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VOICE OF VETERANS OF THE AFGHAN WAR 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 23, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

Republican Leader designee 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Bacevich, Andrew, Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.), Professor of International Relations and History, Boston, University, Boston, MA .......................................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

Chase, Genevieve, Veteran, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Army Reserve, Recipient 

of the Purple Heart, American Women Veterans, Alexandria, VA .................. 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3 

McGurk, Christopher, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Army (Ret.), Recepient of Combat 

Infantryman’s Badge, Two Bronze Stars, and the Purple Heart, New York, 

NY ......................................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15 

Moore, Westley, Captain, U.S. Army (Ret.), Baltimore, MD ................................ 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19 

Reyes, Rick, Corporal, U.S. Marines (Ret.), Los Angeles, CA .............................. 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

(III)

(1) 

VOICE OF VETERANS OF THE AFGHAN WAR 

THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:18 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Cardin, Shaheen, Kaufman, 

Lugar, and Corker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order. Delighted to 

welcome our witnesses and my colleagues to this important hearing. 

Earlier this week, I was invited by a group of Harvard Business 

School about-to-be graduates and first-year students, but all of 

whom are veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan. And I was struck by 

what a smart and accomplished, capable, as we used to say, 

squared-away group of young people I was talking to, with strong 

opinions, strong views about policies, about life. And they had 

earned it. And it underscored my personal belief about the degree 

to which military service instills strong leadership skills. 

What also struck me was the fact that we are living the lessons 

learned over the past 40 years about how we regard veterans. 

We’re all standing on common ground now. We’re saying thank you 

to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who have served. We 

are not confusing a war with the warriors. And I want to thank 

each and every one of you for your service to our country and for 

those who are still serving. 

Today, we want to hear your views of the conflict in Afghanistan. 

We are, as you all know, just completing a review. We’re going 

through a process of trying to fine-tune this policy, if it is fine-tunable. And that’s something we need to examine. We want to understand the challenges from the perspective of the men and women 

who have been fighting there, risking their lives, and suffering the 

losses that come with war. 

We want you to help us understand the definition of what is 

achievable, and perhaps even help us to define the notion of success and victory. We want to honor your service and demonstrate 

our appreciation for the sacrifices that you and other families have 

made. 

2 

History proves that soldiers on the ground have an intimate 

knowledge that is vital to their commanders and to us, as policymakers. Most recently, it was soldiers who sounded the early warnings that our mission in Iraq had some problems. It was soldiers 

in Anbar province who saw the major political opportunity to reconcile with the sheikhs, because they found that on their patrols 

and in their dealings and interactions on a firsthand basis. Soldiers 

know the challenges, up close and personal, and we’re eager to 

hear and to learn from the insights of this generation of young 

warriors who have served with honor and professionalism in 

Afghanistan and elsewhere. 

I made a promise to myself long ago that I would not compare 

all conflicts to the Vietnam war. And that sort of analogy by history can be very unproductive. More importantly, it can divert us 

from developing the right policy for a current conflict. 

What we need to do, and the reason the witnesses are here 

today, is address the intricacies and nuances of Afghanistan from 

every angle. That does not mean, however, that there aren’t some 

parallels between wars. Once again we are fighting an insurgency 

in a rural country with a weak central government. Our enemy 

blends in with the local population and easily crosses a long border 

to find sanctuary in a neighboring country. Our efforts to win the 

loyalty of the locals are hampered by civilian casualties and an 

inability to deliver the security that we promised more than 7 

years ago. We ignore those similarities at our peril. 

There are also fundamental differences. We have a responsibility 

to the men and women fighting in Afghanistan to understand those 

differences and to adapt to them. First and foremost, North Vietnamese never posed a direct threat to our country. The extremists 

we are fighting today, however, in Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan, do represent, and have, in fact, implemented, a 

direct threat to the security of the United States. They planned the 

attacks on New York and Washington that killed 3,000 Americans. 

They have killed hundreds of other innocents in terrorist attacks 

worldwide since then, and they are preparing new attacks on the 

United States and our interests even as we sit here today. 

Our original goal in Afghanistan was to go after those individuals. We were determined to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and 

eliminate al-Qaeda’s base of operations so that they could never 

again attack the United States. Our attention strayed from that 

goal, and our enemies took advantage of our mistakes. Now the 

Obama administration is attempting to redefine and narrow the 

mission, embracing objectives closer to those original goals. We are 

bolstering the American forces in Afghanistan to protect the citizens and to train the Afghan police and army. 

We recognize that no solution is possible without a strong alliance with Pakistan. In some ways, Pakistan represents an even 

greater threat today, so we will increase aid to Pakistan and support its democratic government. But, obviously we’ve seen, in recent days, the challenges to that government are growing. And, in 

the end, the fight there is not ours to determine the outcome; it is 

theirs. The Pakistanis have to determine how deeply they are committed to their own government; their own country. 

3 

We are no longer offering either country a blank check. We will 

set strict standards for measuring progress against al-Qaeda and 

the Taliban, and we will do our best to see that they are met. 

So, let me be clear, there is much still to be done in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. But, our new focus creates a sense of determined optimism for us and for our coalition allies, though—and that is part 

of the purpose today—that strategy has to be put to the test. And 

we look forward to your evaluations. Better defined objectives 

should lead to a better battle plan for our troops, but this remains 

an immensely complicated task, one that leaves our troops simultaneously on the front lines of the struggle against extremists and in 

the absolute middle of nowhere. 

Sitting on a mountain ledge in a helicopter during a snowstorm 

in Afghanistan last year with then-Senator Biden and Senator 

Hagel drove that home to all three of us. We are asking our young 

men and women to be warriors at one moment, but then mayors, 

dispute/conflict-resolution experts, anthropologists, and builders, 

and then warriors again. You and your colleagues have carried out 

these difficult and contradictory tasks with remarkable competence 

and courage, and our job this morning is to listen and learn from 

your perspective. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, I join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming 

this distinguished panel of members of the armed services who 

have served our country in combat. 

As President Obama launches a new initiative in Afghanistan 

and the Congress prepares to consider his request for funding operations in the region, it’s important that we hear from many different perspectives about the way forward. 

I’ve benefited enormously from talking to many Hoosiers who 

have served in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001, both in the regular military and as members of the National Guard and Reserves. 

Since September 11, 2001, 13,000 Hoosier National Guard personnel have been deployed in defense of our country. Currently, 

more than 100 Guardsmen from Indiana are mobilized in Afghanistan alone. Some 20 Hoosiers have lost their lives in that conflict. 

President Obama has elevated the priority of the Afghanistan 

mission, and the September 11 attacks were planned in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda still operates there. The fate of the country remains 

both strategic and symbolic. 

As the Obama administration devotes more resources and troops 

to Afghanistan, however, many details need to be fleshed out. Eyewitness accounts of battlefield conditions may be very valuable in 

evaluating the administration’s plans. Equally important are 

insights about the views and capabilities of the Afghan people, who 

ultimately will have to rebuild their country and provide for political stability. 

I think that Americans across the political spectrum agree that 

the situation in Afghanistan cannot be solved by military means 

alone. Multiple reviews of our policy have concluded that up to 80 

percent of the activities necessary in post-conflict and counterinsurVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:29 Feb 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT BETTY
4 

gency situations are civilian tasks. Success in Afghanistan may 

depend on the attitudes of the people, progress of reconstruction, 

the development of the economy, as much as it depends on battlefield victories. In the end, sustainable peace and progress is dependent upon Afghan determination to achieve for themselves a cohesive society. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our honored witnesses, 

and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Senator Lugar. 

Let us turn now to our witnesses. And again, let me say how 

much we appreciate your willingness to come here and share your 

experiences and your insights. Some of you have come a long way; 

in the case of Rick Reyes, you’ve come all the way from Los Angeles, and we appreciate that. 

The first person to testify will be Genevieve Chase, a staff sergeant in the U.S. Army Reserve, who spent 3 years on Active Duty 

and received a Purple Heart in Afghanistan. Following Ms. Chase 

will be Rick Reyes, a former corporal in the Marine Corps, who was 

one of the first American soldiers into Afghanistan in October 2001, 

and he also served in Iraq. Mr. Reyes will be followed by Chris 

McGurk, whose 10 years of service in the Army included tours in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, and earned him two Bronze Stars and the 

Combat Infantryman Medal. And Wes Moore is a former paratrooper and Army captain, who served as an information and special operations officer with the 82d Airborne in Afghanistan, and 

he will round out the veterans of Afghanistan who will testify. 

Then, finally, we will hear from one of my constituents, a distinguished student of conflict and war and of the region, and a professor. He is Andrew Bacevich. Andrew is a professor at Boston 

University. He’s a prolific writer on war and issues of foreign policy. He is also a veteran of Vietnam, himself. And I should add that 

his son, Andrew, gave his life for our country in service in Iraq in 

2007. 

So, we are deeply grateful for all of you being here today. Thank 

you. 

Genevieve. 

STATEMENT OF GENEVIEVE CHASE, VETERAN, STAFF SERGEANT, U.S. ARMY RESERVE, RECIPIENT OF THE PURPLE 

HEART, AMERICAN WOMEN VETERANS, ALEXANDRIA, VA 

Sergeant CHASE. Senator Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and 

members of the committee, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to share with you my testimony. 

My name is Genevieve Chase, and I served with the U.S. Army 

in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2006 as a 

Pashto-language-trained soldier. During my 40 weeks of cultural 

and language training, our teacher made it very clear to us what 

his hopes and goals were for his students; namely, that we utilize 

our knowledge and skills for the good of the Afghan people. 

Afghans remember their history well, and have not forgotten 

that we left their country without any foundation following the 

defeat of the Soviet Army. The Afghans fully believe we, the Americans, will do it again. 

5 

It is not too difficult to ascertain why, despite our intentions and 

efforts, fiercely nationalistic Afghans continue to believe that we 

are an occupying force. We went boldly in their country, planned 

and carried out our operations, and then retreated to the safety of 

our fortified and guarded compounds before sundown. 

Along with our coalition partners, we threw billions of dollars at 

civil affairs and reconstruction projects that we thought would win 

the ‘‘hearts and minds’’ of the Afghans while we empowered a local 

government in which many local Afghans believed contained nepotistic and corrupt officials. 

With the help of these same embezzling officials, we supported, 

and continue to support, the eradication of their rival tribe’s poppies while failing to provide alternative crops to the poorest of 

farmers. We forced the farmers and drug lords to align with the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda in order to protect their livelihoods while we 

surged in and out of volatile areas. We continue to make hollow 

promises and put those that would assist us, at risk of death by 

the hands of the enemy, for the very act of agreeing to work with 

us. We provide them with little, if any, security against those that 

would oppress them. 

The best of the Afghan village elders and leaders have three 

choices. One, voice and defend the interests of their constituents 

and face beheading or worse. Two, flee their homes and country in 

order to live and protect their families. Or, three, play to the interests of whomever is in their village at the moment, hoping to play 

both sides and not be killed by either. 

I will never forget speaking to a respected village elder, one of 

the few we trusted in the remote area of Helmand province, who 

felt that there was nothing more he could do to save his people but 

make the dangerous trip from the mountains, under the fear of 

Taliban reprisal, to appeal to the Americans and ask for assistance 

in pushing the Taliban out from his village. He left our Provincial 

Reconstruction Team, defeated and without hope. 

How do we create the stability that will allow for legitimate 

elders and leaders to govern without fear? The answer to this question lies in yet another: What have we done wrong, and what lessons have we learned from our mistakes? Just as Lieutenant 

Backsight Forethought in the classic military text, ‘‘The Defence of 

Duffer’s Drift,’’ had seven dreams in which he was able to analyze 

each tactical battle, we have had 8 years in which to do the same. 

Unfortunately, due to the strains on our forces, we not only 

rotate out divisions and brigades, but we piecemeal units that have 

not trained together and have little to no operational experience in 

the Afghan theater. Most significantly, in a culture where a man’s 

trust and respect is earned with time, loyalty, and devotion to the 

cause, we rotate out units every 6 to 12 months. We then ask our 

Afghan counterparts to give the same hard-won trust we earned 

and nurtured over time, to perfect strangers. 

With each rotation, just as Lieutenant Forethought did with his 

reoccurring dreams, we have had to start from the beginning to 

build and cultivate those working relationships again, but not 

always with the same amount of background experience and knowledge of the complexities and intricacies of the Afghan culture. 

6 

The question is not whether an influx of troops will be effective 

or seen as an occupation, but how do we effectively utilize those additional troops? The way in which we do so will cultivate how the 

Afghans perceive our intentions. The concept of the Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams was altruistic, but their application has been 

hindered by a number of issues, all secondary to the lack of 

security. 

Why build schools, provincial centers, bridges, and wells when 

there is no support or security provided for the villagers to utilize 

them? They become little else but targets for the opposition. 

My first recommendation is that we push our troops out to an 

even more local level. Rather than Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams, we establish District Security and Reconstruction Teams 

(DSRT) within and among the villages, working in conjunction with 

village elders. These DSRTs would provide a safe haven for the 

people, rather than the enemy, and in turn, Afghans would maximize the information operations campaign through the development and sustainment of progressive and prosperous communities. 

In order to do this, we start as we did in 2001, supporting the 

Afghans with centralized strategic victories, then spreading out 

from there while maintaining our ground and assisting the 

Afghans in providing their own security by living and serving 

among them. 

Second, we allow individual troops to extend their tours, if requested, so that we may apply expertise and continuity to rotating 

troops. At the very least, we rotate out cohesive divisions and 

brigades within, not only the same theater, but the same area of 

operations. 

Furthermore, we cultivate our own organic assets to include our 

linguists, analysts, and soldiers with Afghanistan, asymmetric, 

and/or counterinsurgency experience, and engage them in a focused 

and concentrated force, armed not just with weapons and ammunition, but the power of knowledge, experience, and wisdom. 

Third, we support the Afghans in rooting our corruption and 

establishing secure and stable environments for which they can 

regain the pride they have for their country rather than supporting 

corrupt officials as they work their own agendas and line their own 

pockets. We should encourage our coalition partners to purchase 

poppy yields, giving the money directly to the farmers rather than 

to corrupt district government officials, while providing alternative 

crops to grow and safe markets in which to facilitate commerce. 

These thoughts are just the beginning of what must a multifaceted and enduring effort on the behalf of all involved. As I 

stated previously, Afghanistan’s diversity in culture and geography 

demand that we embrace a comprehensive and intimate understanding of the nation’s issues. Broad and generalized tactics, as 

we have applied in the past, will not work in every village of 

Afghanistan. Cultivating our homegrown experts by allowing them 

to provide continuity and confluence of operations through their 

learned knowledge, and, moreover, in-depth network of interpersonal relationships, are tantamount to mutual respect and eventual success. 

Just as the enemy has adapted to our tactics, we must get away 

from the big-army mentality and do the same. In time and within 

7 

an environment in which schools will not be burned and bridges 

blown up, the Afghans will have safe access to employment and 

education. When this happens, we will begin to see the possibilities 

of a country free from radical and rampant extremism, where 

adults will be able to provide for their children, and their children 

will be free to attend schools. 

One day, this generation of children in Afghanistan will be better 

prepared to take the reins of their country from their parents, and 

will grow with the memory of war rather than the daily reality of 

it. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify here before the committee today, and look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Sergeant Chase follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENEVIEVE CHASE, STAFF SERGEANT, U.S. ARMY RESERVE, RECIPIENT OF THE PURPLE HEART, AMERICAN WOMEN VETERANS, ALEXANDRIA, VA 

Senator Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee, thank 

you for allowing me the opportunity to share with you my testimony. My name is 

Genevieve Chase and I served with the U.S. Army in Afghanistan during Combined 

Joint Task Force–76, Operation Enduring Freedom, 2006. I deployed as a member 

of a military intelligence team and was trained in the Pashto language. Forty weeks 

of Pashto language training was not merely about learning the language but involved gaining an understanding of the history, culture, and the people of Afghanistan. Our teacher made it very clear to us what his hopes and goals were for his 

students; namely that we would utilize our knowledge and skills for the good of the 

Afghan people. He believed in the mission that we had set out to accomplish in 

Afghanistan and he hoped for a peace in his former homeland. He not only taught 

us language and history, he provided a window into the heart of one Afghan man. 

Afghans remember their history well and have not forgotten that we left their country without any foundation in which to rebuild their devastated land following the 

defeat of the Soviet Army. When I had the unique opportunity to speak with the 

Afghans in their language, they were grave in telling me that we, the Americans, 

would do it again. 

I had great hopes when I left for Afghanistan, some of which were entrusted to 

me by my Afghan teacher. Of these was the possibility that one day I would see 

the children of Afghanistan live without knowing suffering, fear, and death. What 

I saw, heard, and felt when I got there was a palpable desperation of a people living 

in abject poverty and indescribable fear. I returned home with memories that will 

haunt my dreams for a lifetime and with the harsh and sobering realization that 

to the Afghan people and their children, my nightmares are their daily reality. It 

is because of my unwavering hope for the Afghan people that I feel compelled to 

ask some very important questions of the leaders in my country, questions that 

were asked of me, an American soldier, by the Afghans with which I had the honor 

to serve with. 

If we say that we are there to help the Afghans and we want them to believe us, 

why do we not truly listen to them? Afghan culture is by far one of the most complex that I have ever been exposed to. Understanding it requires more than a 

45-minute briefing from someone who may have read about it. Even a 40-week, fulltime language course taught by a native Afghan is not going to give one a comprehensive understanding of what it means to work among and with Afghans, especially when considering the vast differences in tribal cultures. In my opinion, this 

is one area in which I believe that we have wavered in our commitment to the 

Afghans and to the future of their country. In so doing, we have also failed every 

American and coalition soldier that has given his/her life in Operation Enduring 

Freedom. By not honoring the Afghan culture and acknowledging their history, we 

have not only failed in laying the foundations for a secure and stable environment 

but we have failed in building sustainable economic growth, both ideal end-states 

necessary so that we may bring all of our troops home. In nearly 8 years of this 

conflict, we have failed to fully assess and evaluate the culture of the Afghans which 

will prevent us from winning this conflict. 

It is not too difficult to ascertain why, despite our intentions and efforts, that 

some Afghans continue to believe that we are an ‘‘occupying force.’’ We went boldly 

into their country, planned and carried out our operations and then retreated to the 

safety of our fortified and guarded compounds before sundown. The very basics of 

8 

all human needs, according to unadulterated common sense and supported by the 

theory of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, consists of the physiological needs that all 

humans must fulfill in order to survive: Food, water, and shelter. On the next level 

exists the need for security and community, a sense of safety. A society cannot flourish without those basic foundations with which to build structural supports that encourage the growth of a stable and viable economy. Along with our coalition partners, we threw billions of dollars at civil affairs and reconstruction projects that we 

thought would win their ‘‘hearts and minds’’ while we empowered, supported, and 

protected a government in which many local Afghans believed contained nepotistic 

officials and corrupt provincial governments. With the help of these same embezzling officials we supported and continue to support the eradication of their rival 

tribe’s poppies while failing to provide alternative crops to the poorest farmers. 

We forced the farmers and ‘‘drug lords’’ to align with the Taliban and al-Qaeda 

in order to protect their livelihoods while we surge in and out of volatile areas. We 

have continued in making promises, asking and sometimes demanding cooperation 

only to leave those that would assist us to the fate of death by the hands of the 

enemy for the very act of agreeing to work with us. 

The best of the Afghan village elders and leaders have three choices: 

1. Voice and defend the interests of their constituents but face beheading or 

worse; 

2. Flee their homes and country in order to live and protect their families; 

or 

3. Play to the interests of whomever is in their town at the moment hoping 

to play both sides and not be killed by either. 

I am not speculating about what may occur in Afghanistan; these assessments are 

based on my firsthand observations and those of my comrades. I will never forget 

speaking to a respected village elder, one of the few we trusted in the remote area 

of Helmand province, who felt that there was nothing more he could do to save his 

people but make the dangerous trip from the mountains under fear of Taliban reprisal, to appeal to the Americans and ask for assistance in pushing the Taliban 

out from his village. However, he left our Provincial Reconstruction Team defeated 

and without hope. 

How do we create this stability that will allow for legitimate elders and leaders 

to govern without fear? The answer to this question lies in yet another, ‘‘What have 

we done wrong and what lessons have we learned from our mistakes?’’ Just as LT 

Backsight Forethought, in the classic military text—‘‘The Defense of Duffer’s Drift’’ 

had seven dreams in which he was able to analyze each tactical battle, we have had 

8 years in which to do the same. Currently, we not only rotate out units but divisions and brigades. In Vietnam, we rotated in smaller replacement troops which at 

least gave a bit more continuity to the battlefield. Unfortunately, due to the strains 

on our forces, we piecemeal units that have not trained together and have little to 

no operational experience in the Afghan theater but most significantly, in a culture 

where a man’s trust and respect is earned with time, loyalty, and a devotion to the 

cause, we rotate out units every 6 to 12 months. We ask our Afghan comrades and 

leaders to place the same trust in perfect strangers, that we spend priceless time 

earning. With each rotation, just as Lieutenant Forethought did with his reoccurring dreams, we have had to start from the beginning to build and cultivate those 

working relationships again. 

In addition, we put ourselves at a serious disadvantage when we send trained 

Pashto, Dari, and Farsi linguists to units going to Arabic speaking Iraq or put them 

into nondeploying units in Germany or Korea. These are our linguistic experts— 

they should deploy to their respective theaters. Likewise, we often send troops with 

two previous tours in one area of operations in which they are ‘‘subject matter 

experts’’ to work in areas of the world with which they are unfamiliar, and thus 

we lose not only their mentorship and training for junior soldiers, but their relevant 

and pertinent knowledge of the enemy. 

The question is not whether an influx of troops will be effective or be seen as an 

‘‘occupation’’ but how do we effectively utilize those additional troops. The way in 

which we do so will cultivate how the Afghans perceive our intentions. Adding another 17,000 boots on the ground or even doubling that number has the potential 

to be as one fellow comrade put it, ‘‘like applying a Band-Aid to a sucking chest 

wound.’’ It is not how many more troops we add, but how we utilize those troops 

effectively. Afghanistan’s population of over 33 million is dispersed throughout the 

country with concentrated areas in which International Security Assistance Forces 

and coalition troops hold large bases. In the more remote areas, we have established 

small Forward Operating Bases and even smaller Provincial Reconstruction Team 

compounds and firebases. Although the concept of the PRTs was altruistic, their apVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:29 Feb 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT BETTY
9 

plication has been hindered by a number of issues, all secondary to the lack of security. What good sense does it make to build schools, provincial centers, bridges and 

wells when there is no support or security provided for villagers to utilize them? 

My first recommendations are that we push our troops out to an even more local 

level. Rather than Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), we establish, at the minimum, District Security and Reconstruction Teams (DSRT) within and among the 

villages, working in conjunction with the village elders. These DSRTs would provide 

a safe haven for the people rather than the enemy and in turn, Afghans would 

maximize the information operations campaigns through the development of progressive and prosperous communities. In order to do this, we start as we did in 

2001, supporting the Afghans with small, strategic victories and from there spread 

out while maintaining our ground and assisting the Afghans in providing their own 

security by living and serving alongside them. 

Second, we allow individual troops and units to extend their tours if requested 

so that we may apply expertise and continuity to rotating troops. At the very least, 

we rotate out cohesive divisions and brigades within not only the same theater, but 

the same area of operations. Furthermore, we cultivate our own organic assets to 

include our linguists, analysts, and soldiers with Afghanistan, asymmetric and/or 

counterinsurgency experience and engage them in a focused and concentrated force 

armed not just with weapons and ammunition, but the power of knowledge, experience, and wisdom. 

Third, we support the Afghans in rooting out corruption and establishing secure 

and stable environments for which they can regain the pride they have for their 

country rather than supporting corrupt officials as they work their own agendas and 

line their own pockets. We should encourage our coalition partners to purchase 

poppy yields giving the money directly to the farmers rather than to corrupt district 

and government officials, while providing alternative crops to grow and safe markets in which to facilitate commerce. 

These are not all of the answers but merely an evaluation of how we can leverage 

our assets, experiences, and capabilities in the theater. These thoughts are just the 

beginning of what must be a multifaceted and enduring effort on the behalf of all 

involved. As I stated previously, Afghanistan’s diversity in culture and geography 

demand that we embrace a comprehensive and intimate understanding of the nation’s issues. Broad and generalized tactics as we have applied in the past will not 

work in every corner of Afghanistan. Cultivating our ‘‘homegrown experts’’ by allowing them to provide continuity and confluence of operations through their learned 

knowledge and moreover in depth network of interpersonal relationships are tantamount to mutual trust, respect, and eventual success. In addition, keeping subject 

matter experts and experienced commanders within the same area of operations 

while applying a flexible methodology will allow for a more tailored and applicable 

mission. Just as the enemy has adapted to our tactics, we must get away from the 

‘‘Big Army’’ mentality and do the same. 

In time and within an environment in which schools will not be burned or bridges 

blown up, the Afghans will have safe access to employment and education. When 

this happens, we will begin to see the possibilities of a country free from radical 

and rampant extremism where adults will be able to provide for their children and 

their children will be free to attend schools. One day, this generation of children 

in Afghanistan will be better prepared to take the reigns of their country from their 

parents and will grow with the memory of war rather than the daily reality of it 

and they will carry within themselves the hope for enduring prosperity and peace 

for the future of Afghanistan. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify here before the committee today and 

look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much for your thoughtful testimony. 

Next is Rick. 

STATEMENT OF RICK REYES, CORPORAL, U.S. MARINES (RET.), 

LOS ANGELES, CA 

Corporal REYES. First off, I want to thank Senator Kerry for giving me the inspiration of being here today. I sit here, 38 years after 

you were expressing your opinions on the Vietnam war, and, similarly, want to express my opinions about this occupation. 

10 

I also want to thank the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for having me here. 

I also want to say that I love my country, and that is why I’m 

here today. 

My name is Rick Reyes. I am a veteran of both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. I served with the 

United States Marine Corps as an infantry rifleman. We took an 

oath to defend this country, and that doesn’t stop when we check 

in our rifles into the armory. We keep our country safe by telling 

people the truth. And doing that is just as scary as any ambush 

or mortar attack. 

I come from very humble beginnings. I am a son to both an 

immigrant father and mother from Mexico. I grew up in East Los 

Angeles in one of the roughest parts of town, known as Boyle 

Heights. Later, my family moved to southeast Los Angeles to escape the violence, but that wasn’t far enough. As a kid, I always 

envisioned myself of one day fighting for my country and ensuring 

justice. 

Like most of my peers, when I was younger I got involved with 

the wrong crowd. After escaping a serious tragedy in my life, I 

knew the Marine Corps could provide me the opportunity to, not 

only serve my country, but to also straighten out my life by doing 

something honorable. 

On the night of the September 11 attacks, my battalion sat in 

port in Australia. It was sometime around midnight, and we were 

enjoying our off time at the local bars, when all of a sudden the 

music stopped and, over the PR systems, an announcement, heard 

that the United States was being under attack. We were all ordered to head back and aboard the ships. That night, we were told 

we were going to war with the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. 

The next morning, we pulled out of port and for the next month, 

while the administration formulated a plan, we prepared to go to 

war, with the conviction of fighting for justice and the American 

way. 

Our mission was to locate and capture suspected members of the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. Through my experience as an infantry 

rifleman, implemented past and current policy had found almost 

impossible to locate and capture the Taliban because there isn’t 

any effective way to separate them from the innocent civilian population. Patrols were conducted through populated neighborhoods. 

The populations on those neighborhood streets weren’t any different from the population on my street. There were kids running 

around and playing while we occupied their streets, mothers running behind after those kids, making sure they stay out of trouble 

and out of our way, and fathers trying to make a living for the little that they have. 

U.S.-hired translators would tell us where suspected Taliban or 

al-Qaeda would be found. We would follow their lead, often planning attacks and breaking into people’s homes. Due to our training 

in fighting wars and killing enemy, we wouldn’t enter these homes 

or situations quietly, but instead trained to fight with the vigilance 

of encountering death at every turn. 

Although we were on the hunt for suspected Taliban forces, at 

the end—at the end of it, we found that these dangerous missions 

11 

resulted with very poor consequences by destroying innocent lives. 

We weren’t fulfilling our objective of capturing terrorists, but instead creating enemies out of civilians. 

As a Marine trying to ensure justice, I began losing sight of why 

I was there, and the conviction began to fade. Because our mission 

was to capture suspected Taliban, and had no successful way of 

being able to distinguish them, we had no other choice but to suspect the entire civilian population, innocent or not. 

One day, we stopped at gunpoint, detained, beating and nearly 

killing an innocent man, only to find out he was just traveling 

down the road to deliver milk to his children. Because of that, that 

day those kids went without a father. There were hundreds of incidents like this one. Almost 100 percent of the time, we would find 

that suspected terrorists turned out to be innocent civilians. We 

began to feel we were chasing ghosts, fighting an enemy that we 

could not see or that didn’t allow itself to be seen. How can you 

tell the difference between the Taliban and Afghan civilians? The 

answer is that you can’t. It all stopped making sense. 

Later, I found out that these translators were being compensated 

on the amount of intelligence they were able to provide. So, it was 

their incentive to provide as much intelligence as possible, without 

any way to know if the information being provided was false. It 

was such a flat system, but who was I to question authority? 

When I returned home, I felt that occupying Afghanistan and 

Iraq was a mistake. I strongly feel that the military occupation and 

intervention is not the answer. If it didn’t work back in 2001, when 

we had all the energy, all our resources, but, most important, a 

very high troop morale, I asked myself, How could it work now? 

A lot of these men and women serving our country in the Armed 

Forces have been desperately worn and stretched out too thin by 

having them serve up to four tours overseas. If we aren’t killing 

them on the ground due to a flat policy, we are definitely killing 

them in spirit, and that is—and that also has a very serious indirect consequence, when the fight is brought back home. 

I love my country. I never once, while I—while serving, did I feel 

I was protecting America. But, instead, we were harboring the 

worst of sentiments in these foreign Middle Eastern countries. We 

were creating more enemies. 

As a kid, I envisioned myself serving my country and fighting for 

freedom. But, when the opportunity presented itself, it was 

stripped from me, and, instead, I was forced to become a tyrant. 

I have—as I have experienced, our troops are also experiencing a 

very low morale, which oftentimes translates into high suicide 

rates. 

These are just a few of the issues. There is just a huge array of 

reasons why, at the minimum, this occupation needs to be rethought. We should not be sending any more troops into Afghanistan. As a combat troop, we are trained to isolate and destroy the 

enemy, cut off its resources. As an indirect consequence, we impose 

our Western views and alienate their culture and traditions. In 

some respects, this entire occupation has become counterproductive. As a Marine, I was willing to give my life for my country, and 

still am. But, invading and occupying Afghanistan, sending more 

troops to stop what is a political problem, is not the answer. 

12 

I urge the Senators to rethink Afghanistan while there is still 

time. I can almost guarantee that sending more troops will mean 

more civilian and U.S. troop casualties, not for war, but for occupation. Sending more troops will not make the U.S. safer, it will only 

build more opposition against us. 

I urge you, on behalf of truth and patriotism, to consider carefully and rethink Afghanistan. More troops, more occupation is not 

the answer. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Corporal Reyes follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICK REYES, CORPORAL, U.S. MARINES (RET.), LOS

ANGELES, CA 

First, I want to begin by thanking the members of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee for having me here today. Second, I want to say that I love my country 

and that is why I am here today. My name is Rick Reyes. I was a corporal in the 

U.S. Marines and served both in Afghanstan and Iraq. I grew up in east Los Angeles, in rough part of town. As a young man like many of my friends at the time, 

I got involved with gangs. Signing up for the military seemed a logical step for me 

to help straighten out my life, so I enlisted in the Marines. 

On the day of the U.S. attacks, September 11, I was stationed in Australia. That 

night my fellow marines and I were at the bars. All of a sudden the music stopped 

and over the PR system we heard the announcement that the U.S. was under 

attack. We were all ordered to get back on the ship. We were told a couple of days 

later that we were going to Afghanstan to fight the Taliban. All the marines, including myself were totally ready to fight the enemy. 

Our mission was to locate and capture suspected members of Taliban. Missions 

were all done at night. U.S.-hired translators would tell us where suspect Taliban 

or al-Qaeda would be found. We would follow their lead, often by breaking into people’s homes. Because we were so pumped to find Taliban we would often rough up 

suspected terrorists. Sometimes we would break their hands, arms, legs, and mess 

up people’s homes scaring women and children. Those missions were very dangerous 

because at times, family members would shoot us from the back. We lost several 

marines because they were shot in the back by scared Afghans. At the end, we 

found out that suspected terrorists were innocent civilians who were protecting their 

families, their homes—from us. In retrospect, if someone was breaking into my 

home, I would probably fire at us as well. We began creating enemies out of innocent civilians. I saw how Afghans began hating us. As a marine, I began loosing 

sight of why I was there. 

I remember one day, we stopped an Afghani civilian who was taking milk to his 

kids because he was suspected of being a terrorist. We beat him to submission to 

where he dropped his milk. God only knows if that was the first or last time his 

kids had milk in a long time or if his children were all hungry and waiting for him. 

Later we released him after finding out he was innocent. That day his kids went 

without milk—because of us. There were hundreds of incidents like this one. And 

they all tore at me over time. 

Almost 100 percent of the time, we would find that suspected terrorists turned 

out to be innocent civilians. I started to feel like we were chasing ghosts. How can 

you tell the difference between members of the Taliban from an Afghan civilian? 

The answer is that you can’t. No one can. As marines, we did not know who was 

a civilian or a terrorist. It all stopped making sense. We were destroying people’s 

homes and hurting Afghan civilians for no reason. Later I found out that translators 

were paid on the number of tips they provided, so it was their incentive to give us 

as many tips as possible, even if they were false. It was such a flawed system. This 

was not the American way. We were not fighting for justice. This was not the freedom I signed up for. 

By the time I left Afghanistan, I felt that the U.S. being there was a big mistake. 

I joined the military because I wanted to be a hero, and I feel that I was stripped 

of that opportunity and instead was sent to fight an enemy that we could never see. 

The entire time we were there, we were chasing ghosts. I feel strongly that military 

intervention is not the answer. I love my country and never once while serving duty 

in Afghanistan did I feel that we were protecting America. Instead we were 

harboring the worst of sentiments in a foreign country, we were creating more enemies. This is why I strongly believe that we should not be sending more troops to 

Afghanistan. 

13 

As a marine, I was willing to give my life for this country; I still am. But invading 

Afghanistan, sending more troops to solve what is a political problem is not the answer: I urge the senators to rethink Afghanistan while there is still time. I can 

almost guarantee that sending more troops will mean more civilian and U.S. troop 

casualties, more homes being broken into, more children without food, more women 

without husbands. I encourage you to think of the cost of war on their country as 

well as ours. We have to rethink our mission. Sending more troops will not make 

the U.S. safer, it will only build more opposition against us. I urge you on behalf 

of truth and patriotism to consider carefully and rethink Afghanistan. More troops, 

more war, is not the answer. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Reyes. I appreciate it. 

[Applause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Please, everybody. 

Mr. McGurk. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER MCGURK, STAFF SERGEANT, 

U.S. ARMY (RET.), RECIPIENT OF COMBAT INFANTRYMAN’S 

BADGE, TWO BRONZE STARS, AND THE PURPLE HEART, NEW 

YORK, NY 

Sergeant MCGURK. I want to thank Chairman Kerry, Senator 

Lugar, and members of the committee, for inviting me here today 

and testify on behalf of my fellow veterans. I’m both honored and 

humbled. 

I’d like to say, first and foremost, that I believe, beyond a shadow 

of a doubt, that the United States should renew its commitment to 

Afghanistan and its people. I believed in this mission in 2004, and 

I firmly believe in it as I sit here today. 

Some pundits will argue that we may no longer be able to 

achieve any real measure of success in Afghanistan. I say to those 

critics that we must try and help stabilize a country that has been, 

for the most part, ignored ever since combat operations began in 

Iraq in 2003. Our continued inattention to Afghanistan, our drifting foreign policy in the region, and the fact that we have done little to stop the reemergence of the Taliban may very well solidify 

the resentment that the Afghan people have for the United States 

and the central Government of Afghanistan. 

We have one chance to get this right or face those—a real possibility of more terrorist attacks that rival those of 9/11 on U.S. soil. 

I realize that many of the goals that we set forth for ourselves 

at the onset of the war may no longer be fully achievable, but we 

must try to stabilize and secure Afghanistan before it slips further 

into violence. My experience in these matters does not come from 

writing foreign policy; rather, the firsthand experience I gained 

while leading men in combat in two different countries and the 

interactions I had on a daily basis with those people of those 

countries. 

I’d like to illustrate, through personal experience, the two main 

reasons I believe that we should continue our mission in Afghanistan. These reasons are very different, but they serve to capture 

the complexity of issues taking place on the ground. 

The first reason was an interaction that took place while my platoon was conducting security operations for a Provincial Reconstruction Team. The PTR operated out of a firebase in Gardez, in 

Paktia province, and helped to build several schools in the areas. 

They were encouraging many of the local villagers to attend the 

opening ceremonies of all the different schools. On one particular 

14 

mission, my squad was in charge of manning a checkpoint on the 

main road leading up to one school. The morning went by without 

incident, and were in the process of getting ready to return to the 

firebase when a village elder came up to me with a serious expression on his face. I prepared myself for potentially antagonist conversation, but was surprised when he began speaking softly in 

English. 

The conversation I had with him was short, but it was one that 

I will never forget. The man was a commander in the Mujahadeen 

and was wounded several times fighting the Russians. He lost both 

of his brothers to Soviet helicopter gunship raids and walked with 

a severe limp. He told me that he was worried, at first, when the 

Americans came to Afghanistan, but soon realized that we were 

here to help the Afghan people, not exploit them, and he expressed 

to me that we would not abandon Afghanistan again. He shook my 

hand and touched his heart out of respect, and was turning to 

leave, when he stopped, gave me the thumbs-up, and said America 

was good and just. He then turned and slowly walked away. 

I found myself at a loss for words as I stared at him. Here was 

a man, hardened by fighting the Soviet Army, who seemed to have 

lost everything in life, and yet had the faith—excuse me—had faith 

in a country and a people he did not know. He believed in the 

mission of the United States and the hope it gave to the Afghan 

people. 

This experience also served to compound the anger I felt when 

the mission in Afghanistan was neglected in favor of the mission 

in Iraq. Schools like the one built by the PRT stood empty and idle 

through what seemed to be a lack of funding for teachers, books, 

and other supplies. I felt as though the true objective of the mission was forgotten, and that the half-completed school was one 

giant photo opportunity. The commitment to men like the village 

elder was forgotten, the promise only half fulfilled. 

The second and most personal reason took place on September 

29, 2003, while my company was stationed at a firebase in Shkin, 

in Paktia province, right on the Pakistani border. One mission my 

platoon had been—one afternoon, my platoon had been sent on a 

mission to reinforce another platoon currently under enemy smallarms and mortar fire. Upon reaching the platoon in contact, my 

squad dismounted to locate and destroy the enemy mortar tube. As 

my squad swept through the area, my lead team triggered a violent 

ambush that turned into a sustained firefight of more than 10 

hours in duration. During the firefight, a 19-year-old, PFC Evan 

O’Neil of Haverhill, MA, was mortally wounded by an enemy sniper 

while protecting the squad’s exposed flank. As a trained EMT, I 

moved to assist the medic while continuing to direct the fire of my 

squad. 

Upon reaching PFC O’Neill, he said to me, ‘‘Sergeant, is the 

squad OK?’’ I told him that the squad was hanging in there, and 

I told him not to worry, that I was going to get him out of there. 

He then said to me, ‘‘I am sorry for letting you down.’’ I told him 

that he didn’t, and to hold on. The last words O’Neill ever spoke 

were, ‘‘I’m sorry for letting you down.’’ He was only 19 years old, 

yet he understood the mission was larger than himself. His last 

15 

words were entirely selfless. I held Evans’ hand and said the ‘‘Our 

Father’’ as he died. 

Excuse me. 

As I think back to that day, I understand the memory and courage of men like PFC O’Neill must be honored with a clear and coherent strategy to help the people of Afghanistan. We must defend 

the original mission, the one that was abandoned in favor of a misled strategy in Iraq, to protect the American people from terrorist 

threats and to ensure that O’Neill and others like him did not die 

in vain. 

I strongly believe in the mission in Afghanistan, combined with 

our efforts in Pakistan, was and is the true front on the war on 

terror, something I did not believe while fighting in Iraq. 

Senator Kerry, to this very committee in 1971, you spoke of men 

who have returned with a sense of anger and a sense of betrayal 

which no one has yet grasped. My own anger and sense of betrayal 

comes from the possibility that we may not come to a resolution in 

Afghanistan and that the blood that has been shed by the victims 

of 9/11, the Afghan people, and men like PFC O’Neill would be 

forgotten. 

Once again, I’d like to thank you for inviting me here to testify, 

and I truly am happy to see that troops are finally being listened 

to. 

[The prepared statement of Sergeant McGurk follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER MCGURK, STAFF SERGEANT, U.S. ARMY

(RET.), RECIPIENT OF COMBAT INFANTRYMAN’S BADGE, TWO BRONZE STARS AND

THE PURPLE HEART, NEW YORK, NY 

I want to thank Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and the members of the committee for inviting me here today to testify on behalf of my fellow Veterans; I am 

both honored and humbled. I would like to say first and foremost that I believe beyond a shadow of a doubt that the United States should renew its commitment to 

Afghanistan and its people. I believed in my mission then and I firmly believe in 

it as I sit here today. Some pundits will argue that we may no longer be able to 

achieve any real measure of success in Afghanistan. I say to those critics that we 

must try and help stabilize a country that has been, for the most part, ignored ever 

since combat operations began in Iraq in 2003. Our continued inattention to Afghanistan, our drifting foreign policy in the region, and the fact that we have done little 

to stop the reemergence of the Taliban may very well solidify the resentment that 

the Afghan people have for the United States and the central government of 

Afghanistan. We have one chance to get this right or face the real possibility of 

more terrorist attacks that rival those of 9/11 on U.S. soil. 

I realize that many of the goals that we set for ourselves at the onset of the war 

may no longer be fully achievable, but we must try to stabilize and secure Afghanistan before it slips further into violence. My experience in these matters does not 

come from writing foreign policy; rather the firsthand experience I gained while 

leading men in combat in two different countries and the interactions I had on a 

daily basis with the people of those countries. 

I would like to illustrate through personal experience the two main reasons I believe that we should continue the mission in Afghanistan. These reasons are very 

different, but serve to capture the complexity of issues taking place on the ground. 

The first interaction took place while my platoon was conducting security operations for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The PRT operated out of a 

firebase in Gardez, Paktia, province and had helped to build several schools in the 

area. They were encouraging as many of the local villagers to attend the opening 

ceremonies of the different schools. On one particular mission my squad was in 

charge of manning a checkpoint on the main road leading up to a school. The morning went by without incident and we were in the process of getting ready to return 

to the firebase when a village elder came up to me with a serious expression on his 

face. I prepared myself for a potentially antagonistic conversation, but was surprised 

when he began speaking softly in English. 

16 

The conversation I had with him was short but it was one that I will never forget. 

The man was commander in the Mujahadeen and was wounded several times fighting the Russians; he lost both of his brothers to Soviet helicopter gun-ship raids and 

walked with a severe limp. He told me that he was worried at first when the Americans came to Afghanistan, but soon realized that we were here to help the Afghan 

people, not exploit them. He hoped that we would not abandon Afghanistan again. 

