THE FOG OF PEACE:

FINDING THE END-STATE OF HOSTILITIES

Manfred K. Rotermund

November 1999
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ISBN 1-58487-009-5

ii
iii

Foreword .......................

1. Introduction ....................

2. Context of Peace .................

3. Freedom, Power, and Progress ..........

4. A Model of Societies ................

5. The Search for Peace ...............

6. The Role of the Military

 in Pre- and Post-hostility Campaigns .....

7. Conclusion .....................

About the Author ...................
The U.S. armed forces have engaged in a num

military operations other than war since the Vietnam 

The latest of these are Kosovo and East Timor. None of 

conflicts has conformed to traditional wars. These co

are not the continuation of diplomacy by other m

Diplomacy and military action co-exist in the m

theater of war. Another type of involvement is that s

to the intervention in Macedonia—where foreign 

have been inserted to prevent the breakout of fig

These types of conflicts do not contain the certaintie

accompanied World Wars I and II. Here, success and f

are more ambiguous. It may be said that the end-st

hostilities may not have been achieved in any of 

places. Macedonia remains at risk given the high le

ethnic tensions. None of these places is peaceful.

The author of this monograph provides us with 

way of thinking about peace and how to achieve it. Pea

argues, arrives only when domestically centered prog

established in a post-conflict environment. The e

hostilities is only the end of the shooting. It is not the 

danger. It is not the end of the animosities or typical

conditions leading to the hostilities. As a result, the 

hostilities represents the beginning of a transiti

peace—not peace itself.

The military role of intervening states and organiz

(U.S., NATO, U.N.) continues after the end of host

They must begin the transition to peace. Uncondi

disarmament of all combatants is a military task. S

author argues, is the beginning of the process wh

progress is instituted. He likens governance to rid

bicycle. Intervening states can set a rider on a bicycle o

one after the end of hostilities: elections accomplish 

They can even help the rider maintain balance

successful governance will require the rider to 

v
factors can interfere with that stability. Pre-ho

leadership and combatants may claim the spo

war—control of national government. Furthermore, if 

forces are reconstituted as the police or similar entity

moderate voices are likely not to be heard. After a

former combatants are probably the most ideolog

dedicated and organized among the local groups. On

military can prevent this from happening.

Residents of the territory or country must be conv

to establish new lives at the local level before being al

to establish or re-establish national institutions. H

where much of the author’s originality will be foun

argues that a peaceful society will, in fact, expe

considerable conflict. It takes the form of compe

among all sectors of the society: political, religious, civ

well as marketplace competition. As in the United S

that competition will lead to new knowledge and g

freedom. The concrete expression of freedom is pro

From this process may come a new leadership not ves

continuing the earlier conflict. It is the only way to pr

old leadership from re-exerting itself.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offe

study as a contribution to thinking about how the sour

freedom, progress, stability and peacemaking should 

into future conflict termination strategies.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Interim Director

Strategic Studies Institute

vi
INTRODUCTION

Modern hostilities feature military action as an a

to diplomacy or as an active tool of diplomacy. The t

achieving peace after such hostilities is perhaps 

difficult than it was in the past. Diplomatic consider

often place many players at both the war and peace t

or at least in the room. Then there is the very quest

what the constituents of peace may be. Experience te

us that the end of hostilities is not peace. At the end o

monograph, I suggest that the peace achieved in E

after World War II still has many fragile elements to 

contention is that peace can come only after the salie

pre-hostility ideologies, desires, and tendencies has 

minimized. This applies to both conventional war

military operations other than war that bring interve

from the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organiz

(NATO), United Nations (U.N.), or other groups.

As we move into the 21st century, this century ap

to be telling us that the future, typical war will be mor

the Somalian, Bosnian, or Kosovar conflicts than the W

Wars of this century. Religious, cultural, or e

animosities are more likely to bring on war than the s

for Lebensraum or resources. Troops may be sent int

conflicts to separate the combatants. But once sepa

are the combatants then at peace? No.

What is peace? It is an internal state of nations or g

that are achieving progress and are maintaining no

noncombatant relations with their neighbors, both in

and external. Peace requires rejection of the earlier 

that led to the conflict requiring intervention. After wa

after military operations other than war, the military

is to point the combatant groups away from their or

1
Kosovars in Kosovo today, may act on the belief that c

of a territory is now theirs after the intervening forc

removed the oppressor. That may be a logical outcome 

end of hostilities, but it is not a good beginning for a la

peace or nation-building. For peace to be lasting, n

and peoples must adopt new strategies to accomplish 

goals. 

The Post-Hostilities Context.

We can think of the people in the Balkans, the H

Africa, Central Africa, and maybe in the crescent 

Russia as engaged in battles among two or 

monopolies. The aim of politicians and then combatan

eliminate anything that does not serve their own mon

be it ethnic, religious, or nationalistic. An intervening 

may assist one monopoly to push aside the other mon

In the end, one monopoly is left standing. Should 

monopoly take power and rule the territory or nat

suggest that its leadership is not likely to be well-sui

the task. Once in power, I suspect that its strong preju

will cause the leaders to ignore the practical nee

reconstruction and development. The leadership’s po

based on having the conflict remain salient. Thu

intervening force must reduce the power of this mon

with as much vigor as they applied to the elimination 

aggressor monopoly. Substitution of one for the othe

not contribute to the territory’s development—a re

ment if it is not to become a ward state.

The logic behind this argument is simple. The g

intervention must always be greater than just the cess

of the shooting or the mere prevention of future fig

The alternative, reestablishment of the previous cond

or maintenance of current conditions, implies tha

intervention will never end. It was the previous cond

that led to fighting, or it is the current level of tension

might lead to fighting. The goal, then, must be some

2
antagonisms. That movement comes with progress—

the people exert control over their lives, rebuild their h

enterprises, and places of worship.

The initial military task after the end of hostili

disarmament of the combatants. Closely upon this 

follows the hardest task the intervening forces 

accomplish. That is convincing the “winning” comba

that they should not assume power in “their” territ

country. Control must stay with the intervenors. They 

break up the monopoly that “won” the war; they must 

the country toward progress.

Progress exists where development or nation-build

on-going. We can think about development as being d

either from the top-down (the Soviet monopolistic mo

from the bottom-up (the American market model)

former should remain discredited for a long time in

future. That is not to say that the model no longer is i

however—it is employed all over the world. A country b

by a monopoly such as tradition, all-consuming (the

monopolistic) hatreds or dictatorial governmen

develop slowly, if at all. All new knowledge must be fe

and through the monopoly before being applied to 

something different. The latter model has produce

United States—the most stable, yet ever changing, co

in the world. The reason is simply that many indivi

not a single organization or system of beliefs, can crea

act on new knowledge. This type of development sho

fostered whenever forces intervene in these modern ty

conflicts. It is essential in a post-hostility environmen

By its very nature, bottom-up development r

control from above—that is its beauty when applied 

environment where monopolies are dominant

development that occurs chips away at the salience 

monopoly. Thus, in a place like Kosovo where religion-

hatred is still monopolistic, forcing residents to foc

rebuilding their local lives—from local governme

3
conflict. Once local life becomes reestablished, residen

see that some towns or areas are doing a better job o

than are others. This can and should foster compe

initiatives. Those individuals who succeed here wil

reputations that they can then use to rise in politics

critical element in their rise is that their reputation

accomplishments will have been based on pragmati

NOT ideological success. They are candidates to becom

future leaders of their country.

Beginning the process of bottom-up nation-buildin

military task. The remaining leadership will rejec

approach and may even return to violence to mainta

prerogatives. Fighters will not want to return to civilia

yet their skills and presence will be needed fo

reconstruction of the society. Furthermore, they will h

be paid if they stay in uniform. The people, in genera

be leery of adopting the bottom-up approach to develop

since most societies around the world have a top

orientation. Yet, it is small projects that aggregat

sustainable development—reconstruction of housing

roads, building of a new power grid based on 

generating plants, micro and small loans to reesta

businesses, and similarly scaled projects. Large

projects must be managed at the national level, diffic

achieve until stable government exists. Bottom-up des

projects build local knowledge, forestall a mono

oriented national government, and break up develop

projects into more controllable packages.

Figure 1 schematically lays out the transition 

military to civilian (e.g., U.N.) command and then na

resumption of government. The military is the 

organization capable of initiating such developmen

post-conflict environment. Civilian authority 

negotiate disarmament while the military can dema

Similarly, the military can demand that combatan

home and rebuild local life. The military can comman

transport the goods and services needed to pu

4
order must be established before a civilian police forc

function effectively. The intervening military 

accomplish these objectives before transitioning contr

civilian force. They will then have the task of he

thepeople create a national government.

Preventing Hostilities.

The tasks of a foreign military force sent in to pr

the onset or the spread of hostilities (e.g., Macedon

Montenegro) are less active than in the post-host

context. Their largest function is as guarantors of the 

They are there as part of a diplomatic national assi

package designed to convince and then assist the na

authority to defuse long-standing ethnic, religiou

nationalistic tensions. Without the larger diplo

package, all they can do is delay the onset of conflict. 

there, they must gather and use intelligence and situa

awareness to be able to respond sharply to any m

5

External

Military Control

External Civilian

 Control

Local Elections

Regional Elections National Election

Figure 1. Schematic of transition from intervening (ext

military control to national control after the cessat

hostilities. 

Unity of command is maintained; the transfer is from ex

military to external civilian to national control. The election c

superimposed to show that development and the transfer of 

should proceed from the bottom-up. There should be no role 

intervening powers after a national government has been sele
symbols to forestall conflict. The appropriate hist

model for this type of operation is the role of the Fe

Bureau of Investigation and the federal marshals d

the civil rights tensions in the American South durin

1960s. The intervening force’s active presence enabl

reduction of the cultural, governmental and 

tendencies that brought on the tensions.

Diplomatic initiatives should convince the na

government to integrate itself and to more closely eq

the opportunities among the cultures and groups that 

up the country. If this is accomplished, then the interv

military force becomes a temporary adjunct of the 

central government as they reform past practices 

created the heightened state of tensions in the coun

this relationship does not develop, then the i

diplomatic package was either designed for failure o

not well implemented.

The following three chapters provide a rationale f

recommendations made above. They constit

theoretical foundation for future nation-bui

initiatives. Freedom, progress, and stability are the c

concepts of the theory that rest on a base of knowledg

distribution of knowledge on governance in a co

determines the availability of freedom and progres

gives it the degree of stability it possesses. The remain

the monograph then takes these concepts and applies 

to situations of military operations other than war.

6
CONTEXT OF PEACE

Somalia. Haiti. Bosnia. Kosovo. The limited object

these campaigns differentiate these actions from 

previous American military efforts. While not resem

the wars of the past, they are likely the precurs

military campaigns of the future: humanitarian camp

Intra-state, rather than inter-state, issues governed 

campaigns. The cessation of hostilities in operations 

than war, as in war, is just the beginning of foreign 

NATO, U.N., others) involvement. What should b

objective of this military involvement? What is the me

of the end-state that permits military disengagemen

confidence that a repeat of the military/humanit

campaign will not be necessary? This monograph prop

speculative, yet logical approach to resolving 

questions.

1

 The answers to these questions 

implications for all of Europe, not just the Balkans.

In the above examples, and likely in future inst

the objectives for military intervention beyond the cess

of hostilities will be stability and progress. A return 

status quo that brought on the fighting obviously wo

an insufficient outcome for peace. A truce, whether 

Korean variety or other form that does not resolv

war-causing issues, is also not a long-term solution.

Peace will have arrived when the shoemaker se

blood-enemy a pair of shoes rather than kill him. Th

tall order. The history of the Balkans also suggests tha

may be the only realistic definition of peace. E

attempts to contain the hatreds in this region have 

failures. Since the time of the Ottoman Empire, th

outcomes for the people there have been a series of t

7
Habsburg Empire, and finally with Tito after World W

The notion of peace as neighbor selling neighbor a p

shoes is evocative, but it is also rich in content. First, i

not say that buyer and seller become friends, or tha

tolerate each other. It does say that they have reac

state where antagonism and self-interest have come 

rough balance. Thus in Kosovo, a major event will 

transpired when Serb sells Kosovar a pair of sho

Kosovar sells Serb a shirt. Each will have moved b

that point where hatred for the other was a monopol

Monopolistic conflicts consume the Balkans and 

areas in the world: Serb and Kosovar, Hutus and T

Northern Irish Catholic and Protestant, Arab and J

the Middle East, and so on. Present in each of these ar

a conflict of such intensity that selling shoes to each ot

almost inconceivable. As discussed in the coming page

task is to diminish the saliency of the conflagration

conflicts by introducing many other more brushfire

conflicts. These are conflicts of learning about a larger 

in the individual and competition among enterprises, w

enterprises are churches, civic and other groups, no

business enterprises. The presence of a multitude of 

smaller conflicts is the best indicator that a society 

peace internally.

The foreign military—American or those of 

intervening states—has a definite role in achieving pe

the Balkans and in the other likely operations other 

war over the next decades. A single intervention m

however, will not serve all of these campaigns. As co

below, the foreign military role may be a de

quasi-diplomatic guarantor role, a short-term bal

police and logistician facilitating role or a long

logistician-as-carrot and police-as-stick pro-consul ro

8
To remove the fog of peace, we must expand the sc

the discussion on peace. Peace is not the absence of co

only the dead are not in conflict.

Having neighbor sell neighbor a pair of shoes imp

certain level of stability. Secondly, movement beyon

status quo ante or the post-hostilities truce requ

measure of progress. The social, spiritual, and econom

of the society must not only resume but also advance

then does peace become a viable descriptor of the en

ment. These three terms—stability, progress and pe

are highly interrelated, and are all based on the conc

freedom. Without freedom, enduring peace, stability

progress are impossible. An outline of the monog

themes follows in the next several paragraphs.

The first task is to provide a new definition for fre

The existing definitions are misleading. Isaiah B

probably the most highly regarded 20th century think

the idea of freedom, says that we have come up with ov

definitions of the term since the times of the Greek

Romans. He suggests that there are two threads 

permeate all of these definitions. The first of these 

notion of a constraint on government. The constraint 

us scope for activities free of external meddling. A 

example of this is the American Constitution’s use 

phrase: “The Congress shall make no law . . .” Here 

area where Congress should not enter. Colloquially, 

the freedom of “keeping government off my back.

problem with this definition comes out of the definit

the state: the monopoly on power. If the state 

monopoly on power, who is to keep it off the backs 

people, especially the less favored? The state hav

restrain itself is a fatal problem for this definition. Ho

a definition requiring a restraint on government rely 

power of government to achieve its ends?

9
should be able to make as much of ourselves as we ca

all you can be.” The problem with this definition i

humans are social beings who have to live with one an

Thus, we are likely to step on each other when we 

self-actualize. To misquote Shakespeare: “The proble

not in the stars, but in the reality that you, the reader, 

the writer, cannot both be emperor of the world at the 

time.” Philosophers from Hegel through Friedrich H

have compounded the problem by postulating worlds w

everyone could achieve their destinies while march

the same direction. Lenin, Hitler, Mao, and Pol Pot 

taken up this idea and forced their people to mar

lock-step. The result, as we all know, has not been freed

The dichotomy Berlin raises, however, is a real p

our lives both domestically and internationally. 

freedom stem from individuality or conformity? Do we 

more freedom when we can strike out on our own or wh

have our friends defending our rear? My answer to 

dilemmas is to say that we can strike out on our own 

we know what we are doing. In other situations, we 

friends to support us either because the problems 

solved are better solved by a group or the risks are suc

a person would be a fool to venture out alone. 

dilemmas will resolve themselves when we realize th

knowledge content of the two situations is very differ

The proposed definition uses knowledge a

foundation for freedom to get around these long-sta

problems. This definition will become almost self-ev

after an explanation of how freedom comes into bein

contention is that freedom is a product of knowledge 

used in a permitted activity. Freedom then becomes th

of horizon within which we can act.

The next step is to answer the question of what driv

increase in freedom. Freedom grows out of certain con

The first of these conflicts is the product of learni

individuals.4 Hegel’s resolution of the dialectical thes

10
of learning through conflict, even if it is not known as 

The second form of conflict is marketplace compe

Enterprises seek to minimize the force of competiti

differentiating themselves from each other. Both H

synthesis and the differentiating “better idea” are 

knowledge. When that knowledge is applied it becom

basis for additional freedom. This discussion will lead 

un-surprising conclusion that monopolies are the gr

enemies of freedom. Monopolies can take many forms

the individual who has a one-track mind to cul

religious, and civic as well as the traditional bu

monopoly.

It is a short step from increasing freedom to a defi

of stability. Stability exists when a society exhibits in

dynamism—when it creates and applies new know

Essentially, a stable society uses knowledge to expa

bounds, its freedom. Homeostasis or the unm

teeter-totter are not the models of stability. They repr

a “stability” of balance or no movement. These con

applied to individuals or societies, would represent s

where knowledge is not being produced and freedom 

being expanded. The imbalance of stability comes fro

many conflicts and competitive situations being res

and replaced by further conflicts. A static society reg

as knowledge is lost—forgotten—and not replaced b

knowledge.

In short, a stable society participates in progress

many conflicts that create stability also foster pro

Progress is the concrete side of freedom. It is the ta

product of those activities that result in freedom. 

knowledge applied in an activity produces both freedo

progress.

The following step describes the different for

stability a state may assume. It uses a geological met

to describe how these different types of states come 

end.

11
Castro’s Cuba fall into the category of states w

governance is a unitary monopoly. These are the state

often aspire to be utopias; ones that reject any ex

input to the governance process. Dictatorships want to 

knowledge of governance to the ruling elite. Left alone

countries die by dissipation—much as a mountain of 

can turn into a pile of scree, small uncoordinated pie

The next group of states have multiple monopol

governance, each governing a separate piece of turf

group includes Tito’s Yugoslavia, and then Bosni

Macedonia. Also included here is Cuba after Castro 

refugees go back. Major constituencies maintain area

control independently of the central government

France of Louis XVI is the exemplar of a multi-mon

state. The nobility, the Church, the bourgeoisie, an

farmers co-existed, with each group having signi

control over its own activities. Like revolutionary F

and Tito’s Yugoslavia, these countries tend to su

violent earthquake when the bonds that kee

monopolies operating in parallel weaken and 

disappear on the guillotine or in ethnic cleansing

remaining groups attempt to impose their methods o

rest of the population after the center collapses.

The last group of states include just the United S

and the England that has evolved over the past 50 y

These states have an adaptive kind of stability derived 

an absence of monopolies in governance. Here it is as 

tectonic plates are in constant motion. The earth tre

constantly at a low level from the many small conflict

permeate these societies. The constant competition a

the entities slowly shifts the society without ever lead

a magnitude 8.0 earthquake. Religious denomination

even congregations compete with each other for me

and with businesses when they need financing fo

construction. Were the United States and England p

examples of this kind—that is, without any monopolie

12
competition with everyone else.

Peace is a concept that makes sense only again

backdrop of the typology of states developed here. Th

enduring internal peace is the peace found in a mon

free environment. The peace and stability fou

monopoly or multi-monopoly states is more akin 

imposed truce than enduring peace. The apparent pe

these states will either dissipate when government lo

legitimacy or suffer an earthquake of revolution whe

center weakens.

The components of peace are freedom, stabilit

progress. Peace is not the absence of conflict, rathe

dynamic state where many conflicts are ongoing—w

learning and differentiation permit the setting as

cataclysmic war for the day-to-day competition of ma

better world; or at least, a better village.

This abstract conception of peace will form 

foundation for a discussion of various countries. Thu

first task in a Bosnia or Kosovo is to replace the over

large, cataclysmic conflict of ethnic hatred with sm

business, religious and other non-fatal conflicts that l

freedom, stability and progress. This is done at the 

level, almost individual by individual. Preventing e

war in Macedonia or in other states where the killin

not yet started, on the other hand, poses a very dif

problem. Here the national government must take th

role, much as the federal government took the le

achieving racial integration in America.

The foreign-military role is very different in a state 

as Macedonia not yet infected by ethnic killings than i

Kosovo. The foreign troops in Macedonia can provid

population with a comfort level that permits integrat

start and continue. Intelligence gathering and an occa

well-timed appearance may be all that is needed he

success. In Kosovo, the role differs if the goa

multi-ethnic or uni-ethnic state. Reestablishment 

13
Involvement in a multi-ethnic or multi-clan environ

will put more intervening troops at hazard as bot

carrot of logistical support and the stick of military 

will be required.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1.Speculative is the right word for this monograph. In i

thrust, it takes a concept—freedom—from the realm of political 

and reassigns it to the realm of psychology. Freedom has never 

major research topic in psychology. The author’s advisor in g

school wrote a chapter on freedom that was at best mildly receiv

author continues to believe that the chapter was one of the t

works published by Ivan Steiner. This monograph is the produ

years’ ruminations on the topic of freedom, always centered on S

chapter. See Ivan D. Steiner, “Perceived Freedom” in L

Berkowitz, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 

York: Academic, 1972. The publication in 1998 of On Democra

Haven: Yale, by Robert A. Dahl, however, did much to reinfo

confidence of the author on the utility of this exercise. Dahl, w

required reading when the author was in his first year in college 

leaves the end of this latest work open. He describes democ

practiced in various parts of the world but does not ever give dem

a concrete definition. Perhaps it has none. Fareed Zakaria, “The 

Illiberal Democracy” in Foreign Affairs, November-December, 1

that journal’s editor, is a good example of an attempt to put dem

back together again. Dahl’s conclusion, that there are many d

democracies, is the more effective without moving to the psych

dimension.

2. The literature on freedom is voluminous. Philosopher 

historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin spent much of his life study

literature. His 1958 essay, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” is regard

stunning recapitulation and synthesis of the literature. S

collection of his essays: The Proper Study of Mankind, New 

Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1997.

3. Hayek and other recent advocates of capitalism confr

excesses of capitalism by arguing that it should take place in the 

of a Judeo-Christian setting. See Friedrich Hayek, The Constit

Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960. Francis Fukuy

more explicit in saying that democratic capitalism is the 

Hegelian utopia. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History 

Last Man, London: Avon, 1993.

14
extant in psychology. Sigmund Freud, Erik Erickson, and Jean 

use conflict in describing learning. For each of them, learning 

when problems are resolved, not avoided. Others include d

schools of behaviorism, observational learning and cognitive pro

models. There is no research breaking down human learning in

categories. Evidence does suggest that the nonconflict models 

account for the simpler kinds of learning situations only. As a r

reasonable hypothesis is that the conflict models may account 

more complex types of learning governing higher order 

processing. Hegel’s dialectic falls within the conflict model of l

even though he or others have not explicitly termed the dia

learning paradigm. While he spoke of societies being subject 

dialectic, Piaget’s model of individual learning uses a logic very 

to the dialectic. Certainly, Hegel does not allow societies to av

dialectic (a la Pavlov’s dogs avoiding shocks); antithesis must c

thesis in the process of arriving at synthesis.

5. There is much discussion on whether societies are progres

the basis of indigenous or borrowed knowledge. Japan and the 

Union have often been accused of living on borrowed knowl

country such as the United States with a vibrant research secto

tradition of innovation is likely to experience a more consistent 

of progress than will societies that “borrow” the basis of their p

The source or basis of progress does matter.

6. The event that perhaps best marks the passing of the old 

England was the immediate post-war election in which the 

World War II, Winston Churchill, was thrown out of office 

supporting medical and other rights for the “lower” classes, the 

of World War II.

15
FREEDOM, POWER, AND PROGRESS

The relationship among the words in the chapter t

the subject of this chapter. The soldier fights for fre

Command projects power. Everyone aims for progre

fact, as we will see below, the three concepts are 

similar. Both freedom and power are the ability t

Progress is the concrete measure of freedom and pow

Freedom—The Basis for Progress and Stability

I propose a new definition for the concept of freedo

begin, however, allow me to sketch out how freedom 

into being. Knowledge is the father to freedom; not na

law, the Rights of Man, or other nebulous and 

forebears.

1

 Knowledge becomes freedom through a fiv

process: One, the finding that freedom is a per

attribute; Two, that freedom is active; Three, tha

purposive; Four, that it requires success for its nurtu

and—perhaps most controversially—Five, that perm

is an integral part of freedom. These five elements 

and build upon their predecessors.

Element #1: Freedom is a personal attribute sin

knowledge is personal.

2

 The content of any book or com

hard drive is only information. Only when we ass

information and put it to some purpose does inform

become knowledge. Freedom as a personal attr

contradicts the widely held position of political scie

and philosophers that freedom can exist even if indivi

are not in a position to use it. Isaiah Berlin, whose 

monograph “Two Concepts of Liberty” 3 is sti

touchstone for most discussions on freedom, accepte

independent existence of freedom in all of his writing

17
am unable to communicate a thought. A freedom of tra

meaningless to a person without means, ability, or de

travel. One may say to the Chinese that freedom of s

exists in the United States, but a more precise state

would be that Americans speak out—they act—withou

of retribution. If all Americans were docile followers

they would not speak out and the protections offered 

Constitution would be irrelevant. All of this leaves as

course, the fact that constitutions with free speech cl

exist in many countries without protecting a word of sp

Element #2: Freedom is active, manifesting its

activity, not status. A dictionary typically says that h

freedom and being free are equivalent statements. I w

like to insert a difference necessary for an understand

freedom. Being free is the status of not being shackled 

being confined. Having freedom is the ability to act. 

for most purposes, it is necessary to be free before bein

to act, the two are not the same. We are free because 

actions of others, but no agency can confer freedom 

We achieve freedom through the act of learning an

consequent use of the new knowledge.

Freedom becomes manifest in action. In the simp

terms, a person at rest may or may not be able to set a 

record in the 100-meter dash: the proof is in the actio

Element #3: Purpose is an essential building b

freedom. While I maintain that freedom is active, I 

say that freedom is random. For the most part, lea

occurs within goal directed activities; in problem-s

situations. Except in those limited circumstances 

trial-and-error learning is meaningful, the actions 

demonstrate freedom will be purposive. It is purpos

organizes our activities: Where we want to go deter

what we actually do.

Element #4: Success nurtures the growth of fre

Achievement defines freedom. Performance of a

establishes whether mastery of the act exists. That su

18
used in the future. An excellent analogy of the ne

success is the freedom created when the family tee

passes the long awaited driving exam. With that p

comes the capability, the freedom, to drive—par

permission and a car having been obtained. With

permit, the teen is just a passenger without the freed

decide where to go.

Element #5: Permission is an integral part of free

Libertarians may tell us that autonomy is freedom. 

they ignore is the central social character of humans.

5

autonomy were freedom, then eventually we will hav

Ayn Rand, a single surviving Atlas free to shrug ov

conquered minions. Assuming that such an Ubermen

Superman were to come along, he or she necessarily 

use the freedom of autonomy to subjugate the r

humanity. Why? Ultimately, only one person can hav

freedom to act autonomously. When more than one p

does it, they are likely to step on one another. Sad as i

seem, most of us cannot fully self-actualize—become a

we can be—because of the social costs of so much s

activity. Better for us to become what the society giv

permission to be.

Permission plays two roles relative to activity. Th

and traditionally accepted role of permission is the 

sanctioning of an activity. Its second role is ju

important, however. Here, it is a mechanism for pa

information from society or parent to the individual or 

Thus, when a mother says to her son that he may ice 

on the frozen lake, she is also telling the child that the 

safe for skating.

Figure 2 presents the elements of freedom. A 

perusal shows that this definition of freedom is pragm

nature. While not a part of the central thesis o

monograph, the definition has the robustness to encom

religious and ideological freedom as well as the active 

pursued here. Thus, highly religious, perhaps fundam

19
God and the purpose of salvation, thereby deriving a 

of freedom often felt by the religiously fervent.

 Governmental regulatory programs often play the 

“mother” role in telling us that prescription drugs 

airlines are safe. The Federal Aviation Administ

(FAA) inspects aircraft and airline procedures, in pa

convince us that they are safe, despite the occa

accident. We have neither the time nor the skill to in

the plane, its log books, and the training of the crew 

race from city to city. The FAA does this for us

acceptance of this information exchange is evident 

fact that passenger loads hardly decline for an airline 

after the airline may have suffered multiple crashe

short period of time.

6

Illegal or licentious behavior is unsanctioned beh

As a rule, such behavior does not lead to or produce fre

Committing murder (a criminal homicide) doe

20

Freedom is the product of....

* Knowledge

Truth, facts, shared beliefs

*applied to a purpose

Unorganized knowledge

is merely information

*in a non-disallowed activity

Freedom is active

Freedom is the arc

of the individual’s horizon for action

Figure 2. A definition of freedom.

 Another definition is: The more we know, the more we can d

more we can do, the greater is our arc of freedom.
the law are absent.

Creative activity is the one, normal exception to th

for permission as a precursor to activity. No one can te

artist what to paint. The best we can do when confron

creativity, is to not disallow it from proceeding.

In summary, then, freedom is created when know

is applied to a purpose in a permitted, or not disall

activity that leads to success. Except for some 

allowances, such as letting us learn from the failu

others, this is the only way freedom comes into being

Prosaically, freedom is the ability to do what we w

do. The more we do, the more we learn to do; which in 

allows even more action. At each step in the process, w

greater freedom. Thus, freedom becomes the indivi

arc of horizon within which action is possible. Each pe

horizon may be near or far, and broad or narrow in an

the horizontal or vertical dimension. The boundar

freedom, excepting the creative act that expand

bounds, are knowledge and permission—the persona

the social. The perfect Renaissance person, of course, 

horizon that is both very broad and deep—therefore h

almost complete freedom.

Some Notes on Power, Having Freedom and Be

Free, and the Role of Institutions.

The contention here is that use of knowledge le

freedom. If so, how does this square with Bacon’s fa

dictum that knowledge is power? In practice, powe

freedom are the same thing: the ability to accomplish

differ in their contexts. That is, the ability to accomp

power when the knowledge used is a monopoly. In con

action taken in freedom has widely held knowledge 

foundation. Power and freedom represent the end 

along a continuum where knowledge varies with its d

of dispersion. Power increases in effect as know

21
as knowledge becomes more widely dispersed.

If freedom follows from knowledge, then the sou

freedom becomes the educational process. This po

problem for a wide range of institutions, from the milit

the American Constitution, that many see as the prom

protectors, and guarantors of freedom. Two factors 

here. First is the distinction made above between “

free” and “having freedom.” 

When Berlin and others in the Anglo-American tra

speak of freedom as the area wherein the individual 

to act independently, they are speaking about being 

Berlin named this concept “negative freedom” becau

causation is a restraint on government. It doe

necessarily follow from his formulation that people 

will act just because government stays off their back

example, the just-released prisoner will have few reso

that are applicable in a greatly changed world outs

prison after 50 years of incarceration. He is free, bu

little freedom because his knowledge stock—how to su

in prison—is not relevant or useful on the outside.

The distinction between being free and having fre

illuminates the role of the military in the life of the cou

It exists to keep us free, an essential precursor to our h

freedom.

The second factor is the role of institutions in fre

creation. Institutions from elections to the separat

powers are human creations, designed to achieve sp

purposes. Thus, the Constitution delineates ce

freedoms and not others. The Constitution protects o

few narrow slices of freedom—the slices for speech, re

etc.—and essentially ignores the other areas or slices w

Americans have the capability to act.

At best, institutions channel and protect ce

freedoms; they create no freedom. The Ame

Constitution is a governing document—a super la

22
activities of both governmental entities and the p

Giving direction may be a freedom protecting ac

direction or command cannot create freedom. That 

require forcing the horse to drink after leading him 

trough.

Increasing Freedom and Progress.

How does freedom increase; how is the collective ho

of a citizenry enlarged? The basis of the enlargement i

knowledge and the dispersion of existing knowledge

what prompts the creation of new knowledge?

Conflict and competition are the engines of 

knowledge creation and freedom. Individuals expe

conflict when problem solving leads to the replacem

old information with the new. Competition 

enterprises to differentiate themselves from 

competitors. They must develop the proverbial “better 

to serve as the basis of the differentiation. Each 

successful problem solving and differentiation increas

resources available for future action, thereby increasi

freedom of the actors.

When an actor uses new knowledge to create a 

product, two things happen. First comes the freedom d

from success. Second comes the widget from which the 

profits. This product represents progress.

8

 The use o

knowledge is the best measure of progress.

9

The interesting part of the relationship between fre

and progress, however, lies in the negative instance: 

happens when knowledge acquisition and progress c

By analogy, the equipment begins to rust and even

falls apart. Unused knowledge disappears, both at th

of the individual and the society.

Can a group or society decide to maintain and prac

certain stock of knowledge and freeze progress at a c

point? Many such attempts have existed in the U

23
themselves, generally in communes, following a given 

rules. The problem is that no group can truly isolate 

from the rest of the society. The little give and tak

remains eventually forces change or dissolution o

commune. This is not to say that successful communes 

not existed and continue to do so. Two famous comm

are Amana (Iowa) and Oneida (New York). They a

longer famous for being communes, but rather for the 

appliances and silverware they developed to bring reso

into their communities.

Examples such as Amana suggest that small grou

maintain a utopian vision for a time with 

accommodation to the outside world. Certainly one 

reasons they can be successful is that members can 

and go into the larger society. Attempts to achieve ut

visions at a societal level have all suffered defeat.

A society-wide vision of utopia becomes ha

maintain, because history intervenes and passes 

Country-wide utopian attempts have also been d

since death or the gulag are the only options for thos

disagree with the ruling vision. The leaders of the revo

are not going to allow others to tell them that thei

vision is flawed. Only those dissidents able to escap

country’s borders have a chance at normality. Thu

Soviet workers’ paradise was a well-defined dream 

time of the Russian Revolution. It became the ide

Soviet Union would have to strive to achieve, even 

cost of many lives. Obviously, they did not make it. 

end, the leadership’s effort to co-opt history and to c

external developments created so many contradiction

the system could not stand. Hitler’s and Pol Pot’s u

would have suffered similar fates if war ha

intervened.

10

The desire to proclaim an ideal, stop history 

eliminate change will always be with us. Fortun

unless someone attempts to create a world-wide u

24
those attempts. Since the creation of new knowledge 

likely to cease, neither is the growth of freedom. Pro

the consequence of utilizing that freedom, will 

naturally as long as we do not hinder it. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. See Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilizations, New 

Penguin, 1993. Over the course of this volume, Braudel traces th

the term liberty from its Latin origins to the modern day. The 

used early on to generally connote privileges, and it is only a

French Revolution that it assumes its modern meaning of freed

his discussions on the times after plagues, times when there wa

land than there were peasants to farm it. One consequence 

plagues is that the peasants of the 11th and 12th centuries had f

(or really power) because they represented a scarce resour

middle 19th century is the turning point after which freedom be

more concrete concept.

2. I take a pragmatic approach to the concept of kno

Knowledge is that which a group (two or more individuals) agre

true. In other words, knowledge and truth are socially determin

is why one baseball team at each level from PeeWee to the 

Leagues can all be considered World Champions despite the real

only one team can be the best. This definition is an expansion 

Popper’s notion of truth as the result of the scientific process. Sc

accept as true or valid those results of experimentation where a

at refutation have been unsuccessful. Given that Popper wrote a

of great ideological ferment (1930s to 1950s), it is understanda

he limited truth to the results of the scientific method. Reality, h

is much broader. Ideology does drive much behavior. Religious 

accept a given set of truths depending on their denominatio

within each congregation, accept certain “facts” as truths. Ide

and religious truths cannot be refuted, yet they “account” for mu

is considered true in our lives. To permit truth to exist in religiou

musical, and other realms, I suggest that the scientific method is 

convention—which, in fact, it is. It is a social—an agreed 

convention because scientists accept as true results which, in the 

they know will be refuted or supplanted: thus, Socrates’ ether b

our atmosphere. In this view, truth becomes the product of any a

process that serves the need of a group or community. This is no

that truth is relative. It merely reflects the reality that d

communities have their own “truths.” In our modern world, thes

quickly come into conflict. In simpler times, they co-existed in se

25
Princeton University, 1972.

3. See Endnote 2, Chapter 2.

4. Morality is usually seen as the external societal counterw

selfish autonomy or negative freedom. Here, pre-action moral ju

and information exchange are a part of the process of building fre

5. The writings of Richard A. Epstein are representative 

libertarian position. For me, his writing has the advantage of sha

aversion to monopolies, a topic he gives considerable cove

Principles for a Free Society, New York: Perseus Books, 1998.

6. Even a horrific event like the ValuJet crash in the Evergla

only to the recertification of the airline by the FAA and the sub

renaming of the airline to AirTran. AirTran continues flying. 

established airline, USAir, had multiple crashes in the early 

without major long-term effects on its passenger loads. One 

expect the consequences for these airlines to be much more n

without the FAA being there to reassure passengers after each ac

7. In sketching the development of freedom in this monog

stay to the main branch of the process. We do learn from o

mistakes and those of others and build freedom on that learn

also learn by observational learning, a relatively conflict-free p

But observational learning has never been shown to apply t

complex learning.

8. Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress, New York

Books, 1980. In his foreword, Nisbet says that if the idea of progr

in the West, then much else will die with it.

9. This sentence again illustrates my desire to remain on th

road in describing this freedom-peace model. Obviously, new kno

can be used “wastefully” for old purposes. I hope readers do not 

bogged down on such side roads in this short monograph.

10. See Lutz Niethammer,Posthistorie: Has history come to a

P. Camiller, trans., New York: Verso, 1992. This short volume p

excellent arguments for seeing all utopian dreams as failure

making.

26
A MODEL OF SOCIETIES

This chapter uses the distribution of knowled

governance to define three types of societies that exist 

a continuum. It extends from the society where eve

knows how to govern the country to the socie

dictatorship, where one person controls all knowle

governance. Later, we will see that the location of a s

along this continuum determines the strategies that w

successful when diplomatic or military interve

becomes necessary. The distinctions among cou

discussed here may also become indices for the like

that interventions may be required in the future.

Freedom as the Source of Stability:

The Adaptive Society.

New knowledge, once used to new effect, repre

change and progress. As a result, for freedom to b

source of societal stability, stability must incorp

change. A static stability necessarily loses ground to o

who continue changing and developing. More import

static stability loses ground to itself as the sto

knowledge rusts and dissipates. Change, as a p

stability, makes sense if the change comes in 

increments. Following the geological metaphor, te

plates that slide continuously past each other may ca

constant rumbling in the earth, but they will not cause 

earthquakes. The contrast between the Soviet Unio

the United States in this regard is illustrative. Leni

Stalin tried to minimize change to their plans. Peres

proved to Soviet citizens and the entire world tha

“workers’ paradise” had been a false dream, made po

by the Russian ability to withstand deprivation. The U

States has shifted direction and focus over time 

27
myriad changes that have occurred over the last 200 

It has remained stable.

The source of American stability is abstracted in F

3. It depicts knowledge of governance being w

dispersed and without fixed boundaries. The abse

boundaries is important. Many, if not most, Ame

believe they could run government better than the cu

incumbents. Unfortunately for each of us with these b

our beliefs are not held by a large enough group for 

take over the government. Any change we propose 

first gather a coalition around it before it ca

implemented. By the time we have put together a pow

enough coalition, our great ideas have been compro

almost into oblivion.

The reason for American adaptability lies not so m

its government, but rather the highly competitive nat

the society. Competitive clashes occur by the se

Members of industries compete to achieve market s

Across industries, salespersons, preachers, 

superintendents, and others in the retail trade compe

only for the consumers’ money, but also for their time. 

of these competitions, small as they are, push the coun

their own ways. The sum result of all these little pus

28

wide, unmanaged dispersal of knowledge

Figure 3. Dispersion of knowledge of governance 

adaptive society. 

Here many, if not most, individuals influence government as se

actors and through multiple affiliations.
sum of all new knowledge and purpose put t

competitive test, represents the most reliable vis

national stability.

The element that separates the American illustrat

stability from all others is that there is no one vision, 

or person controlling it. It is a stability sponsored, if it 

sponsor, by Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” 1 extende

not only over the economic marketplace, but also the 

and religious marketplaces. 2

Participation of a sufficiently large part o

population results in this kind of stability. Partici

need to be both producers and consumers i

marketplaces. The resulting interaction keeps 

competitive event relatively small. The nature of 

competition cannot be cataclysmic—a company 

depends on making one sale per year is in a catacl

competition. It is do or die. The cost of failure must not 

great that the associated people become pariahs fo

Second acts and even multiple acts must be possi

ensure early failure recognition. This opens enterpr

“creative destruction.” The inclusion of minoritie

women along with white males in economic, social, 

and religious discourse can only increase the stability 

United States. This inclusiveness upsets tradit

patterns of doing business. Tradition is a beha

monopoly. Countries with more monopolistic tende

the highly traditional, have no mechanism for ach

change so effectively or with so much stability.

The above discussion fairly represents the third t

stability mentioned in the Introduction. The United S

and then England are probably the best examp

countries exhibiting adaptive stability. Adaptively 

states have few to no monopolies influencin

governance of the country.

Since World War I, and especially after World W

England has greatly increased its degree of inclusiv

29
in the economy. Furthermore, it has begun the proc

devolving powers to Scotland, Wales, and soon to Nor

Ireland. Each of these events represents an instance w

the number of players, and therefore competition, is 

increased. 

Much is happening in England that makes it 

democratic: however, its basic form of government 

democratic. England is an elected dictatorship. To 

with, national elections typically revolve around 

party’s nominee for prime minister. Yes, parliam

elected. Given the strength of party loyalty, however, i

is secondary to that of the prime minister. As Ma

Thatcher demonstrated, a prime minister can foster 

changes independently of the parliament. Pract

speaking, the Parliament is the only governme

England, and the Prime Minister has absolute power 

in office. That England continues to become more inc

speaks to the possibility of having competing voices 

even in a semi-dictatorship.

The mark of countries with adaptive stability 

multiplicity of active participants in the soc

governance. Few of them will be in government. They 

have influence, in their small way, in directing the p

the country.

3

 In practical terms, a society becomes 

stable and more adaptable as the number of people m

decisions increases. Church attendance, purcha

products, support of charities, and membership in 

voluntary, and even sports clubs—each in its 

way—contributes to the governance of the country. T

the sprouting of soccer fields across the United State

the last 20 years is to see the effect on governm

increasing membership in a particular kind of sport 

What may break up the adaptive stability of a state 

as the United States? I will return to this question la

30
The opposite of adaptive stability is what I have te

monopoly stability. This is the case where governan

single monopoly, and the owners of the monopoly 

external input. The scope for decisionmaking is 

narrow, the country having a few leaders and 

followers. The Soviet Union is the historic exampl

monopoly society. It had an imposed stability since few 

able to influence the direction of governance.

Cuba and China are also good examples of mon

societies. The leaders of both countries have perm

change to occur when forced by circumstances to do it. 

both countries allow capitalists to provide those good

socialist economy no longer can provide. The change

have occurred have been in the economic realm. The 

of government remains as a strict monopoly. What ha

when the two countries’ leadership ages further and 

fades away? The one thing the Soviet Union, Cub

China have shared is elimination of all possible comp

visions of governance. How many leaders do these cou

have who could lead the country without the use of the 

Current events in Russia suggest the answer may b

few. Thus, the initial expectation of the end game in 

countries is a dissipation of power with a conside

interregnum until a new entity assumes power.

Figure 4 may be contrasted with Figure 3 to show 

different pattern for the dispersion of knowled

governance between adaptive and monopoly societies

monopoly society, the leadership or dictator closely ho

such knowledge, eliminating any person or group 

might want to share or take some of the leadership’s p

Consequently, when the central power weake

disappears due to death or other causes, power coa

must first be created before a new central power em

This takes time, opening the society to a period of c

That chaos may lead to the need for external interve

when nonconclusive fighting breaks out.

31
China may be an exception to this rule in that in op

its economy, it has let in foreign investors and expe

These investors, companies, and foreign staffs repres

major infusion of knowledge to the country. This know

affects the local level where the factories and offices 

foreigners interact with the Chinese. Given the great 

China, the sophistication being gained at the city leve

not necessarily diffuse outward or even upward. The n

adapt to economic freedoms and foreign influence, how

opens up the possibility that political power may shif

the center in Beijing to the affected cities. It i

unreasonable to see the growth of at least four major 

centers in China: Beijing, Taipei, Shanghai, and 

Kong. A further possibility, of course, would b

development of a fifth power center in the we

less-Han, part of China. Such a transformation obviou

not a foregone conclusion, but the current flo

knowledge in China suggest that this is an outcome 

real potential. 

Given the current circumstances in Cuba, the exp

outcome of the death of the current leadership shou

dissipation, much as is happening in the former S

Union. The presence of so many refugees just 90 miles 

in Miami, however, changes the scenario somewhat. 

refugees do not return to Cuba and bring their Ame

32

highly centralized knowledge

Figure 4. A rendition of concentrated knowled

governance found in monopoly societies.

Little knowledge of governance remains when the center weak

disappears. Chaos or fragmentation are likely results.
consequence of the center’s losing control.

If the refugees do return instantly, and do so in 

numbers, then major conflict could arise. There w

strong competition to see which group can take ove

national government. Civil war is not an unreaso

expectation if the number of returnees and their comp

visions for the Cuban future are both high.

Multi-Monopoly Societies.

The intermediate case between adaptive and mo

societies is the multi-monopoly society. Here the c

authority does not attempt to maintain a comprehe

monopoly. It allows the major sectors of the s

essentially to rule themselves, so that each has it

monopoly. Louis XVI allowed the Church, the bourg

and the landed farmers to manage their own affairs a

as these did not interfere with the prerogatives of the 

Similarly, in Macedonia the dominant ethnic groups 

lives that do not intersect very much. Each of these g

maintains its own schools, villages, and even govern

This reflects the typical pattern of governance tha

existed in the Balkans, at least since the Ottoman Emp

Figure 5 dwells on the characteristic of countries 

multi-monopoly stability whereby parallel and sep

means of governance co-exist. Such societies exist 

middle ground between adaptive and monopoly soc

Groups know how to manage the state, or believe th

from their experience in managing their own a

Contending powers are ready to try to fill the vacuum 

the center weakens and fails. This is not to say th

collapse of the center is an instant event; it takes 

When it happens, however, the consequences are very 

with much loss of life: revolution in France and e

cleansing in post-Tito Yugoslavia.

33
Reality is that states fall along a continuum rathe

just in the three categories discussed above. 

differentiates states along this continuum is the num

separate monopolies with internal governance re

sibilities. 

It is possible to envision the adaptively stable reg

demise taking either a monopolistic or multi-monop

form. First of all, the demise of such a state will occur 

less frequently than is the case with the other for

states. The reason is that the center, or nat

government, is relatively a much weaker institution 

than it is in the other two cases. Thus, transitio

government are less momentous for the country than 

one dictator replaces another one. The transition figh

election or other means—may be expensive. It is not 

however, to produce the many deaths of a putsch, civi

or revolution. Furthermore, as the number of constitue

in a state increases, the power of each group neces

falls. This makes it less likely that any one group can 

power; there are just too many contenders. The conte

in a monopolistic or multi-monopolistic state are fewe

they start the battle being closer to the goal—they 

always been close to the center of government.

Given that, how may an adaptive state die? It could 

a monopoly to arise and thereby become rejective

34

well defined, segmented

 perspectives

Figure 5. Knowledge of governance distributed in a segm

fashion. 

The Church, nobles, bourgeoisie, and landed farmers in Revolut

France each knew how government should operate. They fou

the heart of France when Royal power failed.
one does not look too closely at the calls for the United S

to become a “Christian nation,” one could make the ca

a monopolistic fundamentalist government arising 

After all, 30-40 percent of the population claims 

fundamentalist. That should be a strong base. Na

elections, however, have shown that this is not a mono

block. Should the possibility actually arise tha

fundamentalists might assume power, very rapidl

would see the monolithic block reduced to contending s

beliefs. This is reasonable since there are 

denominations or wings of denominations that con

themselves to be fundamentalist and yet have en

differences among themselves to not coalesce int

denomination.

4

Alternatively, another possibility would b

intensification of “identity” politics in the country. 

time this might lead to the formation of communities 

their own rulemaking authority. Again, this possibilit

not have a high probability, but it suggests a way th

country could move toward the multi-monopoly m

India may be the ultimate expression of identity po

India may even obtain some stability from the combin

of its government having a short and weak reach in

groups and the large number of linguistic, religious

caste divisions in the country. These groups interac

each other only minimally.

Differentiation of states into this multi-mon

monopoly, and adaptive typology differs from other m

of categorizing states. Whether a government is electe

various institutions, or passes other procedural tests

not matter. The relevant dimension is how knowle

used in governance. Is the knowledge of governance 

exclusively? Is it shared among defined groups that m

their own affairs (a part of the state)? Or, is it disp

throughout the population so that many forces, 

outside government, direct governance? One way tha

methodology is valuable is that it permits putting En

35
uncomfortable words to get around its semi-dicta

structure. At the other extreme, it is clear the govern

of some of the former Soviet states are maintaining 

dictatorial ways despite the adoption of elections and 

democratic fixtures. Once fully operationalized

knowledge-based means of analyzing governance sho

the basis of more reliable indices of where, and what ty

problems may arise around the world.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 

of Nations, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. This oft

work deserves a close reading. The society he describes as bein

the control of the invisible hand is that of the small shopkeeper 

century England. He does not rule out the use of government c

where necessary.

2. The idea of multiple marketplaces is drawn from Ric

Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square, Chicago: Eerdmans, 198

Neuhaus argues that religion has been improperly removed fr

public (i.e., civic) square. Another interpretation is that relig

always been there, but given the highly competitive nature of rel

the United States, the effect is that no single voice can predo

Thus, although many denominations argue for prayer in the sc

similar number argue for church-state separation on this issue

3. A very current example of how companies affect n

governance is the case of HMOs and the health insurance busi

general. Through their decisions to pay for certain procedures 

others, these companies are taking on police powers, powers ge

left to the states. Conceptually, there is not much difference be

state saying “We will incarcerate you if you do that,” and an in

company saying “We will not pay if you have that procedure.”

4. The issue of the effect fundamental religions have on state

further study. The utopian character of fundamental Christi

well-accepted. In the utopian manner, fundamentalists belie

sequenced history, with the “troubles” yet to come; they see the

as the chosen to go to Heaven; and they describe the rest 

population as unworthy of going to Heaven. See Karen Armst

History of God, New York: Knopf, 1993.

36
THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

Most wars have a common psychological characte

The participants have a high degree of certainty about 

mission. That certainty translates into the absen

existential conflict within the participants. So, wa

condition where there is a high level of ext

(inter-group) conflict and a low level of intra-indiv

conflict. Serb and Kosovar—man, woman, and child

clear visions and missions they supported fervently

war then proceeded from bases that consti

impenetrable monopolies. The end of active host

brought an end to the external conflict. What remains 

internal certainty that combatants took to war

dissipation of that certainty—perhaps amon

combatants—is a necessary part of moving from 

cessation of hostilities to the beginning of peace.

As said earlier, peace is not established after host

until the combatants would rather sell each other 

than kill each other. This has not happened in the Ba

since the rise of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, i

be appropriate to speak of a continuous state of war ex

in the Balkans for hundreds of years, broken up onl

few externally imposed truces. The resolution of this t

conflict does not come quickly, and the current danger 

establishment of just another externally imposed 

That truce can end suddenly after the removal of ex

military forces.

The key to a lasting peace in the Balkans 

imposition of new, less lethal conflicts in the minds 

contending populations. These are the conflicts of lea

and competition.

37
where interests become so heterogeneous th

perspective can put together enough members to for

rest to do something. Peace rests on a patte

wide-ranging interactions.

An example taken from the American co

demonstrates the effect multiple and contradictory b

can have on behavior. Many special-identity Yellow 

directories have come on the market over the past few 

Proponents have published Christian, Black, Hispani

probably other Yellow Pages. Anecdotally, these se

have disappeared. The suggested reason for their d

might be the conflict they pose for merchants and bu

people: “Am I a seller of shoes or an ethnic/gender-

seller of shoes?” Both are legitimate business model

the first offers the greater promise of success. While 

may have wanted to contribute to the growth of busin

run by people like themselves, the urge to claim the 

marketplace won when these directories lost support

American history governs this logic. Wheat-gr

state governments have always been much more inte

in having their farmers sell grain to comm

governments than has the national government. The s

well-being depends on the farmer getting a good price f

wheat. As a result, grain belt politicians have usually 

the last persons arguing for embargoes or other p

limiting grain sales. 

Military operations other than war involve u

strategies based on local circumstances. Bosnia and K

where the killing has been intense, require e

separation before any other intervention can be

meaningful. In this type of situation, the presence 

intervening force says to the residents that they s

build new lives while the force keeps their enemies a

The challenge in nation-building under these conditi

to create a stable, progressive state with a foundat

knowledge-based freedom that becomes integrated w

38
create and foster the growth of competition in ende

that were never competitive in the past. A 

accomplishment-oriented ethos should replace nation

fervor. These strategies fit most easily in the econom

civic marketplaces.

An example from the civic marketplace illustratin

phenomenon would be an attempt to reduce national

Kosovo. Nationalism and other ideologies survive best 

taken on a grand scale, without the need to balance 

with reality. This example attempts to insert that r

check. Kosovo, as this is being written right after the 

the bombing, is a clean slate—little remains of the 

government and institutions. One possible U.N. str

might be to create local-level governments with d

responsibilities and appropriate resources (t

authority). Local government, given a chance to de

before a “national” government develops, should 

effective counter-weight to the nationalism that 

dominate the national government.

Local politics is the politics of fixing potholes. It i

for constituents to determine if the job is being done. 

not only is local government a counter-weight to na

government through the division of responsibilities, 

becomes an excellent pragmatic training groun

national service. The building of local governments i

type of situation illustrates the bottom-up approach n

to move beyond the permanent truce this area has su

for decades.

An example from the economic marketplace might 

out of the re-establishment of power plants in the 

Competition would be served if one or a few large 

plants were replaced with many smaller ones form

least several power companies. Just the increase i

number of power companies or authorities sprea

around the country would make power less of a nationa

more of a local issue. Each region, area, or neighbo

39
efficiency would be made up, technically, by the g

redundancy among the plants and, politically, b

lowered likelihood that the national government 

usurp the power grid. Its many “owners” are more lik

defend such a grid than the impersonal grid that 

power from far away.

Macedonia, on the other hand, still offers the poss

of achieving a reduction in tensions through int

integration. In this case, action must flow from th

down. In a sense, the strategy for keeping a Mace

together is almost the opposite of that for a Kosovo. He

task is to foster interaction among the groups, to c

perceptions, and to meld a stronger whole from 

previously isolated pieces. The appropriate strategie

flow downward from the central government as it c

opportunities for interaction among the ethnic group

American experience in racial integration is re

here. The Federal Government led the effort to ac

integration—of course, under pressure if not duress. 

federal laws and police power that opened doo

minorities and women. So it must be in Macedonia w

the government itself must become multi-ethnic to s

example for the ethnic communities.

The Need for a New Concept to Define Peace.

If freedom involves conflict, then peace must as w

seems to be an inescapable consequence. It is a

contentious statement. Many Europeans, for exa

argue that the competitive spirit that permeate

country is unnecessary and undesirable: Why ha

brands of tooth paste when a person uses only one

same complaint is raised about the messiness and ex

of American politics. Referring back to the earlier discu

about utopias, the response to such criticism is to ask

should make the decision as to which brands to allow 

the market and how a candidate should run the camp

40
opposed to a marketplace, rigidities insinuate them

into the fabric of the society. The more that happen

less the country is adaptable to future change.

Another charge that may be made agains

monograph’s arguments is that they are a restatem

pluralism. The concept of pluralism has two meanings

first of these is the idea that a diversity of groups is a 

thing for societies. The diversity of a country su

Switzerland with its independent language-sp

Cantons falls into this type of pluralism. Howeve

purpose here is the opposite of interaction. The Ca

maintain their independence as a means of prese

cultural heritage.

The second meaning of pluralism comes from 

doctrine that the common good includes both majorit

minority positions. This is where the idea of tolerance e

pluralism. It may be a cynical thing to say, but the 

appropriate suggestion here is that few majorities e

more tolerance than they absolutely must demons

One might ask the members of the American Repu

and Democratic parties how tolerant of each other the

Their answers probably would not be on the pleasant 

tolerant. How tolerant of each other are American me

of different denominations? An indicator might be 

many denominations believe that only their membe

go to Heaven. Pluralism in all its guises is a str

forward proposition. It speaks to a multiplic

perspectives, not their interaction and the consequen

the interaction. Conflict is not an essential ingredi

pluralism.

2

The internal conflict proposed here is real; it lead

balancing of costs and benefits, and in general, slows 

decisionmaking. A considered, balanced decision is 

likely to be a moderate decision than its counterpart

people experienced such decisionmaking, then war 

41
ethnic differences. 

Unfortunately, not a few people want to complicate 

lives to the degree necessary to internalize this argu

Certainly, the United States survives with many adhe

to single issues, from advocates of a machine gun in 

closet to the protectors of the snail darter. The elemen

keeps these forces in check is their multiplicity. For 

advocate of a position, there is another person or 

advocating its opposite. This leads to competition of a r

high order. Groups are able to win battles but not wa

fact, their wars never end. The overall environmen

exists in these wars is that none of the combatants ca

the final nail in the coffin of their opponents and ther

rarely try. At the same time, they do not become dri

friends or necessarily tolerate each other. That is 

should be if stability and progress are the goal.

A Descriptor for Freedom-Fostering Societies:

Plurascity.

We need a descriptor for the multiplicity of conflict

exist in a peaceful, stable and progressive state. Plur

is not it. I have coined a term to describe such a societ

best example of which is the United States. The U

States is a plurascity,

3

 not a perfect one but with 

plurascitic characteristics than other countries. The 

comes from the Latin, and means multiple knowledge

conflict to be as widespread as it is here, knowledge m

widely distributed as well—the level of freedom mu

high. Americans act on the knowledge they have; bu

businesses, associations, and for/against govern

designs. All of that activity, in widespread compe

keeps the tectonic plates of politics from becoming 

stressed. 

Because the level of freedom is high in the United S

the effectiveness of power must be correspondingly 

Every political action requires the creatio

42
resolved. That is why issues are rarely resolved i

country—no one has the power to win the final battle 

argument.

Figure 6 shows the differences between pluralism 

plurascity. We can think of India as an almost p

example of pluralism. India is divided into hundr

groups along the schisms of religion, caste, languag

economics. These groups are essentially self-governin

supporting. They co-exist. What conflict exists among 

is likely to take the form of riots or temple bur

Plurascitic conflict—Brahmin competing 

untouchable—is absent. India will become a plurascit

when the boundaries between groups become more per

to competition among individuals, enterprises 

associations.

It should be noted, however, that India does owe m

its stability to the existence of so many distinct grou

within its borders. At the same time, the presence of 

independent groups guarantee that the central govern

of India will remain weak internally until the distin

among the groups become blurred. It is hard to envisio

43

 Pluralism

Doctrine that a diversity of

groups is a good thing.

 Implementation:

 Federalism -- Adaptation to

 a given multiplicity for the

 sake of peace.

 Functional autonomy --

 Adaptation to maintain

 group distinctions.

Doctrine that the common good

includes both majority and

minority positions.

 Plurascity

Condition where life’s

conflicts are internalized

in the individual to

moderate the intensity

of group and sociatal

conflicts.

Figure 6. The contrast between pluralism and plurascit

Plurascity required the conflict of competition, not ju

cohabitation found in pluralism.
state into smaller, more manageable units. 

In summary, peace is rich in the brushfire-sized con

that never reach the status of conflagrations. It is n

absence of conflict. Plurascitic conflict exists w

individuals—as when religious and economic argum

contend for supremacy in a salesperson. The conflic

exists among individuals and groups in the fo

competition. In the latter form, the conflict will e

across multiple marketplaces. The combination of in

conflict and enterprise competition ensures that the 

motivators of war—nationalism, sectarian

acquisitiveness—are moderated by other fo

Plurascities will always hear the voices of caution

voices pointing to the trade-offs, and the voic

self-interest when deciding whether to go to war.

Societies should become more internally stab

plurascitic conflicts spread through them wit

breakdown of monopolies. Furthermore, the richer 

become in plurascitic conflict, the more they will becom

engines of their own progress. Instead of impo

knowledge from more advanced states, a plura

generates knowledge locally through competition

example in support of these assertions is the history 

United States.

The United States has become a plurascity fro

beginnings as 13 relatively homogeneous and monop

colonies. Government is split among three levels plus 

special governmental districts, each competing for th

dollar and in giving service. Religious denominations 

spread across the country to the point that few areas a

served by more than one church, creating competiti

both service and parishioners. Businesses have multi

virtually eliminating even at the local level the mono

of old. The company town is gone, and the local ban

competition. This level of competition, and the grow

knowledge that competition brings, I suggest, is the r

44
constant and incremental. The big shocks that have br

other countries to their knees have been pa

phenomena here. Governments have fallen in 

countries as a consequence of financial and energy s

that the United States has survived.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Ted Honderich, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Ne

Oxford University, 1995.

2. The insufficiency of pluralism as a descriptor of democracy 

assumed from the fact that Robert Dahl, pluralism’s most de

student, has moved on to the concept of poliarchy as a better des

See Endnote 1, Chapter 1.

3. Plurascity may be compared to the competing faction

Madison discusses in The Federalist Papers, No. 10, New York: 

1961, p. 77. Both models subscribe to the idea that factions ca

prevented from arising. Both argue that control of factions 

through having many factions that become counterweights 

other. Neither model restricts factions to a single sector of life. M

however, has his factions acting directly on government, lobb

their positions. I see the process as being more indire

participation in society, as part of a congregation, as a consum

producer, in social and civic gatherings all have primary purpo

are typically not political. Our participation in an activity stren

that activity, increasing its power in the marketplace and bring

the attention of government. Thus, we buy a computer with M

software. Microsoft gains market share. Government sees a g

prosperous company and is, therefore, less likely to interfere 

marketplace, unless of course the issue of monopolistic pra

raised. Ignoring the monopoly issue, the personal comput

industry can get government assistance for export or other 

without much of an effort. Fundamentalist and evangelical ch

are getting more attention from government because these 

growing denominations. My point, in a nutshell, is that b

computer or belonging to a congregation is ultimately a politica

It is an action that has a much greater effect on government th

any election. In some countries, it is also a dangerous action. A

point on Madison: Larry D. Kramer argues that The Federalist

was largely ignored until this century. While we might se

determinative on the structure of the young United States, e

Kramer collects from the notes of the participants at the con

45
misquoted. See Larry D. Kramer, “Madison’s Audience” in H

Law Review, January 1999.

46
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN

PRE- AND POST-HOSTILITY CAMPAIGN

The achievement of plurascity in any of the 

discussed above is a difficult chore, but an achievable 

The military of intervening states will have major ro

bringing warring factions to the truce table and from 

to a stable and progressive future. If the history of pre

wars and operations other than war, especially i

Balkans, teaches humanity anything, it should be t

cessation of hostilities on the battlefield is just the firs

toward peace. The intervening military in the Ba

today and other areas of ethnic or nationalistic te

tomorrow, or anytime tin-pot dictators use their peo

cannon fodder, will face differing situations when 

arrive. 

Post-Hostilities Intervention.

In a homogeneous, single-ethnic Kosovo

post-hostilities task is nation-building. The occupat

Japan may be taken as the model for this type of oper

Demobilization is step one. Foreign aid agencies can

this. The second step is maintenance of order. Exa

such as Haiti, where a civilian police force was introdu

perform this task, suggest that the military will be tak

this task for a longer duration than in the past. The 

task, actual development of a new state, requires a m

presence to prevent factional fighting among g

seeking to assume control of the country.

Earlier, reference was made to a strategy to preve

re-arousal of nationalistic forces by concentr

development at the local level. The purpose for this 

allow development of governance that is more prag

47
military governor has been put in place to manag

nation-building task. That manager needs to have a 

club in the closet for moving former combatants 

peaceful roles. That club is the military, on the ground

a very obvious presence. The club does not have to be 

just flexible and available for instant action.

The club must be much larger and out on patro

multi-ethnic, post-hostilities Bosnia. In this ty

situation the intervening military is the only force s

enough to keep ethnic warfare from re-igniting. Thi

long-term task. Only after plurascitic confl

well-established, when neighbor sells shoes to neighbo

this military force claim a job well done.

In the simplest of terms, the transition from 

cessation of hostilities to a stable peace must begin w

occupation by an external military force in both loca

The local people have no business setting up a na

government—by election or otherwise—until the ha

that spawned the initial fighting have had their sa

reduced. In short, the KLA in Kosovo must be told tha

did not win the war—the intervening military did 

Words with force attached must be used to turn comba

to the immediate tasks of reconstruction and reesta

ment of local life. Once that is accomplished, and p

again have something to lose, then the transition can 

more civilian character. 

In both of the above scenarios the military log

capability plays a major role. Only the military has in 

the management capability to ensure that civ

populations will have shelter and food in the co

dangerous season—winter in Europe, or the dry/wet s

elsewhere. The logistics arm becomes the carrot 

balances the stick on the street or the closet in the cam

to move the local population beyond sectarian hatred

Hatreds cannot be eliminated. How can one 

another who has lost family members to the slaugh

48
individual rebuild or build a life in the present by beco

re-engaged with society. That cannot be accomplishe

refugee camp with its many hours of idleness. If nece

the occupying military power can organize and m

work groups to rebuild homes, infrastructure 

institutions as part of the rehabilitation process.

So, the initial task in nation-building in a Kosovo, 

and other situations where hatred or uncertainties 

high levels is to contain the hatred and then to make 

salient in the people’s lives. There will never be a bat

of psychologists sent into such situations, even if the

chance of them being successful. The task of conta

hatred and then of beginning the task of turning i

positive energy is a military task. Danger is high and m

especially the wartime leadership, will not want to 

Local development is one avenue where these energie

be turned.

Pre-Hostilities Intervention.

The situation in Macedonia represents a contra

scenario to the post-hostilities examples of Bosnia 

Kosovo. Here killing has not yet begun; the miss

prevention today and in the long run. Surprisingl

model for preventing war in Macedonia may be NATO

in Europe. NATO has had two missions in the past: o

counter Soviet expansionism; and two, to unify We

Europe as a counter-weight to the Soviet Union. S

expansionism was halted, so one may say that NAT

been a success. Looking a little more closely on the g

might leave a different conclusion. The two major We

continental powers have certainly been at cross purpo

often as not in the history of NATO. France has gone it 

for much of the period since 1949. Only outside of N

could it have an independent voice in world af

Germany, on the other hand, has been very unassert

the alliance. Thus, it came as a shock when a sud

49
broken-off pieces of Yugoslavia, Croatia. This pa

suggests that western containment of the Soviet Unio

have been due more to American and English steadfas

and the continuing occupation of Western Europe b

United States, than concerted NATO readiness.

Nevertheless, NATO is a good model for reduct

tensions in Macedonia in that encamped foreign troop

provide the various groups confidence that the killin

not start. In a sense, it is the same security NATO has 

Europe vis à vis Germany. Military involvement is th

possible guarantee in such situations. On the nonm

front, Macedonia represents the same kind of an integ

problem the United States faced in the 1940-70s in 

relations. The national government must take the 

while the external powers support and advise it.

Europe struggles still to achieve political integr

Results to date are not as far reaching as the le

integration the United States has achieved in 

relations. The European Union (EU), with the com

currency, may be an answer.

While we worry about one corner of Europe toda

Balkans, we might consider that plurascitic behavior 

in abundance across all of Europe. It would seem 

beginning with the French Revolution, Europe has b

an almost constant state of war with a few pauses

commonality in all the wars fought in Europe durin

period has been that one side or both were advoca

non-plurascitic solution to the world’s problems

French have been seeking an egalitarian utopia. Ge

nationalism is a constant from the Franco-Prussian 

the War-to-End-All-Wars, and World War II. Rigidit

monopolies are common in Europe. Examples include 

issues such as French stateism, where the far

government controls all—including taking the coun

war. They also include small issues such as German 

laws limiting when stores can be open or when a home

50
little different in each state—make the unificat

Europe a more than difficult project. Neither the Ge

nor French want to give up their rigidities—cu

habits—in favor of those of the other.

The true end to the long-running German-Frenc

will come with the rise of multinational combina

within Europe; at the level of business and civic me

and in the biggest merger of them all, the 

Unfortunately, the EU appears to be building bureau

monopolies to replace cultural and national monop

traditions. This contrasts sharply with the manner in 

the United States came together. The colonies trusted 

other so little that they initially gave the ce

government no power. Even today, the internal power 

central government in the United States is still far les

that of European governments. The comprehensiv

stringent regulatory schema being assembled for th

leaves little room for the application of new knowledg

the growth of freedom. The EU will not long survive, 

mind flourish, if rigidities in governance remain in p

The American occupation of Western Europe w

end soon given the more truce-like character of Eur

governance and the lack of true peace.

51
CONCLUSION

I asked two questions at the beginning of the discu

of the Context of Peace. Now is the time to review wh

the questions have been answered.

The first question was: What should be the objec

this military involvement? The answer to this quest

simple, yet it has built-in complexity. It is simple in 

everyone accepts the purpose of interventio

establishment of something beyond the status quo an

United States did not occupy Germany and Japan to r

them to their imperialistic ways. Neither have the 

NATO or the United States intervened in places su

Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo to reestablish in powe

preexisting governing elites. The goal has been to est

democracy. 

Unfortunately, as Robert Dahl amply document

Endnote 1, Chapter 1), democracy is not a very well-d

term. Countries that are counted as democracies sha

central values. Some countries elect dict

(Kazakhstan), while others allow leaders to be

dictators (Peru). Still others, many parliame

countries, elect Prime Ministers who are, in e

temporary dictators (England). After World War I

United States tried to impose democratic institution

mores in Germany and Japan. By some measures

elections, we have been successful in doing so. By 

measures, however, the result has been more equi

Much of the pre-war elite is still active in ruling 

countries. Institutions such as Deutsche Bank, Krupp

Mitsubishi continue to dominate these countries.

Such elites exist in all countries. If their influence i

minimized, then intervention must be designed to bre

53
Bosnia so soon after the Dayton Accords were signe

probably not the way to achieve this end. The only 

well enough organized to campaign in that election w

group involved in prosecuting the war against the Ser

Their reason for existence is their high ideolo

commitment, not necessarily a plus for a post-host

government that should move beyond that conflict.

The need to overcome pre-intervention monopolie

part of the question raised above and the second quest

the determinants of a successful intervention. Give

weaknesses inherent in the concept of democracy, I 

suggested the concept of plurascity as a replacemen

process of fostering a plurascity is much more str

forward than the process of installing democracy. The

two plurascitic catchphrases: eliminate monopolie

encourage competition. One initiative recommende

post-hostilities use in military operations other than 

the establishment of fully functioning local governm

Independent local government with its own sphe

influence is a rare thing in the world. Most countries 

one government, the national government, that reach

the way down to the local level. The beauty in setting 

these governments is that they can compare 

performance against that of their neighbors: the begi

of competition. Furthermore, they can serve as a tra

ground for more pragmatic political leaders. Once 

governments are functioning, then comes the time to 

about regional or national governments.

Unfortunately, the elites that “won” the war—ign

the effect of the intervening powers—will want to as

power right at the conclusion of hostilities. Preventing 

from doing so is a military task that is a pa

demobilization. Unlike civil administrations

intervening military force has the power to accomplis

task without compromise.

54
the end-state that permits military disengagement 

confidence that a repeat of the military/humanit

campaign will not be necessary? All monopolies tha

disabled as part of the occupation count as positives i

regard. Also to be counted as positives are the creat

competitive situations where none existed in the pas

local vs. national government; independent smaller 

companies vs. one large state-owned utility). But is th

absolute endpoint to this process that guarantee

prevention of future conflicts?

Preventing the hostilities leadership from automat

becoming the post-conflict leadership without a con

perhaps the best message the intervening force can s

the rest of the world. Potential conflicts may be foresta

it is known that an intervening force will stay aroun

enough for the development of competition for leaders

the post-hostilities phase. The hostilities leadershi

always have the credential that it “won” the war. Suff

time must be allowed to pass to permit the strugg

leadership to once again become competitive. Others 

have the opportunity to develop a resumé of accom

ments. Reestablishing local life in an area certainly 

qualify as a strong credential.

The intervening force will go home sometime. If it 

right after the end of hostilities, then the conflict will s

re-ignite. The initial military occupation should rem

place long enough to demobilize the combatants a

prevent establishment of a de facto national govern

Once these tasks are accomplished, and the populatio

been turned to the task of reestablishing local life th

reconstruction, then the occupation role ma

transitioned to a civilian governor.

At a minimum, economic activity should resume 

the transition to a national government. One elemen

avoided, of course, is that newly installed governmen

55
businesses. 

The civilian governor can extend local government 

national level once local and national life has 

established. If we are to assign any sanctity to elec

however, then the governor’s tenure ends wit

installation of a newly elected national government.

All this suggests that military disengagement can 

after local development is well underway; that is, 

community level life has been reestablished, 

government is functioning, and businesses and 

community institutions have started operations. A

point in time, the people should have a sufficient inves

in their new lives to minimize the probability that the

rearm and head for the hills.

The elements of plurascitic life will be visible 

Communities will be able to see how neighb

communities are handling reconstruction. Businesse

be one to a community but residents will be able to go 

next village if the local merchant is not responsive. Pa

in one community will be able to assess the quality of s

by visiting the next town. In short, local level develop

or redevelopment will bring considerable information 

to the level of the individual. That information be

knowledge when acted upon. The actions, in turn, 

freedom—the freedom of making decisions and a

plishing results.

Complete military disengagement depends on a nu

of factors. One of the most important is the quality 

civilian police force that is installed. Combat troops s

not be removed until a police force has been demonstra

be competent and effective. Engineering troops may n

remain throughout the external civilian government 

to provide quality assurance as the infrastructu

replaced. A single concept that might encompass the 

in time when military disengagement is warranted m

56
needs.

Such a measure should indicate that the reconstr

environment is now rich enough in knowledge to p

comparisons among goods and services. That is a

measure of the degree of plurascity introduced int

environment.

57
MANFRED K. ROTERMUND is engaged in fe

government contract work through his com

Crossroads Research, Ltd. He currently supports se

Department of Defense agencies in the area of inform

technology program management. In the past he has 

both computer system development and policy analysi

range of civilian and military agencies. He has t

psychology and research methods at the undergradua

graduate level. After graduating from college

Rotermund spent 1967-69 in Laos teaching Engli

teacher training schools and a lycee. Thereafte

obtained an M.S. in Social Psychology from the Univ

of Massachusetts.

59
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Interim Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Author

Dr. Manfred K. Rotermund

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

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Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler