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i 

51–161 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–13] 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUEL 

DEMAND MANAGEMENT AT 

FORWARD-DEPLOYED LOCATIONS AND 

OPERATIONAL ENERGY INITIATIVES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 3, 2009 
(II) 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

ERYN ROBINSON, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

MEGAN PUTNAM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 3, 2009, Department of Defense Fuel Demand Management 

at Forward-Deployed Locations and Operational Energy Initiatives .............. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 3, 2009 .......................................................................................... 33 

TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 2009 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUEL DEMAND MANAGEMENT AT FORWARD-DEPLOYED LOCATIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENERGY INITIATIVES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bishop, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Utah, Readiness Subcommittee ........ 2 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Readiness 

Subcommittee ....................................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Shaffer, Alan R., Acting Director, Defense Research and Engineering, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 3 

Solis, William M., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 39 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P. ..................................................................................... 37 

Shaffer, Alan R. ................................................................................................ 40 

Solis, William M. .............................................................................................. 58 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted for the record.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Dr. Fleming ....................................................................................................... 72 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 71 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 72 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 71 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 71 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 79 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 77 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 81 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUEL DEMAND MANAGEMENT AT FORWARD-DEPLOYED LOCATIONS AND 

OPERATIONAL ENERGY INITIATIVES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 3, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ORTIZ. This hearing will come to order. And I thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing before this subcommittee today 

to discuss energy use and management for military operations. 

This hearing builds upon themes addressed in a hearing this 

subcommittee held last year where we considered the Department 

of Defense (DOD) energy use in the context of recommendations 

made by the Defense Science Board Energy Security Task Force 

and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). That hearing encompassed all of the Department’s energy use, including the energy 

needed for military installations and the energy needed to train for 

and execute military operations. Today’s hearing provides an opportunity to focus on the management of the energy needed for 

military operations and ways to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations. 

In the near future, this subcommittee will also have another opportunity to focus on installations, energy policies, and initiatives. 

This also remains of interest. 

Management of operational energy is an important topic today, 

because we have learned through experience that delivering fuel to 

the battlefield imposes a heavy logistical burden. In fact, fuel logistics represent up to 70 percent of the material the Army ships into 

battle, according to a Defense Science Board report. Forces responsible for providing protection to fuel convoys are put at risk and are 

diverted from other missions. 

Although installations have worked for three decades to improve 

their strategy efficiency, weapons platforms and tactical equipment 

historically have been given a free pass. But reducing operation 

fuel demands can enhance the operational effectiveness of our 

forces and save taxpayers’ dollars. 

Both the Department of Defense and Congress have begun to 

take steps to address operational energy demands. The 2009 De-
2 

fense Authorization Act implements findings of the Defense Science 

Board and GAO by establishing a high-level organizational framework for management of the energy needed for military operations. 

While a nominee has yet to be named, I look forward to working 

with the director of Operational Energy in the future. 

The 2009 Defense Authorization Act also puts into law a Department of Defense initiative to consider fuel logistic support requirements in planning requirements, development and acquisition process the defense feels as a time line for the implementation of this 

effort by October 2011. 

The Department of Defense is developing by working together innovative strategies to enhance the energy efficiency and weapons 

platforms and provide energy solutions for forward-deployed forces, 

and today I look forward to hear more about these efforts today. 

I also look forward to hearing about the findings and recommendations of the GAO who through their work shed additional light on 

fuel demands by forward-deployed forces. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. The chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from Utah, Mr. Bishop, for any remarks that he would like 

to make. Mr. Bishop. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROB BISHOP, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

UTAH, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is indeed a pleasure to be here especially with our two guests who will be testifying 

in just a moment. I look forward to the report as to where we have 

gone. I, like a lot of other people, have a great deal of interest in 

the overall energy issue, especially as it relates to the military. 

Coming from an area where I do, obviously synthetic fuels become 

significant and important. But I understand today we are going to 

simply focus in on the different aspect of that, dealing with simply 

forward deployment. And I am looking forward to that. 

On behalf of Mr. Forbes, who is incapacitated right now and not 

able to get here because of weather conditions, I would ask unanimous consent to have his opening statement placed in the record. 

Mr. ORTIZ. It will be placed into the record. And Mr. Forbes is 

a very dedicated servant of the people; but because of the storm 

that we had, he couldn’t be with us today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Today we have two distinguished witnesses representing the Department of Defense and the Government Accountability Office. We have Mr. Alan Shaffer, Acting Director, Defense 

Research and Engineering, United States Department of Defense; 

and Mr. William M. Solis, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, United States Government Accountability Office. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ prepared testimony will be accepted for the record. 

Mr. Shaffer, we welcome you and Mr. Solis to this hearing today. 

Whenever you are ready, you can begin your testimony today, sir. 
3 

STATEMENT OF ALAN R. SHAFFER, ACTING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Mr. SHAFFER. Thank you, Chairman Ortiz, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the progress the 

Department of Defense has made in energy security for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and civilians, as well as the nation. 

It is important at the outset to frame energy security in a broad 

context. To be sure, the cost of energy affects the overall budget of 

the Department. In fiscal year 2007, the Department spent about 

$13 billion on energy-related programs, up from $11 billion in fiscal 

year 2005. But energy security entails more than just the cost of 

fuel. The logistics of energy resupply affect force security. Energy 

use affects our ability to maneuver and our strategic decisions. 

In the summer of 2006, then- Major General Rick Zilmer, commander of the deployed Marine forces in Al-Anbar Province, Iraq, 

issued a joint urgent operational need (JUON) that said, ‘‘Reducing 

the military dependence on fuel for power generation could reduce 

the number of road-bound convoys. Without this solution, personnel 

loss rates are likely to continue at their current rate.’’ End of quote. 

This JUONs was a wakeup call to the reality of irregular military 

operations. 

In response to the JUONs, the Army Rapid Equipping Force established the Power Surety Task Force to determine what could be 

done to address this need. The task force found that there were few 

turnkey-ready capabilities applicable to the harsh operating conditions at a forward operating base. While maintaining enhanced security awareness, the Department has maintained an overriding 

principle of not subjecting forces to greater risk by prematurely deploying technologies that have not been proven in field testing. 

A little over two years ago, the Department established and operated the Defense Energy Security Task Force, which I have had the 

honor to serve as the executive director. The task force has coordinated the growing energy programs and raised awareness of energy 

issues across the Department. Each military department has established an energy security focal office. 

In total, the Department’s investment in energy security-related projects has grown from requests of about $440 million in fiscal 

year 2006 to $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2009, not including funding 

in the recently passed American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 

which provided $300 million to the Department for energy-related 

research and development (R&D). 

Embedded in this investment are a number of projects specifically focused on either reducing energy demands or increasing energy supply. I will highlight just a few. But I have to point out that 

not all energy solutions are high technology. One of our more effective actions to date has been to insulate deployed facilities using 

spray foam, which yields energy savings reductions of 40 to 75 percent depending upon the environment, compared to noninsulated 

tents. The additional insulation could save as much as 180,000 gallons of fuel per day. 

The three-year Net-Zero Plus Joint Concept Technology Demonstration (JCTD) sponsored by United States Central Command 

to make forward operating bases as energy efficient as possible will 
4 

conclude in 2010. The Net-Zero JCTD will prototype, measure, and 

assess a variety of technologies that could collectively use less energy than they create and be recommended for inclusion in all 

DOD installations and tactical bases. 

The Army’s Tank and Automotive Research and Development 

Center in Warren, Michigan is leading a ground vehicle fuel efficiency demonstrator to test the feasibility and affordability of 

achieving up to 40 percent decreases in fuel consumption in tactical 

vehicles without sacrificing performance or capability. The Air 

Force is developing technologies to increase jet engine efficiency. 

The Navy is testing technology to enhance ship fuel efficiency. 

When you put all of that together, it makes the force more efficient 

for the amount of fuel used. 

We are also exploring the use of renewable energy at forward locations through testing of generators that can be powered by solar 

or wind energy. The hybrid intelligent power generator, also known 

as high power, is demonstrated in quote/unquote intelligent power 

management and the integration of renewable energy technologies 

to reduce fuel and energy consumption in tactical and deployed 

operational environments. 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has re- cently initiated a $100 million program to further develop an affordable algae-based synthetic fuel, with the goal of driving the cost 

to $2 per gallon in 18 months, and allow it to be made locally. 

The Army and Navy are developing and demonstrating compact 

and mobile 10 kilowatt high-temperature fuel cells to power critical 

equipment, including GPS receivers, radio and communications 

equipment, and other deployed electronics. 

DOD has made progress in integrating energy considerations 

into our business processes, requirements development, acquisition, 

and budgeting, and we focused on describing energy operations by 

the return on investment, both financially and in terms of operational capability. For instance, in November 2008, the DOD Acquisition Directive, also known as 5000.2, directed energy costs be 

included in calculations for total ownership costs, to include the 

fully burdened cost of fuel, the cost to deliver fuel the last tactical 

mile. 

Through the Energy Security Task Force, the DOD has developed a DOD Energy Security Strategic Plan, providing a framework for energy management across the enterprise, with four Deputy Secretary of Defense-approved strategic outcomes, they are: 

maintain or enhance operational effectiveness by reducing total 

force energy demands, the subject of our hearing today; increase 

energy strategic resilience by developing alternative or assured 

fuels and energy; three, enhance operational and business effectiveness by institutionalizing energy solutions in DOD planning and 

business processes; and, four, establish and monitor DepartmentWide energy metrics. 

In summary, the DOD has proactively responded to the energy 

challenge. We have initiated numerous demonstrations in other 

projects to reduce consumption and increase assured alternatives 

for our installations and forward-deployed tactical locations. Technologies that make good business sense both financially and operationally are being developed for implementation on a wider scale. 
5 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shaffer can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Solis, whenever you are ready. Good to see you 

again, sir. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. SOLIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SOLIS. Thank you. Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Bishop, 

members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be 

here to discuss DOD’s efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward locations. Of particular interest are those locations not connected to 

local power grids and therefore must rely on fuel-powered generators for electricity. The U.S. military has several hundred such locations in Iraq and Afghanistan today. 

In 2008, DOD supplied more than 68 million gallons of fuel each 

month, on average, to support U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, DOD reported last year that fuel demand for 

these operations is higher than for any war in history. 

While weapons systems such as aircraft, Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected vehicles, and trucks certainly require large amounts of 

fuel, DOD reports that the single largest battlefield consumer is 

generators, which provide power for base support activities. By 

base support activities, I am referring to things such as air conditioning, heating, lighting, refrigeration, and communications, all 

necessary to support the troops that are stationed at these forwarddeployed locations. 

However, transporting large quantities of fuel to forward-deployed locations presents an enormous logistical burden and risk. 

Large truck convoys moving fuel to forward locations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan have encountered enemy attacks, severe weather, traffic accidents, and pilferage. Moreover, the cost of fuel has greatly 

fluctuated over the last several years, and high fuel costs will continue to be of concern. 

Today I will summarize our recent work on fuel demand at forward locations. We are also releasing our full report in conjunction 

with this hearing. First, let me address some of DOD’s ongoing efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward locations. Mr. Shaffer covered some of these in his statement, so I will briefly note three specific efforts. 

A notable effort, as he mentioned, is the application of foam insulation on tents. Applying foam reduces the amount of fuel required 

by generators to provide power to these structures. Demonstrations 

show that the application of foam insulation reduces dust, heat, 

cold and noise, as well as air conditioning requirements. While at 

Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, we were able to see a tented gymnasium that had been foamed. According to camp officials, they 

were able to remove two of the five air conditioning units used to 

cool the gymnasium. This resulted in an estimated fuel savings of 

40 percent and a reduction of indoor temperature from about 95 to 

100 degrees Fahrenheit to about 72 degrees. 
6 

As this example illustrates, foaming tents, in addition to fuel 

savings, also improves the quality of life for troops serving in harsh 

environments. At the time of our review, DOD was pursuing foam 

insulation on a wide-scale basis in Iraq, and had plans to pursue 

this initiative in Afghanistan as well. 

A second effort is the development of microgrids at the forwarddeployed locations. Essentially, this effort consolidates small loads 

on generators by creating groupings of multiple generators. At 

Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, we learned of plans to create such 

microgrids, with the expectation that this effort would improve 

overall energy efficiency and reduce the number of generators that 

operate most of the times of the year. 

Lastly, DOD and the military services have a number of R&D efforts underway. For example, the Air Force Lab has created a renewable energy tent city, a collection of various deployable shelters 

powered by solar and fuel cell generators. There are also DOD efforts to develop more fuel-efficient generators and environmental 

control units. However, since many of these efforts are in the R&D 

stage, the extent to which they will be fielded and under what time 

frame is still uncertain. 

Now I will turn to DOD’s approach to managing fuel at forwarddeployed locations. While the efforts I have highlighted show potential for achieving greater fuel efficiency, DOD still lacks an effective approach to fuel demand at forward-deployed locations. The 

Department recognizes that it needs to reduce its dependence on 

petroleum-based fuel and the logistics footprint of its military 

forces as well as reducing operating costs with high fuel usage. 

However, DOD faces difficulty in achieving these goals because 

managing fuel at forward-deployed locations has not been a departmental priority, and its fuel reduction efforts have not been well coordinated or comprehensive. 

More specifically, our work revealed three shortcomings: 

First, DOD lacks guidance directing forward locations to address 

fuel demand, as well as specific guidelines that incorporate fuel demand reduction and construction, maintenance, and procurement 

policies. DOD generally lacks guidance that directs forward-deployed locations to manage and reduce their fuel demand at the 

Department level, combatant command level, and military service 

level. 

While DOD is driven to address energy issues at U.S. installations, largely by Federal mandates and DOD guidance, agency officials were unable to identify guidance for forward-deployed locations, and they told us that fuel reduction in the past has been a 

low priority compared with other mission requirements. 

Second, DOD lacks incentives and viable funding mechanism for 

locations to invest in fuel reduction initiatives. Officials at Camp 

Lemonier, for example, had identified several projects that would 

reduce camp fuel demand, but they saw little return on investment 

for them to undertake some projects, because they would not see 

the associated savings for other uses toward the camp improvements. Moreover, many of DOD’s forward-deployed locations rely 

heavily on supplemental funding appropriations related to the 

Global War on Terror (GWOT), and delays in receiving this funding 

can present challenges in covering existing costs. 
7 

Third, DOD lacks visibility and accountability within the chain 

of command for achieving fuel reduction. DOD’s current organizational framework does not provide departmental visibility for fuel 

demand at these forward locations. 

We found that the information on fuel demand management 

strategies and reduction efforts is not shared among locations, military services, and across the Department in a consistent manner. 

Moreover, DOD guidance does not designate any DOD office or official as being responsible for fuel demand management at forward 

locations, nor could we identify anybody specifically accountable for 

this function. 

Our report contains several recommendations that we believe can 

help DOD address these issues and provide for a more effective approach to managing fuel demand at forward locations. In this regard, we see important roles for the combatant commands, the 

military services, joint staff, and DOD’s operational energy director, once this individual is named. DOD generally concurred with 

the recommendations in our report. 

Finally, we recognize it may not be practical for DOD to decrease 

fuel usage at every deployed location, and commanders must place 

their highest priorities on meeting mission requirements. However, 

DOD’s high costs, operational vulnerabilities, and logistical burdens in sustaining deployed locations that depend heavily on fuelbased generators underscore the importance for the Department to 

give systemic consideration to incorporating fuel demand into policy decisions for forward-deployed locations. 

The issues surrounding fuel demand take on added significance 

when considering recent developments in Afghanistan. As you 

know, the administration recently announced its intention to boost 

U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, deploying several thousand 

troops above the current levels starting later this spring. Many of 

these troops are likely to be deployed at forward locations, some of 

them remote, that rely extensively on fuel-powered generators, 

which in turn will drive up fuel demands. That will place even 

greater demands on the fuel logistics system, heightening the associated burdens and risks that I described earlier. Therefore, it is 

time for DOD to proactively and systematically manage fuel demand at forward locations. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be happy to 

answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Solis can be found in the Appendix on page 58.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you very much for both of your testimonies. It 

is very enlightening. Not that I am surprised, but I see where we 

really used a lot of fuel, and the thousands of gallons that some 

of this equipment uses. 

And Mr. Shaffer, the GAO report notes that long truck convoys 

moving fuel to forward-deployed locations have encountered enemy 

attacks and severe weather, traffic accidents, and pilferage. As 

DOD begins to increase troop levels in Afghanistan, how will it ensure that fuel delivery challenges will be addressed? And I think 

this is very, very serious, because to add 30,000 more soldiers—and 

this is what we anticipate will happen—now, what steps are being 

planned to decrease fuel demand at forward-deployed locations in 
8 

Afghanistan so that the risk associated with high fuel usage and 

delivery can be reduced? Maybe you can help us understand that 

a little bit better. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. I wish 

I had what would be a better answer for you. What we have found 

as we have gotten into this whole area of deployable energy is that 

a number of the systems don’t work as well as we had hoped that 

they would in a forward-deployed location. So we are still at the 

research and development, and advanced research and development phase. Now, that is not to say that we, the DOD, are making 

the systems, but we have to harden the systems and understand 

how they will operate. And let me give you a case in point, because 

we talked about generators, sir. 

Right now, the Army has a program called Advanced Medium 

Mobile Power Systems. It is their medium-scaled generator. A forward-deployed operating base battalion has about 24 60-kilowatt 

generators deployed with that forward operating base (FOB). No 

one would like to get more efficient generators than we, the Department, would. In fact, the report that you cited from the Defense Science Board showed that under wartime conditions, the 

amount of fuel we use for generators jumps up to about 370 million 

gallons per year for the ground Army alone. 

This Advanced Mobile Power Station, the new generator, will cut 

the energy use between 10 and 20 percent. In a full wartime scenario, we are estimating reducing the fuel used by 52 million gallons. In fact, the program manager for that program is sitting in 

the back here, Colonel Wallace. 

Now, the easy question would be, why don’t we just deploy commercial systems? Because the integrator for this particular generator set is Cummins Manufacturer in Minnesota, and they make 

a pretty good commercial generator. But the commercial generators 

don’t worry about electromagnetic interference. And if we bring the 

generators out to the field and they have a high degree of EMI, 

electromagnetic interference, that could affect the radio communications and other things in the forward operating base. So a lot 

of the little harsh realities of a forward operating base that don’t 

apply to a commercial system apply to some of our forward-deployed locations. 

We are pushing just as hard as we can to develop some of these 

technologies, Mr. Chairman. But, again, we go back to the overriding first principle is we want to make sure that we test things 

so we don’t have unintended consequences that decrease our capability. 

This advanced mobile medium power station or power system is 

being delivered on a fairly accelerated delivery schedule at Aberdeen Proving Grounds starting in June of this year, will go through 

about a one-year full-up test, testing the EMI and other things and 

other operability and conditions, and we look to start fielding these 

systems in 2010, not as fast as we would like to, but we don’t want 

to field systems before we are sure that they won’t cause additional 

problems. That is fundamentally where we are at, sir. 

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, and when we move the 30,000 troops to 

Afghanistan, it is going to be harder to make this delivery. The terrain is different, it is getting a little worse in that area. But how 
9 

soon will it take for you to have some of this equipment that you 

are talking about? I know you say you are going to start sometime 

in June, July testing this equipment. How long do you anticipate 

it will take before you can say, well, this equipment is going to 

work? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, we are going to go on the very fastest test protocol that we can, but I can’t give you a specific time line. They do 

have to make sure that these things work. 

I would like to point out some other things that we are doing. 

We mentioned the spray foam. That was an idea that came out of 

the Power Surety Task Force that started up in response to General Zilmer’s JUONs. We have subsequently moved oversight of the 

Power Surety Task Force under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to work for everybody. And there are plans right now 

to begin spray foaming tents in Afghanistan, and we are just working through the contractual operations of who is going to put the 

spray foam on the tents. But we put spray foam on the tents in 

Afghanistan, and that will reduce the overall heating required or 

the cooling required for our troops in summer and also heating in 

winter. 

It is a fascinating thing, Mr. Chairman. We have the spray foam 

set up and have tested it at Fort Irwin National Military Training 

Center, and I had the opportunity to be out there last August. You 

would go up and touch the side of the tent, and the temperature 

on the skin of the tent was about 130 degrees, 135 degrees in the 

direct sunlight. You would go inside one of these tents that was 

foamed, and the temperature would be about 75 to 80 degrees. 

Now, it is not very often I am looking for a jacket at 75 or 80 degrees; but when you are out in 105 or 110 degrees and you walk 

into something cool, you feel refreshed. 

This is what we have to do for our troops. By spray foaming the 

tents, by bringing the temperature down, by bringing the electric 

demands down, we believe we will give a better fighting force that 

is more refreshed also. So there is a lot of variables at play. 

I can’t tell you exactly when we will have things in place in theater, sir, but we are moving and pushing just as fast as we can to 

get things out there as they are developed, as they work. We accelerated the spray foam in Iraq, and it turned out we had a local contractor who could not perform the mission. That first contract was 

terminated. We are looking to pick up the contract to pick up the 

rest of the tents. But, again, as fast as we can get things out there 

that will hold up, sir, we will get them to the field. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. I would ask a question for Mr. Solis, and 

then I would yield to my good friend Mr. Bishop after my question. 

The GAO report states that DOD lacks a viable funding mechanism for fuel reduction projects at forward-deployed locations. In 

commenting on the GAO draft report, DOD stated that it was not 

convinced financially incentives were the best fuel-reduction strategy for forward-deployed locations. Why does GAO believe that 

funding is an issue, and what are some examples of viable funding 

mechanisms for energy-efficiency projects at forward-deployed locations, Mr. Solis? 

Mr. SOLIS. Thank you for the question. I think what we are talking about there is that a lot of the funding for these installations 
10 

in the forward-deployed locations rely on supplemental funding, 

and some of those priorities don’t necessarily meet up with the 

kinds of investments that you need as we have talked about here 

in terms of other types of more efficient generators, those kinds of 

things. 

The other things, in terms of incentives, in terms of financial incentives—and it is not exactly the same kind of thing. One of the 

things that we talked about is the Navy has a ship program, for 

example, that provides incentives for ship commanders that if they 

make certain improvements, that some of that money can be used 

elsewhere in terms of other ship improvements. So savings then 

can be allocated to other uses on that ship. 

The other thing in terms of a financial mechanism, you know, for 

example, one of the things that we saw related on corrosion 

projects is that this, again, is something where you have something 

that a commander may not put as a priority; but in terms of longterm investment, in terms of saving dollars, that is something 

where we saw if there is a program element, a funding line, a separate funding line, that that commander can draw from without necessarily affecting their mission, I think that goes a long way in 

terms of providing that commander with alternatives for funding 

without necessarily affecting their mission. 

Mr. ORTIZ. My follow-up question would be, I know that we put something like $300 million to do some of this research. Do you 

think that is a sufficient amount of money? Because it seems to be 

that there is going to be a lot of testing different equipment. 

And this is for both of you. Do you think, is that sufficient money 

to do what we want to do so we can keep our soldiers from being 

in harm’s way, to protect them during the winter and during the 

summer? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Chairman Ortiz, first, in the Recovery Act we are very, very pleased to have the $300 million. As we have had the 

Energy Security Task Force in place—and I mentioned that we had 

the senior representatives from each of the services, a focal office— 

we have coordinated that investment, the $300 million across the 

services to try to get the maximum out of it. I can’t tell you if $300 

million is right or is not right. I know that we have $300 million 

of valid, viable projects that will support the Department both in 

reducing our energy demand forward, but also reducing our energy 

demand here at our installations in the continental United States 

(CONUS). 

So there are a number of things that are getting close to being 

developed and close to ready, but not quite there yet. So there will 

be a lot of testing going on. Three hundred million dollars, we 

think we will be able to spend that wisely. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Solis. 

Mr. SOLIS. If I could give you an answer. And I am not going to 

say whether that is the right amount of money; but here I will go 

back to the recommendation that we made in terms of the need for 

a Director of Operational Energy. 

That person would also be involved in looking at, across the 

board, what are the funding requirements that are needed to try 

to deal with some of the issues that we are talking about today? 

Right now, every service is sort of doing their own thing. You don’t 
11 

really have visibility across the board. So I would say that somebody, and hopefully the Director of Operational Energy, once that 

person is named, could be that person that would look across the 

board to see what are the funding requirements. Much like, 

again—and I refer back to what the corrosion office did, is look 

across the board: What makes sense? What are going to provide the 

greatest returns on investment? What is going in this case to reduce our logistics footprint? What is going to take those tankers off 

the road? 

So I would go back and say that until that person is there, I 

think it is going to be very difficult to see, across the board, whether or not $300 million is sufficient, $500 million, or $1 billion, until 

that person is there. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. My good friend, Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. Let me follow up on that individual, that 

person—questions about that, in just a second. But let me start, 

first of all, with Mr. Shaffer. 

In both your testimony as well as Mr. Solis’ testimony, both written and oral, talked about how fuel reduction is a lower priority 

when you are out in the front lines. I can kind of understand that. 

But you also talked about the funding process as a difficulty. And 

I would simply like to say forward-deployment locations are almost 

always funded through supplementals. 

