IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs August 3, 2020

IN RE BRADEN K.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for White County

No. 4701JV-1492 Sammie E. Benningfield, Jr., Judge

___________________________________

No. M2020-00569-COA-R3-PT

___________________________________

This case involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother filed by the 

Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. In the petition, the Department alleged five 

grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court found that all 

five grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that it was in the best 

interest of the child to terminate the mother’s parental rights. As a result, the juvenile court 

granted the petition, and the mother appealed. We affirm the juvenile court’s ruling and 

remand.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed 

and Remanded.

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

Matthew Sewell Bailey, Spencer, Tennessee, for the appellant, Brandi K.W.

1

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; and Lexie Ashton Ward, Assistant 

Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

OPINION

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Brandi K.W. (“Mother”) is the mother of minor child, Braden K., who is the subject 

 

1

In actions involving a juvenile, the policy of this Court is to protect the privacy of children by 

using only the first name and last initial (and in some cases, just the initials) of the parties. In re Jaiden 

C.W., 420 S.W.3d 13, 15 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).

09/30/2020
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of this case.

2

 It is undisputed that Braden’s putative father is Richard K. although he is not 

listed on the child’s birth certificate, has never been a part of his life, and his whereabouts 

have remained unknown throughout this case. This appeal involves only Mother’s parental 

rights because Richard is no longer a part of this case.

On January 4, 2018, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) 

received a referral that alleged Braden, a twelve-year-old boy, was suffering from a lack of 

supervision and psychological harm. The referral also alleged that Mother was abusing 

drugs and alcohol, and physically abusing her children. DCS investigated the referral and 

made an unannounced visit at Mother’s home. During the visit, several drug-related items 

were found in the home, including: marijuana cigarettes in plain sight, a bag of marijuana, 

methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and a marijuana pipe in Braden’s room. There 

were also signs of environmental neglect in the home, such as dirty dishes and trash 

throughout the home, molded food, and broken glass in Braden’s bedroom. After the visit, 

Mother was incarcerated for possession of marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug 

paraphernalia.

On January 24, 2018, DCS filed a petition to declare Braden dependent and

neglected and for emergency custody. On the same day, the juvenile court entered a 

protective custody order that placed Braden in the custody of DCS. Mother stipulated that 

Braden was dependent and neglected, and on March 19, 2018, the juvenile court 

adjudicated Braden dependent and neglected. Braden has remained in foster care since he 

was removed from Mother’s custody on January 24, 2018.3

Following Braden’s removal from Mother’s custody, Julie Brown (“CM Brown”), 

a family service worker with DCS, was assigned to be the case manager of Braden’s case. 

Throughout Braden’s time in foster care, CM Brown worked with Mother to try and 

remedy many of the circumstances that led to Braden’s removal. CM Brown and Mother 

developed a Family Permanency Plan that outlined requirements for Mother. Over the next 

two years, four permanency plans were developed and ratified by the juvenile court. 

Mother participated in the development of each plan and agreed to her responsibilities 

listed in the plans. The first plan was developed on February 15, 2018 and ratified on 

March 5, 2018. The final plan was developed on October 21, 2019 and ratified on 

November 18, 2019. CM Brown ensured that Mother understood the importance of 

completing the requirements in the plans and explained that if they were not completed, 

Mother’s parental rights could be terminated.

The initial permanency plan, developed a few weeks after Braden’s removal, listed 

 

2

Initially, Braden’s sister was also included in this case, but she is no longer a part of the 

proceeding.

3 Braden’s sister was also adjudicated dependent and neglected and removed from Mother’s 

custody on January 24, 2018.
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several requirements for Mother to complete. The plan required Mother to complete an 

alcohol and drug assessment, a psychological assessment, and a parenting assessment and 

follow any corresponding recommendations; obtain a stable legal income that is sufficient 

to provide for Braden’s basic needs; obtain safe and stable housing; resolve her criminal 

issues and not incur new charges; and sign a release form that would allow DCS to track 

Mother’s progress by contacting her providers. The second permanency plan included the 

same requirements and added that Mother was to attend scheduled supervised visits, 

participate in phone calls, and write letters to Braden. The third plan included the same 

requirements as the first two and added that Mother was required to “take advantage of all 

visitations,” and if financially able, “provide for [Braden’s] needs during the visitation[s].”

The final permanency plan included all of the same requirements as the prior three plans. 

Along with the plans’ stated requirements, each plan also described Mother’s responsibility 

to provide child support.

After the development of the first permanency plan, CM Brown made several 

attempts to help Mother complete her requirements. At various times, CM Brown provided 

Mother with a list of service providers; helped schedule appointments; offered to and 

occasionally did transport Mother to appointments and visitations; conducted drug screens 

and encouraged sobriety; and attempted to assess the environmental conditions of Mother’s 

home. At monthly meetings with Mother, CM Brown would review Mother’s

requirements and emphasize the importance of completing the plan. Mother never told 

CM Brown that she could not complete any of the requirements. Despite Mother agreeing 

to the requirements in the plan and CM Brown’s efforts to help Mother, the vast majority 

of the plan was not completed.

Of all the requirements in the permanency plan, Mother only completed one: signing 

releases for DCS to contact Mother’s providers. She began a rehabilitation program but 

did not complete it. Additionally, she completed the initial phase of the alcohol and drug 

assessment but failed to follow any of the recommendations of the assessment. Mother did 

not “take advantage of all visitations” or provide Braden with essential items at visitations. 

Visitations were often rescheduled or cancelled due to Mother’s repeated incarcerations. 

When Mother was not incarcerated, there were still several instances where she missed 

visitations without reporting to CM Brown. At times when visitations did occur, Mother 

admitted to drinking before visits and falling asleep during at least one visit. On several 

occasions, Braden either asked to leave the visitations early or to not visit at all. Even 

though Mother was given opportunities, support, and encouragement to complete the 

requirements in the plan, CM Brown stated she “has put forth no effort,” and “there’s no 

excuse not to.”

Not only did Mother fail to complete the majority of the permanency plan 

requirements, she also continued to lead a tumultuous and illegal lifestyle. Over two years 

passed between Braden leaving Mother’s custody and the final hearing in this case. During 

that time, Mother incurred several new criminal charges, including possession of a 
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schedule II substance, criminal impersonation, and multiple counts of violation of 

probation. As of the final hearing, Mother had four active criminal warrants. In the months 

directly following Braden’s removal, Mother admitted to drinking and using 

methamphetamine.

Along with questioning Mother’s sobriety, CM Brown also took issue with 

Mother’s latest living situation. Throughout her involvement in this case, CM Brown 

visited Mother’s home to assess her living environment. CM Brown described the home 

as a “camper trailer” or “somewhat of a shed” that had several concerning characteristics. 

Specifically, she stated that the home was without electricity, requiring an external 

connection to the home next to it by an extension cord. CM Brown also testified that the 

home had little ventilation, had pressboard flooring, and was very dirty. Despite the small 

size of the home, CM Brown testified that anywhere from eight to fourteen people would 

frequent the home when she would visit and several dogs were in the trailer. All of the 

visitors refused to submit to a drug screen and Mother admitted to using drugs, which led

CM Brown to be concerned that drug activity was occurring in the home.

As for financial support, the record is devoid of any evidence that shows Mother 

provided child support for Braden since he left her custody. CM Brown testified that 

Mother did not contribute any support after Braden left her custody. This testimony is 

consistent with Mother’s Tennessee Child Support Log (a copy of which was admitted as 

an exhibit) that showed, as of January 28, 2020, Mother paid zero support. CM Brown 

testified that Mother was aware of her duty to support because it was stated in the initial 

custody order, which Mother received a copy of, and she reminded Mother of the duty at 

their regular meetings. Mother provided no support despite being able-bodied and capable 

of working.

In contrast to Mother’s actions throughout this case, Braden has progressed in a 

positive direction. Initially, Braden had behavioral and mental health concerns. At trial, 

CM Brown testified that Braden is now very well-behaved and receiving mental health 

counseling. She also testified that Braden no longer has a meaningful relationship with 

Mother but has an extremely positive bond with his foster parents, Donald O. and April O, 

who are also his prospective adoptive parents. CM Brown stated that Braden looks to 

Donald and April for love, support, and security and has even asked to be adopted by them. 

Donald also testified to Braden’s time in their home. Donald stated that he and April have 

developed a bond with Braden and are “ready, willing, and able” to adopt him should they

be allowed the opportunity to do so.

On April 11, 2019, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights.4 In 

the petition, DCS alleged five grounds for termination: (1) abandonment for failure to 

 

4 Originally, the petition also included the putative father, but he was subsequently dismissed 

without prejudice.
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support; (2) abandonment for failure to establish a suitable home; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (4) persistence of conditions; and (5) failure to 

manifest an ability and willingness to parent.

On February 7, 2020, the Juvenile Court of White County held the final hearing on 

the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. At the hearing, three witnesses testified 

to the above-mentioned facts: CM Brown; Nate Theiss, a Sergeant at the White County 

Sheriff’s Office; and Donald O. The court took special notice of Mother not attending the 

hearing despite there being no apparent reason for her absence.5 At the end of the hearing, 

the court rendered an oral ruling. On March 25, 2020, the court entered its final written 

order.

In its written order, the juvenile court found all five grounds for termination of 

parental rights were proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found that it 

was in the best interest of Braden to terminate Mother’s rights. As a result, the court 

granted the petition and terminated Mother’s parental rights. Additionally, the court 

specifically found that all three witnesses were “absolutely credible” and “adopt[ed] the 

testimony of” all three witnesses.

Mother timely appealed.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Mother raises two issues on appeal, which have been copied verbatim from her 

brief:

1. Whether the juvenile court improperly determined that a ground existed to 

terminate the Mother’s parental rights.

2. Whether the juvenile court improperly determined that the termination of the 

Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the juvenile court’s ruling to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights and remand.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN TERMINATION CASES

Previously, the Tennessee Supreme Court has described the gravity of proceedings 

 

5 CM Brown testified that she spoke with Mother a few days prior to the hearing to confirm that 

she knew the date and to offer to transport her to the courthouse. The morning of the hearing, CM Brown 

went to Mother’s home, knocked at her door, called her name, and waited several minutes, but no one 

answered.
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that involve the potential termination of parental rights:

A parent’s right to the care and custody of her child is among the 

oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected by 

the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. But parental 

rights, although fundamental and constitutionally protected, are not absolute.

