alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains financial information extracted from the consolidated
financial statements of PCB Holding Company for the year ended December 31, 1999
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
(Dollars in thousands except per share data.)
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                             230
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           2,309
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                      1,113
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                         24,108
<ALLOWANCE>                                         54
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  28,374
<DEPOSITS>                                      20,464
<SHORT-TERM>                                     1,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                 76
<LONG-TERM>                                      1,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         3,819
<OTHER-SE>                                       2,015
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                  28,374
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  1,690
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                   88
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                    98
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 1,876
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               1,017
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,023
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                              853
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                        6
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                    671
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    205
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         205
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       125
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .32
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .31
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.10
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                       104
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                    51
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        3
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                   54
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                54
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0



</TABLE>
## United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________ No. 18

- 3632

___________________________ United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
Joshua K. Bowers

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

- Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri

- St. Joseph

____________ Submitted: June 11, 2019 Fil ed: June 18, 2019 [Unpublished]

____________ Before COLLOTON, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________
PER CURIAM.

Joshua Bowers pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin and methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (i), (viii) , 846, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug

- trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(a). As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal unless, as relevant here, he- 2

- received a sentence falling outside the plea agreement’s recommended range of 180 to 360 months in prison

. The district court 1 gave him a 310

- month total prison
sentence , which counsel suggests is substantively unreasonable in a brief citing Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967)

.

We re view the validity and applicability of an appeal waiver de novo. See United States v. Scott , 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010). Upon careful review, we conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable and that it is applicable to the issue that Bowers has raised. See United States v. Andis , 333 F.3d 886, 889

– 92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (explaining that an appeal waiver will be enforced if the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreeme nt and the waiver, and enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice). We have also independently reviewed the record and conclude that no other non

- frivolous issues exist

. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 82

– 83 (1988). Accordingly , we dismiss th e appeal.

______________________________

1 The Honorable Greg Kays, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JENNIFER DICOSTANZO,

Appellant,

v.

WALMART, INC.,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-1657

[September 1, 2022]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Paige Hardy Gillman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

502019CA015145.

Bard D. Rockenbach of Burlington and Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm 

Beach, and Maaz Quraishi of Law Office of Maaz Quraishi, P.A., West Palm 

Beach, for appellant.

Nicholas J. Christopolis, Daniel S. Weinger, and James M. Keleman of 

Luks, Santaniello, Petrillo, Cohen & Peterfriend, Jacksonville, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J., GROSS and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0600 

 The following information is located in the confidentiality files of the Director, Sector 

Policies and Programs Division, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U. S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 27711. This 

information is confidential pending final determination by the Administrator and is not available 

for public inspection. 

 Memorandum from K. Schaffner, RTI International, to S. Shedd, EPA/OAQPS. Site visit 

to TPC Group in Houston, Texas on June 22, 2010. Dated August 2010. Draft. 

 The site visit memorandum contains information about marine vessel loading at the TPC 

Group facility. The confidential material is comprised of 13 pages.
(Reap. Dec. 9931)

#### Milton Liebman *v.*United States

Entry No. 940208.

(Decided March 1, 1961)

Plaintiff not represented by counsel.

*William H. Orricle, Jr.,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Lawrence, Judge:

There was no appearance on behalf of plaintiff when the above-enumerated appeal for a reappraisement was called for hearing and the case was ordered submitted by the court.

Rule 5(a) of the rules of the court provides that—

> ■The submission for decision of any case shall be made in open court by the parties thereto or their attorneys, or by stipulation, or by written request to *614the court, or by the court on its own motion. Where the plaintiff, petitioner, or appellant, or his attorney, in a case does not appear when the same is called, and after the opposite party has had opportunity to present evidence on the issues, it may be deemed submitted and may be decided by the court on the record as it appears therein.

Accordingly, I have examined the record in the appeal before the court and find nothing therein which tends in any way to overcome the presumption of correctness which attaches to the decision of the appraiser. I find and hold, therefore, that the proper value of the merchandise is the value returned by the appraiser.

Judgment will 'be entered accordingly.
#### STATE of Alabama ex rel. Brenda WAITES v. Charles R. ISBELL.

2970678.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

July 10, 1998.

*86J. Coleman Campbell and Lois Brasfield, asst, attys. gen., Department of Human Resources, for appellant.

S. Dale Price, Sylacauga, for appellee.

CRAWLEY, Judge.

Brenda Waites and Charles R. Isbell were divorced in June 1995. The divorce judgment provided that the parties would have joint legal and physical custody of their minor child and that neither parent would pay child support. In April 1997, the mother filed a petition to modify the divorce judgment, requesting that she be awarded primary physical custody of the child and that the father be ordered to pay child support. The State of Alabama intervened on behalf of the mother to seek child support from the father. The trial court awarded the mother primary physical custody, but awarded her no child support. The State filed a post-judgment motion, which the trial court denied. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by not awarding the mother child support.

Child support actions are subject to the mandatory application of the Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., child support guidelines. *Hepburn v. Hepburn,*659 So.2d 653 (Ala.Civ.App.1995); *Smith v. Smith,*587 So.2d 1217 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). The trial court has the discretion to deviate from the guidelines if it enters on the record a written finding, supported by evidence presented to it, that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inequitable. Rule 32(A)(ii); *Hepburn.*A trial court’s failure to follow the guidelines, or to make written a finding that application of the guidelines would be unjust, is reversible error. *Hepburn.*

The tidal court failed to follow the guidelines or to make the requisite written finding. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for the trial court to apply the guidelines or to make a written finding that application of the guidelines would be inequitable.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

ROBERTSON, P.J., and YATES, MONROE, and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
No. 96-7994.

#### Silver *v.*United States.

C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.
EXHIBIT 10.12

                                    ADDENDUM


        This ADDENDUM ("Addendum"),  dated March 29, 2002 and effective February
28, 2000, amends and supplements the Memorandum of Understanding ("Memorandum"),
dated July 1, 1999, between Nebraska Book Company,  Inc. ("Company") and Alan G.
Siemek ("Executive") as follows:

1. On May  10,  2000,  Company  entered  into a  Management  Services  Agreement
("Agreement") with  TheCampusHub.com,  Inc.  ("CampusHub"),  under which Company
agreed to supervise and manage the day-to-day operations of CampusHub.

2. On or about February 28, 2000,  CampusHub  offered Executive a position as an
executive  officer of CampusHub.  Such position  would not require the full time
and  attention  of  Executive.  Executive  desires to accept the position and to
continue in his present position with Company.

3. Having  investigated  the  circumstances  of CampusHub's  offer to Executive,
Company  acknowledges  and agrees that  Executive's  employment  as an executive
officer of CampusHub would not  substantially  interfere with the performance of
Executive's duties under the Memorandum and,  consequently,  has no objection to
Executive accepting CampusHub's offer.

4. The parties acknowledge and agree that, to the extent Executive is performing
services  on behalf of  Company,  including,  but not  limited  to,  services in
furtherance of Company's  obligations  under the Agreement,  Executive  shall be
subject to the direction and control of the board of directors of Company,  but,
to the extent Executive is performing services on behalf of CampusHub, Executive
is subject to the direction and control of the board of directors of CampusHub.



                                        NEBRASKA BOOK COMPANY, INC.


                                        By:  /s/ Mark W. Oppegard
                                        --------------------------
                                        Mark W. Oppegard
                                        Chief Executive Officer,
                                        President and Director


                                        EXECUTIVE


                                        By:  /s/ Alan G. Siemek
                                        ---------------------------
                                        Alan G. Siemek
September 11, 1939

No. 42089.

Suit 4194.

#### *H. W. Chadbourne*v. *United States.*

T. D. 49625 affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       1,659,062
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,433,615
<ALLOWANCES>                                    25,000
<INVENTORY>                                  2,162,236
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,689,269
<PP&E>                                       6,354,814
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,786,108
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              13,095,407
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,175,755
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  1,000,000
<COMMON>                                        39,826
<OTHER-SE>                                  13,055,280
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                13,095,407
<SALES>                                     18,643,217
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            18,643,217
<CGS>                                       12,350,163
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               15,748,915
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               247,675
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                25,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,368,171
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,732,632
<INCOME-TAX>                                   341,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          2,391,632
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,391,632
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .55
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .55
        

</TABLE>
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A1 5 A0 85 3

. S E AN RI CHARDS v . THE HONORABLE GLEN A SHMAN, MUNI CI PAL J UDGE FOR THE CI TY OF EAST POI NT.

Fo l l owi n g h i s co n v i ct io n i n m un i ci p al co u rt o f o bs t ru ct i n g o ffi cers , Sean
Ri ch ard s p et i t io n ed t h e s u p eri o r co u rt fo r a wri t o f cert i o rari . On J u l y 1 1
, 2 0 1 4 , t h e

s u p eri o r co u rt g ran t ed t h e w ri t of cert i o rari

. Ho wev er, aft er Ri ch ard s fai l ed t o co m p l y wi t h OCGA § 5 -4 -5 (a) by p o s t i n g b o n d o r fi l i n g an affi d av i t o f i n d i g en ce, t h e

s u p eri o r co u rt d i s m i s s e d t h e p et i t i o n

. Ri ch ard s fi l ed a m o t i on fo r reco n s id erat i o n, wh i ch t h e s u p eri o r co u rt d en i ed

. Ri ch ard s fi l ed a n o t i ce o f ap p eal t o t h is Co u rt

. W e l ack ju ri s d i ct i o n

. Un d er OCGA § 5 -6 -3 5 (a) (1 ), “ [a] p p eal s fro m t h e deci s i on s o f t h e s u p eri o r

co u rt s rev i ewi n g d eci s i o n s o f

. . . l o wer co u rt s b y cert i o rari o r d e n ov o p ro ceed i n g s ”

m u st b e m ad e b y fi l i n g an a p p l i c a t i o n fo r d i s cret i o n ary ap p eal i n t h i s Co u rt

. See
Co n s o l i da t ed Go ver n men t o f Co l u mb u s v. Ba r wi ck
, 2 7 4 Ga. 1 7 6
, 1 7 7 (1 ) (5 4 9 SE2 d
7 3 ) (2 0 0 1 ). Th i s p ro ced u re m us t b e fo l l o wed ev en wh ere t he s u peri o r co u rt d i s m i s s es
t h e cert i o rari p et i t i on

. See Br ewer v. Bd

. o f Zo ni n g Ad

j u st men t o

f A tl an t a , 1 7 0 Ga.
A p p

. 3 5 1 (3 1 7 SE2 d 3 2 7 ) (1 98 4 ). Ri ch ard s fai l ed t o co m p l y wi t h t h e d i s cret i o n a r y
ap p eal pro ced u re. Acco rd in g l y , we l ack ju ri s d ict i o n ov er t h i s ap p eal
, wh i ch i s h ereb y DISM ISSED. January 16, 2015C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia C le r k ’ s O f f i c e , A t la n t a ,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r t i f y t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a tr u e e x t r a c t f r o m

t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

. W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t
h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 01/16/2015
#### John V. Carr & Son, Inc., et al. *v.*United States

No. 7676.

Pro forma invoices dated Windsor, Canada, May 19, 1947, etc.

Entered at Detroit, Mich., May 20, 1947, etc.; Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., July 24, 1947, etc.; Port Huron, Mich., September 15, 1947, etc.

Entry Nos. 10784, etc.; P 97, etc.; A 1222, etc.

(Decided March 1, 1949)

*John C. Bay*for the plaintiffs.

*David N. Edelstein,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Olivee, Chief Judge:

The appeals for reappraisement listed in schedule “A”, hereto attached and made a part hereof, have been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of counsel for the parties hereto:

> IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED subject to the approval of the Court, that the issues in the appeals for reappraisement as listed in the attached schedule, are the same in all material respects as the issues decided in C. J. Tower & Sons vs. United States, R. D. 7624, and that the record in said case may be incorporated herein.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the appraised values of the merchandise involved in each of the cases enumerated in the attached schedule, less the additions made by the importer on entry because of advances *419by the appraiser in similar cases, is equal to the price, at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, at which such or similar merchandise is freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which exported, in the usual wholesale quantities in the ordinary course of trade, for exportation to the United States, and that the foreign value of such or similar merchandise is no higher.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that these cases may be submitted on the foregoing stipulation.

On the agreed facts I find the export value, as that value is defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for the determination of the value of the merchandise here involved, and that such values are the appraised values, less the additions made by the importers on entry because of advances by the appraiser in similar cases.

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alan Neal SCOTT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 81-7398

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 18, 1981.

Alan Neal Scott, pro se.

Bill L. Barnett, Asst. U.S. Atty., Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RONEY, KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Alan Neal Scott was convicted by a jury on two counts of making false statements on bank loan applications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 and on three counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The statutory maximum sentences for these crimes are two years and five years, respectively. The district court imposed a five-year general sentence, and appellant moved under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) to have the court vacate the general sentence as illegal and impose a proper sentence. The district court denied the motion and this appeal followed. We vacate the sentence and remand for proper sentencing.

Appellant does not challenge the validity of his conviction; rather, he argues only that the five-year general sentence imposed by the district court is illegal and must be vacated for a proper sentence. We agree. This case is squarely within the holdings of *Benson v. United States,*332 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1964) and *Walker v. United States,*342 F.2d 22 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*382 U.S. 859, 86 S.Ct. 117, 15 L.Ed.2d 97 (1965). In *Benson*the Fifth Circuit1 held that an “articulate, identifiable sentence” must be imposed; any sentence varying from this standard is “illegal” under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) and cannot stand. *Id.*at 291-92. In *Walker,*the court relied on *Benson*in holding that a general sentence which exceeded the statutory maximum sentence for any one count was illegal. Similarly, in the case before us the five-year general sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for making false statements on bank loan applications, 18 U.S.C. § 1014, and is therefore illegal.

The trial court’s reliance on *United States v. Johnson,*588 F.2d 961 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*440 U.S. 985, 99 S.Ct. 1800, 60 L.Ed.2d 248 (1979), to uphold the general sentence is misplaced. *Johnson*dealt with *265the specific situation involving a conviction for contemporaneous acts of bank robbery under the Federal Bank Robbery Act. Pri- or Fifth Circuit cases have held that contemporaneous acts of bank robbery constitute a single transaction, and that therefore a general sentence, while still “bad business,” is not impermissible. *Id.*at 964. *See Hall v. United States,*356 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 1966). Because the *Johnson*ruling is confined to the special circumstances of contemporaneous acts of bank robbery, it is inapposite here. Consequently, we must vacate the sentence and remand “for correct resentencing in which the defendant will know precisely the penalty assessed as to each and every count and the order in which the sentences thereby imposed are to be served.” *Benson, supra,*at 292.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

1

. The Eleventh Circuit, in the en banc case *Bonner v. Prichard,*661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit.