IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

John F. Zola and Jill M. Zola, :

his wife, and Vincent J. Zola :

and Jayme A. Zola, his wife, :

Appellants :

: No. 155 C.D. 2019

v. :

: Submitted: May 10, 2019

Scotch Valley Estates and Daniel W. :

Derr, II and Shirley R. Derr, his wife :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: November 18, 2019

John F. Zola and Jill M. Zola, his wife, and Vincent J. Zola and Jayme A. 

Zola, his wife (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal from the May 30, 2018 order of the Court 

of Common Pleas of the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, Columbia County Branch (trial 

court), which sustained the preliminary objections of Scotch Valley Estates to 

Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 

Facts and Procedural History

The underlying facts of this case are garnered from the original record 

before the trial court, as well as a 1991 opinion from our Superior Court in the matter 

of Scotch Valley Homeowners Association v. Long (Pa. Super., No. 691 Philadelphia 
2

1990, filed January 14, 1991).1 Scotch Valley Estates is a development comprised of 

residential lots located in Beaver Township, Columbia County, Pennsylvania. Scotch 

Valley Estates was originally owned by Evergreen Lake, Inc., which sought in 1970 to 

establish a planned residential community consisting of 880 individual lots, improved 

roads, a central water and sewer system, a lake, and numerous outdoor recreational 

facilities. As part of this development, Evergreen Lake, Inc., issued a Declaration of 

Restrictions (Declaration) that was properly recorded on September 1, 1970. This 

Declaration addressed the exclusive residential use of each lot and the limitations on 

improvements thereto, which required the approval of Evergreen Lake, Inc., including 

the prohibition of any outbuildings. Although it sold 408 lots, Evergreen Lake, Inc., 

eventually failed and the property was placed in foreclosure.

2

 On February 1, 1977, 

the property was sold to Scotch Valley Estates, Inc. The Board of Scotch Valley 

Estates (SVE Board) later issued variance guidelines for storage sheds, thereby 

permitting sheds on unimproved lots as a principal use and primary structure.3

 

1

In that case, Donald and Mary Long had purchased 10 lots from Evergreen Lake, Inc., in 

December 1971, with the latter promising not to impose maintenance fees until the lots were sold. 

However, after Scotch Valley Estates, Inc., purchased the property in 1977, it began assessing each 

lot owner an annual maintenance fee of $225.00. The Longs sought to enforce their original 

agreement deferring imposition of said fees and were successful before the trial court and Superior 

Court. In fact, because only the lake existed at the time of trial, the trial court concluded, and the 

Superior Court agreed, that the intended purpose of the development never came to fruition and the 

deed restriction relating to payment of maintenance fees for recreational facilities that were 

nonexistent was invalid due to changed conditions. 

2

It appears that sewage issues prevented most lot owners from building residences on their 

lots.

3 These variance guidelines included numerous criteria that must be met before a variance 

would be granted, including a signed letter from all adjoining property owners giving their 

permission; compliance with all local government permitting requirements; compliance with all setback guidelines in current deed restrictions; construction using rustic or earth tone colors; maximum 
3

Plaintiffs John and Jill Zola and Vincent and Jayme Zola each own two 

lots within Scotch Valley Estates. Daniel and Shirley Derr (the Derrs) also own a lot 

within Scotch Valley Estates. The Derrs sought and obtained a variance from the SVE 

Board to erect a 12- by 20-foot shed,4 with electricity but no sewer or water, on their 

unimproved lot. As required by the shed guidelines, the Derrs obtained the written 

approval of the adjacent lot owners for construction of the shed. The Derrs intended 

to use the shed to store fishing equipment and other personal property near the lake that 

was part of Scotch Valley Estates. After receiving the variance, the Derrs constructed 

the shed on their lot.

Shortly thereafter, on October 13, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their original 

complaint against Scotch Valley Estates and the Derrs seeking a declaratory judgment, 

specific performance, and injunctive relief. More specifically, Plaintiffs sought an 

order stating that the Declaration prohibits the SVE Board from granting a variance to 

allow the construction of a shed as a principal use and primary structure on an 

unimproved lot. Plaintiffs also sought an order enjoining the SVE Board from 

administering the variance guidelines for sheds and granting variances. 

Plaintiffs noted in their complaint that section 4(A) of the Declaration 

states that:

No lot shall be used except for single family residential 

purposes. No structure shall be erected, placed or permitted 

to remain on any lot other than one (1) detached single family

residence dwelling and such outbuildings as are usually 

 

height of 15 feet; maximum interior dimension of 250 square feet; limit of one shed per lot; 

prohibition of use of a shed as a residence; permitting electrical service only to the shed; and the SVE 

Board retaining the right to revoke shed privileges at any time if evidence of property abuse exists.

4 The Derrs also sought and obtained a variance from the Zoning Hearing Board of Beaver 

Township relating to front and rear yard setbacks.
4

accessory to a single family residence dwelling including a 

private garage.

(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 55a.) Plaintiffs also noted that section 7(A) of the 

Declaration prohibited outbuildings and that while section 8(A) permitted reasonable 

variances and adjustments, no such variance may be materially detrimental or injurious 

to any other property or improvements and must be done within the intent and purpose 

of the general development scheme.5 Scotch Valley Estates filed preliminary 

objections alleging that Plaintiffs’ requests for relief would affect all property owners 

within Scotch Valley Estates and the complaint failed to join these indispensable 

parties. Scotch Valley Estates also alleged that Plaintiffs improperly requested an 

award of attorney fees.

Plaintiffs did not respond to these preliminary objections, but instead filed 

an amended complaint on November 21, 2017, again naming only Scotch Valley 

Estates and the Derrs as defendants. The amended complaint contained three counts, 

the first challenging a contested corporate action, the second requesting specific 

 

5 Section 8(A) of the Declaration provides, in full, as follows:

The Declarant or Committee [such as the SVE Board] may allow 

reasonable variances and adjustments of these Restrictions in order to 

overcome practical difficulties and prevent unnecessary hardships in 

the application of the provisions contained herein; provided, however, 

that such is done in conformity with the intent and purpose of the 

general development scheme and provided also that in every instance 

such variance or adjustment will [not] be materially detrimental or 

injurious to other property or improvements in the neighborhood or the 

Subdivisions.

(Supplemental Reproduced Record at 8A.) Contrary to Pa.R.A.P. 2173, the supplemental reproduced 

record submitted by Scotch Valley Estates used the capital “A” in its page numbering instead of the 

lower case “b.”
5

performance, and the third requesting injunctive relief. However, the amended 

complaint essentially sought the same relief as the original complaint. Scotch Valley 

Estates again filed preliminary objections alleging that Plaintiffs’ amended complaint 

failed to join indispensable parties and improperly requested an award of attorney fees. 

After briefing and argument, the trial court ultimately agreed with Scotch Valley 

Estates, specifically noting that the requested relief would affect the rights of all 

members of Scotch Valley Estates, such that they were indispensable parties to this 

matter. By order dated March 2, 2018, the trial court granted the preliminary 

objections, dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint and request for attorney fees,6and allowed 

Plaintiffs 20 days to file another amended complaint. 

Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on March 21, 2018, which 

included the same three counts of the amended complaint. Plaintiffs reiterated that the 

Declaration prohibits the construction of a shed as a principal use and primary structure 

on an unimproved lot and that the permitting of sheds in such manner would require 

an amendment to the Declaration by at least a 67% vote of all lot owners. Plaintiffs 

sought an order stating that the Derrs were prohibited from constructing a shed without 

the aforementioned amendment to the Declaration and that the SVE Board was 

prohibited from granting the Derrs a variance, as well as directing the SVE Board to 

rescind the variance granted to the Derrs. 

With regard to the second count requesting specific performance, namely 

compliance with the specific terms of the Declaration, Plaintiffs alleged that the shed 

on the Derrs’ lot devalues, diminishes, and impairs the property values of lawfully 

improved lots; negatively impacts the use and quiet enjoyment of such lots; adversely 

affects the health, safety, and welfare of the community; intrudes upon the aesthetic 

 

6 The trial court held that there was no legal or factual basis stated in the complaint to sustain 

a claim for attorney fees.
6

beauty of the development; and attracts undesirables. Plaintiffs sought an order 

directing the SVE Board to refrain from administering the shed variance as to the Derrs, 

directing the SVE Board to administer and enforce the Declaration as to the Derrs, and 

directing the Derrs to remove the shed on their lot.

With respect to the third count seeking injunctive relief, Plaintiffs alleged 

immediate and irreparable harm for the reasons stated above in the second count, that 

the continued action of the SVE Board in granting variances for sheds will result in 

greater injury if the injunction is not granted, and that ordering the removal of the 

Derrs’ shed was necessary to return the parties to the status quo. Plaintiffs sought an 

order enjoining the SVE Board from granting a variance to the Derrs, directing the 

Derrs to remove the shed, and awarding Plaintiffs costs. 

Scotch Valley Estates once again filed preliminary objections alleging 

that Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint failed to join indispensable parties and that 

there was no legal or factual basis to award costs to Plaintiffs. Following briefing and 

oral argument, by order dated May 30, 2018, the trial court sustained the preliminary 

objections and dismissed the claim against Scotch Valley Estates and the Derrs with 

prejudice. The trial court reiterated that the relief sought by Plaintiffs requires the 

joinder of all members of Scotch Valley Estates as indispensable parties. The trial 

court noted that the rights of all members of Scotch Valley Estates would be affected 

by the requested relief. Plaintiffs thereafter filed a notice of appeal.7 After Plaintiffs 

filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, the trial court issued an 

opinion in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) explaining that Plaintiffs are essentially 

attacking the variance procedure of the SVE Board, which applies to all lot owners in 

Scotch Valley Estates. In other words, because the relief sought by Plaintiffs, i.e., 

 

7 This appeal was originally filed with our Superior Court. However, by order filed January 

2, 2019, the Superior Court transferred the matter to this Court. 
7

voiding the variance guidelines for storage sheds, would affect the property rights of 

all lot owners, the trial court concluded that all members of Scotch Valley Estates are 

indispensable parties to Plaintiffs’ lawsuit. 

Discussion

On appeal,8 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred as a matter of law 

and/or abused its discretion in sustaining the preliminary objections filed by Scotch 

Valley Estates. More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that their second amended 

complaint specifically limited any claims against the SVE Board to its granting of a 

variance to the Derrs and the relief sought would not affect any other property owner 

in Scotch Valley Estates. We agree.

Our Supreme Court addressed the issue of indispensable parties in City of 

Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566 (Pa. 2003), stating as follows:

[A] party is [an] indispensable [party plaintiff] when his or 

her rights are so connected with the claims of the litigants 

that no decree can be made without impairing those rights. 

[T]he basic inquiry in determining whether a party is 

indispensable concerns whether justice can be done in the 

absence of him or her. In undertaking this inquiry, the nature 

of the claim and the relief sought must be considered. 

Furthermore, we note the general principle that, in an action 

for declaratory judgment, all persons having an interest that 

would be affected by the declaratory relief sought ordinarily 

must be made parties to the action. Indeed, Section 7540(a) 

 

8 Our scope of review of a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections and dismissing 

a complaint is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law. Petty v. Hospital Service Association of Northeastern Pennsylvania, 967 A.2d 439, 443 

n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), aff’d, 23 A.3d 1004 (Pa. 2011). “In reviewing preliminary objections, all 

well pleaded relevant and material facts are to be considered as true, and preliminary objections shall 

only be sustained when they are free and clear from doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). “Such review 

raises a question of law as to which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Id. (citation omitted).
8

of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §7540(a), which is part of 

Pennsylvania’s Declaratory Judgments Act, states that, 

[w]hen declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made 

parties who have or claim any interest which would be 

affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall 

prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.

While this joinder provision is mandatory, it is subject to 

limiting principles. For example, where the interest involved 

is indirect or incidental, joinder may not be required. 

Additionally, where a person’s official designee is already a 

party, the participation of such designee may alone be 

sufficient, as the interests of the two are identical, and thus, 

the participation of both would result in duplicative filings.

Id. at 567-68 (citations and footnotes omitted).

Further, in Mechanicsburg Area School District v. Kline, 431 A.2d 953

(Pa. 1981), our Supreme Court identified the following questions to be considered in 

determining whether a party is indispensable:

1. Do absent parties have a right or interest related to the 

claim?

2. If so, what is the nature of that right or interest?

3. Is that right or interest essential to the merits of the issue?

4. Can justice be afforded without violating the due process 

rights of absent parties?

Id. at 956.

In the present case, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is premised on 

the SVE Board’s enactment of variance guidelines for storage sheds, upon which the 

SVE Board relied in granting the variance to the Derrs, and whether such enactment 

runs afoul of the Declaration that governs the Scotch Valley Estates development. 

More specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the Declaration restricts the use of any lot in 

Scotch Valley Estates for single-family residential purposes only and that the variance 
9

guidelines equated to an amendment of the Declaration which would require a vote of 

two-thirds of the residential lot owners in accordance with section 2(A) of the 

Declaration.9 To that end, Plaintiffs appropriately named as defendants the only entity, 

the SVE Board, and individuals, the Derrs, directly impacted by the alleged invalid 

action.

Contrary to the trial court’s reasoning, we do not believe that all other 

property owners within Scotch Valley Estates were indispensable to Plaintiffs’ suit. 

While these lot owners may have an interest in the suit, in the sense that the variance 

guidelines enacted by the SVE Board apply equally to all lot owners, such interest is at 

best indirect and cannot be said to surpass the general interest of all lot owners within 

the development in ensuring that the SVE Board acts lawfully and consistent with the 

Declaration. The SVE Board will represent the interest of these lot owners and the 

matter can be adequately resolved without offending the due process rights of said lot 

owners. 

We reached a similar conclusion in Belleville v. David Cutler Group, Inc.

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 284 C.D. 2013, filed January 3, 2014).10 In that case, William and 

Bette Ann Belleville (the Bellevilles) appealed from a common pleas court order that 

dismissed their amended complaint against David Cutler Group, Inc. (Developer) and 

the Malvern Hunt Homeowner’s Association (Association) for failure to join all 278 

property owners in a planned community known as Malvern Hunt as necessary and 

indispensable parties. The development was subdivided into three communities, “The 

 

9 Section 2(A) provides, in pertinent part, “that at any time after January 1, 1980, these 

Restrictions may be amended by the vote of the then record owners of two-thirds (2/3) of such 

residential lots. . . .” (R.R. at 14a.)

10 Pursuant to section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, an unreported 

decision of this Court may be cited “for its persuasive value.”
10

Reserve,” “The Chase,” and “The Ridings.” The Bellevilles resided in “The Ridings,” 

whose members, according to a recorded declaration dated March 20, 2001, were 

excluded from enrollment in the Association, not subject to maintenance fees, and 

responsible for all aspects of their own property maintenance. However, when the 

Bellevilles purchased their home in August 2001, Developer provided them with an 

unrecorded declaration that required owners in “The Ridings” to pay an annual 

maintenance assessment and, like the recorded declaration, prohibited any amendments 

that would impose additional financial obligations upon these specific owners. 

Developer later filed and recorded an amendment to the original recorded declaration 

attempting to “clarify” that property owners within “The Ridings” were subject to the 

annual maintenance assessment.

The Association later took control of the development from Developer in 

accordance with the provisions of the recorded declaration. In January 2008, the 

Association sent the Bellevilles an assessment notice that was calculated differently 

from the previous invoices they had received. The Bellevilles first learned of the 

exemption from the annual maintenance assessment around this time and a dispute 

arose with the Association. The Bellevilles subsequently commenced a declaratory 

judgment action against Developer and the Association, seeking a declaration that 

certain amendments to the original recorded declaration were null and void, a refund 

of all improperly paid assessments, and punitive damages from Developer for its 

deceitful conduct. Developer filed a motion to dismiss the action due to lack of 

jurisdiction for failure to join indispensable parties, namely all other property owners 

in the development. The common pleas court granted the motion and dismissed the 

declaratory judgment action. 
11

On appeal, this Court vacated the common pleas court’s decision and 

remanded for further proceedings. We concluded that the pecuniary interest of the 

individual owners in “The Chase” and “The Reserve” in not having to pay increased 

assessments to make up for any budget shortfall relating to the annual maintenance 

assessments was not directly related to the precedent to be set as a result of the 

Bellevilles’ declaratory judgment action. Instead, we noted that an order declaring that 

the owners in “The Ridings” were illegally assessed would only indirectly affect the 

owners in “The Chase” and “The Reserve.” Additionally, regardless of whether the 

other owners in “The Ridings” were made parties, we noted that Developer and the 

Association would be bound by the common pleas court’s decision and that each of 

these owners would not be barred from asserting their individual rights against the 

same. In other words, we stated that any declaration from the common pleas court 

would not operate as res judicata or collateral estoppel to preclude or deprive these 

other owners of their right to seek monetary relief.

Similarly, in this case, even if the trial court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs 

and struck the variance guidelines enacted by the SVE Board, the residential lot owners 

of Scotch Valley Estates would not be precluded or estopped from asserting their rights 

under the Declaration. As this Court has previously stated, requiring the joinder of 

hundreds of parties “would undermine the litigation process” and “render the litigation 

unmanageable.” City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 582-83 (Pa. 

2011). In sum, the remaining residential lot owners in Scotch Valley Estates are simply 

not indispensable parties to the present litigation.
12

Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

John F. Zola and Jill M. Zola, :

his wife, and Vincent J. Zola :

and Jayme A. Zola, his wife, :

Appellants :

: No. 155 C.D. 2019

v. :

:

Scotch Valley Estates and Daniel W. :

Derr, II and Shirley R. Derr, his wife :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 18th day of November, 2019, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, Columbia County Branch , 

dated May 30, 2018, is hereby reversed.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge