Filed 4/26/21 Rivas v. Los Angeles Housing Authority CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MARIA HAYDEE RIVAS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LOS ANGELES HOUSING 

AUTHORITY,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B298310

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC651773)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.

The Law Office of Herb Fox, Herb Fox; D & Z Law Group, 

Erik Zograbian; Bedirian & Associates, Sara Bedirian for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

Joseph L. Stark & Assoc., Joseph L. Stark and John M. 

Bergerson for Defendant and Respondent.

___________________________________
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A tenant in public housing suffered injuries resulting from 

a fire in her unit that occurred while she was asleep. She sued 

the housing authority for negligence but admittedly had no 

memory of the fire, and no evidence indicated how it started. The 

trial court concluded no triable issue existed as to whether the 

housing authority’s negligence caused the tenant’s injury, and 

granted the authority’s motion for summary judgment. We 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

Maria Haydee Rivas was a tenant at Pueblo Del Rio, a lowincome housing complex owned and operated by the Housing 

Authority for the City of Los Angeles (Housing Authority). On 

February 29, 2016, Rivas went to bed and fell asleep. Her next 

memory was waking up in the hospital months later.

While Rivas slept, a fire started in her unit. A neighbor 

heard screams from Rivas’s open bedroom window, and first 

responders found her unconscious under her bed. Rivas had no 

knowledge about what caused the fire, which the Los Angeles 

Fire Department concluded was of undetermined origin. 

Rivas sued the Housing Authority for negligence and 

negligence per se. Most of her claims pertained to defective 

smoke alarms, which she alleged created a dangerous condition of 

public property and violated safety laws and regulations. 

However, at some point Rivas abandoned her claims pertaining 

to smoke alarms, so we will focus on the one claim she pursues on 

appeal, which concerns failure to disclose the existence or 

operation of a safety release mechanism on bars covering her 

bedroom window.

In her negligence cause of action, Rivas alleged that the 

Housing Authority negligently “[f]ailed to notify [her] of the 
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mechanism utilized for the release of the [bars on her] window.” 

In her negligence per se cause of action, Rivas alleged that the 

Housing Authority’s “failure to maintain emergency escape and 

rescue openings” violated building codes. 

The Housing Authority moved for summary judgment. It 

argued Rivas could not establish that a dangerous condition 

existed in the unit, nor that the Housing Authority had notice of 

such a condition. The Housing Authority supported the motion 

with evidence that the unit’s smoke alarms were operational, and 

with Rivas’s own testimony that she had no knowledge of 

whether the safety release mechanism operated, and had never 

reported any problem with it.

In opposing the motion, Rivas argued that Health and 

Safety Code section 17958.4 obligated the Housing Authority to 

disclose to her the existence of a safety release mechanism on the 

bars of her bedroom window, a theory not mentioned in the 

complaint.

Rivas supported the motion with her own deposition 

testimony that no one had told her about the safety release 

mechanism, and her declaration that she did not know how to 

operate the mechanism. And Marcela Corona, a Housing 

Authority employee, testified she had no record of Rivas being 

told about the mechanism. 

Rivas admitted she had no evidence about what caused the 

fire, and no direct evidence about how she tried to escape from it. 

But an emergency room triage note indicated that someone from 

the Los Angeles Fire Department told someone on the hospital 

staff that Rivas had been found unconscious under her bed, and 

Shaquille Brown, a neighbor, declared that he heard female 

screams coming from Rivas’s open bedroom window for “a while” 
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during the fire. A photograph of her bedroom showed her bed, 

which was undamaged in the fire, was situated against the wall 

underneath the window. Other photographs showed that Rivas 

suffered substantial burns. 

The Housing Authority objected to Rivas’s declaration on 

the ground that it contradicted her deposition testimony. It 

objected to the emergency room triage note on the ground that it 

constituted inadmissible hearsay, and to the Brown declaration 

on the ground that Brown had not been disclosed as a witness. 

The record on appeal contains no indication that the trial court 

ruled on these objections.

In reply to the opposition, the Housing Authority conceded 

that no document evidenced Rivas having been told about the 

window bar release mechanism, but evidence that Rivas was 

cited several times for blocking access to the mechanism showed 

she knew it was there. The Housing Authority argued it was 

“inconceivable” that Rivas did not know how to use the 

mechanism after having lived in the unit for seven years. 

The trial court concluded there was no evidence of a 

dangerous condition in Rivas’s unit, nor that the Housing 

Authority knew of any such condition. 

The court assumed that Health and Safety Code section 

17958.4 obligated the Housing Authority to disclose the safety 

release mechanism to Rivas in writing, and found that evidence 

existed that it failed to do so. But the court found no evidence 

that the Housing Authority’s failure to make this disclosure 

caused Rivas’s injuries, because she did “not allege that she 

attempted to escape via the barred windows,” and “testified that 

she has no knowledge as to whether she tried to use the escape 

windows.” Therefore, the court concluded, the Housing 
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Authority’s “failure to disclose the existence of the safety release 

mechanism was not a substantial factor in causing harm to” 

Rivas. The court therefore granted the Housing Authority’s 

motion and entered judgment against Rivas. 

DISCUSSION

Rivas contends that triable issues exist as to whether: (1) 

The Housing Authority owed a duty to disclose to her how to 

operate the locking mechanism on her window; (2) it failed to do 

so; and (3) that failure proximately caused her injuries. We 

conclude the Housing Authority owed Rivas no mandatory duty. 

A. Legal Principles

A public entity is not liable “[e]xcept as otherwise provided 

by statute.” (Gov. Code, § 815; see Hoff v. Vacaville Unified 

School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932.) Government Code 

section 815.6, provides, “Where a public entity is under a 

mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to 

protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public 

entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by 

its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity 

establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the 

duty.” (Gov. Code, § 815.6.)1 “Thus, the government may be 

liable when (1) a mandatory duty is imposed by an enactment, (2) 

the duty was designed to protect against the kind of injury 

allegedly suffered, and (3) breach of the duty proximately caused 

1

“Government Code section 815.6 applies the negligence 

per se doctrine to public entities.” (Alejo v. City of Alhambra

(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1185, fn. 3, disapproved on another 

ground by B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 

168, 188, fn. 6.)
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injury.” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 

61 Cal.4th 339, 348.)

To establish a mandatory duty, “the enactment at issue 

[must] be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or 

permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, 

rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action 

be taken or not taken.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 

Cal.4th 490, 498.) “Courts have . . . [found] a mandatory duty 

only if the enactment ‘affirmatively imposes the duty and 

provides implementing guidelines.’ ” (Guzman v. County of 

Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 898.) “ ‘ “[T]he mandatory 

nature of the duty must be phrased in explicit and forceful 

language.” [Citation.] “It is not enough that some statute 

contains mandatory language. In order to recover plaintiffs have 

to show that there is some specific statutory mandate that was 

violated by the [public entity]. . . .” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 910-911.)

Whether an enactment imposes a mandatory duty “is a 

question of statutory interpretation for the courts.” (Creason v. 

Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 631.)

“Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘where no triable 

issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.’ ” (Regents of University of 

California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618 (Regents) 

[“A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that the 

plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of 

action,” or that there is a complete defense to the claim]; Code 

Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c), (o)(1) & (o)(2).) If the defendant 

makes such a showing, the plaintiff must then demonstrate the 

existence of one or more disputed issues of material fact as to the 

cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
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On appeal, we independently review the entire record that 

was before the trial court when it granted summary judgment, 

except any evidence “to which objections have been made and 

sustained.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 618.) We view 

evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party, and 

resolve evidentiary doubts and ambiguities in that party’s favor. 

(Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Board of Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th 

593, 606.) 

B. Application

1. The Burden on Summary Judgment Shifted to Rivas

Rivas preliminarily argues that the Housing Authority’s 

motion for summary judgment addressed only her cause of action 

for negligence, ignoring her cause of action for negligence per se. 

Therefore, she argues, the burden never shifted to her to 

establish a triable issue as to that cause of action. We disagree.

Rivas contends only that the Housing Authority breached a 

mandatory duty pertaining to the safety release mechanism on 

the bars outside her bedroom window. Her only allegation 

concerning that mechanism in her cause of action for negligence 

per se was that the Housing Authority’s “failure to maintain 

emergency escape and rescue openings” violated building codes. 

The Housing Authority moved for summary judgment on the 

ground that no dangerous condition existed in the unit, and that 

it had no notice of such a condition. The Authority supported the 

motion with Rivas’s own testimony that she had no knowledge of 

whether the safety release mechanism operated, and had never 

reported any problem with it. This showing adequately 

addressed the cause of action for negligence per se.
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2. Health and Safety Code section 17958.4 Imposes No 

Mandatory Duty

Rivas contends subdivision (b) of Health and Safety Code 

section 17958.4 imposes a mandatory duty on the Housing 

Authority to “disclose the quick release mechanism” to its 

tenants. We disagree.

Subdivision (a) of Health and Safety Code section 17958.4 

states in pertinent part that “[a]ny city, county, or city and 

county, may, by ordinance, establish a date by which all 

residential real property with security window bars on bedroom 

windows shall meet current state and local requirements for 

safety release mechanisms on security window bars consistent 

with . . . the current edition of the California Building Standards 

Code, and any changes thereto made by the city, county, or city 

and county . . . .” (§ 17958.4, subd. (a).)

Although this subdivision is not directly pertinent because 

it imposes no duty on the Housing Authority, which is not a city 

or county, it provides context for subdivision (b) of Health and 

Safety Code section 17958.4, which Rivas argues pertains here.

Subdivision (b) of Health and Safety Code section 17958.4 

states: “Disclosures of the existence of any safety release 

mechanism on any security window bar shall be made in writing, 

and may be included in existing transactional documents, 

including, but not limited to, a real estate sales contract . . . .” 

(§ 17958.4, subd. (b).)

Subdivision (b) of Health and Safety Code section 17958.4 

does not itself mandate disclosure of the existence of a safety 

release mechanism by anyone to anyone, it provides only that 

when disclosure is mandated, it must be in writing. 
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The obligation to disclose safety release mechanisms 

appears in the California Building Standards Code referenced in 

subdivision (a) of Health and Safety Code section 17958.4. 

Section 12-3-13.1 of that Code provides: “Installation and 

operating instructions shall be provided with each system. 

Installation instructions shall describe how to install and initially 

test the system, and provide periodic testing and maintenance. 

Operating instructions shall be provided that include diagrams, 

drawing[s] and symbols describing how to operate the system and 

escape in the event of a fire or other emergency.” (2019 Cal.

Referenced Standards Code, tit. 24, pt. 12, § 12-3-13.1.)

But this section requires only that installation and 

operating instructions be included with each security bar system

to be installed, not that they be given to homeowners, much less 

to end users. The only code section we have discovered that 

mandates communication with the user of a security bar system 

is section 12-3-12.2 of the California Building Standards Code, 

which provides: “Symbols or diagrams shall be marked on the 

manual actuator to identify how to manually release the security 

bars. The diagram or symbols shall be readily visible to 

occupants when the assembly is mounted as intended.” (2019 

Cal. Referenced Standards Code, tit. 24, pt. 12, § 12-3-12.2.) 

Rivas did not allege and does not argue that the latch on the bars 

covering her window lacked the required symbols or diagrams.

Subdivision (b) of Health and Safety Code section 17958.4

thus obligates no one to do anything in the first instance. It 

therefore necessarily imposes no obligation on a landlord to 

disclose the existence of a safety release mechanism to a tenant.

Accordingly, we conclude no triable issue exists as to 

whether the Housing Authority owed Rivas a duty to disclose the 
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existence of a safety release mechanism for the security bars 

covering her bedroom window. Therefore, summary judgment 

was appropriate. We need not reach the parties’ other 

arguments.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is to receive its 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.