IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-20279

Summary Calendar

EDWARD S. BALLEW; TIMOTHY J. SHANNON; CRAIG P. BOWCOCK;

WILLIAM BAUER,

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INCORPORATED; CONTINENTAL PILOTS

RETIREMENT PLAN,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before GARZA, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

HAYNES, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from the district court’s order dismissing PlaintiffsAppellants’ (“Retirees”) claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the

RailwayLabor Act’s (“RLA”) exclusive and mandatory dispute resolution process

that applies to Retirees’ claims. Retirees argue on appeal that the RLA does not

apply to them because they are no longer “employees” as contemplated by the

RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 181. Alternatively, Retirees argue that even if the RLA

applies to them as former employees, they complied with the terms of their

Collective Bargaining Agreement(“CBA”), which allowed them to bring an action

in federal district court pursuant to Section 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 31, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). For the reasons set forth below, we

AFFIRM.

I. Facts & Procedural History

Retirees are all former Continental Airlines pilots who filed a proposed

class action against Continental Airlines, Inc. and the Continental Pilots

Retirement Plan (“Continental”) in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas in May 2010. Retirees sued under ERISA §

502(a)(1)(B), alleging Continental breached the terms of Retirees’ pension plan. 

On March 21, 2011, the district court dismissed Retirees’ claims for lack of

jurisdiction, holding that the RLA applied to Retirees and that the RLA gives

exclusive jurisdiction over their contract interpretation claim to the

administrative resolution process. Retirees timely appealed the district court’s

order on April 18, 2011.

In their complaint, Retirees allege that Continental misinterpreted the

terms of their pension benefits as memorialized in the Retirement Plan—a

pension plan generally subject to ERISA. Specifically, Retirees contend that the

pilots’ retirement pensions should be calculated according to the most recent

sixty consecutive months’ salaries before leaving Continental. Retirees argue

that Continental inappropriately considered any utilized “sick leave” as an

interruption of a pilot’s consecutive sixty months and thus calculated the

continuous sixty month period from an earlier period in the pilot’s career. 

Retirees aver that this computation method accounts for lower pension

calculations because pilots earn less earlier in their careers.

The CBA provided that employees like Retirees must seek review of

adverse benefit determinations through the Retirement Board, a properly

established “System Board” under the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 184. The Retirement

Board is composed of four people, two appointed by Continental and two

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appointed by the Air Line Pilots Association (“ALPA”). Section 21 of the CBA 1

outlines the jurisdiction of the Board, vesting it with the authority to hear

grievances stemming from the “interpretation or application of any of the terms

of the Agreement.” The CBA specifically exempts “changes in hours of

employment, rates of compensation, or working conditions covered by existing

agreements between the parties,” from the Board’s jurisdiction. Moreover,

section 21 dictates that “all cases properly referred to [the Board] will be final

and binding upon the parties.” If the Board deadlocks on a particular dispute,

parties are allowed to seek further arbitration, so long as the claimants waive

their right to further litigation and the arbitrator is selected from a mutually

agreed list of ERISA arbitrators. If the Board does not deadlock the CBA

contemplates employees’ ability to sue under ERISA. 

Section 28 of the CBA expressly incorporates Continental’s retirement

plans into the CBA—including the Retirement Plan at issue here. Section

9.21(c) of the Retirement Plan provides standard notification procedures for a

claimant’s adverse benefit determination by a Benefits Administrator. That

provision requires the Administrator to “includ[e] a statement of the Claimant’s

right to bring a civil action under section 502(a) of ERISA following an adverse

benefit determination on review.” Section 9.21(d) of the Retirement Plan

provides that a Plan participant has a right to have an adverse benefit

determination reviewed by the Retirement Board. That section also provides a

claimant with “the opportunity to submit written comments, documents, records,

and other information relating to the claim for Plan benefits to the Retirement

Board” and establishes that a “decision on review by the Retirement Board will

The Retirement Board is composed of representatives selected by both the employees’

1

union and the employer and is in place to resolve disputes under a CBA; by contrast, a Plan

Administrator is generally selected by the employer and owes a fiduciary duty to Plan

beneficiaries in administering the Plan, see Izzarelli v. Rexene Prods. Co., 24 F.3d 1506, 1509

n.3 (5th Cir. 1994).

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be binding and conclusive upon all persons and the Claimant shall neither be

required nor permitted to pursue further appeals to the Retirement Board.” The

following section, 9.21(e), does, however, contemplate a claimant’s “right to bring

an action under section 502(a) of ERISA” following an adverse determination by

the Retirement Board. Like the CBA, the Retirement Plan, section 9.21(f),

allows a claimant to pursue binding arbitration before an ERISA arbitrator in

the event of a Retirement Board deadlock.

Acting for Retirees, Captain Edward Ballew sought review of Continental’s

initial adverse benefit determination on August 6, 2009 and made oral

arguments to the Retirement Board on August 10, 2009. The Retirement Board

issued a unanimous decision rejecting Ballew’s interpretation of the Plan in

October 2009. In its decision, the Retirement Board provided that “Captain

Ballew also has the right to bring suit under section 502(a) of ERISA.” Retirees

thus commenced this action in May 2010.

II. Standard of Review

This Court has jurisdiction over the final judgment of the district court

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) de novo. Ramming v. United States, 281

F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.

Labuzan, 579 F.3d 533, 538 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that this Court reviews a

district court’s rulings on questions of statutory interpretation de novo). We may

also affirm on any ground supported by the record, including one not reached 

by the district court. Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 481 F.3d 309, 311

(5th Cir. 2007). 

The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proof for a 12(b)(1)

motion to dismiss. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citations omitted). The plaintiff

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has jurisdiction

based on the complaint and evidence. Patterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523

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(5th Cir. 1981). A court can find that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking based

on “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts

evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts

plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing

Barrerra-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1992)). 

III. Discussion

Retirees filed this action pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), alleging that

Continental breached the CBA by failing to provide Retirees with pension

benefits outlined in the Retirement Plan. The issues presented by this appeal

are (1) whether the RLA applies to Retirees as “employees” under the Act; and

(2) whether, despite the RLA’s exclusive arbitration procedures, Retirees may

seek judicial review of adverse Retirement Board determinations.

A. Retirees as “Employees” under the RLA

First, Retirees contend that they are not covered by the RLA. Citing the

language governing the RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 181, Retirees argue that their

status as former employees exempts them from the RLA’s mandates. This

argument has been squarely rejected by this court. See Bowcock v. Cont’l

Airlines, Inc., No. 10-20856, 2011 WL 2672521 (5th Cir. July 8, 2011)

(unpublished). In that case, one of the appellants here, Craig Bowcock, 2

pursued similar litigation based on his allegation that Continental breached its

fiduciary duty under ERISA by indicating that he would have to abandon his

contemporaneous pension claims (the suit before us now) in order to take

advantage of an early retirement program. This Court affirmed the district

court’s dismissal of Bowcock’s claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Id. at *3. Bowcock argued, just as Retirees do here, that the RLA’s mandatory

Although Bowcock is unpublished and, therefore, not precedential, it represents a

2

reasoned opinion by our court on the same general facts presented in this case. We therefore

rely upon it as persuasive authority.

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dispute resolution procedures were not applicable to him as a retiree because

retirees are not “employees” under the RLA. Id. at *1. As noted in Bowcock, the

Supreme Court decided this issue in Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Day, 360 U.S.

548 (1959). The Day Court considered whether the National Railroad

Adjustment Board maintained exclusive jurisdiction over a former rail employee. 

Id. at 551. Holding that the RLA applied despite the claimant’s status as a

retiree, the Court stated that “[a]ll the considerations of legislative meaning and

policy which have compelled the conclusion that an active employee must submit

his claims to the Board, and may not resort to the courts in the first instance, are

the same when the employee has retired and seeks compensation for work

performed while he remained on active service.” Id. at 552.

Despite Day’s clear pronouncement, Retirees invite us to ignore Supreme

Court precedent because they believe the current Supreme Court would overrule

Day. We are a “strict stare decisis court,” Bowcock, at *3 (citing FDIC v.

Abraham, 137 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1998)), and are in no position to challenge

the statutory construction utilized by the Supreme Court in Day. The Supreme

Court has sole authority to overrule its own decisions, meaning that the courts

of appeal must follow the Supreme Court’s directly controlling precedent even

if it “appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions.” 

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 

Our sister circuits agree. See, e.g., Bloemer v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 401 F.3d 935,

939 (8th Cir. 2005); Leu v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 820 F.2d 825, 831 n.10 (7th Cir.

1987); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 735 F.2d 328, 328 (9th

Cir. 1984); see also Bowe v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 974 F.2d 101, 103 (8th Cir. 1992)

(finding that claimant’s status as a former employee does not fall within the

narrow exceptions to the RLA’s exclusive jurisdiction). We thus follow the

Supreme Court’s precedent and leave to that Court the determination of whether

Day survives another day. 

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B. Judicial Review of a System Board Determination

Next, Retirees argue that even if they are “employees” as contemplated by

the RLA, they complied with the dispute resolution process governed by the CBA

and are thus able to seek judicial review of the Retirement Board’s October 2009

determination.

The RLA notably distinguishes between two types of disputes. “A major

dispute concerns the formation of a CBA, which arises when a CBA is not in

place or when a party seeks to change the terms of a CBA. A minor dispute

concerns grievances or the interpretation or application of agreements covering

rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” Mitchell v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 481

F.3d 225, 230-31 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execs.’

Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 302-03 (1989)); see also 45 U.S.C. § 184 (requiring air

carriers and unions to establish arbitral boards for the resolution of “disputes

between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers by air

growing out of grievances, or out of the interpretation or application of

agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . . .”). At the

crux of the issue here, the RLA requires minor disputes that cannot be settled

through internal grievance procedures to be resolved through a mandatory,

exclusive, and comprehensive resolution process before a claims adjustment

board established by the employees’ union and the employer through the CBA. 

See, e.g., Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994); Bhd. of

Locomotive Eng’rs v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 373 U.S. 33, 38 (1963).

“The distinguishing feature of [a minor dispute] is that the dispute may

be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing agreement.” Consol. Rail

Corp., 491 U.S. at 305. Thus, “[w]here an employer asserts a contractual right

to take the contested action, the ensuing dispute is minor if the action is

arguably justified by the terms of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement.” 

Id. at 307. “Congress considered it essential to keep these so-called ‘minor’

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disputes within the Adjustment Board and out of the courts.” Union-Pacific R.R.

Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978) (per curiam); see generally Hawaiian

Airlines, 512 U.S. at 252 (“Congress’ purpose in passing the RLA was to promote

stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive

framework for resolving labor disputes.” (citation omitted)). Furthermore,

national policy favors the final settlement of labor disputes outside of the judicial

process, see, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 632 F.2d 1321,

1323 (5th Cir. 1980), and “[t]he federal policy of settling labor disputes by

arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the

awards,” Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 175

F.3d 355, 357 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel

& Car. Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)). That being said, “[t]he assertion of any 3

right that is not created by a CBA is . . . not subject to binding arbitration under

the statute.” CareFlite v. Office & Prof’l Emps. Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 612 F.3d

314, 320-21 (5th Cir. 2010) (Dennis, J., concurring).4

 Though a properly resolved adjustment board award is enforceable in federal court,

3

see Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Cent. Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 685 (1963), a System Board

determination is subject only to very narrow judicial review. Sheehan, 439 U.S. at 91. In fact,

“the scope of judicial review of Adjustment Board decisions is among the narrowest known to

the law.” Id. (internal quotes omitted). In fact, this circuit generally only considers three

possible grounds for judicial review of an arbitral decision: (1) whether the Board failed to

comply with the RLA’s requirements; (2) whether the Board failed to confine itself to matters

within the scope of its jurisdiction; and (3) whether the Board’s decision was the result of fraud

or corruption. See, e.g., Mitchell, 481 F.3d at 231 (citing Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of

Teamsters, 391 F.3d 613, 617 (5th Cir. 2004)). We have, however, considered a fourth line of

review grounded in redressing violation of a party’s due process rights. See, e.g., id. (citing

Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 757 F.2d 656, 661 (5th Cir. 1985)). Retirees

do not suggest that their claim falls under this narrow scope of judicial review and we thus

assess only whether their pension claim is a “minor” dispute subject to exclusive and final

System Board resolution.

 CareFlite was decided by a quorum with Judges Dennis and Elrod agreeing on the 4

judgment but not the rationale.

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Retirees would be hard-pressed to dispute that resolution of the pension

determination here can only be done through interpretation of the CBA, which

would normally constitute a “minor” dispute and thus be subject to the RLA’s

mandatory dispute resolution process. See Long v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 994

F.2d 692, 694 (9th Cir. 1993) (“An employee pension plan falls within the scope

of the [RLA] and is subject to its mandatory arbitration procedures.” (citing Air

Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 627 F.2d 272, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 

To be sure, Retirees’ claim is dependent entirely on the proper calculation of

pension benefits, which can only be done through reference to the CBAincorporated Plan. 

Retirees rely on two cases within our circuit to stress the argument that

parties to a CBA may exempt certain disputes from the RLA’s compulsory

arbitration procedures. First, Retirees cite Bonin v. American Airlines, for the

proposition that parties may contract to allow an RLA-governed claim to go to

court under ERISA. 621 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1980). In Bonin, the plaintiff pilot

brought suit under ERISA § 502, alleging various claims relating to his wrongful

discharge and improper allocation of pension benefits owed him under his

pension plan. Id. at 637. After clearly acknowledging the exclusive province of

RLA systems boards over “minor” disputes, we looked to the language of the

Retirement Plan in finding that the pension claims were not subject to

interpretation under the CBA. Id. at 638-39. We looked to the Retirement Plan

itself, which included language governing Board jurisdiction: “‘neither the

interpretation of the Plan nor its administration shall as such be within the

jurisdiction’ of the collective bargaining agreement.” Id. at 639. We thus held

that “[s]ince the pension plan . . . is not maintained pursuant to a collective

bargaining agreement, the district court has jurisdiction of plaintiff’s pension

claim under ERISA.” Id. In coming to this conclusion, we made an important

distinction governing claims under ERISA and the RLA:

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Congress by enactment of ERISA endorsed in effect two alternative

methods of administering pension plan claims for employers whose

collective bargaining disputes are governed by the Railway Labor

Act: (1) arbitration of employee pension claims or (2) independent

administration of claims by the pension plan administrator with a

federal right of review pursuant to ERISA.

Id. In effect, the parties may choose whether they want to be governed

5

exclusively by the RLA or maintain a judicial cause of action pursuant to ERISA.

More recently, a quorum of this court decided CareFlite v. Office and

Professional Employees International Union, which involved a CBA that

included terms similar to the dispositive language in Bonin. 612 F.3d at 316. 

Judge Dennis focused on two clauses in the CBA that made claims stemming

from the termination of employment for failure to obtain certain licenses and

training “non-grievable and non-arbitrable.” Id. He concluded that minor

disputes “‘must be resolved only through the RLA mechanisms, including the

carrier’s internal dispute-resolution processes and an adjustment board

established by the employer and the unions.’” Id. at 318 (quoting Hawaiian

Airlines, 512 U.S. at 253). However, he determined that the “assertion of any

right that is not created by a CBA is . . . not subject to binding arbitration under

the statute.” Id. at 320-21 (citing Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 258). Judge

Elrod agreed that the particular dispute was not arbitrable, but she employed

a different rationale. Id. at 325 (Elrod, J., concurring). She determined that the

dispute was minor but that the RLA allows parties to exclude some minor

disputes from arbitration. Id.

The issue presented here is slightly different: whether parties to a CBA

can choose to include disputes within the RLA’s dispute resolution process, yet

Lest there be any confusion, Bonin makes clear that Systems Boards and Plan 5

Administrators are distinct entities; the former instituted by the RLA and the latter by

ERISA.

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evade the exclusivity of RLA arbitration by expressly providing for judicial

review of System Board decisions. We conclude that they cannot. 

Retirees contend that their pension plan, and its concomitant integration

into the CBA, provides for ERISA relief after an adverse decision by the

Retirement Board. Indeed, the CBA’s terms provide as much, clearly

contemplating the ability of a claimant to sue under ERISA § 502. Insofar as

parties to a contract cannot avoid the exclusivity of the RLA’s arbitral process,

neither does ERISA supersede the mandatory arbitration provisions of the RLA, 6

as evidenced by ERISA’s express provision ceding authority to previously

enacted laws. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (“Nothing in this title shall be construed to

alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United

States . . . or any rule or regulation issued under any such law.”). Retirees’

grievances are thus governed not by ERISA, but “entirely by the [CBA] and

subject to the jurisdiction of the System Board of Adjustment by the [RLA].” 

Bonin, 621 F.2d at 638. 

Bonin does make clear that parties have a choice between two alternate

avenues for resolving ERISA claims that fall under the RLA: providing for RLA

dispute resolution or excluding certain disputes from the RLA’s mandates and

affording judicial review under ERISA following independent administration of

claims by a plan administrator. Retirees here erroneously seek

both—Retirement Board review under the RLA followed by judicial review under

ERISA. The pension claims here are undisputedly grounded in the CBA and

require interpretation of the agreement as evidenced by Retirees’ utilization of

the Retirement Board for review of Continental’s interpretation of the Plan. 

Although the parties sometimes refer to RLA preemption of ERISA claims,

6

“preemption is not the applicable doctrine under these circumstances, since the question

whether one federal law takes precedence over another does not implicate the Supremacy

Clause.” Hastings v. Wilson, 516 F.3d 1055, 1058 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Coker v. TWA,

165 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 1999)).

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Retirees reference language in Bonin and CareFlite that they contend

allow parties to freely contract out of the RLA, but further examination of these

decisions elucidates their limited application. The CBA provision at issue in

Bonin completely removed the pension plans and the CBA from the RLA

resolution process, making the grievances there subject to federal subject matter

jurisdiction because they could not be characterized as “minor” disputes under

the RLA. CareFlite did not command a majority for its rationale but, in any 7

event, did not involve a party who sought both RLA-style review and judicial

review. The pension plans here are subject to the RLA, and Retirees have

indeed sought review before the Retirement Board. 

Moreover, nothing in the CBA explicitly cedes arbitral jurisdiction over

adverse benefit determinations from the Board. Rather than finding themselves

outside the ambit of the RLA, Retirees contend that the CBA provides for federal

judicial review of the Retirement Board determination. This contention is 8

untenable. “[P]arties . . . may neither confer subject matter jurisdiction on the

district court nor strip it of such jurisdiction by agreement or waiver.” Buchner

The D.C. Circuit has explained that any “doubts about the arbitrability of issues 7

should be resolved in favor of coverage.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 86

F.2d 87, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Nw. Airlines v. ALPA, 808 F.2d 76, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

Our sister circuit further found that a party seeking to establish that the System Board has

no jurisdiction “must provide positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible

of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” Id. at 93-94 (citation omitted)

(comparing the grievance at hand to the one in Bonin, the court found no “positive assurance”

that the Plan was entirely independent from the CBA because the Plan was expressly

incorporated into the CBA). Though clearly not binding on our decision here, the burden

established in Delta is instructive. At the very least, the Retirement Plan and CBA here

create doubts about the independence of the Plan from the CBA and thus should be resolved

in favor of coverage under the RLA.

Insofar as Retirees may contend that the judicial review provisions of the CBA 8

constitute a forum selection clause, we find our sister circuit’s construction of ERISA

persuasive. See Cruthis v. Metro Life Ins., 356 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e join the

several courts that have addressed this issue by holding that the phrase, ‘you may file suit in

a state or federal court’ is a statutorily required disclosure of an employee’s ERISA rights

rather than a forum selection clause.” (citations omitted)).

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v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 816, 818 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see Bowe, 974 F.2d

at 103-04 (“‘Parties to an agreement cannot create federal subject matter

jurisdiction by consent.’” (quoting Jader v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d

1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 1991)); see also Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,

552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008) (holding that the narrow grounds for judicial review of

an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act could not be altered by

party agreement); cf. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. US Airways Grp., Inc. 609

F.3d 338, 343 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing 45 U.S.C. § 184) ; Delta, 863 F.2d at 92-95 9

(rejecting union’s argumentthat RLA arbitration requirements cannot be waived

or bargained away because the purpose of an arbitration board under the RLA

is to decide disputes arising out of the CBA, and if a CBA specifically excludes

an issue from arbitration or grievance, then a claim based on that issue cannot

be said to arise from it). 

Retirees contend that they are not seeking to create federal subject matter

jurisdiction, but instead are relying on ERISA as an alternative method of

administering pension plan claims. In support of this argument, Retirees rely

on McDonald v. Continental, 4:10-CV-00408 (S.D. Tex. July 8, 2011), addressing

this same Plan, which suggested in dicta that the provisions were analogous to

those in Bonin and CareFlite and thus subject to judicial review under ERISA

§ 502(a). McDonald, however, determined that the court lacked jurisdiction

“Congress was plainly within its rights to combine the virtues of arbitration with the 9

virtues of collective bargaining. It determined simply that an arbitral forum was required,

with the parameters of that forum being left to voluntary agreement.” Id. Congress thus

“relieved federal courts of the burden of delineating what a group adjustment board would or

should look like,” including the designation of how arbitrators would be chosen, how many

there would be, and what procedures they would follow. Id. “Congress allocated that task to

the parties, allowing them to hash out the specifics through negotiation.” Id. Congress’s

recognition of the parties’ ability to negotiate the scope of the arbitral forum does not by

extension provide parties with the ability to allocate judicial review that Congress did not

otherwise provide.

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over McDonald’s particular (and different) claim. Thus, it does not aid our

analysis here.

If Retirees were able to bring suit under ERISA for “minor” disputes it

would destroy the purposes of the RLA in promoting an efficient and

“comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes.” Hawaiian Airlines, 512

U.S. at 252. The RLA’s dispute resolution process, if it applies, is mandatory

and exclusive and clearly does not contemplate providing an additional outlet for

review. That is just what Retirees are seeking here—Retirees’ interpretation of

the RLA would provide claimants with an additional forum for their disputes

following adverse determinations. Perhaps even more concerning would be the

potential for employers to seek costly judicial review in contravention of a

System Board determination favorable to a claimant. 

Lastly, it is well established that judicial review of System Board

determinations is exceptionally narrow. See, e.g., Sheehan, 439 U.S. at 91. In

this way, it is similar to the limited judicial review of arbitration awards under

the Federal Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court in Hall Street Associates

expressly disallowed the parties’ agreed upon judicial review that exceeded the

judicial review contemplated by the FAA. 552 U.S. at 585-90. Here, the Retirees

are explicitly looking for a “contracted-for” judicial remedy following an adverse

RLA-established Retirement Board ruling without showing any of the narrow

exceptions to RLA exclusivity. We decline to depart from established precedent

preventing parties from creating federal court jurisdiction where there is none.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of

Retirees’ complaint for want of jurisdiction.

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