DA 22-0055

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2022 MT 247N

DENNIS DEE MCDONALD as a general

partner, managing partner and limited

partner of the OPEN SPEAR RANCH FAMILY 

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

 Counter-Defendant and Appellant,

 v.

SHARON MCDONALD, as a general partner,

managing partner and limited partner,

KELLY MCDONALD FRASER, as a limited partner,

COURTNEY MCDONALD, as a limited partner;

and CASEY MCDONALD, as a limited partner,

OPEN SPEAR RANCH FAMILY LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP,

 Counterclaimants and Appellees.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,

In and For the County of Sweet Grass, Cause No. DV-2014-19

Honorable Brenda R. Gilbert, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Hertha L. Lund, Lund Law, PLLC, Bozeman, Montana 

David B. Gallik, Gallik Law Office, PLLC, Helena, Montana

For Appellee Sharon McDonald:

Jim Lippert, Jim Lippert Attorney at Law, P.C., Big Timber, Montana

For Appellees McDonald Children: 

Rodd A. Hamman, Alex W. Hamman, Calton Hamman & Wolff, P.C., 

Billings, Montana

12/20/2022

Case Number: DA 22-0055
V,„ 6A•-if 

2

Submitted on Briefs: November 16, 2022

 Decided: December 20, 2022

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk
3

Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not 

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this 

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana 

Reports. 

¶2 Dennis Dee McDonald (Dennis) appeals numerous orders from the Sixth Judicial 

District Court, Sweet Grass County, granting dissolution of the Open Spear Ranch Family 

Limited Partnership (Partnership).

¶3 Dennis and Sharon McDonald (Sharon) created the Partnership on December 29, 

1997, when they, together with their four adult children, signed the Certificate and 

Agreement of the Open Spear Ranch Partnership (Partnership Agreement). Their fourth 

child is now deceased. The Partnership was created to minimize tax consequences and to 

keep the assets within the family. Dennis and Sharon were general partners, managing 

partners and limited partners and the Children were limited partners. Sharon and Dennis 

each retained a 1% interest as general partners. 

¶4 Sharon and Dennis maintained a common law marriage until Sharon filed for 

dissolution on July 14, 2014. The couple entered into a Property Settlement Agreement 

(Marital Agreement), which the District Court reviewed and approved along with the 

Decree of Dissolution. Both documents reference the Partnership. The parties agreed that 

the division of Partnership assets would be handled in a separate proceeding.
4

¶5 On July 2, 2014, Dennis filed a Complaint to dissolve the Partnership after having 

a fight with an Open Spear Ranch (OSR) ranch employee. Dennis also maintained that 

Sharon and one of the Children abandoned OSR. In his Complaint, which named Sharon, 

the Children and the ranch employee, Dennis alleged that “there was no hope of 

reconciliation of the General Partners’ business relationship” and “[g]iven the fractured 

business relationship of the General Partners, and that neither can act without the consent 

of the other, it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the Partnership activities in 

conformity with the Partnership Agreement.”

¶6 Sharon filed an Answer and Counterclaim on August 14, 2014, also seeking 

dissolution of the Partnership but alleging that (1) Dennis failed to communicate with her 

as general partner and managing partner; (2) Dennis used funds from the Partnership for 

personal use; and (3) she and Dennis have a “fractured relationship.”

¶7 Dennis returned to OSR on September 1, 2014, after recovering from the fight with 

the ranch employee. He testified that, upon his return, he discovered that the Partnership 

bank account had been depleted from $183,148.48 to $8,508.00 within sixty days, the hay 

had not been cut, and livestock had not been attended to. He thus “reassumed responsibility 

for the ranch’s day-to-day operations as he always had and continues to do.” He also 

alleges that Sharon and the Children never returned to OSR. 

¶8 On April 3, 2015, Dennis filed a Motion to Dismiss his Complaint claiming that he 

no longer sought dissolution of the Partnership. Sharon and the Children objected. The 

District Court granted Dennis’s Motion on May 1, 2015, reasoning that:
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The language of rule 41(a)(2) M. R. Civ. P. is plain and clear. The motion 

for dismissal of Complaint is granted and the counterclaims may be 

adjudicated independently. For public policy reasons, a party should be 

permitted to change his position and retreat from litigation, particularly 

where the legal rights of other parties will not be prejudiced.

Litigation over the Partnership dissolution nonetheless continued based on Sharon’s 

and the Children’s counterclaims.

¶9 Dennis filed a Motion for Exclusive Control on October 7, 2015, to manage OSR 

by himself. On October 30, 2015, Dennis requested an ex parte Temporary Order of 

Protection to keep Sharon and the Children from entering OSR. He claimed that Sharon 

conspired to have him killed and that two of the Children removed OSR property and 

interfered with OSR operations. In his request, he also alleged that a ranch employee 

attacked him.

¶10 Next, on November 25, 2015, Dennis filed a “Motion to Amend his Complaint” to 

assert a claim for “rescission” of gifts to the Children. The gifts were the limited 

Partnership interests gifted to the Children during 2011 to 2014, which totaled 48%. 

Sharon and the Children each objected to the Motion. The District Court denied the Motion 

to Rescind on March 16, 2016, stating that the claim was “futile” and “procedurally 

defective” because Dennis had previously requested that his Complaint be dismissed, and 

the gifts were completed and not subject to rescission. The District Court also ordered that 

any check over $3,000 must be co-signed by Dennis and Sharon and established duties and 

obligations for Dennis and Sharon to follow to run OSR.

¶11 The Children filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on May 26, 2016, to 

affirm the Partnership percentages of 16% for each living child, 26% for Dennis, and 26% 
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for Sharon. The following day, Sharon disclosed Jack Wicks (Wicks) as her valuation 

expert. She also requested that Wicks be appointed special master under M. R. Civ. P. 53 

for purposes of distributing the Partnership assets. Dennis objected to the appointment of 

Wicks, arguing that Wicks had a conflict of interest because he was both Sharon’s disclosed 

expert and special master. The District Court granted the Children’s Motion on

November 29, 2016, confirming that the interests in the Partnership were as stated in the 

Children’s Motion.

¶12 On June 17, 2016, Dennis filed a Motion for Summary Judgment contending that 

the Partnership should not be dissolved because Dennis was successfully operating OSR 

“per the Agreement and for the children’s benefit.” On November 19, 2016, the District 

Court denied Dennis’s Motion and determined that the Partnership be dissolved. The 

District Court based its determination on the marital divorce decree, Dennis’s conduct in 

operating OSR, and the fractious relationships in the family’s history. Following its Order, 

the District Court appointed Wicks as special master to determine whether an in-kind 

distribution of Partnership assets, in lieu of a cash liquidation, was practicable.

¶13 On August 9, 2016, the District Court conducted a show cause hearing because 

Sharon alleged that Dennis was not complying with the March 16, 2016 Order. Sharon 

testified that Dennis had commingled Partnership funds with his personal funds, failed to 

provide Sharon with photographs and documents that would allow her to complete the 

duties assigned to her by the District Court, that Dennis attempted to control the Partnership 

website Sharon was ordered to maintain, and that Dennis did not provide information to 

the Partnership’s Certified Public Accountant (CPA) to facilitate timely preparation of the 
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Partnership tax returns. The District Court issued a Decision and Order on Sharon’s 

Motion on September 9, 2016, concluding, “1. Dennis’s practice of depositing Partnership 

funds in his personal account was improper as a matter of law; 2. Dennis breached the 

terms of the district court’s March 16, 2016 Order by failing to provide Sharon with 

numerous business records.” The District Court ordered that Dennis provide Sharon with 

photographs and documents required for Sharon to complete the duties assigned to her by 

the court; provide Sharon with documentation that would allow her to oversee the 

Partnership checking account; and that Dennis reimburse the Partnership checking account 

in the amount he commingled, which was determined to be $127,759.01.

¶14 On January 9, 2018, Wicks filed his revised Special Master’s Report allocating 26% 

of the assets to Dennis and 74% to Sharon and the Children. Dennis filed his objections 

on January 19, 2018.1 From June 20 to June 22, 2018, the District Court held a Rule 53 

hearing2and considered Dennis’s objections to the revised Special Master’s Report. 

