[Cite as State v. Murphy, 2023-Ohio-4825.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

CLARK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO

 Appellee 

v. 

VERLYNIA MURPHY

 Appellant

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C.A. No. 2023-CA-18

Trial Court Case No. 22-CR-0405

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

. . . . . . . . . . .

O P I N I O N

Rendered on December 29, 2023

. . . . . . . . . . . 

THOMAS W. KIDD, JR., Attorney for Appellant

 

ROBERT C. LOGSDON., Attorney for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Verlynia Murphy appeals from her convictions for failure to stop after an 

accident and reckless homicide. We conclude that Murphy’s conviction for failure to stop 

was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Murphy’s car left the public roadway, struck a utility pole, and came to rest in 

the roadway; she then left the scene without her vehicle. Murphy was not involved in a 
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motor vehicle accident or collision with persons or property upon a public road or highway. 

The fact that a driver of another vehicle later was fatally injured after striking Murphy’s 

unoccupied vehicle in the roadway did not bring the matter within the ambit of R.C. 

4549.02(A), which is addressed to the exchange of identification and vehicle registration 

between parties to an accident or collision. As such, Murphy’s conviction for failure to 

stop is reversed, and we will remand this matter to the trial court for it to issue an amended 

judgment entry that reflects the reversal of this conviction and the related driver’s license 

suspension. Because we reverse the conviction for failure to stop, we need not address 

Murphy’s argument that her two sentences should have been imposed consecutively. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} Murphy was indicted on May 10, 2022, for failure to stop and reckless 

homicide. Before trial, Murphy moved to dismiss the charge of failure to stop, which 

was a third-degree felony due to the death of the other driver, and to substitute the charge 

with failure to stop after an accident involving the property of others in violation of R.C. 

4549.03, a misdemeanor of the first degree. The trial court overruled the motion, finding 

that the court lacked charging authority. Following a jury trial, Murphy was found guilty 

of both offenses. The court sentenced her to an aggregate term of 41⁄2 years in prison, 

which included consecutive sentences, and suspended her driver’s license for three 

years. 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR AND ANALYSIS

{¶ 3} Murphy raises two assignments of error. Her first assignment states: 

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
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AND/OR AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE TO 

SUSTAIN MS. MURPHY’S CONVICTION.

{¶ 4} At trial, Deputy Joe Liming testified that on July 25, 2021, he was a deputy 

sheriff in New Carlisle assigned to road patrol, and he was dispatched to Schiller Road, 

a two-lane country road, around 3:15 a.m. on a report of a two-car crash. Liming stated 

that there was torrential rain at the time. When he arrived at the scene, medic units and 

a fire engine were present with lights flashing. Liming observed an unoccupied Ford 

SUV that had crashed into a telephone pole; he also saw a red pickup truck in a nearby 

ditch that was filled with water. The driver of that vehicle was still in the driver’s seat and 

had drowned. Liming identified Murphy as the registered owner of the SUV, and he

proceeded to her address around 5:40 a.m. Murphy told Liming that she had arrived 

home around 1:15 a.m. and had gone to bed. Body camera video of what Liming saw 

at the scene of the accident and of his encounter with Murphy were presented at trial. 

{¶ 5} Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Robert Sabo testified that he responded 

to the scene on Schiller Road around 3:48 a.m. on July 25, 2021, during a “very heavy 

downpour.” He stated that Schiller Road lacked any lighting, and he identified 

photographs from the scene which depicted the SUV, the utility pole that it struck, a 

portion of the pole and attached wires that were next to the SUV on the ground, and the 

pickup truck “down in the creek.” The photos showed that the airbag in the SUV had

deployed. According to Sabo, Schiller Road runs east and west, the SUV was struck 

from behind by the pickup truck, and the pickup truck left the roadway on the south side 

of the road.
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{¶ 6} Sabo further identified photographs of the vehicles taken during daylight 

hours, after the pickup truck was removed from the creek. Sabo stated that the pickup 

truck had been travelling eastbound and sustained the heaviest amount of damage to the 

front end of the truck; other small dents and scratches were related to its course of travel 

off the roadway into the creek. The pickup truck “only had one impact,” which was with 

the SUV, but the SUV “had two impacts because it had damage to both the front and rear 

of the vehicle.” Photos depicted “a red piece” of the pick-up truck in the middle of the 

rear bumper of the SUV.

{¶ 7} Trooper Sabo stated that security camera footage was obtained from a 

nearby business, recorded from 2:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m., and portions of that video were 

played for the jury. Sabo testified that the “first crash” occurred around 2:41 a.m., when 

the SUV travelling westbound on Schiller Road struck a utility pole and spun around such

that its headlights were pointed north. At 3:12 a.m., another vehicle approached;

although the actual collision could not be seen because of the vehicle blocking the 

roadway, the second vehicle could be seen leaving the roadway. Emergency personnel 

arrived at 3:38 a.m. Sabo testified that the video confirmed that two separate crashes 

had occurred in the early morning hours of July 25, 2021, on Schiller Road. 

{¶ 8} Ohio State Highway Patrol Sergeant David Slanker testified that he 

responded to the scene on Schiller Road and learned that the SUV had been reported 

stolen; he proceeded to the address of the registered owner, Murphy, with Liming. 

Slanker testified that Murphy had had difficulty waking up, had appeared disoriented and 

off-balance as she came downstairs, and she “gave the indications or some appearance 
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of impairment.” Murphy told Slanker that she had come home earlier and learned that 

her SUV had been stolen. Slanker noticed abrasions and redness around Murphy’s 

face, which she told him were from waxing the areas. Slanker stated that in his 

experience, the abrasions of Murphy’s face were consistent with the deployment of an 

airbag, and that Murphy also had abrasions on her right arm that were consistent with a 

collision. He did not conduct field sobriety tests or blood tests while at Murphy’s home 

because a significant amount of time had elapsed between the collision and his contact 

with her. 

{¶ 9} Trooper Rachel Simmons of the Ohio State Highway Patrol Investigative 

Section responded to the Schiller Road scene after being contacted by Sergeant Slanker. 

Simmons spoke to Charles Aiple, Murphy’s husband, at the scene. Aiple stated that he 

had been out looking for the SUV, which reportedly had been stolen from his residence, 

when he came upon the crash scene. Simmons proceeded to Murphy’s residence and 

interviewed her; a video of the interview with Murphy was played for the jury. Simmons 

testified that Murphy’s DNA was later found on the airbag, that Murphy’s vehicle had 

contained a six-pack of beer, and that Murphy’s home was about a mile from the scene 

of the collision.

{¶ 10} Jeremiah Smith, a sergeant in the Crash Reconstruction Section of the Ohio 

State Highway Patrol, testified that he was contacted to assist in the investigation of the 

Schiller Road collisions on July 26, 2023. He identified his Crash Reconstruction and 

Analysis Unit Assistance Report. Smith detailed his investigation, and he testified that 

there were two collisions on Schiller Road. Smith’s report stated:
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Through the investigation, the crash was determined to be two 

separate crashes. As viewed on footage from a business surveillance 

camera, the Ford [SUV] is seen travelling west on Schiller Road when its 

headlights are seen diverted from the road and toward the camera. The 

on[-]scene evidence shows the Ford went off the side of the road and struck 

a utility pole. Post impact, the Ford rotated out into the roadway and 

became stationary partially in the east and westbound lanes of travel. A 

short time later, the headlights are seen to go out on the vehicle. Soon 

after, the Chevrolet [truck] is seen traveling east on Schiller Road and, 

subsequently, striking the Ford. The Ford was rotated back into the 

westbound lane. The Chevrolet went off the right side of the road and into 

a ditch. * * *

{¶ 11} Montgomery County Deputy Coroner Anna Castiglione Richmond 

performed an autopsy on the truck’s driver, who was 41 years old at the time of his death. 

The driver’s alcohol level was three and a half times the legal limit, and Richmond 

attributed his cause of death to drowning.

{¶ 12} Murphy presented no witnesses in her defense. At the conclusion of the 

State’s evidence, Murphy moved for an acquittal, arguing in part that she should have 

been charged pursuant to R.C. 4549.03,

1 which governs a motor vehicle accident 

1

“The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to real property, 

or personal property attached to real property, legally upon or adjacent to a public road 

or highway immediately shall stop and take reasonable steps to locate and notify the 

owner or person in charge of the property of that fact, of the driver's name and address, 

and of the registration number of the vehicle the driver is driving and, upon request and if 

available, shall exhibit the driver's or commercial driver's license.” R.C. 4549.03(A).
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resulting in damage to realty. The court overruled the motion. 

{¶ 13} Murphy argues that the State chose not to indict her pursuant to R.C. 

4549.03, which by its language clearly applied to the allegations in this case. She argues 

that R.C. 4549.02 requires a violation to involve a collision with another vehicle that is on 

a public road or a person (pedestrian or cyclist) on a public road; according to Murphy, a 

collision with and/or damage to a telephone pole adjacent to a public road does not 

support a conviction under R.C. 4549.02. 

{¶ 14} The State responds that the authorities cited by Murphy in her brief “almost 

exclusively” involved damage to a “roadside fixture” in which the striking vehicle remained 

off the roadway, whereas Murphy’s collision ended with the vehicle “blocking almost the 

entire roadway for both directions of travel.” The State acknowledges that State v. 

Ragonesi, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190528, 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 4318 (Nov. 18, 2020),

upon which Murphy relies, is analogous to the facts of this case in that the driver in that 

case hit a utility pole and was “partially blocking one lane of travel.” But it argues that 

the First District’s analysis in Ragonesi was “too narrow” to apply in this case because 

although Murphy’s collision occurred off the roadway, “the accident as a whole started 

and ended on the road.” 

{¶ 15} The State asserts that there are two types of incidents that require someone 

to remain at the scene pursuant to R.C. 4549.02: a “motor vehicle accident” or a “collision 

with persons or property on a public road or highway.” The State notes the following 

definitions contained in the Revised Code: 

1) “ ‘Motor vehicle accident’ means any accident involving a motor 
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vehicle” (R.C. 2930.01); 

2) “ ‘Motor vehicle accident’ means any accident involving a motor vehicle 

which results in bodily injury to any person, or damage to the property of 

any person” (R.C. 3937.41(A)(5)); and 

3) “ ‘Accident’ or ‘motor vehicle accident’ means any accident involving a 

motor vehicle which results in bodily injury to or death to any person, or 

damage to the property of any person in excess of four hundred dollars” 

(R.C. 4509.01(J)). 

According to the State, the “incident” herein satisfied all three definitions.

{¶ 16} The State also directs our attention to R.C. 4775.01(B), which defines 

“collision” as “an occurrence in which two or more objects, whether mobile or stationary, 

contact one another in a manner that causes the alteration of the surface, structure, or 

appearance, whether separately or collectively, of an object that is a party to the 

occurrence.” According to the State, the definition of an accident is broader than that of 

a collision, because unlike an accident, a collision requires “some sort of contact, or 

impact, in order to take place.” The State argues that the phrase “with persons or 

property” in R.C. 4549.02 modifies “collision,” and not “motor vehicle accident,” such that 

“the collision must be with persons or property in order for the duty to remain to attach.” 

In other words, every “collision is an accident, but not every accident has a collision.” 

{¶ 17} The State further argues that here, “a collision absolutely took place,”

because Murphy’s “accident as a whole” commenced when she lost control of her vehicle

on the public roadway and did not end until her vehicle came to rest back on the roadway. 
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According to the State, to conclude that Murphy was not guilty “because the collision took 

place off the roadway,” such that no duty to remain at the scene arose, would yield an 

absurd result. The State argues that the General Assembly surely could not have 

intended the language of this statute to allow crashed vehicles to be abandoned in the 

middle of the road, and that the “secondary crash” that killed another driver resulted from 

Murphy’s leaving the vehicle in the road. 

{¶ 18} The State also cites State v. McGraw, 4th Dist. Ross No. 08CA3009, 2008-

Ohio-6134, which agreed with the conclusion in State v. Osborne, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

88453, 2007-Ohio-3267, that the legislature “deliberately chose the word “results” instead 

of “cause” in defining the third-degree felony version of the offense for situations in which 

the failure to stop “results” in the death of a person, “because it intended to encompass 

R.C. 4549.02(A) violations that did not necessarily physically cause the person’s death, 

but rather bore a logical relation to the person’s death.” McGraw at ¶ 11. According to 

the State, given the weather and lack of lighting on the night of the crash, it was a logical 

consequence of Murphy’s failure to stop and departure from the scene that another 

motorist struck her vehicle and that the “secondary crash” caused harm or death. 

{¶ 19} Murphy’s first assignment of error argues that her conviction for failure to 

stop was supported by insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Our standard for reviewing these arguments is as follows. 

{¶ 20} “An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to 

determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the 
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defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 21} Our analysis is different when reviewing a manifest-weight argument. When 

a conviction is challenged on appeal as being against the weight of the evidence, an 

appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in 

the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage 

of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A judgment should be 

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptional 

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin, 20 

Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

{¶ 22} R.C. 4549.02 governs stopping after an accident and the exchange of 

identity and vehicle registration. It states: 

(A)(1) In the case of a motor vehicle accident or collision with persons or 

property on a public road or highway, the operator of the motor vehicle, 

having knowledge of the accident or collision, immediately shall stop the 

operator's motor vehicle at the scene of the accident or collision. The 

operator shall remain at the scene of the accident or collision until the 

operator has given the operator's name and address and, if the operator is 
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not the owner, the name and address of the owner of that motor vehicle, 

together with the registered number of that motor vehicle, to all of the 

following:

(a) Any person injured in the accident or collision;

(b) The operator, occupant, owner, or attendant of any motor vehicle 

damaged in the accident or collision;

(c) The police officer at the scene of the accident or collision.

* * *

(B)(1) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of failure to stop after 

an accident. Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2) or (3), failure to stop 

after an accident is a misdemeanor of the first degree.

* * *

(3) If the accident or collision results in the death of a person, failure to stop 

after an accident is whichever of the following is applicable:

(a) Except as provided in division (B)(3)(b) of this section, a felony of the 

third degree;

* * *

(4) In all cases, the court, in addition to any other penalties provided by 

law, shall impose upon the offender a class five suspension of the 

offender’s driver’s * * * from the range specified in division (A)(5) of the 

Revised Code. * * *

{¶ 23} Most of the cases reviewing R.C. 4549.02(A) refer to the statute as the “hit 
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skip” or “hit-and-run” statute. State v. Provino, 175 Ohio App.3d 283, 2007-Ohio-6974, 

886 N.E.2d 888, ¶ 12; see also State v. Johnson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22789, 2006-Ohio2277; N. Olmstead v. Gallagher, 2 Ohio App.3d 414, 442 N.E.2d 470 (1981).” Those 

cases “all involve situations where the defendant strikes a pedestrian, a person riding a 

bike, or another vehicle where people are injured.” Provino at ¶ 12. 

{¶ 24} “Under R.C. 4549.02(A), a driver involved in an accident is required to 

remain on the scene until she has given her name and identifying information to the driver 

of the other vehicle or to a police officer.” State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C140299, 2015-Ohio-1189, ¶ 7. R.C. 4549.02(A) “is designed to facilitate the investigation 

into accidents,” and it is “ ‘aimed at prohibiting a driver from “failing to stop and give his 

name and address after operating a vehicle that is involved in a collision on a public 

road.” ’ ” Id. “Elevating the penalty to a felony offense advances ‘the legitimate 

governmental interest in punishing more severely those who flee the scene of a grave 

and serious accident versus those who may flee from striking a parked, unoccupied car.’ 

State v. Presley, 2013-Ohio-3762, 995 N.E.2d 256, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.).” Id. at ¶ 8. 

{¶ 25} In Provino, the appellant driver slid off the road in icy and snowy conditions

into a ditch and left the vehicle. Provino at ¶ 2. In reversing appellant conviction for a 

misdemeanor violation of R.C. 4549.02(A), Provino cited State v. Spence, 12th Dist. 

Clermont No. CA2002-02-012, 2002-Ohio-3600, ¶ 12, which held that the explanation of 

circumstances on Spence’s no contest plea was insufficient to support a conviction where 

Spence lost control of a friend’s vehicle, struck a utility pole, and walked to the home of 

the owner of the vehicle. Spence at ¶ 3. Spence noted that “[b]y its very terms, R.C. 
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4549.02 provides that any accident subject to the section involves a collision with either 

a pedestrian or another motor vehicle,” and there was no accident or collision involving a 

pedestrian or another vehicle in that case. Id. at ¶ 12. Thus, Spence’s conviction for 

failure to stop was vacated.

{¶ 26} Further, in State v. Teeple, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-17-28, 2018-Ohio-1767, 

¶ 23, the court, citing Spence and Provino, found that the evidence in the record was 

insufficient to prove the necessary elements of failure to stop under R.C. 4549.02(A). In 

the incident at issue, Teeple had gone off the roadway into a ditch and then struck a road 

sign. The Third District found that the record did not contain any evidence that Teeple’s 

accident occurred “on a public road or highway” as required by the “first prong” of R.C. 

4549.02. Id. at ¶ 20. Regarding the “second prong,” Teeple noted that there was no 

evidence suggesting that Teeple had been involved “in an injury accident” and, because 

his vehicle was the only vehicle involved in the accident, he had had “no duty to notify 

himself of the accident.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 21.

{¶ 27} In State v. Schwieterman, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2023-CA-14, 2023-Ohio2613, a vehicle driven by Schwieterman collided with a bicycle operated by a cyclist. Id. 

at ¶ 4. The cyclist was knocked off his bike, and it landed on top of him. Id. On 

appeal, the State conceded that R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)(b) and (c) were not applicable 

because the bicycle was not a motor vehicle and no police officer was present when

Schwieterman left the scene. Id. at ¶ 15, citing State v. Bryant, 160 Ohio St.3d 113, 

2020-Ohio-1041, 154 N.E.3d 31, ¶ 20. Schwieterman conceded on appeal that he had 

known of his collision with the bicycle, had known that the cyclist had been injured, and 
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had left without giving the cyclist the identifying information referenced in the statute. Id. 

On appeal, we concluded that “a rational trier of fact could have found Schwieterman 

guilty of violating R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)(a)” under these circumstances. Id. at ¶ 20. 

{¶ 28} Finally, in Ragonesi, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190528, 2020 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 4318, which is discussed by both parties, the First District reversed Ragonesi’s 

conviction under to R.C. 4549.02; it concluded that the conviction was not supported by 

sufficient evidence because “the state failed to prove that the collision occurred on a 

public road or highway.” Id. at *5-6. We note that R.C. 4511.01(BB) defines street or 

highway as “the entire width between the boundary lines of every way open to the use of 

the public as a thoroughfare for purposes of vehicular travel,” and R.C. 4511.01(EE) 

defines roadway as “that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for 

vehicular travel, except the berm or shoulder.” See State v. Frankart, 3d Dist. Seneca No.

13-15-03, 2015-Ohio-2737, ¶ 36 (noting that “the definitions in R.C. 4511.01 * * * limit the 

street/highway/roadway to the area used for vehicular travel, and the definition for 

‘roadway’ excludes the ‘berm or shoulder.’ ”).

{¶ 29} In Ragonesi, a Lyft driver observed the taillights of Ragonesi’s car “off the 

left-hand side” of a road in the early morning hours of February 2019. Id. at *2. The 

Lyft driver stopped her vehicle and approached Ragonesi’s, which was unoccupied; she

observed that the front of the vehicle had hit a pole, and the vehicle was smoking. Id. 

A deputy sheriff arrived and noticed that Ragonesi’s vehicle was “resting halfway in the 

main roadway. It was totaled, and its airbag had been deployed.” Id. at *3. The 

deputy determined that the driver had failed to stop at a stop sign, had lost control of the 
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car, had gone off the roadway, and had struck the telephone pole.” Id. Ragonesi was 

charged with “leaving the scene of the accident” under R.C. 4549.02. Id. at *4.

{¶ 30} Ragonesi moved for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State’s 

evidence, and her motion was overruled. She presented the testimony of a resident of 

the road where the accident occurred; the resident and her husband had heard 

Ragonesi’s cries for help, had found her crying next to her car, and had brought her into 

their home due to the bitter cold. Id. Upon returning to the accident scene to look for 

Ragonesi’s phone, the nearby resident encountered the Lyft driver, who had already 

called the police. The resident returned to her home to await the arrival of law 

enforcement. Id. 

{¶ 31} At trial, Ragonesi relied upon State v. Clark, 5th Dist. Stark No. 7544, 1988 

WL 142297 (Dec. 28, 1988), which found insufficient evidence to support a conviction 

pursuant to R.C. 4945.02 where a defendant’s vehicle had skidded down a street and 

struck a utility pole owned by Ohio Power, and the “property allegedly damaged was 

property not on a public road or highway but private property.” Ragonesi further relied 

upon State v. Cutlip, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28735, 2018-Ohio-726, in which the defendant 

“crashed into a mailbox and a ditch,” allegedly in violation of an ordinance identical to 

R.C. 4549.02(A). Id. at *9. The Ninth District in Cutlip, citing Clark, determined:

Under the plain language of the ordinance, the accident or collision 

must occur on a public roadway. * * * In this case the only collisions 

occurred off the roadway * * *. Although not every “accident” requires a 

collision, Mr. Cutlip’s mere failure to control his vehicle on the roadway did 
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not constitute an accident. * * * We note the term “accident” is not defined 

in Macedonia’s Codified Ordinances. If a word is not defined in an 

ordinance, it will be given its common and ordinary meaning. * * * The term 

“accident” ordinarily means “[a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious 

occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of events or 

that could not be reasonably anticipated.” Black’s Law Dictionary 15 (8th 

Ed. 2004).

Id. at ¶ 10.

{¶ 32} Ragonesi concluded that the State had failed to show that the collision with 

persons or property occurred on a public road or highway. The evidence unequivocally 

showed that Ragonesi’s car collided with a telephone pole off the side of the roadway, 

and the fact that part of the car remained in the roadway was irrelevant. Id. at *8. 

According to the First District, Ragonesi had simply been charged under the wrong 

statute, and the State had never sought to amend the complaint. Id. at *8-9.

{¶ 33} Having reviewed the entire record and considered the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the State, we agree with Murphy that her conviction pursuant to R.C. 

4549.02 was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. The evidence was clear that two distinct collisions occurred: Murphy’s 

SUV left Schiller Road, a public roadway, and collided with the utility pole; Murphy then 

left the scene, leaving the SUV behind. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude

that the incident herein involved “a motor vehicle accident or collision with persons or 

property on a public road or highway” pursuant to the plain language of R.C. 4549.02(A)
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and the above authorities which triggered a duty on Murphy’s part of to remain at the 

scene. Murphy also did not leave the scene of a “grave and serious accident.” While 

the State characterizes the impact of the truck with Murphy’s SUV as a “secondary crash”

subject to the statute, R.C. 4549.02 is silent as to such a subsequent event. We further 

conclude that Murphy’s collision with the pole was not injurious within the meaning of R.C. 

4549.02(A)(1)(a), as there was no other person injured when Murphy struck the pole. 

{¶ 34} Finally, R.C. 4549.02(b) and (c) are expressly addressed to the provision of 

the identity and vehicle registration by “the operator of the motor vehicle, having 

knowledge of the accident or collision,” to the owner or operator of any vehicle damaged 

in the accident or to police at the scene. No other motor vehicle was damaged in 

Murphy’s accident or collision, and there was not a police officer at the scene immediately 

after Murphy struck the pole. We cannot conclude that the tragic fact that the truck

subsequently struck Murphy’s SUV brought the matter within the ambit of R.C. 4549.02. 

In other words, in leaving the scene, Murphy did not violate the statute.

{¶ 35} For the foregoing reasons, Murphy’s first assignment of error is sustained.

{¶ 36} Murphy’s second assignment of error is as follows:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING MS. MURPHY TO 

54 MONTHS IN PRISON.

{¶ 37} Under her second assignment of error, Murphy argues that she should not 

have been sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment. Having sustained Murphy’s 

first assignment of error, Murphy’s second assignment of error is moot.

{¶ 38} Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is reversed as to 
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the failure to stop offense; the matter will be remanded to the trial court for it to file an 

amended judgment entry that eliminates the conviction for this offense, including the 

three-year license suspension imposed as a result of this offense. The judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed in all other respects.

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

WELBAUM, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.