United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

November 5, 2009 

Congressional Committees 

Subject: Afghanistan’s Security Environment 

In March 2009, out of concern that the overall security situation in Afghanistan had 

not improved after more than 7 years of U.S. and international efforts, the 

administration completed a 60-day strategic review of U.S. policy and the security 

environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan.1

 Based on this review, and recognizing 

the vital U.S. interest in addressing security threats posed by extremists in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, the administration announced a strategic goal of 

disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating these extremists and eliminating 

their safe havens in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.2 Subsequently, in August 2009, 

the United States issued an integrated civilian-military campaign plan for support to 

Afghanistan.3

 The strategy and campaign plan call for, among other things, the 

execution of an integrated counterinsurgency mission and continued efforts to 

build the capacity of military and civilian elements of the Afghan government to 

lead counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts and provide internal security 

for the Afghan people. Accordingly, the focus for U.S. forces in Afghanistan will be 

to (1) secure Afghanistan from insurgent and terrorist threats and (2) rapidly train 

Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)4 to lead military and law enforcement 

operations. 

We have previously reported on security conditions in Afghanistan and the need for 

additional personnel to help build capable ANSF.5

 This report provides updated 

information on (1) the security situation as gauged by trends in enemy-initiated 

attacks, (2) challenges for U.S. reconstruction efforts posed by security conditions, 

and (3) the recent increase in U.S. and coalition troop presence. To address these 

objectives, we incorporated information from our past and continuing work; 

 

1

A subsequent assessment of the situation in Afghanistan by the commander of the International Security 

Assistance Force and U.S. forces in Afghanistan is currently under way. The commander’s initial assessment 

was completed in August 2009. 

2

The President announced his strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan on March 27, 2009. 3

GAO is currently performing a separate congressionally mandated review of the U.S. campaign plan for 

Afghanistan. 

4

The ANSF consists of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. We reported on U.S. efforts to 

develop capable ANSF in June 2008. See GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be 

Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security 

Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008). 5

See GAO, Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-09-473SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 

2009). 

Page 1 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
analyzed updated data on attacks, troop numbers, and U.S. funding; and reviewed 

relevant documents from the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State), as 

well as the administration’s White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report 

on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan and the recently developed civilianmilitary campaign plan for Afghanistan. 

Afghanistan’s Security Situation Continues to Worsen as Enemy-Initiated 

Attacks Increase

Afghanistan’s security situation has deteriorated significantly since 2005, affecting 

all aspects of U.S. and allied reconstruction operations. As we reported in April 

2009, the rise in enemy-initiated attacks on civilians and on U.S., Afghan, and 

coalition security forces has resulted from various factors, including a resurgence 

of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, a thriving illicit 

drug trade, and threats emanating from insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. 

Since 2005, attacks on civilians, as well as on Afghan and coalition forces, have 

increased every year. The most recent data available, as of August 2009, showed the 

highest rate of enemy-initiated attacks since Afghanistan’s security situation began 

to deteriorate. Overall, nearly 13,000 attacks were recorded between January and 

August 2009—more than two and a half times the number experienced during the 

same period last year and more than five times the approximately 2,400 attacks 

reported in all of 2005. Violence has generally been concentrated in the eastern and 

southern regions of Afghanistan where U.S. forces operate, with insurgents making 

increasing use of improvised explosive devices, suicide attacks, and attacks 

targeting infrastructure and development projects. As figure 1 illustrates, the 

pattern of attacks is seasonal, generally peaking from June through September each 

year. 

Page 2 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
Figure 1: Average Daily Reported Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type in Afghanistan, May 2003 to August 

2009 

Number of average daily attacks per month

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Average daily attacks on International Security Assistance Force and coalition forces

Average daily attacks on civilians

Average daily attacks on Afghan National Security Forces

Total average daily attacks

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Aug.

June

Au

Oct.

Dec.

Feb.

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g.

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g.

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Dec.

Feb.

Apr.

g.

June 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Oct. 9, 2004

First democratic 

presidential

election in 

Afghanistan

Sept. 18, 2005

Elections for lower

house of National

Assembly and 

provincial councils

Aug. 20, 2009

Elections for

president and

provincial councils

Note: Data on attacks against civilians include attacks against Afghan nationals and other civilians, U.S. and non-U.S. 

contractors, nongovernmental organizations, and Afghan government personnel. Data on attacks against the International 

Security Assistance Force and coalition forces include attacks against U.S. and International Security Assistance Force 

military personnel. 

Although never reaching the highest level of attacks in Iraq, the number of attacks 

in Afghanistan surpassed those in Iraq for the first time in July 2008 and has 

continued to exceed levels in Iraq in recent months (see fig. 2).6

 

6

According to Defense Intelligence Agency officials, attack data in figures 1 and 2 do not include violent 

incidents that coalition or Afghan security forces initiated, but represent a reliable and consistent source of 

information that can be used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security situation. 

Page 3 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
Figure 2: Average Daily Reported Enemy-Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, May 2003 to August 

2009

Number of average daily attacks per month

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Average daily attacks in Afghanistan

Average daily attacks in Iraq

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Aug.

Au

Oct.

Dec.

Feb.

Apr.

June

g.

Au

Oct.

Dec.

Feb.

Apr.

June

g.

Au

Oct.

Dec.

Feb.

Apr.

June

g.

Au

Oct.

Dec.

Feb.

Apr.

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g.

Au

Oct.

Dec.

Feb.

Apr.

June

g.

Au

Oct.

Dec.

Feb.

Apr.

June

g.

June 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Security Situation Continues to Challenge U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan

Developing a self-reliant Afghanistan is a key end-state goal articulated in the U.S. 

strategy for Afghanistan, which notes that achieving such an outcome will enable 

the United States to withdraw combat forces and make a sustained commitment to 

Afghan political and economic development. While U.S. and international 

development projects in Afghanistan have made some progress, the deterioration of 

security has impeded efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country. In particular, U.S. 

officials have cited poor security as having caused delays, disruptions, and even 

abandonment of certain reconstruction projects, while also hampering 

management and oversight of such efforts. For instance, the administration’s 

Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan has identified the need for 

more security in order for civilian personnel and contractors to do their work in 

Afghanistan. Similarly, the commander of the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF)7

 and U.S. forces in Afghanistan testified in his June 2009 confirmation 

hearing that improving security was a prerequisite for the development of local 

governance and economic growth in Afghanistan. The following list provides some 

specific examples of how the security situation in Afghanistan hampers U.S. efforts: 

• Development programs delayed or abandoned. U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) staff in Afghanistan cited security as a 

major challenge to implementing development projects. According to USAID, 

programs ranging from road reconstruction to power generation and 

agricultural development face significant cost increases and have been delayed 

or abandoned due to a lack of security. For example, because attacks prevented 

 

7

As of October 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led ISAF consisted of troops from 42 countries 

engaged in efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan. 

Page 4 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
contractors from working on an Afghan road to the Kajaki dam, USAID 

terminated the road contract after it had spent about $5 million on it.8 USAID 

further noted in its comments on this report that supplies for the Kajaki dam 

project must now be flown in due to the deteriorating security environment. 

Additionally, DOD has reported that, although progress has been made in 

completing construction of the “ring road”—Afghanistan’s major highway—a 

lack of security has increased the risk of using Afghan roads. 

• Disruption of supply lines. Supply transportation operations in Afghanistan 

continue to depend on treacherous overland routes. Although sensitive 

equipment is flown in by plane, supply convoys moving overland from Pakistan 

have been subject to repeated threats and attacks. 

• Development of Afghan security forces impeded by security problems.

U.S. officials have reported that efforts to train ANSF have been hindered by 

security problems. For example, despite the fact that the Afghan National Army 

is charged with defeating the insurgency and terrorism, Afghan National Police 

are often reassigned from their training courses to provide immediate 

assistance with the counterinsurgency effort, thus delaying the completion of 

their training. Additionally, DOD officials have indicated that distributing 

equipment to police in the field has been challenged in part by the unstable 

security situation. 

• Counternarcotics operations challenged by insurgent activity. About 98 

percent of Afghanistan’s opium poppy cultivation is concentrated in the 

southern provinces where insurgent activity has been heaviest. Recognizing the 

nexus between the drug trade and the insurgency, in December 2008 DOD 

adopted policies that allow the U.S. military to increase its involvement in 

counternarcotics operations. 

• Oversight of ongoing programs restricted. Afghanistan’s security situation 

has contributed to U.S. funds being expended with limited U.S. government 

oversight. For example, USAID officials told us their ability to monitor and 

evaluate ongoing programs has been restricted by security constraints. In 

comments on this report, USAID noted that due to deteriorating security in 

southern and eastern Afghanistan, monitoring of the delivery of health services 

has been significantly hindered or stopped in some areas. Similarly, State 

officials told us that poor security has considerably inhibited the oversight of 

counternarcotics efforts outside Kabul, including programs such as opium 

eradication, alternative livelihoods, and public information. 

 

8

We reported in July 2008 about U.S. and donor efforts to build roads in Afghanistan. See GAO, Afghanistan 

Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a 

Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed, GAO-08-689 (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2008). 

Page 5 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
Increased U.S. and Coalition Troop Presence Is Intended to Help Secure 

Afghanistan and Develop ANSF Capacity 

As of November 2009, there were reportedly about 67,000 U.S. military personnel in 

Afghanistan—an increase of more than 90 percent from the force level of 35,000 we 

previously reported as of February 2009.9 According to DOD, by the end of 2009 

U.S. troop levels will rise further to about 68,000. Additionally, as of October 2009, 

there were reportedly about 36,000 non-U.S. military personnel in ISAF—an 

increase from the reported February 2009 force level of about 32,000. Furthermore, 

as of September 2009, DOD reported 95,000 Afghan National Army personnel 

assigned to the ANSF.10 According to DOD, the ANSF will reach its authorized endstrength of 230,000 army and police personnel by October 2010. Figure 3 shows the 

reported increase in U.S., coalition, and Afghan military troop strength between 

February 2009 and November 2009. 

 

9

Part of the increase in U.S. troop levels is a result of the President’s February 2009 approval to deploy more 

than 21,000 additional troops to Afghanistan this year. Of these 21,000 troops, about 17,700 are intended to 

stabilize southern Afghanistan and about 4,000 are intended to support the ANSF development mission. 10DOD also indicated that there were about 93,000 Afghan National Police assigned to the ANSF as of 

September 2009. We previously reported in June 2008 that Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior produces the 

number of police assigned and that, according to DOD, these numbers may not be reliable. Subsequently, in 

March 2009, we noted that DOD was working with the Afghan government to identify and validate all police 

personnel on the payroll. See GAO-08-661 and GAO, Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform 

Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenges by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation, 

GAO-09-280 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2009). 

Page 6 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
Figure 3: Increase in Reported U.S., Coalition, and Afghan Military Troop Strength between February 

2009 and November 2009 

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000 80000

90,000

100,000

Afghan

National

Army

ISAF

(non-U.S.)

United

States

Number of troops

Location

Increase since February 2009

Troop strength as of February 2009

Source: DOD and ISAF data.

32,000

67,000

36,000

95,000

35,000 32,000

4,000

79,000

16,000

Note: U.S. figures are as of November 2009. ISAF figures are as of October 2009. Afghan National Army figures are as of 

September 2009. 

Since 2001, more than half of the U.S. funding provided to support Afghanistan’s 

security, governance, reconstruction, and counternarcotics goals as set out in the 

Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) has been dedicated to 

supporting the development of ANSF. As shown in figure 4, the United States has 

provided more than $38.6 billion11 to support the ANDS goals since 2001, of which 

more than $21 billion has been dedicated to ANSF development. In its 2010 budget 

request, DOD asked Congress to provide $7.5 billion for the Afghanistan Security 

Forces Fund,12 representing an almost 34 percent increase over 2009 funding levels. 

 

11This figure does not include funding for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. 

12The Afghan Security Forces Fund is used to plan, program, and implement structural, institutional, and 

management reforms of the ANSF. 

Page 7 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
Figure 4: Breakdown of $38.6 Billion in U.S.-Provided Support to Afghanistan for Fiscal Years 2002 to 

2009 

9%

6%

56% 29%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.

Governance, rule of law, and human rights 

($2.5 billion)

Counternarcotics

($3.5 billion)

Economic and social development

($11 billion)

Security

($21.6 billion)

Dollars (in billions)

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, USAID, and State. DOD and USAID 

provided written comments, which are reprinted in enclosures I and II of this 

report, respectively. In response to DOD’s comment that the report should be 

labeled “For Official Use Only,” we modified sections of the report, resulting in 

DOD’s determination that the report was no longer “For Official Use Only.” DOD 

stated that the facts presented in our report are accurate but asserted that our 

report treats security and development as independent entities rather than 

interrelated activities. We agree with DOD that security and development are 

interrelated activities, and our report illustrates several ways in which 

Afghanistan’s unstable security situation challenges development. For additional 

details, see GAO comments that follow enclosure I. DOD also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. USAID provided updated 

information on the impact of Afghanistan’s deteriorating security situation on 

implementation and oversight of U.S. reconstruction efforts. State did not provide 

written comments. 

Scope and Methodology 

This report represents an update to our prior work on security conditions in 

Afghanistan and is based on past and continuing work. To address our objectives, 

we incorporated updated information from current budget and program 

documents, including updated financial data from DOD. We also incorporated 

updated attack data from DOD, which we used to assess the level of enemyPage 8 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
initiated attacks on civilians and on U.S., Afghan, and coalition security forces. We 

have assessed the reliability of these financial and attack data as part of our 

previous work and have determined that they are sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. Because DOD uses similar methodologies to derive the attack data it 

reports for Afghanistan and Iraq, we were able to compare both sets of data. The 

report also incorporates updated data on troop numbers for the Afghan National 

Army, ISAF, and the United States. We have assessed these data as part of our 

previous and ongoing work and have determined that they are sufficiently reliable 

for broad comparative purposes to identify changes in troop numbers over time. 

However, the report also notes our previously reported concerns with regard to the 

reliability of figures on the number of Afghan National Police. In addition to 

incorporating updated data, we also reviewed relevant documents from DOD and 

State, as well as the administration’s White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s 

Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan and the recently developed 

civilian-military campaign plan for Afghanistan. 

We conducted our work from August 2009 to November 2009 in accordance with all 

sections of GAO’s Quality Assurance Framework that are relevant to our 

objectives. The framework requires that we plan and perform the engagement to 

obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to meet our stated objectives and to 

discuss any limitations in our work. We believe that the information and data 

obtained, and the analysis conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings 

and conclusions. 

- - - - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, DOD, 

State, and USAID. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key 

contributors to this report are listed in enclosure III. 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Enclosures 

Page 9 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chair 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John F. Kerry 

Chair 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chair 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

 and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Chair 

The Honorable Judd Gregg 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chair 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman 

Chair 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

Page 10 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
The Honorable Edolphus Towns 

Chair 

The Honorable Darrell E. Issa 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey 

Chair 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John Tierney 

Chair 

The Honorable Jeff Flake 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives

Page 11 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
Enclosure I 

Page 12 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Comments from the Department of Defense 

See comment 1. 
Enclosure I 

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

See comment 4. 

See comment 5. 

See comment 6. 

Page 13 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
Enclosure I 

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s written responses, dated November 

2, 2009, to our draft report. 

GAO Comments 

1. We modified sections of the report in response to DOD’s technical comments. 

DOD subsequently agreed that our report did not need to be labeled “For 

Official Use Only.” 

2. DOD states that higher levels of security incidents are one measure of the 

security situation but do not reflect the scope, character, and impact of the 

incidents. Although a full characterization of attacks in Afghanistan is beyond 

the scope of this report, we provide several examples of how instability affects 

U.S. efforts. Furthermore, while we acknowledge DOD’s position that a higher 

number of attacks can reflect a worsening situation for the enemy, the 

commander of ISAF and U.S. forces in Afghanistan stated in his August 2009 

initial assessment of the situation in Afghanistan that the insurgency is 

resilient and growing. 

3. DOD asserts that the comparison between attack levels in Iraq and 

Afghanistan is inaccurate. However, all attack figures found in our report are 

based on DOD data that Defense Intelligence Agency officials consider a 

reliable and consistent source of information that can be used to identify 

trends in enemy activity and the overall security situation. DOD further asserts 

that the comparison between Iraq and Afghanistan loses context without 

further explanation. However, a detailed evaluation of factors affecting the 

levels of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan would involve sensitive information 

that could not be included in this report. 

4. DOD acknowledges that the enemy has hindered ANSF development but notes 

that a deeper analysis identifying the scope and character of the impact is 

needed. Although we did not include such an analysis in this update, our prior 

work on the ANSF has identified specific ways in which the lack of security 

has affected ANSF development. For example, we noted in March 2009 that a 

new program to retrain the Afghan National Police and build professional and 

fully capable police units was taking longer than DOD initially projected, due 

in part to growing security threats affecting the program.13 In addition, we are 

currently conducting a separate review of U.S. efforts to develop capable 

Afghan National Army forces. We look forward to working with DOD on that 

review to examine in further detail how the security situation has impeded 

development of the Afghan National Army, to include training timelines. 

5. We have modified our report to note that the authorized end-strength of the 

ANSF is now 230,000. 

 

13GAO-09-280. 

Page 14 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
Enclosure I 

6. DOD contends that this report treats security and development as independent 

entities rather than interrelated activities. We agree with DOD that security 

and development are interrelated activities, and our report illustrates several 

ways in which Afghanistan’s unstable security situation challenges 

development. 

Page 15 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
Enclosure II 

Page 16 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development
Enclosure II 

Page 17 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment
Enclosure III 

Page 18 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov

Acknowledgments 

In addition to the contact named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant Director), 

Aniruddha Dasgupta, Emily Rachman, Gloria Leila Mahnad, Joseph Carney, Martin 

de Alteriis, and Mark Dowling made key contributions to this report. Sarah 

McGrath, Jeremy Sebest, and Cynthia Taylor provided technical assistance. 

(320709) 
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