UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) Larry Burnett, et al ., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil N o. 13-02047 (APM) ) American Federation of Government ) Employees, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Larry Burnett is an African American man and owner of Plaintiff Status Controls, Inc., a corporation that provide d electrician services to Defen dant American Federation of Government Employees (“AFGE”). Burnett and Status Controls fil ed suit against AFGE, alleging that AFGE subjected them to r acial discrimination and a hostile work environment in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Status Control s also asserted claims of breach of contract, conversion, and torti ous interference with contract a nd business relations. Burnett asserted an additional claim of intentional infliction of emoti onal distress. Bef ore the court is Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss all six counts in Plaintif fs’ First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of C ivil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the court denies Defendant’s moti on as to all counts, except the two Section 1981 claims against Burnett.2 II. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs’ First Amended Compl aint alleges the following. Burnett, an African American man and resident of Maryland, is the owner and chief operating officer of Status Controls, Inc. (“Status”), a Maryland corporat ion. Am. Compl., ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 1 -2, 5-6. On November 3, 2011, AFGE retained Status to repair and test the elevators at its pr incipal office in Washington, D.C., on “a time and materials basis.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 9, 13-14. “Upon completion of the work to the elevators ,” AFGE retained Status “to perform various other tasks on a time and materials basis,” including running cables, repairing back-u p generators, removing chiller units, and renovating utility rooms.
Id. ¶ 15.
A. Alleged Workplace Host ility Because of Race In late August 2012, AFGE employees began discriminating agains t Burnett and other Status employees because they were African American. Id. ¶ 16. AFGE had retained Status to run feeder cables—a type of elect rical wiring—to “chiller,” or cooling, units that were to be installed on the premises. Id. ¶ 17. Because Status was completing the work, “[t]he building ’s chief engineer, a white man, explained to the project manager, another white man, that the feeder cables should not be added to the renovation[.]” Id. ¶ 18. The project manager replied to the chief engineer “you don’t wants [sic] th ose black people doing that w ork for you.” Id. ¶ 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). In September 2012, a white woman employed by AFGE confronted Bu rnett and another African American Status employee and asked “you people are stil l here?” Id. ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). Later that month, the same AFGE empl oyee again approached Burnett and asked “you black peopl e are still here?” Id. ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).3 In late September or early October 2012, AFGE employees discuss ed how management did not like having Status or Burnett on site “due to Burnett’s race.” Id. ¶ 23. Around the same time, AFGE’s project manager told another AFGE employee “[t]hat s [sic] what you get with them black people working here,” referring to Status’ workers. Id. ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). Also, in September 2012, the National Secretary/Treasurer of AF GE, an African American man, was assigned to oversee the AFGE offices in Washington, D. C. Id. ¶ 28. The National Secretary/Treasurer called a meeting with the project manager, the chief engineer, and Burnett, where he explained that he was “ the project manager’s new boss and he did not want to see him going to the National President to complain about his new super visor.” Id. ¶ 29. After the National Secretary/Treasurer left the meeting, the project manager refer red to the National Secretary/Treasurer as “one stupid n*****.” Id. ¶ 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). Approximately two months later, the National Secretary/Treasure r told Burnett and another African American Status employ ee that Burnett and Status should be “alert” as “[t]hese white people don’t like you and are out to get you because you’re bla ck. Watch yourself.” Id. ¶ 27 (internal quotation marks omitted). He further told Burnett th at Burnett “was the only minority contractor [who was permitted] to work at the subject building. ” Id. In December 2012, AFGE asked Status to provide an estimate for a project to upgrade AFGE’s security system. Id. ¶ 34. Sometime later in December 2012, AFGE representatives notified Burnett that Status had not delivered the upgrade in a timely manner. Id. ¶ 35. According to Plaintiffs, this was “incorrect as the upgrade had not been ordered.” Id. During the same meeting, AFGE representatives told Burnett to conduct his opera tions at night so that he and his “contract employees [would] be kept out of sight” because “all of Status’ contract employees were4 black” and “their status as such scared people.” Id. ¶ 36. Other employees of contractors and subcontractors working on the renovation, however, all of whom were white, were visible to the public and to AFGE management. Id. ¶ 37.
B. Contract Interference and Termination On January 1, 2013, AFGE and Status entered into a commercial a greement for independent contractor services. Id. ¶ 40. Shortly thereafter, A FGE employees “conspired to terminate Status from its work, claiming that Burnett and the c hief engineer conspired to steal copper in the disposal of the chiller units,” even though indus try standards required removal and disposal of the units. Id. ¶ 41. AFGE “without cause” terminated its contract with Statu s and refused to pay Status for work performed or for materials purch ased on behalf of AFGE. Id. ¶¶ 42- 44. In addition, AFGE refuse d to return Status’ tools a nd equipment. Id. ¶ 44. Moreover, after terminating the contract, AFGE initiated a camp aign to blame Status for the negligence of others. Id. ¶ 45. In October 2012, Status b egan installing piping in the building’s elevator shafts. Id. ¶ 25. As part of this project, Status arranged for a pringle switch 1 expert to perform certain maintenance tasks that Status was not qualified to perform. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Apparently, the pringle switch failed or malfunctioned, causing an explosion in the elevator shaft.
Id. ¶ 45. Because of “Burnett’s race and AFGE’s status as a minor ity-owned business,” AFGE blamed Status for the explosion, even though it knew that “this explosion was caused by another
contractor.” Id. ¶ 45. AFGE further expressed its racial animus by filing a cl aim with its insurance company that wrongly attributed f ault to Status for the pringle switch explosion. Id. ¶ 45. As a result of the false claim, Status had to respond to a subrogati on claim and “its relations with its

1 The Pringle Switch, first manufactured by Eaton Corporation, i s a bolted-pressure contact switch used on switchboards. Eaton Corporation, Pringle Bolted-Pressure Contact Switches , (Nov. 2009),http://www.tristateelectricmc.com/pdf/Eaton%20CutlerHammer%20Pringle%20Bolted%20Contact%20Pressure%20Switches%20bro chure%20DM00808002E.PDF5 own insurance carrier have been interfered with and will potent ially result in [an] increased premium and a different i nsurance rating[.]” Id. ¶ 83.
III. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662 (2009), a complaint must contain “sufficient factual

matter , accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausibl e on its face.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678 (emphasis added) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570) (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556). Factual allegations that are “merely consi stent with a defendant’s liability . . . stops short of the line between pos sibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quot ation marks omitted). While t he factual allegations need not be “detailed,” the Federal Rules d emand more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supp orted by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555). When assessing a motion to dismiss based on Federal Rule of Civ il Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must accept Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true a nd “construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States , 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Singh v. District of Columbia , 881 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D.D.C. 2012). The court shall not “accept inferences drawn by [the] plaintiff if those inferences6 are not supported by the facts se t out in the complaint, nor mu st the court accept legal conclusions cast as factual allegations.” Hettinga , 677 F.3d at 476 (citations omitted).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Counts III and IV) Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 protects the right of “[a]ll persons wit hin the jurisdiction of the United States” to “make and enfo rce contracts . . .” without re spect to race. 42 U.S.C.A §1981(a) (2014). The current version of the statute defines “make and e nforce contracts” to “include[] the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts , and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, a nd conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C.A §1981(b) (2014). Any claim brought under section 1981 “must initially i dentify an impaired ‘contractual relationship’ . . . under which the plaintiff has rights.” Domino’s Pizza v. McDonald , 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006) (footnote omitted). Both Burnett and Status al lege that AFGE subjected them to disparate treatment discrimina tion and a hostile work environme nt in violation of Section 1981.
See Am. Compl., Counts III and IV at 8-9. The parties’ briefing has narrow ed the issues the court must ad dress concerning the Section 1981 claims. Burnett concedes that because AFGE’s cont ract was with Status—not with him personally—he does not have cognizable Section 1981 claims. Pl.s’ Opp., ECF No. 10 at 3. Burnett’s Section 1981 claims, therefore, are dismissed with pr ejudice. In addition, although AFGE’s motion seeks dismissal of “all of the causes of action i n the complaint,” Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, AFGE has not specifically articulated why Status’ di sparate treatment count fails to state a claim. See Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Second Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9-1 (he reinafter Def.’s Mem.). Because “[it] is not the court’s role to fill in the blanks in counsel’s argument,” The Power Co. of America v. FERC , 245 F.3d 839, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and because Defendant has7 not specified an argument to support dismissal, the court does not consider Defendant to have moved to dismiss Status’ di sparate treatment claim, see Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA , 255 F.3d 855, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“A litigant does n ot properly raise an issue by addressing it in a ‘cursory fashion’ with only ‘bare-bones argu ments.’”) (quoting Wash. Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry , 107 F.3d 32, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (other citations omitted). Thus, the only Section 1981 claim that remains for the court’s consid eration is Status’ hostile work environment claim. As to that claim, AFGE advances only a narrow argument. It con tends that Status has failed to state a claim because it has not alleged any harm to itself that is separate and distinct from the “emotional harm and suffering of Mr. Burnett.” Def.’s Mem. at 7. The court disagrees. In Gersman v. Group Health Association , the Court of Appeals held that a corporation whose contract was severed “solely because an individual associated with [the corporation] was Jewish” could bring a Section 1981 claim because “the injury suffered by the plaintiff [corporation] falls within the zone of interests protected by the statute[.]” 931 F.2d 15 65, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1991), vacated on other grounds , 502 U.S. 1068 (1992), reinstated 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Similarly here, Status has alleged harm separate and apart from its owner, Burn ett. Status claims that the hostile work environment its employees experienced caused it to “[lose] and . . . continue to lose business” and that it has “lost and will continue to lose the benefit of [its] bargain with AFGE[.]” Am. Compl. ¶ 68. It remains to be seen whether Status can assemble proof of separate injury to prevail at trial or at summary judgment. At this stage, however, when the court must treat as true the allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in a plaintiff’s favor, Status’ allegation of separate harm is sufficient to overcome AFGE’s mo tion. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (stating with respect to establishin g standing that, “[a]t the8 pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice”). Defendant’s motion to dismiss w ith respect to Count IV is ther efore denied.
B. State Law Claims Next, Defendant contends that Pl aintiffs have failed to adequat ely plead their state law claims. The court turns first to Burnett’s claim for intention al infliction for emotional distress (Count V), and then considers Status’ claims for breach of cont ract (Count I), conversion (Count II), and tortious interfere nce with contracts and busine ss relations (Count VI).
1. Intentional Infliction of Emo tional Distress (Count V) To establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional dis tress, a plaintiff must show “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendan t which (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plain tiff severe emotional distress.” D.C. v. Tulin , 994 A.2d 788, 800 (D.C. 2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitt ed). 2 “Intent or recklessness can be inferred from the outrageousness of the acts.” Howard Univ. v. Best , 484 A.2d 958, 985 (D.C. 1984) (citations omitted). D efendant argues that Burnett ’s allegations of racial bias and hostility do not rise to the lev el of “extreme and outrageous” conduct. Def.’s Mem. at 7-9. 3 In deciding whether alleged conduct is “extreme and outrageous, ” the court must consider: “(1) applicable contemporary community standards of offensivene ss and decency, and (2) the specific context in which t he conduct took place[.]” King v. Kidd , 640 A.2d 656, 668 (D.C. 1993) (citation omitted). The “liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or o ther trivialities,” although statements that were considered a

2 District of Columbia substantive law applies to the four stat e law claims because the conduct that forms the basis for the alleged claims occurred in the District of Columbia. See Olaniyi v. District of Columbia , 763 F. Supp. 2d 70, 93 n. 19 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted). 3 Defendant also argues that Burn ett’s claim of intentional infl iction of emotional distress should fail because that claim is encompassed by his Section 1981 claims. See Def.’s Mem. at 8-9. However, because Burnett does not have a cognizable Section 1 981 claim, there is no legal obstacle to his proceeding on a p ersonal tort claim.9 “petty oppression,” “trivial” or merely “inconsiderate and unki nd” fifty years ago may be “extreme and outrageous” conduct under “tod ay’s social standards and pri nciples (or vice-versa).” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts have applied a balancing test to determine whether the alleged conduct “violates prevailing soci al norms and is sufficiently outrageous to ensure that the a dvantage to society of preventin g such harm seems greater than the advantage of leaving ill-disposed persons free to seek their ha ppiness in inflicting it.” Id. at 668- 69 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the work place, isolated incidents of race discrimination ge nerally will not qualify as “extreme and outrageous” conduct. See, e.g. , Paul v. Howard Univ ., 754 A.2d 297, 308 (D.C. 2000) (holding that a “few isolated incidents” do not suffice t o establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress). 4 But a pervasive discriminatory environment does. The “[c]reation of a hostile wor k environment by racial or sexu al harassment may, upon sufficient evidence, constitute a prima facie case of intentional inflicti on of emotional distress.” Best , 484 A.2d at 986 (citing Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp. , 565 P.2d 1173, 1777 (W ash. 1977) (en banc), which held that a Mexican American plaintiff had stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress where he alleged that he was r epeatedly subject to racial slurs). And “[r]epeated harassment . . . may compound the outrageousnes s of incidents which, taken individually, might not be suffi ciently extreme to warrant liab ility.” Best , 484 A.2d at 985 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

4 This is not to say that an isolated incident of racial discrim ination might not give rise to hostile work environment claim under Section 1981. In Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae , the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to an employer on an employee’s Secti on 1981 hostile work environment claim when the evidence showed, inter alia , that his supervisor on one occasion had used the n-word when expelling the employee from his office. The court explained that, “[a]s other courts have observed, perhaps no single act can more quickly alter the conditions of employment than the use of an unambiguo usly racial epithet such as [n-word] by a supervisor. This single incident might well have been sufficient to establi sh a hostile work environment.” 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks o mitted).10 AFGE construes Burnett’s tort claim as resting on two utterance s of the n-word that were not directed at Burnett but at AF GE’s National Secretary/Treasu rer. Def.’s Mem. at 8 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30-31). Defendant ar gues that, although those statem ents are “highly offensive,” they do not constitute “extreme and outrageous” conduct. Id. Defendant’s reading of the complaint is far too restricted. The complaint recounts a pattern of racist and discriminatory comments and conduct far beyond two mere utterances of the n-word. AFGE’s p roject manager said to its chief engineer “you don’t wants those black people doing that work fo r you,” Am. Compl. ¶ 19; an AFGE employee directly asked Bur nett are “you black people are still here?” id. ¶ 22; the project manager told an AFGE employee “[t]hat’s what you get with them black people working here,”
id. ¶ 24; AFGE’s National Secretary/Treasurer told Burnett that “[t ]hese white people don’t like you and are out to get you because you’re black,” id. ¶ 27; and the project manager twice uttered the n-word, id. ¶¶ 30-31. In addition to these discriminatory comments, Burnet t alleges a number of racially-motivated demeaning or punitive acts by AFGE. AFGE required Status to conduct its operations at night because Burnett and his employees were Afri can American. Id. at ¶ 36. AFGE falsely accused Burnett of trying to steal copper as a pretext to terminating Status’ contract. Id. ¶ 41. And AFGE unjustly blamed Bu rnett for the pringle switch explosion, knowing that another contractor was responsible for the damage. Id. ¶ 45. As a result of these discriminatory acts, Burnett asserts that he suffered “severe mental anguish” and “s ubstantial weight loss.” Am. Compl. ¶ 76. Taking these alleged facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the court concludes that Burnett has stated a claim for intenti onal infliction of emotional distress. Although each statement or action standing alone may not be “su fficiently extreme to warrant liability,” see Best , 484 A.2d at 985 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), the11 alleged pattern of harassing c onduct was sufficiently “degradin g and humiliating” to give rise to a claim of intentional inflic tion of emotional distress, id. at 986. AFGE’s motion to dismiss Count V is denied.
2. Conversion (Count II) The tort of conversion consists o f “unlawful exercise of owners hip, dominion or control over the personal property of another in denial or repudiation of his rights thereto.” Shea v. Frindley , 123 A.2d 358, 361 (D.C. 1956) (footnote omitted). “[W]here t he defendant’s initial possession is lawful, the settled rule is that it [sic] the abs ence of other facts and circumstances independently establishing conversion, a demand for its return is necessary to render his possession unlawful and to show its adverse nature.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Savoy Const. Co. v. Atchison & Keller, Inc ., 388 A.2d 1221, 1223 (D.C. 1988) (stating that plaintiff’s ve rsion of facts justified a suit for conversion, because the evidence can suppo rt a finding that defendant unlawfully possessed plaintiff’s property, and plaintiff’s empl oyee testified that he requested and was refused return of the property). The court disagrees with Defenda nt’s contention that Status has done nothing more than recite the elements of a conversion claim. See Def.’s Mem. at 4-5. Status alleges that it was hired by AFGE to conduct repairs and other maintenance tasks that req uired the use of tools on AFGE’s property. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14. Status further alleges that, a fter improperly terminating Status’ contract, AFGE “refused to return tools and equipment owned by Status.” Id. ¶ 44. Status concludes: “AFGE without rights to same has retained tools and equipment owned by Status and further has refused to return and/or pay for materials purchase d by Status with the intention of depriving Status of same and/or for AFGE’s use.” Id. ¶ 54. These allegations are sufficient to establish that AFGE wrongfully exercised “ownership, dominion o r control” over the tools and12 equipment owned by Status “in denial or repudiation of [its] ri ghts thereto.” Shea , 123 A.2d at 361. Based on these facts, the court may “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556). The motion to dismiss is accordingly denied with respect to Count II.
3. Breach of Contract (Count I) To prevail on a claim of breach of contract, a plaintiff must e stablish “(1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) a n obligation or duty arising out of t he contract; (3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach.” Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez , 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009) (citation omitted). “[T]o state a claim for breach of co ntract so as to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it is enough for the plaintiff to describe t he terms of the alleged contract and the nature of the defendant’s breach.” Francis v. Rehman , No. 14-CV-190, 2015 WL 791408, at *4 (D.C. Feb. 26, 2015) (citing Nattah v. Bush , 605 F.3d 1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). Status’ complaint is hardly a model of clarity. Status has all eged at least two different contracts with AFGE—a “time and materials contract,” Am. Compl. ¶ 14, 5 and a “commercial agreement for independent contractor services.” 6 Id. ¶¶ 40. Based on the complaint, it is unclear whether Status is alleging a violation of the “time and materia ls contract,” the contract for “independent contractor services,” or both. See id. ¶¶ 47-48 (identifying both contracts). It is

5 This “time and materials contract” may refer to and include the following: (1) a contract to “perform work to repair and/or test elevators in the subject property,” Am. Compl

. ¶¶ 13-14; (2) a contract to “p erform various other tasks on a time and materials basis,” which “included but was not limite d to running cables, repairs to back-up elevator generators and the removal of chiller units as well as renovati ons to utility rooms,” id. ¶ 15; (3) “work to install piping in elevator shafts for proper grounding of new equipment and da ta runs,” id. ¶ 25; and/or (4) “remov[ing] chiller units from the subject property,” id. ¶ 32. 6 In support of its Second Motion to Dismiss, Defendant attaches the “commercial agreement for independent contractor services” and argues th at it was a monthly contract that permitted no-cause termination by either side with fourteen days’ written notice to t he other party. Def.’s Mem a t 2-3; Ex. to Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9-2. According to Defendant, the contract was properly terminated on January 16, 2013 based on “the failure of Plaintiff . . . to provide the intended contracted for servi ces until late March 2013, as conceded by Plaintiff[.]” Def.’s Mem. at 3. Plaintiff alleges, however, that the contrac t was breached not by Defendant’s termination, but by Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiff. See Pl.’s Opp. at 2.13 further unclear whether Status is alleging breach based on AFGE ’s improper termination of the contract, id. ¶ 42, failure to remit payment for services, ¶¶ 51-52, or both. In its opposition, Status attempts to clarify that “Plaintiff does not allege that Defend ant breached the contract by terminating it. Rather, the breach occurred as the result of D efendant’s failure to pay [Status] for work performed and materials purc hased prior to the termination [.]” Pl.’s Opp. at 2. The “purpose of the minimum standard of Rule 8 is to give fair notice to the defendants of the claim being asserted, sufficient to prepare a responsive an swer, to prepare an adequate defense and to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies.” Ihebereme v. Capital One , 730 F. Supp. 2d 40, 47 (D.D.C. 2010) (citation omitted). Courts have dismissed breach of contract claims for vagueness or imprecision. See, e.g. , Logan v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n , 80 A.3d 1014, 1023- 24 (D.C. 2013) (dismissing claim where complaint failed to spec ify which contract provisions were breached or what act or omission by defendants constituted a breach); Edmond v. Am. Educ.
Serv ., No. 10-0578 (JDB), 2010 WL 4269129, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2 010) (dismissing claim where complaint failed to allege the existence of a contract be tween the parties); Ihebereme , 730 F. Supp. 2d at 47-48 (dismissing claim where complaint failed t o show that the defendant had a contractual duty relevant to the alleged breach). But, unlike those cases, Status’ complaint sufficiently alleges the existence of a contract, its general t erms, and the contractual obligation that Defendant purportedly violated ( i.e. failing to pay Plaintiff). When those elements are pled, as here, courts have held that plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim, despite the otherwise imprecise or vague nature of the complaint. See, e.g ., Nattah , 605 F.3d at 1057-58 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (plaintiff sufficiently pled breach of contract claim whe re he described the terms of the alleged contract and defendants’ breach, despite a lack of clar ity in the complaint about when the contract had been formed and who had entered it); cf. Ponder v. Chase Home Fin. , 865 F. Supp.14 2d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2012) ( pro se plaintiff pled a claim despite the complaint being “less detai led than the complaint in Nattah ” as he identified the parties and material terms of the contra cts and alleged facts pertaining to his performance and defendant’s bre ach); Akers v. Beal Bank , 668 F. Supp. 2d 197, 200 (D.D.C. 2009) ( pro se plaintiff sufficiently pled a claim despite failure to attach or identify the contract at issue or cite the contractual provi sion that was allegedly breached; her allegations described the basic contractual terms and the defen dant’s breach and were thus sufficient to put the defendants on notice of her claim). Defe ndant’s motion to dismiss with respect to the breach of contract cla im is therefore denied.
4. Tortious Interference With Contrac ts and Business Relations (Co unt VI) To establish a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) the existence of a contract, (2) defendant’s k nowledge of the contract, (3) defendant’s intentional procu rement of the contract’s breac h, and (4) damages resulting from the breach.” Cooke v. Griffiths-Garcia Corp ., 612 A.2d 1251, 1256 (D.C. 1992) (citation omitted). The elements of tortious interfe rence with business relations, or prospective business advantage, are similar, requiring a mere prospective advantageous business transaction instead of the existence of a contract. See Casco Marina Dev. v. District of Columbia , 834 A.2d 77, 84 (D.C. 2003). Status alleges that AFGE tortuous ly interfered with its contrac t or its business relationship with Status’ insurance carrier when AFGE filed an insurance claim for the pr ingle switch explosion with AFGE’s insurance carrier and wrongfully blamed Status for the damage. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45, 82. AFGE does not challenge Status’ pleading of the ele ments. Rather, AFGE moves to dismiss solely on the ground that its filing of an insurance cl aim was “privileged conduct,” “as it [was] carried out in order to protect a present, existing econo mic interest.” Def.’s Mem. at 9 (citing15 Futrell v. Dep’t of Labor Fed. Credit Union , 816 A.2d 793, 808 n. 13 (D.C. 2003) and Raskauskas v. Temple Realty Co ., 589 A.2d 17, 27 (D.C. 1991)). If Status had pled merely that AFGE’s filing of an insurance cl aim interfered with Status’ contract or relationship with its insurance carrier, and no mor e, AFGE’s claim filing arguably would be privileged. But Status ha s pled more. It alleges tha t: Since terminating its contract with Status, AFGE has engaged in a campaign to blame it for negligence committed by others, including assertin g an insurance claim for a ground fault in the pringle switch which caused an explos ion in an elevator shaft which Status never had any contact with during its work a nd which AFGE had expressly retained the servi ces of others. AFGE knew that this explosion was caused by another contractor but sought to blame Status due to Burnett’s race and AFGE’s status as a minority-owned business. Am. Compl. ¶ 45. The court must, a t the motion of dismiss stag e, take as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and draw all r easonable inferences in Plaintif f’s favor. See Hettinga , 677 F.3d at 476. If the facts alleged are true, AFGE’s filing of an insura nce claim was not p rivileged because it was not done to “protect a pre sent, existing economic intere st,” Futrell , 816 A.2d at 808 n. 13 (citation omitted) (internal quot ation marks omitted), but rath er to harm Status “due to Burnett’s race and AFGE’s status as a minor ity-owned busine ss,” Am. Compl . ¶ 45. The motion to dismiss with respect to Count VI is thus denied.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the reasons stated above, Counts III and IV are dismissed w ith respect to Burnett with prejudice. As to all other clai ms, Defendant’s motion to dismi ss is denied. The court will issue a separate order setting an Initi al Scheduling Conf erence in this matter.

Dated: April 22, 2015 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge