Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-595 | September 7, 2018 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stephen T. Owens

Public Defender of Indiana

Randy A. Elliott

Deputy Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Rolland R. Ladyga,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent

September 7, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-PC-595

Appeal from the Grant Superior 

Court

The Honorable Warren Haas, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

27D03-1608-PC-8

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-595 | September 7, 2018 Page 2 of 6

[1] Rolland Ladyga appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for 

post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, 

and intelligent because he had not been advised of his right to a jury trial before 

waiving it. Finding no error in the post-conviction court’s ruling, we affirm.

Facts

[2] On January 8, 2002, the State charged Ladyga with Class A misdemeanor 

operating while intoxicated and Class C infraction driving on the wrong side of 

the road. Later that day, the trial court advised a large group of defendants—

Ladyga among them—about their constitutional right to a trial by jury, their 

right against self-incrimination, and their right to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses at trial. PCR Resp. Ex. 2 p. 2-3. The trial court also advised those 

charged with misdemeanors that they must demand a jury trial, in writing, no 

later than ten days prior to their first scheduled trial date or else they would 

waive that right and would only be entitled to a bench trial thereafter. Id.

[3] On January 23, 2002, the trial court appointed a public defender to represent 

Ladyga. Ladyga requested a bench trial, which was eventually set for June 3, 

2002. 

[4] On June 3, 2002, Ladyga agreed to plead guilty in accordance with a written 

plea agreement. The trial court advised Ladyga once again that he would be 

waiving his constitutional rights by pleading guilty but did not specifically 

mention the right to a trial by jury. PCR Pet. Ex. A p. 2-3. Ladyga affirmed that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-595 | September 7, 2018 Page 3 of 6

he understood his rights, that he had waived them, and that he had reviewed 

the drafted plea agreement with his attorney and understood its contents. PCR 

Pet. Ex. A p. 2-3.

[5] Pursuant to the written plea agreement, the State would dismiss the driving on 

the wrong side of the road charge, Ladyga would pay a fine of $300 as well as 

attorney and court costs, Ladyga would be sentenced to one year in jail 

suspended to probation, and Ladyga’s driving privileges would be suspended 

for ninety days.

[6] On August 25, 2016, Ladyga filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.

On November 1, 2017, Ladyga filed an amended petition for post-conviction 

relief with the aid of counsel. The amended petition argued that Ladyga’s guilty 

plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he was not readvised 

of his constitutional right to a jury trial at the guilty plea hearing. 

[7] On February 23, 2018, following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied 

Ladyga’s petition, finding that the trial court had properly advised Ladyga of 

his constitutional rights and that Ladyga had waived his right to a jury trial by 

the time of the guilty plea by virtue of Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 22. 

Ladyga now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-595 | September 7, 2018 Page 4 of 6

Discussion and Decision

[8] Ladyga’s sole argument on appeal is that he did not plead guilty knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently because the trial court did not readvise him of his 

constitutional right to a trial by jury at the time he pleaded guilty. 

[9] When reviewing a petitioner’s claim for improper denial of post-conviction 

relief, we will disturb a post-conviction court’s decision as being contrary to law 

only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, 

and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion. Dewitt v. 

State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 170 (Ind. 2001). Moreover, we accept the postconviction court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 

738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000). 

[10] Indiana Code section 35-35-1-2(a) provides as follows: 

(a) The Court shall not accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill at 

the time of the crime without first determining that the defendant: . . . 

(2) has been informed by the defendant’s plea the defendant 

waives the defendant’s rights to:

(A) a public and speedy trial by jury; 

(B) confront and cross-examine the witnesses against the 

defendant; [and] . . . 

(D) require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant may not 

be compelled to testify against himself or herself [.]
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-595 | September 7, 2018 Page 5 of 6

(Emphasis added). 

[11] Ladyga concedes that he was advised of all three constitutional rights at the 

January 8, 2002, en masse hearing. But he asserts that the trial court should 

have readvised him of the rights he was waiving at the guilty plea hearing.

[12] Both parties come to us with constitutional arguments, but we need not decide 

the case on constitutional grounds. Instead, this matter can be easily decided on 

procedural grounds. 

[13] Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 states: 

A defendant charged with a misdemeanor may demand trial by jury by 

filing a written demand therefore not later than ten (10) days before his 

first schedule trial date. The failure of a defendant to demand a trial by jury as 

required by this rule shall constitute a waiver by him of trial by jury unless the 

defendant has not had at least fifteen (15) days notice of his scheduled 

trial date and of the consequences of his failure to demand a trial by jury.

(Emphasis added). This Court “has consistently held that, under [Rule 22], a 

misdemeanant waives his right to a jury trial by not making the proper request 

after having been duly advised of his rights and the consequences for failure to 

make a timely demand.” Stevens v. State, 689 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1998); see also Fiandt v. State, 996 N.E.2d 421, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) 

(emphasizing that while right to a jury trial is guaranteed by Indiana and 

United States Constitutions, the right “is not self-executing” in misdemeanor 

cases). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-595 | September 7, 2018 Page 6 of 6

[14] In this case, the highest level of offense with which Ladyga was charged was a 

Class A misdemeanor. As such, Rule 22 required him to make a formal 

demand if he desired a trial by jury, which the trial court clearly stated at

Ladyga’s initial hearing, PCR resp. ex. 2 p. 2-3, and which Ladyga did not do. 

Therefore, Ladyga had waived his right to a jury trial by operation of law before 

the guilty plea hearing took place. As he no longer had this right at the time he 

pleaded guilty, the trial court did not err by failing to readvise him of it. 

Therefore, the post-conviction court did not err by denying Ladyga’s petition 

for post-conviction relief. 

[15] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

May, J., and Robb, J., concur.