In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 18-3371

RICK E. JACOBSEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Tax Court.

No. 25348-15 — Elizabeth Crewson Paris, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 13, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 13, 2020

Before BAUER, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Rick E. Jacobsen’s former

wife Tina M. Lemmens embezzled over $400,000 from her

employer, income that was not reported on the couple’s jointly

filed income taxes. As relevant here, after Lemmens was

convicted for her embezzlement, the Internal Revenue Service

(“IRS”) audited the couple’s joint tax returns for 2010 and 2011. 
2 No. 18-3371

For those years, the IRS proposed total net adjustments

attributable to omitted embezzlement income (therewere other

unrelated proposed adjustments) of over $300,000, with

corresponding deficiencies and accuracy-related penalties of

over $150,000. Jacobsen sought relief under the tax code’s

“innocent spouse” provision, 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b), and equitable

relief provision, § 6015(f). As relevant here, the Tax Court

granted Jacobsen innocent spouse relief for 2010, but denied all

relief for 2011. Jacobsen appeals, but we affirm.

I.

The stipulated facts as found by the Tax Court provide a

backdrop for Jacobsen’s claim on appeal. While Jacobsen and

Lemmens were married, Lemmens, an accountant, handled all

of their finances. During the relevant time period (2009-2011),

Lemmens worked for a blood bank, where her duties included

processing accounts payable and issuing checks to vendors.

Jacobsen, who holds an associate’s degree, worked as a

machine operator at a factory. In addition to working at the

factory, which he did in twelve-hour shifts fourteen days per

month, Jacobsen inspected properties for financial institutions

and insurance companies. 

Jacobsen deposited wages from his work as a machine

operator into a personal account at Evergreen Credit Union in

Wisconsin. The remainder of the couple’s income, from both

Lemmens’ job and Jacobsen’s home inspections, was deposited

into a joint account at Community First Credit Union. 

That joint account was also used by Lemmens for deposits

that she had actually embezzled from the blood bank.

Throughout the tax years at issue here, Lemmens was embez-
No. 18-3371 3

zling from the blood bank by drafting checks to herself or

adding sizable amounts to her own paychecks and classifying

the excess as reimbursements. 

Lemmens was eventually arrested in June 2011 for embezzling over $450,000 from her employer. The Tax Court credited

Jacobsen’s testimony that he neither knew of, nor had reason

to know of Lemmens’ scheme at the time of her arrest. 

First, as discussed above, Jacobsen was for the most part

completely uninvolved with the couple’s finances. Specifically,

he never reviewed bank or credit card statements, nor did he

look over their personal or business finances, which Lemmens

managed. Nor would have reviewingtheirfinances necessarily

have alerted him to Lemmens’ embezzlement given her

practice of depositing the embezzled funds via check into the

couple’s joint account. These checks would have been difficult

to distinguish from the checks for the home inspection business, which were also made out to Lemmens and tended to be

for similar amounts. 

Moreover, throughout the period of Lemmens’ embezzlement, there was nothing lavish or excessive about their

spending. Although they did gamble heavily during the

relevant time period, the Tax Court concluded that Jacobsen

attributed the funds available for gambling to the success of

their home inspection business and the available income from

their other employment. The Tax Court also concluded that

nothing about their lifestyle would have alerted him to her

scheme. During the years Lemmens was embezzling from the

blood bank, Jacobsen drove a used car that he did not replace,
4 No. 18-3371

they did not pay off their mortgage, and at one point they even

had some utilities disconnected for failing to pay.

Lemmens was convicted in 2011 and sentenced in January

2012. Although the two remained married throughout the

criminal trial and into her term of imprisonment, they ultimately became estranged sometime in 2013 and divorced in

May 2015. Their divorce decree specified that Jacobsen and

Lemmens would each pay half of the 2010 and 2011 tax

liabilities. Jacobsen, however, maintains that he believed he

was only agreeing to pay half of the liabilities remaining after

excluding the embezzlement income. 

The disputed tax liabilities arose from the audit of the

couple’s jointly submitted tax returns for 2009, 2010, and 2011.

After Lemmens was convicted, an IRS agent analyzed bank

deposits and interviewed both Lemmens (from jail) and

Jacobsen. In early 2013, the IRS prepared Form 4549 Tax

Examination Changes proposing adjustments to the tax returns

from all three years, most of which arose from income adjustments attributable to Lemmens’ embezzlement.1 As relevant

here, for 2010 the IRS proposed total net adjustments of

$298,710.14, of which $261,959.14 was attributable to omitted

embezzlement income. That proposed adjustment resulted in

a deficiency of $103,247 and an accuracy-related penalty under

26 U.S.C. § 6662(a) (imposing a 20 percent penalty onto amount

of underpayment) of $20,649.40. For 2011, the total proposed

adjustment was $106,424.94, of which $62,449.94 was attribut1

Jacobsen did not challenge proposed adjustments that were unrelated to

Lemmens’s embezzlement, such as approximately $45,000 in disallowed

Schedule C car and truck expenses from the home inspection business.
No. 18-3371 5

able to omitted embezzlement income. This created a deficiency of $25,912, and an accuracy-related penalty of $5,182.2

Lemmens and Jacobsen both signed the Form 4549, thereby

consenting to the assessed adjustments and penalties. 

In January 2014, Jacobsen filed a Form 8857 with the IRS,

requesting innocent spouse relief under § 1615 for 2009, 2010,

and 2011. Although the IRS made a preliminary determination

granting Jacobsen full relief, it reconsidered its decision after

Lemmens filed a statement of disagreement. Ultimately in July

2015, the IRS office of appeals denied all relief under § 6015.

In October that same year, Jacobsen, who was by then

divorced fromLemmens, filed a timely petition under § 6015(e)

seeking review in the Tax Court and entitlement to relief for all

three years. The Tax Court first dismissed Jacobsen’s 2009 tax

and penalty liability as moot because it had by then been

discharged in bankruptcy.

The Tax Court then considered Jacobsen’s eligibility for

relief under 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b), (c), and (f), which each provide

a means forrelief from liability for an understatement attributable to the other spouse listed on the joint filing. Each subsection contains slightly different criteria forrelief, but as relevant

here, relief is available under both subsections (b) and (c) only

if the Tax Court finds that the requesting spouse neither

actually knew nor had reason to know of the understatement. 

The Tax Court granted Jacobsen § 6015(b) relief for 2010,

but denied any relief for 2011. In reaching its conclusion, the

2

For 2011 then, Jacobsen’s half of the $31,094 liability (deficiency plus

accuracy penalty) cited by the Tax Court would be $15,547.
6 No. 18-3371

Tax Court accepted Jacobsen’s testimony that he was totally

unaware of his then-wife’s embezzlement whenthey filed their

2010 tax returns. 

The Tax Court also considered the factors set forth in

26 C.F.R. § 1.6015-2(c) (containing a non-exhaustive list of facts

and circumstances relevant to concluding whetherthe requesting spouse should have known of the understatement) and

concluded that Jacobsen likewise had no reason to know of the

2010 understatement. Section 1.6015-2(c) directs the court to

consider “the nature of the erroneous item and the amount of

the erroneous item relative to other items; the couple’s financial situation; the requesting spouse’s educational background

and business experience; the extent of the requesting spouse’s

participation in the activity that resulted in the erroneous item;

whether the requesting spouse failed to inquire, at or before

the time the return was signed, about items on the return or

omitted from the return that a reasonable person would

question; and whether the erroneous item represented a

departure from a recurring pattern reflected in prior years’

returns.” The Tax Court concluded that each of these factors

supported the determination that Jacobsen was unaware of the

understatement, as required for relief under § 6015(b).

The assessment for 2011, however, was different. Lemmens

was arrested that same year, so by the time the 2011 returns

were filed in April 2012, she had been convicted of embezzlement and was incarcerated. The Tax Court thus denied relief

under § 6015(b), and (c) on account of Jacobsen’s knowledge of

the omitted income. It then considered whether Jacobsen was

entitled to relief under § 6015(f), which applies when relief is
No. 18-3371 7

unavailable under subsections (b) or(c), but it would nonetheless be inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable. 

With the exception of knowledge of the understatement,

which bars relief under § 6015(b), the considerations for

equitable relief under § 6015(f) mirror those the Tax Court had

considered in assessing Jacobsen’s eligibility for relief under

§ 6015(b), which applies when the requesting spouse lacked

knowledge of the understatement and it would be inequitable

given all the facts and circumstances to hold that spouse liable.

See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(1)(C), (D); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.6015-2(d)

(“All of the facts and circumstances are considered in determining whether it is inequitable to hold a requesting spouse

jointly and severally liable for an understatement.”). The Tax

Court considered Jacobsen’s eligibility for equitable relief with

reference to each of the following seven nonexhaustive factors

set forth in the applicable IRS Revenue Procedure: (1) the

current marital status of the spouses, (2) whether the requesting spouse would suffer economic hardship if relief were not

granted, (3) whetherthe requesting spouse knew or had reason

to know of the understatement, (4) whether either spouse has

a legal obligation to pay the outstanding Federal income tax

liability, (5) whether the requesting spouse significantly

benefitted fromtheunderstatement,(6)whetherthe requesting

spouse has made a good faith effort to comply with the income

tax laws in the years following the years for which relief is

sought, and (7) whether the requesting spouse was in poor

mental or physical health at the time the joint return was filed.

Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, at 400–403. 

With the exception of the third factor, whether Jacobsen

knew or had reason to know of the understatement, the Tax
8 No. 18-3371

Court concluded that each of the foregoing factors favored

Jacobsen or were “neutral.” The Tax Court nonetheless

concluded that Jacobsen’s actual knowledge in 2011 of

Lemmens’ embezzlement and the accompanying tax understatement weighed “too heavily” against him to allow equitable relief under § 6015(f). Jacobsen appeals, challenging only

the Tax Court’s conclusion that he was not entitled to equitable

relief from liabilities arising from embezzlement income

omitted from the 2011 return. 

II

The Internal Revenue Code specifies that a husband and

wife who file a joint tax return are jointly and severally liable

for the taxes on their combined incomes. 26 U.S.C. § 6013(d);

see, e.g., Resser v. C.I.R., 74 F.3d 1528, 1534 (7th Cir. 1996). The

so-called innocent spouse statute of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6015,

provides potential avenues of relief to those spouses who

would otherwise be held unfairly liable for tax obligations

arising from jointly filed federal income tax returns. Section

6015 liberalizes the availability of innocent spouse relief

beyond what was previously available under § 6013(e)3, which

Congress added after the Supreme Court held in James v.

United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), that embezzled funds

constituted taxable income. 

3

In 1998, Congress significantly restructured and expanded the availability

of innocent spouse relief by repealing 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e) and replacing it

with § 6015 as part of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and

Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3201, 112 Stat. 685, 740 (1998). See

H. Conf. Rep. No. 105-599, at 249 (1998). 
No. 18-3371 9

Section 6013(e) was designed to protect innocent taxpayers

after the IRS began assessing underpayments and associated

penalties from the spouses of embezzlers, even when the

spouse was unaware of the embezzling or associated tax

liability. It allowed relief where the underpayment was due to

fraud by the taxpayer’s spouse, the taxpayer did not and had

no reason to know of the underpayment, and it would be

inequitable to hold the taxpayer liable for the underpayment

in light of the facts and circumstances. In 1984, Congress

amended that section and slightly broadened the available

relief. See Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424(a), 98 Stat. 494, 801 (1984).

Still not content with the availability of relief, Congress later

repealed § 6013(e) entirely and enacted § 6015 in the Internal

Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 to

make “innocent spouse status easier to obtain.” H.R. Conf.

Rep. No. 105-599, at 249–51 (1998), reprinted in 1998

U.S.C.C.A.N. 288. 

Section 6015, as relevant here, provides three separate

avenues for relief in subsections (b), (c), and (f). Conceding his

ineligibility for relief under § 6015(b) or (c) on account of his

awareness of Lemmens’ embezzlement when he filed the

couple’s 2011 taxes, Jacobsen challenges only the Tax Court’s

conclusion that he is ineligible for equitable relief under

§ 6015(f). The Tax Court may grant such relief when “taking

into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to

hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency

(or any portion of either).” 

Although the parties agree generally that we review the

Tax Court’s decisions “in the same manner and to the same

extent as we review district court decisions from the bench in
10 No. 18-3371

civil actions,” 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1); Gyorgy v. C.I.R., 779 F.3d

466, 472–73 (7th Cir. 2015); Resser, 74 F.3d at 1535, they disagree

as to whether that means we review the denial of relief under

§ 6015(f) for clear error or an abuse of discretion. 

The parties’ differing views onthe standard of review hinge

in part on the Taxpayer First Act, legislation that was passed

shortly afterthe parties filed their briefs. See Pub. L. No. 116-25,

133 Stat. 981 (July 1, 2019). As relevant here, § 1203 of the

Taxpayer First Act added a new paragraph at the end of

§ 6015(e) codifying the existing practice of de novo review by

the Tax Court of appeals from the denial of innocent spouse

relief. Because this addition to § 6015 simply “clarified,” see

Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1203 (“Clarification of equitable relief

from joint liability.”), the existing standard and scope of Tax

Court review, the Commissioner maintains it has no effect on

our standard of review. Thus, argues the Commissioner, denial

of relief under § 6015(f) should be reviewed in the same

manner as any determination of equitable relief in the district

court—for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of

State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining general

applicability of abuse of discretion standard to equitable

determinations).

Jacobsen, however, insists that the Taxpayer First Act

confirms his position that we review decisions under § 6015(f)

for clear error. Jacobsen explains his reasoning as follows:

(1) the Taxpayer First Act makes equitable relief under

§ 6015(f) mandatory as opposed to discretionary; (2) mandatory relief under subsection (f) “is now the same as mandatory

relief under subsection (b),” which also contains an inequity
No. 18-3371 11

condition; and so (3) Tax Court rulings under subsection (f)

should be reviewed underthe same standard as subsection (b).

Jacobsen finds further support for his position with the fact

that subsection (b) is a continuation and expansion of former

§ 6013(e), which we held in Resser was subject to clear error

review, 74 F.3d at 1535. 

We are unconvinced, however, that the Taxpayer First Act

(which settled only the Tax Court’s standard of review of IRS

determinations) sheds any particular light on our standard of

review as to relief under § 6015(f), which multiple courts have

recognized as for abuse of discretion. See Greer v. C.I.R., 595

F.3d 398, 344 (6th Cir. 2010) (innocent spouse relief under

§ 6015(b) reviewed for clear error but equitable relief under

§ 6015(f) reviewed for abuse of discretion); Cheshire v. C.I.R.,

282 F.3d 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2002) (same). Fortunately, we need

not resolve the issue today, as we would affirm the Tax Court’s

decision under either deferential standard. See Freda v. C.I.R.,

656 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2011) (declining to “unravel” the

“quandary” about the appropriate standard of review where

Tax Court’s decision would be upheld under either standard);

Wellpoint, Inc. v. C.I.R., 599 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We

needn’t wade deeper into this mire, however. For this is not a

case in which the standard of review determines the outcome[.]”). 

As described above, Revenue Procedure 2013-34 identifies

seven possible factors for consideration in assessing whetherto

grant relief under § 6015(f). And although it is not bound by

them, the Tax Court generally follows the applicable Notices
12 No. 18-3371

or Revenue Procedures. Pullins v. C.I.R., 136 T.C. 432, 438–39

(2011).

Jacobsen acknowledges that with the exception of his

knowledge for 2011, the Tax Court correctly assessed the

positive, negative, or neutral impact of each of the seven

factors listed in Revenue Procedure 2013-34. He also concedes

that in light of Lemmens’ conviction in early 2012, he had

“reason to know” of the embezzlement income by the time he

filed their 2011 tax return. Yet he maintains that the Tax Court

erred when it concluded that he had actual knowledge of the

unreported embezzlement income for 2011. 

The longstanding test for “knowledge” of omitted taxable

income “is not knowledge of the tax consequences of a transaction but rather knowledge of the transaction itself.” See, e.g.,

Quinn v. C.I.R., 524 F.2d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 1975). Under this

standard, the Tax Court’s conclusion that Jacobsen, who was

aware of Lemmens’ indictment, trial, and subsequent convictionfor embezzlement,had actual knowledge of the embezzled

income is uncontroversial. In conceding that he had “reason to

know” of the embezzled income, Jacobsen admits that after

Lemmens’ conviction but before he filed their taxes he should

have looked into the 2011 bank statements to ascertain the

amounts of embezzled income, looked at the analysis of

embezzled income by year from Lemmens’ trial, or sought

information from Lemmens to determine how much she

embezzled in 2011. But, Jacobsen argues, because he did none

of these things, he lacked “actual knowledge” of the 2011

embezzlement income as contemplated by Revenue Procedure

2013-34.
No. 18-3371 13

Jacobsen’s argument boils down to his claim that he cannot

be accountable for having actual knowledge because there was

no evidence in the Tax Court that he knew the precise amounts

embezzled, an argument he supports with reference to slight

differences in the totals calculated by the restitution order in

Lemmens’ criminal trial, the joint stipulation in their divorce

decree, and the IRS agent’s audit calculations. 

Jacobsen’s argument, however, is based on the faulty

premise that he is not responsible for demonstrating that he

lacked knowledge of the embezzled income. First, relying on

§ 6015(c)(3)(C), Jacobsen maintains that innocent spouse relief

is foreclosed only if “the Secretary demonstrates that an individual making an election under this subsection has actual

knowledge at the time such individual signed the return of any

item giving rise to the deficiency.” (Emphasis added.) But

§ 6015(c), which applies to taxpayers who are no longer

married or otherwise separated according to certain criteria in

the statute—criteria Jacobsen acknowledges do not apply to

him and Lemmens for the 2011 return—is an exception to the

general rule that for all other types of innocent spouse relief

the taxpayer bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., Cheshire, 282

F.3d at 332 (“Except for the knowledge requirement of

§ 6015(c)(3)(C) ... the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that

she has met all the prerequisites for innocent spouse relief.”);

see also C.I.R. v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1277 (11th Cir. 2009)

(taxpayer bears burden of demonstrating eligibility for

equitable relief under § 6015(f)). Given the Tax Court’s undisputed finding that Jacobsen was aware of Lemmens’ embezzlement when he filed the 2011 return, it would be his burden, not
14 No. 18-3371

that of the Commissioner, to demonstrate his lack of knowledge. 

Instead of doing this, Jacobsen simply notes that the Tax

Court made no explicit finding that he knew the particular

amount of embezzlement income in 2011. Jacobsen faults the

Tax Court’s actual knowledge finding because there “was

nothing in the record” demonstrating that he read any documentationfrom Lemmens’ trial that would establishtheprecise

amount of embezzled income from 2011. But it would be

Jacobsen’s obligation, not that of the Commissioner, to have

demonstrated that he could not have accurately determined

the amount embezzled in 2011. Nothing in the record suggests

he did so, and we therefore see no reason to question the Tax

Court’s conclusion that he had actual knowledge of the 2011

embezzlement income. 

The Tax Court reached that conclusion after considering all

the facts and circumstances as anticipated in Sec. 1.6015-

3(c)(2)(iv), Income Tax Regs. The Tax Court noted that by the

time he filed the return in April, Jacobsen was aware of

Lemmens’ arrest in June of 2011, her conviction in November

2011 of embezzling $485,681, and her January 2012 sentence to

incarceration and restitution. Jacobsen cites no authority, nor

are we aware of any, suggesting that a finding of actual

knowledge would be precluded by the fact that a petitioning

spouse may not, as a result of his own lack of investigation, be

aware of the precise amount of embezzlement, particularly

when he has not offered any explanation as to why he failed to

access that information. See Porter v. C.I.R., 132 T.C. 203, 212

(2009) (§ 6015 “does not protect a spouse who turns a blind eye

to facts readily available to her”).
No. 18-3371 15

Jacobsen’s argument that the Tax Court improperly

assigned too much weight to that knowledge is more persuasive. Jacobsen claims that because, with the exception of

knowledge, the factors relevant to relief under § 6015(f) all

favored him or were neutral, by denying Jacobsen’s request for

equitable relief the Tax Court essentially elevated lack of

knowledge to a but-for criteria forrelief. Jacobsen suggests the

Tax Court’s conclusion was especially problematic in light of

Congressional intention to liberalize innocent spouse relief.

Specifically, prior to the 2013 changes discussed supra, the

relevant Revenue Procedures directed that actual knowledge

of the understatement would be treated “as a strong factor

weighing against relief.” Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32, I.R.B. 296,

§ 4.03(2)(a)(iii)(B), superseded by Rev. Proc. 2013-34. The

Revenue Procedures accompanying the 2013 changes to § 6015

expressly abandon that approach, stating in Rev. Proc. 2013-34,

§ 3.07 that “actual knowledge of the item giving rise to an

understatement or deficiency will no longer be weighed more

heavily than other factors, as it did under Rev. Proc. 2003-61.”

See alsoRev.Proc. 2013-34 § 4.03(2)(c)(i)(A) (“Actual knowledge

of the item giving rise to the understatement or deficiency will

not be weighted more heavily than any other factor.”). 

As discussed above, the Tax Court considered each of the

seven factors identified for consideration in Internal Revenue

Procedure 2013-34 § 4.03(2)(a)–(g) and determined that only

the third factor, whether the requesting spouse knew or had

reason to know of the understatement, weighed against

Jacobsen’s request for equitable relief. 

Notably, the court fully considered those factors favoring

relief. It noted Jacobsen’s failure to benefit significantly from
16 No. 18-3371

the embezzled income as well as his subsequent compliance

with tax laws. And the court took note of the fact that Jacobsen

is a veteran suffering from PTSD who experienced a mental

breakdown in response to Lemmens’ crime and has since

moved three times and held four different jobs. 

Because each of the factors for consideration was either

neutral or favored relief, Jacobsen claims the Tax Court must

have weighed knowledge more heavily than the other factors,

in contravention of Rev. Proc. 2013-34 § 4.03(2)(c)(i)(A).

Nothing in the Tax Court’s opinion, however, suggests that it

believed knowledge of the embezzled funds necessarily

precluded Jacobsen from equitable relief or automatically

outweighed the other factors for consideration. Although the

2013 regulations make clear that knowledge is no longer

necessarily a strong factor weighing against relief, as Jacobsen

himself acknowledges in his brief, they do not prohibit the Tax

Court from assigning more weight to petitioner’s knowledge

if such a conclusion is supported by the totality of the circumstances. As explained in the Revenue Procedures, “no one

factor or a majority of factors necessarily determines the

outcome.” Rev. Proc. 2013-34 § 4.03. And although knowledge

no longer weighs heavily against relief, nothing in the statute

or revenue procedures forecloses the decisionmaker from

concluding that in light of “all the facts and circumstances,”

§ 6015(f), knowledge of the understatement weighs heavily

against granting equitable relief. There is thus no reason to

believe the Tax Court’s decision was necessarily erroneous

because only one of the nonexhaustive factors for consideration

weighed against relief.
No. 18-3371 17

Jacobsen also suggests it was inappropriate for the Tax

Court to factor his “participation in preparing the 2011 return”

into its assessment, characterizing it as “another way for the

court to extra-count” Jacobsen’s knowledge of the embezzlment. In assessing the role of Jacobsen’s knowledge in his

entitlement to equitable relief, the court noted that in addition

to Jacobsen’s actual knowledge on account of Lemmens’

criminal conviction and sentence, in 2011 Jacobsen himself

provided the tax information to the paid preparer, whereas in

previous years Lemmens had always prepared and submitted

the tax information. Farfrom demonstrating that the Tax Court

erred, the court’s consideration of his role in preparing the

2011 return demonstrates its commitment to heed the Revenue

Procedure’s directive that the seven listed factors merely

provide “guides” as opposed to an “exclusive list” and that

“[o]ther factors relevant to a specific claim for relief may also

be taken into account.” Rev. Proc. 2013-34 § 4.03(2). 

It is clearfrom its opinion that the Tax Court considered the

factors relevant to Jacobsen’s specific claim forrelief. The court

considered Jacobsen’s individual circumstances as it analyzed

each of the listed factors. Jacobsen does not argue, nor could

he, that the Tax Court misapprehended the facts or otherwise

overlooked information relevant to Jacobsen’s claim. 

We are sympathetic to Jacobsen’s situation, and recognize

that the Tax Court could have easily decided on this record

that Jacobsen was entitled to equitable relief under § 6015(f).

Indeed, were we deciding the case in the first instance as

opposed to on deferential review, we may have decided the

case differently. But notwithstanding the existence of many

factors favoring relief and only Jacobsen’s knowledge counsel-
18 No. 18-3371

ing against it, nothing in the record indicates the Tax Court

misapprehended the weight to be accorded Jacobsen’s knowledge or treated it as a decisive factor barring relief. Indeed, its

discussion of each of the factors as well as the relevance of

Jacobsen’s involvement in preparing the 2011 taxes demonstrate that the Tax Court did not engage in a mechanical

balancing of the factors where the number of factors favoring

relief necessarily counterbalanced the ultimate question of

whether it was inequitable to hold Jacobsen liable for the 2011

deficiencies. We thus cannot say the Tax Court either abused

its discretion or clearly erred in its denial of relief for 2011. See

Greer, 595 F.3d at 353 (“We are indeed sympathetic to Mrs.

Greer’s situation, and again might decide her case differently

had we the opportunity to rule in the first instance rather than

on deferential review. But we cannot say that the prospect of

financial ruin is so plain on the record that the Tax Court

abused its discretion in denying equitable relief.”).

III.

Jacobsen’s case is a close one, and we are ultimately

persuaded by our deferential standard of review. Because

nothing in the record leads us to believe the Tax Court clearly

erred or abused its discretion, we AFFIRM its denial of

equitable relief.