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i 

52–667 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–73] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FAMILY HOUSING, BASE 

CLOSURE, FACILITIES OPERATION AND 

MAINTENANCE 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 3, 2009 
(II) 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

DAVE SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

TOM HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member 

MEGAN PUTNAM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, June 3, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for Military Construction, Family Housing, Base Closure, Facilities Operation and Maintenance ...................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, June 3, 2009 ........................................................................................ 33 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 2009 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FAMILY HOUSING, 

BASE CLOSURE, FACILITIES OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, 

Readiness Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 3 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Readiness 

Subcommittee ....................................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Arny, Wayne, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Installations and Environment ...................................................................................................................... 4 

Calcara, Joseph F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installations 

and Housing .......................................................................................................... 7 

Ferguson, Kathleen I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Installations ....................................................................................................................... 9 

Penn, Hon. B.J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Installations and Environment ...................................................................................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Arny, Wayne ..................................................................................................... 40 

Calcara, Joseph F. ............................................................................................ 79 

Ferguson, Kathleen .......................................................................................... 121 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 39 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P. ..................................................................................... 37 

Penn, Hon. B.J. ................................................................................................. 96 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted for the record.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 143 

Mr. Kissell ......................................................................................................... 144 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Abercrombie ............................................................................................... 156 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 157 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 147 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FAMILY HOUSING, BASE CLOSURE, FACILITIES OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 3, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ORTIZ. This hearing will come to order, but before we do that 

I talked to some members, and I thought that it would be appropriate to have a moment of silence for those that perished in that 

French flight from Brazil going to Paris. 

And if we could just take a moment of silent prayer honoring 

those and remembering those who perished, there was a couple, an 

American couple who were on that flight. If we just take a moment 

of silence. 

[Moment of silence.] 

I thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing before this 

subcommittee today. Today the Readiness Subcommittee will hear 

about our military construction and Base Closure and Realignment 

(BRAC) programs. In general, I am pleased with the budget request this year. 

I think they have done a good job of advancing a number of important initiatives including fully funding the BRAC 2005 process 

and providing the infrastructure to support our growing force and 

re-capitalizing on an aging infrastructure. 

However, I am also concerned about the trends that I see within 

the Department of Defense. First of all, in the BRAC 2005 process 

I am disturbed about the apparent cost escalation over the past few 

years. Since the Department submitted the first budget request to 

implement the findings of BRAC 2005 commission, the cost to implement this program have almost doubled to $34 billion. 

While a variety of reasons have been attributed to this growth, 

I believe the assumptions underlying the 2005 BRAC recommendations were flawed. The department has indicated that its analysis 

of the BRAC recommendation were based on consistent planning 

assumptions. 
2 

Unfortunately, those planning assumptions were completely inadequate. This type of bad cost data leads us to make bad decisions. I am also concerned about whether we can meet the statutory completion date of September 2011. I am concerned that the 

shortcuts may be taken and money may be wasted in an attempt 

to meet the deadline. 

It is important that the department take a critical look at this 

program and review the implementation timelines to ensure that 

government waste is eliminated and artificial acceleration initiatives are avoided. 

We owe the men and women of our Armed Services and the taxpayers of this Nation the very best BRAC implementation plan 

that smoothly relocates forces in strict compliance with the BRAC 

decisions. 

On another subject, I wanted to discuss strategic realignment of 

United States forces in the Pacific. The most pressing issue relates 

to Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam. In Guam alone we are 

expecting more than $10 billion in construction in the next few 

years. It is important to note that Guam is not the only expanding 

location. 

Included in this realignment is the expansion of forces to the 

Futenma replacement facility at Camp Schwab in Okinawa. I believe it is important to get both of these decisions right and to 

make sure our long-term relation with our Pacific partners remain 

vibrant and viable for the foreseeable future. 

Let me turn our attention to another equally important subject, 

the basing of aviation assets. I understand the department is facing 

a number of basing decisions this year. The most expansive involves the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The Air Force alone is to determine the location of four operational JSF bases and one additional pilot training center. 

The problem is that the Joint Strike Fighter is much louder than 

the F–15, F–16 and F–18 aircraft. In the basing of future aviation 

assets the department is to take great caution in balancing the 

needs of the armed forces with the competing requirements of expanded local communities. 

A long-term outlook needs to be taken into account to ensure 

that the Nation has a viable, unencumbered aviation infrastructure 

that fully supports the missions of the armed forces. 

Finally, I remain concerned about the continued underfunding of 

the sustainment of our military infrastructure. Funding only 90 

percent of the Navy’s requirement is short-sighted and only raises 

costs over the long term. 

This chronic underfunding for infrastructure will remain a critical issue of interest for this subcommittee. We can do better, and 

I look forward to working with the department to making this a reality. Gentlemen, I think that we have a lot to discuss today and 

I look forward to hearing you address these important issues. 

The chair recognizes my good friend, the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, for any remarks he would like 

to make. 

Mr. Forbes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I just, again, appreciate your leadership in holding this hearing. And I also want to 

thank the witnesses and appreciate each of them being here today 

to discuss building and maintaining the best possible facilities for 

our troops, whether at home or deployed and their families. 

And I want to just pause a moment and sincerely thank you for 

what you have done. You have made some enormous strides and 

oftentimes we are so focused in the limited amounts of time that 

we have on where we are going tomorrow that we really don’t step 

back and just say how much we appreciate what you have done 

and how you have gotten us to this point. 

So I want to make sure I am thanking you for that, but then Mr. 

Chairman, I am a bit frustrated with the budget the department 

has submitted. And while we need to hold this hearing in preparation for our subcommittee markup next week, we have been given 

incomplete information at best. 

And while it is not the fault of any of our witnesses, transparency has certainly not been an adjective describing this budget 

process and we can and must do better. 

It is difficult enough to properly consider a complex military construction budget under our compressed schedule, worse, we have no 

Future Years Defense Plan or FYDP to help us understand future 

intent. 

Finally, most disturbing, major Defense Department decisions 

announced after the budget was locked will require budget adjustments and detail on these adjustments is still not available, at 

least not available to us. 

And while understandable to some degree in a new administration, many large decisions have been pushed to the quadrennial defense review or QDR, leaving us in a quandary about what is real 

and what is changed in the budget request. 

For example, the Secretary of Defense’s recent decision to limit 

the Army’s Brigade Combat Team (BCT) growth to 45 rather than 

48 brigades calls into question the Army’s military construction 

program. Even though the Army finally identified the brigades that 

will be lost, the ultimate BCT footprint is still undetermined pending QDR review of re-stationing two BCTs from Europe. 

The reality is that the Army cannot articulate with any precision 

how the fiscal year 2010 budget request should be adjusted. In addition, the Deputy Secretary of Defense delayed the Navy’s earlier 

recent decision to home port a nuclear aircraft at Mayport, Florida, 

pending the outcome of the QDR. 

While I support the department’s review of the decision, the 

Navy still has requested funding that could be used in furtherance 

of making Mayport a carrier home port. 

It is difficult for me to support a legitimate request to have another East Coast port in a storm when I know that it could be used 

as a down payment for the unnecessary expense of making 

Mayport a nuclear carrier home port. 

There are equally vexing unresolved issues involved in the basing of Joint Strike Fighter squadrons around the United States due 
4 

to pending environmental reviews. The Marine Corps realignment 

from Okinawa to Guam and the department’s brinkmanship on 

completing BRAC moves in a number of sites. 

This budget also defers a number of land acquisition challenges. 

Even without a FYDP we know the Navy wants an outlying landing field for Oceana-based aircraft squadron. The Army wants to 

acquire more training land in Colorado and the Marine Corps intends to acquire large tracts adjacent to Twentynine Palms Marine 

base in California. 

Each of these actions is important for the readiness of Army, 

Navy and Marine Corps units and each comes with considerable 

public concern or opposition. All of these acquisition and basing 

issues are sensitive national security and local matters, requiring 

the considered judgment of Congress in possession of all of the 

facts. 

But we don’t have the facts, nor do we have transparency. Instead we are asked to approve a budget and funding decisions that 

will be revisited during the QDR. Mr. Chairman, I think it is fair 

to expect that we will make modifications to this request unless today’s witnesses are prepared to resolve some of the questions I 

have posed. 

Our constituents rightfully expect us to understand the consequences of budgets we approve and I don’t believe we have what 

we need to approve this request. But once again, to all of our witnesses, we recognize the great job you have done up to this point. 

We thank you so much for that. 

Mr. Chairman, once again, I just thank you for your leadership 

and your direction and I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. Today we have a panel of distinguished 

witnesses representing the department and again thank you so 

much for your service. 

Our witnesses include Mr. Wayne Arny, Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense for Installations and Environment, the Department of 

Defense, Mr. Joseph Calcara, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Army Installations and Housing and the Honorable B.J. Penn, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Installations and Environment and 

Ms. Kathleen Ferguson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force, Installations. 

We thank you for being with us today. And without objection the 

witnesses’ prepared statements will be accepted for the record. 

Secretary Arny, so good to see you again, sir. You still look like 

a young pilot. 

Mr. ARNY. Not any more. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Without objection, of course, we now will begin and 

Secretary Arny. Welcome and you can begin your testimony whenever you are ready. 

STATEMENT OF WAYNE ARNY, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT 

Mr. ARNY. Thank you sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Forbes, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am 
5 

honored to appear before you today and with your permission, I 

will submit the full statement for the record. 

From the last 10 years the Department has come a long way in 

improving the facilities and the infrastructure in which our military and civilian workforce and families work and live. We could 

not have progressed as far as we have without the continuing support of Congress and in particular the support of this subcommittee. 

Today, we manage over 500,000 facilities worth over $700 billion 

located in approximately 29 million acres of land around the world. 

In comparison, about 10 years ago we had 115,000 more facilities 

in our inventory, which is in part a testimony to our continuing efforts to right-size the department’s infrastructure. 

The principal program that has helped us balance the infrastructure is the BRAC Authority and using that we have been able to 

close over 121 major installations and realign 79 major bases after 

five rounds. The 2005 decisions alone affect over 800 locations and 

include 24 major closures, 24 major realignments and 765 lesser 

actions. 

However, it is not just enough to have closed bases and moved 

functions. At the same time, we tried to focus on how we conduct 

business so as to become more efficient caretakers of the taxpayers’ 

money. An excellent example of our efforts toward efficiency is joint 

basing. 

As part of BRAC 2005, we were required to form 12 new joint 

bases from 26 existing locations so that installation management 

functions will be provided by one component, not two or three as 

it is currently. 

The joint basing implementation process is complicated and almost 50 different areas of responsibilities on these bases have been 

identified for consolidation including food services, environmental 

management, child and youth programs, facility maintenance and 

many more. 

But I can report to you that it is well on the way to achieving 

success. In January 2008 we began issuing a series of joint basing 

implementation guidance documents and for the first time established a set of common definitions and standards for installation 

support to be provided by each joint base. 

We established a schedule that divides the 12 planned joint 

bases into two implementation phases. Five joint bases involving 

11 installations replaced into phase one with an October 2009 milestone for full implementation, which includes the transfer of personnel and funds to the joint base commander. 

The remaining seven bases involving 15 installations were placed 

into phase two with an October 2010 full implementation and that 

is on track. And this is just the beginning of where I see the department and the application of common output levels of service to 

provide consistent and superb support to our service members at 

every installation. 

As for housing, a decade ago we were maintaining over 300,000 

family housing units, two-thirds of which were deemed to be inadequate by the military departments. With your help and vision we 

put housing privatizations in place, and the private sector responded by delivering modern, affordable housing. 
6 

With this year’s request, over 98 percent of the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD’s) housing inventory in the United States will be 

funded for privatization. The military services have leveraged DOD 

housing dollars by 10 to 1 with $2.5 billion in federal investments 

generating $25 billion in housing development at privatized installations. 

With regards to barracks, it was about 17 years ago that the 

military departments began an ambitious modernization program 

to increase the privacy and amenities in permanent party bachelor 

housing. Using the military construction funding and a traditional 

government-owned business model much progress has been made 

but there still is a need for almost $15 billion to complete the permanent party buyout. 

Privatized housing has unique—one of the ways we are looking 

at this is through privatizing bachelor housing, which has unique 

challenges compared to family housing. But if we start viewing 

these buildings more as on-base apartments instead of unique military training or operating facilities, the private sector will see the 

potential for a new economic niche in which both they and the department can come out winners. 

We have seen recent innovative concepts where the Army has 

added bachelor office quarters and senior enlisted bachelor quarters to its existing family housing privatization projects at Fort 

Bragg, Fort Stewart, Fort Drum, Fort Irwin, and a fifth is planned 

for Fort Bliss. 

In contrast, the Army and the Navy is mainly focusing its unaccompanied housing privatization to bring shipboard junior enlisted 

sailors ashore using a special pilot authority. The first unaccompanied housing, privatization pilot project was awarded in December 2006 to San Diego. The second in 2007 in Hampton Roads, and 

a third is under consideration for Mayport and Jacksonville. 

Both of the awarded pilot projects for the Navy have demonstrated that with the authority to pay junior enlisted members 

less than full housing allowance, privatization of single junior enlisted personnel is less costly on a lifecycle basis than the traditional government-owned model. 

I view this as just a starting point, and ask for the subcommittee’s support in the department’s continued progress in shifting toward this way of thinking. This year’s budget signals yet another 

banner year for installations with about $23 billion in military construction and about $8 billion in facility sustainment, restoration 

and modernization. 

At $23 billion, the military construction program is very robust, 

especially compared to the $8 to $9 billion levels we were receiving 

10 years ago. Similarly our sustainment budget is also more robust 

as compared to 10 years ago. 

Recapitalization has been more of a challenge. We moved from 

believing a single recap rate expressed in years applied across myriad category sources could provide funding levels that was rational 

or defendable. 

When I was in the Navy Secretariat, I personally observed the 

inaccuracy of the recap rate as Hurricane Ivan hit Pensacola. The 

sudden infusion of restoration funds skewed the recap rate for 

Navy to a lower number than the targeted 67 years, yet the condi-
7 

tion of the rest of the Navy facilities across the board did not improve. 

I was dissatisfied with that 67-year metric and I asked my staff 

to go back to the basics and open the dialogue on the facility condition indices that are already mandated for DOD in real property 

records. These quality ratings or Q-ratings represent the health of 

our facilities and I believe they have been long ignored. 

This summer my staff will be working closely with the military 

departments and defense agencies to set up program guidelines for 

determining which facilities require priority for funding, reassessing how Q-ratings are conducted and their frequency and most 

importantly reestablishing how the department views and uses 

master planning at the installation level. 

Also, and equally important, in cooperation with our policy secretariat, the joint staff, the combatant command and the services, we 

hope to initiate joint installation master plans at each overseas 

combatant command region. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I sincerely thank you for this opportunity to highlight our management of installation assets. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Arny can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

Secretary Calcara. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH F. CALCARA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, INSTALLATIONS AND HOUSING 

Mr. CALCARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. 

Forbes, members of the committee. I too am honored to be here 

today to present details on our fiscal year 2010 budget. We continue on in the largest transformation in Army history. The fiscal 

year 2010 budget does represent for us the second half of the home 

stretch to complete all our transformation under base realignment 

and closure, military construction, Grow the Army and the Army 

modular force. 

I know there has been a challenging year for all of us. The dynamics with the budget schedule and you have asked us to address 

in detail the impacts from recent force structure decisions. We are 

planning tomorrow to have a detailed session with committee staff 

to go line item-by-line item project. 

Let me just briefly cover for you the top line story in my opening 

remarks. We have about $1.4 billion in the program tied to the 

Grow the Army initiative. As you know, yesterday we publicly disclosed our decisions on how we were going to apply those changes 

to the budget. 

I want you to know it was not a simple process. We have worked 

diligently and deliberately over the last several weeks to make sure 

that every nickel was looked at from both an investment and a capabilities perspective. We are confident that the solution that we 

will propose is exactly what is right for the Army and right for the 

Nation at whole. 

Of the $1.4 billion that is in the Grow the Army wedge in the 

fiscal year 2010 program, approximately half of it is not tied to the 

brigade configuration. It is tied to combat support and combat serv-
8 

ices support. Of the remaining half of that wedge, about half of 

that is tied to reserve and housing, again, not connected to the 

Grow the Army decision. So we are basically talking about 25 percent of the $1.74 billion 

that is in that budget roll out that needed to be looked at for reinvestment use. Our plan is to take those dollars and buy down capacity shortages that we had from the other brigades that we built 

in the 45 total. 

We also plan to buy out our relocatables sooner because you have 

been telling us that is the right thing to do. So that is essentially 

the impacts of the BCT decisions on a macro level. Tomorrow you 

will cross walk one-by-one through them. 

We think it is the right thing to do to get our capacity back, to 

get our relocatables quicker. There is a business case for that and 

the rest of the budget holds. Otherwise, I look forward to your 

questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Calcara can be found in the Appendix on page 79.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Secretary Penn, good to see you again, sir. Whenever 

you are ready for your testimony, go ahead, sir. 

STATEMENT OF HON. B.J. PENN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

THE NAVY, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT 

Secretary PENN. Thank you sir. Chairman Ortiz, Representative 

Forbes, members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to come before you today to discuss the Department of the Navy’s installation 

efforts. I would like to touch on a few highlights in the department’s overall facilities budget request, a very healthy $14.4 billion 

or 9.2 percent of the department’s Total Obligational Authority 

(TOA). 

In Military Construction (MILCON) fiscal year 2010 continues the Marine Corps’ Grow the Force initiative with a $1.9 billion investment targeted primarily at infrastructure and unit specific construction required to move Marines from interim facilities and provide adequate facilities for new units. 

The fiscal year 2010 MILCON budget also provides funds for the 

first 5 construction projects to support the relocation of Marines 

from Okinawa to Guam in the amount of $378 million. 

Our fiscal year 2010 budget request complies with the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) policy and the DOD financial 

management regulation that establishes criteria for the use of incremental funding. 

The use of incremental funding in this budget has been restricted 

to the continuation of projects that have been implemented in prior 

years. Otherwise, all new projects are fully funded or are complete 

and usable phases. 

In family housing, our budget request of $515 million reflects the 

continuation of investment funding for locations where we still own 

and operate military family housing and where additional privatization is planned. 

Prior requests reflect a conservative program to address additional housing requirements associated with Marine Corps force 

structure initiatives. The Navy and Marine Corps have privatized 

virtually all family housing located in the United States. 
9 

Where we continue to own housing at overseas and foreign locations, we are investing in a steady state recapitalization effort to 

replace or renovate housing where needed. Our request also includes funds necessary to operate, maintain and lease housing to 

support Navy and Marine Corps families located around the world. 

Regarding legacy BRAC, we continue our request for appro- priated funds in the amount $168 million as we exhausted all land 

sale revenue. We have disposed of 93 percent of the prior BRAC 

properties, so there is little left to sell and the real estate market 

is not as lucrative as it was several years ago. 

We expect only limited revenue from the sale of Roosevelt Roads 

in Puerto Rico and other small parcels. With respect to the BRAC 

2005 program, our budget request of $592 million represents a 

shifting emphasis from construction to outfitting and other Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs. One success story I would like 

to highlight comes from New Orleans which still struggles to recover from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 

We entered into a 75-year leasing arrangement agreement with 

the Algiers Development District in September of 2008. In exchange for leasing 149 acres of naval support activity in New Orleans, the headquarters Marine Forces Reserve will receive approximately $150 million in new facilities. 

Demolition began recently and we have established temporary 

quarters for the commissary so that military personnel, retirees 

and their families still have access to the quality of life service during construction. 

We continue to work with Algiers Development District to ensure 

this partnership’s successful outcome. We have been able to hold 

down our cost increases to a modest 2 percent for the implementation period of fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2011. 

We have made significant progress in the past year in planning 

for the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The environmental impact statement for Guam is underway with a targeted 

record of decision in time for construction in fiscal year 2010. 

The government of Japan ratified the international agreement on 

13 May, 2009 and appropriated $336 million, fiscal year 2008 

equivalent dollars, to complement our own investment for fiscal 

year 2010. We expect to see Japan’s contribution deposited in our 

treasury by July. 

Finally, it has been an honor and privilege to serve this great nation and the men and women of our Navy and Marine Corps team, 

the military, civilian personnel and their families. Thank you, this 

committee, for your continued support and opportunity to testify 

before you today. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Penn can be found in the 

Appendix on page 96.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary Ferguson, it is good to see you. And you can begin with 

your testimony, ma’am. 

STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN I. FERGUSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, INSTALLATIONS 

Ms. FERGUSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman 

Forbes and distinguished members of the committee. On behalf of 
10 

America’s airmen, it is my pleasure to be here today. I would like 

to begin by thanking the committee for its continued support of 

your Air Force and the thousands of dedicated and brave airmen 

and their families serving our great nation around the globe. 

Today more than 27,000 airmen are currently deployed in support of ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa 

and many other locations, daily demonstrating their importance in 

support of joint combat operations. 

Within the Secretariat for Installations and Environment and Logistics, we fully appreciate the impact our efforts have in support 

of these airmen and how it affects their ability to positively influence our Air Force’s war fighting abilities and capacity to counter 

hostile threats. 

Military construction, family housing and BRAC programs form 

the foundation of our installation structure. Our installations serve 

as the primary platforms for the delivery of global vigilance, reach 

and power for our nation, and our fiscal year 2010 investments reflect a direct connection to this vital work. 

As we continue to focus on modernizing our aging weapons systems we recognize that we cannot lose focus on critical Air Force 

infrastructure programs. Our fiscal year 2010 president’s budget 

request of $4.9 billion for military construction, military family 

housing, BRAC and facility maintenance is a reduction from our 

2009 request of $5.2 billion. 

This reflects an increase in MILCON and fact of life reductions 

due to the anticipated completion of the housing privatization and 

BRAC 2005 round implementation. 

Using an enterprise portfolio perspective we intend to focus our 

limited resources on the most critical physical plant components by 

applying demolition and space utilization strategies to reduce our 

footprint, aggressively pursue energy initiatives, continue to privatize family housing, and modernizing dormitories to improve 

quality of life for our airmen. 

In regards to military family housing, our master plan details 

our housing MILCON, operations and maintenance and privatization efforts. Since last spring we have completed new construction 

or major improvements on more than 2,000 units in the United 

States and overseas, with another 2,286 units under construction 

in the U.S. and almost 3,000 units under construction overseas. 

Our fiscal year 2010 budget request for military family housing 

is just over $567 million. The Air Force request for housing investment is $67 million to ensure the continued improvement of our 

overseas homes. Our request also includes an additional $500 million to pay for operations, maintenance, utilities and leases for the 

family housing program. 

At this point I would like to address our efforts in support of 

base realignment and closure. BRAC 2005 impacts more than 120 

Air Force installations. Unlike the last round of BRAC where 82 

percent of the implementation actions affected the active Air Force, 

in BRAC 2005, 78 percent of implementation actions affect the Air 

National Guard and Air Force Reserve. 

In fact the Air Force will spend more than $478 million on Air 

National Guard and Air Force Reserve BRAC MILCON projects. 
11 

The Air Force total BRAC budget is approximately $3.8 billion in 

which the Air Force is fully funded. 

Our fiscal year 2010 BRAC 2005 budget request is approximately $418 million and less than 20 percent of that is for BRAC MILCON 

projects. I would like to emphasize the Air Force BRAC program 

is on track to meet the September 2011 deadline. Air Force 

MILCON, family housing and BRAC initiatives will continue to directly support Air Force priorities. 

It is imperative we continue to manage our installations by 

leveraging industry best practices and state-of-the-art technology. 

Our civil engineering transformation efforts, now entering the third 

year, continue to produce efficiencies and cost savings that enhance 

support for the war fighter, reduce the cost of installation ownership and free resources for the recapitalization of our aging Air 

Force weapons system. 

More importantly, these investments reflect effective stewardship 

of funding designed to serve our airmen in the field, their families 

and the taxpayer at home. Mr. Chairman and Congressman 

Forbes, this concludes my remarks. 

Thank you and the committee once again for your continued support of our airmen and their families. We look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ferguson can be found in the Appendix on page 121.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. I see that we have a tremendous 

turnout of members this morning. It is either that things are going 

so well, or maybe they are not, and I am pretty sure that they may 

have a lot of questions. 

I am going to be brief. I am going to ask one question and then 

I want to allow the members of this committee. I want to give them 

a chance. 

I know I have met with some of the freshman members, they 

say, ‘‘Oh, my, it takes a long time, before you get down to the front, 

for them to ask a question.’’ But I want to ask Secretaries Penn 

and Ferguson, I know you will be starting the process to determine 

the location of a variety of aviation assets, including the Joint 

Strike Fighter. 

As you are aware, the Joint Strike Fighter is pretty, pretty loud 

and there are people who like the sound of freedom and there are 

other people who are not too happy with the loud noise. Could you 

explain how the noise associated with the Joint Strike Fighter 

would influence basing decisions and whether these communities 

have been contacted? 

Also, can you explain to this committee how Joint Strike Fighter 

basing criteria, included in the House report to the 2008 defense 

authorization bill, would be incorporated into those basing decisions? 

Secretary Ferguson or Penn, whichever is ready, we will give you 

the opportunity to respond to that question. 

Ms. FERGUSON. I can answer the Air Force section. 

Mr. ORTIZ. If you could you get a little closer to the mike, so 

that—— 

Ms. FERGUSON. Okay, here we go. Based in part with what we 

saw as we bedded down—tried to bed down the Joint Strike Fight-
12 

er at Eglin and the noise issues associated with that, the Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force and Secretary Donnelly asked us to look at 

doing enterprise-wide work for the basing of the Joint Strike Fighter across the United States Air Force. 

Back in February we accomplished a rapid improvement event 

where we looked internally in the Air Force how we made basing 

decisions and a couple of results came out of that and we are implementing those right now. 

One of which was to stand up a robust debasing shop within the 

Air Force, and we had lost some of that as we had gone through 

the previous round of BRAC. We had lost some of that capability 

and we are now going to build that back up. 

The second thing we have done is stood up an Air Force senior 

basing executive steering group which I chair. And we have crossfunctional representation across the Headquarters Air Force (HAF), 

at the general officer level that oversees the basing process for the 

Air Force at the strategic level. 

One of the objectives for the Chief of Staff and Secretary was for 

the Air Force to have a defendable, repeatable, transparent process 

as we worked through basing, not just for the Joint Strike Fighter, 

but for all weapons systems across the Air Force. 

Where we are right now specifically with the JSF—in fact tomorrow morning, I have a briefing where Air Combat Command is the 

lead to the JSF bed-down process. We will come in and embrace 

the executive steering group on proposed criteria to bed that down. 

We brief the Chief and Secretary on that proposed criteria at the 

end of June. And then that criteria will be applied across the inventory of installations across the United States. 

As part of that criteria, we expect there will be some consideration for noise and mission capabilities, mission requirements. And 

then we will get that criteria over to the committee once that is approved by the Chief and Secretary. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Secretary Penn. 

Secretary PENN. Yes, sir, we have been working closely with the 

Air Force. They are leading the noise analysis for us and the facilities that we are looking at or we are seeing thus far in the Navy 

are those that are really not in a populated area. They are really 

quite isolated, so I am thinking that is going to be good. 

We have looked at the noise from day one, and it is very difficult 

to get the noise specifications on the aircraft. It is a lot more noisy 

than the tactical aircrafts that Mr. Arny and I are used to, but we 

are working so that we will try not to infringe on the areas around 

the bases. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. Now, I yield to my good friend, Mr. 

Forbes, and I would like to see all the members who are here with 

us today be able to ask questions this morning. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to try to keep 

my questions relatively brief, to again, thanking you all for what 

you have done and for being here today. 

And I am going to address these questions to Mr. Arny and Mr. 

Penn, and I want to preface it by saying, when Secretary Gates 

was here, he indicated that we could ask for everybody’s personal 
13 

opinions, and we didn’t have to just get department opinions or 

what was there. 

So I wanted to address mine under the caveat that I would like 

for your personal opinion on this issue, because we respect the totality of evidence and experience each of you bring to the table. 

But the Navy’s fiscal year 2010 unfunded requirements list in- cludes a shortfall of $395 million for aviation and ship depot maintenance. Now, we have heard a lot of people say that that shortfall 

is much greater than that. The aviation shortfall is bouncing all 

over the place depending on which day we see it. It is either 120 

planes and the next day it may be more than double than that. 

Second thing, ship depot maintenance, last year we are looking at maybe $120 million, this year we are talking about upwards of 

$400 million, but whatever. The official list is $395 million for aviation ship depot maintenance. 

In light of such critical maintenance requirements, do you think it is justified to put $76 million, a fourth of the total amount that 

we have in there, on infrastructure improvements for Mayport on 

a project that we are being told hasn’t even been approved yet? 

Secretary PENN. Yes, sir, I do. First the MILCON that we have 

for Mayport is for two projects, Pier Charlie 1 where we put the 

small boys is deteriorating. I was in Mayport a couple of weeks ago, 

and at this time we cannot drive a truck up to a ship that is 

berthed at Charlie 1 to offload supplies because the piers had sink 

holes in it and everything else. 

At this time, we have to park the vehicles where we are loading 

supplies on the ships, that is Charlie 1 about 50 feet away, crane 

them across to the ship because of that inconvenience, which is a 

real hardship on everyone concerned. 

As I say, there are two projects. Second, in regards to the outcome on the QDR on the carrier, we need to be able to transient. 

We need to put a carrier into Mayport for transient. We are not 

going to use the home porting now. We get the message, no home 

porting of a carrier in Mayport, but to be able to put a carrier into 

Mayport we have to dredge it. 

The nuclear carriers, as you know, have different requirements, 

different depths, and that is what we are striving for. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Arny? 

Mr. ARNY. I concur with Mr. Penn. I was stationed on a conventional carrier out of Mayport, and due to a maintenance accident, 

some of our maintenance people installed a pump backwards, and 

the ship sank at the pier and didn’t go down very far. 

So to bring nuclear carriers in, to have the right safety for supply 

and re-supply, you need to have the dredging done. And Mr. Penn 

is right, the pier, apparently, is falling down, whether you station 

a carrier there or not or whether you—just for—that is more a 

maintenance of the facility rather than for a specific ship. 

Mr. FORBES. When you are talking about the $76 million that 

has been allocated in, though, it would be fair to say that most of 

the dredging project and pier work would only be needed if you 

were trying to put a nuclear carrier in there. Is that not correct? 

Secretary PENN. Not for the pier work, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. How much would the pier work be Mr. Penn? 

Secretary PENN. Yes, the pier work alone is $30 million. 
14 

Mr. FORBES. It is $30 million. 

Secretary PENN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And what about the remaining $46 million? Would 

that be to dig the ditch? 

Secretary PENN. Yes, sir, that is for the ditch. 

Mr. FORBES. Well the reason I ask that is because, you know, basically we know that there are some of these needs. The aviation 

needs—this 100 percent need that we have there we know that 

there is a 100 percent need for the depot maintenance. I think both 

of you would agree on that. 

And the last question I will just ask you is this. Most of the concern that has been expressed about needing to do that dredging 

and get the nuclear carrier in that port was based on the fact that 

we would only have one naval base capable of home porting a nuclear carrier that has access to the Atlantic Ocean, and that a natural disaster terrorist attack has shut down the Norfolk’s naval facility. 

And so the question I would ask you is what risk assessment has 

been given to you, and who has given it to you that outlines the 

risk that such an attack would take place? And if you could just 

contrast that with the fact that we know we have a 100 percent 

need for the aviation shortfall and a 100 percent need for the depot 

maintenance shortfall. 

In other words have you ever asked what that risk assessment 

is? Is it a 10 percent risk, 5 percent risk, 20 percent risk? Who 

gave you the risk assessment, and what was that risk assessment? 

Secretary PENN. Sir, I think it is very difficult to quantify a risk 

assessment, either manmade or natural. 

Mr. FORBES. Did you ever ask for it? 

Secretary PENN. I have. I have asked my own staff for it. I 

haven’t gone to the Navy and asked the operators for it. 

Mr. FORBES. Did you ask the admiral that did the strategic dispersal plan, the one that we based the need to move the carrier 

and having a second port? 

Secretary PENN. I did not. No, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you know of anyone in the department that did? 

Secretary PENN. We will have to get back to you on that. I did 

not know. I would have to check, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 143.] 

Mr. FORBES. If I told you that the admiral said that no one has 

ever asked him for that risk assessment. Would that be contrary 

to any evidence that you have to rebut that? 

Secretary PENN. I will have to get back to you on that because 

he has a large staff working for him and, you know, sometimes we 

go with the Action Officer (AO) level to get responses. 

Mr. FORBES. But normally he would know if that question had 

been asked of his staff or to him, wouldn’t he? 

Secretary PENN. Not necessarily, sir. 

Mr. ARNY. Not necessarily. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Then Mr. Arny, do you know of anyone who 

has ever asked that question? 

Mr. ARNY. No, I do not. 
15 

Mr. FORBES. And I would just finally ask you, don’t you think it 

would help to have asked what the risk assessment was? In other 

words we might have a meteor that falls out of the sky tomorrow, 

but we aren’t putting money in the budget to cover that because 

we don’t think the risk is very high. And I will just tell you that 

when I asked him if anyone had ever asked him that question, his 

answer to me was no. 

And second, when I asked him if he could quantify that risk, he 

said it would be very, very small, less than 10 percent. And so my 

just comment to you is that when we are looking at situations 

where budgets seem to be driving our defense strategy. 

And I know we can argue whether that is true or not. It just 

doesn’t make much sense to me when we are taking 25 percent of 

the cost, that we basically know we need the aviation shortfall and 

for depot maintenance, and we are putting it to a situation where 

the admiral that writes the strategic dispersal plan will tell us that 

it is less than a 10 percent chance that we would ever need that. 

But if you would go back and check with him and see if anyone 

has asked that question. And if you could respond to us on the 

record as to whether or not that question has ever been asked to 

him and what the answer to that is. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 143.] 

Secretary PENN. I will ask that question today, sir. The only 

problem, and I think you will agree, is the loss of a carrier is unacceptable. 

Mr. FORBES. Oh, I don’t think anybody disagrees with that, but 

the shortfall in planes is unacceptable too, shortfalls in depot maintenance from when we have ships that are failing our Inspection 

and Survey (INSURV) inspections, that is not acceptable to us either. 

And Mr. Arny, I know—somebody slipped you a piece of paper. 

If you want to get that in the record go ahead. 

Mr. ARNY. Well, sir, again I didn’t question it because I do believe the dredging is needed, whether you home port a carrier there 

or not, because we are constantly bringing—even when we had a 

conventional carrier there we would bring in nuclear carriers that 

we have got to light load them to get in. 

We have got to come in at high tide. It puts tremendous restrictions on it. We needed, in my opinion, we need to dredge that out 

whether you home port a nuclear carrier there because you are 

going to bring them in. You may not home port them there but you 

are going to bring them in and out as part of your annual operations. 

Mr. FORBES. And my time is up, so I will yield back the balance 

of my time, but if you will get back to me on that risk assessment 

question as to whether or not anybody has asked it. And if you 

could give it to us for the record we would appreciate it. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I am going to 

yield my time to Mr. Kissell and take his when his is due. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Kissell. 
16 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Taylor for yielding your time. I just 

wish you would give me your questions because Mr. Taylor always 

asks the best questions. But I will try to make do with a couple 

I came up with. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. KISSELL. Mr. Calcara, I have noticed, unless I misread the 

number, that Army National Guard construction money is down 

$460 million in the 2010 request from what was actually approved 

in 2009, and for Army families construction, housing construction 

down $180 million from what was requested versus what was approved. Just wondering what the thinking is behind that? 

Mr. CALCARA. Okay. On the Army housing side, most of those 

dollars are tied to capital investments into the Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) program, and as we continue to build out the 

RCI, we are at a 98 percent level. We don’t require as much capital 

investment from the military construction account for those 

projects to keep going. 

On the Guard side the numbers are down. I think if you compare 

request versus request from last year. And you look at some of the 

facilities that we are buying through the base closure on the Reserve side, we are actually bringing more capabilities to the Guard 

than was requested last year. 

What I mean by that is if you will look about $300 million worth 

of the Army Reserve projects, about half of those are shared with 

the Guard. So if you add those two numbers together, and you compare that to last year’s requests, we are within about 10 to 15 percent on the numbers. 

Mr. KISSELL. Secretary Ferguson, in a previous hearing it was 

indicated, and I can’t give you real specifics on this, but there was 

just some indications that either through not having the fighter 

planes available for our Air Force Guard, the Air Guard, but somehow we are deemphasizing the Air Guard. 

Just wondering if you could give me some reassurance that we 

are going to have those good pilots that are training in planes, that 

when we need them that they are going to be there? 

Ms. FERGUSON. The Air Force is not looking to deemphasize the 

Air National Guard in anyway. The Air National Guard and the 

Air Force Reserves are a tremendous multiplier for the Air Force. 

They are deployed alongside our active duty members at all times. 

I can get you a better answer for that, but in all of my meetings 

I have had I have seen no indication from the Air Force that there 

is any emphasis to do that. 

Mr. KISSELL. So the emphasis is going to be there, as we have 

seen it, in terms of the equipment they can train on and the budgeting process so that they can continue to be there? 

Ms. FERGUSON. Absolutely. 

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. And Secretary Arny, one question, and I 

hope this is not too much home cooking. I am from North Carolina, 

and my district goes right to the edge of Fort Bragg, and we have 

most of the military reservation but none of the base. 

A tremendous BRAC changes at Fort Bragg, tremendous incoming commands and we are very, very tickled with that and there 

is going to be a—I think the most flag officers outside of the Pentagon will be at Fort Bragg when all this is said and done. 
17 

But it has been mentioned to me that we are not going to have 

an Air Force officer of flag rank on the base. But there is still going 

to be a significant amount of Air Force presence, and there is some 

concern that if we don’t have an officer of equal rank, that there 

might be some difficulty in going back and forth in terms of communication and getting things done. 

It was suggested it might be a possibility of bringing in an additional ranking officer and staff. Just wondering if you know any on 

that? 

Mr. ARNY. No, sir, that subject hasn’t come up. As a former officer myself I don’t see where that would be a problem. I would defer 

to my Air Force and Army colleagues on the specifics of it. 

Mr. KISSELL. Did you all have any knowledge of any discussions 

on this? And once again I know this is getting down in detail but 

this is a pretty big operation and will be our largest Army base. 

If you all could get back to me on that I would appreciate that. 

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 144.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Recognize my good friend the chairman of the Intelligence Committee from El Paso, Texas, yes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all the secretaries for being here with us this morning. I just wanted to start 

out by taking a few moments to talk about what is, from my perspective, something very frustrating, and that is the overseas rebasing decisions, and actually indecisions is a better word. 

I think this morning I am frustrated beyond words with the latest edict that has come down that we are going to restudy this 

whole issue. I think, Mr. Chairman, this is an issue that has been 

studied and restudied, was studied by the rebasing, overseas rebasing commission, by the BRAC commission. 

We thought that these decisions were made and had already 

been ratified only to find out that we are in the process of delaying 

the move of our troops back to the U.S., which in my opinion is a 

great waste of time and money and a disservice because most importantly it leaves soldiers and their families in old substandard facilities. 

And it also forces our troops that are primarily going to be deploying to places like Iraq and Afghanistan to train in ranges that 

don’t look anything like the areas that they are going to go into 

combat in. I think as a committee, Mr. Chairman, we need to really 

stand strongly on this. 

The other thing that frustrates me is the fact that we seem to 

be rewarding the very countries that are reluctant to keep their 

part of the bargain in places like Afghanistan. 

They are refusing to add additional resources and troops to help 

us out in Afghanistan which puts a further burden on our troops. 

I think we ought to take the stand that if you are not going to help 

us in these areas of the world that are critical, not just to us but 

to the whole world, then we stick with the original strategy and 

bring them home. 

I guess my question this morning I would like to ask Secretary 

Arny or Secretary Calcara the fact that the Secretary of Defense 
18 

recently announced that he planned to stop the growth of the Army 

brigade combat teams at 45. 

That means not creating the 46th, 47th, and 48th brigades, as 

had been announced and planned under the Grow the Army concept. And he also said that while he is stopping those three brigades, he is going to continue with the same levels that have been 

approved by Congress. 

Part of the issue for me is that the Secretary said that he, in his 

words, he was going to, ‘‘thicken the force, and in doing so help to 

decrease the draw time between deployments,’’ which I think all of 

us agree we fundamentally need to address. 

So my question is this, where does the department plan to base 

the over 10,000 soldiers slated to serve in the now canceled three 

BCTs? I assume that we have a detailed plan, and that detailed 

plan has been discussed, has been presented before the decision 

was made by the Secretary to cancel out those three brigades. 

So can you tell this committee what that plan is? How we are 

going to accommodate those 10,000 troops? 

Mr. CALCARA. Sir, the answer is probably more detailed than we 

could get into today. We have essentially looked at those population 

spreads and where they are across the Army, and there are incremental adjustments at certain locations. 

I guess what I am saying, and the short answer is we have identified Bliss, Carson, and Stewart as getting one less brigade because of the announcement. In theory there is a 3,500 person population delta at each of those locations. It is not exactly working out 

that way. 

In some places we had BCTs that were not at full strength so 

they will be getting some of those people. At Fort Bliss, Fort Carson and Fort Stewart we didn’t have people at full strength. They 

will be getting some people. 

So I don’t have a display for you available today going base by 

base where those numbers are spread, but the answer is, wherever 

we had shortages in combat teams and combat configurations 

across the Army. 

Mr. REYES. When will that be available? Mr. Chairman, if we can 

get that information I would appreciate it. And when will that be 

available? 

Mr. CALCARA. We are having a working session tomorrow with 

staff and we will try to provide that information tomorrow. 

Mr. REYES. Well, can we get that, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ORTIZ. Sure we can get that and I think that gentleman has 

raised some very important questions that hopefully we can get to 

the bottom of it. I know that we do have a lot of soldiers who are 

injured and incapacitated. And even though they are inactive duty, 

they can go back for combat duty, but you raised some very interesting questions, and I think we need to follow up. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Ms. Fallin. 

Ms. FALLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of questions about the public-private partnerships on the housing. And I 

am pleased that we have made such tremendous progress and are 

working with private sector to create better living conditions for 

our soldiers. So thank you so much for doing that. 
19 

I was reading where the Department of Defense plans to privatize, hopes to have about 87 percent of the family housing units 

privatized, including 188,000 units by 2010. And I have had the opportunity in my state to visit some of the facilities that we have 

had the public-private partnerships in, and my state has been very 

pleased with that in Oklahoma. 

But I want to ask a couple of questions. It has been indicated 

that 36 percent of the awarded privatization projects will have occupancy rates that are below the expectations from some of the 

things I have read. 

And I guess my question is what challenges will that present, 

and how do we plan to address that issue to ensure that we can 

increase those occupancy rates so that we can optimize these facilities and make sure that we are getting people in that need to be 

in there? 

Secretary PENN. Yes, ma’am, let me take a shot at that. We have 

seen some of those reports, and we are working with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and they had one that said that 

36 percent of the occupancy rates were below expectation and more 

recently said it was 29 percent. 

Our data shows 10 percent. We think they are including—if a 

house is occupied we have what we call a waterfall effect. The 

house is available for rent to an active duty member. If no active 

duty member wants the house, then we go down through a waterfall of Reserve members, civilians living on the base until you eventually get to—you can have civilians from the outside come in with 

the proper clearances. 

Early on, we saw rates that were lower than expected because 

the management on the bases didn’t quite understand how that 

worked. That has changed, and what we have seen are occupancy 

rates of 90 percent or greater. 

Within the Navy we were looking at occupancy rates of like 95 

percent. So again we have a disconnect with GAO, that we are trying to figure out where they are getting their numbers from if they 

are not including some of these people. If the house is occupied by 

an active duty member or a DOD civilian, it is still occupied. 

Now the difference between everybody other than an active duty 

military is that they can only do a one-year lease. An active duty 

military person has a lease for as long as they are stationed there. 

So the waterfall effect still protects—while it protects our occupancy, we think we have balanced it to protect our service members. 

Ms. FALLIN. Okay that makes sense. Now let me ask one other 

thing if I can, Mr. Chairman. 

When you think about the housing markets in the United States 

and foreclosure rates and the availability of homes that are on the 

marketplace and even the credit that is available to build facilities, 

how will the financial markets affect the ability for the partnerships to be able to get the credit they need to be able to build these 

housing units? And will the foreclosure rates, the vacant home 

rates affect, I guess, the occupancy and the need? 

Mr. ARNY. We are seeing an effect. Most of our housing projects 

were done prior—I would say the bulk were done prior to the market changing. And we have seen some debt servicing issues. We 
20 

don’t have any. We are still considered a good risk, but we are seeing the fact that our rates aren’t quite as good that we can get. 

So essentially what we are having to do is lengthen the development. We are lengthening the development time in order to accommodate that. We believe we have enough flexibility in there. It is 

not perfect. We liked it when the market was great but we are accommodating that. 

Ms. FALLIN. Okay. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, if I can 

yield the balance of my time to Congressman Fleming? 

Mr. ORTIZ. Go right ahead, no objections. 

Go ahead, sir. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

gentlelady for yielding. My question, I have a very specific question 

to Mr. Calcara. My district, fourth district for Louisiana, is countercyclic to the rest of the country. We have two large bases, 

Barksdale and Fort Polk, and both of them are growing rather than 

declining. And we are real happy about that of course. 

But we do have a problem in Fort Polk. It is doubling in size, 

taking in acreage, and at the same time building up brigade 

strength. And it is surrounded by a rural area, so we have a housing problem there. And so I would like to ask you if you know specifically what your plans are to help solve that? And if not, generally how we are going to attack that problem? 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, we are looking at Fort Polk, and we have 

been. It is not a simple answer from a privatization perspective because of the market issue there. One of the things that we have 

to look at is the ability to work within the authority’s limits on 

cash investment, as well as priority or preferred returns that the 

private sector is now requiring on equity. 

When we originally started this program, payouts in that range 

were in the 5 percent to 10 percent. We are now looking at equity 

premiums in the 16 to 20 range. So as we start paying more for 

private financing, as interest rates creep higher, as the long bond 

grows and spreads against the long bond grow, our ability to make 

privatization work there is limited. 

But we think that is the best solution. We just think the timing 

to do that right now is probably problematic. But we are not ready 

to give up yet. We are looking at it and we will continue to try to 

find a solution for the housing problem there. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Reyes. 

I mean, correction, Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You actually may 

have read my mind because I was going to bring up what Mr. 

Reyes has already spoken about. It is terribly important for readiness purposes, Mr. Chairman, that we have the active cooperation 

of the community surrounding our installations as we attempt to 

grow those installations. 

For example, the local community has to make certain investments in order to meet the needs of the population that is going 

to be brought in. And that is particularly true of parts of our country which are more rural, and an awful lot of our installations are 

located in more rural areas. 
21 

If you are going to increase the size of the force by 3,000 or 4,000 

people that effectively means 5,000 to 10,000 people are coming 

into this rural community. If the rural community does not prepare 

for that at our request, then when those new troops arrive the facilities simply aren’t there to meet their needs, the needs of their 

families, the needs of their children. 

The decision to reduce from 48 to 45 brigades causes a real problem for the communities that surround Fort Stewart, Georgia. This 

is a rural part of the country. Those communities are smaller communities that don’t simply have excess capacity available to meet 

the needs of 3,000 to 10,000 people being brought in by DOD. 

So at DOD’s request, at Army’s request, those communities in- vested north of $450 million getting ready to receive a new brigade, 

and that money is the sort of investment we ask our partner communities to make routinely. 

I think readiness in the future suffers if we don’t live up to our 

end of the bargain. If we don’t live up to our word, to our commitment to these communities, it causes them to reasonably rely on 

our requests. 

And I think we need to seriously look at the decision to reduce 

brigades encouraging the Army and DOD generally to figure out 

what compensating decisions can be made in order to mitigate the 

negative impact of a decision like this? 

Let us assume in fact we are not going to have the additional brigades. The Army nevertheless is not shrinking. It is growing. Certainly we can put warm bodies into Fort Stewart to, you know, basically meet the obligation that we have with those communities 

that have relied upon us in going ahead and meeting our need to 

bring new troops in. 

And Mr. Chairman, I think maybe we need to have some committee report at the very least that directs that something along 

these lines be done. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to 

yield the balance of my time, if there is no objection, to Mr. 

Kratovil from Maryland. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Sure, no objection. 

Go ahead, Mr. Kratovil. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Thank you very much. Thank you for yielding. I 

was recently at Fort Meade in Maryland and toured the installation there and went to some of the housing, the privatized housing, 

which was very impressive. The units were wonderful, had a great 

community room. There were certainly other very nice amenities to 

it. 

I noticed though that the occupancy rates at a lot of these, in a 

lot of the relationships that we have in these housing, privatized 

housing arrangements, are not where they should be, or at least 

where it was expected. 

One, is that true? And two, why is that and what can we do to 

change that? And if we don’t change that, are these private partners going to be able to continue their investment in the long term? 

Secretary PENN. Sir, we don’t see those same low rates, as a matter of fact we have people standing in line. My son just moved into 

the area, and there is a line for Fort Belvoir. So he rented in the 

private sector. And again DOD-wide only 25 percent of our people 

are living on base and 75 percent are living outside. 
22 

We believe there are enough. First of all we don’t have the evidence to show that occupancy rates are low. If they are low then 

the private sector partner is allowed to rent to other than active 

duty military people. He can rent to reservists, to government civilians and eventually he can rent to private citizens. So if there is 

a low occupancy rate we will take a look at it, but there shouldn’t 

be one. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Okay, are there any, go ahead. 

Ms. FERGUSON. If I can answer from the Air Force perspective, 

certainly I don’t have the info on Fort Meade, but what we have 

found in the Air Force is in the initial development period, our occupancy rate is lower there once the developer gets in there and 

they build new houses or renovate houses. And for our last quarter, 

Air Force overall is at 90 percent, which was our highest that we 

have had since 2006. We have continually seen an increase. 

But to also get to your point, as we continue to privatize the remaining bases that we have in the Air Force inventory, we have 

22 bases left to privatize, we are going to go in with lower numbers 

than what we think we need and then build to the higher numbers 

when occupancy dictates it. 

So we are going with a more conservative approach up front 

based on some lessons learned that the Air Force has had in our 

earlier projects. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Okay. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Go ahead. 

Secretary PENN. Sir, you also can’t compare occupancy rate 

under privatized with our own occupancy rate in the old days, because in the old days if a house was taken out for maintenance, 

it wasn’t counted as being occupiable. With the private sector guy, 

if he has an empty house whether it is down for maintenance or— 

it is an empty house so his numbers will be different. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Okay, thank you. I was also recently at a hospital 

in Harford County just outside of Aberdeen, and the hospital was 

saying that, you know, of course there has been a lot of discussion 

in terms of infrastructure related, the roads surrounding the installations and preparing for this growth that, of course, we are very 

happy to have in Maryland. 

But they were saying that in terms of—they are very concerned 

about infrastructure—in terms of health care, to prepare for these 

folks coming. Are you hearing similar concerns at all in terms of 

the communities where you are going? 

Secretary PENN. It depends on which community, but I haven’t 

heard the health care issue other than I have heard some of the 

road issues, especially around the more urban locations at Fort 

Belvoir and stuff, but not around—— 

Mr. KRATOVIL. All right but is that an issue that we considered 

in terms of looking at the growth that is going to occur with the 

changes with BRAC and the consequences of that on these surrounding communities? 

Mr. ORTIZ. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ORTIZ. You were given time from another member so we—— 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Mr. Chairman, I have no time to yield back, and 

please don’t blame me. 
23 

Mr. ORTIZ. We will see if we can have a second round, but I want 

to go back to some of the questions that were asked. You know, I 

have been here and I have gone through, I think, five base closures. 

This last base closure, I was able to see where the base closure 

commission and QDR commission, they were never able to synchronize with one another, and I think this is one of the reasons 

why we are having the problem that we are having today. 

And this is one of the reasons why the local communities are 

going through what we are going through now. We made some horrible mistakes at the expense of local communities, but now I 

would like to yield to Ms. Bordallo, the lady from Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is a 

very important hearing for me and my constituents. To all of our 

witnesses, thank you very much, Secretary Arny, Secretary Penn, 

a most important thank you to you because you have had a real 

leading role in the Guam military buildup, and also to Secretary 

Calcara and Secretary Ferguson. 

I also want to express my general support for the $787 million 

in total military construction funding in the fiscal year 2010 budget 

for all of Guam’s military installations, including the Guam National Guard. 

Secretary Arny, let me start with you. As you know, on April 9th, 

GAO report called on more senior level involvement from the DOD 

to make sure that Guam’s local infrastructure issues were given 

more consideration in the federal budget process. 

Specifically, the report calls for a meeting of the economic adjustment committee (EAC) for executive level coordination with other 

federal agencies. When can we expect the EAC to begin meeting to 

address the Guam build-up and how will Guam’s local infrastructure concerns be addressed? 

Mr. ARNY. Yes, Ms. Bordallo, the economic adjustment committee, we are working to set up a meeting. I don’t have a date at 

this time, but it may not be—with the agencies not having their 

political appointees in place, it may not occur for another couple of 

months. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. As soon as we hear of that date, you 

could correspond with us. 

Secretary Penn, it is very promising to see some $412 million requested for the Navy and Marine Corps construction, as well as 

$259 million for the new hospital on Guam. Obviously, one of the 

impediments to executing these funds that I am confident this Congress will authorize and appropriate for is the completion of the 

draft environmental impact statement (EIS) and the record of decision. 

So, Secretary, can you update the committee on its status and 

when we can expect to see a draft EIS and along these lines? I am 

also interested in learning more about how the department plans 

on using mitigation funding that this Congress authorized in Section 311 of last year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)? 

Can we expect to see roughly five percent to nine percent set 

aside in each MILCON project for such mitigation efforts, and is 

this something that we can count on from DOD? 
24 

Secretary PENN. Ma’am, we hope to get the master plan out so 

we can do the construction. We want to start in fiscal 2010. That 

is our goal and we are—at this plan for the EIS, we are working 

86 different studies to make sure we do Guam right, okay? 

And for saying the mitigation before we completed the studies 

would be very difficult, would not be good on our part. I know I 

specifically talked with the Department of Agriculture yesterday on 

things we can do as far as the mitigation measures are concerned. 

I think we need the analysis completed before we can do the 

mitigation. There will be some that requires a more significant 

amount of funding than others, but until we have that analysis, the 

baseline, I don’t think we can say what a specific percentage would 

be for the mitigation measures. 

We are looking to mitigate all the areas that are impacted. That 

will be done, okay? It is the right thing to do. I mean the law requires it, but it is the right thing to do. So we are not going to destroy anything. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Arny, do you have any comments on that? 

Mr. ARNY. No, I don’t. I am not sure of the section you are referring to, and I would like to get with your staff and figure that out. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Good, all right. I am also concerned about support needed but seemingly absent from DOD for local and federal 

cooperating agencies in the EIS. It is my understanding that some 

lawyers in the department contend the economic act precludes 

DOD from helping to fund cooperating agencies for the Guam military build-up. 

I hope that this can be resolved, especially for our local cooperating agencies that do not have the funds to review the EIS. So 

how can we get it right and done on time if DOD is not fully funding the EIS? 

Can you comment on this matter and how it is being resolved, 

Secretary Penn? 

Secretary PENN. Yes, ma’am, we are fully funding the EIS. The 

EIS is the Department of the Navy (DON) responsibility and that 

is what we are doing. We have brought all of the local agencies in. 

In fact, there is a major—Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

is having a meeting later this month on Saipan looking at all the 

Marianas, and I think Mr. Arny and I both met with EPA Region 

9 last month. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So that, for the record, will be fully funded by 

DOD? 

Secretary PENN. Exactly. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And then I have one last question. Go ahead, Mr. 

Arny. 

Mr. ARNY. You may be referring to requests from Guam EPA for 

funding for them to review. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. 

Mr. ARNY. We are not allowed to fund Guam EPA to review our 

documents in this particular case. This is not like a—we don’t have 

a Defense-State Memorandum of Agreement (DSMOA) to work that 

and I can work with your staff on the details, but I believe the government of Guam says they will review the documents with the 

staff that they have. 
25 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. Mr. Chairman, I have just one question 

and then no second round for me, if you don’t mind? 

Mr. ORTIZ. Make it short because—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. Ms. Ferguson, thank you for your funding for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and 

the STRIKEs, as well as northwest field activities at Anderson Air 

Force Base. 

As you know from past correspondence, I have been concerned 

about the Air Force’s commitment to Anderson’s military construction needs. We don’t see these projects to be overshadowed or unnecessarily compromised due to increased Navy and Marine Corps 

program needs on Guam with the build-up. 

Can we expect similar commitments in future years for Anderson? 

Ms. FERGUSON. As you can tell from the 2010 budget, we have 

one project in there that supports the STRIKE Forward Operating 

Location (FOL) bed-down, as well as three projects that help facilitate the movement of the folks off the Korean Peninsula. 

I can’t comment on any projects that we have beyond fiscal year 

2010 in this session. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right, thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, just to 

you, with recent developments from North Korea and their plans 

to now launch long-range missiles with supposedly Guam as one of 

their targets, it is our responsibility to provide security for the U.S. 

citizens of Guam, so I urge everyone to work together to get this 

military movement right. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

Now, I will yield to Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, in light 

of the fact that I had my question answered, I am going to yield 

the balance of my time to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. ORTIZ. No objection. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr. 

Fleming, appreciate that. 

Mr. Penn, real quickly, did you say that the EIS has been expanded on Guam to include all of the range areas that are necessary to make this thing work? 

Secretary PENN. No, sir, I did not say that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. What did you say? You said the EPA—— 

Secretary PENN. I said we are conducting 86 studies for the current EIS. 

Mr. CONAWAY. You just said you were bringing somebody in to 

talk about the Marianas. 

Secretary PENN. I said EPA is having a meeting on Saipan. I 

think it starts the 22nd of this month, to talk about all the EIS. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. That is unrelated to the work that has to 

be done for that? 

Secretary PENN. Correct, right. 

Mr. CONAWAY. While we are talking about the Guam movement, 

can the Marine Corps waive the flight safety issues at the replacement facility at Schwab? 

Secretary PENN. No, sir, that is not the intent at all. We do not 

intend to do that. 
26 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, how do you intend to make that system 

work? If the Navy is—how are you going to use that facility to replace the Futenma facility if you can’t waive the flight safety issues 

that the Navy has? 

Secretary PENN. I don’t know what specific flight safety issues 

you are referring to, but with aircraft there are many, many things 

you can do to mitigate, everything from reducing the weight, operating at different temperatures, all those things that are always 

done on a daily basis. 

In the pilot’s pocket checklist, before I would launch, except from 

a carrier, I would go through and check my outside air temperature 

and—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, wait, yes, but that—— 

Secretary PENN [continuing]. And weight and everything and 

that is how you mitigate it. You can go down 1,000 pounds and get 

within limits. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Secretary PENN. We are not going to violate safety. We are not 

going to bend any safety rules at all to operate out of the field. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Is this like a boxing match with one hand 

in your pocket? 

Mr. ARNY. No, sir. 

Secretary PENN. I don’t think so. 

Mr. ARNY. The Pacific commander has said, with the length of 

the runway and the length of the overruns required, that they can 

meet all their operational requirements, and the Marine Corps has 

agreed with that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay, so the Navy will certify that is a safe air 

place. 

Secretary PENN. Yes. 

Mr. ARNY. There is one—there may be some need for waivers in 

terms of, frankly, every field we have in America has waivers, but 

we will make sure they are mitigated or taken out or that we all 

agree that the risk is minimal. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay, and then we can reduce the capacity of 

what we are trying to do, to get under those guidelines. Okay. 

You know, construction budgets fluctuate, unlike say a personnel 

line where that is going to be pretty consistent, so going up and 

going down is not automatically a flag. 

Mr. Arny, how do you look at system-wide—Mr. Calcara mentioned some of the requests being met is a better indicator, versus 

just simply the budget number changing. 

How does the system look at system-wide construction needs to 

say, you know, what percentage of those needs are being funded rationally and, I mean, how do you look at your overall plan for deploying all these scarce resources against a spectacular array of 

needs? 

Mr. ARNY. Well, what Mr. Calcara is referring to is that the 

Guard budget in particular, that Congress is grateful and—or we 

are grateful to Congress because they will usually add to that request, so we measure it from what we requested the year before, 

not from where Congress appropriated. 

On the overall budget, we do look at it from year-to-year, which 

is one of the reasons we are trying to go to this Q rating, so that 
27 

we have a measure of what buildings need to be replaced and when 

they need to be replaced. 

Part of the budget is also for new aircraft, new ships, new tanks 

and the facilities that go with that. And we rely on the services— 

we obviously rely on the services to meet their operational need 

and then we oversee it and make sure it is there. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Did you just tell us that you intentionally underbudget because you know that Congress is going to add money on 

top of it? 

Mr. ARNY. No, sir. We compare our budgets to what we requested—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. But let us just—earlier you—— 

Mr. ARNY. Just for the Guard. For the Guard part of it we compare our request for 2010 for instance to our request for 2009. We 

believe that fills the needs. If Congress adds things on that makes 

us—that Guard budget—puts it in better shape. We believe that 

the request will satisfy our needs. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay, but you are counting on Congress plussing 

that up? 

Mr. ARNY. No, sir, we aren’t. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right, just making sure I hadn’t misunderstood 

that. 

Mr. Calcara, the Army has got five million acres short of places 

to run tanks and helicopters and all that kind of stuff. You dropped 

the request at Pin ̃ on Canyon from 400,000 to 100,000. How are we 

going to keep training the kids we need to train with this kind of 

a shortfall? 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, the shortfall was there. It has been validated 

through, you know, GAO and how we doctrinally compute it. In the 

short term, our position is to only acquire property in areas where 

the local delegation isn’t supporting us. 

In the case of Pin ̃ on Canyon, the mitigations are on battle mixes, 

on configurations, on tempo. We are still accomplishing a lot of 

training at Pin ̃ on Canyon. The question is how efficient and effective could we get by acquiring more training? 

As communications systems develop, as unmanned vehicles develop, we require more physical square footage to really, truly test 

those types of equipment. 

We are compromising some of that, obviously, with a reduced 

footprint, but we are still training there and there are 

workarounds. We just continue to work at it. We think we had a 

plausible strategy for Pin ̃ on Canyon. We had a willing seller at one 

point who changed course on us. We are going to continue to work 

it hard. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Loebsack. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to thank all 

of you on the panel for being here today and for your service to our 

country. And I am very glad and very relieved to see that the three 

remaining BRAC 2005 sites in Iowa are in fact funded in this 

budget request for 2010. 

Those three, of course, are Iowa National Guard Reserve Centers 

in Cedar Rapids, Middletown and Muscatine. Those facilities were 

constructed in 1916, 1950, and 1973, respectively, and are less than 
28 

the current authorized size for such structures. And improvements 

to these buildings will enhance training, recruitment and retention. 

And I think, in particular, in light of the increased role that our 

National Guard Reserve components have been playing overseas in 

our two conflicts, and potentially in conflicts down the line. 

I am also very glad to see the funding is included for equipment 

infrastructure modernization at the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant 

that is near Burlington, Iowa. 

Most of the infrastructure at that plant, and I toured that plant, 

is over 60 years old and requires significant modernization in order 

to assure the safety of our workers, continuity of operations and 

timely delivery to our service members. 

I just have two questions related to these two issues. I understand that funding for the Muscatine Reserve Center may be 

moved up to 2009. A decision may be coming soon. Could either of 

you, either Secretary Calcara or Secretary Arny, address yourself 

to that question? 

Mr. CALCARA. Yes, we currently have Muscatine tracking at 

about $8.8 million in total program. We are experiencing some savings in projects as we are opening bids. Our intent would be, you 

know, once we think we have got past the lion’s share of the program to try to pull some projects forward. 

I would tell you it would probably be in the next 30 to 45 days 

where we would make that decision. We would like to get that one 

in at $9 million if we could. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay, thank you. And then my second question 

has to do with not just the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, but 

plants like it in general. There appears to be perhaps inattention 

to the deteriorating infrastructure of Army ammunition plants including the Army ammunition plant in Iowa. 

Can you highlight how this budget supports modernization of infrastructure at these facilities including security for example, and 

also energy efficiency enhancements? Does the Army or does DOD 

have a long-term plan to address these issues? And either one of 

you or both of you can speak to that issue. 

Mr. ARNY. Over a long-term basis we used to look at sustainment 

rates of 70, 75 percent. We are now at 90 percent. We would like 

to go to 100 if the budget would allow. We are also looking at developing this Q rating plan which will allow us to better measure 

the condition of our facilities. 

And then we will be able to defend ourselves in the MILCON 

world against the procurement folks to say, ‘‘Look, if you want a 

Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Army that is capable, you have got 

to expend this much money.’’ 

We were also beneficiaries this year of the stimulus funds so we 

got an additional $7.4 billion. And also in the 2010 budget we were 

able to sustain our sustainment funding in the latest budget round, 

so we are doing much better, and we have a better long-term way 

to do it. It is not there yet, but it is much better than we have done 

over the past 10 to 15 years. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you very much, and I will yield back the 

balance of my time, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. 
29 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

panel for being here today. Mr. Arny, I am concerned, and I am 

going to ask for your personal oversight on the transfer of the property at Roosevelt Roads. 

I think that all of our Defense Department has a bad habit of 

buying high and selling low, and I think again it is whether it is 

on paying too much for ships or aircraft or taking things that are 

of substantial value and selling it for less than they are worth, we 

have got to do a better job. 

I am going to give you a for instance that I still haven’t had an 

adequate response on. In my congressional district in Gulfport, 

Mississippi, Navy Retirement Home purchased 10 acres of land 

with 2 homes on it. One of the homes had a pool with riparian 

rights, which means it had access to build a pier out in the Gulf 

of Mexico. 

They purchased that 10 acres in 2003 for $5.7 million. In less 

than 12 months they sold off the 2 homes, the swimming pool and 

the riparian rights for less than $1 million. So that means you paid 

$570,000 for acreage timber that you could not access from the 

road, which you turned around and sold 2 homes and 3.4 acres for 

an average of $280,000 an acre. 

That is a bad deal. That is a terrible deal for the taxpayer, and 

quite frankly, I believe something is rotten there. I think somebody 

in your system gave away, literally gave away a public resource. 

Now the reason I say that is number one, I want that looked into. 

That is in my own congressional district, but I want it looked into. 

I don’t want to see that happen. I had visited Roosevelt Roads 

on several occasions. That is a phenomenal piece of property. I realize the market right now for real estate is at an all time low so 

the first question is do we want to be selling this phenomenal piece 

of property when the market is terrible, or do we want to wait a 

few years and get an actual value for that property when the economy recovers, and I believe it will. 

Has anyone given any thought to that? And the other perfect example I will give is in our quest to balance the budget, around 

2004, 2005—I am sorry. Yes, in our quest to balance the budget 

during the Clinton years, shortly after the 1994 election, we sold 

off the oil shale reserves when the price of oil was at $11 a barrel. 

What did it reach last summer, almost $150? So again, there is 

a pattern here where we are not being good stewards. We are in 

a rush to make this year’s books look good. We do a very poor job 

long term, and I am curious what is going to be done to kind of 

change that mentality so we try to buy things for the best price 

and sell things at the best price for the taxpayer. 

Mr. ARNY. Mr. Taylor, I agree with you completely. Let me mention in the Mississippi situation. A year or so ago you had raised 

this, and I put it in the system. I don’t believe that the home falls 

under DOD anymore, and I am not sure. I was in Navy for six 

years. That never came under our purview. 

I think it is a separate management. When I was at OMB in the 

mid-1980s, late 1980s, the various homes were separate agencies 

from DOD. They were not controlled by DOD. 
30 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Arny, again, I remember the funds collected 

from soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines fund that, so I think 

that was very much a DOD nexus. 

Mr. ARNY. Yes, sir, and again, but it is not something that—it 

is a separate little agency if I recall, and I read the articles, and 

I agree with you that that should be investigated. 

Second, on Roosevelt Roads, if it were, and I did base closure for 

Mr. Penn, if you will recall 4 or 5 years ago, we sold several bases 

in California and brought in over $1.1 billion in revenue that then 

we used to monetize cleanup. 

That is the position the department prefers to be in where land 

has real value. We would like to have the flexibility to be able to 

sell what the community doesn’t need in terms of direct economic 

development conveyances. 

However, as you well know, we are frequently pressured, as we 

are being again this year, to give things away for nothing, so I 

would argue that if you leave—the services have now plenty of 

tools in their toolbox to provide benefit to the communities, and to 

provide value back to the taxpayers of the country where land is 

valuable. 

And they also have the ability to wait to sell if they are not pressured to change their rules now. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, again, I want to get it on your radar screen 

because I hope someone, before a contract is let, is going to look 

at that and say wait a minute. Is that a fair price for the taxpayers, and shouldn’t we just wait a little while until the market 

recovers? 

You sold that property in California when the market was red 

hot. That was a smart move, but I would certainly hope that someone is going to take the time to make sure that what we get should 

it be sold is at a fair price to the taxpayers. 

Mr. ARNY. Well there are measures, I am told, that will be in 

your bill that will demand that we do no cost transfers. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Kratovil. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for going 

over my initial time. I was so excited to be able to ask a question 

I couldn’t contain myself, so thank you. Sort of a general question, 

can any of you discuss—I guess Mr. Arny, the progress in the realignment process of Walter Reed to the Naval Bethesda Hospital. 

Mr. ARNY. Yes, sir, I can’t give you all the details, but it is on 

track. The construction is underway. We have a plan that will be 

complete on time and the facilities will be there. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. So as of right now, it is on track and we anticipate that it will be completed as scheduled? 

Mr. ARNY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. All right, Fort Meade’s Warrior Transition Unit 

right now is about—my understanding is it is at about 150? My understanding is there hasn’t been any decision as to whether or not 

that is going to be a permanent unit, apparently still pending. 

The concern that I have is that those numbers are continuing to 

grow and without a final determination, the resources necessary to 

deal with that growth are not forthcoming. My question is, assuming until that decision is made, assuming the unit remains at that 
31 

level or continues to grow, can Fort Meade count of the resources 

necessary to deal with it? 

Mr. ARNY. We have Warrior Transition Units all over the Army, 

and I think our strategy is to meet surges and spikes where we 

have capabilities for care. In the Fort Meade situation we are monitoring it closely. 

The center was sized based on the best information available. 

The best I could tell you is I don’t have any reports that it is undersized or they are experiencing any difficulties at this time. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. My understanding was that the estimates were 

around 80, and now it is about 150, and it is continuing. The expectations are, because I was just there, are continuing to grow, and 

again my concern is at the same time we are having these units 

to provide obviously necessary resources, we are going to set ourselves up for failure if we don’t have the resources in the places 

where we are sending these soldiers. 

So it is something I would like to ask you to keep an eye on, particularly as it relates to Fort Meade. 

Mr. ARNY. We will, and again, we are applying an enterprise concept for Wounded Warrior Units looking across the Army where capacity exists. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Kissell. 

You know, going back to what the Navy buys and sells, without 

having to mention any service at all, we have a piece of land in my 

district that they could have bought for about $700,000 but they 

waited and waited and waited and waited. 

When they came back, now they are going to have to pay $11 to $12 million or more. So this is why some of the members are disturbed and rightly so, you know? I mean to us, taxpayers’ money 

is very sacred, and I don’t have to mention the agency’s name. I 

think some of you know who I am talking about, but anyway we 

are going to have votes in a few minutes. 

We are going to have about 5 votes, which means that if we don’t 

finish our questions you guys will have to stay here for the next 

45 minutes to an hour, and we are not going to punish you like 

that. 

So I just have one last question for my good friend Secretary 

Arny. This round of BRAC wasn’t like any previous round, and the 

implementation of the BRAC commission recommendations were 

complex and interrelated. Is the department going to complete all 

the realignment proposed by the BRAC commission by September 

2011? 

If so, what extraordinary measures will the department adopt to 

meet this deadline? Maybe you can clue us, are you going to be 

able to meet this deadline? 

Mr. ARNY. Yes, sir, we are going to meet that deadline, and I, 

you know, in our House Appropriations Committee (HAC) MILCON 

hearing, you know, all the services agree. We are all on track. We 

are going to meet it. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I know you for a long time. I trust you. 

Mr. ARNY. Okay. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Hearing no further questions, this has been a very 

good hearing, and you can understand the concerns of the com-
32 

mittee and their interest as to why they ask some of these questions, but thank you so much for your service. 

Thank you so much for joining us today, and hearing no further 

questions, this hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 3, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 3, 2009 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JUNE 3, 2009 

(143) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Secretary PENN. During the Navy’s Strategic Laydown and Dispersal review, the 

Navy Staff’s Operations, Plans, and Strategy directorate (OPNAV N3N5) considered 

a variety of factors for various homeports including port force protection postures 

and risk mitigation measures. The analysis of East Coast strategic dispersal of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers was informed by referencing the following threat and 

vulnerability documents: 

a. Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) on Naval Station Norfolk initiated by the Joint Staff and conducted by a team of seven specialists 

from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 6–11 August 2006. 

b. Chief of Naval Operations Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (CNOIVA) for 

Naval Station Mayport conducted by NCIS from 21–26 January 2007. 

c. ‘‘Port Threat Assessment: Sector Hampton Roads’’ conducted by the USCG 

dated 17 May 2007. 

d. ‘‘Port Threat Assessment: Sector Jacksonville’’ conducted by the USCG dated 28 

June 2006. 

e. Southeast Virginia Threat Assessment conducted by NCIS dated 27 August 

2008 and 10 October 2008. 

f. Mayport, Florida Threat Assessment conducted by NCIS dated 30 May 2008. 

g. Jacksonville, Florida Threat Assessment conducted by NCIS dated 3 October 

2008. 

h. ‘‘Domestic Maritime Domain Terrorist Threat Assessment’’ and ‘‘Domestic Maritime Domain Terrorist Threat Assessment (Update)’’ conducted by the FBI 

dated 28 March 2008 and 17 April 2008 respectively. 

i. ‘‘Homeland Security Threat Assessment: Evaluating Threats 2008–2013’’ conducted by the Department of Homeland Security dated 18 July 2008. 

j. ‘‘The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Maritime Domain’’ conducted by the USCG 

dated 25 March 2004. 

k. ‘‘The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland’’ conducted by the Director of National Intelligence dated July 2007. 

Most of these documents are classified but can be provided via the appropriate 

channels, if required. The documents were cited in briefs to Navy leadership during 

the Strategic Laydown and Dispersal decision process. 

The decision to create the capacity to homeport a CVN at NAVSTA Mayport represents the best military judgment of the DON’s leadership regarding strategic considerations. The need to develop a hedge against the potentially crippling results of 

a catastrophic event was ultimately the determining factor in the decision to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport. The consolidation of CVN capabilities in the Hampton Roads area on the East Coast presents a unique set of risks. 

CVNs assigned to the West Coast are spread among three homeports. Maintenance 

and repair infrastructure exists at three locations as well. As a result, there are 

strategic options available to Pacific Fleet CVNs if a catastrophic event occurs. By 

contrast, NAVSTA Norfolk is homeport to all five of the CVNs assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and the Hampton Roads area is the only East Coast location where 

CVN maintenance and repair infrastructure exists. The Hampton Roads area also 

houses all Atlantic Fleet trained crews and associated community support infrastructure. A second CVN homeport on the East Coast will provide additional CVN 

maintenance infrastructure and provide strategic options in case of a catastrophic 

event in the Hampton Roads area. [See page 14.] 

Secretary PENN. The risk assessments for both Norfolk and Mayport are classified. These documents were used by the OPNAV N3N5 staff during the Strategic 

Laydown and Dispersal review. 

The list of risk assessments was previously provided in response to a HASC Department of Defense Priorities hearing held on 27 Jan 09. Since then, there have 

been two new assessments for the Hampton Roads area: 
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(1) CNO Integrated Vulnerability Assessment for Norfolk, Virginia dated 11 May 

2009, classified. 

(2) Southeast Virginia Threat Assessment produced by NCIS dated 17 Jun 2009 

concerning the terrorist threat in the SE Virginia area, classified. 

The information in these reports does not significantly differ from previous reports, nor do they change the strategic impact to naval forces if the Hampton Roads 

area was closed by a catastrophic event. [See page 15.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL 

Ms. FERGUSON. There are currently no Air Force specific General Officer positions 

at Ft. Bragg, but we will continue to support the Air Force general presently assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command position at that location. [See page 

17.] 

Mr. CALCARA. The Army is not aware of any issues. [See page 17.] 

Secretary PENN. There are no Department of the Navy Flag or General Officers 

relocating to Fort Bragg because of BRAC. [See page 17.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 3, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Department has indicated that several basing initiatives have 

been included in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) including Marine Corps 

training requirements associated with Guam, nuclear aircraft carrier basing on the 

East Coast, and Brigade Combat Team retention in the European theater. 

In your estimation, how likely is it that the QDR will be able to make these explicit decisions in time to include the responses in the fiscal year 2011 budget submission? 

Mr. ARNY. The QDR process timeline was established to ensure integration with 

the FY 2011 budget cycle. To date, QDR activities are on track for completion within 

the specified milestone schedule. I have no reason to believe that QDR will not proceed as planned in order to inform the FY 2011 budget submission. However, some 

issues will require additional analysis which will defer budget details to the FY 

2012 submission. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The BRAC 2005 process requires the Department of Defense to complete associated realignments and closures by September 2011. 

Does the Department need additional flexibility in schedule to accomplish the 

BRAC 2005 timeline? 

Mr. ARNY. No. The Department does not need additional flexibility and is on track 

to implement all BRAC 2005 recommendations prior to the September 15, 2011 statutory deadline. To ensure BRAC is fully implemented in accordance with statutory 

requirements, the Department assesses status of each recommendation during an 

annual Integrated Program and Budget Review. The Department recognizes the 

unique challenges associated with implementing the more complex recommendations and the synchronization efforts required to manage the interdependencies 

among many recommendations. To apprise senior leadership of problems requiring 

intervention as early as possible, the Department institutionalized an implementation execution update briefing program in November 2008. These update briefings, 

representing 83 percent of the investment value of all recommendations, provide an 

excellent forum for managers to review progress. The business managers have and 

will continue to brief the status of implementation actions associated with recommendations exceeding $100M on a continuing basis through statutory completion 

of all recommendations (September 15, 2011). 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the Department assess the strategic risk of moving a significant amount of the Department’s command structure concurrently in fiscal year 

2011? 

Mr. ARNY. The Department, specifically the Army, has not identified any strategic 

risks with moving a significant amount of the Army’s command structure concurrently in 2011. 

The Army employs a doctrinal concept of echeloned displacement when moving its 

command and control headquarters in order to ensure continuity of mission performance. Normally, a headquarters divides into two functional elements (base and 

advance). While the base element continues to operate, the advance element displaces to a new site where, after it becomes operational, it is joined by the base element. 

Three Army Commands (ACOMs) will experience the largest impact: U.S. Army 

Forces Command (FORSCOM) to Fort Bragg, NC; Army Materiel Command (AMC) 

to Redstone Arsenal, AL; and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to Fort 

Eustis, VA. All three ACOMs have planned the initial relocation of the advanced 

elements at different times, beginning in FY 2010, and all three base elements join 

up with their respective advanced elements prior to 15 Sep 2011. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the Department attribute the doubling of costs associated 

with BRAC 2005 implementation from the fiscal year 2006 submission? 

Mr. ARNY. The BRAC 2005 program has seen a $14.9B (71%) cost increase over 

the initial cost estimate ($21.1B). This increase represents the combined impact of 

multiple factors, many of which were not included in the cost estimating model 

(‘‘COBRA’’). These factors include: inflation; changes in military construction, environmental restoration and program management costs not included in COBRA; additional Operation and Maintenance to support fact of life cost increases; and con-
148 

struction of additional facilities to enhance capabilities and/or address deficiencies. 

This last item—increasing the scope above the initial plan—accounts for the overwhelming majority of the increase. 

Mr. ORTIZ. DOD has indicated full funding for sustainment is its goal. OSD has 

proposed 90 percent funding of the sustainment account in fiscal year 2010. 

Does OSD believe that the sustainment model accurately forecasts sustainment 

requirements? 

Mr. ARNY. Yes. The Facility Sustainment Model (FSM) is a cost estimating tool 

that planners use to estimate future budget requirements for managing the maintenance and repair of the portfolio of facilities under their stewardship. 

The Department began developing the FSM in 1999/2000 and published for use 

in 2001 to support development of the 2003 budget request. 

The FSM calculates the theoretical annual sustainment requirement for each facility in the official DoD Real Property Inventory (RPI) based on the type of facility 

(i.e., the Facility Analysis Category—FAC), the physical size of the facility (e.g., the 

facility square footage), and the sustainment cost factor for that type of facility (e.g., 

cost per square foot for a FAC). The model is derived from data from the private 

sector and assumes that all facilities are new. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Considering the long-term detrimental effects of not fully funding 

sustainment, what is the risk associated with accelerated deterioration? 

Mr. ARNY. The risks associated with underfunding sustainment translates into increased future repair costs and longer outages to make the repairs. Deterioration 

that is not addressed results in reduced service life of the asset and may lead to 

failure to fully support military readiness. Structural deterioration, penetrations in 

the building envelope that allow water intrusion, and aging service systems (e.g., 

electrical or fire protection) each pose life/safety concerns. Each structure, component, pavement, utility, etc. has its own set of specific risks, including the following 

representative examples: 

• Roofs that are not maintained or replaced as scheduled develop leaks. Water 

intrusion into interior building spaces, which can often go undetected for a long 

period of time, creates additional damage to interior finishes and potentially to 

structural members which significantly increases the future repair bill beyond 

the scope of a roof replacement. Additionally, storm water on the interior of 

buildings creates hazardous conditions for occupants. 

• Pavement crack sealing and surface rejuvenation helps prevent potholes. When 

this maintenance is not performed, it leads to road base deterioration and ultimately reduces the service life of the pavement. The future costs to rebuild road 

pavements far exceed the cost to provide preventive maintenance to the existing 

surface. 

• Concrete spalling on runways and aircraft parking aprons create conditions for 

foreign object debris (FOD), which can cause damage when sucked into aircraft 

jet engines or when blown out of an engine into other aircraft or airfield operators. Aircraft must be hauled by tugs over concrete surfaces that have not been 

maintained to minimize the risk of causing injury to personnel or equipment, 

adversely impacting military readiness. 

• Buildings with aging building service systems (e.g., heating, ventilation, cooling) 

create poor work environments which impact morale, work place efficiencies, 

and even the health of building occupants. 

In conclusion, underfunded sustainment budgets lead to increased requirements 

for more comprehensive repairs in the restoration and modernization budgets and, 

if the repairs are neglected, to increased military construction requirements for replacement structures. 

Mr. ORTIZ. DOD is on track to privatize 87 percent of the family housing units, 

including 188,000 units by 2010. 

Considering that 36 percent of the awarded privatization projects have occupancy 

rates below expectations, are the housing private partners going to be able to continue the long-term investment and financial solvency to continue this program? 

What are the challenges that need to be corrected? 

Mr. ARNY. The 36 percent figure represents a 2006 GAO report. A newer 2008 

GAO report indicates the number has decreased to 22 projects (24 percent). The 

large majority of projects in the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) 

portfolio are only marginally below 90 percent and financial solvency and long-term 

investment is not an issue as Debt Service Coverage Ratios (DCRs) generally remain strong. The occupancy rate of the overall MHPI portfolio in the December 2008 

Program Evaluation Plan is 92 percent. 
149 

Mr. ORTIZ. Compared with the larger outlays required in our personnel accounts 

to support Family Housing Privatization, is the overall Family Housing program 

saving money or has it just moved money from a discretionary account to a mandatory funding account? 

Mr. ARNY. In the long term, the costs for privatized housing are estimated to be 

roughly 10 percent less than the costs to housing owned by the government. Privatization ensures that the sustainment funding is made to properly maintain the 

housing. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Does privatization mask the overall cost afforded to general/flag officer 

quarters? 

Mr. ARNY. No. Such quarters, commonly referred to as executive homes under privatization, are revitalized and sustained in the same manner as ordinary privatized 

family homes. Because private costs incurred for executive homes directly reduce 

funds available for other houses, there may be a greater constraint on spending. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the impact of a deteriorating credit market on the Public Private Venture program? 

Mr. ARNY. As would be expected, the stagnation in the housing and overall financial markets has had an impact on the MHPI program. Market forces have led to 

increased costs and tightening of credit standards. Credit spreads relative to the 

LIBOR (London Inter-bank Offered Rate) index are now as much as 300–400 basis 

points as opposed to 100–150 basis points previously. Additionally, Debt Coverage 

Service Ratios (DCSR) are now commonly required to be in the 1.4 to 1.5 range 

versus 1.15 to 1.2 used for earlier projects. 

This is not a reflection of distrust in MHPI projects but simply a lack of liquidity 

in the market as a whole. Financial institutions recognize that MHPI projects continue to have high occupancy and strong operation and maintenance performance 

while continuing to execute their renovation and new construction schedules. While 

our 94 existing projects are operating normally, finding financing for new projects 

presents unique challenges. 

Previous tools such as bond insurance and Guaranteed Investment Contracts 

(GICs) have all but disappeared. We continue to work closely with private markets 

to ensure that our excellent track record puts us at the head of the line when market liquidity returns. Additionally, we are looking at uses of our authorities to replace financial products which have disappeared from the market. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Army has programmed $11.2 billion for the Grow-the-Army initia- tive and has proposed $4.2 billion in fiscal year 2009 military construction and $1.3 

billion in fiscal year 2010. This military construction investment was based on a 

proposal to increase the force structure to include 48 Brigade Combat Teams. Secretary Gates recently announced that the Army will grow to only 45 Brigade Combat Teams, causing a misalignment in the proposed infrastructure. 

Where will the reduction in three Brigade Combat Teams occur? 

Mr. CALCARA. The Brigade Combat Teams will be reduced by one each at Forts 

Carson, Stewart, and Bliss. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Considering the change in the overall force posture of the Army to 45 

Brigade Combat Teams, what fiscal year 2009/fiscal year 2010 military construction 

projects are misaligned to support the future force? 

Mr. CALCARA. The Army is currently conducting a gap analysis to determine this 

and will provide results to committee staff prior to conference. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Considering the Army end strength to support Grow the Army has not 

changed, what additional Combat Support/Combat Service Support elements are required to support the Grow-the-Army initiative? Where will these additional elements be homebased? 

Mr. CALCARA. The Army does not intend to build additional Combat Support/Combat Service Support elements to support the Grow the Army Initiative. Due to wartime operational demands, the Army has more requirements for Soldiers than the 

Active Component 547,400 Army can fill. By removing three Brigade Combat Teams 

(BCTs) from the program in fiscal year 2011, the Army is estimating the removal 

of approximately 10,300 requirements, allowing those associated Soldiers to be used 

to offset requirements existing elsewhere in the force. In fiscal year 2011, this will 

allow the Army to improve manning levels of next-to-deploy units much sooner than 

we are able. These three BCTs do not exist until fiscal year 2011, and any savings 

from their removal cannot be used to improve manning fill in the near term. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Army has reported that it has 10,000,000 square feet of 

relocatable space to support end-strength growth. 

What is the Army’s plan to discourage future use of relocatable spaces? 

Mr. CALCARA. Garrison Commanders are cautioned to use the relocatable authority only as a last resort. Relocatable buildings will be used at about a 50 percent 

ratio to their real property counterparts except for certain types of uses such as bar-
150 

racks and medical facilities. The Army must use the relocatable authority wisely to 

bridge the gap between mission requirements and availability of real property facilities. The Army is to look at alternate options to provide the needed space. The order 

of precedence is full utilization of available real property, including World War II 

wooden structures where economic considerations and good engineering judgment 

dictate, construction of temporary facilities when the total funded cost does not exceed $750,000, and short-term leased space off post. The last option is to use 

relocatable buildings. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the Army intend to address the 10,000,000 square feet of 

existing relocatable, temporary space at various Army installations? 

Mr. CALCARA. The Army is moving aggressively to eliminate the need for 

relocatable buildings. Over the next two years, 16 percent of the relocatable inventory will be replaced with permanent military construction (MILCON) projects currently under construction. We anticipate an additional 66 percent will be replaced 

with MILCON projects by fiscal year 2015, 13 percent are awaiting programming, 

and the remaining 5 percent satisfy temporary surge requirements and do not require permanent construction. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Army has reported that it has a 5,000,000-acre training deficit 

across multiple installations. 

How does the Army intend to address the existing deficit in training space? 

Mr. CALCARA. The purpose of the Department of the Army’s Range and Training 

Land Strategy (RTLS) is to address the existing land deficit in training space facing 

the Army. The RTLS prioritizes Army training land investments and optimizes the 

use of all Army range and training land assets. The RTLS also provides a longrange plan for the Army to provide the best range infrastructure and training land 

to units. 

The RTLS was developed in five phases. The first phase was to inventory current 

Army training assets. The second phase examined land values, parcel ownership, 

environmental constraints, environmental requirements, and population trends from 

public records to identify the best opportunities for training land acquisition and 

buffering. The third phase analyzed available land data to recommend short-term 

and long-term opportunities based on Army priorities. The RTLS process is designed 

to ensure that Army planners continually reevaluate land requirements against the 

Army Campaign Plan (ACP) and current Army priorities. The fourth phase was the 

establishment of planning objectives and the identification of installations where 

land acquisition supports the ACP. The fifth and final phase was to evaluate public 

attitudes and provide outreach support for specific land acquisitions. 

The deliberate phases of the RTLS provide the framework for the Army to select 

the most appropriate course of action to address training land shortfalls at specific 

Army installations. The options that the Army can pursue to overcome the 4.5 million acre training land deficit include: focused management to maximize existing 

land holdings, buffering through partnerships, utilization of other Federal lands 

where possible, and land acquisition. 

Mr. ORTIZ. If the Army is unable to acquire the documented deficit in real estate, 

will this adversely impact military readiness? How? 

Mr. CALCARA. If the Army is not able to address the documented deficit in real 

estate through the Range and Training Land Strategy (RTLS), there will be impacts 

to training capability. Commanders may have to employ work-arounds to accomplish 

required training events. While work-arounds can be successfully employed to address some training capability shortfalls, long-term use of major work-arounds can 

have a negative impact on training and unit capability. Significant training land 

shortfalls require units, particularly at the brigade level, to develop work-arounds 

that train units without stressing their full operational capability. This creates the 

risk of developing bad habits in training and imbeds false expectations as to true 

battlefield conditions. 

Army training standards are based on lessons learned in combat and tactical wisdom purchased at great human cost. Every work-around is essentially a trade-off 

that makes training less realistic than the conditions they will face in a combat situation. This is a particularly significant challenge with respect to operating over 

large operational areas, employing manned and unmanned aviation, conducting logistics operations, and using state-of-the-art communication and intelligence collection and dissemination systems that require unfettered access to the electro-magnetic spectrum. 

Training capability will be impacted if the Army is unable to address training 

land shortfalls. Unit training readiness levels are determined by commanders. Each 

commander must assess the degree to which work-arounds affect the unit’s operational capability. 
151 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Army initially indicated that it intended to acquire more than 

400,000 acres of land to support the existing Pin ̃ on Canyon range. The Army has 

since reduced its requirements to 100,000 acres. 

Why has the Department vacillated on the acreage required to support training 

in southeastern Colorado? 

Mr. CALCARA. The Army’s doctrinally based requirement for at least 418,577 additional acres of training land has never been reduced, and was not challenged or 

questioned in the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report GAO–09– 

171. In May 2006, Fort Carson’s Department of the Army-approved Land Use Requirements Study (LURS) validated the need for an additional 418,577 acres of 

training land at Pin ̃ on Canyon Maneuver Site (PCMS) to support training for Soldiers stationed at Fort Carson. In February 2007, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approved the Army’s request for a waiver to pursue land acquisition 

for up to 418,577 acres at PCMS. The LURS and OSD approval were completed before the Grow the Army decision was complete. 

At the request of Congress, the Army conducted additional review and analysis 

of the feasibility of acquiring 418,577 acres and determined that an acquisition of 

100,000 acres was feasible and would provide the greatest training benefit, at the 

lowest cost, the lowest acreage footprint, and with the fewest number of affected 

landowners and communities. While the acquisition of 100,000 acres, alone, addresses less than one-quarter of the doctrinal requirement to fulfill the training land 

shortfall at Fort Carson/PCMS, it would provide operational benefits and enhanced 

training for Soldiers and units stationed at Fort Carson. If combined with the existing PCMS acreage, this expanded training area would significantly enhance the 

Army’s overall capability for maneuver training. Specifically, this area would provide sufficient space to allow a Heavy Brigade Combat Team and an Infantry Brigade Combat Team to conduct simultaneous combat training at PCMS. 

Mr. ORTIZ. If the Department is unable to acquire additional land in the Pin ̃ on Canyon region, will this adversely impact the stationing plan at Fort Carson? 

Mr. CALCARA. The Grow the Army (GTA) Stationing Plan, published in 2007, directed the stationing of two Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) at Fort Carson. This decision was based on a stationing analysis and environmental assessment 

that analyzed growth capacity, power projection, training and well-being. The Army 

has a shortfall of training and maneuver land based on doctrinal and operational 

requirements, totaling approximately 4.5 million acres in the United States. In fact, 

almost every U.S.-based installation has a shortfall in maneuver training land. 

However, most installations experiencing training land shortfalls do not have any 

feasible opportunity to rectify the situation through land acquisition. Encroachment 

at most installations has created population densities, environmental issues, and escalating land values, rendering significant land acquisition efforts impossible. Fort 

Carson/Pin ̃ on Canyon Maneuver Site (PCMS) is one of the very few feasible opportunities the Army will ever have to address this issue through land acquisition. 

The shortfall in maneuver training land at Fort Carson/PCMS (as well as at other 

installations) has forced the Army to alter its training by utilizing work-arounds 

that change the exercises and scenarios in ways that make them less realistic. In 

short, these work-arounds do not stress units to their full operational capabilities, 

and run the risk of providing false expectations for units when they experience real 

combat. 

Because the land acquisition process often takes many years to complete, and because of the need to complete the Grow the Army Stationing Plan in the shortest 

possible time, the Army made a decision not to link additional land at Pin ̃ on Canyon, with additional GTA BCTs. 

Prior to the GTA stationing decision, Fort Carson had a validated requirement 

shortfall of maneuver training land of approximately 418,000 acres. Stationing BCT 

#47 would have exacerbated the shortfall to over 500,000 acres. The cancellation of 

BCT #47 brings the shortfall back to approximately 418,000 acres. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Please explain how the Department is planning to acquire land and 

specifically, how eminent domain is planning to be used. 

Mr. CALCARA. In some circumstances, the Army will pursue the purchase of land 

to mitigate training land deficiencies. The current Army position is to purchase land 

only where it is feasible, operationally sound, and compatible with environmental 

conditions and requirements. Additionally, there are no current plans to use eminent domain condemnation authority to acquire land from unwilling property owners. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Marine Corps has requested $1.2 billion in the budget request for 

2010 to support an end strength increase of 27,000 marines. 

Will infrastructure be built in time to support the arrival of the new 27,000 Marines? 
152 

Secretary PENN. The target date for achieving 202,000 was FY 2011. However, the 

Marine Corps attained its 202,000 end-strength goal in 2009. The Marine Corps infrastructure development plan remains on track and we are prepared to support the 

accelerated growth in end strength with the continued implementation of our interim solutions including extended use of temporary facilities, slowing down of demolition, more extensive use of BAH and assignment standards. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What alternatives are the Marine Corps pursuing to accommodate 

growth? 

Secretary PENN. Due to the long lead time for permanent facilities, units may be 

in temporary facility solutions for 2–4 years after unit standup. Temporary facility 

solutions include: doubling up existing facilities, slowing planned building demolition for use in the short term, and relocatable facilities (trailers, sprung shelters and 

pre-engineered buildings). 

The FY 2009 Military Construction plan for the Marine Corps includes accelerated enablers common to 202,000 increased footprint—utilities systems, family 

housing, barracks, training ranges, etc. ($1.4 billion). The Marine Corps military 

construction plan ensures quality of life for our rapidly expanding force. Unit specific construction begins in FY 2010 after the expected completion of the National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review. 

For Marine Corps Bachelor Housing, until additional barracks are constructed, 

the Marine Corps has increased authorization of Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) 

for senior Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to allow them to live off-base and has 

taken steps to temporarily billet Marines in surge/overflow barracks during renovations until new barracks come on-line. Temporary trailers/modular facilities are also 

being used to support initial training/accession pipeline throughput requirements. 

For Marine Corps Family Housing, the Marine Corps plan for addressing the additional family housing requirement due to Growing the Force relies on the communities near the military installations as the primary source of housing. Through the 

conduct of housing market analyses, housing for the additional families associated 

with our 202K growth has been programmed where we’ve determined that the local 

community cannot support the housing needs of our military members. Almost 5,000 

additional homes have been programmed in the current FYDP to support Marine 

Corps family housing requirements. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Navy has taken steps to secure real estate interests in areas 

where aviation accidents are most likely to occur. However, there remains significant real estate that could pose a threat to the local community because of aviation 

operations. 

What steps are the Navy and Marine Corps taking to limit aviation accidents to 

the local community? 

Secretary PENN. The Department takes a proactive approach to maximizing aviation safety in and around our air installations using a combination of airfield safety 

regulations, operational alternatives/procedures, and Air Installation Compatible 

Use Zones (AICUZ) studies. 

Each station evaluates operational alternatives and establishes procedures to reduce accident potential, e.g., flight track modifications, altering hours of operation, 

changes in pattern altitudes, etc. 

Finally, the Department of Navy has a very aggressive AICUZ program focused 

on air operations and land use compatibility in high noise and safety zones. The 

DoN is continually evaluating our training requirements and seeking alternatives 

to mitigate noise and safety concerns while preserving our mission capabilities. 

Through the AICUZ Program, installations work with local officials to foster compatible land use development though land use controls such as zoning. Additionally, 

most Navy and Marine Corps installations have a Community Plans and Liaison Officer (CPLO) on staff to work with neighboring communities to address their concerns. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Does the Navy and Marine Corps have a program for each installation 

that limits aviation incidents to the local community? 

Secretary PENN. The Department of Navy has a very aggressive Air Installations 

Compatible Use Zones (AICUZ) program focused on air operations and land use 

compatibility in high noise and safety zones. The DoN is continually evaluating our 

training requirements and seeking alternatives to mitigate noise and safety concerns while preserving our mission capabilities. Through the AICUZ Program, installations work with local officials to foster compatible land use development 

though land use controls such as zoning. Additionally, most Navy and Marine Corps 

installations have a Community Plans and Liaison Officer (CPLO) on staff to work 

with neighboring communities to address their concerns. 
153 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Marine Corps has proposed a realigned III Marine Expeditionary 

Force command structure that relocates the Marine Corps general officers to Guam 

with little command structure remaining in Okinawa. 

How does the proposed command structure enhance the III Marine Expeditionary 

Force capabilities? 

Secretary PENN. Guam, as the westernmost U.S. territory in the Pacific, does provide strategic flexibility and freedom of action to support the Range of Military Operations including Theater Security Cooperation activities. III MEF forces are currently spread between Okinawa, mainland Japan and Hawaii, while additional 

forces deploy to the region from CONUS as part of the Unit Deployment Program. 

III MEF major subordinate commands, 1st MAW, 3MARDIV and 3MLG are all 

presently located on Okinawa and the current proposed command structure has all 

three subordinate headquarters moving to Guam. Operational relationships between 

these adjacent units will continue to remain operationally effective after they relocate to Guam. Additionally, the current plan calls for Marine Corps Bases Butler 

Headquarters to remain on Okinawa. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Marine Corps is programmed to depart a heavily encroached Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma, Okinawa, and move to a new location on Okinawa at Camp Schwab. The Japanese construction proposal for the Futenma Replacement Facility, embedded in the previously agreed U.S./Japanese Defense Posture Review Initiative, has several safety-of-flight issues that Naval Air Systems 

Command would not waive. Opening up negotiations with the Japanese on this 

issue may necessitate renegotiations on other provisions of the overall agreement. 

Is the Marine Corps prepared to accept the risk associated with a Futenma Replacement facility that will be constructed with safety-of-flight issues? 

Secretary PENN. The Department of Navy is committed to the safety of both aircraft operations and the community in which our aircraft operate. As such, we will 

actively seek and support measures to eliminate deviations from criteria as our bilateral planning processes continue. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Department of Defense has indicated that training associated with 

the realigning force from Okinawa should be funded by Government of Japan and 

U.S. Department of Defense funds. However, transient Marine training enhancements would be funded by the Marine Corps. This training enhancement may exceed $4 billion. 

What is the projected funding requirement for transient Marines? 

Secretary PENN. Training for all DoD forces in the Pacific, including transient Marine forces, is being studied in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Any future 

programs resulting from the QDR to expand training capacity in the Pacific theater, 

to include expansion of training capacity in the Commonwealth of the Northern 

Mariana Islands (CNMI) for Guam-based and transient Marine forces, will be addressed in a separate program of record and will be evaluated in a future Environmental Impact Statement. Projected costs for additional training capacity in the Pacific will be developed following the QDR. 

Mr. ORTIZ. When does the Department anticipate expanding the Northern Marianas training capacity to support Marine training? 

Secretary PENN. The Department is studying alternatives to meet the Marine 

Corps Core Competency and associated collective training and MAGTF readiness requirements as well as joint training requirements in the Pacific in the current 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Programs resulting from the QDR, to include 

expansion of training capacity in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, will be evaluated in a future Environmental Impact Statement and established in a separate program of record. Delivery of these capabilities is expected to 

coincide with completion of other facilities to support the arrival of relocating Marines. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Navy has indicated that alternative CVN berthing is an important 

consideration in managing CVN assets. 

What is the risk of a catastrophic event damaging Atlantic Coast CVN homeporting facilities, and how might that risk be altered by homeporting a CVN at 

Mayport? 

Secretary PENN. It is difficult to quantify the likelihood of a catastrophic event, 

natural or man-made, in the Hampton Roads area (currently the only Atlantic Coast 

CVN homeport). The Navy must plan to address the maintenance and repair infrastructure requirements for CVNs as well as the operational considerations. Homeporting a CVN at NAVSTA Mayport is the hedge against the unacceptable risk of 

having all five Atlantic Fleet CVNs homeported in one area. The risk of a catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads area is not altered by having a second CVN 

homeport, the risk is mitigated and provides the assurance that the Navy will be 

able to meet its national defense obligations. 
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Mr. ORTIZ. Are the costs associated with homeporting a CVN at Mayport worth 

the benefits in terms of hedging against the risk of a catastrophic event damaging 

Atlantic Coast CVN homeporting facilities? 

Secretary PENN. If a catastrophic event were to occur in the Hampton Roads area, 

the only CVN Atlantic Coast homeport and maintenance/repair facility, there would 

be an operational impact on the CVN force. The costs would need to be balanced 

against the lost operational time and capability if Atlantic Fleet CVNs were required to transit 12,700 nautical miles to a Pacific Fleet maintenance and repair 

facility if there was catastrophic damage to the facility in the Hampton Roads area. 

It is prudent to maintain a second CVN port facility on the East Coast just as 

the Navy does on the West Coast to ensure there will be no gap or lapse in Navy’s 

ability to meet its Title 10 requirements and maintain seamless CVN operation. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Department has indicated that requirements associated the nuclear aircraft carrier basing on the East Coast will be determined in the context of 

the QDR. 

In your estimation, how likely is it that the QDR will be able to make this type 

of explicit decisions in time to include the fiscal year 2011 budget submission? 

Secretary PENN. The QDR is not due to report out until early 2010; however we 

do expect some of the specific issues to be briefed to the Secretary of Defense for 

final approval prior to the written report. Budgetary adjustments, if any, will be 

made at the appropriate time. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the QDR impact the fiscal year 2010 budget request to in- clude $75 million in Mayport improvements, which could also be used to homeport 

a CVN at Mayport? 

Secretary PENN. The proposed FY 2010 budget request includes $46.3 million for channel dredging in Mayport. Additionally, the FY 10 budget requests $29.7 million 

for Charlie Wharf improvements at Mayport. These improvements are necessary 

since Charlie Wharf is the primary ammunition loading wharf for ships homeported 

in Mayport, and are not associated specifically with an alternate carrier facility. 

The Navy must perform maintenance dredging at NAVSTA Mayport every two 

years. In FY 2010, the Navy is requesting MILCON funding to dredge the channel 

to a depth adequate to allow a CVN to enter the port without limitation. This would 

provide Navy a port in which a CVN can berth with adequate support and force protection. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The fiscal year 2010 Air Force MILCON budget request contains $1.0 

billion. This limited infrastructure investment is causing significant inefficiencies locally and accelerating degradation of assigned aviation assets. Examples include: 

new F–22s arriving without hangars and other support infrastructure at Elmendorf 

AFB, AK, and trainers remaining in warehouses until the appropriate supporting 

infrastructure is programmed and built. 

Why did Air Force not program infrastructure in time to support valuable aviation assets? 

Ms. FERGUSON. With regards to infrastructure, there is no single ‘‘most’’ critical 

area of risk. The risk in infrastructure the Air Force has taken in facilities and infrastructure is broad and varies according to the needs of the entire AF. We balance 

this risk across all combatant commands, major commands (MAJCOM), and installations by building our investment program utilizing the highest priority projects 

with wing and MAJCOM commanders’ input. The need for MILCON investment is 

across all facility types, including operational, training, maintenance hangars, research and development, and quality of service. With a limited and fixed top line, 

the AF must determine priorities using investment impact data and take risk where 

necessary. MILCON projects included in the program are based on project merit and 

meeting Air Force priorities. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Air Force has proposed to defer investments in facilities 

sustainment and restoration. The Air Force is requesting funds necessary to support 

59 percent of the required facility recapitalization. 

Why did the Air Force elect to take risk in the facility accounts and delay critical 

restoration and modernization activities? 

Ms. FERGUSON. Modernizing the Air Force’s aging aircraft fleet is our toughest 

challenge; in order to recapitalize and modernize the Air Force must take risk in 

some areas. Because the Air Force invested heavily in infrastructure in the past, 

it was decided that risks in our facility and infrastructure accounts were acceptable 

for a short duration. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the long-term effect of a delay in funding restoration and modernization activities? 

Ms. FERGUSON. Our current risk in facilities investment has resulted in a $10.2B 

backlog in requirements and will create additional future bow-waves. The effects of 

delays in Restoration and Modernization will require investments in facility 
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sustainment well above modeled requirements. The Air Force views installations as 

critical war-fighting platforms that provide a core Air Force expeditionary combat 

capability. The AF fully understands the risk taken in our modernizing our facilities 

and infrastructure cannot jeopardize our ability to conduct critical operations from 

our installation weapon systems. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Air Force has indicated that it intends to determine four JSF 

operational bases and one additional training base to support JSF in the next two 

years. 

How will encroachment and increased noise associated with the JSF variant impact the decision to base aviation assets? 

Ms. FERGUSON. The Secretary of the Air Force directed an ‘‘Enterprise-Wide Look’’ 

(EWL) for the beddown of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to ensure the Air Force 

perform an objective review of all potential F–35 operational and training basing options. Additionally, the Secretary recently approved the basing criteria for the JSF 

EWL, which include such factors as airspace and ranges; weather; facilities; runways and ramps; environmental and cost factors; logistics support; and availability 

of support facilities such as housing, medical and child care. The Air Force’s plan 

is to make the criteria available through a briefing to all interested members of 

Congress and their staffs, which we expect to provide in August 2009. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Air Force has taken steps to secure real estate interests in areas 

where aviation accidents are most likely to occur. However, there remains significant real estate that could pose a threat to the local community because of aviation 

operations. 

What steps is the Air Force taking to limit aviation accidents to the local community? 

Ms. FERGUSON. One of our main approaches to limiting aviation accident impacts 

to the local community is to encourage compatible development in the areas with 

the greatest history of aircraft accidents occurring around the airfield. The areas 

with the greatest accident potential is the runway, followed by the clear zone, Accident Potential Zones (APZs) I and APZ II at the end of Air Force installation runways. Air Force installations continually work with local communities to limit development to low densities in APZs I and II. The Air Installations Compatible Use 

Zones (AICUZ) program discourages land uses that concentrate large numbers of 

people in a single area, e.g. churches, schools, auditoriums, residential, and manufacturing that involves flammable materials from being located in these two zones. 

Low intensity land uses such as some light industrial, wholesale trade, some business services, recreation, agriculture, and open space, mineral extraction can be 

compatible in APZ I if they don’t create emissions that create visibility problems or 

attract birds. Compatible land uses for APZ II include all the ones compatible in 

APZ I plus a few more types of manufacturing, low intensity retail trade and low 

density single family residential (1–2 dwelling units per acre). 

The installations and local communities can also pursue encroachment partnering 

projects within APZ and seek funding through Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 

Readiness and Environmental Protection Initiative (REPI) program. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Does the Air Force have a program for each installation that limits 

aviation incidents to the local community? 

Ms. FERGUSON. Yes. The Air Force conducts its aviation mishap prevention program under policy, guidance and oversight issued by the Air Force Chief of Safety. 

At the direction of the Air Force Chief of Safety every installation responsible for 

a flying mission maintains a flight safety program with the over-arching goal of preventing aviation mishaps. An important part of that goal includes preventing mishaps on and around installations where Air Force aircraft operate. 

To accomplish that goal, Air Force installations incorporate mishap prevention 

programs in concert with community involvement, partnering, and information 

sharing. Some examples include: 

Mid-Air Collision Avoidance (MACA) programs 

– Base level safety office programs required by Air Force regulation 

– Community involvement is usually high 

– Includes comprehensive web sites for most bases who share airspace with local 

flying communities/airports/FBOs 

– Can involve road-shows to local airports/flying orgs 

– Bases are required to keep and update a MACA Pamphlet for the local community on a regular basis 

Æ Usually contains basic information about the military base traffic pattern, procedures for passage, ATC radar codes, radio frequencies, etc. 
156 

– Very helpful for local aviators who may or may not have in-depth knowledge 

on the local military operations 

Bird Aircraft Strike Hazard (BASH) programs 

– Each base develops its own procedures depending on local hazards in accordance with Air Force safety policy 

– Includes risks from all wildlife, not just birds 

– Many utilize local outreach programs to keep problem species from public/private land surrounding bases. For example, with landowner permission, McConnell Air Force Base utilizes a border collie to harass geese on private land 

around. 

– Local threat information is also available publicly via world wide web (Avian 

Hazard Assessment System [AHAS] and Bird Avoidance Model [BAM] web 

sites, which use historical data and Next Generation Radar [NEXRAD] data to 

assess strike hazards for any particular time period) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Department of Defense has indicated realigning forces 

from Okinawa should be funded by Government of Japan and DOD funds. What assurances do we have that U.S. companies will receive part, or all of the MILCON 

to construct the housing for the Marines on Guam as opposed to outsourcing these 

requirements to foreign companies ? 

Mr. ARNY. US MILCON projects on Guam will have all of the same protections 

that every other US MILCON project has that are outlined in Title 10 and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). These govern our actions and we must follow 

them. Projects funded with direct cash contributions from the Japan will be openly 

competed on a fair and level playing field and administered by the US Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC). NAVFAC will administer these projects in 

accordance with the FAR. Regarding contractor housing, DoD and GovGuam are determining strategies for mitigating impacts and opportunities for long-term benefits 

to Guam. Contractors competing for work will be evaluated on ability to address 

workforce impacts. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Costs associated with Marine training enhancements on Guam 

and the Northern Marianas would be funded by the Marine Corps. This training enhancement may exceed $4 billion. What is the projected funding requirement for 

transient Marines? When does DOD anticipate expanding the Northern Marianas 

training capacity to support Marine training? 

Mr. ARNY. Training for all DoD forces in the Pacific, including transient Marine 

forces, is being studied in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Any future programs resulting from the QDR to expand training capacity in the Pacific theater, 

to include expansion of training capacity in the Commonwealth of the Northern 

Mariana Islands (CNMI) for Guam based and transient Marine forces, will be addressed in a separate program of record and will be evaluated in a future Environmental Impact Statement. Projected costs for additional training capacity in the Pacific will be developed following the QDR. 

Asia-Pacific Training as a whole is a Directed Issue under the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Several courses of action are currently under review to 

determine how best to ensure adequate joint and combined training capacity to meet 

the broad spectrum of training requirements in the region. A recommendation will 

be made as part of the overall QDR process. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The nation’s four public shipyards are in desperate need of 

modernization to be able to maintain a 21st century fleet. Is there a capital investment/modernization plan for the four public yards? If not, how is the Navy planning 

to ensure continued investment to maintain and modernize the shipyards? The Fiscal Year Defense Plan (FYDP) has not been released yet pending the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR), but in the interim, public shipyards such as Pearl Harbor 

Naval Shipyard in my district, are dealing with cost growth on old project plans and 

antiquated repair facilities that are insufficient to address modern requirements. 

What does the Navy plan to do about this? Push projects further out in the FYDP? 

Secretary PENN. The Naval Sea Systems Command, the Navy’s technical authority for public shipyards, maintains a shipyard modernization plan for the Naval 

Shipyards which acts to guide infrastructure investments. Leveraging this plan and 

other locally generated requirements, specific projects are developed at the installation level and validated regionally. The Navy assesses each prospective MILCON 

project through a structured approach aligned to Navy priorities. This objective as-
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sessment leads to a prioritization of all MILCON requirements and forms the basis 

of the Navy MILCON program. 

Shipyard projects are evaluated and prioritized in the same manner as, and with, 

all Navy MILCON requirements. Every year we review the entire shipyard recapitalization program to ensure it meets or exceeds the minimum capital investment 

requirements of U.S.C. Title 10 Section 2476 (Minimum capital investment for certain depots). The FY10 President’s Budget Submission included two MILCON 

projects valued at $296 million in support of Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Puget 

Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, comprising 27% of 

the total Navy MILCON program. 

Recapitalizing the Public Shipyards is a long-term challenge that the Navy will 

continue to keep at the forefront as we work within the current limited fiscal environment. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. Ms. Ferguson, you discussed in the hearing that Secretary Donley 

and General Schwartz requested a re-look at the basing process for the Joint Strike 

Fighter. 

Part 1: Why did the Air Force decide that the criteria guiding the selection of 

bases was insufficient and required a ‘‘re-look?’’ 

Part 2: Can you please discuss some of the changes you expect to see as a result 

of this re-look? 

Part 3: How much additional time will this ‘‘re-look’’ add to the final selection decisions? 

Part 4: Will the committee have an opportunity to review the new criteria before 

final selection decisions are finalized? 

Ms. FERGUSON. Prior to the fall of 2008, our Major Commands de-centrally managed and executed our basing process. Last fall, Secretary Donley directed that 

these basing decisions take place at the Headquarters Air Force level and established the Air Force Senior Basing Executive Steering Group (SB–ESG) to oversee 

these actions and ensure a standard, repeatable process in determining overall AF 

basing opportunities. Additionally, Secretary Donley directed an ‘‘Enterprise-Wide 

Look’’ (EWL) for the beddown of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to ensure the Air 

Force perform an objective review of all potential F–35 operational and training basing options. To implement Secretary Donley’s new strategic basing process, the SBESG worked with Air Combat Command (ACC), designated as the lead command 

for the JSF beddown, and Air Education and Training Command (AETC) to finalize 

basing criteria for both operational bases and for training bases in a way that recognizes their differing requirements. Secretary Donley recently approved the draft criteria for the JSF EWL, which include such factors as airspace and ranges; weather; 

facilities; runways and ramps; environmental and cost factors; logistics support; and 

availability of support facilities such as housing, medical and child care. The Air 

Force’s plan is to make the criteria available through a briefing to all interested 

members of Congress and their staffs, which we expect to provide in August 2009. 

Finally, it is the Air Force’s intent to complete the Environmental Impact Statements and basing decisions in a manner that supports the current JSF aircraft delivery schedule. 

Mr. FRANKS. Ms. Ferguson, what implications does the Air Force’s new Combat 

Air Forces Restructuring have on your BRAC activities? Specifically at bases where 

the drawdown of legacy aircraft is accelerated and a future mission designation, like 

the Joint Strike Fighter, is yet to be determined? 

Ms. FERGUSON. The Air Force’s new Combat Air Forces Restructuring should have 

no adverse affect on actions required to complete BRAC 2005. MILCON projects associated with BRAC 2005 at Combat Air Forces Restructuring-affected bases are already in progress. At bases where the drawdown of legacy aircraft are accelerated, 

and future missions have not been designated, there is the potential for unused excess capacity. 

Mr. FRANKS. Ms. Ferguson, you mention in your testimony several large energy 

projects that are being touted as a huge success for the U.S. Air Force. Specifically 

you mention, ‘‘photovoltaic (PV) solar array at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, the 

largest PV array in North America, generated 57,139 megawatt-hours in FY2008, 

and saving approximately $1 million per year.’’ When will these projects transition 

from a ‘‘great idea or initiative’’ to something the Air Force mandates at locations 

with very similar environmental conditions, like bases in Arizona. 

Ms. FERGUSON. The Air Force is continually reviewing opportunities to use the 

available renewable resources for energy projects to improve the energy security at 
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its installations, whether through enhanced use lease authority or other forms of 

public-private partnership. Capitalizing on development opportunities for large energy projects requires leadership, partnering with industry, and a cogent strategic 

approach. One of the pillars of the Air Force’s infrastructure energy strategic plan 

is to promote the development of renewable and alternative energy for use in facilities and ground vehicles and equipment. Opportunities to develop renewable and alternative energy in any given locale are driven by four primary factors: 

• Availability of renewable resources 

• Utility and commodity cost 

• Federal, state and local tax incentives, rebates, and mandates 

• Deployment and sustainability 

The Air Force identifies and reviews executable projects each year to ensure the 

best investment opportunities are identified. Projects are addressed on a case-bycase basis to ensure that the project provides the best opportunity to fulfill the Air 

Force mission and meet its goals. 

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