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D’ANNA WELSH v. WILLIAM V. MARTINEZ, JR.

(AC 35335)

Gruendel, Prescott and Borden, Js.

Argued February 17—officially released May 12, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Robaina, J.)

James H. Lee, for the appellant (defendant).

Alinor C. Sterling, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

GRUENDEL, J. The defendant, William V. Martinez,

Jr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the plaintiff, D’Anna

Welsh. He contends that the court improperly (1) permitted, during jury deliberations, the playback of a

statement by the plaintiff’s attorney, and (2) denied his

motion for remittitur. We affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the

jury reasonably could have found the following relevant

facts. The defendant at all relevant times was employed

as a cardiovascular and thoracic surgeon at St. Francis

Hospital (hospital). In January, 2001, the plaintiff was

hired by the hospital as a physician’s assistant in the

cardiac surgery department. The defendant served as

a supervisor to the plaintiff, who worked with several

of his patients.

At that time, the defendant was married and living

with his wife and nine children. The defendant nevertheless sought to become romantically involved with the

plaintiff. The parties flirted with each other, but when

the defendant expressed his interest in exploring a relationship with her, the plaintiff indicated that she would

not consider dating a married man unless and until he

moved out of his family’s home. In April, 2001, the

defendant moved out of that house and into an apartment. The parties then began a personal relationship

that lasted for years. The plaintiff testified that she fell

deeply in love with the defendant. The two talked about

getting married and having children together, while

shopping for engagement and wedding rings and selecting children’s names. At the same time, the plaintiff

‘‘was very frustrated that [the defendant] was still married [because] that wasn’t in accordance with the value

system that [she] wanted to be living.’’

In 2002, the plaintiff and the defendant visited her

father at a convalescent home in Texas, where he was

suffering from lung cancer. The defendant shook her

father’s hand and told him not to worry about the plaintiff, as he would take care of her. That assurance ‘‘meant

a lot’’ to the plaintiff. Her father passed away months

later.

The plaintiff subsequently received an inheritance

from her father. She testified that her ‘‘father was a

very hard worker. I learned my work ethic from him

and he had put money aside for his children, and I

knew I needed to do something important with it, and

I decided to purchase my first home.’’ Once built, her

new home was extremely special to her because she

‘‘felt accomplished [and] very grateful to [her] father

because it would not have happened without him.’’

When the plaintiff moved into the house in November,

2004, she gave the defendant a set of keys, and he
began spending almost every night in her home. Soon

thereafter, the defendant installed a wireless Internet

network in the house against the plaintiff’s wishes.1In

December, 2004, the defendant gave the plaintiff a laptop computer as a Christmas gift. Unbeknownst to the

plaintiff, the defendant had installed a spyware program

on the computer that discreetly forwarded to him, via

e-mail on a daily basis, a copy of everything composed

thereon. A few months later, the defendant purchased

an air purifier for the plaintiff. That would be the first of

several gifts given to her by the defendant that secretly

housed wireless spy cameras. After unsuccessfully

attempting to install spy cameras in the ceiling above

her bed, the defendant gave the plaintiff two clock

radios and a television, which all contained spy cameras

and were positioned in her bedroom in the direction

of her bed. The air purifier likewise was positioned in

the direction of her bathroom shower.

The defendant also installed a receiver antenna in a

crawl space portion of the plaintiff’s basement directly

beneath her bedroom. That antenna received transmissions from each of the spy cameras. The transmissions

then were recorded on a ‘‘multiplexer hard drive

machine’’ connected to the antenna in the crawl space.

The defendant testified that, when the plaintiff was

not present, he routinely would enter the crawl space,

attach a small television monitor to the hard drive

machine and review captured footage. That behavior

continued throughout 2005 and 2006. As a result, the

defendant testified that he saw everything that transpired in the plaintiff’s bedroom.

In addition, the defendant purchased a global positioning system (GPS) device in the summer of 2005. He

installed that tracking device in the plaintiff’s vehicle

without her knowledge. The plaintiff also later learned

that the defendant covertly accessed her cell phone

records by impersonating her and adding his e-mail

address to the account.

By February, 2007, the defendant had begun dating

a nurse at the hospital without the plaintiff’s knowledge.

On February 12, 2007, the defendant returned his set

of house keys to the plaintiff. At that time, he explained

that he was preoccupied with starting his own medical

practice and finalizing his divorce. The plaintiff was

devastated. When he ended theirrelationship,the defendant never informed the plaintiff that he had installed

surveillance equipmentin her home, computer and vehicle, or that he was dating another woman. The defendant testified that, in the months that followed, he

continued to receive daily e-mails documenting everything that the plaintiff wrote on her computer and that

the surveillance equipment in the plaintiff’s home continued to broadcast and record from therein.

On July 18, 2007, the plaintiff hired a plumber to

repair a broken faucet on her property. In order to do
so, the plumber entered the crawl space in her basement

and discovered the defendant’s surveillance equipment.

At the plumber’s urging, the plaintiff contacted the

police. Members of the Bloomfield Police Department

responded to her residence and discovered both the

recording equipment in the basement and the two clock

radios in her bedroom containing spy cameras.2 The

plaintiff immediately realized that the defendant had

been spying on her. As she testified, ‘‘I was devastated.

I knew exactly how they had been—flashback in my

head [to] him handing them to me.’’ Realizing that the

defendant had been spying on her for years, the plaintiff

felt ‘‘betrayed, alarmed, betrayed, humiliated, controlled. I didn’t feel like a person. I felt like I was just

a—I don’t even know, something that he—just like a

toy of his, like I just didn’t count.’’ When she called the

defendant and confronted him about the surveillance

equipment, the defendant offered an ‘‘empty apology’’

and did not deny that he had spied on her over the

course of their relationship. Notably, the defendant did

not inform the plaintiff that he also had monitored her

computer with a spyware program or that he had monitored her vehicle with a GPS device. At that time, the

plaintiff declined to press charges against the

defendant.

In the months that followed, the defendant, although

uninvited, repeatedly appeared at the plaintiff’s home.

He sent her numerous e-mails and left items, such as

books on marital infidelity, at her property. In response,

the plaintiff told the defendant ‘‘to leave me alone.’’ In

September, 2007, the defendant informed her that ‘‘I

can hear you from outside your house.’’ The plaintiff

found his words to be terrifying. As she recounted at

trial:

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Attorney]: Was it like a threat or how

did that come up?

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: It was like—it was like control. . . .

Like scary, honestly scary.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Attorney]: Did you believe him?

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Yes.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Attorney]: Did you know at that point

if you had gotten all of the spy equipment out of the

house?

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Well, I didn’t know how he was hearing me and I thought it was really weird that he always

knew when I was home.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’sAttorney]: What do you mean by that?

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Well, like I would get home, and . . .

five minutes later he would show up . . . unannounced and I didn’t—I wasn’t a creature of habit. It

wasn’t like I was always home at a particular time . . . .

I didn’t understand how he knew . . . who I was talking to. . . . I thought he was still [spying on] me
somehow.’’

The defendant continued to appear at the plaintiff’s

property unannounced, sometimes banging on her door.

When she rebuffed his attempts to rekindle a relationship, the defendant left her a voice mail message stating

that she was ‘‘fucking unbelievable.’’ The defendant also

left a handwritten note at her house that stated in relevant part: ‘‘I wanted to fix [our relationship] and start

anew but you are your stubborn, nasty self.’’ In another

letter, dated November 14, 2007, the defendant complained of a lack of closure and accused the plaintiff

of being ‘‘extremely unfair’’ and ‘‘evil.’’ He stated that

he had ‘‘tried and tried in every way imaginable to

connect with you’’ and that ‘‘the way you have treated

me recently is horrific.’’

On yet another occasion, the defendant drove by the

plaintiff’s house at night and spotted a vehicle in her

driveway. The defendant then parked his vehicle, snuck

into her backyard and approached a back window.

From that vantage point, he watched the plaintiff and

a male guest inside.3 The defendant then returned to

the front of the plaintiff’s property and examined the

license plate on the parked vehicle. The defendant testified that he used that license plate number to illegally

identify the male guest inside the residence. The defendant then placed a phone call to the home of that male

guest and left a message on an answering machine

stating that ‘‘your husband is having an affair, and you

should probably check his phone records.’’

The plaintiff testified that, as the defendant’s behavior continued, she grew scared. As she put it: ‘‘I didn’t

want any contact with him. I didn’t want to be confronted with him. I didn’t want him to try to control

another conversation with me. I didn’t want him to

touch me, try to hug me, try to make it better. I just

want him to leave me alone. . . . I . . . was afraid he

might set my house on fire.’’ On cross-examination, the

defendant’s attorney inquired as to the basis of that

concern. The plaintiffresponded that the defendant was

‘‘[a]t times a very violent, angry-faced, frustrated, the

handwriting in his letters, the voice in the voice mail,

you are fucking unbelievable, I mean to say that to

someone that you care about. I’ve heard a number of

times of women getting killed because the man can’t

have them or won’t comply. . . . [H]e’s a man of

control.’’

The unrelenting phone calls, letters and unannounced

visits by the defendant to her house eventually overwhelmed the plaintiff in February, 2008. As she testified,

‘‘I got a text message from a friend of mine about a

conversation I had . . . in my house that he would

have no way of knowing and I just—I felt tortured in

my own home, and it was at that point that I called

the police to look into this further.’’ The defendant

thereafter was arrested and charged with voyeurism
and eavesdropping.

In response, the defendant filed an application for

accelerated rehabilitation with the Superior Court. A

hearing followed on July 15, 2008, at which the defendant provided sworn testimony in which he stated that

the plaintiff ‘‘had nothing to worry about.’’ The defendant further represented that no further surveillance

equipment remained in the plaintiff’s home.4 On the

basis of those representations, the court granted the

defendant’s application for accelerated rehabilitation.5

The defendant did not apprise the court of the fact

that additional surveillance equipment remained in the

plaintiff’s bedroom, her vehicle, and her computer.

In the year that followed, the plaintiff continued to

feel unsafe in her house. The plaintiff ultimately

retained a Boston company to inspect her home in

January, 2010, in an effort to ‘‘know once and for all’’

that her home was safe and free of surveillance equipment. To the plaintiff’s horror, that inspection proved

fruitful, as images broadcasting from the plaintiff’s bedroom appeared almost immediately on both a ‘‘professional looking’’ receiver as well as a handheld receiver

that ‘‘anybody could get from Radio Shack.’’ The plaintiff testified that her ‘‘worst fear’’ was realized when

she learned that the television in her bedroom ‘‘didn’t

have to be turned on for[the spy camera] to be transmitting up to three football field lengths in distance from

my house . . . it was still transmitting a view of whatever was happening in my bedroom.’’6 As a result, the

plaintiff testified that ‘‘I felt like I had been victimized.

I felt betrayed, lied to, just dehumanized, taken advantage of, just very angry.’’ The bedroom television was

impounded at that time.

The plaintiff commenced this civil action against the

defendant later that year. The operative complaint consisted of four counts alleging tortious invasion of privacy, negligence per se,7

intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and negligent misrepresentation.

During a subsequent deposition of the defendant, the

plaintiff first learned that the defendant also had

installed the GPS device in her vehicle and the spyware

program on her computer.

At trial, the plaintiff, as part of her case-in-chief, introduced into evidence, inter alia, the surveillance equipment found in her home, which had been impounded

by the Bloomfield Police Department, and various correspondences from the defendant. Significantly, the

defendant in his testimony admitted that he (1) had

installed the surveillance equipment found in the plaintiff’s home, (2) had reviewed captured transmissions

therefrom, and (3) had surveyed her e-mail, her phone

calls and her movements outside the home.

The jury also heard the testimony of Kevin Connelly,

a licensed psychologist who specializes in treating post-
traumatic stress disorder. Connelly diagnosed the plaintiff as suffering from that affliction due to her symptoms, which included avoidance behavior,

hypervigilance, persistent nightmares and flashbacks,

difficulty concentrating and exaggerated startle

response. He testified that ‘‘the variable that often has

much more influence on a person’s trauma . . . is the

relationship variable. . . . [W]hen people are hurt

intentionally by someone who is supposed to love them,

who cares about them . . . can be tenfold more damaged because of that relationship. . . . [I]n [the plaintiff’s] case because she never saw it coming, because

she never expected it naturally you begin to doubt your

own judgment, your own perceptions. You don’t know

who’s safe, who’s not safe. If people that love you are

hurting you well what else could happen?’’ Connelly

also explained that post-traumatic stress disorder ‘‘isn’t

something that goes away’’ and cannot be cured,

only managed.

The plaintiff testified that, as a result of her experience with the defendant, she neverfeels safe and always

feels as though someone is spying on her. She does

not feel safe anywhere. The plaintiff suffers from the

persistent grinding of teeth, an affliction known as bruxism, which necessitated the removal of a tooth. She also

experiences frequent nightmares of ‘‘[b]eing covered in

lava, suffocating, being beat up, being shot, full sweat

in the middle of the night.’’ Even when in the privacy

of her own home, the plaintiff testified that ‘‘I never

feel private . . . . I always . . . feel like there’s no

dignity, and I feel humiliated, and I feel I’m being

laughed at . . . .’’ She testified that she remains ever

fearful that someone is peering into her home.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict

in favor of the plaintiff on all counts and awarded her

$2 million in damages. The defendant thereafter filed

a motion for remittitur, claiming that the jury’s verdict

was against the weight of the evidence and excessive

as a matter of law. The court denied that motion, and

this appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly

permitted the playback of a portion of testimony during

the jury’s deliberations. We disagree.

We review the trial court’s decision to permit the

playback of certain testimony for an abuse of discretion.

See State v. Rubaka, 82 Conn. 59, 68, 72 A. 566 (1909)

(jury review of trial testimony ‘‘must rest, to a great

extent, in the discretion of the trial judge’’); State v.

Fletcher, 10 Conn. App. 697, 703, 525 A.2d 535 (1987)

(‘‘[a] determination of the reasonableness of the request

for a review of testimony lies within the discretion of

the trial court’’), aff’d, 207 Conn. 191, 540 A.2d 370

(1988). Under that standard, ‘‘[w]e will make every rea-
sonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial

court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse

of discretion. . . . In determining whether there has

been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is

whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Andrews, 313 Conn. 266, 276, 96 A.3d 1199

(2014).

The following additional facts are relevant to the

defendant’s claim. During its deliberations, the jury sent

a note to the court, in which it inquired: ‘‘Can we have

the plaintiff’s testimony about police presence when

James Atkinson was hired to check for more surveillance equipment?’’ The court reviewed that testimony

with counsel outside the presence of the jury. The court

then highlighted a portion of the plaintiff’s June 21,

2012 testimony and then stated in relevant part: ‘‘All

right. Well . . . the question that follows the [plaintiff’s] statement where [her attorney] asked, ‘Does anyone in your neighborhood’ and so on . . . that should

not come in. . . . [T]he question leading up to it, I

think, can come because . . . it sets up the question

and the answer that it appears that the jury is looking

for, and I’ll tell them if they want other things, they

certainly are free to ask for other things . . . .’’ In

response, the defendant’s attorney replied, ‘‘Right.’’

After both parties indicated that they were ready to

proceed, the court called the jury into the courtroom

and had the following portion of the audio recording

played back:

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Attorney]: There’s been some testimony in the case about the transmission capabilities

of these cameras and whether they can be seen out in

your neighborhood or seen by other people with baby

monitors and so. What’s your fear about that?

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: It’s my worst fear. First off, that television didn’t have to be turned on for it to be transmitting up to three football field lengths in distance from

my house so while it was off it was still transmitting a

view of whatever was happening in my bedroom. It was

very simple. The monitor that Jim Atkinson had in his

hand that I saw my bedroom on which someone else

even outside my own neighborhood could have had and

viewed, and I know they went down the street, Officer

Ledger and Jim Atkinson to test this, and I—I fear that

[the defendant] had one of those too. I still fear that

[the defendant] had one of those, and I don’t believe

that he didn’t.’’8

During playback of that testimony, the defendant’s

attorney objected to the inclusion of what he referred to

as the ‘‘preamble’’to the question posed by the plaintiff’s

attorney. After excusing the jury, the court engaged in

the following colloquy with counsel:

‘‘The Court: I understand your concern . . . but it’s

all part of the same answer. It’s all one long answer
without questions in between so I think it was appropriate to start at the question and then play the

answer back.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Attorney]: I understand, but Your

Honor will note my objection to having that preamble read.

‘‘The Court: Yes, sir.’’

The defendant plainly did not object to the playback

of any of the plaintiff’s testimony. Rather, his sole objection pertained to the playback of a prefatory remark to

the question by her counsel, in which counsel stated:

‘‘There’s been some testimony in the case about the

transmission capabilities of these cameras and whether

they can be seen out in your neighborhood or seen by

other people with baby monitors and so.’’ The defendant

did not furnish any basis for his objection or request a

curative instruction from the court.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly denied his objection to the playback of the

prefatory remark of the plaintiff’s attorney.9 For multiple reasons, we do not agree.

First, we note that the defendant raised no objection

to that statement when it was made at trial. This case

thus is plainly distinguishable from State v. Miguel C.,

305 Conn. 562, 46 A.3d 126 (2012), the sole authority

relied on by the defendant in support of his claim.

Unlike the present case, the defendant in Miguel C.

raised a distinct objection in the middle of the prosecutor’s questioning at trial, which objection the trial court

ultimately sustained. Id., 566–68. For that reason, our

Supreme Court concluded that the playback of the

stricken question during the jury’s deliberations was

improper. Id., 579–81. In particular, the court emphasized that ‘‘the contested testimony was not merely

cumulative, but, rather, was the sole means by which

the state was able to make [the contested statement]

known to the jury.’’ Id., 579.

By contrast, the substance of the contested statement

in the present case was cumulative of other testimony.

The prefatory remark of the plaintiff’s counsel concerned the transmission capabilities of the spy cameras

in the plaintiff’s bedroom and whether they were capable of reception outside of her home. Following the

plaintiff’s testimony on direct examination that the spy

camera in her bedroom television was capable of broadcasting ‘‘up to three football fields in distance’’ from

her house—to which testimony the defendant did not

object—the defendant elicited substantially similar testimony in his cross-examination of the plaintiff:

‘‘[The Defendant’s Attorney]: And this expert came

in and swept [your home], found that the [television]

was capable of sending a signal out although it could

go to that equipment because that equipment which are

all in evidence here was locked up. Correct?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Correct.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Attorney]: So were you concerned

that [the television] is broadcasting a signal of you or

your family or loved ones to persons or persons

unknown within the range that you talk about. Am I

correct?

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Correct.’’

The defendant has provided this court with no authority to support his proposition that a trial court possesses

the authority, in the midst of the jury’s deliberations,

to remove from the jury’s consideration certain trial

testimony that properly was elicited and to which no

objection was raised. That novel assertion finds no support in Connecticut law. Because no objection was

taken when the attorney made the prefatory remark at

issue in the present case, and mindful of our obligation

to indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the

trial court’s ruling, we cannot say that the court abused

its discretion in permitting the playback of the prefatory

remark of the plaintiff’s counsel.

Furthermore, any potential harm stemming from the

playback of that prefatory remark was minimized by

the court’s limiting instructions. As this court repeatedly has observed, ‘‘a question from counsel is not evidence of anything.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Grant, 154 Conn. App. 293, 317, A.3d

(2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 928, 109 A.3d 93 (2015).

It is undisputed that the court, in its charge to the jury,

specifically instructed that ‘‘[y]ou should determine the

facts by careful consideration of all the evidence presented and based solely on the evidence . . . . [S]tatements made by lawyers . . . are not evidence. A

question is not evidence. It is the answer [and] not the

question or the assumption made in the question that

is the evidence.’’ ‘‘Our jurisprudence is clear . . . that

unless there is a clear indication to the contrary, a

jury is presumed to follow the court’s instructions.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Boscarino,

86 Conn. App. 447, 460, 861 A.2d 579 (2004). Nothing

in the record before us suggests that the jury failed to

heed those instructions.

II

The defendant also claims that the court improperly

denied his motion for remittitur. He maintains that the

jury’s monetary award is not supported by the evidence.

He further alleges that the jury improperly predicated

that award on a punitive, rather than compensatory,

basis. We do not agree.

‘‘In determining whether to order remittitur, the trial

court is required to review the evidence in the light

most favorable to sustaining the verdict. . . . Upon

completing that review, the court should not interfere

with the jury’s determination except when the verdict
is plainly excessive or exorbitant. . . . The ultimate

test which must be applied to the verdict by the trial

court is whether the jury’s award falls somewhere

within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages

or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense

of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury

[was] influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or

corruption. . . . The court’s broad power to order a

remittitur should be exercised only when it is manifest

that the jury [has] included items of damage which are

contrary to law, not supported by proof, or contrary to

the court’s explicit and unchallenged instructions. . . .

‘‘[O]ur review of the trial court’s decision requires

careful balancing. . . . First, we must retrace the steps

of the trial court. That is, we must begin by reviewing

the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to

sustaining the verdict, just as the trial court was

required to do. We then must examine the trial court’s

decision in such a way that we employ every reasonable

presumption in favor of its correctness. . . . Stated

differently, we must examine the evidentiary basis for

the jury verdict itself to determine whether the trial

court reviewed the verdict in the light most favorable

to its correctness. Where the evidence supports the

jury’s award of damages, a trial court abuses its discretion by ordering remittitur.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 Conn. App.

589, 614–15, 43 A.3d 722, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 920,

47 A.3d 389 (2012).

A

We first consider the defendant’s claim that the jury’s

award of $2 million in damages is not supported by

the evidence. The undisputed evidence before the jury

revealed that the defendant conducted extensive covert

surveillance of the plaintiff over the course of several

years. That surveillance included intimate video transmissions from her bedroom and shower, daily reports

as to every notation made on her computer, and GPS

monitoring of her vehicle. The jury also had before it

evidence that although the defendant swore under oath

before the court at the accelerated rehabilitation hearing in July, 2008, that the plaintiff ‘‘had nothing to worry

about’’ and that no further surveillance equipment

remained in the plaintiff’s home, the transmissions from

her bedroom thereafter continued and the defendant

continued to receive daily e-mailreports from the spyware on the plaintiff’s computer. The jury also was presented with evidence that despite her request for the

defendant to leave her alone, he continued to appear

unannounced and uninvited at her home. His behavior

terrified the plaintiff, particularly when he informed

her that ‘‘I can hear you from outside your house.’’ In

addition, the defendant’s angry and violent conduct left

the plaintiff scared for her life.
In addition, the jury heard testimony from a licensed

psychologist that, as a result of the defendant’s actions,

the plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder,

which cannot be cured. It also heard testimony that

plaintiff was ‘‘tenfold more damaged’’ by the trauma

intentionally inflicted by the defendant in light of her

close personal relationship with him. There was evidence before the jury that, as a result of the defendant’s

conduct, the plaintiff exhibits avoidance behavior, hypervigilance, difficulty concentrating and an exaggerated

startle response. She also suffers from bruxism and

experiences persistent nightmares and flashbacks.

In hertestimony, the plaintiff further detailed the pain

and suffering she sustained as a result of the defendant’s

conduct. Apart from the humiliation, betrayal and devastation she experienced upon learning that the defendant had been spying on her for a number of years, the

jury had before it evidence that the plaintiff suffered,

and continues to suffer, pain and anguish stemming

therefrom. She lives in a perpetual state of fear that

someone is watching or spying on her and she does

not feel safe anywhere. Even in her own home, she

feels no sense of privacy. In short, her world view has

been fundamentally altered as a result of the defendant’s actions against her.

In his motion for remittitur, the defendant argued

that the plaintiff ‘‘failed to claim any economic damages,

and instead claimed pain and suffering caused by posttraumatic stress disorder for the balance of her life.’’

The defendant renews that claim in this appeal, and

appears to suggest that noneconomic damages alone

cannot justify a sizeable award of damages. We disagree. As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘[c]omparison of verdicts is of little value. No one life is like

any other, and the damages for the destruction of one

furnish no fixed standard for others.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637,

658, 368 A.2d 172 (1976). The destruction in the present

case primarily is psychological, rather than physical, in

nature. That does not diminish its degree, as evidenced

by Connelly’s testimony.

There exists no precise formula on which a court

can instruct a jury as to the computation of compensation for pain and suffering. Jerz v. Humphrey, 160 Conn.

219, 221, 276 A.2d 884 (1971). A jury in such instances

necessarily is tasked with quantifying something that

is inherently difficult to quantify. In their closing arguments to the jury, the plaintiff requested an award of

approximately $20 million in compensation in light of

her thirty-seven and one-half year life expectancy; the

defendant suggested that an award of $100,000 was

more appropriate. The jury rejected both suggestions,

and instead concluded that $2 million was proper compensation for the plaintiff’s pain and suffering.10
‘‘The award of damages for pain and suffering is peculiarly within the province of the trier, and will be sustained, even though generous, if it does not shock the

sense of justice. . . . Proper compensation cannot be

computed by a mathematical formula, and there is no

iron-clad rule for the assessment of damages. . . . The

test is whether the amount awarded . . . falls within

the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages . . . .’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Manning v. Michael, 188 Conn. 607, 616, 452 A.2d 1157

(1982). On the unique facts of this case, and construing

the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining

the verdict, we conclude that the jury’s monetary award

does not shock the sense of justice or otherwise fall

beyond the limits of just damages.

B

The defendant also asserts that the jury improperly

predicated its award of damages on a punitive, rather

than compensatory, basis.11 That assertion necessarily

presumes that the jury disregarded the court’s

instructions.

In its charge, the court instructed that ‘‘it is up to you

to decide what fair, just and reasonable compensation is

. . . . The general rule of damages is this: Insofar as

money can do it the plaintiff is to receive fair, just

and reasonable compensation for all injuries and losses

which are legally caused by the defendant’s proven acts

and or negligence. Under this rule the purpose of an

award of damages is not to punish or penalize the

defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the

resulting injuries and losses.’’ (Emphasis added.) The

court cautioned the jury that it ‘‘may not guess or speculate as to the nature or extent of the plaintiff’s losses

or injuries. The decision must be based on reasonable

probabilities in light of the evidence presented during

the trial.’’

The court then turned to the specifics of the case,

noting that ‘‘the damages which are claimed are known

as noneconomic damages. Noneconomic damages are

monies awarded as compensation for nonmonetary

losses and injuries which the plaintiff has suffered or

is reasonably likely to suffer in the future as a result

of the defendant’s negligence and or [his] intentional

acts. They’re awarded for things such as physical pain

and suffering, mental and emotional pain and suffering

and loss of diminution, the ability to enjoy life’s pleasures. In this case, the plaintiff seeks to recover noneconomic damages for each of the following types of

nonmonetary loss orinjury: herfear, extreme emotional

distress, recurrent and intrusive thoughts of being

exposed and violated, interference with her personal

relationships, feelings of vulnerability and mistrust,

sleep problems including damage to her teeth and difficulties concentrating as well as anxiety and anger.’’ The
court then instructed that ‘‘[y]our award should be in

accordance with the nature and extent of such physical

impairment, loss of function or injury and the length

of time that the plaintiff is reasonably expected to

endure its negative consequences.’’12 At the same time,

the court admonished the jury that ‘‘[o]bviously your

verdict cannot be reached on the basis of sympathy for

any party or on the basis of prejudice in favor of or

against any party.’’

Under Connecticut law, we presume ‘‘that the jury

follows the instructions given by the court.’’ Gajewski

v. Pavelo, 229 Conn. 829, 837, 643 A.2d 1276 (1994); see

also Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371,

403, 3 A.3d 892 (2010) (‘‘[i]n accordance with our jurisprudence and the lack of evidence to the contrary, we

presume that the jury followed the trial court’s charging

instructions’’). On the record before us, we cannot say

that the jury strayed from those instructions. Viewed

in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, the

present case involves a plaintiff irreparably damaged

by the intentional acts of a loved one that destroyed

any sense of privacy and security, even in her own

home. The record does not indicate that the jury predicated its award on an improper basis, but rather that

it sought to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries

that resulted from the defendant’s intentional conduct.

We, therefore, conclude that the court did not abuse

its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for

remittitur.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff testified that she told the defendant that she did not want

the wireless network installed in her home, stating that ‘‘[h]e . . . expressed

his wanting wireless Internet in the house, and I adamantly did not want it

in the house, because it felt creepy to me.’’ The plaintiff testified that, despite

her protests, he installed it anyway.

2 The officers did not find the spy camera installed on the television in

the plaintiff’s bedroom.

3 At trial, the defendant admitted that he had trespassed onto the plaintiff’s property.

4 At trial, the defendant testified as follows with respect to his representation at the July 15, 2008 hearing:

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Attorney]: You were under oath atthe [accelerated rehabilitation] hearing?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes. . . .

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Attorney]: You told the judge, you told [the plaintiff] there

was no more spy equipment in her house?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Correct.

* * *

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Attorney]: [A]t that hearing—did you authorize [your

attorney] to assure [the plaintiff] that there were no other surveillance

[devices] except for the ones that the Bloomfield Police had already

impounded?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Attorney]: So you made—you gave [your attorney] the

authority to assure the court and to assure [the plaintiff] that there was no

more surveillance left in her house.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.’’

5 As conditions of his accelerated rehabilitation, the court also ordered

the defendant to (1) be supervised for two years; (2) make a $500 donation

to the court; (3) pay the defendant’s counseling fees for one year; (4) have

no contact with the defendant; (5) remain one hundred yards from her
property; and (6) see a psychologist.

6 The surveillance inspector, James Atkinson, walked down the plaintiff’s

street and captured the transmissions from inside her bedroom with a

handheld receiver.

7 More specifically, the negligence per se count alleged that the defendant’s

conduct was unreasonable and violative of General Statutes §§ 53a-189, 53a189a, and 53a-189b, which govern the offenses of eavesdropping, voyeurism,

and dissemination of voyeuristic material, respectively.

8 Prior to commencing this appeal, the defendant filed a motion for rectification with the trial court. The parties thereafter filed a stipulation with the

court indicating precisely what was played for the jury during its deliberations on June 25, 2012. The court granted the motion for rectification and

ordered the rectification of the June 25, 2012 transcript in accordance with

the parties’ stipulation.

9

In his principal appellate brief, the defendant appears also to contest

the propriety of the plaintiff’s answer, arguing that ‘‘the plaintiff was able

to insert, into her response to a question about what she feared, her opinion

that images from the undiscovered camera could be seen from 300 yards

away.’’ We decline to review the merits of that assertion for two reasons.

First, our rules of practice require a party, as a prerequisite to appellate

review, to distinctly raise its claim before the trial court. See Practice Book

§ 5-2 (‘‘[a]ny party intending to raise any question of law which may be the

subject of an appeal must . . . state the question distinctly to the judicial

authority’’); Practice Book § 60-5 (‘‘[t]he court shall not be bound to consider

a claim unless it was distinctly raised at trial or arose subsequent to trial’’).

For that reason, we repeatedly have held that ‘‘we will not decide an issue

that was not presented to the trial court. To review claims articulated for

the first time on appeal and not raised before the trial court would be

nothing more than a trial by ambuscade ofthe trial judge.’’(Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Martin, 110 Conn. App. 171, 180, 954 A.2d 256

(2008), appeal dismissed, 295 Conn. 192, 989 A.2d 1072 (2010); see also State

v. Favoccia, 119 Conn. App. 1, 14, 986 A.2d 1081 (2010) (‘‘[i]t is axiomatic

that issues not properly raised before the trial court ordinarily will not be

considered on appeal’’), aff’d, 306 Conn. 770, 51 A.3d 1002 (2012). The record

reveals that the defendant did not voice any objection to the plaintiff’s

answer during either her trial testimony or the subsequent playback of that

testimony to the jury as it deliberated.

Second, at oral argument before this court, the defendant’s counsel conceded that he was challenging only the propriety of the prefatory remark

of counsel, and not the subsequent answer provided by the plaintiff. We

therefore confine our review to the sole objection raised by the defendant

before the trial court.

10 Calculated in light of herlife expectancy,the plaintiff’s request amounted

to approximately $10,000 per week as compared to the defendant’s suggestion of $50 per week. The jury’s award of damages amounts to approximately

$1000 per week.

11 In his principal appellate brief, the defendant also complains that the

jury’s verdict was improperly predicated on certain testimony adduced at

trial, such as a witness’ statement that the defendant was ‘‘employed at a

seven-figure salary.’’ It nevertheless remains that the defendant did not

object to such testimony at trial, nor has he claimed any evidentiary error

with respect thereto in this appeal. The jury’s consideration of thattestimony,

therefore, was not improper.

12 The court also instructed the jury, consistent with the stipulation of

the parties, that the plaintiff’s life expectancy was thirty-seven and onehalf years.