adult “assumed the 

role of a parent on a day-to-day basis for a substantial period of time”; whether the adult 

has “unique knowledge about the child”; whether the adult regularly attended hearings; 

and whether the proceedings will “permanently foreclos[e] future contact between the 

child and the adult.” (In re Michael R. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 150, 155; In re Patricia L. 

(1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 61, 66-67; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.502 (10).) De facto parents 
12

“are among the custodial alternatives the court must appraise, and their views „deserve 

consideration.‟” (In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 75.)

In reviewing a motion denying de facto parent status, we apply a deferential abuse 

of discretion standard. “In most cases, the lower court does not abuse its discretion if 

substantial evidence supports its determination to grant or deny de facto parent status.” 

(In re Michael R., supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 156; In re Jacob E. (2004) 121 

Cal.App.4th 909, 919.) The court did not abuse its discretion in this case.

Reviewing the entire record, we see that appellant is the mother of Ruben‟s 

alleged father, Victor C., who was incarcerated at the time of Ruben‟s birth and has never 

had face-to-face contact with Ruben.3 Appellant has no relation to Brandon, except by 

virtue of her tie to Ruben. Appellant has a lengthy history with DCFS that includes 

substantiated referrals for general and severe neglect of four children. Appellant did not 

maintain life-long close contact with her alleged grandson Ruben: in December 2010, 

six-year-old Ruben told DCFS that he does not really know appellant and could not recall 

the last time he saw her. Appellant admitted lacking a significant relationship with 

Ruben, having seen him a few times at family functions during his lifetime. 

Ruben and Brandon wanted to stay together, but appellant was “extremely clear” 

that she only wanted Ruben, not Brandon. For this reason, along with appellant‟s DCFS 

history and minimal relationship with Ruben, the children were not placed with her. It 

was not until April 2011 that appellant had a change of heart and became willing to care 

for both Ruben and Brandon, nine months after the boys were detained in foster care. In 

May 2011, appellant indicated that she and the boys “are beginning to develop a 

relationship.” After appellant stated that she would clean up the detritus in her home and 

provide beds, the court placed the children with her in June 2011, nearly a year after they 

were detained. Once placed with appellant, the boys were exposed to a chaotic 

 

3 An alleged father is a man who may be the father of a child, but whose biological 

paternity has not been established. (In re Joseph G. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712, 715; 

In re Christopher M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 155, 159.)
13

environment because appellant engages in screaming matches with her resident adult 

children, and Elizabeth was mean to the boys and made them cry.

By contrast, Ms. H. has been involved in the boys‟ lives since they were born. 

Mother and Ruben lived with Ms. H. for two years. Later, Ms. H. had Brandon in her 

home on weekends and they became very attached. Ms. H. actively tried to discourage 

Mother‟s drug use and pregnancies, while urging Mother to complete schooling. The 

boys refer to Ms. H. as their “aunt” or “nana.” She had regular contact with them when 

they were initially placed in foster care and immediately expressed interest in caring for 

both of them if Mother failed to reunify. 

From this record, we cannot say that appellant met her burden of showing that she 

is any closer to the boys or that she knows more unique things about them than Ms. H. 

On the contrary, Ms. H. has spent substantially more time with the boys since birth than 

appellant. The children are psychologically bonded to both Ms. H. and appellant. 

Merely having a close and loving relationship is not sufficient grounds for finding de 

facto parent status when a caretaker fails to fulfill all of a child‟s needs—including 

protecting the child from abuse within the caretaker‟s household. (In re Jacob E., supra,

121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 919-921 [despite five years as caretaker, a grandmother failed to 

merit de facto parent status because she failed to ensure the child‟s visits with siblings, 

meet his schooling and medical needs, he witnessed domestic violence and she struck 

him with a stick, making her home inadequate and another placement more suitable].)

There is no concern that appellant‟s relationship with the boys will be permanently 

foreclosed unless she receives de facto parent status. Ms. H. and appellant are on friendly 

terms and have always co-operated in sharing time with the boys. Ms. H. appreciates the 

importance of maintaining family ties and facilitates sibling visits. There is no reason to 

believe that this cooperative relationship will not continue, or that appellant will be 

unable to maintain a relationship with Ruben and Brandon. (Compare In re Hirenia C., 

supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at pp. 510-511, in which the child‟s caregiver abruptly cut off all 

contact with appellant, who had continuous contact with the child for three and one-half 

years, since birth, and took care of her 130 days a year.)
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2. Appellant’s Motion to Compel

Appellant appeals the juvenile court‟s order finding that she lacks standing to 

compel DCFS to place Ruben and Brandon in her home. “It is well settled that a de facto 

parent of a dependent minor has standing to participate as a party in juvenile court 

proceedings in which decisions about the care, custody, and control of the child will be 

made.” (In re Hirenia C., supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 513; In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 

679, 693.) As discussed in section 1, ante, the court did not confer de facto parent status 

on appellant. Without de facto parent status, a caretaker who is a prospective adoptive 

parent is not a party to the dependency proceeding and has no standing to object to 

actions taken by the child protective services agency. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, 

subd. (n)(3)(C); R.H. v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 364, 372.)

Even if appellant lacked de facto parent status, she may nonetheless be a “„person 

with an interest‟” in Ruben and Brandon, though this generally requires a petition for a 

modification. (In re Hirenia C., supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 515.) Appellant is the 

mother of Ruben‟s alleged father, Victor C., and she cared for the boys in her home on a 

full-time basis for one year. Under these circumstances, she has an interest in the 

companionship, care, custody and management of the children. (In re B.G., supra, 11 

Cal.3d at p. 693.)

When the juvenile court places dependent children, it “must undertake „a judicious 

appraisal of all available evidence bearing on the child‟s best interests‟ including an 

evaluation of the relative merits of alternative custody awards.” (In re B.G., supra, 11 

Cal.3d at p. 693.) In this instance, Ruben and Brandon were removed from appellant‟s 

custody owing to a detrimental environment. This stemmed from the cruel attitude of 

appellant‟s daughter Elizabeth toward the boys, causing them trauma, and appellant‟s 

failure to take court-ordered classes. The social worker observed worrisome behavior 

during a visit, provoking DCFS to file a supplemental petition under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 387.

On August 1, 2012, the court found a prima facie case for removing the boys from 

appellant‟s home. In subsequent reports, the social worker noted that appellant “screams 
15

at the boys constantly to the point that the boys are totally tuning her out,” and there were

screaming matches between appellant, Elizabeth, and Donavan, using bad words. 

Donovan confirmed that the fighting and crying was an increasing problem over the last 

five months. Appellant relied upon Donovan to control the boys‟ behavior, apparently 

because they feared Donovan. There is no evidence that Donovan plans to remain in 

appellant‟s home forever to help her care for the boys. Appellant failed to take courtordered classes to learn coping skills for parenting special-needs children.

In all, appellant‟s home was chaotic, and she was unable to set appropriate 

boundaries for any of the children, including her adult children. Appellant complained 

that Ruben was disruptive, argumentative and did not follow rules. She seemed unable to 

teach her biological children or foster children how to treat her and others with respect 

and civility. This could be an increasing difficulty as appellant approaches age 70 with 

two children in the house. Appellant admitted to bribing Elizabeth with a car to convince

her to cooperate with DCFS. Elizabeth disparaged appellant‟s abilities, noting that one of 

appellant‟s adoptees (Ruben‟s father Victor C.) is incarcerated for 20 years and another 

adoptee died of drug overdose. As late as May 2012, after nearly a year with appellant, 

Ruben and Brandon were “torn” about living with appellant or living with Ms. H. and 

their little brother Brian, and appellant was unable to say when, if ever, her biological 

children would come to accept the boys.

After DCFS removed the boys from appellant in July 2012, the court refused 

appellant‟s requests to have the boys placed back in her care because of continuing 

concerns about the suitability of appellant‟s home. Ruben and Brandon were happy and 

comfortable in the home of Ms. H., where they were strongly bonded to Ms. H., her son, 

and their brother Brian. There is no evidence of screaming, cussing, tantrums, crying, or 

other such drama in the home of Ms. H. The boys accepted the prospect of living with 

either appellant or Ms. H. 

DCFS ultimately dismissed its supplemental petition. In appellant‟s view, the 

boys had to be returned to her home after DCFS dismissed the petition. The court did not 

agree with appellant. After detaining the children and hearing additional evidence over 
16

four months, the court decided that there are sufficient concerns about appellant‟s 

household that the boys should not be returned to her care. It was not that the court “had 

enough” of appellant, as she suggests in her brief; rather, it “had enough” evidence that 

appellant‟s home was unsuitably chaotic for Ruben and Brandon, so that they would be 

better off with someone they have known their entire lives and call their “aunt” or 

“nana.”

The court must continually reassess the “appropriateness of the placement” while 

exercising dependency jurisdiction, taking into account the discretion that DCFS has in 

choosing a suitable home for minor children. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3, subd. (e)(1); 

In re Jacob E., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 922.) It appropriately did so here, when 

selecting between two prospective adoptive families. Though appellant believes that her 

right to custody was fixed in June 2011, the court alerted her on May 22, 2012, that it was 

ordering concurrent adoptive home studies for her and Ms. H., and intended to “look to 

see what would be in the best interest of the children after further review.” There was no 

abuse of discretion and no violation of appellant‟s rights.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

BOREN, P.J.

We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

CHAVEZ, J.