Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 

Lemons, JJ., and Compton,∗ S.J. 

KURT G. SCHLEGEL 

v. Record No. 051651 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 April 21, 2006 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 

Edward L. Hogshire, Judge 

This appeal involves a funds transfer made pursuant to 

alleged unauthorized payment orders and the receiving 

bank’s subsequent freezing of the transferred funds without 

refunding them to the customer’s account. The primary 

issue concerns whether Code § 8.4A-204(a) preempted certain 

common law claims asserted as a result of the unauthorized 

payment orders and the freezing of the funds. Because the 

unauthorized payment orders are covered by Code § 8.4A204(a), the common law claims pertaining to that 

transaction are preempted. Proceeding on the common law 

claims relating to the subsequent freezing of the funds, 

however, would not create rights, duties, and liabilities 

inconsistent with the provisions of Title 8.4A. Thus, 

those claims are not preempted. We will therefore affirm 

 ∗

 Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing 

and decision of this case before his death on April 9, 

2006. 
2

in part and reverse in part the judgment of the circuit 

court. 

I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

 The funds at issue in this appeal were transferred 

from a corporate bank account in the name of Piedmont 

Building & Development Corporation (Piedmont). The 

appellant, Kurt G. Schlegel, and his uncle, Christopher C. 

Grieb, were the corporation’s only shareholders, with each 

owning 50 percent of the company’s stock. In 1999, 

Schlegel, in his capacity as president and acting secretary 

of Piedmont, opened a corporate checking account with a 

bank that is apparently a predecessor in interest to the 

appellee, Bank of America, N.A., (the Bank). The corporate 

signature card listed only Schlegel as having authority to 

access the Piedmont account. The corporate resolution 

authorizing the opening of the account, however, listed 

both the president and chief executive officer as the 

corporate officials having the power to act on behalf of 

Piedmont with respect to the bank account. 

Less than a year earlier, in a corporate resolution 

authorizing the opening of a different account for Piedmont 

at the Bank, Grieb was listed as chairman of Piedmont and 

was one of the persons authorized to access that particular 

bank account. Schlegel admitted that he never notified the 
3

Bank that the authority granted to Greib pursuant to the 

earlier corporate resolution had been revoked. 

 At some point, Schlegel and Grieb disagreed about the 

control and ownership of Piedmont. Schlegel sold property 

owned by Piedmont and deposited the sale proceeds into the 

Piedmont bank account at issue in this appeal. In November 

2001, after Grieb learned of the transaction, he contacted 

the Bank, in his capacity as chairman and chief executive 

officer of Piedmont, and initiated two payment orders 

against Piedmont’s bank account. Grieb instructed the Bank 

to transfer all funds in excess of $5,000 from Piedmont’s 

account to his personal account at the Bank. Pursuant to 

those payment orders, the Bank transferred $65,655.48 from 

Piedmont’s bank account to Grieb’s personal bank account. 

 After the transfer of Piedmont’s funds, Schlegel 

notified the Bank orally and in writing that the payment 

orders were unauthorized because Grieb was no longer 

affiliated with Piedmont and had no authority to send the 

payment orders. On November 19, 2001, in response to 

Schlegel’s complaint, the Bank placed a “hard hold” on the 

funds it had transferred to Grieb’s account, with neither 

Schlegel nor Grieb allowed access to the funds. The funds, 

however, remained in Grieb’s bank account. 
4

 In February 2002, Grieb filed a suit against Schlegel 

to dissolve Piedmont. Schlegel and Grieb eventually 

settled the suit by agreeing, among other things, that each 

would receive 50 percent of the funds frozen by the Bank. 

The Bank then offered to distribute the frozen funds 

according to the settlement between Schlegel and Grieb, 

provided the Bank could recover a portion of its attorney’s 

fees and be dismissed from further liability. An agreement 

was not reached on the Bank’s request. 

 Instead, Schlegel pursued the suit he had filed 

against the Bank in December 2002, seeking damages for 

conversion, breach of contract, and violation of Code 

§ 8.4A-204 for the unauthorized payment orders.1

 Schlegel 

alleged that the Bank not only transferred funds from 

Piedmont’s corporate bank account without authority to do 

so, but also wrongfully froze the funds, thereby depriving 

Piedmont of the use of its property. In response, the Bank 

filed an answer, a cross-bill for interpleader of the 

frozen funds, and a third-party cross-bill against Grieb 

 1

 Schlegel alleged that Piedmont had assigned its cause 

of action against the Bank to him and he was therefore 

bringing the suit in his own name. 

Schlegel filed a motion for leave to file an amended 

bill of complaint. Although the Bank had no objection to 

Schlegel’s motion, the circuit court never entered an order 

granting the motion. 
5

for indemnification and/or contribution. Grieb denied any 

liability to the Bank. 

 The Bank subsequently filed a motion for summary 

judgment with regard to Schlegel’s suit and its cross-bill 

for interpleader. The Bank argued that Code § 8.4A-204 

preempted Schlegel’s common law claims and provided the 

exclusive remedy for the alleged unauthorized payment 

orders. The Bank asked the circuit court to order that the 

frozen funds be distributed between Schlegel and Grieb and 

to permit it to recover its attorney’s fees from the funds 

before distribution. Schlegel filed a cross-motion for 

summary judgment with regard to the Bank’s cross-bill for 

interpleader, asking that the Bank be required to return 

the funds transferred from Piedmont’s bank account and pay 

attorney’s fees and costs. Schlegel also requested that a 

trial date be set for his claims against the Bank for 

conversion and breach of contract.2

In a letter opinion, the circuit court identified two 

issues based on the cross-motions for summary judgment: 

(1) whether Code § 8.4A-204 preempted Schlegel’s common law 

claims for conversion and breach of contract; and (2) 

 2

 Grieb also filed a motion for summary judgment, 

stating that the Bank’s claim against him should be 

dismissed if summary judgment were granted in favor of the 

Bank. 
6

whether the Bank was entitled to an award of attorney’s 

fees under its cross-bill for interpleader. As to the 

first issue, the circuit court concluded that Schlegel’s 

allegations fell “squarely within the confines” of Code 

§ 8.4A-204 and that his common law claims were, therefore, 

preempted by that statute. On the second issue, the 

circuit court, exercising its discretion to award 

attorney’s fees and costs in an interpleader action when 

the plaintiff has acted in good faith, see Pettus v. 

Hendricks, 113 Va. 326, 332, 74 S.E. 191, 194 (1912), 

decided that the Bank should be awarded reasonable 

attorney’s fees and costs. Thus, the court granted the 

Bank’s motion for summary judgment and denied both 

Schlegel’s and Grieb’s motions for summary judgment. 

After receiving evidence on the issue of attorney’s 

fees, the circuit court, in a separate letter opinion, 

directed that the interpleaded funds be divided equally 

between Schlegel and Grieb. The court, however, awarded 20 

percent of the interpleaded funds to the Bank as its 

attorney’s fees. The court found that the Bank had filed 

its cross-bill for interpleader a month after Schlegel and 

Grieb settled the suit between them but that resolution of 

the interpleader was delayed because Schlegel pursued his 

claims for breach of contract and conversion. In the 
7

court’s view, the Bank had been required to expend an 

“extraordinary amount of time and money in defending and 

prosecuting the interpleader.” Thus, the court directed 

that the Bank collect 95 percent of its award for 

attorney’s fees from Schlegel’s share and 5 percent from 

Grieb’s share. Schlegel now appeals the circuit court’s 

judgment. 

II. ANALYSIS 

On appeal, Schlegel challenges the circuit court’s 

conclusion that Code § 8.4A-204 preempted his common law 

claims and the award of attorney’s fees. The circuit court 

decided the preemption issue on cross-motions for summary 

judgment. When no material facts are genuinely in dispute, 

summary judgment is appropriate. Former Rule 3:18 (now 

Rule 3:20); Thurmond v. Prince William Prof’l Baseball 

Club, Inc., 265 Va. 59, 64, 574 S.E.2d 246, 250 (2003). 

Since the circuit court’s ruling on that issue was 

predicated entirely on a question of law, this Court will 

review the decision de novo. See Sheets v. Castle, 263 Va. 

407, 410, 559 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2002). 

On the other hand, the award of attorney’s fees to the 

Bank rested within the sound discretion of the circuit 

court. See Coady v. Strategic Resources, Inc., 258 Va. 12, 

18, 515 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1999). On appeal, we will set 
8

aside the circuit court’s determination on that issue only 

if the court abused its discretion. See Holmes v. LG 

Marion Corp., 258 Va. 473, 479, 521 S.E.2d 528, 533 (1999). 

A. Code § 8.4A-204 and Preemption 

The question whether the provisions of Code § 8.4A-204 

preempted Schlegel’s common law claims for conversion and 

breach of contract is one of first impression in Virginia. 

Title 8.4A, which is essentially identical to Article 4A of 

the Uniform Commercial Code, governs a particular method of 

payment generally referred to as a funds transfer. Code 

§ 8.4A-102 cmt.; see also Fitts v. AmSouth Bank, 917 So.2d 

818, 822 (Ala. 2005). The term 

 “[f]unds transfer” means the series of transactions, 

beginning with the originator’s payment order, made 

for the purpose of making payment to the beneficiary 

of the order. The term includes any payment order 

issued by the originator’s bank or an intermediary 

bank intended to carry out the originator’s payment 

order. A funds transfer is completed by acceptance by 

the beneficiary’s bank of a payment order for the 

benefit of the beneficiary of the originator’s payment 

order. 

Code § 8.4A-104(a). In pertinent part, the term “[p]ayment 

order” is defined as “an instruction of a sender to a 

receiving bank, transmitted orally, electronically, or in 

writing, to pay, or to cause another bank to pay, a fixed 

or determinable amount of money to a beneficiary.” Code 

§ 8.4A-103(a)(1). 
9

 In the funds transfer at issue in this appeal, Grieb’s 

instruction to the Bank to transfer money out of Piedmont’s 

account to his personal account was a “payment order.” See

Code § 8.4A-104 cmt. 1. Grieb was the “sender” of the 

payment order, and the Bank was the “receiving bank.” See

id.; Code §§ 8.4A-103(a)(4) and (5) (defining the terms 

“receiving bank” and “sender”). Grieb, in his individual 

capacity, was the “beneficiary” of the payment order, and 

the Bank was the “beneficiary’s bank.” See Code § 8.4A-104 

cmt. 1; Code §§ 8.4A-103(a)(2) and (3) (defining the terms 

“beneficiary” and “beneficiary’s bank”). In this funds 

transfer, there was no “[i]ntermediary bank.” See Code 

§ 8.4A-104(b). 

 The statute forming the basis of the circuit court’s 

decision, Code § 8.4A-204(a), provides: 

 If a receiving bank accepts a payment order 

issued in the name of its customer as sender 

which is (i) not authorized and not effective as 

the order of the customer under § 8.4A-202, or 

(ii) not enforceable, in whole or in part, 

against the customer under § 8.4A-203, the bank 

shall refund any payment of the payment order 

received from the customer to the extent the bank 

is not entitled to enforce payment and shall pay 

interest on the refundable amount calculated from 

the date the bank received payment to the date of 

the refund. However, the customer is not 

entitled to interest from the bank on the amount 

to be refunded if the customer fails to exercise 

ordinary care to determine that the order was not 

authorized by the customer and to notify the bank 

of the relevant facts within a reasonable time 
10

not exceeding 90 days after the date the customer 

received notification from the bank that the 

order was accepted or that the customer’s account 

was debited with respect to the order. The bank 

is not entitled to any recovery from the customer 

on account of a failure by the customer to give 

notification as stated in this section. 

 This statutory provision provides a customer, such as 

Piedmont (and now Schlegel, through assignment of 

Piedmont’s claim), with a remedy for acceptance of an 

unauthorized payment order. The remedy is a refund of the 

amount wrongfully transferred plus interest if the customer 

exercised ordinary care to determine that the payment order 

was unauthorized and so notified the receiving bank within 

a reasonable time. Id. The question, however, is whether 

that is the only remedy for acceptance of an unauthorized 

payment order. The Bank argues that it is the sole remedy 

because Code § 8.4A-204(a) expressly addresses a customer’s 

rights in the event of an unauthorized payment order and 

thereby preempts any common law remedy. 

 Even though the circuit court concluded that the 

provisions of Code § 8.4A-204(a) preempted Schlegel’s 

common law claims for conversion and breach of contract, 

the court nevertheless recognized that some courts have 

allowed common law claims to proceed when the claims fell 

outside the particular situation covered by Code § 8.4A204(a). We agree that certain common law claims may not be 
11

preempted by Title 8.4A, but we disagree with a portion of 

the circuit court’s decision in this case. 

 In Centre-Point Merchant Bank Ltd. v. American Express 

Bank Ltd., 913 F.Supp. 202, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), the court 

addressed two separate claims, one being that American 

Express had failed to debit Centre-Point’s account and 

reinvest the funds as instructed by a “telex” communication 

and the other claim being that American Express had 

transferred funds from Centre-Point’s account pursuant to a 

fraudulent payment order. With regard to the first claim, 

the court held that the “rollover” instructions were not 

“payment orders” within the meaning of Article 4A of New 

York’s Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 207. As to the 

second claim, the court found that the fraudulent payment 

order did fall within the scope of Article 4A. Id.

 The next question for the court was whether Article 4A 

provided the exclusive remedy for the injury caused by the 

fraudulent payment order. Id. at 208. The court concluded 

that the claim involved an alleged breach of a duty to 

provide commercially reasonable security procedures to 

verify payment orders. Id. Therefore, the claim concerned 

a transaction covered by Article 4A and would determine the 

rights, duties, and obligations of the parties to the 

transaction. Id. Thus, the court decided that the claim 
12

for the fraudulent payment order was precluded by Article 

4A. Id.; see also Fitts, 917 So.2d at 825 (common law 

claims for breach of contract, negligence, suppression, 

wantonness, and conspiracy were all based on an improper 

funds transfer and were thus preempted by Article 4A). 

 Explaining its decision, the court quoted extensively 

from the holding in Sheerbonnet, Ltd. v. American Express 

Bank, Ltd., 951 F.Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1995): 

 While Article 4-A should be the first place parties 

look for guidance when they seek to resolve claims 

arising out of a funds transfer, “the article has not 

completely eclipsed the applicability of common law in 

the area. The exclusivity of Article 4-A is 

deliberately restricted to ‘any situation covered by 

particular provisions of the Article.’ Conversely, 

situations not covered are not the exclusive province 

of the Article.” In fact, the Official Comment 

tacitly states that resorting to principles of law or 

equity outside of Article 4-A is acceptable, so long 

as it does not create rights, duties and liabilities 

“inconsistent with those stated in this Article.” 

Centre-Point, 913 F.Supp. at 206 (quoting Sheerbonnet, 905 

F.Supp. at 407-08). 

 In contrast, the court in Hedged Investment Partners, 

L.P. v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A., 578 N.W.2d 765, 771 

(Minn. Ct. App. 1998), held that certain claims arising 

from unauthorized funds transfers were not preempted by 

Article 4A of Minnesota’s Uniform Commercial Code. At 

issue were 26 funds transfers that allegedly were not 

authorized under an Agency Agreement between a limited 
13

partnership and a bank. Id. at 769. The court concluded 

that the contractual responsibilities at issue were not 

excluded by Article 4A because the Agency Agreement 

addressed fiduciary responsibilities that went beyond the 

scope of funds transfers. The court stated that 

the exclusivity of Article 4A is restricted to 

situations that are covered by particular 

provisions of the Article and that principles of 

law and equity may be applied to disputes 

relating to funds transfers so long as those 

principles do not create rights, duties, or 

liabilities inconsistent with those stated in the 

Article. 

Id. at 771. 

 In the case before us, Schlegel’s common law claims 

against the Bank involved two separate transactions. The 

first one was the alleged unauthorized payment orders Greib 

sent to the Bank. The provisions of Code § 8.4A-204(a) 

address a receiving bank’s liability if it accepts a 

payment order that is not authorized and not effective as 

the order of the customer. The alleged unauthorized 

payment orders are a “situation covered by the particular 

provisions” of Code § 8.4A-204(a) and the remedy Schlegel 

seeks in his common law claims would conflict with the 

statutory remedy. Code § 8.4A-102 cmt.; see Sheerbonnet, 

951 F.Supp. at 408, 410. In other words, to allow Schlegel 

to proceed on his common law claims with regard to the 
14

unauthorized payment orders would “create rights, duties 

and liabilities inconsistent with those stated in” Code 

§ 8.4A-204(a). Code § 8.4A-102 cmt.; see also CentrePoint, 913 F.Supp. at 206; Fitts, 917 So.2d at 824. 

Therefore, his common law claims as they relate to the 

alleged unauthorized payment orders are preempted by the 

provisions of Code § 8.4A-204(a). 

 We do not, however, reach the same conclusion with 

regard to Schlegel’s common law claims arising from the 

second transaction, i.e. the freezing of the funds without 

refunding them to Piedmont’s bank account. Schlegel 

asserted that the Bank wrongfully exercised dominion and 

control over Piedmont’s funds when the Bank froze the funds 

instead of returning them after learning that the payment 

orders were not authorized. According to Schlegel, that 

dominion and control over the funds continued when the Bank 

refused to disburse the frozen funds after Schlegel and 

Grieb resolved their differences about ownership of 

Piedmont and the transferred funds. 

The Bank nevertheless contends that, pursuant to its 

deposit agreement with Piedmont, it had the authority to 

freeze the funds at issue because of the dispute between 

Schlegel and Grieb. Regardless of whether the Bank is 

correct, no provision of Title 8.4A covers the second, 
15

independent transaction by the Bank and Schlegel’s common 

law claims for conversion and breach of contract arising 

from that transaction. We agree with the observations of 

the court in Sheerbonnet: 

 The rules of [Article 4A] are transactional, aimed 

essentially at resolving conflicts created by 

erroneous instruction or execution of payment orders, 

whether by the originator, by an intermediary or 

receiving bank, or by the beneficiary’s bank. A major 

objective is to reduce and control risks that arise in 

payment systems by defining when and how rights and 

obligations are incurred and discharged. As organized 

by the article, funds transfer errors fall into three 

main categories. Errors may occur during the issuance 

and acceptance of the payment order [as when the Bank 

in the instant case accepted Grieb’s alleged 

unauthorized payment orders], or [when the payment 

order] identifies the wrong beneficiary or . . . is 

untimely cancelled. Errors may also occur during the 

execution of the payment order by the receiving bank – 

– as when the originator’s instructions are not 

followed, or the order is executed late, or is issued 

in an improper amount, or is not executed at all. 

Errors may also stem from payment issues – as in the 

obligation of the originator to pay the receiving 

bank, of the beneficiary’s bank to pay the 

beneficiary, and notification of payment and discharge 

of duties requirements. 

951 F.Supp. at 412. 

Schlegel’s common law claims as to the second 

transaction by the Bank do not fall within these categories 

of error. In other words, the freezing of the funds in 

Grieb’s account instead of returning the funds to 

Piedmont’s account is not a situation covered by any of the 

particular provisions of Title 8.4A. See Code § 8.4A-102 
16

cmt. Thus, contrary to the circuit court’s finding, we 

conclude that Schlegel’s common law claims in this regard 

do not “fall squarely within the confines” of Code § 8.4A204 or any other provision of Title 8.4A. These specific 

common law claims are not preempted, and the circuit court 

erred in finding otherwise. 

B. Attorney’s Fees 

With regard to the circuit court’s ruling on 

attorney’s fees, Schlegel argues not only that the Bank was 

not entitled to “any” attorney’s fees, but also that the 

award of 20 percent of the funds at issue was “speculative, 

excessive, and unreasonable.” Schlegel also asserts that 

the circuit court erred in ruling that he was responsible 

for paying 95 percent of the attorney’s fee award. 

As the circuit court noted, we held in Pettus that 

when the plaintiff in the interplea has acted in 

good faith, and has grounds upon which to base 

his call for the interposition of a court of 

equity, requiring the adverse claimants to 

interplead, he is entitled to his costs out of 

the fund in his hands or which he may pay into 

the court. And these costs may include an 

attorney’s fee. 

113 Va. at 332, 74 S.E. at 194 (quoting Woodmen of the 

World v. Wood, 75 S.W. 377, 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903)). 

Contrary to Schlegel’s argument, the principle announced in 

Pettus remains valid. Applying that principle, we cannot 
17

say that the circuit court abused its discretion in 

deciding that the Bank was entitled to an award of 

attorney’s fees. Considering the controversy between 

Schlegel and Grieb about the ownership of Piedmont and its 

assets, the Bank had grounds for filing its cross-bill for 

interpleader. 

We do not, however, reach the same conclusion with 

regard to the amount of the award. Upon reviewing the 

Bank’s invoices itemizing its expenses for attorney’s fees, 

we find entries that relate solely to attorney’s fees 

incurred by the Bank for litigating the issues raised in 

Schlegel’s bill of complaint as opposed to the Bank’s 

cross-bill for interpleader. For example, an entry for 

January 27, 2003 pertained to a conference concerning how 

to respond to Schlegel’s motion for leave to amend his bill 

of complaint. As another example of many such entries, the 

Bank claimed attorney’s fees on April 27, 2004 for studying 

law review articles about Article 4A’s exclusivity. 

A party requesting an award of attorney’s fees must 

establish a prima facie case that the fees requested are 

reasonable. Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 

623, 499 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1998). In deciding whether a 

party has shown the reasonableness of the fees, 
18

the fact finder may consider, inter alia, the 

time and effort expended by the attorney, the 

nature of the services rendered, the complexity 

of the services, the value of the services to the 

client, the results obtained, whether the fees 

incurred were consistent with those generally 

charged for similar services, and whether the 

services were necessary and appropriate. 

Id. In the present case, the Bank did not carry its burden 

to establish “to a reasonable degree of specificity those 

attorneys’ fees associated with its [interpleader].” Ulloa 

v. QSP, Inc., 271 Va. 72, 83, 624 S.E.2d 43, 50 (2006). 

Although the circuit court did not award the full amount of 

attorney’s fees requested because the Bank incurred many of 

the fees in defending against Schlegel’s claims, the court 

nevertheless did not determine whether the amount awarded 

represented compensation for services that were “necessary 

and appropriate” to the cross-bill for interpleader. 

Chawla, 255 Va. at 623, 499 S.E.2d at 833. Thus, we 

conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in 

awarding attorney’s fees to the Bank in the amount of 20 

percent of the funds at issue.3

We likewise conclude that the circuit court abused its 

discretion in directing that 95 percent of the attorney’s 

 3

 The Bank argues that it was also entitled to an award 

of attorney’s fees pursuant to the deposit agreement with 

Piedmont. The terms of the deposit agreement do not change 

our conclusion that the circuit court abused its discretion 

in determining the amount of the award. 
19

fees awarded be deducted from Schlegel’s portion of the 

funds. The circuit court believed that Schlegel was 

responsible for the Bank’s incurring the majority of the 

attorney’s fees because he protracted the litigation by 

filing numerous “ungrounded motions.” The court, however, 

did not relate how those motions protracted resolution of 

the narrow issues involved in the cross-bill for 

interpleader in light of the fact that Schlegel and Grieb 

had reached a settlement that divided the funds at issue 

equally between them. The order memorializing that 

settlement required the custodian for Piedmont to pay all 

outstanding expenses of Piedmont and then distribute the 

funds at issue to Schlegel and Grieb. While the Bank’s 

expenditures for attorney’s fees might not have been an 

outstanding expense of Piedmont at the time the settlement 

order was entered, we find no reason why the award of 

attorney’s fees should not be paid in the same manner, i.e. 

by paying whatever amount is awarded to the Bank and then 

distributing the remaining funds equally between Schlegel 

and Grieb. 

III. CONCLUSION 

In summary, the circuit court did not err in 

concluding that Code § 8.4A-204(a) preempted Schlegel’s 

common law claims arising from the alleged unauthorized 
20

payment orders. The circuit court, however, did err in 

finding that Code § 8.4A-204(a) preempted Schlegel’s common 

law claims for conversion and breach of contract arising 

from the Bank’s failure to return the funds to Piedmont’s 

bank account after it learned of the alleged unauthorized 

payment orders and the Bank’s alleged continuing dominion 

and control over the transferred funds. 

With regard to the award of attorney’s fees, we 

conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that the Bank is entitled to an award 

for attorney’s fees incurred with respect to its cross-bill 

for interpleader. However, the circuit court did abuse its 

discretion by awarding 20 percent of the frozen funds as 

attorney’s fees and by directing that Schlegel pay 95 

percent of the award from his portion of the funds at 

issue. 

For these reasons, we will affirm in part and reverse 

in part the judgment of the circuit court and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, 

 and remanded.