alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2014395EN.01001801.xml

| 10.11.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 395/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.11.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 395/18

---

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 4 September 2014 — European Commission v Hellenic Republic

(Case C-351/13) (1)

((Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Directive 1999/74/EC - Articles 3 and 5(2) - Rearing of laying hens - Unenriched cages - Prohibition - Rearing of laying hens in cages which do not comply with the requirements of that directive))

(2014/C 395/22)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: A. Markoulli and B. Schima, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Hellenic Republic (represented by: I.-K. Chalkias, E. Leftheriotou and M. Tassopoulou, Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1) | declares that, by failing to ensure that from 1 January 2012 laying hens are no longer reared in unenriched cage systems, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3 and Article 5(2) of Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens; |
| --- | --- |

1)

declares that, by failing to ensure that from 1 January 2012 laying hens are no longer reared in unenriched cage systems, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3 and Article 5(2) of Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens;

| 2) | orders the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2)

orders the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 260, 7.9.2013.

---
#### J. W. Lawson *et al.*v. Eliza A. Rush *et al.*

No. 16,033.

Cross-petition — *Summons Not Necessary.*The rule applied that a new summons need not be issued upon a cross-petition.

Error from Leavenworth district court; James H. Gillpatrick, judge.

Opinion filed May 8, 1909.

Affirmed.

*W. W. Hooper,*for the plaintiffs in error.

*W. B. Brownell, J. H. Mitchell,*and *A. E. Dempsey,*for the defendants in error.

*263
      *Per Curiam:*

There is no merit in the contentions of the plaintiffs in error. They were served with summons in the foreclosure proceeding, entered their appearance, and filed dilatory motions which prevented the action from being tried at the October term. The motions were then withdrawn and permission was obtained to answer within twenty days, but no answer was filed. A further extension of twenty days was granted to answer, “without prejudice to a trial at the January term.” At this time one of their codefendants had already filed a cross-petition asking for the foreclosure of a second mortgage. No answer or further appearance was made until six weeks after the judgment was entered, when motions were filed asking the court to set'aside the judgment for irregularity.

The case was regularly set for trial at the January term and was regularly tried. A summons on the cross-petition was not necessary. The original summons brought the defendants into court for every purpose connected with the case, and they were bound to take notice of all the proceedings that followed. *(Kimball and others v. Connor, Starks and others,*3 Kan. 414; *Curry v. Janicke,*48 Kan. 168; *Jones v. Standiferd,*69 Kan. 513, 517.)

The record shows nothing irregular in the proceedings, and discloses such a lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiffs in error as fully to justify the court in refusing to set aside the judgment. Affirmed.
PUBLIC LAW 111–138—FEB. 1, 2010 124 STAT. 7 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 692: 

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 111–87 (Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs). 

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: 

Vol. 155 (2009): Oct. 14, considered and passed Senate. 

Vol. 156 (2010): Jan. 13, considered and passed House. 

Æ 

Public Law 111–138 

111th Congress 

An Act 

To provide that claims of the United States to certain documents relating to Franklin 

Delano Roosevelt shall be treated as waived and relinquished in certain circumstances. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. TREATMENT OF OWNERSHIP OF CERTAIN DOCUMENTS 

RELATING TO FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—If any person or entity makes a gift of any 

property described in subsection (b) to the National Archives and 

Records Administration, then any claim of the United States to 

such property shall be treated as having been waived and relinquished on the day before the date of such gift. 

(b) PROPERTY DESCRIBED.—Property is described in this subsection if such property— 

(1) is a part of the collection of documents, papers, and 

memorabilia relating to Franklin Delano Roosevelt or any 

member of his family or staff; and 

(2) was in the possession of Grace Tully and retained 

by her at the time of her death. 

(c) DATE OF GIFT.—The date of a gift referred to in subsection 

(a) is any date specified by the donor so long as such date is 

subsequent to the physical delivery of the property described in 

subsection (b) to the National Archives and Records Administration. 

Approved February 1, 2010. 

Feb. 1, 2010 

[S. 692] 


anorris on DSK5R6SHH1 with PUBLIC LAWS
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 21



                          SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY

     The following table sets forth all subsidiaries of Smith International,
Inc., other than inactive and insignificant subsidiaries that, considered in
the aggregate, would not constitute a significant subsidiary, indicating the
percentage of issued and outstanding voting securities beneficially owned by
it:


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                             % of Direct
                                         Where               and Indirect
     Name of Subsidiary                  Incorporated         Ownership
     ----------------------------------------------------------------------
     <S>                                 <C>                 <C>        

     Smith Internacional,
      S.A. de C.V.                       Mexico                      l00%
     Omega II Insurance Ltd.             Bermuda                     l00%
     S.I. Nederland B.V.                 Netherlands                 l00%
     Smith International
      Acquisition Corp.                  Delaware                    100%
     Smith International
     Australia (Pty) Ltd.                Australia                   l00%
     Smith International
      Canada Ltd.                        Canada                      l00%
     Smith International
      do Brasil Ltda.                    Brazil                      l00%
     Smith International
      Deutschland GmbH                   Germany                     l00%
     Smith International
      Gulf Services Ltd.*                U.A.E.                       49%
     Smith International
      France, S.A.R.L.                   France                      l00%
     Smith International
      Italia, S.p.A.                     Italy                       l00%
     Smith International
      (North Sea) Ltd.                   Scotland                    l00%
     Smith Internacional
      de Venezuela, C.A.                 Venezuela                   l00%
     ----------------------------------------------------------------------
</TABLE>


     * Not consolidated; accounted for on the equity method of
       accounting.

Except as indicated, all of the above subsidiaries are included in the
Company's consolidated financial statements.



                                   EXHIBIT 21
# C_2012287EN.01003802.xml

| 22.9.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 287/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.9.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 287/38

---

Action brought on 30 July 2012 — Grupo T Diffusión v OHIM — ABR Producción Contemporánea (Lamps)

(Case T-343/12)

2012/C 287/69

Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Grupo T Diffusión (El Prat de Llobregat, Spain) (represented by: A. Lasala Grimalt, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: ABR Producción Contemporánea, SL (Barcelona, Spain)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 1 June 2012 in Case R 1622/2010-3 concerning invalidity proceedings in respect of Community design No 000 42 7448-0001 and declare that design to be fully effective and valid, with no order for costs against Grupo T Diffusión, SA in respect of the costs of ABR and OHIM |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 1 June 2012 in Case R 1622/2010-3 concerning invalidity proceedings in respect of Community design No 000 42 7448-0001 and declare that design to be fully effective and valid, with no order for costs against Grupo T Diffusión, SA in respect of the costs of ABR and OHIM

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Registered Community design in respect of which a declaration of invalidity has been sought: Design for a lamp — Registered Community Design No 000 42 7448-0001

Registered Community design in respect of which a declaration of invalidity has been sought:

Proprietor of the Community design: The applicant

Proprietor of the Community design:

Applicant for the declaration of invalidity of the Community design: ABR Producción Contemporánea, SL

Applicant for the declaration of invalidity of the Community design:

Grounds for the application for a declaration of invalidity: Prior design of a ‘Cypress’ standard lamp

Grounds for the application for a declaration of invalidity:

Decision of the Cancellation Division: Application for a declaration of invalidity upheld

Decision of the Cancellation Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Appeal dismissed

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002

Pleas in law:

---
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk June 18, 2009

d0617 

# Order

June 18, 2009

138724 & (23)

ERIC KORPAL an d MARY KORPAL, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v SC: 138724 COA: 290077 Saginaw CC: 03-049832-NH SAMUEL J. SHAHEEN, M.D. and MIDWESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C., Defendants,

and

STEPHEN A. MESSANA, D.O., SCOTT CHENEY, M.D., ADVA NCED DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING, P.C., and COVENANT HEALTHCARE, Defendants-Appellees.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the motion for i mmediate consideration is GRANTED. We further ORDER that trial court proceedings are stayed pending th e completion of this appeal. The application for leave to appeal the March 12, 2009 or der of the Court of Appeals remains pending.
EXHIBIT 31.b CERTIFICATE OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Theodore Misiewicz, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2005, of Morgan Beaumont, Inc. (the Company); 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The Companys other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules13a-15 and 15d-15) for the Company and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this report (the Evaluation Date); and (c) Presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date; 5. The Companys other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the Companys auditors and the audit committee of Companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): (a) All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the Companys ability to record, process, summarize and report      financial data and have identified for the Companys auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Companys internal controls; and 6. The Companys other certifying officers and I have indicated in this report whether there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses. Date: June 2, 2006
        /s/ Theodore MisiewiczTheodore Misiewicz, Chief Financial Officer  * Provide a separate certification for each principal executive officer and principal financial officer of the Company. See Rules 13a-14(a) and 15d-14(a).
# C_2013207EN.01001001.xml

| 20.7.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 207/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.7.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 207/10

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Sicilia (Italy) lodged on 18 April 2013 — Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia — Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo

(Case C-206/13)

2013/C 207/17

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Sicilia

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Cruciano Siragusa

Applicant:

Defendant: Regione Sicilia — Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo

Defendant:

Questions referred

Questions referred

Do Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principle of proportionality, as a general principle of European Union law, preclude the application of a provision of national law such as Article 167(4)(a) of Legislative Decree No 42 of 2004, under which a ‘landscape compatibility clearance’ [(autorizzazione paesaggistica)] may not be issued by way of retrospective regularisation in any cases where human activity has resulted in an increase in floor area and volume, regardless of whether a specific appraisal has been undertaken as to whether the activity in question is compatible with the features of the landscape of the particular site which merit protection?

autorizzazione paesaggistica

---
# C_2014315EN.01000901.xml

| 15.9.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 315/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.9.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 315/9

---

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 17 July 2014 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio Nazionale Forense –Italy) — Angelo Alberto Torresi (C-58/13), Pierfrancesco Torresi (C-59/13) v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Macerata

(Joined Cases C-58/13 and C-59/13) (1)

1

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Freedom of movement for persons - Access to the profession of lawyer - Possibility of refusing registration in the Bar Council register to nationals of a Member State who have obtained their professional legal qualification in another Member State - Abuse of rights))

2014/C 315/12

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Referring court

Consiglio Nazionale Forense

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Angelo Alberto Torresi (C-58/13), Pierfrancesco Torresi (C-59/13)

Applicants:

Defendant: Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Macerata

Defendant:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

| 1. | Article 3 of Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained must be interpreted as meaning that no abuse can be identified in the fact that a national of a Member State who after successfully obtaining a university degree travels to another Member State in order to acquire there the professional qualification of lawyer and returns to the Member State of which he is a national in order to practise there the profession of lawyer under the professional title obtained in the Member State where that professional qualification was acquired; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Article 3 of Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained must be interpreted as meaning that no abuse can be identified in the fact that a national of a Member State who after successfully obtaining a university degree travels to another Member State in order to acquire there the professional qualification of lawyer and returns to the Member State of which he is a national in order to practise there the profession of lawyer under the professional title obtained in the Member State where that professional qualification was acquired;

| 2. | Examination of the second question referred has disclosed nothing capable of affecting the validity of Article 3 of Directive 98/5. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Examination of the second question referred has disclosed nothing capable of affecting the validity of Article 3 of Directive 98/5.

---

(1)  OJ C 147, 25.5.2013.

1

---
Case No. 9,331.

#### MAY v. BAYNE.

[3 Cranch, C. C. 335.] 1

Circuit Court, District of Columbia.

Oct. Term. 1828.

Apprentices — How Bound — Justice op Peace— Orphans’ Court.

Two justices of the peace cannot bind out an apprentice while the orphans’ court is in session.

[Action by Thompson May against Henry T. Bayne.] Petition by an apprentice to be discharged.

Mr. Ashton, for petitioner.

The justices, had no right to bind him out. The father was a resident of Alexandria county, and not poor or indigent He might, under the 3d section of the Maryland act of 1793, c. 45, have bound out his son, but he' has not done so. His assent was not absolute; but on condition that he could agree with the master as to the terms. Besides, the orphans’ court was in session on that day, and the justices had no jurisdiction. See the Maryland law of 1794, c. 47, § 1. The indentures are dated June 7th, 1S26, and were on the same day recorded in the or*1216phans’ court, but there is no evidence that the court saw or approved them.

R. S. Coxe, contrá.

It is not necessary that the orphans’ court should not be in session, although that court should have been in session on that day, yet it does not appear that it was in session at the very time the indentures were executed. As the father did not reside in the *county,*his assent was not necessary.

THE COURT

(nem. con.) was of opinion that as the orphans’ court was in session on the 6th, and adjourned to, and actually sat on the 7th of June, the justices of the peace had no jurisdiction. The petitioner was discharged.
AAM-11-355-E June 24, 2011 Exemption No. 10297 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2011-0637

Ms. Catherine Weber

Owner Silverhawk Aviation Academy 4505 Aviation Way Caldwell, ID 83605

Dear Ms. Weber:

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your request for exemption. It transmits our decision, explains its basis, and gives you the conditions and limitations of the exemption, including the date it ends.

The Basis for Our Decision

By submission dated June 1, 2011, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of Silverhawk Aviation Academy (Silverhawk) for an exemption from part 120 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) to allow Silverhawk, which is operating under separate parts of 14 CFR, to cover its safety-sensitive employees under one drug testing

program.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition

in the Federal Register because the requested exemption would not set a precedent, and any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to Silverhawk.

The FAA has issued a grant of exemption in circumstances similar in all material respects to those presented in your petition. In Grant of Exemption No. 9703 (copy enclosed), the FAA found that Solid Edge’s § 91.147 air tour operations were closely connected to its part 135 operations. The FAA also found that combining the petitioner’s two testing programs into one would be in the public interest and would maintain an equivalent level of safety to that provided by the current regulations. Thus, the FAA concluded it was unnecessary to burden the petitioner by requiring it to conduct two separate testing programs.2

Having reviewed your reasons for requesting an exemption, I find that—

 they are similar in all material respects to relief previously requested in the enclosed Grant of Exemption No. 9703;

 the reasons stated by the FAA for granting the enclosed Grant of Exemption No. 9703 also apply to the situation you present; and

 a grant of exemption is in the public interest.

Our Decision

Under the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator has delegated to me, I hereby grant Silverhawk Aviation Academy an exemption from part 120 to the extent necessary to allow Silverhawk, which is operating under separate parts of the regulations, to cover its safety-sensitive employees under one testing program, subject to

the conditions and limitations described below.

Conditions and Limitations

1. Employees of Silverhawk are subject to the drug and alcohol regulations at all times while conducting operations under part 135 or part 91.

2. The drug and alcohol testing program must be implemented under the auspices of the Silverhawk part 135 operation, not under part 91.

This exemption terminates on June 30, 2013 unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Sincerely,

/s/
James R. Fraser, M.D. Deputy Federal Air Surgeon

Enclosure