During the hearing, Wicks testified that he did not take into consideration the tax 

ramifications concerning capital contributions made by the parties, that he had not read the 

Partnership Agreement, and that he was unaware any of the parties made capital 

contributions. Dennis’s expert witness, Jim Winchell, CPA, testified that an unequal 

1 Dennis had also requested, on February 20, 2018, a hearing regarding dissolution of the 

Partnership, despite the District Court having previously determined it should be dissolved. 

Dennis argued he was denied an evidentiary hearing to offer evidence in support of not dissolving 

the Partnership. The District Court held a hearing on October 1, 2018, and on January 23, 2019, 

confirmed its previous decision that it was proper to dissolve the Partnership.

2 M. R. Civ. P. Rule 53(d)(2) provides, in pertinent part: “[a]fter hearing, the court may adopt the 

report, modify it, or reject it in whole or in part, receive further evidence, or recommit it with 

instructions.” 
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in-kind division of classes of property would create tax consequences. The District Court 

ruled on Dennis’s objections on March 26, 2020, adopting the Special Master’s Report of 

a 26%-74% in-kind distribution. The District Court did not adjust for tax consequences or 

adjust for Dennis’s contributions from his capital account at this time.

¶15 On November 16, 2020, the District Court entered an Interim Order which required 

an updated Special Master’s Report that addressed outstanding valuations of the parties’ 

property. This Order appointed Wicks to complete another Special Master’s Report. 

Wicks had retired so his associate, Scott Crosby (Crosby), performed the report instead. 

Crosby’s report was very similar to Wicks’s previous report, but with some revised 

valuations. Dennis filed objections on October 12, 2021 to the Updated Report of Special 

Master Crosby. The District Court held a hearing on November 23, 2021. On January 28, 

2022, the District Court adopted the Updated Report of Special Master Crosby, with a few 

exceptions, and issued a final comprehensive order setting forth its findings of fact and 

conclusions of law.

¶16 Dennis appeals and raises the following issues, some of which we restate: Did the 

court err in enforcing the Partnership Agreement when it ordered dissolution; was the 

District Court’s determination of partnership percentages correct as a matter of law and 

should distribution of assets in accordance with these percentages be affirmed; should this 

Court affirm the appointment of the special masters; and whether the court erred in its 

distribution of the equipment, art, and cash assets of the partnership. 

¶17 The construction and interpretation of a written agreement are questions of law that 

we review for correctness. Ophus v. Fritz, 2000 MT 251, ¶ 19, 301 Mont. 447, 11 P.3d 
9

1192. Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is also a question of law reviewed for 

correctness. Doble v. Bernhard, 1998 MT 124, ¶ 19, 289 Mont. 80, 959 P.2d 488. We 

review de novo a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment, applying the same 

criteria of M. R. Civ. P. 56 as a district court. Pilgeram v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, 

Inc., 2013 MT 354, ¶ 9, 373 Mont. 1, 313 P.3d 839 (citation omitted). We review a district 

court’s conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct and its findings of fact to 

determine whether they are clearly erroneous. Pilgeram, ¶ 9. We review the appointment 

of a special master for abuse of discretion. Pankratz Farms, Inc. v. Pankratz, 2004 

MT 180, ¶ 81, 322 Mont. 133, 95 P.3d 671. 

¶18 First, Dennis argues that the District Court erred when it ordered that the Partnership 

be dissolved. He contends that the District Court should have followed the Partnership 

Agreement, without considering the Marital Agreement because the Partnership constitutes 

a business entity rather than marital property. He further asserts that the District Court 

erroneously dissolved the Partnership based on “equitable division” principles that only 

apply to dissolution matters. He maintains that the Partnership was profitable and requests 

that we reverse the dissolution of the Partnership or remand for the District Court to follow 

the language of the Partnership Agreement. 

¶19 The Partnership Agreement provides that the Partnership shall be dissolved if “it is 

not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the partnership business in conformity 

with the partnership agreement.” This is consistent also with Montana law. See 

§ 35-10-624(5)(c), MCA (A partnership “is dissolved . . . upon judicial decree, issued upon 
10

application by a partner, [when] it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the 

partnership business in conformity with the partnership agreement.”). 

¶20 The District Court dissolved the Partnership based on substantial and sufficient 

evidence. The evidence shows that Dennis was unwilling to communicate with Sharon—

as a general and managing partner—regarding partnership business and that he sought to 

preempt and eliminate the duties and authority granted to Sharon by the Partnership 

Agreement. He tried to prevent Sharon and the Children from approaching Partnership 

property by rescinding gifts of limited Partnership interests to the Children and seeking an 

Order of Protection against Sharon and the Children. Notably, he commingled his personal 

funds with Partnership funds. 

¶21 In addition, Dennis argues that the purpose of the Partnership Agreement (to 

preserve the assets and keep them within the family) is an adequate basis to reverse the 

dissolution. Here, however, there was a substantial change in circumstances and positions 

between the partners, which in themselves undermine the basic purpose of the Partnership. 

Putting aside the parties’ dissolution, Dennis conceded that there was no hope of 

reconciliation of the partners’ business relationships. Sharon and the Children also agreed 

that dissolution was necessary; Sharon pointed to the marriage dissolution, lack of 

communication with Dennis, and Dennis’s use of partnership funds for personal use as 

reasons. Dennis asserts that Sharon had an OSR employee pick a fight with him to have 

him killed, that Sharon attempted to sabotage the Partnership with the 2-signatures check 

requirement, and that Sharon’s involvement with the Partnership “has become intolerable” 

and will be detrimental to business. 
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¶22 The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on March 16, 2016, to determine the 

accuracy of Dennis’s allegations. It found that Dennis did not establish reasonable 

apprehension of bodily injury; that Dennis was not the victim of any assault by any 

respondent; that a high level of distrust among the partners existed; that daily involvement 

with the Partnership is impossible because of the lack of trust and hostility between the 

parties; that both general partners needed to sign Partnership checks greater than $3,000; 

and that Dennis must transfer all Partnership funds from his personal account to the 

Partnership account. At a Show Cause hearing following the evidentiary hearing, the 

District Court found that Dennis failed to follow the District Court’s orders: he continued 

to commingle OSR Partnership funds with his personal funds; he did not provide Sharon 

with business records; and he failed to cooperate with the Partnership’s CPA to file tax 

returns. 

¶23 After the District Court denied Dennis’s Motion for Summary Judgment and issued 

an order dissolving the partnership, the District Court held another evidentiary hearing at 

Dennis’s request to hear testimony from the parties concerning dissolution of the 

Partnership. Sharon testified that she wanted the Partnership dissolved based on the lack 

of trust between herself and Dennis; Dennis’s commingling of Partnership funds with his 

personal funds, including credit card payments; his failure to recognize the authority of the 

District Court; his failure to provide her with his personal bank statements; his failure to 

individually sign Partnership checks that exceed $3,000; his accusation that Sharon hired 

an OSR employee to kill him; his accusation that Sharon forged the marriage dissolution; 

his failure to communicate with her regarding Partnership business matters; his failure to 
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notify her of potential Partnership income; and his purchase of Partnership equipment 

without her knowledge or consent. Sharon also updated the District Court that the amount 

of Partnership checks that Dennis wrote exceeding $3,000, without her signature, totaled 

over $528,000. 

¶24 Article III of the Partnership Agreement establishes the powers of general partners. 

Most notably, it requires that any decision or act shall be made only upon the approval of 

the majority interest of general partners. This requires that the general partners—Dennis 

and Sharon—agree when making decisions. Dennis and Sharon also have equal 1% 

general partnership interests. The record demonstrates that Dennis and Sharon cannot 

agree with each other because Dennis has failed to involve Sharon in Partnership matters 

and has misappropriated Partnership funds. The District Court presided over 7 years of 

litigation that demonstrate the broken relationship among Dennis, Sharon, and the Children 

that overcome the partners’ abilities to carry on the Partnership. The District Court issued 

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based on sufficient and overwhelming 

evidence that supports dissolving the Partnership.

¶25 Next, Dennis claims the District Court erred when it did not consider his capital 

accounts and claims Sharon acknowledged them during her testimony. He argues the 

District Court held that Dennis could not disclose the capital accounts in the Marital 

Agreement. The record shows otherwise; the District Court offered Dennis the opportunity 

to disclose his capital account claim, both in his dissolution of marriage and the present 

case. 
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¶26 Dennis waived his opportunity to claim ownership of his capital accounts in two 

ways. First, Dennis knew of his capital account at the time he submitted a Preliminary 

Declaration of Disclosure (Disclosure) in the marriage dissolution proceedings and failed 

to disclose ownership or interest in a capital account for the Partnership. See § 40-4-252, 

MCA (preliminary declarations of disclosure must include the identity of all assets, 

“regardless of the characterization of an asset,” in which the declarant has or may have an 

interest). Pursuant to Article II, § 2.1 of the Partnership Agreement, Dennis’s capital 

account is personal property that is required to be disclosed in the Disclosure. Dennis 

challenges the District Court’s ruling in this regard, claiming that in the Marital Agreement, 

the parties expressly waived disclosures and agreed to handle the OSR assets in the 

partnership case. But the Marital Agreement was filed in May 2017, approximately 

two-and-a-half years after the parties filed their preliminary disclosures. It stated, in the 

“Waiver of Declaration of Disclosure” provision, that “[e]ach of the parties acknowledge 

disclosure of all assets and obligations has been made by the other party and hereby waives 

any declaration of disclosure to be served and filed in this marriage dissolution action.” 

This provision acknowledged the preliminary disclosures and waived only those 

declarations “to be served and filed”; that is, the final disclosures. Sections 40-4-252; 

40-4-253, MCA. The Marital Agreement provided further that it “shall not include any 

item of property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, titled in the name of the 

Open Spear Ranch Limited Partnership.” This provision does not apply to Dennis’s alleged 

$8.5 million capital account, which he claims was his property, not property of OSR. 
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¶27 Second, Dennis failed to object within 30 days when Wicks proposed the in-kind 

distribution of 26% to Dennis and 74% to Sharon and the Children. It took six months 

after Wicks proposed the 26-74 in-kind distribution, for Dennis to argue that his capital 

account was $8.5 million, and Sharon’s was $0. 

¶28 Here, the District Court reasoned that if the equipment were Dennis’s personal 

property, then he was required to disclose them in the divorce proceeding, and he did not 

do so. Second, the Partnership tax returns show that the equipment is Partnership property, 

and the returns listed each partner’s capital account consistent with their partnership 

percentages. The tax returns showed that Dennis did not have $8.5 million in a capital 

account. Finally, because Dennis never disclosed any of the individual assets in his marital 

dissolution or in the tax returns, he is estopped from changing his position in this case. 

¶29 We agree. Dennis and Sharon settled their divorce case and agreed that any issues 

of partnership property would be resolved in the partnership proceeding. Dennis attempts 

to undue roughly 7 years of litigation by claiming rights to capital accounts of the 

Partnership significantly late in the proceedings. He raises a new claim in this case that he 

had an $8.5 million capital account and that Sharon’s account was $0. The purpose of 

judicial estoppel is to bind “a party to his or her judicial declarations and preclude[] a party 

from taking a position inconsistent with previously made declarations in a subsequent 

action or proceeding.” Kaufman-Harmon v. Kaufman, 2001 MT 238, ¶ 15, 307 Mont. 45, 

36 P.3d 403. Judicial estoppel includes four elements, which all must be satisfied: “(1) the 

estopped party had knowledge of the facts at the time he took the original position; (2) the 

estopped party succeeded in maintaining the original position; (3) the position presently 
15

taken is inconsistent with the original position; and (4) the original position misled the 

adverse party so that allowing the estopped party to change its position would injuriously 

affect the adverse party.” Gibbs v. Altenhofen, 2014 MT 200, ¶ 17, 376 Mont. 61, 330 P.3d 

458.

¶30 The District Court correctly found that the four elements of judicial estoppel were 

met. Dennis knew of his capital accounts when the Partnership tax returns were filed. He 

succeeded in the marriage dissolution by ensuring that his capital account was not 

considered in the Marital Agreement. His claim to an $8.5 million capital account as his 

own property in the Partnership dissolution differs dramatically from his previous 

Disclosure in the marital dissolution. And, Sharon and the Children—as 

adverse parties— would be severely injured if the District Court allowed him to claim his 

capital account.

¶31 Dennis’s third issue on appeal concerns the appointment of Wicks and Crosby as 

special masters. For the first time, on appeal, he contends that the special masters lacked 

training and experience in accounting. We will not consider Dennis’s assertion that the 

special masters lacked accounting experience because he did not object on those grounds 

in the District Court. See State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, ¶ 76, 342 Mont. 1, 180 P.3d 1102 

(holding that to properly preserve an issue or argument for appeal, a party must raise it in 

the district court).

¶32 However, Dennis appeals the appointment of the special masters on other grounds 

that he raised in the District Court. He argues that the District Court erroneously appointed 

special masters who declined to address the capital accounts, did not execute an accounting, 
16

did not review the Partnership Agreement, did not hold hearings, and did not determine 

property ownership and offsets. The tasks assigned by the District Court to the special 

masters disprove these claims.

¶33 The District Court has discretion to appoint a special master. Pankratz, ¶ 81. The 

District Court explained its decision to appoint Wicks and Crosby as special masters: 

“Because Mr. Wicks is already familiar with the property, he is a logical person to be 

appointed as special master to make a recommendation for the parties to consider, or for 

the Court’s guidance if the parties are unable to resolve the matter.” The District Court 

ordered Wicks to determine whether its practical to divide Partnership property without 

loss of value; to recommend an in-kind distribution of real estate, livestock, hay, 

machinery, and equipment based on a 2016 appraisal; to address the Hauser Lake house; 

to request relevant documents of the parties; and to report to the District Court. Later, the 

District Court ordered Crosby to provide an updated report on the current market value for 

all real property titled in the Partnership, equipment purchased since Wicks’s previous 

report, all livestock, and all liquid cash assets and accounts receivable.

¶34 The District Court never ordered the special masters to review the Partnership 

Agreement, hold hearings, or consider offsets. The special masters were ordered to 

determine property ownership and incorporate the tasks previously mentioned. Any 

failures by the special masters to comply with the court order were subject to objection at 

hearings before the District Court. The District Court held evidentiary hearings addressing 

Dennis’s objections to the appointment of special masters and, after considering all 

evidence before it, exercised its discretion appropriately and appointed Wicks and Crosby 
17

as the special masters. The record also does not demonstrate that the special masters 

submitted erroneous reports; rather, they complied with court orders and submitted 

recommendations accordingly.

¶35 Dennis also appeals the District Court’s Order granting partial summary judgment 

to Sharon and the Children regarding whether the interests in the Partnership gifted to the 

Children in 2014 were completed and whether the Children retain a 16% interest each in 

the Partnership. The District Court entered its decision to grant partial summary judgment 

following briefing by the parties and conducting a hearing. Based on the record, the 

District Court properly determined that Dennis failed to offer any genuine issues of 

material fact. Dennis instead makes conclusory allegations about the gifts. We conclude 

that the interests in the Partnership gifted to the Children are complete and cannot be 

rescinded.

¶36 Lastly, Dennis argues that the District Court erred when it determined that the 

Partnership owns the equipment, artwork, and cash in the Partnership bank account. 

Dennis does not present argument on appeal regarding the Partnership artwork and cash. 

The District Court was never presented with evidence that the artwork and cash were not 

Partnership property. Accordingly, we will not address issues specific to the ownership of 

the artwork and cash. 

¶37 Dennis did object that he personally owned some of the Partnership equipment. 

Wicks testified that Dennis asked for all the equipment, so Wicks distributed it to him. 

Dennis now claims that some of the equipment allocated to him he personally owned, and 

so he effectively lost the value of the specific equipment upon dissolution of the 
18

Partnership. However, the equipment was listed on the Partnership Income Tax Return 

and depreciated. And, if the equipment was personal property it should have been 

disclosed and distributed in the divorce proceedings. Accordingly, for the same reasons 

set forth regarding the capital accounts, Dennis is estopped from contesting his own tax 

returns and from claiming he personally owned equipment not listed as equipment in his 

divorce proceeding. We conclude the District Court was correct in adopting the Special 

Master’s Report regarding distribution of the equipment.

¶38 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our 

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents 

no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent 

or modify existing precedent.

¶39 Affirmed.

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

We Concur: 

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

/S/ BETH BAKER

/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR