[Cite as State v. Strange, 2024-Ohio-2199.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SANDUSKY COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. S-23-025

Appellee Trial Court No. 21 CR 845

 

v.

Deondre R. Strange DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: June 7, 2024

* * * * *

Beth A. Tischler, Sandusky County Prosecuting Attorney, and

Alexis M. Otero, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Karin L. Coble, for appellant.

* * * * *

ZMUDA, J.

I. Introduction

{¶ 1} Appellant, Deondre Strange, appeals the July 24, 2023 judgment of the 

Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of one count of improperly 

discharging a firearm at or into a habitation and one count of felonious assault. For the 

following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter for further 

proceedings.
2.

II. Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On November 5, 2021, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated 

murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), an unclassified felony; one count of murder in 

violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), an unclassified felony; one count of improperly 

discharging a firearm at or into a habitation in violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) and (C), 

a second-degree felony; and three counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 

2903.11(A)(2) and (D)(1)(a), each a second-degree felony. All six counts included a 

specification that appellant committed the offenses while in possession of a firearm 

pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A) and a specification that the firearm was subject to 

forfeiture pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417. 

{¶ 3} The charges arose from an incident that occurred on October 21, 2021. That 

evening, appellant was informed that his sister and her husband had been involved in a 

physical altercation with their neighbor, J.B. Appellant traveled to his sister’s residence 

and was invited inside.

1

 After discussing the altercation with his sister, and his desire to 

confront J.B., appellant was asked to leave her residence. Once outside, appellant and 

J.B. engaged in a verbal altercation. Eventually, the altercation escalated and J.B. and 

appellant began shooting at one another. J.B. was killed and appellant was injured during 

the altercation.

1 Appellant was accompanied by his brother-in-law, Jermain Howard. Howard was 

convicted of one charge related to the same altercation. He was tried separately from 

appellant. His appeal is still pending before this court in case No. S-23-007.
3.

{¶ 4} On April 27, 2023, the state filed a motion to dismiss the aggravated murder

count. The trial court granted the motion on May 1, 2023. The remaining counts were 

then renumbered to reflect the dismissal of the aggravated murder count. The five 

remaining counts proceeded to a jury trial the following day. Relevant to the present 

appeal, appellant filed a request for a self-defense jury instruction on April 28, 2023. 

Appellant requested that the jury be instructed as follows:

A person is allowed to act in self-defense when extreme danger has 

presented itself to the defendant. The extreme danger must be a reasonable 

belief, even if mistaken, that the person poses an imminent danger of death 

or great bodily harm. The State of Ohio must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the accused person did not act in self-defense in order for there 

to be a conviction.

It is undisputed that appellant’s requested instruction reflected the current status of 

Ohio’s self-defense law as described in R.C. 2901.05. See State v. Messenger, 2022-

Ohio-4562, ¶ 14.

{¶ 5} Appellant’s trial concluded on May 5, 2023. Before instructing the jury, the 

trial court met with the parties to discuss the proposed instructions. The state informed 

the trial court that it believed the instruction should inform the jury that it was the state’s 

burden to prove that appellant did not act in self-defense. Appellant then referenced his 

previously-requested instruction and stated that he had nothing more to add to the state’s 

position. The trial court advised the parties that it believed that its prepared instructions, 

which did not inform the jury that the state had to disprove appellant’s self-defense claim
4.

in order for him to be found guilty, “sufficiently cover[ed] the law that needs to be 

charged to the jury in this case[.]” The trial court then denied appellant’s request for his

proposed self-defense instruction. 

{¶ 6} The following day, the jury found appellant not guilty of murder (count 1) 

and not guilty of two of the three felonious assault charges (counts 4 and 5). The jury 

found appellant guilty of one count of improperly discharging a firearm at or into a 

habitation (count 2) and one count of felonious assault (count 3). On July 24, 2023, 

appellant was sentenced to a minimum prison term of 2 years with a maximum prison 

term of 3 years on the felonious assault and improper discharge of a firearm offenses. 

The trial court ordered those prison terms to be served concurrently. The trial court also 

ordered appellant to serve a three-year prison term on each of the related firearm 

specifications, with those terms to be served concurrently with each other and

consecutive to the indefinite prison terms imposed on the related offenses. The trial 

court’s order resulted in an aggregate, indefinite prison term of 5 to 6 years. The trial 

court’s judgment entry was memorialized the same day.

III. Assignments of Error

{¶ 7} Appellant timely appealed and assigns the following errors for our review:

1. The trial court violated [appellant’s] right to due process when it gave incorrect 

jury instructions that (1) changed the burden of proof and (2) were incomplete.

2. Counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Ohio and U.S. 

Constitutions.

3. The convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence as they are 

 inconsistent with the acquittal for murder.
5.

IV. Law and Analysis

{¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

giving the jury an instruction that failed to identify it was the state’s burden to prove that 

appellant had not acted in self-defense, as described in R.C. 2901.05. The state, in its 

brief and at oral argument, concedes that the trial court erred in giving an erroneous 

instruction.2 We note that the state’s concession of error is not controlling and we must 

independently review appellant’s assigned error. State v. Hermes, 2023-Ohio-2011, ¶ 26. 

However, if the error is clear from the record, we may accept the concession as part of 

our analysis. Id. We begin, then, with a determination of whether the trial court 

committed an error that is clear from the record.

{¶ 9} “A trial court is obligated to provide jury instructions that correctly and 

completely state the law when those instructions are warranted by the evidence presented 

in a case.” State v. Heiney, 2018-Ohio-3408, ¶ 133 (6th Dist.), citing Cromer v. 

Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. Of Akron, 2015-Ohio-229, ¶ 22. We apply a de novo review 

to determine whether a disputed jury instruction correctly stated the applicable law. Id. 

R.C. 2901.05 expressly states that “the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense * * *” before a jury 

can find the offender guilty. Messenger at ¶ 14. At no point in its instructions did the 

2 Neither party filed a notice of conceded error alerting the court to the state’s concession 

pursuant to 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 10(H). 
6.

trial court inform the jury that the state had the burden to disprove appellant’s selfdefense claim. To the contrary, even when the state asked the trial court to provide an 

instruction on its burden, the trial court declined, finding that its prepared instructions 

sufficiently reflected the applicable law. At no point did the trial court correctly describe 

the applicable law to the jury. As a result, we find that the trial court committed an error 

that is clear from the record by giving the jury an instruction that did not correctly state

the applicable law.

{¶ 10} In light of that error, we next “must consider the jury charge as a whole and 

must determine whether the jury charge probably misled the jury in a matter materially 

affecting [appellant’s] substantial rights.” Heiney at ¶ 136. If the error does not affect a 

substantial right, it is considered “harmless.” Id. at ¶ 139. “During a harmless error 

inquiry, the state has the burden of proving that the error did not affect the substantial 

rights of the defendant.” State v. Moore, 2021-Ohio-765, ¶ 37 (6th Dist.). 

{¶ 11} We find that the trial court’s error “probably misled” the jury in that the 

jury was never asked to determine whether the state disproved appellant’s self-defense 

claim beyond a reasonable doubt. The state concedes that the trial court’s incorrect 

instruction affected appellant’s substantial rights by failing to clarify that the state had 

that burden. Other courts which have examined this issue have determined that a trial 

court’s failure to give a correct jury instruction on the state’s burden to disprove a selfdefense claim affected the substantial rights of a defendant. See State v. Gillian, 2023-

Ohio-325, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.); State v. Irvin, 2023-Ohio-3274, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.). Accordingly, 

for these reasons, we accept the state’s concession that the trial court erred as part of our 
7.

analysis. We find that the trial court committed reversible error in giving the jury an 

incorrect instruction that affected appellant’s substantial rights and that this matter must 

be remanded to the trial court. 

{¶ 12} Having accepted the state’s position on conceded error, we must next 

determine the scope of the remand to the trial court in light of that error. Appellant 

requests that only his convictions be remanded to the trial court. The state argues in its 

brief that the trial court’s error “affected the entire case, not just the two counts for which 

[a]ppellant was found guilty.” The state alleges that “the only proper remedy is for the 

case, containing five counts, to be reversed and remanded[.]” The state further argues 

that because the erroneous jury instruction was applicable to all five counts at trial,

including those for which appellant was acquitted, that remanding all five counts would 

not violate appellant’s right to be free from double jeopardy on those acquittals. The 

state’s request is entirely unsupported and, in light of the constitutional protection at 

issue, borders on frivolous.

{¶ 13} The double jeopardy provisions of both the Ohio and the United States 

Constitutions prohibit “(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a 

second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments 

for the same offense. State v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d 425 (1996). “It is axiomatic in 

American jurisprudence that the constitutional principle and prohibition against double 

jeopardy prohibits any person from being ‘twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.’” 

State v. Speer, 2010-Ohio-5648, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), citing Section 10, Article I, Ohio 

Constitution. “In conformity with this axiomatic element of our judicial system, the 
8.

United States Supreme Court has unambiguously affirmed that the double-jeopardy 

constitutional protection uncompromisingly prohibits a person from being subject to a 

second trial following an acquittal on that offense.” Id., citing Fong-Foo v. United 

States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (emphasis added). More importantly, the error conceded by 

the state—or any other claimed error—does not permit this court to review and reverse 

appellant’s acquittals. See State ex rel. Ramirez-Ortiz v. Twelfth Dist. Court of Appeals, 

2017-Ohio-7816 (holding that while the state can appeal a discrete legal issue that is 

capable of repetition yet evading review due to an acquittal, the court of appeals “could 

not disturb the acquittal itself”). 

{¶ 14} Put simply, there is no basis on which this court could intrude on

appellant’s inviolable right to be free from double jeopardy by reversing and remanding 

the acquitted offenses for a new trial as the state requests. As a result, we reject the 

state’s argument that our remand of this case to the trial court should permit the state to 

pursue a second trial on the acquitted offenses. The proper remedy in this case is to 

reverse appellant’s convictions on counts 2 and 3 and to remand only those counts for 

further proceedings.3 Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this 

matter to the trial court for further proceedings on counts 2 and 3 only. 

3 This decision is limited to the five counts that proceeded to trial only. The original 

aggravated murder charge was dismissed prior to trial and is not part of the proceedings 

before this court.
9.

{¶ 15} Because our resolution of appellant’s first assignment of error is dispositive 

of the entire appeal, we find appellant’s second and third assignments of error moot and 

decline to address them pursuant to App.R. 12(A). 

V. Conclusion

{¶ 16} We find appellant’s first assignment of error well-taken and we reverse the 

July 24, 2023 judgment of the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas. We remand 

this matter to the trial court for further proceedings only on counts 2 and 3, as designated 

in the trial court’s May 1, 2023 order.

{¶ 17} The state is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgment reversed

and remanded.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________

 JUDGE

Christine E. Mayle, J. 

____________________________

Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE

CONCUR. 

____________________________

 JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.