The Honor able John R. Gibs on, Senior Circuit J udg e, United States Court of Appea ls for * the Eig hth Circuit, sit ting by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0427n.06 F iled: July 17, 2008 No. 07-6080 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
J ODY CAI

N, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. J OE MI CHAEL

I RVI N, I ndividually

and as Pol ice C h i e f o f t h e C i t y o f R u s s e l l S p r i n g s , K e n tu c ky ; C O LT WI L SON ; CI TY OF R U S S E L L S P RI NG S, KENTUCKY , De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s.

__________________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON A P P E AL F R OM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

B EF OR E: MA RTI

N, GR I F F I

N, and GI B SON , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. * GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Plaintiff J ody

Cain appea ls the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme n t i n fa v or of de fe nd ants on

he r § 19 83 c la ims of e xce ssi ve fo rc e , f a lse arr est, failure to provide medica l car e, and municipal liability

for f ailure to train, as well as her state law claims of assault, batter y , neg lige nce, and outra g e. She simil arly appea ls the di strict court’s order de ny ing he r re quest to consider a lleg ed
ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e . F or the re a so ns se t f

or th b e low , w e a ff

ir m. I.No. 07-6080

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- 2 - On the eve ning of

J une 17, 2005, plaintiff’ s then-boy friend , C o lt W ilson, went to the Key V i l l a g e s h o p p i n g c e n t e r , a p o p u l ar g a t h e r i n g p l a c e f

o r yo u n g p e o p l e i nR

u s s e l l S p r i n g s , K e n tu c ky. J ody Cain joined Wi lson at Key Villag e later

that evening
. Some witnesses at Ke y Villag e noticed that plaintiff, upon her

arr ival, was “ stag g ering ,” could not “wa lk ve ry g ood,” and “ha d to sit down.” At approximately 8:00 or 8:30 p.m., Tammy Har ris, Wil son’s ex-girlf

riend, arr ived at Key

Villag e. Har ris eng ag ed Wilson i n conver sation, which l ed to a verbal c onfrontation betwe en Ha rris and pla int if f. Ca in s ta te s th a t sh e wa lke d a wa y fr om H arr is a

nd , a s she did so , Wil so n p ro du c e d a “ fi st pack” (a va

riant o f b ra s s k n u ck les) and struc k her a round the lef

t ey e. De fenda

nts arg ue that witnesses do not rec all seeingWil son using suc h a o bject. De fenda nts additionally

maintain that Cain, prior to being struck, scr eame d at Wils on and twice sl ap p ed h i m i n the fa ce. A fter the alterc ation, Wil son immediately left the sce ne. Plaintiff was helpe d to her fe et by her f riend Nathan Hardin, and he e scorted he r to the ca r of anothe r fr iend, J acob Sigwa rd. Ha rdin testified that he sug g ested that plaintiff be driven to the ho sp ita l, b ut that Ca in w a s in ste a d p re oc c up ie d w ithfi nd ingso me bo dy to “ be a t up ” Wils on . H ard in stated t hat pl aintiff ins tructed Si g war d to drive to the hom e of J ohn Coleman, Cain’s ex-boy friend. Unable to locate Coleman, Cain then aske d to be taken to the loc al P izz a Hut. Hardin testified that plaintiff wante d to find another ex-boy friend, D avid McGow an, who wor ked at the Pizz a Hut, so that he could “g o afte r” Colt Wilson. Plaintiff, c onverse ly , maintains that she wished to locate McGowa n so that he could drive her to the hospital.No. 07-6080

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- 3 - T h e p o l i ce were initially

dispatched to Ke y

Villag e to investig ate the a ltercation. Office r Jer e my Wes t w a s f

ir st o n th e sc e ne , a

rr ivi nga t 9: 40 p. m. P oli c e Chi e f Jose ph I rv in arr ive d s ho rt ly there afte r. After discussing the alterc ation with people at Key Villag e, I rvin sent West to the hospit al to locat e C ai n . W est arr ived at the hospital shortly befor e 10 p.m. and lea

rned that Cain had not
arr ived. He inf

ormed Irvin of the same. I rvin and Of

fice r J ennife r Taylor eventua lly made contac t w ith plaintiff at 10:15 p.m. in the pa rk inglot of the Pizza Hut. Witn e sse s and the of fi c e rs state , a

nd pla int if f c on c e de s, tha

t du ri ngthi s
co nversation her spee ch wa s slurred a nd that she had trouble maintaining he r bala nce. Plaintiff state s that I rvin mocked he r deme anor during this conversation. Pl aintiff also told I rvin that she had taken he r p re sc ri pti on

pil ls e arl ie r t

hat e ve nin g , w hic h i ncl ud e d L or ta b a nd Xa na x. B e lie vin g that Ca in was intox icated, I

rvin shined a f

lashlight into plaintiff’s e y es and observe d that her pupils were nonrea ctive, a sy

mptom consi s t ent with being under the influence of a c ontrolled substance . At one point during the conver sation, plaintiff lost her bala nce a nd beg an to stumble. I rvin manag ed to g rab plaintiff by her shirt to preve nt her f rom falling . Although Ca in argues that I rvin’s mane uver w as ag g ressive, she admits that Irwin did not in any way strike or touch he r, beyond preve nting he r fr om falling down. Plaintiff c laims she asked I rvin to tr ansport her to the Adair County Hospital, but was rebuf fed. I rvin, conver sely , claims that he asked plaintiff i f she neede d to g o to the hos pital, but that she re fused. Seve ral e y e witnesses c orrobor ate Irvin’s ver sion of events. At this ti me, I rvin noticed a cellophane baghang ing out of plaintiff’s pocket. The off icer s questioned plaintiff a

bout the bag , and she turned it over to the police. The office rs noticed that theNo. 07-6080

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Although the district court stated that the sw ellin g b ec am e noticea ble af ter plaintiff w as 1 alre ady in custody , the Uniform Citation form, completed by Offic er Taylor, seems to indicate that plaintiff’s lef

t ey e wa s swollen when the police initially made c ontact with Cain. I t rea ds, in releva nt part: “Miss Cain was pr esent a nd had bee n into a fig ht with Col t Wi lson earlier . Upon speaking with Miss C ain she wa s slurring her spe ech a nd unsteady . Her

left ey e wa s s wo l l en shut and her rig ht ey e wa s bloodshot, g lassy , was pinpoi nt nonrea ctive to light.” As we read the citation, Offic er T ayl o r m a d e a l l o f

t h e s e o b s e r

v a t i o n s d u r i n g h e r i n i t i a l c o n t a c t w i t h p l a i n t i f f
. A s t h e p i np o i n te ye test was administere d in the Piz za Hut parking lot, we must assume that plai n tiff’s lef t ey e wa s swollen when Chief

I rvin made the decision to arr est Cain and alleg edly deny her r equest for

medical car e. - 4 - bag c o n t ained pr escr iption pil ls outside of their orig inal presc ription container. Plaintiff wa s ultimately arr ested and char g ed with public intox ication; possession of a controlled su b s t an ce, schedule I I I(L ortab) a

nd schedule I V (Xanax); and possession of a controlled substance outside of its original c ontainer. Of fi c e r T ay lor

ini ti a l l y t r a n s p o r t e d p l a i nt if f t o th e Rus se ll Co un ty

Jail , b ut b e c a

us e the fa c ili ty do e s no t ho us e wo man inm a te s, Ca in wa s take n to Ad a ir County Jail
. Jail e r She ila Wils on B e nn e tt testified that while she wa s rec eiving plaintiff into custody , Cain appea red intoxi cate d, but did not
a pp e ar to ne e d me dic a l a tte nti on . On the me dic a l int a ke fo rm , p la int if f l ist e d h e r b a c k a s h e r o nly medical pr oblem, an injury s h e s u stained y ear s befor e. Cain wa s permitted to use the tele phone befor e beingtransporte d to Adair County J ail. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

fo un d th a t du

ri ngpla int if

f’ s tr ans fe r to the A da ir

County Jail , D e pu ty B e nn e tt n oti c e d th a t pl a int if f’ s le ft e y e ha d b e g un

to s we ll. Th e Ad a ir

County Jail re fu se d to a dmi t 1 plaintiff base d on this swe lling. Be nnett then transpor ted plaintiff to the Westlake Reg ional Hospital in Colum bia, Kentuc ky . After initial ex amination at Westlake, plain t i ff was transfer red to theNo. 07-6080

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- 5 - University

of L ouisvill e Hospital for additional t re at ment. Testing reve aled that plaintiff ha d not suffe red br ain injury , nor wa s there any bone fra cture s in he r fac e, jaw, or c hest, althoug h she had soft tissue swelling on he r hea d. Tests furthe r found positive trac es of presc ription me dicine in her sy stem. Plainti ff wa s presc ribed e y e drops a nd discharg ed to the ca

re of her f ather
. Plaintiff subsequently

broug ht state and fe dera l claims ag ainst I rvin in both his official and individual capac ities and ag ainst the City of Russell Springs. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleg ed vio la tio ns of

he r F ourt h an d Fo ur

te e nth Am e ndme nt ri g hts by I rv in an d the City , a nd state law c la ims ag ainst I rvin fo r i n t en t i o n al i n fl i ct i o no f e m o t i o n al d i s t re s s (o u t ra ge) , as s au l t , battery , and neg lige nce. Plaintiff sought punitive dama g es for these a lleg ed injuries under both state and fe dera l law. II. We r eview a

district court’s de cision g ranting summary judgme nt de novo. Sm ith W ho le sa le Co., I nc. v. R .J. Re

ynolds Tobacco, Inc

. , 4 7 7 F. 3 d 8 5 4 , 8 6 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Kessler v. Visteon Corp. , 4 48 F .3 d 3 26 , 3 29 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ). Sum ma ry jud g me nt i s a

pp ropr ia te “ if

the ple a din g s, d e p o s i t i o n s , an s w e r s t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , an d

a d m i s s i o n s o nf

i l e , t o g e t h e r

w i t h t h e a f

f i d a v i t s , i f an y, show that there is no g enuine issue as t o any materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a j udg ment as a matter of law .” Id
. (c i t i n g F ED . R. C IV . P
. 5 6 ( c ) )
. T h e e v i d e n c e m u s t b e v i e w e d in the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he no nmo vin g pa

rt y , g iving th a t pa

rt y the be ne fi t of

a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces. Id
. (c i t i n g Kessler , 448 F.3d at 329). “Howe ver, ‘the nonm oving party must do more th ans im p ly s h o w th a t t

h e r e is s o me me ta

p h y s ic a l d o u

b t a s to th e mate r ia l f

a c ts , Ma t s u s hita Elec. Indus. Co. v

. Zenith Radio C o rp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), it must present sig nificant probativeNo. 07-6080

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- 6 - evidenc e in support of its complaint to d efe at the motion for summary judgme nt.’” Id . (quoting Expe rt Masonry, Inc . v. Boone County, Ky. , 4 40 F .3 d 336 , 341 (6 th Cir . 2 00 6) ). “ ‘Ame re sc int ill a of evide nce is insuffic ient; there must be e vidence on which the jury could rea sonably find for the non-moving party .’” Id
. (q u o t i n g Kessler , 448 F .3 d at 3 29 ). “ [T]he me re e xiste nc e of a c olo ra ble fac tual dispute will not d ef ea t a prope rly

supported motion for summary judgme nt. A g enuine dispute betwee n t h e p ar t ies on an issue of material fa ct must ex ist to render summar y judgme nt appropr iate.” Monette v . Electronic Data Sy s. Corp. , 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 ( 6th Cir. 1996). The fir st issue ruled upon by the district court is whether Chief I rvin utiliz ed excessive f orce
a g a ins t Ca in. Ho we ve r, pla int if f fa ile d to pr e se nt any argume nt re g ard ing thi s iss ue on ap peal. I ndeed, it appe ars that plaintiff h as abandone d this claim, beca use she e x plicitly

states in her appellate brief that her c onstitut ional violations arose from false arr est and denial of me dical ca re, and make s no argument reg arding her excessive forc e cla im. Further more, plaintiff c oncede s by her testimony that she does n o t cl ai m that Chief I rvin used improper forc e ag ainst her. We ther efor e deem this iss ue aba

ndoned or w aived. See Tise o Arc hit e c ts, In c . v . B & B P oo l Se rv ic e an d S up ply Co. , 49 5 F .3 d 34 4, 34 8 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) ; se e als o Dillery v. City of Sandusky , 398 F .3 d 562 , 5 69 (6 th Cir. 2005) (noting “[b] eca use [appellant] wholly

fails to addre ss the issue in he r appellate brief, w e conclude that she has wa ived her rig ht to appeal the district c ourt’s [ruling].”).

III
. On appeal, pl aintiff first argues that she wa s arr ested without probable cause , resulting in a violation of her F ourth Amendment rig hts. This c laim ha s no merit. As we ha ve held, “ [p] olice mayNo. 07-6080

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- 7 - arr est a person without a war rant if they

have pr obable c ause at the time of the ar rest to believe that the per son has committed or is committing a c rime.” United States v. Caicedo , 85 F.3d 1184, 1192 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g Be c k v . O hio , 3 79 U. S. 8 9, 91 (1 96 4) ). I nd e e d, “ [i]f an of fi c e r h a s p ro ba

ble
cause to believe that an indi vidual has commi tted even a very minor criminal offe nse in his presenc e, he may , without violating the Four th Amendment, arrest the of fende r.” At

wat e r v . La

go Vi sta , 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). Fur ther, proba

ble ca use is to be deter

mined on the b asis of the e vidence available to the
arr esting office r at the time of the arr est. Klein v. Long , 2 75 F .3d 544 , 5 50 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1) . T his
rec ord re veals ample support for the of fice rs’ proba

ble ca use dete rmination. Ex amining the disputed fa c ts i n th e lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to pl aintif

f, it i s e vid e nt t

hat Ca in e xhibi te d b e havio r t hat w ou ld provide suff

icient g round s t o ar re s t for violation of K Y . R EV . S TAT . § 52 5. 10 0, wh ic h p ro hib its
a pp e ari ngin a

pu bli c pla c e un de r t

he inf lue nc e of a c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e . Both I rvin and

De pu ty Be nnett believed pla intiff to be inebriated on the basis of he r inability t o s t an d an d her slurr ed speec h. Plaintiff intim ates that this behavior was the result of head tr auma c aused by the punch she
re c e iv e d in th e e y e . A lt

h o u g h th is e xp la

n a ti o nw o u ld

n o t a c c o u n t f

o r w h y w it n e s s e s observe d plaintiff unable to stand and wa lking in a “ zig-zag ” fa shion upon her ar rival at Ke y

Villag e, at the summary judgme nt stag e, we must acce pt plaintiff’s explanation as true. Howeve r, even assuming this wa s the ca use of plaintiff’ s appar ent disorientation, our inquiry is not to determine the vera city of the c harg e, i.e., wa s Cain ac tua lly intox icated, but r ather

whether I rvin had proba

ble ca use to believe that Cain was intox icated. I rvin’s impression that plaintiff wa sNo. 07-6080

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- 8 - inebriate d is supported not only by the observations of a fe llow office r, but also by witnesses who observe d Cain be

for e she was struck. B ased on pla intiff’s admitted use that e vening of L ortab a nd Xana x , her diff

iculty standing , slurred spe ech, a nd non-re active pupil dilation, it was rea sonable for I rvin to arr est plaintiff for violation of K

Y . R EV . S TAT . § 525.100. Moreove r, assuming arguendo that Chief I rvin lacke d probable cause to arre st plaintiff for a violation of § 525.100, Irvin still had probable c ause to a rre st her for

violation of K

Y . R EV . S TAT . § 218A.210, possession of controlled substanc es outside of their presc ription c ontainer, as we ll as for possession of Sche dule I I Iand Schedule I V controlled substances, in viol ation of K Y . R EV . S TAT . §§ 218A.1416 and 218A.1417. T here is no dispute that plaintiff h ad t h es e pil ls on her per son,
vo lun tari ly ha

nd e d th e m ov e r t o p oli c e , a nd wa s una ble to p ro du c e a

pr e sc ri pti on . T hu s, Chi e f I rv in had an a lternative ba sis to a rrest plaintiff. I n this reg ard, w e have stated, “e ven whe re the re is no pro b a b le c a u s e to ar r e s t th e p la in ti f

f f o r th e c r im e c h ar g e d , p r o o f o f p r o b a b le c a u s e to a rre st the plaintif f f o r a r e late d o f

f e n s e is a ls o a d e f

e n s e w h ic h ma

y e n ti tl e th e ar

r e s ti n g o f f ic e r to qualified immunit y .” Ave ry v. King , 110 F.3d 12, 14 ( 6th Cir. 1997). I V. Ne xt, pl a int if

f asse rt s th a t Ch ie f I

rv in v iol a te d h e r c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts by un re a so na

bly de nyinghe r n e e de d me dic a l atte nti on . B e c a us e we mus t vi e w a ll c on te ste d f a c ts i n th e lig ht m os t favor able to plaintiff, we assume that plaintiff r equeste d, and wa s denied, medic al ca re. “Where prison [or jail] officia ls a re so deliberately

indiffer ent to the serious medic al nee ds of prisoner s as to unne cessa rily and wa ntonly inflict pain, they

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- 9 - i n v i o l at ion of the Eig hth Amendment.” Ho rn v . M ad iso n Co un ty

Fi sc al C ou rt , 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g Es te llev . G am ble , 429 U.S. 9 7 , 1 0 4 (1 976)). “ Pretrial deta inees a re
ana log ou sly

pr ote c te d f

ro m su c h mi streatme nt u nd e r t he Du e Pr oc e ss C la

us e of the F ourt e e nth Amendment.” Id
. (c i t i n g Be ll v . W olf ish , 4 4 1 U
. S
. 5 2 0 , 54 5 ( 19 79 ); R o b erts v. City of Troy , 773 F.2d 720, 723 ( 6th Cir.1985)). The Supre me Court has established a two-par t test, with both a subjective a

nd objective pr ong , to determine w hether a prisoner ’s rig ht to adequate medical c are has been violate d. Farmer v . Brennan , 5 11 U. S. 8 25 , 8 34 (1 99 4) ; Napier v. Madison County, Ky. , 238 F.3d 739, 742 ( 6th Cir. 2001). First, the deprivation a lleg ed must be “‘suf ficiently serious’ [in that] a[n] . . . officia l’s act or omission must result in the den i al o f ‘t he minimal civiliz ed mea sure of life’s ne cessities,’” Farmer , 5 1 1 U. S
. at 8 3 4 (q u o t i n g W ilson v. Seiter , 5 01 U. S. 294 , 298 (1 99 1) ; Rhodes v. Chapman , 422 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). The second subjec tive prong require s plaintiff t o show that the police or j ailers had a “sufficiently culpable state of m ind.” W ilson , 5 01 U. S. at 29 7; Napier , 238 F.3d at 742. “To sustain such a

claim, it is not necessar

y that the . . . offic ials consciously soug ht to inflict pain by withho lding tre atment; it is sufficient to show deliberate indiffer ence to [ a prisoner ’s] serious
m ed i ca l needs

. ” Molton v. City of Cleveland , 8 3 9 F
. 2 d 2 4 0 , 2 4 3 ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 8 8 )
. S p e c i f i c a l l y , to satisfy the subjective pr ong , “the pla i n t i ff m u s t alleg e fa cts which, if true , would show that the officia l being sued subjectively perc eived f

acts fr om w hich to inf

er substantial risk to the prisone r, that he did in f

act draw the infer ence , and that he the n disreg arde d that risk.” Com sto c k v . M c Cra ry , 2 7 3 F. 3 d 6 9 3 , 7 0 3 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Farmer , 511 U.S. at 8 3 7 ). Be cause plaintiff re ceive dNo. 07-6080

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- 10 - medical c are , the question befor e us is whether th e tw o-hour de lay

Cain experience d befor e re ceiving that car e amounted to a

violation of her due proce ss rig hts. We a g ree with the district c ourt that plaintiff has satisfied the subjective prong of the Farmer test. Viewing the fa cts in the light mos t favora ble to plaintiff, Cain states that she indicated to Chief I rv in that she wa s in g re a t pa in a nd that sh e wi sh e d to g o to the ho sp ita l. S he a lle g e s th a t Ch ie f I rv in not only ref used this reque st but mocked and insulted her . Assuming these fac ts to be true, Cain has raised a jury question reg ardingwhether Chief I rvin exhibi ted a deliber ate indiffe renc e to plaintiff’s medical ne eds. Ho we v er , we h o l d

t h at p l ai n t i ff

i s u n ab l e t o s at i s fy

t h e c o n co m i t an t o b

j e c t i v e p ro n g. Def endants arg ue that thi s court, in Napier , adopted the rea soning of sever al circ uits in holding that when a plaintiff complains of an unrea sonable de lay in rec eiving medical c are , she must present
me dic a l e vid e nc e to e sta

bli shthe de tr ime nta l e ff

e c t of the de lay . I t is ind e e d tr

ue tha t w e pr e vio us ly adopted the a

pproac h taken by

the First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits in requiring “an inmate who complains that delay

in medical tre atment rose to a constitution al v i o l ati on must place ve rifying medical e vidence in the record to establish the detrimental eff ect of the delay

in medical tre atment to succe ed.” Napier , 2 3 8 F. 3 d at 7 4 2 (c i t i n g Hi ll v. Deka lb Reg ’l Youth De t. C tr. , 40 F.3d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994)). This method, we concluded, ensures an acc urate appra isal of whethe r the “alleg ed depr ivation is ‘sufficiently serious.’” Id
. (q u o t i n g Br own v . B ar ge ry , 20 7 F .3 d 86 3, 86 7 ( 6th Cir. 2000)).No. 07-6080

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- 11 - The scope of this rule ha s been subse quently clar ified as only

one method in which a

plaintiff may satisfy the objective prong and should not be treated as dispositi ve. See B l ackm ore v. Kalam az oo Cou nty , 390 F.3d 890, 897-98 (6th Cir. 2004)
. As stated in Blac k mo re , Napier

c on tr ols in case s where the injury

is not appare nt or appe ars to be r elatively minor. As we e laborated: I n s um, the “ ve ri fy

ingme dic a l e vid e nc e ” re qu ir e me nt i s r e le va nt t o th os e c la ims involving minor m aladies or non-obvious complaints of a serious nee d for medic al car e . . . . I n a wor d, Napier does not apply to medical care claims wher e fa cts show an obvious nee d for medic al ca re t h at lay men would re adily

discern a s requiring prompt medical attention by competent he alth car e provide rs. Napier applies whe re the plaintiff' s “deliber ate indiffe renc e” c laim is based on the prison’s fa ilure to treat a condition ade quately , o r where the prisone r’s a ffliction is seeming ly minor or non-obvious. I n s u ch circumstance s, medical proof is nece ssary

to assess whethe r the delay cause d a ser ious medical injury
. Id
. at 8 9 8 (c i t i n g Napier , 238 F.3d at 742). Our c larifica

tion of Napier

in Blac k mo redictates a

two-par t inquiry when de aling with the “objec tively

serious” pr ong of the Farmer test. A reviewing court should first deter mine whether the injury is “obvious,” i.e. “one that has been diag nosed by a phy sician as mandating tre atment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would e asily

rec og nize the nece ssity

for a doctor’s attention.” Id
. at 8 9 7 (q u o t i n g Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem , 923 F.2d 203, 208 ( 1st Cir. 19 90 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . I f t he re is a n o bv iou s n e e d f

or me dic a l tr eat men t, the n th e c ourt mus t deter mine whether

the delay in securingthat car e wa s rea sonable. Id . at 899-900. I f, however, the in ju r y is n o t a p p ar e n t o r

r e lati v e ly

minor, N a p i er g overns, a

nd a plaintiff must provide “ medical evidenc e” de monstrating that the delay in treatment re sulted in additional injury
.No. 07-6080

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- 12 - Apply ing this standar d t o the instant case , we c onclude plaintiff’ s injury was not one that obviously nece ssitated a doctor ’s ca re. A lthough we construe the fac ts in a manner that assumes plaintiff’s injury

was a ppare nt to the police when the y initially made c ontact with her , this alone does
no t satis fy

the “ ob vio us ne ss” te st. I nd e e d, thi s te st d oes no t add re ss w he the r t he inj ur y is m e re ly ob se rv a ble to b y sta

nd e rs ; if that w e re the c a se , e ve n un tr e a te d blo od y no se s o r v isi ble sc ra

pe s w ou ld satisfy the objective pr ong of the Farmer test. I nstead, the obviousness test is w hether a lay person woul d p er ceive the nee d for immediate me dical assistanc e. Unlike Blac k mo re , w he re the inm a te strug g led with intense abdominal pa i n s and vomi ting f or two day s prior to rec eiving medical attention for a

life-thre atening case of appendicitis, here Cain waited only two hours bef

ore r ece iving medical c are for he r swollen ey e. Similarly , in Ga rre sto n v . Ci ty

of Ma dis on He igh ts , 407 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ), a case relied upon by plaintiff, the ar

rested individual informe d police duringher booking that she was a

n insulin-dependent diabetic. Id . at 794. Afte r the police failed to provide insulin for a full day , she required emerg ency treatment for diabe tic ketoac idosis. Id . at 194-95. The fac ts of these c ases wide ly diverg e fr om those of the instant matter, be cause the prisoner s’ nee d for
me dic a l c are in t

he se c a se s wa s ob vio us and the de lay in tr e a tme nt pr e se nte d a se ri ou s, if no t f a ta l, risk to the prisoners’ health. Given the re latively minor nature of

Cain’s injury , we hold that plaintiff cannot satisfy

the objective pr ong of the Farmer test. V. P l ai n t i ff al s o b ri n gs a c l ai m fo r m u n i c i p al l i ab i l i t y aga i n s tt h e C i t y

o f Ru s s el l S p ri n gs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleg ed deprivation of her constitutional rights under the Four th andNo. 07-6080

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- 13 - Fo u rt ee n th Amendments. This claim includes Cain’s c laim ag ainst Chief I rvin in his official capa city , as a “ suit ag ainst a s t at e o ff i cial in hi s or her

officia l capa city

is not a suit aga inst the
o f f ic ia l b u t r a th e r a s u it a g a in s t th e o f f ic ia l’ s o f f ic e . ” W i l l v. Mi chigan Dept. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). For an injurious prac tice o r policy claim to succe ed, plaintiff must establish a c ausal link betwee n her c onstitut ional injury and the a lle ged wr o n g ful policy
. See Lujan v. De fenders of W ildlif e, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Plaintiff a lleg es onl y two constitutional viol ations, one stemming fr om an alleg ed arrest without probable cause , and one from an a lleg ed denia l of nee ded medical c are . As we note d above, neither of these claims has l eg al or fac tual support, and, ther efor e, there is no constituti onal violation in the instant case. Wit hout a constitutional viol ation, plaintiff’s concomitant municipal liability claim fa ils as a m at t er of law. City of L os Angeles v . Heller , 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (noting “[i] f a pe rson has suff ere d no constitutional injury at the hands of

the individual police office r, the fac t that the depar tmental regulations mig ht ha ve author ized the use of const i tu t i o n al l y

ex ce s s i v e f

o rc e i s qu i t e b es i d e t h e p o i n t ”) (e mp h as i s o m i t t ed ). T h er ef o re , the district
c ourt pr op e rl y g ra nte d s umm ary ju dgmen t reg ard ingthi s c la im, and we do no t r e a c h d e fe nd ants ’ alternative argument of qualified immunity
. V I. In t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt , p l a i n t i f f r a i s e d s t a t e l aw c l a i m s a g a i n s tIr v i n , a l l e g i n g a s s a u l t , b a t t e r y,
ne g lig e nc e , a

nd ou tr a g e (i nte nti on a l inf

lic tio n of e mot ion a l dis tr e ss)
. Ag a in, pla int if f h a s f a ile d to argue that the di strict court’s gr ant of summary judgme nt in favor of defe ndants on these c laims wasNo. 07-6080

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- 14 - imp ro p er. Bec ause pla intiff fails to argue these claims on appe al, these issues a re a bandoned or waived. See Tise o A rc hit e c ts , 4 95 F .3 d at 34 8; Di lle ry , 398 F.3d at 569. V II. F ina lly , p la int if

f’ s argume nt r e g ard ingthe dis tr ic t c ourt ’s re fu sa l to c on sid e r a lle g e d n e wl y discovere d evidenc e is similarly without merit. See F ED . R. C IV . P. 59(e). The evidenc e that plaintiff reque sted the district court to addre ss was not newly discovere d, beca

use it was ava ilable to plaintiff befor e the de cision on defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt. See GenCorp, Inc . v. Ame rican Un de rwr ite rs , 178 F.3d 804, 834 ( 6th Cir.1999). V III
. For these re asons, we a ffirm the judg ment of the district cour t.