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53–570 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–50] 

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR 

NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT 

PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 5, 2009 
(II) 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

BEN GLERUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, May 5, 2009, Army National Guard and Air National Guard Equipment Programs ..................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, May 5, 2009 .............................................................................................. 25 

TUESDAY, MAY 5, 2009 

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT 

PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 1 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member, 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 5 

WITNESSES 

Carpenter, Maj. Gen. Raymond W., ARNG, Acting Deputy Director, Army 

National Guard .................................................................................................... 6 

Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III, ANG, Director of the Air National Guard .......... 10 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Carpenter, Maj. Gen. Raymond W. ................................................................. 29 

Wyatt, Lt. Gen. Harry M., III .......................................................................... 35 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 45 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Abercrombie ............................................................................................... 49 

(1) 

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD 

EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Tuesday, May 5, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:07 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Neil Abercrombie 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Aloha, everybody. Thank you very much for 

coming today. 

This is a very crucial meeting, from our standpoint, in this subcommittee. Some of us have had longstanding questions and observations with respect to the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air 

National Guard (ANG), both from the equipment perspective and 

personnel perspective as we have seen this transition going all the 

way back to Kosovo and Serbia and the whole redirection, if you 

will, of American military effort vis-a-vis the Guard and Reserve in 

terms of an operational force and the implications and consequences of that, over time. 

And we are particularly well served, I think, by having Major 

General Raymond Carpenter, the acting deputy director of the 

Army National Guard and Lieutenant General Harry Wyatt, the 

Director of the Air National Guard, because I think both of you 

have a long-term perspective on precisely these questions and their 

implication. 

Secretary Gates has adopted 82 recommendations from the congressionally mandated Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. One of those recommendations was to equip and resource 

the Guard and Reserve component as an operational reserve rather 

than a Cold War model of a strategic reserve. When I say Cold War 

model, that is a popular way of putting it, whether it was a Cold 

War or no Cold War, the Guard and Reserves’ mission mandate 

and the understanding of what that was precedes the Cold War. 

And from my point of view, equipping and resourcing the Guard 

and Reserve as an operational reserve is not merely a logistical activity or a convenience for auditing purposes, economically or otherwise, but as a change in doctrine, fundamental doctrine, that deserves a much more extended conversation than we have had, inasmuch as virtually no conversation at all. And this hearing today I 

hope will provide at least some basis for that conversation because 
2 

of the nature of the requirements associated with the change in direction in terms of equipment. 

The old strategic reserve model assumed very few mobilizations 

and assumed risk with inadequate equipping strategies, in my estimation. The change to an operational reserve status, coincident 

with the re-organization of the Army, has greatly increased the 

amount of equipment that the Guard and Reserve units are required to have, required not by us or a doctrine, per se, but required by the elements of the deployments to which the Guard and 

Reserve have been assigned, and are likely to be assigned in the 

near and distant future. 

While the Department is making improvements and progress in 

providing adequate funding to equip the National Guard to enhance its role as an operational reserve, there are a significant 

number of units that do not have the required equipment. Sustaining this funding and having the necessary transparency and accountability to the equipment, however, remains a challenge. 

That is a very mild way of saying that, while I think the Guard 

and Reserve can pretty well—and has pretty well calculated what 

its needs are, what its requirements are in terms of equipment, 

personnel, and training, I can’t say the same for the Pentagon in 

terms of being able to even account for what it has done to this 

point. There have been tens-of-billions-of-dollars of additional funding over the baseline pre-change in doctrine, but whether that has 

trickled down to the Guard and Reserve is not an open question. 

I believe that the record shows that it has not. The billions have 

dissipated, but not into the capacity of the Guard and Reserve to 

either have the equipment, have the personnel to complete training 

standards, let alone prepared to be deployed and redeployed. 

So the purpose of today’s hearing is to get a straightforward assessment of the equipment needs of the Army National Guard and 

Air National Guard now, and in the context that these components 

are to be there as an operational reserve. 

The witnesses have been asked to lay out what equipment levels 

their organizations are required to have, how these requirements 

have changed, as well as what equipment levels they actually have 

on hand. 

General Carpenter and General Wyatt have also been asked to 

provide their views on the adequacy of the fiscal year 2009 budget 

and, to the extent possible, given the constraints that prevail in the 

Pentagon today, to the extent possible the 2010 budget request for 

equipping their elements. And we have also asked our witnesses to 

be prepared to provide a status of equipment readiness. 

Just having the equipment on paper or in reality does not necessarily coincide with the readiness component. There you have to 

include personnel as well as whether or not we are counting reset 

and depot or originated equipment, et cetera. 

So with that in mind, that is quite a task. There obviously are 

many elements that the military considers when it judges a unit 

combat-ready, equipment being key to it. 

Compared to other measures of readiness, equipment readiness 

is fairly straightforward. Either you have the equipment you need 

or you don’t. Without the right type and amounts of equipment, 

even the most dedicated and experienced soldier or airman cannot 
3 

train for combat or provide adequate assistance when there is a domestic emergency. 

So for a variety of reasons that today’s hearing I hope will explore, the number of units in the National Guard that can report 

that they are at the highest level of equipment readiness has declined, at least in the judgment of the committee to this point. And 

it has declined since 2001. 

We also learned this week that this continues to be a problem 

for the entire Army. It is not just the National Guard that is having this difficulty. And while most Guard units deployed overseas 

have all the equipment they require, many of those units don’t get 

all that equipment until just before deployment, in some cases after 

they deploy, and whether or not this constitutes the kind of readiness that you feel as commanders are required is another question 

I hope you will explore. 

At a minimum, it makes training to deploy difficult. Given the 

operational reserve equipage model, a large percentage of non-deployed Army National Guard units are far below Army standards 

for equipment on hand in terms of the statistics that I have seen 

to this juncture. 

In addition, the Army National Guard forces that deployed to 

Iraq in 2002 and 2004 left much of their equipment in-theater for 

follow-on forces to use if that was, in fact, able to be done. I know 

you could leave it, but whether it was usable is another story. It 

is unclear whether that equipment will be replaced, and I hope you 

will be able to speak to the question of whether it was usable, or 

to the degree it was usable, and for how long. 

This is particularly an important question, gentlemen, because 

we are now talking of redeploying forces and equipment to Afghanistan and perhaps other areas adjacent to Afghanistan. 

Aging aircraft continue to be a critical issue for the Air National 

Guard. The Air National Guard aircraft are, on average, 28 years 

old, with the KC–135 tankers, need I say, averaging 48 years at 

this stage. 

If the problems of equipment shortages and aging equipment persist, National Guard units, while dedicated and willing—and I take 

that as a stipulation we will have no trouble in sustaining—no 

matter how dedicated and willing, they may simply not be able to 

adequately respond to domestic emergencies, let alone trade in for 

combat. 

And I don’t want to underplay the domestic emergencies. You 

don’t have to think of Katrina as being only a once-in-a-lifetime 

proposition to think about what domestic emergencies constitute— 

tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes. I suppose we are going to get 

the locusts soon. 

At least what this new president is facing, that seems to be next. 

When you are re-naming flu, you know that you are at the crisis 

stage. 

No amount of dedication or desire or willpower can overcome a 

lack of transportation, communication and construction equipment 

when a National Guard unit is trying to help people hit by one of 

those tornados or those hurricanes or floods, et cetera. 

Congress has not hesitated in trying to address the equipment 

readiness shortfalls. For purposes of the record and for those who 
4 

are new members to the committee, this subcommittee, and subsequently the full committee, was instrumental in seeing a reallocation of funding, close to $1 billion, in the last go-round, a reallocation within the Army of funds that could not usefully be spent in 

certain areas of research and development. 

We were able to get that money transferred to the National 

Guard. But that was, in my judgment, the proverbial drop in the 

bucket compared to what was needed, but we were happy, nonetheless, to get at least that amount of money over to you. 

So we have tried to address the readiness equipment shortfall, and since 2001, then, the Congress has provided almost $11 billion 

above what was in the previous administration’s budget for funding—$50 billion altogether has been provided for equipment since 

2001. 

On the surface, that seems like an awful lot. But as I have indicated in the previous portion of my remarks, I hope you can account for where that $50 billion went, because I don’t see much of 

it showing up in your immediate equipment account. We provided $2 billion—Congress, that is to say, has provided $2 

billion to the Guard and Reserve in a separate dedicated funding 

account over the past two years. Again, please forgive me. Those 

of you who have been on the committee for a long time, you are 

well aware of that. 

But as I say, we have new members here, and the public may 

not be entirely aware of what we are doing. That is the reason for 

the length and the depth of these remarks. 

I say to both of you gentlemen not because I don’t expect that 

you know it, but I want to make sure that it is on the record and 

people who may be observing are fully informed. So we have put 

$2 billion in a separate dedicated funding account, and I have an 

idea that we are going to have to do a lot more of that upcoming. 

So this funding has enjoyed sustained bipartisan support both on 

this committee and throughout the Congress. I want to commend 

Mr. LoBiondo in particular for his attention in these areas. And I 

can tell you that it is good to have people on the committee who 

have sustained their interest over a long period of time, as he has. 

So we made some progress then in terms of funding and re-organization, but I am hoping that, as a result of the testimony today, 

we are going to have the foundation to be able to come into this 

next defense bill and really concentrate on Guard and Reserve requirements, using equipment as the taking-off point for what we 

do. 

So what we want to find out today, then, is exactly how equipment funding that has been provided has been used to address 

equipment shortfalls. Where did the money go? What progress has 

been made on improving visibility of tracking equipment requirements through budget preparation and review? 

That is what we have to do right now. You can be very helpful 

to us today. We have to be able to tell the committee as a whole, 

and then the appropriators and the Congress as a whole, exactly 

what we need to do to see to it that the Guard and Reserve are 

prepared to do what we have been requiring them to do up till now, 

and I have no doubt are going to require of them in the immediate 

future. 
5 

We need to be able to know what the funding allocation should 

be and, ultimately, how we should direct the distribution of equipment, if necessary, in the defense bill itself. 

We want to know why equipment readiness rates continue to remain very low for many non-deployed units despite significant additional funds having been provided. No sense in us just putting 

the money out there, both authorized and appropriated, if it is not 

really getting to you in a way that proves useful. So, for example, how much of the $50 billion in funding since 

2001 has actually been used to provide additional equipment for 

you in a way that is useful and immediate? Has the funding been 

used for the intended purposes, or has it dissipated? 

Regardless of what the reasoning is, or was, has it been dissipated? And finally, then, for the 2010 budget, what needs to be 

done by this subcommittee, our full committee and the Congress, 

to address this problem either through legislation or funding? 

I am grateful to you and to the members for this rather extended 

commentary at the beginning. I don’t generally want to do it. But 

I thought it was so important that we have on the record, both for 

the new members and the public, exactly what was at stake that 

I took a little bit more time than I ordinarily would have liked. 

And with that in mind, I am looking forward to the commentary 

and observations of my good friend and someone who has the longterm perspective on what this is about, because even though I have 

mentioned Mr. LoBiondo favorably, I can tell you that Roscoe Bartlett was on this issue. 

I remember, very, very well when I was sitting way down at the 

other end of this podium now, and in fact, I think it was probably 

Curt Weldon and Roscoe Bartlett that first brought to everybody’s 

attention on the committee what the implications for the National 

Guard and Reserve might be way back in the early 1990’s. 

Roscoe. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this hearing. 

And to our witnesses, welcome. And thank you very much for 

your service to our country, and we are happy you are with us 

today. 

The Army National Guard predates the founding of our Nation 

and a standing military by almost a century and a half, and is 

therefore the oldest component of the United States Armed Forces. 

America’s first permanent militia regiment among the oldest continuing units in history, were organized by the Massachusetts Bay 

Colonies 1636. Since that time, the Guard has participated in every 

U.S. conflict to include current deployment in support of Operation 

Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Today’s National Guard and Reserve personnel continue the long 

tradition of protecting our Nation, and they do so in a magnificent 

manner. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the National Guard is no 

longer considered a strategic reserve. It is now considered an operational reserve. 
6 

From an equipment perspective, I absolutely agree that, if we are 

going to continue to expect so much from our Reserve forces, then 

we not only must—not only must we properly equip them, but we 

must equip them with modern equipment. Army National Guard 

equipment funding has increased substantially since the late 

1990’s, where it was in the hundreds-of-millions-of-dollars to billions-of-dollars today. 

To be fair, the Army has made significant progress in equipping 

the Army National Guard, but more progress is needed. For example, in the early 2000s, the Guard had approximately 1,500 medium tactical vehicles. Today, almost 10,000. 

While I certainly support the increasing equipment funding, I 

have two concerns. First although equipping accounts have increased, they have increased as a result of supplemental appropriation bills. The supplementals go away, we must ensure that the 

National Guard continues to get proper funding in the base budget. 

Second, given the tremendous increase in funding for the Guard, 

Congress and our Chairman has really emphasized the importance 

of this—was that full transparency into how the Guard requirements are being met and clear processes in place in order to know 

where all this equipment is going. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I want 

to thank you again, for your service to our country and for appearing before us this afternoon. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. And for the record, 

you were not there originally, were you, when that was first 

formed? I know—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. My father was. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. All right. 

So we will go to the panel now, and then go to questions. And 

we are going to do the questions in, I think it is reverse order of 

seniority today. But without objection, all witnesses’ prepared 

statements will be included in the hearing record, so you need not 

read it word for word. And if you care to summarize and-or respond, even in part to some of the opening remarks, please do so. 

And with that, I think we will go right to General Carpenter. 

And welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RAYMOND W. CARPENTER, ARNG, 

ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 

General CARPENTER. Thank you, Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member Bartlett and members of the committee for the opportunity for us to appear before you today. It is my honor and distinct pleasure to represent some 366,000 Army National Guardsmen, many of who are on point for our Nation as we speak today 

in this hearing. 

I also have the pleasure of representing my retiring boss, soon 

to be retired boss, Lieutenant General Vaughn. I refer to him as 

a plain-speaking Missouri Guardsman, and to his credit, I think 

that he can take credit for a lot of what has happened here in the 

Army National Guard here in the past four years over his tenure. 

If you will indulge me for a moment, sir, I would like to recognize 

someone that is sitting directly behind me. And that recognition is 
7 

in commitment to the service and willingness of the great sacrifices 

on behalf of our Nation that the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) 

in the Army and the Army National Guard make on a daily basis. 

The Secretary of the Army has established 2009 as the Year Of 

The NCO. The U.S. Army’s Non-Commissioned Officer Corps has 

distinguished itself as one of the world’s most accomplished group 

of military professionals. 

With me today is Staff Sergeant Marquez. She is a member of 

the NCO Corps of the Army National Guard. She joined the California Guard in 2000 at the age of 17. In 2004, she deployed to 

Camp Victory in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. She is currently a Virginia National Guardsman and, by the way, served in 

support of—most recently in support of the inauguration. 

She is an NCO, Operations NCO in our operations division here 

in the Army National Guard. She has been married for a little over 

two months. She married a Marine Corps staff Sergeant, Sean 

Jeanus, who is currently deployed into Afghanistan. So, sir, I would 

like to have Sergeant Marquez stand and be recognized for her 

service as an NCO in the Army and the Army National Guard. 

[Applause.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Sergeant Marquez, aloha, and welcome. And 

I see you are still smiling. Two months of marriage, and you are 

not quitting yet. Good for you. 

Sergeant MARQUEZ. It is perfect, sir. He is gone. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. There are some people that wish the same 

thing about us. 

General CARPENTER. Sir, thank you for your introductory remarks. We believe you are right on target. 

Over the last four years, the Army, the Army National Guard 

and the Army Reserve has set about the task of equipping the Reserve components and hopefully moving closer to what we call an 

operational reserve. And frankly, in many cases, that isn’t an operational reserve. It is a strategic reserve on steroids, as my boss 

likes to refer to it. 

We have been fortunate to have been the recipients of generous 

equipment funding that has been provided by this committee by 

Congress, and NGREA, National Guard Reserve Equipment Account, has been part and parcel and key to that equipping piece. 

We have used that account specifically to buy what we call Critical 

Dual-Use equipment, CDU equipment, and that equipment, by definition, is equipment that can be used in the war fight and can also 

be used for emergencies and disasters for our homeland defense 

and security mission. 

We have seen some great strides here in equipping the Army National Guard. You may have read recently where the Secretary of 

Defense made some remarks in a number of war college locations 

a couple weeks ago. And one of the remarks that he made was that 

the Army National Guard had 70 percent of its equipment prior to 

9/11, and we are striving to get back to 70 percent as we move forward. 

But the difference is is that the type of equipment we had prior 

to 9/11 was, for the most part, cascaded equipment that came from 

the Army, not modernized, and much of it not deployable. To the 

Army’s credit and to this committee’s credit, we will retire our last 
8 

Huey helicopter this year. We have had that helicopter in our inventory for four decades. 

And through the funding and process and modernization, that 

helicopter has been replaced by the Black Hawk helicopter and the 

light utility helicopter (LUH). And again, the success of that is 

those Huey helicopters will be gone from our inventory this year. 

We have seen the deuce-and-a-half, the 2.5-ton truck that was 

the main staple for us in the Army National Guard for many years, 

will be retired out of our inventory by the year 2012. We have seen 

M60 machine guns, which is the legacy machine guns, transition 

to the M240 machine guns, the modernized version, and we will 

have those make up the bulk of our inventory by the close of this 

year. 

The vehicular radio component (VRC–12) radio, which again is a 

Vietnam legacy radio, has been retired out of our inventory. So 

there have been some great strides made in the modernization 

piece for us as we go forward into the 21st century here and support not just the war fight, but also support our emergency and disaster mission. And that is critical to us. 

Sir, as you know, courtesy of the recent storms in Hawaii, Hawaii Guardsmen responded to that, and they were on duty for almost a month in support of the citizens of Hawaii. In the Kentucky 

ice storm, we had soldiers—the entire Kentucky National Guard 

was mobilized and responded to that particular disaster. We had 

soldiers who came back from the 39th Brigade from Arkansas, got 

off the airplane, and in a relatively short period of time were assisting the citizens of Arkansas in that particular disaster. 

And so, in the National Guard, our responsibility is to be able 

to fight tonight, and that fight is in the homeland. And that homeland mission has to do with responding to the needs of our citizens 

in emergencies and disasters, whether it happens to be a storm in 

Hawaii, a flood in North Dakota, a fire in California, or a hurricane 

in the hurricane states of Mississippi, Texas and Louisiana. 

So, where are the holes at with regard to our equipping process 

right now? We have made, as I mentioned, huge strides, but we 

still have some work to do in the truck fleet, both in modernization 

and in filling the holes, battle command equipment, and a lot of the 

combat service support equipment we still have a requirement. 

Whether it be generators, material handling equipment, water purification systems, and even tactical ambulance that serve both a 

homeland mission and a war fight mission, these requirements remain unfilled in many cases. 

You discussed briefly transparency. That has been a huge issue 

for us in the Army National Guard. And I think a little bit of that 

had to do with the frustration of what you just described in that 

money was appropriated, but we didn’t see a response immediately 

with regard to the equipment that came to the National Guard. 

Part of that has to do with the process that it takes in terms of 

equipment acquisition. Many times, the appropriation was at the 

end of the fiscal year, and it takes, in some cases, up to two and 

a half years to acquire some of these pieces of equipment, especially the more complex modernized truck fleet and some of the helicopters. 
9 

So even though the appropriation was, for instance, in a 2007 

budget, we may not have seen, or may not see that piece of equipment in our inventory til perhaps mid–2009 or perhaps even as 

late as 2010. 

And so the frustration was how do we keep track of what was 

appropriated and what was showing up in our bullpens and our vehicle storage areas in the Army National Guard? And as my boss 

is likened to say, he said, ‘‘It is like writing a check for $100 in 

2007 and then asking what did I buy in 2009,’’ and you can’t get 

an answer. 

Well, thankfully, transparency has become a huge issue and has 

received a lot of emphasis. The Army has put forth a great effort 

in conjunction with the Reserve components in the Army National 

Guard, and we have a pilot program that involves 75 percent of the 

money that was appropriated in 2007, 2008 and 2009. And the effort here is to try and at least reconstruct what we can from those 

previous years’ appropriations to identify what we think we have 

received and what we have yet to receive. 

That pilot is to report out in July, and that pilot should give us 

a little bit of an indicator of exactly where we are at. We are pretty 

confident that it is headed in the right direction. It is not there yet, 

and I would encourage you to continue to ask questions about 

transparency as we go forward. 

But suffice to say the Army and the Army National Guard and 

the Army Reserve have made great strides in the right direction 

to account for the appropriated dollars that you all have been generous enough to make sure that that National Guard has the 

equipment that we are supposed to have. 

The reset piece you mentioned earlier, our issue is to try and 

make sure that the equipment that comes back to us in fact is 

functional and operational. And to that extent, we have 15 brigade 

combat teams and 131 other units in the Army National Guard 

that require reset in fiscal year 2009. Right now, there is money 

programmed for us to be able to do that reset. It just needs to stay 

on track and to ensure that we have the funding for the work that 

has to be accomplished. 

You also mentioned the equipment that was left behind in Iraq 

in 2003, 2004, 2005. Honestly, the reason that equipment was left 

behind, because it was the most modernized equipment that the 

Army National Guard had. And that was the reason why—it was 

the kind of equipment that was needed to continue the war fight 

over there. This is separate from the battle losses and the damaged 

equipment that we saw with regard to our units. 

The amount of equipment that we left behind, the estimated 

value was somewhere around $3 billion. We received an appropriation of $1.7 billion to offset that, and we continue to work with the 

Army in terms of identification of what the requirement is and the 

future funding to replace that equipment. 

Suffice to say, we still have a ways to go, and we are working 

through that. Our biggest concern, however, is what happens in Afghanistan, because we are about to face the same situation. We 

have a landlocked country where it is very expensive to haul the 

equipment in and out, and it makes more sense to leave equipment 

there. 
10 

And so we just need to make sure that there is a proper accounting for the Army National Guard equipment that we are required 

to leave behind in Afghanistan. And again, we are working with 

the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) to figure out the 

correct process and compliance with DOD instruction 1225.6 to 

meet that requirement. 

Sir, that concludes my opening remarks. Thank you for indulging 

me with my NCO introduction. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Carpenter can be found in 

the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

General Wyatt, welcome and aloha to you. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HARRY M. WYATT III, ANG, DIRECTOR 

OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD 

General WYATT. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member Bartlett and members 

of the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you 

today representing the men and women of the Air National Guard, 

some 106,752 strong. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your comments opening the meeting 

today, and I would agree right on target. I also enjoyed the comment of Ranking Member Bartlett on the history of the National 

Guard. Thank you for recognizing the age of our institution. 

Along those lines, if I could share a little history also with you, 

sir, in 1909, the U.S. Army Signal Corps purchased the world’s 

first military aircraft, the Wright Military Flyer, for $30,000. One 

hundred years have passed, and our aviation equipment has become more reliable, lethal, complex and, unfortunately, costly. 

Even so, I cannot imagine our world today—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, General Wyatt, excuse me. Was 

there a protest at the time? 

General WYATT. No, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And did the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) get into it? 

General WYATT. I think there was only one manufacturer at the 

time, so probably not. 

Even so, I cannot imagine our world today had that event 100 

years ago not taken place. As we meet today, your Air National 

Guard airmen are proudly and admirably protecting skies with 

more than 3,000 members and 16 of 18 air sovereignty alert sites. 

They are ready to respond to disasters like hurricanes, tornadoes 

and fires that the chairman referenced earlier. 

They are volunteering at unprecedented rates to support worldwide contingencies. And the backbone of our force, our traditional 

Guard members, are providing a critical surge capability for our 

Air Force. 

Our Air National Guard airmen would not be able to do any of 

this without the support that we have received from you, Chairman 

Abercrombie, and the members of this committee. Through your 

support of the National Guard and Reserve equipment appropriation, we have been able to seamlessly integrate into the total Air 

Force while providing critical capabilities to the Nation’s governors. 
11 

Our top issues—I think these come as no surprise to the committee. First of all, modernize and recapitalize the aging Air National Guard fleet of aircraft to bridge the gap in mid-term Air 

Force capability and long-term expeditionary viability. An aging 

fleet requires more maintenance, which is one of our core competencies. 

But it also requires more parts and more fuel. All eat away at 

already stressed readiness accounts, and perhaps some of that goes 

to answer the Chairman’s question on declining readiness. 

If we do nothing to accelerate our recapitalization, you can expect 

more safety issues, perhaps more failed inspections, less combat capability, and mission gaps. It is essential that Air National Guard 

recapitalization and modernization occur proportionately, concurrently, and in parallel with the total Air Force. Otherwise, mission 

gaps will cascade across our force, leaving many Air National 

Guard units without a mission. 

Our Air National Guard aircraft are, on average, 28 years old. 

F–15s are 29 years old, C–5s are 36 years old, KC–135s, 48 years 

old, as the chairman referenced. And if the F–16 fleet is not recapitalized soon, 80 percent will begin to reach the end of their service 

life in less than 8 years. 

You are well aware of the challenges that the U.S. Air Force has 

in modernizing and recapitalizing its fighter and refueling fleets. 

We have been working closely with the Air Force in their planning. 

But to date, there are no firm plans to replace the Air National 

Guard F–15 and F–16 fleets currently protecting our skies. 

Past history would show that usually, when the Air Force recapitalizes its fleet, there is available for cascade legacy aircraft, or 

older aircraft, to the Air National Guard. That is no longer an option, as many of the aircraft in the active duty fleet are approaching the same ages as those in the Air National Guard. It is just 

that the Air National Guard has a greater percentage, and our aircraft are older. 

Because of the characteristics of the Reserve component, our 

part-time force, it is essential that equipment changes be planned 

well in advance, a lesson learned during the base realignment and 

closure (BRAC) processes. Over the last several years, Congress 

has been very helpful in supporting the Air National Guard’s Active Electronically Scanned Array, the AESA radar, modernization 

program. This program allows us to meet today’s threats and 

bridge capabilities to the next generation of fighter aircraft. 

AESA is important to improve both capability and sustainment. 

Recently, a Cessna 172 was stolen in Canada. That entered the 

U.S. through Canada, and entered U.S. airspace in a—had it entered in a high-traffic area, such as New York, it would have been 

very difficult for the older F–16s with their older radar to find, 

identify and track it with the equipment that they have on board 

today. 

The aging KC–135 fleet, which was used from Alabama in this 

intercept, is an issue that the Chairman has referenced. But in addition to the aircraft, we need to recognize that Air Sovereignty 

Alert (ASA) and many of the things that the Air National Guard 

does here in the United States of America is a system of systems, 

and all of the systems, each piece of those systems, shows its age. 
12 

As we equip our Air National Guard, we have to keep in mind 

the essential 10 capabilities that our governors need available to 

handle present and future threats. The National Guard Bureau is 

committed to the fundamental principle that each and every state 

and territory must possess these 10 core capabilities for homeland 

readiness. 

We want to ensure that every governor has each of these 10 essential capabilities: command and control, civil support teams, engineering assets, communications, ground transportation, aviation, 

medical, security forces, logistics and maintenance. We continue to 

leverage approximately 98 percent of the equipment within the Air 

National Guard as critical dual-use equipment to make certain that 

these capabilities are available for not only the combatant commanders in our Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotations, but also 

the governors. 

Our expeditionary combat support capability has allowed our Air 

Force to sustain critical support to overseas contingency operations. 

We cannot allow their readiness and availability to degrade because of equipment challenges. 

Some of the examples include our security forces have a shortage 

of weapons due to depot delays. Our communication networks need 

modernization. Civil engineers have shortfall of depot-funded emergency management equipment. And our 1950’s vintage deployable 

air traffic control radars face significant challenges in procuring 

and replacing vintage test equipment and parts. 

These shortages affect not only our readiness for war, but our 

readiness to respond to domestic crisis. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time and support of our Air 

National Guard, and I stand ready to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in the 

Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, General Wyatt. 

We will go to questions in reverse order of seniority, with this observation: General Carpenter, Secretary Gates may take some comfort, or measure of comfort, in the observation about 70 percent 

equipment being available as compared to 9/11. I don’t take comfort 

in that at all. That is what he has got to stretch for to try and come 

with a ‘‘positive’’ statement. 

We have a real serious problem. Almost a decade has passed 

since then. That doesn’t take into account recapitalization and 

modernization or what the status of the equipment was at that 

point pre-9/11. I only need to reference General Wyatt’s last comment about radar equipment, let alone parts. And then, we are 

only at 70 percent. 

So I think I am not—I suppose that was meant to comfort us, 

but it has had the opposite reaction on me. You needn’t comment 

on it. I am just making that observation. 

And we will move to Congressman Wilson, to be followed by Congressman Kissell, and then Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And General Carpenter, General Wyatt, thank you very much for 

being here. I am really proud of both your service, and the Guard 

in general. As a 31-year veteran of the Army National Guard, I 

have really never been prouder of what the Guard’s doing. 
13 

As I visit, the professionalism, the competence, capabilities, the 

dedication, esprit de corps has never been higher. I also am particularly grateful that my former brigade, the 218th Brigade, completed last year, a year serving in Afghanistan. 

And I can report to you that my former colleagues are just so 

grateful for what they see as an opportunity to defeat the terrorists 

overseas to protect American families at home. And I am just so 

proud of what they have done. 

And then, I am particularly grateful that my oldest son served 

in Iraq with the field artillery. He is now Judge Advocate General 

(JAG). My third son is a signal officer with the Army Guard, and 

he has just transferred to logistics. And then, our fourth son just 

joined the Army National Guard. He is simultaneous drilling with 

Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC). 

And I know the reason that they joined, and I did have one son 

off-track. He is a doctor in the Navy who served in Iraq. But the 

reason that my wife was successful training these guys to do well 

is because we would meet Guard members at Army or wherever, 

and my sons were impressed by the people they met and wanted 

to serve with. 

And I do have to point out, with the Air Guard, I was honored 

to be on a delegation for the 64th anniversary of the invasion at 

Iwo Jima. And General Wyatt, you would be very proud that, as 

we were coming into the Japanese air station, they had one picture 

taped to the window, and it was an F–16 of the Swamp Fox Squadron, Air National Guard McEntire Joint Air Base, signed by Dean 

Pennington. And so you are appreciated around the world. 

I also want to point out how much the people of South Carolina 

depend and appreciate on the Guard for our annual concern that 

we have about hurricanes. And so the Guard has just been instrumental for evacuation, for recovery relief, and tornadoes. And then, 

General, you mentioned ice storms. On the rare occasion that we 

have snow or ice, the National Guard is there. 

As I point this out, the equipment is always a concern. And I appreciated that you pointed out, General Carpenter, that there was 

the cascaded equipment, and that is what I used. And it was pretty 

good, but having served at the National Training Center nine years 

ago, I am very pleased that we have modern equipment now. Everything has been superseded by multiple generations of much better equipment. 

But as we have equipment that is declared excess in Iraq or anywhere in the theater, do our adjutant generals have the ability to 

try to put in a bid for this? 

General CARPENTER. First of all, sir, thank you very much for 

your service. The 218th Brigade, as you probably remember, we 

shared their farewell ceremony as they left to do the Task Force 

Phoenix mission in Afghanistan. And they were in a particular situation where the mission was being expanded from not just mentoring the Afghan National Army, but mentoring the Afghan National Police. And they just did an absolutely great job, and we are 

very proud of their service at a national level also. 

With regard to your—excuse me, sir, what was your question 

again? 
14 

Mr. WILSON. The question would be as to equipment that could 

be declared excess, do our adjutant generals have the ability to at 

least make the request? 

General CARPENTER. Sir, I have been involved in a couple of the 

sessions with regard to what is the strategy for equipment as we 

see the off-ramping in Iraq. And the Army’s position across the 

board is that, if the equipment is not excess, the Army is adamant—and that means excess both to the Army and the Army National Guard across the entire Army—if it is not excess, we want 

it brought home, and we want it—if it is in some state that can 

be repaired, absolutely. And that equipment then is scheduled for 

distribution back to the Army units and back to the Army National 

Guard units, sir. So that is the position. 

Now, understanding that what happens on the ground over there 

is going to be dictated by the situation, but, for the most part, that 

is the going in rule here as we off-ramp and deal with the equipment that is in Iraq. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You have one minute, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. And a proverbial problem is maintenance of armories. And so often, that is dependent upon state general assemblies 

and state government funding. What can be done to help back up 

the proverbial ‘‘leaking roofs’’ of armories? Is there a plan to help 

fund renovation of armories? 

General CARPENTER. Sir, the Army National Guard received up- wards of $200 million in the economic stimulus package recently, 

and that package was designed specifically to deal with those kinds 

of things, what we call maintenance and repair as well as environment upgrades for lighting, heating and those kinds of utility efforts there. So it is not going to solve the problem entirely, but we 

understand the requirement, and we continue to make the case to 

the Army. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Mr. Kissell, five minutes. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Generals, for being here, but I especially want 

to recognize Sergeant Marquez for your service and just recognition 

that NCOs are certainly the backbone of the service. And thank 

you so much, and congratulations on your marriage. And hopefully 

you will get together here pretty soon. 

The service that the Guard provides us is so important. On April 

the 14th, I had the opportunity to be in Fayetteville, North Carolina, to watch the 30th Heavy Tactical Brigade deploy, 4,000 soldiers, West Virginia, Colorado, but mostly from North Carolina. 

And I watched those men and women getting ready to go serve our 

country was just a special moment. 

We worry about trying to figure out how to fight the next war 

instead of the last war. And I worry, based upon what we are looking at today in this hearing, that we may be trying to get ready 

to fight the next war using the last war’s equipment, or no equipment at all. 

As we look at these percentages, and we can get lost in percentages, but how much—what percentage of the equipment do we 

need, do we have now to train with? And roughly what percentage 
15 

of that would be modern equipment that would actually be something they could expect to use in theater? 

General CARPENTER. Sir, from the Army National Guard, right 

now, the fill of equipment across the formations in the Army National Guard is 76 percent. Now, of that 76 percent, 13 percent of 

it is either deployed, in reset, or being prepared to deploy. And so 

available to the governors right now is 63 percent of all the equipment. 

The subset, the critical dual-use equipment I talked to earlier, 

there is 65 percent of that equipment available for the Army National Guard and the governors for use in the homeland mission. 

Our goal is to get to 100 percent fill on the critical dual-use equipment. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, General. Just for everybody’s information, you are talking about critical dual-use at this stage, 

right? 

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir. Critical dual-use equipment, the 

governors have in hand right now 65 percent as an average across 

all the states. And so there is still 35 percent of that equipment 

that is not available for them. 

We are over our end strength of 100 percent. And so if you call 

a unit, like the 30th out of North Carolina, for instance, for an 

emergency and disaster mission and they have only got 65 percent 

of their equipment and 100 percent of their soldiers, it leaves you 

asking the question, what capability do you not have by not having 

that other 35 percent of the equipment. 

So we do have those percentages available for use. Now, in the 

case of the 30th, when they got ready to deploy and went through 

the mobilization process, they were filled to 100 percent of the requirement that they needed to deploy overseas. And by the way, 

they go on mission in Iraq mid-month, and we are very proud of 

their accomplishments. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You still have a minute and a half. 

General WYATT. Do you want me to answer that from the air? 

Yes, sir. 

The Air National Guard has been, I think of all the seven Reserve components, has probably been integrated and resourced by 

our parent service perhaps a little bit better than the other Reserve 

components. We have been rotating overseas with the Air Force 

and AEF rotation since the early 1990’s. 

But when we talk about the critical-use equipment, you are 

right. The percentages are a little misleading because, in the Air 

National Guard side, even though our percentages are higher, 84 

percent across the country of our critical-use equipment, dual-use 

equipment, a lot of that is very old. 

Forty percent of our vehicles are past their service life, and it is 

only due to the great maintenance competencies of the Air National 

Guard that we are able to keep those vehicles running. The radar 

systems that we talked about earlier are old. They are decrepit, but 

because we have got some geniuses working the maintenance on 

those systems, we are able to keep them running. 

But we are at that period of time where we have just about exhausted our capabilities to keep that equipment going. The war 

fighting equipment, the jets, the deployable equipment, we are 
16 

fielded at a pretty good rate. But again, a lot of that is extremely 

old. 

We talk about some of the new emerging systems, like air support operation squadron’s tactical air control party (TACP). We 

have not yet been fielded the equipment to the levels that make 

them combat ready. And without the proper amounts of equipment, 

we can’t get them trained to the point where they can be 

deployable. 

Same thing would be true of our air operation centers (AOCs). 

We need some more training equipment to make sure that, when 

a call comes, that we are able to answer the call of our country. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, General Wyatt. 

Gentlemen, perhaps you can give us a little bit more of a breakdown of what the 65 percent, or the 45 percent means. You may 

have a full complement of pens and pencils, but you may then have 

ten percent of what you need in vehicles or rifles or whatever. 

So maybe we need a little bit more definition, if you will, as to 

how that breaks down within the percentages. As Mr. Kissell said, 

there are statistics, and then there is information. 

Mr. Hunter left, so next will be Mr. LoBiondo. I am sticking to 

the five minutes, by the way, because I am told we are going to 

have votes coming up, and it is liable to be a long series. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this hearing and for your close attention to details. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our Nation. 

General Wyatt, I was going to spend a few minutes in an opening 

statement talking about the ASA mission and the Air National 

Guard, but you did a good job, I think in your statement, covering 

this. And I, like my colleagues, and especially Mr. Wilson, are just 

amazed at the dedication and the incredible job the men and 

women of the Air Guard are performing. 

You talked about the problem with equipment, and we call it a 

fighter gap. We call it a bathtub. There are a lot of different names. 

And you articulately used the numbers of the 80 percent, the number of years and the hours, but what is the plan? We have had 

hearing after hearing, year after year, where the problem is recognized by more and more people. 

And I bothered the Chairman out in Hawaii during the break because we had gotten some additional information—and that is why 

I am especially appreciative, Mr. Chairman, of your doing this 

hearing—that we are just not getting any answers. So we are understanding the problem better, but each day, the clock ticks. 

Is there an interim buy that is planned? At what level are the 

discussions taking place? What level of comfort can we as members 

take to when we will see a plan? 

General WYATT. Mr. Abercrombie, I hope that when the budget 

is released, we will be able to give a little more detail and a little 

more fidelity to an answer. 

My concern is this: we know the problem. We have recognized 

the problem. The position of the Air National Guard is that—I 

would like to refer to it as flying a cautious formation with the 

United States Air Force. The Air Force has a recapitalization plan 

that involves fifth-generation airplanes. 
17 

We think that if the United States Air Force, depending upon the 

analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense, 

we think that the solution rests with the United States Air Force. 

If they will write the Air National Guard in to their recapitalization plan early in sufficient numbers, we can address some, but not 

all, of the fighter gap. We will rely upon a cascade of some legacy 

aircraft from the active duty Air Force to the Air National Guard 

to help with the problem. 

But we are flying a cautious wing formation in that we recognize 

that, in order for that plan to be successful, there would have to 

be sufficient numbers of jets purchased, fielded to the Air Guard 

early as opposed to the current plan, which is late. And if there are 

any delays in production or shortages of capability, we need to have 

a backup plan. 

And the Air National Guard has been, and continues, to examine 

plans such as service life extension programs (SLEP) on our F–16s 

and, to some degree, our F–15s. Not just for the airframe, which 

is the immediate problem, but if you service life extend those jets, 

you need to also consider that we use these jets not just for ASA, 

for the Air Sovereignty Alert, but they are a critical part of the Nation’s defense overseas and need to be fully integrated into the capabilities of the fifth generation. 

So as you—airplanes, you also need to improve ASA radars, sensors, gateway communication systems so that you don’t lose the 

dual use, if you will, of those jets, the ASA and the operations overseas. We are also keeping open our options to take a look at fourthgeneration fighters. 

But I would caution against a fleet separate and distinct from 

the Air Force, whichever way the Air Force decides to go. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, I certainly would agree with that. 

Can you share with us your personal opinion about an interim 

buy of 4.5-generation aircraft? I mean, is this something you would 

advocate? I know there are some folks who believe that the F–35 

ought to be the way to go, and that ought to be accelerated. Can 

you tell us what your personal beliefs would be, your personal opinion would be of the best way to solve the problem? 

General WYATT. I guess if the question were asked of me, how 

would you ensure—— 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I am asking that question. 

General WYATT. Okay. How would you ensure that the Air National Guard can continue to perform the number one mission of 

the entire Department of Defense, and that is defense of the homeland, I would tell you that the Air National Guard would do the 

mission with whatever resources we could get. 

If the Air Force’s plan does not cover the Air National Guard in 

recapitalization with fifth-generation fighters, we would turn to 

fourth-generation, 4.5-generation, as a possible alternative, recognizing that each of the options available has its pros, but it also 

has its down side, too. Service life extension programs would be an 

option. They are perhaps the cheapest option, but you never know 

what you are going to get into when you get inside of an airplane. 

And if we are going to do the service life extension programs, we 

need to consider that that product needs to get us—it would only 
18 

be a bridging mission, or a bridging aircraft, if you would, to a future capability that we would need to get into. 

When we talk about fourth-generation fighters, we need to look 

beyond the airframe cost and think about the capabilities that that 

particular jet would need not just to do the ASA mission, which is 

mission number one, but also to not lose the efficiencies that the 

Air Guard provides in doing the homeland security mission, the 

ASA mission, but also the overseas fight. 

So if we do fourth generation buys, we would need to do that in 

conjunction with taking a look at the capability that a AESA radar 

offers, that the gateway communications comm, data link, making 

sure that the fourth-generation buy is compatible with the weapons 

systems of the fifth-generation fighter. And when you stack all of 

those together, we need to take a hard look at the cost of that platform and how it would compare to fifth-generation platforms. 

And a lot of that depends upon how many of the fourth-gen, how 

many of the fifth-gen fighters you would buy, because they are dependent—the price is dependent upon the total number. So it is a 

difficult question to answer without knowing where the Air Force 

is going and without knowing the current budget situation and how 

that will affect the fifth-generation buy. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. When the budget then—and Mr. Gates’ presentation—which is imminent—is presented, could you reconsider 

your answer and then send it on to Mr. LoBiondo and to the subcommittee? 

General WYATT. I would be happy to, sir, with a little more fidelity to where the Department of Defense is going, yes, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 45.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You have got the question in mind? 

General WYATT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. And same, General Carpenter, if you 

have anything that you could add once Mr. Gates’ proposal comes 

forward in the context that Mr. LoBiondo established, okay? 

We will go to Mr. Kratovil now, to be followed by Mr. Coffman 

and Ms. Tsongas. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today, and 

again, for your service to our country. 

General Wyatt, I want to ask you a question that is a particular 

concern in Maryland. As you know, Maryland’s eight C–130’s are 

being relocated, and Maryland and five other states were slated to 

receive the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), but recent reports at least 

seem to indicate that that may not happen. 

What is the plan for the National Guard in terms of maintaining 

the capability of Maryland and those other states if, in fact, that 

comes to fruition? 

General WYATT. The situation in Maryland is that they are one 

of the states that is scheduled to receive the Air National Guard 

component of the Joint Cargo Aircraft as it currently exists. And 

I don’t know what the future will hold. I haven’t seen any announced details. But the existing plan program is for the Air National Guard to get 24 of the JCA. Four of those would be bedded 

down in Maryland at Martin State. 
19 

If that does not happen, we would look to, first of all, find some 

sort of bridge mission for the unit to keep the competencies of the 

pilots and the maintenance crews intact as long as possible. That 

is a perishable skill. 

And my concern, whether that is in the context of JCA or the 

fighter bathtub or tankers, if we don’t have iron on the ramp for 

these units to fly, we will lose those treasures, if you will, because 

it takes a lifetime—it takes a generation to develop the skills, the 

expertise, the maturity of the Air National Guard. 

If we lose a platform at a particular location for a period of time, 

the unit atrophies. There is a possibility of other emerging missions 

that we could lay into Maryland, but without the acquisition of any 

additional iron, it might not be a flying mission. And when you lose 

those skill sets, it will literally take you a generation to develop it 

back to the level that it currently is. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. What would some of those bridge missions be? 

What are some of the likely possibilities? 

General WYATT. We are seeing a continued demand in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. We are 

seeing a continued demand in cyber. I think that is an area of 

great expansion: Irregular warfare. We are taking a look at different capabilities and perhaps platforms that might be attractive 

or necessary to fulfill our requirement for the United States Air 

Force. 

The demand for capability across the Air Force exceeds the Air 

National Guard’s ability to supply that capability. We would need 

to—obviously there is a great training tail that would attach to 

that as we convert from one capability to another, and there would 

be a requirement for equipment. And if it does involve a new flying 

platform, obviously we would need the iron on the ramp for the 

folks to train. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is it. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Just before you do that, excuse me. 

Obviously we are going to have to have votes. I know Mr. Bartlett has a question he needs to ask. If it is okay, is it all right that 

we do that? Because I think this will—I don’t think we will come 

back. We appreciate you being here. If you have other questions, 

submit them to me and we will get them to both generals. 

And we are going to have another hearing. This is the preliminary. This is a hearing for the bill itself, I assure everybody. So we 

will go to Mr. Coffman, and then if it is all right, we will go to Mr. 

Bartlett, and we will close. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Carpenter, you had mentioned that when Guard units go 

to Afghanistan, that they will fall on the equipment of the unit left 

behind. And sometimes I suspect, if they are part of the buildup 

in Afghanistan that is going to be going on now, I suppose they 

may be first in with their gear, leaving their gear for—could be a 

Guard unit, could be a regular Army unit, could be an Army Reserve unit. 
20 

And you mentioned issues in accountability. What is the status 

now of Guard units? When are they going to get their gear back? 

How is that process going to work? 

General CARPENTER. The process that we have in place right now 

in Iraq is something we call theater-provided equipment. And so 

the Guard unit deploys with not the full complement of equipment, 

but falls in on a set of equipment when it gets in theater, uses that 

equipment, and then, when they leave theater, they leave that theater-provided equipment in place. 

We don’t have that large a set of what we call TPE, Theater-Provided Equipment, in Afghanistan. And by the way, the way we got 

the TPE in Iraq was for units to leave their equipment behind for 

use of the follow-on unit. 

Process for us in Afghanistan has been for a Guard unit to leave 

equipment for a Guard unit, and that has worked well. The issue 

for us, though, is that, when you transfer equipment between components, when you either leave equipment behind and lose possession of it or transfer it to an active Army unit, there is a DOD instruction called 1225.6, and that instruction requires that, before 

the equipment is transferred, that the equipment has to be directed 

to be left, and there has to be a payback plan in place, and that 

that agreement has to be signed off by the Secretary of Defense. 

We have not done any of that since the early days of Iraq, and 

frankly, we have a little ways to go in terms of putting those procedures in place. But as I mentioned earlier, we are working together 

with the Army. We think we have got a solution for this in terms 

of both the agreement and the signature by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). And so we are anxious to implement that if it is 

required. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Both General Wyatt and General Carpenter, in 

terms of aviation assets, where do you stand relative to your regular component in terms of modernization? I know, for instance, in 

the Colorado Air Guard, they are hoping to transition from the F– 

16 to the F–35. 

I have no idea where that discussion is. And I think in the Army 

Guard, I think that we still have units with Hueys, I think, UH– 

1s out in Colorado. Where do we stand in terms of modernization 

relative to our active duty component? 

General WYATT. Regarding your question in the F–35, the most 

current plan that I have seen, the official plan that the Air Force 

has on recapitalization of Air National Guard F–16 units, including 

Colorado with the F–35, has the fielding to the Air National Guard 

late to need, not coming to the Guard in time to solve the problem 

with Colorado and most of our other F–16 units. So it is late to 

need. We need to readjust the plan. 

As far as modernization, the Air National Guard has historically 

relied upon the Air Force to help us with modernization of our existing fleets. But occasionally, oftentimes, those modernization requirements aren’t funded, and we rely heavily upon the National 

Guard and Reserve equipment account appropriations to do that. 

The targeting pods that your unit has in Colorado is a great example of that. Precision munitions delivery is a requirement of the 

combatant commands (COCOMS), and historically, the Air National Guard has not been funded for targeting pods. And so we 
21 

have basically built up our fleet of targeting pods through the National Guard Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) process. 

And so we are very appreciative. That is an example of how we 

use that fund to modernize and become integrated with the active 

duty components. But I hope that answers your question, Congressman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Mr. COFFMAN. One question, Mr. Chairman. What do you mean 

by the transition from the F–16 to the F–35 too late? 

General WYATT. Yes, sir. I don’t have the waterfall charts with 

me here, but most of our F–16 units, as I said, begin to lose their 

service life over the next eight years. And the last bed-down plan 

that I have seen from the United States Air Force regarding F–35, 

other than one unit in the first four bed-down plans—OFPs, we call 

them—there is only one Air National Guard unit in there. 

The bulk of the Air National Guard recapitalization in the F–35 

occurs in the out years, approaching 2022 and thereafter. Most of 

our units age out in the 2017 to 2018 timeframe. And so most of 

our units are uncovered under their current plan. 

As I indicated at the beginning, the Air Force has the capability 

of covering that fighter gap by reworking their bed-down plan to 

include the Air National Guard earlier in the bed-down as they acquire airplanes. The numbers are extremely critical, and the rate 

of production is extremely critical. 

So we will need to see what shakes out in that regard before I 

could more fully answer your question. But right now, under the 

current Air Force plan, the Air National Guard is basically uncovered. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, right on it. 

I want to extend my gratitude to Mr. Fleming, Ms. Gifford and 

Ms. Tsongas, and we will go to Mr. Bartlett, and this will be the 

final question and observation. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief, because the 

vote clock is running. 

As I remember history, I think that the Army and the Air Force 

both expressed the need for a small in-theater cargo aircraft. A decision was made that that should be a joint procurement, and the 

Air Force, more than a bit reluctantly, was kind of pulled kicking 

and screaming into this joint procurement of the Joint Cargo Aircraft with the Army. 

Knowing that history, I was more than a bit confused when the 

Secretary in his press statement said that, from now on, that program was going to be totally an Air Force program, who didn’t 

want the program to begin with, and that the Army is going to get 

much fewer aircraft. 

My first question is, are you aware of any analysis that was done 

prior to making the decision to reduce the Army’s stated need of 

78 aircraft down to 38 aircraft? Was there a study that indicated 

that? If the answer is no, just say no. 
22 

General WYATT. You are right, sir. The requirement, as expressed by the JROC, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 

is 78 C–27s. I am not aware of any other subsequent studies. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

With the retirement of the C–23 Sherpa, without the Joint Cargo 

Aircraft to support the Guard’s mission in theater, what are you 

going to do? 

General WYATT. The Air National Guard was not part of the Air 

Force that was kicking and screaming on avoiding this mission. We 

welcome the mission, and we will do it with whatever number of 

airplanes we are allowed. 

But the question is not necessarily the color of service flying the 

airplane, but the question is how do you sustain the requirement, 

which I understand is currently 16 to 18 airplanes in theater, with 

a number less than 78. And in my opinion, you have to have 78 

airplanes, as the JROC study indicated, to sustain the number of 

airplanes anticipated to be deployed continuously in theater regardless of who is flying it and who is maintaining it. 

Mr. BARTLETT. So, without the 78, we really are going to be hardpressed to meet our needs in theater. 

Back home here, with the C–23 being retired, what are the plans 

without the C–27J to support the Guards at home, national homeland security and disaster preparedness relief missions? If we can’t 

even meet our requirements over there, is there going to be nothing 

left here? 

General CARPENTER. Sir, from an Army perspective, a couple 

items I would like to point out. 

There are 42 C–23s within the Army National Guard right now, 

and the mission is in Iraq for the C–23s right now, performing the 

responsibility of getting the cargo to the last tactical mile. And over 

the last five years, that has been exclusively an Army National 

Guard mission. 

We have hauled 180,000 soldiers, passengers, carried 62 million 

tons of cargo. And in Hurricane Katrina, we had almost all of our 

available C–23s were involved in that particular mission. 

Our concern was is that the Joint Cargo Aircraft was the modernization program for the C–23s. We expect the C–23’s lifespan to 

be over in about five years. And so we have got five years to solve 

this problem, is the bottom line, with regard to replacement for 

that capability within the United States, both in the homeland mission and in Iraq. 

It is not a pressurized aircraft, so that aircraft is not available 

for use in Afghanistan. So we have got a couple problems we have 

got to face. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you for your answers. I was more than a 

bit confused, as I stated, when the Secretary made this statement. 

And I gather that there is some concern about our ability to meet 

our commitments in the future if this aircraft is not available. 

And I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. 

Obviously, the presentation to be made by the Secretary and the 

particular elements with which you are associated is going to be 

crucial to our decision-making on the defense bill. 
23 

So if you could take today’s hearing as kind of a baseline for 

some of the answers and observations, if you could share them then 

at that point with us, we are going to send you some questions, as 

well, that have arisen as a result of this, including some from Ms. 

Giffords and others. 

And if we could get that back perhaps—not necessarily tomorrow 

or the next day, but when you have had a chance to answer them 

in the context of Mr. Gates’ presentation, then I think we will be 

able to have a very fruitful and beneficial effect on the defense bill. 

You have friends here in this subcommittee and on this committee, 

I can assure you. 

And with that, I thank you all, and we will bring the hearing to 

a close. 

[Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MAY 5, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MAY 5, 2009 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MAY 5, 2009 

(45) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

General WYATT. Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) is not solely an Air National Guard 

(ANG) mission; it is a Department of Defense responsibility and we should keep 

that in mind when discussing its future. The Air National Guard has fit well in this 

mission set because of the inherent cost effectiveness of our force. That being said, 

the ANG will ultimately accept any solution that allows us to continue supporting 

ASA and our other Air Force missions in the most effective manner possible. Specifically for the ASA mission we see two primary ways to mitigate impending capability 

shortfalls—concurrent and proportional recapitalization with fifth generation aircraft, and/or service life extension and modernization programs for our current fleet. 

Our first choice, for providing both ASA and interoperable capabilities to Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, would be to accelerate fielding in the ANG of fifth generation fighters. Our analysis predicts that if the ANG can recapitalize six units by 

FY17 we can minimize the impact of the fighter gap. While we would prefer all six 

of these units to be recapitalized by fifth generation aircraft, we recognize that 

planned procurement rates (80/year) make this unlikely. At a minimum, however, 

if three of those units were replaced with fifth generation aircraft and the remaining 

three received newer fourth generation fighters as the active component units receive the F-35, we could still provide world class capability at home and abroad with 

no interruption. 

If fifth generation recapitalization is significantly delayed, our next course of action would be to extend the life of our current fleet and modernize its sensor and 

defensive systems. The goal of such a program would be to extend the life of our 

legacy fighters to better match the procurement schedule of the F-35. The magnitude of a service life extension program would be proportional to the magnitude 

of any fifth generation delays. A minor delay might only require the Service Life 

Extension Program (SLEP) and modernization of a small portion of the fleet, while 

major delays would necessitate the—much more costly—extension and modernization of a major portion of the fleet. 

You specifically asked about my opinion with respect to a 4.5 generation solution. 

While I will not completely rule out that option, I ultimately feel that it must be 

considered only as a last resort if the previously mentioned options become impossible. As my time as an A-7 pilot—watching the Gulf War from Tulsa, Oklahoma— 

taught me, the interests of the nation are best served when the ANG and USAF 

operate and maintain the same equipment. 

Based on the current budget picture and the Air Force’s new basing process, I 

firmly believe that concurrent re-capitalization of ANG fighters with the F-35 or a 

SLEP to meet the F-35 production schedule are the most viable options. These options will offer both near-term and long-term solutions that ensure the ANG will 

have sufficient assets capable of defending the homeland and contributing to air expeditionary operations overseas. [See page 18.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MAY 5, 2009 

(49) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves noted 

that the reserve components are now an operational reserve, although the Department of Defense’s business processes and the Army’s strategies for equipping and 

staffing its reserve components are not designed to support the new operational 

roles. a. Could you comment on what changes have been made in the way the Army 

equips reserve forces to accommodate the operational role. b. What is the status of 

the Army National Guard equipment inventory? Is it worse, about the same, or better than last year, and what was the reason for the change? c. Has any progress 

been made on improving visibility of tracking equipment requirements through 

budget preparation and review, appropriations, funding allocation and ultimately in 

the distribution of new equipment? d. Do the equipping and manning strategies for 

the National Guard’s new operational role also take into consideration the strategic 

reserve role the National Guard has historically played? For example, do National 

Guard units that are not immediately deploying have sufficient equipment to perform domestic missions and serve as a strategic reserve should new global demands 

unrelated to the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan emerge? Are there reserve units dedicated to a strategic reserve role and, if so, how are they equipped? 

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. Answer 1a. Under the strategic reserve 

construct, the Army National Guard (ARNG) was equipped using tiered-readiness. 

Little equipment trickled to the ARNG during this time. Under the operational force 

construct, the ARNG is equipped in parity with other components under the cyclic 

readiness paradigm. 

Answer 1b. Army National Guard Equipment On Hand levels have increased approximately 2 percent over the past year. Although upon initial observation this 

may seem like a miniscule change in light of all of the resources provided for equipment it is not. The equipment inventory is not only being filled, but also being modernized-new equipment replacing legacy. Additionally, increased requirements due 

to a transforming and modularizing force gives the mistaken perception that the 

equipment position of the Army National Guard is not strengthening. 

Answer 1c. The Army has made great progress in this area during the past year 

and they are now tracking large programs to the level of detail necessary for full 

transparency. However, the process is currently labor intensive and more work is 

needed to automate the process and expand it to all items of equipment. Furthermore, the Army’s transparency effort uses FY09 as a baseline and there is very limited visibility of funds and equipment still in the pipeline from prior years. Therefore, it will likely be FY11 before the Director Army National Guard will be able 

to testify that he has full visibility based on budgeted programs. 

Answer 1d. The Army National Guard has indicated that in order to train effectively, support the current warfight, surge when called upon, and provide a robust 

domestic response, it is absolutely critical to be equipped to 100 percent of its Critical Dual Use equipment requirement. The Army’s new equipping strategy plans to 

procure enough equipment to fully equip all units, but recognizes that some of this 

equipment will not be available to these units due to ‘‘friction’’ (equipment in Reset, 

equipment in transit, Theater Provided Equipment, etc.). The Army National Guard 

equipping priorities have named/known deployers, CCMRF, CSA RESET Test Pilot, 

hurricane states and likely deployers at the top of the list. These units are the priority to receive equipment. Non-deploying Modified Table of Organization and 

Equipment and Table of Distribution and Allowance units will receive equipment 

distributions only after the higher priority units have been fielded equipment. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Background: To implement the Army’s transition to an expeditionary force, the Army has adopted a cyclical readiness cycle, called the Army Force 

Generation Model (ARFORGEN) intended to put National Guard units through a 

structured cycle of increasing readiness that will enable forces to be ready and available for deployment on a predictable basis—with a goal of deployment availability 

1 year out of six. The Army has yet to develop the specific training, staffing, and 

equipping standards for each phase of the model. Initially, the Army said that National Guard forces would have a minimum baseline set of equipment at all phases 

of the cycle for training and responding to domestic missions, and that additional 
50 

equipment sets would be available to units for training as they neared deployment. 

a. Has the Army identified the equipment that National Guard forces can expect 

in their baseline, training, and deployment sets of equipment? b. If not, what is the 

impact on the National Guard’s ability to train for overseas missions and respond 

to domestic emergencies? 

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. Answer 2a. The Department of the 

Army and other stakeholders have discussed the baseline equipping requirements. 

All are in agreement that 100 percent equipping is the goal, but there are realities 

in certain types of operations that bridging strategies to address shortages must be 

developed under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) umbrella to mitigate 

those shortages. No fixed equipping level has been agreed upon, but we can expect 

that with the influx of projected equipment to the Army National Guard that equipping levels will increase for each of these pools of units. 

Answer 2b. The Army National Guard has continued to support overseas contingency operation by mobilizing and deploying forces in the highest possible state of 

readiness to successfully carry out domestic and overseas missions. This is accomplished by managing and prioritizing limited resources using the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model in support of the National Military Strategy. The dual 

mission of the Army National Guard necessitates a level of continual readiness and 

employability unlike that of its active component counterparts. We have historically 

cross-leveled equipment between States to ensure that training and domestic response missions are accomplished. As our Equipment On Hand (EOH) improves, 

cross-leveling actions are minimized. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In accordance with the ARFORGEN model, the Department of 

Defense has changed its readiness strategy for the reserve from training to deployment standards after mobilization (mobilize-train-deploy) to increased training to 

make forces deployable before mobilization (train-mobilize-deploy). The Army has 

stated the goal of equipping reserve forces with 100 percent of their required equipment, but the timeline to reach that goal stretches past 2019. The National Guard 

and Reserve Equipment Report (NGRER) for FY 2009 included a cascade of $11.6 

billion in equipment from the regular Army to the Army National Guard as part 

of the National Guard’s plan to reach 100% on hand by 2019. 

a. How does the Army plan to equip National Guard forces for the new train-mobilize deploy concept? 

b. Does the Army National Guard have the full time support needed to ensure 

that the increased training and equipment maintenance activities needed to increase readiness are completed before mobilization? 

c. How much of the equipment does the National Guard have that is obsolete and 

cannot be deployed? 

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. Answer 3a. Named/known deployers and 

units likely to deploy are at the very top of the Army National Guard equipment 

prioritization list. A mix of new equipment fielding and equipment cross-leveling actions will be taken to prepare units for deployments. 

Answer 3b. The Army National Guard’s base budget funds 72 percent of our strategic reserve full time support requirements. The peacetime strategic reserve requirements do not take into consideration the increased readiness needed during the 

ARFORGEN model to support contingencies. Currently the Army National Guard 

is using Full time Equivalents (FTE), such as ADOS, Temporary Technicians, and 

Contractor support, to meet these pre-mobilization contingency mission requirements which are funded in the Overseas Contingency Operation Supplemental funding bill. 

Answer 3c. Despite the level of funding programmed in the current Future Years 

Defense Program, ARNG equipping and modernization issues remain. Fielding of 

new equipment and cascading of newer equipment has improved the equipment inventory posture of the Army Guard and allowed displacement of the oldest systems. 

However, the requirement to be interoperable with modern communications and 

command and control systems and to protect the force leaves significant gaps in 

deployable equipment. The Army Guard has currently fielded only 22 percent of the 

Warfighters’ Information Network—Tactical (WIN-T) equipment and the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) is critically short for deployments as well. Concurrently, significant portions of the Army Guard fleet are not capable of accepting 

uparmoring kits. The ARNG is currently scheduled to receive about 21,000 of its 

30,000 Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTVs) by fiscal year 2015, but only 

about 10,000 are on-hand today. The 9,000 vehicle 2015 shortfall alone equates to 

about a $3.7 billion shortfall in funding. Concerning light tactical vehicles, the Army 

Guard has 84 percent of the 46K currently required, but 88 percent of the on-hand 

HMMWVs are generally of the original design and cannot accept armor kits. 
51 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Background: GAO reported that Army National Guard forces 

that deployed to the Iraq theater of operations in 2002 and 2004 were asked to leave 

their equipment in theater for follow-on forces to use. When the reserves are asked 

to transfer their equipment to the active Army, the Army is required by law to notify the reserve as to how and when their equipment will be replaced (called payback plans). As of last year, of the approximately 30 plans required, only 3 had been 

provided to the Army Guard. a. What is the status of the payback plans the Army 

is required to provide the reserve components? b. If the Army has not provided payback plans, what do the units who left the equipment overseas use for training? c. 

How have other Army initiatives, such as its reset activities, affected National 

Guard equipment readiness? 

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. Answer 4a. The Army National Guard left approximately $3.1 B worth of equipment in theater. Of that, approximately 

$300M is equipment that is now obsolete or excess due to changes in authorization 

documents. Army G8 submitted and received $1.7 B in FY07 Supplemental to begin 

pay back to the Army National Guard. In FY08, the Army National Guard and the 

DA G8 agreed on a final $1B which was to be included in FY10 Overseas Contingency Operation request. We believe that only about $700M these funds were actually included in the request and only about $455M of this was validated by OSD. 

Despite the inability to trace the funds through the procurement cycle, the Army 

National Guard continues to receive equipment at an unprecedented rate. 

Answer 4b. To ensure units are trained and equipped for overseas missions, the 

Army National Guard continues to cross-level equipment to fill critical shortages. 

Answer 4c. Overall, reset maintenance is working within the allotted 365 day 

reset period. There are issues working, but nothing that is critically detrimental to 

the reset program. Issues are mostly with systems or programs. One such issue is 

with the Automatic Reset Induction (ARI) requirement. When ARNG equipment is 

inducted into ARI above and beyond the authorized Modified Table of Organization 

and Equipment (MTOE), Army Material Command (AMC) equipment managers are 

only willing to return the amount of equipment that is authorized by MTOE. ARNG 

units are almost exclusively deploying based off of Mission Essential Equipment 

Lists (MEEL) in lieu of MTOE authorization and often times the MEEL requires 

more equipment than the unit’s MTOE which is cross-leveled from other units/ 

States to fill the requirement DA G8 Synchronization Staff Officers (SSO) and AMC 

equipment managers use the MTOE to determine fill of equipment payback and will 

only return to the unit the amount of equipment that is authorized, thus, the extra 

equipment that was cross-leveled to fill the MEEL is lost to the ARNG. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Background: Army National Guard troops deploying since the 

build up of forces in Iraq have been counting on equipment that is already in theater to become deployment-ready. As the fight transitions to operations in Afghanistan, there is no equipment to fall in on, and the situation could be like the beginning of Iraq operations where reserve components were asked to leave their equipment. After a few years of improving equipment levels the National Guard has had 

to use for training and domestic missions, its domestic equipment readiness could 

begin to decline again. a. How does the Army intend to equip reserve forces for Afghanistan? b. How the shift to Afghanistan will affect equipping for domestic missions? 

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. Answer 5a. Equipment is being cross 

leveled in theater. The impact should be minimal. We believe the number of units 

may be constant. They will just be remissioned. The Army National Guard requested that the Army G3 and theater develop the requirement for ‘‘theater provided equipment,’’ and let the Guard know their fair share. The Army should then 

follow the Department of Defense Directive 1225.6 process and get the Secretary of 

Defense approval with payback plan prior to establishing the pool. 

Answer 5b. Thanks to the significant support of Congress, and the hard work 

done by the Army and the Army National Guard to fully equip and modernize our 

organization, our equipment levels have significantly improved. Until such time as 

we are equipped at 100 percent the Army National Guard will continue to crosslevel equipment to ensure all missions are accomplished. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. GAO has reported that the National Guard’s readiness for responding to large-scale domestic emergencies is unknown because of the lack of analytically-based requirements that would need to be developed by the Department of 

Defense in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security. The Army National Guard has taken the initiative to identify critical equipment items its units 

need for overseas missions that are useful for domestic missions. a. How did the National Guard develop this list and is it linked to the 15 national planning scenarios 

set out by the Homeland Security Council? b. Have the Department of Defense and 

the Department of Homeland Security validated this list? c. Does the list take into 
52 

account capabilities that the states might have outside the National Guard or that 

are available in the region so that efficiencies can be achieved? 

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. Answer 6a. The Critical Dual Use equipment list is a list of the equipment that serves a critical role in both Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities missions and operations on the battlefield. The basis of this list was Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 

(MTOE), Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) documents of Army National 

Guard units. The equipment that comprises this list spans the wide spectrum of 

equipment in the Army National Guard to include trucks, command and control, 

and helicopters. It is linked to the 15 scenarios in as much as the equipment supports the full spectrum of Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civilian Authority 

missions from floods to pandemic flu to terrorist attacks. 

Answer 6b. Department of Army approved the list in 2005. For 2009, the Army 

National Guard is once again staffing an updated proposed list. The Department of 

Defense and Joint Staff are aware of the list and we provide status of equipment 

on hand of critical dual use to them as required. 

Answer 6c. The list of Critical Dual Use items was originally developed as a simple metric to assess the ability of the ARNG to perform domestic missions. The 

equipment on this list is based on the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment and Table of Distribution and Allowance documents of the Army National 

Guard; therefore, it is not state/territory-specific. It is not additional equipment over 

and above authorization. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What analysis was done to ensure that U.S. Army and U.S. 

Air National Guard’s needs are met in-theatre without the C-27J? 

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. The Direct Support time sensitive/mission critical requirements are not adequately being met. The use of CH-47 rotary 

wing aircraft and contract airlift support aircraft is unsustainable over time and 

does not fully address the capability gap that exists for fixed wing in the theater 

direct support. Current projections are to have a C-27J Air Force capability in theater in the early FY 11 timeframe. The Air Force overtime will increase C-27J capability to better meet the theater requirements. The insertion of C-27J aircraft will 

relieve the CH-47 fleet and aircrews and negate the need for contract airlift support. 

The requirements process is driven by the Combatant Commanders and it is my 

understanding that the C-27J will enable the Air Force to provide our Combatant 

Commanders with critical Direct Support capability. The only studies I am aware 

of involving the procurement of the C-27J are the Army’s 2005 Analysis of Alternatives and the Air Force’s December 2007 Force Mix Analysis, and the 2009 Air 

Force Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Please provide the planned force structure, by base, unit, for 

approximately 190 F-22 aircraft. 

General WYATT. The Air Force has publically stated the planned basing for the 

F-22 is Langley AFB, VA, Elmendorf AFB, AK, Holloman AFB, NM and Hickam 

AFB, HI. Training will be conducted at Tyndall AFB, FL. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. With the proposed reduced buy of aircraft, how does the U.S. 

Army National Guard plan to meet the increased Homeland Security and Disaster 

preparedness relief missions? 

General CARPENTER. The Army National Guard Aviation response to Homeland 

Security and disaster relief missions has increased over the last several years. Both 

Fixed Wing and Rotary Wing aircraft are used to ensure successful responses. The 

decision not to field 48 Joint Cargo Aircraft in the Army National Guard significantly reduces that response capability. To meet the increased Homeland Security 

and disaster relief missions the National Guard will use all available Air National 

Guard and Army National Guard airlift assess that are in a mission capable maintenance status and are not deployed. These include the Air National Guard C-130s, 

the 38 C-27Js programmed for the Air National Guard, and the Army National 

Guard CH-47s. The 42 Army National Guard C-23s also will provide response capabilities if the Army decides to retain that fleet. Adequate Rotary Wing Homeland 

Security and disaster relief response requires intensive management. While there 

are over 1300 helicopters in the ARNG, deployments and maintenance requirements 

reduce the number of helicopters available to the Governors to about 440 (325 modernized and 115 legacy) at any given time—an average of 6 modernized aircraft per 

State, Territory, and District. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If the reduced number of C-27Js are deployed what is available to backfill the National Guard’s at-home requirements? 

General CARPENTER. The Army National Guard C-23 aircraft complemented by 

Air National Guard lift capability (such as the C-130) can meet the National 

Guard’s at-home air lift requirements. However, the decision to transfer the Joint 

Cargo Aircraft program and the direct support mission to the Air Force leaves unan-
53 

swered questions about the longevity of the Army National Guard C-23 aircraft. The 

Army National Guard at least in the near term (thru FY 12), expects to retain the 

C-23 aircraft, but future funding to extend the life of the C-23 or replace it has not 

been decided. 

The C-27J will enable the Air Force to provide our Combatant Commanders with 

critical Direct Support capability. The Air National Guard believes this added capability is above and beyond our current airlift capacity and will have little impact 

on our availability to support ‘‘at-home’’ requirements. We will continue to work 

with the Services and with OSD to ensure there is adequate capability available to 

fulfill the nation’s domestic needs. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is the impact on the CH-47 fleet if there will now not 

be fixed wing asset replacement? 

General CARPENTER. When CH-47s are diverted from traditional rotary wing tactical missions to direct support fixed wing airlift missions the impacts on the CH47 fleet and aircrews are significant and unsustainable. The CH-47 helicopter is 

best suited for vertical take-off and landing missions with shorter operating ranges. 

Continued use of the CH-47 fleet to fill the direct support fixed wing mission gap 

is more expensive due to higher maintenance costs and operationally more complex 

because intermediate refueling stops are needed. The CH-47 fleet will not be relieved of the Direct Support airlift role in Afghanistan until the Air Force and Air 

National Guard can begin C-27J operations in Afghanistan in FY11 and then increase the C-27J presence to sufficient levels. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In your opinion, do the C-23B Sherpas need to be replaced? 

If the Army does not get the C-27J, what is the replacement plan for the C-23B? 

General CARPENTER. Given the OSD decision to transfer the Joint Cargo Aircraft 

program to the Air Force, there is no replacement plan for the C-23B. Based on combat theater experiences since 2003 and the significant contribution of support provided by the C-23 fleet directly to the ground Commander and Soldiers, the Army 

National Guard believes the Army must reassess its future requirements for fixed 

wing capability. That reassessment would potentially include a modernization path 

for the C-23 mission and confirm the C-23 light cargo mission along with the fixed 

wing utility mission are a core Army Aviation competency. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Currently the ARNG is flying the C-23B Sherpas in direct support of Army units in Iraq—with the plus up of Army forces in Afghanistan, is the 

C-23 the right fixed wing STOL aircraft to provide direct support to those ground 

forces? Is the C27J? 

General CARPENTER. The Army National Guard’s C-23B is not the right aircraft 

to provide direct support to Army forces in Afghanistan. The aircraft is unpressurized and lacks the high altitude performance needed to operate in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. The C-27J is the right aircraft to meet the STOL 

requirements in the mountainous Afghanistan theater and was specifically selected 

to fill the capability gap that currently exists with the C-23s. The STOL and direct 

support requirements related to Army missions being met by the CH-47 aircraft and 

contract airlift support are unsustainable over time. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What fixed wing STOL aircraft are currently supporting Army 

units in Afghanistan? 

General CARPENTER. The Army is currently being supported by a combination of 

Army CH-47 helicopters and contract airlift support. The Air Force plans to deploy 

a C-27J capability into the Afghanistan theater in early FY 11 to meet the Army’s 

STOL aircraft requirements. 

Æ