U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

70–058 DTP WASHINGTON : 2001

DRUG TREATMENT OPTIONS FOR THE JUSTICE

SYSTEM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 4, 2000

Serial No. 106–184

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

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(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian

LISA SMITH ARAFUNE, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman

BOB BARR, Georgia

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

DOUG OSE, California

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

SHARON PINKERTON, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

STEVE DILLINGHAM, Special Counsel

LISA WANDLER, Clerk

CHERRI BRANSON, Minority Counsel

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C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 4, 2000 ................................................................................ 1

Statement of:

Belenko, Steven, senior research associate, National Center of Addiction

and Substance Abuse, Columbia University; Dr. Sally L. Satel, M.D.,

adjunct scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC; and

Martin Iguchi, co-director, Drug Policy Research Center, RAND Corp.,

Santa Monica, CA ......................................................................................... 47

Tauber, Judge Jeff, president, National Association of Drug Court Professionals; and Charles J. Hynes, Kings County District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY ........................................................................................................... 10

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Belenko, Steven, senior research associate, National Center of Addiction

and Substance Abuse, Columbia University, prepared statement of ....... 50

Hynes, Charles J., Kings County District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 34

Iguchi, Martin, co-director, Drug Policy Research Center, RAND Corp.,

Santa Monica, CA, prepared statement of .................................................. 73

Mink, Hon. Patsy T., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Hawaii, prepared statement of .................................................................... 6

Satel, Dr. Sally L., M.D., adjunct scholar, American Enterprise Institute,

Washington, DC, prepared statement of ..................................................... 61

Tauber, Judge Jeff, president, National Association of Drug Court Professionals, prepared statement of ..................................................................... 13

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DRUG TREATMENT OPTIONS FOR THE

JUSTICE SYSTEM

TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room

2254, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Mica, Ose, Towns, Mink, Kucinich, and

Schakowsky.

Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, staff director and chief counsel;

Steve Dillingham, special counsel; Don Deering, congressional fellow; Lisa Wandler, clerk; Cherri Branson, minority counsel; and

Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. MICA. Good morning.

I would like call this hearing of the Subcommittee on Criminal

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources to order.

With concurrence of the minority, we are going to go ahead and

begin our hearing. We will be joined by other Members who are

currently at other meetings. It will allow us to proceed with the

business before us.

This is a hearing on drug treatment options for the justice system. We have two panels of witnesses before us today. We will

start the proceedings with opening statements. I will begin and will

yield to other Members. We will also leave the record open for 2

weeks for additional statements by unanimous request and so ordered.

This morning’s hearing is going to focus on drug treatment options for our judicial systems. Our subcommittee will examine drug

treatment programs and options that hold promise, we hope, in

reaching eligible, nonviolent offenders.

The focus of our hearing is very straightforward and of critical

importance to our Nation. Can we identify approaches and programs for eligible, nonviolent offenders that are successful in bringing the chains of drug addiction and reinforcing individual responsibility and also restoring productive workers to our work force,

which result in substantial cost savings to our American taxpayers?

If that is possible, we hope that it is an objective we can meet

and also shed some light on through today’s hearing. If we can, we

should act without delay in supporting these programs on a national level.

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First, we will examine a growing program for handling eligible

offenders and drug abusers within the judicial system that has

been used for almost a decade in some jurisdictions and appears to

be enjoying continued success. The approach I am referring to is

generally referred to as drug courts.

Drug courts were first implemented by States and local governments which contain our true laboratories of democracy. One of the

original drug courts was established more than a decade ago in my

home State in Dade County, FL. Specialized drug courts are designed to improve the processing of drug cases, and to respond better to the needs of eligible offenders with drug abuse problems.

Another benefit of drug courts is cost savings resulting from reduced burdens on our jails and on our prisons. Federal funding to

support this effort first began in 1989 and took the form of Department of Justice discretionary grants to expedite the processing of

drug cases.

By 1991, the Department also funded what are known as drug

night courts, both under its discretionary grants of the Edward

Burn Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program, also referred to commonly as Burn grants.

This program was named for Eddie Burn, a slain New York City

police officer who was brutally murdered in 1988 while enforcing

drug laws. For many years, the Burn Program has also served as

the primary source of Federal funding for State and local assistance, law enforcement, and drug control efforts.

President Bush kept Eddie Burn’s badge in his desk drawer in

the Oval Office at the White House. I am perplexed, however, today

at how the Burn Grant Program and antidrug effort have fallen out

of favor with the Clinton administration. Last month, the Clinton

administration’s budget submission to Congress proposed reducing

the funding of the Burn formula grants by $100 million. Congress

previously funded the program at the $500 million level. The administration also requested that funding for local law enforcement

block grants be eliminated.

I feel strongly that the administration should refocus its efforts

on drug control and that, in fact, our Department of Justice should

do everything possible to once again incorporate antidrug elements

into all of our block and discretionary grant programs.

Congress has continued to increase Federal funding for drug

courts, prosecutor training, and drug treatment for offenders since

1989, eventually leading to the creation of a special funding program for our drug courts.

As we will hear today, there are now more than 400 drug courts

nationwide. For the past 2 years, Congress has funded the drug

court program at the level of $40 million annually with additional

funding eligibility under our Burn Grants Program and also under

our Juvenile Block Grants Program.

We will hear from experienced analysts who will testify on the

operation and impacts of our drug courts and describe how they

have successfully spread across our Nation. We will also hear of

another innovative approach and a 10-year success story in providing drug treatment to eligible, nonviolent offenders. That program

has been operating since 1990 in Brooklyn, NY. It has received

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quite a bit of notoriety for its success. That program is called the

Drug Treatment Alternatives to Prison [DTAP].

Although this program has not received the level of attention and

Federal support as the Drug Court Program, I plan to do whatever

possible to ensure that this successful approach receives increased

attention and also bipartisan support in the future.

I am very pleased to have a distinguished witness before us

today; the District Attorney for King’s County, NY, Mr. Charles

Hynes, one of those individuals responsible for the development of

this program. He will explain in detail the workings of this alternative prison program.

As we know, as much as 90 percent of State and local criminal

prosecutions are resolved through plea bargaining today. Plea bargains prevent our criminal justice system by bringing it to a

screeching halt with the sheer volume of cases that they are incurring today.

The DTAP Program is managed by the local prosecutor. It allows

prosecutors to select only eligible, nonviolent offenders for a rigorous program that mandates drug treatment and strict observance

of program rules and conditions. The prosecutor uses the leverage

of a substantial prison sentence which can be invoked if an offender violates the program requirements.

The program provides a common sense, cost effective option for

prosecutors, as well as a valuable opportunity to offenders who are

serious about reforming their lives. As we will learn today, evaluation results of the program indicate high treatment retention rates,

low recidivism, and significant cost savings, all elements that the

subcommittee and Congress are interested in pursuing.

The 1 year retention rate in drug treatment is as much as 66

percent. The recidivism rate for participants is less than half for

comparable offenders, 23 percent compared to 57 percent. Nearly

all employable program graduates, 92 percent, are working in vocational programs; only 26 percent were employed prior to entering

the program. The program has saved the city and State of New

York more than $15 million.

Our subcommittee was able to visit this program last December

and I was able to see firsthand some of the positive results of this

program. Today, I am announcing my plans to introduce legislation

which I am entitling, ‘‘Prosecutor Drug Treatment Alternatives to

Prison for Nonviolent Offenders Program,’’ a little lengthy but it

does describe what we are trying to achieve with this initiative.

It will provide seed funding for State and local prosecutors to establish their own drug treatment alternatives for eligible, nonviolent offenders who desire to turn around their lives, and we are

going to use the success of DTAP in Brooklyn as a model.

I hope to enlist the support of other Members of Congress who

are also interested in enhancing our arsenal of successful approaches to reducing the demand for drugs across this Nation. This

program is an innovative, proven program and I think it will also

supplement the role of our drug courts which has also been another

successful program.

This program represents a first important step in fighting the

war on drugs in addressing the treatment needs of eligible, nonviolent offenders. That is an area I think we have ignored that

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needs our attention. Experience has shown that this approach can

break addictions, protect lives, assist families, promote employment, and save substantial tax dollars.

When I visited the DTAP Program and talked personally with

the offenders in this drug treatment program, I saw that it was

making an important difference in their lives and some of them

their whole lives. Almost all of them I talked to, some in their mid30’s, had spent half their lives in prison or in the revolving door

of our criminal justice system or victims of addiction.

This program will give them an alternative. This program will be

funded, that I propose, through grants administered by the U.S.

Department of Justice. The funds will go to every State and directly to urban, suburban, and rural communities with demonstrated needs and interest in programs of this nature.

I welcome all of our distinguished witnesses today and thank

each of you for taking time out of your schedules, your busy professional lives, to share with the subcommittee both your experience

and your recommendations on this important topic. I hope we will

be able to work together to ensure that the future drug demand reduction successes such as the ones I have talked about are put into

place immediately. Time is short and lives really remain in the balance. We must act now if we are going to make a difference, particularly for so many of those that have no alternative but prison

today.

I am pleased at this time to yield to the gentleman from California, Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. None.

Mr. MICA. No opening statement.

Mrs. Mink has not arrived at this point, but we shall proceed.

We have Ms. Schakowsky. Did you have an opening statement?

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. No.

Mr. MICA. She doesn’t have an opening statement at this time.

Again, we will leave open the record for a period of 2 weeks for additional statements or for additions to the record.

With no additional opening statements at this time, I am going

to introduce our first panel of witnesses. The first panel consists of

Judge Jeff Tauber, president of the National Association of Drug

Court Professionals from Alexandria, VA. The second witness is the

Honorable Charles J. Hynes, the Kings County District Attorney

for Brooklyn, NY.

Let me welcome both of our panelists. Let me also inform you

that we are an investigations and oversight subcommittee of Congress. For that, we do swear our witnesses. If you will stand to be

sworn, raise your right hands, please. Do you solemnly swear that

the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee of

Congress is the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]

Mr. MICA. The witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Welcome, both of you. At this point, normally we run the clock.

However, we won’t run the clock today, because we only have two

witnesses on this panel. If you have additional or lengthy statements you would like made a part of the record or some data or

information that deserves to be entered into the record, I would be

glad to grant that request.

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We have been joined now by the ranking member of our subcommittee, the Honorable Member from Hawaii. Before we proceed

with our two witnesses who I have introduced and sworn, it is my

pleasure to recognize the gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs. Mink, for

an opening statement.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is perfect timing.

I want to personally thank you for accommodating my concerns

about the drug problem in Hawaii and enabling the subcommittee

to have a hearing in Hawaii on this very important matter. I

thought the hearings were very productive.

Mr. MICA. I am still recovering from my 22-hour flight back here.

Mrs. MINK. I am sorry you could only stay 36 hours. That is not

our fault, that is the leadership. We would have loved to have you

stay longer.

This matter of the criminal justice system’s use of drug treatment as an alternative to incarceration is a very important subject.

I believe that our discussions today will add a great deal to what

we have already learned.

The trip we took to Hawaii, we met and talked extensively with

inmates who were undergoing drug treatment in the closed prison

system environment. They were eligible for this treatment I believe

14 months before their release. We had an opportunity to sit

around and talk with about five or six of them, to hear the various

details of their experience and how the treatment was going to impact their ultimate release and their ability to stay out of prison

again. The difficulties that they anticipated upon release were

quite profound.

We also had an opportunity to visit the drug court and to see

how that system operates as an alternative to imprisonment, and

to see whether that works. Definitely the criminal justice system

has a role, not only in law enforcement but in this very difficult

area of drug treatment.

I look forward to our discussion today and ask unanimous consent that my statement be put in the record at this point.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Patsy T. Mink follows:]

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Mr. MICA. I know that many who didn’t get to go to Honolulu,

HI, and visit are disappointed. I had envisioned sandy, beautiful

beaches, young women in grass skirts. Instead I was greeted by the

ranking member who took me immediately to the Honolulu Police

Station and from there took me to the State prison where we spent

most of the afternoon. Next, we went to a housing project with local

authorities. The next day we had a 5-hour hearing and then I

thought maybe those beaches were still going to be seen, but we

ended up in drug court for the afternoon before catching our flight

to fly all night. I have a new admiration for our ranking member

who does this on a regular basis, going back and forth.

Mrs. MINK. That just shows you, Mr. Chairman, how important

treatment is.

Mr. MICA. Yes. I needed treatment when I got back. [Laughter.]

Again, I thank the ranking member for her invitation. It was a

very productive hearing and visit. I thank her for that opportunity.

Once again, we have our two witnesses, Judge Jeff Tauber, president of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals and

the Honorable Charles J. Hynes, Kings County district attorney,

Brooklyn, NY. I will recognize first, Judge Jeff Tauber. You are recognized and I also understand you have a video. You are free to

proceed.

STATEMENTS OF JUDGE JEFF TAUBER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS;

AND HON. CHARLES J. HYNES, KINGS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BROOKLYN, NY

Judge TAUBER. Good morning.

Chairman Mica, Representative Mink, and esteemed members of

the Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Reform, my

name is Jeff Tauber. I am a former judge of the Oakland-Alameda

County Drug Court and president of the National Association of

Drug Court Professionals.

Thank you for affording me this opportunity to testify before you

today to address drug courts and other innovative drug treatment

and drug testing programs in the criminal justice system. Before

I begin speaking about these programs, I would like to show you

a brief 5 minute video. A little bit of background, last year was our

10th year of drug courts. ABC national news did a short, 3-minute

news tape on the national conference. I think it portrays in a very

visceral way where drug courts have come from, their effectiveness,

and where they are going.

Following the film is an actual visit or segment of a visit to a

drug court in San Diego where Judge Sue Finley sits. I might add

that Judge Finley is a former judge, recently retired, but previously

had been dean of California Judicial College and a well respected

judge in the California State system.

You will see her dealing with someone who is in relapse in a very

different way than you would expect in a traditional court system.

The significance of the two I think demonstrates the effectiveness

of drug courts. I might add that when we first began our association in May 1994, there were 24 persons sitting in a room in Alexandria from 12 drug courts. Today, I am pleased to announce that

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our conference in Miami had some 2,400 persons and roughly 700

drug courts existing and being implemented. So we have come a

long way in a short time. If we could roll that short segment now?

[Video presentation.]

Mr. TAUBER. Perhaps for those who haven’t seen a drug court,

that gives you just a glimpse at the kind of balance, both toughness

and support that a drug court provides to the offender coming

through the program.

At this time, I would like to continue my remarks. Senator Ben

Nighthorse Campbell stated in the Congressional Record on May

26, 1999, ‘‘Drug courts are revolutionizing the criminal justice systems. Statistics show us the drug courts work, they are clearly cost

effective and help convert many drug-using offenders into productive members of society. Traditional incarceration has yielded few

gains for our drug offenders.’’ What is a drug court? A drug court is a special court that is

given the responsibility to handle cases involving drug using offenders through comprehensive supervision, drug testing, judicial

monitoring, treatment services, immediate sanctions, and incentives. Drug courts bring the full weight of all intervenors to deal

with their substance abuse problems. That means judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, substance abuse treatment specialists, probation officers, law enforcement and corrections personnel, educational and vocational experts, community leaders, and others.

In addition, they ensure consistency in judicial decisionmaking

and enhance the coordination of agencies and resources increasing

the cost effectiveness of programs. The design and structure of

drug court programs are developed at the local level to reflect the

unique strengths, circumstances, and capacities of each community.

Since 1989, the drug court phenomena has been sweeping the Nation. It is very difficult to get a hard number because as we speak,

drug courts are being created. We know that there are easily over

700 that are existing or in the planning stages. Sometimes it is

hard to know exactly where we are within those numbers.

Since 1989, approximately 200,000 persons have actually entered

drug court programs. Many of these programs have achieved remarkable success in reducing the levels of drug abuse, incarceration, and criminal recidivism among drug using offenders. That

interest is heightened by the realization that these same offenders

would otherwise clog our court calendars, strain our treasuries, and

flood our jails and prisons.

In 1997, the General Accounting Office reported that over 70 percent of those who entered drug court programs since 1989 have either successfully completed their programs or are still currently

participating. General Barry McCaffrey, Director, Office of National

Drug Control Policy, has stated, ‘‘The establishment of drug courts

with their judicial leadership constitutes one of the most monumental changes in social justice in this country since World War

II.’’

More recently, Columbia University’s National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse has provided the first major academic review and analysis of drug court research to date and Dr. Steven

Belenko is here and will speak specifically to that at a later moment.

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Drug courts make sense as a single drug court judge and dedicated program staff apply a direct, immediate and personal approach to the drug offender handling all drug cases from start to

finish. Court procedures are adapted to reflect the realities of the

offender’s substance abuse, a cost effective approach to the use of

sanctions and incentives is applied, and coordinated programs are

created for all participants, not just the offender. All participants

are held accountable for their performance and government agencies and community organizations work together as part of a unified drug court system.

With almost 80 percent of arrestees testing positive for illegal

substances, drug courts and drug testing are logical modifications

of the traditional criminal justice system. Drug courts, in fact,

mark a turning back of the judicial time clock to a time when

judges ran their own calendars and were responsible for their

court’s operations. Defendants had to answer directly and immediately to the judge for their conduct, and cases moved slowly and

purposefully through the judicial system instead of relying on negotiated pleas and other structures to speed up the court process.

I would like to add that this extraordinary phenomena is a nonpartisan phenomena. Both Democrats and Republicans have

strongly supported it, Conservatives and Liberals as well. I would

add it has been endorsed by the National District Attorneys Association as well as the National Sheriffs Association and on the

other side, the National Legal Aid and Public Defender Associations.

For those who think of drug courts as perhaps being soft on

crime, I might add that of the judges who have been drug court

judges and are drug court judges, 58 percent are former prosecutors, while only 23 percent are former defense attorneys.

Drug courts are providing a model for other kinds of court involved, community based programs such as DUI drug courts, drug

courts that deal with multiple DUI offenders, mental illness courts

that deal with those who are duly diagnosed, domestic violence offenders and juvenile and family drug court participants and finally,

most recently, reentry drug courts which actually deal with offenders who are leaving jails or prisons and enter drug courts as a

means to monitor their behavior and also to provide rehabilitation

services to them.

Finally, I wanted to indicate that this idea, system, or approach

has spread now to the international community. There is an International Association of Drug Court Professionals. The United Nations Drug Control Program has developed its own standards for

drug courts and there are some six nations now that have drug

courts besides the United States and 12 more that are in the planning stages.

We believe this is an extraordinary phenomena and one we hope

this committee and the Congress will continue to support.

Thank you very much for your patience.

[The prepared statement of Judge Tauber follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you, Judge Tauber.

I would now like to welcome the Honorable Charles Hynes, District Attorney, Kings County, NY.

Mr. HYNES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Ose. I

surely want to thank Chairman Mica and Congresswoman Mink

and the other members of the committee, and my distinguished colleague from Brooklyn, Ed Towns, for the opportunity to speak to

this committee about our drug treatment as an alternative to prison.

I have copies of the annual report which I have submitted and

I would like to touch on a few highlights of the program. My county

is known to most people as Brooklyn and is the largest county in

New York State. It has 2.3 million people, the seventh largest

county in the United States and were it a city, it would be the

fourth largest.

At the time I became district attorney in 1990, our slogan was, ‘‘Brooklyn, a nice place to visit, a great place to live,’’ a cruel joke

because by 1990, Brooklyn had become the fifth most violent municipality in the United States per capita. There were 765 murders

in Brooklyn in 1990, more than 2 a day. There were 36,000 armed

robberies, 39,000 burglaries and nearly 55,000 larcenies. Obviously,

anybody looking at the problem knew it was fueled by drugs. It

was out of control and there didn’t seem to be any way of looking

at this other than a jail being only solution.

It was a decision I made in 1990 that we had to do something

about reducing the demand for drugs in society. So we had to do

something about ending the revolving door that literally had people

going to jail for life on the installment plan, getting arrested, going

to jail, getting out, going back to the neighborhood without a job,

getting arrested again, and off they go to jail and so on.

We decided to try a coercive form of rehabilitation, that people

who were charged with selling drugs for their own drug habit

would have a choice, come into our program, go into long-term drug

rehabilitation, 15 to 24 months, and if you successfully complete it,

we will give you something you have never had before, an education opportunity or a job opportunity.

I hired a job developer, and worked with a business advisory

council in Brooklyn to identify jobs for these graduates. If you don’t

do it, or leave the program, we have an enforcement theme that

will pick you up and when 96 percent effective within 9 days on

the average, you will plead guilty before we will put you into the

program to a felony that sends you to prison for as much as 9

years. If you get caught after leaving the program, you are going

back to prison, or you are going to prison and will get no credit for

any time served in the program.

Ten years after this program started, I am proud that it is a successful model which I am very grateful to Congressman Mica for

considering legislation to advance it for other prosecutors throughout the country.

It is controlled by the prosecutors, and is very selective about

who we take. Typically, we take one in three. These are all people

who are facing a second felony offense, a minimum of 2–1/3 to 4

years in prison and up to 4 to 9 years in prison. We have had the

toughest laws in the country called the Rockefeller drug laws. We

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followed those laws up with mandatory minimum sentences for second felony offenders. The problem has been that we have had no

alternative to the use of those programs. There was no opportunity

to have people try another way. We think the drug treatment alternative is that other way.

No one with any history of violence is permitted into the program, no one with a history of absconding is allowed in the program, no one with any very serious psychiatric problems—we are

beginning to deal with the problems of those affected in a dual way

with psychiatric problems but we are very careful as to who we put

into the program.

If the person successfully completes the 15 to 24 months in drug

treatment and is in job development, we then dismiss the felony

charge. The enforcement team is a critical part of this effort as well

as the fact that we have job opportunities.

We compared a study of recidivism and our graduates have a 23

percent recidivism rate as compared to 47 percent of those who go

to prison who are eligible for our program but don’t accept it. It

cuts the recidivism rate in half.

Its retention rate for 1 year is 66 percent, much higher than the

national average and 60 percent of our participants who have graduated are still in treatment.

DTAP is a money saver. It helps our graduates find jobs because

of our job training program and 92 percent of our employable graduates are working or in some form of job training programs. Of the

441 graduates, they have saved the taxpayers of New York State

over $16 million in reduced costs for incarceration, health care, and

public assistance and with their increased tax revenues based on

their jobs.

DTAP is less costly than incarceration. A typical drug offender

in New York State, spending 2 years in prison, will cost our taxpayers $82,000 for that period. In the same period, a drug treatment placement costs $42,000. The saving in prison cost is at minimum, $11 million during the period of the program.

DTAP has credibility with other prosecutors. All of the other four

district attorney offices in New York City are using the program as

is our citywide Special Narcotics Prosecutor.

I am very confident that based on the track record, DTAP can

be successful in other States because it has shown a high retention

rate, lower recidivism rates, and cost savings of millions of dollars.

As I have said to Congressman Mica and his staff, I would be more

than happy to help any other jurisdiction in this country to create

their own DTAP initiative.

I would be happy to take any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hynes follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony.

We have been joined by the gentleman from Brooklyn, with

whom I have had the honor and privilege of working together on

this subcommittee and other subcommittees. One of which he

chaired visited Brooklyn under his chairmanship and also recently

conducted a hearing in New York City at his request; the gentleman from New York, Mr. Towns. You are recognized if you want

to make a statement or proceed in any way at this point.

Mr. TOWNS. I would like to insert my statement in the record but

I would also like to say to the witnesses, especially my friend from

Brooklyn, the District Attorney Joe Hynes, that we know of his

great work, so I am happy to hear his testimony. I will just hold

any further statements until the question and answer period.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, your statement will be made a part

of the record.

First of all, in the video we saw, Mr. Tauber, at the end it said

the drug courts had an 80 percent success rate. Is that an accurate

statement?

Judge TAUBER. It is very difficult to give statistical analysis. I

am going to leave that to Dr. Belenko. For one thing, every community is so different that to ascribe a specific ratio, to compare

Brooklyn to Scarsdale, for example, you have very different populations, different drugs of choice, and the level of addiction can be

very different. I don’t feel like I personally ought to respond to

that. I will allow Dr. Belenko to do that.

Mr. MICA. Is there any percentage you would care to provide for

the subcommittee as far as the success rate through the drug

courts, 50 percent, 25 percent? Is there any collection of data that

is available that would substantiate some success?

Judge TAUBER. Yes, I think there is. There have been a number

of studies completed. One study by the Government Accounting Office looked at those persons who have entered drug courts since

1989 and found that over 70 percent have either successfully graduated from the program or were still actively participating.

It is interesting to note; American University revised or looked

at that data again since 1997 in 1999 and found the numbers were

consistently over 70 percent.

I also think Dr. Belenko can speak to this better than I but in

his statistics, he shows that of those who do not enter drug courts

but enter treatment, half leave within 90 days. When you look at

drug courts, 60 percent of those who enter are still in drug courts

after a year, which shows an extraordinary retention rate. All the

scientific data and investigation I have ever seen has created a direct correlation between the length of time a person stays in treatment and the success of that person in the program and the length

of sobriety they enjoy afterwards. On those two bases, we can see

there have been great successes in drug courts.

In my own drug court we found that we had half the number of

days persons spent in custody over the 3-years following drug

courts and as a matter of fact, double those who succeeded and

graduated from the program. Once again, that is just one program

and was a number of years ago.

I think more significantly Dr. Michael Finigan from the University of Oregon did a cost benefit analysis of the Portland Drug

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Court which has been around since 1992 and found that for every

dollar spent in the drug court, the county was saving $2.50. When

he looked at the State savings, he found some $10 saved for every

$1 saved.

There is one other point I would like to make in that regard. The

typical drug court costs approximately $2,000 to $2,500 a year per

participant. The typical jail and/or prison starts at $20,000 to

$25,000 per year to incarcerate. Clearly, there is a very strong cost

savings element as well.

Mr. MICA. The other question I would have would be what percentage of those involved in committing some type of a drug offense

are eligible for drug courts?

Judge TAUBER. Drug courts are a grassroots phenomena. That is

where its strength is. They reflect their communities politically,

economically as well as otherwise, so it is very difficult to describe

to you the population that is going to get in because in one community, honestly, it will be persons charged with possession of small

amounts of drugs, and in other communities, they will be dealing

with people charged with burglaries, minor felonies, and others

who are not even charged with drug offenses but where it is clear

the offense is related to drugs.

Mr. MICA. Are they designed for first time offenders and also for

minor offenses?

Judge TAUBER. They started out in Miami dealing specifically

with divertees and first-time offenders. As they have become more

successful, and as they have proven themselves in places like Las

Vegas, San Bernardino, CA, they have gone from small programs

with 100 or 75 persons in San Bernardino to where Judge Pat Morris now has some 1,400 in his drug court or Las Vegas where they

started out with 100 persons and now have 1,800.

By the way, the Nevada Governor has instituted and passed legislation so that individuals presently in prison for drug offenses,

some 300 this next year are expected to be released into the drug

court rather than go to parole because the drug court has proven

more successful than parole and is far cheaper.

Mr. MICA. I have additional questions but I would like to yield

to the ranking member, Mrs. Mink.

Mrs. MINK. Judge Tauber, the system that we have in existence

switched from giving courts discretion in sentencing to a huge

array of mandatory minimums. In the drug court situation, how

does that system circumvent the mandatory minimum requirement

that the States impose upon the conviction of individuals for certain very specific crimes?

Judge TAUBER. Many States don’t have mandatories or if they

do, judges are able to sentence people to jail or prison and to suspend the sentence and allow them to enter the drug court program

with the condition that if they successfully complete the program,

the probation will be terminated or the sentence will not be served.

There are several kinds of drug courts. One is a diversion court

which goes back to Miami which is a pre-plea court and most recently, we are seeing more and more, perhaps 70 percent, of courts

now are post-plea courts dealing with more serious offenders and

many, many courts, perhaps the majority of courts, have both diVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:51 Apr 04, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\70058.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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vergent courts dealing with light, first offenders and post-plea

courts dealing with more serious offenders.

Mrs. MINK. My question was, in jurisdictions where you have

minimum mandatories, how do you overcome those statutes in existence and place individuals who have pleaded guilty into this program rather than serve their minimum mandatory jail sentence?

Judge TAUBER. I couldn’t respond except to say that there are

drug courts in every State in the Union.

Mrs. MINK. They are not abiding by the law?

Judge TAUBER. I can tell you there are 110 drug courts in California and I think there is one in Rhode Island.

Mrs. MINK. I realize that. I am just wondering how they get

started under the circumstances of these prior existing

mandatories.

Mr. HYNES. Can I help out because we have mandatory sentencing in New York State.

Mrs. MINK. So do we in Hawaii and I have a drug court. I was

wondering how they balance it.

Mr. HYNES. Preindictment, I have total authority in my county.

Mrs. MINK. Is that by statute?

Mr. HYNES. Yes.

Mrs. MINK. So the legislature, in my case, would have to pass a

law which says that the courts would have the right.

Mr. HYNES. Once there is an indictment, there is no discretion

in New York, so I do it pre-indictment.

Mrs. MINK. Or you don’t require them to plead guilty?

Mr. HYNES. No, I require them to plead guilty to a State or Supreme Court information but it is pre-indictment, so I retain the

discretion.

Judge TAUBER. There is a drug court in Brooklyn that I believe,

Mr. Hynes. Do they use the same procedure?

Mr. HYNES. Yes.

Mrs. MINK. I think that in order for people to understand exactly

what the drug court is, we have to be able to explain how an individual is selected for the program. Some go to jail, some go to drug

court. What is the definition between those two areas? Obviously

it is better to be in drug court. Obviously it works better, obviously

it is cheaper for the government. The question is, are there statutory steps that must be taken.

In the selection process, we have to be very careful that we are

not selecting people out by various factors of discrimination. I believe it works. We went to see one in Hawaii as it is practiced. The

foundations of it seem somewhat hazy, as to exactly how the program distinguishes between those that go to jail and those that

don’t.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I would like to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. I have a couple of questions on the testimony from District Attorney Hynes. There is a phrase in here that I didn’t understand on page 2. I know what the word means in normal language.

I don’t quite understand it in this context. It says, ‘‘The program

is offered only to non-violent, predicate drug offenders for a certain

punishment.’’ What does that word mean?

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Mr. HYNES. Predicate means they have been previously convicted

of a sale of drugs for their own habit. If you remember the young

fellow who testified before you and the rest of the committee several months ago, Fred Cohen; he was someone who had been convicted of selling drugs for his own habit. Then he got arrested

again. He was a predicate offender. New York State law has a

mandatory jail sentence unless I exercise discretion pre-indictment.

Mr. OSE. The second question I have, I noticed in your testimony

you highlight a recidivism rate of 23 percent and a retention rate

of 66 percent.

Mr. HYNES. Yes.

Mr. OSE. I am hopeful that you can explain. If I understand, the

recidivism rate is someone who has been through the program and

a retention rate is someone who is in the program?

Mr. HYNES. Within the first year of the program, the retention

rate is 66 percent.

Mr. OSE. Retention rate meaning?

Mr. HYNES. Staying in the program.

Mr. OSE. So they are clean, have stayed in the program for a

year, two-thirds of the people have complied. So one-third have

not?

Mr. HYNES. Yes, which to the national average is like 12–15 percent retention rate for this population.

Mr. OSE. In terms of a non-drug court.

Mr. HYNES. For this population in non-drug court. These are the

people who have hit bottom, Mr. Ose. This is their last chance.

Mr. OSE. Pre-indictment?

Mr. HYNES. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. The recidivism rate is people who have completed the

program whether it be drug court or non-drug court and it is 23

percent?

Mr. HYNES. Our population is 23 percent for the drug treatment

alternative to prison.

Mr. OSE. I think District Attorney Hynes said there is a retention rate in treatment of 50 percent and courts, 66 percent. The

treatment you are referring to there, would that be private treatment?

Mr. HYNES. It is not 50 percent.

Mr. OSE. I have lost the reference. I will come back to that.

Judge Tauber, if I understand correctly, your testimony is ‘‘District Attorney Hynes very clearly says that 96 percent of the absconders are returned to court in a median time of 9 days.’’ Your

testimony says, ‘‘The failure to appear rate has dropped from 36

percent to 3 percent.’’ So that would be consistent. You would be

at 97 percent and he is at 96 percent.

Mr. HYNES. It is a different population, Congressman.

Judge TAUBER. It is a different population. I think different parameters as well.

Mr. OSE. You talk here in terms of a drug court?

Judge TAUBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. Talking about the rate at which people fail to appear.

You are talking about the DTAP program where the prosecutors

have control?

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Mr. HYNES. These are people actually in treatment, residential

treatment. The coercive part of it is if they leave the program, they

are picked up.

Let me say a word about the drug court. I was not a great fan

initially of the drug court. I am now convinced that the drug court

is an exceptionally efficient way to do cases in my county for misdemeanors and a selected number of felonies, so we are very satisfied with the success of our drug court in Brooklyn.

Mr. OSE. I want to make clear that the appearance rate under

the prosecutor-driven process is 96 percent and the appearance

rate within a 9-day median under the Drug Corp is different.

Mr. HYNES. Let me try and explain. When someone leaves my

program, they are in Daytop Village and are in the middle of their

15 or 20 month stay at Daytop Village. If they leave, there is a 96

percent chance they are going to be grabbed within 9 days. So 96

percent of the people who left our program are picked up within

a median time of 9 days. They are in the program and they just

walk off.

Mr. OSE. Those are the only questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Mr. MICA. I would be pleased to recognize the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Schakowsky.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you very much.

I am not an attorney but I was a State legislator and there was

a period where we were every other day passing some kind of mandatory minimum sentence relating to drugs. Like my colleague

from Hawaii, I am a bit confused about the interface between these

mandatory minimum sentences and this alternative programming.

Am I to understand that what really matters here is what people

end up being charged with, what the indictment is, and that there

is discretion there. Once there has been an indictment, if there is

a mandatory minimum, there is no way around it?

Mr. HYNES. In New York state, once we have an indictment, we

lose discretion.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. What we are talking about here is the prosecutor’s discretion? Is that what enables this?

Mr. HYNES. They need our involvement in the drug court. We

have to agree to it. We are a partner in the DTAP program. We

totally control the process because we are dealing with a much

more severe kind of population.

Under the State constitution in New York State, the district attorney is the chief law enforcement officer of the county. He or she

decides who is going to be prosecuted and under what charge.

Using that authority before indictment, I exercise discretion. Once

we get an indictment, I have lost discretion.

Ms. Schakowsky. I understand that.

Judge TAUBER. I might add. It may not sound like a very satisfactory answer but there are 50 States and every one of them has

a different statutory setup. Drug courts have managed to find ways

to deal with mandatories to my knowledge in every one of them.

In some places, it is like New York where you have to move either preindictment. Washington, DC, the place where they find

room to maneuver is between the time of plea and the time of sentence because once a person is sentenced, they must be sentenced

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to a mandatory minimum. So they enter the person into the drug

court at the time of plea and the person is not sentenced until they

complete the program or flunk out.

I guess what I am suggesting is that there is flexibility in systems. We would like more flexibility from the State legislators but

drug courts have been able to operate.

One of our disappointments is that perhaps we are reaching 3 or

4 percent of the eligible population throughout the United States.

There are some 2 million persons placed on probation, according to

the Bureau of Justice statistics for drug and alcohol offenses who,

BJA determined or concluded, have a serious drug or alcohol problem. Of that, we have perhaps 250,000 involved in these programs.

We would like to see drug courts expand because as they are proving themselves, it is important they have that opportunity.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Let me ask you this, because I think that is

an important piece of it. Who gets chosen and how does that happen? I am wondering if we have a profile of those individuals who

are diverted from the usual incarceration? Is it a middle class phenomenon, are we talking also a proportionate number of people of

color?

Judge TAUBER. This is my standard response; it depends on the

community. In communities where such is open, let me give Oakland as an example. The persons entering the program were 80

percent African American males, because that reflected those persons being charged with possession for small amounts of drugs,

typically crack-cocaine or other serious drugs. People were actually

diverted under the California statute out of the regular system in

California.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. By statute, you say?

Judge TAUBER. By statute.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. People who might be eligible are nonviolent.

Judge TAUBER. I can tell you book and footnote about California,

that is one State. I could not do that for New York, but in California if you did not have a prior felony, did not have prior drug conviction for 5 years, and if you were not charged with an offense

that involved sales or violence, you were eligible for diversion.

Hawaii, I am quite certain, has a very different setup but drug

courts, the genius of them, is that they are community-based and

that individual communities find what populations are appropriate.

That may be very different depending on the politics, resources,

and the socioeconomic background of that community.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you.

Mr. Hynes did you have a comment on that?

Mr. HYNES. It depends where the program fits. In Kings County,

a very high percentage of our client population are Latinos, the

largest population of participants are people of color. If it was in

Jefferson County or Clinton County in the north country, it would

be all Caucasian. The client population are drug addicts who typically come from impoverished situations, little or no education, almost no jobs and they have drifted into this lifestyle.

We eliminate people charged with violent felonies, those who

have serious prior absconding records and we try and select people

we believe have a real interest in turning around their lives. We

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are very, very careful in the screening process. I think that is key

because we are dealing with a population that has hit rock bottom.

Representative Mink was here when Fred Cohen testified before

this panel. Here was a kid who for 20 years was in the gutter. He

now makes $45,000 a year and pays taxes on that, has a wife and

two kids but he was so bad, he used to take glasine envelopes and

sniff them to try to get residue to get high. It was a tragic problem,

but today he is actually the President of our drug treatment association.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. I want to thank our panelists. You bring to the Congress and to our subcommittee several alternatives to incarceration. One is the drug court program which has been successful in

many jurisdictions; second, being the DTAP Program, which again

does offer some alternative and both good examples of what we can

do.

Unfortunately, these only address a small percentage of the population we have to deal with, but they do provide us with some

positive alternatives and steps that hopefully can be replicated.

Mr. HYNES. May I close with two points? First, thank you, Congressman Mica, for having the foresight to introduce this kind of

legislation. You are right, it is not an extraordinarily large population. As I said to a good friend of mine and a Member of Congress

10 years ago when he said, ‘‘what is it, a damned 100 people?’’ I

said, ‘‘it is a damned 100 people we have never tired to cure.’’

We have 441 taxpayers out of that program and I am very proud

of them and pleased and grateful to you, Congressman Mica, for

this opportunity.

Mr. MICA. Thank you both and we look forward to working with

you and hopefully we can replicate these successful programs

across the country.

We will call our second panel which consists of Steven Belenko,

senior research associate, National Center of Addiction and Substance Abuse, Columbia University, New York; Dr. Sally L. Satel,

adjunct scholar, American Enterprise Institute here in Washington,

DC; and Mr. Martin Iguchi, co-director, Drug Policy Research Center, RAND Corp., Santa Monica, CA. I am pleased to welcome all

three of our witness.

If you will stand at this time to be sworn and raise your right

hands. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to

give before this subcommittee of Congress is the whole truth and

nothing but the truth?

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]

Mr. MICA. The witnesses answered in the affirmative.

We will hear first from Steven Belenko, senior research associate, National Center of Addiction and Substance Abuse, Columbia

University, New York. Welcome and you are recognized.

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STATEMENTS OF STEVEN BELENKO, SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, NATIONAL CENTER OF ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE

ABUSE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY; DR. SALLY L. SATEL, M.D.,

ADJUNCT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE,

WASHINGTON, DC; AND MARTIN IGUCHI, CO-DIRECTOR,

DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, RAND CORP., SANTA

MONICA, CA

Mr. BELENKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to come before you this morning and

talk about my research on drug courts and innovative prosecution

programs.

I have been studying the impact of drugs on the justice system,

including policy and programmatic responses to this problem, for

some 15 years. During the past 8 years, I have had a particular

interest in drug courts and have visited many around the country,

studied their impacts and reviewed a number of research reports

and evaluations on their effectiveness.

In addition, for the past 5 years, I have been conducting an extensive evaluation of the Kings County DTAP Program under a

grant from the National Institute on Drug Abuse.

My remarks will center on two areas, one, the lessons learned

thus far about the operations and effectiveness of drug courts and

the potential role of prosecutorial based treatment in saving tax

dollars by introducing treatment to other segments of the criminal

justice population.

The first program was implemented in Dade County in 1989. The

current generation of treatment drug courts has established an important presence in America’s criminal court system. In many jurisdiction, drug courts have become the intervention of choice for linking drug or alcohol-involved offenders to community-based treatment and related interventions.

The key goals of drug courts are to reduce drug use and associated criminal behavior by engaging and retaining drug involved offenders in treatment and related services. Also, to concentrate expertise about drug abuse and addiction and treatment into a single

courtroom under a single judge and staff, and to address other defendant needs through case management and clinical assessment.

The question of whether drug courts should be thought of as coerced treatment is an interesting one but difficult to answer. Drug

courts are generally considered voluntary in that offenders generally have the right to accept or decline participation once

screened for eligibility and to have their case prosecuted through

regular channels.

Some drug courts also allow offenders an opportunity to opt out

of the drug court after a week or two of trying it out with no loss

of legal rights. However, there are some coercive elements to the

drug court experience which may help to explain their success in

retaining offenders.

For example, defendants may feel subtle or direct pressure to

participate in drug court because of fears of the consequences of

prosecution. Also the close judicial supervision and monitoring, regular drug testing, and graduated sanctions typical of drug courts

may be considered coercive in their own right.

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Also the immediacy of sanctions imposed in most drug courts,

unlike sanctions imposed under probation or parole supervision,

may increase the relevance and behavioral impact of judicial responses.

When interviewed, participants have noted the importance of the

certainty, the swiftness and the predictability of the sanctions for

noncompilant behaviors.

My review of drug court research is based on an article I produced in 1998 which was published in the National Drug Court Institute Review in which I reviewed about 30 existing evaluations.

I recently updated that and that will be out shortly in a new issue

of the National Drug Court Institute Review. I have reviewed another 30 evaluations so my remarks and assessment about drug

court impacts is based on review of those 60 evaluations, as well

as the GAO report from 1997 and periodic surveys of drug courts

conducted by American University Drug Court Clearinghouse.

The structure and procedures in drug courts do result in closer

and more frequent supervision of offenders than typically seen

under standard probation or pretrial supervision. The data indicate

that a number of court appearances, number of drug tests, the level

of supervision and the contacts with treatment providers are substantially more frequent under drug court law than under other

forms of community supervision.

The drug court model also differs in important ways from previous efforts to provide drug treatment of offenders. The various

components of the criminal justice and substance abuse treatment

systems work together to try and use the coercive power of the

court to promote abstinence and pro social behavior, as well as

treatment retention.

By comparison, the types of nonviolent drug offenders typically

targeted by drug courts will often receive probation or short jail

sentence with little treatment or close supervision in the community. In addition, drug courts often seek to standardize the treatment process by requiring discrete treatment phases, a minimum

length of program involvement or specific requirements for the

quantity and type of services. This structure offers an opportunity

for the judicial officer to monitor compliance with the drug court

requirements, provide rewards for advancing through different

phases or participating in certain levels of treatment in a way that

can be quantified. That is predictable for the participant.

Some of my key conclusions are, first of all, in terms of drug use

and treatment history, there is some discussion about the type of

population generally served by drug courts. As Judge Tauber pointed out, there is a lot of local variation in the target populations but

trying to generalize across the country, drug courts generally serve

a clientele that do have extensive histories of substance abuse, but

little prior treatment.

The average age of adult drug court participants is in the early

30’s, as it is in the DTAP Program, and they have been using illegal drugs for some 10 to 15 years.

In the survey conducted by the American University Clearinghouse of drug court participants, only 26 percent of the participants

had been in a prior substance abuse treatment program, although

72 percent had been in jail or prison. These rates are similar for

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overall rates for both treatment participation and prior incarceration found in surveys of arrestees. Similarly for surveys of probationers.

In terms of treatment retention, I think that a key impact of

drug courts as well as the DTAP Program has been its ability to

retain offenders in treatment. The research on drug treatment outcomes has consistently found that time in treatment is closely related to successful outcomes, including reduced relapse and reduced

criminal behavior.

I estimate nationally about 60 percent of those who enter drug

courts are still in treatment after 1 year, although most drug

courts require a minimum program length of 1 year. The percentage of all admissions who actually graduate from drug courts is a

little bit lower than that 60 percent figure. The GAO report in 1997

estimated that 48 percent of those who enter drug courts graduate.

My conclusion is that is probably a little low but generally around

50 percent of those who enter drug courts would be expected to

graduate.

These retention and completion rates are substantially higher

than seen in studies of community based treatment programs.

In terms of drug use and criminal behavior while under drug

court supervision, the existing research suggests that drug court

participants have a low rate of drug use as measured by urine tests

which indicates high rate of program compliance. For example, for

13 drug courts reporting test results in 1998, an average of only

10 percent of those tests were positive for illegal drugs, in contrast

to drug tests of other defendants in those jurisdictions under probation supervision where the positive rate was 31 percent.

In terms of recidivism, a number of drug court evaluations have

found that rearrest rates were substantially reduced while offenders are under drug court supervision.

There are probably four or five evaluations that have looked at

the costs and benefit of drug courts, although they have used different measures, different time periods and it is hard to generalize.

But all have found in one area or another reduced costs and the

data thus far suggest that for the long term, drug court economic

benefits will outweigh the costs.

The study was done by Dr. Michael Finigan in Oregon and he

did find substantial local and State taxpayer savings as measured

with a number of outcome measures from that drug court.

A key issue in drug courts is their effect on recidivism and public

safety. The studies I have reviewed thus far, 21 of those evaluations have examined post program recidivism generally measured

by rearrest and generally for a time period of 1 year after completing the drug court. Of those 21 evaluations that have also used a

comparison group from which we can measure the relative impact

of drug courts, 16 of those studies found that the drug court reduced rearrest for those who went through the system, looking at

everyone who went into the drug court, not just those who successfully graduated. The size of that impact does vary across jurisdictions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Belenko follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony.

We will now recognize Dr. Satel.

Dr. SATEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am also a staff psychiatrist at a local substance abuse clinic,

and worked in the D.C. Drug Court a few years ago.

I was asked to talk to you today about the clinical aspects of

mandated treatment and why it works. It certainly does work as

volumes of data can confirm. How can this be? How can it be that

drug abusers, many of whom actually have little interest in going

into the treatment—that is something you don’t hear a lot about

but many of these folks are not interested in treatment at first.

They are interested in either avoiding the mark on their record or

avoiding potential jail or probation. That is why they choose it. So

how can people who don’t have that much interest in treatment

benefit from it? How is it that drug abusers can respond when they

are told by the criminal justice system that they either participate

in this program or something bad will happen to them, they will

either go to jail or get a record?

A lot of people can’t believe that addicts who enter treatment

unwillingly or halfheartedly can still benefit as much or more than

addicts who show up freely at a clinic and ask to be admitted. This

reality forces us to rethink one of the most trusted fictions in drug

treatment; that a person has to want to get better in order to benefit from treatment. That is the fiction that drug courts and other

forms of mandated treatment put to rest.

The main reason that mandated treatment works is that it keeps

people in longer. You have heard that before. Retention is key, the

longer one stays, the better one does, the better health, the less

drug use, the less crime, the more employment. Addicts who are

levered into treatment do tend to stay longer. This is for two reasons.

First, they stay longer because as I said before, the alternative

in their eyes can be worse, but later because they really do see the

benefits of treatment at the work programs they participate in or

the educational programs which do help them feel more confident

and more encouraged about their future. They feel physically better

and they often get reabsorbed into the warmth of their families,

something they have been estranged from for quite a while.

I have introduced dozens of drug court patients and not all, but

a lot of them are enthusiastic from day one, but many of them are

not. One might say they weren’t happy campers when they came

into the program but the longer they stayed, the rehabilitation

made sense to them. In other words, they stay at first because they

have to, but ultimately they complete it, most of them, about 50 to

60 percent, because they want to.

Ultimately, without some sort of leverage, the standard dropout

rate is very large. We have heard this already and refer to it as

the retention deficit disorder. About half drop out in the first 3

months and at the end of 1 year, between 1 and 10 and 1 and 20

remain.

When you think about the psychology of addiction, these dropout

rates make perfect sense. Residents who enter a therapeutic community may rebel against the rigid structure and the deprivation

of getting high. A lot of addicts are very ambivalent about giving

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up drugs, as destructive as they have been. There is a powerful

psychological force pulling them back to the street.

Even patients with strong motivation make experience flagging

resolve or intense drug cravings or they feel better and think they

either can handle life drug free or that they can handle their drugs.

Either way, they leave. Self discipline, as you know, is not a strong

suit of this population. Again, when mandated to residential or

community treatment, the patient can’t succumb to these pressures

and bolt without consequences.

In summary, these observations and the objective data that support them tell us some very important things. First, they expose

two myths about addiction. The first is that in order to benefit from

treatment, all patients have to want it. Second, to benefit from

treatment, a patient has to hit bottom. We can catch people before

they hit bottom and hopefully you do because otherwise, there are

diseases to catch and overdoses to be suffered.

Second, for treatment to work, patients have to stay in it and one

of the best ways to get hard core addicts to stay is through leverage. As a clinician, I am certainly happy for all the leverage I can

get. It is very good to have an outsider like a judge calling the

shots with swift and certain consequences so that I don’t wait my

time getting caught up in negotiations with patients about the

rules of compliance. The rules are spelled out, and my job is to

work collaboratively with the patient to help him conform and

progress.

When drug courts work well, they really represent a marriage

between the so-called moral and medical models of addiction. The

moral model is punishment, sanctions, and that drug users should

be held accountable with no assistance. The medical model, on the

other hand, is all help with no expectation of accountability for the

patient. I reject both of them out right.

We know that neither of these alone are especially useful. In

other words, addicts who are incarcerated frequently relapse once

they are out of jail, but that hard core patients who enter treatment 1 day are very likely to bolt the next. Together the moral and

medical elements complement each other for an optimal chance to

help addicted men and women.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Satel follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony.

We will hear next from Martin Iguchi with the RAND Corp. from

Santa Monica, CA. You are recognized.

Mr. IGUCHI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this

opportunity to testify.

My name is Martin Iguchi. I am a senior behavioral scientist and

co-director of the Drug Policy Research Center at RAND. I am also

a psychologist. My specialty over the past decade has been in development and evaluation of drug treatment, drug treatment outcomes, as well as evaluation of different policy initiatives such as

drug treatment on demand.

Most recently, we have been also working with L.A. County Probation to set up a DUI Court in Los Angeles, so we have quite a

bit of experience in this area.

While the statement is based on research conducted at RAND,

the opinions and conclusions are mine and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any other agency sponsoring our research. I ask that my full written statement be entered

into the record.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to comment on the use of

treatment as an alternative to incarceration as I believe that drug

courts and other diversion alternatives are exciting and valuable

innovations by the criminal justice system. My colleagues and I

have had an opportunity to study this relatively new phenomenon

and while I may be counted as a supporter of such courts, I do have

a few comments about problems that may arise in implementation.

Over the past several decades, lawmakers in the United States

have responded to the drug epidemic with tougher laws and longer

sentences in an attempt to deter drug use. The increase in drug

cases has resulted in seriously overloaded judicial dockets and a

need for reasoned alternatives.

In 1992, the Drug Policy Research Center conducted a drug policy seminar game involving public officials in Florida and Washington, DC, that anticipated such a scenario. The players in that policy game focused, as we are today, on the need to provide drug

treatment for those involved in the criminal justice system. This

emphasis was consistent with our drug policy modeling work that

indicated treatment might well be a more cost effective way to

spend additional funds intended to reduce cocaine use than other

such options as domestic enforcement, interdiction or source country control.

However, as the drug policy game progressed, players came to realize that they had focused exclusively on the benefits of treatment

as an alternative to incarceration with no thought given to the possible negative outcomes associated with the approach in a larger

context.

Specifically, they came to realize given the limited availability of

treatment slots for those convicted of crimes and those not, they

had created a policy that could be characterized as ‘‘use a gun, get

a treatment slot.’’

Now I don’t mean to overstate the negative here as it is clear

that many communities, such as Brooklyn, NY, have been able to

implement drug courts without overburdening their drug treatment

system.

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I do want to raise the issue, however, that we need to be certain

there is sufficient treatment capacity to support the increase in

drug treatment demand. We do not want those voluntarily seeking

treatment to be deprived of the opportunity for treatment because

the slot is filled with an individual mandated to it.

To highlight how damaging such a scenario might be, I offer a

short anecdote. A colleague of mine runs a drug education outreach

and intervention program in south central Los Angeles. This colleague spends a great deal of time educating young men and

women about the dangers of drug use and the advantages of abstinence.

Recently, after multiple interactions, he finally convinced two

young men to consider treatment for their drug use problem. Unfortunately, my colleague was unable to locate a treatment program with available slots for the two young men. The only publicly

funded treatment slots available were set aside for juvenile probationers. This scenario is a tragic one. We need to be certain that

we expand treatment in parallel with the development of drug

courts so that every person who wants drug treatment can find it.

As a second and related issue, not all who participate in drug use

in drug courts are screened to determine if they meet the diagnostic criteria for drug dependence. While this comment does not

apply to research rich programs such as the Brooklyn Drug-Treatment Alternative to Prison Programs, many programs are not as

discriminating. This means that many individuals are sent to drug

treatment who do not require it, putting additional pressure on an

often overburdened system of care.

My third comment has to do with the question, ‘‘who should run

drug courts, prosecutors or judges?’’ A number of drug courts are

operated by the prosecutor’s office rather than by judges. While I

do not question the integrity of prosecuting attorneys, some public

defenders and defense attorneys have voiced concern that prosecutors might be tempted to offer access to drug courts only to those

who are ‘‘cooperative.’’

While the functional and daily operational characteristic of prosecutor courts appear identical to drug courts run by judges, I want

to provide a word of caution about the importance of avoiding perceptions of pressure on defendants. For that reason, it seems reasonable that judges and not prosecutors should be in charge of drug

courts.

Finally, I want to say that I have been most impressed by the

dedicated and enthusiastic efforts put forth by those involved in

both the judicial and treatment communities to make drug courts

around the country work. While drug courts are clearly responsible

for a decrease in the pressures of overcrowded court dockets, the

daily workloads of everyone involved in drug courts has actually increased.

So what leads these dedicated professionals to give so much more

of themselves for drug court? The answer from all involved appears

to be that the idea of restorative justice or therapeutic jurisprudence is a hopeful one in a context that breeds cynicism.

I attended a drug court graduation ceremony in Rancho

Cucamonga this month and had a conversation with the court magistrate. He stated he looks forward to ending his week with drug

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court every Friday evening. He elaborated that during his normal

work day, he is faced with doing unpleasant things to people who

have engaged in bad behavior. But on Friday evening, he sees hope

and the possibility of rehabilitation. He concluded, ‘‘It is definitely

worth the extra work.’’ Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Iguchi follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony, each and every one of

you.

Unfortunately, I have to disagree with some of the products of

your corporation, Mr. Iguchi. I think in particular, the RAND study

has probably done more damage to this whole effort than anything

I have seen in 20 years of dealing with the drug problem.

Last week, during the debate that we had on the floor, we heard

repeatedly this garbage that was spewed by the study some years

ago and used by many of those who come forward with a solution

that just treatment on demand is the answer. It has created, I

think, a disaster for this country. That happens to be my personal

opinion.

I think this administration took the RAND study and used it as

an excuse to shut down the source country programs and with

great difficulty we have been trying to get those programs put back

in place. The most recent is the ongoing effort starting last week

to get something targeted to Colombia where we know shutting

down the interdiction and shutting down the source country programs has created not only a flood of narcotics unlike we even saw

in the 1980’s, but a more deadly brand, so that 15,973 Americans

in 1998, the latest figure that I have received as chairman of the

subcommittee, didn’t even get a chance for voluntary treatment because they are dead.

I think that some of the trash that was put out that has been

used for substantiation of just provide treatment, we have nearly

doubled the amount of treatment money since 1992 than we have

the amount of money in interdiction in source country programs.

With $20-$40 million in Peru and Bolivia over the last few years,

we have dramatically cut the supply coming in and stopped the

programs in Colombia which are now the source of 80–90 percent

of 80 percent pure heroin and cocaine coming into this country.

Your study, in my opinion, has done more damage and substantiated a false and ineffective approach because you will never end

up treating all the people that you are now opening up to addiction

with the incredible supply that is coming into this country. If you

could stop the supply, we could put you and your study colleagues

out of business because we wouldn’t have to even deal with this

topic before us.

Did you want to respond?

Mr. IGUCHI. I am not fully prepared to respond to that particular

criticism. I, frankly, didn’t come prepared to defend our ‘‘Controlling Cocaine’’ report. We do, however, stand by the integrity of our

‘‘Controlling Cocaine’’ report. It was reviewed by the National

Academy of Sciences and held up as a very reasonable frame for

viewing policymaking decisions. People may quibble with some of

the numbers that were input into that model, but in evaluation

after evaluation of it, we have come away convinced that it is a

very strong model and it is a suitable basis for making policy decisions.

Mr. MICA. It is a strong model for what? It has been used as an

example for the treatment on demand. I don’t have a problem with

treatment on demand, but if you have a torrent of narcotics coming

in and you are creating an addiction population.

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We went to Baltimore a week ago and the predictions are somewhere in the neighborhood of 80,000 drug addicts where they have

had a liberalization, where they have focused primarily on treatment. They can’t keep up with the treatment. Then 50 percent of

the folks don’t even show up for treatment in the program. I am

very concerned that some of these think tanks like yours put out

things that are used as justification for only treatment and then we

shelve—and this administration shelved the interdiction, cut by 50

percent, and took the military out.

We have reports of now cutting out the surveillance to Peru

where we have had such great success, 66 percent reduction and

not providing that assistance so they could go after these traffickers so that the stuff isn’t in the country.

In order to qualify for treatment, the big myth in this whole

thing is when you get to the point of treatment, that means you

are addict. If you are an addict, that means the testimony we have

seen, the people we have interviewed in prison have committed

crimes of violence to the tune of habits they support for $100 to

$500 a day, many of them committing felonies.

By the time they get to your treatment on demand, it has made

a joke of the whole system and we have created someone we can’t

deal with. All the programs they are talking about here today are

only talking about tiny fractions—drug courts, tiny fractions—even

DTAP, a tiny fraction.

Yes, we want to help them, but in DTAP most of the people we

talked to had spent half their lives in prison or in the judicial cycle.

So the treatment on demand is great, but half of those folks don’t

even want to get in the program or don’t show up for the program.

The only reason they show up for DTAP is they are in prison or

they have no choice that they are going to go back to prison.

Again, I think the RAND Corp.—it is nice to have you here today

but I think some of your past studies and conclusions have done

tremendous damage—maybe you were well intended—but by people who were advocates of this one avenue of approach.

Mr. IGUCHI. Mr. Chairman, we can only deal with the numbers

and data that we have. The studies that have been conducted supply the data that go into those kinds of models, and we stand by

them.

The problem with focusing on supply reduction is that we don’t

have demonstrated effective supply reduction methodologies.

Mr. MICA. That is crap. That is baloney. I can get the charts out

here and we can look at what we did with the Andean strategy,

with the South Americans, and with the Vice President’s Task

Force for going after the stuff. If you want a concentrated program

for a few bucks in some of these countries where the peasants are

getting a couple of pesos for that crap, you can stop it. There is no

question about it. We did it in Peru.

Mr. IGUCHI. We did it temporarily.

Mr. MICA. We did it with President Fujimora. Mr. Hastert, who

chaired this subcommittee before me, went down and we talked to

those folks. Ten years ago, you couldn’t even walk on the streets

of Lima because there were bombs going off. The Shining Path was

ruling the roost and they were also profiting from the drug trade.

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We brought that under control, cut it by 66 percent. We can do the

same thing anywhere we want if we have the will.

Even now the President’s own Ambassador to that country has

sent letters to this administration that again, they are changing

their policy of not providing the intelligence and surveillance information that allows them to shoot down the drug traffickers. It sure

as hell will stop anybody on treatment if you shoot down a plane

that is carrying cocaine out of that country to the United States.

Then you don’t have to worry about treating them because they

don’t have the drugs in the first place to be addicted to get on the

treatment program that a lot of them won’t even show up or are

interested in treatment in the first place.

Mr. IGUCHI. I am well aware of—— Mr. MICA. Mrs. Mink, you are recognized.

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Chairman, that was an astonishing outburst, unforgivable.

Mr. MICA. Sorry. I apologize.

Mr. MINK. The witness that I invited to this committee, Martin

Iguchi, I am sure had nothing to do with the 8-year old report of

the RAND Corp.

Mr. MICA. And I didn’t accuse him personally.

Mrs. MINK. You kept saying, ‘‘you, you’’ and I found that—— Mr. MICA. The RAND Corp., for the record.

Mrs. MINK. He is not the RAND Corp., although maybe at times

he wishes he were. He simply is an investigator, senior behavioral

scientist, co-director of the Drug Policy Research Center at RAND.

He doesn’t run the entire gamut of the RAND Corp. investigative

research activities, I am sure. Do you?

Mr. IGUCHI. No, I do not.

Mrs. MINK. I apologize, Mr. Iguchi, for their asking you to answer for the entire RAND Corp.’s research outcomes.

We debated this last week and that is why it is still very much

in the environment here because we were debating it last week but

the RAND Corp., Mr. Chairman, never stated specifically that activities to curtail supply were not appropriate for this government.

I certainly support, as you well know, all efforts that we can engage in to limit the supply but our efforts should not be limited to

only the questions of supply but this country has not paid enough

attention, as I said on the floor last week, to the whole area of

treatment.

Efforts have to be made to encourage State and local governments to do more as they are doing in the drug court area and local

prosecutors need to be encouraged to do more in their specific

areas. So the purpose of this hearing, the purpose of inviting Mr.

Iguchi to testify, was to get his insights on the engagement of the

criminal justice system into drug treatment and whether it is efficient and whether it is appropriate. It is a question of both.

We know that those that exist are efficient. I have visited some,

read some of the statements and documents and reports on it. The

question that Mr. Iguchi raises is the most important question that

we should be debating. That is the preferential selection of individuals to go into these DTAP or drug court programs, require that

these two areas have special abilities to get drug treatment programs for their clients.

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They would be ineffective if while talking to a potential enrollee,

there was not a space somewhere to put that individual into a drug

treatment program. The whole thing must be interconnected.

Whether you are the judge or the prosecutor is irrelevant; you have

to have a special privileged line somewhere to get into the program. Otherwise you are just talking in the wind, if only 6 months

from now a space will open for you.

That is the condition of the public at large today. We can’t take

everybody who voluntarily says I have a drug problem and I really

need help. Instead we say to that individual, you have to wait 6

months; there is no space. But if you commit a crime, you can go

to drug court, and they will take care of you. That is a terrible alternative. I think Mr. Iguchi raises that point and that is a very

troubling point which goes back ultimately to what the chairman

is upset about, and that is our concern about the lack of availability of drug treatment programs in this country.

Less than 50 percent of those who seek it are able to get it. Our

anxieties are really raised because we want to see more of these

treatment programs, not that it is the end all, cure all, but that

it is a necessity. If we are going to be honest about trying to help

people who have a drug problem, we have to find more funds to

create these treatment programs.

You testified, Mr. Belenko, that there was a 66 percent retention

rate in the treatment programs. That was a question that Representative Ose asked. That is a confusing statement. Exactly what

is meant by that statement, there is a 66 percent retention rate in

the substance treatment program by those that are in either drug

court or DTAP?

Mr. BELENKO. That figure was referring to the DTAP program.

What that means is that of those who start the program, 66 percent of them are still in treatment 1 year later. So it is 1 year.

Mrs. MINK. And already detached from DTAP, no longer under

the supervision?

Mr. BELENKO. In DTAP. DTAP requires 15 to 24 months.

Mrs. MINK. Even with that coercion as an alternative to going to

prison, you only have a 66 percent retention in a treatment program?

Mr. BELENKO. I think you have to compare it to retention in residential treatment generally which is quite low where only probably

10 to 30 percent of those who enter residential treatment are still

there after 1 year. Generally, residential treatment requires long

term.

Mrs. MINK. What happens to that 34 percent then that don’t stay

in the program? They are then pushed into the regular criminal

justice system and ultimately go to jail?

Mr. BELENKO. They are prosecuted and under the DTAP model,

as the district attorney has designed it, these are offenders who are

subject to mandatory prison sentences. In fact, 96 percent of them

are returned to court, are prosecuted and sentenced to the prison

terms they would have gotten had they not gone to DTAP.

Mrs. MINK. The clients that are identified for either drug court

or DTAP, how are they able to assure their clients the ability to

enter a treatment program?

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Mr. BELENKO. In both models, there are treatment slots dedicated by prior agreement.

Mrs. MINK. By prior agreement, by State law or whatever?

Mr. BELENKO. Yes, through various funding mechanisms.

Mrs. MINK. So that sets the limits on the number that DTAP can

take or the number the drug court can take, the availability of drug

treatment slots.

Mr. BELENKO. I want to also point out that generally drug courts

are set up with an existing treatment infrastructure in place so

that they know when participants come into a drug court, there

will be a treatment slot.

Mrs. MINK. They run their own, maintain their own?

Mr. BELENKO. Some drug courts operate their own, others use

existing community-based providers, others contract with a single

provider in the community.

Mrs. MINK. But still, the limitation is availability of drug treatment slots?

Mr. BELENKO. That is always the limitation, yes.

Mrs. MINK. If there was not such a limitation and drug treatment spaces were readily available through out the country, what

would be that effect on the number of people that would be in the

program? Would it double the program, triple the program, quadruple it?

Mr. BELENKO. There are still limitations because at some point

drug court staff would be overwhelmed with cases. As under traditional probation where probation officers may have 150 to 200 probationers to supervise, you don’t want a drug course where a case

manager or a judge has to supervise too many cases because I

think some individual attention is required. So there may be limits

in a single courtroom of how many cases you want, but certainly

there is room for expansion.

Mrs. MINK. In the usual congressional budget-type analysis, the

question would be put what is the average cost per client in the

drug court system, maintained in the drug court system as against

the DTAP system, as against going to prison?

Mr. BELENKO. Judge Tauber mentioned the figure, I think, of

$2,000 per year.

Mrs. MINK. $2,000 in DTAP?

Mr. BELENKO. For drug court. Drug courts generally use outpatient treatment models which is much cheaper than residential.

DTAP uses a residential treatment model which is more expensive,

my guess would be $10,000-$15,000 per year.

Mrs. MINK. DTAP clients are typically detained in residential

centers?

Mr. BELENKO. They are required to be in residential treatment

under a therapeutic community model which is very intensive and

long-term treatment. The average cost of a prison nationwide, is

probably about $22,000 a year or so. In New York, it is closer to

$30,000, I believe. Prison is clearly the most expensive; residential

is much cheaper. Outpatient treatment, which most drug courts

use, is even cheaper than that. Relatively inexpensive, not cheap.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. MICA. Thank the gentlelady. I am sorry for berating your

witness today. I just saw RAND Corp., and Mr. Iguchi has been before us and I have been very polite to him.

Mrs. MINK. You should apologize to him for ranting and raving.

Mr. MICA. After hearing a day and a half of debate.

Mrs. MINK. I thought it was a brilliant debate, especially my

part.

Mr. MICA. You were, in fact, brilliant, but using the RAND Corp.

study of past in such a distorted fashion.

Mrs. MINK. Don’t start again or I will take another 5 minutes.

Mr. MICA. I don’t know if Mr. Iguchi was involved in that study,

I am sure he wasn’t.

Mr. IGUCHI. I joined the RAND Corp. 2 years ago.

Mrs. MINK. You didn’t extend him the courtesy of asking if he

was there.

Mr. MICA. Just representing the corporation that did the study

that I felt did a lot of damage.

Mrs. MINK. He specifically said in his opening, I do not represent

the corporation today.

Mr. MICA. He had to bear the brunt of it and if you want to hear

more, tune in tonight for 1 hour in special orders when I will finish

my comments about the misuse of the study. I am sure the RAND

Corp. does very good in compiling statistics and data in a fairly

level, non-biased fashion but again, the misuse of that concerns me.

My concern is that the programs we have heard of today are

great. They do serve a very small portion of the population and in

order to qualify for those programs, those individuals have had to

reach addiction, the need for treatment, had to have committed a

crime, in many cases serious crimes and felonies, and they have

also had to face the possibility of prison and my concern is that it

is much more cost effective if we want to do a cost benefit analysis,

if those individuals are never subjected in the first place to even

using illegal narcotics and then also a balanced approach. I have

never advocated not doing treatment or any of these programs.

They are necessary but when you take out key elements, you put

yourself at risk, again subjecting more people to becoming victims

of illegal narcotics addiction, use of treatment which follows and

prison, all of which have even marginal success rates, even these

that we have heard from today.

I do want to thank all of our witnesses for providing testimony

before us today. It does help us, particularly with the model of the

DTAP Program. We hopefully can support that nationally. We are

already supporting the drug courts nationally and I hope that support will continue and we can have successful programs in both

areas.

There being no further business to come before the subcommittee

at this time, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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