IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

August 13, 2013 Session

IN THE MATTER OF: CONNOR S. L.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Carroll County

No. JC650011 Robert W. Newell, Judge, by Interchange

No. W2013-00668-COA-R3-JV - Filed September 16, 2013

In this second appeal of a child custody decision, Father argues that the trial court erred in

naming Mother primary residential parent and in fashioning the permanent parenting

plan. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with regard to either the

custody or parenting time decisions, and therefore, affirm the decision of the trial court.

Affirmed and remanded.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3. Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

and Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS,

P.J.,W.S., and HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., joined.

Carl E. Seely, Jackson, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Jason L. L.

J. Neil Thompson, Huntingdon, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Amy J. W.

OPINION

I. Background

 This is the second appeal in this cause. In the first case, this Court remanded to the

trial court to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with
Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. See In re Connor S.L., No. W2012-

1

00587-COA-R3-JV, 2012 WL 5462839, at *7–8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2012). The majority

of the proceedings at issue in this case occurred prior to the remand. According to our prior

opinion:

Appellant Jason L. L. (“Father”) and Appellee Amy J.

2

W. (“Mother”) have one child, Connor S.L. (d.o.b. 7/31/11)

3

(“Connor” or “the child”). Although the parties were never

married, Father acknowledged Connor as his child. Mother and

Father lived together for a time after the child's birth; however

the relationship deteriorated and Mother moved out.

On September 29, 2011, Father filed a Petition to

Approve Parenting Plan in the Carroll County Juvenile Court.

Juvenile Court Judge Larry Logan withdrew from the case and

Judge Robert Newell of Gibson County was selected to sit by

interchange. At the initial hearing on November 3, 2011, Judge

Newell ordered the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”)

to conduct a home study, develop a safety plan, and develop a

plan for Father to receive supervised visitation. The Court

further ordered the parties to submit to DNA testing to establish

paternity. Father subsequently filed a petition to establish

paternity. Father later filed a proposed parenting plan in which

he sought to be named the primary residential parent of the

child.

 Rule 52.01 states: 1

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the

facts specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law and direct

the entry of the appropriate judgment. The findings of a master, to the

extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the

court. If an opinion or memorandum of decision isfiled, it will be sufficient

if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein.

In cases involving minor children in juvenile court, it is this Court’s policy to redact names 2

sufficient to protect the children's identity.

The parties apparently disagree as the proper spelling of the child’s name. Father’s brief spells the 3

child’s name as “Conner,” while Mother spells the child’s name as “Connor.” For purposes of this and our

appeal prior appeal, we will refer to the child using the spelling used by Mother. 

-2-
Id. at *1(footnotes omitted).

A hearing was held on January 20, 2012 on all outstanding issues. Both parties were

living with their respective parents at the time of trial. The parents’ work schedules were of

particular interest in this case. Father, who has an Associates Degree in computer

networking, works as a help desk analyst for a finance company. According to our prior

opinion: “Father testified that he works Monday through Friday from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm and

that his commute is approximately forty minutes.” Id. at *1. Father also testified that he owns

a store that requires him to work on Thursday and Friday nights and most of the day on

Saturday. Father testified that he wanted to have parenting time with the child regardless

of his work schedule because his parents and grandparents would be able to care for the

child in his absence. With regard to Mother’s work schedule, Mother testified that she works

approximately thirty-five hours per week at the daycare center where the child currently

attends. Thus, she is able to see the child several times a day and to breast feed the child, as

needed. In addition, Mother testified that she is working towards a certification in child care

that might afford her a promotion and a raise at the daycare. Because of Mother’s

employment with the daycare, the child is able to receive child care for free. Since the

parties’ separation, Mother had resided with her parents. Mother admitted, however, that she

had moved several times prior to the child’s birth and that she had attended several colleges

without obtaining a degree.

Both parties sought to be named primary residential parent. Father asked to be

awarded parenting time with the child from Sunday to Friday night, despite his testimony that

he worked during the day Monday through Friday, and at night Thursday, Friday, and

Saturday. Mother disagreed, and sought to be named the primary residential parent of the

child, citing the fact that she was the child’s primary caregiver:

Mother, in contrast, testified that she was the child's primary

caregiver from the time of his birth and that Father had not had

any unsupervised visits with the child prior to the hearing, even

when the partieslived together. Thus, Mother asked to be named

the primary residential parent of the child. Testimony on behalf

of Father admitted that neither Father nor his family had any

unsupervised visitation with the child since Mother and Father

parted, but alleged that the restriction was based on Mother's

contention that the child should not be away from her while she

was still breast feeding. However, Mother’s father, Guy W.,

testified that his wife has taken care of the child when [the

child] was ill, while Mother was at work.

