GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

HOMELAND 

DEFENSE 

Planning, Resourcing, 

and Training Issues 

Challenge DOD’s 

Response to Domestic 

Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, 

and High-Yield 

Explosive Incidents 

October 2009 

GAO-10-123 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

October 2009

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues Challenge 

DOD's Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive 

Incidents

Highlights of GAO-10-123, a report to 

congressional requesters 

DOD plays a support role in 

managing Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and HighYield Explosives (CBRNE) 

incidents, including providing 

capabilities to save lives, alleviate 

hardship or suffering, and minimize 

property damage. This report 

addresses the extent to which 

(1) DOD’s CBRNE consequence 

management plans and capabilities 

are integrated with other federal 

plans; (2) DOD has planned for and 

structured its force to provide 

CBRNE consequence management 

assistance; (3) DOD’s CBRNE 

Consequence Management 

Response Forces (CCMRF) are 

prepared for their mission; and 

(4) DOD has CCMRF funding plans 

that are linked to requirements for 

specialized CBRNE capabilities. 

GAO reviewed DOD’s plans for 

CBRNE consequence management 

and documents from the 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and FEMA. GAO also met 

with officials from the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense, U.S Northern Command, 

the military services, the National 

Guard Bureau, and some CCMRF 

units. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations 

to DOD to improve the link 

between DOD and other federal 

plans, match capabilities with 

requirements, increase readiness, 

and improve oversight of CCMRF 

funding and resourcing. DOD 

agreed or partially agreed with the 

recommendations and cited 

ongoing or planned actions to 

implement them. 

DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not 

integrated them with other federal plans because those federal entities have 

not completed all elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by 

Presidential directive in December 2007. The system is to develop and link 

planning documents at the federal, state, and local levels. While the system’s 

framework is established, the CBRNE concept and strategic plans that 

provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD has had operational plans in 

place and revises these plans regularly. However, until the Integrated Planning 

System and its associated plans are complete, DOD’s plans and those of other 

federal and state entities will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear 

whether DOD’s CCMRF will address potential gaps in capabilities. We 

previously recommended and DHS agreed that FEMA should develop a 

program management plan and schedule to complete the planning system. 

With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic CBRNE 

incidents, DOD has plans to provide needed capabilities, but its response 

times may not meet incident requirements, it may lack sufficient capacity in 

some capabilities, and it faces challenges to its strategy for sourcing all three 

CCMRFs with available units. Without assigned units and plans that integrate 

the active and reserve portions of CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and 

the states on availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which 

they would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DOD’s ability to 

train and deploy forces in a timely manner is at risk. 

DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the readiness 

of units assigned to the first CCMRF, increasing both individual and collective 

training focused on the mission and identifying the mission as high priority. 

However, the CCMRF has not conducted realistic full force field training to 

confirm units’ readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. 

Competing demands of overseas missions may distract from a unit’s focus on 

the domestic mission, and some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than 

stated goals. These training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD 

from providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build 

cohesiveness. 

DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment 

to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to identify all 

requirements have not been completed, and funding responsibilities are 

spread across the department and are not subject to central oversight. When 

the CCMRF mission priority increased in the spring of 2008, more funding was 

provided. However, units did not have dedicated funding and thus purchased 

equipment with funding also used for other missions. DOD lacks visibility over 

total funding requirements. Without an overarching approach to requirements 

and funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have 

been identified and funded, DOD’s ability to ensure that its forces are 

prepared to carry out this high-priority mission remains challenged. 

View GAO-10-123 or key components.

For more information, contact Davi D'Agostino 

at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-10-123 

Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 7 

DOD Has Its Own CBRNE Consequence Management Plans in 

Place but is Unable to Fully Integrate Them with Other Federal 

Plans, Which Are Incomplete 14 

DOD’s Planned Response to CBRNE Incidents May Be Insufficient 20 

DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness, but 

Training Gaps and Conflicting Priorities May Degrade 

Performance 24 

CCMRF Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed, and 

Funding and Oversight Are Decentralized 33 

Conclusions 37 

Recommendations for Executive Action 38 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 46 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 50 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 56 

Related GAO Products 57 

Tables 

Table 1: Fifteen National Planning Scenarios Grouped into Eight 

Scenario Sets 16 

Table 2: Status of Development for CBRNE-Related Plans Called 

for under HSPD-8 Annex 1, Utilizing the Integrated 

Planning System (as of July 2009) 17 

Table 3: Estimate of Potential Lifesaving Decontamination 

Requirements Compared with Likely Capabilities for a 10 

Kiloton Nuclear Detonation in a Major Metropolitan City In 

the First 72 Hours after Incident 21 

Table 4: Selected CBRNE Individual Training Tasks 25 

Homeland Defense 
Table 5: CCMRF Mission Costs and Funding Sources 35 

Figures 

Figure 1: DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Organizations 

under Federal and State Control 10 

Figure 2: Approximate Response Time Frames for Military CBRNE 

Consequence Management 13 

Abbreviations 

CBIRF Chemical Biological Incident, Response Force 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

 explosive 

CCMRF CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command 

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Page ii GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
Page 1 GAO-10-123 

r, 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

October 7, 2009 

Congressional Requesters 

The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security highlighted the 

continuing threat posed to the United States by the potential use of 

weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations.1

 In addition to 

efforts focused on preventing such attacks, the strategy highlights the 

need for a comprehensive capability to mitigate the consequences of an 

attack involving weapons of mass destruction. Such a capability is also a 

key pillar of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction.

2

 The Department of Defense (DOD) characterizes weapons 

of mass destruction in terms of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclea

and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) materials. Incidents involving CBRNE 

could range in magnitude, from such things as accidents like chemical 

spills that likely could be addressed by local responders to catastrophic 

incidents such as terrorist attacks involving nuclear material that could 

result in extraordinary levels of casualties and property damage. 

A catastrophic CBRNE-related incident occurring within the United States 

would require a unified, national response, including action by DOD. The 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating 

federal disaster response planning, with the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) serving as the primary federal agency under 

DHS for coordinating federal assistance in response to an incident. DOD 

would act in support of the primary federal agency. In addition to 

establishing CBRNE response units in the National Guard, including the 

Civil Support Teams and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages, 

DOD is establishing CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces 

(CCMRF). A CCMRF is roughly a brigade-sized force (approximately 4,500 

troops) that provides federal military assistance when a CBRNE incident 

exceeds local and state capabilities. DOD relies on its existing force 

structure, which it refers to as “dual-capability forces,” to support the 

domestic CBRNE consequence management mission as well as overseas 

missions. 

1

Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 2007). 

2

White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, 

D.C.: Dec. 2002). 

Homeland Defense 
 

In May 2006, we reported that the National Guard Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Civil Support Teams were generally organized and prepared 

for their mission, and we highlighted management challenges that needed 

to be addressed.3

 In response to your request that we assess DOD’s federal 

role in CBRNE consequence management efforts, we initiated a review 

focusing on federal military planning and preparedness efforts and 

CCMRF. Our objectives for this report address the extent to which 

(1) DOD’s plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal 

government plans to address capability requirements, (2) DOD has 

planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence 

management assistance, (3) DOD’s CCMRF are prepared to perform their 

mission, and (4) DOD has funding plans for CCMRF that are linked to 

requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. As agreed with your 

offices, we will conduct a review of the operational effectiveness of the 

National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (commonly 

referred to as CERFP) as a follow-on effort. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for CBRNE 

consequence management operations and has integrated its plans with 

other federal government plans, we reviewed and compared current DOD 

operational- and tactical-level plans for civil support and CBRNE 

consequence management with existing FEMA and DHS planning efforts. 

We also met with officials of DHS, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM). We reviewed our prior reports and worked with other 

GAO staff currently examining the overall domestic homeland security 

planning integration process. To determine how prepared CCMRF is to 

perform the mission, we compared existing DOD policy and practices on 

readiness with the current process used to prepare CCMRF units and 

report mission readiness. We also met with U.S. Joint Forces Command 

and U.S. Army Forces Command—which are responsible for providing 

ready forces to the combatant commands—to discuss the manpower 

sourcing process followed for CCMRF. We obtained readiness reports for 

CCMRF units from U.S. Northern Command and from judgmentally 

selected units that were part of task force operations—which contain most 

of the specialized capabilities. To determine CCMRF funding planning and 

the linkage of funding to mission requirements, we met with Army and 

 

3

GAO, Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams’ 

Mission and Address Management Challenges, GAO-06-498 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 

2006). 

Page 2 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

U.S. Northern Command officials to obtain guidance on the topic and to 

discuss mission requirements, funding needs, and sources. We compared 

funding sources to known CBRNE consequence management 

requirements and highlighted areas where funding was not identified for 

key activities or areas relevant to unit preparedness. We also met with the 

National Guard Bureau to discuss their current capabilities, identified 

shortfalls, and approach to mitigating any identified shortfalls. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to October 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

DOD has its own operational plans for CBRNE consequence management 

but is unable to fully integrate them with other federal government plans 

because other federal departments and agencies have not completed all 

elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential 

directive in December 2007. The Integrated Planning System is intended to 

provide a framework to link the family of related U.S. preparedness 

planning documents at the federal, regional, state, and local levels and is 

to include strategic guidance statements, strategic plans, concepts of 

operations, and operations plans related to the 15 National Planning 

Scenarios.4

 The Integrated Planning System’s framework is in place. 

However, many federal plans that would link with DOD’s plans are 

incomplete. DOD and NORTHCOM have had operational plans in place 

and continue to review and revise these plans as part of DOD’s wellestablished joint planning process. However, until all federal plans are 

complete and specific national guidance is issued, DOD plans and those of 

other federal and state entities will not be integrated, and it will remain 

unclear whether DOD’s CCMRF will address potential gaps in capabilities. 

While there are a number of efforts to develop capability assessments at 

local, state, and federal levels, these efforts are not yet sufficiently mature 

to provide DOD with complete data to shape its CBRNE response. 

Results in Brief 

 

4

 The 15 National Planning Scenarios have been grouped in 8 scenario sets of similar 

characteristics. For example, the 4 National Planning Scenarios related to chemical 

incidents have been grouped together. Concept and operation plans are being developed 

for the 8 scenario sets. 

Page 3 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

Additionally, DHS and FEMA face challenges in obtaining complete and 

consistent data from the states. We previously recommended and DHS 

agreed that FEMA should develop a program management plan and 

schedule for completing the Integrated Planning System process. We are 

recommending that in the absence of completed and integrated plans, 

DOD work with DHS, FEMA, and other interagency partners to agree on 

(1) interim goals, objectives, and assumptions for DOD’s role in 

responding to one or more simultaneously occurring CBRNE incidents in 

the United States and (2) the specific types and quantities of capabilities 

DOD is expected to contribute and the time frames in which those 

capabilities are to be provided. 

DOD has plans for providing the needed capabilities for CBRNE 

consequence management, but its response may be insufficient because 

(1) its planned time frames for responding may not meet incident 

requirements, (2) the quantity of some key capabilities included in CCMRF 

may be inadequate, and (3) challenges remain in force structure plans and 

sourcing CCMRF. First, DOD’s goal is to source three CCMRFs and be able 

to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE incidents. Its plans call 

for the first force to be capable of providing consequence management 

support within 48-96 hours of being notified of a CBRNE incident. 

However, multiple DOD estimates for some of the more catastrophic 

scenarios, such as a nuclear detonation, suggest that planned response 

times may not meet incident requirements. Second, even after its arrival, 

DOD’s planned force has limited quantities of some needed life-saving 

capabilities, such as medical and decontamination assets that can 

contribute to meeting incident requirements. DOD recognizes it may need 

additional units to augment this force, but specific units that would be 

needed to augment CCMRF have not been identified. Unless these units 

are identified in advance and trained for the mission, they may be unable 

to deploy rapidly. Finally, the demands of overseas military operations and 

DOD’s approach to aligning units to the command responsible for carrying 

out CBRNE operations present challenges for training, assembling, and 

deploying CCMRFs. Whereas DOD originally intended CCMRFs to be 

composed entirely of federal active military forces, it now plans to form 

the second and third CCMRFs primarily with National Guard and Army 

Reserve units due to the unavailability of sufficient number of active 

forces to meet requirements. DOD and the governors are developing 

agreements to address how to ensure that National Guard units will be 

available to meet the federal requirements of CCMRF, but those 

agreements are not all in place. DOD also recently reversed its previous 

decision and will only place CCMRF units under NORTHCOM’s direct 

authority in the event of an incident or for specified training events, rather 

Page 4 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

than assigning them to NORTHCOM throughout the period that units are 

on the mission. As a result, NORTHCOM will have less direct authority to 

control domestic deployment availability, manage day-to-day training, and 

monitor the readiness of the units responsible for carrying out the CBRNE 

mission. The combination of these factors place DOD’s ability to organize, 

train, and deploy adequate forces to assist civil authorities in the event of 

one or more major CBRNE incidents at risk. We are recommending that 

(1) DOD align plans for all CCMRFs with stated objectives, to include the 

extent to which existing CCMRF capabilities contribute to identified 

response requirements and mission goals and (2) DOD work with the state 

governors through the adjutants general and the National Guard Bureau to 

create a long-term plan for sourcing CCMRF and ensure that the 

agreements being established between DOD and state governors include 

specific terms on National Guard force availability and duty and response 

status. 

In the last year, DOD has taken a number of actions to improve the 

readiness of units that were assigned to the first CCMRF, including 

increased training and priority for additional personnel and equipment. 

Nevertheless, our review showed that CCMRF could be limited in its 

ability to successfully conduct consequence management operations 

because (1) it does not conduct realistic full-force field training to confirm 

units’ readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly, and (2) 

conflicting priorities between the CCMRF mission and overseas 

deployments affect some units’ mission preparation and unit cohesion. 

First, before designated units assume the CBRNE mission, they must be 

certified that they are trained to perform that mission, but there is no 

requirement to provide these units with a full-force tactical field training 

exercise or to demonstrate that they will be able to meet the required 

response times once they are assigned to the mission. Although units 

generally conduct this type of training prior to an overseas deployment 

and some elements of CCMRF have participated in field exercises, these 

exercises often did not include some critical units or were conducted 

several months after units had already been certified. Without 

requirements to provide field training for the full CCMRF that include an 

assessment of the ability to deploy on no-notice, as may be the case for an 

actual CBRNE incident, DOD cannot be assured that individual units that 

do not normally operate together will be able to operate as a unified force. 

In addition, the shift away from assigning CCMRF units directly to 

NORTHCOM exacerbates this problem, since the NORTHCOM 

commander will have less direct oversight of the training and readiness of 

the forces he will command in a CBRNE incident. Second, while DOD has 

identified CCMRF as a high priority, competing demands associated with 

Page 5 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

follow-on overseas missions may distract from a unit’s focus on the 

domestic mission. For example, Army units are frequently given the 

CCMRF mission when they return from an overseas deployment. Because 

these units are in the “reset” or reconstitution phase of the Army force 

generation model, they often lack personnel and equipment. Other critical 

CCMRF units have been unable to meet the first CCMRF’s rotation goal, 

that is, remain on the mission for at least 12 months. As a result, the 

replacement units that have finished out these rotations have missed 

important joint training opportunities. These training and force rotation 

problems have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to the 

force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. We are recommending 

that DOD (1) include in the CCMRF training program requirements to 

ensure that the entire CCMRF conducts a joint field training exercise as 

part of its mission validation and that the entire CCMRF conduct at least 

one no-notice deployment readiness exercise annually and (2) determine 

the time needed by units to perform the necessary pre-mission CCMRF 

training and examine sourcing options that would ensure that units have 

adequate time to train prior to mission assumption. 

DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and 

equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to 

identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its 

approach to providing program funding has been fragmented and is not 

subject to central oversight. In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority for the 

CCMRF mission increased substantially within the department, and more 

funding was provided. For example, NORTHCOM plans more than 

$33 million for two major exercises in its fiscal year 2010 training program, 

and the Army Reserve has planned over $37 million for fiscal years 2009 

and 2010 to fund additional full-time personnel and training days that have 

been authorized to support the CCMRF mission. However, the initial 

CCMRF established on October 1, 2008, did not have fully defined funding 

requirements or the necessary dedicated resources to effectively carry out 

the CCMRF mission in an integrated and consistent manner. Moreover, 

other important requirements for this mission, such as essential equipment 

requirements for unique nonstandard equipment, have not been fully 

identified and funded. DOD officials told us they are in the process of 

developing these requirements and hope to have them for the next rotation 

that begins in October 2009. While the military services have not always 

budgeted funds specifically for the CCMRF mission, units have purchased 

mission equipment with funding from other sources that may not be 

available in the future. Moreover, units also fund their CCMRF-related 

training activities from their operations and maintenance accounts, which 

are developed without considering the CCMRF mission. As a result, unit 

Page 6 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

officials sometimes reallocate funding initially intended for other purposes 

to meet the CCMRF mission. Because DOD has assigned funding 

responsibilities across the department and much of the funding is being 

provided from existing operations and maintenance accounts, DOD lacks 

visibility across the department for the total funding requirements for this 

mission. Without an overarching approach and funding strategy for linking 

requirements to funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all 

requirements have been identified and fully funded, DOD’s ability to 

ensure in advance that its forces are prepared to carry out this highpriority mission efficiently and effectively could be challenged. We are 

recommending that DOD (1) determine the total requirements for CCMRF, 

including unique nonstandard equipment requirements, and develop a plan 

on how those requirements will be filled and (2) develop an overall 

funding strategy for establishing, fielding, and exercising CCMRF and 

designate a single focal point for coordinating this strategy. 

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report and provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated into the final report as 

appropriate. DOD agreed or partially agreed with all our recommendations 

and described actions it is taking or plans to take to implement them. A 

summary of DOD’s comments and a summary of our response to these 

comments follow the Recommendations for Executive Action section of 

this report. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix II. DHS 

also reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated into the final report as appropriate. 

DOD plays a support role in CBRNE consequence management, including 

providing those capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship or 

suffering, and minimize property damage caused by the incident. DOD 

generally provides defense support of civil authorities only when (1) state, 

local, and other federal resources are overwhelmed or unique military 

capabilities are required; (2) assistance is requested by the primary federal 

agency; or (3) NORTHCOM is directed to do so by the President or the 

Secretary of Defense.5

 DOD has designated NORTHCOM6 to lead the 

Background 

 

5

DHS, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2008), and Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2007). 

Page 7 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

federal military7 portion of such a support operation in direct support of 

another federal agency—most often FEMA. DOD could be the lead federal 

agency for CBRNE consequence management or any other civil support 

mission only if so designated by the President.8

 To be effective, 

NORTHCOM’s efforts must support a wide range of federal departments 

and agencies—including FEMA and the Departments of Health and Human 

Services and Justice—in order to support 50 states, the District of 

Columbia, six territories, and hundreds of city and county governments. 

The National Response Framework establishes the principles that guide 

all response partners in preparing for and providing a unified national 

response to disasters. 9

 Under the Framework, disaster response is tiered; 

local governments and agencies typically respond immediately following 

an incident. When additional resources are required, states may provide 

assistance with their own resources or may request assistance from other 

states through interstate mutual agreements or the Emergency 

Management Assistance Compact.10 Localities and states usually respond 

within the first several hours of a major incident. The federal government 

provides assistance to states if they require additional capabilities and they 

request assistance. In the event of a catastrophic incident, such as one 

 

6

United States Northern Command, established in 2002, has the dual mission of homeland 

defense and support of civil authorities. NORTHCOM leads efforts in its area of 

responsibility which includes the continental United States and Alaska. The United States 

Pacific Command leads DOD’s civil support efforts in Hawaii and other U.S. Pacific 

territories. 

7

This does not include U.S. Coast Guard forces, which are under DHS, or the National 

Guard, which, unless federalized by the President, would remain under the authority of the 

respective state and territory governors. 

8

Under DOD’s immediate response provision, local commanders are authorized to take the 

necessary actions to respond to local civil authorities without higher headquarter approval 

when a civil emergency may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human 

suffering, or mitigate property damage. 

9

DHS, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2008). The National 

Response Framework—previously known as the National Response Plan—is the plan that 

guides how federal, state, local, and tribal governments, along with nongovernmental and 

private sector entities, will collectively respond to and recover from all hazards, including 

catastrophic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. 

10Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a mutual aid agreement among member 

states and is administered by the National Emergency Management Association. States 

affected by disasters have increasingly relied on the compact as a means to access 

resources from other states, including emergency managers, National Guard assets, and 

first responders. GAO, Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC’s 

Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve National Disaster Response, 

GAO-07-854 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007). 

Page 8 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

involving CBRNE, the framework also calls for federal response partners 

to anticipate the need for their capabilities before their assistance is 

requested. The framework lists 15 emergency support functions and 

designates federal lead agencies in areas such as search and rescue, public 

health and medical services, and transportation. DOD is a supporting 

agency for all 15 emergency support functions but is also one of the 

primary agencies for search and rescue and public works and 

engineering.11 Additional tools to guide response efforts are provided by 

The National Preparedness Guidelines, including National Planning 

Scenarios, Target Capability Lists and Universal Target Lists, and national 

priorities. 

The federal government has a wide array of capabilities and resources that 

can be made available to assist state and local agencies in responding to 

incidents. NORTHCOM would command the federalized DOD capabilities 

and coordinate the efforts of state controlled DOD capabilities. Figure 1 

shows the organizational structure of key DOD CBRNE Consequence 

Management Organizations under federal and state control. 

 

11The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the DOD agent responsible for public works and 

engineering. 

Page 9 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

Figure 1: DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Organizations under Federal and State Control 

Army North/ 

Joint Forces

Land 

Component 

Commander

Fleet Forces

Command/Joint 

Force Maritime 

Component 

Commander

Marine Forces

North

Air Forces North/ 

Joint Force Air 

Component 

Commander

Joint Force

HeadquartersState

State Adjutant 

Generals

State Task 

Forces

Joint Task Force 

Civil Support

Task Force 

Headquarters

Task Force 

Headquarters

National Guard 

Bureau

President of the United States

Secretary of Defense

NORTHCOM

Task Force 

Operations

Task Force 

Medical

Task Force 

Aviation

Organizations for which NORTHCOM provides coordination

Units designated for the CCMRF would come under one of these task forces

Source: GAO analysis of NORTHCOM information.

In framing its role in providing CBRNE consequence management 

assistance, DOD has set its standard of preparedness as the ability to 

prepare for and mitigate the effects of multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE 

Page 10 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

events.12 DOD has significant capabilities that could be used to augment a 

federal CBRNE response and also contributes to the organization, training, 

and equipping of several state-controlled military units focused on 

consequence management, including the following. 

• The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support 

Teams. These 22-person units are composed of full time National 

Guard personnel and are located in each state and territory.13 Their 

mission is to assist civil authorities in responding to actual or 

suspected CBRNE incidents by identifying agents and substances, 

assessing consequences, advising civil authorities on response 

measures, and assisting with requests for additional support. The 

teams are under the control of the governors of their respective states 

and territories unless they are activated for federal service, at which 

time they would come under the control of DOD. 

• The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages. 

Each of these larger force packages (about 200 soldiers) is composed 

of personnel from numerous existing National Guard units; these 

personnel remain in the same status as most National Guard personnel 

and must be mobilized for duty. Their mission is to provide follow-on 

assistance in such areas as casualty search and extraction; patient 

decontamination; and emergency medical triage, treatment, and 

stabilization. There are currently 17 authorized response force 

packages, including at least one in each of the 10 FEMA regions of the 

country. Like the Civil Support Teams, the force packages are intended 

to be part of the state response to an incident and therefore remain 

under the control of the respective governors. States that do not have 

this capability can access these force packages through preestablished 

agreements. In rare instances, the force packages can also be 

federalized and placed under DOD authority. 

• The DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces 

(CCMRF). These forces, when fully established, are intended to be 

three brigade-sized forces (approximately 4,500) that provide federal 

military assistance when a CBRNE incident exceeds local and state 

capabilities, including the National Guard forces described previously. 

 

12U.S. Northern Command, Department of Defense Homeland Defense and Civil Support 

Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0 (Oct. 2007), p. 43. 

13California has two Civil Support Teams. New York and Florida are each currently 

establishing a second team. 

Page 11 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

The CCMRFs are comprised of many individual units that are of 

different types and sizes (for example, platoons, companies, battalions, 

and brigades), from multiple military services and DOD agencies, from 

the active, reserve, and National Guard, and are geographically 

dispersed throughout the United States. The response force is intended 

to provide assistance in such areas as command and control, technical 

search and rescue, explosive ordnance disposal, aviation evacuation, 

medical response, and CBRNE detection and decontamination. DOD’s 

stated requirement is to have three of these forces. An important 

element of the first CCMRF is the unique capabilities provided by the 

Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), which is a U.S. 

Marine Corps unit consisting of about 400 personnel that assist local, 

state, or federal agencies and designated combatant commanders in 

the conduct of CBRNE consequence management operations. CBIRF 

maintains capabilities for agent detection and identification, casualty 

search, rescue, personnel decontamination, and emergency medical 

care and stabilization of contaminated personnel. Plans call for CBIRF 

to respond as part of the lead element for the first of three CCMRFs. 

DOD originally intended for all three to be comprised strictly of active 

duty military units. However, DOD’s current plan is to have the first 

force, established October 1, 2008, be comprised predominately of 

active duty military units. The second and third response forces, which 

are scheduled to be fielded on October 1, 2009, and October 1, 2010, 

respectively, are expected to be comprised mostly of National Guard 

and Army Reserve units. DOD is currently working with the states and 

the National Guard Bureau on incorporating these units into the 

structure of the response forces. 

Figure 2 shows the approximate time frames for response to a CBRNE 

incident involving the forces discussed above. 

Page 12 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

Figure 2: Approximate Response Time Frames for Military CBRNE Consequence 

Management 

National Guard WMD Civil 

Support Teams Response

National Guard CBRNE Enhanced 

Response Force Packages

DOD CCMRF

CBRNE 

Incident

12 hours 24 hours 48 hours 96 hours

Source: GAO analysis of NORTHCOM information.

With the exception of key specialized capabilities, such as the National 

Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, DOD relies on 

its “dual-capability forces” to provide all other CBRNE consequence 

management capabilities in addition to existing overseas missions. The 

CCMRFs—the only force listed above that is not under the control of state 

governors and adjutants general—is composed of forces that will come 

under the operational control of NORTHCOM in the event of an incident. 

The force is organized for a CBRNE incident under three task forces: 

• Task Force Operations, which is to coordinate with local emergency 

responders; conduct decontamination operations; survey, monitor, and 

mark incident sites; provide security for DOD forces; and command 

and control of DOD general support operations, mortuary affairs, and 

transportation. 

• Task Force Medical, which is to provide triage and treatment, 

definitive care, medical logistics, hospital augmentation, 

epidemiological support, agent technical support, stress management, 

preventative medicine, veterinary support, and prophylaxis and 

immunization (primarily in support of CCMRF personnel). 

• Task Force Aviation, which is to provide medical evacuation, medical 

lift capability, air transport personnel, air transport supplies, search 

and rescue, and limited aircraft maintenance. 

Page 13 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

The Joint Task Force Civil Support is the command element that provides 

command and control for the first CCMRF. Joint Task Force Civil Support 

is a subordinate command of U.S. Army North (also the Joint Force Land 

Component Commander), which is the Army component command of 

NORTHCOM. Joint Task Force Civil Support is a permanent standing task 

force that has been in existence since 1999 and plans and integrates DOD 

support to the designated lead federal agency for domestic CBRNE 

consequence management operations. When directed by the NORTHCOM 

Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support will deploy to the incident 

site, establish command and control of the first CCMRF or other 

designated DOD forces, and direct military consequence management 

operations in support of civil authorities. Additional command and control 

organizations are being established for the second and third CCMRFs. 

DOD has operational plans for CBRNE consequence management. 

However, DOD has not integrated its plans with other federal government 

plans because the concept and strategic plans associated with the 

Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in 

December 2007 have not been completed. 

DOD Has Its Own 

CBRNE Consequence 

Management Plans in 

Place but is Unable to 

Fully Integrate Them 

with Other Federal 

Plans, Which Are 

Incomplete 

DOD Has Developed Plans 

for CBRNE Consequence 

Management 

Unlike most federal agencies, DOD has had CBRNE consequence 

management operational plans for over 10 years. DOD, NORTHCOM, and 

its components have prepared individual plans that address CBRNE 

consequence management following DOD’s well-established joint 

operation planning process.14 This process establishes objectives, assesses 

threats, identifies capabilities needed to achieve the objectives in a given 

environment, and ensures that capabilities (and the military forces to 

deliver those capabilities) are distributed to ensure mission success. Joint 

operation planning also includes assessing and monitoring the readiness of 

 

14One of the primary joint doctrine documents that lays out DOD guidance for joint 

operation planning is Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning 

(Dec. 26, 2006). 

Page 14 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

those units providing the capabilities for the missions they are assigned. 

DOD and NORTHCOM routinely review and update their plans as part of 

DOD’s joint planning system. For example, the most recent NORTHCOM 

CBRNE consequence management plan was completed in October 2008. 

DOD and NORTHCOM have also developed such planning documents as 

execute orders that are key to linking immediate action to those plans, as 

well as scenario-based playbooks to guide the planning, operations, and 

command and control of military forces for CBRNE efforts. 

Governmentwide 

Integrated Planning 

System Is under 

Development but Not Yet 

Complete 

DHS is leading a governmentwide effort to develop an Integrated Planning 

System that would link the plans of all federal agencies involved in 

incident response, including DOD’s; however, this effort is not yet 

complete.15 While much in the way of federal guidance has been 

developed, to be most effective, policy documents must be operationalized 

by further detailing roles and responsibilities for each entity that may be 

involved in responding to high-risk or catastrophic incidents. 

In December 2007, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1, 

mandated that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with 

the heads of other federal agencies with roles in homeland security, 

develop an Integrated Planning System to provide common processes for 

all of the entities developing response plans.16 The Integrated Planning 

System is intended to provide a framework to link the family of related 

U.S. preparedness planning documents at the federal, regional, state, and 

local levels that are called for in the directive, such as strategic plans, 

concepts of operations plans, and operations plans related to the 15 

National Planning Scenarios. DHS has grouped the 15 national planning 

scenarios on which preparedness plans are to be based into 8 scenario 

sets, of which 5 are CBRNE-related. Each of the scenarios, listed in table 1, 

 

15The full National Response Framework is also not yet completed. Partner guides, 

incident annexes for terrorism and cyber incidents, and the incident annex supplement for 

catastrophic disasters remain incomplete. 

16White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1, National Planning 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007). 

Page 15 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

includes a description, assumptions, and likely effects, so that entities at 

all levels can use them to guide planning.17

Table 1: Fifteen National Planning Scenarios Grouped into Eight Scenario Sets 

Scenario set National planning scenarios 

1. Explosives Attack—Bombing Using Improvised 

Explosive Device

Scenario 12: Explosives Attack—Bombing Using Improvised 

Explosive Device 

2. Nuclear Attack Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation—Improvised Nuclear Device 

3. Radiological Attack—Radiological Dispersal Device Scenario 11: Radiological Attack—Radiological Dispersal Device 

4. Biological Attack—with annexes for different 

pathogens

Scenario 2: Biological Attack—Aerosol Anthrax 

Scenario 4: Biological Attack—Plague 

Scenario 13: Biological Attack—Food Contamination 

Scenario 14: Biological Attack—Foreign Animal Disease 

5. Chemical Attack—with annexes for different agents Scenario 5: Chemical Attack—Blister Agent 

Scenario 6: Chemical Attack—Toxic Industrial Chemicals 

Scenario 7: Chemical Attack—Nerve Agent 

Scenario 8: Chemical Attack—Chlorine Tank Explosion 

6. Natural Disaster—with annexes for different disasters Scenario 9: Natural Disaster—Major Earthquake 

Scenario 10: Natural Disaster—Major Hurricane 

7. Cyber Attack Scenario 15: Cyber Attack 

8. Pandemic Influenza Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak—Pandemic Influenza 

Source: DHS. 

The directive required that the Integrated Planning System be submitted to 

the President for approval within 2 months of the directive’s issuance in 

December 2007. As we have reported, the Integrated Planning System was 

approved in January 2009 by former President Bush, but is currently under 

review by the new administration, and no time frame for its publication 

has been announced.18 The approval of the CBRNE plans required under 

the directive (see table 2 below) would be a step toward unifying and 

integrating the nation’s planning efforts. For example, for each National 

Planning Scenario, a strategic guidance statement is intended to establish 

 

17The 15 National Planning Scenarios have been grouped in 8 scenario sets of similar 

characteristics. For example, the 4 National Planning Scenarios related to chemical 

incidents have been grouped together. Concept and operation plans are being developed 

for the 8 scenario sets. 

18GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and 

Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts, GAO-09-369 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 30, 2009). 

Page 16 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

the nation’s strategic priorities and national objectives and to describe an 

envisioned end-state. Strategic guidance statements will have 

corresponding strategic plans, which are intended to define roles, 

authorities, responsibilities, and mission-essential tasks. Under each 

strategic plan, a concept of operations plan will be developed, and federal 

agencies are further required to develop operations plans to execute their 

roles and responsibilities under the concept of operations plan. 

As of July 2009, strategic guidance statements have been approved for all 

five CBRNE-related scenario sets. Four of the five required strategic plans 

have also been completed. The remaining strategic plan (chemical attack) 

was begun in June 2009 upon the approval of the strategic guidance 

statement for that scenario. One of the five required overall federal 

concept plans—that for terrorist use of explosives attack—has been 

completed. Table 2 shows the status of federal CBRNE strategy and plans 

called for under Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8 

Annex 1. 

Table 2: Status of Development for CBRNE-Related Plans Called for under HSPD-8 Annex 1, Utilizing the Integrated Planning 

System (as of July 2009) 

DHS and Interagency Incident 

Management Planning Team FEMA 

Federal departments and 

agencies 

Planning 

scenario 

Strategic guidance 

statement status 

Strategic 

plan status 

Overall federal 

concept plan status 

Agency 

operational plans status 

Terrorist Use of 

Explosives Attack 

Approved by Secretary 

of Homeland Security, 

August 2008 

Approved by Secretary of 

Homeland Security, 

November 2008 

Approved by Secretary of 

Homeland Security, May 

2009 

DOD has approved plans. 

Other agencies started 

January 2009. 

Improvised 

Nuclear Device 

Attack 

Approved by Secretary 

of Homeland Security, 

September 2008 

Approved by Secretary of 

Homeland Security, 

January 2009 

Under development; 

interagency 

review/adjudication 

DOD has approved plans. 

Other agencies awaiting 

development; due 120 days 

after Concept Plan. 

Biological Attack Approved by Secretary 

of Homeland Security, 

January 2009 

Approved by Secretary of 

Homeland Security, July 

2009 

Under development; 

interagency 

review/adjudication; due 

180 days after Strategic 

Plan 

DOD has approved plans. 

Other agencies awaiting 

development; due 120 days 

after Concept Plan. 

Radiological 

Dispersion Device 

Attack 

Approved by Secretary 

of Homeland Security, 

January 2009 

Approved by Secretary of 

Homeland Security, July 

2009 

Awaiting development; due 

180 days after Strategic 

Plan 

DOD has approved plans. 

Other agencies awaiting 

development; due 120 days 

after Concept Plan. 

Chemical Attack Approved by Secretary 

of Homeland Security, 

June 2009 

Under development; 

started in June 2009 

Awaiting development; due 

180 days after Strategic 

Plan 

DOD has approved plans. 

Other agencies awaiting 

development; due 120 days 

after Concept Plan. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS data. 

Page 17 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

DOD’s plans and those of other federal and state entities cannot be fully 

integrated until the supporting strategic and concept plans are completed. 

As we have previously reported, apart from the sequential timelines 

required in HSPD-8 Annex 1, FEMA and DHS have no schedule or project 

plan for completing the guidance and plans. We have recommended and 

DHS generally agreed that FEMA should develop a program management 

plan in coordination with other federal entities to ensure completion of 

key national preparedness policies and plans called for in such sources as 

presidential directives and that the plan should, among other things, define 

roles and responsibilities and planning processes, as well as identify a 

schedule for completion.19

Current Capability 

Assessments at Local, 

State, and Federal Levels 

May Provide Insufficient 

Data for DOD to Shape Its 

Response to CBRNE 

Incidents 

A number of efforts to develop capability assessments are under way at 

local, state, and federal levels, but these efforts may not yet be sufficiently 

mature to provide DOD with complete data that it can use to shape its 

response plans for CBRNE-related incidents. For example, in fiscal year 

2007, FEMA developed its Gap Analysis Program, which focuses on seven 

general capabilities that are often needed in the aftermath of a hurricane. 

These are: evacuation, medical needs, debris removal, commodity 

distribution, sheltering, interim housing, and fuel availability. While these 

capabilities would be needed for most scenarios, including CBRNE-related 

scenarios, the Gap Analysis Program does not identify unique capabilities 

needed for CBRNE incidents, such as decontamination assets or detection 

assets. In 2008, FEMA expanded the program to include not only 

hurricane-prone states, but all states and all hazards. However, FEMA 

officials stated that neither their questionnaires—which were used to 

query states about potential gaps in their capabilities—nor any of their 

other guidance specified how states should identify requirements unique 

to a CBRNE-related incident. 

FEMA also collects capability data by other means. However, none of 

these efforts—either individually or in the aggregate—has provided a 

comprehensive capability assessment. The Post-Katrina Emergency 

Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) requires that FEMA 

report to Congress on federal preparedness, in part by collecting 

information on state capability levels; states receiving DHS federal 

preparedness assistance must provide preparedness reports. FEMA also 

 

19GAO-09-369. 

Page 18 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

requires these reports in order for states to qualify for its grant funds.20

States, territories, and the District of Columbia completed and submitted 

their first state preparedness reports to FEMA in the spring of 2008 and 

have also submitted reports in the spring of 2009. However, as we have 

previously reported,21 the state capability data that FEMA has collected do 

not provide a comprehensive picture of national capability gaps, because 

they are incomplete and the states do not use common metrics to assess 

their capabilities. FEMA officials stated that in order to provide the 

comprehensive capability-based assessment that Congress requires, the 

next National Preparedness Report, which as of September 2009 is being 

drafting and reviewed, will apply one, comprehensive, capability based 

analytical framework to meet a series of preparedness reporting 

requirements. FEMA anticipates that through this effort, it will be able to 

gain a more complete picture of national preparedness. 

As noted in DHS’s January 2009 Federal Preparedness Report, several key 

components of the national preparedness system are still works in 

progress, and not all data required for the federal government to assess its 

preparedness are available. As DHS also states in its report, standards for 

reporting operational readiness are not fully developed, and DHS does not 

possess the authority to compel the submission of data from other federal 

homeland security partners. Moreover, according to DOD and FEMA, even 

to the extent that states have capability data available, their sensitivity 

about disclosing data that highlight the state’s capability gaps has limited 

the degree to which they share these data with DOD or with entities 

responsible for developing DOD’s plans and related capabilities. DOD 

officials stated that in the absence of a comprehensive capability 

assessment, they continue to work with FEMA and continue to build 

relationships with individual states to collect data on their capabilities. 

 

20The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, (2006). Section 652 of the Post-Katrina Act 

requires that FEMA submit a federal preparedness report to Congress in October 2007 and 

annually thereafter. Section 652 also requires the submission of annual state preparedness 

reports to FEMA, beginning January 2008, by recipients of DHS preparedness assistance, 

including states, territories, or the District of Columbia. 6 U.S.C. § 752(a), (c); see also 

6 U.S.C. §§ 101(15), 701(11) for the definition of a “state.” 

21GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and 

Integrate, Planning, Exercise and Assessment Efforts, GAO-09-369 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 30, 2009). 

Page 19 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

DOD has had plans to provide CBRNE consequence management support 

to civil authorities since before 9/11 and in the last few years has set higher 

goals in the expectation of being able to provide expanded capabilities 

through its three CCMRFs. However, its ability to respond effectively may 

be compromised because (1) its planned response times may not meet the 

requirements of a particular incident, (2) it may lack sufficient capacity in 

some key capabilities, and (3) it faces challenges in adhering to its strategy 

for sourcing CCMRFs with available units. 

DOD’s Planned 

Response to CBRNE 

Incidents May Be 

Insufficient 

DOD’s Planned Response 

Times May Be Too Long 

In 2005, DOD established a standard for itself that called for the ability to 

respond to multiple, simultaneous catastrophic incidents,22 and it initiated 

efforts to create three CCMRFs. For the first 3 years, DOD did not 

regularly assign units to the CCMRF mission, and this decreased DOD’s 

ability to actually field any of the CCMRFs within the timelines it had 

established. In October 2008 DOD sourced the first CCMRF, primarily with 

active force units. A second CCMRF, comprised primarily of reserve units, 

will assume the mission in October 2009 and a third in October 2010. In the 

absence of national guidance suggesting what level of response capability 

DOD should have available within a specified time frame, DOD’s plans use 

a phased deployment to allow the first CCMRF to be able to provide 

consequence management support to civilian authorities within 48-96 

hours of being notified of a CBRNE incident.23 The earlier phases of the 

deployment will provide the lifesaving capabilities. However, multiple 

DOD estimates for some of the more catastrophic scenarios, such as a 

nuclear detonation, have identified significant gaps between the time 

certain life saving and other capabilities would be needed and DOD’s 

planned response times. For example, victims of a nuclear attack would 

require decontamination, which medical experts have established must be 

provided as soon as possible after exposure. If DOD adheres to its planned 

response times in such a scenario, the capabilities of early responders 

such as local police and fire departments would likely be overwhelmed 

before DOD arrived at the incident site. NORTHCOM’s assessment 24 and 

 

22Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington, 

D.C.: June 2005), p. 3. DOD has since refined that standard to “prepare for and mitigate the 

effects of multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE events.” U.S. Northern Command, 

Department of Defense Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept, 

Version 2.0 (Oct. 2007), p. 43. 

23This assumes the CCMRF is tasked to deploy immediately after an incident occurs. 

24U.S. Northern Command, Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities Based 

Assessment (Colorado Springs, CO: Mar. 2009). 

Page 20 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

other DOD estimates demonstrated that, for a number of capabilities, 

DOD’s response would not be timely. Table 3 shows one estimate of the 

potential shortfall in decontamination capabilities that could result. 

Table 3: Estimate of Potential Lifesaving Decontamination Requirements Compared with Likely Capabilities for a 10 Kiloton 

Nuclear Detonation in a Major Metropolitan City In the First 72 Hours after Incident 

Estimated capability by time frame (persons) 

Source of decontamination capability First 24 hours 24-48 hours 48-72 hours

Local 14,460 14,640 14,640

State 1,350 5,400 10,800

CCMRF Package 1 1,350 5,400 5,400

CCMRF Package 2 0 0 2,880

Self decontamination 8,000 8,000 8,000

Other federal decontamination capabilities 270 1,080 1,080

Total decontamination capabilities by time frame 25,610 34,520 42,800

Total decontamination requirement 138,000 112,390 77,870

Unmet decontamination requirement 112,390 77,870 35,070

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

DOD has also identified several other areas where it may not be able to 

provide the needed capabilities as quickly as required. These areas 

included CBRNE search and rescue, transportation, mass care support, 

and mortuary affairs. 

DOD’s efforts to determine the types and quantities of capabilities that will 

likely be needed to augment local, state, and federal response forces are 

based on general requirements and tasks spelled out in federal guidance 

such as the National Response Framework and the National 

Preparedness Guidelines. For example, CCMRF planning documents 

indicate that the DHS Universal Task List, which is described in the 

Guidelines, includes over 1,600 tasks that need to be performed in order 

for entities to be prepared to address the National Planning Scenarios. 

However, the task list is not prescriptive in determining which agency 

should do which tasks, how they should be done, or when they might be 

needed. Additionally, the Target Capability List, which is a companion 

document to the Guidelines, contains 37 key capabilities. As they relate to 

the CCMRF, key response capabilities include emergency triage and 

prehospital treatment, weapons of mass destruction and hazardous 

materials response and decontamination, and medical surge. The 

NORTHCOM capability-based assessment suggests that without a national, 

risk-based determination of DOD’s share of the federal capability 

Page 21 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

requirements, DOD will be unable to determine whether its planned 

response times should be adjusted. 

DOD’s Planned Force May 

Lack Sufficient Capacity in 

Some Key Capabilities 

Needed for Catastrophic 

Incidents 

In addition to timeliness issues, DOD’s planned force has limited quantities 

of some of the needed life saving capabilities, such as medical and 

decontamination services. For example, some nuclear detonation 

scenarios project that hundreds of thousands could be killed, injured, 

displaced, contaminated, or in need of medical care. CCMRF would be 

able to provide only a small portion of the necessary capability. Although a 

CCMRF is estimated, under optimal circumstances, to be capable of 

decontaminating several thousand people per day, some estimates project 

that the gap between needed decontamination capabilities and what local, 

state, and other entities could provide would be tens of thousands. DOD 

recognizes that it may need additional units to augment CCMRF, and it has 

made some tentative estimates. For example, DOD plans anticipate that in 

the case of a blister agent event, an additional medical package would be 

needed beyond what is in included in CCMRF. For a nerve agent incident, 

plans anticipate that an additional mortuary affairs package would be 

needed. For a chlorine tank explosion, additional packages for both 

medical and mortuary affairs would be needed, beyond those that that are 

included in CCMRF. 

However, DOD has not designated specific units to augment CCMRF. 

Unless these units are identified in advance and trained for the mission, 

they may be unable to deploy rapidly. By not aligning CCMRF objectives 

with the projected need for response capabilities and clearly delineating 

national expectations for timely response, neither DOD nor other entities 

involved in incident response can be certain that the CCMRFs will be able 

to respond adequately to mitigate the consequences of a catastrophic 

CBRNE incident. 

DOD Faces Challenges in 

Adhering to Its Strategy for 

Sourcing CCMRFS with 

Available Units 

In sourcing its three CCMRFs, DOD has encountered challenges in 

implementing an approach that could enhance unit availability and 

training and readiness oversight for forces that are not assigned to 

NORTHCOM. DOD originally intended all three CCMRFs to be comprised 

entirely of federal active military forces, but the two follow-on CCMRFs 

will be sourced with large numbers of National Guard and Army Reserve 

units. The demands of ongoing overseas operations have led DOD to draw 

more and more heavily on Guard and Reserve forces to fulfill civil support 

functions. Because National Guard units have responsibilities in their 

respective states, a competition for resources issue may arise between 

Page 22 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

DOD and the states. For example, while governors may need the same 

capabilities within the state or to support mutual assistance agreements 

with other states as would be needed to support a CCMRF, there is no 

clear understanding between the governors and DOD to ensure that these 

units will be available promptly if they are needed for a federal mission 

without being federalized. Moreover, elements from a single unit can be 

spread over many states, further complicating the task of coordinating 

between DOD and each of the states. For example, one Army National 

Guard aviation company belonging to one of the CCMRFs has elements in 

Arkansas, Florida, and Alabama. Three different states would be required 

to make these elements available to form the company. The potential rapid 

deployment mission of CCMRF makes it imperative that specific 

agreements be reached. However, the agreements that have been reached 

to date are general in nature and do not specify how states are to ensure 

that Guard units will be available for a CCMRF deployment. 

Similar issues arise with the Army Reserve. The training demands of the 

CCMRF mission have caused DOD to authorize additional training days, 

but according to Army Reserve officials, reservists cannot be compelled to 

attend training events beyond their annual training requirement. They 

stated that, as a result, units must rely on the voluntary participation of 

their personnel for training beyond the requirement, which reduces their 

assurance that these personnel will be available for other necessary 

CCMRF training. For example, one reserve company was unable to fulfill 

all aspects of its mission requirements because of low participation at a 

training event. Unit officials stated that some of the unit’s members had 

school or work obligations that conflicted with this training. Moreover, 

reserve unit officials stated that, unlike with active unit officials, they 

cannot restrict the personal travel of unit members to ensure that they will 

be available if they are needed to support an unexpected federal CBRNE 

incident response. These challenges to sourcing the CCMRFs increase the 

risk that DOD’s ability to effectively respond to one or more major 

domestic CBRNE incidents will be compromised. That risk can be 

mitigated by plans that integrate the Active and Reserve Component 

portions of the CCMRFs and agreements between DOD and the states on 

the availability of National Guard units and the duty status under which 

they would respond to a major incident requiring federal forces. 

DOD’s decision to change its approach to how NORTHCOM will routinely 

interact with units designated for CCMRF will present additional 

challenges. In 2008, DOD’s sourcing approach was to assign the first 

CCMRF (primarily active forces) to NORTHCOM and allocate the 

remaining two CCMRFs (mix of Guard and Army Reserve) to 

Page 23 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

NORTHCOM.25 Beginning in October 2009, DOD will allocate the units 

from all three CCMRFs to NORTHCOM, rather than assigning them to the 

NORTHCOM commander outright. As a result, despite the fact that 

NORTHCOM’s commander is responsible for commanding the federal 

military domestic CBRNE response in the continental United States, 

NORTHCOM will have no CBRNE forces under its direct control. There 

are advantages to assigning forces directly to NORTHCOM. For example, 

the command would have direct authority over the units’ day-to-day 

activities, including training and exercise schedules, and would be better 

able to monitor readiness. Additionally, there would be fewer 

administrative steps required for the NORTHCOM commander to activate 

and deploy CCMRF units in the event of an incident. This would be crucial 

for deploying the critical initial response elements of the overall force. 

Under DOD’s current allocation approach, NORTHCOM would have 

authority over units while they are participating in scheduled NORTHCOM 

training events, but would have to coordinate with multiple commands to 

enable participation from these units. Current guidance states that other 

commands should make their units available for scheduled NORTHCOM 

exercises “to the greatest extent possible.” However, NORTHCOM cannot 

always be assured that units will be available for these exercises. In 

addition, NORTHCOM remains uncertain about the extent to which it will 

have oversight of CCMRF units’ day-to-day training activities and be able 

to confirm that these units are ready to perform their mission even when 

they are under the authority of another command. 

DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the 

readiness of the first fielded CCMRF. However, DOD faces challenges in 

providing the training necessary to ensure readiness for the full CCMRF. 

We found that CCMRF may be limited in its ability to successfully conduct 

consequence management operations because (1) it does not conduct 

realistic full-force field training to confirm its readiness to assume the 

mission or to deploy rapidly and (2) conflicting priorities between the 

CBRNE mission and overseas deployments affect some units’ mission 

preparation and unit cohesion. 

DOD Has Taken 

Actions to Improve 

CCMRF Readiness, 

but Training Gaps and 

Conflicting Priorities 

May Degrade 

Performance 

 

25Assigned forces are under the direct command of their unified command, such as 

NORTHCOM. Allocated forces are transferred from their assigned unified command to 

another command for employment for a specific period of time. 

Page 24 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

DOD Has Taken Actions to 

Improve CCMRF 

Readiness 

The initial assignment of CCMRF to NORTHCOM in October 2008, and the 

increased priority DOD has placed on the CBRNE consequence 

management mission, have resulted in a number of improvements in the 

preparation of the units that comprise the first fielded CCMRF. The Army, 

in coordination with NORTHCOM and its subordinate commands, has 

established guidance for both individual and collective training—including 

joint mission essential task lists—for units designated for CCMRF. 

Therefore, for the first time, identified units have been conducting both 

individual and collective training focused on the CBRNE mission. For 

example, at the individual level, soldiers were required to be proficient in a 

number of skills, including skills related to operating in a CBRNE 

environment. Individual soldiers were also required to take online courses 

on operating in a domestic environment supporting civil authorities. Table 

4 shows examples of some CBRNE-related training tasks that individuals 

should be able to perform before assuming the CBRNE mission as part of 

CCMRF. 

Table 4: Selected CBRNE Individual Training Tasks 

Be able to protect yourself from CBRN injury/contamination with the chemical-protective 

suit ensemble 

Decontaminate yourself and individual equipment using chemical decontaminating kits 

Perform first aid for nerve agent injury 

React to nuclear hazard/attack 

React to chemical or biological hazard/attack 

Be able to protect yourself from chemical and biological contamination using your 

assigned protective mask 

Detect chemical agents using chemical detector paper 

Source: U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). 

Also, key leaders such as brigade task force headquarters personnel and 

battalion commanders are required to participate in a number of command 

and control training events to gain an understanding of how to organize 

and conduct operations in a complex interagency environment under 

catastrophic disaster conditions. For example, commanders are required 

to attend resident Defense Support to Civil Authorities courses and to 

participate in a number of command and control training events, to ensure 

that unit leaders are familiar with DHS’s National Planning Scenarios and 

with operating in a civil support role. These training events that leaders 

participate in include tabletop exercises—which provide participants 

opportunities to simulate interagency planning, discuss simulated 

scenarios, and assess plans and procedures for CBRNE consequence 

Page 25 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

management—as well as command-post exercises. In order to confirm 

CCMRF’s readiness prior to mission assumption, U.S. Army North 

conducted a command-post mission rehearsal exercise that included key 

leaders from each of CCMRF’s three task forces—Operations, Medical, 

and Aviation. The goal of this exercise is to give the participants 

experience in organizing and conducting operations in a complex 

interagency environment in support of civil authorities under catastrophic 

disaster conditions. The leadership simulates the full participation of units 

through modeling. Under U.S. Army North’s current training guidance, this 

exercise validates CCMRF’s pre-mission readiness. 

In addition, units are training on and reporting their proficiency to perform 

CCMRF Joint Mission Essential Tasks. We had previously reported that, in 

2007, NORTHCOM had developed a list of joint mission-essential tasks—

including the major tasks that units are required to perform to respond to 

potential domestic CBRNE incidents.26 These include both tasks that units 

typically perform as part of their wartime missions and some tasks that 

would be emphasized during or be unique to a domestic CBRNE incident. 

For example, among other mission-essential tasks, the Task Force 

Operations element of each CCMRF 

• commands and controls subordinate units; 

• conducts nuclear, chemical, and biological route, zone, area, and point 

reconnaissance; 

• conducts agent detection, casualty search, technical rescue, hot zone 

extraction, personnel decontamination, and time-critical medical care 

and stabilization; 

• conducts CBRNE incident response force operations; 

• assesses tactical and operational situation; 

• identifies nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards; and 

• conducts mortuary affairs operations. 

Further, we previously reported that NORTHCOM and Joint Task Force 

Civil Support officials had difficulties tracking the readiness of units that 

were identified for the CBRNE consequence management mission, 

because so few of the units were actually filled with the necessary 

personnel and equipment.27 However, the increased priority given to 

 

26GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to 

Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues, GAO-08-251

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008). 

27GAO-08-251. 

Page 26 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

CCMRF in the spring of 2008 has led to designated units receiving 

personnel and equipment ahead of many other units that are not 

designated for CCMRF. Consequently, most units that assumed the 

mission in October 2008 reported that they were prepared to perform the 

mission and had been provided by their respective military service with 

the personnel and equipment they needed to meet established guidance. 

Lack of Sufficient Field 

Training Affects CCMRFs’ 

Ability to Perform 

Effectively 

Although individual units were certified as ready prior to assuming the 

CBRNE mission in October 2008, it is unclear whether the full CCMRF can 

effectively perform CBRNE consequence management operations 

throughout the 1-year mission to which it is assigned, because the 

readiness of the full CCMRF is not confirmed through a realistic field 

training exercise before the force assumes the mission, nor have its rapid 

deployment capabilities been fully assessed. Before individual units 

designated for CCMRF assume the CBRNE mission, the military services 

are required to certify that these units are trained to perform that mission. 

However, there is currently no requirement for all of the units that 

comprise CCMRF to participate together in a realistic full-force field 

training exercise that could confirm that the full CCMRF can perform its 

required tasks in an integrated manner before it takes on the CBRNE 

consequence management mission. While other brigade-sized units 

typically conduct this type of training prior to an overseas deployment, 

and NORTHCOM and U.S. Army North28 (in its role as Joint Force Land 

Component Commander) training officials have discussed the desirability 

of such an exercise, the first fielded CCMRF has not had the opportunity 

to have the entire force train together; only a subset of CCMRF units have 

trained together in field exercises. Further, these exercises were 

conducted several months after these units had assumed the CCMRF 

mission and had already been certified as trained to perform it. 

Joint military guidance describes training as a key element of readiness, 

which is defined in two parts—unit level and joint level readiness. 

However, current DOD and NORTHCOM CCMRF guidance does not 

require the full CCMRF to conduct a joint field exercise to confirm its 

readiness prior to assuming the mission. Rather, DOD guidance requires 

that NORTHCOM annually confirm that the designated headquarters 

organizations can deploy operationally and employ their respective 

 

28U.S. Army North is the designated Joint Force Land Component Commander for domestic 

civil support operations NORTHCOM would command. 

Page 27 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

CCMRF elements. While DOD’s guidance further requires that supported 

combatant commands, such as NORTHCOM, confirm unit readiness and 

the ability to activate, deploy, employ, and command and control CCMRF 

assets effectively, it does not specifically require that the full CCMRF 

conduct a field training exercise to confirm readiness before units assume 

the mission, as is the case with other missions such as overseas 

deployments. Such training is a particularly important matter for CCMRF, 

since this force does not exist as a standing unit that typically operates 

together. Moreover, training officials at Joint Task Force Civil Support, 

Army North, and NORTHCOM have cited the desirability of such 

exercises, which could allow the full CCMRF to demonstrate its ability to 

operate in an integrated manner in a tactical environment. According to 

Joint Task Force training officials, full-force field exercises could 

strengthen unit integration and facilitate units’ gaining familiarity with the 

different capabilities comprising CCMRF. However, as previously stated, 

NORTHCOM confirms the readiness of each CCMRF through a commandpost exercise directed by U.S. Army North, as the designated Joint Force 

Land Component Commander, and these exercises do not include all of 

the personnel from each unit. For example, less than 20 percent of CCMRF 

participated in the 2008 mission readiness exercise that was used to 

confirm readiness. 

While NORTHCOM’s October 2008 mission execution order did not 

contain a requirement for full-force pre-mission field training, it did 

include a requirement for CCMRFs to conduct a full field training exercise 

during the mission period—that is, after the units have already assumed 

the mission. However, no full-force CCMRF training exercise was 

conducted during fiscal year 2009. Rather, subsets of CCMRF have 

conducted field exercises, but these exercises usually did not include all of 

the key units with which they might work during an incident. For example, 

members of the First Brigade Combat Team of the Third Infantry Division 

conducted search and extraction exercises with the Marine Corps’s 

Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) in November 2008. 

No other units from Task Force Operations participated in this training 

exercise. In addition, CBIRF participated in a number of other field 

training exercises, and Army Reserve chemical companies—including 

companies not designated for CCMRF—also participated in field training 

events for tasks such as mass decontamination. 

Further, in January 2009, officials from Task Force Operations—one of the 

three CCMRF task forces—and the Joint Task Force-Civil Support 

proposed that a field training exercise be conducted in March 2009 at a 

training site in Florida. The exercise was approved by U.S. Army North 

Page 28 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

and NORTHCOM, and plans were put in place to include other units from 

CCMRF. The exercise was successful in getting participation from about 

1,500 personnel of the approximately 4,500 —about a third of the 

personnel that comprise the full CCMRF, including 1,200 from Task Force 

Operations. A Joint Task Force-Civil Support training official stated that 

2 months was an extremely short time frame in which to coordinate 

exercise participation and that with such a short time frame not all 

potential participants would be available. For example, the Army Reserve 

chemical company that would provide decontamination and 

reconnaissance resources was unable to attend the field training exercise 

because, company officials stated, the unit was not notified in time to 

program funding to attend the exercise and did not have enough lead time 

for some of its soldiers to arrange leave from their civilian employment. 

Their participation would have addressed a previous recommendation 

from U.S. Army North that the chemical company should conduct training 

in a realistic CBRNE environment with other CCMRF units such as a 

medical support company and the Marine Corps CBIRF, in part to observe 

other military units with similar technical support capabilities and to 

obtain a better understanding of the sequence of events in a joint 

collective training exercise. Absent a directive for CCMRF to conduct a 

full-force exercise prior to units assuming the mission, there is increased 

risk that units may have to respond in support of an incident without prior 

experience or training that simulated such conditions. 

NORTHCOM is taking steps to train the full CCMRF through field 

exercises in the future, but this training is not planned to take place until 

at least several months after CCMRF assumes responsibility for the 

CBRNE mission. For example, in March 2009, NORTHCOM provided 

additional training guidance that has led to NORTHCOM and U.S. Army 

North developing plans for all future CCMRFs to conduct field training 

exercises beginning in fiscal year 2010. However, units will already have 

been on the mission for at least 2 months—and as many as 8 months—

before these exercises take place. 

In addition to the importance of confirming the proficiency of the entire 

CCMRF for conducting its mission, DOD has stated that its forces must be 

available in a timely and reliable manner and must be able to deploy 

rapidly. To accomplish this, units must demonstrate that they will be able 

to meet the required CCMRF response times once they assume the 

mission. However, neither NORTHCOM nor Army North has yet 

conducted deployment readiness exercises for the full CCMRF, and it is 

not clear if its plans for future CCMRFs will include such exercises. 

Officials from various units that comprise the first CCMRF have expressed 

Page 29 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

concerns about being able to deploy rapidly from their home stations. For 

example, Task Force Operations headquarters officials stated that one of 

their primary challenges in conducting the CCMRF mission is deploying 

rapidly from their home stations; these units are accustomed to deploying 

overseas on established schedules and do not have experience deploying 

on short notice. Deployment readiness exercises are important because 

they test units’ ability to ascertain how quickly personnel can be notified 

and assembled, equipment prepared and loaded to fit in potential 

transportation modes such as trucks and airplanes, and both staff and 

equipment moved to the designated point of departure. DOD has provided 

general guidance that supported commands, such as NORTHCOM, should 

confirm the ability of CCMRF units to activate and deploy. In addition, 

NORTHCOM has established guidance that directs U.S. Army North (as the 

Joint Force Land Component Commander) to conduct deployment 

readiness exercises when they are initiated by NORTHCOM. These 

deployment exercises could be conducted to test all processes and 

procedures needed for deployment or to test only those process and 

procedures that do not involve unit movement. Moreover, the 

NORTHCOM guidance does not specify whether these exercises should be 

conducted with or without prior notice. U.S. Army North guidance 

includes a requirement for two deployment exercises per year to confirm 

the ability of CCMRF and Joint Task Force Civil Support to deploy within 

time frames established by NORTHCOM. However, training officials at 

both Joint Task Force headquarters and U.S. Army North said that there 

have been no deployment readiness exercises for the full CCMRF or for 

any of the CCMRF force packages. A Joint Task Force Civil Support 

training official added that a no-notice readiness exercise was being 

considered by NORTHCOM and U.S. Army North to test alert notification 

and the deployment processes and procedures of the full CCMRF, but 

officials were uncertain when such a deployment exercise would take 

place. Training officials also expressed concern that it could become more 

difficult in the future to have no-notice exercises when units from all three 

CCMRFs are no longer under the direct authority of NORTHCOM. 

As was the case with field training exercises, individual units have 

separately conducted deployment readiness exercises that involved all 

phases of deployment preparation, including movement of personnel and 

equipment. However, in these exercises, deployment was planned well in 

advance. For example, staff from units in Task Force Operations that 

incorporated a deployment exercise prior to conducting a March 2009 field 

exercise had up to 45 days to plan for the exercise. However, many 

anticipated CBRNE incidents can occur without notice. With no program 

in place to test the ability of all units in CCMRF to meet specified response 

Page 30 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

times on short notice, NORTHCOM and DOD will continue to be unable to 

verify the ability of CCMRF units to deploy. 

Units’ Preparation for the 

CCMRF Mission and 

Efforts to Achieve Unit 

Cohesion Are Affected by 

Other Missions 

The demands that other missions are placing on the Army also may put the 

effectiveness of the CCMRF’s mission at risk. DOD has identified CCMRF 

as a high-priority mission; however, the Army has at times designated units 

for CCMRF when they have just returned from overseas missions. When 

units first return from overseas, they are in the “reset” phase of the Army 

Force Generation process, over the course of which they progress through 

three sequential readiness pools. The reset phase is typically when units 

reconstitute by repairing equipment, receiving new equipment, and 

assigning new personnel, and begin training to achieve the capabilities 

necessary to enter the ready force pool. Because these units are at the 

beginning of their reset phase, they often lack personnel and equipment. 

Although the Army attempts to accelerate the fill of personnel and 

equipment to these units, some units may not receive their personnel and 

equipment in sufficient time to allow them to meet all of the requirements 

of the CBRNE consequence management mission before they assume it. In 

contrast, units are deployed for overseas missions only when they have 

progressed to the “ready” or “available” phase of the cycle. In most cases, 

units reported having received the necessary personnel and equipment 

before the October mission assumption date, but their personnel had not 

always completed all of the CCMRF-related training before the assumption 

date. 

Army Forces Command officials acknowledged that a number of units 

were still receiving personnel and equipment while preparing for the 

mission. For example, several units, while stating they were prepared to 

perform the mission, still had key personnel that needed training related to 

performing the CCMRF mission. In one instance, a medical company that 

assumed the mission on October 1, 2008, did not complete its postdeployment reconstitution until October 31, 2008. While the company’s 

assigned personnel had completed the required training at the time of 

mission assumption, newly assigned personnel did not receive the 

required training until November 2008. Another medical unit had 

significant personnel turnover in July 2008 and stated that the turnover 

affected its ability to conduct all CCMRF-related training before its 

mission assumption date. Army Forces Command officials said that its 

units are designated for CCMRF while in the reset phase because there are 

not enough units in the available force pool to sufficiently source CCMRF 

in addition to meeting other combatant command requirements for 

overseas deployments. Moreover, many CCMRF units will be deployed 

Page 31 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

overseas after they have completed their CCMRF rotations, and 

anticipating future deployment may distract them from their CCMRF 

training. For example, officials from the Task Force Operations 

headquarters said that they had conducted a number of field exercises at 

the brigade and battalion levels at the beginning of these units’ CCMRF 

rotations. In contrast, CCMRF sustainment training in the latter half of the 

year was conducted by telephone because the units were focused on their 

upcoming overseas missions and were unavailable for field training. 

Moreover, unit cohesiveness and training proficiency have been affected 

by the frequent turnover in units that were assigned to the first fielded 

CCMRF in fiscal year 2009. While the goal has been to have units assigned 

for at least 12 months and to have standard start and end dates for each 

rotation,29 several critical units have been unable to complete their full 

1-year rotation in the fiscal year 2009 CCMRF, and other units will not be 

assigned on the same rotation schedule for fiscal year 2010. For example, 

the brigade headquarters for the aviation task force has changed three 

times, and the brigade headquarters for the medical task force rotated out 

of the CBRNE consequence management mission after only 6 months. 

The pace of this turnover affects the ability of units and personnel to both 

conduct initial training and sustain training. For example, the medical 

brigade originally assigned to CCMRF participated in the mission rehearsal 

exercise conducted in September 2008. The assignment of a second 

medical brigade in February 2009 required the Joint Task Force Civil 

Support to alter the focus of a planned command-post exercise from 

rehearsing its processes and procedures and those of subordinate task 

forces staff to confirming the readiness of Task Force Medical, which was 

preparing to assume the mission in March 2009. Also, while elements from 

the Aviation Task Force headquarters participated in the same 2009 

exercise, the Aviation Task Force currently assigned to CCMRF did not 

participate in the field exercise because it had not yet assumed the 

mission. Officials from another unit cited a challenge associated with the 

frequent higher-level headquarters and other unit rotations. These officials 

stated that the frequency of these rotations means that units have to 

continuously dedicate both time and people to learning the requirements 

of higher headquarters and adjacent units and that turnover in 

headquarters leadership could cause the unit to change its tactics, 

 

29The standard CCMRF rotation for the first CCMRF, which is predominately active units, is 

from October 1 to September 30. 

Page 32 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

techniques, and procedures. The frequent rotations of units could also 

result in the need for more frequent exercises, since not all CCMRF units 

have had the opportunity to train with the full CCMRF as an integrated 

force. DOD officials have acknowledged that providing aviation and 

medical capabilities to the CCMRFs will continue to be a challenge, due to 

the high demand for these capabilities for other missions. 

These training and force rotation issues have prevented DOD from 

providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build 

cohesiveness. Because key leaders from units of the entire force attend a 

mission rehearsal exercise prior to mission assumption, the replacement 

of these units after only a few months negated much of the value that was 

gained from these three task forces working together and deprived the 

replacement task force leaders of having the same opportunity. 

DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and 

equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to 

identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its 

approach to providing program funding has been fragmented because 

funding responsibilities for CCMRF-related costs are dispersed throughout 

DOD and are not subject to central oversight. 

CCMRF Requirements 

Have Not Been Fully 

Developed, and 

Funding and 

Oversight Are 

Decentralized 

CCMRF Mission 

Requirements Have Not 

Been Fully Developed 

The units initially designated for the CCMRF mission did not have fully 

developed funding and equipment requirements. In addition, the recent 

NORTHCOM Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based 

Assessment report highlighted a number of systemic capability gaps that 

need to be addressed and may generate additional funding requirements.30

Moreover, other important requirements for this mission have not been 

identified and funded. The Joint Forces Land Component Commander 

(U.S. Army North) and the Joint Task Force Civil Support31 are responsible 

for developing and approving service-specific equipment unique to the 

CCMRF’s Joint Mission Essential Tasks. However, to date, mission-

 

30U.S. Northern Command, Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities Based 

Assessment (Colorado Springs, CO: Mar. 2009). 

31U.S. Army North and Joint Task Force Civil Support are subordinate commands of 

NORTHCOM. 

Page 33 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

essential equipment requirements have not been fully developed. While 

some equipment requirement lists have been developed and are being 

reviewed by NORTHCOM, equipping officials said that lists have not been 

developed for nonstandard equipment that units may need in order to 

support civil authorities in a CBRNE environment. As a result, some units 

in fiscal year 2009 have determined requirements based on their own 

independent mission analyses. Unit officials stated that filling some of the 

needs they identified—such as the need for nonstandard communications 

equipment that is compatible with civilian equipment—was difficult 

because the units lacked a documented requirement for their planned 

acquisition. In addition, the review process did not always include the 

command organizations that are responsible for the mission. Thus, 

decisions on what to buy and in what quantity were not consistently vetted 

to ensure standardization in equipping various units. U.S. Army North 

officials stated that they were in the process of developing missionessential equipment lists and hope to have them completed in time for the 

next rotation, which begins in October 2009. 

DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support recognized the 

importance of proper funding and budget oversight for the CBRNE 

consequence management mission and noted that the mission’s funding is 

not accounted consistently. However, provision of funding for the mission 

is fragmented and is not monitored centrally within the department. While 

CCMRF is a joint mission, funding guidance leaves the funding 

responsibilities for most requirements to the respective military 

departments or defense agencies. For example, it is up to the military 

departments to determine day-to-day funding requirements and fund unit 

training. Moreover, DOD has not created an integrated, fully dedicated, 

and consistent approach and funding strategy across the department, 

instead dispersing responsibility for funding CCMRF among the military 

services, NORTHCOM, and other entities. For example, while NORTHCOM 

funds predominately joint mission training for the current force, the dayto-day funding for CCMRF-assigned units and individual mission training 

continue to comes from the services. However, the services are also 

simultaneously scheduling and funding the training required to meet the 

units’ wartime mission requirements for which they are responsible after 

the CCMRF mission ends. Table 5 shows funding responsibilities for some 

CCMRF activities. 

Page 34 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

Table 5: CCMRF Mission Costs and Funding Sources 

CCMRF funding events Northern Command DOD components 

Day-to-day operational costs 9

Individual participation in educational events 9

Deployment Readiness Exercise 9

Command-Post Exercise Execution 9

Command-Post Exercise travel expenses 9

Base support installation or training area costs 9

Field Training Exercise Execution 9

Field Training Exercise Travel Duty expenses 9

Other exercise costs (reconstitution or replenishment of expended supplies) 9

Specialized and other CCMRF equipment 9

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Starting in fiscal year 2010, NORTHCOM expects to fund training for two 

CCMRFs, including mission rehearsal, mission readiness, command post, 

and field training exercises. However, unit training not directed by 

NORTHCOM is not funded centrally and must be funded by the military 

services. This fragmentation in funding responsibilities is normal in DOD, 

but the lack of a coordinated plan that allows visibility over all CCMRFrelated funding increases the risk that NORTHCOM would be unaware of 

whether individual units have the necessary resources to effectively 

conduct the pre-mission training they need. DOD’s guidance does not 

identify a single organization to provide oversight of total program 

requirements and available resources. We have previously reported that 

adequate oversight, including program direction and visibility of all costs 

and individual program efforts, provides stronger assurance to DOD that it 

is making the most effective use of departmentwide resources to meet 

mission needs.32 Without this kind of funding strategy and oversight, DOD 

cannot develop a complete understanding of mission activities, priorities, 

and shortfalls or identify resource redundancies and gaps. 

 

32GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Improve Program Management, Policy, and 

Testing to Enhance Ability to Field Operationally Useful Non-lethal Weapons, 

GAO-09-344 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009), p. 35. 

Page 35 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

Extent of Dedicated Funds 

for Some CCMRF Training 

Affects Mission 

In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority for the CCMRF mission increased 

substantially within the department, and funding was provided for specific 

aspects of the mission. For example, NORTHCOM’s training program 

includes more than $33 million to design, plan, and manage exercises as 

well as funds for participant costs for CCMRFs for fiscal year 2010. The 

Army Reserve planned funds of more than $37 million for fiscal years 2009 

and 2010 to support additional full-time personnel and training days that 

have been authorized to support the CCMRF mission. In addition, while 

the military services have not planned funds for equipment specifically for 

the CCMRF mission, some nonstandard equipment has been purchased 

with other remaining funds. In other cases, purchase requests for certain 

equipment were denied by administrative parent commands because, unit 

officials believed, the equipment was considered noncritical by reviewing 

officials. Moreover, units must fund their CCMRF training activities from 

their operations and maintenance accounts, which were developed and 

approved months before units knew they would be assigned to CCMRF. 

According to unit officials, many units were not provided with additional 

funds for the CCMRF mission. As a result, these units sometimes have 

funds allocated from other sources to meet identified requirements for the 

CCMRF mission. Also according to these officials, while the lack of 

planned funds for CCMRF has been mitigated to some extent by the 

mission’s high-priority level, they have found it necessary to curtail or 

cancel some desirable training because funding was unavailable. Army 

officials told us that if funding shortfalls develop because units lack 

sufficient funds to conduct both CCMRF and follow-on mission training, 

units can request additional funds from the Army. However, unless units 

assess their total funding requirement for CCMRF and their other 

designated mission and receive funding based on both missions, CCMRF 

units may be at risk of not having enough funding to conduct all of their 

CCMRF training. This, in turn, puts units at risk of not being fully prepared 

if they are needed to respond to an incident. 

DOD lacks visibility across the department over the total funding 

requirements for this mission because it has no funding strategy for 

meeting CBRNE mission requirements. The services, in the absence of 

funding dedicated to the CBRNE mission, have been using existing 

operations and maintenance accounts to meet mission requirements. 

Without an overarching approach to developing requirements and a 

funding strategy for meeting these requirements, DOD’s ability to carry out 

this high-priority homeland security mission efficiently and effectively is at 

risk. 

Page 36 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

Our nation faces a continuing threat of the potential use of weapons of 

mass destruction by terrorist organizations, and the federal government 

recognizes the need for a comprehensive capability to mitigate the 

consequences of such an attack. A domestic, catastrophic CBRNE-related 

incident would require a unified, whole government, national response. 

DOD plays a crucial role in support of civil authorities for CBRNE 

consequence management and under certain circumstances might even be 

designated as the lead federal agency for such an incident. To provide 

timely and effective support when local and state capabilities are no 

longer adequate, it is crucial that DOD be able to integrate its plans with 

those of other federal agencies involved in disaster response. Until all 

CBRNE plans that are being developed under the Integrated Planning 

System are complete, it will be difficult for DOD to know whether its 

considerable body of operational plans will adequately address anticipated 

gaps in the capabilities needed to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, 

CBRNE incidents. DOD will also need to overcome challenges related to 

sourcing its CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces, 

including issues regarding coordinating with states about the availability 

and deployment status of National Guard units, integrating Guard and 

Reserve units with active duty forces, and ensuring that forces charged 

with dual missions are properly trained to function effectively when called 

on for consequence management response. 

Conclusions 

Because each of the CCMRFs are comprised of units that are 

geographically dispersed, from both the Active and Reserve Components, 

and from all of the military services, it must have opportunities to train as 

a complete force before assuming the mission and to demonstrate its 

capability to successfully conduct the mission, including the ability to 

deploy rapidly. For the mission to succeed, it is critical to ensure that each 

unit can meet its designated response time. Because DOD has not 

developed complete and approved requirements for the CCMRF mission 

and fully defined and monitored funding responsibilities, it lacks full 

visibility across the department for this mission. Without an overarching 

approach to develop full and complete mission requirements, an approach 

and mechanisms in place to fully support those requirements, and a 

centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified 

and fully funded, DOD’s ability to carry out this high-priority homeland 

security mission efficiently and effectively could be in jeopardy. 

Page 37 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

In the absence of completed plans under the Integrated Planning System 

or other specific guidance on DOD’s expected contribution to the federal 

response to a domestic CBRNE-related incident, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs to work with DHS, 

FEMA, and other interagency partners to agree on 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• interim goals, objectives, and planning assumptions for DOD’s role in 

responding to one or more simultaneously occurring CBRNE incidents 

in the United States.; and 

• the specific types and quantities of capabilities that DOD is expected 

to contribute and the time frames in which those capabilities are to be 

provided. 

In order to ensure that DOD’s plans are consistent with stated program 

goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander 

of NORTHCOM and the military services to 

• align plans for all parts of CCMRF, including specialized and generalpurpose units, with stated objectives for CCMRF, and include in their 

planning efforts the extent to which existing CCMRF capabilities 

contribute to identified response requirements and stated CCMRF 

mission goals; and 

• work with the state governors through the states’ Adjutants General 

and the National Guard Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing 

CCMRF and ensure that the agreements being established between 

DOD and state governors include specific terms on National Guard 

force availability and duty and response status. 

In order to increase the assurance that CCMRF can effectively provide 

CBRNE consequence management in support of civil authorities, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of 

NORTHCOM—in coordination with the military services—to include in 

the CCMRF training program requirements that 

• the entire CCMRF conduct a joint field training exercise as part of its 

mission validation, and 

• the entire CCMRF conduct at least one no-notice deployment 

readiness exercise annually. 

Page 38 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander 

of NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command and the Service 

Secretaries to 

• determine the time needed by units to perform the necessary premission CCMRF training, and 

• examine sourcing options that would ensure that units had adequate 

time to train prior to mission assumption once they had all required 

personnel and equipment. 

In order to provide a departmentwide understanding of requirements, 

priorities, and resource shortfalls and to identify potential redundancies 

and gaps in CCMRF resourcing, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense, in coordination with the Commander of NORTHCOM, the 

Secretaries of the military services, the National Guard Bureau, and the 

heads of participating defense agencies 

• determine the total requirements for CCMRF, including unique, 

nonstandard equipment requirements for each type of unit that 

comprises CCMRF, and develop a plan on how those requirements will 

be filled; 

• develop an overall funding strategy for establishing, fielding, and 

exercising CCMRF and designate a single focal point for coordinating 

this strategy. 

In comments on a draft of this report,33 DOD generally agreed with the 

intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking or plans to 

take to address these recommendations. DOD also provided technical 

comments, which we have incorporated into the report where appropriate. 

DHS also reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, 

which we have incorporated into the report where appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

In response to our recommendation that DOD work with DHS, FEMA, and 

other interagency partners to agree on interim goals, objectives, and 

planning assumptions for DOD’s role in responding to CBRNE incidents in 

the United States, DOD agreed and stated that in addition to its routine 

 

33At the time of DOD’s review, this report was numbered GAO-09-928. Subsequently, the 

report number was changed to GAO-10-123. 

Page 39 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

planning activities, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs emphasizes the need for 

the kind of planning we discuss in the report and our recommendation. 

DOD stated that it recently convened an advisory panel to evaluate and, as 

appropriate, make recommendations on modifying DOD authorities, 

capabilities, plans and programs, and policies to assist civil authorities in 

preventing or responding to CBRNE incidents. DOD stressed that this 

panel is authorized to coordinate directly with any department or agency 

the panel considers necessary to carry out its duties. We believe the panel 

DOD described will be a suitable mechanism for coordinating with DHS, 

FEMA, or any other relevant federal agency in addressing the substance of 

our recommendation. 

DOD also agreed with our recommendation that DOD work with DHS, 

FEMA, and other interagency partners to agree on the specific types and 

quantities of capabilities that DOD is expected to contribute and the time 

frames in which those capabilities are to be provided. DOD reiterated that 

the panel discussed above will assist in addressing the recommendation. 

Additionally, DOD highlighted a number of ongoing efforts within the 

department (such as the Quadrennial Defense Review), and efforts being 

coordinated with DHS, FEMA, and other interagency partners (such as the 

Task Force for Emergency Readiness) to more fully understand the 

capabilities that may be required of DOD in the event of a CBRNE 

incident. DOD stressed and we agree that realistic, detailed, and 

coordinated planning at the federal, state, and local levels is essential to 

resolving the uncertainty over just what specific CBRNE consequence 

management capabilities DOD should be preparing to provide in the event 

of an incident. We believe that if consistently pursued and coordinated, the 

ongoing efforts DOD described should help address this recommendation 

and greatly assist overall federal, state, and local planning and 

preparedness for responding to CBRNE incidents. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that it align plans for all parts of 

the CCMRFs, including the specialized and general purpose units, with 

stated objectives for the CCMRF to include the extent to which existing 

CCMRF capabilities contribute to identified response requirements and 

stated CCMRF mission goals. DOD stated that it would continue to 

evaluate changes to the CCMRF’s roles, missions, and requirements and 

make the necessary adjustments to the units’ missions and goals. 

Page 40 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that it work with the state 

governors through the states’ adjutants general and the National Guard 

Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing the CCMRFs and ensure 

that the agreements being established between DOD and state governors 

include specific terms on National Guard force availability and duty and 

response status. DOD stated that the Secretary of Defense has directed the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a long-term total force 

sourcing plan for the CCMRFs and to ensure that as they are fielded, the 

CCMRFs remain appropriately sourced. DOD stated that it continues to 

work with the Departments of the Army and Air Force, and the National 

Guard Bureau along with states’ adjutants general, to address resourcing 

and readiness matters. We believe DOD’s approach to developing a longterm CCMRF sourcing plan will help build stability into its preparedness 

efforts. We continue to believe that negotiating and coordinating clear 

agreements between DOD and the states on the availability and duty status 

of National Guard units designated as part of CCMRF is critical to the 

overall DOD CCMRF capability. If the specific availability and duty status 

of these units is consistently pursued and coordinated, DOD’s efforts vis-àvis the states should help in this regard. 

In response to our recommendation that the Commander of 

NORTHCOM—in coordination with the military services—include in the 

CCMRF training program requirements that the entire CCMRF conduct a 

joint field training exercise as part of its mission validation, DOD agreed 

but cautioned that the availability of funds to conduct full force exercises 

was a critical factor in fully addressing the recommendation. We agree that 

field exercises for each of the CCMRFs requires considerable logistical 

effort and associated costs. However, establishing a requirement for the 

entire CCMRF to exercise would allow DOD to evaluate the relative 

priority of the domestic CBRNE consequence management mission against 

other requirements and would allow DOD to evaluate potential risk if full 

funding is not available. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that NORTHCOM—in coordination 

with the military services—include in the CCMRF training program 

requirements that the entire CCMRF conduct at least one no-notice 

deployment readiness exercise annually. DOD stated that NORTHCOM has 

a field training exercise requirement in its proposed CCMRF training plan 

and that the command is working with the services and U.S. 

Transportation Command to determine the transportation requirements 

Page 41 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

associated with a no-notice exercise for CCMRF. We agree that these 

efforts should help NORTHCOM and DOD continue to develop the CCMRF 

exercise plan. We continue to believe that given the rapid response 

requirement of the mission, the geographic dispersion of CCMRF units 

(Active, Reserve, or National Guard), and the fact that these units do not 

work together routinely underscore the importance of no-notice 

deployment readiness exercises. 

In response to our recommendation that DOD determine the time needed 

by units to perform the necessary pre-mission CCMRF training, DOD 

agreed and stated that it is developing guidance that will direct force 

providers to facilitate NORTHCOM access to allocated CCMRF units 

180 days prior to mission assumption to synchronize CBRNE training and 

exercises. We continue to believe that allocating CCMRF units to 

NORTHCOM rather than assigning them curtails the commander of 

NORTHCOM’s ability to ensure adequate CCMRF training and monitor 

readiness. However, we believe that if consistently implemented, the 

guidance DOD describes will help DOD ensure that CCMRF units and their 

parent commands can adequately plan for critical training. 

In response to our recommendation that DOD examine sourcing options 

for the CCMRF that would ensure that units had adequate time to train 

prior to mission assumption once they had all required personnel and 

equipment, DOD partially agreed. DOD stated that the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff has responsibility for sourcing the CCMRFs and that 

the services and the National Guard Bureau support the Joint Staff in this 

responsibility. DOD stated that it is preparing guidance that will task 

components to allocate properly equipped, manned, and trained forces to 

NORTHCOM to accomplish the CCMRF mission. We believe that if 

consistently implemented such guidance will help DOD components and 

commands better plan for and conduct the necessary CCMRF training. 

However, we believe that DOD should continue to assess the sourcing and 

timing of CCMRF unit assignments with respect to force rotations to 

DOD’s vital commitments overseas. Because the domestic CBRNE 

consequence management mission is so different from DOD’s warfigthing 

missions, it is all the more important to account for adequate time to train 

for it. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD determine the 

total requirements for the CCMRF, including unique, nonstandard 

equipment requirements for each type of unit that comprises the CCMRF, 

Page 42 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

and develop a plan on how those requirements will be filled. DOD stated 

that NORTHCOM and the services are working on a Joint MissionEssential Equipment List that defines CCMRF equipment requirements and 

that NORTHCOM is working with the Army on procurement, storage, and 

management of personal protective equipment for CCMRF units. We 

believe that to the extent these efforts address standard and nonstandard 

equipment needed by units designated for CCMRF, they should help DOD 

provide more stable CCMRF equipment planning and reduce the 

uncertainty of unit commanders about what equipment is needed but not 

clearly identified in existing equipment lists. In addition, as we have 

previously stated, we believe that DOD must identify all requirements for 

CCMRF to provide decision makers with complete visibility over the status 

of filling CCMRF requirements and to highlight potential risks. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD develop an 

overall funding strategy for establishing, fielding, and exercising the 

CCMRF and designate a single focal point for coordinating this strategy. 

DOD stated that it has developed a CCMRF funding strategy and that the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ 

Security Affairs is the appropriate focal point for coordinating the funding 

strategy for DOD assistance to civil authorities in response to a CBRNE 

incident. DOD stated that the assistant secretary will examine, in 

coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, secretaries of 

the military services, and appropriate defense agencie, what additional 

steps should be taken to streamline coordination of the CCMRF funding 

strategy. DOD added that as the employer of the CCMRF during an actual 

incident, NORTHCOM also plays a significant role. While we do not 

believe DOD’s existing funding efforts constitute a complete CCMRF 

funding strategy, particularly in light of all requirements not having been 

defined, we agree that the steps DOD describes in further developing or 

refining its funding strategy should help address the recommendation and 

better assist DOD to plan for and oversee CCMRF preparedness. 

DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary 

of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. In addition, the report 

will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 43 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contacts points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix III. 

avi M. D’Agostino 

Director, Defense Capabilities 

D

 and Management 

Page 44 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
 

List of Requesters 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Adam Smith 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jeff Miller 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats 

 and Capabilities 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Mac Thornberry 

House of Representatives 

Page 45 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

planned for and structured its force to provide chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence 

management assistance, we met with DOD officials and reviewed DOD’s 

plans to determine sourcing requirements for the CBRNE Consequence 

Management Response Force (CCMRF). We reviewed the DOD, Northern 

Command, Army North, Joint Task Force Civil Support, Army Forces 

Command, and Army Reserve Command execution orders to determine 

the requirements for the number of CCMRFs, planned response time 

frames, force composition, sourcing, training, and readiness. We also 

reviewed concept and operations plans for CBRNE. We discussed DOD’s 

plans for providing units to CCMRF with officials from the Joint Forces 

Command, Army Forces Command, Northern Command, Army North, 

Joint Task Force Civil Support, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the 

National Guard Bureau. To determine DOD’s approved incremental 

sourcing of the three CCMRFs, we interviewed officials from the Office of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ 

Security Affairs and the Joint Staff to assess the CCMRF sourcing 

requirements in structuring the force. We discussed with officials from the 

U.S. Army Reserve Command, Joint Forces Command, Army Forces 

Command, and Army North the sourcing requirements for CCMRF 

technical support forces (which perform in the contaminated or hot zone) 

and general support force to determine how units are selected for CCMRF 

and to obtain perspectives on sourcing challenges. We also reviewed 

documentation and interviewed National Guard Bureau officials to 

determine its unit sourcing plans for future CCMRFs. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for CBRNE 

consequence management operations and integrated plans with other 

federal government plans, we met with officials from the Department of 

Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and 

the Joint Task Force Civil Support. For example, we met with the 

Department of Homeland Security officials to discuss the interagency 

process used to support planning for responding to a domestic incident. 

Additionally, we met with Northern Command, Army North, and Joint 

Task Force Civil Support to discuss their plans for supporting federal 

CBRNE consequence management efforts and to discuss how their plans 

are integrated with those of federal agencies that DOD will support and 

reviewed plans, playbooks, and briefing documents that described DOD’s 

responsibilities related to provided capabilities in support of others in 

response to a CBRNE event. Further, we reviewed Joint Task Civil 

Support playbooks relevant to each of the Department of Homeland 

Page 46 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Security’s National Planning Scenarios to determine the extent to which 

DOD has planned for CBRNE consequence management operations. We 

reviewed relevant reports and documents that govern the national 

response to disasters. We discussed with Department of Homeland 

Security and Federal Emergency Management Agency official their efforts 

to establish roles and responsibilities in response to a CBRNE event. We 

also reviewed our prior work on national preparedness to determine the 

status of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) efforts to 

complete and integrate plans.1

 We also reviewed the Department of 

Homeland Security’s National Response Framework, National 

Preparedness Guidelines, and Target Capabilities List to assess DOD’s 

and other federal departments’ roles and responsibilities in providing 

support to civil authorities in response to a CBRNE event. 

To determine how prepared the CCMRF is to perform the CBRNE 

consequence management mission, we compared existing DOD readiness 

policies and practices to the practices for preparing CCMRF units and 

plans for assessing and reporting mission readiness. We discussed these 

issues with officials from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Army 

Forces Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the Joint Staff, U.S. 

Northern Command, and U.S. Army North. Further, we discussed the 

assignment of forces and readiness reporting with officials at the U.S. 

Joint Forces Command to assess the CCMRF sourcing priority 

requirements and the readiness reporting guidance for designated units 

assigned to the CCMRF mission. We also discussed with these officials 

their plans for training and assessing the readiness of units designated for 

CCMRF to determine CCMRF training and readiness certification and 

validation requirements. In determining the requirements, we reviewed 

pre-mission training, exercise, and validation guidance that was used to 

assess unit readiness. We also reviewed training requirements and spoke 

with officials to determine individual and unit mission-essential tasks 

identified for CCMRF. We also reviewed our prior work on U.S. Northern 

Command planning efforts for homeland defense and civil support2

 to 

assess mission-essential tasks previously reported for units assigned to the 

 

1

GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and 

Integrate, Planning, Exercise and Assessment Efforts, GAO-09-369 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 30, 2009). 

2

GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to 

Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues, GAO-08-251

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008). 

Page 47 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

CCMRF mission. Additionally, we reviewed the Defense Science Board’s 

report, Unconventional Operational Concepts and the Homeland3

 to 

obtain their assessment of training and readiness of military units for the 

domestic homeland security mission and recommendations for providing 

realistic training and exercises. Further, we reviewed our prior work on 

the Army’s overall training strategy to determine how it is supported by 

the Army Force Generation Model4

 and to determine the effect of overseas 

deployments on the preparation for units designated for CCMRF. 

We reviewed readiness briefings and mission readiness exercise lessonslearned reports to determine pre-mission assumption validation 

requirement challenges for task force units. To determine criteria for 

training and readiness of designated units for the CCMRF mission, we 

reviewed orders and plans that discussed individual, leader, and unit 

training requirements and discussed those issues with Joint Staff, 

Northern Command, Army North, Army Forces Command, and Army 

Reserve Command officials. We also discussed with CCRMF unit officials 

the guidance and resources that they were provided to prepare for the 

mission to determine preparation challenges. These units were 

judgmentally selected. While we cannot generalize the results of these 

discussions to all units, they were selected to provide a cross section of 

units from different services, from both the active and reserve forces, and 

from units that will provide either specialized CBRNE capabilities or 

general support capabilities. 

To determine CCMRF fund planning and the linkage to mission 

requirements, we met with officials from Northern Command, Army North, 

Army Forces Command, and the Army Reserve Command to discuss 

mission funding requirements and funding sources. We also reviewed 

guidance and funding plans to determine efforts to develop CCMRF-unique 

requirements and to identify the status of funding plans for meeting 

requirements. We met with the National Guard Bureau to discuss their 

current capabilities, identified shortfalls, and their approach to mitigate 

any identifiable shortfalls. Further, we reviewed program-identified 

 

3

Defense Science Board, Unconventional Operational Concepts and the Homeland, Report 

on the 2007 Summer Study on Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. 

Interests (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2009). 

4

GAO, Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army’s Strategy for 

Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation Challenges, GAO-07-936

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 2007). 

Page 48 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

funding shortfalls to determine the impact of planning, coordination, and 

execution of homeland defense training and readiness exercises. We 

discussed with unit officials the funding guidance that their units were 

provided to meet the CCMRF mission and obtained their perspectives on 

the extent to which additional specialized equipment beyond the units’ 

standard equipment would be needed to perform the CCMRF mission. We 

also discussed funding requirements with officials from the Department of 

the Army to determine long-term funding plans for units designated for the 

CCMRF mission. We also met with U.S. Army Reserve Command officials 

to determine equipment and training costs for general support and 

commercial-off-the-shelf equipment costs for technical support units for 

the CCMRF mission. 

In addressing our objectives, we reviewed plans and related documents, 

obtained information, and interviewed officials at the following locations: 

• United States Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado 

• Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia 

• The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 

• The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 

• Joint Task Force Civil Support, Ft. Monroe, Virginia 

• U. S. Army North, Ft. Sam Houston, Texas 

• Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia 

• Army Reserve Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia 

• National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia 

• Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. 

• Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C. 

We conducted our review from February 2008 to October 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

Page 49 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Agency comments were 

made on GAO-09-928. 

This report number was 

subsequently changed to 

GAO-10-123. 

Page 50 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 51 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 52 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 53 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 54 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 55 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 56 GAO-10-123 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Davi M. D’Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. GAO Contact 

In addition to the contact named above, Joseph Kirschbaum, Assistant 

Director; Rodell Anderson; Sandra Burrell; David Fox; Joanne Landesman; 

Greg Marchand; Robert Poetta; and Jason Porter made key contributions 

to this report. 

Acknowledgments 

Homeland Defense 
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise 

Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be 

Improved. GAO-09-849. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009. 

National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to 

Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts.

GAO-09-369. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2009. 

Emergency Management: Observations on DHS’ Preparedness for 

Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-08-868T. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008. 

National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and Procedures to 

Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process. 

GAO-08-768. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008. 

Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern 

Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guards Bureau, 

but Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008. 

Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but 

Needs to Address force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other 

Issues. GAO-08-251. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008. 

Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Tested Various Capabilities 

during 2006 Governmentwide Exercise. GAO-08-105. Washington, D.C.: 

November 19, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Action to 

Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion 

Centers. GAO-07-1241T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare 

for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address 

Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington, 

D.C.: July 31, 2007. 

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands’ Preparedness Efforts 

Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk 

Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. 

GAO-07-395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007. 

Page 57 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
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Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-903. Washington, 

D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil 

Support Teams’ M9ission and Address Management Challenges. 

GAO-06-498. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 

Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643. 

Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 

Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643. 

Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 

Associated with major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

GAO’S Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response 

to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: 

February 1, 2006. 

Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ AllHazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.: 

July 11, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport 

Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: 

January 14, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental 

Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable 

Communications. GAO-04-740. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004. 

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for 

Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003. 

Page 58 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
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(351150) Page 59 GAO-10-123 Homeland Defense
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