alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2013129EN.01000901.xml

| 4.5.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 129/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.5.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 129/9

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Sibiu (Romania) lodged on 27 February 2013 — Silvia Georgiana Câmpean v Administrația Finanțelor Publice a Municipiului Mediaș, Administrația Fondului pentru Mediu

(Case C-97/13)

2013/C 129/16

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Referring court

Tribunalul Sibiu

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Silvia Georgiana Câmpean

Applicant:

Defendants: Administrația Finanțelor Publice a Municipiului Mediaș, Administrația Fondului pentru Mediu

Defendants:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Is the body of rules introduced by Law No 9/2012 in breach of Article 110 TFEU, and does it amount to the introduction of a measure which is manifestly discriminatory? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is the body of rules introduced by Law No 9/2012 in breach of Article 110 TFEU, and does it amount to the introduction of a measure which is manifestly discriminatory?

| 2. | Must Article 110 TFEU be interpreted as precluding the body of rules introduced by Law No 9/2012 (in its original wording) establishing a tax on pollutant emissions from motor vehicles, if that tax is structured in such a way as to discourage the putting into circulation in that Member State of second-hand vehicles purchased in other Member States, but without discouraging the purchase of second-hand vehicles of the same age and condition on the domestic market? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Must Article 110 TFEU be interpreted as precluding the body of rules introduced by Law No 9/2012 (in its original wording) establishing a tax on pollutant emissions from motor vehicles, if that tax is structured in such a way as to discourage the putting into circulation in that Member State of second-hand vehicles purchased in other Member States, but without discouraging the purchase of second-hand vehicles of the same age and condition on the domestic market?

---
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 12, 2017

No. 04

- 16

- 00806

- CR

Roger SALDANA

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 81st Judicial District Court, Frio County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15

- 08

- 00031

- CRF Honorable Russell Wilson, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Appellant ’ s appointed counsel, Mr. Nohl Bryant, filed appellant’s brief on August 21,

2017. 1 The State’s brief was due on October 20, 2017 . According to the State, while in the process of researching its brief, the State discovered material not previously disclosed to Mr. Bryant. Based on the recently obtained material, Mr. Bryant filed a motion requesting ninety days in which to file an amended appellant’s brief. The State filed a motio n asking that the due date for its brief be extended to thirty days after appellant’s amended brief is filed. On October 23, 2017, we issued an order granting in part and denying in part Mr. Bryant’s motion. Our

order directed Mr. Bryant to file appellan t’s amended brief no later than December 8, 2017. Our
order also stated: “ NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS WILL BE GRANTED ABSENT
EXTENTUATING CIRCUMSTANCES

. ” We also granted the State’s motion and directed the State to file its appellee’s brief no later than thirty days after appellant’s amended brief is

filed.

On December 8, 2017, Mr. Bryant filed another request for an extension of time until December 22, 2017. The request is GRANTED

, and Mr. Bryant is hereby ORDERED to file appellant’s amended brief no la ter than December 22, 2017

.

If Mr. Bryant does not file a brief by December 22, 2017, this cause will be abated for the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether: (1) appellant desires to prosecute his

1 Appellant’s brief was originally due on May 22, 2017. Mr. Bryant was granted thr e e extensions of time before filing appellant’s brief on August 21, 2017.appeal; (2) appellant is indigent, and if so, the trial court shall take such measures as may be

necessary to assure the effective assistance of counsel, which may include the appointment of new counsel; and (3) counsel has abandoned the appeal. Because sanctions may be necessary,

the trial cour t will be asked to address this issue even if new counsel is retained or substituted before the date of the hearing. The clerk of this court shall cause a copy of this order to be served

on Mr. Bryant by certified mail, return receipt requested, and by reg ular United States mail.

_________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

co urt on this 12th day of December, 2017

.

___________________________________ K eith E. H ottle

Clerk of Court
VI 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 200 

For the relief of Alemseghed Mussie Tesfamical. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 26, 2011 

Mr. SCHUMER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

For the relief of Alemseghed Mussie Tesfamical. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR 

4 ALEMSEGHED MUSSIE TESFAMICAL. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subsections (a) 

6 and (b) of section 201 of the Immigration and Nationality 

7 Act (8 U.S.C. 1151) and section 240 of such Act (8 

8 U.S.C. 1229a), Alemseghed Mussie Tesfamical shall be el9 igible for issuance of an immigrant visa or for adjustment 

10 of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for perma11 nent residence upon filing an application for issuance of 

12 an immigrant visa under section 204 of such Act (8 


pwalker on DSKD5P82C1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 200 IS

1 U.S.C. 1154) or for adjustment of status to lawful perma2 nent resident. 

3 (b) ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.—If Alemseghed 

4 Mussie Tesfamical enters the United States before the fil5 ing deadline specified in subsection (c), Alemseghed 

6 Mussie Tesfamical shall be considered to have entered and 

7 remained lawfully and, if otherwise eligible, shall be eligi8 ble for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Im9 migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1255) as of the 

10 date of the enactment of this Act. 

11 (c) DEADLINE FOR APPLICATION AND PAYMENT OF

12 FEES.—Subsections (a) and (b) shall apply only if the ap13 plication for issuance of an immigrant visa or the applica14 tion for adjustment of status is filed with appropriate fees 

15 not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of 

16 this Act. 

17 (d) REDUCTION OF IMMIGRANT VISA NUMBER.— 

18 Upon the granting of an immigrant visa or permanent res19 idence to Alemseghed Mussie Tesfamical, the Secretary of 

20 State shall instruct the proper officer to reduce by 1, dur21 ing the current or next following fiscal year, the total num22 ber of immigrant visas that are made available to natives 

23 of the country of Alemseghed Mussie Tesfamical’s birth 

24 under section 203(a) of the Immigration and Nationality 

25 Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(a)) or, if applicable, the total number 


pwalker on DSKD5P82C1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 200 IS

1 of immigrant visas that are made available to natives of 

2 the country of Alemseghed Mussie Tesfamical’s birth 

3 under section 202(e) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1152(e)). 

4 (e) PAYGO.—The budgetary effects of this Act, for 

5 the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You6 Go Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the 

7 latest statement titled ‘‘Budgetary Effects of PAYGO 

8 Legislation’’ for this Act, submitted for printing in the 

9 Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Senate 

10 Budget Committee, provided that such statement has been 

11 submitted prior to the vote on passage. 

Æ 


pwalker on DSKD5P82C1PROD with BILLS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22
- 0668 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. NICHOLAS WELLS,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including November 6 , 2023 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 28 2023

09/28/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0668
Exhibit 15.1



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-10932) pertaining to
the 1999 Employee Stock Purchase Plan of Global-Tech Appliances Inc. (the Company) of our report dated September 9, 2005, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of the Company included in the Form 20-F for the year
ended March 31, 2005.



|                  
|------------------
|                  
|/s/ Ernst & Young 
|                  
|Hong Kong         
|                  
|September 30, 2005
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-6341

STAFFON RAY,

Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

WARDEN OF STEVENSON CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Anderson. David C. Norton, District Judge. 

(8:11-cv-02774-DCN)

Submitted: July 29, 2013 Decided: August 26, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Staffon Ray, Appellant Pro Se. Brendan McDonald, OFFICE OF THE 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Donald John Zelenka, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Staffon Ray seeks to appeal the district court’s 

orders accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and 

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition and 

denying his motion to reconsider. The orders are not appealable

unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). A certificate 

of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) 

(2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court 

denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must 

demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is 

debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Ray has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
# C_2015279EN.01003002.xml

| 24.8.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 279/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 279/30

---

Judgment of the General Court of 8 July 2015 — Deutsche Rockwool Mineralwoll v OHIM — Ceramicas del Foix (Rock & Rock)

(Case T-436/12) (1)

((Community trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - Community figurative mark Rock & Rock - Earlier national word marks MASTERROCK, FIXROCK, FLEXIROCK, COVERROCK and CEILROCK - Relative ground for refusal - Article 8(1)(b) and Article 53(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009))

(2015/C 279/37)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Deutsche Rockwool Mineralwoll GmbH & Co. OHG (Gladbeck, Germany) (represented by: J. Krenzel, lawyer)

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: L. Rampini, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervener before the General Court: Ceramicas del Foix, SA (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: M. Pérez Serres and R. Guerras Mazón, lawyers)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 10 July 2012 (Case R 495/2011-2) concerning invalidity proceedings between Deutsche Rockwool Mineralwoll GmbH & Co. OHG and Ceramicas del Foix, SA.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Deutsche Rockwool Mineralwoll GmbH & Co. OHG to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Deutsche Rockwool Mineralwoll GmbH & Co. OHG to pay the costs.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 379, 8.12.2012.

---
# C_2014292EN.01000502.xml

| 1.9.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 292/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.9.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 292/5

---

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 25 June 2014 — European Commission v Portuguese Republic

(Case C-76/13) (1)

1

((Failure to fulfil obligations - Directive 2002/22/EC - Electronic communications - Networks and services - Designation of the undertakings responsible for universal service obligations - Incorrect transposition - Judgment of the Court establishing a failure to fulfil obligations - Non-compliance - Article 260(2) TFEU - Financial penalties - Penalty payment - Lump sum payment))

2014/C 292/06

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: P. Guerra e Andrade, G. Braun, L. Nicolae and M. Heller, acting as Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Portuguese Republic (represented by: L. Inez Fernandes, acting as Agent, assisted by L. Morais, advogado)

Defendant:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

| 1) | By failing to adopt all of the measures necessary to ensure compliance with the judgment in Commission v Portugal (C-154/09, EU:C:2010:591), the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 260(1) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

1)

By failing to adopt all of the measures necessary to ensure compliance with the judgment in Commission v Portugal (C-154/09, EU:C:2010:591), the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 260(1) TFEU.

Commission

Portugal

| 2) | The Portuguese Republic is ordered to pay to the European Commission, into the account ‘European Union own resources’, a lump sum of EUR 3 million. |
| --- | --- |

2)

The Portuguese Republic is ordered to pay to the European Commission, into the account ‘European Union own resources’, a lump sum of EUR 3 million.

| 3) | The Portuguese Republic is ordered to pay to the European Commission, into the account ‘European Union own resources’, a penalty payment of EUR 10  000 for each day of delay in adopting the measures necessary to ensure compliance with the judgment in Commission v Portugal (C-154/09, EU:C:2010:591), from the date on which judgment is delivered in the present case until the date of full compliance with that judgment. |
| --- | --- |

3)

The Portuguese Republic is ordered to pay to the European Commission, into the account ‘European Union own resources’, a penalty payment of EUR 10  000 for each day of delay in adopting the measures necessary to ensure compliance with the judgment in Commission v Portugal (C-154/09, EU:C:2010:591), from the date on which judgment is delivered in the present case until the date of full compliance with that judgment.

Commission

Portugal

| 4) | The Portuguese Republic is ordered to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

4)

The Portuguese Republic is ordered to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 123, 27.4.2013.

1

---
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 1**  **3 -**  **6 145** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appell ee ,
v. SCOTT LEWIS RENDELMAN , Defendant

- Appell ant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Greenbelt
. James K. Bredar , District Judge. ( 8:07

- cr - 00331

- JKB

- 1; 8:12

- cv - 00859

- JKB )

Submitted : April 25, 2013 Decided: April 30, 2013

Before AGEE and WYNN , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge
.
Dismiss ed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Scott Lewis Rendelman , Appellant Pro Se. Sujit Raman , Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore , Maryland ; Stacy Dawson Belf, Assistant United States Attorney, Gregory P. Bailey , OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNE Y, Greenbelt , Maryland , for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Scott Lewis Rendelman seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2012 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (200 6 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U .S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (200 6 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Rendelman has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate o f appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Ex parte Carl SMITH and James Smith, d/b/a Action Pest Control. (Re Carl SMITH and James Smith, d/b/a Action Pest Control v. Gary ROSS and Kyle Marsh, individually and d/b/a Angel Pest Control).

1970451.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

July 2, 1998.

J. Robert Faulk of McDowell, Faulk & McDowell, Prattville, for petitioners.

Clifford W. Cleveland and Kelly Tipton Lee of Cleveland & Colley, P.C., Prattville, for respondents.

HOOPER, Chief Justice.

WRIT QUASHED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. See *Knox Kershaw, Inc. v. Kershaw,*552 So.2d 126, 128 (Ala.1989); *Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Etheridge,*582 So.2d 1102 (Ala.1991).

MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON, COOK, and LYONS, JJ., concur.

KENNEDY, J., dissents.
Before the Third Division,

June 7, 1951

No. 55627.

#### Trefflichs Bird *&*Animal Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

protests 153061-K, etc. (New York).

*451Opinion by

Cline, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of live birds similar in all material respects to those the subject of *Alfred Mazer*v. *United States*(25 Cust. Ct. 67, C. D. 1265), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Iowa Telecommunications Services, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2008 (the Report), I, Craig A. Knock, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                  |  |  |  |                                                                                                                          
|----------------- |  |  |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: May 1, 2008 |  |  |  | /s/ Craig A. Knock                                                                                                       
|                  |  |  |  | Craig A. Knock                                                                                                           
|                  |  |  |  | Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer Principal Accounting Officer Iowa Telecommunications Services, Inc.
# C_2014261EN.01000502.xml

| 11.8.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 261/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.8.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 261/5

---

Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 12 June 2014 — Bimbo SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

(Case C-285/13 P) (1)

1

((Appeal - Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Community trade mark - Regulation (EC) No 40/94 - Article 8 - Application for Community figurative mark Caffè KIMBO - Opposition proceedings - Earlier national word mark BIMBO - Well-known mark - Partial rejection of the opposition - Appeal manifestly inadmissible))

2014/C 261/07

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Appellant: Bimbo SA (represented by: N. Fernández Fernández-Pacheco, abogado)

Appellant:

Other parties to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent), Café do Brasil SpA (represented by: M. Mostardini and F. Mellucci, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings:

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1) | The appeal is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1)

The appeal is dismissed.

| 2) | Bimbo SA shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Bimbo SA shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 252, 31.8.2013.

1

---