41760 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 107 and 139

[Docket No. 28979; Notice No. 97-13]

RIN 2120–AD–46

Airport Security

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This notice proposes to

amend the existing airport security

rules. It would revise certain

applicability provisions, definitions,

and terms; reorganize these rules into

subparts containing related

requirements; and incorporate some

requirements already implemented in

airport security programs. This

proposed revision also would

incorporate certain new measures that

would provide for better security.

Specifically, this proposal would more

clearly define the areas of the airport in

which security interests are the most

critical and where security measures

should be the most stringent. It would

modify access control requirements by

allowing secondary access media,

modify escort procedures for

individuals without access authority,

and expand the requirement for an

identification system to include a

challenge system. Further, it would

clarify the following: training

requirements for airport security

personnel; the role of the airport

security coordinator; procedures for

airport operators to comply with Federal

Aviation Administration security

directives; procedures for responding to

and evaluating threats; and the need to

review and test security contingency

plans. The intent of this proposal is to

enhance security for the traveling

public, air carriers, and persons

employed by or conducting business at

public airports by increasing awareness

of and compliance with civil aviation

security measures.

DATES: Comments must be submitted on

or before December 1, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposed

rulemaking should be mailed or

delivered, in triplicate, to: Federal

Aviation Administration, Office of the

Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket

(AGC–10), Room 915–G, Docket No.

28979, 800 Independence Ave., SW.,

Washington, DC 20591. Comments may

also be sent electronically to the

following internet address: 9–NPRM–

CMTS@faa.dot.gov. Comments may be

examined in Room 915–G between 8:30

a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays, except

Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy

and Planning, Civil Aviation Security

Division (ACP–100), Penny Anderson,

Federal Aviation Administration, 800

Independence Ave. SW., Washington,

DC 20591; telephone (202) 267–3418.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in this rulemaking by

submitting such written data, views, or

arguments as they may desire.

Comments relating to the

environmental, energy, federalism, or

economic impact that might result from

adopting the proposals in this document

are also invited. Substantive comments

should be accompanied by cost

estimates. Comments should identify

the regulatory docket or notice number

and should be submitted in triplicate to

the Rules Docket (see ADDRESSES). All

comments received, as well as a report

summarizing each substantive public

contact with FAA personnel on this

rulemaking, will be filed in the docket.

The docket is available for public

inspection before and after the comment

closing date. All comments received on

or before the closing date will be

considered by the Administrator before

taking action on this proposed

rulemaking. Late-filed comments will be

considered to the extent practicable.

The proposals contained in this

document may be changed in light of

comments received. Comments received

on this proposal will be available, both

before and after the closing date for

comments in the Rules Dockets for

examination by interested persons.

However, the Assistant Administrator

for Civil Aviation Security has

determined that the airport security

programs required by part 107 contain

sensitive security information. As such,

the availability of information

pertaining to airport security programs

is governed by 14 CFR Part 191

(Withholding Security Information from

Disclosure under the Air Transportation

Security Act of 1974).

Comments wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comment

must include a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket No. 28979.’’ The postcard will be

date-stamped and mailed to the

commenter.

Availability of NPRM

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

Federal Aviation Administration, Office

of Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800

Independence Ave., SW., Washington,

DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267–9677.

Communications must identify the

notice number of this NPRM.

An electronic copy of this document

may be downloaded using a modem and

suitable communications software from

the FAA regulations section of the

Fedworld electronic bulletin board

service (telephone: 703–321–3339) or

the Office of the Federal Register’s

electronic bulletin board service

(telephone: 202–512–1661). Internet

users may reach the FAA’s webpage at

http://www.faa.gov or the Office of the

Federal Register’s webpage at http://

www.access.gpo.gov/suldocs for

access to recently published rulemaking

documents. Persons interested in being

placed on the mailing list for future

NPRM’s should request from the above

office a copy of Advisory Circular No.

11–2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

Distribution System, which describes

the application procedure.

Background

This proposed rule was written before

the tragic crash of TWA 800 on July 17,

1996. That accident raised concerns

about the safety and security of civil

aviation, leading the President to create

the White House Commission on

Aviation Safety and Security, headed by

the Vice President. The Commission

issued an initial report on September 9,

1996, with 20 specific recommendations

for improving security. On February 12,

1997, the Commission issued its Final

Report with 57 recommendations, 31 of

which deal with improving security for

travelers. In addition, the Federal

Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996

(Pub. L. 104–264) was signed on

October 9, 1996, and directs the FAA to

amend rules to upgrade civil aviation

security.

The FAA is working to respond to the

recommendations of the Commission

and to carry out the legislation, and has

issued several proposals. On March 11,

1997, an Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking on the certification of

screening companies was issued (62 FR

12724, March 17, 1997), and on March

14, 1997, the FAA issued a Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking on employment

history; verification and criminal

records checks (62 FR 13262, March 19,

1997).

The rules proposed in this notice

were not written in response to the

Commission or the Reauthorization Act.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41761

1Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1996, U.S.

Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation

Administration Office of Civil Aviation Security.

However, this notice, which proposes to

update the overall regulatory structure

for airport and air carrier security, is the

result of a multi-year effort involving

the FAA, airports and air carriers, and

the Aviation Security Advisory

Committee. The extensive proposed

revisions are considered to be consistent

with the intentions of the mandates,

contain proposals that industry has

identified as necessary or appropriate,

and outline a new organization for the

regulations that would assist in

developing future changes to the rules.

For these reasons, the FAA is publishing

this proposed rule for comment. The

FAA anticipates that any final rule

based on this proposal will incorporate

responses to these mandates.

Terrorist Incidents

In response to a rise of hijacking

incidents, and to ensure the security of

airports serving scheduled air carriers,

the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA) issued 14 Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR) part 107 on March 18,

1972. The rule required each airport

operator to implement prescribed

security measures by developing and

observing an airport-specific security

program. Part 107 has been amended on

several occasions, but the rule has never

undergone a comprehensive update.

Since the inception of part 107, the

primary threat to civil aviation has

expanded beyond hijacking to bombing

of aircraft and murderous attacks within

airports. The following incidents are

indicative of this evolution.

• December 27, 1985: Simultaneous

attacks at two European airports against

the general public in open terminal

areas. At least 13 people were killed and

approximately 80 wounded at Rome’s

Leonardo da Vinci International Airport;

4 persons were killed and

approximately 45 wounded at Vienna’s

Schwechat International Airport.

• September 5, 1986: Terrorist assault

on Pan American (Pan Am) Flight 73.

Four terrorists assaulted Flight 73 in

Karachi, Pakistan as the aircraft waited

to take off. The four terrorists were

dressed similarly to airport security

personnel and drove a van resembling

an airport security vehicle alongside the

aircraft. The terrorists stormed the

aircraft and after 17 hours or

negotiations, the aircraft’s auxiliary

power unit failed. Anticipating an attack

by security forces, the terrorists opened

fire on the massed passengers, killing 22

persons and injuring 125 others before

security forces could intervene.

• September 14, 1986: The bombing

of an international terminal building. A

device detonated in a trash can located

in front of the international terminal

building of the Kimpo International

Airport, Seoul, South Korea. Five

persons were killed and 29 were

injured.

• November 11, 1987: Explosives

detonated in a passenger terminal.

Explosives in baggage detonated,

possibly prematurely, in the passenger

terminal of the Beirut International

Airport, Beirut, Lebanon. Six persons

were killed and 73 were injured. No

person(s) claimed responsibility;

however, the person carrying the bag

was killed.

• December 21, 1988: The bombing of

Pan Am Flight 103. All 243 passengers

and 16 crew on board, plus 11 persons

on the ground at Lockerbie, Scotland,

were killed. Subsequent inspection of

the reconstructed aircraft determined

that a device consisting of plastic

explosives inside a tape cassette player

was responsible for the destruction of

Flight 103. The device had been

concealed in checked luggage.

Individuals working for the Government

of Libya are responsible for the

bombing. One conspirator was the

former manager of the Libyan Arab

Airlines (LAA) office in Valletta, Malta

and retained full access to the airport.

Using this access privilege and other

knowledge gained as representatives of

LAA, the conspirators bypassed security

checks at Valletta’s Luqa Airport and

inserted the suitcase containing the

bomb into baggage of an Air Malta flight

to Frankfurt.

• August 26, 1992: Explosive device

placed in an international terminal. A

20-pound explosive device was placed

in the international terminal in the

Houari Boumedienne International

Airport, Algiers, Algeria. Twelve

persons were killed and 126 were

injured. Members of the Islamic

Salvation Front were arrested. Their

intent was to disrupt foreign

involvement in Algeria.

• November 3, 1994: Armed

individuals seized the airport. Armed

militant Muslim activist seized the

Saidu Sharif Airport in Pakistan’s

Northwest Frontier Province and

barricaded the runway. Pakistani

paramilitary forces attacked several days

later. Five persons were killed and at

least 17 were injured.

• December 24, 1994: Hijacking and

possible intention to destroy Air France

flight 8969. While on the ground at

Houari Boumedienne International

Airport, Algeria, Air France Flight 8969

was commandeered by four terrorists

armed with automatic weapons, hand

grenades, and explosives. The four

gunmen wore what appeared to be Air

Algerie uniforms and displayed airport

identification. The hijackers killed three

people. French counterterrorism forces

stormed the aircraft at Marignane

Airport in Marseille, France; all four

hijackers were killed. Explosive were

found on the aircraft, leading to

speculation that the hijackers intended

to blow up the aircraft over Paris.

• July 22, 1996: A bomb detonated in

a public area of a terminal building. Six

persons were killed and an estimated 60

others were injured when a bomb

exploded in the concourse outside of

the departure/arrival lounges at the

Lahore International Airport, Lahore,

Pakistan. The device, containing

approximately 3 kilograms of

explosives, reportedly had been left in

a briefcase and placed beneath a bench

near the domestic lounge. The explosion

occurred moments before the departure

of PIA flight 715 for Karachi. There were

no immediate claims for the bombing.

Fifty-nine attacks have been recorded

at airports throughout the world during

the past 5 years. These attacks have

included 24 bombings; 15 attempted

bombings; and 20 shootings, shellings

(such as mortar attacks), arsons, and

similar incidents. At least 41 persons

have been killed and more than 250

injured in attacks at airports between

1992 and 1996.1

Terrorism has been, for the most part,

a phenomenon afflicting U.S. interests

overseas, and the threat to U.S. civil

aviation is assessed to be higher abroad

than it is domestically. The World Trade

Center bombing in February 1993,

however, indicates that terrorism is also

a very real threat in the United States,

and may be on the rise.

Ramzi Ahmed Yousef has been

convicted for the bombing of

Philippines Airline flight 434

(December 11, 1994) and for conspiring

to bomb U.S.-flag aircraft. Authorities

believe that Yousef and his coconspirators acted on their own

volition, in opposition to U.S. foreign

policy in the Middle East, and that they

were assisted by local radical

sympathizers in the Philippines and the

United States. The conspiracies are

indicative of an emerging trend in

terrorism, characterized by terrorist

elements operating without traditional

organizational structure or state

sponsorship.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) characterizes such terrorists as

seeking a ‘‘common political, social,

economic, or personal objective which

transcends nation-state boundaries.’’

The U.S. Department of State,

commenting on global terrorism trends
41762 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

2For further analysis of the terrorist threat, please

refer to the following public documents: Terrorism

in the United States: 1994, U.S. Department of

Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995, U.S.

Department of State, April 1996.

3Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996, U.S.

Department of State, April 1997.

4President’s Commission on Aviation Security

and Terrorism, Report to the President, May 15,

1990.

5 DOT Office of Inspector General, Audit of

Airport Security, Federal Aviation Administration,

Report No. RP–FA–3–105, September 20, 1993.

6United States General Accounting Office, Report

to Congressional Committees, Aviation Security:

Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and

International Changes, January 1994.

notes that ‘‘terrorism by extremist

individuals or groups claiming to act for

religious motives’’ continue to dominate

international terrorism.2

The number of international terrorist

attacks against U.S. interests fell

between 1995 and 1996, although

incidents involving American targets

still represented more than 24%of the

total attacks worldwide in 1996.

Domestically, the FBI asserts that the

U.S. is not immune to international

terrorism, describing the terrorist threat

as ‘‘real and potentially lethal.’’ The

FAA views these developments as cause

for concern.3

In addition, individual acts of revenge

or criminality must be considered since

the consequences of such acts can be

just as deadly. Following are three

examples:

• December 7, 1987: Destruction of

Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) Flight

1771. Flight 1771 crashed when a

recently terminated airline employee

boarded the Los Angeles San Francisco

flight with a handgun, shot one

passenger (his former supervisor), the

flightcrew, flight attendant, and

presumably himself. As a result, all 38

passengers and five crew on board were

killed. The fired employee retained his

airline identification after his dismissal

and used to bypass the passenger

screening checkpoint.

• August 14, 1990: Gunman gained

unauthorized access at Washington

National Airport. A man armed with a

.38 caliber revolver entered the Ogden

Allied Services garage at Washington,

DC’s National Airport, and held several

employees at gunpoint. He was a former

employee at Ogden and had voluntarily

left his job. He commandeered a fuel

truck, forced an Ogden employee to

drive onto the air operations area and

fired several shots at a second Ogden

fuel truck, wounding two persons. He

was in possession of 30 to 40 rounds of

ammunition when he was arrested. A

molotov cocktail was recovered from the

commandeered fuel truck, and several

others were found in the gunman’s

vehicle.

• May 7, 1995: Gunman exchanged

fire with police at Minneapolis/St. Paul

International Airport. A man armed

with a 7.62 mm Norinco SK5 assault

rifle attempted to enter a secured area

through a door in the baggage claim

area. Unable to gain access, the gunman

fired several rounds, shattering panes of

plate glass, and then proceeded through

the terminal firing his weapon. The

gunman then exited the terminal to a

public driveway, changed fire with

responding police officers and was shot

three times before being apprehended.

Three persons were injured by flying

debris, but non seriously. The weapon

used appeared to have been altered to

fire automatically and the gunman was

in possess of 90 rounds of ammunition.

The gunman never gained access to the

sterile or secured areas of the airport.

• October 13, 1995: A low-level

explosive device destroyed an

automated facility serving La Guardia

International Airport. The facility, a

Low Level Windshear Alert System

(LLWAS), is locate din a remote area

near Flushing Airport, formerly a

general aviation field. The LLWAS is

housed in a metal box on a utility pole

and is surrounded by a perimeter fence

that was cut to gain entry. Even through

the LLWAS was not fully functional for

several days, air traffic to La Guardia

was not jeopardized. An arrest was

made in this matter. Despite an antigovernment leaflet found at the scene,

no connection was found between the

person arrested and right-wing terrorist

organizations.

Response to Terrorist Incidents

The incidents discussed above have

led to concerted efforts to strengthen

aviation security around the world and

particularly security at U.S. airports.

The FAA responded by issuing

emergency amendments to airport

security programs, using part 107

authority.

The destruction of Pan Am Flight 103

resulted in numerous changes to civil

aviation security. The Presidential

Commission on Aviation Security and

Terrorism was critical of the domestic

U.S. civil aviation security system for

failing to provide the proper level of

protection for the traveling public and

urged major reforms. Specifically, the

commission recommended that the

‘‘FAA initiate immediately the planning

and analysis necessary to phase

additional security measures into the

domestic system over time.4 The

Commission’s report prompted the

Aviation Security Improvement Act of

1990 (Public Law 101–604), enacted

November 16, 1990.

The new law mandated many changes

to airport and air carrier security

programs, as well as Federal staffing and

reporting procedures. Several

rulemakings were initiated to impose

hiring standards for air crew and

security personnel, and training

standards and criminal history checks

for certain airport and air carrier

personnel. The act also required the

FAA to coordinate with the FBI to

assess the domestic air transport system,

develop security guidelines for airport

design and construction, and expand

the security technology research and

development program.

The proposed revisions to part 107

also respond to two other Federal

reports. In September 1993, the Office of

the Inspector General (IG) of the U.S.

Department of Transportation issued a

report critical of certain aspects of the

FAA’s oversight of airport security

systems.5 In January 1994, the General

Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report

suggesting further actions the FAA

could take to improve civil aviation

security.6

The IG report found significant

deficiencies in the effectiveness of

access control and challenge procedures

at five U.S. airports. The report

recommended that airport and air

carrier implementation of procedures

for access control and challenge be

strengthened, stressing that the FAA

must take steps to increase airport and

air carrier employees’ awareness and

responsibility for those procedures.

In January of 1994, the FAA

responded to the report by meeting with

representatives of airports, air carriers

and other airport tenants, and employee

groups/unions to discuss the IG’s

findings and to emphasize the need for

improved employee security awareness.

Simultaneously, the FAA began focused

inspections at U.S. airports with the

highest volume and most complex

security operations. Slated to continue

on a routine basis, these special

inspections targeted the security

measures that the IG found to be a

universal weakness—access control and

challenge procedures.

The response has been an industrywide commitment to address the

identified weaknesses and improve

compliance. In particular, many airports

and air carriers have improved their

training programs and instituted

programs to provide individual

incentives for compliance and

escalating disciplinary action for

instances of non-compliance.

Compliance at airports which have
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41763

instituted such programs has improved

markedly. The FAA proposes to

implement similar measures at other

part 107 airports by clarifying and

modifying access control, identification

display, and challenge requirements.

Separately, the GAO issued a report

entitled ‘‘Aviation Security—Additional

Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and

International Challenges,’’ in response

to a Congressional inquiry on FAA’s

efforts to implement the Aviation

Security Improvement Act of 1990. GAO

found that the FAA has taken important

steps in response to the act and cited

additional actions that should be taken

to enhance the FAA’s security programs

and initiatives. These actions include—

(1) pilot-testing new procedures before

implementation, (2) strengthening

human factors research and its

application, (3) making systematic

analytical use of information that the

FAA collects during air carrier and

airport security inspections, and (4)

providing airport security coordinators

with security clearances, so that they

can be given classified information

regarding threats to civil aviation.

Similar to the IG report, the GAO

report highlighted the need for the FAA

to increase industry employees’ overall

awareness of security measures. The

report concluded that the FA must

refine security training and procedures

to increase personnel sensitivity to

security requirements. The FAA agrees

that complacency must be combated,

and as previously noted, considers

improved employee training and

increased accountability to be an

essential part of the solution.

Specific responses to issues raised in

the IG and GAO reports are discussed

below in the ‘‘Section by Section

Analysis.’’

The Role of the Aviation Security

Advisory Committee

The Department of Transportation

and the FAA are convinced that the

aviation industry and general public

should have input into the development

of future aviation security measures and

issues. On April 3, 1989, the Secretary

of Transportation announced the

formation of a national aviation security

advisory committee under the provision

of the Federal Advisory Committee Act

(Title 5 U.S. Code, Appendix II).

The Aviation Security Advisory

Committee (ASAC) was formed to

examine all areas of civil aviation

security and to ensure a higher degree

of safety for the traveling public by

recommending improvement of aviation

security equipment and procedures. The

ASAC is chaired by the FAA’s Assistant

Administrator for Civil Aviation

Security and makes recommendations to

the FAA Administrator. Committee

membership represents a balance of

Federal government, aviation industry,

and consumer advocacy groups,

including:

1. Air Courier Conference of America

2. Air Line Pilots Association

International

3. Air Transport Association of America

4. Aircraft Owners and Pilots

Association

5. Airport Law Enforcement Agencies

Network

6. Airports Council International, Inc.

7. Allied Pilots Association

8. American Association of Airport

Executives

9. Association of Flight Attendants

10. Aviation Consumer Action Project

11. Aviation Security Contractors

Association

12. Cargo Airline Association

13. Families of Pan Am 103 Lockerbie

14. International Airline Passengers

Association

15. National Air Carrier Association,

Inc.

16. National Air Transportation

Association

17. Regional Airline Association

18. U.S. Department of Defense (Policy

Board on Federal Aviation)

19. U.S. Department of Justice (Federal

Bureau of Investigation)

20. U.S. Department of State

21. U.S. Department of Transportation

(Office of Intelligence and Security

and Federal Aviation Administration

Technical Center)

22. U.S. Department of the Treasury

(Customs Service, Immigration and

Naturalization Service, and Secret

Service)

23. U.S. Postal Service

24. Victims of PanAm Flight 103

All ASAC meetings are open to the

public and are announced in the

Federal Register. Meetings are typically

held three times a year. Members of the

public are permitted to attend and

appear before the committee, subject to

reasonable limitations of space and

time.

The FAA invited the ASAC to

comment on the underlying issues and

potential solutions associated with the

revision of parts 107 and 108. In

December 1993, the FAA sought the

ASAC’s input on a ‘‘discussion paper’’

that presented a broad scope of security

issues and concerns. A copy of this

paper is filed in the FAA public docket

for this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

(NPRM).

To address the issues raised in the

discussion paper, the ASAC formed two

subcommittees to develop

recommendations on airport and air

carrier security issues, respectively, and

provided the FAA formal

recommendations on March 15, 1994.

Individual ASAC members also

provided comments on issues when

their respective organizations differed

from the position taken by the

committee. The views of the ASAC and

of individual committee members were

then forwarded to the FAA with an

overall recommendation that security

regulations should remain flexible and

contain only general security

performance standards. Specific

recommendations are addressed

individually in the ‘‘Section-by-Section

Analysis.’’

Discussion of the Proposed Rule

This proposed revision of part 107

would comprehensively update airport

security regulations to more efficiently

and effectively address terrorist and

other criminal threats to civil aviation.

This proposed action would incorporate

both procedures currently in airport

security programs and new security

procedures, in a manner that is intended

to allow regulated entities and

individuals to understand their

responsibilities more readily. When a

final rule has been adopted, the FAA

will update relevant advisory circulars

and prepare a standard airport security

program that will contain specific

security measures that are considered

sensitive under part 191 and therefore

cannot be included in the proposed

revision. Lastly, the proposed revision

would incorporate certain new

measures that would provide for better

security. For example, the proposed

revisions make individuals directly

accountable to the FAA for violating

certain regulations and would require

airports to include in their security

programs specific disciplinary action

and penalties to be taken with

employees or tenants that do not

comply with security requirements.

Through these changes, the FAA hopes

to create a more effective mixture of

individual and corporate responsibility

for complying with security regulations,

particularly those relating to access

controls and challenge procedures.

Air carrier security programs required

by part 108 also have been amended

extensively since 1985. The FAA

proposes to revise part 108, which

governs aircraft operator security,

concurrently with this part. The

rulemakings will proceed in tandem. All

references to proposed part 108 in this

preamble are intended to refer to the

concurrently proposed revision of part

108. Further, this proposal would

modify the airport emergency plan
41764 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

required under 14 CFR part 139, the

certification and operations rules for

land airports, to indicate that the

evaluation of threats would be handled

under airport security programs.

The proposed revisions of part 107

and part 108 represent a comprehensive

approach toward upgrading the security

requirements of the civil aviation

system. The intent of these proposed

revisions is to foster consistency and

standardization throughout the national

civil aviation security program. Where

possible, the revisions of part 107 and

part 108 propose nearly identical

language to enhance, clarify, or propose

security measures for implementation

by both airport operators and air

carriers.

Changes to definitions in proposed

§ 107.3 and § 108.3 are intended to

promote a common understanding

within the aviation community when

used in these respective regulations.

Moreover, the proposed definitions for

both parts 107 and 108 take into account

the need to clarify the division of

responsibility between air carriers and

airport operators for the implementation

of aviation security measures.

Proposed § 107.7 and § 108.5 would

clarify the authority of the

Administrator to conduct inspections or

tests to determine air carrier compliance

with 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, and the

regulations, and the airport operator’s

and air carrier’s obligation to provide

FAA Special Agents the necessary

access and identification medium to

conduct inspections.

Both proposals include language, in

proposed § 107.9 and § 108.7, that

would prohibit persons from knowingly

making false statements or entries on

security-related documentation.

Proposed § 107.11 and § 108.9 contain

language that would prohibit persons

from interfering with or compromising

required security methods or

procedures. Further, new language

proposed in § 107.103(a) and § 108.103

would require the inclusion of a

security compliance program within an

airport operator’s and air carrier’s

security program.

Proposed § 107.105 and § 108.105

reflect similar procedural language for

the approval and amendment of security

programs. Proposed § 107.209 and

§ 108.223 would require the airport

operators and air carriers to establish

accountability standards for

identification media.

Finally, language is proposed in both

notices to expand training requirements

to include personnel performing

security-related duties (proposed

§ 107.211 and § 108.227), to incorporate

similar sections for the implementation

of contingency plans (proposed

§ 107.301 and § 108.307), and to require

compliance with Security Directives

(proposed § 107.303 and § 108.305).

Section-by-Section Analysis

In this notice, the FAA proposes to

revise existing §§ 107.1 through 107.31.

The FAA further proposes to add

several new sections, some of which

address the security responsibilities of

persons and the requirements for

personnel identification systems.

Individual airport security programs

which implement the requirements of

part 107 would be subject to revision as

a consequence of this rulemaking (see

the section below entitled

‘‘Implementation Schedule’’).

Historically, part 107 has been

amended in increments with each

amendment being added to the

regulation at the end of the part. The

FAA proposes to reorganize the

regulation into specific subparts

identified by subject matter. To do so

would require a change in the current

numbering scheme. For example, all

sections that specify security program

content and approval process would be

listed in proposed subpart B, entitled

‘‘Security Program.’’ All sections which

describe the operational aspects of

systems or procedures required in the

approved security program would be

listed in proposed subpart C,

‘‘Operations,’’ and so on.

This arrangement of the sections by

subpart is intended to make part 107

‘‘user friendly’’ by allowing the reader

to locate a particular section easily and

to identify all requirements relevant to

a specific subject readily. Arranging the

regulation by subparts also would allow

the FAA to keep similar sections

together rather than to add serially to

the body of the regulation.

Throughout the proposed rule,

references are made to 49 U.S.C.

Subtitle VII. This statute is the

recodification of FAA’s authority to

prescribe aviation security regulations

previously found in the Federal

Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. App.

1301 et seq.

Subpart A—General

Section 107.1 Applicability

This notice proposes to extend the

applicability of existing § 107.1. This

proposal would extend the applicability

to employees, contractors, and other

individuals who have significant

security responsibilities at an airport

and whose actions could diminish the

effectiveness of those systems, methods,

or procedures required by this part, by

acts such as subverting an access control

system, divulging security-sensitive

information, or falsifying records.

Further, the FAA proposes to extend

airport security requirements beyond

airports serving scheduled passenger

operations. Instead, the proposed

requirements would apply to an airport

regularly serving any air carrier required

to have a security program under parts

108 and 129. This is not intended,

however, to imply that an airport which

only serves an occasional single air

carrier flight is necessarily required to

implement an airport security program.

Title 49 U.S.C. 44903 specifies that the

FAA shall impose certain security

requirements on airports ‘‘regularly

serving’’ air carrier operations.

This notice also proposes to move

existing § 107.1(a)(3), which applies the

requirements of this part to persons

entering a sterile area, to part 108. This

change would consolidate most security

requirements applicable to the sterile

area in part 108, since the responsibility

for ensuring the integrity of the sterile

area rests mainly with air carriers.

Part 107 currently refers to the

‘‘Director of Civil Aviation Security’’ as

the official who oversees civil aviation

security operations and approves airport

security programs. Under internal FAA

reorganization, the current title of this

position is Associate Administrator for

Civil Aviation Security; however, 49

U.S.C. 44932 refers to this official as the

Assistant Administrator for Civil

Aviation Security. Therefore, paragraph

(b) of this section would use the title

‘‘Assistant Administrator for Civil

Aviation Security.’’ The FAA intends to

resolve this inconsistency before

issuance of the final rule. In addition,

paragraph (b) would clarify that the

Deputy Assistant Administrator for Civil

Aviation Security, or any individual

formally designated could act in the

capacity of the Assistant Administrator

and the duties of this position could be

further delegated.

Section 107.3 Definitions

This proposed section would replace

existing § 107.3, Security program. The

provisions of existing § 107.3 would be

incorporated under proposed Subpart B,

Airport Security Program. This

proposed section also would revise the

definitions contained under current

§ 107.1, Applicability and definitions.

The introductory text of this proposed

section would make the definitions in

proposed part 108 apply to this part.

The term ‘‘air operations area’’ in

existing § 107.1 would be replaced by

the term ‘‘restricted operations area’’

and its definition modified. The

definition ‘‘exclusive area’’ in existing

§ 107.1 would be revised and grouped
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41765

with a newly defined ‘‘exclusive area

agreement.’’ This new definition would

ensure clarity of standards pertaining to

security agreements between the

airports and air carriers or foreign air

carriers, and expand the applicability of

exclusive area agreements to include not

only air carrier leaseloads but

individual access points as well. The

definitions ‘‘escort’’ and ‘‘sterile area’’

would remain essentially unchanged

from existing § 107.1 The definition

‘‘escort’’ would be revised to include

reference to the proposed critical

security area and restricted operations

area; the definition ‘‘sterile area’’ would

be revised to clarify the responsibility to

conduct inspections of persons and

property.

The following definitions would be

added: Airport security program,

Airport tenant, Airport tenant security

program, Assistant Administrator,

Critical security area, Exclusive area

agreement, Restricted operations area,

and Unescorted access authority.

The definitions ‘‘airport tenant’’ and

‘‘airport tenant security program’’ would

be added to this section to clarify

proposed § 107.113 and to eliminate

confusion between airport tenant

security programs (which do not apply

to air carriers and foreign air carriers

that have security programs) and

exclusive area agreements (which only

apply to air carriers and foreign air

carriers that have security programs).

This notice proposes two new

security area definitions. The definition

of ‘‘critical security area’’ is introduced

for the purposes of proposed § 107.201,

Security of the Critical Security Area.

The term ‘‘critical security area’’ would

be added to replace the term ‘‘secured

area’’ found in existing § 107.14. The

definition ‘‘restricted operations area’’

would be added to replace the term ‘‘air

operations area’’ found in existing

§§ 107.1 and 107.13. This definition

would be added for the purposes of

proposed § 107.203, Security of the

Restricted Operations Area. (See below

for further discussion of these particular

sections).

The description of the intended

parameters of ‘‘critical security area’’

and ‘‘restricted operations areas’’ would

be purposely limited. Due to the

different physical layouts and tenant

activities, it is impossible to define with

specificity in this proposed rule the

boundaries of the proposed critical

security area and restricted operations

area. As such, the proposed definitions

give only general descriptions for

critical security area and a restricted

operations area.

The term ‘‘unescorted access

authority’’ would be defined in this

section to support access and

identification requirements of the newly

proposed critical security area and

restricted operations area. It would be

included to ensure a clear distinction

between individuals that are authorized

access and those who are not.

Section 107.5 Airport Security

Coordinator

Under this proposal, existing § 107.5

entitled ‘‘Approval of security program’’

would be incorporated into proposed

$107.105 entitled ‘‘Approval and

amendments,’’ under proposed Subpart

B, Airport Security Program. Existing

§ 107.29 entitled ‘‘Airport Security

Coordinator’’ would be revised and

renumbered as new § 107.5 under new

Subpart A, General.

As part of the employment standards

rulemaking [56 FR 41412; August 20,

1991] adopted in response to the

Aviation Security Improvement Act, the

FAA Administrator requires airport

operators to designate an official at each

airport as the airport security

coordinator (ASC), to serve as the point

of contact with the FAA on security

matters and to provide oversight to the

airport’s security system. The ASC

serves as the counterpart of the air

carrier’s ground security coordinator

required under part 108.

To promote standardization, this

proposed section would further define

the functions and responsibilities of the

ASC, including the designation of

alternate ASCs. Specifically, the ASC

would be responsible for immediately

initiating corrective action for each

instance of noncompliance and for

reviewing all security-related functions

for compliance and effectiveness. The

proposal also would clarify that an

individual serving as an ASC may

perform other duties in addition to

those required by the FAA, and need

not serve full-time as the ASC.

Existing language specifies that the

ASC is the airport operator’s primary

FAA contact, charged with reviewing all

security-related functions for

compliance with this part and the

airport security program. Nevertheless,

the ASAC commented that the FAA has

not applied this requirement as written,

as the ASC is not treated as the FAA’s

primary contact. Proposed language is

intended to clarify the relationship

between the FAA and the ASC.

The FAA also proposes to require

training for the ASC every 2 years. This

training is intended to ensure that ASCs

and their alternates remain updated on

both airport and air carrier security

regulatory and operational

requirements. The ASAC opposed

inclusion in the rule of any ASC

training requirements as well as a

description of the ASC’s job duties and

responsibilities. The committee did

note, however, that, if training is

required, credit should be given for the

ASC’s previous experience.

The FAA therefore requests comments

on methods airport operators would use

to meet this training requirement. For

example, should the FAA require in

security programs specific training as it

does for air carrier ground security

coordinators? Should the training be

performed once or should it be

recurrent? Should the FAA develop

specific guidance or a curriculum for

such a training program? How should

experience be factored into the training

requirement? Should existing ASCs be

‘‘grandfathered’’ under the training

requirement?

The FAA also proposes moving to this

section certain provisions of existing

§ 107.31 recently effective [60 FR 51854;

October 3, 1995] regarding the ASC

responsibility to review and control

results of access investigations and to

serve as the contact for individuals

appealing their results. This change is

intended to ensure that all ASC

responsibilities are located in the same

section of the rule.

Section 107.7 Inspection Authority

Under this proposal, existing § 107.7

entitled ‘‘Changed conditions affecting

security’’ would be moved to proposed

Subpart, B § 107.107. Existing § 107.27

entitled ‘‘Evidence of compliance’’

would be given a new title, ‘‘Inspection

authority,’’ and revised and renumbered

as new § 107.7 under new Subpart A,

General. This proposed section would

combine the evidence of compliance

requirements of existing § 107.27 with

the FAA’s statutory authority to conduct

inspections, investigations, and tests.

Paragraph (a) proposes to state the

Administrator’s authority to conduct

inspections and investigations necessary

to determine compliance with part 107

and the security program. The authority

for the FAA to conduct inspections

necessary to gauge compliance with

Federally-mandated security

requirements has, on occasion, been

challenged by airport operators. The

new language would resolve any

misunderstanding regarding the FAA’s

authority to conduct such inspections

under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII.

Proposed paragraph (b) would restate

the language of existing § 107.27.

Proposed paragraph (c) would clarify

the airport operator’s obligation to

provide FAA Special Agents the

necessary access and identification

media to conduct inspections. This

proposed requirement would not be
41766 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

extended in the rule to any FAA

employee other than Special Agents.

Special Agents are those FAA

employees who are authorized to

conduct inspections of airport and air

carrier security operations and who

must possess and present valid FAAissued credentials. There are some

inspections and investigations that a

Special Agent can accomplish only with

unescorted access to the critical security

area and restricted operations area, and

it is essential that they be able to

accomplish these tasks. The FAA will

provide criteria for ascertaining the

validity of Special Agents’ credentials in

non-regulatory guidance materials.

The inclusion of paragraph (c) is

intended to facilitate FAA Special

Agents conducting inspections,

investigations, tests, and other duties

without being hampered. It is not

intended to allow FAA Special Agents

to have access to the entire airport, only

to those portions necessary to conduct

their duties. Nor is the FAA proposing

to require airport operators to give

access and identification media to all

FAA inspectors. However, as mentioned

in the discussion of § 107.209 (d) below,

airports may be required to accept FAA

form 8000–39 as a valid identification

media.

Section 107.9 Falsification

Under this proposal, existing § 107.9

entitled ‘‘Amendment of security

program by airport operator’’ would be

moved to proposed Subpart B under

§ 107.105 and retitled ‘‘Approval and

amendments.’’ Proposed § 107.9 would

be new, retitled ‘‘Falsification,’’ and

would be included under proposed

Subpart A, General. This section is the

same as the current § 107.2 adopted on

November 17, 1996 (61 FR 64242

(December 3, 1996).

Section 107.11 Security

Responsibilities of Persons

Under this proposal, existing § 107.11

entitled ‘‘Amendment of security

program by FAA’’ would be moved to

proposed Subpart B under § 107.105

‘‘Approval and amendments.’’ Proposed

§ 107.11, retitled ‘‘Security

responsibilities of persons,’’ would be

included under Subpart A, General, and

would be completely new.

The FAA believes that the

contribution of individuals to the

success of the civil aviation system

cannot be overestimated and that the

regulations must address the

responsibility of individuals who work

within the security system. Therefore,

the FAA is proposing to prohibit

persons from tampering, compromising,

or modifying any security system, or

carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon,

explosive, or destructive substance into

sterile areas, critical security areas, or

restricted operations areas. Although the

airport operator is primarily responsible

for carrying out statutory and regulatory

security responsibilities under this part,

the FAA believes that it is critical that

persons employed directly by the

airport operator understand the

importance of their responsibilities to

ensure that security measures within the

civil aviation system are properly

implemented. It is also important that

other persons who may have an impact

on aviation security understand their

responsibilities.

This section proposes specific

requirements to make persons

accountable for complying with

regulatory prohibitions against

interfering with or compromising

security methods or procedures required

under this part. Moreover, by including

these prohibitions in the regulation, this

proposed section would permit the use

of civil penalty action as a means to gain

compliance under this part by persons

who are employed by the airport

operator and other persons not under

the direct authority of the airport

operator (such as trespassers).

While there are some instances in

which enforcement action against

persons may be taken by the FAA, in

many cases enforcement action would

not be appropriate or necessary. The

FAA intends, in proposed § 107.103, to

require the airport operator to include in

its security program procedures to

ensure that persons with unescorted

access to critical security areas or

restricted operations areas will comply

with the requirements of this section.

Many airports already have such

programs in place and have established

penalties, such as monetary fines and

revocation of access authorization. The

airport operator would remain the

primary party responsible for violations,

including those committed by their

employees and contractors. However, in

appropriate cases, persons who fail to

comply would be subject to FAA

enforcement action, such as a civil

penalty of up to $1,000 per violation of

these rules.

The term ‘‘person,’’ used throughout

this new section and the proposed rule,

is used as defined in 14 CFR Part 1,

under § 1.1, General Definitions, which

defines person to mean an individual,

firm, partnership, corporation,

company, association, joint-stock

association, or governmental entity, and

includes a trustee, receiver, assignee, or

similar representative of any of them.

Proposed paragraph (a) of this new

section would prohibit tampering or

interfering with an airport’s security

system, including circumventing access

control systems and misusing

identification media. This proposed

paragraph is intended to provide a

deterrent which, in turn, would promote

the effectiveness of the security control

measures required by this part.

For instance, many airports have

invested in personnel identification

systems as a means of satisfying the

requirement to control movement under

existing § 107.13 (proposed § 107.203).

This proposal would require the use of

personnel identification systems in both

critical security areas and restricted

operations areas and would set forth

minimum standards for personnel

identification systems. Establishing

sanctions for not complying with

personnel identification media display

requirements would significantly

promote the effectiveness of personnel

identification systems.

Further, this section would prohibit

persons from compromising, or

rendering less effective, any system

implemented in response to the various

requirements of this part. This

prohibition includes similar language

found in existing § 107.25(f) that

prohibits the use of an airport-approved

identification by any person unless it is

issued to that person. However, the

proposed language would expand the

prohibition to encompass any type of

intentional misuse, such as tampering,

compromise, or modification, of

security systems or the unauthorized

circumvention of these systems. Such

acts would include writing on walls or

doors combination lock numbers that

provide access to critical security areas

or restricted operations areas,

temporarily or permanently disabling

electronic access systems, and loaning

of access or identification media which

would provide access to, or movement

within, security-sensitive areas of an

airport without authorization.

Under part 108, the responsibility

rests with the air carrier for ensuring

that unauthorized items which may be

harmful to civil aviation or to the

traveling public do not get into the

sterile area. The FAA, accordingly,

believes that the current prohibition

found in existing § 107.21(a) against the

introduction of a deadly or dangerous

weapon, explosive, or incendiary into

sterile areas is more appropriately

located in part 108. The FAA proposes

transferring the existing prohibition

found in § 107.21(a) to proposed part

108.

The risk to the traveling public

presented by the presence of a deadly or

dangerous weapon, explosive, or

incendiary, or destructive substance
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41767

should not be underestimated.

Paragraph (b) of this section, as

proposed, has been drafted to prohibit

the unauthorized possession of such

weapons or other dangerous items in

sterile areas, critical security areas, and

restricted operations areas. The current

rules refer to the carriage of ‘‘explosive,

incendiary, or deadly or dangerous

weapons’’ in various places, including

existing § 107.21 and § 108.9. The

statute, however, refers to searching

persons and property for the presence of

a ‘‘dangerous weapon, explosive, or

other destructive substance.’’ (See 49

U.S.C. 44902) In order to make more

clear what items the air carriers search

for and what items are controlled in

various areas secured for the purposes

of part 107, the FAA proposes to refer

throughout the revised part to ‘‘deadly

or dangerous weapon, explosive,

incendiary, or other destructive

substance.’’ This change is proposed in

paragraph (b) of this section as well as

proposed § 107.101(a)(1),

§ 107.219(c)(1), and § 107.219(c)(4)(ii).

The FAA also will provide guidance on

destructive substances.

This section is also intended to

prohibit persons from conducting

unauthorized ‘‘tests’’ of airport security

systems by compromising or

circumventing any element of the

system. However, proposed paragraph

(c), would allow for individuals

authorized by the Federal government,

airport operator, and air carrier to

conduct tests and inspections of

security systems.

Provisions regarding the carriage of

firearms by law enforcement officers

and other authorized personnel found in

existing § 107.21(b) would be included

in proposed paragraph (d). Paragraph (d)

proposes that provisions of this section

that apply to firearms and weapons

would not be applicable to law

enforcement personnel, Federal Air

Marshals, and certain individuals

authorized in an airport security

program to carry a weapon. This

paragraph would further exempt

persons properly transporting declared

firearms under proposed § 108.213 or

hazardous materials under 49 CFR part

175 from firearms and weapons

prohibitions. Proposed paragraph (d)(7)

also would exclude from these

prohibitions weapons and firearms

legally carried aboard non-air-carrier

aircraft, such as general aviation pilots

operating personal aircraft and

transporting firearms in compliance

with state and local laws.

The concept of requiring persons to be

responsible for complying with security

measures was generally supported by

the ASAC, particularly the airport

operator representatives. Two ASAC

members, the Air Line Pilots

Association and the National Air

Transport Association, however,

expressed reservations about the

feasibility of enforcing such a

requirement and suggested that security

resources could be better used

elsewhere to achieve the same results.

By promoting awareness of security

responsibilities, this proposal also

would address the concerns raised by

the DOT Inspector General about

employee awareness of, and compliance

with, access control and challenge

procedures. Further, this proposed

section parallels efforts to require that

persons be accountable for their actions

related to the dissemination of sensitive

security information [Sensitive Security

Information, final rule published 62 FR

13736, March 21, 1997].

Other federal regulations and statutes

may also contain applicable security

and safety responsibilities of persons,

including the following: proposed

§ 107.207, Access investigation;

proposed § 108.201 Screening of

persons and property and acceptance of

cargo; proposed § 108.213 of this part,

Carriage of weapons; Part 191 of this

chapter, Protection of Sensitive Security

Information; 49 CFR part 175,

Transportation of hazardous materials;

49 U.S.C. 46302, regarding false

information involving aircraft piracy,

interference with flight crew members,

carrying a weapon, and other criminal

laws; and 49 U.S.C. 46303, regarding

carriage of a weapon.

Subpart B—Airport Security Program

Section 107.101 Requirements

While part 107 is a public document

and sets forth broad airport security

requirements, the security-sensitive

details of how an airport meets these

requirements are contained separately

in the airport’s FAA-approved, nonpublic security program. The FAA

intends to continue to use this method

and proposes a new security program

requirements section, § 107.101. This

proposed section would be included

under proposed Subpart B which would

incorporate all sections relating to

airport security programs. The

provisions of existing § 107.3(a) would

be stated in this proposed section. The

FAA believes that this minor change

will help the reader comprehend the

overall purpose and format of an airport

security program.

This new section would incorporate

similar provisions of the existing

regulation that require the airport

security program to be in writing, and

that a copy be kept at the airport

operations office. The program’s

objective has been modified to include

protection against the introduction of a

deadly or dangerous weapon, explosive,

incendiary, or other destructive

substances onto aircraft. Also, the

reference to the Director of Civil

Aviation Security would be updated to

Assistant Administrator and reference to

part 191 prohibitions on the distribution

and disclosure of sensitive security

information would be included.

The FAA is developing a Standard

Airport Security Program (SASP) to aid

airport operators in developing and

revising their security programs.

Drafting of the model program is being

coordinated with the revision of part

107 and it is scheduled to be available

shortly after the publication of the final

rule of part 107. Additionally, the FAA

is revising security advisory circulars to

ensure that they reflect any changes to

part 107 resulting from this rulemaking;

the circulars are intended to be available

references for the development and

revision of airport security programs.

Section 107.103 Content

This proposed section would be new

and would be added to proposed

Subpart B, Airport Security Program. It

would describe the required content of

airport security programs. Basically, it

would revise the provisions of existing

§ 107.3.

Existing § 107.3 defines the type of air

carrier operation that requires a specific

airport security program. Currently, the

type of security program an airport

operator must implement is expressed

in terms of the type of aircraft

operations. The proposed revision

would express the applicability in terms

of aircraft operations regulated under

proposed § 108.101. Proposed § 108.101,

Security program: Adoption and

Implementation, requires each air

carrier to adopt and carry out a security

program as it applies to the type of

operations conducted. This change is

intended to promote consistency and

interdependency between parts 107 and

108.

The FAA designs security regulations

to provide varying levels of protection

based upon the size, type, and

frequency of aircraft operations.

Security provisions, therefore, are more

demanding at airports where air carriers

utilize large transport airplanes with 60

seats or more, and have scheduled

departures and arrivals. The number

and nature of crimes against civil

aviation since 1972 validates the

connection between the requirement for

an airport security program and the type

of aircraft serving a given airport.
41768 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Experience shows that airport served

only by smaller aircraft need not comply

with all requirements appropriate for

airports served by larger aircraft. This

approach currently allows smaller

airports to implement security measures

in a more economical manner. The FAA

believes that this has provided an

acceptable level of security at such

facilities and proposes to continue this

approach to airport operator security

programs.

The proposed rule continues to

specify three different security programs

varying in complexity, but the proposed

part 108 would modify the type of

passenger operations that would

determine the program required. The

most comprehensive security program

would continue to be applicable to

airports serviced by scheduled

passenger operations with aircraft of

more than 60 seats.

The type of passenger operations that

trigger the two remaining types of

airport security programs have been

expanded somewhat, as the result of

proposed changes to part 108, to ensure

complete protection of the sterile area

and to ensure security of all passengers,

even those enplaned by private charters

and on helicopters (discussed below).

As proposed, airports that serve

scheduled passenger or public charter

passenger operations with aircraft

having a passenger seating configuration

of more than 60 seats would continue to

have in their security program

descriptions of the following:

1. Areas to be secured and those

adjacent to the airport that would affect

security;

2. Procedures to control access to

areas to be secured;

3. Exclusive areas and the procedures

each air carrier must use to notify the

airport operator when that air carrier

cannot adequately control access;

4. Law enforcement support and

training;

5. System for maintaining records;

and

6. Alternate security procedures to be

used in emergencies and other unusual

conditions.

Proposed § 107.103(a) also would add

new requirements to require such

airports to include in their security

program a description of the following:

1. Airport security coordinator’s

duties, means of contact, training and

identification;

2. Security compliance program;

3. Critical security area boundaries,

activities, entities and signs, as well as

procedures, facilities, and equipment

used to perform the control functions;

4. Restricted operations area

boundaries, activities, entities and signs,

as well as procedures, facilities, and

equipment used to perform the control

functions;

5. Sterile area boundaries and

procedures, facilities and equipment

used to control access, other than the

passenger screening checkpoint;

6. Personnel background check

procedures;

7. Personnel and vehicle

identification systems;

8. Escort and challenge procedures;

9. Employee and tenant training

programs;

10. Schedule for submitting records;

11. Procedures, facilities, and

equipment supporting air carrier

passenger screening operations,

including law enforcement support;

12. Procedures, facilities, and

equipment supporting the contingency

plan;

13. Procedures for handling Security

Directives, Information Circulars, and

classified information, as appropriate;

14. Procedures for public advisories;

15. Incident management procedures;

and

16. Each airport tenant security

agreement, including a description of

the area and procedures, facilities, and

equipment used to perform the control

functions, and methods by which the

airport operator will monitor and audit

the tenant.

A second level of standards,

contained in proposed § 107.103(b),

would be required for airport operators

serving air carrier operations described

in proposed § 108.101 (a)(2) and (a)(3)

and existing § 129.25 (b)(2) and (b)(3).

Existing § 107.3(g) requires an airport

operator to have a security program if

served by scheduled passenger or public

charter operations where passengers are

enplaned from, or deplaned into, a

sterile area. Proposed § 107.103(b)

would still require an airport serving

these type of air carrier operations to

have an airport security program but, by

referencing proposed § 108.101 (a)(2)

and (a)(3), these operations would be

expanded to also cover public charter

operations using aircraft with less than

61 seats and any private charter

operations when passengers are

enplaned from, or deplaned into, a

sterile area.

For such airports, the minimum law

enforcement standards would remain

essentially the same; however,

requirements for an airport security

coordinator, as well as the

establishment of contingency plans and

incident response procedures, are

proposed. As these additions typically

are procedural in nature, the FAA

believes that the inclusion of such

requirements would not unduly burden

airports with such limited operations.

Instead, this enhancement would

promote better compliance and

emergency preparedness by ensuring

better coordination and dissemination

of security-related information, and

response to threats to civil aviation.

Specifically, this notice proposes that

an airport operator serving air carrier

operations specified in proposed

§ 108.101 (a)(2) and (a)(3) and existing

§ 129.25 (b)(2) and (b)(3) would

continue to have in their security

program the descriptions of law

enforcement support and training, the

descriptions of a system for maintaining

records, and also the identity and means

to contact the airport security

coordinator.

Proposed § 107.103(b) also would

require such airports to include in their

security program a description of the

following:

1. Airport security coordinator duties

and training;

2. Schedule for submitting records;

3. Procedures, facilities, and

equipment supporting the contingency

plan;

4. Procedures for handling Security

Directives, Information Circulars, and

classified information, as appropriate;

5. Procedures for public advisories;

and

6. Incident management procedures.

The third and final level in proposed

§ 107.103(c) is intended for airports

served by air carriers required to have

a security program under proposed

§ 108.101(a)(4) and existing

§ 129.25(b)(4). Similar to existing

§ 107.3(f), an airport security program

would be required if the airport is

served by air carriers that have

scheduled passenger operations in an

aircraft with a passenger seating

configuration of more than 30 but less

than 61 seats. Proposed § 108.101(a)(4),

however, would expand the

applicability to public charter

operations as well as private charter

operations using aircraft with more than

30 seats and any type of international

operation using an aircraft of less than

61 seats to and from the United States.

Such air carriers would not be required

to implement all security measures at all

times. They would implement portions

of their security program only when

directed by the Administrator to do so.

Similar to the second level of airport

security program requirements, the FAA

proposes to expand program

requirements for this third category of

airports to include establishing

procedures for incident response and

public advisories. Again, the FAA views

these additions as procedural and not

unduly burdensome, and believes they
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41769

would promote a higher level of

emergency preparedness.

Specifically, this notice proposes that

an airport operator serving air carrier

operations specified in proposed

§ 108.101(a)(4) and existing

§ 129.25(b)(4) would continue to have in

their security program the descriptions

of law enforcement support availability

and training, the descriptions of a

system for maintaining records, and also

the identity and means to contact the

airport security coordinator. Proposed

§ 107.103(c) also would require such

airports to include in their security

program a description of the following:

1. Airport security coordinator duties

and training;

2. A schedule for submitting records;

3. Procedures for handling Security

Directives, Information Circulars, and

classified information, as appropriate;

4. Procedures for public advisories;

5. Incident management procedures.

The following chart compares security

program requirements between airports

served by different levels of air carrier

operations:

Proposed requirement

Airport served by

Scheduled

operations

and public

charter > 60

seats

Other schd.

operations

and public/

private

charter required to

screen

Any operations not

required to

screen < 61

seats

Airport Security Coordinator (proposed § 107.5) ..................................................................................... X X X

Security Compliance Program (proposed § 107.103(a)(2)) ..................................................................... X

Alternate Security Procedures (proposed § 107.103(a)(19)) ................................................................... X

Critical Security Area (proposed § 107.201) ............................................................................................ X

Restricted Operations Area (proposed § 107.203) .................................................................................. X

Access Controls (proposed § 107.203(b)(1) and § 107.205) ................................................................... X

Signs (proposed § 107.201(b)(7) and § 107.203(b)(7)) ............................................................................ X

Personnel Background Check Procedures (proposed § 107.203(b)(2) and § 107.207) .......................... X

Personnel/Vehicle Identification Systems (proposed § 107.209) ............................................................. X

Escort Procedures (proposed § 107.205(d)) ............................................................................................ X

Challenge Procedures (proposed § 107.209(f)) ....................................................................................... X

Training Programs (proposed § 107.211) ................................................................................................ X

Law Enforcement (proposed § 107.213, § 107.215 and § 107.217) ........................................................ X X X

Records (proposed § 107.219) ................................................................................................................. X X X

Contingency Plan (proposed § 107.301) .................................................................................................. X X

Security Directives/Information Circulars (proposed § 107.303) .............................................................. X X X

Public Advisories (proposed § 107.305) ................................................................................................... X X X

Incident Management and Notification Procedures (proposed § 107.307) .............................................. X X X

Section 107.105 Approval and

Amendments

To facilitate the amendment process,

this notice proposes that existing

§§ 107.5, 107.9, and 107.11 be combined

into a single section, proposed

§ 107.105, and revised to make the

process consistent in both parts 107 and

108. Several changes are proposed to the

amendment process itself. Proposed

§ 108.105 prescribes the same approval

and amendment procedures.

Throughout this new proposed

section, any references to the ‘‘Director

of Civil Aviation Security’’ are replaced

with ‘‘Assistant Administrator.’’ Petition

deadlines also have been included for

airport operators. Specifically,

paragraph (a)(2) proposes that airport

operators submit to the Administrator a

petition for reconsideration within 30

days after receiving the notice to

modify. Paragraphs (d) and (e) of

existing § 107.5 have been combined

into proposed § 107.105(a)(3) which

provide for the Administrator to dispose

of any petition within 30 days of

receipt. The FAA also specifies, in

paragraph (a)(2), that the filing of a

petition stays the notice to modify

pending a decision by the

Administrator. Such timeframes are

intended to promote timely and efficient

action by both the airport operator and

the FAA.

Paragraph (b) of this new section

would prescribe procedures for an

airport operator to request an

amendment to its airport security

program now covered under existing

§ 107.9. Currently § 107.9 states that an

airport operator requesting approval of a

proposed amendment to its program

must submit the request 30 days prior

to the effective date of the amendment.

The FAA proposes to increase the

number of days prior to the effective

date that the airport must submit its

proposed amendment from 30 to 45

days. The proposed rule also notes that

the amendment process may take longer

than 45 days if the proposed

amendment is modified or denied.

These languages changes are intended to

allow extra time for discussion with the

FAA and assist airport operators in

planning for program changes.

Existing § 107.9 also states that the

FAA will respond to an amendment

proposed by the airport operator within

15 days. The proposal extends this time

period to provide the FAA with a more

realistic period in which to conduct a

comprehensive review of the proposed

amendment to an airport security

program. Under this proposal, the FAA

would have 30 days after receipt for

approval or denial of the proposed

amendment.

In proposed paragraph (b)(4) of this

new section, the FAA proposes to

modify existing § 107.9(d) to limit the

time that an airport operator may

petition the Administrator to reconsider

the denial to 30 days. Similar to

proposed paragraph (a), this

requirement is intended to ensure that

the airport operator takes prompt action

on a petition and permits adequate time

to exchange relevant information and

support documentation.

Retention of the FAA’s existing

procedures to amend an airport security

program is proposed in paragraphs (c)

and (d). Two significant changes,

however, are being proposed to the

existing procedures of § 107.11: (1) A

new requirement for airport operators to

submit petitions for reconsideration no

later than 15 days before the effective

date of the amendment, and (2) a

clarification that a petition for
41770 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

reconsideration stays the effective date

of the amendment. These changes also

are proposed to ensure a timely and

efficient exchange of information.

The ASAC recommended that any

amendment issued by the FAA to an

airport security program include an

expiration date. The committee was

concerned that the FAA may use the

amendment process to circumvent the

rulemaking process and suggested that

the FAA be required to initiate a formal

rulemaking if it wished the provisions

of the amendment to continue after the

expiration date.

When there is information that cannot

be discussed in a public forum,

amendment of the security program

provides a means to impose and

implement a new requirement. The FAA

does not believe it would be in the best

interest of the traveling public to require

a rulemaking for every amendment to an

airport security program, but will

establish internal procedures to

periodically review amendments to

ensure that their inclusion in the

security program, rather than part 107,

is appropriate.

Section 107.107 Changed Conditions

Affecting Security

This proposed section would be new

and would include changed conditions

that currently require the airport

operator to take corrective action under

existing § 107.7. It would expand the

scope of the requirement to encompass

all the elements of the security program.

The FAA believes that every element of

a security program plays an essential

part in the overall integrity of an

airport’s security system. Therefore, the

FAA intends to expand those conditions

that must be reported to ensure that any

changes that may impact security will

be reported to the FAA and addressed

as soon as possible.

The proposed rule language reflects

the need for the airport operator to

report any changes in the physical

layout of the airport terminal area that

may have an impact on the checkpoint

screening operation for which an air

carrier is responsible. Similarly, this

section proposes to require the airport

operator to report any changes in air

carrier and foreign air carrier aircraft

operations that could lead to a

regulatory requirement, such as a

change to an air carrier’s level of

service, aircraft, or leasehold.

The proposal, like the existing

regulation, would establish procedures

for the airport operator to follow when

a changed condition occurs. Currently,

it is necessary for the airport operator to

follow routine amendment procedures

set forth in § 107.9 (proposed § 107.107)

when specific elements of the airport

security program change. These

procedures would be augmented under

this proposal to require the airport

operator to initially notify the FAA

within 2 hours, or within an approved

timeframe, of the discovery of any

changed condition that could affect how

an airport complies with regulatory

requirements. The availability of

electronic communication, overnight

delivery services, and local FAA field

offices would seemingly provide the

means for the airport operator to readily

communicate changes to the FAA.

While the proposed language provides

flexibility in notification time,

comments are requested, however, on

the feasibility of a 2-hour notification

requirement.

This proposed section would require

the airport operator during this initial

notification to obtain verbal approval of

any interim measures to be taken to

maintain adequate security. As is

currently the case, this proposed section

would still allow the FAA to issue an

emergency security program

amendment under proposed

§ 107.105(d) if an agreement on

adequate interim measures cannot be

reached. However, new language

provides relief in responding to shortterm changes.

After this initial notification,

paragraphs (c) and (d) propose that the

airport operator follow certain

procedures to amend its security

program to reflect the change. For

changed conditions under 60 days’

duration, paragraph (c) proposes that

the airport operator be relieved from the

amendment process required under

proposed § 107.105 and only be

required to provide written notification

within 72 hours for FAA approval.

Recognizing that many changed

conditions affecting security can be

readily resolved in less time than it

would take to complete the formal

amendment process, the FAA intends

this change to provide some relief in

reporting to the FAA any short-term or

temporary changes while ensuring that

the FAA retains oversight of temporary

or short-term changed conditions to

security.

Proposed paragraph (d) of this section

would provide procedures for the

disposition of changed conditions

anticipated to be over 60 days in

duration. These procedures are

currently used for all instances of a

changed condition affecting security.

Section 107.109 Alternative Means of

Compliance

This proposed section is new. It

would be added to provide relief in

certain unique circumstances from the

full requirements of an airport security

program.

Specifically, it would provide relief

for small airports located in

communities that are only served by

seasonal air carrier or foreign air carrier

traffic (such as ski resorts), remotely

located, subject to extreme

environmental conditions, or have

limited facilities and few employees.

Often these airports serve aircraft larger

than 60 seats for only a portion of the

year, or on an infrequent but regular

basis (e.g. one operation per day, three

operations per week, winter operations

only). However, under the definition of

proposed § 107.103(a), such airports

would be required to have a

comprehensive security program. This

section would permit the FAA to

approve airport operators of such

airports to use alternative means to

comply with the requirements of the

rule

While air carrier or foreign air carrier

operations with aircraft having more

than 60 seats necessitate more complex

security measures, the FAA recognizes

that requiring such airports to

implement security measures at the

same level of intensity as larger airports

would not always be necessary to

achieve the required level of security.

Currently, the Assistant Administrator

can allow for flexibility in applying

security measures at such airports, and

the FAA proposes to incorporate this

process in proposed part 107. To

petition for relief from part 107

requirements, larger airport operators

would still have to use the exemption

process under existing § 11.25, Petitions

for rule making or exemptions.

Section 107.111 Exclusive Area

Agreements

The FAA proposes a new section

devoted to exclusive area agreements.

Existing part 107 includes exclusive

area agreements as a provision of

§ 107.3(b)(3) and (b)(5) and § 107.13,

Security of air operations area. As

exclusive area agreements are a part of

an airport operator’s security program

and detail part 107 responsibilities

assumed by air carriers, the FAA

believes that the requirements for

exclusive areas should be more closely

tied to the airport security program and

addressed in a separate section.

Paragraph (a) proposes expanding the

existing exclusive area responsibilities

for air carriers and foreign air carriers to

include individual access points (e.g.,

doors). The security responsibilities for

these points may be assumed by a part

108 air carrier or part 129 foreign air

carrier based on an agreement with the
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41771

airport operator. This section also

proposes updating the terminology of

the areas in which exclusive area

agreements are applied from the air

operations area to the proposed critical

security areas and restricted operations

areas.

In 1992, the FAA initiated a test

program to allow several all-cargo

carriers to enter into exclusive area

agreements with airports by which they

assumed the responsibility for control of

access to and movement within their

leaseholds. The requirements of part

108 do not apply to all-cargo carriers.

The test program has been successful

and the FAA proposes to allow all-cargo

carriers which have voluntarily

implemented security programs under

part 108 enter into exclusive area

agreements with airport operators.

Section 107.113 Aiport Tenant

Security Programs

This new section proposes to permit

the use of airport tenant security

programs that allow airport tenants

other than air carriers or foreign air

carriers to assume some of an airport

operator’s security responsibilities, as

specified in 49 U.S.C. 44903(c)(2).

While statutory language does not

require the FAA to approve airport

tenant security programs, the FAA

believes the judicious use of such

programs would result in better

compliance by more directly involving

airport tenants in the implementation of

security measures. The FAA is

concerned, however, that under an

airport tenant security agreement,

security violations and the associated

monetary penalties could be viewed as

a justifiable cost of doing business. In

order to counter that possibility, the

proposal would require the airport

tenant security program to specify not

only the enforcement steps, but also the

point at which the airport tenant

security program would be terminated if

the tenant continued to violate it.

While similar in concept to the air

carrier exclusive area agreement, the

airport tenant security program language

would differ in an important matter—

the tenant would be responsible to the

airport operator rather than directly to

the FAA. The airport operator would

function much as the FAA does by

performing compliance and

enforcement functions. The tenant

security program would have to specify

the measures by which the tenant would

control access and meet other part 107

requirements on its leasehold. These

measures would have to be agreed upon

by the FAA, the airport operator, and

the airport tenant, and specified in a

written agreement within the security

program.

Statutory language requires a security

program of an airport tenant to include

the methods the airports operator will

use to monitor and audit the tenant’s

compliance, the enforcement

procedures used in cases of noncompliance, and a provision requiring

the tenant to pay financial penalties to

the airport operator if the tenant fails to

carry out its security responsibilities.

This last provision would require the

program to include the dollar amount of

fines and other penalty action for each

type of violation.

An airport operator complying with

all measures for security compliance

with a tenant security program, as

outlined in its airport security program,

may not be found in violation by the

FAA for security violations occurring on

the tenant’s leased area. However, this

section should not be misconstrued as

diminishing to any degree the

requirements reflected in the airport

security program or the airport

operator’s regulatory responsibilities.

Paragraph (d) also would specify that

the FAA may terminate an airport

tenant security program at any time if

the tenant fails to provide an acceptable

level of security.

The FAA requests comments from

airport operators and airport tenants not

regulated under part 108 who would be

affected by this proposed section.

Specifically, any recommendations for

procedures or policy that the FAA

should issue regarding implementation

of this section are welcomed.

Subpart C—Operations

Section 107.201 Security of the

Critical Security Area

This proposed new section would

provide a more simplified approach to

designating areas to be controlled for

security purposes. As proposed, there

would then only be two types of

protected areas, and security measures

would be prescribed separately for each.

The specific requirements of these

measures would be found in subsequent

sections of the proposed rule.

Existing part 107 requires the airport

operator to designate a portion of the

airport where security measures are

applied to protect areas used for

‘‘landing, taking off, or surface

maneuvering of airplanes.’’ This area is

called the air operations area (AOA) and

existing § 107.13 prescribes standards

for controlling access and movement of

persons and vehicles within it. The

specifics of how an airport operator

meets these standards are detailed in its

airport security program.

The current regulation also requires

airports served by larger air carrier

aircraft to use stringent access and

identification controls within certain

portions of the AOA. One of these

portions, the secured area, was created

with existing § 107.14, Access control

system. Section 107.14 requires the

implementation of complex access

control measures in certain portions of

the AOA where air carriers operate. The

FAA also required airport operators 2.5

years later to implement additional

identification display and training

procedures to provide even more

protection to air carrier aircraft within a

portion of the AOA. Designated as the

Security Identification Display Area

(SIDA), this portion of the AOA

overlaps or is identical to the secured

area.

The interrelated nature of the AOA,

the secured area, and the SIDA has

created considerable confusion in the

aviation community. The secured area

has frequently been misinterpreted to

mean all areas of the airport controlled

for security purposes. The extent of its

application has been regularly disputed,

and it is often considered to be

independent of the AOA. Likewise, the

scope of the AOA has become unclear,

and the term is used within the industry

and the FAA for other purposes. For

example, Advisory Circular 150/5370–

10A, Standards for Specifying

Construction of Airports, uses the term

AOA for safety and construction

purposes. Also, the identification

requirements of the secured area.

The ASAC expressed dissatisfaction

with the terms being used to describe

existing security areas and

recommended that current terms and

requirements be regrouped into two

areas only: the Restricted Operations

Area (ROA) and the Secured Operations

Area (SOA). As proposed by the ASAC,

the SOA would essentially replace the

secured area and the SIDA, and the ROA

would replace the air operations area.

The FAA believes that the terms

‘‘SOA’’ and ‘‘ROA’’ are too similar and

could be inadvertently interchanged,

resulting in further confusion and

misunderstanding. Instead, to

accomplish the same purpose, the FAA

proposes, the terms ‘‘critical security

area’’ as the area with the highest level

of security. This area would be

approximately that of the current

secured area. The term ROA would

apply approximately to areas now

termed ‘‘AOA’’. The FAA also proposes

to require the continuous display of

airport-issued or airport-approved

identification media in all areas to be

secured. This change would apply

current SIDA requirements to all critical
41772 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

security areas and restricted operations

areas, thus eliminating the need for a

separate display area.

A tightly controlled identification

system can be used in tandem with

access control measures that may not

necessarily meet all of the performance

standards of proposed § 107.205(a), such

as group access, to achieve an

acceptable level of security. By

requiring identification media to be

displayed in both the critical security

area and the restricted operations area,

identification media would be used as a

means to comply with the requirement

to control movement to and from such

areas. The FAA continues to view

identification systems as one of the most

effective means to control movement in

any portion of a critical security area or

restricted operations area.

Proposed § 107.201 would require the

airport operator to establish a critical

security area and implement certain

security measures in this area. The

proposed critical security area

essentially would replace the secured

area that originated with existing

§ 107.14. Consistent with existing FAA

policy, only the most critical security

sensitive portions of an airport would

need to be designated as critical security

areas. Generally, those portions of the

airport are the nonplubic areas where

passenger and baggage operations are

conducted. Adjacent areas to passenger

and baggage operations also may be

included in the critical security area if

such areas cannot be separated by

security measures such as time and

distance or a physical barrier. The intent

is to more clearly describe the areas of

the airport in which security interests

are the most critical, and security

measures should be applied

accordingly.

The following table illustrates the

differences in security requirements

between the proposed critical security

area and the proposed restricted

operations area:

Requirements

Critical

security

area

Restricted

operations

area

Complex Access Controls X

Baseline Access Controls X

Escort Procedures ............ X X

Personnel and Vehicle

Identification System ..... X X

Continuous Display of

Identification .................. X X

Challenge Program ........... X X

Employment History Verification .......................... X X

Criminal Records Check ... X

Security Training ............... X

Security Briefing ................ X

Requirements

Critical

security

area

Restricted

operations

area

Signs ................................. X X

The FAA proposes that airport

operators be required to use access

controls in the critical security area that

meet the current requirements of

§ 107.14 (proposed § 107.205(a)).

Airport operators and air carriers have

invested considerable resources

implementing the access control

requirements of existing § 107.14, and

the FAA believes this investment has

resulted in greater protection of the

areas that provide access to air carrier

aircraft. While operational difficulties

have been encountered with the use of

these controls, the FAA will continue to

support their use and work with airport

operators to address operational

concerns, such as efficient control of

group access (see the discussion below

of proposed § 107.205, Access control

systems).

The FAA also proposes to continue to

require identification in the critical

security area, but to further simplify

regulatory requirements, training and

identification requirements would no

longer be linked together as currently

prescribed in § 107.25. Instead, this

notice proposes to separate

requirements for training and for

identification systems that the airport

operator must implement in critical

security areas and restricted operations

area. Proposed § 107.201 would

establish the requirement for an

identification system that incorporates

the standards of proposed § 107.209,

including the implementation of a

challenge program.

Identification systems are already in

use at most airports covered by this

section of the proposal, and the FAA

contends that such systems are

essential. Further, the inclusion of

access control and identification

requirements also permits the United

States to meet its obligations under the

Convention on International Civil

Aviation to comply with International

Civil Aviation Organization (CAO)

Standards. ICAO’s Annex 17 to the

convention establishes international

security standards and recommended

practices. Standard 4.4.1 of Annex 17

requires member states to establish

procedures and identification systems to

prevent unauthorized access by persons

and vehicles to security areas of an

airport.

Under this section, individuals with

unescorted access to the critical security

area would continue to be required to

submit to a personnel background check

as required under existing § 107.31 and

receive training consistent with that

currently required in § 107.25. FBI

criminal history checks are required for

those applying for access to the critical

security area if designated ‘‘triggers’’ are

raised during an employment history

review and verification. The standards

for access investigation are contained in

proposed § 107.207.

Proposed § 107.201(b)(6) would

require the airport operator to train

individuals in a manner prescribed in

proposed § 107.211 prior to authorizing

such individuals unescorted access to

the critical security area. The training

requirement outlined in proposed

§ 107.211 is consistent with the

underlying principle that the critical

security area is the focus of the airport

operator’s security measures. Therefore,

proposed training requirements would

be more involved for the critical

security area than for the restricted

operations area.

This section also proposes to

incorporate signage concepts from FAA

Advisory Circular 107–1 (May 19, 1972).

This advisory circular recommends that

airport operators appropriately post

signs warning of the entry restrictions to

certain areas at the airport and any

penalties associated with unauthorized

entry. Proposed paragraph (b)(7) of this

section would make this a requirement.

Rather than establish specific sign

dimension or wording, the proposal sets

a broad standard for signs, recognizing

the different physical and operational

characteristics of individual airports.

The FAA proposes that the airport

operator be permitted 2 years to

implement the revised sign

requirements. This would allow the

airport operator time to coordinate sign

modifications with other changes

proposed in this section, such as

identification systems and training. (See

the proposed Implementation Schedule

below.)

Section 107.203 Security of the

Restricted Operations Area

As discussed in the analysis of the

critical security area, the FAA proposes

in this new section to require the

designation of a restricted operations

area and to specify measures that must

be implemented in it.

The restricted operations area concept

is based on the current AOA

requirements, but the area to be

protected would be further explained.

Although impossible to fully define for

all airports, in general, restricted

operations areas would be those areas

where air carriers and foreign air
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41773

carriers subject to parts 108 and 129

take off, land, taxi, park, and otherwise

maneuver their aircraft (other than the

critical security area), and adjacent areas

that cannot be separated by other

security measures. This would permit

excluding some areas not used by such

air carriers and foreign air carriers. It

would require including some areas

adjacent to runways and taxiways that

cannot be separated by secondary

controls.

Security measures similar in concept

to the those of the critical security area

have been proposed for the restricted

operations area to strengthen the overall

airport security system, but with less

complex standards for access control,

training, and employment background

checks commensurate with the less

vulnerable operations within the

restricted operations area.

Similar to the differences between the

access control requirements of existing

§§ 107.13 and 107.14, the means used to

control access to and movement in the

restricted operations area can differ

from the standards to be employed in

the proposed critical security area. The

FAA proposes that airport operators be

required to use access controls in the

restricted operations area that meet the

current requirements of § 107.13

(proposed § 107.205(b)). However,

unlike existing § 107.13, this section

proposes additional accountability

procedures (see the discussion below

under proposed § 107.205, Access

control systems).

As in the critical security area, this

section proposes that airport operators

use an identification system to control

movement that meets the standards

prescribed in proposed § 107.209.

The expansion of identification

requirements is not supported by the

ASAC. The committee urged the FAA to

limit identification requirements to the

secured area (proposed critical security

area), leaving the airport operator the

discretion to use an identification

system in other areas. The FAA

acknowledges the need for airport

operators to have the latitude to address

local circumstances but believes that, if

airport identification systems can be

bolstered, more pressing operational

concerns raised by the implementation

of access control systems can be

addressed with greater effectiveness.

The more stringent identification

measures proposed here permit the FAA

to propose permitting group access and

secondary access media standards under

proposed § 107.205.

The FAA proposes to require that the

airport operator implement the same

escort and challenge procedures used in

the proposed critical security area;

however, access investigation would

differ. This section proposes to require

existing employment history

verification standards currently used in

the AOA. This section also proposes

requirements for signs similar to those

of the critical security area.

Section 107.205 Access Control

Systems

The FAA proposes in this section to

specify the requirements for access

control systems that are required in

proposed § 107.201 and, in some cases,

proposed § 107.203. The performance

standards of existing § 107.14 are

included in proposed paragraph (a) with

modifications, and new procedures are

proposed to address operational issues

that have come about since the

implementation of existing § 107.14.

Specifically, the existing performance

standard requiring a system to limit

access by time and date has been

modified to emphasize that this

standard is for contingency purposes

only. During a recent review of

contingency plans (see the discussion

below under proposed § 107.303,

Contingency plans), airport operators

and air carriers expressed concern about

the burden placed on airport operators

to meet this performance standard. The

ASAC concurred and suggested that the

rule clarify that this performance

standard be used for contingency

purposes only.

Both airport operators and air carriers

have urged the FAA to develop

technical specifications for access

controls. This recommendation also was

supported by GAO. The FAA agrees that

there is a need for technical standards

and is supporting current efforts to

develop them, but does not consider the

revised regulation as the proper venue

to issue technical standards. (See the

discussion below entitled ‘‘Universal

Access System.’’)

Existing paragraph (b) would be

replaced by access requirements for the

restricted operations area. While these

requirements are similar to existing

§ 107.13, the FAA proposes additional

accountability procedures. Currently,

§ 107.13 only requires the airport

operator to use procedures to detect and

respond to penetration of the AOA and

does not specify any other performance

or technical standards that such access

controls must meet. To ensure better

control of access media, proposed

accountability procedures would

include regular audits of issued access

media, and measures to ensure that

access controls are locally controlled

and cannot be used to gain access to the

restricted operations area of other

airports.

Paragraph (c) is proposed to address

concerns raised by the ASAC on the

issuance of temporary access media to

individuals who are not in possession of

their original access media. A typical

example of this is an airport or air

carrier employee who shows up for

work without her/his approved access

medium and cannot practicably be

escorted throughout her/his assigned

shift. The existing regulatory language

does not address this situation, but such

temporary access media generally have

been prohibited by local FAA guidance.

This paragraph proposes to allow the

airport operator to issue a second access

medium to an individual as long as

access authorization is verified, and

other specific standards are met.

Paragraph (d) proposes that the

airport operator establish and

implement escort procedures for

individuals without access authority.

Many airport operators already have

some type of escort procedure in place

based on FAA policy guidance, but such

procedures are applied inconsistently.

To ensure a more consistent application

of these procedures, the FAA believes

escorting standards should be

incorporated into the rule.

This proposed section also addresses

the issue of individual validation and

group access. FAA airport inspections

that were prompted by the IG audit

revealed that, despite best efforts, there

are certain instances where individual

validation of access authority has

become operationally unfeasible.

Performance standards require an access

control system that validates an

individual’s access authorization;

however, unauthorized group access,

commonly known as ‘‘piggybacking,’’

often occurs. In such an instance, an

individual with assumed authorized

access passes through an access point

without being subject to any control

measures that validate authorization for

that individual’s access. As a result, the

FAA is reviewing alternative access

measures to accommodate group

validation of individual access

authorization. The FAA is currently

conducting field tests of possible

solutions.

To support this effort, the FAA is

proposing paragraph (e) to allow airport

operators to address the issue of group

access. The present performance

standards do not allow for group access,

but this new language would allow the

FAA to work with each airport operator

to resolve the issue locally.

Comments regarding the practicality

of group access are requested. Any

recommendations on methods currently

used for access of more than one

authorized individual in a vehicle or
41774 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

more than a single individual at an

access point would be helpful. For

example, local procedures have been

developed by some airports that allow

for access validation of all persons in a

vehicle without requiring each

passenger in the vehicle to validate her/

his access authorization by individually

using the medium (e.g., by ‘‘swiping’’ a

magnetic card).

Proposed paragraph (f) would address

access control points that lead from

non-public areas, other than critical

security areas, to the sterile area. Such

non-public areas would include air

carrier offices and storage areas. In some

airports, a sterile area can be accessed

via points other than the passengerscreening checkpoint. While current

policy partially addresses access to the

secured area from the sterile area, very

little guidance exists for access to the

sterile areas other than the passenger

screening requirements of part 108. This

rule would clarify that an individual

could not be escorted from, for instance,

a critical security area, into a sterile area

and bypass the screening requirements

of part 108.

Paragraph (g) of this section proposes

to incorporate the current provisions for

alternative access system. Based on field

experience, alternatives would address

the use of the passenger-screening

checkpoints as an acceptable access

control measure used in combination

with other control measures. Further,

this paragraph intends to permit

alternatives for access controls measures

on portions of the ramp where aircraft

park or maneuver that lack physical

barriers, such as doors or walls, on

which to install traditional access

controls. The SASP will also provide

airport operators more guidance on

acceptable alternatives to address

unique physical or operational

circumstances.

Special Discussion on Universal Access

System (USA)

The implementation of existing

§ 107.14, Access Control Systems,

resulted in many different airport access

control systems nationwide. Such

variances created access problems for

air carrier air crews, whose duties

require that they regularly travel to

many different airports. Typically, air

crews must either obtain separate access

media at every airport to which they fly

or be escorted through access control

points. The aviation industry made

several attempts to remedy this

situation; however, due primarily to

financial constraints, was unable to

resolve the problem.

Eventually, pilot groups and air

carriers turned to the ASAC for

assistance. The ASAC responded by

organizing a working group to research,

develop, and test standards, and devise

an implementation plan for a national

access control system that would permit

transient air crewmembers to carry a

single access control medium which

will work at each airline’s. An air carrier

or airport operator could implement

such a system at either a select number

of access points or incorporate it into its

entire access control system.

In October 1993, Congress

appropriated $2 million dollars for

development and testing of Universal

Access System (UAS) standards. The

FAA and the ASAC’s UAS Working

Group (UASWG) have used these funds

to develop preliminary standards and

functional requirements, and to field

test prototype installations. During this

process, the ASAC also expressed

interest in developing standards for all

access control systems. The committee

decided to use the services of (RTCA,

Inc.), another federal advisory

committee, to organize this effort,

building on research and standards

developed by the UAS Working Group.

At the request of the industry, the FAA

served as a co-chair of this TACA group,

which has since completed its work and

compiled its recommendations into

RTCA document #D0230. Once UAS

standards are finalized, Appendix E of

this document will be updated to

include specific UAS standards. These

tests were conducted in cooperation

with volunteer air carriers and airports,

including Northwest Airlines and Delta

Air Lines; the Detroit Metro Wayne

County Airport, and Miami

International Airport. Testing has been

completed and a final test report is

under review. Next, the preliminary

standards will be revised and the UAS

working group will address

implementation issues.

Since these UAS access points will be

held to § 107.14, there is no immediate

need to modify part 107 or part 108 to

accommodate anticipated use of the

UAS. Procedural changes which result

from a UAS installation will be handled

by amendment to the Air Carrier

Standard Security Program (ACSSP) or

airport security programs (ASP),as

appropriate.

Section 107.207 Employment History,

Verification, and Criminal History

Records Checks

The White House Commission on

Aviation Safety and Security

recommended, and the Federal Aviation

Reauthorization Act of 1996 required,

that the FAA adopt rules to provide for

expanded background checks and

criminal history records checks of

persons with responsibilities for

screening passengers and property. On

March 14, 1997, the FAA issued a

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to

respond to these mandates (62 FR

13262, March 19, 1997). The comments

received in response to that notice will

be considered in developing a final rule.

However, while that notice refers to

unescorted access to the SIDA, under

this proposal the term SIDA would no

longer be used. It is proposed instead

that the rule would refer to unescorted

access to critical security areas. Under

this proposal, existing § 107.31 would

be moved to proposed Subpart C,

Operations, under new § 107.207.

Section 107.209 Identification Systems

Under this proposed new section, an

identification system would be required

for both the critical security area and the

restricted operations area. The FAA

would add this section to regulate

standards governing the issuance,

display, and accountability of

identification systems to promote their

effectiveness. This proposed section

would also comply with ICAO’s Annex

17, Standard 4.4.1 that requires member

states to establish identification systems

to prevent unauthorized access by

persons and vehicles to security areas of

an airport.

While most airports currently use

identification systems of some type to

satisfy the movement control

requirements of existing § 107.13, there

has never been a regulatory requirement

to have such a system. Many of the

standards and criteria in this proposal,

however, have long been included in

many airport security programs and, as

a result of an 1987 program amendment,

national standards for such systems

were established. Thus, any system

currently in place most likely would

require little, if any, alteration to be in

compliance with the rule as proposed.

Even proposed standards for auditing

and vehicle identification not found in

the 1987 amendment codify common

industry practice.

In addition, the FAA is proposing that

the standards would become effective 2

years after a final rule is adopted,

providing airport operators with time to

make necessary changes so that their

systems would meet regulatory

requirements.

The ASAC requested that airport

operators be afforded 5 years to phase in

any identification changes required by

the revised rule; however, the

committee did not provide any financial

or operational data to support this

position. As the implementation of

proposed identification requirements is

dependent on the implementation of
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41775

other security measures in this proposal,

the FAA recognizes that it will take

some time to make all the proposed

changes. Even so, the FAA sees benefits

to bolstering airport identification

systems and considers 5 years to be

impractical for implementation of the

proposed identification requirements.

Two years has been proposed based on

data collected for the economic analysis

for this rulemaking. The FAA requests

comments on this schedule, including

information regarding operational and

cost impacts (see the proposed

Implementation Schedule below).

In proposed § 107.209(b), standards

are proposed for personnel

identification media. Under this

proposal, the media must convey

accurate information about the

individual, bear an expiration date, be

readily identifiable for challenge

purposes, and indicate the individual’s

authorization for access and movement.

These specifications are similar to those

contained in FAA policy and establish

broad parameters rather than specific

sizes, colors, or actual wording that

must appear on the media. The airport

security program would state how the

individual airport would meet these

standards. This would permit

considerable flexibility to the airports

and accommodate technological

advances.

This new section also proposes that

an airport operator’s identification

system include procedures to

incorporate identification display

requirements of existing § 107.25 and to

minimize the number of unaccountable

identification media. Accountability

requirements are intended to ensure the

integrity of the system by specifying an

audit at least once a year and media

revalidation or reissuance procedures

when there is no accountability for a

certain percentage of identification

media. Procedures are also proposed

that would require airport operators to

retrieve expired identification media

and safeguard unissued identification

media stock and supplies. These

standards would apply to personnel and

vehicle identification systems

separately.

The ASAC commented that an audit

every 2 years is sufficient and

recommended that any requirements for

audits not be specified in the revised

regulation but included in an airport’s

security program. While it has been the

FAA’s policy to require an audit every

2 years, many airport operators have

resisted, claiming that the regulation did

not require them to do so. The FAA

proposes to resolve any

misunderstandings about the need to

audit identification systems by

including the requirement in the

regulation.

The FAA views identification systems

as one of the most effective means to

control movement in any portion of the

proposed critical security area or the

proposed restricted operations area. As

such, the proposal also intends to

increase the frequency of the audit to

once a year to ensure the integrity of an

airport’s identification system. Many

airport operators already have

automated identification systems that

conduct audits on an on-going or daily

basis. The proposed annual audit

reflects this advance in technology

while allowing leeway for less

sophisticated identification systems.

The inclusion of the phrase ‘‘and as

necessary’’ with the 1-year requirement

is intended to ensure that an

identification system is audited

whenever the integrity of a system is in

question.

Initially, the FAA considered

requiring an airport operator to

revalidate its system if 5 percent of

identification media were

unaccountable. This would codify

internal FAA guidance on

unaccountable identification media

which has been incorporated into most

airport security programs. Many airport

operators, however, have complained

that the 5 percent requirement requires

revalidation or reissuance of media too

frequently and does not account for the

operational reality that employees will

lose or misplace identification. The

ASAC also expressed similar concerns

that this percentage is too low and

recommended that the percentage be

increased to 10 percent. This

recommendation was not supported by

any financial or operational data.

Recognizing the serious economic

implications associated with

revalidation or reissuance of

identification media, the FAA has

researched accountability percentages

and found such percentages to range

from 2 percent to 10 percent, depending

on whether the identification system is

used in a military, civilian, or

commercial application, and the layout

of the facility. As there appears to be no

clear consensus as to the appropriate

percentage level for use at airports, the

FAA requests comments on what

criteria should be the basis for

accountability percentages and what

these percentage should be. Comments

should be supported by financial and

operational data and the impact on the

integrity of the identification system.

It is anticipated that initial

accountability criteria and percentages

will have to be tested over an extended

period of time and amended as

appropriate. To facilitate this process,

the FAA proposed that guidance on

accountability criteria and percentages

be included in the SASP to permit the

FAA to be more responsive to

operational needs and technological

changes. Thus, the revised rule only

proposes that the airport operator

revalidate its systems or reissue badges

when a certain accountability

percentage identified in the airport

security program is reached.

As proposed, revalidation and

reissuance percentage would be based

on issued identification media. The

term issued would apply to any

identification medium currently

assigned to an individual or vehicle.

Returned media should be considered

accountable when an individual or

vehicle no longer has access and

movement authorization.

Additionally, the same standards are

proposed for vehicle systems as

proposed for the personnel

identification system. The FAA is

concerned, however, that these

standards may not permit the use of

existing vehicle identification systems

based on specific vehicle markings or

paint schemes. If such systems

incorporate accountability procedures,

airport operators may be allowed to use

painting or marking schemes to meet the

vehicle identification requirements of

this proposed section.

Recommendations are requested on

standards that will accommodate such

vehicle identification but still provide

for accountability and integrity of the

system.

At ASAC’s suggestion, the FAA also

proposes in § 107.209(c) to permit the

use of the identification program for

vehicles used under part 139, if that

system also meets the requirements of

this proposed section.

Paragraph (d) proposes that airport

operators would be required to issue

temporary identification media to

persons whose duties are expected to be

temporary, such as contractors. To

minimize the number of accountable

and valid identification media, the FAA

proposes that such individuals should

have their identification media valid

only for the time needed to perform

their temporary duties.

The FAA further proposes in this

section to allow an airport operator to

approve the identification media of

other entities which meet the standards

of this regulation. Inclusion of this

practice would codify an acceptable

practice used by many airports. The

most common example is an air carrier

issuing identification media to its

employees that in turn are acceptable to

the airport operator for movement and
41776 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

access authority. The FAA also issues

identification badges to certain FAA

Aviation Safety Inspectors (ASI’s) to

replace locally issued airport

identification media when ASI’s are

conducting inspections outside their

assigned geographical area. Such FAAissued identification is known as FAA

Form 8000–39 and guidance on the

acceptance of this identification will be

provided in the SASP.

Paragraph (f) proposes to require an

airport operator to develop a challenge

program. Airport operators currently

establish their own challenge

procedures to meet the requirements of

existing § 107.25(e)(2), but in this

paragraph the FAA proposes to expand

these requirements in order to ensure

standardized challenge procedures

between airports, and within the critical

security areas and restricted operations

areas. The FAA believes consistent

challenge procedures will simplify the

challenge process for employees, and

thereby promote better compliance with

identification media display and

challenge requirements. The particulars

of the challenge program, however,

would remain detailed in the approved

airport security program. Even though

the ASAC did not support standardized

challenge procedures, the FAA believes

that the lack of standardization has

resulted in inconsistent challenge

procedures among employees at a given

airport, as well as employees who

perform their duties at different airports.

As a result, the effectiveness of a

fundamental element of the airport

security program is being undermined.

Section 107.211 Training

This proposed section would remove

the training requirements from existing

§ 107.25 currently titled ‘‘Airport

identification media’’ and place them

into this new section which would be

devoted solely to security training

requirements. The change is intended to

emphasize the need for individuals with

security responsibilities to be properly

trained so that they will be better

prepared to fulfill their security duties

and responsibilities.

The underlying principle of this

proposed section is that individuals

who have access to those areas where

air carriers conduct passenger

enplaning/deplaning operations would

have more critical security

responsibilities than individuals whose

access is limited to peripheral areas of

an airport. Accordingly, the FAA

proposes a two-tiered training program

that would provide security training for

individuals with critical security area

access authorization and security

information to individuals with

restricted operations area access

authority. Thus, the training would be

appropriate for the scope of the

individual’s access and movement

privileges.

Under this section, the FAA proposes

that persons with critical security

responsibilities should be subject not

only to the proposed requirements but

also to the training curriculum currently

required under existing § 107.25. This

enhanced curriculum would promote

consistent national implementation of

security measures. As proposed,

security training would include

instruction on the identification system,

challenge and escort procedures,

restrictions on divulging sensitive

security information, falsification of

records, and other security

responsibilities under proposed

§ 107.11.

All individuals who have unescorted

access to, and movement privileges

within, the proposed restricted

operations area would be provided with

information commensurate with their

security responsibilities under this

proposal. Security training for those

individuals with access to the restricted

operations area would be generally the

same as that for the proposed critical

security area; however, security training

of the restricted operations area could

be accomplished in a less formal

manner and could be provided through

a simple videotape presentation, printed

material, or verbal presentation.

In addition, this proposed section

would direct the airport operator to

ensure that persons performing security

functions for the airport are briefed on

their responsibilities under the

proposed rule, the airport security

program, and any other pertinent

security information.

This proposed section also would

specify requirements for maintaining

documentation of training and the

deadline for implementing a revised

training syllabus.

Section 107.213 Law Enforcement

Support

Under this proposal, existing § 107.15

entitled ‘‘Law enforcement support’’

would be renumbered to proposed

§ 107.213 and revised. Several changes

are proposed for the law enforcement

support requirements of existing

§ 107.15. Under existing § 107.15,

airport operators must provide law

enforcement to support its security

program; to support the passengerscreening system required by proposed

part 108 and existing part 129; and to

respond to an incident at the request of

an air carrier or a foreign air carrier.

As stated in the discussion of

proposed § 107.3, Definitions, above, the

term ‘‘law enforcement officers’’ has

been replaced by the term ‘‘law

enforcement personnel.’’ Existing part

107 uses the term ‘‘law enforcement

officer’’ to describe State or local law

enforcement and private security

personnel, resulting in confusion about

the use of private security personnel to

support the airport security program

and passenger screening functions. This

confusion may be the result of the law

enforcement community using the term

‘‘law enforcement officer’’ solely to

describe qualified Federal, State, or

local municipality law enforcement

officers. Yet, 49 U.S.C. 44903(c) allows

for the use of Federal, State, or local law

enforcement officers as well as private

security personnel to support airport

and air carrier security programs.

To avoid any further

misunderstandings, the FAA proposes

to use the term ‘‘law enforcement

personnel’’ throughout revised part 107

to generically describe both law

enforcement officers and private

security personnel meeting the

requirements of part 107. This would

not change the requirements for the type

of law enforcement personnel an airport

operator can employ.

Existing § 107.15(a) has been modified

to specify the qualifications of law

enforcement support required under

proposed § 107.103(a) and (b). However,

the most substantial change made to this

proposed section would be the

distinction between the use of

uniformed and ‘‘plainclothes’’ law

enforcement personnel.

Currently, § 107.17(a)(2) requires law

enforcement support to be identifiable

by uniform. Proposed § 107.213(a)

would state that an airport operator

need only provide uniformed law

enforcement personnel in support of the

passenger-screening system required

under proposed part 108 and existing

part 129. This change was suggested by

the ASAC which recommended that

airport operators be permitted the

leeway to use ‘‘plainclothes’’ law

enforcement personnel. The FAA

partially concurs with this

recommendation and believes that the

airport operator, in most cases, is best

suited to determine the local need for

uniformed and ‘‘plainclothes’’ officers.

This modification would allow law

enforcement personnel to operate

covertly in situations the airport

operator deems appropriate, such as

investing theft in the baggage make-up

areas, while requiring a readily

identifiable law enforcement presence at

the passenger-screening checkpoint. The

passenger-screening checkpoint
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41777

presents a unique situation where

individuals subjected to security

measures may become uncooperative,

and suspect bags and individuals must

be successfully segregated in highly

congested, often restricted, areas of the

airport terminal. The FAA believes that

passenger-screening efforts would be

better supported by a prompt response

by uniformed law enforcement

personnel who are readily identified as

having the authority to take charge of

the situation.

Paragraph (b) also would be modified

to clarify its applicability to the airport

security program required under

proposed § 107.103(c).

Section 107.215 Law Enforcement

Personnel

Under this proposal, existing § 107.17

entitled ‘‘Law enforcement officers’’

would be renumbered to proposed

§ 107.215, retitled ‘‘Law enforcement

personnel,’’ and revised.

The minimum standards for law

enforcement support at an airport

essentially would be unchanged. As

discussed in proposed § 107.213 above,

the requirement for law enforcement

personnel to be in uniform would be

modified. To reflect this proposed

change, proposed § 107.215(a)(2) would

be amended to delete the uniform

requirement.

Currently, § 107.17(c) requires that

law enforcement officers meet the

training standards, if any, prescribed by

either the State or local jurisdiction for

officers performing comparable

functions. Proposed paragraph (c)

would update training requirements for

State and local law enforcement officers

to reflect the fact that all States have law

enforcement training programs. This

paragraph also would specify that

private security personnel used to meet

the requirements of part 107 must be

trained in a manner acceptable to the

Administrator if the State and local

jurisdiction does not prescribe training

standards for such personnel.

Section 107.217 Supplementing Law

Enforcement Personnel

Under this proposal, existing § 107.19

entitled ‘‘Use of Federal law

enforcement officers,’’ would be

renumbered to proposed § 107.217,

retitled ‘‘Supplementing law

enforcement personnel,’’ and revised.

Proposed § 107.217 would give the

Administrator greater flexibility in

responding to requests to supplement

local law enforcement personnel. This

revised section still would set forth the

same procedures for an airport operator

to request Federal assistance in

supplementing local law enforcement,

but would incorporate statutory

language that would provide for

supplemental support from any

personnel employed by the Federal

government.

Section 107.219 Records

Under this proposal, existing § 107.23,

entitled ‘‘Records,’’ would be

renumbered to proposed § 107.219 and

revised. Proposed § 107.219 would

incorporate new recordkeeping

requirements found throughout the

proposed rule and would ensure that

the FAA has access to such records.

This new section would require that law

enforcement actions taken in support of

passenger-screening activities or the

airport security program be recorded,

maintained, and submitted to the FAA.

Such records would be necessary to

measure the effectiveness of the civil

aviation security program and to

support FAA compliance programs.

Paragraph (a) proposed that the FAA

have access to any record required

under the proposed rule and would

require the submission of records to the

FAA pursuant to a schedule approved

in the airport’s security program.

Requiring the airport operator to

provide the FAA with a report of law

enforcement responses on a regular and

predictable basis would prove a more

timely and efficient means of

disseminating this information to the

FAA. The manner in which records are

submitted to the FAA, and at what

frequency, would be determined for

each airport to accommodate local law

enforcement reporting and FAA

investigation procedures.

A slight modification is proposed for

records resulting from law enforcement

activity. In proposed paragraph (b)(1) of

this section, the word ‘‘action’’ would

be changed to ‘‘response.’’ A law

enforcement ‘‘action’’ routinely has

been confused with ‘‘police action’’

which, within the law enforcement

community, suggests some type of

detention/arrest or other action related

to alleged unlawful activity. In the

context of the civil aviation security

program, it was intended that a response

by a law enforcement entity to any civil

aviation security incident needs to be

recorded. That response may or may not

result from a violation of local law.

Proposed paragraph (b)(2) of this

section would extend the period of time

during which records must be

maintained to a more practical 180 days.

Oftentimes, the current 90-day

requirement is insufficient for

investigation and enforcement purposes.

Proposed paragraph (c) would be

expanded to require records to reflect

more specific information about

individuals who are detained or

arrested, which would aid the FAA and

the FBI in the investigation of such

incidents.

The addition of proposed paragraph

(d) of this section would require the

airport operator to make and maintain

for 180 days records of any corrective

action taken against persons who fail to

comply with proposed falsification and

security responsibilities sections

(proposed §§ 107.9 and 107.11). A new

paragraph (e) is also proposed to require

the airport operator to maintain any

additional records that may be needed

to support the airport security program,

and highlight additional recordkeeping

requirements found throughout the

proposed rule.

Subpart D—Contingency Measures

Section 107.301 Contingency Plan

Contingency plans are an existing part

of airport and air carrier security

programs. They contain security

measures that can be immediately and

flexibly applied to counter threats that

arise quickly. To ensure the integrity of

the national civil aviation security

system, the security-sensitive details of

the contingency plan cannot be

included in a public regulation, but

proposed new § 108.307 would include

in the proposed rule a 1987 security

program amendment (amended in 1994)

requiring airport operators and air

carriers to have and implement a plan.

The application of contingency

measures in response to the Persian Gulf

War provided valuable lessons on

contingency planning and the FAA used

this information to make changes to air

carrier and airport security programs.

Recently, the FAA and the air carriers

thoroughly reviewed these plans to

incorporate changes and ‘‘lessons

learned’’ from response to the elevated

threat during the Persian Gulf War. The

method for implementation of these was

modified to allow for a greater degree of

flexibility, and new test procedures also

were adopted. The ASAC endorsed the

final product of this effort and

supported the codification of

contingency plan requirements for this

proposed revision of part 108.

This proposed new section would

require air carriers to implement FAAissued contingency measures contained

in their security programs when

directed by the Assistant Administrator

for Civil Aviation Security. It also

proposes that airport operators and air

carriers test these contingency plans to

ensure that all parties involved are

aware of their responsibilities and that

information contained in the plan is

current.
41778 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Section 107.303 Security Directives

and Information Circulars

This proposed section would be new.

It would correspond to proposed

§ 108.305 and would impose the same

requirements upon the airport operator

to respond as necessary to Security

Directives which may apply to airports.

These proposed measures also reflect

modification made to the existing

Security Directive process in proposed

part 108. Existing part 108 provides that

the air carrier shall specify, not later

than 72 hours after delivery of a

Security Directive, the method by which

the measures in the Security Directive

‘‘have been implemented,’’ unless the

Security Directive provides a different

time. This appears to assume that,

within 72 hours after receipt of the

Security Directive, procedures have, in

fact, been implemented. However, if the

Security Directive does not require

implementation within 72 hours, it is

not clear from the existing rule when

the implementation methods must be

provided to the FAA. The proposed rule

would make clear that, unless the

Security Directive provides otherwise,

within 72 hours after receipt of the

Security Directive, the airport operator

or air carrier would provide to the FAA

the implementation methods that are

either in effect or will be in effect when

the Security Directive is implemented.

In response, the FAA would either

approve the airport operators proposed

alternative or notify the airport operator

to modify the alternative measures to

comply with the requirements of the

Security Directive within 48 hours after

receiving proposed alternative

measures.

In July 1989, the FAA issued a final

rule [54 FR 28982, July 10, 1989] that

required the use of Security Directives

and Information Circulars as the means

to disseminate information to air

carriers concerning security threats and

appropriate measures to be

implemented. The FAA uses

Information Circulars for the

notification of general information

regarding threats to civil aviation

security, and Security Directives to

notify of specific, credible threat

information and measures to be taken.

The FAA did not similarly amend

part 107 as it was thought at the time

that most credible threats were directed

at U.S. air carriers, and the threat to

domestic airports was relatively low.

The FAA now believes that the

concerns of the airport community and

the President’s Commission on Aviation

Security and Terrorism regarding the

coordination of security threat

information need to be addressed in this

revision of part 107.

Airport operators have repeatedly told

the FAA that they are not privy to

security information in the same

manner as air carriers and, as such, they

are often at a disadvantage in

responding to a higher level of threat.

Comments received from the ASAC

echoed this concern. The ASAC

recommended that airport operators

receive Security Directives and

Information Circulars; however, the

committee stipulated that the FAA

should only issue these documents to

airport operators on an information

basis only, with no requirement to

implement specified measures. In its

assessment of the aviation security

system, the President’s Commission on

Aviation Security and Terrorism also

stressed the need to have better

coordination and communication of

security information among the FAA,

airport operators, and air carriers.

In proposing this requirement, the

FAA has not overlooked ASAC’s

concerns, however; as Security Directive

measures directed at airports are

anticipated to be site specific and

appropriate for the threat level, the FAA

views the benefit of the proposed

requirements as a necessary precaution

that will not unduly burden airport

operators. Further, the FAA in the past

has issued emergency amendments to

airport security programs to respond to

an increased threat. Such emergency

measures often may be more efficiently

handled by use of Security Directives.

This section also proposes to permit

the airport security coordinator to apply

for a security clearance through the FAA

in order to receive classified

information related to national security.

Such clearances for airport security

officials were recommended by the

Federal Bureau of Investigation in a

1992 report, and more recently, by the

GAO in the aforementioned audit of

FAA’s compliance with the Aviation

Security Improvement Act of 1990. The

FAA carefully considered the

implications of granting such

clearances, particularly the risk of

unauthorized release of sensitive

information, and subsequently endorsed

the issuance of security clearances, on a

voluntary basis, to select airport

personnel at 74 of the largest and

busiest U.S. airports. As of May 1995,

101 clearances had been granted to

airport security personnel. The results

of this voluntary program have been

positive and the FAA believes the

dissemination and coordination of

security sensitive information among

airport security personnel has been

enhanced. As such, the FAA proposes to

formalize this program in part 107 and

permit airport security at all airports

regulated under part 107 to apply for a

security clearance.

Section 107.305 Public Advisories

This proposed new section would be

added to incorporate new statutory

language and the 1986 airport security

program amendment.

In August 1986, the FAA amended

airport security programs to require

airport operators to notify the public of

ineffective security measures at foreign

airports. This amendment was issued by

the Administrator under the provisions

of § 107.11(f) in response to Pub. L. 99–

83; 99 Stat. 222–227, Title V—

International Terrorism and Foreign

Airport Security, Section 552(a), Travel

Advisory and Suspension of Foreign

Assistance. This legislation requires

airport operators to immediately post

and prominently display the identify of

any foreign airport that the Secretary of

Transportation determines is failing to

maintain and administer effective

security measures. The provisions for

public notification established in Pub.

L. 99–83 have been included in 49

U.S.C. 44907.

Airport representatives on the ASAC

commented that this public notification

requirement was ineffective, nothing

that such postings are typically ignored

by the traveling public. They suggested

that only air carriers be required to

notify passengers of such airports.

Congress has determined, however, that

such postings are important to alert the

traveling public. The FAA encourages

comments and recommendations on

how such postings of notifications could

be more effectively displayed.

Section 107.307 Incident Management

This new section would be added to

require the airport operator to establish

procedures to evaluate and respond to

threats of sabotage, aircraft piracy, and

other unlawful interference to civil

aviation operations. Existing part 107

lacks a requirement for airport operators

to respond to threats of such criminal

activity. Instead, part 139, Certification

and Operations: Land Airports Serving

Certain Air Carriers, requires airport

operators to be prepared to respond to

an actual incident of sabotage, hijack,

and other emergencies by developing

and testing an airport emergency plan

under § 139.325. These emergency

procedures are typically incorporated in

the airport security program verbatim.

Proposed paragraph (b) would

specifically provide that evaluation of a

threat would be under the security

program. However, any event covered

by the part 139 airport emergency plan,
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41779

such as an actual hijacking, would be

handled as specified in the airport

emergency plan.

The procedures to evaluate threats

may include sensitive security

information and, as such, should remain

in the airport security program to limit

its distribution. The FAA believes that

emergency response procedures to such

incidents, however, should remain in

the part 139 airport emergency plan. An

expedited response to emergency

situations is critical, and response

procedures to any emergency should be

limited to one document to minimize

delays and confusion.

To promote coordination between

parts 107 and 139, the FAA is also

proposing to amend § 139.325 to ensure

that emergency response procedures to

hijack and sabotage incidents contained

in the airport emergency plan are

consistent with the approved airport

security program. Proposed § 107.307(d)

would support this coordination by

requiring the airport operator to review

annually threat and incident response

procedures. Such a review is intended

simply to ensure threat response

procedures and contacts are still

accurate and should not be interpreted

as a requirement for a full-scale

exercise. The FAA anticipates that such

a review could readily be incorporated

into the annual review of the airport’s

emergency plan required under

§ 139.325(c)(4).

In the event that an airport required

to have an airport security program

under part 107 is not required to have

an airport emergency plan under part

139, paragraph (c) proposes to require

such facilities to develop emergency

response procedures in addition to

threat evaluation procedures. This

proposed section is intended to ensure

such airport operators are prepared to

respond to actual incidents of criminal

activity and is not intended to require

minimum standards for aircraft rescue

and firefighting or emergency

equipment.

Implementation Schedule

The FAA will include in the final rule

an implementation schedule for the

transition from the existing

requirements to those adopted in the

final rule. The revisions to part 107 have

been extensive, and the FAA recognizes

that airport operators will have to make

extensive changes to security measures

and airport security programs. The FAA

proposes to make new part 107 effective

120 days after the publication of the

final rule, unless otherwise noted in the

rule. Several sections of the proposed

rule, including identification, signs and

training requirements would permit

extra time to phase out old security

measures and references and introduce

new ones. It is anticipated that this

transition schedule will be based on

airport size and possibly limited to

certain requirements that necessitate a

longer time period to implement. The

FAA is requesting comments on this

proposed schedule and

recommendations on a feasible

implementation schedule and

methodologies to facilitate a smooth

transition.

Harmonization With International Civil

Aviation Organization and Joint

Aviation Requirements

In keeping with U.S. obligations

under the Convention on International

Civil Aviation, it is the FAA’s policy to

comply with International Civil

Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards

and Recommended Practices (SARP) to

the maximum extent practicable. As

discussed above in the analysis of

§§ 107.201, 107.209, and 107.221, the

FAA has determined that, where

applicable, it has complied with ICAO

SARPs in developing this proposal.

ICAO has required strengthened and

intensified security programs in

response to terrorist attacks. Due to the

increased severity of criminal acts

against civil aviation, the ICAO Council

convened on an accelerated schedule

and, on December 19, 1985, adopted

Amendment 6 to Annex 17 to the

Convention on International Civil

Aviation, entitle ‘‘Standards and

Recommended Practices—Security—

Safeguarding International Civil

Aviation against Acts of Unlawful

Interference.’’ Eleven new specifications

were introduced into the Annex and

nineteen specifications were adopted as

standards. Domestic airport security

programs were amended accordingly. In

September 1989, the ICAO Council

adopted Amendment 7 to Annex 17

which allows it to implement standards

and recommended practices at an

accelerated pace. In December 1992, the

ICAO Council adopted Amendment 8 to

Annex 17 which introduced new

provisions for the following: screening

checked baggage and controlling cargo,

variations to procedures relating to

security programs, pre-flight checks of

international aircraft, and measures for

incorporating security into airport

designs.

The Joint Aviation Authorities, an

associated body of the European Civil

Aviation Conference, develop Joint

Aviation Requirements (JAR) in aircraft

design, manufacture, maintenance, and

operations for adoption by participating

member civil aviation. The JAR do not

address aviation security.

Paperwork Reduction Act

Proposed §§ 107.5, 107.101, 107.103,

107.105, 107.107, 107.111, 107.113,

107.210, 107.203, 107.207, 107.209,

107.211, 107.215, 107.217, 107.219

contain information collection

requirements. As required by the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44

U.S.C. 3507 (d)), the FAA has submitted

a copy of these proposed sections to the

Office of Management and Budget

(OMB) for its review.

The information to be collected is

needed to allow the FAA to comply

with Congressional reporting

requirements and to verify compliance

with statutory requirements under 49

U.S.C. Subtitle VII to protect persons

and property in air transportation

against acts of criminal violence.

The collection of information required

under this proposal has been in effect

for several years, and reporting and

recordkeeping requirements have

remained generally consistent. While

many of the proposed part 107 program

amendment and law enforcement record

requirements remain virtually

unchanged, some additional

information collections would be

required. For all of the reporting

elements in the collections of

information contained in this proposal,

the annual reporting burden is

estimated to be 15,630 hours. For all of

the recordkeeping elements in the

collections of information contained in

this proposal, total initial annual

recordkeeping is estimated to be

753,658 hours and annual

recordkeeping burden is estimated to be

388,735 hours.

It is estimated that this proposal will

affect 460 part 107 regulated airports

annually.

Organizations and individuals

desiring to submit comments on the

information collection requirement

should direct them to the Office of

Information and Regulatory Affairs,

OMB, Room 1235, New Executive Office

Building, Washington, DC 20503;

Attention: Desk Officer for Federal

Aviation Administration. These

comments should reflect whether the

proposed collection is necessary;

whether the agency’s estimate of the

burden is accurate; how the quality,

utility, and clarity of the information to

be collected can be enhanced; and how

the burden of the collection can be

minimized. A copy of the comments

also should be submitted to the FAA

Rules Docket.

Economic Summary

The FAA has determined that this

proposed rule is not a ‘‘significant
41780 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

rulemaking action,’’ as defined by

Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory

Planning and Review). The anticipated

costs and benefits associated with this

proposed rule are summarized below.

(A detailed discussion of costs and

benefits is contained in the full

evaluation in the docket for this

proposed rule.)

The FAA is responsible for

promulgating regulations to provide a

safe and secure civil air transportation

system. Consistent with its statutory

responsibilities, the FAA has adopted

Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR’s)

dealing with aviation security. These

rules include FAR part 107 covering

airport security and FAR parts 108, 109,

and 129 regulating the security practices

and procedures of affected air carriers.

These regulations provide specific

measures and guidelines to prevent air

piracy and other criminal acts. At the

time that these rules were promulgated,

the primary focus of civil aviation

security was the prevention of

individual acts of air piracy.

Over the last decade, terrorist and

criminal actions against civil aviation

have resulted in the continued tragic

loss of life and property. This has

resulted in the FAA promulgating

several emergency rulemaking actions.

The FAA has also combatted these

terrorist and criminal incidents by

imposing specific requirements on

airports by amending their individual

security programs.

The proposed regulation is an attempt

to comprehensively updated airport

security regulations. Such a

comprehensive review is necessary to

address changes to the structure of civil

aviation security as well as to analyze

the effect of emergency rulemaking on

the entire security program. Thus, the

FAA is proposing to amend the existing

airport security rules to incorporate in

the rules certain requirements that had

been part of the airports’ security

programs. (In a parallel rulemaking

effort, the FAA is also proposing to

amend the existing air carrier security

rules, which are contained in part 108.)

The FAA is proposing to revise the

current §§ 107.1 through 107.31 and add

new sections, some of which address

the security responsibilities of

individuals. Historically, part 107 has

been amended in increments with each

amendment added to the regulation in

near chronological order. The FAA

proposes to reorganize the regulation

based on subparts organized by subject

matter. Arranging the regulation by

subparts allows the FAA to keep

operationally similar sections together.

This proposed rule groups the section

into four subparts—Subpart A—General

(§§ 107.1 to 107.11), Subpart B—Airport

security program (§§ 107.101 to

107.113), Subpart C—Operations

(§§ 107.201 to 107.219), and Subpart

D—Contingency Measures (§§ 107.301

to 107.307).

Currently, there are 460 airports in the

U.S. aviation system that have an

Airport Security Program (ASP)

approved by the FAA; the contents of

this program, its approval, and the

amendment process are key components

of part 107. All airport security

programs cover many of the same

requirements and concerns. However,

due to the different physical layouts and

security requirements of each airport,

each airport’s security program will

have some unique features.

Accordingly, it is important to note that

there is not a single airport security

program, but, instead, many programs

that have many common elements.

Many of the proposed changes to part

107 simply change definitions or make

minor word changes. These changes

would not result in any incremental

costs and will not be covered in this

summary. Nine proposed sections

would increase costs, and three

proposed sections would result in cost

savings. In this analysis, the FAA

estimated costs for a 10-year period,

from 1996 through 2005. As required by

OMB, the present value of this cost

stream was calculated using a discount

factor of 7 percent. All costs in this

analysis are in 1994 dollars.

Proposed § 107.5, entitled ‘‘Airport

Security Coordinator’’ (formerly

§ 107.29), would increase the

responsibilities of the Airport Security

Coordinator (ASC). Under this proposed

rule, the ASC, or in certain cases, the

airport operators or their designees,

must review materials and security

functions for effectiveness and

compliance and take corrective action

immediately for each instance of noncompliance with this part and

immediately notify the FAA of the

instances and any corrective measures

taken. The ASC must also be trained in

accordance with the FAA-approved

security program every two years. The

estimated cost resulting from these

changes total $7.5 million, discounted.

Proposed § 107.11, entitled ‘‘Security

Responsibilities of Persons’’ would

prohibit persons from tampering,

compromising, or modifying any

security systems, or carrying a deadly or

dangerous weapon, explosive,

incendiary, or destructive substances

into sterile areas, critical security areas,

or restricted operations areas. Proposed

§ 107.103 would have the FAA require

the airport operator to include in its

security program procedures to ensure

that persons with unescorted access to

critical security areas and restricted

operations areas comply with the

requirements of proposed § 107.11; the

cost of this requirement is assigned to

proposed § 107.11 as this section is the

basis for the compliance program. The

cost to implement such a compliance

program would include initial

compliance program and annual

administration of this program.

However, part of the compliance

program is the challenge procedure

which is covered in proposed

§ 107.209(f). Thus, the net total

compliance costs of $2.7 million,

discounted, do not include the costs of

setting up and administering a challenge

program.

Proposed § 107.103, entitled

‘‘Content’’ (amending the current

§ 107.3) would expand the requirements

for the Airport Security Programs

(ASP’s) to include descriptions of

incidence response and notification

procedures, controlled notification

signs, and the increased responsibilities

of the Airport Security Coordinators.

The estimated administrative costs

would be approximately $49,200,

discounted.

Proposed § 107.107, entitled

‘‘Changed conditions affecting security’’

(amending the current § 107.7) would

involve notification costs. All airports

are required to alert the FAA to certain

changes in airport security. This

proposal would increase the number of

airport security changes that the FAA

needs to be aware of; require each

airport operator to notify the FAA

within two hours of discovery of these

changes and explain the interim

measures being taken to deal with them;

and relieve airports of having to modify

their ASP for a changed security

condition under 60 days. This proposed

revision would save an estimated $5.1

million, discounted.

Proposed § 107.201, entitled ‘‘Security

of the critical security area’’ (amending

the current § 107.14) would replace the

secured area portion which is subject to

the current § 107.14. Only the most

critical security sensitive portions of the

airport would need to be designated as

critical security areas, such as those

areas where passenger and baggage

operations are conducted and adjacent

areas that are not separated by security

controls or physical barriers. The intent

is to better define the areas of the airport

in which the security interest is the

most critical and where security

measures should be the most complex.

This would entail a number of

additional costs including rebadging

and training all employees with access

to the proposed critical security area,
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41781

requiring those airports without a

personnel or vehicle identification

system to establish one, and changing

warning notices and signs for this area.

This proposed revision would cost an

estimated $129.7 million, discounted.

The proposed § 107.203, entitled

‘‘Security of the restricted operations

area’’ (amending the current § 107.13),

would establish ‘‘restricted operations

areas.’’ In this area, which would be

similar on the current AOA, the means

used to control access and movement

would not need to be held to the same

standards as the means proposed to

control access and movement in the

critical security area. However, the

proposed regulation on restricted

operations areas would still entail a

number of additional costs including

rebadging and providing information to

all employees with access to the

restricted operations area and changing

warning notices and signs for this area.

This proposed revision would cost an

estimated $12.7 million, discounted.

Proposed § 107.205, entitled ‘‘Access

control systems’’ (amending the current

§ 107.14), would embellish the existing

performance standards for access

controls by allowing the issuance of a

second access medium to individuals.

The secondary access media program

would give airport operators an option

in addition to using either existing

airport escort programs or denying

employees access without their original

cards, both of which can be very costly.

An airport operator opting to use a

secondary access media would incur

additional costs, including development

costs, annual computer time, card

manufacturing costs, and card storage

costs. A few airports currently escort all

employees who do not have their access

cards. Most others deny entry to

employees without access cards. They

are either sent home to retrieve the card

or not allowed to work for the day, so

that employee’s supervisor would need

to reassign employees and/or obtain

employees from labor pools which exist

to insure against employee ‘‘no shows’’.

In addition, this proposed section

would require airports to ensure that all

doors leading from nonpublic areas,

other than the critical security area, to

the sterile area meet the access control

requirements of this proposed section.

The total net cost savings would be $4.7

million, discounted.

Proposed § 107.209, entitled

‘‘Identification systems’’ (amending the

current § 107.25), would require airports

to implement an ID system if they don’t

have one, and require ID systems to

meet certain standards. Such standards

would require airports to audit their

identification (ID) systems once a year

and revalidate their ID systems when a

percentage, specified in each airport’s

ASP, of the currently issued

identification media become

unaccountable for both personnel and

vehicle systems. Airports that do not

have personnel or vehicle identification

systems would have to install a system

and incur administrative costs. In

addition, it would require airport

operators to have temporary personnel

and vehicle IDs for people without

unescorted access authority. In addition,

this proposed section would require

airport operators to implement a

challenge program in the ‘‘critical

security’’ and ‘‘restricted operations’’

areas. The purpose of the challenge

program is to improve each airport

operator’s ability to limit unauthorized

incursions in the secured area. The

proposed rule would require all airports

to codify their present challenge

programs; airports without such a

program would also incur

administrative costs. The total costs of

this proposed section would be $7.5

million, discounted.

Proposed § 107.215, entitled ‘‘Law

enforcement personnel’’ (amending the

current § 107.17), would allow for the

use of plainclothes officers in support of

the airport security program. This is a

voluntary program, but the use of

plainclothes officers could result in

savings. The airport operator could

better utilize officers and realize savings

in labor costs. The analysis assumes that

5.5 percent of airports would use this

option, yielding cost savings of $19.5

million, discounted.

Proposed § 107.219, entitled

‘‘Records’’ (amending the current

§ 107.23), would require that records be

maintained pursuant to a schedule in

the ASP and increase the time an airport

must maintain records from 90 days to

180 days. Airports would still be

required to report all deadly weapon

activity, arrests, and threats against civil

aviation, but the proposed section

would also require the airport operator

to maintain records of corrective actions

imposed on persons in support of the

security compliance program. The

additional recordkeeping and

maintenance costs would total $9.4

million, discounted.

The proposed § 107.303, entitled

‘‘Security Directives and Information

Circulars’’ would develop standardized

procedures that airport operators must

follow upon receiving such documents

issued by FAA. The administrative time

cost required to process and respond to

these documents is estimated at a

discounted $78,100.

The proposed § 107.3037, entitled

‘‘Incident management,’’ would require

that airports incorporate certain

procedures into their ASP’s for

responding to threats of sabotage,

aircraft piracy, and other unlawful acts

against civil aviation. This section

would also require that airport

operation to coordinate these

procedures with emergency response

procedures required in FAR part 139;

the costs of incorporating these threat

response procedures into part 107 and

the review that would be necessary are

estimated to be approximately $1.3

million, discounted.

The 10-year cost of this proposed rule

would be $174.5 million (present value,

$142.1 million).

The FAA requests comments on the

most cost-effective ways to implement

these proposals. Many of these

proposals are performance standards

and do not provide many detailed

requirements as to how they would or

would be implemented. Thus, the

regulated parties may have several

options as to how to comply. The FAA,

in preparing this analysis, chose what it

considered to be a reasonable approach

in analyzing and costing out each

proposed section, and recognizes that

there may be more efficient ways to

implement each section. The FAA

requests that comments be as detailed as

possible and cite or include supporting

documentation.

The FAA points out that, in

estimating the costs of the rule, the

projected costs may well be in excess of

the actual costs of complying with a

final rule. Some of the projected costs

are significant in terms of the total

projected costs of the rule. For example,

the designation of ‘‘critical secured

areas’’ has total projected costs that

could be as high as $129.7 million,

compared with total projected costs of

$142.1 million, discounted, over 10

years. In terms of implementation, the

FAA expects that airport operators

would find ways of meeting the

objectives of the rule in ways that may

significantly reduce costs.

FAR Part 107 contributes to a secure

civil air transportation system by

providing specific regulations to prevent

criminal acts or air piracy. The benefits

of the proposed part 107 rules would be

a strengthening of airport security. The

current airport security systems, in

which security is maintained through an

intricate set of interlocking

requirements, are effective and have

prevented terrorist and criminal acts.

The proposed changes would simply

add to this effectiveness. In a parallel

rulemaking effort, the FAA is also

proposing to amend the existing air

carrier security rules, which are

contained in part 108.
41782 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

7The five rules are :

• Access to Secured Areas at Airports (1988).

• Security Directives (1989).

• Explosives Detection Systems (1989).

• X-Ray Systems (1990).

• Employment Standards (1990).

The high degree of dependence

between parts 107 and 108 and among

the proposed amendments does not

permit the separation of the benefits of

these proposed amendments from the

previous rules. It would be extremely

difficult to determine to what extent an

averted terrorist incident could be

credited to either airport operator

security or to air carrier security.

Accordingly, the benefits from the

proposed rules for parts 107 (airport

operators) and 108 (air carriers) have

been combined in this benefit-cost

analysis.

The benefits of this rulemaking would

be the prevention of specific criminal

and terrorist incidents, primarily

explosions, hijackings, and sabotage.

The FAA examined the number of

criminal and terrorist incidents from

1985 to 1994 to compute the overall

benefits. In order to provide the public

and government officials with a

benchmark comparison of the expected

safety benefits of rulemaking actions

over an extended period of time with

estimated costs in dollars, the FAA

currently uses a value of $2.7 million

and $518,000 to statistically represent a

human fatality and a major injury

avoided, respectively.

The FAA has calculated benefits

based on the types of criminal and

terrorist incidents that parts 107 and

108 are designed to combat. A Poisson

probability distribution was used to

assist in estimating the potential

benefits of these proposed rules. The

Poisson distribution is particularly

useful in describing discrete random

variables having a low probability of

occurrence. Applying this distribution

to the actual number of historical

incidents results in projected

probabilistic estimates of potential

future incidents.

The FAA developed the Poisson

probability distribution model based on

the historical record while assuming

that the past level of threat carries into

the future. This model was used to

estimate the potential number of future

criminal and terrorist incidents that may

occur in the absence of aviation security

rulemaking actions. What resulted were

probability estimations of experiencing

such incidents on board U.S. air carriers

over the next 10 years. Given the

uncertainties of predicting future

criminal and terrorist incidents, the

FAA is taking a conservative approach

and using the historical record of

incidents as representatives of the true

mean of occurrences for incidents,

which sums to $1.871 billion (present

value, $1.334 billion).

The agency recognizes that potential

benefits could change as the result of

the changing dynamics of aviation

security. While the benefits estimate is

valid based on those incidents cited in

the historical record, this baseline could

change upon the assessment of an

increased credible security threat(s). If

such information warrants some form of

regulatory initiatives, then the historical

baseline would be augmented to include

those threats. Subsequently, the pool of

potential safety benefits could increase

and be applied to any future rulemaking

actions related to such threats.

Since 1987, the FAA has initiated

rulemaking and promulgated five

security-related rules 7 that have

amended both parts 107 (airport

operators) and 108 (air carriers). These

rules also added to the effectiveness of

both parts in that they were designed to

address certain aspects of the total

security system to help prevent

additional criminal and terrorists

activities. These rules comprise a

portion of the costs of combating the

criminal and terrorist incidents that the

existing parts 107 and 108 are trying to

prevent. Accordingly, these costs can be

compared with the benefits of

preventing such incidents. To put the

proposed changes to parts 107 and 108

into context, the costs of these past

rulemakings will be added to the costs

of the proposed changes to parts 107

and 108; the benefits will also be

contrasted against the costs of all these

rulemakings.

In reviewing the five security-related

rules, the costs were updated from their

respective base-year dollars to 1994

dollars using the implicit price deflator

for Gross Domestic Product. The present

value of the costs and benefits was

recalculated using the current discount

rate of 7 percent. The FAA has

developed new data that has improved

components of past analyses. The

estimated update discounted costs total

$498 million.

The FAA has developed three costbenefit comparisons. Comparing

benefits of $1.871 billion, which are

based on the historical record of

incidents, to the combined estimated

costs of the proposed amendments to

parts 107 and 108, $217.4 million,

suggests that expected benefits exceed

estimated costs.

Using the Poisson distribution, the

FAA estimated the probability of

occurrence of potential benefits. From

this information, the agency has been

able to determine the probability of

obtaining occurrences where potential

benefits would exceed costs. Each of the

criminal and terrorists incidents,

explosions, hijackings, and sabotage,

has a range of expected occurrences

(based on the current assumed level of

threat) with an associated probability for

each discrete number of events. The

FAA calculated the probability and

associated benefits of each possible

combination of occurrences. The results

of this analysis indicate that the

probability exceeds 95% that obtaining

combinations of occurrences where the

benefits of avoiding any of these

combinations of occurrences will

exceed the estimated costs of these

proposed rules.

When the estimated cost of these two

proposed rules are added to the cost of

the five security rules ($727 million,

undiscounted) already issued, the

combined cost is $944 million,

undiscounted. The probability of

obtaining a combination of occurrences

yielding benefits equal to or greater than

$944 million is over 68%. The FAA,

therefore, has determined that the

benefits of these two proposed rules

exceed their costs, even when the costs

of these two rules are added to the cost

of the previously issued rules.

International Trade Impact Statement

In accordance with the Office of

Management and Budget memorandum

dated March 1983, federal agencies

engaged in rulemaking activities are

required to assess the effects of

regulatory changes on international

trade. This proposed rule would affect

all airport owners that have an FAAapproved security program in accord

with part 107. Unlike domestic air

carriers that compete with foreign air

carriers, domestic airports are not in

competition with foreign airports. For

this reason, a trade impact assessment

would not be applicable.

Initial Regulatory Flexibility

Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980

(RFA) was enacted by Congress to

ensure that small entities are not

unnecessarily burdened by government

regulations. The RFA requires agencies

to review rules that may have a

‘‘significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities.’’

The FAA’s criterion for a ‘‘substantial

number’’ is a number that is not less

than 11 and that is more than one third

of the small entities subject to the rule.

The FAA’s small entity size standards

criterion define a small airport as one

owned by a county, city, town or other

jurisdiction having a population of
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41783

8A primary airport is one which enplanes 10,000

or more passengers annually (as per 49 U.S.C.

47102 (11)).

49,999 or less. If two or more towns,

cities, or counties operate an airport

jointly, the population size of each are

totaled to determine whether that

airport is a small entity. The threshold

annualized cost levels in December

1983 dollars is $5,400 for airports;

adjusting to 1994 values, this threshold

cost becomes $7,800.

The FAA examined all primary

airports 8 to determine the number of

airports classified as small entities.

After reviewing population data, the

FAA determined that 108 of the primary

non-military airports are owned by

jurisdictions with populations less than

50,000.

Some airports are already in

compliance with portions of the

proposed rule and the total costs

estimated in the regulatory evaluation

were adjusted accordingly. However,

this regulatory flexibility determination,

in looking for the maximum cost that

could be incurred by a small entity

airport, assumed that the typical airport

was not in compliance. Annually, the

proposed part 107 would cost the

average Type A (<2) airport no more

than $28,299, save the typical Type B

airport $3,327, and cost the typical Type

C airport no more than $2,869.

The cost of the proposed part 107 to

Types B and C are less than the

threshold figure of $7,800, but the costs

of Type A (<2) airports exceed this

threshold. As noted above, there are 21

Type A (<2) airports in the 108 airports

that qualify as small entities. At 19% of

the number of small entities, this is less

than the definition of a ‘‘substantial

number’’. Therefore, the FAA finds that

this proposed rule would not have a

significant impact on a substantial

number of small entities.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates

Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), enacted as

Pub. L. 104–4 on March 22, 1995,

requires each Federal agency, to the

extent permitted by law, to prepare a

written assessment of the effects of any

Federal mandate in a proposed or final

agency rule that may result in the

expenditure by State, local, and tribal

governments, in the aggregate, or by the

private sector, of $100 million or more

(adjusted annually for inflation) in any

one year. Section 204(a) of the Act, 2

U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal

agency to develop an effective process

to permit timely input by elected

officers (or their designees) of State,

local, and tribal governments on a

proposed ‘‘significant intergovernmental

mandate.’’ A ‘‘significant

intergovernmental mandate’’ under the

Act is any provision in a Federal agency

regulation that will impose an

enforceable duty upon State, local, and

tribal governments, in the aggregate, of

$100 million (adjusted annually for

inflation) in any one year. Section 203

of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which

supplements section 204(a), provides

that before establishing any regulatory

requirements that might significantly or

uniquely affect small governments, the

agency shall have developed a plan that,

among other things, provides for notice

to potentially affected small

governments, if any, and for a

meaningful and timely opportunity to

provide input in the development of

regulatory proposals. This proposed rule

does not contain any Federal

intergovernmental mandates or private

sector mandates.

Federalism Implications

The regulations proposed herein will

not have substantial direct effects on the

states, on the relationship between the

national government and the states, or

on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, in

accordance with Executive Order 12612,

it is determined that this proposed

regulation will not have sufficient

federalism implications to warrant the

preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed in the

preamble, and based on the findings in

the Initial Regulatory Flexibility

Determination and the International

Trade Impact Analysis, the FAA has

determined that this proposed

regulation is significant under Executive

Order 12866. In addition, it is certified

that this proposal, if adopted, will not

have a significant economic impact,

positive or negative, on a substantial

number of small entities under the

criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

This proposal is considered significant

under DOT Regulatory Policies and

Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26,

1979).

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 107

Airports, Arms and munitions, Law

enforcement officers, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements, Security

measures.

14 CFR Part 139

Air carriers, Airports, Aviation safety.

The Proposed Amendment

In consideration of the foregoing, the

Federal Aviation Administration

proposes to amend parts 107 and 139 of

14 CFR as follows:

1. Part 107 is revised to read as

follows:

PART 107—AIRPORT SECURITY

Sec.

Subpart A—General

107.1 Applicability.

107.3 Definitions.

107.5 Airport security coordinator.

107.7 Inspection authority.

107.9 Falsification.

107.11 Security responsibilities of persons.

Subpart B—Airport Security Program

107.101 General requirements.

107.103 Content.

107.015 Approval and amendments.

107.107 Changed conditions affecting

security.

107.109 Alternate means of compliance.

107.111 Exclusive area agreements.

107.113 Airport tenant security programs.

Subpart C—Operations

107.201 Security of the critical security

area.

107.203 Security of the restricted

operations area.

107.205 Access control systems.

107.207 Employment history, verification,

and criminal history records checks.

107.209 Identification systems.

107.211 Training.

107.213 Law enforcement support.

107.215 Law enforcement personnel.

107.217 Supplementing law enforcement

personnel.

107.219 Records.

Subpart D—Contingency Measures

107.301 Contingency plan.

107.303 Security directives and information

circulars.

107.305 Public advisories.

107.307 Incident management.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 5103, 40113,

40119, 44701–44702, 44706, 44901–44905,

44907, 44913–44914, 44932, 44935–44936,

46105.

Subpart A—General

§ 107.1 Applicability.

(a) This part describes aviation

security rules governing:

(1) The operation of each airport

regularly serving an air carrier required

to have a security program under part

108 of this chapter.

(2) The operation of each airport

regularly serving a foreign air carrier

required to have a security program

under § 129.25 of this chapter.

(3) Each person who is in, or entering,

a critical security area, restricted

operations area, or sterile area described

in this part and part 108 of this chapter.
41784 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(4) Each person who files an

application or makes entries into any

record or report that is kept, made, or

used to show compliance under this

part, or to exercise any privileges under

this part.

(b) Except as provided in § 107.105 of

this part, the authority of the

Administrator under this part is also

exercised by the Assistant

Administrator of Civil Aviation Security

and the Deputy Assistant Administrator

for Civil Aviation Security, and any

individual formally designated to act in

their capacity. The authority of the

Assistant Administrator, including

matters under § 107.105 of this part,

may be further delegated.

§ 107.3 Definitions.

Terms defined in part 108 of this

chapter apply to this part. For purposes

of this part, part 108 of this chapter, and

security programs under these parts, the

following definitions also apply:

Airport operator means a person who

operates an airport serving an air carrier

or a foreign air carrier required to have

a security program under part 108 or

§ 129.25 of this chapter.

Airport security program means an

airport operator’s security program

required under § 107.101 of this part

and approved by the Administrator.

Air tenant means any person, other

than an air carrier or foreign air carrier

that has a security program under part

108 or § 129.25 of this chapter, that has

an agreement with the airport operator

to conduct business on airport property.

Airport tenant security program

means the agreement between the

airport operator and an airport tenant

that specifies the measures by which the

tenant will perform security functions

under § 107.113 of this part.

Assistant Administrator means the

FAA Assistant Administrator for Civil

Aviation Security as described in 49

U.S.C. 44932.

Critical security area means a portion

of an airport specified in the airport

security program in which security

measures specified in this part are

carried out. In general, this area is

where air carriers and foreign air

carriers enplane and deplane

passengers, and sort and load baggage,

and any adjacent areas that are not

separated by security controls or

physical barriers.

Escort means to accompany or

supervise an individual who does not

have unescorted access authority to a

critical security area or a restricted

operations area, in a manner sufficient

to take action should the individual

engage in activities other than those for

which the escorted access is granted.

Exclusive area means any portion of

a critical security area or restricted

operations area, including individual

access points, for which an air carrier or

foreign air carrier that has a security

program under part 108 or § 129.25 of

this chapter has assumed responsibility

under § 107.111 of this part.

Exclusive area agreement means an

agreement between the airport operator

and an individual air carrier or foreign

air carrier that has a security program

under part 108 or § 129.25 of this

chapter that permits such an air carrier

or foreign air carrier to assume

responsibility for specified security

measures in accordance with § 107.111

of this part.

Restricted operations area means a

portion of an airport specified in the

airport security program in which

security measures specified in this part

are carried out. In general, this area is

where air carrier and foreign air carrier

aircraft take off, land, taxi, park, and

otherwise maneuver (other than critical

security areas), and any adjacent areas

that are not separated by security

controls or physical barriers.

Unescorted access authority means

the authority granted to individuals by

an airport operator, air carrier, foreign

air carrier, or airport tenant authorized

under this part, or parts 108 or 129 of

this chapter, to gain access to, and be

without an escort in, critical security

areas and restricted operations areas.

§ 107.5 Airport security coordinator.

(a) Each airport operator shall

designate an Airport Security

Coordinator (ASC), and any alternate

ASC as necessary, in the airport security

program to serve as the airport

operator’s primary and immediate

contact for security-related activities

and communications with the FAA.

Any individual designated as an ASC

may perform other work duties in

addition to those described in paragraph

(b) of this section.

(b) The ASC, or alternate ASC, shall—

(1) Serve as the airport operator’s

primary and immediate contact for

security-related activities and

communications with the FAA;

(2) Be available to the FAA on a 24-

hour basis;

(3) Review with sufficient frequency

all security-related functions to ensure

that all are effective and in compliance

with this part, including the airport

security program, airport tenant

activities, and applicable security

directives;

(4) Immediately initiate corrective

action for any instance of noncompliance with this part, the airport

security program, and applicable

security directives;

(5) Review and control the results of

access investigations required under

§ 107.207 of this part;

(6) Serve as the contact to receive

notification from individuals applying

for unescorted access of their intent to

seek correction of their criminal history

record with the FBI; and

(7) Perform any other duties deemed

necessary by the Administrator as set

forth in the airport security program or

in a Security Directive.

(c) Effective [insert 180 days after

publication of the final rule in the

Federal Register], each airport operator

shall ensure and document that the

individual designated as the ASC, and

each designated alternate ASC, has been

trained within the preceding 24

calendar months to carry out the

responsibilities described in paragraph

(b) of this section, as specified in the

airport security program. The airport

operator shall maintain ASC training

documentation in its principal

operations office until 180 days after the

termination of each individual serving

as an ASC.

(D) With respect to training required

under this section, whenever a person

completes recurrent training in the

calendar month before or the calendar

month after the calendar month in

which that training is required, that

person is considered to have completed

the training in the calendar month in

which it was required.

§ 107.7 Inspection authority.

(a) Each airport operator shall allow

the Administrator, including FAA

Special Agents, at any time or place, to

make any inspections or tests to

determine compliance of the airport

operator, air carrier, foreign air carrier,

and other airport tentants with—

(1) The airport security program;

(2) This part;

(3) 49 CFR part 175, which relates to

the carriage of hazardous materials by

aircraft; and

(4) 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, as amended.

(b) At the request of the

Administrator, each airport operator

shall provide evidence of compliance

with this part and its airport security

program.

(c) On request of any FAA Special

Agent, and presentation of valid FAAissued credentials, each airport operator

shall issue to that agent access and

identification media to provide the

special agent with unescorted access to,

and movement within, critical security

areas and restricted operations areas.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules 41785

§ 107.9 Falsification.

No person may make, or cause to be

made, any of the following:

(a) Any fraudulent or intentionally

false statement in any application for

any security program, access medium,

or identification medium, or any

amendment thereto, under this part.

(b) Any fraudulent or intentionally

false entry in any record or report that

is kept, made, or used to show

compliance with this part, or exercise

any privileges under this part.

(c) Any reproduction or alteration, for

fraudulent purpose, of any report,

record, security program, access

medium, or identification medium

issued under this part.

§ 107.11 Security responsibilities of

persons.

(a) No person may:

(1) Tamper or interfere with,

compromise, modify, attempt to

circumvent, or cause a person to tamper

or interfere with, compromise, modify,

or circumvent, any security system,

method, or procedure implemented

under this part.

(2) Enter, or be present within, a

critical security area or restricted

operations area without complying with

the systems, methods, or procedures

being applied to control access to, or

presence in such areas.

(3) Use, allow to be used, or cause to

be use, any airport-approved access

medium or identification medium that

authorizes the access or presence of

persons and vehicles in critical security

areas or restricted operations areas in

any other manner than that for which it

was issued by the appropriate authority

under this part, part 108, or part 129 of

this chapter.

(b) Except as provided in 49 U.S.C.

subtile VII, and paragraphs (c) and (d)

of this section, no individual may have

any deadly or dangerous weapon,

explosive, incendiary, or other

destructive substance on or about the

individual’s person or accessible

property when entering, or within a

critical security area or restricted

operations area of an airport governed

by this part, or a sterile area governed

under § 108.201 of this chapter.

(c) The provisions of this section with

regard to paragraphs (a) and (b) of this

section do not to apply to persons

authorized by the Federal Government,

airport operator, air carrier, or foreign

air carrier to conduct inspections for

compliance with this part, part 108, or

part 129 of this chapter, or 49 U.S.C.

subtitle VII, while they are conducting

an inspection.

(d) The provisions of this section with

respect to firearms and weapons do not

apply to the following:

(1) Law enforcement personnel

required to carry a firearm or other

weapon while in the performance of

their duties at the airport.

(2) Persons authorized to carry a

firearm under § 108.213, § 108.215, or

§ 129.27 of this chapter.

(3) Persons authorized to carry a

firearm in a sterile area, critical security

area, or restricted operations area under

this part, an approved airport security

program, an approved air carrier

security program, or security program

used in accordance with § 129.25 of this

chapter.

(4) Properly declared firearms in

checked baggage for transport under

§ 108.213 of this chapter.

(5) Transportation of hazardous

materials under 49 CFR part 175.

(6) Federal Air Marshals.

(7) Aircraft operators not subject to

part 108 or part 129 of this chapter

carrying firearms in accordance with

state and local law.

Subpart B—Airport Security Program

§ 107.101 General requirements.

(a) No person may operate an airport

subject to this part unless it adopts and

carries out an airport security program

that—

(1) Provides for the safety and security

of persons and property on an aircraft

operating in air transportation or

intrastate air transportation against an

act of criminal violence, aircraft piracy,

and the introduction of deadly or

dangerous weapon, explosive,

incendiary, or other destructive

substance onto an aircraft;

(2) Is in writing and is signed by the

airport operator or any person to whom

the airport operator has delegated

authority in this matter;

(3) Includes the items listed in

§ 107.103 of this part;

(4) Is organized in the same sequence

as § 107.103 of this part to the extent

practicable; and

(5) Has been approved by the

Administrator.

(b) The airport operator shall maintain

one complete copy of the security

program in its principal operations

office, and make it available for

inspection upon the request of the

Administrator.

(c) Each airport operator shall—

(1) Restrict the distribution,

disclosure, and availability of sensitive

security information, as defined in part

191 of this chapter, to persons with a

need to know, and

(2) Refer all requests for sensitive

security information by other persons to

the Administrator.

§ 107.103 Content.

(a) Except as otherwise approved by

the Administrator, each airport regularly

serving an air carrier, required to

conduct screening under § 108.101(a)(1)

or § 129.25(b)(1) of this chapter, shall

include in the security program a

description of the following—

(1) Name, means of contract, duties,

and training requirements of the airport

security coordinator, and designated

alternates, required under § 107.5 of this

part.

(2) Security compliance program that

specifies procedures the airport operator

will implement to ensure persons with

authorized unescorted access to critical

security areas and restricted operations

areas comply with § 107.9 and § 107.11

(a) and (b) of this part, including

revocation of unescorted access

authority of persons that fail to comply

with security requirements.

(3) Critical security areas, including—

(i) Dimensions and a map detailing

boundaries and pertinent features;

(ii) Each activity or entity on, or

adjacent to, a critical security area that

affects security;

(iii) Procedures, facilities, and

equipment used to perform the access

control functions required under

§ 107.201(b)(1) of this part; and

(iv) Notification signs required under

§ 107.201(b)(7) of this part.

(4) Restricted operations areas,

including—

(i) Dimensions and a map detailing

boundaries, and pertinent features;

(ii) Each activity or entity on, or

adjacent to, a restricted operations area

that affects security;

(iii) Procedures, facilities, and

equipment used to perform the access

control functions required under

§ 107.203(b)(1) of this part, and

(iv) Notification signs required under

§ 107.203(b)(7) of this part.

(5) Sterile areas, including—

(i) Dimensions and a map detailing

boundaries and pertinent features;

(ii) Activities and tenants located

within the sterile area;

(iii) Access controls to be used when

the passenger-screening checkpoint is

non-operational and the entity

responsible for that access control; and

(iv) Procedures, facilities, and

equipment used to control access as

specified in § 107.205 of this part.

(6) Access investigation procedures

used to comply with § 107.207 of this

part.

(7) Personnel and vehicle

identification systems as described in

§ 107.209 of this part.
41786 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(8) Escort procedures in accordance

with § 107.205(d) of this part.

(9) Challenge procedures in

accordance with § 107.209(f) of this

part.

(10) Training programs required

under § 107.211 and § 107.215 of this

part.

(11) Law enforcement support used to

comply with § 107.213(a) of this part.

(12) System for maintaining records

and schedule for reporting records, as

described in § 107.219 of this part.

(13) Procedures, facilities, and

equipment used to support air carrier or

foreign air carrier screening functions of

§ 108.211 of this chapter.

(14) Procedures, facilities, and

equipment incorporated in the

contingency plan required under

§ 107.301 of this part.

(15) Procedures for the distribution,

storage, and disposal of Security

Directives, Information Circulars, and,

as appropriate, classified information, as

specified in § 107.303 of this part.

(16) Procedures for public advisories

as specified in § 107.305 of this part.

(17) Incident management procedures

used to comply with § 107.307 of this

part.

(18) Alternate security procedures, if

any, that the airport operator intends to

use in the event of natural disasters and

other emergencies or unusual

conditions.

(19) Each exclusive area required

under § 107.111 of this part.

(20) Each airport tenant security

program as specified in § 107.113 of this

part.

(b) Except as otherwise approved by

the Administrator, each airport regularly

serving an air carrier or foreign air

carrier required to conduct screening

under § 108.101(a)(2) or (a)(2) or (a)(3),

and § 129.25(b)(2) or (b)(3) of this

chapter shall include in the security

program a description of the following—

(1) Name, means of contact, duties,

and training requirements of the airport

security coordinator, and designated

alternates, as required under § 107.5 of

this part;

(2) Law enforcement support used to

comply with § 107.213(a) of this part;

(3) Training program for law

enforcement personnel required under

§ 107.215 of this part;

(4) System for maintaining records

and schedule for reporting records, as

described in § 107.219 of this part;

(5) Procedures, facilities, and

equipment incorporated in the

contingency plan required under

§ 107.301 of this part;

(6) Procedures for the distribution,

storage, and disposal of Security

Directives, Information Circulars, and,

as appropriate, classified information, as

specified in § 107.303 of this part;

(7) Procedures for public advisories as

specified in § 107.305 of this part; and

(8) Incident management procedures

used to comply with § 107.307 of this

part.

(c) Except as otherwise approved by

the Administrator, each airport regularly

serving an air carrier or foreign air

carrier required to have a security

program under § 108.101(a)(4) or

§ 129.25(b)(4) of this chapter, shall

include in the security program a

description of the following—

(1) Name, means of contact, duties,

and training requirements of the airport

security coordinator, and designated

alternates, required under § 107.5 of this

part;

(2) Law enforcement support used to

comply with § 107.213(b) of this part;

(3) Training programs for law

enforcement personnel required under

§ 107.215 of this part;

(4) System for maintaining records

and schedule for reporting records, as

described in § 107.219 of this part;

(5) Procedures for the distribution,

storage, and disposal of Security

Directives, Information Circulars, and,

as appropriate, classified information as

specified in § 107.303 of this part;

(6) Procedures for public advisories as

specified in § 107.305 of this part; and

(7) Incident management procedures

used to comply with § 107.307 of this

part.

(d) The airport operator may comply

with paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this

section by including in the security

program, as an appendix, any document

that contains the information required

by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c). Such an

appendix shall be referenced in the

corresponding section(s) of the security

program.

§ 107.105 Approval and amendments.

(a) Approval of security program.

Unless otherwise authorized by the

Assistant Administrator, each airport

operator required to have an airport

security program under this part shall

submit its proposed airport security

program to the Assistant Administrator

for approval at least 90 days before any

air carrier or foreign air carrier, required

to have a security program under

§ 108.101 or § 129.25 of this chapter, is

expected to begin operations. Such

requests shall be processed as follows:

(1) Within 30 days after receiving the

proposed airport security program, the

Assistant Administrator will either

approve the program or give the airport

operator written notice to modify the

program to comply with the applicable

requirements of this part.

(2) Within 30 days of receiving a

notice to modify, the airport operator

may either submit a modified security

program to the Assistant Administrator

for approval, or petition the

Administrator to reconsider the notice

to modify. A petition for reconsideration

must be filed with the Assistant

Administrator. Except in the case of an

emergency requiring immediate action

in the interest of safety, the filing of the

petition stays the notice pending a

decision by the Administrator.

(3) Upon receipt of a petition for

reconsideration, the Assistant

Administrator either amends or

withdraws the notice, or transmits the

petition, together with any pertinent

information, to the Administrator for

reconsideration. The Administrator

disposes of the petition within 30 days

of receipt by either directing the

Assistant Administrator to withdraw or

amend the notice to modify, or by

affirming the notice to modify.

(b) Amendment Requested by an

Airport Operator. Except as provided in

§ 107.107(c) of this part, an airport

operator may submit a request to the

Assistant Administrator to amend its

airport security program, as follows:

(1) The application must be filed with

the Assistant Administrator at least 45

days before the date it proposes for the

amendment to become effective, unless

a shorter period is allowed by the

Assistant Administrator. However, in

accordance with the procedures in this

paragraph, it may take longer than 45

days for a final decision by the

Administrator.

(2) Within 30 days after receiving a

proposed amendment, the Assistant

Administrator, in writing, either

approves or denies the request to

amend.

(3) An amendment to an airport

security program may be approved if the

Assistant Administrator determines that

safety and the public interest will allow

it, and the proposed amendment

provides the level of security required

under this part.

(4) Within 30 days after receiving a

denial, the airport operator may petition

the Administrator to reconsider the

denial.

(5) Upon receipt of a petition for

reconsideration, the Assistant

Administrator either approves the

request to amend or transmits the

petition, together with any pertinent

information, to the Administrator for

reconsideration. The Administrator

disposes of the petition within 30 days

of receipt by either directing the

Assistant Administrator to approve the

amendment or affirm the denial.
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(c) Amendment by the FAA. If safety

and the public interest require an

amendment, the Assistant

Administrator may amend an airport

security program as follows:

(1) The Assistant Administrator sends

to the airport operator a notice, in

writing, of the proposed amendment,

fixing a period of not less than 30 days

within which the airport operator may

submit written information, views, and

arguments on the amendment.

(2) After considering all relevant

material, the Assistant Administrator

notifies the airport operator of any

amendment adopted or rescinds the

notice. If the amendment is adopted, it

becomes effective not less than 30 days

after the airport operator receives the

notice of amendment, unless the airport

operator petitions the Administrator to

reconsider no later than 15 days before

the effective date of the amendment.

The airport operator shall send the

petition for reconsideration to the

Assistant Administrator. A timely

petition for reconsideration stays the

effective date of the amendment.

(3) Upon receipt of a petition for

reconsideration, the Assistant

Administrator either amends or

withdraws the notice, or transmits the

petition, together with any pertinent

information to the Administrator for

reconsideration. The Administrator

disposes of the petition within 30 days

of receipt by either directing the

Assistant Administrator to withdraw or

amend the amendment, or by affirming

the amendment.

(d) Emergency Amendments.

Notwithstanding paragraphs (a), (b), and

(c) of this section, if the Assistant

Administrator finds that there is an

emergency requiring immediate action

with respect to safety in air

transportation or in air commerce that

makes procedures in this section

contrary to the public interest, the

Assistant Administrator may issue an

amendment, effective without stay, on

the date the airport operator receives

notice of it. In such a case, the Assistant

Administrator shall incorporate in the

notice a brief statement of the reasons

and findings for the amendment to be

adopted. The airport may file a petition

for reconsideration under paragraph (c)

of this section, however, this does not

stay the effectiveness of the emergency

amendment.

§ 107.107 Changed conditions affecting

security.

(a) After approval of the airport

security program, each airport operator

shall notify the Administrator when

changes have occurred to the—

(1) Procedures, methods, system,

facilities, training, equipment, area

descriptions, staffing, or any other

description or requirement prescribed

by the airport security program;

(2) Nature of air carrier or foreign air

carrier operations, including changes to

level of service, aircraft, and leasehold;

or

(3) Layout or physical structure of any

area under the control of the airport

operator, air carrier, or foreign air carrier

used to support the screening, access, or

movement control functions required

under parts 107, 108, or 129 of this

chapter.

(b) Whenever a changed condition

described in paragraph (a) of this

section occurs, each airport operator

shall notify the Administrator within 2

hours, or within the time specified in its

security program, of discovery of the

changed condition and each interim

measure being taken to maintain

adequate security until an appropriate

amendment to the security program is

approved. Each interim measure(s) must

be acceptable to the Administrator.

(c) For changed conditions under 60

days duration, each airport operator

shall forward the information required

in paragraph (b) of this section in

writing to the Administrator within 72

hours of the original notification of the

change condition(s). The Administrator

will notify the airport operator of the

disposition of the notification in

writing. If approved by the

Administrator, this written notification

will become a part of the airport

security program for the duration of the

changed condition(s).

(d) For changed conditions over 60

days duration, each airport operator

shall forward the information required

in paragraph (b) of this section in the

form of a proposed amendment to the

airport operator’s security program, as

required under § 0107.105 of this part.

The request for an amendment shall be

made within 30 days of the discovery of

the changed condition(s). The

Administrator will respond to the

request in accordance with § 107.105 of

this part.

§ 107.109 Alternate means of compliance.

If the safety and security of the

airport, and air carrier passengers and

operations, are not diminished, the

Administrator may approve an airport

security program that permits the use of

alternate means of compliance with the

requirements of this part. Such an

amendment may be considered for an

airport operator of an airport that is

served seasonally or infrequently by an

air carrier or foreign air carrier required

to conduct screening under

§ 108.101(a)(1) or § 129.25(b)(1) of this

chapter.

§ 107.111 Exclusive area agreements.

(a) The Administrator may approve an

amendment to an airport security

program in accordance with this section

that permits an air carrier or foreign air

carrier that has an approved security

program under part 108 or part 129 to

assume responsibility for specified

security measures for all or portions of

the critical security areas or restricted

operations areas. The assumption of

responsibility must be exclusive to one

air carrier or foreign air carrier, and

shared responsibility among air carriers

or foreign air carriers is not permitted.

(b) An exclusive area agreement shall

be in writing and maintained in the

airport security program. This

agreement shall contain descriptions of

the following:

(1) Dimensions, boundaries, and

pertinent features of each area, or

individual access points, over which the

air carrier or foreign air carrier will

exercise exclusive security

responsibility.

(2) Procedures and a description of

the facilities and equipment used to

perform the control functions described

in § 107.201 or § 107.203 of this part, as

appropriate.

(3) Procedures by which the air carrier

or foreign air carrier will immediately

notify the airport operator and provide

for alternative security measures when

the procedures, facilities, and

equipment required by the agreement

are not adequate to perform the control

functions in accordance with § 107.201

or § 107.203 of this part, as appropriate.

(4) Methods by which the airport

operator will monitor and audit the air

carrier’s or foreign air carrier’s

compliance with the exclusive area

agreement.

(5) Circumstances under which the

airport operator will terminate the

exclusive area agreement for cause and

resume responsibility for security

measures covered by the exclusive area

agreement.

§ 107.113 Airport tenant security

programs.

(a) The Administrator may approve an

airport tenant security program that

permits an airport tenant having access

to a critical security area or restricted

operations area to accept responsibility

for all or part of the specified security

measures of §§ 107.201 or 107.203 of

this part within the tenant’s leased areas

or areas designated for the tenant’s

exclusive use under an agreement with

the airport operator. This airport tenant
41788 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

security program shall be included in

the airport security program.

(b) The airport tenant security

program shall include the following:

(1) Dimensions, boundaries, and

pertinent features of each area covered

by the airport tenant security program.

(2) Measures by which the tenant will

carry out within its designated areas the

security requirements imposed by the

Administrator on the airport operator.

(3) Methods by which the airport

operator will monitor and audit the

tenant’s compliance with the security

requirements.

(4) Terms of the agreement, including

monetary and other penalties, to which

the tenant may be subject if it fails to

carry out any security requirements it

agreed to perform.

(5) Circumstances under which the

airport operator will terminate the

airport tenant security program for

cause.

(c) The airport operator may not be

found to be in violation of a requirement

of this part in any case in which the

airport operator demonstrates that:

(1) The tenant, or an employee,

permittee, or invitee of the tenant, is

responsible for such violation; and

(2) The airport operator has complied

with all measures in its airport security

program to ensure the tenant has

complied with the airport tenant

security program.

(d) The Administrator may amend or

terminate an airport tenant security

program in accordance with § 107.105 of

this part.

Subpart C—Operations

§ 107.201 Security of the critical security

area.

(a) Each airport operator required to

have an airport security program under

§ 107.103(a) of this part shall establish

at least one critical security area and

describe each critical security area in its

security program.

(b) Each airport operator required to

establish a critical security area shall do

the following:

(1) Prevent the entry of unauthorized

individuals and ground vehicles by

establishing and carrying out a system,

method, or procedure for controlling

access to critical security areas of the

airport in accordance with § 107.205 of

this part.

(2) Establish and carry out a personnel

and vehicle identification system

described under § 107.209 of this part to

control the presence and movement of

persons and ground vehicles within the

critical security area.

(3) Establish and use escort

procedures in accordance with

§ 107.205(d) of this part.

(4) Establish and use challenge

procedures required under § 107.209(f)

of this part.

(5) Subject each individual to a

personnel background check as

described in § 107.207 of this part before

authorizing unescorted access to a

critical security area.

(6) Train each individual before

granting unescorted access to the critical

security area, as required in § 107.211(b)

of this part.

(7) Post signs at critical security area

access points and on the perimeter that

provide warning of the prohibition

against unauthorized access. Such

warning signs shall be posted by each

airport operator not later than 2 years

after [the effective date of this rule].

§ 107.203 Security of the restricted

operations area.

(a) For those portions of the airport

where air carrier and foreign air carrier

aircraft take off, land, taxi, park and

otherwise maneuver but are not

delineated as a critical security area,

each airport operator required to have

an airport security program under

§ 107.103(a) of this part shall establish

and describe in its security program a

restricted operations area.

(b) Each airport operator required to

establish a restricted operations area

shall do the following:

(1) Use a system, method, or

procedure for controlling access to

restricted operations areas of the airport

in accordance with § 107.205(b) of this

part.

(2) Subject each individual to a 5-year

employment history verification before

authorizing unescorted access to the

restricted operations area.

(3) Establish and use a personnel and

vehicle identification system described

under § 107.209 of this part to control

the presence and movement of

individuals and ground vehicles within

the restricted operations area.

(4) Establish and use escort

procedures in accordance with

§ 107.205(d) of this part.

(5) Establish and use challenge

procedures required under § 107.209(f)

of this part.

(6) Provide security information as

described in § 107.211(c) of this part to

each individual with unescorted access

to the restricted operations area.

(7) Post signs on restricted operations

area access points and perimeters that

provide warning of the prohibition

against unauthorized access. Signs shall

be implemented by each airport

operator not later than 2 years after [the

effective date of this rule].

§ 107.205 Access control systems.

(a) Critical Security Area. Except as

provided in paragraph (g) of this

section, the system, method, or

procedure for controlling access to the

critical security area required under

§ 107.201(b)(1) of this part shall—

(1) Ensure that only those individuals

authorized to have unescorted access to

the critical security area are able to

obtain that access;

(2) Ensure that an individual is

immediately denied access to a critical

security area when that person’s

authority for that area is withdrawn;

(3) Provide a means to differentiate

between individuals authorized to have

access to an entire critical security area

an individuals authorized access to only

a particular portion of a critical security

area; and

(4) Be capable of limiting an

individual’s access to a critical area by

time and date, as specified in the airport

contingency plan required under

§ 107.301 of this part.

(b) Restricted Operations Area. Except

as provided in paragraphs (c) and (e) of

this section, the system, method, or

procedure for controlling access to the

restricted operations area required

under § 107.203(b)(1) of this part shall—

(1) Prevent the entry of unauthorized

individuals and ground vehicles;

(2) Provide for detection of and

response to each unauthorized presence

in or access or attempted access to, the

restricted operations area by an

individual whose entry is not

authorized in accordance with the

airport security program;

(3) Be locally controlled; and

(4) Incorporate accountability

procedures to maintain the integrity of

that system, method, or procedure.

(c) Secondary access media. An

airport operator may issue a second

access medium to individuals

authorized access to critical security

areas and restricted operations areas, if

the airport operator follows methods

and procedures in the airport security

program that—

(1) Verify the access authorization of

the individuals granted unescorted

access to critical security areas and

restricted operations areas but are not in

possession of their original access

medium;

(2) Limit time of access with second

access medium;

(3) Retrieve the second access

medium when expired; and

(4) Deactivate or invalidate

temporarily the original access medium

until the time that the individual

returns the second access medium.

(d) Escorting. Each airport operator

shall establish and implement
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procedures for escorting individuals

who do not have unescorted access

authority to a critical security area or a

restricted operations area that—

(1) Ensure that only individuals with

unescorted access authority are

permitted to escort;

(2) Ensure that the escorted

individuals are continuously

accompanied or supervised in a manner

sufficient to take action should escorted

individuals engage in activities other

than those for which escorted access

was granted;

(3) Identify what action is to be taken

by the escort, or other authorized

individual, should individuals under

escort engage in activities other than

those for which access was granted;

(4) Prescribe law enforcement support

of escort activities; and

(5) Ensure that individuals escorted to

a sterile area without being screened

under § 108.201 of this chapter remain

under escort in accordance with this

section, or submit to screening pursuant

to § 108.201 of this part.

(3) Group validation. An airport

operator may submit for approval by the

Administrator procedures in its airport

security program for group validation

without each individual validating

access authority at individual access

points.

(f) Sterile areas. With the exception of

access points leading from a critical

security area, each airport operator shall

ensure that all points that provide

access to the sterile area from nonpublic

areas meet the requirements of this

section.

(g) Alternative systems. The

Administrator may approve an

amendment to an airport security

program that provides an alternative

system, method, or procedure that

provides an overall level of security

equal to that which would be provided

by the system, method, or procedure

described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of

this section.

§ 107.207 Employment history,

verification, and criminal history records

checks—[Reserved]

[Note: The is a separate rulemaking action

that will result in new text for this section.

To avoid confusion, the section is not

repeated here. See the preamble for further

explanation.]

§ 107.209 Identification systems.

(a) Personnel identification system.

The personnel identification system

under §§ 107.201(b)(2) or 107.203(b)(3)

of this part shall include the following:

(1) Personnel identification media

that—

(i) Convey accurate identification of

the individual to whom the

identification medium is issued;

(ii) Indicate clearly the scope of the

individual’s access and movement

privileges;

(iii) Indicate clearly an expiration

date; and

(iv) Are of sufficient size and

appearance as to be readily observable

for challenge purposes.

(2) Procedures to ensure that each

individual continuously displays the

identification medium issued to that

individual.

(3) Procedures to ensure

accountability through the following—

(i) Retrieving expired identification

media;

(ii) Reporting lost or stolen

identification media;

(iii) Securing unissued identification

media stock and supplies;

(iv) Auditing the system at a

minimum of once a year or sooner as

necessary to ensure the integrity and

accountability of all identification

media;

(v) As specified in the airport security

program, revalidate the identification

system or reissue identification media if

a portion of all issued identification

media become unaccounted for,

including identification media that is

combined with access media; and

(vi) Ensure that only one

identification medium is issued to an

individual at a time. A replacement

identification medium may only be

issued if an individual declares in

writing that the medium has been lost

or stolen.

(b) Vehicle identification system. The

identification system required under

§ 107.201(b)(2) and § 107.203(b)(3) of

this part shall include the following:

(1) Vehicle identification media that—

(i) Indicate clearly the scope of the

vehicle’s access and movement;

(ii) Indicate clearly an expiration date;

and

(iii) Are of sufficient size and

appearance as to be readily visible when

affixed to the vehicle.

(2) Procedures to ensure

accountability through—

(i) Retrieving expired vehicle

identification media;

(ii) Reporting lost or stolen vehicle

media;

(iii) Securing unissued vehicle

identification media stock and supplies;

(iv) Auditing the system at a

minimum of once a year or sooner as

necessary to ensure accountability of all

vehicle identification media;

(v) As specified in the airport security

program, revalidate, or reissue vehicle

identification media, if a portion of all

issued vehicle identification media

become unaccounted for; and

(vi) Ensure that only one

identification medium is issued to a

vehicle at a time. A replacement

identification medium may only be

issued if the owner of the vehicle, or

designee, declares in writing that the

medium has been lost or stolen.

(c) Part 139, Ground vehicle system. If

approved by the Administrator, a

vehicle access control and operations

system may be used to meet the

requirements of both § 139.329, Ground

Vehicles and this section.

(d) Temporary identification media.

Each airport operator shall issue

personnel and vehicle identification

media to persons whose duties are

expected to be temporary. Temporary

identification media system shall

include procedures and methods to—

(1) Retrieve temporary identification

media;

(2) Authorize the use of a temporary

media for a limited time only; and

(3) Ensure that temporary media are

distinct and clearly display an

expiration date.

(e) Airport-approved identification

media. The Administrator may approve

the use of identification media meeting

the criteria of this section that are issued

by entities other than the airport

operator, as described in the airport

security program.

(f) Challenge program. Each airport

operator shall establish and carry out a

challenge program that requires each

individual authorized unescorted access

to critical security areas and restricted

operations areas to ascertain the

authority of any individual not

displaying an authorized identification

media to be present in such areas. A

challenge program shall include

procedures to verbally challenge or

report individuals not visibly displaying

authorized identification media that—

(1) Apply uniformly in both critical

security areas and restricted operations

areas, including exclusive areas;

(2) Identify how to challenge directly

or report individuals not visibly

displaying authorized identification

medium, including procedures to notify

the appropriate authority; and

(3) Prescribe law enforcement support

of challenge procedures, including

response to reports of individuals not

displaying authorized identification.

(g) Effective date. The identification

systems described in this section shall

be implemented by each airport

operator not later than 2 years after [the

effective date of this rule].

§ 107.211 Training.

(a) Each airport operator shall ensure

that individuals performing security-
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related functions for the airport operator

are briefed on the provisions of this

part, applicable Security Directives and

Information Circulars promulgated

pursuant to § 107.303 of this part, and

the airport security program, to the

extent that such individuals need to

know in order to perform their duties.

(b) An airport operator may not

authorize any individual unescorted

access to the critical security area unless

that individual has successfully

completed training in accordance with

the FAA-approved curriculum specified

in the security program. This

curriculum must detail the methods of

instruction and include at least the

following topics—

(1) Control, use, and display of

airport-approved access and

identification media;

(2) Escort and challenge procedures,

and the law enforcement support for

these procedures;

(3) Security responsibilities as

specified in § 107.9 and § 107.11 (a) and

(b) of this part; and

(4) Any other topics specified in the

airport security program.

(c) An airport operator may not

authorize any individual unescorted

access to a restricted operations area

unless that individual has been

provided, and so acknowledges in

writing, information in accordance with

the airport security program,

including—

(1) Control, use, and display of

airport-approved access and

identification media;

(2) Escort and challenge procedures

and the law enforcement support for

these procedures;

(3) Security responsibilities as

specified in § 107.9 and § 107.11 (a) and

(b) of this part; and

(4) Any other topics specified in the

airport security program.

(d) Each airport operator shall

maintain a record of all training given

to each individual under this section

and written acknowledgment required

under paragraph (c) of this section, for

180 days after the termination of that

person’s unescorted access authority.

(e) Training described in this section

shall be implemented by each airport

operator not later than 2 years after

[insert the effective date of this rule].

§ 107.213 Law enforcement support.

(a) In accordance with § 107.215 of

this part, each airport operator required

to have an airport security program

under § 107.103 (a) and (b) of this part

shall provide:

(1) Law enforcement personnel in the

number and manner adequate to

support its security program.

(2) Uniformed law enforcement

personnel in the number and manner

adequate to support each passengerscreening system required under

§ 108.201 or § 129.25 of this chapter.

(b) Each airport required to have an

airport security program under

§ 107.103(c) of this part shall ensure

that:

(1) Law enforcement personnel are

available and committed to respond to

an incident at the request of an air

carrier or foreign air carrier that has a

security program under part 108 or

§ 129.25 of this chapter.

(2) The procedures by which to

request law enforcement support are

provided to each air carrier or foreign

air carrier that has a security program

under part 108 or § 129.25 of this

chapter.

§ 107.215 Law enforcement personnel.

(a) Each airport operator shall ensure

that law enforcement personnel used to

meet the requirements of § 107.213 of

this part, meet the following

qualifications while on duty at the

airport—

(1) Have arrest authority described in

paragraph (b) of this section;

(2) Are identifiable by appropriate

indicia of authority;

(3) Are armed and firearm and

authorized to use it; and

(4) Have completed a training

program that meets the requirements of

paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section.

(b) Each airport operator shall ensure

that law enforcement personnel used to

meet the requirements of § 107.213 of

this part have the authority to arrest,

with or without a warrant, while on

duty at the airport for the following

violations of the criminal laws of the

State and local jurisdictions in which

the airport is located—

(1) A crime committed in the presence

of the law enforcement personnel; and

(2) A felony, when the law

enforcement personnel has reason to

believe that the suspect has committed

it.

(c) The training program required by

paragraph (a)(4) of this section shall—

(1) In the case of Law Enforcement

Officers, meet the training standards

prescribed by either the State or local

jurisdiction in which the airport is

located for law enforcement personnel

performing comparable functions.

(2) In the case of private Law

Enforcement Personnel, be trained in a

manner acceptable to the Administrator,

if the State and local jurisdictions in

which the airport is located do not

prescribe training standards for private

security personnel who meet the

standards in paragraph (a) of this

section.

(3) Include training in—

(i) The use of firearms;

(ii) The courteous and efficient

treatment of persons subject to

inspection, detention, search, arrest, and

other aviation security activities;

(iii) The responsibilities of law

enforcement personnel under the airport

security program; and

(iv) Any other subject the

Administrator determines is necessary.

(d) Each airport operator shall

document the training program required

by paragraph (a)(4) of this section and—

(1) Maintain documentation of

training in its principal operations office

until 180 days after the departure or

removal of each law enforcement

personnel from service at the airport;

and

(2) Make training documentation

available for inspection upon the

request of the Administrator.

§ 107.217 Supplementing law enforcement

personnel.

(a) When the Administrator decides,

after being notified by an airport

operator as prescribed in this section,

that not enough qualified State, local,

and private law enforcement personnel

are available to carry out the

requirements of § 107.213 of this part,

the Administrator may authorize the

airport operator to use, on a

reimbursable basis, personnel employed

by the Administrator, or by another

department, agency, or instrumentality

of the Government with the consent of

the head of the department, agency, or

instrumentality, to supplement State,

local, and private law enforcement

personnel.

(b) Each request for the use of Federal

personnel must be submitted to the

Administrator and include the following

information:

(1) The number of passengers

enplaned at the airport during the

preceding calendar year and the current

calendar year a of the date of the

request.

(2) The anticipated risk of criminal

violence, sabotage, aircraft piracy, and

other unlawful interference to civil

aviation operations.

(3) A copy of that portion of the

airport security program which

describes the law enforcement support

necessary to comply with § 107.213 of

this part.

(4) The availability of law

enforcement personnel who meet the

requirements of § 107.215 of this part,

including a description of the airport

operator’s efforts to obtain law

enforcement support from State, local,

and private agencies and the responses

of those agencies.
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(5) The airport operator’s estimate of

the number of Federal personnel needed

to supplement available law

enforcement personnel and the period

of time for which they are needed.

(6) A statement acknowledging

responsibility for providing

reimbursement for the cost of providing

Federal personnel.

(7) Any other information the

Administrator considers necessary.

(c) In response to a request submitted

in accordance with this section, the

Administrator may authorize, on a

reimbursable basis, the use of personnel

employed by a Federal agency, with the

consent of the head of that agency.

§ 107.219 Records.

(a) All records required to be

maintained under this part shall be

furnished to the Administrator pursuant

to the schedule included in the airport

security program.

(b) Each airport operator shall ensure

that—

(1) A record is made of each law

enforcement response taken in

furtherance of this part; and

(2) The record is maintained for a

minimum of 180 days.

(c) Data developed in response to

paragraph (b) of this section must

include at least the following:

(1) The number and type of deadly or

dangerous weapon, explosive,

incendiary, or other destructive

substance discovered during any

passenger-screening process, and the

method of detection of each;

(2) The number of acts and attempted

acts of aircraft piracy.

(3) The number of bomb threats

received, real and simulated bombs

found, and actual detonations on the

airport.

(4) The number of detentions and

arrests, including—

(i) Name, address, and the immediate

disposition of each individual detained

or arrested;

(ii) Type of deadly or dangerous

weapon, explosive, incendiary, or other

destructive substance confiscated, as

appropriate; and

(iii) Identification of the air carriers or

foreign air carriers on which the

individual detained or arrested was, or

was scheduled to be, a passenger, or

which screened that individual, as

appropriate.

(d) Each airport operator required to

have an airport security program under

§ 107.103 (a) of this part shall make, and

maintain for 180 days, records of

corrective action imposed on persons

that fail to comply with § 107.9 and

§ 107.9 and § 107.11 (a) and (b) of this

part.

(e) Each airport operator shall make

and maintain any additional records

required by the Administrator, this part,

and the airport security program,

including, but not limited to, the

following recordkeeping requirements

of this part:

(1) § 107.5, Airport security

coordinator.

(2) 107.207, Employment verification.

(3) § 107.211, Training.

(4) § 107.215, Law enforcement

personnel.

Subpart D—Contingency Measures

§ 107.301 Contingency plan.

Each airport operator required to have

a security program under § 107.103(a)

and (b) of this part shall adopt a

contingency plan and shall:

(a) Implement its contingency plan

when directed by the Administrator.

(b) Conduct reviews and exercises of

its contingency plan with all air carriers

and foreign air carriers and all persons

having responsibilities under the plan to

ensure that all parties involved know

their responsibilities and that all

information contained in the plan is

current.

§ 107.303 Security directives and

information circulars.

(a) When a threat against civil

aviation becomes known, the Assistant

Administrator may issue an information

circular to notify airport operators of the

general situation or a Security Directive

setting forth mandatory

countermeasures to an assessed threat.

(b) Each airport operator required to

have an airport security program shall

comply with each Security Directive

issued to the airport operator by the

Administrator, within the time

prescribed in the Security Directive for

compliance.

(c) Each airport operator that receives

a Security Directive shall—

(1) Immediately upon receipt from the

FAA, or within the time prescribed in

the Security Directive, verbally

acknowledge receipt of the Security

Directive to the FAA, followed by

written acknowledgment of receipt

within 24 hours;

(2) Not later than 72 hours after

delivery by the FAA, or within the time

prescribed in the Security Directive,

specify the method by which the

measures in the Security Directive have

been implemented (or will be

implemented, if the Security Directive is

not yet effective) by providing the FAA

a copy of the written measures and

implementation procedures; and

(3) Ensure that information regarding

the Security Directive and measures

implemented in response to the Security

Directive are distributed to specified

personnel, as prescribed in the Security

Directive, and to other personnel with

an operational need to know.

(d) In the event that the airport

operator is unable to implement

paragraph (b)(2) of this section, the

airport operator shall submit, within 72

hours after receipt of the Security

Directive, proposed alternative

measures and the basis for submitting

the alternative measures to the

Administrator for approval. Within 48

hours after receiving the airport

operator’s proposed alternative

measures, the Administrator either

approves the proposed alternative

countermeasures or notifies the airport

operator to modify the alternative

countermeasures to comply with the

requirements of the Security Directive.

The airport operator shall implement

any alternative measures approved by

the Administrator within 72 hours of

receipt of notification of the

Administrator’s determination.

(e) Each airport operator that receives

a Security Directive or Information

Circular and each person who receives

information from a Security Directive or

Information Circular shall:

(1) Restrict the availability of the

Security Directive or Information

Circular, and information contained in

either document, to those persons with

an operational need to know.

(2) Refuse to release the Security

Directive or Information Circular, and

information contained in either

document, to persons other than those

who have an operational need-to-know

without the prior written consent of the

Administrator.

(f) The airport security coordinator, or

an individual designated by the airport

operator, may receive classified

information related to national security

if the airport security coordinator, or

designee, has applied to the

Administrator and received the

appropriate security clearances.

§ 107.305 Public advisories.

When advised by the Administrator,

each airport operator shall prominently

display and maintain in public areas

information concerning foreign airports

that, in the judgment of the Secretary of

Transportation, do not maintain and

administer effective security measures.

Such information shall be posted in the

manner and for the timeframe specified

in the airport security program.

§ 107.307 Incident management.

(a) As described in the airport security

program, each airport operator shall

establish procedures to evaluate the
41792 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Proposed Rules

appropriate response to threats of

sabotage, aircraft piracy, and other

unlawful interference to civil aviation

operations, including bomb threats.

(b) Immediately upon receipt of a

threat of any of the incidents described

in paragraph (a), each airport operator

shall—

(1) evaluate the threat in accordance

with its airport security program;

(2) Initiate appropriate action as

specified in the Airport Emergency Plan

under § 139.325 of this chapter; and

(3) Immediately notify the

Administrator of acts, or suspected acts,

of unlawful interference to civil aviation

operations, including specific bomb

threats to aircraft and airport facilities.

(c) Airport operators required to have

an airport security program under

§ 107.103(c) of this part but not subject

to part 139 of this chapter, Certification

and Operations: Land Airports Serving

Certain Air Carriers, shall develop

emergency response procedures to

incidents of threats identified in

paragraph (a).

(d) To ensure that all parties know

their responsibilities and that all

procedures are current, at least once

every 12 calendar months each airport

operator shall review the procedures

required in paragraphs (a) and (b) with

all persons having responsibilities for

such procedures.

PART 139—CERTIFICATION AND

OPERATIONS: LAND AIRPORTS

SERVING CERTAIN AIR CARRIERS

2. The authority citation for part 139

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701–

44706, 44709, 44719.

3. Section 139.325 is amended by

redesignating paragraph (h) as new

paragraph (j) and adding new

paragraphs (h) and (i) to read as follows:

§ 139.325 Airport emergency plan.

* * * * *

(h) Each airport subject to part 107,

Airport Security, shall ensure that

instructions for response to paragraphs

(b)(2) and (b)(6) of this section in the

airport emergency plan are consistent

with its approved airport security

program.

(i) FAA Advisory Circulars in the 150

Series contain standards and procedures

for the development of an airport

emergency plan which are acceptable to

the Administrator.

* * * * *

Issued in Washington, DC, on July 21,

1997.

Anthony Fainberg,

Director, Office of Civil Aviation Security

Policy and Planning.

[FR Doc. 97–19698 Filed 7–31–97; 8:45 am]

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