He shook my hand and touched his heart out of respect and was turning to leave 

when he stopped, gave me a thumbs up, and said that ‘‘America was good and just’’ 

He then turned and slowly walked away. I found myself at a loss for words as I 

stared at him. Here was a man hardened by fighting the Soviet Army, who seemed 

to have lost everything in life and yet he had faith in a country and a people he 

did not know. He believed in the mission of the United States and the hope it gave 

to the Afghan people. 

This experience also served to compound the anger I felt when the mission in 

Afghanistan was neglected in favor of the mission in Iraq. Schools like the one built 

by the PRT stood empty and idle through what seemed to be a lack of funding for 

teachers, books, and other supplies. I felt as though the true objective of the mission 

was forgotten, and that the half-completed school was one giant photo op. The commitment to men like the village elder was forgotten; the promise only half fulfilled. 

The second and most personal experience took place on September 29, 2003, while 

my company was stationed at a firebase at Shkin in Paktika province, right on the 

Pakistani border. One mission my platoon had been sent to reinforce another platoon currently under enemy RPG and mortar fire. Upon reaching the platoon in contact, my squad dismounted to locate and destroy the enemy mortar tube. As my 

squad swept through the area, my lead team triggered a violent ambush that turned 

into a sustained firefight of more than 10 hours in duration. During the firefight, 

19-year-old PFC Evan O’Neill of Haverhill, MA, was mortally wounded by an enemy 

sniper while protecting the squad’s exposed flank. As a trained EMT, I moved to 

assist the medic while continuing to direct the fire of my squad. Upon reaching PFC 

O’Neill, he said to me, ‘‘Sergeant, is the squad OK?’’ and ‘‘I’m sorry for letting you 

down.’’ I told him that the squad was hanging in and I told him not to worry, that 

I was going to get him out of there; those were the last words he ever spoke—‘‘I 

am sorry for letting you down.’’ He was only 19, yet he understood that the mission 

was larger than himself. His last words were entirely selfless. I held his hand and 

said the ‘‘Our Father’’ as he died. As I think back to that day, I understand that 

the memory and courage of men like PFC O’Neill must be honored with a clear and 

coherent strategy to help the people of Afghanistan. We must defend the original 

mission—the one that was abandoned in favor of a misled strategy in Iraq—to protect the American people from terrorist threats and to ensure that O’Neill and others like him did not die in vain. 

I strongly believe that the mission in Afghanistan was and is the true front in 

the war on terror, something I did not believe while fighting in Iraq. Senator 

Kerry—to this very committee in 1971, you spoke of ‘‘men who have returned with 

a sense of anger and a sense of betrayal which no one has yet grasped.’’ My own 

anger and sense of betrayal comes from the possibility that we may not come to a 

resolution in Afghanistan, and that the blood that has been shed by the victims of 

9/11, the Afghan people, and men like PFC O’Neill would be in vain. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. I appreciate your testimony 

very, very much. 

Mr. Moore. 

STATEMENT OF WESTLEY MOORE, CAPTAIN, U.S. ARMY (RET.), 

BALTIMORE, MD 

Captain MOORE. Thank you very much. And I’d like to thank the 

entire committee for this time. And, Mr. Chairman, I’d like to specifically thank you for acknowledging the importance of hearing 

from junior officers and NCOs. I believe I speak for everyone on the 

panel, and the soldiers with whom we served, when I say that we 

appreciate the audience. 

In early 2005, I was working as a banker in London, and, less 

than a year later, I was deployed with the 1st Brigade of the 82d 

Airborne Division in Eastern Afghanistan. My good friend and a 

hero of mine, LTC Michael Fenzel, deputy brigade commander of 

17 

a unit that I later joined, asked me if I’d be willing to leave the 

world of finance and to serve. A sense of duty to my oath as an 

officer, a sense of commitment to the troops I would lead, and a 

sense of loyalty to my friend who asked me to join him propelled 

me to leave my comfortable existence and spend 9 months in the 

border region of Afghanistan. 

Now, before deploying, I read extensively about the history of the 

region and sought counsel from those who I thought had any insight on the area. And within days of arriving in our area of operations, I realized nothing could have prepared me for some of the 

most trying, exhilarating, and heartbreaking days of my life. 

Iraq dominated the news cycle at the time. However, what I immediately learned was that the fight in Afghanistan was just as 

crucial and precarious, if not more, than Iraq. The terrain, the economic and educational conditions, its neighbors, two of which are 

nuclear-armed, the tribalism and Pashtunwali law that reigned 

supreme over any inclination of nationalism, the lack of basic services, such as electricity and clean water resources, and a plethora 

of other realities, make this conflict more complex than I could 

have ever imagined. But, my time in Afghanistan also made this 

war very real to me, and made getting it right very personal. 

The fighting was tough, and the kinetic operations are all-encompassing. But, the main reason I was asked to serve as the director 

of information operations was to address the American strategic 

support plan for Program Takhim e Sol, which is the Afghan reconciliation program, which is also known as PTS. The Afghans, followed by the lessons of South Africa and Chile before them, aim 

to create a reconciliation program that allowed Afghans who were 

involved with al-Qaeda, HIG, the Haqqani network, and the 

Taliban, to turn in their weapons, pledge allegiance to the new 

Afghan Government, and return home to their families without 

fear of retribution or imprisonment. 

When my team arrived, eight people had PTS’d, or reconciled. 

Lieutenant Colonel Fenzel and the other senior leaders of my unit 

got it. They understood the basic premise that the more insurgents 

that we can convince to peacefully reconcile meant the fewer that 

we needed to make submit via force. We reevaluated our strategies 

and techniques to support the Afghans in this initiative. We created a program called the Afghan Public Relations Officers, or 

APROs, who are Afghans who worked with us to better tailor our 

messages and our reaction to the day’s events. We stopped using 

broadcasts written by United States solders and simply read by 

translators, and altered, not only the messages, but the messengers, and recruited respected leaders, such as President— 

former President Mujadidi to better reach our targets. We stopped 

using leaflet drops in order to spread the word, because, with a 

population that has a literacy rate in the single digits, written 

materials were utterly ineffective. We broadcasted PTS success stories so that people who were on the fence knew that a safe alternative awaited them, and that the option of waiting for our forces 

to find them was a losing proposition. By the time we redeployed, 

533 people had PTS’d and rejoined Afghan society, and the initiative still runs, to this day. 

18 

Now, I say that, not just to pat our team on the back about the 

work that they did, because our effects were not perfect and there 

were some significant flaws to that initiative, but to say that many 

important lessons were learned during that experience, and I’ll 

highlight three. 

The first. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is a very rural fight and cannot be fought out of Kandahar or Kabul. The reason we were effective is because we spent time out in the field, days at a time. We 

were talking to locals, building trust, and gaining insight. But, we 

need more, and it needs to be with a distinct local focus. In Iraq, 

the saying was, ‘‘As goes Baghdad, so goes the rest of the country.’’ 

This is not the case in Afghanistan, and, in many ways, it’s the 

antithesis of the truth. 

No. 2. We are underfunded and undermanned in Afghanistan. 

We have fought this war on the cheap. And I say that, not only in 

a military side, but particularly on the civilian support side and the 

reconstruction side. But, in the military angle, specifically, we have 

asked two brigades to cover over a 1,600-mile area that is known 

as Eastern Afghanistan, much of it in the most dangerous terrain 

in the world. Now, we’ve just announced that we’re adding another 

17,000 troops. But, even when those troops come online this summer, it is still a paltry number needed to fulfill the troop-to-task 

demands required for persistent engagement with people in the 

rural areas. 

And No. 3. Many of the attacks we sustained were not conducted 

by ideologues, they were conducted by people who simply had no 

economic options and felt the pull of a monetary reward for supporting insurgents. I personally dealt with insurgents who told me 

that they were not Taliban for cause, but essentially Taliban for 

hire. This number is now smaller, and that dynamic is now changing, but we need to help—we need to help provide jobs, education, 

security, and a viable future for the Afghans and their families in 

order to avoid the Taliban’s campaign of ruthless intimidation and 

their significant information operations platform. 

Right now an American soldier is ending another long day patrolling the mountain ranges of Kunar province. And under sweatsoaked Kevlar and burdened by the 40-pound rucksack he’s been 

carrying for the past 12 hours, he looks over his shoulder and he 

sees a group of Afghan children playing in the distance. And at 

that very moment, he’s again reminded of what’s at stake. And 

that same soldier’s thinking about his own family and loved ones 

back at home, constantly being reminded of why he’s there. 

Let me be clear, I, like many of my fellow soldiers and citizens, 

want this war to end, and we want this war to end, badly. I’ve lost 

friends, I’ve lost colleagues, both Afghan and American. And I 

understand the burden that sits on your shoulders, as decisionmakers, because it is similar to the burden that sat on mine as an 

officer who led troops in combat. But, the Taliban is executing a 

doctrine based on exhaustion, where their entire strategy depends 

on our political and national will faltering. Many of them are fond 

of saying, ‘‘The Americans have the wristwatches, but we have the 

time.’’ You have the wherewithal in this committee to make that 

an illusion by committing the resources, support, and political will 

to ensure this war is brought to an effective close. 

19 

Thank you for your time and commitment to getting this right. 

I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Captain Moore follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WESTLEY MOORE, CAPTAIN, U.S. ARMY (RET.), BALTIMORE, 

MD 

Thank you all for this opportunity and your service. 

Mr Chairman, I want to specifically thank you for acknowledging the importance 

of hearing from junior officers and NCOs. I believe I speak for everyone on the panel 

and the soldiers with whom we served when I say we appreciate the audience. 

In early 2005, I was working as an investment banker in London. Less than a 

year later, I was deployed with the 1st Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division in Eastern Afghanistan. My good friend and a hero of mine, LTC Michael Fenzel, deputy 

brigade commander of the unit I later joined, asked me if I would be willing to leave 

the world of finance and serve. A sense of duty to my oath as an officer, a sense 

of commitment to the troops I would lead, and a sense of loyalty to my friend who 

asked me to join him propelled me to leave my comfortable existence to spend 9 

months in the border region of Afghanistan. 

Before deploying, I read extensively about the history of the region and sought 

counsel from those who I thought had any insight on the area. Within days of arriving in our area of operations, I realized nothing could have prepared me for some 

of the most trying, exhilarating, and heartbreaking days of my life. 

Iraq dominated the news cycle at the time. However, what I immediately learned 

was that the fight in Afghanistan is just as crucial and precarious if not more than 

the fight in Iraq. The terrain, the economic and educational conditions, its neighbors, two of which are nuclear armed, the tribalism and ‘‘pashtunwali’’ law that 

reigns supreme over any inclination of nationalism the lack of basic services such 

as electricity and clear water resources, and a plethora of other realities make this 

conflict more complex than I could have ever imagined. But my time in Afghanistan 

also made this war very real to me, and made getting this right very personal. 

The fighting was tough, and the kinetic operations are all-encompassing, but the 

main reason I was asked to serve as the director of Information Operations was to 

address the American strategic support plan for Program-Takhim e Sol, or the 

Afghan Reconciliation Program. The Afghans, following the lessons of South Africa 

and Chile before them, aimed to create a reconciliation program that allowed 

Afghans who were involved with al-Qaeda, HIG, the Haqqani Network, and the 

Taliban to turn in their weapons, pledge allegiance to the new Afghan Government, 

and return home to their families without fear of retribution or imprisonment. 

When my team arrived, 8 people had PTS’d, or reconciled. LTC Fenzel and the other 

senior leaders of my unit ‘‘got it.’’ They understood the basic premise that the more 

insurgents we can convince to peacefully reconcile, meant the fewer we needed to 

make submit via force. We reevaluated our strategies and techniques to support the 

Afghans in this initiative. We created a program called ‘‘Afghan Public Relations 

Officers, or APROs,’’ who were Afghans we worked with us to better tailor our messages and reaction to events. We stopped using broadcasts written by U.S. soldiers 

and simply read by translators, and altered not only the messages but the messengers, and recruited respected leaders like former President Mujadidi, to better 

reach our targets. We stopped using leaflet drops in order to spread the word because with a population that has a literacy rate in the single digits, written materials were utterly ineffective. We broadcasted PTS success stories so that people who 

were on the fence knew that a safe alternative awaited them, and that the option 

of waiting for our forces to find them was a losing proposition. 

By the time we redeployed, 533 people had PTS’d and rejoined Afghan society. 

The initiative still runs to this day. I say that not to pat our team on the back, or 

to say the effects were perfect, because there were some significant flaws in the initiative, but to say many important lessons were learned during that experience. 

(1) Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is a rural fight, and cannot be fought out of Kandahar or Kabul. The reason we were effective is because we spent time out in the field. 

Days at a time, we were talking to locals, building trust, gaining insight. But we 

need more, and it needs to be with a local focus. In Iraq, the saying was ‘‘As goes 

Baghdad, so goes the rest of the country.’’ This is not the case in Afghanistan, and 

in many ways that is the antithesis of the truth. 

(2) We are underfunded and undermanned in Afghanistan. We have fought this 

war on the cheap and I say that not only on the military side, but on the civilian 

support side as well. But on the military angle specifically, we asked two brigades 

to have coverage over a 1,600-mile area that is known as Eastern Afghanistan, 

20 

much of it in the most dangerous terrain in the world. We just announced we are 

adding 17,000 troops but even when those troops come online, it is still a paltry 

number needed fulfill the troop-to-task demands required for a persistent engagement with the people in rural areas. 

(3) Many of the attacks we sustained were not conducted by ideologues. They 

were conducted by people who simply had no economic options and felt that pull 

of monetary reward for supporting insurgents. I personally dealt with insurgents 

who told me they were not Taliban for cause, but Taliban for hire. This number is 

now smaller, and the dynamic is now changing, but we need to help provide means 

to jobs, education, security, and a viable future for the Afghans and their families 

in order to avoid the Taliban’s campaign of intimidation and their significant information operations platform. 

Right now, an American soldier is ending another long day of patrolling the 

mountain ranges in the Kunar region. Under his sweat-soaked Kevlar, and burdened by the 40-pound rucksack he has been carrying for the past 12 hours, he 

looks over his shoulder and sees a group of Afghan children playing in the distance. 

And at that very moment, he’s again reminded what’s at stake. And that same soldier is thinking about his own family and loved ones back at home, constantly being 

reminded why he’s there. Let me be clear; I, like many of my fellow soldiers and 

citizens, want this war to end. I have lost friends and colleagues, both American 

and Afghan. I understand the burden that sits on your shoulders as decisionmakers 

because it is similar to the burden that sat on mine as an officer who led troops 

in combat. But the Taliban is executing a doctrine based on exhaustion, where their 

entire strategy depends on our political and national will faltering. Many of them 

are fond of saying, ‘‘The Americans have the wristwatches, but we have the time.’’ 

You have the wherewithal to make that an illusion by committing the resources, 

support, and political will to ensure that this war is brought to an effective close. 

Thank you all for your time and commitment to getting this right. l welcome your 

questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, 

Captain. Very important testimony. 

Colonel Bacevich, you get to be the wrap-up. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW BACEVICH, COLONEL, U.S. ARMY 

(RET.), PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 

HISTORY, BOSTON UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MA 

Colonel BACEVICH. Well, thank you for the privilege of presenting 

my views to this committee. And I am particularly honored to do 

so alongside these veterans of the Afghanistan war. 

Members of this generation have come to know war well, and I 

certainly would not presume to comment on their experience. My 

own generation had its own intimate relationship with a different 

war; one that has now become a distant memory. As with many 

who served in Vietnam, my own views, even today, are perhaps too 

colored by that experienced. Still, in getting some perspective on 

the predicament we currently face, Vietnam may retain some lingering relevance. 

In one of the most thoughtful Vietnam-era accounts written by 

a senior military officer, GEN Bruce Palmer once observed that, 

‘‘With respect to Vietnam, our leaders should have known that the 

American people would not stand still for a protracted war of an 

indeterminate nature and with no foreseeable end to the U.S. commitment.’’ General Palmer thereby distilled, in a single sentence, 

the central lesson of Vietnam. To embark upon an open-ended war 

lacking clearly defined and achievable objectives was to forfeit public support, thereby courting disaster. And his implication was 

clear: Never again. 

General Palmer’s book, which he titled ‘‘The 25-Year War’’ 

appeared in 1984. Today, exactly 25 years later, we once again find 

21 

ourselves mired in a protracted war of an indeterminate nature 

with no foreseeable end to the U.S. commitment. How did this 

happen? 

In the wake of Vietnam, the United States military set out, quite 

consciously, to develop a new way of war intended to preclude any 

recurrence of protracted indeterminate conflict. Yet, events since 

9/11, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, have now demolished such expectations. Once again, as in Vietnam, the enemy calls the tune, 

obliging us to fight on his terms. Once again, decision has become 

elusive; and, as fighting drags on, its purpose becomes increasingly 

difficult to discern. 

American soldiers are now said to face the prospect of perpetual 

conflict. We find ourselves in the midst of what the Pentagon calls 

‘‘The Long War,’’ a conflict global in scope, if largely concentrated 

in the Greater Middle East, and expected to last even longer than 

General Palmer’s 25-year war. 

Yet, there’s one notable difference today between today and the 

day 38 years ago, when the chairman of this committee testified 

against the then-seemingly endless Vietnam war. At that time, 

when the young John Kerry spoke, many of his contemporaries had 

angrily turned against their generation’s war. Today, most of the 

contemporaries of those fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan have simply tuned out the long war. The predominant mood of the country 

is not one of anger or anxiety, but of dull acceptance. 

In other words, Americans today do appear willing to stand still, 

to use General Palmer’s phrase, when considering the prospect of 

endless war. 

Now, there are many explanations for why Americans are so disengaged from the long war, but the most important, in my view, 

is that few of us have any personal stake in that conflict. 

When the citizen-soldier tradition collapsed under the weight of 

Vietnam, the post-Vietnam military rebuilt itself as a professional 

force. The creation of this all-volunteer military was widely hailed 

as a great success. Only now are we beginning to glimpse its shortcomings; chief among them the fact that it exists at some remove 

from American society. 

The upshot is that, with the eighth anniversary of the long war 

now approaching, fundamental questions about this enterprise continue to be ignored. My purpose today is to suggest that members 

of this committee have a profound duty to take these questions on. 

In his testimony before this committee, the young John Kerry, 

famously, or infamously, in the eyes of some, asked, ‘‘How do you 

ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?’’ What exactly 

was that mistake? Well, there were many, but the most fundamental lay in President Johnson’s erroneous conviction that the 

Republic of Vietnam constituted a vital United States national 

security interest, and that ensuring that country’s survival required a direct United States military intervention. Johnson erred 

in his estimation of South Vietnam’s importance, and he compounded that error with a tragic failure of imagination, persuading 

himself that there existed no alternative to a massive United 

States troop commitment and that, once in, there was no way out. 

My own view is that today we are, in our own way, repeating 

LBJ’s errors. Recall that in his testimony before this committee, 

22 

speaking on behalf of other antiwar veterans, the young John 

Kerry remarked that ‘‘We are probably angriest about all that we 

were told about Vietnam and about the mystical war against communism.’’ The mystical war against communism finds its counterpart in the mystical war on terrorism. As in the 1960s, so, too, 

today. Mystification breeds misunderstanding and misjudgment. It 

prevents us from seeing things as they are. 

As a direct result, it leads us to exaggerate the importance of 

places like Afghanistan, and, indeed, to exaggerate the jihadist 

threat, which falls well short of being existential. It induces flights 

of fancy so that, for example, otherwise sensible people conjure up 

visions of providing clean water, functioning schools, and good governance to Afghanistan’s 40,000 villages, with expectations of 

thereby winning Afghan hearts and minds. It causes people to 

ignore the consideration of cost. With the long war already, this 

Nation’s second most expensive conflict, trailing only World War II, 

and with the Federal Government projecting trillion-dollar deficits 

for years to come, how much can we afford, and where is the money 

coming from? 

Now, for political reasons, the Obama administration may have 

banished the phrase ‘‘Global War on Terror,’’ yet even today the 

conviction exists that the United States is called upon to dominate 

or liberate or transform the Greater Middle East. Methods may be 

shifting, but the emphasis on pacification giving way to militarized 

nation-building, priorities may be changing, AfPak now supplanting Iraq as the main effort. 

The urgent need is to demystify this project, which, from the outset, was a misguided one. Just as in the 1960s, we possessed neither the wisdom nor the means needed to determine the fate of 

Southeast Asia, so today we possess neither the wisdom, nor the 

means necessary, to determine the fate of the Greater Middle East. 

To persist in efforts to do so will simply replicate, on an even greater scale, mistakes and misjudgments comparable to those that 

young John Kerry once rightly decried. 

Thank you. 

[Applause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Please, folks, we will have no demonstrations of 

any kind—for, against, in the middle, either way. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Bacevich follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. BACEVICH, COLONEL, U.S. ARMY (RET.), 

PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND HISTORY, BOSTON UNIVERSITY, 

BOSTON, MA 

Thank you for the privilege of presenting my views to this committee. I am particularly honored to do so alongside these veterans of the Afghanistan war. 

Members of this generation have come to know war well and I would not presume 

to comment on their experience. My own generation had its own intimate relationship with a different war, one that has now become a distant memory. As with 

many who served in Vietnam, my own views even today are perhaps too colored by 

that experience. Still, in gaining some perspective on the predicament that we currently face, Vietnam may retain some lingering relevance. 

What strikes me most about that war is the extent to which its lessons have been 

forgotten and in some cases even inverted. 

In one of the most thoughtful Vietnam-era accounts written by a senior military 

officer, GEN Bruce Palmer once observed that ‘‘With respect to Vietnam, our leaders 

should have known that the American people would not stand still for a protracted 

war of an indeterminate nature with no foreseeable end to the U.S. commitment.’’ 

23 

General Palmer thereby distilled into a single sentence the central lesson of Vietnam: To embark upon an open-ended war lacking clearly defined and achievable 

objectives was to forfeit public support, thereby courting disaster. The implications 

were clear: Never again. 

General Palmer’s book, which he titled ‘‘The Twenty-Five Year War,’’ appeared in 

1984. Today, exactly 25 years later we once again find ourselves mired in a ‘‘protracted war of an indeterminate nature with no foreseeable end to the U.S. commitment.’’ 

How did this happen? 

In the wake of Vietnam, the United States military set out to develop a new way 

of war intended to preclude any recurrence of protracted, indeterminate conflict. The 

expectation was that by emphasizing technology and superior skill U.S. forces would 

achieve victory quickly and at acceptable costs, thereby protecting themselves from 

the possibility of public abandonment. In 1991 Operation Desert Storm seemingly 

validated this new paradigm. 

Yet events since 9/11, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, have now demolished such 

expectations. Once again, as in Vietnam, the enemy calls the tune, obliging us to 

fight on his terms. Decision has become elusive. As fighting drags on, its purpose 

becomes increasingly difficult to discern. 

American soldiers are now said to face the prospect of perpetual conflict. We find 

ourselves in the midst of what the Pentagon calls ‘‘The Long War,’’ a conflict global 

in scope (if largely concentrated in the Greater Middle East) and expected to last 

even longer than General Palmer’s ‘‘Twenty-Five Year War.’’ 

To apply to the Long War the plaintive query that GEN David Petraeus once 

posed with regard to Iraq—‘‘Tell me how this ends’’—the answer is clear: No one 

has the foggiest idea. War has become like the changing phases of the moon: It’s 

part of everyday existence. For American soldiers there is quite literally no end in 

sight. 

Yet there is one notable difference between today and the day 38 years ago when 

the chairman of this committee testified against the then seemingly endless war in 

Vietnam. At that time, when the young John Kerry spoke, many of his contemporaries had angrily turned against their generation’s war. Today, most of the contemporaries of those fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan have simply tuned out the 

Long War. The predominant mood of the country is not one of anger or anxiety, but 

of dull acceptance. 

In other words, Americans today do appear willing to ‘‘stand still’’ when considering the prospect of endless war. There are many explanations for why Americans 

are so disengaged from the Long War, but the most important, in my view, is that 

few of us have any personal stake in that conflict. 

When the citizen-soldier tradition collapsed under the weight of Vietnam, the 

post-Vietnam military rebuilt itself as a professional force. The creation of this allvolunteer military was widely hailed as a great success. Only now are we beginning 

to glimpse its shortcomings, chief among them the fact that it exists at some remove 

from American society. Americans today profess to ‘‘support the troops’’ but that 

support is a mile wide and an inch deep. It rarely translates into serious public concern for whether the troops are being used wisely or well. 

The upshot is that with the eighth anniversary of the Long War now approaching, 

fundamental questions about this enterprise continue to be ignored. 

My purpose today is to suggest that the members of this committee have a profound duty to take those questions on. 

In his testimony before this committee, the young John Kerry famously—or infamously, in the eyes of some—asked: ‘‘How do you ask a man to be the last man 

to die for a mistake?’’ 

What exactly was that mistake? Well, there were many, but the most fundamental lay in President Johnson’s erroneous conviction that the Republic of Vietnam 

constituted a vital U.S. security interest and that ensuring that country’s survival 

required direct U.S. military intervention. 

Johnson erred in his estimation of South Vietnam’s importance. He compounded 

that error with a tragic failure of imagination, persuading himself that there existed 

no alternative to a massive U.S. troop commitment and that once in there was no 

way out. 

My own view is that we are, in our own day, repeating LBJ’s errors. Recall that 

in his testimony before this committee, speaking on behalf of other antiwar veterans, the young John Kerry derisively remarked that ‘‘we are probably angriest 

about all that we were told about Vietnam and about the mystical war against communism.’’ 

24 

The mystical war against communism finds its counterpart in the mystical war 

on terrorism. As in the 1960s so too today: Mystification breeds misunderstanding 

and misjudgment. It prevents us from seeing things as they are. 

As a direct result, it leads us to exaggerate the importance of places like Afghanistan and indeed to exaggerate the jihadist threat, which falls well short of being 

existential. It induces flights of fancy, so that, for example, otherwise sensible people conjure up visions of providing clean water, functioning schools, and good governance to Afghanistan’s 40,000 villages, with expectations of thereby winning 

Afghan hearts and minds. It causes people to ignore considerations of cost. With the 

Long War already this Nation’s second most expensive conflict, trailing only World 

War II, and with the Federal Government projecting trillion dollar deficits for years 

to come, how much can we afford and where is the money coming from? 

For political reasons the Obama administration may have banished the phrase 

‘‘Global War on Terror,’’ yet even today the conviction persists that the United 

States is called upon to dominate or liberate or transform the Greater Middle East. 

Methods may be shifting, with the emphasis on pacification giving way to militarized nation-building. Priorities may be changing, AfPak now supplanting Iraq as 

the main effort. Yet by whatever name the larger enterprise continues. The President who vows to ‘‘change the way Washington works’’ has not yet exhibited the 

imagination needed to conceive of an alternative to the project that his predecessor 

began. 

The urgent need is to demystify that project, which was from the outset a misguided one. Just as in the 1960s we possessed neither the wisdom nor the means 

needed to determine the fate of Southeast Asia, so too today we possess neither the 

wisdom nor the means necessary to determinate the fate of the Greater Middle 

East. To persist in efforts to do so—as the Obama administration appears intent on 

doing in Afghanistan—will simply replicate on an even greater scale mistakes and 

misjudgments comparable to those that young John Kerry once rightly decried. 

The CHAIRMAN. But, thank you for the testimony. Very, very important statement, and, I think, a wonderful mix of views here that 

really pose to the committee the heart of this dilemma. And I’m 

grateful to each and every one of you for the testimonies that 

you’ve given here today. And our job now is to sort of probe and 

see if we can figure out the answers to some very provocative questions that have been posed in the testimonies that we’ve heard 

today. 

I’m very grateful to you, Colonel Bacevich, for posing this fundamental dilemma about resources and strategy, though I’m not sure 

if I’m grateful for the reminders that I’m now the ‘‘older John 

Kerry.’’ 

But, the—sort of cutting to the rub of this, I guess—you talked 

about the tragic failure of imagination. Each of you, I think, in 

your own way—Sergeant McGurk, Captain Moore—you’ve each 

talked about the shift of resources to Iraq and the fact that we 

haven’t had resources. And I’m very sympathetic to what I heard 

from you about when I was up in Kunar province, I saw the outstanding work of one of the PRTs, and their extraordinary ability 

to have forged very personal relationships with people in that particular village, where they clearly made a difference. But, as Colonel Bacevich is mentioning, there are 40,000 such villages and 

countless numbers of people. And the question, to some degree, is 

posed in your own statements about the support—about the task 

as you saw it, to try to have a more engaged kind of personal relationship—and really, Mr. Reyes, it sort of plays off your sense of 

frustration at what you were trying to do, because you’ve articulated the frustration of going out there and not being able to discern who’s Taliban, who isn’t, and being able to figure out how you 

put the pieces together. In other places, where they had a different 

set of resources or maybe a better definition of the mission, they 

25 

were able to put those pieces together. But, in the end, the question is, Do all the pieces add up to putting it together in the way 

that Colonel Bacevich is asking? 

So, I think the review process that’s gone on, where General 

Petraeus and others have tried to measure, How do you recalibrate 

this?—the question now that we have to ask is, Is this calibration 

accurate? Is it sufficient? Is it going to be able to undo the negatives that you ran into, Mr. Reyes? Is it going to be able to reinforce the positives that you both talked about, and you talked 

about, Genevieve? But, are they, in the end, going to be adequate 

to meet the challenge that Colonel Bacevich talks about, which is 

the sufficiency overall of this larger strategy to actually work? And 

that’s what we’ve got to figure out. I think that’s a fair statement 

of the challenge. 

It seems to me that the administration is trying to narrow that 

mission, Colonel, and they’re trying not to get into a place where 

they are talking about an internal rebuilding, but, rather, defining 

the mission in its original terms, which was to get al-Qaeda and 

prevent al-Qaeda from using it as a base to be able to attack the 

United States. 

Now, is that, or is that not, in your judgment, Colonel, a sufficient recalibration of the strategy—an achievable calibration of the 

strategy, maybe I should say? 

Colonel BACEVICH. You know, my preliminary report card of the 

Obama administration would give the administration very high 

marks, in the sense that some of the, bluntly speaking, ideological 

fantasies that seemed to inform thinking during the Bush era have 

now been set aside, and the approach now seems much more 

grounded in reality, and pragmatic. And, you know, one would 

have to applaud them. And I think that that statement does apply 

to this administration’s perspective on Afghanistan, that, to a degree, the expectations and objectives are being ratcheted down. I 

would still say those objectives are not clearly defined. 

But, my complaint with regard to the administration is that, at 

least as best I can tell, I haven’t heard a clear statement of how 

Afghanistan fits in this larger context of ‘‘the long war.’’ 

Now, the administration has abandoned, best I can tell, the 

phrase ‘‘Global War on Terror,’’ but what is the larger enterprise, 

and how does Afghanistan relate to that larger enterprise? And if 

you focus on the larger enterprise rather than strictly on Afghanistan, it seems to me you confront questions of purpose and duration and resource requirements that demand attention. Otherwise, 

the long war—and I emphasize that phrase, because it seems to me 

that it’s very—it is descriptive, in the sense that the only thing we 

can say about this war is that it’s going to go on for a long, long 

time. It seems to me we need—we just urgently need to ask ourselves whether or not the purposes of the long war are achievable, 

necessary, and affordable. And Afghanistan is a subset of that 

larger set of questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I understand that. I agree with that. And 

the question then becomes, Do you define the challenge today, not 

just in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but in other places, as a kind of 

global counterinsurgency effort that we have to wage—not a global 

war on terror, but a counterinsurgency? And, as you know better 

26 

than anybody, there’s a distinction between counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency. Is it fair to say that you could have a footprint 

that is calibrated to the task of protecting the United States from 

what we already know, by 2001 September experience, is the ability of this group of people to organize and plot against us, some 

other attack from an open territory? In other words, if we’re not 

there in some way preventing them from the freedom to do that, 

isn’t it pretty clear they’re going to do that? 

Colonel BACEVICH. I think this is one of the areas where Vietnam—the Vietnam comparison is relevant, because those who—the 

architects of that war insisted that, once we made the commitment 

of Americanizing the war, that there really was no alternative 

except to follow through. That’s the tragic failure of imagination. 

And I would want to argue that we needn’t—we should not fall into 

that trap again. We should at least be willing to consider the possibility—examine the possibility—of alternatives to the long war. 

If the long war—this effort to reduce the jihadist threat to the 

level in which it would be tolerable, if you will—to do that by 

invading and occupying and transforming countries—that’s, in 

essence, what U.S. strategy has been since 9/11, focused on Iraq 

and Afghanistan—is there another fundamentally different approach? And I think there is. I mean, it seems to me there are 

workings of an alternative approach, an approach that does not require us to invade and occupy countries in the establishment of 

very robust defenses. I mean, 9/11 happened, not because al-Qaeda 

was so smart, it happened primarily because we were so stupid and 

we allowed it to happen. 

So, an alternative strategy begins with the creation of robust defenses. It includes an effort to deny to the jihadists the resources, 

and primarily the financial resources, that they need to plot 

against us. And we provide those resources, in large part because 

of our dependence upon oil, that comes from the Persian Gulf, 

which funnels billions of dollars, some portion of which gets 

diverted to the jihadists. 

What that says is, a serious alternative strategy makes an energy policy an urgent priority. It’s—an alternative strategy is one 

that says—that views the terrorist threat, not as the equivalent of 

Nazi Germany, but, in a sense, as an international criminal conspiracy, a religiously motivated mafia, and that the way you deal 

with that is through a sustained, well-resourced, multilateral police 

effort to identify and root out terrorist networks—again, something 

that is accomplished, not through invading and occupying countries. 

Now, I’m not trying to sell you, at this particular moment, on 

every aspect of this alternative strategy; I’m simply trying to—I am 

trying to sell you on the idea that perhaps it is possible to conceive 

of an alternative to the long war which will enable us to accomplish 

our national security objectives more effectively and more cheaply. 

The CHAIRMAN. What do you, as the troops who are on the 

ground trying to implement this strategy, feel about what you’ve 

just heard? But also, is there time, in your judgment, given the 

shift that you’ve heard articulated in this recalibration of our policy—do you believe that that is adequate to be able to allow you 

to do the things that you were talking about and make sufficient 

27 

progress, or do you get trapped in the place that Colonel Bacevich 

was talking about? 

Captain Moore, Sergeant, and Corporal. 

Captain MOORE. Thanks, sir. And actually, in listening to the 

comments, I actually wholeheartedly agree that there needs to be— 

we need to holistically approach how we’re going to look at this. We 

need to look at alternative energy resources. We need to look at 

economic resources and all the other factors that play into this, 

that play into the conflict. But, we can’t do it to the exclusion of 

providing security to Afghanistan, and we can’t do it to the exclusion of providing an opportunity for the NGOs and the State 

Department and USAID to be able to go in and do the work, because the challenge of them being able to do the work in Afghanistan has not—in some cases, has been the lack of resources that 

have been—has been targeted toward them, but, in many cases, it’s 

been security. They haven’t had the security measures in place that 

would allow them to actually further the advancement of development causes and development cures. 

But, going back to something that you mentioned earlier, I think, 

is a very important point—— 

The CHAIRMAN. My question is, Captain, can we ever provide 

adequate security without the kind of commitment that digs you 

into the hole that takes you beyond your resources, beyond your capacity? That’s the balance. 

Captain MOORE. Yes, sir. Well, it’s not the, ‘‘Can we provide the 

adequate security.’’ It’s that, Can we put together the resources to 

help the Afghans provide adequate security? And the answer to 

that is ‘‘Yes.’’ 

The CHAIRMAN. You believe we can. 

Captain MOORE. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, on the ground, you sense that with an adequate amount of focus now on the tribal level, more local anticorruption and other kinds of efforts, you have confidence in the 

ability to make progress. 

Captain MOORE. Sir, when you look at the progress that the ANP 

and the ANAs, or the Afghan National Police and the Afghan 

National Army, has made, even just over the process of the past 

3 to 4 years, it’s quite significant. They have more people on rolls, 

they’re more competent, they’re more efficient. So, I think—and 

especially if we can tailor our—not only development funds, but 

then also our training, in terms of looking at a more local level, 

better understanding Pashtunwali and the Pashtun understanding 

of the eastern border of Afghanistan, then I think we absolutely 

can build those forces. 

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant Chase. 

Sergeant CHASE. Sir, I just would like to back up what Wes said, 

and also, I do agree with some things that the Colonel has said, 

except I would like to take us back a minute to the Soviet invasion 

and when they left, and the point that was made to me several 

times by Afghans who lived during that time period: Nobody provided them with infrastructure, with security, or with a stable government. That’s where the issues were. That’s how al-Qaeda was 

able to get into Afghanistan and use it as a safe haven, because 

that country was so volatile and so desperate. Al-Qaeda did attack 

28 

us on our soil and were harbored by the Taliban and now that 

we’ve gone in and essentially, for the most part, have worked to get 

rid of the al-Qaeda in—I’m sorry, I’m so nervous—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No, you’re doing great. 

Sergeant CHASE. In the beginning, we focused so much of our 

efforts on getting rid of the al-Qaeda and this idea of getting rid 

of Osama bin Laden—as far as we know, he hasn’t been in Afghanistan for quite some time; however, we are now dealing with homegrown and very much internally developed Taliban, supported and 

facilitated by al-Qaeda. The local Afghans I spoke to were only concerned with issues like losing their livelihoods and other things I’ve 

mentioned. However, if we leave without providing security, propping up a stable government, and giving the local villages and the 

people that are there some sense of structure and some sense of 

safety and security, we’ll be back. If we don’t do this now, we’ll be 

back. We belong to an all-volunteer military, and the three of us 

are sitting here before you, telling you that we need to do this right 

and we need to do it now. I have many friends who have said that 

they would go back to Afghanistan—many of us will do what needs 

to be done now because we don’t want to have to go back in the 

future—we don’t want our children to have to go back. 

Afghanistan’s a very different country, it’s a very different fight. 

And to say that we have invaded Afghanistan is highly inaccurate. 

In fact, we haven’t done enough, effectively, to help them. Understanding their culture more intimately and working with Pashtunwali code, as well as the culture of the Afghans, we would be better 

able to assist them in taking care of themselves, as opposed to 

where in an invasion as we go in, very much like the Russians did, 

and tell them how to live. 

Essentially, yes, if we worked smarter and allocated our resources more appropriately, as well as truly worked with and 

among the Afghans. I have every confidence that we can accomplish what we need to in order for Afghanistan to be safe and viable without external and internal influence from extremists. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’ve exceeded my time. Sergeant McGurk and 

Mr. Reyes, why don’t you come in, with an answer to Senator 

Lugar perhaps, so that we can get around the dais here, and you 

answer that. Is that fair enough, Senator Lugar? 

Senator LUGAR. Why don’t they go ahead. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

Would each of you, then, respond to that? And as you do, remember that when we went in, in 2001, in the aftermath of that we had 

100-percent of the Afghan people behind us, supportive, ready to 

roll. And obviously that has now dropped. I’ve seen some numbers 

that are perilously low at this point in time. So, part of the question is, Do we have time to turn that around, and the capacity at 

the same time? 

Sergeant McGurk. And then Mr. Reyes. 

Sergeant MCGURK. Sir, I’d have to say we don’t have any choice 

but to make the time. I think we made our bed, and now we have 

to lie in it. We went into Afghanistan to try to defeat the Taliban, 

try to prevent al-Qaeda from reemerging within Afghanistan and 

building more bases. And then we just left. We left the Afghan people to themselves. We half propped up a government and then left. 

29 

We started building trust, we started building really good rapport 

with the local Afghan people, and we just left. It’s as plain as that, 

sir. 

I’m not a policy wonk, I’m not an expert when it comes to foreign 

policy. I can tell you, the sense on the ground when I was there 

was, they were happy we were there. 

I also served in Iraq, and I can tell you, I never got that sense, 

once, when I was in Iraq. I was in Baghdad, Al Shualah, and different areas on the western fringes of Baghdad. I was out even by 

Abu Ghraib Prison. I never once saw the same support from the 

Iraqis that I saw from the Afghan people. 

And as I said in my testimony, when that—the village elder 

came up—and here’s a man who was fighting the Russian Army— 

was basically thanking me. You know, I’m not the entire mission 

in Afghanistan at the time, but I am representative of the Army, 

and they were happy that—he was happy, and I know that many 

of the people we dealt with were extremely happy that we were 

there, and they asked us not to leave. I mean, it’s no big secret 

that, you know, when the Russians were defeated in Afghanistan, 

we took our funding and left. And a lot of the resentments were 

carried over until then. And there were some older generation of 

Afghan that were kind of a little leery of us. And I think that if 

we don’t make the effort, we don’t take—make the time, we’re 

going to be facing more terrorist attacks. 

To say that, you know, Afghanistan was an invaded country— 

kind of what Genevieve said, it wasn’t an invaded country. And 

unlike Vietnam, the Vietnamese didn’t attack us on United States 

soil. 

So, to answer your question, sir, in a general term, is, we have 

to make the time to at least try and stabilize, as best we can. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Never let anybody tell you you’re not 

an expert. You are. That’s why you’re here. 

Corporal Reyes. 

Corporal REYES. The way we defeat these terrorist networks is 

by seizing recruitment. We need to remove the motive of why these 

terrorist organizations are growing. Once we remove that motive, 

we need stronger intelligence. With that stronger intelligence, we 

create a more isolated situation, versus taking a shot in the dark 

by sending 17,000 more troops sweeping the landscape, leaving a 

lot of destruction behind, and just giving them more motive to have 

these—the Taliban grow. 

The CHAIRMAN. There’s really a difference of opinion here, obviously, between those who feel that, given the right strategy, given 

the right resources and mission definition, you can avoid the negative effect that you’re talking about, Corporal, and wind up actually 

creating a positive response. Certainly, we’ve seen that in PRTs 

and other places where we’ve had that adequate ability. But, I understand what you’re saying, also, that where we have collateral 

damage, where you have civilian destruction, where you have those 

other things, you have recruitment. I don’t disagree with that at 

all. It’s a dilemma. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

30 

Now, let me just say—and I suspect each one of us has similar 

feelings—that we were deeply moved by your testimony this morning. This was important to hear. 

And I appreciate, having testified as you have, that now you’ve 

engaged and been stimulated by the chairman in vigorous debate 

of sorts about what our policy ought to be. 

I have come to this hearing from an equally vigorous debate, over 

breakfast. We had GEN Brent Scowcroft, and I will not ascribe to 

him any particular views, but there were 16 Members of Congress 

sitting around the table with as diverse a set of opinions as we’ve 

heard in this hearing, but they really come down to a fundamental 

problem that you’ve illustrated so well, and that is, in terms of 

your own feelings, the emotions generated by the service you’ve 

given, the people that you have worked with in Afghanistan, at 

least some of you feel that, in fact, we must take the time, we 

must, in fact, rebuild, or build, from the beginning, a country that 

is very complex, that some would say has really almost only been 

a semi-country made up of tribes, various divisions, various crosscurrents in life. 

And many people, whether they are for or against that policy, 

evaluate that this is likely to be very expensive; maybe not in 

terms of American lives perpetually, or Afghan lives, maybe just in 

terms of the resources. As we’ve already said, this is in the context 

of a country presently that is running a trillion-dollar deficit, may 

have that sort of predicament for several years to come, in a world 

that is similarly troubled. 

Now, you could make the case that life is unfair in this respect. 

The Afghans, after all, didn’t create the world economic crisis, nor 

our trillion-dollar deficit, nor our problem, really, in recruiting 

Armed Forces, or even in building our own capacity. But, this is 

one set of facts. 

Another, however, more constructive thought is that al-Qaeda is 

not just an Afghan-Pakistani problem, that there are currently 

al-Qaeda in Yemen, in Somalia, in various other countries where 

attacks have occurred on our Embassies in Africa in the past. And 

therefore, in fact, the configuration of our response, in terms of the 

Armed Forces or the intelligence forces that we have, ought to be 

our objective. In other words, be on the ground in a whole host of 

countries, not simply Afghanistan and Pakistan, ferreting out 

where the trouble is, informing ourselves, either working with resident governments or, where there isn’t much of a government, to 

take action to make certain that we are not attacked or that these 

folks are not effective. Not an impossible task. And when General 

Petraeus visited with our committee, at the chairman’s direction, 

we discussed, really, a number of things which are occurring which 

I found reassuring, and are not a part of the Afghan-Pakistan situation, but are a part of the al-Qaeda predicament, as we see it, as 

a group of organized terrorist cells. 

I, finally, would just say that I found at least the Professor’s 

thoughts important with regard to the oil import business. This is 

an issue that’s come before the committee perennially. The fact is, 

we have financed, in a great way, not just the Afghan-Pakistan 

problem, but other sources of grave foreign policy difficulty. 

31 

Now, you can say, ‘‘Well, after all, supply and demand works. 

The American motorists wanted SUVs, wanted vans. Why all the 

worry about economy with regard to oil? First things first back 

here.’’ But, our inability, I think, in the leadership of the country, 

to illustrate the predicament we’ve had is, in large part, our fault, 

and we all have to do better. We will have to be thinking together, 

because the energy situation—not just the oil, but in other facets 

in which we have seen cutoffs to NATO allies and problems of this 

sort—are very real, and will remain that way. 

Likewise, the multilateral police situation has been difficult, thus 

far, to sell to Europeans, who are loyal to NATO, some loyal to us, 

but never really believed in the conflict and have a good number 

of other views, even now, in their Parliaments, as expressed in 

their low defense budgets, their lack of available transportation for 

their forces anywhere. 

So, we have work to do if we’re going to go that route, but it’s 

not an improbable task for the future. If we’re talking about 

whether it’s a short war or a long war, the threat of al-Qaeda or 

other terrorists probably is going to exist for us and for others in 

alliances that we have. 

So I don’t really have questions of the panel; I just express 

appreciation that you’ve brought forward dilemmas that we’ve got 

to wrestle with. And I appreciate the thoughts about the President, 

about the fact that he and his advisers are strenuously debating 

these issues. In my judgment, although I’m not a part of the inner 

circle, they’ve not come to conclusions. They are proceeding pragmatically, sort of working day by day. 

And as the chairman just visited Pakistan, and others likewise, 

returned from that country, they find a very troubled state, that, 

leaving aside whatever has been occurring with regard to the war 

or the conflict thus far, may create enormous dilemmas for the 

world, quite apart from the United States, vis-a-vis India or surrounding countries, leaving aside where we started, with Afghanistan. And that’s going to require, on the part of our President, the 

Secretaries of State, Defense, and maybe others of us who have 

supported and advised on this, some extraordinary dilemmas. 

But, thank you for coming, thank you for your testimony. 

I thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for calling us together. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Senator Lugar. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

historic hearing. 

It’s very important, as we chart our way forward in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, we talk to those who have served on the ground and 

who will live with the aftereffects of this war for the rest of their 

lives. We must also recognize the family members, including Colonel Bacevich, who have lost their loved ones during these difficult 

times. I also want to thank all the witnesses for being here today 

and for their selfless service to our country. We are indebted to all 

of you. 

I voted in favor of the authorization to use military force in 

Afghanistan, because that was where al-Qaeda, which had planned 

and carried out the attacks of September 11, was based. The preVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:29 Feb 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT BETTY
32 

vious administration’s mismanagement of that war, however, was 

tragic, and it has left us in a very difficult position. 

The situation in the region remains explosive, and the current 

administration’s decision to increase the United States military 

presence in Afghanistan may have no lasting positive impact, so 

long as there are safe havens for militants in Pakistan. Indeed, the 

escalation may further destabilize the situation in Pakistan, to the 

detriment of United States national security. So, while the President is certainly right to focus on this region, I am somewhat concerned that we may be sending our troops right into the eye of the 

storm with an insufficient strategy for addressing the greatest 

threat to our national security, which, of course, lies on the Pakistan side of the border. 

As to some questions, General McKiernan requested additional 

troops in Afghanistan for the purpose of providing security for the 

Afghan population, yet recent polling indicates that the overwhelming majority of Afghans oppose an increase in troop levels. 

My sense is that there are mixed feelings among the Afghan population and that our status as a party to the conflict can make it 

difficult, if not impossible, for our troops to serve a peacemaking 

function. What was your experience, Corporal Reyes, on this matter? 

Corporal REYES. The troop escalation is very unnecessary. With 

better intelligence, we can create a more isolated situation, where 

we’re not going to risk innocent civilian lives and create more 

resentment toward us. With that, you create a motive for these terrorist groups to become larger. So, it’s counterproductive to escalate 

the troops right now in—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. But—so, your first sentence was what, again? 

It is not necessary? 

Corporal REYES. A troop escalation isn’t necessary, no. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Isn’t necessary. 

Corporal REYES. No. 

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. 

Corporal REYES. It’s not. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

Colonel Bacevich, what are the prospects for defeating the insurgency by increasing the number of United States troops in Afghanistan, given some concerns that many, if not most, Afghans in the 

south oppose the presence of United States troops? 

Colonel BACEVICH. Well, several people have made the point that 

this is not a problem that has a military solution, that, to the 

degree that there is a solution, the solution in Afghanistan is going 

to be found in what is going to be a massive and protracted and 

tremendously costly exercise in nation-building. I think that the 

likelihood of that exercise producing success, 10 or 15 years downstream, is not great. 

But, I think the larger point to be made—and, I mean, you made 

it in your introductory remarks, and Senator Lugar, I think, 

alluded to the same thing—is, even if we could magically wave our 

wand and, tomorrow, have the Afghanistan problem be solved—the 

country would be stable, that the government would be legitimate—what exactly would we have achieved, in a strategic sense? 

And, I think, in a strategic sense, the gains would be very limited, 

33 

because, as you suggested, and as this—as this administration, I 

think, has acknowledged in its creation of this term ‘‘AfPak’’—it is 

a mistake to view Afghanistan in isolation, and, in many respects, 

the larger problem is in neighboring Pakistan. So—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. And—— 

Colonel BACEVICH. So, to invest enormous resources in Afghanistan, I think, is allowing tactical considerations to take precedence 

over strategic thinking. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, this is precisely what’s been bothering 

me since I spent 4 or 5 days in Pakistan in this region less than 

a year ago and after the thoughtful remarks of the chairman, after 

his recent visit there. I want to follow on this interrelationship 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan. What about the possibility that 

an escalation in Afghanistan could actually be more destabilizing 

to Pakistan? In other words, in terms of militants spilling back 

over into that border—is that a fair concern, or not? 

Colonel BACEVICH. I think it’s a very real concern. You know, 

there’s a—it’s a wonder—there’s a very interesting—I think, 

flawed—new book out by David Kilcullen, the counterinsurgency 

specialist, called ‘‘The Accidental Guerrilla.’’ There’s a lot about 

that book I disagree with, but there’s one core truth, I think, that 

he gives us, and that is the notion that most of the people who 

fight against us in places like Afghanistan are fighting against us 

because we’re there. Now, we may not believe that we are invading 

and occupying countries, but the people on the other end viewed— 

view themselves as being invaded and occupied. So, to some degree, 

to some measurable degree, in places like Afghanistan, increasing 

the United States presence actually increases the dimensions of the 

problem. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And, Colonel, Admiral Mullen has acknowledged that the Pakistani Security Services maintain relations with 

militants in Pakistan. There are reports that—press reports that 

this includes the provision of fuel and ammunition for Taliban 

operations against United States forces in Afghanistan. If these 

allegations are correct, what is the likelihood that we can stabilize 

the region or deny al-Qaeda safe havens there, so long as these 

sorts of activities continue? 

Colonel BACEVICH. Next to none. 

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. 

And then, Sergeant Chase, in your experience, can we trust the 

Afghan Army and police? Are they motivated or do they have a different perception of what is needed in Afghanistan? 

Sergeant CHASE. Well, sir, I was in Afghanistan in 2006, and my 

experience in working with the Afghan National Army and Afghan 

National Police is limited, but I will say that, having been there 

and spoken to Embedded Training Teams that do work amongst 

these units, the Afghan National Police, because of the tribal affiliations and preexisting familial rivalries that they have, because of 

their locality in their districts, and the fact that they come from 

those areas, tend to be a little less effective than, say, the Afghan 

National Army, where the people come from all over Afghanistan. 

The ANA have less local tribal ties and are able to make more objective decisions within the areas where they operate. 

34 

In my experience, my observation and what I’ve heard from other 

people, the ANA is a bit more effective than the ANP. The locals 

don’t trust the ANP, a lot of times, in their own districts. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you all. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. Good 

questions. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And, while I value what I do here in the public arena, and think 

that it’s important, I want all of you to know that I think our service pales to what each of you have done, and do, and I thank you 

so much for being here. I thank you for your sincere presentations 

and for everything that you’ve done on behalf of our country, and 

will do. I thank you very much for this presentation. 

So, as I listened to the presentation, on the heels of presentations 

by Mr. Holbrooke and others regarding what our mission is, I’m 

confused. I have heard—first of all, let me say that I think that we 

have fought Afghanistan on the cheap. I do think that Iraq affected 

everything that we did in Afghanistan. I absolutely believe that’s 

true. I said that as soon as I came back from Afghanistan, and I 

think that goes—I don’t think anybody will even debate that. I 

think that is true, and I think it has led us into a very complex 

situation. 

On the other hand, as I hear, especially when someone speaks 

with such assuredness—and I’m speaking of Mr. Holbrooke—I get 

nervous when anybody is that sure of themselves. And I hope the 

other side of that isn’t the often-wrong component that sometimes 

comes with that phrase. OK? 

So, I listened. I thought Colonel Bacevich’s presentation was 

most interesting. The fact is that al-Qaeda exists in many countries—many, many countries around the world. The stated mission 

is, we’re going to, in Afghanistan, make sure that it’s not a safe 

haven for al-Qaeda. And yet, in Pakistan we use drones and 

Hellfire missiles and intelligence to counter that, not troops on the 

ground. 

I hear each of you speak about the relationships that you’ve 

developed, and I absolutely understand fully why a sense of a lack 

of commitment or followthrough, to you, would be failure and letting people down that you’ve gotten to know, and certainly people 

who have died in your presence. I understand that. 

But, let me just ask Captain Moore and Sergeant McGurk, Do 

you think that the mission of making Afghanistan—which has been 

stated, and hopefully not stated just to win stripes for people, 

thinking that, you know, our administration is willing to be strong 

on defense—but, the stated mission to make it so that it’s not a 

safe haven for al-Qaeda—is that the right stated mission? Because 

it doesn’t seem that that so much is what is driving the two of you 

in your testimony. It seems to me to be more that we shouldn’t let 

the Afghanistan people down again, like we did when Russia was 

there. I’d just like to understand what motivates much of your testimony. 

Sergeant MCGURK. Sir, I just want to clarify one point. When I 

say ‘‘renewing a commitment,’’ I’m not saying to send 60,000 comVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:29 Feb 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT BETTY
35 

bat troops into Afghanistan. What I mean is more of a civil component. 

And this holistic approach, you need to get—or, we need to get 

human intelligence within Yemen, within Egypt, Syria, all the 

places where the madrassas are that these people are actually, you 

know, learning this hatred for the West. 

I think that Afghanistan, in the terms that I’m referring to as 

being the front where the war on terror is, this is where everybody 

is coming to fight. This is the—this is back before 9/11, when 

Osama bin Laden enacted the planes mission. That’s when he 

decided, with the help of some of his other counterparts and some 

of the other cells, decided to take down the Twin Towers. He said 

he wanted to draw the United States into fighting on his home 

turf, because, ‘‘We beat the Russians, we can beat the United 

States.’’ 

I think we need to have more of a civil component within 

Afghanistan, along with using smart power, diplomatic approaches 

in addressing issues like the Swat Valley within Pakistan, but, at 

the same—same sense, like I said, we need to develop more of a 

robust human intelligence capability, because you’re not going to— 

we could fight it all day long for the next 20 years in Afghanistan, 

and we’re not going to—we’re not going to defeat the Taliban or 

al-Qaeda, because they’re being recruited—they’re being trained in 

other places and coming to fight us there. 

So, I would say, sir, that it needs to be a mix of a civil/military 

operation. We need to somehow help the Afghan Government start 

something like a job corps program. I mean, you have, in the northeastern part of the country, the Afghan—central Afghan Government banned any type of timber operations, because they were 

afraid of getting rid or stripping the country of its timber resources. 

And the southern part of the country, that’s where you have, you 

know, 90 percent of the poppy crops being grown. We spend more 

time, along with the ANA, burning these crops. So, when you take 

two lifestyles away from a large group of the Afghan population, 

what’s the next thing they’re going to do, and what they know how 

to do? That’s fight us. 

So, I think we need to get a larger civil component in there, less 

of a combat-troops component. Maybe they can act as a quick-reaction force or go into certain areas where there are hotbeds, like 

along the border with Pakistan, and try to root out the insurgency 

that way. 

I just think it needs to be a well-rounded and well-thought-out 

mission with a mix of civil and military operations. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

Captain MOORE. Thank you, sir. And I agree with much of what 

Sergeant McGurk said. And the idea that I also—I also don’t feel 

that it’s—these are isolated ideas of providing safety and security 

for the Afghan people and trying to make sure that Afghanistan is 

not a hotbed for al-Qaeda. I think those are actually very complementary ideas, because, without the safety and security being 

provided within Afghanistan, and without safety and security 

that—not only that we can help provide, but that the Afghans are 

really going to provide for themselves—not only will that be an 

area for al-Qaeda, to be able to grow and to flourish, but then, also, 

36 

it’s never going to provide any type of security or any type of 

growth for the Afghan people. 

I think part of my frustration, which has been throughout—and 

I’m actually—I’m happy to see that it seems like the administration is really starting to take a new approach to it—is, for a while, 

we never had a clear mission about Afghanistan. You know, we 

weren’t sure whether it was democracy. We weren’t sure whether 

it was nation-building. We weren’t sure if it was stability. We 

never had a clear belief as to why we were there. And that was 

also, not only frustrating for the American people, but also very 

frustrating for the soldiers. And it’s very tough to build morale and 

help to keep morale up when you’re not quite sure exactly what the 

mission is. 

I think we’re starting to clarify that now. I think there’s a much 

better understanding; whereas, as President Obama has clearly 

said, we’re going to provide security, and then we’re going to leave. 

So, I think understanding that, and then helping to kind of fill 

that in—so, What exactly does that mean? How exactly we’re going 

to bolster development efforts? How are we going to get the State 

Department and USAID more involved in what’s happening, particularly in the eastern and northeastern part of Afghanistan—is 

the way we’re really going to add color to that larger statement. 

Senator CORKER. Well, I’m glad you have a—with all due respect, 

a clear idea of what the strategy is, because I have no idea what 

it is, other than sending additional troops. So, if you could help me, 

I’d appreciate it. I have to tell you, I—what I’ve heard is that 

Afghanistan is not going to be a safe haven for al-Qaeda, and 

that’s—so, we’re going to double down with troops and resources. 

I don’t know, I don’t know that that clears up anything for me. So, 

since you have a clear idea, I’d love for you to expand on that some. 

Captain MOORE. With—the clear idea is this, sir, is that, without—security needs to be tantamount to everything, because you 

cannot implement anything else within that region unless you can 

provide better security. 

Senator CORKER. So, it sounds a lot like Iraq. 

Captain MOORE. Well, no, no. It’s not like—especially in this 

case. First of all, the parallels between Iraq and—I mean, sorry— 

the difference between Iraq and Afghanistan are stark. We’re talking very different countries, very different regions, with very different histories. 

In Afghanistan, we’re talking about a country that has literally 

been in a constant state of war for decades, and a sporadic state 

of war for centuries, an area that—and this is where the whole 

idea of understanding that clarity of mission, because this is an 

area that we’ve had Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan and 

the British Empire and the Russians all being involved. And 

there’s two things that the Afghans believe—firmly believe—about 

anytime foreign forces will enter their country. The first thing is 

that they’re going to try to convert them and they’re going to disrespect Islam. That’s one. And the second thing they firmly believe 

is that soon they will be gone. And regardless of what is left behind, and regardless of what type of power vacuums are left behind, the foreign forces will leave. 

37 

The point is this. By showing a commitment to that country, by 

showing a commitment—and, again, I think Sergeant McGurk 

made a great point—is that it’s not just a military-component commitment; the military-component commitment is important, because providing that security is important, but it needs to be complementary with, What exactly is that going to do? Because if we 

can increase security aspects and increase security apparatus within the country, and get the extra, not only 17,000 troops, but 4,000 

trainers, inside of the area, and allow the ANA and the ANP to 

build up, then we can actually start allocating other resources to 

make Afghanistan not a safe haven for al-Qaeda, but then also provide the security and safety and the future for the Afghan people, 

which will prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for 

al-Qaeda. 

Senator CORKER. I want to thank all of you again. 

And, Colonel, I thought your testimony was exceptionally good, 

and I really didn’t have a lot of questions, as a result of that. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for having this hearing. And I 

hope that—I know that, you know, sometimes partisan issues end 

up coming into play on major issues like this, but I really appreciate your willingness to look at this issue. I hope we will dig a 

whole lot deeper. I just have to tell you, I’m—I have a—say, an 

average intelligence—I’m having difficulty connecting the dots, and 

I hope that we’ll have additional hearings to help us do so more 

fully. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Senator Corker, let me just say to you that 

the testimony has been excellent, and I think the questions have 

been excellent, and it underscores this dilemma. 

I am so sympathetic, more so than many people may understand, 

because of the experience that many of us had in our generation, 

Colonel Bacevich, which was torn apart over a war that lacked 

leadership and definition and clarity and reality and truth and a 

whole bunch of things. And when I hear Sergeant McGurk say, 

‘‘We want to make sure that the honor that should be afforded us 

for our sacrificed service is there in the policy decisions you’ve 

made,’’ that is exactly what brought me to that table, years ago. 

And when I flew into Iraq, a number of years ago, I won’t forget 

the captain who was a pilot in the aircraft, a C–130, as we were 

going in, turned to me, and he said, ‘‘Look, Senator, no matter 

what, just one thing I ask you, just make sure that, 20 years from 

now, all of this was worth it for us.’’ And I understand that sentiment. 

But, Colonel Bacevich has raised some very fundamental, larger 

questions that are almost bigger, in a sense, than your individual 

ability to want that relationship you built with somebody, that old 

man you met on the street. I understand that. You want that to 

be meaningful. And, they thought that we would just leave again, 

and so forth. Fact is, we are going to leave again, and they do know 

that—at some point. And the test here is how much can you 

achieve for them, and do you have to sometimes measure whether 

or not part of the reason they fight us is that we are there. And 

so, you have to balance this somehow and find a way to deal with 

some very tricky issues, including the intelligence piece of this. If 

you could get a different footprint somehow, so you had good intel, 

38 

there are plenty of ways for the United States to prevent al-Qaeda 

from attacking us. And the question is, Do you have to have this 

massive expenditure and footprint and input in order to be able to 

achieve that goal, if that is the limit of your goal? If your goal is 

larger than that, in terms of nation-building and otherwise, that’s 

a much more expensive and longer term proposition, but it also 

runs up full score against the propositions the Colonel put to us, 

appropriately, and others have written about, which is, Is it achievable? 

So, we’ve got some hard work to do, and we’ve got to do a lot of 

careful analysis here. And I know the administration is approaching this very carefully. Nobody’s suggesting they’re offering a guarantee here, but they’re trying to make first steps to see if it is possible, needless to say, to transition to an ANP and an ANA that 

can stand up for themselves and take on that responsibility and 

sustain your rightful hope that that outcome will honor your sacrifice, which is what we want. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all 

for being here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say to everybody, we have a vote 

that is on; because it just started, we will have time to be able to 

conclude. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I will be very quick. 

But, I do want to thank you for being here, for your insights, and 

for your sacrifices for our country. 

You know, I—there’s been a lot of discussion about the conduct 

of the war in Afghanistan, but I guess the real alternative is 

United States withdrawal. And what I’d like to ask you is what you 

think the impact of unilateral withdrawal from Afghanistan would 

be. And I guess I would ask you if you would begin, Colonel 

Bacevich. 

Colonel BACEVICH. I think that the—there are alternatives— 

there are more alternatives than ‘‘more of the same and then abject 

withdrawal.’’ I think that there are courses that we could follow 

that would enable us to achieve what Senator Corker said was the 

purpose of the exercise, make sure that Afghanistan is not a safe 

haven for al-Qaeda, that would not necessarily entail the kind of 

investment of troops and resources that we’ve already undertaken 

and we’re about to expand. There are other ways to achieve our 

purposes; it’s not simply ‘‘do what we’re doing’’ or ‘‘abandonment.’’ 

And I think that the—an example of what might be an alternative would be that we recognize the tribal nature of Afghan politics, acknowledge that their tradition is not one in which authority 

is effectively exercised from Kabul, but it’s effectively exercised, 

basically, in the outback, and to provide incentives to the tribal 

chiefs to govern their patch of earth in ways consistent with their 

interests. In other words, just don’t let al-Qaeda in. Provide them 

incentives to do that. And where those incentives don’t work, then 

perhaps it may be necessary for us to engage in some kind of a punitive action, not unlike what we’re doing in Pakistan, to eliminate 

any elements of al-Qaeda that do find a way, whether working in 

the seams or not, to establish bases. 

39 

So, I don’t think the alternative is either ‘‘do what we’re doing’’ 

or ‘‘abandon the country.’’ 

Senator SHAHEEN. OK. Thank you. If I can ask each of you to 

respond to that. 

Sergeant CHASE. With all due respect, sir, if you have suggestions on what could be done more in-depth, I think that’s kind of 

what we’re all here for, is to find out what are our—what are our— 

what are the alternatives. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Sergeant CHASE. Personally, a blanket withdrawal from Afghanistan would be devastating to Muslim extremism in the world. It 

would send a message very clearly to the rest of the world and the 

rest of the extremists that they have not only won and defeated us 

in Afghanistan, but they’ve now—they would now gain momentum 

for their cause. That would be my fear. 

I’m not a policy person. I’m also not a scholar. But, pulling out 

of there would devastate Afghanistan, and, I think, the entire 

region. And just an example of that was when we left after the 

Soviets. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Sergeant MCGURK. It’s kind of what I’ve been saying all along 

and what I said in my initial remarks. I think that, just to not even 

try, just a unilateral withdrawal, and then say, ‘‘Sorry,’’ it’s just not 

going to cut it. I honestly think that the type of vacuum that would 

be created, you would have more insurgents, more Taliban going 

across the Pakistan border. I think you’d have—you—to a degree, 

I think that you would kind of take away any legitimacy that the 

Pakistan Government has, currently; it would be completely gone. 

Pakistan is a nuclear state. And I think you would have a people 

that would be more prone—or, excuse me, more apt to allowing a 

regime like the Taliban into their country, because at least they 

provide a measure of security; whereas, we just decided to leave, 

and leave them to their own devices. 

As you can tell, I’m very passionate about this, from my experiences in Afghanistan. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I appreciate that. 

Sergeant MCGURK. To not at least try—and I understand that 

many people say that we can’t achieve any measure of success, or 

the type of success that we wanted to achieve when we initially 

went into Afghanistan, I completely understand that—but, having 

been on the ground and seen firsthand the people and the culture—and, you know, granted it is a tribal culture that doesn’t 

trust a central government—but, being on the ground, you—they’re 

not a number to me; it’s not, ‘‘Oh, it’s the Afghan people.’’ It’s not, 

‘‘This is just Afghanistan.’’ These are real people I dealt with on a 

daily basis. And to just leave them and say, ‘‘You know, we’re 

really sorry. We screwed up by going into Iraq. We really can’t afford to try to at least, to some measure, fix what we did in Afghanistan. We’re leaving. Sorry.’’—to me, that’s very unacceptable. 

I grew up in a military family. I love this country wholeheartedly. I joined the military, not to become a weapon of war, but 

to be a deterrent to it. And I really think that we should—and I 

don’t want to keep repeating myself, but I really think we should 

40 

at least try to do something to help the Afghan people before we 

leave. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Captain Moore. 

Captain MOORE. I believe that an abrupt withdrawal from 

Afghanistan would not only be a tactical mistake, but also, more 

importantly, a strategic mistake. It would be primarily a tactical 

mistake because, again, you’re giving up a primary front to a place 

that we committed to, to a people that we committed to, to a culture that we committed to. And primarily, on the strategic side, it 

would also send a message to the rest of the world that the United 

States can’t stick, that, once the wave of any type of political pressure or any type of political will begins to wane, that, regardless 

of whatever commitments have been made, regardless of whatever 

intentions have been sought out, regardless of whatever speeches 

have been done, that the United States is not going to commit to 

seeing something through. 

Now, again, we need to be strategic about how we do that. And, 

again, I agree with Dr. Bacevich, where he said it’s not, you know, 

‘‘more of the same’’ or ‘‘complete withdrawal.’’ But, at the same 

time, we need to understand, not only the short-term, but the longterm ramifications of the message that that sends to the rest of the 

world about where we are as a nation. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Corporal Reyes. 

Corporal REYES. I keep going back to my earlier statements. I 

don’t think a complete withdrawal would be the answer, but I 

know a troop escalation’s a huge mistake. You want to talk about 

a country with that many troops, that’s a sign of poor intelligence. 

With stronger intelligence, there’s no reason to occupy the country 

with that massive amount of troops. So, we need to strengthen our 

intelligence and then plan and then execute. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, to each of you, for your very compelling testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

I want to thank everybody on this panel enormously. And let me 

just say, quickly, I completely agree with what Colonel Bacevich 

just said. As the conclusion of the panel, the option here is not, in 

my judgment, ‘‘throw up your hands’’ and ‘‘complete withdrawal,’’ 

which would invite all kinds of repercussions and have significant 

negative consequences on our policy, in any number of ways. But, 

in addition to that, nor is it ‘‘more of the same’’ for the Obama 

administration, with whom we’ve been trying to work very closely. 

I completely agree with the observation about the tribalism. This 

is something that I have become more and more tuned into, the 

more I’m traveling now in the Middle East and in North Africa and 

so forth; it is just definitional, in terms of how we need to approach 

things. And we have not been thoughtful enough and sensitive 

enough in the past. 

We have to remember that the Soviets attacked and destroyed 

some of that infrastructure. They killed a lot of tribal chiefs. And 

the strength that used to be there has been somewhat diminished. 

But, of this I am convinced, the vast majority of Afghans do not 

want to be Taliban, and they don’t buy into the extremist Taliban. 

41 

There are a lot of Taliban for hire right now. And we need to understand that as we think through our approach. But, it has to be 

very thoughtful, very sensitive. I think the administration is working overtime to tune that in. We’ve met with General Petraeus, 

we’ve met with Ambassador Holbrooke, and others. There’s a lot of 

thinking going on about how you empower entities outside of 

Kabul, how you deal with corruption, how we get around this and, 

frankly, heed a lot of the wisdom that was in Colonel Bacevich’s 

testimony. 

So, there’s a balance here, and that’s what we’re going to try to 

strike. I agree with Senator Corker, it has been woefully fought on 

the cheap, and stupidly in many ways, not from a military point 

of view, but the civilian leadership guidelines and possibilities were 

so constrained and predefined that the military folk on the ground 

have been operating under an unbelievable handicap, and we’ve 

lost enormous headway as a consequence of that. 

So, we’re going to try to be as thoughtful as we can, as smart 

as we can. This is not the only hearing we’re going to have on this, 

by far. And we have a lot of distance yet to go. 

This committee will exercise its oversight authority, and I will 

certainly do all I can to live up to the responsibility, as chair, to 

see that we thoroughly vet all of the possibilities and try to come 

up with the smartest policy possible. 

Colonel, I have to run and vote. I wanted to catch you for a 

moment, but I hope I can sit down with you when we get back to 

Massachusetts. 

Colonel BACEVICH. Yes, sir, I’d enjoy that. 

The CHAIRMAN. We really appreciate everybody’s testimony, each 

of you. I know this was not the first thing you trained for, so we’re 

just hugely appreciative of the fact that you came here today. Each 

of you expressed your candid personal opinions. I know that’s not 

always easy and, particularly in the case of several of you, very difficult on an emotional level. So, we’re grateful to you. Thank you 

for your service, thanks for your testimony, thanks for your continued service. And we look forward to continued relationships with 

all of you. Thank you. 

We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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