4
5

Table of Contents

 Page 

Executive Summary 7 

Chapter One: Theory and Principles 9 

 Insurgency 9 

 Counterinsurgency 12 

Chapter Two: Attributes and Actors 15 

COIN Strategy Components/Functions 15 

The Affected Government 19 

The U.S. Country Team 19 

The International Community 20 

Inter-governmental Organizations 21 

Non-Governmental Organizations 21 

The Private Sector 22 

Chapter Three: Assessment and Planning 23 

 Assessment 23 

 Planning 23 

Chapter Four: Conclusion 27 
6

Appendices 

A U.S. Government Roles in COIN 29 

National Security Council 29 

Intelligence Community 29 

Department of State 29 

Department of Defense 29 

U.S. Agency for International Development 30 

Department of Justice 30 

Department of Treasury 30 

Department of Homeland Security 30 

Department of Agriculture 31 

Department of Transportation 31 

B Best Practices 32 

C Website Links to Assessment & Modeling Tools 34 

D Useful References 35 

E Acronyms and Abbreviations 38 

F Contact information for comments 39 
7 

Executive Summary

The relative stability of the bipolar Cold War era has given way to a more 

volatile international environment in which adversaries employ unconventional, 

and often violent, tactics including terrorism, insurgency, propaganda, subversion, 

sabotage, and criminal money-making activities. This Interim Guide focuses 

specifically on insurgency and the strategies and tactics to combat it, collectively 

known as counterinsurgency (COIN). Information, including intelligence; 

economic development, incentives, and sanctions; security and public services; 

and social and political resolution are all necessary components of COIN, and 

none is sufficient in isolation from the others; moreover, each of these four spheres 

depends on the others. This document is intended to provide a broad 

understanding of the characteristics of COIN, and to serve as a basis for 

interagency discussion of policy, programs, and the development of national 

capabilities relevant to COIN. 

 Insurgency is a protracted political-military campaign conducted by an 

organized movement seeking to subvert or displace the government and 

completely or partially control the resources and/or population of a country 

through the use of force and alternative political organizations. Insurgents exploit 

societal trends, grievances, and needs; insurgency is “armed politics,” and while 

military action may be an important component of COIN, political resolution is 

indispensable to success. Conflict dynamics that contribute to insurgencies 

include societal incentives for violence; state incapacity to contain or effectively 

respond to violence; and regional or broader international conditions that inspire, 

or fail to discourage, violence. Effective COIN requires deep and detailed 

context- and culture-specific understanding of local and regional conditions, and 

ultimately must enable the affected government to gain the support of its 

population, rendering ineffective the insurgents and their tactics. 

 In the U.S. Government, when the President directs a national response to a 

current or emerging conflict, the Secretary of State manages the formal 

interagency assessment and planning process that will govern the USG response. 

Where insurgency, nascent or active, does not rise to the level of Presidential 

determination, interagency efforts, starting with the U.S. mission to the affected 

nation, may be able, in concerted action with the host nation and other partners, to 

help prevent or curtail the development of a serious challenge by insurgent actors 

to the affected government. 

 An integrated - and ideally, a whole-of-government - planning effort based 

on a common assessment of the environment and understanding of the problem is 
8

the most effective approach to buttressing or helping to build effective government 

institutions in COIN. Planning will integrate civilian and military capabilities, and 

synchronize and sequence the activities of contributors, to help the threatened 

government achieve control through indigenous government institutions. An 

effective information campaign is indispensable to the validation and 

reinforcement of COIN activities. 

 The public face and main effort of every COIN operation must be 

indigenous; only the national government can address in a sustainable way the root 

causes an insurgency, establish its legitimacy with its populations, and remove or 

reintegrate the insurgents. Developing indigenous capabilities to accomplish these 

tasks is central to COIN, and international support is essential to the success of the 

effort; in fact, supporting the development of these capabilities must be the main 

effort of COIN. 

 Enlisting and enabling the support and assistance of regional and other 

interested partners should be a key component of any COIN plan. U.S 

government organizations with roles or capabilities essential to COIN include the 

Intelligence Community; the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, 

Homeland Security, Agriculture, Transportation, Commerce, and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development. Other agencies, such as the Departments of 

Education and Health and Human Services, may have relevant capabilities. The 

National Security Council may play a leading, coordinating, or enabling role in 

COIN strategy development and execution. 

 The Chief of Mission, supported by the Combatant Commander, 

coordinates with the affected nation the implementation of U.S. government 

support to COIN. The representatives of each department and agency on the 

Country Team support with their particular programs and operations the overall 

COIN strategy. The contributions of other national and international 

organizations, as well as non-governmental and private sector actors, are critical to 

effective COIN. Every functional contribution that strengthens or promotes 

accountable and effective indigenous governance responsive to the needs of its 

people is important; COIN is the sum of these efforts. 
9

Chapter One

Theory and Principles

Insurgency

Definition. For the purpose of this guide, an insurgency is a protracted political-military 

activity1

 conducted by an organized movement seeking to subvert or displace the 

government and completely or partially control the resources and/or population of a 

country through the use of force and alternative political organizations. Insurgent activity 

is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent 

control and influence. Methods for weakening government control include guerilla 

warfare, terrorism, and political mobilizations, propaganda, recruitment and training, 

front and covert party organization, and international activity. A common characteristic 

of insurgent groups is the intent to control a particular area and/or population. This 

objective differentiates insurgents from terrorists, whose objectives do not necessarily 

include the creation of an alternative governing authority capable of controlling a given 

area or country. Insurgency is a contest with the government for support of the people 

and control over resources and territory. 

Building a Core. Insurgents require supporters, sanctuary, money, supplies, weapons, 

and intelligence on government actions. Insurgents need significant support from only a 

small percentage of a given population to wage a robust insurgency. From most of the 

population, insurgents require only acquiescence or inaction. The factors that actually 

mobilize support for the insurgency may differ greatly from the insurgents’ actual goals 

or ideology. 

• The charisma of insurgent leaders sometimes is more important than their ideology. 

• Fighters, sympathizers, and supporters may not be fully conversant with the insurgent 

ideology while still justifying their actions with rhetoric and symbols provided to 

them by insurgent propagandists. 

• Actions on the ground often are related to local or private conflicts, and may have 

nothing to do with insurgent ideology. 

Competing for the Broader Population. To gain support or at least the complicity of 

the people, insurgents will use both positive and negative inducements. Tools of 

persuasion include the provision of money, basic social services, control of land, or 

positions of authority within the renegade organization. Insurgents may appeal to the 

self-interest of various constituencies through alliances of convenience with domestic 

groups such as warlords, tribal leaders, political parties, ethnic groups, organized crime, 

 

1 Military activity in this sentence denotes activity by an armed force not authorized by the indigenous government. 
10

and local bandits. Such partnerships may exacerbate localized conflict and mobilize 

support for the insurgency. 

 Simultaneously, insurgents may seek to erode popular support for the government 

through coercion and retribution. Coercion can either augment or replace persuasion as a 

means of mobilization of support, depending on the ability of government security forces 

to protect the population. If insurgents can provoke excessive government action against 

a population, retribution in response to death, injury, mistreatment, or dishonor can 

become a powerful motivator for action against the government. 

Undermining the Government. Insurgents will attempt to render territory ungovernable 

while seeking influence over its population, although they may not themselves intend to 

become the governing authority. Insurgents exploit and manipulate societal trends and a 

population’s grievances and needs by applying a wide range of both non-violent and 

violent means, funded by an illicit economy. 

 Insurgents use propaganda, including information, misinformation, and 

disinformation to influence potential supporters, opinion-leaders, and opponents, locally 

and more broadly, to promote their cause and diminish the government’s resolve. They 

may penetrate, manipulate, or disrupt government and societal institutions and 

organizations. They may seek to control community action, disrupt or discredit 

government action, provoke overreaction by security forces, exacerbate sectarian tension 

which may alienate ethnic groups from each other, or provoke violence. 

 Insurgents may couple subversion and propaganda with open violence. Many 

groups use terrorism, the deliberate use of violence against non-combatants with the 

intention to coerce, intimidate, and modify behavior. Insurgents use terrorism to 

intimidate or eliminate opponents, publicize their cause, paralyze societies, and goad the 

government into over-reaction. 

 Larger insurgencies will coordinate their terror campaigns with guerrilla warfare. 

Insurgents, usually having less conventional military capacity than the government, will 

often use guerrilla tactics, including raids, ambushes, assassination, sabotage, booby 

traps, and improvised explosive devices. They may take advantage of mobility, stealth, 

deception, and surprise to weaken, discredit, or paralyze less agile government security 

forces. 

 In order to fund their activities, insurgents may foster an illicit economy, 

sometimes of international scope, eluding government monitoring, taxation, and 

interdiction. Insurgents often raise funds and weapons through criminal activities such as 

theft, extortion, trafficking in narcotics, arms, and people, money laundering, piracy, 

document fraud, bribery, kidnapping, and other black market activity. Criminal activities 

often drive insurgents into marriages of convenience with organized crime. Insurgents 

may also receive smuggled funding and supplies from foreign governments and 

sympathizers. Such illicit financial activities diminish government revenues, increase 
11

corruption among local officials, and generally weaken the control and legitimacy of the 

central government. 

 The combination of propaganda and subversion, terrorism and/or guerrilla 

warfare, funded through illicit economic activity, undermines an affected nation’s 

governing apparatus. When able to separate a population from the authority and services 

of the state, the insurgents may seek to fill the vacuum with a counter-government or 

parallel administrative structures to control, intimidate, or mobilize the population to their 

ends. 

Strategies of Disorder, Provocation, and Exhaustion. If able to capture a sufficient 

degree of public support and effectively undermine the government’s ability to exert its 

authority, an insurgency may be able to compete successfully with the state for control of 

the nation. Insurgents may seek to discredit the government by instigating civil discord, 

in order to diminish popular faith in the government and encourage people to turn to the 

insurgency to “restore” public order and security. Within the general disorder, 

insurgents, blended into the broader population, may commit spectacular attacks to 

provoke the government, frustrated by its inability to distinguish fighter from civilian, 

into indiscriminate reprisals that will alienate the people. The insurgents may accelerate 

this shift in popular support by inculcating fence-sitters with the movement’s ideology 

through propaganda and activities that engender a sense of social identity, solidarity, and 

political alienation from the government. Insurgents try to manage the tempo and 

intensity of their activities to permit a level of effort they can sustain indefinitely. By 

prolonging the conflict, they hope to exhaust the opposition. The insurgents draw the 

government or an occupying force into a series of fruitless, expensive, reactive moves 

that expend political will, funds, resources, and lives. They seek to impose unsustainable 

costs on the government to force capitulation. 

 While pursuing this strategy, an insurgency may try to leverage international 

support from diaspora or émigré communities, international institutions, friendly foreign 

governments and populations, and the international media. Insurgents may directly target 

public opinion in countries that support the local government, thereby pressuring the 

sponsor to cease its assistance. 

Stages. Every insurgency is different and each conflict develops differently. 

Insurgencies may evolve through some or all the stages of subversion and radicalization, 

popular unrest, civil disobedience, localized guerrilla activity, and widespread guerilla 

warfare to open armed conflict - or to dormancy. One or more different stages may be 

manifest in any given insurgency at the same time. An insurgency may actually succeed 

in overthrowing the government (historically a rare event), may force it into political 

accommodation; or may itself be simply crushed. Insurgencies may be co-opted by 

domestic or international terrorist groups, morph into purely criminal organizations, or 

wither into irrelevance. The measures used to deal with an incipient insurgency are often 

very different from those that are effective against mature or declining insurgencies. 

Thus, practitioners must understand at what stage or stages the insurgency is in order to 

develop appropriate and effective responses. 
12

Transnational dynamics. Contemporary insurgencies often act on behalf of or are 

supported by transnational organizations with access to satellite communications, the 

Internet, global media, and transnational banking systems. All insurgencies need 

physical safe haven, and may find it in neighboring countries. Therefore, contemporary 

COIN must take into account regional and global dynamics as well as the internal 

situation of the nation most directly affected. 

Cultural, tribal, ethnic, ideological and religious factors. Many insurgencies include a 

strong component of religious, tribal, ethnic, ideological or cultural identity (sometimes 

extremist) that may resonate with some subset of the target population. Insurgencies may 

take advantage of competing power structures, such as tribal governments, that also 

challenge the authority and span of control of the central government. COIN strategies 

must be developed with an in-depth understanding of the specific cultural, ideological, 

religious, political, and regional factors involved. Any of these factors may play a causal 

role or simply be exploited by insurgents (or government forces) for propaganda and 

mobilization purposes. 

Counterinsurgency

Definition. COIN is the combination of measures adopted to defeat an insurgency, and 

ideally will include integrated or synchronized political, security, economic, and 

informational components that reinforce governmental legitimacy and competence while 

reducing insurgent influence over the population. COIN strategies should be designed to 

simultaneously protect the population and prevent insurgent violence; strengthen 

government institutions’ capacity and legitimacy to govern responsibly, including redress 

of legitimate grievances; and marginalize insurgents politically, socially, and militarily. 

Community leaders discuss the process for selecting delegates to a new district council 
13

Characteristics. COIN is a complex, and normally a coalition, effort, conducted at the 

request and in direct support of the affected government. The capabilities required for 

COIN may be very similar to those required for peacekeeping operations, humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief, stabilization operations, and development assistance 

missions. 

Purpose. The purpose of COIN is to restore the monopoly on political power and the use 

of force by the legitimate government. Regaining the confidence and support of the 

governed people is central to this objective. COIN differs from other civil-military 

operations not in the methods employed but in the purpose of the undertaking. 

Unity of effort. COIN always involves multiple stakeholders on both sides of the 

conflict. Complementarity of purpose and unity of effort are required for interagency and 

international COIN operations. 

COIN as a special environment. For civilian agencies engaged in diplomatic and 

development activities, COIN is less about performing a different set of tasks than is 

about operating in a different kind of environment. In COIN, civilians may have to 

execute their normal informational, economic, political, and security activities in chaotic, 

unstable, or actively hostile environments. Normal tasks may need to be carried out in 

dramatically different ways. In COIN, civilian missions may require new tools, or the 

use of old tools in new ways. The targeted application of any tool requires a 

sophisticated understanding of the context and local drivers of the specific conflict. 

Primacy of non-military means. Security is a necessary but insufficient condition for 

COIN; security alone will not defeat an insurgency. When possible, civilian and military 

measures should be applied simultaneously to achieve success as in an integrated “Clear, 

Hold, and Build” strategy that will delegitimize and disempower the insurgency while 

strengthening government control over its territory and institutions. 

Strategies. COIN is a response to a specific insurgency and requires in-depth assessment 

of that insurgency based on solid understanding of the relevant social, cultural, economic, 

political and security conditions, and detailed knowledge of insurgent motivation, goals, 

organization, and methods. There are two basic approaches to COIN strategy: 

• Enemy-centricity. The enemy-centric approach conceptualizes COIN as a contest 

with an organized enemy, and focuses COIN activity on the insurgent organization. 

This approach emphasizes defeat of the enemy as its primary task and other activities 

as supporting efforts. There are many variants within this approach, including "soft” 

vs. “hard,” direct vs. indirect, violent vs. non-violent, and decapitation vs. 

marginalization strategies. This approach can be summarized as "first defeat the 

enemy, and all else will follow." 

• Population-centricity. The population-centric approach shifts the focus of COIN 

from defeating the insurgent organization to maintaining or recovering the support of 

the population. While direct action against the insurgent organization may be 
14

required, it is not the main effort; this approach assumes that the center of gravity is 

the government’s relationship with and support among the population. It can be 

summarized as "first protect and support the population, and all else will follow." 

 Each approach may be employed at different stages of an insurgency. An enemycentric approach might work against an incipient or centrally-controlled insurgency led 

by a particularly charismatic or powerful individual. However, historical experience has 

shown that against a mature insurgency, population-centric approaches have a higher 

likelihood of success. The current United States (U.S.) military COIN doctrine, Army 

Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication [MCWP] 3-33.5, 

Counterinsurgency, released in December 2006, states: 

“The cornerstone of any counterinsurgency effort is establishing security for the 

civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be 

implemented and disorder spreads. To establish legitimacy, commanders 

transition security activities from combat operations to law enforcement as 

quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they lose public 

support. Using a legal system established in line with local culture and practices 

to deal with such criminals enhances the ... government’s legitimacy.” 

“Victory” in COIN. A COIN effort can be said to have been successful when the 

following conditions are met: 

• The affected government effectively controls legitimate social, political, economic 

and security institutions that meet the population’s needs, including adequate 

mechanisms to address the grievances that may have fueled support of the 

insurgency; 

• The insurgent movement and its leaders are effectively co-opted, marginalized, or 

separated from the population, with the voluntary assistance and consent of the 

population; and 

• Armed insurgent forces have decamped or been demobilized, and/or reintegrated into 

the political, economic, and social structures of the country. 
15

Chapter Two

Attributes and Actors

COIN Strategy Components/Functions

One highly regarded COIN theorist, David Galula, (paraphrasing Chinese General 

Chang Ting-chen) asserted that successful COIN campaigns are normally about 80% 

political, and 20% military in nature. Classic COIN theory divides counterinsurgency 

into four “components” to better explain how these traditionally distinct areas have to be 

integrated in order to achieve “victory,” describing the four components as Diplomatic, 

Information, Military, and Economic. 

 In fact, COIN must address with equal urgency two imperatives - political action 

and security operations, recognizing that insurgency is first and foremost a political 

struggle, and that, while successful security operations will not necessarily result in a 

COIN “victory,” security will almost always be prerequisite to political resolution. 

Security operations, guided and supported by an information campaign, should and often 

will improve the political and economic situation at the local level, increasing the social 

acceptability of the COIN campaign. Today, classic COIN components can be more 

usefully described as functions: Political, Informational, Economic, and Security. 

This diagram illustrates the key functions of a comprehensive COIN framework. 

The frame is structured as a base (Information), three pillars (Security, Political and 

Economic) and a roof (Control). This approach builds on classic COIN theory but also 
16

incorporates best practices that have emerged through experience in numerous complex 

operations over the past several decades. 

 The diagram is a conceptual model, not a template for action. It is intended to 

demonstrate to policy makers and program implementers where their efforts fit into a 

COIN strategy or campaign, rather than telling them what to do in a given situation. It is 

an aid to collaboration, not an operational plan. The functions should be linked to one 

another in ways that are not easily captured in a diagram but are described below. The 

general framework can be applied to COIN as well as peacekeeping operations, 

stabilization and reconstruction, and complex humanitarian emergencies. 

The Information Base. Information is the foundation for all other activities. The 

collection, formulation, and dissemination of information are crucial in shaping 

perceptions of the conflict by all stakeholders. Substantive security, political and 

economic measures are critical; however, to be effective in the strategic sense, they must 

be integrated into a broader information strategy. 

Conflict resolution radio station studio production center

• Every action in COIN sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to 

characterize the message to the target population in the area of the insurgency and 

often to international observers as well. Messages and themes should be aimed at 

enhancing the legitimacy of the affected government. Messages are delivered 

through media operations, including public affairs and public diplomacy as well as 

military information operations, with the intent to counter insurgents’ ideology, 

undermine their motivation and popular support, and deny them sanctuary, both 

physical and virtual.

• An information strategy must address ideological, social, cultural, political, and 

religious motivations that influence or engender a sense of common interest and 
17

identity among the target population. It should be based upon efforts to understand 

the environment through census data, public opinion polling, and the collection of 

cultural and “human terrain” information in denied areas. A comprehensive 

information strategy involves understanding the effects of operations on the 

population, adversaries, and the environment. 

• The information campaign must be conducted at global, regional, and local levels in 

order to influence every level of support to the insurgency. 

• An information campaign creates a narrative that enhances the legitimacy of the 

affected government. It must resonate with the population and be based upon 

verifiable facts and measurable progress rather than promises. Deeds speak for 

themselves, and in COIN, actions must validate rhetoric. 

• Information includes intelligence, which allows units to distinguish between insurgent 

and civilian. With this knowledge, security forces may penetrate insurgent cells, and 

apprehend the members, leading to further intelligence gains. 

ECONOMIC

SECURITY

POLITICAL

INFORMATION

HOST 

NATION 

LEGITIMACY

The Security Pillar. This pillar is comprised of two key components: (1) military force 

to secure the population from attack or intimidation by guerrillas, criminals, terrorists or 

other armed groups and (2) police security, to include community policing, law 

enforcement, police intelligence activities, border police/patrol and paramilitary field 

forces. Effective police activity is often more important in COIN than military action. 

The concept of security also incorporates individual security, which involves the 

protection of human rights, and the effective functioning of civil legal institutions 

(courts, jails, prisons) and public safety (fire, ambulance, sanitation, civil defense), and 

public health (access to food, safe drinking water, and medical care.)

• While the security “pillar” may seem military centric due to the high visibility of the 

military’s presence, the civilian security role is particularly critical in developing 

security sector institutions supporting the rule of law and accountable governance. 

• Economic and political progress is not dependent upon a completely secure 

environment, nor does the ability to provide adequate security depend entirely upon 

on political and economic progress. The level of effort in each area will depend upon 
18

conditions specific to the insurgency and the ability of the affected government to 

deal with it. 

The U.S. Government delivers civil disorder management equipment and training to foreign security forces 

The Political Pillar. This pillar focuses on strengthening the capability and capacity of 

the government to respond – and to be seen to be responding - to the needs of its people. 

Associated activities will include diplomacy, development assistance, advising and 

training, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs. The military may 

support political efforts where civilians, because of the security environment, are not able 

to operate freely. 

The Economic Pillar. This pillar includes humanitarian relief, such as safe water, 

sanitation, basic heath care, livelihoods assistance, and primary education, as well as 

longer-term programs for development of infrastructure to support agricultural, industrial, 

educational, medical and commercial activities. Assistance in effective resource and 

infrastructure management, including construction of key infrastructure, may be critically 

important to COIN efforts. Assistance must be tailored to the affected governments’ 

capacity to absorb support and manage its outcomes. 

The Control Roof. The three pillars support the overarching objective of enabling the 

supported government to manage the balance between insurgent activity (the tempo of 

operations, level and intensity of violence, and degree of instability that it engenders) 

such that the population will, in the long run, support the government against the 

insurgents — noting that this “balance” can differ from one society to the next. 

Relationship between functions. Maintaining an appropriate balance among the 

functions is important. For example, economic assistance programs with inadequate 

security could create soft targets for the insurgents. Security assistance in the absence of 

capable political leadership and oversight could create more – and more capable – armed 

groups outside the control of the government. Moreover, while an action may fall within 
19

one pillar, it often has immediate effects in the other pillars. Efforts must be integrated 

because effects are impossible to segregate. 

The Affected Government

 The national government threatened by an insurgency, nascent or active, is 

obviously the most important actor in development and execution of any COIN strategy 

undertaken on its behalf. Effective COIN requires that the major effort be, and be seen 

by the local population to be, indigenous; only the government itself can mobilize the 

support of the people against the insurgent movement. Foreign forces do not operate 

independent of, nor are political, economic, or other development assistance activities 

undertaken except at the request of, the government concerned. 

Local community leaders and constituents discuss peace initiatives 

 Insurgencies often gain credibility, particularly in fragile states, where nationallevel leaders fail to address legitimate grievances and individuals or groups resort to 

violence as a means of redress. Provincial governments are usually responsible for 

managing resources on behalf of the national government, and may be the lowest level of 

government that has some type of formal internal security force that can operate in a 

counterinsurgency role, including the ability to hold captured insurgents in significant 

numbers. Local government entities perceived as illegitimate, corrupt, oppressive, or 

non-inclusive provide fertile ground for an insurgency to develop and operate, but are the 

lowest level through which the national government can deliver security and other public 

services. The perceived capacity of local government to provide for the population is 

critical to national government legitimacy. 

The U.S. Country Team

All United States Government (USG) COIN strategies, plans, programs, and 

activities are undertaken in support of the affected government and managed through the 

elements of the U.S. Country Team, led by the Chief of Mission. The Chief of Mission 
20

(COM) is the senior representative of the USG to the government of the foreign country 

to which accredited and is responsible for recommending and implementing national 

policy regarding that country, and overseeing the activities of official USG employees in 

the country. Where appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the 

Ambassador has extraordinary decision-making authority as the senior USG official 

present during periods of instability and crises. Where a confirmed ambassador is not 

present, the Charge d’Affaires represents the Secretary of State as the senior diplomat 

accredited to the foreign government. 

The Country Team is the central element of interagency execution. When 

insurgency can be identified in its early stages, the COM and other senior representatives 

of the Country Team may encourage government leaders to take preventive action 

through the use of informational, security, political and economic measures. The COM 

can request foreign assistance, help mobilize international support through multilateral 

diplomacy, and engage non-governmental organizations to help address the causes of 

unrest before the crisis escalates and limits political alternatives to the use of force. 

 Although not part of the Country Team or subordinate to the COM, a U.S. 

geographic Combatant Commander (CCDR), a four star general or admiral, will be 

tasked to plan and execute the military component of a COIN campaign if the USG 

decides to deploy U.S. combat forces to assist an affected government’s security forces in 

defeating or suppressing an insurgency. The CCDR, in coordination with the COM, will 

usually establish a subordinate Combined Joint Task Force to conduct COIN operations 

in the affected area or country. 

 USG efforts must be designed and executed in such manner to increase both the 

legitimacy of the threatened government and the population’s perception of that 

legitimacy. COIN strategy requires tailored approach that captures and integrates the 

range of USG agency and department capabilities. The USG may also elect to provide 

operational assistance to indigenous forces; such assistance will be the product of 

deliberate foreign policy decisions taken in Washington D.C., and, with the exception of 

pre-existing law enforcement or counterterrorism liaison relationships with the host 

nation, will be subject to the oversight of the COM. Representative capabilities of USG 

agencies relevant to COIN are listed in Appendix A, and COIN best practices in 

Appendix B. 

The International Community

Considerable attention should be paid to potential contributions of the 

international partners during the development of COIN strategy and plans. In particular, 

regional partners can help prevent the establishment of external sanctuaries, prevent or 

slow the spread of the conflict to other areas, and provide local expertise, basing, and 

possibly even security assistance. Regional security organizations may be politically and 

materially helpful to COIN efforts. 
21

 Many U.S. allies and coalition partner have a comparative advantage in 

deployable capabilities relevant to COIN, e.g., training, development, and employment of 

national police forces (which the USG does not have.) They can also bring considerable 

economic development and social institution-building to COIN efforts. Coalition 

operations require close coordination of effort to achieve common political, economic, 

security and informational objectives. Early inclusion of international partners in the 

COIN effort, and collaborative and transparent planning, can help mitigate the effects of 

operational-level differences in goals, training, capabilities, equipment, logistics, culture, 

doctrine, intelligence and language.

Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO)

IGOs, formed when two or more national governments sign a multilateral treaty 

to form such a body and finance its operations, possess legal personality in international 

law and their staffs enjoy diplomatic status. Most IGOs are regionally focused, and when 

IGO member states could be adversely affected by an insurgency in their region, the 

organization may act, through collective action, to deny legitimacy, sanctuary, and 

support to insurgents. 

Non-government organizations (NGO)

 NGOs are private, self-governing, non-profit organizations dedicated to 

promoting education, health care, environmental protection, human rights, conflict 

resolution or similar issues, and support the establishment or development of institutions 

of civil society. There are thousands of registered NGOs, some focused on disaster relief 

and others on long-term development. NGO activities are a direct function of the 

interests of their donors. In order to secure freedom of movement, including access to 

semi-permissive environments, NGOs generally want to be perceived by local 

populations as politically neutral, needs-driven organizations, and as a result, often try to 

minimize contact with the uniformed military or other governmental actors. This 

dynamic complicates coordination of government and NGO activities. 

Local entrepreneurs gain access to international manufacturing technology 
22

 Key issues associated with NGOs operating in COIN environments involve the 

allocation of resources and provision of security. NGOs execute a variety of aid and 

development activities that meet the needs of a local population and should be deconflicted with USG efforts as much as possible. Where security is problematic, NGOs 

may rely on COIN forces – military and otherwise - transportation and protection. 

Therefore, COIN planning should incorporate insofar as possible NGO activities. USG 

COIN planning should also consider whether NGOs operating in the affected country are 

promoting aims counter to the COIN strategy, domestic and/or international law, and the 

affected nation’s aims of legitimacy and effectiveness. 

The Private Sector

Multinational Corporations. Multinational Corporations (MNCs) usually become 

involved in counterinsurgency when their own financial interests are threatened, or when 

financial advantage is perceived. COIN planners should consider the capabilities, risks 

and advantages of MNCs with respect to indigenous government needs as well as U.S. 

and foreign commercial interests involved. 

Contractors. Contractors provide security, training, technical expertise, and logistical 

support. Policy makers should be cognizant of the fact that contractors are often viewed 

by the local population as USG representatives and any negative behavior or interaction 

with the local population on the part of contractors can have an adverse impact on COIN 

efforts. 

Grantees. The USG generally delivers development assistance through grants. USG 

grant managers oversee the activities of grantees to ensure that funds are used for the 

intended purpose, but cannot change the nature of grant once it has been authorized. 

COIN planners must be aware of USG-funded grantee activities in order to protect USG 

investment and avoid duplication of effort.
23

Chapter Three

Assessment and Planning

USG COIN support should include information, political, security, and economic 

components to strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of the affected government. 

The relative emphasis on these components will depend upon the specifics of the 

situation; the environment should be thoroughly assessed prior to planning and 

continuously evaluated throughout the course of the COIN effort. Planning should 

proceed based upon methodical and thorough assessment. 

Assessment

 A whole-of-government approach to a COIN engagement begins with a strategiclevel “joint” interagency analysis of the conflict. An interagency team comprised of all 

relevant agencies with core competencies needed to counter the insurgency should 

conduct the assessment. This effort may be conducted at the direction of the National 

Security Council and will usually be led by the Department of State. The assessment is 

the first step towards developing a whole-of-government COIN strategy and supporting 

plans. 

 Insurgencies are frequently described in terms of sources and root causes, parties 

and actors, and drivers and triggers. The sources and root causes of insurgency can be 

described in terms of the stakeholders’ frustrated needs and their grievances. The drivers 

of the insurgency can be expressed in terms of the dynamics among the stakeholders’ 

dissatisfaction and stakeholder opinion leaders’ motivations and means. 

 Following the assessment of these factors, analysis and prioritization of the 

findings leads to an integrated strategy that applies appropriate capabilities and resources 

against the requirements. The joint assessment process will yield a comprehensive 

picture of the environment and a common understanding of the nature of the problem, 

and serve as the basis for whole-of-government planning. 

 At the strategic level, analytical tools such as the Interagency Methodology for 

Analyzing Instability and Conflict, the Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF), and the 

Political Instability Modeling paper may be useful aids to the development of situationspecific information for policy-level strategic planning. The CAF, the Tactical Conflict 

Assessment Framework, and similar modeling tools can be used to inform programmatic, 

operational and tactical level plans. See Appendix C for web links to these and other 

assessment and modeling tools. 

Planning

 Insurgency evolves in stages, and COIN planning processes will be a function of 

when in the development of the insurgency the USG decides to intervene. Depending 
24

upon the strength and legitimacy of, and tools available to, the affected government, the 

USG may play a subtle role in countering an incipient insurgency or may intervene more 

forcefully if faced with open warfare. Regardless of the timing, the affected government 

will have sought assistance from the USG because, on some level, the former lacked the 

necessary governmental tools to counter the insurgency that threatened it. 

 COIN planning should integrate civilian and military capabilities across each of 

the four COIN strategy functions. The purpose of whole-of-government planning is to 

synchronize and sequence the activities of each contributing agency into a coherent 

strategy that will assist the threatened government to achieve effective control over its 

environment by strengthening legitimate and effective government institutions. A 

comprehensive information campaign is the basis for all other activity, and performs an 

integrating function that ties other activities together. 

 Political, economic and security measures are developed in parallel to ensure 

stable progress, which is measured by developing situation-specific metrics to track 

growth in the effectiveness and legitimacy of the threatened country’s governing 

institutions. U.S. Government strategy to support a specific government’s 

counterinsurgency effort involves a tailored approach that captures and integrates the 

range of capabilities of many U.S. Government departments and agencies in order to 

support the affected government in establishing legitimate and effective institutions. 

U. S. Government interagency planning meeting with NGO representatives 

 A whole-of-government plan should specify: 

 The over-arching goal to be achieved 

 Critical assumptions about the environment 

 Critical assumptions about cause and effect 

 Major mission elements necessary and sufficient to achieve the goal 

 Essential task areas within each major mission 
25

 Sequencing of essential tasks 

 Resources available to support the plan (skilled people, relationships, expert 

knowledge, money, materials, and time) 

 Metrics to assess progress toward the overarching goal and major mission 

elements 

 The outputs of whole-of-government assessment and planning should include 

detailed descriptions of: 

• Dynamics driving the conflict, including those that create and support the 

insurgency, and those that might mitigate the conflict and defuse the 

insurgency 

• Primary actors and factors, including opinion leaders and identity groups 

(insurgent groups and their supporters, legitimate government leaders and 

their constituencies), identity issues around which the actors coalesce 

(ideologies or other organizing principles), the degree to which the insurgency 

has subverted or penetrated the legitimate government, indigenous and 

external support to the insurgency, vulnerabilities of the insurgent movement 

• Purpose of engagement (the “what” or mission statement for COIN campaign) 

• Major mission elements and essential tasks (the “how” for COIN operations) 

• Resources required; detailed description of how the programs will be funded 

and managed by each USG department and agency; and resource shortfalls 

• Measures of effectiveness and performance indicators for each component of 

the plan and for the overall strategy 

• Coordination and synchronization mechanisms – “business rules” for 

integration of activities across departments and agencies, including clear lines 

of authority, command, and communication 

• Incorporation, where appropriate and possible, of other national, IGO, and 

NGO capabilities into plans and operations 

 In summary, whole-of-government assessment and planning leads to a common 

understanding of a situation and an integrated interagency approach for addressing its 

root causes. This process ensures the capabilities and capacity of USG departments and 

agencies are applied appropriately to assist the threatened government’s COIN efforts. A 

list of useful references in the study of insurgency and COIN are in Appendix D. 
26
27 

Chapter Four

Conclusion

 Effective COIN requires multi-faceted and integrated operations that apply 

civilian and military capabilities across information, security, political and economic 

functional areas. The goal of COIN is to help an affected government achieve control 

over its sovereign territory by establishing, developing, and consolidating legitimate, 

effective government institutions. 

 The USG can assist an affected government with strategies that combine 

information, security, political and economic elements. Traditionally, diplomatic and 

political actions are led by the Department of State, development by the U.S. Agency for 

International Development, and security activities by the Department of Defense. The 

complex nature of insurgency requires the integration of capabilities extant in a number 

of other USG agencies and departments as well, including those of other partner nations, 

inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. 

Preparations for voter registration and elections to select delegates for the 

national constitutional referendum in Afghanistan

 Diplomatic efforts in COIN assist a government’s effort to mobilize support for 

its legitimacy, marginalize insurgents, extend its control throughout its territory, and 

strengthen the rule of law. An affected government may, through development 

assistance, be able to mitigate the economic distress that often exacerbates insurgency. 

Relief could come through immediate humanitarian relief, extension of government 

services, or long-term economic development assistance. USAID’s expertise and 

expeditionary culture are essential to COIN; the Departments of Treasury, Agriculture, 

Transportation, and Defense also have significant economic assistance capability and 

capacity. 
28

 Diplomacy and development are enabled by and contribute to defense. Local 

government’s efforts should focus on population security, which include constabulary 

activities and intelligence. The Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and Homeland 

Security, as well as the national and international Intelligence Communities, possess deep 

expertise and significant capacity to assist the affected government in ensuring security, 

justice, and respect for the rule of law. 

 Insurgencies, and thus COIN strategies, can vary significantly from one situation 

to another. COIN efforts succeed if they result in a political resolution acceptable to the 

parties involved. Diplomacy, development and defense are interdependent at every level 

of COIN operations, and civil-military integration is required at the strategic, 

theater/operational and local/tactical levels to defeat insurgencies and protect the interests 

of the United States and our allies and partner nations. Most successful COIN campaigns 

have achieved this unity of effort through unified authority. 

 This Interim Guide serves to synthesize COIN theory with recent experiences of 

officials working in the area across USG departments and agencies. It deliberately 

focuses at the broad national level so as to develop civilian literature on COIN to 

complement extant military doctrine. As the first serious USG effort at creating a 

national COIN framework in over 40 years, this version of the Guide is intended to 

provide the basis for continued discussion among and feedback from practitioners; their 

input will contribute to the refinement of the document into a final version suitable for 

publication as an official interagency publication. The ultimate intent of this effort is to 

develop our national capability to conduct or aid effective COIN efforts in support of 

legitimate and responsible governments that respond to the needs of their people. 

 Contact information for the authors and contributors is listed in Appendix F. 
29

Appendix A

U.S. Government Roles in COIN

National Security Council 

 The National Security Council (NSC) is the President's principal forum for 

consultation with senior advisors and cabinet officials on national security and foreign 

policy matters. The NSC staff provides advice to the President with respect to the 

integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies and manages the processes through 

which the President’s polices are coordinated and implemented. 

 

Intelligence Community

 Intelligence is central to any COIN campaign; it is the basis upon which a precise 

and deep understanding of the nature of insurgency, its context, and its remedies are 

based. The U.S. and international intelligence communities are indispensable 

contributors, providing intelligence support to policy makers, including indications and 

warning; conflict assessment tools; deployable support, including Rapid Analytic Support 

and Expeditionary Response teams; collaborative tools; and dedicated support to 

planning staffs. 

Department of State

 The Department of State, through its bureaus, offices, and missions overseas, 

leads and oversees USG support to COIN efforts. The relevant regional bureau will 

normally direct primary policy regarding U.S. intervention in or operations in support of 

other governments. Several functional bureaus and offices, including the Office of the 

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, the Bureau 

of Population, Refugees, and Migration, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the 

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, will have substantive roles in the development and 

execution of COIN strategy. Chiefs of U.S. Missions will oversee official USG 

operations in the countries to which they are accredited. 

 

Department of Defense 

The Department of Defense and U.S. military forces provide a broad range of 

capabilities to support an integrated USG COIN effort. These include advising and 

training foreign military, paramilitary, internal security, and police units; planning and 

conducting security operations in support of indigenous security forces; intelligence, 

communications, and logistical support; public affairs and military information 

operations; medical assistance; civil affairs support; and infrastructure repair and 

construction. Army Field Manuel 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, 
30

Counterinsurgency, and U.S. military joint doctrine describe U.S. military COIN 

capabilities and operations in detail. 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

 USAID can assist USG COIN efforts by fostering economic growth, promoting 

human health, providing emergency humanitarian assistance, and enhancing democracy 

in developing countries. USAID has field offices in 100 developing countries, working 

in close partnership with private voluntary organizations, indigenous groups, universities, 

American businesses, international organizations, other governments, trade and 

professional associations, faith-based organizations, and other U.S. government agencies. 

USAID has working relationships, through contracts and grant agreements, with more 

than 3,500 companies and over 300 U.S.-based private voluntary organizations. USAID 

programs are designed to enhance institutional capacity and ameliorate the root causes of 

conflict. 

Department of Justice 

 The Department of Justice, through its constituent agencies (the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the US Marshal’s Service, and the Bureau 

of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco and Explosives) and its components, works with other 

nations to combat transnational crime and international terrorist activities, including 

financial and operational support that may buttress insurgency operations. Justice also 

has offices devoted exclusively to providing overseas technical assistance that are highly 

relevant to COIN: the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, 

which develops police and corrections institutions; and the Office of Overseas 

Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training, which develops prosecutorial and 

judicial institutions.

Department of Treasury 

 The Department of Treasury operates several offices directly relevant to COIN, 

including the Offices of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Terrorist Financing and 

Financial Crime, Intelligence and Analysis, and Foreign Asset Control, and the Financial 

Crimes Enforcement Network. The Office of International Affairs, through its Office of 

Technical Assistance, works directly with foreign governments to support their efforts to 

improve their financial systems. 

Department of Homeland Security 

 The Department of Homeland Security includes 22 separate and distinct Federal 

agencies. The Department’s overarching purpose is to govern domestic security 

operations; however, several component agencies operate overseas, interacting and 

cooperate with host nation government agencies. A significant by-product of that 

interaction and cooperation is the development of host nation government capabilities to 

provide security and safety of their population. Homeland Security agencies with 
31

capabilities most relevant to COIN are the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol; U.S. 

Immigration and Custom Enforcement; Transportation Security Agency; U.S. Coast 

Guard and the U.S. Secret Service. 

Department of Agriculture 

Most insurgencies occur in countries where the majority of the population is 

dependent upon agriculture, and where unemployed or underemployed rural youth are 

considered prime candidates for recruitment. Development of the agricultural sector and 

its institutions helps facilitate trade and increase incomes, reducing recruitment and 

support for insurgency. The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) executes U.S. 

Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) international programs, including market 

development, trade agreements and negotiations, and the collection and analysis of 

statistics and market information. FAS delivers training and technical assistance, and 

collaborates with developing and transitional countries to facilitate trade and promote 

food security. The goals of USDA’s international work are to help ensure that countries 

critical to U.S. national security strengthen their institutions, policies, and market-based 

agricultural systems, thereby contributing to long-term economic and political stability; 

adopt regulations consistent with international standards to increase trade, resulting in 

economic growth and stability; and employ agricultural practices that will reduce 

instability, increase regional cooperation, and ensure an adequate resource base for future 

generations.

Department of Transportation 

Transportation infrastructure is a critical component of the economic health and 

development of countries, factors that mitigate conditions that encourage insurgency. All 

facets of commerce, trade, travel, and quality of life depend on mobility. Transportation 

facilitates a government’s ability to provide its population with basic services and 

security, thereby reducing the appeal of insurgency within the most likely populations of 

potential recruits and reduces the growth of a disaffected population. Transportation can 

support COIN by helping countries to strengthen their institutions, policies, and 

intermodal transportation systems, contributing to long-term economic and political 

stability; adopt regulations consistent with international standards to increase commerce 

trade and safety, resulting in economic growth and stability; and adopt transportation 

practices that promote infrastructure development for local, regional and international 

movement of people and commerce. 
32

Appendix B

Best Practices 

The following best practices are common to several historical conflicts and may 

be useful in the development of strategies, policies, and plans. It may be instructive to 

evaluate these best practices against COIN case studies, including the Philippines 1946-

1954; Malaya 1948-1960; Vietnam 1967-1972; Laos 1964-1973; El Salvador 1981-1992; 

and the ongoing insurgency in Colombia. For additional best practices, see FM 3-24, 

Counterinsurgency, Dec 2006, pg. 1-29. 

• Long term commitment. COIN is a long-term undertaking, and policy makers 

must be prepared to invest years’ of effort to a COIN campaign.

• Create a unified civilian-military authority under the right person. 

Successful COIN strategies operate under combined and collaborative civilmilitary leadership. When led from the top, close coordination between civilian 

and military organizations will permeate to the tactical levels. Successful COIN 

campaigns can be often be directly attributed to capable, imaginative individuals 

in key leadership positions. 

• Respect people. Cultural sensitivity and awareness of heterogeneous nuances of 

the local population affecting communities’ interests and loyalties.

• Emphasize human intelligence. Emphasis should be placed on the development 

and use of intelligence sources. Important goals include: employment of police 

investigative techniques; strengthening counter-intelligence programs and 

training; developing a tips program that protects informants; offering rewards for 

information; identifying and constraining insurgent mobilization and recruitment 

forums; and de-conflicting intelligence efforts.

• Protect and control the population. Employ “clear and hold” operations to 

secure populated areas and prevent insurgent intimidation. Other methods include 

disrupting insurgents’ access to food, supplies, and other resources from the 

population; ensuring effective border controls; and isolating contested areas. One 

might consider voluntary relocation of civilians from conflicted areas if local 

customs allow, and if benefits outweigh costs. Also work to eliminate sanctuaries 

and establish constructive presence in each community; develop procedures to 

reinforce isolated outposts; protect critical infrastructure; secure roads and rivers 

to promote unimpeded commerce; and ensure laws for reasonable searches and 

detention of suspected enemy personnel.

• Strengthen indigenous political processes and institutional performance. To 

the extent possible in the area of operation, address real grievances; provide fullspectrum government services; uphold the rule-of-law; conduct military Civic 
33

Action; organize civil-military committees with multiple agencies—local as well 

as federal officials—and military services to ensure unity of effort; and 

professionalize and improve indigenous security forces, government ministries, 

and local officials through advisor and training programs. Work to promote 

democratization and self-determination as alternatives to insurgent ideology; rootout corruption; emphasize performance and national-loyalty over cronyism and 

patronage in official appointments; establish robust oversight programs similar to 

an Inspector General; employ tax breaks and other incentives to energize private 

investment; provide competent refugee assistance; enforce strict fire discipline 

and appropriate Rules of Engagement; and synchronize security and development 

efforts.

• Mobilize the population to contribute to its own defense. Organize community 

watch groups; enlist local population self-defense forces and auxiliary police with 

adequate oversight and legal framework; recruit community-improvement work 

details; and engage community, tribal and/or religious leaders. 

• Develop comprehensive incarceration programs. Provide Human Rights and 

Law of War training to security personnel; emphasize appropriate standards of 

conduct; pre-establish detention and interrogation procedures and have necessary 

facilities and resources; develop programs for prisoners which focus on 

reintegration into broader society and mitigate the risk of radicalization during 

detention; and provide oversight of security contractors.

• Employ robust information and psychological operations. Inform civilians 

about the benefits of government security, development, and political reform; 

highlight insurgent brutality and criminal conduct; craft liberal reconciliation 

programs for rank-and-file insurgents to divide followers from leaders; challenge 

self-image and idealism within insurgent ranks; and expose instances when 

insurgent leaders display selfishness, incompetence, and corruption.
34

Appendix C

Website Links to Assessment & Modeling Tools

1. Political Instability Modeling 

http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDocuments/PoliticalInstabilityM

odeling.pdf

2. USAID Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A framework for Strategy 

and Program Development 

http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDocuments/CMM_ConflAssessF

rmwrk_May_05.pdf

3. USAID Conflict Mitigation and Management Policy 

http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDocuments/USAID_Conflict_M

M_Policy_Apr_2005.pdf

4. USAID Community-Based Development in Conflict-Affected Areas 

http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDocuments/USAID_CMM_CBD

_Guide_May_2007.pdf

5. S/CRS Triggering Mechanisms for “Whole-of-Government” Planning for 

Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation 

http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDocuments/PlanningForRSTrigg

ers-20070816.pdf

6. S/CRS Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization 

http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDocuments/InteragencyManagem

entSystem-20070309.pdf
35

Appendix D

Useful References

Baker, Jim Systems Thinking and Counterinsurgencies Parameters Winter 2006-07: 26-

43. 

Baltazar, Thomas and Elisabeth Kvitashvili “Combating Terrorism: The Role of USAID 

and Development Assistance” Marine Corps Gazette Web Article Apr 2007. 

Blaufarb, Douglas S. and George K Tanham Fourteen Points: A Framework for the 

Analysis of Counterinsurgency Washington: BDM, 1984. 

Cassidy, Robert M. "Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 

Vietnam and Other Small Wars" Parameters Summer 2004: 73-83. 

Cassidy, Robert M. “The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency” 

Summer 2006. 

Childress, Michael. The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in Internal Defense and 

Development: The Cases of El Salvador and Honduras Santa Monica: RAND, 

1995. 

Cohen, Eliot, et al. "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency” 

Military Review March-April 2006: 49-53. 

Bensahel, Nora “Preventing Insurgencies after Major Combat Operations” Defense 

Studies Vol. 6, No. 3 Sep 2006: 278-291. 

 

Byman, Daniel Going to War with the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and 

the War on Terrorism Carlisle: SSI, 2005. 

Echevarria, Antulio J. II. Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths. Carlisle: SSI, 2005. 

Galula, David Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger, 

1964. 

Gompert, David C. “Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency” RAND 

Occasional Paper, 2007. 

Grdovic, Mark. “Understanding Counterinsurgency” Special Warfare Dec 2004: 5-8. 

Hammes, T.X. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Osceola: Zenith 

Press, 2004. 
36

Hoffman, Bruce “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq” RAND Occasional 

Paper, 2004. 

Hoffman, Bruce “From the War on Terror to Global Counterinsurgency” Dec 2006. 

Jureidini, Paul A. et al. Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 

Summary Accounts. Washington: SORO, 1962. 

Kilcullen, David. “Countering Global Insurgency” 2004. 

Killebrew, Robert, ed. The Country Team in American Strategy. 2006. 

Komer, Robert W. Bureaucracy Does its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN 

Performance in Vietnam. Washington: RAND, 1972. 

Kiszely, John. “Learning About Counter-Insurgency”. RUSI Journal Dec 2006: 16-21. 

Ladwig, Walter C., III. "Managing Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Malaya". Military 

Review May-June 2007: 56-66. 

Lawrence, T.E. “The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence”. The Arab Bulletin Aug. 20, 1917. 

Long, Austin On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND 

Counterinsurgency Research. Santa Monica: RAND, 2006. 

Marks, Thomas A. “Insurgency in a Time of Terrorism” JCOA-LL Bulletin Vol. II, No. 

4, Sep 2005: 33-43. 

Metz, Steven Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy. Carlisle: 

SSI, 2007. 

Muckian, Martin . “Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to 

the New Adversary” Parameters Winter 2006-07: 14-25. 

Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 

Malaya and Vietnam Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 

Record, Jeffrey “External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success” Parameters

Autumn 2006: 36-49. 

Record, Jeffrey “The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful 

Counterinsurgency” 2006. 

Rosenau, William “Subversion and Insurgency” RAND Occasional Paper, 2007. 
37

Schwarz, Benjamin C. American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The 

Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building. Santa Monica: 

RAND, 1991. 

Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency". Military Review May-June 2005: 

8-12. 

Stewart, Richard W. “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency 

Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification” National War College 

Research Paper, 1 May 2006. 

Ucko, David “Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations: Insights from 

Malaya 1948-1960” The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 30, No. 1, Feb 2007: 

47-72. 

United States Departments of the Army and Navy FM 3-24/ MCWP 3-33.5 

Counterinsurgency. 2006. 

United States Department of Defense DOD Directive 3000.5 Military Support for 

Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. 2005. 

United States White House United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy. 1962. 

United States White House NSPD-44 Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning 

Reconstruction and Stabilization. 2005. 
38

Appendix E

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CAF Conflict Assessment Framework, USAID 

CCDR Combatant Commander, Defense 

COIN Counterinsurgency 

COM Chief of Mission, State 

DOD Department of Defense 

Justice Department of Justice 

State Department of State 

FAS Foreign Agricultural Service, Agriculture 

FM Field Manuel, DOD 

IGO Inter-Government Organization 

MCWP Marine Corps Warfighting Publication, Defense 

MNC Multinational Corporation 

NGO Non-governmental organization 

NSC National Security Council 

S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 

 And Stabilization, State 

U.S. United States 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 

USG United States Government 
39

Appendix F

Contact information for comment on the Guide

Department of State Ms. Donna Hopkins 202-647-0792 

 hopkinsdl@state.gov 

 Mr. Thomas Cooney 202-647-7031 

 cooneytf@state.gov 

 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

 Ms. Elisabeth Kvitashvili 202-712-0197 

 ekvitashvili@usaid.gov

 Ms. Alexa Courtney 202-712-5181 

 alcourtney@usaid.gov 

Department of Defense Dr. Janine Davidson 703-697-5401 

 janine.davidson@osd.mil

 COL John DeJarnette 703-697-5912 

 john.dejarnette@osd.mil

Office of the Director for National Intelligence 

 Mr. Jonathan Wohlman 202-201-1304 

 jonathanmw@dni.gov

 Mr. Guy White 202-201-1345 

 elmergw@dni.gov

Department of Justice Mr. Joseph Jones 202-514-8881 

 joseph.jones@usdoj.gov

 Ms. Barbara Berman 202-616-0808 

 barbara.berman@usdoj.gov

Department of Treasury Mr. Jonathan Weinberger 202-622-2867 

 jonathan.weinberger@do.treas.gov

 Mr. Stuart Jones 202-622-1193 

 stuart.jones@do.treas.gov

Department of Agriculture Mr. Christian Foster 202-690-1791 

 christian.foster@fas.usda.gov

 Ms. Amy Freitas 202-690-1752 
40

 amy.freitas@usda.gov

Department of Transportation Mr. Joseph Traini 202-366-0603 

 joseph.traini@ost.dot.gov

 Ms. Angela Stubblefield 202-366-6542 

 angela.stubblefield@dot.gov

Department of Homeland Security 

 Mr. Mark A. Randol 202-282-8729 

 mark.randol@dhs.gov

 Mr. Eric Wardlow 202-282-8785 

 eric.wardlow@dhs.gov