FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT MAR 19, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO N OT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

N o. 06- 1291 9 D. C. Dock etNo. 0 4- 01 21 3 C V-J- 25 -TEM DONALD J. NOVELLA, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us WAL-MART STORES, INC., De fendant-Appellee.

Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida (M ar ch 19, 200 7) Before DU BIN A and COX , C ircuit Judg es, and SCHL ES IN GE R,* D istrict Judg e.

____ ____ ____ ____ __ *Honora ble Har vey E. Schlesing er, United States District J udg e for the Middle District of Florida , sitti ngby

desig nation.After car efully revie wingthe re cord a

nd the brief

s of the par

ties, we have dete rmined that 1 No ve lla ’s a dd iti on a l st ate law c la im of ne g lig e nt i nf

lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss i s b arr e d b y the state l aw “i m p ac t ru l e” a

nd thus is without merit. See R.J. v . Humana of Fla. , 652 So. 2d 360, 362-63 (F la. 1995). 2 PE R CU RIA M: Ap p el l an tDo n al dNo v el l a, a d ea f i n d i v i du al , ap p ea l s t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t t o hi s e m

plo y er in thi s a ct ionf

or dis cr im inatio n in vio la tio n of

the A m er ic an s W ithD isa bil iti es A ct

( A D A ), 42 U . S. C. § 12 101 et seq . a nd v ar iou s st at e lawc la im s. H e ar gue s th at the abil ity

to co m m uni cate ef fe ct ive ly a t hi s te rm inatio n m ee tin g w as both an “ es se nti al f unc tio n” of

his j ob an d on e of

the “ pr ivi le ge s and b en ef its ” of e m plo ym en t, r equir ing ar ea sona ble acco m m od at io n– sp eci fic al ly, th e p res en ce o f an in te rp ret er–un de r th e ADA. Furthe rm or e, he a rg ue s th at his te rm inatio n, w hil e pur porte dly due to m an ag em en t’ s c onc lus ionthat he ha d w ri tte n ob sc en e gr af fi ti on the ba thr oom w al ls, w as in re ta liatio n e ith er f or his r ep ortin g of

the gr af fi ti, or f or his r eque st that an in te rp re te r be pr es en t a t hi s te rm inatio n m ee tin g, in vio la tio n of the F lor ida Whistlebl ower

Ac t (FWA) , F la. Stat. § 448.102 (3). 1

I . We r e v i e wag r a n to f

s u mmary j u d g me n to n a n A D A c l a i m de novo . Lowe v. A la. P ow er

Co . , 244 F . 3d 1 305, 130 7 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) . S um m ar y j udgm en t i s3

ap pr opr ia te “ if

the ple ad ing s, de posi tio ns, a nsw er s to int er ro ga tor ie s, a nd adm iss ion s onf

ile , tog ethe r w iththe a ff

idavit s, if a ny , sho wthat the re is no genuin e issue of m aterial f act and that the m ovin g party is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law. ” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c) . W e have re cognized that su m m ary j udgm ent is appropriate in an em ploym ent case where the plaintiff has off ered ev ide nc e that i s “ mer el

y co lo ra bl e, or

is not significan tly proba tive .” Earley v . Ch am pio n I nt’ l C orp. , 907 F . 2d 1 077, 108 0- 81 ( 11th C ir . 199 0) ( quot ing A nde rso n v . L ibe rtyL obbyI nc . , 477 U . S. 242 , 249 -5 0, 106 S . Ct . 250 5, 251 1 (1 98 6) ). I I . Inor de r to s ta te ac la im

of dis cr im inatio n un de r the A D A , N ove lla m ust have m ade a pri m a fa ci e c as e show ing : ( 1) he ha s adis ab ili ty ; ( 2) he is a

“ qua lif ie d in div idu al , ” w hic h is to say , able to pe rf orm the e sse nti al f

unc tio ns o f the e m plo ym en t po sit ionw ithor w ith out r ea sona ble a cc om

m oda tio n; and ( 3) W al Mar t u nl awfu ll y

di sc riminat edag ai ns t h im be cau se of h is di sabi li ty. R ee d v . H ei l Co . , 206 F . 3d 1 055, 106 1 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) . I t w as und isp ute d he re that N ove lla ha s adis ab ili ty . T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t r ea chthe iss ue of w he the r N ove lla

w as a

“ qua lif ie d in div idu al . ” In ste ad , the c ourt de ci de d th e iss ue sol el y on the gr ound that the third pron g was not m et because no rea sonable accom m odation wa sWhil e we re fe r to thi s a s a te rm inatio n me e tin g , th e re c or d d e mon str ate s th at it wa s r e a lly 2 a mee ting whe re N ovella wa s simply g iven notice of

his termination. 4 required at the ter

m ination m eeting. Regar ding the third prong of a pri m a fa ci e 2 ca se , in the c ont ex t of

dis ab ili ty

law , “ dis cr im inatio n” e nc om pa sse s th e fa ilure to m ake re asonable accom

m odation s for the known disabilit ies of otherwise qualified pe rs on s. D’

Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. , 422 F. 3d 12 20, 1236 (11t h Cir. 2005 ). E qua l E m plo ym en t O ppor

tun ity Co m m iss ion( E E O C) r eg ulatio ns d ef ine the term “ reasonable acc omm odation ” to include bot h m odifications that enable an em ploy ee to “perform

the essential functions ” of the j ob, and m odifications that enable an em

ploy ee to “ enj oy

the equal benefits and privileges of em ploym ent” as oth er , non -d isa

ble d e m plo y ee s. 29 C . F. R. § 16 30. 2( o) (i i) , ( iii ). T he “ es se nti al ” func tio ns o f a j ob are the f undam en ta l du tie s of

the j ob and are dis tin ct

f ro m

“ m arg in al ” fu nc ti on s. La Ch anc e v. D uff y' s D raf t H ouse, I nc . , 146 F . 3d 8 32, 835 (11th Cir. 1998). “ De term ining whether a particular

j ob du ty is an essential function in volv es a fa ctual inqui ry to be conducted on a ca se-by -case basis.” Lucas v. W

.W . G raing er, I

nc. , 2 5 7 F. 3 d1 2 4 9 , 1 2 5 8 (1 1 t h Ci r. 2 0 0 1 ). “ [I ]n co n du ct i n g t h i s i n qu i ry, ‘co n s i d er at i o n s h al l b e g i v en t o t h e e m p l o yer’s j udgm en t . . . and i f ane m plo y er ha s pr ep ar ed

a w ri tte n de sc ri pti on f

or the j ob,5

thi s de sc ri pti on s ha ll be c onsi de re d e vid en ce of the e sse nti al f

unc tio ns o f the j ob.’ ” Id. (quot ing Earl v. Me rvyns, I nc. , 20 7 F .3d13 61 , 13 65 (11 th Cir .20 00 )). W e ha ve not

a ddr es se d w he the r the abil ity to unde rs tand c harg es a nd d ef en d one se lf a t a te rm inatio n m ee tin g qu al if ie s a s on e of

the “ be ne fi ts and p ri vil eg es ” of em plo ym en t. N one the le ss, w e ha ve he ld t ha t “ [a ] n ‘ ac co m

m oda tio n’ is ‘reaso nabl e’–an d, t he refo re, req ui redun de r th e ADA– on ly if ite nable s th e em ploy ee to perf

orm the essential functions of the j ob.” LaChance, 146 F.3d at 835 (em phasis add ed). Inli ght of our e ar lie r pr onounc em en t i n LaChance , w e conclude that co m m uni catio n a t a

te rm inatio n m ee tin g, the pur pose of whic h is to giv e the emp l o yee n o t i ce o f h i s t er m i n at i o n , i s n o t an “ es s en t i al fu n ct i o n ” o f a n empl o yee’s job . I I I . To establish a pri m a fa ci e case f or retaliation under the FWA, Novella w as required to show: (1) that he engaged in protected activity ; (2) that he suffe red an adve rs e em

plo ym en t a ct ion ; and ( 3) ac au sa l l ink be tw ee n th e pr ote ct ed

a ct ivi ty an d t he ad ve rs e act io n. R ic e- La m ar v . Ci tyof F

ort L aude rdal e , 853 S o. 2d 1 125,To the extent that Novella also asser ted retaliation in violation of the AD A, we note that the 3 test was the same as for

FWA violations. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servic es, Inc . , 161 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998). 6 1132 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 200 3) . O ppos ing a ny a ct or a ct ivi ty that i s m ad e 3 unlawful by

the AD A is a “ protected activity .” H igd on v . J ac ks on , 393 F . 3d 1 211, 1218 -19 (11th Cir. 2004). T he causation requirem ent is construed b roadly , so that a pla int if f m ust onl y sho wthe e m

plo y er ’ s aw ar en es s of

apr ote ct ed

a ct ivi ty a nd a

“ cl os e te m

po ral pro xi m it y ” b et ween th e aware ne ss an d t he ad ve rs e d eci si on . I d. at 1220 . How ever, an em

ploy er m ay

rebut a pri m a fa ci e c as e of r et al ia tio n w ith ev ide nc e of

ale git im at e nond isc ri m inator y pur pose , w hic h th e em

plo y ee m ust th en pro ve by “ si gn ifi can tl y pro ba ti ve ev id en ce” t o h av e b een pre te xt ua l. Carter v. Ci ty of Mia mi , 870 F . 2d 5 78, 584 ( 11th C ir . 198 9) . W e m ay a ff irm the j udgm en t below on any

legal ground, regardless of the grounds relied upon by the district co ur t. Cuddeback v. F

la. B d. of E

duc. , 38 1 F .3d12 30 , 12 35 -3 6 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 4) . Thus, e ven if Novella w ere able to establish a pri m a fa ci e cas e o f ret al ia ti on , we m ay a ff irm the j udgm en t be lowon the ba sis that the re w as ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce of pr et ex t. Id. at

123 6. A ft er c ar ef ul r ev ie wof

the r ec or d w e co nc lud e that N ove lla f ai le d to es tabl is h a ny caus at io n b et ween hi s re po rti ng of t he gra ffi ti an d h is ter m in at io n. Consequent ly , he failed to establish a pri m a fa ci e c as e fo r re ta liator y f ir ing .7

Beca use Novella otherw ise failed to rebut W al-Mar t’ s showing o f a le gitim ate, nond isc ri m inator

y bus ine ss p ur

pose f or his ult im at e te rm inatio n, his c la im that he w as f ir ed in re ta liatio n f

or r eque sti ng an in te rp re te r al so f ai ls. For the above-stated re asons, we aff irm the district court’ s grant of summ ary j udgm en t. AFFIRMED.