UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANDREW HANSON, et al., :

:

Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 22-2256 (RC)

:

v. : Re Document No.: 8

:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., :

:

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, four American citizens who reside in or spend time in the District of Columbia, 

challenge the constitutionality of D.C. law that bans possession of large-capacity magazines 

(“LCMs”). Plaintiffs own pistols and wish to equip them with LCMs for self-defense. They 

claim this conduct is protected by the Second Amendment under the test set forth in the Supreme 

Court’s recent decision, New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 

(2022). They now move for a preliminary (and permanent) injunction that enjoins Defendants,

the District of Columbia and the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department Robert J. Contee 

III (together, “the District”), from enforcing this law. The Court held oral argument on the 

motion. The matter is fully briefed and ripe for decision. For the reasons described below, the 

Court concludes that the District’s LCM ban is constitutional, and therefore Plaintiffs have not 

shown likelihood of success on the merits. The Court will thus deny Plaintiffs’ motion for a 

preliminary injunction. 
2

II. BACKGROUND

A. Case Background

The sole object of Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge is D.C.’s LCM ban, which provides

in full:

No person in the District shall possess, sell, or transfer any large capacity 

ammunition feeding device regardless of whether the device is attached to a 

firearm. For the purposes of this subsection, the term “large capacity ammunition 

feeding device” means a magazine, belt, drum, feed strip, or similar device that 

has a capacity of, or that can be readily restored or converted to accept, more than 

10 rounds of ammunition. The term “large capacity ammunition feeding device” 

shall not include an attached tubular device designed to accept, and capable of 

operating only with, .22 caliber rimfire ammunition.

D.C. Code § 7-2506.01(b). Violation of this provision carries a penalty of up to three years in

prison and a fine of up to $12,500. D.C. Code §§ 7-2507.06(a)(4); 22-3571.01(b)(6).

Some context is in order to understand the gun law at issue. An ammunition feeding 

device, more commonly known as a magazine, “is a vehicle for carrying ammunition. It can be 

either integral to the gun or detachable.” Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island, No. 22-cv246, 2022 WL 17721175, at *4 (D.R.I. Dec. 14, 2022). “Most modern semi-automatic firearms, 

whether handguns or semi-automatic rifles like AR-15s, use detachable box magazines.” Id.

The magazine is simply “inserted into and removed from the frame of the firearm, much as an 

extra battery-pack gets swapped in and out of a battery-operated tool, like a leaf blower, for 

example.” Id. Magazines come in different sizes and have different capacities. Under D.C. law, 

a large-capacity magazine, or LCM, is simply a magazine that can hold more than ten bullets. 

“When a multiple-round device like an LCM is attached, a handgun becomes a ‘semiautomatic’
3

weapon, meaning that it is capable of rapidly firing several bullets, one right after another. 

However, the gun still requires a trigger-pull for each round fired.” Id.1

Plaintiffs each hold a license to carry a concealed pistol issued by the D.C. Metropolitan 

Police Department and they regularly carry firearms in D.C. See Hanson Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 8-2; 

Yzaguirre Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 8-3; Chaney Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 8-4; Klun Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 8-5. 

Each Plaintiff possesses LCMs outside D.C., and each Plaintiff claims that, but for D.C. law 

banning LCM possession in D.C., he would use LCMs for self-defense in D.C. Hanson Decl. ¶¶ 

3–4; Yzaguirre Decl. ¶¶ 3–4; Chaney Decl. ¶¶ 3–4; Klun Decl. ¶¶ 3–4. In October 2022, 

Plaintiff Yzaguirre attempted to register a firearm with the Metropolitan Police Department but 

was denied because his firearm came with a 12-round LCM, in violation of D.C. law. Yzaguirre 

2d Decl. ¶¶ 2–7, ECF No. 16-1. 

Plaintiffs brought suit on August 1, 2022, seeking: a declaratory judgment that D.C.’s 

LCM ban violates the Second and Fifth Amendments; a preliminary and permanent injunction 

preventing the District from enforcing this ban; damages; and other costs. See Compl. at 22–24, 

ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs then moved for a preliminary injunction on August 19, 2022. Pls.’ Appl.

for Prelim. Inj. (“Pls.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 8. A few days later, the District moved for an extension 

of time to respond and also to conduct limited discovery as to the facts underlying Plaintiffs’ 

motion for a preliminary injunction. ECF Nos. 9, 10. The Court granted both motions on 

1 Both automatic and semi-automatic guns reload automatically; when fired, the force of 

a shot ejects the spent bullet casing while simultaneously pulling a fresh bullet from the 

magazine into the gun’s chamber. See Tom Givens, Concealed Carry Class 113 (2019), Ex. C to 

Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 17-5. But whereas automatic guns fire continuously from a single pull of 

the trigger, semi-automatic guns fire only one bullet per pull of the trigger. Id.; see, e.g., 1933 

Ohio Laws 189, 189 (“Automatically . . . means that class of firearms which, while the trigger on 

the firearm is held back continues to fire successive shots. Semi-automatically means that class 

of firearm which discharges one shot only each time the trigger is pulled, no manual reloading 

operation being necessary between shots.”). 
4

September 7, 2022. Min. Order (Sept. 7, 2022). On October 31, 2022, Plaintiffs supplemented 

their motion for a preliminary injunction with leave of Court. Min. Order (Oct. 31, 2022). On 

December 1, 2022, the Court permitted three nonprofit organizations, Brady, Gifford Law Center 

to Prevent Gun Violence, and March for our Lives to jointly submit an amicus brief in support of 

the District. Min. Order (Dec. 1, 2022); see Amicus Brief, ECF No. 18-1. Plaintiffs’ motion for 

a preliminary injunction was fully briefed as of January 23, 2022. The Court heard oral 

argument on the motion on April 13, 2023. The motion is now ripe for decision. 

B. Legal Background

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “A well regulated 

Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear 

Arms shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Although short, this text is anything but 

simple. To understand and interpret this constitutional text, the Court looks to caselaw that is 

relevant to the specific question at hand. As it turns out, Plaintiffs are not the first to raise a 

Second Amendment challenge to the District’s LCM ban: a group of plaintiffs challenged the 

same law over a decade ago in Heller v. District of Columbia (“Heller II”), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011), which ultimately upheld the ban. Heller II was decided in the wake of the Supreme 

Court’s seminal Second Amendment case, District of Columbia v. Heller (“Heller”), 554 U.S. 

570 (2008). The Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen last year, however, soundly rejected how 

the Courts of Appeals interpreted and applied Heller, and so calls into question the outcome of 

Heller II. Thus, although Plaintiffs’ challenge to D.C.’s LCM ban is not entirely new, it 

demands renewed analysis under the framework Bruen provides. 

Understanding Bruen requires taking a few steps back, to Heller. In Heller, the Supreme 

Court held that the District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violated the Second 
5

Amendment. 554 U.S. at 572. At the time, the District prohibited handgun registration, made it 

a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and required residents to keep any lawfully owned 

firearms unloaded and dissembled. Id. at 574. In ruling for the plaintiffs and striking down D.C. 

law, Heller established that the Second Amendment confers “the individual right to possess and 

carry weapons in case of confrontation.” Id. at 592. The Supreme Court explained in this 

landmark decision that “the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second 

Amendment right.” Id. at 628.

Heller also cautioned that “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second 

Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626. Quoting Blackstone and other sources, the Supreme 

Court stated that “the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any 

manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id. Thus, the Second Amendment “does not 

protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” Id.

at 625. And the Court did not “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 

firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 

places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications 

on the commercial sale of arms.” Id. at 626–27. 

In the wake of Heller, the District passed the Firearms Registration Amendment Act of 

2008 (“FRA”), which updated D.C.’s gun laws. Of relevance here, the FRA added a new 

provision that bans LCM possession—the same provision at issue in this case. See D.C. Law 17-

372 § 3(n), Firearms Control Amendment Act of 2008,

https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/laws/docs/17-372.pdf (adding “new subsection (b)” to 

D.C. Code § 7-2506.01). A group of plaintiffs once again sued the District, this time challenging

the constitutionality of, inter alia, the District’s ban on assault weapons (in particular, semi-
6

automatic rifles) and its ban on LCM possession. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1249. In assessing the 

plaintiffs’ challenges to these laws, the D.C. Circuit followed the same framework that its sister

Courts of Appeals employed in Second Amendment challenges post-Heller. Under this “twostep approach,” a court must “ask first whether a particular provision impinges upon a right 

protected by the Second Amendment; if it does, then . . . go on to determine whether the 

provision passes muster under the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 1252.

As relevant here, Heller II applied this two-step approach to the plaintiffs’ challenge to 

D.C.’s LCM ban. At the first step, the Circuit examined “whether the prohibited weapons are 

‘typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.’” Id. at 1260 (quoting Heller, 

554 U.S. at 625). The Circuit found it was “clear enough in the record” that LCMs are in 

common use and recognized that “fully 18 percent of all firearms owned by civilians in 1994 

were equipped with magazines holding more than ten rounds, and approximately 4.7 million 

more such magazines were imported into the United States between 1995 and 2000.” Id. at 

1261. Still, the Circuit was not “certain” “based upon the record as it st[ood]” whether LCMs 

were in common use for lawful purposes—that is, “whether these weapons are commonly used 

or are useful specifically for self-defense or hunting” and thus “whether the 

prohibitions . . . meaningfully affect the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. Ultimately, the Circuit 

expressly declined to resolve the first step on the merits, instead assuming without deciding that 

the first step was satisfied. Id.

At the second step of the analysis, Heller II applied intermediate scrutiny. It stated that 

this was the proper standard because given that “the plaintiffs present hardly any evidence that 

semi-automatic rifles and magazines holding more than ten rounds are well-suited to or preferred 

for the purpose of self-defense or sport,” it was “reasonably certain the prohibitions do not 
7

impose a substantial burden upon t[he] right” to keep and bear arms under the Second 

Amendment. Id. at 1262. Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, the Circuit found that the 

LCM ban was “substantially related” to the District’s “important interests in protecting police 

officers and controlling crime.” Id. The Circuit credited testimony that “high-capacity 

magazines are dangerous in self-defense situations because ‘the tendency is for defenders to keep 

firing until all bullets have been expended, which poses grave risks to others in the household, 

passersby, and bystanders’” and studies showing that attacks with LCMs “result in more shots 

fired, persons wounded, and wounds per victim than do other gun attacks.” Id. at 1263–64.

Thus, the Circuit held that D.C.’s LCM ban “do[es] not violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional right 

to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 1264.

Then came Bruen. In Bruen, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Heller and held that the 

Second Amendment “protect[s] an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside 

the home.” 142 S. Ct. at 2122. Bruen, however, rejected the Courts of Appeals’ two-step 

framework for assessing Second Amendment challenges and announced that this framework was 

inconsistent with Heller. “Heller’s methodology centered on constitutional text and history” and 

“did not invoke any means-end test.” Id. at 2128–29. Thus, although “step one of the [Courts of 

Appeals’] predominant framework [wa]s broadly consistent with Heller,” step two “[wa]s one 

step too many.” Id. at 2126–27. Bruen declared that the proper analytical framework for 

assessing Second Amendment challenges is as follows: “[1] When the Second Amendment’s 

plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. 

[2] The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the 

Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 2129–30 (brackets added). 
8

With respect to the second part of Bruen’s test, the Supreme Court acknowledged that in 

some cases the “historical inquiry” will not be “straightforward.” Id. at 2131. For “cases 

implicating unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic technological changes,” courts should 

take “a more nuanced approach.” Id. at 2132. In those situations, courts must conduct a 

“historical inquiry that . . . will often involve reasoning by analogy.” Id. “Like all analogical 

reasoning, determining whether a historical regulation is a proper analogue for a distinctly 

modern firearm regulation requires a determination of whether the two regulations are 

‘relevantly similar.’” Id. Bruen provided two “metrics” for conducting this analysis: “how and 

why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” Id. at 2132–33. 

“Therefore, whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right 

of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified are ‘central’

considerations when engaging in an analogical inquiry.” Id. at 2133 (emphasis in original) 

(citation omitted). Analogical reasoning “is neither a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory 

blank check.” Id. “[A]nalogical reasoning requires only that the government identify a wellestablished and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin. So even if a modern-day 

regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass 

constitutional muster.” Id. (emphases in original). 

Bruen then applied this standard to the facts of the case, which involved a challenge to 

New York State’s public-carry licensing regime that required an applicant to show “proper 

cause” for self-defense. At the first step, the Supreme Court had “little difficulty” in concluding 

that the plaintiffs’ desire to “carry[] handguns publicly for self-defense” was covered by the text 

of the Second Amendment. Id. at 2134. Thus, the Second Amendment “presumptively 

guarantee[d]” the plaintiffs the right to do so. Id. at 2135. Bruen then turned to the next step of 
9

the inquiry, where New York State had the “burden” to “show that [its] proper-cause 

requirement is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. This 

New York could not do. After surveying history from the 12th through the 19th century, with 

particular emphasis on Founding-era regulations, Bruen concluded that “[a]part from a few late19th-century outlier jurisdictions, American governments simply have not broadly prohibited the 

public carry of commonly used firearms for personal defense.” Id. at 2156. Thus, Bruen

concluded that New York’s “proper cause” licensing regime was unconstitutional. Id.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a 

clear showing that the [movant] is entitled to such relief.’” John Doe Co. v. CFPB, 849 F.3d 

1129, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 

Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [(1)] 

that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [(2)] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 

absence of preliminary relief, [(3)] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [(4)] that an 

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “Of course, the movant carries the 

burden of persua[ding]” the Court that these factors merit preliminary relief, Fla. EB5 Invs., 

LLC v. Wolf, 443 F. Supp. 3d 7, 11 (D.D.C. 2020) (citing Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 258 

(D.C. Cir. 2004)), and must do so by making a “clear showing,” Cobell, 391 F.3d at 258. “A 

preliminary injunction may be granted based on less formal procedures and on less extensive 

evidence than in a trial on the merits.” Cobell, 391 F.3d at 261 (D.C. Cir. 2004).2

2 At this stage, the Court will consider all of the many exhibits and sources upon which 

the parties rely. In addition to providing declarations from their own experts, Plaintiffs provided 

five expert declarations filed in Duncan v. Bonta, No. 17-cv-1017 (S.D. Cal.), an ongoing case 

involving a Second Amendment challenge to a California law that, like the D.C. law at issue 

here, bans LCM possession. See Pls.’ Reply at 2 n.1, ECF No. 24. 
10

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court begins with standing. “[T]he D.C. Circuit has declared in unequivocal terms 

that [a] party seeking a preliminary injunction must show a substantial likelihood of standing.” 

Angelo v. District of Columbia, No. 22-cv-1878, 2022 WL 17974434, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 

2022) (cleaned up) (quoting Green v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 54 F.4th 738, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2022)). 

Plaintiffs breezed through the issue of standing in their briefing, and the District did not even 

bother to address standing at all. Nonetheless, the Court finds that at least one Plaintiff, Tyler 

Yzaguirre, has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of standing because he was denied 

registration for a firearm on the ground that its magazine had a 12-round capacity in violation of 

D.C.’s LCM ban. See generally 2d Yzaguirre Decl. That is a concrete injury, traceable to the 

allegedly unconstitutional law, which a court-issued injunction could redress. See Lujan v. Defs.

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); cf. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1249 (in recounting the 

plaintiffs’ injuries, finding that “Plaintiff Heller was also denied registration of a pistol because 

the magazine had a capacity of 15 rounds”). And “because at least one Plaintiff has standing, the 

Court need not analyze whether other plaintiffs have standing.” Williams v. Walsh, No. 21-cv1150, 2022 WL 17904227, at *11 n.7 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2022).

On the merits, Bruen governs. Under Bruen, the Court must first determine whether “the 

Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.” 142 S. Ct. at 2126. If so, “the 

Constitution presumptively protects that conduct,” and “the government must demonstrate that 

the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.

Thus, the first question in this case is whether the Second Amendment covers LCM possession. 

If yes, the second question is whether the District’s LCM ban is relevantly similar to a historical 

analogue. The Court holds that the answer to the first question is no. Although that alone 
11

resolves the case for the District, the Court will nonetheless proceed to analyze the second 

question and hold that in the alternative, the District’s LCM ban is also consistent with this 

country’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

3

 

A. Whether LCMs Are Covered by the Second Amendment

Under Bruen’s first step, the Court must determine whether the scope of the Second 

Amendment covers LCM possession. Notably, this first step is consistent with the first step of

Courts of Appeals’ decisions pre-Bruen. In other words, Bruen did not disturb the analysis 

Courts of Appeals conducted under the first step of their framework. See 142 S. Ct. at 2127 

(“Step one of the [Courts of Appeals’] predominant framework is broadly consistent 

with Heller[.]”). The Court will therefore still discuss these now-abrogated cases in this section 

and accord their step-1 analysis persuasive weight to the extent they are instructive. At the first 

step in this case, the parties raise two primary disputes. First, they disagree whether LCMs are 

“arms” within the meaning of the Second Amendment. Second, they disagree whether LCMs are 

typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. The Court will examine each in 

turn. 

1. Whether LCMs Are “Arms” Under the Second Amendment

The parties dispute whether LCMs are “arms” under the Second Amendment. Recall that 

the Second Amendment protects an individual right to “keep and bear Arms” for self-defense. 

U.S. Const. amend. II (emphasis added). Heller interpreted this term as follows:

The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “arms” as “[w]eapons 

of offence, or armour of defence.” 1 Dictionary of the English Language 106 (4th 

ed.) (reprinted 1978) (hereinafter Johnson). Timothy Cunningham’s important 

3 Because the Court concludes that the District’s LCM ban is constitutional and that 

Plaintiffs have “little likelihood of succeeding on the merits,” the Court “[h]as no need to address 

the other preliminary injunction factors.” Apotex, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 449 F.3d 1249, 

1253 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
12

1771 legal dictionary defined “arms” as “any thing that a man wears for his 

defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.” 1 

A New and Complete Law Dictionary; see also N. Webster, American Dictionary 

of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1989) (hereinafter Webster) (similar).

Heller, 554 U.S. at 581. 

At least three Courts of Appeals have concluded that LCMs are “arms” within the 

meaning of the Second Amendment. See Ass’n of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y 

Gen. New Jersey (“ANJRPC”), 910 F.3d 106, 116 (3d Cir. 2018); Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 

160, 175 (4th Cir. 2016); Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1146 (9th Cir. 2020).

4

 In 

ANJRPC, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a New Jersey law that, as with the 

D.C. law in this case, made it illegal to possess a magazine capable of holding more than ten 

rounds of ammunition. 910 F.3d at 110. The Third Circuit specifically addressed “the question 

[of] whether a magazine is an arm under the Second Amendment” and concluded “[t]he answer 

is yes.” Id. at 116. It reasoned that “[b]ecause magazines feed ammunition into certain guns, 

and ammunition is necessary for such a gun to function as intended, magazines are ‘arms’ within 

the meaning of the Second Amendment.” Id.

Likewise, a panel of the Fourth Circuit in Kolbe reasoned that because the Second 

Amendment plainly covers firearms, “there must also be an ancillary right to possess the 

magazines necessary to render those firearms operable.” 813 F.3d at 175. At issue in that case 

was a Maryland law that banned assault weapons like the AR-15 as well as detachable LCMs. 

Id. at 169–70. The panel in Kolbe found “strong historical support” for the notion that 

magazines constitute “arms” because “magazines and the rounds they contain are used to strike 

4 At least two Courts of Appeals have noted this question but declined to address it. See

Worman v. Healey, 922 F.3d 26, 33 n.3 (1st Cir. 2019); New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. 

v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 264 n.127 (2d Cir. 2015).
13

at another and inflict damages” and early American provisions protecting gun rights “suggest[] 

‘arms’ should be read to protect all those items necessary to use the weapons effectively.” Id. at 

175 (citation omitted). 

Finally, in Duncan, a panel of the Ninth Circuit considered the constitutionality of 

California’s ban on LCM possession and concluded at the outset that “[f]irearm magazines are 

‘arms’ under the Second Amendment.” 970 F.3d at 1146. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that 

“[w]ithout a magazine, many weapons would be useless” and therefore “there must be some 

corollary . . . right to possess the magazines necessary to render those firearms operable.” Id.

(citation omitted). 

ANJRPC, Kolbe, and Duncan all recognized that the Second Amendment covers not just 

possession of a firearm, but the sorts of things that make a firearm operable. See Bruen, 142 S. 

Ct. at 2132 (“[E]ven though the Second Amendment’s definition of ‘arms’ is fixed according to 

its historical understanding, that general definition covers modern instruments that facilitate

armed self-defense.” (emphasis added)). The same logic prevails in other Second Amendment 

contexts as well. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding 

that city’s ban on firing ranges implicated the Second Amendment because “[t]he right to possess 

firearms for protection implies a corresponding right to acquire and maintain proficiency in their 

use; the core right wouldn’t mean much without the training and practice that make it 

effective”).5 

5 Although Kolbe and Duncan were both subsequently vacated by en banc decisions in 

those circuits, the respective en banc decisions did not cast doubt on the panels’ analysis of this 

specific question. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 137 n.12 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 

(explaining that because it found LCMs “most useful in military service” and “not 

constitutionally protected,” it would not reach the question whether LCMs were “arms” under 

the Second Amendment); Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.4th 1087, 1103 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc)
14

The District, however, argues that LCMs are not “arms” but rather “accoutrements” (i.e., 

accessories). Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Appl. for Prelim. Inj. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 9–11, ECF No. 17. 

According to the District, the term “arms” at the Founding did not encompass accoutrements 

such as ammunition or cartridges that stored such ammunition. Id. at 10. And the District argues 

that even if the Second Amendment covers accessories which are integral to the operation of a 

firearm, LCMs are not one of them because Plaintiffs could still use their existing firearms with 

magazines that carry ten bullets or less, and in fact, currently carry these smaller magazines on 

their firearms. Id. at 11–12; see also Ocean State Tactical, 2022 WL 17721175, at *11 (finding 

similar arguments persuasive in holding that LCMs are not “arms” under the Second 

Amendment). 

The Court is unpersuaded by the District’s exacting standard. Its position contradicts the 

conclusions that ANJRPC, Kolbe, and Duncan reached on this question. In ANJRPC, for 

example, the Third Circuit found that LCMs are “arms” under the Second Amendment because

“magazines feed ammunition into certain guns, and ammunition is necessary for such a gun to 

function as intended.” 910 F.3d at 116 (emphasis added). The District’s logic, by contrast,

would allow it to ban all magazines (not just LCMs)—a result even the District does not endorse 

here—because a firearm technically does not require any magazine to operate; one could simply 

fire the single bullet in the firearm’s chamber. See Ocean State Tactical, 2022 WL 17721175, at 

*12 (noting that “a firearm can fire bullets without a detachable magazine”). The Court will 

therefore follow the persuasive reasoning of ANJRPC, Kolbe, and Duncan in concluding that 

LCMs are “arms” within the meaning of the Second Amendment. 

(“assuming, without deciding, that California’s law implicates the Second Amendment” and not 

discussing the question of whether LCMs are “arms” under the Second Amendment). 
15

2. Whether LCMs Are Typically Possessed by Law-Abiding Citizens for Lawful Purposes

Even though LCMs are “arms” within the meaning of the Second Amendment, they must 

still satisfy another inquiry to fall within the amendment’s scope. The next question under step 

one of Bruen is whether LCMs are “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 

purposes.” Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625). In Heller II, the D.C. 

Circuit noted in passing that the record in that case showed that “magazines holding more than 

ten rounds are indeed in ‘common use.’” Id. at 1261. As evidence, it observed that “fully 18 

percent of all firearms owned by civilians in 1994 were equipped with magazines holding more 

than ten rounds, and approximately 4.7 million more such magazines were imported into the 

United States between 1995 and 2000.” Id.; see also New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. 

Cuomo (“NYSRPA”), 804 F.3d 242, 255 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Even accepting the most conservative 

estimates cited by the parties and by amici, the . . . large-capacity magazines at issue are ‘in 

common use’ as that term was used in Heller.”). 

Plaintiffs seize on this observation as if it alone decides the question of whether LCMs 

are covered by the Second Amendment. It does not. Heller II’s comment was dicta because the 

Circuit ultimately assumed, without deciding, that LCMs were covered by the Second 

Amendment. 670 F.3d at 1261. More importantly, Heller II recognized that whether LCMs are 

“in common use” is merely the beginning of the analysis. The full inquiry is “whether the 

prohibited weapons are ‘typically possessed . . . for lawful purposes.’” Heller II, 670 F.3d at 

1260 (emphasis added) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625). On that critical question, Heller II

expressed uncertainty: “based upon the record as it stands, we cannot be certain whether these 

weapons are commonly used or are useful specifically for self-defense[.]” Id. at 1261 (emphasis 

added). That is the question this Court must now resolve. 
16

The parties unsurprisingly stake divergent positions. Plaintiffs maintain that LCMs “are 

overwhelmingly used for lawful purposes” such as self-defense. Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Reply 

to Opp’n to Appl. for Prelim. Inj. (“Pls.’ Reply”) at 12, ECF No. 24.

6

 The District disagrees; it 

argues that LCMs are not in common use for self-defense for two reasons. First, it claims that 

LCMs’ military characteristics make them a poor fit for self-defense and take them outside the 

scope of the Second Amendment. Second, the District claims that law-abiding individuals do not 

use LCMs for self-defense because incidents where a civilian actually expends more than ten 

bullets in self-defense are “vanishingly rare.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 18. The Court agrees with the 

District on both arguments. 

a. Whether LCMs are Most Useful in Military Service

Heller specifically contemplated that “weapons that are most useful in military service” 

fall outside of Second Amendment protection. 554 U.S. at 627; see NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 256 

(“Heller expressly highlighted ‘weapons that are most useful in military service,’ such as the 

fully automatic M–16 rifle, as weapons that could be banned without implicating the Second 

Amendment.”); Duncan, 19 F.4th at 1102 (en banc) (noting in dicta “significant merit” to the 

plaintiffs’ argument that because “large-capacity magazines have limited lawful, civilian 

benefits, whereas they provide significant benefits in a military setting,” they are not covered by 

Second Amendment). Plaintiffs counter that “the Supreme Court’s precedents do not withhold 

6 Plaintiffs also argue that LCMs are commonly used for lawful purposes such as training 

and competition. Pls.’ Reply at 11–12. But given that “individual self-defense is ‘the central 

component’ of the Second Amendment right,” it is unclear whether a weapon that is not typically 

possessed for self-defense may nonetheless be covered by the Second Amendment on the ground 

that it is typically possessed for sporting. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2118 (emphasis in original) 

(citation omitted). The Court has no occasion to address that novel question here, because the 

Complaint and the motion for a preliminary injunction focus on Plaintiffs’ right of self-defense. 

See Compl. ¶¶ 27–36; Pls.’ Mot. at 7–14. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed at oral argument that 

Heller and its progeny focus on self-defense. 
17

protection from arms merely because they are useful in militia service.” Pls.’ Reply at 15. That 

may be true, but it is beside the point. Heller established that weapons that are “most useful in 

military service” are excluded from Second Amendment protection. 554 U.S. at 627 (emphasis 

added). “Most” is a superlative. A weapon may have some useful purposes in both civilian and 

military contexts, but if it is most useful in military service, it is not protected by the Second 

Amendment. 

Here, in passing the LCM ban, D.C. lawmakers took the position that LCMs were not 

suitable for civilian self-defense. The D.C. Council’s Committee on Public Safety and the 

Judiciary, which referred this legislation for approval, favorably referenced D.C. Chief of 

Police’s observation that “magazines holding[] over 10 rounds are more about firepower than 

self-defense.” Council of the District of Columbia Committee on Public Safety and the 

Judiciary, Committee Report at 9, https://perma.cc/YN6H-2U9M. That view is shared by 

judges, too. The Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 131 (4th 

Cir. 2017), held that LCMs are unprotected by the Second Amendment because they are most 

useful in military service. In Kolbe, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a Maryland 

law that banned assault weapons like the AR-15 as well as detachable LCMs. Id. at 120. After 

describing the many “difficult questions” that Heller raised concerning what the Second 

Amendment protects, the court remarked that Heller offers “a dispositive and relatively easy 

inquiry: Are the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines ‘like’ ‘M-16 rifles,’ i.e., 

‘weapons that are most useful in military service,’ and thus outside the ambit of the Second 

Amendment?” Id. at 136. The “line that Heller drew,” the court stated, was “between weapons 

that are most useful in military service and those that are not.” Id. at 137. The court then found 

that “[t]he answer to that dispositive and relatively easy inquiry is plainly in the affirmative.” Id.
18

at 136. It held that “[w]hatever their other potential uses—including self-defense—the AR-15, 

other assault weapons, and large-capacity magazines prohibited . . . are unquestionably most 

useful in military service.” Id. at 137. Turning to LCMs in particular, the court found that they 

“are particularly designed and most suitable for military and law enforcement applications” 

because of their “ability to reload rapidly,” “hit multiple human targets very rapidly,” and 

“deliver extraordinary firepower.” Id. (citations omitted). Kolbe did not limit its analysis of

LCMs as they are used in assault weapons—to the contrary, it found that the “uniquely military 

feature[]” of LCMs’ rapid-fire capacity also applied to “other firearms to which they may be

attached”—for example, the handguns that Plaintiffs in this case carry. Id.; cf. Friedman v. City 

of Highland Park, Illinois, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We know . . . that semi-automatic 

guns with large-capacity magazines enable shooters to fire bullets faster than handguns equipped 

with smaller magazines.”).

Kolbe is no outlier. The en banc Ninth Circuit cited Kolbe approvingly for the 

proposition that “[large-capacity] magazines likely are ‘most useful in military service,’ at least 

in an ordinary understanding of that phrase.” Duncan, 19 F.4th at 1102. The Ninth Circuit 

found that “[e]vidence supports the common-sense conclusion that the benefits of a largecapacity magazine are most helpful to a soldier: ‘the use of large-capacity magazines results in 

more gunshots fired, results in more gunshot wounds per victim, and increases the lethality of 

gunshot injuries.’” Id. at 1105. Duncan also cited two reports by the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (a federal agency) which concluded that “large capacity 

magazines are indicative of military firearms,” in part because they “provide[ ] the soldier with a 

fairly large ammunition supply” and that “detachable large capacity magazine[s] [were] 

originally designed and produced for . . . military assault rifles.” Id. at 1105–06. See also Or. 
19

Firearms Fed’n, Inc. v. Brown, No. 22-cv-01815, 2022 WL 17454829, at *10–11 (D. Or. Dec. 6, 

2022) (favorably citing Kolbe and Duncan en banc decisions and finding that evidentiary record 

showed that LCMs “are often used in law enforcement and military situations”). 

If Kolbe and other courts are correct that LCMs are most useful in military service, one 

would expect to find support for this in history. Exactly so. The District’s historical evidence in 

this case shows that LCMs’ lethality was popular in military settings, and indeed many of them 

were designed specifically for military (and law enforcement) use. The District’s expert, Brian 

DeLay, who has a Ph.D. in history and has extensively studied the history of firearms and arms 

trades, found that in the United States, “high-capacity firearms went almost exclusively to 

military buyers through the early 1870s and . . . very few were in the hands of private persons.” 

Delay Decl. ¶ 23, ECF No. 17-9. Mr. DeLay further concluded that “in the 1860s and 

1870s . . . [d]etachable magazines were still decades away from practical success, and would be 

produced for militaries long before they made their way into civilian markets in meaningful 

quantities.” Id. ¶ 25. This trend continued into the 20th century. See, e.g., Pauly Decl. ¶ 77, 

ECF No. 17-8 (expert with a Ph.D. in history explaining that the first Lugers, which were

semiautomatic pistols with a pistol-grip magazine, “w[ere] adopted by the German army in 

1908”); Paul M. Barrett, Glock: The Rise of America’s Gun 6–11 (2012) (explaining that in 

1980, Glock, the founder of the popular pistol many Americans own, designed a pistol for the

Austrian military that could hold more than eight rounds); Jeff Kinard, Pistols: An Illustrated 

History of Their Impact 270–75 (2003) (explaining that Switzerland firm SIG developed the 

SIG-Sauer P226 in 1983 which could accept a 15-round magazine, and was used by the U.S. 

Navy SEALs as well as police and military organizations in Europe, and that the 1989 SIG-Sauer 

P228 and P229, which contain 13 and 12 round-magazines, “earned universal reputations as 
20

highly reliable and accurate weapons for military and police use”); Roth Decl. ¶ 48, ECF No. 17-

11 (observing that semi-automatic weapons with LCMs such as the M-16 rile “were designed for 

offensive military applications rather than individual self-defense” and “emerged from 

technologies developed for military use during the Cold War”). 

Even Plaintiffs’ experts seem to believe that LCMs are best suited for military and law 

enforcement use. See, e.g., Murphy Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 24-6 (acknowledging that “magazines 

holding more than 10 rounds are most useful in the military or in a law enforcement context”); 

Harnish Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 24-7 (“The Beretta M9 [which has a 15-round magazine] was 

adopted by the United States Armed Forces as the official service pistol in 1985.”); id. ¶ 9 

(“Pistols with the capacity to hold ten rounds, or more than ten rounds . . . [are] selected by law 

enforcement and military agencies in the United States for the practicality and performance they 

provide to the organization, but more importantly the capability they provide to the end user.”). 

Thus, the Court concludes that LCMs are not covered by the Second Amendment because they 

are most useful in military service. 

b. Whether LCMs Are in Fact Used for Self-Defense

The District also argues that LCMs are not covered by the Second Amendment because 

they are not “in fact used for th[e] purpose” of self-defense. Defs.’ Opp’n at 18. As support, it 

relies on a study of the National Rifle Association’s (“NRA”) “Armed Citizen Stories” website 

which concluded that law-abiding citizens on average fire only two bullets in self-defense 

situations and virtually never more than ten. Id. This study, which assessed data from the years

1997 – 2001, was actually conducted by one of Plaintiffs’ experts, Claude Werner. Mr. Werner 

is a retired U.S. Army officer who has experience in competitive shooting, self-defense, and 

firearms instruction. Werner Decl. ¶¶ 2–5, 7, ECF No. 24-8. In his study, titled “Analysis of 
21

Five Years of Armed Encounters (With Data Tables),” Mr. Werner explained that he reviewed a 

total of 482 reports in that time period from the NRA’s database. See https://perma.cc/QTL7-

U8EM. Upon collecting and organizing the data from these reports, Mr. Werner concluded that 

the average number of shots a civilian fired in a self-defense incident in this time period was 2.2. 

Id.

Courts and scholars alike have relied on the findings of this study, specifically the 2.2 

bullets per incident figure. See, e.g., Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Accessories and the Second

Amendment, 83 J. L. & Contemp. Probs. 331, 244–45 (2020); Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 127 (en banc) 

(“[T]he State’s evidence substantiates ‘that it is rare for a person, when using a firearm in selfdefense, to fire more than ten rounds.’ Studies of ‘armed citizen’ stories collected by the 

National Rifle Association, covering 1997-2001 and 2011-2013, found that the average number 

of shots fired in self-defense was 2.2 and 2.1, respectively.” (citations omitted)); Duncan, 19 

F.4th at 1105 (en banc) (“[T]he record here, as in other cases, does not disclose whether the 

added benefit of a large-capacity magazine—being able to fire more than ten bullets in rapid 

succession—has ever been realized in self-defense in the home.” (emphasis in original)); cf.

Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1262 (“[T]he plaintiffs present hardly any evidence that . . . magazines 

holding more than ten rounds are well-suited to or preferred for the purpose of self-defense or 

sport.”). 

Plaintiffs raise primarily two arguments in response. First, they try to back away from 

the findings of the 1997 – 2001 study that their own expert conducted. Mr. Werner claims that 

his 1997 – 2001 timeframe is “dated.” Werner Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 24-8. To the contrary, the 2.2 

figure has remained exceptionally stable over time. NERA Economic Consulting (“NERA”), a 

reputable economic consulting firm, reviewed 736 reports from the same NRA Armed Citizen 
22

database in the 2011 – 2017 period and concluded that the average number of shots a civilian 

fired in a self-defense incident in this time period was 2.1. See Amicus Brief at 19 & n.70; Decl. 

of Lucy P. Allen (“Allen Decl.”) ¶ 8, Ass’n of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Grewal, 

No. 3:18-cv-10507, 2018 WL 4688345 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2018), ECF No. 31-2. The NERA 

study tracked essentially the same metrics from the NRA Armed Citizen database over a more 

recent time period and arrived at a virtually identical data point.7 Tellingly, one of Plaintiffs’ 

other experts concedes that “the average amount of rounds fired in self-defense is usually less 

than 10, generally only two or three.” Murphy Decl. ¶ 8.8 

Mr. Werner next argues that his study is flawed because it is heavily skewed toward 

“positive outcomes”—that is, successful self-defense incidents that are reported. Werner Decl. 

¶ 8; Ellifritz Decl. ¶¶ 14–16, ECF No. 24-7 (same). Selection bias is no doubt a legitimate 

concern in any statistical inquiry. The problem for Plaintiffs is that Mr. Werner does not provide 

any studies, arguments, or even logic that remotely suggests that were the study able to properly 

capture negative outcomes, the average number of bullets fired in self-defense would somehow 

skyrocket to 11 or more bullets. The best Mr. Werner can say is that “[w]e don’t know how may

[bullets] have been fired in non-positive outcomes.” Werner Decl. ¶ 8. But if no one knows, 

how does this support the idea that LCMs are commonly used for self-defense? 

7

In addition to studying the NRA Armed Citizen database from 2011 – 2017, NERA 

performed another study of self-defense (in the home only) in the 2011 – 2017 timeframe based 

on “comprehensive search of published news stories” online and concluded that the average 

number of shots fired per incident was 2.34—again, a substantially similar figure. See Allen 

Decl. ¶¶ 12–17 (explaining methodology and findings). 

8 The Complaint attempts to describe six self-defense incidents in the country that 

involved firing more than ten rounds. But amicus correctly points out that five out of these 

incidents were “officer involved” shootings, Compl. ¶¶ 28–33, and the sole example of civilian 

self-defense involved a “[f]amed Los Angeles watch shop owner,” Compl. ¶ 30—hardly 

representative of ordinary civilian self-defense incidents. 
23

Finally, Mr. Werner points out that his study had “very little data as to the ammunition 

capacity of the citizen employed firearm.” Id. ¶ 9. He reasons that although “a substantial 

number of citizen defenders would have used plus 10 magazines” in these incidents, “i[f] we 

were doing the study today using current data, the percentage of citizens using plus 10 magazines 

would be even higher.” Id. This argument actually undermines Plaintiffs’ position. If civilians 

only fired a few bullets on average despite using an LCM-equipped firearm, it was not for a lack 

of ammunition. The data shows that they simply did not need the extra ammunition in the LCM 

for self-defense. 

Perhaps realizing that their own expert’s study has backfired, Plaintiffs try a different 

tack: they claim that a law-abiding citizen nonetheless “uses” a LCM for self-defense even when 

he does not necessarily expend double-digit bullets in a self-defense incident. See Pls.’ Reply at 

13 (“If a citizen fires two rounds out of a 15 round magazine to save his life, he nevertheless uses 

the 15 round magazine for self-defense.”). That is a creative argument, but the Court is 

unconvinced. The dictionary defines “use” as “[t]he application or employment of something; 

esp., a long-continued possession and employment of a thing for the purpose for which it is 

adapted, as distinguished from a possession and employment that is merely temporary or 

occasional.” Use, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added); cf. Voisine v. 

United States, 579 U.S. 686, 692 (2016) (“Dictionaries consistently define the noun ‘use’ to 

mean the ‘act of employing’ something.”). Here, LCMs are best suited for a military “purpose” 

and are poorly “adapted” for self-defense. As the Ninth Circuit en banc put it, civilians do not

“use” LCMs for self-defense, because “the added benefit of a large-capacity magazine—being 

able to fire more than ten bullets in rapid succession—has [virtually n]ever been realized in selfdefense.” Duncan, 19 F.4th at 1105 (en banc); see Allen Decl. ¶ 10 (“Out of 736 incidents [in 
24

the Armed Citizen database between 2011 – 2017], there were two incidents (0.3% of all 

incidents), in which the defender was reported to have fired more than 10 bullets.”); Or. 

Firearms Fed’n, 2022 WL 17454829, at *11 (finding record showed that “large-capacity 

magazines are rarely used by civilians for self-defense”). 

Plaintiffs protest that the District’s reasoning would allow it to “justify a ban on all 

firearms able to fire more than two or three shots” because “on average, only 2.2 shots are fired 

by defenders.” Pls.’ Reply at 13. But no such ban exists anywhere in the country, and the Court 

doubts that the District will see this as an invitation to go down Plaintiffs’ slippery slope. Recall 

that the studies show that two bullets is merely the average amount of bullets fired in selfdefense situations; thus, a law that restricts magazine capacity to say, five or six bullets, might

meaningfully hinder the common and lawful usage of magazines for self-defense. In any event, 

this is not a case that requires the Court to delineate the constitutional limits of a hypothetical 

restriction. It suffices to say that the District’s LCM ban, which limits magazine capacity to ten 

bullets, enables law-abiding people in D.C. to possess magazines with ample ammunition to 

defend themselves.9

In conclusion, the Court finds that the Second Amendment does not cover LCMs because 

they are not typically possessed for self-defense. LCMs fall outside of the Second Amendment’s 

scope because they are most useful in military service and because they are not in fact commonly 

used for self-defense. Given that the District prevails at step one of Bruen’s framework, the 

9 The District’s magazine capacity limit (10) also prevents civilians from maintaining 

greater firepower than law enforcement. Law enforcement in the District routinely carry 15- and 

17-round magazines. Parsons Decl. ¶¶ 14–16, ECF No. 17-7. The District’s LCM ban keeps the 

advantage police have over armed civilians who may be suspects or engaged in criminal activity. 

Id. ¶¶ 17–18. 
25

Court finds that D.C.’s LCM ban is constitutional. Nonetheless, to round out the analysis, the 

Court will consider Bruen’s second step in the alternative. 

B. Whether the Ban Is Consistent with this Nation’s Tradition of Firearm Regulation

Even were LCMs covered by the scope of the Second Amendment, the Court finds that 

D.C.’s ban is constitutional for the independent reason that the District has shown that it is

consistent with this country’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. “Like all analogical 

reasoning, determining whether a historical regulation is a proper analogue for a distinctly 

modern firearm regulation requires a determination of whether the two regulations are 

‘relevantly similar.’” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2132. Bruen provides two “metrics” for conducting 

this analysis: “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed selfdefense.” Id. at 2132–33. “Therefore, whether modern and historical regulations impose a 

comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably 

justified are ‘central’ considerations when engaging in an analogical inquiry.” Id. at 2133

(emphasis in original). 

Although the burden is on the government to identify a historical analogue, Bruen

stressed that this is not an impossible standard. See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2162 (Kavanaugh, J., 

concurring) (“Properly interpreted, the Second Amendment allows a ‘variety’ of gun 

regulations.”). Bruen acknowledged that in today’s world, centuries after the ratification of the 

Second Amendment, it is not unusual to see “modern regulations that were unimaginable at the 

founding.” Id. at 2132. Thus, “cases implicating unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic 

technological changes” require “nuanced” consideration. Id. at 2131–32. For that reason, 

analogical reasoning is not “a regulatory straightjacket”: it “requires only that the government 

identify a well-established and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin.” Id. at 
26

2133 (emphases in original). “So even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for 

historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” Id. After 

all, “the Constitution, can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders 

specifically anticipated.” Id. at 2132; see id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 

415 (1819), for the principle that the Second Amendment was “intended . . . to be adapted to the 

various crises of human affairs”). 

1. Whether a Nuanced Approach to History Applies Here

Although D.C.’s LCM ban has yet to be tested under step two of Bruen’s framework, the 

Court is not the first in the country to apply Bruen to this kind of regulation. In Oregon 

Firearms Federation, a federal district court employed Bruen’s test to a substantially similar 

challenge to Oregon’s LCM ban. 2022 WL 17454829 (D. Or. Dec. 6, 2022). That case analyzed

the constitutionality of Measure 114, a ballot initiative passed by Oregon voters in November 

2022 which outlawed the use and sales of LCMs. Id. at *2. The ballot measure provided limited 

exceptions, such as allowing existing owners of LCMs to continue to use them on their property 

or for recreation, and giving firearms manufacturers a 180-day grace period to fulfill existing 

contracts to out-of-state buyers. Id. at *4. The plaintiffs, gun owners and users of LCMs, 

brought suit and sought a temporary restraining order “aimed primarily” at the LCM ban. Id. at 

*5. The court first held that under Bruen, LCMs are not covered by the Second Amendment. Id.

at *8–11. Then, “[a]ssuming for the sake of argument that the Second Amendment’s plain text 

covers large-capacity magazines,” the court “next consider[ed] whether Measure 114 is 

consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at *12. 

Oregon Firearms Federation answered this second question in the affirmative. The court 

observed that LCMs are “a dramatic change in firearms technology” because although some 
27

multi-shot firearms existed before the Founding era, they were “experimental, designed for 

military use, rare, defective, or some combination of these features,” and the evidence showed 

that “semi-automatic weapons did not become ‘feasible and available’ until the beginning of the 

twentieth century.” Id. at *12 & n.17. The court also found that “large-capacity magazines 

implicate unprecedented societal concerns” because of their frequent use in recent mass 

shootings. Id. at *13. Turning to historical analogues, Oregon Firearms Federation observed 

that “in the 1800s, states often regulated certain types of weapon, such as Bowie knives, blunt 

weapons, slungshots, and trap guns because they were dangerous weapons commonly used for 

criminal behavior and not for self-defense.” Id. The court also found a historical tradition of 

banning private military organizations as evidence that “demonstrates the government’s concern 

with the danger associated with assembling the amount of firepower capable of threatening 

public safety—which, given firearm technology in the 1800s, could only arise collectively.” Id.

at *14. The court found that Oregon’s LCM ban was “comparably justified” with these historical 

regulations because just as the historical regulations were rooted in public safety concerns, the 

LCM ban “consider[ed] the public safety concerns of today” in “the rise in mass shooting 

incidents and the connection between mass shooting incidents and large-capacity magazines.” 

Id. And Oregon’s ban placed a “comparable burden” as the historical regulations on the right to

self-defense: the burden was “minimal,” the court explained, because “in over seven hundred 

self-defense incidents, less than one half of a percent involved more than ten shots.” Id.

In this case, the District’s evidence also shows that LCMs are the object of “dramatic 

technological changes” and implicate “unprecedented societal concerns,” and thus its ban 

requires “nuanced” consideration. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2132. First, with respect to the 

technological pedigree of LCMs, Mr. DeLay explained that while “firearms with ammunition 
28

capacity in excess of 10 rounds date back to the 1500s,” “such weapons amounted to little more 

than experimental curiosities” and that “[m]ost never advanced beyond proof of concept.” 

DeLay Decl. ¶ 7. The airgun, “the only high-capacity weapons from the [founding] period that 

enjoyed even experimental military use” was “so rare that owners could charge people to see 

them.” Id. ¶¶ 14–16; see “To the Curious,” The Weekly Museum (New York, NY), Feb. 11, 1792 

(Ex. B to DeLay Decl.). Based on his twelve years of studying the arms trade in the Founding 

era, Mr. DeLay found zero “evidence in primary sources that large-capacity firearms were 

anything other than exotic curios in this era.” Id. ¶ 19; cf. Sweeney Decl. ¶¶ 15, 31, ECF No. 17-

15 (expert with Ph.D. in history observing that review of 1,170 newspaper ads and reports in the 

18th century shows that “repeating firearms in eighteenth-century America” “were 

extraordinarily rare”); Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410 (observing that assault weapons and LCMs, 

which city ordinance banned, “were not common in 1791” and that “[s]emi-automatic guns and 

large-capacity magazines are more recent developments”). Against this backdrop, statements 

such as “magazines of more than ten rounds are older than the United States” are misleading and 

grossly exaggerate the state of affairs at the Founding. See David Kopel, The History of Firearm 

Magazines and Magazine Prohibitions, 78 Alb. L. Rev. 849, 851 (2015) (hereinafter “Kopel”); 

Pls.’ Mot. at 14–15 (relying on Mr. Kopel’s “heavy lifting” research). Even some of Plaintiffs’ 

experts concede this point. See, e.g., Helsley Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 24-2 (acknowledging that 

multi-shot weapons like the Giradoni air rifle were “complex, likely unreliable, and fragile” and 

only “a window into the future”); Hlebinsky Decl. ¶ 23, ECF No. 24-3 (acknowledging it is 

“typical” to find “one-off examples” of multi-shot weapons at the Founding era). 

High-capacity firearms became more common in military settings in the second half of 

the 19th century, but they were still rare. DeLay Decl. ¶ 22. The “Henry” rifle in 1860 could 
29

fire sixteen rounds without reloading, and the “Winchester Model 1866” also became an iconic 

high-capacity rifle. Id. But these “high-capacity firearms went almost exclusively to military 

buyers through the early 1870s,” and “constituted less than 0.2% of all firearms in the United 

States in the late 1860s and early 1870s.” Id. ¶¶ 23–24 (describing production numbers); see 

also Pauly Decl. ¶ 62 (“Henry rifles were developed by the start of the American Civil War but 

were quite expensive—exorbitantly priced for regular rank-and-file troops—and did not see 

much combat. By the end of the hostilities, the War Department had only officially bought 

1,731 of the guns.”). Moreover, these rifles did not resemble the semiautomatic weapons of 

today: they had fixed magazines, and “[u]sers of these ‘lever-action’ weapons were still required 

to pull a lever between shots, slowing the firing rate to about one shot every three seconds.” 

Defs.’ Opp’n at 23 (citing Pauly Decl. ¶ 61); see Rivas Dec. ¶¶ 29–30, ECF No. 17-12 (same, 

from expert with Ph.D. in history). Only near the “turn of the [20th] century” were “[t]he 

semiautomatic firearm and its detachable box magazine . . . invented.” Kopel at 857; see Rivas 

Decl. ¶ 29 (“The semi-automatic weapons with which twenty-first century Americans associate 

large capacity magazines were either not in existence or not manufactured in large numbers until 

the twentieth century.”).10 It would take yet even more time for these inventions to “improve[] 

and become more affordable.” Pls.’ Reply at 11 (citing Kopel at 857–64, which describes 

firearms in the 20th century). “[T]he first handheld firearm that both (a) had a detachable 

10 Mr. Kopel nevertheless claims that weapons such as the multi-shot flintlock rifle, 

“Pepperbox” pistols, Colt multi-shot revolver, and 1873 Winchester rifle were common in the 

1800s. Kopel at 853–57. In view of the record, the Court joins Oregon Firearms Federation in 

concluding that “those firearms were experimental, designed for military use, rare, defective, or 

some combination of these features.” 2022 WL 17454829 at 12 & n.17; see also Amicus Brief 

at 12–15 (analyzing firearms Plaintiffs identified in this era and concluding that “no firearm 

capable of firing more than ten rounds without reloading achieved widespread commercial 

success prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment” (emphasis omitted)). 
30

magazine holding more than ten rounds and (b) was commercially available to civilians in the 

United States was the Thompson submachine gun, introduced to the market in the 1920s.” 

DeLay Decl. ¶ 25; see also Kopel at 851 (“Handgun magazines of more than ten rounds would 

become popular in the 1930s.”). As this history shows, LCMs reflect “dramatic technological 

changes” in comparison to the weapons of the Founding era. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2132. 

Second, the record also shows that LCMs implicate “unprecedented societal concerns.” 

Id. The District claims that “[t]he proliferation of modern semiautomatic arms, coupled with the 

availability of LCMs, directly correlates with the contemporary problem of mass shootings in 

America today.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 26. The District’s expert, Randolph Roth, has a Ph.D. in 

history and has spent decades studying homicide and mass violence data. Roth Decl. ¶¶ 9–10. 

He found that “the development of semiautomatic rifles and handguns dramatically increased the 

number killed and wounded in mass shootings from 1966 to the present.” Id. ¶ 53.11 Mr. Roth 

claims that “with extended magazines, semiautomatic rifles [in this period] cause an average of 

299 percent more deaths and injuries than regular firearms, and semiautomatic handguns 184 

percent more than regular firearms.” Id. ¶ 55. He concluded that “[i]n combination, 

semiautomatic firearms and extended magazines are extraordinarily lethal.” Id.; see also Amicus 

Brief at 17 (“[A]s of July 2020, LCMs were used in the ten deadliest mass shootings of the prior 

decade, and mass shootings from 1990 to 2017 involving LCMs resulted in a 62 percent higher 

11 Mr. Roth defined “mass shooting” as “a multiple homicide incident in which four or 

more victims are murdered with firearms not including the offender(s) within one event, and at 

least some of the murders occurred in a public location or locations in close geographical 

proximity (e.g., a workplace, school, restaurant, or other public settings), and the murders are not 

attributable to any other underlying criminal activity or commonplace circumstance (armed 

robbery, criminal competition, insurance fraud, argument, or romantic triangle).” Id. ¶ 53 n.103. 

This is similar, although not identical, to the FBI’s definition of “mass murder.” Cramer Decl. ¶ 

3 n.1, ECF No. 24-14. 
31

death toll compared to those that did not involve an LCM.”); Or. Firearms Fed’n, 2022 WL 

17454829, at *13 (“Every mass shooting since 2004 resulting in fourteen or more deaths 

involved large-capacity magazines with ten or more bullets.”); Worman, 922 F.3d at 39 

(observing that semiautomatic rifles “equipped with LCMs have been the weapons of choice in 

many of the deadliest mass shootings in recent history”); Duncan, 19 F.4th at 1096 (en banc) 

(“About three-quarters of mass shooters possess their weapons and large-capacity magazines 

lawfully. In the past half-century, large-capacity magazines have been used in about threequarters of gun massacres with 10 or more deaths and in 100 percent of gun massacres with 20 or 

more deaths, and more than twice as many people have been killed or injured in mass shootings 

that involved a large-capacity magazine as compared with mass shootings that involved a 

smaller-capacity magazine.”); NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 263–64 (“Large-capacity magazines are 

disproportionately used in mass shootings, like the one in Newtown, in which the shooter used 

multiple large-capacity magazines to fire 154 rounds in less than five minutes. Like assault 

weapons, large-capacity magazines result in ‘more shots fired, persons wounded, and wounds 

per victim than do other gun attacks’”).12

Small wonder that in recent years, numerous state legislatures—at least nine so far—have 

banned LCMs. See ANJRPC, 910 F.3d at 110 & n.1 (citing regulations and observing that they 

responded to the fact that “[a]ctive shooting and mass shooting incidents have dramatically 

12 Plaintiffs’ expert, Clayton Cramer, claims that “individual mass murder” is not 

“particularly modern” and gives examples of mass murders committed by axes or by drowning in 

prior centuries. Cramer Decl. ¶¶ 19, 23. But this is consistent with the District’s claim that 

individual mass shootings and the lethality associated with LCMs are a uniquely contemporary 

problem. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ expert Gary Kleck concedes that “mass shooters who used 

LCMs inflicted more casualties than those who did not.” Kleck Decl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 24-15. 

Although Mr. Kleck challenges any inference of causality, the Court need not resolve that debate

here. That this is a hotly contested issue only reinforces the fact that LCMs are the subject of 

unprecedented societal concerns today.
32

increased during recent years,” and that “[i]n addition to becoming more frequent, these 

shootings have also become more lethal”); see also, e.g., Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 120 (en banc) (“In 

response to Newtown and other mass shootings, the duly elected members of the General 

Assembly of Maryland saw fit to enact the State’s Firearm Safety Act of 2013 (the “FSA”), 

which bans the AR-15 and other military-style rifles and shotguns (referred to as “assault 

weapons”) and detachable large-capacity magazines.”); Duncan, 19 F.4th at 1095 (en banc) (“In 

response to mass shootings throughout the nation and in California, the California legislature 

enacted Senate Bill 1446, and California voters adopted Proposition 63.”). 

Because LCMs implicate “unprecedented societal concerns” and are the object of 

“dramatic technological changes,” the Court’s analysis of historical analogues to modern LCM 

bans requires “nuanced” consideration. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2132. In what follows, the Court 

examines one such historical analogue that the District has proffered: numerous states’ highcapacity weapon bans during the Prohibition Era. 

2. Whether Prohibition-Era Bans Are Historically Analogous

“Regulations concerning removable magazines and magazine capacity were in fact 

common as early as the 1920s . . . these regulations were adopted by nearly half of all states, 

representing approximately 58% of the American population at that time.” Spitzer Decl. ¶ 22, 

ECF No. 17-10 (expert with Ph.D. in government); Tbl. 1 to Spitzer Decl. (listing states). These 

regulations largely banned the mere possession of a gun that was capable of holding a certain 

number of rounds without reloading. Plaintiffs attempt to dismiss these regulations as 

“restrictions on machine guns,” and claim that what makes a machine gun worthy of regulation is 

“its ability to fire automatically, not [its ability to] accept detachable magazines of more than 10 

rounds.” Pls.’ Reply at 25 & n.17. But it is wrong to characterize these laws as only regulating 
33

automatic weapons and their magazine capacity. At least five states in this era, plus the District 

of Columbia, defined “machine gun” in their statutes to include semi-automatic weapons capable 

of shooting a certain number of bullets without reloading. See Act of July 8, 1932, ch. 465, §§ 1, 

8, 47 Stat. 650, 650, 652 (District of Columbia); 1927 Mass. Acts 413, 413-14 (Massachusetts); 

Act of Apr. 10, 1933, ch. 190, 1933 Minn. Laws 231, 232 (Minnesota); Act of Apr. 8, 1933, no. 

64, 1933 Ohio Laws 189, 189 (Ohio); 1927 R.I. Pub. Laws 256, 256 (Rhode Island); Act of Mar. 

7, 1934, ch. 96, 1934 Va. Acts 137, 137 (Virginia).13 Indeed, D.C.’s ban—which Congress

passed—was modeled heavily after the Uniform Act, “a model law” that the National Rifle 

Association endorsed. Spitzer Decl. ¶¶ 12–13; compare Act of July 8, 1932, ch. 465, §§ 1, 8, 47 

Stat. 650, 650, 652, with Report of Firearms Committee, Handbook of the National Conference 

on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Meeting (1928) (attached 

as Ex. P to Defs.’ Opp’n). The D.C. statute defined “machine gun” as “any firearm which shoots 

automatically or semiautomatically more than twelve shots without reloading,” and it prohibited 

the possession of any machine gun within D.C. See Act of July 8, 1932, ch. 465, §§ 1, 8, 47 Stat. 

650, 650, 654 (emphasis added). As these regulations demonstrate, “[r]estrictions on fully 

automatic and semi-automatic firearms were closely tied to restrictions on ammunition 

magazines or their equivalent.” Spitzer Decl. ¶ 19. Like fully automatic weapons, semiautomatic weapons “utilize the same fundamental firearms technology: an action that 

13 These statutes are reproduced in Appendix 3 to the Spitzer Decl. In addition to these 

six jurisdictions, Michigan banned the possession of “any firearm which can be fired more than 

sixteen times without reloading” without specifying whether such a firearm was considered a 

machine gun. Act of June 2, 1927, no. 372, 1927 Mich. Pub. Acts 887, 888; Mich. Pub. Acts 

1929, Act No. 206, Sec. 3, Comp. Laws 1929. 

These seven jurisdictions capped capacity as follows: D.C. (12); Massachusetts (any); 

Michigan (16); Minnesota (12); Ohio (18); Rhode Island (12); Virginia (16). See App’x 3 to 

Spitzer Decl. 
34

automatically loads a new round into the chamber after each shot is fired . . . and is capable of 

firing numerous rounds without reloading.” Id. ¶ 17. By defining “machine gun” broadly, these 

regulations revealed a widespread tradition dating back to the 1920s and 1930s of regulating

high-capacity weapons that could fire rapidly without reloading. 

These Prohibition-era bans closely resemble D.C.’s ban today. It is therefore no surprise 

that the “how” and “why” of D.C.’s LCM ban is analogous to that of the Prohibition-era 

regulations. Consider the “how,” or the “comparable burden,” first. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. 

The District’s LCM ban is similar to the Prohibition-era regulations in that the burden it places 

on an individual’s right of self-defense is relatively light. Recall that studies show that an 

individual expends on average two bullets in a self-defense incident where she fires her weapon. 

See supra at subsection IV.A.2.b. Similar to the regulations from a century ago, the District’s 

ban does not prohibit individuals from obtaining magazines with capacities of ten or less rounds. 

Magazines with capacities of ten or less are plentiful. Cf. Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 25 F. 

Supp. 3d 1267, 1275 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing evidence that LCMs make up minority of all 

magazines owned). And it appears that these smaller-capacity magazines can readily replace an

LCM in a firearm: every Plaintiff in this case admits that the firearms he currently carries—

“even those for which the standard magazine is an LCM”— “are all equipped with magazines 

that are not LCMs.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 12 (citing Plaintiffs’ declarations and Ex. A, Pls.’ Answers 

to Interrogs. at 7–10). Furthermore, like the regulations from a century ago, D.C. law does not

prohibit an individual from possessing multiple guns, or multiple magazines. Thus, the burden 

that the District’s ban imposes on ordinary individuals is commensurate to that of the 

Prohibition-era regulations, and not at all onerous.
35

Similarly, with respect to the “why,” D.C.’s LCM ban is “comparably justified” with the

Prohibition-era regulations. The Prohibition era witnessed the growth of gangster and criminal 

organizations who availed themselves of the enhanced firing capacity of these new technologies. 

Spitzer Decl. ¶¶ 12–18. In response, numerous states enacted sweeping bans on high-capacity 

semi-automatic and automatic weapons during this era that applied to all individuals, not just a 

certain subset of the population such as gangsters or criminals. Id. This shows that the states 

confronted the public safety issues of their time with vigor; indeed, these regulations were at the

time “obviously uncontroversial” from a constitutional perspective. Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law 

History in the United States and Second Amendment Rights, 80 L. & Contemp. Probs. 55, 69 

(2017) (hereinafter “Spitzer, Gun Law History”). Likewise, the District’s ban seeks to promote 

public safety by limiting the number of rounds in one magazine that an individual may lawfully 

carry for self-defense in an attempt to mitigate the carnage of mass shootings in this country.14 

Just as states and the District enacted sweeping laws restricting possession of high-capacity 

weapons in an attempt to reduce violence during the Prohibition era, so can the District now. See 

supra subsection IV.B.1 (describing mass shootings with LCMs as an “unprecedented societal 

concern”). 

Plaintiffs raise three main counterarguments to this analysis, but none is persuasive. 

First, Plaintiffs argue that under Bruen, “20th century laws do not establish a historical 

tradition.” Pls.’ Reply at 26. But Bruen said no such thing. Bruen merely stated that “when it 

comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is created equal.” 142 S. Ct. at 2136. 

Because “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when 

14 Whether LCM bans empirically increase public safety is again not an issue for the 

Court to resolve. These policy decisions are appropriate for the legislature to consider. 
36

the people adopted them,” the years leading up to 1791 (the adoption of the Second Amendment) 

and 1868 (the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment) are particularly important touchstones of 

constitutional meaning. Id. at 2136 (emphasis omitted; citation omitted). Outside these 

windows, “post-ratification adoption or acceptance of laws” are insignificant to the extent that

they are “inconsistent with the original meaning of the constitutional text.” Id. at 2137 

(emphasis added) (cleaned up). Thus, in Bruen, the Supreme Court paid little heed to 19th and 

20th-century evidence because “it contradict[ed] earlier evidence” in that case. Id. at 2154 & 

n.28. That result, however, is not a directive to discard 20th century history in every case. Bruen

left open the possibility that in an appropriate case, 20th century history that is not contradicted 

by earlier evidence can illuminate a modern-day regulation’s constitutional vitality. Cf. Bruen, 

142 S. Ct. at 2136 (citing James Madison for the interpretive principle that “‘a regular course of 

practice’ can ‘liquidate & settle the meaning of’ disputed or indeterminate ‘terms & phrases’ in 

the Constitution” (citation omitted)). The 20th century, after all, began over a hundred years 

ago, and that is no inconsequential length of time. Cf. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1253 (“Heller tells 

us ‘longstanding’ regulations are ‘presumptively lawful.’” (citation omitted)). 

In this case, it is appropriate to apply 20th century history to the regulation at issue. The 

historical tradition of high-capacity regulations in the 1920s and 1930s—over a hundred years 

ago—does not contradict any earlier evidence, and it supports the constitutionality of the 

District’s LCM ban. To reiterate, Bruen had no occasion to consider 20th century history 

because while “handguns . . . had gained a fairly secure footing in English culture” leading up to 

the Founding era, there was no evidence that public carry was limited “only to those who 

demonstrate some special need for self-protection” like New York’s proper cause regime. 142 S. 

Ct. at 2142. Bruen then ventured into the 18th century, where it found that “the history reveals a 
37

consensus that States could not ban public carry altogether.” Id. at 2146 (emphasis in original). 

By contrast, in this case, the 1920s and 1930s regulations do not contradict any earlier evidence. 

That is so because semiautomatic and high-capacity weapons were not technologically feasible 

and commercially available in meaningful quantities until the early 1900s. See supra subsection 

IV.B.1; Amicus Brief at 16 (“[C]rucially, when multi-shot firearms did begin to gain widespread 

civilian use, states across the country passed laws limiting access to these weapons.” (emphasis 

omitted)). Unlike the handguns at issue in Bruen, the weapons here did not gain a “secure 

footing” in American society prior to the 1900s. 142 S. Ct. at 2142. Accordingly, they did not 

pose “a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century,” and it would make no 

sense to divine constitutional significance from non-existent legislation concerning non-existent 

problems. Id. at 2131. States do not “regulate for problems that do not exist”; instead, they 

“adopt laws to address the problems that confront them.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 

481 (2014); see also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (“A legislative body 

cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions 

which the legislation is intended to affect or change[.]”). 

To flesh this principle out a little more, consider personal jetpacks, an “expensive and 

experimental curiosity” that are unregulated today despite the obvious safety issues and dangers 

they pose. DeLay Decl. ¶ 21. “A future historian (or jurist) discovering evidence that a patent 

was taken out on a jetpack design as early as 1919 (it was); that militaries remained intrigued by 

the technology throughout the century (indeed, they still are); and that the jetpack commanded 

enduring popular interest, could conclude that the absence of public regulation reflected an 

ideological disposition against regulating jetpacks. But the simpler and more accurate 

explanation would be that jetpacks remained too rare to attract regulatory attention in 2022.” Id.
38

Second, Plaintiffs attempt to dismiss the Prohibition-era regulations as “irrelevant 

outliers.” Pls.’ Reply at 25. But unlike “only three restrictions on public carry” that the 

government could produce in Bruen, which the Supreme Court “doubt[ed] . . . could suffice to 

show a tradition of public-carry regulation,” 142 S. Ct. at 2142, the District here has pointed to 

no less than six states plus D.C. that regulated semi-automatic and automatic weapons based on 

their high firing capacity. See supra subsection IV.B.2.

15

 Of particular significance, the D.C. 

law that the Court has discussed above was passed by Congress (a nationwide body) and drew 

heavily from the Uniform Act (a model law). Like D.C., Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 

and Rhode Island all banned mere possession. See Act of July 8, 1932, ch. 465, §§ 1, 8, 47 Stat. 

650, 650, 652; 1927 Mass. Acts 413, 413-14; Act of June 2, 1927, no. 372, 1927 Mich. Pub. Acts 

887, 888; Mich. Pub. Acts 1929, Act No. 206, Sec. 3, Comp. Laws 1929; Act of Apr. 10, 1933, 

ch. 190, 1933 Minn. Laws 231, 232; 1927 R.I. Pub. Laws 256, 256. Plaintiffs try to distinguish 

the Ohio and Virginia laws as outliers because the former permitted licensed carry and the latter 

permitted defensive uses of these weapons. Pls.’ Reply at 26. But Ohio’s licensing law in 1933 

required one to post $5,000 bond—today’s equivalent of over $115,000—effectively 

“prevent[ing] law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from carrying” these 

weapons. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2150.

16

 As for Virginia, although it prohibited possession of a 

machine gun only “for offensive and aggressive purpose,” it “presumed” this purpose whenever

the weapon was possessed outside the home. Act of Mar. 7, 1934, ch. 96, 1934 Va. Acts 137, 

15 Actually, that number could be potentially as high as ten jurisdictions, if one reads 

three ambiguous state statutes in favor of the District. See Spitzer, Gun Law History at 69

(describing statutory ambiguity in machine gun bans from Illinois, Louisiana, and South 

Carolina). 

16 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, at 

https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited April 20, 2023). 
39

137 (emphasis added). In short, Plaintiffs cannot avoid the conclusion that there is a historical

tradition of severe restrictions, if not outright bans, on these high-capacity weapons. 

Accordingly, the District’s law is at the very least “analogous enough to pass constitutional 

muster.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. 

Third, Plaintiffs argue that the subsequent repeal of some of these state regulations

undercuts the District’s reliance on this history. Pls.’ Reply at 26. But Plaintiffs do not explain 

why the decision of some states to “devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and 

values” is anything more than permissible “experimentation with reasonable firearms 

regulations . . . under the Second Amendment.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 

785 (2010). Take Rhode Island, for example. Although it eventually repealed its 1927 statute 

banning possession of machine guns (defined, by the way, to include “any weapon which shoots 

more than twelve shots semiautomatically without reloading”), Rhode Island changed course in 

2022 “[i]n the wake of recent mass shootings” and amended its law to “specifically ban LCMs,” 

Ocean State Tactical, 2022 WL 17721175, at *4. And other jurisdictions, like D.C., made 

modifications to its law without ever repealing it. See Kopel at 874 (“The District of Columbia 

ban, with modifications, is still in effect.”). The Second Amendment gives states space to

experiment, and that is what Rhode Island and D.C. have done. Bruen did contemplate that state 

regulations that were “rejected on constitutional grounds” can “provide some probative evidence 

of [a similar modern regulation’s] unconstitutionality.” 142 S. Ct. at 2131. But Plaintiffs have 

not suggested that any repeal was related to constitutional infirmity. The Court has conducted 

independent research on this question and did not find anything suggesting this was the reason, 
40

either. Thus, the Court is satisfied that the District has met its burden to produce a historical

analogue justifying its LCM ban.17 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 8) is 

denied. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and 

contemporaneously issued.

Dated: April 20, 2023 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge

17 The parties also dispute whether other potential historical analogues that the District 

introduced are relevantly similar to the ban at issue here. These include regulations on 

gunpowder, trap guns, and dangerous weapons such as Bowie knives. Defs.’ Opp’n at 28–32, 

35–39. Because the Court holds that the District has adequately identified a historical analogue

in the Prohibition-era regulations, it has no occasion to consider additional examples.