COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

C. WILLIAM STIPE, III 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0898-97-4 PER CURIAM 

 FEBRUARY 24, 1998 

JEAN McCLUNG STIPE 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

David T. Stitt, Judge 

 (James G. Gore, Jr.; Andrew S. Regenbaum; The 

Gore Law Firm, on briefs), for appellant. 

 (Susan Massie Hicks; Melinda G. Williams; 

Hicks & Havrilak, on brief), for appellee. 

 C. William Stipe, III, (husband) appeals the decision of the 

circuit court awarding $1,283 in monthly spousal support to Jean 

McClung Stipe (wife). Husband contends that the trial court 

erred by failing to (1) impute income to wife for earnings on her 

equitable distribution award of an interest in husband's 401(k) 

retirement plan; (2) impute income to wife for earnings on the 

equitable distribution cash award of $28,721; (3) consider wife's 

free mortgage from her parents; (4) consider equitable 

distribution funds previously received and spent by wife; (5) 

consider evidence that wife's expenses were inflated; and (6) 

consider the tax consequences. Wife presents as an additional 

question whether the court erred by denying her motion for 

sanctions and for post-trial attorney's fees. Upon reviewing the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of 

the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 "The determination whether a spouse is entitled to support, 

and if so how much, is a matter within the discretion of the 

court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear that 

some injustice has been done." Dukelow v. Dukelow, 2 Va. App. 

21, 27, 341 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1986). 

 In awarding spousal support, the 

chancellor must consider the relative needs 

and abilities of the parties. He is guided 

by the nine factors that are set forth in 

Code § 20-107.1. When the chancellor has 

given due consideration to these factors, his 

determination will not be disturbed on appeal 

except for a clear abuse of discretion. 

Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 129, 341 S.E.2d 827, 829 

(1986). 

 The trial judge's oral comments and his written order of May 

28, 1997 demonstrate that he considered the statutory factors 

when making the spousal support award. Therefore, we will 

reverse the spousal support award only if there is evidence that 

the trial judge abused his discretion. 

Imputation of Income

 Under appropriate circumstances, a trial court may impute 

income to a party who seeks spousal support. See Srinivasan v. 

Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 734, 396 S.E.2d 675, 679 (1990). 

The court "must look to current circumstances and what the 

circumstances will be 'within the immediate or reasonably 
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foreseeable future,' not to what may happen in the future." Id.

at 735, 396 S.E.2d at 679 (citation omitted). Where imputation 

of income is proper, the evidence must enable the trier of fact 

to reasonably project the amount to be imputed. See Hur v. 

Virginia Department of Social Services, 13 Va. App. 54, 61, 409 

S.E.2d 454, 459 (1991). 

 Husband contends that the trial court erred by failing to 

impute income to wife on the basis of interest she could earn on 

her share of the retirement funds split between the parties under 

the equitable distribution of their marital assets. This 

contention is without merit. As noted by the trial court, "a 

retirement pension is suppose[d] to grow, and the way it grows is 

by reinvesting earnings." Here, neither party was retired, and 

wife was not currently receiving, or about to receive, any 

payments from this pension. Cf. McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 

248, 251, 391 S.E.2d 344, 347 (1990) (error not to include in 

wife's income the payment she received each month from husband's 

defined benefit pension). Moreover, husband presented only 

generalities and possibilities, not evidence, to support the 

amount of income he sought to impute to wife as earnings. We 

find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision not to 

impute unproven amounts of earnings on retirement funds which are 

not currently being withdrawn. 

 Husband also contends that the trial court erred by failing 

to impute income for earnings on the $28,721 cash award. Wife 
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testified that she used the cash award to pay attorney's fees and 

as a down-payment on her residence. Because this award was no 

longer available for investment, we find no error in the trial 

court's refusal to impute income from hypothetical earnings to 

wife. 

Mortgage

 Husband contends that wife's mortgage arrangement was merely 

an advance on her inheritance. The trial court believed the 

testimony of wife and her mother that the arrangement was a 

legitimate transaction resulting in an actual debt. That 

testimony demonstrated that wife's parents purchased the home for 

her when there was a delay in the distribution of the proceeds 

from the sale of the parties' marital residence. The parents 

charged wife $1,000 a month in rent initially, then $1,200 a 

month as a mortgage payment, based upon the monthly cost to them 

of their bank loan. While the parents subsequently paid off the 

bank loan in cash, wife's monthly payment remained $1,200. Wife 

and her parents acknowledged that the mortgage was interest-free, 

but wife executed a promissory note in the amount of the 

outstanding mortgage, payable to her parents and their heirs, 

which included other children besides wife. Because the evidence 

supports the court's determination that the mortgage arrangement 

was legitimate, we will not disturb that determination. 

Previously Distributed Funds

 While husband raised as a separate question wife's use of 
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previously distributed marital funds, he failed to address this 

contention in his brief. "Statements unsupported by argument, 

authority, or citations to the record do not merit appellate 

consideration." Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 

S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). Accordingly, we will not address this 

issue. 

Wife's Monthly Expenses

 Husband contends that he established at the post-trial 

hearing that wife's expenses were inflated. However, the trial 

court found that there had not been a material change in wife's 

financial circumstances. Credible evidence supports the trial 

court's determination. Therefore, we find no error. 

Tax Consequences

 Husband contends that the trial judge failed to consider the 

tax consequences when setting spousal support, as required under 

Code § 20-107.1(9). As support, husband quotes a remark by the 

trial judge that he did not consider the tax consequences to the 

parties. In full context, however, the trial judge stated: 

 I've also considered other factors. I've not 

considered the tax consequences to the 

parties. I've considered that they are going 

to have to deal with their own tax 

consequences. So, again, I've considered all 

these factors. 

This remark demonstrates that the trial judge considered the 

statutory factor, but gave little weight to the tax consequences 

faced by the parties in this instance. The trial judge need not 

recite specific findings from the evidence relative to each 
 6 

factor or assign the weight accorded to it. See Woolley v. 

Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986). 
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Failure to Award Fees

 Wife raises a single issue on appeal. She contends that the 

trial court erred by failing to grant her motion for sanctions 

against husband or to award her attorney's fees for costs 

incurred in connection with husband's post-trial motions. An 

award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the sound 

discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal only 

for an abuse of discretion. See Graves v. Graves, 4 Va. App. 

326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). The key to a proper award 

of counsel fees is reasonableness under all the circumstances. 

See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277, 338 S.E.2d 159, 

162 (1985). The trial court found that the post-trial motions 

filed by both parties were appropriate and not frivolous. 

Husband was required previously to pay a portion of wife's 

attorney's fees. We cannot say that the trial judge's decision 

not to impose sanctions or award attorney's fees was unreasonable 

or that the trial judge abused his discretion in not making an 

additional award. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.