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52–273 2009

S. HRG. 111–196 

FOLLOWING THE MONEY: A QUARTERLY REPORT 

BY THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL 

FOR THE TARP 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 23, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee 

( 

(II) 

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 

[Created pursuant to Sec. 5(a) of Public Law 304, 79th Congress] 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Chair 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

KEVIN BRADY, Texas 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MICHAEL BURGESS, M.D., Texas 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

SENATE 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Vice 

Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Ranking Minority 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

NAN GIBSON, Executive Director 

JEFF SCHLAGENHAUF, Minority Staff Director 

CHRISTOPHER FRENZE, House Republican Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MEMBERS

Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Chair, a U.S. Representative from New York .......... 1 

Hon. Kevin Brady, a U.S. Representative from Texas ......................................... 2 

WITNESSES

Statement of Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector General, Troubled Asset Relief 

Program ................................................................................................................ 4 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Prepared statement of Representative Carolyn B. Maloney ................................ 40 

Prepared statement of Representative Kevin Brady ............................................ 40 

Prepared statement of Neil Barofsky ..................................................................... 42 

Letter dated April 28, 2009, from Representative Hinchey to Chair Maloney .................................................................................................................. 49 

Letter dated May 29, 2009, from Neil Barofsky to Representative Hinchey ................................................................................................................ 50 

Letter dated May 20, 2009 from Neil Barofsky to Chair Maloney ............... 53 

Prepared statement of Representative Michael Burgess ...................................... 55 

(1) 

FOLLOWING THE MONEY: A QUARTERLY 

REPORT BY THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR 

GENERAL FOR THE TARP 

THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 2009 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met at 9:30 a.m., in Room 210, Cannon House Office Building, the Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney (Chair), presiding. 

Senators present: Klobuchar and Casey. 

Representatives present: Maloney, Hinchey, Sanchez, Cummings, Snyder, Brady, and Burgess. 

Staff present: Gail Cohen, Nan Gibson, Colleen Healy, Hayley 

Matz, Andrew Wilson, Lydia Mashburn, Chris Frenze, and Robert 

O’Quinn. 

Chair Maloney. The meeting will come to order, and I welcome 

the members of the panel and our special guest. 

Good morning. I want to welcome Mr. Barofsky, the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and thank 

him and his staff for his testimony today on the SIGTARP’s new 

report to Congress, just released last Tuesday. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY, CHAIR, 

A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK 

Chair Maloney. The SIGTARP reports to Congress quarterly, 

and this is the second report. Like the first report, issued February 

6th, this report takes a strong but clear position against the aspects of the TARP program that the SIGTARP believes risk promoting fraud, waste, and abuse. Mr. Barofsky is a former prosecutor who does not shrink from telling it like it is, so the interests 

of the SIGTARP’s mission is to make the best use of our taxpayers’ 

dollars. 

The SIGTARP’s reports distinguish themselves by thorough but 

very clear explanation of the TARP programs and the SIGTARP’s 

audit and investigation strategy, as well as specific recommendations on steps Treasury should take to prevent waste, fraud, and 

abuse in the program. 

Regrettably, some of the key recommendations in this report reiterate critical recommendations in the first report—recommendations that would promote transparency and accountability and reduce the potential for fraud and misappropriation, but which 

Treasury has yet to adopt. 

2 

The second report is even more critical to our understanding 

than the first, in part because the TARP has become such a complex series of programs and in part because the dialogue between 

the SIGTARP and Treasury on key issues is more advanced and is 

getting into some specific issues that are of great interest to policymakers and to this committee. 

As a proponent of greater transparency of the program, I requested that the Federal Reserve release AIG counterparty information; and the disclosures were made last month. The SIGTARP 

is set to audit the payments to the AIG counterparties and investigate why it was deemed necessary to redeem these securities at 

full value. This is a key issue that lies at the heart of the AIG rescue: Why were the counterparties made whole at the expense of the 

taxpayer? Shouldn’t they have had to share in the loss? 

The report repeats the recommendation of the first report that 

Treasury must require TARP recipients to report the use to which 

they put the TARP money. This recommendation echoes the concerns of legislation I have introduced with many of the members 

of this committee that would require Treasury to track the TARP 

funds, even using presently reported or public information. Treasury has not adopted this very important recommendation, but the 

work of the SIGTARP, including a survey they conducted of some 

364 TARP recipients, shows that additional information can be provided. 

On a basic level, it is absolutely critical that we know where the 

money has gone and how it has been used. There are reports that 

some banks getting TARP money have used it to buy banks in 

China and highways in Spain or even to short the stock of their 

competitors. These emphasize the need for us to know where the 

money has gone. Beyond that, we should be able to assess, looking 

at available data and performance measurements, whether or not 

these funds have been used effectively. 

However, these lessons are not always reflected in the new proposed programs. As this report notes, the PPIP has some inherent 

features that make it vulnerable to conflicts of interest. The government would be remiss in its duty if it were not to impose rigorous reporting and disclosure requirements on these managers 

and investors. I am concerned that Treasury Secretary Geithner, in 

his testimony Tuesday, headed in the opposite direction, saying 

that Treasury would exempt the PPIP participants from the executive compensation requirements of the TARP statute. 

The goals of transparency and accountability that guide the 

SIGTARP inform this new report and its recommendations. It is 

crucial not only to the success of the TARP but to the recovery of 

our financial system and our economy that we pay very close attention. 

[The prepared statement of Representative Maloney appears in 

the Submissions for the Record on page 40.] 

Chair Maloney. I very much look forward to your testimony and 

recognize the ranking member, Mr. Brady. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. KEVIN BRADY, A U.S. 

REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS 

Representative Brady. Thank you. 

3 

I am pleased to join with you in welcoming Inspector General 

Barofsky before the committee this morning. His office is one of the 

most important guardians of the trillions of dollars taxpayers have 

at risk in the massive bailouts of large financial institutions. 

Unfortunately, as Kansas City Federal Reserve President Thomas Hoenig testified earlier this week, these bailouts ‘‘risk prolonging the crisis while increasing the cost.’’ In this context, I found 

the Inspector General’s most recent report quite disturbing. 

Mr. Barofsky, your report contains very troubling information 

that has not been previously disclosed. This report identifies numerous key weaknesses in the design and implementation of the 

government bailouts that could greatly increase their cost. 

For example, according to your report, the Treasury Department 

has indicated it will not adopt the special Inspector General’s recommendations that all TARP recipients ‘‘account for the use of 

TARP funds, set up internal controls to comply with such accounting, and report periodically to Treasury on the results with appropriate sworn certifications.’’ The complexity and lack of transparency in TARP programs are further reason for concern. 

I think the key question before the committee this morning is 

why this Treasury continues to resist adopting many of the commonsense safeguards recommended in your report. The massive 

Public-Private Investment Program unveiled by Secretary Geithner 

is, to many, key to our Nation’s economic recovery. 

Your report notes many aspects of the Public-Private Investment 

Program could make it inherently vulnerable to fraud, waste, and 

abuse. Vulnerabilities include the huge size of the program, along 

with conflicts of interest, collusion, and money laundering. 

With regard to money laundering, which you identify as a potential risk, your report notes it would be unacceptable if TARP or related funds, ‘‘were used to leverage the profits of drug cartels or organized crime groups.’’ Unlike banks and retail brokers, the government’s proposed public-private partnerships are not currently 

subject to comparable disclosure rules to prevent money laundering 

and abuse. The question is, why not? 

Furthermore, the report demonstrates how interactions between 

two different bailout programs could encourage excessive leverage 

and greatly magnify taxpayer losses. In other words, without adequate protections, the toxic loan program could be gamed for profit 

by the financial institutions it is trying to save, or used as a legal 

vehicle for those who cannot launder their money through existing 

financial institutions. The question is, why not address in advance 

the vulnerabilities your report has identified? 

With regard to another component of the bailouts administered 

by the Fed, your report said Treasury should require additional 

anti-fraud and credit protection provisions specific to all mortgagebacked securities before participating in an expanded TALF, including minimum underwriting standards and other fraud prevention measures. 

According to the latest estimates, the amount of losses from toxic 

assets in the U.S. alone may be as high as $2.7 trillion. This clearly 

is a huge potential liability for American taxpayers. Unfortunately, 

Treasury’s financial rescue plan seems designed to marginalize 

Congress in this debate and avoid the appropriations process. 

4 

Nonetheless, Congress should not finalize the 2009 budget resolution without considering the tremendous costs of the ongoing bailouts. 

Economic research shows that the national debt following this fi- nancial crisis may increase by as much as $8.5 trillion in as few 

as 3 years. This grim fiscal prospect should be an overriding consideration as we consider budget priorities and proposals for yet 

more spending. Congress should not go on an irresponsible spending spree with trillions of dollars of bailouts already threatening 

the taxpayers. 

Inspector General, you have raised serious and troubling questions in your report. Let’s hope we can receive satisfactory answers 

to them from this administration. 

I would yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Representative Brady appears in the 

Submissions for the Record on page 40.] 

Chair Maloney. I would now like to introduce our distinguished 

witness. 

Neil Barofsky is the Special Inspector General for the Troubled 

Asset Relief Program. He was confirmed by the Senate on December 8, 2008, and was sworn into office on December 15, 2008. 

Prior to assuming the position of Special IG, Mr. Barofsky was 

a Federal prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern 

District of New York for more than 8 years. In that office, Mr. 

Barofsky was a senior trial counsel who headed the mortgage fraud 

group which investigated and prosecuted all aspects of mortgage 

fraud, from retail mortgage fraud cases to investigations involving 

potential securities fraud with respect to collateralized debt obligations. 

One of the matters that Mr. Barofsky supervised was the broad investigation into the $55 trillion credit default swap market which 

was conducted in partnership with the New York State Attorney 

General’s Office. 

Mr. Barofsky is a magna cum laude graduate of the New York 

University School of Law. 

I want to thank you very much for your work, for being with us 

today, and please proceed with your testimony. And I welcome all 

my colleagues and thank them for being here at this important 

hearing. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF NEIL BAROFSKY, SPECIAL INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 

Mr. Barofsky. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for 

that kind introduction. It is a privilege to appear before you today 

and before this committee to discuss our quarterly report to Congress. 

It was approximately a little bit more than 6 months ago, close 

to 7 months, that the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was 

enacted and a little bit over 3 months, 4 months, since I took office. 

During that time period, the original concept of the bailout designed to be a $700 billion program to buy up toxic assets from 

struggling financial institutions has changed significantly. We are 

now charged with overseeing 12 separate programs involving, by 

our calculation, up to $3 trillion of predominantly government 

5 

money. TARP money, the $700 billion, is the seed; and it was combined with guarantees by the FDIC and nonrecourse loans from the 

Federal Reserve. 

This is a daunting and historic challenge for my office; and, as 

we report in our quarterly report, as I have been building my office 

I have addressed three primary areas in carrying out this task: enforcement, transparency, and coordinated oversight. 

I would like to first discuss what we have been doing on the enforcement front. This is of particular importance to us because, of 

the four oversight bodies referenced in the bailout act, we stand 

alone as the one having a criminal law enforcement body. I recently have been described as the TARP cop, and we take that role 

very, very seriously. 

Our hotline is up and running, available on the Internet at our 

Web site: www.SIGTARP.gov. We have a toll-free telephone number: 877–SIG–2009. We process more than 400 referrals from that 

hotline. We have had tremendous response to it. We have had—of 

our 21 ongoing criminal investigations, a third of them come from 

the hotline, tips from whistle-blowers, insiders, and victims of 

fraud. 

Our approach as an investigations division as we build is to be 

extremely proactive. We are seeking to, in many ways, to redefine 

Federal criminal law enforcement in reaction to large government 

programs. 

I think a best example of that is our assembling of the TALF 

task force, which we are about to expand to include not only the 

TALF program but also the Private-Public Investment Program. 

This task force will then be addressing up to $2 trillion of coverage 

of the bailout programs. It includes us, of course, as well as seven 

other law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, the SEC, the 

IRS, FinCEN, the IG for the Federal Reserve, the Postal Inspection 

Service, basically a who’s who of white collar criminal law enforcement. 

The way that we are seeking to redefine the policing of these programs is to put enforcement up front. Way too often in the past 

there has been a launch for a Federal government program, then 

there is the fraud, then there is the law enforcement reaction. 

What we are trying to do is move that reaction up the chain, not 

only just before the actual fraud but even in the formation of these 

programs. And what I mean by that is, as was referred in the introductions, in our quarterly report we make specific recommendations about some of these programs that have not yet been rolled 

out in their entirety. Those recommendations came not just from 

our own study and analysis but consulting with members of our 

task force. We are seeking to combine the collective resources, 

knowledge, and expertise of these fine Federal law enforcement officers to help protect the program before they go out. 

And the second thing that we are doing through that is deterrence. By letting all those out there who may seek to criminally 

profit off of these programs to know that we are out there and we 

are not alone, that this is a combined Federal law enforcement. We 

are going to marshal our resources to bring those who may try to 

steal to justice. 

6 

And I think another great example of that is what happened yesterday. Yesterday, I was down in Tennessee announcing the first 

criminal charges being filed in connection with the SIGTARP investigation. Gordon Grigg was charged with eight counts of mail and 

wire fraud through his conducting of a scam that involved selling 

a fictional investment, TARP-backed securities, something that 

doesn’t exist, cannot exist, was a pure creation of his criminal 

imagination. 

What is significant about this case is not the numbers. It was a 

$10 million securities fraud. But it shows you what coordinated law 

enforcement can do. 

We first learned of this case back in January when the SEC 

called us up and told us what was going on. They asked us for our 

assistance; and we helped shut the scam down, helping them get 

a temporary restraining order. After that, we used our unique position to coordinate a criminal law enforcement response. The FBI, 

the Postal Inspection Service, and the U.S. Attorney for the Middle 

District of Tennessee, coordinated together to get the filing of those 

charges. 

And I think that these charges indicate and should signal to 

those considering to commit fraud that we are out there. It doesn’t 

matter what the size of the fraud is, whether it is large or small; 

it doesn’t matter where the fraud is committed, whether it is on 

Wall Street or on Main Street; and it doesn’t matter who the victim 

of the fraud is. Whether it is the United States, it is government 

itself, individual unsuspecting investors, such as in the Grigg case, 

or even struggling homeowners, the Federal government stands 

ready, willing, and able to enforce the laws and to make sure that 

these folks get brought to justice. 

The second area that we are focusing on is, of course, transparency. On my eighth day in office, December 23rd, we made our 

first of our series of recommendations to Treasury, and these were 

largely based on our concerns about transparency. One of them, 

which has been adopted, was that Treasury post all of its agreements up on the Internet related to the TARP, although not a terribly complicated concept but one that hadn’t been adopted at that 

point. And in the last administration they largely agreed to do so; 

and Secretary Geithner, shortly after he took office, fully adopted 

that recommendation. 

We also made the recommendation, however, which was referenced in the opening comments, which has not been adopted; and 

that is that Treasury require all TARP recipients to account for 

their use of funds. This is a recommendation that we made back 

in late December. It is a recommendation we continue to make. It 

was referenced in our last report, and it is referenced in this report. 

Our efforts to get this recommendation implemented met only 

with success with respect to two TARP recipients, Citigroup and 

Bank of America, but, otherwise, it hasn’t come to pass. Even this 

week, when the final agreement was inked with AIG, provide AIG 

with another $30 billion of taxpayer money, once again what we believe is a basic concept of oversight, making the recipient account 

for the use of funds, was left out. 

7 

What we did because of our commitment to transparency in late 

January, early February, was to take matters into our own hands. 

We launched our own audit by surveying each of the TARP recipients; and what we found after we got 100 percent response rate 

from the 364 institutions that we surveyed was that you can—it is 

possible and you can get good results from requiring or asking 

banks how they are using the money. Particularly for those financial institutions that established internal controls before they got 

the money, made the conscious effort to try to keep track of the 

funds. 

This is a recommendation we made to Treasury that hasn’t been 

adopted, but some financial institutions did it on their own. And 

those that did were able to give us some very specific answers, 

sometimes granular detail, about specific actions they were able to 

take that they wouldn’t be able to take but for TARP funds. Sometimes even individual loans that were made out of TARP money. 

And I think that the results of the survey—and we are going to 

be putting a preliminary report out hopefully in June—will indicate 

that the prior complaints that are impractical or impossible or a 

waste of time are simply unfounded complaints; and we are going 

to continue to push the Treasury to adopt this recommendation. 

Also part of our transparency efforts in our oversight is through 

our audit function. We currently have six audits pending, as was 

mentioned. Not only is it on use of funds but on executive compensation, AIG counterparties, the recent bonus and retention payments made by AIG, a case study into Bank of America and Merrill 

Lynch and how Bank of America was the beneficiary of, in four different transactions, three different TARP programs, $45 billion in 

cash and more than $100 billion of toxic asset guarantees, as well 

as several other issues that we are looking into. 

And, of course, also part of our oversight function is making recommendations; and, as I noted before, we don’t do these in a vacuum. For example, in our report, we consulted with the mortgage 

fraud experts at the FBI. We sat down with them before even any 

of the details of the mortgage modification program were rolled out 

because we thought it was so important. 

In drawing on my own experience as a mortgage fraud prosecutor, we were concerned that some of those same concerns that 

I saw in prosecuting those cases would be funneled in and try to 

victimize this program. So not only the recommendations reflect my 

own experiences but also those of mortgage fraud experts at the 

FBI. 

Similarly, our recommendations concerning the Private-Public 

Investment Program. And, as noted, we have some grave concerns 

about the structure of these programs if certain very serious steps 

are not taken to address the high potential for fraud, whether it 

is conflicts of interest, price collusion, price fixing, money laundering, and other dangers that are potentially present in these programs. 

I was happy to see, though, that last night Treasury did announce adoption of one of our recommendations involving asset 

management. We have long been pushing for Treasury to take 

steps to value this vast portfolio of assets that they manage on behalf of the taxpayers, who, of course, are the investors in this proVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:59 Dec 18, 2009 Jkt 052674 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\52273.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
8 

gram; and yesterday they did adopt that recommendation by hiring 

three asset managers. We were encouraged to see that. 

And, obviously, it is so important now that Treasury is going to 

be actually liquidating some of the assets, including the warrants 

that were required in the capital purchase program. 

As I noted before, it is an honor and privilege to appear before 

you today to deliver my quarterly report to this committee; and I 

look forward to answering any questions that you may have. Thank 

you. 

Chair Maloney. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

[The statement of Neil Barofsky appears in the Submissions for 

the Record on page 42.] 

Chair Maloney. In your report, you express concern that the 

new PPIP is, and I quote, ‘‘inherently vulnerable to fraud, waste, 

and abuse due to conflicts of interest among fund managers, the 

opportunities for collusion in the procedures, and money laundering 

opportunities.’’ The report proposes a series of conflict of interest 

rules and disclosures and investor screening comparable to ‘‘Know 

Your Customer’’ requirements to guard against these risks. 

Can you explain the dangers you envision in more detail? 

Mr. Barofsky. If I may, if I can give you an example, I think 

it might be the best way to provide some detail to this. For conflicts 

of interest, for example, basically—I am going to use the legacy securities program as an example. This is where—the program where 

$1 of private investment is going to be raised by a fund manager, 

and it is going to be matched with a dollar from Treasury of equity 

and then $2 of lending. So the $1 is going to turn into $4 of buying 

power. And of course it is not going to be $1. It is going to be $1 

billion or $2 billion. But it is going to be 75 percent taxpayer 

money at risk. 

And the way the conflict of interest could work is that the funds 

that are going to qualify for this by their very definition, by the nature of the prerequisites, will likely either have for themselves or 

be managing vast portfolio of the same very toxic assets they are 

going to go out and be out and purchasing. And the design of the 

program is that the fund managers in essence set the new price for 

these securities. 

The theory behind the PPIP is that these markets are broken 

and that the prices that currently exist in the market are depressed, are much lower than they would be if the market was 

functioning and normal. And the idea behind the PPIP is that putting government money to help restart the market and help price 

it at what would be more accurate. So a lot of discretion and, 

frankly, economic power is going to be given to this small number 

of fund managers. 

Now, the conflict of interest comes into play. What if that fund 

manager has on its books or managing for other clients from which 

it derives fees the exact same mortgage-backed security that it is 

going to go out and buy at a higher price? 

An example we use in the report, if—let’s say there is one that 

is currently at 20 because the market is depressed, and the fund 

manager thinks, well, it is probably worth about 30. Normally, 

without a conflict of interest, it would go out and buy that security 

from others up to the price of 30. But if the fund manager realizes 

9 

that it could set the price and set that price at what it feels or 

wants to do, it could set that price at 50 and start buying at 50. 

Obviously, the sellers would be more than willing to take 50 for an 

asset that is only worth 30. 

Now, at the same time, the asset manager then can sell off what 

he or she has on their books and records that they value at 20, 

think it could be worth up to 30. They can unload it at 50, making 

a huge profit. 

So what happens at the end of this scenario? The fund manager 

makes a huge profit, the seller of the toxic asset makes a huge 

profit, but eventually that price drops down to what its market 

level would be, to 30. And who is left holding the bag? The taxpayer. 

So that is a really simplified example of how conflict of interest 

could come into play and hurt the taxpayer without the right types 

of protections. 

Chair Maloney. Could you elaborate more on steps that we 

could take to prevent these type of risks to taxpayer dollars? 

Mr. Barofsky. I think the two areas that are going to be essential is, one, we have to have very, very strict conflict-of-interest 

rules. Now, there is a wide array of possible solutions. One is that 

the entity not be able to enter into transactions for securities that 

it has on its own books and records. Now, this may be inherently 

very, very difficult, if not impossible, the way the program is currently structured, but that would be a way of limiting this conflict 

of interest. 

Alternatively, there has to be very, very strict walls, we believe, 

so that whoever is making these decisions for the fund manager 

isn’t providing information to other parts of the company and isn’t 

receiving information from other parts of the company. So in a way 

to put that manager in a black box so that their decisions are independent of what impact those decisions may have for the benefit 

of the rest of the company. 

Another key area is, obviously, transparency; and our recommendations continue to push for more and more transparency 

throughout the TARP. But in this area we think it is crucial. 

Again, not just for the point of transparency, for the sake that, obviously, this Congress and the American people need to know what 

is going on with their investments, but as a fraud protection. We 

need to know every detail of every transaction that is going on in 

these funds the taxpayers are a part of, and that should be publicly 

reported so all the investors can see. And by investors I mean taxpayers can see what is going on. 

But we also need to access and be able to see what else is going 

on in the company. So my office and Treasury, as part of its compliance function, has to be provided all information about transactions 

managed or for that fund manager’s books in the securities and 

similar securities so that we can track and see if that fund manager is making decisions not for the benefit of the taxpayer but the 

benefit of itself or other clients that it has. 

Those are some of the types of recommendations we include in 

our report. 

Chair Maloney. Thank you. 

My time is expired. Mr. Brady for 5 minutes. 

10 

Representative Brady. Thank you. 

I applaud your approach on being proactive on the fraud area 

and prevention and also on focus on transparency within the program. Both are clearly needed. 

On page 147 of the report, you talk about the areas of vulnerability under the new Public-Private Investment Program; and you 

talk about, as the chairman said, conflicts of interest, collusion, and 

the potential for money laundering, which our U.S. leaders have 

rightly focused in the G–20 and in the OECD on trying to stop 

these activities around the world. So my question is: Has the 

Treasury adopted all of your recommendations to protect taxpayer 

interest related to the new Public-Private Investment Program? 

Mr. Barofsky. They have not yet. We had a meeting with them 

earlier this week where we discussed in detail a lot of our recommendations. They have indicated that a lot of them are under 

consideration, but they have not yet adopted them. 

Representative Brady. Have they given you a time line for 

adopting them or indicated that they will adopt some, many, most, 

all? 

Mr. Barofsky. They have not. The people that we were speaking 

to were sort of the engineers and mechanics of the program, and 

they were extremely receptive of our recommendations. They 

thought that they made sense. They raised significant concerns. 

But, ultimately, those are decisions that are made by the policymakers. And they have not communicated to us, one, where they 

are leaning as far as our recommendations or, two, providing us 

with a time line. 

Representative Brady. So Secretary Geithner has not announced publicly or privately whether he is going to adopt these 

recommendations. 

Mr. Barofsky. No, he has not. 

Representative Brady. You make the same, commonsense recommendations in dealing with the TARP, simply asking that the 

recipients account for the use of the money and set up internal controls so we can continue to track it. I think that is a desire of every 

Member of Congress and the public as well. Has Treasury adopted 

these recommendations? And, if not, why? 

Representative Barofsky. They have not, other than in the 

last administration when the—in the targeted investment program 

investments of Citi and B of A. That is the only time it was adopted. 

As to the why not, it is really for Treasury to answer. What I 

have been told on various times by Mr. Kashkari is that they believe that, because of the inherent fungibility of money, that it is 

not a positive use of resources, that it would be a waste of time 

possibly, that it is very difficult to track and other explanations. 

I believe the results of our survey disprove those suggestions. 

But as I spoke to Mr. Kashkari I think last week or the week before, he told me that he has raised our concerns to the Secretary 

as well as to Chairman Bernanke and that they continue to agree 

that this requirement not be imposed. 

Representative Brady. I just think stonewalling on this issue 

of transparency really undermines public support and confidence in 

11 

the program. One of the goals of it is to restore public investor confidence in the system. 

Can I ask a final question? But in your report you raise issues 

about using the dollars that have been set aside for the Term 

Asset–Backed Securities Loan Facility, TALF, basically focused at 

consumer loans and using that to finance the Public-Private Investment Program. You suggest it really undermines TALF’s stated 

purpose of trying to deal with creditworthy consumers and small 

business. Can you elaborate on that? 

Mr. Barofsky. There are a number of concerns that we had in 

the expansion of the TALF. The program was designed for a certain purpose, as you noted; and that purpose was inherent in the 

fraud and credit loss protections of the program. 

Applying that to legacy assets, these toxic mortgage-backed securities, those protections don’t really work. That is why we previously made the recommendation to tread very carefully, and what 

we are encouraging Congress to do is really rethink those protections. 

We have had discussions with the Federal Reserve as well as 

with Treasury; and they have indicated that they are going to be 

adopting our recommendations, at least to the extent that they are 

not going to at least be dropping the legacy mortgage-backed securities right into the program. They are going to do—in response to 

our recommendations, they have indicated that they are going to 

do security-by-security analysis and also indicated that they may 

adopt our recommendation that certain types of mortgage-backed 

securities are just off the table. And those would be things—these 

securities that we know have been just riddled with fraud, the liar 

loans, the stated loans with no underwriting whatsoever, those 

types of things. 

So we are going to continue to push for those recommendations 

to be adopted. 

Representative Brady. Well, I just hope that Treasury understands that if they don’t adopt your recommendations this Congress may well direct them to do. 

So, Madam Chairman, thank you. 

Chair Maloney. Thank you so much. 

The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Congresswoman Sanchez for 5 minutes. 

Representative Sanchez. Thank you, Madam Chair; and thank 

you, Mr. Barofsky, for being before us. 

I used to work in the securities industry. I used to be one of 

those people that put together financial deals. So my question goes 

to something that you were talking about earlier, that conflict of 

interest that is occuring. 

Now, at least when I used to work in the investment banking industry, when we would sell securities, whatever type they were, we 

would make a syndicated group, spreading the risk over everybody 

on the street, including people who had desks like Bank of America 

and your typical commercial banks. So my question is, doesn’t everybody have some part of these assets, and it would be very—for 

anybody to think that they don’t have any of these funds within 

their portfolio? 

12 

Mr. Barofsky. That is one of the problems with the conflict of 

interest; and that is one of the problems ultimately in the design 

of the program unless very, very strict conflict of interest rules are 

put into place and the right types of walls. Because, unlike most 

times when a deal is being syndicated here, by design the fund 

manager who is going to be using the government assets is going 

to be setting a brand new price. 

Representative Sanchez. He is setting a price on what he has 

got already in his portfolio. I mean, it would be highly unlikely, in 

particular with these large mortgage-backed loans which include so 

many different pieces of mortgages, that he wouldn’t have something in his portfolio with respect to that. 

Mr. Barofsky. That is a huge danger in the program. It is unlike anything we have seen. 

I mean, if this program didn’t exist with the government sanction 

and one party was—a private party in normal circumstances was 

setting the price for an asset that was on its books and records, one 

might suggest that that would be manipulation. Here, this is what 

the whole point of the program is to get these prices up. So it is 

why we really strongly believe these protections must be in place. 

Representative Sanchez. I basically see the taxpayers paying 

going in and the taxpayers paying coming out, too. I mean, it is a 

very difficult thing to adjust to. 

I have a question about what Secretary Geithner said yesterday 

in his testimony. He talked about there being an availability of 

about $135 billion left in the TARP funds. It showed your figure 

of $109.5 billion, but he also said that $25 billion of that would be 

from the monies that the banks are paying back by the end of the 

year. 

Now, when we did this TARP program—by the way, I didn’t vote 

for it, because I saw a lot of these problems inherent in it—we said 

that we wanted the taxpayers to be paid back. So now we have Secretary Geithner saying, well, when these monies are paid back it 

is like a revolving fund, and we are going to be putting them back 

out again. Is that your interpretation of the program or do you 

think it was a one-time appropriation? 

Mr. Barofsky. I think the legal analysis that I have seen—and 

I have seen it from Treasury as well as—from what has been described to me by Treasury as well as by GAO—is that for the principal amounts, if those come back, the Treasury has the ability to 

keep $700 billion out up and through the end of this year. That is 

when, under the legislation, when that authority sunsets unless it 

is expanded. For any of the interest payments, the profits, any of 

those types of things, that doesn’t go back into the kitty. That actually goes directly to pay down the debt. 

But that is my understanding of the legal construct, that money 

that is paid back of principal can be reused by Treasury as part 

of the TARP, at least until the end of the year. 

Representative Sanchez. Now, I have been reading in the 

paper about how some of these banks want to pay back the money; 

and the insinuation has been that they want to be able to pay their 

directors and their executives at compensation levels above the 

amounts that congress passed recently. Why do you think that 

some of these banks are so anxious to pay back those monies? 

13 

Mr. Barofsky. I have been reading the same articles as you 

have; and I think that is certainly one of the concerns, I think, for 

a lot of financial institutions, increased oversight. I think from 

what I read there is a fear that terms and conditions may change 

on them. 

I don’t want to presume to get inside the mind of the chief executives of these financial institutions, but I certainly think that executive compensation restrictions must weigh on their decision making. 

Representative Sanchez. And, lastly, I have some people who 

have said that the next problem with respect to mortgages will 

come in the commercial mortgage industry and that one of the reasons the banks are holding onto these monies is that they want to 

be able to have the reserves in place for some of the losses that 

they expect in the commercial field. Do you have any comment on 

that? 

Mr. Barofsky. Well, I think we have seen—and, again, our ultimate—or I should say our initial report on the use of funds survey 

that we had is going to come out now within the next 2 months. 

But I obviously have looked through about probably about 100 of 

the responses; and one of the things that we do see is that financial 

institutions are preserving the TARP money as a cushion for future 

losses. Whether it is commercial mortgage-backed security or the 

residential mortgage-backed security or just further deepening of 

the recession, that is something that we have seen. 

Representative Sanchez. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chair Maloney. The gentlelady’s time has expired. Congressman Burgess for 5 minutes. 

Representative Burgess. Thank you, Madam Chair; and thank 

you for being here today. 

Madam Chair, I might ask unanimous consent that my opening 

statement be inserted into the record. 

[The prepared statement of Representative Burgess appears in 

the Submissions for the Record on page 55.] 

Representative Burgess. Now, the report that we have, almost 

20 criminal investigations under way in connection with the TARP 

facility for the financial sector; and the report said these investigations involve possible public corruption, corporate stock and tax 

fraud, insider trading and mortgage fraud. To the extent that you 

can do so in front of the committee today, can you provide us more 

background information in some specific detail surrounding those 

criminal investigations and what we might expect to see going forward? 

Mr. Barofsky. Well, as I noted before, one of them was Gordon 

Grigg, who was formally charged in an information in the Middle 

District of Tennessee yesterday on eight counts of mail fraud and 

wire fraud involving defrauding individual investors by lying and 

saying that he had connections with the TARP program, was selling TARP-backed securities. That is an example of one of the 

smaller investigations we have ongoing. 

We have previously discussed that we have an ongoing inquiry 

into Bank of America and Merrill Lynch and the circumstances 

that surrounded its end-of-the-year bonus payments. 

14 

Although I can’t comment on any detail of our other pending investigations, they do include the categories of cases that you have. 

And just by way of an example of a type of potential investigation, in the securities fraud let’s say a financial institution applied 

for TARP funds but was cooking its books. In other words, its financial statements were off. They were manipulated or its ratios 

were distorted, and they did so to get TARP money or to get more 

TARP money. That would be a very good example of the type of investigation that we are going to be conducting. 

Representative Burgess. Let me—and as a consequence of 

your quarterly report to this committee, we will be informed of 

those investigations as they come to conclusions and the results of 

those? 

Mr. Barofsky. Absolutely. 

Representative Burgess. Let me ask you—and I hate it when 

people do this to me—but you gave an example, so can I walk 

through a hypothetical example with you of the public-private investment partnership that we are hearing so much about? And I 

think you stated in your testimony that part of the oversight function is making recommendations. So I will offer this as something 

you might consider for a recommendation. 

You also made the point that collusion and money laundering, 

and it was important to know your customer. So perhaps we ought 

to choose our customers more wisely. And much of this debt we are 

passing off to our children and grandchildren, so actually not original with me. 

American solutions, the American Enterprise Institute have suggested that perhaps we make a TARP fund for students, if you will. 

So that the FDIC providing the debt-to-equity funding at a ratio 6 

to 1, Treasury providing 50 percent of the equity financing, and the 

investor is left with 7 percent of the initial cost. 

An example has been given if two students near graduation have $70,000 in loans to pay off that they sell their loans to each other. 

And each could then put down a down payment of $10,000, which 

will be borne half by the student and half by the TARP funding, 

and the remaining $60,000 will be guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The result would be that they would 

have their student loans reduced significantly to a liability of 

$5,000; and in the end they could walk away from the $70,000 debt 

with that $5,000, leaving the government, or the taxpayer, on the 

hook for covering it. 

I will admit that is a novel approach. What would you think of 

such a scenario? 

Mr. Barofsky. I think I may have a conflict of interest since I 

am still carrying law school debt, and I would like to participate 

in that program, so it might be unfair for me to comment on that. 

Representative Burgess. And this is tongue in cheek, but this 

is what our constituents are telling us. This is what they are feeling. This program, it almost defies gravity the way it is being approached. You have people back home asking where is my bailout 

or where is my Treasury-backed security or where is my funding 

or where is my bailout on my student loan? It just underscores the 

enormity of the task that is in front of us and certainly in front 

of you. 

15 

I think we are very fortunate to have someone of your caliber 

who is on top of this and certainly am grateful for the time that 

you have given us this morning. I wish you every success in bringing these cases forward and bringing them to light and then successful prosecutions where those are necessary. 

I thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chair Maloney. I thank the gentleman. 

And in order of appearance to the committee the Chair now 

yields 5 minutes to Representative Snyder. 

Representative Snyder. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Good morning. I wanted to ask, in terms of your approach, 

should there be a different approach in terms of some of the requirements you have talked about—I don’t remember the details of 

some of your suggestions—between those institutions that clearly 

at the beginning of this 6, 8, 10 months ago were institutions in 

trouble versus those banks—90 percent or so of banks or other financial institutions that are not in trouble, that are still making 

a living, versus those that are clearly somewhat of a criminal enterprise, should your approach, should the approach of the Treasury Department be different as we approach those three different 

entities? 

Mr. Barofsky. Well, I think it depends on the program. I think 

within any particular program all institutions should be treated 

fairly and equally. Obviously, anything that approaches a criminal 

enterprise should be treated very differently. We will seek to have 

those individuals responsible for that put in jail, which will be a 

much different approach. But I think that—— 

Representative Snyder. How about with regard to your requirement of how—the specific transparency with regard to the use 

of TARP funds? Should it be the same whether an institution has 

been in trouble, or it is one that we are actually encouraging to 

take money in order to improve the credit market? 

Mr. Barofsky. Our recommendation is across the board on that. 

We think that any TARP recipient should be required to report on 

its use of funds. 

Representative Snyder. I interrupted you. So, basically, it will 

take out the criminal enterprise there. In fact, those institutions 

that were not in trouble at the beginning of this program and still 

aren’t, ones that we have been somewhat encouraged to take funds 

and participate because we want these funds to get out to the 

American public as part of the credit market, you are saying in another program they should be treated differently than those institutions that were in trouble. 

Mr. Barofsky. I think that, with respect to use of funds, certainly any institution, regardless of its health, if they are taking 

10, 15, 20, $25 billion of taxpayer funds and getting the benefit of 

those funds, they should be required to let us know how they are 

using it. 

I think as far as other conditions or more stringent conditions 

that are put on the terms of the funds, I think the Treasury has 

adopted different approaches for those financial institutions. The 

terms and conditions for Citi and Bank of America are more stringent than that on Goldman Sachs; and I think that that is reflecVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:59 Dec 18, 2009 Jkt 052674 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\52273.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
16 

tive of the different types of investment, the higher risks of those 

investments. 

Representative Snyder. You mentioned specific dollar 

amounts. Is your recommendation that beyond a certain level—you 

said $10 billion, $20 billion. I thought your recommendation was 

any level of TARP funds should be declared, the use of the funds 

should be declared. Am I wrong on that? 

Mr. Barofsky. No, no. Absolutely, that is the case. 

I was just using that as an example, that whether they are 

healthy or not healthy, because of the volume of money, and some 

of the banks that received the most have been most public about 

their intention to pay back the funds. That is why I was using 

those numbers. But I think in those cases it is all the more important. We believe that every financial institution—it should just be 

a basic condition of taking government assistance. 

Representative Snyder. We use the phrase ‘‘bailout funds’’ a 

lot, and then you just used the phrase ‘‘government assistance’’. I 

am trying to put myself in the position of the community bankers 

out there—we all have some of these in our district—that they are 

actually doing well. At least they are in Arkansas. They are trying 

to weather this thing reasonably well. They are not in trouble. 

I think their view is that they thought they were—initially, early 

on—kind of helping things out. It was a chance for them to make 

some money. It was a chance for them to make some more loans, 

at the same time expand the credit market. And yet we kind of 

come back to them. I think they feel like they are being treated as 

something different than what they initially thought. 

So—I don’t know—is it fair to call it assistance? They probably 

would look on it as a chance to try to help to get the American 

economy moving again. 

I want to ask, you were dismissing, though, the fungibility argument. If I was somebody who was going to declare how I was going 

to use these funds and money is fungible, I would take that money 

in. And you have given some examples. I think you think most 

folks can say exactly how they use that money, but if I am a banker that has got 10 projects and I think if I bring in this sum of 

money that will enable me to do 8 or 9 of those projects versus 6 

or 7, wouldn’t I just cherry-pick and pick the nicest looking one to 

declare that is how I am using my TARP funds? How do you get 

around that? 

Mr. Barofsky. Well, to be clear, there is no question that money 

is fungible. We are not suggesting otherwise. I think when—we 

heard this in similar arguments when we were first announcing 

our survey. When we did our survey, we asked the banks not just 

the blanket question of how did you use the money. We asked them 

to make specific reference to issues like how do you plan to use the 

money. Our belief is that most financial institutions, responsible financial institutions, have budgets and plans; and when they are 

acquiring a large and significant amount of capital they make a 

plan. 

So in your example you may say, okay, we have these nine 

projects on the shelf. We are going to do these six. And then there 

is going to be some internal planning—e-mails internal memoranda, formal budgets—that it is going to say, well, if we get this 

17 

money, we are going to also be able to do these other three that 

have been sitting on the shelf. 

If they then, in fact, do those other three, notwithstanding the 

unarguable fungibility of money, you can track that use of funds 

because those are three projects that wouldn’t have gotten done 

other than the infusion of government capital. 

And I do agree with your comment before. Assistance is another 

word. It is one of the words that is used in the statute, which is 

probably why I use it, but for a lot of these it is just an investment 

from the government. So I don’t in any way argue with your other 

characterization. 

Representative Snyder. One final comment, please. Of eight or 

nine projects there and you are going to have them declare the one 

that you say this is the TARP funds. Now that we are an investor 

in that bank, the taxpayer investment, we want all six, eight, nine, 

ten of those projects to work well, do we not? 

Mr. Barofsky. We certainly are hopeful that the banks perform 

well so they can repay the money. 

Representative Snyder. Thank you. 

Chair Maloney. Thank you. 

Senator Casey for 5 minutes. 

Senator Casey. Thank you very much, Madam Chair; and I 

want to thank you for inviting the Senators to come over to this 

side of the Capitol. We are grateful to be here. We don’t get over 

here enough. 

Sir, thank you for your service to the country and for your prior 

service as a prosecutor. I think it is important to reiterate the real 

cornerstone or foundation of your work in this capacity. 

I was an elected state auditor, and in that capacity the foundation of the work that I was charged with doing—and I think it is 

very similar to what you are doing and what you have worked hard 

at doing—is that you have to be independent. No matter who the 

President is, no matter who is in Congress, no matter who is in the 

administration, you have to maintain that independence; and I appreciate and commend the work that you have done already. You 

need to have that kind of independence and objectivity as you pursue these difficult issues. 

Our job here is not just to talk about or react to your reports. 

Our job is to make sure that you have all the resources that you 

need. Whether it is money or personnel, whatever it takes, we have 

to make sure that you have those resources. 

So the first question I have is in terms of personnel. I know in 

the midst of a tough economy, people don’t like to talk about hiring 

more people but I am a great believer that the human resources 

you have is commensurate with the result you get, especially as a 

prosecutor or an investor or an auditor. So the first question I have 

is, do you have the resources you need in terms of personnel, in 

terms of technology and other resources to do the job you have to 

do? 

Mr. Barofsky. We currently have 37 people on staff. We are 

building to 150 is what our target is for us to be efficient, not too 

big, not too small, to be able to do this task that is assigned to us. 

This Congress unanimously passed, both Houses, a bill that is 

going to give us some enhanced hiring flexibility. I look forward to 

18 

that hopefully being signed this week, and that is going to help us 

as we build towards that goal. 

We have a pending request to OPM, the Office of Personnel Management at the White House, to give us some other flexibilities, 

some direct hire flexibilities; and I am confident if we get those 

flexibilities we are going to be able to build and get the right people 

to make sure that we can carry out this task. 

As far as resources is concerned, the original bill provided us 

with $50 million. We think that is certainly going to get us through 

this year and through a good chunk of next year. We are, obviously, since we are going to be around for more than 2 years—I 

think that is inevitable—we are going to need additional resources. 

I know that there is a pending amendment in the Senate on a bill 

that I think Senator Boxer is going to introduce this morning 

which would give us some additional funding which I think would 

certainly take us through fiscal year 2010; and when we run short 

we will be back and let you know for sure. 

Senator Casey. Great. One last question. When I look at what 

was set forth in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act—an act 

that I voted for, because I thought it was the right thing to do, but 

we have to make sure that act works—the underlying purpose, as 

set forth there, talks about protecting home values and college 

funds and retirement accounts and life savings. That is number 

one. Number two is preserving homeownership and promoting jobs. 

Number three, promoting overall returns to the taxpayers. Finally, 

provides public accountability. 

We all understand from our States and districts across the country, when people call in, they are frustrated on two levels. First, 

they see layer upon layer of legislation and public initiative, and 

they don’t see the results. They don’t think that credit is flowing, 

and they don’t see any significant positive effect on their lives. 

That is one area of frustration. 

The other area is lack of accountability. I know that you talked 

at length before and I don’t want to reiterate it, but I want to get 

your sense of why this is happening. When you said to Treasury 

that you thought there should be some—with regard to the 364 institutions—that there should be some accountability as to how they 

are spending the dollars, which you continue to reassert or reiterate that recommendation to Treasury, that they should require 

all TARP recipients to report on the use of the funds. Please tell 

us again and articulate for us, what argument does Treasury use 

pursuant to your recommendation or in response to your recommendation as to why they should not do that? 

Mr. Barofsky. Although I am reluctant to speak for Treasury, 

what I have heard is arguments because of the fungibility of 

money, that it is impractical or impossible to require banks to report on the use of funds. It could be a waste of time or resources, 

and just a fundamental disagreement with why it would be important for us to do so. 

Senator Casey. That makes no sense to me and I know it 

makes no sense to you. So I am glad you pursued this information 

on your own and got the information on your own initiative. 

I am over my time. Thank you very much. 

19 

Chair Maloney. Thank you. Congressman Hinchey has yielded 

his time to Senator Klobuchar due to her time constraints. The 

Chair recognizes the good Senator for 5 minutes. 

Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much. Thank you, Congressman Hinchey. Who says that the House and Senate can’t work 

together? 

It is good to see you again, Mr. Barofsky. We had a hearing in 

front of the Judiciary and I thought that I learned everything that 

I needed to know about you. Now I know you still have student 

loans. I will tell you, when I met my husband, he had $50,000 in 

student loans but I married him anyway. Hopefully you are doing 

fine. 

I have to get back to the Senate on the Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act which I know you support. It is very important to add 

some funds to help you out. You talked to Senator Casey about 

your goal of reaching that 150 employees. When do you think you 

will reach that goal? 

Mr. Barofsky. A lot of that depends on once we have all of our 

hiring authority and we get this direct hire authority from OPM. 

We are building to that. I would love to have it by the end of this 

year. That is our goal. 

Senator Klobuchar. Because you and I discussed the kind of 

perfect storm that the Justice Department is facing, and you are 

facing. With more money going out there, it means more potential 

for fraud and corruption. We also have the issue of more white collar crime that is either starting up, or actually has been going on, 

as in the case of Bernie Madoff for years, that it is being discovered 

because of the tough economic times. 

Along the line of Bernie Madoff, which I know we talked about 

in the Judiciary Committee, how that tip had come in and was disregarded from a whistle-blower. And I know that you and the Justice Department are very focused on doing a better job of handling 

these whistle-blower tips. I will give you a little pitch here, 877– 

SIG–2009; is that correct? 

Mr. Barofsky. Thank you. That is correct. 

Senator Klobuchar. I have read since the Judiciary Committee 

hearing, you have had hundreds of tips come in. The argument before was it is just too hard. There are too many tips; we can’t figure 

them out. What triage process are you going through, and how is 

that working? 

Mr. Barofsky. From day one—and I have to credit my chief of 

investigations—from the day I hired him, he was pushing the importance of a hotline. He always thought it was going to be one of 

the most important functions of his investigative division. 

One of the things we did is we hired a very capable attorney 

from another IG’s office, attorney investigator, and someone fairly 

senior. We put her in charge of the hotline. So we put one of our 

best people that we have, and we gave this important responsibility 

to her. And we are supplying her with the right support. 

We are not a large office yet. We are not even close to our capacity, but we made sure that we have the necessary resources and 

support so that she can follow up and the people working under 

her can follow up on every single inquiry. We take everyone seriously. 

20 

As I noted before, a third of our current criminal investigations 

are resulting from that hotline. 

Senator Klobuchar. Unbelievable. 

Mr. Barofsky. It is a wonderful source. 

I also think for victims as well as whistle-blowers, as sort of another benefit, it gives people an opportunity to vent sometimes. 

Senator Klobuchar. I wouldn’t advertise it that way. We know 

what it is like when people call to vent. It is a way for people to 

talk to you and get their ideas known. 

Mr. Barofsky. Sometimes we get good ideas. For example, the 

hotline number was my office number. I would just pick it up. 

Senator Klobuchar. I like that hands-on approach. 

Mr. Barofsky. But one of the calls that I received was from a 

gentleman who was very upset who lived up in Massachusetts. It 

was the time Citi had announced that they were going to be paying 

$50 million for a new plane. One of the things he said was, I am 

so tired, how come these banks are saying that they can’t account 

for how they are using the money, but they can say with 100 percent certainty that $50 million did not come from TARP funds? 

It is a good argument. It helped inspire us to move towards our 

use of funds survey. 

Senator Klobuchar. To end with that, the use of the funds, and 

you talked about how it is on the Web site now and people can 

trace it. And for people who don’t have the time to go on, what is 

your Web site? 

Mr. Barofsky. www.SIGTARP.gov. 

Senator Klobuchar. That is for the tips. 

And then www.financialstability.gov. 

Mr. Barofsky. That is not ours. That is Treasury’s Web site. 

Senator Klobuchar. So for people who don’t have the time to 

wade through all of that, what is your summary of where this 

money is being spent, so the American people know it is not all of 

these bonuses and the scandals. Where is the money being spent? 

Mr. Barofsky. It is a little early for us to be able to report on 

our survey results. We expect to have something out there in hopefully early to middle June, which will give that information. 

The Treasury Web site, as you noted, does track what the banks 

are reporting on their lending activities, as their lending goes up 

and down, sort of the impact of the TARP funds. 

And, of course, if anyone wants to learn more about our problems, going to our Web site and pulling down the reports page 

brings up a copy of our reports. One of the things we try to do with 

these reports, the taxpayers, who are the investors in all these programs, we try to write them in Main Street terms so they can understand and see what is going on with their money. 

Senator Klobuchar. Will it show a specific project that the 

money is being lended to and things like that? 

Mr. Barofsky. Not on our Web site, no. 

Senator Klobuchar. Where will they be able to find that out? 

Is that on the Treasury Web site? Or does it just show that it is 

going to lending? 

Mr. Barofsky. The only monitoring that Treasury is doing is requiring them to report on what their lending levels are at certain 

categories and whether they go up or down from month to month. 

21 

But it doesn’t have anything to do with tracking the use of TARP 

funds. 

Senator Klobuchar. But it shows lending versus, say, bonuses? 

Mr. Barofsky. It just says lending. 

Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. 

Chair Maloney. Congressman Hinchey is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Representative Hinchey. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for 

doing this hearing. 

Mr. Barofsky, I want to express to you my deep appreciation. I 

think it was a very wise move to bring you into this area of responsibility. I think you are doing a very good job, and I think all of 

us who focus on this really appreciate what you are doing. 

At the same time that we appreciate what you are doing, we recognize the complexity of the job that you have and how complex 

and how difficult it can be, particularly when you are not getting 

the cooperation of people that you really have to work with in order 

to come up with the recommendations and the facts that you have 

the responsibility to deliver. 

Your use of the word ‘‘fraud’’ in the context of your presentation 

this morning I think was very, very appropriate. Fraud is just so 

relevant in this particular set of circumstances from the very beginning. The situation we are dealing with is fraudulent investments 

that were put together by a number of operations, like AIG, for example, and a whole host of others. There were fraudulent investments that drew money out of the people who invested so they 

could make money for themselves. They knew what they were 

doing, and they did it purposely and intentionally. There is no 

question about it. 

So what you are doing now to look into this situation with regard 

to the TARP funding—which was a bailout bill for some of the institutions that were engaged in that fraudulent practice from the 

beginning, and which was presented to us by former Secretary of 

the Treasury Paulson in a way that was guaranteed not to give any 

real analysis of the situation, any real facts—and, unfortunately, it 

was ultimately passed by this Congress without those kinds of contexts as well. 

Subsequently, the House of Representatives passed legislation 

which would require the Treasury Department to get these kinds 

of facts and put the information out there. But, unfortunately, that 

bill was not passed by the Senate. I think that is just another example of the very effective political influence that is going on by 

a lot of these banking institutions and others, and also the political 

influence that is going on by people involved in the political process 

here in our government. 

So what you are doing is very, very critical and important. The 

problem is how are we going to deal with it more effectively? What 

are we supposed to be doing? What can we do to help you? What 

can we do to strengthen your ability to get the facts that you want 

to get and which we need so badly? 

Mr. Barofsky. I think right now, particularly with the recent 

Special Inspector General Act of 2009, it really gives us a lot of arrows in our quiver. I think we have the necessary tools to do our 

job. Ultimately, of course, our recommendations are just that; they 

22 

are recommendations, and Treasury is not compelled to adopt 

them. 

Representative Hinchey. But that is the problem, isn’t it? You 

are making recommendations. The recommendations that you are 

making are solid, secure, and very, very positive. They should be 

followed through. But the problem that we are seeing is that these 

recommendations are not being adhered to. 

Mr. Barofsky. In some circumstances, that is true. Some are 

being followed, which is the good news. But ultimately, recommendations are just that—recommendations. 

I mean, I think in the new act there is a requirement that the 

Secretary certify to Congress where he fails to adopt a recommendation that addresses a deficiency. To that extent once that 

act becomes law, there will be some very direct accountability for 

those circumstances. 

Representative Hinchey. That is right, if that does become 

law. That is what has to happen. But in the meantime, we are 

struggling to get this situation to be dealt with in a more effective 

way, and there is obvious opposition to that. 

Can you tell us at this point, what are the positive aspects that 

you have seen? What are the things that you have seen that give 

you some hope that this is going to develop in a more positive way? 

Mr. Barofsky. First of all, I would say that one of the things 

that we are seeing from our initial returns of the use of funds survey is that this injection of capital for a lot of banks, particularly 

the smaller community banks, at least as they are reporting to us, 

did go out to increase lending. They were able to leverage the 

money and use it to increase lending, especially the smaller community bank levels. 

I think a lot of these programs, although we have some very 

large concern about the potential for fraud in them, a lot of these 

potentials can be addressed. And if Treasury does adopt these recommendations, these could very well be very good and viable and 

positive programs. 

On some of these issues, Treasury has been very receptive to our 

recommendations. They have not been implemented yet, but early 

indications are strong. I think there is hope. I certainly don’t want 

to sound an alarm that all is lost. I think there is opportunity here 

to protect the taxpayer with these programs. 

Representative Hinchey. We are going to have to be directly 

involved with you to make sure that the positive circumstances 

that you are talking about actually come into play, actually become 

facts. I thank you very much. 

Mr. Barofsky. Thank you. 

Chair Maloney. Congressman Cummings for 5 minutes. 

Representative Cummings. Thank you, Madam Chairlady. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Barofsky, for your very quick response 

to my letter, along with 20 or so other Members of Congress, about 

the counterparties. I really appreciate you jumping on that so 

quickly. 

I just want to ask you what, if any, requirements has Treasury 

imposed upon the TARP recipients with regard to their need to increase lending to perform other acts in the public interest? 

23 

Mr. Barofsky. None. The requirements in the capital purchase 

program—I assume that you are talking about the capital purchase 

program. 

Representative Cummings. That is right. 

Mr. Barofsky. There is no such requirement. The only requirements or restrictions on the use of funds have to do with what will 

be the statutorily enforced restrictions on executive compensation, 

as well as some redistributions on dividends and buying back of 

shares. 

Representative Cummings. Does that make your job more difficult? 

Mr. Barofsky. What makes my job more difficult is the failure 

to adopt the recommendations to have the financial institutions report on their use of funds. As additional conditions are imposed, it 

is obviously a lot easier to see how money is not being used if you 

are also requiring the institutions under the pain of a certification 

for which it would be a crime to lie on the report to us how they 

are using the funds. That would obviously make oversight easier. 

Representative Cummings. One of the problems that we face 

in this bailout is establishing metrics to measure the success of the 

various programs. I would like to ask about President Obama’s 

Making Homes Affordable program. How much assistance has 

flowed to homeowners and servicers to facilitate mortgage modifications? 

Mr. Barofsky. It is just getting underway: $50 billion of TARP 

funds has been set aside; an additional $25 billion from HERA has 

been set aside. I think they have signed contracts now with 

servicers that would be up to about $13 billion. Money has not 

flown out yet under the mortgage modification program, but steps 

are in place. 

I should say, if I can go back to my other answer, our requirements in the Citi and Bank of America agreements is that they do 

implement mortgage modification plans. So that is an example outside of the capital purchase program where Treasury is compelling 

those institutions to do something for public good. 

Representative Cummings. I don’t know if you are the appropriate person to ask this question of. How soon do you see that 

happening? One of the things that is happening in my district, we 

have a person who actually deals with foreclosures. That is all she 

does, trying to prevent foreclosures. It seems like the President’s 

plan is out there, but the mortgage companies haven’t caught up 

with it. Do you follow what I am saying? So in the meantime, people are falling through the floor. That is, they are being foreclosed 

upon. Do you have any idea of when you see that being in full operation? 

Mr. Barofsky. It should be going on now. Part of the mortgage 

modification plan under this agreement with the servicers is that 

before Federal money starts flowing in, they need to put the struggling homeowner on a 90-day trial period. During that trial period, 

the servicer is supposed to not foreclose on the property. During 

that trial period, the individual homeowner should be making payments only at the level of what the reduced mortgage would be 

once it is modified. So that type of relief should be happening now. 

24 

One of the things that we are doing as part of our investigations 

is to make sure that that is what is happening; that the servicers 

are abiding by their rules, that they are not foreclosing. And we are 

working, obviously, with Treasury and their agents to make sure 

that happens. 

Representative Cummings. So if I have folks dealing with my 

constituents who are not doing what you just said, how should I 

address that? Send that information to you? 

Mr. Barofsky. Yes. The first thing they should do is contact 

their servicers. If they qualify, the servicers should be putting them 

into the modification plan. If they don’t qualify, they should be directed to other forms of Federal assistance. If they are inside of a 

servicer, a program servicer agrees to modify the mortgage pursuant to President Obama’s plan and they are still getting foreclosed 

upon or they are being charged a fee in a no-fee program, then they 

are the victims of fraud and they should contact our office. 

Representative Cummings. Finally, some have argued that 

even though the mortgage modifications may reduce interest rates 

for homeowners, the outstanding principal remains unchanged and 

homeowners tend to remain underwater. Without a change in refinancing criteria, the interest rate reductions may only be forestalling rather than preventing default. Do you think a change in 

the refinancing criteria is required? 

Mr. Barofsky. That is sort of a policy-level opinion. I would be 

reluctant to offer an opinion without doing a more comprehensive 

study. 

Representative Cummings. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chair Maloney. Thank you for your insightful questions. 

Mr. Barofsky, there have been suggestions that a significant 

number of CDOs were grounded in fraud or misrepresentations by 

the entities that were the sponsors of these transactions. As a consequence, the investors in the CDOs and in related credit default 

swaps have suffered substantial losses. Now taxpayer money is 

being used in essence to bail out the originators, investors, and 

counterparties to these transactions. 

What programs are being considered by your Department to recover taxpayer dollars from those persons and entities that engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or other wrongdoing which induced investors and others to participate in fraudulent transactions 

for which the taxpayers are now footing the bill? 

Mr. Barofsky. We are going to be working closely with the Department of Justice. They of course have their civil enforcement as 

well as asset forfeiture abilities using the court system. We are 

forging a close relationship with the Department of Justice here in 

Washington, D.C., as well as in individual U.S. attorney’s offices. 

When we find the type of contact that you are describing, we are 

going to work with the Department of Justice as our partner to try 

to reclaim that money. 

Chair Maloney. Have you found any of these cases? Have you 

initiated any cases such as this now in your Department as described? 

Mr. Barofsky. I don’t want to comment on that too detailed because I am reluctant to discuss too much of the details of pending 

investigations. 

25 

Chair Maloney. I think one of the problems is that there is a 

statute of limitations running. By the time you get around to it, the 

statute of limitations may have expired. Your comment on that? 

Mr. Barofsky. Our focus is going to be on reclaiming taxpayer 

funds on these transactions. On those we have 5 years from the 

date of investment at least. If there is any ongoing fraud that is 

occurring, that would extend that statute of limitations. So from a 

TARP perspective and recovering taxpayer funds, we do have some 

time to put these investigations together and to get the Department of Justice on board. 

Chair Maloney. I would like to share with you that we have 

come forward with legislation that would require the tracking of 

where the TARP moneys are going, giving you and government, the 

public, and others more information so that we can make better 

policy decisions in the future. I would like to give this legislation 

to you for your consideration and response back to the committee, 

if you have any further programs or ideas of how we could better 

track this money so we could have better policies going forward. 

Mr. Barofsky. I look forward to receiving it. 

Chair Maloney. My time has expired, and I will call on Mr. 

Brady. 

Representative Brady. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

On page 148 of the report you focus on the potential for collusion 

within the Public-Private Investment Program. The scenario you 

lay out is two banks, both of which have a toxic loan of $100 million value in the marketplace, much less $60 million. So basically 

they buy each other’s toxic loan at a higher price net, put up a 

small amount of money, and Treasury matches that in equity. 

FDIC gives them a loan for $60 million, or really the value of itself. 

In that case, both banks book a profit on the sales and they have 

now transferred 92 percent of the risk to the taxpayer. Yet the 

toxic loans still stay within the system, which is great if you are 

at the bank or a shareholder, bad if you are the taxpayer who eventually ends up with the cost. 

What changes should be made in this bad loan program to prevent this type of thing? In your scenario you talk about kickbacks 

and more complicated collusion, and I am just using the simple example you used in your report. What changes need to be made to 

prevent things like that from occurring? 

Mr. Barofsky. The list is probably a lot longer than I will go 

through. Transparency, I keep coming back to that. It is vital for 

us to be able to mine the data for these institutions, to be able to 

keep track and look not just at the transactions that apply to that 

particular transaction, but to look at other transactions and similar 

transactions to see what is going on. 

Our ability to seek through some of these, look through some of 

the corporate shells to know who the players are so we can run 

through them through databases and see if there are bad players 

out there, players who have had prior regulatory problems. Try to 

identify the bad players, that is very important. 

Making sure that the funds are under strict KYC, and giving 

Treasury the ability to look through and run its own tests. 

Those are just some of the examples of where we can help deter 

as well as detect. And that is really an important part of it. If you 

26 

increase transparency, not only does it make it easier to detect, but 

if the players know bright sunlight is shining down on them, it is 

a lot harder to do this type of collusion. 

And of course we are going to keep pushing our hotline. Insiders 

who know about this, who can tip us off, will also help us being 

able to detect those committing frauds. 

Representative Brady. Having now dug into the use of these 

dollars, the complex programs that have been morphed and welded 

together, and then your background prosecuting with credit-debit 

swaps and complicated financial instruments, given the complexities, and how deep and wide this financial crisis was interwoven, 

do you think lawmakers up here really understand all of the intricate issues that created the point of our financial collapse?—I know 

that Mr. Burgess has introduced sort of a 9/11 Commission on the 

financial crisis so that we can sort of move away from the narrative 

and the spin and really go through and identify all of the complex 

decisions and financial models and everything that led to a global 

financial collapse. 

From your background, do you think it would be helpful to have 

that type of detail as we move forward on trying to prevent, as you 

are trying to from the bailout funds, to prevent this in the future? 

Mr. Barofsky. I think it is vital for us to understand how we 

got here. It is absolutely vital; otherwise we will repeat our prior 

mistakes. It is inevitable. 

One of the things that we try to do in the reports, as I mentioned 

before, is to at least unlock the riddle of what is currently happening with these 12 different programs and try to explain them 

in ways that the Members of Congress as well as the American 

public and the media can really understand what is going on now. 

But I think looking back and seeing how we got there, it would 

be vitally important for policymakers and lawmakers and the administration to get a good, comprehensive understanding of why we 

are here. 

Representative Brady. I do, too. I think it is important that we 

move away from the spin zone and get into the intricacies, and I 

think it would provide an independent view of how we go here and 

independent recommendations on how we stop it from occurring 

again. 

Thank you for the work that you are doing. Please let this committee and lawmakers know what other resources you need and 

how we can help. I think you are on the right track. 

Chair Maloney. Thank you. Mr. Hinchey. 

Representative Hinchey. There is a very interesting story in 

the Wall Street Journal today about how Bank of America bought 

Merrill Lynch and how that purchase of Merrill Lynch triggered 

the situation where they needed a big bailout and they needed substantial amounts of money from TARP. 

In the context of the examination of that situation recently, it 

was revealed that Secretary Paulson and Ben Bernanke, the head 

of the Federal Reserve, had pressured the Bank of America not to 

reveal what they were doing with regard to the purchase of Merrill 

Lynch, why they were doing it and how they were doing it. Didn’t 

they realize that was going to cause them some problems and get 

them into a situation where they needed a TARP bailout? But they 

27 

were told not to say anything, as I have just said, by those two 

very powerful individuals. 

Have you looked into this situation yet? Have you had an opportunity to look into it yet? And if so, can you tell us what you believe the circumstances are? 

Mr. Barofsky. Yes, we are looking into that situation. The article that you are talking about was testimony taken up in New York 

of Chairman Ken Lewis. I was actually there during that testimony. We have our own investigation as well as an audit into these 

circumstances. 

I would say we are going to be putting out an audit product that 

details all of the circumstances. But I would caution anyone from 

leaping to too many conclusions about what Secretary Paulson or 

Chairman Bernanke said until we have looked at all of the facts 

and reported on them. 

I think that the conclusion that one may draw that it is black 

and white, that there was an order from the United States Government not to disclose this information, I don’t think it is as crystal 

clear as may be suggested in that article. But that is something we 

are going to do. We are going to present all of the sides of those 

conversations in our audit report. It is a part of an ongoing investigation that we have. We are aware of the circumstances and the 

situation that you described. 

Representative Hinchey. I am happy that you are looking into 

this, and I hope that you are going to do it in a very effective and 

thorough way. I know there are going to be some restrictions on 

you and some lack of cooperation with you with regard to this particular set of circumstances, as there are in the whole array of circumstances, a lack of providing the information that you need. Is 

that going to be a problem for you as this moves forward? 

Mr. Barofsky. I don’t think so. We have not encountered any restrictions. I know that there are certain things that it is reported 

in that article that the State attorney general accessed, certain 

things that he couldn’t get. We can get access to that because of 

our situation as the Federal oversight body overseeing the bailout. 

And to date, everyone has been very cooperative in providing us 

information and giving us access to necessary interviews. I assume 

that is going to continue. As required by statute, I will certainly 

let Congress know if there is any resistance or push back. 

Representative Hinchey. I hope you are right. We look forward to the results of your investigation. We know from the basis 

of our own experience here with regard to hearings that we have 

had with the Treasury Department and with the Federal Reserve, 

how they have been reluctant to be candid about the economic circumstances that we were facing back in 2008 in the context of a 

recession which began, clearly, as early as December of 2007. Nevertheless, they continued over and over to say that there were no 

economic problems that we were facing, there was nothing big to 

worry about. And all of that continued until all of a sudden the 

TARP bill showed up here in the Congress with Secretary Paulson 

saying this was something absolutely essential that needed to be 

passed. 

There was no preliminary, actual honest analysis of the economic 

circumstances that we were facing then. I can’t help but see that 

28 

some of this is still continuing. We are still not getting all of the 

truth about this situation. We are not getting a clear analysis of 

it. As a result of that, this Congress has not been as effective as 

it should be in moving forward and dealing with the legislation 

that is needed to move us forward on behalf of the people of this 

country so that their money is not being wasted the way that as 

it has been. Hundreds of billions of dollars wasted in the context 

of this set of circumstances. And even now, as you were saying, as 

much as $3 trillion, money that has come of the Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, and a whole host of 

other places, much of that is still on the back of the taxpayers of 

America. 

All of this information needs to come forward. So if there is 

something that you can say about that now and what you think is 

going to happen soon, it would be appreciated. 

Mr. Barofsky. We are going to continue, through our audit function and our investigative function, to push and push for more and 

more transparency. Our audit reports will be available to every 

Member of Congress and eventually to every taxpayer. We will 

push for that transparency to bring forward those answers. 

Representative Hinchey. Thank you. 

Chair Maloney. Congressman Burgess for 5 minutes. 

Representative Burgess. And that transparency, the Federal 

Reserve, the FDIC, to some degree Treasury, when you stop and 

think how much money—it probably equals all of the discretionary 

money that we will appropriate this year—that those appointed individuals have under their control, it is absolutely critical that that 

transparency and that accountability and that oversight be there. 

Because I think Mr. Hinchey is correct; the credibility of the 

United States Government has suffered as a consequence of mishandling of this situation. There is plenty of blame to go around 

for all branches of the government and both parties, certainly. 

In your report, you point out that many aspects of the public-private investment partnership could make it inherently vulnerable to 

fraud, waste and abuse, and you identified three major areas. 

Let me ask you specifically on the conflict of interest, first on the 

conflict of interest, do we need to be a little concerned, moderately 

concerned, greatly concerned on the conflict-of-interest issue? 

Mr. Barofsky. If unaddressed, extremely concerned. Too much 

power is being granted to these private players, and if the right 

protections are not in place, we basically would be asking I think 

potentially for catastrophic taxpayer loss without the right protections. 

Representative Burgess. On the issue of collusion, government 

leverage presenting a great incentive for collusion, can you explain 

how that can expose taxpayers to further loss? 

Mr. Barofsky. As a simple example, buyer and seller agree on 

a price that is above the price that it should be. The price should 

be 50. They agree to pay 80; the buyer agrees to give 80. Therefore, 

a criminal profit of 30. The reason they can do that is because the 

buyer is only on the hook, because of leverage, 7 percent of that 

initial investment. 

So if the spread on the price fix is greater than the exposure because of the tremendous amount of government leverage, it is a 

29 

simple economic mathematical calculation. Both sides can make a 

lot more money. The only downside is, of course, detection and 

prosecution. 

Representative Burgess. On the money laundering, the fact 

that both the public/private invested partnerships and the term 

asset-backed securities loan facility present an opportunity for 

money laundering, organized crime, narcotics, and large-scale fraud 

operations, do you think that we are doing enough to forestall those 

activities, the activities of the money laundering? 

Mr. Barofsky. Not yet; but I am hopeful as these programs are 

rolled out they will be. 

I think the Federal Reserve has a pretty good anti-money laundering program on the TALF as it currently exists. For these other 

programs which will be run by Treasury and the FDIC, we are 

going to have to see. They are still in their formation stages. 

My prior background being a prosecutor of narcotics traffickers, 

my chief of staff who is here, headed up the Southern District’s 

international narcotics trafficking unit and did massive money 

laundering cases. We are pretty familiar with the complexities and 

the ways that drug trafficking organizations launder their funds. 

There needs to be very, very tight restrictions, and we are going 

to push for them. 

Representative Burgess. And you are making recommendations to Treasury to protect the taxpayers’ interests? 

Mr. Barofsky. Absolutely. 

Representative Burgess. Have any been adopted by Treasury? 

Mr. Barofsky. They are still in the formation stages. They have 

indicated early that they have registered our concerns and they are 

taking them seriously. But they have not formally adopted these 

restrictions yet. 

They have required certain know-your-customer standards be applied in the legacy securities program, and that is certainly a very, 

very good first step. 

Representative Burgess. Is there anything that we can do to 

help? 

Mr. Barofsky. I think conducting hearings like this, making 

sure that the Members of Congress and members of the public 

know what is going on with their money is a tremendous help. If 

there is anything specific, I will be sure to let you know. 

Representative Burgess. We look forward to that. 

Your report documents a potential increase in leverage from the 

interaction of the public-private investment partnership and the 

term asset-backed security loans facility. You note the unfairness 

and the additional risk imposed to the taxpayer. Can you also explain how this can magnify the dangerous incentives already in 

place? 

Mr. Barofsky. This really concerns us. When this was rolled 

out, it was not part of the initial announcement. It was in one of 

the term sheets. When I saw it, it raised my concern. 

One of the basic things that was explained to us, because we 

made a series of recommendations with respect to the TALF back 

in February, and one of the things that the Federal Reserve kept 

impressing on us, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, is that 

based on the complicated economic models that the Federal ReVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:59 Dec 18, 2009 Jkt 052674 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\52273.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
30 

serve conducts, is that this haircut, this skin in the game, the 

amount of money that the private investor is responsible for putting up personally before getting these nonrecourse loans was crucial from credit loss as well as a fraud risk. 

When you have these programs interact, particularly what you 

have in the PPIF program, Treasury lending money to the fund 

manager and then taking that already leveraged lent money and 

bringing it to the TALF window, you are diluting that interest, that 

skin in the game, by at least 50 percent, thereby undercutting one 

of the fundamental protections to the taxpayer. That caused us 

grave concern. 

As you also noted, that leverage on leverage. So that fund manager has that tremendous ability and power to set the price. When 

you are pricing up a security which, in an illiquid market, you are 

magnifying that ability by two, three, four, or five times; thus, increasing the dangers, making it all the more important that we 

have the right fraud protection measures in the original program 

as well. 

So that is why we recommend not to do it, particularly if there 

is Treasury leverage, that there shouldn’t be this interaction between the two programs unless they come up with a way to almost 

significantly redo and recalculate the way that they do the TALF. 

Representative Burgess. I hope they are listening to you. I 

yield back. 

Chair Maloney. Congressman Cummings for 5 minutes. 

Representative Cummings. Thank you, Madam Chairlady. 

You said something that struck my interest, and I hope it doesn’t 

go by our committee. You said that one of your greatest concerns 

is the conflict-of-interest issue; is that right? 

Mr. Barofsky. It is a very grave concern of ours. 

Representative Cummings. Why is that, Mr. Barofsky? What 

do you mean by that? 

Let me tell you where I am going with this. A lot of my constituents when they see who the players are, they feel as if everybody 

came off Wall Street. And as they say to me in the grocery store, 

these folks may be playing golf together, social events and those 

kinds of things. And what is to say that things are not being done 

which are not necessarily—and I am not accusing anybody of anything, I am just telling you what my constituents feel—in the public interest. That is one type of conflict. 

I think it is very important if the President and the leadership, 

this Congress, is going to turn this economic situation around that 

the public has a certain level of confidence that everybody is playing fairly. You just gave some scenarios that should concern all of 

us. 

I am just wondering with regard to conflict, what kind of recommendations have you made? And when we spoke to Mr. 

Devaney, by the way, with regard to the stimulus package, who is 

the watchdog trying to help folks, he said one of his basic concerns 

was that he prevent people from doing stuff wrong. I am wondering, is there any of that here? Are you following me? 

Mr. Barofsky. Sure. So much of our recommendations are 

geared towards deterrence. The bottom line is that with $3 trillion, 

we could have a staff of thousands, and if the right protections are 

31 

not in place beforehand, we will never catch up. That is why we 

pushed so hard with these recommendations, our law enforcement, 

and our task force to deter fraud from occurring beforehand. 

That is where transparency becomes so important, as I noted before. It is hard to execute a conflict of interest if you know everyone 

is looking very carefully at what you are doing. But conflict of interest really, in the terms I am using, is anytime someone puts 

their own private interest above that and to the detriment of the 

taxpayer. In these programs there is a real danger of that. 

I think what you are referring to are the relationships between 

Wall Street and those who may be making policy decisions. The importance is for the policymakers to have a sense of detached skepticism of Wall Street. That is what we bring. It is not that we think 

that all of Wall Street is geared and going to do things wrong, but 

we have to recognize where the economic incentives are and at 

times have to assume the worst in order to build the right protections. 

Representative Cummings. One of the arguments we heard on 

Tuesday from Dr. Simon Johnson and Dr. Joseph Stiglitz was that 

corporate separation of ownership and control have produced perverse incentives for the officers and directors of these financial 

firms such that the interests of the officers were not necessarily 

aligned with the interests of the shareholders. 

Do you agree with this assessment and, if so, how can taxpayers’ 

ownership rights be exercised, especially in light of the recent discussion of a potential plan to convert preferred stock to common equity shares? Do you have any concerns there? 

Say, for example, with AIG, we own 79 percent, and decisions are 

being made every day of something that we own. I guess you end 

up investigating us. But the question is, do we have sufficient control there to actually carry out the wishes of the public? The things 

that are in the best interests of the public? 

Mr. Barofsky. I think of the benefits of the audits of AIG, the 

one that obviously we have initiated at your request, as well as the 

audit of the executive compensation issues at AIG, will bring attention to this issue. Right now, AIG—basically the Federal interest 

is being run by a number of trustees who have been assigned to 

look out for the government’s interest. 

Under the conversion that you are describing, under the capital 

assistance program, again the concept is there is going to be a private trust that is independently going to manage the government’s 

voting interests. So, in a way, separating the voting and control 

from the actual policymakers, and the goal there is to separate 

from political influences decisions to run the corporations. 

One of the things that we are going to see in the AIG audit is 

how much of that is actually happening. What is the impact and 

influence on a day-to-day basis of the Federal Reserve and of the 

Treasury in decision-making? 

But these are very complex and very real concerns, and we are 

hoping that this audit will help shed some light on it. 

Representative Cummings. Thank you very much. 

Chair Maloney. Thank you. 

32 

I would like to go back to your comments, Mr. Barofsky, on the 

use of TALF to buy toxic assets with taxpayer funds, to better understand it. 

The SIGTARP expresses in your report serious concerns that 

Treasury’s proposed expansion of TALF to allow the use of legacy 

residential mortgaged-backed securities as collateral poses a significant risk of fraud. And to mitigate these, the report recommends that Treasury require individual review of the securities 

involved and reject those that do not meet sound underwriting 

standards. Has Treasury agreed to do that, to do an individual review? 

Mr. Barofsky. They have to a certain extent. Always when dealing with Treasury and our interactions with them, until something 

is formally announced, we are going to keep pushing and pushing. 

They have indicated in their response to our recommendations, basically the way it works before we put these recommendations in 

the report, we share them with Treasury and give them an opportunity to respond. 

In response to this particular recommendation, they did note that 

they are going to be considering, in their language, CUSIP by 

CUSIP, and that is the individual number that is assigned to each 

type of bond review, and that they are going to consider individual 

underwriting standards. We think this is vitally important. 

Under the original version of the TALF, there is a reliance on 

credit rating agencies. And with these toxic—particularly these residential mortgaged-backed securities, those are useless. They 

shouldn’t be paid any attention. We need to protect the taxpayer, 

to look behind those ratings at the actual loans that backed these 

securities in order to protect the taxpayer. 

Chair Maloney. And the so-called liar loans, you also recommended that Treasury impose significant higher haircuts on all 

MBSs, and especially the legacy RMBs. Are they going to do that? 

Have they indicated their reaction to that? 

Mr. Barofsky. They are going to impose higher haircuts for 

those. We will have to see what the percentage is. Just to be clear, 

on the liar loans, our recommendation for that is we don’t touch 

them, that they be thrown out of the program. We can’t have any 

degree of certainty that these loans with virtually no underwriting, 

the very worst of what got us into the current crisis, and there can 

really be no taxpayer protection. 

Chair Maloney. In your first report, you recommended against 

the expansion of TALF to this category, correct? 

Mr. Barofsky. Yes. 

Chair Maloney. And obviously Treasury has not responded or 

reacted to that. 

Can you explain your reasoning and comments? Why does Treasury believe that it should be expanded to TALF? Have you had any 

conversations? Can you shed some light on that reasoning? 

Mr. Barofsky. Our recommendation was that it not be expanded 

unless it significantly reworked the program. And the type of recommendations that we are making are a significant reworking of 

the program. So if these recommendations are adopted, we think 

that the taxpayer can be protected. 

33 

Chair Maloney. Can you elaborate just to clarify for our colleagues and the public, TALF was not designated for this purpose. 

Is this going to weaken the ability of TALF to fulfill the purpose 

that it was put in place for? If this program needs more subsidy, 

maybe it is better to give the subsidy instead of endangering another program? Can you elaborate on that. 

Mr. Barofsky. TALF, as originally envisioned, was a $200 billion facility to deal with certain classes of asset-backed securities, 

including student loans. That hasn’t changed. That $200 billion as 

far as we have been informed by the Federal Reserve and Treasury, this is in addition to. So it is not pushing out the original intent of TALF. It is adding to it. 

Chair Maloney. Will it hinder its ability to meet its original 

purpose? 

Mr. Barofsky. It shouldn’t. As described, if that money is still 

in place, it should exist alongside the expansion of the program. 

Chair Maloney. Do you believe the measures that you have suggested to mitigate the risk will make this expansion an effective 

and sound use of taxpayer money? Or do you think the risk is too 

high and the benefit does not correspond to the risk? 

Mr. Barofsky. Whenever we make our recommendations, we 

recognize the reality. The only way to ensure there is no fraud in 

a government program is to not have a government program. We 

deal with the hand that we are dealt. We try to make our recommendations to protect these programs from fraud, waste and 

abuse to the greatest degree we can, given what the programs are. 

It would be a very rare circumstance where we would come out 

and say, ‘‘You cannot do this program, it is too vulnerable to 

fraud.’’ I think with the right protections, we can be okay. 

Chair Maloney. Thank you, and I yield 5 minutes to Mr. Burgess. 

Representative Burgess. Thank you. I appreciate the recognition. Let me ask you a question, Mr. Barofsky. The Secretary of the 

Treasury, Henry Paulson, and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 

Bernanke pressed some major banks to accepted the TARP funds 

in October, 2008, even though these large banks, neither wanted 

the TARP funds. Now some of the banks, notably Goldman Sachs 

and J.P. Morgan Chase, want to return the funds immediately, but 

the administration has talked about imposing a national interest 

test to block well-capitalized banks from returning TARP funds. In 

a fiscal year where Federal deficits will exceed $1.8 trillion or 13 

percent of the GDP, does blocking well-capitalized banks from repaying the taxpayer serve the public interest? 

Mr. Barofsky. That is a policy based question that is better 

asked to the Secretary of Treasury. 

I will note that in the stimulus act, which changed the rules regarding the ability of banks to repay or redeem their preferred 

shares, it is in consultation with the regulators. Ultimately, it is 

the regulators’ decision as to whether to approve or not approve, 

or at least it should be the regulators’ decision to approve or not 

approve the repayment of funds. 

But your more fundamental question is one that I am not really 

qualified to answer. 

34 

Representative Burgess. I appreciate that, and I appreciate 

your honesty. 

Just intellectually, it seems as if the banks no longer need the 

money, it would make sense to give it back or it would make sense 

to allow them to do so. Can you speculate as to what would be the 

moral hazard for not allowing them to repay the money that they 

felt they no longer needed or didn’t need in the first place? 

Mr. Barofsky. I think a lot of this gets—to use a phrase that 

was used earlier during this hearing—a lot of spin. From our perspective, we don’t like to get into speculation and addressing the 

motives without a full-fledged audit. We are doing an audit. Part 

of our audit into Bank of America includes looking at that fateful 

day in October when the nine financial institutions were called to 

the Treasury and, as you say, that they were basically told that 

they were going to be accepting these infusions of capital. We will 

be able to provide more detail through that audit. 

Representative Burgess. Very well. Can we talk AIG for just 

a minute? 

Mr. Barofsky. Sure. 

Representative Burgess. What can you share with us about 

your findings so far through the audit as you have been through 

it concerning potential overpayments made by AIG to its counterparties? 

Mr. Barofsky. Generally, I can share with you very little. One 

of the tenets of an ongoing audit is that we, as a matter of policy, 

we don’t share information until the audit is complete. 

There are a number of reasons for this. One of the most significant is we want to encourage an atmosphere of free flowing of information with AIG and with the Federal Reserve and with Treasury. If we start disclosing information as we go, it can impact the 

actual audit itself. It is a long-standing audit principle. 

The one exception I have drawn on that is in the use of funds, 

where we will be doing preliminary results even before our audit 

is concluded. I have given some anecdotal answers because it is 

such a vital and important issue to get that information out because of its impact on our other recommendations. But I have to 

ask for your indulgence to allow us to finish that audit before we 

start giving results and observations. 

Representative Burgess. When can we expect to see the completed results? 

Mr. Barofsky. My current plan is that all of audits, our six 

pending audits, will be completed by the summer. I am hoping that 

it will be earlier in the summer than later. But that is our goal for 

each of the audits, including the two AIG audits. 

Representative Burgess. So late June or early July when we 

have this quarterly visit again? 

Mr. Barofsky. I would say within the next 3 months. I am hopeful to have some of these audits completed, if not all of them. 

Representative Burgess. Very well. 

On the issue that the Senator from Minnesota brought up about 

having the hotline and how critical that was. Last fall, when we 

did not have any sort of infrastructure at all and we would get 

those venting calls—I mean a lot of venting calls, thousands of 

venting calls—it would have been great to have a 1–800–go–ask– 

35 

Neil number to triage those. With your permission, I may link to 

your Web site or put your number up on our Web site as well, because I think you bring up a point that is so critical. 

A lot of that information is out there, and I was astounded by 

the amount of information that came to me last October. And not 

feeling I was the correct one for that information or qualified to act 

on it, it was sometimes difficult for me to find where that information should go. So I am very grateful that you are on the job and 

doing what you are doing. Thank you. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chair Maloney. Mr. Hinchey is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Representative Hinchey. I once again want to express my appreciation to you. What you are doing is critically important for the 

economic circumstances that this country is confronting. We are 

very grateful for the competent way in which you are doing this. 

One of the things that you have done is to highlight the lack of 

financial disclosure, the lack of information coming out of this 

whole financial situation. As I was reading your SIGTARP report 

that came out just recently, one of the things that you talked about 

was the fact that you had checked in with I think it was 364 recipients of the TARP funding and that you had contact with them and 

you were asking questions and trying to get information from 

them. And you were pressing for the facts: How much money did 

you get? What did you do with it? What were the effects of what 

you were doing? 

I mean, this is public money, money owned by the people of this 

country. And so that should be known. What you were doing obviously is so important and you were doing it in such a significant 

way. 

But the Treasury comes back and says, no, it is not going to be 

possible. We can’t do that. That information cannot be delivered. 

But then, in the context of those 364 operations that you looked 

into, you made a very interesting statement which is that some 

banks were able to provide detailed, at times even granular descriptions of how they used taxpayer money. 

So if some banks can do it, why can’t all of the banks do it? I 

know that they all can, but I know also that they don’t want to for 

their own particular reasons, whatever they may be. We can speculate what those reasons might be, and it would be interesting to 

do so. But that is the situation that we are confronting. 

What do you think is going to happen as this moves forward? Do 

you think you will be more successful to get that information out 

through the Treasury and through the banks? Or what is it that 

we should be doing to make sure that actually happens? 

Mr. Barofsky. We are going to keep trying and pressing. I believe that logic for our arguments ultimately should win the day. 

Obviously, Congress has the ability and power to statutorily requirement of this kind of information. You have required me 

through the Special Inspector General Act, once it is signed, required me to do this report. We got out in front of it back in January, but part of that requires us to report to you by September 1 

on how the financial institutions have used those funds. A similar 

type of requirement could be imposed on Treasury. 

36 

Representative Hinchey. Good. I hope there is more success as 

time moves on and there is much more openness. 

Your report notes that since the SIGTARP’s office has only preliminary information, the recommendations are not necessarily at 

a very high level. A few of the recommendations you put forward 

are interesting and very important. I would just like to mention 

them. 

Here is what you are recommending: Treasury should place strict 

conflict of interest rules upon the Public-Private Investment Program and the managers of that program so that investors in this 

program would not have the potential to artificially inflate prices 

of the assets; Treasury should mandate transparency which would 

ensure that taxpayers know how their funds are being used and 

that such transparency would identify conflicts of interest; stringent investor screening procedures should be in place to prevent 

money laundering. All of these things are so solid that you are recommending and so critically important and so obvious that they 

should be done. 

So you’ve noted that this program is particularly vulnerable to 

fraud at many levels. Given the Treasury’s track record on instituting accountability provisions in its contracts, what do you think 

the strategy should be to encourage the Treasury to employ the 

recommendations listed in the report in this program? 

Mr. Barofsky. I am going to remain optimistic. I am an optimist 

by nature, and I am going to remain optimistic. 

Putting aside even my optimism, I think the consequences of failing to adopt these recommendations are so great. I communicated 

this to Treasury earlier this week. 

We want these programs to work. As Special Inspector General, 

it is vital to us that these programs work. The dangers here are 

so bad, in our view, that if they are not addressed it is not just a 

question of a little bit of fraud here or there but it is putting into 

question the American people’s confidence in their government and 

the ability to get us out of this financial situation. It puts into danger the very recovery. 

We think it is so fundamentally important that we are optimistic 

that Treasury is going to recognize these dangers and the potential 

consequences of failure to protect the taxpayer money. We are 

hopeful that they will be implemented and implemented in full. 

Representative Hinchey. Mr. Barofsky, I thank you very much 

for everything you are doing and for everything that you have said 

and for the answers you have given to the questions here today. 

Thank you. 

Chair Maloney. Mr. Cummings for 5 minutes. 

Representative Cummings. What do you see as the consequences that you just talked about? 

Mr. Barofsky. In the first place, we could be looking at literally 

hundreds of billions of dollars lost to fraud of taxpayer money. To 

me, as part of my mandate, that is front and foremost. 

But the danger of loss of confidence—if the American people lose 

all confidence in their government and the ability of the Treasury 

to engineer this bailout, so much of economic recovery is based on 

confidence. When people start feeling good about spending money, 

going out, and purchasing—it is a very psychological concept, of 

37 

course, a recession. If there is a perception out there that all this 

program is is picking winners and losers and rewarding at taxpayer expense and loss of hundreds of billions of dollars to fraud, 

it is going to have an impact beyond just the money that is lost. 

I think it could damage the psyche of the American people. I think 

it is critical that we make sure that the American people know that 

we are protecting their investment, and that ultimately that is 

going to lead to recovery. 

Representative Cummings. First of all, I agree with every syllable that you just said. Without going into the AIG situation, you 

said everybody is cooperating with you, and I assume that includes 

AIG? 

Mr. Barofsky. Yes. I would say initially there was a little bit 

of back and forth. But, as of this week, information is flowing. 

Representative Cummings. How long have you been looking 

into them? 

Mr. Barofsky. It has been a couple of weeks. 

Representative Cummings. Okay. We have heard a lot of discussion about the stress test for certain TARP recipients. These 

tests are nearly completed. Do you think the results should be 

made public and do you think the tests are considering the right 

scenarios and asking the right questions? 

Mr. Barofsky. I don’t feel qualified to answer that question because I haven’t seen the results of the stress test. We have many 

areas of expertise, but that type of regulatory detail is not something that we have looked at. I think it is something that we are 

going to look at. I think that is the subject of a future audit once 

we have the right staff and personnel in place to answer that question. But, at this time, I think it is too early for us to be able to 

do so. 

Representative Cummings. Quite a few institutions are trying 

to pay money back, small and a few large. I know that a lot of it, 

according to reports in the paper, it had to do with compensation 

issues, but do you think any of it has to do with you and your office? I’m just curious. I mean, looking into things? 

Mr. Barofsky. I think if there are financial institutions that are 

out there that are afraid of us and worried about the oversight that 

we are providing, I think that is a positive development. 

Any financial institution that is playing by the rules and doing 

what they are supposed to do has absolutely nothing to fear from 

our office. We are not on a witch hunt or looking to make anybody 

look bad. But if they are not playing by the rules, if they are stealing and committing fraud, and we are inspiring them to get out of 

the program or not to get into the program in the first place, I 

think that is why you created me, to provide that level of deterrence. 

Representative Cummings. Mr. Barofsky, you have the American people looking in on this right now, and the people in my district, many of them have lost their savings which they are never 

going to get back. Never. They have lost their homes. They have 

lost their jobs. They have lost all kinds of opportunities, and I 

think that they are just looking for somebody, just trying to make 

sure that somebody is watching over all of this. Like you said, this 

public confidence thing is major. I mean, what can you tell them 

38 

with regard to your office and how do you plan to deal with all of 

this? 

It seems like you have a lot on your plate, a lot. They are just 

looking for—as all of the polling shows, they trust the President 

and they trust that he is going in the right direction. But they also 

realize that trying to straighten out this mess is like pushing a 

heavy boulder up a hill. And when these kinds of things happen, 

that is some of the things you most fear. It is like putting ice on 

that hill. So what can you tell them now? And I only have 3 seconds left. 

Mr. Barofsky. I hope I have more than 3 seconds. 

Congressman I have spent the last 8 or 9 years of my life as a 

Federal prosecutor before I came on board. Some of the most heartbreaking work I ever did was when I was heading up the mortgage 

fraud unit and seeing some of the pain that you are describing of 

your constituents and what happens when people are taken advantage of and they lose their homes, their life savings. 

I bring all those experiences to this job; and I have assembled 

a staff that is just remarkably talented individuals. From my chief 

of staff here, who was a former prosecutor, my investigations division, my audit division, we have some of the best and brightest and 

most talented people you can imagine. So many of them making 

personal sacrifices, financial and otherwise, just to join my office, 

the amount of money that people have walked away from because 

they believe in this mission of our office. 

And what I can say to your constituents is that we are here. The 

staff that I have together, my office, myself, we take this role, we 

view it in an historical context. $3 trillion, never has so much 

money been pushed out in such a short period of time. 

And you, the Congress, have given us an enormous responsibility; and it is one that we bear every single day. And we are 

going to be looking out for the taxpayers without regard to any political concern, economic concern for ourselves. We have an important role, and we are going to fulfill that role. 

Representative Cummings. Thank you. 

Chair Maloney. I want to thank my colleagues and particularly 

want to thank you, Mr. Barofsky, for your public service and for 

your testimony today. We certainly do appreciate your very hard 

work in tracking the TARP program and identifying waste, fraud, 

and abuse. 

Clearly, we have a tremendous obligation to protect taxpayers’ 

funds. I appreciate your efforts in this area, and I hope you will 

come back and speak to us again when your next report comes out. 

Thank you very much, and this meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(39) 

Submissions for the Record 

40 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CAROLYN B. MALONEY, CHAIR

Good morning. I want to welcome Mr. Barofsky, the Special Inspector General for 

the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and to thank him and his staff for his testimony 

today on the SIGTARP’s new report to Congress, just released Tuesday. 

The SIGTARP reports to Congress quarterly, and this is its second report. Like 

the first report, issued February 6, this report takes a strong but clear position 

against the aspects of the TARP program that the SIGTARP believes risk promoting 

fraud, waste and abuse. Mr. Barofsky is a former prosecutor who does not shrink 

from telling it like it is, so the interests of the SIGTARP’s mission is to make the 

best use possible of the taxpayers’ money. 

The SIGTARP’s reports distinguish themselves by thorough but very clear explanation of the TARP programs and the SIGTARP’s audit and investigations strategy, 

as well as specific recommendations on steps Treasury should take to prevent waste, 

fraud and abuse in the program. 

Regrettably, some of the key recommendations in this report reiterate critical recommendations in the first report—recommendations that would promote transparency and accountability and reduce the potential for fraud and misappropriation, 

but which Treasury has yet to adopt. 

This second report is even more critical to our understanding than the first, in 

part because the TARP has become such a complex series of programs and in part 

because the dialogue between the SIGTARP and Treasury on key issues is more advanced and is getting into some specific issues that are of great interest to policy 

makers and to this Committee. 

As a proponent of greater transparency of the program, I requested that the Federal Reserve release AIG counterparty information and the disclosures were made 

last month. The SIGTARP is set to audit the payments to the AIG counterparties 

and investigate why it was deemed necessary to redeem those securities at full 

value. This is a key issue that lies at the heart of the AIG rescue: why were the 

counterparties made whole at the expense of the taxpayer? Shouldn’t they have had 

to share in the loss? 

Similarly, the report repeats the recommendation of the first report that Treasury 

must require TARP recipients to report the use to which they put the TARP funds. 

This recommendation echoes the concerns of legislation I have introduced that 

would require Treasury to track the TARP funds, even using presently reported or 

public information. Treasury has not adopted this very important recommendation, 

but the work of the SIGTARP, including a survey they conducted of some 364 TARP 

recipients, shows that additional information can be provided. 

On a basic level, it’s absolutely critical that we know where the money has gone 

and how it’s been used. Reports that banks getting TARP money have used it to 

buy banks in China, highways in Spain, or even to short the stock of their competitors to bring them down and gobble them up—these emphasize the need for us to 

know where the money has gone. Beyond that, we should be able to assess—looking 

at available data and performance measurements—whether or not these funds have 

been used effectively. 

However, these lessons are not always reflected in the new proposed programs. 

As this report notes, the PPIP has some inherent features that make it vulnerable 

to conflicts of interest. The government would be remiss in its duty if it were not 

to impose rigorous reporting and disclosure requirements on those managers and investors. I am concerned that Secretary Geithner, in testimony Tuesday, headed in 

the opposite direction, saying that Treasury would exempt the PPIP participants 

from the executive compensation requirements of the TARP statute. 

The goals of transparency and accountability that guide the SIGTARP inform this 

new report and its recommendations. It is crucial not only to the success of the 

TARP but to the recovery of our financial system and our economy that we pay close 

attention. 

I look forward to the testimony. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KEVIN BRADY, SENIOR HOUSE REPUBLICAN

I am pleased to join in welcoming Inspector General Barofsky before the committee this morning. His office is one of the most important and effective guardians 

of the trillions of dollars taxpayers have at risk in the massive bailouts of large financial institutions. 

Unfortunately, as Kansas City Federal Reserve President Thomas Hoenig testified 

earlier this week, these bailouts ‘‘risk prolonging the crisis, while increasing the 

cost.’’ In this context, I found Inspector General Barofsky’s most recent report quite 

41 

disturbing. Mr. Barofsky, your report contains very troubling information that has 

not been previously disclosed. 

This report identifies many key weaknesses in the design and implementation of 

the government bailouts that could greatly increase their cost. For example, according to the report, the Treasury Department has ‘‘indicated that it will not adopt 

SIGTARP’s recommendations that all TARP recipients account for the use of TARP 

funds; set up internal controls to comply with such accounting; and report periodically to Treasury on the results, with appropriate sworn certifications.’’ The complexity and lack of transparency in TARP programs is further reason for concern. 

The key question before the committee this morning is why the Treasury Department continues to resist adopting many of the safeguards recommended in your report. 

Regarding the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) unveiled by Secretary 

Geithner, your report notes, ‘‘Many aspects of PPIP could make it inherently vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse.’’ Vulnerabilities include the huge size of the program along with conflicts of interest, collusion, and money laundering. With regard 

to money laundering, your report notes that it would be unacceptable if TARP or 

related funds ‘‘were used to leverage the profits of drug cartels or organized crime 

groups.’’ Unlike banks and retail brokers, these partnerships are not currently subject to comparable disclosure rules to prevent money-laundering and abuse. Furthermore, the report demonstrates how interactions between two different bailout programs could encourage excessive leverage and greatly magnify taxpayer losses. 

With regard to another component of the bailouts administered by the Fed, the 

report said, ‘‘Treasury should require additional anti-fraud and credit protection 

provisions specific to all MBS, before participating in an expanded TALF, including 

minimum underwriting standards and other fraud prevention measures.’’ 

According to the latest estimates, the amount of losses from toxic assets in the 

U.S. alone may be as high as $2.7 trillion. This clearly is a huge potential liability 

for American taxpayers. Unfortunately, the Treasury’s financial rescue plan seems 

designed to marginalize Congress and avoid the appropriations process. Nonetheless, Congress should not finalize the 2009 budget resolution without considering 

the tremendous costs of the ongoing bailouts. 

Economic research shows that the national debt following this financial crisis may 

increase by as much as $8.5 trillion in as little as 3 years. This grim fiscal prospect 

should be an overriding consideration as we consider budget priorities and proposals 

for yet more spending. Congress should not go on an irresponsible spending spree 

with trillions of dollars of bailouts already threatening the taxpayers. 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL BURGESS

Thank you Madam Chairwoman, 

I would like to thank Mr. Barofsky for his testimony here today and for his important work as the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program. 

The role of oversight and investigation may not be as glamorous as program implementation or funds management but to the people I represent, it is probably more 

important than any other aspect of the TARP. Your work is worth every penny that 

you recover through your criminal investigations or deter through the presence of 

your office. Not to mention, the prosecution of the individuals or group who seek 

to corrupt the public trust. 

The report your team compiled is a compelling argument to provide you with more 

resources. Your recommendations to Treasury to require all TARP recipients to report on their actual use of every dollar, and auditing for verification, is an important 

first step in keeping the TARP out of trouble. 

There is no doubt that the economic downturn we are experiencing makes government assistance programs like TARP susceptible to criminal elements, but, based 

upon my reading of this report, the TARP program has design flaws that make it 

an especially prime target. In your report you say ‘‘the character of the program 

makes it inherently vulnerable to fraud, waste and abuse,’’ including collusion and 

money laundering. Taking advantage of any government program is despicable but 

TARP abuse has the potential to send Americans reeling from a lack of confidence 

in basic governmental protections. 

Some of the weaknesses you expose in this report are certainly shocking. It makes 

me wonder if the ‘‘Troubled’’ part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program refers to the 

‘‘Program’’ itself instead of the ‘‘Assets.’’ 

I look forward to hearing your testimony and your recommendations for Congress. 

With that I yield back. 

Æ