. . . When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks 

not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it. Few 

consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural 

family ties. The parental rights at stake are far more precious than any 

property right. Termination of parental rights has the legal effect of reducing 

the parent to the role of a complete stranger and of severing forever all legal 

rights and obligations of the parent or guardian of the child. In light of the 

interests and consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to 

fundamentally fair procedures in termination proceedings.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 521-22 (Tenn. 2016) (footnote omitted) (citations 

omitted) (quotation marks omitted).

One of the protections afforded to parents in termination actions is the requirement 

that the petitioner prove the elements by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 522; In re 

Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 552 (Tenn. 2015); In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 

636, 639 (Tenn. 2013). This heightened standard of proof “minimizes the risk of 

unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental parental rights.” In 

re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522. Clear and convincing evidence “establishes that the 

truth of the facts asserted is highly probable and eliminates any serious or substantial doubt 

about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” In re Audrey S., 182 

S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted). It must also “eliminate[] any 

serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re 

Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522 (quoting In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 

2010)).

In regard to this Court’s role in cases involving the termination of parental rights, 

our Supreme Court has explained:

Under [Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure] Rule 13(d), appellate courts 

review factual findings de novo on the record and accord these findings a 

presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. In 

re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn.

2009); In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). . . . The 

trial court’s ruling that the evidence sufficiently supports termination of 

parental rights is a conclusion of law, which appellate courts review de novo 

with no presumption of correctness. In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d at 393 
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(quoting In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 810). Additionally, all 

other questions of law in parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, 

are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. In re Angela E., 

303 S.W.3d [240,] 246 [(Tenn. 2010)].

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524.

IV. DISCUSSION

To terminate a party’s parental rights, the petitioning party must prove two elements 

by clear and convincing evidence. In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681 (Tenn. 2017); 

In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 552. First, the petitioner must prove at least one of the 

statutory grounds listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g). In re Gabriella 

D., 531 S.W.3d at 681; In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 552. Second, the petitioner must 

prove that terminating the parent’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. In re 

Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d at 681; In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 552.

A. Grounds for Termination

In this case, the juvenile court found that all five alleged grounds for termination of 

Mother’s parental rights were proven by clear and convincing evidence. We shall review 

each ground separately. See In re Carrington, 483 S.W.3d at 525–26 (stating this Court 

must review each ground for termination, “regardless of whether the parent challenges” 

every ground alleged).

1. Abandonment – Failure to Support

Abandonment is listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g) as a 

potential ground for termination of parental rights. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-

102(1)(A), -113(g)(1). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102 defines

“abandonment” as occurring when “[f]or a period of four (4) consecutive months 

immediately preceding the filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or any amended 

petition to terminate the parental rights of the parent . . . , that the parent or parents or the 

guardian or guardians either have failed to visit or have failed to support or have failed to 

make reasonable payments toward the support of the child.” Id. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) 

(2019).

6

 To avoid a finding of abandonment, a parent must provide more than token 

financial support. In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 S.W.3d at 641; In re Addalyne S., 556 

S.W.3d 774, 787 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). “Token support” is support that, “under the 

circumstances of the individual case, is insignificant given the parent’s means.” Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(B) (2019). If a petitioner sufficiently alleges that a parent has 

 

6 The relevant portions of the Code appear the same as they did when the petition was filed on April 

11, 2019.
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abandoned a child by failing to provide support, the parent may assert that the failure was 

not willful. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(I). The absence of willfulness is an affirmative 

defense that must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.7 A child support 

order is not required to prove abandonment by failing to support because an adult parent is 

presumed to know that he or she has a duty to provide support. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

102(1)(H); In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 724 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017); In re Jacob 

M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).

DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on April 11, 2019. 

Accordingly, the relevant four-month period under section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) is from 

December 11, 2018 to April 10, 2019. During the juvenile court proceedings, Mother did 

not assert a lack of willfulness as an affirmative defense to her lack of support, and she

does not do so on appeal.

Instead, Mother argues for the first time on appeal that the juvenile court improperly 

determined she failed to support Braden because her child support log does not indicate 

whether the log relates to Braden or his sister. This argument is unpersuasive. The child 

support log is not the only evidence that shows Mother’s lack of support. CM Brown 

testified that Mother did not provide support during the four months immediately preceding 

the filing of the petition. She further stated that Mother has never provided support even 

though she was made aware of her duty to do so. This testimony was not refuted. Further, 

Mother has offered no excuse nor reason why she did not provide support. CM Brown 

affirmed that she is able-bodied and capable of working. In its final order, the juvenile 

court stated that CM Brown’s testimony was sufficient proof to show Mother did not 

provide support during the requisite four-month period. It also found that CM Brown was 

“absolutely credible.” “When the resolution of an issue in a case depends upon the 

truthfulness of witnesses, the trial judge, who has had the opportunity to observe the 

witnesses and their manner and demeanor while testifying, is in a far better position than 

this Court to decide those issues.” In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 591 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2016). This Court affords considerable deference to the weight and credit a trial court 

places on a witness’s testimony. See Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2014); In 

re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d at 591. Therefore, CM Brown’s testimony regarding Mother’s 

lack of support is sufficient evidence on this issue.

The record shows that Mother did not provide support for Braden from December 

11, 2018 to April 10, 2019. Mother received the initial custody order that stated she had a 

duty to provide support for Braden. She was also reminded of this duty when she would 

attend court proceedings before the juvenile court or meetings with CM Brown. Further, 

each permanency plan—all of which Mother helped develop and to which she agreed—

 

7 Under previous versions of the Code, to assert abandonment by failing to support, a petitioner

was required to prove the parent willfully failed to support the child. See, e.g., In re Addalyne S., 556 

S.W.3d at 789.
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stated she was responsible for paying child support. Mother has simply provided no 

justifiable excuse for failing to provide support in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the 

juvenile court’s finding that Mother abandoned Braden for failing to provide support. See 

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), -113(g)(1).

2. Abandonment – Failure to Establish a Suitable Home

Abandonment may also occur under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-

113(g)(1) when a parent fails to obtain and sustain a suitable home for the child. Section 

36-1-102(1)(A)(ii) states that a parent has “abandoned” a child when:

(a) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal 

custody of a parent . . . by a court order at any stage of proceedings in 

which a petition has been filed in the juvenile court alleging that a child 

is a dependent and neglected child, and the child was placed in the 

custody of the department or a licensed child-placing agency;

(b) The juvenile court found . . . that the department or a licensed childplacing agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child 

or that the circumstances of the child’s situation prevented reasonable 

efforts from being made prior to the child’s removal; and

(c) For a period of four (4) months following the physical removal, the 

department or agency made reasonable efforts to assist the parent or 

parents or the guardian or guardians to establish a suitable home for the 

child, but that the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians have not

made reciprocal reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home and have 

demonstrated a lack of concern for the child to such a degree that it 

appears unlikely that they will be able to provide a suitable home for the 

child at an early date.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii)(a)-(c) (2019).

As stated above, in order for a court to terminate parental rights under this ground, 

it must find “that a parent failed to provide a suitable home for his or her child even after 

DCS assisted that parent in his or her attempt to establish a suitable home.” In re Jamel 

H., E2014-02539-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 4197220, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2015).

Although the parent is required to make “reasonable efforts” to establish a suitable home, 

“successful results” are not required. In re D.P.M., No. M2005-02183-COA-R3-PT, 2006 

WL 2589938, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2006). DCS must make “reasonable efforts” 

to assist the parent by doing more than simply providing a list of service providers. In re 

Matthew T., No. M2015-00486-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 1621076, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Apr. 20, 2016). Efforts made by DCS shall “be reasonable if such efforts equal or exceed 
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the efforts of the parent or guardian toward the same goal, when the parent or guardian is 

aware that the child is in the custody of the department.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

102(1)(A)(ii)(c). DCS should utilize its superior resources in assisting a parent to find a 

home, but “[its] efforts do not need to be ‘Herculean.’” In re Hannah H., No. E2013-

01211-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 2587397, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2014) (citing Dep’t 

of Children’s Servs. v. Estes, 284 S.W.3d 790, 801 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008), overruled on 

other grounds by In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533 (Tenn. 2015)). See also In re Matthew 

T., 2016 WL 1621076, at *7.

In the present case, on January 24, 2018, DCS filed its petition alleging that Braden 

was dependent and neglected. That same day, the juvenile court entered a protective

custody order that removed Braden from Mother’s custody and placed him with DCS. 

Since Braden was removed from Mother’s physical custody on January 24, 2018, Mother 

has never established a suitable home. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii)(c).

The juvenile court found that in the four months following Braden’s removal, DCS 

made numerous efforts to help Mother find a suitable home. CM Brown’s testimony, 

which was completely undisputed by Mother, described those efforts. CM Brown did 

much more than provide a list of service providers. She aided Mother by working with her 

to develop the first permanency plan. After the initial plan was developed, CM Brown 

explained the importance of completing the plan’s requirements, encouraged Mother to 

complete the plan’s requirements, and provided her with information on service providers. 

CM Brown also helped schedule Mother’s appointments, offered or provided Mother 

transportation, and encouraged Mother’s sobriety. CM Brown conducted drug screens with 

Mother and attempted to conduct home visits to assess her living conditions. In the four 

months after Braden’s removal, CM Brown held child and family team meetings to review 

Mother’s progress and determine if there were any barriers to Mother’s success that could 

be eradicated. Based on these facts, we agree with the juvenile court that DCS made 

reasonable efforts to assist the Mother to establish a suitable home for Braden.8

In contrast to the efforts made by DCS, Mother made essentially no effort to 

establish a suitable home. Initially, after his removal, she was incarcerated. Then, she 

lived with her father for approximately two weeks before moving into her “camper trailer.”

CM Brown conducted several home visits at the trailer and found several issues with the 

 

8 On appeal, Mother argues DCS failed to prove this ground by clear and convincing evidence 

because it did not establish when CM Brown made these efforts. In doing so, Mother points to a single 

instance during CM Brown’s direct examination where counsel for DCS mistakenly referred to April 25, 

2019 instead of May 25, 2019. Respectfully, we disagree. The record is clear that CM Brown made 

significant efforts to assist Mother directly after Braden’s removal and beyond. Regardless, as we have 

previously explained, under section 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii), “[a]s long as the proof relates to ‘a period of four 

(4) months following the removal,’ . . . the ground may be established [because] the statute does not limit 

the court’s inquiry to a period of four months immediately following the removal.” In re Jakob O., No. 

M2016-00391-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 7243674, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016) (citation omitted).
- 11 -

home. She stated that it lacked electricity, had little ventilation, and had inadequate 

flooring. Even if we can assume the physical attributes of the home are appropriate for a 

child, Mother’s actions failed to establish a suitable home. See In re Navada N., 498 

S.W.3d at 595 (stating “[a] suitable home ‘requires more than a proper living location’”)

(quoting In re Hannah H., 2014 WL 2587397, at *9). CM Brown testified that Mother did 

not complete her psychological evaluation, parenting assessment, or provide proof of 

means of income. While Mother attended some visitations during this time, she did not 

attend all of them and frequently drank alcohol during or before the visits. Mother also 

admitted to using illegal drugs during this time period.

Based on her actions, or lack thereof, in the months following Braden’s removal, 

we cannot say Mother made reasonable efforts to remedy the conditions that led to 

Braden’s removal. We have held before that a parent’s continued use of drugs and alcohol 

“demonstrate a lack of concern for the welfare of the [child] such that it [is] unlikely that 

the conditions would be remedied at an early date.” In re Hannah H., 2014 WL 2587397, 

at *9. See also In re Aaralyn O., No. W2017-01411-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 468246, at *7 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2018) (holding a parent’s continued drug use shows the parent is

“either unable or unwilling to maintain a safe and stable home”). In the months preceding 

the final hearing, Mother continued to use drugs, engage in criminal activities, and live in 

an unsuitable home for Braden. Her lack of effort demonstrates a lack of concern for 

Braden to such a degree that it appears unlikely she will provide a suitable home at an early 

date. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii)(c). In contrast to Mother’s lack of effort, 

DCS made significant efforts to assist Mother in finding a suitable home. 

Therefore, we find that DCS made reasonable efforts to aid Mother in establishing 

a suitable home for Braden, and Mother did not make reciprocal efforts. As a result, the 

record shows by clear and convincing evidence that Mother failed to provide a suitable 

home for Braden. Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-1-113(g)(1) and -102(1)(A)(ii) 

have been established as a ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

3. Substantial Non-Compliance with the Permanency Plan

Grounds for termination of parental rights may also be established if “[t]here has 

been substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with the statement of 

responsibilities in a permanency plan.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2). In order to 

sufficiently prove this ground, “[DCS] must demonstrate first that the requirements of the 

permanency plan are reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that caused the 

child to be removed from the parent’s custody in the first place.” In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 

643, 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 547 (Tenn. 2002); 

In re L.J.C., 124 S.W.3d 609, 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)). Then, DCS must prove “that 

the parent’s noncompliance is substantial in light of the degree of noncompliance and the 

importance of the particular requirement that has not been met.” Id. (citing In re Valentine, 

79 S.W.3d at 548-59; In re Z.J.S., No. M2002-02235-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL 21266854, 
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at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2003)).

“Determining whether a parent has substantially complied with a permanency plan 

involves more than merely counting up the tasks in the plan to determine whether a certain 

number have been completed and ‘going through the motions’ does not constitute 

substantial compliance.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 537 (citing In re Valentine, 

79 S.W.3d at 547). It will be insufficient to only show “that a parent has not complied with 

every jot and tittle of the permanency plan.” In re Ronon G., No. M2019-01086-COA-R3-

PT, 2020 WL 249220, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2020) (quoting In re M.J.B., 140 

S.W.3d at 656). “Trivial, minor, or technical deviations from a permanency plan’s 

requirements will not be deemed to amount to substantial noncompliance.” In re M.J.B., 

140 S.W.3d at 656.

Despite Mother’s contentions to the contrary, it is clear that she failed to 

substantially comply with the requirements of any of the four versions of the permanency 

plan. Throughout the differing versions of the permanency plan, Mother was required to 

submit to an alcohol and drug assessment and follow its recommendations, report to DCS 

within 24 hours if she relapses during her drug and alcohol treatment, complete 

psychological and parenting assessments, obtain and maintain stable employment, resolve 

her criminal issues and avoid incurring new charges, sign release forms for DCS to contact 

her providers, take advantage of all possible visitations with Braden, and maintain a bond 

with Braden. Braden was removed from Mother’s custody due to her substance abuse and 

environmental neglect. Accordingly, we agree with the juvenile court that these 

requirements are reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that led to Braden’s 

removal.

Despite the efforts CM Brown made to assist Mother, the only requirement Mother

fully completed was signing release forms for DCS to contact her providers. Mother began 

a rehabilitation program but did not complete it. She completed the first part of an alcohol 

and drug assessment, but she did not follow any of the corresponding recommendations. 

She attended some visitations, but there were several instances when Mother did not report 

to CM Brown and missed visitations. Further, CM Brown testified that Mother admitted 

that she continued to consume illegal drugs and alcohol. Yet, there is no evidence that she 

ever reported a relapse to DCS. Mother also failed to obtain a stable and safe home and 

continued to engage in criminal activity. As of the final hearing, there were three 

outstanding warrants for her arrest. Finally, it is evident from CM Brown’s testimony that 

Mother failed to maintain a bond with Braden. On multiple occasions, Braden would either 

ask to leave a visitation early or would ask not to go at all.

Again, Braden was removed from Mother’s care due to her drug use and inability 

to provide sufficient care and an appropriate home for Braden. As such, her noncompliance 

with the permanency plan requirements are anything but “[t]rivial, minor, or technical 

deviations.” See In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 656. Mother’s noncompliance was 
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substantial. See id. She was not only aware of the requirements of each permanency plan, 

she helped develop each plan and understood the significance of completing the 

requirements. Taken together, there is clear and convincing evidence to show substantial 

noncompliance with the permanency plan.

4. Persistence of Conditions

Next, we shall address the juvenile court’s finding that persistence of conditions was 

proven by clear and convincing evidence. Persistence of conditions applies as a ground 

for termination of parental rights when:

(A) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal 

custody of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a court order 

entered at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the 

juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and:

(i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist, 

preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian, 

or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable probability, would 

cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, preventing 

the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian;

(ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied 

at an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent 

or guardian in the near future; and

(iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship 

greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe, 

stable, and permanent home;

(B) The six (6) months must accrue on or before the first date the termination 

of parental rights petition is set to be heard.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) (2019).

“A parent’s continued inability to provide fundamental care to a child, even if not 

willful, . . . constitutes a condition which prevents the safe return of the child to the parent’s 

care.” In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d at 605 (omission in original) (quoting In re A.R., No. 

W2008-00558-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 4613576, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2008)). 

When determining whether “conditions persist,” a court may consider the conditions that 

led to a child’s removal from a parent’s custody as well as any other conditions that are 

likely to cause a child to be subject to further abuse and neglect. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

113(g)(3)(A)(i); In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 872. Under this ground, a parent’s inability 
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to eliminate such conditions does not need to be willful. In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 

484, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).

In the present case, Braden was removed from Mother’s custody on January 24, 

2018. On March 19, 2018, the juvenile court adjudicated him dependent and neglected. 

The final hearing on the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights took place on 

February 7, 2020. Based on this undisputed sequence of events, Braden was clearly 

removed from Mother’s custody for a period of six months, and the six-month period 

accrued well before the final hearing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(i), (B).9

Many of the conditions that led to Braden’s removal persist. In January 2018, 

Braden was removed due to Mother’s drug use, alcohol abuse, and environmental neglect. 

Mother continues to consume illegal drugs and drink alcohol and engage in criminal 

activity. Additionally, as testified to by CM Brown, Mother’s current home has several 

attributes that would likely lead to environmental neglect of a child. It is clear from the 

record that the conditions that led to Braden’s removal, Mother’s drug use and unsuitable 

home, as well as her continued criminal activity, persist. We agree with the juvenile court 

in that, should Braden return to Mother’s custody, it is likely that these conditions would 

subject him to further neglect. See id. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(i).

Again, Mother was given over two years to remedy the conditions that led to 

Braden’s removal. Through CM Brown, Mother was afforded a great deal of support to 

help eliminate the conditions. CM Brown worked with Mother to develop and execute the 

permanency plan, she helped schedule Mother’s appointments and visitations, she offered 

to provide Mother transportation, she conducted drug screens and encouraged sobriety, and 

she attempted to visit Mother’s home to assess its environmental conditions. Considering 

the length of time Mother was afforded to eliminate the conditions, her lack of progress,

and the efforts made by CM Brown to aid Mother, we find that there is little likelihood 

Mother will remedy the conditions at an early date. See id. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(ii).

Under subsection (iii), it is apparent that a continuation of a parent-child relationship 

 

9

In her brief, Mother argues that the March 2018 order that adjudicated Braden dependent and 

neglected was not final because the putative father (who was a party in the dependent and neglect 

proceedings) was never served with the adjudicatory or dispositional orders. Mother argues further, 

“[w]ithout a final order previously finding Braden to be dependent and neglected, the ground of persistence 

of conditions does not apply.” This argument is without merit. Under the applicable version of section 36-

1-113(g)(3), the order removing a child from a parent’s custody can be “entered at any stage of proceedings 

in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected 

child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Thus, the juvenile court order that 

removed the child from custody need not be final in order for persistence of conditions to be established. 

See also In re Savannah M., No. M2018-00752-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 354869, at *5 n.12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Jan. 28, 2019) (stating that under the statute, as amended on July 1, 2018, the persistence of conditions 

ground applies when a child has been removed from a parent’s custody for six months by an order entered 

at any stage of the proceedings involving a petition that alleges the child is dependent and neglected).
- 15 -

between Mother and Braden would greatly diminish his chances of integrating into a safe 

and stable home. See id. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A)(iii). Mother’s visits with Braden were 

minimal and occurred less frequently in recent months. The low-quality of the visits and 

Braden’s desire to leave them early or not visit at all indicate that there is no longer a 

significant or meaningful bond between Mother and Braden. A continuation of this 

tumultuous parent-child relationship would not be to Braden’s benefit. Further, Braden is 

currently in a safe and stable home. He has developed positive connections with Donald 

and April, who have expressed an intent to adopt him should the petition in this case be 

granted.

For these reasons, we find that the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 36-1-113(g)(3) have been satisfied by clear and convincing evidence. DCS has 

sufficiently proven persistence of conditions as a ground for termination of Mother’s 

parental rights.

5. Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Parent

Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14), a court may terminate a 

party’s parental rights when:

A parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an 

ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or 

financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal 

and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or 

psychological welfare of the child.

This is a relatively new ground for termination. See In re Jayda H., No. E2019-

00855-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 6320503, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2019). This 

ground requires a petitioner to prove two elements. First, there must be clear and 

convincing proof that the parent “failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally 

assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child.” In re Keilyn

O., No. M2017-02386-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3208151, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 

2018). See also In re Maya R., No. E2017-01634-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 1629930, at *8

(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018). Second, the petitioner must prove that placing the child in 

the parent’s custody would pose a risk of substantial physical or psychological harm to the 

child. In re Keilyn O., 2018 WL 3208151, at *8; In re Maya R., 2018 WL 1629930, at *7.

Since this ground was added to section 36-1-113(g), a “split” of authority has 

developed on the first element. See In re Colton B., No. M2018-01053-COA-R3-PT, 2018 

WL 5415921, at *9-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2018) (describing the differing

approaches). Some panels have held that a petitioner must “prove both an inability and an 

unwillingness of the parent to assume custody or financial responsibility.” Id. at *9. In 

comparison, other panels have held that a petitioner must prove “that a parent has failed to 
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meet the requirement of manifesting both a willingness and an ability to assume legal and 

physical custody of the child or has failed to meet the requirement of manifesting both a 

willingness and an ability to assume financial responsibility of the child.” In re Jayda H., 

2019 WL 6320503, at *9 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-

COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018)). However, these 

differing approaches are not relevant if “the parent has manifested neither a willingness

nor an ability to assume custody and responsibility.” In re Dylan S., No. E2108-02036-

COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 5431878, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019) (citing In re J’Khari 

F., No. M2018-00708-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 411538, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 

2019); In re Colton B., 2018 WL 5415921, at *9-10).10

Based on the facts of this case, we do not find a need to address the split of authority. 

From January 2018 to February 2020, Mother failed to manifest either a willingness or an 

ability to parent Braden. During that time period, Mother has provided no financial 

support; she has continued to incur criminal charges; she continued to use illegal drugs; 

and she failed to provide a suitable home for Braden. Furthermore, Mother missed several 

opportunities to visit Braden and often drank alcohol at or before visits. Even on the day 

of the final hearing, a day of great magnitude in a case that would render significant 

consequences for Mother should DCS be successful, Mother did not appear. Mother was 

informed of the hearing date and its importance several days beforehand; she was offered 

transportation to court by CM Brown; and CM Brown went to Mother’s residence the 

morning of the hearing to transport her. Yet, Mother was absent from the courtroom. 

Mother’s inability to provide necessities for Braden and her continued volatile behavior 

shows she is unwilling and unable to assume custody or financial responsibility of Braden. 

See In re Jonathan M., No. E2018-00484-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 5310750, at *5 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2018) (stating a parent’s “[a]bility focuses on the parent’s lifestyle and 

circumstances”); In re Amynn K., 2018 WL 3058280, at *15 (stating “[the parent’s] actions, 

including his continued criminal activity and his failure to financially support the Child, 

raise doubt as to [his] actual willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for 

the Child”). DCS has satisfied its burden and proven the first element of this ground by 

clear and convincing evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14); In re Keilyn O., 

2018 WL 3208151, at *8.

Turning now to the second prong of section 36-1-113(g)(14), we find that there is 

clear and convincing evidence to show that placing Braden in the custody of Mother would 

subject him to a risk of substantial psychological and physical harm. Mother’s current 

home and lifestyle are not the appropriate setting to care for a child. CM Brown testified 

that Braden himself has expressed concerns for his own safety when he is with Mother. In 

comparison, Donald (Braden’s foster parent) testified at length about Braden’s positive 

 

10 In In re Neveah M., No. M2019-00313-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 1042502 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 

4, 2020), this Court noted the split of authority on this ground. Id. at *16 n.8. Recently, the Supreme Court 

granted permission to appeal in In re Neveah M., but it has yet to issue an opinion.
- 17 -

progression since entering his home. Braden has developed bonds with Donald, his wife 

April, and the other children in their home. Removing Braden from a positive home that 

he is comfortable in and has grown attachments to would be detrimental to both his 

psychological and physical wellbeing. Having determined that both elements of section 

36-1-113(g)(14) have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, we find that Mother 

has failed to manifest an ability and willingness to parent Braden.

B. Best Interest of the Child

After a petitioner proves at least one ground for termination of parental rights, it 

must then prove by clear and convincing evidence that terminating the parent’s rights is in 

the best interest of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c) (2019); In re Adoption of 

Angela E., 402 S.W.3d at 639; In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d at 606 (citing White v. Moody, 

171 S.W.3d 187, 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). Courts are instructed to consider the nonexhaustive list of factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(i) to make its best 

interest determination. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d at 607. The unique circumstances of 

each case determine the relevancy and weight a court may give to each factor. In re Audrey 

S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. “[W]hen the interests of the parent and the child conflict, courts are 

to resolve the conflict in favor of the rights and best interest of the child.” In re Navada 

N., 498 S.W.3d at 607 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d)). 

The nine factors listed in the Code are as follows:

(1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of 

circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s 

best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian;

(2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting adjustment 

after reasonable efforts by available social services agencies for such 

duration of time that lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear 

possible;

(3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or other 

contact with the child;

(4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established 

between the parent or guardian and the child;

(5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to 

have on the child’s emotional, psychological and medical condition;

(6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the parent 

or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional or 
- 18 -

psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child or adult 

in the family or household;

(7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s home is 

healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the home, or 

whether there is such use of alcohol, controlled substances or controlled 

substance analogues as may render the parent or guardian consistently 

unable to care for the child in a safe and stable manner;

(8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotional status would 

be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian from 

effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision for the child; 

or

(9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent with the 

child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-

5-101.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i).

Over two years have transpired since DCS received the referral that alleged Braden 

was suffering from a lack of supervision, psychological harm, physical abuse, and exposure 

to drugs and alcohol. Shortly after DCS received the referral, Braden entered DCS custody. 

Since that time, Mother has continued to exhibit many of the actions that led to Braden’s 

removal. Her criminal activity, drug use, lack of financial support, and unsuitable home 

would likely cause Braden to suffer further neglect should he return to her home. Mother 

has been given many opportunities and support to satisfy the requirements of the 

permanency plan, but she failed to complete the vast majority of its tasks. Since she has 

made almost no progress in adjusting her lifestyle in two years, it is unlikely that Mother 

will make sufficient changes to her lifestyle in the near future. Factors (1) and (2) weigh 

in favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Mother did visit Braden after he left her custody, but these visits were minimal and 

of low quality. Visitations were often cancelled due to Mother being incarcerated or her 

failure to report to CM Brown. Mother admitted to drinking before and during some visits 

and falling asleep on at least one occasion. Rather than visit, Braden often asked to leave 

the visitations early or asked to not visit at all. The record indicates that in the months 

immediately preceding the final hearing Mother did not visit with Braden at all. In the 

absence of regular visitation or a meaningful bond between Mother and Braden, factors (3) 

and (4) weigh in favor of termination.

As we have discussed, Braden has developed a bond and attachment towards his 

new home with Donald and April. He is open and honest with April about his past troubles 
- 19 -

with Mother, and he has a “father-son” relationship with Donald. Donald testified that 

Braden interacts well with the other children in the household and that they often “goof 

off” together like typical teenagers. Additionally, Donald has coordinated visits between 

Braden, his sister, and his maternal grandmother. If Mother’s parental rights are 

terminated, Donald intends to continue to allow these visits with other family members. 

Allowing Braden to maintain a bond with other family members while living in a safe 

environment will surely benefit his emotional and psychological wellbeing. Considering 

how well-integrated and attached Braden is in his current home and the individuals that 

reside with him, factor (5) also weighs in favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights.

There is no proof that Mother has directly physically or psychologically abused 

Braden. However, there was evidence of environmental neglect in Mother’s previous 

home, which Braden resided in prior to leaving Mother’s custody. CM Brown testified 

that when she visited Mother’s previous home there was trash and dirty dishes throughout 

the home, illegal drugs in multiple rooms, molded food, and broken glass in Braden’s room. 

The environmental neglect Mother showed Braden while he was in her care is evidence 

that factor (6) weighs in favor of termination.

Although Mother has moved since Braden left her custody, her current home is also 

problematic. CM Brown visited Mother’s new home throughout this case and stated that 

it was concerning. She testified that Mother’s new “camper trailer” has no electricity and 

requires an extension cord to be connected from the outside; it has little ventilation; and it 

has pressboard flooring. CM Brown also suspected that drug activity may be occurring in 

the home since several unrelated individuals frequent the home, all of which refused to 

submit to a drug screen. Taken as a whole, CM Brown described the residence as “very 

unclean” with several “unsafe conditions.” The record shows that Mother does not have a 

healthy and safe home, and her admitted drug use and continued criminal activity are likely 

to render her unable to consistently provide care for Braden. Factor (7) also weighs in 

favor of termination.

While one of the requirements in the permanency plan was for Mother to obtain a 

psychological assessment and follow its recommendations, there is no evidence in the 

record to address factor (8). Our inability to address this factor is not fatal to DCS’s 

petition. When conducting a best interest analysis in termination cases, courts are not 

required to find that every factor supports termination. In re Matthew T., 2016 WL 

1621076, at *16 (citing In re Dominique L.H., 393 S.W.3d 710, 719 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2012)).

Finally, in addressing factor (9), CM Brown testified that Mother has provided no 

financial support of any kind since Braden left her custody. There is no proof in the record 

to show otherwise. As a result, factor (9) also weighs in favor of terminating Mother’s 

parental rights.
- 20 -

After considering the statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 

36-1-113(i) and applying them to this case, we conclude that it is in the best interest of 

Braden to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the juvenile court’s findings that all 

five alleged grounds for termination have been proven by clear and convincing evidence. 

We also affirm the finding that it is in the best interest of Braden to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights. As a result, we affirm the juvenile court’s order to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to Braden.

This case is remanded to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be 

necessary and are consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are assessed against 

appellant, Brandi K.W., for which execution may issue, if necessary. 

_________________________________

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE