‘averse

1 saop se ‘Ayyenurjuos
J ay) aso juRIsUOD aq 07 Spuc ASIN
‘) puv tsysoo o1Wo0UOda a[qRJeprsUod sy 1BUINSI-49A0 IO -JapuN
19" IY] PUL ASI PUP AK Jo sanqra paywurnsa ay} Vaamjoq aouasazyIp
1 (Z) fanqea queysuos e& sey Ayyensn 41 parenoyeo st ASI a9u0 (1)
B aIN AY styq Jo Sainqvaj [eIaAIG “IeAd Youd Joy (@UT] SNONUIWUOD Yep)
AQ Jo aieurnsa pue (aut snonuruos 74411) (AQ) pralé tunurdo jenqoe taead
yore 10} (saut] [eJUOZOY panop) ASIN payeuInsa pur (sauty peqO
(ASW) pleats ayqeurejsns wnuwixeu penqoe dSurmoys savas aut peaqayiodApy “| andi

bSEL €S6L eS6L LS6L OS6L

rquapt

ASW [On
L-~--+ ASW $0 159
AO jonjay
AO JO ISH

i

YIELD (WGT)


The Northeast Fishery Management Task Force was
organized to consider and develop possibie management
options directed toward these problems as they exist in
the North Atlantic and elsewhere. This paper is a con-
tribution to the deliberations of the Task Force. Its pur-
pose is to provide a framework and methodology for the
identification and analysis of management options or
systems. (For example. some that have been discussed
are: eliminating quotas and managing on!y by means of
closed areas and adjustment of mesh sizes: providing
“tax” incentives and/or disincentives to encourage
fishermen to adopt particular management strategies;
maintaining the status quo; stock certificates; laissez-
faire; self-management: and a fishery development
bank.) The paper considers: (1) why it is necessary to
develop a management system. (2) methodology for
analyzing management objectives, (3) the framework for
developing management options, (4) some of the criteria
that can be used to select management options, and (5)
the next steps for implementation

WHY A MANAGEMENT SYSTEM?

Management is basically a decision-making activity.
In some instances management decisions are simple—(if
today’s price of apples is less than five cents a pound,
store the apples and wait for tomorrow). In more typical
instances, though, management decisions involve much
greater complexity. In fisheries, for example, the
managers must identify important management ques-
tions; obtain appropriate data; synthesize data; generate
management rules or regulations dependent upon the
data: deploy and monitor fishing effort to the extent re-
quired by regulation; and institute cost-effective en-
forcement and administrative regimes.

To be effective. management must coordinate and
organize all of these diverse and complex activities so
that the total management process is beneficial, cost-
effective, and reasonably predictable. Coordination and
organization will not happen by themselves, but require
a system for their accomplishment. Such a system will
resolve many difficulties that are inherent in contem-
porary fishery- management.

By analogy. consider a large complicated fishing
operation. Its success requires teamwork: the ca} is
the manager, the engineer makes sure that the hardware
works, the electronics specialist ensures that the fish-
sensing and communication devices are at the state-of-
the-art and in good working order, the leading fisherman
uses his intuition and the electronic devices to locate the
fish, and the officers select the fishing grounds (a
business decision balancing running costs with potential
catch). These people, the engineer, the electronics
specialist, the leading fisherman, and the rest of the
crew, might individually be the best in the world, but if
they do not understand the captain’s objectives, or if
they communicate poorly, then the fishing operation will
be poorly managed and unprofitable. These difficulties

we

could be remedied by development of a system for
management. one which provides for simultaneous and
planned consideration and integration of all aspects of
management. Important events take place and they take
place on time because it was planned that way.

A management system is more than a management
plan. It is a mechanism that facilitates: (1) preparation
of fishery management plans that address the “right
questions,” providing approaches for their solution; (2)
the actual working of the plan; (3) systematic revision of
the plan: and (4) the development of a structure for
relating management plans to one another as required. A
conventional fishery management plan might be com-
pared to an automobile engine which is in perfect work-
ing order, but which is completely useless because it has
no gauges, wires, fuel tank, transmission, etc. A manage-
ment plan might be the best in the world, but without
accessory parts—a management system and the neces-
sary information to make it work—the plan cannot be ef-
fective.

Development of a successful management system re-
quires a strategic approach. Strategy implies “doing the
right thing” as opposed to ‘“‘doing the thing right.” The
strategic approach may be compared with short-range
tactics:?

Short-range
Approach

Strategic

Approach
* Broad scope ¢ Narrow scope
© Long time horizon * Short time horizon

* Considers only solution
of particular problem

* Considers relation of one
problem to the others

* Concentrates on
feasibility

* Concentrates on objec-
tives

The comparison shows that even the best short-range
approach may have limited utility since it could be ad-
dressing the wrong management problem. On the other
hand, an excellent management strategy that ignores
aspects of the short-range implementation questions will
result in inefficient and muddled execution.

A responsible decision-maker will insist on a
ment system that has sufficient strategic content so that
it:

Nave

© deals directly “with changing patterns of multiple pur-
poses and objectives . . .”” dealing with all relevant
variables whether or not they are easily measured.

views the decisions that are made in the context of
other decisions.

is innovative and creates new values or norms where
necessary.

does not subordinate longer-range considerations for
short-term solutions.


Catch/ Unit of Effort

A B
Fishing Effort

Figure 5. The relation between catch-per-unit-of-effort (CPUE) and effort usually shows
a decline in CPUE with increasing fishing effort. If A is the amount of effort
expended by the domestic fleet, then the domestic fleet will have a CPUE of C.
If, however, in addition, there is foreign fishing the total amount of effort,
domestic plus foreign, will be B. With the amount of fishing set at B, the CPUE
will drop to D. The difference between C and D reflects the quantity of ad-
ditional effort or cost of fishing that a domestic fishermen experiences because
of foreign fishing.

4U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1981 — 700-792/346


B. Economic signals are often transmitted with con-
siderable time lag; while the performance of a zero-
control system might trace the economic optimum,
oscillations about that optimum might be great
enough to generate genuine hardship. Time lags are
particularly critical because investment is often
geared to conditions at the time it is made. Fish
stocks are notorious for their fluctuations and once a
boat is built, it is a financial commitment for a
number of years, during which stocks may
deteriorate.

Thus, a zero-control system will need to take into ac-
count questions of minimal stock size and, also, ways of
dealing with time lags in economic signals, a “market
failure” situation which may be a significant constraint
avainst optimality. [t is interesting that both of these
problems can dealt with in a relatively cost-effective
manner. The conservation question involves quotas, and
the economic-signal problem involves development of
appropriate data flow and systems models.

Under maximum control, the amount of effort and its
deployment would be controlled by a single entity, which
would buy and sell boats, hire fishermen, generate
fishing strategies, etc. Vertical integration might involve
control over the processing sector of the industry as well.
With a single entity managing the fishery, profits and/or
rent would be maximized, dependent upon the manage-
ment entity’s ability.

Such a system has drawbacks: there would be no com-
petition to stir innovation, and the marketplace could be
completely controlled by the management entity,
leading to a monopoly disadvantageous to the consumer.
Further, it would be difficult to change the entity if it
were not competent.

Let us now examine the question of ownership.
Ownership could vary from one extreme, at which there
is complete public “ownership” of the stocks, to the
other, at which ownership is vested in the private sector.
The stocks of fish are owned by the public, but because
public ownership can be abstract and diffuse, the best
return is not necessarily guaranteed by such ownership.
Prior to the FCMA, public ownership of the stocks
resulted in management schemes involving extensive
negotiations with foreign states wishing to fish off our
coasts. Management results often depended upon a
tradeoff between the motivation of foreign countries to
fish in our waters and our ability to negotiate the
magnitude of their catch.

Passage of the FCMA has reaffirmed public ownership
of the fish stocks, but placed the public trust for
management of those stocks in the Department of
Commerce and the quasi-public Regional Fishery
Management Councils.

Despite clearer public responsibility for management,
incentives for cooperation by average fishermen have
remained more or less as they were. To change the per-
formance of the fishing community materially with
respect to management, new incentives must be
developed. Many approaches are available, some of

them not new. (For example, given certain guidelines for
statistics-keeping and management performance, stocks
might be leased to a fishing group or company to manage
to the best of its ability.)

Questions of control and ownership will be central to
any management option; in fact, the appropriate mix of
control and ownership may well be the most important
strategic question in fishery management (see p. 7-9).
Boundary conditions for management and control are set
forth below:

Zero
control

Complete
control

Public
ownership
and mgmt.

Private \
ownership
and mgmt.

A full discussion of these boundary conditions is
beyond the scope of this paper. The following comments,
however, will help to define them.

With zero control and public ownership and manage-
ment, the management system would theoretically res-
pond to economic and social signals. There might be
some additional constraints resulting from fishing mor-
tality. Some believe that under the present management
strategy, quotas are generally not constraining fishing. If
indeed this is the case, then the present management
regime fits within the zero-control category.

With complete control and public ownership and
management , a governmental agency or a quasi-public

company (such as the U.S. Postal Service) would “run”
the fishery.

With zero control and private ownership and manage-
ment, the right to fish in a laissez-faire system would be
accorded either to an individual who would bid for the
right to fish, or to a limited group. As such a group
became larger, though, private ownership and manage-
ment would approach public ownership and manage-
ment.

With complete control and private ownership and
management, there would be a shift from controlling the
catch to controlling the entities that make the catch.
Under this approach, economies of scale might be possi-
ble.

Thus. the range of control-ownership options can be
bounded. There are no intrinsic reasons why any of them


The Greatest Overall Benefit to the Nation

Benefits must be perceptible on a national scale in
order io judge among alternative benefits. concluding
that some particular activity will vield the greatest
overall benefit to the nation.” It is relatively easy to es-
timate the effect of a change in stee! or oil production on
the national economy (one would think), but it is not
easy to perceive the effect of a small change in fish
production upon either the national economy or the
national food industry. If the economic impacts of the
commercial fishing industry are difficult to perceive,
then the benefits of providing recreational opportunities
must be even more difficult to quantify.

When considering “benefits to the nation” in terms of
per-capita food consumption, fish are seen to be a
relatively small component. Similarly, while there have
been no studies, to our knowledge. of the contribution of
sport fishing to total recreation, the time spent sport
fishing must be only a small fraction of total recreational
time.

While contribution of fishing to food supply or recrea-
tion may be perceived as very small in terms of total
national benefits. it can be argued that this apparent un-
importance is merely a function of the way in which the
statistics are computed, The value of fish may be
underestimated. because a national calculus for
measuring food or recreationa! benefits understates the
great impact that fish have in certain regions, where they
may be the basis of important recreational or commer-
cial components of the economy. Further, the degree to
which derivative industries such as the tackle and bait
industries or the restaurant industry depend upon the
availability of fish is neither fully understood nor in-
cluded in national analyses of benefits.

The discussion reflects that it is probably impossible,
at this time, to estimate how much fish contribute to the
relative or absolute ‘‘national benefit,” or to quantify the
abstraction: “maximum benefit to the nation in terms of
food and recreational opportunities.” If ‘maximum
benefit to the nation” is an abstraction. it follows that
“optimum yield” is itself an abstraction.

Because of this. it is important to develop
operationally relevant approximations to optimum
vield. In deriving such approxim.:tioms, it is essential io
cumpare the optimum-yield chjective with the process
for attaining that objective for consistency between the
objective and the process. In other words, is there a
logical consistency between “A vield that generates the
greatest overall benefit to the nation with respect to food
production and recreational opportunities” and “MSY
as modified by social, economic, and ecological factors?”
If we assume, as it is reasonable to do, that benefits to
the nation may accrue in social, economic, and
ecological terms, then we can see that MSY does not
necessarily limit the outcome of the optimum vield
calculation (According to FCMA, MSY needs only be
calculated before the social. economic. and ecological
factors are reckoned.); OY. we recall, is determined by

first calculating MSY. then estimating a deviation from
Ms by giving appropriate weight to “social. economic.
and ecological factors.”

MSY: Economic, Social, and Ecological Deviations

In this section, the utility of MSY and the nature of
economic, social, and ecological deviations from MSY
are considered.

First, it is important to determine how MSY relates to
optimum yield. As discussed above, the Act permits ap-
parently great deviations from MSY as a result of
ecological, social. or economic considerations. Because of
the large deviations permitted. one could argue that
apart from the specification that it be calculated. the
MSY parameter was of little importance or use.

In understanding the role of MSY, it is important to
recognize what it is and how it arrived at its present state
of disrepute.

The MSY concept is quite simple and has been used as
a point of departure for the management of many fish
stocks. In Europe after World War II the MSY
model—owing to its simplistic pooling of such critical
population-dynamic variables as growth, recruitment,
natural mortality, and fishing mortality—became sub-
servient to the yield-per-recruit type of model since this
took into account al] of the factors mentioned except-
recruitment. Nevertheless, the MSY model] defines,
within some strict and probably realistic assumptions.
the magnitude of catch that offsets natura] population
increase; not only do we obtain estimates of this
equilibrium catch, but we also find that level of effort
which yields the maximum equilibrium catch, the MSY.
This is a convenient concept for the manager.

The utility of the MSY concept has been ts definition
of a single value. As we enter the realin of ecological.
economic, and social factors, however, we must deal with
the reality of multiple factors. The science of ecology as
applied to the marine ecosystem has not provided much
practica] advice on how its modifying force may be con-
sidered. The studies in recent vears have become more
relevant to management concerns; nevertheless. there is
still a certain “fuzziness” in the concepts. Very basical-
ly, there are two aspects important to management. To
what extent is the recruit: : bject to en-
vironmental factors comparea iv spawning stocks? How
do species interactions modily the implications drawn
from single-species studies?

With respect to economic benefits, the concept of
social surplus is used as an index. Basically, this concept
states that producers and consumers have an interest in
any commodity. Benefits to the consumer are measured
as a maximal quantity of a commodity at the lowest
possible price; benefits to the producer derive from
production of a maximal quantity of a commodity at the
highest price. Maximum social surplus, is the maximum
joint Lenefit to both the consumer and the producer. In
general, changing the status quo in regard to social sur-
plus involves lowering the cost of production of fishing or



Responsible decision-making can arise only from
systematic analysis of the problem it addresses. In
carrying out such an analysis, one must consider objec-
tives, options, criteria, and the consonance of con-
clusions with objectives. It is evident that responsible
decision-making requires various options or systems for
management and that development of such systems or
options is a critical task in fishery management.

METHODOLOGY
FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF
MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES

Identifving fishery management objectives is a critical
task. Oljectives must be realistic and achievable. They
must also be mutually understood by those involved. If
objectives are not clearly stated, then individuals in the
management system may think they are striving to at-
tain a common objective, while they work at cross pur-
poses. If, however, objectives are clearly stated and there
is disagreement with respect to their rationality or in-
tent, then it is possible to focus on differences, resolve
points of contention, and possibly arrive at even better
objectives,

In this section we discuss some of the general problems
of objective identification and then consider specific
issues related to fishery management objectives.

GENERAL PROBLEMS OF
OBJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION

A number of studies have developed general criteria
fot objective identification. These criteria are important
for management system development because, as in-
dicated earlier, efficiency in any management option or
management system is promoted by rational,
operationally sensible objectives.

There are two particular pitfalls to worry about in
developing criteria to identify and evaluate objectives.
The first is setting objectives which are too idealistic to
be useful practically. and the second is setting objectives
which take into account only a small part of the entire
problem.

Objectives that are too idealistic are commonly called
“motherhood” objectives, or in systems jargon,
“overdetermined” objectives. Typical overdetermined
objectives are stated in such terms as “for the maximum
benetit of mankind’, “maximize social welfare”, or
“catch all the underutilized fish in U.S. waters.” A little
reflection will reveal that objectives stated in such terms
have different meanings for different people, by
themselves providing little operational guidance.

The second class of objectives, those that take into ac-
count only a small part of the entire problem, are
frequently called ‘suboptimal objectives.” since concen-
tration upon such objectives may yield an optimal solu-

tion for a small piece of the problem, but not for the
object of concern, the entire problem. Taking a strategic
approach as previously outlined is the best safeguard
against this pitfall.

There are two consequences of taking too narrow a
view. In the first, the view or definition of the problem is
suboptimal. In the second, the approach to the solution
of the problem is suboptimal in the sense that there is an
over-concentration of effort on only parts of the problem,
so that a total solution, however superficial, is never
arrived at. Analysis which concentrates only upon deter-
mination of objectives and which ignores the process for
attaining the objectives is a typical example.

While the identification of appropriate and useful
objectives is critical, the development of procedures for
attaining the objectives is also of considerable impor-
tance, !iven the best objectives will never he attained
unless there is a process in place for their attainment.
Thus, the development of any management system or
option for management requires as much concentration
on the system for attaining the objectives as on the
objectives themselves.

SPECIFIC FISHERY OBJECTIVES

In this section, specific fishery objectives are
considered in the context of our general discussion on
setting objectives. First, we discuss objectives set forth
in the FCMA; next, we review typical fishery
management objectives.

The FCMA adopts the principle of optimum yield
(OY) as its guiding light for an ideal management
regime. The Act says that optimum yield shail be taken
from each stock that comes under the authority of the
Act (principally stocks that are fished in the conserva-
tion zone, generally 3-200 miles from the coastline). The
Act defines optimum yield as the catch... . which will
provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation with
particular reference to food production and recreational
opportunities.” The Act not only defines optimum yield,
but it also specities a process for its calculation, saying
that optimum vield shall be determined by first
calculating maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and then
modifying MSY by relevant economic, social, and
ecological factors.

The detinition of OY and the process described for its
calculation raise a number of issues which must be ad-
dressed *o appreciate fully the role which optimum vieid
is evidently intended to play, under FCMA. as a
management obiective. With respect to the definition of
OY. how shall... the greatest overall benefit to the na-
tion with respect to food production and recreational op-
portunities” be interpreted?

With respect to the process, how do we interpret
“MSY?” How are OY and MSY ultimately integrated to
give a consistent approach to fishery management?



the total number of
below. the revised es-

e. Make economic studies to estimate the likely
profitability of each boat when the fleet approaches its
optimum size.

f. Decide. particularly if this profit is large. what use
should be made of it. and introduce appropriate ad-
ditional conditions on license holders, e.g., substantial
license fees. commitment als« to land defined quantities
of fish. ete

f, at interv

g. Repeat steps c. to s

A simple scheme for setting alternative objectives
might involve the following:

MSY's of various stocks are first determined;
economic. social. and ecological modifications are then
determined to satisfy OY: catch goals are established
consistent with these determinations; and the catches
are monitored frequently and adjusted as necessary.

It should be possible, based on past experience, to es-
timate the likely reproductive success of various parent-
stock sizes. A range of alternatives could be computed,
and keeping in mind the inherent errors in this process,
it would be possible to set flexible stock-size goals.

It should also be possible to think of management
measures that involve as many species as possible. Start-
ing with the maximum number of species (perhaps even
all in aggregate) and reducing the number for prac-
ticability might be a better strategy than starting with
the minimum number and later being incapable of in-
creasing the number of species.

These observations suggest a need to begin with sim-
ple objectives that are consonant with the FCMA. These
simple objectives need to be based on the MSY’s of the
stocks under consideration, taking into account ap-
propriate ecunvinic. social, and ecological functions.
Since these econemic. social. and ecological functions
are not likely tc be known or even measurable, con-
siderable systematic trial] and error will be necessary. As
the stocks increase in value and more knowledge accrues,
management might need refinement, but this should be
based upon additional! information; the information can
be acquired directly or indirectly through trial and error.

DESICN AND ANALYSIS
OF MANAGEMENT OPTIONS

In the first part of this paper, the importance of
objectives and the principles for identifying and select-
ing them were discussed. This section considers the
process for attaining objectives once they are identified,
concentrating on the design and analysis of management
options or system.

At the outset, let us define ‘management option.”
Such an option includes both an objective and the
process for attaining that objective. Process is often
viewed too narrowly; it is expressed simply in terms of
catches, quotas. or some particular fishing program. The

kind of fishery management we aim toward, however, is
much broader in scope. In addition te the tradition:
rules on such factors as catch o1 effort, it cons data
collection, storage. and retrieval; tactics of fishing effort
deployment: fishing effort monitoring: management per-
formance measures: fishery development: and improve-
ment of the regulatory regime. Management must con-
sider these items individually. and also. how they relate
to one another. not forgetting the personnel and funds
necessary to make the entire system work. In other
words, any particular option for management is a system
in which all components are identified, each component
is given appropriate consideration, and inter-
relationships among components are planned. Manage-
ment is much more than a plan; it is a system that
develops plans—but it also enabies plans to work

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The design and analysis of particular management
options or management systems are based on certain
general principles. In the section which follows, we will
consider: (1) control and ownership. (2) communication,
and (3) management unit identification.

In analyzing management options or management
systems, we need to consider the degree to which fishing,
is controlled and the character of the group controlling
it. To being with. “boundary” conditions for
management-control and ownership need to be
examined. For example, “zero control” implies that
fishing operates on a laissez-faire basis. By contrast,
“maximum control’ implies a management authority
which controls every fishing action and possibly all
processing as well.

Under zero control. fishing inter would be in-
fluenced by economic coi ms rather than by
regulation. In a “perfect” economy. zero control would,
in fact, be ideal because the amount of fish landed would
be that which consumers desire, and the combined
benefits to both producers and consumers would be
maximized.

The zero-control option implies what is caught is the
optimal] yield, but there are problems which must be
considered

A. If stocks are intensively fished, then the catch per
unit of effort (CPUE) will decline to a point where it
will not be profitable to fish. At the point where
fishing ceases, there should be a residual spawning
stock capable of perpetuating the population.
Although it is not necessarily true that the
“uneconomic point” will negatively affect the
viability of the stock, there is a point of view that
high discount rates will cause an uncontrolled
fishery to have this effect. This is only true,
however, if the value of catch is sufficiently high
relative to the salvage value of the capital in the
fishery, and if there are no alternative uses for the
capital.


NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/NEC -7

This TM series is used for documentation and timely communication of
preliminary results, interim reports, or special purpose information; and

poAMOSay, has not received complete formai review, editorial control, or detailed
¢' Ye. editing

4
con

WATIONAL og
NOuwess'

Northeast Fishery Management

“arent oro Task Force

Methodology for
Identification and Analysis
of Fishery Management
Options

Brian J. Rothschild’, Richard C. Hennemuth2,
Jacob J. Dykstra3, Leo C. Murphy, Jr.4,
John C. Bryson§, and James D. Ackerté®

‘Chesapeake Biological Laboratory, Univ. of Maryland, Box 38, Solomons, MD 20688
2Woods Hole Laboratory, National Marine Fisheries Service, Woods Hole, MA 02543

3Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative Association, Box 730, Point Judith. Ri 02882

+7 Edgedwood Farm Ad., Wakefield, Ri 02879

3Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, Federal Bidg., Rm. 2115, North & New St.'s, Dover, OF 19901
6The Gorton Group, 327 Main St, Gloucester, MA 01930

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Richard A. Frank, Administrator

National Marine Fisheries Service
Terry L. Leitzetl, Assistant Administrator tor Fisheries

Northeast Fisheries Center
Woods Hole, Massachusetts

Cecember 1980


Fishing effort is
deployed, then the
effects are measured

¢ Fishing effort can be
forecast

Stocks of fish are
defined as multi-
species economic units

Stocks of fish are
considered by
individual species

Measures of perfor-
mance need to be made
explicit

Measures of perfor-
mance are not explicit

Partitioning management activities into planning,
management, and control functions will relate the
various stages of the system to one another and promote
further organizational simplicity.

The planning function sets goals or objectives for
r ‘gement and it structures the process for attaining
these goals. Preparation of a fishery management plan is
integral to the planning function. But management must
be more than a relatively simple statement of what can
be caught; a plan for management must address data
collection, the efficiency with which data will be
transformed into management rules, and how the
management process is to be evaluated. Management
must indicate who is to do what and at what time.
Furthermore. as addressed in the section on objectives, it
is not uncommon that a plan, because of the way it is
structured, addresses intuitive and short-term issues
rather than long-term or strategic ones. Intuition, for
example, might tell us that the best way of moving traf-
fic across a river is by bridge. A plan for the bridge is
made. It is an excellent plan and the bridge is beautiful.
However it is later determined that what was really
needed was a tunnel. An expensive experiment! Thus,
the planning function must not only result in good plans;
it must plan the right things.

Any management function is intended to carry out a
plan in an efficient way. The management function uses
conventional management inputs—budget, human
resources. raw materials—to produce a designated
product of the management system. In the case of fishery
management, the public sector utilizes budget, people,
and data to generate a set of management rules under
which fishermen produce fish.

The control function is established to evaluate the
degree to which the management activity conforms to
the plan. In other words, the planning function es-
tablishes a direction and measures of performance for
the management function, while the control function
evaluates the degree to which the management activities
conform to the plan.

It is obvious, then, that fishery management involves
the interrelationship of a great many events. Some are
natural events, such as the occurrence of a large year
class of fish, while others, such as a particular manage-
ment decision, are part of the planning, management,
and control process. If the planning, management, and
control events happen in a reactive and haphazard way,
then management system efficiency will probably be

quite low. If, however, there is planned coordination
among the natural and management events, then the in-
formation generated can be utilized with maximum ef-
ficiency, thus contributing to a more cost-effective
management system.

The most convenient way of handling all of the diverse
components of information, planning, management, and
control is through development of a management infor-
mation system (MIS). Such a system is a systematic
ordering of events enabling management to respond to
their occurrence in the most efficient, cost-effective, and
timely manner. A MIS is part of any management op-
tion, and therefore it needs to be treated explicitly.

Figure 3 is an example of the structure of a MIS.

The successful achievement of management objectives
depencis upon timely and reliable information. Essential
-of-the-art and computer-based management
information system, designed to collect, store, process,
and disseminate a broad range of information for the
North Atlantic area.

The MIS should be designed to handle both non-
biological and biological data, with algorithms to
extrapolate, project trends, and provide alternate
“trade-offs.’’ The system should be oriented to
management-by-exception and timely management
decision-making.

Much of the information put into the system will come
from commercial fishermen. To secure their cooperation,
it will be important to furnish frequent “feedback” on
catch dynamics, trends, trade-offs, etc., to these
fishermen.

The North Atlantic regional system should be
designed to interface with other regional MIS’s and/or
any future national MIS.

It should include:

is a>

* Remote terminal input and output capability

Data-base management system

Variable record length capability

Password and privacy-protection capability

* A scheme for timely updating of files on a continuing
base

A variety of output mediums, e.g.,
© Visual display terminal

* Hard copy

* Microfilm

¢ Plotter

Since the system is intended as a management tool for
the Councils, they must participate in its design and
specifications. including format and content of graphic
and printed output.

IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS

A number of approaches to management have from
time to time been discussed. These include:


should be excluded from analysis. though they need to
be developed further in terms of the mechanisms by;
which they would be executed (e.g.. iease of fish stac!
limited entry: incentive-disincentive taxes: laissez-faire
and ownership certificates). One interesting option is the
creation of a fishery development bank that manages
stocks. finances development. and provides insurance for
resource fluctuations.

Communication is another critical component of
management sysiems: when communication is good,
ideas and concepts are interpreted exactly as intended;
when communication is poor, ideas and concepts are un-
derstood differently than intended. Good communica-
tion permits a mutual understanding of views regarding
the nature of a problem, the kinds of objectives that
must be sought to resolve problems. and the processes
required to attain objectives. If communications are
poor. then situations arise where. for example, a simple
viewpoint is thought to represent a multiplicity of views,
or, on the other hand. a complex of views might be in-
terpreted as a simple idea. Poor communications often
result in fishery managers having an inaccurate view of
their decision environment. For example. suppose there
is a public nearing on whether the size of trawl mesh
should be increased. There are 100 fishermen, but only
three think that mesh size should be increased: 97 do
not. Five fishermen attend the hearing: three are for the
increase and two are against it. The hearing examiner
would naturally assume that most fishermen prefer an
increase in mesh size. Thus. poor communications
between the fishermen and a manageinent agency can
result in the agency having a distorted view of the real
world. It is particularly important to realize that the
decision environment of fishery management requires
frequent and numerous decisions. Because there are so
many decisions in fishery management (even doing
nothing implies a decision to do nothing) it is important
that managers consider the results of similar, previous
decisions. Basing new decisions on experience or infor-
mation from previous decisions is called feedback.
Without proper feedback, errors in decision-making can
be compounded. but with feedback, errors in previous
decisions can often be corrected. The feedback problem
is of special importance in fishery management because
it is the decision-makers who regulate the fishery. Lut
the fishermen who observe directly the effects of
regulations. Most observers agree that communications
between the two groups are generally less than efficient.
Good communications. like good management systems,
will not simply happen: they need to be explicitly plan-
ned and resources must be devoted to ensuring their ade-
quacy.

Another principle that requires considerable thought
is the definition of an appropriate management unit. It is
clear that it will be difficult to consider all of the stocks
that live off the northeast coast of the U.S. as a single
management unit, but what are appropriate units? As
with setting objectives, it is too easy to define units on an
intuitive basis. Logical divisions involve biological,

the

oa

geographic. social. and economic considerations (or any
combination of these).

The criteria for choosing among alternative manage-
ment units should include

* Control

* Management capability

* Economic and social factors

¢ Regional competence of management bodies
* Costs

* Variability

* Net benefits

THE STRUCTURE OF A FISHERY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

As a basis. an option for fishery management should
reflect explicit consideration of the basic components of
a fishing system. The various options or management
systems can be structured around the components.
Figure 2 displays the elements of a fishery management
vstem. The system operates in a time frame. Manage-
ment is defined on the basis of certain stocks at a par-
ticular time. A description of the system must include in
whatever detail is appropriate a description of the
stocks, their population dynamics, and the economic
and social consequences of catching the stocks.

The system must relate to the kinds of data that are
collected, the degree to which the data are represen-
tative, and sample sizes. The data must obviously serve
as an efficient link between the condition of the fish
stocks and the management rules. The management
rules include decisions on the intensity and distribution
of fishing effort. In addition, management rules must
contain formulae for determining the performance of
management in terms of both managers and fishermen.
Performance evaluation of fishermen with regard to
management rules or “enforcement” needs to be part of.
any fishery management system.

As a result of management rules, fishing effort will be
deployed at T and will modify the stocks at time T+1.
New data will be nsed to evaluate the degree to x
ishing complies with ihe gement rules; as a result.
new management rules wil] be defined, and the cycle will
be completed.

Even a preliminary consideration of Figure 2 reveals
some of the problems of present management systems
and potential improvements of those systems:

Present System w System
¢ Time interval one vear

or several months

© Time interval that isa
function of needs

* Data collected need to
be responsive to
management rules

* Data are collected in-
dependent of manage-
ment rules


increasing the demand for fish. If we maximize social
surplus, then for the purpose of our first approximation,
we say that we are being economically efficient. It is im-
portant to note that even if data are not available, the
directional influence of certain management actions on
social surplus can often readily be ascertained.

For example, for some resources, domestic markets are
weak or nonexistent, yet significant foreign markets exist
or could be developed. The export alternative broadens
the consumer sector and may increase the social surplus.

Maximization of social surplus and economic efficien-
cy are just part of the picture. There is also the question
of how the “maximum wealth” is distributed among
members of society; the distribution of wealth is an im-
portant sociological consideration. The social-surplus
calculus provides a first cut at distribution, in that it
spec tt roducers and con The op-
tions beyond this are so numerous 7 special con-
sideration should he given to each fishery

h f
shares uf

At

Optimum Yield, MSY, and Time

It is important to recognize that optimum and
physical yield change with time, and that both are
calculated quantities. Optimum yields are calculated on
the basis of actual or theoretical social values, MSY’s on
the basis of actual historical yields or theoretical biologi-
cal models. The quality of the estimates has important
consequences which must be considered (Figure 1).

Commonly Used Objectives in Fishery Management

In this section. commonly used objectives in fishery
management are discussed relative to the principles for
identification of objectives outlined above.

Some management objectives are phrased in such
terms as “maximizing the overall good to society.” Such
“overdetermined” objectives can be interpreted in many
different ways, and as a practical matter, without
further detailed specification, they are not likely to be
measurable or attainable.

For objectives related to multiple-species fisheries,
there is always a question whether management should
focus on one. several, or all of the species. Analysis of
such a question requires the costs and benefits of each
alternative to be examined. If only some species are in-
cluded in the management strategy and there is no
analysis of the rationale for their inclusion, then there is
a serious danger of suboptimization—that is, optimizing
the management of the selected species, when optimiza-
tion for another set of species, or for all of the species in
the fishery, would yield the maximum net benefit.

Objectives phrased in terms of maintaining a par-
ticular stock size, a minimum stock size, or a particular
number of spawners also cause problems. There is often
little or no theoretical guidance on the appropriate stock
size and if there were, there would be uncertainty as to
when the stock had actually reached the appropriate
theoretical level. In any event, manipulating stock size is
really a method to achieve some social goal.

or

Objectives that are intended to operate over too long a
time period present their own difficulties. For example,
multiple-vyear planning horizons are theoretically ideal,
but the fact must be recognized that the period can be so
long that the risks of planning exceed the benefits. To
take an extreme example, financial planning for the year
2079 involves so much uncertainty that its practical
benefits are difficult to perceive. This problem is
reduced by improvements in our ability to forecast the
future, and by adopting plans that are sufficiently flexi-
ble to accommodate any uncertainty.

It is important to develop alternative objectives. This
is of course much more difficult than criticizing extant
objectives. Since so many objectives tend to be
overdetermined, it is necessary to develop criteria for
setting more practical objectives which are both at-
tainable and « ant with the more phi
“asking the right question” strategic objectives.

Practical objectives are attainable in measurable
terms. It would be difficult to know if many overdeter-
mined objectives were in fact attained simply because
such objectives are often so general as to defy measure-
ment or evaluation

The availability of information is thus one important
criterion for setting the appropriate degree of ‘‘deter-
mination” in an objective. For example, compare two
hypothetical objectives. The first is to catch 10 tons of
fish and the second is to maximize net social benefits.
The information required for the first is simple, but that
required for the second is most complex, so much so in
fact, that an index of net social benefits would be almost
impossible to agree upon.

The best available fishery information is most often
limited when compared to the amount generally thought
to be required for management. Practical objectives
must therefore be consonant with strategic objectives,
but they must also not require information beyond that
readily available unless plans for acquiring more data
and information accompany them. Areas where data
tend to be lacking include stock variability, interspecific
interaction, and the relationship among biological,
economic, and social variables.

As an example of a limited-information approach to
management, consider the following scheme for a shrimp
fishery.’

sephical

a. Examine the extent of the area involved, and estimate,
on the basis of comparison with other areas, the likely
number of trawiers required for operations at the op-
timum level ifor example 50).

b. Issue licenses for the operation of rather Jess than this
optimum number (say 30). A condition of obtaining a
license would be provision of full statistical data on the
operations, including catches of each size of shrimp,
fishing effort. and location of fishing.

c. Allow the operation of these vessels for two or three
years without modification. Then examine the statistical
and other data. assess the stock and obtain a revised es-
timate of the optimum number of y leg 1. This
may be above or below the original estimate



INTRODUCTION

Fisheries management is always difficult, for it
involves many complexities. For example, fish stocks are
naturally variable, making it difficult to predict their
abundance; fishing is often intense, giving the impres-
sion that stocks are overfished; and limited communica-
tion between fishing and reyilatory groups generates
coutinuing conflict ave just some of the dif
ficulties that contribute to the fact that an explicit
multiple-species approach to fishery management has
seldom been pursued.

Prior to 1976, fishery management in what is now the
U.S. conservation zone was not in general addressed
directly; in fact, management tended to be reactive and
piecemeal, lacking overall goals. However, in 1976, the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA)
was passed to alleviate this problem by requiring
strategic decision-making and public participation in
the fishery management process. But, implementation
of these new requirements would be difficult; new and
different management institutions would be needed.

When the FCMA was enacted, the domestic New
England fishery management environment had not been
examined in terms of the complexities that it faces to-
day. The New England Fishery Management Council
had relatively little information for decision-making; it
was thought that many of the stocks were overfished; the
fishery was based on at least 20 species and stocks re-
quiring simultaneous consideration; and fishermen at
different ports had varying objectives, capabilities, and
outlooks. Further complicating the already difficult
fishery management environment, the FCMA specified
rigorous and sometimes abstract conditions for manage-
ment. The New England fisheries catch and effort data
base concentrated on the traditional species. The
research-vessel trawl survey which began in 1963
provided a very valuable fishery-independent set of data
on the fish stocks over the whole region. Certainly one of
the most comprehensive assessment and management
regimes in the world was developed under the Inter-
national Commission for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries (ICNAF). However, two things became ap-
parent very quickly when the Councils began to work.
The delivery of assessment information to the Councils
in the ICNAF format was not meeting the needs of the
more localized domestic management problems; and the
available data on economic and social structure were
neither adequate nor in the right format for easy and
quick application. It was evident that~ the evolving

regulatory regime would be rife with time-consuming,
redundant, and costly paperwork.

The New England Fishery Management Council
began its work on haddock and yellowtail flounder, using
a preliminary management plan prepared by the U.S.
Department of Commerce as a point of departure. Sim-
ple Quotas were in a first attempt to develop
management mea was soon realized, however,
that the desired effects could not be obtained by simple
quotas, and as a result, a number of “patchwork”
procedures were put into place. Even now, additional
temporary procedures are contemplated. The potential
effects of some of these “patchwork” management
measures were unfortunately not always clear when the
measures were adopted, pointing up the need for
analysis and discussion of new management measures,
so that at the very minimum, decision-makers—e.g.,
Council members—have a common understanding of the
complex potential eftects of even simple management
measures.

reser

Given the difficulties of the fishery management en-
vironment, it is not surprising that management in the
U.S. North Atlantic waters operates reactively rather
than strategically. and that the existing management
system is perceived as producing frequent and confusing
regulatory changes. Furthermore, there is a lack of con-
fidence in quotas, data, and stock assessments, and a
general concern with the adequacy of the management
process.

In the face of all of these difficulties, the Councils have
made substantial progress toward development of
management plans. It becomes clear, though, that
management plans by themselves do not ensure a totally
successful fishery-management regime. There are other
components in the system that must be given explicit at-
tention with respect both to their internal workings, and
to the way that they interrelate to various parts of the
system. These parts include statistics gathering,
statistical summarizing, the development of manage-
ment rules and regulations, the deployment of fishing ef-
fort, and enforcement. In addition, it is essential that the
budgetary and human resources of all entities involved
in fishery management—the Councils, the States, the
Research Centers and the Regional Offices of the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)—be brought
to bear in an appropriate fashion to solve the problems of
fishery management.


] ]
| Stocks | Dato Mot nee Stocks Data
of fish -| of —>| Rules Fishing at ar
T T ar T aT T+ T+
Check
Results
|
loy-
Mgt Deploy
ment of
Rulesot -—| —_.).  -— — eicetera
Fishing
TH or T+

Figure 2. Components of a fishery-management system. The figure shows only one cycle
between time T and time T+1. Actually, the system would continue
indefinitely.


d1WLOULId atf) JO MatA [BOTJayJoOdAY wB seats YOY Japout AjIpourutod-AJaysy Y

sIoueW
Asens04

Y ~~

@0ud pue O

19407 puz 10
Werey

ON /

tl
Ns

pueweg sewnsuog,

SOANBWOLY ©
qwend B1eNd +
eouR)sIG +
ewosul +

Puswea 10 s01984

ub}e104 «

sig reuonees90y
eamynoenby +

sty woduiy «

L__| soaneuseny ysy-UON «
uorimusans sejedg «
ewoou «

Aiddng sewnsucg

Pueweg 108se901g

CAupenb=TyAH pur ‘Ayquenb=h
Syuiod Buyivap joywul=qOW ‘eul] Surveys yoyseu="JOW) “apqeylwar
-un Apjuauins are yBuorjesedo Ay[ny japow ayy ayBul oy pasinbes aq pjnom
yey) BBP ay) Jo AuBY] “Japour ayy Jo ysad ayy yoayye japou oy) Jo wed sJeyNIy
-aud Auv Ul SUOISIDap SHOLBA MOY SPa]Jal J] “a]qeyns alow aq yYysiw sjapour
sayy sasodind oytoads 40y ‘sdiysuonejas ayy Jo anyeu ayy Mos 0} paudisap
‘quo [eivuod B st japoul sIy, “Aloysy ayy ut sdiysuorzejasiayur BoIBojo1q pue

ebe01 «
subse +
s0qe1 +
weuded «
peppy
ener

———
jessen-x
eld
Aueno,
don /
ennai

Oe

onsewiog pue ub }e103

Aueno

Wk

pueweg jeuojee1sey

eond
Aneno

Ayuend

TOW

se2}A1eg puy
914984 104
pueweg

puswed 10 s10;984

vac

Aysueg ¥201S—
soqe1—
eydeq—

Std 40 81509

“p analy

s\ebpng—
and}
wwowebeuen

uonezjue6io—
eydoeg—

yndul

juewebeuryy

Aiddng uB}es04

a—

is)

Aiddng je1910uW09,

1101 50

uonesoi1y

puy yo1eD
Weiog

\

Anueno,

[Adaos reuoneess0y

wuewobeuen
Asausis

pausiy | peusyun

849015 40 sMIEIS

yoe9
reuoneeisey

fo

491d,
IeeWWOD

suonemonid
ep
-ueW

reanen

14


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction
Why a Management Syste .
Methodology for the Identification of Management Objectives.......
General Problems of Objective Identification ...
Specific Fishery Objectives

The Greatest Overall Benefit to the Nation ......... 000.0 eee eee

MSY: Eccnomic, Social, and Ecological Deviations . see e ee eee
Optimum Yield, MSY, and Time ..... 6... ese e ee cece eee ee eee
Commonly Used Objectives in Fishery Management .........-+.200-

Design and Analysis of Management Options. .
General Principles .
The Structure of a Fishery Management System ..
Identification of Possible Options

Phase II Implementation

Appendix: Effect of Foreign Fishing ............ 00... c cece eee ee

Footnotes ...

Figures

1 Hypothetical time series showing actual maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) (solid horizontal lines) and estimated MSY (dotted horizontal
lines) for each year; actual optimum yield (OY) (light continuous line)
and estimated OY (dark continuous line) for each year
Components of a fishery management system
Hypothetical output from management information system (MIS)
showing schedule for data synthesis, reports, and various management
ACTIONS cece e cece been teen teen ene e eee neeeeeannas
A fishery commodity model which gives a hypothetical view of the
economic and biological interrelationships in the fishery .............-
The relation between catch-per-unit-of-effort (CPUE) and effort
usually shows a decline in CPUE with increasing fishing effort .........

wo

wo

oe

on

1

14


PREFACE

This document is the result of studies originating within the North-
east Fishery Managern-nc Vask Force. ‘The Task Force, organized in 1979
by the New England and Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Councils and
funded by the NMFS, seeks to promote discussion and dialogue on the
major issues of fishery management and to explore the effects of various
fishery management alternatives.

Composed of representatives from the fishing industry, Regional
Fishery Management Councils, federal and state agencies, academic in-
stitutions, and general public, the Task Force will operate in three phases.
The first phase will assemble background information for identifying and
analyzing management options. The second phase will examine this
background information to determine the data requirements, regulatory
measures, administrative procedures, and enforcement methods
associated with each management option. The third phase will critically
review the various options for application to specific fisheries, particularly
the Atlantic demersal finfish fishery.

This document is one of eight developed under Phase I operations,
all of which are being issued in the NOAA Technical Memorandum
NMFS-F/NEC series. This document and six others functionally serve as
appendixes to the eighth and leading document for Phase I operations—
“Overview Document of the Northeast Fishery Management Task Force,
Phase I.”

Jon A. Gibson, Coordinator
NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/NEC series


Eliminating quotas and managing only on the basis of
closed areas and adjustment of mesh sizes

Providing “tax” incentive and or disincentive to
encourage fishermen to adopt particular management

strategies

Maintaining the status quo

Issuing stock certificates

Laissez-faire

Self management

Establishing a fishery development bank

Limited entry

These approaches will require analysis. and it needs to
be stressed that such approaches are not in themselves
complete management options or management systems,
which require all system components to be describe
from statistics collection through the development of
performance standards as well as cost/benefit analysis.

Choices will need to be made among management
systems or combinations of systems. and these choices
must take into account possible changes in stock struc-
ture or stock abundance and national or global changes
in the -commodity system (see Figure 4—a fisheries
commodity model for forecasting these changes). In ad-
dition, various costs and benefits need to be examined.
Costs include:

* Data costs

Management costs

Enforcement costs

.

Research cos

s

Administrative costs

.

Costs of possible lost benefits to fishermen and con-
sumers

Benefits include:

Tonnage of various kinds of fish

Value of fish ex-vessel and at various levels of the
economy

Nun

>of fishermen and others n.koyment

Consumer surplus

Revenue and profit

In addition to these more-or-less easily quantifiable
criteria, it is important to ass the human impact of
any management system.

10

PHASE II IMPLEMENTATIO.

Implementation of the next stage of the planning
process. Phase II. requires:

¢ Teams to work on each management option: iden-
tification of team leaders; a work plan which makes
the work of each team comparable

A model relating catch of several species to nominal
fishing effort

A first-phase commodity model

* A plan for intercounci! communication

Specifications for a management information system

Development of “‘data-free’’ management procedures

* Detailed discussions on control and “ownership ”

APPENDIX:
EFFECT OF FOREIGN FISHING

In considering “benefits to the nation” it is important
to consider the various alternative uses for fish. The im-
plications of one particular use of fish, allocation of fish
to foreign fishermen, is not commonly understood. Any
allocation of fish to foreign fishermen will generally
represent a cost to domestic fishermen, because a foreign
allocation will increase per-unit-cost of fishing to
domestic fishermen. Even if there is no domestic fishery,
the lowered levels of stock abundance brought about by
foreign fishing may serve as a disincentive for domestic
fishery development.

FOOTNOTES

1. U.S. Government Accounting Office. 1976. The U.S. fishing
industry—present condition and future of marine fisheries.
Vol. 1. Report to Congress by the Comptroller General.

we

The discussion on strategy is based on: (1} Rothschild, B. J.
1973. Questions of strategy in fishery management and
development. J. Fish. Res. Board Can. 30:2017-2030; (2)
Gross. B. 1971. Management strategy for economic and
social development. Part I. Policy Sci. 2: 329-371, and (3)
Management strategy for economic and social
Part Il, Policy Se. si -25

fier

Go velopmne

3. Gulland. J. A. 1972. Some introductory guidelines to
management of shrimp fisheries. U.N. Indian Ocean
Program Rep. No. JOFC/DEV/72/24. 12 p



PLANNING

MGT.
ACTIVITIES

CONTROL
ACTIVITIES

GATHERING AND

ACTIVITIES

DISSEMINATION

ees en eee a eee ee |

PRODUCTION AND REVISION OF MANAGEMENT PLANS
©

REPORTS ON PLANNING FOR PLAN IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPRO\
oe Sa el *- 2 oe e

MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS
000 @ oO aa
VARIOUS MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
® o 0-o-@ >
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
. oO — Yo ——® - oo $$ i>
PERFORMANCE EVAWATIONS
ad

DaTA oN MANAGEMENT COSTS.

° * >
DATA ON CATCH
DATA ON FISHING EFFORT
DATA ON STOCK ABUNDANCE
TIME >

Figure 3. Hypothetical output from management information system (MIS) showing
schedule for data synthesis, reports, and various management actions. The
solid circles represent regularly scheduled events and the open circles represent
events that are timed on the basis of other events. The systematic arrangement
permits coordination of all the events and tends to maximize the effectiveness
of the decision process.

13