No. 250, November 2009 Strategic Forum 1

are acting correctly by maintaining close and 

effective policy coordination.

The goal of U.S. diplomacy remains 

denuclearization. This will take time, and our 

security strategy must deal with the world as 

it is. The commitment of the administration of 

President Barack Obama to extended deterrence is critical in supporting both U.S. diplomatic and security strategy and its allies.

Change and Continuity

On April 14, 2009, Pyongyang, in 

response to the United Nations Security 

Council (UNSC) statement condemning 

North Korea’s April 4 rocket launch, ended 

its participation in the Six-Party Talks aimed 

at the denuclearization of North Korea and 

added that it “will no longer be bound to any 

agreement” of those talks. Pyongyang also 

declared its intent to “strengthen our selfdefensive deterrent in every way.” On May 25, 

North Korea conducted its second nuclear 

test. On July 4, North Korea test fired seven 

missiles into the Sea of Japan.

A month later, Pyongyang unexpectedly shifted gears. Kim Jong-il received former President Bill Clinton and agreed to the 

release of two American journalists sentenced 

by North Korea to 12 years of hard labor for 

illegal entry in March 2009.1 Shortly afterward, Kim met with Hyun Jeong-eun, the 

chairwoman of the Hyundai Group. The KimHyun meeting resulted in an agreement to 

resume tourism to Mount Kumgang, which 

North Korea poses two distinct but 

interrelated challenges. The first is external: 

the challenge posed by its nuclear weapons 

program and the threat of proliferation off the 

Korean Peninsula. The second is essentially but not wholly internal: the challenge 

posed by the pending transfer of power in 

Pyongyang and potential for instability as the 

process plays out. This complex reality underscores the need for balance and strategic 

patience if the twin dangers of proliferation 

and instability on the peninsula are to be successfully managed.

U.S. national security interests on the 

Korean Peninsula are focused on deterrence 

of North Korea, defense of the Republic of 

Korea (ROK) if deterrence should fail, and 

support for Korean unification under the ROK. 

The United States also has a national security 

interest in North Korea’s stability. This interest should not be mistaken as support for the 

Pyongyang regime, but given the risks posed 

by its nuclear weapons program, instability could result in the loss of command and 

control over those weapons and increase the 

risk of proliferation. 

The Six-Party Talks aimed at the denuclearization of North Korea are currently 

suspended. Nevertheless, diplomacy with 

North Korea will likely resume at some point 

but be protracted in nature. The policy challenge is what to do while the diplomacy plays 

out. The United States, the ROK, and Japan 

 Strategic Forum No. 250

November 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

North Korea: Challenges, 

Interests, and Policy

by James J. Przystup

Seoul had suspended since the 2008 shooting of a South Korean tourist; to restart operations at Kaesong Industrial Complex, a 

collaborative North-South economic development; and to resume reunions of separated 

families. On August 22, a North Korean delegation attended the state funeral of former 

South Korean President Kim Dae-jung.

In this rapidly evolving and complex 

environment, North Korea continues to pose 

two distinct but interrelated challenges that 

cannot be lost sight of. The first is external: 

the challenge posed by its nuclear weapons 

program and the threat of proliferation off 

the peninsula. The second is essentially but 

not wholly internal: the challenge posed by 

the pending transfer of power in Pyongyang 

and the potential for instability as the process 

plays out. This complex reality underscores 

the need for balance and strategic patience if 

the twin dangers of proliferation and instability on the Korean Peninsula are to be successfully managed.

U.S. Interests

Since the end of the Korean War, U.S. 

national security interests on the Korean 

Peninsula have focused on deterrence of North 

Korea, defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK) 

if deterrence should fail, and support for Korean 

unification under the ROK. In addition to deterring North Korea, U.S. policy since the early 

1990s has defined the denuclearization of North 
No. 250, November 2009 Strategic Forum 2

Korea and elimination of other weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs 

as a national security interest. At the same 

time, policy has been directed toward preventing the proliferation of WMD and related technologies from the peninsula. Former Secretary 

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld defined North 

Korea’s proliferation of WMD as the greatest 

threat posed by Pyongyang to U.S. interests.

The United States also has a national 

security interest in the stability of North 

Korea. This interest should not be mistaken as 

support for the Pyongyang regime. But given 

the challenges posed by North Korea’s nuclear 

weapons program, instability could result in 

the loss of command and control over nuclear 

weapons and material and increase the risk 

of proliferation. Indeed, it is the threat, if not 

the reality, of instability that ranks among the 

most complex of contemporary challenges to 

international security. Attempts by external 

actors to respond to the multiple contingencies that could flow out of instability in North 

Korea could entail miscalculation and result 

in unintended consequences.

From a security perspective, a stable 

state in North Korea allows hope for a diplomatic resolution of the nuclear crisis, the 

disablement and ultimate dismantlement of 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and 

the eventual opening and reform of its political-economic system.

However, in the near term, the likelihood of a complete denuclearization as 

well as opening and reform should be considered highly improbable. Pyongyang has 

made clear that it will not give up its nuclear 

weapons until the end of any denuclearization process that will include normalization 

of its relations with Washington and the end 

of the U.S. “hostile policy.” Earlier this year, 

North Korea’s foreign ministry reiterated that 

its “principled stand is to realize the denuclearization through the normalization of relations.”2

 Nonetheless, over the next decade, 

North Korea is likely to continue to seek recognition as a de facto nuclear power.

Alternative Strategies

At least three broad alternatives to the 

present strategy toward North Korea of diplomacy through the Six-Party Talks may be 

considered. The first alternative is a military strategy that would involve a preemptive strike aimed at terminating North Korea’s 

nuclear weapons program. At present, such 

a strategy would seem unwarranted, though 

it could appear more reasonable under circumstances of a perceived imminent threat 

from North Korea. Even so, success in such 

a strategy would require comprehensive and 

near-perfect intelligence. Unfortunately, intelligence on North Korea is exceedingly limited.

Given the likelihood of North Korean 

retaliation, opposition to a military strike 

should be anticipated from Six-Party partners 

South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Even 

with a favorable military outcome, one that 

damages but does not eliminate North Korea’s 

nuclear weapons program, the risks in terms 

of retaliation are significant, in particular 

for South Korea and Japan and potentially for 

Guam and Alaska. A U.S. failure to prevent 

North Korean retaliation could strain, if not 

rupture, the alliance structure in Northeast 

Asia, result in a breakdown of U.S. relations with China, and generate Korean and 

Japanese acquiescence in a China-dominated 

East Asian order.

A second strategy, based on the assumption that denuclearization is not achievable under the Kim dynasty, would be aimed 

at regime change to effect resolution of 

the nuclear issue. Policy would be directed 

to bring intense external pressures, economic and financial in particular, to bear 

on Pyongyang in the hope of forcing regime 

change, if not collapse.

Success would require the complete cooperation of China but would run up against its 

strategic interests and priorities on the peninsula: avoiding instability and a potential 

collapse of the North Korean state and unification under a South Korean government 

allied to the United States. Absent truly egregious behavior on the part of Pyongyang—

and after two nuclear tests and several missile 

tests, it is difficult to imagine what Beijing’s 

definition of egregious behavior might be—

it is unlikely that China, at the risk of destabilizing North Korea and inviting potential 

unification, will fully utilize the economic 

leverage that it enjoys to pressure North Korea 

to end its nuclear program. Even in the aftermath of the May 25 nuclear test, China has 

made clear that force should not be used to 

enforce UNSC Resolution 1874, which imposed 

sanctions on North Korea.

This approach would also exacerbate 

the deep and longstanding political divide in 

the ROK over policy toward North Korea, and 

wholehearted support from Seoul should not 

be expected. And should North Korea collapse, 

the United States would not be able to disengage itself; the liability for sorting things out 

on the peninsula would fall on Washington.

Finally, in the event this strategy 

resulted in the destabilization of North 

Korea, it could leave South Korea and Japan 

in particular open to a götterdämmerunglike response by whatever remains of the 

North Korean leadership.

A third strategy is diplomatic in nature. 

This would involve a U.S. decision to withdraw from the Six-Party Talks on the premise that they are hopelessly deadlocked 

and not likely to result in the denuclearization of North Korea. At the same time, 

Washington would make clear that it is prepared to normalize diplomatic relations upon 

Pyongyang’s singular decision to surrender its 

nuclear weapons and allow the United States 

to verify termination of the program.

Given the chasm of mistrust that exists 

between Washington and Pyongyang, the 

chances for success in such an approach 

Dr. James J. Przystup is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the 

National Defense University. Comments may be directed to przystupj@ndu.edu.

it is the threat, if not 

the reality, of North 

Korean instability 

that ranks among 

the most complex of 

contemporary challenges 

to international security 
No. 250, November 2009 Strategic Forum 3

are minimal at best. Moreover, such a go-italone strategy would come at great cost to 

U.S. standing in Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing. 

Among other things, it could undermine 

the momentum behind the Barack Obama 

administration’s strong support for diplomatic engagement as a major facet of international relations.

Leaving the Six-Party Talks would also 

end diplomatic constraints, however tenuous, on North Korea’s behavior and invite (if 

not encourage) various forms of bad conduct, such as additional missile and nuclear 

tests. In short, it would hand the initiative to 

North Korea, and it is altogether likely that 

the United States would wind up paying a very 

high price just to get Pyongyang to cease and 

desist. Getting North Korea back to the negotiating table would entail an even higher price.

Obama and North Korea 

In her February 13 speech to the Asia 

Society in New York, Secretary of State Hillary 

Clinton defined North Korea’s nuclear program as the “most acute challenge to stability in Northeast Asia” and made clear that the 

Obama administration is “committed to working through the Six-Party Talks” to resolve 

the issue. At the same time, she cautioned 

North Korea “to avoid any provocative action 

and unhelpful rhetoric toward South Korea.”

At the policy level, Clinton emphasized 

that the United States will continue to hold 

North Korea to its commitment “to abandoning all nuclear weapons and to return at an 

early date to the Treaty on Nonproliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons.” In return for North 

Korea’s agreement to the complete and verifiable elimination of its nuclear weapons 

program, the Obama administration would 

be “willing to normalize bilateral relations, 

replace the peninsula’s long-standing armistices with a permanent peace treaty, and 

assist in the meeting of energy and other 

economic needs of the North Korean people.”3

 The Secretary also reiterated her hopes 

to engage North Korea “in the kind of serious discussion” that would result in the fulfillment of Pyongyang’s commitments to 

denuclearization and nonproliferation, which 

would ultimately lead to the normalization 

of U.S.–North Korean relations. But Secretary 

Clinton emphasized that “so much depends 

on the choices they make.”4

In early June, the New York Times

reported that North Korea’s May 25 nuclear test 

had caused the Obama administration to reexamine the central assumption that has guided 

U.S. policy since the 1994 Agreed Framework: 

namely, that North Korea would be willing to 

bargain away its nuclear weapons program for 

a package of economic and diplomatic benefits. 

The reassessment resulted in the conclusion 

that North Korea is not interested at present in 

any grand bargain and that its top priority is to 

be recognized as a nuclear weapons state.5

Accordingly, the nuclear test appears to 

have shifted the administration’s approach to 

North Korea from persuasion to pressure in 

its diplomacy, as underscored by its efforts in 

the UNSC and the adoption of UNSC 1874. At 

the same time, the administration’s security 

strategy is focused on reassuring the ROK and 

Japan of the U.S. security commitment and 

on the containment of North Korea and the 

interdiction of any proliferation risk.

Since announcing the end of its participation in the Six-Party Talks, Pyongyang 

has repeatedly called for direct bilateral 

talks with the United States on the basis 

of full equality. On May 20, Gary Samore, 

the National Security Council Coordinator 

for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, told a Washington, DC, conference that North Korea’s efforts to abolish the Six-Party Talks and deal with the 

United States bilaterally on the nuclear issue 

would prove unavailing and that “North 

Korea will realize that it has no alternatives.” 

Samore predicted that the talks will eventually resume but also predicted that there will 

likely be a hiatus of “several months.”6 North 

Korea’s nuclear test, however, has likely 

extended the timeline for their resumption.

Return to Diplomacy

At some point, diplomacy with North 

Korea will resume, but when talks restart, 

the diplomats will likely be confronted with 

inherited and enduring structural problems 

that have marked the Six-Party Talks from 

the outset.

The first is the reality of shared common interests but different national priorities. 

The United States and the present ROK government have made the denuclearization of 

North Korea the primary focus of their diplomacy. Absent the denuclearization of North 

Korea, there can be no real peace and no 

peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. 

Japan, at the strategic level, seems to 

understand the critical importance of denuclearization, but at the political level, resolving 

the abductee issue has served to complicate 

Japan’s diplomacy toward the Six-Party Talks.7

The New Democratic Party of Japan coalition 

government will inherit the issue and its political and diplomatic complications.

China, meanwhile, is concerned first 

and foremost with the issue of stability in 

North Korea; second, with the continuation 

of the North Korean state; and finally, with 

denuclearization. Concerned with the potential for unrest or instability in North Korea, 

Beijing will attempt to persuade and may 

even pressure Pyongyang, but it will avoid 

strong-arming it. Unless and until Beijing 

perceives the North Korean nuclear program as setting off a nuclear arms race in 

Northeast Asia and destabilizing the regional 

security environment, it is unlikely that 

China will be willing to exercise the ultimate 

leverage that it has on North Korea. The leadership in Beijing is wagering that the United 

States will be able to reassure the ROK and 

Japan of its security commitment and of the 

continuity of extended deterrence. In this 

context, China is free-riding on the strength 

of the U.S. alliances with the ROK and Japan 

to avoid its worst-case scenario and to continue its support policy toward North Korea.

Underscoring Beijing’s focus on stability, after signing on to UNSC 1718, which condemned North Korea’s nuclear testing in 2006, 

China’s trade with North Korea increased at 

a rate of 41 percent through 2008. Though 

should North Korea 

collapse, the liability 

for sorting things out 

on the peninsula would 

fall on Washington
cies—the breakdown of internal order, refugee 

outflows, dealing with or disarming the Korean 

People’s Army, and securing WMD—is imperative. That said, the guiding assumption for U.S. 

policy over the next 4 years should be that of 

regime and policy continuity in Pyongyang.

Underscoring its survival-centric reality, 

Pyongyang has resisted opening itself up and 

initiating market-based reform, viewing such 

steps as potentially and dangerously loosening 

political control. In response to food shortages, Kim has reluctantly allowed a degree 

of marketization, but overall, the regime 

remains firmly in control. And the regime’s 

track record makes clear that its preference 

is not to build on successes, such as marketization and the Special Economic Zones, but 

to pull back reforms once the initiatives have 

gained some breathing room. In the absence 

of a cataclysmic event, political control is 

likely to remain a priority over economic benefit for the near to mid term.

North Korea’s commitment to its nuclear 

weapons program should be viewed in the 

context of regime survival. In a world in 

which the United States, over the past two 

decades, has undertaken a series of unilateral military initiatives to address its security 

interests, it is not improbable that Pyongyang 

sees its nuclear weapons program as the 

regime’s ultimate insurance policy—a deterrent against U.S. unilateralism. Over the first 

6 months of 2009, Pyongyang reiterated its 

intent to be recognized as a nuclear weapons 

state and its demand that dealings with the 

United States are to be based on the principle of full equality (that is, with North Korea 

treated as a nuclear power).

Realistically, this speaks to the degree of 

difficulty in achieving complete denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks. Optimistically, 

this means that the talks are in for a period 

of protracted diplomacy. The policy challenge, then, is what is to be done during this 

long timeout.

Protracted Diplomacy

A period of protracted diplomacy will 

affect the interests of the United States and its 

allies in a number of ways.

First, the longer that North Korea continues to assert its status as nuclear state, the 

small in overall volume, China does continue to supply North Korea with critical oil 

and petroleum. However, according to China’s 

ministry of commerce, bilateral trade during the first 6 months of 2009 declined 2.5 

percent, with China’s trade surplus falling to 

$386 million in the first half of 2009 from 

$1.27 billion in 2008, when Chinese coal 

imports hit a 5-year high.8

The economic pain resulting from the 

falloff in trade with China, the suspension of 

economic assistance from the ROK under the 

Lee Myung-bak government, and the enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1874, may, in part, 

account for Pyongyang’s August diplomatic 

charm offensive.

The second structural issue is verification, the issue on which the Six-Party Talks 

foundered in December 2008. It remains the 

sine qua non of any politically viable denuclearization regime.

At the same time, it appears that diplomacy is stuck on issues relating to the 

September 2005 Joint Statement: for example, on what is covered under “existing” 

nuclear programs and the definition of the 

“appropriate time” when discussions will take 

place with North Korea regarding the provision of a light water reactor.9

 Also, it is not 

clear if diplomacy has yet determined whether 

“mutual consent” will govern inspections 

beyond the Yongbyon nuclear facility.

A third structural issue is the almost 

complete lack of trust among the parties, and 

in particular, between the United States and 

North Korea. After all the years of mistrust—

beginning with the implementation of the 

1994 Geneva Agreed Framework and extending through the 1999 Perry process and missile negotiations at the end of the Clinton 

administration, the October 2002 Beijing 

meeting, the termination of the Agreed 

Framework, and the Three-Party and subsequent Six-Party Talks—bridging this chasm 

is perhaps the most daunting challenge of the 

Six-Party Talks.10

A fourth structural issue is North Korea 

itself. The current regime is intensely focused 

on its own survival, as any successor regime 

likely will be. This does not imply that the 

United States, the ROK, and other powers need 

not be vigilant for a regime crisis; on the contrary, preparation for a full range of contingenmore difficult it will be to realize complete 

denuclearization. This does not mean that 

the United States and its diplomatic partners 

should abandon the objective of complete, 

verifiable denuclearization in favor of accepting a cap on North Korea’s nuclear weapons 

program. The costs in terms of U.S. credibility in the ROK and Japan, and with respect to 

the global nonproliferation regime, would be 

incalculable and complicate the diplomacy of 

the pending Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

review conference.

Second, the risks of proliferation from the 

peninsula will continue. North Korea’s cooperation with Syria cannot be considered a one-off 

case. The risk factor will only increase should 

a succession crisis result in Pyongyang’s loss of 

control over its nuclear arsenal.

Third, increasing tensions and growing 

security concerns will test alliance relationships. The April missile test and May nuclear 

test have heightened Japanese security concerns and raised questions over the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. At the same 

time, issues related to the development of 

conventional strike capabilities have surfaced 

in Japan’s political debate. While a distinct 

minority, some Japanese political figures have 

called for the development of an independent 

nuclear capability. In the ROK, similar concerns regarding the U.S. defense commitment 

and extended deterrence have also surfaced, 

accompanied by calls to extend the range of 

South Korea’s missile arsenal to allow Seoul 

to bring all of North Korea within range.

To date, the Obama administration has 

been sensitive to the security concerns of its 

allies and focused on reinforcing its security 

commitments and the continuity of extended 

deterrence. Reacting to North Korea’s missile 

and nuclear tests, the Obama administration 

moved quickly to reassure the ROK and Japan. 

Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg led 

the guiding assumption 

for U.S. policy over the 

next 4 years should be 

that of regime and policy 

continuity in Pyongyang

No. 250, November 2009 Strategic Forum 4
No. 250, November 2009 Strategic Forum 5

a combined State-Defense delegation to Seoul, 

Tokyo, and Beijing in early June and was followed a month later by the Undersecretary of 

Defense for Policy, Michèle Flournoy.

Fourth, protracted diplomacy brings 

with it greater opportunities for North 

Korean wedge-driving. For example, the decision of the George W. Bush administration 

to remove North Korea from the list of state 

sponsors of terrorism was viewed by many 

in Japan as an act of political betrayal with 

regard to Japan’s abductee issue. At a minimum, the Bush administration’s accelerated 

diplomatic pace during its final months created a public perception in Japan that the 

United States was reneging on its commitment to uphold Japan’s concerns in the negotiations. Similarly, the failure to produce a 

sanctions resolution following the April 5 

missile test was viewed by some in Japan as 

a failure of U.S. diplomacy to support Japan’s 

early call for sanctions.

Also, the increasingly direct nature of 

U.S.-North Korean diplomacy during the last 

years of the Bush administration raised political concerns in some quarters of Seoul about 

ROK marginalization. Pyongyang’s present 

insistence on bilateral talks with the United 

States represents a continuation of its wedgedriving strategy. At the same time, its current diplomatic offensive, underscored by the 

agreement to resume Mount Kumgang tours, 

to open border crossings to allow normal operations at the Kaesong Industrial Park, and 

to resume family reunions, is likely to stimulate debate in a South Korea deeply divided 

over policy toward North Korea. The South 

Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo welcomed 

Pyongyang’s decision to send a delegation 

to the state funeral of former South Korean 

President Kim Dae-jung as ushering in a “new 

state in relations.”11 Calls for a resumption of 

economic aid should be expected.

A continuation of North Korea’s nuclear 

challenge is likely to strain China’s relations 

with the United States, the ROK, and Japan. 

Political leadership in all three countries has 

repeatedly asked China to exert its influence 

on North Korea to move Pyongyang back to the 

Six-Party table; to date, however, the talks have 

yet to reconvene. Over time, the risk for Beijing 

is that China, once seen as being part of the 

solution, will come to be seen as part of the 

problem. Unless China is prepared to be more 

forthcoming in the concerted efforts by the alliance partners to realize the denuclearization of 

North Korea, it may find itself increasingly isolated and faulted for a failure of diplomacy.

Finally, maintenance of the status quo 

will adversely affect the development of multilateral security structures in Northeast Asia. 

Visions of a Northeast Asia Peace and Security 

Mechanism will have to be put on hold. 

Absent the denuclearization of North Korea, 

prospects for a multilateral security structure 

in Northeast Asia are distant at best.

The Next Steps

The United States, the ROK, and Japan 

are doing exactly what they should be doing. 

The U.S.–ROK coordination following the 

missile and nuclear tests is a case in point. 

That also goes for trilateral coordination with 

Japan. The strength of coordinated diplomacy 

helped to produce UNSC 1874, and coordinated efforts to implement the resolution will 

bring pressure to bear on Pyongyang and 

incline it toward reengaging in the Six-Party 

Talks. To address the risks of proliferation 

from North Korea, concerted efforts should be 

made to strengthen the Proliferation Security 

Initiative. Pressure and persuasion are intrinsic to successful diplomacy.

Policy should make clear that the door 

remains open to North Korea to rejoin the 

talks when it is ready to do so. Toward that 

end, efforts should be made to adopt a trilateral note to Pyongyang, which would reiterate security assurances and pledges of no 

hostile intent, while making clear that the 

United States, the ROK, and Japan will never 

accept it as a nuclear power. China and 

Russia should be invited to join in the statement. However, the United States should not 

run after Pyongyang to persuade it to return 

to the Six-Party Talks. Provocation should 

not be rewarded.

Nor should the United States and its diplomatic partners, out of concern that not 

paying attention to Pyongyang will cause 

North Korea to take even more provocative 

actions, attempt to incentivize it to return 

to the Six-Party Talks. After almost 15 years, 

Pyongyang knows full well what is on the 

rewards menu, and its actions have made 

clear that it has different preferences and priorities at this time. Ordering a smooth succession is at the top of the list. With the 

prospect of succession in the not too distant future, trading in his nuclear arsenal 

for diplomatic promises of good will would 

only serve to weaken Kim Jong-il’s hand in 

ordering succession. Indeed, it appears that 

Pyongyang’s preference is for the outside 

world to put the check under the door and 

just go away.

However destabilizing, North Korea’s 

recent actions do provide an opportunity to 

expand and intensify U.S.–ROK–Japan diplomatic coordination, contingency planning, 

and security cooperation. This would directly 

in view of the 

contingencies that 

could transpire in North 

Korea, a whole-ofgovernment approach 

remains sadly lacking

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by 

members of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists 

in national security affairs from this country and abroad. The 

opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of 

the Federal Government. NDU Press also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly (JFQ) for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For 

more information on NDU Press and access to JFQ, visit the Web 

site at www.ndupress.edu. 

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

 

I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Patrick M. Cronin

Eugene B. Rumer Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press
Notes

1

 On August 13, 2009, North Korea also released a 

South Korean employee of the Hyundai Group who had been 

in North Korean custody since March 2009 for remarks critical of the North Korean political system.

2

 Available at <www.kcna.co.jp/item2009/200901/

news13/20090113-1ee.html>.

3

 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “U.S.-Asia 

Relations: Indispensable to Our Future,” remarks to the Asia 

Society, New York, NY, February 13, 2009, available at <www.

state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/117333.htm>.

4

 Ibid.

5

 David E. Sanger, “U.S. Weighs Intercepting North 

Korean Shipments,” The New York Times, June 7, 2009, 1.

6

 Gary Samore, remarks to Arms Control Association, 

Washington, DC, May 20, 2009, available at <www.armscontrol.org/node/3671>.

7

 From 1977 to 1983, a number of Japanese citizens 

were abducted by agents of the North Korean government. 

The government of Japan recognizes 16 nationals as victims 

of abduction. To date, Pyongyang has admitted to the abduction of 13 Japanese citizens.

8

 “North Koreans Spurn Tesco Ham as China Trade 

Withers,” August 19, 2009, available at <www.bloomberg.

com/aps/news?pid=email_en&sid=afKaNvv64Ze4>.

9

 The Six-Party Joint Statement of September 2005 

committed North Korea, the United States, South Korea, 

China, Japan, and Russia to “the verifiable denuclearization 

of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner” and set out 

the respective commitments of the signatories.

10 Although the United States and North Korea were 

able to engage in and conclude a number of agreements, 

negotiations and implementation were tendentious and gave 

rise to suspicions of bona fides.

11 Chosun Ilbo, August 20, 2009, available at <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_

dir/2009/08/20/2009082000535.html>.

12 Remarks by President Barack Obama and President 

Lee Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea, April 2, 2009.

benefit the alliance partners and indirectly 

may move China to reformulate its priorities toward North Korea and exert the leverage 

necessary to make a comprehensive settlement 

a reality.

While U.S.–ROK military plans have 

been updated, they exist in a political and 

diplomatic vacuum. From a planning perspective, it is best to get ahead of the curve 

and let reality catch up. In view of the multiple and complex contingencies that could 

transpire in North Korea, a whole-of-government approach remains sadly lacking. 

Such an approach should begin between 

the United States and the ROK, with Japan 

brought in on issues that may affect its interests (refugees in particular). Chinese officials, concerned with stability in North 

Korea, to date have found such discussions 

to be “premature”—but if China saw the 

United States, the ROK, and Japan prepared 

to discuss North Korean contingencies, it 

might be more willing to participate itself.

Looking ahead, the U.S., South Korean, 

and Japanese approach to North Korea should 

be that the Six-Party Talks will continue and 

that Pyongyang’s return is awaited. The three 

governments should make clear that they 

hold no hostile intent toward Pyongyang but 

that they and the international community 

are determined to hold Pyongyang to its SixParty commitments. Recognizing that some 

problems are not immediately resolvable, the 

United States, the ROK, and Japan, in effect, 

are playing for time, for an orderly succession 

and a new leadership in Pyongyang.

The Obama administration has correctly insisted that North Korea will not be 

treated as a nuclear power, that Pyongyang 

return to the Six-Party Talks, that any bilateral negotiations must take place within 

the Six-Party framework, and that provocative behavior “will be met [with] serious enforcement of the sanctions that are in 

place.”12 The current U.S. diplomatic strategy 

is to keep the door open to engaging North 

Korea, in the hope that a new leadership in 

Pyongyang may have a different understanding of North Korea’s security and prosperity. 

Meanwhile, U.S. security strategy is aimed 

at deterring the outbreak of war, the use by 

North Korea of nuclear weapons or other 

WMD, and preventing the proliferation of 

WMD from the Korean Peninsula.

This course of action will mean living 

with a nuclear North Korea for the foreseeable future. But living with is not the same 

as accepting. The goal of diplomacy remains 

the complete, verifiable denuclearization of 

North Korea; this will take time, while security strategy must deal with the world as it is. 

The Obama administration’s commitment 

to extended deterrence is critical in supporting both our diplomatic and security strategy 

and our allies.

No. 250, November 2009 Strategic Forum 6

Burma in Strategic Perspective: 

Renewing Discussion of Options

Lewis M. Stern, George Thomas, and Julia A. 

Thompson

(Strategic Forum No. 249, October 2009)

Unity of Effort: Key to Success 

in Afghanistan

Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond

(Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009)

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