IN THE INTEREST OF B.E.D., ) 

MINOR, ) 

 ) 

BARRY COUNTY JUVENILE OFFICE, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent, ) 

 ) 

vs. ) No. SD36546 

 ) 

R.G.D, ) 

 ) Filed: July 29, 2020 

Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BARRY COUNTY 

Honorable Judge Johnnie E. Cox 

AFFIRMED 

R.G.D. ("Father") appeals the trial court's judgment terminating his parental 

rights to B.E.D. ("Child").1

 The trial court terminated Father's parental rights to Child 

based on two statutory grounds: abuse or neglect and failure to rectify. See 

§§ 211.447.5(2) and (3).2 The court further found termination of Father's parental rights 

was in Child's best interest. See § 211.447.6. In his sole point relied on, Father argues 

 

1

 At the termination hearing, Child's mother ("Mother") consented to the termination of her parental 

rights and her parental rights are not at issue in this appeal. We mention Mother only as necessary to 

state the facts related to Father. 

2 All statutory citations are to RSMo. Cum. Supp. (2018). 
2 

the trial court erred in finding termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best 

interest. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment. 

Factual and Procedural History 

When this Court reviews a judgment terminating parental rights, it views the 

evidence and related reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the judgment. 

Interest of C.E.B., 565 S.W.3d 207, 211 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018). So viewed, the 

following evidence was presented at trial. 

Child was born in March 2017.3 On May 21, 2017, Father drove approximately 20 

miles on a public road at midnight on a farm tractor with Mother and Child while he was 

intoxicated. Father had a BAC of .160, and Mother also appeared to be intoxicated. 

Father was arrested and Child was taken into care. 

Father was charged with driving while intoxicated ("DWI") as a habitual offender, 

driving while revoked/suspended, endangering the welfare of a child, failure to drive on 

the right half of a roadway, and failure to secure Child in a child restraint. Father later 

pled guilty to DWI, was sentenced to four years in prison and has been incarcerated 

since June 9, 2017. Child has continued in care since the date of the incident. 

In December 2018, a petition to terminate Father's parental rights was filed. The 

termination hearing was held in November 2019. At the hearing, a caseworker from the 

Children's Division ("CD") and Father testified.4 Child's guardian ad litem ("GAL") also 

testified. 

Danielle Lee, Child's CD caseworker ("Caseworker"), testified regarding her 

involvement with Child's case. Caseworker testified Father had previously pled guilty to 

 

3 Paternity of Child is not disputed. 

4 Father appeared at the hearing by video from his location at Northeast Correctional Facility in Bowling 

Green, Missouri. 
3 

DWI on multiple occasions and also pled guilty to driving while revoked and suspended. 

Father's parental rights to two other children had been terminated in earlier 

proceedings. 

Caseworker testified records from the prison indicated Father had been 

diagnosed with an alcohol addiction problem. Father had not completed any substance 

abuse or alcohol programs while incarcerated.5 Father had not successfully completed a 

recommended parenting program. A social summary showed Father had been 

diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder with psychosis and Alcohol Use Disorder in 

controlled remission. 

Regarding Father's efforts to maintain contact with Child and support Child, 

Caseworker testified Father sent letters and a birthday card to Child. Father had not 

provided any financial support for Child, nor had he provided any gifts or in-kind 

support.6 Caseworker testified Father had not rectified the conditions causing Child to 

be taken into care and Caseworker did not believe additional services could be offered 

which would enable reunification within a reasonably ascertainable period of time. 

Caseworker believed Child had no emotional ties to Father because Father had been 

incarcerated for the majority of Child's life and Child did not remember Father. 

Caseworker opined it would be detrimental to Child to remove her from her current 

placement. 

Father testified he first used alcohol at age five and had issues with alcohol for 

approximately 45 years. He acknowledged having been found guilty or having pled 

guilty to six or seven DWIs. He testified he had undergone several prior treatments for 

 

5 Father did attend AA meetings. 

6 Father told CD he would pay $.50 per month for child support but never made a payment. 
4 

alcohol-related substance abuse, including a 120-day treatment and a year-long 

treatment. Father agreed it had been recommended that he participate in another longterm treatment program, and that his evaluation showed him to have severe withdrawal 

and severe relapse risks. Father also admitted he had been found guilty of having 

contraband while incarcerated. Father testified he had two visits with Child before he 

went to prison. Father's anticipated release date from prison is September 10, 2021. 

The GAL testified to the lack of bond between Father and Child. She did not 

believe that "a 45-year history with alcohol is going to be cured any time in the near 

future, especially since there hasn't been a whole lot of treatment so far while he's been 

in prison." It was her opinion that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's 

best interest. 

In Father's one point on appeal, he contends the trial court's best interest 

findings are an abuse of discretion. Finding no merit in this point, we affirm. 

Standard of Review 

A trial court's decision that termination is in a child's best interest is reviewed 

under an abuse of discretion standard. J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo. 

banc 2014). An abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly against the logic of 

the circumstances before the court and is "so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the 

sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." Interest of J.P.B., 509 

S.W.3d 84, 96 (Mo. banc 2017) (internal citation and quotation omitted). When 

reviewing questions of fact, this Court recognizes the trial court is "free to disbelieve 

any, all, or none of the evidence, and it is not the reviewing appellate court's role to reevaluate the evidence through its own perspective." J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 627. The 
5 

trial court's judgment is presumed valid, and it is the appellant's burden to demonstrate 

it is incorrect. C.E.B., 565 S.W.3d at 211. 

Discussion 

 In one point on appeal, Father argues the trial court abused its discretion in 

finding termination of his parental rights was in Child's best interest because: 

Father had provided care and a suitable home and support for [Child] 

before going to jail; Father had made every effort to engage with and 

maintain a relationship with [Child] after [Child] was taken into care and 

while Father was incarcerated; Father had never expressed consent to 

termination of his parental rights; Father had applied himself to selfimprovement efforts while in jail; he was on the waiting list for alcohol 

treatment; Father has never harmed [Child]; and it is in the best interests 

of [Child] to preserve the relationship between the natural parent and 

[Child] if possible. 

 "The determination of what is in a child's best interest is an ultimate conclusion 

for the trial court based upon the totality of the circumstances." In re K.M.W., 342 

S.W.3d 353, 359 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011). Section 211.447.7 enumerates seven factors the 

trial court must consider when determining whether termination of the parent-child 

relationship is in the best interest of a child. C.E.B., 565 S.W.3d at 218. 

There is no requirement that all seven of these factors must be negated before 

termination can take place, and there is no minimum number of negative factors 

required for termination. In re C.M.H., 408 S.W.3d 805, 815 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013). 

These factors merely serve as an aid to the trial court's best interest determination. Id.

Here, the trial court analyzed the factors under section 211.447.7, and found five 

factors unfavorable to Father:7 

 

7

 Regarding the factor found at 211.447.7(5), the parent's disinterest in or lack of commitment to the child, 

the trial court's finding addresses only Mother. Regarding the factor found at 211.447.7(7), the trial court 

made no finding. The trial court's findings related to Mother have been omitted, unless needed for 

context. 
6 

[1] There are no emotional ties between [Child] and [Father] or [Child] 

and [Mother]. [Child] was removed from her birth parents and 

placed in foster care at approximately 2 months of age, and has 

remained in foster care continuously, to date. To [Child], her birth 

parents are strangers. 

 

[2] Neither [Mother] nor [Father] has had meaningful and consistent 

in-person contact with [Child] since she came into protective 

custody. Father has written [Child] and sent her some cards, but 

[Child] is not yet three-years of age, and does not read or understand 

who the cards/letters come from. 

[3] Neither [Mother] nor [Father] has provided any payment for the 

cost of [C]hild's care and maintenance, monetarily or in-kind, during 

the two and one-half years that [Child] has been in the custody of 

[CD] and other than Father's incarceration, there is no evidence that 

either is physically or financially unable to provide support for 

[Child]; 

[4] Additional services are not likely to bring about a lasting parental 

adjustment enabling a return of [Child] to [Father] within an 

ascertainable period of time given the length of his remaining 

incarceration, and considering the time he would have to devote to 

long-term alcohol abuse treatment before being considered safe and 

appropriate for reunification. 

. . . . 

[6] While incarceration in and of itself is not grounds for termination of 

Father's parental rights, it cannot be overlooked that due to Father's 

ongoing incarceration, and the long-term treatment he will require 

for his alcohol dependency, [Child] will continue to be deprived of a 

stable home with Father for a number of years in addition to the two 

and one-half years she has already spent separate from [Father]. 

[Child] does not know Father and that will not change over time. 

 

Father had not had in-person contact with Child since she was just a few months 

old and Child had no emotional bond with Father. Missouri courts have found 

termination of parental rights to be in the best interest of a child when, among other 

things, the evidence demonstrates the child had no relationship with the parent. See, 

e.g., In Interest of J.B.L., 479 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016); T.W.C. v. 

Children's Div. of Div. of Soc. Servs., 316 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). 
7 

Father's anticipated release from prison will occur in September 2021, when Child will 

be over four years old and no bond between Father and Child can reasonably be 

anticipated to form in the interim period. See J.B.L, 479 S.W.3d at 780. "[A] lack of 

bonding is substantial evidence supporting that termination is in the best interest of the 

child[.]" In re Z.L.R., 347 S.W.3d 601, 611 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) (internal citation and 

quotation omitted). 

Father's efforts to maintain contact with Child during his incarceration, see 

§ 211.447.7(2), included Father's correspondence with CD, his request for CD to 

communicate with Child on his behalf, and some cards and letters sent to Child. 

Correspondence to CD does not constitute maintaining contact with Child. It is Father's 

incarceration, resulting from his own volitional criminal activity, that is the reason he 

has not been able to have meaningful contact with Child. See Z.L.R., 347 S.W.3d at 611. 

Father's birthday cards and letters, sent to Child who had no memory of him and who 

cannot read, do not establish or guarantee a bond. See K.M.W., 342 S.W.3d at 364. 

This is particularly true with someone as young as Child. 

Father admitted he had not provided support for Child. The significance of child 

support paid by an incarcerated parent "is not necessarily the amount of the support[.]" 

Id. at 362 n.12. Rather, a minimal contribution made by an incarcerated parent evinces 

an intent to continue a relationship with the child. Id. While Father excuses his lack of 

support for Child on the basis of his minimal income while in prison, the trial court's 

finding that Father had not provided any monthly or in-kind support for Child is 

supported by Father's own testimony. 

 Regarding additional services that could be provided to Father to enable a lasting 

parental adjustment such that Child could be returned to Father within an ascertainable 
8 

period of time, see § 211.447.7(4), the trial court found no such additional services were 

available considering Father's current incarceration, his subsequent need for long-term 

treatment for alcohol abuse, and the uncertainty of his circumstances following his 

release from prison. Father emphasized the numerous classes he had completed, and 

that he was on the waiting list for other classes, without explaining how any of these 

classes aided reunification with Child. Although Father testified he thinks he will 

receive additional substance abuse treatment before he is released, and that he will be 

able to avoid alcohol problems upon his release, the trial court was free to disbelieve his 

testimony. See J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 627. 

Finally, the trial court found that the length of Father's ongoing incarceration and 

his need for additional long-term treatment meant that Child would continue to be 

deprived of a stable home for a period of years in addition to the two and one-half years 

Child had already spent apart from Father. As the Supreme Court of Missouri has noted 

when considering grounds for termination under section 211.447.5(6), "it is 

the duration of incarceration and the impact of such duration when considering all 

relevant circumstances, including the child's age, that may render a parent unable to 

care appropriately for the child for the reasonably foreseeable future." J.P.B., 509 

S.W.3d at 96. By the time Father is released from prison, Child will have been in State 

care for over four years with no memory of Father and no reasonable likelihood that 

Father will then be able to care appropriately for Child. It is the best interest of Child, 

not of Father, that is our "primary concern[.]" J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 632. 

Furthermore, the GAL recommended termination of Father's parental rights due to his 

long history of alcohol abuse over a 45-year time period. It was within the court's 

reasonable discretion to find that Child's best interest was not served by having Child 
9 

remain indefinitely in foster care. See In re J.K., 38 S.W.3d 495, 502 (Mo. App. W.D. 

2001). "Every child is entitled to a permanent and stable home." Z.L.R., 347 S.W.3d at 

608. 

Considering Father's lengthy history of alcohol-related substance abuse, his 

history of relapse, the duration of his present incarceration, and Child's age, the trial 

court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest 

was not an abuse of discretion. Rather, this finding was "in line with the logic of the 

circumstances before it, was not arbitrary and unreasonable, and does not shock our 

sense of justice or indicate a lack of careful consideration." K.M.W., 342 S.W.3d at 

365. 

Conclusion 

The trial court's judgment terminating Father's parental rights is affirmed. 

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – OPINION AUTHOR 

GARY W. LYNCH, J. – CONCURS 

DON E. BURRELL, J. – CONCURS