FILED

June 11, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

MAY SESSION, 1998

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9709-CC-00359

)

Appellee, ) FAYETTE COUNTY

 )

V. ) 

) HON. JOHN KERRY BLACKWOOD,

) JUDGE 

WILLIE J. WADE, ) 

) (POSSESSION OF SCHEDULE II

Appellant. ) DRUG WITH INTENT TO SELL)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

HAROLD D. ARCHIBALD JOHN KNOX WALKUP 

Falls Building, Suite 790 Attorney General & Reporter

22 North Front Street

Memphis, TN 38103 ELIZABETH T. RYAN 

Assistant Attorney General

2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243

ELIZABETH T. RICE

District Attorney General 

302 Market Street

Somerville, TN 38068

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION

The Defendant, Willie Wade, appeals as of right his conviction of possession

of cocaine with the intent to deliver following a jury trial in the Fayette County

Criminal Court. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I Standard

Offender to twelve (12) years in the Department of Correction and fined him a total

of $20,000. In this appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgment of the

trial court. 

On November 29, 1996, Captain Arthur Williamson of the Somerville Police

Department was on routine patrol in Somerville. Captain Williamson was looking for

Defendant to talk to him about a certain matter when about 12:00 p.m. he saw

Defendant stopped at a stop sign in his vehicle. Captain Williamson pulled up

behind Defendant’s vehicle and turned on his siren and blue lights. Defendant did

not stop and instead sped up and pulled away from Captain Williamson. However,

Defendant soon stopped his car in an apartment complex. Captain Williamson

pulled up next to Defendant and they both got out of their cars. The Captain asked

Defendant “what was the hurry and why he sped away.” Defendant told him that

“he just didn’t want to know what the problem was, he didn’t want to go to jail.”

Captain Williamson then told Defendant that he needed to speak with him, but

Defendant pulled away from Williamson, who had been holding Defendant by the

back of his jacket, and ran off into the apartment com plex.

Captain Williamson called for back-up and then started running after

Defendant. When he finally caught up with Defendant, he placed Defendant under
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arrest and frisked him for weapons. As Williamson was escorting Defendant back

to the patrol car, Investigator Kevin Crawford arrived on the scene. Crawford then

frisked Defendant again before placing him in the patrol car and found a plastic

baggie containing a white powder substance in Defendant’s coat pocket. Crawford

also seized $337.44 from Defendant. The denominations of the bills were as

follows: nine $20 bills, one $10 bill, twenty-seven $5 bills and twelve $1 bills. Before

Defendant left the scene, his mother arrived, and in response to a question asked

by his mother, Defendant stated, “they got the powder off of me.” 

Kay Sheriff, a forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation

analyzed the substance brought to the lab by Investigator Crawford. The white

powder tested positive for cocaine and weighed 2.2 grams. Based on his

undercover work both buying and selling drugs, Investigator Crawford testified that

the estimated street value of the substance Defendant had in his possession at the

time of his arrest was approximately $300. He also said that “the $20 denomination

is the normal currency used in the drug trade.” Captain Williamson testified that he

had known Defendant for most of his life and that he had never known Defendant

to have any gainful employment.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the

standard is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosection, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

This standard is applicable to findings of guilt predicated upon direct evidence,
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circumstantial evidence or a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence.

State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). On appeal, the

State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all inferences

therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Because a

verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a

presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of illustrating why the

evidence is insufficient to support the verdict returned by the trier of fact. State v.

Williams, 914 S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing State v. Tuggle, 639

S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973).

Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to

be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence, are

resolved by the trier of fact, not this court. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623

(Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 1987). Nor may this court

reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835. A jury verdict

approved by the trial judge accredits the State’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts

in favor of the State. Grace, 493 S.W.2d at 476.

Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of

possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-

17-417(a)(4) provides that it is an offense to “[p]ossess a controlled substance with

intent to manufacture, deliver or sell such controlled substance.” The statute also

provides that where the substance is cocaine in an amount equal to or greater than

0.5 grams, the offense is a Class B felony.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(c )(1).

Defendant was charged with and convicted of the possession of more than 0.5
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grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver. The lab report revealed that the actual

amount of cocaine found in Defendant’s possession was 2.2 grams.

Tennessee law allows a jury to infer from the amount of a controlled

substance or substances possessed by an offender, along with other relevant facts

surrounding the arrest, that the controlled substance or substances were possessed

for the purpose of selling or otherwise dispensing the drug. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-

17-419. In State v. Larry G. Hart, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9406-CC-00111, Hardin County

(Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, June 28, 1995) (no Rule 11 application filed), the

defendant had only one gram of cocaine in his possession, but when that fact was

viewed in light of all the circumstances, this Court found that amount to be sufficient

to sustain a guilty verdict. Furthermore, this Court has held that the possession of

a beeper and $239.00 in cash, though not criminal offenses in and of themselves,

when coupled with the possession of 1.1 gram of cocaine, was sufficient evidence

for the jury to conclude that a defendant was guilty of possession of cocaine with the

intent to deliver. See State v. Ronald Mitchell, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9702-CC-00070,

Lauderdale County (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Sept. 15, 1997) (Rule 11 application

denied April 27, 1998). In the instant case, the proof in the record establishes that

Defendant had 2.2 grams of cocaine in his possession and that he tried to flee from

the police twice. That 2.2 grams of cocaine was estimated by Investigator Crawford

to be worth about $300 in street value. The record also reveals the uncontradicted

testimony of Investigator Crawford that the $20 denomination is the normal currency

used in the drug trade. Defendant had nine $20 bills in his possession at the time

of his arrest. The evidence also shows the large total amount of $337.44 in cash that

Defendant had on his person when he was arrested. Finally, there was Captain

Williamson’s testimony that he did not know of Defendant ever having any gainful
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employment. All of the foregoing facts lend credence to the jury’s verdict, and we

therefore conclude that a rational basis existed for the jury’s conclusion that

Defendant possessed the cocaine with the intent to deliver. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________

THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________________

JOHN H. PEAY, Judge

___________________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge