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Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism

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Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass

Destruction,Proliferation and Terrorism,Washington,DC

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi The Honorable John A. Boehner

United States House of Representatives United States House of Representatives

235 Cannon House Office Building 1011 Longworth House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515 Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Harry Reid The Honorable Mitch McConnell

United States Senate United States Senate

528 Hart Senate Office Building 361-A Russell Senate Office Building

Washington, DC 20510 Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Speaker Pelosi, Majority Leader Reid, Minority Leader Boehner, and Minority Leader McConnell:

In December 2008 in accordance with the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007 (P.L. 110-53), the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and 

Terrorism submitted its report, World at Risk.

That report assessed the nation’s activities, initiatives, and programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction 

proliferation and terrorism and provided concrete recommendations to address these threats.

The Commission found several areas where the risks to the United States are increasing: the crossroads of 

terrorism and proliferation in the poorly governed regions of Pakistan, the proliferation of biological and nuclear 

materials, and technology, and the potential erosion of international nuclear security, treaties, and norms as we 

enter a nuclear energy renaissance. 

In 2009, the Commission was authorized for an additional year of work, to assist Congress and the 

Administration to improve understanding of its findings and turn its concrete recommendations into actions. 

In accordance with that authorization, the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, based upon close 

consultation with Commissioners, hereby submit a report card assessing the U.S. Government’s progress in 

protecting the United States from weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism.

This report card provides an assessment of the progress that the U.S. government has made in implementing 

the recommendations of the Commission. It is our hope that by identifying areas of progress, as well as those 

in need of further attention, appropriate action will be taken to mitigate the threat posed by weapons of mass 

destruction to the United States.

We thank you for the opportunity to extend the work of the Commission and for the honor of allowing us to serve 

our country.

Respectfully submitted,

Senator Bob Graham Senator Jim Talent

Chairman Vice Chairman

January 26, 2010
Dear Mr. President:

In December 2008 in accordance with the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007 (P.L. 110-53), the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and 

Terrorism submitted its report, World at Risk.

That report assessed the nation’s activities, initiatives, and programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction 

proliferation and terrorism and provided concrete recommendations to address these threats.

The Commission found several areas where the risks to the United States are increasing: the crossroads of 

terrorism and proliferation in the poorly governed regions of Pakistan, the proliferation of biological and nuclear 

materials, and technology, and the potential erosion of international nuclear security, treaties, and norms as we 

enter a nuclear energy renaissance. 

In 2009, the Commission was authorized for an additional year of work, to assist Congress and the 

Administration to improve understanding of its findings and turn its concrete recommendations into actions. 

In accordance with that authorization, the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, based upon close 

consultation with Commissioners, hereby submit a report card assessing the U.S. Government’s progress in 

protecting the United States from weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism.

This report card provides an assessment of the progress that the U.S. government has made in implementing 

the recommendations of the Commission. It is our hope that by identifying areas of progress, as well as those 

in need of further attention, appropriate action will be taken to mitigate the threat posed by weapons of mass 

destruction to the United States.

We thank you for the opportunity to extend the work of the Commission and for the honor of allowing us to serve 

our country.

Respectfully submitted,

Senator Bob Graham Senator Jim Talent

Chairman Vice Chairman

The Honorable Barack Obama

President of the United States

The White House

Washington, DC 20500

January 26, 2010
1

Overview

In December 2008, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and 

Terrorism released a unanimous threat assessment: Unless the world community acts decisively and with great 

urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) will be used in a terrorist attack 

somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. That weapon is more likely to be biological than nuclear. 

Less than a month after this assessment, then Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell publicly endorsed it.

The assessment was based on four factors.

First, there is direct evidence that terrorists are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Second, acquiring WMD fits the tactical profile of terrorists. They understand the unique vulnerability of 

first-world countries to asymmetric weapons—weapons that have a far greater destructive impact than the 

power it takes to acquire and deploy them. The airplanes that al Qaeda flew into the World Trade Center 

were asymmetric weapons.

Third, terrorists have demonstrated global reach and the organizational sophistication to obtain and use 

WMD. As recent actions by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula demonstrate, the al Qaeda network is 

expanding through international partnerships. In particular, it is well within their present capabilities to 

develop and use bioweapons. As the Commission’s report, World at Risk, found, if al Qaeda recruits skilled 

bioscientists, it will acquire the capability to develop and use biological weapons.

Fourth, the opportunity to acquire and use such weapons is growing exponentially because of the global 

proliferation of nuclear material and biological technologies. 

Almost fourteen months have passed since the Commission issued its World at Risk. That means nearly a 

quarter of the five-year margin of shrinking safety has passed. 

During that time, the risk has continued to grow. 

This is not meant to question the good faith or deny the dedication of anyone in the government. The fact is 

that first-world democracies are particulary vulnerable to asymmetric attack, especially from organizations that 

have no national base and therefore, are undeterred by the threat of retaliation. So although everyone wants 

to prevent such attacks, and the government made progress toward that end in certain areas, the forces and 

factors that imperil the country have been outracing defensive efforts and overwhelming good intentions.

It is possible that fortuitous circumstances may reduce the anticipated risk. Outside forces may change and 

render more benign the groups that are working against us, or as in the case of the Detroit-bound flight on 

Christmas Day, an attack may occur but fail in execution to the point that the destructive impact is minimal.

But the United States cannot count on such good fortune. Plans must be based on the assumption that what 

is likely to occur, given the current trajectory of risk, WILL occur, unless the trajectory is reversed. And on the
2

current course, what is likely to occur within a very few years is an attack using weapons of mass 

destruction—probably a bioweapon—that will fundamentally change the character of life for the world’s 

democracies.

In reaction to the Christmas Day attack, President Barack Obama stated that he would do everything in his 

power to support the men and women in intelligence, law enforcement and homeland security to ensure they 

have the tools and resources to keep America safe. He promised to “leave no stone unturned in seeking better 

ways to protect the American people.” It is in this spirit of protecting America that the Commission made its 

recommendations, and it is in this spirit that the report card was developed. 

The assessment is not a good one, particularly in the area of biological threats. While the government has made 

progress on preventing such attacks, it is simply not paying consistent and urgent attention to the means of 

responding quickly and effectively so that they no longer constitute a threat of mass destruction. The failures 

did not begin with the current group of leaders. Each of the last three Administrations has been slow to 

recognize and respond to the biothreat. The difference is that the danger has grown to the point that we no 

longer have the luxury of a slow learning curve. The clock is ticking, and time is running out.

Failure to Understand Nature of Biothreat

The evolution of the nature of the threat is nowhere more pronounced than in the area of biological weapons. 

A revolution in biotechnology continues, expanding potentially dangerous dual-use capabilities across the globe. 

As the delayed response to H1N1 has demonstrated, the United States is woefully behind in its capability to 

rapidly produce vaccines and therapeutics, essential steps for adequately responding to a biological threat, 

whether natural or man-made. 

H1N1 came with months of warning. But even with time to prepare, the epidemic peaked before most 

Americans had access to vaccine. A bioattack will come with no such warning. Response is a complex series 

of links in a chain of resilience necessary to protect the United States from biological attacks. Rapid detection 

and diagnosis capabilities are the first links, followed by providing actionable information to federal, state, and 

local leaders and the general public; having adequate supplies of appropriate medical countermeasures; quickly 

distributing those countermeasures; treating and isolating the sick in medical facilities; protecting the well 

through vaccines and prophylactic medications; and in certain cases, such as anthrax, environmental cleanup. 

We conclude that virtually all links are weak, and require the highest priority of attention from the Administration 

and Congress. 

The Chair and Vice Chair believe that this lack of preparedness and a consistent lack of action, even on 

fundamental issues like provision of adequate high-level expertise and investment in medical countermeasures, 

is a symptom of a failure of the U.S. government to grasp the threat of biological weapons. 

Whereas the Administration has demonstrated a keen understanding of the nuclear threat and has set in motion 

a series of policies that all hope will bear fruit, there has been no equal sense of urgency displayed towards the 

threat of a large-scale biological weapons attack. 

Positive Strides to Address Nuclear Threat 

President Obama has undertaken substantial effort to bolster the nonproliferation regime. From his April 2009 

speech in Prague to his chairmanship of a United Nations Security Council meeting on the subject and plans for 

a Global Summit on Nuclear Security, he is attempting to bend current trend lines.
3

We have some concerns in the nuclear arena, particularly regarding the Administration’s failure to prevent the 

lapse of verification mechanisms established under the START treaty. Ensuring their continuation was very 

important and insufficient attention was paid to it. 

The U.S. government has placed priority on Iran and North Korea, and much attention and resources have been 

spent on Pakistan, but progress has been slow. The Chair and Vice Chair are gravely concerned about these 

regions. Recognizing the limited leverage the United States has in addressing them and the time-consuming 

nature of diplomacy, as the Administration works to deepen global resolve to act, we underscore the 

unacceptable consequences of failure. 

The U.S. government must strengthen the nonproliferation regime, develop more effective policies to eliminate 

terrorist havens in Pakistan, and galvanize allies to stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons 

programs. 

Iran and North Korea

No grade is provided for Iran and North Korea in recognition if the broad nature and ambition of the 

Commission’s recommendation to “stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs.” In World at 

Risk, the Commission stated that because of the dynamic international environment, it would not address the 

precise tactics that should be employed by the next administration to achieve this strategic objective. However, 

the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea pose immediate and urgent threats to their respective regions 

and to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which could trigger a dangerous cascade of proliferation. 

The actions of both countries in the past year have only increased these threats. Iran has rebuffed negotiating 

efforts, been exposed in its pursuit of a covert uranium enrichment site, and stated its intention to build 

additional facilities in defiance of UN Security Council mandates. It has also violently crushed its own domestic 

political opposition. North Korea has conducted both nuclear and missile tests. With Iran, the Administration 

has reacted with extreme patience but now appears poised to push for strengthened sanctions (a step 

supported by the House of Representatives in a sanctions bill passed in December 2009). Regarding North 

Korea, the Administration succeeded in tightening multilateral sanctions on the country with Security Council 

Resolution 1874, but direct diplomatic engagement has failed to bring North Korea back into the six-nation 

talks. The Commission is deeply concerned with these events and the time that has been lost in 2009. Failure 

to stop Iran and North Korea could result in a cascade of proliferation, which would dramatically increase the 

likelihood of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Failure on Government Reform and Building a National Security Workforce

As former members of the U.S. Senate, the Chair and Vice Chair are enormously frustrated at the inability of 

Congress to reform its own oversight of the nation’s homeland security agency. 

The Chair and Vice Chair recognize the immense domestic challenges faced by Congress and the new 

Administration over the past year, including the financial crisis and health care reform, but believes that there 

should have been room for the structural procedures necessary to face the critical national security issue of 

protecting Americans from WMD threats.

As an independent branch of the U.S. government, Congress has an essential role to play in ensuring our 

national security—through authorization, appropriation, and oversight. It is essential to the safety of the 

American citizen that these functions are carried out competently. 
4

For instance, the authorization, appropriation, and oversight for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) are spread across more than 80 committees and subcommittees. This ensures that Congress will 

continue to lack a deep understanding of the important and interrelated security and intelligence policy issues 

that face the nation. This fragmentation guarantees that much of what Congress does will be duplicative and 

disjointed.

Oversight of DHS should be removed from legacy committees and focused within the House and Senate 

Homeland Security Committees.

The refusal of Congress, as the nation’s elected representatives, to pull congressional authority together into 

one coherent oversight body is both self-serving and conspicuous, suggesting that individual concerns for “turf” 

supersede the legislature’s willingness to assume responsibility to ensure national security. 

Although the executive branch has made improvements in integrating the efforts of various departments and 

agencies, much work remains, as demonstrated by the Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day. That thwarted 

attack exposed not only the inability of various intelligence agencies to provide protection, but also the inability 

of Congress to provide oversight.

In addition, both the Administration and Congress are well aware of the need to substantially improve how our 

federal departments, agencies, and the national laboratories hire and retain highly skilled personnel. The aging 

of our national security workforce has been a growing problem for over a decade, and yet little has been done 

by either branch of government.

If these long-standing deficiencies in executive agency operations and congressional oversight of homeland 

security, intelligence, and other crosscutting 21st century issues are not corrected, the United States will remain 

woefully underprepared to respond to the growing WMD threat.

The Commission emphasized in World at Risk that there is a vital connection between the process of making 

decisions and decisions made, or not made. In other words, if the process is balkanized; if there are no 

“integrators” to make sure agencies or committees work together; if experienced, senior officials are not put 

into the crucial positions, then the people can expect that little or nothing will be done—despite the good will 

of top authorities. 

Progress on Citizen and Community Preparedness

A well-informed, organized, and engaged citizenry remains the country’s greatest resource. The federal 

government has made some progress in supporting the development of preparedness and resilience of state 

and local governments, business and non-profit communities, and individual citizens. Efforts, such as 

development of a checklist that citizens can use to ensure the readiness of their local governments, need to be 

expanded to ensure that all communities and citizens are prepared in the event of a WMD attack. 

 
5

Grading System

This report card uses letter grades to assess the U.S. government’s progress in implementing the Commission’s 

recommendations. The grades are based on close consultation with Commissioners, but the final assessments 

are those of the Chair and Vice Chair. 

The letter grades take into consideration the scope of the recommendations and assess the level of attention 

paid, commitment demonstrated, and actual steps taken. The grades reflect the level of progress based upon 

what is both realistic and essential, given the urgency and complexity of the threats the country faces. Each 

grade is accompanied by text that discusses key details, considers the long-term nature of some goals, and 

offers recommended actions that can lead to significant improvement.

Some of our recommendations can be implemented by the President making a decision or the President and 

Congress passing a law or appropriating money. Others require working with foreign governments to persuade 

them to change their attitudes and behavior. Our grades reflect an appreciation of this difference.

Grades are not provided for every one of the 13 recommendations and 49 actions outlined in World at Risk. 

Rather, 17 grades are given, highlighting the issues of highest priority for protecting the American people from 

WMD threats. They are grouped into four main areas: Biological Risk, Nuclear Risk, Government Reform, and 

Citizen Engagement. Within each area the recommendations are listed in order of weighted importance, with 

those of the highest priority appearing first. The full 13 recommendations from World at Risk are provided 

starting on page 15.

A

B

C

D

F

I

Grade

Incomplete—not realistic to assess in the timeframe allowed

No attention or action taken

Limited initial steps (e.g, action limited to one committee or chamber of Congress)

Initial steps taken, but significant follow-up action required

Serious action taken/commitment demonstrated, not yet complete

Recommendations fully adopted or significant steps taken towards 

implementation of longer term goals
F

6

Biological Risks

Enhance the nation’s capabilities for rapid response to 

prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass casualties.

World at Risk recommendation 1-5

The lack of U.S. capability to rapidly recognize, respond, and recover from a biological attack is the most 

significant failure indentified in this report card. Deterrence of bioterrorism rests upon the ability of the nation 

to mitigate the effects of an attack. Unfortunately, there is no national plan to coordinate federal, state, and 

local efforts following a bioterror attack, and the United States lacks the technical and operational capabilities 

required for an adequate response. These technical and operational capabilities are each links in a chain, 

critical to the strength of the attack response. Weakness in any capability leads to a diminished response, and 

diminished effectiveness in deterring an attack.

Rapid detection and diagnosis capabilities are the first links in the chain, followed by: providing actionable 

information to federal, state, and local leaders and the general public; having adequate supplies of appropriate 

medical countermeasures; quickly distributing those countermeasures; treating and isolating the sick in medical 

facilities; protecting the well through vaccines and prophylactic medications; and in certain cases, such as 

anthrax, environmental cleanup. 

The United States is seriously lacking in each of these vital capabilities.

Especially troubling is the lack of priority given to the development of medical countermeasures—the vaccines 

and medicines that would be required to mitigate the consequences of an attack. Congress created the 

Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority Advanced Development Fund to promote the 

development of new vaccines, drugs, and production processes required to meet the modern threats from 

man-made and naturally occurring epidemics. The estimated cost of developing the medical countermeasures 

required to meet the threats identified by the Department of Homeland Security is $3.4 billion a year for the 

next five years. Appropriation for FY 2010 is less than one tenth of that. In addition, there have been several 

attempts by the Administration and Congress to “raid” the BioShield Strategic Reserve Fund for programs not 

associated with national security.

In World at Risk, the Commission unanimously concluded that bioterrorism was the most likely WMD threat to 

the world. The capability to deter and respond to bioterrorism depends upon the strength of all links in the 

biodefense chain. Virtually all links are weak and require the highest priority of attention from the Administration 

and Congress.

Improving the capabilities to rapidly recognize, respond, and recover from a bioterrorism attack has great 

dual-benefit in that it will significantly enhance public health infrastructures and medical capacities to deal with 

naturally occurring diseases and other disasters. 
Tighten government oversight of high-containment laboratories.

World at Risk recommendation 1-3

The Commission recommended that government oversight be tightened so that governmental policies are 

consistent, enforceable, and promote important bioscience research. However, regulatory fragmentation 

remains the norm. There are too many agencies at the federal, state, and local levels that regulate pathogens, 

in sometimes conflicting ways. Congress bears primary responsibility for the needed reforms to tighten the 

oversight of these dangerous pathogens. 

Following the Commission’s recommendation for a review of the domestic program, many government, 

academic, associations, and private sector studies came to similar conclusions regarding the importance of 

eliminating duplicative regulations, and organizing pathogens into risk categories. Most agree that the highest 

risk pathogens, deserving the most stringent controls, number closer to eight than the 80 pathogens currently 

on the Select Agent List. 

The Senate Homeland Security and Government Reform Committee has acted on the Commission’s 

recommendations in the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009. We applaud its efforts to address 

laboratory security. But work by one Committee in one House of Congress does not represent the kind of urgent 

and comprehensive action that World at Risk called for. The full Senate should take up the Committee Bill, a 

companion bill should be introduced and moved quickly through the House, and both bodies should act 

expeditiously in considering and resolving the inevitable differences of opinion that arise in the passage of such 

legislation. 

As stated in World at Risk, the Commission is firm in its conclusion that the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services should have the lead for laboratory security of human pathogens.

A Presidential directive could be used to improve some of these deficiencies. 

Conduct a comprehensive review of the domestic program 

to secure dangerous pathogens.

World at Risk recommendation 1-1

The Administration has completed several reports since the Commission made its recommendations in 

December 2008, focusing on many of the areas identified for security review, including laboratory security, 

reliability and trustworthiness of employees who have access to dangerous pathogens and research facilities, 

and federal oversight of high-containment laboratory research. This was a specific recommendation in the 

report, and we are pleased that it was quickly accomplished. But reports and reviews alone will not protect us; 

the next step is to integrate and implement the conclusions of these reports into a national strategy that 

ensures laboratory safety and security without impeding the pace of scientific progress.

Strengthen domestic and global disease surveillance networks. 

World at Risk recommendations 2-3 & 1-5

The nation’s ability to recognize a disease emergency—whether it is man-made or naturally occurring—is the 

first link in a chain that leads to a robust public health response. Once a disease is detected, important 

C

A

7

D
information about the disease must be rapidly communicated to all those who are susceptible. The sick must be 

treated, the well protected, and the outbreak eventually contained. If any part of this chain is weak or broken, as 

it currently is, an adequate response is not possible. Surveillance is a key part of biodefense preparedness 

because it would help reduce the impact of an attack. The WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009

addresses many of the Commission’s concerns regarding global disease surveillance networks. This legislation has 

not been enacted.

As demonstrated during the recent H1N1 pandemic, domestic disease surveillance has been inadequate. The 

United States does not have the diagnostic testing capabilities required, and has a fragmented surveillance 

network. The Administration has developed plans to increase global surveillance disease networks; this progress 

on the international front is the reason our grade is as high as it is. However, the domestic situation needs 

attention and improvement. Currently our government cannot determine how many people have contracted a 

disease even during a pandemic such as H1N1, which was foreseen for many months. That is not acceptable. 

This grade could be raised by developing a strategy and an implementation and funding plan for a more robust 

disease detection and reporting network within the United States.

Propose a new action plan for achieving universal adherence 

to the Biological Weapons Convention.

World at Risk recommendation 2-4

In December 2009, the National Security Council released the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. 

The Chair and Vice Chair commend this ground-breaking initiative that provides national guidance for integrated 

actions intended to prevent biological terrorism and other significant outbreaks of infectious disease. During the 

past year, the U.S. Department of State has held a number of productive international meetings in preparation for 

the 2011 Biological Warfare Convention (BWC) 7th Review Conference. We were pleased to see the 

Administration’s rejection of efforts to restart BWC Protocol negotiations, recognizing that it is virtually impossible 

to verify compliance with the spread of dual-use advanced biotechnology around the world. However, U.S. policy 

on biological weapons cannot rest solely on opposition of the BWC Protocol. In order to provide leadership at the 

2011 BWC Conference, the United States will have to take the necessary steps at home to enhance its ability to 

prevent biological terrorism, such as passage and rapid implementation of the WMD Prevention and Preparedness 

Act of 2009. To earn an A on this recommendation the U.S. Department of State must develop a full action plan 

for increasing international adherence to the biological weapons ban. 

Develop a national strategy for advancing bioforensic capabilities.

World at Risk recommendation 1-2

An Interagency Bioforensics Strategy has been finalized and approved by the U.S. Office of Science and 

Technology Policy and exceeds the criteria stated in the Commission’s recommendations. Implementation is 

underway and expected to be completed early in 2010. These steps should be incorporated into the White House 

strategy for prevention of biothreats. 

B

A

8
Nuclear Risks

Implement a comprehensive policy toward Pakistan. 

World at Risk recommendation 6

In World at Risk, the Commission recommended that the President and Congress should implement a 

comprehensive policy that engages Pakistan and other countries to eliminate terrorist safe havens, secure 

nuclear and biological materials, counter and defeat extremist ideology, and constrain a nascent nuclear arms 

race in Asia. Although significant action has been taken towards these ends, the situation in Pakistan continues 

to deteriorate and remains precarious. Because the long term impact of these initiatives cannot be realistically 

assessed at this point, the Chair and Vice Chair, therefore, provide an incomplete grade and the following 

recognition of what has been done and what remains to be completed.

Congress and the Administration took an important step in this regard by passing the Enhanced Partnership with 

Pakistan Act of 2009, which provides $7.5 billion in aid to Pakistan over five years, tripling economic aid to the 

country and seeking to balance motivation of the military to address urgent security threats to the United States 

and Pakistan alike with substantial support for the country’s people and civilian institutions. President Obama 

has given this priority attention to the region, appointing a high-profile envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 

encouraging Pakistan, to press harder to eliminate al Qaeda safe havens. The Pakistani Army has stepped up 

military efforts along the border of Afghanistan, and the Chair and Vice Chair commend the Administration for 

continuing efforts to target the al Qaeda leadership in the region. 

As part of a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan, President Obama has called for “an effective partnership 

with Pakistan.” Militarily, the “surge” of troops to Afghanistan coupled with increased support for Pakistan’s 

offensive against al Qaeda and Taliban extremists in previously ungoverned territory constitutes what General 

David Petraeus has called a “hammer and anvil” strategy. For that strategy to be successful, the “hammer” and 

the “anvil” must both be continued at the same time to provide coordinated and simultaneous pressure on both 

sides of the border. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates, and leaders of the U.S. intelligence community have been frequent visitors to their counterparts in this 

undertaking. Moreover, we applaud the Administration for sustaining an accelerated campaign to eliminate a 

large number of al Qaeda leaders in the area. On the ideological front, the latest Pew Global Attitudes poll 

shows overall trend lines improving on Pakistani attitudes towards al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban. 

Indeed, the poll shows that unfavorable views towards the Taliban and al Qaeda have nearly doubled since last 

year to 70% and 61% respectively. 

However, while these efforts are important, Pakistan remains in crisis, with an increasing number of bold attacks on 

well-guarded military, police, and UN targets. We are pleased that the Pakistani government appears to be taking 

serious military action to combat insurgents, but other factors contributing to its precarious position have not been 

satisfactorily addressed. Pakistan is reportedly expanding its arsenal of nuclear weapons, a development that 

heightens concerns about the security of its nuclear stockpile and fuels, and which would run counter to another 

recommendation of the Commission, developing a policy to contain a nascent nuclear arms race in South Asia. 

The U.S. Department of State has expanded efforts to secure biological research laboratories that possess 

stocks of dangerous pathogens and to promote a culture of biosafety in Pakistan. It is beginning to work with 

I

9
the U.S. Department of Defense on this front, but further interagency coordination, especially with the 

intelligence community, is needed to adequately address this risk. 

A good grade on Pakistan will require improvements on several fronts, including military success as measured 

by secured territory and elimination of al Qaeda safe havens; development success, as measured by numbers 

of hospitals, roads, power plants, and schools (with well-trained teachers), as well as by rising literacy rates 

(particularly among women in the tribal areas); and ideological success as measured by improvement in 

Pakistani views of the United States (currently among the lowest in the world with only 16 percent favorability, 

according to recent Pew Global Attitudes surveys).

Work with Russia to reduce dangers of WMD. 

World at Risk recommendation 7

President Obama has made relations with Russia a priority, focusing especially on cooperation in combating 

nuclear danger. The results so far, however, are limited, as the Russian government has proved a difficult and 

often reluctant partner. At the July Obama-Medvedev summit, the two leaders endorsed a number of ongoing 

initiatives that the Commission had recommended, including (1) deepening their commitments to the Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); (2) strengthening 

the ability of other nations to implement UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540; (3) broadening longterm cooperation to further increase the level of security of nuclear facilities around the world; (4) sustaining 

nuclear security upgrades in Russia; (5) expanding capabilities to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials 

and radioactive substances; and (6) working jointly to repatriate research reactor highly enriched uranium (HEU) 

fuel. Permanent working groups have been established to accelerate these efforts.

We are pleased about Russian support for the United States in securing passage of UNSCR 1887 on 

nonproliferation and disarmament, toughening UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea, and joining the 

United States in leading in the upcoming Global Nuclear Security Summit, where Russia has agreed to host the 

follow-up. In addition, the United States and Russia have worked together in achieving an International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) agreement on Russia’s International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk. 

The Chair and Vice Chair lament the failure of the Administration to anticipate the urgent necessity for extending 

important verification and monitoring provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) prior to the 

treaty’s lapse on December 5, 2009. As of this writing, these provisions have not been extended. Though 

negotiations continue with the hope of reaching an agreement soon, the negotiation of technical annexes and 

the need to then gain legislative approval in both countries will further delay the reinstitution of an important 

facet of the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship, something the Commission noted was crucial to lessening the 

threat of nuclear terrorism. The Administration can raise this grade by taking concrete steps to further GICNT 

and PSI, by reinvigorating cooperative biological threat reduction programs in Russia, by making progress on 

limiting fissile nuclear material, and by completing a post-START verification and monitoring mechanism. 

Strengthen the nonproliferation regime. 

World at Risk recommendation 3 

The Chair and Vice Chair applaud President Obama’s leadership in putting the danger of nuclear proliferation 

B

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10
and nuclear terrorism at the top of his national security agenda, as evidenced by his first foreign policy speech 

abroad in Prague last April, his chairmanship of the UN Security Council in September, and his initiative to 

assemble key heads of state in Washington this spring for a Global Nuclear Security Summit. After many years 

of essentially no growth in the IAEA budget, the United States succeeded in reaching agreement on a real, if 

modest, funding boost (2.7%) and increased its own 2009 voluntary contribution by 20 percent. The 

Administration also won approval of a UN Security Council Resolution reaffirming the importance of 

nonproliferation and endorsing many of the Commission’s recommendations. 

We are also pleased that the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution authorizing the Director General to 

conclude and implement a Russian proposal to establish a reserve of low enriched uranium (LEU) for supply to 

the IAEA for its member states. Other efforts, including seeking measures to restrict the spread of dangerous 

enrichment and reprocessing technologies, are ongoing but have yet to bear fruit. Much must still be done to 

enhance the IAEA’s authorities. The Administration needs to report on how well the IAEA is meeting its own 

nuclear safeguards timeliness detection goals, whether these goals are tough enough to provide timely warning, 

and where the IAEA is unlikely to be able to get timely warning of a military diversion under any circumstances. 

Also, despite some effort in Congress, the government has yet to implement Title V of the Nonproliferation Act 

of 1978 by reporting on U.S. cooperation with developing nations to develop non-nuclear alternative energy 

sources and to create a non-nuclear energy peace corps. Finally, we believe that Congress and the President 

may need to further reform the oversight of the approval of proposed nuclear cooperative agreements. The 

nuclear proliferation assessments that must accompany proposed agreements, such as the U.S.-Russian 

civilian nuclear cooperative agreement, deserve greater attention and review by Congress. 

The Administration can improve its grade on this front by taking concrete steps, including supporting 

congressional initiatives where appropriate, to strengthen the safeguards system, to expand near-real time and 

wide-area surveillance, to require foreign visitors to IAEA safeguarded sites to be registered and accounted for, 

and most importantly, to make progress in reversing trends in North Korea and Iran. The Administration can also 

improve its grade by taking concrete steps to constrain the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. 

We also reaffirm the language in World at Risk that the United States should discourage, to the extent possible, 

the use of financial incentives in the promotion of nuclear power. 

Review cooperative nuclear security programs.

World at Risk recommendation 4

President Obama took a significant step in announcing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear 

material around the world within four years and in April 2010 will host a Global Nuclear Security Summit in 

Washington, D.C. An inter-agency review of nuclear cooperative security programs is underway and 

implementation plans are being developed. While indications to date have been positive, much remains to be 

done. Funding for programs like the Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which actually 

decreased for fiscal year 2010, will have to be increased if the President’s four-year goal is to be reached. 

Decisions on key positions for moving these programs forward, particularly in the U.S. Department of Energy’s 

National Nuclear Security Agency, have been delayed. Appropriate resources for nuclear cooperative security 

programs, completion of detailed implementation plans, and progress at the Global Nuclear Security Summit, 

will be needed to raise this grade and to achieve President Obama’s stated goals. 

 

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Government Reform

Reform congressional oversight to better address intelligence, homeland 

security, and crosscutting 21st-century national security missions.

World at Risk recommendation 9

Congress has a responsibility not only to authorize and appropriate necessary national security missions, but 

also to provide effective oversight of those efforts. Regular oversight hearings should be held, but should avoid 

duplication and disjointedness. Congress has failed to take even the relatively easy first steps to consolidate 

oversight authority of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The estimated number of committees and 

subcommittees that oversee DHS ranges from 82 to 108. Virtually no progress has been made since 

consolidation was first recommended by the 9/11 Commission in 2004. The Commission also recommended 

that Congress should create an Intelligence Subcommittee in the Appropriations Committee in both chambers 

with jurisdiction over the National Intelligence Program and the Military Intelligence Program budgets. Limited 

action has been taken on this recommendation. To improve this failing grade, the leadership of both parties, 

and in both chambers, must make the public commitment to begin this needed consolidation. Then they must 

begin to implement the commitment in 2010, even if it takes several years to complete.

Implement education and training programs to recruit and 

retain the next generation of national security experts. 

World at Risk recommendation 11

The unwillingness of successive administrations and congresses to address in any responsible manner the 

growing shortfall in our national security workforce—a problem identified as far back as the 1999 Hart-Rudman 

report—represents a fundamental failure of government. This shortage in personnel will significantly diminish 

the nation’s ability to address a growing number of security issues. Several of the necessary programs, such as 

Boren scholarships funded by the National Security Education Program, already exist, but they lack sufficient 

scale and continuity of funding and political support in the Administration and Congress to meet growing 

personnel shortages in intelligence, defense, space, security, and at the national laboratories. 

Proposals like that of the Director of National Intelligence to establish an Intelligence Officer Training Corps, 

modeled on the military’s ROTC program, are critical to provide future scientific and engineering personnel as 

well as linguistic and area studies for developing capable analysts. While the use of contract personnel fills 

some vacancies, the practice is overly expensive, creates no lasting organizational expertise, and is, at best, a 

short-term solution to a long-term problem. What needs to be done is known and the national consequences

of not hiring a sufficient number of qualified individuals are understood. Therefore, the decision of both the 

Administration and Congress to not adequately fund needed recruitment and retention programs, to include 

joint-duty assignments, is an inexcusable failure. To judge this situation as anything other than an abject failure, 

both the Administration and Congress must commit to spending what is required to recruit, hire, train, and 

retrain a qualified, motivated national security workforce.

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F

F
Integrate, under a single overarching strategy, efforts to coordinate, 

integrate, and deliver foreign assistance, public 

diplomacy, and strategic communications.

World at Risk recommendation 12

The Commission recommended that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the U.S. Agency for International 

Development and other offices, should take the lead in building organic capability within the civilian agencies of the 

U.S. government to deliver foreign assistance, public diplomacy, and strategic communications. In May, following a 

60-day review, President Obama created a Global Engagement Directorate in the NSC to drive comprehensive policies 

that integrate diplomacy, communications, international development and assistance, and domestic engagement and 

outreach in pursuit of a host of national security objectives, including those related to homeland security. The U.S. 

Department of State is working on a congressionally mandated Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 

(QDDR) to guide diplomatic and development efforts, and in August, the president issued a new Presidential Study 

Directive (PSD) to review U.S. global development programs toward a more strategic and coordinated development 

policy. Interim QDDR results are expected to be released in February, followed by issuance of the PSD. Completion of 

the QDDR is tentatively expected in July 2010. Congress is also weighing in with introduction of the Initiating Foreign 

Assistance Reform Act of 2009 in the House and the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act of 2009 

in the Senate. These are all positive steps, but the extent to which these efforts result in a coordinated overarching 

strategy, and particularly the extent to which public diplomacy and strategic communications are included in these 

largely development focused reviews, remains to be seen.

Designate a White House principal advisor for WMD proliferation and terrorism. 

World at Risk recommendation 8

The Administration adopted the Commission’s recommendation by appointing a WMD coordinator. However, this step 

has not fully addressed the reasoning behind the Commission’s recommendation. In World at Risk, the Commission 

expressed concern that there is a long history of cases in which policy tradeoffs were required between nonproliferation 

and geopolitical interests. In virtually all cases, economic and geopolitical considerations trumped nonproliferation 

concerns. In order to ensure that nonproliferation concerns are fully heard and understood, it is critical that an official 

with sufficient senior-level interagency authority and direct access to the president be in charge of WMD proliferation 

and terrorism. No such official currently exists. To improve this grade and to truly ensure the protection of the United 

States, such an official should be appointed as rapidly as possible.

Create a more efficient and effective policy coordination structure by restructuring 

the National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC).

World at Risk recommendation 8

The President integrated the NSC and HSC shortly after taking office and is to be commended for taking this first 

important step. If the United States is going to successfully pull together the various departments and agencies 

of the federal government, integration must begin at the top. Next, however, the executive branch faces the 

infinitely more difficult and infinitely more important challenge of improving interagency cooperation. On that front, 

there has been little progress over the past year, or any meaningful efforts by Congress to drive this larger issue. 

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Citizen and Community Preparedness

Practice greater openness of public information so that citizens better

understand the WMD threat. 

World at Risk recommendation 13

There is evidence that the current Administration is taking positive steps to be open with the public about the 

WMD threat. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)’s ready.gov website with its links to other 

government agencies has been improved and has become a comprehensive source of information for citizens 

interested in preparing ahead of time in the event of an emergency, be it a natural disaster, pandemic, or WMD 

attack. In developing the soon to be released first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (a guide to homeland 

security policies, programs, and missions), DHS included an on-line exchange with the U.S. public as well as 

outreach to 11,000 mission partners from the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. In July 2009, DHS 

Secretary Janet Napolitano established the Homeland Security Advisory Task Force to assess the effectiveness 

of the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System in informing the public about terrorist threats and 

communicating protective measures within government and throughout the private sector. The Task Force 

recommended changes to the color-coded system, but no action has yet been taken. These are significant 

efforts to reengage and inform the American citizenry. However, further thoughtful work is needed if the 

American people are to become decidedly more aware of and prepared for the threats the nation faces. 

Work with a consortium of state and local governments to improve

preparedness in the event of a WMD attack. 

World at Risk recommendation 13

In January 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano issued a series of Action Directives, including reviews of 

current state and local intelligence-sharing as well as state, local, and tribal integration. The DHS 2010 budget 

request also seeks to establish an Office of Stakeholder Relations, which would act as the primary conduit 

between DHS and state, local, and tribal governments. In addition, in March 2009, FEMA released the 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, which provides planning guidance and advocates for a hybrid planning 

system to better link together federal, state, local, and tribal officials. The federal government must continue 

these efforts and become a stronger advocate for citizen, community, state, and regional preparedness to 

effectively respond to recurring natural disasters. This should include partnering with the private sector and 

non-governmental organizations, particularly through organizations such as Business Executives for National 

Security (BENS). By properly organizing and preparing for natural disasters, similar to the organizational model 

used by BENS, communities and states will acquire most of the capabilities needed to respond in the event of 

a man-made disaster, or WMD attack, and clearly identify those capabilities that must be reinforced. Until all 

states have reached a level of preparedness appropiate for their needs, DHS and Congress must become more 

effective advocates for preparedness through an ongoing effort—and that level of preparedness must be 

sustained.

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World at Risk Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States should undertake a series of mutually reinforcing domestic measures 

to prevent bioterrorism: (1) conduct a comprehensive review of the domestic program to secure dangerous 

pathogens, (2) develop a national strategy for advancing bioforensic capabilities, (3) tighten government 

oversight of high-containment laboratories, (4) promote a culture of security awareness in the life sciences 

community, and (5) enhance the nation’s capabilities for rapid response to prevent biological attacks from 

inflicting mass casualties.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The United States should undertake a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the 

international level to prevent biological weapons proliferation and terrorism: (1) press for an international 

conference of countries with major biotechnology industries to promote biosecurity, (2) conduct a global 

assessment of biosecurity risks, (3) strengthen global disease surveillance networks, and (4) propose a new 

action plan for achieving universal adherence to and effective national implementation of the Biological 

Weapons Convention, for adoption at the next review conference in 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The United States should work internationally toward strengthening the nonproliferation 

regime, reaffirming the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons by (1) imposing a range of penalties for NPT 

violations and withdrawal from the NPT that shift the burden of proof to the state under review for 

noncompliance; (2) ensuring access to nuclear fuel, at market prices to the extent possible, for non-nuclear 

states that agree not to develop sensitive fuel cycle capabilities and are in full compliance with international 

obligations; (3) strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency, to include identifying the limitations to its 

safeguarding capabilities, and providing the agency with the resources and authorities needed to meet its 

current and expanding mandate; (4) promoting the further development and effective implementation of 

counterproliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat 

Nuclear Terrorism; (5) orchestrating consensus that there will be no new states, including Iran and North Korea, 

possessing uranium enrichment or plutonium-reprocessing capability; (6) working in concert with others to do 

everything possible to promote and maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing; (7) working toward a global 

agreement on the definition of “appropriate” and “effective” nuclear security and accounting systems as legally 

obligated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; and (8) discouraging, to the extent possible, 

the use of financial incentives in the promotion of civil nuclear power.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The new President should undertake a comprehensive review of cooperative nuclear 

security programs, and should develop a global strategy that accounts for the worldwide expansion of the threat 

and the restructuring of our relationship with Russia from that of donor and recipient to a cooperative 

partnership.

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RECOMMENDATION 5: As a top priority, the next administration must stop the Iranian and North Korean 

nuclear weapons programs. In the case of Iran, this requires the permanent cessation of all of Iran’s nuclear 

weapons–related efforts. In the case of North Korea, this requires the complete abandonment and 

dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. If, as appears likely, the next 

administration seeks to stop these programs through direct diplomatic engagement with the Iranian and North 

Korean governments, it must do so from a position of strength, emphasizing both the benefits to them of 

abandoning their nuclear weapons programs and the enormous costs of failing to do so. Such engagement must 

be backed by the credible threat of direct action in the event that diplomacy fails.

RECOMMENDATION 6: The next President and Congress should implement a comprehensive policy toward 

Pakistan that works with Pakistan and other countries to (1) eliminate terrorist safe havens through military, 

economic, and diplomatic means; (2) secure nuclear and biological materials in Pakistan; (3) counter and 

defeat extremist ideology; and (4) constrain a nascent nuclear arms race in Asia.

RECOMMENDATION 7: The next U.S. administration should work with the Russian government on initiatives to 

jointly reduce the danger of the use of nuclear and biological weapons, including by (1) extending some of the 

essential verification and monitoring provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that are scheduled to 

expire in 2009; (2) advancing cooperation programs such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and the Proliferation Security Initiative; (3) sustaining security 

upgrades at sensitive sites in Russia and elsewhere, while finding common ground on further reductions in 

stockpiles of excess highly enriched uranium; (4) jointly encouraging China, Pakistan, and India to announce a 

moratorium on the further production of nuclear fissile materials for nuclear weapons and to reduce existing 

nuclear military deployments and stockpiles; and (5) offering assistance to other nations, such as Pakistan and 

India, in achieving nuclear confidence-building measures similar to those that the United States and the USSR 

followed for most of the Cold War.

RECOMMENDATION 8: The President should create a more efficient and effective policy coordination structure 

by designating a White House principal advisor for WMD proliferation and terrorism and restructuring the 

National Security Council and Homeland Security Council.

RECOMMENDATION 9: Congress should reform its oversight both structurally and substantively to better 

address intelligence, homeland security, and crosscutting 21st-century national security missions, such as the 

prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism.

RECOMMENDATION 10: Accelerate integration of effort among the counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and 

law enforcement communities to address WMD proliferation and terrorism issues; strengthen expertise in the 

nuclear and biological fields; prioritize pre-service and in-service training and retention of people with critical 

scientific, language, and foreign area skills; and ensure that the threat posed by biological weapons remains 

among the highest national intelligence priorities for collection and analysis.

RECOMMENDATION 11: The United States must build a national security workforce for the 21st century.

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RECOMMENDATION 12: U.S. counterterrorism strategy must more effectively counter the ideology behind 

WMD terrorism. The United States should develop a more coherent and sustained strategy and capabilities for 

global ideological engagement to prevent future recruits, supporters, and facilitators.

RECOMMENDATION 13: The next administration must work to openly and honestly engage the American 

citizen, encouraging a participatory approach to meeting the challenges of the new century.

For full text of the report, visit www.preventwmd.gov.
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About the Commission 

Congress established the bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Proliferation and Terrorism to address the grave threat that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

poses to the United States.

The Commission is a legacy of both the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the 

Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States (the 9/11 Commission). The reports produced by these Commissions explained to the American people 

how and why the U.S. government failed to discover that terrorists, operating from Afghanistan, were infiltrating 

the United States in order to use a most unconventional resource—commercial airplanes—as weapons that 

would kill thousands of people. Those Commissions looked at the past. This Commission looks to the future.

The Commission’s report, World at Risk, was published in December 2008 with the finding that the U.S. 

government has yet to fully adapt to the current circumstance of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

Recognizing the urgency in this assessment, Congress took the unprecedented step of authorizing an additional 

year of work by the Commission to assist Congress and the Administration to turn these recommendations into 

actions. Specifically, the report identifies 13 recommendations consisting of 49 actions that Congress and the 

Administration should take to change the trajectory of risk.

The full report is available at www.preventwmd.gov.
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism

Original Commissioners

Senator Bob Graham, Commission Chairman

Senator Jim Talent, Commission Vice Chairman

Graham T. Allison 

Robin Cleveland

Stephen G. Rademaker

Congressman Timothy Roemer 

Wendy R. Sherman

Henry D. Sokolski

Rich Verma

Commission Staff, 2009—2010

Colonel Randall Larsen, USAF (Retired), Executive Director

Lindsey R. Neas, Chief of Staff

Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Science Advisor

David Lampen, Technology Assistant

Jay Lavender, Communications Advisor

Carmen MacDougall, Communications Director

Susan Perez, Administrative Assistant

Sara E. Rubin, Communications Associate

Daniel P. Sullivan, Senior Professional Staff

Peter D. Zimmerman, Science Advisor

The Commission would like to thank Jamie Gorelick, Partner, and Keith Murphy, 

Associate, of WilmerHale for serving as General Counsel and Associate Counsel.