J-S07032-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF T.A.T., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.O., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1939 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 13, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-000605-2018

IN THE INTEREST OF T.A.T., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.O., MOTHER

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:

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1940 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0003044-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.B.T., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.O., MOTHER

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:

:

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1941 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 13, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000603-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.B.T., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.O., MOTHER

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:

:

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1942 EDA 2019
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Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0002127-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.A.T., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.O., MOTHER

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:

:

:

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1943 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 13, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000604-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.A.T., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.O., MOTHER

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:

:

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1944 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000430-2017

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: Filed: April 30, 2020

J.O. (Mother) appeals from the decrees entered June 13, 2019, which 

terminated involuntarily her parental rights to her children, T.B.T., a male 

born in May 2013, E.A.T., a female born in August 2015, and T.A.T., a male 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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born in April 2017 (collectively, Children).

1 Mother also appeals from the 

orders entered that same day, changing Children’s permanent placement 

goals from return to parent or guardian to adoption. We affirm.

The record reveals that the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (DHS) has a lengthy history of involvement with this family. DHS 

obtained an order of protective custody (OPC) for T.B.T. on September 26, 

2016, based on allegations that Mother lacked suitable housing. However, 

the trial court lifted the OPC on September 28, 2016, instructing that DHS 

should obtain a new OPC once it learned of T.B.T.’s whereabouts. The next 

action in this case took place on February 17, 2017, when DHS filed motions 

to compel Mother’s cooperation in its general protective services

investigation. DHS averred that it received allegations that Mother struck 

one of the Children, that the family’s whereabouts were unknown, and that it 

had been unable to complete its investigation due to Mother’s lack of 

cooperation. The court entered an order discharging the motion on February 

27, 2017.

Finally, DHS obtained protective custody of Children on or about

November 14, 2017.2In its applications for protective custody, DHS averred

____________________________________________

1 The trial court entered separate decrees in which it terminated involuntarily 

the parental rights of T.T., who is the father of T.B.T. and E.A.T., and the 

putative father of T.A.T. The court also entered a separate decree 

terminating involuntarily the parental rights of any unknown father that 

T.A.T. may have. Neither T.T., nor any unknown father, appealed the 

termination of his parental rights.
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that one of the Children3 had suffered two black eyes but that Mother 

refused to permit a doctor to examine him. DHS further averred that Mother 

had been verbally aggressive toward DHS and hospital staff. The trial court 

entered shelter care orders on November 15, 2017, and orders adjudicating

Children dependent on November 28, 2017.

Following the adjudications of dependency, Mother made little, if any,

progress toward achieving reunification with Children. As detailed below, 

Mother failed to comply with the objectives in her Single Case Plan (SCP) 

and exhibited hostility toward Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) case 

managers. DHS filed its petitions to terminate involuntarily Mother’s

parental rights to Children on July 24, 2018, along with petitions to change 

Children’s permanent placement goals from return to parent or guardian to 

adoption. DHS filed amended termination and goal change petitions on 

January 30, 2019.

 

2

In the various pleadings filed in this matter, DHS indicates that it intended 

to obtain an OPC for T.A.T. on November 13, 2017, but that it obtained an 

OPC for T.B.T. in error. DHS indicates that it removed T.A.T. on November 

13, 2017, but that it did not obtain an OPC for T.A.T. until November 14, 

2017, and that it did not remove T.B.T. until November 14, 2017, despite 

obtaining an OPC for him on November 13, 2017.

3 The record is inconsistent as to which of the Children suffered the injury. 

The applications for emergency protective custody for T.B.T. and T.A.T.

indicate that T.B.T. suffered the injury. However, the application for 

emergency protective custody for E.A.T., as well as the dependency petitions 

and the subsequent pleadings for all three of the Children, indicate that 

T.A.T. suffered the injury.
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The trial court held a hearing on the petitions on June 13, 2019, at the 

conclusion of which it announced that it would terminate Mother’s parental 

rights and change Children’s goals to adoption. The court entered decrees 

and orders memorializing its decision on June 13, 2019. Mother timely filed 

notices of appeal on July 10, 2019, along with concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal. 

Mother now raises the following claims for our review.

1. Whether the trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate 

[Mother’s] parental rights to [Children] was not supported by 

clear and convincing evidence warranting such determination[.]

2. Whether the trial court’s decision to change [C]hildren’s 

permanency goal from reunification with the parent to adoption 

was not supported by clear and convincing evidence 

demonstrating that such decision would best protect [C]hildren’s 

needs and welfare and be in [C]hild[ren’s] best interests[.]

Mother’s Brief at 5 (trial court answers omitted).4

____________________________________________

4 While Mother filed notices of appeal from the trial court’s goal change 

orders, and while she purports to challenge the orders in her statement of 

questions involved, she does not develop her goal change claim in the 

argument section of her brief with citation to relevant legal authority. Thus, 

Mother has waived this claim. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 

(Pa. Super. 2017) (“[T]his Court will not review a claim unless it is 

developed in the argument section of an appellant’s brief, and supported by 

citations to relevant authority.”). Further, even if Mother had preserved her 

goal change claim for our review, our decision to affirm the decrees

terminating her parental rights would render that claim moot. See In the 

Interest of D.R.-W., ___ A.3d ___, 2020 WL 465686 at *9 (Pa. Super. 

2020) (“[E]ven if Father had not waived his goal change claim, it would be 

moot in light of our decision to affirm the court’s termination decrees.”). We 

therefore affirm the June 13, 2019 goal change orders. 
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We focus our analysis on the decrees terminating involuntarily 

Mother’s parental rights to Children, which we review in accordance with the 

following standard.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of 

parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. It requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in [subs]ection 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to [subs]ection 

2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child 

under the standard of best interests of the child. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In the instant matter, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need 
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only agree with the court as to any one subsection of 2511(a), in addition to 

subsection 2511(b), to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision pursuant to 

subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions 

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

***

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We begin by considering whether the trial court committed an abuse of 

discretion by terminating Mother’s rights pursuant to subsection 2511(a)(2).
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In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[]

§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). Critically, “[t]he grounds for termination due to parental 

incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as 

well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 

337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted).

In its opinion, the trial court found that Mother remained incapable of 

parenting Children and failed to remedy the causes of their placement in 

foster care. Trial Court Opinion, 9/24/2019, at 4-6. The court emphasized 

Mother’s failure to complete her SCP objectives and particularly her failure to 

address her mental health issues. Id.

Mother challenges the trial court’s findings, insisting that the evidence 

DHS presented during the hearing “did not establish any substantial parental 

objective plan that [M]other failed to meet or could not remedy within a 

reasonable period of time to prohibit reunification.” Mother’s Brief at 17, 19. 

She emphasizes that DHS did not remove Children from her care for over a 

year after it became involved with the family and that it filed its termination 

petitions less than six months after she received her initial SCP. Id. at 20, 
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23. Mother contends that DHS and CUA rushed to terminate her rights and 

failed to provide her with the assistance necessary to achieve reunification. 

Id. at 20-22, 24-25. She directs our attention to her testimony during the 

hearing, which she argues demonstrates that she was capable of meeting 

Children’s needs. Id. at 21-25.

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s decision. During the 

hearing, DHS presented the testimony of CUA case management supervisor 

Sonya Jamison, CUA case manager Malia Gadson,5 and CUA case manager 

Symone Brown, all of whom testified regarding Mother’s lack of compliance 

with her SCP objectives. Mother’s objectives included attending a domestic 

violence program, attending drug and alcohol and mental health treatment, 

submitting to random drug screens at the Clinical Evaluation Unit, obtaining

housing and employment, and attending visitation with Children. N.T., 

6/13/2019, at 7, 28-29, 44. However, Mother did not attend a domestic 

violence program, did not attend mental health and drug and alcohol 

treatment, did not submit to random drug screens, and did not provide proof 

of employment.

6 Id. at 7-10, 23-25, 29-30, 39-40, 44-45, 54.

____________________________________________

5 Gadson’s first name appears as “Malia” in the transcript of the hearing but 

as “Melea” elsewhere in the record.

6 Jamison added that Mother received a referral for a parenting capacity 

evaluation but failed to comply, and that she refused to sign consent forms. 

N.T., 6/13/2019, at 30, 40.
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Mother also failed to obtain appropriate housing. At the time DHS first 

became involved with Mother, she was living with her sister. Id. at 7.

Later, Mother began living with her grandfather. Id. at 45. Jamison 

testified that Mother became “very combative” when CUA attempted to visit 

the home and insisted that the case manager not come inside. Id. at 38. 

Similarly, Brown testified that she visited Mother’s home once, which “went 

fine,” but that Mother was uncooperative and hostile during her subsequent 

attempt to perform a “pop-up” visit at the home. Id. at 48.

Perhaps most striking, however, was Mother’s failure to attend 

visitation with Children. Between November 2017,

7 and May 24, 2018, 

Mother attended only 4 of 66 possible visits. Id. at 10. Between May 25, 

2018, and October 24, 2018, Mother attended only 2 of 22 possible visits. 

Id. at 30-31. The record does not reveal the number of visits that Mother 

attended between October 2018 and February 2019. However, from 

February 27, 2019, until the time of the hearing on June 13, 2019, Mother 

attended only 1 of 16 possible visits. Id. at 44-45, 55. While Mother did 

have additional contact with Children via telephone, FaceTime, and/or 

Skype, it was unclear how often this type of contact occurred. Id. at 24, 41. 

Given Children’s young ages, this type of contact is not a substitute for in-

____________________________________________

7 Gadson listed the number of visits Mother attended starting in February 

2017, although Children remained in Mother’s care until November 2017. It 

appears that Gadson used February 18, 2017 as a start date because CUA 

assigned her to Mother’s case at that time. See N.T., 6/13/2019, at 6, 10. 
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person visits that were available to Mother. Children’s foster mother 

testified that Mother spoke to Children infrequently. Id. at 66. When asked 

if Mother spoke to Children on a weekly basis, the foster mother responded, 

“Maybe, sometimes, depending on who is in.” Id.

Finally, the record demonstrates that Mother has been uncooperative 

and even overtly hostile to CUA. Gadson described an incident that took 

place during a visit on February 16, 2018, during which Mother began yelling 

at Children and using profanity. Id. at 10-12. She recalled, 

I tried to redirect her. I guess she didn’t like what I was saying. 

She got irate and was using profanity towards me. So as I 

proceeded to leave the conference room where they was [sic]

having the visit she got up and walked towards me, and that’s 

when the agency had contacted police.

***

THE COURT: What kind of language did she use?

THE WITNESS: Called me B and MF’ers and just using that 

language, and then she said if I terminate her rights she was 

going to terminate my life.

Id. at 12.

CUA removed Gadson from the case and assigned a different case 

manager to Mother. Id. at 13. The trial court also entered a protective 

order on Gadson’s behalf. Dependency Court Protective Order (T.B.T.), 

2/28/2018. Apparently, Mother’s interactions with her new case manager 

were not much better, as the court entered a protective order on his behalf 
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as well. N.T., 6/13/2019, at 31-32; Dependency Court Protective Order

(T.B.T.), 10/2/2018. 

Mother’s belligerent behavior continued during the hearing on June 13, 

2019. She interrupted the proceedings repeatedly, to the point where the 

trial court removed her from the courtroom. N.T., 6/13/2019, at 12-21.

Mother later returned to the courtroom to testify. Id. at 80-96. However, 

at the conclusion of the hearing, when legal counsel for T.B.T. and E.A.T.8

reported that his clients wanted their foster mother to adopt them, Mother

became belligerent once again, resulting in the court’s removing her for a 

second time. Id. at 98-99. 

Accordingly, the record demonstrates that Mother has made little, if 

any, effort to comply with her SCP objectives and achieve reunification with 

Children. She has displayed a lack of interest in Children and their welfare 

by failing to attend visitation consistently, and has been uncooperative and

____________________________________________

8 Counsel explained that the trial court did not appoint him to represent 

T.A.T., who was only two years old at the time. N.T., 6/13/2019, at 69. 

See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018) (holding that where a 

“child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict between the 

child’s legal interests and his or her best interests; as such, the mandate of 

Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act that counsel be appointed ‘to represent 

the child,’ 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), is satisfied where the court has appointed 

an attorney-guardian ad litem who represents the child’s best interests 

during such proceedings.”). T.A.T. did have a separate guardian ad litem

during the hearing. 
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hostile to CUA, the agency tasked with assisting her with reunification.

9

Based on the record, DHS demonstrated that Mother has been incapable of 

or has refused to provide Children with appropriate parental care, and that 

she cannot or will not remedy her parental incapacity and/or refusal at any 

point in the near future. As this Court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be 

held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to 

assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims 

of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 

502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). Thus, we conclude that the court did not abuse 

its discretion by terminating involuntarily Mother’s parental rights to Children 

pursuant to subsection 2511(a)(2).

Next, we consider if the trial court abused its discretion by terminating

involuntarily Mother’s parental rights pursuant to subsection 2511(b). We 

apply the following analysis. 

S[ubs]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, [subs]ection 2511(b) does not explicitly require a

____________________________________________

9 While Mother maintains that DHS and CUA failed to provide her with the 

assistance necessary to achieve reunification, this argument is meritless. 

Even accepting that DHS and CUA failed to provide Mother with reasonable 

reunification efforts, our Supreme Court has held that reasonable 

reunification efforts are not a prerequisite to the involuntary termination of 

parental rights pursuant to subsection 2511(a)(2). In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 

662 (Pa. 2014).
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bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the 

Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the 

emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to 

be considered as part of our analysis. While a parent’s 

emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the 

subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only 

one of many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 

stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, the trial court concluded that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights would not have a detrimental effect on Children and would be in their 

best interests. Trial Court Opinion, 9/24/2019, at 6-7. The court 

emphasized the testimony of the CUA witnesses, which demonstrated that 

Children share a bond with their foster mother. Id. at 5-6. The court also 

emphasized the report of legal counsel for T.B.T. and E.A.T., who stated that 

his clients wanted their foster mother to adopt them. Id. at 5.

Mother argues in response that DHS failed to present sufficient 

evidence regarding the effect that terminating her parental rights would 

have on Children. Mother’s Brief at 26-27. Specifically, Mother complains 

that DHS failed to present expert testimony during the hearing. Id. at 26.
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She insists that this was a critical omission, because Children “have resided 

with and known [her] all their lives” and because she has “raised and cared 

for them since birth[.]” Id.

Contrary to Mother’s assertions, the record reveals that she has failed 

to provide for Children for a significant portion of their lives. At the time of 

Children’s placement in foster care in November 2017, T.B.T. was four-anda-half years old, E.A.T. was two years old, and T.A.T. was six months old. 

By the time of the hearing on June 13, 2019, T.B.T. was six years old, E.A.T. 

was three-and-a-half years old, and T.A.T. was two years old. Thus, 

proportional to their ages, Mother missed a significant portion of their lives.

Importantly, Mother had only minimal contact with Children following their

placement, due to her failure to attend visitation consistently. The CUA 

witnesses testified regarding 104 possible visits that Mother could have 

attended. N.T., 6/13/2019, at 10, 30-31, 44-45, 55. Mother attended only 

seven of those visits and engaged in an unspecified amount of phone contact 

with Children. Id. at 10, 24, 30-31, 41, 44-45, 55. Given this dearth of 

contact, the record confirms that Children do not share a meaningful bond

with Mother. See Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 449 (Pa. 

Super. 2017) (“[A] child develops a meaningful bond with a caretaker when 

the caretaker provides stability, safety, and security regularly and 

consistently to the child over an extended period of time.”).
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To the extent Mother argues that the trial court could not terminate 

her parental rights absent expert testimony addressing her relationship with 

Children, this contention is contrary to our law. This Court has explained 

that trial courts may rely on the opinions of agency caseworkers when 

conducting a subsection 2511(b) bonding analysis. See In re Z.P., 994 

A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“When conducting a bonding analysis, 

the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social workers and 

caseworkers can offer evaluations as well.”) (citations omitted). Here,

Brown testified that she did not believe Children share a bond with Mother, 

that terminating Mother’s rights would be in Children’s best interests, and 

that Children would not experience harm as a result. N.T., 6/13/2019, at 

57-58. She testified that Children are thriving and happy in their preadoptive foster home, where they have resided since November 2017. Id.

at 56-57. Brown added that Children refer to their foster mother as “mom.” 

Id. at 57; see T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268 (“Common sense dictates that courts 

considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a 

pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster 

parents.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its 

discretion by terminating involuntarily Mother’s parental rights to Children 

pursuant to subsection 2511(b).

Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion by terminating involuntarily Mother’s parental rights 
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to Children and we affirm the court’s termination decrees. Because Mother 

waived any challenge to the court’s goal change orders, and because any 

such challenge would be moot due to our decision to affirm the termination 

decrees, we affirm those orders as well. 

Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/30/20