So I guess the question would be, how can DOD ensure these 

kind of energy-efficient programs or projects are going to be adequately resourced when you give the uncertainties that are always 

maintained with supplemental funding for these issues? 

Mr. SHAFFER. That is a very good question, Mr. Bishop. Let me 

start by saying the operational employment of systems will be 

funded by supplemental. But the Department as a whole has recognized over the last couple of years that we have had the task force 

in place that we do need to have—and because of operational concerns, we do need to invest more in developing maturing—and rapidly, by the way, I should say—rapidly maturing technologies to reduce our forward-deployed energy footprint. 

And I know, I read the GAO report about what the Director of 

Operational Energy Plans and Programs would do. 

I will tell you that through the Energy Security Task Force, we 

do have an active running visibility and spreadsheet into what the 

Department is investing for energy security at large. It is about 

$1.3 billion in fiscal year 2009. A large chunk of that—and I can’t 

give you the exact percentage—but a large chunk of that is focused 

specifically on maturing those technologies needed to bring down 

our forward-deployed energy footprint either at a forward operating 

base, or with some of our tactical platforms that move forward. 

So we do have visibility. I think the Department has looked at 

it in the base budget by tripling the base budget investment and 

maturing new technologies in the last three years. And then, when 

it gets to operational employment, there will be some supplemental 

dollars that will help that along. But for things like the advanced 

mobile generator that I was talking about just recently, the Army 

recognized that need and has put it into their program as a program of record. They are scheduled in total to field 67,000 sets beginning late in fiscal year 2010, 2011. And that will be part of the 
12 

standard table-of-equipment allowance to every forward brigade 

team and battalion team. 

So it is a mixture. We are injecting new energy-efficient technology solutions into our force, because it makes our force more 

operationally capable. As far as the incentives to forward-deployed 

troops, that is through supplementals. 

But at the end of the day, the reason the Department came back 

and partially concurred with the GAO finding about incentives and 

financial incentives, forward-deployed troops, the best incentive is 

you have a better fighting force and you have a better chance of 

bringing troops home alive. Operational energy efficiency will give 

that incentive to forward commanders, and that is an incentive 

that money doesn’t begin to match. 

Mr. BISHOP. And I appreciate that last particular point, and obviously that is why the prioritization has to be there. What I guess 

I am hearing from you—and correct me if I am wrong with this— 

is what we are really talking about is not necessarily a systemic 

change in the way money would be allocated in the base, but rather the amounts of money that would be allocated to different line 

items that currently are there. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. I think that is an accurate assessment. 

Mr. BISHOP. On one of those other areas. In the last authorization bill that was passed there was the position of the Director of 

Operational Energy Plans that was required as part of that legislation. Could you just tell me what the status of the Department’s 

efforts are on that particular position? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, that particular position is nominated by the 

President and confirmed at the consent of the Congress. We have 

not gotten down, we the Department have not gotten down to 

nominating that position right now. I can’t tell you where the administration is in their process of nominating that position. I do 

know it reports directly to the Secretary, and it is an important position. But I can’t tell you where we are with regard to that particular nomination right now. 

Mr. BISHOP. But with the change of administration, has the new 

administration signaled its intent to establish that position, or is 

that still not necessarily—has not been decided yet? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, I don’t think that there is any question about 

whether or not the position will be created. It is in law, and therefore the Department will take a look at that. I have heard no one 

say that we, the Department, are not going to create this position. 

Mr. BISHOP. All right. 

Mr. SOLIS. Sir, if I could only add to answer part of your question. I believe Secretary Gates did say or indicate that they were 

going to name somebody for that. 

Mr. BISHOP. Let me ask one last question. And you mentioned 

very briefly as far as the kinds of incentives when you are dealing 

in a forward. How does DOD intend to address the issue of measuring fuel consumption in these forward-deployed locations, which 

once again has to be probably not the number one priority at that 

time, but how do you actually implement and come up with legitimate information and data? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, that is one heck of a question. It is a very good 

question, one I kind of hoped you weren’t going to ask today. 
13 

Mr. BISHOP. All right. I will take my time back and you don’t 

have to do it. 

Mr. SHAFFER. What I will tell you is that in the Energy Strategic 

Security Plan that we have put together, the fourth of the four 

goals was to develop an effective set of metrics for measuring energy use both in garrison and deployed. We are not there yet, sir, 

and that will be a very important task for the new Director of 

Operational Energy Plans. And I would suggest that that would be 

one of the most important things that person could do. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it. 

Mr. ORTIZ. My good friend, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, I think it is very timely what you are doing. We 

had the Transportation Command in just last week, telling us 

about the 10-day transit just through Afghanistan, to get a gallon 

of anything from the port of Karachi to the Afghan border. So I 

think it is very timely. 

A couple questions. Whose job is it on a base or in a region, 

whose job is it to try to minimize the amount of fuel that is used, 

without affecting operational capabilities? I am very, very impressed with your 26 million gallons per month just with the generators. I was wondering if you have further broken that down. For 

example, how much of that electrical capacity is used to heat 

water? Do you have any idea? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, I do not have that particular. Let me take that 

for the record and go back and see if we can find that out. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 71.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. The reason I am asking is I think I supplied you 

gentlemen or someone at the GAO with products that are commonly available in the private sector used extensively on boats, 

where they use the radiator cooling fluid, the heat that is generated in that engine, to both heat water and to heat spaces. And 

I realize that the water is a lot easier to transport through pipes 

than it is that warm air. But I would imagine a pretty significant 

amount of the energy that is used is heating water during the wintertime in Iraq and Afghanistan where most Americans don’t realize it gets pretty doggone cold out there. So I was curious if anyone 

has looked into that, because that is existing technology about 

Raritan and other companies. 

The second thing is, do you actually have a statistic as far as fuel 

demand per GI? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, if I can, first, let me on the first point that you 

have made—and I will make this pledge to you. In going through 

some of the background material for this hearing, I came across the 

bullet that said that last year you had asked about, I think, about 

the heat exchanger. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Right. They use a heat exchanger for water, a radiator-type device for heating a space. 

Mr. SHAFFER. I do not know that anybody has done that. What 

I will pledge to you, sir, is we will have the Power Surety Task 

Force take a look at that and see how that could fit into our NetZero Joint Capability Technology Demonstration and some of the 

other testing things, and we will give it a fair hearing. 
14 

Mr. TAYLOR. I want a specific response to what percentage of 

that is used to heat water. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Because I am guessing it is significant. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. We will find that information out. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 71.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. And I would like a specific response. I came to a calculation of about 18 gallons per GI per day. Is that anywhere 

near—that would be total force divided into total gallons. Total deployed force divided by total gallons. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. I think that I have seen different figures 

ranging anywhere from about 8 gallons per deployed force member 

up to around 18. So depending on how you look at it, somewhere 

in that range. But, again, this gets back to the questions by Mr. 

Bishop. We don’t have the right set of metrics right now to fully 

understand the problem. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, going back to my question. And the very real, 

not just the trucks that are lost, not just the fuel that was lost, but 

to the best of my knowledge thus far, 135 drivers who have been 

killed just transiting Pakistan. This is very real. If you can reduce 

the number of trucks on the road, you are reducing casualties. 

So the question is, whose job is it, within the restraints of an 

operational zone where combat comes first, whose job is it to try 

to reduce that demand in a way that does not diminish the combat 

effectiveness of that forward operation location? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. At the end of the day, it is always the 

commander’s job. And that is why Major General Zilmer sent out 

the JUONs. 

The actual fuel handling is done by the logistician. And there is 

the combination of operational commanders, the G4s, the J4s, the 

civil engineers, and the Defense Energy Supply Center. But the 

specific—at the end of the day, sir, the specific responsibility is 

with the deployed commander. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Who in the DOD, as different vendors come to us 

and say, I have got something, this oil additive, this fuel additive 

will improve your productivity, who in the DOD actually tests 

those products to see if they are for real? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, it depends upon the specific technology. But 

the fuel additive is—we have actually turned some of those pieces 

and some of those fuel additives over to the Tank Automotive Engineering Research Development Engineering Center at Warren, 

Michigan, and they actually have a cell there that tests some of 

those fuel additives to see if they work, if they work over a long 

period of time, if they foul the equipment at all. And that is the 

right place, because that particular center is then looking to inject 

those particular capabilities into our ground fleet. 

Within the Navy, the testing is done primarily over at the Naval 

Ship Center, Carderock, or Navy Research Laboratory. 

So we do have people who do test the various pieces of equipment, but it would vary depending upon which gear it is. 

If you ever have any questions, sir, you can go ahead and have 

your staff send it to me, and we will make sure that someone takes 

a hard look at it; because if we can deploy something—you men-
15 

tioned 135 soldiers killed. If we can deploy something that will 

save one American’s life—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, clarification. Those were contract drivers. 

Mr. SHAFFER. It doesn’t matter. An American is an American 

first. 

Mr. TAYLOR. They are still human beings. 

Mr. SHAFFER. So if we can reduce casualties in any way, sir, that 

is something we are pledged to do. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Ms. Shea-Porter. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a question, please, about the Tactical Garbage to Energy 

Refinery. Two units were deployed in May of 2008 I think for a 90- 

day demonstration and pilot program. Could you please update us 

about how that turned out? Was it successful? And, if so, are we 

going to see more of that? Obviously that helps where we don’t 

have to have as many convoys who are going to be having to transport garbage. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, ma’am. I wish I could tell you that they had 

worked as well as advertised. They did not. We deployed them, as 

you said, for 90 days. The goal was to operate this system for 20 

hours a day at a forward operating base with a battalion. We made 

the assumption that it would be 4 pounds of trash per person per 

day, 500 people deployed, so that would be about a ton of fuel a 

day, or a ton of trash. That ton of trash should have turned into 

100 gallons of JP–8, which would fuel a 60-kilowatt generator for 

20 hours. Unfortunately, the harsh operational forward setting, we 

couldn’t get that many hours a day out of that particular rig. We 

were only getting on order sometimes four to six hours a day of operation before the dust and dirt and everything would cause it to 

stop operating. 

What I can tell you is that we did see promise. And, in fact, we 

have seen promise in these garbage-to-energy converters in fixed 

locations. So, actually, on February 18 and 19 at Aberdeen Proving 

Grounds, the Army called together a group of people to take a look 

at how do we move to the next step? How do we harden some of 

these—they are called tactical garbage-to-energy refinery (TGER) 

systems—so they can be deployed and actually reduce some of our 

energy demand? 

Now, at a forward-operating base, we looked at operating one 60- 

kilowatt generator basically per day. A battalion size FOB has 

about 24 generators per day of that size. So it is going to be just 

a small reduction, but it does other things. Instead of producing energy, if we can get rid of a ton of trash a day and turn it into something useful, that is very important, because that increases the security of our forces. We don’t have to use our forces or contracted 

forces in guarding trash. We don’t have to have them doing the security details. 

So there are so many operational advantages. And it goes back 

to our primary principle: We want to deploy anything we can that 

gives us energy efficiency, provided we at least maintain our operational capability. Garbage to energy, that particular system would 

increase our capability. 
16 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And will you put more money, more R&D 

money into that? 

Mr. SHAFFER. I have to see if this is an R&D or an engineering 

problem, ma’am, so I do not know. Let me take that for the record 

and go back and talk with the team who pulled together at Aberdeen. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I would appreciate that. And I yield back. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Good afternoon, gentlemen. I appreciate your being 

here today. 

Mr. Shaffer, just a couple numbers I had written down, and I am 

not sure I got them correctly. The total amount of money we spend 

on fuel per year, the Department of Defense? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, which year? Because of the escalating costs, 

we have been all over the place. The last full year we have numbers for is 2007; and in 2007, we spent about $13 billion. 

Mr. KISSELL. That was the number I had written down. Now, I 

wrote down also $1.3 billion in research for alternative energy. Was 

that the right number? 

Mr. SHAFFER. It is more than alternative energy, sir. It is $1.3 

billion in energy security-related projects across the Department. 

That involves also doing some of our installation research and testing. So it is alternative fuels, platforms, and installations. 

Mr. KISSELL. And I know this question is going into, instead of— 

I know the fluctuations in how much energy cost. But the overall 

amount of energy, the fuel that we are using just in gallons or 

whatever measure we use, is it holding steady? Is it going up significantly? Or have any of these improvements started bringing it 

down? 

Mr. SHAFFER. The last year we have good numbers for, sir, is 

2007. And, basically, in about the last five to seven years we have 

had about a six percent decline in overall energy use in the Department. 

At our installations, the decline has been even more dramatic. So 

we have declined even more. So even though we have been forward 

deployed fighting a war, right now our energy use is slowly coming 

down. 

Mr. KISSELL. Do we have any goals in that regard toward what 

we are trying to get it down to? 

Mr. SHAFFER. No specified goals. On the installation side, sir, we 

do. We have the published goals of the Energy Security Act and 

other things. So we do have goals on the installation side. 

We don’t have any firm goals on the tactical side, and we could 

be criticized for that, but it becomes very difficult on the tactical 

side because so much is dependent upon the type of operation you 

are employing, how much maneuver you are doing, what situation, 

where you are deployed. Deploying to Iraq and air conditioning 

tents in summer takes a lot more energy than deploying to someplace where it is a temperate region. So I would like to tell you we 

have good metrics, sir, but we do not. We probably need to get better metrics. But we don’t have specified goals other than down. 
17 

Mr. KISSELL. How close or what do we need to do start getting 

those better metrics, because that is something you mentioned 

three or four times. 

Mr. SHAFFER. I honestly think, and I mentioned this earlier in 

my remark to Mr. Bishop, I believe that getting a good set of 

metrics that help us understand the situation should be one of the 

higher priorities of the new Director of Operational Energy Plans. 

That is in the statute. It is a very, very important step to improving our overall capacity and capability in the Department. Short of 

that, the development of metrics will be pretty much at the joint 

staff level, and they are unfortunately right now extremely busy. 

Mr. KISSELL. I would agree with you. Mr. Solis, you had mentioned that we lacked—maybe having this as a priority for energy 

efficiency, maybe we lacked guidance in how to come about this, 

and in listening to you guys talk today, I find myself the mixture 

of excitement at the possibilities of improvement and the mixture 

of frustration that maybe we don’t have the guidance. Do we need 

that Director to get the guidance, or is that something that could 

come from somewhere else? 

Mr. SOLIS. One of the recommendations that we made is that 

there does need to be better guidance that is provided by the combatant commanders. Mr. Taylor asked about who was in charge, 

and right now there really is no guidance that comes down from 

a combatant commander that talks about reducing energy fuel demands at forward locations. That is across the board. And there is 

also nothing there in terms of the military services in terms of fostering that kind of look-see. So I think there is that lack of guidance, and I think that is something that as a starting point would 

help improve the management and emphasis in priority that has 

looked at fuel demands at forward locations. 

I would also mention to you, we talked a little, or you mentioned 

a little, about metrics as well. I would also offer first off what you 

need to do in terms of not only goals is to look at, and what we 

tried to do in our report, is what is actually happening at some of 

these foreign locations. Not surprisingly, if you look at Bagram, a 

lot of the fuel goes towards air and weapons systems. But if you 

look at a lot of the other locations that we looked at in Djibouti and 

Iraq, a lot of that—and when I say a lot, more than 50 percent, 

sometimes 60, 70 percent is going towards base operations. So I 

think if you look at how, where you are burning your fuel, how you 

are burning your fuel, I think that then can also help you decide 

what investments you are going to make. 

So I think you need guidance. You need to understand what you 

are doing at these locations so then you can better tailor what your 

investment approach would be. 

Mr. KISSELL. And one last question, and it goes to what you just 

said. If I read through this correctly, the Air Force and our aviation 

uses the majority of our fuels; is that correct? 

Mr. SOLIS. That is correct. 

Mr. KISSELL. And we have been talking about a lot of forwardbased ideas. So it would seem in what you just said that if the Air 

Force is using the majority of the fuels in operational bases, do we 

have kind of meaningful programs there for reducing and improving, and is that working? 
18 

Mr. SOLIS. Let me go back. Certainly the Air Force is burning a 

lot of fuel, it uses a lot of fuel. But as I mentioned before, if you 

go to look at some of these forward-operating locations, the predominant use of fuel is for base operations, not necessarily for the 

weapons systems or for the aircraft. 

I believe that the Air Force is looking into different things in 

terms of I think there is a synfuel initiative that they have; there 

are other things that they are doing, as far as I understand, to try 

to reduce their use of fuel. They have just come out with a strategic 

plan. We haven’t evaluated it. But there are other things that they 

are trying to do in terms of looking at the weight of their aircraft, 

flying direct distances and a number of other things. I don’t know 

if Al has any more information, but they have come out with a 

strategic plan to look at how they reduce their fuel consumption in 

their aircraft. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. And let me take a very short answer at 

your question, also. 

Because the Air Force uses more energy, more fuel than our 

other services, they recognized, I think, a little bit ahead of the 

other services the need for energy security. So the Air Force has 

been serious about this business for the last three to four years. 

They have a number of projects, in addition to the synfuel project, 

to increase their energy efficiency. They are looking at—and this 

is going to sound silly—they are looking at winglets on the ends 

of some of their transporting aircrafts. Those are, if you look out 

at your commercial aircraft—those are the struts that go up. Well, 

under certain circumstances winglets can increase your energy efficiency, your mileage, by 10 percent. That is significant. We have 

to test it to make sure it doesn’t cause any capability loss for some 

of our fighting force. But the Air Force is serious about that. 

The Air Force has also recast their turbine engine research program. It used to be known—I have to throw out these acronyms 

only because otherwise they clog up my brain. It used to be known 

as IHPTET, Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine Technology program. The point of IHPTET was to increase your thrust 

to weight. That has been changed to a program called VAATE, 

Versatile Affordable Accelerated Turbine Engine. The whole point 

of VAATE is to get 25 to 30 percent more energy efficiency out of 

our turbine engines, and we are accelerating that along with looking at some the core engine technologies to give us better energy 

efficiency, a better capability to operate in a high bandpass mode. 

And the Air Force really looks like they are on the verge of making 

some breakthroughs in turbine engines. That would be great for 

the nation because the Air Force is doing this with commercial vendors, our aircraft engines, and that would be good for our industry 

also. So I think the Air Force is making some progress, sir. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Ms. Giffords. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate you holding this hearing, and to the gentlemen who are testifying today, I think this is one of the most important, perhaps one 

of the most insightful hearings we are probably going to have all 

year. 

A couple of questions, and, of course, this is couched in the fact 

that 80 percent of the energy that is used by our Federal Govern-
19 

ment is used by the Department of Defense. The vast majority of 

that is used for operational activities, and 94 percent of that is petroleum fuels. So getting this right, we have the ability not just to 

revolutionize the Federal Government, but certainly our country, 

industry and the planet. 

One of the things that struck me was in the report, and this is 

from Mr. Solis, that cited the Department’s lack of established incentives or a viable funding mechanism for investing in the fuelreduction projects. The Department in its official line said they are 

not convinced that financial incentives represents the best strategy 

to reduce fuel usage. 

When I think about how much money that we are spending on 

contractors, is this something that could be perhaps used under existing or future logistics contracts in terms of getting them to move 

towards energy consumption? 

Mr. SOLIS. Again, I don’t know that you need separate contracts. 

I think what we were talking about there in terms of like funding 

mechanism or incentives, first a funding mechanism, again, there 

is nothing—there is not a separate line; it mostly, from our view, 

is mostly supplemental. 

Again, the forward locations now that we are talking about, if 

you do look at the installation side here in CONUS, there are a lot 

of funding mechanisms. There are things in the military construction (MILCON) budget that allow for energy improvements in 

terms of looking at how you can get returns on investment and 

save fuel or reduce fuel and energy demands. There may be some 

other means of doing that. I am not sure necessarily by contracting 

you necessarily have to do it, but what there has to be certainly 

is something out there that says here are the priorities of the Department, here is what we are going to fund, here is how we are 

going to do it. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. I would be interested in working with members 

of the committee specifically to talk about why it is that we have 

not heard from the Obama administration about implementing section 902 from the last Defense Authorization Act, because I think 

having this coordinator could be really a key position for us. And 

so if we could talk later on that, Mr. Chairman. 

Following the lines what was talked about in Mr. Shaffer’s beginning comments about the ESKIMO spray program, this seems to 

be like a total no-brainer. Obviously it works; what, 40 to 70 percent conservation or energy reduction. Why is it that we are not 

immediately expanding this to all temporary facilities, permanent 

facilities and even bases here? I come from southern Arizona. It 

gets to be 110, 120 degrees. It seems to me we should be using this 

foam everywhere. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Thank you, ma’am. The first answer is, we are reinitiating the contract in Iraq and looking to do it, a contract, in 

Afghanistan. So I think that we are cleaning up the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. 

The other answer is why aren’t we doing this everywhere here? 

You know, that is a very good question. Now, there is a mechanism 

to do this, because I have done the return-on-investment calculations, and these types of things will pay for themselves fairly quickly. Under the Energy Conservation Investment Program, ECIP, the 
20 

local base commander has the opportunity to work with a commercial firm to go ahead and make those changes locally, because at 

the end of the day, a local base commander pretty much owns their 

base facility. We have made the information available to them. We 

meet in a senior energy forum with the leaders of each of the services. I can take back specifically your comments to both the Air 

Force and the Army. I don’t know if you have any Navy bases in 

Arizona, but I can take it back directly to the Air Force and Army 

and ask that question directly of them. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 71.] 

Ms. GIFFORDS. And not just in Arizona; obviously everywhere, 

but specifically in areas that make the most sense, even those 

areas that have a climate similar to Iraq and Afghanistan. It seems 

to me if we get this right here, obviously we can deploy that technology more easily. 

And following up, you had talked about the TGER program. 

There is also that transportable hybrid electric power station. Solar 

is big in Arizona. Can you talk about some of the successes of that? 

I understand that there was a program that was tested. It was 

tested at one point, but then during the GAO study it was determined that it was not ready for deployment in Iraq. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, ma’am. The TTHES program, the Tactical 

High Energy—the Tactical Transportable High Energy System 

(TTHES) had some wonderful technology and would have worked 

very, very nicely in a fixed location. When you get to packaging it 

up and taking it apart, the system just didn’t hold up to the rigors 

of packaging and deployment. 

So we have the Power Surety Task Force, and, by the way, that 

particular program spun off a four- to five-year development program called HI–Power, where we are looking at ruggedizing those 

technologies that we can and getting them out as fast at possible. 

The TTHES also gave rise to the Joint Capability Technology 

Demonstration Net-Zero Project, which includes transportable and 

tactical solar powers. And it is fascinating because I have seen this 

whole group come along to where they were just kind of almost 

jury-rigged type of solar panels to now we are almost able to roll 

them out in a fabric. Again, we are not there yet, but we are getting very close. And the manufacturing capability for solar firms is 

stepping up to try to give us a more rugged and viable capability. 

And if I can go back to one question you asked earlier about the 

spray foaming. We really stumbled upon that, the Power Surety 

Task Force, and deployed it to Fort Irwin. Now, as we bring it to 

Fort Irwin, we are bringing through the battalions and brigades 

that are going over to Iraq. Those soldiers and commanders are 

seeing the value of spray foaming, and they are bringing it back 

to their location. So I think this is a technology that will grow because it works. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. One final question, Mr. Chairman. Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds were used in nearly 

two dozen projects in Iraq. Did you have a chance, Mr. Solis, during your investigation to determine whether or not they worked, either personally or anecdotally? Do we have good information about 
21 

how those dollars unrolled and what type of technology exactly was 

used? 

Mr. SOLIS. I am sorry, did you say CERP funds? We have done 

some work on that, but I am not familiar with that. I would probably have to take that for the record, if I could. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Shaffer. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Ma’am, I will do the same thing. I will take that 

one for the record because I don’t have that data with me. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 71.] 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Chairman, obviously the potential here is tremendous, and I just want to make sure that with the new administration we are working together to take this technology—when you 

look at the numbers, it is astounding. We should be able to make 

sure that particularly with the solar, which is becoming more and 

more cost-effective, that we are putting it in Iraq and Afghanistan 

and making it as easy to use as possible. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I appreciate your comments. Sometimes we look at 

ammunition and body armor, but I think this is a very, very important issue that we have to address. If you don’t have the fuel, you 

can’t protect our soldiers by not utilizing the airplanes or the helicopters. You are right. This has been very, very interesting. But let 

me yield to the gentleman from Maryland Mr. Kratovil. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, let me just tell you one of the most difficult 

things getting used to as a former prosecutor is waiting to answer 

these questions. It is always nice when it is a smaller group. So 

thank you. 

Mr. Solis, let me start with you, if I may. I know the report gives 

five recommendations. What we seem to come back to throughout 

these questions is the importance of naming this Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs. I know that is not listed. 

Would you agree that of all the things that we could move forward 

on, that that would be the most significant in really making 

progress on this issue? 

Mr. SOLIS. I think it is one thing, and we actually did make that 

recommendation in our previous report, but I would also mention, 

as we said in our report, this report, that there still needs to be 

some guidance that is coming down from the combatant commanders on down so that people understand what the requirements are for forward location not only just in terms of saying that 

it needs to be put in there, but what are the construction standards 

that folks are going to look to, what are the living standards? All 

these kind of things have to be part of that guidance that comes 

down from the combatant commander. 

But having said that, there still needs—the Operational Director 

still is an important position that needs to be filled. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. I guess my question is you are talking about guidance. My question is where does that guidance come from? And I 

am going to go to that first recommendation. 

Mr. Shaffer, what do you see as the major obstacles, practical 

considerations that are obstacles to carrying out that first recommendation in terms of the combatant commanders? 
22 

There was some pushback, and I am asking what are your practical objections to it. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Let me make sure that I answer the question that 

you wanted to have answered. You wanted to know, sir, what, we, 

the Department, think the first thing that the Director of Operational Energy Plans should do to be effective in issuing the guidance. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. No. What I am asking is the first recommendation 

is to direct the combatant commanders in consultation with the 

military service component commands to establish requirements for 

managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations within their 

areas of responsibility. My question is do you see any practical 

problems with that recommendation? 

Getting back to sort of where is this guidance coming from? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. And I am thinking, because I will give you 

a partial answer, sir, but at the end of the day, this is really one 

that has to go back and be addressed to the combatant commanders and the joint staff, because they set the operational guidance. 

I think that one of the things that the Department has to weigh, 

and we have weighed this very carefully as we have gone forward 

with the Energy Security Task Force, is there is a number of wonderful opportunities out there in the energy security realm. But 

again, and I have said this a couple of times, we have to come back 

to the very first principle of energy security. We have been very, 

very conscious within the Department not to rush to deploy something that would cause degradation in our operational capabilities 

or fighting force. And I think that that will be part of the dynamic 

that will go out in issuing the guidelines, because it would be very 

easy for someone to say as a combatant commander, thou shalt go 

out and reduce energy consumption by such and such a percentage, 

and make that a directive. But when you are out in an operational 

setting, the commander has to have the flexibility to do everything 

they can to protect our forces. 

So that is going to be a very difficult dynamic, and we are going 

to have to take some time working through that with the operational commanders. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Mr. Solis. 

Mr. SOLIS. I am not sure that we would necessarily advocate saying that the mission doesn’t take precedence. I think what we are 

saying is you need to understand that right now there is nothing 

out there to guide the base commanders on how to deal with reducing fuel demands at forward locations. What we have talked about 

today in many cases are individual initiatives that base commanders unto themselves sort of take up. But again, there is nothing out there in terms of when a unit or a commander goes out 

there and first establishes a base, how do I go about doing this in 

terms of trying to make sure I am accomplishing my mission, but 

also reducing fuel demands? 

And, by the way, I think they go hand in hand, particularly, 

again, as we talk about Afghanistan. You have to look at reducing 

fuel demands because that is going to affect how you do your operation. And until that happens, and until there is better guidance, 
23 

I think, that comes down, I think it is going to continue to be an 

issue for the Department until they begin to deal with this. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am intrigued by this foaming. It has not been deployed yet, it 

is still experimental; is that correct? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Dr. Fleming, it actually has been deployed in Iraq, 

and we have got through roughly 50 percent of the total amount 

of tentage that we wanted to foam. The problem we ran into was 

the performance of the contractor. So the Army went out and 

novated that first contract and are looking to recompete it. At the 

end of the day, and I don’t have the figures with me handy, we can 

get those to you as part of the record, we are foaming a large majority of the tents at forward-operating bases in Iraq. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 72.] 

Dr. FLEMING. Do you foam the entire structure, or is it just the 

tiny openings? And also, when you take the tent down, do you just 

remove the foam, and you can refoam later? How does that work? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, the process of foaming takes away the possibility of taking it down. You actually spray-foam the entire tent, 

and, in fact, we can get some pictures to you. It comes in various 

thicknesses that actually go over the entire tent superstructure. 

You keep, of course, the windows open, the doors open, but other 

than that, the entire tent is foamed. 

Now, again, if you go back to the return on investment, if you 

are going to have tents up in a place for a long period of time, the 

amount of energy you save very, very quickly pays for that tent. 

So it becomes a return on investment, in addition to giving your 

troops a much better environment in which to live. 

Dr. FLEMING. It makes a tent more or less disposable then? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. 

Dr. FLEMING. But, as you say, the cost is offset by the energy 

savings. So that is great. 

With regard to saving energy, that is really what this hearing is 

all about. What is a major impetus for saving energy? Is it cost? 

Is it logistics? Does it make it easier to deploy out in the field? 

What are sort of the, I guess, priorities of that strategy? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, that is a wonderful question, and it is a very 

complex question, and it is one I am not going to answer directly. 

Energy security is so complex, but everywhere you turn, there is 

a benefit to the Department. And I will give you a little anecdote. 

When we brought the operational goals to then-Deputy Secretary 

England, our first goal said something along the lines of, reduce 

energy use while maintaining operational capability. He actually, 

the Deputy Secretary, turned that bullet into saying, increase operational efficiency by increasing your energy efficiency. So you actually get operational capability enhancement by increasing your energy efficiency. 

But you also have force security issues because you don’t have 

to have the long convoys. You have operational issues. And at the 

end of the day, energy will affect us strategically also with our 

dealing with other countries, because you have to take a look at we 
24 

have talked a couple of times about Afghanistan: What do we have 

to do strategically in that part of the world to make sure that we 

can continue oil flowing to our troops and forces in Afghanistan? 

And that affects the dynamic of our operational capabilities. So 

what is more important, strategic operational capability and lives? 

Money? They are all very, very important. 

Dr. FLEMING. One more question. You know, a lot of great technologies that we use every day came out of military and also space 

requirements. And so my question is, how much of what you are 

doing is off the shelf, and how much of it is still sort of an experimental thing as we go forward? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. Most of what we are finding and most of 

what we are developing, with the exception of some of the advanced alternative fuels, is really just engineering and ruggedizing 

commercial off-the-shelf products. I talked about the generators 

that the Army is doing a wonderful job fielding for us earlier. We 

are using effectively commercial generators being bought from 

Cummins Corporation in Minnesota. But there are certain requirements, ruggedization and shielding requirements, so you don’t have 

electromagnetic interference that are absolutely vital to military 

applications. So we are taking commercial systems and modifying 

them or engineering them. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also thank you for 

hosting this hearing and for holding this hearing. 

I want to go back to the Tactical Garbage to Energy Program, 

which, of course, turns garbage into energy. And I believe, Mr. 

Shaffer, that you indicated that there were positive results from 

that program; is that correct? 

Mr. SHAFFER. I would say, sir, that they were promising results, 

not necessarily positive results, because it didn’t work quite as well 

as we would have wanted it to. But there is a very, very good 

promise of the future as we harden and ruggedize the TGER. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What leads you to take that assessment that it is 

a—it is something that—your word is different from mine, but I 

will say a positive result. I mean, is that fair to say, a positive result? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But there are some bugs that need to be worked 

out? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What are those, by the way? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Rather than give you some false information, let 

me take that for the record, sir, because there was, as I said, a 

workshop that was just held less than two weeks ago at Aberdeen 

Proving Grounds where the experts got together, and I don’t have 

all the specific information right now. I know that it dealt with the 

amount of time between when the system went down, how the system handled dust, steady flow of garbage. But let me get the specifics for you, sir, and get that back to you. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right, please do. 
25 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 72.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Are those two units deployed to Iraq still in operation at this time? 

Mr. SHAFFER. I do not believe so, but let me verify that and get 

that back to you. I don’t know for a fact. I think we brought them 

back home. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 72.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Was there any way during the time period that 

these units were in use that you were able to determine the costeffectiveness of this program versus leaving it the way that it has 

always been? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, I don’t know. And again, I will take that for 

the record and get that back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 72.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Solis, do you have an opinion on any of those 

questions that I asked? 

Mr. SOLIS. Again, we looked at a number of these different 

projects, and as we noted, and as Mr. Shaffer noted, a lot of these 

are still in the R&D phase, and more work needs to be done in 

terms of looking at the viability of some of these projects or initiatives and technologies before they deploy. And that is all I could 

really offer on it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Do both of you believe that we should extend 

this pilot project, or should we expand it, or should we simply ignore it? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, as evidenced by the fact that we had a fairly 

significant group of folks get together at Aberdeen Proving 

Grounds, I don’t think that we want to abandon this project. Even 

if it doesn’t solve the energy issues that we face, it will help. Even 

if it doesn’t solve the energy issues that we face, the additional 

force security applications of being able to turn trash into oil are 

pretty significant, because right now the only thing that we can do 

with trash at our bases are burn it in a pit, which we don’t like 

to do; hire people to carry it away, which increases our force security demands; or go ahead and bury it ourselves, which we don’t 

like to do. So none of the current options are as good as turning 

some of this garbage into oil. So if we can do it in any way that 

is cost-effective, it would be—it would make no sense not to. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And let me ask this question: Are there plans to 

incorporate renewable battery cell technology into Department of 

Defense’s efforts to reduce its reliance upon petroleum-based fuels? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. The bulk of our work right now in renewable batteries and fuel cells are more at the smaller end scale, because when we send dismounted infantry out on a long-duration 

mission right now, sometimes we are loading those kids up with 30 

to 40 pounds of batteries. We are focusing on them the small end 

of the batteries right now because that appears to be where the 

technology is most mature. We have some small efforts into larger 

fuel cells and larger batteries for things like submarines, but that 

technology seems to be a little bit further off. So right now, sir, we 
26 

are really focused on the dismounted infantry and individual battery end. 

Mr. JOHNSON. One last question, Mr. Chairman. Since we do 

have what I would consider to be landfills, in other words since we 

do bury our—some of our trash and garbage, that begins to break 

down, and methane gas is formed. Do we have any plans to instead 

of burning off that—instead of burning off that methane gas to be 

able to convert that methane gas into energy? 

Mr. SHAFFER. I am not aware of any, but let me check on that 

and get back to you. I have not heard of that discussed. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 72.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Shaffer, I am a Certified Public Accountant by background. 

Would you give me your definition of cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness? 

Mr. SHAFFER. In the use that I was using it, it is strictly a financial thing. It is how much does the thing cost, how much can be 

saved, and how quickly can it pay for itself. So that is why you do 

the cost-benefit analysis, but you also have to keep the operational 

considerations out there separately; how does it improve our force 

structure? 

Mr. CONAWAY. Does that play a role in the decisionmaking process at all? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Oh, yes, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. On the foam tent, you said it pays for itself within 

a certain period of time. Does that take into consideration the full 

life cycle of the foam tent? In other words, the fact that you have 

got to haul new tents to the battlefield when you move; you have 

got significant disposal issues, I suppose, of that foam and that tent 

that you wouldn’t have if you just had the tent and kept moving 

it around; is your concept of cost-benefit analysis the full life cycle 

of the issue? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, it would, but understand that most of the 

places that we are foaming right now are fairly fixed forward-operating bases. They are places where we have folks and have had 

folks for some period of time. So it is not like—and I remember this 

very well when I was on Active Duty. I was in the Air Force, but 

I was assigned to the Army. We would move every 24 hours. That 

is not the situation we are finding ourselves right now. We are 

going out in widely dispersed bases, and they are setting up for 

some period of time. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So the answer is no? 

Mr. SHAFFER. The answer is no, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So the extra hauling it around, extra fuel in hauling it over to Iraq and that kind of stuff, that wouldn’t be figured 

into in your cost-benefit. 

Where in the system do we decide that the efforts to save fuel, 

as an example, degrades our ability to do the job? Who gets to 

make that decision? And what kind of flexibility do they have of 

not doing the fuel-saving technique because we can’t get the job 

done? Where is that decision made? 
27 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, it is always the operational commander’s prerogative, and first and foremost in any of this energy security stuff, 

and I go back to what we said, the primary rule or principle for 

energy efficiency and energy security is that within the Department it will not come at operational—degradation of operational capability. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I appreciate that comment. 

We have talked a lot ad nauseam about this trash-to-fuel thing. 

One of the issues in any fight is the ratio of folks who are actually 

pulling the triggers versus that long line of folks behind them that 

make sure they have all the stuff they need. Is the increased supply logistics chain that is driven by much of these new things, is 

that taken into consideration in the cost-benefit analysis and 

whether or not we would deploy that? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, I don’t think we have matured to the point 

where I can give you an answer yes or no. I would say no right 

now. But, you know, right now we are in the process, the combatant commander wants the capability, and we do everything we can 

to provide that capability forward. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Is that something that, as we make these decisions, that the system ought to examine? In other words, if we can 

do this whiz bang, eco-friendly deal, but it takes 15 extra guys to 

do that, is the decision whether or not to move forward with the 

whiz bang deal, the added people, shouldn’t that have a piece of the 

decisionmaking process of the extra supply chain that is created by 

that? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. But at the end of the day, those decisions 

would be made by the operationally deployed commander. We don’t 

push anything into theater that the commander of Central Command or Multinational Force Iraq or Multinational Force or Operation Enduring Freedom wants, so it is always basically the commander, the operational commander, approves everybody coming in 

and out of their theater of operations. 

Mr. CONAWAY. It is not a far stretch, though, from setting these 

standards to then evaluating that commander against those standards and whether or not he or she gets promoted based on those 

kinds of things. 

You missed a couple of evaluation centers. Mr. Taylor came up 

with an idea of some sort of a fuel additive. Are those evaluation 

centers proactive in looking for off-the-shelf new stuff that is coming out? We have great confidence in the inventors in this country 

coming up with all kinds of stuff. Do they have a piece of what they 

do? Is somebody trying not to miss the obvious and folding that 

into their system as opposed to waiting? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, I would like to tell you we are better at horizon scanning and technology scouting than we are. The bottom line 

is that most of those people who are doing the testing are pretty 

well fully employed, and we have people out looking for technologies. But I won’t tell you we are beating down the bushes for 

them. We have more than enough stuff that is sent to us already. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
28 

Just to follow up a little bit on Mr. Conaway’s last question, I 

would guess that you are viewed by the industry out there that is 

creating new technology, trying to make us more energy-efficient, 

as a prime buyer, and that that industry is beating down your 

doors really if they come up with ideas. And they are looking for 

a platform where development of their idea might be paid for 

through tax dollars, and they get to keep the patent and then eventually be able to sell to the private sector. It just seems to me a 

no-brainer that they would be coming to you. Who do they go to, 

by the way? Who is it that they typically approach? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, if it is research and development, they will either come in ultimately into my office, or they will come into one 

of the science and technology (S&T) executives of the services. So 

we have S&T execs of each of the services. We have my office—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. I would imagine you all receive people with open 

arms in hope that, in fact, they have come up with the latest things 

that will make it much more efficient for us to conduct operations. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. We try to address every one of those that 

comes in. We have open Web sites, and we also have—actually we 

have invested and are in the process of investing with the firm 

called In-Q–Tel. I don’t know if you are familiar with In-Q–Tel, because some of the special authorities that are vested within the Intelligence Community, they can go out and do some horizon scanning. We have asked In-Q–Tel to go out for us and look for energy 

solutions. 

So that gets back a little bit to how are we looking for other solutions. We are looking using other government agencies to help us 

look where we have limitations ourselves. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I suppose that is a—just to make sure that we 

have covered everything—a reasonable expenditure. I hope we are 

not spending too much money on that, because it is hard for me 

to believe that any competent person out there developing an opportunity in the energy field wouldn’t have in mind DOD as a possible partner. 

I found myself thinking about operational risks that are associated with hauling a whole bunch of fuel out to the front and kind 

of costs associated with that, the fact that personnel have to be diverted, et cetera, and how the prospect of operational risks of that 

sort might motivate commanders and troops to be more fuel-efficient. And then I found myself being fairly skeptical that that 

wouldn’t, in fact, be much motivation, just sort of recalling my days 

in combat and how many people were happy to pass on to the next 

unit the problems that they have got today; well, they are coming 

in here tomorrow, yes, we sort of figured it out, but it will be risky 

for us to deal with it, and we will let them figure it out and deal 

with it. And the problem gets passed off from one unit to the other 

unit. And that is not always the case, obviously, but it is often the 

case. 

So I found myself wondering what kind of incentives can you put 

in place that would motivate the individual troop, the individual 

commander to be as energy-efficient as possible. And I have the 

sense that GAO might see some opportunities here that perhaps 

DOD isn’t really thrilled about. And if you could, Mr. Solis, could 

you describe what might be a little bit of a dispute? 
29 

Mr. SOLIS. I think, first off, a lot of these bases that we are talking about, while they are considered expeditionary, like in Djibouti, 

they have been there now for six years. So I think a lot of these— 

you might understand if it is a small forward-operating base that— 

you maybe have a platoon size or even squad size—that people are 

moving in and out constantly. But I think as we think about these 

things, I think the incentives become more important in terms of 

for the base commander to be thinking about what is going to reduce, as you mentioned, my operational risk, and what is going to 

try and improve those kind of things, the quality-of-life issues? 

So I think—and what we have seen and what I have seen, is, for 

example, I go back to what I mentioned before in terms of what the 

Navy does with its ships, it provides a funding line so that if there 

are improvements made, that ship, that commander can they then 

apply some of that funding, those savings, towards other priorities 

that the ship has. And I think the same kind of thing in terms of 

looking at for the future in terms of what you can do in a forwarddeployed location, I think those are the same kind of things in 

terms of the incentives that you can think about for the future. 

Mr. MARSHALL. There is a tension here, of course. If you are worried about quality of life for the individual unit and members of 

those units, it seems to me maxing out on the air conditioning in 

some places, for example, or maxing out on the heat, or, you know, 

moving your vehicle quicker rather than slower, all of those things 

are things that all Americans would like to do. We keep our thermostat low in the wintertime and high in the summertime, and you 

can imagine a commander, given the stresses the troops are under 

in a particular location, preferring to do just the opposite. 

Mr. SOLIS. I would agree. At the end of the day, as Mr. Shaffer 

said, the operational commander is making the final decisions on 

what the priorities are and what is going to be, you know, in terms 

of what is going to—what improvements are you going to make, 

what are you going to put off, what are my mission requirements. 

And so those things all have to be considered. 

But again, as time goes on and these bases remain there, I think 

those are the kinds of things that you are looking for in terms of 

possibly—if you go to Camp Arifjan that was built out in the middle of the desert in Kuwait, when they first got there, obviously the 

operational considerations were the first and foremost. But as time 

goes on, as you expand that base, as you increase the number of 

personnel there, other things come into play. And I think, again, 

as you look to Afghanistan where you have operational risks, there 

are other things that come into play, such as reducing the number 

of tankers and the number of fuel requirements for your operational needs. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you holding this 

hearing, and frankly I have the suspicion that in the long run it 

is going to be technology that makes the major bites. Some process, 

yes, some incentives, yes, but largely it is going to be technological 

improvements that make the major bites in reducing our energy 

consumption. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 
30 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is for Mr. Shaffer. I understand that each of the military departments has established a single senior-level official to oversee 

energy issues, including forward operational energy issues within 

their departments. What role does the DOD see these officials playing; not the departments, but across departments? Is there some 

interaction that you all are expecting? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, I actually had a very hard time hearing you 

with the background noise. 

Mr. ROGERS. It is my understanding that each of the military departments have established senior officials to handle energy issues, 

including operational energy issues. 

My question is what role does the Department of Defense expect 

those officials to play not only with regard to energy issues within 

their department, but across departments? Networking. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, I think that is a very good question. I will answer it by way of illustration, and this is across the Navy, Army 

and Air Force. 

When the stimulus act, the recovery act was passed, $300 million 

was added to the Department of Defense for research and development in energy-related products. Now, we could have just let each 

of the services go off on their own and do their own thing, but I 

convened about four different one-hour sessions with the senior 

leaders of each of the services, a session to lay out on the table 

what are we thinking of doing? How can we work together to meet 

the intent of the American Recovery Act, but at the same time get 

the very best we could out for the Department of Defense in our 

operational capability? 

So I look at the senior officials as being partners with the Director of Energy—Operational Energy Plans being full partners in implementing what should be everybody’s vision, and that is to increase our energy efficiency so we can increase or enhance our 

operational capability. 

Mr. ROGERS. Have they been charged with specific milestones or 

goals or objectives. 

Mr. SHAFFER. No, sir, not yet, because the actual clock that ticks 

with the specifics of what is delivered comes after the nomination 

and consent of the Senate, or consent of the Congress, for this new 

position. So right now they have not. They have, however, all been 

very instrumental in working with our staff in putting together a 

strategic plan with our goals. 

Mr. ROGERS. I understand that one obstacle with regard to the 

confirmation, but give me a time horizon that you expect to see 

some milestones established and then some goals achieved. 

Mr. SHAFFER. I want to say within the statute it is either within 

60 or 90 days after the Director of Operational Energy Plans comes 

on board. Again, we have—I have kept the task force in place to 

put out a strategic plan. We have that. But at the end of the day, 

I don’t want to presuppose or corner the new political appointee 

into a position. That is going to be that nominee, his or her responsibility to put in place that strategy for the Department. So within 

60 to 90 days, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 
31 

Mr. ORTIZ. Talking about the convoys, I think until we develop 

or come up with new technology, we are going to have to continue 

to do what we are doing now. When we move these convoys with 

fuel from point A to point B, and we are talking about contractors 

that they—we hire contractors, and I am assuming that some of 

them are foreign contractors. 

Mr. SHAFFER. I do not know. 

Mr. ORTIZ. If I was the owner of a company that owns these 

trucks, and I was going to be moving these convoys, this fuel, I 

think it would be in my best personal interest to have as few 

guards as I could so that I could make more profit. Is there a requirement as to how many guards you should have when you move 

those convoys or those trucks? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Sir, I will have to take that for the record. I do not 

believe so, but I don’t know that for a fact. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Because I think someone mentioned—I think it was 

you, Mr. Shaffer, you mentioned about 135 truck drivers have been 

killed. I think this is very, very important, because if we are moving all this fuel and all this equipment, and we don’t require them 

to have guards at least to protect them. If you could come back 

with us later on, you know, and let us know, because I am not too 

familiar with what the contractors do and how they do it, how they 

move all this stuff, this would help me a lot. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 71.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. We are going to have votes in the next 20 to 30 minutes, so anybody else has any question at this moment? 

If not, thank you so much. I think that this has been a very helpful hearing that we had today, and some of the inputs, some of the 

information that you gave us, and some of the witnesses asked 

very, very interesting questions. 

Mr. Johnson has a question. Go ahead. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Does the Department of Defense have a recycling program in 

place? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Yes, sir, I think we do. It is not in my area of expertise, so let me go ahead and get the specifics back to you because, I mean, you know, we have the bins everywhere. I look at 

it, but I don’t know the specifics. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 73.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Not hearing any other questions, this hearing stands 

adjourned. 

Thank you so much. 

[Whereupon, at 2:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 3, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 3, 2009 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 3, 2009 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

Mr. SHAFFER. The combatant commander has the decision authority, in coordination with the Services, in securing lines of communication. The Services and the 

combatant command have developed guidelines and policies for the use of private 

security for convoys and they allow subordinate commanders, in coordination with 

national level providers, flexibility in meeting mission requirements. 

The Defense Energy Support Center currently accomplishes all first destination 

delivery of fuel in the Central Command Area of Responsibility using contractors. 

Currently, no military escorts are provided in Afghanistan. Contractors provide 

varying degrees of convoy security based on their assessment of risk. In order to 

use armed private security companies, contractors must submit security plans and 

receive approval from Combined Joint Task Force 101 through the Defense Logistics 

Agency and Central Command in accordance with the current policy on the use of 

armed contractors. There is no set number of escorts for contractor provided security. 

Military escorts are provided to convoys operating inside of Iraq and the number 

varies based on the overall insurgent threat. [See page 31.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR 

Mr. SHAFFER. On a base or in a region, minimizing the amount of fuel used without affecting operational capability is the responsibility of the Commander. The Department has improved training future commanders to include fuel in their decisionmaking process by recently incorporating energy considerations into wargames. 

Within the DoD, we estimate that about 68 million gallons of fuel are used each 

month in Iraq and Afghanistan. You asked if we can quantify how the 26 million 

gallons of fuel consumed each month in generators is partitioned among functions 

such as providing hot water. Unfortunately, the short answer is that we don’t have 

this capability. We find no factual data or capability to measure the amount of energy that is allocated to heating water, or for partition of fuel usage among the variety of functions for which generators are used. [See page 13.] 

Mr. SHAFFER. The Department does measure overall consumption at forward-deployed locations, but does not currently have the capability to delineate energy use 

by function. We have confirmed with the Army Petroleum Center that there is no 

data available to confirm the percentage of energy used to heat water but to do so 

would take quite a bit of excess measurement equipment. We agree that it would 

be useful to have a finer breakdown of fuel usage at these locations. [See page 14.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

Mr. SHAFFER. You wanted us to find out why we are not expanding the use of 

spray-foam in hot weather areas like Arizona. Spray-foam insulation is a proven 

way to reduce demand. It is safe (national, state and EPA certified), and has been 

used in the U.S. construction industry for decades. Expanding the use would require 

funds from one of several potential sources, depending upon the circumstances—operation and maintenance (O&M) or Energy Conservation Investment Program 

(ECIP). Each has some limitations. A request to produce and install spray-foam insulation with O&M funds would need to compete with other training and operations 

funding requirements. ECIP could work but the requirements for measure and validation and large documentation trail makes use of ECIP funds slow. These types 

of projects are not funded centrally, so greater use will take time. As we show clear 

savings potential, I anticipate greater use. [See page 20.] 

Mr. SHAFFER. The feedback within in DoD concerning benefits of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) is consistent with last summer’s 

findings of the GAO (GAO-08-736R Military Operations). 

Multiple commanders told the GAO that they feel the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program is effective. However their opinions are anecdotal because there 

are no definitive performance indicators. 
72 

Some commanders informally tracked direct fire attack, indirect fire attack, and 

use of improvised explosive devices in the vicinity of CERP projects. Those that 

tracked these items felt attacks usually decreased. Again anecdotally, commanders 

reported a sense of greater cooperation from the nearby Iraqi people. Nonetheless 

there is no certainty that the positive changes in behavior of the local population, 

if real, were a direct consequence of the CERP projects. Nor that the behavior will 

be sustained. 

We have helpful information about the dollars and information giving insight into 

CERP projects. The Iraq Reconstruction Management System tracks relief and reconstruction projects in Iraq. It reflects hundreds of CERP projects whose total cost 

is on the order of $3 billion. The most usual order of magnitude of the cost of individual projects ranges from $1 thousand to $10 million. 

You asked about CERP project involving technology. Searching the IRMS for electricity projects reveals hundreds of projects, each with a title and geographic location. We have included the websites below: 

GAO report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08736r.pdf 

The Iraq Reconstruction Management System (http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/ 

audits/08-021.pdf) is intended to track relief & reconstruction projects in Iraq. [See 

page 21.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. FLEMING 

Mr. SHAFFER. The original $95 million spray-foam contract in Iraq was written 

to spray-foam 9.5 million sq ft (base year) with two options for 2 million sq ft each. 

The Government terminated the contract for the convenience of the Government. 

Changing of Government priorities caused several delays and the colder, wetter 

weather was a further reason for the termination. Although the proper foam formulation can be sprayed in freezing weather, only a ‘‘summer formula’’ was shipped 

to Iraq. The Government wanted to wait until the colder, wetter weather was past 

to resume foaming operations. The Government has already sent the vendor intent 

to re-start foaming operations to consume the supplies that have been purchased 

and shipped. The exact start date is still to be determined. [See page 23.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Mr. SHAFFER. TGER was an early proof-of-principle prototype, not a mature or 

deployable system. Consequently it was not surprising that there were many ‘‘bugs’’ 

identified in real-world testing. When the TGER worked, it worked well—considering it was not a fully optimized system. Unfortunately, for numerous reasons, 

there was more down-time than mission time. The TGER prototype deployment was 

a success when measured against the intended goals. However, there remain significant technological challenges to fielding a reliable, maintainable tactical garbage-toenergy system. In the end, we believe waste-to-energy offers potential for installations, FOBs, and tactical forces but additional work is required to ensure we are 

meeting true user needs, particularly for the tactical forces. [See page 24.] 

Mr. SHAFFER. The two TGER units are not in operation at this time. They were 

deployed in Iraq from May to August 2008 for a 90-day evaluation. [See page 25.] 

Mr. SHAFFER. The TGER deployment was a prototype contract. Determining cost 

effectiveness of the TGER prototype was not a major goal of the 2008 deployment; 

obtaining a solid cost estimate will require further maturation and testing. [See 

page 25.] 

Mr. SHAFFER. The Department continuously investigates the economic viability of 

multiple renewable energy sources. Landfill gas (LFG), a form of renewable thermal 

energy, can be among the most cost effective, but project cost is directly proportional 

to the distance between the gas source and the point of consumption. The Energy 

Policy Act (EPAct) of 2005, section 203 defines ‘‘renewable energy’’ as ‘‘electric energy generated from solar, wind, biomass, landfill gas, ocean (including tidal, wave, 

current, and thermal), geothermal, municipal solid waste, or new hydroelectric generation capacity achieved from increased efficiency or additions of new capacity at 

an existing hydroelectric project.’’ Under this definition, landfill gas that is not converted to electricity, does not count toward the Department’s EPAct 2005 renewable 

energy goal, lessening the incentive to pursue such projects. The project economics 

of converting landfill gas to electricity are less often viable, but that is not always 

the case. There are a handful of such projects supporting DoD: 
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• Hill AFB, UT—2.3 MW electrical generation plant constructed through an Energy Savings Performance Contract (ESPC) in January 2005 using LFG from 

an offbase source. 

• Fort Huachuca, AZ & Fort Knox, KY—commercially purchases electricity from 

landfill gas plants 

• Fort Sill, OK—pursuing a 3-4 MW electrical generation plant through an ESPC. 

• MCAS Miramar, CA—pursuing expansion of an existing plant that supplies 

electricity to San Diego Gas and Electric. The expansion would generate 3 MW 

directly for the installation. 

• MCLB Albany, GA—pursuing 1.6 MW of electrical generation from an off-base 

landfill through an ESPC. 

• Navy Region Hawaii—pursuing a privately owned 1.5 MW landfill gas project 

at the Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai. 

Finally, the opportunity to do projects on military installations using LFG produced by on-base sources is limited as we primarily rely on off-base municipal landfills for waste disposal and our older military owned landfills do not generally 

produce adequate methane. However, the Department is pursuing RDT&E projects 

aimed at utilizing waste streams at forward operating locations. As some of the 

projects develop, there is a distinct possibility of adapting them to fixed installations 

as well. [See page 26.] 

Mr. SHAFFER. The Department of Defense has a long history of recycling. In 1972, 

the Defense Property Disposal Service (DPDS) was established to centralize surplus 

property disposal and Defense Property Disposal Offices (DPDO) were located worldwide on or near a military installation. Then in 1976, DoD issued solid waste management procedures governing the sales of recyclable materials. Seven years later, 

DPDS initiated their Resource Recovery and Recycling Program which allowed installations around the world to participate in a disposal and recycling program 

where they would receive proceeds from the sale of recyclable materials they generated. These regional facilities are now called the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices. 

The DoD’s recycling program further developed under DoD Instruction 4715.4, 

‘‘Pollution Prevention,’’ June 18, 1996. This DoD Instruction requires DoD Components establish procedures for a cost-effective waste reduction and recycling program. Several Executive Orders through the years have reinforced our commitment 

to maximize our recycling opportunities. They were combined into Executive Order 

13423 (2007) which encourages all Federal agencies to increase diversion of solid 

waste and maintain cost-effective recycling programs. In 1992, DoD recycled 0.5 million tons of waste material. In 2008, the DoD Components recycled over 4.3 million 

tons which is a 65% recycling rate of the solid waste generated. This surpasses the 

Environmental Protection Agency’s national recycling goal of 35%. 

We also issued an integrated solid waste management policy in 2008. Under this 

policy, installation solid waste and recycling managers must make every effort to 

maximize non-hazardous solid waste diversion to optimize reduction in both the volume of solid waste disposed and overall cost of non-hazardous solid waste management. This requires a thorough understanding of the composition of the waste 

stream, available options for waste diversion or disposal, and associated costs (or 

costs avoided). Today many installations have their own recycling program and continue to work with the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices to develop opportunities for further solid waste diversion from landfills. [See page 31.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 3, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

Mr. ORTIZ. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provides $300 

million to the Department of Defense for energy research and development projects. 

This funding can be used for projects that impact energy use for military installations or for operational forces. In your view, should greater priority be given to 

projects that benefit operational forces or installations? Please provide a list of the 

investments to be made with the $300 million provided in the American Recovery 

and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that will address operational energy use generally, 

and a list of investments that will address energy use at forward deployed locations 

specifically. In addition, your testimony states that the fiscal year 2009 request included $1.3 billion for energy-related projects. For the record, please provide us with 

a summary of projects included in that estimate and their funding allocations. 

Mr. SHAFFER. Consistent with the intent of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Department developed a balanced investment portfolio for the 

$300 million added investment in Energy R&D. We did not specifically prioritize the 

investment for operational or installation projects, but rather sought a balance that 

seeks to meet the needs of the Department in both areas. We sought projects that 

can benefit the Department and obligate funds expeditiously. The list of projects is 

attached. 

[The list of projects is retained in the committee files and can be viewed upon request.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. DOD initiated a pilot program in 2007 to determine the fully burdened 

cost of fuel for three weapon systems. What is the status of the pilot program and 

what types of benefits, challenges, and lessons learned has DOD collected based on 

the pilot program? Is the Department on track to meet the implementation timeline 

of three years required by the 2009 defense authorization act? Has the Department 

undertaken any estimates of the fully burdened cost of fuel delivery in Iraq or Afghanistan? If so, what were the results? 

Mr. SHAFFER. In 2007, the Department commissioned a study of the three pilot 

programs for the purpose of developing guidance for how future acquisition programs should apply the fully burdened cost of fuel. The study examined the types 

of trade analyses that could be conducted, how energy considerations are represented, and how the use of the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) could be applied to acquisition decisions. 

The study identified a number of challenges and lessons learned. For example, 

there is currently no analytical organization within the Department, within either 

OSD or the Services, with all the data or tools necessary to calculate the FBCF 

based on scenario-specific wartime requirements. Further, because DOD acquisition 

costing methodologies have been based for decades on peacetime assumptions, calculating FBCF to include wartime ‘‘tail’’ cost factors is challenging. The pilot study did 

lead to a recommendation against assigning the responsibility to individual programs offices because of the need for methodological consistency and common data 

sources across programs. The study did confirm that the FBCF ‘‘number’’ will usually vary by program, to reflect the varying demand for fuel logistics for each individual platform (i.e. each acquisition program). 

The first program to apply fully burdened cost of fuel will be the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Program. The Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) guidance developed by the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation and approved by 

the USD(AT&L) required the development and use of the FBCF. The JLTV study 

team is building their approach into their AoA study plan, and the Army is considering how best to organize to support the requirement to calculate the FBCF. The 

Departments of the Navy and the Air Force have formed task forces to develop implementation plans for the FBCF. 

Based on progress to date, the Department is on track to achieve the three year 

implementation deadline established by law. As new AoAs and programs are established, they will be required to develop and apply FBCF estimates in their program 

AoAs. 

Mr. ORTIZ. According to GAO’s report, DOD plans to begin procuring new fuelefficient generators in 2010. Is this too late to deploy these units as a part of the 
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buildup in Afghanistan? What steps will DOD take to ensure that the new fuel-efficient generators are deployed to locations, such as Afghanistan, where DOD would 

benefit the most from reducing its high fuel demand? 

Mr. SHAFFER. The Department of Army expects to deploy Advanced Medium Mobile Power Sources (AMMPS) as part of the build up in Afghanistan by 2011. 

AMMPS will be fielded in accordance with Army fielding priorities and deploying 

units will be first to be equipped with AMMPS. 

Mr. ORTIZ. DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendation that the Joint Staff incorporate fuel demand considerations into its initiative to develop joint living standards 

at forward-deployed locations. Please elaborate on what steps DOD intends to take 

to ensure that fuel demand is appropriately considered in this effort. 

Mr. SHAFFER. DOD reduced the demand for fuel at selected forward area bases 

by applying insulating spray foam to the outside of the tents. This foam reduces the 

amount of energy required for heating and air conditioning by 40 to 70 percent. We 

are also developing a ‘‘smart micro grid’’ for use in forward area bases which will 

generate only the power required at any given time, as opposed to generators running constantly at less than optimal efficiency. For new procurement, the Department will use the fully burdened cost of fuel (the cost of the fuel and the cost to 

deliver it to the forward area bases) in life cycle cost estimates. These estimates will 

be a component of the Energy Efficiency Key Performance Parameter for major systems. These measures should reduce the number of fuel convoys required and reduce the force protection requirement. Ultimately, these considerations have been— 

and will continue to be—injected into the Senior Warfighter (SWarF) Joint Standards of Life Support and standing Joint Expeditionary Basing-Working Group (JEBWG) deliberations. Ultimately, the team will balance fuel demand implications of 

any new standard applied to forward deployed locations if the new standard drives 

an increased power load (and subsequently fuel requirements). 

Mr. ORTIZ. GAO’s report provides fuel usage profiles at several individual forward-deployed locations. The data show that large amounts of fuel are being consumed for base support functions, such as air conditioning or refrigeration, as well 

as for ground and air missions. However, the GAO report also notes that locations 

collected and categorized their fuel usage differently, which places limitations on the 

utility of the data. How does DOD intend to address the issue of measuring fuel 

consumption at its forward-deployed locations to ensure that consistent, accurate 

data are collected and reviewed to inform energy policy decisions while at the same 

time ensuring that base commanders and service members are focused on meeting 

mission requirements? What efforts has DOD made to develop methods to automatically measure fuel consumption at forward-deployed locations so that information 

can be quickly and consistently collected and relayed to the department? 

Mr. SHAFFER. The Services and DOD do measure overall consumption at a forward-deployed location, but do not currently delineate between base support consumption and weapon system/vehicle consumption. The current daily average for energy usage in Iraq for petroleum products is 1.3M US gallons of jet fuel; 396,000 

US gallons of diesel; and 90,000 US gallons of motor gasoline. 

The Defense Energy Support Center observation concerning policies for fuel usage 

at each individual forward-deployed location varies based upon operations being 

conducted and types of equipment being used or supported. The DOD agrees that 

managing fuel demand in addition to requirement generation should become a consideration in forward-deployed location sustainability. However, DOD believes the 

combatant commander must be the decision authority for when reduction efforts 

begin being tracked and what conservation measures are employed in order to avoid 

detraction from tactical operations. We believe the Services and Combatant Commands should develop the guidelines that address energy efficiency considerations 

in base construction, maintenance, and procurement policies. It is our experience 

that guidelines regarding policy will be general in nature and allow combatant commanders flexibility. We do, however, support the initiative to have the fuel demand 

considerations and requirements be incorporated into the development of joint 

standards of life support at both fixed and forward-deployed locations. An accounting procedure will be developed in coordination with the services that is suitable for 

a deployed environment. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Why should DOD focus its attention on fuel demand at forward-deployed locations that are not permanent, such as those in Iraq or Afghanistan? 

Would the department make more effective use of its resources by focusing on permanent locations? 

Mr. SOLIS. While we recognize that base commanders must place their highest 

priority on meeting mission requirements and that it may not be practical for DOD 

to decrease fuel usage at every forward-deployed location, DOD faces high costs, 

operational vulnerabilities, and logistical burdens in sustaining forward-deployed lo-
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cations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, that depend heavily on fuel-consuming generators. For current operations, DOD’s long truck convoys moving fuel 

to forward-deployed locations have encountered enemy attacks, severe weather, traffic accidents, and pilferage. Furthermore, the ongoing Global War on Terrorism may 

require DOD to sustain many of its forward-deployed locations supporting current 

operations for longer than initially anticipated. For example, during our visit to 

Djibouti, Navy officials referred to Camp Lemonier as an ‘‘expeditionary’’ camp even 

though it had been existence for about 6 years at that time. In October 2008, Camp 

Lemonier was transferred under the newly established Africa Command, which suggests that the camp will endure for the foreseeable future. In the case of Afghanistan, DOD may need to establish new forward-deployed locations or enhance existing ones as it increases troop levels in that country. Factoring fuel demand considerations into decision-making processes as forward-deployed locations are established 

and maintained could help DOD achieve its goals of reducing its reliance on petroleum-based fuel, the risks associated with delivering large amounts of fuel to its forward-deployed locations, and operational costs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

Ms. GIFFORDS. According to a January 26th ‘‘Stars and Stripes’’ article, ‘‘American 

forces have long relied’’ on solar technology to power Iraqi streetlights and now use 

solar panels to power medical clinics and sewage pumps. We have used CERP funds 

to install solar arrays in Iraq including nearly two dozen in Baghdad alone. Are we 

utilizing similar arrays at our forward locations? 

Mr. SHAFFER. Some forward operating base (FOB) locations do have some solar 

street lights installed; this meets the lighting requirements of the area where there 

is no power grid as well as reducing the overall power requirements. However, Army 

Central Command is not aware of any large scale installations of solar power systems in any of our FOBs. Because the FOBs are not enduring, they are focused on 

meeting the power requirements for operational needs. The cost of purchasing, installing and maintaining a solar system makes it unfeasible for non-enduring types 

of installations. Plus, in areas where the enemy is lobbing mortar shells into the 

compound, one mortar shell in a field of solar panels could damage very expensive 

solar panels. There are no solar streetlights or large-scale solar projects installed 

in Afghanistan. Again, because of the high initial cost and temporary nature of the 

FOBs, Army Central Command does not think there will be a large installation of 

solar technology at FOBs. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. According to the GAO Report, the Net Zero Plus Joint Capability 

Technology Demonstrator will be demonstrated over a 3-year period. Can you go 

into additional detail about the demonstration project and will it be conducted intheater? 

Mr. SHAFFER. The Net-Zero Plus (NZP) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) provides improved energy efficiency to forward operating bases (FOB), 

thus reducing loss of life to hostile fire incurred during current fuel delivery operations. It achieves these energy efficiencies by leveraging energy technologies to provide efficient structures, alternative power generation and smart distribution systems for a Forward Operating Base. 

The capabilities/technologies that the NZP JCTD will demonstrate are: 

1) Energy Efficient Structures—external applied insulation referred to as ‘‘Eskimo’’ as well as non-permanent, lightweight and transportable structures incorporating energy efficient materials and technology. 

2) U.S. Marine Corps developed Deployable & Renewable Energy Alternative 

Module (DREAM)—a tactical deployable system using solar power. 

3) Pyrolysis Waste Disposal System—a thermal, deployable, destruction of waste 

with energy recovery. 

4) Smart power distribution using the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) developed 

Electronic Power Control and Conditioning unit. 

Each technology will be assessed for a 12–18 month period at the U.S. Army National Training Center (NTC), Ft. Irwin, CA during the period from Oct. 2008 to 

Sept. 2010. The NZP JCTD is not conducting capability demonstrations in the U.S. 

Central Command theater, but is instead using the NTC because it replicates the 

current theater of operation without placing risk on warfighter operations. 

The Operational Sponsor is U.S. Central Command. The lead service is the U.S. 

Army. The planned completion will be in Fiscal Year 2010. 
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Ms. GIFFORDS. According to a January 26th ‘‘Stars and Stripes’’ article, ‘‘American 

forces have long relied’’ on solar technology to power Iraqi streetlights and now use 

solar panels to power medical clinics and sewage pumps. We have used CERP funds 

to install solar arrays in Iraq including nearly two dozen in Baghdad alone. Did you 

have an opportunity during your investigations to examine any of these projects either in person or anecdotally? 

Mr. SOLIS. While our report highlights several efforts under way or planned by 

DOD components to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations, we did not 

specifically review solar technology efforts funded by the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program (CERP). DOD funded three solar-related projects in Iraq in 2008 

using CERP—specifically, $165,000 to provide a Baghdad clinic with solar power, 

$3.7 million for solar power street lamps in Baghdad, and $5.8 million for solar 

lights in Fallujah—but we did not evaluate these projects. However, GAO has conducted prior work on other aspects of CERP. In June 2008, for example, we reported 

on the extent to which DOD has established selection criteria, coordinates with 

other U.S. Government agencies and with the government of Iraq, and exercises 

oversight of CERP projects in Iraq (see GAO-08-736R). Our work found, for example, 

that DOD has broad selection criteria for CERP projects, which gives significant discretion to commanders in determining the types of projects to undertake. Thus, it 

is important that DOD and commanders at all levels have the information needed 

to determine whether projects are meeting the intent of the program, assess program outcomes, and be better informed about their funding requests. In addition, 

we have reported on U.S. efforts to rebuild Iraq’s electricity sector as part of its reconstruction projects, most recently in March 2009 (see GAO-09-294SP). Restoring 

the electrical infrastructure is critical to reviving the Iraqi economy and ensuring 

productivity of the oil sector; however, demand has grown substantially and continues to outstrip capacity. For 2008, supply met around 52 percent of demand, even 

with increased electrical power generation. As a result, Iraq continues to experience 

electrical shutdowns despite billions of dollars invested. According to the State Department, at the end of November 2005, average hours of power per day were 8.7 

hours in Baghdad and 12.6 hours nationwide; by the end of November 2008, Baghdad averaged 15.4 hours and the rest of the country averaged 14.6 hours. The Iraqi 

Ministry of Electricity estimated in its 2006–2015 plan that it would need $27 billion over the next 6 to 10 years to provide reliable electricity across Iraq by 2015. 

However, U.S. Government officials working with the ministry estimate twice that 

amount will be needed for power generation, transmission, distribution, and other 

infrastructure. Based on U.S. and United Nations reporting, inadequate operating 

and maintenance practices, as well as the lack of skilled technicians, inhibit an effective electrical infrastructure. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Your study seems to indicate that there is a coordination problem 

within the Department and across the services on managing Operational Energy. 

If the Administration appointed a Director of Operational Energy Plans & Programs 

and fully implemented Section 902 from last year’s Defense Authorization Act, do 

you believe that could solve some, or even all, of the coordination problem? 

Mr. SOLIS. In meeting the requirements of the Duncan Hunter National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 to establish a Director of Operational Energy 

Plans and Programs and an operational energy strategy, we believe that DOD has 

an opportunity to improve communication and coordination of fuel reduction efforts 

at forward-deployed locations as well as establish visibility and accountability for 

fuel demand management. Furthermore, a director of operational energy would provide DOD with an executive-level official who sets the direction, pace, and tone to 

reduce operational energy demand across the department. While DOD components 

have efforts under way or planned that show potential for achieving greater fuel efficiency, we found that DOD faces difficulty achieving its goals to reduce its reliance 

on petroleum-based fuel and minimize the logistics ‘‘footprint’’ because managing 

fuel demand at forward-deployed locations has not been a departmental priority and 

its fuel reduction efforts have not been well coordinated or comprehensive. Specifically, we found that information on fuel demand management strategies and reduction efforts is not shared among forward-deployed locations, military services, and 

across the department in a consistent manner. As our report noted, DOD guidance 

does not designate any DOD office or official as being responsible for fuel demand 

management at forward-deployed locations, and we could not identify anyone who 

is specifically accountable for this function through our interviews with various 

DOD and military service offices. Without establishing visibility and accountability 

over fuel demand management at forward-deployed locations, DOD is not well positioned to address the shortcomings we identified in our report—including the lack 

of fuel reduction guidance, incentives, and a viable funding mechanism for initiatives to decrease demand. Thus, DOD cannot be assured that good fuel reduction 
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practices are identified, shared, prioritized, resourced, implemented, and institutionalized across locations in order to reduce the costs and risks associated with 

high fuel demand. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. In your prepared testimony, you note the Air Force has initiated 

a biomass-derived aviation fuel certification program. Can you provide further details regarding this Air Force initiative to test Algae and other bio-mass energy 

feedstocks? Do the other Services (Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard) have similar 

programs to certify algae and biomass-derived synthetic fuels? 

Mr. SHAFFER. The Air Force is conducting research and development on alternative fuels produced from biomass. The Air Force has obtained samples produced 

by industry and academia, as well as test samples produced as part of the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency’s research program. As a follow-on to first generation certification of synthetic fuels derived via the Fischer Tropsch process, the 

most promising second generation biomass candidates are fats and oils that are 

hydroprocessed into a hydrotreated renewable jet (HRJ) fuel; samples of which have 

been produced from algae, seed crops, and animal waste. The Air Force has also 

worked with the commercial airline industry, Boeing, and biomass fuel producer 

UOP [Universal Oil Products] to analyze HRJ/petroleum fuel blends used in recent 

flight demonstrations by Continental Airlines and Japan Airlines; a small portion 

of these fuels was derived from algae oil. HRJ fuels are chemically similar to the 

Fischer Tropsch-derived synthetic kerosene fuels currently undergoing certification 

by the Air Force and lessons learned from these certification efforts should streamline HRJ fuels certification. In addition, the Air Force is also analyzing third generation biofuels produced from halophytes, cellulosic material, and waste products. 

The technology to produce fuels from these resources is less mature than the fats 

and oils used to produce HRJ fuels, but these feedstocks offer significant promise 

in terms of availability and cost. 

The Air Force is planning to conduct a flight demonstration ‘‘pathfinder’’ test as 

the first step in the certification process of HRJ fuels. The current plan is to competitively procure two biomass candidates and conduct a comprehensive evaluation 

to make sure they are fit-for-purpose for use in military aircraft. Once the chemical 

and physical similarity to petroleum-derived fuels is assured, the flight test program 

will start. In addition, the Air Force is conducting analyses of alternative fuels to 

determine their life cycle greenhouse gas footprint from ‘‘field to wake,’’ is collaborating with the U.S. Department of Agriculture to assure sustainability, and is evaluating the potential for commercial production and estimating costs. 

To the best of our knowledge, the Army, Navy, and Coast Guard have not initiated biomass-derived certification programs at this time. The Air Force is collaborating with its sister Services on the opportunities to jointly certify common platforms for alternative fuel use. 

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