BY THE COMPTROLLER-GLNE-RAL

Report To The Congress

OF THE UNITED STATES

Gains Made In Controlling

Illegal Drugs, Yet The

Drug Trade Flourishes

This report assesses the Federal Government's drug enforcement and supply control efforts during the

last 10 years, including information contained in a

series of GAO reports issued on drug control and

various related topics during this time.

Federal agencies have fought hard to reduce the adverse impact of illegal drugs on American society.

While current indicators suggest some positive results in reducing drug-related deaths and injuries

and decreasing heroin supplies, the drug trade continues to flourish, and the problem persists for reasons tied to the enormous supply of and demand

for drugs.

Effective law enforcement, crop eradication, and

other controls will cause shifts and temporary disruptions in trafficking and use patterns, and buy

time to enable the Nation to concentrate on longterm solutions. But if the United States is to make

greater inroads, it must take a much tougher and

consistent stance. The executive and legislative

branches must form a partnership to agree upon

and vigorously carry out a consistent national policy on drug abuse. I/lIIl1 II

,N;D·~CO Sr~ q>, 110663

GGD-80-4 V6C OU%5. O0~~~/ - / /sO~CTOBER 25, 1979 .'~&
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON. D.C. 24

B-175425

To the President of the Senate and the

Speaker of the House of Representatives

The United States drug abuse problem has been a matter

of national concern for decades, and, in recent years, the

illegal use of drugs has been increasing in many countries

throughout the world. The huge supply and demand for

illegal drugs continues to frustrate attempts to contain

the problem.

This report presents an assessment of the extent and

nature of drug abuse in the United States, focuses on the

Federal drug supply reduction strategy, and identifies a

number of long-standing problems hampering the effectiveness of the Government's drug law enforcement and supply

reduction efforts. The report contains recommendations

for improving efforts under the present Federal strategy

and proposes that the executive and legislative branches

form a partnership to agree upon and vigorously implement

a consistent national policy on drug abuse. The report

also points out that the drug abuse problem is too much

for the United States to overcome alone and recommends

the establishment of a consortium of victim countries

to develop a global plan of action.

We are sending copies of this report today to the

Director, Office of Management and Budget; Director,

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; Director,

Central Intelligence Agency; the Secretaries of

Health, Education, and Welfare, Transportation,

Treasury, and State; and the Attorney General of the

United States.

e X'n ral

of the United States
CONTENTS

Page

DIGEST

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION 1

Assessment of the nature and

extent of drug abuse 1

Historical evolution of Federal

concern and effort 4

Federal Government strategy 8

Need for centralized direction of

drug abuse and drug traffic

prevention 10

Federal resources-fiscal

years 1969-1978 12

2 -REDUCING DRUG AVAILABILITY IN THE

UNITED STATES: EFFORTS HAVE NOT

HAD LASTING BENEFITS 15

What successes have been achieved? 15

French-Turkish Connection broken 17

Success with the eradication

program in Mexico 17

Heroin indicators show decline 17

Drug seizures and removals

increase 18

Conspiracy cases stressed 18

Greater foreign support for drug

control programs 19

Successes have few lasting

benefits 19

Why does the problem persist? 21

Enormous drug demand 21

An unlimited drug supply exists 22

Realities of growing countries

make it difficult to prevent

cultivation of illicit crops

and stop trafficking at the

source 29

Risk of trafficking business low

relative to the tremendous

profits 31

Actions needed to support Federal

strategy implementation have

not materialized 32
Page

Proposed actions 34

Drug problem requires Federal

partnership and tougher stand 34

Drug problem requires worldwide

commitment 35

3 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL: SOME

PROGRESS BUT TASK IS FORMIDABLE 37

Eradication-short term results

but no solution 38

Crop substitution: a matter of

long-term economic development 44

A serious commitment by the international community is needed 49

Cooperative enforcement is important

to foreign strategy 55

Narcotics control plans needed to

chart goals and accomplishments 61

Conclusions 64

Recommendations 65

4 BORDER MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

NEED TO BE RESOLVED 66

Why is the border important to drug

control? 66

Illegal entry at United States-Mexico

border 67

The Southeast border: "a drug disaster

area" 70

Border management issue unresolved 80

Conclusions 81

Recommendations 82

5 IMMOBILIZING MAJOR DRUG VIOLATORS:

AN ELUSIVE GOAL 83

Enforcement strategy requires close

coordination 84

DEA not yet proficient in conspiracy

cases 85

Lack of Justice Department direction

has caused varied commitments to

drug prosecutions 90
Page

IRS' role in drug enforcement is

limited 92

FBI attack on organized drug crime

has yet to be realized 97

The Bank Secrecy Act has not yet

been as useful to drug enforcement

as originally intended 99

Achieving international assistance

against traffickers: results have

been disappointing 100

Diversion of legal drugs: a flourishing activity with little

enforcement attention 106

Conclusions 110

Recommendations 111

Matters for consideration by the

Congress 112

6 BAIL AND SENTENCING PRACTICES FURTHER

WEAKEN IMMOBILIZATION EFFORTS 113

Trafficking while on bail 113

Sentences do not deter trafficking 117

Expanding the use of magistrates can

help promote immobilization of

traffickers 123

Conclusions 124

Recommendations 125

Matter for consideration by Congress 126

7 MOBILIZING STATE AND LOCAL RESOURCES

IS EASIER SAID THAN DONE 127

Reliance placed on State and local

agencies 127

Financial and political realities

make mobilization unrealistic 128

Firm and clear policy required for

State and local assistance 131

Conclusions 133

Recommendations 134

8 AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION 135

9 SCOPE 148
Page

APPENDIX

I Extent and costs of the drug problem 149

II Price/Purity, arrests, seizure, and

court disposition statistics 156

III List of GAO reports on drug control

and related topics 161

IV Letter dated May 15, 1979, from the

Director, Administrative Office

of the United States Courts 165

V Letter dated June 8, 1979, from the

Director, The Federal Judicial

Center 166

VI Letter dated June 1, 1979, from the

Inspector General, Department of

Health, Education, and Welfare 167

VII Comments dated May 25, 1979, from

the Central Intelligence Agency 168

VIII Letter dated June 19, 1979, from the

Deputy Assistant Secretary for

Budget and Finance, Department of

State 169

IX Letter dated August 2, 1979, from the

Assistant Attorney General for

Administration, United States

Department of Justice 185

X Letter dated June 21, 1979, from the

Assistant Secretary for Administration, Department of Transportation 206

XI Letter dated September 27, 1979, from

the Assistant Secretary (Enforcement

and Operations), Department of the

Treasury and the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue 210
ABBREVIATIONS

ADB Asian Development Bank

AID Agency for International Development

BNDD Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

CCE Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute

CCINC Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics

Control

CENTAC Central Tactical Unit

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CSU Controlled Substances Unit

DAWN Drug Abuse Warning Network

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

GAO General Accounting Office

GOM Government of Mexico

GUB Government of Burma

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development

INC International Narcotics Control

INM Assistant Secretary for International

Narcotics Matters

IRS Internal Revenue Service

NCAP Narcotics Control Action Plan

NDDS Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section

NIDA National Institute of Drug Abuse

NTP Narcotics Traffickers Program
NWFP North-West Frontier Province

ODALE Office for Drug Abuse and Law Enforcement

ODAP Office of Drug Abuse Policy

ONNI Ottice of National Narcotics Intelligence

RICO Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

SAODAP Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention

TECS Treasury Enforcement Communications System

UN United Nations

UNFDAC United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S GAINS MADE IN CONTROLLING

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ILLEGAL DRUGS, YET THE

DRUG TRADE FLOURISHES

DIGEST

Federal agencies have fought hard to reduce the

adverse impact of illegal drugs, primarily heroin

and dangerous drugs, on American society. These

efforts have shown some positive results as measured by decreased drug-related deaths and injuries,

and reduced availability of some illegal drugs.

Nevertheless, drug trafficking and abuse still

flourish despite several decades of U.S. efforts

both here and abroad. The gains made are fragile,

requiring constant vigilance, as

-- source countries move quickly to fill

temporary drug shortages,

-- trafficking patterns shift, and

-- the types of drugs consumed readily change.

This report assesses the Federal Government's drug

enforcement and supply control efforts during the

last 10 years, including information contained in

a series of GAO reports issued on drug control and

various related topics during this time. (See

pp. 161 to 164.)

WHAT SUCCESSES HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED?

Notable successes have been attained in carrying

out the Federal supply reduction strategy, as a

result of actions taken in the United States and

overseas to immobilize major trafficking networks

and control the production of illicit drugs.

(See pp. 15 to 21.)

-- Turkish- restrictions on poppy cultivation and

increased United States and French enforcement

disrupted the French-Turkish heroin connection

in the early 1970s and produced a dramatic

shortage of heroin in the United States.

--Joint U.S.-Mexico efforts in crop eradication

and narcotics enforcement, assisted by a drought,

GGD-80-4

Tear Sheet. Upon removal, the report

cover date should be noted hereon.
are decreasing Mexico's share of the U.S. illicit

heroin market. Street-level heroin currently

has the lowest purity and highest price since 1973,

and National Institute of Drug Abuse statistics

show that heroin-related deaths have been declining.

-- Enforcement activities in the United States and

abroad have caused significant drug removals and

increased clandestine laboratory seizures.

-- Emphasis on conspiracy investigations has led

to many high-level drug traffickers being

convicted on conspiracy charges, some receiving

substantial prison sentences.

-- Other countries have increased their efforts

to reduce supply on their own and through

United Nations and United States programs.

-- The amount of diversion of legal drugs at the

wholesale and manufacturing levels has declined

sharply in recent years. f / r

Current indicators suggest that there is a major

shortage of heroin in the United States,'a significant accomplishment against the Nation's number one

drug enforcement priority. However, this and other

such hard-won successes are short-lived. Growing

areas, shipment routes, trafficking organizations,

and even the types of drugs abused all readily

change and adapt to new conditions.

For example, the heroin, shortage created by the

breaking of the French Connection was temporary.

Mexico emerged as the next principal supplie. of

heroin to the United States. 'Today's conceriis

that as Mexican heroin availability declines, heroin

from Southeast Asia and the Middle East will fill

the gap. Some also fear that use of dangerous

synthetic drugs will continue to increase as heroin

users find it difficult to obtain heroin.

(See pp. 19 to 21.)

WHY DOES THE PROBLEM PERSIST?

THE ENORMOUS SUPPLY OF AND DEMAND FOR DRUGS has

created a multibillion dollar worldwide business

involving millions of Americans.> The National

Institute on Drug Abuse has estimated that

there are:

ii
-- 1.7 million persons who have used heroin,

with 453,000 daily users.

--13 million persons who have used stimulants

such as amphetamines.

--6.9 million persons who have used PCP at

least once.

-- 10 million who have used cocaine.

-- 43 million people who have tried marijuana

at least once.

The marijuana market alone consumes between

60,000 and 91,000 pounds per day, resulting

in an outlay of $13 billion to $21 billion

per year. (See pp. 21 to 25.)

THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL REALITIES OF

DRUG-GROWING COUNTRIES make it difficult to prevent cultivation of illicit crops and stop

trafficking at the source.) Most producing nations

are poor, underdeveloped, struggling countries

presenting problems that are too complex for a

predominantly law enforcement approach to be

effective in reducing drug supplies. Suppression

efforts have been hindered by long-standing and

socially accepted traditions of smuggling and

corruption. As seen from several pilot projects,

the other approach of substituting legitimate

crops for drugs requires massive economic development that is both costly and long-term. To date,

the developed countries of the world have been

unwilling to fund such high-risk ventures.

(See pp. 29 to 31, and 44 to 55.)

THE ENORMOUS PROFITS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING attract an

ample number of entrepreneurs who see opportunities

that far outweigh those offered by legitimate businesses.) Payments by abusers and traffickers for

heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and hashish in the

United States are estimated to be on the order of

$35 billion to $51 billion annually. Drug trafficking in the U.S. today appeals to people from

all walks of life, including doctors, lawyers,

accountants, businessmen, and entertainers.

(See pp. 31 and 32.)

Tear Sheet

i ii
IT IS EASY TO ENTER AND DISTRIBUTE DRUGS in the

United States.) While nobody knows for sure how

much illicit drugs come into the country, it has

been estimated that law enforcement agencies seize

only 5 to 10 percent of all illicit drugs available.

(See pp. 31 and 32.)

ACTIONS NEEDED TO FULLY SUPPORT FEDERAL DRUG

STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION HAVE NOT MATERIALIZED.

Differing views among Government agencies, as well

as the public, make it difficult to attain the

necessary legislative, executive, and judicial

actions. Drug supply reduction efforts have yet

to achieve a well-integrated, balanced, and

coordinated approach. (See pp. 32 to 34.)

WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT THE PROBLEM?

The United States must take a much tougher

and consistent stance to make real gains in

reducing the availability of illicit drugs.

The following long-standing problems must be

resolved:'

-- Organizational difficulties between Federal

agencies diluting law enforcement efforts

at borders.

-- Large-scale drug traffickers, in terms of

immobilization from trafficking, being

incarcerated for short periods of time while

their ill-gotten gains remain intact.

-- Unclear Federal, State, and local enforcement roles hampering attacks on drug

traffickers.

-- Inconsistent and sometimes conflicting drug

policies resulting in no clear overall

direction.

-- Businesses and individuals promoting the use

of drugs through the sale of drug-oriented

paraphernalia and magazines.

-- Governments of developed countries and international financial institutions providing

little or no support for controlling illicit

drug production.

iv
The executive and legislative branches must

form a partnership to agree upon and affirm

a national policy for dealing with drug abuse

and support necessary legislation. A joint

commission could be formed to accomplish this

and to recommend a course of action to promote

vigorous implementation of the agreed policy.

(See pp. 34 and 35.)

BORDER MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

NEED TO BE RESOLVED

Although the U.S. border provides opportunities for interdicting illicit drugs, the

availability of drugs attests to the fact

that the border has not been a serious

impediment to illegal entry. Large amounts

of heroin and marijuana have crossed the land

border with Mexico. More recently, our Southeastern States have been flooded with marijuana

and cocaine shipped by air and sea from South

America. (See pp. 66 to 82.)

GAO recommended in its 1977 report on the Southwest border (GGD-78-17) that the Congress require

the executive branch to develop a comprehensive

border control plan. A border management agency

should be established to overcome organizational

difficulties and better respond to the problems

created by drug smuggling. (See pp. 69 and 70.)

OPPORTUNITIES TO OVERCOME

OBSTACLES IN IMMOBILIZING

MAJOR TRAFFICKERS

Federal efforts to reduce drug trafficking

through attempts to immobilize major traffickers have fallen short of expectations.

Even though numerous high-level traffickers

have been convicted their organizations often

continue to operate and maintain distribution

capacity. A concerted effort among numerous

Federal agencies to incarcerate major drug

dealers for long periods and take away their

financial resources has not materialized to

the extent necessary. (See pp. 83 to 112.)

Tear Sheet v
For recommendations to the Congress and Federal

agencies that will strengthen prosecution of

drug traffickers and dealers and help to better

attack the tremendous financial gains from

trafficking. (See pages 111 and 112.)

CHANGES IN BAIL AND SENTENCING COULD

STRENGTHEN IMMOBILIZATION EFFORTS

Bail and sentencing practices in Federal

courts throughout the country have diluted

the effect of drug enforcement efforts.

Many defendants who are released on bail

continue their drug trafficking because

Federal law does not allow judges to consider danger to the community a reason for

denying bail. Even when convicted, drug

traffickers are often not effectively immobilized for long periods because prison

sentences are short. (See pp. 113 to 126.)

The Congress should consider modifications

to the bail law that take into account both

constitutional principles and the means to

prevent traffickers from engaging in illegal

activities that present a danger to the

community. Correcting the sentencing problem

is not easy, however; any changes to the

criminal justice system must be comprehensive

and approached with utmost caution. GAO therefore recommends that the Judicial Conference

of the United States assess the effects of

judicial discretion, including the sentencing

of drug violators. (See p. 126.)

NEED TO CLARIFY FEDERAL, STATE,

AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT ROLES

Increased reliance has been placed on State and

local drug enforcement: efforts because Federal

efforts have focused on leaders of national

and international trafficking networks. Even

though the Federal Government has developed

numerous programs to assist and cooperate with

State and local agencies, the mounting of a

unified attack has been made virtually impossible by financial, political, and other

realities. State and local agencies are allocating fewer resources for drug enforcement,

vi
and Federal grants for the same purpose have

declined as well. In addition, jurisdictional

problems in some regions hinder attempts to

fully mobilize the more than 15,000 police

agencies in the United States against drug

abuse and trafficking. (See pp. 127 to 134.)

In the face of these difficulties, the Attorney

General must establish a clear, realistic policy

on what can reasonably be expected from State

and local governments and what the Federal

Government should do to elicit their support.

The response of the various levels of government to businesses' and individuals' promoting

the use of drugs through the sale of drugoriented paraphernalia and magazines must also

be addressed. (See pp. 134, 21, and 22.)

SOMEONE MUST OVERSEE

STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

The Congress has long recognized the Federal

Government's continuing failure to provide

a central mechanism to establish drug policy

and be accountable for its effective implementation. Even though the Office of Drug

Abuse Policy was established to do this, it

was abolished before it had a chance. If

any improvement is to be made in coordinating Federal drug control efforts, someone is

needed who has a clear delegation of authority

from the President to monitor activities and

demand corrective actions. This responsibility

is currently entrusted to the President's

Domestic Policy Staff, and it is too early to

tell whether this arrangement will ensure the

vigorous implementation of the Federal drug

strategy. The presence of a tough and consistent stance will go a long way in demonstrating within the United States and to

other countries the strong commitment our

Nation is making in combatting the drug abuse

problem. (See pp. 10 to 12 and pp. 34 and 35.)

DRUG PROBLEM REQUIRES WORLDWIDE COMMITMENT

The United States has been the prime force in

efforts to control illicit drug production, but

Tear Sheet vii
increased commitment of developed countries is

needed if we are ever to have a great impact

on the problem. With this reality in mind, GAO

recommends that the Secretary of State, with the

support of the Congress, promote a world conference and the formation of a consortium of

victim countries that would develop a plan of

action to fight the global drug problem in a

unified way. (See pp. 37 to 65.)

To further develop strong drug control within

foreign countries, GAO also recommends that

the Secretary of State require the Assistant

Secretary for Narcotics Matters to prepare

realistic Country Narcotics Actions Plans

detailing short and long-term objectives, the

means of achieving these goals, and the methods

for reviewing progress. For drug-producing

areas that encompass several countries, action

plans should be prepared on a regional basis.

GAO believes law enforcement and crop eradication

will always have a major role in drug control,

and can have an even greater impact if GAO's

recommendations are implemented. However, there

is no guarantee that the supply and use of drugs

will be reduced significantly for a long time.

Effective enforcement, eradication, and other

controls will cause shifts and temporary disruptions in trafficking and drug use patterns

and will buy time to enable the Nation to concentrate on long-term solutions. Also, it

is generally acknowledged that the demand for

drugs would be even greater were it not for law

enforcement and supply control efforts.

One question which remains unanswered is: How

does this Nation effectively curtail the demand

for illicit drugs? In the Nation's search for

long-term solutions to the drug abuse problem, it

must continue to give high priority to each vital

component of the Federal effort: law enforcement

and control, treatment and rehabilitation, education and training, and research.

Eight Federal Government organizations having

direct supportive responsibilities for activities

discussed in this report were asked to comment on

the report. The Administrative Office of the U.S.

viii
Courts and the Federal Judicial Center offered

no specific comment on GAO's report. The

Department of the Treasury, the Central

Intelligence Agency, and the Department of

Health, Education, and Welfare in their

responses did not take issue with any of the

report's contents. The Departments of Justice,

Transportation, and State, while generally

agreeing with GAO's assessment of the drug

problem and recommendations to address it,

expressed some concern with certain areas in

the report they considered misleading, outdated, or disappointing. Chapter 8 contains a

discussion of these Departments' concerns and

GAO's evaluation. (See pp. 135 to 147.)

Tear Sheet

ix
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

(Drug abuse and trafficking still flourish despite

several decades of efforts to overcome the problem. 3

Since 1968, the Federal Government has frequently

reviewed and adjusted its strategy--both domestic and

international. ( r- country's $5.5 billion drug abuse

program during the past decade has dealt with both demand

reduction ($3.4 billion) and supply reduction ($2.1 billion).

This report presents an assessment of the extent and

nature of drug abuse in the United States, -focrus9,s-on the

Federal drug supply reduction strategy, and- identifies a

number of long-standing(problems--hampering the effectiveness of the Government's drug law enforcement and supply

reduction efforts.)

ASSESSMENT OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF DRUG ABUSE

The adverse social costs of drug abuse to the Nation

are staggering, although impossible to measure precisely.

Federal Government estimates of the annual social costs to

counter drug-related crimes and lost productivity, and to

carry out treatment and prevention programs range from

$10 billion to $14 billion. The human tragedy of more

than 7,800 drug-related deaths in 1977, broken homes, ruined

lives, and divided communities are results of drug abuse

which cannot be calculated in dollars and cents.

(A continuing trend of great concern is the levels of

drug use and abuse among young people in the United States.

Since the mid-1960s drug abuse has increased dramatically,

spreading from colleges to high schools to junior high

schools and below. The serious implication of this

trend is illustrated by the fact that drugs were the

seventh most common cause of death for Americans aged 10-19

and ranked fourth for the 20-24 age group in 1976. These

age categories represented one-fourth of all drug-related

deaths during 1976.)& k ' 

National drug use and abuse trends are illustrated by

the following-, and are also detailed in Appendix I.

-- The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)

estimates that, since 1973, at any one time

an estimated 450,000 to 500,000 persons use heroin

daily. In 1977 an estimated 1.7 million persons

1
used heroin on less than a daily basis. It is

also estimated that 19 percent of the property

crime committed in the UnitedStates is heroinrelated.

-- Heroin is readily available to U.S. troops in

Europe. Additionally, the services have experienced an increase in the use of marijuana by the

troops. In some instances the drug abuse problem

that the military has encountered is more serious

than the drug abuse problem in major U.S. cities.

-- The use of the hallucinogen PCP has nearly

doubled over the past year and surpassed the use

of LSD. PCP is regarded by many medical experts

as potentially the most harmful of the commonly

abused drugs.

-- Cocaine and marijuana use has moved from the

fad stage and has become accepted by an increasing number of the Nation's population.

Cocaine use is increasing. Its use occurs

primarily among people age 12 to 25, and in

1977 it was reported that the first use of

cocaine occurred at the sixth grade level and

below in the Nation's schools. The public

uses marijuana more than any other psychoactive drug. An estimated 43 million Americans

have tried marijuana, and its use has been

rising steadily in the past decade. The

portion of young people using marijuana on

a daily basis is increasing and is now approaching 9 percent among high school seniors nationwide. Average monthly use of marijuana is

estimated at 1 person in 25 for those 12 to

13 years old and 1 in 7 for those 14 to 15

years old. Recent studies have shown that

the use of marijuana can be a stepping-stone

to other drugs, and that dependency and tolerance do occur.

-- An estimated 7,800 persons died in 1977 as a

result of abusing drugs, a decrease of about

1,600 from 1976. Deaths from heroin declined

by about 59 percent, while deaths from tranquilizers and barbiturates each declined by

about 5 percent. Deaths related to PCP are

up 18 percent.

In 1972, and again in 1977, thousands of Americans were

asked whether they ever had taken any of a variety of illegal

drugs. The following chart presents their answers.

2
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HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF

FEDERAL CONCERN AND EFFORT

The drug problem has been a matter of national concern since the early 1900s when the first narcotics laws

were passed. Early efforts to deal with the problem primarily focused on reducing the supply of drugs, first

through taxation, then by prohibition and strict legal control. The basic assumption behind this approach was that

reducing the supply and availability of drugs would lead to

a reduction in their use by encouraging drug-dependent

individuals to detoxify, and by keeping drugs out of the

hands of users.

By the end of the 1950s there was a general agreement on the part of both the public and legislators that

the Federal policy of strict supply reduction by itself

was not enough. During the 1960s and early 1970s, as

drug abuse increased and spread to new markets, the

almost exclusive emphasis on supply reduction and stiff

penalties was challenged with growing frequency, leading

to increased research and experimentation with treatment

for drug abusers.

Beginning in 1968, in response to rising public and

political concern about drug abuse and its consequences

for society, a variety of changes occurred in an attempt

to curtail drug abuse.

Reorganization of the Federal

drug law enforcement efforts

As drug abuse was increasing, Federal counter-efforts

were found to be highly fragmented and generally ineffective

in curtailing drug supplies. To overcome the needless overlap and competition between rival agencies, an effective

organization structure was needed.

President Johnson's Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1968

transferred primary drug investigative responsibility to

the Justice Department. Drug law enforcement agencies in

the Departments of Treasury and Health, Education, and

Welfare were merged to create the Bureau of Narcotics and

Dangerous Drugs (BNDD). Treasury's U.S. Customs Service

continued to be responsible for drug smuggling

investigations.

4
The formation of this new agency did not solve the

problem. Drug law enforcement continued to be characterized as "fragmented" and having "serious operational

shortcomings." By 1972, the criminal investigative and intelligence functions were shared by (1) BNDD and the

Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE) in the

Department of Justice and (2) the U.S. Customs Service,

as part of its antismuggling functions, in the Department

of the Treasury. The Office of National Narcotics

Intelligence (ONNI), also in the Department of Justice,

was responsible for developing and maintaining a national

narcotics intelligence system and for serving as a clearinghouse for Federal, State, and local agencies needing access

to such intelligence.

To correct these problems, President Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 created a single agency approach

to drug enforcement. BNDD, ODALE, and ONNI were abolished

and all Federal drug enforcement was vested in one new

agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the

Department of Justice. The functions and resources of the

abolished agencies, together with the investigative and

intelligence gathering functions and resources of the Customs Service relating to drug law enforcement, were

transferred to DEA. The Customs Service's anti-drug role

was limited to interdiction of illicit drugs at U.S. borders and ports of entry. This plan also intended a more

significant role for the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) in drug enforcement.

Even after this reorganization problems continued to

exist. In our report entitled "Federal Drug Enforcement:

Strong Guidance Needed," dated December 18, 1975, we pointed

out that the problems of fragmented organizations and interagency conflicts had not been resolved, and we endorsed the

recommendation in the Domestic Council's September 1975 report calling for settlement of jurisdictional disputes

between DEA and Customs. Our report contained a note of

caution that it was questionable whether agreements brought

about by Presidential directive will ever work without a

clear delegation of authority to someone acting on behalf

of the President to monitor adherence to guidelines and tell

agencies what is expected of them. The report also pointed

out a need to clarify the FBI's role in drug law enforcement.

The effectiveness of the present organization structure in carrying out drug law enforcement operations is

discussed in the succeeding chapters of this report.

5
Reorganization of the Federal

drug abuse prevention efforts

Prior to the early 1970s no single office had primary

responsibility for coordinating the Federal drug abuse

prevention effort.

President Nixon, in a message to the Congress on June 17,

1971, stated that the drug abuse problem had reached the dimension of a "national emergency" and that drug law enforcement must be balanced by a "rational approach" to the

reclamation of the drug abuser himself. By Executive Order

he created the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP). SAODAP was given the responsibility of mobilizing, coordinating, and overseeing the resources of the

Federal Government to provide treatment and rehabilitation

for drug abusers. The Federal drug abuse prevention functions were scattered among as many as 14 agencies engaged

in research, prevention, training, education, treatment, and

rehabilitation, all aimed at reducing the demand for drugs.

With the enactment of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-255) Federal policy clearly

called for a balanced response to the problem of drug abuse

by adding a vigorous prevention and treatment component to

the existing law enforcement effort. The act mandated the

temporary Special Action Office, and authorized the permanent

establishment of NIDA--a separate organization within the

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare--to handle

research, prevention efforts, treatment, training of professional and paraprofessional personnel, and rehabilitation

programs.

The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act also created

the Strategy Council on Drug Abuse and directed the development, promulgation, and yearly publication of a comprehensive, coordinated, long-term Federal strategy for all

drug abuse prevention and drug enforcement functions conducted, sponsored, or supported by the Federal Government.

The first Federal Strategy for Drug Abuse and Drug Traffic

Prevention prepared by the Strategy Council was published

in 1973, and four others followed in 1974, 1975, 1976 and

1979. In addition, the White Paper on Drug Abuse, a report

to the President from the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task

Force, was released in 1975.

6
Reorganization of Federal

international narcotics control

Narcotics control considerations have played a fluctuating role in foreign policy since the early 1900s. As the

Federal Government moved to a more comprehensive drug abuse

and traffic prevention policy, curtailment of drug supplies

originating outside the United States received an increasingly higher priority.

In his June 17, 1971, message to the Congress,

President Nixon asked for accelerated international cooperation and made narcotics control a top priority foreign

policy objective. With the establishment in August 1971 of

the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control

(CCINC) and the designation of the Secretary of State as

Chairman, the President gave the Department of State primary

responsibility for developing an intensified network of

international cooperation and controls. CCINC was charged

with developing a strategy to check the illegal flow of

narcotics to the United States and coordinating the efforts

undertaken abroad by involved Federal departments and

agencies to implement that strategy. While the CCINC was

assisted by various subcommittees, the Senior Advisor to the

Secretary and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters

chaired the CCINC Working Group and, as the Secretary's

designee, was given the authority to coordinate the programs

and policies of various U.S. agencies involved in international narcotics control.

U.S. embassy involvement in drug law enforcement

increased in many countries as a result of the President's

directive establishing the CCINC. To complement the

Washington effort, drug control committees were formed in

some foreign nations to deal with illicit drug trafficking.

The committees were responsible for coordinating and

guiding U.S. anti-drug activities in their respective

countries. Their first task was to develop plans outlining, among other topics, the (1) host country's

influence on the U.S. drug problem, (2) U.S. goals and

objectives to counteract this influence, and (3) specific

steps to achieve these goals and objectives.

The CCINC met five times in 1971-1973 to determine

overall policy and to act on recommendations from the

Working Group. CCINC's last meeting was in November 1973,

when it met jointly with the President and the Domestic

Council Cabinet Committees on Drug Abuse. The Select

Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control noted this in a

7
1977 report, and said that CCINC's not! holding meetings

eliminated high level policy direction to the working

interagency subcommittees.

The Agency for International Development (AID) was

also active in international narcotics control. In 1967,

it first authorized funds to provide enforcement and

agricultural equipment for poppy control and substitution

in Turkey. Between 1971 and 1973, AID, using contingency

funds provided by the Foreign Assistance Act, financed,

managed, and implemented almost all narcotics assistance.

For the first time the Congress specifically appropriated

international narcotics control funds for fiscal year 1974,

and, in November 1973, the Secretary delegated to the Senior

Advisor the responsibility for administering the international narcotics control program funded under Foreign

Assistance Act legislation. This program provided technical

assistance, equipment, supplies, and training to key producing and trafficking countries. Most of the expenditures,

however, were programmed through AID under a State/AID

Participating Service Agreement.

The President abolished the CCINC and its subcommittees

in March 1977, along with the cabinet committees on drug

abuse prevention and drug law enforcement. At the same

time, the President activated the Office of Drug Abuse Policy

(ODAP) to oversee the formation and implementation of drug

abuse policies, and he directed that the Strategy Council be

revitalized to serve as the Government-wide advisory committee

for this problem area.

During fiscal year 1978, the Department of State assumed

those narcotic control functions previously performed by AID.

In October 1978, the Congress approved the creation of the

Bureau of International Narcotic Matters in the State Depart--

ment which provides the focus for integrating narcotic control considerations within the general foreign policy of the

United States.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGY

Federal strategy to curb the extent and impact of drug

abuse in the United States has become multifaceted, recognizing the link between education, treatment, rehabilitation, research, law enforcement, crop eradication, and rural

development. It consists of a variety of domestic and international efforts to reduce the supply of and demand for

illicit drugs and those legal drugs diverted to illicit use.

The strategy points out that successful Government efforts

can minimize drug abuse.

8
The strategy consists of a three-part effort to reduce

the negative effects of drug abuse and parallels the

authority of the single-purpose, lead agencies in the drug

field. In the area of drug abuse prevention, treatment,

and rehabilitation, NIDA has overall responsibility. For

supply control activities, two agencies are chiefly

responsible. DEA is the lead agency for drug law enforcement. The Department of State has responsibility for

coordinating international narcotics control efforts and

crop substitution efforts, with authority vested in the

Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters.

The objective of supply reduction is to reduce drug

availability for illicit use by making drugs difficult

to obtain, expensive, and risky to possess, sell, or

consume. Supply reduction efforts attempt to disrupt

the entire chain of production and distribution through

substituting and eradicating crops in illegal growing

areas abroad, interdicting illicit shipments, arresting

and jailing important traffickers, and seizing and confiscating the equipment and fiscal resources needed to

operate trafficking networks. The basic assumption is

that decreasing availability will result in fewer people

experimenting with drugs, fewer experimental users advancing to chronic, intensive use of drugs, and many

current drug users abandoning their use and seeking

treatment.

Key elements of domestic drug law enforcement are

-- interdicting drugs at the border,

-- carrying out conspiracy investigations and

otherwise targeting Federal enforcement

resources at high-level traffickers,

-- immobilizing drug traffickers by incarcerating

them for long periods and reducing their financial

resources,

--controlling the supply of legally manufactured

drugs in order to prevent diversion into illegal

channels, and

-- relying on State and local police for directing

efforts against local drug dealers and providing

leads to conspiracy cases.

9
The Federal Government's goal in:international drug

control programs is to control illicit drugs at their source

and thus prevent them from entering the United States.

The key activities of the international control program

are:

-- gaining the support of other nations and international institutions for drug control,

-- preventing the cultivation of the raw materials

in the source countries by means of illicit

crop destruction and crop substitution programs,

and

-- developing strong drug control organizations within

foreign countries.

NEED FOR CENTRALIZED DIRECTION OF DRUG ABUSE

AND DRUG TRAFFIC PREVENTION

The success of the Federal strategy and the present

organizational structure relies on an effective interaction and a close, complementary relationship among 17

Federal agencies 1/, State and local agencies, key foreign

governments, and international institutions. Since the

early 1970s several reviews of the overall drug control

efforts initiated by the executive branch, the Congress,

and GAO have pointed to a continuing need for high-level

policy and program oversight of the rapidly expanding

drug abuse effort.

In July 1976 the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse

and Control was created by the House of Representatives

to assist committees having legislative jurisdiction in

the area of narcotics abuse and control.

l/The Domestic Council's 1975 "White Paper" on drug

abuse described 17 Federal entities operating programs in the area of supply and/or demand reduction.

Subsequent investigations by staff of the House

Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control,

however, revealed that there were in fact as many as

100 Federal entities within departments, independent

agencies, or executive offices which have operated

such programs between 1969 and 1976.

o10
On March 19, 1976, the Congress amended the Drug Abuse

Office and Treatment Act of 1972 (Public Law 94-237) to

establish ODAP in the Executive Office of the President.

One year later, on March 14, 1977, President Carter

activated the office. The legislative intent made clear

that the Congress was dissatisfied with inconsistent and

sometimes conflicting Federal drug abuse policies with no

clear overall direction. The Congress wanted a central

accountability mechanism to insure a coherent Presidential

drug abuse policy throughout the executive branch. ODAP's

statutory authority, responsibility, and objectives were to

oversee all organizational and policy issues for drug abuse

and drug traffic prevention, to coordinate the performance

of drug abuse functions by Federal departments and agencies,

and to recommend and implement resource and program priorities.

By the end of March 1978, ODAP conducted seven interagency policy reviews and issued reports covering the

areas of demand reduction, drug law enforcement, international narcotics control, narcotics intelligence, regulatory and compliance activities, drug abuse in the

armed services, and border management and interdiction.

In July 1977, President Carter submitted Reorganization Plan No. 1 to the Congress which included a proposal

to abolish ODAP. Many members of Congress expressed concern over the termination of ODAP because of their belief

in the continuing need for such a high level policy and

coordinating office, but also saw the need for reorganization in the Executive Office. A responsible

official assured the Congress that the various functions of

ODAP would continue to be fully carried out within the

Executive Office of the President. On March 26, 1978, the

reorganization plan took effect, and ODAP was abolished

in April. All functions of ODAP have been absorbed by the

Office of Drug Policy in the Domestic Council. Six staff

members are assigned exclusively to drug abuse issues.

Various Members and committees of the Congress continue

to be concerned about the possible adverse impact on drug

abuse policy and coordination in the Government in the

future as a result of the abolishment of ODAP. This concern

centers around whether (1) the essential characteristics of

the ODAP structure, accountability and accessibility to the

Congress, will be maintained and (2) the policy studies and

recommendations promulgated by ODAP as approved by the President will be implemented vigorously by all affected elements

of the executive branch. The responsible committees of the

11
Congress have reserved judgment on how effective this new

coordinating structure is until sufficient experience under

the new setup has been gained..

FEDERAL RESOURCES--FISCAL YEARS 1969-1978

During the past decade, the Federal Government has

spent about $5.5 billion on programs to prevent drug abuse

and reduce the availability of illicit drugs. Prior to 1969,

most resources were used to support law enforcement activities, but as the United States moved to other approaches

for combatting the drug problem, demand reduction became the

predominant effort in terms of financial assistance, receiving $3.4 billion, or 62 percent of Federal resources. Since

1969, $2.1 billion, or 38 percent of the Federal resources,

were used for supply reduction, mainly for law enforcement

efforts of BNDD/DEA and the U.S. Customs Service.

12
TOTAL U. S. DEMAND REDUCTION/SUPPLY

REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS

F. Y. 1969-1978 (note a)

Total Obligations -

Demand Reduction --

Supply Reduction ...

(in millions of dollars)

850 850

800 800

750 750

700 700

650 650

600 600

550 550

500 500

450 / 450

400 400

350 350

*##*300* 300

250 250

200 200

150 150

100 ,... 100

50 , 50

0 0

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

a/ Figures for 1977 and 1978 are projected amounts

Source: Oversight Hearings on Federal Drug Strategy, 1977

House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and

Control, p. 60.

13
Most U.S. efforts have concentralted on the domestic

drug abuse problem. A small portion of total resources

were devoted to the supply and demand'problems in drugproducing countries. Assistance provided by the Department of State increased from $5.4 million in 1971 to

$40 million in 1978. Overall, this support amounted to

about $222 million, or about 4 percent 1/ of the Federal

resources budgeted for drug abuse conltrol over the past

10 years. The majority was used for supporting supply

reduction efforts, namely crop eradication programs in

Mexico and Burma.

l/This percentage would increase slightly if the expenditures

for other Federal agencies' supply and demand reduction

programs in foreign countries were included.

14
CHAPTER 2

REDUCING DRUG AVAILABILITY IN

THE UNITED STATES--EFFORTS HAVE

NOT HAD LASTING BENEFITS

Law enforcement and diplomatic accomplishments have

shown some positive results in reducing the availability

and adverse impact of some illegal drugs, yet the drug

trade flourishes. Most evidence indicates that these gains

have not permanently reduced overall drug availability, but

have shifted trafficking and distribution patterns and caused

users to switch to other drugs when their preferred drug

becomes hard to get.

The drug problem persists because of enormous consumer

demand, tremendous profits, little risk, and the characteristics of the underdeveloped source countries. In addition,

the Federal drug supply reduction efforts have yet to

achieve a well-integrated, balanced, and truly coordinated

approach. The huge supply and demand for drugs and the

enormity of the undertaking will continually frustrate

attempts to contain the problem under the present approach.

WHAT SUCCESSES HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED?

Notable and well-publicized successes have been attained

in carrying out the Federal supply reduction strategy. These

have resulted from actions taken by the United States to

immobilize major drug trafficking networks through drug law

enforcement and to elicit foreign support in controlling the

production of illegal drugs. For example:

-- A Turkish restriction on poppy cultivation and

increased United States and French enforcement

suppressed the French-Turkish heroin connection

in the early 1970s and produced a dramatic

shortage of heroin in the United States.

-- Although cold weather and drought may have helped,

DEA reports that joint United States-Mexico efforts

in poppy eradication and narcotics enforcement have

reduced heroin availability in the United States.

15
--DEA reports that heroin currently has the lowest

purity and highest price since 1973 and that

heroin-related deaths have been!declining, 1/ which

it attributes to a lessening of heroin supplies in

the United States.

-- Enforcement activities in the United States and

abroad have caused significant drug removals and

increased clandestine laboratory seizures.

-- DEA has increased its emphasis on conspiracy

investigations, and many high-level drug traffickers

have been convicted on conspiracy charges. As a

result, some convicted traffickers have received

substantial prison sentences.

-- Foreign countries have increased their support of

supply reduction efforts, both On their own and

through programs sponsored by the United Nations

and the United States.

-- The amount of diversion of legal drugs at the

wholesale and manufacturing levels has declined

sharply in recent years.

Current indicators suggest that there is a major shortage

of heroin in the United States, a significant accomplishment

against the Nation's number one drug enforcement priority.

Such successes are, however, short-lived--growing

areas, shipment routes, trafficking organizations, and even

the types of drugs abused all change and adapt to new conditions. For example, the heroin shortage created by the

breaking of the French Connection was temporary--Mexico

emerged as the principal supplier of heroin to the United

States. Now the concern is that, as Mexican heroin availability declines, heroin from Southeast Asia and the

Middle East will fill the gap. Some also fear that use of

dangerous synthetic drugs will continue to increase as

heroin users find it difficult to obtain heroin.

1/DEA uses these three factors to measure its performance and

the availability of heroin. DEA and ODAP recognized these

factors as indicators and not precise measurement devices.

.16
French-Turkish Connection broken

Perhaps the most widely publicized success was when

the so-called "French Connection" was suppressed in the

early 1970s. It was estimated that in the late 1960s as

much as 90 percent of the heroin used in the United States

was derived from opium diverted from legal production in

Turkey. Much of this high-quality "white" heroin was processed by French-Corsican smugglers and transshipped via

France for distribution in the United States. Partly because of a Turkish ban on poppy cultivation, and partly

because of increased United States and French narcotic

enforcement against the trafficking networks, this source of

heroin was nearly dried up by 1973. Heroin availability in

the United States declined and, reportedly, the number of

users dropped dramatically during 1972 and 1973.

Success with the eradication

program in Mexico

With the success in suppressing the supply of heroin

from Turkey, Mexico emerged as the principal supplier of

heroin to the United States. Production was stepped up to

meet the heroin shortage, and Mexico's share of the U.S.

market is estimated to have increased from 38 percent in

1972 to 90 percent by 1976. Correspondingly, the use of

heroin in the United States started increasing again in

early 1974 after declining in 1972.

Mexico decided in 1975 to dramatically increase its

effort to eliminate illicit opium cultivation by expanding

crop destruction operations and committing more personnel

to the task. Now it is reported that successes in eradication campaigns and enforcement actions have reduced

overall availability of heroin in the United States and

contributed to a shift in marijuana sources from Mexico to

Colombia. It has also been reported that cold weather and

drought in Mexico's poppy-growing areas have contributed to

this decrease.

Heroin indicators show declines

Though the effectiveness of drug control efforts is

virtually impossible to precisely measure, DEA's three heroin

availability indicators all point to decreased supplies of

the drug. The retail heroin purity index, which measures

the purity of heroin available at the street level, has

declined from 6.1 percent in 1976 to 4.1 percent during

17
November 1978. At the same time, thelprice of heroin has

reached its highest level since 1973, when'the full impact

of the Turkish opium ban was evident. Heroin-related overdose deaths, as reported by the Drug Abuse Warning Network

(DAWN) 1/ were 770 in 1977, down almost 60 percent from 1976.

(See app. I, pp. 154 and 155.)

Drug seizures and removals increase

Enforcement activities in the United States and abroad

have caused significant removals of drugs from the illicit

market and an increased number of clandestine laboratory

seizures. Total domestic and foreign heroin/opium removals

increased substantially in 1977, to almost 41,000 pounds

from about 22,000 pounds in 1975. During the same period,

seizures of cocaine, marijuana, and hashish also increased

substantially. In addition, the seizure of clandestine drug

laboratories increased 65 percent from 1976 to 1977. Of the

laboratories seized in 1977, 50 were producing PCP, and 77

were producing stimulants, hallucinogens, and other drugs.

According to DEA, the number of seizures suggests a proliferation of clandestine laboratories in the United States.

The preceding statistics are difficult to interpret

and are not necessarily true measures of enforcement effectiveness. With the exception of marijuana, most drugs are

seized closest to the source of production, and foreign

seizures do not necessarily mean that these drugs were

destined for the United States. However, drug seizures

by law enforcement over the years have been significant.

(See app. II, p. 156.)

Conspiracy cases stressedOne of the most significant accomplishments in the law

enforcement area has been DEA's increased emphasis on conspiracy and financial investigations to immobilize high-level

traffickers and their organizations. In 1978, 104 traffickers

were charged with conspiracy violations in Federal Court,

compared to 90 in 1974. Moreover, there has been increased

numbers of complex conspiracy cases. This topic is more

fully discussed in chapter 5.

1/NIDA and DEA have developed a national drug abuse data

collection system which collects data associated with

drug abuse-related crises as reported by hospital

emergency rooms and medical examiners in 24 of the

largest metropolitan areas of the United States.

18
Complex conspiracy cases directed at financiers and

organizational heads who isolate themselves from actual drug

transactions are much more time-consuming than "substantive"

cases where an individual is arrested immediately after drugs

are purchased from him. A breakdown of DEA's arrest statistics of traffickers arrested during the period 1975 through

1978 are contained in appendix II, page 156.

Greater foreign support for

drug control programs

Foreign countries have increased their support of

efforts to reduce drug supplies. The Department of State

has used its diplomatic offices and narcotics assistance

funds to establish cooperative efforts with 10 countries

which are principal sources of drugs flowing into the United

States. To illustrate, Mexico's decision to use herbicides

and increase its eradication efforts is considered to be

the single most important factor contributing to the decrease

in Mexico's share of the U.S. illicit heroin and marijuana

markets. These efforts by Mexico are also believed to be the

primary reason for the favorable changes in the heroin-related

fatalities and heroin retail price purity.

Through the United Nations Fund For Drug Abuse Control

(UNFDAC), more than 70 foreign governments have contributed

to international narcotics control programs. The increase

from the 40 member nations contributing in 1975 illustrates

the increased international concern for the drug problem. Other

indications include a judicial assistance treaty between the

United States and Switzerland, development and ratification

of the Single Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the

assignment of drug control attaches to Thailand by at least

six foreign nations.

Successes have few lasting benefits

Despite these many hard-won achievements, the Federal

supply reduction efforts have not had a significant impact

on the overall drug problem. Successes have been temporary, as drug trafficking and drug use patterns shift in

response to supply reduction efforts.

Even though recent successes in attacking the supply

of Mexican heroin have reportedly reduced overall heroin

availability in the United States, it remains to be seen

whether this gain can be maintained. Experts consider it

likely that the United States will become an increasingly

19
attractive market for heroin from Southeast Asia and, perhaps,

the Middle East. Mexico currently remains the principal

supplier of heroin to the United States, but DEA intelligence

reported in 1978 that traffickers are finding Asian heroin

a desirable alternative to Mexican heroin because of its

low price and availability throughout Asian markets. Narcotics traffickers are conscious of the demand created by the

dwindling availability of Mexican heroin and are reaching out

to Asian representatives who are anxious to connect these

distribution networks to their sources,of supply. White

Asian heroin has, in fact, already become a significant

source in the illicit market of the New York metropolitan

area and a dominant source in Washington, D.C.

Supply reduction accomplishments have also contributed

to a shift in the U.S. supply of marijuana. It is believed

that at least partly because of the success of the paraquatspraying program in Mexico, marijuana users in the United

States have switched to Colombian marijuana. Colombia is

now the major supplier of marijuana to the United States,

with most of the illegal substance entering through the

Southeastern United States.

Patterns in the types of drugs abused also change as a

result of "successful" drug supply reduction efforts. Compulsive and chronic drug users, who create the largest portion of the drug abuse problem, tend to use whatever drug

is available. When one substance becomes unavailable,

these users switch to another or to a combination of drugs

which they use in the same self-destructive pattern. Thus,

it is not surprising that DEA reported an increasing trend

in the use and trafficking of heroin substitutes and supplements as retail heroin purity declined in 1977.

In its New York Region, for example, DEA found that

since heroin purity has fallen, polydrug abuse has increased, and many users have switched to synthetic drugs

such as PCP, Talwin, and Preludin. Intelligence reported

that a scarcity of quality heroin has given rise to a dramatic increase in PCP sales, particularly in Harlem, where

it is marketed in the same manner as heroin. DEA also

found that former heroin distributors are involved in

the New York PCP trade, and there are indications of the

overall acceptance of PCP by the addict population.

The 1979 Federal Strategy recognizes the great

potential for increased abuse of synthetic drugs. Abuse of

PCP, in particular, has recently reached alarming proportions in several major cities. The strategy noted that

20
the marketing and use of PCP have been increasing and

that PCP may represent the drug abuse wave of the future.

It further stated that:

The control of cheap and easily manufactured synthetic drugs is difficult and may well be a major

concern of the future. It is quite possible that

the marketing of PCP will serve as a model for

further illegal synthetic drugs.

The reactions of both drug users and traffickers to

drug supply reduction's accomplishments demonstrate that

successes have been short-lived and have had little impact

on the overall drug abuse problem.

WHY DOES THE PROBLEM PERSIST?

The drug problem persists because of the enormous supply

of and demand for drugs. The Federal strategy implementation

can be improved for greater effectiveness, but the desire for

drugs, the situations faced in the underdeveloped source

countries, and the low risk of the trafficking business relative to the tremendous profits will continually frustrate

attempts to contain the problem.

Enormous drug demand

Drug use has become engrained in our society, and the

demand for drugs will not be easily reduced. With society's changing attitudes toward the drug culture, millions

of Americans have experimented with many types of illicit

drugs, including cocaine, marijuana, and PCP. In addition

to this increasing abuse, there continues to be an enormous

demand for heroin.

The ever growing demand for illicit drugs in the United

States includes both the young and elderly, and crosses racial, cultural, social, and economic lines. NIDA estimated

that about 43 million people have experimented with marijuana, 6.9 million people have used PCP, 2 million have

used heroin, and 19 million have used hashish.

The total list of substances abused by Americans is

extensive, but recent studies show that the demand for

marijuana, cocaine, and PCP is increasing more rapidly than

for other drugs. The age levels at which these drugs are

first used have moved steadily downward, now affecting even

those of grade school age. Also influencing the greater

21
use of these drugs is the fact that valrious implements and

rituals associated with drug abuse have become commercially

exploited by magazines and retail shops. As an example,

certain magazines depict the drug culture as the "in"

society. Through advertisements in these magazines, readers may buy any number of implements to facilitate drug

consumption.

Drug abuse is not confined to citizens residing in the

United States, but has also affected American troops serving overseas. An Army semiannual drug survey, for

instance, showed significant increases in the use of marijuana/hashish, dangerous drugs, and heroin. Furthermore,

military officials have recently stated their concern about

the high purity heroin that has become, available to service

personnel.

Over the last decade the illicit use of opium-based

drugs has become a worldwide problem, growing in the countries of origin and spreading to many of the industrialized

countries of the world, especially in Europe.

Reducing this enormous demand for drugs is an extremely difficult undertaking, as recognized by President Carter

in his 1977 Message on Drug Abuse. The President said:

"No government can completely protect its citizens from all harm--not by legislation, or by

regulation, or by medicine, or by advice. Drugs

cannot be forced out of existence; they will be

with us for as long as people find in them the

relief or satisfaction they desire."

An unlimited drug supply exists

Numerous foreign countries produce opium, cocaine, and

marijuana. Legally manufactured drugs are exported, but

some are returned for the U.S. illegal market. Dangerous

drugs are clandestinely manufactured both here and abroad,

and drugs are diverted in legitimate U.S. channels from

manufacturers, pharmacies, and physicians. Drug clinics are

sometimes the source for the abuse of methadone, a drug used

to treat heroin addicts. Even the process of filling recognized medical needs is the source for drug abuse.

Because of the hidden nature of an illicit activity that

transcends the borders of many nations and which has both

licit and illicit sources, it is impossible to accurately

estimate illicit drug production and Supply. Even for heroin

22
and cocaine--drugs traditionally receiving high priority in

U.S. supply reduction efforts--estimates have varied and at

best, are educated guesses. However, these estimates, along

with the many drugs abused and the many sources, show that a

virtually unlimited supply easily meets the world demand.

The charts on the following pages show the opium-growing

areas throughout the world and the major trafficking routes

for illicit drugs flowing into the United States.

23
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LL

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Many countries can easily

meet U.S. heroin needs

Opium poppies are cultivated both legally and illegally in many countries. Licit opium production is geared to

meet the world demand for manufacturing pharmaceuticals

such as morphine and codeine. Much of the illicit opium

production is consumed by the local addict population,

while that converted into heroin is consumed both locally

and in other countries, primarily the United States and

Western Europe. Overall, licit and illicit production far

exceed both the licit and illicit opium demand.

No accurate information is available on illicit opium

production. DEA, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the

State Department estimate this production, however, and

the following data are based on the "educated guesses"

made by these agencies. The table is intended only as a

general guide to gauge present illicit opium production

in the major producing areas.

Estimated Illicit Opium Production

By Major Producers

COUNTRY METRIC TONS

Pakistan 500-600

Afghanistan 300-400

Burma 300-400

Thailand 70-80

Laos 50-60

Mexico 28-40

Total 1,248-1,580

26
Most of the opium used to supply the U.S. heroin market

is illicitly produced. However, this was not always the

situation. In the past, the diversion of part of the 200

metric tons legally produced in Turkey found its way into

the infamous French Connection and subsequently into the

United States.

The changing licit and illicit production is presently

causing concern among United Nations and U.S. officials.

These changes illustrate the ease with which heroin demand

is satisfied by a variety of countries.

-- Pakistan and Afghanistan production dwarfs

production in Mexico and the Golden Triangle,

the primary sources supplying the United States.

With opium now being refined into heroin in

Pakistan, this area has emerged as a

potential source.

--Concern exists in some quarters over the possibility of diversion from licit production in

Turkey since more poppy straw has been produced

and stored than can be sold on the licit market.

Reportedly in 1978, Turkey harvested 36,400

metric tons of poppy straw, and 30,500 tons of

straw from the 1976 and 1977 crops were in

storage.

-- Seizures of Middle Eastern heroin destined for

Canada and Western Europe are also on the rise,

and evidence shows that the number of heroin

laboratories in various countries, including

Turkey and Italy, is increasing.

-- India is producing more opium than the

licit market needs, thereby creating the

potential for diversion. India has been

practically the sole supplier of licit opium

for the past 5 years with production increasing

from 866 tons to 1,651 tons.

-- Previously unknown illicit growing areas have

been found in Lebanon and Egypt. Some illicit

production has reportedly surfaced in Turkey

and Colombia, but Department of State officials

have seen no reports which verify the production.

27
-- The existence of large inventories of seized

illicitly produced opium in Thailand and

Afghanistan further increases the risk of

diversion and could further disrupt the licit

market.

Coca production increasing rapidly

Nearly all of the cocaine flowing to the United States

comes from South America. For the most part, the coca is

grown in Peru and Bolivia, then processed into cocaine in

Colombia. Past estimates of the amount of cocaine available

for world use each year have ranged from 63 to 100 tons with

an estimated 15 to 46 tons entering the United States

annually.

Officials generally agree that the amount of cocaine

coming to the United States is increasing and that a similar

increase is occurring in Europe. In line with these increases,

coca-growing areas have expanded in South America. DEA

officials in Peru and Bolivia in 1978 reported that over

107,000 acres may be used for coca production. Excluding exports and local consumption, their reports show that 37,360

tons of coca could be available for the illicit market. Depending upon the method used in estimating the cocaine production, 82 to 248 tons of cocaine could be available for world

use.

Marijuana is in abundant supply

Marijuana, the most widely used illicit drug in the

United States, is chiefly grown in Colombia and Mexico.

Until recently, Mexico provided most of the marijuana consumed in the United States. But, as paraquat-spraying and

enforcement efforts there took hold, Colombia emerged to

become the primary source, most of the marijuana coming into

the Southeastern United States by the tonload in boats and

aircraft. According to some news reports, Colombia has

300,000 acres of marijuana under cultivation, helping to

provide users in the United States with the 60,000 to

91,000 pounds per day needed to satisfy their demand.

There are several other marijuana-growing areas, including Jamaica, Thailand, Panama, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the

United States. While domestic marijuana production can be

found in all parts of the United States, DEA believes it

represents no more than 10 percent of the total market.

The most sophisticated domestic cultivation appears to be

taking place in Hawaii, where potent marijuana capable of

rivaling many foreign varieties is being produced.

28
Dangerous drugs have many sources

Dangerous drugs come from many licit and illicit sources.

Each year as much as 15 billion dosage units are licitly manufactured in the United States, and over 1.4 billion prescriptions are written. Diversion from this licit source by forged

prescriptions, scrip rings, prescriptions issued by unscrupulous practitioners, and thefts easily meets the illicit

demand.

Clandestine laboratories are easily established and

maintained, and illicitly produce barbiturates, amphetamines,

and heroin substitutes such as Dilaudid and Quaalude

(methaqualone). Laboratories in the United States were the

sources for the much-abused LSD and presently produce all

of the illicit PCP.

Large quantities of drugs are licitly manufactured and

exported, but some eventually are returned for distribution

in the illicit U.S. market. In 1977 for example, such drugs

were coming from Mexico, Canada, Spain, Jamaica, and The

Netherlands.

In the past, the primary source of illicit methaqualone

was diversion from the legitimate market or from clandestine

laboratories in the United States. Now Colombia has become

an important new source. The operators of clandestine laboratories easily obtain methaqualone base from European pharmaceutical companies even though the base is a controlled

substance in Colombia.

Realities of growing countries make it

difficult to prevent cultivation of illicit

crops and stop trafficking at the source

Most countries producing opium, coca, and marijuana

are poor, underdeveloped, struggling nations with similar

social and economic characteristics. Cultivation is typically done by people having little to do with the national

government and are outside the mainstream of society. They

live in areas where the national government has little or

no actual control and insufficient resources to gain

control.

In Burma, the largest producer of opium grown in the

Golden Triangle, the production of opium is more a political problem than a police matter. The overwhelming

29
majority of opium production occurs in areas under the control of various insurgent groups rebelling against the

government. These areas are almost totally inaccessible

to modern transportation. The farmer grows opium because

of economic need and political pressure from the various

warring groups which traffic in opium as a means of

supporting their guerrilla wars against the Government of

Burma.

Opium and coca are traditional crops in many areas and

an integral part of the culture. The leaves of the coca

bush have been chewed by members of the Andean civilization

for at least 3,000 years for religious ceremonies and to

relieve fatigue, hunger, and cold. Similarly, opium and its

byproducts have been used in most producing regions for

centuries to relieve pain or as part of their social customs

or religious rites.

Perhaps more important than any other is the reality

that drug cultivation is a key economic factor in the lives

of the farmers who lack viable economic alternatives to

illicit drug cultivation. Farmers are unconcerned about

the moral and political consequences of drug cultivation,

seeing it only in economic terms. This is best illustrated

by the hill tribes in Northern Thailand. Those farmers who

do not cultivate the opium poppy have an average family income of about $175, while those who grow opium receive

about $250 for each acre cultivated. In Colombia, for

instance, the estimated $1-billion-a-year business generated

by illegal drug-smuggling reportedly almost equals what coffee, Colombia's main legitimate export, brings in annually.

Suppression efforts have been hindered by longstanding

and socially accepted traditions of smuggling and corruption.

Not surprisingly, in some countries the enormous profits

made in the opium, coca, and marijuana trade provide the

means to finance corruption which nurtures and protects the

drug traffic and is the most important factor inhibiting

efforts to deal with the traffic. It saps the will and capability of the governments to mount an effective effort

against traffickers and their organizations. Some government, police, judicial, and military officials profit from

narcotics trafficking with near impunity. For example, in

some countries widespread corruption exists within the

principal unit empowered with narcotics enforcement.

30
These realities are too complex for a predominately

law enforcement approach to be effective and too much for

the United States to overcome alone. Other foreign

countries are not fully committed to providing the assistance needed to reduce illicit production in producing

countries. International drug control and the realities

of growing countries are discussed in chapter 3.

Risk of trafficking business low

relative to the tremendous profits

The enormous profits of the drug trafficking business

attract an ample number of entrepreneurs who see opportunities for profits that far exceed those available from

legitimate businesses. Notwithstanding the obstacles created by law enforcement, it is relatively easy to enter and

distribute drugs in the United States. The appeal of drug

trafficking is demonstrated by the diversity of traffickers,

many of whom do not have the typical backgrounds associated

with other kinds of criminal activity.

It is widely recognized that illegal drug sales in the

United States are a multibillion-dollar business, directly

affecting the U.S. economy. The National Narcotic Intelligence Consumers' Committee estimated payments by

users and traffickers for heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and

hashish, and other dangerous drugs are between $35 billion

and $51 billion annually.

To place the financial rewards and the extensive

activities of the drug traffic in perspective, an

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury reported that the 1974

sales of the A & P grocery chain amounted to less than

$7 billion. To make those sales, A & P required more than

3,000 stores, 100,000 employees, and $200 million in

working capital, and recycled billions of dollars through

the banking system. According to DEA, the financial base

of any major international drug trafficking ring is vast

and complex, with operating funds running into millions

of dollars.

The potential for accumulating large and quick profits

is a strong lure which many find irresistible. The drug

business is filled with numerous "rags-to-riches" stories.

For example, DEA reported one Florida case where the head

of a marijuana smuggling ring became a millionaire in just

a few years. In 1971, before entering the illegal traffic, the individual was allegedly in such desperate

31
financial condition that he burned his boat to collect

the insurance on it. Shortly afterwards he became involved in drug smuggling, and, by 1974, he reportedly had

become a millionaire with foreign bank accounts and interests in several corporations. In another case, a truck

driver earning $1.65 an hour in 1972 rose to become a

leader of an organization grossing $200,000-$300,000 per

week in 1976 from the sale of heroin. During this time

period the trafficker became a partner in a taco factory,

paid $74,000 in cash for seven automobiles, and moved from

a $70-a-month apartment to a $330,000 house, paid for in

cash, in an exclusive Los Angeles neighborhood.

Drug trafficking today appeals to people from all

walks of life. A review of convicted traffickers shows

that they have backgrounds ranging from hardcore criminals

to highly respected professionals, such as lawyers, accountants, businessmen, doctors, and entertainers. According

to those involved in drug enforcement, the increased marijuana and cocaine trafficking has particularly attracted

many who do not fit the usual. stereotype of a drug violator.

In chapter 5 we discuss the particular problem of doctors who,

intentionally and for profit, prescribe or sell drugs to

individuals with no legitimate medical need.

The risks of drug trafficking are low relative to the

profits that can be made, thus assuring the continual replacement of those traffickers who are caught. Law enforcement creates obstacles; however, (1) the border has not been

a serious impediment to drug smuggling (see ch. 4 for

details), (2) success in immobilizing traffickers has been

limited (see chs. 5 and 6), (3) only an estimated 5 to 10 percent of all illicit drugs available in the United States are

seized, (4) efforts to attack: and confiscate the financial

resources of traffickers are disappointing, and (5) sentencing of convicted traffickers has failed to provide a strong

deterrent to drug trafficking.

Actions needed to support Federal strategy

implementation have not materialized

The Federal strategy has sought to contain and, ultimately, reduce the supply of illicit drugs. However, the

huge supply of and demand for drugs and the enormity of the

undertaking have frustrated attempts to achieve the goal.

Moreover, differing views among Government agencies as

well as the public make it difficult to attain the necessary

legislative, executive, and judicial actions.

32
There has been and continues to be longstanding

fragmentation in and among the agencies involved in drug

supply reduction. Since 1968, there has been a variety

of changes in drug strategy, policy, and agency structure

to reduce this fragmentation and provide clear high-level

direction so that supply reduction effectiveness would be

increased.

Chapters 3 through 7 of this report demonstrate that

the drug supply reduction efforts have yet to achieve a

well-integrated, balanced, and truly coordinated approach.

Our work shows that:

-- The United States, emphasizing short-term

measures to reduce drug availability, has

not received the degree of international

support needed to overcome the long-term

nature of the problem (i.e., social, political,

and economic conditions in producing countries) nor is it likely that these problems

will be overcome within the foreseeable

future. (See ch. 3.)

-- There is no comprehensive border control

plan, and thus, Federal agencies at the U.S.

border carry out separate but similar lines

of effort with little consideration for

overall border security. This has diluted

border coverage and control and meant that

the border has not been a serious impediment

to the illegal entry of drugs. (See ch. 4.)

-- Legal obstacles, lack of expertise, little

overall direction, and changing priorities have

prevented Federal agencies from fully using

and coordinating their unique skills, jurisdictions, and resources. As a result, the

Federal Government has had only limited

success in immobilizing high-level traffickers

and their organizations through conspiracy

investigations, the use of financial evidence,

and other techniques. (See ch. 5.)

-- Bail and sentencing practices throughout

the country have further weakened efforts

to immobilize drug traffickers. Many arrested

for trafficking take advantage of the bail

33
law and traffic in drugs while awaiting trial,

while those eventually convicted are often

not incarcerated for long periods of time.

(See ch. 6.)

--The enormous number of jurisdictions,

coupled with financial and political realities, make it virtually impossible to

mobilize State and local enforcement resources on a coordinated nationwide attack

on drug trafficking. (See ch. 7.)

As discussed in chapter 1, various members and committees of the Congress have expressed concern that ODAP's

elimination may have an adverse impact on drug abuse policy

and coordination in the Government. Our work shows their

concern is well-founded in light of past history. A clear

delegation of authority to someone acting on behalf of the

President is needed to improve drug supply reduction. It

remains to be seen whether the accountability of ODAP will

be maintained in the new coordinating structure, and whether

ODAP's policy recommendations will be implemented vigorously by all affected members of the executive branch.

PROPOSED ACTIONS

Drug problem requires Federal

partnership and tougher stand

While the United States has articulated a strong

stance to combat drug abuse in its Federal strategy and

policy statements, the implementation has not consistently

supported such a stance and has indicated to many a growing acceptance of drug use within this country. This

reality has fueled misunderstanding as to what drug abuse

policy the United States is willing to back up with action.

The confusion is shared by the public at large, law enforcement officials at all levels of government, and other

nations.

The United States must take a much tougher and consistent stance to make real gains in reducing the availability

of illicit drugs. We must resolve these longstanding

problems:

-- Federal agencies' organizational difficulties

diluting law enforcement efforts at our borders.

34
-- Large-scale drug traffickers, in terms of

immobilization from trafficking, being

incarcerated for short periods of time while

their ill-gotten gains remain intact.

-- Unclear Federal, State, and local enforcement

roles hampering the attack on drug traffickers.

-- Inconsistent and sometimes conflicting drug

policy, resulting in no clear overall

directions.

-- Businesses and individuals promoting the use of

drugs through drug-oriented paraphernalia and

magazines.

-- Developed countries and international financial

institutions providing little or no support for

controlling illicit drug production.

To remedy these and other problems discussed in this

report will take a Federal partnership of the executive

and legislative branches of Government. They must reach

agreement upon and affirm the Nation's policy for dealing

with the drug abuse problem and enact the legislation

for achieving the desired results. A joint commission

could be formed to clearly set forth the Nation's policy

and recommend a course of action to ensure vigorous implementation of the agreed-upon policy. The presence of a

tough and consistent stance will go a long way in demonstrating within the United States, and to other countries,

the strong commitment the United States is making in combatting the drug abuse problem.

Drug problem requires worldwide commitment

The United States has been a prime force in efforts to

control drug production, but increased commitment of developed

countries is needed if we are to have a great impact on the

problem. GAO's recommendations to improve worldwide commitments are set forth on page 65.

Though we believe law enforcement and crop eradication

will always have a major role in drug control and can have

a greater impact if our recommendations are implemented,

35
there is no guarantee that the supply and use of drugs will

be reduced significantly for a long time. Effective enforcement, eradication, and other controls will cause shifts and

temporary disruptions in trafficking and drug use patterns

and buy time to enable the Nation to concentrate on longrun

solutions. Also, it is generally acknowledged that the demand for drugs would be even greater were it not for law

enforcement and supply control efforts.

One question which remains unanswered is: how does

this Nation effectively curtail the demand for illicit

drugs? In the Nation's search for long-term solutions to

the drug abuse problem, it must continue to give high priority to each vital component of the Federal effort--law

enforcement and control, treatment and rehabilitation,

education and training, and research.

:36
CHAPTER 3

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL:

SOME PROGRESS BUT TASK IS FORMIDABLE

The United States, working with producing nations, has

been the predominant force in efforts to control illicit

production in source countries, where the potential to impact drug availability and the drug problem is considered to

be the greatest. These efforts have centered on programs

for drug crop eradication and substitution, cooperative

drug law enforcement, and obtaining assistance from other

nations.

If success is viewed from the perspective of conditions existing before these programs began, progress and

meaningful accomplishments are evident in some source countries. International narcotics control efforts have had the

greatest impact in producing short-term heroin shortages in

the United States. If the measurement of success lies in

those conditions that must exist if cultivation and trafficking are to be substantially reduced, progress has been modest.

Longstanding political, economic, and social problems

in growing countries have limited the impact of international drug control efforts. The conditions discussed below

demonstrate that illicit drugs will continue to be available to meet the demand for years to come and even decades

because:

-- Growers lack viable economic alternatives

to the cultivation of opium, coca, and

marijuana. Replacing the illicit crops

is a long-term and expensive undertaking

and such extensive economic development

has rarely occurred in the past, if at all.

--Most countries are not seriously committed

to resolving the worldwide drug problem.

Prospects that additional resources will

be provided for drug control are further

lessened by the development priorities and

risks in producing countries and the uncertainty of contributions by international

financial institutions and the Agency

for International Development (AID).

37
-- Foreign drug enforcement, while one of

the few elements which has had an immediate impact and which is necessary to

help achieve long-term objectives, has

not had a lasting effect on overall drug

availability and trafficking.

ERADICATION: SHORT-TERM RESULTS

BUT NO SOLUTION

Eradication as a tool for reducing drug availability

faces many obstacles. Currently this approach is operating

in Burma and Mexico, two of the nine narcotics producing

countries which are viewed as the major sources of narcotics

abused in the United States. These programs have met with

varying degrees of success. Regardless of the degree of

success achieved, these successes are likely to be temporary

in nature unless actions are taken to provide growers with

an alternative source of income. To do this would require

massive expenditures and would take considerable time to

achieve the goal. Experiments with such programs are

discussed on pages 44 through 48 of this chapter.

Eradication impact on Mexican production:

cautious opitimism advised

During fiscal years 1970-78, U.S. narcotics assistance

to Mexico, not including the estimated $3 million spent

annually by DEA, amounted to approximately $69 million.

Most of it was used for remote sensing and communication

equipment and the purchase and maintenance of the. 64 helicopters and 24 airplanes used in the narcotics control

program.

The use of helicopters and aerial eradication using

herbicides overcame many of the problems associated with past

efforts to destroy the opium poppy. Plants were manually

destroyed with sticks, machetes, and hoes, and the almost

inaccessible terrain, where crops were grown and often

processed, prevented the use of conventional land transportation or fixed-wing aircraft from transporting eradication

personnel to the growing areas. Even with helicopters,

manual eradication could not make the needed impact on

opium production. With the increasing Mexican heroin in the

United States, the Mexican Government considered alternatives

and decided to use aerially sprayed herbicides as an eradication tool.

Since 1976, aerial eradication using herbicides has

had some notable successes in Mexico. According to DEA,

38
eradication destroyed an equivalent of 34,861 pounds of

heroin during 1976-77--over 17 times the amount of heroin

seized domestically by DEA and other agencies during the

same period. Largely because of these efforts, DEA stated

availability was reduced and heroin purity reached

4.2 percent by September 1978, the lowest point since 1971.

Field sizes are getting smaller, and growers are going to

great lengths to avoid detection. Fields are being planted

and camouflaged by trees and canopies, and clusters of

fields are being found outside traditional growing areas.

Despite eradication successes, prospects are that

Mexico will continue to be a major heroin source for U.S.

addicts. After about 3 years of aerial eradication, the

Mexican share of the U.S. market has decreased from 89

percent, or 5.2 metric tons, in 1975, to about 65 percent,

or 2.76 metric tons, in 1978.

In our 1977 report on the eradication program, 1/ we

reported that cautious optimism was advised. This is the

same position the United States must take today despite the

estimated reduction of 2.4 metric tons of heroin entering

the United States from Mexico and the Mexican Attorney General's claim that the program destroys 95 percent of the

known production.

Most recently, uncertainty on crop production and destruction surfaced when the eradication statistics for the

1978 campaign declined dramatically from similar periods in

1977. For the first 3 months of 1978, the number of fields

and areas eradicated in the major poppy-growing areas

declined 62 and 86 percent respectively. Over the next

6 months, further reductions were experienced in the overall

program.

l/"Opium Eradication Efforts In Mexico: Cautious Optimism

Advised" (GGD-77-6, Feb. 18, 1977; Confidential).

39
Eradication Statistics for the Tri-State

Area of Sinoloa, Durango, and Chihuahua

3-month period Fields Hectares

January - late March

1977 23,699 5,802

1978 9,009 785

Percent of decrease 62 86

Eradication Statistics for the Overall Program

6-month period Fields Hectares

April 1 - September 30

1977 5,146 576

1978 3,937 262

Percent of decrease 25 30

The Mexican officials contend that the decline in the

opium poppy eradication was due to a successful 1977 fall

eradication campaign which caused farmers to plant fewer

poppies. During that campaign 11,299 fields, or 1,482 hectares, were reported to have been destroyed in the Tri-State

area.

As early as February 1978, this decline was a cause

of concern among U.S. program officials who at that time

had insufficient information to determine what factors were

responsible. In August 1978 the question of whether the

decline in Mexican opium cultivation was due to eradication

40
or to a drought in the fall of 1977 was raised. Some analysts

believed that the drought significantly contributed to the

decline in the amount of opium poppy reportedly eradicated

from January through March 1978, and that it affected the

poppy growers to much the same degree as it did the legitimate

farmers who were forced to reduce their planting by as much

as 50 percent.

Some analysts believed that there was still insufficient

information to quantify the impact of the drought. It concluded that if the fall 1977 eradication campaign was

successful and the drought was not a prime factor, eradication for the upcoming fall crop should decline. If there

is an increase over the spring 1978 totals, it would appear

that the drought and not the fall 1977 eradication campaign

was a key factor in the reduced number and size of fields

eradicated in early 1978.

The severe drought conditions were also reported by

the Mexican National Meterological Service and the Mexican

hydrologists. By December 1977, the drought was prevalent

throughout the major opium-producing region, and at one

location crop conditions were reported to be the driest

in 10 years. In February 1978, the U.S. Agricultural

attache reported that there was little or no precipitation

in Sinoloa.

In May 1978 a verification team, jointly funded by the

United States-Mexico, reported that as a result of flying

to various parts of the country to inspect the eradication

efforts, they felt that the Government of Mexico (GOM)

representatives were sincere in their opinion that the 1978

spring campaign was their most successful campaign. It is

GOM's opinion that the fewer fields found by the verification team substantiate the effectiveness of the eradication

campaign. However, the team reported that in the Tri-State

area of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua where crops usually

received sufficient rainfall, trees had lost their foliage,

streams were dry, and few animals were visible except

around isolated ponds.

In commenting on this section of the report, the

Department of State outlined a number of factors which it

believes enhance the potential for success in the Mexican

program. The Department is more optimistic about the

program in 1979 than it was in 1978 when our audit work was

performed. Its comments are included in appendix VIII,

page 183.

41
Political problems in Burma

overshadow manual eradication

In 1974, the Government of Burma (GUB) started a campaign to reduce and eliminate drug trafficking because of

its domestic drug abuse problem and the relationship between narcotics and insurgency--narcotics trafficking had

become the major source of financial support for most of

the antigovernment insurgent organizations. From fiscal

year 1974 through fiscal year 1978, the United States provided over $27 million in aid, including 26 helicopters

and 5 planes. One additional helicopter was requested for

fiscal year 1979.

The eradication effort in Burma, unlike the program in

Mexico, is done manually and lacks the advanced technology

and extensive resources available to the Government of

Mexico. Although GUB has reported some success in destroying opium poppies, these claims have not been verified by

outside sources.

Prospects are slim that the program will have a

significant impact on production in the near future for

the following reasons.

-- The estimated 100-110 metric tons of opium

produced in Mexico outpaced manual destruction efforts. In Burma, an estimated 300 to

400 metric tons are produced.

-- The government lacks control over most of

the opium-producing areas of the country.

These areas are infested by roughly 30

insurgent groups, with the largest of these

groups, the Burmese Communist Party, operating

where an estimated 40 percent of the opium is

produced.

If GUB did not have to contend with the Burmese

Communist Party and other insurgent groups, their capability

to deal with the production would be enhanced since their

scarce resources could be devoted to narcotics.

Nonparticipating countries

face similar problems

Pakistan and Afghanistan, the world's largest producers

of opium, and five other major opium, marijuana, or cocaineproducing countries, have no eradication program. Like Mexico

and Burma, these countries have similar inhibiting social,

political, and economic problems.

42
In Pakistan, poppy is culivated on about 98,000 acres,

or three percent of the cultivated land in the North-West

Frontier Province (NWFP). An estimated 200,000 farmers are

directly involved in poppy cultivation, which provides income

for about 619,000 people there. According to DEA in December

1978, eradication of the problem will be a long and difficult

process because (1) existing narcotic legislation in Pakistan

does not apply to the tribal areas of the NWFP, (2) the NWFP

is politically unstable, (3) effective enforcement is impossible, and (4) the economic and cultural importance of the

opiate trade is formidable in this poor area.

Convincing countries to implement an eradication program

is difficult. Such a program is costly, has many operating

problems, and is often labeled drastic. For example, a proposed marijuana herbicide eradication program in Colombia was

discussed for over 2 years, but appears to have been discarded

for the time being. According to DEA, Colombia cannot financially afford to institute an aerial eradication program, and

the Department of State has not funded an herbicide eradication program because of the paraquat issue.l/

The Department of Justice believes that the concept of

eradication cannot be applied broadly to all areas. The

area used for the cultivation of marijuana in Colombia, for

example, has been used for this purpose only recently. Its

current large-scale production evolved only within the last

3 to 5 years. An eradication program in Colombia would entail

l/Because of the potential health risk of paraquat-sprayed

marijuana, in September 1978, the International Securities

Assistance Act of 1978 was enacted as an amendment to the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This amendment prevents

the usage of monies authorized under the Foreign Assistance

Act for any program involving the spraying of marijuana with

any herbicide if it is likely to cause serious harm to the

health of persons who may use or consume the sprayed marijuana. The prohibition does not apply to an herbicide used

in conjunction with another substance that would clearly

identify the marijuana as having been sprayed. As provided

under this statute, the Secretary of State has informed the

Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) of the

use of paraquat by Mexico to spray marijuana. The former

Secretary of HEW recently circulated his proposed determination on the "serious harm" test to the Secretary of Agriculture and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency for comment, as required by the statute.

43
socio-political problems. The influx into the country

of enormous amounts of money generatedlby the marijuana

traffic is already causing serious economic problems. The

Colombian Government has recently expressed a renewed

interest in eradication and recognizes that there are

less controversial herbicides than paraguat. To reduce

marijuana in the United States will require destruction

of the Colombian crop and other principal sources. In

Colombia, eradication, combined with an adequate regulatory

program and the continuation of existing interdiction

efforts, may well provide a viable long-term solution to

the Colombian marijuana problem.

CROP SUBSTITUTION: A MATTER

OF LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

One much-talked about proposal for reducing illicit

drug production is the development of crop substitution

programs to provide growers with alternate sources of

income. While several demonstration projects have made

some progress, the chances that crop substitution programs

will have an appreciable impact on the drug trade are

undermined by longstanding social, political, and economic

conditions. Crop substitution must be recognized for what

it is--long-term rural development requiring many skills,

much expertise, and lots of money. If it is ever successful,

such success will only come in the very distant future.

Even then, as long as there are economic imbalances in the

world, production of drugs can easily shift to other countries where income replacement has not been tried.

Greater emphasis on substitution programs

In the past, most international drug control projects

were aimed at drug law enforcement, which produces shortterm impact, while little attention was placed on long-term

programs for reducing farmers' economic motivation for

cultivating drugs. Now these programs are being stressed,

and pilot projects are being funded by the United States and

the United Nations in such countries as Thailand, Burma,

Afghanistan, Bolivia, and Peru.

To offer any promise of success, these projects must

(1) be within the administrative and political control of

the host government, (2) obtain extensive financial resources

and technical expertise for comprehensive rural development,

(3) control and avoid leakage from the traditional drug

44
use often ingrained in foreign cultures, (4) develop

marketing and distribution systems in rugged areas,

and (5) develop a capability to vigorously enforce bans

on illicit cultivation. Obviously, satisfying many of

these requirements would be a difficult task even in

developed countries. It is virtually impossible in

the Third World, where most illicit drug cultivation

occurs.

Crop substitution in Thailand has

modest success with little impact

Developing viable income alternatives for the poppy

farmer has been the goal of the United Nations, the Royal

Thai Government, and the United States since 1972, when a

pilot crop substitution project was implemented in Northern

Thailand. After 6 years and about $12.1 million this

premier project has shown that crop substitution is possible

at least to a limited extent, and that a combination of crops

can compete with opium. Even so, the conversion process has

been painstakingly slow. In addition, the small reduction

in opium cultivation in Thailand means little to worldwide

drug control, since Thailand is not a major heroin supplier.

Even though Thailand has received much bilateral and

multilateral assistance over the years, it continues to have

the classic image of a developing country. Incomes vary

widely from the per capita average of about $380 a year.

The many poor farmers and laborers tace a dismal and questionable future. Those who grow opium belong to the tribal

minorities who are outside the mainstream of Thai society

and, with few exceptions, are not citizens. The Thai

Government limits these farmers' marketing of legal crops to

those that do not compete with crops marketed by the lowland

farmers. The highland farmers see opium poppy cultivation

in strictly economic terms and are unconcerned about the

moral and political consequences of the business.

Overall, the crop substitution demonstration project

has shown some success in 30 of the estimated 800 to 1,000

opium-growing villages in Thailand. Even though the Thais

believe opium production can be reduced 90 percent by 1981

with extension of the program, U.S. officials see this as

unrealistic in light of the number of villages that need

to be covered. Program expansion would face many obstacles,

including resistance from the hill tribes, and the complicated

task of developing an economic infrastructure so that crops

from the highlands can be marketed effectively. Furthermore,

the costs of such a tremendous undertaking appear to be

beyond the resources of Thailand, the United Nations Fund

45
for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), and U.S. narcotics control

budgets.

Political factors inhibit program in Burma

As the result of a 1976 agreement between GUB and the

United Nations, over $2 million in drug control funds were

made available to introduce livestock and crop substitution

programs in Burmese opium-growing areas. Both U.N. and U.S.

officials consider such efforts a modest start in a country

that is one of the largest producers of illicit opium in the

world. The problems associated with Burma appear even more

overwhelming than those encountered in Thailand. Insurgent

groups control the major poppy-producing areas, there is

little U.N. or U.S. presence to monitor progress in Burmese

society, and the country itself is among the poorest in the

world.

Unlike the demonstration projects in Thailand, Burma's

substitution program is managed totally by the Burmese

Government. It is located in an area formerly used for legal

agricultural projects until the economic benefits convinced

farmers to turn to the opium poppy about 10 to 15 years ago.

Although the area is only a very small portion of the total

Burmese land under poppy cultivation, it is the only opium

area actually controlled by the government.

Whatever the results of the present crop substitution

project in Burma, it is clear that its impact, at best, will

be minute compared to the problem. The country's limited

marketing and transportation networks will not make it easy

for crop substitution to take hold.

The long road to replacing

illicit coca in South America

Bolivia and Peru are the world's largest producers of

coca leaf for both the licit and illicit market. In Bolivia

programs have been implemented to limit production to only

that needed for legal internal use, and experiments are

being conducted with replacement crops. While similar

efforts are under consideration in Peru, there appears to

be little hope for any substantial cutbacks in coca production for a variety of economic and cultural reasons.

Because coca provides Andean farmers with their only

source of income, the only potential way for curtailing its

production is to substitute alternative crops or nonfarming

activities for coca production. Prior to October 1978,

46
programs to identify suitable alternative crops were developed

by AID, which has also supported crop substitution projects

in Bolivia.l/ According to AID, however, the search for

suitable crops will take several years, since it involves

finding marketable crops that will grow in coca areas as well

as solving transportation, storage, and other marketing problems. State Department and DEA officials in Washington believe the key to success of these projects lies in basic

rural development in coca-growing areas designed to improve

the quality of life for the farming population, thus allowing

a phased ban on production.

In a March 1978 report 2/ we disclosed that U.S. officials in Peru and Bolivia were pessimistic about the success

of crop substitution, with or without related economic development projects, because

-- coca has been grown and used in Bolivia

and Peru for centuries;

--coca growing requires little work, while

potential alternative crops require much

attention; and

-- no alternative crop can match the economic

return of coca, especially considering the

unlimited amount of funds available to

encourage production.

Since then, DEA reported that crop substitution was

virtually nonexistent or ineffective in both countries and

that in Bolivia the U.S. Ambassador was recommending a longrange and very large-scale crop substitution project which

involved government monopoly buying of the coca leaf crop.

The report stated the belief that only a massive program

could begin to deal with the production in Bolivia.

According to the Department of State, some suitable crops

such as tea and coffee have been found. Because of the

many conditions which are necessary to offer any promise

of success (see p. 44), replacing illicit coca production in South America remains a long and difficult process.

l/On October 1, 1978, the Assistant Secretary of State for

International Narcotics Matters assumed responsibility for

the programs.

2/"Drug Control in South America Having Limited Success--

Some Progress But Problems Are Formidable" (GGD-78-45,

Mar. 29, 1978).

47
Outlook for substitution is even

more bleak in other growing countries

Crop substitution projects in Thailand, Burma, and South

America have been given the most emphasis by the United

Nations and the United States. Crop substitution of limited

scope is either ongoing or has been tried in Laos, Pakistan,

and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the modest progress that has

been made in Thailand, Burma, and South America is considerable when compared to the progress in Laos and the Middle

East.

Presently, neither UNFDAC nor the United States are

funding crop substitution projects in Laos. A program planned by UNFDAC was scheduled to start in 1977, but because

of differences over its location the project was never

implemented. Although it is not known whether UNFDAC will

be allowed to resume its efforts, past experience with drug

control in Laos yielded few results. Farmers there resisted

the agricultural redirection, and no substitute crop was

ever identified.

In Pakistan and Afghanistan, substitution programs

supported by UNFDAC are only in their infancy--a preliminary

study of Afghanistan has been completed, and a major project

was begun in Pakistan during 1976. Prospects for success in

these countries are not encouraging. Poppy cultivation is

deeply ingrained in the cultures of the inaccessible mountain

regions, where there is little or no government authority.

Further, illicit production in the region has increased

to the point where it is the world's largest producer of

opium.

Even with success, drug cultivation is likely to continue

After analyzing the experience of the several countries

that have ongoing programs to substitute legitimate crops for

illicit drugs, it becomes all too clear that success will not

be measured in years, or even decades. The massive economic

development necessary to divert impoverished farmers from drug

cultivation has not been accomplished to date in very many

regions of the world, if at all. Even if it could occur,

however, there is risk that drug cultivation will merely shift

to other countries where economic development has not taken

hold and the farmers see opportunities for the usually higher

income that drugs produce.

48
A SERIOUS COMMITMENT BY THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS NEEDED

Foreign governments have long recognized the international implications of drug abuse by entering into international treaties and conventions, and by supporting

international organizations such as UNFDAC. Within their

own countries, narcotics laws have been passed, enforcement

efforts have disrupted drug trafficking, and some radical

measures, such as eradication and crop substitution, have

been undertaken. While these actions demonstrate that international cooperation exists, other factors challenge whether

the international community is seriously committed to resolving the drug abuse problem. Foreign countries provide

little assistance in helping the United States prosecute

fugitives, traffickers, and financiers who live or conduct

their business in their countries (see p. 100), and their

bilateral and multilateral support is insufficient to

achieve the needed impact on the production and movement of

illicit drugs. Prospects that additional resources will

be provided for improved drug control are further lessened

by the development priorities and risks in producing

countries and the uncertainty of contributions by international financial institutions and AID.

Minimal support--even for

pilot and feasiblity projects

Representatives to the United Nations have spoken

strongly against the worldwide drug problem and make various

commitments in the political arena, but often member countries have not demonstrated that they are committed to

resolving the problem. A significant number of signature

countries to the international treaties titled "Single

Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961" and "Convention on

Psychotropic Substances of 1971" 1/ have not fulfilled their

responsibilities. Some countries either do not understand

the treaty requirements or do not sincerely intend to carry

out their commitment. Others, although sincere, lack the

capability and/or resources to meet their commitment.

Regardless of the good intentions expressed or even what

a country believes can be accomplished multilaterally or bilaterally in terms of its direct interest, providing assistance for drug abuse activities demonstrates a country's drug

1/The U.S. Senate has not yet ratified the Convention on

Psychotropic Substances of 1971.

49
priority and its concern for the problems of other countries.

The needed support has not been forthcoming. Even though

their own drug abuse problems have been increasing in recent

years, economically viable countries have provided little

bilateral support for law enforcement and other narcotics

control projects.

Who is supporting drug control

besides the United States?

Funds contributed to UNFDAC by foreign governments have

been substantially below that needed to ever begin to come

to grip with worldwide drug production and abuse. In

establishing UNFDAC in 1971, the Secretary General said that

$5 million annually was expected for the first 5 years and

about $20 million a year thereafter. While the number of

countries contributing to UNFDAC has increased to 71 in 1977,

cash contributions from 1971 through 1977 have amounted to

only $30.7 million--substantia.lly less than a year's appropriation for the U.S. international narcotics control program.

Of this amount the United States contributed $22 million, or

72 percent. Norway provided the second largest assistance,

contributing $1.7 million in cash and pledging an additional

$4 million in development assistance from 1978 through 1981.

Even though UNFDAC pilot and feasibility projects require

substantially less resources than the large-scale development

projects envisioned as the ultimate solution to illicit production, contributing countries have not met these minimal

needs. UNFDAC officials have indicated that they are committing more funds each year than UNFDAC has received. Some

existing UNFDAC projects will have to be reduced or cancelled

unless additional funds become available.

This situation exists at a time when the United States

is decreasing its contribution. According to UNFDAC officials,

the change in U.S. funding levels could cause other governments to lose interest and confidence in UNFDAC, especially

when there is a need to get more countries to contribute to

the fund.

Other examples of limited support of drug control by

foreign nations are:

-- Six countries have assigned narcotics

attaches to work with the Thai Government

on international narcotics problems but

50
only to the extent that it relates to trafficking in their individual countries.

These representatives make use of information paid for by the United States but do

not contribute to the informants' payments or

rewards, nor do they provide any financial

assistance to the Thai Government in their

ettorts to control drug trafficking.

--Besides some South American countries,

Canada is the only country that has

police attaches in South America.

--Norway had no success in getting other

European countries to contribute money

for narcotics control in Burma.

Difficulties in focusing development

assistance on narcotics control

Since 1972 international financial institutions such as

the International Bank for Reconstruction (IBR) and the Asian

Development Bank (ADB) have been encouraged to help prevent

the trafficking or production of illicit narcotics. Providing

alternatives for farmers growing illicit crops requires extensive development assistance, and international tinancial

institutions are looked upon as a major source of financial

assistance for these large-scale ettorts. However, no significant support has been provided, partly because of host

country determinations that drugs are not a priority item

and the risks the banks see in financing such projects.

Although AID has been directed to give greater attention to

crop and income substitution projects, AID and host country

priorities may limit the support given.

International financial institutions--

an unused resource

When legislation in 1972 increased U.S. contributions

to the international financial institutions, the National

Advisory Council on International Monetary and Fiscal

Policies asked the institutions to provide technical and

economic assistance for development projects which directly or indirectly curb production, processing, or transportation of illegal drugs. The Council pointed out that to

some extent agricultural diversification, intrastructural

51
expansion, and industrial development provide economic alternatives to opium poppy cultivation, thus helping to reduce

narcotics production and marketing for' illicit purposes.l/

Financing these kinds of activities was a normal part

of international financial institutions' operations, and the

U.S. Executive Directors were instructed to encourage their

development in regions where such alternatives were

feasible. By mid-1975, no such loans were made because,

according to U.S. officials, such loans were made on their

economic and financial merit and no proposals requested

financing for the expressed purpose of reducing or

eliminating illicit narcotic production.

Many drug-producing countries provided local counterpart contributions to support projects initiated by UNFDAC,

but by mid-1977 no countries had been willing to borrow from

an international financial institution to finance a project

involving narcotics control.

A country's hesitancy to use international financial

institution support for narcotics control is influenced by

economic and governmental considerations. This is illustrated by the following information contained in a 1977 AID

report on Thailand.

-- The Thai Government has always been cautious

about foreign borrowing on any but the most

concessional terms because of perceived

problems of debt servicing.

-- Technical ministries within the government

are hesitant in seeking cabinet approval for

rural, noncapital projects financed at

IBR and ADB lending terms.

-- Risk aversion is an innate part of Thai

cultural tradition and has a particularly

inhibiting influence on public sector

policies and practices. While politically

committed to investments in the rural

economy, the Thai Government bureacracy is

reluctant to commit limited financial and

institutional resources to carry out nonconventional and somewhat experimental

approaches to rural development.

1/"If the United States is to Develop an Effective International Narcotics Control Program, Much More Must Be Done"

(ID-75-77, July 29, 1975).

52
On the other hand, international financial institutions

perceived other factors which would cause them to support

capital revenue-producing and capital infrastructure

projects rather than narcotics control. According to ODAP,

the banks' experience indicated that crop substitution in

itself was not sufficient to counteract illicit cultivation

of narcotics crops without the strong support of the government involved and an adequate enforcement program.

According to a 1977 World Bank memorandum, the following

additional difficulties were present:

--The income generated by a poppy crop

is significantly higher than could be

obtained by growing other crops in the

same environment.

-- The margins in the opium trade are large

and could easily absorb a significant

increase in producer price and still

compete effectively with any substitute

crop.

-- The poppies are mostly grown by politically disaffected insurgency groups

and/or by people who do not have security

of tenure.

The memorandum further observed that "for a comparable investment, one could reach and benefit many more of the

target population than would be affected by investment in

a remote poppy-cultivating area."

While there have been difficulties in harnessing international financial institutions' support, its importance

has not been reduced. According to the ODAP study:

-- A U.S. sponsored resolution was adopted by

the U.N. Commission on Narcotics Drugs and the

U.N. Economic Social Council urging governments

to include narcotics crop substitution projects

in their national development programs when

applying for assistance from institutions.

-- The IBR has now stated that, in agreement.

with recipient countries, the Bank was prepared to strongly support efforts to develop

viable projects which could lead to a reduction in poppy and coca cultivation.

53
-- The ADB and IBR were prepared to obtain

assurances that development assistance

did not contribute to increased' cultivation in recipient countries.

However, the IBR still believed that there were difficulties in designing effective crop substitution programs and

that broad-based rural development was' necessary to reduce

the illicit production of drug crops if costly failures were

to be avoided.

In November 1978, the State Department reported that it

and other relevant agencies would continue to encourage such

support and to hold up project assistance where it might

directly or indirectly encourage narcotics production.

In June 1979, Department officials informed us that AID had

obtained the assurance that project assistance would not

support narcotics production in Peru and Afghanistan by inserting a "poppy clause" in the loan agreements and that the

ADB was including a similar provision. They said that AID

had invoked the poppy clause in Afghanistan in 1977.

No assurance of AID assistance

To assure that greater attention would be given to

providing income alternatives for growers, the President

in August 1977 directed the Administrator of AID to include

such measures as income and crop substitution in its development assistance programs. In response to his request, AID

instructed its missions in December 1977 to consider

appropriate economic development projects in drug-producing

areas and to give assistance priority to these areas over

other areas in the country which normally would qualify for

development assistance. However, other AID requirements and

host country development priorities could lessen the impact

these actions will have on narcotics production.

The amount of AID funds used for this purpose is influenced by the following considerations:

-- Narcotics projects must meet normal development

assistance funding levels and be considered in

light of AID's overall integrated development

program, which is aimed at the rural poor and

basic human needs. In some instances, farmers

producing illicit crops may exceed the rural

poor and basic human needs standard.

54
-- Because of the relationship between economic

development and population growth, Section 194(d)

of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1977 was enacted.

AID is required to identify the potential impact

development assistance projects will have on population growth and to design appropriate development

assistance projects to build motivation for smaller

families.

--Developing countries must fully support the use

of AID development funds for narcotics-related

projects since it would compete with other country

priorities for scarce development funds.

--Because these efforts require extensive development

assistance, narcotics-producing countries will have

to depend on support from international financial

institutions. As discussed on page 51, such

support was rarely, if ever, used in the past.

Although this effort is only beginning, the President's

policy of using development assistance funds has not materialized since, as of August 1978, the State Department indicated

that no significant agricultural developments have occurred

since the issuance of the AID guidelines.

COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT IS

IMPORTANT TO FOREIGN STRATEGY

Unlike some long-range and perhaps unproven approaches,

enforcement is one of the elements of the Federal strategy

which has yielded immediate results in temporarily disrupting

the flow of drugs in producing countries. Although countries

such as Mexico and Thailand have increased their cooperation

'and improved their narcotics suppression capabilities,

it has generally occurred through the joint assistance of

Department of State and DEA personnel stationed in those

countries. Because of the many internal factors adversely

affecting drug enforcement in other nations, we believe the

U.S. policy should continue to stress the need for programs

to strengthen the capacity of foreign police for deterring

drug production and traffic.

The role of enforcement in source countries

Experience has shown drug enforcement activities

are important to overall control efforts because:

55
-- Traffickers overseas are likely to move

large amounts of drugs, and successful

enforcement actions have the immediate

effect of disrupting the flow of drugs

at the source, thus having a larger

impact than smaller seizures made in the

United States.

-- Enforcement provides intelligence for

U.S. domestic and border cases.

--An enforcement capability is necessary to

the success of any crop substitution

program.

-- Police agencies must enforce the ban on

illicit production and ensure that fertilizer and irrigated fields are not

used to increase opium yields.

-- By lending its expertise in making

cases and providing intelligence, DEA

acts as a constant motivator of

foreign enforcement agencies, improving

their capability and strengthening

their institutions.

-- Enforcement fills a present need until

other long-term approaches achieve the

desired results.

-- If enforcement pressure is removed,

there would be no obstacles or risks

to the production and movement of

illicit drugs.

In the 1973 reorganization of drug control activities,

DEA was given responsibility for cooperating with foreign

law enforcement agencies. At the same time, the Federal

strategy placed greater emphasis on efforts in source countries. The number of DEA positions assigned to other

nations has doubled from 1972 to 1977, increasing from

186 to 379. Recently these positions have declined to

303, of which 274 were tilled as of February 1979.

In past studies by our office and other organizations,

the value of overseas enforcement programs and the need to

improve such programs have been continuing themes. In 1975,

56
we reported that DEA operations may infringe on foreign

sovereignty, and in some countries DEA appeared to be reaching a point where its overseas operational activity may be

substantially replacing the narcotics control functions of

local police.l/

In our 1975 report on South America, Embassy officials

believed that sometimes DEA agents pose a real threat to

country relations, and DEA agents were often not willing to

balance enforcement efforts with the overall objectives of

the mission.2/

In 1976 DEA activities were somewhat curtailed with

the passage of the Mansfield Amendment, which prohibited

DEA from participating in any direct police arrest

actions overseas. DEA officials informed us that this

restriction has not substantially affected their ability

to operate in foreign countries.

In 1978 differing views continued to exist regarding

DEA's presence overseas.3/ Some State Department officials

found it objectionable that "U.S. Police" are operating in a

foreign country, and they believed that U.S. interests in the

long run would be better served if host government police were

able to actively participate in unilateral drug enforcement

without relying on DEA's involvement. Other officials support the presence of DEA overseas. DEA believed that involvement of its agents is not only justified but needed if the

United States is ever to be successful in controlling drugs

flowing into the country. In any event, foreign drug enforcement agencies are still hindered by political and operational

limitations, such as the prevalence of corruption, insufficient intelligence, inadequate narcotics laws and penalties,

and poor investigative techniques.

l/"If the United States Is To Develop an Effective International Narcotics Control Program, Much More Must Be Done"

(ID-75-77, July 29, 1975).

2/"Problems in Slowing the Flow of Cocaine and Heroin From

and Through South America" (GGD-75-80, May 30, 1975).

3/"Drug Control In South America Having Limited Success--

Some Progress But Problems Are Formidable" (GGD-78-45,

Mar. 29, 1978).

57
DEA presence in Mexico may be weakened!

The United States has long been involved in assisting

Mexico in its efforts to suppress heroin and other illict

drugs. U.S. funding for the Mexican narcotics control program and DEA have been important to the success of the aerial

eradication program, and DEA agents have actively worked with

the Mexican Federal Judicial Police in developing cases and

exchanging narcotics information. However, recent developments in Mexico resulted in DEA's role being significantly

reduced.

As far as the opium and marijuana eradication program

is concerned, DEA's participation has ended. In March 1978

the Attorney General of Mexico stated that there should be

no permanent U.S. police participation in the program.

Several months after Mexico ended DEA's participation

in the eradication program, other positions stated by

Mexican officials made it clear that DEA's role in Mexico

might be further reduced. The Mexican Attorney General

has been striving for a self-sufficient narcotics control

program in terms of personnel but not necessarily financial

resources. As Mexico moves toward this goal, a gradual

reduction of DEA's activity may be requested, eventually

limiting the agency's role to that of liaison.

The Mexican Federal Judicial Police had unprecedented

enforcement successes in August and September 1978. During

that period the Federal Police, with DEA support, took

action against two drug traffickers DEA considered to be

the largest traffickers in Mexico. One trafficker was

arrested andthe other was killed during an armed confrontation with Mexican police. Ten other major traffickers

were either arrested or were killed in armed confrontation

with the police. It is still too early to tell whether

these arrested traffickers will be immobilized for a long

time.

Conditions in the Golden Triangle

warrant strong DEA role

While the Royal Thai Government and GUB have developed

a limited capability to respond to some aspects of the

narcotics problem, Burma has been unable to prevent the

refining of opium along its border, and Thailand has

failed to halt the transportation of Burmese heroin

across its land. Suppression efforts have been diluted

by the longstanding enmity between the two countries.

However, there have been some recent enforcement successes,

58
but certainly not sufficient to justify a lessening

of DEA resources in the Golden Triangle.

In early 1976 the United States was concerned about

the threat posed by drugs from Southeast Asia as a result of the success with suppression programs in Mexico.

In evaluating the capability of Thailand's entorcement

groups, a number of factors that adversely affect control

efforts in the country were mentioned, including the lack

of recognition of drug addiction as a major problem in the

Thai society at the time, and the political realities

involving the hill tribes who grow opium and the communist

insurgents who are an even greater threat to the government.

Even if some of these problems were mitigated, Thailand

was still thought to face difficulties because most heroin

shipped from the country was produced in the Burmese

border areas, where inaccessible terrain and armed gangs

complicate enforcement efforts.

Since then things have changed. The Government of

Thailand has committed itself to some degree, not only in

word but also in deed, to suppressing the narcotics trade.

By mid-1978, Thai enforcement authorities were continuing

to make large drug seizures and arrest important traffickers.

Four of the 10 top trafficking groups in Thailand have been

disrupted, to some limited degree. For example, a joint

Thai/DEA enforcement operation resulted in the seizure of

97 kilograms of heroin, 58 kilograms of morphine base, and

83 kilograms of prepared opium.

U.S. efforts have helped the Thais improve their enforcement capability. However, it is still questionable whether

this improvement will be long-lasting without a continued high

level of U.S. support. There is some question as to the Thai

Government's preparation for assuming a larger share of the

burden and responsibilities of narcotics suppression. The

drug control effort in Thailand is very dependent on U.S.

Government support. Thus, it appears that Thailand, like

Mexico, cannot withstand any significant reduction in U.S.

drug control support without some decrease in effectiveness

and capability.

Whatever the capability and commitment of Thailand's

drug enforcement effort, that of Burma is even more uncertain and more dependent on outside help. The narcotics

control program in Burma is a moderate operation, its

limited resources permitting only a few operations each

year with only limited impact at best. In one operation,

59
for example, the Burmese military destroyed a number of

heroin laboratories, but when the troops pulled out the

traffickers went right back in and re-established the

refineries.

Because of the interwoven naturelof narcotics production

and trafficking in Burma and Thailand,' it seems essential

that the two Governments must work together to stop it.

This will be an extremely difficult task. The relationship between the countries is characterized by centuries-old

mistrust and suspicion. In a recent attempted Burmese/Thai

operation, for example, the Thai Border Police were to

support Burmese troops in an attack on an opium refinery

and capture the refinery workers as they retreated into

Thailand. During the operation, however, a helicopter

carrying the Thai police landed accidentally in Burma.

Burmese officials seized the aircraftiand detained its

passengers. Though the incident was resolved after several

days of strained negotiations, the incident readily illustrates the problem that must be overcome if there is to be

even the slightest success in curtailing illicit drug production. Needless to say, it is difficult to see how this

can be done without continued encouragement from the countries which suffer from the traffic in opium.

Other nations' drug enforcement efforts

Though much attention has been placed on drug cultivation and activities in Mexico and the Golden Triangle, other

areas of the world have emerged recently as either major

suppliers or potential major suppliers to the international

drug market. The countries, unfortunately, do not appear

any better off with regard to drug enforcement capabilities,

and they too require assistance from the United States.

In Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru the production and distribution of marijuana and cocaine has become a huge business.

Poverty, official corruption, and many other problems common

to underdeveloped nations mean that none of these countries

has been able to mount a successful enforcement program

against drugs. DEA and U.S. Customs, however, have developed

worthwhile programs for liaison, training, and intelligence

exchange. In Colombia, the DEA office, with the Ambassador's

support, has spurred the establishment of a narcotic unit in

the Attorney General's office, while in Peru DEA helped establish cooperative relationships among Peru and several bordering nations. It is clear, then, that because of economic conditions and the lack of adequate enforcement capability,

continued U.S. efforts to assist in and cooperate with foreign

enforcement efforts in those countries are both necessary and

appropriate.

60
The Middle East Asian countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan, only now becoming known for their vast drug-producing

capacities, present certain problems to U.S. enforcement and

narcotics control efforts overseas. Neither of the two countries has strong crop substitution or eradication programs,

and corruption, uncontrolled areas, political instability, and

limited central government control undermine control efforts.

Until recently, no one had served a drug-related sentence in a

Pakistani jail. The United States has been able to provide

limited assistance to these countries because of the political

situation, and as of February 1979, there was only one DEA

agent in Afghanistan and five DEA agents in Pakistan.

NARCOTICS CONTROL PLANS NEEDED TO CHART

GOALS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

In order to assess the capability and gauge the success

of drug suppression efforts overseas, certain U.S. Embassies

have been required in the past to develop Narcotics Control

Action Plans (NCAPs) for their respective countries. However,

because this or a similar requirement no longer exists, it is

not possible to assess whether ettorts are having the desired

impact. It is essential that the United States develop

detailed plans for implementing and evaluating narcotics

activities in individual countries and on a multinational

basis.

Beginning in 1971, NCAPs were intended to be the

basic planning documents for narcotics control activities

in individual countries. They represented each Mission's

analysis of the drug situation within a country, and

contained programs which should be implemented to achieve

desired results. Once approved by the Cabinet Committee on

International Narcotics Control, NCAPs served as the basis

for negotiating narcotic control agreements with toreign

governments.

In the past, there were problems in developing useable

NCAPs. Generally the plans lacked consistent and clearly defined objectives and did not contain well-defined projects.

Most were really not action plans because they lacked program

specifics and the lack of detail and criteria for measuring

progress prevented meaningful evaluations. Still, NCAPs were

viewed as necessary for narcotics control, and the Department

of State in 1975 initiated actions to improve them.l/

l/"If the United States is to Develop an Effective International Narcotics Control Program, Much More Must Be Done"

(ID-75-77, July 29, 1975).

61
In subsequent reports, the Department of State agreed

with our findings and recommendations on the need for detailed NCAPs. In our report on opium eradication in Mexico,

which was based upon field work completed in 1976, we pointed

out that U.S. assistance had escalated without detailed planning, and that it is difficult to evaluate how well the narcotics program is meeting its objectives without a sufficientlydetailed description of the timing and nature of expected

improvements in the Mexican government's institutional capability to handle increased program assistance.l/ In our

report on the U.S. Mexican border, the Department agreed

with us that the U.S. Mission in Mexico be required to expand

the NCAP to include program goals and specific objectives

supporting border interdiction efforts.2/

In March 1978, ODAP's report on "International Narcotics

Control Policy" addressed similar needs:

Country Narcotics Action Plans for those countries

affected by the supply and/or demand for drugs should

be developed by the U.S. Country Team led by the

Ambassador and the appropriate narcotics components

within such Embassies in accordance with specific

guidelines issued by S/NM (the Senior Advisor for

Narcotics Matters). The plans should look to the

future and, as such, recommend both long and shortterm objectives in the areas of income substitution,

law enforcement and intelligence cooperation, training,

prevention, and treatment, which would, in the end,

enable foreign governments to deal with the problems

associated with narcotics control within, and at, their

borders and more fully participate in international

cooperative efforts. The plans should explicitly

include the means of achieving these goals as well

as proposed initiatives with host country governments

and should identify offices which might further assist

in the international narcotics control effort. On a

semi-annual basis the plans and progress within each

country would be reviewed and assessed by the Executive

Director of the Strategy Council or his designee.

l/"Opium Eradication Efforts in Mexico: Cautious Optimism

Advised" (GGD-77-6, Feb. 18, 1977).

2/"Illegal Entry At United States-Mexico Border--Multiagency

Enforcement Efforts Have Not Been Effective In Stemming the

Flow of Drugs and People" (GGD-78-17, Dec. 2, 1977).

62
In responding to this recommendation, the Department of

State replied that approximately 2-1/2 years ago, the NCAP

requirements were suspended when the narcotics functions were

transferred from AID to the Department of State. Narcotics

control planning was subsequently incorporated into the

Department of State's yearly Goals, Objectives, and Resource

Management planning process and its Zero Based Budgeting procedures. Department officials believed that narcotics should

not be treated differently from other foreign policy issues.

This change, however, did not provide the detailed plans

which were previously considered necessary for managing the

narcotics control effort. The above documents provide general

guidance but do not contain specific objectives and milestones

which can be used to measure and evaluate the progress toward

intended goals.

In Burma and Thailand, for instance, no formalized

strategies had been developed to integrate long and shortterm objectives, the means for achieving these objectives,

and the methods for monitoring activities and assessing progress. In Mexico there has not been a detailed planning

document since the NCAP in 1975, even though there are indications of changing roles for DEA and the U.S. Embassy

with regard to drug control matters. Without a serious

assessment of the capabilities in Mexico to carry out enforcement, eradication, and other drug control activities,

it is not possible to know the course that U.S. drug control

programs should follow to achieve the desired effects.

While NCAPs were previously required for 59 countries

we believe the concept is still workable, especially if it is

limited to the 10 countries now considered the major sources

of drugs in the United States. Since the U.S. drug strategy

has begun to emphasize economic development and international

cooperation in addition to traditional enforcement-oriented

activities, there is probably even greater need for comprehensive planning documents on both a countrywide and a multinational, regional basis. Such plans could be used to help

decide the best mix of resources and approaches needed to

accomplish our objectives within each country's operating

constraints. Overall, an evaluation of progress would help

to shed some light on our accomplishments under the broad

strategy, what we can expect to achieve from additional

resources and approaches, and how it will affect the level

of domestic drug abuse.

63
We also believe that the NCAPs should be integrated in

areas of the world where narcotics production and trafficking

is a multinational problem. For example, a regional NCAP

could be developed in the Golden Triangle from the individual

plans for Burma, Thailand, and Laos, and the same could be

done for the South American countries of Colombia, Bolivia,

and Peru.

CONCLUSIONS

International efforts have made some inroads in their

long and continuous efforts to limit the availability of

illict drugs. Crop substitution, opium poppy and marijuana

eradication, and improved law enforcement are widely recognized as steps in the right direction but, when viewed from

the perspective of the worldwide dimensions of the drug

trade, they have not substantially reduced cultivation and

trafficking.

The United States has been the prime force in efforts to

combat the illegal drug trade. International narcotics control has received only nominal support from international

financial institutions and other developed countries in comparison to what is needed, because of other country priorities

and attitudes and the realisms in drug-producing countries.

While international cooperation can not be fully realized

under these circumstances, efforts to obtain greater support

must be continual and stressed at the highest levels of

government and in international forum. To accomplish more,

victim countries must reassess their priorities, develop a

unified action plan, and support the plan with the needed

resources.

Though drug enforcement and control programs have not

overcome the long-standing social, political, and economic

conditions in producing countries, they nevertheless have

yielded temporary results. These efforts have produced

short-term heroin shortages in the United States and

helped to motivate foreign agencies in carrying out their

drug enforcement missions. A continuing enforcement presence

is essential to assure that long-range approaches to supply

reduction take hold. The Strategy Council on Drug Abuse

should, therefore, continue to give enforcement efforts a

high priority in formulating the Federal strategy.

In the face of the realities that make worldwide drug

supply reduction such a difficult task, the United States

has not developed comprehensive country and regional plans to

implement and evaluate its programs. These plans have become

64
more important as our Nation looks to long-range, costly

measures for reducing drug availability and greater participation by other countries and international financial

institutions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that:

-- The Secretary of State, with the support of the

Congress, promote a world conference and the

formation of a consortium of victim countries

that would develop a plan of action to fight

the global drug problem in a unified way.

-- The Secretary of State require that the Assistant

Secretary for Narcotics Matters prepare realistic

country narcotics action plans detailing short and

long-term goals, the means of achieving these goals,

and the methods for reviewing progress. Because narcotics production and trafficking often encompasses_

several countries, as in the Golden Triangle, the

Assistant Secretary should also be instructed to

prepare similar plans on a regional basis.

65
CHAPTER 4

BORDER MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

NEED TO BE RESOLVED

The U.S. border provides an important opportunity for

interdicting illicit drugs and obtaining intelligence about

domestic and international drug distribution systems. However, the availability of drugs in the United States attests

to the fact that our border has not been a serious impediment to illegal entry. Large amounts of heroin and marijuana

have crossed our border with Mexico, and, even more recently,

our Southeastern States have been flooded with marijuana and

cocaine that is shipped by air and sea from South America.

The issue of improved border control has been studied and

recommendations have been made, but the problems remain

unresolved. The seriousness of the problems and the everexpanding segments of the border being used for large-scale

smuggling dictate a need for corrective action.

WHY IS THE BORDER IMPORTANT TO DRUG CONTROL?

The major portion of the Nation's efforts to reduce

availability of illegal drugs is directed toward disrupting

the entire supply chain of production and distrubution

from overseas sources to domestic trafficking networks.

This has been attempted by focusing enforcement efforts on

the vulnerable parts of the supply system. The U.S.

border provides an opportunity to affect the supply chain

by intercepting drug traffic resulting in the arrest of

persons and the seizure of drugs, discovery of previously

unknown narcotics trafficking activities, and the possible

determination of the source or the ultimate destination of

the illegal drugs. This task is difficult at all borders,

and is further complicated by our Nation's desire to maintain an essentially open border for facilitating the flow

of legitimate traffic.

Control of the border is basically a problem of controlling the movement of people, vehicles, aircraft, boats,

and goods. Presently, 8 agencies representing 7 cabinet

departments are involved in border operations, enforcing

over 400 Federal laws and regulations relating to border

traffic. The principal agencies involved in law enforcement

are the Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization

Service, and DEA. Other agencies with a role in controlling

the border include the FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms; Department of Defense; Federal Aviation Administration; Coast Guard; Department of Agriculture; and Public

66
Health Service. In performing its responsibilities, each

agency is expected to use its limited resources to achieve

optimum results.

Over the past few years, the Congress, the executive

branch, and our office have issued reports dealing with

efforts to control illegal entry into the United States.

Studies by the Congress and the executive branch have

delineated the policy and direction that a border control

program should take and the areas of operation that should

be improved. The predominant recurring theme of these

reports and studies is the need for greater coordination

and cooperation among the various agencies having enforcement responsibilities in this area.

ILLEGAL ENTRY AT UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER

Mexico is a principal source or transit country for

illicit drugs entering the United States. The map on

the next page shows the trafficking routes for drugs

flowing from Mexico across the Southwest border. Law

enforcement activity along the U.S.-Mexico Border is a

large part of the Nation's domestic and international

etforts to contain this problem. Despite these efforts,

the flood of illicit drugs across the border continues.

If Federal enforcement activities along the border were

better planned, coordinated, integrated, and executed,

more control could be maintained.

While measuring the deterrent effect of border law

enforcement is not possible, the available supply of drugs

attests to the fact that it has not been a serious impediment to illegal entry. The substantial Federal investment

for enforcement at the Southwest border is achieving only

limited measurable impact on the drug problem. Border

forces interdict only a small quantity of the estimated

heroin and cocaine entering the United States from Mexico.

Most seizures are marijuana.

Border apprehensions seldom involve high-level

traffickers. The overwhelming majority of persons crossing

the border in possession of drugs who are apprehended by

Customs and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) are

drug users, smalltime operators, couriers, or low-level

members of drug trafficking organizations.

67
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In 1978 we testified before congressional committees

on the findings of our report 1/ on Southwest border control

problems. We addressed the need for effective leadership

and direction of our Nation's effort at this most critical

border area. Controlling the movement of people, aircraft,

boats, and vehicles along this 2,000 mile open-land border

is complex and difficult. It requires what has not yet

been achieved--a comprehensive, coordinated effort by all

Federal law enforcement agencies. We found that separate

Federal agencies carried out their specific missions with

limited consideration for the activity of the others.

This has produced separate but similar lines of effort,

diluting border coverage and control, with little consideration for overall border security.

Although the border alone will not solve the drug

problem, it is a necessary element if the Nation is ever

to control this problem. The executive branch of the

Federal Government has not developed an integrated strategy

or a comprehensive border control plan to consider all

aspects of the problem and establish clear, measurable

objectives indicating what it intends to accomplish with

the various law enforcement resources. A plan of this

type is critical because of the many agencies with overlapping responsibilities.

We believe that sound management principles and the

inherent difficulties of multiagency cooperation call for

an integrated Federal strategy and comprehensive border

control plan. Until this is accomplished, we recommend

the following interim actions to strengthen law enforcement

at the border and provide the data needed for evaluating

the problem and determining what legislation is needed.

1. The Director of the Otffice of Management and

Budget should prepare an annual analysis of law

enforcement along the U.S.-Mexican border.

Such an analysis would bring together

the separate budget requests of the various

border enforcement agencies to facilitate

integration of agencies' plans, programs,

resources, allocations, and accomplishments.

The analyses should be included with the

agencies' appropriation requests.

l/"Illegal Entry at United States - Mexico Border--

Multiagency Entorcement Ettorts Have Not Been

Effective In Stemming The Flow of Drugs and

People" ( GGD-78-17, Dec. 2, 1977).

69
2. The Director of the Otfice of Management and

Budget and the Domestic Policy Staff,

together with the Attorney General, Secretary

of the Treasury, and the other Department

heads having responsibility for border law

enforcement, should develop an integrated

strategy and comprehensive operational plan

for border control.

3. The Office of Management and Budget should

coordinate closely with responsible congressional committees in developing legislation

needed to accomplish the proposed plan.

4. The Secretary of State should require the U.S.

Mission in Mexico to expand the NCAP

to include program goals and specific

objectives for supporting border

interdiction efforts.

The above recommendations were presented in our December 1977 report, together with various agencies' comments.

The Office of Management and Budget and the Departments of

Justice, Treasury, and State generally agreed with our

findings and recommendations. The various departments supported the conclusion that the absence of a Federal Government

integrated strategy and an overall border control plan has

resulted in overlapping, duplicative, and poorly coordinated

activities.

THE SOUTHEAST BORDER: "A DRUG DISASTER AREA"

In recent years the smuggling of drugs from South America

has become a major business in the Southeastern United States,

particularly in Florida. Marijuana from Colombia arrives by

the tonload, while hundreds of pounds of cocaine flow into the

area for distribution across the country. The maps on the

following pages show the major trafficking routes for drugs

flowing from South America across the Southeast border of the

United States. Such activity generates billions of dollars

in income for those involved, with an incalculable tax revenue

loss to the United States and with much of the profits destined

for other countries. Law enforcement agencies have been overwhelmed by this enormous activity, and, to make matters worse,

U.S. law generally does not make it illegal for individuals

subject to U.S. jurisdiction to possess controlled substances

on the high seas. In addition, current international agreements do not deal effectively with the large mother ships which

carry multiton quantities of drugs on the high seas.

70
"The Colombian Connection"

ffji g; fColombian Marihuana Trafficking via]

the Caribbean to the U.S.

NEWYORK

SouthAmerican Cocaine Trafficking;

TOUMIAM T i .

TO MEX.

K 4 TO :& EUROP < 2> PAR.

'C6ALIF .. .

IVIA EUROPE

Source: Drug Enforcement Administration

71
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72
Because of its geographic location and its many social,

cultural, and financial ties, South Florida has long been a

natural gateway for people and goods traveling between South

America and the United States. While this traffic in the

past has probably always included drugs, recent shifts in

trafficking patterns have made the Southeastern region even

more important. The success of the paraquat-spraying program in Mexico has resulted in increased use of Colombian

marijuana, while U.S. demand for cocaine, grown chiefly

in Peru and Bolivia, has increased. With 8,425 miles of

shoreline on its 1,350 miles of coastline, and with over

250 airstrips, South Florida has emerged as a prime gateway

for illicit drugs entering into the United States. The maps

on the following pages show trafficking routes for drugs

flowing from South Florida to other parts of the country.

During a 6-month period ending in June 1978, the U.S.

Coast Guard, Customs Service, and DEA reported seizures of

more than 477 tons of marijuana and 359 pounds of cocaine.

In the same period, the Government of Colombia seized about

610 tons of marijuana. According to DEA, these seizures

represent more drugs than were collectively seized by the

Federal law enforcement community during the entire previous

year.

Along with the drugs, large numbers of vessels

of all sorts have been confiscated by Federal agencies.

From July 1975 through March 1978, 107 vessels were

seized in connection with charges of drug smuggling in the

Southeastern United States, with over half of them seized

in Florida. Seventy of these vessels contained 5,000 pounds

or more of marijuana, with 19 of the 70 carrying 25,000

pounds or more of the contraband. (See photographs on

pp. 78 and 79.) Some enforcement officials believe

that, rather than serving to illustrate the effectiveness

of law enforcement, the high volume of seizures merely

indicates the tremendous amounts of drugs passing through

the region.

The Department of Justice believes that while the large

seizures do indicate the tremendous volume of drugs available, they also are an indicator of improved cooperative

enforcement. Justice estimates that the percentage of

marijuana now seized, destroyed, or abandoned at sea may be

in excess of 20 percent of that being imported into the

United States.

73
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75
Federal enforcement agencies have paid increasing

attention to the financial impact all this illegal drug

activity has on the region and the entire country. In congressional testimony before the House Select Committee on

Narcotics Abuse and Control during the summer of 1978, it

was estimated that the total gross value of the drug trade

in South Florida was at least $7 billion annually, with the

majority from marijuana sales, and at least $500 million

from cocaine sales.

Fortunes have been built on the drug trade, and

persons with no visible means of support have paid huge

sums for pleasure boats, homes, and other expensive properties. The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and

Control reported in August 1978 that to meet the demands

for cash created by the illicit drug trade, the Federal

Reserve System has had to shift million of dollars in cash

to banks in the Miami district. Federal agencies have

developed programs to attack the profit earned by drug

traffickers. However, it is too early to tell what the

results will be.

Many enforcement officials in South Florida believe

the situation is completely out of control. Federal,

State, and local agencies have been overwhelmed by the

amount of smuggling activity. Large "mother vessels" with

multiton loads of marijuana set anchor beyond the 12-mile

limit as smaller vessels carry the contraband to shore.

To make matters worse, the U.S. law generally does not cover

the possession of narcotics on the high seas by U.S. citizens or by anyone aboard U.S. vessels. Extending coverage

of U.S. law to this area can help, 1/ but the fact remains

that most mother ships are either foreign registered or

stateless. Under international treaties, the U.S. Coast

Guard has blanket authority to board stateless vessels,

but in the case of foreign vessels the Coast Guard must

seek permission of its country of origin to board, search,

and if necessary take action. This is a very timeconsuming process. Since international treaties ordinarily

do not deal with this issue, the key nations will have

to unite to resolve it. Otherwise, the mother ships will

continue to operate.

l/Legislation has recently been introduced (H.R. 2538, 96th

Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. H1049 (March 1, 1979))

which would make possession or transfer of controlled substances on the high seas by individuals subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States substantive offenses.

76
It is obvious that our Southeast border has not been

controlled effectively. The Congress has recognized the

problem, and the administration has taken some steps to

strengthen drug enforcement in the area, including application of additional resources and the creation of joint

enforcement task forces. While it is too early to assess

the impact of these actions, the problem is not likely to

go away. To improve the effectiveness of our present resources at U.S. borders, an integrated management plan is

necessary.

77
Marijuana Field in Colombia

I A__ -_-- 

Stored bales of marijuana awaiting shipment

Source: Drug Enforcement Administration

78
::\::

Loading of marijuana onto "mother ships"

I Hi

Marijuana being unloaded from seized mother ship

in Miami Florida, on way to incineration

Source: Drug Enforcement Administration

79
BORDER MANAGEMENT ISSUE UNRESOLVED

In 1977 the Office of Drug Abuse Policy completed a

major study of border control and associated law enforcement activities. The ODAP report, developed with representation from the principal agencies involved in border

control, focused on the major border functions ot inspecting persons and goods at ports of entry and patrolling

between these ports to prevent surreptitious entry. The

report identified an overall lack of coordinated border

management and a significant overlap and duplication of

effort in both of the principal border control functions.

The report concluded that a revised management structure

was needed which could achieve maximum effectiveness with

available resources, respond to changing priorities, and

provide adequate border control as well as better service

to the public. ODAP recommended the following.

-- A multipurpose border management agency should

be created by consolidating INS and Customs in

a new agency.

-- An appropriate reorganization plan should be

developed by the President's Reorganization

Project to include placement of the consolidated

border management agency in a cabinet department

consistent with overall Government reorganization planning.

-- The emphasis and direction of the reorganization planning should be to provide the optimum

organization for long-term effectiveness in overall border control. This approach enhances

control over all the border threats (drugs,

aliens, loss of revenue, gun smuggling, etc.).

80
-- Consolidation of the agencies and functions

should be achieved through an umbrella management concept. The reorganization plan should

provide a set of initial priorities, but allow

the new Director some flexibility in determining

the internal structure of the new agency. The

following functions should receive high

priority for early consolidation.

1. Primary inspection of all ports.

2. Patrolling of the land borders.

3. Operational support, particularly communciations and computer systems.

4. Management structure and administrative

support.

The President's Reorganization Project cooperated in

the ODAP study and concurred with its basic finding that

adoption of a concept of "border management" was necessary

to solve the organizational problems identified and to

implement President Carter's announced initiatives in

response to the problems of drug abuse and undocumented

aliens. In December 1977, the project circulated a draft

document, containing reorganization options relating to border management, among various knowledgeable individuals and

groups for their comments and suggestions.

Ironically, and-perhaps predictably, since the current

efforts toward reorganization were initiated, the agencies

involved in border enforcement have placed an increased

emphasis on voluntary cooperative agreements. Previous

studies of border activities also spawned interagency

agreements and memorandums of understanding which temporarily lessened the severity of certain aspects of the problem.

However, they did little to improve overall effectiveness

or solve the long-term border control problem. The essential

characteristic of the problem remains. Federal agencies with

different orientations continue to identify the best activities to meet their missions with limited consideration for

the activity of others. Little consideration is given to

overall border security.

CONCLUSIONS

It is evident that the U.S. border has not provided

the impediment to illegal entry of drugs that the Federal

drug strategy has envisioned. The problems of managing the

81
border are longstanding and, despite recent attention, have

remained unresolved. The Congress and the administration

need to get together to correct the situation. Still to

be decided is whether the President's law enforcement

reorganization plan will be submitted to the Congress. The

plan's objective is to combine law enforcement agencies with

similar functions to avoid overlapping and duplication, and

to enable law enforcement to be carried out in an efficient

and economical manner. In our opinion, this single agency

approach makes the most sense as the long-range solution.

In view of the potential action, we are not repeating

our recommendation relating to improvements in border management. We do feel, however, that corrective legislation

is needed regarding the illegal possession of controlled substances on the high seas by individuals subject to U.S.

jurisdiction. Such legislation would enable the Coast Guard

to reach the activities of some of the mother ships described

in this chapter. The legislation, however, would not reach

the activities of foreign vessels on the high seas absent a

treaty with the foreign nation involved or specific authorization by that foreign nation.

RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS

We recommend that the Congress enact legislation which

would make it illegal for any person on a U.S. vessel or on

a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or

for a U.S. citizen on board any vessel to illegally possess

or transfer on the high seas a controlled substance (as

defined in section 202 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 812).

82
CHAPTER 5

IMMOBILIZING MAJOR DRUG VIOLATORS:

AN ELUSIVE GOAL

Federal efforts to reduce drug trafficking through

attempts to immobilize major violators have fallen short

of expectations. With much persistence and expense,

numerous high-level drug traffickers have been prosecuted

and convicted, but this has not had a long-term impact on

the availability of drugs in the United States. Incarcerating major traffickers for long periods and seizing their

financial resources, the key elements to success, have not

been accomplished to a sufficient extent. Even in those

successful cases where high-level traffickers are arrested

and given stiff prison sentences, their organizations

often continue to operate and maintain their distribution

capacity.

The Federal enforcement approach relies on a close,

complementary relationship and effective interaction among

a variety of investigative, interdictive, regulatory, and

prosecutive agencies. Each agency is expected to aggressively use its unique skills, jurisdiction, and resources

to achieve optimum results. This concerted effort has not,

however, materialized. Legal obstacles, inexperience, lack

of direction, changing priorities, as well as bail and

sentencing practices (ch. 6), have all limited our success

in immobilizing major drug traffickers and their organizations. Specifically:

-- DEA and the law enforcement community in

general have moved slowly in effectively

using conspiracy laws to immobilize major

drug traffickers.

-- The Department of Justice has not adequately

planned or directed the prosecutive efforts

against major traffickers.

-- Policy and legislative mandates have restricted

Internal Revenue Service's role in drug enforcement.

-- The FBI has not been a significant force in the

fight against major traffickers to date.

-- Delays have diminished the usefulness of the

Bank Secrecy Act in investigating the enormous

profits of drug traffickers.

83
-- Assistance from other countries in prosecuting

international traffickers has been limited.

-- Federal and State control of the diversion of

licit drugs at the retail level has been

largely nonexistent.

ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY REQUIRES CLOSE COORDINATION

As discussed in chapter 1, drug law enforcement is an

important component of the overall supply reduction effort.

The Federal enforcement program encompasses a number of

agencies and is designed to deter, immobilize, and inconvenience illicit drug producing and trafficking organizations,

primarily through conspiracy and financial investigations,

so that the availability of illicit drugs will be minimized.

Reorganization Plan 2 of 1973 consolidated the principal drug investigative and intelligence resources in DEA,

the "lead agency." However, many other agencies each have a

vital role. The narcotics control contributions of organizations such as the FBI, the U.S. attorneys' offices, IRS,

and U.S. Customs Service must be maximized by the agencies

and directed to the overall objectives of disrupting illicit

traffic and reducing the availability of drugs. Each agency

has certain skills and many operate under unique statutes,

the use of which must be coordinated by the lead agency.

Success of the current drug enforcement strategy is largely

dependent on close and complementary relationships among

these agencies.

To achieve maximum impact, the enforcement strategy

calls for Federal efforts to focus on the prosecution and

conviction of those high-level traffickers who direct major

organizations. It is believed that immobilization of these

leaders significantly reduces the organizations' abilities

to move quantities of drugs for a considerable period of

time. Experience has shown that conspiracy investigations

are often the only way to proceed, since the kingpins

usually avoid possessing or selling the drugs themselves.

Much more than traditional buy/bust drug enforcement

methods, conspiracy investigations have exacting technical

requirements, depend to a great degree on investigative

84
skills and sophisticated support systems, and require careful

coordination of various agencies' efforts by DEA.1/

The use of financial evidence has received much attention recently as an important conspiracy investigation

tool. DEA has recognized that complete immobilization of

trafficking organizations depends not only on incarcerating

major traffickers for long periods but also on confiscating

the financial resources derived from or used in connection

with drug trafficking. Furthermore, financial intelligence

can identify drug financiers who might otherwise remain

unknown to law enforcement, and it can help in building

conspiracy cases. DEA believes that traffickers' financial

resources can be attacked through effective use of the

Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute (21 U.S.C. 848),

the recently enacted forfeiture provision (21 U.S.C. 881)

of the drug laws, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations (RICO) statute (18 U.S.C. 1961-1968), the tax

laws, and various provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act

(31 U.S.C. 1051 et. seq.). In addition, the establishment of

mutual assistance treaties to exchange financial information

with foreign countries has been a long-term objective of the

United States to help in this effort. Such financial investigations are the most complex of the conspiracy cases and

require both an added degree of cooperation among the agencies involved and sophisticated investigative skills not

traditionally associated with drug enforcement.

DEA NOT YET PROFICIENT IN CONSPIRACY CASES

Even though DEA has increased its emphasis on conspiracy

and financial investigations, it has not yet attained proficiency in investigating major interstate and international

drug violators. Many DEA agents have not been trained in the

latest financial conspiracy techniques, and intelligence functions often do not receive the priority they deserve. DEA

needs to do much more if the Federal Government is to be successful in attacking major drug traffickers and their assets.

l/Buy/bust is an enforcement technique involving the

arrest of an individual immediately after purchasing

drugs from him. Conspiracy investigations go a step

further, however, in that they seek to prove an

alliance between two or more persons for the purpose

of dealing in drugs, even though one or several of

the persons may never handle the drugs.

85
The number of conspiracy cases has increased

Using the conspiracy strategy, Federal law enforcement

has successfully arrested and prosecuted many high-level

drug traffickers. DEA statistics show an upward trend in

the number of individuals charged with conspiracy during the

last 5 fiscal years, increasing from 90 in 1974 to 104 in

1978. Moreover, there has been a clear trend toward increasingly complex conspiracy investigations.

Many conspiracy cases were directed against large drug

trafficking organizations and some were highly successful.

Two of the more significant cases were the following:

-- Leroy "Nicky" Barnes was convicted ot engaging

in a continuing criminal enterprise, of conspiring to distribute heroin and cocaine, and of

distributing large amounts of heroin. He was

sentenced to life in prison and fined $125,000.

Barnes ran a $1-million-a-month heroin and

cocaine operation out of a garage in Harlem.

Ten members of the Barnes syndicate were convicted ot lesser charges. All but 2 were

sentenced from 15 to 30 years in prison, and

several received substantial fines.

-- Jose Valenzuela was convicted of engaging in a

continuing criminal enterprise to distribute

heroin and other related charges in U.S.

District Court, Los Angeles. He received concurrent prison sentences of life and two terms

of 60 years. Eight co-defendents were convicted

of lesser narcotics violations. The Valenzuela

family operated laboratories in Culiacan, Mexico,

and smuggled multikilogram quantities of heroin

to other family members in California. This

high-quality heroin was then redistributed to

five distinct trafficking groups in New York

City.

Agents lack necessary experience and orientation

We noted that progress had been slow in developing the

agent expertise necessary to become more effective in conspiracy investigations. In seven ot eight cities we visited

that have major drug problems, Federal prosecutors told us

that most DEA agents are still either not oriented toward or

not trained sufficiently in developing major conspiracies,

especially the financial cases. They are, in effect, still

oriented toward buy/bust and simple conspiracy enforcement

86
techniques. While these tactics result in greater numbers

of arrests and drug seizures, they are not considered an

appropriate application of Federal enforcement resources.

A 1977 DEA Field Evaluation Team in one region found

"confusion among the agents as to whether DEA wants

conspiracy cases or statistics," while a 1977 evaluation

of another region concluded that, overall, "the agents

were not concentrating most of their efforts on conspiracy

investigations or targeting against specific violators."

DEA has trained many of its agents in the fundamentals

of conspiracy investigations, but has offered very little

training in the specifics of financial investigations.

DEA reported that 1,764 of its agents received conspiracy

training between 1972 and June 1979.1/ However, financial

training was not added to the conspiracy training course

until 1977, and, therefore, less than 10 percent of those

agents attending received instruction in conducting the

RICO, CCE, and other financial investigations that DEA is

now placing much hope in. Even then, this added training

is only an elementary introduction to a complex topic that

involves such things as identifying concealed assets,

tracing funds through foreign bank accounts, examining

legitimate businesses used for laundering funds, and

unraveling various other complex drug-related financial

transactions. In addition to the conspiracy training

course, which provided agents with their primary financial

training, some agents have also been familiarized with the

potential of financial investigation and use of the CCE and

RICO statues through various briefing sessions and seminars.

A separate instruction course in financial investigation has

only been recently devised, with the first course held in

May 1979.

Lack of agent knowledge and training in these areas,

we believe, is one reason that there have been relatively

few prosecutions and asset forfeitures utilizing financial

investigative techniques. Justice Department officials told

us that in the 8 years between 1970, when the RICO and CCE

laws became effective, and September 1978, there had been

only three RICO cases and no CCE cases where traffickers'

assets were forfeited to the government. In fact, there had

1/In June 1979, DEA employed 1,926 agents. We did not

determine how many of the 1,764 trained in conspiracy

investigation had left DEA since 1972, and, therefore

we could not calculate the percentage of the 1,926 agents

currently with DEA that had received this training.

87
been a total of only 53 CCE cases authorized and an estimated

4 or 5 drug-related RICO prosecutions. Even though there are

other reasons, detailed in this report, for the lack of

financial investigations, it is clear that DEA must: do more

to truly immobilize drug networks and achieve the hoped-for

reductions in drug traffic.

According to the Chief of the DEA field training

unit, the agency realizes the need for more agent training

in finances and conspiracies, but the process is a slow

one. To help develop this capability, DEA should give

consideration to hiring some individuals with backgrounds

in accounting, finance, and other analytical skills for

postions either as agents or analysts.

Intelligence has frequently

received too little priority

Intelligence activities continue to receive, in some

cases, little attention and low priority relative to DEA's

other programs. This is unfortunate, especially in light

of DEA's need to enhance its approach and use financial

information in pursuit of large-scale drug conspiracy

cases. Intelligence systems are vital and must play an

active role in the enforcement effort, providing timely,

useful information to aid in the investigation of complex

trafficking organizations.

A 1978 Field Evaluation Report of one DEA regional

office indicated that "Regional Management has made no

serious commitment to the intelligence program," and, in

one DEA district office we visited, the agent assigned to

the intelligence function had to be used at times in

enforcement activities because of limited availability of

staff resources. Such impositions on the intelligence function have not been confined to a few isolated areas, but in

fact were confirmed by DEA's Acting Deputy Administrator in

a January 1978 memorandum as taking place in most regions.

In contrast to these less than adequate intelligence

operations are the activities of the El Paso Intelligence

Center (EPIC) and the Unified Intelligence Division in

New York (UID). Established in 1974, EPIC has developed

into a coordinated intelligence center supported by automated

data bases of the six Federal agencies responsible for controlling various aspects of the border. UID, which was

established in 1973 to blend information from Federal sources

with criminal intelligence from New York State and City

police, has been successful in developing intelligence

88
whereby enforcement's limited resources can be effectively

applied to specific trafficking networks. It is unfortunate

that such an approach is not more widespread throughout DEA.

In 1978 DEA took steps to improve its intelligence

capabilities and commitment. These steps included the

establishment of a Regional Intelligence Coordinator

position in each region, the development of lists of

major trafficking organizations, and analyses of money

flows related to drugs. Also, the National Narcotic

Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC) came into being

to coordinate and disseminate narcotics information among

numerous Federal agencies. It is too early to determine

the effect of these plans on DEA's investigative efforts.

The CENTAC Program typifies

DEA's experience with conspiracy cases

DEA began its headquarters-controlled Central Tactical

Unit (CENTAC) program in late 1973 to perform priority conspiracy investigations of high-level violators beyond the

capabilities of the regional offices. Although this program

is DEA's most sophisticated enforcement effort, the CENTAC

investigations have often failed to immobilize the targeted

trafficking organizations.

CENTACs were organized to operate over wide geographic areas, nationally and internationally, to handle

cases which are difficult to investigate and prosecute

under a regional enforcement structure. The CENTACs have,

therefore, been given certain advantages over DEA's

regional investigations. They have central management,

increased agency mobility, and special funding. The

CENTACs also have greater opportunity for using financial

conspiracy tools (e.g. CCE and RICO laws, IRS assistance,

financial data analysis).

The CENTAC program has achieved some notable successes

against individual traffickers, and many high-level

defendants have received substantial prison sentences as

a result of their convictions on conspiracy charges.

However, our analysis of five recent CENTACs indicated that,

in most cases, the efforts did not achieve the overall

objective--complete immobilization of the targeted drug

trafficking organizations. All of the drug organizations

reportedly have maintained their drug-related wealth as well

as the potential to continue their trafficking. Like DEA's

other conspiracy investigations, CENTACs had not attacked

the vast financial resources ot the traffickers.

89
Although elimination of narcotics trafficking may be

impossible, the CENTAC program does offer distinct: advantages in immobilizing large trafficking organizations

through conspiracy cases.

In commenting on this report, Justice said that certain

changes have been recently made to the CENTAC program. Its

Criminal Division has arranged to assign an experienced

attorney to DEA at the beginning of any CENTAC investigation

to monitor and counsel its development, and the effort to

attack the financial holdings of trafficking organizations

is now established as a primary objective for each new CENTAC.

We believe these are positive actions which should improve

CENTAC effectiveness. Our office is currently reviewing in

detail the CENTAC program, with a separate report to be

issued on this subject.

LACK OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION HAS

CAUSED VARIED COMMITMENTS TO DRUG PROSECUTIONS

The establishment in February 1975 of 19 Controlled

Substances Units (CSUs) was considered a key element in the

Federal Government's bid to prosecute major international

and interstate drug violators through the conspiracy

statutes. However, the lack of clear policy regarding the

CSUs, together with a lack of Justice Department control

over drug prosecutions, has meant that individual U.S.

attorneys vary in their commitment to the CSU prosecution

program and in their methods of operating. Predictably,

some CSUs have very effectively implemented the conspiracyoriented program while others have not.

During the time that Reorganization Plan No. 2 was being

considered, a proposal was made by the administration for the

creation of a narcotics division within the Justice Department. It was hoped that the new division could help coordinate the complex drug conspiracy cases that cross jurisdictional lines of U.S. attorney's offices and sometimes cause

rival claims between offices that undermine successful prosecution.l/ The Division was never established, but: in 1975

CSUs were created in 19 cities (later expanded to 22). These

units were to provide a core of experienced attorneys in

each city who could devote the full time and effort necessary to develop complex drug cases with DEA. Control over

1/Report to the Senate Committee on Government Operations

on Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, October 16, 1973.

90
Federal drug prosecutions remained with the individual U.S.

attorneys, even though responsibility for monitoring CSUs

was assigned to Justice Department's Narcotic and Dangerous

Drug Section (NDDS).

The CSU program suffered from the start in that no

well-defined goals and objectives were established by the

Justice Department. In fact, the program was created not

by Departmental Order but by a general purpose statement

and an authorization of additional attorney positions,

allowing each U.S. attorney to implement the CSU concept

as he/she saw fit. Operational guidelines were not issued

until April 1977, more than 2 years after the first

CSUs were created. Moverover, a formal Department of

Justice Order establishing the CSU program (renamed the

Major Drug Traffickers Prosecution Program) was signed by

the Attorney General in October 1977 but, as of

November 30, 1978, had not been officially disseminated.

Within this framework, it is easy to understand the

wide variance of CSU practices and priorities detailed in

a 1979 Department of Justice Internal Audit Report.l/

-- Some districts insisted upon well-qualified

and experienced attorneys who are willing

to remain with the program for extended

periods, while others assigned new personnel

and made assignments for short periods.

-- CSUs did not always handle only cases

involving major interstate and international

drug traffickers. In some districts, the

CSU caseloads consisted of both big and

small drug cases, and, in some instances,

even nonnarcotic cases.

-- CSU attorneys have received little supervision and only limited training in the

legal techniques, methods, and tools that

are effective in developing major narcotic

cases. As a result, few CSU attorneys

use the conspiracy, RICO, and continuing

criminal enterprise statutes in prosecuting

violators.

l/"Controlled Substances Units In The Department of Justice,"

U.S. Department of Justice Internal Audit Staff, March

1979.

91
-- Coordination and communication among CSUs,

necessary for developing interstate and

international conspiracy cases, was not

effectively established.

During our visits to several U.S. attorney's offices we

found specific examples of the situations related by the

Department of Justice (DOJ) Internal Audit Report. For

instance, in San Francisco, Assistant U.S. attorneys and

DEA personnel acknowledged that, up until recently, CSU

efforts were not very effective at developing and prosecuting

major conspiracy cases. In Chicago, all types of drug cases

are handled by the U.S. attorney's narcotics unit, which is

generally staffed by attorneys with little trial experience.

Although some of the more complex drug cases are handled by

attorneys outside the unit to take advantage of their experience, these attorneys are not assigned full-time to narcotics.

In Miami, the lack of CSU emphasis on major conspJracy cases

prompted NDDS to assign two of its staff attorneys to work

with DEA in the investigation and prosecution of several

large-scale trafficking organizations.

Effective drug enforcement requires an unusually

high degree of communication and coordination among

agencies, and conspiracy cases against the top level drug

financiers require, additionally, sophistication and a

marshalling of available resources. CSU attorneys occupy

the best position to accomplish this oversight and coordination through their early involvement in conspiracy case

investigations. For this to happen, however, the parochialism and individual prosecution practices of U.S. attorneys

will have to be tempered, and the Justice Department's nationwide drug prosecution strategy strengthened. Several

alternatives for doing this are: increasing Justice Department (NDDS) control over CSU activities; establishing drug

prosecution units independent of the U.S. attorneys'

offices, similar to the organized crime strike forces; or

implementing uniform prosecutive priorities among the

various Federal judicial districts to assure consistent

commitment to high-level drug prosecutions.

IRS' ROLE IN DRUG ENFORCEMENT IS LIMITED

The President and Members of the Congress have stressed

in recent years the need to use the tax laws and IRS'

financial expertise in investigating major drug traffickers.

With the increased emphasis on conspiracy and financial

investigations, the value of tax and tax-related information,

as well as IRS' financial expertise, is obvious. However,

92
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 placed certain restrictions on

IRS which limit its ability to assist drug enforcement

efforts.

The intent of the Congress, in enacting the Tax Reform

Act of 1976, was to afford taxpayers increased privacy over

information they provided IRS and additional civil rights in

summons matters. In our March 1979 report, 1/ we pointed

out that the new legal provisions have had their desired

effect, although implementation of the act has caused some

time delays and coordination problems between IRS and other

Federal law enforcement agencies. In our opinion, the

adverse impact on the law enforcement community, as a result

of the disclosure provisions, had not been sufficiently

demonstrated to justify changing the law. Nevertheless, the

types of coordination problems being experienced illustrated

the need for better coordination within the framework of

existing law. The Congress needs to consider whether the

adverse impacts warrant revision of the legislation and

whether any revision can be made without disrupting the

balance between criminal law enforcement and an individual's

rights.

IRS efforts against drug traffickers have varied in

recent years. The Narcotics Traffickers Program (NTP) was

established at President Nixon's direction in 1971 to disrupt

the narcotics distribution system through intensive tax investigations of middle and upper echelon drug dealers. By

1975, however, the NTP had been dismantled because IRS exceeded its cash-seizing authority and because of the program's low revenue yield. The Commissioner of Internal

Revenue also believed that the public's trust in the IRS as

an impartial administrator of the tax laws is vital and could

be jeopardized when IRS is assigned missions whose primary

objectives are not tax-related. The NTP activities were subsequently integrated into the Service's regular tax enforcement efforts, and the practice of seizing drug-related cash

was severely restrained.

In 1976 President Ford directed IRS to again establish

a tax program aimed at high-level drug traffickers. In a message to the Congress, he expressed confidence that a reasonable program could be designed to promote effective enforcement of the tax laws against individuals who were violating

them with impunity. Consequently, the heads of IRS and DEA

l/"Disclosure and Summons Provisions of 1976 Tax Reform

Act--Privacy Gains With Unknown Law Enforcement Effects"

(GGD-78-110, Mar. 12, 1979).

93
signed a Memorandum of Understanding, and IRS implemented

its High-Level Drug Leaders Tax Enforcement Project.l/ The

House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control found,

however, that the program actually provides no greater emphasis on narcotics traffickers than on any other taxpayer group.

Whatever the effectiveness of the IRS High-Level Drug

Leaders Tax Enforcement Project, the Tax Reform Act of 1976

restricts the extent to which IRS can get involved in drug

enforcement. The act reflects the Congress' intent to

tighten the rules governing IRS' disclosure of tax information. It is consistent with the policy of the former Commissioner of Internal Revenue that IRS, while participating in

activities such as strike forces and NTTP, focus its efforts

on tax administration matters, with a view toward avoiding

the abuse of certain IRS powers in the future. Among other

things, the act affords taxpayers increased privacy over

information they provide IRS by placing substantial restrictions on other Government agencies' rights of access to tax

information, with stringent criminal and civil penalties

for unlawful disclosure.

For nontax criminal cases the heads of certain Federal

agencies, including the Department of Justice, can gain

access to tax information that IRS had obtained from third

parties by submitting a written request to the Secretary of

the Treasury specifying the taxpayer's name and address, the

tax periods involved, the statutory authority under which

the agency head is proceeding, and the specific reason why

the tax information is needed. They can gain access to information IRS had obtained from taxpayers, including tax

returns and associated information, by obtaining a Federal

district court order.

In a letter to GAO dated November 13, 1978, commenting

on a draft of our report on the effects of the disclosure

and summons provisions of the 1976 Tax Reform Act, the

Department of Justice was critical of the act. Justice

stated that the act is primarily responsible for the Department's utilization of tax information dropping to a fraction

of pre-1977 levels. According to Justice, the significant

decline in access to evidence of criminal activity demonstrates the severe adverse impact of the act upon law

enforcement when considered in light of the major role which

tax information has historically played in prosecutions of

white-collar and organized crime, public corruption, and

1/Also referred to as the Narcotics Trafficker Tax Program

(NTTP).

94
narcotics trafficking. The Department added that it is

unavoidable that reduced access to tax information impedes

law enforcement effectiveness in controlling these high

priority areas of law enforcement.

The Justice Department further stated that the initial

effect of the act's disclosure provisions was to cause a

"virtual collapse" in coordination between IRS and Justice.

Justice believes that although this situation has improved

somewhat with experience, coordination is and will continue

to be greatly diminished. It said one aspect of reduced

coordination is that other law enforcement agencies have

less access to IRS expertise in the analysis of financial

records so crucial to complex prosecutions.

In our visits throughout the country on this review,

many DEA officials and Federal prosecutors expressed

similar views about the act's disclosure provisions. The

types of problems being experienced were presented in our

March 1979 report, and included the following:

-- IRS cannot always disclose information about

nontax crimes. In conducting their daily

activities, IRS employees sometimes obtain

information indicating that a particular

taxpayer has committed a crime outside IRS'

jurisdiction. If such information is

obtained by IRS from a third party, IRS can

take the initiative in disclosing the information to the head of the appropriate Federal

agency including the Attorney General.

However, if that information is obtained

from a taxpayer, his records, or his representative, IRS cannot alert the Attorney

General or other Federal agency heads

regardless of the crime's seriousness.

--IRS cannot alert Justice attorneys to seek

disclosure of criminal tax information. A

coordination problem arises when IRS has

criminal tax information on an individual

which can be useful to a U.S. attorney or

a Strike Force attorney, and the affected

attorney does not know IRS has the information.

In this regard, the Tax Reform Act prohibits

IRS from initiating discussions with Justice

attorneys about a person's criminal tax

affairs until IRS officially refers its case

to Justice for prosecution. As a result,

95
Justice attorneys believe that the Tax

Reform Act has adversely affected their

ability to properly carry out their duties

as Federal prosecutors and law enforcement

coordinators.

-- IRS apparently takes more time to respond to

Justice requests for tax information. But

Justice was unable to provide us with examples

of specific problems caused by IRS' response

time. Before enactment of the Tax Reform

Act, IRS had little cause to question the

validity of requests for tax data made

by U.S. attorneys, Strike Force attorneys,

and other Department of Justice officials.

The time needed to respond to such requests,

therefore, would have been minimal. Since

the disclosure provisions became effective,

however, IRS has had to evaluate the propriety

of each request and ensure that all applicable

legal requirements have been satisfied.

In light of these new concerns, an increase

in IRS' response time would not be unexpected.

Justice, however, has expressed concern about the

delays its attorneys encounter when seeking

tax information.

-- Coordination between IRS and DEA has been

slowed. Once the disclosure provisions

became effective, implementation of the

IRS High-Level Drug Leaders Tax Enforcement

Project was slowed due to disclosurerelated questions about the legality of and

the methodology to be used under the IRS/

DEA agreement governing the project's

operation. However, the Tax Reform Act

did not render the agreement obsolete.

For example, in September 1977, DEA requested,

through an Assistant Attorney General,

access to third party tax information of

798 alleged high-level drug dealers. IRS

authorized that access in letters dated

October, November, and December 1977.

The above examples indicate that the disclosure provisions have had some adverse effects, but, in our opinion,

the record of those effects is insufficient to warrant

recommending changes to the law. In this regard, we recognize the need to strike an appropriate balance between

96
criminal law enforcement and an individual's right to privacy.

That balance is particularly important in tax administration

because taxpayers should be able to satisfy their income tax

obligations with the knowledge that information they provide

IRS will be used only as authorized by law. The types of

coordination problems being experienced, however, point up

the need for better coordination within the framework

of existing law. The Congress needs to consider whether

the adverse impacts on Federal law enforcement activities

warrant revision of the legislation and whether any revision

can be made without disrupting the balance between criminal

law enforcement and an individual's rights.

FBI ATTACK ON ORGANIZED DRUG

CRIME HAS YET TO BE REALIZED

It is widely believed that the FBI has acquired

considerable expertise and intelligence in investigating

both organized crime and the financial aspects of criminal

activity, two areas that have been shown to be inextricably

linked to the drug traffic. Although the agency's role in

support of drug enforcement has never really been clear,

there is today more interchange between DEA and the FBI than

in the past. Much of this increased level of activity,

however, had not shown significant results as of mid-1979.

At the time of hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 2

of 1973, various statements were made about FBI involvement

in drug law enforcement. The plan itself is not specific,

and merely requires the Attorney General to provide for

maximum cooperation between the FBI and DEA on drug law

en~forcement and related matters. The Presidential message

transmitting the plan calls for "a more effective antidrug role for the FBI, especially dealing with the relationship between drug trafficking and organized crime." The

Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations,

in its report on the plan, was more specific in its comments

on an expanded FBI role. It recommended such things as a

close working relationship in the use of informants, daily

headquarters liaison at high levels, access to each other's

intelligence memos, and the sharing of laboratory and training facilities as well as selected case records. In our

December 1975 report on Federal drug enforcement 1/,

however, we concluded that the FBI role needed to be

clarified if more is expected than the exchange of information and intelligence at the operating level.

1/"Federal Drug Enforcement: Strong Guidance Needed"

(GGD-76-32, Dec. 18, 1975).

97
Since that report, DEA and the FBI have increased

their interchange with two major joint investigative

projects aimed at the highest levels of the national and

international drug traffic. Operation BANCO, started in

November 1977 in the Miami DEA office, is a financial flow

investigation to identify potential tax-related cases;

seize the financial assets of drug traffickers; develop tax

and conspiracy prosecutions; and identify, for prosecution

by foreign governments, foreign nationals involved in drug

trafficking. The joint project grew out of separate but

related investigations involving the multimillion-(some

estimate more than a billion) dollar marijuana and

cocaine-smuggling business that has flourished in South

Florida in recent years.

The other joint operation of DEA and the FBI is their

task force program, established in September 1977. It

consists of three investigative units, in New York, Chicago,

and Los Angeles, formed "to apply FBI skills and statutes

in financial flow relative to drug trafficking..." and to

seek the immobilization of traffickers for violatiDns of

statutes under FBI jurisdiction if drug prosecutions cannot

be developed. In effect, the task forces are intended to

combine the expertise of both agencies in long-range, complex investigations of traffickers who are in some way

related to organized crime.

At the time of our audit work in September 1978, it was

too early to assess whether the DEA/FBI joint operations

will be successful. There were few quantifiable results in

terms of arrests, prosecutions, convictions, or immobilization of any large drug networks. This is due to various

factors. Primarily, the complex nature of the targeted

investigations does not allow for quick results, and there

were delays caused by problems in selecting investigative

targets. What was clear, however, is that the FBI has not

been a major force in investigating the organized crime and

financial aspects of drug trafficking. This is 5 years

after the Congress and Reorganization Plan No. 2 sought to

have the FBI become an important factor in the attack on

illegal drugs.

Regarding operation BANCO, the Department of Justice

stated that as of June 1979 some indictments have been

returned, the most recent being the indictment under RICO

Statute of 11 members of a large narcotics organization.

We believe that the Department of Justice should continue to monitor DEA/FBI joint activities and seek additional

98
means for using the FBI's purported expertise in investigating the financial aspects of drug trafficking and organized

crime. Only by doing this can the FBI's part in drug enforcement be more fully defined and developed.

THE BANK SECRECY ACT HAS NOT YET BEEN AS USEFUL

TO DRUG ENFORCEMENT AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED

The Bank Secrecy Act was passed by the Congress in

1970 to, among other matters, furnish Federal agencies

with additional tools to fight organized and white-collar

crime, including the drug traffic. It was felt that the

act's financial reporting requirements would help in

investigating illicit money transactions as well as persons

utilizing foreign bank accounts to conceal profits gained

from drug smuggling, gambling, racketeering, and other

illegal activities. Unfortunately the act has not worked

as planned because there have been delays in carrying it out.

If the law is to become more useful in the fight against

drug traffickers, agencies must work faster in collecting,

analyzing, and disseminating the required financial data.

Basically, the Bank Secrecy Act regulations require

three reports to be filed with Federal agencies. One is

a report submitted to IRS, by domestic banks and other

financial institutions, of each large (more than $10,000)

and unusual transaction in any currency. The second report

is filed with Customs by each person who transports or

causes to transport in excess of $5,000 in currency and

other monetary instruments into or outside the United States.

In the third report, each person subject to U.S. jurisdiction who has interests in foreign financial accounts must

disclose this by filing a statement with the Treasury Department. The Treasury has overall responsibility for

coordinating the efforts of involved Federal agencies and

for assuring compliance with the act's implementing

regulations.

Although the act and its required reports have indeed

helped in identifying and convicting major drug traffickers,

several administrative stumbling blocks have prevented the

act from being more useful to drug enforcement. The law

was passed in October 1970, and the regulations became

effective in July 1972. Two unsuccessful court challenges

of the act's reporting requirements further delayed the

enforcement of both the domestic and foreign currency

reporting provisions. As a result, Customs did not begin

to enforce the currency transportation requirement until

September 1972, and IRS did not commence enforcement of the

domestic transaction requirement until June 1974.

99
Another shortcoming in the Bank Secrecy Act's implementation has been the minimal dissemination of the

information collected. According to a May 5, 1977, House

Government Operations Committee study, "the exchange of

currency information obtained by IRS and Customs with agencies outside Treasury has been essentially nonexistent and,

indeed, the exchange of information between agencies within

the Department has been minimal." There are a number of

reasons for this, including disclosure problems and disagreements among agencies concerning the assignment of

responsibilities.

Although there has recently been some exchange of

information with DEA, Treasury and its responsible agencies

only recently began to set up a computerized program for

collecting, analyzing, and disseminating Bank Secrecy information, more than 7 years after the law was enacted. In

July 1978, Treasury established a Reports Analysis Unit in

the Office of the Secretary to maximize the effective utilization of data from the three reports required to be filed

under the Bank Secrecy Act. The Unit, which Treasury planned

to integrate into the Customs Service, will be responsible

for coordinating the computerization of all three reports.

It also acts as a liaison with other Federal agencies, making

those agencies aware of the data available and providing them

with the data when appropriate.

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury informed GAO by

letter dated March 19, 1979, 1/ that the currency transportation reports are presently entered on the Treasury Enforcement

Communications System (TECS), a computerized information system designed to assist Federal personnel in carrying out

various law enforcement missions. He said that Treasury intends to also enter both the domestic transaction reports

and the reports of foreign financial accounts on TECS.

Treasury believes, and we agree, that placing all three

reports on TECS will improve their potential usefulness.

Treasury now needs to follow through with its intention

of computerizing the Bank Secrecy information and further

improving the usefulness of the data.

ACHIEVING INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AGAINST

TRAFFICKERS: RESULTS HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTING

Domestic law enforcement efforts to immobilize traffickers and their organizations can be stymied unless

l/"Better Use of Currency and Foreign Account Reports

Needed for Law Enforcement" (GGD-79-24, Apr. 1979).

100
foreign governments provide help. Because many known drug

traffickers and financiers conduct their business, live, or

are fugitives in foreign countries, it is sometimes impossible for the U.S. Government to arrest or prosecute such

individuals. As discussed in chapter 3, foreign governments

have assisted in the apprehension or initiation of investigations against major traffickers. In recent years foreign

governments have been asked to provide additional assistance

through extradition and the exchange of evidence for prosecution here or abroad. But the results have been disappointing for numerous reasons. Prospects for improvement are not

encouraging.

Extradition offers little hope

Extradition treaties between countries permit the

surrender to one country of an individual living in another

country when he is either accused or convicted of a crime.

Although the United States is party to more than 80 extradition treaties, their effectiveness in drug prosecutions

has been restricted because of practices in foreign countries and the lengthy nature of the extradition process.

During the last several years, administration studies

as well as GAO reports have pointed out that extradition

in the field of drug law enforcement has been used with

limited success for several reasons. The March 1978 ODAP

study on International Narcotics Control Policy pointed out

that most of our treaties with foreign countries and the

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs recognize drug offenses

as extraditable offenses but also recognize the right of each

country to prevent the extradition of its own citizens. We

understand, for example, in Mexico, the top priority country

in the U.S. international narcotics control program, law and

practice do not permit the extradition of Mexican nationals.

Even if a proposed extradition is not subject to the

above restriction, other factors reportedly limit the use of

this tool in attempting to immobilize major traffickers:

-- Some countries do not permit hearsay evidence

in their criminal justice processes and will

not approve an extradition request if the

case is based on such evidence.

-- Some countries do not have laws against

conspiracy and will not extradite an individual

charged in a conspiracy.

101
-- Some countries will not extradite individuals in

cases based on evidence secured through undercover methods.

-- Administrative procedures for extradition

are complex and time-consuming.

Extradition treaties are not much help in U.S., efforts

to immobilize drug traffickers who use other countries to

circumvent prosecution. The Interagency Committee on

International Narcotics under the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotic Control recommended that a preferred

approach would be for the United States to encourage the

cooperation of other countries in prosecuting international

traffickers.

Operation JANUS needs better

management and commitment

In April 1975 the Government of Mexico (GOM) agreed to

a unique joint program with the United States to prosecute

major suppliers in Mexico responsible for smuggling and

distributing large quantities of drugs in the United States.

The procedure, named Operation JANUS, allows evidence obtained in the United States to be used in Mexican courts

for prosecuting Mexican and third country nationals who

supply drugs to this country, as well as Mexican citizens

who are fugitives from the United States. The success

achieved by JANUS as of November 1978 has been disappointing, primarily because of poor management on the part of

both countries and a lack of continuity in the program when

the Mexican government changed administrations.

In May 1978 DEA issued an evaluation of JANUS, disclosing that 54 of 138 cases that had previously been reported

as JANUS prosecutions during the program's 3-year existence

were never litigated for a number of reasons, including

loss of case files, improperly certified evidence, or simply

lack of follow-up by either DEA or GOM. DEA closed out these

cases and removed them from the JANUS program. Of 84 remaining JANUS defendants, only 4 had been convicted. Three of

these convictions were subsequently overturned by Mexican

courts because the U.S. documents were not properly certified

or processed by the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations in

Mexico City. The study showed the following statistics:

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Number Percent

Total JANUS Defendents 84 100

Convictions 4 5

Dismissals, acquittals, or

other releases 5 6

Pending (as of April 1978) 75 89

One major problem with JANUS was the lack of continuity

between the present and former GOM administrations, including

the removal by the previous administration of all JANUS

prosecution files. This rendered the current administration

incapable of initiating prosecutions or even determining the

status of JANUS cases. The program had to be reinstituted,

with case files replaced, and is now beginning to show some

results.

During our visit to the U.S. Mission in Mexico in

November 1978, we were informed that the GOM and DEA have

instituted procedures to better manage JANUS and overcome

some of the obstacles that have limited the program's success. Recent results and and future hopes for Operation

JANUS, rather than past results, are considered by DEA to

be truer indicators of JANUS' potential.

According to DEA, between January and November 1978

10 new cases involving 9 Class I and 1 Class II heroin

traffickers were submitted for JANUS prosecution under the

streamlined procedures. In addition, DEA reconstructed the

cases of 35 of the 75 pending defendants shown in the above

table by going back to the originating DEA domestic offices

to obtain new sets of documents. A DEA official said that

in the first of the 10 new cases, the defendant was convicted

less than 2 weeks after the arrest warrant was issued. In the

35 reconstructed cases, the Mexican Attorney General's Office

had arrested 5 defendants as of November 1, 1978, of which

4 were convicted and 1 acquitted.

Given proper management and commitment on both sides,

JANUS may in the future realize some of the expectations

that it has not fulfilled in the past. However, there

are limitations that must be recognized. For example, only

defendants in the United States who have not been convicted can be tried in Mexico in connection with the same

case. If a defendant is convicted in a U.S. trial and flees

the country while on bail pending appeal, he becomes a fugitive, but because of double jeopardy is not subject to trial

103
in Mexico under Mexican law. This is further complicated by

the Mexican policy against extradition of its nationals.

Another limitation is that to prosecute a trafficker in

Mexico, it must be proved that he was present at the

physical transfer of the drugs--Mexico has no conspiracy

law.

ODAP, in its March 1978 report on International

Narcotics Control Policy, realized the limitations of JANUS

but nevertheless recommended that the program be further

refined and expanded to other countries. A State Department official also recognized JANUS' limitations and

recommended caution in extending the program. He noted in

a February 1978 memorandum that JANUS has not been demonstrated to be a great success, and infant cooperative

arrangements with Colombia, Chile, and Peru have yet to bear

impressive results. Accordingly, he believed that the United

States should be reserved in moving this concept forward

in the international arena until effectiveness can be

demonstrated.

Significant drawbacks limit

use of Letters Rogatory

As a process that is somewhat the reverse of JANUS,

Letters Rogatory can be used to obtain evidence from other

countries for prosecuting major traffickers in the United

States. Although Letters Rogatory have received some attention recently as a result of a major trafficker's conviction,

the use of this device is a slow, laborious process that has

not had much success to date.

Available for many years to the Federal criminal justice

system, the Letter Rogatory is nothing more than a formal

request by the judiciary of the United States for assistance

from the judiciary of another country. Such a request might

include asking the foreign country to issue a subpoena to

testify or produce documents, take depositions, or use some

other mechanism to gather evidence. Its use to drug enforcement was most recently shown in the case of a large-scale

domestic drug distributor, Roger Fry, who used Swiss bank

accounts to conduct his illegal transactions. Information on

these accounts was obtained from the judiciary of Switzerland

via Letters Rogatory and used in the investigation. Fry

pleaded guilty to operating a continuing criminal enterprise

and is now serving a 10-year prison sentence.

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Though Letters Rogatory appear to offer some assistance

to Federal prosecutors in obtaining evidence for international drug cases, there are significant drawbacks to their

use. According to ODAP's international drug control report,

only 1 of 11 Letters Regatory sent by the U.S. Government to

different countries in 1977 was fully effective. Of the

remaining 10 Letters, 2 were partially effective, 4 were

refused, 2 responses were overdue, 1 was withdrawn, and the

other was too recent for results.

The ODAP report stated that Letters Rogatory could

become more effective with improvements in translation

speed, legal assistance to Embassies, and the reciprocal

representation of the United States by foreign justice

ministries. But, as one State Department official put it,

Letters Rogatory are not the preferred means for obtaining

evidence, and in fact should only be used as a last resort.

Mutual assistance pacts offer some help,

but take much time to develop

As financial information has been touted for its usefulness in investigating and prosecuting drug traffickers,

the strengthening of laws and conclusion of treaties for

exchange of such information have become long-term objectives of the U.S. international narcotics control policy.

Although one mutual assistance treaty is now in effect and

another being discussed, the treaty process is tedious and

time-consuming.

In January 1977 the United States and Switzerland

effected a judicial assistance treaty that can potentially

assist Federal enforcement agencies in their effort to

both incarcerate major traffickers and take away their drugrelated resources. The treaty provides for assistance in

acquiring banking and other records, locating and taking

testimony from witnesses, and the service of judicial and

administrative documents. According to ODAP's report on

international drug control, the treaty is intended to overcome problems presented in obtaining evidence concerning

activities occurring outside of each country. This evidence

can then be used to investigate or prosecute crimes committed

within each country.

For all the potential benefits that could flow from

mutual assistance treaties, such agreements are extremely

slow in developing and cannot offer much immediate help in

tracking down traffickers and their assets. The Swiss

treaty was signed in 1973 but did not become effective

105
until more than 3 years later. No less than 10 other

areas around the world have been identified as tax/financial havens for traffickers, and an untold number of other

countries are potential havens. Yet, the United States is

attempting to develop a treaty with only one of these

nations at the present time, and it is not known when it

will take effect. Clearly, then, the process must either

be speeded up or other ways developed to gain international

financial data to immobilize traffickers now and in the

future.

In commenting on this section of the report, the Department of Justice cited examples of the arrests abroad of major

traffickers through international cooperation. See pages 197

through 202 for a description of the cases.

DIVERSION OF LEGAL DRUGS: A FLOURISHING

ACTIVITY WITH LITTLE ENFORCEMENT ATTENTION

Although the abuse of heroin, cocaine, and other illegal

drugs has been well-documented, the equally serious, and some

say more widespread, use of legal drugs has surfaced in

recent years as a major problem as well. About 7 million

Americans use legal drugs, such as barbiturates, tranquilizers,

and amphetamines, for nonmedical purposes. It is estimated

that as many as 7 out of every 10 drugs being abused or resulting in death are legal drugs. Yet, governmental control

of these drugs at the dispensing or retail level, their major

point of diversion, has been largely nonexistent. Last year,

our office issued a report to the Congress on this problem

and recommended several actions to reduce diversion.l/

The retail level is the major source of diversion

Although the exact amounts and sources of controlled

substances being abused are unknown, much information

shows that a large part of the Nation's drug abuse problem

stems from the diversion of legal drugs. According to DEA,

about 30,000 drug products are subject to the Controlled

Substances Act, and about 15 billion dosage units are

manufactured each year. DEA estimates that 250 to 270

million dosage units are diverted annually, and as much as

90 percent of this diversion is from retail sources.

l/"Retail Diversion of Legal Drugs--A Major Problem With

No Easy Solution" (GGD-78-22, Mar. 10, 1978).

106
Opportunity for diversion of legal drugs appears

greatest at the retail level because of the large number of

practitioners--physicians, dentists, veterinarians, retail

pharmacies, hospitals, and teaching institutions. As of

October 1976, more than 540,000 manufacturers, distributors,

and dispensers were registered with DEA, with 532,408, or

98 percent, at the dispensing or retail level. For legitimate drugs, practitioners are the final link in the

distribution chain since they prescribe, administer, or

dispense controlled substances to the ultimate users.

Opinions differ on the most likely source of retail diversion, but it is generally agreed that diversion occurs

through thefts and the improper activities of physicians,

pharmacists, and the general public. Retail diversion can

be intentional for profit and abuse, intentional in a misguided effort to help those in need, or unintentional due

to carelessness.

Problems in controlling retail diversion

Despite the severity of the problem, retail diversion

has not been dealt with at the Federal and State levels.

Limited authority and resources, weak regulatory requirements, and the large number of retail outlets restrict DEA's

efforts to control retail diversion at the dispensing and

practitioner level. The responsibility to control drugs

at the retail level has been relegated largely to the States,

which generally do not have the capability or, in some cases,

the desire to provide aggressive antidiversion programs.

DEA has made efforts to assess and upgrade State capabilities

and to educate practitioners, but this approach has had little

impact on the overall diversion problem.

Under the Controlled Substances Act, DEA has extensive

authority to register and regulate drug manufacturers and

distributors. DEA can grant or deny registration for drug

manufacturers and distributors under many conditions, and

thus the act's registration provisions are a basic regulatory

tool. The situation is different, however, for doctors, pharmacists, and other practitioners, who generally are entitled

to be registered if they are authorized to dispense and

prescribe controlled substances by the State in which they

are licensed to practice. As with registrations, DEA has no

significant authority to impose physical security requirements on practitioners.

107
Limited resources also preclude DEA from pursuing an

extensive regulatory program at the retail level. Its

compliance investigators are fully occupied in monitoring

drug manufacturers and distributors, and additional

investigators would be required for DEA to effectively

monitor the retail level if stronger regulatory requirements existed. DEA believes that because of its present

focus it has greatly reduced diversion in manufacturing

and distribution, and that redirecting its present resources

toward the retail level could compromise these successes.

Because of the constraints at the retail level, DEA

can merely assist States to control retail diversion.

However, most States are incapable of dealing with the

problem because of inadequate legislation, ineffective

organization, and inadequate resources. Studies have

shown that State controlled substances laws are frequently

only general in nature and have various shortcomings

hindering effective regulatory and enforcement activities.

One study also found that State licensing boards, which

are primarily responsible for enforcing drug compliance by

practitioners, see their primary role as determining fitness to practice. State boards generally have no members

outside the profession, and few States oversee their boards'

activities.

DEA is trying to assess and upgrade State capabilities

to evaluate practitioners. Although the largest assistance

effort--diversion investigation units composed of Federal

agents and State investigators--has had some success,

most of DEA's other activities have had little effect so

far. These efforts have stressed planning, experimental

projects, and long-term solutions rather than the present

need to investigate violators. This assistance approach

has also been negatively influenced by various factors,

including DEA's enforcement priorities, Federal tunding

limitations, and the degree of commitment by States.

Alternative approaches to combatting

retail diversion

There are two basic approaches which can be taken to

effectively deal with retail diversion: DEA's direct role

over the dispensing level and practitioners could be strengthened until it parallels the agency's role with respect to

manufacturers and distributors, or DEA's assistance role to

motivate and help the States carry the burden could be accelerated. Regardless of the approach taken, controlling retail

108
diversion will be a time-consuming task requiring legislative

changes and increased resources. Because of the potentially

great costs involved in changing DEA's role, we previously

recommended that the Attorney General study the costs and

benefits of these approaches.

Under the direct approach, DEA would have as much

responsibility over retail-level practitioners as it

currently does over manufacturers and distributors. DEA

would not be as dependent on State licensing actions, and

it would have the necessary tools to compel practitioner

compliance. Significant legislative changes, at the Federal

level, would be necessary to deny registrations, prescribe

security controls, and impose more stringent prescription and

and recordkeeping requirements.

The direct approach also involves substantial costs.

To implement, monitor, and enforce additional controls,

large increases in DEA's resources and in the operating

costs of practitioners would be required. There is also

an intangible drawback--a vastly increased Federal presence

in the medical profession. Moreover, even with a greatly

expanded DEA role, there is no guarantee of quick results,

and great reductions in diversion will most likely take a

long time.

The assistance approach would continue the current

situation in which the States have the primary responsibility for controlling retail diversion. DEA, however,

would assume a more active role in assisting the States.

This approach would be costly and would require a change

in DEA's legislative authority.

A critical element in this assistance approach is

the States recognizing their responsibilities--they

would bear the major burden for establishing aggressive

antidiversion programs. Unfortunately, other national

problems have shown that States are often reluctant or

unable to do the job without Federal funding. Accordingly,

the Federal Government would likely have to financially

support State efforts far beyond what has been previously

provided. Some type of DEA grant program would have to

be authorized and implemented to insure State involvement.

No matter which of the two approaches is taken, it

is clear that more effective control over "the respectable pushers" will be costly. Without any changes,

however, the large market in legal drugs can be expected

to continue.

109
CONCLUSIONS

The Federal Government's strategy of disrupting the

drug distribution networks to reduce the supply of drugs

has not been effectively carried out. Attempts to

immobilize major violators and their organizations through

conspiracy investigations and attacks on their financial

resources have not been accomplished to a sufficient

extent. Although DEA has been given responsibility for

coordinating the attack on drug leaders, it lacks the

authority to require the needed coordination. Neither it

nor the other agencies involved have been successful in

realizing a truly coordinated program. Lack of expertise,

little overall direction, shifting priorities, and legal

obstacles are all to blame.

For its own part, DEA has not attained proficiency

in conspiracy investigations. Few agents have been

trained in investigating the financial aspects of the

drug traffic, and intelligence functions have not always

been given their rightful priority in efforts to investigate complex drug trafficking organizations.

Though Controlled Substances Units were expected to

provide full-time experienced attorneys to prosecute major

drug cases, they have suffered greatly from lack of

Justice Department guidance and control. Some CSUs have

effectively implemented the conspiracy-oriented program

while others have not.

Federal drug strategies in recent years have envisioned key roles for both the IRS and FBI in investigating

the financial and organized crime aspects of drug trafficking. Neither agency, however, has played much of a role

to date. IRS is restricted by the disclosure provisions of

the Tax Reform Act from doing a great deal, while much of

the FBI's drug-related activities have yet to show significant

results.

Even though the Bank Secrecy Act was intended to help

drug enforcement in attacking the financial resources of

traffickers, it has not been very useful. Treasury

Department agencies have been slow in implementing some

of the law's provisions, and the information that is

supposed to aid investigations has not been disseminated

to any great extent.

110
Eliciting the aid of other countries is essential if

the United States is to have any success in prosecuting

international traffickers. Several programs have been

advanced to do this, but little has come out of them, and

there is little hope for the future. Operation JANUS has

suffered from poor management and lack of continuity on

the parts of both the United States and Mexico. Extradition has not worked because countries generally are not

willing to give up their own citizens, and differing legal

systems limit the process even when suspects are not citizens.

Two other methods, Letters Rogatory and mutual assistance

treaties, have received attention, but the length of time

required to develop these techniques and the large number

of countries that must be dealt with serve to limit their

use considerably.

Diversion of legal drugs, especially at the retail

level, has been flourishing for years, yet has received

little attention compared with the efforts spent against

drugs like heroin and cocaine. Responsibility to control

this problem is largely with the States, but most States

are incapable of fulfilling this responsibility due to

inadequate laws, ineffective organization, and insufficient

resources. In our 1978 report on retail diversion we recommended that the Congress strengthen enforcement efforts

against the growing diversion of legal drugs by authorizing

DEA to either exercise direct regulatory authority over

retail-level practitioners or implement grant programs for

assisting States in controlling diversion. We continue to

support this recommendation.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO AGENCIES

To overcome the major impediments in immobilizing

major traffickers, we recommend that:

-- The Attorney General

1. Strengthen the prosecution of major drug

traffickers through the increased

commitment and continuity of attorney

resources. Several alternatives for

achieving this include increasing

Department of Justice control over the

activities of the Controlled Substances

Units, establishing independent drug

prosecution units similar to organized

crime strike forces, or implementing

uniform prosecutive priorities among the

111
various Federal judicial districts

to assure consistent commitment to high

level drug prosecutions.

2. Direct the DEA Administrator to improve

investigative capability against drug

traffickers' financial resources by

training DEA agents and hiring financial

specialists to assist in investigations.

3. Continue to monitor and improve the

operation of DEA/FBI Task Forces, and

seek additional means to use the FBI's

expertise in investigating the financial aspects of drug trafficking and

organized crime.

-- The Secretary of the Treasury speed the

processing and dissemination of Bank

Secrecy Act reports so that law enforcement agencies can achieve the maximum

benefit of the information.

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

Our review work and experience lends further support

to the recommendation in our previous report on the Tax

Reform Act that the Congress needs to consider whether the

adverse impacts of the act's disclosure provisions on

Federal law enforcement activities warrant revision of the

Internal Revenue Code, and whether any revision can be made

without disrupting the balance between criminal law enforcement and individuals' rights.

112
CHAPTER 6

BAIL AND SENTENCING PRACTICES

FURTHER WEAKEN IMMOBILIZATION EFFORTS

Bail and sentencing practices throughout the country

have diluted the effect of drug enforcement efforts. Many

defendants who are released on bail continue their drug

trafficking, while those who are convicted often are not

immobilized for long periods of time. These are longstanding problems that have remained unresolved despite

considerable attention. Changes in the judicial system

should be considered by the Congress to improve the bail law

and enhance the capacity of the court system. The Judicial

Conference of the United States should perform a comprehensive assessment to determine the effects of judicial

discretion on the justice system and whether disparate

sentences and a reduced deterrent value of sentencing have

resulted.

TRAFFICKING WHILE ON BAIL

Many alleged drug traffickers who are subsequently

convicted do not curtail their illegal activities after

arrest because they continue their illicit trafficking activities while free on bail. The current bail law does not

authorize judges, when deciding bail in noncapital cases,

to consider the danger of an alleged trafficker to the

community, i.e., the likelihood that the defendant will deal

in drugs while on bail and thereby present a danger to the

community. Various reports and studies have concluded that

the bail statutes have, therefore, hindered the immobilization of alleged drug traffickers by allowing them to be

released with no restrictions before trial.

Bail law does not authorize detention

of drug defendants likely to

traffic in drugs

The Bail Reform Act of 1966 (18 U.S.C. 3146 et. seq.)

does not provide for pretrial bail decisions for drug defendants based on considerations of whether the individuals

may traffic in drugs while on bail and therefore pose a

"danger to the community." Current bail law applicable

to drug violations provides that assurance of "the appearance

of the person as required" is the criteria to be considered.

113
Other bail laws--those dealing with capital offenses l/--do

permit judges to consider danger to the community and allow

the refusal of pretrial bail. But narcotics violations are

not considered capital offenses.

The Bail Reform Act was passed to better assure that

defendants, regardless of financial status, are not needlessly detained while awaiting court appearances. The bail

law delineates certain factors judges are to use :Ln determining a defendant's conditions of release. One section of the

act provides that defendants in noncapital cases shall be

released on bail unless the judge determines that release

will not reasonably assure the defendant's appearance at

trial. If the judge determines that the imposition of bail

by itself will not ensure the defendant's appearance, he

may impose certain specified conditions on the defendant's

release. Since drug offenses are not capital offenses,

bail for such defendants must be provided in accordance

with section 3146.

In contrast, another section of the bail law (18 U.S.C.

3148) provides that defendants in capital cases and convicted

defendants awaiting sentencing or appeal shall be released on

bail unless the judge determines that no conditions of release will adequately assure either that the defendant will

appear for trial or sentencing or that the defendant will

not pose a threat to the community. If such a determination

is made, the judge may order the defendant detained. Where

the danger to the community rationale is employed to detain

a convicted drug offender awaiting appeal, there must be

substantial evidence that the community would be threatened

by the defendant's release.

Studies have cited bail law as a problem

Various reports by the executive branch, the Congress,

and our office have all concluded that many drug traffickers

continue to deal in drugs while free on bail pending trial.

In addition to these past studies, we noted recent instances

where drug defendants were released prior to triaL and

then rearrested on new drug charges while out on bail, obviously diluting the effects of drug enforcement efforts.

1/Crimes punishable by death.

114
In 1973, our office 1/ concluded that some alleged drug

traffickers were not being effectively immobilized because,

among other reasons, they were frequently released on bail

for long periods. This situation was determined to exist

because the bail criteria did not consider the likelihood of

a defendant continuing to deal in drugs and thereby posing a

danger to the community when released on bail, and BNDD

generally did not monitor the activities of arrested traffickers who were free on bail. We recommended that DEA

monitor those alleged traffickers who are out on bail and

who are likely to traffic in drugs.

The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and

Control has also identified the bail law as a problem.

The Committee, in a 1977 Interim Report, found that the

current law allows for major traffickers to be released to

the community, and a significant number of those released

return to their illegal activities or become fugitives.

DEA has continually claimed that the bail law is inadequate. In one study, DEA found that of a random sample

of 499 individuals released pending trial after arrest for

narcotics trafficking in 1972, 47.5 percent were implicated

in postarrest trafficking. Similar DEA results were used

as a basis for the recommendation in the 1975 White Paper

that stiffer penalties be imposed to deter drug offenses

committed while on bail. A more recent (1977) DEA

examination of bail practices showed that

-- one-half of DEA's serious defendants in

the study were released awaiting trial,

on bond or personal recognizance; and

-- more than one-third of the released

serious defendants were free on bond

or own recognizance for 7 months to

more than a year.

In our review we saw examples of what can happen after

an alleged drug trafficker is released. To illustrate:

-- Two men were arrested and charged with

manufacturing PCP. While on trial for

that charge, the same two were arrested

again and charged with conspiring to

1/"Difficulties in Immobilizing Major Narcotics Traffickers"

(B-175425, Dec. 21, 1973).

115
manufacture PCP. Enough material to

make 10 pounds of PCP was seized at the

time of the second arrest.

-- An individual was arrested on drug

charges and released on bail. While

free on bail, he was arrested in

another State and charged with conspiring to smuggle approximately 58

pounds of cocaine from Bolivia to

the United States. The Magistrate ordered the person released on the

existing bail posted in the first case.

Various proposals have been suggested to help alleviate the problem of accused drug offenders continuing to

deal in drugs while released on bail. One of these proposals has suggested that the Federal bail statute be

amended to provide that judges setting pretrial bail in

all serious, noncapital cases could consider whether a

defendant released on bail would pose a danger to the

community.

While the proposed changes appear simple and clearcut, they are not without problems, since opinions differ

regarding their advisability and constitutionality. It has

never been resolved, for instance, whether a defendant may

constitutionally be denied bail in noncapital offenses for

reasons other than to assure that the defendant appear for

trial. Some believe that it may be unconstitutional to

deny bail to defendants for any other reason than assuring

their appearance for trials except in capital offenses.

The Eighth Amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not

be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishments inflicted." This provision is,

however, subject to two different interpretations. The

first is that, since only excessive bail is prohibited, the

Congress is not prevented from denying bail altogether in

certain classes of cases. The second interpretation is that,

since "excessive bail" is prohibited, an outright denial of

bail, which is a more serious infringement on the liberty of

an accused person, must also be barred. The Supreme Court

has never settled this issue.

In summary, then, it is clear that the bail problem

is complex and difficult to deal with. This does not

mean that the Congress should be deterred from developing

116
solutions, but any modifications or reform to the bail

law must consider both constitutional principles and the

means to prevent traffickers from engaging in illicit

activities that present a danger to the community.

SENTENCES DO NOT DETER TRAFFICKING

Convicted drug traffickers often are not effectively

immobilized for long periods of time because they receive

short or no prison sentences. Although some have recommended minimum mandatory sentences to correct this, the

solution is not that simple, and we do not advocate such

a move. Changes should not be narrowly based, but must

be made throughout the entire criminal justice system.

Whatever the case, changes should not be made until a

comprehensive evaluation is made of the effects of discretion in the criminal justice system.

Sentencing has been criticized by others

Drug sentencing has continually come under attack for

failing to immobilize drug traffickers. As stated in the

1975 White Paper, indictment and arrest do not guarantee

immobilization but merely begin a long process during most

of which the alleged trafficker may be free to traffic in

drugs. At the end of the process, incarceration may be

relatively short, thereby wasting investigative resources,

weakening the deterrent to drug crimes, and reducing the

public's trust in the criminal justice system. To increase

the periods of incarceration, the Domestic Council Drug

Abuse Task Force recommended in the White Paper that minimum

mandatory sentences be required for persons convicted

of high-level trafficking in narcotics and dangerous drugs.

More recently, ODAP concluded in a December 1977 report on drug enforcement policy that the present sentencing

system does not appear to provide a strong deterrent for

potential drug violators. There have been repeated arrests

as well as continued postarrest trafficking. ODAP also

noted that the system does not insure equal justice under

the law because sentences for similar offenses are often

inequitable, and went on to recommend that the administration consider a legislative change establishing sentencing

guidelines.

DEA has also been a strong and vocal critic of drug

sentencing. In testimony before the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, September 23, 1976,

the Administrator of DEA said the chances are 1 out of 3

117
that a convicted heroin or cocaine trafficker will be back

on the street on probation and, of those sentenced to

prison, 1 out of 3 are eligible for parole within 1 year.

He said the sentencing statistics contradict the theory of

a deterrent and a serious sanction for narcotic offenses.

A separate DEA study of 919 DEA defendants whose

Federal court dispositions were reported in 1976 disclosed

that:

-- 24 percent of the convicted serious 1/

violators received probation.

-- 61 percent of the convicted serious

violators for whom a specific outcome

could be determined received sentences

of three years or less, and 81 percent

received sentences of 6 years or less.

-- Actual time served for narcotics violators averaged only 43.2 percent of the

sentence imposed; this means 61 percent

of the convicted serious violators actually serve about 15-1/2 months or less

and 81 percent serve 31 months or less.

--42 percent of the convicted serious

violators were habitual criminals.

We previously concluded that

drug sentences were short

We concluded in 1973 that arrested narcotics traffickers were often not immobilized, partly because they

received short or no prison sentences. We noted that the

short sentences tended to negate the deterrent effect of

prosecution.2/

Federal judges have wide latitude in sentencing narcotics violators because the law prescribes maximum penalties

but no minimum penalties, except in cases of chronic abusers who are convicted of participating in a continuing

criminal enterprise. Our 1973 review of the sentences for

l/"Serious" offenses include the trafficking, distribution,

and manufacturing charges.

2/"Difficulties In Immobilizing Major Narcotics Traffickers"

(B-175425, Dec. 21, 1973).

118
a sample of convicted narcotics violators showed that most

received sentences of 5 years or less. There was a tendency

in these cases to impose short periods of incarceration 1/

even though the cases involved major traffickers who

profited substantially from their crimes.

Current prison sentences are still short

Recent court data shows that convicted drug violators

are usually not incarcerated for long periods of time.

This continues to negate the deterrent effect of prosecution.

To provide some insight into the sentencing of drug

violators, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

furnished us with the sentences imposed during 3 fiscal

years for all those convicted of selling, distributing, or

dispensing Schedule I narcotics. 2/ The penalty for conviction of a first offense is imprisonment for not more

than 15 years. Actual sentences were as follows:

FY 1975 FY 1976 FY 1977

Number Convicted 1,651 1,909 2,143

Percent Receiving Various

Sentences: (note a)

Probation 24 21 20

Up to 3 years 16 17 28

3 - 5 years 22 24 21

5 years and over 36 36 30

a/The percentages do not add up to 100 because this

analysis excludes those defendants receiving fines

only, split sentences, etc.

As the above schedule shows, most defendants received

less than 5 years, with about one-third of the defendants

1/The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 provides a maximum

penalty of 15 years imprisonment per count for first

offenses and 30 years imprisonment per count for

second offenses for violators of Federal drug trafficking

statutes involving Schedule I or Schedule II narcotic

drugs.

2/There may be a small number of convicted defendants

excluded from our analysis because the type of drug

involved in some cases was unknown.

119
sentenced to 5 years or more. The length of these 'sentences

considerably overstates the actual periods of incarceration

since individuals may be eligible for parole after serving

one-third of their sentence.

The disposition of convicted traffickers in 5 CENTAC

investigations further illustrates the fact that DEA's

highest level violators are not immobilized for long periods

of time because of the short term of their incarceration.

As the chart on the next page shows, 92 Class I violators

convicted in the CENTACs received sentences averaging little

more than 5 years with an almost equal period of special

parole as well. Again, the prison time actually served is

significantly less when considering that most violators are

eligible for parole after serving one-third of their

sentences.

120
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Improving the justice system is difficult

and requires comprehensive study

In exercising judicial discretion, Federal judges

impose sentences on drug violators for a variety of reasons, including deterrence, punishment, rehabilitation,

and immobilization. These sentences have often been

criticized as being too short to immobilize traffickers

for long periods of time. Consequently, mandatory minimum sentences have been recommended to increase the

periods of incarceration for high-level traffickers.

Proper corrective action, however, must be more comprehensive than that, as each segment of the criminal justice

system is interdependent. The entire issue is clouded by

a lack of hard data that show who is sentenced, why they

are sentenced, what the sentences are, and what is the

result.

Our report on sentencing disparities 1/ illustrates

clearly the dangers in attempting simplistic solutions to

criminal justice problems. In the report we concluded that

the exercise of judicial discretion results in wide disparities in the sentencing of criminal defendants throughout

the Federal justice system, but enactment of narrow-based

solutions is an undesirable alternative. Such action,

particularly with respect to limiting only judicial discretion, will reduce disparity in some portions of the

process but may actually encourage it elsewhere. For this

reason, definitive and sweeping action will be necessary.

Although the judicial branch gathers some sentencing

data, only limited information is available for determining

the adequacy of the types and lengths of sentences imposed

or whether the appropriate sentencing statutes were used.

More important, the available information is not sufficient

for determining the extent of undesirable disparities in

sentencing decisions.

We recognize that short sentences and sentencing disparities are not the same, but they both require comprehensive study. Once this is done, appropriate changes can be

proposed.

l/"Reducing Federal Judicial Sentencing and Prosecuting

Disparities: A Systemwide Approach Needed" (GGD)-78-112,

Mar. 19, 1979).

122
EXPANDING THE USE OF MAGISTRATES CAN HELP

PROMOTE IMMOBILIZATION OF TRAFFICKERS

In a prior report 1/ we concluded that expansion of

the jurisdiction of Federal magistrates could enable them

to handle minor narcotics cases now required to go before

a U.S. District Judge. This would ease the overburdened

District Court system with about the same deterrent effect.

Although there has been a shift in law enforcement

priorities to the higher-level trafficking networks and

to drugs which pose a greater risk to society, the Federal

Government is left with the problem of enforcing laws

against smalltime smugglers. The problem is particularly

acute for marijuana interdictions made along the Southwest

border. One way to increase the risk of prosecution for

these lower-level violators would be to expand the trial

jurisdiction of U.S. magistrates. At present there are no

Federal narcotics statutes with penalties low enough to

allow the case to be heard before a magistrate.

Under existing law the U.S. District Courts may designate U.S. magistrates to try and to sentence persons

accused of certain minor Federal offenses for which the

penalty "does not exceed imprisonment for a period of

1 year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both." It is

the view of the Judicial Conference that there are a number

of misdemeanors in the United States Code not presently

included in the term "minor offense" which could

be tried by U.S. magistrates. These include the illegal

possession of drugs (21 U.S.C. 841(b)). The Conference

believes that an increase from $1,000 to $5,000 in the

magistrates' jurisdiction for minor offenses, while

retaining certain exceptions presently enumerated in the

statute, would provide a beneficial expansion and would

thereby relieve U.S. district judges of some of the burden

in handling minor crimes which are misdemeanors. In our

prior report the benefits of expanding the authority of and

increasing the use of magistrates was discussed. The report recommended that the Congress expand the magistrates'

jurisdiction to encompass most misdemeanors, e.g., minor

drug offenses, especially possession of marijuana.

1/"Illegal Entry At United States-Mexico Border: Multiagency Efforts Have Not Been Effective In Stemming The

Flow of Drugs and People" (GGD-78-17, Dec. 2, 1977).

123
The expanded use of magistrates could significantly

reduce the amount of time U.S. attorneys, public defenders,

investigators, and apprehending officers spend on each case.

It could relieve (1) the dilemma U.S. attorneys face along

the Southwest border when an alleged violator does not warrant

felony prosecution for trafficking and (2) the U.S. District

Court's time spent on first-time prosecutions of couriers or

narcotics users attempting to support their habit.

CONCLUSIONS

The Federal drug enforcement strategy recognizes that

effective immobilization of drug traffickers, through incarceration for long periods and confiscation of their

financial resources, is vitally important to supply reduction efforts. According to the strategy, the failure to

immobilize traffickers against whom a substantial case has

been developed is very costly in terms of weakening the

deterrent value of the law, reducing public trust in the

justice system, and wasting investigative resources.

Unfortunately, major drug traffickers are often not

effectively immobilized even after they are arrested. In

chapter 5 we discussed the lack of success in taking away

traffickers' financial resources, and in this chapter we

have shown that incarceration is not serving to immobilize

drug violators for long periods of time. Many are released

on bail and deal in drugs while awaiting trial. For those

eventually convicted, prison sentences are often short.

Judging by the amount of drug trafficking identified

and the easy replacement of convicted traffickers, it does

not appear that sentencing has provided much of a deterrent.

In addition, the flood of cases in the criminal justice

system has caused delays in the disposition of cases and

has meant that some suspects are released rather than

tried.

The bail law itself has hampered immobilization efforts.

The Bail Reform Act does not provide for consideration of

how dangerous a drug defendant is to the community--the

law provides that assurance of the defendant's appearance in

court is the only criteria to be considered. As a result,

the law allows many alleged drug traffickers to be

released before trial, providing them the opportunity to

traffic in drugs. Though we recognize that some bail

reform proposals have raised questions of constitutionality,

we believe the problem to be serious enough for the Congress

to consider developing a solution.

124
In sentencing those drug violators who are eventually

convicted, Federal judges have wide latitude. Others have

concluded that present sentencing practices do not deter

drug crimes and that minimum mandatory sentences should be

established to provide stiffer penalties for drug violators.

However, the problem is not that simple. We believe that

any changes to the criminal justice system must be comprehensive and must be approached with the utmost caution.

Proposed changes should be carefully assessed for their

potential impact on other segments of the judicial system.

There is one other refinement which can be made

to the criminal justice system to save time and, thus,

indirectly promote greater immobilization of traffickers.

The justice system is overloaded with criminal cases.

Presently, however, Federal magistrates lack the authority

to hear even minor narcotics cases. By expanding the

magistrates' authority, cases can be expedited and much

time can be saved.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

In our prior report on sentencing disparities, we recommended that the Judicial Conference undertake a comprehensive assessment of the nature and extent of undesirable

sentencing disparity existing in the Federal criminal justice system. As a result of our current study, we

recommend that the Judicial Conference's assessment also

contain a determination of the effects of judicial discretion on the justice system, including the sentencing of

drug violators. The assessment should attempt to find out

the extent of undesirable results caused by the use of

judicial discretion, such as inequitable sentencing practices and a reduction in the deterrent value of sentencing.

The study should also determine to what degree discretion

needs to be maintained in the judicial system.

We also recommended in our previous report that, on the

basis of results of the assessment, the Judicial Conference

should

-- establish a reporting and review mechanism

to collect sentencing data and to periodically study the adequacy of sentencing

decisions and

125
-- request from the Congress any legislative,

statutory, or rule changes needed to

improve the sentencing process and to

provide assurance that criminal sentencing is consistent and fair among and

within districts.

RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS

We recommend that the Congress expand the capacity of

the Federal court system to better immobilize drug traffickers

by passing legislation to expand the magistrates' jurisdiction

to encompass most misdemeanors.

MATTER FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

Because the present bail law does not provide danger to

the community as a criteria for setting conditions of pretrial release for defendants charged only with noncapital

offenses, alleged traffickers have opportunities to deal in

drugs and, in some cases, may use that opportunity and thereby

pose a danger to the community while on bail. In evaluating

proposals for the reform of the present law, the Congress

must consider both constitutional principles and the means to

prevent traffickers from engaging in illicit activities that

present a danger to the community.

126
CHAPTER 7

MOBILIZING STATE AND LOCAL RESOURCES IS EASIER

SAID THAN DONE

The Federal strategy places increased reliance on

State and local drug enforcement efforts because Federal

activities are to be focused against leaders of national

and international trafficking networks. Although the

Federal Government has developed numerous programs to

assist and cooperate with State and local agencies, the

enormous number of jurisdictions, coupled with financial

and political realities, makes it virtually impossible to

mount a unified attack. In recognition of these realities, there is a need to establish a policy on the use

of Federal drug enforcement resources versus those of

State and local governments. Such a policy should clarify

the roles of Federal, State, and local governments, and

provide for training, equipment support, intelligence

exchange, and coordination. At the same time, the policy

should emphasize that the Federal role discourages direct involvement in enforcement actions against low-level violators,

such as in some Task Force operations, so that DEA's

resources will not be diverted from their primary mission.

RELIANCE PLACED ON STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES

In 1975, the White Paper on drug abuse urged the Federal Government to take the lead in mobilizing the enormous

potential resources available in State and local law enforcement agencies. It further recommended that Federal

law enforcement efforts be focused on the development of

major conspiracy cases against high-level drug leaders,

moving away from street-level activities. More recently,

the Attorney General echoed these sentiments in giving

the Justice Department's fiscal year 1980 enforcement

priorities. He expressed the need for State and local

enforcement authorities to assume a greater responsibility

for the investigation of cases where there is concurrent

Federal-State jurisdiction. In acknowledging that State

and local authorities are quite capable of investigating

many of these cases, the Attorney General called upon

them to take a greater share of the workload.

In attempting to mobilize resources for drug enforcement, DEA has primary responsibility for coordinating

Federal drug efforts with those mounted by State and local

governments. This activity is to promote the apprehension,

prosecution, and sentencing of drug violators.

127
Over the years the Federal Government has sought to

strengthen State and local enforcement agencies and more

fully utilize their potential through several mechanisms.

LEAA grants have supported State and local drug enforcement activities, while LEAA and DEA have jointly funded

Federal, State, and local task forces aimed at disrupting

lower and mid-level drug traffic. From Fiscal Year 1972

through fiscal year 1977, LEAA awarded about $108 million

in grants for State and local drug enforcement. In addition to these programs, DEA provides a variety of services

to State and local agencies, including the training of

police officers, analysis of drug evidence, and exchange

of intelligence through DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center.

In commenting on this report, the Department of Justice

noted that DEA has taken several steps to enhance the

Attorney General's policy of encouraging more self-reliance

by State and local law enforcement agencies. DEA no longer

funds most of the salaries of participating police officers in

task forces as it did previously. Also, all new task forces

will have a 3-year life span, unless a justification is

recognized for continuance, and all existing task forces will

be evaluated each year for decisions on continuance.

FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL REALITIES

MAKE MOBILIZATION UNREALISTIC

As the Federal drug strategy has pinpointed the need

for better liaison among Federal, State, and local authorities, it has also become increasingly clear that certain

realities prevent a totally unified approach. Financial

resources have not kept pace with drug enforcement needs,

and the effectiveness of agencies' activities has been

hampered by security risks, political struggles, differing

priorities, and lack of communication.

Enforcement resources decreasing

The irony of Federal drug enforcement, according to

the 1976 Federal Strategy For Drug Abuse And Drug Traffic

Prevention, is that, while there is more and more dependence on State and local involvement in drug law enforcement,

"State and local authorities are allocating fewer and fewer

resources to combatting drug abuse." The Strategy Council's

report further found that "over the past few years many

States and most major metropolitan areas have actually reduced the funding of enforcement programs, drug law enforcement particularly." Our recent work in major cities showed

much of the same:

128
--The Chief Assistant State Attorney for Dade County

(Miami) believes law enforcement is both "outmanned

and outgunned" to deal with the drug problem. He

cited a recent case involving a wiretap that could

have resulted in apprehension of many more highlevel violators. It was curtailed because the

police ran out of money.

-- In New York City, the recent financial crisis resulted in the layoff of 5,000 police officers.

According to the chief of NYPD's narcotics division,

the cutbacks affected drug enforcement just as they

affected other types of police work.

-- There have been recent cuts in drug enforcement

activity in San Francisco, and, according to the

head of the police department's narcotics unit,

only 20 officers are working narcotics presently,

down from 60 officers at one time. This is despite

the fact that drug activity does not appear to have

decreased in the city.

-- The narcotics division of the Phoenix Police Department has refused to join a multiagency task force

in the city. The head of the unit stated he cannot

give up one or more officers to the task force when

he is struggling to get more resources to satisfy

the division's own responsibilities.

-- A 1977 survey by the California Department of

Justice showed that 77 percent of local police

agencies in the State indicated they do not have

adequate equipment for drug enforcement. An assesment by the same department in 1976 concluded that

"local agency commitments to drug enforcement have

declined while drug abuse is increasing."

Local police agencies in the past increased their

commitment to drug enforcement through LEAA grant funds.

Even these funds, however, have declined substantially,

due both to reduced Federal outlays and changing local

priorities. The following table shows that although total

LEAA appropriations increased by 8 percent from fiscal year

1972 to fiscal year 1977, LEAA grants used for drug law

enforcement declined 79 percent.

129
Percent

Changed

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 72-77

(in millions of dollars)

Total LEAA

Appropriations $ 699 856 871 887 810 753 + 8

LEAA Funds Used For

Drug Law Enforcement

Block Grants $13.3 14.0 11.1 9.9 6.9 1.5

Discretionary Grants $10.2 9.0 10.2 11.5 7.0 3.5

Total $23.5 23.0 21.3 21.4 13.9 5.0 -79

For fiscal year 1978, LEAA had no program for assisting State and local drug enforcement activities. According to an LEAA official, drug enforcement programs in the

agency are "a thing of the past." Multiagency task forces

formerly funded by LEAA are now being supported directly by

DEA in the amount of about $7 million in fiscal year 1978.

A DEA program that assigned agents to LEAA regional offices

in order to provide drug enforcement expertise was discontinued when LEAA closed its regional offices in 1977.

With LEAA funds for drug enforcement declining, many

State and local agencies have terminated their projects.

The previously mentioned California Justice Department

study found that, as Federal grants have been terminated,

the agencies that had received the grants were forced to

discontinue the programs rather than absorb them in their

own budgets. Specialized drug enforcement units, the

study explained, are "luxuries that cannot be afforded on

tight fiscal budgets." This is evidently the case nationwide, as the 1976 Federal drug strategy concluded that

"many promising State and local programs originally funded

through LEAA start-up funding were terminated because

State and local jurisdictions have chosen not to absorb

these programs in their budgets."

Political, jurisdictional, and other

obstacles hinder coordination

It is a sad fact that no matter how many programs are

developed and no matter how much assistance the Federal

Government provides, certain obstacles will continue to

block complete mobilization of the estimated 15,000 Federal,

State, and local agencies throughout the country. These

130
obstacles occur in the form of political, jurisdictional,

and other realities that, while not exclusive to drug

enforcement, seem more visible there because responsibilities

for drug control cut across all three levels of government.

A good example of a political reality can be seen in

Arizona, where two State agencies have been struggling for

several years to gain exclusive drug enforcement authority

in the State. Other local agencies have either taken sides

in the debate or have remained neutral, some even choosing not to participate in a narcotics intelligence system

developed by one of the State agencies. Several officials

in Arizona believe the conflict has hampered drug enforcement, but, whatever the case, such a situation is not in

the best interest of cooperative drug enforcement.

In a populous county in California, we found drug enforcement to be fragmented, duplicative, and inefficient

during our visits in 1977. The county has 24 municipal

and county police departments, each engaging in drug law

enforcement to some degree. Although an ad hoc task force

was organized in 1970 to coordinate drug enforcement

activities, the multitude of jurisdictions has resulted

in duplicated efforts. Also, jurisdictional jealousies

and local politics have prevented agencies from combining

their resources to mount a countywide attack on illegal

drugs.

In another case, a DEA task force in California was

terminated in 1975 due to lack of LEAA funds, but also because of security leaks by some local agents. This made

it difficult to achieve the confidence necessary to engage

in such sensitive work. According to one DEA official,

corruption has been a big problem in working with local

police on other task forces as well.

FIRM AND CLEAR POLICY REQUIRED

FOR STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE

Perhaps more than any other type of law enforcement,

drug enforcement cuts across all three levels of government--

Federal, State, and local. With many agencies performing

similar activities across the country, it is essential that

the roles of the Federal versus State and local activities

be clearly defined by the Attorney General with the advice

of DEA, the agency designated to take the lead in coordinating enforcement activities. Training local police, providing

laboratory support, furnishing technical equipment, and

sharing intelligence all seem to be appropriate and helpful

131
uses of Federal drug enforcement resources, but the line

must be drawn when it comes to using Federal resources to

combat strictly local drug problems, as has been done in

some DEA task force operations.

Of all the ways that DEA cooperates with and assists

State and local drug enforcement, the task force program

is probably the most direct, because it involves working

on joint enforcement actions. When originally organized

by the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement in 1972, the

joint Federal, State, and local task forces were to concentrate their efforts on street-level heroin traffickers

while BNDD, and later DEA, attacked the higher-level

violators. In 1975, DEA issued a policy encouraging task

forces to target higher-level violators. According to

DEA, there are now 21 DEA task forces operating across the

country, involving about 70 DEA agents, with divergent

goals and varying degrees of effectiveness.

The Department of Justice stated in its comments on

this report that the mission of the task forces has evolved

to target violators on the basis of the geographic needs

of the task force area, which are generally higher than

the original scope of the program. This level is dependent

on the problem within a community. Justice said the quality

of task force cases has been steadily improving while the

number of arrests has declined, and this means that task

force resources are successfully being directed towards

a higher level of the drug traffic. In the 6-month period

that ended December 1977, 13 percent of the task force

arrests were Class I cases (higher-level violators), and

55 percent were Class IV cases (lower-level violators).

In a more recent 6-month period ending December 1978,

18 percent of the task force arrests were Class I cases,

and 42 percent were Class IV.

In Los Angeles, the DEA task force is an ad hoc sort

of operation, bringing together selected officers from

four agencies only after high-level traffickers have been

targeted. The task force in San Diego, in contrast, is

comprised of DEA agents together with the full narcotic

units of the city and county police agencies. They work

all levels of the drug traffic, from citizens' marijuana

complaints to high-level heroin trafficking organizations.

In New York, the task force is a permanent drug enforcement unit consisting of officers assigned from the New York

Police Department, DEA, and the New York State Po:Lice.

Created to fill a void between DEA's international efforts

132
and the police street activities, the task force works both

high and middle-level traffickers. The Reno, Nevada, task

force, on the other hand, has involved only DEA and State

enforcement officers and works lower-level drug violators

for the most part. Although operations of task forces vary

considerably throughout the country, it appears that they

have generally focused on lower level violators (i.e.,

Class III and IV) than DEA does in its own activities.

Even though DEA administers numerous programs to improve State and local enforcement capabilities, it does

not have a firm, definitive policy on State and local

assistance. Ideally, enforcement activities between DEA

and State and local agencies should be conducted at a

level where results are beneficial to all participants.

This level will vary among-locations, but the benefits

that should be received in all locales are the same:

training of officers, exchange of intelligence, and immobilization of drug traffickers. In no case, however, should

joint enforcement activities mean that DEA's scarce

resources be reduced to working the lowest levels of the

drug traffic. This is, and should remain, the sole responsibility of State and local police.

In August 1977 President Carter addressed the issue of

the appropriate Federal, State, and local drug enforcement

roles. He said:

"For nearly a decade, Federal support of State and

local enforcement activity has steadily expanded.

The time is ripe to evaluate the results of this

effort, to determine whether Federal participation

should be altered, and to determine the proper

division of responsibility between Federal and

local officials."

We agree with the need for such an evaluation and further

believe that, on the basis of such an evaluation, a firm

policy should be established to guide Federal efforts to

cooperate with and assist State and local authorities.

CONCLUSIONS

DEA has undertaken numerous programs to upgrade the

capabilities of, and cooperate with, State and local drug

enforcement agencies. However, the problems in doing this

are formidable, and it is not likely that mobilization of

the enormous potential of State and local enforcement resources will occur. In light of this, it is important that

133
the Attorney General establish a clear, realistic policy on

what the Federal Government can reasonably expect from State

and local agencies, recognizing the differences among agencies

yet not compromising its own standards and objectives. The

Federal role should additionally discourage the direct

involvement in enforcement actions directed at low-level

violators, so that DEA is not diverted from its very

difficult task of investigating large-scale trafficking

organizations.

RECOMMENDATION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

We recommend that the Attorney General, with assistance

from DEA, determine the appropriate division of responsibility between Federal and State and local drug enforcement

agencies. On the basis of this determination, a specific

policy should be developed concerning DEA's role in cooperating

with and assisting State and local drug enforcement efforts.

Such a role should provide for such things as training,

exchanging intelligence, and furnishing technical equipment,

but should discourage Federal involvement in actions against

low-level violators. The policy should take into consideration the adverse effects of financial and political realities

that have always hindered cooperation among agencies.

134
CHAPTER 8

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

Formal written comment on our report was requested

from eight Federal Government organizations having direct

supportive responsibilities for activities discussed in

this report. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

and Federal Judicial Center offered no specific comments

on the report. (See apps. IV and V.) The Department of

Health, Education, and Welfare and its National Institute

of Drug Abuse reviewed data in the report on the demand

for illicit drugs and saw no need for any revisions. (See

app. VI.) The response from the Department of the Treasury

said the Department and IRS were in substantial agreement

with the statements and conclusions made in the report, but

the response was received too late for us to include an

evaluation of it in the report. (See app. XI.) The specific

comments on the other four organizations are presented in

appendixes VII through X. Our evaluation of these comments

is discussed below.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Central Intelligence Agency said our report is

probably the most comprehensive and authoritative statement

of the problem it has seen. The CIA agrees with our observation that the conditions in narcotics-producing countries

(i.e., ineffectiveness of crop substitution programs, corruption, socioeconomic effects, etc.) are too complex for an

approach that is oriented toward law enforcement and too much

for the United States to overcome alone. It said that the

various agencies in the narcotics field have been working

with insufficient intelligence and that even with sufficient

intelligence there is not too much one can do overall against

the problem.

The CIA said that almost all Federal agencies engaged

in the narcotics field are paying more attention to the financial aspects of narcotics and have instituted vigorous

programs to overcome past deficiencies. We believe that our

presentation on pages 83 to 111 fully recognizes the accomplishments of the agencies in this area. However, in our

opinion, much more must be done.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Department of State said our report does a creditable

job in assessing the last 10 years of Federal Government

135
efforts to control illegal drug supplies. The Department

concurred wholeheartedly with our assessment of the drug

abuse problem and general recommendations to address the

problems. There were, however, several areas in the report

which the Department characterized as either misleading,

erroneous, or disappointing. Specifically, these areas included tenor and tone of the report, exaggerated role of law

enforcement or understatement of other supply reduction

efforts, understatement of successes, and certain

recommendations.

In our view, the Department's difficulties with the

report stem primarily from a perspective that difEers

from our own. Certainly, when one compares the state of

international narcotics control 10 years ago to that which

exists today, it becomes clear that a great deal of progress

has taken place as a result of U. S. support and increasing

foreign support of supply reduction efforts, such as law

enforcement, eradication programs, treaties, and crop

substitution. As we pointed out in chapter 2, these are

gains for which the domestic and international narcotics

control efforts can justifiably take credit. However, as

stated on page 37, progress has been modest when viewed in

terms of the enormous worldwide drug problem and the conditions that must exist if cultivation and trafficking are

to be substantially reduced.

The Department's comments implied that the Federal

strategy was not intended to have a significant impact on

the overall drug problems but to restrict the use of the

most deleterious and heinous drugs. The Department

points out that supply reduction efforts have had a

significant impact on the availability of heroin, the

priority drug in the Federal strategy. Consistent with

this viewpoint, the Department believes that our report

does not adequately recognize this accomplishment, stating

also that it is misleading to lump all drug use into one

category. It stated that perhaps the report is asking more

from the supply reduction strategy than it was intended

to deliver.

The stated objective of the current Federal strategy

is to discourage all drug abuse and to reduce to a

minimum the health and social consequence of drug abuse

when it does occur. The purpose of our report was to

show that drug abuse and trafficking still flourish

despite decades of U.S. efforts to overcome the problem.

In our opinion, supply reduction efforts have not had a

lasting and significant impact on the overall consumption

of illicit drugs.

136
We recognize that the Federal strategy has set priorities

by drug type, with heroin as the number one priority. We

in no way want to downplay the recent success and progress

that has been achieved with this drug, and page 17 clearly

presents the reported gains in reducing heroin availability

and heroin-related deaths and injuries. However, in our

opinion, the tremendous quantities and widespread availability

of illicit drugs, including heroin, attest to the crisis at

hand.

The magnitude of illicit drug consumption in the United

States is enormous, and a continuing trend of great concern

is the increasing level of drug use among young people.

Huge quantities of heroin are still entering the country

(pp. 19 and 150), many heroin addicts are shifting to

synthetic drugs as heroin availability declines (p. 20),

tremendous quantities of legal drugs are being diverted to

illegal use at the retail level (p. 29), abuse of PCP has

reached alarming proportions in some major cities (p. 20),

and use of cocaine and marijuana continue to increase throughout

the country (p. 21, 28, 152, and 153).

Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether the

reported gains in reducing heroin availability can be

maintained. In our opinion, the Nation's experience has

shown such benefits to be temporary and regional in

nature.

The Department feels our report leaves the reader with

a sense of futility and frustration over the possibility

of ever being successful. It believes progress has been

made and that the Nation has begun to have greater success

in supply reduction. When one considers the amount of

money and effort spent to curtail drug abuse and looks

at the current drug abuse situation, a realistic assessment

of the country's demonstrated ability to correct the problem

would necessarily be pessimistic.

The report points out that the social, economic, and

political realities of drug-growing countries make it highly

unlikely that illicit drug supplies will be permanently

reduced. In fact, the Department also recognizes that

long lasting success will require an extremely expensive

and long range program that faces many difficulties. As

stated on page 35, increased commitment of developed countries

is needed for greater impact on the problem. Action by

the United States alone will not do.

137
The Department of State expressed concern that the report

is implying that law enforcement alone has more immediate

results and therefore may be superior to other supply reduction efforts. The Department believes that the only

viable long-term approach to reducing the availability of

illicit substances is crop eradication coupled with

enforcement and income substitution.

We do not agree that the report indicates that law

enforcement alone has more immediate results and therefore

may be superior to other supply reduction efforts. At

no point do we indicate that law enforcement by itself

will achieve the desired impact on drug supplies. On the

contrary, we agree that it will take a combined effort

from the affected countries to achieve the desired objective of effectively reducing drug availability. Yet, as

our report points out, there is only one drug-producing

country where each of the vital components--crop eradication,

law enforcement, and income substitution--are in operation,

and even in this country they have achieved only modest

results. Further, the social, political, and economic

conditions in this country and foreign countries make it

unlikely that they can be applied extensively enough to

achieve the long range objectives.

Our conclusion stems from analyzing the short and longterm impacts of each major supply reduction strategy element.

Our report recognizes that crop eradication coupled with

law enforcement efforts has prevented a significant amount

of heroin from reaching the United States. Although limited

to Mexico, the importance of aerial eradication using herbicides is obvious when, according to DEA, these efforts have

destroyed an equivalent of over 17 times the amount of

heroin seized domestically.

Yet we recognize that eradication successes are likely

to be temporary unless growers are provided with alternative

sources of income--but this has not occurred in Mexico

or in any producing country. Crop substitution has not

advanced beyond the demonstration stages. Long-term rural

development requires many skills, much expertise, and massive

expenditures of funds over decades. It is highly unlikely

that the United States would be willing to bear the cost

of such a program.

Regarding law enforcement, we clearly state cn page 31

that the realities in producing countries are too complex

for a predominately law enforcement approach to be effective,

and on page 35 we state that law enforcement.has not had

138
a lasting effect on overall drug availability and trafficking.

While its impact is limited, we also recognize that law enforcement is a necessary ingredient to achieve the shortand long-term objectives in the eradication and crop substitution programs and in other United States and host country

operations.

The Department believes that the important lessons

learned from the successful experiences in Turkey and

Mexico have been understated in our report and that the

international program, under the direction of the State

Department, was chiefly responsible for these successes.

We believe that U.S. assistance across the board was

critical. While our report does not attempt to establish

which Federal agency, program, or foreign government produced the most impressive results, it recognizes the importance of U.S. assistance and the impact that the foreign

cooperative effort in Turkey and Mexico has had on drug

trafficking and availability.

Both history and the opinion of many persons involved

in supply reduction efforts show that while these successes

have impeded trafficking and reduced illicit drug production,

ample supplies continue to exist. Traffickers have taken

advantage of these supplies to meet demand.

On page 65 we recommend that the Department prepare

comprehensive country and regional narcotics action plans

to be used in carrying out and evaluating its drug programs.

The Department believes that the necessary steps have

been taken to comply with this recommendation. According

to the Department, it is currently using a variety of

documents to accomplish this goal.

The Department should be credited for initiating these

planning efforts. However, it is too early to tell whether

the intent of our recommendation will be achieved. For

example, discussions with INM officials in July 1979 indicate

that key planning documents involving the major countries

entering into bilateral project agreements may not be fully

operational until mid-1980. The PROW/AG, which outlines

goals, objectives, indicators of success, the implementation

schedule, and budget/resource requirements is not expected

to be in place until January 1980.

Further, INM has not yet received any Narcotics Assessment and Strategy Statements (NASPs), which are the first

step in the Department's country programming process. NASP

139
is a critical element since it is a collective effort involving the Mission, the host country, and other sources and is

intended to provide a detailed analysis of a country's narcotics environment, as well as to outline a strategy for

changing conditions within a country. Development of NASPs

for seven countries is required by March 1980.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The Department of Justice agrees with our assessment

of the magnitude of the worldwide narcotics traffic, the

enormous profit associated with this criminal activity,

and the long-standing problems that have impeded Government

efforts in reducing the supply of illegal drugs. The Department also agrees that all branches of the Government--

executive, legislative and judicial--need to take actions

to strengthen our Nation's supply reduction efforts. The

Department believes, however, that some of our findings

were based on past performance, outdated information, and

misinterpretations and that the report tended to depict

a negative view which does little to display the positive

accomplishments the Government has made in reducing the

supply of illegal drugs.

What the Department perceives as a negative view in our

report is, in our opinion, a frank assessment of the Nation's

short-run success placed in perspective to the enormity and

long-term nature of the United States' drug problem. Historically, the Nation's experience with the drug problem

has shown that very real successes were, in the main, temporary and regional. For example, as pointed out on

page 17, when the French-Turkish heroin connection was suppressed in the early 1970s, the number of heroin users

dropped dramatically during 1972 and 1973. This success led

to the President making cautious statements about "turning

the corner on drug abuse." This notion became accepted

as fact by many in government and by most of the public

and the press.

It is not our intent to downplay the hard-won achievements and progress made over the last decade. Where appropriate we have updated the information in our report in

response to the Department's comments and fully recognize

the Government's accomplishments in reducing the supply of

illegal drugs. While we acknowledge that it is encouraging

that DEA's indicators point to a continual decline in

140
heroin availability since 1976, we are not ready to

conclude that this trend can be termed lasting. The

fact remains that, as stated on page 39, huge quantities

of heroin are still entering the country from Mexico.

Perhaps more disheartening, intelligence reports indicate

that quantities of heroin from Southeast Asia and the

Middle East are increasing and eroding the gains made in

recent years. The Federal community can point with

pride to lasting accomplishments in controlling diversion

at the manufacturing and wholesale levels. However, we

cannot close our eyes to the tremendous corresponding

diversion taking place at the retail level. We discuss

the retail diversion problem on page 106. Likewise, even

though availability of LSD has declined dramatically since

the 1960s, we must be realistic and acknowledge that equally

devastating drugs, such as PCP, are increasing in use. As

pointed out on page 20, abuse of PCP has recently reached

alarming proportions in several major cities. Furthermore,

the increasing consumption of cocaine and marijuana, even

though these drugs are reputed to be less injurious, are'

of concern and attest to the lasting nature of the U.S.

drug abuse problem.

The Department expressed concern that the report is

minimizing the importance of successes against producing

centers and trafficking routes. On the contrary, in chapter

2 the report highlights such successes. Moreover, on page

36, our report cites the importance of effective law enforcement, crop eradication, and other controls in buying time to

The Department, while recognizing that there have been

problems in the past, believes that cooperation among concerned agencies has improved dramatically and is better and

more effective now than it has ever been. According to the

Department, the isolated problems that continue are insignificant and do not have a major impact on total drug enforcement.

It feels that our report does not address the very positive

cooperative activities currently taking place.

The Department rightfully points out that there have

been some recent accomplishments as a result of DEA/FBI activities and that our report draft fails to mention the

multiorganization cooperative venture of the E1l Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). We have added these to the report.

However, our report draft did recognize the establishment

141
of the joint DEA/FBI investigation operations, the enforcement actions of DEA, Customs, and the Coast Guard in the

Southeastern United States, and the implementation of IRS'

High Level Drug Leaders Tax Enforcement Project in cooperation with DEA.

Improvements in cooperation taken by the agencies fail

to address the basic reasons that have prevented them from

achieving a truly coordinated program. As pointed out on

page 32 and discussed in detail in chapter 5, legal

obstacles, lack of expertise, little overall direction,

and changing priorities have prevented Federal agencies

from fully using and coordinating their unique skills,

jurisdictions, and resources.

Neither the FBI nor the IRS have played key roles in

investigating the financial and organized crime aspects

of drug trafficking as envisioned by Federal drug strategies.

Attempts to improve cooperation among agencies involved

in border enforcement have, historically, done little to

improve overall effectiveness or solve the long-term border

control problem. (See p. 33.) The essential characteristic of the problem remains: Federal agencies with separate

statutory responsibilities but similar lines of effort

still identify the best means to meet their specific mission

with limited consideration for overall border security.

In commenting on the report, the Department said that

the FBI does not have primary investigative jurisdiction

under Federal law to investigate narcotics violations.

It currently provides support to DEA by (1) making available

to the appropiate Federal, State, and local agencies certain

of the FBI's centralized services, (2) debriefing FBI

sources, subjects, and informants and disseminating this

information to appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies,

and (3) providing investigative support. While we are aware

that the FBI has been providing information to DEA, as well

as to State and local agencies, we did not focus on this

aspect of cooperation in our report because our concern

lies with the extent of investigative support provided

by the FBI. Although we recognize the FBI does not have

primary investigative jurisdiction to investigate narcotics

violations, as previously mentioned, Reorganization Plan

No. 2 of 1973 envisioned that the FBI would have a key

role in this area. In this regard, the FBI's investigative support has increased in recent years, but the FBI has

still not played a key role in immobilizing major drug

142
traffickers. Therefore, we believe Justice should actively

seek additional means for using the FBI's expertise in

investigating the financial and organized crime aspects of

drug trafficking.

Justice takes exception to our use of statements by

some State Department officials that DEA presence in foreign

countries was objectionable. They said that these statements

contrast sharply with testimony given during congressional

hearings on this subject by top level State Department representatives. These representatives strongly supported

the need for DEA agents overseas.

It is not the intent of our report presentation to imply

that DEA presence in a foreign country is undesirable. Rather,

our purpose is to show that there are differing views on the

subject, and certain revisions have been made in the report

to more clearly show this. We believe that law enforcement

will always have a major role in drug control overseas.

Indeed, on page 55 we discuss the importance of a strong DEA

role in foreign countries around the world.

The Department disagrees with our conclusion that DEA

is not yet proficient in investigating major interstate

and international drug violators. As evidence of this

disagreement, the Department states there has been a significant increase in specialized training in conspiracies,

Conspiracy Units have been established in some regions,

and the Central Tactical Unit (CENTAC) program has concentrated on conspiracy investigations.

While we agree that emphasis on drug conspiracy cases

in DEA has increased during the last few years, we question

the depth and extent of this commitment. For example, the

Conspiracy Units mentioned were, at the time of our review,

limited to the Eastern and Southern judicial districts

of New York--units that were active long before conspiracy

gained wide acceptance as a productive drug enforcement

tool. Though other units had been organized elsewhere,

they have since been disbanded.

We recognize that CENTAC units concentrating upon conspiracy investigations have been established, and these units

have achieved some notable successes. However, they constitute only a small percentage of DEA's enforcement resources

and therefore do not represent a significant commitment to

conspiracy-type investigations.

143
DEA's efforts to provide conspiracy training to most of

its agents constitute a good start, but the buy/bust attitude

continues in many locales, and additional training in the

complexities of drug finances has not been accomplished

to the extent necessary. As we stated on page 87,

less than 10 percent of the agents who received conspiracy

training were given instruction in conducting financial

investigations. Even then, the additional training was

elementary compared to the complexities of performing such

investigations.

The Department also feels that the report fails to give

recognition to successful conspiracy investigations that

have had national and international impact. It specifically

cited the Nicky Barnes, Jose Valenzuela, and Hell's Angels

conspiracy cases. We disagree. On page 86 we specifically

recognize the Nicky Barnes and Jose Valenzuela cases as

representing highly successful conspiracy cases. The Hell's

Angels indictments were issued after our draft report was

submitted for comment. The success of this case must await

the results of trials._

The Department does not agree that all of the items that

we categorized as deficiencies in the Controlled Substances

Unit (CSU) program represented weaknesses in the program.

Specifically, the assignment of new personnel, or assignments

of personnel for short periods to CSUs, is not, in the Department's opinion, necessarily counterproductive to an effective

program. The Department also believes it is not entirely

inappropriate for CSUs to handle all kinds of narcotics

cases, including the small ones, since this may be necessary

for developing expertise, identifying witnesses, or obtaining

leads.

Our report does not characterize the varying operating

commitments and practices of CSUs as deficiencies, but rather

we attributed these variances to a lack of clear policy

regarding CSU and lack of Department of Justice control over

drug prosecutions. We recommend several alternatives to

improve CSU activities. The Department agrees with the need

for improvement. Specifically, it believes that one of our

alternatives--increased Department of Justice control over

CSUs--can be accomplished and would be helpful in improving

CSU operations.

144
The Department believes that the restrictions on IRS

involvement in drug enforcement are unacceptable. According

to the Department, both the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and IRS

internal policy interpretations have impeded Federal investigations from receiving the financial information that lies

at the heart of almost all significant enforcement efforts.

This issue was thoroughly discussed in our March 1979 report

on the disclosure and summons provisions of the Tax Reform

Act, in which we stated our belief that it had not yet been

determined whether these restrictions were intolerable.

If the Department can document cases where delays have

caused adverse effects, it should provide them to the

Congress for its consideration.

The Department disagrees with our conclusion that

the results of efforts to achieve international assistance

against traffickers have been disappointing. What we fail

to recognize, according to the Department, is that accomplishments have been made despite the difficulties in

dealing with human behavior and national interests. We

did not intend this report segment to be an indictment

of all international enforcement efforts. Rather, we

state only that techniques such as extradition and JANUS

have been ineffective in prosecuting traffickers. In

chapter 3 of the report we point out in more detail some

successes made through cooperative enforcement efforts

between the United States and foreign countries.

In commenting on our recommendation that the Attorney

General direct the DEA Administrator to improve investigative capability against trafficker's financial resources

by training DEA agents and hiring financial specialists,

the Department notes that DEA agents have been sensitized

to the potential of financial investigation through various

briefing sessions and workshops, and training courses

and seminars have been scheduled for the future.

We recognize that DEA has taken actions to familiarize

its agents with financial investigative techniques. However,

we question whether these training sessions will be sufficient

for DEA to attain proficiency in attacking the financial

resources of traffickers. Financial investigations are the

most complex of conspiracy cases, requiring very sophisticated

investigative skills not traditionally associated with drug

enforcement. But DEA's agents typically do not have financial

backgrounds, which would require far more training in financial

analysis than that currently being provided. For DEA to

145
develop the ability to conduct complex financial analysis

(e.g., tracing funds through foreign bank accounts or examining financial transactions of legitimate businesses used for

laundering funds), we believe it will be necessary for the

Administrator to hire specialists who already have the

necessary financial background.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

The Department of Transportation takes exception to our

statement that drug supply reduction efforts have yet to

achieve a well-integrated, balanced, and truly coordinated

approach. The Departement believes our report does not

recognize the high level of interagency cooperation that

has emerged over the past year, and that the accomplishments

attendant to this cooperative effort are either not recognized or are described as temporary in nature.

The Department did not specify how interagency cooperation has improved over the past year or the accomplishments

which resulted from these increased efforts. Page 66

recognizes various joint efforts including that of the

Coast Guard, DEA, and Customs in the South Florida-Caribbean

area. We have seen no new evidence that recent improvements

in cooperation address the basic reasons why the involved

agencies have not successfully realized a truly coordinated

program.

As pointed out on page 33 and discussed in detail in

chapter 5, legal obstacles, lack of expertise, little overall

direction, and changing priorities have prevented Federal

agencies from fully using and coordinating their unique

skills, jurisdictions, and resources. And, as pointed out

on page 81, attempts to improve cooperation among agencies

involved in border enforcement have historically done little

to improve overall effectiveness or solve the long-term

border control problem.

The Department also expresses concern that our report

does not recognize maritime smuggling threats outside of

the southeastern region of the United States. Our intention

is to demonstrate that the U.S. border has not been a serious

impediment to illegal entry of drugs. Although we realize

that maritime smuggling occurs in many parts of of the country,

we believe that by focusing on the major smuggling areas we

can best portray the seriousness of the problem and the

need for corrective action.

146
In this regard, we have noted that drug smuggling from

South America has become a major business in the Southeastern

United States in recent years, particularly in Florida. A

previous report 1/ issued by our office showed that approximately 85 to 90 percent of the Coast Guard's drug interdictions were made at its 7th and 8th districts, headquartered

in Miami, Florida, and New Orleans, Louisiana, respectively,

with most of the contraband seized in those districts

coming from Colombia.

The threat of smuggling in other areas does, however,

serve to illustrate the ease with which drug traffickers

shift their operations in response to increased enforcement--

a basic theme presented in our report.

1/"The Coast Guard's Role in Drug Interception--How Much

Is Enough?" (CED-79-40, Feb. 12, 1979).

147
CHAPTER 9

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review assessed the impact that drug supply

reduction efforts, both domestic and international, have

had on the U.S. drug abuse problem. We analyzed the progress and problems of key elements of the Federal strategy,

including the activities and programs of agencies and organizations having direct, indirect, and supporting responsibilities for domestic drug law enforcement and international

drug control.

We reviewed policies, procedures, practices, correspondence, and documentation relating to each strategy

element. Extensive reliance was placed on congressional

reports and testimony, executive branch studies, and

past reports of our office. A list of our past reports

on drug control and other related topics is included in

this report as appendix III, p. 161.

Data was compiled regarding drug use trends, drug

production and transshipping estimates, drug seizures and

removals, arrests of traffickers, the length of sentences,

and other relevant factors. Additionally, we held discussions with numerous knowledgable officials throughout the

United States and abroad representing involved organizations at the local, State, Federal, and international levels.

Locations Visited

Work for the review was performed at:

--DEA, Department of Justice, Internal Revenue

Service (IRS), U.S. Customs Service, Department of State headquarters in Washington, D.C.

-- Various DEA district or regional offices, U.S.

attorney's offices, State narcotics agencies,

and local police departments in Los Angeles,

NewYork, Chicago, Miami, San Francisco,

Detroit., San Diego, Phoenix, and Reno.

--U.S. Embassy and host government offices in

Mexico, Thailand, Burma, and Hong Kong,

including visits to a crop substitution

project in northern Thailand and to crop

eradication projects in Oaxaca and

Chilpancingo, Mexico.

-- The United Nations Fund For Drug Abuse

Control, Geneva, Switzerland.

148
APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

EXTENT AND COSTS

OF THE DRUG PROBLEM

The magnitude of illicit drug consumption in the United States is enormous. An estimated 453,000 Americans

use heroin daily, nearly 10 million have used cocaine,

and 43 million have tried marijuana. In addition, a continuing trend of great concern is the increasing level of

drug use among young people.

Illegal drug sales in the United States have become a

multibillion dollar business, with the payments by users

and traffickers for heroin, cocaine, marijuana, hashish, and

other dangerous drugs estimated to be between 435 billion

and $51 billion annually. The U.S. economy is directly

affected by these large sums of money, which help to corrupt

legitimate businesses and expand opportunities for organized

crime. Moreover, much of the illegal profits flow out of

the country, contributing to balance of payments problems

as well.

Needless to say, the cost of drug abuse to individuals

and society is staggering. Although it is difficult to

precisely measure, estimates of social cost range from

$10 billion to $14 billion annually. These figures include the costs of law enforcement, medical treatment,

absenteeism, and nondrug crime, but do not account for the

social toll in terms of broken homes, ruined lives, and

other human suffering.

The total list of substances abused by Americans is

extensive, and in this appendix we discuss four of the

major illegal drugs: heroin, PCP, cocaine, and marijuana.

These drugs appear to be prone to abuse, have some of the

most serious effects, are commonly known in today's society,

and are used,by large numbers of people. Although the

abuse of legal drugs such as amphetamines and barbiturates

is equally serious, and some say more widespread, we have

not discussed these drugs here. The diversion of these

drugs is the subject of a 1978 GAO report 1/ capsulized

in chapter 5 of this study.

l/"Retail Diversion of Legal Drugs--A Major Problem

With No Easy Solution" (GGD-78-22, Mar. 10, 1978).

149
APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

In assessing the use, availability, and cost of the

four drugs, we found it necessary to rely extensively on

previous studies and data compiled by ODAP, NIDA, and

DEA. 1/

HEROIN

Heroin is the most potent pain-relieving derivative of

morphine, creating a very intense euphoric effect that makes

the drug the most favored among addicts. Recent data indicates that an average of 453,000 people use heroin on a

daily basis in the United States, while about 1.7 million

use the drug on less than a daily basis. In addition,

there are approximately 111,000 heroin users receiving

treatment throughout the country. All of this use amounts

to an estimated annual consumption of 9.4 tons, costing almost $18 billion. DEA's heroin identification system shows

that 65 percent of the drug comes from Mexico, with most of

the remainder originating in Southeast Asia.

According to DEA, the purity of heroin has declined

from 6.6 percent in the first quarter of calendar year 1976

to 4.2 percent in the third quarter of 1978. The price per

milligram of pure heroin has risen in the same time period

from $1.26 to $1.96. This increase in price and decrease

in purity is significant, because it is generally believed

to reflect a decline in heroin availability brought about

by international and domestic control efftorts. Thus tewer

heroin users can obtain the drug, and fewer new people are

initiated into its use.

Nationwide, the number of heroin-related deaths declined considerably from 1976 to 1977, decreasing 59 percent

from 1,875 to 770. At the same time, heroin injuries went

from 12,368 in 1976 to 7,750 in 1977, a 37-percent decrease.

This downward trend in hospital visits and in the number of

deaths implies either that tewer people are using heroin because of its low quality and high cost or that the same number

of people are using it, but tewer experience negative

1/While the data presented in this appendix was derived

from DEA and NIDA systems, this should not be construed

as an endorsement by our office of these systems. Our

office currently has a study underway to evaluate certain

indicators used in monitoring supply reduction effectiveness.

150
APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

health consequences. The data strongly suggests that the

heroin problem is either stabilizing or decreasing.

PCP

PCP (Phencyclidine), approved for use as an animal

tranquilizer, has become a major drug of abuse among young

people today. Though its effects on humans are unpredictable, it can cause severe and long-lasting behavioral

problems with effects ranging from mental dullness and misperceptions to paranoia, psychosis, hostility, and violence.

Its use can cause death either directly by overdose or indirectly through violent behavior and accidents.

In a recent NIDA drug survey it was found that 6.9 million persons have used PCP at least once. Reported deaths

from PCP have risen by 18 percent, while hospital emergency

room visits have increased by over 88 percent in the past

year. Use of PCP by the 12-18 age group has doubled (up to

5.8 percent), and use by the 18-25 age group is up by

50 percent (up to 13.9 percent). According to DEA intelligence, all indications are that the use of this extremely

potent drug will continue to increase in the foreseeable

tuture.

DEA reports indicate that clandestine manufacturing

laboratories in the United States, which vary widely in

sophistication, account for the entire illicit supply of

PCP, with diversion of legally manufactured PCP veterinary

supplies being a negligible source of supply. The drug is

easy and inexpensive to make, and with the large demand

that exists, profits are high for manufacturers. The

common chemicals and equipment needed can be purchased

for a few hundred dollars, and using relatively unsophisticated techniques the manufacturer can convert his investment

into tens of thousands of dollars worth of PCP.

The greatest concentration of clandestine PCP laboratories has been documented in parts of California and in

Detroit, although during 1977 PCP labs were seized in almost every geographic area of the United States. DEA

believes that this, along with intelligence data, suggests

widespread manufacture and distribution of the drug all

over the country. The extent of the problem is turther illustrated by the fact that the number of PCP labs seized by

DEA has been dramatically increasing--there were 50 PCP

labs seized in 1977, compared to 22 in 1976 and 18 in 1975.

151
APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

MARIJUANA

The most widely used illicit drug, marijuana is

also the subject of much study and controversy. Ai-ter

four decades, efforts to discourage its use have not

been successful. According to NIDA, about 43 milllJon

Americans have tried marijuana, and about 16 million have

used it within the last month of its 1977 survey. It has

been estimated that 60,000 to 91,000 pounds of mar:Ljuana are

consumed every day, costing users anywhere from $13 to

$21 billion per year. Though most of it now comes from

Colombia, marijuana is also grown in Mexico, Thailand,

Jamaica, and the United States.

Since 1962, more and more people have used marijuana,

particularly young adults (18-25) and youths (12-17).

NIDA's statistics show that illicit use of marijuana between 1971 and 1977 increased more than 100 percent tor

those aged 12-17 and more than 50 percent for those 18-25.

By 1977, 60 percent of the young adults and 28 percent of

the youths surveyed by NIDA reported having used marijuana

at least once.

Over the years there has been a host of studies on

humans and animals as to the effects of marijuana. Some of

these studies have noted that marijuana users lose ambition

and drive, while in 1978 researchers tound that delta-9-THC,

1 of only about 360 known chemicals identified in marijuana,l/

reduced dominance and social competition in animals. At the

1977 International Symposium on Marijuana, 41 scientists

from 13 nations presented new research findings which, in

their view, linked the habitual use of marijuana with brain

deterioration, cancer, and harmful effects on human

reproduction.

Although marijuana is infrequently mentioned in medical

examiner and emergency room reports to the DAWN system, the

relationship between marijuana use and automobile driving

is cause for concern. Evidence continues to accumulate that

marijuana use at typically social levels impairs driving

ability and related skills. Since the diminution of

1/"A Review of the Cannabinoids in Cannabis Sativa L.," the

University of Mississippi Research Institute of Pharmaceutical Sciences, School of Pharmacy.

l5~2
APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

perception and other motor capabilities resulting from marijuana use may persist for several hours beyond the period

of apparent intoxication, individuals may attempt to drive

without realizing that their ability to do so is still

impaired.

COCAINE

The abuse of cocaine in the United States has become

increasingly popular in recent years despite its relatively

high cost. This popularity has created a $15-18 billion

annual market for the estimated 19-23 metric tons of the drug

that enter the United States each year. Nearly all of this

drug originates in Bolivia and Peru.

Although many believe cocaine to be a "safe" drug, it

is the most powerful natural stimulant known to man. The

effects of the drug are so intense that the cocaine user cannot deny himself of it, the result being repeated doses of

cocaine at short intervals. Consequences of continued use

have been associated with tactile hallucinations of animals

moving in the skin, or bugs or insects moving under the

skin. After-effects of cocaine abuse include headache, cardiac and respiratory disturbance, and a postdrug depression

characterized by indisposition to mental or physical exertion

and difficulty in concentration. These symptoms may be modified as a result of how the drug is taken, the quantity consumed, and the rate at which the drug is used. Cocaine has

the ability to constrict blood vessels and has a legitimate

use in the medical profession. When cocaine is used illicitly

and snorted repeatedly it can cause the destruction of the

nasal linings. Contrary to street lore, death sometimes

occurs when cocaine is snorted rather than injected.

In the past 2 years there has been a statistically

significant upward trend in cocaine use by young adults.

A nationwide survey in 1977 showed that nearly 1 in 5

persons aged 18-25 reported having used cocaine at least

once. From 1976 to 1977 there was a statistically significant 43-percent increase in the number of young adults who

reported using cocaine. Overall, the survey estimates that

nearly 10 million Americans have used cocaine at least once

in their lifetimes.

153
U.S. Drug Related Deaths by Substance 1976

Total: 9,407

NOTE: Percentages do not add to 100 percent because of rounding.

U.S. Drug Related Deaths by Substance

1977

Total: 7,807

Source: Drug Enforcement Administration

154
APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

U.S. Drug Related Injuries by Drug Mentions*

1976

Total: 160,102

NOTE:

=A mention refers to the specific drug or drugs reported per patient on a single visit. Percentages may not add to 100% because of rounding.

U.S. Drug Related Injuries by Drug Mentions*

1977

Total: 155,654

NOTE:

'A mention refers to the specific drug or drugs reported pr patient on a single visit. 'Percentages may not add to 100% because of rounding.

Source: Drug Enforcement Administration

155
APPENDIX II APPENI)IX II

PRICE/PURITY, ARREST, SEIZURE, AND

COURT DISPOSITION STATISTICS

Heroin price/purity, arrest, and drug seizure statistics are frequently viewed as indicators of progress and

results ot ettorts to reduce illicit drug supplies. These

figures, however, are difficult to interpret and are not

necessarily true measures of enforcement effectiveness.

Increased arrests, convictions, and seizures for instance,

can be due to increased trafficking and amounts available

rather than more effective law enforcement. Decreases in

these data, on the other hand, may be due to tactors such

as a change in investigative approach or successful crop

eradication ettorts. For example, DEA believes the 1977

decline in domestic heroin removals is probably indicative

of decreased heroin traffic resulting primarily trom the

destruction of Mexican opium poppies. Because of the inconclusiveness ot these statistics, caution should be used

when reviewing them.

156
APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

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157
APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

FEDERAL DRUG ARRESTS

Total Domestic And Foreign Arrests

1975 1976 1977 1978

(calendar years) (3 quarters)

Domestic Federal

and Cooperative

DEA 7,304 6,143 6,397 3,786

DEA/Other Federal 3,134 2,654 2,513 1,132

DEA/State & Local 6,906 4,181 4,592 2,952

17,344 12,978 13,502 7,870

DEA/Foreign

Cooperative 1,183 1,353 1,119 918

Total 18,527 14,331 14,621 8,788

DEA Court Dispositions

1973 1976 1977 1978

(calendar years) (3 quarters)

Federal Dispositions 3,785 6,416 5,116 4,748

% Convicted 82 85 84 86

% Acquitted/Dismissed 18 15 16 14

State Dispositions 479 1,334 1,095 1,430

% Convicted 84 82 82 86

% Acquitted/Dismissed 16 18 18 14

158
APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

DOMESTIC ARRESTS BY LEVEL OF VIOLATOR 1/

1975 1976 1977 1978

(calendar years) (3 quarters)

Level I Arrests

DEA 799 922 649 2/ 400

DEA Cooperative

(Other Federal/

State/local) 229 212 218 131

Total 1,028 1,134 867 531

Level II Arrests

DEA 696 730 546 2/ 314

DEA Cooperative

(Other Federal/

State/local) 249 216 207 130

Total 945 946 753 444

Level III Arrests

DEA 4,667 3,648 3,260 2,073

DEA Cooperative

(Other Federal/

State/Local) 3,759 2,694 1,982 1,595

Total 8,426 6,342 5,242 3,668

Level IV Arrests

DEA 1,140 843 1,942 999

DEA Cooperative

(Other Federal/

State/Local) 5,365 3,713 4,698 2,228

Total 6,505 4,556 6,640 3,227

NOTE: The above data is from DEA's Performance Measurement

System, and we have not performed any verification or

reconciliation of it. According to DEA, some of the arrest

data is preliminary.

l/DEA's G-DEP System classifies drug violators by four

categories, Level I being the highest type of violator,

and Level IV being the lowest.

2/DEA attributes the 1977 decline in Level I and II

arrests, in part, to a November 1976 change in the

criteria for classifying violators.

159
APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

DRUGS REMOVED FROM THE ILLICIT MARKET

1975 1976 1977 1978

(calendar years) (3 quarters)

Heroin (gross lbs.)

Domestic 1,033 1,122 887 1/ 560

Foreign 1,474 653 1,948 1,046

Total 2,507 1,775 2,835 1,606

Opium (gross lbs.)

Domestic 22 70 99 48

Foreign 19,530 19,400 37,900 9,000

Total 19,552 19,470 37,999 9,048

Morphine (gross lbs.)

Foreign only 451 565 226 506

Cocaine (gross lbs.)

Domestic 1,361 1,679 1,623 1,618

Foreign 2,202 2,507 6,244 3,317

Total 3,563 4,186 7,867 4,935

Marijuana (gross lbs.

x 1,000)

Domestic 949 1,373 2,137 5,084

Foreign 570 311 334 1,196

Total 1,519 1,684 2,471 6,280

Hashish (gross lbs.)

Domestic 13,950 12,507 25,135 23,287

Foreign 33,000 14,300 29,300 68,800

Total 46,950 26,807 54,435 92,087

Hashish Oil

(quarts/gross lbs.)

Foreign only 12/282 11/191 12/550 12/0

Dangerous Drugs

(dosage units

x 1,000,000)

Domestic only 32.2 27.9 20.2 13.5

NOTE: "Domestic" includes removals by DEA, U.S. Customs,

and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as well as

DEA's cooperative action with State/local authorities and

other Federal agencies. "Foreign" is removals by foreign

authorities in cooperation with DEA.

l/DEA believes the decline in domestic heroin removals can

be attributed to heroin supply curtailment in the U.S. resulting from effective enforcement and opium crop eradication efforts.

160
APPENDIX III APPENDIX III

LIST OF GAO REPORTS ON DRUG CONTROL

AND RELATED TOPICS

Reference Date

Drug Control Report Number Issued

CongreSsman Thomas E. Morgan, B-173123 5/28/71

Chairman, House Committee on

Foreign Affairs (Letter Report),

with enclosure dated May 21, 1971,

entitled "General Accounting

Office Observations and Data Concerning Illegal Entry of Narcotics."

Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman, B-173123 6/21/71

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Letter Report), with

enclosure dated May 21, 1971,

entitled "General Accounting

Office Observations and Data Concerning Illegal Entry of Narcotics."

Limited Use of Federal Programs to B-164031(2) 9/20/71

Commit Narcotic Addicts tor Treatment and Rehabilitation

Efforts to Prevent Dangerous Drugs B-175425 4/17/72

From Illicitly Reaching the Public

Federal Efforts to Combat Drug B-164031(2) 8/14/72

Abuse

The Heroin Hotline B-176833 9/26/72

United States Ettorts to Increase B-176625 10/4/72

International Cooperation in Controlling Narcotics Tratticking

(Secret)

Efforts to Prevent Heroin From B-164031(2) 10/20/72

Illicitly Reaching the United

States

Heroin Being Smuggled Into B-164031(2) 12/7/72

New York City Successfully

161
APPENDIX III APPENDIX III

Reterence Date

Drug Control Report number issued

Difficulties in Immobilizing B-175425 12/21/73

Major Narcotics Traffickers

Identifying and Eliminating B-175425 6/7/74

Sources of Dangerous Drugs:

Efforts Being Made, But Not

Enough

Congressman Charles B. Rangel B-173123 7/23/74

House of Representatives

(Letter Report concerning

opium supply/demand.)

Recission of the Opium Poppy B-173123 9/9/74

Growing Ban By Turkey

United States Economic Assistance B-125085 9/16/74

to Turkey

The Honorable William R. Cotter B-173123 10/15/74

House of Representatives (Letter

Report on drug abuse efforts in

Hartford, Conn. area.)

The Honorable Charles B. Rangel B-173123 11/21/74

House of Representatives (Letter

Report concerning additional

information on opium supply/

demand.)

Efforts to Stop Narcotics and GGD-75-44 12/31/74

Dangerous Drugs Coming From and

Through Mexico and Central America

Security Controls for Methadone GGD-75-50 1/30/75

Distribution Need Improving

Problems in Slowing the Flow of GGD-75-80 5/30/75

Cocaine and Heroin From and

Through South America (Confidential)

If the United States Is To Develop ID-75-77 7/29/75

An Effective International Narcotics

Control Program, Much More Must Be

Done

162
APPENDIX III APPENDIX III

Reference Date

Drug Control Report number issued

Improvements Needed In Regulating GGD-75-102 8/28/75

and Monitoring The Manutacture and

Distribution of Licit Narcotics

Letter Report: Inventory and B-173123 9/6/75

Security of U.S. Opium Stockpile

(Restricted)

Federal Drug Enforcement: Strong GGD-76-32 12/18/75

Guidance Needed

Alledged Improper Personnel Practices FPCD-76-27 12/19/75

At the Drug Enforcement Administration

Stopping U.S. Assistance to Foreign ID-76-5 2/19/76

Police and Prisons

More Effective Action Needed to GGD-77-51 3/9/76

Control Abuse and Diversion in

Methadone Treatment Programs

Opium Eradication Efforts in Mexico: GGD-77-6 2/18/77

Cautious Optimism Advised

(Confidential)

Methadone Deaths in New York City GGD-77-25 3/14/77

Drugs, Firearms, Currency and Other GGD-76-105 5/31/77

Property Seized by Law Enforcement

Agencies: Too Much Held Too Long

Illegal Entry at United States-Mexico GGD-78-17 12/2/77

Border--Multiagency Enforcement

Efforts Have Not Been Effective in

Stemming the Flow of Drugs and People

Review of Selected Narcotics Enforce- GGD-78-9 12/14/77

ment Research and Development

Projects

Drug Control in South America Having GGD-78-45 3/9/78

Limited Success--Some Progress But

Problems Are Formidable

163
APPENDIX III APPENDIX III

Reference Date

Drug Control Report number issued

Retail Diversion of Legal Drugs-- GGD-78-22 3/10/78

A Major Problem With No Easy

Solution

The Coast Guard's Role In Drug CED-79-40 2/12/79

Interception--How Much Is

Enough?

Other Related Reports

Disclosure and Summons Provisions GGD-78-110 3/12/79

of 1976 Tax Reform Act--Privacy

Gains With Unknown Law Enforcement

Effects

Reducing Federal Judicial Sentenc- GGD-78-112 3/19/79

ing and Prosecuting Disparities:

A Systemwide Approach Needed

Better Use of Currency and Foreign GGD-79-24 4/06/79

Account Reports By Treasury and

IRS Needed for Law Enforcement

Purposes

164
APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES COURTS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20544

WILLIAM E. FOLEY

DIRECTOR

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL. JR. May 15, 1979 DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Mr. Allen R. Voss

Director, General Government Division

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Voss:

I have reviewed the draft of your proposed report

on the control of the production of illegal drugs and

the flourishing of drug traffic. I must advise you that

we cannot, as the administrative body for the federal

judiciary, address the policy matters covered in your

report, such as the effect of sentencing practices on

drug traffic and drug enforcement, nor can we speak on

behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

If a final draft of your report is ready by July, we

will refer the recommendations addressed to the United

States Judicial Conference, contained at page 184, to the

Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law for

consideration at its summer meeting. The Committee will

also be addressing itself at this meeting to the earlier

GAO report on the problems of disparity in criminal

sentencing and prosecution in the criminal justice system.

After consideration of these items, the Committee will

report to the September 1979 meeting of the Judicial

Conference. A further statement will be rendered by this

Office on behalf of the Conference after it meets.

Please let us know if we can be of any further

assistance.

Sincerely,

William E. Foley

Director

165
APPENDIX V APPENDIX V'

THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER

DOLLEY MADISON HOUSE

1520 H STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005

A. LEO LEVIN

DIRECTOR June 8, 1979

Mr. Allen R. Voss

Director

General Government Division

United States General Accounting

Office

Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Voss:

Thank you for your letter of May 2 enclosing a draft report

on sentencing disparity and the drug problem and soliciting any

comments that the Center might wish to provide. Since none of

the recommendations in the report is directed to the Center, and

since the work of the Center is not directly involved, we have

elected not to file any comments on this report. We (do note that

there are recommendations to other agencies within the third

branch and if those recommendations are retained in the final

report we shall of course stand ready to provide any assistance

that the Conference, the Administrative Office, or the Judicial

Councils may request from us in the course of meeting those

recommendations.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on draft GAO

reports, and look forward to any future reports that you may care

to share with us.

Sincerely,

A. Leo Levin

ALL: gwf

166
APPENDIX VI APPENDIX VI

l~/I) a' DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20201

JUN 1 i979

Mr. Gregory J. Ahart

Director, Human Resources

Division

United States General

Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Ahart:

The Secretary asked that I respond to your request for our

comments on your draft report, "Gains Made in Controlling

Illegal Drugs, Yet the Drug Trade Flourishes." As requested,

the National Institute of Drug Abuse has reviewed the data

in the report on the demand for illicit drugs and sees no

need for any revision.

Thank you for the opportunity to review this report before

its final publication.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas D. Morris

Inspector General

167
APPENDIX VII APPENDIX VII

These comments were received from the Central Intelligence

Agency.

25 May 1979

SUBJECT: USGAO Report "Gains Made in Controlling Illegal Drugs, Yet the

Drug Trade Flourishes"

1. The report is probably the most comprehensive and authoritative

statement of the problem which we have seen. We cannot argue with the

statistics presented which seem to give as balanced a view as possible of

the various educated guesses being made right now by the various agencies

working in the narcotics field. The most perceptive thought in the paper

was that the circumstances in narcotics producing countries are too

complex for an approach that is oriented toward law enforcement to be

effective and too much for the United States to overcome alone. Those

circumstances include the ineffectiveness of crop substitution programs,

corruption, socioeconomic effects, etc.

2. There are indications throughout the report that the various

agencies in the narcotics field have been working with insufficient

intelligence. We believe this is a correct statement. The report also

implies that even with sufficient intelligence, there is not too much

one can do overall against the problem; this too seems to be correct.

3. Also in the report, it was stated or inferred many times that

not enough attention was being paid to the financial aspects of narcotics

problems. As of this writing, almost all Federal agencies engaged in

the narcotics field are indeed paying more attention to this facet of

narcotics--and indeed have instituted vigorous programs to overcome

the deficiency.

[See GAO note.]

GAO note: Deleted material refers to classified

information not included in the final

report.

168
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washinlrto r. O.C. 20520

19 JUN 1979

Mr. J. Kenneth Fasick

Director

International Division

U. S. General Accounting Office

Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Fasick:

I am replying to your letter May 1, 1979, which

forwarded copies of the draft report: "Gains Made in

Controlling Illegal Drugs, Yet the Drug Trade Flourishes".

The enclosed comments on this report were prepared by

the Assistant Secretary of International Narcotics Matters.

We appreciate having had the opportunity to review

and comment on the draft report. If I may be of further

assistance, I trust you will let me know.

Sincerely,

RogerS. Feldman

Deputy Assistant Secretary

for Budget and Finance

Enclosure:

As stated

169
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

INM RESPONSE TO GAO AUDIT, ENTITLED

"GAINS MADE IN CONTROLLING ILLEGAL DRUGS,

YET THE DRUG TRADE FLOURISHES"

A. Report Summary

The GAO report, entitled "Gains made in Controlling

Illegal Drugs, Yet the Drug Trade Flourishes" assesses

the Federal Government's "drug enforcement effort: during

the last 10 years." In summary, the Auditors found that

positive measures have been achieved but that these gains

are fragile, temporary and implicitly quite insignificant.

The report explains that the enormous supply and demand

for drugs; the social, economic, and political realities

of drug growing countries; the enormous profits realized

in drug trafficking; and the ease of smuggling and distributing contraband contribute to the persistence of

the problem.

The auditors state that the Government has not implemented the appropriate actions to support the Federal

Drug Supply and Demand Reduction Strategy. To remedy this

situation, a series of recommendations are presented which

include:

--Creating a more effective Federal partnership

between the Executive and Legislative Branches

to address the problem,

--Resolving border management problems,

-- Strengthening prosecutive and judicial procedures,

-- Creating strong oversight for the Strategy implementation, and

--Encouraging worldwide commitment.

GAO concludes that law enforcement will always play

a critical role in the strategy. Specific recommendations

for the Department of State are:

--The Secretary of State with the support of Congress

should promote a world conference and the

formation of a consortium of victim countries

that would develop a plan of action to fight the

global drug problem in a unified way.

170
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

--The Secretary of State require that the Assistant

Secretary for Narcotics Matters prepare realistic

Country Narcotics Action Plans detailing short

and long-term goals, the means of achieving

these goals, and the methods for reviewing

progress. Because narcotics production and

trafficking often encompasses several countries,

as in the Golden Triangle, the Assistant

Secretary should also be instructed to prepare

similar plans on a regional basis.

B. General Comment

The task undertaken by GAO which resulted in a 219 page

report was formidable indeed. As stated by the auditors,

the drug problem is complex and multi-faceted, requiring

a mix of both supply and demand reduction efforts. INM

concurs wholeheartedly with GAO's assessment of the problem,

and general recommendations to address the problem. The

Federal Government does require a stronger partnership

between the Executive and Legislative Branches, as well as

improved cooperation and coordination among Executive

Branch agencies. Moreover, more effective prosecutive

and judicial procedures, improved border management, clarified government roles, etc., are all excellent recommendations.

Although INM believes that GAO has done a creditable

job in assessing the last 10 years of government efforts,

there are several general areas which we feel are misleading, erroneous or disappointing. These areas include:

(1) Tenor and tone of the report, (2) Exaggerated role of

law enforcement (or under-statement of other supply

reduction efforts), (3) Under-statement of successes, (4)

Recommendations.

Tone and Tenor of the Report: INM believes that a

more positive, realistic attitude toward the Government's

response to date would be accurate and beneficial. The

report highlights the continuing growth in the level of

drug use and abuse in the U.S. since the mid-1960's. Yet,

from a health and social perspective, the use of the most

deleterious and heinous drugs has not increased. It is

misleading to lump all drug use into one category. The

Federal supply reduction effort has had a significant

impact on the heroin problem, the priority drug in the

Federal Strategy. The auditors have concluded that since

"drug use patterns have shifted in response to supply

reduction efforts" the Government therefore has not had

a significant impact on the overall drug problem. Perhaps

the report is asking more from the supply reduction

strategy than it was intended to deliver.

171
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

Throughout the report, the auditors leave the reader

with a sense of futility and frustration over the possibility of ever being successful. The report seems to

conclude that the last ten years have had little positive

effect; and one might assume that the next ten will

probably not be much different. INM believes that

progress has been made and that, though many problems

remain to be resolved, we have learned a great deal and

have begun to have greater success in supply reduction.

Exaggerated Role of Law Enforcement: INM believes

that the report lacks balance when discussing law enforcement as the cornerstone to the Supply Reduction Strategy.

It is certainly true that law enforcement and interdiction

are critical elements to any supply reduction strategy,

but when employed alone the results have been uniformly

disappointing, both for the short or the long term. Very

little mention is made of the crop eradication efforts,

which, coupled with enforcement and income substitution,

strike INM as the only viable long term approach to

reducing the availability of illicit substances.

In Mexico, crop eradication, coupled with enforcement, has been the most effective means of reducing

available supplies. Tripling the number of enforcement

or interdiction personnel in Mexico almost certainly

would not have resulted in the same short or long term

impact as the eradication efforts coupled with law enforcement.

INM also believes that,given time, income substitution efforts will have more impact on drug supply -than

law enforcement efforts alone. Development assistance

entails changing the patterns of poverty and this is a

long, complicated process. Cultural and institutional

limitations will continue to exist and myopic approaches

must be avoided. Nevertheless, enforcement should be

seen as auxiliary to the broader issue of changing

economic and cultural environments. It has to support

the other supply reduction efforts, i.e., eradication

and income substitution.

Finally, in considering any strategy, the reader

must remember that changing societal behavior is a longrange process, (It took Iowa farmers ten years to swJtch

to growing hybrid corn, and this notwithstanding a concentrated government effort in a relatively developed

society). The audit report implies that law enforcement

172
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

alone has more immediate results and therefore may be

superior to other supply reduction efforts. If that is

implied by the authors, INM strongly disagrees. The Federal

Government should be looking for long term results, not

short term arrests and seizures that attack the problems

only peripherally.

Under-statement of Successes. Although no one agency

can assume total credit for any success in the reduction of

heroin supply, INM believes that the international program

is chiefly responsible for the successes in Turkey and

Mexico. Moreover, these successes were and are significant

and, to date, are continuing. The auditors may not have

intended to downplay these successes, yet INM feels that the

important lessons learned from Mexico and Turkey have been

understated in this report. For a myriad of reasons, these

programs have been successful and should not be considered

lightly.

GAO Recommendations. The report was somewhat critical

of a perceived lack of comprehensive planning documents (No

NCAP's) for drug control efforts. INM believes that the

necessary steps have been taken to ensure that appropriate

planning occurs, despite the discontinuation of NCAP's.

First, each Mission must submit a GORM which highlights

narcotics as a goal. Second, each of the major narcotics

country missions submits a Summary Narrative in its ZBB

request which incorporates the elements of the NCAP. Third,

each Mission also submits an Annual Narcotics Status Report

(ANSR) which deals with goals, accomplishments, problems,

etc. Fourth, each major country which enters into bilateral

project agreements now uses a programming system that

provides documentation on the planning process: the

Narcotics Assessment and Strategy Statement (NASP); the

PROW/AG which outlines the goals, objectives, indicators of

success, the implementation schedule, and budget/resource

requirements. Finally, strategy papers have been developed

to present truly regional approaches. Recently, a five year

coca strategy paper, a mexican heroin paper,an East Asia

Regional strategy paper and a Near East Asia strategy paper

were completed to illustrate the need for comprehensive

planning.

The second recommendation to hold a victim nation

conference is a laudable one. INM supports this suggestion

and, through diplomatic initiatives, is continually

attempting to achieve the goals which could be gleaned from

such a conference. Continual demarches to the International

Organizations is also designed to achieve these goals. In

sum, INM agrees that the developed, "victim" nations need

173
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

to devote more resources to solving this truly global

problem.

C. Summary. To conclude our general comments, INM believes

that the major successes in the supply reduction efforts

have been due largely to the International efforts exercised

by and under the direction of the State Department in

mobilizing both Turkey and Mexico to enact strong, effective

measures to control or eradicate illicit supplies. By

stating this, we are in no way demeaning the role or efforts

of law enforcement per se; rather, we wish to place it in

perspective as one of several complementary supply reduction

strategies. As the USG agency with primary responsibility

for all international drug control efforts, the State

Department will not only continue to provide policy

guidance, leadership and support for all drug programs

overseas, but will carry out even more vigorously its

mandate to prevent the entry of illicit narcotics into the

U.S.

Mathea Falco

Assistant Secretary of

International Narcotics Matters

Attached are specific comments on various sections in

the Audit Report.

174
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

D. Specific Comments:

The following specific INM comments relate to sections

of this draft report as indicated.

Page ii - first major paragraph indicates that hard-won

successes are short-lived. INM believes that these successes

will be-short-lived only if continued diplomatic pressure

and continued program assistance does not continue in order

to preclude resurgence.

Page iii - It is stated in the second paragraph of

report that payments by abusers and traffickers are on the

order of $35 to $51 billion annually but it is not clear

whether this figure is worldwide or whether it represents

U.S. expenditures only.

Page vi - Paragraph 3 indicates that jurisdictional

problems in some State and Local regions hamper attempts to

mobilize fully the numerous agencies in the United States

against drug abuse and trafficking. It would seem that more

detailed explanation is required here since the greater

number of arrests and seizures are made by these State and

Local agencies thus permitting the Federal government to

concentrate on matters of national and international trafficking networks. It would seem that, in addition to the

Attorney General establishing a realistic policy on what can

reasonably be expected from State and Local governments,

further increased cooperative efforts between Federal,

State, and Local governments must be initiated and maintained to ensure maximum effective utilization of the

various police agencies.

Page vii - The GAO report addresses the Federal government's failure to provide a central mechanism to establish

drug policy and to be responsible for its effective implementation. Report further states that this responsibility

is presently entrusted to the President's Domestic Policy

Staff and that it is too early to tell whether this arrangement will ensure the vigorous implementation of the Federal

Drug Strategy. It would seem that GAO should address

specific organizational weaknesses with clear cut recommendations to ensure effective implementation of the Federal

Drug Strategy.

175
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII'

Page viii - It is believed that GAO's terminology in

the last two paragraphs is vague, misleading, and possibly

even inaccurate. B/INM believes that supply reduction

consists of enforcement, eradication and control. In fact,

we think the major successes enjoyed in Mexico have been due

to eradication and that successful efforts in Turkey have

been a combination of control and eradication. INM recognizes the fact that successes must be long range in nature

and can be costly. In addition, we believe that GAO should

have addressed income substitution as another basic element

of supply reduction; also we believe that with appropriate

income substitution the motivation for cultivation of

illegal narcotics will be greatly reduced but recognize the

fact that this approach must be a long range and costly

objective in each and every case.

CHAPTER I

Page 1, second paragraph. We believe that this should

also focus on demand reduction which is and must be an

integral part of the Federal strategy.

Paragraph 3, same page. Draft report indicates annual

social cost to U.S. Government as being from $10 to $14

billion. We have seen figures as high as $17 billion. GAO

should cite the source of this estimate.

Page 3, paragraph 2. Draft report indicates deaths

from heroin declining by 59%. We again question the source

of this figure since we have seen figures showing a '70%

decline in heroin deaths. Further, we think it is essential

to show that the decline in heroin availability is a result

of the successful United States/Mexico Joint Eradication

Program.

Pages 5 - 8. Draft report goes into some detail on

these pages with respect to reorganization of Federal drug

law enforcement efforts. We believe that in this section

inadequate attention is given to the role of the Department

of State since it is our opinion that successes achieved to

date have been largely a result of international successes.

Without the Department of State leadership in the international program, the necessary diplomatic initiatives could

not have been which resulted in increased narcotics control

activity by a number of different source and transit countries.

176
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

This is not to demean DEA's role but to emphasize the

importance of the Department's in transcending the enforcement capabilities of DEA.

Page 9. In the first paragraph under Federal Government Strategy, we believe that crop eradication and

income substitution should be added to the first sentence

after law enforcement. Again, we feel that this report must

not only emphasize law enforcement but also emphasize crop

eradication and income substitution which are integral parts

of the supply-demand solution.

In the second paragraph under Federal Government

Strategy, last sentence should be changed to read as

follows: The State Department has responsibility for

coordinating international narcotics control efforts and for

carrying out income substitution efforts with authority

vested in the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics

Matters (INM).

Page 13. Suggest a recheck on the number of staff

members in the Office of Drug Abuse Policy in the Domestic

Policy Staff.

Pages 18, 19 & 20. INM again feels that inadequate

recognition is being given eradication and U.S. diplomatic

initiatives vis-a-vis enforcement in considering accomplishments. Again, it would seem appropriate to go into more

depth in explaining the Turkish and Mexican successes -

including the fact that U.S. assistance across the board was

critical.

Page 21 Drug seizures and removals increase. In this

section, the draft report lumps domestic and foreign

activities together and we believe that domestic and foreign

activities should be separated at least by percentage so as

to give a more accurate picture.

Page 23. We believe the second line, second paragraph

should read as follows: The Department of State has used

its diplomatic offices and small amount of narcotics

assistance funds to establish cooperative efforts with ten

countries which are principal sources of drugs flowing into

the U.S.

We also believe that in this section the report should

note Department of State efforts to encourage developed

nations to increase their funding for UNFDAC.

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APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

Pages We continue to take exception to draft

report statements that successes have few lasting benefits.

Turkey has not yet returned to illicit production arnd, with

appropriate surveillance and follow up, Mexico hopefully

would follow the same pattern. We do believe that where

successes occur it is necessary to maintain surveillancemonitoring to prevent resurgence in the same area. We

believe that it is preferable to say that the problem is

still enormous with trafficking pattern changes. This is

more accurate than saying that past efforts are "short

lived."

[See GAO note.]

Page We believe that the term "foreseeable future"

last sentence on this page is so vague and indefinite that

it has no meaning.

Page Again, we feel that the last sentence must

contain law enforcement, eradication and income substitution.

CHAPTER III

Page We continue to take issue with the draft

terming present eradication successes as being temporary in

nature only. We do believe it might be appropriate to

indicate that eradication success to date covers only a

small part of the actual and potential growing areas of the

world. We further believe that, in most cases, eradication

will require alternative sources of income which in turn

would require massive expenditures and considerable time for

goal achievements.

178
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

[See GAO note.]

Pages If GAO is to raise the whole question

of draught in detail, then a conclusion should be drawn to

avoid ambiguities. It seems to us that GAO should say that

in May 1978 the verification team found fewer fields thus

substantiating the effectiveness of the eradication Campaign

in the simplicity of GOM official opinion (bottom page 55

and top of page 56).

Page paragraph 2. With USG assistance, the Government of Burma in 1974 initiated a campaign to reduce and

eliminate drug trafficking. We are not certain that

narcotics control efforts were absent prior to this time and

feel that this must be verified.

Page last paragraph. Draft report mentions that

the Department of State has refused to fund a herbicide

eradication program because of the paraquat issue. INM

feels that it is morally incumbent upon GAO to explain the

overall paraquat issue as well as the Congressional amendment putting conditions on the use of herbicides in the

spraying of marijuana.

Page INM believes that GAO has accurately identified the complexity and difficulty of crop substitution

strategies. Despite the realistic difficulties enumerated,

we do not believe such severe pessimism is called for.

Page To offer any promise of success, these

projects must (1) be within the administrative and political

control of the host government, (2) obtain extensive

financial resources and technical expertise for comprehensive rural development, (3) control and avoid leakage

from traditional drug use often ingrained in foreign

cultures, (4) develop marketing and distribution systems in

remote areas, and (5) develop a capability to vigorously

enforce bans on illicit cultivation. Obviously, satisfying

many of these requirements would be a difficult task even in

developed countries. It should be noted that we are trying

pilot projects but resources for full implementation must

come from other sources.

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APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

Crop Substitution in Thailand

Developing viable income alternatives for the poppy

farmer has been the goal of the United Nations, the Royal

Thai Government, and the United States since 1972, when a

pilot crop substitution project was implemented in Northern

Thailand. After 6 years and about $12.1 million this

premier project has shown that crop substitution is possible,

and that a combination of crops can compete with opium. The

small reduction in opium cultivation in the pilot project in

Thailand has, as yet, had little impact on world-wide drug

control efforts. It should be noted that pilot projects are

to provide the framework for long term development.

Page second paragraph. We suggest the title should

be "The Difficult Road" not "The Long Road". In the same

paragraph, last sentence should state - "there appears to be

little hope for any substantial...."

In the second paragraph, we think that the draft report

is in error in stating that coca provides ANDEAN farmers

with their only source of income. In the same paragraph,

last line page 64, some suitable crops have already been

found, e.g., tea, coffee.

Page In the last paragraph, draft report states

that DEA reports crop substitution has been ineffective. We

feel that this question is out of DEA's area of expertise

and the U.S. Ambassador in conjunction with INM is taking

appropriate steps.

Page GAO should note that the United States Senate

has not yet ratified the Convention on Psychotrophic

Substances of 1971.

Pages GAO should be aware of the fact that

AID has included "poppy clauses" in loan agreements for Peru

and Afghanistan. Inclusion of the poppy clause was invoked

in Afghanistan in 1977. ADB has included poppy clauses and

the Department of State is working toward more financial

institution action.

[See GAO note.]

180
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

[See GAO note.]

On page second paragraph, fourth sentence should

read: "In Colombia, through diplomatic representations and

the use of INC funds, the Ambassador has encouraged the

establishment of a narcotics unit in the Attorney General's

office with which DEA works. In Peru, DEA has established

cooperative relationships with the Police. INC funds for

conferences and joint enforcement operations of DEA with

Latin American countries have helped to improve police

relationships. It is ...."

Page paragraph 2, third line should read: U.S.

narcotics control efforts overseas.

Page Draft report continually refers to NCAPs as

being the basic planning documents for narcotics control

activities in individual countries. Report does not

recognize the fact that NCAP's have now been replaced by

PROW/AG's which we feel are more detailed and represent

better planning documents for international narcotics

control programs.

In Chapter III, we have noted no mention of U.S. Coast

Guard participation and yet this organization is heavily

involved making significant seizures. The draft report fails

to note the significantly increasing priority effort being

given to narcotics control within the Department of State

and its diplomatic efforts. No mention is made of the

Bureau status recently achieved by INM. There is also no

mention of narcotics goals being included in the GORMs which

are subject to the highest level discussions within the

Department of State. For years, DEA and others have bemoaned

this lack of priority emphasis and now that it is taking

place, we consider it a significant step forward and one

that should be acknowledged by this report.

Page It should be noted that legislation has

been introduced to incorporate possession of narcotics on

the high seas. We believe that this report should note this

proposed legislation.

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APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

Page 145, paragraph 2. Draft report indicates that

foreign governments have not materially assisted in the

apprehension or initiation of investigations directed at

major traffickers. INM disagrees with this statement; we

believe that foreign governments have initiated investigations and apprehended a number of major traffickersgroups. We further believe that GAO should identify how

many Class I violators have been apprehended or eliminated

abroad in the last year as opposed to the number in the

United States.

182
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

Attachment 2

INM RESPONSE TO GAO DRAFT ENTITLED

"OPIUM ERADICATION EFFORTS IN MEXICO:

CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM ADVISED."

The Mexican Attorney General (AG) administers the

narcotics control program and has assigned about 600 fulltime personnel to the program. The Embassy's Narcotics

Assistance Unit (NAU) has a program evaluator who advises

the AG's office on program planning. Like the other

programs in INM, Mexico has agreed to using a new programming system which outlines goals, objectives, milestones, indicators of auccess and implementation schedules

for each project. At the time this audit was conducted, this

system had not been developed or implemented.

The U.S. Embassy has worked closely with the Government

of Mexico to develop a program to control effectively the

production and trafficking of narcotics. The program is

reducing significant amounts of Mexcian heroin and marijuana

entering the U.S. In 1976, Mexico supplied about 87% of the

heroin and 70% of the marijuana consumed in the U.S. These

amounts declined in 1978 to about 50% of the heroin and 30%

of the marijuana which entered the U.S. There was a corresponding 70% decrease in heroin-related deaths, in the same

period, which was attributed to the Mexican program. Projections for 1979 indicate that even smaller quantities of

Mexican narcotics will be available.

The Mexican Government coordinated closely with the

U.S. Embassy to devise a management and operations system to

attack drug cultivation. Mexico has been divided into 12

administrative zones in which a zone coordinator directs all

narcotics eradication activities. Mexico is constructing 15

forward bases in narcotics growing areas, 5 of which are

completed, to utilize aircraft and related resources more

effectively for locating and eradicating illicit narcotic

crops. The Mexican military supports the program in the

field with several thousand troops that are used to inderdict narcotics and discourage drug cultivation. A U.S.

civilian team has been contracted by the two Governments to

verify from aircraft the eradication campaigns conducted

throughout the year. The team conducts four 45-day reconnaissance missions during the Spring and Fall poppy growing

seasons and its reports coupled with DEA seizure data

confirm a continuing decline in narcotics production.

183
APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII

A U.S. company has been contracted by the Mexican

Government to develop self-sufficiency in all aspects of

aviation maintenance and training by 1982. Very favorable

safety records and increasing aircraft utilization demonstrate the Mexicans are steadily reaching self-sufficiency.

One of the more significant projects of the program is

the development of a Remote Sensing Poppy Detection System

under a contract to NASA. The System will use a scanner

carried by a Lear Jet capable of covering several thousand

square kilometers per sortie to detect poppy fields using

signature data in on-the-ground computers. The system will

detect fields more quickly and more widely than the reconnaissance aircraft presently used. Implementation of the

system is projected for 1981.

In conclusion, INM believes that the GAO recommendation

to institute more comprehensive planning procedures has been

accomplished. We in INM are even more optimistic about the

efforts fo the Mexican program in 1979 than we were when the

audit report was completed in 1978.

GAO note: Deleted material refers te classified

information not included in the final

report.

184
APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Ad&dls Reply to the

Divi io. IndLeted

and Refs to Initila nd Number

AUC 0 2 1979

Mr. Allen R. Voss

Director

General Government Division

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Voss:

This letter is in response to your request for comments

on the draft report entitled "Gains Made In Controlling

Illegal Drugs, Yet The Drug Trade Flourishes," dated May 1, 1979.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) agrees with the General

Accounting Office's (GAO) assessment of the magnitude of

the worldwide narcotics traffic, the enormous profit associated

with this criminal activity, and the long-standing problems

that have impeded Government efforts in reducing the supply

of illegal drugs. GAO has recognized some of the more notable

successes of the supply reduction strategy in foreign cooperative

ventures, in criminal law enforcement, and in diversion

control. The report points out the enormous socio-economic

costs of the illicit drug trade, both abroad and domestically,

and rightly concludes that the hard-won gains in supply

reduction must be preserved if these worldwide costs are

to be reduced. DOJ supports the GAO call for executive

branch actions toward better implementation of policy and

improved interagency coordination, for judicial/legislative

cooperation toward achieving bail and sentencing reform,

for the selective application of enhanced resources, and

for better integration in reduction of both supply and demand.

More particularly, DOJ agrees with the report's conclusions that new approaches in the areas of bail and sentencing

and an expansion of the criminal jurisdiction of U.S. magistrates

are needed to achieve a more effective response to the problems

of drug trafficking. Indeed, these matters are receiving

close attention within DOJ. With respect to bail, DOJ is

185
APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

currently considering several means by which the serious

difficulties presented by existing law might be reduced,

consistent with constitutional requirements. As to sentencing

reform, DOJ has been a strong advocate of legislative proposals

to establish a comprehensive guidelines sentencing system

in order to rationalize the exercise of sentencing discretion

and enhance the deterrent effect of Federal criminal sentences.

And, recognizing the untapped potential of magistrates to

dispose of minor criminal cases quickly, efficiently and

fairly, DOJ has proposed amendments to the Federal Magistrates

Act that would improve the quality of those judicial officers

and permit them to handle many cases that presently burden

the Federal district courts.

The report contains some inaccurate and inconsistent

statements which will be addressed later in the response.

Because some of the findings are based on past performance,

outdated information, and misinterpretations, the report

tends to depict a negative view and does little to display

the positive accomplishments the Government has made in

reducing the supply of illegal drugs.

In the case of heroin, the reduction of supplies has

resulted in significant decreases in purity available to

the addict, in the raw number of addicts, in heroin-related

deaths, and in heroin-related emergency room incidents.

Since these indicators have continued over a 3-year period,

this positive impact on an adverse phenomenon of great social

concern can properly be termed a real accomplishment--one

that is largely attributable to supply reduction efforts.

The GAO report merely indicates that addicts have switched

to other drugs, and fails to emphasize that these drugs

are less injurious. Similarly, international enforcement

successes against production centers and trafficking routes

are minimized by pointing out that traffickers react by

simply shifting their areas of operation; yet, it can be

demonstrated that continuing disruption of trafficking

operations results in measurable reductions of retail supplies.

Likewise, through the expenditure of considerable effort,

successes have been achieved in improved interagency coordination

at home and in the formation of international cooperation

abroad. The ongoing multiton seizures off the Southeastern

United States by the United States Coast Guard (USCG.) and

the mobilization of Colombian troops and their dispatch

to outlying production areas are examples of positive contributions to a reduced supply of cocaine and marijuana

within the United States. These and other accomplishments

are current and show even greater promise for the future.

186
APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

With regard to the matters discussed in the report,

we differ with some of GAO's conclusions and also point

out some important issues that are not addressed in the

report. Our comments are referenced by chapter, subject

matter, and page to the section of the draft report to which

they pertain.

I. Chapter 2 - Reducing Drug Availability in the United

States--Efforts Have Not Had Lasting Benefits

A. What successes have been achieved (pp. 17-25).

DOJ believes there have been lasting benefits and significant impacts. Any time the heroin retail purity drops from

6.6 percent in 1976 to 3.5 percent in 1978, it is obvious

that.Federal supply reduction efforts have had a significant

impact. Such a trend continuing over a 3-year period cannot

be termed other than lasting and significant. This indicates

a certain amount of success in recognizing and meeting the

shifting trafficking and distribution patterns.

The type of control maintained by the legitimate industry

has virtually eliminated diversion at the manufacturing

and wholesale level. These controls are chiefly due to

Federal regulations and a cooperative spirit engendered

by DOJ efforts. This situation is definitely lasting and

significant. Also to be included in this category is the

reduced supply of amphetamines and the ensuing reduction

in abuse. Amphetamine production for human consumption

in the United States has been greatly reduced, primarily

because of Government decisions. Prior to Government

control of amphetamine production in 1972, approximately

800 million dosage units were being produced. Current production is now 300 million, which is a 60 percent reduction,

without impacting legitimate medical needs. Additionally,

among other examples, significant reductions in the availability

of LSD demonstrate the lasting benefits of Federal efforts.

B. Why does the problem persist (pp. 26-46).

The report states that in one drug-growing country many high government, police and military officials profit from

narcotics trafficking with near impunity, and that widespread

corruption exists within the principal unit empowered with

narcotics enforcement. While we agree that corruption is

187
APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

a serious problem in the country named, this statement is

far too broad. That Government has taken significant steps

to weed out corruption.

C. Proposed actions (pp. 46-48).

The GAO report states that the United States must carry

out a much tougher and consistent stance to make real gains

in reducing the availability of illicit drugs and must resolve

some long-standing problems. DOJ is aware of these problems

and within its authority is taking actions to resolve some

of them. The numerous agencies involved in narcotics law

enforcement, even when the focus is only on the Federal

level, present a maze of conflicting procedures and priorities

that negatively impact on the efficient and effective gathering

of criminal evidence. For example, if a narcotics-laden

vessel is located off the coast of the United States, the

apprehension and disposition of the vessel and crew would

involve several different agencies; however, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has primary responsibility for

narcotics evidence gathering. Pertinent evidence may go

unnoticed in the process because the agency or agencies

then on the scene may not have responsibilities or capabilities

for effective preservation of such evidence. To resolve

some of these situations, the Criminal Division plans to

have attorneys with experience in these matters meet with

the various agencies to agree upon procedures for effectively

managing the physical evidence and subjects that may be

encountered.

While there have been problems in the past, the current

climate indicates that cooperation between all agencies

concerned has improved dramatically and is better and more

effective now than it has ever been. The isolated problems

that continue are insignificant and do not have a major

impact on total drug enforcement. Unfortunately, the report

does not address the very positive cooperative activities

currently taking place. Included here are the joint DEA/

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) operations; the unprecedented cooperative efforts between the United States

Customs Service (USCS) and DEA; the coordinated USCG and

DEA operations in the crucial Caribbean area; the mult:iorganization cooperative venture at the E1l Paso Intelligence

Center (EPIC); and numerous individual instances of successful

cooperation on investigative operations.

188
APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

Since the FBI does not have jurisdiction under Federal

law to investigate narcotics violations, it is currently

providing support to DEA in three major areas. These areas

relate to (1) making available to the appropriate Federal,

State, and local agencies certain of the FBI's centralized

services; (2) debriefing FBI sources, subjects, and informants

and disseminating this information to appropriate Federal,

State and local agencies; and (3) providing investigative

support.

For example, on May 8, 1979, DEA made available to FBI

the identities of 2,348 Class I violators in the United

States. This list of Class I violators was distributed

to all 59 FBI field offices with instructions to search

respective files on each violator and furnish results to

the local DEA office. As a result of the FBI's narcotics

dissemination program, based on the debriefing of informants,

subjects, and suspects, for fiscal year 1978, the FBI has

disseminated over 10,000 items of narcotics intelligence

information to other agencies, resulting in 155 Federal

arrests, and 45 State arrests as well as the confiscation

of $188,583,600 of narcotics-related items by Federal authorities,

$2,509,855 by local authorities, and $981,750 by State

authorities.

Support has been provided to DEA in a number of important

areas. For example, in Miami, Operation Banco emanated

through data compiled from financial institutions complying

with the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. This is a joint FBI/DEA

operation whose primary objective is to identify and associate

illicit financial gain with drug smuggling endeavors originating

in Colombia, South America, and deter or immobilize those

violators through proceedings utilizing the continuing

criminal enterprise and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations (RICO) statutes. Thus far, many grand jury

subpoenas have been served to obtain bank account records,

corporate records, and witness testimony depicting drug

monies in excess of $500,000,000. Additionally, some indictments have been returned, the most recent being the

indictment under the RICO Statute of 11 members of a large

narcotics organization.

In September 1977, the Attorney General approved the

establishment of joint FBI/DEA investigative task forces

in three selected cities--Chicago, Los Angeles, and New

York.

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APPENDIX IX AP:PENDIX IX

DOJ agrees that a disturbingly broad variance of Federal

sentences is imposed for similar narcotics offenses. Recent

events have underlined the negative impact that inconsistent

Federal, State and local law enforcement roles can have

on major narcotics investigations. DOJ has a major responsibility for fostering cooperation at all levels between Federal

and non-Federal authorities. We consider it essential that

a Federal drug policy emanate from a single source in order

to ensure effective direction and coordination of national

and international drug control efforts.

DOJ does not believe that noncontraband drug-oriented

paraphernalia should be a major focus of Federal criminal

enforcement.

It is true that difficulties are encountered with developing countries and financial institutions in providing

support for controlling illicit drug production. DOJ has

completed negotiations with the Colombian Government concerning

extradition and mutual assistance treaties. Additionally,

DOJ is developing a plan that will address the question

of how to deal with financial evidence derived outside the

United States.

II. Chapter 3 - International Narcotics Control: Some Progress

But Task Is Formidable

A. Eradication - short term results but no solution

(pp. 50-58).

The report states that eradication programs have met

with varying degrees of success, and that regardless of

the degree of success achieved, these successes are likely

to be temporary in nature unless actions are taken to provide

growers with an alternative source of income. The report

further states that Pakistan and Afghanistan, the world's

largest producers of opium, and five other major opium,

marijuana or cocaine producing countries have no eradication

program, and like Mexico and Burma, these countries have

similar inhibiting social, political and economic problems.

The concept of eradication cannot be applied broadly

to all areas. The area used for the cultivation of marijuana

in Colombia, for example, has been used for such only recently.

Its current large-scale production evolved only within the

last 3 to 5 years. An eradication program in Colombia would

entail socio-political problems. The influx into the country

190
APPENDIX IX

of enormous amounts of money generated by the marijuana

traffic is already causing serious economic problems. The

Colombian Government has recently expressed a renewed interest

in eradication. To reduce marijuana in the United States

will require destruction of the Colombian crop and other

principal sources. In Colombia, eradication, combined with

an adequate regulatory program and the continuation of existing

interdiction efforts, may well provide a viable long-term

solution to the Colombian marijuana problem.

In September 1978, the International Securities Assistance Act of 1978 was enacted as an amendment to the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This amendment prevents

the usage of monies authorized under the Foreign Assistance

Act for any program involving the spraying of marijuana

with any herbicide if it is likely to cause serious harm

to the health of persons who may use or consume the sprayed

marijuana. The prohibition does not apply to a herbicide

used in conjunction with another substance that would clearly

identify the marijuana as having been sprayed. As provided

under this Statute, the Secretary of State has informed

the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) of

the use of paraquat by Mexico to spray marijuana. The Secretary

of HEW recently has circulated his proposed determination

on the "serious harm" test to the Secretary of Agriculture

and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency

for comment, as required by the Statute.

With regard to countries such as Peru and Bolivia, the

report correctly points out that eradication or any other

meaningful control must be accompanied by some type of longterm economic development program (not necessarily crop

substitution) in order to present a viable long-term solution.

B. Cooperative enforcement is important to foreign

strategy (pp. 77-88).

GAO states that in its 1975 report on South America,

Embassy officials believed that sometimes DEA agents pose

a real threat to country relations and DEA agents were often

not willing to balance enforcement efforts with the overall

objectives of the mission. GAO further states that unnamed

State Department officials experienced similar beliefs in

early 1978 when they found it objectionable that "U.S. Police"

were operating in a foreign country and they believed that

191
APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

U.S. interests in the long run would be better served if

host government police were able to conduct unilateral drug

enforcement without relying on DEA's involvement. The above

statements contrast sharply with testimony given before

several Congressional hearings on this subject by top level

State Department representatives in which they contradict

GAO's statements and strongly support the need for DLiA agents

overseas. Liaison with the direct and timely exchange of

criminal information to support prosecution will always

be a requirement.

DOJ took exception to the 1975 report because GAO failed

to obtain the points of view of foreign government officials

in the nations being examined and this same omission has

been made again.

The report does not mention the specific types of behavior

that U.S. Embassy officials found objectionable. All DEA

offices in South America are committed by 5-year cooperative

work plans which were implemented in September 1977. These

work plans involve working with the Department of State

on joint ventures such as (1) encouraging host governments

to increase moral and financial commitments to international

narcotics control programs, (2) initiating stricter coca

production control systems, (3) developing crop substitution

or diversification planning, and (4) exploring other possible

legitimate uses for coca leaf. In addition, DEA is committed

to upgrading host country narcotics law enforcement. Toward

this end, current efforts by on-site DEA agents are aimed

at augmenting an intelligence base on international narcotics

traffic and traffickers, observing the expertise and evaluating

the effectiveness of host country law enforcement agencies,

identifying problem areas encountered by local enforcement

agencies, and recognizing areas where any component of the

U.S. mission can contribute to combatting the narcotics

problem.

Congressional delegations who have visited Latin America

in 1977, 1978 and April 1979 did not report, as a result

of their on-site visits, the adverse situations GAO mentions.

On the contrary, the Select Committee on Narcotic Abuse

and Control, in their August 1977 study mission, found that

DEA and host country relations were excellent and DEA's

presence important and needed.

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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

III. Chapter 4 - Border Management Problems Need to be Resolved

_pp. 96-163

GAO states that "Rather than serving to illustrate the

effectiveness of law enforcement, some enforcement officials

believe the high volume of seizures merely indicates the

tremendous amounts of drugs passing through the region.

In fact, it has been estimated that U.S. Customs seizes

less than 5 percent of the total amount of illicit drugs

in South Florida."

While the large seizures do indicate the tremendous

volume of drugs available, they also are an indicator of

improved cooperative enforcement. DOJ estimates the percentage

of marijuana now seized, destroyed, or abandoned at sea

en route may be in excess of 20 percent of that being imported

Tiito the U.S.A.

IV. Chapter 5 - Immobilizing Major Drug Violators: An

Elusive Goal

A. Enforcement strategy requires close coordination

and DEA is not yet proficient in conspiracy cases

(pp. 118-127).

GAO states that "Even though DEA has increased its emphasis

on conspiracy and financial investigations, it has not yet

attained proficiency in investigating major interstate and

international drug violators. Many DEA agents have not

been trained in the latest financial conspiracy techniques,

and intelligence functions often do not receive the priority

they deserve. DEA needs to do much more if the Federal

Government is to be successful in attacking major drug

traffickers and their assets."

DOJ does not entirely agree with these statements.

DEA has increased its emphasis on conspiracy investigations

through several different modalities. The major ones include

a significant increase in specialized training in this area,

establishment of conspiracy units in some regions, and

concentration on conspiracy investigations in the Central

Tactical Unit (CENTAC) program.

Since 1972, DEA has provided conspiracy training at

its training center to 1,253 special agents. Additionally,

DEA has trained 439 State and local police officers. The

Office of Training has also conducted one to two conspiracy

seminars in each DEA region for an additional 511 special

agents. Therefore, of 1,926 agents, 1,764 have received

conspiracy training.

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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX'

In addition, the Criminal Division, DEA, and the Attorney

General's Advocacy Institute have sponsored nine controlled

substance conspiracy conferences; the tenth is scheduled

for August. These conferences stress the use of the continuing

criminal enterprise and RICO statutes as well as advocating

the use of investigative tools, such as Title IIIs. Coincidentally, prior to receiving the draft report, the Criminal

Division arranged to assign one of its experienced attorneys

to DEA at the beginning of any CENTAC investigation to monitor

and counsel its development. The Criminal Division has

arranged that DEA advise the Division whenever DEA makes

any major investigative investment, be it CENTAC, a mobile

task force, or any other type of case.

The report fails to give recognition to successful

conspiracy investigations developed by DEA that have had

national and international impact. These include, to mention

only three, the Nicky Barnes case in New York, the Valenzuela

case in New York and California, and the Hell's Angels

conspiracy in San Francisco, California.

DEA's Region One, headquartered in New York, has two

conspiracy groups--one in the Eastern District and another

in the Southern District. Region One also has the New York

Joint Drug Enforcement Task Force, a joint effort between

DEA and the New York City Police Department, which works

almost exclusively on conspiracy investigations.

The CENTAC program, headquartered at Washington D.C.,

has concentrated its efforts at high level violators, host

of whom have been indicted on conspiracy charges. An example,

is CENTAC 12 which centered on major heroin, cocaine, and

marijuana violators who used a sophisticated network of

corporate and legal fronts. In this one conspiracy investigation alone, 311 defendants were indicted, of which 56

percent were Class I and II violators.

B. Intelligence has frequently received too little

priority (pp. 125-126).

This statement may have been true in the past, but since

1978 intelligence has received greater emphasis.

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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

In DEA's domestic field reorganization in 1978, the

position of Regional Intelligence Coordinator was established

at each region. Frequent coordination between these officers

and Headquarters staff elements has ensured that field intelligence

resources are optimally applied in support of enforcement

operations.

Most recently, the overall intelligence program has

been authorized to hire to full strength. In addition,

to increase field positions, the Headquarters' staffs charged

with operational and strategic intelligence have each been

furnished with an additional 14 positions. These gains

will have a significant impact on the overall DEA intelligence

function.

The report comments elsewhere on the National Narcotics

Intelligence Consumer's Committee (NNICC), but the unifying

and coordinating impact of the NNICC on narcotics intelligence

should be mentioned here also. The report also does not

recognize the highly favorable impact that strategic studies

and weekly and quarterly trend reports have had on producing

an informed national community. These products have won

manifest respect from both the executive and legislative

branches. The especially significant growth of EPIC should

be mentioned because of its unifying impact on interagency

enforcement activities. The development of the Unified

Intelligence Division, blending information available at

the Federal level with criminal intelligence in the New

York City area from State and local police, and its major

impact on trafficking in a key metropolitan area is also

not recognized.

C. The CENTAC program typifies DEA's experience with

conspiracy cases (pp. 126-127).

The report states that an ". . analysis of five recent

CENTACs indicates that, in most cases, the efforts did not

achieve the overall objective--complete immobilization of

the targeted drug trafficking organizations."

Complete immobilization of some targeted drug trafficking

organizations may be impossible. DEA has input into the

arrest, indictment and, to a lesser degree, the convictions

of a defendant, but does not have control of bond dispositions,

time between arrest and incarceration, length of incarceration,

or the extent to which major violators are able to function

while in prisons and jails.

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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX 'IX

A documented case demonstrates that incarcerated traffickers

can continue to function while technically immobilized and

in prison. The violator in question was incarcerated :Eor

19 years and continued to direct a drug trafficking organization. While in prison, he was convicted and sentenced

for an additional 25 years for conspiracy to violate Federal

drug laws. Later, he was indicted and convicted by a State

for an additional 12 years for conspiracy to violate drug

laws while incarcerated. A second State is still prosecuting

after indicting him for other violations of their drug law.

Additionally, 13 members of his family and three of his

attorneys have also been indicted, arrested, and in most

cases already convicted and sentenced.

CENTACs were originally designed to attack drug-related

organizations through conspiracy prosecutions. In one CENTAC

initiated almost 3 years ago, over $300 million from a major

trafficker was traced and $250,000 seized in cooperation

with the Swiss and Panamanian Governments. Efforts since

then have continued to increase, in CENTAC and other DEA

operations, the attack on financial assets as a tool toward

immobilization. Since CENTAC 18 (and also including CENTAC

12) the effort to attack the financial holdings of these

organizations is of major importance and is established

as a primary objective in the initial development of the

operational plan for each new CENTAC. In the first 9 months

of fiscal year 1979, DEA has developed more indictments

under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute than the

entire previous year.

D. Lack of Justice Department direction has caused

varied commitments to drug prosecutions (pp. 128-

131).

The GAO report states that the lack of clear policy

regarding the Major Drug Traffickers Prosecution Units (MDTPU),

together with a lack of DOJ control over drug prosecutions,

have meant that individual U.S. attorneys vary in their

commitment to the MDTPU prosecution program and their methods

of operating. DOJ agrees that more emphasis must be placed

on the MDTPU. However, some of the deficiencies GAO mentions

are not necessarily weaknesses. For example, assignments

of new personnel, or assignments of personnel for short

periods to MDTPU is not necessarily counterproductive to

an effective program. Attorneys have to be trained, and

training them in a narcotics unit is the best way to develop

good narcotics prosecutors. To interest the best prosecutors

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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

in litigating drug cases, it is often necessary to assure

them that they will be available to try major nondrug cases.

If a good program is in effect, some limited attorney turnover

can be tolerated. Additionally, it is not inappropriate

for a MDTPU to address the entire spectrum of narcotics

violations, including so-called "small drug cases." This

kind of scope may be necessary for developing expertise,

orienting DEA investigations, and identifying witnesses

and leads for more significant cases.

DOJ envisions an enhanced role in developing coordination

and communication not only among the specialized units,

but among all U.S. attorneys' offices. The diversity and

inconsistency GAO mentions is a natural and probable consequence

because of the broad autonomy the U.S. attorneys have in

their respective districts. We do believe better coordination

and communication can be effected and efforts to improve

this area are being made through closer liaison and training.

GAO suggests three alternatives for strengthening the Department's nationwide drug prosecution strategy. We concur

with increasing Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section (NDDS)

authority over unit activities, as well as with implementing

uniform priorities, at least in the broad general sense,

among the offices. We disagree that a strike force type

of regime in the narcotics prosecution arena should be imposed.

First, with narcotics cases representing 30 percent of the

caseload nationwide, there is no way that a strike force

type of program can be sufficiently comprehensive to be

effective. Secondly, the problem in the narcotics arena

is seen not as exceptional, but rather as symptomatic of

all Federal law enforcement. The needs for coordination,

control, policy standards and uniformity exist in other

enforcement areas as well, although perhaps not to the

extent that they exist in the narcotics area.

E. Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) role in drug

enforcement is limited (pp. 132-138).

The difficulties encountered in engaging the IRS to

investigate narcotic crimes are not unique. A Criminal

Division attorney has been assigned the task of developing

expertise in financial investigations which will include

an attempt to resolve some of the misunderstandings concerning

the effective use of the IRS. DOJ realizes it will have

to take the lead because it impacts on all law enforcement.

Since financial investigation lies at the heart of almost

all significant Federal enforcement efforts, something will

have to be done to streamline DOJ's ability to obtain and

use the information available to the IRS. Although the

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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

report suggests that there is not yet sufficient information

to determine whether the IRS problem is an intolerable one,

DOJ believes the situation is unacceptable.

The Tax Reform Act of 1976 was based on legislative

perceptions of the tax return's sensitivity and the taxpayer's

right to privacy. During an earlier period, at the initial

development of the Organized Crime Strike Force concept,

tax return information played an integral role in initiating,

developing, and prosecuting cases against high level narcotics

traffickers and traditional organized crime families.

Through passage of this Act, Federal investigators are now

impeded from receiving this invaluable information except

with an ex parte court order, a cumbersome judicial process

of varying length. Once a request is processed through

the judicial system, the time period for actual receipt

from IRS ranges from 6 months to 1 year. Because of the

time frame, the case could be adjudicated, making the miaterial

useless.

Current internal policy interpretations and the resultant

constraints placed upon IRS special agents prohibit them

from disseminating tax return information, even though there

may be a clear relationship to narcotics trafficking. Moreover,

IRS agents may receive other Federal agencies' information

in pursuing tax investigations, but are constrained from

reciprocation of this information exchange, even with nontax return information. These reasons--of both law and.

internal policy constraints--have greatly contributed to

the loss of IRS participation in the overall Federal effort

to jointly prosecute major drug traffickers.

F. FBI attack on organized drug crime has yet to be

realized (pp. 138-141).

As stated previously, the FBI does not have primary

investigative jurisdiction under Federal law to investigate

narcotics violations, but is currently providing support

to DEA. The FBI and DEA, since September 1977, have exchanged

more information and worked far more effectively than at

any time in their history. While the individual special

task forces have had mixed results, the opportunity for

individual joint case development has been enhanced and

several joint DEA/FBI investigations are either underway

or contemplated.

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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

G. The Bank Secrecy Act has not yet been as useful

to drug enforcement as originally intended (pp.

141-145).

While the Bank Secrecy Act has not been as useful to

drug enforcement efforts as originally intended, this situation

is changing. The Treasury Department has created a Currency

Investigations Division in the USCS to handle reports filed

pursuant to the Act. The information in the reports is

fed into the USCS Treasury Enforcement Communication System

computer, from which it can be easily retrieved. Sophisticated

matches and searches are now possible. Investigative leads

are referred to the field and other law enforcement agencies,

while arrangements have been made with DEA to provide information which meets certain agreed-upon criteria. Access

by investigators and prosecutors in the field has also been

streamlined. Finally, increased enforcement of the Currency

Transaction Reports and the addition of the crime of attempt

as applied to outbound travelers will greatly increase the

generation of information envisaged by the Act.

H. Achieving international assistance against traffickers:

results have been disappointing (pp. 145-154).

Some of the outstanding examples of major successes

that have been achieved through international cooperation

include the arrests abroad of such major syndicate leaders

as Yow Teh, Pak Yok Lin, Tan Suan-chin, Michael Pokorney,

Vitaya Isaraphanich, Jaime Herrera and John Grammatikos.

These cases are summarized below.

Yow Teh

Officers from the German Federal Police and the Hamburg

Criminal Police arrested Yow Teh and an accomplice on July 5,

1979 in Hamburg. A seizure of 38 kilograms of #3 heroin

in late May led to the arrests. Yow Teh is a Malaysian

citizen who, prior to his arrest, was the alleged leader

of a Singapore/Malaysian syndicate believed responsible

for controlling the distribution of heroin throughout Scandinavia,

northern Germany, and The Netherlands. He also was identified

as an investor and an active partner in a travel service

that arranged for an unsuccessful shipment of 138 kilograms

of #3 heroin seized in Bangkok in late 1976. Authorities

were able to successfully conclude the investigation as

a result of close cooperation between narcotics police in

Germany, Singapore, Thailand, The Netherlands, Denmark and

Belgium.

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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

Pak Yok Lin

When Pak Yok Lin was arrested in Bangkok in May 1976,

his syndicate had been regularly supplying heroin in ninepound lots, often in golf bags carried by Caucasian "tourists,"

to the United States, Canada, Europe and Australia. Released

for "lack of evidence" (reportedly a $50,000 bribe), he

disappeared from view until 1978, when his trafficking activities again came to DEA's attention. In late May 1979,

a joint DEA/Thai investigation culminated in the arrest

of Lin and ten others, and the seizure of a total of 15

kilograms of #3 heroin in Bangkok. Arrested with Lin was

a fugitive from Hong Kong who had been arrested in 1974

for conspiring to import almost six metric tons of opium

and well over four tons of morphine. He has since been

actively smuggling heroin from Bangkok to Hong Kong and

the United States. A second member of Lin's group has been

identified as the source of supply for over 500 kilograms

of #4 heroin during 1978, some of which was seized in Europe.

Tan Suan-chin

Tan Suan-chin, a citizen of Singapore, was a major

international trafficker, whose base of operations was in

Sweden. Suan-chin, an independent trafficker who organized

and financed his own operations, supplied the heroin market

in The Netherlands. In 1975 he was allegedly responsible

for the importation of 125 kilograms of #3 heroin into that

country. In 1976 he attempted to smuggle a single shipment

of 138 kilograms of #3 from Bangkok to Amsterdam, but the

heroin was seized in Bangkok. Several months later, Swedish

authorities arrested him on conspiracy charges for his participation in that unsuccessful venture. A Swedish court

sentenced him to ten years and upon completion of his prison

term he will be expelled from Sweden.

Michael Pokorney

Michael Pokorney started his smuggling activities while

stationed in Bangkok with U.S. forces in 1974. Shortly

thereafter, Pokorney emerged as the head of a well-organized

organization that was smuggling and distributing multikilogram quantities of Asian heroin from Thailand to Detroit,

Michigan, Washington, D.C., and New York, New York. Pokorney

utilized couriers who traveled to Thailand and then returned

to the United States via Hong Kong and Europe. Pokorney

consigned the heroin to high-level black traffickers in

Detroit. On August 23, 1978, Pokorney was arrested by DEA

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'APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

in Detroit for drug trafficking, racketeering, income tax

evasion and continuing criminal enterprise. On March 22,

1979, Pokorney was sentenced to 15 years of custody, fined

$60,500 and forfeited all assets for operating a criminal

enterprise. Pokorney also received a concurrent sentence

of five years and a $10,000 fine for income tax evasion.

Vitaya Isaraphanich

Vitaya Isaraphanich, a Thai national, utilized Thai,

Filipino and Black American males to smuggle heroin into

the United States. Isaraphanich also used a tropical fish

business, air freight and diplomatic channels as methods

of smuggling heroin. Isaraphanich claimed he had a Thai

police contact in Bangkok to alert him to DEA's knowledge

of his heroin shipments. Isaraphanich was arrested in

September 1978 with ten ounces of Asian heroin. In March

1979 he was given a suspended sentence of ten years and

five years probation.

Jaime Herrera

On October 10, 1978, Jaime Herrera-Nevarez surrendered

himself to Mexican authorities. Herrera had been long

documented as the major heroin source in Mexico supplying

the Chicago area. His surrender was a result of pressure

placed by American authorities. Herrera was subsequently

tried and convicted of trafficking in heroin and sentenced

to 5 years and 3 months in prison. The significance of

this arrest lies in the fact that Herrera was the head of

an organization numbering several hundred traffickers,

including chemists, financiers, and major distributors.

John Grammatikos

On April 2, 1979, DEA agents returned from Switzerland

with an internationally notorious heroin trafficker. With

the cooperation of the Greek and Swiss police, John Grammatikos,

alias Johnny Grams, was arrested at Zurich, Switzerland

as he deplaned in January of 1979. Grammatikos headed a

group known to have smuggled at least 75 kilograms of heroin

into the U.S. since mid-1977. Switzerland has an extradition

treaty with the United States and that instrument was utilized

to bring the defendant back to the United States for trial.

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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

GAO's statement that there have been disappointing

results in achieving international assistance against traffickers is not supported by the facts. Because of the

critical impact that international treaties have on domestic

prosecution, several Criminal Division attorneys have iparticipated in ongoing negotiations with the Government of

Colombia. Agreement has been reached on an extradition

treaty and a treaty of judicial assistance. DOJ agrees

that the JANUS program has to be managed more effectively

and has therefore assigned a Criminal Division attorney

who has primary responsibility for international matters

to coordinate this program.

As in all matters dealing with human behavior and national

interests, there are bound to be problems and, most certainly,

disappointments. Nevertheless, there have been many accomplishments. It must be remembered that until a few years ago,

many foreign governments simply dismissed the notion that

they had a drug problem, contrary to existing evidence.

It was much easier to identify drugs as a U.S. problem.

Today the situation is quite different. Many of these same

countries now recognize their own internal problems and

are actively seeking our advice and counsel on drug enforcement and related matters. As a result, international cooperation, although still nationalistically oriented, has

improved dramatically. This, in itself, must be viewed

in positive terms, as should be the entire international

effort of the U.S. Government; and to that end, DEA has

been in the forefront both in practice and principle.

Unprecedented results in Mexico, Burma, Thailand, and Colombia

attest to the success of this intensive campaign.

I. Diversion of legal drugs: a flourishing activity

with little enforcement attention (pp. 154-161).

GAO states that ". . . retail diversion has been neglected

at the Federal and State levels." DEA has initiated several

programs aimed at retail diversion. It is true that these

efforts have not had a major impact on this form of diversion,

but GAO, in a recent report on the subject, "Retail Diversion

Of Legal Drugs--A Major Problem With No Easy Solution,"

dated March 10, 1978, stated: "The Drug Enforcement Administration's efforts to control retail diversion are severely

restricted because of inadequate statutory authority, weak

regulatory requirements, and inadequate resources. The

Controlled Substances Act provides the agency with extensive

authority to register and regulate drug manufacturers and

202
APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

distributors, but not practitioners . . . . Security regulations

for safeguarding drugs are virtually nonexistent, and the

agency lacks statutory authority to establish stronger ones."

GAO states that as a result of DEA's lack of statutory

authority, ". .. the responsibility to control drugs at

the retail level has been relegated to the States. . .. "

The States were given the responsibility at the retail level,

not as a result of DEA inability, but as a part of the

overall design of the Controlled Substances Act, whereby

DEA was given strong statutory authority at the manufacturer/

distributor level and the States, who actually authorize

individuals to practice, maintain responsibility for practitioners.

GAO should note that three different methods of funding

were used for the Diversion Investigation Unit (DIU). Initially,

the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funded

the DIU program because DEA lacked funding authority. In

fiscal year 1977, DEA obtained its own appropriated funds,

but as a transition measure transferred these funds to LEAA

to continue the program. Commencing with fiscal year 1978,

DEA has been funding the DIU program with its own appropriated

funds through cooperative agreements with the States.

J. Recommendations (pp. 164-165).

GAO recommends that the DEA Administrator improve investigative capability against drug traffickers' financial resources

by training DEA agents and hiring financial specialists

to assist in investigations. Since DEA began its financial

intelligence/investigative program in early 1976, its agents

have been sensitized to the potential of this relatively

new addition to the agency's law enforcement arsenal.

Briefing sessions have been conducted as part of DEA's

training courses in conspiracy, intelligence analysis,

intelligence collection, advanced agent, and supervisory

training. Hundreds of other agents, and a like number of

Federal prosecutors, have participated in financial investigative/prosecutive workshops conducted under the joint DEA/DOJ

Advanced Controlled Substances Conspiracy Seminars.

A separate course of instruction in financial investigation has been devised and is currently being taught at

DEA's National Training Institute in Washington. At the

first offering of the course, May 25-29, 1979, representatives

from the Criminal Division, USCS, and the Central Intelligence Agency attended. Key enforcement supervisors and

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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

intelligence analysts were among the course participants.

Additional Financial Investigation Training Seminars are

scheduled with an anticipated attendance of approximately

70 DEA supervisory personnel. The course is aimed at

familiarizing agents and their supervisors with the latest

techniques in mounting effective attacks on criminallyacquired assets as a means of immobilizing trafficker organizations.

Current DEA requirements for the establishment of each

new CENTAC operation include the formulation of a comprehensive

plan to seize and effect forfeiture of trafficker assets.

The 8 CENTACs now underway include such planning.

GAO further recommends that the Attorney General continue

to monitor and improve the operation of DEA/FBI Task Forces,

and seek additional means to use the FBI's expertise in

investigating the financial aspects of drug trafficking

and organized crime. After the establishment of FBI/DEA

joint teams in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles in 1977,

the Department monitored and encouraged the activities of

the teams, assisted in the resolution of problems which

arose shortly after the teams were formed, directed their

efforts toward organized crime members, and monitored the

production of the teams toward selected targets. Close

and frequent liaison between various levels of the management

of FBI and DEA fulfill an ongoing troubleshooting function.

This contact also permits the generation of new approaches

for productive coordination of the mission accomplishment

of the two agencies.

V. Chapter 7 - Mobilizing State And Local Resources Is

Easier Said Than Done Lpp. 186-197J

GAO states that ". . . the Federal role should deemphasize

direct involvement in enforcement actions against low-level

violators, such as in some Task Force operations, so that

DEA's resources will not be diverted from their primary

mission."

DEA does not place emphasis on enforcement actions

against low-level violators. There are no State and local

task forces that purposely target low-level traffickers.

The Task Force Program represents a unique Federal/State/local

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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX

partnership which has tangible and intangible benefits that

cannot be measured merely by examining the level of violators.

Through the Task Force Program, an expanding cadre of local

police officers is being trained and experienced in proven

drug enforcement techniques. These officers can now more

effectively enforce State and local drug laws without DEA's

expertise or assistance, leaving DEA free to concentrate

its efforts and resources at higher levels.

Over the years the mission of the task forces has changed.

Originally the mission was to train local officers and focus

on lower-level violators. Now the mission has evolved to

target violators based on the geographic needs of the task

force area, which are generally higher than the original

scope of the program. This level is dependent on the problem

within a community. For example, a New York City Task Force

might be expected to have higher-level traffickers than

a St. Louis Task Force.

The quality of task force cases has been steadily improving

while the number of arrests has declined. This means that

task force resources are successfully being directed toward

a higher level of the drug traffic. In the 6-month period

that ended December 1977, 13 percent of task force arrests

were Class I cases (higher-level violators), and 55 percent

were Class IV cases (lower-level violators). In a more

recent 6-month period ending December 1978, 18 percent of

task force arrests were Class I cases and only 42 percent

were Class IV.

Following the Attorney General's policy guidance to

encourage more self-reliance by State and local law enforcement

agencies, DEA has taken several steps to enhance this policy.

DFA no longer funds the salaries of participating police

officers in task forces as it did previously. All new task

forces will have a 3-year life span, unless a justification

is recognized for continuance. All existing task forces

are evaluated each year for decisions on continuance.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the report.

Should you desire any additional information, please feel

free to contact us.

Sincerely,

Assistant Attorney Gener

for Administration

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APPENDIX X APPENDIX X

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

FOR ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Henry Eschwege

Director

Community and Economic

Development Division

U. S. General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Eschwege:

We have enclosed two copies of the Department of Transportation's

(DOT) reply to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft: report,

"Gains Made in Controlling Illegal Drugs, Yet the Drug Trade Flourishes.'

If we can further assist you, please let us know.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

I55j

It's a blaw we can live with.

206
APPENDIX X APPENDIX X

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REPLY

TO

GAO DRAFT OF A PROPOSED REPORT

ON

"GAINS MADE IN CONTROLLING ILLEGAL DRUGS,

YET THE DRUG TRADE FLOURISHES"

207
APPENDIX X APPENDIX X

Summary of GAO Findings and Recommendations

This GAO draft report assesses the Federal Government's drug enforcement

efforts during the last 10 years. While it identified notable successes

which have shown some positive results as can be measured by decreased

drug-related deaths and injuries, it found that drug trafficking and

abuse still flourishes. The study suggested four major reasons for this:

the social, economic, and political realities of drug growing countries;

the enormous profits of drug trafficking;-the ease of entry and distribution

of drugs; and the fact that the actions needed to fully support federal

drug strategy implementation have not materialized.

The draft report offered recommendations to deal with the problem areas

identified. They are:

(1) The drug problem requires federal partnership and a tougher

stance. The Executive and Legislation branches must form a

partnership to agree upon and affirm national policy for

dealing with drug abuse problems.

(2) Border management problems need to be resolved. The Executive

Branch should develop an integrated strategy or a comprehensive

border control plan to establish clear, measurable objectives

including what it intends to accomplish with various law enforcement resources.

(3) Opportunities to overcome obstacles in immobilizing major

traffickers. Recommendations include strengthening prosecution

of major traffickers, improving DEA investigative capability,

and continuing to monitor and improve the operation of DEA/FBI

Task Forces.

(4) Strengthen immobilization efforts through changes in bail and

sentencing practices.

(5) Clarify federal, state and local enforcement rates.

Summary of Department of Transportation Position

The Department offers the following concerns regarding the draft analysis

and recommendations:

(1) The draft report, in Chapter 2 (p. 44), suggests that drug

supply reduction efforts have yet to achieve a well-integrated,

balanced, and truly coordinated approach. We believe that this

comment does not recognise the high level of interagency

cooperation that has emerged over the past year. Also, the

accomplishments attendant to this cooperative effort are either

not recognized or are described as temporary in nature. In this

respect, we might also note that neither the report nor the

Appendix III list of GAO Reports on Drug Control, took note of

the February 1979 GAO Report (CED-79-40) "The Coast Guard's

Role in Drug Interception - How Much is Enough?"

208
APPENDIX X APPENDIX X

(2) Chapter 4 of the draft report discusses border management

problems. We are concerned that the report did not recognize

maritime smuggling threats outside of the southeastern region

of the United States. The report further suggests that the

Coast Guard can not stop foreign mothership trafficking due

to lack of jurisdiction or authority. We would like to make

note of two exceptions to this statement. According to the

1958 Convention of the High Seas, stateless vessels, that is,

those not registered in any country, are subject to boarding

by any war ship (which includes Coast Guard vessels). Further,

through the provision of the 1958 Convention of the High Seas,

the Coast Guard may seek permission of the vessels country of

origin to board, determine if contraband is on board and, if

necessary, to take action on the part of the country of origin.

References to this authority, as well as to the Coast Guard's

high seas drug law enforcement successes are discussed in

further detail in the above mentioned, GAO Report, CED-79-40.

(3) We agree with the comments in Chapter 4 which state the

importance of control of U.S. borders in disrupting the

entire drug supply chain -- through seizure of illicit drugs,

discovery of traffic activities, arrest of drug couriers,

and the possible determination of the suppliers and distributors.

We also agree that border control is presently achieving only

limited success in interdicting drug supplies.

(4) We are recommending alternate language for the discussion of

the relationship between marijuana use and automobile. accidents

found in Appendix I, "Extent of Costs of the Drug Problem"

p. 206. This revised language presents a more accurate

description of our understanding of this problem. We recommend

that paragraph 2 of page 206 be rewritten as follows: "Although

marijuana is infrequently mentioned in medical examiner and

emergency room reports to the DAWN System, the suspected relationship between marijuana use and automobile accidents is

cause for concern. There is some preliminary evidence to indicate

that marijuana use at typically social levels could impair some

individual's driving ability and related skills. Some data

suggests that the impairing effects resulting from marijuana

use may persist for several hours beyond the period of apparent

intoxication. Individuals who are not aware of this phenomena

may attempt to drive without realizing that they may still

be impaired."

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APPENDIX XI APPENDIX XI

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

'f79 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220

SEP 27 1979

Dear Mr. Voss:

We wish to thank you for providing us this opportunity

to comment on the GAO report entitled, "Gains Made In

Controlling Illegal Drugs, Yet The Drug Trade Flourishes."

The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service

have each reviewed the draft report. This single response

incorporates the comments of:both the Department and the

IRS, and is signed by Richard J. Davis, Assistant Secretary

(Enforcement and Operations) and Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner

of Internal Revenue, with respect to the programs under our

own respective authority.

The Treasury Department agrees that the problem

persists on a large scale, despite the most energetic

enforcement, crop eradication, treatment, and educational

efforts of Federal, state and local authorities over the

last decade. As the report states, we are still confronted

with an unacceptable level of drug abuse, producing major

social, economic and physical damage to many Americans.

Our experience confirms the need for an integrated

approach not only to border interdiction, but to the

entire Federal drug effort. It is obvious that no single

approach, program, or action will decide the issue or

assure success. We agree with GAO that the Federal effort

must confront the problem and attack it at all points,

particularly those most vulnerable to Federal aiction.

Furthermore, we have agreed with previous-GAO recommendations, again included in this report, for more coordinated

and integrated operations among Federal enforcement agencies.

Specifically, with regard to border interdiction,

which the report regards as "an important opportunity for

interdicting illicit drugs and obtaining intelligence,"

we do not believe sufficient recognition has been given

to the growing cooperation among involved agencies during

the past two years. The Treasury Department, in conjunction

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APPENDIX XI

APPENDIX XI

-2-

with the Customs Service, has undertaken efforts to improve

the coordination of its interdiction program with all other

involved agencies. Customs, Coast Guard, DEA, and INS

officials at all levels meet frequently to assure cooperation

of agency policy and operational activities. A series of

joint interdiction operations has been undertaken at several

border areas, as well as at airports. Intelligence, the

vital key to interdiction success, has been enhanced by the

E1l Paso Intelligence Center with all other involved agencies

in developing and disseminating both tactical and strategic

information on drug smuggling. The result has been a more

effective Federal enforcement effort. Finally, under the

auspices of the White House, regular meetings of the principal

heads of agencies involved in the drug problem have resulted

in significant progress.

This integrated effort has most recently been directed

to the massive smuggling in Florida and adjoining areas.

Initially, the smugglers, employing "mother" ships, conducted

almost unhampered operations. Responding to this smuggling

threat, all of the Federal agencies, as well as state and

local agencies, have formed a fully integrated enforcement

program. Coast Guard cutters, many including Customs Patrol

Officers, have intercepted an increasing number of smuggler

craft and enormous quantities of marihuana. Many of these

smuggler vessels were initially sighted or tracked by Customs

aircraft. Augmenting these efforts to intercept these

smuggling vessels has been the activity of the Customs

Marine Patrol, which has also recorded increases in seizures.

DEA also has been fully involved in these operations and

active in supplying information on vessels and aircraft

involved in smuggling. Similar integrated efforts exist

within the seaports and airports, contributing to numerous

major cocaine seizures. Assisting in supporting these

efforts is the joint Customs, DEA and FBI program to intercept illegal transfer of funds used for purchasing drugs in

Colombia and other countries.

We are currently reviewing the marihuana smuggling

problem in Florida with the Department of Justice in order

to determine what additional steps should be taken to

ensure that all appropriate situations are adequately

investigated.

The Department and the IRS are also in substantial

agreement with the statements and conclusions made in the

report. The IRS views on certain areas covered in the

draft report are included in departmental and IRS responses

to two other GAO reports - "Disclosure of Summons Provisions

211
APPENDIX XI APENDIX XI

- 3 -

of 1976 Tax Reform Act - Privacy Gains with Unknown Law

Enforcement Effects" (GCD-78-1100) issued March 12, 1979,

and "Better Use of Currency and Foreign Account Reports

by Treasury and IRS Needed for Law Enforcement Purposes,"

(GCD-79-24) issued April 6, 1979.

The draft report is correct in stating that the HighLevel Drug Leaders Tax Enforcement Project is designed to

focus IRS resources on individuals who have received substantial untaxed income from illegal drug traffic. The

project focuses on those individuals who can be linked to

drug trafficking only through the analysis of financial

transactions. The IRS believes that this is an appropriate

use of its limited resources. Project guidelines also

require that the IRS use its jeopardy and termination

assessment authority only in those instances justified

under the provisions of existing law.

Additional details concerning the High-Level Drug

Leaders Project appear in the June 14, 1979, statement of

Singleton B. Wolfe, Assistant Commissioner (Compliance)

of Internal Revenue, before the House Select Committee on

Narcotics Abuse and Control. A copy of that statement is

enclosed.

As indicated in Mr. Wolfe's statement, the Internal

Revenue Service gives a high priority to the High-Level

Drug Leaders Tax Enforcement Project. This special.

emphasis is reflected, among other things, by the special

attention given DEA Class I information items as compared

to the processing of other information items received by

the Service. IRS followsla different procedure for processing DEA Class I information items to assure that each

of these items receives a district office evaluation.

In consonance with the DEA-IRS July 27, 1976,

Agreement, the IRS is continuing to work with DEA to

improve the coordination between the two agencies to

provide more effective enforcement against high-level

drug traffickers and financiers. DEA requests for tax

information, of course, will be made in accordance with

provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. On this point,

the IRS is in basic agreement with GAO and recommendations

made on pages 164 and 165 of the draft report. Although

section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code in its present

form may not be a perfect balance of the competing

interests (disclosure versus privacy), the IRS suggests

that additional experience is needed under the Tax Reform

212
.APPENDIX XI APPENDIX XI

- 4 -

Act of 1976 and that additional efforts be made to utilize

the means of informational exchange available under the

present law.

With respect to the multilateral development banks,

a subgroup of the President's Strategy Council on Drug

Abuse examined the subject of economic assistance for

narcotics producing regions. The subgroup, chaired by

Assistant Secretary Davis, recommended an interagency

agreement to institutionalize a formal Justice/State/

Treasury reporting system to assure that all agencies are

aware of the narcotics growing regions' developmental

projects which might be relevant to reducing narcotics

cultivation, and the actions being taken by each agency.

The interagency agreement went into effect on March 28,

1979.

With respect to the narrative and conclusions in the

draft report that pertain to the Bank Secrecy Act, we

direct your attention to the Treasury Department's comments

on the GAO report, "Better Use of Currency and Foreign

Account Reports by Treasury and IRS Needed for Law Enforcement Purposes" referred to above. In addition, we have

enclosed a copy of Assistant Secretary Davis' April 25,

1979, statement before the House Ways and Means Oversight

Subcommittee. That statement, submitted during hearings

on offshore tax havens, contains information not included

in our comments on the earlier GAO report (GCD-79-24).

While we are making a substantial effort to improve

the implementation of the Bank Secrecy Act, the record

should show that the reporting requirements have, for a

number of years, been useful in the identification, investigation, and prosecution of drug, and drug related

violations. Since May 1977, the Department has on its

own initiative, provided DEA with more than 2,800 reports

reflecting currency transactions totalling $370 million.

In addition, Customs frequently has used the authority in

the Act to seize unreported currency carried by drug

suspects.

213
APPENDIX XI APPENDIX XI

We appreciate this opportunity to present the

Department's comments on your draft report, and thank

you for your patience in awaiting our response.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Richard J. vis Jerome Kurtz

Assistant Secretary Commissioner of

(Enforcement & Operations) Internal Revenue

Mr. Allen R. Voss

Director, General Government Division

U. S. General Accounting Office

441 G Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20548

(186520)

214

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