GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Statement Before the Commission on 

Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 

Afghanistan 

OPERATION IRAQI 

FREEDOM 

Preliminary Observations 

on DOD Planning for the 

Drawdown of U.S. Forces 

from Iraq 

Statement of William M. Solis, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST 

November 2, 2009 

GAO-10-179 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2, 2009

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 

Preliminary Observations on DOD Planning for the 

Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq 

Highlights of GAO-10-179, a statement 

before the Commission on Wartime 

Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 

The United States and the 

Government of Iraq have signed a 

Security Agreement calling for the 

drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. 

Predicated on that agreement and 

U.S. Presidential guidance, MultiNational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) has 

issued a plan for the reduction of 

forces to 50,000 U.S. troops by 

August 31, 2010, and a complete 

withdrawal of forces by the end of 

2011. The drawdown from Iraq 

includes the withdrawal of 

approximately 128,700 U.S. troops, 

over 115,000 contractor personnel, 

the closure or transfer of 295 bases, 

and the retrograde of over 3.3 

million pieces of equipment. 

Today’s statement will focus on (1) 

the extent to which the Department 

of Defense (DOD) has planned for 

the drawdown in accordance with 

timelines set by the Security 

Agreement and presidential 

directive; and (2) factors that may 

impact the efficient execution of 

the drawdown in accordance with 

established timelines. This 

statement is based on GAO’s 

review and analysis of DOD and 

MNF-I plans, and on interviews 

GAO staff members conducted 

with DOD officials in the United 

States, Kuwait, and Iraq. It also 

draws from GAO’s extensive body 

of issued work on Iraq and 

drawdown-related issues. 

While DOD’s primary focus remains on executing combat missions and 

supporting the warfighters in Iraq, several DOD organizations have issued 

coordinated plans for the execution of the drawdown within designated time 

frames. In support of these plans, processes have been established to monitor, 

coordinate, and facilitate the retrograde of equipment from Iraq. DOD’s 

organizations have reported that their efforts to reduce personnel, retrograde 

equipment, and close bases have thus far exceeded targets; since May 2009, 

for example, DOD reports that the number of U.S. servicemembers in Iraq has 

been reduced by 5,300, and another 4,000 are expected to be drawn down in 

October. However, many more personnel, equipment items, and bases remain 

to be drawn down. For U.S. forces, contractor personnel, selected vehicles, 

and bases, the graphic below depicts drawdown progress since May 2009, as 

well as what remains to be drawn down by August 31, 2010 and December 31, 

2011, respectively. 

Drawdown Progress Since May 2009 and What Remains to Be Drawn Down through August 

31, 2010, and December 31, 2011 

Percent

Drawn down since May 2009, as of 

Sept. 2009

To be drawn down through Aug. 31, 2010

Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Bases

Tracked and wheeled vehicles

Contractor personnel

U.S. forces

To be drawn down 

through Dec. 31, 2011

Efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq, however, may be complicated 

by crucial challenges that, if left unattended, may hinder MNF-I’s ability to 

meet the time frames set by the President, the Security Agreement, and MNFI’s phased drawdown plan. First, DOD has yet to fully determine its future 

needs for contracted services. Second, the potential costs and other concerns 

of transitioning key contracts may outweigh potential benefits. Third, DOD 

lacks sufficient numbers of contract oversight personnel. Fourth, key 

decisions about the disposition of some equipment have yet to be made. Fifth, 

there are longstanding incompatibility issues among the information 

technology systems that may undermine the equipment retrograde process. 

And sixth, DOD lacks precise visibility over its inventory of some equipment 

and shipping containers. While much has been done to facilitate the 

drawdown effort, the efficient execution of the drawdown will depend on 

DOD’s ability to mitigate these challenges. We will continue to assess DOD’s 

progress in executing the drawdown from Iraq and plan to issue a report. 

View GAO-10-179 or key components. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 
Page 1 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Chairman Thibault, Chairman Shays, and Commissioners: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss issues related to 

the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. When GAO last reported on the 

progress of planning for the Department of Defense’s (DOD) drawdown 

from Iraq in September 2008, the pace and overall extent of drawdown had 

yet to be determined, although various defense commands had already 

begun planning toward that end.1

 Since then, the United States and the 

Government of Iraq have signed a Security Agreement that took effect on 

January 1, 2009, which includes a timeline and requirements for the 

drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. In addition, on February 27, 2009, 

President Obama announced that by August 31, 2010, Multi-National 

Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) mission will change from combat to supporting the 

Iraqi government and its security forces. In light of these developments, 

MNF-I has issued a phased plan aligned with goals and time frames set 

forth by the Security Agreement and the President, including a transition 

in mission, the reduction of forces to 50,000 U.S. troops by August 31, 

2010, and a complete withdrawal of forces by the end of 2011.2

The drawdown effort has already begun. It is, however, one of several 

tasks U.S. forces in Iraq are conducting concurrently in a continuously 

evolving environment during a period of Iraqi political uncertainty. For 

example, besides overseeing operations in Iraq, MNF-I and its subordinate 

headquarters are also merging into a single headquarters, called United 

States Forces-Iraq, which is scheduled to become mission capable on 

January 1, 2010, and includes a 40 percent reduction of headquarters 

personnel. Moreover, brigade combat teams are being replaced by 

relatively new Advise and Assist Brigades that will focus primarily on 

training Iraqi security forces while retaining the capability to conduct fullspectrum operations. Finally, although DOD has reported that enemy 

 

1

 GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for 

Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq, GAO-08-930 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2008). 

2

 In a separate initiative, the Government of Iraq introduced a referendum on the Security 

Agreement which may be voted on during the January 2010 national elections. If passed, it 

could require U.S. forces to leave Iraq much earlier than the December 31, 2011 deadline 

set in the Security Agreement. 
activity has decreased markedly since its highest point in June 2007, the 

insurgency in Iraq remains dangerous.3

As of August 31, 2009, there were approximately 128,700 U.S. military 

personnel in Iraq, spread among 295 bases throughout the country. 

Additionally, there were over 3.3 million pieces of Army equipment in Iraq 

worth $45.8 billion, 18 percent of which is theater provided equipment, 

which is a pool of permanent, stay behind equipment that has accumulated 

in Iraq and Kuwait since combat operations began in 2003. Although much 

of this theater provided equipment has remained in theater as units rotate, 

the withdrawal timelines in the Security Agreement will compel DOD to 

make critical decisions regarding the future of this equipment. Figure 1 

below provides a more detailed breakdown of the U.S. Army equipment in 

Iraq. In addition, DOD reported over 119,000 contractor personnel in Iraq 

as of third quarter fiscal year 2009.4

 Contractor personnel in Iraq and 

Kuwait perform a wide range of tasks essential for drawdown including 

repairing military vehicles, providing trucks and drivers for logistics 

convoys, and providing transportation assets and personnel necessary for 

the retrograde of equipment. In addition, contractor personnel working on 

the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) provide the majority 

of base and life support in Iraq.5

 

3

 DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress in Accordance with 

the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008, Section 9204, Public 

Law 110-252 (July 23, 2009). 

4

 We have determined that agency-reported data should not be used to identify trends or 

draw conclusions about the number of contractor personnel in Iraq, due to limitations such 

as incomplete and inaccurate data. GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and 

USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-10-1 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2009). 

5

 The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, commonly referred to as LOGCAP, is a 

program to provide worldwide logistics and base and life support services in contingency 

environments, and is currently providing most base and life support in Iraq. 

Page 2 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Figure 1: Breakdown of U.S. Army Equipment in Iraq 

11%

18%

65%

Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data.

6%

Theater provided equipment, non-standard 

(369,298)

Theater provided equipment, standard 

(212,556)

Contractor acquired property

(604,623)

Unit owned/authorized equipment

(2,143,699)

You asked us to provide our preliminary observations concerning DOD’s 

progress in planning for the drawdown of materiel from Iraq, and 

challenges that may affect the smooth execution of the drawdown. My 

statement today will focus on: (1) the extent to which DOD has planned 

for the drawdown from Iraq in accordance with timelines set by the 

Security Agreement and presidential directive, and (2) factors that may 

impact the efficient execution of the drawdown in accordance with 

established timelines. Additionally, we will continue to assess DOD’s 

progress in executing the drawdown and plan to issue a report. 

My statement is based on our review and analysis of DOD and MNF-I 

plans, and interviews GAO staff members conducted with DOD officials in 

the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq. Additionally, I have drawn from our 

body of issued work examining Iraq and drawdown-related issues.6

 This 

work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

 

6

 For a list of this work, see GAO’s web page, Topic Collection: Iraq and Afghanistan, at 

http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/oif.html. 

Page 3 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We provided 

copies of a draft of this statement to the Department of Defense for its 

review and comment. We considered and incorporated its comments, as 

appropriate. 

While DOD’s primary focus remains on executing combat missions and 

supporting the warfighters in Iraq, several DOD organizations have issued 

coordinated plans for the execution of the drawdown from Iraq within 

designated time frames. Furthermore, in support of these plans, processes 

have been established to monitor, coordinate, and facilitate the retrograde 

of equipment out of Iraq. Additionally, several organizations have been 

created to oversee, synchronize, and ensure unity of effort during the 

drawdown.7

 Moreover, DOD reports that it has exceeded its goals during 

the initial months of the drawdown. While DOD’s progress since May 2009 

has exceeded its targets, a large amount of personnel, equipment, and 

bases remain to be drawn down within the established timelines 

Summary 

Several unresolved issues may impede effective execution of the 

drawdown in accordance with time frames set by the President and the 

Security Agreement and which are encompassed in MNF-I’s phased 

drawdown plan. These include: 

• contract services that have not been fully identified; 

• potential costs and other concerns of transitioning key contracts that may 

outweigh potential benefits; 

• longstanding shortages of contract oversight personnel; 

• some key decisions about the disposition of equipment that have not yet 

been made; 

• longstanding information technology system weaknesses; and 

• a lack of precise visibility over some equipment. 

Without resolution, these issues may inhibit the efficient and effective 

execution of the drawdown. 

 

7

 Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a 

commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same 

command structure. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 

States (Mar. 20, 2009). 

Page 4 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
A number of DOD organizations have issued orders outlining a phased 

drawdown from Iraq that meet the time frames set forth in the Security 

Agreement and presidential guidance, while being responsive to security 

conditions on the ground. Additionally, much has been accomplished to 

prepare for the retrograde8

 of materiel from theater, including establishing 

processes to monitor, coordinate, and facilitate the flow of equipment out 

of Iraq. Furthermore, several organizations have been created to facilitate 

the retrograde of equipment and support unity of effort. To date, these 

efforts have contributed to MNF-I meeting or exceeding its targets for 

drawing down forces, retrograding equipment, and closing bases. While 

DOD has made significant progress executing the drawdown, there 

remains a large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases that must be 

drawn down within the established timelines. 

DOD Organizations 

Have Issued 

Coordinated Plans 

and Established 

Processes and New 

Organizations to 

Facilitate the 

Drawdown from Iraq 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, MNF-I, and its subordinate 

command responsible for executing the drawdown in Iraq—Multi-National 

Corps-Iraq (MNC-I)—have issued plans outlining how the drawdown 

should be managed over time. These plans also endeavor to provide 

flexibility to commanders on the ground to conduct ongoing combat 

operations while simultaneously executing the drawdown. For example, in 

order to balance operational needs with the requirement to meet 

drawdown goals, commanders have the discretion to choose which of 

their equipment is no longer essential for ongoing operations, and can 

therefore be retrograded. Subsequent phases will see an increase in the 

flow of equipment retrograded from Iraq as the pace of the drawdown 

quickens. 

In support of these plans, processes have been established to monitor, 

coordinate, and facilitate the retrograde of equipment out of Iraq. As we 

reported in September 2008, MNF-I had processes in place to manage the 

retrograde of various types of equipment from Iraq. Since that time these 

processes have been refined and new elements have been established to 

improve them. For example, partly in response to our previous work, 

representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Lean Six 

Sigma office conducted six reviews to optimize theater logistics, one of 

 

8

 We use the term “retrograde” to indicate the removal of military equipment from an 

operating area. 

Page 5 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
which focused on the process for retrograding equipment from Iraq.9

 This 

work informed the development of a new data system, referred to as the 

Theater Provided Equipment Planner, which is intended to streamline the 

retrograde process by facilitating the issuance of disposition instructions 

for theater provided equipment while it is still in Iraq. In addition, a second 

new data system, Materiel Enterprise Non-Standard Equipment, has also 

been developed to facilitate the issuance of disposition instructions for 

non-standard equipment. 

In addition to refining the retrograde processes, several organizations have 

been created to oversee, synchronize, and ensure unity of effort for the 

retrograde of equipment from Iraq. In September 2008, GAO reported that 

the variety of organizations exercising influence over the retrograde 

process and the resulting lack of a unified or coordinated command 

structure was not consistent with joint doctrine, led to increased 

confusion and inefficiencies in the retrograde process, and inhibited the 

adoption of identified mitigation initiatives. To bolster unity of effort, 

MNF-I has created a Drawdown Fusion Center, the mission of which is to 

provide a strategic picture of drawdown operations, identify potential 

obstacles, address strategic issues, and assist in the development of policy 

and guidance related to several aspects of drawdown. To accomplish this 

mission, the Drawdown Fusion Center provides guidance on the 

disposition of materiel, monitors and advises on transportation options, 

tracks and monitors the capabilities of ports through which materiel is 

shipped, tracks logistics actions that impact disposition during drawdown, 

and acts as a focal point for all external agencies and the Government of 

Iraq in matters related to the drawdown. Assisting the Drawdown Fusion 

Center is U.S. Army Central’s Support Element-Iraq, a liaison element 

established to enhance synchronization and coordination among MNF-I; 

MNC-I; U.S. Army Central; Headquarters, Department of the Army; and 

Army Materiel Command. It also generates theater and Department of the 

Army disposition guidance for all forces and materiel redeploying and 

retrograding out of Iraq. Finally, the Department of the Army, with Army 

Materiel Command as the lead agency, created a Responsible Reset Task 

Force to facilitate the provision of disposition instructions for materiel 

 

9

 Lean Six Sigma, a disciplined process improvement methodology, has been endorsed by 

DOD leadership as a key means by which the department will become more efficient in its 

operations and more effective in its support of the warfighter. On April 30, 2007, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense created a program office to drive DOD-wide activities associated with 

Lean Six Sigma. 

Page 6 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
retrograding out of Iraq and synchronize those instructions to facilitate the 

reset of Army equipment.10

DOD organizations reported that their efforts to reduce personnel, 

retrograde equipment, and close bases in the initial months of the 

drawdown have exceeded targets. First, according to the MNF-I 

commanding general, U.S. forces have already begun drawing down in Iraq 

without compromising security. For example, since May 2009, the number 

of U.S. servicemembers in Iraq has been reduced by 5,300. Furthermore, 

the MNF-I commander testified on September 30, 2009, that another 4,000 

servicemembers will likely be drawn down in October 2009—earlier than 

originally planned—due to improvements in Anbar province. Second, as of 

August 2009, the Army reported that it has exceeded its target figure for 

the retrograde of rolling stock by 1,800 pieces.11 Finally, the Army has 

reported that as of August 2009, it had closed three more bases than 

originally planned. 

While DOD’s progress since May 2009 has exceeded its targets, a large 

amount of personnel, equipment, and bases remain to be drawn down 

within the established timelines. To meet the presidential target of 

reducing the number of U.S. forces in Iraq to 50,000 by August 31, 2010, 

MNF-I must reduce its forces by almost 60 percent by next summer. 

Furthermore, to meet the other targets established by MNF-I and the Army 

for August 2010, MNF-I must draw down 32 percent of its contractor 

personnel workforce, retrograde over 50 percent of its tracked and 

wheeled vehicles, and close 67 percent of its bases in Iraq. The remaining 

forces, contractor personnel, and equipment will have to be drawn down 

during the final 16 months, from September 2010 to December 31, 2011, 

during which time some of the largest bases in Iraq will also need to be 

closed or transferred to the Government of Iraq, a task the commanding 

general of MNF-I stated could take 9 to 10 months to complete. Figure 2 

below illustrates the numbers of U.S. forces, contractor personnel, tracked 

and wheeled vehicles, and bases that have been drawn down since the 

initiation of drawdown; that must be drawn down by the August 31, 2010, 

 

10 We use the term “reset” to refer to the repair, recapitalization, and replacement of 

military equipment in order to restore units’ equipment to a desired level of combat 

capability commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources. 

11 Rolling stock is a subset of class VII equipment and includes wheeled vehicles, tracked 

combat vehicles, wheeled/tracked construction equipment, trailers, semitrailers, and 

standard trailer-mounted equipment such as generators. 

Page 7 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
change of mission date; and that must be drawn down before December 

31, 2011. 

Figure 2: Drawdown Progress Since May 2009 and What Remains to Be Drawn Down through August 31, 2010, and December 

31, 2011 

Percent

Drawn down since May 2009, as of Sept. 2009

To be drawn down through Aug. 31, 2010

To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011

Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Bases

Tracked and

wheeled vehicles

Contractor

personnel

U.S. forces 5,300 78,800 50,000

4,500 21,200 15,500

83 255 40

9,900 40,300 75,000

Efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq may be complicated by 

crucial challenges regarding several unresolved issues that, if left 

unattended, may hinder MNF-I’s ability to meet the time frames set by the 

President, the Security Agreement, and MNF-I’s phased drawdown plan. 

These challenges include: 

Efficient Execution of 

the Drawdown 

Requires the 

Resolution of Several 

Key Issues • contract services that have not been fully identified; 

• potential costs and other concerns of transitioning key contracts that may 

outweigh potential benefits; 

• longstanding shortages of contract oversight personnel; 

• some key decisions about the disposition of equipment that have not yet 

been made; 

• longstanding information technology system weaknesses; and 

• a lack of precise visibility over some equipment. 

Some of these issues are outside MNF-I’s purview and require action by 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments. 

Page 8 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Others require a coordinated effort by MNF-I, U.S. Army Central, and other 

DOD organizations supporting the drawdown effort. 

DOD has not fully defined the additional contracted services it will need to 

successfully execute the drawdown and support the remaining U.S. forces 

in Iraq. Experience has shown that requirements for contracted services 

will likely increase during the drawdown and joint guidance states that 

planners should work closely with contracting officers to determine the 

best approach for purchasing contract services.12 In Iraq, such efforts may 

be hampered because contracting officials in Iraq do not have full visibility 

over the approximately 52,000 contracts in theater.13 Officials at Joint 

Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, the organization responsible for 

coordinating contract support during the drawdown, are currently trying 

to get the full picture of operational contract support in Iraq. However, 

DOD lacks a centralized repository of the specific services available on the 

various contracts. For example, there are several contracts for trucking 

services currently being used to transport materiel in support of the 

drawdown, but planners may lack the details necessary to allocate these 

services efficiently as drawdown progresses. Joint guidance also calls for 

DOD to identify contracted support requirements as early as possible to 

ensure that the military receives contracted support at the right place, at 

the right time, and for the right price.14 In particular, for the drawdown of 

forces to occur according to the timelines, commanders will need to 

determine their contract support requirements and communicate these to 

contracting officers several months in advance. Although the MNF-I 

drawdown order anticipates an increase in its need for contracted services 

through September 1, 2010, as of July 2009 commanders had not identified 

the specific types and levels of contracted services they will need during 

the drawdown. For example, Army officials in Kuwait responsible for the 

retrograde of theater provided equipment had not defined the specific 

level of contracted services needed to perform functions such as repairing 

vehicles and requesting disposition instructions. 

Contract Services 

Needed to Support 

the Drawdown Have 

Not Been Fully 

Identified 

 

12 Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Feb. 16, 2007). 

13 The total of 52,207 contracts is measured in accordance with the definition of “contract” 

from section 864(a)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 

which includes task orders, among other things. See GAO-10-1. 

14 Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support (Oct. 17, 2008). 

Page 9 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
In planning for the contractor presence needed during the final phase of 

the drawdown, MNF-I has made assumptions in the absence of defined 

requirements or full visibility over contracted services that may contribute 

to wasted resources and may hinder the timely execution of drawdown. 

Even though it anticipates an increase in contracted services needed 

during the drawdown, MNF-I has set a target for reducing the number of 

contractor personnel in Iraq to 75,000 by September 1, 2010. According to 

MNF-I officials, this target was based on the historic ratio of contractor 

personnel to servicemembers in Iraq, rather than requirements for 

contracted support. However, as GAO has previously reported, the 

drawdown of forces may create additional requirements for contracted 

support, and officials in Iraq have acknowledged that additional contractor 

personnel will be needed to provide services currently being provided by 

U.S. forces.15 For example, according to DOD, in the third quarter of fiscal 

year 2009 the number of armed private security contractors in Iraq went 

from 10,743 to 13,232, a 23 percent increase. This increase in private 

security contractors was due, in part, to an increased need for private 

security contractors as the military began drawing down its forces. 

Without identifying the level and types of contractor support needed to 

facilitate the drawdown, the actual number of contractor personnel 

needed remains unknown. Unless commands in theater define and 

communicate contract requirements with sufficient lead time, DOD risks 

not having the right contracted services in place to meet drawdown 

timelines and may resort to contracting methods that could cost the 

government more and that may be conducive to waste. Moreover, in 

determining the best means to meet commanders’ requirements, planners’ 

limited visibility over the range of contracted services available may 

contribute to decisions based on incomplete information, buying services 

that are already on contract, experiencing difficulty in enforcing priorities, 

and using limited contracting resources inefficiently. These outcomes may 

impact the timely execution of the drawdown. In 2006, we reported that a 

lack of visibility over contracted support negatively impacted MNF-I and 

MNC-I planning for base closure, among other things.16

 

15 GAO, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but 

Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 

2003). 

16 GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing 

Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, 

GAO-07-145 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2006). 

Page 10 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
The transition of key contracts that are scheduled to expire during the 

height of the drawdown presents the potential for the interruption of vital 

services. With the exception of LOGCAP, major contracted services in Iraq 

and Kuwait, including those for base and life support, convoy support, and 

equipment maintenance will soon reach their expiration date and are 

scheduled to be re-competed and re-awarded.17 If contracts are awarded to 

new contractors, outgoing and incoming contractors would be required to 

transition within a certain time period to continue vital services. If these 

contracts are re-awarded as scheduled, major contracted services in Iraq 

and Kuwait will be transitioning nearly simultaneously during the height of 

the drawdown, increasing the risk that services will be interrupted. 

According to a DOD lessons learned document, during the transition from 

LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV in Kuwait which concluded in June 2009, the 

incoming contractor intended to hire at least 80 percent of the outgoing 

contractor’s personnel to begin providing services according to schedule. 

However, the outgoing contractor needed to retain its employees in order 

to continue to provide the services for which it was contracted. Although 

the incoming and outgoing contractors agreed to a protocol for 

transferring employees, poor execution at some sites led to staffing 

shortages and some service interruptions. To prevent similar service 

interruptions when other key contracts transition, it will be critical that 

DOD ensures that the outgoing contractor release personnel to the 

incoming contractor as anticipated. Furthermore, if contractor personnel 

choose not to transfer to the new contractor, the transition may result in 

greater-than-anticipated costs and delays as the contractor hires, screens, 

and deploys new personnel. Additionally, a lack of experienced personnel 

may also lead to service interruption. For example, according to the 

lessons learned document, a shortage of personnel available to operate 

large machinery in Kuwait forced officials to shut down operations critical 

to the drawdown. In addition, offices responsible for issuing credentials to 

employees were not prepared to handle the large volume of employees 

needing to obtain new badges, a situation exacerbated by the provision of 

inaccurate employee lists by the incoming contractor, resulting in a further 

disruption of services. As of July 2009, officials had not considered 

possible stresses on these offices that might occur during the upcoming, 

near-simultaneous contract transitions expected to occur during the 

drawdown. Finally, the outgoing contractor refused to provide, and in one 

Near-Simultaneous 

Transition of Key 

Contracts Creates 

Risks for Interruption 

of Services 

 

17 We met with Army officials, including contracting officers responsible for these 

contracts. These officials acknowledge that the contracts will expire well before the end of 

the drawdown and in no case did these officials indicate they are considering extending the 

expiring contracts through the drawdown period. 

Page 11 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
case erased, data it was required to provide to the government. 

Government officials confirmed that these data would have facilitated a 

more efficient transition process. Contract management officials stated 

that challenges experienced during the transition from LOGCAP III to 

LOGCAP IV in Kuwait will likely be magnified during the upcoming 

contract transitions in Iraq, given the scope of contract transitions during 

the height of the drawdown. 

Even though LOGCAP III in Iraq does not expire during the drawdown 

time frame, DOD plans to undertake a complex transition to other means 

of contracted services despite concerns that the potential benefits of doing 

so may not be fully realized. According to DOD officials, MNF-I plans to 

transition base and life support and logistics functions currently provided 

by LOGCAP III to other contracts, including LOGCAP IV, the Air Force 

Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP), and individual sustainment 

contracts with Iraqi contractors.18 However, unlike convoy support and 

maintenance contracts in Iraq and Kuwait, LOGCAP III does not expire 

until January 2012. A senior DOD official has stated that the rationale for 

making the transitions includes reducing the cost of base and life support 

services and mitigating the risks associated with relying on a single 

contractor to provide essential services. However, this official and others 

have raised concerns, indicating that these potential benefits may not be 

fully realized. For example, while cost savings may result from 

transitioning from LOGCAP III to other contracts, the senior DOD official 

with whom we spoke has conceded that costs may actually increase 

during the transition when both the incoming and outgoing contractors 

have duplicative personnel, including large transition teams. These costs 

may offset potential savings, in part because the new contracts would 

have, at most, about a year to realize their potential benefits, given the 

time needed to conduct the transition and the date that the Security 

Agreement states U.S. forces must be out of Iraq. Moreover, according to 

Army officials, there has been no formal cost-benefit analysis to weigh 

potential benefits against risks such as cost increases. In the absence of a 

robust cost-benefit analysis, the benefits of making the transition remain 

uncertain. 

The upcoming LOGCAP transition in Iraq will potentially increase the 

contract management and oversight responsibilities of the combat forces 

 

18 Sustainment contracts provide supplies and services to deployed U.S. forces, such as 

food services and housing. 

Page 12 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
and impact the quality of service provided to the warfighter. Unit 

commanders, as customers of LOGCAP, play a significant role in the 

management and oversight of the LOGCAP contractor. For example, 

customers are required by the Army to periodically evaluate the 

contractor’s performance. Currently, units provide feedback to the 

contractor during monthly performance evaluation boards. Because the 

Army intends to award several task orders for services for base and 

logistics services—possibly to multiple contractors—it is possible that the 

number of monthly evaluations would increase for some commanders. 

Furthermore, while service disruptions like those experienced in Kuwait 

during the transition to LOGCAP IV between February and June of 2009 

may have amounted to temporary inconveniences, in a continuously 

evolving environment like Iraq they have a greater potential to negatively 

impact ongoing operations. For example, according to a senior Defense 

Contract Management Agency official responsible for contract 

management and oversight in Iraq, there is concern about DOD’s plan to 

begin transitioning the theater transportation mission at the beginning of 

2010, since it could require a new contractor to assume the mission just as 

the department undertakes a significant troop-level reduction that is 

planned for March-April 2010. Executing the rapid movement of troops 

and equipment out of Iraq will require significant truck assets. 

Transitioning the mission to a new contractor and requiring the new 

contractor to provide 23,000 trucks and crews could be daunting. 

Additionally, this official expressed concerns about the ability of a new 

LOGCAP IV contractor to quickly obtain the necessary staff to execute the 

mission if the transitions from LOGCAP III are done as currently planned. 

As we noted above, if an incoming contractor needs to hire a significant 

number of new personnel, service interruptions could result. 

For commanders in the field already tasked with conducting complex 

counterinsurgency operations and the drawdown of forces, among other 

responsibilities, it is important to know who is responsible for providing 

particular services. However, increasing the number of contracts in Iraq, 

as is planned to occur during the upcoming transition, may complicate 

commanders’ abilities to obtain essential contracted support. For example, 

under the current LOGCAP III contract in Iraq, commanders generally 

need to speak with one program manager to obtain the full range of 

contracted services. Under LOGCAP IV, however, services may be divided 

among multiple contractors for any particular location. As a result, the 

tasks of determining how to obtain essential services and correcting 

service problems may divert commanders’ limited resources from other 

responsibilities, which potentially increases risk to the mission. 

Page 13 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
In addition, complex transitions to local contractors may impact the 

quality of services provided to the warfighter. For example, commanders 

in Iraq noted that some base and life support services being provided to 

U.S. forces through a newly transitioned contract managed by local 

sustainment contractors were not meeting the level of quality that U.S. 

forces had come to expect. We also found that a similar strategy in Kuwait 

resulted in service interruptions, including inefficiencies at key storage 

areas that led to expanses of disorderly materiel such as tires and 

cylinders.19 Should the upcoming LOGCAP transition in Iraq proceed as 

planned, the need for commanders to overcome challenges on which we 

have previously reported, such as inexperience in dealing with 

contractors, uncertainty regarding oversight responsibilities, and inability 

to dedicate resources for oversight, would be particularly acute.20

Limited oversight resources coupled with a projected significant increase 

in oversight demands during the LOGCAP transition in Iraq heightens the 

risk of waste. The successful transition from LOGCAP III to multiple base 

and life support contractors will require a large number of government 

oversight personnel, as the transition from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV in 

Kuwait demonstrated. However, overseeing the LOGCAP transition in Iraq 

would be an added responsibility for the Defense Contract Management 

Agency, which will continue to be responsible for the day-to-day 

management and administration of the LOGCAP III contractor, private 

security contracts, and other large contracts in Iraq. A Defense Contract 

Management Agency official expressed concern about conducting 

LOGCAP transitions at multiple locations simultaneously throughout Iraq 

because this would require a greater number of oversight personnel than a 

consecutive transition. For example, Defense Contract Management 

Agency officials cited insufficient numbers of property administrators 

available to transfer billions of dollars worth of property from LOGCAP III 

to one of several dozen possible contracts. These personnel shortages may 

delay the transfer of property, such as materiel handling equipment critical 

for loading, unloading, and moving containers which, in turn, may inhibit 

the timely retrograde of equipment from Iraq. Contract oversight 

requirements would further increase following the transition. Specifically, 

 

19 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Sound Practices Critical to Ensuring Value for the Defense 

Logistic Agency’s Acquisitions, GAO-09-1040T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2009). 

20 GAO, Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and Other Actions 

Needed to Improve DOD’s Oversight and Management of Contractors in Future 

Operations, GAO-08-436T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 2008). 

Page 14 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
the Defense Contract Management Agency may go from overseeing one 

LOGCAP contractor to having to oversee three LOGCAP contractors and 

the AFCAP contractor. In addition, the contracts for specific base services 

that the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan plans to award to 

Iraqi contractors could increase the workload for contracting officers from 

this command. Furthermore, as the number of contracts increase at an 

installation, commanders will be required to increase the number of 

personnel to ensure responsible oversight of contractor personnel. As a 

result, the number of personnel available for other operations will 

decrease. 

DOD’s longstanding challenge to provide an adequate number of trained 

oversight personnel in deployed locations will continue to plague the 

department as it proceeds through the drawdown. Since 2004 we have 

reported on DOD’s inability to provide an adequate number of oversight 

personnel in CENTCOM’s theater.21 Joint doctrine emphasizes the 

importance to commanders of ensuring that appropriate administration 

and oversight personnel are in place when using contractors.22 While MNFI guidance recognizes the need to ensure oversight, DOD is likely to find it 

difficult to meet the oversight requirement as forces are withdrawn and 

the pool of personnel available for oversight decreases. Historically, as 

forces decrease, the need for contracted services increases. The oversight 

challenge in Iraq and Kuwait is exacerbated by the competing need to 

provide professional contract management and oversight personnel from 

agencies like the Defense Contract Management Agency to meet the 

increased oversight requirements in Afghanistan. DOD officials at all levels 

have expressed concern about the department’s ability to provide the 

required number of oversight personnel. For example, an Army unit in 

Kuwait with 32 government personnel that is currently providing oversight 

for more than 3,000 contractor personnel anticipates doubling its 

contractor workforce, but is not anticipating a concomitant increase in 

oversight personnel. The unit has identified the lack of oversight personnel 

as a significant concern to successfully moving equipment out of Kuwait. 

Longstanding 

Contract Oversight 

Personnel Shortages 

May Increase the 

Likelihood of 

Wasteful Practices 

During the Drawdown 

As we noted in several of our previous reports, having the right people 

with the right skills to oversee contractor performance is crucial to 

ensuring that DOD receives the best value for the billions of dollars spent 

 

21 For a summary, see GAO-08-436T. 

22 Joint Publication 4-10. 

Page 15 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
each year on contractor-provided services supporting forces deployed to 

Iraq. For example, we reported in 2004 that the Defense Contract 

Management Agency could not account for $2 million worth of tools 

purchased using the AFCAP contract, in part because of a lack of contract 

management and oversight personnel in CENTCOM’s theater.23 In January 

2008, we reported that the Army did not have adequate staff to conduct 

oversight of an equipment maintenance contract in Kuwait.24 We have 

found in the past that, as a result of the vacant oversight positions, the 

Army was unable to fully meet the oversight mission including fully 

monitoring contractor performance. In that same report we noted that 

poor contractor performance resulted in the Army spending $4.2 million to 

rework items that were presented to the Army as meeting contract 

standards but failed Army inspection. We have also noted that an 

inadequate number of oversight personnel results in some contracts 

receiving insufficient oversight. For example, in 2008 we reported that the 

Army assigned seven contracting officer’s technical representatives to 

provide oversight for about 8,300 linguists in 120 locations across Iraq and 

Afghanistan. In one case, a single oversight person was responsible for 

linguists stationed at more than 40 different locations spread throughout 

the theater of operations. Officials responsible for the contract agreed that 

there were not enough contracting officer’s technical representatives to 

effectively oversee the contract.25 Having too few contract oversight 

personnel precludes DOD from being able to obtain reasonable assurance 

that contractors are meeting their contract requirements at every location 

where the work is being performed. Without adequate contract oversight 

personnel in Iraq and Kuwait during the drawdown, DOD risks not 

receiving the level and quality of service it needs to effectively and 

efficiently meet the goals of the drawdown. 

 

23 GAO, Military Operations: DOD’s Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts 

Requires Strengthened Oversight, GAO-04-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2004). 

24 GAO, Defense Logistics: The Army Needs to Implement an Effective Management and 

Oversight Plan for the Equipment Maintenance Contract in Kuwait, GAO-08-316R 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2008). 

25 GAO, Military Operations: DOD Needs to Address Contract Oversight and Quality 

Assurance Issues for Contracts Used to Support Contingency Operations, GAO-08-1087 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008). 

Page 16 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
MNF-I’s execution of the drawdown from Iraq in accordance with 

established timelines depends on its obtaining clear guidance as to what 

equipment can and will be provided to the Government of Iraq and what 

will be retained by the U.S. military; identification of the mechanisms that 

are to be used to transfer equipment to the Government of Iraq; 

determinations of what will be done with certain types of non-standard 

equipment, such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP); 

and resolution of other decisions related to the Army’s modernization and 

reset plans. 

Execution of the 

Drawdown Is 

Dependent Upon Key 

Decisions over the 

Disposition of 

Equipment 

DOD plans to transfer military equipment to the Government of Iraq in 

order to achieve U.S. objectives in Iraq, but decisions still need to be made 

by DOD on what can and will be transferred to the Government of Iraq, 

contributing to planning uncertainty. Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq, an MNF-I subordinate command responsible for training 

and equipping the Iraqi security forces, has prepared a list of equipment it 

believes will enable the Government of Iraq to provide for its own security 

after U.S. forces have left Iraq.26 This list comprises about 1.5 percent of 

the estimated 3.3 million pieces of equipment in Iraq, with a projected 

value of about $600 million. This list is currently undergoing progressively 

higher levels of review within DOD, for potential approval by the Military 

Department Secretaries and the Secretary of Defense. Until this list is 

approved, and an appropriate transfer mechanism determined, the 

equipment that will be transferred to the Government of Iraq remains 

uncertain. Currently, no decision has been made as to what authorities will 

be used to transfer these items to the Government of Iraq. While certain 

authorities exist that may permit the transfer of excess defense articles, 

DOD has also requested additional authority to transfer non-excess 

defense articles.27 Section 1234 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2010 provides an additional authority, requested by the 

Department of Defense, under which the Secretary of Defense, with the 

concurrence of the Secretary of State, may transfer certain equipment to 

the Government of Iraq without the Military Departments declaring it 

excess to their needs.28 Because this provision does not specify a 

 

26 GAO recently issued a classified report on the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. See 

GAO, Securing and Stabilizing Iraq: U.S. Drawdown Plans Should Include Contingency 

Plans for Use If Key Assumptions about Security and Iraqi Capabilities Prove Wrong, 

GAO-09-939C (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2009). 

27 For instance, under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2321j), 

excess defense articles may be transferred to other countries under certain circumstances. 

28 Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1234 (2009). 

Page 17 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
mechanism for reimbursing the Military Departments for the transfer of 

non-excess equipment, the loss of which may affect unit readiness, senior 

Army officials expressed concern about it prior to its passage, and the 

conference report accompanying the Act urged the Secretary of Defense to 

develop a plan to reimburse the Military Departments for such items.29 In 

addition, other DOD officials expressed strong reservations about section 

1234 prior to its passage, arguing that existing authorities, such as those 

which underpin Foreign Military Sales, are sufficient to transfer U.S. 

military equipment to the Government of Iraq, but are not fully understood 

within the department. Clarification of authorities to be used for 

transferring equipment to the Government of Iraq will help facilitate 

decisions on which equipment will be transferred, and will assist in 

ensuring that DOD will meet its stated timelines. 

The complexity of issues surrounding transfer authorities has already 

presented obstacles to transferring equipment to the Government of Iraq. 

For example, beginning in May 2009, MNC-I undertook an initiative to turn 

over the Ibn Sina hospital, located in the International Zone, to the 

Government of Iraq as a fully equipped, fully operational hospital. 

However, 100 of the approximately 9,800 pieces of equipment in the 

hospital, such as intensive care unit beds, trauma centers, and patient vital 

signs monitoring equipment, were ineligible for transfer because, 

according to Army officials, the Army could not declare them as excess to 

the needs of the Army.30 As a result, officials had to seek alternate means 

to transfer or sell the remaining pieces of equipment necessary to outfit 

the hospital. Ultimately, the hospital was transferred to the Government of 

Iraq on schedule. However, Army officials stated that after exhausting all 

legal options for transferring or donating the remaining equipment, the 

hospital was transferred without these 100 pieces of important equipment. 

According to the Army, disposition for nearly all currently identified nonstandard equipment in Iraq has been determined, but all items needing 

 

29 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111-288, at 838-839 (2009). Section 1234 requires a report including a 

description of “the plan, if any, for reimbursing military departments” for non-excess 

equipment, and prohibits transfers that would have an “adverse impact on the military 

readiness of the United States,” in accordance with section 516 of the Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2321j). 

30 Under section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2403), the term 

“excess defense articles” generally refers to defense articles, with some exceptions, owned 

by the U.S. government that is excess of the approved level of stock for all DOD 

organizations at the time the equipment is transferred. 

Page 18 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
disposition have not yet been identified. Non-standard equipment is mainly 

theater provided equipment that has been issued to units that is not listed 

on their modified table of organization and equipment.31 Non-standard 

equipment includes a wide range of items such as construction equipment, 

materiel handling equipment, flat screen televisions, certain types of 

radios, and MRAPs. To facilitate the retrograde of non-standard 

equipment, the Army is implementing a new process in which the Life 

Cycle Management Commands are cataloguing all types of non-standard 

equipment in Iraq for entry into a new database.32 The Army then 

determines the location to which each type of item will be shipped upon 

retrograde from Iraq. Army officials state that they have determined 

disposition for the majority of types of non-standard equipment already 

identified in Iraq. However, these officials also state that additional types 

of non-standard equipment are still being entered into the database as 

efforts to gain accountability over non-standard equipment continue. Until 

this effort is complete, the disposition of some types of non-standard 

equipment in Iraq may be delayed. 

Decisions on the disposition of MRAPs also have not been finalized, and 

DOD faces challenges in retrograding the large number of these vehicles 

that remain in Iraq. MRAPs are a unique type of non-standard equipment 

that were initially procured specifically for use in Iraq to better protect 

servicemembers from improvised explosive devices. As the drawdown 

progresses, DOD officials acknowledge that most of the MRAPs 

retrograded from Iraq will return to the United States, and that only some 

of these vehicles are suitable for use in Afghanistan. According to Army 

officials, the Army, which manages most of the MRAP fleet, has issued 

preliminary disposition instructions for MRAPs to be retrograded from 

Iraq, but service-wide requirements for MRAPs have not yet been finalized. 

Moreover, although in January 2008, DOD designated the Red River Army 

Depot and Marine Corps Logistics Command bases in Albany and Barstow 

as the depots that would repair MRAPs in the United States, Headquarters, 

Department of the Army only recently issued a message directing the 

shipment of 200 MRAPs from Kuwait to Red River Army Depot as part of 

 

31 A modified table of organization and equipment documents the specific types and 

amounts of equipment Army units are authorized to have. 

32 The Army Materiel Command has five Life Cycle Management Commands, each of which 

is responsible for certain types of equipment. They are: Aviation and Missile, Chemical 

Materials Agency, Communications-Electronics, Joint Munitions & Lethality, and Tankautomotive & Armaments Command. 

Page 19 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
an MRAP Reset Repair Pilot Program. To date, all MRAPs retrograded 

from Iraq have passed through the MRAP Sustainment Facility in Kuwait 

for repair. However, at the time of our July 2009 visit to the CENTCOM 

area of operations, this facility could process only 20 MRAPs per week, 

contributing to a build-up of nearly 900 MRAPs in a retrograde lot in 

Kuwait. The officials who manage this lot stated that it was nearing full 

capacity for holding MRAPs. However, data provided by U.S. Army Central 

indicate that DOD’s capacity to process and ship MRAPs out of Kuwait 

exceeded the relatively few numbers of additional vehicles that left Iraq 

since our visit, decreasing the total number of MRAPs that are sitting in 

the retrograde lot to under 800 as of October 2009. Nevertheless, 

according to U.S. Army Central, over 8,000 MRAPs remain in Iraq. To 

remove MRAPs from Iraq according to the timeline set by the Security 

Agreement, the pace of their retrograde will need to significantly increase 

as the drawdown progresses, which heightens the potential for 

bottlenecks. 

The disposition of equipment in theater may also be affected by other 

decisions that have not been made related to the Army’s future 

composition and equipment reset needs. For example, the Army has not 

decided what equipment and how much of each type of equipment will be 

transferred to Army Prepositioned Stocks33 and Theater Sustainment 

Stocks.34 Also, the Army is currently drafting an “Equipping White Paper” 

that describes how the Army plans to allocate equipment in accordance 

with future force structure designs. For example, Army officials stated that 

they are considering changing one or more heavy brigade combat teams 

into Stryker brigade combat teams. Other factors also add uncertainty to 

the disposition of equipment. For example, while the Army has taken steps 

to streamline the reset induction process for equipment in Iraq, disposition 

for reset depends on when the equipment is retrograded from Iraq and the 

condition of the equipment. In addition, the extent to which equipment 

may be stored in Kuwait is unclear. Specifically, some officials from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that some equipment may be 

stored at depots or in Kuwait while decisions about disposition are made, 

while Army officials told us that the Army has no plans to store equipment 

 

33 The Army Prepositioned Stocks program supports the National Military Strategy by 

strategically prepositioning critical war stocks afloat and ashore worldwide and, thus, 

reducing the deployment response times of the modular expeditionary Army. 

34 Theater Sustainment Stocks are a pool of military equipment in theater that can be used 

to expedite the replacement of equipment damaged during operations. 

Page 20 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
in Kuwait. Finally, decisions have not been finalized on what additional 

equipment will be transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan. 

Weaknesses in data systems used to retrograde equipment from Iraq that 

we cited in our September 2008 report remain uncorrected, and a new 

problem has surfaced. In our September 2008 report, we noted that when 

theater provided equipment reached Kuwait, the 401st Army Field Support 

Brigade, which received the equipment, had to undertake two concurrent 

manual data entry processes in separate logistics information systems to 

establish accountability and visibility for the equipment. We also reported 

that the process for requesting disposition instructions was lengthy and 

involved sending spreadsheets populated with equipment data from 

Kuwait to the appropriate Life Cycle Management Command in the United 

States and then back to Kuwait. According to DOD officials we 

interviewed in Iraq and Kuwait in July 2009, the manual manipulation of 

data and extensive reliance on spreadsheets still occurs while other DOD 

officials stated that any problems that delay equipment from being 

retrograded can be problematic given the rapid pace of the drawdown. In 

addition, during our recent field visits we identified another data system 

problem that prevented the timely issuance of disposition instructions for 

equipment identified for retrograde from Iraq. Specifically, due to a data 

corruption error that occurs during data transfer between two legacy 

Army systems, Army officials in Kuwait were unable to issue orders to 

move the equipment to its designated destination. Officials stated that this 

problem had a negative effect on their ability to retrograde equipment, and 

officials in the United States and Kuwait worked together during regularly 

scheduled meetings to discuss issues delaying the transmission of these 

instructions. To fix the problem in the system, programmers had to 

implement manual fixes for each individual set of disposition instructions. 

According to Army officials, a solution to correct the data corruption error 

has been implemented since our visit. However, we have not been able to 

validate this claim and, according to Army officials, similar problems with 

legacy systems occur regularly. 

Longstanding 

Information 

Technology System 

Weaknesses May 

Compromise the 

Timely Retrograde of 

Equipment 

Higher projected flows of theater provided equipment during later phases 

of the drawdown may also put the timely issuance of disposition 

instructions at risk. We reported in 2008 that receipt of disposition 

instructions for some rolling stock took anywhere from three to nine 

months, resulting in equipment being held in Kuwait awaiting disposition 

instructions. Although officials told us during our July 2009 visit to Kuwait 

that this situation had improved, the data used to support that claim may 

be unreliable. With increased flows of equipment, inefficiency resulting 

Page 21 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
from the reliance on the entry of data by hand will be magnified. The 

higher volume of equipment requiring disposition instructions may stress 

the manual processes currently being used, thereby increasing the risk 

that more time will be necessary to request and receive disposition 

instructions, which may again cause equipment to sit idle in Kuwait. While 

the Theater Provided Equipment Planner may improve retrograde process 

efficiency by automating the issuance of disposition instructions that 

would otherwise need to be issued through the existing manual process, 

the extent to which items will be retrograded using the new system, 

especially as the volume of equipment being retrograded increases during 

later phases of the drawdown, is unclear. In addition, the increased 

volume of equipment projected for the later phases of the drawdown will 

require additional contractor personnel to make the manual entries made 

necessary by the system incompatibility issues. 

The execution of the drawdown may also be affected by the lack of a 

complete and accurate inventory of three broad types of equipment. These 

three types of equipment include contractor acquired property,35 nonstandard equipment, and shipping containers. According to Army data, 

these three types of equipment comprise 28 percent of the total DOD 

property in Iraq. To facilitate a more complete and accurate record of 

equipment in Iraq, MNF-I required its subordinate units to complete a 100 

percent inventory of their equipment, identify excess equipment that can 

be immediately retrograded, and account for previously undocumented 

equipment by June 27, 2009. Undocumented equipment, however, 

continues to be identified and added to the inventory. 

DOD’s Lack of Precise 

Visibility Over Its 

Inventory of 

Equipment and 

Shipping Containers 

Inhibits Planning for 

Retrograde from Iraq 

According to MNF-I guidance, the command’s ability to meet drawdown 

requirements and timelines depends upon establishing an accurate and 

complete inventory of the amount and types of equipment that will have to 

be retrograded from Iraq. In that vein, MNF-I ordered a 100 percent 

inventory of all U.S. government owned equipment in Iraq. Overall, DOD 

officials stated that property accountability has improved in Iraq since 

2006, especially with regard to theater provided equipment. The guidance 

calling for completion of an inventory by June 27, 2009 was intended to 

account for undocumented items. When these previously undocumented 

 

35 For simplicity, we use the term “contractor acquired property” to include all items that 

the contractor manages expressly to perform the contract, including items given to the 

contractor by the government (government furnished equipment) and items 

acquired/fabricated by the contractor using government funds. 

Page 22 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
items are entered onto property books, commanders become accountable 

for them. The intent is to facilitate drawdown planning and execution by 

providing an incentive for commanders to take action on previously 

undocumented items that otherwise may not be factored into the 

retrograde plans. However, although MNC-I states that the inventory is 

complete, previously undocumented equipment continues to be found 

every month. Until all undocumented equipment is included in the 

inventory, DOD’s information on the number of items requiring retrograde 

remains incomplete, which adds risk to meeting the drawdown timelines. 

During our visit to the CENTCOM area of operations in July 2009, officials 

in Iraq and Kuwait stated that, of all categories of equipment, they had the 

least visibility over contractor acquired property. Army officials stated, 

however, that as of October 2009, this situation had improved. While 

contractors are typically required under the terms of their contract to 

maintain property accountability over this equipment, there is no 

standardized process for doing so, limiting MNF-I’s and U.S. Army 

Central’s accountability and visibility over this equipment. During the 

drawdown, accountability of contractor acquired property is important to 

ensure the efficient allocation of the transportation assets used to 

retrograde this equipment. 

U.S. Army Central officials also noted that they lack full accountability and 

visibility over non-standard equipment in Iraq, adding another potential 

risk to their ability to efficiently retrograde this equipment out of Iraq. 

Army officials have estimated that there could be as many as 360,000 

pieces of non-standard equipment in Iraq, but concede that they have low 

confidence in property accountability for non-standard equipment. 

Moreover, Army and U.S. Army Central officials note that obtaining an 

accurate inventory of non-standard equipment is complicated by the fact 

that many of these items have multiple identification numbers and that 

commanders have significant flexibility in accounting for this equipment. 

For example, a piece of non-standard equipment that is valued at greater 

than $5,000 must be recorded on a military unit’s property book, but after 

the value of that item depreciates below the $5,000 threshold, it is left to 

the individual commander’s discretion whether to continue recording the 

property. Not knowing the precise amount of non-standard equipment in 

Iraq that will need to be retrograded contributes to planning uncertainty 

for the organizations tasked with executing the drawdown, and may put at 

risk the ability to position transportation assets and personnel to manage 

the many aspects of the retrograde process in time to facilitate a steady 

flow of equipment from Iraq. 

Page 23 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Another factor compounding planning uncertainty is the lack of an 

accurate accounting of the quantity and serviceability of shipping 

containers in Iraq. Containers are unique in that not only are they items 

that have to be retrograded from Iraq, they are also a primary vehicle for 

shipping other types of equipment out of Iraq. According to U.S. Army 

Central officials, the data system in place to track containers is inaccurate 

and incomplete because, among other factors, it must be manually 

updated every time a container arrives at or leaves a specific location. 

Reports based the data from this system indicate that the system is at best 

25 percent accurate. Furthermore, updates to the location and status of 

containers may not occur routinely because of personnel shortages. For 

example, according to officials in charge of container management, 200 

containers listed as located in Iraq were, in fact, in Afghanistan. Moreover, 

in addition to inaccurate data on the number of containers and their 

locations, officials also lack data on the serviceability of containers. In an 

effort to rectify this problem, MNC-I issued an order directing a 100 

percent inventory of containers, including instructions for reporting the 

serviceability of the containers. Subsequent reports indicate that 

approximately 54,000 containers had been physically inventoried as of 

August 2009, which was almost 25,000 fewer than the number of 

containers in the data system. Out of these containers entered in the data 

system, the location of over 7,000 could not be verified and the 

serviceability of 39 percent remained unknown. Moreover, many 

containers in Iraq are being used for storage, office space, and living 

quarters, among other purposes, yet are not documented as such, and may 

not immediately be available for retrograde. Due to limited container 

accountability, MNF-I and U.S. Army Central’s ability to plan for the steady 

flow of equipment out of Iraq necessary to meet the drawdown timelines 

may be at risk. 

Concluding Observations As I have stated today, much has been done in Iraq and Kuwait to facilitate 

the drawdown effort. However, the effective execution of the drawdown 

may be compromised by several complex challenges: notably, 

identification of contractor requirements needed for the drawdown, and 

development of plans to address the challenges created by key contract 

transitions and to mitigate the risk of waste caused by an inadequate 

number of trained oversight personnel that would aid the successful 

management of contract services. Additionally, the effective execution of 

the drawdown is dependent upon decisions about what equipment can and 

will be transferred to the Government of Iraq, the clear establishment of 

transfer mechanisms, and final decisions on the disposition of nonstandard equipment. Moreover, longstanding data information system 

Page 24 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
incompatibility issues and a less-than-comprehensive inventory of some 

types of equipment in Iraq may hamper the drawdown. 

GAO Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

For further information about this statement, please contact William M. 

Solis (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this 

statement include Vincent Balloon, Carolynn Cavanaugh, Carole Coffey, 

Timothy DiNapoli, Laurier Fish, Walker Fullerton, Guy LoFaro, Greg 

Marchand, Jim Melton, Emily Norman, Jason Pogacnik, David Schmitt, 

Cheryl Weissman, Gerald Winterlin, and Gwyneth Woolwine. 

Page 25 GAO-10-179 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
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