-3-
Id. at *1–2 (footnotes omitted).

The DCS caseworker who performed the home studies and supervised Father’s

parenting time also testified. The DCS case worker confirmed that both home studies had

shown no problems with either parent’s home and recommended that no restrictions be

placed on either parent’s parenting time. The DCS caseworker further testified that in

observing Father’s interaction with the child it was “appropriate,” and that he showed

affection for the child. Father’s mother also described Father’s relationship with the child as

“loving [and] caring.”

According to our prior opinion:

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally

ruled that Father was the biological parent of the child, named

Mother primary residential parent and awarded Father every

other weekend visitation. The trial court further set Father's

child support based on his income and ordered that he pay

retroactive child support as of the time that the parties separated.

A written order memorializing the trial court’s oral ruling was

entered on February 24, 2012. The order included a permanent

parenting plan.

Id. at *1–2 (footnotes omitted).

Father appealed the trial court’s order, arguing , inter alia, that the trial court erred in

failing to consider any of the statutory factors outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated Section

36-6-106(a). We concluded that the trial court’s failure to make any findings of fact or

conclusions of law, as required by Rule 52.01, necessitated a remand to the trial court on the

custody and parenting schedule issues.

4

After the case was remanded to the trial court, the trial court heard argument from

counsel about the effect of the remand on December 20, 2012. At this time, the trial court

ruled that the existing parenting plan would remain in place until a new plan was ordered.

The trial court further directed counsel for both parties to submit memoranda of law and

proposed findings of fact on the custody and parenting time issues. An order memorializing

these rulings was entered by the trial court on January 18, 2013. Father submitted his

Because neither party took issue with the trial court’s ruling establishing the paternity of the child, 4

we affirmed the trial court’s order in that respect. On appeal, neither party questions that Father is the

biological and legal parent of the child.

-4-
proposed findings of fact and memorandum of law on January 17, 2013. In his memorandum,

Father argued that he should be named the primary residential parent for the child due to

Mother’s history of denying him parenting time, the fact that she had moved several times

in the preceding years, and that the child had spent the majority of his life in the home of

paternal grandfather, rather than with Mother alone. Father also pointed out that a home

study ordered to be performed by the trial court recommended no restrictions on his parenting

time and that he had maintained stable and steady employment for a number of years.

Mother filed her proposed findings of fact and memorandum on January 18, 2013.

Mother likewise contended that she should be named primary residential parent of the child.

Mother argued that she had been the primary caregiver for the child from his birth, that she

never refused to allow Father to visit with the child, and that she is able to spend more time

with the child because of her more accommodating work schedule. The trial court heard oral

argument from counsel on January 30, 2013.

The trial court entered a memorandum containing findings of fact and conclusions of

law on January 30, 2013. According to the memorandum:

The Court in order to abide by the remanded issues of the

Tennessee Appeals Court has obtained a copy of the transcript

of evidence of the hearing on Friday January 20, 2012 and

required a written argument by both Attorneys and a

memorandum of law submitted to the Court for consideration.

The Court finds the following:

* * *

2. The Juvenile Court of Carroll County adjudicated [Father] as

the biological father based upon the results of paternity testing

on the 20th day of January 2012 . . . .

3. The biological mother . . . . under [Tennessee Code Annotated

Section] 36-2-303 had served as primary care giver of the child

since the child was born out of wedlock and no paternity had

been established by the father giving him legalstanding until the

present proceeding filed in this Court.

4. The minor child has resided with the mother the majority of

his life, except for a period of about five weeks more or less

when the father and mother lived together. There are no facts

disputing that she had not taken greater responsibility as the

primary care giver of the child performing the parenting

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responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child.

5.The Department of Children Services found both parents

suitable, but did not recommend that it would be in the best

interest of the Child for custody to be changed from the mother

to the father.

6. The order of supervised visitation by the Court was to setup

a safety plan of visitation and the plan be monitored by

Department of Children Services until a hearing date on the

case. It was ordered because the Court had no knowledge of

either party and it was for the protection of the child until the

case could be heard. It was not to be used as a decision making

process by the Court unless the Department of Children Services

found something that the Court should consider upon their

recommendations.

7. The Court finds based upon the facts that both parents are

capable of taking care of the child and have good support from

relatives.

8. The father is employed currently as a help desk analyst for

Portfolio Recovery Associates in Jackson Tennessee.

9. The fathers work schedule at Portfolio Associates is Monday

through Friday from 8:00 a. m . until 5:00 p.m. The father is also

subject to be on an on-call rotation at different times.

10. The father owns and operates a Business (a Store) in

McKenzie, Tennessee. The hours of the Store being open is

from Thursday from 6:00 p.m. until midnight, open on Friday

from 6:00 p.m. until midnight, and open on Saturday from 1:00

p.m. until 10:00 p.m. The father is operating the Store during

this time. The father has no Employees so it is reasonable to

assume that he will be working at the Store during the hours the

Store is open.

11. The father testified that the support for the child up until this

trial date had been by the mother and her father . . . , but that he

was willing to start support for the child.

12. The Mother is employed at a Day Care Center in Camden,

Tennessee. She takes [the child] to work with her at the Day

Care Center. [The child] is placed in the Infant Care Classroom

and the mother teaches in the Pre-School Class room. The Day

Care is free for [the child] and she is allowed to go into the

Infant Care Classroom and breast feed [the child].

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The attorneys of the parties presented different permanent

parenting plans under [Tennessee Code Annotated] Section

36-6-404(b) to the Court, but considering the facts and evidence

presented to the Court. The Court decided it would be in the best

interest and welfare of the Child to proceed under [Tennessee

Code Annotated Section 36-6-106 and develop a Shared

parenting plan based on the minors best interest and availability

of parents. The Shared Parenting plan order was to permit both

parents the ability to enjoy maximum participation possible in

the life of their child. A major concern [] evident in the

testimony was with the availability of the father as evidenced in

the facts 8,9,10 above. It is good to foster a good relationship

between the family members, but the purpose of the Statutes is

to get the biological parents participating in the life of their

child. I realize that each party has good family support, but the

Court feels that the father considers it to be a major

responsibility of his family and grandparents. It is the intent of

the Court to require that the parents raise the child. The Court

used the Shared Parenting Plan as a starting point that could lead

to more participation by the father in the life of his child

consistent with factors set out in [Tennessee Code Annotated]

Section 36-6-106 and Subdivisions (a)(l)-(10) that could be

reconsidered by either party and/or the Court at a later date.

It was the decision of the Court that the best interest of

the child would be better served to develop a share parenting

plan to address the visitation at the present time.

There is no evidence in the record that the father is more

fit than the mother such that it would be in the best interest and

welfare of the child to remove the mother as the primary care

giver of the child that has been exercised by her since the child

was born. ([Tennessee Code Annotated Section] 36-2-303).

Since the birth the child the mother has been the primary care

giver taking the responsibilities relating to the day to day needs

of the child and provided the support for Conner with the help

of her father.

[Father] did address the factors in [Tennessee Code

Annotated] Section 31-6-106, but no arguments at trial or any

evidence introduced that it would be in the best interest of the

child for the custody or primary care be moved from the mother

to the father.

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The Court finds that the evidence and factors in this

custody and visitation matter as determined by the Court was

better for [the child’s] best interest and welfare as expressed

under [Tennessee Code Annotated] 31-6-106 . The legislature

expressed that the Court shall strive to create a plan where both

parents can participate in a child's life. This does not mean the

Court is required to award each parent equal parenting time. It

does not mean that the Court should make the parenting time

equal because a family member can exercise a majority of the

biological parents parenting time with the child during the

parents visitation period. It is to give the biological parents an

opportunity to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing

parent child relationship between the biological parents

consistent with the best interest and welfare of the child.

It is the decision of this Court upon applying the factors

and evidence with [Tennessee Code Annotated] Section

36-6-106(a) that the original Shared Parenting Plan and Court

Order on the 20th day of January, 2012 was an appropriate order

based on the facts and issues presented to the Court with the oral

statements of the Court incorporated into the order.

Accordingly, the trial court kept in place its original ruling with regard to the parenting and

child support issues. A final order incorporating the above findings was entered on January

30, 2013.

From this order, Father now appeals, raising the following issues, which are taken

from his brief:

1. Whether the trial court’s ruling as to custody is contrary

to the preponderance of the evidence?

2. Whether the trial court, after considering the statutory

factors mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated Section

36-6-106(a) to achieve the maximum participation

possible for each parent in the child’s life, has reached a

decision not supported by the evidence?

3. Whether the trial court’s ruling is in the best interest of

the child or supported by the evidence?

From our review of the parties’ briefs, there are two dispositive issues:

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1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that it was in

the child’s best interest to name Mother primary

residential parent?

2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the

ordered parenting plan best achieved the maximum

participation possible for each parent in the child’s life,

in accordance with the child’s best interest?

Based on the following analysis, we conclude that the trial court did not err in naming

Mother the child’s primary residential parent or in fashioning the permanent parenting plan.

II. Analysis

Because this case was tried by the court sitting without a jury, we review the case de

novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact by the trial

court. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). In applying the de novo standard, we are mindful that “[t]rial

courts are vested with wide discretion in matters of child custody and that the appellate courts

will not interfere except upon a showing of erroneous exercise of that discretion.” Hyde v.

Amanda Bradley, No. M2009-02117-COA-R3-JV, 2010 WL 4024905, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Oct.12, 2010) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 169 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)).

Because “[c]ustody and visitation determinations often hinge on subtle factors, including the

parents' demeanor and credibility during . . . proceedings,” appellate courts “are reluctant to

second-guess a trial court's decisions.” Hyde, 2010 WL 4024905, at *3 (citing Johnson, 169

S.W.3d at 645). Accordingly, appellate courts review a trial court's decision regarding which

parent to name as the primary residential parent for an abuse of discretion. See Fulbright v.

Fulbright, 64 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Porter v.

Porter, No. M2012-00148-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 313838, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013)

(Kirby, J., concurring) (declining to reverse the trial court’s ruling only because of the “high

standard” required under abuse of discretion review). “[A] trial court's decision regarding

custody or visitation should be set aside only when it ‘falls outside the spectrum of rulings

that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence

found in the record.’” Curtis v. Hill, 215 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting

Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001)). Thus, it is not within the province of

appellate courts to tweak a parenting plan in hopes of achieving a better result than the trial

court. See Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88. As our Supreme Court has explained:

When no error in the trial court's ruling is evident from the

record, the trial court's ruling must stand. This maxim has

special significance in cases reviewed under the abuse of

discretion standard. The abuse of discretion standard recognizes

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that the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court

to make certain judgments. The abuse of discretion standard

does not require a trial court to render an ideal order, even in

matters involving [parental responsibilities], to withstand

reversal. Reversalshould not resultsimply because the appellate

court found a “better” resolution. See State v. Franklin, 714

S.W.2d 252, 258 (Tenn. 1986) (“appellate court should not

redetermine in retrospect and on a cold record how the case

could have been better tried”); cf. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d

620, 625 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (affirming trial court's ruling

under abuse of discretion standard while noting that action

contrary to action taken by the trial court was the better

practice); Bradford v. Bradford, 51 Tenn. App. 101, 364

S.W.2d 509, 512–13 (1962) (same). An abuse of discretion can

be found only when the trial court's ruling falls outside the

spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an

application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found

in the record. See, e.g., State ex. rel Vaughn v. Kaatrude, 21

S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88. The trial court's discretion, however, is not unbounded. Hogue,

147 S.W.3d at 251 (citation omitted). The court must base its decision upon proof and apply

the appropriate legal principles. Id. (citation omitted).

“By statute as well as case law, the welfare and best interests of the child are the

paramount concern in custody, visitation, and residential placement determinations, and the

goal of any such decision is to place the child in an environment that will best serve his or

her needs.” Burden v. Burden, 250 S.W.3d 899, 908 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting

Cummings v. Cummings, No. M2003-00086-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2346000, at *5 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004)). “In choosing which parent to designate as the primary residential

parent for the child, the court must conduct a ‘comparative fitness’ analysis, requiring the

court to determine which of the available parents would be comparatively more fit than the

other.” Chaffin v. Ellis, 211 S.W.3d 264, 286 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Bah v. Bah, 668

S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tenn. 1983)). “In engaging in this analysis, the court must consider the

factors set out in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a).” Ellis, 211 S.W.3d at 286

(footnote omitted). While “there is no statutory requirement that the court list every

applicable factor along with its conclusion as to how that particular factor impacted the

overall custody determination,” the statute nevertheless “requires the trial court to consider

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all the applicable factors.” Murray v. Murray, No. M2009-01576-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL

5

3852218, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.28, 2010). Moreover, this Court has encouraged trial

courts to “be as precise as possible in making child custody findings” in order to facilitate

meaningful appellate review. In re Elaina M., No. M2010-01880-COA-R3-JV, 2011 WL

5071901, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2011).

Father argues that the evidence in the record does not support the trial court’s decision

that naming Mother the primary residential parent or allowing Mother to spend significantly

more time with the child than Father is in the child’s best interest. We first consider whether

the trial court erred in finding that it was in the child’s best interest to name Mother the

primary residential parent.

A. Primary Residential Parent

To determine which parent should be named primary residential parent, we will

consider each applicable factor contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-106(a),

along with the trial court’s findings and the evidence contained in the record.

(1) The love, affection and emotional ties existing between the

parents or caregivers and the child;

The trial court did not make a specific findings as to this factor. Father points to his

testimony at trial that he desired to foster and maintain a strong relationship with the child

and the testimony of the DCS case worker, who noted that Father and the child have an

affectionate relationship. Father also points to testimony from his mother that Father is a

“loving, caring Father.” Mother, on the other hand, argues that because Father’s parenting

time with the child up until the time of trial was limited and supervised, she has a stronger

emotional connection with the child. The evidence in the record shows that both parents have

an affectionate and loving relationship with the child. Accordingly, this factor weighs in

favor of neither parent.

(2) The disposition of the parents or caregivers to provide the

child with food, clothing, medical care, education and other

necessary care and the degree to which a parent or caregiver has

been the primary caregiver;

 This Court has previously expressed concern that the case law holding that trial judges need not 5

articulate the factors pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-106(a) appears to conflict with the

intent of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. See In re Elaina M., No. M2010-01880-COA-R3-JV,

2011 WL 5071901, at *8 n.13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2011).

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The term “caregiver” means “the person or persons or entity or entities responsible

for providing for the supervision, protection and basic needs of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 37-5-501(b)(1). The trial court found that Mother was the primary caregiver of the child

and that this factor weighed heavily in favor of Mother being named the primary residential

parent. Father does not dispute this finding, but contends that Mother’s status as primary

caregiver is not dispositive because he has never been unwilling to be the primary care

provider for the child or to provide the child with food, clothing, or medical care. Mother

asserts, however, that prior to trial she spent the majority of the time with the child, providing

the child with all necessary care. Mother further points out that Father failed to pay any child

support prior to trial. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial

court’s finding that this factor weighed in favor of Mother.

(3) The importance of continuity in the child's life and the length

of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment;

This factor weighs in favor of Mother. The trial court specifically found that the child

has resided almost exclusively with Mother and her family members “except for a period of

about five weeks more or less when the father and mother lived together.” This Court has

previously held that the issues of stability and continuity for a child are “extremely

important.” Hayes v. Pierret, No. M2012-00195-COA-R3CV, 2013 WL 3346847, at *5

(Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2013). Father contends that this finding is in error, however,

because at the time the initial petition was filed by Father, the child had resided with Father

at his parent’s residence more than with Mother’s family. Father’s argument essentially asks

this Court to ignore all the events that occurred after Father filed the petition that instigated

these proceedings. This Court has previously recognized that the circumstances of children

and their parents change over time. See In re Jaiden C.W., No. M2012-01188-COA-R3-JV,

2013 WL 1501876, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 11, 2013). Accordingly, we decline Father’s

invitation to consider only the events prior to the filing of the initial petition that instigated

this case. This factor, accordingly, weighs in favor of Mother.

(4) The stability of the family unit of the parents or caregivers;

The trial court specifically found that “both parents are capable of taking care of the

child and have good support from relatives.” Father, argues, however, that Mother is not

stable because she has been unable to complete her college degree, and had moved several

times prior to the birth of the child. We conclude that the evidence in the record does not

preponderate against the trial court’s finding. Father fails to show how Mother’s failure to

finish college has had any impact on the child. Mother has maintained stable employment and

housing throughout the pendency of these proceedings. Mother further testified that she is

attempting to earn a child care certification that could lead to a promotion and increase in pay

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at the daycare where she works. In addition, she and her family have exclusively provided

financial support for the child throughout these proceedings. However, Father expressed

some concern regarding a possible move by Mother back to Alabama, where she had lived

previously. Father admitted, however, that Mother stated that moving away from her family

support was “not an option.” Regardless, the trial court specifically stated that issues of

relocation, if any, would be decided if Mother’s alleged move ever materialized. Father also

has maintained stable employment and housing since the child’s birth and has a strong family

support system. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that this factor favors neither

party.

(5) The mental and physical health of the parents or caregivers;

The trial court did not make a finding as to this factor. Nothing in the record suggests

that either parent’s mental or physical health would interfere with their ability to parent the

child.

(6) The home, school and community record of the child;

The trial court did not make a finding as to this factor. The child was only five months

old at the time of trial. Nevertheless, Mother argues that the child has a community record

because the child is “engrained [sic] in the community, attend[s] church, and ha[s] family in

the community.” We conclude that due to the child’s young age at the time of trial, this factor

favors neither party.

(7)(A) The reasonable preference of the child, if twelve (12)

years of age or older;

Due to the child’s age, this factor is not applicable. Therefore, it weighs in favor of

neither party.

(8) Evidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child, to the

other parent or to any other person;

There were no allegations of abuse at trial. Accordingly, this factor favors neither

party.

(9) The character and behavior of any other person who resides

in or frequents the home of a parent or caregiver and the

person's interactions with the child;

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The trial court did not make a specific finding with regard to this factor. Father argues

that this factor weighs in his favor because Mother has brought her boyfriend to the home

while the child was there. The evidence in the record shows that Mother’s boyfriend resides

in Kentucky, however, and nothing in the record indicates that he either “resides in or

frequents” Mother’s home. In addition, nothing in the record suggests that Mother’s

boyfriend is a poor influence for the child. Father contends that Mother also resides with her

mother (“Maternal Grandmother”) , who is prescribed medication to treat bipolar disorder.

Maternal Grandmother has also stated that her feelings toward the child at issue are not as

strong as the feelings she has for her other grandchildren. It is undisputed that Maternal

Grandmother has previously cared for the child outside Mother’s presence. However, Father

has failed to present any evidence that Maternal Grandmother does not properly care for the

child, does not show the child appropriate love or affection, or that she would be a danger

to the child. Mother likewise expressed concern over Father’s step-father, with whom Father

lives. Mother testified that Father once told her that step-father was abusive during his

childhood. However, Mother admitted that she had not witnessed any untoward behavior

with the child. Accordingly, this factor favors neither party.

(10) Each parent’s or caregiver’s past and potential for future

performance of parenting responsibilities, including the

willingness and ability of each of the parents and caregivers to

facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child

relationship between the child and both of the child's parents,

consistent with the best interest of the child. In determining the

willingness of each of the parents and caregiversto facilitate and

encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship

between the child and both of the child's parents, the court shall

consider the likelihood of each parent and caregiver to honor

and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements and rights,

and the court shall further consider any history of either parent

or any caregiver denying parenting time to either parent in

violation of a court order.

The trial court did not make any specific findings with regard to this factor. To be

sure, Mother has taken responsibility for the majority of the past performance of parenting

responsibilities in this child’s life. However, Father argues that this was through no fault of

his own and that his failure to parent the child was instead due to Mother’s unwillingness to

allow him to spend substantial time with the child. According to Father’s testimony, after

Mother and Father’s relationship deteriorated, Mother refused to allow Father to visit with

the child outside her home or her presence. Mother disputes this contention, however, and

argues that parenting time was only supervised by court order pending the DCS home study.

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Mother did admit, however, that she asked Father to leave when the child was hospitalized

for pneumonia prior to trial. Mother submits that she only asked Father to leave because she

was tired and because the nurses had indicated that everyone needed to leave the room

anyway. However, the record also reflects that Mother did not interfere with any of Father’s

court ordered parenting time, other than when the child was ill, and that she did allow Father

additional parenting time when the child was hospitalized. From our review of the record and

in light of the fact that there were no allegations that Mother ever interfered with parenting

time that was ordered by the Court without due cause, we conclude that this factor favors

neither party.

After a review of the relevant factors, we note that the majority of the factors weigh

in favor of neither party or are not applicable to the case-at-bar. Factors 2 and 3 weigh in

favor of Mother. No factors weigh exclusively in favor of Father. However, this Court has

held that:

Ascertaining a child's best interests does not call for a rote

examination of each of [the relevant] factors and then a

determination of whether the sum of the factors tips in favor of

[one parent or the other]. The relevancy and weight to be given

each factor depends on the unique facts of each case. Thus,

depending upon the circumstances of a particular child and [his

or her parents], the consideration of one factor may very well

dictate the outcome of the analysis. 

In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (applying the above doctrine

in a termination of parental rights case). In this case, we agree with the trial court that the

evidence preponderates in favor of naming Mother the child’s primary residential parent.

Mother has been the child’s primary caregiver from his birth. Thus, maintaining continuity

of care would further the goal of stability in the child’s life. Tennessee courts have

repeatedly held that continuity and stability are “important factors” in determining which

parent should be named primary residential parent. See, e.g., In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d

772 (Tenn.May10, 2010);Richards v. Richards, No. E2010-00521-COA-R3CV, 2011 WL

2135432 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2011); In re Horner, No. E2002-00588-COA-R3JV,

2003 WL 1452997 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 21, 2003); King v. King, No.

M2000-00424-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1035175 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2001). This

Court has recently stated that these two factors are entitled to “great weight” in determining

which parent should be named primary residential parent. Wood v. Wood, No. W2012-

01250-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 2149747, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2013). In contrast,

Father’s involvement with the child, though somewhat constrained by both Mother and the

trial court’s decisions with regard to supervised parenting time, has been limited. Regardless,

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the evidence shows that even for the brief period in which Mother and Father lived together,

Mother took primary responsibility for caring for the child. Therefore, we conclude that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that it was in the child’s best interest to

name Mother primary residential parent.

B. Parenting Plan

Father next argues that the trial court erred in entering a parenting plan that affords

Mother substantially more time with the child than Father. To support his argument, Father

cites Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-106(a), which states:

In taking into account the child’s best interest, the court shall

order a custody arrangement that permits both parents to enjoy

the maximum participation possible in the life of the child

consistentwiththefactorssetoutinsubdivisions(a)(1)-(10),thelocationoftheresidencesoftheparents,thechild'sneedfor

stability and all other relevant factors.

“Accordingly, Tennessee courts must now fashion custody arrangements so as to give each

parent the maximum amount of time possible with the child, in accordance with the child's

best interests.” Rountree v. Rountree, 369 S.W.3d 122, 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (footnote

omitted). Thisrequirement “ reflects a public policy in favor of allowing the child ample time

with both parents, which is a paramount consideration in all Tennessee parenting plan

decisions.” Id. at 129 n.3. In this case, the trial court awarded Father significantly more

parenting time with the child than he had been enjoying previously, butsignificantly less time

than was awarded to Mother. From our review of the record, the trial court awarded Mother

approximately 72% of the time with the child, while Father was only awarded 28% of the

time, in every other weekend increments. The trial court based its decision on the parties’

respective work schedules, and their ability to spend time with the child. As previously

stated, the trial court found:

The Shared Parenting plan order was to permit both parents the

ability to enjoy maximum participation possible in the life of

their child. A major concern of evident in the testimony was

with the availability of the father as evidenced in the facts 8,9,10

above. It is good to foster a good relationship between the

family members, but the purpose of the Statutes is to get the

biological parents participating in the life of their child. I realize

that each party has good family support, but the Court feels that

the father considers it to be a major responsibility of his family

and grandparents. It is the intent of the Court to require that the

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parents raise the child. The Court used the Shared Parenting

Plan as a starting point that could lead to more participation by

the father in the life of his child [in the future].

Despite these findings, Father asserts in his brief that “there is no reason why each

parent should not have roughly equal parenting time at this point” in the child’s life.

Respectfully, we disagree. The evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that

Mother is able to spend significantly more time with the child than Father due to her work

schedule. In fact, Mother is able to see the child throughout the day because she works at the

daycare that the child attends. Nothing in the record suggests that Father’s schedule would

allow him to see the child during the day in the same fashion. Father, in addition to his fulltime employment, also operates a store during several of the nights that he requested

parenting time with the child. Father testified at trial that his parents would be able to care

for the child while he was working. Thus, the trial court was correct to conclude that Father

would not actually be caring for the child during a significant portion of his requested

parenting time. Based on the evidence in the record regarding the parties’ work schedules,

we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning the permanent

parenting plan in accordance with the child’s best interests.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Juvenile Court of Carroll County is

affirmed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for all further proceedings as may be

necessary and are consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellant,

Jason L. L., and his surety.

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

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