[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-13567

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 4:16-cv-00338-HLM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

EASEMENTS AND RIGHTS-OF-WAY OVER A TOTAL OF 15.66 ACRES OF 

LAND, 

MORE OR LESS, IN GORDON COUNTY, GEORGIA, 

JAMES W. HOBGOOD, 

 Defendants - Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(June 19, 2019)

Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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The Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), a federally-owned corporation that 

acts as an agency or instrumentality of the United States1

, appeals the denial of its 

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury awarded landowner 

James Hobgood $921,125 in “just compensation” for the taking of easements and 

rights of way to construct power lines on Hobgood’s land in northern Georgia. After 

careful review, we affirm.

I. 

Hobgood is the fee simple owner of 374.28 acres of contiguous land west of 

the city of Calhoun in Gordon County, Georgia. This property consists of two 

undeveloped residential lots (5.83 total acres) and an adjacent agricultural tract 

(368.45 total acres). The agricultural tract (the “farm”) is bounded on its western 

edge by the Oostananaula River and is bisected by the Beamer Bottom public road, 

with about 277 acres between the river and road and about 90 acres above the road. 

About 95 percent of the farm is in the floodplain, and it is unimproved except for an 

irrigation system. Hobgood has farmed the land since he purchased it in 1988.

In 2013, TVA announced a project to build a new 115-kV power line in 

Whitfield and Gordon Counties for the purpose of providing a second source of 

electric power to the cities of Calhoun and Dalton. The selected route was 20.5 miles 

long and crossed part of all three tracts of Hobgood’s land.

 1 Springer v. Bryant, 897 F.2d 1085, 1089 (11th Cir. 1990).

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On November 17, 2016, the “date of taking,” TVA filed a complaint and 

“Declaration of Taking” to acquire permanent easements and rights-of-way

(collectively, the “easements”) totaling 15.66 acres of Hobgood’s land. With regard 

to the farm, the only tract of land at issue in this appeal, the easements condemned 

by TVA are 150 feet wide and cross 13.38 acres of the farm adjacent to or near some 

of its borders. TVA has constructed transmission towers and power lines within the 

easements.

II.

The district court set the matter for a jury trial for the sole purpose of 

determining just compensation. Before trial, TVA moved to exclude several

categories of testimony and evidence, including, as relevant here, Hobgood’s posttaking plans to develop the farm into subdivided residential lots. The court granted 

TVA’s motion, finding that “any plans . . . to develop a subdivision were simply 

speculative as of the date of the taking.” TVA, however, did not move to exclude 

more general testimony from Hobgood’s experts—a professional engineer and a 

real-estate appraiser—to the effect that the farm was suitable for future residential 

development and that this suitability affected its market value. 

A three-day jury trial was held in May 2018. The jury heard three different 

valuations of the amount of just compensation to be awarded—that is, the difference 

in the farm’s value before and after the taking (“pre-take” and “post-take,” 

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respectively). First, according to Marion Wilson, TVA’s expert appraiser, just 

compensation was $68,435 based on a pre-take value of $1,842,250 and a post-take 

value of $1,773,815. Second, according to Bruce Penn, Hobgood’s expert appraiser, 

just compensation was $921,125 based on a pre-take value of $2,026,475 and a posttake value of $1,105,350. Finally, Hobgood testified that the pre-take value of the 

farm—approximately $3,375,000—had been cut in half post-take.2

 

At the close of the evidence, TVA moved for judgment as a matter of law. It 

argued that the evidence failed to support Penn’s or Hobgood’s valuation figures. 

The district court denied that motion and submitted the case to the jury, which 

credited Penn’s valuation and awarded $921,125 in compensation for the taking of 

easements on the farm. The court then denied TVA’s renewed motion for judgment 

as a matter of law, and this appeal followed.

III. 

We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, 

applying the same standards as the district court. Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 

597 F.3d 1160, 1173 (11th Cir. 2010). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate 

only when “the facts and inferences point so overwhelmingly in favor of one party 

 2 Hobgood’s total valuation of $3,497,500 included damages for the two residential lots, 

which he valued at a total of approximately $122,500. Excluding damages for the residential lots 

results in the figure cited above—$3,375,000—which reflects Hobgood’s approximate valuation 

of the farm. TVA does not challenge the jury’s award of $75,337.50 for the two residential lots. 

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that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Id. (citation, quotation 

marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted). In making that determination, we review the 

entire record, but we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party 

and do not assume the jury’s role of weighing the evidence or making credibility 

determinations. Id. We will credit evidence supporting the moving party that is 

uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least if it comes from disinterested witnesses, 

but “we will disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not 

required to believe.” Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 

1312 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). 

IV.

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from 

taking private property “without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. (“[N]or 

shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). “‘[J]ust 

compensation’ means the full monetary equivalent of the property taken.” United 

States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970). In other words, “[t]he owner is to be put 

in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not 

been taken.” Id. In general terms, that means a landowner is entitled to “the fair 

market value of the property,” which the owner bears the burden of proving. Id. 

Fair market value is determined at the time of taking. United States v. 320.0 

Acres of Land, More or Less in the Cty. of Monroe (“320 Acres in Monroe County”), 

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605 F.2d 762, 781 (5th Cir. 1979).3 In cases where the estate taken is less than 

absolute ownership, such as an easement, the compensation to be paid is “the 

difference between the fair market value of the land as a whole with and without the 

burden.” United States for Use of Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Robertson, 354 F.2d 877, 

880 (5th Cir. 1966). 

Fair market value includes “all elements of value that inhere in the property, 

but it does not exceed market value fairly determined.” Olson v. United States, 292 

U.S. 246, 255 (1934). Because a reasonable buyer “will purchase land with an eye 

to not only its existing use but to other potential uses as well,” fair market value 

“includes any additional market value it may command because of the prospects for 

developing it to the ‘highest and best use’ for which it is suitable.” 320 Acres in 

Monroe County, 605 F.2d at 781; see Olson, 292 U.S. at 255 (“The highest and most 

profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed 

in the reasonably near future is to be considered . . . to the full extent that the prospect 

of demand for such use affects the market value while the property is privately 

held.”).

The highest and best use of property is presumed to be its current use. See 

Untied States v. 158.24 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Bee Cty., Texas (“158.24 

 3 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 

1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 

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Acres in Bee County”), 515 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1975). But landowners may 

prove, “if they can, that the actual use to which they are putting it is not the highest 

and best use for the property as viewed by a potential purchaser.” United States v. 

Buhler, 305 F.2d 319, 328–29 (5th Cir. 1962). 

When a landowner proposes a different use as “highest and best,” the 

landowner must do more than show that the property is physically adaptable to that 

use. Olson, 292 U.S. at 256–57; Cameron Dev. Co. v. United States, 145 F.2d 209, 

210 (5th Cir. 1944). In particular, the landowner must present evidence of a market 

for the proffered element of value. See 158.24 Acres in Bee County, 515 F.2d at 233 

(concluding that there was no evidence of a “market” or “demand” for the 

landowner’s proposed highest and best use); Cameron Dev., 145 F.2d at 210. In 

other words, the landowner needs to show a reasonable probability that the proposed 

use will be needed and wanted at a near enough point in the future to affect the 

current value of the property. 320 Acres in Monroe County, 605 F.2d at 817–18; 

United States v. 69.1 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Platt Springs Twp. 

(“69.1 Acres in Platt Springs”), 942 F.2d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 1991); see Olson, 292 

U.S. at 257 (speculative and remote uses “not fairly shown to be reasonably 

probable” should be excluded from consideration). 

In terms of proving market value, “[c]ourts have consistently recognized that, 

in general, comparable sales constitute the best evidence of market value.” 320 

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Acres in Monroe County, 605 F.2d at 798; see also United States ex rel. and for the 

Use of the Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Easement & Right of Way over a Tract of Land in 

Madison Cty., Tenn. (“Right of Way in Madison County”), 405 F.3d 305, 308 (6th 

Cir. 1968) (“[E]vidence of sales of comparable property is persuasive evidence of 

market value, either as direct proof or in support of a witness’s opinion.”). 

Ordinarily, “[t]he extent of comparability goes to the weight rather than to the 

admissibility of the evidence.” Right of Way in Madison County, 405 F.2d at 307. 

V.

We divide our discussion into three parts. First, we summarize the relevant 

evidence presented at trial. Second, we describe TVA’s arguments on appeal. And 

third, we evaluate whether the evidence adequately supported the jury’s award.

A.

As noted above, the parties offered competing valuations from expert 

appraisers. But despite their differing results, both appraisers used the same basic

analytical method for valuing the land: the “comparable sales” approach. This 

approach entails considering sales of similarly situated parcels and using those sales, 

with adjustments to account for any relevant differences, to evaluate the value of the 

subject property. E.g., Palmer Ranch Holdings Ltd. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 

812 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 2016). 

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Wilson, TVA’s expert, used comparable sales of agricultural property in the 

area to determine that the farm pre-take was worth $5,000 per acre, for a total of 

$1,842,250. After the taking, in Wilson’s view, the value of 353 acres of the farm 

remained unchanged because that acreage could still be farmed without interference. 

Wilson opined that the highest and best use of the land both before and after the 

taking was its existing use as agricultural land. Wilson explained that it was zoned 

agricultural and that various features of the farm—that it was “predominantly 

floodplain land,” “very flat and level,” and had “access to year-round water and the 

possibility of irrigation”—made it “perfect for farming.” As to the remaining 15 

acres or so, Wilson found that the value of the acreage within the easements (13.38 

acres) was damaged by 90% ($60,435), while the value of the acreage trapped 

between the easements and the property’s eastern boundary (1.7 acres) was damaged 

by 80% ($8000). Accordingly, Wilson found that Hobgood was entitled to $68,435 

in compensation for the taking. 

Penn, Hobgood’s expert appraiser, likewise used a comparable sales approach 

to value the farm as having a pre-taking value of $5,500 per acre and a total pre-take

value of $2,026,475. Penn then used “paired sales analysis” to conclude that the

presence of the power lines diminished the value of the farm by 45 percent; that the 

farm was worth $3,000 per acre after the taking; and that the property had a 

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diminished post-take value of $1,105,350. Using these values, Penn calculated the 

difference between the farm’s pre-take value and its post-take value as $921,125. 

Penn explained that “paired sales analysis” is a type of “trend analysis” that 

involves “look[ing] at the market” and comparing properties with and without power 

lines in the same area and seeing if there is “any difference in value per acre.” Penn 

testified that he found enough comparable sales in Gordon County to “fe[el]satisfied 

that [he] could tell from a trend analysis what the market shows the potential 

difference in value would be to [the farm] with the power line on it.” Penn stated 

that he had done a lot of similar “trend analyses and paired sales” based on 25 years 

of work for both power companies and property owners negotiating with power 

companies, and that his analysis in this case was consistent with his findings 

historically. “Simply put,” according to Penn, “with the transmission line on the 

property now, it will sell for less than what it would before.”

Penn, who had been a real estate appraiser since 1983, elaborated that the area 

of Gordon County where the farm was located was an “investor market” with people 

who “buy and sell land to hold and to resell.” According to Penn, the farm pre-take 

was marketable to investors because floodplain in Gordon County—in contrast to 

other market areas—“provides premium value to a prospective buyer” and “tends to 

hold value” comparable to or higher than “high-end dry land.” 

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But the power lines, in Penn’s view, were a “blemish” that would cause 

potential purchasers to offer less or look elsewhere. He said that power lines, 

regardless of their placement on the property, cause the greatest loss in value to large, 

undeveloped tracts of land like the farm. Due to the presence of the power lines, 

according to Penn, the farm “lost the investor market” because the property was good 

for agriculture only. Penn stated that “[$]3,000 an acre basically demonstrates an 

agricultural use, an exclusive agricultural use, as opposed to the higher land prices 

you’re seeing that investors are paying and people are paying for the expectation that 

something different will be used for the property.” 

Penn initially stated that the highest and best use of the farm pre-take was 

residential development “in the future.” He later amended that opinion by stating 

that, at the time of taking, “[t]he highest and best use is for an investor to come and 

buy it.” He explained that there were “a number of people that buy and sell tracts of 

land [in the area].” So his assessment of the pre-take value was not based solely on 

the farm’s “residential value,” even though he thought it was “natural to assume,” 

due to other residential development in the area, that the farm “would likely go 

residential.” He stated that his opinion had nothing to do with the feasibility of 

residential development, but rather what an investor would pay in the current market 

for “this property with riverfront, what he felt was a good price to pay with the 

expectation that the price would go up in the future.” 

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The final valuation estimate came from Hobgood himself. Hobgood testified 

that the farm pre-take, based on “what [he] could do with it,” was worth 

approximately $3,375,000.

4

 Hobgood, who had lived in Gordon County nearly all 

his life and “fool[ed] with property all the time,” testified that he bought the farm, 

like “any land [he] ever buy[s],” with a view to “what other potential it might have 

rather than just farming.” Hobgood thought the farm would be ideal for cutting up 

into mini-farms “because people like a little land with their home, especially if it 

connects to the river.” He stated that “people pay a big price for property that’s 

abutted up to the river or stream.” And in Hobgood’s eyes, “there’s not a prettier 

view in north Georgia than being on this farm and looking west. You’ve got a 

mountain range behind this and it’s just a beautiful view.” 

Hobgood halved the pre-take value to arrive at a post-take value. He 

explained that, in his experience, power lines harm property values by an average of 

50%. He elaborated that power lines affect the view, and that if the farm becomes 

“estate lots or mini farms,” “you’re looking directly at the power line, because most 

people are probably going to build a home up closer to the road,” where the power 

lines are more visible. On cross-examination, Hobgood stated that he still had 

 4 Hobgood’s total pre-take valuation of $3,497,500 included the two residential lots that 

are not at issue in this appeal. With respect to the farm, Hobgood valued the 277 acres between 

the river and the road at $9,600 per acre and 60 of the 90 acres above the road at $12,000 per acre. 

He did not seek damages for 30 of the acres above the road, which he said were a “low area” where 

he might put in a lake or pond.

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interest from people looking to buy the farm as a sod farm, and he believed he could 

sell it for more than $5,500 per acre. 

Hobgood also called Karl Lutjens, a professional engineer, to offer testimony

to the effect that the farm was suitable for residential development, despite being in 

the floodplain and zoned agricultural. According to Lutjens, there were no 

significant barriers to building houses on the farm. 

As a rebuttal witness, TVA called Randy Saxon, who was hired by TVA to 

review Penn’s work. Saxon testified to various deficiencies in Penn’s analysis, 

including that Penn did not make any analysis of the housing market in Gordon 

County, such as “the current lot inventory of the county, absorption rates for lots, 

[and] absorption rates for houses.” Further, Saxon testified that there was not a 

market for residential development at the time of taking because across the county 

there was a five- to six-year backlog of available residential lots on the market. With 

regard to Penn’s post-take analysis, Saxon stated that Penn’s “paired sale analysis” 

was improper and inconsistent with the standard for conducting that type of analysis. 

Contrary to Penn and consistent with Wilson, Saxon testified that the highest and 

best use of the property was its existing agricultural use. Saxon also addressed the 

studies on which Penn based his conclusion that the transmission line harmed the 

farm by 50%, stating that the studies did not support Penn’s conclusion. 

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Finally, the jury saw an aerial photograph of Calhoun and the surrounding 

area, including the farm, a map of the property marked with the path of the 

easements, photographs of the property and the transmission towers and power lines, 

and information about the “comparable sales” used by the expert appraisers to 

evaluate the value of the farm. 

B.

On appeal, TVA argues that Hobgood failed to overcome the presumption that 

the property’s existing agricultural use was its highest and best use.

5 In TVA’s view, 

because Penn’s valuation, which the jury adopted, was supposedly based on 

residential-development use, Hobgood was required to present evidence of a 

“market demand” for residential-development property. Hobgood failed to meet this 

burden, according to TVA, because he failed to present any objective “marketanalysis” evidence—such as a “market study”—supporting that use, and the only 

market-analysis evidence introduced at trial, through Saxon’s testimony, showed 

that there was not a market demand for residential development property in the near 

 5 TVA maintains that the district court should not have allowed the jury to consider a use 

other than agriculture because Hobgood failed to show that the farm was needed or likely to be 

needed in the reasonably near future for his proposed alternative use. See 320 Acres in Madison 

Cty., 605 F.2d at 815 (“[T]he trial judge has the responsibility . . . to screen the proffered potential 

uses and exclude from jury consideration those which have not been demonstrated to be practicable 

and reasonably probable uses.”). But TVA did not move pretrial to exclude the testimony and 

evidence, of which it was fully aware, that it now claims should not have been admitted. Nor did 

TVA object to the introduction of this evidence at trial. Accordingly, we do not review whether 

the court abused its discretion by failing to exclude this evidence. Nevertheless, we still must 

determine whether the trial evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s award. 

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future. TVA therefore asks that we conclude Hobgood failed to rebut the 

presumption that the highest and best use of the farm was its existing agricultural 

use and remand for entry of judgment based on Wilson’s valuation (for an award of 

$68,435). 

C.

We agree with TVA that landowners must produce credible evidence 

demonstrating a reasonable probability that the proffered element of value will be 

needed and wanted at a near enough point in the future to affect the current value of 

the property. E.g., 320 Acres in Monroe County, 605 F.2d at 781. We also agree 

that proof of physical adaptability alone is not enough. See Olson, 292 U.S. at 256–

57. But viewing the trial evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

Hobgood’s favor, we cannot say that Hobgood failed to meet his burden of proof as 

a matter of law. See Brown, 597 F.3d at 1173. 

As we see it, substantial evidence supports the jury’s award of $921,125 in 

just compensation for TVA’s taking of the easements on Hobgood’s farm. Hobgood 

proffered expert testimony from appraiser Bruce Penn that this amount represented 

the difference in fair market value of the whole tract before and after the taking. See 

Robertson, 354 F.2d at 880. Penn calculated the pre-take value of the farm at $5,500

per acre using comparable sales data. He then conducted a “paired sales analysis” 

of properties in the same area with and without power lines to determine “what the 

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market shows the potential difference in value would be to [the farm] with the power 

line on it.” Based on that analysis, which was consistent with the analysis he had 

performed in numerous other instances involving similar issues, he determined that 

the easements and power lines harmed the farm’s value by nearly 50% and reduced 

the price per acre to $3,000. 

Penn explained that the farm pre-take was desirable land from an investment 

or development standpoint. He testified that he was familiar with the area and that 

the farm was located in an “investor market” with several people who “buy and sell 

land to hold and to resell.” He further testified that the farm pre-take was marketable 

to these investors because riverfront property in Gordon County “provides premium 

value to a prospective buyer” and is comparable in value to “high-end dry land.” 

According to Penn, there had been other residential development in that same area, 

and in his view the farm would likely go residential in the future as well. He stated 

that his assessment of the pre-take value was based on what an investor would pay 

in the current market for “this property with riverfront, what he felt was a good price 

to pay with the expectation that the price would go up in the future.” He further 

testified that the presence of the transmission towers and powers lines would cause 

potential purchasers to offer less or look elsewhere. Cf. Right of Way in Madison 

County, 405 F.2d at 309 (noting that certain segments of the buying public may 

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“remain apprehensive of these high voltage lines, and therefore might be unwilling 

to pay as much for the property as they otherwise would”).

Hobgood likewise testified that he was actively involved in the real-estate 

market in Gordon County and that “people pay a big price for property that’s abutted 

up to [a] river or stream.” Hobgood also testified that the farm had beautiful views, 

and the jury saw pictures of the farm and the surrounding land. Additionally, 

Hobgood offered expert testimony to the effect that the farm was reasonably 

adaptable for residential development, despite being zoned agricultural and 

primarily floodplain. 

TVA responds that this evidence is little more than proof of physical 

adaptability and suitability and that Hobgood failed to present any “objective” 

evidence substantiating Penn’s market analysis. But TVA largely ignores Penn’s 

testimony that he arrived at his pre-take and post-take valuations using comparable 

sales, which we and other courts have recognized are the “best evidence of market 

value.” 320 Acres in Monroe County, 605 F.2d at 798; United States ex rel. Tenn. 

Valley Auth. v. 1.72 Acres of Land in Tenn. (“1.72 Acres in Tennessee”), 821 F.3d 

742, 757 (6th Cir. 2016). While TVA now contends that the comparable sales Penn 

used in his analysis do not actually support his conclusions, it did not move to 

exclude his testimony as unreliable or not based on sufficient facts or data. See, e.g., 

Fed. R. Evid. 702 (governing the admissibility of expert testimony). And we find 

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that the extent of comparability was a matter for the jury to weigh. See Right of Way 

in Madison County, 405 F.2d at 307. Given that Penn was an expert appraiser with 

over 30 years of experience and familiarity with the Gordon County real-estate 

market, we see no reason why the jury could not have credited his testimony that, 

based on these comparable sales, the farm’s fair market value at the time of the 

taking was $5,500 per acre based in part on its suitability for potential use for 

residential development. Likewise, the jury could have concluded based on his 

testimony—regarding “what the market shows the potential difference in value 

would be to [the farm] with the power line on it”—that the transmission line harmed 

the farm’s value in the market and that it would sell for substantially less post-take. 

We likewise reject TVA’s argument that Penn’s valuation was flawed because 

he did not review “market data[] to determine if there was a sufficient demand for 

residential property in Gordon County to support his opinion.” While testimony 

from TVA’s expert appraiser, Saxon, may have established that there was a backlog 

of available residential lots in Gordon County, that does not necessarily contradict 

or even undermine Penn’s testimony that the investor market would have been 

interested in the farm pre-take for its development or resale potential. To begin with, 

not all property is created equal. The jury heard testimony that the farm had beautiful 

views and offered premium riverfront property, so it could have reasonably 

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concluded that the backlog of residential lots would not deter a reasonable purchaser 

interested in those elements of the land. 

Moreover, as the Sixth Circuit has noted, there is a “substantial differential in 

value between farm land susceptible to future development and land already sold as 

a residential or commercial development.” Right of Way in Madison County, 405 

F.2d at 308. Penn valued the farm pre-take as a large tract of farmland with river 

frontage that was susceptible to future development; he did not calculate the value 

of the farm based on a hypothetical subdivision. While the farm may not have been 

in demand for residential use at the time of the taking, the jury was provided with 

enough evidence, construed in the light most favorable to Hobgood, to conclude that 

development was foreseeable and feasible enough that reasonable buyers would 

consider it in deciding what to pay for the property. Cf. 69.1 Acres in Platt Springs, 

942 F.2d at 294 n.3 (“It is unimportant how far in the future the sand will actually 

be mined, so long as the mining is foreseeable and lucrative enough that reasonable 

buyers would consider it in deciding what to pay for the property.”). In other words, 

“a reasonably minded trier of fact faithfully applying the law could find that [the 

farm’s susceptibility to residential development] represents an element of fair market 

value.” 320 Acres in Monroe Cty., 605 F.2d at 818. 

The cases on which TVA relies are all distinguishable. In 1.72 Acres of Land 

in Tennessee, the landowner’s expert was not permitted to testify, and the landowner 

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himself offered no evidence beyond his own testimony about “what he thought were 

demand generators for a hotel.” 821 F.3d at 755–56. Here, by contrast, Hobgood’s 

expert appraiser, based on the “comparable sales” method, gave his opinion as to the 

difference between the farm’s pre-take value and its post-take value.

Nor is this case like United States v. 47.3096 Acres of Land in Oxford 

Township (“47.3096 Acres in Oxford Township”), where the Sixth Circuit reversed 

a finding of just compensation that was based on an expert appraiser’s valuation of 

farmland based on its hypothetical worth as a residential subdivision “via a ‘lot 

method’ of appraisal”—that is, “by estimating the number of lots and multiplying 

the amount by a fixed lot price.” 583 F.2d 270, 272 (6th Cir. 1978). The court found 

that this evidence should not have been admitted because “there was no evidence of 

any current demand or potential for subdivisions in the neighborhood, or evidence 

that defendants had a plan to subdivide the property.” Id. at 272. Unlike the expert 

in 47.3096 Acres in Oxford Township, Penn did not value the farm via the lot method

or as a residential subdivision. And Penn testified that there was demand in the 

investor market for property like Hobgood’s farm at the time of the taking. 

United States v. 341.45 Acres of Land, More or Less, Located in St. Louis 

County (“341.45 Acres in St. Louis County”) is distinguishable for similar reasons. 

See 633 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1980). That case, like 47.3096 Acres in Oxford Township, 

concerned the valuation of property—without road access—as a subdivision. See 

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id. at 112–13. The case of United States v. 1.604 Acres if Land, More or Less, Situate 

in City of Norfolk, Virginia., 844 F.Supp.2d 668, 679–81 (E.D. Va. 2011), 

concerning the feasibility of finishing the construction of a partially constructed 

tower, bears little resemblance to this case, so it is not persuasive. 

Finally, TVA notes that Hobgood’s own testimony reflects that he could have 

sold the farm for use as a sod farm for more than $5,500 per acre. There was no 

additional evidence presented about this offer or potential use, however, and the fact 

that Hobgood may have received an oral offer to buy the farm by prospective sod 

farmers is of marginal relevance. Because “[o]ral and not binding offers are so easily 

made and refused in a mere passing conversation, and under circumstances involving 

no responsibility on either side, . . . [they] cast no light upon the question of value.” 

Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341, 349 (1903).

Throughout its briefing, TVA makes a compelling argument that the evidence 

presented at trial would have supported a verdict in its favor. But Hobgood’s 

evidence of the fair market value of his land was not so remote or speculative that 

no reasonable jury faithfully applying the law could have returned an award in his 

favor. And it is not our role to second-guess the jury’s resolution of conflicting 

evidence or to reweigh the evidence ourselves. See Brown, 597 F.3d at 1173. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of TVA’s renewed motion for 

judgment as a matter of law.

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AFFIRMED.

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