89–008 

111TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 111–427 

IMPEACHMENT OF G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR., JUDGE OF 

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

MARCH 4, 2010.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed 

Mr. CONYERS, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany H. Res. 1031] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the resolution (H. Res. 1031) impeaching G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., judge of 

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, for high crimes and misdemeanors, having considered the 

same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the resolution be agreed to. 

I. THE RESOLUTION 

H. RES. 1031 

Impeaching G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., judge of the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, for high crimes 

and misdemeanors. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 21, 2010

Mr. Conyers (for himself, Mr. Smith of Texas, Mr. Schiff, Mr. 

Goodlatte, Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas, Mr. Sensenbrenner, Mr. 

Delahunt, Mr. Daniel E. Lungren of California, Mr. Cohen, Mr. 

Forbes, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Mr. Gohmert, Mr. Pierluisi, and 

Mr. Gonzalez) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

Resolved, That G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., a judge of the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, is imVerDate Nov 24 2008 00:06 Mar 05, 2010 Jkt 089008 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR427.XXX HR427

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peached for high crimes and misdemeanors, and that the following 

articles of impeachment be exhibited to the Senate: 

Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives of the United States of America in the name of itself and all 

of the people of the United States of America, against G. Thomas 

Porteous, Jr., a judge in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Louisiana, in maintenance and support of its 

impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors. 

ARTICLE I

G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., while a Federal judge of the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, engaged 

in a pattern of conduct that is incompatible with the trust and confidence placed in him as a Federal judge, as follows: 

Judge Porteous, while presiding as a United States district judge 

in Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, 

denied a motion to recuse himself from the case, despite the fact 

that he had a corrupt financial relationship with the law firm of 

Amato & Creely, P.C. which had entered the case to represent 

Liljeberg. In denying the motion to recuse, and in contravention of 

clear canons of judicial ethics, Judge Porteous failed to disclose 

that beginning in or about the late 1980’s while he was a State 

court judge in the 24th Judicial District Court in the State of Louisiana, he engaged in a corrupt scheme with attorneys, Jacob 

Amato, Jr., and Robert Creely, whereby Judge Porteous appointed 

Amato’s law partner as a ‘curator’ in hundreds of cases and thereafter requested and accepted from Amato & Creely a portion of the 

curatorship fees which had been paid to the firm. During the period of this scheme, the fees received by Amato & Creely amounted 

to approximately $40,000, and the amounts paid by Amato & 

Creely to Judge Porteous amounted to approximately $20,000. 

Judge Porteous also made intentionally misleading statements at 

the recusal hearing intended to minimize the extent of his personal 

relationship with the two attorneys. In so doing, and in failing to 

disclose to Lifemark and its counsel the true circumstances of his 

relationship with the Amato & Creely law firm, Judge Porteous deprived the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of critical information for 

its review of a petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to 

overrule Judge Porteous’s denial of the recusal motion. His conduct 

deprived the parties and the public of the right to the honest services of his office. 

Judge Porteous also engaged in corrupt conduct after the 

Lifemark v. Liljeberg bench trial, and while he had the case under 

advisement, in that he solicited and accepted things of value from 

both Amato and his law partner Creely, including a payment of 

thousands of dollars in cash. Thereafter, and without disclosing his 

corrupt relationship with the attorneys of Amato & Creely PLC or 

his receipt from them of cash and other things of value, Judge 

Porteous ruled in favor of their client, Liljeberg. 

By virtue of this corrupt relationship and his conduct as a Federal judge, Judge Porteous brought his court into scandal and disrepute, prejudiced public respect for, and confidence in, the Federal 

judiciary, and demonstrated that he is unfit for the office of Federal judge. 


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Wherefore, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., is guilty of high 

crimes and misdemeanors and should be removed from office. 

ARTICLE II

G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., engaged in a longstanding pattern of 

corrupt conduct that demonstrates his unfitness to serve as a 

United States District Court Judge. That conduct included the following: Beginning in or about the late 1980’s while he was a State 

court judge in the 24th Judicial District Court in the State of Louisiana, and continuing while he was a Federal judge in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Judge 

Porteous engaged in a corrupt relationship with bail bondsman 

Louis M. Marcotte, III, and his sister Lori Marcotte. As part of this 

corrupt relationship, Judge Porteous solicited and accepted numerous things of value, including meals, trips, home repairs, and car 

repairs, for his personal use and benefit, while at the same time 

taking official actions that benefitted the Marcottes. These official 

actions by Judge Porteous included, while on the State bench, setting, reducing, and splitting bonds as requested by the Marcottes, 

and improperly setting aside or expunging felony convictions for 

two Marcotte employees (in one case after Judge Porteous had been 

confirmed by the Senate but before being sworn in as a Federal 

judge). In addition, both while on the State bench and on the Federal bench, Judge Porteous used the power and prestige of his office to assist the Marcottes in forming relationships with State judicial officers and individuals important to the Marcottes’ business. 

As Judge Porteous well knew and understood, Louis Marcotte also 

made false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in an 

effort to assist Judge Porteous in being appointed to the Federal 

bench. 

Accordingly, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., has engaged in conduct so utterly lacking in honesty and integrity that he is guilty 

of high crimes and misdemeanors, is unfit to hold the office of Federal judge, and should be removed from office. 

ARTICLE III

Beginning in or about March 2001 and continuing through about 

July 2004, while a Federal judge in the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, G. Thomas Porteous, 

Jr., engaged in a pattern of conduct inconsistent with the trust and 

confidence placed in him as a Federal judge by knowingly and intentionally making material false statements and representations 

under penalty of perjury related to his personal bankruptcy filing 

and by repeatedly violating a court order in his bankruptcy case. 

Judge Porteous did so by—— 

(1) using a false name and a post office box address to conceal his identity as the debtor in the case; 

(2) concealing assets; 

(3) concealing preferential payments to certain creditors; 

(4) concealing gambling losses and other gambling debts; 

and 

(5) incurring new debts while the case was pending, in violation of the bankruptcy court’s order. 


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In doing so, Judge Porteous brought his court into scandal and 

disrepute, prejudiced public respect for and confidence in the Federal judiciary, and demonstrated that he is unfit for the office of 

Federal judge. 

Wherefore, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., is guilty of high 

crimes and misdemeanors and should be removed from office. 

ARTICLE IV

In 1994, in connection with his nomination to be a judge of the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 

G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., knowingly made material false statements about his past to both the United States Senate and to the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to obtain the office of 

United States District Court Judge. These false statements included the following: 

(1) On his Supplemental SF-86, Judge Porteous was asked 

if there was anything in his personal life that could be used 

by someone to coerce or blackmail him, or if there was anything in his life that could cause an embarrassment to Judge 

Porteous or the President if publicly known. Judge Porteous 

answered ‘no’ to this question and signed the form under the 

warning that a false statement was punishable by law. 

(2) During his background check, Judge Porteous falsely told 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation on two separate occasions 

that he was not concealing any activity or conduct that could 

be used to influence, pressure, coerce, or compromise him in 

any way or that would impact negatively on his character, reputation, judgment, or discretion. 

(3) On the Senate Judiciary Committee’s ‘Questionnaire for 

Judicial Nominees’, Judge Porteous was asked whether any 

unfavorable information existed that could affect his nomination. Judge Porteous answered that, to the best of his knowledge, he did ‘not know of any unfavorable information that 

may affect [his] nomination’. Judge Porteous signed that questionnaire by swearing that ‘the information provided in this 

statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate’. 

However, in truth and in fact, as Judge Porteous then well knew, 

each of these answers was materially false because Judge Porteous 

had engaged in a corrupt relationship with the law firm Amato & 

Creely, whereby Judge Porteous appointed Creely as a ‘curator’ in 

hundreds of cases and thereafter requested and accepted from 

Amato & Creely a portion of the curatorship fees which had been 

paid to the firm and also had engaged in a corrupt relationship 

with Louis and Lori Marcotte, whereby Judge Porteous solicited 

and accepted numerous things of value, including meals, trips, 

home repairs, and car repairs, for his personal use and benefit, 

while at the same time taking official actions that benefitted the 

Marcottes. As Judge Porteous well knew and understood, Louis 

Marcotte also made false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in an effort to assist Judge Porteous in being appointed 

to the Federal bench. Judge Porteous’s failure to disclose these corrupt relationships deprived the United States Senate and the public of information that would have had a material impact on his 

confirmation. 


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1 Among the reasons the Department gave in declining prosecution were that some of the conduct at issue was barred by the statue of limitations, and that some of the demonstrably false 

statements may not have been ‘‘material’’ as a matter of law. Letter from John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Hon. Edith H. Jones, Chief 

Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Re: Complaint of Judicial Misconduct Concerning the Honorable G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., May 18, 2007 (hereinafter ‘‘DOJ Complaint Letter’’) at 1 (Ex. 4). 

The evidentiary materials have been identified as HP [House Porteous] Exhibit numbers by 

the Task Force Staff, and the documents are cited as ‘‘(Ex. [#]).’’ Certain publicly available documents, such as House and Committee Resolutions, or pleadings in connection with litigation, 

have also been marked as exhibits for ease of reference. The testimony cited in this Report consists of the following: 1) testimony of witnesses before the House Impeachment Task Force during one of four hearings (either on November 17-18, 2009 (Hearing I), December 8, 2009 (II), 

December 10, 2009 (III) or December 15, 2009 (IV)), cited as ‘‘[Witness] TF Hrg. [I, II, III or 

Continued 

Wherefore, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., is guilty of high 

crimes and misdemeanors and should be removed from office. 

II. INTRODUCTION 

The House Committee on the Judiciary, in conjunction with its 

duly authorized ‘‘Task Force on Judicial Impeachment,’’ has conducted an investigation into the conduct of United States District 

Court Judge Gabriel Thomas Porteous, Jr., (‘‘Judge Porteous’’) and 

has determined, for the reasons set forth in this Report, that Judge 

Porteous’s impeachment is warranted as a factual matter, fully 

supported by the Constitution, and is consistent with precedent. 

III. JUDGE G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR. 

Judge Porteous was born December 14, 1946. He grew up in the 

New Orleans area and attended Louisiana State University both as 

an undergraduate and for law school. He graduated from law 

school in 1971. 

From 1971 to 1973, Judge Porteous was Special Counsel to the 

Office of the Louisiana Attorney General. He then served as an Assistant District Attorney from approximately 1973 through 1984. 

During that time period, Assistant District Attorneys could also 

hold outside employment. Thus, during some portion of this time, 

Judge Porteous was a law partner of Jacob Amato, Jr., at the law 

firm Edwards, Porteous & Amato. Attorney Robert Creely also 

worked at this firm. 

Judge Porteous was elected judge of the 24th Judicial District 

Court in the State of Louisiana in 1984 and remained in that position until October 1994. In August 1994, Judge Porteous was nominated by President Clinton to be a United States District Court 

Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana. His confirmation hearing was held on October 6, 1994. He was confirmed by the Senate 

on October 7, 1994, received his commission on October 11, 1994, 

and was sworn in on October 28, 1994. 

Judge Porteous was married in 1969 to Carmella Porteous, who 

passed away on December 22, 2005. 

IV. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

In or about late 1999, the Department of Justice (occasionally 

referenced as the ‘‘Department’’ or ‘‘DOJ’’) and the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (the ‘‘FBI’’) commenced a criminal investigation of 

Judge Porteous. The criminal investigation continued for several 

years, and ultimately ended in early 2007, without an indictment. 1


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IV] at [page];’’ 2) testimony of witnesses before the Fifth Circuit Special Investigative Committee 

Hearing in October 1997, cited as ‘‘[Witness] 5th Cir. Hrg. at [page],’’ or otherwise referencing 

the speaker if the person quoted is not the sworn witness; 3) testimony of witnesses before the 

Federal grand jury, cited as ‘‘[Witness] GJ at [page];’’ and 4) deposition testimony taken by Task 

Force Staff, in the late summer and fall of 2009 and early 2010, cited as ‘‘[Witness] Dep. at 

[ ].’’ Facts that are undisputed—such as the date Judge Porteous was nominated or confirmed— 

are not always cited. Several witnesses were interviewed by Task Force Staff but were not deposed. Every effort has been made in this Report to rely on documentary materials or testimony 

under oath; however, on a few occasions, references are made to Task Force Staff interviews 

where a deposition was not conducted. 2DOJ Complaint Letter (Ex. 4). 

3 An order of immunity had been obtained and provided to Judge Porteous in connection with 

his testimony before the Fifth Circuit Special Committee. 4That hearing did not address Judge Porteous’s improper relationships with bail bondsmen, 

nor did it examine his conduct during the confirmation process to become a Federal judge. 5 Report by the Special Investigatory Committee to the Judicial Council of the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, In the Matter of Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. United 

States District Judge, Eastern District of Louisiana, Dkt. No. 07-05-351-0085 (Nov. 20, 2007) 

(Ex. 5). 6Memorandum Order and Certification, In re: Complaint of Judicial Misconduct Against 

United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability 

Act of 1980, Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit, Dkt. No. 07-05-351-0085 (Dec. 20, 2007) at 

4 (Ex. 6(a)). A dissenting opinion authored by Circuit Judge James L. Dennis examined each 

of Judge Porteous’s acts individually and concluded that, under that analysis, the evidence did 

not demonstrate a possible ground for impeachment and removal. Id. (J. Dennis dissenting) (Ex. 

6(b)). Judge Dennis would have recommended suspending and reprimanding Judge Porteous. 7Memorandum Order and Certification, In re: Complaint of Judicial Misconduct Against 

United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability 

In a letter dated May 18, 2007, the Department submitted a formal complaint of judicial misconduct to the Honorable Edith H. 

Jones, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit. The DOJ Complaint Letter described numerous instances 

of alleged misconduct by Judge Porteous that potentially related to 

his fitness as a judge. 2 The alleged misconduct included soliciting 

and accepting things of value from litigants, attorneys, and other 

interested persons (such as the owners of a bail bonds company) 

with matters before him. The misconduct was alleged to have commenced while Judge Porteous was a State judge serving on the 

24th Judicial District Court in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana (from 

1984 to 1994), and to have continued while he was a Federal district judge. In addition, the Department also set forth information 

that Judge Porteous, while a Federal judge, made false statements 

and engaged in other dishonest conduct in connection with his personal bankruptcy. 

Upon receipt of the DOJ Complaint Letter, the Fifth Circuit appointed a Special Investigatory Committee (the ‘‘Special Committee’’) to investigate the Department’s allegations. A hearing was 

held before the Special Committee on October 29 and 30, 2007 (the 

‘‘Fifth Circuit Hearing’’), at which Judge Porteous, representing 

himself, testified, 3 cross-examined witnesses, and called witnesses 

on his own behalf. 4 Thereafter, the Special Committee issued a Report to the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit, dated November 

20, 2007. That Report concluded that Judge Porteous committed 

misconduct which ‘‘might constitute one or more grounds for impeachment.’’ 5

On December 20, 2007, by a majority vote, the Judicial Council 

of the Fifth Circuit accepted and approved the Special Committee’s 

Report and likewise concluded that Judge Porteous ‘‘had engaged 

in conduct which might constitute one or more grounds for impeachment under Article I of the Constitution.’’ 6 The Fifth Circuit 

Judicial Council thereafter certified these findings and the supporting records to the Judicial Conference of the United States. 7


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Act of 1980, Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit, Dkt. No. 07-05-351-0085 (Dec. 20, 2007) at 

5 (Ex. 6(a)). 8 Certificate of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to the Speaker, United States 

House of Representatives [Re: Determination that Consideration of Impeachment of Judge G. 

Thomas Porteous may be Warranted], June 17, 2008 (Ex. 7). The Certificate was thereafter 

hand delivered to the Honorable Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, on June 18, 2008. 9Order and Public Reprimand, In re: Complaint of Judicial Misconduct Against United States 

District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 

Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit, Dkt. No. 07-05-351-0085 (Sept. 10, 2008) at 4 (Ex. 8). 10 H. Res. 1448 (2008). 11 H. Res. 15 (2009). 12See Reestablishment of the Task Force on Judicial Impeachment: Before the H. Comm. on 

the Judiciary, 111th Con. (2009) (statement of John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the 

Judiciary), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/transcripts/transcript090122.pdf at 30-34. The 

Task Force consisted of Chairman Adam B. Schiff (CA), Ranking Member Bob Goodlatte (VA), 

Sheila Jackson Lee (TX), Steve Cohen (TN), Henry C. ‘‘Hank’’ Johnson (GA), Pedro Pierluisi 

(PR), Charles A. Gonzalez (TX), F. James Sensenbrenner (WI), Daniel E. Lungren (CA), J. 

Randy Forbes (VA), and Louis Gohmert (TX). 

On June 17, 2008, the Judicial Conference of the United States 

determined unanimously, upon recommendation of its Committee 

on Judicial Conduct and Disability, to transmit to the Speaker of 

the House a Certificate ‘‘that consideration of impeachment of 

United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous (E.D. La.) may 

be warranted.’’ 8

On September 10, 2008, the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit 

issued an ‘‘Order and Public Reprimand’’ taking the maximum disciplinary action allowed by law against Judge Porteous, including 

ordering that no new cases be assigned to him and suspending his 

authority to employ staff for 2 years or ‘‘until Congress takes final 

action on the impeachment proceedings, whichever occurs earlier.’’ 9

On September 17, 2008, the House of Representatives of the 

110th Congress passed H. Res. 1448, which provided, in pertinent 

part: ‘‘Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary shall inquire 

whether the House should impeach G. Thomas Porteous, a judge 

of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.’’ 10 On January 6, 2009, Chairman John Conyers, Jr. of the 

Committee on the Judiciary introduced H. Res. 15, which continued 

the authority of H. Res. 1448 of the 110th Congress for the 111th 

Congress. 11 On January 13, 2009, H. Res. 15 passed the full House 

by voice vote. 

V. COMMITTEE AND TASK FORCE ACTIONS 

On January 22, 2009, the impeachment inquiry was referred by 

the Committee on the Judiciary to a Task Force on Judicial Impeachment (the ‘‘Task Force’’), comprised of 12 Committee Members, to conduct the investigation. 12 On July 29, 2009, the Committee on the Judiciary voted to permit the House General Counsel 

to seek immunity orders to compel the testimony of 8 witnesses. 

A. IN GENERAL

Task Force Staff reviewed materials provided from the Fifth Circuit (which included DOJ materials that had been provided to the 

attorneys handling the Special Investigatory inquiry). Task Force 

Staff also obtained additional documents from DOJ and from other 

entities, and interviewed over 70 individuals and took over 25 

depositions. The evidentiary materials that are pertinent to this 

Report were made part of the record at the Task Force meeting of 

January 21, 2010. 


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13Memorandum in Support of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary 

for an Order Directing the Department of Justice to Disclose Certain Grand Jury Materials, In 

re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Misc. No. 

09-4346 (E.D. La. July 8, 2009) (Ex. 401). Howard had been prosecuted for not disclosing that 

he accepted hunting trips from Rowan Companies on his financial disclosure reports, and, in 

fact, had been on some of the same Rowan hunting trips as Judge Porteous. 

After the Committee filed its Motion, Judge Porteous’s counsel wrote to the judge assigned 

to the case and asserted that it would not be proper for any judge currently sitting in the judicial districts comprising the Fifth Circuit to hear and decide the Committee’s motion. Letter 

from Richard W. Westling, Counsel to Judge Porteous, to the Honorable Neal B. Biggers, Jr., 

Senior United States District Judge (July 13, 2009) (Ex. 400). As a result, the Fifth Circuit designated the Honorable Callie V. S. Granade, the Chief Judge of the Southern District of Alabama, to hear and decide the Committee’s motion. 14 Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.’s Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion of the U.S. 

House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary’s Motion for an Order Directing the Department of Justice to Disclose Certain Grand Jury Materials, In re: Grand Jury Investigation 

of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 (E.D. La. July 28, 

2009) (Ex. 402). 15Order, In re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, 

Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 (E.D. La. Aug. 5, 2009) (granting motion to disclose grand jury materials) 

(Ex. 403). 16 Judge Porteous’s Motion for a Stay of the Court’s August 5, 2009 Grand Jury Disclosure 

Order Pending Appeal of the Order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 

In re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Misc. 

No. 09-4346 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2009) (Ex. 404). 17 U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary’s Opposition to Motion for Stay of the Court’s Grand 

Jury Disclosure Order Pending Appeal, In re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States District 

Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2009) (Ex. 406). 18Order, In re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, 

Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2009) (denying motion to stay disclosure pending appeal) (Ex. 407). 19 Notice of Appeal of the Court’s August 5, 2009 Grand Jury Disclosure Order, In re: Grand 

Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 

(E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2009) (Ex. 405). 

B. LITIGATION BY JUDGE PORTEOUS

IN RESPONSE TO THE TASK FORCE INQUIRY

Judge Porteous has litigated in three different courts in an attempt to preclude, or delay, the Committee from obtaining critically-needed information in this impeachment inquiry. 

After review of the DOJ Complaint Letter, and the referral from 

the U.S. Judicial Conference, the Committee moved to obtain a 

court order authorizing DOJ to disclose grand jury materials. The 

Committee originally moved on July 8, 2009 for an order authorizing the disclosure of grand jury materials related to the DOJ investigations of Judge Porteous, Rowan Company, and Diamond Offshore, and a Department of Interior employee, Donald C. Howard. 13

On July 28, 2009, Judge Porteous filed an opposition to the Committee’s Motion. 14 While never challenging the fact that the information sought was relevant and necessary for the impeachment inquiry, the Judge’s opposition was based solely on a concern for secrecy of grand jury matters. The court dismissed this objection and 

issued an order dated August 5, 2009, granting the Committee’s 

Motion. 15 Thereafter, Judge Porteous moved to stay the Order 

pending his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; 16 the Committee opposed Judge Porteous’s stay motion 17 and 

the District Court denied the stay as without merit. 18 Judge 

Porteous took an appeal of the August 5 grand jury disclosure 

order 19 and also moved in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

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20 Appellant’s Motion for a Stay of the District Court’s Grand Jury Disclosure Order Pending 

Appeal, In Re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, 

Jr., No. 09-30737 (5th Cir. Aug. 20, 2009) (Ex. 408). 21Opposition to Appellant’s Motion for Stay, In Re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States 

District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., No. 09-30737 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2009) (Ex. 409). 22Order, In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 09-30737 (5th Cir. Sept. 14, 2009) (denying appellant’s motion for a stay pending appeal) (Ex. 410). 23 Appellee’s Motion for Summary Affirmance, In Re: Grand Jury [Proceedings], No. 09-30737 

(5th Cir. Sept. 23, 2009) (Ex. 411). 24 Appellant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee’s Motion for Summary Affirmance, In 

Re: Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 09-30737 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2009) (Ex. 412). 25 Reply of U.S. House Judiciary Committee to Appellant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee’s Motion for Summary Affirmance, In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 09-30737 (5th Cir. 

Oct. 9, 2009) (Ex. 413). 26 Appellant’s Motion to Disqualify the Panel of Judges that Ruled on the Motion for a Stay 

Pending Appeal, to Vacate the Panel’s Order Denying a Stay, and to Designate a Panel of 

Judges From Another Circuit to Hear all Further Proceedings in this Appeal, In Re: Grand Jury 

Proceedings, No. 09-30737 (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 2009) (Ex. 414). 27Opposition of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee to Appellant’s Motion to Disqualify the 

Panel . . . To Vacate the Panel’s Order . . . and to Designate a Panel of Judges From Another 

Circuit to Hear . . . This Appeal, In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 09-30737 (5th Cir. Oct. 

6, 2009) (Ex. 415). 28Original Brief on Behalf of Appellant G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., United States District Judge, 

In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 09-30737 (5th Cir. Oct. 26, 2009) (Ex. 416). 29Order, In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 09-30737 (5th Cir. Nov. 12, 2009) (granting appellee’s motion for summary affirmance and denying appellant’s motions to disqualify all Fifth 

Circuit Court of Appeals Judges from the case, vacate the order denying the motion for staying 

pending appeal, to designate a panel from another Circuit, and stay pending appeal) (Ex. 417). 30 U.S. House Judiciary Committee’s Motion to Obtain Grand Jury Materials and Specified 

Court-Ordered Wiretaps, In re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. 

Thomas Porteous, Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 2009) (Ex. 418). 

peal. 20 The Committee opposed this motion, 21 and the Court of Appeals denied the stay. 22 Throughout these pleadings, Judge 

Porteous never argued that the grand jury materials sought were 

not relevant to the Committee’s impeachment inquiry. 

On September 23, 2009, the Committee moved for summary affirmance of the district court’s August 5, 2009 grand jury disclosure 

order. 23 Judge Porteous opposed this motion 24 and the Committee 

replied. 25 Judge Porteous moved to disqualify the panel of Fifth 

Circuit judges that ruled on the motion for a stay pending appeal, 

to vacate the panel’s order denying the stay, and to designate a 

panel of judges from another Circuit to hear all further proceedings 

in the appeal. 26 The Committee opposed this motion. 27 On October 

26, 2009, Judge Porteous filed the merits brief in his appeal. 28

On November 12, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit issued an order which granted the Committee’s motion for 

summary affirmance, and denied all of Judge Porteous’s motions. 29

The Task Force finally obtained access to the grand jury materials 

in mid-November 2009. 

The Judge’s legal maneuverings had delayed access by the staff 

to important and relevant information for approximately 5 months. 

By way of a motion filed October 8, 2009, the Committee sought 

a second Order authorizing disclosure of grand jury and Title III 

wiretap materials that related to Judge Porteous. These materials 

were obtained during the Department’s ‘‘Wrinkled Robe’’ investigation into corruption in connection with the relationship of certain 

bail bondsmen to State judges of the 24th Judicial District Court 

of Louisiana, where Judge Porteous had presided prior to becoming 

a Federal judge. 30 Again, Judge Porteous filed an opposition to this 


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31 Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.’s Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion of the U.S. 

House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary’s Motion to Obtain Grand Jury Materials 

and Specified Court-Ordered Wiretaps, In re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States District 

Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2009) (Ex. 419). 32 Reply of U.S. House Judiciary Committee to Judge G. Thomas Porteous’s Opposition to the 

Motion to Obtain Grand Jury Materials and Specified Court-Ordered Wiretaps, In re: Grand 

Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 

(E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2009) (Ex. 420). 33Memorandum in Response to U.S. House Judiciary Committee’s Motion to Obtain Grand 

Jury Materials and Specified Court-Ordered Wiretaps, In re: Grand Jury Investigation of United 

States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2009) (Ex. 

421). 34Order, In re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, 

Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2009) (granting Committee’s motion for order authorizing disclosure of grand jury and Title III materials) (Ex. 422). 35 Judge Porteous’s Motion for a Stay of the Court’s October 23, 2009 Grand Jury and Specified Wiretaps Disclosure Order Pending Appeal of the Order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, In re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. 

Thomas Porteous, Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 (E.D. La. Nov. 4, 2009) (Ex. 423). 36Opposition of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives to Judge 

Porteous’s Motion for Stay of the Court’s October 23, 2009 Order Pending Appeal, In re: Grand 

Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 

(E.D. La. Nov. 10, 2009) (Ex. 424). 37Order, In re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, 

Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2009) (denying motion for stay pending appeal) (Ex. 

425). 38 Appellee’s Motion for Summary Affirmance, In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 09-31062 

(5th Cir. Dec. 30, 2009) (Ex. 426). 39Order, In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 09-31062 (5th Cir. Jan. 29, 2010) (Ex. 436). 40Order, In re: Grand Jury Investigation of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, 

Jr., Misc. No. 09-4346 (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2009) (granting unopposed motion to unseal) (Ex. 427); 

Order, In Re: Grand Jury Proceeding, No. 09-30737 (5th Cir. Dec. 30, 2009) (same); Order, In 

Re: Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 09-31062 (5th Cir. Dec. 30, 2009) (same). 

motion, 31 and the Committee replied. 32 The Department of Justice 

filed a memorandum in support of the Committee. 33 On October 

23, 2009, the court granted the Committee’s motion and authorized 

disclosure of the grand jury and Title III materials. 34

Once again, Judge Porteous moved in the district court to stay 

disclosure. 35 The Committee opposed his stay motion. 36 The district court denied the stay motion as without merit. 37 Judge 

Porteous did not move to stay disclosure in the Court of Appeals, 

but he did file and pursue an appeal of the disclosure order. The 

Committee obtained access to the Wrinkled Robe grand jury and 

Title III materials in mid-November 2009 pursuant to the district 

court’s disclosure order. 

On December 30, 2009, the Committee moved for summary affirmance of Judge Porteous’s appeal from the Wrinkled Robe disclosure order. 38 On January 29, 2010, the Fifth Circuit granted the 

Committee’s motion and affirmed the district court’s disclosure 

order. 39

The district court and the Fifth Circuit granted the Committee’s 

unopposed motions to unseal the litigation 40 so that all of the 

pleadings would be available to the public. 

In addition to the grand jury litigation, on November 12, 2009, 

a few days prior to the first evidentiary hearing of the Task Force, 

Judge Porteous filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia seeking a permanent injunction preventing the Committee from using or reading his sworn immunized 

testimony that had been provided to the Committee by the Judicial 

Conference. On an emergency basis, Judge Porteous sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin three aides to the Impeachment 

Task Force from using testimony he had provided under a grant of 

immunity to the Fifth Circuit Special Committee more than 2 years 


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41 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Porteous v. Baron, et al, Case 

No. 1:09-cv-2131 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2009) (Ex. 428); Plaintiff G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.’s Motion 

for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Porteous v. Baron, et al, Case 

No. 1:09-cv-2131 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2009) (Ex. 429). 42Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Porteous v. Baron, et al, Case No. 1:09-cv-2131 (D.D.C. Nov. 

13, 2009) (Ex. 430). 43 Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.’s Reply Memorandum to Defendants’ Opposition to his Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction, Porteous v. Baron, et al, 

Case No. 1:09-cv-2131 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2009) (Ex. 431). 44 Bench Order, Porteous v. Baron, et al, Case No. 1:09-cv-2131 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2009) (denying motion for a temporary restraining order) (PACER Docket Report) (Ex. 432). ‘‘PACER’’ is 

an acronym for ‘‘Public Access to Court Electronic Records.’’ It is an electronic database that 

allows users to obtain case and docket information from the Federal courts. A document referred 

to in this Report as a ‘‘PACER Docket Report’’ is a standard computerized printout that sets 

forth the various events that occur in the course of a given case. In this case, the PACER Docket 

Report reflects the denial of the Motion for the Temporary Restraining Order on November 16, 

2009. 45Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Porteous v. 

Baron, et al, Case No. 1:09-cv-2131 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2009) (Ex. 433). 46 Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Porteous v. Baron, et al, Case No. 1:09-cv-2131 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2010) (Ex. 434). 47Defendants’ Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, Porteous v. Baron, et al, 

Case No. 1:09-cv-2131 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2010) (Ex. 434). As of the date of the preparation of this 

Report, the motion to dismiss is under advisement. 48See To Consider Possible Impeachment of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, 

Jr. (Part I), Hearing Before the Task Force on Judicial Impeachment of the Committee on the 

Judiciary, House of Representatives, 111th Cong. (Nov. 17-18, 2009). 49See To Consider Possible Impeachment of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, 

Jr. (Part II), Hearing Before the Task Force on Judicial Impeachment of the Committee on the 

Judiciary, House of Representatives, 111th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2009). 50See To Consider Possible Impeachment of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, 

Jr. (Part III), Hearing Before the Task Force on Judicial Impeachment of the Committee on the 

Judiciary, House of Representatives, 111th Cong. (Dec.10, 2009). 51See To Consider Possible Impeachment of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, 

Jr. (Part IV), Hearing Before the Task Force on Judicial Impeachment of the Committee on the 

Judiciary, House of Representatives, 111th Cong. (Dec. 15, 2009). 

earlier. 41 On an expedited schedule, the Committee moved to dismiss this motion, 42 and Judge Porteous replied. 43 United States 

District Judge Richard J. Leon of the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia denied Judge Porteous’s motion for a 

temporary restraining order after oral argument on November 16, 

2009. 44 Per the Court’s request, the Committee filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss. 45 Judge 

Porteous opposed this motion 46 and the Committee replied. 47

C. TASK FORCE HEARINGS

The Task Force held four hearings regarding the conduct of 

Judge Porteous. On November 17 and 18, 2009, Attorneys Robert 

Creely, Jacob Amato, and Joseph Mole testified. 48

On December 8, 2009, Federal Bureau of Investigation Special 

Agent DeWayne Horner, Attorney Claude Lightfoot, and Chief 

United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Maryland Duncan Keir testified. 49

On December 10, 2009, Bail Bondsman Louis M. Marcotte, III, 

and his sister Lori Marcotte testified. 50

At each of the above hearings, Special Impeachment Counsel 

Alan I. Baron presented an overview of the evidence that related 

to the topics of the hearings. 

On December 15, 2009, Professors Akhil Reed Amar (Yale Law 

School), Charles Geyh (Indiana University Maurer School of Law), 

and Michael Gerhardt (University of North Carolina School of Law) 

testified. 51

Judge Porteous’s attorney, Richard Westling, Esq., was permitted 

to give an opening statement at the initial hearing and was offered 


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the opportunity to examine the witnesses at each of the four hearings. He did in fact examine witnesses at all the hearings except 

the December 10, 2009 hearing, where, despite having been offered 

the opportunity to participate, neither Mr. Westling nor any other 

attorney representing Judge Porteous was present. Mr. Westling 

was given the opportunity to identify witnesses whose testimony he 

sought for the Committee to hear. Mr. Westling did not identify 

any such individuals. Judge Porteous was also provided the opportunity to testify. He declined to do so. 

On January 21, 2010, the Task Force held a meeting to consider 

proposed articles of impeachment. In connection with that meeting, 

Task Force exhibits cited in this Report were made part of the 

record. At that meeting, Task Force Members agreed by an 8-0 vote 

to recommend four specified Articles of Impeachment to the Full 

Committee. 

On that same day, Chairman Conyers introduced H. Res. 1031, 

setting forth the four recommended Articles of Impeachment 

against Judge Porteous. 

On January 27, 2010, the Committee on the Judiciary met and 

unanimously approved by record votes each of the four articles, 

and, upon doing so, voted unanimously to report H. Res 1031 to the 

full House. 

VI. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF IMPEACHMENT 

A. PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The following are the pertinent provisions in the United States 

Constitution that relate to impeachment: 

Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: 

The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole 

Power of Impeachment. 

Article I, Section 3, Clauses 6 and 7: 

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on 

Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United 

States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of twothirds of the Members present. 

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to 

hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under 

the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment 

and Punishment, according to Law. 

Article II, Section 2, Clause 1: 

The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves 

and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except 

in Cases of Impeachment. 

Article II, Section 4: 

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 

United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other 

high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 


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52 A commentator wrote in 1825: 

All executive and judicial officers, from the president downwards, from the judges of 

the supreme court to those of the most inferior tribunals, are included in this description. 

W. Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America, Philip H. Nicklin ed. 

(1829), 213 (The Law Exchange reprint (2003)). Another prominent commentator, Joseph Story, 

wrote: 

All officers of the United States . . . who hold their appointments under the national 

government, whether their duties are executive or judicial, in the highest or in the lowest departments of the government, with the exception of officers in the army and navy, 

are properly civil officers within the meaning of the constitution, and liable to impeachment. 

2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 790 at 258 (1833) (citing Rawle) (quoted in To Consider Possible Impeachment of United States District Judge Samuel B. Kent of the Southern District of Texas: Hearing Before the Task Force on Judicial Impeachment of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. Serial No. 111-11 (June 3, 2009) 

(statement of Prof. Arthur Hellman)). 53 H.R. Rep. No. 101-36, Impeachment of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., Report of the Committee on 

the Judiciary to Accompany H. Res. 87, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter ‘‘Walter Nixon 

Impeachment Report′′] at 5 (1989). 

In this regard, it has long been recognized that Federal judges 

are ‘‘civil Officers’’ within the meaning of Article II, Section 4. 52 Finally, as to the life tenure of Federal judges, the Constitution provides: 

Article III, Section 1: 

The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, 

shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour. . . . 

B. THE MEANING OF ‘‘HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS’’ 

The committee report accompanying the 1989 Resolution to Impeach United States District Court Judge Walter L. Nixon summarized the British precedents for impeachment, the events at the 

Constitutional convention leading to the adoption of the ‘‘high 

crimes and misdemeanors’’ formulation for impeachable conduct, 

and the interpretation of that term in the 12 judicial impeachments 

that had occurred prior to 1989. In its summary of the historical 

meaning of the term, the report noted: 

The House and Senate have both interpreted the phrase 

broadly, finding that impeachable offenses need not be limited to criminal conduct. Congress has repeatedly defined 

‘‘other high Crimes and misdemeanors’’ to be serious violations of the public trust, not necessarily indictable offenses 

under criminal laws. 53

In applying these concepts to the conduct of a judge, the Walter 

Nixon Impeachment Report further stressed that the term ‘‘misdemeanor’’ as used in the Constitution was not intended to denote 

a minor criminal offense, but rather focused on the behavior of the 

judge, that is, whether the judge ‘‘misdemean[ed]’’ and thus should 

be removed: 

Indeed, when the phrase ‘‘high crimes and misdemeanors’’ 

first appeared during the impeachment of the Earl of Suffolk in 1386, the term ‘‘misdemeanor’’ did not denote a violation of criminal law. In the context of impeachment, the 

word focuses on the behavior of a public official, i.e., his 

demeanor. Gouverneur Morris, a member of the Committee on Style and Revision of the Constitutional Convention and one of the founding fathers responsible for the 


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54Walter Nixon Impeachment Report at 5 (footnote omitted). 55 Id. at 12. 56 H.R. Rep. No. 100-810, Impeachment of Alcee L. Hastings, Report of the Committee on the 

Judiciary to Accompany H. Res. 499, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter ‘‘Hastings Impeachment Report’’], at 6. 57 Hastings Impeachment Report at 7. 58 Id. at 7. The last four judicial impeachments—those of Judge Samuel B. Kent (2009), Judge 

Walter L. Nixon (1989), Judge Alcee Hastings (1988), and Judge Harry Claiborne (1986)—occurred subsequent to Federal criminal proceedings, and the impeachment articles were to a 

great extent patterned after the Federal criminal charges. However, the principles that underlie 

the propriety of impeachment do not require that the conduct at issue be criminal in nature, 

or that there have been a criminal prosecution. 59 U.S. Const., art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 60 ‘‘Impeachment of Judge George W. English,’’ excerpts from Cong. Rec. (House), Mar. 25, 

1926 (6283-87), reprinted in ‘‘Impeachment, Selected Materials, House Comm. on the Judiciary,’’ 

Comm. Print (1973) at 163 (hereinafter ‘‘English Impeachment Report’’). 

final revisions to the Constitution, explained the use of the 

term ‘‘Misdemeanor’’: ‘‘[T]he judges shall hold their offices 

so long as they demean themselves well, but if they shall 

misdemean, if they shall, on impeachment, be convicted of 

misdemeanor, they shall be removed.’’ 54

The Walter Nixon Impeachment Report concluded: 

Thus, from an historical perspective the question of what 

conduct by a Federal judge constitutes an impeachable offense has evolved to the position where the focus is now 

on public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of 

the judiciary. When a judge’s conduct calls into questions 

his or her integrity or impartiality, Congress must consider whether impeachment and removal of the judge from 

office is necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial 

branch and uphold the public trust. 55

The report that accompanied the Alcee Hastings impeachment 

resolution stated that the phrase ‘‘high crimes and misdemeanors’’ 

‘‘refers to misconduct that damages the state and the operations of 

governmental institutions, and is not limited to criminal misconduct.’’ 56 That Report stressed that impeachment is ‘‘non-criminal,’’ designed not to impose criminal penalties, but instead simply 

to remove the offender from office, 57 and that it is ‘‘the ultimate 

means of preserving our constitutional form of government from 

the depredations of those in high office who abuse or violate the 

public trust.’’ 58 The fact that the individual who is impeached and 

removed from office ‘‘shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law,’’ 

makes it further clear that impeachment is a remedial provision, 

not a punitive one. 59

VII. ARTICLE BY ARTICLE ANALYSIS 

A. IN GENERAL

In connection with the impeachment of Federal Judge George W. 

English in 1926, the House Committee on the Judiciary noted: 

‘‘Each case of impeachment must necessarily stand upon its own 

facts. It can not, therefore, become a precedent or be on all fours 

with every other case.’’ 60 That observation is particularly true in 

regard to the case of Judge Porteous, who has committed misconduct in several spheres of activity over many years. As one 

scholar noted in his testimony before the Task Force, any lack of 


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61Prof. Gerhardt TF Hrg. IV at 25. 62 Civ. Action No. 93-1794 (E.D. La.). See PACER Docket Report (Ex. 50). 63Prof. Geyh TF Hrg. IV at 12 (written statement at 6). 64 As Professor Geyh testified: 

[J]udge Porteous’s misconduct here was of the gravest sort. The current Code of Conduct for United States judges provides that ‘‘A judge should comply with the restrictions 

on acceptance of gifts set forth in the Judicial Conference Gift Regulations. [citation 

omitted]’’ The judge who solicits or receives money from a lawyer who has an important 

case pending before the court, creates the taint of corruption that the Judicial Conference’s gift regulations are designed to prevent; it is thus unsurprising that ethics 

rules universally condemn the practice. 

Prof. Geyh TF Hrg. IV at 12 (written statement at 6). The principles of impeachment do not 

require that the conduct at issue constitute a specific crime or violation of a civil or regulatory 

rule of law. Nonetheless, the fact that the conduct alleged to warrant impeachment violates 

widely accepted ethical standards or particular civil or criminal laws is a relevant consideration 

that informs, and in this case supports, the decision that impeachment and removal is appropriate. In connection with the impeachment of Judge Harry Claiborne, the accompanying Report 

referenced the Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges as ‘‘[o]ne guide to what is considered ‘good behavior’ befitting a member of the judiciary.’’ The Report noted that Canon 1 (providing that judges should ‘‘uphold the integrity’’ of the judiciary) and Canon 2 (providing that 

judges should ‘‘avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety’’) ‘‘reinforce the Committee’s 

determination that Judge Claiborne has brought disrepute upon the profession and severely undermined public confidence in the institution.’’ H.R. Rep. No. 99-688, ‘‘Impeachment of Judge 

Harry E. Claiborne, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H. Res. 461,’’ 99th 

Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1986) [hereinafter ‘‘Claiborne Impeachment Report’’]. 

factual precedents directly on point ‘‘has to do with more the nature of Judge Porteous’s misconduct than with anything else. The 

fact is that we are discovering or finding in this case a pattern of 

misbehavior that extends over such a long period of time that is 

virtually unique in the annals of impeachment.’’ 61 Nonetheless, a 

review of prior judicial impeachments reveals that the four Articles 

against Judge Porteous are consistent with the Constitution and 

impeachment precedent. 

B. DISCUSSION OF THE ARTICLES

1. Article I 

Article I sets forth Judge Porteous’s conduct in the course of presiding over the case Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc. [‘‘Lifemark’’] v. 

Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc. [‘‘Liljeberg’’ or ‘‘the Liljebergs’’], 62 including his failure to recuse himself despite his close personal and 

financial relationships with attorneys for the Liljebergs (including, 

in particular, his prior financial relationship with Amato and 

Amato’s partner Creely, while Judge Porteous was a State judge); 

making false and deceptive statements at the recusal hearing to 

conceal his relationship and otherwise failing to disclose his prior 

financial relationship; and continuing to solicit and accept things of 

value from the attorneys in that case, including cash, while he had 

the case under advisement. 

The conduct alleged in Article I—financial entanglements with 

persons having business before the court—is well recognized as 

constituting the ‘‘gravest sort’’ of judicial misconduct. 63 The Committee notes that the conduct involving the solicitation and receipt 

of things of value violates Federal law as well as several of the 

Canons of Judicial Ethics that are designed to ensure that parties 

receive a fair trial by an impartial judge—a judge that is neither 

soliciting nor accepting things of value from attorneys who are appearing in front of him. 64

Further, Article I against Judge Porteous alleges misconduct 

similar to that alleged in articles of impeachment against other 

judges. For example, in 1912, the House voted articles of impeachVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:55 Mar 04, 2010 Jkt 089008 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR427.XXX HR427

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65 H. Res. 622, 62d Cong., 2d Sess (1912) (Articles of Impeachment against Judge Robert W. 

Archbald), 48 Cong Rec. (House) July 8, 1912 (8705-08), reprinted in Impeachment, Selected Materials, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Comm. Print (1973) at 176, 181-82 (Articles 10 and 11) 

(hereinafter ‘‘Archbald Articles’’). The Committee Print also contains excerpts from the accompanying Report, Robert W. Archbald, Judge of the United States Commerce Court, H. Rept. No. 

946, 62d Cong., 2d sess. (1912), 48 Cong Rec. (House) July 8, 1912 (8697) (hereinafter ‘‘Archbald 

Impeachment Report’’). 66 Impeachment of Judge Halsted L. Ritter, H. Res. 422, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 2, 1936) 

and Amendments to Articles of Impeachment Against Halsted L. Ritter, H. Res. 471, 74th Cong., 

2d Sess. (March 30, 1936), reprinted in Impeachment, Selected Materials, House Comm. on the 

Judiciary, Comm. Print (1973) at 188-197 (H. Res 422), 198-202 (H. Res. 471) (hereinafter ‘‘Ritter Articles’’). 67 Ritter Articles at 188-189. Judge Ritter was acquitted of that Article in the Senate; however, it is not possible to determine the basis for the verdict—whether it was for failure of proof 

or because of some other reason. In any event, Judge Ritter was convicted of a different Article—Article 7—which re-alleged the $4,500 cash payment from his former partner. 

ment against Circuit Judge Robert W. Archbald alleging numerous 

incidents of improper financial involvement with attorneys and 

parties. Articles 1 though 6 against Judge Archbald described complicated financial schemes whereby, while he was a judge of the 

Commerce Court, Judge Archbald enriched himself through financial dealings with companies and attorneys with cases before the 

Court. Articles 7 through 9 described complicated relationships 

through which Judge Archbald obtained money from counsels for 

parties with cases in front of him when he was a district court 

judge. Article10 charged that as a district court judge, Judge 

Archbald received money from an individual who was an officer 

and director of major railroad corporations ‘‘which in the due 

course of business was liable to be interested in litigation pending 

in the said court over which [Archbald] presided as a judge.’’ That 

Article further charged that Judge Archbald’s acceptance of the 

money was thus ‘‘improper and had a tendency to and did bring his 

said office of district judge into disrepute.’’ Article 11 charged that 

Judge Archbald did ‘‘wrongfully accept and receive’’ money that 

was ‘‘contributed to [him] by various attorneys who were practitioners in the said court presided over by [Judge Archbald].’’ 65

Similarly, in 1936, the House voted articles of impeachment 

against Judge Halsted L. Ritter. 66 In particular, Article I of the 

Ritter Articles described financial dealings between Judge Ritter 

and his former law partner, in which Judge Ritter appointed the 

former law partner as a receiver in a civil case. Thereafter, Judge 

Ritter approved the payment of a $75,000 receiver fee to the former 

partner (increasing the amount from $15,000 that had been set by 

another judge), and then received $4,500 back from the former 

partner. 67

Article I against Judge Porteous, in alleging misconduct arising 

from his undisclosed financial relationships with attorneys with a 

case in front of him, is consistent with the sorts of charges that 

have supported Articles of Impeachment against Judges Archbald 

and Ritter. 

Article I also charges that by his conduct, Judge Porteous has 

harmed the judicial system by bringing it into disrepute. This harm 

constitutes a discrete injury that justifies impeachment and removal, and numerous of the prior judicial impeachments, including 

those of Judges Claiborne, Nixon, Ritter, and Archbald, have included Articles that, after reciting the essential facts, have alleged 

that by virtue of that conduct the judge has brought such disrepute 


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68See, e.g., Archbald Article 10 (charging that Judge Archbald’s acceptance of money from an 

officer of a railroad company was ‘‘improper and had a tendency to and did bring his said office 

of district judge into disrepute’’). 69One of the Articles against Judge Harold Louderback accused him of partiality so as ‘‘to 

excite fear and distrust and to inspire a widespread belief in and beyond said northern district 

of California that causes were not decided in said court according to their merits, but were decided with partiality and prejudice and favoritism to certain individuals . . . all of which is prejudicial to the dignity of the judiciary.’’ H. Res. 403 (1933), Articles of Impeachment Against Harold Louderback, reprinted in Impeachment, Selected Materials, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 

Comm. Print (1973) at 185. This same language was used in the articles of impeachment against 

Judge George W. English, which accused him of conduct so as to ‘‘excite fear and distrust and 

to inspire a widespread belief . . . that causes were not decided in said court according to their 

merits but were decided with partiality and with prejudice and favoritism to certain individuals. . . .’’ English Impeachment Report at 163. 70 Article IV is based exclusively on pre-Federal bench conduct. However, since that issue is 

arguably implicated in Article II as well, the legal discussion is set forth here. 71The United States Commerce Court was in existence from 1910 to 1913. It heard appeals 

from orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 

to the Federal courts, and so undermined public confidence in the 

courts, that the judge should be impeached. 68

Thus, when Judge Porteous denied a recusal motion and it was 

later revealed that he had financial entanglements with certain of 

the attorneys, not only did he harm the party seeking a fair and 

impartial judge (Lifemark), but he harmed the judicial system as 

a whole by inviting cynicism as to its fairness and by suggesting 

to the public at large that, for a litigant to prevail at trial, it may 

be necessary to pay for meals or trips or to provide other things 

of value to the presiding judge. 69

2. Article II 

a. Overview 

Article II describes Judge Porteous’s corrupt relationship with 

bail bondsman Louis Marcotte and his sister Lori Marcotte, spanning from the late 1980’s/ early 1990’s through Judge Porteous’s 

tenure as a Federal judge and into approximately 2004. This article 

alleges what is in substance a bribery scheme, whereby Judge 

Porteous solicited and accepted things of value from the Marcottes 

and, in return Judge Porteous took numerous actions to assist the 

Marcottes, both as a State judge (in setting bonds and taking other 

judicial acts) and as a Federal judge. This type of conduct is specifically set forth in Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution as a 

grounds for impeachment—that is ‘‘Treason, Bribery, or other high 

Crimes and Misdemeanors.’’ 

b. Pre-Federal Bench Conduct—The Judge Archbald Precedent 

Some of the conduct alleged to constitute a basis for impeachment in Article II occurred prior to Judge Porteous taking the Federal bench. 70 Including such conduct as a basis for impeachment 

is consistent with the impeachment of Judge Archbald and with a 

common-sense interpretation of the Constitution and Congress’s 

impeachment power. 

Judge Archbald was a District Court Judge in the Middle District of Pennsylvania from March 29, 1901 through January 31, 

1911, when he was then appointed to the Circuit Court for the 

Third Circuit. While on the Circuit Court, he also sat on the United 

States Commerce Court. 71 In 1912—while Judge Archbald was a 

circuit court judge—the House voted articles of impeachment 

against him, alleging improper conduct both as a circuit judge sitVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:55 Mar 04, 2010 Jkt 089008 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR427.XXX HR427

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72 Archbald Impeachment Report at 182. Archbald was ultimately convicted in the Senate of 

5 of the 13 articles—Articles 1, 3, 4, and 5 involving Commerce Court conduct, and Article 13, 

a ‘‘catch-all’’ article involving both district court and Commerce Court conduct. VI Cannon’s 

Precedents of the House of Representatives, § 512, p. 707. 73 Archbald Impeachment Report at 175. 74 Archbald Impeachment Report at 175. 

ting on the Commerce Court (Articles 1 through 6) and in his prior 

position as a district judge (Articles 7 through 12). Article 13 set 

forth a ‘‘catch-all’’ article encompassing both district court and Circuit Court/Commerce Court conduct. That Article alleged that 

Archbald ‘‘as such United States district judge and judge of the 

United States Commerce Court,’’ sought loans from persons who 

had an interest in the matters ‘‘pending in the court over which he 

presided as judge of the district court, and in suits pending in the 

United States Commerce Court, of which the said Robert W. 

Archbald is a Member.’’ 72

The Archbald Impeachment Report specifically addressed the fact 

that Articles 7 through 12 were based on judicial conduct that occurred prior to Judge Archbald being appointed to the Circuit 

Court (from which removal was sought). In the section of the Report entitled ‘‘Impeachment for Offenses Committed in Another Judicial Office,’’ the Report stated: 

It is indeed anomalous if the Congress is powerless to 

remove a corrupt or unfit Federal judge from office because 

his corruption or misdemeanor, however vicious or reprehensible, may have occurred during his tenure in some 

other judicial office under the Government of the United 

States prior to his appointment to the particular office 

from which he is sought to be ousted by impeachment, although he may have held a Federal judgeship continuously 

from the time of the commission of his offenses. Surely the 

House of Representatives will not recognize nor the Senate 

apply such a narrow and technical construction of the constitutional provisions relating to impeachments. 73

In reaching this conclusion, the Archbald Impeachment Report 

focused on the similarity of the prior office in which Archbald committed impeachable conduct (district court judge) to the office from 

which Archbald was holding at the time of his impeachment (circuit court judge). The report further noted that precedents from 

State courts supported impeachment of a public official for misconduct that occurred in a prior term of office, especially if ‘‘the 

prescribed functions of such offices were of the same general nature 

and susceptible to the same malversations and abuse.’’ 74

In that the ‘‘prescribed functions’’ of Judge Porteous’s prior office 

as State court judge were ‘‘of the same general nature’’ as the office 

of district court judge that he presently occupies, and were thus 

‘‘susceptible to the same malversations and abuse,’’ the reasoning 

in Archbald fully supports considering Judge Porteous’s State judge 

conduct as a basis for impeachment. It would simply be ‘‘anomalous’’ if Congress were ‘‘powerless to remove a corrupt or unfit Federal judge from office because his corruption or misdemeanor, however vicious or reprehensible, may have occurred during his tenure 

in some other judicial office’’—in this case, a State judgeship that 


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75 Id. 76Prof. Gerhardt TF Hrg. IV at 30 (written statement of Prof. Michael J. Gerhardt, University 

of North Carolina at 4) (emphasis in original). 77 Id. 78 Id. This particular example is used to illustrate the principle that pre-Federal bench conduct may justify impeachment; it is not intended to suggest that such conduct must be comparable to homicide. Rather, ‘‘[f]rom there you simply have to ask yourself whether the conduct 

as a State judge is sufficiently egregious to rise to an impeachable standard.’’ Prof. Geyh TF 

Hrg. IV at 36. 79Prof. Amar TF Hrg. IV at 17. 

he occupied immediately prior to the Federal judgeship from which 

impeachment is now sought. 75

c. Pre-Federal Bench Conduct—Views of Constitutional 

Scholars 

There is broad support among scholars that certain pre-Federal 

bench conduct—especially of the sort that was committed while 

Judge Porteous was a State judge—may properly constitute a basis 

for impeachment. At the Task Force Hearing of December 15, 2009, 

Professor Michael Gerhardt testified that though Article II of the 

Constitution describes certain types of conduct for which impeachment is warranted (‘‘Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 

Misdemeanors’’), ‘‘it does not say when the misconduct must have 

been committed,’’ 76 and certainly does not require that such conduct occur during the tenure of the Federal office from which impeachment is sought. As Professor Gerhardt noted, ‘‘[t]he critical 

questions are whether Judge Porteous committed such misconduct 

and whether such misconduct demonstrates the lack of integrity 

and judgment that are required in order for him to continue to 

function’’ as a Federal judge. 77

The reason for considering pre-Federal bench conduct in appropriate circumstances is evident from very basic examples. Take the 

situation where the individual committed a truly heinous crime 

prior to becoming a Federal judge: 

Say, for instance, that the offence was murder—it is as 

serious a crime as any we have, and its commission by a 

judge completely undermines both his integrity and the 

moral authority he must have in order to function as a 

Federal judge. The timing of the murder is of less concern 

that the fact of it; this is the kind of behavior that is completely incompatible with the public trust invested in officials who are sufficiently high-ranking to be subject to the 

impeachment process. 78

However, the crime or misconduct need not be comparable to homicide to justify impeachment. As another professor testified: 

Let’s take bribery. Imagine now a person who bribes his 

very way into office. By definition, the bribery here occurs 

prior to the commencement of office holding. But surely 

that fact can’t immunize the briber from impeachment and 

removal. Had the bribery not occurred, the person never 

would have been an officer in the first place. 79

Or, as the third expert testified: ‘‘[A] quid pro quo arrangement 

with bail bondsmen . . . is the kind of corruption that fairly may 


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80Prof. Geyh TF Hrg. IV at 36. 81Lori Marcotte Dep. at 47 (Ex. 76). 82 Canon 2B of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (1999) provides: ‘‘A judge should 

not lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of others[.]’’ Again, 

it is noteworthy that the sort of conduct that is described in Article II, which the Committee 

has concluded warrants Judge Porteous’s impeachment, also runs afoul of standards of conduct 

promulgated by the Judicial Conference. 

be characterized as a violation of the public trust. Who cares if it 

occurred before [Judge Porteous took the Federal bench]?’’ 80

Thus, consistent with reasons set forth in the Archbald Impeachment Report and those provided by three legal scholars at the Task 

Force Hearing, there is simply no basis in the Constitution, nor is 

there a basis in policy, for the House or Senate to adopt a narrow 

or technical reading of the Constitution so as to divest themselves 

of the power to consider pre-Federal bench conduct as a grounds 

for impeachment. 

d. Federal Bench Conduct 

Even though Judge Porteous’s conduct while a Federal judge did 

not involve taking judicial actions to benefit the Marcottes, the 

Federal bench conduct constituted a continuation of the same unlawful relationship that was in place when Judge Porteous was a 

State judge, and consisted of Judge Porteous’s efforts to help the 

Marcottes form relationships with no fewer than four State judicial 

officers as well as other business executives. By these acts, Judge 

Porteous assisted the Marcottes—whom he knew to be corrupt—to 

expand their reach in the 24th Judicial District Court (24th JDC). 

By attending meals with the Marcottes and other judicial officers, 

Judge Porteous not only received the benefit of those free meals, 

but provided the opportunity for the Marcottes to show off their relationship with him and to put their generosity on display by paying for him and the others who were in attendance. Though there 

is no evidence that Judge Porteous specifically communicated to 

these judges that he sought or intended for the Marcottes to form 

corrupt relationships with them, from his personal experience 

Judge Porteous knew that the Marcottes gave him and others 

things of value to induce favored treatment and thus had every 

reason to know that the Marcottes would seek to establish the 

same relationship with new judges. Thus, Judge Porteous was instrumental in helping the Marcottes form a bond with one State 

judge, Ronald Bodenheimer, with whom the Marcottes formed a 

corrupt relationship that continued for several years until he was 

arrested and convicted. 81 Judge Porteous’s vouching for the 

Marcottes was a critical causal factor in the perpetuation of the 

corruption in the setting of bail bonds in the 24th JDC even when 

Judge Porteous was no longer on the State bench. 82

3. Article III 

Article III alleges that Judge Porteous committed numerous acts 

of misconduct in the course of his personal bankruptcy, including 

making false material statements under oath and otherwise violating court orders. This Article is analogous to the tax evasion, 

perjury, and obstruction of justice bases of impeachment set forth 

in the impeachments of Judge Harry E. Claiborne, Judge Walter 

Nixon and Judge Samuel B. Kent—each of which involved dishonesty under oath in arguably personal and/or financial matters. 


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83 Claiborne Impeachment Report at 1-2. 84Walter Nixon Impeachment Report at 1-3. 85 H. Res. 430, 111th Cong. (2009) (Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Samuel B. Kent). 86Keir TF Hrg. II at 81. Thus, though Judge Porteous’s bankrutpcy conduct may have been 

‘‘personal’’ in some respects, its consequences directly impact his ability to carry out his judicial 

responsibilities. Further, Judge Porteous’s failure acts in the nature of filing false financial disclosure forms that concealed his liabilities for years, though not charged as part of Article III, 

constitute part of the evidence that implicates Judge Porteous’s fitness to hold judicial office. 

In the case of Judge Harry E. Claiborne, a United States District 

Judge for the District of Nevada, the House voted four Articles of 

Impeachment. Articles I and II alleged that Judge Claiborne had 

filed false income tax returns for calendars years 1979 and 1980 

under penalties of perjury. The returns were false because they reported total income in the amount of $80,227.04 and $54,251.00 respectively, when ‘‘as he then and there well knew and believed, he 

received and failed to report substantial income [from legal fees] in 

addition to that stated on the return.’’ Each Article further alleged 

that because of such conduct, Judge Claiborne ‘‘was and is guilty 

of misbehavior and was and is guilty of a high crime and misdemeanor and, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial 

and removal from office.’’ 83

In the impeachment of District Court Judge Walter Nixon, the 

first two Articles each alleged, in substance, discrete incidents of 

perjury before the grand jury, namely, that ‘‘[i]n the course of his 

grand jury testimony and having duly taken an oath that he would 

tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, Judge 

Nixon did knowingly and contrary to his oath make material false 

or misleading statements to the grand jury.’’ Each Article summarized the substance of the alleged perjurious statement. Article I, 

for example, alleged that ‘‘[t]he false or misleading statement was, 

in substance, that Forrest County District Attorney Paul Holmes 

never discussed the Drew Fairchild case with Judge Nixon.’’ Each 

Article concluded: ‘‘Wherefore, Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., is guilty 

of an impeachable offense and should be removed from office.’’ 84

Finally, the House voted four Articles of Impeachment against 

Judge Samuel B. Kent. Articles III and IV alleged, in substance, 

that Judge Kent obstructed justice by making false statements to 

the Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory Committee (Article III) and 

to the FBI when it investigated his conduct (Article IV). 85

Judge Porteous’s conduct in his personal bankruptcy invites disrepute upon the judiciary. The need for honesty by the debtor in 

bankruptcy proceedings is obvious, and dishonesty by a Federal 

judge as a debtor in bankruptcy has particular ramifications. As 

Chief Judge Duncan Keir of the United States Bankruptcy Court 

for the District of Maryland testified: 

[Because the conduct at issue] occurs by a Federal judge, 

I think it has a potential effect of denigrating, if you will, 

the integrity of the court. What happens if 6 months later 

somebody has been found by a bankruptcy court to have 

violated these oaths and denied a discharge, and they appeal it, and the appeal goes in front of Judge Porteous? 

What is that argument going to be? You did it? I did it? 

It is untenable. 86

Article III against Judge Porteous is consistent with these Articles against Judges Claiborne, Nixon and Kent. As with the Judge 


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87Professor Gerhardt noted that the violation of the bankruptcy laws ‘‘reflects a level of disdain for the law that I think is just simply incompatible with being a Federal judge.’’ Prof. 

Gerhardt TF Hrg. IV at 36. 88Prof. Amar TF Hrg. IV at 18. 89Prof. Gerhardt TF Hrg. IV at 24. 

Claiborne impeachment, Article III against Judge Porteous charges 

that he filled out forms related to his own personal financial situation under penalty of perjury, on which he concealed material facts. 

And, as with the perjury and acts of obstruction alleged in the impeachment Articles against Judge Nixon and Judge Kent, Judge 

Porteous’s dishonest statements on court forms and his violation of 

a court order occurred in the context of a Federal judicial proceeding and demonstrated a disregard of, and contempt for, the authority of the supervising Federal court. 87

4. Article IV 

Article IV alleges that Judge Porteous committed a fraud on the 

judicial confirmation process by making material false statements 

to the FBI and on his Senate Judiciary Committee Questionnaire 

in response to questions as to whether there was anything in his 

past that could be used to blackmail or coerce him. Judge Porteous 

answered ‘‘no’’ to such inquiries, notwithstanding his unlawful financial relationships with certain attorneys (Creely and Amato) 

and with the Marcottes. 

For reasons set forth in the discussion of Article II, it is appropriate to consider pre-Federal bench conduct as a basis to impeach. 

Even though Judge Porteous did not make the statements in a judicial capacity, and even though this conduct did not carry over 

into his tenure as a Federal judge, the false statements corrupted 

the judicial appointment and rendered it illegitimate from its inception. As Professor Amar testified before the Task Force, after 

stating why pre-Federal bench ‘‘bribery’’ would constitute impeachable conduct: 

Now what is true of bribery is equally true of fraud. A person who procures a judgeship by lying to the President and 

lying to the Senate has wrongly obtained his office by 

fraud and is surely removable via impeachment for that 

fraud. 88

Professor Gerhardt agreed that ‘‘lying to or defrauding the Senate in order to be approved as a Federal judge’’ is likely to justify 

impeachment. First of all, that conduct is serious as a stand-alone 

matter in that it ‘‘plainly erodes the essential, indispensable integrity without which a Federal judge is unable to do his job.’’ 89 Professor Gerhardt noted, however, that in the case of Judge Porteous, 

it is not necessary to determine whether the false statements themselves demonstrated his unfitness. 

For, by defrauding the Senate in his confirmation proceedings, Judge Porteous has engaged in misconduct that 

is egregious and has a more than obvious connection to his 

present position. The nexus is that Judge Porteous deprived the Senate of information that would undoubtedly 

have changed the outcome in his confirmation hearing. His 

failure to disclose is nothing less than an attack on the integrity of the confirmation process and an affront to the 


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90Prof. Gerhardt TF Hrg. IV at 31. 91Prof. Amar TF Hrg. IV at 34-35. Professor Amar further noted that these questions did not 

constitute some sort of ‘‘trap’’ for the unwary: ‘‘All he has to do is say, [‘]I do not wish to be 

considered for this position.[’]’’ Id. at 42. 92 Civ. Action No. 93-1794 (E.D. La.). See PACER Docket Report (Ex. 50). 

constitutional responsibilities of the President and the 

Senate. 90

The questions are sufficiently precise for purposes of concluding 

that the false answers were knowing and intentional, and warrant 

impeachment. As Professor Amar testified: 

[E]veryone knows what is actually at the core of the 

question[s]. Are you an honest person? Are you a person 

of integrity? Do you have the requisites to hold a position 

of honor, trust, and profit? Do you have judicial integrity? 

That is at the core of all these questions. That is not at 

the periphery. 

And what he lied about was his gross misconduct as a 

judge: taking money from parties, taking money in cash 

envelopes, not reporting any of this to anyone. . . . 

* * * 

[W]e know what those questions at their core [were] 

about, and he lied at the core. There is vagueness at the 

periphery, but this was really central. 91

VIII. THE FACTS UNDERLYING ARTICLE I—JUDGE 

PORTEOUS’S RELATIONSHIPS WITH ATTORNEYS ROBERT 

CREELY, JACOB AMATO, JR., DON GARDNER AND 

LEONARD LEVENSON, AND HIS HANDLING OF THE 

LILJEBERG CASE 

A. INTRODUCTION

Judge Porteous, while a State court judge, was particularly close 

to four attorneys: Jacob Amato, Jr., with whom Judge Porteuos had 

practiced law; Robert Creely, Amato’s partner who also practiced 

with Judge Porteous; and local attorneys Leonard Levenson and 

Donald Gardner. These individuals regularly paid for expensive 

lunches for Judge Porteous, accompanied him on travel, including 

travel to gambling establishments, hosted him on hunting trips, 

and otherwise subsidized his lifestyle. Creely and Amato, in particular, provided Judge Porteous substantial cash from ‘‘curatorships’’ assigned to Creely by Judge Porteous. 

Judge Porteous’s personal and financial relationships with these 

attorneys, as well as his financial dependence upon them, became 

particularly significant in connection with his handling of a civil 

case, Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc., v. Liljeberg Enterprises, 

Inc., 92 when he was a Federal judge. A few weeks prior to the 

scheduled November 1996 non-jury trial before Judge Porteous, the 

defendants (the Liljebergs) brought in Amato and Levenson as trial 

counsel. In response, the plaintiffs (Lifemark) filed a motion to 

recuse Judge Porteous, arguing that Amato’s and Levenson’s late 

entry in the case and their known close relationships with Judge 

Porteous supported the conclusion that Amato and Levenson were 

hired precisely because of those relationships. Counsel for 


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93There is no attempt here to break out the meals, entertainment, and trips that occurred 

prior to and subsequent to Judge Porteous’s appointment as a Federal judge. 94 Amato 5th Cir. Hrg. at 254 (Ex. 20). 95 Amato 5th Cir. Hrg. at 255 (Ex. 20). See also Amato TF Hrg. I at 104 (Judge Porteous paid 

for lunch for Amato ‘‘at least on one occasion’’). 96 Amato GJ at 15 (Ex. 18). 97 Amato 5th Cir. Hrg. at 255 (Ex. 20). 98 Amato GJ at 38 (Ex. 18). 99 Amato GJ at 66 (Ex. 18). 100 Amato GJ at 39 (Ex. 18). 

Lifemark, however, was unaware of any prior financial relationship 

between Judge Porteous and Amato, and unaware that Amato and 

his partner Creely had provided Judge Porteous thousands of dollars in cash while Judge Porteous was a State judge. 

Judge Porteous denied Lifemark’s recusal motion in a fashion 

that concealed his respective relationships with Amato and 

Levenson. Lifemark then added Gardner to their trial team. Trial 

was ultimately held in June and July 1997. Subsequent to trial, 

while the case was pending his decision, and while his financial circumstances were significantly deteriorating, Judge Porteous continued to seek money and accept other things of value from these four 

attorneys. 

Finally, in April 2000, as his financial situation became increasingly dire (and just weeks prior to his consulting with a bankruptcy 

attorney), Judge Porteous ruled for the Liljebergs. This verdict, if 

it had stood, would have been worth hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees to Amato (and his partner Creely) and Levenson— 

men who had supported Judge Porteous’s life-style for years. Judge 

Porteous’s decision was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a scathing opinion that castigated Judge Porteous’s legal 

reasoning. 

B. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE ATTORNEYS PRE-LILJEBERG— 

MEALS, TRIPS, HUNTING AND ENTERTAINMENT 93

Meals and Related Entertainment. Beginning with Judge 

Porteous’s years on the State court bench and continuing through 

his tenure on the Federal bench, the four attorneys—Creely, 

Amato, Levenson and Gardner—routinely provided Judge Porteous 

with meals, trips, and entertainment, as well as covered other expenses. 

Amato and Creely took Judge Porteous to lunch frequently. 

When asked how frequently Judge Porteous paid, Amato testified 

‘‘[n]ot very often.’’ 94 As Amato noted: ‘‘He [Porteous] probably paid 

for one or two of them.’’ 95 As to the frequency of the lunches: ‘‘It 

would depend upon what his schedule was and my schedule. I 

would say we probably met two to three times a month over a, you 

know, a period of time. And depending—you know, some months it 

might have been more. Some months less. It just depended.’’ 96

Amato identified the restaurants he took Judge Porteous to as including: Red Maple, Beef Connection, Ruth’s Chris Steak House, 

Fitzgerald’s, and Smith & Wollensky’s. 97 Amato also recalled paying for Porteous’s swearing in party as a Federal judge at the ‘‘Jefferson Orleans,’’ 98 at which about 100 to 200 people attended. 99

This would have been in late 1994. This party would have cost several thousand dollars. 100


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101Gardner GJ at 69 (Ex. 33). See also, Gardner Dep. at 8 (lunch ‘‘once a week’’ when Judge 

Porteous was a State judge) (Ex. 36). 102Gardner Dep. at 37 (Ex. 36). 103Levenson GJ at 10 (Ex. 25). 104Levenson GJ at 10 (Ex. 25). 105Levenson GJ at 11 (Ex. 25). 106Levenson GJ at 12 (Ex. 25). 107Levenson GJ at 15 (Ex. 25); Levenson Dep. at 28 (Ex. 30). Judge Porteous stipulated to 

Levenson’s and Forstall’s grand jury testimony at the Fifth Circuit Hearing. 5th Cir. Hrg. at 

341. 108Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 128 (Ex. 10). Another attorney, Warren A. Forstall, stated he 

would take Judge Porteous to lunch at Ruth’s Chris Steak House and Smith & Wollensky’s, and 

that he [Forstall] always paid the bill. Forstall GJ at 30 (Ex. 38). The Ruth’s Chris Steak House 

bills, on average, were $100. Id. at 31. 109 Bodenheimer testified that Judge Porteous told him: 

Congratulations kid, you know. Now, let me tell you, give you some pointers about 

being a judge. Number one, you’ll never be known as Ronnie again. You’ll be judge for 

the rest of your life. Number two, you’ll never have to buy lunch again OK. There will 

always be somebody to take you to lunch. And number three, always wash your rear 

end so the attorneys have a clean place to kiss. 

Bodenheimer GJ at 10 (Ex. 87). See also Bodenheimer Dep. at 12 (Ex. 86). 110 Creely GJ at 19-20 (Ex. 11). Creely also testified there may have been another trip to Mexico in 1995 (when Judge Porteous was a Federal judge). He said he knows he took Judge 

Porteous twice, and maybe a third time. Id at. 20-21. Creely also traveled to Las Vegas with 

Judge Porteous a few times when Judge Porteous was a State judge. Creely recalled going to 

Las Vegas with Judge Porteous as part of a fund-raiser to retire campaign debt of a local candidate in September 1990 , Creely GJ at 29-31 (Ex. 11) and in January 1991 on a Jefferson 

Continued 

Gardner described purchasing Judge Porteous numerous meals 

over time—‘‘50, 60 lunches a year when he was a [New Orleans] 

district court judge.’’ 101 In response to questioning at the Task 

Force deposition, Gardner agreed that he had paid for ‘‘countless, 

countless, countless more meals’’ than Judge Porteous had paid for 

Gardner. 102

Levenson also testified to treating Judge Porteous to lunches 

over the years. Levenson testified that, starting while Judge 

Porteous was a State court judge, these lunches ‘‘would average 

. . . maybe over the course of a year three or four times a month, 

or more. Some months would be or some weeks would be more. 

Some would be less.’’ 103 Levenson paid ‘‘[m]ost of the time;’’ 104

Judge Porteous paid ‘‘[v]ery rarely.’’ 105 ‘‘To say that I could specifically remember him picking up another lunch bill, no. Did he do 

it? I’m sure he did. Was it rare? Yes.’’ 106 Levenson listed the restaurants they went to as Mandina’s, Ruth’s Chris Steak House, 

Smith & Wollensky’s, Bon Ton, Red Maple, and the Beef Connection. 107 Judge Porteous at the Fifth Circuit Hearing testified that 

Levenson took him out to places such as Ruth’s Chris Steak House 

and Smith & Wollensky’s. 108

Former State Judge Ronald Bodenheimer testified that when he 

was first elected, Judge Porteous gave him pointers on being a 

judge. Judge Porteous told Bodenheimer that he would ‘‘never have 

to buy lunch again. . . . There will always be somebody to take 

you to lunch.’’ 109

These attorneys continued taking Judge Porteous out for lunches 

after he became a Federal judge, including during the period when 

they had the Liljeberg case pending before him. 

Creely took Judge Porteous on several hunting and fishing trips 

while Judge Porteous was on the State bench. For example, Creely 

identified a dove hunt in Mexico in September 1990, where he paid 

for Judge Porteous. Creely also took Judge Porteous on another 

dove hunting trip to Mexico—probably in September 1993. 110 The 


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Bar ‘‘Continuing Legal Education’’ trip. Creely GJ at 32 (Ex. 11). Caesars Palace records reflect 

that Creely gambled at that casino in January 1991. 111 Creely GJ at 19-20. Creely also testified there may have been another trip to Mexico in 

1995 when Judge Porteous was a Federal judge. He testified he knows he took Judge Porteous 

twice, and maybe a third time. Id. at 20-21. 112 Creely GJ at 24-25 (Ex. 11). 113Levenson Dep. at 18-19 (Ex. 30). 114Gardner GJ at 23 (Ex. 33). 115 Creely Dep. at 3 (Ex. 16). 116 Creely Dep. at 6 (Ex. 16). Before the Grand jury, Creely testified: ‘‘Every time he came 

to us it was a car note he couldn’t pay. His house was being foreclosed upon. He couldn’t pay 

his kids’ tuition.’’ Creely GJ at 61 (Ex. 11). At the Fifth Circuit hearing, Creely stated that 

Judge Porteous requested the money ‘‘for various personal issues.’’ . . . ‘‘[I]t would be things 

like tuition, different things that he needed in his—in his personal life.’’ Creely 5th Cir. Hrg. 

at 199 (Ex. 12). 

cost of these trips paid for by Creely would have been approximately $1,500 per person plus air fare. 111 Creely also took Judge 

Porteous fishing on a houseboat Creely leased at Delacroix Island 

on more than 20 occasions—each time hosting Judge Porteous. 112

Levenson went on trips to Las Vegas with Judge Porteous, as 

part of a group, on more than one occasion when Judge Porteous 

was a State judge. Levenson also recalled going on ‘‘one . . . maybe 

two’’ trips to Las Vegas. One of the trips was to the Riviera Hotel 

where Levenson shared a room with Judge Porteous. Attorney 

Warren Forstall also went on that trip and roomed with State 

Judge George Giacobbe. Although Levenson did not have a specific 

recollection of what he may have paid for Judge Porteous, he answered affirmatively that he ‘‘could state with confidence . . . that 

[he] paid for some aspects of drinks or meals or other entertainment . . . for which Judge Porteous would have been a beneficiary.’’ 113

Gardner also recalled going to Las Vegas with Judge Porteous on 

several Jefferson Bar Association ‘‘Continuing Legal Education’’ 

trips, which he thought occurred in the 1970’s. 114

C. CASH FROM CREELY AND AMATO (PRE-LILJEBERG) 

Amato and Creely formed a law partnership in about 1975 that 

lasted until 2005. It was a true partnership—all the income and expenses were shared, they held joint accounts, they held themselves 

out as partners, and took equal draws. 115

While he was on the State bench, Judge Porteous requested cash 

from Creely on several occasions. Creely provided cash to Judge 

Porteous in response to those requests. As Creely testified: 

Q. [C]an you just describe a typical instance that would 

characterize how this request would be made and the 

sorts of dollar amounts which were encompassed by 

these requests? 

A. In reference to the dollar amounts, it would be hard for 

me to say. He would ask me for money when we were 

together socially or fishing or one of those things. He 

would ask for money. 

Q. Did he give you reasons? 

A. Yes. He would have—it would be a number of reasons, 

just a number of reasons, like needing to pay tuition, 

needing to meet his obligations, financial obligations. 116


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117 Creely Dep. at 7 (Ex. 16). 118 Creely GJ at 50 (Ex. 11). See also Creely TF Hrg. I at 20 (Judge Porteous would ask for 

money for ‘‘tuition’’ and ‘‘living expenses’’). 119 Creely Dep. at 8 (Ex. 16). 120 Amato GJ at 25-28 (Ex. 18). See also Amato GJ at 61 (Ex. 18) (to obtain money Amato 

and Creely would each take a draw). 121 Creely TF Hrg. I at 21. 

The amounts were as much as $500 to $1,000 and Creely never 

perceived these payments to be loans. 117 Creely explained that he 

and his partner, Amato, would take draws from the firm account 

in the form of checks payable to the two men, would cash the 

checks, and would give Judge Porteous the cash. When asked to describe the mechanics of how he would get the money to give to 

Judge Porteous, Creely testified: 

[I] think sometimes I had to go cash a check, take a draw, 

yes. Yes, sir. I did not always have money to hand him. 

I would have to get—I’d have to say, you know—‘‘You 

know, his tuition’s due. He can’t pay his tuition, Jake 

[Amato].’’ And he‘d say, ‘‘all right,’’ you know. ‘‘How much 

money does he need?’’ And I would say five hundred or a 

thousand dollars, whatever. I’m just—and I wanna try to 

be fair to him, OK, to whatever number. And then we’d go 

get a check cashed and give him the money. 118

Even though the requests were made to Creely, and the actual 

provision of money to Judge Porteous came from Creely, the payments to Judge Porteous were split 50-50 between Creely and 

Amato. 119

Amato testified consistently as to Judge Porteous’s reasons for 

needing money (as reported to Amato by Creely), the frequency of 

the requests, the procedures for getting the money to Judge 

Porteous, and the fact that the payments were split between Amato 

and Creely. Amato testified that ‘‘Bob [Creely] would come in and 

say, you know, ‘Porteous is looking for money.’ ’’ After the request 

was made: ‘‘We both took draws to do it. We would split it. . . .’’ 

Amato characterized the reasons Judge Porteous gave as follows: 

‘‘[H]e couldn’t pay the tuition for his children. He was gonna lose 

his house. They were gonna take his car. His daughter was a maid 

in the Washington Ball and he needed money. Those are the kind 

of stories that I would get through Bob Creely that Porteous needed money. . . . [H]e [Judge Porteous] was always poor mouthing, 

you know, he was always busted. He always—you know, it was always a catastrophe. It was always something that, you know—that, 

you know, hard to ask a—it’s hard to turn down a friend, you 

know.’’ 120

D. THE CURATORSHIP KICKBACK SCHEME WITH CREELY AND AMATO

1. Creely’s and Amato’s Testimony 

Creely ultimately balked at providing monies to Judge Porteous. 

Creely testified: ‘‘I told him, quite frankly, I thought it was an imposition on our friendship for him to continue to ask me for 

money.’’ 121 As Creely stated in his Task Force deposition: ‘‘I got 


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122 Creely Dep. at 7 (Ex. 16). Creely testified consistently before the Fifth Circuit: ‘‘[I] told him 

that I—we could not continue giving him money, I couldn’t continue giving him money.’’ Creely 

5th Cir. Hrg. at 204 (Ex. 12). 123 Creely described the duties of a curator as follows: ‘‘[W]hat you do is, you represent an 

absentee that they can’t find. So when somebody would get their house foreclosed on and they 

would leave and they couldn’t find them to serve them with the foreclosure proceedings the 

court would appoint a lawyer. And I would be the curator in the Porteous instances, in which 

case then I would have to—the bank would give me the last known address—write a letter, registered letter. Then I’d have to run an ad in the newspaper. And then I’d have to get a certified 

copy. . . . But a curator is to represent a person that they can’t find.’’ Creely GJ at 101-02 (Ex. 

11). 124 Creely GJ at 51-54 (Ex. 11). 125 At the Task Force Hearing, when asked if he wanted Judge Porteous to assign him curatorships, Creely answered, ‘‘No, I did not,’’ and testified they were not important to his business. 

Creely TF Hrg. I at 21-22. 126 All the work, consisting primarily of placing notices in the newspapers and preparing routine notices to be filed with the court, was done by Creely’s secretary. 127 Creely 5th Cir. Hrg. at 209-10 (Ex.12). 

tired of the requests for every request he made. I was tired of 

it.’’ 122

As a result of Creely’s discontent, and in order to generate cash 

that Creely and Amato could then use to provide Judge Porteous 

money as he requested, Judge Porteous began increasingly to assign Creely ‘‘curatorships.’’ 123 Judge Porteous took this initiative at 

a time when Creely was resisting giving him more money. Creely 

described how this scheme began as follows: 

[T]his borrowing turned into this, as you said, burden, and 

that’s a good word ’cause I, you know, can use many words 

for it. But he—there was a time I said, you know, ‘‘I just 

can’t keep doing this man, I can’t keep supporting your 

family.’’ . . . 

And so I told him I had to stop. I gotta stop doing this. 

All right . . . But he started sending curatorships over to 

my office. . . . And he would send like two or three at a 

time. . . . 

And he then started calling and saying, ‘‘Look. I’ve been 

sending you curators, you know. Can you give me the 

money for the curators?’’ I said, ‘‘Man.’’ So I talked to my 

law partner. I said, ‘‘Jake, you know, man what do we do?’’ 

He says, ‘‘Well, just go ahead and give it to him.’’ We decided to give him the money. We would deduct the expenses. We would pay income taxes on it. . . . 

But the practice became that he—and it got to the point 

that he would call my secretary and say, ‘‘Dianne, how 

may curators do I have over there?’’ And then she’d come 

in and it was like a—it was a bad deal. I mean, it’s a bad 

feeling. OK. And she would say, she’d say, ‘‘Hey, you got 

four or five curators’’ and say, ‘‘He’s calling wanting the 

money on [sic].’’ And I said, ‘‘Well, just go get two draws, 

one for Jake, one for me’’ and then I would give him the 

money. Either me or Jake would give him the money. 124

Creely would receive a fee of approximately $200 for a curatorship, 

which went into the law firm accounts. Creely did not want these 

curatorships, 125 even though they involved minimal work. 126 Rather, Creely viewed these curatorships as ‘‘basically a way for me to 

supply him funds as before instead of coming out of my pocket. It 

was being provided through the curatorships.’’ 127


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128 Creely 5th Cir. Hrg. at 208-09 (Ex. 12). 129 Creely 5th Cir. Hrg. at 209-10 (Ex.12). The term ‘‘kickback’’ is occasionally used in this 

Report notwithstanding Creely’s resistence to it, and notwithstanding the evidence that suggests 

that he and Amato were not thrilled about this financial relationship, about engaging in these 

acts to give Judge Porteous money at Judge Porteous’s instigation. 130 Creely TF Hrg. I at 23. 131From Creely TF Hrg. I at 23: 

Q. [S]o he was taking official acts [assigning curatorships] to enrich himself, correct? 

A. [Creely] I can’t speak for him, but that was my understanding. 132 Creely TF Hrg. I at 38. 133 Amato TF Hrg. I at 100. He also testified before the Task Force: ‘‘[J]udge Porteous sent 

curator cases to Bob Creely and at some point asked that he be—receive some of that money.’’ 

Id. Amato has been consistent throughout his various appearances. Before the grand jury, 

Amato testified that Judge Porteous ‘‘would send curatorships to Bob Creely and then he would 

ask Bob to, you know, ‘I need some money for one of these catastrophes. And, you know, I’ve 

sent you 10 or 15 or 20’ or however many ‘curatorships so, you know, send me a check or’ not 

‘Send me a check.’ But you know, ‘I need some money.’ ’’ Amato GJ at 61 (Ex. 18). At the Fifth 

Circuit Hearing, he testified: ‘‘At some point in time when Judge Porteous was on the State 

Continued 

This was not a dollar-for-dollar arrangement. At the Fifth Circuit 

Hearing, Creely testified that Judge Porteous received more than 

50% of the curatorship fees. Creely also confirmed that the payments of the curatorship fees to Judge Porteous were at Judge 

Porteous’s request. 128 Notwithstanding the mechanics of the 

scheme, Creely resisted characterizing it as a ‘‘kickback’’ scheme 

because Creely did not believe he was getting anything out of the 

arrangement: 

It had nothing to do with, ‘‘Look, why don’t you give me 

these and I’ll give you that back,’’ or ‘‘Do something for me 

and—you know, and I’ll give you this back.’’ It was just— 

it just occurred that he—you know, he got the curator 

money. 129

In the Task Force Hearing, Creely similarly resisted the use of 

the term ‘‘kickback’’ to describe the relationship, describing the fact 

that he had received the curatorships from Judge Porteous as a 

‘‘justification to help him out so that I didn’t have to go and spend 

my own money on him.’’ 130 Nonetheless, Creely understood that 

Judge Porteous linked his assignment of curatorships to Creely’s 

giving cash back to Judge Porteous. 131

Q. [Mr. Johnson] The curatorship process, you say that 

you would not—there was no agreement before this 

scheme started, but didn’t it become apparent to you 

during the course of the curatorship scheme that this 

was a way of you being able to pay Judge Porteous? 

A. It evolved into that, yes. He began to rely upon the curators, began to call for them, and we rationalized he 

is asking for money, giving him the money. And it 

wasn’t all of the money, but, yes, it—that is what it 

sounds like. 132

Creely’s partner, Amato, confirmed the essentials of this arrangement. Amato testified that ‘‘Mr. Creely came to me 1 day and said 

that Tom—or Judge Porteous asked him for some money based 

upon sending curatorships. . . . Bob [Creely] would tell me Judge 

Porteous needs, you know, $500, $1,000, whatever it is for the curatorships, and we would each draw a check for whatever half the 

amount that he requested.’’ 133 In response to questioning by Task 

Force Chairman Schiff, Amato testified: 


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bench, Bob Creely started getting a number of curator cases. And after a period of time that 

that went on, Bob came to me and said that, ‘The judge is—Judge Porteous wants some of the 

curator fees. What should we do?’ . . . Well, I told him I didn’t like the idea but I guess it’s 

something we had to do.’’ Amato 5th Cir. Hrg. at 238 (Ex. 20). 134 Amato TF Hrg. I at 107. 135 Amato TF Hrg. I at 111. 136 Amato TF Hrg. I at 101. 137Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 119 (Ex. 10). 138Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 130-33 (Ex. 10). 139Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 134 (Ex. 10). 

Q. [Mr. Schiff] [W]as there ever any doubt in your mind 

that what he [Judge Porteous] was asking for during 

the period he was sending you curatorships was part of 

the money he was sending you for the curatorships? 

A. No, no doubt. 134

Amato knew that giving money to Judge Porteous was wrong. 135

When asked whether he felt he had a choice as to giving Judge 

Porteous money, he replied: ‘‘Yes, I think we had a choice, but I 

just wasn’t strong enough to put an end to it. To put an end to it, 

I would have to break up my law partnership and break up a 

friendship that I have had over a number of years with Judge 

Porteous, and I wasn’t strong enough.’’ 136

2. Judge Porteous’s Statements About His Financial Relationship 

with Amato and Creely at the Fifth Circuit Hearing 

In his testimony at the Fifth Circuit Hearing, Judge Porteous 

confirmed the essential aspects of his receiving cash from Amato 

and Creely at the Fifth Circuit Hearing. He admitted that: 1) he 

received cash from Creely and Amato; 2) at some time, Creely expressed his displeasure with giving him cash; and 3) thereafter his 

receipts of cash were linked to his assigning Creely curatorships. 

At that Hearing, he testified: 

Q. When did you first start getting cash from Messrs. 

Amato, Creely, or their law firm? 

A. Probably when I was on State bench. 

Q. And that practice continued into 1994, when you became a Federal judge, did it not? 

A. I believe that’s correct. 137

Judge Porteous also admitted that these transactions ‘‘occasionally’’ 

followed his assignment of curatorships to Creely, though he 

claimed he did not know if the amounts paid back to him ‘‘matched 

each time’’ the curatorship fees. 138

Furthermore, Judge Porteous confirmed that he started assigning Creely the curatorships after Creely expressed resistance to 

giving Judge Porteous money: 

Q. Do you recall Mr. Creely refusing to pay you money before the curatorships started? 

A. He may have said I needed to get my finances under 

control, yeah. 139

Judge Porteous implied in his cross-examination of Creely and 

Amato at the Fifth Circuit Hearing that he gave Creely and Amato 

the curatorships so they would have funds to pay an individual 


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140 Creely 5th Cir. Hrg. at 232-33 (Ex. 12); Amato 5th Cir. Hrg. at 260-62 (Ex. 20). In any 

event, this would not provide any legitimate basis for curatorship fees to have been given back 

to Judge Porteous. 141 Amato TF Hrg. I at 100. Amato elaborated in his deposition: ‘‘[W]e had a professional law 

corporation, Amato and Creely, PLC. We filed tax returns. We had office signs. We had cards, 

checks. We owned the office building together. . . .’’ ‘‘[W]e had a pension profit sharing 

plan. . . .’’ He went on to testify: 

Q. Now, in the course of those encounters from your vantage point, would Judge 

Porteous have known that you and Bob were true, full-blown partners? 

A. I don’t, I don’t know anything else we could have done to indicate otherwise. 

* * * 

Q. And following up, therefore, on the previous set of questions, is there any question 

in your mind that Judge Porteous would have known that the money that was coming 

back from Mr. Creely for those curatorships was an equal part money coming from you? 

A. I would, I would think so. I mean, I, I don’t know what was in his mind, but I would 

think he would imagine that, you know. 

Amato Dep. at 5-7 (Ex. 24). 142 Amato 5th Cir. Hrg. at 258-59 (Ex. 20). 143 Creely GJ at 44 (Ex. 11). 

they had hired at Judge Porteous’s request. Amato denied this to 

be the case and Creely did not recall it. 140

3. Judge Porteous’s Knowledge of Amato’s Financial Participation 

Even though Judge Porteous’s requests for and receipts of cash 

went through Creely, the evidence establishes that Judge Porteous 

knew that the monies coming back to him were from Amato as 

well. Judge Porteous was close to Amato, had practiced with him, 

and the Amato-Creely partnership was well-known. When asked at 

the Task Force Hearing if Judge Porteous would have known the 

money was coming from Amato as well as Creely, Amato responded: ‘‘Of course. We owned our own office building. We had 

checks. We had business cards. We filed pleadings and, you know, 

Amato and Creely, a professional law corporation.’’ 141

Further, Judge Porteous, in questioning Amato at the Fifth Circuit Hearing, evidenced his understanding that the money provided 

to Judge Porteous came from Amato in addition to Creely: 

Q. [J]ust so I’m clear, this money that was given to me, 

was it done because I’m a judge, to influence me, or 

just because we’re friends? 

A. Tom, it’s because we were friends and we’ve been 

friends for 35 years. And it breaks my heart to be 

here. 142

4. Frequency and Amounts of Cash from Amato and Creely 

Throughout the various proceedings—the DOJ investigation, the 

Fifth Circuit Hearing, and the Task Force Inquiry—efforts have 

been made to quantify the amounts of cash given to Judge Porteous 

by Creely and Amato. Creely’s and Amato’s estimates have varied. 

a. Grand Jury Testimony 

In his March 2006 questioning before the grand jury, Creely estimated that the total amount given to Porteous could have been 

more or less than $10,000. 

Q. And how much cash we’re talking about? 

A. [I] don’t know how much it is. I mean, it could be 

$10,000. It could be less than that. 143


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144 Amato GJ at 36-37 (Ex. 18). Amato testified that he thought all the funds given to Judge 

Porteous came from the ‘‘curatorship’’ scheme. Amato 5th Cir. Hrg. at 242 (Ex. 20). 145 Creely 5th Cir. Hrg. at 201 (Ex. 12). 146 Amato 5th Cir. Hrg. at 242, 247 (Ex. 20). 

In his May 2006 questioning before the grand jury, Amato testified that the amount was greater than $10,000 and less than 

$50,000, agreeing that it was ‘‘probably’’ over $10,000, but ‘‘I don’t 

think it ever approached anywhere near [$50,000]. 144

b. Fifth Circuit Hearing 

In October 2007, before the Fifth Circuit, Creely was asked how 

much he and Amato gave to Judge Porteous. He responded: ‘‘I 

would say approximately $10,000 thereabout. Maybe more than 

that but at least 10,000.’’ 145

In response to questioning by Judge Benavides, Amato testified 

consistently with his grand jury testimony as to the frequency and 

total amount of the cash requests—this time agreeing that it could 

be from $10,000 to $20,000: 

A. It has just—it’s been so long ago and so much water 

under the bridge since then, I can’t tell you specifically 

how many draws we took, how much money we gave, 

and when did we give it to him. 

Q. All we need is an amount. 

A. It was never an amount that was astonishing. It was 

always a couple thousand dollars. 

Q. A couple thousand dollars sometimes every 6 months 

and sometimes every three or 4 weeks? 

A. Yeah, but, I mean, it wasn’t a constant thing. It wasn’t, 

you know, ‘‘Look, I expect a check every Thursday’’ or 

Friday for 2 weeks or anything like that, no. 

* * * 

Q. All right. But there’s no doubt that there had been, you 

say, not more than $50,000; but would be fair to say 

ten to twenty thousand dollars in cash? 

A. I would say, yes, close to that. 146

In his testimony before the Fifth Circuit, Judge Porteous admitted receiving cash from Amato and Creely, but would not be pinned 

down on an amount. He did not deny that the total amount could 

have been in excess of $10,000. He testified as follows: 

Q. Judge Porteous, over the years, how much cash have 

you received from Jake Amato and Bob Creely or their 

law firm? 

A. I have no earthly idea. 

* * * 

Q. It could have been $10,000 or more. Isn’t that right? 

A. Again, you’re asking me to speculate. I have no idea is 

all I can tell you. 


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147Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 118-19 (Ex. 10). 148 Creely Dep. at 8-9 (Ex. 16). 149 Amato Dep. at 7-8 (Ex. 24). 150 Creely TF Hrg. I at 24. 

Q. When did you first start getting cash from Messrs. 

Amato, Creely, or their law firm? 

A. Probably when I was on State bench. 

Q. And that practice continued into 1994, when you became a Federal judge, did it not? 

A. I believe that’s correct. 147

c. Task Force Inquiry—Creely and Amato Depositions 

In Creely’s Task Force Deposition, he stated that the amount 

paid to Judge Porteous by Amato and himself was close to $20,000 

(including approximately $2,500 paid in 1999, discussed below). He 

testified: 

Q. What is your best feel for how much that [what you 

and Amato gave Judge Porteous] would have amounted 

to? 

A. During the twenty year period of time he was on the 

bench, it would be about $10,000 a piece. 

Q. So that would be about $20,000; is that right? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And this was all cash, correct? 

A. Yes. 148

At his deposition, Amato acknowledged that the amount could 

have even been greater than $20,000: 

Q. Now, referring again to these monies from the curatorships, at some point in prior testimony the amount of 

$10,000 was used to describe in some sense the amount 

of monies which had come from you and Creely to 

Judge Porteous when he was a State judge. If upon the 

analysis of the curatorship records the amount proves 

to be greater by some substantial amount, is that a fact 

that you would take dispute with? 

A. No. I don’t—I have no idea how much the curators 

amounted to. 

Q. Okay. So if it was over 20,000 or over 30,000 or whatever the dollar amount is, that is not an amount that 

you would disagree with? 

A. Right. 149

d. Task Force Hearing Testimony 

At the Task Force Hearing, Creely, consistent with his deposition 

testimony, estimated the amount that he and Amato paid to Judge 

Porteous was approximately $20,000. 150


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151 Amato TF Hrg. I at 101. See also Amato TF Hrg. I at 108 (agreeing that the total amount 

was ‘‘in the neighborhood of 10 [thousand] to 20 thousand [dollars]’’). 152 Amato TF Hrg. I at 101. 153 Ex. 193. These were identified by Amato’s long-time accountant Jody Rotolo. See also 

Rotolo Dep. (Ex. 191). Mr. Amato provided the records to the Task Force without a subpoena. 154This chart has been marked as Ex. 190. A similar chart, used at the November 17, 2009 

Task Force Hearing, listed 191 curatorship cases. Further review has identified an additional 

curatorship assigned by Judge Porteous to Creely, and has revealed a few changes in the 

amounts in some of the years. The curatorships are listed on the Exhibit List as Exhibits 189(1) 

through 189(227), and includes a few curatorships that were assigned to Creely by other judges. 

Amato, like Creely, estimated at the Task Force Hearing that the 

amount was ‘‘over $10,000, but how much over, I don’t know.’’ 151

He did not disagree with Creely’s estimate that the amount could 

have been as much as $20,000. 152

e. Analysis of the Curatorship Records from the 24th Judicial 

District Court 

Subsequent to Creely’s deposition but before Amato was deposed, 

the Task Force obtained from Amato a computer printout of records 

that were retained in his office’s computer system that listed the 

curatorships assigned to Creely. 153 The printout revealed that 

Creely had over 350 curatorships assigned to him (from all 

judges—not just Judge Porteous) in the late 1980’s (when the firm’s 

financial records were first computerized) and early 1990’s. Of the 

cases listed in that printout, the Clerk’s Office of the 24th Judicial 

District Court (‘‘24th JDC’’) located and made certified copies of the 

curatorship cases that, based on case assignment information, appeared to be the ones that were most likely to have been handled 

by Judge Porteous. Those records have been provided to the Task 

Force. The analysis of those records reflects the following: 

Total number of curatorships assigned to Creely: 350 

Total number of these cases located by the 24th JDC 

Clerk’s Office: 209 

Total number of theses cases assigned to Creely by 

Judge Porteous: 192 

The reimbursement amount to Creely would have started at $150 

in 1988, increased to $200 sometime in 1988, and stayed at $200 

until 1994. The payment to Creely for the 192 curatorships that 

have been identified is approximately as shown in the following 

chart: 154


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155Gardner GJ at 31 (Ex. 33). 

Thus, the best evidence to date is that a minimum, Judge 

Porteous assigned curatorships to Creely resulting in Creely receiving fees amounting to over $37,500 from 1988 through 1994. 

E. CASH AND THINGS OF VALUE FROM GARDNER

Donald Gardner was another attorney from whom Judge 

Porteous asked for money and other things of value, and who also 

ended up as an attorney in the Liljeberg case discussed below. His 

testimony, including his description of Judge Porteous’s behavior, 

is consistent with (and thus serves to corroborate) the testimony of 

Creely and Amato. 

As to requests for cash, Gardner testified he gave Judge Porteous 

money on more than one occasion, at least sometimes in connection 

with Judge Porteous’s gambling. Gardner’s grand jury testimony 

does not pin him down on the frequency of these events or the 

dates they occurred: 

I wouldn’t say often, but when I was with Tom [Porteous], 

he’d come up to me . . . Donnie, you got $200? Can I borrow $200 from you? I’m a little short. I’d give him the 

$200. Can I borrow $100 from you? You know. And I’d give 

it to him. 155

Similarly: 

I think he [Porteous] was always short. I think that’s why, 

you know, he would ask me from time to time for money 

for stuff, you know, to buy gifts, to do this or whatever. 

At the gambling casinos at the CLE [Continuing Legal 

Education trips], you know, I remember. . . . I gave him 

a couple hundred dollars. He, you know, Donnie, I’m bustVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:55 Mar 04, 2010 Jkt 089008 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR427.XXX HR427

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156Gardner GJ at 62-63 (Ex. 33). Gardner provided more detail in his deposition testimony, 

testifying: ‘‘[On occasions] when we were at CLE [Continuing Legal Education], he would come 

up and say, ‘Don, you got a hundred dollars?’ And sometimes I’d give him a couple 20’s. I’d give 

him—I’d count out five 20’s or a hundred dollars. But I have to tell you, there was never any 

occasions where Tom Porteous ever asked me for any large sums of money or did I give him 

that. It would just be, ‘Hey, I’m short. You’ve got a few dollars?’ ’’ Gardner Dep. at 32 (Ex. 36). 157Gardner 5th Cir. Hrg. at 461 (Ex. 32). 158Gardner 5th Cir. Hrg. at 467 (Ex. 32). 159Gardner GJ at 31-32 (Ex. 33). 160Gardner Dep. at 32-33 (Ex. 36). 161Gardner GJ at 32-34 (Ex. 33); Gardner 5th Cir. Hrg. at 468 (Ex. 32). 162Gardner 5th Cir. Hrg. at 464 (Ex. 32). There might have been as many as one per month 

on the average. Gardner Dep. at 24-25 (Ex. 36). Gardner testified he received 50 curatorships 

from Judge Porteous, if not more. This would have meant approximately $10,000 in fees. (The 

curatorship reimbursement rates at the applicable time period were $150 and $200.) Even if 

Judge Porteous did not have the same understanding with Gardner as he did with Creely regarding the curatorships, it is significant that Judge Porteous assigned the curatorships to an 

individual who in turn was spending money on him on a regular basis. It is reasonable to conclude that Judge Porteous knew and intended that by assigning Gardner curatorships, he was 

generating cash for Gardner that Gardner could, in turn, use for Judge Porteous’s benefit. 

ed. You got a couple hundred dollars on you? Like I said, 

I didn’t gamble. I always had money if you don’t gamble. 

156

At the Fifth Circuit Hearing, Gardner estimated the amount he gave Judge Porteous to be ‘‘[p]robably less than [$]3,000.’’ 157 Gardner agreed with the questioner that his payments to Judge 

Porteous were ‘‘in small amounts, like $300 or a hundred dollars, 

when he [Judge Porteous] would ask.’’ 158 Gardner specifically re- called an instance when he gave Judge Porteous $200 so that 

Judge Porteous could buy a Christmas present (drinking glasses) 

for his wife. 159 In the grand jury, Gardner testified that the total amount was more like $2,000: 

Q. How many times did he ask you for cash in the amount 

of—in the range of a hundred dollars or in the range 

of between fifty and a hundred dollars? 

* * * 

I’m asking in total. 

A. In total from the time I’ve known Tom to present, most 

of it was before he was a Federal judge. But I would 

imagine that the total would be close—and I keep going 

through adding it up in my mind—$2,000, give or 

take. 160

Gardner also recalled paying for some home improvements (hanging fans, paying a sheet rock installer), paying to have Judge 

Porteous’s car towed when it broke down, as well as buying Judge 

Porteous an expensive fountain pen. 161

As he did with Creely, Judge Porteous assigned Gardner curatorships. Gardner denied that Judge Porteous asked for cash back 

from these appointments. 162

Judge Porteous called Gardner as a witness on his behalf at the 

Fifth Circuit Hearing. In response to questioning from Judge 

Porteous at that Hearing, Gardner testified as follows: 

When we were practicing lawyers, we were Christmas 

shopping for the wives; and I believe that you had bought 

a gift and you were short. And you asked me if I had some 

money on me. You wanted to buy some glasses—glasses, 

and I think I gave you some money then. 


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163Gardner 5th Cir. Hrg. at 461 (Ex. 32). Judge Porteous asked for and accepted money from 

Gardner to buy a Christmas present for his wife: 

We [Judge Porteous and Gardner] were shopping one Christmas and he wanted to buy 

Mel [Judge Porteous’s wife Carmella]—we would go out for Christmas and try to find 

a gift for our wives, and he wanted toasting glasses. He was short and he asked me, 

he says, ‘‘Don, can I borrow $200 for toasting glasses?’’ 

They were in the 160, 180 range. And I had it on me because I had Christmas money 

and loaned it to him. 

Notwithstanding Gardner’s use of the word ‘‘loan,’’ Judge Porteous never repaid him. Gardner 

Dep. at 34-35 (Ex. 36). 164Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 129 (Ex. 10). 165 Creely FBI Interview, Aug. 1, 1994, PORT 0477-78 (Ex. 69(b)) (also marked as Creely Dep 

Ex. 50 (Ex. 250)). 166 Creely Dep. at 11, 13, 14 (Ex. 16). 

At various times, you’d asked me for this or that when 

we were out either eating or drinking and I’d advance it 

to you or give it to you. I did so as a friend. 163

At the Fifth Circuit Hearing, Judge Porteous admitted receiving 

cash from Gardner prior to his becoming a Federal judge. 

Q. Now, other than Messrs. Amato and Creely, who else 

had—what other lawyers—lawyer friends of yours have 

given you money over the years? 

A. Given me money? 

Q. Money, cash. 

A. Gardner may have. Probably did. 

* * * 

Q. And when is the last time Mr. Gardner gave you 

money? 

A. Before I took the Federal bench, I’m sure. 

Q. Okay. And do you recall how much? 

A. Absolutely not. 164

F. CREELY’S STATEMENTS AS PART OF JUDGE PORTEOUS’S

BACKGROUND CHECK

In August 1994, Creely was interviewed by the FBI as part of 

Judge Porteous’s background check. The FBI write-up of the interview reports: 

CREELY has never known the candidate to use illegal 

drugs or to abuse alcohol or prescription drugs. . . . 

CREELY advised that he knows of no financial problems 

on the part of the candidate and the candidate appears to 

live within his economic means. 165

In his August 28, 2009 Task Force deposition, Creely was questioned about his statements concerning Judge Porteous’s drinking 

habits and financial circumstances. Although Creely stated that 

Judge Porteous ‘‘drank excessively,’’ and that ‘‘he did, in my opinion, drink a lot,’’ he also stated that Judge Porteous ‘‘was a very 

intelligent man’’ and that ‘‘[h]is drinking in no way impaired his 

ability as a judge.’’ 166 In his Task Force Hearing testimony, Creely 


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167 Creely TF Hrg. I at 25. 168 Creely Dep. at 13 (Ex. 16). 169 Creely Dep. at 12 (Ex. 16). 170 Creely TF Hrg. I at 25. 171 Civ. Action No. 93-1794 (E.D. La.). See PACER Docket Report (Ex. 50). 172The Motion by the Liljebergs to enter the appearance of attorneys Amato and Levenson 

was dated September 16, 1996 (Ex. 51(a)). Judge Porteous granted the motion on September 

26, 1996 (Ex. 51(b)). 

acknowledged having seen Judge Porteous in circumstances in 

which Judge Porteous had obviously abused alcohol. 167

As to Judge Porteous’s financial circumstances, Creely testified 

both at the Task Force Hearing and during his deposition that his 

statements to the FBI were not truthful. In his deposition, Creely 

testified: 

Q. [I]f the FBI’s write-up of its interview with you indicated that you, and I’m quoting, ‘‘advised that [you] 

knew of no financial problems on the part of the candidate and the candidate appears to live within his economic means,’’ do you have any reason to doubt that 

you said that? 

A. No sir. 

Q. And that wouldn’t have been true, would it? That 

would not have been true, because, in fact, you did 

know that he had financial problems, correct? 

A. Yes. 168

Creely stated he made those statements because he held Judge 

Porteous in ‘‘very high esteem,’’ had a lot of affection for him, and 

would not have wanted to do anything to harm his candidacy for 

the Federal judgeship.’’ 169 Before the Task Force, Creely testified: 

‘‘I didn’t want to do anything to impede his [Judge Porteous’s] advancement. He was a friend. He was a very manipulative friend. 

And I didn’t want to—I didn’t want to hurt the guy. 170

G. THE LILJEBERG PROCEEDINGS

On January 16, 1996, as a Federal judge, Judge Porteous was assigned a complicated civil action, Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc. 

[‘‘Lifemark’’] v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc. [‘‘Liljeberg’’ or ‘‘the 

Liljebergs’’]. 171 This case involved a dispute between a hospital and 

a pharmacy, and implicated bankruptcy law, real estate law, and 

contract law. The case was filed in 1993, and had been assigned 

to other judges before being transferred to Judge Porteous in January 1996. The matter was particularly contentious, with millions of 

dollars at stake. 

1. September-October 1996—Amato and Levenson Are Hired by the 

Liljebergs; Lifemark files a Motion to Recuse Judge Porteous 

The Liljeberg case was set for a non-jury trial before Judge 

Porteous beginning on November 4, 1996. On September 19, 1996, 

approximately 6 weeks prior to the scheduled trial date, the 

Liljebergs filed a motion to enter the appearances of Amato and 

Levenson as their attorneys. 172 As Amato described it: ‘‘I was approached by a lawyer by the name of Ken Fonte who represented 

the Liljebergs and asked if I would be interested in the case. And 

I told him ‘I’m always interested in litigation and I would take a 


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173 Amato GJ at 41 (Ex. 18). 174 Amato GJ at 42 (Ex. 18). 175 Amato GJ at 44 (Ex. 18). See also, Motion to Recuse, Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc., v. 

Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Civ. Action No. 93-1794 (E.D. La.) (Oct. 1, 1996) at 3 (stating that 

Levenson and Amato were to receive a contingent fee) (Ex. 52). 176 Amato GJ at 50 (Ex. 18). Amato stated he believed that the Liljebergs had a good case. 

Amato GJ at 54 (Ex. 18). 177 Ex Parte Motion of Liljeberg Enterprises Inc. To Substitute Counsel, Lifemark Hospitals 

of La., Inc., v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Civ. Action No. 93-1794 (E.D. La.) (Sept. 16, 1996) 

(Ex. 51(a)). 178 Amato TF Hrg. I at 102. 179Mole TF Hrg. I at 141. See also Mole 5th Cir. Hrg. at 168 (Ex. 65); Mole GJ at 9-10 (Ex. 

64). 180Motion to Recuse, Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc., v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Civ. Action 

No. 93-1794 (E.D. La.) (Oct. 1, 1996) (Ex. 52). 181Mole 5th Cir. Hrg. at 169-70 (Ex. 65). 

look at the case.’ ’’ 173 According to Amato, the Liljebergs ‘‘were 

looking for people [attorneys] who were, you know, not only competent, but had some rapport with the court.’’ 174 Amato and 

Levenson were hired on a contingent fee basis, that is, they would 

not receive anything unless the Liljebergs prevailed. 175 Amato estimated that if the Liljebergs prevailed at trial, his fee would have 

been between $500,000 and $1,000,000. 176 The motion to enter 

Amato’s appearance clearly identified him with the firm ‘‘Amato 

and Creely.’’ 177 Amato described the case as ‘‘exceptionally important’’ to him. 178

The decision of the Liljebergs to add Amato and Levenson so 

close to the trial date aroused the concerns of Lifemark’s lawyer, 

Joseph Mole, who spoke to other attorneys who knew Judge 

Porteous, Amato and Levenson: 

I learned that—from people who would talk to me . . . 

—that Mr. Levenson and Mr. Amato were very close to 

Judge Porteous, that Mr. Amato had been his law partner, 

as had Mr. Creely—Amato and Creely was the firm—and 

Mr. Levenson was very close to Judge Porteous and had— 

I think had been to a fifth circuit conference or two as 

Judge Porteous’s guest, that they frequently socialized in— 

in the way of lunches, hunting trips, and things like that, 

and that they—I also knew—well, I formed the opinion 

that there was—there was a high likelihood that the 

case—it was a bench trial. There was no jury. So it would 

be entirely a decision by the judge in a case that had been 

valued as high as $200 million for my client that the case 

would be handled in the way by the judge that would be 

favorable to his friends, and that was of deep concern. 179

On October 1, 1996, Mole, on behalf of his client Lifemark, filed 

a motion to recuse Judge Porteous. The motion focused on the appearance of impropriety suggested by the fact that just weeks prior 

to trial, the Liljebergs retained two lawyers who were close friends 

with Judge Porteous, neither having particular expertise in complicated business litigation. 180

Lifemark’s recusal motion did not allege an actual conflict of interest or that Amato (or his partner Creely) had given money to 

Judge Porteous because Lifemark’s counsel (Mole) had no idea 

what, if anything, Amato (or Creely) had ever given to Judge 

Porteous. 181 If he had known of prior cash dealings between Judge 

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182Mole GJ at 14 (Ex. 64). The various investigations have not disclosed that Levenson gave 

Judge Porteous cash at any time. 183Mole TF Hrg. I at 142. 184Mole TF Hrg. I at 142. 185Mole 5th Cir. Hrg. at 171 (Ex. 65). 186Mole TF Hrg. I at 141-42. 187 [Lifemark’s] Motion to Recuse, Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 

Civ. Action No. 93-1794 (E.D. La., Oct. 1, 1996) [hereinafter ‘‘Motion to Recuse’’] at 3, 5-6 (Ex. 

52). 188Motion to Recuse at 7 (citing United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 156, 156 (5th Cir., 1995)) 

(Ex. 52). 

tion, 182 and he believed that if a prior financial relationship existed recusal would have been mandatory. 183 Further, Mole believed recusal would have been required even if the relationship 

were between Judge Porteous and Creely, and not Judge Porteous 

and Amato, because Creely and Amato were partners and it was 

the firm Amato & Creely that had entered its appearance for 

Lifemark—not just Amato. 184

Because he was unaware of a prior financial relationship, as 

Mole himself described: ‘‘[I] danced around that issue [of a financial 

relationship] pretty carefully because I didn’t want to accuse the 

judge that was going to try my case of doing something of which 

I had no evidence.’’ 185 Thus, Mole argued ‘‘that the judge shouldn’t 

be handling a case where two of his closest friends, if not his very 

closest friends, had just signed up 6 weeks before trial, whose facts 

had been in litigation since 1987 in one court or another, and that 

I didn’t believe they had anything to add, other than their relationship with the judge, and that if the result came out in a certain 

way, it would create an appearance that things had not been 

right.’’ 186

As to the appearance of impropriety, the recusal motion stated: 

Your Honor’s relationship with Messrs. Amato and 

Levenson is well known to the legal community. It needs 

no elaboration in this memorandum. This would be of no 

concern were it not for the timing of their addition, and 

the fact that the [Liljebergs] clearly believe that influence 

with governmental bodies, including judges, can be bought. 

* * * 

Under the circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that 

Your Honor is duty bound to remove any appearance of 

impropriety. In spite of Your Honor’s attempts to be fair, 

the obviousness of the Liljebergs’ intentions, coupled with 

the timing of the hiring of these lawyers, will always leave 

questions in the eyes of any objective observer, the ‘‘man 

in the street,’’ who is aware of the Court’s relationship 

with Messrs. Amato and Levenson and the Liljebergs’ attitudes toward the political and judicial systems. [citation 

omitted.] Under such circumstances, Lifemark suggests 

that Your Honor, the Federal courts, and the litigants in 

this case (including the Liljebergs) are all best served by 

Your Honor’s recusal. 187

The Motion went on to argue that the applicable standard for review of Judge Porteous’s role was ‘‘how things appear to the well 

informed, thoughtful and objective observer, rather than the 

hypersensitive, cynical and suspicious person.’’ 188


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189 [The Liljebergs’] Memorandum in Opposition to Lifemark’s Motion to Recuse Lifemark 

Hospitals of La., Inc., v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Civ. Action No. 93-1794 (E.D. La., Oct. 9, 

1996) [hereinafter ‘‘Memorandum in Opposition’’] (Ex. 53). 190Lifemark’s Reply Memorandum to Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc.’s Opposition to Motion to 

Recuse, Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc., v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Civ. Action No. 93-1794 

(E.D. La., Oct. 11, 1996) [hereinafter ‘‘Lifemark’s Reply to the Liljeberg’s Opposition’’] (Ex. 54). 191Memorandum of Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc. and St. Judge Hospital of Kenner La., Inc., in 

Opposition to Reply Memorandum of Lifemark on Motion to Recuse, Lifemark Hospitals of La., 

Inc., v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Civ. Action No. 93-1794 (E.D. La., Oct. 15, 1996) (hereinafter 

‘‘Liljeberg’s Opposition to Lifemark’s Reply’’) (Ex. 55). 192Liljeberg’s Opposition to Lifemark’s Reply at 2 (Ex. 55). 193Transcript of Proceedings, Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse, Lifemark Hospitals, Inc., v. 

Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Civ. Action No. 93-179-4-T (E.D. La., Oct. 16, 1996) (hereinafter 

‘‘Recusal Hearing Transcript’’) at 4 (Ex. 56). 

The Liljebergs filed their Opposition dated October 9, 1996, 

signed by Levenson; 189 Lifemark filed its Reply to the Opposition, 

dated October 11, 1996; 190 and the Liljebergs filed a Memorandum 

in Opposition to Lifemark’s Reply, dated October 15, 1996, again 

signed by Levenson. 191 That final pleading attacked Lifemark’s 

factual allegations, not because they were untrue, but because they 

were unproven, lacked specificity, and, in essence, alleged nothing 

more than the existence of ‘‘a friendly relationship:’’ 

In its original supporting memorandum, Lifemark uses 

terms such as ‘‘close,’’ ‘‘extremely close’’ and ‘‘closest’’ to 

characterize the relationship between the Court and 

Messrs. Amato and Levenson. . . . However, such vague 

superlatives provide absolutely no information upon which 

an objective, thoughtful and well-informed person could 

reasonably rely in determining whether grounds exist to 

question the Court’s impartiality. 

* * * 

Lifemark presents no evidence that a reasonable person 

would attribute to the mere existence of a friendly relationship a significant likelihood that a judge would violate 

Federal law and subordinate his oath of office just to help 

a lawyer earn a fee. 192

Judge Porteous, of course, knew that his respective relationships 

with Amato and Creely went well beyond the ‘‘mere existence of a 

friendly relationship.’’ 

2. Judge Porteous’s Statements at the Recusal Hearing 

On October 16, 1996, Judge Porteous held a hearing on the 

recusal motion. Both Levenson and Amato were present. In that 

hearing, the following colloquy occurred: 

The Court: Let me make also one other statement for the 

record if anyone wants to decide whether I am 

a friend with Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson— 

I will put that to rest for the answer is affirmative, yes. Mr. Amato and I practiced the law 

together probably 20-plus years ago. Is that 

sufficient? . . . So if that is an issue at all, it 

is a non-issue. 193

* * * 

Mr. Mole: 


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194 Recusal Hearing Transcript at 6-7 (Ex. 56). 195 Recusal Hearing Transcript at 8 (Ex. 56). Judge Porteous spent several transcript pages 

on the issue of whether the attorneys had given him campaign contributions and challenged 

Mole on that issue: 

[D]on’t misstate, don’t come up with a document that clearly shows well in excess of 

$6700 with some innuendo that that means that they gave that money to me. If you 

would have checked your homework, you would have found that that was a Justice for 

All Program for all judges in Jefferson Parish. But go ahead. I don’t dispute that I received funding from lawyers. 

Recusal Hearing Transcript at 10 (Ex. 56). 196 Recusal Hearing Transcript at 10-11 (Ex. 56). 

I am happy to tell the Judge what the public 

perception is of the relationship. 

* * * 

I don’t know what the Court wants to do with 

that issue, whether or not the Court wants to 

make a statement or accept the statement. 

The Court: No, I have made the statement. Yes, Mr. 

Amato and Mr. Levenson are friends of mine. 

Have I ever been to either one of them’s 

house? The answer is a definitive no. Have I 

gone along to lunch with them? The answer is 

a definitive yes. 194

* * * 

Mr. Mole: The public perception is that they do dine 

with you, travel with you, that they have contributed to your campaigns. 

The Court: Well, luckily I didn’t have any campaigns. So 

I’m interested to find out how you know that. 

I never had any campaigns . . . 

* * * 

The Court: The first time I ran, 1984, I think is the only 

time when they gave me money. 195

* * * 

The Court: [T]his is the first time a motion for my recusal 

has ever been filed. . . . I guess it got my attention. But does that mean that any time a 

person I perceive to be friends who I have dinner with or whatever that I must disqualify 

myself? I don’t think that’s what the rule suggests. . . . Courts have held that a judge 

need not disqualify himself just because a 

friend, even a close friend, appears as a lawyer. 196

* * * 

The Court: Well you know the issue becomes one of, I 

guess the confidence of the parties, not the attorneys. . . . My concern is not with whether 

or not lawyers are friends. . . . My concern is 


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197 Recusal Hearing Transcript at 17-19 (Ex. 56). 198 Judgment [Denying Motion to Recuse], Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc., v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Civ. Action No. 93-1794 (E.D. La., Oct. 17, 1996) (Ex. 57). 199Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Brief of Petitioner [Lifemark], In re: Lifemark Hospitals 

of Louisiana, Inc., No. 96-31098 (5th Cir., Oct. 24, 1996) (Ex. 58); Order [Denying Petition for 

Writ of Mandamus], In re: Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc., No. 96-31098 (5th Cir., Oct. 

28, 1996) (Ex. 59). 

that the parties are given a day in court 

which they can through you present their 

case, and they can be adjudicated thoroughly 

without bias, favor, prejudice, public opinion, 

sympathy, anything else, just on law and 

facts. . . . 

I have always taken the position that if 

there was ever any question in my mind that 

this Court should recuse itself that I would 

notify counsel and give them the opportunity 

if they wanted to ask me to get off. . . . 

[In the Bernard case] the court said Section 

450 requires not only that a Judge be subjectively confident of his ability to be even handed but [that an] informed, rational objective 

observer would not doubt his impartiality. . . . I don’t have any difficulty trying 

this case. . . . 

[I]n my mind I am satisfied because if I had 

any question as to my ability, I would have 

called and said, ‘‘Look, you’re right.’’ 197

Judge Porteous denied the recusal motion after the argument in 

open court on October 16, 1996. The complete written opinion 

signed the following day states: 

On Wednesday, October 16, 1996, the court heard oral argument on Lifemark Hospitals, Inc.,’s Motion to Recuse. 

The Court, having reviewed the motion to recuse, the opposition, the reply, and the response to the reply and having heard oral argument, for reasons stated in open court 

denies the Motion to Recuse. 198

Lifemark sought a writ of mandamus from the Fifth Circuit. That 

petition was also denied. 199

3. Discussion of the Recusal Hearing 

The attorneys—Levenson and Amato—made no factual disclosures. Amato, who was present in the courtroom during the recusal 

hearing, viewed the issue of disclosure and recusal to be Judge 

Porteous’s issue—not Amato’s. He thus took his lead as to disclosure from Judge Porteous, and was not going to embarrass the 

judge by stating that in the past he and his partner had given 

Judge Porteous tens of thousands of dollars funded by curatorships 

assigned by Judge Porteous. As Amato testified at his Task Force 

deposition: 

Q. Okay. Now, in connection with that motion to recuse 

Judge Porteous, would it be fair to say that you considered it really Judge Porteous’[s] decision as to whether 

or not he should be recused? 


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200 Amato Dep. at 8-10 (Ex. 24). 201See also Amato TF Hrg. I at 103; Amato 5th Cir. Hrg. at 248 (Ex. 20); Amato GJ at 57 

(Ex. 18). 202There is also some evidence that Judge Porteous’s secretary, Rhonda Danos, had solicited 

Amato, Creely and Levenson to help pay for his son’s expenses when Judge Porteous was a 

State judge. 

A. Oh, absolutely. 

Q. And would it be fair to say that you followed his lead 

in terms of disclosures which could be made or should 

be made relative to your relationship with Judge 

Porteous? 

A. Yes. That Porteous—that was Porteous’[s] obligation. 

* * * 

Q. . . . Was the fact that you all had given back to Judge 

Porteous money from the curators disclosed in the 

course of the Liljeberg litigation? 

A. No, it was not disclosed. 

Q. And if that, if that was a fact that could have or should 

have been disclosed, that was really in your mind 

something that Judge Porteous would have to do? 

A. Yes. 200

Amato, in the Task Force Hearing, before the Fifth Circuit, and in 

the grand jury, has acknowledged the materiality of this prior relationship to Judge Porteous’s handling of the recusal motion. 201

With Amato and Levenson remaining silent in the courtroom, the 

only factual disclosures about the relationships were made by 

Judge Porteous, and these were limited to the facts that he was ‘‘a 

friend with Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson,’’ had been a former law 

partner with Amato, had ‘‘gone along to lunch with them’’ but had 

not ‘‘been to either one of them’s house,’’ and that the first time he 

ran for judge was ‘‘the only time when they gave me money.’’ 

Judge Porteous did not mention that Amato, through his firm 

Amato & Creely, had given him thousands of dollars in cash, including monies funded through the assignment of curatorships to 

Creely. And, as discussed, Judge Porteous would have known, and 

in fact subsequently acknowledged, that the funds paid by Creely 

under that arrangement came from Amato as well. Judge Porteous 

did not address Mole’s specific statement that he [Mole] had heard 

Judge Porteous had traveled with the attorneys, and thus, did not 

disclose, for example, that he had gone to Las Vegas with Levenson 

(and shared a room with him) and had gone hunting and fishing 

with Amato and Creely on several occasions. Judge Porteous also 

failed to disclose that Amato and Creely paid for his party to celebrate his appointment to the Federal bench. 202

Judge Porteous’s statement denying that he had ever been to either one of their houses suggests a relationship that is totally at 

odds with the truth of their respective associations. He trivialized 

Mole’s motion by comparing it to the following: ‘‘But does that 

mean that any time a person I perceive to be friends who I have 

dinner with or whatever that I must disqualify myself? I don’t 

think that’s what the rule suggests. . . .’’ And, by suggesting 

merely that he had ‘‘dinner with’’ or ‘‘gone along to lunch with’’ the 


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203 Recusal Hearing Transcript at 8-10 (Ex. 56). 204 Recusal Hearing Transcript at 18 (Ex. 56). 205Mole 5th Cir. Hrg. at 174 (Ex. 65); Mole GJ at 18 (Ex. 64). 206 Ex Parte Motion of Lifemark to Enroll Additional Counsel of Record (Don Gardner), 

Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc., v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Civ. Action No. 93-1794 (E.D. La., 

Mar. 11, 1997) (Ex. 60(a)). 207Mole TF Hrg. I at 143; Mole 5th Cir. Hrg. at 174-75 (Ex. 65). 208Gardner 5th Cir. Hrg. at 462 (Ex. 32). 209Mole 5th Cir. Hrg. at 177-80 (Ex. 65); Mole GJ at 21-22 (Ex. 64). 

two men, with no elaboration, he affirmatively concealed what was 

really the truth: that Amato and Levenson had paid for hundreds 

of his lunches and dinners at expensive restaurants for a decade 

or longer. Judge Porteous affirmatively attempted to divert the 

hearing from the true issues raised in the recusal motion by spending considerable attention on the issue of whether the attorneys 

had given him campaign contributions—denying that fact—and 

criticizing Lifemark’s attorney for raising the issue. 203

Finally, Judge Porteous made several ‘‘lulling’’ statements— 

stressing his awareness of and sensitivity to his ethical concerns 

associated with recusal issues, and suggesting his comfort with the 

issue having been raised. The most significant instance of this conduct was Judge Porteous’s statement: 

I have always taken the position that if there was ever any 

question in my mind that this Court should recuse itself 

that I would notify counsel and give them the opportunity 

if they wanted to ask me to get off. 204

This self-serving statement purported to demonstrate the Judge’s 

sensitivity to his ethical responsibilities and thus bolstered the factual and legal record for appellate review. 

4. March 1997—Lifemark Hires Gardner 

Lifemark, having lost the recusal motion, felt that it was necessary to ‘‘level the playing field,’’ and thus hired Don Gardner to 

be part of its trial team. 205 Lifemark’s pleading to the court entering the appearance of Gardner was date-stamped March 11, 

1997. 206 As Mole described: 

Q. Why was Gardner then brought in by Lifemark? 

A. After we lost the motion to recuse, my client and I discussed that—and my client insisted that we try to find 

a lawyer who, like Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson, was 

a friend with the judge and knew him very well. They 

were concerned that they would do everything they can 

to achieve a level playing field. I resisted doing that. I 

am not happy with the fact that we did it. But my client insisted, and so we did it. 207

Even Gardner recognized: ‘‘[T]hey [Lifemark] wanted to have a 

friendly face.’’ 208 Lifemark’s contract with Gardner provided that 

Gardner would be paid based on the results of the case, that he 

would be guaranteed $100,000 simply for entering his appearance, 

and that he would receive another $100,000 if Judge Porteous 

withdrew or if the case settled. 209 As Mole bluntly testified at the 

Fifth Circuit Hearing: 

Q. So is it fair to say this term [the $100,000 guaranteed 

payment] also shows that the purpose that Don GardVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:55 Mar 04, 2010 Jkt 089008 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR427.XXX HR427

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210Mole GJ at 28 (Ex. 64). 211The Court’s ‘‘PACER’’ Docket Report reveals that the trial took place from June 16, 1997 

through June 27, 1997, then started again on July 14, 1997 and concluded July 23, 1997. (Ex. 

50). 212 Amato GJ at 48 (Ex.18). 213Mole TF Hrg. I at 144; Levenson Dep. at 41-42 (Ex. 30); Transcript(s) of Proceedings (Excerpts), Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc., v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., Civ. No. 93-CIV-1794 (E.D. 

La.) (Excerpts of Non-Jury Trial, July 17, 1997 and July 21, 1997) (Ex. 61). 214 As described in the Bankruptcy Section of this Report, Judge Porteous’s debts were largely 

a result of gambling. 

ner came in the litigation was because of his relationship with Judge Porteous? 

A. Yeah. Embarrassing but true. 210

5. June and July 1997—Trial 

Judge Porteous conducted a bench trial in the Liljeberg case in 

June and July 1997. 211 Amato handled a substantial portion of the 

trial for the Liljebergs. 212

One incident during the trial is noteworthy. Judge Porteous 

played an active role in examining some of Lifemark’s witnesses, 

and at one point in the proceedings near the end of the day, 

Lifemark’s attorney, Mole, sought permission to ask additional 

questions of the witness after Judge Porteous’s examination. Judge 

Porteous lost his temper at Mole, and though the descriptions of 

the event vary, Judge Porteous ended up knocking or throwing 

some of the evidence binders that were in front of him in the direction of Mole. When the parties returned to court the following trial 

day, which was after an intervening weekend, Judge Porteous stated for the record his position, and then permitted Mole to ask additional questions. 213

At the conclusion of the trial in July 1997, Judge Porteous took 

the case under advisement. He did not issue his opinion until April 

26, 2000, nearly 3 years after trial. 

H. JUDGE PORTEOUS’S DECLINING FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES— 

1996 THROUGH 2000 

Judge Porteous’s financial circumstances in the years preceding 

his filing for bankruptcy in 2001 are discussed in the next section. 

However, in order to understand Judge Porteous’s behavior in accepting and soliciting things of value from attorneys during the 

pendency of the Liljeberg case (and to appreciate his dependency on 

attorneys and others to support his lifestyle), it is useful to note 

the decline of Judge Porteous’s financial situation during the period 

1996-2000. 

At the end of 1996, a few months after the October 1996 recusal 

hearing, Judge Porteous had credit card debt of approximately 

$45,000, and a balance in his individual retirement account (IRA) 

of $59,000. Over the next 4 years, he gradually drew down his IRA 

account, frequently to pay off his credit cards. By April 2000, he 

had credit card debt of $153,000, and an IRA balance of $12,000. 

By the time he rendered his decision in the Liljeberg case in 

April 2000, Judge Porteous was just weeks away from consulting 

with a bankruptcy attorney. 214


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215 Amato TF Hrg. I at 103-04. See also Amato Dep. at 17-18 (Ex. 24) (paying for Judge 

Porteous’s meals at restaurants such as Beef Connection, Ruth’s Chris Steak House, and Dickie 

Brennan’s while Liljeberg case was pending). 216 Exs. 21(b)-(c). By virtue of the limited records, the chart does not include all instances 

where there is a calendar entry mentioning Judge Porteous but no corresponding credit card 

charge, and also does not include meals for which there is no entry on Amato’s calendar. 

I. JUDGE PORTEOUS’S RELATIONSHIPS WITH AMATO, LEVENSON, AND

GARDNER WHILE HE HAD THE LILJEBERG CASE UNDER ADVISEMENT (JULY 1997-APRIL 2000) 

During the period from July 1997 through the issuance of his 

verdict for the Liljebergs in April 2000, with millions of dollars for 

the parties and substantial fees for the attorneys at stake, Judge 

Porteous continued to seek and accept things of value from Amato, 

Creely, Levenson and, to a lesser extent, Gardner. 

1. Meals 

Amato continued to take Judge Porteous to lunches after the 

Liljeberg trial and prior to Porteous’s ruling in that case. As Amato 

testified in his Task Force appearance: 

Q. After the trial, did you continue to take Judge Porteous 

to lunch on a regular basis? 

A. Judge Porteous and I have been eating lunch together 

for—since we have known each other, yes. 

Q. Okay. And some of them . . . involved you eating well 

at Ruth’s Chris Steak House, the Beef Connection, 

Andrea’s, Emeril’s, and so forth, correct? 

A. Yes, we had a nice—we had a good time. 

* * * 

Q. So I am talking about roughly summer of 1997 to April 

2000, and that is the period that you have just testified 

that, as part of your whole life, you took him to restaurants that we have just mentioned, correct? 

A. Right. 215

The Department subpoenaed Amato’s calendar and corresponding credit card records reflecting meals he bought for Judge 

Porteous starting in 1999. From 1999 to April 2000 (during which 

the Liljeberg case was pending), the following chart reflects some 

of the meals attended by Judge Porteous and paid for by Amato. 216


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217Gardner Dep. at 16 (Ex. 36). 218Gardner Dep. at 15-16 (Ex. 36). 219Gardner Dep. at 16 (Ex. 36). 220Gardner Dep. at 16-17 (Ex. 36). 221Gardner Dep. at 17 (Ex. 36). 

Gardner also testified that he took Judge Porteous to meals 

while the Liljeberg case was pending. Specifically, Gardner testified 

he took Judge Porteous to the following restaurants when Judge 

Porteous was a Federal judge: Ruth’s Chris Steak House (‘‘more 

than six [times].’’ 217); Mr. B’s (‘‘four or five times a year’’ 218); 

Emeril’s (‘‘on occasions’’ 219); Brennan’s/Dickie Brennan’s (‘‘I’ve been 

to Dickie Brennan’s I guess with Tom Porteous three or four times 

during that period of time’’ 220); NOLA’s (‘‘[t]hree or four times’’ 221), 


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222Gardner Dep. at 17 (Ex. 36). 

and Metro Bistro (‘‘a little more frequent [than NOLA’s]’’ 222). For 

each of these restaurants, there are charges on Gardner’s American 

Express account from approximately 1994 through 2000, including 

charges during the roughly 3 year period spanning Gardner’s appearance as an attorney in the Liljeberg case (early 1997) to the 

issuance of Judge Porteous’s decision (April 2000). 

Though Gardner could not identify specific meals during this 

time frame as being ones where he paid for Judge Porteous, the 

charges on Gardner’s American Express card identify the likely 

meals, and provide a sense of what the meals would have cost. For 

example, Gardner testified he took Judge Porteous to NOLA’s, 

Dickie Brennan’s or Brennan’s ‘‘three or four times.’’ Charges on 

Gardner’s credit card between 1997 and 1999 (when Liljeberg was 

pending and when Gardner represented Lifemark) at those restaurants were as shown in the following chart: 

From August 1994 through February 2000, Gardner had over 30 

charges at Ruth’s Chris Steak House, 16 charges at Emeril’s, over 

30 charges at Mr. B’s, and 23 at the Metro Bistro—consistent with 

his testimony as to other places he frequently took Judge Porteous. 

2. May 1999—Creely Helps Pay for Bachelor Party Trip to Las 

Vegas 

In connection with his son Timothy’s bachelor party, Judge 

Porteous went on a trip from May 20-23, 1999 (while Liljeberg was 

pending) with several of his friends, including Creely and Gardner, 

to Las Vegas, Nevada. Creely paid for Judge Porteous’s room and 


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223 Creely GJ at 39-40 (Ex. 11). 224 Caesars Palace Record (Ex. 377); Creely American Express Record for May 1999 (Ex. 378). 225Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 140 (Ex. 10). 226 Creely GJ at 40 (Ex. 11). 227 Creely GJ at 41 (Ex. 11). 228 Creely American Express Record for May 1999 (Ex. 378). 229Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 194 (Ex. 10); Gardner 5th Cir. Hrg. at 465 (Ex. 33). 230Gardner 5th Cir. Hrg. at 465-66 (Ex. 32). 231 Amato Dep. at 11-13 (Ex. 24); Amato Dep. Ex. 83 (Ex. 283). 232 Amato Dep. at 13 (Ex. 24). 

for a portion of Timothy’s bachelor party dinner during that 

trip. 223

As to Judge Porteous’s room, Caesars Palace records reflect that 

Judge Porteous’s room was charged to Creely’s credit card number. 224 Judge Porteous also seemed to recall that Creely paid for 

his room. 225

As to the bachelor party meal at a steakhouse, Creely testified: 

[A]nd in these charges [on my credit card], all right, is a 

meal for the bachelor party meal, OK, that we went out 

on, and the way all that—$560.48. And the way I recall 

what happened, there’s no way that all these people could 

eat for $500 at a steak house, drinking and eating. The 

way I recall, is that there were a number of people that, 

after the meal and the bill came out, that put up the credit 

card to pay for the meal. . . . There were a number of 

credit cards put up to have the tip and the bill divided 

among everybody. 226

Creely recalled that Judge Porteous did not share the cost of this 

meal. 227 Creely’s American Express records also revealed a charge of $560.48 at the steakhouse. 228

Gardner also went to Las Vegas on the bachelor party trip. 229

Gardner denied paying anything for Judge Porteous on that 

trip. 230

3. June 1999—Judge Porteous Solicits and Accepts Money from 

Amato 

On June 28, 1999—after his son’s wedding and prior to issuing 

his decision in Liljeberg—Judge Porteous solicited money from 

Amato. This request was made while the two men were on a fishing trip. Amato identified the date of the fishing trip—June 28, 

1999—by reference to an entry on his calendar. 231 At the Task 

Force Hearing, Amato recalled the amount requested by Judge 

Porteous as being $2,500. 232 Amato described the incident as follows: 

It was a weekday, and a friend of mine has a fairly large 

boat, and we were going to Caminada Pass, which is the 

pass at Grand Isle, and at certain times of the year, the 

fish run between the Gulf of Mexico and the marsh. And 

the fish just at night, they bubble up. They come to the 

surface, and it is a free-for-all. So we went fishing that 

night. Judge Porteous was drinking. We were standing on 

the front of the boat, the two of us, and he was—I don’t 

know how to put it. He was really upset. He was—had a 

few drinks. He said, ‘‘My son’s wedding was more than I 

anticipated. The girl’s family can’t afford it. I invited too 

many guests.’’ Would I lend him, give him, provide him, 


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233 Amato TF Hrg. I at 104-05. See also Amato GJ at 19-20 (Ex. 18) (‘‘The only time Judge 

Porteous ever asked me for money was when his first son got married. I went fishing, an overnight fishing trip, and him and I were standing on the bow of the boat and he told me that 

his son’s wedding cost more than the bride’s family anticipated because he invited too many 

guests and could I lend him some money.’’). 234 Amato GJ at 21 (Ex. 18). 235 Amato GJ at 20-24 (Ex. 18). 236 Amato 5th Cir. Hrg. at 240 (Ex. 20). 237 Amato GJ at 64 (Ex. 18). 238 Creely GJ at 59-60 (Ex. 11). Notwithstanding minor discrepancies (the fishing trip was 

June 1999, not May; the wedding was for Judge Porteous’s son, not daughter), Creely’s testimony was consistent with Amato’s. 239 Creely GJ at 61 (Ex. 11). At the Fifth Circuit Hearing, Creely testified that he recalled the request being a tuition expense, but confirmed that he recalled the amount as $2,000. Creely 

5th Cir. Hrg. at 212-14 (Ex. 12). 240 Creely 5th Cir. Hrg. at 214 (Ex. 12). 241 Creely 5th Cir. Hrg. at 215 (Ex. 12). Amato was asked whether he recalled an incident 

where Judge Porteous’s secretary picked up the money. He replied ‘‘I don’t recall that, but I 

don’t say that it didn’t happen. You know, it well may have happened.’’ Amato 5th Cir. Hrg. 

at 241 (Ex. 20). 

Danos recalled picking up envelopes of money or having envelopes delivered from Creely and 

Amato. In response to questions from the attorneys, she identified that as having occurred in 

the May-June 1999 time frame. Danos 5th Cir. Hrg. at 421-22 (Ex. 43). 

however you want to call it, something, like $2,500, to pay 

for part of the wedding or the after-rehearsal party or 

something? 233

Notwithstanding Amato’s use of the term ‘‘lend’’ in describing 

Judge Porteous’s request of him, Amato was clear: ‘‘I didn’t believe 

I was gonna be paid back.’’ 234 Amato testified he gave Judge 

Porteous cash. 235 Amato described this incident consistently at the 

Fifth Circuit Hearing, 236 and further testified that he recalled providing the cash to Judge Porteous in a bank envelope. 237

Creely recalled and corroborated critical aspects of that incident 

as well. Specifically, Creely was asked whether Judge Porteous requested money when he was a Federal judge: 

[I] know one occasion that I remember. And it was an occasion and it was May 1999. I have it written on my calendar. And it has at the bottom of the page ‘‘Fishing Mitch 

Martin.’’ And Mitch Martin is a friend of ours that had a 

boat. . . . I didn’t go on this trip. 

[B]ut after this trip that—this one trip—I do recall my law 

partner [Amato] went fishing with him—I didn’t go on this 

fishing trip—he [Amato] came back and said, ‘‘The judge 

was crying about not being able to pay for a wedding of 

some sort for his daughter. I don’t know what it was. But 

I think it had something to do with a wedding or something. And he said, [‘‘]He’s crying.’’ And he said, ‘‘What do 

I do[?’’] I said, ‘‘I don’t know what to tell you to do. It ain’t 

even me.’’ And I believe he gave him the money and I gave 

my law partner back half of the money or—I don’t know 

how that happened. But I do know he asked for that 

money and it was given to him. 238

Creely recalled ‘‘that I gave my law partner a thousand dollars, 

which means he gave him [Judge Porteous] $2,000,’’ 239 and that 

Judge Porteous’s secretary, Rhonda Danos, picked up an envelope 

with the cash. 240 Creely also testified he told Judge Porteous it 

was not appropriate for him to be sending his secretary to pick up 

the money. 241


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242Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 121 (Ex. 10). 243Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 136-37 (Ex. 10). 

Judge Porteous, testifying in the Fifth Circuit hearing, denied 

recollection of the specific circumstances in which he made a request to Amato, but did not deny that the conversation occurred. 

He admitted that he actually received money from Amato for the 

purposes Amato described, and that the money was received in an 

envelope. 

Q. Do you recall in 1999, in the summer, May, June, receiving $2,000 for [sic: should be ‘‘from’’] them? 

A. I’ve read Mr. Amato’s grand jury testimony. It says we 

were fishing and I made some representation that I 

was having difficulties and that he loaned me some 

money or gave me some money. 

Q. You don’t—you’re not denying it; you just don’t remember it? 

A. I just don’t have any recollection of it, but that would 

have fallen in the category of a loan from a friend. 

That’s all. 242

* * * 

Q. [W]hether or not you recall asking Mr. Amato for 

money during this fishing trip, do you recall getting an 

envelope with $2,000 shortly thereafter? 

A. Yeah. Something seems to suggest that there may have 

been an envelope. I don’t remember the size of an envelope, how I got the envelope, or anything about it. 

* * * 

Q. Wait a second. Is it the nature of the envelope you’re 

disputing? 

A. No. Money was received in [an] envelope. 

Q. And had cash in it? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And it was from Creely and/or—— 

A. Amato. 

Q. Amato? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And it was used to pay for your son’s wedding. 

A. To help defray the cost, yeah. 

Q. And was used—— 

A. They loaned—my impression was it was a loan. 

Q. And would you dispute that the amount was $2,000? 

A. I don’t have any basis to dispute it. 243


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244Danos Dep. I at 21-22 (Ex. 46). Rhonda Danos was deposed twice, first on Aug. 25, 2009, 

referenced as ‘‘Danos Dep. I (Ex. 46),’’ and on December 3, 2009, referenced as ‘‘Danos Dep. II 

(Ex. 47).’’ 245Danos Dep. I at 22 (Ex. 46). 246 Amato Dep at 21-22 (Ex. 24). 247 Amato TF Hrg. I at 104 (‘‘I recall that . . . one of his children were coming to Washington 

to extern, I think, for Senator Breaux, and they were looking for contributions to defray the 

cost.’’). 248Levenson GJ at 64-65, 66 (Ex. 25). 249Gardner GJ at 74 (Ex. 33); Gardner 5th Cir. Hrg. at 468 (Ex. 32); Gardner Dep. at 26- 

27 (Ex. 36). 250Gardner 5th Cir. Hrg. at 471 (Ex. 32); Gardner Dep. at 26 (Ex. 33). The dates of the payments, and the son (or sons) for whom the payments were made, is not entirely clear from the 

record, though Amato, Gardner and Danos all recall these requests being made. 

Danos generally recalled there were two externships. She was ‘‘pretty sure one of them was 

when [Judge Porteous] was, was [a] State [judge]. The other may have been when we were in 

Federal court.’’ Danos Dep. I at 21 (Ex. 46). However, whether these requests and payments 

were made prior to the Liljeberg proceeding or while the decision was pending (or, as appears 

likely, whether there were two externships, one in each time-frame), it was never disclosed to 

Lifemark that Judge Porteous (through Danos) had ever requested, and that Amato and 

Levenson had paid, monies to help support Judge Porteous’s son or sons. 251 Amato TF Hrg. I at 105. 252The date is not noted on Amato’s calendar. 

4. Payments for ‘‘Externship’’ for Judge Porteous’s Son 

At some point in time—and the best evidence suggests that it occurred during the pendency of the Liljeberg case—Judge Porteous 

and his secretary, Rhonda Danos, solicited the four attorneys to 

contribute to an ‘‘externship’’ for Judge Porteous’s son. As Danos 

testified: ‘‘I pretty much knew who to call,’’ identifying Levenson, 

Creely, and Amato among others. 244 She testified that all the attorneys contributed, and indicated that as a general matter they 

gave $500. 245

Amato recalled that ‘‘I just remember that some sort of way that 

. . . Timmy or Tommy needed money to go to Washington, and 

they were passing the hat.’’ 246 He testified he contributed a few 

hundred dollars. 247

Levenson testified that Danos solicited him for funds for Judge 

Porteous’s son: ‘‘[I] recall Rhonda [Danos] saying that they were 

trying to have some friends help him with—I don’t know if it was 

travel expenses or living expenses of something so that he could go 

to Washington’’ and that Levenson gave Rhonda ‘‘a couple hundred 

dollars.’’ 248

Gardner recalled being asked by Judge Porteous himself. He testified: ‘‘[T]o the best of my recollection . . . he [Judge Porteous] 

says that Tommy or one of his sons, and I think it’s Tommy, had 

the opportunity to extern and whatever. It was a golden opportunity, but that there were some expenses resulting as a result of 

it. And I think at that point in time I may have volunteered to give 

him $200 to do that. . . . I don’t know if I gave it to Tommy or 

gave it to his secretary or whatever.’’ 249 Gardner placed the 

externship as occurring sometime in 1998, 1999 or 2000, that is, 

while the Liljeberg case was pending. 250

5. Five Year Anniversary Party—Fall 1999 

Amato and Creely also paid for a party for Judge Porteous to celebrate his fifth year on the Federal bench, at the French Quarter 

Restaurant and Bar, to which his former clerks and other attorneys 

were invited. 251 This would have been in late 1999, during the 

pendency of the Liljeberg case. 252 Danos and Judge Porteous’s 

courtroom deputy clerk, Ricky Windhorst, recalled this party as 


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253Danos Dep. I at 35-37 (Ex. 46). 254 Amato Dep. at 14-15 (Ex. 24). In his deposition he estimated $1,500. At the Task Force Hearing Amato estimated $1,700. TF Hrg. I at 119. 255Levenson Expense Records (Ex. 26). The ‘‘Isle of Capri’’ was the hotel where the restaurant 

was located. Levenson has stated that if Judge Porteous was present, it is likely that he 

(Levenson) would have taken Judge Porteous (among others) to that restaurant, and though he 

did not have a specific memory of each dinner, he had taken Judge Porteous to dinner at the 

Isle of Capri restaurant on at least one occasion. Levenson Dep. II at 9 (Ex. 31). Judge 

Porteous’s credit card records reflect that he was in fact in Biloxi, Mississippi, at these Bar 

events in both 1999 and 2000. Though Judge Porteous’s attendance at the 2000 dinner is not 

certain, that dinner would have been just a few weeks prior to Judge Porteous issuing his opinion in the Liljeberg case. 256 Usry Dep. at 20 (Ex. 163). 257Levenson Dep. at 8-10 (Ex. 30). 258Levenson Dep. at 23 (Ex. 30). 259Levenson Expense Records (Ex. 26). 

well. 253 Amato estimated the amount of the party as approxi- mately $1,500. 254

6. Continued Association and Travel with Levenson while Liljeberg 

was Pending 

During the 1996-2000 time frame, Judge Porteous maintained a 

close relationship with Levenson, characterized by the two men 

traveling together on several occasions. On some of those occasions, 

Levenson purchased meals and drinks for Judge Porteous. 

Meals and Drinks at the Jefferson Bar Association Events in Biloxi, Mississippi. Levenson has stated he paid for meals and drinks 

for Judge Porteous and others at the annual Jefferson Bar Association events held in April of the various years, though he does not 

recall specific meals. His credit card records reflect a charge of 

$197.24 for food at the ‘‘Isle of Capri’’ restaurant in Biloxi on April 

15, 1999, and a charge for $405.38 at that same restaurant on 

April 14, 2000. It is likely he paid for Judge Porteous at one or 

both of these meals. 255

Hunting Trips at Attorney Allen Usry’s Mississippi Property 1996- 

1998. From 1996 through 1998, there were one or two hunting 

trips that included Levenson, Judge Porteous, and other associates 

of Judge Porteous (including a neighbor and a now-deceased bankruptcy judge). Allen Usry, an attorney who on occasion worked 

with Levenson, recalled that Levenson and Judge Porteous came to 

his property to hunt on two occasions during the period after fall 

of 1996 (that is, after Levenson entered his appearance in the 

Liljeberg case) through 1998. Usry recalled that ‘‘probably both 

[hunting trips] . . . [b]ut at least one for sure’’ occurred in this period. 256 Levenson recalled one such trip. 257

Trip to Washington D.C. for Mardi Gras—February 1999. In 

1999, Judge Porteous’s daughter was made a ‘‘Princess’’ in connection with an event generally referred to as Mardi Gras in Washington D.C. This event consisted of meals, drinking, and other entertainment. Levenson traveled to Washington D.C. with Judge 

Porteous for this event. It appears that Judge Porteous paid his 

own airfare and hotel charges. Levenson stated he would not have 

paid for meals, because the meals were provided at that event, 

‘‘[b]ut I’m sure we probably had a round of drinks, several of us at 

the bar, that I would have paid for.’’ 258

Trip to Houston for the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference—April 

1999. In April 1999, Levenson went to Houston as Judge Porteous’s 

invitee for the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference. 259 Levenson paid 

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260Levenson Dep. II at 11-12 (Ex. 31). Levenson’s Hotel Bill reflecting charges at 

‘‘Delmonico’s,’’ and his credit card statement reflecting a dinner at ‘‘Americas’’ are marked as 

part of Levenson Dep. II Ex. 91 (Ex. 291) (LEV 048, 043). 261Levenson Dep. at 19 (Ex. 30). Caesar’s Palace records reveal that Judge Porteous was there 

from October 27-29, 1999. (Ex. 299). 262Levenson Dep. II at 11-12 (Ex. 31). Levenson’s Hotel Bill reflecting charges totaling more than $300 at ‘‘Aqua’’ is marked as part of Levenson Dep. II Ex. 91 (Ex. 291) (LEV 034). 263 Usry Dep at 14 (Ex. 163); Usry Dep. Ex. 86 (Ex. 286). 264Levenson Dep. at 10-13 (Ex. 30). Levenson confirmed that he went on this trip with Judge 

Porteous. Efforts have been made to establish whether Levenson paid for Judge Porteous and, 

if so, what amount. Judge Porteous’s records do not reflect that he paid for the Blackhawk trip; 

but he had only a few months before asked Amato for money, and the evidence demonstrated 

that he hardly ever paid for his own hunting. The Levenson financial records that were obtained 

during the Department’s investigation do not include his 1999 American Express records. 

Blackhawk no longer possessed the pertinent 1999 records. 265Levenson Dep. II at 5 (Ex. 31). 266Levenson Expense Records (Ex. 26). The records were obtained subsequent to Levenson’s 

deposition, and he was not questioned about these charges. 

taurant called ‘‘Americas’’ (for which there is a charge of $574.71 

on his credit card) and other food or drinks at ‘‘Delmonico’s’’ restaurant (for which there are charges amounting to over $200 on 

Levenson’s credit card). 260

Las Vegas—October 1999. In October 1999, Levenson was in Las 

Vegas at the same time as Judge Porteous. ‘‘I don’t recall traveling 

with him. I do remember going to a national bull riding championship with him out there.’’ 261 Levenson recalled paying for a dinner 

with Judge Porteous, and confirmed that the ‘‘Aqua’’ restaurant 

charge of $256 reflected in his hotel records corresponds to that 

meal. 262

Hunting trip at the Blackhawk Hunting Facility—December 1999. 

Usry was offended by the behavior of Judge Porteous and his 

friends during prior hunting trips at his property—stemming from 

their drinking—and falsely told Judge Porteous he had sold his 

Mississippi property so he would not have to invite Judge Porteous 

back. In December 1999, Levenson and Usry planned to go with 

Judge Porteous and another friend of Usry’s to the ‘‘Blackhawk’’ 

hunting facility in Louisiana. Usry recalled that he was going to 

pay for his friend and that Levenson would pay for Judge Porteous. 

Usry’s calendar reflected that this trip was planned for December 

7-10, 1999. 263

A few days prior to the trip, Usry’s friend had a health emergency that made it impossible for him to go on the trip, so Usry 

cancelled as well, leaving Levenson and Judge Porteous to go 

alone. 264 Levenson testified that either he, Usry, or some combination of the two of them ended up paying for Judge Porteous. 

Q. What do you recall about the payment for yourself and 

Judge Porteous at this lodge? 

A. I know I was supposed to make a payment. I don’t recall whether or not I made any payment, and I was unable to find any records where I had made any payments, but I was certainly supposed to pay for myself 

and a portion of some of the other [persons] which 

would have included Judge Porteous. 265

Trip to Houston for the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference—May 

2000. In May 2000, less than 2 weeks after the Liljeberg case was 

decided, Levenson went to San Antonio, Texas, to accompany Judge 

Porteous to the annual Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference. 266

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267Levenson Dep. II at 16-17 (Ex. 31). Levenson’s credit card statement reflecting these payments are marked as part of Levenson Dep. II Ex. 91, at 16-17 (Ex. 291). 268 Amato Dep. at 18-20 (Ex. 24). 269Mole 5th Cir. Hrg. at 193 (Ex. 65). 270Mole TF Hrg. I at 159. 

and his credit card reflects charges of $322.16 at the ‘‘Little Rhein 

Steakhouse’’ (on May 7, 2000), and $201.33 at ‘‘L’Etoile’’ for food 

(on May 9, 2000). 267

7. Conversations with Amato while the Liljeberg Case was Pending 

Amato testified that Porteous made occasional comments to him 

acknowledging that he [Judge Porteous] knew that Amato was 

waiting for the opinion to be issued. Amato interpreted Judge 

Porteous’s comments as being favorable, and testified that he believed that Judge Porteous was going to rule for him. 268

8. These Items of Value were not Disclosed to Lifemark 

Notwithstanding Judge Porteous’s statement at the recusal hearing that: ‘‘I have always taken the position that if there was ever 

any question in my mind that this Court should recuse itself that 

I would notify counsel and give them the opportunity if they wanted to ask me to get off. . . .’’ he did not notify Mole of any of his 

post-recusal hearing (and post-trial) contacts with Amato, Creely, 

or Levenson in order to give Mole the opportunity to move to 

recuse. 

Mole testified he was unaware that Judge Porteous requested 

money from Amato, and that Amato gave him money: 

Q. Were you aware of any cash changing hands in ‘99 during the pendency of this suit? 

A. No. I would have been very alarmed to find out that 

Jake was giving money to the judge during the case as 

being under submission for decision by Judge 

Porteous. 269

Mole similarly denied knowing or being informed ‘‘that Mr. 

Amato and Mr. Levenson took Judge Porteous out to lunch on a 

number of occasions;’’ that ‘‘Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson contributed money to Judge Porteous to help pay for some type of intern 

or externship for one of Judge Porteous’s sons;’’ ‘‘that Amato had 

paid about $1,500 for a party to celebrate Judge Porteous’s fifth 

year on the bench;’’ and that ‘‘with regard to Mr. Levenson, . . . 

that he had, in fact, traveled to Washington with Judge Porteous 

at the end of January 1999, that he traveled to Houston with 

Judge Porteous in April 1999, that he was in Las Vegas with Judge 

Porteous in October 1999, and that Levenson and Judge Porteous 

went on hunting trips together, including a hunting trip to a hunting lodge in December 1999.’’ As Mole testified: ‘‘All of those things 

were the things I—sort of things I feared were happening or would 

happen, but had—I had no knowledge of.’’ 270

At the Fifth Circuit Hearing, Judge Porteous cross-examined 

Mole to elicit the fact that Gardner went on the Las Vegas bachelor 

party trip as well. 

Q. Are you aware that, again, while this case was under 

advisement, that your counsel Mr. Gardner accomVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:55 Mar 04, 2010 Jkt 089008 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR427.XXX HR427

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271Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 194 (Ex. 10). 

panied me and my family to Las Vegas for a bachelor 

party? 

A. No, I did not know that. 

Q. So, he went—if I represent to you that he went, do you 

find anything wrong with that? 

A. You know, I find something wrong with the whole system that allows that to happen, Judge Porteous. So, 

yeah, I do. 

Q. Okay. But if he—should I have recused because I went 

with Gardner? 

A. Well, I’m not the judge here but—— 

Q. I’ll withdraw that question. 

A. Yeah, you should. I think you should. 271

J. APRIL 2000—JUDGE PORTEOUS RULES FOR THE LILJEBERGS; AUGUST 2002—CASE REVERSED BY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF

APPEALS

On April 26, 2000, Judge Porteous issued a written opinion ruling for Amato’s and Levenson’s clients, the Liljebergs. 

In ruling for the Liljebergs, Judge Porteous concluded that 

Lifemark—a lender to the Liljebergs—had breached certain duties 

it purportedly owed to the Liljebergs in connection with a $44 million loan to construct a hospital. Lifemark’s loan to the Liljebergs 

was secured by hospital property owned by the Liljebergs. In 1993, 

Lifemark had failed to take certain steps to secure its debt—it was 

required to ‘‘reinscribe’’ its lien in the appropriate land and title 

records for the lien to remain in effect and had failed to do so. As 

a result, another entity—Travelers—which had obtained an unrelated $7.8 million judgment against the Liljebergs, was able to file 

a lien on the property and place itself in the prime position ahead 

of Lifemark, which had by its inaction lost its security interest. 

Travelers, now in the prime position, executed its $7.8 million judgment on the property, forcing its sale in 1994. The property was 

sold for $26 million—approximately $7.8 million of which went to 

Travelers, and $18 million to Lifemark (now sitting in the second 

position). 

The Liljebergs alleged (and Judge Porteous found) that 

Lifemark’s failure to ‘‘reinscribe’’ its lien breached a duty Lifemark 

purportedly owed to the Liljebergs, and that because of that 

breach, Travelers was able to move to the front of the line (ahead 

of Lifemark) and foreclose on the Liljebergs’ property, in this way 

damaging the Liljebergs. Judge Porteous made this finding despite 

the fact that Travelers could have executed on the property even 

in second position behind Lifemark, and even though the Liljebergs 

could have ‘‘reinscribed’’ the Lifemark lien themselves. In his April 

2000 opinion, Judge Porteous ordered that the 1994 judicial sale be 


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272On this point, Gardner testified he and Judge Porteous had the following off the record 

conversation: 

At the end of that day’s testimony when that was resolved, Mr. Levenson and myself 

went back to talk about the next day, and Judge Porteous commented about the thing. 

He says, ‘‘I’m really having some problems with Lifemark not reinscribing their mortgage and allowing another creditor to jump ahead of that.’’ Because they allowed the 

foreclosure in effect by not reinscribing their mortgage. 

And I said to him, I said, ‘‘Judge’’—I may have said ‘‘big boy’’ because I was friendly 

with him, but we were not in court. And I said, ‘‘I don’t care who you are. No Federal 

judge’’—because I’m very familiar with State law in foreclosures. I did a lot of them 

at [a prior law firm]. ‘‘You cannot overturn a State court foreclosure absent fraud.’’ And 

those people [the Liljebergs] put no evidence whatsoever on about any fraud, because 

they [Lifemark] had a right not to reinscribe their mortgage. They were perfectly in 

their legal rights the way they went about it. 

Gardner Dep. at 53-54 (Ex. 36). 273Mole TF Hrg. I at 160. 274The Liljebergs owned and operated an entity called ‘‘St. Jude.’’ Throughout this discussion, 

for simplicity’s sake, ‘‘St. Jude’’ will be replaced by ‘‘[the Liljebergs].’’ 

‘‘undone.’’ 272 This was extraordinary relief that the Liljebergs had 

not even requested. 273

Lifemark appealed Judge Porteous’s decision to the Fifth Circuit. 

In August 2002, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in striking language, rejected Judge Porteous’s conclusions that Lifemark’s failure 

to preserve its own security interests gave the Liljebergs grounds 

for complaint. The Fifth Circuit characterized various aspects of 

Judge Porteous’s ruling as ‘‘inexplicable,’’ ‘‘a chimera,’’ ‘‘constructed 

entirely out of whole cloth,’’ ‘‘nonsensical,’’ and ‘‘absurd’’: 

The extraordinary duty the district court imposed upon 

Lifemark, who loaned the money to build the hospital and 

held the mortgage on it to secure its payment, is inexplicable. Whatever duty Lifemark may have owed as the 

pledgee of the collateral mortgage note, they do not include 

a requirement that Lifemark reinscribe the mortgage executed in Lifemark’s favor to secure a debt owed by [the 

Liljebergs] 274 to Lifemark, in order that the mortgage may 

retain priority for Lifemark’s benefit as pledgee and mortgagee. As Lifemark aptly points out, ordinarily a debtor 

such as [the Liljebergs] is happy to have its creditor fail 

to record its lien. We reject the assertion that Lifemark as 

the mortgagee here owed a duty to its mortgagor to reinscribe the mortgage, as illustrated in part, indeed, by the 

very difficulty of describing exactly how not protecting a 

mortgage[e]’s first position, in and of itself, could possibly 

harm the mortgagor. 

* * * 

Nor can this theory explain how it can lie beside the undisputed right of Lifemark Hospitals, Inc. to, ‘‘at any time, 

without notice to anyone, release any part of the Property 

from the effect of the Mortgage.’’ . . . The grant of a security interest to secure [the Liljebergs’] debt was to protect 

the lender, Lifemark Hospitals, Inc., not the borrower. 

Nor did Lifemark as mortgagee have a duty to protect 

the hospital owner from other creditors asserting their 

rights against the hospital, as the district court held 

Lifemark did. . . . This is a mere chimera, existing noVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:55 Mar 04, 2010 Jkt 089008 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR427.XXX HR427

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275 In the Matter of: Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 304 F.3d 410, 428-29 (5th Cir. 2002) (Ex. 63). 276 Id. at 431-32 (footnote omitted) (Ex. 63). 277Mole GJ at 41-42 (Ex. 64). 

where in Louisiana law. It was apparently constructed out 

of whole cloth. 275

Judge Porteous offered a second ground for undoing the judicial 

sale, namely, that there was a conspiracy by Lifemark to wrest control of the hospital from the Liljebergs. Evidence of the conspiracy 

included the fact that Lifemark failed to reinscribe its lien and 

thus permitted Travelers to initiate foreclosure proceedings. This 

was also rejected by the Fifth Circuit as ‘‘border[ing] on the absurd’’ and ‘‘close to being nonsensical’’: 

[T]he district court’s findings of a ‘‘conspiracy’’ to wrest 

control of the hospital and medical office building from 

[the Liljebergs] and Liljeberg Enterprises border on the absurd. . . . The district court’s ‘‘conspiracy theory’’ conclusion is 

based, in part, on the view that Liljeberg Enterprises’s or 

[the Liljebergs’] losses were caused by Lifemark. Specifically, not reinscribing the collateral mortgage and not buying out the Travelers lien and adding the Travelers debt 

to the debt owed by [the Liljebergs] to Lifemark. . . . The 

district court and Liljeberg Enterprises offer no statutory 

or case law support for this proposition, for the simple reason that this is not the law. [footnote omitted] 

The theory that Lifemark proximately caused any loss to 

Liljeberg Enterprises or [the Liljebergs] from the Travelers 

foreclosure on its judicial mortgage cannot accommodate 

the undisputed fact that, under Louisiana law, [the 

Liljebergs] could have reinscribed the collateral mortgage 

itself. [footnote omitted] . . . That it could have and did 

not do so is telling. It rends a large hole in the conspiracy 

claim and leaves [the Liljebergs’] inaction unexplained. . . . 

* * * 

[T]he idea that Lifemark deliberately subordinated its 

mortgage interest to Travelers, knowing it would result in 

a required payment, to wit, approximately $7.8 million, to 

Travelers at any judicial sale, comes close to being nonsensical. 276

After the case was reversed by the Fifth Circuit, the parties settled. 277

IX. THE FACTS UNDERLYING ARTICLE II—JUDGE 

PORTEOUS’S CORRUPT RELATIONSHIPS WITH BAIL 

BONDSMAN LOUIS M. MARCOTTE, III, AND LORI MARCOTTE 

A. INTRODUCTION

In the early 1990’s, while a State judge in the 24th Judicial District Court (the ‘‘24th JDC’’) located in Gretna, Louisiana, Judge 

Porteous formed a relationship with local bail bondsman Louis M. 


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278 Affidavit in Support of Application, In the Matter of the Application of the United States 

of America for an Order Authorizing the Interception of Wire Communications, Misc. No. 01- 

2607 (E.D. La., Aug. 27, 2001) (redacted) at 136 (Ex. 69(f)). 279The DOJ Complaint Letter stated: ‘‘Although the investigation developed evidence that 

might warrant charging Judge Porteous with violations of criminal law relating to judicial corruption, many of those incidents took place in the 1990’s and would be precluded by the relevant 

statutes of limitations.’’ DOJ Complaint Letter at 1 (Ex. 4). 

Marcotte, III, and his sister, Lori Marcotte, who operated a bail 

bonds company called Bail Bonds Unlimited (BBU). That relationship was characterized by a course of conduct whereby the 

Marcottes provided numerous things of value to (then) State judge 

Porteous, and Judge Porteous in turn took numerous steps in his 

official capacity to assist the Marcottes in their bail bonds business. 

Judge Porteous was instrumental to the Marcottes in their ability 

to expand their business in the 24th JDC. 

Ultimately, the Marcottes’ conduct and their relationship with 

State judges and other State law enforcement officials came under 

investigation. In the late 1990’s, after Judge Porteous had become 

a Federal judge, the FBI, working with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Louisiana, conducted the 

‘‘Wrinkled Robe’’ investigation, targeting public corruption in the 

setting of bonds in the 24th JDC. This investigation included wiretaps and other covert methods, and resulted in convictions of Louis 

Marcotte, Lori Marcotte, another BBU employee (Norman Bowley), 

two State judges (Ronald Bodenheimer and Alan Green) and several other State law enforcement officials. 

The role Judge Porteous played in the inception of the corrupt 

scheme is discussed generally in the FBI’s August 2001 affidavit in 

support of its request to obtain wiretaps. That affidavit described 

how the Marcottes had provided Judge Porteous (referred to as 

‘‘JUDGE #2’’ in the Affidavit) with meals and a trip to Las Vegas 

and that Judge Porteous had expunged a conviction of a Marcotte 

employee. The Affidavit cited specific instances where Judge 

Porteous set bonds at the Marcottes’ request in order to benefit the 

Marcottes financially. The affidavit concluded that the ‘‘pattern of 

illegal activity has been occurring for at least the last 8 years [i.e., 

from 1993 to 2001] beginning with [Judge Porteous].’’ 278 However, 

as DOJ noted in its 2007 Complaint Letter to the Fifth Circuit, the 

corrupt relationship between Judge Porteous and the Marcottes 

that occurred while Judge Porteous was a State judge, even if it 

were clearly of a criminal nature, could not have been the subject 

of a criminal prosecution as part of Wrinkled Robe, because it was 

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 279

The FBI’s perception of Judge Porteous’s central role in the corruption in the 24th JDC has been confirmed by the Marcottes in 

their Task Force Hearing testimony and in their respective depositions. Not only did Judge Porteous set bonds at the Marcottes’ request, but because Judge Porteous was an influential judge on the 

24th JDC, the Marcottes were able to trade and build on their close 

relationship with him to form corrupt relationships with other 

judges. Significantly, though the Marcottes would give things of 

value to other judges and law enforcement officials who helped 

them throughout the 1990’s and into the 2000’s, several of whom 

were subsequently convicted of Federal corruption offenses, they 

each perceived Judge Porteous to be the single most significant 

judge in assisting them in their business. 


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280Louis Marcotte Dep. at 24-25 (Ex. 68). 281Lori Marcotte Dep. at 66-67 (Ex. 76). 

Louis Marcotte testified: 

Q. Now, of all the judges who have helped you, where 

would you rank Judge Porteous? 

A. Number one. 

Q. Okay. You didn’t even hesitate in that response, did 

you? 

A. No. 

Q. And you’re certain of that; is that right? 

A. Yes. 280

Lori Marcotte, Louis’s sister, who ran the company with Louis, 

testified similarly: 

Q. Who was the single most important judge [to] the success of your company, in the 24th Judicial District 

Court? 

A. Tom Porteous. 

Q. Is there any question in your mind about that? 

A. No. 281

Even as a Federal judge, Judge Porteous took steps to help the 

Marcottes maintain and expand their business. He lent his status 

as Federal judge and reputation on their behalf, notwithstanding 

his knowledge of their corrupt acts. In particular, Judge Porteous 

vouched for the Marcottes with newly elected State judges and 

other judicial officers, and helped the Marcottes secure and cement 

relationships—including a corrupt relationship with one judge in 

particular, former State Judge Ronald Bodenheimer. Judge 

Porteous undertook these efforts while accepting numerous expensive meals from the Marcottes. 

Two other incidents that reflect actions taken by Louis Marcotte 

for the benefit of Judge Porteous are noteworthy. First, in 1994, 

Louis Marcotte was interviewed by the FBI as part of its background check of Judge Porteous in connection with his nomination 

to be a Federal judge. Louis Marcotte was not candid with the FBI 

as to his knowledge of Judge Porteous’s activities. Second, in 2003, 

when he was under criminal investigation, Louis Marcotte prepared an affidavit that generally attempted to exculpate Judge 

Porteous. As discussed below, that affidavit was misleading, if not 

false. 

B. OVERVIEW—THE IMPACT OF LOUISIANA STATE JUDGES ON THE

BAIL BONDS BUSINESSES

In the 24th JDC where Judge Porteous presided as a State judge 

until October 1994, the practices of the State judges in setting 

bonds had enormous financial impact on those in the bail bonds 

business. If the bonds were set too high, persons who were arrested 

would not be able to afford to pay the premium (typically 10% of 


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282The actual amount was 12.5%. Of that amount, 10% went to the bondsman, and 2.5% went 

to the court. The 10% amount will be used for this discussion. 283Lori Marcotte Dep. at 8 (Ex. 76). 284Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 42. 285Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 43. 286Though financial records of Judge Porteous in the 1990-1994 time-period have not been 

obtained, the testimony of those who knew him—including Creely, for example—make it clear 

that Judge Porteous had financial difficulties meeting family obligations. 

the bond) 282 to the bondsman to have the bond posted. If the bond 

was set too low—say, personal recognizance—the bondsman would 

not make any money in the form of premiums. As a general matter, 

a bondsman wanted bonds to be set at profit-maximizing levels— 

that is, the highest amount for which the individual who was arrested could afford to pay the premium, but no higher than the person could pay. As Lori Marcotte testified: 

Q. [E]xplain what the consequences are if bond was set 

too low or if the bond was too high. 

A. It depends on how much money the person had to bail 

out. If they had little money, then having a low bond 

set would be advantageous to us. If they had plenty 

money, then a higher bond would be set. 

Q. [W]hy isn’t it in your best interest for the judge to set 

a $100,000 bond or $1 million bond? Does that mean 

you get $100,000 premium? 

A. Not if the people don’t have the money. No, it doesn’t 

maximize profit to write a bond and not collect all the 

money. 283

In the 24th JDC, the practice was that the Marcottes (or their 

employees or agents) would interview a prisoner upon arrest, find 

out identifying information, the nature of the crime, and the prisoner’s record, locate relatives or persons capable of posting bail, 

and ultimately determine how much the prisoner could afford to 

pay in the form of a premium: ‘‘We would screen the family or the 

defendant to find out how much money they had. At some point, 

we would run credit reports to see if they had available credit on 

their credit cards.’’ 284 The Marcottes would use that information in 

making a recommendation to one of the judges in the courthouse 

as to the amount of bond that the judge should set. 

The procedures in the courthouse during the relevant time period 

called for bond to be set by a sitting magistrate assigned to that 

duty. However, any judge in the courthouse could set bond, so if 

the bondsman thought that the magistrate who would hear the 

case would set the bond too high or too low, the bondsman would 

seek out a favored judge to set the bond at the bondsman’s recommended, profit-maximizing level. As Louis Marcotte explained: 

‘‘[I]f the magistrate wasn’’t favorable, we would start calling the 

judges at home, you know, real early before the magistrate got 

there. And then, if we couldn’t get in touch with them, we would 

go shopping in the courthouse before the magistrate set the 

bond.’’ 285

It is against this background and set of financial incentives that 

Louis Marcotte and Lori Marcotte formed a relationship with Judge 

Porteous. 286


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287Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 44. The various restaurants were described as ‘‘pretty close 

to the same cost’’ as Ruth’s Chris Steak House. Id. 288Lori Marcotte Dep. at 18 (Ex. 76). 289Danos Dep. I at 25-26 (Ex. 46). 290Louis Marcotte was best man at Netterville’s 1994 wedding. 291 Netterville Dep. at 8 (Ex. 92(a)). 292 Bodenheimer Dep. at 8 (Ex. 86). 

C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MARCOTTES AND JUDGE

PORTEOUS THROUGH THE SUMMER OF 1994 

The relationship between Judge Porteous and the Marcottes involved a course of conduct, consisting of Judge Porteous soliciting 

and accepting a steady stream of things of value from the 

Marcottes, while, at the same time, Judge Porteous took a series 

of official actions for their financial benefit. These actions on both 

sides grew more extensive, and more intertwined, from the inception of their relationship in or about 1990 and 1991 to the time 

that Judge Porteous took the Federal bench in late October 1994. 

1. Judge Porteous’s Solicitation and Acceptance of Things of Value 

from the Marcottes 

Meals. The Marcottes frequently took Judge Porteous to lunch, 

along with his secretary Ms. Danos, as well as other courthouse 

personnel or staff. The meals were expensive and involved significant consumption of alcohol. Louis Marcotte estimated they occurred ‘‘around once a week and sometimes twice a week’’ and 

identified the restaurants as ‘‘the Beef Connection, Ruth’s Chris 

[Steak House], a place named Romairs, you know, restaurants near 

the courthouse.’’ 287 Lori Marcotte similarly described the frequency 

of the lunches as ‘‘[a] few times a month. Sometimes once or twice 

a week and then sometimes once a month. So overall, I don’t know, 

twice a month in the whole history, but sometimes more.’’ 288 On 

occasion the lunches would go on for hours, to the point that Lori 

Marcotte left her credit card number with the restaurant—essentially providing Judge Porteous and others access to an open bar 

and unlimited food. 

Several witnesses corroborated the Marcottes. When asked which 

restaurants the Marcottes took her and Judge Porteous to, Danos 

responded: ‘‘Red Maple, Beef Connection, Emeril’s. I’m sure there’s 

others. . . .’’ 289 Attorney Bruce Netterville was friends with Louis 

Marcotte, 290 and was also an occasional guest of the Marcottes 

when they were taking Judge Porteous to lunch. Netterville identified ‘‘Ruth’s Chris Steakhouse on Broad Street and the Red Maple 

which is on Lafayette and, I think 10th, but Lafayette Street in 

Gretna’’ as among the restaurants they went to, but had no doubt 

there were others as well. 291 Bodenheimer (who would subsequently be elected judge) testified that when he was a prosecutor: 

‘‘I was assigned to [Judge Porteous’s] court. And when we broke for 

lunch, he would—Louis and his, one or sometimes both of his sisters, would be there to take him [Judge Porteous] to lunch.’’ 292

Sometimes Louis would call Judge Porteous, sometimes Judge 

Porteous would call Louis: ‘‘It started out with me calling him for 

lunch. And then, as we got closer and developed a relationship, he 


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293Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 44. 294From Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 45: 

Q. [L]et’s just say [you took him to lunch] three times a month for 3 years, so 100 

lunches. Of the 100 lunches that you went to with Judge Porteous at the restaurants 

and at the rates that you described, how many of those did Judge Porteous pay for? 

A. He didn’t pay for any. 295Designations in Table 4 reflect that Lori Marcotte used both a personal (P) and corporate 

(C) American Express account. Records for the Red Maple charges do not indicate the date of 

the month on which the charges were incurred. 

would call and then I would call.’’ 293 According to Louis, Judge 

Porteous never paid for a meal. 294

Corporate credit card records of Louis Marcotte and Lori Marcotte were obtained going back as far as January 1994, as well as 

Lori Marcotte’s personal credit card going back to March 1993. 

These records are consistent with the recollections of the Marcottes 

and other witnesses concerning lunches at the Beef Connection, 

Red Maple, Emerils, and Romairs, and reveal charges at those restaurants on the days shown in the following chart: 295

Bodenheimer testified that Louis’s and Lori’s other sister, Lisa 

Marcotte, was occasionally in attendance at these lunches, and 

there are charges on Lisa Marcotte’s American Express account for 


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296Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 45-46. 297Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 45. See also, Louis Marcotte FBI Interview, 4/29/04, at 3- 

4 (Ex. 72(d)). In his FBI interviews, Louis specifically recalled Judge Porteous requesting that 

Marcotte replace four tires on the car, and in a follow-up phone call to the FBI, Louis Marcotte 

reported that a car stereo for Judge Porteous’s car was purchased at ‘‘Delta Electronics’’ and 

that tires were purchased at ‘‘Uniroyal.’’ The tire business’s name had changed and was called 

‘‘Premier Tire’’ at the time of the interview. Louis Marcotte FBI Interview, Apr. 22, 2004, at 

1 (Ex. 72(b)); Louis Marcotte FBI Interview, Apr. 26, 2004 (Ex. 72(c)). 298Danos testified she knew that the Marcottes paid for the repairs ‘‘Because I, I remember 

Gus [the mechanic] saying it was taken care of or whoever was working there at the time.’’ 

Danos Dep. I at 55-56 (Ex. 46). 299Duhon Dep. at 10, 12 (Ex. 78). 300Wallace Dep. at 6-7 (Ex. 83). 301Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 46. 

meals at the Red Maple and Beef Connection, consistent with the 

amounts set forth above, in this same time period. Lori Marcotte 

and Lisa Marcotte confirmed that on occasion Lisa was in attendance at lunches with Judge Porteous and paid for the meals. 

Automobile repairs and maintenance—early 1990’s. The 

Marcottes, through their employees Jeffery Duhon and Aubrey 

Wallace, began to take care of Judge Porteous’s various automobiles (including those of his family). 296 This service included 

picking up Judge Porteous’s car to have it washed, detailed, and 

filled up with gas, as well as more significant repairs. As Louis 

Marcotte described: ‘‘[F]irst, I started washing it. And then, you 

know, after I would wash it, I would add a little gas to it. And then 

it escalated from there, you know. Then the mechanical work started, the tires, the radios in the cars, and then his son’s cars, and 

transmissions and stuff like that.’’ 297 Danos recalled an incident 

where she went to pick up Judge Porteous’s car from the repair 

shop, and the proprietor told her that the Marcottes were paying 

for the repairs. 298

Duhon testified that he ‘‘took care of three of [Judge Porteous’s] 

cars. I had his, his son’s, and his wife[’s].’’ As to what he meant 

by ‘‘took care of them,’’ Duhon explained: ‘‘Anything. Mostly keeping them maintained, maintenance up on them, transmission, 

brakes, tune-ups, air condition[ing], anything that was wrong with 

his automobiles, his three automobiles.’’ Duhon specifically recalled: ‘‘I had a transmission rebuilt in a Cougar, brake job. I used 

to tune them up, get them tuned up a lot.’’ 299

Aubrey Wallace, another Marcotte employee, similarly testified 

that ‘‘I was assigned on some occasions, several occasions to do detail of the car, just basic maintenance. If it needed some maintenance work, I would bring it to the proper place that it needed to 

go.’’ By ‘‘detailing’’ Wallace meant: ‘‘Generally, just cleaning the car 

inside and out, gassing it up. If there were any additional work 

that I needed to do, it would be specified to me what I needed to 

do.’’ 300

As with the meals, sometimes Louis offered and sometimes 

Judge Porteous solicited car service. As Louis described: ‘‘Well, 

sometimes we would be at lunch and he would say, ‘Well, you 

know, my car is not running well,’ and I would say, ‘Okay, Judge, 

I will take care of that.’ And there was also requests from him, you 

know, asking me to do it. So it worked both ways.’’ 301

Trip to Las Vegas with Judge Giacobbe and Attorney Bruce 

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302The Marcottes had similar incentives to pay for Danos as they did for Judge Porteous— 

she was a gatekeeper to Judge Porteous and would help the Marcottes have access to him, and 

dealt with the jail on bond matters on behalf of Judge Porteous. See e.g., Danos Dep. I at 6 

(Ex. 46). In fact, one measure of the importance of Judge Porteous to the Marcottes is the fact 

that they gave things to his secretary as well to ensure access to him. 303Lori Marcotte Dep. at 29-30 (Ex. 76); 304Lori Marcotte Dep. Ex. 2 (Ex. 202); Lori Marcotte Dep. Ex. 6 (Ex. 206). 305 Affidavit in Support of Application, In the Matter of the Application of the United States 

of America for an Order Authorizing the Interception of Wire Communications, Misc. No. 01- 

2607 (E.D. La., Aug. 27, 2001) (redacted) at 47 (PORT 793)) (Ex. 69(f)). Judge Porteous also admitted going on this trip in a November 1994 interview with the New Orleans Metropolitan 

Crime Commission—a respected private citizens watchdog agency—though he denied that the 

Marcottes paid for him. Interview of United States District Court Judge G. Thomas Porteous 

by Anthony Radosti and Rafael C. Goyaneche, III, Metropolitan Crime Commission, Nov. 9, 1994 

(part of Ex. 85). 306Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 46. 307Louis Marcotte Dep. at 14-15 (Ex. 68). As written up by the FBI, Louis Marcotte stated 

in an April 2004 interview: 

On this [Las Vegas] trip the lawyers and LOUIS split the cost of Judge PORTEOUS’ 

expenses and gave the money to DANOS to put it through her checkbook in order to 

hide the payments. DANOS then wrote a check to pay for the expenses so there was 

no direct link between LOUIS, JUDGE PORTEOUS and [others]. 

and Danos, 302 among others (including attorneys who helped the 

Marcottes in their business), on a trip to Las Vegas with them. 

Judge Porteous did not attend this trip, though Danos did. The trip 

included attending a ‘‘Siegfried and Roy’’ show, as well as a flight 

over the Grand Canyon. One of the dinner bills paid for by Lori 

Marcotte was particularly expensive—‘‘the largest bill we had ever 

paid for dinner.’’ 303 Photographs have been obtained of guests sitting around the table, and of Lori Marcotte holding the bill. 304

Thereafter, from approximately 1992 through 1994, the 

Marcottes paid for at least one, and maybe two, trips for Judge 

Porteous to Las Vegas. 

One of the Las Vegas trips included another State judge—Judge 

George Giacobbe—as well as Netterville, one of the criminal attorneys with whom the Marcottes had dealings in a professional capacity. That trip to Las Vegas is confirmed by Netterville and Lori 

Marcotte and was also mentioned in the Wiretap Affidavit. 305

Louis Marcotte testified he wanted attorneys to be on the trip with 

him and Judge Porteous because ‘‘it just doesn’t look good with a 

bail bondsman hanging out with judges. So what I did is I brought 

some attorneys in to make it look good.’’ 306

Both Louis Marcotte and Lori Marcotte claimed they split the 

costs of the trip with the attorneys and did so by paying cash to 

Judge Porteous’s secretary Danos. Louis Marcotte testified: 

Q. Okay. Now, do you recall how Judge Porteous’[s] travel 

was arranged for and/or paid for? 

A. Yes. My sister brought cash money to Rhonda, and 

Rhonda had wrote the check to pay everything, and we 

reimbursed her. And we got money from the lawyers 

for half of it. 

Q. And how is it that you happen to remember that? 

A. Because that’s just one thing that you’d remember. 

Q. Okay. And was there, was there conscious thought 

about paying Rhonda so the money wouldn’t come— 

look like it’s coming right from you to Judge Porteous? 

A. Right. 307


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Louis Marcotte FBI Interview, 4/30/04 at 5 (Ex. 72(a)). See also, Louis Marcotte FBI Interview, 

Apr. 22, 2004 at 3 (Ex. 72(b)). Lori Marcotte told the FBI that Louis paid for Judge Porteous’s 

airfare, hotel, food and expenses at a club. Lori Marcotte FBI Interview, Mar. 30, 2004 at 2 (Ex. 

74(b)). 308Lori Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 56. 309 ‘‘LORI remembered DANOS called LOUIS [Marcotte] and told LOUIS that PORTEOUS 

was ready to go to Las Vegas.’’ Lori Marcotte FBI Interview, Apr. 21, 2004 at 1 (Ex. 74(d)) See 

also Lori Marcotte FBI Interview, Apr. 2, 2004 at 6 (Ex. 74(c)). 310 Netterville Dep. at 11-12 (Ex. 92(a)). 311Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 47. 312Lori Marcotte FBI Interview, Mar. 30, 2004 at 2 (Ex. 74(b)); Lori Marcotte FBI Interview, 

Apr. 2, 2004 at 8 (mentioning possible trip associated with a bail bonds convention) (Ex. 74(c)). 313Danos Dep. I at 15 (Ex. 46). 

Lori Marcotte likewise recalled ‘‘standing in [Danos’s] office, with 

another attorney, handing her the money.’’ 308 According to Lori 

Marcotte, this trip to Las Vegas, paid for by the Marcottes, was initiated at Judge Porteous’s request. 309

Attorney Netterville testified that he did not recall how much he 

actually paid for the trip but acknowledged that if he had been 

asked to pay for more than his individual personal share (i.e., if he 

had been asked to chip in for the judges) he would have done so. 

Netterville testified: 

Q. But you don’t doubt that if Louis said your share of 

this trip is ‘‘X’’ dollars that that’s something you would 

have paid? 

A. Yes, I would have. 310

Possible second trip to Las Vegas. Louis Marcotte and Lori Marcotte both testified they believed there was a second trip where 

they took Judge Porteous to Las Vegas, a fact that appears supported by Danos as well. Louis recalled a second trip because he 

‘‘remember[ed] we were standing by a slot machine, and his wife 

was asking him for some change to put—some dollars to put back 

in, coins, you know, to put back into the slot machine.’’ 311

Lori Marcotte also testified there may have been a second trip 

to Las Vegas paid for by the Marcottes, possibly in connection with 

Judge Porteous speaking at a Professional Bail Agents of the 

United States (PBUS) Convention. 312

Danos did not recall Judge Porteous taking the previously described trip with Judge Giacobbe and the attorneys (a trip that she 

did not attend). 313 However, she, like Lori Marcotte, recalled what 

appeared to be a different Marcotte-Judge Porteous trip to Las 

Vegas in connection with one of the PBUS conventions that Danos 

herself attended: 

Q. [D]id the Marcottes ever take Judge Porteous to Las 

Vegas, either with you on any trip that you were in attendance on or on a trip that you know they took him 

on even if you were not in attendance on? 

A. One Las Vegas trip. 

Q. Okay. And what do you recall about that trip? 

A. Not very much. It was their convention. And I think 

they would have liked for him to have spoken, but they 

already had speakers lined up. 

Q. Okay. And you were in attendance on that trip? 


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314Danos Dep. I at 15 (Ex. 46). See also Danos Dep. II at 11 (recalling being on a Marcotte 

trip to Las Vegas with Judge Porteous) (Ex. 47). 315Danos Dep. I at 17 (Ex. 46). 316Danos Dep. II at 12 (Ex. 47). See also Danos Dep. I at 18 (‘‘One trip I do recall putting 

the judge’s fare on my card. But I, don’t recall if it was Lori or Louis that reimbursed me.’’) 

(Ex. 46). 317See Duhon Dep. at 13-14 (Ex. 78); Wallace Dep. at 10-11 (Ex. 83). The fence repairs occurred either prior to Wallace’s February 1991 incarceration or subsequent to his August 1993 

release. 318Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 46. See also, Louis Marcotte FBI Interview, Apr. 29, 2004, 

at 7-8 (Ex. 72(d)). 319Lori Marcotte FBI Interview, Mar. 30, 2004, at 2 (Ex. 74(b)). 320 At some point in 1993, Judge Porteous officiated at Adam Barnett’s wedding, which was 

also attended by Lori Marcotte. 

A. Yes, sir. 314

* * * 

Q. The trip which there was a bail bond convention going 

on, and I think it’s your testimony that to the best of 

your recollection this was still when he was a State 

judge, I take it, is it your testimony that that was a 

trip that was paid for by the Marcottes? 

A. I think it was. 315

Consistent with both Louis’s and Lori’s testimony, Danos did recall that on one occasion the Marcottes reimbursed her for Judge 

Porteous’s trip to Las Vegas. Danos did not dispute that it was Lori 

who paid her in cash. 316

Fence repairs. In or about 1994—while Judge Porteous was still 

a State judge—Marcotte’s employees Duhon and Wallace rebuilt a 

fence at Judge Porteous’s house. They were there more than 1 day 

and also performed other repairs at the house. They both recalled 

picking up lumber at Home Depot and described the incident in 

consistent terms. 317 Louis Marcotte described the incident as follows: ‘‘[W]e were at lunch and he mentioned, ‘Well, look, my fence 

blew over in the storm.’ And I said, ‘Well, you know, I got two guys 

that will take care of it for you. No problem.’ ’’ 318 Lori Marcotte 

confirmed they paid for a fence for Judge Porteous. 319

Favors for Judge Porteous’s Son. The Marcottes permitted one of 

Judge Porteous’s sons to use one of their parking spaces near the 

courthouse for his courier business. They also hired his son on occasion. 

2. Judge Porteous’s Actions on Behalf of the Marcottes 

Setting Bonds. When Louis Marcotte first entered the bail bonds 

business as the owner of Bail Bonds Unlimited (BBU), he did not 

have connections with judges or other law enforcement personnel 

in the 24th JDC where he did the bulk of his work. Louis and Lori 

came to know Judge Porteous through another bondsman—Adam 

Barnett (who in turn knew Judge Porteous from other connections 

in the courthouse). 320 On occasion, when Louis Marcotte needed a 

‘‘difficult’’ bond to be set, Barnett would go to Judge Porteous to 

have him set the bond. Barnett was not an employee of Marcotte’s, 

but Louis Marcotte would provide Barnett some portion of the premium that was paid by the individual for whom bond was posted. 

Louis Marcotte gradually excluded Barnett as the middleman 

and he and Lori began to deal with Judge Porteous directly. As 

Louis and Lori began to do things for Judge Porteous—described 


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321Lori Marcotte Dep. at 13-14 (Ex. 76). 322Lori Marcotte Dep. at 14 (Ex. 76). 323Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 47. 324Other witnesses describe the Marcottes’ frequent access to Judge Porteous. These witnesses include Lori Marcotte, Danos, Netterville (a criminal defense attorney who associated 

with the Marcottes), Aubrey Wallace (Marcotte employee), and Bodenheimer (a prosecutor at the 

time, and eventually a State judge). 325Duhon Dep. at 7-9 (Ex. 78). 

in the previous section—Judge Porteous became the ‘‘go-to’’ judge 

for the Marcottes. Over the time period roughly between 1990 

through 1994, as the Marcottes increasingly gave Judge Porteous 

things of value, they would increasingly go to Judge Porteous to 

have him set bonds at amounts they requested, and would seek 

other favors from him. It started ‘‘just a little bit’’ but, as Lori Marcotte described: ‘‘[I]n the end it was a lot. It was an everyday, everyday thing in the courthouse. We’d go to the courthouse to see 

him in his office, call him on his cell phone, call him at home, contact him through his secretary. If he wasn’t in the office, she would 

find him for us, get, get him off the bench. When we needed him 

to set a bond, he was available for us to set a bond, or split a bond 

too.’’ 321 As to the frequency of their contacts: ‘‘A few times a week. 

And sometimes when we would go to see him, we’d have more than 

one bond, sometimes ten at a time. We would make a stack of 

worksheets and bring bonds. So it’s not so much how, how many 

times in a week. It’s when we did go, we always had more than 

one.’’ 322

Louis Marcotte described the reasons he gave Judge Porteous 

things of value as follows: 

Q. The real question, Mr. Marcotte, is, why did you do all 

of these things for Judge Porteous? What value were 

you getting by virtue of the fact that you were providing him this stream of value? 

A. I wanted service, I wanted access, and I wanted to 

make money. 323

The Marcottes’ access to Judge Porteous is corroborated by numerous witnesses who saw the Marcottes around his courtroom or 

in his chambers. 324 For example, Marcotte employee Duhon testified that Louis Marcotte would go to Judge Porteous more than to 

any other judge in the courthouse to get bonds set. He further described Louis’s access to Judge Porteous as follows: 

Q. [W]ould you describe what it would be like to have 

Judge Porteous go in and set bond at the request of 

Louis? 

A. Yes. He’d get to his chambers at 9:00 in the morning, 

and they might have 10 or 12 lawyers waiting there. 

Me and Louis would just walk right by both of them, 

all of them and walk into his office and have a seat carrying sheets of paper which is like bond form we bring 

to them, and he let them see them. 325

Splitting bonds. One way in particular that Judge Porteous 

helped the Marcottes was through a practice referred to as ‘‘splitting’’ a bond. If a bond for a serious crime would otherwise naturally be set at an amount that would be too high for an accused 

to pay the required premium, a judge could ‘‘split’’ the bond into 


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326Louis Marcotte noted that, frequently, the bail component that was not backed by a surety 

bond may have had no real value. Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 48 (‘‘[M]ost of the time the 

personal surety wasn’t worth anything, and the only portion of the bond that was worth something was the commercial part of the bond that was executed by the bail agent and backed by 

the insurance company.’’). 327Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 47. 328See Lori Marcotte Dep. at 15 (Ex. 76). As described by the FBI in its wiretap affidavit: 

[I]t is common practice for bondsmen to attempt to get a bond reduced in order to make a bond 

more affordable; however, there is a built-in reluctance to grant such requests, especially in 

cases where serious crimes are involved. This reluctance is based primarily on the fact that a 

Judge, who depends on the public vote to keep his/her job, fears potential serious criticism from 

the public in general and from the media in particular if a defendant commits another serious 

crime while out on bond. Splits are a much more attractive means of making bonds ‘‘affordable’’ 

because a Judge can always argue he/she did not ‘‘reduce a bond.’’ 

Affidavit in Support of Application at 20-21, In the Matter of the Application of the United 

States of America for an Order Authorizing the Interception of Wire Communications, Misc. No. 

01-2607 (E.D. La., Aug. 27, 2001) (redacted) at 20-21 (Ex. 69(f)). 329 Bodenheimer Dep. at 6-7 (Ex. 86). 330Lori Marcotte Dep. at 17 (Ex. 76). The act of setting a bond is entrusted to a Judge’s discretion, so it cannot be argued that the actions of Judge Porteous in splitting or reducing in 

bond in any particular cases was ‘‘right’’ or ‘‘wrong,’’ or that splitting bonds in general was either appropriate or inappropriate across the board. 

two pieces—one portion was a standard commercial bond, the other 

was a property bond or other personal promise not backed up by 

a bondsman. As an example, a $100,000 bond could be ‘‘split’’ into 

a regular $50,000 commercial bond and a $50,000 component that 

was secured by property or by the promise of a third party (the 

accused’s mother, for example) to pay $50,000 if the accused did 

not appear as required. 326 By splitting the bond, the accused needed only to come up with the premium for the $50,000 piece, that 

is, $5,000. A judge’s action in splitting a high bond would mean 

that the Marcottes would receive some premium rather than no 

premium. 

A ‘‘split bond’’ had political value for the elected State judges who 

‘‘liked setting high bonds, because if it came out in the newspaper 

that, you know, something happened and the guy [who was let out 

on a split bond] did something wrong, then it would look like he 

got out on a high bond.’’ 327 A judge who ‘‘split’’ a bond could claim 

that he did not actually reduce the bond (even though in substance 

this was the effect). Certain individuals in the law enforcement 

community opposed this practice, and there were some judges who 

would not ‘‘split’’ bonds. 328

Judge Porteous became associated with this practice of ‘‘splitting 

bonds’’ and bragged about having invented it (even though it may 

have been done by other judges in the past). Former State Judge 

Bodenheimer testified it was his understanding that Judge 

Porteous ‘‘was the one who somehow came up with this idea of 

doing these bond splittings’’ and that Louis Marcotte ‘‘told me that 

Porteous was, was the one who came up with the idea about splitting bonds in the first place.’’ 329 Lori Marcotte stated that ‘‘because 

Judge Porteous was respected in the courthouse by other judges, 

his peers, the District Attorney’s office, Judge Porteous—by Judge 

Porteous splitting and setting bonds for us was making it like the 

norm, creating the practice of splitting bonds. He actually originated this practice of splitting bonds.’’ 330

Setting aside convictions. Judge Porteous took other significant 

official actions as favors to the Marcottes. In 1993 at Louis 

Marcotte’s request, he set aside the burglary conviction of Jeffery 

Duhon. Duhon was not only an employee of the Marcottes but was 


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331 In 2003, after Louis Marcotte was publicly identified as the subject of a criminal investigation, Judge Porteous’s expungement of Duhon’s record was reported in the local newspapers: 

Duhon said it was Porteous who gave him his break in 1992, when the judge expunged his felony record as a favor to Marcotte, allowing him to apply for a bail bonds 

license. Duhon had been arrested for burglary when he was 17, a charge for which he 

served 93 days in jail for probation violation, he said. 

M. Carr and M. Torres, ‘‘Judges Were Given Gifts; Marcotte’s Ex-workers Tell of Shrimp, 

Fence,’’ New Orleans Times-Picayune, Feb. 8, 2003 (part of the Metropolitan Crime Commission 

Documents, at MCC 0199-200 (Ex. 85), and separately marked as Ex. 119(e)). 332Marcotte Dep. at 6-8 (Ex. 68). Exhibit 77(a) is the Motion for Expungement. That Motion 

is undated, however, it was assigned to ‘‘Division B’’—Judge E.V. Richards—of the 24th Judicial 

District Court. Judge Richards set a hearing on that Motion for July 15, 1993. It is not known 

if that hearing took place. Ex. 77(b) is the Judgment of Expungement dated July 29, 1993, 

signed by Judge Porteous. 333Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 48. 334Marcotte Dep. at 6-8 (Ex. 68). 335 Bodenheimer testified: ‘‘Out of all the judges there—Porteous came from the District Attorney’s Office—and he was probably the most influential judge with the District Attorney’s office, 

in my opinion.’ Bodenheimer Dep. at 5 (Ex. 86). Netterville similarly testified that Judge 

Porteous was perceived to be an influential Judge on the 24th JDC. Netterville Dep. at 9 (Ex. 

92). 336Louis Marcotte FBI Interview, May 17, 2004 at 2 (Ex. 72(e)). 337Louis Marcotte FBI Interview, Apr. 22, 2004 at 3 (Ex. 72(b)). 

also married to Lisa Marcotte (Louis’s other sister). 331 Louis Marcotte testified he ‘‘approached Porteous to see if he would expunge 

Jeff Duhon’s record’’ and that Judge Porteous did so. 332 Judge 

Porteous’s action in setting aside Duhon’s conviction was particularly unusual because Duhon had been sentenced by Judge E. V. 

Richards, not Judge Porteous, ‘‘[s]o what [Judge Porteous] did was 

he took the conviction out of another section and brought it in his 

section and then expunged the record.’’ 333 Louis Marcotte elaborated that in his experience, it was unusual for a judge in one division to expunge a conviction in a criminal case assigned to a judge 

in a different division. 334

Additionally, as discussed below, on the eve of his ascension to 

the Federal bench in October 1994, Judge Porteous set aside the 

conviction of Aubrey Wallace, another Marcotte employee. 

Helping the Marcottes with Judge Alan Green and other Judges. 

As noted, Judge Porteous was a former prosecutor, had a good relationship with the District Attorney, and was perceived by many in 

the courthouse to be influential on the bench. 335 By forming a public relationship with Judge Porteous, the Marcottes gained credibility with other State judges on the 24th JDC. Thus, the 

Marcottes sought to have other State judges included in their 

lunches with Judge Porteous. Louis Marcotte told the FBI he 

‘‘wanted to target judges who were not doing bonds and asked 

RHONDA DANOS [Judge Porteous’s secretary] to invite them to 

lunch with Judge PORTEOUS.’’ 336 An FBI write-up of another 

Louis Marcotte interview recounts: ‘‘MARCOTTE frequently called 

on PORTEOUS to help bring in other judges MARCOTTE could 

use to split bonds, reduce bonds and give MARCOTTE good service.’’ 337

As one example, Judge Porteous helped connect the Marcottes 

with Judge Alan Green (who was ultimately convicted of a corruption offense arising from his relationship with the Marcottes). Lori 

Marcotte described this in her Task Force Hearing testimony as 

follows: 

I remember setting up a lunch with some other judges and 

some attorneys and Judge Porteous and Rhonda, and we 

had—they had invited or we had invited Judge Green who 


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338Lori Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 57. See also Lori Marcotte FBI Interview, Apr. 2, 2004 at 

1 (Ex. 74(c)) (‘‘After Green won the election, Lori and Louis discussed initiating a relationship 

with Green via Judge Porteous. Porteous got Green to come to lunch with Porteous and the 

Marcottes which was set up by Danos [Porteous’s secretary]. They had lunch at Romer’s (ph) 

[should be ‘Romair’s’].’’). Danos also identified Judge Green as one of the judges who accompanied them with Judge Porteous on lunches when he was a State judge. Danos Dep. I at 27 

(Ex. 46). 339Lori Marcotte FBI Interview, Nov. 5, 2004 at 2 (Ex. 74(e)). 340 Bail Bonds Unlimited v. Bobby Gene Hollingsworth, No. 467-905, Div. E (J. McManus) 

(24th Jud. Dist. Ct., Jeff. Par., La.) (Ex. 91(b)). 341Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 51. 

was newly elected. And, I mean, it is pretty clear because 

that was really the first lunch where Judge Porteous had 

explained the concept of splitting bonds. That was kind of 

like the stage for everything else that would happen. 338

This practice of having Judge Porteous vouch for the Marcottes 

with the State judges in the 24th JDC continued after Judge 

Porteous became a Federal judge. 

Helping in civil ‘‘non-compete’’ litigation. The Marcottes also requested that Judge Porteous help lobby other judges on their behalf in connection with ‘‘non-compete’’ litigation initiated by the 

Marcottes against a former employee. As written up by the FBI, 

Lori Marcotte described the request for assistance in a BBU civil 

case against a former employee, Bobby Gene Hollingsworth, as follows: 

BBU [Bail Bonds Unlimited] sued BOBBY HOLLINGSWORTH over a non-compete clause in his contract. LOUIS 

MARCOTTE went to JUDGE PORTEOUS and wanted 

JUDGE PORTEOUS to call JUDGE CLARENCE McMANNUS and tell him how to rule. JUDGE PORTEOUS said 

he would contact JUDGE McMANNUS and called him 

while LOUIS MARCOTTE was in JUDGE PORTEOUS’ 

chambers. McMANNUS ruled in favor of BBU. 339

The official court case jacket is consistent with this recollection, 

and reveals that the Marcottes (Bail Bonds Unlimited) filed the 

case against Hollingsworth in August 1994, shortly prior to Judge 

Porteous taking the Federal bench. The Marcottes initially obtained a Temporary Restraining Order restraining Hollingsworth 

from competing against them, then obtained a permanent injunction which was to be in effect until September 1995. 340

C. THE JULY-AUGUST 1994 BACKGROUND CHECK

OF JUDGE PORTEOUS

The bulk of the background investigation of Judge Porteous in 

connection with his nomination to the Federal bench occurred in 

July and early August 1994. On August 1, 1994, Louis Marcotte 

was interviewed as part of that standard background check. It is 

not known how the FBI got Louis Marcotte’s name as a person to 

interview; however, Marcotte testified that Judge Porteous told him 

‘‘that the FBI is going to be coming to interview you.’’ 341 Louis 

Marcotte told the FBI as follows: 

MARCOTTE said the candidate [Porteous] is of good character and has a good reputation in general. He said the 

candidate is well-respected and associates with attorneys 

who are upstanding individuals. He does not know the 


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342Porteous Background Check Documents, at PORT 503-04 (Ex. 69(b)). 343Porteous Background Check Documents, at PORT 503-04 (Ex. 69(b)). 344Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 49. 345Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 49 (‘‘I knew he was struggling, because his cars were in deplorable condition.’’). 346Louis Marcotte Dep. at 12 (Ex. 68). 347Louis Marcotte Dep. at 11 (Ex. 68). In his Task Force Hearing testimony, Louis Marcotte 

repeated his testimony that Judge Porteous would have numerous vodka drinks at lunch and 

that he deliberately misled the FBI about his knowledge of Judge Porteous’s drinking. Louis 

Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 49. Thus, Louis Marcotte, like Robert Creely, was not candid with the 

FBI as to both Judge Porteous’s financial circumstances and as to his drinking. 348Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 50. 349Porteous Background Check Document, at PORT 462-63 (Ex. 69(c)). 

candidate to associate with anyone of questionable character. 342

As to Judge Porteous’s drinking and financial situation, the writeup reports: 

He [MARCOTTE] advised that the candidate will have a 

beer or two at lunch, but has never seen him drunk. He 

has no knowledge of the candidate’s financial situation. 343

Louis Marcotte acknowledged that these statements about Judge 

Porteous’s financial situation and drinking habits were false. As to 

Judge Porteous’s financial condition, Marcotte has since testified 

that he knew at the time that Judge Porteous was ‘‘struggling’’: 

‘‘[B]y looking at the surroundings and the problems with the drinking and the cars and asking people for repairs and stuff like that, 

you know, one would think that, hey this guy is struggling. And 

by looking at the cars, you could see that he was struggling.’’ 344

He further described Judge Porteous’s cars as being in ‘‘deplorable 

condition.’’ 345

As to Judge Porteous’s drinking, Louis Marcotte bluntly described his statement to the FBI that Judge Porteous would have 

a ‘‘beer or two’’ at lunch in the following terms: ‘‘That’s a false 

statement.’’ 346 Marcotte testified that he was familiar with Judge 

Porteous’s drinking, and ‘‘knew that he [Judge Porteous] was an alcoholic. He drank a lot. . . . He would drink four or five glasses 

of Absolut for lunch.’’ 347

Finally, the FBI interview quoted Louis Marcotte as stating that 

he ‘‘was not aware of anything in the candidate’s background that 

might be the basis of attempted influence, pressure, coercion or 

compromise or would impact negatively on the candidate’s [Judge 

Porteous’s] character, reputation, judgement or discretion.’’ Louis 

Marcotte acknowledged that he ‘‘was lying again,’’ not only because 

of his knowledge of Judge Porteous’s ‘‘actions with the gambling, 

the drinking’’ but because of Louis Marcotte’s knowledge of his own 

relationship with Judge Porteous, which gave him leverage over 

Judge Porteous. 348

After the initial portion of the background check had been completed, FBI Headquarters directed that further investigation be 

conducted as a result of some derogatory information that was uncovered (including allegations as to Judge Porteous’s drinking and 

that he was living above his means). 349


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350Louis Marcotte FBI Interview, Aug. 17, 1994, at PORT 513-14 (Ex. 69(b)). The FBI was 

primarily concerned with certain bonds that Judge Porteous had set at the request of an attorney at a time prior to Marcotte having formed a relationship with Judge Porteous. 351 Note to DOJ re: Judge Porteous, Aug. 19, 1994, at PORT 530 (Ex. 69(b)). 352Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 51. 353Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 64. 354Wallace had been arrested on burglary charges on May 8, 1989; he pleaded guilty to the 

felony charge of simple burglary on June 26, 1990 and was sentenced the same day to a suspended sentence of 3 years incarceration and placed on probation for 2 years. State v. Wallace, 

No. 89-2360 (24th Jud. Dist. Ct., Jeff. Par., La.) (court case file) (Ex. 82). At the time of his 

May 1989 burglary arrest, Wallace was under indictment for felony drug charges (PCP and cocaine) for an offense alleged to have occurred on December 15, 1988. 

While he was on probation for the burglary conviction, Wallace pleaded guilty on February 

26, 1991, to the felony drug charges of possession of over 28 grams of cocaine and possession 

of PCP and was sentenced to 5 years incarceration. 355Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 51. Louis Marcotte’s Task Force Hearing testimony tracked 

his statement to the FBI in 2004 in which he stated that Judge Porteous wanted to wait until 

after his Senate confirmation to set aside Wallace’s conviction: 

PORTEOUS waited until the last days of his term as a 24th Judicial District Court 

Judge to expunge AUBREY WALLACE’S criminal record. PORTEOUS did not want the 

fact that he expunged WALLACE’S record to be exposed in the media or discovered in 

On August 17, 1994, Louis Marcotte was briefly reinterviewed, 350 and the background investigation was completed a few 

days later. 351

At the Task Force Hearing, Marcotte testified that after the FBI 

interview (it was not clear which one), he met with Judge Porteous 

and ‘‘told him [Judge Porteous] everything that they asked 

about’’ 352 and that he had given Judge Porteous ‘‘a clean bill of 

health.’’ 353

On August 25, 1994, Judge Porteous was nominated by President 

Clinton to be a United States District Court Judge for the Eastern 

District of Louisiana. 

D. JUDGE PORTEOUS’S ACTIONS TO BENEFIT THE MARCOTTES

DURING HIS FINAL MONTHS ON THE STATE BENCH

1. September-October 1994 Set-Aside of Wallace’s Felony Conviction 

After he was nominated, and around the time of his Senate confirmation process, Judge Porteous was pressed by Louis Marcotte 

to set aside the felony burglary conviction of his employee Aubrey 

Wallace. 354 As described by Louis Marcotte: 

Q. [W]hat was Judge Porteous’s response when you made 

that request of him? 

A. He waffled a little bit because he wasn’t confirmed at 

the time, but he told me—I saw him a few times, I 

pushed him and said, you know, ‘‘Judge, you know, I 

really need to get this done.’’ He said, ‘‘After my confirmation, I will do it.’’ 

Q. And, in fact, did he do it? 

A. Yes, he did. 

Q. And, in your mind, do you have an opinion as to why 

Judge Porteous set aside Wallace’s conviction? 

A. Because all of the stuff that I have done for him in the 

past. 

Q. Was there any question in your mind that he set aside 

the conviction as a favor to you? 

A. Yes, he did it for me. 355


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his background investigation for his Federal judicial appointment. PORTEOUS told 

MARCOTTE that he (PORTEOUS) would act on WALLACE’S expungement after he 

was appointed to the Federal judicial bench. PORTEOUS told MARCOTTE he was not 

going to risk a lifetime judicial appointment for WALLACE. 

Louis Marcotte FBI Interview, Oct. 15, 2004 at 1 (Ex. 72(g)). Lori Marcotte specifically recalled 

that ‘‘we went to Judge Porteous to ask him if he would expunge Aubrey Wallace’s criminal 

record. My brother and myself, we went to Judge Porteous’[s] office.’’ Lori Marcotte Dep. at 25- 

26 (Ex. 76). 356Motion to Amend Sentence, State of Louisiana v. Aubrey N. Wallace, No. 89-2360 (24th 

Jud. Dist Ct., Jeff. Par., La.), Sept. 20, 1994, (part of Ex. 82). Wallace’s first name is spelled 

‘‘Aubry’’ in the court records from this case. The correct spelling of his first name is in fact ‘‘Aubrey.’’ Accordingly, throughout this Report, his first name will be spelled ‘‘Aubrey’’ regardless 

of how it may have been spelled in court records. 357Transcript of Proceedings, State of Louisiana v. Aubrey Wallace, No. 89-2360 (24th Judicial 

Dist. Ct., Jeff. Par.), Sept. 21, 1994, at PORT 0620-24 (part of Ex. 69(d)). Probation was initially 

deemed to have been unsatisfactorily completed because Wallace was incarcerated while on probation. 358The Order stated in full: 

ORDER 

Considering the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the sentence on Aubrey WALLACE 

is hereby amended to include the following wording, ‘‘the defendant plead under Article 

893.’’ 

GRETNA, LOUISIANA this 22 day of September, 1994. 

G. Thomas Porteous /s/ 

JUDGE 

Order (amending sentence), Louisiana v. Aubrey N. Wallace, No. 89-2360 (24th Jud. Dist Ct., 

Jeff. Par., La.), Sep. 22, 1994 (part of Ex. 82). 

Setting aside Wallace’s burglary conviction required Judge 

Porteous to take two steps: first, the sentence for Wallace’s burglary conviction—a sentence which Wallace had completed—had to 

be amended from one which, as a matter of law, was not eligible 

to be set aside, to one that could be set aside; second, the sentence, 

having been so amended, would then need to be set aside. 

On September 20, 1994, Robert Rees, an attorney who did occasional criminal work and thus had interactions with the Marcottes, 

filed a motion on behalf of Wallace to set aside Wallace’s conviction. This was a bare-bones motion, reciting only that Wallace had 

been sentenced in 1990 and now ‘‘desires to amend his sentence to 

give him benefit under Article 893.’’ 356

On September 21, 1994, Judge Porteous held a hearing in which 

he took the first step in the set aside process, by amending Wallace’s sentence to make it eligible to be set aside. At that hearing, 

Netterville (an attorney who did business with the Marcottes and 

who had traveled to Las Vegas with Judge Porteous and Louis 

Marcotte in or about 1992 or 1993) stood in for Rees. Netterville 

did not recall this hearing or how he came to stand in for Rees, and 

he did not consider Wallace a client. His appearance was limited 

to his saying ‘‘Thank you, Judge’’ and ‘‘Thank you.’’ The entire 

hearing was less than one transcript page, the critical portion consisting of Judge Porteous’s conclusion: ‘‘Accordingly, the sentence 

will be amended to include removal of the unsatisfactory removal 

of probation and the entering of the plea under Code of Criminal 

Procedure 893. All right. I’ve signed the order.’’ 357

On Thursday, September 22, 1994, Judge Porteous signed the 

written order that was proposed as part of the underlying September 20, 1994 Motion. The Order amended the sentence so that 

it would represent that the defendant pleaded guilty under a provision of State law (Article 893) which permitted the conviction to be 

set aside. 358

Judge Porteous’s Senate confirmation hearing occurred 2 weeks 

later, on Thursday, October 6, 1994. He was confirmed by the SenVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:55 Mar 04, 2010 Jkt 089008 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR427.XXX HR427

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359Transcript of Proceedings, State of Louisiana v. Aubrey N. Wallace, No. 89-2360 (24th Jud. 

Dist. Ct., Jeff. Par., La.), Oct. 14, 1994, at PORT 000625-29 (Ex. 69(d)). The attorney’s name 

was Robert Rees (without the ‘‘e’’). It is reported in the documents as Robert ‘‘Reese,’’ and that 

spelling is used in the quoted materials. The prosecutor in the courtroom for the two hearings, 

Assistant District Attorney Michael Reynolds, stated in a Task Force Staff interview on January 

5, 2010, that the set-aside didn’t ‘‘smell right’’ to him at the time, that it was wrong as a matter 

of discretion and perhaps illegal, but that because of Judge Porteous’s close relationship with 

the then-District Attorney, there was nothing he could do. 

On October 19, 1994, Judge Porteous signed again the same order he had previously signed 

on September 22, 1994 (the order amending the sentence to permit it to be set aside). It is not 

known why he signed this second identical order. It was actually signed after Judge Porteous 

had set aside the conviction. 360Order (setting aside arrest and dismissing charges), State of Louisiana v. Aubrey N. Wallace, No. 89-2360 (24th Jud. Dist Ct., Jeff. Par., La.), Oct. 14, 1994 (part of Ex. 82). 

ate on Friday, October 7, 1994, and received his commission the 

following Tuesday, October 11, 1994. 

On Friday, October 14, 1994, 1 week after being confirmed but 

prior to being sworn in as a Federal judge (which occurred on October 28, 1994), Judge Porteous held another hearing on the Wallace 

matter to finish the process, this time with Rees appearing for Wallace. Again, the transcript of the entire hearing takes up but one 

transcript page, starting as follows: 

Mr. Reese: You Honor, Robert Reese on behalf of—— 

Judge Porteous: I’m going to grant that. I’ve already 

amended the sentence to provide for a 

893. 

* * * 

Under 893 the dismissal will be entered. 359

Judge Porteous also signed a written order that date to the same 

effect, thus setting aside Marcotte employee Wallace’s 1990 burglary conviction. 360

November 1994—Judge Porteous’s Interview by the Metropolitan 

Crime Commission. Shortly after setting aside Wallace’s conviction, 

an allegation was made to the New Orleans Metropolitan Crime 

Commission (MCC)—a citizen’s watchdog group—concerning the 

lawfulness of Judge Porteous’s actions in setting aside Wallace’s 

conviction. Judge Porteous was interviewed by MCC representatives on November 8, 1994, 11 days after he became a Federal 

judge. 

In that interview, Judge Porteous denied having ‘‘frequent’’ 

lunches with the Marcottes, denied that the Marcottes paid his way 

to Las Vegas, and denied that he amended Wallace’s sentence out 

of friendship or at the request of Louis Marcotte. That interview 

was written up as follows: 

Upon arrival we advised Judge Porteous that the purpose of our meeting was to question him regarding his 

amendment of the Aubrey N. Wallace sentence. . . . In 

particular we advised Judge Porteous that we wanted to 

ask him about his relationship with Louis Marcotte. . . . 

The Judge stated ‘‘lets not sugar coat anything, in other 

words you guys think I’m dirty.’’ We replied that we had 

some questions about his handling of the Aubrey Wallace 

case and welcomed an explanation of his reasoning in this 

matter. . . . 


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361 Interview of United States District Court Judge G. Thomas Porteous by Anthony Radosti 

and Rafael C. Goyaneche, III, Metropolitan Crime Commission, Nov. 9, 1994 (part of Ex. 85). 362 J. Darby, Amending Sentence Questioned, Federal Judge Defends Actions, New Orleans 

Times-Picayune, B-1, Mar. 19,1995 (Ex. 119(a)). 

The Judge freely admitted that he has known Mr. Marcotte for a number of years and considers him to be a 

friend. We asked the Judge if he frequently ate lunch with 

Mr. Marcotte and provided him with the name of the two 

restaurants they frequent. He admitted that he has had 

several lunches with Mr. Marcotte, but he didn’t know if 

he would term his lunches with Marcotte as ‘‘frequent.’’ 

Additionally, we asked if he had traveled to Las Vegas 

with Mr. Marcotte and he confirmed that he had. The 

Judge stated that six or seven people went as a group to 

Vegas and Marcotte was a member of the group. The 

Judge when asked did Marcotte pay his way, quickly 

changed the subject. Porteous when asked a second time 

advised that Marcotte did not pay his way to Vegas. 

* * * 

The Judge vehemently denied that he amended the sentence out of friendship for or at the request of Louis Marcotte. 

The Judge stated he felt he had done nothing criminal, 

but stated that the Assistant District Attorney had the authority to appeal his ruling it was improper. The Judge 

ended the meeting by telling us to ‘‘do what you think you 

have to do.’’... 361

These events were reported in the New Orleans Times-Picayune 

in a March 19, 1995 article: 

U.S. District Judge Thomas Porteous, while serving his 

final weeks on the state bench in Jefferson Parish, illegally 

amended a convicted drug offender’s burglary sentence and 

then removed it from the man’s record, according to the 

Metropolitan Crime Commission. 362

The Lawfulness of the Set-Aside. The action of Judge Porteous 

setting aside Wallace’s burglary conviction was not appealed by the 

State and thus not subject to review as to its lawfulness. Nonetheless, the observations of a practicing attorney in this field are noteworthy. Netterville, the attorney who stood in to represent Wallace 

at the initial set-aside hearing, has handled hundreds of set-aside 

motions in his career and understands the law and practice involved in the process. Notwithstanding that Netterville actually appeared for Wallace in open court in seeking the set-aside, he testified in a Task Force deposition that he would not have accepted 

that case from a paying client and viewed the set-aside as legally 

improper: 

Q. If a client, if a person came to you and said I want to 

hire you to have my conviction set aside and . . . I 

wasn’t sentenced under Article 893 [which permits set 

asides] and my probation was unsatisfactorily terminated, what would you tell them? 

A. I’d say you can’t hire me because it can’t be done. 


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363 Netterville Dep. at 18-19 (Ex. 92(a)). 

Q. So that’s more—I mean, isn’t that more than just being 

irregular to highly irregular. 

A. No, it’s highly irregular. You can’t, you can’t do it. If 

the district attorney had objected and taken a writ, he 

would have won in my opinion. 363

Whether or not the set-aside was unlawful, the facts at a minimum demonstrate that on the eve of his taking the Federal bench, 

Judge Porteous took the ‘‘highly irregular’’ official act of setting 

aside the felony conviction of one of Marcotte’s employees, at the 

personal request of Marcotte and as a favor to him. The fact that 

Judge Porteous timed this judicial act to occur after his confirmation is strong evidence that he knew of its impropriety and that he 

knew that it evidenced his improper relationship with the 

Marcottes. It is not possible to challenge the ‘‘merits’’ of a decision 

to set aside a conviction (any more than it is possible to challenge 

the exercise of discretion in setting a bond), for such an act inherently embodies the judgment of a judge as to whether an individual 

merits this significant benefit. However, in this instance, the following factors are noteworthy: 

• Wallace had two felony convictions in a short period of time 

(stemming from the 1989 drug charge and the 1990 burglary 

charge, which occurred while on release from the drug 

charge). Wallace had been released from prison for about a 

year on the drug charge, and was still on parole for that offense at the time Judge Porteous set aside Wallace’s burglary conviction. 

• It is consistent with Judge Porteous’s other conduct as a 

judge that benefitted Louis Marcotte. Indeed, Judge Porteous 

had previously set aside the conviction for Marcotte’s brother-in-law (Duhon). 

• There was no compelling justification for Judge Porteous to 

set aside the conviction in the last days of his tenure on the 

State bench. The motions and orders were bare-bones, handled by persons close to Louis Marcotte and Judge Porteous. 

There were no facts adduced at the hearings or in the pleadings in support of the motion, such as a contention of extraordinary rehabilitation. 

• Judge Porteous knew that Wallace, like Duhon, had worked 

on his cars and his house. 

• Moreover, even if both the legality and the merits could be 

argued, at the time he set aside the conviction, Judge 

Porteous was indebted to Marcotte, who had assisted him by 

lying on his behalf in the confirmation process. So long as 

Judge Porteous was a State judge—and particularly when 

Judge Porteous was seeking to become a Federal judge— 

Louis Marcotte had leverage over Judge Porteous by virtue 

of Marcotte’s knowledge of their corrupt relationship. 


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364Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 51. See also Louis Marcotte Dep. at 24 (Ex. 68). Louis 

Marcotte’s Task Force Hearing testimony was consistent with what he told the FBI in 2004: 

‘‘After PORTEOUS was appointed to the Federal bench, he expunged WALLACE’S record and 

did almost every bond MARCOTTE asked.’’ Louis Marcotte FBI Interview, Oct. 15, 2004 at 1 

(Ex. 72(g)). From Judge Porteous’s perspective, at the time he set aside Wallace’s conviction and 

signed the bonds on the ‘‘way out,’’ he knew that Louis Marcotte had been interviewed twice 

by the FBI, and had the power to derail his nomination, and, further, that this was one of his 

last opportunities to set bonds for the Marcottes. 365Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 58. 366See Exs. 350 (a)-350(zz). Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 51. 

2. Judge Porteous’s Bond-Setting in His Final Days on the State 

Bench 

Louis Marcotte also recalled that when Judge Porteous was 

about to leave the State bench, Marcotte used him to ‘‘open the 

floodgates’’ in terms of setting bonds: ‘‘I figured he was on his way 

out and let’s open the floodgates and let me try to make as much 

money as I can before he left.’’ 364 In response to questioning from 

Mr. Schiff at the Task Force hearing, Louis Marcotte explained: 

‘‘Now, prior to that [the last days on the bench], you know, there 

was a ton of bail applications as well, but my words were ‘Well, 

let’s wear him [Judge Porteous] out.’ ’’ 365 Marcotte’s testimony has 

been corroborated by a series of bond forms that were obtained 

from the Sheriff’s Office and the 24th JDC reflecting numerous 

bonds set by Judge Porteous, for prisoners for whom the Marcottes 

posted bonds, in the last days of his tenure on the State court 

bench. 366

E. JUDGE PORTEOUS’S RELATIONSHIP WITH LOUIS MARCOTTE AND

LORI MARCOTTE WHILE HE WAS A FEDERAL JUDGE

1. Overview 

Judge Porteous and the Marcottes continued to maintain a relationship after he became a Federal judge. Even though Judge 

Porteous could no longer set bonds for them, the Marcottes continued to take Judge Porteous to expensive lunches, assisted in having him speak at Bail Bond conventions in Biloxi Mississippi (at 

the Beau Rivage Resort) and in New Orleans at the Royal Sonesta 

Hotel, and took his secretary Rhonda Danos to Las Vegas at least 

twice, to maintain access to Judge Porteous. Louis Marcotte explained that because Judge Porteous was a Federal judge, he 

‘‘brought strength to the table’’ on any issues for which the 

Marcottes sought his assistance, particularly maintaining and forging new relationships with other State judicial officers and business executives. 

In his Task Force Hearing testimony, Louis Marcotte was blunt 

about the prestige that Judge Porteous provided by being at the 

‘‘table’’ with him: 

A. Because, number one, he was a Federal judge. Right 

there, that brings strength to the table whenever he 

sits down with me. 

* * * 

A. It would make people respect me because, you know, I 

am sitting with a Federal judge. 


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367Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 52. See also Louis Marcotte Dep. at 16 (Louis Marcotte 

maintained a relationship with Judge Porteous ‘‘[b]ecause whenever I brought Porteous to the 

table, I brought strength. . . . Because other judges respected him and they listened to him 

when he talked.’’) (Ex. 68). 368The exhibits supporting the first four dates in the table include, for each date, a copy of 

the meal check from the Beef Connection and the pertinent page from Lori Marcotte’s American 

Express Card. The meal checks reflect the purchase of ‘‘Abs’’ or ‘‘Abso’’—short for ‘‘Absolut’’— 

Judge Porteous’s drink of choice. The respective exhibits are Ex. 372(a) for August 6, 1997; Ex. 

372(b) for August 25, 1997; Ex. 372(c) for November 19, 1997; and Ex. 372(d) for August 5, 1998. 

The exhibits for the last two dates also include the pertinent pages from a BBU calendar that 

contain a reference to Judge Porteous on the given date. See Ex. 373(c) (February 1, 2000) and 

Ex. 373(d) (November 7, 2001). 

In addition, there are other calendar entries mentioning potential lunch appointments with 

Judge Porteous on other dates for which no corresponding or corroborating credit card statements reflecting restaurant charges were located. Nonetheless, the very presence of Judge 

Porteous’s name in the Marcotte calendars starting in 1999 reflects an ongoing relationship during the years while he was on the Federal bench. 

* * * 

Q. So it is good for you to be sitting with a Federal judge 

if you are meeting with somebody else, right? 

A. Yes, sir. 367

Judge Porteous, while a Federal judge, helped the Marcottes 

meet at least four judicial officers—newly elected Justices of the 

Peace Charles Kerner and Kevin Centanni, and newly elected State 

judges Ronald D. Bodenheimer and Joan Benge. In addition, Judge 

Porteous also went with the Marcottes to meals that were also attended by Norman Stotts, the executive for the insurance company 

that underwrote the Marcottes’ bonds. In each instance, Louis 

Marcotte’s explanation of how Judge Porteous ‘‘brought strength’’ 

and helped him with these individuals is corroborated by other witnesses and evidence. 

2. Maintaining the Marcotte-Porteous Relationship 

Both Louis Marcotte and Lori Marcotte testified that they continued to take Judge Porteous to lunches when he was a Federal 

judge—typically with others, and frequently with other State 

judges. Their testimony on this fact is corroborated by records that 

were obtained, including calendars of Bail Bonds Unlimited (BBU), 

noting some of the activities of Louis and Lori Marcotte in the 

1999-2002 time frame; various credit card records of Louis Marcotte, Lori Marcotte, and other BBU employees; and several meal 

checks from the Beef Connection going back to August 1997. Thus, 

as reflected in the following table, several meals can be identified 

as including Judge Porteous while he was a Federal judge: 368


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369 Judge Porteous’s hotel room of $206.00 was paid by PBUS, and other food and entertainment for Judge Porteous was provided by PBUS and the Marcottes. Judge Porteous did not disclose this reimbursement in his Financial Disclosure Report for calendar year 1999. In contrast, 

Judge Porteous did disclose the following comparable events for which he was reimbursed: (1) 

‘‘Jefferson Bar Association, 4/15/99, Speaker CLE Seminar, Biloxi, Mississippi (Hotel);’’ (2) ‘‘Louisiana State Bar Association, 6/9-6/12/99, Speaker CLE Seminar, Destin Fla. (Hotel, Food and 

Mileage)’’; and, (3) ‘‘LSU Trial Advocacy Program, 8/9-8/11/99, Faculty Member, Baton Rouge, 

La (Hotel, Food and Mileage).’’ Judge Porteous’s receipt of hotel accommodations at a gambling 

location from the PBUS arose from his association with the Marcottes, and his failure to report 

the receipt of this reimbursement is consistent with an attempt to conceal that relationship. 370The photographs were identified by Lori Marcotte in her deposition. See Lori Marcotte 

Dep. Exs. 23 and 24 (Exs. 223 and 214). 371Louis Marcotte Dep. at 16-17 (Ex. 68). 372This discussion of events is set forth in Justice of the Peace Kerner’s deposition. 

PBUS Convention at the Beau Rivage—July 1999. In July 1999, 

the PBUS held its annual convention at the Beau Rivage resort in 

Biloxi, Mississippi. The Marcottes paid for some of the events and 

entertainment at that convention. Judge Porteous’s room was paid 

for by PBUS, 369 however Danos’s room was paid for by the 

Marcottes. Photos taken at that convention show Judge Porteous in 

the company of Louis Marcotte and Marcotte employee Norman 

Bowley, among others, at the cocktail reception hosted by BBU. 370

3. Judge Porteous’s Assistance to the Marcottes 

a. 1997—Helping with Newly Elected Justice of the Peace 

Charlie Kerner 

Charlie Kerner was the Justice of the Peace in Lafitte, a city 

about 30 minutes outside of New Orleans. Both Louis Marcotte and 

Lori Marcotte testified that Judge Porteous helped them try to 

forge a relationship with Justice of the Peace Kerner. Louis Marcotte testified that they had Judge Porteous attend a lunch with 

Kerner: ‘‘We sat down at the Beef Connection. We ate with Kerner. 

And then we thought we had a good lunch, and, and Kerner had 

listened to Porteous. And then after we called Kerner, he kind of 

froze up on us.’’ 371

Kerner confirmed that on one occasion, when Judge Porteous was 

a Federal judge, he (Kerner) arranged to have lunch with Judge 

Porteous and Danos. 372 Kerner sought to have lunch with Judge 

Porteous to thank him for having sworn him in as Justice of the 


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373The lunch would have been in 1997, Kerner having been elected in late 1996. 374Kerner Dep. at 6 (Ex. 79). 375Kerner Dep. at 9 (Ex. 79). 376Kerner Dep. at 12 (Ex. 79). 377Kerner Dep. at 13-14, 16-17 (Ex. 79). 378Kerner Dep. at 10-11 (Ex. 79). Lori Marcotte, in her Task Force testimony described this 

event in similar terms: ‘‘We had Rhonda set up a lunch and had Judge Porteous attend. And 

we went to the Beef Connection and we showed up. My brother had the law book in his hand, 

and we had instructed Judge Porteous to explain about the power of the Justice of the Peace 

being able to set bonds. And he did.’’ Lori Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 56-57. 379Lori Marcotte FBI Interview, April 21, 2004 at 5 (Ex. 74(d)). According to the FBI writeup, Lori Marcotte stated: ‘‘PORTEOUS talked to KEVIN CENTANNI, a Justice of the Peace in 

Jefferson Parish, about doing bonds. CENTANNI did a couple of bonds but stopped because he 

felt uncomfortable doing the bonds.’’ 380 Centanni FBI Interview, July 6, 2004 at 1 (Ex. 69(h)). When interviewed by Task Force 

staff on January 6, 2010, Justice of the Peace Centanni stated he did not recall whether Judge 

Porteous was present. 

Peace. 373 Kerner had ‘‘a lot of respect’’ for Judge Porteous and was 

‘‘honored’’ that Judge Porteous had sworn him in. 374

On the day of the lunch, Kerner received a call from Danos stating that Louis Marcotte, whom Kerner had never met, would be 

joining them and that the Marcottes would pay for lunch. At that 

lunch, in the presence of Judge Porteous and Danos, Marcotte 

spread law books and other materials over the lunch table and 

tried to explain to Kerner the authority that Kerner possessed to 

set bonds to help Marcotte. As Kerner described it: 

[H]e [Louis Marcotte] produced some law books to me and 

had a outline of what he felt as a magistrate and saying 

setting bonds or whatever would be in my jurisdiction to 

help him to lower the bonds, you know, so they can help 

people like that. That’s the way he presented it to me. 

* * * 

Well, he wanted me to help him, help them, I guess, if 

someone say if the bond could be lowered in a margin that 

would be affordable to them. That’s the way I took it. 375

Kerner testified that when Louis was giving this presentation: 

‘‘[I] felt a little uncomfortable. I’ll say that. I felt a little uncomfortable.’’ 376 The respect Kerner felt towards Judge Porteous and the 

honor he felt by Judge Porteous’s presence affected Kerner’s willingness to hear what the Marcottes had to say. 377 After that lunch, 

Kerner spoke to another Justice of the Peace who knew the 

Marcottes, and after that conversation he decided he wanted nothing to do with them. 378

b. 1997—Helping with Newly Elected Justice of the Peace 

Kevin Centanni 

Lori Marcotte, in her FBI interviews in 2004 379 and Task Force 

interviews, stated that Judge Porteous also arranged for them to 

meet newly elected Justice of the Peace Kevin Centanni. As with 

Justice of the Peace Kerner, the Marcottes’ efforts to cultivate a relationship with Centanni were not successful. 

Centanni, when interviewed by the FBI in 2004, recalled a meal 

at the Beef Connection with the Marcottes and other judges, at 

which he ‘‘believed’’ Judge Porteous was in attendance. 380 At that 

lunch, according to the FBI write-up, Louis Marcotte gave 

Centanni information on bond setting and bond splitting. ‘‘CENTANNI believed MARCOTTE was trying to educate CENTANNI to 


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381 Centanni FBI Interview, July 6, 2004 at 2 (Ex. 69(h)). 382Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. at 53. Similarly, when asked what the Marcottes requested of 

Judge Porteous, Lori Marcotte responded: ‘‘The same thing that we—that Judge Porteous did 

with us with the other judges, to, to introduce us to him, to get close to him, to—he was familiar 

with bond splitting because he was a D.A., Judge Bodenheimer. But just to establish trust and 

to help us split bonds, to get us to help us split bonds.’’ Lori Marcotte Dep. at 46 (Ex. 76). She 

testified that Bodenheimer ‘‘took Judge Porteous’[s] place.’’ Id. at 47. 383 Bodenheimer GJ at 11 (Ex. 89). 384 Bodenheimer Dep. at 12 (Ex. 86). See also id. at 13 (Judge Porteous told Bodenheimer ‘‘regardless of what preconceived notions I might have about them, that [Louis Marcotte] really 

wasn’t a bad guy, that he wouldn’t steer me wrong, if he tells me something about a particular 

defendant and a bond, I can take it to the bank, he won’t lie to me.’’). 

get CENTANNI to do bonds for MARCOTTE, however, CENTANNI 

rarely set bonds.’’ 381

c. 1999—Helping with Newly Elected State Judge Ronald 

Bodenheimer 

In 1999, Judge Porteous took steps to assist the Marcottes in 

forming a relationship with newly elected State Judge Ronald 

Bodenheimer. Shortly after Bodenheimer was elected, Louis Marcotte asked Judge Porteous to help the Marcottes form a relationship with Bodenheimer. During his Task Force Hearing testimony, 

Louis Marcotte was asked to describe what he asked Judge 

Porteous to do with regard to Bodenheimer. Louis Marcotte described his request to Judge Porteous as follows: 

A. Judge, tell this guy [Bodenheimer] I am a good guy. 

Tell him that commercial bonds is the best thing for 

the criminal justice system and that—ask him would 

he take—ask him would he take your spot when—because you left now and I needed somebody to step in 

to Porteous’s shoes so I can get the same things done 

that I got done when Porteous was there. 

Q. Do you know whether or not Judge Porteous spoke to 

Judge Bodenheimer? 

A. Yes, he did. 

Q. And after he spoke to Judge Bodenheimer, did your relationship with Judge Bodenheimer change as a result? 

A. Yes, it did. Bodenheimer became the Porteous of the 

24th District Court. 382

Bodenheimer confirmed Louis Marcotte’s testimony. He testified 

in the grand jury: ‘‘I distanced myself from him [Marcotte]. 

Porteous knew it.’’ 383 Bodenheimer recalled that Judge Porteous 

told him that he [Judge Porteous] ‘‘knew that I didn’t really like 

Louis Marcotte and that group very much but they were really— 

they really weren’t as bad as people thought they were, that he 

[Louis Marcotte] was a pretty good guy.’’ 384

Bodenheimer had appeared as a prosecutor in front of Judge 

Porteous in State court in the early 1990’s and ‘‘looked up’’ to 

Judge Porteous. Thus, Judge Porteous’s comments about the 

Marcottes were significant to Bodenheimer and affected his willingness to form a relationship with the Marcottes. As Bodenheimer explained: 

Q. So how did the fact that Judge Porteous—how did the 

fact that you looked up to Judge Porteous influence, inVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:55 Mar 04, 2010 Jkt 089008 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR427.XXX HR427

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385 Bodenheimer Dep. 13-15 (Ex. 86). He testified consistently in the Grand jury: 

I distanced myself from [Marcotte]. Porteous knew it. And he [Porteous] says, ‘‘I know 

you got this bad taste in your mouth for him. I know that you’ve heard these rumors 

about him and cocaine.’’ He said, ‘‘Let me tell you. It’s not true. He’s a good guy. You 

can trust him. If you got problems with bonds go see him. He’ll never steer you wrong. 

He’ll never get you hurt.’’ 

Bodenheimer GJ at 11 (Ex. 89). 386 Bodenheimer GJ at 20 (Ex. 89). See also Bodenehimer Dep. at 15-17 (Ex. 86). 387See, e.g., Superseding Bill of Information for . . . for Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud, 

United States v. Ronald. D. Bodenheimer, Crim. No. 02-291 (E.D. La.), Mar. 31, 2003, at 3 (Ex. 

88(d)). 388Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 53-54. 389Louis Marcotte Dep. at 18-19 (Ex. 68). 

fluence you in interpreting the comments that Judge 

Porteous made in your dealings with the Marcottes? 

A. I had a lot of respect for Judge Porteous. I had a lot 

of respect for him as a person. I had a lot of respect for 

him and his rulings. I had been with him for a long 

time, and I knew he was very, very, just in my opinion, 

was very, very smart. And if he told me something, I 

wouldn’t question it. 

Q. So when he vouched for the Marcottes, that was very 

significant for you in your willingness to form a relationship with the Marcottes? 

A. Yes. 385

Over time, Bodenheimer would attend lunches with Louis Marcotte 

and Judge Porteous. Louis Marcotte would pay: ‘‘[I]t would be the 

better restaurants, maybe like the Beef Connection. . . . Of course, 

we did go to Emeril’s one time. But mostly it would be something 

like the Beef Connection or a place called the Red Maple[.]’’ 386

Bodenheimer, who ended up ‘‘[taking] Judge Porteous’[s] place,’’ 

ultimately pleaded guilty to Federal corruption charges arising 

from his relationship with the Marcottes. 387

d. March 2002—Helping with Newly Elected State Judge 

Joan Benge 

In 2001, Joan Benge was elected to the State bench. Louis Marcotte sought to get to know her and wanted Judge Porteous to be 

at a March 2002 lunch at ‘‘Emeril’s’’ that included himself, Judge 

Benge and others. 388 As Louis Marcotte testified: 

A. Well, Benge was a new judge. And basically what we 

tried to do was rally a bunch of judges to have lunch 

with Porteous, and he could tell them how great the 

bail bond business is and how, how. . . . 

* * * 

Q. And did you want Judge Porteous to be there because—— 

A. Yes, I did. Because I wanted to show strength. He’s a 

Federal judge, and when he—if he spoke, then they 

would listen. 389

As described by Bodenheimer, Louis Marcotte arranged the lunch 

and told him that he wanted to have Judge Benge present because 

‘‘he didn’t really know her that well and he wanted to get to meet 


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390 Bodenheimer Dep. at 20 (Ex. 86). 391 Bodenheimer Dep. at 20 (Ex. 86). 392Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 53-54. Photographs that span the period from 1993 to 2002 

have been obtained that depict Judge Porteous with Wrinkled Robe convicted conspirators Louis 

Marcotte, Lori Marcotte, Norman Bowley, and Ron Bodenheimer. 393 ‘‘A bail bondsman is no more than a State Farm agent. We are licensed through the Commission of Insurance. We carry a property and casualty license. And the insurance company supplies us with policies that we can post at the jail so we can get defendants out. It is not real 

money; it is just a policy. If the defendant doesn’t show up in court, then the courts cash the 

policy.’’ Louis Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 42. 394Marcotte Dep. at 15-20 (Ex. 68). 395Stotts FBI Interview, Dec. 18, 2002, at 22 (Ex. 69(g)). Stotts also confirmed having meals 

with the Marcottes that included Judge Porteous in an interview with Task Force Staff in late 

2009. 396Danos Dep. II at 14 (Ex. 47). 

her.’’ He also knew that Judge Benge, who had been a prosecutor 

in the 24th JDC, ‘‘respected him [Judge Porteous] as much as I 

did.’’ 390 As it turned out, Judge Porteous arrived late for the meal, 

and only had drinks. 391 The Emeril’s credit card receipt and meal 

check for $414 has been obtained. Louis Marcotte paid for this 

lunch with his American Express card. The FBI surveilled and 

videotaped this March 2002 lunch, at which Judge Porteous, Louis 

Marcotte, Bodenheimer and Judge Benge (as well as BBU staff and 

Judge Benge’s secretary) were in attendance. 392

e. Meals with Insurance Company Representative Norman 

Stotts 

The Marcottes’ bonds were underwritten by an insurance company called ‘‘Amwest.’’ As Louis Marcotte described, the Marcottes 

were in essence insurance agents for Amwest and bail bonds were, 

in essence, insurance policies that would pay the court if a defendant did not show up as required. 393 Amwest would receive from 

the Marcottes a portion of the premiums. As the Marcottes were, 

in substance, selling Amwest insurance policies, Amwest had a 

vital interest in the Marcottes’ profitability and business practices 

and could, for example, limit the dollar amount of bonds they could 

write. 

On a regular basis, Amwest would send a high level company official, Norman Stotts, to meet with the Marcottes. Louis and Lori 

would take him out to lunch and include Judge Porteous. As Louis 

described: ‘‘It makes me look good with the insurance company. It 

gives me more writing authority to write big bonds, you know. It 

just showed strength in my organization by having a Federal judge 

sitting with me at the table.’’ 394

In his FBI interview, Stotts confirmed that he went to lunch with 

Judge Porteous on occasions when Judge Porteous was a Federal 

judge. 395 Danos also recalled attending a lunch with Stotts. 396

F. THE WRINKLED ROBE INVESTIGATION AND THE PROSECUTION OF

LOUIS MARCOTTE, LORI MARCOTTE, AND LOUISIANA STATE JUDGES

In 1999, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Louisiana commenced a broad investigation of Louis 

Marcotte’s corrupt relationship with Louisiana State judges and 

other State law enforcement officials. The FBI labeled this investigation ‘‘Wrinkled Robe.’’ In August 2001, the FBI sought and obtained wiretaps, and in June 2002, the FBI executed a search warrant at the Marcottes’ offices. 


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397Superseding Bill of Information for . . . Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud, United States 

v. Ronald D. Bodenheimer, Crim. No. 02-219 (E.D. La.), Mar. 31, 2003, at 3 (Ex. 88(d)). 

It is of no consequence that the judge—be it Bodenheimer or Judge Porteous—may have taken 

the same discretionary acts in setting, splitting, or reducing bonds or setting aside convictions 

even without accepting the financial inducements from the Marcottes to do so. A judge has significant discretion to exercise as he or she deems fit—just not in exchange for things of value. 

In this regard, the Committee notes by way of reference that the Federal courts have reached 

the same understanding in interpreting the bribery laws. Public officials accused of taking 

bribes have occasionally attempted to defend their conduct, or claim a lack of corrupt intent, 

on the grounds that they would have taken the same act or reached the same decision anyway, 

or that the official acts alleged to have been committed for things of value were affirmatively 

‘‘good’’ for the community. 

One Federal circuit court addressed and rejected these arguments as follows: ‘‘It is neither 

material nor a defense to bribery that ‘had there been no bribe, the (public official) might, on 

the available data, lawfully and properly have made the very recommendation that (the briber) 

wanted him to make.’ ’’ United States v. Janotti, 673 F.2d 578, 601 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing United 

States v. Labovitz, 251 F.2d 393, 394 (3d Cir. 1958)). In Labovitz, the court explained: ‘‘It is 

a major concern of organized society that the community have the benefit of objective evaluation 

and unbiased judgment on the part of those who participate in the making of official decisions. 

Therefore, society deals sternly with bribery which would substitute the will of an interested 

person for the judgment of a public official as the controlling factor in official decision.’’ United 

States v. Labovitz, 251 F.2d at 394. 

The standard Federal criminal jury instruction on this topic tracks the above cases, and provides: ‘‘It is not a defense to the crime of bribery as charged in Count of the indictment that 

the [offer] [or] [promise] [demand] [or] [receipt] of anything of value was made [to] [by] the public official to influence an official act which is actually lawful, desirable, or even beneficial to 

the public.’’ O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, 2 Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 27:11 (6th ed.). See also United 

States v. Dorri, 15 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1994) (same). 398 Bodenheimer GJ at 25-27 (Ex. 89). 

The results of the investigation included the convictions of Louis 

Marcotte and Lori Marcotte for their actions in giving things of 

value to State judges and other State law enforcement officials 

(such as jail employees) who helped them in their bail bonds business. Two State judges (Bodenheimer and Green) and other State 

law enforcement officials were also convicted on Federal corruption 

charges arising from their relationships with the Marcottes. By any 

reasonable interpretation of the evidence, Judge Porteous’s conduct 

was indistinguishable (if not more extensive) from the conduct of 

the other two State judges who were convicted. 

1. Bodenheimer’s Guilty Plea 

Bodenheimer pleaded guilty in March 2003 to conspiracy to commit mail fraud on a ‘‘deprivation of honest services’’ theory. (This 

was prior to the Marcottes’ guilty pleas.) Among the overt acts 

charged in the Information were that he: 

regularly set, reduced, and split bonds underwritten by a 

Jefferson Parish bail bonding company in criminal cases 

pending before him and other judges, irrespective of 

whether he was scheduled for ‘‘magistrate duty.’’ . . . 

BODENHEIMER routinely set the bonds at a level requested by the bail bonding company in a manner which 

would tend to maximize the company’s profits; that is, by 

securing the maximum amount of premium money available from the criminal defendant and his family. 397

The sorts of things Judge Bodenheimer received from the 

Marcottes were similar to those things that the Marcottes gave to 

Judge Porteous. Louis Marcotte, according to Bodenheimer, 

‘‘worked on my house,’’ ‘‘took us on fishing trips,’’ and ‘‘took us to 

the Beau Rivage [casino] to a show.’’ 398 The factual proffer signed 

by Bodenheimer stated that he ‘‘enriched[ed] himself by setting, reducing, and splitting bonds in various criminal matters pending before him as well as other judges on terms most advantageous to the 


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399Factual Basis [in Support of Guilty Plea], United States v. Ronald D. Bodenheimer, Crim. 

No. 02-219 (E.D. La.), Mar. 31, 2003, at 10 (Ex. 88(f)); Bodenheimer Dep. Ex. 45 (Ex. 245). 400 Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order, United States v. Ronald D. Bodenheimer, 

Crim. No. 02-219 (E.D. La.), Apr. 28, 2004 (Ex. 88(h)). 401M. Carr and M. Torres, ‘‘Judges Were Given Gifts; Marcotte’s Ex-workers Tell of Shrimp, 

Fence,’’ New Orleans Times-Picayune, Feb. 8, 2003 (part of the Metropolitan Crime Commission 

Documents, MCC 0199-200 (Ex. 85), and separately marked as Ex. 119(e)). Judge Porteous is 

identified by name in that article which states: 

The former employees claim Marcotte paid for car repairs and built a fence for former 

24th Judicial District Judge Thomas Porteous, who now sits on the Federal bench[.] 

Id. 402Louis Marcotte Dep. Ex. 80 (Ex. 280). 403Marcotte Dep. Ex. 80 (Ex. 280). 404Louis Marcotte Dep. at 23-24 (Ex. 68). 405Louis Marcotte Dep. at 23 (Ex. 68). 406Though the statement may be parsed as ‘‘literally true’’ if read as a denial that Judge 

Porteous and Louis Marcotte had a specific conversation where Louis Marcotte agreed to give 

a specific thing of value to Judge Porteous in exchange for a specific official act, the sweeping 

nature of the denial is misleading, if not outright false, in that it conceals the numerous things 

of value that Louis Marcotte gave Judge Porteous and the numerous official acts of Judge 

Porteous that benefitted Louis Marcotte in return. 

bail bonding company in exchange for things of value, including 

meals, trips to resorts, campaign contributions, home improvements, and other things of value.’’ 399

On April 28, 2004 , Bodenheimer was sentenced to 46 months incarceration on the corruption count, to run concurrently with other 

offenses to which he pleaded guilty. 400

2. Louis Marcotte Affidavit 

On April 17, 2003, 2 months after a New Orleans Times-Picayune article publicly linked Judge Porteous to accepting things of 

value from Louis Marcotte as a State judge, 401 and 1 month after 

Bodenheimer pleaded guilty, Louis Marcotte signed an affidavit designed to protect Judge Porteous. 402 That affidavit stated, in pertinent part: 

At no time have I ever given money or anything of value 

to Judge Porteous for reducing or altering any bond. 403

Louis Marcotte testified in his deposition that the statement was 

‘‘not accurate.’’ 

Q. Okay. And would you describe whether or not that 

statement is accurate or not? 

A. It’s not accurate. 

* * * 

A. I gave him meals, trips, car repairs, radios. 

Q. And why did you do all that? 

A. I wanted him to help me with the bonds. 404

In his deposition, Louis Marcotte testified he felt uncomfortable 

signing the affidavit, and ‘‘thought my lawyer was protecting 

Porteous and not me.’’ 405 Nonetheless, just as he did in 1994 in 

connection with the FBI background check, Louis Marcotte made 

statements intended and designed to protect Judge Porteous and to 

insulate him from investigation, scrutiny and the disclosure of the 

relationship between the two men. 406


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407 Bill of Information for Conspiracy to Operate an Enterprise through a Pattern of Racketeering Activity and Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud, United States v. Louis M. Marcotte, III, 

and Lori M. Marcotte, Crim. No. 04-061 (E.D. La.), Mar. 3, 2004, at 4 (Ex. 71(a)). 408DOJ policy generally prohibits publicly identifying uncharged conspirators unless they 

have otherwise been publicly identified. Thus, though Bodenheimer’s name could be included in 

the Marcotte Information as a named conspirator because he had previously pleaded guilty to 

a corrupt relationship with the Marcottes, the prosecutors would not have identified Judge 

Porteous in the Marcotte Information as he had not been publicly accused. 409 Bill of Information for Conspiracy to Operate an Enterprise through a Pattern of Racketeering Activity and Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud, United States v. Louis M. Marcotte, III, 

and Lori M. Marcotte, Crim. No. 04-061 (E.D. La.), Mar. 3, 2004, at 5 (Ex. 71(a)). 410 Bill of Information for Conspiracy to Operate an Enterprise through a Pattern of Racketeering Activity and Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud, United States v. Louis M. Marcotte, III, 

and Lori M. Marcotte, Crim. No. 04-061 (E.D. La.), Mar. 3, 2004, at 6 (Ex. 71(a)). 

3. Louis Marcotte’s and Lori Marcotte’s Guilty Pleas 

In March 2004, both Louis Marcotte and Lori Marcotte pleaded 

guilty to an Information charging Federal corruption offenses. 

Louis Marcotte pleaded guilty to Racketeering Conspiracy. That 

conspiracy was alleged to have commenced prior to 1991. 407 The 

temporal scope of the scheme is consistent with the allegations in 

the FBI wiretap affidavit that generally described the inception of 

the corrupt relationship between Marcotte and judges in the 24th 

JDC as beginning with their relationship with Judge Porteous. 

Similarly, the Information’s elaboration of the acts of the judicial 

conspirators describes the actions of Judge Porteous. 408 The Information described the racketeering conspiracy, in pertinent part, as 

follows: 

3. It was a further part of the conspiracy that, in return 

for things of value, certain judges would make themselves available to BBU; quickly respond to the requests 

of BBU; and set, reduce, increase, and split bonds to 

maximize BBU’s profits, minimize BBU’s liability, and 

hinder BBU’s competition. 

4. It was a further part of the conspiracy that, to allow 

BBU to maximize profits, the conspirator judges would 

engage in the practice of ‘‘bond splitting.’’ . . . At 

BBU’s request, the conspirator judge would set the commercial portion of the bond at an amount the defendant 

could afford and would set the balance in some other 

manner. BBU would then post the commercial portion 

of the bond and collect a percentage of that bond as 

commission. This practice allowed BBU to maximize its 

profit and minimize its liability. 409

Bodenheimer, who had already pleaded guilty to having a corrupt relationship with the Marcottes, was specifically identified in 

the Louis Marcotte Information as one of the judges with whom 

Marcotte had a corrupt relationship. That relationship was described as follows: 

Beginning at a date unknown and continuing until in or 

about June 2002, LOUIS M. MARCOTTE, III provided 

Bodenheimer with gifts, meals, and other things of value. 

In return, Bodenheimer was available to BBU; quickly responded to the requests of BBU; and set, reduced, increased, and split bonds to maximize BBU’s profits, minimize BBU’s liability, and hinder BBU’s competition. 410


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411 If ‘‘Porteous’’ were to be substituted for ‘‘Bodenheimer’’—in the above paragraph, the charging language would aptly describe the nature of Louis Marcotte’s relationship with Judge 

Porteous as established by the evidence. 412 Bill of Information for Conspiracy to Operate an Enterprise through a Pattern of Racketeering Activity and Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud, United States v. Louis M. Marcotte, III, 

and Lori M. Marcotte, Crim. No. 04-061 (E.D. La.), Mar. 3, 2004, at 14-15 (Ex. 71(a)). 413 Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Louis M. Marcotte, III, Crim. No. 04-061 

(E.D. La.), Aug. 28, 2006 (Ex. 71(e)). 414 Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Lori Marcotte, Crim. No. 04-061 (E.D. La.), 

Aug. 28, 2006 (Ex. 73(d)). 415 Indictment, United States v. Alan Green and Norman Bowley, Crim. No. 04-295 (E.D. La.), 

Sept. 29, 2004 (Ex. 93(a)). 

The things of value included: Louis Marcotte’s hiring Bodenheimer’s daughter, paying for meals and paying for hotel rooms. 

The Louis Marcotte Information further specified that during the 

course of that corrupt relationship, Bodenheimer set and split hundreds of bonds. 411

Lori Marcotte pleaded guilty at the same time as Louis Marcotte 

to conspiracy to commit mail fraud, that is, ‘‘to deprive the citizens 

of the State of Louisiana of the honest and faithful services, performed free from deceit, bias, self-dealing, and concealment, of certain Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Deputies in the performance of their 

official duties.’’ 412

Louis Marcotte was sentenced August 28, 2006 to 38 months incarceration, followed by 3 years supervised release. 413

Lori Marcotte was sentenced August 28, 2006 to 3 years probation, including 6 months of home detention. 414

4. Judge Alan Green’s Conviction 

Judge Alan Green was indicted September 29, 2004, along with 

Marcotte employee Norman Bowley, on several charges arising 

from Judge Green’s corrupt relationship with the Marcottes. 415

The conspiracy to commit mail fraud (honest services fraud) count 

(Count Two) with which Green was charged described the scheme 

in terms that again track the Marcottes’ relationship with Judge 

Porteous (as well as Judge Bodenheimer): 

2. It was part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that 

the defendant, NORMAN BOWLEY, the defendant, 

ALAN GREEN, along with Louis Marcotte, Lori Marcotte, and others known and unknown to the Grand 

Jury, engaged in a scheme to maximize BBU’s and the 

Marcottes’ profits from writing bail bonds in Jefferson 

Parish and elsewhere through the corruption of the defendant, ALAN GREEN. 

* * * 

4. It was a further part of the scheme and artifice to defraud that, in return for things of value, ALAN GREEN 

would make himself available to BBU; quickly respond 

to the requests of BBU; and set, reduce, increase, and 

split bonds to maximize BBU’s profits, minimize BBU’s 

liability, and hinder BBU’s competition. 

5. It was a further part of the conspiracy that, to allow 

BBU to maximize its profits, the defendant, ALAN 

GREEN, would engage in the practice of ‘‘bond splitting.’’ . . . At BBU’s request, GREEN would set the 


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416 Id. at 18-19. The charging language in the Green case is similar in essential aspects to 

a description of the Marcottes’ relationship with Judge Porteous. 417 Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Alan Green, Crim. No. 04-295 (E.D. La.), 

Feb. 9, 2006 (Ex. 93(b)). 418Lori Marcotte Dep. at 28 (Ex. 76). 419There is ample corroboration for these trips: (1) Lori Marcotte testified she took Danos to 

Las Vegas in 1992 and that on that trip they took an airplane trip over the Grand Canyon. 

Lori Marcotte identified a ‘‘certificate’’ that she was given by the tour company for that Grand 

Canyon trip dated February 1992. Danos also recalled that trip and the Grand Canyon flight. 

(2) Louis Marcotte’s credit card records reflect that he purchased for Danos a February 1996 

flight to Las Vegas, and Golden Nugget Casino hotel records reflect a room for Danos charged 

to the Marcottes’ office address. Danos also recalled a trip paid by the Marcottes at which she 

stayed at the Golden Nugget. (3) Lori Marcotte’s credit card records reflect her purchase for 

Danos of a February 1998 flight to Las Vegas. On that trip, the Marcottes stayed at the Luxor 

Hotel, and Danos shared a room with a Marcotte employee. See, e.g., Lori Marcotte Dep. at 28- 

29 (Ex. 76); Danos Dep. I at 13-14 (identifying various trips to Las Vegas); Lori Marcotte Dep. 

Ex. 1 (the Grand Canyon flight certificate) (Ex. 201); Ex. 371 (containing, among other records, 

Louis Marcotte’s credit card statement containing charges for air travel purchased for Danos for 

a trip to Las Vegas in 1996 and the Golden Nugget Casino room statement for Danos for February 1996 (charged to the BBU address)). 420Danos Dep. I at 8 (Ex. 46). 421Danos Dep. I at 12 (Ex. 46). 422When asked how it came about that she took Danos to Las Vegas, Lori Marcotte testified: 

‘‘Well, we would go to Judge Porteous’s office to get bonds set or split, and I started speaking 

to her at the desk and asked her to come to Las Vegas. We were having a bail bond convention, 

and we asked her to come along.’’ Lori Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 55-56. 

commercial portion of the bond at an amount the defendant could afford and would set the balance in some 

other manner. BBU would then post the commercial 

portion of the bond and collect a percentage of that 

bond as commission. This practice allowed BBU to 

maximize it profits and minimize its liability. 416

On June 29, 2005, the jury found Green guilty of Count Three 

of the Indictment, charging him with a single substantive count of 

mail fraud. The jury did not reach a verdict on the conspiracy 

count. However, Count Three incorporated by reference the description of the scheme set forth above. 

Judge Green was sentenced on February 9, 2006, to 51 months 

incarceration, to be followed by 3 years of supervised release. 417

G. THE MARCOTTES’ RELATIONSHIP WITH DANOS

As alluded to at various points above, the Marcottes maintained 

a relationship with Judge Porteous’s secretary, Rhonda Danos, over 

the same time period that they maintained a relationship with 

Judge Porteous. As Lori Marcotte testified: 

She [Danos] could call [Judge Porteous] if he wasn’t in 

the office. She could get him off of the bench. . . . Also 

she could call the jail, call in the bonds for us and call to 

get information on the case itself. So when Judge Porteous 

was off the bench, he could split or set the bond fast. 418

Thus, the Marcottes included her in the lunches with Judge 

Porteous, paid for numerous expensive entertainment events, and 

took her to Las Vegas four or five times, some of which took place 

after Judge Porteous became a Federal judge. 419 Danos has also 

testified that ‘‘[i]t may have been four [trips to Las Vegas]’’ 420 and 

that the Marcottes took her to two ‘‘Siegfried and Roy’’ shows on 

those trips. 421 Notably, Lori Marcotte testified she did not know 

Danos well prior to inviting her the first time, 422 and she explicitly 


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423Lori Marcotte TF Hrg. III at 56. 424 Although Danos testified she believed the things of value were solely because of a friendship, she would have known that Lori Marcotte brought jail personnel along on at least one Las 

Vegas trip that Danos attended. Notably, one of the jail employees, Edward Still, pleaded guilty 

to Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud. The Information charged that Still and others, including 

Louis Marcotte and Lori Marcotte, conspired to defraud the citizens of Louisiana of their right 

to the honest services of Still (and other Sheriff’s Deputies who worked in the jail). See Bill of 

Information for Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud, United States v. Forges et al [including Edward Still], Crim. No. 04-217 (E.D. La., July 21, 2004) (Ex. 95(a)). Among the overt acts in that 

Information were: ‘‘In or about February 1993, Louis Marcotte and Lori Marcotte paid for the 

defendant, Edward Still, to take an expense-paid trip to Las Vegas, Nevada.’’ Id. at 4. Still admitted this event in the ‘‘Factual Basis,’’ filed in court, to support his guilty plea. See Factual 

Basis at 3, United States v. Still, Crim. No. 04-217 (E.D. La., Sept. 1, 2004) (Ex. 97(b)). Still 

pleaded guilty September 1, 2004, and received a sentence of probation. See Judgment in a 

Criminal Case, United States v. Still, Crim. No. 04-217 (E.D. La., Feb. 2, 2005) (Ex. 97(c)). 

linked providing these trips with the fact that Danos had been so 

good to them. 423

To the extent that Judge Porteous would have understood that 

the Marcottes gave things of value to Danos because of official acts 

performed (or to be performed) by her, then his tolerance of those 

activities would have, in substance, been the condoning of a relationship based on the Marcottes’ provision and Danos’s acceptance 

of a stream of illegal gratuities. 424

X. THE FACTS UNDERLYING ARTICLE III—JUDGE 

PORTEOUS’S FALSE STATEMENTS AND VIOLATION OF 

THE COURT ORDER IN CONNECTION WITH HIS PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY 

A. OVERVIEW

Judge Porteous’s conduct surrounding his bankruptcy case was 

characterized by numerous false statements and material omissions on the official forms that he signed under penalty of perjury 

that were filed with the court. He also violated a court order by incurring gambling debt and other indebtedness. These acts included 

filing for bankruptcy under a false name (and with a PO Box rather than his actual residence address) to conceal his identity, and 

failing to disclose an anticipated substantial tax refund. In addition, Judge Porteous made numerous other false or deceptive statements about his income, liabilities, and financial activities in order 

to conceal his prior and ongoing gambling activity. As a result, his 

unsecured creditors (predominantly credit card companies) received 

a fraction of what he owed them, while, at the same time, (1) every 

casino that had ever extended credit to Judge Porteous was paid 

in full, and (2) the casinos continued to extend to Judge Porteous 

lines of credit which he utilized even while in bankruptcy. 

The evidence related to Judge Porteous’s dealings with Creely, 

Amato, other attorneys, and the Marcottes demonstrates that 

Judge Porteous experienced financial difficulties throughout the 

1990’s. He solicited money from friends; accepted hundreds of 

meals and payments towards travel and entertainment with no 

pretense that he would reciprocate; drove vehicles in ‘‘deplorable’’ 

condition; and depended on others for home and car repairs. Judge 

Porteous even asked Gardner to give him money on one occasion 

so he could buy a Christmas present for his wife. Many of these 

requests and acceptances of meals and money occurred while on 

gambling trips at locations such as Las Vegas or casinos in Mississippi. 


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425 An ‘‘established player’’ or ‘‘rated player’’ at a casino is a player who has filled out a credit 

application with the casino in order to open up a line of credit. Established players are thereafter able to draw on their line of credit at the casino to gamble and are also provided with 

‘‘comps’’ from the casinos, in the form of complimentary or reduced rates on hotel rooms and 

free meals and drinks. As FBI Special Agent Horner explained, there are two reasons why a 

gambler would want to be rated: ‘‘One for tax purposes, for wins and losses, because they have 

to report their winnings and losings. Number two, a gamer or gambler would want their gaming 

activity rated—they call it rated play—because the casino will then give the customer food and 

room specials. They will give them free shows if they play enough. They will even give them 

free transportation to the casino. There is a term of art that is used, RFB. It is called room, 

food, beverage. A gambler will try to attain RFB status at the casino where when he walks in— 

or he or she walks in, you know, everything is paid for, including your room. So that is the 

main benefit to a gambler.’’ Horner TF Hrg. II at 23. 426 A marker is a form of credit extended by a casino that enables the customer to borrow 

money from the casino. See also Horner TF Hrg. II at 13. 427 Judge Porteous became an established player at the following casinos: (1) Beau Rivage Casino in Biloxi, Mississippi, (2) Caesar’s Palace in Las Vegas, Nevada, (3) Caesar’s Tahoe, in Lake 

Tahoe, Nevada, (4) Casino Magic in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, (5) Grand Casino Biloxi in Biloxi, 

Mississippi, (6) Isle of Capri in Biloxi, Mississippi, and (7) Treasure Chest Casino in Kenner, 

Louisiana. See Porteous Central Credit Inc. Gaming Report (Ex. 326). 428FBI Credit Card Chart (Ex. 348). At the Fifth Circuit Hearing, FBI Financial Analyst Gerald Fink testified that the gambling charges on Judge Porteous’s credit cards were $66,051 in 

gaming charges. Fink 5th Cir. Hrg. at 345-48 (Ex. 332). These same dollar amounts were preThe extent of Judge Porteous’s deteriorating financial condition 

in the late 1990’s is reflected in his financial records. These reveal 

extensive gambling expenses and credit card debts that increased 

dramatically in the late 1990’s and amounted to approximately 

$180,000 by the end of 2000. 

For years, Judge Porteous concealed the extent of these liabilities. He annually filed false financial disclosure reports with the 

Judicial Conference that materially understated his credit card liabilities. 

Ultimately, on March 28, 2001, Judge Porteous and his wife 

Carmella filed for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. 

B. JUDGE PORTEOUS’S FINANCIAL AFFAIRS PRIOR TO

FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY

1. Causes of His Debt 

By the time Judge Porteous took the Federal bench in October 

1994, he had a history of gambling and was an ‘‘established player’’ 425 at the Grand Casino Gulfport in Gulfport, Mississippi. As an established player, Judge Porteous held a $2,000 line of credit at 

the Grand Casino Gulfport, which allowed him to take out $2,000 

worth of markers at the casino. 426 After becoming a Federal judge, 

and prior to filing for bankruptcy in March 2001, Judge Porteous 

became an established player and opened up lines of credit at 

seven more casinos. 427 His credit limits ranged from $2,000 to $5,000. 

An analysis of Judge Porteous’s credit card and bank account 

records, performed by the FBI, revealed that from 1995 through 

2000—while he was a Federal judge—over $130,000 in gambling 

charges appeared on his credit card statements: 

1995 $ 9,545.08 

1996 $ 22,927.48 

1997 $ 32,927.48 

1998 $ 16,056.84 

1999 $ 40,825.62 

2000 $ 8,908.90 —————— Total $131,191.40 428


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sented at the Task Force Hearing. A subsequent review has revealed that the chart of credit 

card gambling expenses used at the Fifth Circuit and the Task Force Hearing failed to include 

several of Judge Porteous’s credit cards, and that the actual amount of credit card gambling 

charges is substantially greater. Agent Horner, at the Task Force Hearing, testified that the 

chart he identified, Exhibit 327, ‘‘doesn’t include everything. There is probably some additional 

credit card charges that were not included in this time period, and there may be some additional 

withdrawals out of his bank account that were not included.’’ Horner TF Hrg. II at 9. An updated chart, Exhibit 348, supplements the chart (Exhibit 327) that was used at the Task Force 

Hearing. 429The June 2000 date was chosen for the purposes of the Fifth Circuit Hearing because that 

was the first time Judge Porteous met with his bankruptcy attorney, Claude Lightfoot. 430See discussion in VIII(I)(3), supra. 

Additionally, between January 1997 and June 2000, Judge 

Porteous wrote checks or made cash withdrawals from his bank accounts at casinos totaling at least $27,739. 429 Thus, Judge 

Porteous had incurred at least $150,000 in gambling charges and 

related gaming withdrawals in the 5 years preceding his bankruptcy filing. 

2. Judge Porteous’s Financial Condition from 1996 to 2000 

From 1996 to 2000, Judge Porteous’s financial situation grew increasingly dire, as follows: 

Year-end 1996—Credit card debt in excess of $44,826; IRA Balance of $59,000. In December 1996—a date as of which nearly all 

the known credit card records of Judge Porteous were obtained— 

Judge Porteous had about $45,000 in outstanding credit card debt 

and an IRA balance of about $59,000. (He had no stocks or bonds 

or other significant savings or assets other than modest equity in 

his house.) 

June of 1997—Credit card debt of $69,000; IRA balance of 

$20,000. During the first 6 months of 1997, Judge Porteous’s financial situation deteriorated significantly. During that period, he 

made three withdrawals from his IRA account amounting to 

$40,000, resulting in his IRA balance falling to approximately 

$20,000. His credit card debt increased to $69,000. 

June of 1999—Credit card debt of $103,000; IRA balance of 

$9,500. Judge Porteous took additional withdrawals from his IRA 

in April 1998 and January 1999. By June 1999 (when Judge 

Porteous sought money from Amato on the boat), 430 Judge 

Porteous’s credit card debt had increased to approximately 

$103,000, while his IRA balance had fallen to approximately 

$9,500. 

April 2000—Credit card debt of $153,000; IRA balance of 

$12,000. In September 1999, Judge Porteous withdrew another 

$1,600 from his IRA (his balance was as low as $7,700 on September 30, 1999, but the value grew over the next several months 

as the value of his securities in that account increased), but his 

credit card debt had increased to more than $150,000. 

3. Judge Porteous’s False Statements Concealing Liabilities on Financial Disclosure Reports 

On an annual basis, starting with calendar year 1994, Judge 

Porteous was required by law to file Financial Disclosure Reports 

with the Judicial Conference of the United States. 

Part VI of the Financial Disclosure Report required Judge 

Porteous to report liabilities by means of a letter code, the pertinent categories being ‘‘J’’ for liabilities of $15,000 or less, and ‘‘K’’ 


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431 Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Federal judges are required by law to file 

annual public reports with the Judicial Conference disclosing certain personal financial information. See 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101(a), 101(b), and 101(f)(11)-(12). Public financial disclosure was intended ‘‘to deter conflicts of interests from arising,’’ to ‘‘deter some persons who should not be 

entering public service from doing so,’’ and to subject a judge’s financial circumstances to ‘‘public 

scrutiny.’’ ‘‘By having access to financial disclosure statements, an interested citizen can evaluate the official’s performance of his duties in light of the official’s outside financial interests.’’ 

See S. Rpt. 95-170, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 21-22 (1977), Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Report to Accompany S. 555, ‘‘Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977.’’ (This Act took the 

name ‘‘Ethics in Government Act’’ in its final form.) 

These disclosure requirements were upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Fifth Circuit in Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979). In that case, the Fifth 

Circuit explained: 

While nomination and confirmation procedures no doubt weed out certain persons who 

should not serve as Federal judges, they do nothing to scrutinize the behavior of judges 

once confirmed. Congress could legitimately conclude that the statutory controls mandated by the Act would further the interest of judicial integrity. 

By alerting litigants and the public of a judge’s financial interest, the financial disclosure provisions of the Act can serve as a check on potential judicial abuse. 

Id. at 701. Individuals who have made false statements on Financial Disclosure Reports have 

been subject to prosecution under the Federal criminal laws as a violation of title 18, United 

States Code, Section 1001 (False and Fraudulent Statements). 432Danos testified that Judge Porteous prepared the forms, including specifying the codes to 

be used, and she simply typed the forms for him using the information he provided. Danos Dep. 

II at 4-5 (Ex. 47). 

Judge Porteous’s Financial Disclosure Reports are marked as exhibits as follows: Ex. 

102(a) (Financial Disclosure Report for 1996); Ex. 103(a) (Report for 1997); Ex. 104(a) 

(Report for 1998); Ex. 105(a) (Report for 1999), and Ex. 106(a) (Report for 2000). The 

various credit card statements for December of the respective calendar years containing 

balances that should have been reported are marked as follows: Ex. 167 (statement for 

Citibank account 0426 (December 12, 1996)); Ex. 168 (statements for MBNA accounts 

0877 (December 19, 1997) and 1290 (December 4, 1997), and Travelers account 0642 

(December 30, 1997)); Ex. 169 (statements for MBNA accounts 0877 (December 19, 

1998) and 1290 (December 4, 1998)); Ex. 170 (statements for Citibank accounts 0426 

(December 10, 1999) and 9138 ((December 21, 1999), MBNA accounts 0877 (December 

18, 1999) and 1290 (December 4, 1999)); Ex. 171 (statements for MBNA accounts 0877 

(December 20, 2000) and 1290 (December 5, 2000), Citibank accounts 0426 (December 

12, 2000) and 9138 (December 21, 2000), Travelers Bank account 0642 (December 29, 

2000), and Discover account 9489 in the name of Carmella G. Porteous (December 25, 

2000)). 

for amounts between $15,001 and $50,000. The filer is required to 

list all liabilities to credit card companies where the balance exceeded $10,000 at the close of the calendar year for which the Report was filed. 431

Table 6 sets forth the credit card liabilities that Judge Porteous 

actually disclosed as compared with the credit card debts he actually incurred and failed to disclose on his Financial Disclosure Reports for calendar years 1996 through 2000. 432


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433 Judge Porteous’s Financial Disclosure Report (for calendar year 1998), filed May 13, 1999 

(Ex. 105(a)). That warning cites 5 U.S.C. App. 4, § 104 which provides, in part, that the Attorney 

General may bring civil penalty enforcement actions (seeking damages not to exceed $10,000), 

against persons who knowingly and willfully falsify a financial disclosure report. Even though 

the report does not cite to the criminal laws, Judge Porteous would have known that a false 

statement would also violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001 (False Statements) 

which makes it a crime for an individual ‘‘in any matter within the jurisdiction of the . . . judicial branch’’ to make a ‘‘materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation,’’ 

or make or use ‘‘any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially 

false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry.’’ 

The reports were signed by Judge Porteous on a signature line 

directly below the following certification: 

I certify that all information given above (including information pertaining to my spouse and minor or dependent 

children, if any) is accurate, true, and complete to the best 

of my knowledge and belief, and that any information not 

reported was withheld because it met applicable statutory 

provisions permitting non-disclosure. 

Below Judge Porteous’s signature is the following additional warning in capital letters: 

NOTE: ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO KNOWINGLY AND 

WILFULLY FALSIFIES OR FAILS TO FILE THIS REPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 

SANCTIONS 433

Thus, for several years prior to filing for bankruptcy, Judge 

Porteous concealed his financial circumstances on documents where 

he was legally required to disclose them. 


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434Lightfoot GJ I at 22 (Ex. 120). Lightfoot testified three times before the grand jury: August 

19, 2004 (Lightfoot GJ I), September 9, 2004 (Lightfoot GJ II), and November 4, 2004 (Lightfoot 

GJ III). 435 In August 2000, even as Judge Porteous was consulting with Lightfoot for the purpose of 

attempting a workout of his debts, he requested a credit limit increase at the Treasure Chest 

Casino from $2,500 to $3,000. See Porteous Central Credit Inc. Gaming Report (Ex. 326). Judge 

Porteous did not disclose this fact to Lightfoot. 436Lightfoot Affidavit in Support of Attorney’s Fees at 1, Docket No. 18, In the Matter of 

Porteous, Case No. 01-12363, (Bankr. E.D. La.) (hereinafter ‘‘Lightfoot Affidavit and Invoice’’) 

(Ex. 342). During the workout process, Lightfoot analyzed Judge Porteous’s assets and debts and 

came up with a plan to offer at least a partial payment to Judge Porteous’s creditors for all 

of Judge Porteous’s credit card debt of which Lightfoot was aware. Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 87. 437Lightfoot Dep. at 14-15 (Ex. 123); Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 42. 438Lightfoot Dep. at 3 (Ex. 123). Lightfoot’s worksheets contained ‘‘every single question that 

appears in the petition, the schedules and the statements and the Chapter 13 plan. . . . [I]t 

contains everything that would ultimately be contained in a bankruptcy filing.’’ Lightfoot TF 

Hrg. II at 42. 439Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 42. 440Lightfoot GJ III at 36-37 (Ex. 122). 441Lightfoot GJ I at 39 (Ex. 120). 442 Judge Porteous never provided Lightfoot with an updated pay stub closer to the date of 

the bankruptcy filing in March 2001, nor did he provide any other information indicating that 

his salary increased in 2001. Lightfoot Dep. at 4 (Ex. 123). 443Lightfoot GJ I at 54 (Ex. 120). 

C. THE PRE-BANKRUPTCY WORKOUT PERIOD— 

JULY 2000 THROUGH FEBRUARY 2001 

In the summer of 2000, Judge Porteous retained attorney Claude 

Lightfoot as his bankruptcy counsel. Lightfoot had never met Judge 

Porteous prior to representing him. 434

Lightfoot spent ‘‘considerable time’’ with Judge Porteous and his 

wife in July and August 2000, 435 working to compile documentation on their assets and debts and to develop a workout proposal 

for the creditors in an effort to avoid a bankruptcy filing. 436 Lightfoot also told Judge Porteous not to incur any new debts and provided Judge Porteous general information describing Chapter 13 

bankruptcies. 437

During the early months of his engagement with Judge Porteous, 

Lightfoot gave Judge Porteous worksheets to fill out. 438 Lightfoot 

specifically explained to Judge Porteous that he needed to disclose 

all of his assets and all of his debts. 439 Lightfoot believed that the 

worksheets may have been filled out before he met with Judge 

Porteous on July 20, 2000, and that Judge Porteous personally 

filled out the worksheets because, for example, only Judge 

Porteous’s Social Security number was initially filled in on the 

worksheets, and not Mrs. Porteous’s. 440

Judge Porteous also provided Lightfoot with a ‘‘big pile of invoices,’’ bills, and credit card statements. 441 Included among these 

documents was Judge Porteous’s pay stub from the period ending 

May 31, 2000, which showed Judge Porteous’s net monthly income 

to be $7,531.52. 442

Lightfoot spent considerable time preparing an analysis of Judge 

Porteous’s debts and collecting all relevant documents that creditors would need to review when considering whether the workout 

proposal was a fair settlement. 443 Finally, on December 21, 2000, 

Lightfoot sent Judge Porteous a copy of the workout letters that 

had been sent to all of Judge Porteous’s unsecured creditors, ‘‘with 

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444December 21, 2000 Letter from Lightfoot to the Porteouses (Ex. 146). 445December 21, 2000 Letter from Lightfoot to the Porteouses (Ex. 146). Five days after Lightfoot sent Judge Porteous the workout letters, Judge Porteous traveled to Caesars Lake Tahoe 

and took out a $3,000 marker. (Ex. 380). Judge Porteous did not disclose to Lightfoot this gambling trip or the $3,000 extension of credit. 446Lightfoot Dep. at 9 (Ex. 123); Lightfoot 5th Cir. Hrg. at 446 (Ex. 124); Lightfoot TF Hrg. 

II at 43. 447Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 65. 448Lightfoot 5th Cir. Hrg. at 453 (Ex. 124). 449Treasure Chest Records (Ex. 331). 450Treasure Chest Customer Transaction Inquiry (Ex. 302). 

ed to exclude. 444’’ The workout letters listed thirteen debts owed to 

ten different creditors, totaling $182,330.23. 445

During the entire period that Lightfoot represented Judge 

Porteous in connection with his bankruptcy, Judge Porteous never 

told Lightfoot that he had any gambling debt. Lightfoot has been 

consistent in his testimony at every forum—the grand jury, the 

Fifth Circuit, the Task Force Deposition, and the Task Force Hearing—that at all times he was unaware of Judge Porteous’s gambling. 446 At the Task Force Hearing, in response to questioning by 

Mr. Goodlatte, Lightfoot testified: ‘‘I didn’t know [Judge Porteous] 

gambled . . . whatsoever.’’ 447 At the Fifth Circuit Hearing, Chief 

Judge Jones pressed Lightfoot on this point: 

Q. And you’re telling us, as his counsel, in whom he confided for months and months before the time that he 

was—that he filed this petition, when he continued to 

gamble almost every week before and after he filed 

bankruptcy, that you had no earthly idea that this was 

because of gambling? 

A. I didn’t. I never knew him before, and I—I really didn’t 

know that gambling was an issue with the judge. 448

D. JUDGE PORTEOUS’S CONDUCT BETWEEN THE END OF THE WORKOUT (FEBRUARY 2001) AND FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY (MARCH 28, 

2001) 

In about February 2001, Lightfoot concluded that the proposed 

workout would not succeed, and he turned his attention toward 

preparing a bankruptcy filing for Judge Porteous. From February 

2001 to the filing of the initial bankruptcy petition on March 28, 

2001, Judge Porteous committed a series of acts that have particular significance in connection with the bankruptcy forms he 

subsequently signed under oath. These acts reflect his intent to 

conceal certain of his debts, particularly his gambling debts, in violation of applicable bankruptcy law requiring the disclosure of such 

liabilities. 

1. Treasure Chest Markers 

On March 2, 2001, Judge Porteous’s credit limit at the Treasure 

Chest Casino (‘‘Treasure Chest’’) was increased from $3,000 to 

$4,000. 449 Also on that day Judge Porteous gambled at Treasure 

Chest and took out seven $500 markers. He repaid four markers 

in chips that same day but left the casino owing $1,500. 450

On March 27, 2001, the day prior to filing for bankruptcy, Judge 

Porteous made a cash payment of $1,500 to Treasure Chest, repaying the three markers that had been outstanding since March 2, 


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451Treasure Chest Customer Transaction Inquiry (Ex. 302). Judge Porteous’s payment of 

these markers on March 27, 2001 in order that they would not be included on the bankruptcy 

schedules also reflect his understanding that markers were a form of unsecured debt. 452Fleet statement and Danos check number 1660 in the amount of $1,088.41 (Ex. 329). 453 Judge Porteous’s handling of this payment to Fleet demonstrates his knowledge of the 

bankruptcy process and his determination that Fleet not be included as an unsecured creditor. 

First, it was not Judge Porteous’s practice to pay off credit cards early and in full. Second, 

though he did not have funds in his accounts to make the Fleet payment (he had only $559.07 

in his main checking account on the date Danos wrote the $1,088.41 check to Fleet), he could 

have easily waited until April 1, 2001, when he would receive his monthly salary check in excess 

of $7,500. Instead, he had Danos pay it a few days prior to his filing for bankruptcy. (Also, by 

having Danos pay the Fleet card, if creditors were subsequently to insist on examining Judge 

Porteous’s accounts in the month prior to bankruptcy, the check to Fleet would not be signed 

by Judge Porteous, and Judge Porteous’s personal involvement in hiding this card from the 

creditors would not be apparent.) Third, the 5-week gap in any charges on the card was inconsistent with the card’s prior usage pattern, but can be explained by Judge Porteous’s desire to 

be certain there was no debt outstanding on the date of the filing for bankruptcy. Finally, the 

concealed payment on the concealed account occurred 3 days after Judge Porteous obtained a 

P.O. Box to hide his actual residential address at a time when he was structuring (and concealing) his activities with his bankruptcy filing in mind. 454Grand Casino Gulfport Patron Transaction Report (Ex. 301(a)). 

2001. 451 Judge Porteous thus made certain that he had no unsecured debts to Treasure Chest as of the date he filed for bankruptcy. 

2. The Fleet Credit Card 

Carmella Porteous had a Fleet credit card issued in her name. 

In the few months prior to March 2001, partial payments had been 

made to keep that account current and in good standing. Thus, the 

balance on the account’s January 17, 2001 closing date was $1,144, 

on which $315 was paid in February. The February closing balance 

was over $1,250, on which a $370 payment was made on March 5, 

2001. 

On March 19, 2001, a Fleet statement was issued showing a new 

balance of $1,088.41. Payment on the account was due April 15, 

2001. Nonetheless, just a few days after the closing date, Judge 

Porteous directed his secretary Rhonda Danos to pay off this credit 

card in full. On March 23, 2001, Danos wrote a check drawn on her 

personal account in the amount of $1,088.41 to Fleet, indicating in 

the memo line that the payment was for the Carmella Porteous account. 452 The Fleet card was not used to make any charges from 

March 5, 2001 (three weeks prior to filing for bankruptcy), to April 

7, 2001 (about 10 days after the bankruptcy petition was filed). 453

3. Grand Casino Gulfport Markers 

On February 27, 2001, Judge Porteous gambled at the Grand Casino Gulfport (‘‘Gulfport’’) and took out two $1,000 markers. Had 

they been outstanding on the date Judge Porteous filed for bankruptcy, the debt to the casino would have had to be disclosed on 

the schedule of unsecured creditors that would be filed as part of 

the bankruptcy process. (And, as will be discussed, if Judge 

Porteous paid the debt within 90 days of filing for bankruptcy, that 

payment would be required to be disclosed on his Statement of Financial Affairs, one of the official forms that must be filed in a 

bankruptcy case.) 

Gulfport records reflect that the casino attempted to deposit and 

collect on these markers starting March 16, 2001—which would 

have been prior to the bankruptcy filing—but the markers were returned as ‘‘uncollected.’’ 454 FBI Agent Horner determined that 


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455Porteous Bank One Records (Ex. 144). 456Porteous Fidelity Money Market Statement (Ex. 143). 457 No other debt has been uncovered which would require that there be at least $2,000 in 

Judge Porteous’s bank account for the 3 days prior to his anticipated receipt of his salary deposit. 458See Porteous Bankruptcy Schedules (Ex. 127); Grand Casino Gulfport Patron Transaction 

Report (Ex. 301(a)); Bank One Account Summary (Ex. 301(b)). 459Porteous PO Box Application (Ex. 145). 460 2000 Porteous Tax Return (Ex. 141). 461Porteous Initial Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition, Docket No. 1, In the Matter of Porteous, 

Case No. 01-12363 (Bankr. E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2001) (hereinafter ‘‘Initial Petition’’) (Ex. 125). 

During his testimony before the Impeachment Task Force, the Honorable Duncan Keir, Chief 

Judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland, described Chapter 

13 bankruptcies as wage earners’ plans, in that they are only available to individuals who are 

receiving a monthly income. There is no liquidation in a Chapter 13, and a debtor is therefore 

Continued 

there was a problem with Judge Porteous’s bank routing number 

on the markers. 

On March 27, 2001—the day prior to filing his initial bankruptcy 

petition, and the same day he paid off his Treasure Chest markers—Judge Porteous deposited exactly $2,000 into his Bank One 

account. 455 This amount consisted of $1,960 cash and a check he 

drew on his Fidelity money market account of $40—thus ensuring 

that there be a $2,000 in that account. 456 Without this deposit, there would not have been $2,000 to pay the markers. This $2,000 

deposit into an account from which Judge Porteous knew a $2,000 

debt was to be collected demonstrates Judge Porteous’s awareness 

that the Gulfport markers were outstanding as of March 27. 457

Gulfport records reflect that the casino ultimately redeposited 

the markers for collection on March 24, 2001 (a fact, which if 

known to Judge Porteous, would explain his $2,000 deposit), and 

the markers cleared Judge Porteous’s bank account on April 5 and 

6, 2001, a week after he filed for bankruptcy. 458

Despite Judge Porteous’s efforts to have these markers paid off 

pre-bankruptcy, the markers were in fact pending on March 28, 

2001 when he filed. 

4. Obtaining a Post Office Box 

On March 20, 2001, Judge Porteous opened a Post Office Box for 

the explicit purpose of using that address, along with a false name 

in his bankruptcy filing, instead of using his home address. 459

5. Filing a Tax Return for Calendar Year 2000 

On March 23, 2001 (the same date Danos wrote the check to 

Fleet), the Porteouses signed their income tax return for 2000 and 

claimed a tax refund in the amount of $4,143.72. 460

Judge Porteous did not disclose to Lightfoot his activities associated with the Gulfport and Treasure Chest markers, the Fleet payment, or his filing for a tax refund. As described in (E) below, 

Judge Porteous further failed to disclose these activities when he 

signed forms and schedules under oath in connection with his 

bankruptcy. 

E. MARCH 28, 2001—JUDGE PORTEOUS’S INITIAL BANKRUPTCY

PETITION FILED UNDER A FALSE NAME

On March 28, 2001, Judge Porteous filed a Petition for Chapter 

13 bankruptcy (the ‘‘Initial Petition’’) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 461 While the 


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allowed to keep his property. In exchange for that opportunity, debtors must provide the bankruptcy trustee ‘‘with at least as much in value as they would have received had it been a liquidating Chapter 7 bankruptcy.’’ Keir TF Hrg. II at 68. 462Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 44. 463 Initial Petition (Ex. 125). Lightfoot had no doubt that the Porteouses understood that they 

were signing a document containing false information when they signed the Initial Petition. 

Lightfoot GJ III at 31 (Ex. 122). 464Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 55 (Ex. 10). Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 1005 requires that the 

caption of a bankruptcy petition include the name of the debtor and ‘‘all other names used by 

the debtor within 6 years before filing the petition.’’ Fed. R. Br. P. 1005 (2001). Accuracy in the 

caption of the petition is not merely a matter of form. ‘‘It is of substantive importance since it 

informs the creditor of exactly who the debtor is in order that the creditor may have an opportunity to determine whether it has a claim against the estate.’’ In re Anderson, 159 B.R. 830, 

838-39 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993); accord In re Adair, 212 B.R. 171 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997). 465Lightfoot 5th Cir. Hrg. at 435 (Ex. 124). 466Lightfoot 5th Cir. Hrg. at 435 (Ex. 124). 467Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 44. 468Lightfoot GJ III at 23-24, 26 (Ex. 122). 

Initial Petition contained a list of creditors, it did not contain financial schedules or other detailed financial information. Those documents were subsequently filed on April 9, 2001. 

This Initial Petition was filed with the false names ‘‘G.T. Ortous’’ 

and ‘‘C.A. Ortous’’ as debtors and also listed a newly obtained P.O. 

Box address instead of Judge Porteous’s actual residential address. 

Judge Porteous personally reviewed the Initial Petition before it 

was filed, 462 and both he and his wife signed the Initial Petition 

‘‘under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this petition is true and correct.’’ 463

Judge Porteous admitted at the Fifth Circuit Hearing that the 

names used the Initial Petition were false. 

Q. Your name is not Ortous, is it? 

A. No, sir. 

Q. Your wife’s name is not Ortous? 

A. No, sir. 

Q. So, those statements that were signed—so, this petition 

that was signed under penalty of perjury had false information, correct? 

A. Yes, sir, it appears to. 464

While Judge Porteous admitted that he filed his initial bankruptcy petition with a false name, Lightfoot has taken responsibility for coming up with that idea. 465 Lightfoot has since characterized the use of false names as a ‘‘stupid idea,’’ 466 and he explained in his Task Force testimony that his goal in filing the Initial Petition with the false names was to avoid embarrassment to 

Judge Porteous: 

I had hoped that I could avoid him the embarrassment— 

or have him avoid the embarrassment of a big story in the 

newspaper. At that time, these filings were listed in the 

newspaper once a week. And I knew that it would be corrected very quickly before any notice would go out to creditors. And that was a mistake, and it was my suggestion, 

and I am sorry that I made that suggestion. 467

Lightfoot acknowledged that Judge Porteous may have said something about not wanting his bankruptcy to be in the paper. 468

While it was Lightfoot’s idea to use a false name, Judge Porteous 


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469Lightfoot testified: 

Q. After you made the suggestion to Judge Porteous that he file under a false name 

in the original petition, did he object to your suggestion? 

A. No. 

Q. Did he ever say to you, no, I refuse to file a document with a false name?A.No. 

Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 44. 470Porteous Amended Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition, Docket No. 2, In the Matter of 

Porteous, Case No. 01-12363 (Bankr. E.D. La. Apr. 9, 2001) (hereinafter ‘‘Amended Petition’’) 

(Ex. 126). 471 Judge Porteous identified his Amended Petition during his testimony before the Fifth Circuit Special Committee. Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 56-57 (Ex. 10). 472Porteous Chapter 13 Schedules [‘‘Bankruptcy Schedules’’] and Statement of Financial Affairs, Docket No. 3, In the Matter of Porteous, Case No. 01-12363 (Bankr. E.D. La. Apr. 9, 2001) 

(Ex. 127). 473Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 46. As Lightfoot explained in his Task Force testimony: ‘‘[I] would 

sit down, and I believe with his wife at one time as well, and we went through them to see 

that everything was accurate and there were no changes, just going page by page, pointing out 

what was there.’’ Id. 474Lightfoot Dep. at 5-6 (Ex. 123). 475 Bankruptcy Schedules at SC00111, SC00116 (Ex. 127). 

never objected and never refused to file a document under oath 

representing he was ‘‘G.T. Ortous.’’ 469

F. APRIL 9, 2001—JUDGE PORTEOUS’S AMENDED PETITION, ACCOMPANYING SCHEDULES, AND STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS

1. The Amended Petition 

Judge Porteous amended his Initial Petition on April 9, 2001, 2 

weeks after it was filed, correcting the false names and listing his 

actual residential address in Metairie, Louisiana. 470 The Amended 

Petition did not list Judge Porteous’s newly acquired PO Box under 

either the ‘‘street address’’ field or the ‘‘mailing address’’ field. 471

2. The Bankruptcy Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs 

Along with the Amended Petition, Judge Porteous filed two other 

documents. The first consisted of schedules setting forth such items 

as assets (for example, real and personal property, and property 

claimed as exempt), debts (secured and unsecured creditors), income, and other miscellaneous financial matters. The second, entitled ‘‘Statement of Financial Affairs,’’ consisted of a series of questions requiring disclosure of specific financial activities. Judge 

Porteous signed each document under penalty of perjury. 472

Though they were filed April 9, 2001, these forms should have described Judge Porteous’s financial affairs as they existed on the 

date of the Initial Petition—the date which determines the bankruptcy ‘‘estate.’’ 

Prior to filing these documents, Lightfoot provided Judge 

Porteous with draft copies and specifically reviewed them with 

Judge Porteous at least twice. 473 The final review took place within 1 week of the Initial Petition’s filing. 474 Judge Porteous then 

signed both his Bankruptcy Schedules and his Statement of Financial Affairs under penalty of perjury, declaring that the documents 

were true and correct. 475

3. False Representations in the Bankruptcy Schedules 

a. The Tax Refund 

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476The instructions for completing Category 17 on Schedule B state that ‘‘Item 17 request [sic] 

the debtor to list all monies owed to the debtor . . . and specifically, any expected tax refunds.’’ 

Instructions for Completing Official Form 6, Schedules at 62 (Ex. 345). 477 Bankruptcy Schedules at SC00096 (Ex. 127). During his Fifth Circuit testimony, Judge 

Porteous acknowledged that he checked ‘‘none’’ in response to this question. Porteous 5th Cir. 

Hrg. at 80 (Ex. 10). The decision to check ‘‘none’’ was Judge Porteous’s decision—not Lightfoot’s. 

Lightfoot 5th Cir. Hrg. at 451 (Ex. 124). 478 2000 Porteous Federal Tax Return (Ex. 141). 479Porteous Bank One records (Ex. 144). Bankruptcy Trustee S.J. Beaulieu told the FBI during an interview in 2004 that the Porteouses should have disclosed any tax refund to Beaulieu, 

and Beaulieu would have then required the Porteouses to turn over the refund so that it could 

be distributed to the unsecured creditors. Beaulieu FBI Interview, Jan. 22, 2004, at SC00410 

(Ex. 334). Judge Porteous acknowledged during his Fifth Circuit testimony that the $4,143.72 

tax refund was deposited into his Bank One checking account on April 13, 2001. Porteous 5th 

Cir. Hrg. at 82-83 (Ex. 10). 480Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 81-82 (Ex. 10). 481Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 83-84 (Ex. 10). 482Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 46. 483Lightfoot Dep. at 19 (Ex. 123). 

uidated debts owing debtor including tax refunds.’’ 476 In response 

to Category 17, the box ‘‘none’’ is checked. 477

However, on March 23, 2001—5 days before he filed his Initial 

Petition and seventeen days before he filed his Bankruptcy Schedules—Judge Porteous filed his calendar year 2000 Federal income 

tax return and requested a $4,143.72 tax refund. 478 And on April 

13, 2001—just 4 days after the Bankruptcy Schedules were filed— 

Judge Porteous received his entire $4,143.72 Federal tax refund by 

way of a direct deposit into his Bank One checking account. 479

At the Fifth Circuit Hearing, Judge Porteous was shown the return and identified it as having been filed on March 23, 2001. 

When confronted with the fact that the Schedule did not disclose 

the pending refund, Judge Porteous responded: ‘‘When that was 

listed, you’re right.’’ 480

At one point in his Fifth Circuit testimony, Judge Porteous 

claimed that he called Lightfoot when he received the refund, and 

that they discussed what he should do with it: 

Q. What did Mr. Lightfoot tell you? 

A. Said, ‘‘If the trustee didn’t put a lien on it, put it in 

your account; but they may—they may ask for it back.’’ 

Q. But, Judge Porteous, that schedule was signed under 

penalty of perjury. 

A. It was omitted. I don’t know how it got omitted. There 

was no intentional act to try and defraud somebody. It 

just got omitted. I don’t know why. 481

Lightfoot, however, testified before the Task Force that Judge 

Porteous never told him about the year 2000 tax refund. 482 In response to Judge Porteous’s statement that he talked about the refund with Lightfoot after he received it, Lightfoot testified that he 

had a conversation with Judge Porteous in relation to Judge 

Porteous’s receipt of a different tax refund in a subsequent year. 

Lightfoot testified he specifically recalled the issue in that conversation being whether the ‘‘special confirmation order we received from the Houston [bankruptcy judge]’’ required that the refund be disclosed or turned over, and that to answer Judge 

Porteous’s question, it would be necessary to ‘‘look at [the] confirmation order’’ since it was not a typical order issued in New Orleans. 483 The confirmation order in Judge Porteous’s case was 

issued June 28, 2001. As of the date Judge Porteous received the 


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484Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 47. See also Lightfoot Dep. at 18 (‘‘I would have felt the requirement, the obligation on my part to amend the schedules, to list an expected tax refund as the 

questions read, and I would have informed the trustee at the upcoming meeting of creditors.’’) 

(Ex. 123). 485Lightfoot 5th Cir. Hrg. at 447 (Ex. 124); see also Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 46. Chief Judge 

Keir also explained that ‘‘liquidated’’ in this context means the tax refund is an amount certain—it does not mean that the amount has already been collected. According to Judge Keir, 

‘‘[a] tax refund that has been determined or at least initially determined by the tax return is 

a liquidated amount.’’ Keir TF Hrg. II at 70. Judge Keir also made the point that the undisclosed tax refund had significance going forward in determining Judge Porteous’s disposable income: ‘‘Not only was it an asset that should have come in . . . but in effect it affects the calculation of what is disposable income. If you claim no dependents, no deductions, and have them 

take out extra money, you can lower that take-home pay. All you are doing is putting it in your 

own savings account, if you are allowed to do that. Therefore, your monthly payment is also 

going to be less under this plan calculation.’’ Keir TF Hrg. at 77. 486 Bankruptcy Schedules at SC00095 (Ex. 127). During his Fifth Circuit testimony, Judge 

Porteous acknowledged that he listed his Bank One checking account under Schedule B as having a balance of $100. Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 79-80 (Ex. 10). 487Porteous Bank One Records (Ex. 144). Lightfoot testified that he asked Judge Porteous on 

April 9, 2001 how much money Judge Porteous had in his Bank One account, and Judge 

Porteous told Lightfoot that he had ‘‘about $100.’’ Lightfoot GJ III at 43. (Ex. 122). 488Lightfoot 5th Cir. Hrg. at 436, 448 (Ex. 124). 

refund (April 13, 2001) the order had not yet been issued. Therefore, the conversation that Lightfoot had with Judge Porteous 

about whether the order required disclosure of the refund could not 

have taken place in reference to the 2000 tax refund. 

Further, Lightfoot testified he viewed the existence of the refund 

as significant and he stated that if he had known about it, he 

would have disclosed it to the bankruptcy trustee: 

I would have amended this schedule to list it, had it been 

absent, and probably informed the trustee, particularly if 

the meeting of creditors hadn’t been held yet. I would have 

mentioned it. 484

According to Lightfoot, a tax refund is an asset and ‘‘[i]f you have 

a liquidated refund owing to you at the time you file, it should be 

listed.’’ 485

b. Omitted and Undervalued Financial Accounts 

The Bankruptcy Schedules were also inaccurate as to two of 

Judge Porteous’s accounts. 

Question 2 on Schedule B (‘‘Personal Property’’) requires the 

debtor to list, among other things, ‘‘checking, savings or other financial accounts.’’ In response, the current market value of Judge 

Porteous’s Bank One Checking Account—into which his monthly 

salary was deposited—was listed as $100. 486 However, the opening 

balance in Judge Porteous’s Bank One account for the time period 

of March 23, 2001 to April 23, 2001 was $559.07, and the closing 

balance for the same time period was $5,493.91. Indeed, the day 

prior to filing his Initial Petition, Judge Porteous had deposited 

$2,000 into the account—the amount he owed on the Gulfport 

markers—so he knew that the account held at least that amount. 

At no time during that month did Judge Porteous’s balance drop 

to as low as $100. 487

Judge Porteous also omitted a Fidelity money market account entirely from Category 2 on Schedule B. This account was held in 

both his and his wife’s names, and was an active account of Judge 

Porteous. Judge Porteous never told Lightfoot about this account, 

and did not include it on the worksheets that he filled out for 

Lightfoot in the summer of 2000. 488 As Lightfoot testified: ‘‘I asked 


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489Lightfoot GJ III at 45 (Ex. 122). 490Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 85-87 (Ex. 10). 491 Judge Porteous deposited each of the following withdrawals from his IRA into his Fidelity money market account: January 22, 1997 ($12,000); April 30, 1997 ($12,000); April 6, 1998 

($7,200); January 19, 1999 ($2,000); September 27, 1999 ($1,600); May 12, 2000 ($2,400); and 

November 21, 2000 ($2,400) (Ex. 383). 492Porteous Fidelity Statement (Ex. 143). The Fidelity statement that was issued to Judge 

Porteous immediately prior to his filing the original bankruptcy petition was dated March 20, 

2001, and showed a balance of over $600. There was some activity on the account, dropping the 

balance down to $283.42 on March 28, 2001. On April 4, Judge Porteous deposited another $200 

into the account. Judge Porteous knew about this money market account, having written five 

checks on this account between March 22, 2001 and April 12, 2001, including a check in the 

amount of $40 which he deposited into his Bank One account on March 27, 2001—the day prior 

to filing for bankruptcy. Moreover, the account was similarly active and used for the same purposes in the summer of 2000, at the time when Judge Porteous should have disclosed it to Lightfoot. Judge Porteous deposited $2,400 into that account on May 12, 2000, leaving and ending 

balance that month of $2,456.33, and, after some transactions the next month, a balance on 

June 20, 2000 of $2,055.43. 493 Bankruptcy Schedules at SC00108-09 (Ex. 127). 

for all bank accounts, and this [the disclosed accounts] is what I 

got. I was never told there were others.’’ 489 Judge Porteous acknowledged the existence of his Fidelity money market account, 

and acknowledged that it was omitted from his Schedule B, during 

his Fifth Circuit testimony. 490

The Fidelity money market account was an active account used 

by Judge Porteous for transactions outside his personal checking 

account. He would deposit into the account withdrawals from his 

IRA account, travel reimbursements, insurance checks, cash, and 

other miscellaneous items. He used the funds for a variety of purposes, including the payment of gambling debts. For example, on 

November 27, 2000, Judge Porteous deposited $2,400 that he withdrew from his IRA into that account, and on November 30, 2000, 

he wrote a check on that account for $1,600 to the Treasure Chest 

Casino. 491 On occasion, he would move money from his main 

checking account (the Bank One account, into which his salary 

checks were deposited) to the Fidelity money market account and 

then write checks from the latter account. The checks drawn on 

this account also included checks to Danos that appeared to constitute Judge Porteous’s repayment to her for payments she made 

on his behalf. 

Moreover, Judge Porteous had used the Fidelity money market 

account in the time frame immediately surrounding his filing for 

bankruptcy. 492 By omitting the Fidelity money market account, 

Judge Porteous kept a bank account available for his own use 

while in bankruptcy that was outside the knowledge of, and thus 

the potential scrutiny of, creditors. 

c. Understated Income 

Schedule I of the Bankruptcy Schedules, ‘‘Current Income of Individual Debtor(s),’’ required Judge Porteous to list his ‘‘current 

monthly gross wages, salary, and commissions (pro rate if not paid 

monthly).’’ On that schedule, Judge Porteous’s monthly gross income was listed as $7,531.52, the amount that was reflected on the 

pay stub Judge Porteous gave Lightfoot when he first retained him 

in the summer of 2000. 493 That amount listed was in fact Judge 

Porteous’s net salary for that month (not gross as called for by the 

Schedule), and the pay stub was attached to the Schedule. In 2001, 

Judge Porteous’s net judicial salary had increased to $7,705.51 per 


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494Porteous Bank One Records (Ex. 144). Judge Porteous never disclosed to his bankruptcy 

attorney that his judicial salary had increased in 2001. Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 47. Schedule 

I was improperly filled out because Judge Porteous’s gross income, even according to his attached May 31, 2000 pay stub, was $11,775, and his net (not gross) income was $7,531.52. Nonetheless, the form was prepared by Lightfoot and the pay stub was attached. 495Moreover, even as a ‘‘net’’ amount, the $7,531 was misleading. Judge Porteous had Social 

Security taxes withheld from his salary until he reached a statutorily defined annual gross salary—referred to as the Social Security ‘‘wage base’’—a level he typically reached in July of a 

calendar year. At that point, he was no longer subject to Social Security tax withholding, and 

his net monthly salary would increase several hundred dollars. Judge Porteous had experienced 

this pattern for years. In 1999, when the Social Security wage base was $72,600, Judge 

Porteous’s net monthly salary increased from approximately $7,350 on June 1 to $8,052 by August, where it stayed for the rest of the year. In 2000, when the Social Security wage base was 

$76,200, Judge Porteous’s salary increased from $7,531 on June 1 to $8,253 on August 1, where 

it likewise remained for the rest of the year. 

The same pattern would hold for 2001. As noted, Judge Porteous received $7,705 per month 

through June 1, 2001 (though he reported only $7,531 to the bankruptcy court). His monthly 

net salary increased to $7,875 on July 2, 2001, and thereafter increased to a range between 

$8,555 through $8,592 for the rest of the year—roughly $1,000 per month more than he reported 

on his Schedule I, or over $5,000 more for that year. See also Horner TF Hrg. II at 26 (testifying 

that from ‘‘August through December [2001], the pay that is deposited in his account every 

month is about $8,500’’). 

Schedule I specifically contemplated the possibility that a wage-earner in bankruptcy may anticipate a salary increase, and, to ensure that all disposable income is actually paid to creditors, 

specifically inquires at the bottom of Schedule I: ‘‘Describe any increase or decrease of more than 

10% in any of the above categories anticipated to occur within the year following the filing of 

this document.’’ In the response for Judge Porteous, the word ‘‘NONE’’ is typed. Judge 

Porteous’s net monthly salary did in fact go up more than 10%. Thus, Judge Porteous in fact 

enjoyed thousands of dollars a year in undisclosed disposable income that would otherwise have 

been available to pay his creditors—income that was significantly in excess of the $7,531.52 that 

was disclosed on Schedule I as his monthly income. 496Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 43. It was clear to Lightfoot that a marker was a form of debt that 

had to be reported. He explained, ‘‘I have had some cases involving gambling, people who had 

markers, and, of course, they are a civil liability. It is a debt like any other debt in that sense. 

Continued 

month. 494 Judge Porteous’s net income, therefore, was understated 

by $173.99 a month, or $2,087.88 annually, or over $6,000 for the 

3 year life of the proposed Plan. 495

d. Schedule of Unsecured Creditors 

Notwithstanding Judge Porteous’s pre-bankruptcy efforts to ensure there would be no outstanding casino markers on the date of 

filing his Initial Petition, Judge Porteous in fact owed $2,000 in 

outstanding markers to the Grand Casino Gulfport on March 28, 

2001. Though he listed numerous creditors on Schedule F, ‘‘Creditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority Claims,’’ this casino debt was 

not included. Once again, this was a gambling-related matter as to 

which Lightfoot was unaware. As Lightfoot testified: 

Q. Did Judge Porteous tell you more specifically that on 

February 27th of 2001 he gambled at the Grand Casino 

Gulfport, he took out $2,000 in markers and that he 

left the casino that day still owing $2,000? 

A. No. I never knew that he gambled at all or had any 

gambling debts. 

Q. Did he ever tell you that he owed $2,000 to the Grand 

Casino Gulfport on March 28th, which was the day 

that he filed the bankruptcy petition? 

A. No. 

Q. Should Judge Porteous have told you about those sorts 

of gambling debts? 

A. Yes, so I could list them. 496


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So it has to be listed. I would have listed and do list anybody who has a casino-type debt.’’ Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 53. 497 Ex. 144. 498 Bankruptcy Schedules at SC00111 (Ex. 127). 499Statement of Financial Affairs at SC00112 (Ex. 127). The question thus seeks to inquire 

as to whether the debtor has favored or preferred some creditors over others, by paying some 

creditors in full to the detriment of others. As a Federal judge, Judge Porteous would have well 

understood this purpose. Lightfoot explained: 

But what I’m looking for was there anything unusual, any unusual payments to anybody, anything outside a normal monthly installment, like a normal house note, a normal car payment, a normal payment to the credit card company. In other words, anybody gets paid off, I want to know that. Some relative gets paid back, I want to know 

that. 

Lightfoot GJ III at 70-71 (Ex. 122). 500Statement of Financial Affairs at SC00112 (Ex. 127). During his Fifth Circuit testimony, 

Judge Porteous acknowledged that his response to Question 3 was ‘‘normal installments.’’ 

Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 89 (Ex. 10). 501Lightfoot TF Hrg. at 48. See also Lightfoot GJ III at 70-72 (Ex. 122). 

Gulfport collected on these markers on or about April 5-6, 

2001. 497

e. Signed Declaration 

At the end of Judge Porteous’s Bankruptcy Schedules, he signed 

a ‘‘declaration under penalty of perjury by individual debtor,’’ 

which stated: 

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read the foregoing 

summary and schedules, consisting of 18 sheets plus the summary 

page, and that they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. 498

4. Statement of Financial Affairs 

Judge Porteous’s April 9, 2001 Statement of Financial Affairs 

likewise contained false information by failing to report the Fleet 

payment and the payment of certain gambling debts within 90 days 

of his filing the Initial Petition. 

a. Payments to Creditors (Fleet and the Casinos) Within 90 

Days of Filing for Bankruptcy 

Question 3 on the Statement of Financial Affairs required Judge 

Porteous to ‘‘[l]ist all payments on loans, installment purchases of 

goods or services, and other debts, aggregating more than $600 to 

any creditor, made within 90 days immediately preceding the commencement of this case.’’ The question thereafter provided fields for 

the debtor to list the name and address of any creditor, the dates 

of payments, the amount paid, and the amount still owing. 499

Relying on the information that Judge Porteous had provided, 

Lightfoot entered the answer: ‘‘normal installments.’’ 500 When 

questioned about what he meant by ‘‘normal installments’’ during 

his Task Force Hearing testimony, Lightfoot explained: ‘‘ ‘[N]ormal 

installments’ was intended to cover the normal installments on his 

two leased cars and his two home mortgages.’’ 501

That answer—‘‘normal installments’’—was false, in light of Judge 

Porteous’s actions in the weeks immediately preceding filing for 

bankruptcy. 

First, it failed to disclose Judge Porteous’s payment to Treasure 

Chest. On March 2, 2001, Judge Porteous gambled at Treasure 

Chest and took out seven $500 markers, for a total extension of 

credit of $3,500. He repaid $2,000 with chips on March 3, 2001, but 

he did not repay the balance until March 27, 2001 (the day before 


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502Treasure Chest Customer Transaction Inquiry (HP Ex. 302). Judge Porteous was able to 

take out so many markers on March 2, 2001 because his credit limit at Treasure Chest had 

been increased during the previous summer. See Central Credit, Inc. Gaming Report for Judge 

Porteous (HP Ex. 326). 503Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 48. 504Fleet Statement and Danos Check (Ex. 329); Fleet Statements at SC00590 (Ex. 140). This 

payment was credited by Fleet on March 29, 2001. Because this check was not received by Fleet 

until the day after Judge Porteous initially filed for bankruptcy, Judge Porteous could argue 

that the payment to Fleet was not in fact made within the 90 days preceding his bankruptcy 

filing (even though it had been mailed within that time), and thus it was not required to be 

reported on the Statement of Financial Affairs. However, if this were the case, then Judge 

Porteous should have made sure that Fleet was listed on Judge Porteous’s Schedule F as an 

unsecured creditor. In either event, Fleet should have appeared somewhere in Judge Porteous’s 

bankruptcy filing. In fact the transaction does not appear anywhere. 505Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 97-98 (Ex. 10). 506Danos 5th Cir. Hrg. at 402-03 (Ex. 43). 507 ‘‘In other words, I, I—my questioning revealed that the only payments that they [the 

Porteouses] said they made were just normal installments on the debts that I knew of.’’ Lightfoot GJ III at 72 (Ex. 122). 508 In short, Judge Porteous would have known either that the debt was actually pending (in 

which case it should have been listed on Schedule F as a debt owed to an unsecured creditor) 

or that it had been paid (in which case it should have been listed on the Statement of Financial 

Affairs as a payment made in the 90 days preceding the bankruptcy filing). This indebtedness 

was not listed in either place, because Judge Porteous did not tell Lightfoot about it. 509Statement of Financial Affairs at SC00113 (Ex. 127). 

his Initial Petition was filed), when he made a $1,500 cash payment to the casino—that is, he made a payment on a debt ‘‘aggregating more than $600 to any creditor, made within 90 days immediately preceding the commencement of this case.’’ 502 Lightfoot testified that the repayment of the markers to Treasure Chest should 

have been reported on the Statement of Financial Affairs, but that, 

as with all of Judge Porteous’s gambling activities, Lightfoot did 

not include this payment because he did not know about it. 503

Second, Judge Porteous also failed to disclose that on March 23, 

2001, he had his secretary, Danos, pay off his wife’s Fleet credit 

card balance of $1,088.41. 504 Judge Porteous claimed, in his Fifth 

Circuit testimony, that he had no recollection of asking Danos to 

pay off his wife’s Fleet bill. However, he also testified that Danos 

had ‘‘paid some bills’’ for him in the past. 505 Danos testified before 

the Fifth Circuit that she ‘‘assume[d]’’ Judge Porteous asked her to 

write the check to Fleet and that she didn’t talk with Carmella 

about paying her bills. 506

As to both these items—the Treasure Chest payment and the 

Fleet credit card payment—Lightfoot did not include them in response to Question 3 on the Statement of Financial Affairs because 

Judge Porteous did not disclose them to him. 507

Finally, on February 26, 2001, Judge Porteous took out $2,000 in 

markers at the Grand Casino Gulfport. As noted, these were in fact 

outstanding as of the date he filed for bankruptcy (March 28, 2001) 

and were not reported on the Schedule of Unsecured Creditors. 

However, if Judge Porteous believed that the markers had in fact 

been repaid prior to filing for bankruptcy, that payment should 

have been disclosed. Again, Lightfoot was unaware of the Gulfport 

markers. 508

b. Gambling Losses 

Question 8 on the Statement of Financial Affairs required Judge 

Porteous to ‘‘[l]ist all losses from . . . gambling within 1 year immediately preceding the commencement of this case or since the 

commencement of this case.’’ In response, the box for ‘‘none’’ is 

checked. 509 However, an analysis of Judge Porteous’s gambling acVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:55 Mar 04, 2010 Jkt 089008 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR427.XXX HR427

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510FBI Gaming Losses Chart (Ex. 337). FBI Agent Horner explained this chart both to the 

Impeachment Task Force and to the Fifth Circuit Special Committee, and he testified that 

Judge Porteous’s losses totaled $12,895.35, but Judge Porteous also had winnings of $5,312.15. 

Horner TF Hrg. II at 16; Horner 5th Cir. Hrg. at 317-18 (Ex. 338). The analysis of Judge 

Porteous’s gambling activities (including losses) in the year preceding his bankruptcy was based 

on a review of each casino’s records. Casinos keep these records because ‘‘first of all, they have 

to determine wins and losses for tax purposes for these people; and then, second of all, they’re 

basing their comps on these numbers. So . . . they want the numbers to be as accurate as possible.’’ Horner 5th Cir. Hrg. at 322 (Ex. 338). 511Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 99 (Ex. 10). 512Statement of Financial Affairs at SC00116 (Ex. 127). 513 Bankruptcy Schedules at SC00092 (Ex. 127). 514 Judge Porteous never advised Lightfoot that, after filing the amended petition on April 9, 

2001, he incurred thousands of dollars in gambling debt at casinos. Lightfoot 5th Cir. Hrg. at 

449 (Ex. 124). 515While there was no official court order during this time period prohibiting Judge Porteous 

from incurring new debt, nor had the bankruptcy trustee yet instructed Judge Porteous that 

he may not incur new debt, Lightfoot had already made it clear to Judge Porteous that he 

tivities in the year preceding his bankruptcy filing revealed that 

Judge Porteous had accrued $6,233.20 in net gambling losses during that year. 510

During his Fifth Circuit testimony, Judge Porteous admitted that 

his response of ‘‘none’’ to that question was ‘‘incorrect’’: 

Q. Judge Porteous, do you recall that in the—that your 

gambling losses exceeded $12,700 during the preceding 

year? 

A. I was not aware of it at the time, but now I see your 

documentation and that—and that’s what it reflects. 

Q. So you—you don’t dispute that? 

A. I don’t dispute that. 

Q. Therefore, the answer ‘‘no’’ was incorrect, correct? 

A. Apparently, yes. 

Q. Even though this was signed under oath, under penalty 

of perjury, correct? 

A. Right. 511

c. Declaration 

At the end of his Statement of Financial Affairs, Judge Porteous 

signed a declaration which stated: 

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read the answers contained in the foregoing statement of financial affairs and any attachments thereto and that they are true 

and correct. 512

E. JUDGE PORTEOUS’S POST-FILING ACTIVITIES AND THE

BANKRUPTCY CREDITORS MEETING

1. Post-Filing Activities 

Despite the fact that he had filed for bankruptcy protection and 

claimed to have over $190,000 in credit card debts, 513 Judge 

Porteous continued to gamble and to incur thousands of dollars in 

additional debt immediately following his bankruptcy filing. 514

Judge Porteous’s activities between March 28, 2001, when he filed 

his Initial Petition, and the Creditors Meeting on May 9, 2001 included the following: 515


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should not be incurring any new debt. Lightfoot Dep. at 13-14 (Ex. 123). Moreover, Judge 

Porteous’s return to the same conduct that had caused him to go into bankruptcy in the first 

place necessarily placed his creditors at risk. Gambling, and seeking credit to do so, in the very 

days after filing false documents in bankruptcy (that concealed his gambling) bear on the question of his ‘‘good faith’’ in seeking bankruptcy. See testimony of Judge Greendyke, in X(F)(1) 

and (2), infra. Finally, Judge Porteous’s repayment of the Beau Rivage debt by endorsing a 

check to Danos and having her write a check to the casino, thus bypassing Judge Porteous’s 

account altogether, is evidence of his consciousness of the wrongfulness of taking out and repaying debts to casinos between the time of filing for bankruptcy and the Creditors Meeting. 516 Beau Rivage Credit History (Ex. 303). 517 Beau Rivage Balance Activity (Ex. 304). Judge Porteous was able to leave the casino while 

still owing money because he had an established credit line. FBI Agent Horner testified before 

the Fifth Circuit Special Committee and explained that a player has ‘‘to establish some kind 

of credit line with the casino before they would let you [leave while still owing money].’’ Horner 

5th Cir. Hrg. at 309-10 (Ex. 338). 518Treasure Chest Customer Transaction Inquiry (Ex. 305). 519 Harrah’s Casino Credit Application (Ex. 149). This application lists ‘‘$0’’ for indebtedness, 

though it is not clear who may have written that figure on the form. See also Central Credit, 

Inc. Gaming Report for Judge Porteous (Ex. 326). 520 Harrah’s Patron Credit Activity (Ex. 306). Judge Porteous wrote a check to repay these 

markers on April 30, 2001, but Harrah’s held the check for 30 days before depositing it. 521Thus, rather than depositing the money into his own account and writing a check on that 

account, Judge Porteous conducted this transaction in a way that bypassed his accounts altogether and consistent with an intent to conceal his gambling. (Ex. 382). 522Treasure Chest Customer Transaction Inquiry (Ex. 307). 523Trustee’s Memo to Record, Docket No. 7, In the Matter of Porteous, Case No. 01-12363 

(Bankr. E.D. La. May 9, 2001) (Ex. 129). A section 341 creditors meeting is a statutorily mandated meeting of creditors and equity security holders that is held by the bankruptcy trustee. 

Continued 

• April 6, 2001—Judge Porteous requested a one-time credit 

increase at the Beau Rivage Casino from $2,500 to 

$4,000. 516

• April 7-8, 2001—Judge Porteous took out $2,000 in markers at the Beau Rivage Casino. He left the casino owing $1,000, 

which was not paid back until May 4, 2001. 517

• April 10, 2001—Judge Porteous took out $2,000 in markers 

at Treasure Chest. He paid them all back the same day in 

chips. 518

• April 30, 2001—Judge Porteous submitted a casino credit ap- plication to Harrah’s Casino and requested a $4,000 credit 

limit. 519

• April 30, 2001—Judge Porteous took out $1,000 in markers 

at Harrah’s Casino. These markers were not paid back until 

May 30, 2001. 520

• Approximately April 30-May 1, 2001—Judge Porteous repaid the Beau Rivage by withdrawing $1,000 from his IRA, which 

was paid to him in the form of a check dated April 24, 2001. 

He endorsed the check directly to Danos, and she deposited 

it into her personal account on May 1, 2001. On April 30, 

2001, Danos wrote a check payable to the Beau Rivage in the 

amount of $1,000, the memo line referencing Judge Porteous. 

As noted, that payment was credited against Judge 

Porteous’s Beau Rivage account on May 4, 2001. 521

• May 7, 2001—Judge Porteous took out $4,000 in markers at 

Treasure Chest. He left the casino owing this amount and 

repaid all $4,000 2 days later in cash. 522

2. Bankruptcy Creditors Meeting 

On May 9, 2001, the Section 341 Creditors Meeting was held in 

Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy case. 523 Bankruptcy trustee S.J. 


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See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2003). Lightfoot explained during his Task Force testimony that the purpose of a section 341 creditors meeting is to examine the debtor under oath regarding his petition and bankruptcy schedules. Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 49. 524See Creditors Meeting Hearing Transcript (indicating that Judge Porteous was given a 

copy of the pamphlet) (Ex. 130); see also Chapter 13 Pamphlet (Ex. 148). During his testimony 

before the Fifth Circuit Special Committee, Judge Porteous acknowledged receiving the pamphlet from the bankruptcy trustee. See Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 60 (Ex. 10). 525 Chapter 13 Pamphlet at SC00402 (Ex. 148). 526 Creditors Meeting Hearing Transcript at SC00595-96 (Ex. 130). 527 Creditors Meeting Hearing Transcript at SC00598 (Ex. 130). During his Fifth Circuit testimony, Lightfoot confirmed that both he and the bankruptcy trustee advised Judge Porteous 

about not incurring new debt without permission. Lightfoot 5th Cir. Hrg. at 454 (Ex. 124); 

Lightfoot Dep. at 13-14 (Ex. 123). 528Treasure Chest Customer Transaction Inquiry (Ex. 308). 

Beaulieu, Jr. presided over the hearing, which was attended by 

Judge Porteous and his attorney Lightfoot. At the beginning of the 

hearing, Judge Porteous was provided with a copy of a pamphlet 

entitled ‘‘Your Rights and Responsibilities in Chapter 13.’’ 524 Section 6 of this pamphlet discussed credit while in Chapter 13 and 

specifically provided: 

You may not borrow money or buy anything on credit 

while in Chapter 13 without permission from the bankruptcy Court. This includes the use of credit cards or 

charge accounts of any kind. If you or a family member 

you support buys something on credit without Court approval, the Court could order the goods returned. 525

Judge Porteous was thereafter placed under oath and asked if 

everything in his bankruptcy filing was true and correct. Judge 

Porteous stated, ‘‘yes.’’ Judge Porteous was also specifically asked 

if he listed all of his assets in his bankruptcy filing, and again he 

answered ‘‘yes.’’ He also affirmed that his take home pay was 

‘‘about $7,500 a month.’’ 526

The bankruptcy trustee made it clear to Judge Porteous that he 

was no longer allowed to incur any new debt or to buy anything 

on credit. Specifically, the trustee told Judge Porteous that he was 

‘‘on a cash basis now.’’ 527 Judge Porteous did not disclose at the 

hearing that between the time of filing for bankruptcy and the date 

of the Creditors Meeting he had incurred additional debt by taking 

out markers at casinos—one of which he paid back by way of a 

transaction that bypassed his personal accounts altogether. Nor did 

he disclose that he had increased a credit line, that he had concealed a credit card in his bankruptcy filing, or that he had outstanding markers at Harrah’s Casino on the date of the meeting. 

Despite this admonition by the bankruptcy trustee, and despite 

the clear language in the ‘‘Rights and Responsibilities’’ pamphlet 

stating that he was not allowed to borrow money, Judge Porteous 

continued to gamble, to take out casino markers, and to incur new 

debt after the Creditors Meeting on May 9, 2001. Judge Porteous’s 

activities between May 9, 2001 and June 28, 2001 included the following: 

• May 16, 2001—Judge Porteous took out a $500 marker at 

Treasure Chest. He repaid the marker the same day in 

chips. 528

• May 26-27, 2001—Judge Porteous took out $1,000 in markers at the Grand Casino Gulfport. He paid back $900 on May 


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529Grand Casino Patron Transaction Request (Ex. 309). 530Treasure Chest Customer Transaction Inquiry (Ex. 310). 531 Judge Greendyke is now in private practice with the law firm of Fulbright & Jaworski 

LLP. Prior to entering private practice in 2004, Judge Greendyke was the Chief Judge of the 

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. He was specially assigned 

Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy case to avoid having the case heard by a bankruptcy judge from 

the Eastern District of Louisiana. Judge Greendyke was interviewed by Impeachment Task 

Force staff on January 7, 2009. 532Order Confirming the Debtor’s Plan and Related Orders, Docket No. 22, In the Matter of 

Porteous, Case No. 01-12363 (Bankr. E.D. La. June 28, 2001) (hereinafter ‘‘June 28 Order’’) (Ex. 

133). 533Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 62 (Ex. 10). Lightfoot also testified before the Impeachment Task 

Force that Judge Porteous was aware the June 28 Order had been entered and that Judge 

Porteous had received a copy of the Order. 534Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 50. First, on December 20, 2002, the bankruptcy trustee granted 

Judge Porteous’s request to refinance his home. (See Ex. 339.) And second, on January 2, 2003, 

the bankruptcy trustee granted Judge Porteous’s request to obtain two new car leases. (See Ex. 

340). 

27, 2001 and paid back the remaining $100 on June 5, 

2001. 529

• June 20, 2001—Judge Porteous took out a $500 marker at 

Treasure Chest. He repaid the marker the same day in 

chips. 530

F. THE JUNE 28, 2001 CONFIRMATION OF JUDGE PORTEOUS’S BANKRUPTCY PLAN, AND JUDGE PORTEOUS’S VIOLATIONS OF THE ORDER

1. The Order’s Prohibition Against Judge Porteous Incurring New 

Debt 

On June 28, 2001, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge William Greendyke 531

signed an Order Confirming the Debtor’s Plan and Related Orders 

(the ‘‘June 28 Order’’). Among its terms, the June 28 Order prohibited Judge Porteous from incurring new debt without the permission of the trustee: 

The debtor(s) shall not incur additional debt during the 

term of this Plan except upon written approval of the 

Trustee. Failure to obtain such approval may cause the 

claim for such debt to be unallowable and non-dischargeable. 532

Judge Porteous testified he understood the June 28 Order at the 

time the order was entered. 533 Judge Porteous’s understanding 

that he needed the bankruptcy trustee’s permission to incur new 

debt is evidenced by the fact that on at least two separate occasions 

he sought and received such permission. 534

2. Judge Greendyke’s Decision to Sign the Confirmation Order 

Judge Greendyke was asked about his decision to sign the June 

28 Order, confirming Judge Porteous’s Chapter 13 plan, during his 

Fifth Circuit testimony: 

Q. Given the sum of these events—the false filing of the 

name on the initial petition, the omission of the tax refund on the schedules where it should be noted, the 

preferred payment to certain creditors. . . . 

* * * 

Given the sum of those events, had you known that, what would 

have been your course of action while you were the judge superVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:55 Mar 04, 2010 Jkt 089008 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR427.XXX HR427

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535Greendyke 5th Cir. Hrg. at 384-85 (Ex. 335). 536Greendyke 5th Cir. Hrg. at 392 (Ex. 335). 537See Discharge of Debtor After Completion of Chapter 13 Plan, Docket No. 49, In the Matter of Porteous, Case No. 01-12363 (Bankr. E.D. La. July 22, 2004) (Ex. 137). 

vising that bankruptcy? Had you known all those events, what action would you have taken? 

A. If I had been aware of those items prior to the signing 

of the confirmation order, I would not have signed the 

confirmation order. I would probably have sua sponte 

objected on the basis of lack of good faith. I anticipate 

if my Houston trustee had been aware of that he would 

have filed a similar objection. And we would have had 

a hearing to try and iron things out. 

Q. And in bankruptcy filings, is good faith on behalf of the 

debtor one of the key elements that the judge and the 

trustee rely on? 

A. It’s a confirmation requirement. 535

In response to questioning by Chief Judge Jones, Judge 

Greendyke further testified that he did not scrutinize Judge 

Porteous’s bankruptcy as closely as he normally would have because Judge Porteous was a Federal judge: 

Q. I assume you attributed a higher—a certain level of integrity to this filing because the subject in quest was 

a Federal judge? 

A. I did not scrutinize it—— 

Q. Right. 

A. —particularly because I thought it was a judge and 

I—— 

Q. Because you thought a judge would turn square corners? 

A. Yes, Judge. That’s why I was surprised when I found 

out the things I found out. 536

3. Violations of the June 28 Order 

Judge Porteous was subject to the terms of his Chapter 13 repayment plan for 3 years. 537 Notwithstanding Judge Greendyke’s 

Order that ‘‘[t]he debtor(s) shall not incur additional debt during 

the term of this Plan except upon written approval of the Trustee,’’ 

Judge Porteous: (1) took out 42 markers over the course of 14 different gambling trips at 4 different casinos, (2) applied to increase 

his credit limit at one of those casinos and thereafter utilized his 

increased credit line, and (3) obtained and used a new low-limit 

credit card. He did not have the permission of the trustee or the 

bankruptcy court to engage in these activities. 

a. Casino Markers 

After the June 28 Order was issued, Judge Porteous continued 

to gamble and to take out markers, i.e., incur debt, at casinos on 

a regular basis. He obtained these markers on his existing lines of 


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538See Central Credit, Inc. Gaming Report for Judge Porteous (Ex. 326). Agent Horner explained during his Task Force testimony that gamblers are required to fill out credit applications before they can take out markers at casinos, and these applications are very similar to 

credit card applications. Horner TF Hrg. II at 13. 539The documents related to the Treasure Chest transactions are marked as follows: Ex. 311 

(July 19, 2001 markers); Ex. 312 (July 23, 2001 markers); Ex. 313(a)-(b) (August 20-21, 2001 

markers); Ex. 315 (October 13, 2001 markers); Ex. 316 (October 17-18, 2001 markers); Ex. 318 

(November 27, 2001 markers); Ex. 319 (December 11, 2001 markers); Ex. 322 (April 1, 2002 

markers). The documents related to the Harrah’s transactions are marked as follows: Ex. 314 

(September 28, 2001 markers); Ex. 320 (December 20, 2001 markers). The documents related 

to the Beau Rivage transaction are marked as Ex. 317 (October 31-November 1, 2001 markers). 

The documents related to the Grand Casino Gulfport transactions are marked as Ex. 321 (February 12, 2002 markers), Ex. 323 (May 26, 2002 markers), and Ex. 325 (July 4-5, 2002 markers). 

At the Task Force Hearing, the total dollar amounts of the markers were erroneously added 

up to be in excess of $149,000. 

credit at the casinos, and on occasion sought an increase on a line 

of credit. 538

Judge Porteous took out at least 42 markers between July 19, 

2001 and July 5, 2002. The following table summarizes Judge 

Porteous’s gambling activity during the first year following the 

June 28 Order: 539

Judge Porteous repaid his October 17-18, 2001 debt to Treasure 

Chest using his undisclosed Fidelity money market account. As 

Table 7 shows, Judge Porteous left Treasure Chest on October 18, 


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540 Judge Porteous’s financial records related to his use of his Fidelity money market account 

to repay Treasure Chest are marked as Ex. 381. 541Lightfoot Dep. at 9-10 (Ex. 123). See also Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 64 (‘‘No doubt at all’’ 

that a marker is a form of indebtedness.) 542Porteous 5th Cir. Hrg. at 6465 (Ex. 10). 

2001, owing $4,400. The following week, on October 25, 2001, 

Judge Porteous withdrew $1,760 from his IRA. He received those 

funds by check and, on October 30, 2001, he deposited the check 

into his Fidelity money market account. On November 9, 2001, he 

repaid Treasure Chest with $2,600 cash and a $1,800 personal 

check from the Fidelity money market account into which he had 

deposited the IRA proceeds. 540

During his Task Force Deposition, Lightfoot explained that a 

marker is a form of indebtedness owed to a creditor, that it was 

clearly prohibited by the June 28 Order, that at no time did Judge 

Porteous inform him that he [Judge Porteous] had taken markers, 

and that if the Judge had so informed him, it would have been significant. 

Q. Is there any question in your mind that a marker is a 

form of indebtedness owed to a creditor? 

A. None whatsoever. 

* * * 

Q. And if he had ever asked you, by the way, is a marker 

a form of indebtedness which has to be disclosed, what 

would you have said? 

A. I’d say—I would have told him that it’s a civil liability 

that has to be disclosed because it’s a debt, but that 

there are other issues about if you can’t pay it, it may 

be the subject of some sort of criminal bad check prosecution that you need to look into. 

Q. Okay. But there’s no question it’s a form of debt, correct? 

A. At a minimum it’s that, and at a maximum it could be 

worse. 541

Judge Porteous was questioned about his understanding of a 

marker before the Fifth Circuit Special Committee, and he accepted as accurate the following definition: 

A marker is a form of credit extended by a gambling establishment, such as a casino, that enables the customer to 

borrow money from the casino. The marker acts as the 

customer’s check or draft to be drawn upon the customer’s 

account at a financial institution. Should the customer not 

repay his or her debt to the casino, the marker authorizes 

the casino to present it to the financial institution or bank 

for negotiation and draw upon the customer’s bank account any unpaid balance after a fixed period of time. 542

Judge Porteous’s knowledge that a marker constituted an unsecured debt is further evidenced by his pre-bankruptcy efforts to ensure that there were no markers outstanding when he filed for 

bankruptcy. 


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543Keir TF Hrg. II at 78. 544 Capital One Credit Application and Statements (Ex. 341(a)-(b)). FBI Agent Horner identified Judge Porteous’s Capital One Credit Application during his Task Force hearing testimony. 

Horner TF Hrg. II at 18. 545 Capital One Credit Application and Statements (Ex. 341(a)-(b)). 546 Beaulieu FBI Interview, Jan. 22, 2004 at SC00410 (Ex. 334). 547Grand Casino Gulfport Credit Line Change Request (Ex. 324); see also Horner TF Hrg. 

II at 18. 548Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 51. 

While Judge Porteous repaid some of these markers on the same 

day they were taken out, those markers were no less an extension 

of credit than the markers that were not repaid until some time 

later. As Chief Judge Keir explained during his Task Force testimony: 

[T]he debt is incurred when the marker is taken. That is 

when the debt arises. You owe the money. And it is the incurrence of debt that was prohibited by the order. It was 

not qualified by saying ‘‘unless you pay it off within the 

same day,’’ or any other words, such as if you pay it off in 

the same session or something. It is the incurrence of debt. 

And, of course, when the marker was taken out, there is 

no way that Judge Porteous knew he was going to be able 

to or not going to be able to pay it from a particular source 

or at a particular time. It was gambling. There is a chance. 

So the only real event in terms of his disobedience of the 

order was the obtaining of the marker. 543

b. Judge Porteous’s Application for a New Credit Card 

On August 13, 2001—less than 2 months after Judge 

Greendyke’s June 28 Order was entered—Judge Porteous applied 

for a new Capital One credit card. The credit card carried a $200 

credit line. Judge Porteous began using it immediately for dining 

out, clothing purchases, theater tickets, gasoline, and groceries, 

among other things. 544 In May 2002, Judge Porteous’s credit line 

was increased to $400, and in November 2002, it was increased 

again to $600. 545

Judge Porteous never sought permission from the bankruptcy 

trustee to apply for this credit card. When asked about a debtor’s 

request to obtain a new credit card, bankruptcy trustee S.J. 

Beaulieu told the FBI that he objects to all new credit applications 

by debtors and sends the application to the bankruptcy judge. 546

c. Judge Porteous’s Application for a Casino Credit Increase 

On July 4, 2002, Judge Porteous succeeded in increasing his 

credit limit at the Grand Casino Gulfport from $2,000 to $2,500. 547

Immediately thereafter, Judge Porteous gambled at the casino and 

took out the full $2,500 in markers. 

4. Lightfoot’s Knowledge of Judge Porteous’s Post-June 28 Conduct 

Judge Porteous did not tell Lightfoot that he had taken out 

markers, applied for a credit card, or sought credit line increases 

at casinos. When asked at the Task Force Hearing whether he 

would have considered these acts violations of Judge Greendyke’s 

Confirmation Order, Lightfoot responded: ‘‘They clearly would have 

been.’’ 548


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549 As Mr. Schiff noted at the markup: 

Our investigation also uncovered that Judge Porteous falsely reported the full extent 

of his liabilities in his required financial disclosure reports. These debts, which arose 

from Judge Porteous’[s] gambling problem, provided further evidence of his willful efforts to conceal his financial situation and the extent of his gambling over the years. 

Taken together, it is clear that his false statements in the bankruptcy proceedings 

were not the result of an oversight or mistake, but reflected instead intentional and 

willful conduct to conceal his financial affairs and his gambling. 

Markup of H. Res. 1031 [and other bills], House Committee on the Judiciary (Hearing Transcript, Jan. 27, 2010) at 33, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/transcripts/ 

transcript100127.pdf. 550See also Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 43. 

G. INTENT AND MATERIALITY

1. Intent 

There are numerous reasons to conclude that the instances of falsity on the Bankruptcy Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs, and the acts in violation of the June 28 Order, were committed by Judge Porteous knowingly and with intent to deceive and 

defraud. 

First, prior to bankruptcy, Judge Porteous had on numerous 

other instances signed forms and documents with false information 

in an effort to conceal material facts. For example, he signed false 

documents in connection with his background check to become a 

Federal judge (and made other false statements to the FBI). On an 

annual basis, he also signed false Financial Disclosure Reports 

that, among other things, concealed his debts. 549

Second, the fact that Judge Porteous was dishonest and acted 

with the intent to conceal and deceive in connection with filing his 

Initial Petition under a false name and misleading address supports the conclusion that the other false statements at issue were 

made with a similar intent. 

Third, throughout the workout process and up to the time of filing for bankruptcy in March 2001, Judge Porteous updated Lightfoot as to the full extent of his credit card debts (with the exception 

of the Fleet card, which Judge Porteous concealed entirely), and he 

did so as late as March 2001 so as to include the most current 

March credit card balances as of the date of filing. As Lightfoot explained: 

[H]e had a practice of providing me with updated credit 

card statements. Every so often I would get another collection and I would adjust the balances, because the accrual 

of interest was making them get larger. 550

Though Judge Porteous updated Lightfoot on his credit card debts, 

he did not update Lightfoot on income and assets (including the tax 

refund), and did not provide information that would disclose his 

gambling activities. Thus, the evidence demonstrates that Judge 

Porteous was careful in picking and choosing the information he 

would tell his attorney—informing Lightfoot only what he wanted 

him to know and, more to the point, concealing what he did not 

want to reveal. 

Fourth, Judge Porteous is a Federal judge who has presided over 

bankruptcy matters. Whether some of the acts under scrutiny can 

be explained as a good faith mistake if committed by someone of 

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551Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 64. See also Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 48-49. 552Keir TF Hrg. II at 71. 553Keir TF Hrg. II at 72. (‘‘[Trustees] can and on fairly rare occasion do actually launch these 

adversary proceedings to recover back from the preferred creditor all of the money, and then 

the creditor has to wait and get their aliquot share from distributions under the plan.’’). Lightfoot TF Hrg. II at 54. 

cance of the documents he was signing and he well understood that 

he was signing them under penalty of perjury. 

Fifth, the omissions and false statements concerning gambling 

activities are consistent with, and are explained by, Judge 

Porteous’s powerful motives to keep those activities secret from his 

attorney, from his creditors, and from the bankruptcy trustee and 

judge. Judge Porteous may not have known precisely what would 

happen if his attorney and creditors learned of his gambling, but 

there is little question that he would have anticipated that the result would have been further scrutiny into his finances and potentially court ordered restrictions on his gambling. 

Indeed, Lightfoot testified that it would have been very important to him to learn of Judge Porteous’s gambling, and that such 

information not only would have triggered numerous other questions, but would have resulted in his admonishing Judge Porteous 

that he could no longer gamble and take on debt to do so. When 

asked by Mr. Goodlatte what he would have done had he learned 

that Judge Porteous gambled, Lightfoot testified: 

A. I would want to know where are the gambling debts. 

They must be listed. You can’t gamble anymore. You 

can’t incur debt to gamble. Those admonitions. Have 

we listed all of the debts or do you have—And then I 

would get into the area of the markers. Because the 

markers, although they are a civil liability to pay, as 

you were explaining, they also could—if the marker is 

put through as a check and it bounces and then you 

have a bad check, which is a more serious problem. 

Q. Tell me what sorts of questions you would have asked 

him and what advice you would have given him if he 

told you he was a frequent gambler? 

A. Well, I would have told him exactly what—do you have 

any gambling debts that you haven’t told me about? If 

so, I need the name, address, account number, balance 

due. Are you doing it now? Because your budget will 

not work if you gamble. You have no authority to make 

any debts to gamble. 551

Judge Keir testified that if Judge Porteous had disclosed the preferred payments to creditors on his Statement of Financial Affairs, 

he would have run the risk that the trustee would have sought to 

void those transfers and bring those payments back into the bankruptcy estate. 552 The casinos would thus be treated the same as 

other unsecured creditors, and would have received less than full 

payment on the markers. 553 Further, a default to one casino would 

jeopardize Judge Porteous’s credit at all casinos. As Agent Horner 

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554 Horner TF Hrg. II at 19. 

tem, and ‘‘if a gambler gets a negative history on his central credit 

report, what happens is the other casinos generally cut him off.’’ 554

Thus, the conduct discussed in this Section is not simply a variety of isolated and unrelated insignificant omissions that can be 

characterized as mere mistakes. Rather, the omissions and false 

statements form a sophisticated and coherent pattern of deception 

that demonstrates a determined effort by Judge Porteous to pick 

and choose those aspects of the Federal bankruptcy laws with 

which he would honestly comply and those which he would disregard. 

Judge Porteous’s conduct consisted of calculated acts at every 

juncture associated with his bankruptcy. These include: 

• His failure to be truthful to his attorney at the very outset 

as to his gambling debts and as to the Fidelity money market account; 

• His conduct in the days immediately preceding his filing the 

Initial Petition (having Danos pay off the Fleet Card, obtain 

the P.O. Box, and paying off Treasure Chest markers); 

• His causing false statements and omissions to be made on 

the Initial Petition, the Bankruptcy Schedules, and the 

Statement of Financial Affairs, and swearing to those documents under penalty of perjury; 

• His secretly incurring gambling debt after filing for bankruptcy but prior to the Creditors Meeting, and paying off 

some of this debt by directing that a check constituting a 

withdrawal from his IRA be endorsed to Danos, and having 

her write the check paying the casino; 

• His false swearing to the accuracy of the documents he had 

previously signed, and acknowledging his understanding of 

the requirement that he was on a ‘‘cash basis now’’ at the 

Creditors Meeting; 

• His applying for and taking out debt at casinos, applying for 

and using a personal credit card in violation of the June 28 

Confirmation Plan Order, and his using his concealed Fidelity money market account to pay some of those debts. 

Notwithstanding his knowledge that Chapter 13 bankruptcies 

are to be characterized by providing to the creditors all disposable 

income, Judge Porteous knowingly enjoyed substantial disposable 

income, while creditors were left receiving only a portion of what 

he owed them, and less than what they would have received had 

he been honest and acted in good faith. 

2. Materiality 

Notwithstanding the willfulness of Judge Porteous’s conduct, a 

question at the Task Force Hearing was raised as to the ‘‘materiality’’ of the false statements and omissions. For example, Judge 

Porteous’s attorney sought to make the point in his examination of 

the witnesses that even though Judge Porteous filed under a false 

name, the casinos would have ultimately learned of the bankruptcy 


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555 Horner TF Hrg. II at 29-30. 556Greendyke 5th Cir. at 384-86 (Ex. 335). Judge Keir would have done the same: ‘‘It is a 

requirement under section 1325 that the plan be proposed in good faith. The plan, based upon 

falsehoods like this, is not proposed in good faith and the confirmation would have been denied 

right at that point.’’ Keir TF Hrg. II at 74. 557Lightfoot Hrg. II at 43. 558Keir TF Hrg. II at 70-71. As Judge Keir explained: 

So if you hide $4,100 of your assets, you’re reducing the amount that the trustee is 

going to calculate in making a recommendation to the court as to how high the plan 

payment has to be. The second thing is, of course, a tax refund is effectively cash to 

put into your account. You can spend it. If you spend it and then your case for some 

reason was converted to Chapter 7, it is not going to be available to creditors. It is gone. 

So, often, at least in my district, the trustee will take the position and if not agreed 

will file a motion asking for a court order that the refund be paid into the trustee upon 

receipt and, as in effect, part of the payment required into the plan. 

Id. at 70. 559Keir TF Hrg. II at 69. 560Keir TF Hrg. II at 71. 

if they had run a credit check that included Judge Porteous’s Social 

Security number. 555

The false statements were material for numerous reasons. First 

and foremost, one requirement for obtaining bankruptcy relief is 

that the debtor act in ‘‘good faith.’’ Dishonesty in the filing of bankruptcy petitions is the antithesis of good faith. Bankruptcy Judge 

Greendyke was asked about his decision to sign the June 28 Order 

during his Fifth Circuit testimony, and indicated that if he knew 

all the facts concerning Judge Porteous’s conduct, he ‘‘would probably have sua sponte objected on the basis of lack of good faith.’’ 556

Lightfoot testified that one of the reasons he instructed Judge 

Porteous pre-bankruptcy to stop taking on debt was because of this 

‘‘good faith’’ requirement: 

Well, by the time someone is in a financial distress sufficient to be consulting about a bankruptcy, it is not good 

faith for such a person to continue making debt. So I always admonish them not to do it anymore, not to make 

any more credit card charges, et cetera. 557

Second, if Judge Porteous had disclosed accurate information, the 

proceedings could have taken an entirely different course. For example, the trustee could have ordered that the undisclosed tax refund be distributed to the creditors, or could have determined that 

the payment plan should be increased to account for that additional amount in Judge Porteous’s possession, or that Judge 

Porteous was over-withholding and thus had more disposable income. ‘‘But, by hiding [the refund], he both falsified the amount 

that the plan was going to have to pay and took away from the 

trustee the opportunity to obtain the funds to make sure creditors 

got those funds.’’ 558 Or, as Judge Keir explained, by filing under 

a false name and by using a P.O. Box, Judge Porteous had ‘‘falsified the official record of the United States court.’’ Accordingly, 

between the time Judge Porteous filed his Initial Petition and his 

Amended Petition, a lender’s credit inquiry would likely have failed 

to reveal that Judge Porteous had in fact filed for bankruptcy. 559

By failing to disclose the Fleet card, he deprived Fleet of the accurate information whereby it could decide whether it would wish to 

cancel Judge Porteous’s account. 560 Alternatively, if Judge 

Porteous had disclosed payments to casinos within the 90 days of 

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561Keir TF Hrg. II at 71. 562Keir TF Hrg. II at 68. 563Keir TF Hrg. II at 72. Keir explained by analogy: ‘‘[If] one goes 110 miles an hour the 

wrong way down a one-way street but by good fortune doesn’t hit anybody, they are not exonerated from their intentional misconduct for certain.’’ Keir TF Hrg. II at 69. 564Keir TF Hrg. II at 69-70. As one appellate court has noted: ‘‘Materiality does not require 

a showing that creditors are harmed by the false statements. . . . Matters are material if pertinent to the extent and nature of bankrupt’s assets, including the history of a bankrupt’s financial transactions. . . . Materiality is also established when it is shown that the inquiry bears 

a relationship to the bankrupt’s business transactions or his estate . . . or concerns the ‘discovery of assets, including the history of a bankrupt’s financial transactions.’ ’’ United States v. 

O’Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578, 

587 (7th Cir. 1998) (‘‘Materiality . . . does not require harm to or adverse reliance by a creditor, 

nor does it require a realization of a gain by the defendant. Rather it requires that the false 

oath or account relate to some significant aspect of the bankruptcy case or proceeding in which 

it was given, or that it pertain to the discovery of assets or to the debtor’s financial transactions.’’) 

turn dollar for dollar than unsecured creditors generally in the 

case.’’ 561

Third, if Judge Porteous had been truthful as to his gambling activities, he may have invited further and more pointed scrutiny of 

all his financial affairs, bringing to light his actual income and tax 

refund—the sort of scrutiny that was not conducted in part because 

he was so careful and thorough in removing evidence of his gambling from his bankruptcy filings, and because it was assumed that 

as a Federal judge, he would turn square corners. Judge Keir explained that the bankruptcy system depends on the honesty of the 

debtors in disclosing financial information. Judge Keir testified: 

All of this information is sworn to under penalty of perjury. So they [the debtors] are taking a court oath as to all 

of this, and this provides the essential information that 

both the creditors and the trustee can then use to decide 

whether further investigation by way of the examination 

or take action [by] filing [a] particular action before the 

bankruptcy court. They investigate the liabilities by asking 

questions of other witnesses or seeking bank records, for 

example. All of this activity would follow on based upon 

what the debtor has revealed. It has to be complete or 

there is no trail for the creditors and the trustee to follow. 562

Thus, ‘‘the whole system demands and depends upon the honesty 

of the honest but unfortunate person who seeks relief.’’ 563 Individuals can’t just simply decide ‘‘that they can do whatever they want, 

ignoring laws, and so long as you can’t measure the particular 

damage of the violation, there is no violation at all. That would be 

chaos.’’ 564

XI. THE FACTS UNDERLYING ARTICLE IV—JUDGE 

PORTEOUS’S FALSE STATEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH 

HIS CONFIRMATION 

In 1994, Judge Porteous, in connection with his nomination to be 

a Federal judge, was the subject of an FBI background check and 

was required to submit to interviews and fill out various forms and 

questionnaires. 

First, Judge Porteous filled out and signed a document entitled 

‘‘Supplement to Standard Form 86 (SF-86).’’ That form, at question 

10’s, sets forth the following question and answer by Judge 

Porteous: 


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565Porteous Background Check Documents, at PORT 00298 (part of Ex. 69(b)). 566Porteous Background Check Documents, at PORT 00298 (part of Ex. 69(b)). The form is 

undated. The date ‘‘April 27, 1994’’ was written by hand. The Standard Form 86 is entitled 

‘‘Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions (For National Security).’’ 567Porteous Background Check Documents, at PORT 00294 (part of Ex. 69(b)). 568Porteous Background Check Documents, at PORT 00493-94 (part of Ex. 69(b)). 569Porteous Background Check Documents, at PORT 00049 (part of Ex. 69(a)). 

[Question] Is there anything in your personal life that 

could be used by someone to coerce or blackmail you? Is 

there anything in your life that could cause an embarrassment to you or to the President if publicly known? If so, 

please provide full details? 

[Answer] NO 565

Judge Porteous signed that document under the following statement: 

I understand that the information being provided on this 

supplement to the SF-86 is to be considered part of the 

original SF-86 dated April 27, 1994 and a false statement 

on this form is punishable by law. 566

Second, Judge Porteous, when interviewed by the FBI in July 

1994, was asked a series of standard questions designed to elicit 

derogatory information. The FBI Agent, in her write-up of the 

interview, recorded Judge Porteous as stating: 

PORTEOUS said he is not concealing any activity or 

conduct that could be used to influence, pressure, coerce, 

or compromise him in any way or that would impact negatively on the candidate’s character, reputation, judgement, 

or discretion. 567

Third, Judge Porteous was interviewed a second time by the FBI 

on August 18, 1994, about concerns related to 1993 allegations that 

he had received monies from an attorney and a bail bondsman to 

reduce bond. Again, in the FBI Agent’s write-up of that interview, 

Judge Porteous is recorded as stating ‘‘that he was unaware of anything in his background that might be the basis of attempted influence, pressure, coercion or compromise and/or would impact negatively on his character, reputation, judgement or discretion.’’ 568

Fourth, on his United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 

‘‘Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees,’’ Judge Porteous was asked 

the following question and gave the following answer: 

[Question] Please advise the Committee of any unfavorable 

information that may affect your nomination. 

[Answer] To the best of my knowledge, I do not know of 

any unfavorable information that may affect my nomination. 569

The signature block in the form of an ‘‘Affidavit,’’ reads as follows: 

AFFIDAVIT

I, Gabriel Thomas Porteous, Jr., do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my 

knowledge, true and accurate. 

Gretna, Louisiana, this 6 day of September, 1994. 


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570Thus, both Louis Marcotte and Robert Creely have admitted making false statements when 

they were interviewed by the FBI in connection with Judge Porteous’s background check. Each 

individual admitted not being candid as to their knowledge of Judge Porteous’s drinking habits 

and his financial circumstances. 

It is signed by Judge Porteous and by a notary. 570

These four statements each concealed that Judge Porteous had 

engaged in serious and potentially criminal misconduct on the 

bench on numerous occasions over several years. These acts involved his assigning curatorships to Creely as part of a kickback 

scheme. It also involved his setting bonds and setting aside convictions for the Marcottes as part of a course of conduct, quid pro quo 

relationship with them. 

XII. OTHER THINGS OF VALUE RECEIVED BY JUDGE 

PORTEOUS AS A STATE COURT JUDGE 

Judge Porteous’s acceptance of other things of value from attorneys and parties, both as a State court judge and as a Federal 

judge, is relevant to his intent and to address a contention that the 

conduct discussed in Articles I and II constitute nothing more than 

a misinterpretation of Judge Porteous’s friendship and his motives 

in relation to a few attorneys and the Marcottes. 

Attorney Leonard Cline was a plaintiff’s attorney who, in the late 

1980’s, had at least three cases in front of Judge Porteous for 

which Judge Porteous awarded his clients large verdicts. In the 

mid-1990’s, an attorney sued Cline, alleging, in substance, that 

Cline owed him a portion of the fees from one of the cases. In connection with that suit, Cline’s secretary, Sharon Konnerup, gave a 

sworn statement in which she testified that Cline and Judge 

Porteous were friends, that Cline had given Judge Porteous a 

unique firearm which she had actually seen, and that Cline also 

paid for a cruise for Judge Porteous. Her testimony as to the firearm was as follows: 

Q. Does Mr. Cline or did Mr. Cline, at the time you were 

working with him, have any kind of a relationship with 

Judge Porteous? 

A. They were very good friends. Judge Porteous would 

stop by the office every now and then. 

Q. Did they go to lunch together? 

A. Yes, they did. 

Q. Did Mr. Cline ever give any gifts to Judge Porteous? 

A. He gave him a very, very, very unique shotgun that 

had silver inscriptions on it, all silver scroll, decorative. 

Q. Was that during your tenure with Mr. Cline? 

A. Yes, it was. 

Q. Did you ever see the shotgun? 

A. Yes, I did. 

Q. Did Mr. Cline tell you he had purchased it for Judge 

Porteous? 


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571Konnerup Dep. Ex. 34 at 13-14 (Sworn Statement of Sharon Konnerup, taken in American 

Motorists Ins. Co. v. American Rent-all, Inc., et al, No. 322-619 (24th Jud. Dist. Ct., Jeff. Par., 

La., Sept. 7, 1995)) (Ex. 234). 572 Id. at 14-16. 573Konnerup Dep. at 5 (Ex. 194). 574 Cline Dep. at 11 (Ex. 195). Judge Porteous actually awarded Cline’s client $1,126,319.79 

after a non-jury trial. The case is described on appeal at Tracy v. Jefferson Parish, 523 So.2d 

266 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (Ex. 196(a)). 575 Cline Dep. at 14-15 (Ex. 195). See also, Judgment, Cabral v. National Fire Insurance Co., 

No. 374-310 (24th Jud. Dist. Ct., Jeff. Par., La.), May 22, 1989 (Ex. 196(a)). 576 Cline Dep. at 18 (Ex. 195). That case was American Motorist Ins. Co. v. American Rentall, No 322-619 (24th Jud. Dist Ct., Jeff. Par., La.). It was reported on appeal at 579 So.2d 429 

(La. Sup. Ct. 1991) (Ex. 196(f)). 

A. Yes, he did. 571

Konnerup also testified that, based on discussions that she overheard, she believed that Cline had paid for a cruise for Judge 

Porteous. 572

Konnerup was deposed by Task Force Staff about this incident. 

At her deposition, Konnerup testified that she worked for Cline 

roughly between 1988 to 1990. She indicated her current recollection of events was not as clear as it was at the time of the 1995 

sworn statement, but she did adopt her 1995 prior statement, stating that she took the oath to tell the truth seriously, and she was 

confident she told the truth as she knew it at that time. 573

Attorney Cline, who was deposed by Task Force Staff, acknowledged having three cases in front of Judge Porteous. In the first, 

Judge Porteous awarded a verdict after a non-jury trial of 

‘‘[s]omething like a million dollars . . . or $800,000’’ in May 1987 

in a case where Cline’s client suffered injuries after tripping over 

a manhole cover. 574 In the second case, in May 1989, Judge 

Porteous awarded a default judgement of $1,461,105.18 to Cline’s 

client. The case thereafter settled for about $450,000. 575 In the 

third case, in June 1989, Judge Porteous awarded a verdict of $1.5 

million to Cline’s client in an automobile accident case, also after 

a non-jury trial. The award was reduced on appeal to about $1 million. 576

Cline was asked at the Task Force deposition whether he ever 

gave Judge Porteous a firearm or a cruise. He claimed to have no 

recollection of doing so: 

Q. Now in or about the 1988 to 1990 time frame do you 

recall giving Judge Porteous any sort of hunting weapon, be it a shotgun, a rifle, or any other hunting weapon? 

A. I have no recollection of that one way or another. 

Q. And in or about the same time frame, do you recall 

paying for a cruise for Judge Porteous? 

A. I have no recollection of paying for a cruise one way or 

the another. 

* * * 

My best guess today is I have no recollection of giving 

Judge Porteous a gun or a cruise. I have no recollection 

one way or the other. 


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577 Cline Dep. at 21-22, 24-25 (Ex. 195). In contrast to Cline’s lack of recollection as to whether 

he gave Judge Porteous a firearm or a cruise, Cline had a detailed memory of the facts of the 

Tracy v. Jefferson Parish case that took place in the late 1980’s, which Cline described as follows: 

Q. [H]ow can you sue Jefferson Parish for somebody slipping on a water meter manhole? 

A. Well, because the grass grew about 16 to 18 inches under the cover, which means 

that the grass, when the cover’s not on it, there’s not much light in there. So it takes 

a while for the grass to grow 16 to 18 inches. 

So the [P]arish inspected the meters and read the meters supposedly every month or 

whatever, every other month. I’m not sure what the evidence showed back then. But 

it showed that they had plenty of notice that the grass was under there. 

And after we reported the accident, they came out and cut all the grass and put a nice 

cover on there and took pictures and said, ‘‘Well, look, this is how it was.’’ And, of 

course, we already had pictures. We had an expert out there, and that wasn’t so. 

Cline Dep. at 9-10 (Ex. 195). 578 Cline Dep. at 25-26 (Ex. 195). 

* * * 

Q. Is it possible that you did? 

A. I have no recollection. 

Q. [S]o you’re saying it is possible, you just don’t recall? 

A. I have no recollection of doing that, and I just can’t answer that question. I don’t know, I mean, I don’t have 

any recollection. 577

Cline testified he owned more that ten firearms, though he denied being a ‘‘collector.’’ 578

XIII. OTHER INSTANCES OF JUDGE PORTEOUS ACCEPTING 

THINGS OF VALUE FROM PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS 

WHILE A FEDERAL JUDGE, AND HIS NON-DISCLOSURE 

OF THOSE TRANSACTIONS 

A. INTRODUCTION

Judge Porteous’s acceptance of things of value from attorneys 

with matters before him in the Liljeberg case was not an isolated 

incident. He also accepted hunting trips and expensive meals at 

high-end restaurants from parties, their attorneys, and even witnesses, without making appropriate disclosures to the opposing attorneys who appeared before him. Judge Porteous’s acceptance of 

these things of value in cases in addition to the Liljeberg case provides additional evidence of his intent to inappropriately use his 

Federal judgeship to obtain personal benefits. 

B. JUDGE PORTEOUS’S RECUSAL PRACTICES AS A FEDERAL JUDGE

Judge Porteous had no procedures in place to recuse himself in 

the event of a conflict, in contrast to the practice of other Federal 

judges. 

Judge Porteous’s courtroom clerk, Richard Windhorst, testified 

that he had previously clerked for District Court Judge Morey L. 

Sear, who provided Windhorst a ‘‘conflict list.’’ If a company on the 

list was a party in a case assigned to Judge Sear, Windhorst was 

instructed to call the clerk’s office and have the case reassigned to 

another judge. Judge Richard Haik maintained a ‘‘recusal list’’ for 

the same purpose. As described later in this section, Judge Haik 

made sure to include on that list companies which provided him 


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579 Haik Affidavit (Ex. 186). 580Windhorst Dep. at 5-6 (Ex. 184). 581 Civ. No. 2:96-cv-00961-GTP (E.D. La.), filed March 15, 1995, closed May 28, 1999. See 

PACER Docket Report (Ex. 28). 582This trip occurred while the Liljeberg case was under advisement with Judge Porteous. 583These were: 

• ‘‘First National Bank v. Evans, Civ. No. 2:96-cv-01006-GTP (E.D. La.), filed March 20, 1996, 

closed September 19, 1997. In this case, Judge Porteous appointed Levenson to represent a 

missing party. Levenson was paid approximately $470. See PACER Docket Report (Ex. 28(c)); 

Levenson Dep. at 32-33 (Ex. 30). 

• Joseph v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Civ. No. 2:97-cv-001923-GTP (E.D. La.), filed January 21, 

1997, closed July 24, 1998. Levenson did not recall this case. See PACER Docket Report (Ex. 

28(d)); Levenson Dep. at 33 (Ex. 30). 

• Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance v. Ravannack, Civ. No. 2:00-cv-01209-CJB-DEK. (E.D. La.), 

filed April 19, 2000, closed June 13, 2007. This complicated products liability case was reassigned from Judge Porteous to Judge Carl Barbier in 2006. See PACER Docket Report (Ex. 

28(e)); Levenson Dep. at 34 (Ex. 30). 

• Holmes v. Consolidated Companies, Inc., Civ. No. 2:00-01447-GTP (E.D. La.), filed May 17, 

2000, closed May 22, 2001. Levenson represented the defendant in an employment discrimination case. The case settled for what Levenson described as a ‘‘minimal amount.’’ See PACER 

Docket Report (Ex. 28(f)); Levenson Dep. at 34-36 (Ex. 30). 

• Morales v. Trippe, Civ. No. 2:04-02483-GTP-DEK (E.D. La.), filed August 31, 2004, closed 

April 18, 2005. This personal injury case settled for the insurance policy limits. See PACER 

Docket Report (Ex. 28(g)); Levenson Dep. at 37-38 (Ex. 30). 

with hunting trips. 579 In contrast, Judge Porteous had no such list 

and had no such procedures. He recused himself only on matters 

on which his sons, who were attorneys, were involved. 580

C. THE ALLIANCE GENERAL CASE AND OTHER CASES WHERE

LEVENSON REPRESENTED A PARTY

1. The Alliance General Case 

From 1996 to 1999, during roughly the same time that the 

Liljeberg case was pending before him, Judge Porteous was also 

presiding over Alliance General Insurance Co. v. Louisiana Sheriffs’ 

Automobile Risk Program. 581 In that case, which was filed in 

March 1996, the plaintiff, an insurance company, sued various 

Sheriffs Associations (‘‘the Sheriffs’’), attempting to void an auto insurance policy on the grounds that the Sheriffs made misrepresentations in procuring the policy as to the nature and extent of the 

claims. The Sheriffs were represented by Allen Usry. Usry, in turn, 

retained Levenson. 

During the pendency of that case, Usry and/or Levenson invited 

Porteous on at least one, and perhaps two, hunting trips to Usry’s 

Mississippi property. In May 1999, Judge Porteous decided a summary judgement motion in favor of the Sheriffs—Levenson’s and 

Usry’s client—which effectively ended the litigation. In December 

1999, Levenson and/or Usry paid for Judge Porteous to hunt at the 

Blackhawk hunting facility. 582

2. Other Levenson Cases Before Judge Porteous 

Levenson had other cases with Judge Porteous as well, and in 

fact had cases pending before Judge Porteous at all times from 

March 20, 1996 (prior to his becoming involved in the Liljeberg 

case) through 2007. 583 Judge Porteous’s relationship with 

Levenson prior to and during the Liljeberg case has been described 

in prior sections. That same relationship, whereby Levenson frequently paid for Judge Porteous’s meals, continued at least until 

2003, when they traveled to Washington, D.C. for a Mardi Gras 


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584Levenson Dep. at 25 (Ex. 30); Danos Dep. I at 66-67 (Ex. 46). 585Levenson Dep. at 38-39 (Ex. 30). 586 Chopin Dep. at 17-18 (Ex. 182). 587Levenson Dep. at 28-29 (identifying Chopin as an attorney who took Judge Porteous to 

lunch) (Ex. 30); Gardner Dep. at 38 (identifying Judge Porteous and Chopin as friends) (Ex. 36). 

See also Baynham Dep. at 19 (‘‘My understanding was that they had been friends for a long 

time.’’) (Ex. 158); Danos Dep. I at 23 (Porteous and Chopin became friends when Porteous was 

a State judge) (Ex. 46); Danos Dep. I at 68 (Chopin was one of the attorneys who took Judge 

Porteous to lunch on occasion) (Ex. 46). 588 Chopin claimed he and Judge Porteous split the costs of meals. Chopin is the only attorney 

interviewed who has stated that Judge Porteous paid for more than a small fraction of the 

meals. Chopin Dep. at 56-57, 65 (Ex. 182). 589 Chopin Dep. at 64-66 (‘‘I’m going to assume [Judge Porteous] charge[d], but it could have 

been, you know, where we were just getting a sandwich and paid cash. But certainly he’s 

charged them.’’) (Ex. 182). Chopin’s representation that Judge Porteous paid for meals with him 

by credit card is not corroborated by any of Judge Porteous’s credit card records in the Committee’s possession. 

event. 584 At no time in any case that Levenson had before Judge 

Porteous did Judge Porteous disclose to the opposing party that he 

had a close relationship with Levenson, that they had traveled together frequently (including during the pendency of the case), and 

that Levenson had paid for meals on those trips. 585

D. JUDGE PORTEOUS’S RELATIONSHIP WITH RICHARD CHOPIN AND

ACCEPTANCE OF HUNTING TRIPS FROM DIAMOND OFFSHORE

1. Attorney Richard Chopin 

Attorney Richard Chopin was a friend of Judge Porteous for 

years. They first met when they taught trial advocacy at Louisiana 

State University Law School. 586 They were perceived by others to 

be friends. 587

Chopin wrote a letter to Second Circuit Judge Ralph Winter, 

dated March 28, 2008, supportive of Judge Porteous, in which Chopin described Judge Porteous as an ‘‘outstanding judge’’ and among 

‘‘one of finest judges before whom I have ever appeared.’’ He stated 

he had never ‘‘heard, seen or experienced any impropriety in Judge 

Porteous’[s] conduct’’ and characterized the allegations against 

Judge Porteous as having the appearance of a ‘‘witch hunt.’’ Letter 

from Richard A. Chopin, Esq., to Hon. Ralph K. Winter, March 28, 

2008 Chopin Dep. Ex. 58 (Ex. 258). Chopin also solicited other attorneys to write letters in support of Judge Porteous. Chopin Dep. 

at 70-71 (Ex. 182); Chopin Dep. Ex. 59 (Ex. 259). 

Chopin testified that he took Judge Porteous out to lunch, but he 

stated that Judge Porteous reciprocated. 588 Chopin also testified 

that Judge Porteous would have used a credit card to charge meals 

at expensive restaurants in the period subsequent to Judge 

Porteous filing for bankruptcy and when Judge Porteous was under 

court-ordered restrictions from incurring new debt. 589

2. Diamond Offshore 

Diamond Offshore (‘‘Diamond’’) is an oil rig company with headquarters in Houston, Texas, that has been sued on occasion as a 

result of injuries to others or damage to property that occurs in the 

operation of Diamond’s rigs. If the injuries or damages occurred in 

the Gulf of Mexico, the civil suits were frequently brought in the 

Eastern District of Louisiana, and would occasionally be assigned 

to Judge Porteous. Chopin was frequently retained by Diamond to 

defend the company in litigation. 


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590 Chopin did not deny that he was the impetus to Diamond’s inviting Judge Porteous, but 

testified that he did not remember doing that. Chopin Dep. 19-20 (Ex. 182). 591 Chopin Dep. at 21-22 (Ex. 182); Chopin Dep. Ex. 51 (Ex. 251). As late as November 15, 

2006, Chopin was still involved in inviting Judge Porteous on these hunting trips. In an email 

to Diamond’s General Counsel, Chopin wrote: ‘‘. . . I had lunch with Judge Porteous yesterday 

and he asked if I heard anything about the hunt. . . . I know he would be thrilled to be invited 

again. . . .’’ Diamond Documents at D0075 (Ex. 177). 592Porteous did not disclose the 2000, 2001 and 2003 Diamond hunting trips in his financial 

disclosure reports. He did disclose the hunting trips as gifts in his 2005, 2006 and 2007 his financial disclosure reports. See Exs. 106(a), 107(a), 109(a), 111(a), 112(a) and 113. By 2006, 

Judge Porteous knew he was under a criminal investigation. 593 Bradley Dep. at 27-28 (Ex. 181). 594 All the Diamond cases assigned to Judge Porteous either settled or were reassigned, so unlike the Liljeberg case, Judge Porteous had only limited opportunities to issue dispositive rulings 

in those cases. Thus, no particular ruling by Judge Porteous has been subject to judicial scrutiny 

in his handling of the Diamond cases. 

3. 2000-2007—Judge Porteous Accepts Six Hunting Trips From Diamond 

Diamond owned or leased a hunting property in Texas that it 

used for entertainment purposes. In the late 1990’s, Diamond arranged a hunting trip for attorneys and others in the claims management part of the business. Chopin was invited, and, according 

to a Diamond employee who had some responsibility for the trips, 

Chopin, in turn, recommended that Diamond invite Judge 

Porteous. 590

The documentary evidence confirms that Diamond perceived 

Chopin to be associated with Judge Porteous in connection with 

these trips. In connection with Judge Porteous’s attendance on the 

2001 trip, the communications from Diamond to Judge Porteous 

concerning that trip stated that Judge Porteous could provide his 

information to Chopin and that Chopin would act as an intermediary. 591

Judge Porteous went on six Diamond-sponsored hunting trips. 

These occurred in early January in 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 

and 2007. In each of these 6 years, Chopin was also present. Diamond documents reflect that Judge Porteous and Chopin shared a 

room on at least the 2005 and 2006 trips. 592

In connection with the hunting trips, Diamond paid all of Judge 

Porteous’s expenses. Diamond flew Judge Porteous, Chopin and 

others from New Orleans to the hunting facility in Texas. It provided air transportation (including by private aircraft), meals, lodging, and an open bar, and paid for hunting licenses if necessary. 

If the guest shot a deer, the deer would be cleaned and butchered, 

and the processed meat sent to the guest. 593 The only expense a 

guest was required to cover was the cost of mounting a deer head 

if this service was requested. 

4. Specific Cases Assigned to Judge Porteous Involving Diamond 

and/or Chopin 

Notwithstanding the fact that Judge Porteous had started in 

January 2000 to attend all-expense-paid, high-end hunting trips 

sponsored by Diamond, he continued to preside over litigation in 

which Diamond was a named defendant, without disclosing his receipt of Diamond trips. 594

The Diamond cases in front of Judge Porteous (since he first 

started attending the Diamond hunting trips) include: 

• Sylve v. Oceaneering Int’l, Inc., British Borneo Exploration, 

and Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc. was filed March 


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595 Civ. No. 2:99-cv-00841-GTP (E.D. La.). See PACER Docket Report (Ex. 180(d)). 596 Civ. No. 2:01-cv-00441-JCZ (E.D. La). See PACER Docket Report (Ex. 180(f)). 597 Civ. No. 2:03-cv-02505-GTP-ALC. (E.D. La.). See PACER Docket Report (Ex. 180(g)). 598 Civ. No. 2:04-cv-00922-CJB-ALC (E.D. La.). See PACER Docket Report (Ex. 180(h)). 599 Civ. No. 2:03-cv-00782-GTP (E.D. La.). See PACER Docket Report (Ex. 178). 

1999. 595 Even though Diamond was a named defendant, any 

liability on Diamond’s part would have been covered by an 

insurance policy. The insurance company (Oceaneering International) was thus responsible for managing the defense. 

However, Diamond was not dismissed from the case. Diamond took Judge Porteous hunting in January 2000, while 

the case was pending and 2 months prior to trial. Trial commenced March 13, 2000, and the parties settled on March 

14, 2000. 

• Boothe v. Diamond Offshore Mgt. was filed February 20, 

2001. 596 Diamond was represented by Chopin. This case was 

filed about a month after Judge Porteous had attended his 

second Diamond hunting trip with Chopin in January 2001. 

A year later, in February 2002, the case was reassigned from 

Judge Porteous to Judge Jay C. Zainey. 

• Johnson v. Diamond Offshore was filed in September 2003 

and was pending until March 2005. 597 Diamond was represented by Chopin until August 2004, at which time Chopin 

was replaced by another attorney. In January 2005, during 

the case’s pendency, Judge Porteous went on his fourth Diamond hunting trip. In this case, as with the Sylve case 

above, Diamond was indemnified by a third party. The case 

settled. 

• Jones v. Diamond Offshore was filed March 31, 2004 and 

was resolved in June 2006. 598 In January 2005, during the 

pendency of the case, Judge Porteous went on his fourth Diamond hunting trip. In 2006, the case was reassigned from 

Judge Porteous to Judge Carl Barbier and settled for a modest amount. 

Although Judge Porteous did not end up presiding over jury or 

non-jury trials involving Diamond, and was not otherwise significantly involved in determinations as to the liability of Diamond, in 

none of these four cases were the plaintiffs or their attorneys made 

aware that Judge Porteous had gone on hunting trips paid for by 

Diamond. 

One additional case, Farrar v. Diamond Offshore, 599 deserves 

specific mention. Diamond was represented by Chopin in a personal injury case brought by plaintiff Farrar alleging negligence. 

The case was filed in March 2003—2 months after Judge Porteous 

had taken his third Diamond hunting trip (also attended by Chopin). The parties settled in April 2004 on terms acceptable to plaintiff’s counsel, Peter Koeppel. However, Koeppel’s observations illustrate the consequences of Judge Porteous’s failure to disclose his 

relationship with both Diamond and Chopin. After testifying that 

he was unaware that Judge Porteous had gone on one or more 

hunting trips paid for by Diamond and attended by Diamond’s 

counsel, Koeppel testified that if he had known of that fact, he 

would have felt ‘‘ethically . . . obligated to inform my client . . . 

to seek their consent in terms of either proceeding forward or adVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:55 Mar 04, 2010 Jkt 089008 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR427.XXX HR427

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600Koeppel Dep. at 6-7 (Ex. 183). 601 Baynham Dep. at 5 (Ex. 158). 602Their firm’s offices are on the same floor in the same building. Chopin Dep. at 47-48 (Ex. 

182). Over the years, Chopin and Baynham have represented both Rowan and Diamond. 603Dr. Cenac is an orthopedist who is frequently retained by Diamond and Rowan, as well 

as Chopin and Baynham, as a medical expert witness. Hedrick recalled this hunt, and stated 

he perceived Judge Porteous and Dr. Cenac to be friends. Hedrick Dep. at 5-6 (Ex. 166). It is 

not known how Judge Porteous initially came to be friends with Dr. Cenac. 604 Hedrick’s receipts and expense report for the meal have been obtained. See Rowan Documents at RH 000110-11 (Ex. 154). These contain a January 16, 2002 entry for ‘‘Judge Porteous’’ 

with the amount of $392 and the corresponding receipt. Hedrick identified these documents in 

his deposition. Hedrick Dep. at 12 (Ex. 166); Hedrick Dep. Ex. 92 (Ex. 292). 605Several witnesses have described these trips. See Hedrick Dep. at 8-10 (Ex. 166); Baynham 

Dep. at 28-30 (Ex. 158) and Koeppel Dep. at 11-13 (Ex. 183). 

vising the court to recuse himself.’’ He further testified that information that the Judge had accepted a trip from Diamond would 

have been important to his clients: ‘‘[P]eople who work out offshore 

on drilling rigs tend to be rather unsophisticated and wary of the 

legal system in general. I can’t say that for every one of them, but 

in general. So it would be important to tell Them.’’ 600

D. JUDGE PORTEOUS’S ACCEPTANCE OF HUNTING TRIPS FROM

ROWAN COMPANIES

1. Rowan, Baynham, Hedrick and Dr. Cenac 

Rowan Companies (‘‘Rowan’’) was an oil rig company with headquarters in Houston, Texas. It also owned and operated drilling 

rigs in the Gulf of Mexico, and was on occasion sued for damages 

as a result of injuries or damages to property that occurred in the 

operation of the rigs. When the injuries or damages occurred in the 

Gulf of Mexico, civil suits were often brought in the Eastern District of Louisiana. On occasion, Judge Porteous was assigned these 

cases. Rowan, like Diamond, leased or owned a property in Texas 

and sponsored hunting trips for invited guests. 

The Rowan hunting trips were similar to the Diamond trips. 

Rowan paid for all expenses, including transportation to and from 

the location (by private plane on occasion), lodging, meals, liquor, 

hunting licenses, and meat processing. 601

Bill Hedrick was the Rowan Vice President who supervised Rowan’s claims management process, and was responsible for retaining 

outside counsel to defend Rowan in litigation. Hedrick would frequently retain T. Patrick Baynham, a New Orleans attorney, to 

represent Rowan. Baynham, like Chopin, specialized in maritime 

defense. 602 In mid-November 2001, Hedrick met Judge Porteous 

for the first time at an overnight hunt at the camp of Dr. Christopher Cenac, Sr. 603

2. Hunting Trips and Meals with Rowan, Hedrick and Baynham 

On January 16, 2002, about 2 months after first meeting Judge 

Porteous, Hedrick paid for dinner with Judge Porteous and others. 

The bill was $392 at ‘‘Eleven 79’’ restaurant. 604

On November 4-7, 2002, Judge Porteous went hunting at the invitation of Hedrick at the Rowan hunting facility in Texas. Hedrick 

was also in attendance. 605


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606 Rowan Documents at RH000112-13 (Ex. 154). The first of those pages, RH 000112, references a January 16, 2002 entry for ‘‘Judge Porteous’’ with the amount of $591.36. The second 

page sets forth the corresponding receipt. Hedrick identified these documents in his deposition. 

Hedrick Dep. at 12-13 (Ex. 166); Hedrick Dep. Ex. 93 (Ex. 293). Hedrick was reimbursed by 

Rowan for any meals he spent hosting Judge Porteous. These were treated as business expenses—presumably because it was in Rowan’s corporate interest to have good relations with 

the Judge hearing some its cases. 607PACER Docket Report, Hanna v. Rowan Company, Inc., et al, Civ. No. 2:03-cv-03258-GTPJCW (E.D. La.) (Ex. 156). 608PACER Docket Report, Hanna v. Rowan Company, Inc., et al, Civ. No. 2:03-cv-03258-GTPJCW (E.D. La.) (Ex. 156). 609 Hedrick Dep. at 13-14 (Ex. 166); Hedrick Dep. Ex. 94 (Ex. 294). 610 Baynham Dep. at 12; Baynham Dep. Exs. 63-64 (Dep. Exs. 263 and 264); Rowan Documents at RH 000204 (Ex. 151). This trip was reported by Judge Porteous in his 2004 Financial 

Disclosure Report, which he filed in May 2005. This report was filed while the Hanna case was 

pending and prior to the settlement of that case in August 2005. See Ex. 105(a). 611 Baynham Dep. at 16-17 (Ex. 158); Baynham Dep. Ex. 67 (Ex. 267). 612PACER Docket Report, Hanna v. Rowan Company, Inc., et al, Civ. No. 2:03-cv-03258-GTPJCW (E.D. La.) (Ex. 156); Young Dep. at 6 (Ex. 159); Young Dep. Exs. 72, 73 (Exs. 272, 273). 613 Baynham Dep. at 20 (Ex. 158). Chopin Dep. at 51 (Ex. 182). Both Baynham and Chopin 

described the lunch as including several drinks. Baynham informed Hedrick in an email the following day, December 10, 2004, that he had had an ‘‘extended lunch’’ with Judge Porteous. 

Baynham Dep. at 21 (Ex. 158); Baynham Dep. Ex. 68 (Ex. 268). 

On January 16, 2003, Hedrick paid for dinner with Judge Porteous, his wife, and others. The bill was $591.36, again at Eleven 79. 606

3. Hanna v. Rowan case before Judge Porteous 

On November 21, 2002—2 weeks after the first hunting trip—the 

complaint in Hanna v. Rowan Company Inc. 607 was filed and assigned to Judge Porteous. 608 This case involved a claim for damages allegedly sustained by plaintiff Hanna when a ladder on 

which he was climbing or standing broke, causing him to fall and 

injure his back. Rowan was represented by Baynham. As of the 

date the case was filed, Judge Porteous had already gone on the 

Rowan hunting trip, and had been the guest of the Rowan Vice 

President at two meals, where Rowan had paid $392 and $591. 

This case was pending until August 2005, when settlement was 

reached in the midst of a jury trial. 

During the pendency of the case, on August 25, 2004, Hedrick 

again took Judge Porteous to lunch. Also in attendance was Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles, III. This time, the meal was at 

the Steak Knife and the bill was $142.00. 609 Then, on November 

16-19, 2004, while the Hanna case was still pending, Judge 

Porteous attended another Rowan hunting trip, where Baynham 

and Hedrick were both in attendance. 610

A few days after the hunting trip, at Hedrick’s suggestion, 

Baynham called Judge Porteous to arrange for a lunch for the 

three of them. It was scheduled for December 9, 2004, to coincide 

with the date of a scheduled settlement conference with the Magistrate Judge in the Hanna case. 611

On December 7, 2004—2 days prior to the lunch—Judge 

Porteous issued an order denying Hanna’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment. 612

Hedrick was unable to attend the December 9, 2004 lunch. 

Baynham, knowing that Chopin was a friend of Porteous, asked 

Chopin to go in Hedrick’s place. Baynham did not know Porteous 

well, so it made things easier for Baynham to invite Chopin. The 

three of them had what Baynham described as an ‘‘extended lunch’’ 

at Restaurant 1827. 613 Neither Chopin nor Baynham could locate 

a receipt for this lunch. Baynham believed that Chopin must have 


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614 Baynham Dep. at 21-22 (Ex. 158). 615 Chopin Dep. at 52 (Ex. 182). 616 Rowan Documents at RH000105 (Ex. 153) and RH000288 (Ex.165). Hedrick identified 

these documents in his deposition. Hedrick Dep. at 14 (Ex. 166); Hedrick Dep. Ex. 95 (Ex. 295). 617 Baynham Dep. at 16 (Ex. 158); Young Dep. at 8 (Ex. 159). 618 Young Dep. at 9-10 (Ex. 159). 619 Young Dep. at 10 (Ex. 159). 620 Baynham Dep. at 26-27 (Ex. 158). 621K. Moran, ‘‘Company Facing Suit Took Judge Hunting,’’ New Orleans Times-Picayune, Oct. 

29. 2006 (Ex. 119(j)). 

paid for it, 614 and Chopin believed that Baynham would have paid 

for it. 615

On March 24, 2005, while the Hanna case was still pending, 

Judge Porteous had yet another lunch with Hedrick. Hedrick’s expense report reflects that this lunch also took place at Eleven 79 

restaurant and cost $130.00. 616

None of the meals or trips that took place while the case was 

pending (or prior thereto) were ever disclosed to Hanna’s counsel, 

Timothy Young. 617

In August 2005, the Hanna trial commenced, and settled midtrial. Hanna received a cash settlement. Hanna’s attorney, Young, 

was satisfied with the settlement, so this is not a case like 

Liljeberg where a party or counsel was the recipient of an unfavorable verdict by Judge Porteous that was reversed by the Court of 

Appeals. Young testified that ‘‘perhaps’’ he would have wanted to 

know about the lunches, and ‘‘most likely, yes’’ he would have 

wanted to know about the hunting trips. 618 He further testified 

that if he had known of this information, he would have discussed 

it with his client. 619 Notably, Baynham himself stated that he expected Judge Porteous to recuse himself. 620

In October 2006, the fact that Rowan took Judge Porteous hunting during the pendency of the Hanna case in 2004 was reported 

in the New Orleans Times-Picayune. In an article entitled ‘‘Company Facing Suit Took Judge Hunting,’’ the New Orleans TimesPicayune reported: 

In 2003, a seaman named Robert Hanna sued his employer, an offshore drilling company, after stairs on one of 

its ships collapsed beneath him and dropped him several 

feet to the floor. 

His case against the Rowan Companies went to trial in 

U.S. District Court in New Orleans in August 2005. Within 2 days, attorneys announced they had agreed to a settlement, the judge dismissed the jury and everyone appeared to walk away satisfied. 

What Hanna might not have known, however, is that 

while his personal injury suit was pending, well before 

trial began, Rowan treated the presiding judge, Thomas 

Porteous Jr., to a $1,000 hunting trip. 621


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622PACER Docket Report, Turner v. Pleasant, Civ. No. 2:01-cv-03572-GTP (E.D. La.) (Ex. 

179(a)). 623 Also, when Turner v. Pleasant was pending, Dr. Cenac had been the King of Mardi Gras 

in Washington D.C. in 2003. Judge Porteous was a guest at that event. 624Guest List for January 3-5, 2003, Diamond Hunting Trip, D0081 (Ex. 177). 625PACER Docket Report, Turner v. Pleasant, Civ. No. 2:01-cv-03572-GTP (E.D. La.) (Ex. 

179(a)). 626Order and Reasons, Turner v. Pleasant, Civ. No. 2:01-cv-03572-GTP (E.D. La., Jan. 22, 

2004) (Ex. 179(c)). 627Order and Reasons, Turner v. Pleasant, Civ. No. 2:01-cv-03572-GTP (E.D. La., Jan. 22, 

2004) at 5 (Ex. 179(c)). 628Souhlas testified that after he had tried the case, he ‘‘was told by a person that they [Judge 

Porteous and Chopin] had a close personal relationship and they went on many hunting trips 

together’’ and that was the first time he had been made aware of that fact. Souhlas Dep. at 

14 (Ex. 185). Chopin did not include in any pleading an allegation that Souhlas was aware of 

the hunting trip at the time of the trial. 

F. TURNER V. PLEASANT—ANOTHER CASE WHERE COUNSEL SOUGHT

JUDGE PORTEOUS’S RECUSAL

1. Introduction 

In 2004, Judge Porteous faced a recusal motion in the case Turner v. Pleasant, 622 arising from his relationship with Pleasant’s attorney, Dick Chopin. Just as Lifemark’s recusal motion in the 

Liljeberg case threatened to expose Judge Porteous’s prior dealings 

with the attorneys in that case, the recusal motion in Turner v. 

Pleasant threatened Judge Porteous with the disclosure that he 

had been taking hunting trips from Diamond, including having 

gone on a Diamond hunting trip with defense counsel Chopin during the pendency of the case. As discussed below, there are striking 

similarities between how Judge Porteous handled the recusal motions in Turner v. Pleasant and Liljeberg. 

2. Background—Procedural History 

On November 30, 2001, the complaint in Turner v. Pleasant was 

filed. This was a personal injury case alleging that the defendant 

(Pleasant) operated his boat in a negligent fashion, causing an excessive wake that tossed Mrs. Turner in the air and caused her to 

sustain a compression fracture of her back. 

The plaintiffs were represented by Ernest Souhlas and his partner Carter Wright; the defendant was represented by Chopin. The 

defense medical expert was Dr. Christopher Cenac, with whom 

Judge Porteous had previously hunted and had a social relationship. 623 On January 3-5, 2003, while the case was pending, Judge 

Porteous went on a Diamond hunting trip which Chopin also attended. 624

About 3 months after Judge Porteous and Chopin went on the 

hunting trip, on April 22-23, 2003, a non-jury trial was held in the 

Turner case. Dr. Cenac was one of the defendant’s medical experts. 625

Nearly 9 months after trial, on January 27, 2004, Judge Porteous 

issued his opinion in favor of the defendant. 626 In reaching his decision, he specifically credited the testimony of Dr. Cenac. 627

3. Souhlas’s Motion for a New Trial and Motion to Recuse Judge 

Porteous 

After the April 2003 trial in Turner v. Pleasant, and while the 

case was awaiting Judge Porteous’s decision, Souhlas learned that 

Judge Porteous had gone hunting with Chopin while the case was 

pending. 628 Accordingly, on February 5, 2004, a week after Judge 


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629Plaintiffs’ Motion for New Trial and/or Motion to Recuse, Turner v. Pleasant, Civ. No. 2:01- 

cv-03572-GTP (E.D. La., Feb. 7, 2004) (Ex. 179(d)). 630Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial and/or Motion to Recuse at 

7, Turner v. Pleasant, Civ. No. 2:01-cv-02572-GTP (E.D. La., Feb. 7, 2004) (Ex. 179(d)). 631 [Defendant’s] Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for New Trial and/or Motion 

to Recuse at 7, Turner v. Pleasant, Civ. No. 2:01-cv-02572-GTP (E.D. La., Feb. 17, 2004) (Ex. 

179(e)). 632Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial and/or Motion 

to Recuse at 3, Turner v. Pleasant, Civ. No. 2:01-cv-02572-GTP (E.D. La., Feb. 17, 2004) (Ex. 

179(f)). In fact, the hunting trip occurred while the case was pending trial. 

Porteous issued his decision, Souhlas filed a motion for a new trial 

and also moved to recuse Judge Porteous. 629

In that motion, after arguing that Judge Porteous’s decision was 

contrary to the facts elicited at trial, Souhlas requested, in the alternative that ‘‘this Court grant a new trial and recuse itself in this 

matter based upon . . . the grounds that the findings of fact and 

the conclusions of law reflect partially [sic: should be ‘partiality’] 

and bias in favor of the defendant and/or defense counsel in this 

case.’’ 630

In his opposition to the motion, Chopin responded primarily by 

attacking Souhlas: 

In an act of desperation never previously witnessed by 

the undersigned, the plaintiffs have vituperatively attacked the Court and its integrity. Not only are the plaintiffs’ claims flagrantly in violation of all rules, they are 

reprehensible. Moreover, the plaintiffs do not even attempt 

to offer any support for their new allegations. 

* * * 

The defendants will not dignify the plaintiffs allegations 

by according them any additional print, except to say that 

the plaintiffs’ motion for recusal also should be denied. 631

Souhlas, in his reply to Chopin’s opposition, specifically addressed Chopin’s contention that he (Souhlas) had not offered any 

support for his claims of bias. He specifically alleged that Judge 

Porteous ‘‘may have a close personal relationship with defense 

counsel, Richard A. Chopin,’’ that ‘‘the relationship includes social 

contacts and hunting trips,’’ and that ‘‘some of the social contacts 

took place while this case was under advisement’’ 632—assertions 

which were in fact true. 

On March 22, 2004, Judge Porteous denied Souhlas’s motion. In 

doing so, he did not discuss or address any of the factual assertions, terming them ‘‘unsubstantiated.’’ Judge Porteous stated: 

To suggest that the Court has any partiality for the defendant and/or defense counsel is utterly unsubstantiated 

given that the Court has often demonstrated its complete 

independence and the absence of any partiality or favoritism in prior cases involving defense counsel. Additionally, 

in a previous non-jury case involving one of plaintiff’s 

counsel, Mr. Souhlas, where a substantial verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, there was no suggestion of 

any partiality by the court towards plaintiffs’ counsel, even 

though he has been a friend of this judge for over twenty 

years. This flagrant attack on the credibility of this Court 

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633Order and Reasons, Turner v. Pleasant, Civ. No. 2:01-cv-02572-GTP (E.D. La., Mar. 25, 

2004) at 4 (emphasis supplied) (Ex. 179(g)). Judge Porteous referenced a personal injury case 

that Souhlas had filed in1996. The plaintiff in that case had stepped in a hole on a city street, 

resulting in permanent damage to his right leg. Judge Porteous awarded the plaintiff $650,000. 

The facts are set forth in Wykle v. City of New Orleans, 154 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. 1998). 634 Brief on Behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellants [Turner], Turner v. Pleasant, No. 04-30406, 2004 

WL 3588422, at *1, 29-30 (5th Cir., Jul. 12, 2004) (Ex. 179(h)). 635Original Brief on Behalf of Defendants/Appellees [Pleasant], Turner v. Pleasant, No. 04- 

30406, 2004 WL 3588420, at *28-29 (5th Cir., Aug. 11, 2004) (emphasis supplied) (Ex. 179(i)). 636 Reply Brief on Behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellants [Turner], Turner v. Pleasant, No. 04-30406, 

2004 WL 3588421, at *14 (5th Cir., Aug. 30, 2004) (Ex. 179(j)). 637 Room Assignment Sheet [for Diamond Hunting Trip January 7-9, 2005] at D0089 (Ex. 

177). 638Turner v. Pleasant, No. 04-30406, 2005 WL 744568 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2005) (Ex. 179(k)). 639 A few weeks after Judge Porteous denied Souhlas’s recusal motion, on April 20, 2004, Chopin settled the Farrar case with attorney Koeppel. See PACER Docket Report, Farrar v. Diamond Offshore Co., Civ. No. 2:03-cv-00782-GTP (E.D. La.) (Ex. 178). 

ported by any evidence. This Court finds that no reasonable man would harbor doubts about this judge’s impartiality, and therefore, recusal is not warranted. 633

4. Souhlas’s Appeal to the Fifth Circuit 

Souhlas appealed to the Fifth Circuit, and raised the same issues 

as to Judge Porteous’s relationship with Chopin that he had raised 

below. He argued that the factual allegations had neither been addressed nor disputed, by either Judge Porteous or Chopin, in the 

District Court proceedings. 634

In response, Chopin relied on Judge Porteous’s language in his 

ruling denying the recusal, including Judge Porteous’s statement 

that he and Souhlas had been friends for 20 years. 635

In his reply brief to the Fifth Circuit, Souhlas reasserted the 

specificity of his allegations, i.e., Judge Porteous’s ongoing social relationship with and hunting trip with Chopin during the pendency 

of the proceedings. Souhlas further addressed Judge Porteous’s contention that he and Judge Porteous were longtime friends, and specifically denied ‘‘that a close personal relationship exists between 

plaintiffs’ counsel and the District Court.’’ 636

In January 2005, while the case raising the issue of Judge 

Porteous’s relationship with Chopin, Judge Porteous and Chopin 

shared a room together on another Diamond sponsored hunting 

trip. 637

On March 31, 2005, the Fifth Circuit denied the appeal. 638 As 

to Souhlas’s motion to recuse, the Fifth Circuit noted only that the 

allegation was unsubstantiated. 

5. Discussion of Judge Porteous’s Handling of the Recusal Motion 

in Turner v. Pleasant 

It is noteworthy that at the time of Souhlas’s motion, in February 2004, the Farrar v. Diamond case (a case with Chopin as 

Diamond’s counsel that was discussed above) was pending in front 

of Judge Porteous. Thus, if either Chopin or Judge Porteous were 

to have disclosed that they had gone hunting together as guests of 

Diamond while the Turner case was pending, such a disclosure 

could have caused problems for Judge Porteous and Chopin in connection with the Farrar case (and also revealed that Judge 

Porteous had accepted prior Diamond trips as well). 639 Accordingly, the entire thrust of Judge Porteous’s (and Chopin’s) response 

to Souhlas’s allegations was to assert that the allegations were 

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640This is similar to Judge Porteous’s line of questioning of Mole at the Fifth Circuit Hearing, 

in which he pointed out that Gardner, Lifemark’s attorney, also went to Las Vegas as part of 

his son’s bachelor party celebration, just as Amato did. 641Souhlas Dep. at 18-21 (Ex. 185). 642 In addition, the positions taken by counsels in the respective cases are remarkably similar: 

they attacked the moving party while offering no facts, even in response to specific allegations, 

and each counsel left it up to Judge Porteous to decide what would be disclosed. Chopin wrote, 

for example, that Souhlas ‘‘vituperatively attacked the Court and its integrity,’’ and characterized plaintiffs’ claims as ‘‘reprehensible.’’ Similarly, the Liljebergs characterized Lifemark’s motion as containing ‘‘unsubstantiated innuendo’’ in support of a ‘‘scurrilous conclusion.’’ Chopin, 

like counsel for the Liljebergs, offered no factual explanations, but argued that the relationship 

was not proven. Chopin wrote, for example: ‘‘[P]laintiffs do not even attempt to offer any support 

for their new allegations.’’ [Defendant’s] Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

New Trial and/or Motion to Recuse at 7, Turner v. Pleasant, Civ. No. 2:01-cv-03572-GTP (E.D. 

La.), Feb. 17, 2004 (Ex. 179(e)). The counsel for the Liljebergs wrote: ‘‘Lifemark’s motion includes no evidence whatsoever pertaining to the Court’s alleged affinity for [counsels] . . .’’ 

Memorandum in Opposition to Lifemark’s Motion to Recuse at 2, Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc. 

v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., No. 93-1794 (E.D. La.), Oct. 15, 1996 (Ex. 53). 

mation which would permit a fair assessment of the merits of the 

recusal motion, and to attack Souhlas for raising the issue. 

Moreover, Judge Porteous’s statement that Souhlas ‘‘has been a 

friend of this judge for over twenty years’’ deserves particular scrutiny—both for what Judge Porteous may have intended to be the 

legal or factual significance of that purported relationship, as well 

as for the veracity of the assertion. One reading of Judge Porteous’s 

‘‘friend’’ statement was that he intended to imply there was a symmetry between his relationship with Souhlas and his relationship 

with Chopin—the implication presumably being that if he were 

friends with both men then Souhlas’s complaint could not be meritorious since Judge Porteous would have no more incentive to be 

partial to Chopin than to be partial to Souhlas. 640 However, not 

only is this argument indefensible even if it were true; but Souhlas 

testified at a deposition that he was not a ‘‘friend’’ of Judge 

Porteous. Souhlas never went to lunch or dinner with Judge 

Porteous, never traveled with Judge Porteous on any trips, did not 

go to his swearing-in, had never been to Judge Porteous’s house, 

had never had Judge Porteous to his house, had never invited 

Judge Porteous to his annual ‘‘hoe-downs’’ (events to which he invited a broad swath of the New Orleans legal community), and had 

never met Judge Porteous’s wife—in fact, did not even know her 

name. 641

Thus, as he did in the Liljeberg case, Judge Porteous, when faced 

with allegations that would threaten to disclose his relationship 

with parties and attorneys who had given him things of value, handled the motion in a manner calculated to seal off further inquiry 

into those relationships. He disclosed no pertinent material facts 

about his relationship with Chopin, failed to address the discrete 

allegations known and raised by the moving counsel, and made deceptive statements that distorted the factual record as to his relationship with the attorney at issue. 642 By so distorting the record, 

Judge Porteous assured affirmance on appeal of his denial of the 

recusal motion, and a victory below for Chopin. Souhlas’s clients 

were never informed by the Judge who denied them compensation 

for their serious injuries that he was a close friend and frequent 

lunch guest of the defendant’s lawyer Chopin and had gone on a 

hunting trip with him while the case was pending and shortly prior 

to trial; nor were they informed that Judge Porteous had been a 


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643While Judge Porteous’s hunting trips may superficially call to mind the duck-hunting trip 

that Justice Scalia and Vice President Cheney attended together while the case Cheney v. U.S. 

Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, No. 03-475 (Sup. Ct.) was pending, the situations are materially different. Vice President Cheney was named in an institutional capacity only, not in his 

individual capacity. As Justice Scalia explained: 

Richard Cheney’s name appears in this suit only because he was the head of a Government committee that allegedly did not comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act 

. . . and because he may, by reason of his office, have custody of some or all of the 

Government documents that the plaintiffs seek. If some other person were to become 

head of that committee or to obtain custody of those documents, the plaintiffs would 

name that person and Cheney would be dismissed, and it was the prerogatives of the 

Office of the Vice President that were at stake. 

Justice Scalia noted that the Vice President was represented by Government lawyers and that 

throughout the litigation, the Vice President’s position had been described as the position of ‘‘the 

government.’’ Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 918 (2004) (Scalia, 

J., denying recusal motion). In contrast, Diamond and Rowan had substantial personal financial 

interests at stake in pending and future cases before Judge Porteous at times when Judge 

Porteous accepted their offers to spend money on him—money that came from the company 

treasuries and were expended in pursuit of their business interests. 

Moreover, the fact of the Scalia-Cheney hunting trip was publicly disclosed and was certainly 

known to all counsels in the case before Justice Scalia. In contrast, there was a concerted and 

sustained effort to keep Judge Porteous’s hunting trips a secret from litigants who would have 

reason to believe their interests before the court might be affected. 

It should also be kept in mind that there are unique practical, structural considerations to 

recusal at the Supreme Court level. As to the notion that he should err on the side of recusal, 

Justice Scalia explained: 

That might be sound advice if I were sitting on a Court of Appeals. . . . There, my 

place would be taken by another judge, and the case would proceed normally. On the 

Supreme Court, however, the consequence is different: The Court proceeds with eight 

Justices, raising the possibility that, by reason of a tie vote, it will find itself unable 

to resolve the significant legal issue presented by the case. . . . Moreover, granting the 

motion is (insofar as the outcome of the particular case is concerned) effectively the 

same as casting a vote against the petitioner. 

Id. at 915. In contrast, there was absolutely no structural impediment to Judge Porteous’s 

recusing himself. He could have easily been replaced by another district judge who had not accepted things of value from Diamond or Rowan. 644 Judge Porteous’s Financial Disclosure Report (2004) (Ex. 110(a)). 645 Judge Porteous’s Financial Disclosure Report (2006) (Ex. 112(a)). 646 Judge Porteous’s Financial Disclosure Report (2005) (Ex. 111(a)). 647 Judge Porteous’s Financial Disclosure Report (2006) (Ex. 112(a)). 648 Judge Porteous’s Financial Disclosure Report (2007) (Ex. 113). 649 Case No. 2:05-cv-00224-DEK. See PACER Docket Report (Ex. 180(l)). 

house guest of the defendant’s expert witness, whose credibility 

was at issue. 643

G. DISCLOSURES OF TRIPS STARTING IN 2005 

1. Financial Disclosure Reports 

Judge Porteous did not disclose the 2000, 2001, or 2003 Diamond 

hunting trips on his Financial Disclosure Reports, nor did he disclose his 2002 Rowan hunting trip. 

In his report for calendar year 2004 (filed May 12, 2005), Judge 

Porteous reported the 2004 Rowan hunting trip as a ‘‘gift’’ valued 

at $1000, 644 and, in his report for 2006 (filed May 14, 2007), he 

reported the 2006 Rowan hunting trip as a ‘‘gift’’ valued at 

$800. 645 By 2005, Judge Porteous knew he was under a criminal 

investigation. 

In each of his Reports for calendar years 2005 (filed July 24, 

2006), 646 2006 (filed May 14, 2007) 647 and 2007 (filed May 9, 

2008), 648 Judge Porteous reported the respective Diamond hunting trips as a ‘‘gift,’’ each valued at $1,000. 

2. Judge Porteous’s Only Disclosure of Diamond Hunting Trips 

In May 2005, the case of Pioneer Natural Resources, Inc. v. Diamond Offshore 649 was filed. It was originally assigned to Judge 

Ivan L. R. Lamelle. In July 2007, the case was reassigned to Judge 


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650This event is noted in the docket entries for September 26, 2007 reads as follows: 

ORDERED that counsel notify Clerk of Court by 10/9/2007 4:00 PM if their clients consent to the undersigned continuing to handle this matter. FURTHER ORDERED that 

failure to notify the Clerk shall result in the undersigned’s recusal from this matter. 

PACER Docket Report (Ex. 180(l)). 651 In fact, even this disclosure was not entirely complete. On the 2007 Diamond hunting trip, 

the attorney representing Diamond in the Pioneer case was also in attendance. This fact was 

not disclosed to Pioneer’s counsel. 652 Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, §§ 301 and 303, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989). 653 Unless otherwise noted, references to the ‘‘Gift Regulations’’ refer to the Regulations of the 

Judicial Conference of the United States under Title III of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 Concerning Gifts that were promulgated in 1997. (Ex. 364). The regulations discussed in the text 

were in effect from August 1997 through August 2003 and thus cover the period when most of 

the conduct at issue occurred. These Gift Regulations were revised in 2003 in ways that are 

not relevant to the substance of the discussion. See 2003 Gift Regulations (Ex. 365). 

Porteous. On September 26, 2007, Judge Porteous made a disclosure to both counsels indicating that he had been on Diamond 

hunting trips, that he wanted the attorneys to consult with their 

clients and affirmatively represent they did not object to his continuing to preside over that case. 650

This 2007 disclosure, occurring after DOJ had sent its complaint 

letter to the Fifth Circuit, is the only known instance of Judge 

Porteous having informed counsel of having taken hunting trips 

paid for by Diamond or Rowan. 651

XIV. JUDGE PORTEOUS’S CONDUCT IN RELATION TO THE 

‘‘GIFT BAN’’ PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL LAW 

A. THE STATUTE

At all pertinent times, the applicable Federal law, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7353(a)(2) (the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 652), provided: 

[Except as permitted by agency ethics regulations] no . . . officer 

or employee of the . . . judicial branch shall solicit or accept anything of value from a person—. . . whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the individual’s official duties. 

Thus, to determine whether it was acceptable for Judge Porteous 

to accept ‘‘anything of value’’ from attorneys and parties with matters before him, it is necessary to examine the Judicial Conference’s regulations implementing this provision. 

B. THE REGULATIONS

The Gift Regulations promulgated by the Judicial Conference of 

the United States 653 track the statutory prohibition, but address 

two separate circumstances—a Federal judge’s solicitation of a gift 

and a judge’s acceptance of a gift. 

The term ‘‘gift’’ is broadly defined, with narrow exceptions, one 

being for ‘‘modest items of food.’’ 

§ 3. Definition of ‘‘Gift.’’ 

‘‘Gift’’ means any gratuity, entertainment, forbearance, bequest, favor, the gratuitous element of a loan, or other 

similar item having monetary value but does not include 

. . . modest items of food and refreshments, such as soft 


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654There are other narrow exceptions, such as plaques, certificates, and trophies, and certain 

rewards and prizes, including random drawings. 655There is no material difference in this definition in the 2003 Regulations. 656The other section 5 exceptions to the Gift Regulations have no application to the facts of 

this inquiry such as certain gifts incident to a public speaking engagements, or invitations to 

bar-related functions or activities devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or 

the administration of justice. 

drinks, coffee and donuts, offered for present consumption 

other than as part of a meal. 654

As to the solicitation of a gift, the Gift Regulations are unambiguous in prohibiting a judge from soliciting things of value from attorneys or parties with matters in front of him. Those regulations 

provide: 

§ 4. Solicitation of Gifts by a Judicial Officer or Employee. 

(a) A judicial officer . . . shall not solicit a gift from any 

person who is seeking official action from or doing business 

with the courts (or other employing entity), or from any 

other person whose interests may be substantially affected 

by the performance or nonperformance of the judicial 

officer[’s] official duties, including in the case of a judge 

any person who has come or is likely to come before the 

judge. 655

As to the acceptance of a gift, the regulations permit a judge to 

receive only certain gifts. Section 5 of the regulations provides: 

§ 5. Acceptance of Gifts by a Judicial Officer or Employee; 

Exceptions. 

A judicial officer or employee shall not accept a gift from 

anyone except for—— 

* * * 

(c) ordinary social hospitality; 

(d) a gift from a relative or friend, for a special occasion, 

such as a wedding, anniversary, birthday, and the gift 

is fairly commensurate with the occasion and the relationship; 

(e) a gift from a relative or close personal friend whose appearance or interest in a case would in any event require that the officer or employee take no official action 

with respect to the case; 

* * * 

(h) any other gift only if: 

* * * 

(2) in the case of a judge, the donor is not a party or 

other person who has come or is likely to come before the judge or whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of his or her official duties[.] 656


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657Section 5(d) provides an exception to permit a judge to accept a ‘‘gift from a relative or 

friend, for a special occasion, such as a wedding, anniversary or birthday, if the gift is fairly 

commensurate with the occasion and the relationship.’’ Creely’s payment of close to $1,000 for 

Judge Porteous’s hotel accommodations as a contribution towards his son’s bachelor party dinner is not ‘‘fairly commensurate with the occasion.’’ Section 5(e) permits judges to accept a ‘‘gift 

from a relative or close personal friend whose appearance or interest in a case would in any 

event require that the officer or employee take no official action with respect to the case.’’ This 

provision appears to permit a Federal judge to accept a gift if, upon accepting the gift, the judge 

would thereafter recuse himself or herself, that is, ‘‘take no official action with respect to the 

case.’’ Indeed Judge Porteous could have accepted the ‘‘gifts’’ from Creely and Amato. Section 

5(h) permits judges to accept ‘‘any other gift,’’ but only if ‘‘the donor is not a party or other person who has come or is likely to come before the judge or whose interests may be substantially 

affected by the performance or nonperformance of his or her official duties.’’ In this case, the 

donor—an attorney or a party (Rowan or Diamond)—would constitute a ‘‘party or other person 

who has come or is likely to come before the judge or whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of his or her official duties.’’ 

C. APPLICATION OF THE GIFT BAN STATUTE AND REGULATIONS TO

JUDGE PORTEOUS’S CONDUCT

1. Solicitation and/or Acceptance of Cash, Other Things of Value, 

and Overnight Trips (other than Meals at Restaurants) 

Judge Porteous’s solicitation and acceptance of things of value 

from attorneys and parties with matters before him are proscribed 

by statute and regulations because they are ‘‘things of value’’ given 

by attorneys and parties ‘‘whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the [Judge’s] official duties.’’ As to some items—such as Judge Porteous’s soliciting 

money from Amato during the pendency of a case, accepting the 

payments for his Las Vegas hotel room and payment towards his 

son’s bachelor party dinner from Creely, and accepting hunting 

trips from Diamond and Rowan—the application of the statute and 

regulations is straightforward. None of the section 5 exceptions 

permitted Judge Porteous to accept those items while he had cases 

with those attorneys or parties in front of him. 657

2. Meals at Restaurants 

Judge Porteous accepted hundreds of meals from attorneys and 

parties with matters pending before him. Unless there is an exception that would allow him to accept these meals, the statutory prohibition against accepting ‘‘anything of value’’ from attorneys and 

parties ‘‘whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the [Judge’s] official duties’’ prohibits his acceptance of these meals. This conduct will be discussed 

in light of possible exceptions. 

The exception in the definition of ‘‘gift’’ for ‘‘modest items of food.’’ 

The definition of ‘‘gift’’ in the regulations provides an exception for 

‘‘modest items of food and refreshments such as soft drinks, coffee 

and donuts, offered for present consumption other than as part of 

a meal.’’ This provision—explicitly permitting a judge to accept 

light refreshments (even from attorneys and parties with matters 

before him)—would be unnecessary if a judge were otherwise free 

to accept expensive meals at high-end restaurants paid for by parties or attorneys with matters before him. Moreover, a lunch consisting of food and drinks at a restaurant such as Ruth’s Chris 

Steak House is not, under any interpretation, a ‘‘modest item of 

food . . . such as soft drinks, coffee and donuts.’’ 

The exception under section 5(c) of the regulations for ‘‘ordinary 

social hospitality.’’ Section 5 of the regulations provides that ‘‘[a] judicial officer or employee shall not accept a gift from anyone except 


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658The Ethics and Government Act defines ‘‘personal hospitality of any individual’’ as ‘‘hospitality extended for a nonbusiness purpose by an individual, not a corporation or organization, 

at the personal residence of that individual or his family or on property of facilities owned by 

that individual or his family.’’ Ethics in Government Act, Section 109(14), codified at Title 5, 

United States Code, Appx. 4, Sec. 109(14). Such ‘‘personal hospitality’’ is not required to be disclosed in the Financial Disclosure Reports. 659Prof. Geyh TF Hrg. IV at 8-9 (written statement at 2-3). Furthermore, Professor Geyh explained there is no such thing as ‘‘ordinary social hospitality’’ extended by a corporation—an entity that is not in the business of making friends but is instead in the business of making 

money. Prof. Geyh TF Hrg. IV at 16 (written statement at 10). This discussion does not address 

the circumstance where a judge and an attorney alternate paying for meals on a rotating basis. 

As Prof. Geyh stressed, and Judge Porteous himself stated, Judge Porteous sought and expected 

the attorneys to pay for his meals—not the other way around—and in fact he virtually never 

reciprocated. 

for [certain exceptions].’’ One of those exceptions is set forth in Section 5(c), which permits a judge to accept ‘‘ordinary social hospitality.’’ The term ‘‘ordinary social hospitality’’ is not defined in the 

Judicial Conference regulations, but is similar to and conveys the 

same meaning in context as the phrase ‘‘personal hospitality of any 

individual’’ used in the Ethics in Government Act. The latter 

phrase is defined as ‘‘hospitality extended for a nonbusiness purpose by an individual, not a corporation or organization, at the personal residence of that individual or his family or on property of 

facilities owned by that individual or his family.’’ 658 If ‘‘ordinary 

social hospitality’’ included expensive meals at restaurants, then 

this definition would subsume and render meaningless the narrow 

carve-out in the definition for ‘‘soft drinks, coffee and donuts.’’ It 

would make little sense for the regulations to explicitly permit a 

judge to accept donuts from counsel in a meeting during trial when 

a different provision would permit counsel to take that same judge 

to an expensive restaurant during the trial. 

As Professor Geyh testified, Judge Porteous’s acceptance of the 

meals violated both the gift rules (because they were not ‘‘ordinary 

social hospitality’’) as well as other ethical canons that prohibit his 

exploitation of his position for personal gain: 

Codes of conduct permit judges to accept ‘‘social hospitality’’ without running afoul of restrictions on the gifts 

judges may receive, and friends and former colleagues who 

take each other to lunch can be a conventional form of social hospitality. This, however, was not ordinary ‘‘social 

hospitality.’’ These lawyers reportedly paid Judge 

Porteous’s lunch bills countless times for years with no 

meaningful reciprocation by the judge. Moreover, this oneway payment practice appears to be what Judge Porteous 

wanted and expected. Former State Judge Ronald 

Bodenheimer testified that when Bodenheimer became a 

judge, Porteous told him that, once a judge, he would 

‘‘never have to buy lunch again. . . . There will always be 

somebody to take you to lunch.’’ In other words, Judge 

Porteous was trading on his position as a judge in contravention of the ethical principle that a judge should not 

‘‘lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private 

interests of the judge.’’ 659


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660 Judge Haik, who also attended the Diamond hunting trips, immediately recused himself 

after the first trip from hearing cases where Diamond was a party. See Affidavit of Judge Richard Haik (Ex. 186). 

D. ACTIONS BY JUDGE PORTEOUS THAT APPEAR TO VIOLATE

FEDERAL LAW

The following actions by Judge Porteous would appear to violate 

the gift ban of 5 U.S.C. § 7353, and the Judicial Conference regulations promulgated thereunder: 

1) Judge Porteous’s solicitation and acceptance of approxi- mately $2500 from Amato in June or July 1999 while the 

Liljeberg case was pending. At that time, Amato had a financial interest in the resolution of the Liljeberg case that 

would have been ‘‘substantially affected by the performance 

of [Judge Porteous’s] official duties.’’ 

2) Judge Porteous’s acceptance of Creely’s payment for his 

hotel room and for a portion of his son’s bachelor party dinner in Las Vegas in May 1999 while the Liljeberg case was 

pending. At that time, Creely, as Amato’s partner, had a financial interest in the resolution of the Liljeberg case that 

would have been ‘‘substantially affected by the performance 

of [Judge Porteous’s] official duties.’’ 

3) Judge Porteous’s acceptance of Creely’s and Amato’s payment of approximately $1,500 to celebrate Judge Porteous’s 

5 years on the bench in late 1999 while the Liljeberg case 

was pending. At that time, Amato and Creely had an interest in the resolution of the Liljeberg case that would have 

been ‘‘substantially affected by the performance of [Judge 

Porteous’s] official duties.’’ 

4) Judge Porteous’s acceptance of hunting trips paid for by Diamond without disclosure or recusal. In at least three instances, Judge Porteous accepted Diamond-sponsored trips 

while Diamond had cases pending in front of him and thus 

had interests which may have been ‘‘substantially affected 

by the performance of [Judge Porteous’s] official duties.’’ 

Even in the situations where a Diamond case was not actually pending at the time of the hunting trip, based on the 

routine and predictable nature of his being assigned cases 

involving Diamond, Judge Porteous would have known that 

he was accepting something of value from an entity ‘‘whose 

interests may be substantially affected’’ in subsequent litigation that would be assigned to him. 660 At a minimum, 

after having attended trips and accepted value from Diamond, Judge Porteous should have disclosed his receipt of 

the trips to counsel (and recused himself if counsel sought 

recusal). 

5) Judge Porteous’s acceptance of three hunting trips paid for 

by Rowan. In connection with the 2004 trip, when the 

Hanna case was pending, Rowan had an interest in the resolution of that case which would have been ‘‘substantially 

affected by the performance of Judge Porteous’s official duties.’’ Moreover, based on the routine and predictable nature 

of his being assigned Rowan cases, Judge Porteous would 


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have known that he was accepting something of value from 

an entity ‘‘whose interests may be substantially affected’’ in 

subsequent litigation that would be assigned to him. At a 

minimum, after having attended trips and accepted value 

from Diamond, Judge Porteous should have disclosed his receipt of the trips to counsel (and recused himself if counsel 

sought recusal). 

6) Judge Porteous’s acceptance from various attorneys and 

parties of hundreds of meals at high-end restaurants while 

those attorneys had matters pending before him. 

XV. THE DOJ’S DECISION NOT TO PROSECUTE JUDGE 

PORTEOUS 

As noted at the outset, DOJ decided not to prosecute Judge 

Porteous. Several observations are in order. 

First, the nature of Congress’s determination whether to impeach 

is fundamentally different from DOJ’s decision whether to prosecute. Congress does not decide guilt or innocence with reference 

to a criminal statute. Rather, it is for Congress to make what is 

in essence a ‘‘fitness for office’’ determination. Congress alone has 

the power to remove an unfit Federal judge, and conduct that renders a judge unfit may not necessarily violate a criminal statute. 

Second, Congress has an independent responsibility to review the 

evidence and cannot rely on DOJ’s assessment of what the evidence 

reveals. Thus, just as the House heard the evidence involving 

Judge Samuel B. Kent, and before that of Judges Walter Nixon and 

Robert Collins, and did not rely solely on the fact that each of those 

judges had been criminally convicted, so it is proper for Congress 

to consider and review the evidence that relates to the conduct of 

Judge Porteous, even though some of that evidence (but not all) 

was considered by the Department of Justice. 

Third, even though aspects of Judge Porteous’s conduct may appear to support a criminal prosecution, the Department faced numerous practical obstacles that would necessarily have impacted its 

considerations as to whether prosecution was in order for certain 

categories of conduct. One problem in particular involved the statute of limitations—a potentially insurmountable hurdle in a criminal prosecution, but not a bar to impeachment. Some of the most 

corrupt conduct, such as Judge Porteous’s relationship with the 

Marcottes and his initiation of the ‘‘curatorship’’ scheme with 

Creely and Amato, was time-barred by the statute of limitations. 

Nonetheless, such conduct, even if it cannot be used to support a 

Federal criminal prosecution, is profoundly relevant to the determination of whether Judge Porteous should remain a Federal 

judge. 

Fourth, another problem facing the DOJ was the existence of 

various procedural and evidentiary rules that would have affected 

the DOJ’s ability to demonstrate before a jury the complete picture 

of Judge Porteous’s conduct. The four Articles of Impeachment involve different types of conduct, in different spheres of activity, and 

at different times. For example, even assuming no statute of limitations issues existed, a bankruptcy fraud charge could not necessarily have been brought in the same proceeding as a corruption 

charge; likewise, evidence of Judge Porteous’s relationship with the 


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661These considerations were touched on by the panel of legal scholars who testified at the 

December 15, 2009 Task Force Hearing. Ms. Jackson Lee asked the panel to opine on the DOJ 

decision not to seek prosecution. Professor Michael Gerhardt, University of North Carolina 

School of Law, responded: ‘‘I think it has no impact. I think it is of no real consequence.’’ Professor Gerhardt stressed that impeachment is not a criminal proceeding, the burden is different, 

the House can consider different evidence, and it would not be bound in any event if there were 

a conviction, as the House must make an independent judgment as to the evidence. Gerhardt 

TF Hrg. IV at 41. Professor Akhil Reed Amar, Yale Law School, agreed. He noted the different 

purposes of impeachment and criminal prosecution, testifying that impeachment ‘‘remov[es] a 

position that the judge should never should have had in the first place. It is not like putting 

someone in prison, taking away their very life. It is not even retributive.’’ Amar TF Hrg. IV 

at 41. Professor Charles Geyh, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, concurred, specifically 

noting that the statute of limitations would impact DOJ but not Congress. Geyh TF Hrg. IV 

at 41-42. 662Walter Nixon Impeachment Report, at 33-34. 

Marcottes would not necessarily have been admissible in a trial on 

bankruptcy issues. 661

Fifth, the Impeachment Task Force has interviewed new witnesses and uncovered new evidence that simply was not considered 

by the Department, including evidence related to conduct that was 

time-barred for criminal prosecution. For example, it obtained 

depositions and public testimony from Louis Marcotte and Lori 

Marcotte, corroborating court records, as well as the depositions of 

their employees and associates relating to the Marcottes’ relationship with Judge Porteous. Additionally, the Task Force obtained 

and considered the curatorship records that corroborate and expanded the scale of the financial relationship with Creely and 

Amato that was not otherwise developed by the DOJ; it obtained 

the recusal hearing transcript in connection with the Liljeberg case; 

and, finally, the Task Force and the Committee had the benefit of 

the Fifth Circuit hearings which expanded on the evidence available to the DOJ. 

XVI. CONCLUSION 

The following language from the House Report accompanying the 

Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., and Samuel B. Kent Articles of Impeachment aptly sets out the core principles underlying and justifying the Impeachment Resolution against Judge Porteous: 

The [House’s] role is not to punish [Judge Porteous], but 

simply to determine whether articles of impeachment 

should be brought. Under our Constitution, the American 

people must look to the Congress to protect them from persons unfit to hold high office because of serious misconduct 

that has violated the public trust. Where, as here, the evidence overwhelmingly establishes that a Federal judge has 

committed impeachable offenses, our duty requires us to 

bring articles of impeachment and to try him before the 

United States Senate. 662

XVII. COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION 

On January 27, 2010, the Committee met in open session and ordered the resolution, H. Res. 1031, favorably reported without 

amendment by a rollcall vote of 24 to 0, a quorum being present. 

XVII. COMMITTEE VOTES 

In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the following 


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rollcall votes took place during the Committee’s consideration of H. 

Res. 1031: 

1. Impeachment Article 1. Approved 29 to 0. 

ROLLCALL NO. 1 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Conyers, Jr., Chairman ............................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Boucher ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Nadler .........................................................................................................

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren ....................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Cohen .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Pierluisi ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Quigley ........................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Chu ............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Gutierrez .....................................................................................................

Ms. Baldwin ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gonzalez ......................................................................................................

Mr. Weiner ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ...................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Wasserman Schultz .................................................................................... X 

Mr. Maffei ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith, Ranking Member ............................................................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. ...................................................................................... X 

Mr. Coble ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Gallegly .......................................................................................................

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Lungren ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa .............................................................................................................

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Franks .........................................................................................................

Mr. Gohmert ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Jordan ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Poe .............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Chaffetz ......................................................................................................

Mr. Rooney ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Harper ......................................................................................................... X 

Total ................................................................................................ 29 0 

2. Impeachment Article 2. Approved 28 to 0. 

ROLLCALL NO. 2 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Conyers, Jr., Chairman ............................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler .........................................................................................................

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren ....................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Cohen .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson ....................................................................................................... X 


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ROLLCALL NO. 2—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Pierluisi ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Quigley ........................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Chu ............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Gutierrez .....................................................................................................

Ms. Baldwin ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gonzalez ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Weiner ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ...................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Wasserman Schultz .................................................................................... X 

Mr. Maffei ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith, Ranking Member ............................................................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. ...................................................................................... X 

Mr. Coble ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Gallegly .......................................................................................................

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Lungren ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa .............................................................................................................

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Franks .........................................................................................................

Mr. Gohmert ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Jordan .........................................................................................................

Mr. Poe .............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Chaffetz ......................................................................................................

Mr. Rooney ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Harper ......................................................................................................... X 

Total ................................................................................................ 28 0 

3. Impeachment Article 3. Approved 23 to 0. 

ROLLCALL NO. 3 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Conyers, Jr., Chairman ............................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman .......................................................................................................

Mr. Boucher ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Scott ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren .......................................................................................................

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Cohen .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Pierluisi ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Quigley ........................................................................................................

Ms. Chu ............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Gutierrez ..................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Baldwin ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gonzalez ......................................................................................................

Mr. Weiner ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ......................................................................................................

Ms. Wasserman Schultz ....................................................................................

Mr. Maffei ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith, Ranking Member ............................................................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. ...................................................................................... X 

Mr. Coble ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Gallegly ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 


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ROLLCALL NO. 3—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Lungren ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa .............................................................................................................

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Franks .........................................................................................................

Mr. Gohmert ......................................................................................................

Mr. Jordan .........................................................................................................

Mr. Poe .............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Chaffetz ......................................................................................................

Mr. Rooney ........................................................................................................

Mr. Harper ......................................................................................................... X 

Total ................................................................................................ 23 0 

4. Impeachment Article 4. Approved 25 to 0, with one Member 

passing. 

ROLLCALL NO. 4 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Conyers, Jr., Chairman ............................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman .......................................................................................................

Mr. Boucher ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................

Ms. Lofgren .......................................................................................................

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Cohen .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Pierluisi ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Quigley ........................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Chu ............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Gutierrez ..................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Baldwin ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gonzalez ......................................................................................................

Mr. Weiner ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ......................................................................................................

Ms. Wasserman Schultz ....................................................................................

Mr. Maffei ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith, Ranking Member ............................................................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. ...................................................................................... X 

Mr. Coble ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Gallegly ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Lungren ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa .............................................................................................................

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Franks .........................................................................................................

Mr. Gohmert ......................................................................................................

Mr. Jordan ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Poe .............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Chaffetz ......................................................................................................

Mr. Rooney ........................................................................................................

Mr. Harper ......................................................................................................... X 

Total ................................................................................................ 25 0 

5. Motion to report the resolution. Approved 24 to 0. 


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ROLLCALL NO. 5 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Conyers, Jr., Chairman ............................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman .......................................................................................................

Mr. Boucher ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Scott ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren .......................................................................................................

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Cohen .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Pierluisi ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Quigley ........................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Chu ............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Gutierrez ..................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Baldwin ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gonzalez ......................................................................................................

Mr. Weiner ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ......................................................................................................

Ms. Wasserman Schultz ....................................................................................

Mr. Maffei ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith, Ranking Member ............................................................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. ...................................................................................... X 

Mr. Coble ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Gallegly ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Lungren ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa .............................................................................................................

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Franks .........................................................................................................

Mr. Gohmert ......................................................................................................

Mr. Jordan .........................................................................................................

Mr. Poe .............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Chaffetz ......................................................................................................

Mr. Rooney ........................................................................................................

Mr. Harper ......................................................................................................... X 

Total ................................................................................................ 24 0 

Æ 


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